Title
Policy Paper 52: Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy

Permalink
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Publication Date
2000-03-01
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CACM</td>
<td>Central American Common Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Europe Agreements with the Central and East European Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFM</td>
<td>Council of Foreign Ministers</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>COREU</td>
<td>CFSP telex system</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EP</td>
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<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental consultations on asylum, refugee, and migration policies in Europe, North America, and Australia</td>
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<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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<td>Qualified majority voting</td>
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UNDERSTANDING EUROPE’S NEW COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: A PRIMER FOR OUTSIDERS

by Michael Smith

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has recently re-launched its ambitions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which might even lead to a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This paper explains the functioning of these mechanisms for outsiders and assesses the EU's potential for success in these domains by placing them in their proper historical context, which extends back to the creation of "European Political Cooperation" in 1970. It argues that despite a number of obstacles there are still strong reasons to believe that the EU will be able to develop more effective cooperation in these areas, based on 1) the EU's common foreign/security policy interests; 2) recent changes in the decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP/ESDI; 3) the common European resources that are now devoted to this area; and 4) the EU's performance record in foreign/security policy cooperation, which is not limited to its problems in the Balkans. While generally optimistic, the paper concludes on a note of caution about these developments, noting the challenges involved in developing this new capacity while also managing other crucial problems of integration, such as the single European currency and enlargement to the East.

I would like to acknowledge the Council for European Studies, the U.S. Fulbright program, and the UC Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation for their financial support of the research on which this paper is based. I would also like to thank the EU and U.S. officials who agreed to be interviewed for this research.

Re-Launching Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

On November 15, 1999, the defense ministers of all 15 European Union (EU)1 member states met under the auspices of that organization for the first time in the 42-year history of European integration. At this historic meeting they agreed to help enhance the EU's emerging "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) with increased cooperation in military affairs. Although hailed as a watershed, this development was actually part of a much longer, complex process of European cooperation. Nearly ten years earlier the member states of the European Union had initiated a series of major institutional reforms to help strengthen the European integration project. Part of this process involved the establishment of the CFSP, which included steps toward a common defense policy, in order to help prepare the EU for a new role on the global stage. Tired of being an economic giant but a political dwarf, EU member states fully agreed (although to differing degrees) about the need to speak with a single voice given the revolutionary changes in world politics that were taking place. In what seemed to be a major step forward for the EU at the time, the CFSP provisions named the Western European Union (WEU), a previously independent, little-known forum for defense consultations, as the nascent defense arm of the EU. Mention of the WEU in the Maastricht Treaty seemed to finally break down a long-standing taboo against linking defense cooperation to European economic integration.
These efforts toward greater foreign and security policy cooperation in the EU were welcomed by the United States, which had been pressing the Europeans for some time to assume a greater share of the defense burden. Both the Bush and the Clinton administrations offered words of encouragement during the negotiation of the basic provisions of the CFSP. The main area of disagreement revolved around the relationship of the CFSP/WEU to NATO, the terms of which were eventually worked out during NATO’s pivotal ministerial meeting in Berlin in 1996. That agreement, however, seemed to be undermined by the weak performance of the CFSP on the ground, which raised doubts about Europe’s ability to play a more independent role in security and defense policy. The CFSP, among other aspects of the Maastricht Treaty, quickly became the subject of criticisms by U.S. observers, EU bureaucracies, the European Parliament, and by Europeans themselves, leading to yet another series of reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

The EU is now in the process of implementing the reforms outlined by the Amsterdam Treaty. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has been a key motivation for these efforts, which recently climaxed with the first meeting of EU defense ministers. It is no longer inconceivable that the EU can develop its own military forces and intensify arms procurement policies among its member states. In fact, this renewed effort has been so dramatic that observers forget that the EU had taken a number of steps toward a CFSP well before the Amsterdam negotiations. They also overlook the twenty years of informal cooperation in this area that originally led to the Maastricht CFSP provisions. The Kosovo crisis has provided a much-needed impetus for these efforts, but we must not forget that European integration in any policy area is a slow, incremental process. The EU’s “new” foreign and security/defense policy is being built upon a foundation of cooperative external policies going back to the early 1970s; it must also enhance a powerful body of long-standing European economic and social policies, the acquis communautaire, that comprise the central purpose of European integration. In other words, the CFSP will not develop in a vacuum: It will be closely linked to existing policies and institutions of the EU. Understanding those policies and institutions is the first step toward a full appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of the EU’s ambitions in this area.

While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about these ongoing experiments given the EU’s difficulties in the Balkans, a closer look at the record of the CFSP provides some helpful lessons about the future of these efforts. The purpose of this policy paper is to present such insights in the hopes of improving policymakers’ understanding of the true motivations and capabilities behind the CFSP. A more balanced assessment of the CFSP process suggests that the EU is indeed capable of playing a greater role in certain aspects of trans-Atlantic security, for four basic reasons: There is a set of common interests that Europeans will act upon and with which they can be motivated. There is a highly-respected system of common principles for decision-making that can be mobilized by Europeans and outside actors, like the U.S., though it takes time and much finesse. There is a growing set of common resources that can be drawn upon when action is called for. Finally, there is a long history of common actions that can be and has been used to induce continued cooperation. These facts demonstrate that the EU has created a complex framework for sustained foreign and security policy cooperation; whether they will choose to utilize it is, as always, a matter of political will.

The EU’s Common Interests

At a time when most EU states take for granted the idea of an enhanced European identity in security affairs in the face of problems such as Yugoslavia, it is easy to forget just how far the Europeans have advanced in such matters since they first agreed to the idea of cooperation in foreign policy. This occurred in 1971, with the establishment of “European Political Cooperation” (EPC), the precursor to the CFSP. Previous plans in this area, such as the “European Defense Community” of the 1950s and the Fouchet Plans of the 1960s, had failed because they were considered too ambitious. EPC was far more modest; it provided little more than an informal forum for consultations on foreign policy (but not defense) issues, independent of (but closely linked to) the economic goals of the European Community (EC). These regular consultations soon paid off. A common foreign and security policy worthy of the name, as opposed to ad hoc
cooperation in foreign policy, implies some set of common interests or values to be served by that policy, and one of EPC's most important attributes was the way it encouraged constant discussion about the mutual foreign and, later, security policy interests of the EC. Despite differences over tough issues like the Middle East, East-West relations, and the EC's relationship with the United States, the Community was gradually able to clarify and express a growing set of shared goals to justify collective action later.

The Legacy of European Political Cooperation

Under the EPC system, the Europeans struggled for two decades to reach a consensus on what those common interests might be. Especially during EPC's early years, most EC member states claimed that certain areas (domaines réservés) were off-limits to discussion, and they took pains to prevent those areas (such as France and its African colonies; Greece and its relationship to Turkey; Britain and Ireland; East and West Germany; etc.) from being mentioned as statements of common interests in EPC treaties. In fact, during the EPC period the most that Europeans could formally commit themselves to was a set of basic principles that were embedded in a broader, multilateral normative structure involving most Western states. This structure generally emphasized free and open government, respect for the rule of law, protection of human rights, economic liberalism, the indivisibility of security in Western Europe, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and so on. These have been identified as general "civilian power" norms: favoring diplomacy over coercion; preferring mediation, as opposed to threats or force, in conflict resolution; the use of long-term economic tools for political problems; and support for the rights of indigenous peoples and lesser-developed states. These ideals were also supported by the fact that EC member states are stable democracies linked by a complex network of socio-economic relationships.

Some of these basic principles were reflected in Europe's first post-EPC attempt to specify its common interests, the "Document on the European Identity" of December 1973. This document stressed values such as representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and human rights. EC states also pledged to continue their experiment with political cooperation and to transform "the whole complex of their relations into a European Union by the end of the present decade." More specifically, they agreed that they could not solve international problems on their own and that they must act as a unit if Europe were to play a greater role in the world. Although the document stressed the continued importance of U.S. security guarantees for Europe, the EC also attempted to strengthen its links with virtually every other major region of the world. Finally, the document noted the importance of European trade and aid to developing nations. All of these principles were subject to redefinition in the future, in the context of developing a "genuinely European foreign policy."

Although the grander aims of the "Document on the European Identity," such as creating a European Union by the end of the 1970s, fell short at the time, EPC did make progress in specific areas. While it expanded in unforeseen ways over the years, it should always be kept in mind that EPC was first and foremost a defensive measure to protect the EC. Member states generally agreed on the need to shield the still-evolving Community from potentially disruptive unilateral foreign policy actions by its own members. This "damage-limitation" function has been continually recognized in EPC/CFSP agreements, and it establishes a powerful rationale for motivating European cooperation in foreign policy. The importance of damage limitation was quickly revealed in practice during the chaotic response of the EC to the first oil shocks of the 1970s. The lack of cooperation here directly led to one of the longest-running EPC initiatives: the Euro-Arab dialogue, discussed further later. Thus, through EPC the member states of the EC resolved never to allow their foreign policies to become so independent and selfish that they threatened to disrupt their hard-won efforts regarding economic integration.

Beyond the general damage-limitation common interest of the EC, EPC was gradually able to stimulate discussions (and actions) on security and defense policy, which had long been one of the most important domaines réservés of several EC states. This unwritten rule of EPC made taboo the consideration of issues that were known to be sensitive to certain member states. Security was at the top of the list of such subjects for obvious reasons: a number of EC states...
particularly Britain and Denmark) felt that such discussions should be handled by NATO, and/or they thought that the EC’s external reach should be limited to economic, and if necessary, “soft” political affairs, such as human rights. In addition, the memory of the failed attempts regarding the European Defense Community made most EC states unwilling to provoke a new debate over the issue. Although the EC’s own Treaty of Rome obliged its member states to consult each other when considering unilateral action on security issues which might impact the functioning of the EC, security or defense matters were rarely the object of serious discussion in EPC. Defense in particular was left to NATO, but EPC enabled its members to carve their own role in such matters while recognizing their status as junior partners of NATO, even in the face of domestic difficulties over this role for EPC. Starting in the 1970s, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process was a major step toward the inclusion of security affairs on the EPC agenda; its success paved the way for an expanded number of related issues to be included in EPC. The 1970s oil crises, which led to the Euro-Arab Dialogue, also touched upon security to the extent that they threatened EC energy supplies.

With the positive experience of the CSCE process, and after the negative experiences of the Iran and Afghanistan crises (where EC states could not back their common interests with collective action), the 1981 "London Report" on European Political Cooperation finally recognized the necessity of discussing in EPC “foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security,” a major step toward eradicating the security taboo. This decision was quickly implemented, and in May 1981 the EC included discussion of the "political aspects" of European security for the first time. The European Council, a regular series of intergovernmental-level summits which still stands at the apex of EC/EU affairs, also showed an increasing tendency to discuss security issues during this period, often during dinner or fireside chats afterwards. Through the 1980s, topics included relations between superpowers, Afghanistan, the NATO "double-track" decision on Euro-missiles, and internal conflicts in non-member states such as Cyprus, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Africa, and Central and South America.

After more heated debate against the backdrop of renewed U.S./USSR tension during the early 1980s, the 1986 Single European Act finally included a reference to cooperation on the “political and economic aspects of security” within the framework of EPC, a major advancement of the formal agenda for political cooperation. As I discuss below, this decision opened the door to increased consideration of security-related questions, nonproliferation measures, and arms control issues in EPC despite their controversy for some member states.

