Title
Making Race in the New South: Mexican Migration and Race Relations in Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7rz9q3jn

Author
Jones, Jennifer Anne Meri

Publication Date
2011

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
Making Race in the New South:  
Mexican Migration and Race Relations in Winston-Salem, North Carolina

By

Jennifer Anne Meri Jones

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Sociology  
in the  
Graduate Division  
of the  
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Sandra Smith, Chair  
Professor Irene Bloemraad  
Professor Michael Burawoy  
Professor Michael Omi

Fall 2011
Making Race in the New South:
Mexican Migration and Race Relations in Winston-Salem, North Carolina

© 2011
by Jennifer Anne Meri Jones
Abstract

Making Race in the New South: Mexican Migration and Race Relations in Winston-Salem, North Carolina

By

Jennifer Anne Meri Jones

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Sandra Smith, Chair

In this dissertation, I investigate how race is produced by looking at the reception experiences of Afro and Mestizo Mexican migrants to the New South. Despite the fact that Afro and Mestizo Mexicans are both phenotypically and culturally distinct from one another, they now assert a shared racial identity as minorities and as Latinos. Based on ethnographic field work in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, I argue that pervasive discrimination due to status drives Mexicans to assert a minority identity that is shaped by their understanding of African-American experiences, and that Mexicans as a whole in this context find themselves increasingly distanced from whites.

The literature on intergroup relations argues that racial and ethnic relations, particularly between minority groups, are rife with conflict and competition. Moreover, the immigration literature suggests that relations with African-Americans are particularly poor in part because upward mobility is achieved by avoiding associations with Blacks, and aspiring toward whiteness. However, in the case of contemporary Mexican migrants in Winston-Salem, I find the opposite processes emerging. Rather than a sense of closeness with whites, Mexicans express a sense of closeness with Blacks, increasingly viewing themselves as minorities and as similar to Blacks. I describe these positive interminority relations as emerging in three ways: through contact and social closeness; solidarity and a sense of shared discrimination; and an emerging sense of linked fate. Using a 12-month ethnographic case study of Winston-Salem, I seek to explain this counterintuitive outcome. My study shows that these positive relations are facilitated by their sense of shared status with African-Americans, an absence of resource competition, sustained positive contact with Blacks, and identifying a common enemy in whites. The implications of these findings for other U.S. communities are considered.
For my Family
Table of Contents

Making Race in the New South:  
Mexican Migration and Race Relations in Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Chapter One: Introduction...........................................................................................................pp. 1  
Becoming Minorities  
Racial Distancing  
American Whiteness  
The New South  
Resource Competition and Race Relations  
The Study  
Research design, sample and data  
North Carolina  
Ethnography  
Interviews  
Overview of the Dissertation

Chapter Two: Racializing Latinos..............................................................pp. 19  
Racializing Latinos  
Black/Brown Relations  
Shared Status  
Group Threat and Intergroup Contact  
Becoming Minorities: Local Context and Reverse Incorporation  
Government  
Reinforcing Context

Chapter Three: Vamos a Carolina! Mexican Migration and North Carolina..........pp. 33  
Push and Pull: From Mexico to North Carolina  
Push from Mexico  
Pull to the New South  
The New South  
North Carolina: Race in the Receiving Community  
Historical Winston-Salem  
Demographic Change  
North Carolina

Chapter Four: Fear and Loathing in North Carolina...............................pp. 48  
The Honeymoon period  
Policy  
9/11 State  
From Open Doors to Shut Gates  
Fear and Loathing  
The New Non-Citizen
Chapter Five: “Blacks may be Second Class, but They Can’t Make Them Leave”:
Mexican Racial Formation and Immigrant Status in Winston-Salem..................pp. 70
  Racial Formation
  Becoming Minorities: Reverse Incorporation
    Government
    Reinforcing Context
  New Latinos
    From Discrimination to Racial Stratification
    Connections with Blacks
    It’s about Status: Not like Puerto Ricans and Cubans
    Exceptions

Chapter Six: Salsa and Soul: The Emergence of Positive Interminority Relations in Winston-Salem.................................................................pp. 88
  Positive Interracial Relations
    Proximity and Contact
    Shared Exclusion
    Black Leadership
    Everyday Blacks
    Solidarity and Collaboration
  Distance from Whites: From the Stranger to the Enemy
    Progressives: The Stranger
    Majority Middle
    Enforcement
  Black/Brown Solidarity

Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Looking Toward the Future.........................pp. 106
  Discrimination and Policy
  Resource Competition
  Receiving Contexts
  Interminority Relations and Racialization
  What’s Next?

References........................................................................................................pp. 115

Appendix I: Map of North Carolina Counties..............................................pp. 138

Appendix II: Dot Matrix Map of Triad area demographic change, 1970-2010.......pp. 139

Appendix III: Cloropleth maps of demographic change in Winston-Salem,
  1970-2010........................................................................................................pp. 142

Appendix IV: Income and Occupational data by race for Winston-Salem........pp. 147
  Forsyth County 2000 Census Summary File: Educational Attainment
  by Race over 25 years
  EEO Residence Data Results for Winston-Salem city,
North Carolina, 2000

Appendix V: Immigration Policy Abbreviations and Timeline…………………….pp. 151

Appendix VI: Methodological Appendix ……………………………………….....pp. 155
  Methodology
  Latino Interviews
Acknowledgements

Dissertation writing is a difficult, long, lonely, laborious process, involving, if not blood and sweat, certainly plenty of tears. It is also an exciting and liberating process in which you finally make that transition from student to scholar, producing a large-scale project all your own, often for the first time. Of course, while the project belongs to you, it takes nothing short of an army to get to the light of day. For this reason, I am immensely grateful for the space to officially recognize the people who invested in me and supported me through not only the dissertation process, but also this long road we call graduate school.

When I started at Berkeley, I was barely a legal adult, and unsure of whether I had made the right decision. After all, I had never taken a sociology course in my life, and knew next to nothing about academic life. Fortunately for me, I began this journey with the unwavering support of my family, who always believed I could achieve whatever I wanted, and encouraged me to go my own way, suppressing any and all reservations they may have had about the process- be it money, distance, and just plain confusion about what exactly I was up to. They never questioned me, always offered words of encouragement, and never hesitated to tell me that they were proud of me and all that I had already accomplished. Few people can count on their families for unconditional support, and I have been terribly fortunate to have a sister, parents, grandparents, cousins, aunts and uncles, and various honorary Lasleys and Joneses who have offered me their well-wishes and support along the way. In particular, I thank them for never asking ‘why aren’t you done yet?’, and trusting that I would get there, even when I wasn’t sure myself. I’d also like to thank my dear friends from Chicago to California, especially Euna Chi, Leah Drew, Lea Mosena, and Katie Sklarsky, who have cheered me along the entire way.

In particular, I’d like to thank my parents, Patricia Lasley and Keith Jones, grandparents Anna and William Lasley, and sister, Pamela Jones, who, over the years, have helped me with money and moves, listened to my lamenting about progress and getting pale in the library, encouraged me through writing blocks, bragged about me to their friends and acquaintances, bought me dinner, and always treated my efforts as worthwhile, if not downright heroic. I’d also like to express my deep gratitude to my parents for investing in my education from birth, even when we had very little. My mother especially was unwavering in her commitment to making sure that I had access to the people and institutions that would allow me to flourish, even at great sacrifice. I see now how much easier it would have been to do otherwise, and I am certain I would not have had the same success without those opportunities.

I want to acknowledge the women in my family, who have been not only been pillars of strength and caring, but have also led by example through a commitment to achievement and independence. In particular, my grandmother throughout her life has been a woman ahead of her time, undeterred by the many doors closed to her. She has always bore the brunt of life’s challenges with calm and a smile, and is generous with her
gifts to a fault. I feel especially blessed to share many of her qualities and to be able to be a source of pride and vindication for her, to achieve where she could not.

I have also had a number of important mentors along the way, from my middle school history teacher Ms. Bell, who took me aside one day and told me that she believed I could one day be a Supreme Court Justice if I wanted, to my Pomona College mentors and thesis advisors, Pierre Englebert, Phyllis Jackson, Sidney Lemelle and Heather Williams, who encouraged me to consider an academic career. I am also grateful to those invisible mentors in Pomona Sociology, who seek me out at conferences and disciplinary events to give words of encouragement, despite the fact that I never took a class from them. Two professors who were instrumental in my choice as an undergraduate to pursue sociology were not at Pomona at all, but at Northwestern. They may not realize it, but by offering me a summer research position to work on their newest book projects, Eric Klinenberg and Mary Pattillo introduced me to a field that was a better fit for my research interests than I realized, and changed my life by encouraging me to apply to Berkeley and pursue the questions that motivated me.

While at Berkeley, I have had the great fortune to have numerous colleagues and mentors who have supported me and provided invaluable feedback, guidance, mental, and emotional support along the way. I would like to start by thanking the members of the Afro-Latino Working Group, the Berkeley Journal of Sociology, the Diversity Working Group, the Race Workshop, and the Summer Institute for Preparing Future Faculty for the opportunity to workshop my research and to hone my skills at seeing the big picture.

A special thank you to my various writing and thinking partners over the years, especially: Kemi Balogun, Hana Brown, Dawn Dow, Tianna Paschel, Marcel Paret, and Jennifer Randles, Petra Rivera and Leslie Wang. Their time, friendship and feedback has been invaluable. I’d also like to thank colleagues Ruha Benjamin, Nora Broege, Felipe Dias, Trevor Gardner, Shannon Gleeson, Juan Herrera, Margo Mahan, Sarah Anne Minkin, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Heidy Sarabia, Tamera Stover and Kara Young for their friendship and intellectual support over the years. Thanks to all of you and the numerous other friends and colleagues who have helped me refine my thinking, as well as meet me for a drink in commiseration or celebration, depending on the week.

A thank you also the Sociology graduate students and various other graduate students (current and former) who work(ed) in Barrows Hall for providing a truly stimulating environment to learn and grow as a scholar. I count myself lucky to have them as colleagues for life. A thank you also to the Graduate Diversity Office directors, Gloria Chun, Audrey Knowlton and Josephine Moreno for their support and flexibility, and for providing such a positive working environment as I worked my way through my dissertation writing.

I’d like to give a special second thank you to Jennifer Randles and Tianna Paschel whose support improved not only my research, but also my sanity, through coffee, happy-hours, dissertation dinners, weekly hikes and phone calls until the bitter end. They both
read draft after draft and memo after memo, and know my dissertation very, very well. I am eternally grateful to their thoughtful attention and support. They were essential to my progress, and I hope I have been as good a colleague and friend to them as they have been to me.

When I started at Berkeley, I was fortunate to be assigned to Laura Enriquez, a wonderful and thoughtful advisor, and to take courses with Raka Ray and Michael Burawoy, who helped me see the labor of learning sociology as a vocation. Still, I fancied myself a future race scholar, and had not yet found a mentor. By my second year however, by a massive stroke of luck, we managed to lure Professor Sandra Smith into our ranks. Sandra quickly became my mentor and champion, shepherding me through the entire graduate school process, from the MA paper, to my first teaching assignment, to committee service, not to my first co-authored publications, the dissertation, professional development and absolutely everything in between. Sandra has shown me what true mentorship is, and has provided a model for me to help my future students learn and grow. I cannot thank her enough for her patience, commitment, candor, and friendship over these last several years. Even when I took two steps forward, one step back, Sandra stuck with me and pushed me further than I thought I could go. I cannot imagine what this process would have been like without her, and I owe much of my success to her.

I also want to thank my dissertation committee, Michael Omi, Michael Burawoy and Irene Bloemraad for their feedback and guidance throughout the researching and writing process. Their expertise was invaluable as I conceived, executed and thought through the findings in this project, and I could not have done it without their help. Thanks also to Cybelle Fox who was not a committee member, but who has always been available to answer all of my questions about both my research and the professionalization process, and learn from her as she made the transition from graduate student to faculty member.

Thank you to Dan Lewis, who took an interest in me early on as a teaching assistant and quickly became one of my greatest champions and mentors, talking shop with me over numerous lunches and dinners and offering me hours of both research and professional advice, all while waiting patiently for me to finish dessert.

I could not have completed this project, particularly at this scale, without the support of graduate and research funding. Special thanks to the Jacob K. Javits Fellowship Program and the Department of Sociology for pre-doctoral funding, and to the National Science Foundation, the UC Center for New Racial Studies, the Berkeley Department of Sociology Lynnea Stephens Memorial Research Grant Program, the University of California Diversity Initiative for Graduate Study in the Social Sciences (UC DiggSSS) Faculty Mentored Research Award Program, the Department of Sociology Research Grant Program, the Center for Race and Gender, and the Abigail Hodgen Publication Award program for their dissertation research support. Also thanks to the Center for Race and Gender, the Center for Latin American Studies and the Race Workshop for the opportunity to present my work in progress and for a space to workshop ideas.
I would be remiss not to give a warm, heartfelt, thanks to the staff of the Berkeley Sociology department, particularly Elsa Tranter, Carolyn Clark, Anne Meyers, Rada Rodic and Belinda White, whom I surely drove to the brink with my many questions and concerns. Thank you for helping me navigate the great bureaucracy that is Berkeley with finesse and aplomb. I don’t know how you do it, but I am grateful for it.

Many thanks to the Wake Forest University Sociology Department who hosted me as a Visiting Scholar during my field work. A special thanks to Ian Taplin, Catherine Harris and Joan Habib, for their hospitality during my tenure. I am incredibly grateful for the resources provided by the department to conduct my research, as well as the opportunity to present work in progress.

This project is in part, about the ways in which Mexican migrants experience of immigration enforcement, exclusion and discrimination terrorizes, inspires fear and trepidation, and ultimately, changes the way they think about themselves and others. I am eternally grateful to the many men and women who shared their time and their stories with me, both in Mexico and in North Carolina, trusting that I would both relate their stories, and that they would be safe from retribution. Given the difficulties many of them faced in their daily lives, this was no small thing. I hope I have done them justice. Many thanks also to the community members and gatekeepers in my study, who helped me understand the lay of the land, introduce me to the right people, and see the big picture. This project would not have been possible with you.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge all of the pioneers that paved the way before me. Despite our achievements, there are relatively few women of color in academia, and even fewer black women. Through this dissertation, I am reminded of the many sacrifices that many people continue to make, and the barriers they face, just to provide their families with food, shelter and safety. I am acutely aware of the privilege I experience, and that I will continue to experience as an academic. I thank all of those, seen and unseen, who have helped me get here, and hope that my work can play a small role in documenting the costs and unintended consequences of the social and political choices we make everyday.
In the fall of 2008, a two-day conference was held in Greensboro, a medium-sized town next to Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Both cities had experienced an explosion in the number of Latinos residing in their cities and surrounding communities, increasing six-fold over the last two decades. For weeks, civil rights activists, church leaders, educators, students, community members, and union organizers from Greensboro, Winston-Salem and other surrounding communities planned to gather to discuss and organize, with the explicit purpose of forging positive relationships between African-Americans and Latinos. Gathering in a local Baptist church and community center, over the course of the two days, various African-American and Latino pastors and community representatives spoke to nearly 300 participants about the similar structural conditions faced by black and brown communities – problems with gangs, poor schools, employment, institutional discrimination, violence and exploitation – and how they would come together as a minority community to resolve them.

