Title
The Incas Under Spanish Colonial Institutions

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Inca resistance to the Spanish invasion was bitter, obstinate, and frequently effective. Pizarro's expeditionary force occupied Túnez in 1532, and it was not until 1539, when the Inca army of Charcas surrendered and Manco Inca retired to Vilcabamba, that Spanish control of the country was secure. The story of Inca resistance in this period has never been told in a coherent fashion, but it would be perfectly possible to reconstruct it, at least in its general outlines, from the records already published. The literature on the conquest is so abundant, however, and the problems involved so complex, that it would be impractical to attempt to review the subject in a survey of the scope of the present one.

Although the year 1539 marks an important turning point in the history of the conquest, armed resistance was not ended. Manco Inca set up a government in exile in the mountain fastnesses of Vilcabamba from which he and his successors continued to harass the Spanish conquerors and their native collaborators until 1572. In 1565 the Vilcabamba government made an attempt to stir up a large scale rebellion, combining military preparations with a very successful effort to revive faith in Inca religion. The Spanish authorities discovered the plan before any military operations could be undertaken, and they took immediate steps to tighten their control of the Inca population, steps which will be discussed below in the sections on corregidores and doctrina.¹

When Francisco de Toledo (viceroy 1569-1581) undertook to give a stable organization to the Peruvian colony, one of the most pressing problems which faced him was the insecurity of the Spanish hold on the native population. He took two kinds of vigorous action. One was to destroy the Inca government in exile, a project which he carried out by means of an elaborate and well-organized expedition in

¹See the two articles in HAHR by George Kubler (1944, 1947); also Lohmann Villena, 1941, Levillier, 1921-26, Vol. III, pp. 59-60, 80-81, 97-99, and Temple, 1950b.
1572. The other was a wholesale resettlement of the native population, begun in 1570 and continued throughout his term of office. The policy of resettlement had been suggested some twenty years earlier, and an attempt to put it in effect was made on a small scale by Toledo's predecessor, Governor Castro.\(^2\) It was Toledo who applied it to the whole Inca Empire, however.

The object of the resettlement program was to move the natives away from their traditional shrines and collect them into Spanish-style towns (\textit{reducciones}), where they would be under closer supervision by the civil authorities and by their parish priests. Since the program called for moving at least a million and a half people, it was a very spectacular undertaking, and its successful accomplishment is a great tribute to Toledo's organizing ability. The native nobility and religious leaders realized that the maintenance of their own position and of the Inca cultural tradition would be proportionately more difficult as Spanish control became more effective. They therefore made an attempt to buy off the viceroy at the beginning of his \textit{visita general} (1570-1575), offering to raise a payment of 800,000 pesos if he would abandon the resettlement program.\(^3\) The offer was rejected.\(^4\)

Toledo's drastic measures mark the true end of the Spanish conquest in Peru. They brought home to the whole native population, as no earlier events had done, the fact that Spanish rule was intended to be permanent, and they convinced the Inca leaders that further active resistance was hopeless. It was not until about ninety years after Toledo's administration that there was any more significant Inca political activity, apart from isolated complaints of local Spanish abuses.

The Spanish settlers in their security soon came to ignore the Incas, except as a convenient source of labor and money. The Incas for their part were careful not to be too conspicuous, fearing ridicule or persecution. Many Inca traditions were maintained, however, and much of Inca culture was only superficially altered. Even a nucleus of Inca leadership survived in the form of a hereditary native nobility, the caciques, descendants of the Inca governors and other officials who had been confirmed in office by the Spanish conquerors.

In Spanish law, the caciques were hereditary officials charged with civil and criminal jurisdiction over their subjects under the super-

\(^{\text{3}}\) Toledo, in Romero, 1924, pp. 190-191.
\(^{\text{4}}\) Very few of the records of the resettlement, one of the most important events in Inca and Peruvian colonial history, have yet come to light. Toledo's instructions to the visitadores who carried it out have been published by Romero (1924), and a summary of the resettlement of the province of Condesuyos del Cuzco is also available (Ulloa, 1908).
vision of Spanish authorities. They were exempt from tribute and forced labor, and they had the right to have their cases tried directly by the audiencias, bypassing the authority of the corregidores who were their immediate superiors. They were permitted the use of the title "don" and were entitled to honors similar to those of the hidalgos of Castile. The caciques had a special incentive to maintain and transmit Inca cultural traditions, for their title to office was based on the fact that an ancestor had belonged to the Inca nobility. This principle was repeatedly recognized by the Spanish courts. After 1619 the viceroyal government provided special schools for the sons of caciques. These schools were under Jesuit administration and apparently offered an excellent education by the standards of the time and place. There were 2,078 caciques in the viceroyalty of Peru in 1754.

The descendants of the Inca emperors made up another privileged group the nobility of which was recognized by the Spanish government. There was some overlap, for many of the caciques also claimed royal descent.

By about 1660 the caciques, many of whom were educated gentlemen of some wealth, began to be seriously concerned at the extortion and abuses to which their people were subject, and they undertook to speak out as Inca leaders. The earliest evidence of such political activity which has so far come to light is a memorial addressed to the king by Antonio Collatopa, cacique of Cajamarca, some time before 1664. It is a protest in the name of all the Inca caciques against the abuses practiced by the corregidores and curas doctrineros. Collatopa apparently got to court and had his memorial printed in Madrid.

Protests brought no improvement in the colonial situation, and the caciques grew bolder. In 1666-1667 they attempted to organize a general revolt under the leadership of Gabriel Manco Capac. The headquarters of the plotters was in Lima, and the original plan was to set fire to the city and take advantage of the resulting confusion to massacre the Spanish residents. The movement was plagued by jealousies and disagreements, however, and one of the plotters betrayed it to the fiscal protector, who happened to be Diego de León.
Pinelo. Eight of the leaders were hanged, drawn, and quartered, but many others escaped. Gabriel Manco Capac made his way to Jauja where he attempted to revive the plot. This time it was betrayed because one of the participants made the mistake of mentioning it in confession, and the priest immediately took the story to the civil authorities.\footnote{Loomann Villena, 1946, pp. 89-92; Vargas Ugarte, 1947, pp. 74-75.}

The revolt of Gabriel Manco Capac was not a protest of loyal citizens against bad government but an Inca revolt against the king and against Spaniards in general. The plotters intended to spread the rumor that a royal cedula had been issued reducing the Indians to slavery. It is a matter of some interest that they thought such a rumor would be believed.

The Inca activities of the 1660's marked the beginning of an Inca national movement which reached its greatest strength in the eighteenth century. The Inca nationalists fought colonial abuses by legal means, petitioned the king for something like equal rights for Indians, and, when peaceful measures proved ineffective, attempted to establish an independent Inca state by armed revolt. A brief chronological summary will give some idea of the intensity of this activity.

In 1721 a worthy successor to Antonio Collatopa found his way to Spain and became the agent at court of the Inca caciques. He was Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, cacique of four towns in the valley of Chicama and a descendant of the ancient Chimu kings. He presented four printed memorials to the Spanish government listing Inca grievances (in 1722, 1724, 1729, and 1732). In 1737-1738 a large scale Inca revolt broke out in Azángaro under Andrés Ignacio Caena Condori; the Spanish authorities who suppressed it found seventeen provinces implicated. The next year a plot to restore the Inca Empire was discovered in Oruro. In 1742 a lone Inca adventurer named Juan Santos proclaimed Inca independence to the forest tribes on the frontier of Tarma. His bowmen wiped out twenty-seven Franciscan missions in the tropical valleys and threatened the sierra back of Lima until 1761. The Inca nationalists in Lima sent two representatives to Spain in 1749 with memorials addressed to the king and to the pope; the next year they revived the plan of 1666 and plotted another general revolt. It was betrayed through the confessional, and the heads of its leaders were placed beside those of the rebels of 1666 which still adorned the bridge at Lima.

The greatest of all Inca rebellions broke out in 1780 under the leadership of Tomás Catari and José Gabriel Thupa Amaro, following the failure of a series of attempts to secure redress of grievances by
legal means. At one time the rebels held the whole country from Cuzco to Tarija, except for a handful of Spanish garrison cities which were all under close siege. The revolt was finally put down in 1782 but flared up again briefly in Huarochiri in 1783.

The final Inca effort took place in the period of the wars of independence. When the Angulo brothers started a criollo rebellion in Cuzco in 1814, the Inca cacique Mateo Pumaccahua joined them with an Inca army, hoping to achieve with criollo help what the Incas had so often failed to achieve by their own resources. After a number of successes, the Inca forces were scattered at Umaechiri, and Pumaccahua was captured and executed at Sicuani in 1815.12

The record of Inca activity in the Colonial Period is thus one of repeated protest against Spanish rule and the conditions associated with it. Perhaps the Incas would have objected equally strongly to any form of alien rule, but there were many specific features of the Spanish system which they found intolerable. They felt the oppressive character of the Spanish regime chiefly through the institutions of encomienda, corregidores, mita, land grants, and doctrina. Some observations on the way these institutions functioned in Peru will help to explain Inca reactions.

ENCOMIENDA. One of the first institutions of exploitation introduced in Peru was the encomienda, well known in its general features to all students of the Spanish Empire.13 A number of special studies of the encomienda in Peru have appeared,14 but the subject is far from exhausted. All writers on this, as on so many other, colonial subjects have emphasized the legal aspects of the problem and treated it mainly from the point of view of the Spanish government.

