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Rebels Without Borders: State Boundaries, Transnational Opposition, and Civil Conflict

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Idean Salehyan

Committee in Charge:

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Professor Barbara F. Walter, Co-chair
Professor Wayne A. Cornelius
Professor Gordon O. Hanson
Professor David A. Lake

2006
This Dissertation of Idean Salehyan is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

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University of California, San Diego

2006
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VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Rebels Without Borders: State Boundaries, Transnational Opposition, and Civil Conflict

by

Idean Salehyan

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor Kristian Skrede Gledisch, Co-chair
Professor Barbara F. Walter, Co-chair

One of the primary functions of modern states is to prevent domestic unrest and threats to their rule. Political scientists have argued that limitations on state power and authority are important pre-conditions for civil conflict. However, scholars have overlooked the territorial dimensions of state strength. The power of the government to repress challengers is largely limited to its own geographic territory while opposition groups frequently mobilize across national boundaries. Opportunities to mobilize
dissident activities abroad, particularly in neighboring states, make rebellions more likely to emerge and endure. Extraterritorial mobilization also exacerbates informational problems, making it more likely that negotiations to resolve conflict will fail. Neighboring states are more likely to host rebel organizations if they have a pre-existing rivalry with the target government or if they are too weak to prevent rebel access. Moreover, large refugee diasporas often contribute to conflicts at home. Transnational rebellions will also internationalize civil conflicts by creating tensions between states and increasing the likelihood of a state-to-state dispute. Finally, conflict resolution is best served by regional cooperation to combat insurgents and/or facilitate negotiations. Several hypotheses are developed relating to the onset and duration of civil war as well as the propensity for interstate conflict. These are tested using quantitative analyses as well as more detailed examinations of the civil wars in Nicaragua and Rwanda.
Chapter 1: Introduction

This is the generation of the great Leviathan… he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred upon him that by terror thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home…”
-Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1668)¹

The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.
-Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919)²

Social thinkers throughout the centuries have argued that the defining feature of the state is its command of overwhelming power relative to other groups in society, which it uses to maintain internal order and prevent challenges to its rule. While states may differ from one another in terms of their political institutions and policies, they all claim the exclusive right to exercise coercive force domestically and use their power against armed threats to their authority. Therefore, the costs of organizing and undertaking a rebellion are extremely high (insurgents risk death) and the probability of success does not appear to be great. Nevertheless, numerous instances of civil conflict—e.g. Sudan, Kosovo, Kashmir, Northern Ireland—indicate that rebellion is not as uncommon as this asymmetry of force would lead one to believe. This presents an apparent puzzle for social scientists: given the expected costs, why do people ever rebel against the state? Stated differently, we may also ask, why does the state fail to maintain order over its territory and among its citizenry?

This dissertation argues that although the state has an advantage in the *domestic* use of force, its power is largely constrained by its internationally recognized borders. While states work to monitor and repress dissent at home, they are limited in their ability to exercise force in territories where they are not sovereign. Understanding this limitation on state power, rebel groups often evade repression by strategically positioning themselves outside of the state’s reach. External bases and mobilization opportunities abroad enable rebels to avoid the coercive power of the state. Conditions in neighboring states, therefore, critically affect the bargain between states and challengers by altering the apparent *internal* asymmetry of force.

The case of Liberia highlights this phenomenon. On December 24 of 1989, Charles Taylor and his rebel organization, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, launched an insurgency against the government of Samuel Doe. Taylor’s forces consisted of a few dozen fighters armed with small arms such as rifles and pistols; clearly, this group was vastly outnumbered by Doe’s superior military and police forces. The NPFL launched its initial strikes from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, and concentrated its early efforts on targets in Nimba County which is located along the Liberian/Ivoirian border. Soon, backing for Taylor materialized as members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, who felt alienated by Doe’s support of his Krahn co-ethnics, joined the rebellion. After several months of fighting and thousands of deaths, Doe was deposed and later executed. Why was the Doe government, which had thousands of troops and armaments, unable to stop a few dozen rebels from sparking a bloody civil war, which would eventually lead to the regime’s collapse? In short, Taylor’s ability to mobilize supporters
outside of Liberia and slip back and forth across the border allowed him to evade government forces long enough to be able to re-enter the country and lead the NPFL to victory.

Examples of transnational rebellion are not limited to the Liberian case. Consider the following examples:

- Sikh insurgents, fighting to secede from India, have mobilized support and resources from members of the Sikh diaspora and conducted operations in neighboring Pakistan.

- The Rwandan Patriotic Front established a state-in-exile in Uganda and recruited fighters among Tutsi refugees. After the RPF re-entered the country and deposed the Hutu government, former regime members escaped to DR Congo where they established their own external bases.

- Nicaraguan Contras held bases in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica and launched attacks upon the Sandinista government from safe positions across the border.

- Palestinian insurgents, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization, gathered resources and troops in countries across the Middle East as well as among the larger Palestinian diaspora.

- The Ugandan rebel outfit, the Lord’s Resistance Army, benefited from sanctuary in Sudan where they were assisted by the Sudanese government.

Thus, modern insurgencies are not limited to the geographic area of the state, presenting a major challenge for territorial nation-states whose power is bounded by their borders.
Rebel groups frequently mobilize outside of national boundaries as state security forces cannot easily repress dissent beyond their sovereign territorial domain.

One of the most striking findings of this dissertation is that a majority of rebel groups (a striking 55%) have utilized territory outside of their target state’s borders in mobilizing and sustaining their activities. This finding alone casts considerable doubt upon theories and empirical studies of civil conflict that fail to include regional and international factors in their analyses. Traditionally, research on civil conflict has treated nation-states as hermetically sealed, independent units. Country-level attributes and processes—such as income inequality, ethnic tensions, dependence on primary commodities, and the responsiveness of political institutions—dominate theories of civil war. This is especially true of quantitative analyses which, by assumption, treat observations as independent. External factors are frequently excluded from the analysis as if states exist in isolation of one another, interdependence among units is ignored. This traditional view reflects the common field-divide in political science: comparativists study relations within states while international relations scholars study relations between states.

Transnational forms of social organization complicate this neat picture. More often than not, territorially bounded nation-states are not perfectly congruent with the polity, or group of people who make claims upon the state. If a significant share of rebel organizations conduct operations outside of their own state’s territory, then domestic conditions alone are not sufficient for explaining the processes leading to the onset and continuation of violence. Ignoring the transnational organization of rebel groups offers incomplete explanations for armed conflict at best, and incorrect, biased results at worst.
Caging the Leviathan: A Preview of the Theory

The ability to impose order and prevent anarchy is central to the theory of the state—rebellion is unlikely unless there are constraints on state power to combat challengers. Writing in the 17th Century, Thomas Hobbes argued that a strong state, or Leviathan, is required to maintain peace. In principle, it should not take vast amounts of resources for a state to deter or defeat internal challengers. The state is a social actor that specializes in the use of coercion—this is its defining feature (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002; Hardin 1995; Olson 2001). There are many types of governments, which differ in terms of their political institutions; their propensity to provide private as opposed to public goods; the degree to which they extract resources from society; and their political ideologies. Parliamentary and presidential democracies, one party states, military dictatorships, monarchies, theocracies, and communist regimes are but a few forms of government in the world today. Nevertheless, they all share the common feature of possessing a near monopoly of military and police forces relative to all other social actors. States have successfully coordinated the use of violence while the rest of the population lacks such coordination; they possess superior resources and armaments; they gather information on illicit and/or subversive activities; and moreover, they work to undermine any efforts to challenge their authority. Even if a state appears to be weak relative to others in the international system, the state is almost always unmatched in its power relative to other groups in society.

In this vein, Russell Hardin (1995: 29) writes, “To wreck the state, it is not enough that anarchy breaks out a little bit at a time. If it is to prevail against threatened sanctions, it must break out all at once. It must be pervasive. A moderately organized
state can typically keep its citizens under control without going to Orwellian extremes.”

Yet, surprisingly, civil wars are quite common. Marshall and Gurr (2003) report that about one third of the world’s states experienced internal warfare at some point during the 1990’s. Why does the Leviathan fail in its task of maintaining order and preventing challengers from emerging? In short, why do civil wars occur?

Of course, several explanations have already been offered by social scientists. Class conflict, ethnic hatred, state instability and weakness, and natural resource dependence—among others—have all been offered as factors motivating or enabling conflict to emerge. Our theories of civil violence usually focus on domestic-level explanations; in other words, it is normally assumed that most of the processes leading to civil war occur within countries. As will be argued in depth in Chapter 2, international and regional conditions may be just as important as these domestic factors. Here, a preview of the theory will be offered.

**Territorial States and Transnational Rebels**

As the Weberian definition of the state suggests, the state is territorially bounded—it cannot (easily) exercise force in territories where it is not sovereign. International borders are institutions that provide a geographic demarcation of where one state’s authority ends and another’s begins. While a state may possess a nearly absolute monopoly on the use of force internally, its policing force is confined to its own security jurisdiction—its sovereign territory. However, although the Leviathan is “caged” by international borders, social actors—including migrant diasporas and opposition groups—can and often do organize transnationally, implying that they are less
constrained by national boundaries. Thus, if rebel groups can use other territories as a base of operations, thereby escaping the jurisdiction and repressive capabilities of the state, they can significantly lower the costs of mobilizing and sustaining an insurgency. Diasporic communities can mobilize opposition in relative safety, and neighboring countries that wish to encourage rebellion, or are unable to stop it, may become havens for transnational rebel organizations (TNRs).

This mismatch between the geographic constraints on state power and the ability of groups to organize transnationally has profound implications for the study of comparative and international politics, many of which have not been fully explored by political scientists. Scholars often assume that states and societies come in neatly packaged bundles and that lines on a political map clearly define and structure social relations. For decades, the discipline has taken for granted that domestic politics is about state-society relations and international politics is about state-to-state relations (see e.g. Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992). However, in an age of unprecedented mobility of goods, finances, and people on one hand, and territorial state boundaries on the other, “societies” are not neatly compartmentalized and all actors that make demands upon states are not physically present within that state’s jurisdiction. Ethnic groups, religious communities, firms, and activist networks, often span national boundaries, making it difficult for any one state to regulate their activities. The bulk of the early work on transnational organizations focused on international economic exchanges and the activities of multinational corporations (see e.g. Huntington 1973; Keohane and Nye 1971). Political scientists are only beginning to understand the importance of transnational forms of social organization outside of the economic realm (see e.g.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Beissinger 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Saideman 2001). By allowing a more flexible conception of state-society relations, we can better understand a wide variety of political phenomenon and, of special importance for this study, how several rebel groups work.

Bargaining Failure

Power asymmetries between states and rebels—measured in terms of troop numbers and military equipment—become less important when rebels can evade state strength. Several authors have commented on the ability of weaker actors to prevail against more powerful opponents; these scholars have either focused on the resolve of actors (Mack 1975) or their strategies (Arreguin-Toft 2001). Warfare is not simply about the balance of power between groups, but also their relative ability to impose and bear costs (Slantchev 2003). Strategically-oriented rebel groups, particularly during initial stages when they are still mobilizing troops and resources, fear the ability of the state to repress and will often position themselves outside of the state’s jurisdiction where the state lacks a power advantage. For these transnational rebels, access to external territory reduces the probability of defeat as well as the costs of rebellion. This will in turn influence the underlying bargain between rebels and governments—and the probability of war—by affecting the information available to both actors as well as their ability to make credible commitments (see Fearon 1995). Rebels mobilize forces in order to gain bargaining leverage over the government. If both sides agree about the distribution of power—either currently or in the future when rebels realize their full strength—they can
gauge the relative probability of victory in a war and come to a Pareto superior allocation of benefits. Such a compromise would be preferable to warfare, which is costly in terms of lives and resources. Thus, access to external bases enables TNRs to extract a better deal by improving their bargaining strength.

Yet, because it is more difficult for states to monitor rebel activities outside of their territory, and rebels have an incentive to misrepresent their strength, it is harder for both sides to come to an agreement about the distribution of power between them. This information-poor environment makes bargaining more difficult because parties cannot agree to a suitable allocation of benefits. Furthermore, as long as permissive conditions in neighboring countries persist, rebels cannot credibly commit to demobilization after a peace deal has been struck. Efforts to end civil wars require demobilization by rebels (Walter 2002), and it is difficult to verify if full demobilization has taken place when fighters maintain forces abroad. Moreover, rebels can regroup at some point in the future as long as external sanctuaries are available to them. Finally, the government must also commit to refrain from attacking if and when demobilization and re-integration into the country occurs; without sufficient security guarantees, disarming combatants will be unlikely. Thus, although external bases raise the bargaining power of rebels, they also make war more likely to occur and more difficult to end because they exacerbate bargaining problems.

Sanctuary in Neighboring States, International Conflict, and Conflict Resolution

Neighboring states will become havens for transnational rebels under at least three conditions. First, some states are simply too weak to prevent TNR groups from
entering their territory. These states lack the means to effectively prevent access to foreign rebels and face high opportunity costs for attempting to do so. Secondly, states that wish to create instability in rival regimes across the border are likely to become sanctuaries for rebel groups. Finally, refugee diasporas in neighboring states—particularly those in weak and rival states—are likely to contribute to rebellion (Zolberg, Suhrke, Aguayo 1989). Refugees have a grievance against the state from which they fled and those living in poor camp conditions have few productive alternatives to joining insurgents. Rebel access to extraterritorial bases in neighboring countries, therefore, hinges upon the characteristics of states in the region, the presence of diaspora communities, and interstate relations. For this reason, the incentives and behavior of host states are important for understanding conflict processes; conflicts entail a three-way interaction between rebels, their target states, and their hosts (Bapat 2006).

Allowing sanctuary to rebel groups can sour relations between states. Sanctuary in neighboring countries threatens to widen civil conflicts into international disputes as rebel host and home countries confront one another over insurgent access. Real or perceived foreign support for rebel organizations—especially allowing access to external bases—may provoke a confrontation between rebel host and home countries, particularly as rebel bases are frequently located in contiguous territories.

In addition, the host state will play a pivotal role in facilitating (or preventing) peace. Regional cooperation among neighboring states will be vital to managing conflict when TNRs exist; two-actor bargains between rebels and governments necessarily expand to include the host state. Depending on the host state’s relations with both sides to the conflict and the relative costs of hosting versus expelling fighters, TNR hosts can
play a pivotal role in conflict management. They can move to expel rebels, making them vulnerable to attack and raising the odds of government victory. Furthermore, neighbors can help in fostering a peace deal in three related ways. First, they can pressure disputants to the bargaining table by using access to territory as leverage. Secondly, they can assist in verifying demobilization agreements and preventing future access to external bases, thereby making peace promises more credible. Finally, they may provide security guarantees to demobilized fighters by allowing asylum should the government attack them when vulnerable.

These arguments will be given greater attention in the following chapter. The remainder of this chapter will give an overview of current armed conflicts and review the literature on civil war, assessing its strengths and weaknesses. Most contemporary theories of civil conflict focus on either the motives that lead to fighting or opportunities to fight, while almost exclusively analyzing domestic-level variables. While this literature certainly has a lot of merits, the explanations offered are incomplete. Recently, as international relations scholars in political science have turned their attention to civil war, people have become more interested in the international determinants of civil conflict, but this body of work is still in its infancy and it lacks firm theoretical foundations and well-accepted empirical regularities.

**Trends and Definitions**

First, it is important to understand the nature and scope of the problem. The terms “insurgency,” “civil conflict,” “rebellion,” and “civil war” will be used
interchangeably. While some prefer to keep these terms distinct, as used here, they all refer to organized violence against the state by non-governmental actors for political ends. This definition does not include events such as mob violence, in which there is little formal organization; non-violent protest; internal coups in which one faction of the government fights against another faction; communal conflict between rival groups that do not involve the state; and criminal acts, in which actors do not have political motivations.

Some scholars have adopted the convention of reserving the term “civil war” for conflicts which exceed 1,000 battle deaths, or some other death threshold. This terminology is unfortunate, however, as it has been adopted for reasons of methodological convenience rather than any theoretical criterion. There are few theoretical reasons to believe that conflicts above a certain arbitrary threshold are conceptually distinct from and not comparable to conflicts below that threshold. In addition, datasets using the 1,000 deaths criteria undercount the extent of violent incidents, which has methodological drawbacks (discussed in Ch 3). For these reasons, a low threshold of 25 deaths is used in the empirical analyses to follow, although a minimum death-count is not an integral part of the conflict definition.³

One of the most striking features of civil conflict is that it is much more common than international war. Again, this presents a puzzle for scholars because state strength should, in principle, prevent challengers from emerging. Figure 1.1 displays the frequency of conflict by type in the post-WWII period, as listed by the Uppsala

³ However, it is important to note that the empirical results do not change significantly if alternative deaths thresholds are used.
University/Peace Research Institute of Oslo armed conflict dataset (hereafter, U/PACD). Intrastate wars and internationalized intrastate wars (in which foreign governments have contributed troops) are by far the most common type of conflict, and the number of such wars had been rising until a steep drop in the 1990’s. This rise in the number of civil wars occurred because in any given year, more civil wars began than were resolved, which over time led to an increase in absolute numbers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The end of the Cold War, however, dried up funding for many combatant groups and so several conflicts fizzled out. By contrast, the number of international wars per year has remained fairly constant over the period and hovers between 1 and 10 wars underway each year. Extrasystemic, or colonial wars are now a thing of the past, with the final colonial conflicts having been fought in the 1970’s.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Colonial wars are a difficult to categorize conceptually, however. In some sense, all wars of succession may be termed anti-colonial. For example, if one considers the Soviet Union a colonial empire, violent succession in Armenia and Azerbaijan may be considered colonial wars of independence. Similarly, the East Timorese fight for liberation may be considered an anti-colonial war against Indonesia.
Figure 1.1. Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2000

It is incorrect to characterize these conflicts as independent events, however. Conflicts tend to be geographically clustered in certain regions, and it is interesting to note the geographic distribution of wars in addition to their temporal distribution (Gleditsch 2002). As Figure 1.2 reveals, in several regions such as Western Africa, the African Great Lakes region, South Asia, and the Middle East, numerous countries have been involved in intrastate conflicts during the late 1990’s. Even a casual reading of several cases reveals considerable interdependence between conflicts in neighbors. In addition, spatial statistics have revealed that this clustering is too regular to be
completely random, suggesting that conflicts may be determined by factors common to the region or the diffusion of conflict across space. (see e.g. Lake and Rothchild 1998; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Sambanis 2002)
Figure 1.2. Location of Civil Conflicts, 1996-2000 (dark areas indicate conflict locations)
In some cases, common ethnic cleavages may partly explain the regional clustering of violence. For example, Hutus and Tutsis have come into conflict with one another in Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC; additionally, Kurds have fought for independence in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Refugees may also contribute to the regional spread of civil war thorough conflict externalities and the expansion of rebel social networks (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, for example, contributed to instability there and were one factor which fueled local conflict. Civil war may also cause negative economic and social effects across the region, which contribute to local unrest (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Sandler and Murdoch 2004). Thus, civil wars are interdependent phenomenon with significant external linkages; country-specific theories and solutions may not be adequate.

Transnational Rebellion

Taking the observed regional and international interdependence of conflicts as a starting point, careful analysis reveals that most rebellions are not simply domestic in nature. Therefore, theories and empirical analyses of ‘internal’ conflict that focus exclusively on structural country attributes or purely domestic bargaining processes overlook much of the relevant action. Transnational rebels are defined as armed opposition groups whose operations are not confined to the geographic territory of the nation-state(s) that they challenge. Transnational rebels gather funding and resources among the diaspora, recruit fighters among refugee communities, and importantly, secure bases in neighboring countries from which to attack their home state.
Transnational rebellion is widespread. The armed conflicts dataset compiled by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research (Gleditsch et al. 2002) lists armed opposition groups by name. In these data, there were 291 groups (excluding those involved in military coups) for which there was reliable information available through primary or secondary sources. Of these, 159 (55%) had either some or extensive presence in other states. Thus, the majority of rebels are not confined to the territorial boundaries of the state that they challenge. Importantly, this observation casts doubt upon studies that focus entirely on within-country factors such as terrain, political institutions, natural resources, state infrastructure, and so on.

Which countries host transnational rebels? To illustrate their pervasiveness, Table 1.1 gives a partial list of rebel host and target countries. Foreign rebels may locate in these countries either at the invitation of the host government or despite their best efforts to limit access. Refugee communities also frequently provide shelter to rebel groups. Several rebel groups, such as Turkey’s PKK, have operations in multiple countries. In addition, many countries such as Thailand and Uganda, have hosted a number of rebel groups from several states. Thus, ‘rebels without borders’ participate in a large share of the world’s ‘internal’ armed conflicts, although we do not fully understand how they operate. This dissertation develops a theory of transnational rebellion and provides one of the first systematic, cross-national analyses of such events.

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5 This data is described in more detail in Chapter 3 and was collected by the author. “Some” presence refers to limited or sporadic use of external territory for rebel operations. “Extensive” presence refers to cases where major operations were conducted in other countries and external bases were sustained for a substantial period of time. 60 rebel groups were listed as having some external presence, 99 were listed as having extensive presence.
But before turning to the argument and empirical analysis, which is the subject of subsequent chapters, this chapter will review the current literature on civil conflict.
Table 1.1. Selected Transnational Rebels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Government</th>
<th>Rebel Host</th>
<th>Rebel Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Burma</em></td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Arakanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>BCP, KIO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>KIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>KNU, SSA, MTA, ABSDF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Burundi</em></td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>CNDD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Palipehutu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>CNDD, Ubumwe</td>
<td>Funcinpec, Khmer Rouge, KPNLF, Khmer</td>
</tr>
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<td><em>Cambodia</em></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Issarak</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Khmer Issarak, Khmer Rouge, FUNK</td>
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<td><em>DR Congo</em></td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>RCD, FLNC</td>
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Motive and Opportunity Theories of Rebellion

Most studies of collective violence against the state have focused either on rebel motives or the opportunity for rebellion.6 The motive perspective examines the rewards that groups hope to gain through fighting. Groups fight in order to gain greater political representation, redress perceived discrimination, or better themselves economically. Opportunity theories, in contrast, argue that while motive may be necessary for groups to take up arms, it alone cannot explain why groups are willing to bear the costs of collective violence, especially when coercion is likely. An armed challenge will not take place unless the probability of victory is sufficiently high and the costs of conflict are sufficiently low. These traditions are examined in greater depth below.

Motive

Ted Robert Gurr (1970) offered one of the best articulated theories of how group grievances provide a motive for people to launch an insurgency. According to Gurr’s Relative Deprivation (RD) approach, when some social groups are disadvantaged relative others and/or when there is a mismatch between group aspirations and their current situation, people feel aggrieved and are psychologically predisposed to violence. Gurr writes, “The frustration-aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence...” (1970: 23). According to this perspective, group grievances may emerge through a variety of mechanisms. First, a group may see a decline in its overall welfare

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6 Or, as Most and Starr (1989) put it, opportunity and willingness.
as socio-economic conditions deteriorate. For example, economic shocks such as currency crises or a decline in commodity prices are mechanisms by which certain groups may see a decline in their welfare and are in turn conducive to violence. Along similar lines, Samuel Huntington (1968) argues that modernization—defined as industrial growth, urbanization, development of a modern economy, etc—often leads to social disruptions which undermine authority structures and ways of life among traditionally organized groups, leading to a decline in living standards and a rationale for violence.

Secondly, group ambitions and aspirations may not keep up with the ability to realize these goals. According to Gurr (1970: 50), “Those who experience aspirational RD do not anticipate or experience significant loss of what they have; they are angered because they feel they have no means for attaining new or intensified expectations”. Unrealized expectations of technological development, economic welfare, educational opportunities, and the like, provide a motive for violence. Finally, groups may have been witnessing a rapid increase in their welfare, but due to some sudden shock, the rate of increase stagnates or begins to decline. A reversal of fortunes after a period of “good times” leads to psychological distress and propensity towards violence.

Several authors have suggested that ethnic groups are especially prone to make comparisons of in-group welfare in relation to others (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Vanhanen 1999). Ethnicity becomes a fault-line for political conflict when certain groups are disadvantaged by the state in terms of their access to economic opportunities and/or political power. Real or perceived discrimination against ethnic groups and the belief that political elites favor their ethnic kin create a sense of
frustration, grievance, and an impetus to violence. Ascribed traits such as ethnicity, language, and religion, moreover, provide a clear basis for comparison when judging the relative position of groups. Therefore, societies that are ethnically stratified are expected to have a greater incidence of violence because group comparisons of relative deprivation/dominance lead to grievances.

Other scholars have indicated that economic inequality in general leads to political instability and violence—regardless of ethnic relations (Alesina and Perotti 1996; MacCulloch 2004; Muller and Seligson 1987). The logic behind the inequality/instability connection is again that differences in group welfare lead to discontent, which in turn breeds violence. As Alesina and Perotti (1996: 1204) put it, “Income inequality increases social discontent and fuels unrest.” Muller and Seligson (1987), combine the inequality argument with a collective action argument by claiming that inequality in rural areas should have less of an impact on collective violence than urban inequality because people in the countryside are dispersed and have fewer opportunities for social organization. Of course, these arguments about income distribution are nothing new as Marxist thinkers have long argued that social stratification yields discontent and that class conflict is the natural result of social inequality (Marx, Lenin, and Eastman 1932; Moore 1967).

As evidence, scholars in this tradition would argue, for example, that the EZLN revolt in Chiapas, Mexico was driven by income inequality and discrimination against indigenous peoples. The Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, moreover, was motivated by cultural discrimination and unequal access to economic opportunities and political representation. Finally, protests and violent eruptions in Baltics and the Caucasus during
the final years of the Soviet era were driven by discontent over economic scarcity, especially as people compared their fortunes with the West.

Another more recent line of thought argues that “greed” rather than grievance is a significant motive for several insurgencies. The desire for profit provides a *raison d’être* for some rebel organizations and scholars have argued that many rebels are not so much concerned with righting wrongs but with enriching themselves through plunder (Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; 2001). This perspective focuses on the selective incentives, or side benefits unrelated to any stated aims, that motivate groups to fight. The capture and sale of easily obtainable natural resources such as diamonds, timber, and narcotics provide an economic rationale for mobilizing a rebel army as the sale of these commodities is more lucrative than alternative sources of income for many rebels. The sale of cocaine in Colombia, diamonds in parts of Africa, and timber in South East Asia, for instance, fuel rebel movements and provide them incentives to fight, independent of any objective grievance. Commodities with a high value-to-weight ratio such as diamonds and drugs, and those that do not need extensive capital investments to extract, are especially attractive to rebels as they can be easily obtained and smuggled. Additionally, rebels may turn to extortion and demand payment from multinational firms with fixed assets that cannot easily move operations elsewhere.

Both the “greed” and “grievance” perspectives highlight important motivations for rebellion, but explaining motive is not sufficient for explaining insurgency. The grievance tradition in particular has lost favor among political scientists. Foremost

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7 Collier and Hoeffler in their 2001 article modify their earlier 1999 paper. In the earlier paper, they strongly argue that “loot” provides a motive for fighting. In the 2001 piece, they modify this stance somewhat and argue that easily captured resources provide rebels with financing with which to sustain rebellion and that easy plunder lowers the opportunity cost for fighting.
among the critiques is that grievances are ubiquitous; of all of the potentially aggrieved groups only a small fraction actually rebel, therefore grievances alone cannot explain insurgent violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2003; Lichbach 1995; Tilly 1978). Arguably, all countries contain some group that is disadvantaged relative to others, but very few experience rebellion. Among ethnic groups, for example, the Tibetans have long eschewed armed struggle despite continued discrimination; Crimean Tatars have frequently voiced opposition to the Ukrainian government but have never turned violent; and the indigenous peoples of Brazil have not engaged in open violence despite gross inequality. In an empirical study using the Minorities at Risk\(^8\) dataset, Gurr and his co-author Will Moore (1997) find little relationship between grievances and rebellion, although they show that grievance may heighten protest activity.

This same critique can be made of the “greed” perspective, however. Resources for plunder are frequently available; nearly all countries have some resource that can be looted. Even if a country is not richly endowed with natural resources, rebel organizations can enrich themselves through extortion, hostage taking, and other criminal activities. In other words, grievances and resources for plunder are quite common and cannot alone explain conflict. This is not to say that motivations are unimportant, clearly they are. Without a sense of collective disadvantage and the prospect of economic or political advancement, it is hard to imagine why people would take up arms to challenge the state; rebellion would be groundless otherwise. However, motivation is not enough for groups to undertake the costly act of mobilizing a rebellion and fighting against the state—incentives must be coupled with the opportunity for action.

\(^8\) For more information on the Minorities at Risk project, see: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/minoritiesatrisk/
Opportunity

Rebel motives explain the benefits that opposition groups seek to gain through fighting. Opportunity theories of civil violence do not deny that these motivations are important, but they add the probability of a successful outcome and the costs of mobilizing/fighting to the equation. To be persuaded to fight, people must believe that there is a reasonable chance of obtaining their objectives, or else they will not be willing to bear the costs of joining a rebel movement. There must be limitations on the Leviathan’s nearly absolute control over the means of legitimate coercion for people to believe that challenging the government will be worthwhile.

Charles Tilly (1978) makes political opportunity a central variable in his theory of group mobilization and contentious political action. In this view, the decision to rebel involves a strategic calculation of how the incumbent government is likely to respond, taking into account its capacity for repression. According to Tilly (1978: 101), “Governmental repression is uniquely important because governments specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action… to keep potential actors visible and tame”. Therefore, for rebellion to occur it is not enough that people are discontent with the status quo. People fear the power of the state to imprison, harass, intimidate, torture, and kill, and they will not turn their dissatisfaction into visible forms of resistance so long as these costs are high. Thus, according to opportunity theories, the cost of repression is a critical variable for explaining insurgency and other forms of political dissent (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lichbach 1995; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). As alluded to earlier, this notion stems back farther to Thomas
Hobbes, who noted the importance of a strong central authority in maintaining domestic order.

Opportunity theories of collective violence are explicitly strategic; the expected behavior of the government and constraints upon its ability to wield force are key to the decision to engage in rebellion. Therefore, civil wars are more likely when the Leviathan is relatively weak and incapable of maintaining order. In this regard, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75-76) write, “…financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices.”

A now familiar argument in this tradition examines the relationship between democracy, repression, and civil war. Muller and Weede (1990) and Hegre et. al. (2001), among others, argue and empirically demonstrate that there is an inverted-U relationship between autocracy/democracy and civil war. In the most democratic regimes, violence is less likely because groups can resolve their disputes through established legal and political channels and forgo a costly rebellion. In the most autocratic and repressive regimes, violence is also less likely because the central state can successfully thwart challengers through coercion. Civil wars are therefore most likely to occur in “weak authoritarian” regimes (or “anocracies”), where democracy is not firmly entrenched and the capacity of the state to repress challengers is not great. Additionally, Hegre et. al. (2001) find that during periods of regime transition or instability, in which the state has yet to fully consolidate power (i.e. it is weak), insurgency is more likely to occur.

In another body of work, Timur Kuran (1989) and Susanne Lohmann (1994), argue that one important function of government—particularly authoritarian ones—is to
control information about discontent. People do not take to the streets because they are unaware that there are many like-minded people who are also unhappy with the status quo. Dissatisfied people will engage in contentious political activities only if they can be assured that there exists a critical mass of people who would do so as well—there is safety in numbers. However, because of restrictions on the media in repressive societies, people do not have access to such information. Repression costs factor heavily into Kuran’s and Lohmann’s analyses because socially uninformed people fear that if they act alone to voice discontent, they will be singled out by the government for punishment. Thus, control over the media (also a form of repression) keeps society atomized and prevents the manifestation of collective protest and/or violence. Mass protest and/or rebellion erupt when control over information breaks down and it becomes apparent that there are enough angry people who are willing to act to make such activities worthwhile for the individual. People who are reluctant to speak out for fear of government coercion become more willing to do so as numbers increase because the likelihood of individual repression decreases (see also Granovetter 1978).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) point to several additional variables that diminish the state’s repressive capabilities and increase the likelihood of civil war. Rough terrain, such as a mountainous landscape or densely forested regions, inhibits the states’ ability to pursue rebels into remote areas and provides insurgents the opportunity to escape coercion. Further, the state’s administrative, police, and military capabilities are clearly related to its repressive capacity. In addition, infrastructure such as roads and railways, allow the government to maintain control over potential challengers by extending its power over its entire territory. In some of the poorest states where such infrastructure is
lacking, government control does not extend very far beyond the capital because the state cannot project power into the periphery (Herbst 2000). 9

The common thread through all of these studies is that as governments become less capable of repression and as aggrieved people believe that rebellion will be successful, civil conflict is more likely. Hence, while motive may provide the rationale for a rebel organization, political opportunities provide the mechanism by which groups move from amorphous sentiment to organized violence. While motive may be a necessary condition for insurgency, there are hundreds (or even thousands) of groups that have adequate motive for rebellion, whether that motivation be greed or grievance-driven. For practical purposes, because of the ubiquity of motive, it may be held constant by analysts; focusing on political opportunities allows for systematic cross-national and temporal variation in the explanatory variable—e.g. political institutions, policing capabilities, control over information, substitution for non-violent action.

For these reasons, the argument presented in Chapter 2 focuses heavily on the political opportunity side of the ledger. However, as I will emphasize below, the opportunity tradition has overlooked the international and transnational dimensions of civil conflict. Most studies of civil violence (whether opportunity or motive-oriented) tend to focus on domestic politics while ignoring forces outside of the state which may be equally if not more important. If rebel organizations have access to opportunities to mobilize an insurgency beyond the borders of their target state, then studies that look exclusively at domestic conditions such as terrain or state repressive capacity can be

9 Anarchy within the state resembles international anarchy. This creates a self-help system, which may lead to violence according to Posen (1993).
wrong or misleading. Moreover, much of the current literature on civil war focuses on the political environment without paying much attention to bargains between actors. While environmental conditions shape the range of possible behaviors available to actors (Lake and Powell 1999), conflict is not inevitable and understanding tacit or explicit bargaining processes is important in explaining final outcomes.

The Global Politics of Civil Conflict

Over 25 years ago, Theda Skocpol (1979: 19) remarked: “Transnational relations have contributed to the emergence of all social-revolutionary crises and have invariably helped to shape revolutionary struggles and outcomes.” Despite this observation, for years most theories and empirical studies of civil war and insurgency have focused largely or exclusively on domestic-level variables. With growing dialogue between international relations specialists and comparativists, there has been a fruitful inter-mixing of theories across the subfields of political science. Recently, there has been a growing tendency in IR to attribute international-level outcomes to domestic-level factors (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Cowey 1993; Doyle 1986; Milner 1997; Putnam 1988). Within this literature, there is now a large body of work which attributes international violence to domestic politics—most notably, the literature on the democratic peace. However, despite extensive scholarship on the international sources of domestic politics (Gourevitch 1978), there have been relatively few studies which use international factors to explain political violence at the domestic level.

Judging by the empirical record, however, it is clear that Skocpol’s assertion is quite appropriate. A number of examples illustrate this. The Central American conflicts
of the 1970’s and 80’s were fueled by US backing of anti-Communist regimes and Cuban/Soviet support for revolutionary movements. The insurgency in the Indian region of Punjab was in large part supported and financed by the Sikh diaspora in Europe and North America (Tatla 1999). The conflict in Liberia in the 1990’s quickly spread to involve Sierra Leone, and had important security implications for nearby Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. Anti-Israeli groups such as the PLO, Hamas, and Hizbollah, benefit from government and private sponsors across the Middle East. The United States government, in its current “war on terror” provides material support to Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia, among other states, for domestic counterterrorism efforts. Colombian rebels and paramilitaries support their operations by tapping into the international drug trade. Clearly then, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that theories which focus entirely on the domestic determinants of civil conflict are ignoring much of the action. Our theoretical toolkit, therefore, must include international factors if we are to properly understand civil war.

Accordingly, there have been a number of positive developments in the field of conflict studies. In the last several years, a growing number of scholars have noted the importance of interstate relations and transnational politics for the study of civil war. To begin with, conflict processes such as the onset, duration, and resolution of conflict are argued to be partly a function of interstate politics. One of the longest-standing theories in this regard is that several local conflicts may be characterized as proxy wars between rival governments (Midlarsky 1992; Rosenau 1964)\(^{10}\). In particular, during the bipolar Cold-War era the US and the USSR were greatly concerned with how civil wars in

\(^{10}\) On foreign intervention beyond the Cold-War context, see Regan (2000).
developing countries would tip the global balance of power and they actively intervened in numerous conflicts in Central America, South East Asia, and the Horn of Africa, among others. Additionally, previous research on intervention has shown that external interventions by foreign governments prolong civil wars (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Regan 2002); that foreign governments often intervene in domestic conflicts in order to protect their ethnic kin (Cetinyan 2002; Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 2001); and that third party guarantors may allow combatants to make credible commitments to one another during peace negotiations and military demobilization (Walter 2002).