**European Interests and the CFSP at Maastricht**

The momentous events in world politics between 1989 and 1991 jolted Europe out of its complacent, dependent role in Atlantic security affairs, leading to the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU) and its "second pillar," the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Formally linked to the policies and institutions of the “first pillar” (the EC), and the “third pillar” (cooperation in justice and home affairs), the CFSP included mechanisms for adopting common foreign policy positions and undertaking joint actions. The TEU was perhaps the most important institutional change regarding European integration since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and it specifies a number of the broad aims of the CFSP within the EU’s single institutional framework. These aims, or common interests, include:

1. Safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the EU.
2. Strengthening the security of the EU and its members in all ways.
3. Preserving peace and strengthening international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris.
4. Promoting international cooperation.
5. Developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The TEU also states that one of the objectives of the Union is to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, "including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." This mention of defense affairs in the CFSP agenda, despite the opposition of Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Ireland, was one of the most hotly contested and potentially significant provisions concerning the CFSP. Toward this end, the WEU was explicitly linked to the EU for the first time, and it was requested to "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." Since the aforementioned states could not agree to a full merger of the WEU and the EU at the time of the treaty, a declaration attached to the TEU further reiterated the WEU's commitment to strengthen itself in stages as the defense arm of the EU, which satisfied the French, and as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance, which satisfied the British and the Americans. Both decisions satisfied the Germans, long caught between the military ambitions of France and their own strong respect for NATO's mission and history.

Although foreign ministers had previously attempted to create such a list at a meeting in Asolo, Italy, in October 1990 (the "Asolo list"). Instead, several general clauses allowed this agenda-setting function to be performed as needed by the European Council. Thus, in a decision taken soon after the TEU was concluded, the Lisbon European Council (26-27 June 1992) managed to flesh out some of the operational details regarding common interests of the new EU, specific areas for CFSP actions, and domains falling under the security dimension of the CFSP. According to this report, factors that help determine the EU's common interests include:

1. Geographical proximity of a given country or region.
2. An interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country.
3. The existence of threats to the security interests of the Union.

Specific functional areas for potential CFSP actions include:

1. Strengthening democratic principles and institutions.
2. Promoting regional stability and regional cooperation.
3. Assisting international efforts to deal with emergency situations.
4. Strengthening existing cooperation against arms proliferation, terrorism, and illicit drugs.
5. Supporting good government.

Finally, the domains falling under the security dimension of the CFSP, which covers defense issues as well, include:

1. Disarmament and arms control in Europe, including confidence-building measures.
2. Nuclear non-proliferation.
3. Economic aspects of security, especially technology transfer.

Finally, the Edinburgh European Council (7-8 December 1992) set down four sets of issues suitable for joint action in the security field: the CSCE process; disarmament and arms control in Europe; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the economic aspects of security. Later, the Extraordinary European Council (Brussels, 1993) defined the general objectives of European security as preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of the EU, its democratic character, its economic stability, and the stability of neighboring regions. These statements of common interests clearly build upon EPC's limited record in this area. The CFSP was also able to act in the service of several of these common European interests, though in carefully circumscribed (if not timid) ways.
CFSP Common Interests from Amsterdam to Kosovo

The Maastricht Treaty and its associated agreements concerning the CFSP represented a major breakthrough for the EU in terms of its ability to formally agree to a set of common interests to be served by the CFSP/WEU. As we have seen, such agreement had eluded them for most of the history of EPC. Still, a number of states felt there was room for improvement with regard to defining common interests, and they took advantage of the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference of the EU, which resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty, as an opportunity to codify these interests.

Thus, to aid the EU in asserting its identity in world affairs, the Amsterdam Treaty states that the CFSP shall:

1. Safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. Strengthen the security of the Union in all ways.
3. Preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders.
4. Promote international cooperation.
5. Develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Number three above deserves special mention, as it references external borders for the first time. The Amsterdam negotiations immediately followed the most recent enlargement of the EU, which brought Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the fold. This action extended the EU’s frontier to Slovakia, Hungary, and, most importantly, Russia. With this explicit reference to external borders in the CFSP, long a highly contentious issue, the EU had taken another small step toward securing an area of freedom, security, and justice among its member states.

A far more significant step forward in this area was the fact that the "Petersberg tasks" (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), outlined by the WEU at a meeting on 19 June 1992, were formally incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty. This was another breakthrough, as EU states had disagreed for years as to whether such tasks, which clearly include a military component, were appropriate for the CFSP. Similarly, Amsterdam also introduced the notion of "common strategies" in areas where the EU shares common interests; the first such strategy, focusing on Russia, has just been developed. This new approach should help the EU bridge the gap between general statements of interests and more concrete policies on foreign and security issues, such as common positions and joint actions (see below).

Beyond Amsterdam, in the aftermath of NATO’s actions against the Serbs in Kosovo, the European Council at Cologne (15 June 1999) called for an independent EU military force to support these efforts. Kosovo seems to have established a precedent for military intervention in defiance of national sovereignty to support human rights, one of the long-standing common interests of the EU. As we shall see, the EU has taken additional measures to support this principle, particularly since they were chagrined at having to rely on U.S. resources. Moreover, Kosovo, like the Balkans in general, demonstrated that there will be conflicts in which the United States is reluctant to participate, making it necessary for Europe to take the lead. The fact that Kosovo took place during Clinton’s impeachment trial also made the EU aware of the consequences of relying on a weak White House for leadership. All of these factors, and EPC’s path-breaking statements on multilateralism, civilian power, damage-limitation, and human rights, have helped to produce a new drive toward a common foreign and security policy worthy of the name.
Common Decision-Making Principles

Reaching agreement on common interests is only the first step toward a common foreign and security policy. The second component involves common decision-making rules to help translate aspirations into action. The EC/EU has had relatively little trouble setting down a set of decision-making rules in the EPC/CFSP sphere compared to its lengthy efforts to agree on fundamental common interests. In general, decision-making methods here resemble those of other security-related institutions, like NATO and the WEU. Consensus is the basic rule, although the EU has attempted to apply qualified majority voting rules to certain aspects of the CFSP in order to break deadlocks. Before turning to these efforts, it will be instructive to consider the cardinal rules that developed during EPC and are still respected.

Decision Making Under EPC

In general, EPC was a decentralized network for informal discussions about foreign policy issues among EC member states and the European Commission, the EC's executive bureaucracy. Although it eventually included a number of decision-making rules, it largely relied on a handful of basic principles, most of which were incorporated into the current CFSP mechanism. The cornerstones of the mechanism were consultation, confidentiality, and consensus. Consultation meant that EC states had to regularly discuss foreign policy issues with each other before adopting final positions of their own, so that the policies of their partners would not catch members by surprise. EPC discussions were also confidential. States could not use information shared during them to embarrass or blame other states. And consensus meant that EPC discussions were always conducted by unanimity; in theory, all EPC delegations were equal, and full agreement was required for all decisions. There were no provisions for voting or weighting of votes as in regular Community affairs. This was not necessarily a paralyzing rule, as one might assume of a consensual system. Officials did not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, but tended toward compromise and a median position in the hopes of reaching agreement.

Beyond these fundamental principles, three others deserve mention. The first involved the notion of domaines réservés, or areas that were off-limits for discussion in the group. In other words, any EC state could block discussion of a sensitive matter with little or no justification. These domaines réservés included unilateral problems within states (such as problems with ethnic minorities), bilateral problems between member states (such as Northern Ireland), bilateral "special relationships" whereby one EC state was expected to take the lead on an issue or to prevent disruption of the status quo, such as colonial relationships), and crises with military consequences affecting one or more partners (such as Africa). For a long time, these situations were considered outside the scope of EPC, except at the direct initiative of the country or countries that claimed the domaines réservé.

Second, EPC eschewed the hard bargaining and trade-offs that regularly occur when conducting EC business. Instead, the activities of technical experts in a growing number of EPC working groups, organized along functional and geographic lines, produced a culture of problem solving with regard to foreign policy issues. These experts attempted to find common viewpoints and solutions without haggling across issues or attempting to purchase support by offering incentives. Again, this is not to say that "splitting the difference" or making compromises on areas of disagreement did not occur, only that, thanks to this unwritten rule, EPC officials generally understood that the quid pro quo approach to political cooperation was inappropriate. Each issue was treated on its own merits to determine whether it really deserved a unique European response. Thus, package deals and issue linkages rarely took place in the context of EPC. Again, like the consensus rule, this prohibition against deal making or log rolling was not perceived as a deficiency. Rather, it helped EC states stay focused on the substance of the issues at hand. Finally, the EC states that were permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain and
France) were expected to share information about that institution with their EPC partners and to make sure that EPC positions were represented within it.

With these basic principles and a number of other unwritten rules too numerous to be mentioned here, EPC quietly developed itself alongside the far more formal, bureaucratized, "supranational" EC decision-making mechanism, which involves EC resources, legal obligations, and EC organizations such as the European Commission and European Court of Justice. Later, however, EPC was able to draw upon EC resources and competencies to give more force to its decisions, as EPC had no funding of its own (other than national contributions to a small secretariat in Brussels). EPC was also noteworthy for the way its rules enhanced the power of smaller states within the Community. Each state took a turn holding the EC/EPC six-month rotating presidency, and each enjoyed the right to set the agenda and represent EPC outside the Community (a role handled by the Commission during most EC negotiations with non-members).

**CFSP Decision Making After Maastricht**

Most of these fundamental EPC provisions were preserved and expanded under the new CFSP of the Maastricht Treaty; only the notion of *domaines réservés* has been scaled back so that now virtually no subject is off-limits to discussion (although action on sensitive subjects is another matter). Compared to EPC, the CFSP involves a far more formal, and somewhat convoluted, policy process for decision making, closer to what goes on in normal Community affairs (although with important exceptions). The new policy sequence consists of several distinct stages involving EU governments and EC organizational actors. Recognizing the sequence and complexity of these stages, which reflect a number of compromises made when Maastricht was negotiated, helps one understand why CFSP decision making can take such a long time and seem so inefficient. Yet the process also reveals that there are opportunities for outsiders to influence the process, through many access points.

Briefly, this sequence can be broken down into six basic stages: agenda setting; decision making; policy implementation and external representation; providing resources for the CFSP; evaluation and compliance; and democratic oversight and accountability. While this process seems coherent and rational, each stage involves different treaty articles (some in conflict with each other), actors, and procedures. There is also no set timetable, so delays are common. These stages and actors are summarized in Table 1.

Thus, regular CFSP *agenda setting* primarily involves periodic consultations at the intergovernmental level. The European Council is the chief agent here; it brings together the heads of state and government of EU member states, supported by their foreign affairs ministers, and the President of the Commission, supported by another member of the Commission. Under the TEU, the European Council is charged with setting broad guidelines for the development of the EU, and for defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP during twice-yearly summits. These guidelines are subsequently referred to in CFSP decisions and texts. As under EPC, then, in periodically expressing the CFSP in terms of broad policy aims, and in breaking occasional deadlocks, EU heads of state or government (or their foreign ministers) clearly enjoy a privileged role in the TEU.

*Decision making*, or the specification of explicit tasks designed to give substance to the guidelines of the European Council, is more complex. In addition to the three basic policy tools established under EPC (*consultations*, *declarations*, and *démarches*), which involve EU member states and their delegations to third states and to international organizations and conferences, the CFSP involves two primary policy instruments: *common positions* and *joint actions*. *Common positions* are expressed through the conformity of national positions and through coordination at international organizations and conferences. *Joint actions* are more complicated; they involve more decision-making procedures and often require the use of EC financial resources.