At the end of the conference, all the participants gathered to form a large circle in the sanctuary. The two pastors leading the gathering – one African-American and one Latina – asked everyone to cross their arms and join hands. Once all hands were held, participants were asked to pledge their commitment to black and brown unity by stating that “this chain won’t break with me”, either in English or in Spanish. Immediately after the last pledge was spoken, the entire group joined the pastors in a rousing version of ‘We Shall Overcome’, while a gentle swaying rippled around the circle.

This event was the beginning of an ongoing series of meetings between blacks and browns, and one of several efforts to cultivate an alliance between them. In this meeting and others, members of the coalition made a concerted effort by black and Latino church leaders to create a discourse about their shared minority experiences and turn it into a political coalition. Indeed it was this same group that played a key role in rallying black and Latino workers in the Smithfield poultry plant strikes, and the town halls to discuss the Greensboro Sheriff’s plans to sign on to the 287(g) program.

Several months later, another church gathering took place in Winston-Salem to discuss community responses to the unprecedented levels of immigration in the community. At this meeting, approximately 40 people were present, all leaders and volunteers in churches across town and the surrounding areas. Of those present, four were African-American, two were Latino, and the rest white. The meeting was opened by Dr. Miller, a pastor, and director of liturgical studies at Wake Forest University. She gave a speech about how people of faith should respond to immigration by highlighting the passages on immigration in the bible. Dr. Miller asked people to reflect on the experience of moving and being a stranger in a new community. She noted that as church leaders, their goal, regardless of the policy debates, is to ‘welcome the stranger in our midst’. She

---

1See “The hands behind the turkey” for more information on activism around the Smithfield plants and the use of racial tactics to prevent unionization (Evans 2008).

2The 287(g) program, one of ICE’s initiatives activated under the 1996 immigration reforms, allows a state and local law enforcement entity to enter into a partnership with ICE, under a joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The state or local entity receives delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions (ICE 2011).
called for the church leadership to get involved, noting that “in some way, we are all migrants, we all have stories of migration.” She went on to say that “the bible points to people of faith as a migrating people, that we are wanderers. And our story is a migration story.” Highlighting biblical stories of migration and referring to passages from the bible, she noted that “the bible calls for compassion and hospitality in both the new testament and the Hebrew texts.” She stepped to the side of her podium to more emphatically drive home to the audience “that to welcome the stranger is to welcome and love Jesus.” Her message certainly seemed to touch the audience, as the speaker that followed demurred that they could hardly match such a speech, to a second round of applause from the clergy and volunteers seated around the room.

This meeting was an immigration breakfast sponsored by the North Carolina Council of Churches, a progressive group that takes on various issues facing North Carolina and coordinates with churches throughout the state to take a political stance on these issues. While this meeting was similar to the black and brown conference in that its aim was to work toward concrete solutions facing Latino residents, the approach was one of distance and tolerance, rather than coalition building and shared status. Few Latinos were present, and none were invited to offer their perspective or serve as partners in the effort. Moreover, part of the message was simply to advocate for a sense of tolerance, not based on their own experiences, but on the abstract message of ‘welcoming the stranger’ and the wandering religious tribes in the Old Testament.

Together, these meetings are representative of two divergent processes at work in Winston-Salem. On the one hand, African-American leaders are working to develop partnerships and coalitions with Latinos in the community, reaching out to them as minorities, through the lens of their own experiences and commitment to Civil Rights. Progressive whites on the other hand, offered a message of abstract morality and tolerance based on religious principals and a history of immigration over 2000 years in the past, in order to counter the negative immigration messages prevelant in the present.

So how can we begin to explain scenes such as these? The interracial contact and race relations literatures, particularly the scholarship that focuses on black/brown relations highlights conflicts and antagonism while giving relatively little attention to circumstances in which coalitions do emerge (Foley 2010). Moreover, recent research on the New South where the racial composition of the South has completely shifted from a racial binary, to a multi-ethnic region in less than two decades also highlights tense relations between these two groups.

Empirically, because these demographic shifts are both dramatic and very recent, much of the academic literature on the New South is descriptive, and to a lesser extent, focuses on analyzing immigrant incorporation (Blanchard and Hill 2001; Donato, Stainback and Bankston 2005; Fink 2003; Griffith 2005; Lacy 2009; Marrow 2008; Odem and Lacy 2009; Odem 2009; Rich and Miranda 2005; Smith and Furseth 2006). Little work has been done to make sense of the impact of demographic change on race relations (Marrow 2008; Stuesse 2009; Winders 2009; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2005), and work on anti-immigrant policy backlash at the municipal level is only now emerging (Odem 2009; Wong 2011). Of the limited academic and journalistic work that has been done to analyze race relations in the New South, a particular picture has emerged. Cities and towns across the South are now bursting at the seams, leaving institutions overcrowded, and municipal leadership without solutions. Most have turned
to immigration enforcement as a solution. Moreover, tensions between blacks and Latinos are high, largely due to competition over resources (Marrow 2008; 2009a; McClain et al. 2006; McClain et al. 2007; Vaca 2004). Scholars like Marrow (2009a) and Lopez-Sanders who are investigating the formation of race relation on the ground, in fact find that competition over resources directly spurs Latino newcomers to develop close relationships with whites and in conflict with blacks, with whom they are competing for housing and work. As a result, the picture of race relations in New Destinations that has emerged is nothing like the scene described above, in which blacks and browns gather to address only shared community concerns, and for blacks to reach out to Latinos, while whites, at best preach a message of tolerance, failing to cultivate a feeling of closeness towards them on the part of Latinos. Indeed much of the literature describes race relations that fit squarely into a long history of conflictual race relations between African-Americans and immigrants.

In a third scenario, Latinos might avoid both blacks and whites altogether, choosing instead to establish ethnic enclaves and insular networks in order to establish access to mobility and resources. Segmented assimilation studies suggest that ethnic isolation can be an effective form of building social networks and accessing key resources, and might therefore be a viable alternative to building relations with either group.

The racialization and incorporation of Mexican immigrants however, is generally explained as a process of avoiding blacks and favoring whites. Much of the literature posits this as a defining aspect of incorporation and racialization in order to achieve mobility. Similarly, those that investigate race relations between these two groups uncover, perhaps unsurprisingly, hostile and conflictual relations between African-Americans and Latinos over time, underscoring conflict with blacks due to limited resources and access to political power. In both the immigration and racial formation literatures, few scholars find positive relations between African-Americans and Latinos, and theorize Latino racial formation as a minority identity that is developed in relation to the experience of African-Americans.

What accounts for these emergent alliances? What leads to this form of incorporation in which Latinos identify with African-Americans, and how does it shape their racialization? In this dissertation, I seek to explain this counterintuitive finding in which blacks and browns identify with one another, by examining local level incorporation patterns New South, and how these local processes of incorporation are shaping the racialization patterns of Mexicans settling there.

To explain these findings, I turn to the immigrant incorporation, whiteness and New South and racial conflict literatures, investigating both their problematic assumptions and contributions in making sense of the experiences of Mexicans in Winston-Salem. Given the existing research, we would expect that throughout the South and other new immigrant destinations, Latino migrants would identify with, and see themselves as closer to whites. Indeed, this is what recent research finds. In Winston-Salem however, I find that Mexican migrants identify with, and see themselves as closer to blacks. To explain these findings, I posit that race is made locally as a result of how Mexicans are incorporated, and that the dynamic nature of incorporation itself plays an important role in shaping the racialization process. Indeed, in Winston-Salem and throughout the South, recent changes at the municipal level around immigration policy
have produced an environment in which Latinos feel besieged by law enforcement and excluded from the larger community. I argue that within this particular context, the anti-immigrant policy shift in the context of informal segregation has produced a sense of racialized discrimination among Mexicans. Unlike many communities where New South studies are taking place, the setting of Winston-Salem provides a context where there is low resource competition between Latinos and blacks in terms of the labor market, housing, and political representation. This lack of competition provided fewer reasons for sustained conflict, while anti-immigrant policies that have also impacted African-Americans have opened up opportunities in the black community for discourses that reinforce a sense of shared discrimination, minority status and call for mutual support. Moreover, a minority-based identity and sense of closeness with blacks is juxtaposed against angry rhetoric in the anti-immigrant white community and distancing discourses employed by pro-immigrant whites. As a result, Mexicans in Winston-Salem are coming to see themselves as racialized minorities. In the process, they come to see themselves as minorities along with blacks; and that this closeness contributes to this sense of self.

**BECOMING MINORITIES**

For new, non-white arrivals in the United States, a racialized minority identity is not a given. Particularly among Latinos and Asians, scholars often highlight that pan-ethnic and racial identities rarely emerge due to overwhelming attachments to national identities. Scholars argue that an identity frame which privileges culture, nationality and language is more easily inhabitable by immigrants. Immigrants’ failure to develop a racialized or minority identity is understood in part as unfamiliarity with U.S. paradigms, a failure to privilege and mobilize around shared experiences that may transcend national origin, or as highlighted above, quickly learn to distance themselves from minorities in order to achieve mobility. While much of the new immigration scholarship attempts to capture the dynamic interaction between host societies and immigrants, much of the work on immigrant identity formation gives relatively little attention to issues of power, inequality and racism (Hattam 2007: 11). Race scholarship on the other hand highlights power and inequality, but has often provided a relatively narrow view on race and racial formation, focusing largely of racial groups separately, or in terms of relations, primarily between whites and blacks.

In part, this is a result of the theoretical slippage that happens when attempting to theorize race and ethnicity as distinct concepts. It is common throughout race and ethnicity scholarship to understand ethnicity as a sense of collective identity based on culture, language and national origin – a sense of share qualities, but not status. Race, on the other hand, is used to describe a system through which a set of physical characteristics (most notably skin color and hair texture) is used to group individuals and determine their access to economic, political and social resources according to the group they belong to. A racialized identity therefore suggests an acceptance of such categories that determine one’s status, and a sense of linked fate or political mobilization can emerge. Racial groups that are deprived of privileges and therefore are of similar status but not the same group, have, in recent decades, formed cross group affiliations and identities as minorities (Harris 1995).

These definitions become more slippery however, when we begin to think about pan-ethnic groups, in which individual ethnic groups are lumped together according to
some characteristic (often physical, but also according to language or other markers) to assign status and access to resources. Members of this group may then accept and mobilize around this designation in order to access resources or fight discrimination. In this way, a panethnic group behaves almost identically to a racial group. Concepts such as reactive ethnicity, emergent ethnicity and resistance ethnicities reinforce this theoretical overlap, defining ethnicity as emergent from structural conditions to position groups in U.S. culture, sometimes positioning them against and adverse mainstream (Castells 2004; Yancey, Erskin and Juliani 1976).

In this dissertation, I attempt to bridge the literatures on immigrant incorporation and race, and therefore rather than continue to frame ethnicity and race as distinct processes, I think of them here as overlapping and mutually constitutive, particularly with attention to the role of status and intergroup relations. As Hattam notes, “Although much has been gained by these rich bodies of research, both fail to capture the central political dynamics of immigration and race. Both try to link histories of racism and immigration, but do so in ways that flatten out the distinctive positioning of ethnics. As a consequence, both misread the dynamics of contemporary ethnic and racial politics in the United States (2007: 14).” In much of the emerging scholarship on Latino migration particularly in New Destinations, but also across the United States, scholars have already begun to intensely debate whether Latinos, as immigrant or citizens will be incorporated, and, as a test of America’s racial stratification system, how they will become racialized (Lippard and Gallagher 2011:12). Based on a long standing pattern of distancing and conflict with African-Americans, much of the literature on immigrant incorporation, racialization and intergroup relations would not have predicted that newcomer Mexicans would develop a minority identity and sense of closeness with blacks. By looking more closely at these literatures however, this study serves as the exception that proves the rule, explaining how and when local context facilitates minority racial formation and positive black/brown race relations.

Racial Distancing
As highlighted above, the origins of the literature on immigration and incorporation is the concept of straight-line assimilation, theorized initially by Park (1950), and then more notably by Milton Gordon (1964), as well as and Glazer and Moynihan (1963). In an effort to theorize the incorporation of Eastern European immigrants in the 1920s and 30s into the white majority, Gordon and others elaborated a theory of assimilation in which Europeans lost their ethnic distinctiveness over time through extended contact, adaptation, intermarriage and reproduction. This process of becoming white Americans was viewed as more or less inevitable, as well as necessary to achieve socioeconomic mobility. Gordon in particular provides a comprehensive yet concise social-structural framework, in which assimilation only becomes possible through structural assimilation—that is the acceptance of non Anglo White Protestants into mainstream institutions. True assimilation and acculturation into a racial or ethnic group for Gordon (1964) is comprised of both historical and participational identification (we share a fate, we share a set of behaviors) that allows people a sense of peoplehood and communal strength.3

3 While some theories of ethnic pluralism – the emergence of a hyphenated identity – also emerged with regard to Europeans, these were largely considered symbolic identities that at best, had little impact on the
Even when taking into account later waves of non-European immigrants, the literature continues to highlight incorporation and assimilation as a function of avoiding native born minorities, particularly African-Americans, if upward mobility is to be achieved (Rumbaut 1994; Waters 1999; Zhou 1997). In this articulation, the more time poor, non-white immigrants spend in the U.S., and therefore presumably become acculturated into the minority underclass, the more negative the structural assimilation trajectory. Thus, to be associated with African-Americans is to lose one’s access to opportunity.

More recently, historians and sociologists of the early European migration waves expand on this proposition by highlighting both the process of being accepted by mainstream whites, as well as actively seeking out such acceptance. Whiteness scholars argue that acquiring a white identity had everything to do with facilitating structural assimilation, arguing that a key piece of this process was to distance oneself from being identified with blacks, as many European groups, including Hungarians, Italians and Irish, initially were (Barrett and Roediger 1997; Brodkin Sacks 1998; Jacobson 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Kolchin 2002; Roediger 1991; Roediger 2006). In this framework, whiteness was perceived, by new immigrants as a key asset in accessing economic mobility. As a result, distancing oneself from blackness was a necessary strategy in acquiring access to the privileges that whiteness afforded. Hattam theorizes ethnic identity with a more complex analysis of resources and politics, but nevertheless views ethnic identity formation as a third way- not white, but also keeping a healthy distance from blacks (2007). This linking of racial identity, distancing and upward mobility, is an essential frame many scholars argue, through which immigrant incorporation is achieved and understood.