The first encomiendas in Peru were granted by Pizarro, at least as early as 1534.15 They were grants of broad powers, entitling the encomendero to the services of specified native districts. Within his district, the encomendero was entirely free to demand whatever tribute or personal service he saw fit. The unhappy results of this situation are described in some detail by Luis de Morales, writing in 1541.16

12 The story of the Inca national movement is told in greater detail and with references to the sources in Rowe, 1955. There has been much interest in the rebellion of Thupa Amaro in Peru in recent years, and some important collections of documents relating to it have been published. See especially Paz, 1952; Vargas Ugarte, 1951a; Valderrama, 1944, 1948, 1947, 1948-49; Santistéban Ochoa, 1942; Lewin, 1943; Archivo Histórico del Cuzco, 1950; Temple, 1950a. The interpretive literature on this rebellion and on that of 1814 is also very abundant, though not of very high quality.


14 Torres Saldamando, 1879-80, 1900a; Zurkalskow, 1919; Belacás Guinassi, 1945.


16 Morales, 1943.
and Martel de Santoyo, writing in 1542. The three published examples of Gasca's assessments are frightening documents. The natives were required to supply large amounts of money, miscellaneous food products, and manufactured goods, mostly delivered to the encomendero's town house which might be forty leagues away. All three of these assessments include chickens, eggs and wheat as well as native produce, and those of Ilabaya and Conchucos include pigs. Gasca's assessments were certainly excessive, but even so they may well have been less than what the natives had been forced to pay before there was any assessment at all. In addition to the payments in money and kind, the natives were subject to a fixed amount of personal service, cultivating the encomendero's fields, guarding his animals, and serving his household. This service was performed by turns (mit'a). There was an additional but smaller assessment in goods and services to support the priest assigned to the encomienda. No systematic revision of Gasca's assessments was made until Viceroy Toledo's visita general (1570-1575), but personal service without pay was prohibited in encomienda grants of 1559 by the Marqués de Cañete. The fixed assessments and abolition of personal service without pay caused some changes in the methods of exploitation used by the encomenderos. Nominal payments for services were made, and the encomenderos began trading on a large scale, mainly in coca and other supplies for Potosí. This commerce used native carriers or llamas belonging to the natives. The abuses of this period are described by Domingo de Santo Tomás and Bartolomé de Vega. The situation of the Inca population appears to have been scarcely better than before the reforms.

The encomenderos were not satisfied with their advantages and, in 1550, sent representatives to Spain with large presents for the Emperor to ask that the encomiendas be made hereditary in perpetuity. It is said that the encomenderos of Peru offered 7,600,000 pesos for the privilege. A royal commission was sent out in 1559 to investiga-
gate and grant perpetuity if it proved desirable. The native caciques became seriously concerned and empowered Bartolomé de las Casas and Domingo de Santo Tomás to offer 100,000 ducats more than the top price offered by the encomenderos if the king would abolish the encomienda system altogether. Neither extreme course proved acceptable to the Spanish government.

The institution of corregidores de indios in the provinces in 1565 drastically reduced the powers of the encomenderos over the people entrusted to them, and their prerogatives were further restricted by the new tribute assessments of Viceroy Toledo, which simplified the payments and reduced them where they were exceptionally heavy. With these developments the encomienda took on the general form it was to maintain until its extinction in the first half of the eighteenth century. Guaman Poma de Ayala, writing in 1615, gives a vivid picture of the encomenderos' share in exploiting the natives at that date, and the terms of a cedula of the end of the seventeenth century indicate that complaints were still being made then.

CORREGIDORES. Before 1565, the Spanish administrative hierarchy in the former Inca Empire consisted of a governor or viceroy, three audiencias (Lima, 1542, Charcas, 1556, and Quito, 1561), and the corregidores who governed the Spanish municipalities. Each of the municipal corregidores had authority over the whole territory subject to his city; he governed the Spanish population (encomenderos, miners, merchants and soldiers) directly and the Inca population through the native caciques. The encomenderos were supposed to live in the cities, and the only Spaniards authorized to live among the natives were the curas doctrineros. In practice, of course, both the encomenderos and the priests interfered to some extent with the authority of the caciques, keeping them busy collecting a large and miscellaneous tribute in kind and furnishing labor for various projects. Nevertheless, the caciques had extensive powers, greater in the more remote provinces than near the cities.

The first experiments in establishing direct Spanish rule in the provinces were made by Viceroy Marqués de Cañete (1556-1561), probably as a means of controlling the turbulent encomenderos. He appointed some provincial corregidores but soon removed most of them because he said they were thieves. The only provinces in which the

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corregidores were maintained were the crown *repartimientos* of Chucuito and Chincha.\(^{28}\)  

In 1565 Governor Castro revived and put into effect the plan of appointing corregidores de indios in all provinces. In reporting this measure to the king, he said flatly that his purpose was to control the native population, making impossible future conspiracies like the planned Inca uprising which he had just discovered. He proposed to make the natives pay the cost of this measure as a punishment for conspiring to revolt.\(^{29}\)  

Under the new arrangement the municipal corregidores were responsible only for the Spanish population, and hence they are called *corregidores de españoles*. They naturally objected to this reduction of jurisdiction but to no effect. Other objections were made by the religious authorities, whose power over the natives was curtailed by the new arrangement, and by the caciques, who had the most to lose. Archbishop Loayza encouraged the caciques to collect funds to oppose the introduction of provincial corregidores, and they got together 6,000 pesos in a few months.\(^{30}\)  

The Spaniards, like other rulers of colonies before and since, always insisted that their administration was in the best interests of the natives. They showed real ingenuity in devising arguments to prove that whatever policy was convenient or desirable for other reasons was also the solution to all the problems their native subjects complained of. Governor Castro took pains to present the establishment of provincial corregidores in this light, saying that they would provide the native population with protection from illegal exactions by the parish priests, the encomenderos, and their own caciques. As it turned out, Cañete’s evaluation of the corregidores was the more accurate.  

The corregidores de indios were given wide powers. They were responsible for internal security, the collection of taxes, and the administration of justice in their districts. At the same time they served short terms (one or two years if appointed by the viceroy, three to five years if appointed by the king), they were badly underpaid, and there was no regular promotion system by which an able administrator could expect advancement to a better post. Under these conditions, the only incentive to take on the job of corregidor was the opportunity for graft which the post offered because of the wide powers that went with it; the wonder is that any honest men could

\(^{28}\) Vega, 1896, p. 116.  
\(^{29}\) Castro to the king, April 30, 1565, in Levillier, 1921-26, Vol. III, p. 80; see also his letter of April 26, p. 70.  
be found to serve. Most corregidores came to their jobs with one idea, to make a fortune during the brief period of their administration. The only way they could do so was at the expense of the natives.

The corregidores were quick to discover methods of exploiting the people subject to their control. The detailed analysis of the situation written by Antonio de Ayans in 1596 reveals that the patterns of the next two centuries had already been established. The corregidores had gone into many kinds of business. They made the natives transport wine and coca for them to Potosí. They forced the women to weave clothing for them for less than half the free market wage. They prohibited outside merchants from trading in their jurisdiction and then brought in goods themselves which they forced the natives to buy at inflated prices, whether the goods were of any use to the purchasers or not. They collected the royal tribute in kind, had it sold at auction, bought it in at half its market value up to the amount due for tribute, and then resold it at the going rate.\textsuperscript{31}

All this commercial activity was entirely illegal. Magistrates were forbidden to trade with the people under their jurisdiction by a long series of royal cédulas the repetition of which is in itself an indication that they were not being obeyed. Lib. V, tit. ii, ley xlvii of the Recopilación summarizes three sixteenth-century decrees on the subject and one of 1619. Further mid-seventeenth-century legislation against the commerce of the corregidores is summarized by Lohmann Villena.\textsuperscript{32} Later cédulas to the same effect were issued in 1681, 1711, 1720, and 1727.\textsuperscript{33}

For obvious reasons of political morality the viceroys were forbidden to appoint their attendants and retainers to corregimientos and similar posts by a cédula of December 12, 1619. In 1680, however, the Duque de la Palata asked for and received permission to grant twelve Peruvian corregimientos to members of his retinue. The privilege was confirmed in 1688 to the Conde de la Monclova and became a normal viceregal perquisite; it was confirmed again to Amat in 1761. The other sixty-three corregimientos were granted by the king.\textsuperscript{34} As was to be expected, the appointment of intimates of the viceroys to corregimientos aggravated existing abuses by increasing the already excessive powers of the corregidores and making appeal from their judgments more difficult.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} Ayans, 1651, pp. 41-50.
\textsuperscript{32} 1646, pp. 92-93, 233-243.
\textsuperscript{33} Matray y Ricci, 1819, nos. 7, 358, 432, 481.
\textsuperscript{34} Navarra y Rocafull, 1839, pp. 121-128; Amat y Junient, 1947, pp. 181-182; Porlier, ms., Vol. I, fol. 166-169, 175-174, 186.
\textsuperscript{35} Mora Chino Capac, 1722, pp. 3-5.
There were cases of bribery and favoritism in the appointment of corregidores from quite early in the seventeenth century, but systematic sale of such offices only began in the 1670's. Earlier laws prohibiting the sale of magistracies remained on the books, but they were simply ignored, and both kings and viceroyes regularly granted all corregimientos *por beneficio* if anyone could be found to make an offer. Juan and Ulloa mention the practice as a matter of course in their time (1742-1749), indicating that the government justified it as a war finance measure. The royal conscience was evidently troubled from time to time, though not enough to stop the sales; in 1747 and 1748 Viceroy Manso de Velasco was instructed that corregimientos were to be sold only to persons who were otherwise qualified.

The high prices that were paid for provincial corregimientos are an indication of the profits to be made from commercial extortion. The viceroy Duque de la Palata (1681-1689) settled a claim for 26,500 pesos by appointing the claimant corregidor of Cajatambo for three years. The annual salary of this post was 1,000 pesos. About 1741, Manuel de Elcorrobarrutia paid 16,000 pesos for the corregimiento of Chancay and drew no salary for it because he was already being paid as *contador*. The normal salary for this corregimiento was 800 pesos.