The broad guidelines set down by the European Council inform specific common positions and joint actions. These are defined according to certain decision-making procedures by EU foreign ministers acting as the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM). Procedures for taking some CFSP decisions by qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFM were a major innovation in
### Table 1: The Common Foreign and Security Policy Process

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<th>Policy stage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agenda setting: defining general principles/areas for the CFSP (includes military/defense issues)</td>
<td>European Council of Heads of State/ Government (includes a member of the Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making: formulating CFSP common positions and joint actions</td>
<td>Council of Foreign Ministers, Commission (Supported by CFSP telex system, the Political Committee, European Correspondents, working groups, CFSP Secretariat, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing positions and actions (includes external representation)</td>
<td>EU Presidency, Council of Foreign Ministers, Commission, plus the Western European Union. Involves qualified majority voting in some cases and consultation with the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing resources/funding</td>
<td>EU Presidency, Council of Foreign Ministers, Commission, European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation in terms of consistency (EC/CFSP) and compliance</td>
<td>EU Presidency, Commission, European Parliament, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic oversight (limited)</td>
<td>European Parliament, national parliaments</td>
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the TEU. However, no such voting has successfully taken place since the CFSP entered into effect, due to lingering fears of setting a precedent for qualified majority voting, although states have “refrained from insisting on a consensus” on several minor CFSP decisions. Similarly, the CFSP mentions crisis procedures, but these have not been invoked because of the already high frequency of CFSP meetings and discussions (many on the secret CFSP telex system, known as COREU). Finally, the Commission also shares the right to propose such positions and actions, thus raising its status in the CFSP closer to that which it enjoys under normal EC affairs. Another body, the Political Committee, is also charged with monitoring the international situation and defining policies by submitting opinions to the CFM at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It is composed of national foreign ministry officials from the political affairs directorates, roughly equivalent to U.S. assistant secretaries of state.

*Policy implementation* and *external representation* are similar to policymaking in that they are a joint responsibility of two actors: the EU Presidency and the Commission. However, the EU does not enjoy legal personality under the terms of international law; thus, the CFSP, as under EPC, cannot conclude international agreements on its own (as the EC can in trade and other economic matters). This omission often requires unusual institutional improvisation in external negotiations, as U.S. officials and other interlocutors have discovered. Thus, the state holding the EU presidency (rather than the Commission alone, as in EC affairs) represents the Union under the CFSP, implements its policies, and expresses its positions in international organizations and conferences. It can be assisted by other EU states, and the Commission is fully associated in these tasks. In addition, the WEU is directed to "elaborate and implement" any decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications. One exception is noted: in forums or conferences where not all EU states are represented (such as Britain and France in the UN
Security Council) those EU states who are represented must inform their EU partners about decisions taken in those forums, as under EPC. The CFSP policy process also includes the provision of adequate resources to implement positions and actions, if necessary. This topic is covered in a separate section below.

The new policy process also involves evaluation and compliance. This aspect of the CFSP is covered at many levels, yet there are no provisions for sanctioning EU states who do not live up to their commitments, nor is the European Court of Justice allowed to make rulings in this area. This is unlike the situation in normal EC business, where the Court has the right to impose fines and has advanced European economic integration in a number of ways through its path-breaking rulings. For the CFSP, the European Council oversees the entire tri-pillar structure of the EU, and both the CFM and the Commission must ensure the unity, consistency, and effectiveness of the EU’s external activities in terms of security, economic, and development policies. The CFM is further charged with ensuring that EU member states comply with the principles of the CFSP. Below the ministerial level and under EPC, diplomatic and consular missions and Commission delegations in third countries and in international organizations and conferences are also charged with ensuring that common positions and joint actions are complied with and implemented. The Political Committee is also directed to monitor the implementation of CFSP policies, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the EU Presidency and the Commission. This is one of the weakest aspects of the policy process; since everyone seems to be responsible for monitoring compliance, no one has the final authority over this area.

Finally, the TEU provides for some small measure of democratic accountability over the CFSP beyond the provisions already discussed. The importance of democracy to the functioning of the EU’s institutions is mentioned in the Preamble to the TEU, and the development of democracy is listed as a general objective of the CFSP. More specifically, the 626-member, directly-elected European Parliament (EP) is the primary forum in which democratic accountability over the CFSP is pursued, although national parliaments are also expected to pay attention to it. Toward this end, the EU Presidency state must consult with the EP and must ensure that its views are duly taken into consideration. The EP is to be regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission about the development of the CFSP. Finally, as under EPC, the EP can ask questions of the Council, make recommendations, and hold an annual debate on the implementation of the CFSP. Although the EP has long experienced difficulties in terms of influencing the day-to-day performance of EPC/CFSP, it is still a force to be reckoned with. It has held up funding for EPC/CFSP actions and has other tools to enforce its will, such as its dramatic decision this year to force the resignation of the entire Commission for the first time.

**CFSP Decision Making After Amsterdam**

Although many of the problems with implementing the CFSP involve mere political will, during the Amsterdam negotiations EU states appreciated that there was room for improvement concerning decision-making procedures. Reform of these procedures thus became a major priority during 1996 and 1997, when the final Amsterdam Treaty was negotiated, then approved by the Amsterdam European Council (16-17 June 1997), signed by EU member states on 2 October 1997, and ratified by all EU states by March 1999. However, EU states were still unable to agree upon extending true QMV procedures to security or defense cooperation, as some had hoped. Instead, the Amsterdam Treaty follows the new doctrine of “flexibility” in such matters, effectively opening the door to two classes of membership in the EU’s CFSP pillar for the first time (similar to recent decisions on social policy and monetary union), which now mentions a nascent “European Security and Defense Identity” (ESDI).

First, all member states are entitled to participation when the EU avails itself of the WEU in the service of Petersberg tasks. Those states that participate even if not WEU members may also be involved in planning and decision making. Second, the EU still relies on unanimous CFM decisions when taking CFSP decisions, but Amsterdam permits abstentions by member states so as not to prevent the adoption of such decisions by others. Such “positive abstention” would theoretically allow for “coalitions of the willing” to proceed with a particular action. This is a major new exception to the long-standing consensus rule in EPC/CFSP. Third, when abstaining in a
vote, any member of the CFM may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration to do so. In that case, the member is not obliged to apply the decision, but must accept that the decision commits the Union. To enhance compliance, abstaining states must refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision, and the other member states are to respect its position. However, if such abstaining members represent more than one-third of the votes weighted in CFM, the decision will not be adopted.

The new procedures slightly improve the provisions for QMV in the CFSP by removing a cumbersome TEU procedure which required an initial unanimous decision to act, then another unanimous decision of all EU member states to "define later decisions" which could be taken under QMV. However, if a set of abstaining states amounts to more than one-third of the votes in Council, a coalition easy enough to engineer, the EU cannot act. Moreover, as always, there is a powerful escape clause that may paralyze the EU: if a member of the Council declares that, "for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken." The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity, but this use of QMV requires at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 members. Again, this means that various other combinations of EU states can block CFSP decisions. And, as usual, none of these provisions applies to decisions having military or defense implications, which must still be taken by consensus.

Beyond changes to decision-making rules, Amsterdam also established the notion of "common strategies" in areas where EU member states have common interests. This measure was intended to help improve the consistency of the EU’s external relations across all three of its policymaking pillars. Along these lines Amsterdam also modified the issues of policy implementation and external representation by providing that the EU Presidency should "be assisted by the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy." This High Representative can also assist the Council of Ministers by contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of CFSP policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the EU presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties. Moreover, the Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint other special representatives with (temporary) mandates to handle particular policy issues, such as the administration of Mostar or the Great Lakes region of Africa.

This provision for a High Representative, another major break from EPC, provoked much debate during the negotiations, and a new CFSP representative (Spain’s Javier Solana, former secretary-general of NATO) was not formally appointed until just recently. There was some concern that whoever held the position would be only a figurehead, but the choice of someone like Solana, a high-profile, respected, competent diplomat and administrator, should allay those fears. Moreover, he was chosen with remarkably little discord, especially compared to the embarrassing debacle over appointing the first head of the European Central Bank and the headaches over appointing an entirely new Commission after the EP forced the resignation of European Commission President Jacques Santer’s team. Solana recently took office, and he seems very keen and capable enough to both raise the profile of the CFSP/ESD and to oversee a merger of the EU/WEU in the very near future.13

**CFSP Reforms Concerning the WEU**

On that note, it is worth taking a brief look at the EU’s post-Amsterdam relationship to the WEU.14 After years of negotiations in several forums between 1990 and 1997, measures to improve cooperation between the EU and the WEU, and between the WEU and NATO, were outlined, and the WEU itself moved from London to Brussels.15 Since Maastricht the WEU has attempted to define possible missions for itself, such as the Petersberg tasks of 1992 and a common European defense policy on 9 May 1994, while also attempting to clarify its relationship to NATO and the EU. The Italians and the British, who held the EU presidency and the WEU presidency respectively during the first half of 1996, managed to adopt a joint declaration on taking steps to increase EU/WEU institutional links, adapt the WEU’s "Humanitarian Task Force" for use by the
EU, and conduct WEU military exercises. Similarly, the 7 May 1996 "Birmingham Declaration" of the WEU made it clear that the organization was ready to serve as the defense arm of the EU and to perform Petersberg tasks with NATO's logistical support.

These plans were attached to the Amsterdam Treaty, although EU member states still could not agree to a full merger of the two institutions or a timetable for such, thanks to the continued opposition of Britain and the neutral EU member states. Nor could the EU commit itself to establishing an independent defense capability. Instead, Amsterdam refers to the "progressive framing of a common defense policy . . . which might in time lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide," wording which closely matches that in the Maastricht Treaty. Amsterdam does affirm that the WEU is an "integral part of the development of the Union," providing the EU with an operational capability for the Petersberg tasks discussed earlier. The WEU also "supports the Union in framing the defense aspects" of the CFSP. However, as with the TEU, EU member states could not agree to instruct the WEU to serve the EU; instead, the Amsterdam Treaty says the EU "will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." Institutional links are to be enhanced, "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide" (emphasis added). Once more, this tortured wording reflects lingering differences over the specific institutional links between the EU and the WEU, and the long-term goal of a common defense policy. 16

In particular, when the EU "avails itself of the WEU," the WEU acts according to the guidelines of the European Council (set by unanimity, of course), the highest level of EU decision making. This level, however, includes several states who are only "observers" of the WEU (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) and excludes many WEU "associate members" and "associate partners" who are not EU members. Yet, as noted above, all EU member states are entitled to participate, while the role of WEU observers is to be defined later. New arrangements for "enhanced cooperation" between the EU and the WEU include:

1. Consultation/decision-making, particularly in crisis situations.
2. Joint meetings of EU/WEU organizations.
3. Harmonization of presidencies, rules, and practices of EU/WEU organizations.
4. Coordination of staff of WEU Secretariat-General and EU Council Secretariat-General, including exchange and secondment of personnel.
5. Arrangements to allow relevant bodies of the EU, including its new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, to draw on the resources of the WEU's Planning Cell, Situation Center, and Satellite Center.
6. Cooperation in the field of armaments, potentially involving a European Armaments Agency.
7. Practical arrangements for ensuring cooperation with the European Commission.
8. Improved security arrangements with the EU.