In the post-1965 era of immigration in which the vast majority of migrants to the United States (regardless of status) are non-European, new paradigms for understanding the prospects for assimilation have become necessary for contemporary immigration scholarship. In taking on contemporary immigrant incorporation, scholars of non-white immigration have sought to uncover how migrants assimilate when phenotype makes the strategy of achieving whiteness difficult, if not impossible (Marrow 2009; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Waters 1999). Because African-Americans are situated in this paradigm as the prototypical ‘underclass’, most immigration scholarship has taken a prescriptive view of the whiteness theory of immigrant incorporation, arguing that non-European immigrants who seek a slice of the pie are best served by avoiding blackness and aspiring toward whiteness and mobility through racial distancing.

While some scholars maintain that straight-line assimilation processes continue to dominate, even among Latino, Asian, African and other non-white immigrants, segmented assimilation has become the dominant paradigm of contemporary immigration theory. This framework modifies the straight-line assimilation model with attention to racial differences and the relative difficulty they may experience being accepted into the mainstream and achieving structural mobility, as well as avoiding downward mobility into the minority underclass (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; South, Crowder and Chavez 2005; Waters 1999; Zhou 1997). Even in the case of black migrants, association process of becoming white, and at worst, were simply euphemisms for anti-black attitudes and behaviors (Gans 1979; Steinberg 1985).
with African-Americans is found to be problematic. Among black immigrants, who presumably face discrimination due to skin color, upward mobility is achieved through migration (Waters 1999; Kasnitz 1999). As a result, the vast majority of the literature on Afro-Caribbeans highlights their efforts to maintain ethnic ties in order to practice what immigrants, regardless of era, seem to already know – it makes them preferable for hiring, interethnic association, and therefore, upward mobility (Waters 1999; Bryce-Laporte 1972). As Rogers succinctly notes, “Waters has argued this tendency is most pronounced among middle-class Afro-Caribbeans eager to shore up their status and guard themselves and their children against socioeconomic backsliding (Waters 1999). In its least blunt and perhaps most common formulation, this view suggests ethnic group identification among Afro-Caribbeans militates against any strong sense of shared racial identity between the immigrants and their African-American counterparts (e.g., Foner 1985) (2006: 172).”

This framing in which mobility and access to resources is obtained by distancing from African-Americans is prevalent throughout the immigration and whiteness literatures, but it has not gone unchallenged. Scholars such as Portes and Rumbaut (1996), Portes and Stepick (1993) and Rogers (2006) find distancing practices to be untenable over time. They maintain prevailing racial inequalities in American life ultimately compel the immigrants to identify with African-Americans around a shared racial group identity (Vickerman 1999; Kasnitz 1992; Sutton and Makiesky 1975). Rogers in particular finds that those Caribbean blacks with collectivist beliefs were more likely to routinely interact with blacks in civil and social networks (2006). They in turn adopted black group consciousness as a source of identification. It is worth noting that this form of identity appears to have an empowering, eye-opening effect on those Afro-Caribbean respondents, with none of the demoralizing consequences typically associated with race-based oppositional consciousness among immigrants in other studies (Rogers 2006: 189-191).

As Stepick and Stepick (2009) argue, however, there is growing evidence that associating with native minorities as collective non-whites does not necessarily produce downward assimilation, but rather can have positive outcomes, such as access to diversity programs in which employers and universities seek out applicants who will increase institutional diversity (Kasinitz et al. 2008). Moreover, there is reason to believe that the advantages or disadvantages of identifying and developing close social relations with native-born minorities, particularly blacks, varies depending on the conditions of minorities in local context. Neckerman, Carter and Lee (1999) address this criticism concretely, arguing that the segmented assimilation paradigm largely ignores the cultural and class heterogeneity of minority communities, and thus does not consider the range of possibilities that acculturation into minority populations can mean. In particular, they highlight that acculturation into middle class minority communities whom have been able to overcome structural barriers and discrimination to achieve economic and social mobility. They propose attention to a ‘minority culture of mobility’ that “draws on available symbols, idioms and practices to respond to distinctive problems of being middle class and minority” (949). Indeed, Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) note that the problem of the incorporation of newcomers that results in downward assimilation (a situation that scholars argue is best achieved in part by avoiding relations with native-
born minorities) is that immigrants are incorporated into highly segregated inner city structures where both resources and attitudes toward mobility are poor.

In bracketing the assumption that incorporation into minority communities is always a form of joining the underclass, their findings indicate that the issue of mobility and intergroup relations between new immigrant groups and native-born minorities be shaped by class status, access to the labor market and community level resources, in which some communities may indeed hold mainstream norms and resources are readily accessible, despite the presence of a large minority population. Therefore, despite an overwhelming emphasis on racial distancing as a key mechanism through which strategic racial and ethnic identities are produced, this smaller body of emerging scholarship indicates that racial affinities may actually be produced through experience, particularly racial threat and discrimination, rather than as a strategy of upward mobility.

**American Whiteness**

While Mexicans throughout U.S. history have experienced varying degrees of exclusion and inclusion, as well as racial designations (Foley 2010; Telles and Ortiz 2008), the decades’ long fight of Mexican-Americans to assimilate and be considered white Americans, thereby accessing property rights, has not entirely given way to a Latino identity. Although claims to a white racial status are certainly less pressing in the post-Jim Crow era when discrimination is no longer legal and mobilization along ethnic lines was an increasingly legitimate path to claim access to resources, scholars highlight that as recently as the 2000 census, 48% of Latinos identified as white (Foley 2010). Moreover, as an increasing share of the Mexican population are newcomers, many bring with them a preference for whiteness as dictated by Mexican mestizaje ideology, and a national understanding that education and wealth are properties of whiteness.

Indeed, this poses a significant contemporary challenge to the development of a minority identity, as most newcomers come to the United States to work and achieve upward mobility (even if transnationally). Thus, as in their home country, what they are trying to achieve is associated with whiteness. Moreover, as much of the contemporary literature indicates, as Mexicans settle outside of traditional receiving destinations, they are unlikely to encounter many other native born ethnic minorities. Because they come to see themselves in relation to the whites, and in the South, the blacks in their communities, some scholars find that Latinos develop aspirational identities in which they see themselves as more similar to whites (Basler 2008; Darity, Deitrich and Hamilton 2005; Frank, Akresh and Lu 2010; Gans 1999; Marrow 2008). This has important consequences not only for the development of interracial relations, but also suggests a political realignment. Indeed, pollsters frequently consider Latinos as an ‘up for grabs’ demographic, neither Democrat nor Republican, in part because a relatively small proportion of Latinos are able to vote, but also because it is assumed that Latino interests do not necessarily perceive themselves as a minority group, and that voting Republican appeals to many Latinos because it is a form of distancing themselves from blacks and asserting a white American identity (Basler 2008).

Indeed some scholars find that Latinos continue to assert a white identity even when they are well aware that are not recognized as such by mainstream society (Frank, Akresh and Lu: 2010). Some scholars indicate that this is merely part of a long-term strategy in which the white group will eventually expand into a more multiethnic
category that situates them above blacks (Gans 1999; Lee and Bean 2004, 2007; Yancey 2003). Alternatively, Latinos might choose to disassociate from either blacks or whites, choosing to develop ethnic identities that are insular and distinct from other groups. Indeed some scholars find that Latinos frequent choice of an ‘other’ or national identity suggests that they are choosing to eschew racial categories altogether (Frank, Akresh and Lu: 2010). And finally, similar to the practices identified in the immigration literature, such status positioning as whites suggests that Latinos would indeed be well-served by distancing themselves from blacks. However, while this literature attempts to parse out the various factors that lead Latinos toward identifying with whites or blacks, they do not often take into account that these experiences also change across time and context, constraining and expanding the ability of newcomers to assert new identities. Indeed, what happens in new destinations, where Latino newcomers are key players in significant regional change?

The New South
As highlighted above, New South studies have taken on the challenge of explaining how its “southern distinctiveness” has quickly evaporated, and the consequences of rapid demographic and economic change. Several edited volumes in recent years have been dedicated to detailing the impact of newcomers on the Southern economy and the shape of demographic change (Murphy, Blanchard and Hill 2001; Smith and Furseth 2006; Fink 2003; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2005). Because Latino newcomers are integrating into communities that are largely African-American and white, many with long histories of racial tension, the immigration literature can be instructive as to how race and race relations in the New South will unfold.

Indeed, recent work seeks to dig deeper into the role of Latinos in community-level change and race relations (Marrow 2008; Odem and Lacy 2009). While few published works have begun to account for how municipal and state immigration enforcement policies are impacting incorporation, racial formation and race relations (Lippard and Gallagher 2011; Lovato 2008; Odem and Lacy 2009), scholars such as Angela Stuesse (2009) who looks at race relations in the Mississippi poultry industry, find that the anti-immigrant sentiment and the state of the labor market are essential for structuring the integration of newcomers. This can play out in a number of ways. Stuesse finds that while organizers struggle to build successful alliances between blacks and Latinos, African-Americans have been central to immigrant rights struggles as major players in Mississippi’s labor movement. Still, the majority of blacks in the area are competing with Latino newcomers for increasingly low-wage work, and are frustrated by a shift toward hiring preferences for undocumented Latinos over the native-born. Stuesse also suggests that Latinos fail to see connections between themselves and the position of blacks, whom they see as more privileged, unaware of the difficulties faced by blacks throughout the region.

Other studies, such as those of the carpet factories of Dalton, Georgia (Mohl 2003; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2009) indicate that powerful white employers specifically sought out cheap immigrant labor to avoid paying higher wages to native-born residents, creating tensions between locals and elites. African-Americans had largely been driven out of the area decades earlier by barring access to better-paying mill jobs. When elites began recruiting Latino workers in the 1990s, they were protected by
them for a time from anti-immigrant activism. Eventually however, rapid growth and job losses among local whites gave way to aggressive anti-immigrant sentiment and a variety of anti-immigrant measures throughout the state and county.

Indeed, much of the New South literature highlights the role of Latino entry into the labor market, replacing black and white workers in many sectors, in producing a great deal of tension between native-borns and newcomers (LeDuff 2000; Mohl 2003). Elaine Lacy (2011) reports tensions between blacks and Latinos due to labor market competition in South Carolina, as well as discrimination against Latinos at the hands both blacks and whites. Rich and Miranda (2005) find a similar sense of escalating tension between working class native-borns, both white and black, and newcomer Latinos in the Lexington, Kentucky area, where Latinos have become a major part of the horse industry. Similarly to Lopez-Sanders’ work in Greenville, South Carolina (2011), and Marrow’s in eastern North Carolina (2008) mentioned above, rapid demographic change, resource competition, existing race relations, and increased enforcement play key roles in shaping the experiences of newcomer Latinos to the South. While this scholarship hardly suggests a pattern of positive inter-minority relations, and indeed overwhelmingly finds conflict, it does highlight the role of resource competition, particularly in the labor market, in shaping the experiences of Latino migrants. Moreover, it suggests that the increasing role of discrimination and anti-immigrant policies may further direct racial formation and race relations in the South.

Resource Competition and Race Relations

By and large intergroup relations scholarship has focused on relations between minorities and whites (Glaser 1994; Giles and Hertz 1994; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985). More recently however, this literature has extended to race relations between minority groups, often extending a hypothesis of conflict to relations between any and all racial groups, particularly between blacks and others (Falcon 1988; Johnson and Oliver 1994; Meier and Stewart 1991; Oliver and Johnson 1984; Olzak 1992; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Gimpel and Edwards 1999). A predominant presumption in the interminority relations literature, particularly with regard to Blacks and browns, is that this sense of competition is due to the relatively equal position of Blacks and Latinos at the bottom of the social structure, and therefore their relatively tenuous relationship to the labor market (frequently referred to as ‘fighting for crumbs’ or a ‘zero-sum game’) (Bobo and Hutchins 1996; Borjas 2001; Gimpel and Morris 2007). Indeed, a number of studies that explore new destinations find that competition between minority groups not only in the labor market, but also for low-income housing and other resources. Newcomers also put additional strains on institutions such as health care and education, facilitating tensions between newcomers and all native groups, but with African-Americans in particular (Cravey 1997; Hackenberg and Kukulka 1997; Millard and Chapa 2004; Kandel and Parrado 2005). Moreover, theories of immigrant incorporation and mobilization hinge on the ability of newcomers to integrate into the local labor market, even if this is at the cost of native born-workers.

Importantly, negative attitudes and stereotypes between these two groups are almost always correlated with economic and resource competition, particularly in cases where it is believed that the presence, and often preferential hiring of Latino immigrants, drives down wages (Gay 2006; Hutchinson 2007; McClain et al. 2006; McClain et al.
McClain and colleagues work in particular highlights perceptions of socioeconomic and political competition between African-Americans and Latinos and hostile attitudes between the two groups (McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1993; McClain and Tauber 1998, 2001; Meier et al. 2004; McClain 2006, McClain et al 2006; McClain 2007).

While this literature often makes the problematic assumption that these conditions persist over time and across context, it also rightly highlights the role of resource access in constructing relations between racial groups. Although scholars find that competition between groups is pervasive, it also suggests that we should consider how the absence of competition can play an important role in facilitating positive intergroup relations. Specifically, increasing contemporary integration into suburban and small town communities where native born minorities hold a stable position in the labor market may eliminate a sense of economic competition, opening up the possibility for more positive intergroup relationships. Indeed, there is a small but emerging body of literature that highlights the role of discrimination in producing a sense of shared minority status with Blacks that trumps any pre-existing sense of intergroup competition (Hagan, Shedd and Payne 2005; Portes 1990; Jones-Correa and Hernandez 2007). Contrary to the findings of Bobo and Hutchins (1996) which develop a theory of racial alienation as a catalyst for intergroup conflict, other works highlight that when groups perceive a shared minority status that collectively distinguishes them from whites, solidarity and positive intergroup perceptions emerge (Kaufmann 2003; Thornton and Mizuno 1999).

Together, these literatures highlight a pattern of avoiding blacks, either to evade downward mobility, or to steer clear of conflict. However, by paying attention to local context, these studies reveal that key factors- specifically the labor market and availability of resources, the demographic composition of the area, and the pre-existing sense of racial threat and race relations in a community, play a significant role in shaping the experiences of newcomers, and their reception by native-born community members. Moreover, the increasing presence of anti-immigrant sentiment and local level immigration enforcement can produce a feeling of exclusion and targeting among Latinos that in turn produces a sense of being racialized as Latinos into a minority group. Moreover, the response of leaders in both the black and white community can play a significant role in how Latinos see themselves in relation to others.

