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ISBN
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Authors
Maurer, WM
Lugo, A

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The Legacy of Michelle Rosaldo: Politics and Gender in Modern Societies

Alejandro Lugo and Bill Maurer

For the past twenty years the work of Michelle Z. Rosaldo has had a profound impact on feminism and anthropology, both among scholars who knew and worked closely with Rosaldo, and continued her research agenda after her death in 1981, and those, like the editors of this volume, who never knew Rosaldo but who find her work provocative and, in our own cases, were led to graduate work in feminist theory and anthropology in part because of her interventions. For both of the editors reading Rosaldo’s lead essay in Woman, Culture and Society (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974) was a defining moment in our anthropological educations and in our development as persons; it led us to rethink our position as gendered (male) subjects, to bring feminist analysis “home” to our everyday lives, and, ultimately, to become graduate students at Stanford University, where we studied with some of Rosaldo’s colleagues and coauthors.

Some of the contributors to this volume are anthropologists who knew and worked with Rosaldo (Lamphere, Collier, and MacCormack as colleagues and Gray as a student of hers) and some who had not but had relied heavily on her thinking (Diaz Barriga, Gutmann, Lugo, and Maurer). Four of these scholars (Diaz Barriga, Gutmann, Lugo, and Maurer) are younger male ethnographers who were trained in the tradition of feminist anthropology during the 1980s and received their Ph.D. degrees in the 1990s under female feminist anthropologists of Michelle Rosaldo’s generation. The intellectual combination of different genders and generations in the volume permits us, as editors, to make necessary connections between Michelle Rosaldo’s varied positionalities, as the remarkable young scholar that she herself was and as a feminist theorist who persuasively noted that “the tendency to ignore imbalances in order to permit a grasp of women’s lives has led too many scholars to forget that men and women ultimately
live together in the world and, so, that we will never understand the lives that women lead without relating them to men" (1980a:396).

In this sociological and theoretical sense the volume as a whole—and specifically the essays by Diaz Barriga, Gutmann, Lugo, and Maurer—shows how the anthropological study of “masculinity,” “femininity,” and gender (meaning both women and men) has been inspired by the work of Michelle Rosaldo. At the same time, and perhaps most important, the volume tries, from different gender, generational, and intellectual perspectives, to push the field of feminist anthropology forward by reconsidering several of Michelle Rosaldo’s lasting influences. The most important of these, ultimately, is best captured in Rosaldo’s own words, in which she stated not only that gender matters but that genders matter: “If men . . . appear to be the actors who create the social world, our task is neither to accept this fact as adequate in sociological terms nor to attempt, by stressing female action, to deny it. Instead, we must begin to analyze the social processes that give appearances like these their sense, to ask just how it comes about—in a world where people of both sexes make choices that count—that men come to be seen as the creators of collective good and the preeminent force in local politics” (1980a:414–15; emph. added).

We should state at the outset what this book is and is not about: it is more a productive than a critical retrospective of Michelle Rosaldo’s work; although it is not an uncritical commemoration, this book celebrates Michelle Rosaldo’s significant role, especially as the young theorist and ethnographer that she was, in helping shape the kind of anthropological enterprise that we practice today, in the late 1990s (and intend to be, we argue, for many generations to come). To that end the volume will provide an in-depth analysis of Rosaldo’s many contributions to anthropology and feminism. Yet this volume is not “the next step” in feminist anthropology: rather, we hope that a rereading of Rosaldo’s ideas and arguments, and their reconsideration vis-à-vis recent, exciting ethnographic work, will further enrich this vital branch of our field and help confirm its proper location at the center of the center of anthropological inquiry.

As editors, we hope to make a case for a general reconsideration of Rosaldo’s key theoretical ideas, especially those surrounding the public/domestic dichotomy, the self and emotion, social personhood, and critiques of essentialism in studies of gender and society. Each of the essays takes one or more of these analytically and politically useful insights from Rosaldo’s work and sets it in motion for new intellectual and political practices. The authors do not always share the same perspective on
Rosaldo’s work, and they do not necessarily agree with one another on Rosaldo’s legacy. But, together, they point to exciting syntheses of old and new feminist analysis and to new directions for feminist research and politics. We attempt to spell out some of these directions in this introduction.

