"Who's Crazy Now?"
An Essay Dedicated to
Christopher Hill

Clare L. Spark

Cultural studies in academia are now a battle zone, riven by "the Canon Wars"; some scholars in the humanities believe that Western high culture (i.e., "the great tradition" or "the canon") has molded and distorted the consciousness of women and non-whites, forcing them to act against their interests. Such claims have often been tainted as Marxist or Stalinist by their conservative opponents. In this essay I attempt to relocate this dispute outside the academy, arguing that social movements of the 1960s-1980s carried (possibly unconscious) antidemocratic form and content while advocating "empowerment." An undertow of anti-Semitism, irrationalism, and pessimism may have weakened oppositional movements and community mental health. However, today's "Canon Warriors" are not cynical or deluded reactionaries, but are responding to real duplicities in "enlightened" academic culture that may have been misattributed to "modernism" (to the detriment of the project of emancipation and development that these individuals and groups wish to advance).

The essay is divided into two parts: first, I review the achievements and challenge of radical Protestantism, contrasting its left-liberal position with the portraits drawn in competing accounts of modernity, suggesting that many

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New Leftists and organicist Marxists (those who lack a concept of, or belief in the value of the dissenting individual) may be partly in revolt against specters unleashed by counter-Reformation forces. I present a synthesis for antidemocratic propaganda that identifies the critical, scientific spirit, mass literacy and mass politics with radical Protestants and crazy Jews: it is the master narrative that rules the anticommunist unconscious.

Second, I suggest that the upper-class need to contrast American "freedom" with German and Soviet "autocracy" after 1917 has led to the mislabeling of cultural freedom; that is, institutional boundaries circumscribing dissent cannot be limned without exposing the class favoritism of ostensibly "neutral" institutions (the schools, the media, the state) in democratic capitalist societies. To describe constraints upon the critical intellect where none should be subjects the rude unmasker to expulsion; to remain complicit with deceptive institutions creates anxiety. Some intellectuals may flee to the safety and nurture of authoritarian ideologies, while blaming hypocritical promises for emancipation on "Wandering Jewish" modernity, again hewing to the tale of terror. I have found the same double-bind in the Columbia University academic freedom controversy of 1917 and in recently declassified government documents pondering the legitimation and centralization of "psychological warfare" operations during the early 1950s in the face of the "national aversion to propaganda". All the enlightened "representatives" under discussion--promoters of sanity, flexibility, prudence, and Lockean constitutionalism--abjure selfish individualism and coercion, meanwhile practicing mind-management and paternalism, promiscuously merging elite interests with those of their constituents as well as capitalist interests with those of workers and peasants abroad. Academic radicals, to the extent that they participate in organicist formulations of mass culture and national or regional character ("the masses," "the people," "the West"), may know very little about either popular resistance to antidemocratic propaganda or the contradictions within "bourgeois ideology." Constructing the "apocalyptic sublime" style in art and life to represent all popular initiatives, such "radical" intellectuals cannot participate in, nor recognize, self-management. Their searching spotlights should turn inward to examine internalized elitism and fear of the critical spirit.
The Apocalyptic Sublime and its Adversaries

We are no longer in an age of ignorance, and information is not partially distributed according to the ranks and orders, and functions, and dignities of social life. All learning has an index, and every science its abridgment. I am scarcely able to name any man whom I consider as wholly ignorant. We no longer look for learned authors in the usual place, in the retreats of academic erudition and in the seats of religion. Our peasantry now read The Rights of Man on mountains and moors and by the wayside; and shepherds make the analogy between their occupation and that of their governors. Happy indeed, had they been taught no other comparison. Our unsexed female writers now instruct us or confuse us and themselves in the labyrinth of politics, or turn us wild with Gallic frenzy.²

As everyone knows, we are at a critical and promising historical moment. The crumbling of "war communism" (as some have termed the "socialist" regimes responding to invasion and civil war after 1917) creates a new opening for left-liberals.³ Without the specter of Stalinism, cold warriors may be bereft of the indispensable enemy but they, along with Trotskyists,⁴ also retain a certain credibility. It would be tragic if progressives did not take this opportunity to rethink the objectives, tactics, and misalliances of social movements since the Russian Revolution. With ever more confident assaults on science emanating from sectors of the academy and the Third World (a sometimes total rejection of Western culture),⁵ it is more urgent than ever that we recuperate and protect the achievement of the radical Enlightenment, the still novel and precariously situated idea of the priesthood of all believers. As the great English historian Christopher Hill recently reminded us,⁶ it was the revolutionary puritan principle that no intermediary should be inserted between Bible reader and text that undergirded democratic demands. Ordinary people could read scripture for themselves, a notion easily transferred to a broader context. All people had the capacity to grasp and interpret the world, to read social texts, to identify friends and enemies, the better to survive while leading a decent life: We do not rely on
charismatic individuals to do our thinking for us, but demand to see the facts. The Judeo-Christian God that we have chosen requires that we be critical, independent, good, and a lover of the truth; to create the beloved community.⁷

Today, we carry that demand in the democratic aspiration for self-management. We want to participate in the decisions that matter: what is produced, how the work process is organized, what shall be done with the surplus. All other great decisions: whether our children shall die in war, whether women shall control their reproductive processes, how our children shall be educated, the structure of our classrooms, families, the media, and so on, revolve around the question of production and its control; for the people who make these decisions, almost reflexively, measure all challenges from below with the standards: Is this proposal for reform good for Capital or Labor? How can the possessing class absorb dissent without fortifying the majority? How can we make this look like a constitutional democracy, with, as Woodrow Wilson promised, "open covenants for peace, openly arrived at"? How can we prove that the system works? In practice, this has meant that academics are expected to give a plausible rendition of radical social criticism: moral, humane, daring, and efficacious.

Writing in 1942 to the mental health profession, and arguing for a national program of government-sponsored subliminal propaganda and professional discipline of free-speech advocates,⁸ the Harvard sociologist and antifascist activist Talcott Parsons understood that the persons who "define the situation" control politics. If I say that an emotionally mature person can make the system work for her/him by joining the appropriate interest group and following correct procedures, then I have foreclosed structural transformation as a sane response to the troubles of individuals. Or, take the contending social theories available in a more "radical" post-1960s social environment. If I say that the primary contradiction in society is male over female, or white over non-white, or the state over the individual, or capital over labor, distinctive politics and strategies for change are advanced: each group--feminists, cultural nationalists, libertarians, socialists--promises to liberate its constituency, yet only one radical vision does not look backward to a golden age of matriarchy or splendid empire or unchecked libertinage, but promises to emancipate humanity materially and intellectually. Crucially, the left-liberal position does not call for the end of history or the permanent resolution of the conflict be-
tween the individual and society, but advocates intellectual argument (rational "difference") as the source of health, progress and democracy; the critical spirit is committed to open-ended and revisable versions of the truth and definitions of the good society. The rights of individuals, not the "community" (that vague entity whose "public interest" has heretofore been determined by elites), are paramount. Herman Melville embodied such views in his seeker after truth, Captain Ahab, but Melville is not a team player. It is often a heresy in hip academic circles to say that truth even exists; such are the fruits of "cultural relativism": "history" was an insolent notion advanced by the plebs which had brought miscegenation and decline to Europe, as Michel Foucault, the late French philosopher argued in a rarely quoted passage from his essay *Nietzsche, Genealogy and History*.

The ongoing fights between optimistic and pessimistic world views cannot be understood without reviewing competing historical descriptions of modernity. But first, a definition: The divisions that have elucidated my work are those between left materialists and left organicists. The materialist conception of history holds that people and institutions are changeable; religions, families and states are constructed by people reacting to specific situations, or (as I read Marx), we make our history but not under conditions of our own choosing. We are daunted by the deadening hand of tradition. The Prometheans are both free and constrained, sometimes soaring like eagles, sometimes pecked at. Moreover, the realm of freedom is constantly changing; charting our options requires ongoing incisive critical, historical analysis (and lots of self-scrutiny). We do what we think we can; we are social activists and realists, moral, but not moralistic (not condemning people who are trapped, but proposing to remove the trap through structural reform). We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but try to understand the opportunities of the historical moment (which may not be obvious). By contrast, left organicists view human beings as entirely shaped by rules and structures. Not only are we excused from action (because the working class must bring us socialism, in the great unfolding of history), but we can't act; the world is a fait accompli. Consequently, the organicists seem to oscillate between optimism and pessimism. If the Soviet Union or the Communist Party or the working class has "failed," they abandon "radical politics." Compare my radical Protestant/empiricist portrait of
modernity with its competition. First, classical Marxist theory (which many antifascist intellectuals of the 1930s found appealing) envisions the modern world as full of promise. The revolutionary bourgeoisie was a progressive class, developing the productive forces, emancipating mankind from the harshness and terror of nature, bringing science, mass literacy, political equality, and civil liberties in its wake as it asserted itself against the old aristocracy, arguing that merit (not birth) was the standard for leadership. Crucially, industrial capitalism created a new class in its very womb, the exploited workers, who, because of ever worsening capitalist crises, increasing immiseration, their numerical majority, and their capacity to stop production in the factories, would overthrow the owning class and rescue the world from barbarism—and with a minimum of violence, perhaps even using the legal methods institutionalized in advanced bourgeois democracies.