THE STUDY
Drawing from the extended case study method (Burawoy 1998), the design of this study was to theorize the racialization process on the ground, particularly among newcomer Latinos. I embarked on this study searching for a site and population in which the racialization process was underway. I knew anecdotally that the Southeast was undergoing a massive demographic shift, upsetting the status quo in a region that had been primarily dichotomous—defined by a black/white divide—for decades. This process alone, I reasoned, would generate interesting racialization processes. My preliminary research also indicated that this community in particular was also receiving a high number of Afro-Mexicans, creating a natural experiment in which I could examine the racialization process of a new group that was more or less ethnically homogenous, but made up of two phenotypically distinct groups.
I entered the field with the purpose of testing and examining racialization theory through a community-level case study. I anticipated that the sending communities, pre-existing racial ideas and differences between the Mexican migrant populations would play an important role in the racialization process. Therefore I designed the study as multi-sited, conducting ethnographic research in the Mexican sending communities as well as the receiving community of Winston-Salem. The research design was not intended to be a comparative study of countries, but rather to highlight the process of racialization as a combination of factors that include migration, local context, and the malleability of racial and ethnic identities in relation to the role of citizenship and the state.

I expected that this 16-month design would give me greater insight into how Mexicans came to see themselves as raced. What I found, however, was that circumstances in the receiving context created such a pervasive experience of discrimination that skin color did not matter significantly in shaping racialization. Because this study was designed to test and generate racial formation and intergroup relations theory, I used this counterintuitive finding as a starting point to examine the often taken-for granted mechanisms that shape race and race relations on the ground.

**Research Design, Sample and Data**

This dissertation is based on data gathered from 145 formal and informal interviews with Afro-Mexicans, Mestizo Mexicans, and community members both in Mexico and the United States, as well as extensive ethnographic fieldwork in both locations. Specifically, I spent four months in Mexico doing ethnographic research and conducting 60 in-depth interviews that focused on examining the racial ideologies and structural conditions of migration in the communities of the Costa Chica and Veracruz, situating these community frameworks within the larger Mexican context. These regions are home to the largest concentration of Afro-Mexicans in Mexico, and have also recently become key sending communities to the United States. These semi-structured interviews were conducted in Spanish, exclusively with Mestizo and Afro-Mexicans using snowball sampling techniques and key community informants to access respondents. The majority of ethnographic research took place in the towns of Cuajinicuilapa, in the Costa Chica and Coyolillo in Veracruz. Twenty interviews were conducted in the Veracruz region, and 40 interviews were conducted in the Costa Chica region.

**North Carolina**

---

4 This framing acknowledges that many Mexicans in both categories of Mestizo and Afro may have African (descended primarily from slaves brought to Mexico through the port of Veracruz), Indigenous and European ancestry. However, I use Afro to highlight those Mexicans whose Afro ancestry is visible and/or acknowledged via phenotype, assertion of parental status, naming, and context specific understandings of race. For more information on Afro-Mexican identity, see: Cruz-Carretero 1989; Lewis 2000; Vinson 2001; Vaughn and Vinson 2005.

5 Other towns included in this study included: Barajilla, San Nicolas, Punto Moldonado, Buenos Aires, Llano Grande, Tierra Colorado, Ometepec, Tlapextla, Grande Tlapextla, Tecoyame, Pinotepa Nacional, Ciruelo, and Collantes in the Costa Chica, and Xalapa, Córdoba, Puerto Llave of Veracruz and Alvarado in Veracruz.
The dissertation is primarily drawn from 85 formal and informal interviews with Afro-Mexicans, Mestizo Mexicans, and black, white and Latino community leaders, as well as 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the Winston-Salem area of North Carolina. I chose this site because of its centrality in the “New South”, as well as the ability to study both race relations across blacks, whites, and Latinos, and consider racial differences within the Mexican group due to the concentration of Afro-Mexican and Mestizo Mexican immigrants there.

The majority of Mexican respondents in my study reported having little formal education beyond high school, and many lacked more than a few years of primary school education. All Mexican respondents fell in the poverty to lower middle class range, with most respondents in the working-class category. This concentration of respondents at the lower end of the class and education structure as well as limited documentation status, is consistent with the class structure and status of Mexican migrants in the area, as well as the sending communities they are from. This contrasts significantly with the whites and African-Americans in Winston-Salem who are, in both groups, more firmly middle or stable working class. The African-Americans and whites in my study were primarily community leaders and are not a representative sample of blacks and whites in the community. I deliberately focused on community leadership in this case because they play an important role in shaping attitudes in the community and are the most visible arbiters of community relations. There were few Latino leaders in my study (though there are some) simply because there were very few in the community. The vast majority of Latinos in this community are newcomers and lack documentation. As a result there is currently little large scale organizing within the Latino community.

Ethnography
The bulk of this study was 12 months of community-level inductive ethnographic research, modeled on the extended case study method in which I entered the field looking to examine the racialization process on the ground (Burawoy 1998). While in the field, I used this method in order to examine and reconstruct racial formation theory, adjusting my data collection and engagement with the site to refine my concepts and revisit the explanatory mechanisms for positive interminority relations. In this way, both data collection and post-field work analysis were theory generating and theory testing processes. My research process was therefore dialogical and long-term, linking macro and micro processes that strengthen my understanding of how race is constructed.

---

6 While this study looks at both Afro-Mexican and Mestizo Mexican immigrants in the area, they both adopted a collective minority stance and expressed closeness with African-Americans. I anticipated that this unique combination of two racial groups of Mexican origin, combined with the particular experience of Afro-Mexicans’ social erasure of their identity as Mexicans would undoubtedly have specific consequences for the identities they assumed in the U.S. By and large, however, this was not the case. Afro-Mexicans, as I hypothesized, did establish a strong sense of shared minority identity with blacks, expressing closeness with African-Americans, and frequently drawing parallels between the two groups. However, Mestizo Mexicans were not markedly different. They too highlighted a sense of share minority identity, drawing parallels between themselves and African-Americans, and indicating high levels of closeness. As a result, while I anticipated different racialized outcomes, I found that Mexicans as a whole related to blacks in similar ways. As a result, for the purposes this paper, I’ll discuss Mexicans largely in the aggregate.
Using this method, I determined conducting a closed ethnographic study focused on a single, contained site, was less fruitful than building my study around multiple entry points in order to understand what was happening in the community as a whole. Because Winston-Salem is fairly segregated by both race and class, this approach was essential to understanding the dynamics of place, particularly in terms of race relations. While in Winston-Salem, my fieldwork centered on three key church sites with significant Latino populations. These churches also had outreach programs to Latinos specifically, as well as other members of the community, giving me ample opportunity to observe and make contact with Latinos as well as interracial interaction. I spent two to four hours a day, three to five days a week, across these three locations. Although these three churches were very active in providing support to the Latino population, they were also quite distinct. The first was a Catholic church, which held separate masses and services, as well as had a chapel to serve its Latino population, which was very large and overwhelmingly Afro-Mexican. This church was considered to be the most progressive of the Catholic churches in town, and also had a school attached. The English masses were predominantly white, but also had significant numbers of African-Americans and Latinos. The second church was a small independent Christian church, founded by a couple from Peru and consisted primarily of Latinos. It’s location near a trailer park attracted many Mexicans from the neighborhood. It also received funding and support for after school and parenting programs, whose staff and volunteers were almost exclusively white. The third church was a progressive Methodist church with a multiracial congregation and several community outreach programs, including community organizing, food banks, health clinics and other services for the poor. Most of the individuals who took advantage of these services were black and Hispanic, and volunteers were of all races. Church members in these three locations had varying contact with different racial groups, and therefore varying opportunities to develop their ideas about interracial relations based on experience.

My time was divided between being an observer through attending church services and church sponsored meetings or community events, or simply socializing, and being a participant volunteer. I volunteered my time for tutoring, providing child care during church sponsored ESL classes, support and translation during food banks and free health clinics, and general support during after-school programs. I also was a regular participant in an interfaith community organization in which two of the three churches participated. After establishing relationships with the outreach staff in each of the churches, I also accompanied them to visit church members, attend relevant meetings and joined the board of a Latino church, group which was organizing to form a non-profit to meet the needs of local Latinos. Because Winston-Salem has a long history of oligarchical leadership and low levels of unionization, churches are the most important civil society institutions in town, and therefore they were key entry points for my study.

In addition to these primary sites, I conducted participant observation in a number of secondary sites, including: after-school programs, other churches, city council meetings and events, conferences and town halls, political and campaign events, and events sponsored by the YMCA and the city of Winston-Salem, particularly its human relations commission, which is largely responsible for dealing with issues of race relations, including sponsoring conferences, meetings and other community events. I also visited and attended meetings on race relations and immigration at the three universities.
in town: Wake Forest, Winston Salem State and Salem College, as well as attended meetings and workshops for immigrants sponsored through the community college system and public library. I observed at these secondary sites irregularly, depending on what community events were taking place.

More informally, I visited with Latino residents, met with immigration lawyers, officers and city servants, observed and participated in political campaigns, attended community events and festivals, participated in conferences, spent time with reporters from the Spanish Language press. I developed relationships with many trusted figures in the city that were known for their efforts in improving community relations. I also spent time observing in popular public places, such as malls, grocery stores and parks. These sites allowed me to observe informal relationships, particularly intergroup interactions. Finally, I lived in the downtown area of Winston-Salem, the center of the city, city events, and the most diverse area of the city. I became a member of the downtown YMCA, and participated in community life as much as possible. I intentionally cast a wide net to capture a variety of community-level intergroup interactions. Field notes were taken and analyzed daily.

**Interviews**

Of the 85 interviews conducted in North Carolina, 35 were formal and ethnographic interviews with Mexican migrants. None of the Mexicans in my sample were U.S.-born. Of those 26 respondents who reported their status, only two were documented. This contrasts with the whites and African-Americans in Winston-Salem who were more middle class. I conducted the remaining 50 formal and ethnographic interviews with African-American, white and Latino community members to develop a more coherent theory of community perceptions and views on integration and race relations.

Interviews were conducted in English, Spanish or both. Formal interviews lasted between 45 minutes and three hours, and were conducted with a formal interview schedule. Ethnographic interviews were somewhat shorter, lasting between 30 minutes and two hours, and had no formal interview schedule. The extensive interview schedule included questions about perceptions of their own racial identity, relationships with other racial groups, the community racial climate, views on immigration, and differences within and among groups. I gained access to my respondents using ethnographic contacts, contacts that I established before entering the site, as well as key community informants and flyers. While many in my study were fearful of strangers due to their status, I was able to gain trust in the community via my contacts, presence as a volunteer and eventually as a member of the community.

Because this study is purely qualitative, interviewer effects were taken into consideration. When conducting interviews, I kept ethnographic notes on how respondents perceived my ethnic background. My ethnographic notes indicate that Latino and white respondents found me sufficiently racially or ethnically ambiguous enough to

---

7 While I did not spend a significant amount of time in schools or workplaces, I do consider these to be key institutions of socialization and race relations but did not feel that the access that I would have to these sites would provide me with ample opportunity to observe intergroup interaction among adults. I did however pay attention to the role of schools and the workplace in my study, interviewing staff and social workers that managed Latino relations in schools, and interviewing all Latino respondents about their educational and workplace experiences.
attribute an inaccurate racial or ethnic background to me that matched their own. In other words, Latinos most often assumed that I was also Latino. Whites frequently queried me on my ethnic background, and African-Americans asserted that they knew I was of mixed African-American descent. Whenever possible, I deferred revealing my actual ethnic and racial background until the interview was complete. Finally, it is important to note that my interview data strongly reflects my ethnographic observations in the field, including contexts where I was merely an observer or one participant among many, indicating that interviewer effects were not likely to be at work in this study. Through this case, I show that the particular ways in which the factors of racial meanings, demographics and institutions are configured in Winston Salem leads to racial closeness among all Mexicans with African-Americans.8

OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
Throughout *Making Race*, I explore the process by which Mexican migrants come to North Carolina, and how their racial identities are formed in the North Carolina context. To explain how Mexicans become racialized and relate to other racial groups in their communities, I highlight a series of explanatory mechanisms both macro and micro, that not only shaped, but fundamentally altered the day-to-day lives of Mexicans living in Winston-Salem and surrounding areas. I then highlight how these experiences are interpreted by Mexican immigrants, particularly in relation to the other native-born racial groups they come into contact with. In so doing, I engage the immigrant incorporation and racialization literatures in developing a framework of reverse incorporation and minority identity construction. The mechanisms I identify in *Making Race* do not suggest that incorporation and racialization is the result of the (relatively) static conditions of legal status or phenotype. Rather, the conditions of incorporation can be highly local and volatile, forcing migrants to interpret these changes in manner that provokes the assertion of new identities, often in unpredicted ways.

In Chapter Two, I develop the theoretical framework of this study, bringing together the literatures on racializing Latinos, black/brown relations and local context to explain the experiences of Mexicans in Winston-Salem, and how those experiences shaped Mexicans ideas not only about their own racial identity, but their relationships with whites and blacks. In particular, I highlight the utility of examining local conditions when investigating emerging patterns of racialization and race relations.

In Chapter Three, “‘Vamos a Carolina!’: Mexican Migration and North Carolina”, I provide a brief overview of the push-pull factors that bring new Mexican migrants to North Carolina, and the resulting demographic change in North Carolina, examining the political, economic and social factors that have led to new patterns of

8 I also maintained a coding system of skin color, on a scale from 1-10 (light to dark) and included respondents throughout the spectrum. Because phenotype plays an important role in how race is constructed and understood, I included this measure to provide an additional frame through which I could make sense of the racialization process. It also allowed me to ensure that I had a range of phenotypes in my sample. The majority of Mestizo Mexican respondents, however, fell in the 3-5 range, whereas Afro-Mexicans fell mostly in the 4-8 range. Because Mexican respondents fell into two different groups, I anticipated that phenotype would play an important role in how the racialization process would unfold. As indicated above however, phenotype played a small if not insignificant role in structuring race relations, and that by and large my findings were not impacted by skin color.
migration, both from sending regions that have previously not had much contact with the U.S., and migration to the South, where a strong presence of Latinos is very new. I argue that much of this shift is motivated by economic and immigration policy shifts, resulting in a multitude of unintended consequences. I then provide a historical overview of race relations and economic conditions in Winston-Salem prior to the massive demographic change that occurred in the 1990s. I outline the long-standing history of segregation in the town as well as relative economic prosperity, resulting in low levels of political conflict and lower levels of resource competition between whites and blacks. Finally, I close Chapter Three with an overview of demographic change in the New South and North Carolina since the 1980s.

“Chapter Four: Fear and Loathing in North Carolina: Mexican Migration to the Post 9/11 South” explores in depth the changes to immigration policy and social responses to the influx of Latinos into the new South. Focusing on legal changes in North Carolina and municipal actions from 1990-2010, within the context of federal changes due to 9/11, NAFTA and the absence of federal immigration reform, I argue that legal changes in 2005, namely legislation that denied access to state identification and drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants, served as a key turning point in the immigration experience for Winston-Salem Mexicans. Moreover, I argue that this process is experienced as distinctly local, largely shaped by municipal actors and local bureaucrats, rather than state and federal level actors. I find that in taking a turn away from recruitment and toward racial exclusion and discrimination, Winston-Salem and similar municipalities in the state fundamentally altered the incorporation patterns of Mexican newcomers in their communities.