Elcorrobarrutia, the principal in the last example, furnished posterity with a very informative glimpse of how a corregidor managed his business because he asked the opinion of a Lima theologian, P. Diego José Merlo, S.J., as to whether or not he was justified in pricing the mules he proposed to distribute to the natives of Chancay at 150 per cent over the cost price and the clothing and other articles at 100 per cent. These, he explained, were the usual rates for such transactions. To give his spiritual adviser some information on which to base a judgment, he furnished a budget of his expenses which may be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses for a five year term</th>
<th>pesos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficio (what he paid for the job)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despachos, pase, media anata (fees and taxes)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of an assistant (teniente) at 1,200 pesos</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of an agent in Lima, at 100 pesos</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retainer of a lawyer, at 100 pesos</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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[37] Parry, 1953, pp. 54-57.
[40] Navarra y Rocafull, 1859, p. 181.

Pensions en el palacio y otros ministros ("cuts")................. 2,000
Living expenses, at 3,000 pesos................................. 15,000
Entertainment of the viceroy, who would visit him........... 5,000
Residencia and audit........................................... 2,000
Interest on money borrowed for these expenses at 8 per cent. 8,700

Total .......................... 59,700

The estimate for living expenses may be a trifle generous. Juan and Ulloa estimated, as of 1742, that a corregidor who exercised some economy could live on 2,000 pesos a year.\(^{42}\) Corregidores whose provinces were more distant from Lima would probably not have to entertain the viceroy. Otherwise the figures are probably representative for the period.

In budgeting his business activities, Elcorrobarrutia gives figures only for the distribution of mules. He proposed to distribute 2,200 mules which would cost him 18 pesos 4 reales each. The overhead was substantial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses for distribution of mules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of 2,200 mules at 18½ pesos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture, herders, and distributors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcabala (sales tax), 4 per cent on 85,500 (the sales price)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of four collection agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on money borrowed to meet these expenses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total .......................... 67,004

Elcorrobarrutia expected to lose 300 of his mules, so he put his net receipts at 80,000 pesos. He calculated the profits on the mules, therefore, at 12,996 pesos, which he figured as 19½ per cent. It is a pity that he did not also furnish us with a budget for the clothing and other goods he intended to distribute. One would like to know how he proposed to make up the other 46,724 pesos he owed for the corregimiento; he would have had to collect at least 55,000 pesos to do it. That would mean a 135,000 pesos business, or 27,000 pesos a year, just to make his expenses. There were 1,225 able bodied adult male natives in the province of Chancaí according to the count of 1754.\(^{43}\)

The learned P. Merlo, after 33 paragraphs of close argument and Latin quotations, concluded that the prices Elcorrobarrutia proposed


\(^{42}\) Orellana, 1859, p. 7.
to charge were just under the circumstances. Then he took up the matter of the corregidor's oath of office in which the magistrate had to swear to obey the royal ordenanzas. One of the ordenanzas prohibited the corregidores from having any sort of business dealings with the people under their authority, as we have noted. Nevertheless, P. Merlo argued that this regulation was, by 1741, interpreted to mean that the corregidores must not charge excessive prices or use violence to make people buy. This interpretation was justified by reference to the purchase of the office. The king would not charge beneficio for the office unless he expected the holder to benefit financially from it.44

A corregidor with a delicate conscience might refrain from using violence in his business dealings, but everyone involved understood that the corregidor was not operating as an ordinary merchant bound by the rules of the market place. He was carrying out a repartimiento, a distribution, in which his agents delivered to every head of a family a quantity of goods determined arbitrarily by the corregidor and for which the recipient was obliged to pay at the prices the corregidor set.44a If the recipient did not want the goods or thought the prices excessive, he could scarcely take the case to court, for the corregidor was judge of first instance in his province. If the recipient refused to cooperate he faced the fact that the corregidor also had full police authority.

In spite of the dangers involved in going over the corregidor's head to complain, the volume of protest grew so great that the Marqués de Castelfuerte, viceroy 1724-1736, complained to the king that all his time was being taken up with grievances resulting from the repartimiento system. The grievances were also taken to court by the Inca procurador, Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, and detailed in his indignant memorial of 1732. The viceroy had a solution to offer: he suggested that the king legalize the repartimiento and regulate it. Castelfuerte's successor, the Marqués de Villagarcia, was instructed to investigate this proposal and report on it. Villagarcia thought it prudent to ignore this part of his instructions.

The next viceroy, Manso de Velasco, 1745-1761, was a soldier who was chosen for the job to meet the emergency created by Juan Santos' Inca rebellion of 1742. He revived Castelfuerte's proposal as soon as he took office, collected opinions on it, and reported favorably to the king. The result was a series of cedulas and royal orders in 1751 directing the establishment of a junta in Lima to draw up schedules

44 Merlo, 1952.
44a This type of distribution is to be distinguished from the earlier repartimiento of Indians. See Kubler, 1946, pp. 374-375.
of the types of goods to be distributed in each province with the amount and price. Repartimiento up to the amount of the schedule was to be legalized. The junta reported its schedules (aranceles) in 1753, and they were approved by cedula of June 5, 1756.\textsuperscript{45}

The value of goods to be distributed in the provinces according to the aranceles varied from a low of 10,000 pesos for the Cercado of Lima to a high of 226,750 pesos for the corregimiento of Sicasica. In three corregimientos, Trujillo, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and Apolobamba, no repartimiento was provided for. The legal amount in Chancay was 122,000 pesos which is 13,000 pesos below the minimum calculated above to make the corregidor's books balance. The corregidor thus still had no incentive to obey the law.

What happened in fact was that the corregidores interpreted the new policy as virtually a license to steal, and the lot of the natives, which was already sufficiently difficult under the old system, became markedly harder. Viceroy Guirior noted as much in his \textit{relación de mando} of 1780 and blamed the deterioration squarely on the legalization of the repartimiento.\textsuperscript{46} This conclusion is confirmed by the representation made to the king by the cabildo of Cuzco in 1768 (Ciudad del Cuzco, 1872), by Viceroy Amat's \textit{relación de mando} of 1776,\textsuperscript{47} and by the testimony of Miguel Feijóo de Sosa in 1778.\textsuperscript{48} These reports describe a situation which was clearly worse than that of Juan and Ulloa's time. The aranceles were not obeyed; they served only as a basis for collecting the alcabala. The corregidores assumed the right to exclude all other traders from their districts. Tribute funds were credited to repartimiento payments, so that the king's name could be invoked in making the collections. Furthermore, instead of making one repartimiento in five years, as the law required, the corregidores took to making two or more in their term of office, so that their collections were at least twice the amount of the aranceles. Great brutality had to be used in order to squeeze such sums out of a population which was living on the margin of subsistence to start with.

The caciques, on whom the ultimate burden of the collections fell, objected as strongly as they could, often at great personal risk; as

\textsuperscript{44} The history of the measure is given by Amat y Junient, 1947, pp. 186-188; Ciudad del Cuzco, 1872, pp. 211-212; and Feijóo de Sosa, 1952, pp. 335-337. See also Manco de Velasco, 1859, pp. 151-157; Mariluz Urquijo, 1952, pp. 192-195; Porlier, ms., Vol. I, fol. 45. My colleague Woodrow W. Borah located a copy of the Peruvian aranceles in the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico (Ramo de Reales Cédulas, Duplicados, Vol. 102, fol. 122-283) and was kind enough to arrange to have it microfilmed.

\textsuperscript{45} Guirior, 1872, pp. 29-30.

\textsuperscript{46} Amat y Junient, 1947.

\textsuperscript{47} Feijóo de Sosa, 1952.
officials charged with civil and criminal jurisdiction they had a responsibility to do so. The corregidores answered by inventing the doctrine that the caciques' only proper function was that of collecting taxes and rounding up labor for the mita. Any further action on their part was insubordination if not actual treason. In virtue of this doctrine, the corregidores began to depose caciques who tried to defend their subjects and to replace them with new men, often Spaniards or mestizos, who would be properly subservient.

The natives were driven in desperation to unplanned and unorganized outbreaks of violence, the object of which was to assassinate a particular corregidor or his agents. Amat reports such outbreaks in Sicasica in 1770 and 1771, in Pacajes and Carangas in 1771, and in Huamachuco in 1773 and 1774. The rioting was pitilessly suppressed; in none of these cases was the corregidor punished if he survived the rising. There were similar risings in Chumbivilcas and Urubamba in 1776 and in Huamalies in 1777.

The cupidity of the corregidores reached such a point during the period of legal repartimiento that they began to include Spaniards as well as natives in the distribution. The Spaniards were willing to take a share because, if they were in debt to the corregidor, he would protect them against their other creditors until he had collected his own debt. However, there were limits, and when Baltasar de Sentmanat, corregidor of Arequipa, made two repartimientos within a year and a half he prepared the way for the bloody urban riots of early 1780.