We have organized this introduction in terms of what we see as Rosaldo’s major theoretical contributions to anthropology: her elaboration of the public/domestic analytical dichotomy for the analysis of gender cross-culturally; her intervention in the positivist agenda of cognitive and psychological anthropology; and her attention to the social bases of emotion and feeling. Each of Rosaldo’s contributions pointed toward and, we believe, can be used to push forward three recent analytical innovations in anthropology: an analysis of the biopolitics of populations; a consideration of the performative practices that constitute social subjects; and a questioning of the interiority presumed to inhere in socially produced individuals. Finally, we believe Rosaldo’s theoretical insights help us move beyond the quandaries of identity politics in useful and politically important ways.

From the Public/Domestic Dichotomy to the Biopolitics of Populations

The elaboration of the public/domestic analytic dichotomy to explain women’s subordination has arguably been Michelle Rosaldo’s most significant contribution to feminist anthropology. In her elemental feminist essay “Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview” Rosaldo proposed that “an opposition between ‘domestic’ and ‘public’ provides the basis of a structural framework necessary to identify and explore the place of male and female in psychological, cultural, social, and economic aspects of human life” (1974:23). More specifically, she stated:

“Domestic,” as used here, refers to those minimal institutions and modes of activity that are organized immediately around one or more mothers and their children; “public” refers to activities, institutions, and forms of association that link, rank, organize or subsume particular mother-child groups. Though this opposition will be more or less salient in different social and ideological systems, it does provide a universal framework for conceptualizing the activities of the sexes. The opposition does not determine cultural stereotypes or asymmetries in the evaluation of the sexes, but rather underlies them, to support a very
general (and, for women, often demeaning) identification of women with domestic life and of men with public life. These identifications, themselves neither necessary nor desirable, can all be tied to the role of women in child rearing; by examining their multiple ramifications, one can begin to understand the nature of female subordination and the ways it may be overcome. (23–24)

For Michelle Rosaldo what was “perhaps most striking and surprising is the fact that male, as opposed to female, activities are always recognized as predominantly important, and cultural systems give authority and value to the roles and activities of men” (19).

In the years following the publication of her essay anthropologists divested the cultural analysis from her theoretical framework and reduced it to positivist interpretations of domestic and public “spaces” (e.g., from the domestic kitchen to the public plaza or marketplace, respectively). Consequently, anthropologists went about attempting to draw the boundaries between the public and the private in particular societies, delineating how women’s work in the “domestic” had “public” ramifications, arguing that women did have public roles or authority, after all, and pointing out the limitations of the public/domestic dichotomy in societies that seemed not to have such clearly demarcated domains. When brought to “the field,” the dichotomy, not surprisingly, seemed to soften with use, and many began to view it less as an ethnographic certitude and more as a simple yet powerful imposition of Western categories on diverse cultural realities.

As emerges in several of the essays here (Collier, Lugo, Maurer, and Diaz Barriga), however, the recognition of the public/domestic dichotomy as an imposition of Western categories does not strip it of its usefulness and, in fact, is itself an important intervention in understanding the legacy of Enlightenment political philosophy and practice as it has impacted the world, both colonial and postcolonial. Studies of colonialism have demonstrated how colonial officials actively enforced public and private on colonized populations (e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Chatterjee 1993; Lazarus-Black 1994; Stoler 1995), generating a whole series of resistances against and capitulations to a bourgeois order spread through imperial ventures, war, and commerce. In fact, Michelle Rosaldo had much to say about the Victorian tenets that have given ideological support and constitution to gender relations during these imperial and colonial ventures since the turn of the century. As she wrote, “The turn-of-the-century social theorists [Durkheim, Spencer, Engels, Simmel, Malinowski, Radcliffe-
Brown, among others] whose writings are the basis of most modern social thinking tended without exception to assume that women's place was in the home. In fact, the Victorian doctrine of separate male and female spheres was, I would suggest, quite central to their sociology” (1980a:401).