In Chapter Five: “‘Blacks May Be Second Class, but They Can’t Make Them Leave’: Mexican Racial Formation and Immigrant Status in Winston-Salem”, I focus on how race is produced by looking at the reception experiences of Afro and Mestizo Mexican migrants to the new South. Drawing from ethnographic field work with individuals in Mexico and North Carolina, I find that shared phenotype and perceived cultural similarities with African-Americans and pervasive discrimination due to status drives Afro-Mexicans to assert a race based Latino identity that is shaped by their understanding of African-American experiences. Moreover, I argue that this perspective is shared by Mestizo Mexicans who despite their lack of shared phenotype experience similar constraints in terms of access to resources and status, and that Mexicans as a whole in this context find themselves increasingly distanced from whites. While Mestizo and Afro Mexicans are not necessarily close with each other, and Afro-Mexicans are more likely to assert a closeness to African-Americans, including, in some cases, asserting a black identity as well, they both find connections to the black experience that contribute to the production of a racialized identity. Moreover, both groups distinguish themselves from Puerto Ricans, whom they assert are distinctive because of their ‘Americanness’ and possession of legal documentation. These findings suggest that race is not merely a function of phenotype, but rather is produced through a variety of structural factors and experiences. Here I provide an extensive discussion of how Mexicans are asserting a raced-based Latino identity, as well as minority identity in which they identify a sense of closeness and shared status with African-Americans.

In Chapter Six, “Salsa and Soul: Racial Conflict and Closeness in Winston-Salem”, I develop an important empirical counterpoint to literature on conflict between
Latinos and African-Americans by examining racial closeness between Mexicans and African-Americans in Winston-Salem. The literature on black and Latino relations argues that upward mobility is achieved by avoiding associations with blacks. In the context of Winston-Salem however, it is difficult, if not illogical, for Mexicans here to engage in behaviors in which they achieve mobility by distancing themselves from U.S. minority groups. In this case, their ethnic status affords them no privileges in terms of status or access to economic resources, marking them as non-citizen ‘others’. Thus, instead of asserting a pragmatic distance from African-Americans, I find that their position pushes Mexicans to orient themselves toward them. Contrary to previous studies, I find that a significant number of Afro-Mexicans and Mestizo Mexicans express closeness to African-Americans, contradicting much of the race and immigration literature, which find that Latinos and African-Americans are frequently in conflict. I suggest instead that the experience of Mexicans in a new contemporary geographical and political context, in part as a consequence of restrictive immigration policies, indicates that Mexicans can move toward a more minority based consciousness.

I close Making Race in Chapter Seven by applying the mechanisms I uncovered here to other empirical studies of Latino immigration to the New South, highlighting how attention to context may give us a deeper understanding of how racial formation unfolds. I also make a broader statement about the implications of local level immigration enforcement policy on immigrant incorporation, racialization and race relations throughout the region, and speculate how these patterns might impact race relations in the coming decades by taking into account policy, demographic distribution and resource competition, as well as speculate as to how the tools developed in the study can also be applied across racial and ethnic groups.
Chapter Two
Racializing Latinos

People inhabit identities strategically, yet that this is not a process in their overall control. Instead, racialized identities of all kinds are formed in the intersection between community alliances and self-articulations and wider structures of power (Bhattacharyya, Gabriel and Small 2002: 161).

In Winston-Salem, North Carolina, the Mexicans living there have experienced a fundamental shift in their daily lives. In a period of just a few short years, they have gone from feeling like welcomed participants in the American Dream, to excluded and unwelcome intruders. This experience of being systematically maltreated and discriminated against, has had swift impact on the way in which Mexicans both conceive of their own identities, as well as how they relate to other groups. In particular, rather than assign value to Latinos according to their phenotype and other physical characteristics, they have been assigned a new value according to status. As a result, while they remain an ethnic group, they have developed a reactive and politicized identity that is in effect, racialized. Moreover, these new racialized Latinos come to develop a minority consciousness in which they understand these new experiences both by likening themselves to African-Americans, and developing positive relations with them. This is contrasted with whites, who at best, have failed to create enduring connections with newcomers, and at worst, are the face of exclusion.

RACIALIZING LATINOS

To explain how such exclusionary practices and reactive identities emerge, the racialization literature departs from the immigrant assimilation literature precisely to do the work of more effectively highlighting the role of power, inequality and discrimination in structuring groups (Bhattacharyya, Gabriel and Small 2002; Blauner 1972; Cox 2000; Omi and Winant 1994; Wilson 1980; Winant 2001). Omi and Winant define racial formation “as the sociohistorical process, by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed (1994: 55).” This literature rightly underscores that race and therefore racial meanings are not fixed, but rather constructed, contested and frequently in flux. Moreover, the outcomes of this process are incredibly important, as race becomes “common sense – a way of comprehending, explaining and acting in the world. A vast web of racial projects mediates between the discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is routinized and standardized on the other (Omi and Winant 1994: 60).”

In order to ‘make race’, pan-ethnicity, racial formation and stratification theorists agree that there must be some kind of top-down process through which an arbitrary characteristic is used to lump together individuals as a group. This grouping constructs a common sense assumption of shared certain negative characteristics, and therefore can be reasonably excluded and exploited. Additionally, according to all of these theoretical strands, a critical mass of individuals in this group must also accept this designation (this can be for example, for the purposes of mobilization, or an internalization of negative views). The findings outlined in this dissertation confirm Massey’s recent work, which
theorizes that Mexicans are being racialized in large part because they are being increasingly exploited and excluded. Drawing from Barth (1969, 1981), Massey argues that groups become the targets of exclusion and discrimination and that individuals within that group contest, give meaning to, and accept the meanings attributed to them in various ways. He also notes that both the in-group and out-group participate in the construction of the boundaries and identities that create a system of racial stratification (2008: 64).

Until the 1980s, being undocumented was a relatively benign status. There was little risk and little investment required to cross the border. Massey argues that in the post-9/11 era, the framing and boundary work around Mexican immigration has played a central role in their exclusion as a group, in which xenophobia in effect has given way to racialization. To demonstrate this, Massey also shows that anti-Mexican attitudes have had very real effects on the class status of Latinos, which has on a number of measures dropped below that of African-Americans. This is also accompanied by a parallel shift in discrimination against Latinos on a variety of stratification measures. As of 2000, for example, Latinos are more likely to experience discrimination in the housing market than African-Americans. Telles and Ortiz (2008) make a similar argument about the exclusion and racialization of Mexicans into the formation of an underclass, though they are hesitant to argue that Mexicans are being unilaterally racialized. Here, they use racialization to highlight a parallel status with African-Americans as excluded and discriminated against, with a very low status within the social hierarchy. The alternative would be assimilation, a status similar to that of European whites. Telles and Ortiz explain the racialization of Mexicans in the following manner:

American society often stigmatizes those of Mexican origin, regardless of whether Mexicans are considered or consider themselves white, whether they are physically distinct, or whether they speak Spanish or have a Spanish surname or accent. This racialization also creates shared personal and political identities, which often become the basis for collective political action (2008: 15).

Thus according to these two frameworks, phenotype plays a marginal role in the racialization of Mexicans. Instead, it is discrimination and their increasingly devalued social status that makes race. ⁹ I would also argue that this is not discrimination on the basis of nationality alone, but nationality, status, and other more classic forms of denigration, such as perceptions of criminality.

Scholars of racialization and pan-ethnicity identify similar, if not identical processes by which a racialized or pan-ethnic identity emerges. Ethnicity scholars frequently refer to this process as the formation of a reactive ethnicity, in which ethnic group formation codifies in response to hostilities directed against the group categorically. Race scholars call this process racialization, in which externally imposed ideas about value lead to arbitrary standards in which access to resources and status are imposed. While not analytically distinct concepts, this scholarship predicts that

---

⁹ To the extent that there is spill-over to other Latinos who are negatively framed along with Mexicans, and that Mexicans themselves refer to this sense of discrimination as anti-Latino (rather than only anti-Mexican) we might consider this a process of Latino racialization.

20
systematic threat and discrimination will inspire group identification among immigrants (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Stepick 1993), rendering their identities more salient.

According to Dawson’s linked fate concept (1994), for that group to develop a sense of we-ness, or as a group for itself, rather than simply in itself, it must also have reinforcing mechanisms. According to Dawson, for African-Americans, this would come from institutions such as the black church. I argue that these reinforcing mechanisms can also come from outside of the group, and in this case are African-Americans, who are engaging in discourse of shared minority status. In this way, closeness, though a separate phenomena, plays an important role in the racial formation process for Mexicans.

By drawing on the literatures on collective identity, black/brown relations and the context of reception, we can make sense of how racialization unfolds among new groups. This literature suggests that while not inevitable, nor instantaneous, exposure to discrimination plays a key role in initiating collectivization. These experiences are not sufficient however, and also require exposure to reinforcing mechanisms of group identity, such as group based-institutions and social movements.

The literature on pan-ethnicity in particular suggests that collective identity formation is shaped not only via structural discrimination (as in the relocation policies that spurred the Red Power movement in the 1970s), but also in relation to other groups (as in Asian American activism around the violent targeting of Japanese Americans in the 1980s) (Cobas, Duany and Feagin 2009; Espiritu 1992; Josephy et al.1999; Massey and Sanchez R. 2010; Nagel 1994; Omi and Winant 1994; Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996). Moreover, this reactivity allows groups to subsume differences in the interest of forming a collective. Similarly, the racialization literature argues that this discrimination must be experienced at the micro-level, through day-to-day unequal and seemingly arbitrary experiences. The linked fate literature (Dawson 1994) further indicates that these experiences must be accompanied by a meaningful interpretation of them as raced, via reinforcing tropes of group consciousness.

Therefore, a ‘Latino’ identity is not a given, but rather a racialized perspective that is not necessarily shared by all Latinos in a given context. Scholars who examine interracial relations, however, tend to gloss over these distinctions in the Latino community, treating Latinos as though they already share a sense of collectivity. This Pan-Latinoness cannot be taken for granted, however, as Mexicans in this study are quick to report a perceived hierarchy within the Latino community, in which Puerto Ricans and Cubans view themselves more as American, with legal status and access to resources. Recent scholarship indeed finds that those Latinos who do assert a pan-ethnic identity, as well as report discrimination, are more likely to report closeness to African-Americans (Kaufmann 2003; McClain 2006; Sanchez 2008). Thus, while Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) find very cautionary support for the long-term development of Latino group consciousness, I draw on this literature to hypothesize that for Mexicans in particular, whose immigration experiences are becoming increasingly exclusionary, experiences of marginalization drives group consciousness and the development of linked fate, producing what I am calling a racialized Latino identity.

In historicizing the sense of racial group interests that exists among African-Americans despite class cleavages, Dawson describes ‘linked fate’ as a unique concept that “explicitly links perceptions of self-interest to perceptions of racial group interests
Dawson claims that “the historical experiences of African-Americans have resulted in a situation in which group interests have served as a useful proxy for self-interest (1994: 77).” This concept of a linked fate, or shared set of interests that becomes a proxy for one’s own self-interests, has become an increasingly popular tool for understanding the extent to which a group not only is raced by outsiders, but also articulates a sense of collectivity from within.

The concept of linked fate has only recently been applied to Latinos and to a lesser extent, Asians and Native Americans (Lien 2001; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Masuoka 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003; Stokes 2003). For some scholars, Latinos are considered strong candidates for developing a linked fate. Others, however, as indicated in Chapter one, argue that those who intend to assimilate are more likely to view themselves as white, or that the identities they bring with them, as well as the various racial categories in their home countries, trouble any possibility for collective consciousness (Darity et al. 2005; Golash-Boza 2006; McClain et al. 2009; Rodriguez 2000). As noted above, the ties that bind pan-ethnic groups are often thin, and cannot be presumed. Still, some emerging scholarship does indicate that pan-ethnic consciousness and linked fate for these groups is possible (Massey and Sanchez R. 2010; Rodriguez 2000).

In the chapters that follow, I show that what Mexicans are building is a sense of collective, racialized consciousness as Latino minorities, and that African-Americans are working to activate a sense of shared interests between African-Americans and Latinos as minorities. This combination of a sense of pervasive discrimination against Mexicans, the development of group consciousness via the black community, and the failure of the white community to activate similar connections, produces a sense of minority status in which they see themselves as more similar to and closer to blacks because of their shared status and similar experiences in North Carolina. This racialization process and the development of group consciousness also has consequences for future intergroup relations, particularly regarding a “greater sense of common status with, and positive attitudes toward, African-Americans” (Sanchez 2008: 431-432).

While scholars of Latino identity dispute the level of collectivity among Latinos generally, recent work indicates that there is potential for ‘Latino’ to become a salient category for some, particularly as persistent, structural discrimination is on the rise. Those Latinos that believe that they are the primary targets of that discrimination are much more likely to identify as Latinos. As a result, there is significant evidence that Mexicans are rapidly moving from a ‘group’ to an ‘identity’, a significant shift, particularly among first generation Mexicans. In other words, they are no longer simply outwardly defined via a set of shared characteristics, but also beginning to be internally defined in relation to others (Garcia Bedolla 2003). Moreover, this sense of diminished status, along with reinforcing messages and feedback from other non-whites can facilitate a sense of minority status as well.

Studies suggest that first generation migrants are the least likely to identify with pan-ethnic labels, preferring national-origin ones, in large part because scholars assume

---

10 It is important to note that this chapter does not attempt to uncover how Mexicans feel about being be Latino- or whether those feelings are positive or negative. Rather, I attempt to understand what it means to be Latino in relation to others.
that it takes a significant period of time to adapt a perspective that fully incorporates them into a United States framework. Moreover, in previous generations, this group was far more transnational, making frequent trips home to visit family and check on small scale investments such as farms and homes. In my study, however, first generation Mexicans were highly likely to use the terms Hispanic or Latino, suggesting that certain forms of structural discrimination, stigmatization and low levels of receptivity can speed up the racialization process, particularly when accompanied by reinforcing actors in the local social and political context. As Portes and Magaly Sanchez note:

Welcoming attitudes and behaviors on the part of natives facilitate integration and serve to blur boundaries between groups, whereas hostile attitudes and actions retard integration and brighten intergroup boundaries…In today’s hostile context of reception, in other words, we observe a negative process of assimilation in which the accumulation of discriminatory experiences over time steadily reinforces an emergent pan-ethnic “Latino” identity while promoting the formation of a new, reactive identity that explicitly rejects self-identification as “American” (2010: 2).