Regarding NATO, Amsterdam's "Declaration Relating to the WEU" reaffirms that NATO is the "essential forum" for Atlantic defense. The WEU is "an essential element" of the development of the ESDI "within the Atlantic Alliance," and it will "continue its efforts to strengthen institutional and practical cooperation with NATO." Cooperation with NATO is to be developed in the following areas:

1. Mechanisms for consultation between the WEU and NATO in the context of a crisis.
2. The WEU's active involvement in the NATO defense planning process.
3. Operational links between the WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation, and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU, including:
   - Military planning.
   - A framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring, and return of NATO assets and capabilities.
   - Liaison between the WEU and NATO in the context of European command arrangements.
The WEU also worked out "preliminary conclusions" on the formulation of a common European defense policy. As the Amsterdam Treaty was being finalized, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, with some support from the Netherlands and Luxembourg, announced on 21 March 1997 their proposal for "a common European defense," including the full integration of the WEU into the EU. Presumably, EU members who are not full members of NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) could also "opt in" to this defense structure at a later date. At the time, this coalition was still solidly blocked by another one opposed to a rapid merger of the EU and the WEU: Britain, Portugal, and the WEU Observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden). At least these countries agreed to include the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, and they have contributed to security operations in the Balkans and elsewhere. In addition, the delicate question of security clearances for Council Secretariat-General personnel has been breached, with specific arrangements to be decided later. Finally, as with the Maastricht Treaty, any such arrangements or merger must respect the obligations certain member states have regarding NATO. However, since Kosovo the EU has breached the subject of an independent military/defense capability once again. This time everyone seems to be on board. Concrete steps have been taken to upgrade the CFSP's capabilities in this area and are covered next, in the section on common resources.

Common Resources for Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation

Decisions on foreign policy cooperation have limited impact unless they are supported by tangible resources, whether civilian or military. EPC wisely avoided this issue by focusing on "declaratory diplomacy" for most of its history; with no budget of its own it relied on the resources of the EC or of individual member states during the rare instances when its foreign policy cooperation required financing. And, of course, there was no possibility of coordinated military action within the framework of EPC until after the Persian Gulf War.

Civilian Resources

This situation has changed considerably since the advent of the CFSP, which managed to set down some basic decision-making principles regarding permanent resources for foreign policy actions. In terms of civilian/financial resources, under the TEU any "administrative expenditures" for the CFSP were to be charged to the Community budget, while "operational expenditures" could either be charged to the EC budget with a unanimous decision of the Council (making it subject to the usual Community budgetary procedures, which involve EC actors), or be charged to EU member states in accordance with a GNP scale. Although this provision prompted disagreements when it was implemented, the fact that the CFSP explicitly included such matters and, more importantly, linked them to EC procedures and actors, marked a significant advancement compared to EPC. EPC used Community resources in an ad hoc way, with no consistency, planning, or oversight. The CFSP clearly changed that practice.

However, the distinction between CFSP "administrative" expenditures and CFSP "operational" expenditures has not held up in practice. Protracted budgetary disagreements between member states and EC organizations, and the reluctance of some member states to make their GNP contributions to the CFSP, held up several joint actions, particularly the EU's administration of Mostar, after the CFSP entered into effect. Agreement on what constituted "administrative" and "operational" CFSP expenditures, and on whether such expenditures should be charged to EU member states or to the EC budget, took a long time to reach. Even then, the EU provided the CFSP with an operational budget ranging from 20-30 million Euros between 1993 and 1998, a pittance compared to other EU policy domains such as agriculture.

The Amsterdam Treaty finally makes it clear that the EC budget is to be the primary source for CFSP funds and a new procedure for procuring those funds has been agreed to by the relevant EC organizations. Now, both CFSP administrative expenditure and operational expenditure are to be charged to the budget of the EC under its normal procedures, which includes inputs from the Commission and oversight by the European Parliament. There are, as
usual, key exceptions to this procedure for expenditures arising from operations having military or defense implications and cases where the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. In keeping with the doctrine of "flexibility," EC member states who formally abstain from military or defense actions according to the above provisions are not required to finance such actions. As before, in cases where expenditure is not charged to the EC budget it will be charged to the member states in accordance with a GNP scale, unless the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. This is not likely to happen, considering the past difficulties with funding the Mostar operation.

Details about the financing of the CFSP are described in the new inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission that was attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. The new CFSP budgetary procedure is described in detail in this agreement, and it includes sections regarding the funding of:

1. The observation and organization of elections or participation in democratic transition processes.
2. EU envoys.
4. Financial assistance to disarmament processes.
5. Contributions to international conferences.
6. Urgent actions.

Considering the haphazard nature of CFSP funding over the past four years, and disagreements among EU member states regarding this issue, this agreement could go a long way toward improving the budgetary process.

Amsterdam also established a CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, to be established in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers under the responsibility of its Secretary-General, the new High Representative for the CFSP. The decision to establish this unit was the easiest one for the IGC negotiators to reach, as most clearly felt the EU's difficulties in situations such as Yugoslavia were due in part to the lack of a common definition of the problem. This unit, in conjunction with the existing Political Committee that prepares all CFSP issues for the Council, is intended to help remedy this perceived deficiency. Under the new treaty, cooperation with this unit will be established with the Commission, EU member states, and the WEU to ensure the coherence of the EU's external economic and development policies. It will be staffed by personnel from the General Secretariat, EU member states, the Commission, and the WEU, and the institutions these officials represent are expected to share relevant, even confidential, information. The tasks of the unit will include the following:

1. Monitoring and analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP.
2. Providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying future focus areas for the CFSP.
3. Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations that may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises.
4. Producing, at the request of either the Council, the Presidency, or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations, and strategies for the CFSP.

Military Resources

If decisions over financial resources for foreign and security policy cooperation have been hard to reach, decisions about military resources have been nearly impossible until very recently. Under EPC, overt military crises were extremely difficult to handle as EC member states often diverged over the means and ends of defense policy (and EC defense ministers were not permitted to meet in Council or EPC). This disagreement directly led to the "reactivation" of the WEU in 1984 as a quasi-defense arm of the EC. The defense issue also increasingly challenged the ability of
EPC to consider the rapid changes in the USSR in the late 1980s. However, the reactivation of the WEU did provide the EC with a "ready made" defense-related institution (albeit a very weak one) to graft onto its CFSP ten years later. Moreover, a WEU Declaration attached to the TEU implied that the CFSP would be able to draw upon the expertise and resources of the WEU in areas involving defense, although practical measures in this area were not worked out. Following Maastricht, the WEU established several new permanent organizations to support itself: a Planning Cell, a Situation Center, a Satellite Center, and the Institute for Security Studies.

Although the language of the TEU satisfied two visions of an emerging ESDI, which had been tentatively agreed to during the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome, the practicalities of these new relationships remained in doubt long after Maastricht entered into effect. To further enhance the ESDI, France and Germany upgraded their joint army corps to the "Eurocorps," a force of about 60,000 troops which includes contributions from Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain. It became operational on 30 November 1995. It is independent of, but linked to, the WEU, and the two forces began joint exercises ("Crisex") on 15 December 1995. Other military groupings, such as "Euromarfor" (among others), further complicated the question of command and control.

However, after more wrangling over the role of these troops, NATO and the Eurocorps reached an agreement in December 1992, one which clearly favored NATO as the dominant European security institution. First, the Eurocorps would be assigned to NATO in the event of a European attack; second, the Eurocorps would also fall under NATO command during crises and NATO-run peacekeeping operations; and third, in peacetime the Eurocorps would not be under NATO command but NATO would have the right to review its operations so as to determine its compatibility with NATO’s planning, doctrine, and training. At the Luxembourg European Council, 22 November 1993, the EU reiterated that the Eurocorps could be deployed in the framework of the WEU in the event that NATO fails to act or if the Europeans decide to act alone, but the extent of such independence remained unclear.

The Amsterdam Treaty also states that EU member states will support armaments cooperation in the hopes of framing a common defense policy, but the negotiators stopped short of making a formal commitment to a common arms procurement policy or organization. The EC/EU has long been confounded by the number of ad hoc arms production agreements involving small coalitions of its members. Article 223 of Maastricht, which effectively permits state protection of domestic arms industries in EU member states, effectively discourages mergers or acquisitions of defense manufacturers, but member states seem unwilling to revoke it. Its most important purpose perhaps is as a bargaining chip to obtain a reciprocal pledge from the United States to give up its "Buy American" defense procurement policy, but progress has been slow in terms of permitting greater trans-Atlantic cooperation, whether in terms of shared production or transnational industry mergers, on this issue. The sensitivity of the issue and fears of Commission involvement in approving such acquisitions or mergers mean Article 223 will remain in force for some time.

During Amsterdam, however, there was clear recognition that if the EU wanted to increase its share of the shrinking global arms market and develop a robust ESDI it must change its research and procurement practices, given the very large economies of scale required by these industries. Of course, opposition to Commission involvement or to the revocation of Article 223 does not preclude other cooperative measures; Britain was approved to join the proposed Franco-German arms agency (set up in 1995) on 4 June 1996, while France and Germany formally agreed at their Dijon summit (6 June 1996) to give a new push to defense cooperation and to "review" their 27 bilateral arms programs, which would extend to joint procurement.

Similarly, the Commission contributed to the debate with a number of proposals in a January 1996 communication. Its explicit goal was to improve the competitiveness of the EU’s approximately 50 billion Euro defense industry. According to this communication, between 1984 and 1992 domestic demand in EU defense industries fell by 30 percent, exports were cut in half, and the industry shed 37 percent of its workforce. As Martin Bangemann, EU Industry Commissioner, bluntly put it, "If the EU wants a CFSP, then it has to choose between a domestic arms industry or buying military hardware from America." The Commission wants to apply single European market rules to the defense industry and foster joint armaments research and production, but some EU states still fear potential Commission influence in military affairs through the "back door" channel of industrial policy. There was wide agreement that some sort of
coordination and potentially a formal European Armaments Agency or West European Armaments Organization should be established among these groups and industries, but this objective did not find its way into the Amsterdam Treaty in any substantial way.

After languishing for several years, these efforts to upgrade the EU’s military resources were greatly accelerated by the Kosovo crisis, which revealed a number of shortcomings in the EU’s existing approach to these questions. At their Anglo-French summit at St. Malo in December 1998, Britain finally dropped its long-standing opposition to the idea of a common EU defense policy. The two states also broached the idea of some type of "convergence criteria," similar to those set out for monetary union, to help realize EU defense cooperation. These criteria would help the EU achieve a higher state of force flexibility, modernization, and mobility. Although cynics might suggest that this change was a way for Britain to stay engaged in the EU without joining the single currency just yet, there was also widespread dissatisfaction in Europe during Kosovo with the EU’s subordinate position to the United States and NATO, not to mention disappointment with the frailties of American leadership during Clinton’s preoccupation with impeachment. The British about-face on this issue was as vital as France’s rapprochement with NATO two years earlier, since these are the only two EU states with the capability to project forces beyond Europe (and Europe’s only nuclear weapons states).

Since the breakthrough at St. Malo, the idea of reinvigorating the CFSP with defense cooperation has rapidly gained momentum. Britain, France, and Germany ordered their aerospace industries to produce a plan for restructuring. This too was unprecedented, as it had been almost unthinkable for France’s state-dominated defense industries to agree to defense restructuring in tandem with their EU partners. Then the February 1999 NATO summit in Washington formally endorsed the idea of giving Europe the capacity to act alone, using NATO assets. Similarly, on 10 May the new Commission president, Romano Prodi, stated that a common EU army was the "logical next step" for a CFSP/ESDI, although he acknowledged it might take years. Two days later, ministers at the WEU meeting in Bremen agreed to gradually merge it into the EU, and again raised the idea of convergence criteria. France and Germany also discussed the St. Malo agreement in late May at their 73rd bilateral summit in Toulouse, and agreed to build up a rapid reaction force around the Eurocorps.