The volume of complaints increased greatly, and royal cedulas were issued in 1768, 1772, and 1778 asking for reports on the repartimiento problem. Thoughtful officials in Peru were very disturbed about the situation, rightly fearing a general revolt if the Incas got desperate enough. Bishop Gregorio del Campo of La Paz urged that the repartimiento be abolished and the corregidores paid an adequate salary. He said that the natives would be glad to finance the proposal through an increase in tribute if the weight of the repartimiento were lifted. Miguel Feijóo de Sosa, corregidor of Trujillo, made the same recommendation in his well reasoned and informative memorial of 1778. About the same time, Francisco José de Mesa Ponte, Marqués de Casa-Hermosa, a Canarian who had just completed a five year

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41 Guirior, 1872, pp. 35-37.
42 Feijóo de Sosa, 1952, p. 349; Pando, 1952, p. 103.
45 Amat y Junienct, 1947, pp. 190.
46 Feijóo de Sosa, 1952.
term as corregidor of Huaylas, offered to serve a second term without repartimiento as an experiment. He asked for a salary of 8,000 pesos a year, to be paid by the natives. The natives were willing, and Viceroy Guirior approved the project. It was too late for experiments, however, for the patience of the Incas had run out and the whole political picture was changed by the great rebellion of 1780-1782.

The Inca leaders capitalized on popular hatred of the corregidores as soon as hostilities broke out, proclaiming the abolition of the office and of the repartimiento system in all provinces under their control. The measure proved so effective in enlisting support for the movement that the Spanish authorities were forced to make some immediate concessions in order to maintain their position. The Junta de Guerra assembled in Cuzco announced the abolition of the repartimiento on November 20, 1780. The measure was approved in Lima on December 7 and reported to the king, who confirmed it by cedula of July 12, 1781. The repartimiento never again became legal in the Spanish Empire, although a proposal to revive it was made by the visitador Jorge de Escobedo in 1784. The very name of corregidor was so odious in Peru by that time that Escobedo and the viceroy made haste to suppress the office, introducing the system of government by intendentes and subdelegados which had long been planned and was already functioning in other viceroyalties. The change was made in Peru in 1784.

The reforms seem to have put matters back to approximately the same state they had been in before 1751. The repartimiento continued illegally, and further royal cedulas were issued in 1784 and 1791 against the practice and its abuses. In 1804, Demetrio O’Higgins, intendente of Huamanga, complained that the subdelegados in his intendency were distributing 10,000 mules a year at the exorbitant price of 45 to 50 pesos, using the tribute money as capital and paying no alcabala. He noted that no one would take these mules unless forced to do so, since purchasers could get animals more cheaply by buying them direct from the mule drivers. O’Higgins complained further that royal orders issued between 1792 and 1797 had so modi-
fied the Ordenanza de Intendentes that the subdelegados ended by having almost exactly the same powers as the old corregidores. It was the same old rose, and it had the same smell.

MITA. When the Inca emperors needed labor for public works or other state purposes, they drafted it from the most conveniently located provinces. The provincial governors were supposed to see to it that such calls for public service were rotated among the families under their jurisdiction so that no man would have to serve a second time until all the rest had had a turn. A man designated for state service was called mit'ayag, having a turn, from mit'a, turn. This is the origin of the Spanish terms mitayo (vecero) and mita, in common use in the Colonial Period.

When Spanish control was first extended to the provinces of the Inca Empire, governors, encomenderos and doctrineros made their demands for native labor in the form of orders to the caciques to furnish a specified number of men for a stated project. The caciques equated these demands with the ones formerly emanating from Cuzco, and they raised their quotas by the traditional method. Thus, any sort of forced labor done for the Spaniards came to be called mita, and the word retained this general meaning throughout the Colonial Period. The word is sometimes understood to refer specifically to service in the mines, a particularly burdensome form of forced labor, but this type is properly designated as mita de minas or more specifically mita de Potosí or whatever the mining center involved might be. Mita labor was also applied by the Spaniards to building and road construction, service to travelers in the tambos, labor in privately owned obrasjes (factories), the cultivation of Spanish farms, the care of cattle, and in short, to all types of manual labor.

At first the colonial mita system was simply an abuse, for the private profit of the conquerors, of the Inca system of service to the state. Since mita labor had not received any direct wages under the Inca emperors, the conquerors saw no reason why they should pay any. It was only with the greatest difficulty, and after the failure of the armed

Ibid., 343.

There is further information on corregidores in the valuable eighteenth century study of Cañete y Domínguez, 1952, pp. 343-352. I note that Lohmann Villena presented a paper on corregidores to the Primer Congreso Internacional de Peruanistas, Lima, 1951. Only a summary of it has been published, however (Lohmann Villena, 1952).

There are two useful surveys of the mita system in Peru, Basadre, 1939, and Pérez Tamayo, 1947. Basadre writes in general terms; Pérez Tamayo, though dealing only with the mita in the Audiencia of Quito, includes extracts of many documents from the Archivo de la Corte Suprema in Quito which give a vivid picture of the actual functioning of the forced labor system.
rebellion of encomenderos led by Hernández Girón (1553-1554), that the Spanish government succeeded in introducing the principle that native labor should be paid. The legal wage for mita labor, however, was never as high as that paid to native laborers in the free market, and during much of the Colonial Period it was less than the minimum which the laborer needed for his own food. Furthermore, the mitayo was not excused from paying his regular tribute assessment just because he was called away to put in several weeks' work in the encomendero's wheat fields. Naturally, the natives showed no inclination to hire themselves out for Spanish projects on such terms. The Spanish settlers thereupon enunciated the doctrine that "Indians are lazy by nature and must be forced to work for their own good." The government accepted this verdict and used it to justify continuation of the system of forced labor throughout the Colonial Period. The regulations which governed the mita gave first consideration to the wishes of the Spanish settlers for cheap and submissive labor and then added a multitude of ineffectual restrictions designed to protect the natives from the abuses the system invited.

The commonest form of mita, present in all Spanish towns, was the mita de plaza, for construction, farm work, and general service. For example, the Conde de Nieva (viceroy 1561-1564) issued an order that a stated number of laborers should come to Lima periodically from the surrounding provinces as far away as Jauja and assemble daily in the plaza to hire themselves out to residents who wanted to build houses or cultivate their fields. The daily wage set was one real. The free rate for unskilled native labor was two to three reales, and one real was barely enough for the day's food. Furthermore, Jauja is 40 leagues from Lima in the sierra, ten days' journey on foot, and the mitayos were paid nothing for traveling time. The cacique of Jauja was jailed for refusing to force his subjects to comply with the viceroy's order.66

The provinces along the main post roads were subject to a mita for service in the tambos or post houses, located normally at intervals of three to eight leagues. The tambo was another Inca institution taken over by the conquerors; tampu was the Inca word for a post house maintained by the state for official travelers. Before the conquest, the post houses had been stocked and maintained by the communities along the road as part of their service to the government. The Spaniards put the system to private use but demanded that the natives maintain the tambos as before. Regulations requiring payment were gradually introduced, but enforcement of them proved impossible.

66 Vega, 1896, pp. 119-121.
until Spanish post masters were appointed, and for many years unscrupulous travelers robbed, cheated, and beat the tambo attendants at will. There is an extensive literature on the subject.67

Mining was a state monopoly under the Inca Empire and, like other state business, was conducted with mita labor. It was done on a very small scale, however, and was not particularly burdensome. The Spaniards continued the use of the mita system for mining, although forced labor in the mines was for many years technically forbidden by Spanish law. At first the mines were small and the ore rich, and local labor was sufficient. When, however, the quality of the ore began to decline, as it did at Potosí in the 1560's, the miners began agitating for more cheap labor. Viceroy Toledo carried out a major reorganization of Peruvian mining practice in 1574-1578, the key measures of which were the introduction of the amalgam process of extracting silver from its ore, using mercury, and the establishment of mita service for the mines on a very large scale. The mercury was mined at Huancavelica, and most of the silver was mined at Potosí, so these were the main centers to which mita labor was assigned. Some smaller gold and silver mines were so favored as well. The Spanish government gave formal approval of Toledo's measures, thus reversing the earlier royal policy that Indians were not to be used for forced labor in the mines. In spite of some very severe criticism and a number of serious proposals to abolish it, the mita system remained the basis of Peruvian mining until the end of the Colonial Period.68

The mita of Potosí was both the largest and the most burdensome of the colonial mita arrangements. It drew labor from the whole highland area between Cuzco and Tarija, affecting the lives of some 450,000 people at the time it was set up. As organized by Toledo, it called for one seventh of the adult male population in the provinces affected (14,248 men in 1578) to go to Potosí each year and remain there for twelve months. Each man was supposed to work one week and have two weeks off so the effective labor force distributed among the Spanish proprieters (azogueros) was one third of the total mita; Cañete y


68 The best general summary of the history of the mita de minas, with references to the legislation governing it, is that given by Solórzano Pereira (and his successor), 1930, Vol. I, pp. 308-314. There is some additional information for Potosí in Cañete y Domínguez, 1871, pp. 179-181 and 1952, pp. 101-117. For Huancavelica the story can be extracted from the monographs of Lohmann Villena, 1949a, and Whitaker, 1941. Nearly all the relaciones de mando of the Peruvian viceroyas have something to say on the subject. Most of the secondary literature on the mita de minas is of very poor quality.
Dominguez gives 4,724 men as the figure for 1578. The effective labor force was called the *mita ordinaria*. The men were expected to work a twelve hour day, five days a week, with Sunday off and Monday devoted to straightening out the week’s work assignments. Apologists for the mita since the seventeenth century have pointed out that the system only required four months’ forced labor once in seven years from a given individual. There is nothing wrong with the arithmetic of this statement, but it gives a very inadequate picture of what the mita meant to the men who served in it.