While Portes and Magaly Sanchez (2010) argue that emergent ethnicity (in-group solidarity) gives way to reactive ethnicity (resistant or confrontational) due to negative experiences over time, I find that racialization develops initially as reactive, and then becomes emergent as groups internalize identities and use them as the basis for group consciousness, solidarity and political action. Portes and Magaly Sanchez framing suggests that all natives respond to newcomers in the same way. What I show is that differences in white and black attitudes also play an important role in rejecting self-identification as American. Discrimination from whites in particular serves to foreclose access to an ‘American’ consciousness, framing it as unattainable. Indeed, my respondents almost exclusively refer to whites as ‘Americans’ and as the architects of hostile anti-immigrant policy. African-Americans by contrast offer messages of shared status and solidarity. As a result, Mexicans overwhelmingly choose to assert pan-ethnic identities as well as a minority consciousness, finding affinities with other non-white groups of similar status. In this case, that group is African-Americans. Harris (1995) suggests that non-whites living in a post-Civil Rights Era (Blauner 1972) have learned to develop a secondary status as persons of color or minorities, in which they express closeness with other non-white groups in opposition to whites. Minority status is then an additional scale of identity formation, in which similar mechanisms of discrimination and domination produce a sense of closeness with other groups. This shared sense of peoplehood is largely understood through a sense of shared interests and status, and therefore is both affective and instrumental, creating a position from which coalitions can emerge. By asserting a minority status, Latinos not only reject a distancing from blacks and a desired closeness to whites, but also adopt an important relational identity that has strong implications for race relations and eventual political mobilization.

**BLACK/BROWN RELATIONS**
As indicated in Chapter One, the overwhelming majority of literature that deals with intergroup relations finds racial and ethnic groups to be in negative and conflict. Moreover, despite a relative dearth of literature dealing with nonwhite groups, much of the literature on black/brown relations assesses relations between the two groups to be particularly poor, despite the fact that many scholars and activists find that Blacks and Latinos have numerous shared interests (Kaufmann 2003; Marrow 2008; McClain et al. 2006; McClain et al. 2007; Mindiola et al. 2002). Indeed, scholars, journalists, and conventional wisdom all indicate that throughout the United States, tensions between Blacks and Latinos are high.

Scholars explain this conflict as a result of competition for limited resources, including jobs, housing, and political representation, negative racial attitudes and perceived group threat. Moreover, many scholars find that Latinos predominantly see themselves as closer to whites, actively distancing themselves from association with African-Americans, and therefore foreclosing the possibility of any positive social relations or political coalitions (Marrow 2008; Forman, Goar, and Lewis 2002). Finally, even in the relatively scarce sociological literature where some forms of closeness are found, intergroup collaboration is found to be temporary, and therefore unsustainable.

McClain and colleagues have given the most systematic attention to the issue of black/brown relations, investigating the topic with attention to interracial attitudes, perceptions of competition and political conflict over the last two decades, largely in the Southeast (McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain and Tauber 1998; McClain et al. 2004; McClain et al. 2006; McClain et al. 2007). Their early work (McClain and Karnig 1990) that surveys data from 49 U.S. cities with at least 10% Hispanic and 10% black in 1980 uncovers little economic and political competition between the two. They find that the socioeconomic outcomes of both groups are linked, but that there is evidence that suggests that political competition increases as both groups gain success, and that Hispanics fare less well when blacks are the majority. When testing 1990s data, McClain and Tauber (1998) find continued support for improved socioeconomic outcomes, though the significance of this covariance declined. They also find little evidence of political competition, (although the political edge held by blacks declined) though there are some negative effects of black population size.

In 2004, Meier et al. examined school districts in Texas from 1997–1999 and uncover that in the field of education policy, some relationships between Latinos and blacks are characterized by complementary and cooperative relations, and in others, are riddled with conflict and competition (407). 2003 data on Latino attitudes toward blacks in Durham, NC indicates that Latinos have negative perceptions of blacks, but that these perceptions are mollified by high levels of education and a strong sense of group identity with other Latinos (McClain et al. 2006). Using the same Durham study, McClain et al. (2007) find that among blacks, there was a correlation between stereotypic views of Latinos and the perception of economic competition, and feel more threatened than do non-blacks.

Taken together, these literatures point to key explanatory factors—resource competition, pre-existing racial beliefs and community race relations, policy regimes and community behavior—that appear to play key role in shaping race relations. The case study presented in this dissertation serves an exception that proves the rule, examining local conditions to show that when the conditions of hostility outlined in the literature are
absent, closeness can emerge. Using the factors highlighted in the existing literature as a starting point, I examine how Mexican immigrants experience and interpret the conditions in Winston-Salem to facilitate a sense of closeness in four key ways: shared space and institutions with blacks; a sense of sudden anti-Latino discrimination that is not promoted by blacks; a sense that this sense of discrimination and a common enemy is shared with blacks; and shared experiences and support via civil and institutional discourses with blacks coupled with distancing and ‘othering’ by whites.

**Shared Status**
The combination of identifying a hostile out-group (whites) and uncovering a sense of shared status and social similarities with another group (blacks) results in a simultaneous process of distancing from whites via a perception of threat and conflict (Coser 1956; Brown 1998; Espiritu 1992) and closeness to blacks via a perception of shared social status and positive experiences (Nagel 1995). This combined effect mimics experimental work by Muzafer and Sherif (1954) and other social conflict theorists who find that separation and competition between groups can create conflict, while common goals and interests creates a sense of solidarity. This concept of shared interests and status on the one hand and a common enemy on the other, has been shown to be highly effective in diffusing any sense of competition that may emerge, creating a solid foundation for collaboration between groups. Contemporary research on Latinos highlights this point, finding a correlation among Latinos with a strong sense of pan-ethnic identity, characterized by shared interests and status with blacks, and positive interminority group attitudes (Kaufmann 2003).

From what we know about intergroup relations and contact, racialization and social movements scholarship, there is no reason to believe that these processes will necessarily emerge, nor lead to one another. However, much of the literature on linked fate and political mobilization suggests that for group mobilization and coalitions to emerge, a sense of solidarity is a necessary condition (Dawson 1994). While much of the literature on intergroup closeness and coalitional minority politics does not examine an empirical case of closeness (Bentacur and Gills 2000; de la Garza et al. 1992; Kaufmann 2003; Piatt 1997; Priestly 2007; Sonenshein 1990), the ‘rainbow coalition’ or ‘minority politics perspective’ argue that an understanding of shared interests and status appears to be an essential building block toward positive intergroup relations.

Dawson’s concept of linked fate provides a more specific racialization framing that highlights how minority groups come to understand their success or failure as tied together by virtue of their collective experiences of discrimination and socio-economic hardships, as well as implies a sense of shared interests. Some of the work that employs a linked fate concept points to the correlation among Latinos between a sense of pan-ethnic identity and a strong sense of linked fate with blacks, suggesting that a sense of group interests is correlated with a sense of shared discrimination and hardship (Kaufmann 2003). Moreover, it indicates that this shared hardship can catalyze closeness both within and across minority groups, including among blacks and Latinos.

**Group Threat and Intergroup Contact**
Intertwined with the intergroup competition scholarship is a robust literature on racial group threat. “Rooted in the conflict perspective, the racial threat hypothesis suggests that
as the proportion of blacks increases in relation to whites, intensified measures of control will proliferate in response to the perceived growing threat derived from closer proximity to minorities” (Welch and Payne 2010: 29). According to this scholarship, a growing proportion of minorities in a given community cultivates a sense of threat. This is in part rooted in a belief that blacks will begin to compete for political power and economic resources, and in part a measure of prejudicial beliefs regardless whether any real threat to resource access exists (Bobo and Hutchins 1996; Blumer 1958; Sherif et al. 1961; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Van den Berghe 1967; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). The threat hypothesis is often employed to test the proliferation of punitive policies and institutional control vis-à-vis minority populations, particularly Latino immigrants and African-Americans (Blalock 1967; Stults and Baumer 2007).

Directly in contrast to this literature is the intergroup contact hypothesis which posits that sustained intergroup contact, under the right conditions, can ameliorate a sense of racial threat, opening the possibility for positive community relations (Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Cook 1985; Gaertner et al. 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Oliver and Wong 2003; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Sigelman et al. 1996; Stephan 1985). In this framing, contact under favorable conditions leads to positive relations and unfavorable conditions leads to conflict or has no effect. While the unfavorable conditions are circumstances under which perceptions of threat and intergroup competition are exacerbated, racial animus is reduced when members of both groups are of equal status, have a high quality of contact, and are engaged in cooperation and mutual support with each other.

Much of this is work focused on black/white interactions, however, neglecting how contact changes interminority relationships. Oliver and Wong (2003) is a notable exception, finding that in the context of interminority relations, social contact reduces, rather than exacerbates tensions, and can reduce intergroup prejudice in multiethnic settings. They also find that while there can be tensions on the municipal level, contact at the neighborhood level is key in reducing those tensions. Moreover, they find that economic and racial composition are important factors to consider when examining interethnic perceptions (2003: 508).

While the racial conflict scholarship suggests that equal status creates a sense of economic threat over perceived labor market competition, Amir focuses on socioeconomic and occupational status, indicating that to develop positive perceptions of the out-group, one must be in contact with those who are of equal or superior status (1969: 325). Moreover, the literature that examines the discrimination hypothesis and linked fate indicates that equal economic status in some cases may be less important than a shared sense of systematic discrimination in animating a sense of shared status. Studies that examine linked fate highlight the importance of race interests over class interests for some racial and ethnic groups, particularly African-Americans (Dawson 1994). If we consider the literature on linked fate in relation to intergroup relations, together, they suggests a plausible scenario in which shared minority status and experiences of discrimination are more relevant than shared socioeconomic status in eliminating a sense of threat and negative attitudes.

While they focus on the emergence of conflict, these literatures offer three key conditions under which positive intergroup contact may occur. First, perceived threat may be ameliorated by sustained positive contact. Second, the development of a sense of
equal status vis-à-vis the state can facilitate positive relations. And third, cooperation toward common goals and providing mutual support builds positive rapport between groups and reduces any remaining sense of competition. Rather than take conflict as a given, this dissertation makes an important contribution to this scholarship by examining a case in which these favorable conditions exist. By approaching race relations research at the local level, we can develop a better sense of how and why conflict and competition, or cooperation and closeness emerge.

BECOMING MINORITIES: LOCAL CONTEXT AND REVERSE INCORPORATION
While Omi and Winant (1994) underscore that racial projects take place at both the micro and macro level, it is less clear how this actually unfolds—how this day-to-day experience of race both shapes racial formation at the local level and how these processes interact with macro level ones. In highlighting large scale social forces, much of the literature that seeks to explain the racialization process focuses on structure and social movements in racial formation, and is thus driven by macro-level analyses. While states undoubtedly shape racial formation through policy, the census and the distribution of resources, an over-reliance of state level explanations fails to account for within-state variation. I propose that this method is increasingly less useful in making sense of these types of processes which are increasingly variable, and shaped at the local-level. Indeed, with this in mind, it not at all surprising that much of the literature that seeks to explain the racial formations of Latinos finds contradictory outcomes, often depending on the site of study and national origin (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Telles and Ortiz 2008). These contradictions suggest that while an emphasis on macro level systems and processes represent an essential contribution to our understanding of race, it also may obscure important emerging patterns that are distinctively micro and local. Indeed, in the case of Mexicans in Winston-Salem, a macro level approach can help us make sense of key experiences in relation to the state (economic forces, demographic change), but would fail to give us sufficient insight into how groups relate to one another, as well as policies and practices that are distinctly local.

In the late 1990s, Portes (1997) argued that in order to theorize immigrant incorporation, we must take into account the distinct circumstances awaiting different immigrant groups in terms of institutions, regional contexts and social perceptions. In the decade that followed, a growing subset of immigration scholars have focused their attentions on the local incorporation context, with special attention to the specifics of place that distinguish it from other localities (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Nicholas, Stepick and Stepick 2009; Portes 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Reitz 1998; Stepick and Dutton Stepick 2002; Stepick et al. 2003). This method of investigation is becoming increasingly necessary as states and municipalities are left to their own devices in addressing immigration in the absence of comprehensive immigration reform. A local level approach reveals widely different contexts from one municipality to another, indicating that incorporation and racialization patterns may be better understood by analyzing key structuring factors at the local, rather than state, regional or national levels. Waters and Jimenez (2005) highlight this, indicating that:
There is good reason to believe that immigrant assimilation in these new gateways may differ in fundamental ways from the experiences of immigrants in more established gateways. One potential difference is in intergroup relations. The long history of immigration in more established gateways means that notions about the place of immigrants in the class, racial, and ethnic hierarchies of these established gateways are well-entrenched. In contrast, the lack of immigration history in new gateways means that the place of immigrants in the class, racial, and ethnic hierarchies is less crystallized, and immigrants may thus have more freedom to define their position (2005:117).

Nicholas, Stepick and Stepick (2009) argue that this attention to structural context, and how that context is experienced differently by different racial and ethnic groups, explains incorporation dynamics in South Florida, where they examine the role of social context reception in producing opportunities and barriers to mobility and success. In defining the context of reception as the opportunities available to immigrants and how immigrants are treated by members of the host society, they take a more structural approach to assimilation, noting that opportunities and barriers are socially constructed by established residents. Some are created at the federal level, while others are created and enforced locally. Different groups may experience different receptions in the same context. They also note that newcomers play a role, even if it is reactive, in the formation of contexts, and that these factors come together in structuring opportunity. Moreover, they contend that this attention to context has largely been absent in the immigration literature. “Context of reception, that is influenced by and felt at the regional, and the much more micro, local, face-to-face level, has been the object of somewhat less published analysis” (Stepick and Dutton Stepick 2002; Stepick et al 2003).

To explain how Mexicans are developing new identities and relating to other groups in Winston-Salem, I use a context of reception framework to highlight local level factors that I propose are leading Mexicans to a racialized Latino identity and a minority consciousness. By examining the local context in Winston-Salem, I use the factors at work in the intergroup relations literature to show how they come together to produce a particular set of experiences for Mexicans living there.

In the case of immigrants, I contend that this is occurring in part because recent demographic and legislative changes have destabilized the context of reception. Specifically, the spread of immigrant settlement across the United States, coupled with significant changes in immigration policy at the local level, has produced widely disparate contexts into which immigrants are received. Moreover, because this volatility is strongly influenced by changes in immigration policy and discourse, it also shapes race and citizenship, deeply intertwined social concepts and practices that can determine not only political and economic status, but also quite literally mark who belongs and who does not (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003; Glenn 2004; Massey and Sanchez R. 2010). Moreover, because debates around immigration have reached a stalemate at the federal level, it is increasingly municipal and state governments (ACLU 2009; Marrow 2009b; SB1070) that are deciding whether to formally exclude, and in many cases, expel, Latino immigrants from their communities. It is this contestation and reconfiguration of
citizenship at the local level that both constrains and directs how new immigrants come to understand themselves as raced.

I posit that this process of persistent, pervasive, local-level discrimination creates a framework in which the salience of race is sped-up. A sense of a sudden, negative shift in the landscape of incorporation makes the experience of discrimination and exclusion virtually unavoidable for Mexicans in Winston-Salem. Combined with reinforcement from African-Americans, as well as efforts to build political coalitions, these experiences are highly racializing for Mexicans. Moreover, the absence of competition with African-Americans, along with negative messaging from whites, eliminates much of the alternative race-framing highlighted in other contexts.