It has also been argued that domestic conflicts in one country may have negative externalities for other countries in the region. Ethnic conflicts, for instance, may spread to other states through a series of diffusion and escalation effects (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Indeed, as noted above, empirical research has shown that conflicts tend to cluster geographically and that violence in one’s neighbors is correlated with local conflicts (Gleditsch 2002; 2003; Sambanis 2001). Refugee flows between countries may be one factor driving the international diffusion of conflict (Salehyan and Gledtisch 2006). Moreover, conflicts in neighboring states have also been shown to contribute to declining economic fortunes across the region and an increase in infectious disease, which may in turn fuel further conflict (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Sandler and Murdoch 2004).

Finally, a few scholars have noted the importance of transnational social actors such as migrant diasporas, ‘terrorist’ networks, and criminal organizations in directly or indirectly contributing to violence (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sandler 2003; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). As opposed to ‘global civil
society’ groups, these actors represent the dark side of transnationalism. Mary Kaldor (1999) and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (2001) have observed that in the contemporary period, ‘conventional’ warfare has diminished while conflict between governments and loosely organized, non-hierarchical, transnational groups has increased. A growing literature on natural resources and conflict, for example, argues that conflicts are in part fueled by transnational criminal activity such as the sale of illicit drugs on the global black market and unscrupulous multinational firms that operate in conflict zones (Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Migrant diasporas, furthermore, may contribute to conflict by providing resources and support to opposition groups (Byman et al. 2001; Lyons 2006; Shain 1989; Tatla 1999). Kaldor in particular has argued that transnational actors as security threats are a new phenomenon that has been rising since the end of the Cold War. It is undeniable that modern advances in global communications (most notably the internet), travel, and the ease of commerce have facilitated transnational exchanges. However, earlier movements based upon world-organizing principles such as Communism, Anarchism, and Liberalism, as well as cross-national religious movements such as political Islam have long relied upon transnational linkages for support, casting doubt upon the claim that this phenomenon is entirely new (see Bell 1971).

This literature shares the view that conflicts are not purely domestic phenomena. To understand the processes behind civil violence, we must understand how actors such as foreign governments and transnational organizations influence local conflicts. Moreover, the broader regional and international environment may contribute to violence as conditions in other countries can serve to inhibit or exacerbate conflict. This growing
body of work rightly emphasizes the global/domestic conflict nexus and shatters the conventional divide between the study of international and comparative politics. Taken as a whole, however, the literature lacks a core set of organizing principles. Some of the literature focuses on typologies and definitions without providing clear analytic connections behind variables; other studies focus on a narrow phenomenon without placing it in a broader context; and yet others point to empirical regularities while offering little theoretical substance.

Additionally, much of the recent literature on the international dimensions of civil conflict neglects the older literature, particularly research on political opportunity structures. The political opportunity framework, which emphasizes repression by governments and cost avoidance by rebels, provides a useful lens through which to understand internationalized conflict. Do external conditions, such as the availability of a foreign patron, transnational ethnic alliances, and civil wars in nearby countries, have any bearing on the opportunity for rebellion? How do such factors relate to the state’s repressive capabilities and the ability for opposition groups to mobilize, launch, and sustain an insurgency? This dissertation moves beyond the claim that international politics ‘matters’ and frames the international/regional environment in terms of rebel opportunities for mobilization. Where rebel mobilization is blocked by the state, opposition groups can look beyond the state’s territory in organizing their activities.

This literature also overlooks recent work on conflict bargaining, which models war as a sub-optimal result of bargaining failure (Fearon 1995; Lake 2003; Powell 1999; Wagner 2000). Disputants should, in principle, be willing to forgo a costly conflict by coming to an agreement at the bargaining table. Negotiations break down when actors
cannot agree on a suitable distribution of benefits because they either do not have sufficient information about their relative strength or because they cannot credibly commit to the terms of a deal. How do international and regional conditions alter the incentives or ability of actors to come to a peaceful agreement? How does the introduction of third-party actors, particularly foreign governments, change the rebel-government bargaining scenario? This dissertation argues that because, from the perspective of the government, the international environment is less information-rich than the domestic environment, bargaining problems are exacerbated by TNR groups. States cannot effectively monitor rebel mobilization in other states and divergent beliefs about relative capabilities leads to bargaining failure. Moreover, foreign host states complicate the bargain by introducing a new actor into the scenario. Rebels cannot credibly promise to evacuate extraterritorial bases in the event of a deal with the government unless rebel host states agree to monitor and enforce disarmament plans.

Outline of the Dissertation

The following chapter (Chapter 2) will address these remaining questions and further develop a theory of transnational rebellion. In this chapter, a number of themes will be addressed. First, the role that state boundaries play in shaping international and domestic politics will be explored. Borders are characterized as international institutions that limit the state’s authority to a given geographic area. Second, transnationally-organized opposition groups and rebel organizations can evade state strength by mobilizing abroad. In particular, neighboring states will be vital for the military operations of rebels. Third, the role that weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugee
communities play in hosting TNRs will be discussed. Fourth, external mobilization is argued to affect the availability of information, conflict bargaining, and the probability of war. Extraterritorial rebel activities are difficult for states to monitor and gather information on, which impedes peaceful settlements. Fifth, external rebel sanctuaries will have important implications for rebel home/host state interactions and the probability of an international dispute. Finally, conflict resolution efforts are characterized as a three-way bargain which also includes rebel host states.

Chapter 3 develops several hypotheses relating to the onset and continuation of civil conflict. A large-N statistical analysis of conflicts during the latter half of the 20th century is conducted using a variety of methodological techniques. Several of the claims find strong support in the data. First, weak neighboring states, rival neighbors, and refugee communities are shown to raise the probability of war onset and/or continuation. Second, the presence of extraterritorial bases is demonstrated to have a large impact on the duration of civil wars. Third, the conflict propensities of ethnic groups are explored. Ethnic groups that are concentrated near international borders are shown to be more likely to rebel than those located in the interior of a country because of opportunities to mobilize abroad.

Chapter 4 tests the impact of external bases in neighboring countries on state-to-state relations and the probability of international war. Does providing sanctuary to rebels provoke international conflicts? While scholars have focused on constraints on the use of force in a dyad (e.g. joint democracy, power ratios) or bilateral distributional issues (e.g. territory, scarce resources), it is argued that foreign support for rebel organizations is likely to provoke an international military confrontation between states.
The tacit or explicit provision of foreign sanctuaries on neighboring territory is especially likely to escalate to interstate violence because proximity between states provides opportunities to fight. A large-N statistical analysis is complemented with a more detailed look at several interstate conflicts during the 1990’s to test this proposition. Results show that while all forms of external support to rebel groups increase the risk of an international war, foreign sanctuaries have a particularly large effect on the odds of militarized disputes.

Chapter 5 looks in depth at conflict resolution efforts. It is argued that the cooperation of rebel hosts states will be vital for conflict termination. Host states can expel rebels, pressure combatants to the bargaining table, and help to make commitments to peace more credible. A pair of cases is examined in this chapter. First, the conflict resolution effort in Nicaragua and the regional peace initiative involving Central American governments is explored. The Nicaraguan Contra uprising faced several obstacles to peaceful settlement, but wider regional cooperation—particularly the active role that Honduras and Costa Rica played in the negotiations—enabled peace to take root. Second, agreements between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to expel Hutu rebels hiding on Congolese soil will be explored. Unable to defeat rebel forces across the border on its own, Rwanda sought a peace agreement with the DRC and security cooperation to evict TNR groups.

The final chapter offers concluding remarks. This chapter will outline the unique contributions of the dissertation and recapitulate its major findings. The theoretical framework and empirical analysis significantly advance our knowledge of civil conflict. But in addition, important implications for the theory of the state and state-society
relations emerge from this research. This chapter also offers policy advice for dealing with transnational rebel groups and provides (hopefully) constructive suggestions for the international community. Scholars are only beginning to understand the interactions between territorial nation-states and internationally-mobile social actors. A deeper understanding of transnational forms of social organization can lead to important breakthroughs in the study of civil and interstate conflict as well as a number of other political phenomena.
Chapter 2: Transnational Rebellion

The theory of transnational rebellion presented in this chapter argues that potential rebels will find it difficult to conduct an insurgency unless there are constraints on the ability of the state to repress their activities. Importantly, when able, rebels will locate themselves outside of the territory of the state in order to escape the state’s strength. While this provides challengers the opportunity to mobilize an insurgency, it also exacerbates problems commonly associated with conflict bargaining. Thus, to answer the question: “why do states fail to maintain order?” we must understand the interaction between territorially-organized states and non-territorial, or transnational, opposition groups.

This argument is developed in several sections. First, state sovereignty and territoriality imposes significant limitations on state capacity to repress rebels. While sovereignty grants advantages to the state in responding to dissent internally, the internationally recognized borders of the state constrain its sovereignty to a particular geographic area beyond which it is less able to project force. Secondly, because rebels fear repression imposed by the state, they will attempt to position themselves beyond the state’s reach. Access to neighboring territory allows rebels the opportunity to mobilize and sustain an insurgency while eluding state security forces. This also makes finding a peaceful bargain more difficult because governments cannot easily monitor rebel activities in other countries, leading to information failures and problems of credible commitment. Third, neighboring countries are more likely to become havens for rebel forces if and when they are too weak to prevent rebel access and/or they wish to promote
instability in their rivals. Furthermore, refugee communities in neighboring countries are especially likely to support transnational rebels.

After examining the conditions under which TNRs are more likely to emerge, this chapter will also look at the implications of transnational rebellion for state-to-state relations. Hosting rebel groups brings states into conflict with one another, threatening to cause international clashes between neighbors. Therefore, the presence of extraterritorial bases changes the nature of the conflict from a two-actor contest between rebels and governments to include relations with the host state as well. The decision to allow rebels access depends on the host state’s relationship with both sides as well as the relative costs of continued hosting versus expulsion. Bringing rebel host states into the picture can also improve upon our understanding of conflict termination and resolution. Although transnational rebels create tensions between neighbors, they also provide opportunities for security cooperation to limit TNR operations. Accordingly, this chapter argues that regional cooperation will be critical to bringing conflicts to an end. Host states can expel rebels from their soil, making them more vulnerable to defeat; they can also assist in the implementation of peace agreements by monitoring demobilization on their territory, disallowing future access, and providing security guarantees to combatants.

**State Boundaries as International Institutions**

State boundaries are perhaps the most fundamental international institutions in the modern state system (Ansell and Di Palma 2004; Kahler and Walter 2005; Kratochwil 1986; Ruggie 1993; Starr 2006; Starr and Most 1976). Borders define where
the authority of one state ends and that of another begins. Furthermore, across theoretical divides in the literature, they define the ‘units of analysis’ in contemporary international relations scholarship (Bull 1977; Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992). While studies of international institutions frequently focus on multilateral agreements and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade agreement, state boundaries have received much less attention as international institutions despite their fundamental role in structuring world politics.

Borders are politico-military institutions that define the geographical jurisdiction of the state—they are agreed-upon or *de facto* lines of control beyond which others have no authority. According to the classic Weberian definition of the state (Weber 1958: 212), the state is an entity that “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (emphasis added). Internally, states have the power to regulate economic activity, establish procedures for the selection and removal of leaders, regulate the media, punish criminals, and suppress armed challenges to its rule. This last point is particularly important because while states vary greatly on items such as economic policies and political institutions, all states work to monitor and limit internal threats to their supremacy.

States also work to regulate flows across their borders. As international institutions, borders are the gateways between the state, its citizens, and the outside world. At one extreme, autarchic states seek to prevent the entry of factors of production, goods, and ideas from the outside. The insular policies of North Korea seem to best fit this ideal type. At the other end of the spectrum, some states fully embrace
globalization and have worked to lift barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, information, etc. In actuality, most countries maintain some balance between complete globalization and full insulation; for example, the industrialized countries of North America and Western Europe, while relatively open, still preserve barriers to agricultural imports and immigrant labor. In addition, while well-equipped and capable states are better able to monitor their borders to prevent unwanted entry, weak governments are less able to patrol their borders. Thus, in addition to government policies regarding global flows, government capacity to control their borders may also vary.

There has been a considerable amount of debate in recent years over how effective the state has been in managing its borders and to what extent state sovereignty is still a useful concept. Much of the literature on state sovereignty and territoriality argues that the state is being rendered irrelevant by global markets (Camilleri and Falk 1992; Elkins 1995; Ohmae 1990) and universal human rights discourses (Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994). It is claimed that borders serve a diminished function or are no longer important in regulating international affairs. For example, some have noted that in an area as fundamental as managing immigration—or who is allowed within the state—government policies to restrict entry are regularly undermined by the forces of supply-and-demand for immigrant labor (Cornelius et al. 2004). Anticipating a radical change from the Westphalian nation-state model, Ruggie (1993: 172) writes, “…conventional distinctions between internal and external once again are exceedingly problematic…” In
short, this view finds that the state has been weakened and the world is becoming increasingly ‘borderless.’

Stephen Krasner (1995-1996; 1999) doubts that the world is now being transformed and argues that the view that there was once a ‘golden age’ of Westphalian sovereignty is misguided. Sovereignty is not being weakened in a globalizing world; rather, the concept was never robust to begin with. Since the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th Century, state sovereignty has been frequently violated in relations between states, either through the free-will of both parties or through coercion by more powerful states. Sometimes, governments voluntarily allow monitoring and regulation of domestic activities by external actors (e.g. IMF conditionality rules). Other times, powerful states are able to force others to change their domestic behavior, or even more aggressively, replace the government with one of their liking. However, Krasner (1995-95; 1999) explicitly does not address the question of whether control of cross-border flows is eroding, and chooses to focus instead on the Westphalian view of sovereignty, or freedom from external interference by other states (see also Thomson 1995).

On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that state sovereignty has been quite effective in preventing external meddling in internal affairs. Hedley Bull (1977) argues that mutual recognition of boundaries is one of the core principles of modern international relations. In addition, the very existence of exceptionally inept states and

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11 The claim that the territorial state is now in decline is nothing new. See Herz (1957).
12 Krasner (1999 p. 4) defines four types of sovereignty: legal, Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence. Domestic sovereignty, or the strength of the state to regulate internal activity and interdependence sovereignty, or the ability to control flows across borders is not examined in his work. Similarly Janice Thomson (1995) argues that states have never been able to adequately regulate flows across their borders and that this definition of sovereignty is not particularly relevant. However, as will be argued below, when seen as military institutions, state boundaries have been more effective in preventing infiltration by the security forces of other states.
respect for their borders in a competitive global environment is cited as evidence that sovereignty matters (Herbst 2000; Jackson 1987). Still others doubt that there is a diminished role for national governments in the international economy and have pointed to the importance of the state in managing markets and directing the flow of capital, migrants, and commodities (Cohen 2001; Evans 1997; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Helliwell 1998). Finally, some scholars have pointed to the primacy of the state in defining global human rights regimes and the ability of states to circumvent their international legal obligations in this regard (Hathaway 2002; Joppke 1999).

The Military Function of Borders

The literature on sovereignty and state control over borders focuses overwhelmingly on global economic flows while ignoring the politico-military function of borders. As international institutions, the *primary function of international boundaries is to demarcate legal or de facto lines of military control and political jurisdiction*. The military and police forces of one state have no authority in another state and crossing borders with such forces is seen as an act of aggression. States employ police forces to detect, apprehend, and punish criminals on their territory on a daily basis. Furthermore, security agents regularly monitor subversive groups to prevent and defeat insurrections. However, while goods and capital may move relatively freely, state agents cannot easily cross borders. A popular, and quite telling, Hollywood cliché involves criminals escaping across the border where they are beyond the jurisdiction of police forces. Thus, the ability of the state to respond to criminals and dissidents is largely restricted by national boundaries.
States jealously guard their exclusive right to exercise political authority within their own territory. Although they do not rule by force alone, states have a comparative advantage in the domestic use of coercion (Hardin 1995). Sovereignty implies that states command a preponderance (though often not a monopoly) of military capabilities relative to other domestic actors, and that other state actors do not have authority on their soil.

Since the Treaty of the Pyrenees between France and Spain in 1659, states have insisted upon clearly defined borders and have taken measures to fortify their frontiers against foreign incursion onto their territory (Sahlins 1989). With the intensification of warfare and rising nationalist sentiment in Europe during the late 18th and 19th centuries (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Tilly 1990), the process of border demarcation accelerated and nearly all of the continent was geographically compartmentalized into exclusive political jurisdictions. It is important to note that while boundaries were being defined with great care during this period, global flows of goods and capital followed a relatively laissez-faire pattern. In fact, it was not until roughly the turn of the 20th century that states began to restrict the movement of people across their borders by establishing immigration control laws and issuing passports (Castles and Miller 1993).13 The first US legislation to limit the entry of foreigners did not come until the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which restricted a relatively small subset of immigrants; prior to that time nearly anyone who wanted to could immigrate to the US. Thus, the establishment of national boundaries was principally for military purposes—states worked to prevent the intrusion of foreign state agents while being less interested in the

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13 For an interesting discussion on the invention of the passport and other identity documents see Torpey (2000).
entry of non-governmental actors. Currently, except for a few desolate and sparsely inhabited areas of the world (e.g. the Rub al Khali between Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman), contiguous countries are separated by some form boundary-line. Most of these borders are agreed upon by treaty, but others—e.g. Israel-Syria, India-Pakistan—are simply de facto, but no less real, lines of control (see also Herbst 1989).

Several observers have noted that especially since World War II, international borders have constrained the use of force between governments—military lines of control are now more respected than ever (Andreas 2003; Zacher 2001). Mark Zacher (2001) documents a rise in this respect for the “territorial integrity norm,” which is partly a function of the post-war international order established by the major Western powers. Thus, while the process of globalization has led to a more economically integrated world, in terms of their security functions, borders are quite important: although states may vary in their ability to prevent incursions, no state welcomes military violations of its sovereignty and cross-border incursions are likely to spark an international conflict. Moreover, the international community, as expressed in the UN Charter and several subsequent documents, widely views border violations with disapproval. Acts of aggression across national boundaries—e.g. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990—elicit a clear response by the international community; although it is unclear to what extent censure factors into state behavior, international opprobrium is not costless, especially if coupled with more concrete sanctions.
Figure 2.1. The Relative Openness of Borders

Figure 2.1 depicts a stylized view of the openness/ restrictiveness of borders with respect to particular types of flows in the contemporary period. This presents an ideal-type of modern boundaries and global flows in the aggregate; while particular countries may deviate from this pattern, the general relationships apply to borders in general. Global flows of information lie at the open end of the continuum: radio broadcasts, satellite television, and the internet penetrate even the most isolationist countries. Global flows of capital—particularly portfolio investments—are also relatively open in the contemporary period, with billions of dollars worth of transactions taking place across the world in a single day. Next up the spectrum, international trade in goods, and to a lesser extent services, have expanded dramatically since World War II. However, countries still impose significant tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly in politically sensitive areas such as agriculture and defense technology.

Towards the more restrictive end, while global factor mobility pertains mostly to capital, most countries still impose strict limits on labor migration. In order to protect domestic labor and prevent the entry of culturally ‘unwelcome’ foreigners, barriers to immigration and the mobility of people across borders has not kept pace with other
global movements. Nevertheless, flows of legal and undocumented migrants are substantial (Cornelius et al. 2004; Joppke 1998).

Finally, even the most globally integrated states condemn the crossing of security forces across national boundaries—here, borders are quite effective in restricting flows. This is not to say that state security forces are not mobile at all: through bilateral treaties, several governments have allowed the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil (e.g. US bases in Germany and South Korea); by agreement, foreign police and intelligence agents are sometimes allowed access to a state’s territory; and forceful occupations, although growing more rare, are not unheard of. As Krasner (1999) indicates, though contract or imposition, violations of strict sovereignty—even by military forces—do occur. Nonetheless, for the great majority of states, most of the time, security forces are limited to territorial boundaries. Military violations of sovereignty, especially by force, are certainly costly for the initiator as well as for the target and are thus rare events—they reach the news headlines when the do. We see them happening most often when power asymmetries between states are great (e.g. the US in Afghanistan, Iraq), but for most dyads, countries cannot easily penetrate national boundaries against the other’s will.

In sum, the Leviathan is limited by its boundaries—the capacity to wield force, particularly in crushing insurgencies, is largely constrained by sovereign borders. State security forces are specialized to maintain control internally and defend against external aggression. To control society, government agents gather information on domestic actors in order to monitor dissent; they prosecute subversives; they harass, torture, and execute

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14 The lifting of internal migration controls in the European Union is an important exception, however.
opposition leaders; and they massacre rival factions. Relative to the citizens which they claim authority over, states are far superior in their ability to wield force. State capacity may not be spread evenly across its territory—the state may be relatively weaker in certain peripheral regions—but its power and authority drops off dramatically, if not to nil, at its border. This implies that transnationally organized groups, including rebels, are less vulnerable to state efforts to limit their activities.

**Transnational Opposition**

Not all politically-relevant populations, or those who make demands upon the state, are physically present within that state’s territory. Recognizing this, there has been a remarkable growth in the study of transnational organizations, including firms, religious institutions, and advocacy networks (e.g. Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Huntington 1973; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Keohane and Nye 1971; Pauly and Reich 1997; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Tarrow 1994 ch. 11). Much of this work focuses on multinational corporations and global ‘civil society’ groups such as human rights and environmental organizations. In an important contribution, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that pressure from the outside can be effective when opportunities for domestic human rights and environmental activism are blocked by an unresponsive state. When the state either ignores or cracks-down on groups advocating some form of policy change, these groups often link up with sympathetic actors in other countries who, because they are not subject to similar repressive measures, are better positioned to voice their concerns.
Research on civil and international conflict has also noted the importance of transnational actors, particularly ethnic groups that reside in more than one state. In an important body of work, several authors have demonstrated a relationship between bisected ethnic groups and international conflict (Cetinyan 2002; Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 2001; Woodwell 2004). This literature has shown that during periods of domestic violence, ethnic groups often come to the aid of their kin in other countries when they face a threat from their government. Ethnic irredentism to capture territory populated by kin groups is also responsible for many international disputes (Ambrosio 2001; Carment and James 1995; Chazan 1991). These studies suggest that political actors are not necessarily defined by extant national boundaries, but that many groups share common aims with people in another country.

While foreign businesses and human rights groups may place pressure upon states to adopt certain policies, nationals of the country in question—who have a more direct stake in politics—may also reside abroad and remain politically active while maintaining social ties to their country of origin. Although state agents are geographically constrained by territorial borders, the citizens of a state are relatively freer to cross national boundaries (see fig. 1.1) and in doing, place themselves outside of the reach of the state. Migrants exit the state for a variety of reasons including better economic prospects, political persecution, or family reunification. While living abroad, these diaspora communities\(^\text{15}\) often continue to strongly identify with their homelands and participate in

\(^{15}\)The term “diaspora” has several different meanings in the literature. In the original usage of the term, it applied to the displacement of Jews from the biblical land of Israel. Authors differ in their use of the term based upon several criteria including forced versus non-forced dispersal, the number of host countries, assimilation into host societies, multi-generational ties to the homeland, and the political relationship with the home government. Here, I use the term much more broadly, while focusing on the political identities...

Many times, the relationship between the state and diaspora communities is mutually supportive. Migrants often send remittances to their home countries, work with governments to facilitate business investment, and support legitimate political parties (Chakravartty 2001; Fitzgerald 2000; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Levitt and Dehesa 2003; Saxenian 2001); on the other side of the ledger, the home country’s foreign policies sometimes work to protect the interests of its diaspora in their host countries (King and Melvin 1999). Some scholars have gone so far as to call expatriate political participation in home country affairs ‘transnational citizenship,’ implying that states can offer (and emigrants can demand) political rights to those not physically present on their territory (for a critical analysis see Fox 2005; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).

The literature on transnational migrant politics often overlooks politically contentious activities while focusing on peaceful civic participation. However, as Sidney Tarrow (2005) indicates, transnational actors, including migrant groups, can also engage in politically unwelcome (from the state’s perspective) activities. Figure 2.2 illustrates the different modes of immigrant participation in home country politics. Certain
diaspora groups, or individuals in the diaspora, may pay little attention to political affairs in their home countries. Such migrants may maintain family and/or economic links back home but remain apathetic about politics. These people may demonstrate greater attention to, and civic participation in, the politics of their host countries, although host and home country political participation need not be mutually exclusive affairs. Those migrants that do engage in home country politics may contribute to what may broadly be termed ‘civic’ activities, or legal/legitimate political behavior that are within the constitutional system. Empirical work on transnational citizenship, such as expatriate voting or campaigning, has attempted to model the left-leaning arrow in figure 2.2 (see e.g. Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). However, some members of the diaspora engage in unlawful and/or contentious political activities in opposition to the regime, such as supporting dissident parties or transnational rebel organizations. This end of the participation spectrum has been understudied (but see Byman et al 2001; Lyons 2006; Tatla 1999).
The important thing to note about migrant diasporas and other forms of transnational social networks and organizations is that these actors are beyond any one state’s legal, political, and coercive reach. This gives such actors a strategic advantage over state agents who are not as mobile. Tacitly, most social science research assumes a perfect congruence between states and societies; social actors which make demands upon the state are believed to lie within the boundaries of the state. All forms of transnational organization call this assumption into question. But even more starkly, the mobility of people across national boundaries implies that not even all citizens of the state—namely, persons that the state claims authority over and that have an interest in the nature of the
regime in power—reside on the sovereign territory of the state, where they would be subject to the state’s laws.

**Rebellion**

While transnational firms, advocacy groups, and migrant associations often have relatively benign or positive effects, other transnational actors may be involved in disruptive acts.\(^{17}\) Many migrant diasporas—particularly those who flee for political reasons—can play an active role in opposing their home governments, including through subversive means. Some ethnic groups such as the Sikhs and the Kurds\(^ {18}\) aspire to a national homeland apart from the territory of the state(s) exercising control of the region and have mobilized support for their cause among diaspora communities. Other migrant groups—e.g. Iranians, Cubans, Vietnamese—work towards changing the central regime in power in their home countries. Thus, Albert Hirschman’s (1970; 1978) classic distinction between exit and voice may not entail mutually-exclusive alternatives: people who are dissatisfied with the state may exit the country, but continue to be vocal in their opposition to it.

Importantly, political opposition groups abroad may engage in the types of activities that the target government would never tolerate on its own soil. Because they cannot exercise authority outside of their political jurisdiction, the police and military forces of the home state cannot easily suppress these activities; thus, actors located

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17 For examples of the literature on transnational terrorism see Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), Dorff (2005), and Enders and Sandler (1999). See also Byman et al. (2001) for a discussion of outside support for insurgencies.

18 For an excellent discussion of the Sikh diaspora and their political activism towards and independent Khalistan, see Axel (2001) and Tatla (1999). The political activities of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe are documented in Lyon and Ucarer (2001) and Wahlbeck (1999).
abroad may engage in several forms of opposition politics that would normally be proscribed within the target state. In addition, while states devote considerable resources towards the surveillance of domestic dissent, they are less able to monitor transnational groups. Because state agents are less able to gather intelligence abroad, this creates informational asymmetries between states and challengers, as governments are not fully aware of extraterritorial opposition activities. The forms of subversive acts occurring abroad are many. First, opposition groups in foreign countries may create media outlets such as newspapers, radio broadcasts, satellite television stations, and internet websites for voicing their views and mobilizing discontent. These messages are directed at members of the diaspora as well as people inside the country. Cubans in the US broadcast Radio Martí, an anti-Castro radio station, to the island; and Iranians in exile have created no fewer than eight opposition satellite channels.

Second, diaspora communities often provide funding and resources to opposition parties within their origin state, including violent factions. Sikhs and Kurds living in Europe provided substantial resources to secessionist groups back home, and Irish Republican sympathizers in the US have provided support to Sinn Fein and the IRA. Third, migrants living abroad may lobby their host government to make policy demands and impose negative sanctions on their home government in order promote change. Both indigenous and migrant Tamils in India have pressured the government in New Delhi to

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take a more active role in the Sri Lankan conflict; similar Tamil lobbying has occurred across Europe.

Finally, rebel organizations often find it useful to relocate themselves outside of the territorial borders of their target state. Rebel groups, particularly in their formative stages, must evade the state’s capacity to repress dissent or else risk an early defeat. The initial process of rebel mobilization is extremely precarious because the opposition cannot survive a decisive attack. As noted in the previous chapter, the literature on political opportunity structures argues that state repression works to deter and eliminate insurgencies; limitations on the state’s ability to repress dissidents is a necessary precondition for violence. Rational actors will not rebel if they believe that the probability of victory is low and repression costs are likely to be high; these conditions present themselves when the state has effective means of coercion at its disposal (Lichbach 1995; Tilly 1978). Using this framework, a substantial body of empirical research confirms the expectation that opposition violence is reduced when state coercion is robust (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Moore 1998; Muller and Weede 1990). Therefore, conditions such as rough terrain, regime transitions, and poor infrastructure, which reduce the state’s ability to repress challengers effectively, provide strategic opportunities for insurgent groups to emerge.

Yet there is no reason to expect that in the strategic calculations of rebel groups, opportunities to mobilize, launch, and sustain a rebellion are limited to the geographic area of the state. Instead, rebels recognize that state power is constrained by international

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20 When looking at non-violent protest behavior, as opposed to open armed insurrection, there is an interesting finding in the literature which suggests that protest behavior actually increases as regimes engage in more repression (Francisco 1995; Moore 1998). Moore (1998) in particular suggests that dissident violence decreases when governments coerce, but that non-violent protest may increase.
borders and, when able, will organize transnationally to evade repression costs.\(^{21}\) Transnational rebels (TNRs), therefore, can engage in opposition politics while being relatively free from government coercion. The establishment of extraterritorial bases allows rebels to recruit/train fighters and gather supplies during the mobilization phase, and during the combat phase, flee to safe ground.\(^{22}\)

*Neighboring* territory will be especially important for rebel operations. Insurgent groups do not have the ability to project force across long distances, and so proximity to the target country will be especially important for military purposes. TNRs may find recruits and support from diaspora communities and state patrons further abroad, but the ability to launch combat operations will critically depend on nearness to the target state.

Still, warfare is socially costly and peaceful alternatives to fighting may exist. While conditions in neighboring countries may provide the opportunity for groups to rebel against the state—contextual factors make rebellion feasible—fighting is not a forgone conclusion. James Fearon (1995) has made an important contribution to the study of *international* war by arguing that states should, in principle, be willing to come to a bargained solution short of a costly war. If states can agree about the balance of forces between them and the relative probability of victory, they can forgo the loss of lives and resources that conflict entails by allocating resources through a deal that both sides would prefer to war (see also Powell 1999). Bargaining failure may occur under

\(^{21}\) We must be careful not to conflate migrants with transnational rebels. Only very few international migrants or refugees participate in violent activities. However, transnational rebels *are* migrants in the sense that they leave the territory of the state, even if it is to organize violence and return to attack the state. Thus, while TNRs are migrants, very few migrants are TNRs.

\(^{22}\) Empirically, Buhaug and Gates (2004) demonstrate that during periods of civil war, conflicts often are fought near international boundaries, providing at least preliminary evidence that border effects are important.
two conditions. First, states may be uncertain about one another’s capabilities and resolve to use force. Informational problems lead actors to be overly confident about their ability to prevail in a conflict and so proposed distributions of benefits are unsatisfactory as they believe fighting would leave them better off. Secondly, conflict may occur if states cannot credibly commit to refrain from attacking. Promises to abide by the terms of a peace deal may not be credible in equilibrium and so any bargain is likely to fail.

This framework can be applied analogously to civil war (see Lake 2003), although with important modifications. Although they may disagree about their relative strength, states are already pre-mobilized for war—they have standing armies that can be called upon to fight at any moment. Insurgents, by contrast, do not have substantial military capabilities prior to the decision to fight and/or make demands of the government. Therefore, if they are to gain bargaining leverage, opposition groups must first mobilize military forces with which to threaten the government. Rebels can be defeated prior to realizing their full strength, and the process of mobilization and securing resources (e.g. through theft) may itself be violent. Even during the mobilization phase, however, there is a tacit bargain between governments and rebels over the distribution of benefits. Governments may be able to offer aggrieved groups enough concessions or reforms to avoid violent conflict. Bargaining failures may occur if both sides disagree about the mobilization potential of the rebels. If both sides can agree on the future power of the challenger, the state can offer enough concessions to

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23 While this may be typical of most states, I acknowledge that very weak and inept government may have great difficulty calling upon their armed forces to combat internal and foreign enemies.
prevent or end a conflict, but the future is inherently more uncertain than the present. Therefore, uncertainty about the future power of the challenger makes civil conflict considerably more difficult to resolve through an ex ante bargain.

This reasoning can be extended to transnational rebel organizations as well. Because the process of mobilization is precarious, rebels can ‘incubate’ themselves by conducting their operations in other countries, thereby eluding government attacks. But doing so creates informational asymmetries. While rebels need to gather strength in order to gain bargaining leverage, and can do so in other countries, governments realize that challengers have incentives to misrepresent their strength. Mobilization activities in other countries are difficult for governments to verify because the state cannot easily monitor rebel activities abroad and so disagreements about relative power may emerge. Thus, in addition to uncertainty about the power potential of the rebels, external mobilization exacerbates informational problems and increases the risk of bargaining failure.

Another important modification to the interstate war analogy regards the post-settlement phase. While governments in an international dispute can retain their forces after a negotiated settlement, peace negotiations during times of civil unrest require demobilization by rebels (see Walter 2002). Rebels mobilize force in order to gain bargaining power, but demobilization is exceptionally difficult. When rebels have access to extraterritorial bases in neighboring countries, compliance with demobilization schemes are hard to implement and monitor. As long as permissive conditions in neighboring states persist, rebels can always maintain weapons stockpiles and/or re-

24 Powell (1999, Ch 4) makes a similar argument with respect to the shifting power balance between states.
mobilize their fighters after peace negotiations, making promises to desist from fighting in the future non-credible. Verification of demobilization abroad is difficult to conduct without the cooperation of foreign governments. In other words, it is difficult for the rebels to promise that they will not rise again. Additionally, as Walter (2002) argues, rebel disarmament leaves them vulnerable to a strike by the government, and such security fears make negotiations hard to implement. These arguments will be given greater attention in subsequent sections.25

Before turning to conditions under which extraterritorial bases may emerge, it is important to fully understand why they are tactically desirable. To begin with, when rebels have access to sanctuaries on external territory, governments cannot easily pursue rebels across the border because doing so violates the sovereignty of, and risks a confrontation with, the neighboring state. Cross-border strikes by the government on foreign soil threaten the sovereignty and security of the neighboring country and are likely to provoke a wider conflict. Limited attacks against TNRs can and do occur across national boundaries—for example, Cambodian troops exchanged artillery fire with Khmer Rouge forces in Thailand and Ugandan forces crossed into Sudan in pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army. In these examples, however, the government whose sovereignty had been violated objected strongly and moved to fortify their borders against further raids.

As another interesting example, in December of 2004, Colombian authorities bribed Venezuelan National Guardsman to arrest and return Rodrigo Granda, a leading

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25 Toft (2003) argues that for ethnic groups, territory is often indivisible, another source of bargaining failure that authors such as Fearon (1995) discount. Goddard (2006) argues that territory is not intrinsically indivisible, but that indivisibility is socially constructed by political actors. This debate is not explicitly dealt with here, although there are good reasons to believe that territory is a negotiable resource.
operative of the rebel group Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC), who had been residing in Caracas. Venezuela strongly protested the maneuver, insisting that its sovereignty had been violated. This incident caused a major diplomatic rift between the neighboring countries as Venezuela temporarily recalled its ambassador in Bogotá and suspended commercial relations. Thus, even relatively minor intrusions or domestic interference by the security forces of another country in pursuit of TNRs have the potential to escalate into international conflicts.

Secondly, even if a state is strong enough to extensively penetrate another country’s territory and attempt to rid it of rebel groups, it would still bear significant governance costs in doing so. It would mean that the invading state would have to take, hold, and police part or all of the neighboring country’s territory, which is usually prohibitively costly. Thus, there are few clear examples of states that have attempted this strategy, usually at significant costs to themselves. In an attempt to destroy the Palestinian resistance, in 1982 Israel invaded and held southern Lebanon after repeated PLO attacks across the border; however, it quickly became embattled with local Lebanese militias, namely Hezbollah, for almost two decades. In a similar manner, the Kagame government in Rwanda invaded Eastern Congo in pursuit of Hutu fighters, many of whom participated in the Rwandan genocide. In doing, Rwanda became involved in a protracted conflict in the Congo, which proved to be extremely costly. In both of these examples, the governments viewed the rebels across the border as an

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26 Governance costs refer to the costs borne by a state in managing the affairs of a subordinate or occupied polity. For a discussion, see Lake (1996).
existential threat, and so, were willing to bear the enormous costs of entering and occupying foreign territory, but such examples are quite rare.

Finally, although it is difficult to assess the importance of norms in the behavior of states, the international community—through the UN Charter and several treaties—has repeatedly promulgated the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Border violations, even in pursuit of rebels, elicit international condemnation. In 1976, Rhodesian forces attacked the Nyadzonia refugee camp in Mozambique in pursuit of rebels who were allegedly mobilizing there, and in doing, drew substantial fire from the international community. Border violations have also been the focus of numerous Security Council resolutions, illustrating the international consensus against such acts. For instance, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, UN Resolution 509 (June 6, 1982) states, “Reaffirming the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon… [the Council] demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon.” In a similar resolution against Rwanda and Uganda, UN Resolution 1304 (June 16, 2000) demands that, “Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all of their forces… without further delay.” In these examples, the offending government clearly did not withdraw their troops—faced with the threat across the border, these states were willing to put up with disapproval of their actions—but international censure is certainly one cost that such tactics entail.