Marxists in the 1930s were careful to distinguish between early and late capitalism, explaining the switch from rationalism to mysticism: ripened capitalism is confronted by socialist parties, movements of workers and intellectuals legitimizing their demands with the language of science and universal reason (the weapon wielded against feudalism by the revolutionary bourgeoisie). The capitalist must return to the psychological terrorism, irrationalism and elitism of the Church and aristocracy in order to brake socialist transformation. The bourgeoisie thus becomes reactionary, fascist, or proto-fascist, resorting to the corporatism of the past all the while insisting that its opponents are the romantic enemies of Enlightenment. Drowning in the old idealism, intellectuals allied to the bourgeoisie can no longer describe the system accurately. Science and technology abandon their mission to liberate mankind from toil; industrial development intensifies national rivalries for raw materials and markets. Only the proletariat and its allies bear the legacy of the Enlightenment, specifically the capacity to describe social divisions and to harness the energies of industrialism to create material abundance wherein every individual would have the leisure to develop her or his intellect and creativity. For some, this dream was shattered by the willingness of workers to fight and die for their capitalist rulers in the First World War, but revived in movements for worker's control after 1917 (e.g., worker's councils in the first phase of the Russian Revolution, American Wobblies in 1919; it is the specter that still haunts conservative elites).
But for the romantic conservatives, foes to the "divisive" worker's movements of the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie was never a progressive class. Deploiring the horrors of (Jewish) Mammon and the industrialism it spawned, these thinkers warned against "agitators" such as Charles Kingsley's Crossthwaite (a figure of the proletarian Christ), and deplored the messianic tradition of revolutionary puritanism bequeathed by the Old Testament and taken up by left Romantics. In the 1930s, numerous Christian Socialists were ensconced in Ivy League universities and the publishing industry (thinkers such as Princeton's Willard Thorp or Harvard's F.O. Matthiessen, and whose lineage might also include William Blake, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, the Macmillan brothers, the pre-Raphaelites, William Morris, the Distributists Hilaire Belloc, G.K. Chesterton, and Eric Gill, T.S. Eliot and Aldous Huxley). A similar ideology was carried in the arts and crafts movement, by volkisch Germans, and some pro-Soviet American intellectuals (Jay Leyda is one example), some New Leftists, counter-culture adherents, and non-Red sections of the Green movement, following, say, Lewis Mumford. For them, no less than for The Nation magazine, or the National Civic Federation, or the Martin Dies Committee, or the postwar Committee for Economic Development, the division that mattered and had to be erased, was inevitable (and rational) class conflict, the devilish idea propagated by bad Jews like Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemberg, and some Freudians. Although it was obvious to nineteenth-century industrial workers that they were wage-slaves with different and opposing interests to the capitalists who owned their tools, counter-revolutionary corporatist elites argued that there was no natural antagonism between labor and capital. Good paternalistic fathers could and would restrain the predatory side of capitalism; enlightened capitalists (the Progressives) saw the value of bringing trade unions into the system, as long as workers were free of the divisive Jewish spirit. The Progressives have used scientific management to impose workplace harmony, co-opting lower class insurgency throughout our century; yesterday in the programs of the New Deal and postwar foreign aid; today in the ideology of pluralism-without-the-left, and in academic programs that reinforce ethnic, racial or gender identity.

The class harmonizing impulses of romantic conservatives, Christian Socialists and Progressives were not malevo-
lent, however, identical fears of conflict have informed the most dangerous tendencies of the twentieth-century. These corporatist utopias were also the intellectual progeny of rebellious aristocrats, viewing with horror the swarming groups unleashed by the revolutionary bourgeoisie: women, workers, non-whites, and Jews. George Mosse has partly described their ideological and political program in the early twentieth century. In the tendency Mosse described, conservative revolutionary social theorists proposed to remove Jewish machines, money interest, and Jewish ideas such as crooked parliamentarism, the internationalism associated with racial mixing and rootlessness, and I would add, the "deplorable individuality" associated with revolutionary puritanism and the Wandering Jew. Everyone would be rooted in small racially homogeneous communities, for racial unity dissolves class antagonisms. Production would return to the guild model, to be led by an elite advanced by merit in this (German) scenario sometimes called "national biological socialism." Although Mosse says that the "romantic" reactionaries were imprisoned, exiled, or murdered by Hitler, Mein Kampf transmitted their world view. In Hitler's formulation, the natural harmony, the warm personal bonds that once existed between master and man had been disturbed by absentee capitalists, the Stock Exchange, and demagogues; agitators with an agenda. Good paternalistic fathers urged, just like the old Church fathers, do not trust the evidence of your senses. You, the ever-gullible masses are being duped by Jewish agitators in the pay of Jewish bankers who will impose an unprecedented international tyranny once the old nationalist elites have been overthrown by the workers.

This story of "the Big Lie" still circulates; it is the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion, its precursor ("The Rabbi's Speech") manufactured by German, French and Russian conservatives after the Paris Commune of 1871. The Protocols were taken seriously by the London Times in 1920, Henry Ford, and of course Hitler and Goebbels; it was the story that historian Norman Cohn named "the warrant for genocide." But this narrative of conspiracy, false utopia, and catastrophe was no fresh invention: it evoked the myths of Icarus and Narcissus, staples of antidemocratic propaganda since democracy and the people reared their snake-like heads in ancient Greece, especially powerful after the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and the unremitting heresies that followed. The message was simple: Against the
messianism of the Old Testament which called for universal truth and justice (a message taken to legitimize the democratic aspirations of the many right here on earth),20 the masters warned. Put down that Book! Do not over-reach; "know thyself" means know thy limitations. Curb thy ambition. Virtue lies in subordination to authority. Let thy better define social reality. Free thought unravels the social fabric to bring anarchy and chaos; then comes a tyrant who will restore order, but not the permanently debilitated social organism. Free thought is thus a recipe for decline and fall, not the emancipation promised by cynical demagogues. In his monumental summation of classic American literature, American Renaissance (1941), Harvard's F.O. Matthiessen warned against Captain Ahab's lust for power, quoting his challenge to Starbuck (the first mate on the ill-fated Pequod), "Who's over me?" and urged progressive academics to rescue America from such disastrous links to the "savagery" of the Hebrew prophets; however, the organicist Matthiessen excised the words that followed "Who's over me?" The missing sentence, "Truth hath no confines" linked the materialist Ahab's search for truth to equality and democracy, not authoritarianism. Melville's critical spirit was not hubristic (as Matthiessen had charged), but agonizing, as Melville and his other revolutionary puritan characters contemplated "the endless winding way" of critical thought, and the threat to conservative order that such new freedom implied.21

Truth Hath its Confines

With this introduction to the competing views of materialists and organicists, we may understand how contemporary institutions can make us crazy; how our "liberal" families, schools and media put their inhabitants in "double-binds." The double-bind should not be confused with the dispensing of mixed messages such as love/hate, or the mixture of good and bad in our moral behavior, rather it results from the misnaming of experience; there is a lack of correspondence between the word and the reality it purports to describe. In Herman Melville's view (Pierre, 1852), the double-bind follows the simultaneous demand for both truth and order, intellectual independence and loyalty to corporate welfare; the pretense that there is no necessary conflict between these values leads to the confusion of safety and danger. Protecting an image of her liberality, "mother" will turn on and expel the child who delivers an accurate portrait of fam-
ily relations; a dangerously divided (some would say schizophrenic) consciousness is produced in those who do not recognize institutional duplicity. In the 1950s and '60s, the double-bind was described by Gregory Bateson and R.D. Laing as a problem in the family attributed to the bad mother unchecked by the good father; her coldness and ambivalence (the alternations between clinging and rejection) made her sons crazy. She did not really love her child; but if he did not take her false love for true, she would really give him a hard time. If he accepted her false love as true, he was really crazy. Dr. Michael Goldstein, a UCLA psychologist, has told me (without irony) that double-bind theory is passé, because "it can't be measured."

While it is true that the detailed reconstruction of family relations is a demanding task (as any historian will agree), I do not believe that such efforts are terminally distorted by "subjectivity," as Dr. Goldstein's reply suggests; rather, double-bind theory is all too instructive when applied to the university and other free-but-stabilizing institutions. In scientific, innovating societies like our own, unbounded independence of thought is required to create new, more competitive technologies, but free thought is carefully (and subtly) circumscribed; the humanities and social sciences are strongholds of reaction and counter-Enlightenment, generally oblivious to the social relations they misdescribe and reproduce in the classroom. My point is made concrete in the following incident, a purge at Columbia University which has not been adequately described or analyzed by previous scholars. Here the double-bind is the misnaming of circumscribed thought as free thought, the misnaming of academic slavery as academic freedom by "moderate" conservatives--the corporatist liberals.