As outlined above, the context of reception, particularly local context, plays an essential role in shaping the reception of newcomers, and their subsequent integration into the community. Local context has a variety of dimensions, and includes, but is not limited to: the demographic composition of an area, its economy and level of well-being, the quality and practices of its schools, services and local government, as well as the accessibility of neighborhoods. Other features include the views of elites, public discourse, the robustness of civic organizations, and the degree of welcome from local institutions (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009: 26).

In Portes and Rumbaut’s *Legacies* (2001), the authors highlight how immigrants are received, i.e. their modes of incorporation and its consequences, as key determinants in how migrants and their children will perform over time. They find that there is a great diversity among immigrants in terms of the dimensions of their integration, which they identify as: 1) their individual features, 2) the social environment that receives them and 3) their family structure (2001: 46). However, they note that while newcomers arrive with different levels of capital, they do not encounter a level playing field. Instead, “the policies of the receiving government represent the first such factor confronting newcomers…When enforced, exclusion precludes immigration or forces immigrants into a wholly underground and disadvantaged existence (2001:46).”

Alternatively, the political context may be more neutral through widely available legal access or welcoming, by actively encouraging immigration and settlement. Government support can change over time, but when it exists, provides an important window of access to newcomers. The second key factor they identify is reception in the host society. Portes and Rumbaut argue that race is a key criterion of social acceptance than can be more influential than culture, class, religion or language. They see this as a large part of a large national or regional social context, identifying the specific local community and immediate context of reception as a key third factor, in which the role of groups, particularly co-ethnics shape the incorporation patterns of newcomers.

I find however that since 2001, these three levels of reception – governmental, societal and communal – have become more intertwined. Macro factors of government and race have become localized, increasing the level of variation between contexts, as well that complexity of the incorporation process. Moreover, co-ethnics are less likely to be present, particularly in new destinations, forcing newcomers to make sense of these new complex experiences without a pre-existing pattern or framework of incorporation in the local social, political or economic context. In Winston-Salem, government policy is heavily local, dictating constrained access to school and social services, as well as other local institutions. They also change the contour of public spaces, and as discussed in
Chapter four, making them plausible sites of discrimination and enforcement. While newcomers there have good access to economic resources and housing, civic organizations and the degree of welcome by them, are often divided by race.

**Government**

As highlighted in Chapter four, prior to 2005, Mexicans living in Winston-Salem felt that the atmosphere in the community was quite welcoming. They were able to get driver’s licenses, it was relatively easy to get employment, housing was plentiful, and schools were working hard to provide support for Spanish speaking children and families. As the population of incoming migrants peaked, however, circumstances quickly shifted. This shift in policies did not come at the national level as immigration policy has been defined in decades past, but at the state and municipal level. This shift of policies toward immigration enforcement, deportation and the barring of immigrant access to local institutions and services had particular consequences for Mexicans. As Telles and Ortiz note, Mexican American in particular are “defined by the experience of their immigration and thus immigration policies may be particularly important in their integration” (2008: 39). Immigration policy is used to determine who belongs and who doesn’t, and exclusionary polices serve the specific role of signaling who is to be stigmatized as not fully American.

To move this process of defining and excluding who belongs and who does not to the local level, not only makes the process more direct and protracted, particularly in small towns and suburbs where service providers and law enforcement agents are also neighbors, it also creates a sense of social exclusion that is less tangible from federally directed policies. As elaborated in Chapter four, it is not merely the effect of these policies, but that they represent an about-face in context, makes the experience feel much more like discrimination than the fact of being undocumented alone. Because early waves of immigrants in North Carolina felt welcome, accepted, and had no trouble accessing the labor market and social services, it is difficult to interpret legal changes and social discourse in any other way than as arbitrary and discriminatory hostility. It is this context of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment, legal changes and general hostility that generates reactive ethnicity and a sense of groupness that in part spurs Mexican migrants to come to perceive themselves as Latinos. While it is important that they share a language and some aspects of culture, the most important characteristic they share is status, and therefore, being discriminated against.11

**Reinforcing Context**

While discrimination and exclusion from whites and from key municipal and state institutions play a pivotal role in racializing Latinos, race is developed in relation to other groups. The characteristics of the Winston-Salem social context not only create a sense of distance from whites due to a longstanding history of discrimination and segregation, but also the accessible labor market produces low levels of competition between Latinos and African-Americans, a key source of tension in other contexts. As a result, the process of becoming integrated in to the community has become increasingly racialized.

11 Other non-Mexican Latinos are frequently mistaken for Mexicans and may be swept up in discrimination in such a way that produces pan-ethnic consciousness (See: Espiritu 1993). However, at this stage, there is little evidence that other Latinos are moving in that direction.
As in much of the South, but particularly within the black community, segregation and persisting racial inequality has meant that African-Americans are civically engaged in their own communities, particularly as active participants in community churches and local community organizations, such as the YMCA. Because Latinos are moving into neighborhoods where the local institutions are predominantly African-American, they too are incorporated into these institutions. At the same time, necessary institutions and services such as schools and post offices remain segregated from whites, separating Latinos from those institutions as well. This has had long-term consequences for the prospect of integration in Winston-Salem, particularly when it comes to resources.

Winston-Salem was part of a national trend in the 1980s and 1990s where schools re-segregated resulting in not only blacks becoming more distanced from whites, but Latinos increasingly settled into minority communities as well. In switching back to ‘neighborhood schools’ and ending bussing, by the late 1990s, Latino youth were unlikely to encounter any whites in their peer group (Mendieta 2007: 217). Churches, particularly Catholic churches, which are traditionally determined by parish, and therefore are neighborhood institutions, are also reflective of this neighborhood segregation. The only black Catholic church in town has now become majority Hispanic.

This increased contact and familiarity with black institutions and history also gives Mexicans a sense of the idea of blackness in the U.S. context, even when they may not necessarily have extensive personal experience with blacks due to language barriers. This in turn provides a set of symbols and meanings – the Civil Rights movement, state sanctioned exclusion, and the symbolism and expectations carried by President Obama to initiate immigration reform and to serve as a role model for children of color – that resonate with contemporary Mexican migrants in Winston-Salem. Moreover, many of these symbols are highlighted by African-American leaders who have pushed a discourse of shared discrimination and experiences. This effort has been fairly successful, and has impacted many Latinos who are working to make sense of their own experiences and identities.

These political and social structures have room to strongly impact racialization because of the low-levels of labor market and resource competition. In particular, the labor market plays a pivotal role in constructing race relations and perceptions of access to resources and mobility, among both African-Americans and Mexicans. As highlighted in Chapter one, much of the work on relations between blacks and browns finds conflict due to resource competition (Gay 2006). Thus, unlike the contexts of some communities where the labor market is quite volatile, the stability of the labor market and its significant expansion in the 1990s in both blue collar and white-collar professions is likely that one of the key conditions that make a shared status discourse possible. In Winston-Salem, for the most part, Latinos pose no economic threat to the African-Americans in this community. As highlighted in Appendix III and IV, Latinos were a negligible proportion of of the population and labor market until the mid-1990s. As the size of the group grew several times over, they arrived with relatively few skills and little education, and therefore were largely filtered into construction, labor and service positions. African-Americans by contrast were primarily distributed more broadly, and were strongly represented in management, technical, health care, sales and other professional sectors. Winston-Salem’s African-Americans in particular have benefitted from long term job stability and good wages in the city’s tobacco and textile
manufacturing plants, and represent a significant proportion of the middle class (Tursi 1994). Additionally, because African-Americans represent nearly 40% of the population in Winston-Salem, they are not fearful about a depletion of numbers. Moreover, while studies of rural areas that highlight racial conflict and job competition between African-Americans and Latinos are important studies of how new racial conflicts emerge (Marrow 2008); many Latinos are migrating to cities and suburbs such as Winston-Salem where economic competition may be less pronounced (Singer 2009).  

In 2008, as throughout the United States, Winston-Salem began to experience a significant economic downturn. Initially, many African-Americans were protected from the job turn because the sectors in which they are now more concentrated – education, management and health care – were impacted by the decline more belatedly than sectors that disproportionately impacted immigrants – namely construction and service work. As the recession expanded, manufacturing jobs, a sector that impacted both Latinos and African-Americans (almost exclusively) began to decline more rapidly.  

As the recession expanded, manufacturing jobs, a sector that impacted both Latinos and African-Americans (almost exclusively) began to decline more rapidly. By 2009 when unemployment reached 10% in North Carolina, job competition at the lower end of the economic spectrum began to increase. It is more difficult to assess how this has translated in terms of social perceptions. However, it does not appear that African-Americans are objectively losing jobs to Latinos during the recession, perhaps in part because of the increase in raids and employer crack-downs during this period and in part because immigration flows appear to have stabilized.

Anecdotally, some African-Americans have reported that they feel employers prefer to hire Latinos for short-term work, but they claim that this is employer bias, and does not produce negative feelings toward Latinos. They explain that they understand that many immigrant Latinos have no choice but to take low wages, and therefore are preferred, and that this is an effort by white employers to divide and conquer. At the level of stable salaries that can support a middle class lifestyle, however, few Latinos hold jobs outside of construction and service. In this way, early evidence indicates that while tensions may have increased somewhat, they have not reached the level of economic competition that is reported to instigate hostile relations between African-American and Latinos elsewhere.

Finally, as suggested by Dawson, discrimination alone is not sufficient in producing strong ties and solidarity. There must also be reinforcing messages in the form of community members whose views align with newly constructed identities. Because there are no other significant minority populations in the region, the task falls to the African-Americans in the community. In the case of Winston-Salem, African-American leaders have embraced this task, serving as an important counterpoint to negative, anti-immigrant messages that are pervasive in the community. Elaborated in Chapter Six, this relationship plays a key role in reinforcing minority identity and positive black/brown relations.

Together, the factors at work in the local context of Winston-Salem produce an exceptional case of racial formation and race relations. Unlike much of the previous literature, Mexicans have settled in a community where the government context has

---

12 This is due in part to the larger concentration of wealth and stability among African-Americans and other residents in cities and suburbs, as well as the more permanent nature of work in these areas. Migrant workers in rural areas are more likely to be individual seasonal workers, often with temporary work visas, residing in the U.S. only temporarily, and often are hidden from view, working long hours and living on the farms where they work until they return home at the end of the season.

13 This sector was already losing between 500 and 1000 jobs annually on average since 2000 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).
changed to become more hostile and locally directed, while simultaneously maintaining a stable economy and labor market, reducing the sense of competition between Latinos and other groups. Moreover, while blacks and whites have long had hostile relations, they are also fairly prosperous. Additionally, because Latinos are such newcomers to the area, there are few opportunities for alliance building with co-ethnics or other immigrants. Instead, their ideas about race and race relations are produced largely through their relations with whites and blacks. And finally, blacks and whites play a pivotal role in reinforcing Mexicans ideas about race, with blacks providing support and a sense of solidarity, and whites merely preaching tolerance, or at worst, exclusion. In the remainder of this dissertation, I elaborate how this context facilitates a racialized and minority identity among Mexicans, along with overwhelmingly positive relations toward blacks, and distant feelings toward whites.
Chapter Three
Vamos a Carolina! Mexican Migration and North Carolina

When one finally gets off the three-hour coach bus ride from Acapulco to the Costa Chica, the imprint of migration is readily apparent. Along the hot, dry and dusty two-lane main road that connects the city to small villages along the coast, all the way down to Oaxaca, are pick-up trucks with North Carolina plates. Young men wearing Carolina blue baseball caps and University of North Carolina t-shirts and low-slung shorts, ride in the cab and nod to each other and say ‘what’s up’. It’s the only English they know. Small bodegas have names like ‘Mercado Carolina’, and market stalls sell CDs with popular Chilenas about going ‘North to Carolina’. At the local post office, 90% of the mail coming in is post-marked from Raleigh, Durham, Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Greensboro and various small towns from around the Tar Heel State. Teenagers sitting in the shade of the few trees and building around the square discuss about their plans to leave for Carolina soon. And while they are unable to locate North Carolina on a map, they have uncles, brothers and fathers who are there and will help them find their way.

How did we get here? What has changed so that this series of predominantly Afro-Mexican towns and provinces that are fairly isolated from urban Mexico, and yet are directly tied to North Carolina? Below I detail the changes in migration patterns from Mexico as well as the impact of these changes on North Carolina.

PUSH AND PULL: FROM MEXICO TO NORTH CAROLINA

Push: From Mexico

Afro-Mexican cities and pueblos are part of a larger wave of migrants beginning in the 1980s and 1990s who have come to the United States in larger numbers, and from areas where migration was largely uncommon. As a result, just as the South has experienced a significant jump in the arrival of immigrant labor in the 1990s, Mexican sending regions have changed as well (Hernandez Leon and Zuniga 2002).

Unlike any other migrant group, Mexicans immigrating to the United States have been arriving steadily since the mid-1800s. These patterns of out-migration have remained stable, with the majority of migrants coming from the Western states of Mexico (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001). Only since the late 1980s have migration patterns from Mexico to the U.S. shifted away from the Western states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, and to a lesser extent, Durango, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas, which historically accounted for over half of migrant sending states between 1926 and 1992 (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001: 111). Periphery states have rarely accounted for more than two percent of migrants prior to 1990 and states in the Center sent fewer than 20% of migrants until the late 1980s (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001). Since the

---

14 I use Jorge Durand’s geographic scheme to describe changes in immigration patterns by Mexican region. His regional definitions are as follows: Historic Western states: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas. The Center is defined as: The Federal District, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro and Tlaxcala. The Border: Northern and Southern Baja, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas. The Periphery refers to Campeche, Chiapas, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Veracruz and Yucatan (Durand, Massey and Zenteno 2001: 115).
1980s, migrants began arriving from all states throughout Mexico, leading to a major shift in the regional, class and racial experiences of new Mexicans in the United States.

The 1990s marked another uptick in the spread of migration due in large part to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the trilateral trade block signed in 1994 by the U.S., Canada and Mexico. One of the consequences of NAFTA was a shrinking market for Mexican produced corn and sugar. U.S. corn exports flooded the Mexican market, crowding out Mexican corn producers and sparking the use of corn syrup for local products (Zahniser and Coyle 2004). This was coupled with a severe curtailment in government sponsored loans for small Mexican farmers, particularly those who grow corn and raise cattle.

As a result the failure of the Mexican government to buffer against NAFTA, many farmers who were previously able to subsist on small-scale production now saw temporary migration to the United States (El Norte) as the only option to obtain the necessary funds for the growing season. In many cases, opportunities for self-sufficiency dried up permanently, forcing able bodied men to empty out of towns in search of employment. The situation in many of these small coastal towns continues to deteriorate even more quickly for families, particularly those with children.