Many anthropologists are now engaged in a critical reassessment of the imposition and spread of Enlightenment categories, their internal contradictions and their constitutive force in colonial and postcolonial worlds (Handler and Segal 1990; Fitzpatrick 1992; Strathern 1992; Thomas 1994; Collier, Maurer, and Suarez-Navaz 1995; Young 1995; Coombe 1997). In this context, in 1980 Michelle Rosaldo articulated the need for understanding the domestic/public dichotomy as a problematic Victorian ideology. As she stated very clearly:

My stress on the Victorians derives, first of all, from a conviction that they are our most relevant predecessors in this regard, and second, from an intuition that the Victorian dichotomies—in their appeal to maternity and biology—were in fact, significantly different from what came before [since the time of the Greeks]. Once it is realized that domestic/public constitutes an ideological rather than an objective and necessary set of terms, we can, of course, begin to explore the differences in formulations which may appear initially to be “more of the same.” (1980a:402 n. 20)

Through Michelle Rosaldo’s insights about the ideological, biological, and political aspects of Victorian institutions in the metropole, and especially considering the dispersion of British, French, and American colonialisms during the late nineteenth century and during most of the twentieth century, we have come to acknowledge a vital theoretical connection between the work of Michelle Rosaldo and that of Michel Foucault (1977, 1978). For instance, the public/domestic dichotomy, as an Enlightenment imposition and as a Victorian ideology, produces new social categories and social realities in the act of being enforced through colonial and capitalist regulations of populations. In parallel manner Foucault’s notion of biopower brings together the public world of the state, of regulation, of social order writ large, with the domestic in an exploration of the power of the state to call forth subjects and the power of subjects to recreate their subjectification by and for the state (Foucault 1977, 1978; Donzelot 1979). With regard to power, gender, and morality under the modern state Michelle Rosaldo noted about the Victorian legacy:
Victorian theory cast the sexes in dichotomous and contrastive terms, describing home and woman not primarily as they were but as they had to be, given an ideology that opposed natural, moral, and essentially unchanging private realms to the vagaries of a progressive masculine society. And, similarly, I would suggest that when modern theorists write that paternity is a variable and social fact whereas maternity is a relatively constant and unchanging one, constrained by nature . . . or perhaps, when they distinguish moral kinship from the bonds of selfish interest forged in economic life; or, then again, when they describe the differences between apparently formal and informal social roles and forms of power—they are the nineteenth century’s unwitting heirs. (Rosaldo 1980a:404)

Following Foucault, anthropologists today are looking to the mutual implication of domination and resistance in everyday acts of statecraft, medicine, pleasure, and knowledge. Thus far, they have found that modern biopolitics of populations, key to the regulation and governance of citizens of states inspired by the social contract vision of “liberty, equality and fraternity,” brings public and domestic together in a synergistic tension that preserves the fiction of separate spheres while maintaining their imbrication into each other (Horn 1994; Ginsberg and Rapp 1995; McClintock 1995). Foucault has contributed the important insight that power is productive, not only repressive (and that its repressions are always themselves productive). Thus, it now becomes a crucial analytical task to highlight the productive practices of power that make the illusion of separate spheres seem real and determinative of people’s lives and subjectivities. This is, in the end, a self-reflexive task as well: for many people the doctrine of separate spheres seems to correspond to our everyday experiences, as we move in self-discipline from home to work and back again, enjoy our domestic pleasures “apart” from the eye of the state, and make our private consumer choices in a market supposedly “free.”