These ideas laid groundwork for the historic Cologne European Council of June 1999, which incorporated ideas from a paper from the German Presidency on greater security and defense cooperation in the EU. For the first time, the EU agreed to allow its defense ministers to meet in the context of EU institutions, and fully endorsed the idea of cooperation in arms planning and procurement, including possible targets to increase spending and reduce conscription (which drains funds from efforts to re-shape Europe’s military architecture and modernize its forces). It was also agreed that the Eurocorps would be upgraded to a rapid-reaction force. Similarly, at their July 1999 Anglo-Italian summit (the first in four years), these states launched an idea for a full pan-European defense force supported by the convergence criteria model, which would be tracked by the Council of Ministers. These efforts make it clear that the long-standing taboos over a common military policy have finally been laid to rest.

The Record: Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions

The EU seems to have developed the architecture for a more ambitious common foreign and security policy. Beyond these efforts, we can examine the record of EC/EU cooperation in this area for clues about its future. Before examining the record of actions, we should note that EPC/CFSP have continued to perform their most important function: that of damage limitation. Despite the great number of difficult problems that have emerged in world politics since the end of the Cold War, the EU has not been torn apart or derailed by conflicting foreign or security policies among its member states. Indeed, the EU has been able to function effectively in a number of areas—enlargement, monetary union, the GATT/WTO negotiations—even as its member states debated tough questions about the future of NATO, the EU’s CFSP, and what to do about the Balkans. This alone shows the continuing importance of the CFSP as a confidence-building mechanism, even though it might not yet be able to tackle certain problems without assistance from NATO.
Beyond the passive impact of EPC/CFSP, there is little doubt that today the European Union can also take action in world politics. As we might expect of an institution built on economic integration, most of this foreign policy activity takes the form of trade, aid, development, and other economically-oriented policies. What has often been overlooked, particularly in the context of the EU’s troubles in the Balkans, is its growing body of political or security-related foreign policy actions. Although these actions have rarely involved military force, and they are far fewer in number than EC-related foreign economic policy actions, they do indicate a willingness among EU states to pool their foreign policies on behalf of the common interests noted above. Equally importantly, they are often used as precedents or guides to future foreign policy activity, no small feat considering the EU’s high sensitivity to collective legal rights and obligations.

EPC Foreign Policy Activity

As noted earlier, EC member states were generally reluctant to formalize their common interests during the EPC era. However, they were willing, even in the beginning, to undertake common foreign policy actions on a case-by-case basis. Together, these "unified basic foreign policy standpoints," as one insider put it, comprised an informal communauté de vue or acquis politique to which EC states could refer during later considerations of foreign policy problems. It is impossible to cite all of them here. Instead they might be classified as sets of collective values or policy orientations surrounding a geographic and/or functional domain. Looking at the most ambitious and highest-profile EPC initiatives of its early years, it became clear that issues were chosen based on their proximity and importance to the EC, not on their chances for resolution.

At first, the typical emphasis was on long-term goals with third countries or regions closest to the EC (hence the CSCE and the Euro-Arab dialogue). In line with the aims of the "Document on the European Identity," these plans generally emphasized progressive conflict resolution as opposed to rapid crisis management. In part to distinguish itself from U.S. foreign policy positions, EPC declarations on these issues showed what behavior or principles would result in a favorable response from the EC. As with their periodic statements of common interests, this desire of the Europeans to distance themselves from the attitudes and policies of the United States remains one of the most important factors behind the development of EPC/CFSP. It should not be taken lightly.

For example, substantive policies in the Middle East could easily be distinguished from U.S. positions. Prior to EPC, the EC could not even discuss events such as the 1967 war in the Middle East, yet once the mechanism was established this issue became a major focus of attention. Here, following the first session of the General Commission of the Euro-Arab Dialogue in May 1976, both the EC and the Arabs agreed that peace in the region depended on Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories and the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, and, perhaps most controversially, affirmed that the Palestine Liberation Organization should represent the Palestinians in all international peace efforts. This laid the groundwork for the most comprehensive statement on the EC’s policy toward the region: the 1980 Venice Declaration. The Venice Declaration established two additional substantive principles destined to guide the EC’s future policy in the region. First, it supported the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to exist within secure frontiers; and second, it affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The EC also confirmed its hopes for an international peace conference on the issue, rather than the more piecemeal solution offered by the United States, which involved only Israel and Egypt. The EC followed up these statements with more aid to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, a clear example of the ability of EPC to back up its foreign policy positions with tangible resources.

The second major topic discussed at most EPC meetings involved a conference on East-West relations in Europe. In the emerging climate of détente of the early 1970s, EPC helped the EC take the lead in the CSCE negotiations, beginning with its first proposal tabled during the preparatory phases of the process in January 1973. These talks culminated in the 1 August 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act. As a facilitating mechanism for conference diplomacy, EPC proved itself in various CSCE forums in subsequent years, including the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm, 1984-86); the Vienna follow-up conference (begun in
November 1986); the expert meetings on human rights and fundamental freedoms (Ottowa, 1985) and on human contacts (Bern, 1986); and the Cultural Forum (Budapest, 1985). All accounts also credit the usefulness of EPC discussions for forging common positions on this difficult issue. With the CSCE process, the Europeans were able to place their own East-West security relations in a framework that also included arms reductions, discussions on human rights, and strengthening mutual trust and understanding, all of which became important points of reference during the late 1980s changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The evolution of EPC’s policy toward South Africa offers some additional lessons about the ability of the EC to take action on political issues. Here, the EC expressed its total dedication to the dismantling of apartheid through peaceful means, and to replacing it with a democratic, non-racial system of government. As usual, EPC’s first statement on this issue was fairly weak; it merely condemned apartheid and stressed opposition to racial discrimination. The EC did, however, state that it would do everything possible to promote democratic majority rule and non-racial government for the peoples of South Africa. Following this opening, in a series of increasingly bold statements, the EC stressed that the state of emergency in South Africa must be lifted, that all political prisoners must be freed, and that the ban on political parties must be reversed. To encourage such behavior on the part of South Africa’s government, in 1977 the EC instituted a novel policy tool, the "Code of Conduct for Community Companies with Interests in South Africa." Although the Code was implemented on a national basis, with varying degrees of compliance, it was nonetheless an important step forward in EPC activity since it clearly linked a common EC interest (human rights) and a foreign policy orientation (anti-apartheid sentiments) with behavioral standards involving EC governments and their countries’ firms in South Africa. When this action did not bring about the desired reforms quickly enough, the EC progressively added stronger measures to its policy throughout the 1980s. The most comprehensive such measures instituted in 1985 by the EC (plus Spain and Portugal, both of which were about to join the EC). These included both restrictive measures and more positive measures, including a reinforcement of the Code of Conduct.

EPC’s South African policy is also noteworthy because of its increased relationship to EC organizations and activities. Here, after much debate, EPC actions eventually involved nearly all EC policy tools and procedures, showing the growing ability of EC governments to bridge the "legal gap" between the EC and EPC. In South Africa, EPC was used as far more than a coordination instrument (unlike in the Middle East), and the use of EC instruments for political ends in South Africa expanded in new ways between 1977 and the end of the apartheid regime in 1991. Over a period nearly spanning the history of EPC itself, actions against apartheid included diplomatic démarches; EPC declarations; the Code of Conduct (1977-84); the joint initiatives of 1985; regional funds; the first use of European Coal and Steel Community rules as an EPC tool to ban imports of steel and iron in 1986; and finally, restrictions on new investments and imports of Krugerrands. These common policy changes occurred despite much opposition by Britain, Germany, and Portugal.

EPC’s Central America initiative also reflected an ability to back up principled declarations with more specific policy orientations and external actions, even when they directly threatened U.S. policies and interests. Here, the EC expressed its support to achieve peace in the region in accordance with the Contadora Group’s objectives, approved by all the governments in the region on 9 September 1983. These objectives expressed the fact that a solution to the unrest must emerge from the region itself and not be imposed from the outside, while guaranteeing peace, democracy, and respect for human rights. In addition to the institutionalization of an annual political dialogue with the region, beginning with an historic meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, on 28-29 September 1984, EPC’s efforts were later enhanced with several Community-based trade and economic assistance agreements to encourage regional cooperation and integration in Central America. In particular, the EC gave the states of the Central American Common Market (CACM), plus Panama, a five-year non-preferential economic agreement.

EPC also attempted to move beyond these newly institutionalized policies in its relations with the United States. By vacillating between ignorance and a divide-and-conquer strategy toward Atlantic relations, the United States had seriously complicated the EC’s efforts toward political cooperation. After EPC decided to proceed with the Euro-Arab Dialogue, as U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was pushing his own solution to the problems in the Middle East, the Europeans felt that something had to be done to appease the United States about EPC. During an informal meeting of EC foreign ministers on 20-21 April 1974, the EC established the principle of periodic consultations about EPC with allied or friendly countries, starting with the United States. Such consultations would take place through the country holding the EC Presidency, provided the other EC states agreed to them. Given this new informal but clearly institutionalized EPC mechanism, Kissinger ceased his objections to the European efforts in the Middle East, and to EPC in general. Instituted at the Ottawa summit later in 1974, the agreement undoubtedly paved the way for the Euro-Arab Dialogue, and enabled the United States and the EC to coordinate their policies during later crises, as in Cyprus and elsewhere.

Beyond these efforts involving long-term conflict resolution, EPC was also able to extend its reach into security affairs despite the sensitivity of this topic for a number of EC states. More specifically, two security-related issues deserve attention at this point: EPC actions in defense/military areas and nuclear non-proliferation.37

Although it took a long time for EPC to make progress in the defense area, we have seen that the taboo over discussing military matters was gradually broken. Of course, at this time there were still strict limits on EPC military actions. For example, EPC failed to provide more than political cover for European participation in the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers in 1981-82 because of military implications. Of the ten EC member states at the time, only Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands participated in this operation. Instead, as noted above, EPC concentrated on the use of sanctions to support its emerging security and defense identity. Here, EC states gradually abandoned their reticence to use Community resources for political ends, particularly where security interests were at stake, as with the Iran hostage crisis, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the Falklands Islands conflict. The Falklands case was particularly noteworthy, as it was the first time that territory claimed by an EC member state was attacked with military force. Although several EC states expressed reservations about British policy in this area, and two EC states (Denmark and Ireland) defected from cooperation once the crisis turned into war, most observers, and certainly the Argentines, were surprised at how quickly the EC threw its support behind Britain in the form of political statements and economic sanctions.38 EPC was instrumental in encouraging these behaviors.

Concerning non-proliferation policies, a complete evaluation of Europe’s efforts in this area is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, I focus on the role of EPC in addressing major developments in the control of nuclear technology. Here, while EC states always recognized their dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,39 they also began their own efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is the one area where a common security problem encouraged EC states to pursue a common foreign policy, as they all more or less exhibited a common sensitivity to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the EC’s southern flank. Although they disagreed on several major issues regarding nuclear technology (such as safety in nuclear power plants, exports of nuclear materials, and nuclear strategy and arms control), EC states managed to confront many of these highly controversial questions within the framework of EPC.

These efforts were agonizingly slow; for example, EC states did not even attempt a common position at the 1967-68 NPT negotiations. Indeed, France abstained from participating, and the positions of the other five EC states diverged widely. After EPC was created, these five -- Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands -- managed to agree on a division of labor between the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM. By the time of the ratification of the NPT in 1975 the dispute over the EC’s internal non-proliferation policy had ended. With this issue resolved, the next stage of cooperation concerned external proliferation, and the heated disputes within the EC over this topic led to a novel solution: putting the entire issue under the control of EPC and its working groups, rather than under the EC. This act was a watershed in the evolution of EC foreign policy cooperation because it represented a major breach of the taboo against discussing security matters in EPC.40

With the EPC non-proliferation working group in place, cooperation began to grow in this highly sensitive area. Following an initial EPC statement on the topic in 1983, the EPC working group managed to set down explicit rules about transfers of nuclear technology.41 This statement formally adopted the so-called "London guidelines"42 regarding nuclear exports to non-EC
countries and established additional rules and restrictions concerning the transfers of nuclear materials within the EC. These involved definitions of such materials, certification standards for states wishing to transfer materials, and provisions for the review of such regulations in light of future changes in the international non-proliferation regime. The safeguards were especially onerous on the EC’s major nuclear suppliers (France, Germany, and to a lesser extent, Belgium and Italy) yet they helped lay the groundwork for later CFSP action in this area.