27 For a discussion of international norms in the foreign policy behavior of states, see Katzenstein (1996). Additionally, Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) develop a theoretical framework and empirical test for assessing the importance of international norms relative to strategic state interests; this framework is applied to US asylum enforcement.
The argument is not an absolute one: international borders are not sacrosanct. However, it is quite costly for state forces to cross national boundaries in pursuit of transnational rebels, and doing so may not even be an option for governments that lack the ability to confront their neighbors. Therefore, extraterritorial bases provide rebel groups with substantial cover in evading security forces, both while mobilizing insurgents and during combat operations. The following section examines the opportunities for rebel groups to establish external sanctuaries in neighboring countries.

**Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups**

**Refugees**

Under what conditions are neighboring states likely to be used by rebel groups? As mentioned earlier, access to neighboring territory will be especially important for organized rebellion; while protest activity against the state may take place more broadly, proximity to the target is important for the military operations of rebel groups. The first condition under which extraterritorial bases may emerge has already been alluded to: migrants in neighboring countries, particularly refugees, may contribute to opposition activities. Oppressive governments and political violence have been demonstrated to be an important cause of refugee outflows (Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and Shellman 2004; Schmeidl 1997), and the vast majority of the world’s refugees end up in areas near their country of origin. Refugees in particular exit the state because of a direct experience of persecution or political violence and therefore
have strong reasons to oppose the regime from which they have fled. While refugees are, of course, the victims of violence, they also have all of the main ingredients conducive to their involvement in rebel factions. Rather than simply being a consequence of fighting, they may also be a potential cause. First, because they have suffered violence and have often endured substantial losses—e.g. their livelihoods, property, family members, and homeland—refugees have a clear grievance or motive for opposition activities. Secondly, because of these losses, refugees have low opportunity costs for fighting. Those refugees residing in squalid camps and who are dependent on foreign assistance have very few productive alternatives to joining rebel organizations, which may in fact offer a better quality of life and a sense of purpose. Finally, because they are not within their home state’s political jurisdiction, the state cannot directly monitor or repress refugee communities.

This should not detract from the legitimate humanitarian concerns that refugee migration entails. The majority of the world’s refugees never engage in fighting and are rightly characterized as victims. However, refugees are also not passive actors. Rather,

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28 Refugees flee their origin country for a variety of reasons, which are not limited to direct government persecution. Many individuals flee a region because of general conditions of violence in their origin country and have no particular stake in the politics between the government and opposition. However, a substantial subset of any refugee exodus is likely to include people who flee because of direct grievances against the state. For a discussion, see Lischer (2005).

29 Several theoretical works suggest a number of ways in which refugees, and migrants in general, can cause conflict. First, refugees may foster conflict in the host country through their direct involvement in violent activities or through their impact on the economy and ethnic relations. Secondly, refugees may cause conflict between sending and receiving countries as providing shelter to refugees may be seen as harboring dissidents and it implicates the sending country in the commission of human rights violations. Finally, refugees may cause conflict in their home country through participation in armed factions. For excellent examples of this literature see: Loescher (1993); Teitelbaum (1984); Weiner (1992).

30 A number of authors have begun to examine the issue of rebel recruitment. See, for example, Gates (2002) and Weinstein (2005).
they can and do participate in politics in both their home and host countries, including through violence, and their humanitarian needs should not obscure this role.

A large body of case-study literature and qualitative accounts demonstrate this ‘refugee warrior’ phenomenon (Lischer 2005; Stedman and Tanner 2003; Teitelbaum 1984; Weiner 1992-1993; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989), but systematic quantitative research on this topic has been lacking. A number of anecdotal cases do however illustrate the relationship between refugee communities and violence. Cuban exiles in the United States organized the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961; refugees from Rhodesia supported the ZANU and ZAPU rebels in Mozambique and Zambia; and Nicaraguan Contras turned to refugee communities in Honduras for resources and recruits. More recently, the Rwandan Patriotic Front organized among Tutsi refugees in Uganda; refugees in Chad from the Sudanese region of Darfur have backed various armed factions; and the United Tajik Opposition conducted significant operations among refugee camps in Afghanistan. Thus, while refugee camps are often thought of as shelters for the displaced, they may also serve a double-purpose as bases in which rebels find relief as well gather supplies and recruits.

31While the argument here is that refugees contribute to conflict in their home countries, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) have found through large-N empirical testing that refugees often lead to the onset of civil conflict in their host countries, confirming the expectation that refugees are one mechanism of conflict diffusion across regions.
Refugee Countries of Origin, 2000

Figure 2.3. Refugee Countries of Origin, 2000
To give a sense of the pervasiveness of refuge migration, Figure 2.3 displays the countries of origin of refugees in 2000, with darker regions indicating greater numbers. Countries such as Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine each generated millions of refugees, who overwhelmingly reside in adjacent countries (Iran and Pakistan for Afghans; Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria for Palestinians). Other significant refugee source countries include those that have been devastated by war such as DR Congo, Iraq, Sudan, and Burma. Roughly 10% of Afghans resided outside of their country in 2000; in the same year, approximately 22% of the non-Arab Sudanese population were refugees. Figure 2.4 graphs the number of refugees worldwide (figures in thousands) from 1980 to 2002. There was a significant peak in the early 1990’s which was largely due to new conflicts at the end of the Cold War—e.g. Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan—and the elimination of exit restrictions in Eastern Europe, which prompted a rise in the number of asylum-seekers in Western countries. The number of refugees during this period ranged between 10 and 18 million, which is certainly larger than the population of several countries. Although most of these refugees never engage in violence, a politically significant subset are recruited into or support TNR operations.
Rival States

During periods of civil war, scholars have noted that rebel organizations and governments often receive substantial external support by foreign patrons who have a stake in the conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Forman 1972; Regan 2000; Rosenau 1964). However, external support during ‘proxy wars’ is not limited to the provision of resources and direct military intervention. Hostile neighbors may also allow rebel groups to establish extraterritorial bases on their soil in order to undermine their opponents. Rebel groups strategically form alliances with hostile neighbors to fight a mutual enemy across the border. Therefore, while it has been overlooked in the literature, sanctuary is an important ‘resource’ that rival governments can offer rebel groups.
Moreover, international borders between rival governments are likely to be especially ‘hard,’ or defended against incursions by state security forces. Hostile states view one another with suspicion and will fortify their borders against any intrusion, however limited. Because states cannot be sure of one another’s intentions, actions taken to increase military presence near the border—even if only to limit movements by TNRs—are likely to be seen as threatening and will invite countervailing measures (Jervis 1978). Additionally, in order to damage their rivals, host governments may provide resources, training opportunities, and logistical support to rebel groups; some even go as far as to use their own troops in joint operations with the rebels, blurring the line between civil and international war.

Both during and after the Iran-Iraq war, for example, Iran offered sanctuary to members of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq; likewise, Iraq was host to the Iranian militant group, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq. Pakistan, a long-time enemy of India, offered training grounds and rear bases to Indian rebels in both Punjab and Kashmir. Finally, Thailand allowed Cambodian opposition forces to establish extraterritorial bases on its territory and provided substantial protection against Cambodian government forces by fortifying its borders. More directly, several rival governments have engaged in fighting alongside rebel movements which they had supported and trained on their soil. Libya invaded Chad along with support from Frolinat rebels who had organized on Libyan territory and Tanzania invaded Uganda to oust Idi Amin, along with rebels from the United National Liberation Front.
Weak States

Several states lack adequate resources, personnel, and infrastructure to be able to effectively police their territory. These ‘weak states’ may come to play reluctant hosts to TNRs through their simple inability to rid their soil of such groups. Several governments only effectively control their capital cities while lacking any substantial presence in, or ability to penetrate, peripheral areas. In the context of transnational terrorism, it has been acknowledged that ‘terrorist’ groups often find opportunities for mobilization in failed or collapsed states (Dorff 2005; Rice 2003) and TNRs may also find sanctuary in weak states. Weak neighbors provide strategic opportunities for rebels because although they may not be welcomed, the host government faces high opportunity costs for trying to deal with what is perceived as another state’s problem. These host states will be reluctant to redirect significant resources away from more pressing domestic concerns, including monitoring and suppressing local dissent.

In the context of weak neighboring states, the target and host state may work together in a limited manner to limit TNR activity. The host state may offer some policing of its own, allow limited cross-border strikes against the rebels, and they may not feel threatened by troop mobilization near the international border. However, more extensive campaigns by the target state against rebels are not likely to be welcomed as they necessarily threaten the host government and the security of local populations. As opposed to rival government situations, security cooperation may occur when the host country is a weak state; but even here, the target government is limited in its response to TNRs by its diplomatic relations with its neighbor, and rebels are relatively more safe in such countries as opposed to within the target state itself.
Along these lines, after the collapse of the government in Somalia, the Ethiopian rebel faction, Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, took up bases there. The government of Bhutan, despite trying to maintain friendly relations and cooperating with India, found it difficult to rid its territory of Assamese rebel groups, as have Burma and Bangladesh. Liberia has also served as a base of operations for rebels from Sierra Leone, Guinea, and most recently, Cote d’Ivoire. Finally, after the US invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban forces have regrouped in remote areas of Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s cooperation with US forces.

The Conditional Effect of Refugees

Above, it was argued that refugee encampments, rival states, and weak states may be used by rebels in their efforts to conduct and insurgency. However, the effect of refugees may be conditional on where they are located. In particular, well-governed countries that are on good terms with their neighbors can work to prevent the militarization of refugee communities (Lischer 2005). Efforts to provide security and productive livelihoods to refugees, screen against combatants, and integrate refugees into host countries can mitigate the security risks of refugee camps. For example, Malawi received over one million refugees from Mozambique, but worked with aid agencies to limit the militarization of camps and move the refugees towards self-sufficiency. For long-term refugee communities, providing them with their basic needs and allowing them to access local employment options are likely to be especially important because such efforts raise the opportunity costs for recruitment into rebel organizations.
By contrast, disorderly camp conditions in which the host government is unable to prevent rebel infiltration will be more conducive to violence, as will cases where rival governments actively encourage rebel mobilization among refugees. As an example of the latter, Honduras—which was opposed to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua—encouraged Nicaraguan refugees to reside in camps along the border and allowed various Contra factions to mobilize among these camps. Humanitarian NGO’s and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are normally limited in their ability to provide security without the cooperation of the host government, and in fact, their humanitarian resources may end up in the hands of combatants (Lischer 2005). Thus, refugees located in weak and/or rival states will be more likely to contribute to violence than refugees located in states that are both friendly and capable of effectively governing camps.

The Importance of Information

As was discussed above, states and rebels should prefer to come to a negotiated settlement short of war that would leave them both better off. Opportunities for external mobilization raise the bargaining power of opposition groups by making it more difficult for the government to win a decisive victory. Weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugee communities in which to mobilize can improve bargaining outcomes for rebels, but these factors are common knowledge to both parties. States and rebels should simply update their beliefs about the probability of victory and adjust their demands accordingly. Commonly-known information prior to a conflict should not lead to war.

Peace bargains fail when actors cannot agree about the distribution of realized or potential power between them (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). Uncertainty about the end-
point of rebel mobilization is a common feature of all civil conflicts. Rebels must mobilize strength in order to win concessions; there may be disagreement about the mobilization potential of the rebels at some future point; and gathering resources and recruits may itself be a violent process (e.g. theft, conscription). Transnational rebellions introduce another important source of uncertainty. States have greater capacity to monitor and control dissident activities at home than they do abroad. They devote significant resources towards establishing domestic intelligence and surveillance capacities; have networks of informers; and access to sophisticated monitoring equipment. Information on the external operations of rebels is inherently difficult for states to monitor and verify because the state often lacks the ability to gather intelligence abroad, particularly in unfamiliar areas. Information about transnational rebels is scarce. Rebels may try to signal their strength to the government, but because the state knows that the opposition has an incentive to overstate its capabilities in order to win more than they would otherwise, such information is not reliable. Furthermore, rebels cannot reveal too much about their operations and tactics because doing so would leave them at a military disadvantage.

Thus, weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugees in neighbors do not lead to conflict by themselves. They simply alter the expected utility of war (or peace) and are not private information. Rather, external mobilization in such territories leads to an information-poor environment, which exacerbates bargaining problems and increases probability of violence. Weak states, rival states, and refugee diasporas provide opportunities for rebels to mobilize and increase their bargaining leverage, but poor information about external mobilization is responsible for bargaining failure and armed
conflict. For instance, target government cannot be sure of the degree of support foreign governments give rebels. Are rival states merely providing sanctuary, or are they financing and arming rebels as well? Can neighbors be trusted when they claim to be too weak to expel rebels, or are they covertly assisting TNRs? In addition, are refugee communities sheltering rebels and providing them resources, or are the host state and international aid agencies effectively preventing rebel access? Reliable information on these and other issues is difficult to come by.

Finally, as will be argued in depth below, this scarcity of information is also responsible for making commitments to peace less credible. Peace deals frequently entail rebel demobilization and the disbanding of extraterritorial bases (Walter 2002). However, for the same reasons described above, the state cannot be certain if full compliance with demobilization agreements has taken place. Rebels may be able to hide armaments and supplies across the border in order to regroup at some point in the future, and the state has little reliable information about the extent of compliance. Offering concessions to the opposition without being confident that they will abide by their part of the bargain would leave the state worse-off than continuing to fight. Thus, as will be discussed below, the cooperation of host states will be critical to creating a lasting peace.

**Regional Relations and the Termination of Conflict**

**Interstate Conflict**

The theory above pertains to the ability of rebel groups to mobilize their support base, gather resources, and fight their target government. However, transnational rebellion also has important implications for relations between target and host states.
When rebels have access to extraterritorial bases across the border, ‘domestic’ conflicts necessarily become the subject of state-to-state relations at the regional level. Once bases are established in neighboring territories, tensions are likely to arise between states. The target government will blame the host for harboring dissidents and creating security risks. Also, target governments cannot be entirely certain of the host government’s motivations or degree of support for the rebels. Weak neighbors may not be trying hard enough to combat rebels on their soil because they tacitly support the rebellion; rival neighbors may be contributing arms and resources in addition to mere sanctuary.

Furthermore, the target state may move military equipment and personnel near the international border to prevent crossing by rebel factions. Such movements are likely to be seen as provocative as neighboring countries cannot be certain of their neighbor’s true intentions. Additionally, fighting along the border, cross-border strikes, and ‘hot-pursuit’ of combatants on foreign territory may endanger the security and sovereignty of the neighboring state. Such incidents threaten to widen the scope of ‘domestic’ conflicts to include conflicts between states (Gleditsch and Salehyan n.d.).

As was discussed previously, rival states are especially likely to view troop activities along the border with suspicion. Since rivals already fear attacks by the other side, the escalation of conflict stemming from TNRs activities is especially likely in these dyads. Weak states may tolerate or even allow troop mobilization along the border and limited strikes against rebel positions—security cooperation is possible to limit cross-border rebel operations. However, the mere presence of TNRs on neighboring territory is likely to sour relations among neighbors, and even cooperative governments will not be willing to allow foreign state agents extensive access to their soil.
Therefore, interstate conflict is likely to arise out of ‘civil’ wars when access to extraterritorial bases is at stake.

**Conflict Resolution**

The resolution of civil conflict has sparked a good deal of empirical and theoretical scholarship (Fortna 2004; Hartzel, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999; Walter 1997, 2002; Zartman 1985). This literature has normally looked at rebel-government interactions, and while Walter (1997, 2002) argues that third-party security guarantees make negotiated settlements more likely, the focus has primarily been on bargaining problems between governments and rebels. However, for transnational rebellions, it is more appropriate to characterize negotiations as a three-actor bargain between rebels, governments, and host states (Bapat 2005). Conflict is more likely to come to an end when host states agree to limit rebels access to their territory or if they cooperate in implementing a peace negotiation. When TNRs are present, there are three levels of interaction to consider: 1) the interaction between the rebels and the target government; 2) between the rebels and the host government; 3) between the target and the host government.

The preferences of the target government and the rebels are fairly clear. The target government prefers to fight the rebels on its own territory, where it has a comparative advantage in repressive capabilities. They will pressure the host government to push rebels off of its soil, thereby removing their tactical cover. The rebels wish to maintain bases across the border from which to continue mobilizing and attacking the target government. The preferences of the host government, however, will
vary depending on its relationship with either side, the costs of allowing the rebels an external presence, and the costs of attempting to expel them. As a simple decision function, the choice of expelling the rebels can be expressed as:

Expel rebels if: \[(1 - p)(U_{gw}) - p(U_{rw})] + C_h > [k (U_{rw}) - (1 - k)U_{gw}] + C_e\]

Where \(p\) and \(k\) are the expected probabilities that the rebels will be victorious given continued hosting and expulsion, respectively; \(U_{rw}\) is the utility to the host for the rebels winning and \(U_{gw}\) is the utility of government victory; and \(C_h\) and \(C_e\) are the costs of hosting and expelling the rebels, respectively. In general, \(p\) is greater than \(k\), otherwise the rebels themselves would not prefer to keep up extraterritorial bases. As this framework suggests, the host government will move to expel the rebels as the costs of hosting and its preference for a government victory increase. Conversely, it will continue hosting TNRs as the costs of expulsion and its preference for a rebel victory increase. This framework can be easily extended to negotiated settlements as the utility terms can be modified to reflect a compromise solution between total victory by one or the other side.

An important factor influencing this decision is the foreign-policy relationship between the target and the host country. When the host country is hostile to the target state, its preference for a government victory is low. Therefore, rival neighbors have a strong incentive to continue allowing rebels access to their territory in order to undermine their opponents. In contrast, host governments that are friendly but perhaps too weak to prevent rebel access will not side with the rebels and are more likely to
prefer a government victory. However, in addition to preferences for a rebel or government victory, states must consider the relative costs of expelling or continuing to harbor TNRs. Attempting to expel the rebels can provoke direct fighting between the rebel faction and the host government, and will entail a diversion of resources towards that end. However, continuing to allow rebels access to the host state’s territory leads to bilateral tensions and conflict between neighbors; furthermore, any cross-border attacks by the target government in pursuit of rebels jeopardizes the security of the host country and the safety of local populations.

Conflict can end in several ways. First, the rebels may re-enter the country, successfully defeat the government and gain power, or in the case of secession, win independence. The odds of this event are clearly higher when rebels have access to extraterritorial bases relative to when they are confined to the territory of the target state.

Barring this, a second possible ending is for the government to successfully defeat the rebels. As long as rebels have continued access to extraterritorial bases, for reasons explained above, the probability of successful repression is low and conflict will endure. Therefore, conflict is more likely to end in government victory if the host decides to expel rebels from its territory, which allows the target to wield its power more effectively. This may happen if: 1) the target and host governments improve relations with one another. If states end their mutual antagonism and seek to improve bilateral relations, the host state will be less inclined to work towards a rebel victory and will cooperate to limit TNR presence. 2) The host government improves its capacity to

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32 For example, in 1970, Jordan and various Palestinian militias fought over continued rebel access to Jordanian soil. This event, known as Black September, caused hundreds of deaths on each side but forced the PLO and other groups out of Jordan.
restrict TNR activities, thereby lowering the costs of expulsion. Here, the host government may even engage in joint operations with the target state to oust rebel units on its soil. 3) The target government is able increase the costs of continued hosting through negative sanctions, including by threatening (or engaging in) an international war. The target state may in extreme cases invade the host state to rid it of rebel groups, as in the case of Israel and Rwanda; or, through other forms of threats and intimidation, pressure the host to expel rebels on its own. Situations 1 and 2 entail positive efforts at cooperation by neighboring states while the 3rd scenario involves coercion.

Finally, conflicts may end in negotiated settlements. Here as well, the cooperation of the host government will be a critical determinant of negotiation success when TNRs are present. Host governments can either block peace agreements or pressure parties to come to an agreement, as well as work to ensure that an agreement is adhered to. Sometimes, host states may prefer continued fighting over a peace negotiation and will work to prevent the implementation of a deal; thus, the host government may act as a “spoiler” during peace negotiations (on spoilers see: Stedman 1997). By refusing to limit rebel presence on its soil and continuing to provide resources to rebel groups, host governments can make continued fighting more attractive and impede the progress of negotiations.

Host states may, on the other hand, play a more positive role and encourage parties to come to the negotiating table. Here, they have bargaining leverage over both sides to the conflict: they have leverage on the rebels through access to their territory and they have leverage on the government through assistance to insurgents. Thus, hosts can increase the costs of continued conflict for either side (either by allowing or disallowing
rebel bases) and encourage warring groups to come to the bargaining table. Hosts states will find a negotiated resolution to the conflict more desirable if continued cross-border fighting and poor relations with their neighbor is costly to them and if their preferences for a decisive rebel victory is not particularly deep.

For example, Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana, which hosted rebels from neighboring Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] (ZANU and ZAPU), were critical in pressuring combatants to the negotiating table. Early on in the conflict, these ‘front-line’ states supported the principle of Black majority rule in Rhodesia, although they believed that negotiation with the White settler government was desirable. As the war progressed, the conflict became increasingly costly for the host governments. Zambia, for instance, lost its access to the Indian Ocean through Rhodesia. A Zambian Foreign Minister remarked, “We have been much too preoccupied with Rhodesia. Our economy, our growth has been severely retarded. We must now turn to fulfill our national aspirations.” Additionally, the Rhodesian government increased the costs of continued hosting during the final years of the conflict by intensifying sporadic attacks on rebel bases in Zambia and Mozambique, several of which killed locals as well. Weary of the fighting, the front-line states pressed all parties to come to a negotiated settlement, and in particular, threatened the rebels with expulsion if they did not bargain seriously with the government (see Preston 2005; Stedman 1991; Walter 2002, Ch. 6).

Additionally, for a negotiated settlement to occur, there must be a process of rebel demobilization—rebels must credibly commit to cease fighting and lay down their arms,

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and governments must credibly commit to not attacking after disarmament occurs (Walter 1997, 2002). However, disarming must include the promise to discontinue the use of extraterritorial bases and eliminate weapons stockpiles across the border; it is difficult for the target state to verify if this has happened without the assistance of the host. Rebels can hide weapons stockpiles abroad and remobilize in the future as long as permissive conditions in neighboring countries persist. Therefore, host governments must cooperate to limit rebel activities on their soil and ensure compliance with demobilization agreements, especially among units on its soil. Host governments can also assuage the rebel’s sense of vulnerability by offering sanctuary once again if the government reneges on the peace agreement and attacks combatants after they have disarmed. Thus, neighbors can assist in making promises to fully demobilize more credible (see also Bapat 2005), prevent future re-armament, and provide security guarantees for combatants during the implementation of settlements.

In short, regional cooperation is necessary to bring conflicts to an end when extraterritorial bases are present. The host state and the target state may work together to eliminate extraterritorial bases and drive rebels back across the border, where the government’s ability to combat them is greater. Alternatively, during peace negotiations, the cooperation of the host government can be vital. Host states can pressure rebels and the government to come to the bargaining table, ensure that rebels lay down their arms after a peace deal, and provide asylum if governments subsequently attack demobilized fighters. While access to external bases allows fighting to erupt and sustain itself, lack of these opportunities will cause conflict to end, either through a decisive victory or by forcing groups to negotiate peace.
This theory of transnational rebellion makes three overarching claims, which can be assessed empirically. First, rebellion is more likely to occur when conditions in neighbors favor the establishment of extraterritorial bases, particularly as external mobilization is difficult for states to verify. International borders constrain the use of force by governments, and so access to external territory should embolden rebels. This proposition will be tested in the next chapter. Second, hosting foreign rebels will bring the host and target countries into conflict with one another. Therefore, the probability of international disputes will increase when civil wars display transnational characteristics. This proposition will be tested in Chapter 4. Third, the cooperation of rebel host countries will be needed in bringing civil wars to an end when TNR groups are present. Host states can either assist in defeating the rebels or work to make negotiated settlements more likely to succeed. This claim will be tested in Chapter 5. The following chapters will develop specific hypotheses relating to these claims; discuss ways of operationalizing key concepts; and conduct a series of empirical studies to probe the validity of the argument.

The first general proposition stated in the previous chapter is that rebellion will be more likely to occur when conditions in neighboring countries allows rebels to take up extraterritorial bases. International borders and safe havens in neighboring countries allow rebels the opportunity to mobilize support and sustain their forces while being less susceptible to government repression. Mobilization in other countries also exacerbates informational and commitment problems. This chapter develops several testable hypotheses based upon this theoretical claim. Three distinct tests are conducted in order to evaluate the various observable implications of the theory, using a variety of data. First, a time-series cross-sectional analysis of civil conflicts is developed with conflict incidence as the dependent variable. Neighboring country conditions—particularly rivalry, weakness, and refugee communities—are analyzed to determine whether these factors lead to the onset and continuation of conflict. Second, data on whether or not rebels use extraterritorial bases was collected and a duration analysis of the length of conflict is conducted. Because governments cannot easily repress groups who have access to extraterritorial bases, these conflicts should last longer on average. Finally, rather than treating country-years as the unit of observation, data on ethnic groups was analyzed to determine whether ethnic groups located near an international boundary are more likely to rebel. If the theory is valid, we should find evidence in our data that neighboring country conditions and international borders have an important impact on conflict behavior.
Hypotheses

The first set of hypotheses relate to neighboring country conditions. Under what conditions are rebels most likely to find sanctuary in neighboring states? First, as argued in the previous chapter, weak/failed states are likely to be used by transnational rebels because the host government is unable to stop them. Such states do not have sufficient resources and capabilities to prevent transnational rebels from taking positions on their soil. Furthermore, weak governments face high opportunity costs for dealing with another state’s rebel groups, particularly if the host government must divert resources away from policing domestic dissidents. Therefore, this hypothesis is given as:

\( H1 \) (weak state): Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a weak state.

Second, rival governments may encourage and aid transnational rebels by allowing them access to their territory. Rival states wish to foment instability in their neighbors and will harbor transnational rebels in order to undermine hostile governments. Borders between hostile states, moreover, are especially likely to be hardened and any incursion across the border by state security forces is likely to be challenged, providing cover for rebel groups. This hypothesis is stated as follows:

\( H2 \) (rivalry): Rebellion is more likely to occur when the state is bordered by a rival state.

Third, refugees located in nearby states are likely to contribute to rebellion. Refugees who flee oppressive and inept governments have strong incentives to join
insurgents, and since life in refugee camps is often dismal, refugees have few opportunity costs for fighting. Refugee encampments therefore provide recruits and resources for rebel organizations. Hypothesis 3 claims that:

\[ H3a \text{ (refugee diasporas): Rebellion is more likely to occur when there are refugees in neighboring states.} \]

Additionally, the location of refugee communities is argued to be important. Capable and friendly governments can effectively manage refugee communities to preserve their non-combatant status. Refugees should not pose a security threat if the host government maintains order in refugee encampments. Conversely, refugees in countries where the government is weak and/or those in rival states are more likely to provide support to rebel organizations. Therefore, two sub-hypotheses are developed:

\[ H3b \text{ (refugees & rival states): Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in rival states.} \]

\[ H3c \text{ (refugees & weak states): Refugees are more likely to contribute to rebellion if they are located in weak states.} \]

Each of the hypotheses listed above relate to the occurrence of conflict, which includes both conflict onset and continuation. Refugees in neighbors, rival governments, and weak states nearby may lead to a new conflict and, once underway, may lead to longer conflicts. Each of these claims will be tested below through a time-series cross sectional analysis of civil conflict.

Additionally, once fighting has begun, it is possible to directly observe whether or not rebels are using extraterritorial bases. Data was collected on insurgencies during
the post-WWII period to determine whether or not rebels did in fact have access to external territory.\textsuperscript{34} It is expected that when they do, governments will have a difficult time in suppressing them and therefore rebellion will endure longer. Therefore, a second test is developed, which focuses on conflict duration. This hypothesis is stated as follows:

\textit{H4(extraterritorial bases): Conflicts will endure longer if the rebels have access to extraterritorial bases.}

Finally, rather than using country-years as the unit of analysis, the final hypothesis and test relates to the propensity of ethnic groups to rebel. Since many civil conflicts take on an ethnic dimension, it is possible to observe which ethnic groups rebel and which do not. Many ethnic groups in the world are territorially concentrated in particular regions. The theory of transnational rebellion implies that as opposed to ethnic groups that are dispersed and/or those that are confined to the interior of a country, ethnic groups that are located near international borders are more likely to rebel because they have greater access to external territory. This test is attractive because it allows for within-country variation on the units of observation. Rather than looking at conditions pertaining to the country as a whole, we may assess the likelihood of conflict among particular sub-national social groups. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed:

\textit{H5(ethnic rebellion): Ethnic groups that are located near an international border are more likely to rebel.}

\textsuperscript{34} This data will be discussed in greater detail below.
**Data and Methods**

**Dependent Variable**

The main dependent variable in this analysis is the incidence of civil conflict. The data are annual country observations spanning the period from 1951 to 1999—the years for which reliable data were available. Two points of clarification are needed here. First, as opposed to several studies which treat conflict onset and duration as distinct phenomenon (see e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Regan 2002), this study will examine conflict *incidence*. Much of the literature has adopted the practice of dropping from the analysis subsequent years of violence after the initial year (in the case of onset), or only looking at periods of ongoing war with conflict resolution as the dependent variable (duration). However, as discussed by Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2002), while it is sometimes important to look at conflict onset and continuation as separate research questions, it is also important to study the reasons why conflicts endure in tandem with onset.

The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, moreover, applies generally to the occurrence of conflict within a country. As academics and policy makers, we are not only concerned with the outbreak of a rebellion or civil war, we are also concerned with its continuation, and there is no need to chop up our datasets. The initial conditions that lead to war may also be associated with how long a war lasts—war persists until these factors are no longer present; but if onset and continuation are driven by different processes, we should like to know this as well. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, there exist estimation techniques that can account for both types of events. Therefore, the dependent variable in this study is conflict incidence, or *spells of conflict*, which is
dichotomous and coded 1 for years in which a country experienced a civil war or internal violence and 0 otherwise. More precisely, conflict incidence is defined as the probability of observing a war onset at time t given peace at time t-1 as well as the probability of observing continued war at t+1 given that there was a war at time t.

Secondly, much of the literature has looked at the phenomenon of civil war, which is normally defined by a somewhat arbitrary classification of conflicts based upon the number of battle-deaths (usually 1,000 or more). Typically, authors offer no good explanation for limiting their analyses to conflicts that reach a certain death threshold and therefore artificially truncate the number of violent incidents in their datasets. Simmering, low-level conflicts such as the 20-year long conflict in the Indian state of Manipur or the conflict in the Angolan province of Cabinda would never make it into datasets that define civil wars as necessarily exceeding 1,000 deaths. Rather than looking exclusively at war, which is an imprecisely defined concept, this study examines lesser armed conflicts—rebellions, insurgencies, terrorist acts, guerilla wars, etc—in conjunction with larger-scale conflicts such as full-blown wars and revolutions. On theoretical grounds, moreover, there is no good reason to expect that low- and high-intensity contests between governments and rebels are driven by an entirely different set of causal factors.

Taking this into consideration, the list of civil conflicts used here is drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (hereafter U/PACD), which was developed

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35 A high threshold for classifying binary events also has important methodological limitations when using either a lagged dependent variable or counts of years at ‘peace’. With a 1000 deaths threshold, an event that falls just short of the cutoff point would not be counted as a conflict and would be assumed to have no impact on the subsequent probability of violence. In practice, however, low-intensity conflicts are likely to be systematically associated with a higher likelihood of future large-scale conflict. See Gates and Strand (2004) for a related discussion.
by the department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The list of countries used in the statistical analysis below conforms to the list of countries for which there is data on the dependent variable; however, because of data limitations on the independent variables (namely, refugees), the initial year of analysis is 1951, not 1945 which is the start year for the U/PACD. For inclusion in the U/PACD, a conflict must meet the following characteristics: 1) armed force must have been used during the conflict; 2) there must be at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year; 3) the conflict must occur between the government of a country and an organized opposition group; 4) the incompatibility between the government and the opposition must be over the control of the central government and/or territory within the state (Gleditsch et al. 2002).36

A few modifications were made in order to overcome deficiencies in the data and better account for what “conflict” and “insurgency” mean for the purposes of this study. First, I eliminate all cases of coups, or instances of violence in which a faction of the military was listed as the opposition group. Theoretically, contests for power between rival factions within the ruling elite are distinct from conflicts that emerge from popular forces. The process of popular mobilization, rebel recruitment, and securing sanctuary in neighboring countries that occur during the rebellions analyzed here is markedly different from revolts launched from within the barracks.

Second, there was the question of what to do with brief lulls in the violence. Should a brief period with little or no violence, followed by the resumption of fighting be

36 For those familiar with this data, I include all intrastate and internationalized intrastate disputes (type 3 and type 4 conflicts) that occur on a state’s territory.
coded as a new war altogether, or should this be counted as one ongoing period of conflict? For theoretical reasons I adopt the latter approach and consolidate spells of conflict in which there are three or fewer interim years of “peace” between parties fighting over the same incompatibility. In reality, although active fighting may have ceased, the underlying conflict has not been resolved. Therefore, cease-fires and temporary truces of three or fewer years, followed by renewed conflict are not counted as “peaceful” periods but are included within the larger conflict (i.e. they are coded one).

Several examples will clarify this coding decision. From 1990 to 2001, the government of Senegal fought a minor armed conflict against the Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance. However, there was no fighting reported in the U/PACD for the years 1991, 1994, 1996. Rather than code four separate armed conflicts (1990, 1992-93, 1995, 1997-2001), I consolidate this conflict into one long spell from 1990-2001. It is not appropriate to think that the issues at stake in the underlying clash were “resolved” in 1991, 1994, and 1996—there simply was no reported fighting during these years, but the dispute continued nonetheless.

As a second, perhaps more unconventional example, take Nicaragua. In the U/PACD data, there is one conflict between the Somoza government and the Sandinistas from 1978 to 1979, and a second conflict listed between the newly empowered Sandinista government and the Contra rebels from 1981 to 1989. There is no fighting reported in 1980. Following the given coding rules, this is counted as one continuous

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37 As with many data coding decisions, sometimes we are forced to make arbitrary distinctions in the data. Lulls in the fighting that last three or fewer years are subsumed under one long period of conflict while cease-fires that last four or more years are coded as periods of piece. There are no good theoretical grounds for deciding on a three-year interim period, it is entirely a decision made for expediency. Alternative codings (i.e. with no consolidation, with 5 year gaps) made no difference in the results.
spell of conflict from 1978 to 1989. While many may be tempted to count this conflict as two distinct civil wars, it may just as well be considered one long period in which control over the central government was contested by various factions. In fact, many of the Contra rebels were ex-Somoza military personnel. Because the issue of incompatibility remained unchanged between the rounds of fighting—that is, control of Managua—this is considered to be the same civil war. Lastly, take the case of Russia during the early 1990’s. In 1990-1991, the USSR (Russia) fought against rebels in the then break-away region of Armenia. Three years later in 1994, Chechen rebels decided to launch their own insurrection against the central government. While these conflicts are separated by two years of peace (1992 & 1993), the issues at stake were distinct—the separatist conflict in Armenia was over a different incompatibility than the separatist conflict in Chechnya—therefore, these are listed as two separate wars. Russia is coded as having two conflicts 1990-1991 (Armenia) and 1994-2002 (Chechnya), with a two year period of peace in between.

A final modification was also included. As an addendum, U/PACD has a list of unclear cases in which a conflict did not make the final dataset either because: 1) the opposition group did not meet the level of organization needed, 2) the number of deaths was not confirmed, or 3) the issue of incompatibility was not clearly over the central government or territorial autonomy. The first two exclusions are reasonable: to exclude riots, mob violence, or petty criminality there must be an organized opposition group and the number of deaths must meet their minimal definition.

However, excluding cases in which the incompatibility is unclear is a bit more problematic—if a conflict is not over control of the central government or a piece of
territory is it not a real conflict? Some issue-incompatibilities may defy traditional classifications but are nonetheless real disputes in which governments fight armed opposition groups and people die. If an analyst compiling the data could not be certain of the reasons behind the conflict or the conflict did not fall into one or the other pre-defined incompatibility category, there is no reason to eliminate it from a dataset. There are three cases in the U/PACD list of unclear cases that are excluded from the final dataset for the reason of unclear incompatibility, but which are re-included here: 1) Indonesia versus Communist Insurgents, 1965; 2) Jordan versus the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 1970-1971; 3) and Zimbabwe versus Renamo, 1987. In the case of Jordan and Zimbabwe, the government fought against foreign rebels who had taken up bases on its soil and who did not necessarily contest control over the central government or a region. In the Indonesian case, it was not clear if the group demanded territorial autonomy or control over the central government. Nevertheless, these were real conflicts between a government and an organized opposition and so these cases are included in the dataset used here.

Independent Variables

Rivalry:

The first hypothesis is that countries that border rival states are more likely to experience internal armed conflict. Rival governments are expected to provide sanctuary and support to rebel groups as a means to destabilize the regime across the border.