From Positivism to Performativity

Rosaldo’s interventions in psychological and cognitive anthropology had a lasting impact as well and contributed a great deal to anthropological interest in the “self” (Rosaldo 1983, 1984). As she put it, “My point is simple. Psychological idioms that we use in offering accounts of the activities of our peers—or our companions in the field—are at the same time ide-. 

logical’ or ‘moral’ notions. As ethnographers (and moral persons) we are compelled at once to use them and to suspect them” (135). Rosaldo took a long-standing problem in psychological anthropology, the distinction between “guilt" societies and “shame” societies, and completely revised the terms of the debate. Rather than assume that people in shame societies are constrained by social conventions to rein in their inner desires, while people in guilt societies self-monitor to control those inner passions (and feel bad when they fail), Rosaldo called for a critical examination of the “view of persons as embodiments of continuing and conflictual inner drives and needs”—part and parcel of Western psychological thinking—and thus a reassessment of the very different ways that different “selves” are created in different societies.

Like her discussion of public and domestic, however, her reanalysis of psychological anthropology was taken up in a positivist spirit by some of her colleagues and followers. What others picked up on was her comment that “the ‘selves’ that [feelings such as guilt or shame] help defend—and so, the way such feelings work—will differ with the culture and organization of particular societies” (Rosaldo 1983:136; qtd. in Levy’s [1983:129] introduction to the special issue of Ethos in which Rosaldo’s essay appears). Rather than question the very terms of analysis like the self, anthropologists and psychologists thus went about busily identifying different selves in the cultures of the world, even as they (rightly) sought to destabilize the analytical persistence of the autonomous cogito as a unit of analysis in Western social science. This research agenda was a kind of “butterfly collecting” that went on without much critical reflection on the very category of the self itself (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1991). Rosaldo called attention to this problem in her final essay, worrying that a cross-cultural psychology may not be possible: “insofar as our psychology is wedded to our culture’s terms in its accounts of people elsewhere in the world, it is unlikely to appreciate their deeds” (1984:150).

Recent anthropological and feminist theory echoes, in some respects, Rosaldo’s initial concerns and calls attention not to the selves themselves as units of analysis but to the practices and technologies that constitute different ways of being (de Lauretis 1987; Battaglia 1995). This work demonstrates the reiterative and citational practices through which people continually reenvision and reify seemingly solid categories of self and social life, the practices that make “essences” seem so essential (Butler 1993; Morris 1995). Performativity theory shifts the discussion away from selves and forces us to question the discursive regimes under which it
makes sense to “think” selves and “feel” selves (Diaz Barriga, Gutmann, Lugo, Maurer, this vol.; see also Lugo 1990; Borovoy 1994).

Moving beyond positivism also compels a questioning of other categories of analysis and social life, other apparently “real” objects and subjects, to investigate how such entities come to be so real and to have the force of objectivity behind them. Social studies of science and technology, for example, have explored certain entrenched categories of modernity and their performative reiterations (Strathern 1992; Latour 1993; Franklin 1995). For feminist anthropologists working from the legacy of Woman, Culture, and Society (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974) and Toward an Anthropology of Women (Reiter [Rapp] 1975), foundational texts of the 1970s, such a rethinking of objectivism compels a rethinking of Marxism and materialism. What, for instance, are the limits of the discursive production of “land,” “resources,” “jobs,” and the “workers” who make worlds and selves from them (MacCormack, Gray, Diaz Barriga, this vol.)? This kind of reflexive move also demands an accounting of the “objects” and “authors” of anthropological inquiry; how and what do we study, and what is the position of researcher and researched in their performance of clearly (and not-so-clearly) defined roles in the objectivity game (Gray, Gutmann, Maurer, this vol.; Bourdieu 1977)?

From Emotion and Feeling to the Question of Interiority

A third lasting influence of Rosaldo’s work has been on the study of emotion and feeling, which, in anthropology and beyond, has been heavily indebted to her ethnography Knowledge and Passion (1980). Rosaldo drew attention to deeply held sentiments, apparently interior states of being, and opened up these “interiors” for critical analysis. Researchers picking up this thread of inquiry have truly gone to the heart of the matter, as it were, by interrogating not just the cultural construction of emotion or sentiment but the construction of interiority itself. They have asked under what discursive regimes of power it makes sense for people to imagine that they “have” interiors, selves that “feel” at a corporeal level. Work on emotion has been closely connected to work on the body (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987; Lutz 1988) and also to work on the performativity that grants the body its materiality and simultaneously creates the necessary fiction of interiors to bodies under certain regimes of power (Lugo, this vol.; Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990; Butler 1993; Steedman 1995; Collier 1997).