Our best picture of the economics of Potosí mine labor is given by Antonio de Ayans, writing in 1596. The daily wage of free labor at Potosí at this period was 12 reales. At this rate, a man could earn 30 pesos (of 8 reales) a month. Ayans estimates that a miner’s monthly expenses for food alone would come to 28½ pesos; other obligations, including taxes, would bring his total needs up to 60 pesos if he was the head of a family. Ayans does not suggest how the deficit could be made up, but one obvious way would be for the laborer’s wife and children to work also. Another source of additional income was provided by the right of *k’apcha* (share) which the workmen enjoyed. Over Sunday, when Spanish mining operations were suspended, any Indian who wished to do so could enter the mines and extract ore for himself. Evidently the opportunity was not wasted, for a sample account for the years 1773-1777 indicates that more silver was turned in to the Banco de Rescates by *k’apcha* workers than by the Spanish proprietors in each of the years in question. The figures suggest some interesting reflections on the efficiency of Spanish mining operations.

The wages paid to the free laborer (*mingado* or *alquila*) were thus only about half his subsistence requirements. The wages of the mitayo, or *indio de cédula*, were fixed by law at 4 reales a day, or one third of those paid to free labor. He only had to work for this rate one week out of three, however. The other two weeks he could work at the free rate. Thus his monthly earnings would be either 20 or 25 pesos, depending on whether his turn at forced labor came up once or twice in the month. The legal wage for mitayos remained the same for two hundred years, while the free labor rate fluctuated somewhat with the labor supply and the cost of living. The free labor rate always remained higher than the mita rate, however.

The financial problems of the mitayos were aggravated by the fact
that they had to leave their homes and travel long distances to work in Potosí. Ayans reports that it took the mita contingent from Chucuito two months to travel the hundred leagues or so to Potosí; it must have taken the mitayos of Tinta and Quispicanchi three months. The mitayos usually took their families with them, and they had to take their own food and bedding for the trip, so the pace was set by the strength of the small children and the independence of the pack llamas. Legally, the mitayos were supposed to be paid for their travel time; in practice, they were paid nothing at all for it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Spanish proprietors said that they were retaining the travel money for the trip to Potosí to compensate themselves for shortages in the number of mitayos who arrived and the money for the trip home on the grounds that the mitayos were in debt to them. Later, in the eighteenth century, the proprietors paid the travel money for the return trip only, not a very serious financial burden because nowhere near all the mitayos who came to Potosí returned home again. Also, the pay rate was low. It was ½ real per league, and the mitayos did about two leagues per day. Furthermore, the proprietors counted the leagues in round numbers and from Potosí to the nearest town in each province, not to the mitayo’s home. In effect, the mitayos paid their own travel expenses. Ayans gives a graphic picture of the departure of the mita of Chucuito in the 1590’s, an exodus of 7,000 men, women and children with over 40,000 llamas and alpacas for food and transport.

In addition to paying their own travel expenses, the mitayos had to bring a “present” (rikuchikuy) for the Capitán Mayor de la Mita and the Alcaldes Veedores del Cerro. Furthermore, they had to pay about twice as much tribute as they normally paid at home, the bizarre theory behind this law being that the Indians were earning hard money in the mines, whereas at home they were just farming.

Working conditions deteriorated rapidly. In the 1590’s the mine workers were put on double shift, a p’unchaw-run (day man) being replaced at sunset by a tinta-run (night man). About 1610 the proprietors decided that they were losing time changing shifts, so they started keeping the workmen underground continuously from Monday evening to Saturday evening. The pickmen were distributed in teams of three; one worked while the other two ate or slept in the mine.
behind him. The shifts were timed by candle; when the candle burned out it was time to change. The pick was an iron bar weighing twenty to twenty-five pounds and the ore was a rock so hard that observers compared it to flint. The mine was damp and the air bad. This continuous work system was never legal, but it remained in effect throughout the seventeenth century. The viceroy Conde de Lemos made a determined effort to stop it in 1670, but the proprietors refused to comply, threatening to close down the mine if the order was enforced.78 Caiete y Domínguez, writing in 1796, describes only night work in the mines and does not make it clear what changes in working-hours had taken place since the time of the Conde de Lemos.79

In the eighteenth century the greatest source of abuse of mine labor was the use of work quotas, another illegal practice. The pick work was done by volunteer labor and the mitayos had the job of carrying the ore out of the mine to the sorting yards. The ore was carried in a leather sack holding 100 lbs., and each mitayo was expected to complete a quota of twenty-five sacks of ore (one palla) in twelve hours. The wage of 4 reales was cut proportionately if the quota was not met. Given the depth of the mine, access to which was provided only by long ladders, the quota was an impossible one, and the only way a mitayo could meet it was to hire an assistant (yana-pakoq) out of his own pocket. In addition, although the ordinances stipulated that mitayos were to be given two candles a night, they were only given one and had to pay for the second themselves.80

Under such conditions, many mitayos ended their year in debt and unable to go home until they could earn enough as volunteers to pay their obligations. When and if they did go home after an absence of thirteen to eighteen months or more, depending on distance and debts, they would be dependent on the charity of their neighbors while they tried to get their abandoned farms started again. Many preferred not to go home at all but to abandon their houses and land and go to work on some Spanish hacienda in a strange province where, until 1732, their status as forasteros made them legally exempt from mita service, and, in practice, from tribute also. The most common goal of this migration was the Yungas frontier of Carabaya and Larecaja which was not subject to the mita of Potosí at all.

Each escape of this sort increased the burden of those who stayed at home. The mita quotas decreased much more slowly than the decrease in the number of originarios available to meet them, and the

80 Ibid.
proprietors of Potosí were merciless in their insistence that the quotas be met to the last man. If the number was short an officer was sent, at the Indians’ expense, to collect the missing men and complete it. In an effort to increase the pressure on the originarios to stay home or return, the caciques were made responsible for filling mita quotas. Marcos Thupa Amaro, uncle of the Inca rebel leader, who served as cacique of Surimana from 1750 to 1766, was bankrupted by the seizure of a train of mules and a hundred pesos’ worth of goods because his mita quota was one man short. The corregidores could give their subjects no protection, because the governor of Potosí had the authority to suspend any corregidor who failed to dispatch the mita. As a result of all this relentless pressure by the Potosí proprietors, it became necessary to send men back to Potosí after much less than their theoretical period of six years at home between turns. As early as 1596 there were cases in which a man was sent back to Potosí as soon as he got home. Even so, the mitas were chronically short.

It was possible for a man who had property to buy his way out of the mita, either by hiring a substitute or by making a cash payment. In Chucuito in 1596 it cost a man the equivalent of 426 pesos to hire a substitute, a good indication of how much the mita was dreaded. By the middle of the seventeenth century mining was less profitable, and the proprietors were willing to accept cash payments (indios de plata) instead of mitayos. The amount collected from each mitayo in 1655 was 250 pesos. Theoretically the proprietor was supposed to use the money he received to hire a volunteer to do the mitayo’s work, but many proprietors preferred to turn their indios de plata into indios de faltriquera by pocketing the money and doing that much less mining. This practice was a nightmare to the Spanish authorities but they were never able to stop it.

Conditions were similar in the other mines. At Huancavelica they were worse because many mitayos died slowly, azogados, from breathing the poisonous mercury dust. Mita labor was also assigned to the obrajes or factories in which manufacturing was done in the viceroyalty. This practice, and indeed the obrajes themselves, had no Inca precedent. Under the Inca Empire manufacturing was a state monopoly, and the work was done by full time specialists supported out of state revenues. The

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81 Ayans, 1951, p. 37; Mora Chimo Capac, 1732, p. 16.
82 Ciudad del Cuzco, 1872, p. 230.
84 Ayans, 1951, p. 39.
85 Sarmiento de Sotomayor, 1899, pp. 30-31.
obraje was a European institution which acquired some special characteristics in America. The earliest one in Peru is said to have been a cloth factory at Sapallanga (Jauja) established probably in the 1550's. The number of obrajes increased rapidly, and Viceroy Toledo found it necessary to regulate working conditions in them in 1577. The seventeenth century was the period of greatest prosperity for obraje operation, but this type of manufacturing continued to be an important part of the Peruvian economy until independence was established. Then the flood of English goods that entered the country swept away local manufacturing except in the most remote districts.

The majority of the obrajes turned out woolen and cotton cloth by the yard on foot-treadle looms of European type. The paños de Quito were especially renowned and were traded all over South America. There were also some obrajes devoted to the manufacture of cordage and sacking, sandals, felt hats, leather goods, gunpowder, and arquebus fuses. Many of these factories were very impressive establishments. At San José de Conchacalla near Pomacanchi (Department of Cuzco) are the ruins of an obraje which was sacked by Thupa Amaro in 1780; the loot is said to have amounted to 13,000 pesos and twenty piaras of cloth. The buildings of the obraje were solidly constructed of masonry and adobe with two large patios, a chapel, a fulling mill (batán), and a grist mill. Smaller manufacturing establishments were called chorrillos.

Most of the obrajes were owned by individuals (particulares), not infrequently by encomenderos or priests, although it was supposed to be illegal for either group to have business dealings with the natives entrusted to them. Other obrajes belonged to religious orders and a few directly to the crown. Many Indian communities established their own obrajes in the second half of the sixteenth century, operating them as a means of paying their tribute assessments. Manufacturing was too lucrative a business to be left in native hands, however, and Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1596-1604) began to appoint Spanish administrators to the obrajes de comunidad. The salaries of these administrators were high by colonial standards; the administrators of the obrajes of Quito got from 1,200 to nearly 2,000 pesos a

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87 Coppa, 1891, pp. 32-33, 37.
88 Toledo, 1925.
89 Interesting details of the work done in a textile obraje are given in the records of the Jesuit obraje of Cacamarea in 1703, published by Romero (1923).
90 Pérez Tamayo, 1947, p. 172.
92 Coppa, 1891, p. 128; Pérez Tamayo, 1947, p. 184.
year in 1639, more than the pay of most corregidores. Such ap­point­ments proved a convenient way of taking care of the viceroy's re­tainers and dependents at the expense of the natives. Naturally, there were many abuses, and the administration of the obrajes de comunidad was notoriously inefficient. The protectores de indios pro­posed as a remedy that these obrajes be leased to individual Spaniards, and some were being so leased by 1620. Finally, in the first half of the eighteenth century, the government ordered the obrajes de comunidad sold at auction. They were bought up by individual Spaniards at ridiculously low prices.