38 These country-years of conflict constitute less than ½ of one percent of the total number of civil war years (4 out of 1157). They are included for theoretical reasons, but eliminating them from the estimation did not significantly change the results presented below.
Anecdotally, Iran and Iraq, two long-time rivals, provided extraterritorial bases to one another’s rebel groups as did India and Pakistan. Several datasets on interstate rivalry have been created, but perhaps the most up-to-date and complete dataset has been complied by William R. Thompson (2001). This data is based upon qualitative accounts, particularly foreign policy histories of governments, belligerent public statements, and acts of aggression between countries. To be included as rivals, two countries must, “regard each other as a) competitors, b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and c) enemies” (Thompson 2001, 560). The Thompson data differs from other rivalry datasets (see e.g. Diehl and Goertz 2000) in that it does not require a minimum dispute duration between countries nor does it rely upon counts of open armed hostilities (see Thompson 2001 for details)\textsuperscript{39}.

Some of the rivalries listed in the Thompson dataset occur between non-contiguous countries, for example, China and the United States. Because the theory pertains to the use of \textit{neighboring} territory, these cases of non-neighboring rivals are excluded from the analysis. The rivalry indicator used here is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for country-years in which the state in question neighbors at least one state which is considered a rival (and 0 otherwise). Neighbors are defined as states falling within 100km of the borders of the country in question, including strict contiguity based upon the Gleditsch and Ward Minimum Distance Dataset (Gleditsch and Ward 2001). This practice ensures the inclusion of neighboring states that are not strictly contiguous but which are separated by short spans of water, short enough to be easily crossed by combatant groups.

\textsuperscript{39} I thank William Thompson for providing me with an electronic version of this dataset.
Neighboring State Weakness:

The second hypothesis considered in this analysis is that weak neighboring countries—those with poor policing, infrastructural capacity, and administrative resources—are more likely to be used as cover for transnational rebel groups. These neighboring states are simply incapable of effectively ridding their territories of rebels from across the border, and this weakness invites TNRs to take up bases. Moreover, since the resources of such governments are limited, they are likely to devote more effort toward local concerns (including internal security) while being less interested in other nations’ problems. As opposed to rival neighbors, weak neighbors may assist the target government in some policing activities and may even allow limited forays across the border by state security forces—cooperation in dealing with the insurgency is possible. However, more extensive repression measures are not likely to be welcome as extensive cross-border military adventures are necessarily threatening to a state’s security. Thus, rebels enjoy relief from strong suppression efforts when located in weak states.

Measuring state weakness is extremely difficult, both conceptually and practically. What does it mean for a state to be “weak”? What aspects of policing, the military, infrastructure, etc, are the most important? Which indicators cover a sufficient number of countries for a sufficient number of years to make statistical analyses worthwhile? In this study I use two measures for state weakness. First, I include a dummy variable coded as 1 if the country in question borders (within 100km) at least one state which is experiencing armed conflict as defined by the U/PACD and 0 otherwise. Neighboring a country experiencing a civil war has been found to be an important
predictor of domestic conflict in other studies (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Sambanis 2001), although authors usually attribute such clustering to opaque mechanisms such as ‘diffusion’ or ‘spillover’ effects. The explanation for conflict clustering offered here is that civil wars in neighboring countries expose security weaknesses and divert resources towards combating domestic insurgents.\footnote{This of course is not the only explanation for conflict clustering. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find that refugees from neighboring countries significantly raise the probability that the host country will experience a violent conflict. This may due to direct hostility between the refugee group and the host government; the exchange of personnel, resources, and ideas among combatant groups; changing demographics; and economic competition.} Under these circumstances, rebels from neighboring countries seek to benefit from this condition of relative ‘anarchy’ by positioning themselves inside the neighbor’s territory. The expectation, therefore, is that countries with neighbors at civil war are more likely to experience war themselves.

Several states may be weak, although not experiencing a civil war. They may simply lack the resources to effectively maintain control over their territory. While measures of infrastructure such as roadways and communications networks, measures of police personnel and equipment, tax extraction, and so on, would be ideal indicators of state strength, such data is not readily available for all countries. This is especially true for the poorest governments which lack the capacity to gather adequate information. Therefore, as a proxy for state capacity, I use data on the neighboring countries’ GDP per capita, drawn from Kristian Gleditsch’s expanded GDP data; this dataset includes estimates for countries not covered by traditional data sources such as the Penn World Tables (Gleditsch 2002). Countries that are wealthier overall are expected to have better communications, administration, police resources, and infrastructure which may in part be captured by GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003). A dummy variable was
included if the state in question borders at least one country which falls below the 10th percentile on GDP per capita for that year.  

Refugees:

Finally, this study will assess the role of refugees in neighboring states in facilitating conflict in their home country. Refugee communities can contribute to conflict by providing resources and safe-haven to insurgent groups and are prime locations for recruitment into rebel organizations (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). Refugees often flee because they are dissatisfied with the current regime in power and are thus likely candidates for opposition activities; those living in impoverished camps have few opportunity costs for fighting; and mobilization against the home state can occur across national boundaries where the state cannot extend its reach. Displaced populations also attract international humanitarian assistance from multilateral aid agencies and NGO’s, which is sometimes channeled to fighters giving them the means to sustain their operations (Lischer 2003; Stedman and Tanner 2003).

To test this hypothesis, I include data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Population Data Unit. This data contains dyadic entries for annual refugee stocks, sorted by origin and destination countries.  

\footnote{A number of alternative measures based on neighboring country GDP per capita were used, but as with this measure, none were found to be important. A vector of all neighboring countries was created and data on the minimum GDP per capita in this vector was included in regressions. As another indicator, mean GDP per capita for the vector of neighboring states was included. Finally, data on road coverage was included but because of the large number of missing observations and lack of temporal coverage, this was also not ideal.}

\footnote{I thank Bela Hovy of the UNHCR for providing me with this data.}

\footnote{Refugee figures are not without problems. In particular, Jeff Crisp (1999) notes how the politicized nature of many refugee crises leads some actors to distort refugee numbers in order to advance a political}
Palestinian refugees were collected by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the US Committee for Refugees and were used to supplement the UNHCR data. Using the same definition for neighboring states (above), I take the sum of all refugees from the country of observation in all neighboring states. The distribution of this variable is highly skewed as the vast majority of country-years have no refugees in immediate neighbors, and the data has a long right tail with countries such as Afghanistan and Mozambique sending over 1,000,000 refugees to neighboring states. Furthermore, the effect of refugees may not be strictly linear, but diminishing with size. Therefore, the natural log of the number of refugees is taken to eliminate much of the skewness and account for diminishing marginal impact.

Clearly, there is inherent endogeneity in the refugee measure. Several statistical studies have confirmed that refugees are a consequence of civil war (Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Neumayer 2004; Schmeidl 1997), while the argument here is that refugees may also cause or exacerbate conflict. In using refugee data as a predictor of conflict, there are several conceptual and methodological issues to be aware of. First, current refugees may be a consequence of the conflict and will therefore be correlated with the dependent variable although there may be no causation (type 1 endogeneity). Therefore, I lag the refugee variable and include a lagged dependent variable as well. This way, I can assess the effect of refugees at t-1 while controlling for conflict in the same period; last year’s refugees should contribute to this year’s conflict even when taking into account past fighting.
Secondly, taking into account conflict at t-1 may not be sufficient, conflict in earlier periods may matter as well. A conflict may cause a significant number of refugees, fighting may cease for a few years, and then resume again for reasons totally unrelated to refugees but as a direct result of attributes of the past conflict (see figure 3.1).

![Figure 3.1. Type 2 Endogeneity](image)

A number of steps are taken to account for this type of endogeneity. The first has already been discussed above and relates to how the dependent variable was coded. Brief lulls in fighting of three or fewer years are subsumed under the larger conflict and not counted as peace years. During these brief interim periods, there may be refugees in neighboring states at t-1 but no actual fighting during this period, which would show up as a positive “hit” in the regression if these years were coded as peaceful. Coding these interim years of no fighting as conflict years coded one as opposed to peace years coded zero partially corrects for this type of endogeneity.

Because three years may be too brief as an interim period, a variable for peace years—the number of years the country has been without conflict—is included. If there was a recent war that led to a significant number of refugees, this is accounted for by
such a variable. This method also controls for duration-dependence in the dependent variable; peace and war may be self-sustaining processes (more on this below).

The third potential problem in using refugees as an independent variable arises from the conflict deaths threshold (type 3 endogeneity). Conflicts appear in any given dataset if they cause a sufficient number of fatalities. An insurgency may simmer below this threshold for a number of years, generating a large number of refugees, and then explode into a larger civil war that crosses the requisite number of deaths. It would appear as though the refugees generated during the low-intensity phase (coded as peace) were responsible for the war, but it may simply be the escalation of conflict-years not coded in the dataset. This would indeed be problematic if the threshold were set too high—at 1,000 or even 100 deaths—however, the low conflict intensity threshold in the U/PACD (25 deaths) greatly reduces such concern. Very low-level violence, causing fewer than 25 deaths, are not likely to generate a significant number of refugees.
Figure 3.2. Type 3 Endogeneity

The final type of endogeneity, simultaneous causation, is not so easily accounted for. While lagged values of the independent and dependent variables can account for the effect of last year’s refugees, it may be the case that annual records are simply too coarse for the present analysis. Refugees generated in February, for example, may join a rebel organization by October, and annual observations would not account for this possibility. However, this should also have the effect of biasing the results against a positive finding for refugees and so is less of a concern.\textsuperscript{44}

Refugees may have a larger impact in certain countries and a smaller impact in others. The two sub-hypotheses to be explored are that refugees are most likely to

\textsuperscript{44} Also see table 3.3 in the appendix to this chapter. One way to account for endogeneity is to consult the cases themselves. It is possible to observe whether rebels were also based in countries where there were significant refugee communities. A careful reading of cases reveals that several large refugee communities also harbor rebel groups.
contribute to conflict if they are located in weak or rival states. Refugees in neighbors that have the capacity to adequately regulate migrant communities and that do not wish to encourage opposition are less likely (but not unlikely) to be active in armed opposition groups. To test this possibility, I include a variable for refugees located within neighboring countries that are either rivals (as defined above) or in countries that are themselves experiencing an internal conflict. I also create a further disaggregated measure for refugees in 1) rivals, 2) countries affected by civil war, 3) all other states.

Control Variables

The main variables of interest, listed above, relate directly to the broader regional environment of the state. However, domestic conditions are not expected to be irrelevant. A number of domestic variables, found to be important in other studies of conflict, must therefore be included as control variables. These factors include wealth, population, regime type, and ethnic relations.

To begin with, a variable is included for the country’s GDP per capita (logged). It is expected that conflict will be less likely in wealthier countries because citizens have fewer economic grievances, high opportunity costs for fighting, and because the state may be better able to deter challengers through a strong and well-equipped security force (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). GDP data are drawn from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded GDP data, which has the best temporal and geographic coverage; this measure is lagged to account for possible reverse-causation as conflict may cause a decline in economic conditions. Secondly, a control for total population size (logged) is included. It may be the case that countries with larger populations are more
difficult to govern because state security forces are stretched thin when they must monitor dissent among a large population. Because conflict may affect population size (either through deaths or emigration) a once-lagged value is included.

Third, several studies have demonstrated that regime type is an important predictor of civil conflict. It is argued that the most democratic and the most autocratic countries are least susceptible to a violent challenge. Democracies encourage non-violent means of dissent while the most authoritarian regimes can effectively deter any opposition. It is mixed regimes, or “anocracies”, which are not fully-democratic but not extremely repressive that are most likely to experience conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). Therefore, the expectation is that there should be a parabolic, inverted-U shaped, relationship between continuous measures of democracy and conflict. Regime data for this study comes from the combined democracy-autocracy score from the Polity IV data project (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This widely-used data, with annual country entries, is a 21-point scale ranging from most autocratic (-10) to the most democratic (+10) regimes. Because conflict is likely to affect regime type, I use once-lagged rather than contemporaneous values for the Polity score. To test for the non-linear effect of democracy, I include a squared Polity term as well.

Finally, it is argued that the ethnic composition of the country may be an important predictor of conflict. However, there is little agreement as to what measure of ethnicity is most appropriate (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002; Vanhanen 1999; see Cederman and Girardin 2005 for a discussion). Various measures of

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45 Countries with special indeterminate codes are assigned a value of zero, according to the standard practice in the literature and the recommendation of the Polity project.
fractionalization, polarization, and ethnic dominance have been proposed, with very little consensus on what aspects of ethnicity really matter. In the interest of cumulative studies, I include the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index used by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The ELF index used by Fearon and Laitin is based on the Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964, and is supplemented with data from the CIA Factbook, the Encyclopedia Britannica, and US Library of Congress Country Studies. This index gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals are from different ethnolinguistic groups. Fearon and Laitin (2003) include the ELF index itself in their regressions and do not find a significant effect; however, the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict may not be linear. Rather, there may be a parabolic relationship with the most homogenous and most heterogeneous countries being the least conflict prone. Countries with little diversity face little ethnic competition, while in countries with several small ethnic groups, no single group poses a large threat to others. In countries with a moderate amount of ethnic diversity, however, power politics among large ethnic factions may lead to conflict. Therefore, in addition to the ELF score, I also include a squared ELF term.

**Methods**

The data are in time-series cross-sectional format with country-years as the units of observation and a binary dependent variable indicating the presence or absence of conflict as defined above. Furthermore, instead of looking at conflict onset or duration as separate research questions, this analysis looks at incidence or spells of conflict. A number of methods have been proposed in estimating models with such a structure (Beck
et al. 2001; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). As it is important to examine alternative models to determine the sensitivity of the analysis to different estimation techniques, a number of possibilities will be discussed here. In particular, the empirical analysis will use three different methodological techniques: a logit with a lagged D.V., a time-series cross-section logit with random effects, and a transition model (Beck et al 2001).

Logit With a Lagged DV:

Because the dependent variable is binary, maximum-likelihood estimation techniques such as logit are appropriate for the statistical analysis. However, because the data are collected over time, one way to correct for serial correlation is to include lagged values of the dependent variable on the right-hand side.

\[
P(y_{it} | X_{it}) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(X_{it}\beta + \varphi y_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}))}
\] (1)

This approach resembles the standard time-series method in which an autoregressive component is included in the estimation, but it is not identical. Note that in the binary D.V. context, when \( y_{t,1} \) equals one, the effect is \( \varphi \) and zero otherwise. However, due to the non-linear nature of the logit model, this does not mean that the shift in probabilities is a simple function of \( \varphi \). Rather, there may be unobserved or latent conditions in the previous time period which affect current values of \( y \), but which are not explicitly modeled because only realized values of the dependent variable are included.
While models for estimating latent variables on the right hand side have been proposed, they are still in their infancy, are computationally demanding, and not always feasible in practice (Beck et al 2001). Nevertheless, inclusion of observed values of \( y \) at time \( t-1 \) is much better than simply ignoring model dynamics.

This concern with the effect of latent causes is somewhat (but not entirely) mitigated by the definition of the dependent variable in this study. In studies where the conflict threshold is set high, say 1,000 deaths, conflicts below that threshold at \( t-1 \) are given a zero value on the right-hand side. Clearly, a conflict with, say, 900 deaths in one year may have a big impact on events in the following year, but this would not be modeled directly through the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable which would be given a value of zero in this case. By including a much lower threshold for crossing from the zero to the one category, this poses much less of a problem in the present analysis.

Random-Effects Logit with lagged DV:

Another approach, advocated by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), is a random effects model. This model separates the individual-specific part of the error term, \( \nu \), from the error term itself, \( \varepsilon \). In the case of the data used here, the “effect” to be estimated is that of the country—it may be the case that there are unmodeled attributes specific to the country in question that drive conflict.
Random effects models assume—as with the error term, $\varepsilon$—that $\nu$ is randomly drawn and uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables. As an alternative to random effects models, fixed effects models do not make such assumptions and directly estimate the individual-level effect by including dummy variables for each grouping. However, fixed effects models do not permit time-invariant independent or dependent variables as they would be perfectly collinear with the effect term and are therefore not feasible given the research design.

In a random effects model, the panel-level variance component can also be estimated. The standard deviation of the panel-level variance is given as $\sigma_{\nu}$, which allows us to estimate $\rho$, where:

$$
\rho = \frac{\sigma_{\nu}^2}{\sigma_{\nu}^2 + 1} \quad (3)
$$

This is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component. When $\rho$ is zero, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator—the “effects” are not important.

The benefit of including random effects over the logit with lagged DV is that attributes of the country that are not directly modeled are taken into account. In other words, the previous model assumes that the errors are uncorrelated within country clusters (except for in the previous time period), while modeling effects allows us to account for the possibility correlated errors.
Transition Model:

The final estimation technique to be used is one proposed by Beck et al (2001), the transition model. We can think of spells of conflict as two different “transitions” in the data. The first is the transition from no conflict to conflict, and the second is the transition from conflict to peace. More formally, the transition model is given as a pair of logit equations:

\[
P(y_{it} = 1|y_{it-1} = 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x_n \beta + \delta y_{it-1} + \epsilon_n)} \quad (4)
\]

\[
P(y_{it} = 1|y_{it-1} = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x_n \beta + \delta y_{it-1} + \epsilon_n)} \quad (5)
\]

More concretely, the transition model is simply two different logit models. The first model estimates the probability of a new conflict onset given that there was peace in the previous year; the second model estimates the probability of conflict continuation given that there was conflict in the previous year. In practice, two logit models are run with the sample being split into two groups based upon the value of the lagged DV. The transition model differs from the two models presented above in an important way. The previous models account for an intercept shift based on the value of the lagged dependent variable while assuming that the covariates driving the model remain the same. The transition model, by contrast, allows for differences in the value and even the
composition of the right-hand side variables and coefficients based on whether onset or continuation is being estimated. In addition, we can account for duration dependence by including a count of war years (for the group where \( y_{t-1} = 1 \)) and peace years (for the group where \( y_{t-1} = 0 \)), in a procedure identical to the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) method for BTSCS.

Results

Table 3.1 reports the results for the lagged dependent variable and random-effects logit models. Models 1 and 3 do not include squared terms for ethnic fractionalization or Polity, while 2 and 4 do. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in the lagged DV models (non-independence is directly accounted for in the random-effects models). Actual p-values for the z statistics are reported (one-tailed tests) instead of the more traditional use of stars, allowing the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about the statistical strength of the associations. Although standard practice, there are no convincing reasons to use such an arbitrary cut point. As can be seen in Table 1, the results are fairly consistent across these two methodological choices. As expected, all

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46 Some readers may be more familiar with the dynamic probit (or logit) model favored by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002). In the dynamic probit model, a lagged dependent variable and interaction terms between each IV and the lagged DV are included on the right hand side. In effect, the transition model is identical to the dynamic probit model. Splitting the sample is easier to read and interpret than interaction terms, so this approach will be used here.

47 There is a debate in the statistics literature, however, on the utility of using tests of statistical significance for apparent populations. Normally, significance testing is used to give a measure of how confident the analyst or reader can be that the relationship in the sample holds true for the population being generalized to. In the current study, nearly all country-years since 1945 are analyzed, so the sample size approaches the entire universe of cases that the theory addresses. If readers accept that the entire population is being analyzed, then standard errors are not used to understand true population parameters, but rather, they are used to determine the consistency of the statistical relationship in the observed data. In other words, they reveal how often the expected (probabilistic) relationship between the DV and IV occurs in practice. For a discussion, see Berk, Western, and Weiss (1995) and Bollen (1995).
models show a strong effect for the lagged dependent variable. First, let us consider Hypothesis 1, that countries with rival neighbors are more likely to experience civil conflict. Across the four models presented in Table 3.1, there is a consistently positive and significant relationship between interstate rivalry and intrastate conflict. All results on this variable are significant at conventional levels—indicating that the effect is consistent across cases—while the results in the random-effects models being slightly stronger. Therefore, there is good evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2—the contention that countries with weak neighbors are more likely to experience civil conflict—receives support from one of the indicators. To begin with, it is clear across all models that countries with a neighbor experiencing a civil conflict are more likely to experience conflict themselves. This strongly positive and statistically significant finding confirms earlier studies that demonstrate the tendency for civil conflicts to be geographically clustered. The explanation offered here is that states weakened by civil war are likely to serve as safe-havens for rebel groups from other countries and according to this measure of state weakness, Hypothesis 2 receives good support. The other measure of state weakness—low GDP per capita—does not receive very good support in the models presented here. In the first three models, the sign on this variable is actually in the wrong direction, while this sign changes in model 4—none of these results show a consistent effect. Perhaps this measure of state weakness is too crude to adequately capture the policing capabilities of neighboring states. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 receives strong support from at least one indicator; namely, civil conflict in neighboring states.
Table 3.1. Logit Regression of Neighboring Country Conditions and Civil Conflict Incidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LOGIT WITH LAGGED DV</th>
<th>RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival NB</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low GDP NB</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War NB</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees in NB (t-1)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (t-1)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.299</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (t-1)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac^2</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-2.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(1.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict (t-1)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.720</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.1. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(0.210)</th>
<th>(0.210)</th>
<th>(0.187)</th>
<th>(0.185)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.506</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-3.894</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.048)</td>
<td>(1.087)</td>
<td>(1.342)</td>
<td>(1.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5896</td>
<td>5896</td>
<td>5896</td>
<td>5896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Squared</td>
<td>927.80</td>
<td>979.32</td>
<td>1049.90</td>
<td>1059.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi Squared</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.160*</td>
<td>0.800*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; robust s.e. for LDV models.
P values are of one-tailed significance tests
* indicates .05 significance for Rho
Hypothesis 3a states that refugees in neighboring countries are likely to lead to conflict. Not only are refugees a consequence of conflict, but they may also provide shelter, resources, and recruitment opportunities for combatant groups. Results show that lagged values of refugees—even when controlling for lagged values of the dependent variable—are positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of violence. This result is consistent across models and provides strong support for Hypothesis 3a.

The control variables behave largely as expected across the models. First, across all models, there is support for earlier findings which show a positive association between population size and conflict: larger countries are more conflict-prone. Secondly, higher GDP per capita reduces the probability of a civil conflict, confirming the finding of Fearon and Laitin (2003), among others. Polity scores included by themselves indicate a positive relationship between democracy and violence, but the inclusion of squared terms in models 2 and 4 confirm the expectation that the relationship is non-linear. Anocracies, or countries with mixed authoritarian and democratic elements, are the most susceptible to violence. Contrary to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the models show a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and conflict; in addition, the inclusion of squared terms indicates that this relationship is parabolic. As expected, low and high levels of fractionalization reduce the probability of violence while countries with intermediate levels of ethnic pluralism are the most prone to conflict.

Table 3.2 reports the results regarding the location of refugees. Models 5 and 7 include a combined category for the sum of all refugees in weak and/or rival states and compares this with refugees in all other states. Judging from the size of the coefficient,
refugees in weak or rival neighbors have a larger effect on the probability of conflict; however, refugees in other states continue to have a positive effect on conflict. Models 6 and 8 disaggregate the composite category into three categories for refugees in rivals, those in civil war states, and those in other states. All three coefficients are in the expected direction, but contrary to expectations, refugees in civil war states do not have a consistent effect on conflict, judging by the large standard errors. Thus, while Hypothesis 3b receives good support, 3c must be rejected. We can speculate why this would be the case. Target governments dealing with refugee camps in very weak states may have greater security options available to them. They may be able to engage in cross-border strikes against rebels and position troops along the border to prevent re-entry into the state, all with relatively little objection by the host state.
Table 3.2. The Location of Refugees and Civil Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LOGIT W/LAGGED DV</th>
<th>RANDOM EFFECTS LOGIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Model 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Riv./CW NB (t-1)</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Rival NB (t-1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Civ. War NB (t-1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in non-Riv./CW NB (t-1)</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (t-1)</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (t-1)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac</td>
<td>2.820</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.327)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac^2</td>
<td>-2.533</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.470)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5.668</th>
<th>&lt;0.001</th>
<th>5.684</th>
<th>&lt;0.001</th>
<th>5.341</th>
<th>&lt;0.001</th>
<th>5.364</th>
<th>&lt;0.001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.787</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-3.619</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-4.401</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-4.260</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.002)</td>
<td>(1.008)</td>
<td>(1.252)</td>
<td>(1.256)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6049</td>
<td>6049</td>
<td>6049</td>
<td>6049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Squared</td>
<td>1061.82</td>
<td>1051.56</td>
<td>1094.01</td>
<td>1099.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi Squared</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.130*</td>
<td>0.129*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; robust s.e. for LDV models.
P values are of one-tailed significance tests
* indicates .05 significance for Rho
Because logit coefficients are not easily interpretable, Table 3.3 computes the substantive impact of the variables on the predicted probability of violence using model 1 in Table 3.1. To set the baseline category, all of the dichotomous independent variables were set to zero, all continuous variables are set at their means, and Polity is set to zero. Because values of the lagged dependent variable have a large impact on the results, two different baseline comparison groups were used: one with the lagged DV set to zero, another with the lagged DV set to one. While the latter estimates the probability of conflict continuation, the former analyzes conflict onset.

Table 3.3. Predicted Probabilities from Model 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With LDV set at Zero</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>% Change from Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Rivalry 0 to 1</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>35.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Neighbor Conflict 0 to 1</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>71.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Refugees 0 to 100,000</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>85.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change GDP $3,490 to $9,485**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-21.429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With LDV set at One</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>% Change from Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline*</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Rivalry 0 to 1</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>5.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Neighbor Conflict 0 to 1</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>8.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Refugees 0 to 100,000</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>8.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change GDP $3,490 to $9,485**</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>-6.519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Baseline: all dichotomous variables set at zero, continuous variables set at their means, Polity set at zero. The estimated model is Model 1 in Table 1.
**GDP of $3,490 is the mean, $9,485 is one standard deviation above the mean.

The upper portion of Table 3.3 reports the changes in predicted probabilities over a baseline where the lagged dependent variable is set at zero. Therefore, in our
hypothetical country that had no civil war in the previous year, the chance of experiencing a civil war is approximately 1.4%. How do various values of the independent variables affect this baseline probability? A similar country with a rival has a 1.9% chance of experiencing a civil war. While this probability may not appear to be very large, remember that it is a 35.7% increase over the baseline. A country with a neighbor experiencing civil conflict has a 2.4% chance of experiencing a conflict, or a 71.4% greater probability of violence over the baseline. An increase in the number of refugees from 0 to 100,000 increases the probability of a civil war 85.7% over the baseline, a particularly large change. Data on GDP per capita is also included to provide a comparison with a control variable. Increasing a country’s GDP per capita from the mean to one standard deviation over the mean ($3,490 to $9,485) reduces the probability of a civil war onset by 21.4%. While the absolute probabilities reported in the upper portion of Table 3.3 may seem low, it is clear that the change in the probability of a new conflict over the comparison group is rather large. As can be seen, rivalry, neighboring civil war, and refugees may have a big substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict.

The lower portion of Table 3.3 sets the value of the lagged dependent variable in the baseline category to one; in other words, the probability of conflict continuation is reported. The probability of continued rebellion given a conflict in the previous time period is rather high, 81% for the baseline. How do the variables of interest affect this underlying probability? First, a country with a rival neighbor is expected to have an 86%
chance of conflict continuation, or a 5.2% increase in the expected probability. A
neighbor with a rebellion increases the probability of conflict continuation by roughly
8.4%, while 100,000 refugees across the border increases the probability of continuation
by 8.9%. As a comparison, a shift in GDP per capita from the mean to one s.d. above the
mean is associated with a reduction of 6.5% in the probability of another year of fighting.
Clearly, as Table 3.3 shows, there is an important substantive effect of each of the
variables of interest as rivalry, neighboring conflict, and refugees all lead to a substantial
increase in the likelihood of rebellion onset or continuation.

**Transition Model Results**

The final method used to analyze these data is the transition model. Again, this
model entails two different estimations: one where the lagged dependent variable is set to
zero, and another where the LDV is set one. Substantively, the former is looking at
conflict onset while the latter estimates conflict continuation. The transition model also
allows the effect of the right-hand side variables to be different for each cut of the data.
Because values of the dependent variable may be duration-dependent, a count of peace
years was included for the cases where the LDV equals zero and a similar count of war
years was included for cases where the LDV was one.49

Table 3.4 reports the results for the transition model; models 9a and 10a report
the results for conflict onset, while 9b and 10b include the cut for continuation. While

---

49 The inclusion of a count of years since the last war also corrects for potential endogeneity between
conflict and refugees. If there was a past conflict that produced the refugees, the independent effects of the
prior conflict itself are accounted for.
the lagged DV and the random-effect approaches yield similar results, the estimates for this model are somewhat different. Partly, this is due to the reduction of the number of observations in each grouping which affects the standard errors, but it also reveals substantive differences between the models. While the previous models assume that conflict continuation and conflict onset are driven by similar processes, the transition model makes no such assumption. Models 9 and 10 differ only in their inclusion of control variables, with Model 9 eliminating the squared terms for Polity and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. First, Hypothesis 1 is supported, although not very strongly, in the transition model. For the LDV = 0 model, the effect of interstate rivalry is positive, although the high p-values indicate that rivalry may not have a consistent effect on onset across the observations. For the LDV = 1 model, the effect is also in the expected direction, and the p-value is somewhat higher indicating that we can be somewhat more confident that rivalry has a consistent influence on conflict continuation, with the results for onset being more indeterminate.
Table 3.4. Transition Model results for Neighboring Country Conditions and Conflict Incidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict (t-1) = 0</th>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict (t-1) = 1</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 9a</td>
<td>Model 10a</td>
<td>Model 9b</td>
<td>Model 10b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival NB</td>
<td>0.133 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.172 (0.245)</td>
<td>0.327 (0.253)</td>
<td>0.339 (0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low GDP NB</td>
<td>-0.287 (0.288)</td>
<td>-0.126 (0.276)</td>
<td>-0.177 (0.275)</td>
<td>-0.162 (0.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War NB</td>
<td>0.701 (0.228)</td>
<td>0.584 (0.228)</td>
<td>0.243 (0.242)</td>
<td>0.232 (0.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees in NB (t-1)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.026)</td>
<td>0.048 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (t-1)</td>
<td>0.241 (0.075)</td>
<td>0.262 (0.078)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.291 (0.131)</td>
<td>-0.289 (0.134)</td>
<td>-0.308 (0.175)</td>
<td>-0.270 (0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (t-1)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.004)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac</td>
<td>1.285 (0.406)</td>
<td>4.777 (1.756)</td>
<td>-0.147 (0.497)</td>
<td>-1.093 (1.904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac^2</td>
<td>-4.059 (1.918)</td>
<td>0.017 (2.085)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.075 (2.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace (war) years</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.071 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.072 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.415 &lt;0.001</td>
<td>-4.619 &lt;0.001</td>
<td>3.692 0.019</td>
<td>3.650 0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4. Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1.121)</th>
<th>(1.133)</th>
<th>(1.773)</th>
<th>(1.817)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>4920</td>
<td>4920</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wald Chi Squared</strong></td>
<td>61.24</td>
<td>70.06</td>
<td>24.94</td>
<td>26.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P &gt; Chi Squared</strong></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
P values are of one-tailed significance tests
As for Hypothesis 2, the transition model yields an interesting result. As with the previous models, having a neighbor with a low GDP does not have an important impact on conflict, but the estimates for the neighboring civil war variable indicate that conflict in adjacent countries has a clear impact on conflict onset but not for continuation. While the coefficients are positive for both the LDV = 1 and the LDV = 0 models, only the LDV = 0 model is statistically significant at conventional levels. That neighboring state weakness, as defined by conflict, would have a more consistent effect on onset than continuation is puzzling from the perspective of the theory. As argued above, perhaps once fighting is underway, governments which face TNRs in a neighboring country that is simply too weak to stop them are better able to develop strategies for containing these groups and limiting cross-border movements, thereby shortening the conflict. In some cases, target governments and neighboring countries also facing civil war may develop common responses to their security problems. Nevertheless, given a positive coefficient for the LDV=1 model, we can still expect that on the whole, conflicts are longer when weak neighbors are present.

Finally, refugees have a positive and significant effect on conflict continuation, but no consistent effect on conflict onset. It is important to note that past conflict is effectively controlled for given the research design as values of the lagged dependent variable are accounted for when the model is split in two; therefore, the continuation estimation examines the effect of refugees at t-1, controlling for conflict at t-1. This lack of a significant result for the onset model is perhaps not surprising given that in many cases conflict precedes large refugee flows. Moreover, conservative methodological steps taken to rule out endogeneity work against a positive finding for onset because
recent conflicts in the past are taken into account. The effect of refugees on conflict continuation confirms Hypothesis 3; refugees have an important impact on the prolongation of conflict. Not surprisingly, the longest-lasting civil conflicts also have large exile communities who participate in the fighting; for instance, Afghanistan, Sudan, Myanmar, Israel, and Mozambique.

What of the control variables? Table 3.4 shows that conflict continuation is highly duration-dependent, with the effect of war years being quite strong. Duration dependence is not as important for peace years however, which may be due to the manner in which the dependent variable was coded, although Beck et al (2001) find similar results with respect to state failure. Population has a strong effect on conflict onset—as indicated by a positive and significant coefficient in the LDV = 0 cut, but it does not seem to explain conflict continuation very well.

Furthermore, wealthy countries are less likely to experience a conflict onset, and in the cases where they do have a conflict, fighting is generally shorter as demonstrated by a negative coefficient in both cuts of the data. Both the onset and the continuation models find a parabolic relationship between conflict and the Polity index, with the most authoritarian and the most democratic countries experiencing fewer and shorter wars than countries with intermediate values. Ethnic fractionalization, however, only appears to have a strong impact on conflict onset with intermediate values of ELF leading to the greatest probability of conflict; the impact of ELF on duration was insignificant whether included by itself or with its square.

---

50 Recall that short periods of peace lasting fewer than four years between two spells of conflict were coded as one rather than zero.

51 Likelihood-ratio tests for the squared terms were conducted to test for joint-significance.
Table 3.5. Refugee Location and Conflict Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LDV = 1</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Riv./CW NB (t-1)</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Rival NB (t-1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in Civ. War NB (t-1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. in non-Riv./CW NB (t-1)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (t-1)</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (t-1)</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac</td>
<td>-1.189</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>-1.159</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(1.900)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.900)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac^2</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(2.066)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Years</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.227</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>3.541</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop</td>
<td>(1.522)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.547)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td></td>
<td>1007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Squared</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi Squared</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
P values are of one-tailed significance tests
Table 3.5 looks in depth at the effect of refugees and finds results similar to those presented earlier. Because the refugee variable is only found to be a predictor of duration, the LDV=1 cut—or duration component—of the transition model is reported. The combined category for refugees in rivals and/or civil war neighbors is positive and significant, while refugees in all other neighbors is not. Breaking apart the location of refugees into three groups reveals that, while all of the signs are in the expected direction, only refugees in rivals yields a consistent result. This indicates that rivals are especially likely to contribute to rebellion when they can use refugee communities as means towards destabilizing their neighbors. Furthermore, where management of refugee communities effectively limits the location of extraterritorial bases and TNR activities, conflict is greatly mitigated.

Again, to interpret the results, quantities of interest were computed using hypothetical values of the independent variables, using the estimation results from Model 9. Only the results for the main variables that were statistically significant at reasonable levels will be reported here. Similar to the methods used for Table 2, above, to construct the baseline comparison category, all of the dichotomous IV’s were set to zero, refugees and Polity were set to zero, and all of the continuous variables were set at their means. For the onset model, the peace years variable was set to 10, while for the continuation model, war years was set to 1. Let us begin with the results for conflict onset. In the baseline hypothetical scenario, a country is expected to have a 1.5% risk of a conflict—a result quite similar to the baseline in Table 3.3. A civil war in a neighboring country boosts this probability to 3%, for a 100% increase in the risk of violence; clearly, a nearby conflict has an important effect on the likelihood of local conflict.
For conflict continuation, the effect of rivalry and refugees was analyzed, with the war years variable set to one. How do these variables affect the probability that a conflict will endure for a second year? The probability of conflict continuation for the baseline comparison category is 78%; again, very similar to the baseline results in Table 3.3. Holding the other variables constant and shifting the value of rivalry from 0 to 1 raises this probability to 83%, or a 6.4% increase in probabilities. For refugees, moving from 0 to 100,000 refugees raises the probability of conflict to 86%, or a 10% increase in probabilities over the baseline.

**Extraterritorial Bases and Conflict Duration**

In the above analysis, it is assumed that neighboring state weakness, rivalry, and refugees will be positively associated with conflict because of opportunities for TNRs to establish extraterritorial bases. However, it is also possible to directly observe whether or not a rebel organization has an extraterritorial base once fighting is underway. If the rebels can escape to nearby territories, the government will have a difficult time in suppressing their activities and rebel movements can persist for longer than they would if they were directly exposed to the state’s coercive force. Also, extraterritorial activities make information about rebel activities less available and commitments to peace less credible, thereby prolonging conflicts by making bargained solutions more difficult to reach. Unfortunately, because of their clandestine nature and the difficulties of data collection for so many observations, it is not possible to observe the presence of extraterritorial bases during periods of peace, and thus conflict onset cannot be analyzed here. However, once rebel groups
begin fighting, it is possible to examine conflict histories and media reports to
determine if they are using nearby territories.