Often politics repeat the claims of interiority and rely on coincidences
of feeling or sentiment to generate attachment to causes or, alternately, disaffection. Highlighting that these are claims, historically and discursively situated and not universal or, at least, unproblematic, interrupts their endless repetition and reveals cracks and fissures in modern imaginings of the self, its “inner” workings, and its politics. To say that these are claims is not to suggest that they are “authored” by a prediscursive or autonomous subject. Rather, the claims are repetitions of existing norms such that these norms are stabilized (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Hall 1995).

Beyond Identity and Sentiment

This deconstructive move brings us back again to the performativity of domestic and public and the stabilization of self and world by reiterative practices that conjure up essences and realities together with bourgeois individuals and their “free” choices. Opening up interiors opens up the whole realm of bourgeois politics and subjectivities. In this regard Rosaldo had been concerned with how feminists had challenged, mostly ineffectively, social science discourses about gendered personal identity. She wrote:

one gets the feeling that feminist distress with the failure of social science to address issues of gender in the past feeds a sense that gender as a sociological issue is inherently different from other aspects of social organization with implications for personal identity, demanding some sort of nonconventional (and usually, psychologically oriented) account. My own sense, by contrast, is that our frustration stems, first, from the failure of sociological theory to relate gender in systematic ways to other kinds of inequality and, second, from the inadequacies of a utilitarian tradition [including much of Marxist social thought] that has made it extremely difficult to conceptualize the sociological significance of human consciousness, culture, or thought. (1980a:408 n. 38)

Feminist political theorist Joan Scott (1992) has crystallized a number of disparate concerns with the kind of identity politics and theoretical maneuver that preoccupied Michelle Rosaldo and that gained force in the 1980s. Scott highlighted the fact that the resources identity politics drew upon were in the main sentiment and affect based on a presumed commonality of experience among members of specific groups. Recognizing
that groups and individuals only come into being through social practices and that the experiences particular to them are themselves products of social relations, Scott called for an analytical deconstruction of the category of experience itself as an Enlightenment construct based on Western understandings of self and society. Yet others have convincingly argued that to state that identity and experience are social constructions does not help account for their tangible reality, their lived force, in people's everyday lives. For this reason Paul Gilroy (1993) has called for a stance of "anti-anti-essentialism," by which he means a critical perspective on essentialism that at the same time does not dismiss the lived reality of categories and experiences deemed immutable or essential but, rather, tries to account for that reality in politically engaged terms.

Accounting for the "realness" of social constructions raises questions of agency and transcendence. If we acknowledge that social constructions are made real by our practices, do we concede that we can never overcome, say, racial or gender oppression? Recent feminist theory rejects this proposition and instead argues for a critical engagement with the practices that continually produce and reproduce the "realities" of the social world. From this position such theory puts forth the subversive potential of practices that mock, mimic, or in other ways transgress the social realities by performative iterations of other realities—the drag performance, for instance (Butler 1993). Donna Haraway (1991) reminds us that the realities we construct are themselves parts of our subjectivities and are open to disarticulation and rearticulation, and Allucquere Stone (1995) notes that such things as the apparently real facts of sex and the apparently "virtual" persona of cyberspace are both contingent articulations of self and social world. While we may not be able to "transcend" the inherited categories reiterated in social worlds impacted by capitalism, colonialism, and Enlightenment social theory, we may very well be able to introduce new variations on the theme that highlight the contingencies of our social world and denaturalize it (Visweswaran 1994).