Except perhaps for military policies, then, EPC quietly and persistently led to a major expansion of the EC’s foreign affairs action agenda, in both geographic and functional terms, and a simultaneous contraction of the domaines réservés often to the irritation of member states. The veto was used less frequently; even when it was attempted, the system rarely "gave up" on important matters. Officials simply wore each other down with arguments until previously taboo subjects were considered in EPC. In this manner the scope of EPC expanded, so that virtually no subject was off-limits by the time of the Treaty on European Union.

Common Actions Under the CFSP

The expansion accelerated in the 1990s. As mentioned previously, the CFSP, along with the rest of Maastricht Treaty, entered into force in November 1993, thus replacing EPC. Ratification of the treaty was delayed as Europe attempted to build support for it among somewhat skeptical national electorates while confronting serious crises in the European monetary system and in Yugoslavia. The treaty then suffered another setback when Danish citizens voted to reject it (in part due to reservations concerning references to defense in the TEU). At the Edinburgh European Council in May 1993 Denmark was given an opt-out to these provisions (among others), and implementation finally proceeded later that year. Between November 1993 and October 1999, the CFSP produced a number of common positions and joint actions, its two primary policy instruments under the Maastricht Treaty, on a variety of subjects. And the EU continued to produce a number of declarations, as under EPC. Thus, in every major area examined in the previous section (the Middle East, Central/Eastern Europe, Central America, South Africa, and the security domain), common foreign policy activities increased in number and complexity. They also expanded beyond these original areas, as the architects of the CFSP had hoped. In fact, CFSP positions and actions have become so numerous that it is impossible to examine all of them here. Instead they are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.

In the rest of this section I briefly summarize the CFSP’s activities in the geographic areas to which it devoted the most attention: the former Yugoslavia and relations with Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The CFSP’s activities in security and defense are covered in a separate section below.

As the record shows, the most comprehensive CFSP activity involved the Balkans. Europe’s difficulties here have often been cited as a major failure of the CFSP, yet it is unfair to judge the CFSP by its performance in this area alone. First, it is arguable that no state or institution, within Europe or without, acted decisively and effectively at the time. Yugoslavia was not the EU’s finest hour, but neither was it the finest hour of the UN, the CSCE, NATO, or their member states. During most of the crisis, none of these institutions had that rare combination of capabilities, will, public support, and an acceptable settlement to a possibly insoluble problem. Moreover, they often worked at odds with each other, alternately attempting to stop the conflict, contain it, punish aggressors, or protect citizens and UN peacekeepers. Second, it should be kept in mind that the CFSP was not explicitly designed for stopping nationalist violence on the scale that took place in the Balkans. Like EPC before it, the CFSP at the time was primarily focused on long-term conflict resolution with economic tools, not quick crisis management using military means. Even if the EU had decided to intervene by force at an early stage (with or without the help of the United States), it is not certain that such an act would have prevented civil war. Third, it should also be kept in mind that the CFSP did not enter into effect until November 1993, by which time the problem may have escalated beyond the control of any single actor. Even if the TEU had been ratified before then, it is unreasonable to expect that the implementation of the CFSP would have taken place immediately and efficiently in the face of such a problem. A number of issues concerning the implementation of CFSP joint actions had to be resolved first.
### Table 2: CFSP Common Positions Through October 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects of CFSP common positions</th>
<th>Decision dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2 June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2 December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8 November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti: 2 common positions</td>
<td>30 May 1994, 14 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa</td>
<td>2 June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>8 December 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 3 common positions</td>
<td>20 November 1995, 4 December 1995, 3 June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>24 October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>15 March 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi: 2 common positions</td>
<td>24 March 1995, 6 June 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola: 2 common positions</td>
<td>2 October 1995, 30 October 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blinding laser weapons</td>
<td>18 September 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological and toxic weapons</td>
<td>25 June 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Review Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/East Timor: 2 common positions</td>
<td>25 June 1996, 16 September 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)</td>
<td>24 July 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>17 December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>28 October 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fourth and finally, internal EU disagreements over the Balkans conflict did not allow it to spread to the rest of Europe, did not prevent the CFSP from acting in other areas, and did not disrupt the functioning of the EU. These are no small achievements considering what happened during previous periods of instability in this region, and they reaffirm the importance of the basic purpose of the CFSP: to protect the EU from any divergent foreign policy positions of its member states.

However, these comments do not fully exonerate the EU from its failures in the Balkans particularly since the Europeans themselves claimed they could handle the situation; they are only intended to place the evaluation of the CFSP in the proper context. Although military force through NATO has ended the violence for the time being, the EU in fact devoted a great deal of attention to the region. Through its common positions, the CFSP imposed various sanctions and instituted an arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia. Through its joint actions, the CFSP provided aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported the electoral process in the region, and took over the administration of the city of Mostar. This last action saw the first involvement of the WEU in a CFSP activity, although this was not a formal CFSP joint action as set down by the Maastricht Treaty. Here, the WEU more or less volunteered to assist in Mostar in order to improve its operational capabilities. Most recently, a CFSP joint action was used to contribute personnel and funds to help re-establish a viable police force in Albania following the violence in Kosovo. Moreover, all of these efforts will soon be absorbed into a new framework for cooperation, an EU "stability pact" for Southeastern Europe, similar to ones already in place in Central and Eastern Europe. In the long run, these efforts involving state-building and democratization should prove as valuable as military strikes.46

The second major area involved CFSP actions toward the former communist world. The EU devoted a considerable amount of attention to developing new relationships with its Eastern flank, where it hoped to apply its most fundamental ordering principles (democracy, the rule of law, market economies, and respect for human rights). These principles are enshrined in the primary framework for these relations, the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The most prominent CFSP action here was the Stability Pact with the CEEC, also known as the Ballardur Plan (after the French prime minister who first proposed it). Although greeted with a great degree of skepticism at first from inside and outside the EU, the Pact created a framework of preventative diplomacy to help head off conflicts overborders and ethnic minorities, a major concern given the situation in Yugoslavia.

The Pact was particularly notable for the way it fostered discussions on a number of sensitive topics: the consolidation of borders; the EU’s relationship with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successor to the CSCE and the original forum for airing concerns over borders and minorities; the question of minorities; environmental problems; and the possibility of helping to secure the East without extending formal security guarantees. EC funds in the amount of 870 million Euros were provided for the project. The entire exercise also encouraged a vital debate over the conditions for future membership of the EU, a main concern for most states involved in the Pact. In the end, the Pact produced 47 constructive agreements between the participating countries and EU states, and an even greater number of agreements (76) between the participating countries themselves. Once in place, the OSCE then took over the Pact following the conclusion of the CFSP joint action at the final Paris conference (20-21 March 1995). Considering the fact that there have been no border conflicts or violent acts in Central and
**Table 3: CFSP Joint Actions Through October 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject of CFSP joint actions</th>
<th>Decision dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>9 March 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6 December 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy in Zaire</td>
<td>11 November 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy in the Congo</td>
<td>19 December 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Pact in Central/Eastern Europe: 2 joint actions</td>
<td>20 December 1993, 14 June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995</td>
<td>25 July 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian elections observations</td>
<td>9 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
<td>5 March 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action to protect against effect of the extra-territorial application of third-country legislation U.S. Helms-Burton Act</td>
<td>22 November 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls</td>
<td>29 April 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of dual-use technology</td>
<td>19 December 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eastern Europe on the scale that took place in the Balkans, the Stability Pact must be considered a major success for the CFSP.47

Actions involving Russia and other former Soviet states proceeded along similar lines, although they were until very recently more modest and somewhat less of a priority than those involving the CEEC. Still, one of the very first CFSP joint actions involved monitoring elections in Russia. According to Commission officials, this was the first real "test case" of their ability to devise, implement, and fund a CFSP joint action with Commission resources. Here the Commission also showed its willingness to make Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and their Interim Agreements subject to political criteria; these agreements are also closely linked to the full range of EC activities. Moreover, as of July 1999 Russia is now the subject of the CFSP’s first ever "common strategy," a new tool of the Amsterdam Treaty, which builds upon the existing PCA with Russia. This strategy attempts to coordinate all EU policies toward that country in support of specific goals: consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and public institutions in Russia; integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space; cooperation to strengthen stability in Europe and beyond; and cooperation on other issues (energy, nuclear safety, crime, and illegal immigration). These direct efforts to engage these countries are far more extensive and coherent than those applied under the EPC system, and common strategies are now under development for Ukraine, the western Balkans, and the Mediterranean region.

In addition to these two major areas, the CFSP acted in a number of other areas beyond what had been achieved in EPC. The CFSP revitalized the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which was now included within a broader Mediterranean framework (soon to become a common strategy) linked to EC policies. The CFSP debated attention to other African and Caribbean countries (such as Angola, Haiti, Rwanda, the Sudan, Burundi, and Nigeria), reflecting its long-standing concern with the developing world. It was of course unable to prevent the violence in Burundi and Rwanda, yet this was due as much to the blocking actions of France as it was to the lack of a CFSP military component in the region. Even so, the CFSP, in cooperation with the Organization for African Unity (OAU), has attempted to meet this deficiency with a common position to prevent conflicts in Africa. Efforts involve a closer linkage to EC activities, arms control measures, and a joint action appointing an EU representative to the Great Lakes region of Africa to act as a primary point of contact. Finally, political dialogues have been extended to several other countries beyond those already mentioned, such as Japan and the United States.

The new dialogue with the United States is particularly noteworthy. Although it did not involve a separate CFSP joint action, EU-U.S. relations were institutionalized in a far more complex "New Trans-Atlantic Agenda" involving a joint action plan to address the economic, social, and political dimensions of trans-Atlantic cooperation. This was the most comprehensive statement of EU-U.S. relations ever, growing out of the more limited EC-U.S. Trans-Atlantic Declaration negotiated in 1990. Although not all parts of the action plan have been implemented, the whole concept is much more substantial than the ad hoc approach to European-U.S. relations that had taken place under EPC.48 Relations did suffer a setback in 1996 when the EU became angry at the U.S's Helms-Burton Act, which attempted to govern the activities of foreign firms in Cuba, but the Agenda itself was not derailed. Perhaps most importantly, the Dialogue was strongly influenced by negotiations between the United States and the Commission (which later involved the Spanish EU presidency). Intensive collusion between these actors helped to sell the idea to those EU states, such as France, that were extremely suspicious of it.

Security Actions Under the CFSP

The CFSP was able to touch upon security issues as well. Over the past six years, and beyond the efforts already mentioned, four security-related issues have been directly addressed by the CFSP through joint actions: 1) a directive on assistance with UN mine-clearing efforts; 2) preparation for the renewal of the NPT; 3) the control of exports of dual-use goods; and 4) the EU’s participation in the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Several common positions also involved security problems, such as attempts to prohibit blinding laser weapons, plans to evacuate EU nationals from third countries (which also involves the WEU), and
preparation for a conference on the proliferation of biological and toxic weapons. All of these efforts achieved positive results.