All of the conflicts in the U/PACD were researched to determine if the rebels
had a presence outside of the boundaries of the target state during the period of
conflict. A variety of primary and secondary sources were consulted to determine if
insurgents used extraterritorial bases. A three part variable was developed and
coded as follows: 0 = no extraterritorial presence; 1 = limited or sporadic use of
external territory; 2 = extensive and sustained use of extraterritorial bases. Values
of this variable were included for each country-year observation and changes in these
values, although not common, were included. Alternative codings were also
estimated by combining the 0 and 1 categories as well as by combining the 1 and 2
categories, but these variations did not affect the results.

The LDV=1 cut of the transition model is used to estimate conflict duration,
and the dataset, including the control variables, is the same as that used above.
Although in principle it is possible to count duration in months, weeks, or even days,
since all of the independent variables are reported in years, the time units are also
given in years. Coefficient estimates give the log-odds of conflict continuation for an
additional year.

52 These sources include: 1) the Uppsala University Armed Conflicts Database,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php; 2) the Minorities at Risk conflict histories; 3) Brogan,
Times Archives; 7) the International Boundaries News Database, http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/; 8) the
53 For methodological reasons, this variable was lagged. Because data on extraterritorial bases was
only collected for country-years where the value of the dependent variable equals 1 (i.e. when there is
a civil conflict), the model cannot be estimated with the variable itself because there is no variation on
the D.V. However, including lagged values of the extraterritorial bases variable eliminates this
problem, and lagged values are very highly correlated with current values: R=.95.
Table 3.6. Extraterritorial Bases and Conflict Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extraterr. Base</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (t-1)</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (t-1)</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac</td>
<td>-2.811</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Frac^2</td>
<td>2.760</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Years</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.771</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 1007
Wald Chi Squared 54.79
P > Chi Squared <0.001

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
P values are of one-tailed significance tests

As table 3.6 shows, the effect of extraterritorial bases on conflict duration is positive and significant. Substantively, the effect is large as well. Setting ethnic fractionalization and GDP per capita at their means,\(^5^4\) Polity to one, and war years to one, changing the value of extraterritorial bases from zero to one is predicted to increase the probability of war continuation by 16% over the baseline (77% to 89%). Changing the value of extraterritorial bases from zero to two increases the probability of war continuation by 23% (i.e. up to a 95% predicted probability). Thus, in both statistical and substantive terms, H4 is confirmed. Furthermore, the direct inclusion

\(^{5^4}\) Squared terms were not estimating in reporting predicted probabilities.
of the extraterritorial bases variable has the largest substantive impact on conflict duration.

**International Borders and Ethnic Conflict**

A final observable implication of the theory to be addressed in this chapter is that ethnic groups located near international borders will be more likely to rebel. As opposed to groups located in the interior, the mere proximity to international boundaries suggests that ethnic rebels may be able to slip back and forth across the border in order to escape government repression efforts. Although the theory is not specific to ethnic conflict per se, using ethnic groups as the unit of analysis is attractive because it allows for sub-national variation in conflict patterns. Furthermore, given that many conflicts are characterized by contests between ethnic groups over control of the state or succession, it is reasonable to use ethnic groups—as opposed to some other sub-national actor—as the unit of analysis. Thus, Hypothesis 5 expects that all else being equal, ethnic groups that are concentrated in regions that fall along international borders are more likely to rebel than those that are either dispersed throughout the country or isolated in the interior.

The data used here comes from the Minorities at Risk Project,\(^5\) which collects information on ethnic group characteristics, group discrimination, and acts of protest/violence for ethnic groups throughout the world (for details see Davenport 2004). In this dataset, an eight-part variable for the level of anti-regime rebellion is included. The value labels are as follows:

0  No violence reported  
1  Political banditry, sporadic terrorism  
2  Campaigns of terrorism 
3  Local rebellions 
4  Small-scale guerrilla activity 
5  Intermediate guerrilla activity 
6  Large-scale guerrilla activity 
7  Protracted civil war 

The dataset also has a variable for the concentration of ethnic groups near an international boundary (variable GC9). This variable is a four part variable for: 1) no geographic concentration; 2) the group is concentrated away from an international border; 3) the group is concentrated along one international border; and 4) the group is concentrated along two or more borders. For the present analysis, a dummy variable is created which is scored one for categories 3 and 4, above. Observations were collected by ethnic group in five-year periods from 1980 to 2000, so there are 5 observations per group.
Table 3.7. Level of Ethnic Rebellion and Location Near a Border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebellion Score</th>
<th>International Border</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 69.8825
p-value = <0.001

Table 3.7 shows the bivariate relationship between the MAR rebellion score for each observation (ethnic group/year), categorized between groups that are located along an international border and those that are not. Comparing actual versus expected values indicates that there is a statistically significant difference among these categories. As can be seen from the table, although the modal category for both types of ethnic groups is no conflict, at each step in the rebellion index, groups located near an international border more frequently engage in violence.

However, others suggest that transnational ethnic ties may explain this relationship as borders often bisect ethnic communities, and ethnic groups may come to the aid of their kin in other countries (Cetinyan 2002; Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 2001; Woodwell 2004). But this mutual assistance may either embolden ethnic groups to rebel or make governments more likely to offer concessions. The central government might treat such groups more favorably in order to prevent conflict (Cetinyan 2002). Therefore we must control for ethnic kin in neighboring countries in a multivariate analysis. Thus, I include another dummy variable, also
taken from the MAR dataset, which is coded one for groups that have ethnic kin in other states. As additional controls, I include a seven part variable (also from MAR), which indicates the degree of economic disadvantage a group faces and regime data based on the Polity score.

I also include a dummy variable for concentrated (as opposed to dispersed) ethnic groups that are not located near an international border in order control for factors associated with group concentration per se. Monica Toft (2003) argues that territorial concentration in an ethnic homeland makes groups more likely to rebel because actors view territory as an indivisible issue. Using the same data sources, she empirically finds support for the claim that group concentration is an important predictor of violence. Thus, the effects of simple group concentration must be controlled for.

Two alternative estimation techniques are used. First, a Random Effects GLS model is estimated, with ‘effects’ being for each ethnic group as the same group enters the dataset several times. Second, because the seven point scale may reflect simple orderings rather than a truly continuous dependent variable, an ordered logit model is estimated with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic group.

---

56 In models not shown, country as opposed to group effects were estimated. Results do not vary with this alternative specification.
Table 3.8: Ethnic Conflict and International Borders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GLS</th>
<th>Ordered Logit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Border</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.366)</td>
<td>(.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Kin</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.318)</td>
<td>(.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated Group</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Discrimination</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.055)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuts: 1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.624</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>258</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi2</td>
<td>32.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi Squared</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard errors for ordered logit cuts reported in the "p-value" column
**P-values are of one-tailed tests

Table 3.8 shows the results for the multivariate analysis; the results are robust to the estimation technique used. As can be seen from the table, even when including the control variables, groups that are located near an international border are shown to be more likely to engage in rebellion. Interestingly, the coefficients show that the effect for location near an international border is larger than that of ethnic kin in other states; and, in both models, ethnic kin did not come up significant. Furthermore, group concentration does not matter in and of itself; it only matters

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57 In additional GLS models, not reported, time ‘effects’ were estimated by including dummy variables for each of the years (setting 1980 as the baseline). The results remain virtually unchanged, with the coefficient international border increasing in size.
when groups are concentrated and located near a border. Therefore, Toft’s (2003) hypothesized relationship between territorial concentration and violence only applies in cases where group concentration combines with international opportunities for mobilization.

The other control variables reveal that economic discrimination, a measure of grievance, increases violent activity and that the level of democracy—a state-wide attribute—decreases violent behavior. In sum, there is good evidence in support of Hypothesis 5—ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when they are located near international boundaries.

**Evaluating the Hypotheses**

Based upon the results offered above, what can be said about the hypotheses and have any unexpected relationships emerged in the data? First, Hypothesis 1 receives relatively good support from the models. The logit with a LDV models and the random-effects logit model both suggest a positive relationship between neighboring state rivalry and conflict and an analysis of predicted probabilities suggests that this effect is rather important in substantive terms. In the transition model, however, the statistical significance of this finding drops off somewhat, although the sign of the coefficient remains positive for both the onset and the continuation models. Nevertheless, it does seem as though having a rival neighbor increases the likelihood of conflict and the finding that refugees in rival neighbors have an important effect lends support to the claim that such states encourage rebellion.
Second, Hypothesis 2 receives strong support for at least one of the indicators. While neighboring a weak state, as measured by GDP, is not a significant predictor of conflict, neighboring a state weakened by civil war does have a big statistical and substantive impact on violence. Failed states, therefore, can and do provide fertile breeding grounds for rebel organizations. Interestingly, however, the transition model reveals that neighboring civil war only has a consistent effect on conflict onset, and—in a statistical sense—much less of an impact on continuation. This phenomenon is not adequately explained by the theory as the expectation was that neighboring state weakness would affect both processes, and further research into why this is the case is warranted. It was suggested that target states may be able to come up with effective strategies in dealing with TNRs in weak states as cross-border strikes and troop positions near the border are tolerated by the host state.

Hypothesis 3 also finds strong evidence in the data. Across the models, refugees were demonstrated to be an important cause of conflict, not just the unfortunate victims of it. Refugees in neighbors are found to be a statistically significant and substantively large predictor of violence. Despite anecdotal evidence suggesting that refugees may also cause conflict to reignite further down the line (e.g. Rwandan Tutsis in Uganda, Palestinians in Lebanon), the transition model demonstrates that refugees have an important effect on conflict continuation while having little effect on conflict onset. This is perhaps not surprising given that most refugees first flee from violence and only then engage in or facilitate it, and there are relatively few long-term refugee communities that start rebellions later in time as compared with refugees that fight in contemporaneous conflicts.

Additionally, steps taken to rule out the effects of past fighting on current conflict factors against a positive finding for conflict onset with respect to the refugee
variable. Refugees are obviously correlated with prior conflict and it is difficult to ascertain whether subsequent conflicts are related to attributes of previous war or whether refugees are directly responsible for the resumption of fighting. However, this is not to say that this phenomenon does not happen in practice: Cuban exiles fleeing Castro launched the Bay of Pigs insurgency; ex-Samoza military personnel began the Contra rebellion against the Sandinistas from bases in Honduras; Afghans who fled the Taliban began a civil war against that regime; to name a few examples. However, to be on the methodological “safe-side” with regards to endogeneity, such incidents would not be picked up as cases where refugees began a new rebellion because the effects of the first round of fighting, which lead to an exodus in the first place, are taken into account.

The sub-hypotheses, 3b and 3c, also receive support when refugees in rival and civil war neighbors are combined into a single category. However, hypothesis 3c, when tested through a measure for refugees in civil war states only, was rejected. Again, this finding mimics the lack of a strong result for conflict prolongation when civil wars are fought in neighbors. Neighboring conflicts appear to cause local conflicts to break out, but they do not cause them to endure, even when refugees are in such states. The results do, however, provide further evidence that neighboring state rivalry matters: when there are refugees in such states, they are especially likely to launch attacks against the government that displaced them.

Observing the opposition’s use of extraterritorial bases directly and estimating their effect on conflict duration yielded positive results as well. An additional hypothesis, H4, was articulated and confirmed using the transition model for conflict continuation. Extraterritorial are shown to have an important substantive impact on how long conflicts last. Finally, Hypothesis 5—ethnic groups near an international
border will be more likely to rebel—finds good support. Groups that are territorially concentrated and near an international boundary are more likely to fight because they have access to neighboring territory.

What does this imply for the theory in general? The theory presented in the previous chapter suggested that regional and border effects are important to conflict processes; when rebels have the ability to mobilize outside of their target state fighting is more likely to erupt and rebel organizations can better escape repression. State boundaries constrain government forces to their sovereign jurisdiction, but rebels and opposition groups are less limited in their geographic scope. Based upon this theory, it was posited that neighboring country conditions make conflict more (or less) likely to occur. In particular, weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugee communities were suggested to be prime sanctuaries for rebel groups. As can be seen from the data, there is a strong correlation between neighboring country conditions and civil violence. Border and regional effects are matter; civil conflicts do not appear to be driven wholly by internal processes.

Importantly, this chapter has demonstrated that nation-state ‘boxes’ are too limited as units of analysis. Instead, civil conflicts are better characterized as regional or international phenomenon. International borders clearly do not limit rebel organizations and our theories and empirical studies of civil war should likewise not be confined to country-level factors. Understanding the nexus between internal and external conditions is likely to substantially improve upon our analyses of conflict.
Chapter 3 Appendix

Most statistical analyses are plagued by indeterminate causal connections between the independent and dependent variables. It is axiomatic that statistics can prove correlation, but not causation. For instance, in studies of civil conflict, GDP has been used by various authors as a measure of state capacity, grievances, and the opportunity costs for fighting. Causal inference in a statistical sense suggests that a one-unit increase in X has a particular effect on the Y variable, but it is difficult to determine if the proposed theoretical conditions are responsible for this relationship, or if alternative explanations for the same correlation are more accurate.

In order to get a better sense of causation, it may be useful to dig a little deeper behind the statistical correlations presented in this chapter. Therefore, I conduct an analysis of civil conflicts during the period 1996-2000 to verify if positive ‘hits’ in the statistical regressions hold for the theoretical reasons suggested in Chapter 2. Namely, did neighbors actually host rebels when they were expected to? For this time frame, I look at cases of conflict where there existed: 1) a rival neighbor, and/or 2) a neighbor experiencing civil war, and/or 3) neighbors are hosts to 10,000 or more refugees. In other words, since these variables are dichotomized and conflict is also a dichotomous variable, the cases analyzed here are those that are both are coded ‘one.’ Then, if there was a conflict in country A and neighboring country B was a rival (for example), did rebels from country A use country B’s territory as the theory suggests? Or, was sanctuary in this state irrelevant to the conflict? Data on the presence of extraterritorial bases (described above) was used to determine whether the coincidence of independent and dependent variables is
correctly accounted for by the theory—rebels should have external bases in these territories.

This approach mimics Michael Ross’ (2004) with respect to natural resource abundance and conflict. Ross deliberately chooses thirteen cases of civil conflict where natural resources were plentiful to determine whether these conflicts were in fact fueled by the presence of such commodities. Through detailed process tracing he is able to check the validity of the theoretical claims made by others (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and propose alternative causal pathways. While the analysis here is less ambitious in terms of rich detail, it serves as a similar ‘check’ on the statistical methodology.

The percent correctly attributed tally at the bottom of each table divides the total number of cases of civil war by the number of cases where rebels were present in at least one of the listed neighbors. Table 3.1 looks at the presence of external bases during periods of civil war in which there existed a rival neighbor; Table 3.2 looks at bases in neighboring countries that are also experiencing conflict; and table 3.3 looks at the relationship between refugee communities of 10,000 or more and the presence of rebel bases.
Appendix Table 3.1. Civil War & Interstate Rivalries, 1996-2000

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<tr>
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Percent correctly attributed: 78%
### Appendix Table 3.2. Civil War & Neighboring Civil War, 1996-2000

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Percent correctly attributed = 67%

Appendix Table 3.3. Civil War & ≥ 10,000 Refugees in Neighbors, 1996-2000
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Percent correctly attributed: 75%
Chapter 4: Extraterritorial Bases and International Conflict

In June of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. This war, codenamed “Operation Peace in Galilee,” was not fought over territory or economic resources, but because Lebanon was host to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was responsible for a series of attacks on Israel. The PLO had established its headquarters in Lebanon after it was evicted from Jordanian territory in 1970 and grew into a formidable insurgent army, primarily recruiting among refugee camps. Cross-border strikes—primarily artillery fire and bombings—by Israeli forces against the PLO were a frequent occurrence. Weakened by internal disputes and war among religious factions, Lebanon’s fragile government was powerless to move against the PLO forces in the south or Israeli incursions. Then, after an assassination attempt on Israel’s ambassador to the UK, Sholomo Argov, Israel invaded Lebanon to rout the PLO and occupied a security zone in the south for nearly two decades.

The previous chapter provided evidence that the availability of mobilization options abroad makes rebellion more likely to break out and to endure. However, as was discussed in chapter 2, extraterritorial bases should also serve to exacerbate tensions between rebel host and home countries. This chapter will explore the implications of TNR activities for state-to-state relations. Tacit or explicit support for rebel organizations can exacerbate existing tensions or create new conflicts between states and has the potential to escalate to violent confrontations. As the example above demonstrates, hosting rebel groups or other militants can draw states into conflict with one another. Circumstances similar to those that confronted Israel, the PLO, and Lebanon can be found in several other cases as well.
A major theme of this dissertation is that civil conflicts often have consequences for other states in the international system, and as such, ‘domestic’ disputes frequently become internationalized. While there is now a large body of scholarly research on foreign intervention in civil wars, much of this work seeks to explain the causes of such intervention or its effect on conflict outcomes and/or duration (see e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Carment and Rowlands 1998; ElBadawi and Sambanis 2000; Meernik 1996; Regan 2000, 2002; Walter 2002). Yet, scholars have largely ignored the possibility that foreign interference in another state’s domestic conflicts—particularly on behalf of rebel groups—raises the probability of a violent international confrontation between states. Thus, this chapter will present a brief review of the international conflict literature, discuss the relationship between external rebel bases and interstate conflict, and present an empirical test for the following hypothesis:

**H6 (International Conflict): The presence of extraterritorial rebel bases will increase the probability of an international dispute between rebel host and home countries.**

All forms of foreign intervention on behalf of the opposition, including supplying military equipment, financing, or simply offering rebels diplomatic recognition will create conflicts between states. Therefore, this chapter will also consider the effects of other forms of intervention on interstate conflict. While all types of intervention are likely to provoke tensions, external bases on adjacent territory is expected to have a particularly strong effect because proximity between states provides opportunities for violent interactions.
International Conflict

Before delving into the main argument—the subject of the next section—it is useful to consider the literature on international war. Much of the international conflict literature focuses on constraints on the use of force in a dyad that prevents disputes from escalating to war (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Bremer 1992; Oneal and Russett 2001; Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Schultz 2001). For example, the democratic peace theory claims that democratic norms and institutions provide non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Doyle 1986). In the ‘commercial peace’ tradition, scholars have argued that trade between states increases the opportunity costs for fighting because in addition to bearing the costs of war, states must also bear the costs of forgone economic exchange (see Barbieri and Schneider 1999 for a review). Finally, research on power differentials finds that weaker powers are effectively deterred from going to war with much stronger opponents (Bremer 1992; Geller 1993). None of this work makes explicit claims about the reasons why states go to war; these studies all argue that given some dispute there may be factors that prevent conflicts from escalating to violence.

In addition to looking at constraints on the use of force, it is also important to consider the issues that states fight over (see Diehl 1992; Gartzke 1998; Hensel 2001; Vazquez 1995). Usually, it is assumed that states fight one another over distributional issues between them such as territory, scarce resources, the gains from trade, and so on (see e.g. Fearon 1995; Hensel 2001; Krasner 1991). While states can cooperate to realize efficiency gains and improve their joint welfare, sometimes gains made by some imply loses for others. To use Stephen Krasner’s (1991) terminology,
‘life on the Pareto frontier’ is inherently conflictual. While there are many examples of positive-sum games between states (e.g. trade agreements), states are often faced with zero-sum confrontations with others.

In addition to distributional concerns, conflicts frequently arise over matters of domestic politics. Internal wars often give rise to issues of international contention and a systematic analysis of internal-to-external conflict linkages promises to greatly improve upon studies that look exclusively at constraints on force or distributional issues between states (Gleditsch and Salehyan n.d.). One significant line of research in this regard focuses on external intervention on behalf of kin groups during periods of ethnic rebellion (Cetinyan 2002; Moore and Davis 1998; Saideman 2001; Trumbore 2003; Woodwell 2004). States often come into conflict with one another over discrimination against and repression of ethnic groups, particularly during periods of civil war. Empirical analyses demonstrate that when one ethnic group is a majority in one state and a minority in another, conflicts between states frequently erupt over the treatment of the minority (Woodwell 2004).

More generally, real or perceived outside intervention on behalf of rebel groups will create animosities between states. While ethnic kin may provide support for their brethren, foreign powers may also become interested in conflicts for ideological reasons, or to affect the domestic balance of power for strategic reasons. During the Cold War, the superpowers often worked with other states to assist rebel groups and undermine regimes deemed ‘hostile.’ For instance, Pakistan and Honduras cooperated with the United States to contain leftist regimes in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, respectively. Even alleged support can lead to conflicts between states. As an example, Senegal accused Guinea-Bissau and Gambia of harboring rebels from the break-away region of Casamance, which both governments denied. It
was clear that the rebels were operating on foreign soil, but the Senegalese government could not be sure if these states were providing material support to the opposition, if they tacitly provided access, or if they were simply unable to root them out. Thus, other states often become involved in ‘domestic’ insurgencies, and beyond issues of distributional politics between states, conflicts often arise over foreign interference in domestic affairs.

**Sources of Interstate Conflict**

In chapter 2, it was argued that holding bases in *neighboring* countries will be especially important for the military operations of rebel organizations because they lack the ability to project force over long distances. Bases across the border provide a strategic advantage to TNR groups. Thus, any discussion of foreign assistance to rebel groups must include sanctuaries in neighboring states as a form of support. Clearly, external parties will only *deliberately* back rebel groups if they are already hostile to the government in power. Yet, any actions to provide assistance to combatants are likely to heighten tensions even further and exacerbate already sour diplomatic relations, and at the extreme, escalate to war (for a similar argument see Bapat n.d.).

Providing sanctuary to transnational rebels on one’s territory is especially likely to provoke a *military* confrontation between states. It is well-known that geographic contiguity increases the risk of an armed conflict in a dyad because of the opportunity to use force—it is less costly to fight with states nearby and proximity provides ample opportunities for violent interactions (Most and Starr 1989). Land transport is relatively easy to conduct, but moving military forces longer distances
Rebel host and home countries may come into conflict with one another for a number of reasons. First, the home state often blames the host for harboring dissidents and providing support to insurgents. Home countries will demand that the host state rid its territory of rebels and can threaten to use force in order to gain compliance. Navin Bapat (n.d.) has formally demonstrated that weak host states may not be able to prevent an external attack because they do not have the means to dislodge internal rebels, and strong/rival hosts may value the benefits of continued hosting over the costs of war with their neighbors. Second, although extensive counter-insurgency actions across the frontier are usually prohibitively costly, limited forays and strikes on foreign soil may occur and ‘hot pursuit’ raids into foreign territory are likely to provoke hostilities as the security and sovereignty of the host country are violated. Hosts may retaliate against ‘incidental’ border violations which jeopardize local populations. Third, negative externalities that impact adjacent countries can spark international incidents. It is well-known that civil wars in neighbors can lead to disruptions in economic activity, the spread of disease, and costly refugee flows (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch).

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58 This is not to say that international conflicts over rebel patronage never occur between distant states. A major reason for the US military invasion of Afghanistan was to attack Al-Qaeda forces, which were hosted by the Taliban government. However, most states do not have the capacity to attack far away countries.
these externalities can lead to disputes between states. Finally, the rebel home country may deploy troops near the international border in order to fight insurgents, and such troop mobilization may be seen as threatening to neighbors who cannot be entirely certain of the intent of such actions.

From a bargaining perspective, neighboring countries could, in principle, avoid a costly conflict through finding a negotiated agreement (Fearon 1995). However, transnational rebellions must be seen in the context of three-actor strategic interactions. A host government may not be able to meet the target government’s demand of limiting rebel activities because moving forcefully against foreign rebels may be more costly than an international conflict. Host states must weigh the costs of expelling rebels against the costs of a dispute with neighbors, and may find themselves unwilling or unable to act against TNRs. Moreover, rebels can themselves initiate violent actions against the target state from bases across the border and involuntarily drag the host government into a conflict. The target government will often strike against rebel positions across the border in ‘hot-pursuit’ of combatants, and these cross-border forays frequently lead to clashes between states, leaving little time to come to the bargaining table prior to the outbreak of violence.

There are several examples of states that have fought one another over rebel access to neighboring territory. Thailand has engaged in militarized disputes with Burma and Cambodia over its provision of shelter and support to rebel organizations. Likewise, India has frequently clashed with Pakistan over alleged support for separatists in Kashmir, including the presence of Kasmiri rebels on Pakistani territory. Pursuit of rebels across the border has also been the cause of long-term military occupations of neighboring territory; Israel took and held southern Lebanon for over two decades in order to deny the PLO and other militant groups safe-havens,
and Rwanda moved into the Eastern Congo in pursuit of factions that participated in the 1994 genocide. While these anecdotal cases are informative, it remains to be seen if there are broadly generalizable patterns across countries.

**Data and Methods**

To test the hypothesis that external rebel bases raise the probability of conflict between rebel host and home countries, I conduct a statistical analysis of international conflicts during the latter part of the 20th Century. The units of analysis are dyad/years from 1946-1999, and are restricted to contiguous dyads because rebel bases are overwhelmingly located in neighboring states. To operationalize the dependent variable, international conflict, I use two common datasets. First, I include a dichotomous variable from the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) which is coded one for category 4 or 5 MIDs, namely those that involve the actual use of force. Secondly, to use a different indicator of conflict, I include a variable from the International Crisis Behavior dataset (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988), which is also dichotomous and coded one if there is an interstate crisis in the dyad that has the potential to escalate into war. However, the ICB data is only available up to 1995. Because these dependent variables are binary and collected over time, I employ the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) non-parametric event-history method by including a count of peace years among states.

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59 Conflict, in a general sense, can refer to full-blown war, small-scale clashes, or negative diplomatic exchanges. The specific operationalization here, however, comes from the available data. The Militarized Interstate Disputes variable captures, large-scale wars and minor clashes that involve the use of force. The International Crisis Behavior data does not require the actual use of force, but is based upon qualitative assessments of belligerent foreign policies that have a high likelihood of escalation to war.

60 http://www.icbnet.org/

61 The MID dummy variable and the ICB data are only correlated with one another at the .29 level, indicating that they are capturing somewhat different phenomenon.
and three cubic smoothing splines on the right hand side. Accordingly, only the initial year of conflict is recorded and ongoing years are excluded from the analysis. The main independent variable of interest is a dichotomous indicator coded one if at least one state in the dyad is hosting rebels from the other state. This is the dyadic version of the external base variable discussed in the previous chapter.

Table 4.1 describes the distribution of the dependent variables and the main independent variable, external bases. Each unit of observation is a unique dyad/year. As can be seen, MIDs and ICB crises are relatively rare, occurring in 394/10,199 and 183/9,524 of the dyad/years, respectively. However, when comparing cases with and without extraterritorial rebel bases, it becomes clear that the relative frequency of international conflict is higher when such bases exist. For the MID events, 13% of the dyad/years where there were rebel bases in neighbors resulted in conflict, as compared with only 3% of the cases where there were no such bases. For the ICB crises, this relative frequency is 7% versus 1%, or seven times higher. The chi-squared values, furthermore, demonstrate that this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.000 level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1. Relative Frequency of MIDs and ICB Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MID</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Base</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared = 207.721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICB Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Base</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared = 144.515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several control variables are added to the analysis. First, power ratios may affect the likelihood of conflict, as weak countries should be unlikely to confront very powerful states. The power ratio variable included here is taken from the Correlates of War’s (COW) Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) and is the natural log of the stronger state’s CINC divided by the weaker state’s CINC. The CINC index is a widely-used aggregate measure based upon military personnel, military expenditures, economic production, and population data. Second, alliance data, also from the COW project, was included (Singer, Bremer and Stuckley 1972). This is a dichotomous indicator coded one if the members of the dyad are part of a mutual defense pact.\footnote{The MID, ICB, alliance, and CINC data were generated using the EUgene software. See Bennett and Stam (2000).} Third, data from Polity was included to control for dyadic democracy; democracies are expected to be less likely to fight one another. The Polity index is a 21-point scale from –10 to 10, which includes information on institutional characteristics of the regime (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The Polity score of the least democratic state in the dyad was included to test the democratic peace hypothesis. Finally, it is important to include a control for pre-existing rivalries between states. Interstate rivalries may lead states to be more willing to support rebels and be more prone to use force; therefore, excluding it from the analysis may lead to omitted variable bias. To control for the effects of rivalries, I include Thompson’s (2001) dichotomous indicator for the presence of an international rivalry in the dyad (see ch3).

To check the results against a well-established model of international war, I also replicate the results reported in Russett and Oneal (2001, Table 5.1). This model
specification includes information on all dyads, contiguous or not, from 1946 to 1991.\textsuperscript{63} The conflict indicator used in this analysis also comes from the MID data and is similar to the measure described above (category 4 and 5 disputes). However, the R&O data is limited in that it does not include post-Cold War conflicts. The variables in this model include the ‘liberal peace triad’: a joint democracy measure, a measure of bilateral trade, and an indicator for joint membership in international organizations. Additional variables include the dyadic power ratio, alliances,\textsuperscript{64} distance between states, contiguity, and whether both states are minor powers (see Russett and Oneal for a full description of variables used). This data is analyzed using the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) method for BTSCS data. All models (including the ones described above) employ robust standard errors clustered by dyad to account for additional non-independence of observations.

Results

Table 4.2 reports the results of the first analysis, using data on contiguous dyads. The MID results and the ICB results are reported side-by-side to compare alternative operational definitions of international conflict. Of the control variables in the MID analysis, only the joint democracy indicator reveals a statistically important effect, and a negative sign demonstrates support for the democratic peace hypothesis. In the ICB analysis, large power differentials are shown to decrease the likelihood of an interstate conflict and the joint democracy indicator remains consistent.

\textsuperscript{63} Because data on external bases is only available for the post-WWII period, the full time span of the Russett and Oneal data cannot be used.

\textsuperscript{64} The R&O alliance indicator is coded one for any form of alliance, which includes defense pacts as well as less binding alliance commitments.
Turning to the key independent variable, the external rebel base indicator has a positive sign and demonstrates consistency across the choice of dependent variables, providing strong confirmation for the hypothesis that rebel host and home countries are likely to come into conflict with one another. Indeed, the odds of conflict for such dyads are four to five times higher (depending on the DV used) than dyads in which no rebels were hosted. Both models are estimated with and without the control for international rivalries. While rivalries are a statistically significant predictor of conflict, the external base variable is robust to its inclusion.
Table 4.2. Rebel Bases and International Conflict, Contiguous Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MID data</th>
<th></th>
<th>ICB data</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Base</td>
<td>1.353</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>1.148</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Pact</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.976</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-3.513</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10197</td>
<td></td>
<td>10197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-2</td>
<td>294.370</td>
<td></td>
<td>295.630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-values are of one-tailed significance tests
Figure 4.1 provides a graphic representation of the relationship between external bases and the probability of an international conflict, compared with the effect of power ratios and the joint democracy indicator. To set a baseline category for computing predicted probabilities, all other variables were set to their means, defense pact was set to zero, and the peace years indicator was set to five. As can be seen from the distance between the lines, the impact of external bases is quite large in a substantive sense, and the results are largely similar across the data sources used. While joint democracy and the power ratio are measures of constraint or deterrence, the external base variable represents an *issue* of contention between states and has a much larger substantive effect on the probability of conflict.

---

65 Models 1&3 were used in generating these graphs.
Figure 4.1. Predicted Probabilities: Democracy, Power Ratios, and External Bases

These results are checked against Russett and Oneal’s *Triangulating Peace* (2001) dataset in Table 4.3. The first model in the table replicates the R&O results for all dyads, 1946-1991, but uses the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) specification for BTSCS data. This model demonstrates that joint democracy decreases the likelihood of an international conflict, supporting the democratic peace hypothesis; but the other liberal variables (trade and IGO membership)—while negatively related to conflict—
are not significant at conventional levels. The other variables indicate that a large power imbalance decreases the likelihood of conflict in a dyad, presumably because more powerful states can deter an armed confrontation. Additionally, alliances are shown to decrease the likelihood of conflict and minor power dyads are less conflict-prone. Finally, direct contiguity increases the risk of war while the continuous measure for distance between states is negatively related to conflict.

In model 6, the external base variable is included in the R&O model. As can be seen, the coefficient on external base is positive and quite large—taking the anti-log of the coefficient reveals that external rebel bases increase the odds of conflict in a dyad by nearly a factor of three. The controls behave largely the same as before. Thus, the results are robust to this alternative dataset and additional controls. Finally, model 7 includes the control for international rivalries, and again, the external base variable remains positive (and ‘significant’), although reduced slightly in magnitude. To get a better feel for these results, Figure 4.2 displays the substantive effect of extraterritorial bases on the predicted probabilities of conflict, compared with other R&O indicators. The baseline category is one with a non-allied, non-major power, contiguous dyad, with all continuous variables set to their means and years of peace set to five. Again, as the solid line for external bases is much higher than the dotted line for cases with no bases, the substantive effect of hosting rebels on the risk of conflict in a dyad is quite high. Thus, the hypothesis that external rebel bases make conflict between states more likely is robust to this alternative modeling choice.
Table 4.3. Rebel Bases and International Conflict, Russett and Oneal Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Incl. Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Base</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-18.187</td>
<td>-15.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.475)</td>
<td>(13.524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Membership</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>-0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Contiguous</td>
<td>-1.244</td>
<td>-1.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Powers</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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Table 4.3. Continued

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(0.188)</th>
<th>(0.195)</th>
<th>(0.185)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rivals</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.130 &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>-0.103 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.086 (0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.371 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.401 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.362 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.550 (0.449)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.460)</td>
<td>-1.810 &lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>27412</th>
<th>27412</th>
<th>27412</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-2</td>
<td>581.71</td>
<td>712.69</td>
<td>782.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P-values are of one-tailed significance tests
Exploring the relationship

Statistical correlations are good for identifying broad empirical patterns, but they tell us little about the causal relationship behind the findings (see chapter 3 appendix). Correlations may be spurious, or they may hold for reasons other than those identified by the theory. For example, debates rage over the true causal story behind the democratic peace—is the relationship due to institutional or normative factors? Is it in fact spurious? Without taking sides on this theoretical debate here, while statistical analyses repeatedly demonstrate that democracies are less likely to fight one another, there is little consensus as to why this is the case, or if omitted variables are really at work (Gowa 1995; Rosato 2005).

Above, I argued that foreign support to rebel organizations is likely to cause tensions between states. While all forms of support can lead to conflict, sanctuaries in neighboring countries are especially likely to lead to military confrontations, because proximity between rebel host and home countries allows states the opportunity to fight one another. Thus, external rebel bases in neighboring countries
provide both the motive and the opportunity for militarized international disputes. The statistical regressions demonstrate a robust relationship between external bases and interstate conflict, but is this relationship truly causal?

New MID narratives available from the Correlated of War project for the 1990’s allow us to get a better sense of the issues that provoke tensions between states. These narratives give a short description of the events that occur during a MID. Table 4.4 lists all MIDs described in the online narratives in which at least one state was hosting the other’s rebel organization(s). In other words, this approach deliberately selects cases that are coded ‘one’ for both disputes and external bases. The narratives then allow us to ascertain whether the co-incidence of variables in the regression is for the reasons specified by the theory or whether the relationship is not properly explained. Therefore, the objective here is not statistical inference (which was done above) but rather, to look at the underlying processes that lead from the IV to the DV.

66 http://cow2.la.psu.e
Table 4.4. External Bases and MID’s, Case Narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country A</th>
<th>Country B</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>MID Number</th>
<th>Rebels?</th>
<th>Notes (incorrect attribution in parentheses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4007</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Dispute over bombings by Kashmir militants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4054</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Afghanistan supporting rebel forces from Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4067</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Chadian border guard killed while pursuing rebels in Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4182</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4182</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Israel attacks Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4040</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>(coastal dispute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4078</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Both sides accuse one another of supporting rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4219</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Spillover from guerrilla war in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4002</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Burmese rebels operating in Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4005</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>(incidental shooting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4158</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Turkey enters Iraq to attack PKK (Kurdish) forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4168</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>(brief border clash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4124</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Each side accuses the other of supporting rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4170</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Cross-border clashes between rebel forces and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4191</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Turkey enters Iran and attacks a Kurdish village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4192</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Iran enters Iraq to attack Kurdish rebel forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4123</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Cross-border fight between Burundi and refugees in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4172</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Spillover from Colombia conflict, Venezuela enters Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4246</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Angola intervenes in Congo in support of rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4339</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Failed peace negotiations in DRC, Angolan support for rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4339</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Failed peace negotiations in DRC, Ugandan support for rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4138</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>(territorial water dispute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4289</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Turkey attacks Iran over PKK bases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent Correctly Attributed: 83%
The MID narratives that are available overwhelming confirm that issues arising out of civil wars and rebel activities are responsible for several interstate conflicts. The narratives were read to determine whether the reason given by the Correlates of War project for the clash involved the presence of a TNR group. While it may be difficult to know exactly what issue(s) led to fighting, these narratives give at least some indication of conflict motives. Table 4.4 demonstrates that in 83% of the cases where external bases and MIDs coincided with one another, the presence of rebels was cited as a major factor leading to conflict. In only 4 of the 23 listed cases was the relationship spurious or simply coincidental. Therefore, the causal mechanisms identified above do appear to be at work in the vast majority of cases. While conflict histories are only available for recent MIDs, this set of cases provides strong preliminary evidence that the statistical relationship is in fact valid.