**Book Overview**

In our estimation the anthropological issues and theoretical themes discussed here constitute Michelle Rosaldo's feminist legacy for the twenty-first century. The volume is organized into two main parts, "Domestic and Public Revisited" and "History, the State, and Class," which provide a forum for the presentation of ethnographic materials and theoretical
engagements that challenge, expand, reflect on, or simply apply Michelle Rosaldo’s own insights about feminism and anthropology and about social theory and society more generally.

In part 1, "Domestic and Public Revisited," the first four essays recapture one of Rosaldo’s most criticized theoretical conceptualizations of gender relations: the domestic/public dichotomy. This section begins with a Marxist-feminist essay, “Land, Labor, and Gender,” in which one of Rosaldo’s well-known critics, the late Carol MacCormack, continues to argue that the “ranked dichotomy of domestic and public domains” does not constitute a “robust” feminist critique due to its static, universalizing, and, therefore, biological reductionist bent on its consequent analytical interpretation of gender relations.

By giving a feminist angle to the structural Marxist theories of Meillasoux and Terray and examining a sample of precapitalist and capitalist societies from Africa and Asia, MacCormack proposes, instead, to look at key elements in modes of production—in this case, at the multiple uses of land (both as subject and/or instrument of labor)—in order “to tease out some reasons why gender, age, and class exploitation may be greater in some social formations than in others.” MacCormack argues that a Marxist emphasis on modes of production effectively transcends “the static process of putting people in categories” and, moreover, that a Marxist historical perspective on gender relations does show, for instance, how so-called domestic domains are in fact often constituted by external processes, such as the global economy.

The second essay in this section, “Destabilizing the Masculine, Refocusing ‘Gender’: Men and the Aura of Authority in Michelle Z. Rosaldo’s Work,” by Alejandro Lugo, challenges Rosaldo’s critics (including herself in 1980) by trying to demonstrate that the universalism, essentialism, and biological reductionism seemingly embedded in the domestic/public dichotomy are, for the most part, products of selective misreadings of Michelle Rosaldo’s 1974 theoretical and political position. Lugo argues that her critics ignored Rosaldo’s recommendations for social transformations in our society (e.g., bringing men into household obligations) and in this process separated Rosaldo’s own political strategy and practice from her theoretical interventions in trying to explain how and why the activities of both men and women were given different social values cross-culturally. Through ethnographic material collected at the U.S.-Mexico border among male and female maquiladora workers, Lugo suggests that the theoretical and empirical consequences of this misreading are many, par-
particularly for feminist anthropology: for instance, Michelle Rosaldo’s rigorous focus on the study of gender, of both men and women, was set aside; her early contribution—her preoccupation with men as gendered subjects—was left in the dust; and, finally, her theoretical and political concerns about what constituted the “sources of power” and the “aura of authority” in gender relations were, ironically, muted.

The third essay, by Bill Maurer, “Sexuality and Separate Spheres: Gender, Sexual Identity, and Work in Dominica and Beyond,” theorizes the category of “sexuality” in relation to capitalism in the Caribbean. Through ethnographic revelations of how work and sexuality are defined by both men and women in creole-speaking Dominica, Maurer argues that the ideology of the domestic and public continues to produce sexual and gendered identities that are directly connected to a local discourse on “wage work.” Maurer argues that, since women are not considered to be part of the labor market and thus do not work for wages, their economic and labor contributions (whether in the public or the domestic domains) are not considered, even by women themselves, to be work at all; this lack of public recognition in the realm of work is smoothly translated into a cultural acknowledgment regarding women’s sexuality—that is, that women have no “sex,” especially apart from their sexual and social relations with men. In this process Maurer shows that sexual and gender identities are themselves products of social relations but that (combining Michelle Rosaldo and Judith Butler), “whether or not markets actually determine people’s social status, people who think in terms of market rationality act as if they do, and find it natural.”