In October 1917, Columbia University was the site of a tumultuous academic freedom controversy. For weeks there were mass meetings, petitions, threats of strikes and rumors of campus revolt after two professors associated with the antiwar movement had been summarily dismissed by Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler acting under pressure from conservative faculty, alumni, and trustees. The rebellious professors, experimental psychologist James McKeen Cattell and Comparative Literature professor Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, were viewed as poisons or cancers, sneakily attacking the organism of harmoniously cooperating administration, faculty and students. Their alleged crime was opposition to the draft, which they considered a betrayal by
Woodrow Wilson, elected on a peace platform (however, according to The Columbia Spectator, Cattell feared that the Conscription Act would arouse disorder and revolution).24

The Columbia faculty responses would be paradigmatic for critical intellectuals at bay. Clearly there was a conflict between truth and order, independence and loyalty. The impromptu firings of Cattell and Dana revealed that professors were not like aristocrats, nobly free and frank, but slaves, with no more power over their activities in and out of the classroom than workers in "a badly run factory," said John Dewey.25 The popular political scientist Charles Beard and the economist Henry R. Mussey resigned in protest (while a Jewish student protester, Leon Samson, was expelled and reportedly excluded from law schools). Beard complained bitterly about continued trustee interference with the teaching of political science; the reputation of the value-free university and the integrity of his own pro-war position were at stake. But conservative alumni and students did not agree. The university was not a breeding-ground for soap-box agitators like Dana, Cattell and Samson, but a school for gentlemen, who would aristocratically submerge their personal desires for the good of the whole, in this case the state of those who profited from an alliance with England and France.

These two alternatives were at least rational. They recognized the conflict and made their sacrifices (a job, academic freedom) accordingly. But there were two mad corporatist alternatives; these persist today and push politics toward dementia and schizophrenia. One group, "Members of the Committee on Instruction of the Schools of Mines, Engineering, and Chemistry," did not see any conflict between truth and order if Columbia students were properly administered: Yes, Cattell and Dana should be removed to protect Columbia's reputation, but "We are also anxious that our students shall be surrounded by those influences which while encouraging vigorous independent thought, at the same time develop unquestioned loyalty to our country," i.e., you could make science classless and good for upper-class Protestants if you encircled the brood and got them loaded.26 The other strategy was to reform Butler; yes, distraught professors27 said, the cancers had been well excised, but needlessly repressive practices were to blame. Responsible corporatist thinking would restore the normally harmonious university; rationally cooperating faculty and administrators would prevent another uprising and bring closure to this awful aberration. The corporatist liberal position is utopian
because, for instance, it does not recognize that "greedy" capitalists do not pick and choose their strategies on the basis of morality or even long-term expediency; they are coerced by market forces, by abstract and impersonal social property relations. These corporatist liberals (like those in protest movements based in the petit-bourgeoisie, such as populism and fascism) wanted capitalism without tears. They could not countenance the perception that authority in late capitalist society might be inevitably and uncontrollably abusive, nor could they have bonded with the lower orders: both alternatives made them too Jewishly divisive, parricidal and poor. (I think Beard, a Progressive, not a Marxist, resigned to protect the fantasy of the neutral university.)

What am I suggesting about our current political culture and its methods for legitimizing itself and proclaiming its superiority to proposed democratic alternatives? Scientists (including social scientists) need free thought to invigorate their productions. If these "originals" are dependent on conservative institutions they will be motivated to discover techniques which do not threaten the authority of their masters. Let us contrast a discreet (solid) truth with a reckless (cracked) antithesis. Journalists working in a "free press" will boldly "muckrake," thereby postulating the existence of genuinely liberal Good Fathers to correct the irrationality of "mass culture" and the false Prometheans it disgorges; the muckrakers implicitly bring back the moderate men of the vital center to restore "balance"; criticism which suggests that "balance" is impossible in class divided societies is un-American and unscientific. Here, then, is the source of the double-bind: the science bequeathed by the puritan revolutionaries brought permanent turmoil to the bourgeois democracies (delightful or terrifying, depending on one's intellectual and moral allegiances). Ordinary people reading the texts (of the Bible or of society), could compare official readings with their own. Their representatives in republican governments would have to prove their loyalty to the voters by accurately depicting their records and the system they served. But as class divisions intensified in late capitalism, politicians and other leaders could not serve two masters. Some materialists (the people who trusted the evidence of their senses as the starting point for thought) said structures must change: economic and political democracy should coincide. The idealists (mystical corporatist liberals) said there was only one master--the community; with socially responsible capitalism, the people and capital would
grow together. These "moderates," I have argued, perpetuate the double bind and use symbols of terror (e.g., the wasteland-making Jewish cosmopolitan, the fifth column/cancer within), to discourage would-be "extremists."

But does the Terror work? Radical thinkers undermine mental health to the extent that they join with organicist thinkers to view "the masses" as easily molded and swindled. Assuming "hegemony" and relying on the fact of concentrated ownership in the media (a fact tied to consumerism), leads to political despair. We must not forgo "old-fashioned" but still revolutionary empirical investigation into the complex intertwining of emotions, perceptions, and material forces (including the repression of critical thought in authoritarian families) that comprises human motivation and action as they are manifested in particular individuals.

In the remainder of this essay, I examine the discourse of "enlightened" policy makers, some of whose whitewashed versions of themselves may have discredited "modernity" in the eyes of today's postmodernists and Canon Warriors. Here too we shall see materialists and organicists debating the efficacy of mind-management to predict, control, and evaluate human behavior. Examination of some early 1950s formulations of "the Soviet threat" reveals no obsessions with troops and tropes, but rather some sophisticated analyses of the revolutionary potential of indigenous (but Communist-controlled) labor movements in France and Italy during the postwar economic crisis; an hysterical response to Soviet publications unmasking hypocrisies in U.S. information programs; and the ongoing fear of Marxism's appeal in "defining the situation" of poor people around the globe. Given their commitment to democratic capitalism, terror in the service of natural harmony and/or incoherence would be the only recourse of moderate men steering the ship of state.

**Uncharted Waters**

*[The New York Times, 1951]: The Psychological Strategy Board is a new, incomplete team with nothing less than a world of ideas to explore. It has also made a start at stockpiling plans for defeating the big lie with the hard fact...[On the sources of Soviet strength, according to Joseph Stalin]: the main force is the Soviet Union with its huge standing armies; the direct reserves are the satel-
lites, colonial revolutionaries and the "world proletariat" that has been infiltrated by indigenous Communist parties; and the indirect reserves are the conflicts that Soviet psychological warfare can breed among free countries, and the internal conflicts it can develop between capitalism [sic] and labor.31

[C.D. Jackson, 1952]: What it adds up to is that God has decided to take out a brodie on the American people. Also, we are now faced with the first real enemy of this country. This one is really implacable against us--so we are stuck with the American people and their enemy. Query: Do we want to do something about it?32

The Psychological Strategy Board (a controversial, but relatively unstudied group operating from 1951-1953, after which its functions were assumed by the US Information Agency and the Operations Coordinating Board),33 was a part of the National Security Council; it consisted of the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Director of Defense, the Director of the CIA, plus representatives of both non-member and member agencies. PSB was our common Brain, keeping the body politic on its toes; it was

the nerve-center for strategic psychological operations. At the apex of government, it provides a single office for assuring the planned use by all governmental units of activities to influence the opinions, attitudes, emotions and behavior of foreign groups in ways that will support the achievement of our approved national aims. Through the Board, the President is enabled to turn to one body, instead of many, for a prompt assessment of psychological operations--as to magnitude, emphasis, pace, effectiveness, and responsibility for execution. Thus a unified base is afforded from which to take from an enemy the initiative in "psychological operations."34

Nevertheless, some strategists thought PSB was too weak. In December, 1951, The New York Times carried a
sensational six-part series of articles clearly designed to build public support for an agency of soaring mind-managers (a "powerful, independent propaganda board, making policy and carrying it out") to substitute for the "compromise board" that had been established earlier that year as the PSB.\textsuperscript{35} The second article, "Soviet Hate Drive Makes U.S. Target," announced that Lenin's birthday (January 21, 1951) had marked a dramatic turn in Soviet tactics: Peter Pospelov, "the leading theoretician of the Soviet Communist Party" had abandoned his previous policy of denouncing capitalism and promoting peaceful co-existence; Pospelov had "switched" to "a virulent campaign of hate against American people themselves"; Pospelov wanted to "stab at the increasing strength of United States leadership in the free world." Now Americans were "blood-stained imperialists"; moreover, Communism would prevail in "the final phase" of struggle. Pospelov claimed to have discovered new evidence that Lenin always viewed land-grabbing Americans as a menace to Russians; under his direction thirteen new books appeared, documenting atrocities and "tailored geographically to arouse local [Soviet] fears of U.S. hostility." Such fake scholarship was clearly part of an "unremitting drive to create a world of Communist proletariats dominated by Moscow."\textsuperscript{36} The \textit{Times} acknowledged that PSB designs were controversial amongst psychologists and within the government, but managed to turn defenselessness into its opposite. The raging arguments over the Voice of America, symbol manipulation and the apparent national disunity such debates reflected could be, in the hands of experts, proof of the confrontation with hard fact in an open society: "Skillful psychological handling of this normal phenomenon of American life would depict it as an element of strength, demonstrating the freedom of expression that Washington is trying to propagate." However, the \textit{Times} did not support the Truman administration's "nobly conceived" Campaign of Truth (which it concluded was too frail to take back the symbols of democracy and peace from the Soviets). In the same article that insisted "we use truth," that orderly Congressional checks and balances would prevent the propagandizing of the American people or narrow expressions of Executive Branch interest, the \textit{Times} writer (commenting on recent criticisms of the Voice of America), chortled over U.S. successes in deploying duplicitous black and grey propaganda in Eastern Europe:

Americans are matching the fanaticism and
ruthlessness of their Communist antagonists with cool native ingenuity in this underworld of the ideological struggle, but Russian agents seldom have got any clue that it is Americans who are beating them.37

In its last gasp, the Times series reconciled its readers to both amorality and vagueness:

The job of making propaganda out of truth is no less complex than the Soviet Union's in propagating the big lie... Officials can give no easy definition for describing either what propaganda or the propagandists should be. But the result they would like is to inspire in free men the zeal to fight as ruthlessly to keep their freedom as their fanatic Communist opponents fight to destroy it.38

In other words, the victory of irrationalism and covert operations would not undermine "freedom of expression"—as long as the rationalists had an occasional opportunity to complain. The lurid, hysterical tone of the Times articles suggests high-level disagreements over the place of unreason in a democratic society. In a declassified Top Secret report irritably summarizing interagency "bickerings" in the history of psychological warfare since 1945, Edward P. Lilly blamed the people, complaining that Americans had not continued George Creel's operations after World War I, again rushing to "hectic liquidation" of the OSS, the OWI, etc. after 1945. It would not be easy to get [the hysterical narcissists] to sponsor ongoing propaganda and assume the responsibilities of world leadership:

America desired to be left alone to amass wealth in the Twenties and to concentrate on its domestic depression and recovery programs during the Thirties. While domestic information facilities increased, especially radio broadcasting, and America became the most news-conscious people, they remained basically indifferent to world developments. The widespread acceptance of the economic interpretation of history and of life, together with the revisionist histories of World War I,
caused the average American to view wars as profit and persuasion: bankers and munitions makers reaped the profit and plied their fellow citizens and world opinion with appealing propaganda to increase their gains. Unaware that they were being propagandized, Americans became isolationist and comcomitantly developed a phobia against the very word "propaganda" as a horrid, sinister word, a really un-American word and activity....Psychological warfare was an intangible concept whose value and effectiveness was practically a matter of faith. Since it was considered "un-American," its inability to prove its worth was embarrassing.39

Lilly's report (like the Times' articles) suggests that Americans were more incorrigibly positivistic and irreverent (and may still be) than the mind-managers would have preferred--at least that is how they were perceived by their public servants. But just as striking as Lilly's disgust is his distance from "America" or "the people," while at the same time he, like other strategists, conflates their interests. The Symbolists who ran (or advised) the Psychological Strategy Board were, in their view, not putting one over on the American people or foreign nationals; they were not cynically lying about Soviet capabilities and intentions after the war, nor, apparently, were they in agreement as to objectives, methods or the effectiveness of their procedures;40 rather they were conservative liberals unwilling or unable to live with the consequences of "difference"--like Progressive parents putting their children into double-binds: "Do grow up and be your own person, but don't diverge from my values, objectives, methods, and analysis (i.e., "democratic pluralism" minus class analysis), or I'll really reject you."41 Refusal to admit "common ground" would be deemed self-indulgent; recalcitrant feelings were "targets"; yet mind-management was anathema to a concept of enlightened Americanism that placed benevolent foreign policy and rational self-criticism at the center of its national identity. As C.D. Jackson, publisher of Fortune and wartime Deputy Chief of Psychological Warfare Division in SHAEF, told a few of his radiant fellow citizens at an "off the record" meeting at the Princeton Inn, May 10-11, 1952,

...we never can nor want to operate as a mono-
lith, via thought-control, etc. which the Russians can do, want to do, and do do. We are a mosaic. A mosaic does no good when the pieces are all over the floor, but bound together in a pattern that is useful and beautiful.

Within the last few weeks I have been involved in various discussions with the [Mutual Security Agency], particularly the support program part of it. There was a big do in Washington on Point Four, conversations with the Ford, Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, on their activities around the world and in India, and how these things could tie in with programs on the [Voice of America]. But somehow it doesn't all come together as something that must be proclaimed as a central American theme, and made simple and clear and beneficially potent to the people who are enslaved and looking for liberation, and also beneficially potent to us.

For a mosaic to come together, I am not promoting a super PSB, but somehow or other we must be smart enough to pull these things together--adding the White House, adding the State Department, adding centers of American radiation around the world, adding our organization, adding Valentine's organization [Radio Free Asia], adding Kirk's organization, so a symphonic theme can be played which will be heard and enjoyed by the people of the world and our people. (pp.20-21)

[Jerome?] Wiesner followed this Wagnerian crescendo with a chilling and deflating comment, evaluating what wasn't there. "Aren't there really two problems: 1. We are not doing a very good job of political warfare for our aims. 2. We don't know what are [sic] aims really are."

To summarize the Wilsonian project and dilemma: Elite strategists trying to win the cold war (and forced to explain repressive legislation and the treatment of the Rosenbergs) at times seemed to envy the Soviets' centralized organization and unproblematic mission which was to invent an image of Soviet society promoting "land-reform, peace, anti-imperialism, youth" threatened by American warmongering. By contrast, highly moral American pro-
pagandists had to tell the truth and create unity (where there was no national consensus on the objectives of U.S. foreign policy), employing symbols (modeled on Wilson's Fourteen Points) that were too vague to persuade fact-loving democrats. The strategists at Princeton felt that the free world of the West, must, without provoking war, liberate the enslaved masses of the East; as C.D. Jackson phrased it, getting at "the minds of men," "we are trying to win World War III without having to fight it. It is going to be the neatest trick of the week if we can pull it off (p.110)." Traditional Progressive policies were proposed. Seeking agreement on the American posture vis-a-vis Germany, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Rostow, p.50), the corporatist liberals distinguished themselves from hot-tempered militarist and/or isolationist opponents in Congress. Frank Altschul suggested a dramatic move to polish America's image: in the light of catastrophic new weapons and the threat of a world conflagration, the USSR should be re-approached, urged to disarm, and offered "a world-wide gigantic Marshall Plan," which they would of course again reject (pp.66-67). However, in the statement which the Princeton liberals hammered out, neither bribery nor chivalrous rescue operations were explicitly proposed, but enlightened internationalism all around. Setting itself against the inevitable war preached by Lenin and Stalin (p.66), the American message transmitted to Iron Curtain countries would clearly advocate: the release of military expenditures for the development of resources; the creation of a European community which would enfold a reunited Germany; a Soviet Union with the same relationship to the European community as that enjoyed by the U.S.; and the reiteration of American identity as anti-imperialistic (p.92). If diplomats could only get past the militaristic fanatics (as Joseph Grew insisted the U.S. should have done with the Japanese before the war, p.79), surely peaceful statesmen could "grill into them" kindly American intentions.

Psychological strategists also had plans for the non-aligned countries alive with anticolonial sentiments. Over and over the Wilsonian liberals exhorted each other: freedom-loving, peace-loving America must not impose its will on the smaller or weaker nations, but discover their objectives, then help them in ways that linked their improved public health and productivity to democratic capitalism (the Western way).43 Eschewing satellites,44 "we" would adjust their aims to our purposes.45 That is, Progressive elites would co-
opt, not antagonize or neglect the "seething" anticolonial poor, thus to drive them into the arms of the lurking Soviet octopus. American planners would study the belief-systems of other countries, sending students, doctors, anthropologists and good labor union representatives abroad. The mission was chummy but self-critical; for many, it was still the Campaign of Truth, reverberant with "Baptist fervor." One evangelist was particularly skilled in comparative anatomy, physics, geography, domestic science, and mental hygiene. In this memorandum from Yale professor Frederick Barghoorn, a hat is tipped to permanent revolution while false prophets are exposed; a certain reticence remains:

Despite the enormous differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they share one important attribute which distinguishes them from almost all other states in the world. Both are power-generating units and both have surplus power to export. From the point of view of psychological operations, perhaps the main difference between these two centers is that Moscow is an allegedly revolutionary center but is actually afraid to practice what it preaches and for this reason is forced to isolate itself from foreign influences, while the U.S., although unfortunately in the minds of many as "reactionary" does not fear the free exchange of ideas. In between these two poles lies much of the world. To a very large extent, the in-between world is the object rather than the subject of political and cultural influences. It is because of this very fact that the citizens, and particularly the intellectuals, of this in-between world are so touchy and sensitive. This fact must be kept constantly in mind in order to prevent tactless errors.

...our national policy is based upon utilizing the strong and healthy parts of the free world as the basis upon which to build a political offensive against Soviet totalitarianism. In other words, we must begin by setting our own house in order and proceed outside....our over-all objective is to preserve the peace without sacrificing the values which we regard as even more important than peace...one
world, in some form or another with a consensus regarding at least certain common procedures, and probably certain common values, must be our ultimate if not always explicit over-all objective....

However, the "in-between world" probably lay between the poles of unresolved U.S. foreign policy. As George Morgan wrote to his colleague Mallory Browne at the PSB, shortly after the Princeton Meeting of May 1952,

The dilemma between passive co-existence and destruction of the Kremlin is somewhat oversimplified since the policy of NC 20/4 and related papers actually falls somewhere in between. In any case it may prove impossible for some time for the United States to make a wise final decision between such alternatives, and meanwhile the resulting contrast between peaceful and war-like aspects of our policy may turn out to be something that we just have to live with.