A few examples will serve to further underscore these causal connections. In MID 4124, Eritrea accused Sudan of supporting an Islamic militant movement, which was trying to overthrow President Isaias Afwerki. In turn, Sudan accused Eritrea of providing shelter to Sudanese rebel groups from the south. As a result, there were several military clashes between the two governments between 1996 and 1998. At first, both governments moved troops near the international border, and in a speech given in July of 1996, the Sudanese vice president warned Eritrea not to provoke a war. On July 23, however, a Sudanese newspaper reported that the government had beaten back an invasion force comprised of rebels supported by Eritrean regular troops; subsequently, a state of emergency was declared in the Sudanese province of Kassala. Over the following months, Sudanese opposition groups, notably the

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67 This conflict summary is supplemented by news searches from the International Boundaries News Database; http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/newsarchive.html. Access date: 12/10/2005.
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, frequently launched attacks from Eritrea, and in January of 1997, made a major advance into Sudan near the town of Dawazin. After several such attacks on Sudan, the Sudanese Information Minister said that Eritrean support for rebel groups amounted to a declaration of war between the countries. Then, on February 26, 1998, Eritrean media sources reported that Sudan had launched air and artillery attacks on several villages in the Gologue region of Eritrea. A few days later, it was reported that Eritrean forces began shelling the Sudanese villages of Awad, Galsa, and Hadra. Further deployment of troops to the border by both governments threatened an escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war. However, this was averted by a summit in Qatar in May of 1999, when the presidents of both countries agreed to end hostilities and resume diplomatic relations.

Similarly, in MID 4002, Burma and Thailand clashed several times over the issue of ethnic Karen rebels from Burma operating across the border in Thailand. These incidents took place around the Burmese village of Kawmoora and the Thai village Mae Sot, which lie directly across the border from one another. On several occasions, the Burmese government pursued rebels on the other side of the border, violating Thailand’s sovereignty, and prompting a Thai military response and troop deployment to defend the border against further encroachment. Stray Burmese shells landing on Thai territory also threatened Thailand’s security, and in response, the Thai government demanded that Burmese forces stay at least five kilometers away from the border.

MID 4182 refers to a series of incidents between 1993 and 2001 in which Israel clashed with Lebanon and Syria over Hezbollah presence in these countries. Cross-border attacks by Hezbollah often provoked Israeli retaliation against forces on Lebanese and Syrian territory, which in turn elicited a response from these
governments. Lebanese and Syrian troops sometimes fought alongside Hezbollah guerillas when Israel launched attacks on their soil, threatening a regional war. As these examples demonstrate, international conflicts frequently occur as the result of rebel activities and foreign support for insurgent organizations—thus, civil wars frequently incite international tensions and military incidents.

**Alternative Measures of External Support**

While foreign sanctuaries should be included in discussions of external assistance to opposition groups, other forms of support are not expected to be irrelevant to conflict behavior between states. Traditionally, scholars have used direct transfers of resources, such as military equipment or finances, as measures of external support; yet, external bases should also be included as an important ‘resource’. While external bases should have the greatest impact on the risk of interstate conflict because of proximity between countries, military and economic assistance to rebels should also increase conflict behavior. Therefore, we must consider the possibility that other forms of intervention can also lead to conflict.

To test this proposition, Patrick Regan’s (2000) data on external interventions in civil wars is used in the analysis. A dummy variable is included and is coded one for cases of military and/or economic assistance to rebel organizations by third party state actors. However, Regan’s list of civil wars does not include all of the cases listed in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset as he uses a higher deaths threshold for categorizing conflicts. This coding of foreign intervention was included in the Russett and Oneal model for international conflict, described above. Because the Regan data includes interventions from both proximate and distant states, the R&O

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68 Cases of neutral interventions and UN interventions were not included.
dataset is preferred because it includes observations for all dyads. Insignificant variables for trade and IGO membership were not included in the estimation, although results do not change substantially with their inclusion.

Table 4.5 reports the results for this alternative coding of foreign intervention. The first model includes the Regan foreign intervention variable, and a positive and significant coefficient indicates that military and economic assistance also raise the probability of an interstate dispute. Model 9 includes the external base variable along with the Regan intervention variable to compare the relative effect of these two types of support for rebel organizations. While the external base indicator is positive and significant, the magnitude of the coefficient for the Regan indicator drops off substantially, and it falls below traditional levels of statistical significance.\textsuperscript{69} Because of possible multicollinearity between the variables, a correlation matrix is presented below table 4.5; this reveals only a moderate correlation among the variables. Additionally, an examination of the data reveals that of the cases in which there was military and/or economic support for rebels (i.e. Regan-type interventions), all but three of the corresponding MIDs involved neighboring states.\textsuperscript{70} Therefore, foreign support for rebel organizations—through bases or other resource transfers—is especially likely to provoke MIDs between proximate states.

\textsuperscript{69} When estimated without the control for international rivalries, the Regan foreign intervention variable remains statistically significant in model 9.
\textsuperscript{70} These MIDs are Iraq versus USA 1986 & 1991 and China versus Thailand 1969.
Table 4.5. Comparison with Regan’s coding of foreign intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mil. and Econ.</th>
<th></th>
<th>Incl. Bases</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
<td>P-Value</td>
<td>(Robust s.e.)</td>
<td>P-Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Base</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention (Regan)</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied</td>
<td>-0.477</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-0.436</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Contiguous</td>
<td>-1.197</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-1.198</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Powers</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.441</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>1.192</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.653</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>-2.819</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.481)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.493)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>27412</td>
<td></td>
<td>27412</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-2</td>
<td>835.830</td>
<td></td>
<td>792.710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rival</th>
<th>Regan Int</th>
<th>External Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention (Regan)</td>
<td>0.1531</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Base</td>
<td>0.2734</td>
<td>0.2956</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

Foreign interventions in internal conflicts have received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years. Many civil conflicts—e.g. Sierra Leone, the DR Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo—have become important international events as interested third parties become involved. This chapter demonstrates, however, that foreign interventions in civil wars not only affect events in the target country itself, but also have important implications for state-to-state relations. Support for insurgent groups in other countries frequently leads to international conflicts between states; this relationship is confirmed through a statistical analysis of MIDs and ICB crises during the post-World War II era. A closer look at several cases in the 1990’s confirms the causal relationship between foreign patronage of rebel organizations and international conflicts.

This chapter also expands upon standard definitions of external intervention and foreign support for rebel organizations. Most studies have looked at active troop support and/or transfers of finances and military equipment to combatants and have neglected the importance of sanctuaries on the territory of other countries. These forms of support were also shown to lead to increased international hostilities (in some models), although the impact of external bases appears to be significantly larger. This research implies that scholars looking at state decisions to intervene in civil wars must pay greater attention to issues of strategic interaction between states. Choosing to intervene is likely to have important consequences for state-to-state relations—including the probability of conflict—that must be accounted for in theoretical and empirical analyses.
Chapter 5: Ending Civil Wars through Regional Cooperation

What are the main obstacles to resolving transnational rebellions? Why do they tend to endure for so long? In Chapter 2, it was argued that transnational rebellions will be more difficult to terminate, either through effective counterinsurgency or through a negotiated settlement. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 strongly suggests that foreign bases significantly prolong civil wars, providing evidence in support of this claim. Theoretically, the duration of conflicts was explained by a pair of factors. First, extraterritorial bases allow rebel groups—even relatively weak ones—to evade state strength. Therefore, it is difficult for state security forces to repress such organizations, causing insurgencies to persist for longer than they would otherwise. Second, even when they are desired, negotiated settlements are difficult to conclude because sanctuaries in neighboring states create special commitment problems; peace agreements frequently require rebel organizations to disarm and demobilize their fighters, including those abroad.

While impediments to peace relating to disarmament have been discussed by others (Walter 2002), external bases exacerbate commitment problems because target governments cannot adequately monitor and gather information on compliance with rebel demobilization in other states. As long as the opportunity to maintain foreign bases persists, governments cannot be certain that rebels will not renege on a deal by hiding supplies and weapons and/or re-mobilizing in neighboring states in the future. This suggests that rebel host states can play an important role in facilitating peace by providing commitments of their own that their territory will be off-limits.

71 Conflict resolution is sometimes taken to refer to bringing about an end to the root causes of violence, but here a less ambitious definition is used: the cessation of active fighting.
This chapter complements the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 by providing case evidence from the Nicaraguan Contra rebellion and the Rwandan ex-FAR rebellion (post-1994). Whereas the statistical analysis showed a strong correlation between neighborhood conditions and conflict duration, this chapter will delve into these cases in greater detail in order to illustrate the mechanisms underpinning the theory of transnational rebellion. These include: the difficulty of repression encountered by the state; the role of host states in facilitating or preventing rebel activities; and the state-to-state commitments needed for conflict termination. Nicaragua presents a case where the government and rebels did not make progress in direct talks until rebel host states—Honduras and Costa Rica—agreed to limit Contra activities and facilitate a negotiated settlement. In Rwanda, security cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo significantly contributed to successful counterinsurgency operations by neutralizing the Hutu rebels hiding in the eastern provinces of the DRC. Both cases are examined longitudinally to show how changes in host state policies towards the rebels precipitated conflict termination at a particular point in time and how use of foreign territory was the critical issue preventing peace. The selection of these cases will be discussed in greater detail below.

**Returning to the Theory**

Successful counterinsurgencies and negotiated settlements involving TNR groups will require the cooperation of the rebel host state.\(^{72}\) For successful

\(^{72}\) Of course, conflicts may also end through a rebel victory after rebels have mobilized to sufficient strength so as to defeat the state. This possibility will not be dealt with here as it is primarily a battle-
counterinsurgency, rebel host governments can choose to restrict the use of their territory by foreign fighters and push them off of their soil, thus making them vulnerable to defeat by the target state. Governments can more effectively battle rebels in their own jurisdiction. This frequently requires security cooperation and bilateral agreements between host and target countries to coordinate counterinsurgency efforts on both sides of the border. In order to alleviate bilateral frictions stemming from rebel presence on foreign soil, the target government will require credible assurances by the host that it is actively working to eliminate TNR bases on its territory.

Negotiated settlements will also require the cooperation of the host state. Others have argued that commitment problems are often a barrier to peace settlements because rebels are required to demobilize and disarm their fighters, leaving them vulnerable to reprisals (Walter 2002). The presence of external bases exacerbates commitment problems by making it more difficult for governments to accept promises of disarmament. TNR groups must commit to demobilizing their fighters on foreign territory and provide assurances that they will not reorganize abroad at some point in the future. Yet, promises of full demobilization are difficult for states to monitor and verify because the informational environment abroad is more opaque, and because states have little reason to believe that future rebel re-mobilization will not occur so long as neighboring territory is available. This lack of reliable information about the extent of rebel compliance with the terms of a peace deal and the persistence of permissive conditions make finding a bargained solution to civil

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field outcome that does not depend on host state commitments. This chapter is mainly concerned with the three-way rebel-government-host bargaining processes that are required for counterinsurgency and negotiated settlements.
wars more difficult, and they create a need for a three-actor (or more) bargain involving the host state(s).\textsuperscript{73}

Host countries can cooperate in the negotiation process a couple of ways. First, neighboring states may work to pressure combatants to the bargaining table. They can exercise their leverage on both parties by using ‘carrots and sticks’—rebel expulsion versus continued support—to make a settlement a more attractive alternative. Secondly, they can assist in making demobilization promises more credible by verifying that TNRs have left their territory and providing assurances that their soil will be off-limits in the future. Here the host state must make credible promises of its own. It must ensure that it will follow through on its promise to limit rebel access to its territory. It can use costly signals such as inviting outside observers, making public commitments to domestic and international audiences (audience costs), and expending significant resources towards demobilization to demonstrate its willingness to pursue peace. Therefore, negotiated settlements involving TNRs benefit from the active participation of rebel hosts to exert pressure on actors to negotiate seriously and provide assurances of rebel compliance with disarmament plans (for a related argument see Bapat 2006).

The rebel host state will agree to cooperate with counterinsurgency efforts or facilitate negotiated settlements under a number of conditions. To recapitulate the argument made in Chapter 2, first, the target and host governments may improve relations with one another. As relations with the target state improve, the host state is less inclined to prefer a rebel victory and may cooperate to expel TNRs. As part of the deal to end their mutual rivalry, governments may agree to cooperation on

\textsuperscript{73} As David Cunningham (2006), argues, increasing the number of actors in a civil conflict can prolong disputes as more veto players must be satisfied.
security issues, particularly dealing with TNRs. For instance, the India-Pakistan peace process has included the issue of Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri insurgents. Secondly, host governments, particularly weak ones, may improve their capacity and resources devoted to policing their territory and expelling foreign fighters on their soil. This shift in capabilities may include the invitation of foreign actors such as the UN to assist in the processes. Finally, as the costs of continued hosting increase, neighboring states will become more likely to push TNRs off of their territory. These costs may include conflict with the target state, forgone economic exchange, and international pressure. Costs may also involve domestic pressure to bring an end to fighting as local populations are affected by the damage caused by conflict spillovers.

One remaining issue is the choice between complete expulsion and the facilitation of a peace agreement. Empirically, some rebel hosts cooperate to defeat rebels while others work for a negotiated settlement. This choice is largely a function of the host’s affinity for the rebel’s cause. This can be thought of as a continuum between complete rebel victory, where the host strongly prefers the opposition to the incumbent regime, and defeat, where the host does not particularly side with the rebels. The more the host state values a compromise that includes the rebels, the more likely it will be to pursue negotiations over repression. However, this choice is largely treated exogenously here; this underlying preference is difficult to measure and merits a more thorough theoretical treatment, and so will be left for future research.
What to Look for in the Cases

The null hypothesis—that extraterritorial bases have no impact on the duration of conflict—has already been rejected in the statistical analysis in Chapter 3. What remains to be seen is whether the correlation holds for the reasons identified by the theory. If the theory is indeed plausible, several additional points that are not easily operationalized in a statistical analysis must be demonstrated. 1) Successful counterinsurgency is hampered by rebel access to neighboring territory. The government must be shown to have a relative tactical advantage in battling rebels on its own soil, but to be unable to defeat rebels operating across national boundaries. 2) Successful insurgent repression occurs when rebels no longer have access to foreign territory. 3) Barring number 2, a successful negotiated settlement is more likely when governments can be assured of rebel demobilization on foreign soil and future non-use of external territory. 4) Most importantly, for either successful repression or a negotiated settlement to take place, an agreement (formal or informal) between rebel host and home countries must be obtained. That is, we must find evidence that conflicts cannot be resolved through rebel-government interactions alone, but critically hinge upon cooperation between governments in the region to expel rebels and/or provide assurances of rebel demobilization.

Several cases of conflict termination would serve demonstrate each of these points, including Rhodesian [Zimbabwean] rebels hiding in Zambia and Mozambique; Indian rebels from Assam hiding in Bhutan; and Senegalese rebels from Casamance operating in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. In the end, Nicaragua and Rwanda were chosen for a number of reasons. There is relatively good information on each of these conflicts through published materials, news accounts, and online
sources. The Nicaraguan conflict ended through a negotiated settlement while the Rwandan conflict waned after counterinsurgency operations; the different endings are not considered “dependent variables” to be explained, but provide evidence that these modes of conflict termination are not the result of substantially different processes requiring distinct explanations. In both cases, agreements by rebel hosts to restrict TNR activities were important pre-conditions for conflict termination. Yet the cases also highlight interesting nuances in the role of the host state in cooperating with counterinsurgency efforts (Rwanda) or facilitating credible commitments after peace agreements (Nicaragua). Finally, these conflicts vary in their geographic context and when they were fought; namely, during and after the Cold War. Also, Rwanda was an ethnic conflict, whereas Nicaragua was an ideological contest. Therefore, these differences cannot be sufficient explanations for a common outcome: the termination of conflict.

In Nicaragua, as will be explored in depth below, each of the elements identified above are apparent. The Sandinista government, despite being able to prevent the Contras from establishing a lasting presence on Nicaraguan territory and threatening the capital, was not able to pursue the rebels into Costa Rica and Honduras for fear of provoking a war with these states and their military supporter, the United States. The Sandinistas refused to engage in direct talks with the Contras, believing that the support of the US and neighboring governments was critical to the rebels’ continued viability. Importantly, during the initial rounds of peace negotiations to end Nicaragua’s civil war the rebels were excluded altogether, and instead, talks were conducted between the governments in the region. Only after agreements were signed between Nicaragua and its neighbors did serious negotiations between the government and the rebels begin. When Nicaragua was provided credible
assurances by neighboring states that Contra units—particularly in Honduras—would be disbanded, the peace process could go forward. This case will also demonstrate that the “traditional” view of the Contras and Central American allies as pawns of the United States is too simplistic. This view suggests that the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of US support ended the Contra insurgency. Rather, as has been argued by others and will be demonstrated below, Honduras and Costa Rica began to assert their independence even as the US pressured them to continue their support for the rebels. Although waning of Cold War concerns was not irrelevant, the commitment by Contra hosts to enforce demobilization agreements, despite the Bush Administration’s opposition, allowed peace to move forward.

Rwanda presents a hard case for the theory. In Chapter 2 it was argued that international borders protect TNRs because it is costly for the state to strike rebel positions in territories where it is not sovereign. However, borders were not argued to be completely inviolable; while crossing a border significantly increases the costs of counterinsurgency operations, sovereignty violations can and do occur. Rwanda after the 1994 take over by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) presents an instance of a government that was willing and able to extensively penetrate the territory of a neighbor; in this case, Zaire/DRC. This territorial violation occurred because the Hutu rebels included those responsible for the 1994 genocide, and therefore presented an existential threat to the Tutsi-led government of Rwanda. However, in support of the theory, the Rwandan government faced considerable costs in pursuing such a strategy and was ultimately unable to defeat rebel forces by itself. While the government established military superiority over its own territory, it was not able to defeat insurgents hiding across the border, demonstrating that despite substantial sovereignty violations, governments are still limited in their ability to combat TNR
groups. Rwandan armed forces were hampered by conflict with DRC and its regional allies, their lack of local knowledge, and their inability to maintain control over such a vast territory. Successful repression of the Rwandan rebels resulted from the signing of an agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, which called for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces in exchange for the DRC’s cooperation in forcibly disarmig the Hutu rebels. Thus, conflict termination did not occur as a result of Rwandan actions alone—even with extensive penetration of Congolese soil—but after the DRC agreed to cooperate in preventing rebel access.

**Alternative Theories**

Alternative theories of conflict duration and resolution focus on rebel-government interactions and ignore the role that host states (when present) play in prolonging conflicts and facilitating conflict termination. Many studies of conflict resolution focus on the beliefs of actors regarding battle-field outcomes: wars come to an end through negotiated settlements when both parties believe that the odds of a decisive victory are low. Alternatively, military superiority favors a decisive victory. William Zartman (1989) argues that successful bargaining is likely to occur when conditions are “ripe for resolution,” that is, when war-weary fighters no longer believe they can win their objectives through military force. When both sides to a conflict reach a mutually hurting stalemate—where combatants face substantial costs for continued fighting, but have little hope of winning—it becomes apparent that conflict will leave them worse off than accepting a deal. Applying this framework to peace negotiations in Zimbabwe, Stephen Stedman (1991) uses Zartman’s conception of ripeness as a starting point and refines it by looking at internal disputes among
various rebel factions and leaders. Nonetheless, Stedman clearly emphasizes military stalemate as a key factor driving actors to the bargaining table.

Mason and Fett (1996) and Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) take a similar approach in analyzing when actors will prefer a fight to the finish over a negotiated settlement. According to these authors, for a peace deal to be struck both sides must accept that the expected utility of settlement exceeds the expected utility of war (see also Wittman 1979). Otherwise, conflict will continue until one side is defeated. Following Zartman and Stedman, conditions on the battle-field are decisive. Mason and Fett (1996) empirically demonstrate that longer conflicts are more likely to end in negotiated settlement, presumably because neither side expects to win, while the size of the government army is negatively related to settlements. Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999) expand this basic framework and distinguish between government and rebel victory. However, the principal theoretical claims in these studies are based upon the military capabilities of belligerents.

According to this approach, conflicts will come to an end as a result of military factors. Conflicts endure until one side or the other is defeated, or a military stalemate leads to a negotiated settlement. The importance of rebel host states should be irrelevant for these theories. Successful repression will be a function of government strength relative to the rebels and negotiated settlements will be obtained when the combatants believe that they cannot win a decisive victory. Credible commitment problems surrounding rebel disarmament on foreign territory and/or host government efforts to evict rebels should not matter for these theories.

Barbara Walter (1997, 2002) makes a major contribution to the study of civil war duration and termination by looking at the strategic bargaining problems specific to civil wars. Moving beyond notions of “ripeness” Walter argues that even though
actors may prefer a negotiated settlement to continued fighting, problems of credible commitment make bargaining difficult; thus, conflicts continue long after battle-field conditions would suggest. The need for rebel demobilization after civil wars and reintegration into society is vital for understanding this commitment problem. On one hand, demobilized rebels are vulnerable to an attack by government forces; on the other hand, governments are wary about the extent of compliance with demobilization agreements. Therefore, a third party security guarantee—namely, international peacekeeping—is required to overcome the commitment problem and enable negotiated settlements to go forward. Echoing Walter, in a broad empirical analysis of UN peacekeeping missions, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find that such interventions can prevent the re-emergence of violence.

This theoretical perspective recognizes the importance credible commitment problems during the implementation of a peace deal. However, the credible commitment problem is solely on the part of the combatants. The role of the rebel host state in pressuring combatants to the bargaining table,\(^74\) providing information on rebel demobilization, and providing credible promises of its own regarding the non-use of its territory should be minimal. Moreover, according to this view, the role of the third-party enforcer is to prevent an attack against demobilized fighters. For cases of negotiated settlements, the arrival of peacekeeping forces should be the critical step to secure the peace; the cooperation of neighboring states will be unimportant. Additionally, such international missions will be mostly responsible for preventing violent attacks against disarmed fighters; their activities will mostly apply

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\(^{74}\) Walter (2002: 164) acknowledges that outside pressure can be important to bring about a settlement: “…outside pressure is likely to have a significant impact on combatants’ decision to pursue negotiated settlements. This suggests that additional research needs to be done on the effects of different types of third-party actions on the settlement process, not just on the effects of third-party mediation and security guarantees.”
to the country where fighting is taking place rather than ensuring rebel demobilization in surrounding states.

In sum, if alternative theories better explain conflict duration and termination, the rebel-government interaction should be paramount while the role of host states should be minimal. According to relative capability theories, the military balance between rebels and governments should explain why the Rwandan regime was able to defeat Hutu rebels; stalemate should explain the peace negotiations in Nicaragua. For credible commitment theories, difficulties in negotiating the Nicaraguan peace accords should mainly apply to the combatants themselves. In contrast, the theory of transnational rebellion suggests that securing the cooperation of rebel host countries should be as important (if not more) as rebel-state relations for the termination of conflict.

Nicaragua

Background to the Conflict

Decades of economic mismanagement and authoritarianism under the Somoza regime in Nicaragua lead to the formation of the leftist Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in the early 1960’s. The Sandinistas’ name came from a revolutionary, anti-imperialist figure, Augusto César Sandino, who during the 1920’s and 30’s opposed the conservative regime of Emiliano Chamorro and US interference in Nicaraguan affairs. The FSLN was formed in 1961 out of a number of leftist organizations, including the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth, and the Frente Revolucionario Sandino, and received inspiration from the recent success of the Cuban revolution (Miranda and Ratliff 1993). The FSLN
advocated broad economic reforms to address income inequality in Nicaragua and an end to the oligarchy of a handful of economic and political elites with extensive ties to the United States. Such demands were echoed elsewhere in Central America (Booth 1991). The FSLN was largely based in urban areas, particularly Managua, and launched its initial attacks in the early 1970’s. Responding to this growing threat, Anastasio Somoza engaged in a campaign of repression, including censorship of the media, the arrest of political opponents, and widespread torture and executions. Such repressive measures backfired, however, as public resentment against the Somoza regime grew and international condemnation of human rights violations intensified.

US support for the Somoza regime waned as President Jimmy Carter, who championed the cause of international human rights, demanded political reform and an end to the state of siege in Nicaragua. During this time, the Sandinistas grew rapidly in strength as arms flowed in from Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and recruits from broad segments of Nicaraguan society joined the revolution. Battles between the Nicaraguan National Guard and the FSLN intensified in 1978 after the killing of a popular anti-Somoza newspaper editor, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, led to a series of mass protests and general strikes. The Sandinista rebels also benefited from the support of Costa Rica and the use of its territory, where it trained soldiers, stockpiled weapons, and formed a government in exile (Walker 2003). This government in exile declared itself the rightful government of Nicaragua on June 18, 1979. With the combination of military set-backs, popular protests, and international pressure, Anastasio Somoza fled the country a month later on July 17. Two days afterwards, the FSLN marched on Managua and established a new revolutionary regime.
Soon after the revolution, however, opponents of the new government surfaced and took up arms. Supporters of the old order, particularly members of the former National Guard, were one of the main components of this anti-Sandinista front, which would come to be popularly known as the Contras. Yet it would be incorrect to characterize the Contras as simply a counterrevolutionary force comprised of right-wing Somoza supporters. As several scholars have noted (Brown 2001; Horton 1998), peasants in Nicaragua’s rural highlands—including many who fought with the FSLN against the Somoza government—rose up in opposition to the Sandinista’s radical reform agenda, particularly agricultural expropriation and redistribution. Moreover, Nicaragua’s indigenous Miskito population formed their own opposition groups in response to perceived discrimination.

The first serious battle between the Sandinistas and the rebels (who had not yet organized under the “Contra” banner) was fought in the Nueva Segovia region in November of 1979, when rebels attacked a military outpost near the town of Quilalí (Brown 2001: 14). While the Nicaraguan resistance would later benefit from extensive US aid, these initial campaigns were fought without foreign help. Therefore, although the Contras were often accused of being a US ‘mercenary’ force, they originated independently of foreign assistance. In fact, during the first several months of the Sandinista revolution, the United States—under the Carter administration—sought to work with the new government. Initially, the US provided foreign aid to the Sandinistas in the hope that it could head-off a further shift to the left and alignment with the Soviet Union. These early rebel activities were for the most part poorly organized and ad hoc.

As the Sandinista regime continued in its program of socialist economic reform and deepened its ties with Cuba and the USSR, several actors in US foreign
policy circles began to view the regime as a regional threat. With conflicts gathering steam in El Salvador and Guatemala, it was feared that governments across Central America could fall and align with the Soviet Bloc. With Carter losing the 1980 presidential election to Ronald Reagan, the US took a much more active role in organizing, equipping, and training the various opposition groups, now referred to collectively as the Contras. The right-wing government in Argentina, also fearing a leftist turn in the region and wishing to bolster ties with the US, provided extensive assistance to the Contras as well. With a much stronger opposition force and fears of a possible US invasion, the Sandinistas increasingly relied upon Cuba and the Soviet Union for military assistance, and significantly augmented its armed forces (Walker 2003). Thus, Nicaragua had become a prime Cold-War battle ground.

**Significance of Extraterritorial Bases**

While the Contra forces clearly benefited from the support of the Reagan administration, they were never strong enough to take and hold significant parts of Nicaraguan territory. Unable to establish a lasting presence within the country, the Contras relied upon access to bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, two countries which played pivotal roles in the Nicaraguan civil war. As Lynn Horton notes, the border region had long been of strategic importance to several rebel movements: “…Quilalís strategic location near the Honduran border as well as its rugged terrain continued to make the municipality attractive to guerilla movements” (1998: 33). Thus, it is not surprising that the earliest and most significant battles with the Sandinistas occurred along Nicaragua’s porous borders.

Under the military rule of Policarpo Paz García, Honduras and the Reagan administration took active roles in opposing the Sandinista regime. Honduras was not
simply a pawn in the US’s camp, but rather, it actively sought to undermine the
Sandinista regime, which it viewed as a threat. In 1981, Colonel Gustavo Alvarez
Martínez, a fierce anti-communist, approached US Ambassador Jack Binns to
propose a direct attack on Nicaragua; the US viewed this option as too extreme and
rejected the plan (Schultz and Schultz 1994: 64-65). Instead, the military junta in
Honduras, in conjunction with the CIA under William Casey, orchestrated a covert
war against Managua by equipping and training Contra forces, including ex-Somoza
Guardsmen and former Sandinista peasants who defected from the revolution. After
the Honduran elections, which ended military rule and brought President Roberto
Suazo Córdova to power in 1982, the Honduran government continued its policy of
hosting the Contras and allowing US intelligence and military personnel access to the
rebels. For its part, Honduras received millions of dollars in US foreign assistance.
By 1983, there were an estimated 7,000 Contras operating in Honduras (Brogan
1998: 506),75 with the largest faction, the Fuerza Democratica Nicaragüense (FDN),
operating under the command of Enrique Bermúdez, a former member of the
National Guard.

Yet, granting extraterritorial bases to the Contras did not come without costs
for Honduras. The border regions of Choluteca and El Paraíso became de facto
military zones. Relations between local Hondurans and foreign fighters and refugees
were often tense. In contrast to refugees from El Salvador, who were believed to
sympathize with leftist insurgents in that country and whose activities were restricted,
Nicaraguan refugees were encouraged to reside in camps along the border, where the

75 Although estimates vary, sources indicate that the Contras reached 15,000 troops located in
Implementation Regime in Nicaragua. In Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements,
Contras could easily recruit among them and gather supplies (Hartigan 1992). Locals complained of lawlessness in these camps and the destruction of private property. Additionally, the Nicaraguan government sometimes attacked positions on Honduran territory in ‘hot pursuit’ of the rebels, further souring relations between neighbors and jeopardizing the safety of locals. For instance, the Sandinista army crossed into Honduras in February of 1987, killing one Honduran soldier and injuring three; several Hondurans were also injured or killed by landmines placed within the country. These incidents, and the militarization of the border region, led several thousand Hondurans to flee the area for the interior (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989: 211).

Along the southern frontier, Costa Rica hosted other Contra factions, the largest of which was led by Eden Pastóra Gomez (known popularly as Comandante Zero), a former Sandinista commander. Pastóra had been part of the FSLN march on Managua, but for personal and/or ideological reasons, he turned on his former comrades. Relations between Pastóra and Bermudez were strained as Pastóra, the former anti-Somoza revolutionary, did not want his former National Guard enemies to regain control of the country (Schultz and Schultz 1994). In contrast to Honduras, Costa Rica, the only stable democracy in the region, was more reluctant to allow extensive Contra/US access to its territory due to popular wariness about the US’s intentions in the region. However, under pressure from the Reagan administration and the promise of millions of dollars in aid, Luis Alberto Monge Álvarez, president of Costa Rica, tacitly provided bases to the Contras while publicly denying they

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existed. In contrast to rebel units led by ex-members of the National Guard, however, the US was more hesitant to provide resources to former Sandinista leaders, whose anti-communist credentials were lacking (Schultz and Schultz 1994).

Extraterritorial bases were critical for the Contra’s operations and longevity. Despite several offensives, they could not establish territorial control over significant parts of Nicaragua nor did they threaten to take major urban areas. As one diplomat observed, “The Contras don't stand much chance of defeating the Sandinistas on their own. While they can retreat into Honduras they will survive. But if they move into Nicaragua in force, they'll be stopped.” After a number of early setbacks trying to establish a rebel presence on Nicaraguan territory, Contra Commander Edgar Chamorro decided to change tactics and engage in a war of attrition stating that, “We know that militarily we cannot defeat the Sandinistas . . . they have reserves which seem inexhaustive.” Thus, the Nicaraguan government was able to establish military supremacy over its own territory and was not likely to be defeated through conventional battles on its own soil. Without safe-havens inside the country, the Contra’s ability to flee into Honduras and Costa Rica prevented their demise. Recognizing this, in an attempt to pressure these host states to evict the Contras and discredit them internationally, in July of 1986, Nicaragua filed a suit against its neighbors in the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Yet, such pressure did little to change Honduran and Costa Rican policies.

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Cross-border attacks against Contra positions on foreign soil were not unheard of, but they were costly actions. Each time the Sandinistas violated the border, they risked escalating tensions with their neighbors and a wider regional war. In one instance—not unlike several others—Honduras mounted an air strike against Nicaraguan government forces after they crossed the border. In December, 1986, approximately 250 Nicaraguan soldiers overran a Honduran border checkpoint near the town of Maquingales after an incursion by Contra forces. Honduran General Humberto Regalado Hernandez reacted to the border violation by stating, “I know the Nicaraguans are having trouble with the Contras in the border region, but this does not give them the right to violate our territory.” On December 8, the Honduran Air Force attacked Sandinista positions inside Nicaragua, and General Regalado remarked that if border violations continued, he would recommend a full-scale invasion to the President. Therefore, although the border was not an impenetrable barrier, the Nicaraguan armed forces could not conduct counterinsurgency operations at will on foreign soil as border violations elicited a strong response.

Although toppling the state seemed distant, the resistance took a toll on Nicaragua’s resources and economy. The Contras, with robust support from the US, Honduras, Costa Rica, and other allies in the region gained in strength and were able to mount more significant assaults on Sandinista positions, although they were never able to threaten Managua directly. For the next several years, the central government spent a large share of its budget on soldiers and armaments obtained from the USSR, Cuba, and other Eastern Bloc countries. But such extensive military spending and damage done by the war left the Nicaraguan economy in shambles. Between 1980

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83 Ibid.
and 1990, real GDP per capita in Nicaragua fell to half of what it had been under Somoza. Nonetheless, the conflict can be described as a war of attrition with few decisive battles. Fighting was confined to rural areas and peripheral towns. Despite extensive funding and support by the US, the Contras could not defeat the Sandinistas in head-to-head combat and were forced to retreat to their base camps in Honduras and Costa Rica when government forces went on the offensive. According to reports, by 1986, despite several years of fighting, most Contra forces had pulled back to their positions in neighboring countries. Thus, without their sanctuaries across Nicaragua’s borders, the Contras could not have persisted for as long as they did.

Beginning the Peace Process

The peace negotiations in Nicaragua consisted of two phases. The first phase, known as the Contadora process, began in January of 1983 and ended in failure in 1986. Peace negotiations resumed in 1987 at the prodding of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez; this phase, known as the Esquipulas talks, culminated in an end to the conflict and democratic elections in Nicaragua in 1990. Both phases of negotiations consisted of a series of offers and counteroffers that were alternatively promulgated and rejected by the major players in the conflict—particularly the Sandinistas, the Contras, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the United States. Thus, peace negotiations lumbered along for years before a final settlement, acceptable to all parties, was reached. The willingness to negotiate early on demonstrates that the conflict was not an intractable one. Yet it is important to note that for several years—

84 Based upon data from the Penn World Tables: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (access date May 16, 2006).
at least until the Sapoá agreement in 1988—peace talks did not include the Contras. Rather, governments in the region debated the terms of a peace deal, fully understanding that the support of external actors was vital to the continued viability of the opposition (see Aguilar Urbina 1994; Hartzell 2002; Roberts 1990; Schultz and Schultz 1994). It was only after external actors, particularly Honduras, agreed to prohibit rebel bases on their territory that the Contras and the Nicaraguan government could finally commit to a peace and disarmament plan.

Wary of growing US influence in Latin America and the threat of a regional war, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama pressured all five governments in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica) to the bargaining table in January 1983 in order to resolve the several conflicts underway. Thus began the Contadora negotiations. That summer, a broad document of objectives was drafted that outlined 21 points, including a halt to the Central American arms race, the prohibition of military interference by actors outside of the region, democratization, and importantly, the cessation of support for insurgent groups in neighboring countries (Bagley 1986; Roberts 1990). The United States gave rhetorical support to the Contradora plan as it did not want to be perceived as blocking regional peace initiatives; however, hardliners in the Reagan administration who were committed to “rollback” in Nicaragua were skeptical of an agreement that would legitimize Sandinista rule and limit US influence in Central America.

The US used its influence among the members of the “Tegucigalpa group” (Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador) to shape the terms of the Contadora peace plan. With regard to the Nicaraguan conflict, Honduras and Costa Rica in particular had considerable bargaining leverage during the talks as the Contras operated from their territory; without their cooperation, peace talks were doomed to fail. Thus, at
the behest of the US, the Tegucigalpa group worked to devise a final treaty that they believed would be too demanding for the Sandinistas to accept. In doing, they hoped that a rejection of the plan would cast the Sandinistas in a negative light among international audiences (Bagley 1986; Roberts 1990).