The last essay in the first section, Miguel Díaz Barriga’s “The Domestic/Public in Mexico City: Notes on Theory, Social Movements, and the Essentializations of Everyday Life,” tries to show, relatedly, that the ideology of the domestic and public continues to be quite dominant as a hegemonic construct, in this case, in Latin America, particularly affecting the nature and outcome of urban social movements. In fact, Díaz Barriga argues that it is not possible to theorize urban social movements in the Third World without confronting the pervasiveness of the discourse on public and domestic life and experience, either on the part of poor women or on the part of scholars studying the phenomenon. By examining poor women’s narratives of their participation in grassroots organizing in Mexico City, Díaz Barriga suggests, following Michelle Rosaldo (1980), that “resistance to traditional gender relations not be seen simply as creating continuities between the domestic and public” but as a pragmatic attempt,
on the part of the common folk, "to move away from the broader inequalities and essentializations of everyday life."

In part 2, "History, the State, Class," three contributors give rigorous scrutiny to issues and topics touched upon in the first section; in particular, Michelle Rosaldo’s feminist legacy for the varied but strategic ways in which we, as scholars, can address our own cultural assumptions of what men and women are about. This includes the kinds of research questions we should ask when studying gender and, more concretely, how we address "unexpected" encounters with such themes as history, the state, and class in the varied contexts of modernity, nationalism, and (once again) capitalism.

Jane Collier’s essay, "Victorian Visions," reflects on Michelle Rosaldo’s feminist preoccupation with how such nineteenth-century social thinkers as Marx, Bachofen, Spencer, and Durkheim theorized marriage, sex, and the family under capitalism. The specific phase of modern capitalism during the late nineteenth-century produced politically unstable contexts and discourses that influenced what these men wrote and said about women, particularly within a context heavily characterized by a continually imminent "breakdown of morality in public life." In this essay Collier argues that Michelle Rosaldo was interested in these historical questions precisely to identify the "gaps in contemporary theory which can be traced to turn of the century assumptions" about women. Based on a series of course notes put together in 1978 for a seminar she taught with Michelle Rosaldo at Stanford, Collier shows how Rosaldo herself hoped to uncover the gender assumptions inherent in the subtle (and not so subtle) rhetorical strategies of social scientists and political debaters. Collier examines how these biased assumptions permeated such social and theoretical inventions as "the family," "marriage," "the public," and "the domestic" during the Victorian era. In this process Collier discusses the complex ways in which gender conceptions are in fact shaped by larger political issues and, more important, how capitalist discourse affects and effects "how we attempt to shape and make sense of our relations with others."

Matthew Gutmann’s essay, "A (Short) Cultural History of Mexican Machos and Hombres," focuses on the history and nationalist problematic that led to changing male identities of working-class men in a barrio of Mexico City. By juxtaposing the muchachos’ personal narratives about what it means to be a man with and against key anthropological and philosophical texts on Mexican men and Mexican identity (by Oscar Lewis, America Paredes, Octavio Paz, and Samuel Ramos), Gutmann
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provides an analysis of the political economy of machismo, its relatively recent invention in the twentieth century, and its unhappy rearticulation with a masculinity that is itself "a product of men and women's cultural efforts." Through an elaborate discussion of how we can best interpret gender relations that are constantly in flux, particularly in ethnographically challenging contemporary societies such as Mexico City, Gutmann reminds us, following Michelle Rosaldo, that there comes a time when "what is needed . . . is not so much data as questions"—new and different questions that can possibly be translated into new ways of studying and interpreting not only men as men and women as women but also "manliness" and "womanliness" as historically and culturally gendered categories of analysis.