Like Professor Barghoorn, Arthur O. Cox of the PSB Office of Coordination would have made the whole world home-like by taking phony Marxists to task; but unlike patient George Morgan, Cox felt that the problem was immediately manageable. Explaining the purpose of PSB to its new director, Raymond B. Allen (former President of the University of Washington which had recently purged two Communist professors), Cox called for "political action on both an overt and covert basis." We were competing with the deployment of "the Utopian theories and words of Karl Marx" which had been disingenuously "used as the key for entering governments and men's minds to enable the ["Kremlin-controlled"] political apparatus to take power." Negotiations, collective security, dollar diplomacy, containment, NATO's defensive shield, had all been tried to no avail: We too had been taken in by Kremlin "Agitprop" and were out of tropes.

We have been losing this battle for men's minds because we have not yet harnessed our great strength and energy in an all out offensive to throw back Kremlin-controlled
Communism, back to its seat of power—the Politburo. Our enemy is not Marxism. Our enemy is not any economic or political theory. Our enemy is not the Red Army—the majority of the Red Army are potential friends of the United States. Our enemy is not Yugoslav Communism. Our enemy is not the Russian people—just ten percent of them. Our enemy is the fanatical conspiratorial Communist apparatus run by the Politburo for the ultimate purpose of world conquest.

For almost five years now we have been frightened, running helter skelter in every direction giving the Politburo one victory after another because we have not isolated our enemy, and as a result have permitted the Kremlin to successfully generate the impression that we hate all Russians, all Slavs, and even all people who are revolting from the control of imperialism. The Politburo has successfully created the myth of two camps—the philosophy of black and white—the peace-loving Communist democracies versus the imperialist-war mongering capitalists. And we have unwittingly fallen into their trap by accepting a reverse philosophy of the free world against the slave world—the democratic peoples against the totalitarian peoples. We have permitted ourselves to think in terms of two camps—of geographical areas. This has been a grave and tragic error. Our only enemy in this cold war is a maximum of 25 [?] million organized, militant members of the Communist Party spread throughout the world who take their orders from the Kremlin.

Slowly it has dawned on the American people that something should be done; the PSB is our promising toddler:

There has been a growing body of thought, most of it fairly unsophisticated and inarticulate, in Washington and throughout the country that in this cold war our government needed something akin to a democratic
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Agitprop in foreign affairs. As a result, the Psychological Strategy Board has emerged. To follow the analogy, the NSC might correspond to the Politburo and the PSB to the Agitprop, assuming of course the major difference that they dictate to the people and we are servants of the people...It is the first groping step forward in the United States Government to bring together a group of people specifically assigned to plan psychological strategy for the cold war.

Cox explains that the Russians have confused freedom with slavery, ideology with politics, which we, quiet servants of the people, instruments of their will, blessedly unbeset by the will to power, do not. After the necessary cleansing, our temporary expedient will surely wither away--unlike that of [the Elders of Zion, Mother]:

...As I see it, PSB should be considered a temporary phenomenon, a momentary product of the cold war. If it weren't for the existence of the Kremlin-controlled Communist Party, we wouldn't be in existence and shouldn't be. Traditional agencies should be doing the job. The men in the Kremlin have achieved their power by identifying the Utopian economic ideas of Karl Marx with ruthless, totalitarian political organization. The greatest psychological hoax ever perpetrated on mankind. The original revolution was genuine and so was the original Lenin. But soon Lenin discovered that the idea wouldn't work, but it did permit him to remain in power. Stalin had time to analyze Lenin's discovery and has been perfecting it ever since as the instrument of his personal power. The ideas of Marx have great emotional appeal to the downtrodden or the Platonic idealists, and particularly to the people of underdeveloped areas. These ideas are the entering wedge of the Communist Party--once the Party penetrates and achieves political power the Ministers of Interior and the security police do the rest--always with a token bow to Karl Marx and the withering away of the state....
In the following excerpts from the seventeenth meeting of the PSB, January 15, 1953, the toddler continues to arouse a Top Secret mixture of skepticism and delirious self-congratulation among government officials. Will the exact evaluation of psychological operations continue to elude the experts, or have inheritors of Renaissance exploration and boundlessness conquered the nothingness that followed the death of God?

[Under Secretary of State David A. Bruce]: [We at the State Department] continue to be wary of attempting to measure with the existing dubious criteria the effectiveness of a given psychological function in situations in which many other forces, economic, political, and military are at work.

[Admiral Alan G. Kirk (USN Retired), Director of PSB]: [We do get] a reasonable presentation of what has actually happened. The technique of evaluating these efforts in this field of psychological strategy, psychological warfare, that technique is being developed slowly for many reasons because it is something that no one has yet set down criteria on. That is on evaluation. I think some of the earlier steps may have been faltering but I think if we don't try these things, at least have a go at it, we'll never develop any technique whatsoever.

[William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense]: [Commends the Board and notes there has been "some retracing of steps" but] I hope that out of it, as it grows, will come a really well directed psychological effort on the part of the United States which can be very useful in the cold war in which we are engaged. [Averell Harriman and Bruce concur.]

[General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA]: [This is ] a completely uncharted field.

[William C. Foster]: Uncharted waters and no
one knows the depth of the waters, and yet I think we have made some progress toward something.

[General Smith]: The thing is when people take a look at this at least they have something to look at, not a void.

[Averell Harriman, the Mutual Security Agency]: I have been watching this sort of thing since during the war in relation to Russia and the advance of government thinking in the last ten years is really fantastic.

[General Smith]: When we first became associated, Averell, if you talked to anybody in the government about psychological warfare they'd have looked at you with an absolutely blank expression, wouldn't know what the hell you were talking about. At least we've got some idea.

[Averell Harriman]: And the knowledge of what the people think.

[Brigadier General Millard C. Young of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]: There's been one rather unfortunate note I have to bring to your attention. The wing commander of the 581st was shot down Monday night near the Yalu River and that is our first air force casualty of note.

[William C. Foster]: I'm sorry to hear that.

[General Young]: John K. Arnold Jr., shot down about 11 o'clock at night in a B29. According to reports his B29 but a crew other than himself [sic!] of an outfit that was over there in Japan on TDY from March Field. We don't quite know how that happened.

[General Smith]: You don't know what mission he was on?

[General Young]: The report is a leaflet mis-
sion but had other implications too. [They go off the record.]50

Although the language of open-ended experimentation was constantly mobilized, PSB "psychological operations" weren't always rational. Had the Cold Warriors been faithful to the radical Enlightenment they would not have confused "the people" with themselves, nor worried about "tactless errors" nor resorted to a "not always explicit over-all objective" and covert action, while simultaneously trumpeting America's ever-revolutionary identity and fidelity to "the free exchange of ideas." They could have factually described capitalism (early and late) and its competition, Soviet communism. The internal debates, the achievements and limitations of both societies could have been described, including the dynamics of development; how struggles between the inheritors of the radical and conservative enlightenment had shaped and constrained institutions in every "modern" society; how no society had educated everyone for democratic participation in group structures which constantly challenged authority, and which insisted on an accurate description (however provisional) of itself and its relationships, so that people could know what they were supporting and why. But the political Symbolists were repelled from such sane alternatives; as class actors in late capitalism they were expected to redefine healthful Americanism as non-Jewish and non-radical Protestant. Accordingly they purveyed pseudo-Enlightenment. Moreover, they were not speaking to ordinary people, but to notable counterparts in other societies. They beckoned poten-
tially Progressive rulers to reform now and avert a bloody massacre; they addressed other notables for whom the very concept of the dissenting individual was lost in the woozy discourse of organicism—a discourse transmitting delectable fantasies of total control/hysterical cravings for total sub-
mission.

CONCLUSIONS

The "democratic pluralism" promoted after both World Wars fostered only interest group politics;51 the class poli-
tics which attempted to advance the cause of cultural freedom for everyone were proscribed. Conflicts between truth and or-
der, independence and loyalty which surfaced in the Columbia University academic freedom controversy of 1917 pervaded democratic institutions throughout this century; the bizarre
corporatist solution advocated by members of the Columbia applied sciences faculty would be the medicine of choice in Progressive circles. Such corporatism transmitted pre-capitalist views of the malleable, easily excitable lower orders, an assumption which did not require testing through empirical investigation. Moreover, the mind-body split in idealist thinking lent itself to the fantasy that psychological warriors mobilizing cultural symbols could isolate decisive emotional factors in order to target and influence people to act against their perceived interests. Here may be the relevant context for current disputes over the teaching of Western high culture in the schools and media. Many Canon Warriors (including some Marxists) seem worried that women and non-whites are molded by a hostile culture; perhaps their conservative opponents feel that incorporating the literature and history of the lower orders will not merely devalue the humanities or that high culture will suffer by juxtaposition, but that Western liberal ideas are not strong enough to maintain their hold on students. This last suggestion follows from the material I have presented: Conservatives have appropriated the liberal language of the Enlightenment; what is truly feared may not be competing artists, "political correctness," or "nihilism," but the decoding of language and images which so many contemporary insurgents have undertaken, and which will continue to expose double-binds and a disregard for civil liberties in ostensibly enlightened institutions (including those of the Left).