The obrajes seem to have been granted the services of 100 to 400 mitayos each. Most of these were boys 9 to 17 years old; for example, the obraje of Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción de Yaruqui was assigned 12 adult mitayos and 100 boys in the visita of 1683. This system had several advantages from the employers' point of view. In the first place, the ordenanzas set the wages of boys at much less than those of adults. In the second place, boys were not subject to most other types of mita service, so the expansion of manufacturing did not cut into the general labor supply as badly as it would if only adults had been used.

According to the Ordenanzas de Obrajes of 1664, the mita for obrajes was supposed to be taken from communities not more than two leagues away, and the mitayos were to be paid ½ real per league for travel money. In the sierra of Lima and Charcas, the mita was to be one seventh of the men (or boys) available; on the coast one sixth, and in Quito one fifth. The mitas were supposed to change every six months. In the work year the mitayos were to be allowed forty days off to take care of their crops and up to one month's sick leave with pay. The legal work day was from 7 A.M. to 5 or 6 P.M. with half an hour off for breakfast and two hours for lunch. Weavers and nappers were supposed to be paid 47 pesos 2 reales a year except in the district of Cuzco where the salary was 56 pesos 4 reales. Other adult workers got 40 pesos 4 reales (in Cuzco, 48 pesos 4 reales). Boys were to be paid 24 pesos 2 reales (in Cuzco, 28 pesos 3 reales). All workers were also entitled to six pounds of meat a week or one real a day for their food. This pay scale is considerably higher than the one set in Toledo's ordenanza of 1577.

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93 Cappa, 1891, pp. 183-184.
94 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
95 Pérez Tamayo, 1947, p. 201.
96 Ibid., pp. 195-197.
97 Bonavides de la Cueva, 1664; Toledo, 1925.
The obraje system was subject to many abuses and hence was a source of constant complaints. The managers gave their workmen excessive daily quotas and punished those who failed to complete them. They made the men work through rest periods or after legal closing time. They deducted fees and charges from the men’s pay or forced them to accept cloth instead of cash. The work rooms were usually kept locked to prevent the workmen from moving around and loafing. The obrasjes usually had their own illegal stocks and prison cells with which to punish refractory workmen, and the lash was used freely. The owners of obrasjes hired professional bullies called guatacos (watakoq), mestizos, negros, or mulattoes whose job it was to track down fugitive laborers or force them to come back by terrorizing their wives and children. Regular bribes were paid to the corregidores, and visitadores were silenced by payments or threats.

Two incidents may be cited which throw much light on the way in which obraje labor was regarded by Spaniards and natives. One is that 89 persons implicated in the abortive Inca rebellion of 1737 were condemned to work in the obrasjes as punishment. The other is that the Indians of Chinchaioca offered in 1623 to serve in the dreaded mita of Huancavelica if they could be excused from obraje service.

It should be noted that not all obrasjes were served by mita labor. The ones that had no mita assignment used instead “free” labor which in some respects was even worse off than the mitayos. The men were encouraged to accept advances and were kept thereafter in a state of debt servitude, sometimes for life.

LAND. In Inca territory, as elsewhere in Spanish America, the Colonial Period saw the growth of land ownership by Spanish families. By the time of independence much of the best farm land had passed from Inca into Spanish hands, although, since the Europeans and criollos mostly refused to work, the labor on these estates was done by natives in a state of peonage. This much is common knowledge, but, curiously enough, little research has been done on the process by which the colonial revolution in land tenure was accomplished. The only studies on Peru known to me are papers of 1879 and 1900 by Enrique Torres Saldamando.

It was once assumed that encomienda grants included the granting of land, and statements to this effect can be found even in recent publications. The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming:102

103 Esquivel y Navia, 1901, p. 291.
104 Lohmann Villena, 1949a, p. 266.
But if the encomienda was not the origin of Spanish land holding, what explanation is there for this important phenomenon?

Much land was taken by Spanish settlers, many of them also encomenderos, in the early years of the conquest. The Inca system of taxation involved payment in labor, not in kind. In each district certain lands were set aside for the support of the government and the state religion, and the inhabitants furnished the labor to cultivate these lands. They paid nothing to the government from the produce of their own fields. The system provided a form of social security also, for there was usually a surplus in the government’s share, and the surplus was made available to any district where the crops had failed. When the Spaniards overthrew the Inca regime, they claimed the government land for the Spanish king as successor to the Inca emperor. Then the cabildos of the newly founded Spanish municipalities assumed the right to make land grants and granted much of the Inca government land to individual Spaniards. The early volumes of cabildo records are full of such grants, although nothing is ever said about prior ownership.

The exactions of the Spanish population bore most heavily on the Inca land holders, the hatun-runa who paid tribute and were subject to mita service. As noted in the previous section, Spanish law left one loophole for escape if a man became desperate enough. Mita and tribute were assessed only on the inhabitants of a given province who belonged there by birth and descent (originarios); outsiders (forasteros) were not subjected to these obligations until 1732. Hence, a man could escape several of the most crushing burdens of the colonial system by fleeing to another province. To do so he had to abandon his house and land, of course. Title to it would fall ultimately to his community, which might be tempted to sell it as surplus land or might lose it outright if a Spaniard with money and influence claimed it was in the public domain and offered to buy it from the king. An anonymous report of 1775 gives some idea of the scale on which this abandonment of property proceeded. In the districts of La Paz and Chuquisaca, the ones chiefly affected by the mita of Potosí, 58% of the able-bodied men were forasteros. Cuzco had 38% forasteros and Huamanga 28%. No district in the viceroyalty of Peru had less than 20% forasteros.

At the same time that the flight of men to other provinces vacated land which could be added to Spanish estates, the migration provided...
the labor needed to work the growing haciendas. The refugees arrived destitute and were happy to be allowed to work a small plot on a Spanish estate even on the most disadvantageous terms. The process described was cumulative throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; as more men fled the mita service there were fewer left to meet the provincial quotas and the burden on the survivors became increasingly heavy. It seems probable that only the general inefficiency of the Spanish colonial system prevented the total uprooting of the surviving Inca population.

The early grants of land to Spaniards were made freely to encourage settlement and reward services to the government. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, however, Philip II found himself in serious financial straits complicated by the loss of the Great Armada in 1588. One of the measures his government devised to meet the emergency was a general review of Spanish land holding in the colonies, grantees to pay a fee for confirmation of title (composición de tierras). At the same time the colonial authorities were urged to sell off as much of the vacant public land as possible without taking land needed by the Indians. Orders to this effect were given in two cédulas of November 1, 1591. These orders were put into effect in Peru by the fourth Marqués de Cañete (vicerey 1590-1596), and the results were highly profitable to the royal treasury. The matter seems to have been handled with some discretion, for comparatively few complaints were made by the natives.

In spite of the revenues received from America, the economic position of Spain continued to deteriorate, and by 1631 the government was so desperate for funds that Philip IV ordered a new composición de tierras, this time with instructions that even persons who claimed land without legal title might secure such title by making a satisfactory payment. The Conde de Chinchón, who was viceroy of Peru at the time, protested this dangerous measure, but the king wrote him in 1634 that it must be enforced. The Spaniards in Peru immediately took advantage of the invitation to claim more land, and the complaints of the natives grew so urgent that in 1648 the king ordered a review of all the composiciones resulting from the cédula of 1631. In cédulas of 1651 and 1654 Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra was ordered to organize a Junta de Tierras y Desagravios de Indios. It functioned until 1662.

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107 Torres Saldamando, 1900b, pp. 89-91.
109 Toledo y Leyva, 1899, p. 25; Escalona y Agüero, 1775, Book I, p. 82.
110 Sarmiento de Sotomayor, 1899, pp. 37-40; summary in Torres Saldamando, 1900b, pp. 86-87.
The review of land titles was entrusted to visitadores de tierras who traveled through the provinces hearing complaints. As an example of the procedure followed, we can take the case of the native village of Qorwani in the valley of Abancay. The complaint of the villagers was presented through their caciques to the visitador Fray Domingo de Cabrera Lartaun in 1656; their petition alleged that the lands of the village were insufficient. The visitador had a count of the villagers made and measured their lands. To determine whether the lands were sufficient or not, he applied the rule that each tribute payer should have 4 *tupu* of land and each dependent 2 *tupu*. The cacique principal was supposed to have 16 *tupu* and the segunda persona 8. Twenty *tupu* were allowed as a margin for population increase and 10 for commons. The total population of the village was 556, and Fray Domingo found that their lands were 266 *tupu* short of the minimum needed. He told the villagers to choose this amount from among the best lands taken from them in the composición and gave them possession of the parcels they selected.

If this case is a fair sample of the procedure followed in the visita it is easy to understand how so much land passed into Spanish hands in the Colonial Period. No effort was made to return all lands unjustly taken from the natives. The sole object of the visita was to ensure that each tribute payer had a farm of minimum size left to him, using a formula which allowed about nine acres for the support of a family of five persons. This quantity of land would be a medium allotment for a peon on an hacienda in the same area today.

The major legislation on land problems in the eighteenth century appears to be that included in the cedula of October 15, 1754, reproduced by Ots Capdequi. This decree also provides a loophole by which lands claimed in excess of those covered by titles presented for confirmation could be acquired by payment of fees.