In the final essay, "Myths of the Bourgeois Woman: Rethinking Race, Class, and Gender," Christine Gray theorizes the category of class through an in-depth analysis and criticism of the uncritical way in which the "bourgeois woman" is often lumped together with bourgeois men in most Marxist feminist critiques of "class" domination in capitalist societies. Gray specifically argues and tries to demonstrate through rich textual discussions that feminist scholars have not properly considered the vulnerability middle-class women experience whenever they challenge dominant discourses of femininity (in this case, particularly as this femininity is manifested in the ideologies and practices embedded in the doll Barbie). Gray observes that, for the most part, bourgeois men, and not bourgeois women, have been the privileged ones, specifically during the last two decades of the twentieth century; a time in which high numbers of middle-class women (including female academics) are getting divorced, are "opting" for having children, and, when possible, are giving preference to their own professional careers (instead of that of their husbands). Challenging what she views as an erasure of white middle-class women in the ethnographic and theoretical texts of such feminists as Emily Martin, Rayna Rapp, and Karen Sacks, Christine Gray argues that, until we rigorously unpack the thick relations between gender, class, and race in feminist analysis, feminist academics, and particularly feminist anthropologists, will continue to reproduce the domestic/public ideology that still pervades and, in fact, often sustains contemporary capitalist social relations. Gray suggests that the tensions currently being experienced by both poor women and by white middle-class women of any color and race can be better understood through Michelle Rosaldo's enduring critique of gender inequalities. As Gray herself notes:
In fact, once one recognizes that Rosaldo’s work is an almost perfect theoretical rendition of capitalist gender ideologies and practices, it provides a useful perspective for exploring the subtleties of capitalist accumulation in non-Western societies, for ferreting out the symbolic structures that generate the myths and antagonisms of Western capitalism. How are Western ideologies of public/private space, and the idea of the bourgeois woman who “does it all” without messing up her hair, being imposed on non-Western societies?

Conclusion

As a whole, the essays in this volume variously explore the connections, ruptures, and continuities that characterize the four major shifts we identified early on as constituting the legacy of Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo. First, they move us from simplistic discussions of the public/domestic dichotomy to a more productive and sophisticated conversation on the biopolitics of populations. That is, they connect Michelle Rosaldo with Michel Foucault, for, as we noted, the French philosopher’s notion of biopower brings together the public (the world of the state, of capitalist regulation, of social order writ large) with the domestic (the world of the home, the family, reproduction, and sex). Second, the volume seeks to shift from a focus on positivist theoretical practice to Judith Butler’s conceptualization of performativity, which should allow us to recognize, as Bill Maurer argues in his essay, that “practices, which call upon the persons to continually reiterate their supposedly inherent or natural attributes (including things like ‘sex’ or ‘race’), in fact are constitutive performances, creating the materiality of individual identities in the act.” Third, the essays make an analytical departure from sentimental notions of feeling and emotion to a conceptual (though not necessarily purely cerebral) discussion of the interiority of the person; that is, they call for a move toward social feeling, in which sentiments, emotions, and “feeling selves” are in themselves, following Michelle Rosaldo, products of social relations and of concrete social practices. We agree, as we think Michelle Rosaldo would, with social science philosopher Charles Varela when he states that

“I think,” “I feel,” “I intend,” or “I will,” are first person first order avowals that publicly express a mental state of a speaker and not a report of a mental state in the speaker. They are expressive indices of

Fourth, and finally, though related to the third proposition, the volume makes an inclusive (instead of excluding) theoretical motion to move beyond (though not exclude) “identity” into a more engaging sense of the social person. That is, it seeks to go beyond exclusive studies of “masculinity” and “femininity” and into more rigorous studies of gender, of both men and women, and last, but not least, to move beyond “domestic” and “public” and into a better understanding of the logic and performance of capitalism and its respective hegemonic constructions of social existence, particularly as the latter manifests itself in why, when, and how “we attempt to shape and make sense of our relations with others” (Collier, this vol.).

Michelle Rosaldo was not only a pioneering and sophisticated feminist scholar, but also a major theorist within the general field of anthropology and, more admirably, one of the best minds—indeed, a true philosopher—of the study of “social life.” The ideas and ideals of Rosaldo’s feminist interventions were profound. Destabilize public and domestic, and you destabilize patriarchy. Question the self, and you question being. Critique identity, and you unpack subjectivity. Explore emotions, and you explore the inner lives of human beings to reveal how they are constantly “becoming” in social worlds of their making but not their choosing. What are the implications of a move beyond public and domestic, beyond the self, beyond (but without excluding) sentimentalism and humanism? These are wide-open questions. It remains the task of feminist anthropology to work through them. This volume represents a number of interwoven attempts to do so.

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