On September 21, 1984, Nicaragua unexpectedly announced that it would accept the terms of the treaty, which stipulated that it would expel all Soviet military advisors, halt all arms imports, reduce the size of its army, end support to guerillas in El Salvador, begin talks with internal opposition parties, and permit external monitors to verify compliance (Bagley 1986). Most importantly, Nicaragua would hold elections in November. In return, the US would stop supporting the Contras and providing military assistance to Central American allies, and neighboring countries would forbid the use of their territory. The Sandinistas believed that without external support—armaments from the US and bases in neighboring states—the Contras would collapse as a fighting force. With their plan having backfired, the US and the Tegucigalpa group quickly changed their position and declared that the agreement was simply a set of talking points rather than a final document and demanded further revisions. They also expressed doubts that the November elections would be free and fair, despite the invitation of international monitors. Thus, Honduras and Costa Rica, falling in line with the Reagan administration’s demands, were able to scuttle a peace treaty in 1984 (Bagley 1986).

The Contadora group began to re-write the treaty in earnest. In September of 1985, with much more input from the Tegucigalpa group, a new document was proposed. This version, like its predecessor, called for arms reductions and

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democratic elections in Nicaragua; however, it did not prohibit Contra activities in Honduras and Costa Rica. Without such assurances, Nicaragua was unwilling to sign the revised treaty. The third and final draft of the Contadora treaty failed to pass in June, 1986, again over the issue of foreign support for the Contras. Again, Nicaragua rejected the document, arguing that it would not offer concessions without sufficient guarantees that foreign support for the Contras would end (Bagley 1986; Child 1992). Soon thereafter, Honduras and Costa Rica announced that they would boycott the Contadora talks altogether, arguing that Nicaragua was obstructing the peace process.\(^7\) The Contadora process had ended in failure.

The Reagan administration used the Sandinista’s rejection of the deal as a pretext for overcoming growing Congressional objection to CIA operations in Central America and winning support for the appropriation of $100 million in military and logistical aid to the Contras.\(^8\) At this high-point in their strength, the Contras occupied twenty villages within Honduran territory, although they were unable to hold any significant areas within Nicaragua itself (Schultz and Schultz 1994: ch 5). The Contras’ fighting force reached over 10,000, and more than 70,000 refugees were located in Honduras, Costa Rica, and other countries in the Americas.

Esquipulas

A major shift occurred in 1986, when Costa Rica elected Oscar Arias Sánchez as president. Costa Rican involvement in the Contra war was a central issue


in the 1986 election.\textsuperscript{89} Arias, who ran on a pro-development and pro-peace platform, responded to domestic discontent about the Nicaraguan war and the perception of US meddling in Central American affairs. In his inaugural address, he stated, “We will keep Costa Rica out of the armed conflicts of Central America and we will endeavor through diplomatic and political means to prevent Central American brothers from killing each other.”\textsuperscript{90} Upon taking office, Arias called for the resumption of negotiations. In 1987, Central American heads of state met in Esquipulas, Guatemala to devise a new regional peace accord. Given his instrumental role in pushing the actors to the bargaining table and crafting the agreement, the Esquipulas treaty is often referred to as the Arias plan. Unlike his predecessor, with a popular mandate to pursue peace, Arias was willing to confront the Contras as well as the United States and take the hard steps necessary to reach an agreement.

Like Contadora, Esquipulas was an agreement between governments in the region and excluded the Contras. The treaty was signed on August 1987 by the presidents of Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Esquipulas, like its predecessor, was a broad plan for peace and democratization in Central America, and it called for the dismantling of external rebel bases.\textsuperscript{91} It also called for national reconciliation commissions in each country, free elections, and an international monitoring mission under the UN. This international monitoring mission was a key demand of Nicaragua, which needed credible assurances and independent verification that rebels would disband their external bases according to


\textsuperscript{91} Article 6 of the treaty states: The five countries signing this document reiterate their commitment to prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and refuges to provide them with or allow them to receive military and logistical support.
Article 6 of the treaty. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega commented that it was essential to establish a “…multinational force of civilian observers at the border to guarantee an easing of tension there and to end the Contra activities that are carried out from Honduran territory… If the multinational force is established, we both have a guarantee.”

The US was shocked by the signing of the agreement and quickly expressed its opposition to the accord. Central American support for US policy in the region was slipping and these governments were taking a more independent stand. Signaling his commitment to the plan, in January 1988, Arias—who recently gained substantial political capital by winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts at Esquipulas—ordered Contra commanders to leave Costa Rica. Thus, the Contras had lost a key political ally, and importantly, the southern front lost its access to safe-havens across the border. The road to peace had begun. As Kenneth Roberts writes, “…a regional peace settlement was precluded so long as two basic conditions existed: the veto power wielded by hardliners in the Reagan administration, and the willingness of the Tegucigalpa group to follow Washington’s policy lead. However, it was the erosion of this second condition that ultimately undermined Reagan administration policy in Central America and made possible the signing of the Arias Treaty in 1987” (1990: 87). With the about-face in Costa Rica, this erosion of support had begun.

The signing of Esquipulas did not bring an immediate end to the conflict. Rather, the treaty was the first step in a series of negotiations, and the difficult task of implementing the treaty’s provisions proceeded slowly. Again, Honduras wavered in

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its commitment to peace in Nicaragua; it was unwilling to take firm measures against the rebels, and as such, the use of Honduran territory allowed the Contras to survive (Hartzell 2002; Schultz and Schultz 1994). Honduran president Azcona was in a difficult position. On one hand, the United States and hardliners in his government, including in the military, did not want to turn their backs on the Contras. On the other hand, the war was increasingly unpopular domestically, and obstructing the peace process would jeopardize Honduras’ international image and its relations with its Latin American neighbors (Garrison and Gerner 2001).

For Nicaragua, the issue of foreign sanctuaries was critical. Esquipulas required an end to extraterritorial bases and Nicaragua demanded that this point be adhered to before further progress could be made. According to Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Victor Hugo Tinoco, “For Nicaragua, if the mercenary forces [Contras] continue to use the territory of other neighboring countries, Nicaragua will find it difficult to comply with the agreements that would like to comply with” (Tinoco 1988: 39). Therefore, foreign bases were an important stumbling block that prevented the Esquipulas process from meeting its objectives.

Honduras’ Decision

While initially showing signs of indecisiveness, Honduras ultimately came to back the implementation of Esquipulas. The costs of hosting the rebels became quite high. Several international and domestic events undoubtedly affected Azcona’s decision to lend his support to the peace deal. First, as a broad contextual factor, the atmosphere of reform in the USSR signaled a waning of Cold-War geo-strategic concerns. Second, in late 1986, the Iran-Contra scandal broke out, which turned Congressional and public opinion against US operations in Central America. Third,
as a result of the scandal, in 1987 Congress narrowly rejected Reagan’s request for more economic and military aid for the Contras. Given the climate of controversy in the US and the declining strategic importance of Central America, Azcona feared the consequences should the US abandon Honduras and the Contras. As Garrison and Gerner write:

…the future of the Contras provided a constant threat to the stability of the Honduran state. If the United States, following the suspension of aid, chose to wipe its hands of the Contra problem, then the Honduran government would be left to clean up the mess alone. The presence of twelve thousand guerrillas and one hundred thousand family members and supporters would require resources that Honduras did not have. Furthermore, the country faced the strong possibility that the guerrillas would degenerate into roving bands of drug smugglers, gunrunners, hired assassins, and even criminal bandits (2001: 4-5).

Even key Honduran military advisors feared a war against the Contras if the US withdrew its support and the rebels had to be removed by force (Schultz 1994: 228-229). Although Honduras wanted to keep pressure on the Sandinista regime, it was not willing to bear the costs of hosting the rebels alone without continued American support to guarantee its security, fund the rebels, and provide foreign aid (Child 1992: ch 5).

Domestically, pressure on Azcona to evict the Contras mounted, further raising the costs of housing Honduras’ “guests.” The issue came to a head on April 5, 1988 when Honduran and US agents seized Juan Ramón Matta, a notorious drug trafficker, and extradited him to the United States (Schultz and Schultz 1994). Matta was popular among many poor Hondurans for his contributions to charitable causes; to others, the maneuver had violated the Honduran Constitution, which prohibits the
extradition of Honduran citizens. Protests in Tegucigalpa over the affair became increasingly violent as anti-US sentiment flared. Over 1,000 people marched on the US embassy where they set part of the compound on fire, smashed windows, overturned cars, and burned the American flag. Protests and riots continued for several days. The Matta affair was simply a spark in the tinder-box; the real frustration was over the perception that Honduras had become a US stooge. One opposition leader commented that Honduras had become, “like the circus dog that jumps through the hoops when its master tells it to... There has been a complete submission to the United States, and people are tired of it.”

Even after the protests over Matta subsided, opposition to the war and to the US continued. In July, four US service personnel were attacked and in December, the Peace Corps headquarters was bombed. Calls came from across the political spectrum to break free of US influence and move against the Contras. The border regions in particular cried out for relief from the unwelcome presence of Nicaraguan refugees and insurgents. Azcona could no longer afford to maintain the status quo and began to assert some independence from the US by backing Esquipulas.

Continued Obstacles to Peace

Contra commanders were clearly aware of these pressures. Given that policies in Costa Rica and now Honduras were shifting, they were forced to the

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bargaining table with Nicaragua. In March of 1988, the Sandinistas and Contras held their first formal talks in Sapoá, Nicaragua. The parties agreed to a sixty day cease-fire and the continuation of talks on a permanent peace. The Sapoá agreement also called for a general amnesty, the repatriation of Nicaraguan exiles, and the protection of the Contra’s political rights. The Reagan administration was dismayed that the Contras had entered negotiations with the Sandinistas without its blessing, but for their part, the Contras feared that they were being abandoned by regional allies had no other choice but to strike a deal. Therefore, external pressure on the combatants was a critical element in the decision to begin talks. However, only a few months later, the cease-fire broke down as fighting erupted in the border region near Quilalí. Tellingly, during these battles one Nicaraguan Lieutenant noted that the rebels largely remained in their Honduran hideouts and periodically crossed the border to conduct their raids, "One group of 40 or 60 contras will cross into Honduras to pick up supplies, and another group will come into Nicaragua as replacements." 

With the ceasefire having failed, Ortega appealed directly to Honduras to evict the Contras, thereby allowing the peace process to move forward. Rebel’s continued access to Honduras was seen as the key obstacle to implementing the ceasefire. On August 24, 1988, Ortega sent a personal letter to President Azcona. It is worth quoting this letter at length. In it, Ortega wrote,

…relations between Nicaragua and Honduras have been seriously affected by the presence and activities of Contra mercenary forces in Honduran territory… These circumstances, President Azcona, make it necessary to implement strong measures against these mercenary forces consonant with the commitments outlined in treaties currently in effect between the two countries and with general and generally-practiced international law. Those actions

would be aimed, first, at disarming the mercenary forces and moving them away from the border… Time is so crucial, President Azcona, that we can say regional peace and our people’s tranquility is in your hands.

…We also reiterate our proposal to establish, with UN guidance, a system for international observers… at the border between the two countries to prevent situations such as the one we are currently facing.101

Thus, Ortega viewed the presence of Contra forces in Honduras as the basis for the rebels’ viability and an impediment to further negotiations.102 Importantly, this letter reiterated the demand for international observers to monitor the implementation of this plan.

The 1988 presidential election in the United States brought fresh uncertainties in Central America. Neither Honduras nor the Contras could be certain that the Bush administration would continue to be as steadfastly anti-Sandinista as Reagan. The President-elect had yet to form his Latin America team. Thus, the implementation of Esquipulas became more urgent as the possibility of abandonment by the US was a real threat. Central American leaders moved in earnest to bring an end to the conflict and met in Costa del Sol, El Salvador on February 12-14, 1989 to come up with the Tesoro Beach Agreement. In exchange for the closing of rebel bases in Honduras within 90 days, Nicaragua agreed to hold elections in February of 1990 and to allow international monitors to oversee all stages of the elections.

Upon hearing the news of the agreement, the Bush administration pressured Honduras not to act on its provisions; undersecretary of state Robert Kimmitt was sent to Tegucigalpa in March to persuade Azcona not to disband rebel bases until

after the scheduled elections. The US felt that if Contra bases were disbanded before the elections, it would lose bargaining leverage should the outcome of the vote not be to its liking (Schultz and Schultz 1994: 252-256). In response, Honduras again dragged its feet as it announced that it would not evict Contra bases by force according to the 90 day deadline; instead, it advocated the “principle of simultaneity” by which disarmament and elections would be implemented together. Heartened by the announcement, Contra leaders lobbied governments in the region as well as the Bush administration to maintain its external bases. Rebel commanders clearly wanted to keep the military option open. In part, they feared that if they were forced out of their safe-havens in Honduras and the Sandinistas won (or stole) the upcoming elections, they would be vulnerable to attack.

The Tela Accord

Nicaragua moved quickly to signal its commitment to holding elections and securing peace. Sandinista leaders met with domestic (non-Contra) opposition groups to hammer out the terms of the February elections, which it was committed to hold. On August 4, a forty-point accord was struck with opposition leaders which included the repeal of national security legislation that restricted opposition activities, guidelines for the campaign, and specific election procedures. This agreement satisfied the main demands of the Central American governments. In response to this positive step by the Sandinistas, on August 7 Central American leaders, including President Azcona, signed the Tela Declaration, which reiterated the governments’

commitment to disband rebel bases on their territory and importantly, called on the United Nations to verify base closures, demobilization, and repatriation. Underscoring the significance of this agreement, President Ortega remarked that Nicaragua had been brought to the “gates of peace,” but that it would not, “let down its guard until the Contras are disbanded.”

Soon after, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was created by the Security Council on November 7, 1989 to oversee rebel disarmament; by December, UN officials were stationed in Honduras. The invitation of this monitoring mission to oversee the disarmament and repatriation process in Honduras was the decisive step towards peace and satisfied a key demand of the Sandinista government (Child 1992; Tinoco 1988: 74).

The invitation of UN peacekeepers accomplished two important tasks. First, it sent a strong signal that Honduras was now firmly committed to the peace process. Rebel hosts must themselves offer credible commitments that they will abide by demobilization agreements and the invitation of the UN was a costly signal to that effect. If the UN found that Honduras did not follow through on its disarmament promise, there would be substantial international and domestic audience costs for its insincerity. Secondly, the invitation of international monitors assuaged the Sandinista’s security fears. The Sandinistas were unable to verify Contra demobilization in Honduras themselves and reluctant, given past failures, to accept promises by Honduras that demobilization had taken place. Nicaragua was more willing to believe information supplied by a neutral observation team. Therefore,

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with Honduras now cooperating, Nicaragua would be willing to abide by its part of the deal.

The Contras were furious that they were not consulted in drafting the Tela Accord and refused to cooperate with the demobilization plan. Although they were to give up their weapons in advance of the elections, deadlines came and went without compliance by the insurgents. Although Contra activities had been restricted, Honduras argued that they lacked the means to disarm the rebels—several thousand strong—by force. Notwithstanding this failure, on February 25, 1990, Nicaragua held internationally-monitored elections in which Violeta Chamorro, the main opposition leader, won a victory over Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega. The result came as a surprise to those who feared that the elections would be marred by fraud. Pressure for rebel demobilization mounted after the Sandinistas were defeated at the polls; by now, even President Bush asked Contra leaders to stand down.

The End of the Contra War

On March 15, the UN demanded that rebels in Honduras be demobilized and repatriated immediately. Honduras was also eager to get rid of foreign fighters on its territory; however, while they lacked the will to disarm the Contras before, now they needed assistance with actually carrying out repatriation. As such, the Contras dragged their feet, claiming that they could not be certain that the Sandinistas would actually cede power by the scheduled April 25 transfer of government. These fears were exacerbated by Chamorro’s decision to retain General Humberto Ortega, the

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former defense minister, as army chief under the new government and allow Sandinistas to head the National Police force as a gesture of national reconciliation (Hartzell 2002: 368).

The UN, in consultation with Central American governments, decided to take more aggressive measures to gain compliance with the demobilization plan (Child 1992). On March 27, the Security Council authorized an armed mission to Nicaragua to assist in the demobilization and repatriation of the insurgents. This step provided the help that Honduras needed to go forward with repatriation. Venezuela sent the largest contingent to Honduras, including a paratrooper battalion. Pressured to leave Honduras, the Contras were no longer viable as a fighting force, now they could only negotiate the terms of their demobilization. Contra leaders met with the government-elect at Toncontín airport in Honduras where the rebels agreed to disarm before Chamorro’s inauguration in exchange for cash and land concessions. Disarmament proceeded slowly and the rebels had not fully disarmed by the time of the inauguration, but they were not actively fighting either. With their main demand—the removal of the Sandinista regime—having been met, the Contras gave up their armed struggle. The May 30, Managua Protocol on Disarmament between the Contras and the Nicaraguan government—now under Chamorro—was the final agreement between the state and the rebels. A few days later, in front of a gathering of Contra fighters, Chamorro declared an end to the war.108 By July, the vast majority of the Contras had returned to Nicaragua and turned in their weapons.

Not all demobilized Contras were satisfied with the deal. Many complained that the land that was promised as part of the demobilization pact was not handed

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over to them or was inadequate. Some ex-fighters, known as the re-Contrás, again took up arms against the state. Former Contra leaders including Commander Rubén (Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro García) and Commander Dimas (Tomás Laguna Rayo), led the charge and were able to rally a few hundred troops (Library of Congress Federal Research Division 1993). Again, much of the fighting took place in the border region near Quilalí, but the re-Contrás were unable to make significant military advances. The insecurity created by the re-Contrás was intensified in late 1991 by the formation of re-Compás, former Sandinista soldiers who also demanded agricultural plots. However, by 1992 the government regained control over the situation as it established military dominance over Nicaraguan territory and was able to buy off many insurgents with land and cash. Unlike the Contra rebels, the re-Contrás and re-Compás did not have the support of external hosts, and as such, they could not mount a successful military challenge to the state. Thus, this new uprising was short-lived and ended in defeat.

To conclude, governments in the region, particularly Costa Rica and Honduras, played key roles in the Nicaraguan peace process. Due to blockages by the Tegucigalpa group, the Contadora plan fell by the wayside. Peace negotiations could not move forward without the cooperation of rebel hosts. Costa Rica moved first to expel Contra fighters from their territory, and under the presidency of Oscar Arias, revived the peace process under the Esquipulas framework. Gaining the cooperation of Honduras proved to be a more difficult matter, however. Under pressure from the United States, and wanting to pursue its own agenda against its Sandinista rivals in Nicaragua, Honduras was reluctant to forbid rebel access to its territory. However, under growing domestic opposition to the war and fears that the
mood in the US was shifting, Honduran President Azcona finally decided that the military option was no longer in his country’s best interest. The costs of continued hosting had become too high and conciliatory gestures by the Sandinistas assuaged the sense of hostility between the two nations.

Importantly, it was only after their Honduran hosts signed Esquipulas that the Contras agreed to talk to the Nicaraguan government. Therefore, rebel hosts can play an important role in pressuring combatants to the bargaining table. Honduras’ invitation of a UN peacekeeping mission through the Tela Declaration was the final step that secured the peace. In allowing ONUCA the authority to monitor Contra demobilization, Honduras demonstrated that the rebels were no longer welcome; it used a costly mechanism to signal its commitment to peace; and it provided for the credible transmission of information about disarmament on its territory. Nicaragua was willing to believe these assurances that rebel demobilization was forthcoming. While the Contras were initially reluctant to comply and the actual process of demobilization was fraught with obstacles, they had no choice but to forgo military operations given their inability to fight the Nicaraguan government on its own turf. Therefore, the shift in Honduras can explain the timing of the peace in Nicaragua.

**Rwanda**

The civil conflicts in Rwanda exemplify the transnational aspects of war as they involved actors throughout the Great Lakes region. Tutsis and Hutus are scattered across various states in central Africa, refugee flows contributed to the spread of conflict, and rebels and governments frequently battled one another across national boundaries. The post-genocide government of Rwanda presents an extreme
case of a state that was willing to extensively penetrate a neighboring countries’
territory in order to remove the ruling regime and eliminate transnational rebel
groups. Although it bore considerable costs in doing so, Hutu rebels across the
border—some responsible for the 1994 genocide—presented a serious threat to
Rwandan Tutsis, providing a compelling reason for the intrusion. While Rwanda was
successful in ousting the Mobutu regime, which was complicit with Hutu rebels, it
was not able to remove the Kabila government or completely defeat TNRs in the
Congo. Therefore, despite sovereignty violations by Rwanda, the government faced
considerable difficulties defeating insurgents on foreign soil as compared with its
relative effectiveness on Rwandan territory. As will be seen, a peace agreement with
the Congo and the invitation of a UN force were required to debilitate the Hutu
militias. The DRC’s cooperation in counterinsurgency efforts following an
agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa dealt a critical blow to rebels hiding in the
Eastern Provinces. While it is still too early to declare the rebels completely defeated
(as of this writing), all signs indicate that they are defunct as a fighting force for now.

Background to the Conflict

Under Belgian rule, the Tutsi minority was favored over the Hutu majority in
their access to civil service positions and influence in the colonial government.
However, after independence in 1962, Hutus assumed control of the government
under President Grégoire Kayibanda, who brutally repressed the Tutsi minority—
accused of being agents of the Tutsi-dominated government in neighboring
Burundi—leading many to flee the country. Kayibanda ruled until 1973 when a
military coup removed him from power and installed Juvenal Habyarimana, also a
Hutu, as president. Yet conditions for Rwandan Tutsis did not improve much under
Habyarimana, and many left for neighboring countries, particularly Zaire, Uganda, and Burundi. The refugee presence in Uganda would become particularly important. Rwandan Tutsis in exile fought alongside Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Army in Uganda, contributing to the overthrow of Milton Obote. With a friendly regime in power in Uganda, Rwandan Tutsis formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the mid-1980’s to demand greater rights and bring down Habyarimana’s government.

The RPF began its attacks against Rwanda in 1990, but was initially unable to make major advances. However, in 1991, a successful attack on the border town of Ruhengeri demonstrated the strength of the RPF, whose ranks began to swell with new recruits. On the battlefield, the tide began to turn in the RPF’s favor. With the Habyarimana regime now under serious threat, the French provided significant military assistance to the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in order to prop up the government. Unable to advance any further, the RPF agreed to a cease-fire and formal talks with the government in Arusha, Tanzania. In 1993, the government and the RPF signed a power-sharing agreement to put an end to the conflict and hold multi-party elections. Yet the signing of the Arusha accords alienated hard-line elements in Habyarimana’s government, who were unwilling to relinquish power.

In a tragic turn of events, on April 6, 1994, Habyarimana was killed as his airplane was shot down; although official government reports blamed the rebels, RPF leader Paul Kagame denied the accusations. Hutu extremists seized this opportunity to undermine the Arusha accords. Using their access to the media, these extremists fomented fears among the civilian population that the RPF would soon invade the country once again (Gourevitch 1998; Uvin 1999). During the next three months the FAR along with popular militias armed with machetes—known as the
Interahamwe—went on a genocidal campaign to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus. United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, in a dramatic failure of international resolve, did little to quell the violence. The Rwandan genocide left an estimated 800,000 people dead; as UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan would comment ten years later, “an entire country was shattered.”

Alarmed at the slaughter, the RPF again went on the offensive. While the Interahamwe was conducting massacres, the FAR was crumbling against RPF advances. By July, the RPF had captured the capital, Kigali, and put an end to the genocide. Afraid of retaliation by the new government, thousands of Hutus fled Rwanda on a daily basis in one of the largest mass exoduses of the 20th Century. Hutu leaders encouraged this exodus, planning to launch an insurgency from across the border. Along with civilian refugees, thousands of members of the FAR and Interahamwe left the country, with the largest share going to Zaire. According to reports on the ground, these fighters kept large stockpiles of weapons, were allowed to remain in military uniform, and were welcomed by officials in Mobutu Sese Seko’s government.

As Figure 5.1 shows, just as Tutsi refugees began to re-enter Rwanda from Uganda and Burundi, Hutu refugees fled to Tanzania and Zaire en masse. By the end of 1994, there were over 1.2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire and more than 1 million in Tanzania. Humanitarian aid agencies were stretched thin as camp conditions quickly deteriorated and an outbreak of cholera left tens of thousands dead.

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Within these camps, members of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe began to regroup. As Sarah Kenyon Lischer (2005) explains, in contrast to Tanzania, which took great effort to preserve the civilian nature of the refugee encampments and disarm combatants, Mobutu’s government was neither willing nor able to neutralize Hutu militants in eastern Zaire. Mobutu’s sympathies were with the former government, not the Tutsi-led RPF. Furthermore, with the refugee camps being run by the very people who perpetrated the genocide, much of the humanitarian aid provided by international donors was diverted towards the militants. Security in the Zairian camps posed a constant problem. Refugees believed to be sympathetic to the RPF were frequently lynched.\textsuperscript{111} UN officials in Zaire warned that the militarization of the refugee camps could pose a serious threat to regional security; “we are sitting on a volcano,” said Shahyar Khan, the Secretary General’s representative in Rwanda, “we must separate the wolves from the sheep.”\textsuperscript{112}

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Figure 5.1. Rwandan Refugees in Neighboring States.
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

However, neither Zaire nor the international community took steps to disarm the ex-FAR and the militias, who were beginning to conduct cross-border raids against the new Rwandan government and attacks on local Zairian Tutsi (known as the Banyamulenge). News reports documented the training and supplying of roughly 40,000 fighters, including thousands near the town of Goma. Hutu militants soon began to conduct strikes across the border. In 1995 and 1996, the RPF-led state responded to rebel attacks with sporadic, limited forays against the refugee camps; however, as the new government was still taking shape, it was not prepared to take more extensive measures to root out the rebels. Thus, the former government and Interahamwe forces—perpetrators of the 1994 genocide—had become a well-armed and well-trained insurgent force.

Rwandan Intervention Against Mobutu

With the failure to pacify the refugee camps, violence continued in eastern Zaire as Mobutu actively supported the Hutu militants (International Crisis Group 2001). A series of attacks were launched against the Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsis) by ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces and local Hutus, who wished to bolster their position in North and South Kivu (provinces in eastern Zaire, along the Rwandan border). Mobutu viewed this as an opportunity to move against his political rivals in the east; Zairian Tutsis were opposed to Mobutu’s rule as they were denied citizenship rights by the state, which argued that they were not ‘indigenous’ to Zaire. In late 1996, Zaire moved to displace hundreds of thousands of Tutsis living in the Kivus (Curtis 2005; Isima 2005). Amnesty International reported that dozens of Banyamulenge were executed, ‘disappeared’, and arrested by Zairian security forces; in addition, thousands of Tutsi refugees fled the region. Rebel forces were also escalating their attacks against Rwanda from Zairian territory.

In response to these developments across the border, Rwanda decided to act. Its motives were first, to break the back of the insurgent forces, who were gaining strength and posed a serious threat to the regime; and second, to protect Zairian Tutsis from further persecution. However, these objectives were intertwined. The Banyamulenge in eastern Zaire were seen as key local allies in the fight to dislodge Hutu rebels from their bases; if the Mobutu/ex-FAR ethnic cleansing campaign against the Banyamulenge were to succeed, the rebels’ position would be

strengthened. Rwanda intervened by arming the Banyamulenge as early as October, 1996. Mobutu’s armed forces clashed with local rebels supported by Rwandan troops; by November, the Zairian town of Goma had fallen into rebel hands.\textsuperscript{116} Thus, the presence of Rwandan Hutu rebels—supported by the Mobutu government—led to a direct confrontation between Rwanda and the Banyamulenge versus the government of Zaire. However, Rwanda recognized that it would need more than the support of local Tutsis and enlisted Laurent Kabila—a member of the Luba tribe from the Katanga province—and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) to carry out the war. Rwanda wanted nothing less than the removal of Mobutu from power and the installation of a friendly regime, which it could count upon to uproot the ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces.

The ADFL quickly consolidated support in the east. The rebel force captured much of the interior of the country and prepared for a push on Kinshasa by May of 1997. Domestic and international support for Mobutu had also crumbled. Mobutu had been a key Cold-War ally of the West, but with the Soviet Union now dissolved, his international backers did not come to his defense. Moreover, due to his support of rebel movements across Africa, he had grown increasingly unpopular on the continent. Internally, decades of cronyism and underdevelopment in Zaire led many to openly support Kabila’s advance as a welcome relief from Mobutu’s rule. On May 17, 1997, only months after fighting erupted in the Kivus, the ADFL occupied Kinshasa and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Mobutu fled the country and died a few months later in Morocco of cancer.

During Kabila’s push towards the capital, Rwandan troops and their local allies in the east seized upon the opportunity to move against Hutu rebels in the Kivus. Most of the Rwandan refugees were moved to the Mugunga refugee camp near Goma by Hutu leaders; the ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces were accused of using these civilian refugees as human shields. Days of relentless attacks by Rwandan forces and local militias against Mugunga succeeded in cutting off international aid to the camp and dispersing the rebels. By November 15, 1996, the major camps had been cleared and an estimated 700,000 Rwandan refugees were repatriated in one of the largest reverse-migrations in recent history.117 A few months later, refugees at the Tingi-Tingi camp were similarly assaulted. Reports from the field alleged that in the confusion, thousands of innocent refugees had been slaughtered. In addition, the rebels were in disarray, at least temporarily.

Rwanda’s action in Zaire/DRC is one of the rare examples in which a government fighting a transnational rebel group was willing to go beyond the occasional cross-border strike and undertake extensive military operations on another state’s territory. As was argued previously, international borders are not inviolable, but rather, states face considerable costs in pursuing TNRs across the frontier. These costs include a conflict with the neighboring state, governance costs for holding neighboring territory, and international censure. In the Rwandan case, the Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide presented an existential threat to the government, and indeed, to Rwandan Tustis as a whole; therefore, the state was willing to bear considerable costs for defeating the rebels. Importantly, Rwanda sought to mitigate these costs by acting through local proxies: the Banyamulenge and the ADFL. These

forces had better knowledge of the terrain and native population, and they would be instrumental in confronting Mobutu’s forces and moving against Rwandan Hutus in the east. The Rwandan military role in the Congo was to be temporary. After the installation of a friendly regime, Kabila would govern the territory, freeing Rwanda of significant governance costs. Finally, international condemnation of the sovereignty violation was muted because the international community viewed the pursuit of the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide as legitimate and had come to view Mobutu with disdain.

Yet despite the Kabila takeover in May and the dispersal of the refugees, Rwanda’s rebel problem had not been solved. While many rebel fighters were killed, others simply dispersed into the Congo’s dense forests or fled to Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Zambia, and elsewhere (International Crisis Group 2001). Soon after the ouster of Mobutu, ex-FAR officers, including Col. Habimana, Col. Hakizimana, Col. Mugemanyi, and Col. Nkundiye formed a new insurgent group, the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR). According to a report by the International Crisis Group, there remained approximately 15,000 Rwandan rebels in Kivu province, despite the removal of Mobutu and the destruction of the refugee camps (International Crisis Group 1998b). Rwanda had wagered that Kabila would use the new Congolese armed forces to oust these fighters and destroy the insurgency, but this was a gamble that Kigali ultimately lost. Soon, Kabila would turn his back on his former patron and lend his support to the ALiR.
Rwanda versus Kabila

Initially, Kabila included many Tutsis in his administration and in the Congolese armed forces. However, he faced intense criticism that he was too reliant on foreign support and moved against the Banyamulenge and Rwandan elements in the military (Curtis 2005; International Crisis Group 1998a; Scherrer 2002 ch. 10). In July of 1998, over 10,000 Rwandans and Banyamulenge were expelled from the armed forces. In response, within days a new rebel movement, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) emerged in the east as the Banyamulenge again felt marginalized. Rwanda backed this uprising against its former protégé as Kabila had failed to move against ALiR forces, and the expulsion of Tutsis from the military confirmed Rwandan suspicion that Kabila would not be a reliable partner. Uganda also joined in to support the RCD, as the guerrillas of the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan rebel outfit, held bases in the Congo as well.

Rwanda hoped that it could repeat its swift success against the Mobutu regime. It would use the RCD as cover to both unseat Kabila and move against the ALiR forces, who were gaining strength. Kabila quickly formed an alliance with the Rwandan Hutus to prevent the RCD advance (International Crisis Group 2001, 2003). Additionally, unlike Mobutu, Kabila had important international allies who came to his defense. While the RCD, Rwanda, and Uganda were advancing west, Angola and Zimbabwe sent forces to prop up the government. Soon, at least seven foreign governments had troops in the Congo. Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were backing Kabila while Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda backed rebel forces. Africa was experiencing a continental war, which would become one of the bloodiest ever fought. One report claims that some 4 million people died over the course of the war.
in the Congo as a direct result of the fighting as well as preventable causes such as malnutrition and disease.\textsuperscript{118}

This time, Rwanda’s intervention in the Congo became an extremely costly endeavor. Rather than a quick victory, Rwanda was faced with a devastating war. Instead of re-building institutions and focusing on economic development, health, and education, government resources were stretched thin by the engagement in the Congo. The Rwandan government also became alienated on the continent. The war against Kabila and his foreign supporters distanced Rwanda from other African governments. Moreover, Rwanda and Uganda, erstwhile allies—for unclear reasons—fell into disagreement about the conduct of the war and came to blows against one another.\textsuperscript{119} The RCD split into two factions, one supported by Rwanda, the other by Uganda, and these factions frequently fought one another rather than the central government. With this divided opposition, the goal of unseating the government in Kinshasa became distant.

The wider international community also condemned Rwanda for its violation of Congolese sovereignty. Security Council resolution 1234 of April 9, 1999, was the first in a series of resolutions to demand respect for “the territorial integrity, political independence, and national sovereignty” of the DRC and call for the “withdrawal of all foreign forces.”\textsuperscript{120} Progress in fighting ALiR forces was also mixed. While Rwanda was able to prevent a large-scale attack by Hutu rebels on its own territory, ALiR remained quite formidable. The rebels maintained 10-15,000 men north Kivu

\textsuperscript{118} “3.9 Million Dead From War in Democratic Republic of Congo: the Lancet.” \textit{Agence France Press} January 6, 2006.


\textsuperscript{120} UN Security Council Resolution 1234, April 9, 1999. Full text is available online: http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm. Also see resolutions 1258, 1273, 1279, 1291, 1304, 1316, 1323, 1332, 1341, 1355, 1376, 1399, 1417, 1445, 1457, 1468, 1489, 1493, 1501.
and across Congolese territory, and many rebel leaders were sheltered in Kinshasa (International Crisis Group 2003). Rwanda’s lack of knowledge of the local population and terrain hurt its counterinsurgency efforts. As President Paul Kagame would later recount in an interview, one of the primary difficulties in defeating Hutu rebels, “…is a geographical question. It is a question of the terrain, the expanse of the Congo. You wouldn’t easily round up such forces in that whole expanse of the Congo and forces that are being supported by Kabila.”

The balance sheet suggested that Rwanda could not sustain military operations in its neighbor for long and that its objectives could not be met through force alone. The costs to the Rwandan government, including conflict with the DRC and other African states, international censure, and direct costs borne through military occupation, outweighed the benefits of pursuing ALiR forces in the DRC. Although the Rwandan armed forces controlled their own territory, combating the rebels on foreign soil—particularly the vast area of the Congo—proved to be exceptionally challenging.

Beginning the Peace Process between Rwanda and the DRC

After a series of failed negotiations, the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia met in Lusaka, Zambia to sign a cease-fire on July 10, 1999. The provisions of the Lusaka Agreement included an immediate end to hostilities; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) consisting of representatives from each state to monitor the cease-fire; the disarmament of the militias; the withdrawal of foreign troops; and a request for a UN mission to enforce

compliance. The UN force was asked by the parties to investigate cease-fire violations, collect weapons, and disarm fighters by force if necessary. In response, the UN Security Council created the UN Organization Mission in Congo (MONUC) on November 30. MONUC’s mandate focused on five key elements: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (these are collectively referred to as DDRRR). However, the Security Council refused to authorize a robust Chapter 7 peace-enforcement mission which could go after armed factions by force, insisting that disarmament would be entirely voluntary (Alusala 2004).

The Lusaka cease-fire was flawed from the beginning and little real progress towards peace was made. Several obstacles to peace became apparent. The RCD reluctantly signed the agreement in August, but divisions within the rebel group forestalled the implementation of Lusaka’s terms. Moreover, the Joint Military Commission was dysfunctional as it failed to meet regularly as planned; it was, after all, comprised of representatives of the belligerent parties rather than neutral observers. Finally, without Chapter 7 authorization to go after the militias by force and delays in sending peacekeepers, MONUC was essentially toothless. Thus, flouting the Lusaka agreement, Kabila continued to supply Hutu militias and Rwanda maintained its forces in the eastern Congo. In August of 2000, the DRC declared that it would no longer honor the Lusaka accord, but a few days later suggested that the agreement needed to be revised rather than scrapped. This signaled a wavering commitment to peace. Also in 2000, a new Rwandan Hutu rebel movement emerged

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with the backing of Kabila calling itself the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

Then, unexpectedly, Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by one of his bodyguards in January of 2001. After an initial period of confusion, his son Joseph Kabila assumed control of the government. Joseph Kabila was relatively unknown and, unlike his father, had not earned the enmity of the Rwandan government. The new president addressed the UN Security Council in February and pledged his commitment to peace, although he continued to insist that foreign forces be withdrawn. President Paul Kagame recognized that Joseph Kabila appeared to be more cooperative. In response to the succession in the DRC, Kagame remarked, “the opportunity [for peace] is available and it’s not going to be there forever.” The two governments began talking once again.