There was a permanent court in Lima to handle land sales and composiciones from 1720 to 1782, and revisitas are mentioned for 1722-25 and 1786. Opportunities were thus always available for further acquisition by Spaniards of lands formerly belonging to the natives, although the process probably proceeded more gradually than in the bonanza period between the orders of 1634 and 1648. Some

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111 The *tupu* of Abancay was one twelfth of a *fanegada*. Since the *fanegada* was an area 288 varas by 144 varas, each *tupu* measured 72 varas by 48 varas, thus equaling about three fourths of an acre (Expediente de tierras de Qorwani, ms.; cf. Torres Saldamando, 1900b, p. 85. The original Inca *tupu* was about 100 by 50 varas (Cobo, 1890-95, Vol. IV, p. 224).

112 Expediente de las tierras de Qorwani, ms.


114 Torres Saldamando, 1900b, pp. 87-88; Croix, 1859, pp. 91-95.
detailed information on the methods used by Spanish residents to get lands from the Indians in the eighteenth century is given by Juan and Ulloa.\textsuperscript{115}

DOCTRINA. The general pattern of native religion in the Andean area at the time of the Inca conquest was the worship of a multitude of supernatural powers which the Incas called generically wak'a (usually rendered uaca or guaca in sixteenth century Spanish records). These wak'a were the spirits of particular places (mountains, lakes, springs, rocks) and their power was consequently local. Certain very important wak'a like Tití-qaqqa on the Island of Titicaca and Pacha-kanaq at Paucacamac were more generally revered, and pilgrims journeyed from great distances to visit their shrines. Most of the wak'a were represented by portable cult objects, usually images or curiously shaped stones. In addition to the wak'a, Andean peoples generally worshipped some nature deities which were identified with heavenly bodies or natural forces such as the sea or thunder.

The great Inca organizer, Pachakuti (1438-1471), devised a new state religion which he imposed on all his subjects. Existing cults were not molested, except that many of the more influential wak'a were taken to Cuzco and enshrined there as symbols of imperial unity. People were, however, expected to worship the Inca gods in addition to their own. The Incas were just as interested as the Spaniards were later in spreading the "true religion," and they used their desire to do so as a justification for conquest. Pachakuti's doctrine emphasized worship of a great creator god and, under him, of a group of nature deities of whom the Sun was the most important. There was an organized priesthood headed by a near relative of the emperor.

The Spanish invaders were little interested in learning about Inca religion, and few of them ever understood it. They did not disbelieve in the existence of the Inca gods; they regarded them rather as perverse and dangerous manifestations of the Devil which could be vanquished with the aid of the Holy Trinity, the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints. Our Lady made a miraculous appearance at Cuzco during the conquest to help the Spaniards in battle, just as the Inca creator god occasionally appeared to men in a moment of crisis. Since the chief moral justification of the Spanish conquest was that the pope had commissioned the Spanish kings to win the inhabitants of the Indies to the True Faith, efforts were made from the first to convert the natives of Peru. Pachakuti's religion was so closely identified with the Inca state that it was generally discredited on the collapse of Inca power; many, especially among the Inca nobility, were ready

\textsuperscript{115} Juan and Ulloa, 1918, Vol. I, pp. 318-322.
to accept the Spanish religion on the grounds that its efficacy was proved by the success of Spanish arms. The worship of the wak’a was not so easily given up, however, and the natives attempted to do as they had done under Inca rule and add the cults of the conqueror to their own.

The Spanish priests and soldiers tried to make their point of view clear by destroying native shrines and building churches where the shrines had stood, but they were handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the language and lack of understanding of the details of wak’a worship. It was not until after 1550 that systematic lists of native shrines began to be made, and the first printed grammar and dictionary of the Inca language did not appear until 1560. The encomenderos do not appear to have taken too seriously their obligation to provide “religious instruction” to the natives entrusted to them, and the number of priests available was hardly adequate to the task. In 1565 Governor Castro complained to the king that, although some 300,000 persons had been baptized, it would be hard to find forty real Christians in the number.116

As noted earlier, the Inca government in exile in Vilcabamba stirred up a great religious revival in 1565 as part of a plan for a general rebellion. The religious movement was called taki-‘onqoy (dance sickness); it was propagated by itinerant preachers who taught that all the wak’a had come back to life and were being marshalled by Pacha-kamaq and Titi-qaqa into two armies to attack the Christian god. The Inca people were urged to desert Christianity and return to their traditional rites. The taki-‘onqoy had one new feature; instead of giving oracles through regular priests at the shrines, the gods now spoke through persons who became possessed. Fr. Francisco de la Cruz wrote to the king in alarm that more than 200 native religious leaders had been found in the province of Huaylas alone.117

The Spanish authorities moved promptly to deal with this emergency, and ecclesiastical visitadores were sent out to combat the Inca religious revival by destroying more shrines, arresting native religious leaders, and preaching. With the fall of Vilcabamba in 1572 and the removal of the natives from their traditional settlements and associated places of worship in Toledo’s resettlement, the religious re-

117 Letter of January 25, 1566, in Lissón Chaves, 1943-46, Vol. II, no. 7, pp. 304-308. The most detailed account of the taki-‘onqoy is the one given by Cristóbal de Molina (1943, pp. 78-84). There is other information about it in a letter of Gaspar de Sotelo to the Corregidor of Cuzco, March 24, 1555 (Lohmann Villena, 1941, pp. 5-6) and in two probanzas de servicios, executed for P. Cristóbal de Albornoz in 1570 and 1584, of which extracts have been published by Barriga (1953, pp. 122-135, 293-301).
vival gradually died down and the Spanish ecclesiastical authorities relaxed. Archbishop Mogrovejo of Lima made another visita of his diocese in 1593.

It came as a real shock to the Spanish churchmen in Peru when, in 1608, P. Francisco de Avila, Inca-speaking priest of San Damian in Huachiri, discovered that his parishioners, though cooperative enough in public, were still practicing virtually all their traditional rites in secret. It took the authorities two years to convince themselves that Avila knew what he was talking about; then visitadores were appointed and a large scale campaign of extirpación de la idolatría was undertaken.\footnote{Avila, 1918, pp. 57-98; Arriaga, 1910, pp. 1-10.}

The activities of the visitadores de idolatría were similar to those used in Europe by the Inquisition (Holy Office) for the suppression of heresy. The Inquisition existed in Peru, of course, but it was not supposed to have jurisdiction over the Indians. The bishops therefore had to set up their own machinery for finding and punishing natives who persisted in clinging to their own religion. The procedure of the visitadores engaged in such work is described in some detail in the reports they filed with the bishop on the completion of their assignment. The visitador was an ecclesiastical judge, and he was sent out with a full complement of notaries and other assistants. When he entered a native village he made a public announcement of his commission and invited all persons having knowledge of "idolatrous" practices to "relieve their consciences" by informing him. A few informers were usually forthcoming. The visitador then collected testimony by questioning privately all persons implicated. Accused persons against whom there was considerable evidence were subjected to torture if they refused to confess; a whipcord applied to the thumbs was the usual method.\footnote{The cord was twisted on the thumbs until the blood spurted. Cordele was one of the commonest methods of judicial torture used in Europe at the time.} When sufficient evidence to convict had been assembled, the visitador pronounced sentence. Cooperative and penitent sinners were given light sentences such as sweeping out the church for a period of two to six years. More obstinate ones had their hair cropped, were given fifty lashes, and were ordered to live in a town distant from the shrines where they had been convicted of worshiping. The persons sentenced were warned that if they relapsed they faced more serious sentences such as four years' service in the galleys of Callao for the men and perpetual servitude in Lima convent for the women. There was a special reformatory called Casa de Santa Cruz in the Cercado of Lima, founded by the Príncipe de
Esquilache, for convicted native priests.\textsuperscript{120} Cult objects were publicly burned and crosses set up at the native shrines. Offerings, stored crops, and domestic animals belonging to the wak'a were sold at auction and the proceeds applied to the salaries of the visitador's assistants. Lands belonging to the wak'a were turned over to the local church. Copies of the records of the trials were deposited in the church and with the corregidor of the province so that the local civil and religious authorities could keep an eye on the persons sentenced.

The bishops found it necessary to send out visitadores de idolatria periodically throughout the Colonial Period. For example, after the first round of trials following Avila's discovery, visitadores were sent to the province of Huarochiri in 1642, 1660, 1700, and 1723. In spite of all persecutions, however, the records of the later visitas indicate about as much persistence of native religion as the earlier, though the Spaniards seem to have been successful in reducing the number of native priests.\textsuperscript{121}

In the end it was the Inca point of view that triumphed in most areas. Christianity was accepted as a second religion, while the traditional worship was carried out as well, sometimes secretly and sometimes in the open. The way in which the combination is made today has been analyzed recently by Núñez del Prado.\textsuperscript{122}

Considering the incessant persecutions to which it has been subjected throughout the past four hundred years, the survival of native religion among the Incas is a surprising phenomenon. Christians in general are experts at religious persecution, partly from their own historical traditions of suffering from it, and the Spanish church had a long record of successful suppression of heresy at home. Why did it fail in Peru? One reason was certainly negligence on the part of the parish priests who did not maintain sufficient vigilance over their parishioners between visitas. A reading of the visita records for Huarochiri suggests that native reactions also had something to do with it. The priests visualized resistance to conversion only in the form of defiance. The Incas, however, resisted by yielding, and the visitadores found their behavior incomprehensible. Persons accused

\textsuperscript{120} Cobo, 1882, pp. 140-141.