The Canon Warriors should reconsider their hostile image of "the West" (an ahistoric, organicist category) but at the same time critical intellectuals should specify the misuses of "enlightened" social science during this century. Only a critical history, built upon the firm foundation of Enlightenment universalism, egalitarianism, and demystification (the uncompleted project of radical Protestantism), can challenge and overcome the sociopathy of the twentieth century. Amidst the rubble, surely it is possible to make a different differance\(^\text{52}\) to piece together the texts of past and present, to produce a coherent narrative, to be in the world, but not of it.\(^\text{53}\)

NOTES
1. Originally a sermon delivered to the First Unitarian Church, Los Angeles, California, January 21, 1990, revised for publication.

4. See Mick Cox, "The Cold War as System," *Critique* 17 (1986), 17-82, for a useful Trotskyist review of the debates and a long bibliography. Cox thinks anti-communist liberals and New Leftists misconceived the Soviet threat and were ideologically attached to Stalinism; he argues that both the West and the Soviets used the Cold War to bring stability to declining or failing systems; the "Other" disciplined labor in each society.

5. See Tzvetan Todorov, "Race, Writing and Culture," in Henry Louis Gates, ed., *Race, Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 370-380. Todorov makes many of the points of this essay in his critique of the other essays in the volume, however, he has no explanation for the scandalous lack of attention to anti-Semitism (p. 377). The Todorov essay is viewed as a theft of newly-won self-esteem, in Toni Morrison, "Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature," *Michigan Quarterly* (Winter 1989), p. 3. For Morrison, Western culture is inseparable from racism; 19th century whiteness was a crazy-making ideology; Herman Melville's purpose in *Moby Dick* was to attack "white male"-ness through Ahab's assault on the whale (15-16). Of course, the character of "the West" is the major dispute in cultural studies today; for a recent account of the Canon Wars, see Scott Heller, "Colleges Becoming Havens of 'Political Correctness' Some Scholars Say," Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 21, 1990.

6. At a UCLA Colloquium "Democratic Ideas in Seventeenth-Century England."

7. This position can be caricatured as "narcissism" by conservatives; see, for instance, George Sandys', *Ovid's Metamorphosis Englished* (New York: Garland Press, 1976) 106; from Sandys' 1632 to today, the warning is directed against the empiricism and materialism of rising groups which lead to self-love, eroding the paternalist ethos and therefore generating catastrophic revolts from below.

8. Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and Social Control," *Psychiatry*, Volume 5, #4. Liberal-rational professors were advised that "defining the situation," not the direct indoctrination of attitudes, was the task of elites promoting orderly progress against revolutionaries, debunkers, and cynics. Students and others who believed that free speech should be a part of the pattern of their lives would be disciplined in the psychiatrist's office. The antifascist activist Parsons was bringing closure to the Enlightenment.

9. Idealists and materialists are arguing about one major "truth": Do ordinary people have the capacity to manage their lives? Since the nineteenth century the conflict has centered around two key questions: 1. Class collaboration or class conflict, i.e., is there or is there not an irreconcilable contradiction between capital and labor? All tactics flow from this determination. 2. What is the role of the intellectuals? Are groups to have authoritarian or democratic leadership? Franz Mehring's discussion of hostile idealist critiques (1895) focused solely on the confusion of materialism and sensuality, see "Concerning Historical Materialism," *The New International*, June 1941, 120-126. For the political implications of idealism, pragmatism, and the concept of mass culture, see Robert A. Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave LeBon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975).

10. For an important turning point in academic history, see Carolyn F. Ware,
The Cultural Approach to History, edited for the American Historical Association (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 3-16. The methods and concepts of cultural anthropology would correct the elitist biases of "scientific history" while keeping readers out of trouble: "...[The cultural historian may not] rest upon the prescription of the scientific historians to let the facts speak and to be guided wherever the material may lead...." (p.9) The concept of the protestant individual, "in the world, but not of it" disappears in the concept of "personality" or "individual-in-society" as formulated by cultural anthropologists and social psychologists; we are shaped by "culture," and in turn produce it (see the Introductory Note). However, the primacy of the shaping function of culture makes voluntarism impossible.

11. The Foucault passages are found in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1984), 91,92. Professor Jack Solomon brought them to the attention of scholars at a UCLA Conference on critical theory in 1986. Similar views have been extant since Plato; see an important formulation in Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1922), the first chapter for the social theory of what some would later dub "postmodernism"; Lippmann's authorities include Plato, William James, and Jung; his enemies are Marx and Freud; his ruling idea that reality is ever too complex to grasp (except for the "political scientist" who must intervene before authority is decentralized, i.e., before the befuddled stereotype-ridden majority makes disastrous political decisions). Today such counter-Enlightenment views are ensconced (and contested) in cultural studies, but did not burst upon the scene with Lippmann or Foucault. The now forgotten left-liberal social psychologist Ellis Freeman summarized organismic thinking since Plato in Conquering The Man in the Street: A Psychological Analysis of Propaganda in War, Fascism, and Politics (New York: Vanguard Press, 1940), a work which irritated Harold Lasswell because it did not equate fascism and communism.

12. See Richard Crossman, ed., The God That Failed (N.Y.: Harper, 1949). 4, pp. 10-11. The "despair" that led "profoundly Christian" or individualistic antifascist intellectuals into Communism was "hysterical"; those who joined the Party will never recover "a whole personality." See also Alan Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1987), 369, 372. Wald rightly criticizes the way former leftist intellectuals used the notion of "independent critical [thought]" to hide their complicity with Cold Warriors after the war; however he attributes an absolutism to the idea of autonomy that is foreign to the views of scientists: "An axiom of Marxism, as well as of all other materialist philosophies, holds that total autonomy from the social institutions that shape lives and consciousness is a delusion, a myth that serves the ideological function of preserving the simulacrum of "free will" while sustaining the dominant institutions, social relations, and culture of the existing society" (369). This view, while sensibly examining the power of structures and the Cold War tactic of repressive tolerance, also makes it difficult, if not impossible to stand outside the system to describe and evaluate relationships between leaders and the led. Wald wants both partisan commitment and objectivity; moreover, Marxist intellectuals should be both internationalist and take "the standpoint of the oppressed groups in society" (373); but what if "the oppressed" are rigorously anti-modern, localist and authoritarian?

13. A founding document of Christian Socialism was Kingsley's Alton Locke,
tailor and poet, published anonymously in 1850, as the testament of a repentant Chartist.

14. This connection has been denied by leading figures in American Studies; see Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History (University of Chicago Press, 1987), who argues that there was once an attempt to impose the romantic nationalist idea of organic unity (i.e., white male hegemony); New Leftists have remedied this situation by celebrating the diversity and incoherence that was always there. Leo Marx insisted on the connection between F.O. Matthiessen’s generation and the New Left at the November 4, 1990 meeting of the American Studies Association. The Marxist writers of Partisan Review characterized Lewis Mumford, Waldo Frank, etc. as antifascist fascists, opposed to “critical intelligence;” see Dwight McDonald, “War and the Intellectuals II,” PR, Spring 1939, 3-20, and James Burnham’s review of Louis Hacker’s The Triumph of American Capitalism, PR, Nov-Dec 1940, 479.

15. See the editorial, Feb.8, 1919, urging its conservative readers to move sharply leftward to meet the challenge of disillusioned, therefore proto-Red Wilsonians.

16. See Rabbi Lee J. Levinger, Anti-Semitism in the United States: Its History and Causes (New York: Bloch, 1925) for a classic conservative pluralist statement directed to recent Jewish immigrants and proscribing European formulations of class struggle (“Fascismo” versus “Socialism”). For the moderate Levinger, artists and scientists were tragic misfits; groups not individuals were possessed of “individuality.” Cf. the recent novel of the East German author Stefan Heym, The Wandering Jew (1983); Heym named his radical Wandering Jew Ahab.

17. George L. Mosse, Germans and Jews; the Right, the Left, and the search for a “Third Force” in pre-Nazi Germany (N.Y.: Howard Fertig, 1970).

18. Numerous writers submerge this narrative with the observation that Germans were irrational to confuse capitalist and communist Jews, for instance, J.P. Stern, Hitler: The Fuhrer and the People (Berkeley: U.C. Press, 1975), who writes “...Hitler’s public...readily accepts the peculiar logic of Hitler’s anti-Semitism, according to which, without a word of explanation, ‘international financial interests’ are seen as not being at odds with ‘Bolshevization’ but identical with it.” (p.80) Also see Arno Mayer, Why Did The Heavens Not Darken? The Final Solution in History, (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1988), 92; in addition to causing the Versailles Treaty, revolutions and bolshevism, Jews were denounced “...as the mainstay of parasitic capitalism and the masterminds of the modernist subversion of classical culture.”

19. This was a pamphlet adapted from Herman Goedsche’s Biarritz (1868), in which rich Jews are shown to be plotting against the oppressed masses of Europe. “Making a show of zeal for the social question of the moment,” they are planting free thought and skepticism only to destroy religion, meanwhile monopolizing media and controlling public opinion. Jews will enslave the proletariat to money, thus they will rise at (Jewish) will; the outcome will be world domination as Abraham was promised by God. Translated and discussed in Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide; the myth of the Jewish world-conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), 36-40, 269-274.