However, while it is true that the security-related actions have been quite limited in scope and ambition, it should be kept in mind that the very idea of discussing security affairs in the context of the CFSP is still somewhat controversial for a number of EU states. Other states are more concerned that the EU framework would reduce their autonomy over such matters by "contaminating" decision about security with supranational EC procedures. Finally, the EU has been attempting to implement the CFSP in the face of debates about other internal issues (such as the single European currency) and external problems (such as Yugoslavia), while conducting much broader debates with the United States about the future of other security-related institutions, such as NATO and the WEU. Under these circumstances, the fact that the CFSP was able to take any actions concerning security represent no small achievement. And the fact that three of the four actions involved EC competencies to varying degrees is yet another confirmation of the CFSP's ability to overcome long-standing prejudices regarding the institutionalization of security cooperation in the EU in general and the role of EC actors in security affairs in particular.

Concerning the EU/WEU link, results have been far more modest. Although the WEU sent mine-sweepers into the Persian Gulf in 1988, participated in a naval blockade during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and helped enforce sanctions against Yugoslavia on the Danube River and in the Adriatic Sea, no WEU actions had been taken in conjunction with or at the request of the EU by the start of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1996. In fact, only one joint EU/WEU decision had been taken: the Council Decision of 27 June 1996 to have the WEU prepare contingency plans to support the emergency evacuation of EU citizens from a third country. Since then, the WEU has been involved in only one other matter: the recent joint action to support a police force in Albania, the Multinational Advisory Police Element. Beyond this limited record of specific actions, the WEU has rarely, if ever, been present at CFSP meetings, and institutional links between the Commission and the WEU were poorly developed during most of the time period under consideration. Amsterdam has attempted to address some of these institutional gaps, but these efforts have not produced any results on the ground. Moreover, according to EU insiders, Commission relations with NATO have been much better than those with the WEU. This situation will hold until all EU member states agree on the post-Cold War status of the WEU, which will likely involve fully incorporating its activities into the CFSP.

To summarize, the record clearly shows far more cooperative activity than ever occurred under the EPC mechanism, measured in terms of both geographic and functional scope. The CFSP has regularly employed its two new policy tools, common positions and joint actions, while also relying on the declaratory diplomacy developed under EPC. EC resources are now used in a far more consistent way than under EPC, and the creation of common strategies for certain regions should help continue this trend. Yet the CFSP’s similarities with EPC are also important. First, the CFSP still prefers to pursue its aims through cooperation with other regional organizations and is still highly sensitive to the legal authority of the UN and other bodies. It is far more difficult to engage the CFSP on many issues without laying the groundwork in the UN. Second, the CFSP is still often geared toward distinguishing the EU from foreign policy positions of the United States, the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda notwithstanding. Although this may be due to honest policy disagreements or to the influence of more independent-minded EU states (chiefly France), all EU states find it useful to have a forum in which to develop their positions independent of U.S. pressures. The United States should not despair, however. Three factors are working in favor of greater trans-Atlantic cooperation: the many opportunities available for outsiders to influence the CFSP process (through EU member states, the EU Presidency, EC organizations, and other international or regional organizations), the existence of a permanent institutional framework for EU-U.S. cooperation (the Trans-Atlantic Agenda), and the painful memories of what happens when the Europeans and the United States worked at odds with each other (the Balkans).
The Future of the CFSP

The Amsterdam Treaty continues a long tradition in the institutional development of European political cooperation: incremental reforms based largely on a lowest-common-denominator consensus among EU states. There are real improvements, such as the new CFSP budgetary process, the streamlined procedures for taking joint actions, and the creation of common strategies. There are cosmetic changes, such as the new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. There are unresolved questions, such as the role of the new High Representative for the CFSP and the new commitment to an ESDI and its relationship to the WEU. And there are omissions, such as a legal personality for the EU so that it can conclude international agreements (at present such agreements must be signed by all member states or by the EC on behalf of the EU). This WEU question in particular continues to haunt the EU’s vision of its role in the world. The WEU’s own secretary-general, José Cutiliero, recently summed up the case for merging the WEU into the EU by noting that the WEU was considered an odd-job organization often misused by this or that nation to complicate matters rather than simplify them, a minor institutional anomaly perched between the European Union and NATO, an irritant to those intent on building a coherent European security and defense architecture; the sooner we get rid of it, the better.52

This paper has argued that the EU has laid a strong foundation for more intensified cooperation in foreign and security policy among its own members and with outsiders such as the United States. As we have seen, interests have been clearly articulated, decision-making principles have been developed, resources have been committed, and cooperative actions have been growing in number and complexity. The question is the extent to which these activities will continue to tip the balance sheet in favor of a more effective and coherent CFSP/ESDI. To help answer this question, I examine the CFSP’s obstacles and opportunities.

The Obstacles

On the negative side, these common interests, decision-making principles, resources, and actions count for little whenever there is a lack of common political will among European states when an opportunity to act independently presents itself. For example, the EU stood by during the military confrontation between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean island of Imia/Karadak in early 1996. This would have been a perfect opportunity for Europe to get involved in a security/defense matter, but the United States had to step in. Similarly, when Commissioner Hans van den Broek suggested in early May 1996 that the EU take over the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia after U.S. troops left, he was soundly criticized from all sides, including Britain and France, for the idea and for speaking out without consultation from governments.53 As a collective, Europe would not conceive of staying in Bosnia without the United States, and the same attitude has been expressed since the Kosovo operation.

The domestic politics of individual states can interfere with collective action as well. At the very least, elections, domestic problems, and changes of government periodically prevent the rotating EU presidency from exerting the leadership required for Europe to act. This could be seen during Italy’s presidency the first half of 1996, where its weak government did nothing about the Greco-Turkish Aegean crisis. At the most, domestic public opinion or constitutional provisions get in the way of European collective action in defense matters, as Denmark, Germany, and Ireland have demonstrated. Germany managed to change its constitutional interpretation regarding defense matters, but only after a protracted debate that complicated, if not delayed, NATO/WEU decision-making on peacekeeping in Bosnia.54 Austria has done this to some extent as well.

The other side of this problem of political will occurs when an EU state decides to go it alone, without the involvement of NATO or the EU. France has most often demonstrated this tendency, with its unilateral actions in the Middle East and Africa, its decision to halt conscription and withdraw troops from Germany without consulting the Germans, and its highly controversial nuclear tests in the Pacific in defiance of its EU/UN partners, yet all EU states are susceptible to this temptation (and Amsterdam’s decision-making procedures still allow one state to block
collective action for "important and stated reasons of national policy"). Britain's Tony Blair has taken the lead for NATO action in Kosovo and supported U.S. military strikes against Iraq in defiance of his EU partners. Under Gerhard Schröder, Germany has spoken more assertively in defense of its own national interests, a stance that would have been almost unthinkable under Helmut Kohl. Thus, the EU could not agree to use the CFSP to help alleviate the growing crisis in Kosovo/Albania, one that seemed to be tailor-made for the EU's new ambitions. After an exodus of 14,000 refugees to Italy by March 1997, several EU states (Denmark, Italy, France, and Greece) wanted to send troops once Albania appealed to the European members of NATO, yet Britain, Germany, Sweden, and neutrals were able to block the idea. Instead, 7,000 multinational troops, led by Italy and France, were deployed on 14 April in Operation Alba, or "Sunrise," and the CFSP/ESDI/WEU suffered another missed opportunity. Moreover, these troops stayed only long enough to assist with elections and to distribute food and medicine. There was no support for a peacekeeping or peacemaking mission.55

As in Bosnia, NATO and the United States had to become involved to end the crisis. Beyond political will and domestic politics, the more fundamental issue of resources remains. Can the EU really afford its own independent defense capability? Military budgets in the EU have been slashed and are still under heavy strain, while economies in general have struggled to meet the criteria of economic and monetary union while dealing with double-digit unemployment. According to some estimates, a European intervention force of 50,000 troops would cost from 18 to 49 billion U.S dollars over the next 25 years, and a satellite intelligence system would cost between 9 and 25 billion U.S dollars over the same period. Another estimate puts the cost of European military independence at 107 billion per year.56 The EU may be unable to pay this price, even if it wanted to. It should also be noted that the WEU still has very limited operational resources compared to NATO. It also lacks a supreme commander, fully-functional headquarters, and a system of unified and joint commands.

Assuming the EU could find the financial resources to support the ESDI, there is still not enough cooperation among defense companies in Europe as of yet to support greater military independence. EU states are still supporting national champions with limited domestic consolidation and restructuring while inhibiting cross-national mergers and acquisitions under the protection of Article 223. For example, Western Europe has ten prime contractors for warplanes and helicopters, while the United States has five; Western Europe has 11 missile companies and the United States has four. Most French armaments firms are still state-owned, making partnerships problematic (although British and German cooperation is now on the rise compared to long-standing Franco-German cooperation). Also, the French are much less inclined to make partnerships with American firms, which further distances them from British and German cooperative efforts. These partnerships also help to alleviate pressures for a common European arms industry. Thus, external cooperation and lingering domestic barriers to reform prohibit a robust European-wide arms industry. For now only the Eurofighter is going forward, and possibly the Eurocopter. The "Horizon" air-defense Eurofrigate is having troubles since Britain pulled out, leaving France and Italy to develop the vessel on their own.57 The EU also lags far behind the United States in the development and integration of new warfare technologies: digital communications, a global positioning system (guidance and navigation), computers, precision-guided munitions, and stealth technology to evade radar.58

Without its own resources the EU must increasingly rely on NATO to support its ambitions, an option that presents another set of difficulties. NATO and the United States (that is, the U.S. Congress) are unlikely to give the EU a blank check to use NATO resources. The many layers of decision making required for the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to become operational, combined with Europe's limited military assets, mean that most security-related missions, Petersberg tasks or otherwise, that require military force will also require U.S. involvement, whether by legislative approval or active participation in the operation. Even if France "won" the exclusion of a clause in the Berlin agreement proposing that NATO could "supervise" or "oversee" European operations, there are three important limitations here concerning CJTFs: 1) the North Atlantic Council must unanimously approve the use of NATO assets; 2) NATO will be able to monitor and review the use of NATO assets; and 3) NATO has the right to recall forces in the event of a "grave security crisis."59 Moreover, it should be recalled that NATO has few assets of its own. Most of its assets are national assets, and most of those
assets are U.S. assets. In Kosovo, for example, the United States supplied about 80 percent of the air power, the most important component of the campaign. Thus Europe will probably have to borrow military equipment from the United States if the CJTF concept is to have any relevance. In short, there will be no "Europeanization" of NATO yet, in terms of all-European commands and independent European commanders (linked to the EU or not).60

Finally, even if these problems were resolved, the EU is about to confront other challenges that may work against an effective ESDI capacity. Enlargement and economic and monetary union will seriously complicate matters and water down the EU's independent efforts in security and defense.61 Up to seven new EU members in the short term (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia), adding over 60 million to the EU's population, and a new currency will impose major costs on the EU, diverting monies that could be used for military personnel and equipment. An intertwined set of "hard cores" in Europe (the single currency, security/defense policy, free movement of persons, social provisions, and so on) with varying memberships could make it very difficult to mount a collective security operation with so many other pressing concerns. The EU will also "import" the security problems and external interests of its new members, while at the same time giving them an effective veto over decision making regarding the CFSP/ESDI. How these new members will be represented in the Commission's external relations departments (not to mention the EC's other institutions), which involve up to seven commissioners and four directorates-general, presents another extremely difficult issue. Thus, given the current mix of limited resources, weak decision-making procedures, competing interests, and the pending difficulties related to enlargement, the idea of a truly operational ESDI may ultimately be an insurmountable obstacle.