Among this confusion, Hutu rebels continued to plot against the government. The ALiR had approximately 12,000 men stationed in North Kivu and around the Kahuzi Biega forest. The FDLR had between 7,000 and 8,000 fighters spread across the east (International Crisis Group 2003). These forces continued to recruit among Rwandan refugees; yet, many of the new recruits were far too young to be implicated in the 1994 genocide. In September of 2000, ALiR was formally dissolved and integrated within the FDLR command structure (International Crisis Group 2003).

In May and June of 2001, with renewed vigor, a series of large-scale attacks were launched by the FDLR. These incursions were referred to as Operation Oracle du Seigneur (Operation Lord’s Oracle) and were perhaps the best-coordinated

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assaults on Rwanda. Kabila was accused of continuing his father’s policy of support for Hutu rebels. Yet, the rebels suffered a major defeat in Operation Oracle du Seigneur as they could not establish a presence within Rwandan territory, and lost around 4,000 men (International Crisis Group 2003, 2001). The FDLR retreated to their bases in the DRC. The government in Kigali had established military superiority over Rwandan soil—the rebels were unable to contest the state’s power at home and were reliant upon external bases for their viability. Despite the continued Rwandan army presence on Congolese soil, the FDLR was relatively safe; on unfamiliar territory, the Rwandan government could not root out the rebels. It is also worth noting that the rebels attempted to establish a presence in Burundi, but with the cooperation of the Burundian government, its bases there were destroyed (International Crisis Group 2001: 8). Therefore, presence in the DRC was critical for the insurgents.

The Pretoria Agreement

After years of fighting, the DRC and Rwanda decided that they had had enough; the costs of conflict were high and little progress was being made. A stalemate had been reached: Rwanda could not topple the government in Kinshasa with the help the RCD and the FDLR had been unsuccessful in their military operations. Moreover, the FDLR bases in the DRC remained in tact. In addition, the conflict took a heavy toll on both countries’ economy, military, and international image. After the failure of Lusaka, renewed peace talks began between the

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governments. The demands were clear: Rwanda was to leave Congolese territory in exchange for Congo’s firm commitment to evict Hutu rebels. According to President Kagame, “The disarmament and repatriation of Interahamwe based in Congo is still the most important problem.”

South Africa took the lead in mediation efforts and on July 30, 2002, Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Agreement. Congolese President Kabila made conciliatory public statements, indicating that he was prepared to follow through with the agreement. Referring to the removal of Hutu rebels, he commented, “Where force will be needed, force will be used…”

Kagame clearly saw the Pretoria agreement as an important step towards defeating the rebel force and ending the conflict. Nearly eight years of Rwandan presence in the DRC had failed to rout the insurgents and this agreement provided new hope for putting an end to the rebellion. In his public appearances surrounding Pretoria, Kagame made it clear that he viewed foreign bases as the key obstacle to peace in the region. In an interview, he commented that, “…we must, first of all, make sure that these people [ex-FAR and Interahamwe] do not get support from anywhere and, if we do that, based on the political will, it is possible to deal with the problem.” He added that, “These people represent a threat to our country. They pose a problem in and outside Rwanda.”

The RCD echoed Kagame’s concern over foreign fighters. Joseph Mudumbi, an RCD official in charge of foreign relations, stated, “we ask that Kinshasa proceeds with the immediate arrest of the Interahamwe

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130 Ibid.
leaders and ex-FAR.”\textsuperscript{131} Clearly, then, foreign bases were seen as a chief impediment to counterinsurgency efforts.

Specifically, the Pretoria Accord created a timetable for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the disarmament of Hutu rebels. It also set up the Third-Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM), which was made up of MONUC and South African representatives to verify compliance. This was an important step. As opposed to the JVM, which was comprised of the belligerents themselves, the TPVM would provide neutral information regarding treaty compliance. This gave Rwanda a credible source of information about rebel demobilization, assuaging its fears about compliance with the plan. It was more willing to believe information revealed by these sources than the DRC’s own promises.

Acting in accordance with its treaty obligations, on September 24, the Congolese government officially banned all FDLR activities and expelled its leaders based in Kinshasa (International Crisis Group 2003), stating that, “…Rwandan ex-fighters operating within the FDLR on Democratic Republic of Congo soil are strictly and totally banned from henceforth… and the leaders here are declared persona non grata and invited to leave the territory within 72 hours.”\textsuperscript{132} International pressure on the DRC helped in obtaining such a statement as the United States had explicitly called for the measure. Several prominent rebel leaders were arrested and sent to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to face genocide charges, signaling the DRC’s commitment to following through with the plan.

The Pretoria agreement, public declarations repudiating the FDLR, the creation of the TPVM, and the arrests of rebel leaders were credible signals to Rwanda that the DRC would no longer support rebel organizations on its territory. To reciprocate the DRC’s demonstration of goodwill, Rwanda recalled all of its troops from Congolese territory by October of 2002. In doing, Rwanda entrusted Congo to deal with the FDLR, which, although seriously weakened, had approximately 15,000-22,000 men and many more potential recruits in the refugee camps (International Crisis Group 2003: 8).

Eviction

Now, the DRC faced the difficult task of following through with the DDRRRR plan. MONUC still insisted that it could not move against rebel strongholds with force, stating that it would only help demobilize and repatriate those volunteering to do so. On October 31 Congolese troops launched a major assault on an FDLR camp at Kamina. However, this operation was regarded as a disaster as hundreds of rebels fled the scene without capture and several civilians were killed (International Crisis Group 2003). Only a handful of militants at Kamina were eventually repatriated. On one hand, these actions against the FDLR demonstrated Congo’s sincerity in expelling foreign rebels; on the other hand, its limited success in doing so demonstrated its poor capacity to act. While Congo signaled its willingness to move against the FDLR, it had little ability to do so without considerable assistance.

Responding to this need and calls from parties on the ground to take more significant action, the UN Security Council decided to strengthen Kabila’s hand and play a much more active role in the disarmament process. Security Council Resolution 1493 of July 28, 2003 authorized MONUC to engage in Chapter 7 peace-
enforcement operations; the UN could now go after the militias with force (Boshoff 2004). The FDLR fully understood that its bases in the Congo were vulnerable. In early 2004, desperate to turn the tide of the insurgency, the rebels mounted a series of raids against Rwanda, hoping to provoke a broader domestic insurgency and be able to re-enter the country. If the rebels were no longer welcome in the DRC, they had to find a foothold within Rwanda itself. However, this offensive, termed Operation La Fronde (Operation Slingshot), did not succeed in its task and the FDLR was forced to retreat back across the border once again (International Crisis Group 2005).

Soon afterwards, responding to Rwandan pressure for greater action against the rebels, the DRC attacked FDLR positions in late April, killing several dozen. However, progress against the Hutu rebels was halted in May, when a group of Congolese soldiers mutinied against the government, and eventually captured the town of Bukavu. Rifts within the Congo’s military, which had just been re-organized after a peace deal with the RCD prevented unified action and diverted attention away from policing foreign fighters. Again, the DRC’s weakness was evident.

In response to this growing insecurity, MONUC’s forces were raised to over 16,000. Yet despite Chapter 7 authorization, MONUC stalled in taking decisive action in meeting the DDRRR objectives and became embroiled in a series of corruption and abuse scandals. In its impatience, in late 2004, Rwanda hinted that it may re-invade eastern Congo to attack the remaining FDLR fighters, and there were

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reports of Rwandan troops sighted on the Congolese side of the border. Relations between the neighbors were again tense as the prospect of a renewed invasion mounted. However, this option was obviated by more robust UN action. In early 2005, after the killing of several peacekeepers drew international attention to the continuing conflict in the east, the UN finally took the offensive against the various local and foreign militias based in the DRC. Several assaults were conducted on FDLR positions. In a parallel development, the African Union—wanting to take a more visible role—began to seriously consider sending an armed force to the Congo to help disarm the FDLR (International Crisis Group 2005).

FDLR commanders acknowledged that after ten years of failed attempts to mount an effective challenge against the Rwandan government and Congolese/international efforts to disarm them, they had to give up the armed struggle. Rebel leaders met with representatives from the DRC in Rome and on March 31, 2005 officially declared that they “vow to abandon armed struggle and turn to a political process.” The movement also condemned the 1994 genocide and called for the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. In return for forsaking armed conflict, the FDLR insisted that it be recognized as a legitimate political party, a demand that Rwanda flatly rejected (International Crisis Group 2005). Despite the Rome declaration, little progress was made. FDLR fighters on the ground were reluctant to give up their arms and feared reprisals and criminal charges should they

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In the meantime, alongside Congolese troops, MONUC’s forces in the east were directly engaging rebel forces.\footnote{138}{Lacey, Marc. “After failures, UN Peacekeepers get Tough.” International Herald Tribune. May 24, 2005. Page 2.} In July, MONUC destroyed several FDLR camps located in South Kivu and surrounding regions.\footnote{139}{“UN Destroys Six Rwandan Rebel Camps in DR Congo.” Agence France Presse. July 15, 2005.} Then, on August 25, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda issued a joint statement setting a September 30 deadline for the FDLR’s disarmament; rebel leaders protested the ultimatum and insisted upon negotiations with Kigali as well as security guarantees upon repatriation.\footnote{140}{“Rwandan Hutu Rebels in Eastern Congo Given One-month Disarmament Deadline.” Agence France Presse. August 25, 2005.}

The rebels were thoroughly marginalized and no longer militarily viable— their former Congolese allies, the African Union, and the UN urged their disbanding. Yet, the September deadline came and went without significant action by the FDLR. Then, MONUC and Congolese forces followed through on their threat to move against the rebels by force. In October, some 2,000 troops from the DRC backed by 500 UN troops and attack helicopters moved into Virunga national park to clear out rebels hiding there.\footnote{141}{BBC News. “Rebels Targeted in DR Congo Park.” BBC Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4393836.stm Access date: February 11, 2006.} In December, 10 rebels were killed as the UN/DRC force captured several villages the FDLR had occupied.\footnote{142}{Agence France Presse. “Ten Rwandan Rebels Killed in Clashes with Congolese Military.” December 12, 2005.} A few days later, on December 16, a rebel leader, Seraphin Bizimungu, gave himself up along with 85 fighters,
declaring “The time for war is over, the time for cohabitation and peace in the Great Lakes region has come.”143 The rebel force was slowly eroding.

In early 2006, clashes between DRC/MONUC forces and the FDLR continued, but these demonstrated the rebel’s lack of organization as they were hardly able to put up a fight. Kagame viewed the developments in the Congo and relations with Kinshasa positively. In May, 2006, he remarked, “We believe that the government of [DR]Congo at the moment is not supporting the FDLR or the Interahamwe in any way... Let it be clear that we don't consider [DR]Congo as supporters of militias anymore.”144 Although it is still too early to declare the FDLR to be completely defunct, it is certainly no longer a major threat to the Rwandan government. With broad regional cooperation and an international peacekeeping force, the rebels have lost access to their external bases in the Congo and are now fighting for their survival rather than any political objectives they once espoused.

In sum, the conflict in Rwanda and the spillover into Zaire/Congo blurs the distinction between civil and international war. Hutu refugees who fled across the border into the Congo led the Rwandan government to act first against the Mobutu government and then against Kabila. In dealing with transnational rebels, Rwanda presents one of the few cases in which a state was willing to extensively penetrate a neighboring country’s territory in order to fight the opposition. But whereas it was successful in removing the Mobutu government, the conflict against Kabila proved to be more difficult; moreover, in neither instance were the Hutu rebels defeated outright. The Rwandan government had established military dominance over its own

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territory but faced considerable obstacles in attempting to fight the rebels on foreign soil.

Because Rwanda could not eliminate the rebel threat in the DRC by itself, in 1999 it opted for peace with the Congo and a regional agreement that promised to end rebel access to external territory. However, Laurent Kabila proved to be unwilling to follow through with the Lusaka Accords and disarm the rebels; he could not provide credible commitments that the DRC would evict the Hutu rebels. After his son succeeded him, progress on disarming the rebels was again slow. Yet after signing the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, the DRC demonstrated its commitment to disarm the rebels; so much so that Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops. The invitation of the Third Party Verification Mechanism, cooperation with MONUC, and costly offensives against Hutu rebels sent credible signals that the Congo was no longer willing to harbor militants. However, early actions to disarm FDLR forces demonstrated the DRC’s lack of capability to act despite demonstrating its resolve. The transformation of MONUC into a more robust peace-enforcement mission greatly enhanced the ability to move against the FDLR and joint DRC/MONUC operations left the insurgents marginalized. Thus, the rebel threat against the Rwandan government largely came to an end after Congo agreed to cooperate with Rwanda and work with UN forces.

**Evaluating the Cases**

Both Nicaragua and Rwanda demonstrate the importance of extraterritorial bases for the prolongation of conflict and the necessity for broad regional cooperation in bringing about an end to transnational rebellions. In the Nicaraguan case, the
rebels and the government came to the bargaining table only after rebel hosts pressured them to do so and provided substantial guarantees that demobilization would take place. Actors were unable to come to a bargained solution in the absence of promises from rebel host states that their territory would be off-limits to rebels. In Rwanda, a peace agreement with the DRC paved the way for forceful actions against Hutu rebels, which seriously debilitated their fighting capabilities. While these conflicts raged on for years without resolution, they were terminated after significant cooperation by rebel host states.

Theories that focus on military capabilities and battle-field outcomes fall short in explaining the resolution of these conflicts. In Nicaragua and Rwanda, governments were able to prevent rebels from establishing a lasting presence on their own soil, thus displaying their military dominance at home. However, rebels across the border were difficult to overcome; this was also the shown to be the case in Rwanda/DRC, despite extensive sovereignty violations. The military balance between government and rebels alone cannot explain why these conflicts endured for as long as they did or why they ended at a particular point in time. Rather, the provision of sanctuary by rebel host states—not the insurgents’ own resources—determined the viability of the opposition. The removal of sanctuary and actions by host states precipitated conflict termination in both cases.

Theories that focus on credible commitment problems do a better job explaining the resolution of conflict for cases of negotiated settlements, but they are incomplete. These theories focus on rebel-government interactions and overlook the importance of regional hosts. The theory of transnational rebellion builds upon this framework by adding that rebel host states must provide credible promises of their own that foreign combatants on their territory are not welcome now or in the future.
In the Nicaragua case, accords between Central American governments pressured the Contras to the bargaining table and assured the Sandinistas that there would be compliance with demobilization plans. Agreements struck between states in the region were vital to securing an agreement between the parties to the conflict themselves.

In both Nicaragua and Rwanda, the intervention of the United Nations was important for fostering peace. This complements and extends the theory of third party intervention. While Walter argues that third parties are needed to enforce the peace and prevent retribution by providing security guarantees, the evidence from Nicaragua and Rwanda suggests additional roles for interveners. First, the invitation of external peacekeepers provided a costly signal on the part of rebel hosts that they were serious about rebel demobilization. Honduras and the Congo faced difficulties in credibly promising to disband rebel units on their territory; allowing access to UN missions demonstrated their resolve to do so. Second, external actors served as a reliable information transmission mechanism. Target governments were reluctant to believe host country promises that rebel demobilization and disarmament were taking place and had little ability to monitor compliance on their own; independent monitors provided a more reliable verification process that assuaged these fears. Third, peacekeepers helped to improve the capacity of host states to evict foreign rebels. Particularly in the Congo case, but also in Honduras, the state faced considerable obstacles in following through with threats to disarm rebels on their soil. While the need for forceful disarmament was averted in Honduras by the voluntary repatriation of Contra fighters, MONUC troops played an important role helping the Congolese government to uproot Rwandan rebels. Additionally, MONUC was not tasked with implementing a peace agreement and providing security guarantees for parties that
were otherwise willing to strike a deal, but with the forceful disarmament of a rebel organization.

These case narratives also illustrated several additional aspects of the theory of transnational rebellion that were difficult to test through statistical analysis. Rwandan and Nicaraguan rebels were largely unable to contest the strength of their respective states on their own territory. Therefore, the rebels found host states where they could shield themselves from government attacks, thereby causing conflicts to endure for longer than they would have otherwise. In both cases, the presence of transnational rebels across the border brought rebel host and target countries into conflict with one another. While Nicaragua was not willing to challenge rebel hosts with significant force, tensions in Central America certainly escalated. Rwanda was more willing to bear the burden of intruding on Congolese territory, but also acted through local proxies to mitigate some of these costs. Nonetheless, while establishing military dominance on its own soil, Rwanda could not successfully defeat rebel forces on external territory. Finally, a peace agreement in Nicaragua and the defeat of Rwandan rebels was facilitated by state-to-state negotiations rather than rebel-government interactions alone.

While it is difficult to make broad generalizations from two cases, the evidence presented in this chapter is suggestive of broader patterns. Cooperation between India and Bhutan has helped in combating Assamese rebels from northeast India. Sudan and Uganda have at times cooperated to prevent access to one another’s rebels. The civil conflict in Zimbabwe was brought to a successful resolution after rebel host states, particularly Zambia and Mozambique, cooperated in promoting a negotiated settlement. A more thorough examination of additional cases is likely to
provide further insights into conflict resolution processes when rebels are organized transnationally.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This chapter offers concluding comments on this dissertation as a whole. First, the unique contribution of this dissertation to the study of civil war and political science more generally will be discussed. Second, the empirical results will be recapitulated, pointing to the major findings. Then, the theoretical implications of this research will be explored and directions for further research will be developed. Finally, a few remarks on policy implications will be offered.

What’s New Here?

This dissertation challenges the conventional thinking in international and comparative politics that states and the societies they govern exist in a neat, hierarchic, and geographically congruent relationship with one another. The introduction asked: why do people ever rebel against the state? Related to this first question, why does the state sometimes fail to maintain order over its territory and among its citizenry? While enjoying a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and specializing in the use of organized coercion, states should have a clear advantage over potential rebels and be able to deter dissent, at least according to the traditional view. This is the *sine qua non* of modern nation-states, the ability to enforce compliance and maintain domestic peace.

Conventional analyses in the political opportunity framework are correct in looking for weaknesses in the state’s ability to repress insurgencies. These theories point out that even if the motive for opposing the ruling regime exists within society, challengers need to be able to evade state strength in order to mobilize an effective opposition. However, scholars in this tradition have failed to consider territoriality as
a fundamental constraint on state power. As Max Weber observed, states rule over a given territory, their ability to use force is largely confined to a particular geographic area. Thus, part of the answer to the questions posed here lies in understanding the implications of territoriality.

By taking a more fluid view of state-society relationships, this dissertation is able to uncover an important mechanism leading to several civil conflicts: the ability of opposition groups to organize transnationally. Borders are fundamental institutions in international politics as they define zones of political authority. The state’s strength is confined by its national boundaries. Opposition groups are not so geographically constrained. When opportunities to mobilize rebel organizations outside of the state’s domain exist, particularly in neighboring territories, rebellions are more likely to emerge and endure. International migration and identity bonds between states and their expatriates problematize conventional analyses that treat “domestic” politics as stopping at the border. Rebel organizations exploit this territorial constraint on the Leviathan by finding external sanctuaries and mobilizing among the diaspora. The research presented here has found that empirically, over half of all modern rebel organizations have used territory outside of their target state in conducting their operations. Therefore, focusing exclusively on domestic factors overlooks an important opportunity for mobilization.

Yet, opportunities to mobilize a rebellion do not lead to conflict in and of themselves. Rebels must be able to evade state power and garner sufficient resources so as to threaten the state—this is the contribution of opportunity theory—but armed conflict can be averted through some bargained solution. Thus, this dissertation integrates the political opportunity framework with bargaining theory. While finding openings to mobilize abroad, TNRs complicate bargaining situations because states
frequently lack the capacity to monitor rebel capabilities in other countries. TNRs have an incentive to overstate their strength in order to win greater concessions and, because states do not enjoy the (relatively) dense informational environment that exists at home, it is difficult to come up with a settlement suitable to both parties. States are faced with uncertainty in knowing how much to concede in order to avert a violent confrontation. In addition, even if a suitable deal can be found, rebels must credibly commit to disarm and demobilize their fighters. Again, informational difficulties complicate this important step. It is difficult for states to monitor and verify compliance with rebel disarmament in other countries because the informational environment is more opaque and because there is little assurance that external sanctuaries will not be utilized in the future.

Most studies of civil conflict focus on rebel-government interactions alone. In investigating TNR groups, this dissertation has introduced another important actor to the study of civil war: rebel host states. In doing so, sharp distinctions between domestic and international politics are blurred. Neighboring countries serve as both a geographic location where TNRs can mobilize and as separate actors with their own preferences and agendas. Rebels find access to neighboring territory when the host state is either unwilling or unable to prevent them from establishing extraterritorial bases. When neighboring countries value a rebel victory over the current regime, they are likely to host TNRs. When neighboring countries face high costs for expelling rebels, their territory is also likely to be utilized by TNRs. Whether neighbors tacitly or explicitly host foreign fighters, states are likely to be drawn into conflict with one another over the issue of insurgent access. Most studies of international war, while focusing on bilateral distributional concerns, have failed to appreciate these linkages between international and domestic conflict. Foreign
support for insurgencies is an important and under-studied source of international disputes.

Moreover, rebel host states can play an important role in conflict resolution efforts. Again, by introducing another actor to the study of civil war, this dissertation improves upon our understanding of civil conflict beyond that which can be offered by dyadic theories. Given shifts in rebel hosts’ relationship with the target state and/or their ability to evict foreign rebels they can assist in conflict termination. Rebel hosts can remove the opportunity to utilize external territory as well as improve the prospects for successful bargaining by evicting rebels, pressuring combatants to negotiate, and/or facilitating credible commitments to demobilize. Thus, they can affect both the opportunity and the bargaining sides of the ledger. Yet, they must provide credible assurances of their own that their territory will be inaccessible to rebels.

**Findings**

This empirical research presented in this dissertation offers three major findings. First, conditions in neighboring countries and the presence of extraterritorial bases significantly raise the likelihood of conflict onset and continuation. This was the focus of Chapter 3. Three conditions in particular were explored: weak neighboring states, rival neighboring states, and refugees in neighbors. In addition, the importance of refugee location—whether refugees were located in weak and/or rival states—was analyzed. Finally, the prospects of ethnic rebellion were explored to determine if ethnic groups with access to international borders are more likely to rise up against the state.

145 These were treated exogenously in Chapter 5, but suggest an important direction for future research.
One operationalization of weak neighbors—a civil war in a contiguous country—was a robust predictor of conflict onset. This regional clustering of civil wars has fostered a great deal of research as has the importance of ‘failed states’ as havens for violent organizations (Dorff 2005; Gleditsch 2002; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). However, scholars have failed to integrate these theoretical concepts and empirical findings in a useful manner. This dissertation proposes one possible solution: conflicts tend to cluster because failed neighbors invite TNRs to challenge the state.

Neighboring state rivals were also found to have an effect on the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. While the statistical relationships were somewhat weaker for this variable, there is support for the hypothesis that rival neighbors are associated with internal wars. Moreover, refugees in neighbors were found to significantly prolong armed conflicts. This is especially true if refugees are located in rival states, although their independent effect is strong as well. Therefore, the effects of rivalry and refugees are especially pronounced in cases where they coincide. Rival neighbors often manipulate refugee communities to encourage armed insurrection against their foreign opponents.

One of the most important results presented in Chapter 3 is that extraterritorial bases significantly prolong armed conflicts. Although it was not possible to observe the existence of external bases in the absence of conflict, once fighting began it was found that such bases significantly increase the duration of war. This was perhaps the most direct application of the theory. Finally, shifting the unit of analysis to ethnic groups, it was demonstrated that ethnic groups located near international boundaries are more likely to rebel than others. Ethnic groups that can easily slip across the
border—even when controlling for the presence of kin in neighboring states—are more likely to take up arms.

The second major finding in this dissertation is that external bases and foreign support for rebel organizations significantly increase the probability of an international conflict between rebel host and home countries. This was the focus of Chapter 4. Using a variety of datasets and estimation techniques, the relationship between foreign sanctuaries and interstate disputes was found to be robust and substantively important. Foreign support for rebel groups—particularly access to territory—is a significant predictor of international war and one that has not been fully appreciated by IR scholars. However, the relationship between internal and international conflict is not likely to be a simple, unidirectional one. States may encourage TNRs to establish bases on their soil in order to undermine their rivals and the presence of these bases will exacerbate rivalries. This complex relationship is left for future empirical research, although the results presented here are quite suggestive.

Finally, using case studies, Chapter 5 demonstrated that countries in the region can play an important role in bringing about an end to armed conflict. While access to foreign soil makes conflicts more likely to endure, neighboring countries sometimes agree to pressure rebel organizations off of their territory. In the Rwandan case, Hutu rebels hiding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo greatly benefited from the patronage of Mobutu, and later, Kabila. Even with substantial violations of Congolese sovereignty, Rwanda was not able to defeat this rebel force. After the signing of a regional peace accord and forceful actions to evict TNRs, open armed conflict was abated. Neighboring states can also facilitate peace settlements between states and opposition groups. Peace agreements among Central American governments limited the ability of the Nicaraguan Contras to use neighboring
territory in their fight against the Sandinistas. This pressured the Contras to negotiate with Nicaragua in earnest. Moreover, credible promises by Honduras and Costa Rica that their territory would be off-limits to foreign fighters and that rebel disarmament was forthcoming assuaged Nicaraguan fears about reneging. Therefore, the termination of conflict (when TNRs are present) is not the simple product of rebel-government interactions alone, but critically depend on the cooperation of states in the region.

When taken as a whole these findings yield a complex and nuanced picture of the international dimensions of internal conflict. Civil conflicts are affected by relationships with other states, diaspora support, and the availability of neighboring territory. Internal conflicts frequently lead to international disputes when extraterritorial bases exist. Conflicts become multi-actor bargains between opposition groups, target states, and host governments. These findings shatter neat, clean distinctions between domestic and international politics and suggest ways in which conflicts between and within states intersect and overlap.

**Theoretical Implications**

The theoretical framework and research presented here has two major implications for political science. First, this dissertation contributes to the study of civil war and political violence. It advances our knowledge of violent conflict and will be of interest to those studying international and internal wars. Second, this dissertation has broader implications for the theory of the state and state-society relationships. This second contribution is a significant departure from standard thinking in international relations and comparative politics, which treats domestic and
international politics as separate fields of inquiry. These issues and directions for future research are discussed below.

Implications for Conflict Studies

To begin with, transnational rebels are not a new phenomenon, but a thorough discussion of the cross-border organization of opposition groups has been largely absent from the study of civil war. Indeed, labels such as ‘internal,’ ‘domestic,’ and ‘intragrade’ war—although unavoidable—underscore the state-centric nature of most research on the subject. Recently, scholars have begun to pay greater attention to particular aspects of this broader phenomenon by analyzing transnational ethnic conflict (Cetinyan 2002; Saideman 2001; Woodwell 2004) and the transnational activities of terrorist groups (Bapat 2005; Enders and Sandler 1999; Enders and Sandler 2006). Moreover, the issue of diaspora funding and support for insurgencies has begun to enter into the study of armed conflict (Byman et al. 2001; Collier et al. 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lyon and Ucarrer 2001; Lyons 2006). While these studies are promising, they fail to fully appreciate the strength that transnational actors derive from their territorial fluidity and do not capture the full range of transnational opposition activities. Moreover, these studies lack a common theoretical framework for understanding the varieties of transnational political violence.

The analysis here offers such a common theoretical framework. Access to external space to operate in provides the political opportunity needed for rebel mobilization, but at the same time, it exacerbates informational problems related to bargaining under the shadow of violence. Transnational rebels—including ethnic-based organizations, international ‘terrorists,’ revolutionary movements, and others—
use their geographic flexibility to evade state power and gather resources and support. Strategically-oriented opposition groups, fearing the ability of the state to exercise force, frequently look beyond national boundaries to develop their capabilities. However, this source of strength is also a liability. While mobilizing abroad can increase the power of rebel groups and diminish the threat of repression, it also makes bargaining less likely to succeed.

Any discussion of transnational rebel activities must necessarily take into account the role of the rebel host state. Foreign governments can provide an important resource to rebel groups—access to territory—as well as influence bargaining behavior. Therefore, another contribution of this dissertation to the literature on civil war is to extend the analysis beyond two-actor strategic interactions. Some scholars have already begun to consider the effects of multiple opponents on behavior in civil wars (Cunningham 2006; Walter 2006). At least one published study has looked at strategic bargains involving rebel host states (Bapat 2005). Much more can be done. Introducing new actors to the standard rebel-government framework makes our theories less parsimonious, but promises large rewards.

There are several exciting directions for future research on transnational opposition groups. First, military activities in neighboring countries were emphasized here, but this does not exhaust all forms of transnational dissent. Rebels also gather resources and financing among the wider diaspora, including those outside of the immediate region. Transnational dissident organizations are also frequently involved in forms of dissent short of violence such as media messages (radio, television, internet) and lobbying foreign governments to put pressure on the home state. A thorough examination of political activities beyond the immediate
region as well as the full range of opposition behavior is warranted. Several questions may be asked: why are some diasporas more politically active than others? What is the relationship between opposition groups outside of the country and those in the interior? How do geographically dispersed groups overcome collective action problems in mobilizing dissent? Under what conditions are such activities likely to be successful?

Second, endogenous relationships between internal and external conditions could be more fully thought through and empirically analyzed. Refugees flee conflict zones, but are frequently involved in subsequent violence. External enemies often play hosts to rebel organizations, but such foreign assistance leads to further conflict between states. Future research should look at the potential for substitution between direct state-to-state confrontations and state support for rebel organizations. Why do some states fight directly while others pursue their objectives through proxies?

Finally, the rebel’s choice between internal and external mobilization opportunities, as well as the effects of this choice, should be explored. This dissertation takes TNRs as a given subset of all rebel organizations. However, rebel organizations strategically decide to take up external bases rather than organize domestically. Under what conditions will rebel organizations prefer to mobilize abroad rather than domestically? How does this distinction affect how the conflict unfolds?

Implications for the Theory of the State

Perhaps the broader contribution of this dissertation is to re-conceptualize state-society relations. As has been mentioned above, traditional analyses in political science often assume that political actors co-exist within discrete boundaries. This
dissertation accepts the premise that state agents are largely confined to a particular jurisdiction; the political institutions, legal apparatus, and coercive capabilities of the state are restricted to its sovereign domain. However, this is a simplifying assumption and an ideal type rather than a perfectly accurate depiction of modern states. Many states lack the means to exercise sovereignty over parts of their formal territory (Herbst 2000). Moreover, the most powerful states often attempt assert their authority and legal jurisdiction abroad (Raustiala 2006). More research into the political geography of state power and authority is needed. Nevertheless, it is fair to argue that for most states, most of the time, sovereignty is territorially defined.

Nonetheless, what is offered here is a major departure from the ‘insular’ view of state-society relationships as this dissertation allows societies or political communities to extend beyond the legal-formal boundaries of the state (see also Migdal 2004). Borders are perhaps the most fundamental international institutions in the modern states-system; however, their functions are mainly to demarcate mutually-exclusive zones of governmental control. States attempt to regulate flows across their borders, but the substantial movement of people between countries and the maintenance of bonds of citizenship and identity generate incongruence between the sovereign territory of the state and the geographic diffusion of the polity.

All transnational actors and exchanges present challenges for the application of the legal authority of the state. Offshore internet gambling, for instance, circumvents established laws for many countries and is difficult to regulate. As such, transnational organizations such as firms, NGOs, and criminal organizations, have attracted a great deal of research (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Huntington 1973; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995). Typically, scholars view these organizations as forming a network of distinct units, bound by a common goal,
though existing separately within nation-states. Environmental activists, for example, exist within their own countries but communicate and share resources with like-minded groups elsewhere. While the network is an important form of transnational social organization, international migrants and diaspora communities are more than a network of separate units. They form a seamless political community; they are a common people, not just people with a common cause. Therefore, this dissertation fits within an emerging literature on diasporas and expatriate political activities (Fox 2005; Shain and Barth 2003). The differences and similarities between diasporas and transnational networks needs to be more fully explored.

While the focus of this dissertation has been on armed violence between transnational rebels and the state, this does not even begin to capture all possible forms of political exchange between states and their expatriates. Much more research needs to be done on the subject. To begin with, positive, mutually-beneficial relationships frequently emerge. Some states allow expatriate citizens to vote in national elections (Levitt and Dehesa 2003; Marcelli and Cornelius 2005). Indeed, some states such as Italy and Croatia reserve seats in the legislature for expatriate citizens. Expatriate voting and political representation present a challenge for normative democratic theory as individuals who are not subject to the state’s laws or tax obligations are given the right to influence homeland politics. Expatriates have also played important economic roles in their home countries through sending remittances and facilitating trade and investment. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, members of the diaspora have assisted in reconstruction projects. Thus, states have promoted the rights of their citizens living abroad while members of the diaspora contribute to legally-sanctioned political activities and economic investment.
Other diaspora communities are less politically involved in home country affairs and prefer to incorporate into the politics of their hosts, although interest in host country politics does not necessarily preclude home country activism. While the passage of time—for both individuals and generations born abroad—is one obvious source of waning interest in the homeland, several communities such as Irish-Americans and German Turks, maintain such ties for decades. Accordingly, we may ask: Why are some diasporas more politically active than others? Why do some states and expatriates form mutually-supportive relationships with one another while others engage in conflict? Here, the policies of the host country to encourage or prevent certain political activities is likely to be important as well as the degree to which immigrants are allowed to incorporate into host societies. Thus, how do relations between host and home governments shape the range of political activities available to immigrant groups? How does the receptiveness of the host polity affect subsequent political behavior? These and other questions remain to be thoroughly investigated.

**Implications for Policy**

This dissertation also entails important policy implications for states and the international community to prevent the emergence and spread of armed conflict. Leaving aside the issue of whether or not armed conflict is sometimes justified to unseat an unpopular regime, civil wars have devastating consequences, and policy makers have an interest in limiting their occurrence. Most policy recommendations to date have focused on domestic solutions to what is seen as an internal problem. Building domestic institutions and state capacity, fostering economic growth,
reducing corruption, and power-sharing among ethnic groups have been offered as solutions to civil war and are clearly important. But an exclusively domestic focus will only go so far in preventing political violence.

Fostering the development of infrastructure, economic growth, effective police forces, and democracy should be seen as a regional initiative—particularly in developing countries—rather than solely a national one. Democracies stand a better chance if neighboring countries are also democratic; economic development is enhanced when neighbors are also growing (Gleditsch 2002). Regional organizations can help. The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have played important roles in promoting growth and democracy—as well as limiting conflict and human rights violations—among member states and aspirants to membership, particularly in Eastern Europe. Regional organizations in developing countries such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Central American Common Market are steps in the right direction, but should be strengthened to promote long-term development solutions in conflict-ridden regions.

Fostering and maintaining peaceful international relations should also be a key priority. States and international actors should take a more active role in ending old rivalries. Decades-old disputes between India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, Uganda and Sudan, among others, threaten regional peace and stability. Finding solutions to these international conflicts can go a long way in resolving civil conflicts. The mutually-reinforcing relationship between civil and international war—a key theme of this dissertation—can be broken if the international community is prepared to take a more active role in facilitating conflict resolution and peace among states.

Beyond ending international rivalries, fostering security cooperation to find multilateral solutions to common threats is an important endeavor. When
transnational rebels exist, countries can prevent the escalation of armed conflict by sharing intelligence with one another, coordinating counterinsurgency actions, and providing border security. In the global war against one particular transnational organization, Al-Qaeda, the United States' security cooperation with states in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere plays a vital role in preventing further attacks. Such ties between states must be duplicated and strengthened to deal with other crises.

Finally, maintaining the civilian status of refugee communities should be a major concern of international donors and NGOs. Several authors have noted the failure of the international community to effectively respond to the Rwandan refugee crisis following the 1994 genocide (Gourevitch 1998; Lischer 2003). Failure to distinguish between bona fide refugees and perpetrators of Rwandan genocide led to the diversion of humanitarian aid to combatants. In many cases, armed rebels operate in refugee camps while the host state and agencies such as the UNHCR are powerless to stop them. This failure to protect refugee communities fosters further violence and greater refugee flows. Greater international resolve is needed to keep armed combatants from utilizing humanitarian resources and preventing recruitment among vulnerable refugees.

In short, if civil war is more than a domestic problem, part of the solution lies in promoting more robust international cooperation to deal with security threats. Of course, this assertion by itself has become rather cliché in the policy community. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked at a conference in Munich:

…In this era of interdependence, let us banish from our minds the thought that some threats affect only some of us. We all share a responsibility for each other's security, and we must work together
to build a safer world. Indeed, in strengthening the security of others, we protect the security of our own.\textsuperscript{36}

Yet, even though such statements are now commonplace, we must keep beating the drum until real action is taken. If nothing else, this dissertation provides strong evidence in support of these often-made claims and fuels calls for greater international responsibility. Still, there is no policy consensus on this issue. On the opposite side of the aisle, global isolationists in powerful countries would retreat from extensive engagement in failed or failing states as if we can afford to ignore them. That these conflicts do not have far-reaching effects is a myth. Hopefully, this work will play a role in advancing the political debate to strengthen the hand of internationalists who seek global solutions to the problem of civil war.

References