20. Father Mapple’s sermon in Moby-Dick argues for the higher law; it could only refer to the moral necessity for abolitionism, a position undermined by
Melville's father-in-law Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of Massachusetts, who had just upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, polarizing Boston.

21. *American Renaissance, Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman* (N.Y.: Oxford U. P., 1941), xv, 448, 466, 474, 475, 477. These matters are explored in my doctoral dissertation on the Melville revival, 1919-1991. Melville's most explicit description of the double-bind is found in *Pierre, or the Ambiguities* (1852), one of the most controversial works in American literature.

22. Carlos E. Sluzki and Donald C. Ransom, ed., *Double Bind: The Foundation of the Communicational Approach to the Family* (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1976), 11. Conducive to schizophrenia is "the absence of anyone in the family, such as a strong and insightful father, who can intervene in the relationship between the mother and child and support the child in the face of the contradictions involved."

23. My sources were easily accessible documents (including newspaper clippings, faculty reports and letters to Nicholas Murray Butler, letters of resignation, etc.) in "Miscellaneous correspondence relating to the dismissal of Cattell and Dana" in the Columbia University Manuscripts Division, Butler Library, quoted with the permission of Columbia University, and the *Columbia Spectator* (October 1-31, 1917). The lengthiest account of the Columbia purge is found in Carol Gruber, *Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher Learning in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U.P.), 187-206.

24. *Columbia Spectator*, Oct. 4, 1917, p.2. Cattell, while calling for community control of private universities, denouncing "academic slavery" and applauding the prospect of socialism, also admired elitists. See *An Education in Psychology: James McKeen Cattell's Journal and Letters from Germany and England, 1880-1888*, ed. Michael M. Sokal (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press), 303. In *University Control* (N.Y.: Science Press, 1913), Cattell wanted rationalizing, bureaucratic businessmen to cease interfering with faculty matters. However, as a signer of antifascist petitions in the 1930s, he was identified by the Martin Dies committee as a left-wing subversive in theHUAC report of 1944.


26. Compare the language of George W. Dithredge of the International Steel Car Company in his letter to Butler, September 14, 1917: "With the example of Scott Nearing and his progressive descent to the dogs, Columbia cannot afford to cast the mantle of protective charity over a man [Cattell] so clearly unfit to exercise any influence over our young men, who above learning and technique must be saturated by precept and example with the principles and spirit of good citizenship."

27. The file contains an unsigned report (apparently from the Committee of Nine, aHUAC-type body organized to inquire into the penetrations of left-wing scholarship from which John Dewey resigned after the Dana firing), and a letter to Butler from the faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, and Pure Sciences. The Committee of Nine report is almost hysterical in tone; both documents sought corporatist remedies.


29. In one meeting of the secretive Psychological Strategy Board, 3/27/52 (see below on the PSB), Colonel Paul Davis presented the Mid-East as a cauldron of "social revolution." Modernism would be corrosive to the social systems of
conservative Arab societies. Israel was feared as "a very modern dynamic expansionist State which is creating tensions throughout the area." See Declassified Documents Catalog: 1988 (Woodbridge CT, Reading England, Research Publications), #001760. This source lists and numbers declassified documents (grouped according to the government agency from which they originated), which may then be read on microfiche. Future citations will be abbreviated as DDC.

30. See Herbert Schiller, Culture Inc.; the corporate takeover of public expression (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1989), and numerous other media critics, including Noam Chomsky and Michael Parenti.


32. Transcript of Princeton Inn Meeting, 1952, an informal gathering organized by C.D. Jackson, attended by government officials and "citizens expert" in psychological warfare, "to clarify and clean up morals and frustrations of the people in this country," and to advise the newly organized Psychological Strategy Board and the President on the need for clear political objectives in Eastern Europe, so that Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, etc. could advise specific, government-approved actions to the people they had riled up against the USSR. See DDC:1988,#001164; #001165 contains Lewis Galantiere's summary of the meeting.


33. See Roland I. Perusse, "Psychological Warfare Reappraised," A Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), 25-35. Perusse's account of the short-lived PSB (with some bibliography of press responses) defends the objectivity and fairness of the program, agreeing with W.H. Jackson that terms such as "psychological warfare" and "cold war" gave a false impression of U.S. intentions; however, there will always be a need for such functions: "It is the duty of persons cognizant of psychological factors to keep diplomats, political and military officers, economic experts, and others who have dealings with foreign peoples and foreign governments informed of the climate of and changes in public opinion in foreign countries and to let such persons know of the probable public reaction to policies contemplated. In this way, many moves that could cause resentment can be avoided, or if they must be taken, regardless of probable adverse public opinion, because of the overriding other factors, the psychological specialist, if we want to call him that, can offer suggestions as to how effects may be mitigated or cushioned. Such a specialist also has a duty to come up with suggestions for actions that will create favorable public reaction abroad (33-34)."

See also William E. Daugherty, "Personnel Qualifications For Psychological Warfare," 157-184; quoting Dan Lerner: "...(3) A systematic "policy conception" of the propaganda process, requires constant awareness that the purpose of sykewar is to use the target's hopes, fears and wishes (in addition to one's own) in manipulating symbols to achieve policy purposes. (4) A
systematic conception of the psychocultural process opinion-formation, which constantly involves awareness that sykewar operates within a vast environment. Any element of the environment is capable of affecting the attitude-structure of any target. The skill required of the propagandist is the ability to discover the decisive affective elements in a given target and how to manipulate them (p.160)." Cf. Perusse's statement that since C.D. Jackson's resignation as Presidential advisor on psychological warfare, April 1, 1954, "psychological factors are no longer considered in isolation and superior to other elements in foreign policy formulation and execution but are considered a vital and integral part of every action (p.32)."

34. "Role of Psychological Strategy Board under 4/4/51 Presidential Directive," DDC: 1990, #002961. Cf. Charles Bohlen's remark at the Princeton Meeting, p.103: Disagreeing with the premise that psychological (interchangeable with political) warfare was a novel development of the PSB, responding to recent Soviet initiatives, "...we have been waging [political warfare] since 1946. A lot has been going on"; adding that the U.S. has had the initiative since 1947. Perhaps in contrast, Allen Dulles earlier remarked that the PSB was a development which "I personally welcome tremendously" (p.82). According to the Lilly report (see below), the State Department had consistently opposed an independent psychological warfare agency, causing delays in the appearance of the PSB.


36. Pospelov was pictured seated at his desk in front of a map of Europe, NYT, Dec.11, 1951, p.14.


38."Truth Held Weak in Fight on Soviet," NYT, December 15, 1951, p.3


40. See Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," International Security, Winter 1983/1983, 110-138; this and other revisions agreeable to the upper-class peace movement tend to make the presence or absence of a Soviet military threat the decisive factor of the cold war. For opposing views on the objective character of the Soviet threat in the mid 1940s, see Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (N.Y.: Random House, 1983), 23, and The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (London: Pinter Press, 1990), 62. Cockburn's contention that U.S. intelligence was entirely irrational is not borne out by the records I have examined, nor is his reductive thesis that "The official overview has remained unchanged since the early Cold War era when President Truman declared: 'The Soviet Union and its colonial satellites are maintaining armed forces of great size and strength in both Europe and Asia. Their vast armies pose a constant threat to world peace.' Schweitzer writes, "...the main threat was perceived to be 'local aggressive actions', by means of direct or indirect intimidation or 'political warfare'. This was to be the general pattern for all of Washington's threat analyses."

See also Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace; The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). Yergin dichotomizes U.S. policy as torn between the Riga axioms (USSR is an "immediate military
threat") and Yalta axioms (USSR is a great power responding to conventional diplomacy). But the Cold War (including the reorganization of covert operations) intensified after the victory of Communist China, the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb, Soviet criticisms of U.S. foreign and domestic actions (imperialism, racism), and failure of the CIA to predict the invasion of South Korea, not in response to military strength in 1945-48. Cf. NSC 20/4, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," in Gaddis, op.cit., 203-211. It was the political, not the military conquest of Europe by the Soviet Union that was specified.

A mixture of military, political and ideological factors are described in CIA document, "Political Alignments and Major Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in the Event of War Before July 1951," January 23, 1951, DDC: 1988, #003534; its claims are echoed in the Leviero NYT articles, Dec.10-15, 1951. See also Lilly Report, op.cit., pp.30-90 for details of U.S. ideological campaigns to counter political developments in Western Europe, including the creation of the Cominform (the hostile Soviet response to the Marshall Plan which misrepresented the "independence" of Communist parties).

One PSB document, a memorandum from Admiral L. Stephens, suggests that U.S. planners lacked a clear concept of domestic security based on the legitimacy of democratic capitalism; security could only be grounded in some defensive but hostile action toward Soviets. See DDC: 1988, #003550, "Method of Approach to a Strategic Psychological Plan," Oct.31, 1951: "Our accepted policy and aim is to retract and reduce Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security. A clear statement of what those limits might be would be very helpful in the formulation of a general strategic plan. Some think that the threat can be removed only if the hold of the Bolshevik power over the USSR and its satellites is broken. Others think that the exercise of Soviet power and influence against U.S. security can be made so unprofitable that the threat will cease to be a genuine one. In the latter case, there are differences of opinion on the concrete circumstances under which this situation would be attained...It is easy to deal in generalities, but to my mind, the difficulty of transforming generalities into concrete action is one of the major defects of our present effort...." See his article in The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, ed. C. Grove Haines, (John Hopkins Press, 1954).