The Opportunities

The preceding comments should not imply that the EU can play no important role in security affairs. For one thing, contributions to NATO-EU security cooperation need not involve military instruments alone, a fact that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic tend to overlook. The EU's formidable economic capabilities and emerging social welfare structure could provide considerable support for European security cooperation, although this role is somewhat less ambitious than some Euro-enthusiasts hope for.62 The Union is now the largest provider of humanitarian aid in the world, and it plays equally important roles in economic security through its common market, trade, and development programs. Despite the provision incorporating the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP, the EU can still be a more powerful force for long-term security, not crisis management, using socio-economic tools, not military ones. Other non-combat related support tasks, such as policing, customs patrols, information sharing, support operations, training, and humanitarian aid are also possible. There is nothing wrong with enhancing the EU's characteristics as a civilian, economic power; in fact, there are strong reasons for doing so at the expense of military power.

Similarly, despite the complexities of the next enlargement,63 the EU has proven highly successful in encouraging new and potential member states to reform their political/economic systems and conceptions of foreign/security policy, as we have seen with former authoritarian regimes (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and with certain EU states that tended toward neutrality (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden), although Austria blocked NATO warplanes from using its airspace during the Kosovo war. There is no reason to believe that the EU's ability to promote democratic reforms and condition the foreign/security policies of its new member states will cease with the next enlargement. In fact, enlargements and institutional improvements have been closely linked in European integration since the first enlargement, which resulted in the creation of EPC. Moreover, the Commission has developed a coherent, explicit strategy, "Agenda 2000," for expanding the EU and improving the conduct of its external affairs.64

The EU is taking steps to implement this strategy. The CFSP has raised expectations among Europeans about the desirability and legitimacy of cooperating in this area at the EU level, and public opinion polls since the mid-1980s when the issue first became open to public debate show that European citizens increasingly support the CFSP/ESDI.65 Also, the appointment of someone as distinguished and capable as Javier Solana to be High Representative for the CFSP
was an important step. It should also help that the new NATO secretary-general, former British defense secretary George Robertson, is close friends with Solana, his predecessor, and with another British official, Chris Patten, the EU’s new external relations commissioner. Robertson speaks highly of his colleagues and says they share a similar viewpoint. Also, the current Finnish EU Presidency has made a European crisis management force a priority. In fact, it is often forgotten that Finland and Sweden jointly proposed such a force in 1997 at the Amsterdam negotiations. Finally, the new strategy for the CFSP includes a major budget increase for the first time since it was established in 1993. The CFSP budget had languished in range of 20-25 million Euro, but the current budget foresees an increase to 40 million Euro.

Conclusion

It is perhaps appropriate that we now end on a note of optimistic caution about the "new" CFSP. Above all, the EU must be careful to recognize its limitations even in the midst of its reforms. At present, the WEU is in serious danger of becoming superfluous as the "European arm" of NATO and as the "defense arm" of the EU. Its functions should be brought into the EU as part of the CFSP, otherwise its existence simply produces unnecessary institutional confusion in Europe. Given recent changes in the EU and NATO, the added value provided by the WEU for its members is rapidly diminishing. It is a primarily a forum for defense ministers, but these officials are now permitted to meet in the EU as a Council of Foreign and Defense Ministers, a taboo that took over 40 years to break. The WEU is also important for confidence building, managing common resources (however limited), and information sharing, but these functions can also be handled within the framework of the CFSP/ESDI. Thus, the WEU is probably no longer necessary as a mere "insurance policy" to supplement the activities of NATO. In short, it seems the EU is no longer deluding itself about the practical and institutional requirements for a CFSP/ESDI worthy of the name. The "big three" in the EU have all made difficult adjustments to their long-standing prejudices in the hopes of improving the mechanism. Germany is now willing to send troops for peacekeeping and other missions, France is able to see a continued role for NATO in Europe, and Britain is now able to accept that a European army need not undermine NATO. With these changes of attitude, a real debate about the scope and limitations of the CFSP/ESDI can begin. However, if Europe’s ambitions in this area prevent others from acting, or needlessly complicate multilateral cooperation in security affairs, then it is necessary for those ambitions to be scaled down to more realistic levels. As Bosnia tragically demonstrated, Europe must realize the consequences of making inflated claims about its willingness or ability to take on more responsibility in world politics. The fact that Europe continues to make these claims is somewhat surprising considering the maddening diversity of EU states: great and small powers, neutrals and alliance members, concerns about national pride, foreign policy legacies, and differences in power and administrative capabilities. But the Europeans have surprised us before with the strength of their commitment to integration, most recently with the single European currency, and they may surprise us again.

Notes

1. The term "European Union" (EU) refers to three areas of institutionalized cooperation: the original European Community (EC) established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. Following common usage, I use the term "EU" to refer to these three activities as a collective. I use the term "EC" to refer to activities, policy competencies, and events involving that institution alone.


5. European citizens’ groups complained about the failings of the CFSP (among other things) at public hearings organized by the European Parliament in preparation for the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations. European Report 2111, 28 February 1996.


7. This can also be said of multilateral approaches to cooperation in general, where democratic governance, respect for the rule of law, and the recognition of complex patterns of economic, social, and political forces encourages similar states to repeatedly attempt collective solutions to common problems. See John Gerard Ruggie, ed. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

8. "Declaration on Western European Union," signed by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom (all members of both the EU and the WEU), attached to the TEU.


10. The Council of Foreign Ministers, also known as the General Affairs Council, is more properly referred to in the Maastricht Treaty as the "Council of the EU." However, common usage prefers the original term and I will adhere to that convention here.

11. These decisions involved financial sanctions against Bosnia-Herzegovina, the prohibition against making payments under contracts caught by the embargo against Haiti, and the EU’s anti-personnel mine-clearing directive.

12. The Amsterdam Treaty is officially referred to as the "Consolidated Version of the TEU." To help distinguish it from the Maastricht TEU, I prefer the term "Amsterdam Treaty."


16. For example, the Irish draft treaty revisions, which preceded the Amsterdam Treaty, had suggested that the wording of the relevant treaty article should be changed to "the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the perspective of a common defence. . . . The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications" (emphasis added to reflect textual changes).


18. This subject is addressed in the Declaration on Enhanced Cooperation Between the European Union and the Western European Union, attached to the Amsterdam Treaty.


20. The budget during these years was actually denominated in European Currency Units, forerunner to the new common EU currency, the Euro. The ECU/Euro was worth about $1.05 at the time of writing.


28. The restrictive measures included an arms embargo (exports and imports); refusal of military cooperation; recall of EC military attaches from South Africa and refusal to grant accreditation to South African military attaches; discouraging cultural or scientific events (except those involving the ending of apartheid); freezing of official contacts and international agreements in the sporting and security spheres; cessation of oil exports to South Africa; cessation of exports of sensitive equipment destined to the police and armed forces of South Africa; and a prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector.

29. The positive measures included a reaffirmation of the Code of Conduct; programs of assistance to non-violent anti-apartheid organizations; programs to assist the education of the non-white community, including grants for study in the EC; an intensification of contacts with the non-white community in the political, trade union, business, cultural, scientific, and sporting sectors, and others; programs to assist the South Africa Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the front-line states; and programs to increase awareness among the citizens of EC member states resident in South Africa. The measures are elaborated in EC Foreign Ministers, "Press Statement by the EPC Council of Ministers on South Africa," Luxembourg, 10 September 1985.

30. On the EC’s South Africa policy, see Martin Holland, The European Community and South Africa: European Political Cooperation Under Strain (London: Pinter, 1988); and Martin Holland, European Union Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).

31. Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela

32. These principles are outlined in the "Conclusions of the 26th European Council on the Solemn Declaration on European Union, Poland, the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, the Middle East, and Central America," (Stuttgart, 17-19 June 1983).

33. From the "Joint Communiqué of the Conference of Foreign Ministers between the European Community and its Member States, Portugal, Spain, the States of Central America and the Contadora States," (San Jose, Costa Rica, 28-29 September 1984).


36. The most comprehensive discussion of the EC in Central America is Hazel Smith, European Foreign Policy and Central America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

37. It should be noted that another security-related area, anti-terrorism efforts, were discussed under the framework of EPC starting in 1984. However, these discussions did not produce any significant external actions on the part of the EC, other than symbolic condemnations and a refusal to cooperate with states accused of supporting terrorism. Moreover, most EC anti-terrorist activities took place in another informal framework, Trevi, centered on the justice and interior (or home affairs) ministries of EC member states. These activities were later institutionalized under the Maastricht Treaty as the "third pillar" of the European Union, justice and home affairs cooperation. For details, see Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs, and Crime in Europe after 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990).


39. For example, the "Document on the European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers" (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973), notes that those EC states who are members of the Atlantic Alliance "consider that in the present circumstances there is no alternative to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the United States and by the presence of North American forces in Europe."


41. This was the "Statement by the Ten on Non-Proliferation," (Brussels, 20 November 1984).

42. Negotiated between 1974 and 1977 by the major nuclear suppliers.
43. In particular, EC states were required to specify: the ultimate destination of nuclear materials, the delivery timetable, the use timetable, the form in which delivery will take place, and the use of such material (fueling, processing, research and development, or energy generation).


45. Also note that these tables do not include numerous cooperative decisions taken under the CFSP to fund, extend, appoint envoys, or otherwise modify the implementation of CFSP common positions and joint actions.


50. WEU support of the EU’s administration of Mostar was not an official request by the EU made under the decision-making procedures of the CFSP.

51. This decision was not even published in the Official Journal of the EU due to Danish reservations about participating; it was as much a symbolic decision for the IGC process (to show critics of reform that nearly all CFSP instruments had been used at least once) as it was a practical CFSP action. Denmark eventually “opted out” of this decision, but the Danes also said they would not impede the development of closer cooperation among member states in this area. Agence Europe, 29 June 1996; European Report no. 2045, 3 July 1996.


53. Agence Europe, 7 May 1996.


55. These troops left after the Albanian elections in July and were replaced by 600 policemen, mostly Italians (with some help by the WEU).


58. For more on this point, see "The Future of Warfare," The Economist, 8 March 1997.


60. For far more pessimistic assessments of Europe’s willingness and ability to become more independent of NATO and the United States, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (June 1990): 5-56; and Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO."


63. The EU is now negotiating the admission of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Negotiations with Malta, which withdrew, then resubmitted its application for EU membership (1996-98), should resume by the end of 1999.

64. In particular, the Commission has called for an "integrated approach" to EU external relations so that its political capabilities can match its economic resources. Qualified majority voting in the CFSP is a necessary part of that approach, as is a strengthening of the WEU’s operational resources. See the Commission’s report, Agenda 2000: Volume I, For a Stronger and Wider Union (DOC/97/6, Strasbourg, 15 July 1997), Part IV, “The Union in the World.” Not all EU member states are fully committed to these ideas.

65. For example, Eurobarometer surveys since June 1993 consistently reveal that out of up to twenty-two policy in which citizens Europe-wide preferred EU decision-making to national solutions, three of the top four areas in each survey were components of political union (CFSP or Justice and Home Affairs). For more detailed surveys, see Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Public Support for European Integration," International Organization 47 (Autumn 1993): 507-34; Richard Eichenberg, "Does Europe Want a Common Security Policy (Anymore than it Ever Did?)," paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 19-23 March 1997; and Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, "European Public Opinion on the Future of Its Security," Armed Forces and Society 10 (Spring 1993): 335-52.

66. See George Robertson’s interview with Alexander Nicoll, Financial Times, 15 September 1999, 14.