\textsuperscript{121} The foregoing account of visitas de idolatria is put together from the records of the visitas of Huarochiri and Ambar (Chancay) in the Archivo Arzobispal, Lima. These records were found by George Kubler in 1948-49 and he was kind enough to call my attention to them. A selection of them was made by Nancy C. Gilmer and transcribed for the Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. Miss Gilmer used this material for an M.A. thesis (Gilmer, ms.). On the question of "idolatria" see also Kubler, 1946, pp. 400-406.

\textsuperscript{122} Núñez del Prado, 1955, pp. 15-18.
of idolatry would confess all, give up their cult objects without complaint, and promise to be good Christians. As penitent sinners, they would be given relatively light sentences. The visitador would then return to Lima and report the complete success of his mission, while the natives quietly made themselves new cult objects and went on with their ancient rites. The frustration and exasperation of the visitadores at such conduct is quite clear in their reports, but they never found an answer to it.

No doubt a third factor in the failure of the Spaniards to win the Incas away from their native religion was the close identification of the church with the Spanish government. This is an aspect of colonial affairs which is often misunderstood, even by students of Spanish American history. The organization of the church in the Spanish dominions was entirely controlled by the king through his right of patronazgo, and the church was as much an arm of the government as the army or the fiscal administration. Military and financial support for its activities was provided when necessary, and ecclesiastics were expected to do all in their power to encourage loyalty and obedience to the civil government in the population at large. On at least two occasions, mentioned above, Spanish priests in Peru reported to the government information about plans for rebellion which had been revealed to them under the seal of the confessional, and such action was considered highly meritorious.123

The church in Peru was operated by, and primarily for, the Spanish population of the country. The second Provincial Council of Lima (1567) forbade the ordination of Indians and mestizos and ordered that they be admitted to no church office above that of sacristan or acolyte. The Incas complained to Pope Gregory XIII (February 13, 1583) but without any immediate result. A century later the Congregation of the Council directed that Indians, mestizos and mulattoes not be barred from ordination.124 Finally Charles II made the ordination of Indians legal by cedula of March 12, 1697. Some attention was paid to this order in Mexico, but it was ignored in Peru. At the complaint of Vicente Mora Chimo Capac, the Inca procurador, the cedula was reissued in 1725. It still had not been obeyed when it was issued for the third time on September 11, 1766.125 This time some attention seems to have been paid to the royal wishes, for a num-

123 Mano de Velasco to the king, September 24, 1750, in Loayza, 1942, pp. 161-178.
125 The cedula of 1766 incorporates the other two. It was printed by order of Viceroy Amat and then reprinted in 1767 at the expense of la nación indígena del Perú. See Vargas Ugarte, 1949b, pp. 126-130; Paz, 1952, Vol. II, pp. 282-287.
number of Incas were ordained before the end of the Colonial Period; Justo Apu Sahuaraura, Gregorio Choquehuanca, and Vicente Pazos Kanki are examples that come to mind. The government’s grip on the church was slipping, however, and ecclesiastics took a prominent part in the Cuzco rebellion of 1814.

Not only were Indians barred from ordination for most of the Colonial Period in Peru, they were also not given the Eucharist. The First Provincial Council of Lima (1551-1552) ordered that the only sacraments administered to Indians be Baptism, Penitence, and Matrimony. Bishops were permitted to grant Confirmation in individual cases. Indians needed a special authorization from the bishop to receive the Eucharist. The Second (1567) and Third (1582-1584) Provincial Councils relaxed these restrictions on paper, but a pattern had been set which continued to modern times. Peña Montenegro noted that in his time (1666) parish priests commonly refused the Eucharist to Indians in Quito, and Vargas Ugarte says that until quite recently it was commonly refused to Indians in the Peruvian sierra.126

Thus there was no native clergy during most of the Colonial Period, and the native laymen were not admitted to full participation in the sacraments. Even those Incas who became fully converted and devout believers were treated as second class Christians, a status which they found understandably irksome.127

Native parishes were not administered exactly like parishes in Europe. In America a distinction was made between Spanish parishes (curatos) and Indian ones (doctrinas), necessary in the first place because a priest was supposed to demonstrate proficiency in the native language in order to hold a parish of the latter type, and in the second place because there was a special body of church legislation governing doctrinas. In the doctrinas, children were obliged to attend classes daily, early in the morning, and were supposed to be taught prayers, the catechism, church music, and reading and writing by the cura or by a specially appointed teacher. The instruction in reading and writing was seldom given in practice; Spaniards had a deep mistrust of literate Indians. Adults were supposed to attend compulsory catechism classes on Wednesdays, Fridays, and Sundays, and attendance at Mass on Sunday and feast days was also obligatory. The cura appointed native police officials (fiscales and alguaciles) to round up the congregation for these occasions. The catechism classes were fre-

127 Cf. the protest of Calixto de San José Tupac Inca in Loayza, 1948.
quentely interfered with by mita obligations, but Spanish authorities usually gave the natives Sunday off so that they could attend Mass. The curas were supposed to examine their native parishioners at least once a year on their knowledge of Christian doctrine and impose public penance on those who gave unsatisfactory answers. 128

The curas doctrineros had special authorization to impose corporal punishment for religious offenses. The Synod of Quito of 1596 established the following schedule of penalties: contumacious concubinage or separation of husband and wife, 50 lashes; failure to confess, 24 lashes the first time and 50 lashes the second; failure to attend Sunday Mass, 24 lashes the first time and 50 the second; eating meat on Friday, 24 lashes in public the first time and 50 the second. The lash consisted of three straps about two feet long, according to Guaman Poma’s illustrations; it was the same instrument used in punishing civil offenses. 129 The police power legally entrusted to the curas doctrineros was thus very considerable, and it was increased in practice by the fact that the civil authorities in Inca villages were natives, while the priests were Spaniards.

Abuses of power by the curas doctrineros became so common that a man who did his duty was likely to be praised for exceptionally meritorious conduct. One of the commonest abuses was assessing illegal dues under the guise of gifts; each parishioner might be required to bring an egg to Sunday Mass, for example, or the congregation might be assessed a sheep a week for the cura’s table. Many priests claimed that the long tradition of usage made such assessments their right. 130 Illegal fees were commonly charged for church services of all kinds; the fees for funerals were likely to be especially high. Another abuse was requiring unpaid personal service, either under the guise of penance or as a form of mita. It was usually the women, children and old men who were called on for this service, for the adult men were kept busy by the corregidores and encomenderos. 131 It was also quite common (and still is in the sierra) for the curases to keep one or more native concubines and raise large families of children ("so-brinos"). Guaman Poma was probably right in attributing to the curas a major role in the growth of a mestizo population in the rural areas. 132

128 Ord., 1598, pp. 52-56.
129 Peña Montenegro, 1754, p. 90, Guaman Poma de Ayala, 1936, pp. 582 [596], 385 [589], 591 [605], 609 [623]-625 [639], 652 [666], 661 [675]-670 [685].
130 Peña Montenegro, 1754, pp. 107-110.
131 Cf. Guaman Poma de Ayala, 1936, pp. 504 [578], 645 [659].
Unhappy as is the general picture of the relationships between the Spanish church and the Incas, it must not be forgotten that there were always some ecclesiastics who championed the natives, often with great courage and spirit, against the economic extortions to which they were subject and the brutality of secular Spaniards. The first such defenders of the Incas were Dominicans like Domingo de Santo Tomás and Bartolomé de Vega. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, Jesuits became prominent in this field; Antonio de Ayans is an outstanding example. In the eighteenth century it is Franciscans who stand out, and some, like Antonio Garro and Isidoro de Cala y Ortega, were deeply involved in the protests of the Inca nationalists of that period.

Our survey of the Spanish colonial institutions which most directly affected the Incas can be summed up by saying that Spanish colonial rule was characterized by economic exploitation and personal degradation of the natives. Both features were carried to an extreme which is difficult to credit unless one is familiar with the closely similar conditions in which the Incas of today live under the domination of the descendents of their colonial masters.

Apologists of the Spanish colonial regime have claimed repeatedly that the laws themselves were humane and that native complaints resulted from the failure of local officials to carry them out. Such a claim can be made only by a partisan selection of the laws considered. The laws which required forced labor at inadequate salaries were clearly exploitative, and so was the law which permitted the forced sale of goods at fixed prices. Other laws were, to say the least, discriminatory, like the ones which limited native land ownership to a low maximum figure while permitting the indefinite growth of Spanish estates. The assignment of Indians to forced labor in the mines equated them legally with Spaniards guilty of “atrocious” crimes, for only the worst criminals were sentenced to this type of labor in Spain.

All Spaniards had a hand in the exploitation of the Indians, from the king down, and royal protestations of solicitude for Spain’s American subjects cannot be accepted as giving an adequate picture of royal policy. Some of the worst abuses of the colonial system arose from such royal decisions as the sale of magistracies and the legalization of invalid land titles in return for payment. Measures like these, besides being directly harmful, had a demoralizing effect on subordinate officials. Bribery became an accepted feature of colonial life as the king’s loyal subjects followed His Majesty’s example.

However often the king protested the contrary, the colonial system permitted and even encouraged the exploitation of the native popula-
tion by civil and religious officials and by miners, manufacturers, merchants, and soldiers for their own profit. Spaniards in these categories either had legally or assumed tacitly excessive powers over the natives. They were so rarely punished for abusing the natives, even when their extortions led to armed rebellion, that they felt quite free to ignore inconvenient laws and instructions. The courts functioned largely for the benefit of the Spanish population, and it was virtually impossible for a native to obtain justice in a civil suit where his opponent was a Spaniard, European or criollo. The attitude of the courts is reflected by the decree issued by the Audiencia of Lima in 1563 that the testimony of two Indian men or three Indian women be considered equal to that of one Spaniard.\footnote{133 Audiencia de Lima, 1950.}

No wonder the Incas revolted.

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