41. See "Memo to Mr. Cutler from Bill Korns. Subject: Psychological Strategy in the Ensuing Years," DDC: 1988, #003536. Korns distances himself from the Right, denying that the phrase "common cause" is to be conflated with the "holy crusade": "The idea, if not the actual phrase, of a "holy crusade" is already being propagated by Henry Luce among others. Not only is this drive overwhelmingly anti-Communist rather than pro-freedom. It is also America First as opposed to United Nations, Common Cause, or Free World. It is the "our way or else" approach." Cf. Eisenhower's directive stating the mission of the USIA, including "Depicting imaginatively the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world." (Perusse, pp.31-32) Also, for the distinction between universalists and promoters of diversity, see John L. Gaddis, "The Strategy of Containment," in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzioni and John Lewis Gaddis (Columbia U.P., 1978), 25-37.

42. Jackson Report, "Propaganda and Information Activities in the Free World," n.d., DDC:1988, #001163, p. 6. This report, the result of five months of inter-
views, is partly excerpted in Perusse, op.cit. pp.30-31; the report was ordered by Eisenhower early 1953; chaired by W.H. Jackson (a New York attorney, ex-deputy director of the CIA, and a foe to "discrimination"), it employed C.D. Jackson (Eisenhower's "personal advisor on psychological warfare,"p.30) and was said to be instrumental in dissolving PSB, thus changing the image of sykewar from the offensively manipulative to the neutrality of "information"; nothing should interfere with the concept of common ground and voluntary association with U.S. objectives. Portions are quoted below.

43. See especially Top Secret Memorandum to William Korns from Ned Nordness, Office of Information, Mutual Security Agency, Oct.18, 1952, DDC:1990, #002970, one of the few documents to give concrete examples of methods and locales. "MSA Information is devoting the major part of its energy and attention to publicizing programs, campaigns and projects and to see that the benefits received by some are appreciated by more. The line taken here should be not one of gloating and self-satisfaction...It is a major directive in MSA Information to give as much credit as possible to pro-Western elements in and out of Government for improvements and benefits brought about by American aid." Commenting on the success of mobile units staffed by locals in "seething" Southeast Asia, Nordness wrote, "It is important in our opinion that locals should bear as much of the psychological warfare as possible. This tends to increase pride among the recipients, to give the operation more hometown appeal and generate more confidence."--a pattern for American information agencies.

Nordness understood very well that Americans were in a bind regarding anti-colonial social movements; if they ignored them, World Communism would win; if they supported the insurgents, they could antagonize the rulers of the West who supported the rule of capital in America. He suggested that Americans risk offending her capitalist allies, but simultaneously groom pro-Western leadership (in which individuality would reside in global capitalism): "It is, of course, through enlightened programs and positions of their own [that] the Western powers and ruling classes of Asia made themselves individuals. The Asian Revolution can therefore work Western influence on the upheaval and realistic possibility which in turn would help solve the dilemma for the U.S. [sic]." That is, only the merging we associate with corporatism and fascism can resolve the double-bind.

44. See Jackson Committee Report, #001163, op.cit. The report begins with an expression of alarm: "Extreme statements made by Americans, often for domestic effect, are prominently displayed abroad and can create serious doubt as to the maturity, stability, and constancy of purpose of the United States." To be effective, propaganda "must be dependable, convincing and truthful. In particular situations, propaganda, overt or covert, may play a role of decisive importance in the attainment of specific goals, but too much or too blatant propaganda can be harmful." Solidarity was found in these shared values: "belief in God, belief in individual and national freedoms [etc.]... Sharing such beliefs, the United States has partners and allies abroad, not subservient allies held by force."

45. See Memo from Charles Norberg to John Sherman, May 19, 1952, DDC:1989, #000533: speaking of the Middle East, Norberg wrote, "it might perhaps be appropriate from time to time to define our objectives in the first instance in terms of the psychological objectives of the indigenous populations and then to
determine how we can best achieve those objectives." Did Norberg intend to support socialist transformation? Compare his statement to C.D. Jackson's complaint in a report of a Luxemburg meeting, 1953: American labor union representatives have been actually strengthening the labor movement in France and Italy. Washington should do something because they are undermining unification of the non-Communist trade union movement! #001168, Top Secret. 46. "Memo for Colonel Philbin; Schedule of Priorities for psychological warfare," Oct. 22, 1951, DDC:1990, #002962. See a related document for an example of tactful diplomacy and Progressive uplift all around: White House Memo (2), "To Mallory Browne from Wallace Irwin, Jr. Subject: Potential Role of Wealthy Individuals in Foreign Countries." DDC: 1988, #003546: "...it seems possible that such projects would foster better relations between classes in the countries involved, and give wealthy individuals a vested interest in the cause of social improvement outside of and against Communist revolutionary fronts. Progress would be made in this way toward filling a psychological and political vacuum which is now open to exploitation by nationalist demagogues and ultimately by Communists."

47. May 26, 1952, DDC:1988, #000534. Morgan believed that indigenous conditions (not Soviet anti-American propaganda) were responsible for the "misgivings about the American military effort" in Western Europe and England. 48. Memorandum to Dr. Allen, 3/25/52. DDC: 1990, #002967, p.1. 49. #002967, ibid., pp.2-3. Cf. statements in an FBI report on CPUSA activities, July 1-December 31, 1952. Describing a handbook "The Role of the Working Class," this operative makes Marx and Engels master puppeteers and experimental scientists: "This handbook states that the role of the working class is decisive in the struggle against war and Fascism not because it is numerically larger than any other group but because Marx and Engels decided that the working class would be the best group to put their theories into practice." DDC: 1988, #00965.

The CPUSA educational material quoted in the FBI report on "Communist Front Schools" (#000970) suggests that the double-bind was perpetuated in American Communist institutions. Avram Landy (1938), writing in The Communist described the Party as teacher: "the entire work of the Party rests on the recognition that its own activity, far from being a substitute for the struggle of the masses, must help the masses in this struggle to learn from their own experiences, to draw the necessary conclusions from their own mistakes and to see the next steps required by the struggle." But what if the conclusions of "the masses" (note the individuality given to the millions) were in disagreement with the official positions of the CP (also speaking with one voice)? What does "help" mean? Similarly, the Jefferson School of Social Science (in an evaluation of its work 1944-1950), while holding that the CP was the organizational embodiment of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice; that the Soviet Union was the leading force of peace, democracy, and socialism; that "instruction should reflect C.P. policy"; and that the United Front was the "main tactic of the democratic camp in the US"; also found it unproblematic to explain that "Ours is not the routine job of purveying pre-conceived bodies of subject matter, even "Marxist subject matter"; rather, ours is the creative task of teaching people, of bringing theoretical understanding to thousands of the most important individuals in America, of helping to develop effective leaders of the working-class movement--upon which rests our confidence in a progressive future." (Quoting the 1954 catalog):
"Its students are encouraged to think for themselves and to reach their own rea-
soned conclusions."
50 DDC: 1990, #002971. The document was Top Secret and was extensively san-
itized.
51. Cf. the Italian Fascist Sindicati where "classes and trade unions are rec-
ognized as representatives of various interests and economic activities which
merge into the one State." In L. Minio-Paluello, Education in Fascist Italy (New
52. I refer to "diferance," Jacques Derrida's widely quoted term which asserts the
elusiveness of final meanings in language; also the "difference" celebrated by
promoters of cultural diversity, and which may express either good boundaries,
appreciation and toleration, or more ominously, grounds for disunity and violent
conflict.
53. Cf. the co-option of the Old Testament in a PSB memorandum, 2/15/52,
"Mobilization of Spiritual, Religious, and Moral Factors in Psychological
Strategy," with participants Herbert Agar and Mallory Browne, in which the pu-
ritan doctrine of the higher law is transformed into its opposite: state worship.
Browne proposed that a Free World Conference (aimed at "actual or potential leg-
islators" of the Middle East and Asia) should be organized to promote the
"spiritual idea" that "law is the basis of all freedom." "It was agreed that the one
field where the Russians can not claim to monopolize all that is good is pre-
cisely in the spiritual and religious field. In other words, they have gotten away
to a large extent with perverting "peace" to their own uses, but they can not pose
as spiritual leaders; they can not claim to be the true prophets of law, and we
must not let them steal our thunder there. The same is true, of course, with free-
dom itself." DDC: 1990, #002965, also #002966, "Exploitation of Basic Moral
and Social Forces." God-like tasks included "the identification of exploitable
moral and social forces with emphasis on emergent, little-known, or neglected
ones" and "development of a global psychological strategy plan establishing
national objectives and broad courses of action with regard to the exploitation of
moral and social forces." So much for left-wing over-reachers. At the Princeton
Meeting, 5/10-11/52, Lang deified America: "What I would hope to get out of
this meeting is the shaping in Atlantic Charter fashion of some statement of
moral principles which cannot be pinned down, but as a result of which the peo-
ple look to one country for their salvation and as the champion of liberty and
freedom." (#001164, p.102)