Indeed, some of the migrants who are professionals and those who have settled in the U.S. for more than 10 years that I interviewed shared this analysis, and indicated that they felt that more and more migrants were coming from Mexico in part because the Mexico economy is in decline. They directly linked this to policies such as NAFTA, noting that there is not enough work available in Mexico, and increasingly, Mexicans, particularly those from the country, have no choice but to migrate. They also note that many migrants do not come with the intention of remaining in the U.S. permanently, and many do return. However, because it has become increasingly difficult to cross back and forth, and most migrants are young adults that either have young children that they bring with them or subsequently have children while in the U.S., the incentive to return diminishes.

As much of the transnational literature has reported (Levitt 2001; Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994), many migrants here continue to send money home to their parents and extended families, as well as pay for homes to be built for retirement. Remittances now serve as an essential form of income for those who stay behind in coastal Mexico where the local economy is dominated by the volatility of small scale agriculture and natural resource production. However, after living in the U.S. for enough time to earn enough money to build a home, the children of migrants are old enough to consider the United States home, and often do not want to return to Mexico. Some migrants still intend to return despite this, but push off their return date to retirement. Others simply make arrangements to have their remains returned to Mexico upon their death, acknowledging that they will likely spend the rest of their lives in the United States.

This shift in the push dynamic between Mexico and the U.S. is particularly significant not only because of the increasing diversity of class and educational backgrounds of migrants, but also because Periphery and Center regions have relatively
large populations of Afro-Mexicans compared to Mexico’s traditional sending states (Durand, Massey and Zeneto 2001). Mexicans everywhere are feeling the pressure to migrate, not to make a fortune, but to sustain a reasonable quality of life. The coastal regions in particular, that have rarely sent migrants prior to the 1980s, are largely populated by small farmers who have little alternative. Moreover, Mexican policies continue to intensify this process, doing little to discourage migration and offering little economic support.

**Pull to the New South**

Mexicans and other Latino migrants are not only leaving Mexico in droves, however. Other migrants who had previously settled in other areas of the United States, particularly California, Arizona and New Mexico, but also other traditional settlement states such as Texas and the metro areas of Chicago, have found their way to North Carolina through migration chains and family networks. For the most part, they are motivated by better job prospects, but also a lower cost of living and a more welcoming atmosphere. Others sought out greater access to institutional benefits, such as driver’s licenses, which states like California banned undocumented immigrant access to as early as 1993 (IGS 2010). As a result, “between 1995 and 2004, 38.2% of North Carolina’s Hispanic newcomers migrated from abroad, 40.2% migrated from another U.S. jurisdiction, and 21.6% were born in North Carolina” (Kasarda and Johnson 2006: 2).

In 2008, I attended a meeting for immigrants at the Winston-Salem public library. When discussing migration patterns in a community meeting on immigrants’ rights, the facilitator, Sara, asked why people were coming to North Carolina from other states. A young woman answered, saying she had a friend from Arizona, and she told her they moved because the law was ‘fuerte’ [strong] there, and they can’t do anything there anymore, so they left. Sara nodded, saying that she’s heard “that people are coming from the border states because it’s less violent here, it’s calmer here, better weather, it’s cheaper, and there’s more work.” This pull to North Carolina for a better quality of life, not only in terms of economic opportunity, but also the low cost of living and freedom from increasingly restrictive immigration policies, was significant and expansive. As Emmanuel from the Costa Chica notes:

Look, well part of it is that it’s just gotten easier. It’s cheaper to get there now, so everyone can go. In the beginning, in early 80s, there were a few people who went legally, they had permits to go to the U.S. for work, and after that, more people starting going.

Interviewer: Did they go to the same places?

Emmanuel: No, in lots of places, California, Fresno, Utah, Carolina, Chicago, all over.

Interviewer: That’s interesting, because there are lots of people in Carolina now…
Emmanuel: Well, when people go, and there’s no work, they move somewhere else. So lot’s of people, they went to California, but then when people went there, were migrating to California, they moved on, because it was expensive, there’s not much work there now.

Indeed, for many of my Latino respondents, North Carolina was not their initial destination. The majority of them had originally settled in California, though a few came from Texas, Arizona and the Northeast, the earliest arriving in the early 1990s. While the primary motivation was to leave the service labor market in favor of better opportunities, for those Mexicans who had families with children, the political situation in California and other Southwestern states had become increasingly difficult.

In 1994, California took the lead on passing comprehensive anti-immigrant policy with the passage of proposition 187, also known as the Save Our State Initiative. This ballot measure was promoted as a way to deal with fiscal pressures on the state, but quickly became a way for voters to ‘send a message’ to the numerous immigrants in the state. Not only was this law the first effort by California to address immigration, but the law would ban undocumented immigrants from the use of public services, including hospitals and schools. While the law was quickly rendered unconstitutional, voters were engaged in a symbolic politics in which the message was clear- we don’t want you here. Indeed, one exit poll found that voters for the initiative indicated that they voted for the measure exactly for that reason (Calavita 1996; Garcia Bedolla 2003). The initiative was extremely popular among conservatives and garnered support from Governor Wilson, winning by a large margin—59% to 41%. Moreover, with the exception of the liberal counties surrounding the Bay Area, every other county voted in favor of the law.

Despite the legal challenges and subsequent outcry, soon after, various states with large immigrant populations began proposing similar legislation, presumably with a similar intent – to register its dislike of the immigrant population. While these economic and social pressures did little to halt the flow of new immigrants to California and other traditional receiving destinations, this pervasive sense of racial threat did create significant pressure on previously settled immigrants to try their luck elsewhere. As migration into the United States from Mexico continued to increase throughout the 1990s and 2000s, migrants who had been in the United States long enough to establish networks elsewhere were the first to go. As a whole, the Southeast region has not only been drawing new immigrants at break neck speed, but it has also drawn away these Latino workers who had previously settled in states such as California and Arizona.

The New South
The 1990s and early 2000s marked a massive economic expansion in the U.S. South, drawing workers from across the economic spectrum. White and African-Americans migrated to the South in large numbers to find employment in the newly expanded finance industry and corporate headquarters. As the South continued to undergo enormous economic expansion, and required a growing unskilled and semi-skilled labor force to handle not only increasing manufacturing needs, but also massive construction projects and service work. The availability of good jobs and a moderate cost of living across the South served as a magnet to Mexican migrants who came to the region in astonishing numbers. This was true in North Carolina in particular, which experienced
nearly 400% growth in a decade (Griffith 2006; Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005). North Carolina’s relative abundance of semi-skilled and unskilled work throughout the 1990s, combined with a low cost of living, made it an increasingly attractive and important destination for immigrant laborers (MPI 2007). Over the last two decades, it has become the state with the highest growth of Latinos in the United States. In sum, North Carolina quickly became the preeminent site of the “New South” (Smith and Furseth 2005).15

The U.S. South has been particularly successful at drawing a significant proportion of these new migrants to fill this labor need, as well as previously settled migrants from California, Arizona, and New Mexico, in part because of a heretofore general reluctance in the region to enforce national immigration policy and call on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to deport migrants viewed as necessary for agricultural, construction and processing work.

Thus far, however, rather than turn to a domestic pool of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, they are increasing their efforts to maintain a low-wage immigrant workforce (ACLU 2009). This demand for more immigrant laborers has in turn produced a greater effort to tap into new labor pools and create new, unmonitored migration routes. The combined result is that plant owners and farmers are now recruiting heavily from the Periphery and Center, resulting (as noted above) in entire communities migrating across the border from regions that have never been in the United States in large numbers.16 At a meeting I attended on the rights of the undocumented in North Carolina, one Latino man in front of me noted that “most people here come from Guerrero, you know Acapulco, Cuaji, etc., at least the people that I work with in the church. They told me that about 10 years ago, there was a sign posted in the town that stated there was work in Kernersville, NC.” This is the only evidence that I have of direct recruitment, but it is likely that recruitment occurs more informally.17 In most cases, people report following family members, and in some cases, calling members who had settled in other parts of the country to Winston-Salem.

As noted above, others were drawn to North Carolina because of its lax laws an easy access to institutions. Antonio, a Mexican reporter for the Spanish Language newspaper noted that:

One of the reasons that [migration increased] was because you could get a drivers license. North Carolina was probably one of the last states in the United States, and that changed in 2006, that would give you a driver’s license. For several years —seven, eight, nine years—would not ask for more than passing the examination. You know, the driving examination, the written examination and a number. You didn’t have to prove anything else. They required two addresses, and that’s it! That’s part of the reason. I understand that people from Georgia, from South Carolina, from Florida,

15 The New South is a popular designation among scholars and journalists to refer to the rapid growth of the Latino population in the Southeast, and their subsequent impact on the economy, political context and social relations there.
16 These economic shifts and changes in the opportunity structure in Mexico have resulted in a move toward necessary migration among the able bodied adult men in many of these communities. As they settle in the U.S. for extended periods, they frequently send for their wives and later children to join them in the U.S.
17 Kernersville is a small town neighboring Winston-Salem.
you know, neighboring places, started to come here to get driver’s licenses.

These significant shifts in push and pull factors are creating new immigrant incorporation contexts that combine circumstances that have yet to be adequately examined in the literature. Moreover, because the experiences of these migrants are both distinct, but also more permanent because migrants are staying in the U.S. in increasing numbers, indicates that new, more complex racial dynamics are likely to arise. These factors have come together to create a dramatic demographic shift in Winston-Salem, NC, where the bulk of this study takes place. To understand the impact of this immigration on race relations, below I provide an overview of Winston-Salem’s racial and economic history.

NORTH CAROLINA: RACE IN THE RECEIVING COMMUNITY

Winston-Salem, NC is a medium sized town, with approximately 215,000 people in the triad region of Northwestern North Carolina. It’s the largest city in Forsyth County and one of the top five cities in terms of population within North Carolina. 2006 census estimates indicate that the metro population continues to grow, in part due to annexing and in part due to in-migration. The census estimates that approximately 56% of the population is white, 37% black, 8.6% Latino and 1.6% reporting two or more races (See: Appendix III).

While community lore holds that Highway 52 continues to segregate black and white communities, census data indicate that Blacks have been segregated somewhat differently, clustered around the center of the city, and then fanning out primarily to the north and then throughout the city over time (see appendix III). In 1970, most African-Americans were conctrated in the city center, where the tobacco processing plants were located. In the 1980s and 1990s, they continued to spread out across the east side of the city. In recent decades, blacks are now represented across the city, with the exception of a cluser of neighborhoods in the northeast sector of the city that remain white. This persistent segregation has existed in part because of enduring negative interracial attitudes between Blacks and whites, and in part because of the lower-cost housing stock in the city center originally built to accommodate black tobacco and domestic workers. Nevertheless, steady economic growth in the city and the strength of black institutions, including hospitals and a university, enabled significant upward mobility of Blacks over time. Winston-Salem has two universities, Wake Forest University (WFU) on the white side of town and Winston-Salem State University (WSSU) on the black side. Wake Forest was brought to Winston-Salem from Wake Forest in 1956 by the R.J. Reynolds family in an attempt to turn Winston-Salem into a

18 While recent data indicated that a significant number of migrants returned to Mexico during the height of the 2009 recession, that number has dropped off in recent months. Because of the increased danger of crossing the borders, migrants remain in the U.S. far longer than in previous generations.
19 This is an increase of about 30,000 since the 2000 census, due in large part to suburban annexation. The mayor believes that this still is an undercount, and estimates the population at around 225,000.
20 The top cities in population are: Charlotte, Raleigh, Greensboro, and Durham. Fayetteville is the only other city in North Carolina with a population above 100,000.
21 To this day, a popular community organization dedicated to issues facing minority communities is called ‘Crossing 52’.
Winston-Salem State is, by contrast, a historically black university founded in the late 1890s. Winston and Salem were joined in 1913. Salem was originally founded by Moravians, and a portion of downtown has remained preserved as ‘Old Salem’ in which costumed actors live and work as the early Moravians did in the late 1700s. This area is bordered by a small women’s liberal arts college, Salem College.

As the Winston-Salem economy shifted and expanded in the 1990s to include more managerial and white collar positions available to African-Americans, blacks began to move out of the rental and lower quality housing units near the downtown area, and into more expensive homes away from the city center, largely to the North and West. The less expensive, lower-quality housing created an easy pocket of available housing stock for new Latinos to move into on the black side of town, and live alongside wealthier African-American neighbors. As newcomers to the city in the 1990s, Latinos settled around main highways, as well as throughout the city. Moreover, though certainly not isolated from whites, they appear to have clustered near Blacks. This pattern of settlement indicates that in contemporary Winston-Salem, while most whites in town and neighboring suburbs reside in predominantly or exclusively white neighborhoods, blacks and browns tend to live together or in diverse neighborhoods, populated by all three groups.

Although the black and increasingly Latino neighborhoods are less opulent than those that are predominantly white, the cost of living in Winston-Salem is low, and so most African-Americans own their homes. Moreover, rental housing is spacious and has shared outdoor space, resembling the type of desirable middle-class apartment complexes we might find in urban cities to the north, devoid of most of the issues that plague poor urban neighborhoods. Because there was no competition for housing, the transition of Latinos into the black neighborhoods was relatively smooth. The key exception would be schools, which have experienced significant growing pains due to the massive increase of Latino school children, increasing not only the number of students served, but also demanded special accommodations such as an increased need for ESL courses and bilingual teachers and staff.

**Historical Winston-Salem**

In the early 1800s, the Reynolds family built a tobacco empire there, eventually crowding out the Hanes family, which later turned to textile manufacturing. Throughout the 1800s and until the 1950s, the majority of the population of Winston-Salem, and much of the surrounding areas were employed either in tobacco through the Reynolds family, or in textile manufacturing through the Hanes family. Though slavery was common statewide, the presence of the Moravians tempered the regime of slavery in Winston-Salem. Many slaves were integrated into the Moravian religious traditions, trained to work in factories, and were sometimes allowed to receive wages and run small businesses. The Moravian approach was often pragmatic, sometimes breaking religious rules in order to serve businesses and the rising business class. The Moravian theocracy crumbled in the 1850s,

---

22 Moravians are a small, but mainline denomination of Protestants, affiliated in the United States with the the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America. They were one of the first denominations to engage in missionary work. They also favored a communal style of living and work, favoring prayer and simplicity, and thus garnering comparisons to the Quakers.

23 The Hanes Family made its fortune on hosiery and intimate apparel.
to be replaced by a rising business class, headed by the Reynolds and Hanes families. In the 1890s, blacks continued to migrate to the area to work in cotton mills, tobacco factories, and as domestics. Until this point the black population was relatively small, but by 1910 they came to represent 40% of the population. The Reynolds and Hanes families served and flourished as the oligarchs of Winston-Salem. They controlled city government, built universities, created infrastructure projects and sponsored the arts. Manufacturing has been the primary industry in Winston-Salem for approximately 200 years, and as a result, these two families, along with a handful of other prosperous business owners, controlled and administered Winston-Salem in a manner that is locally referred to as a ‘benevolent oligarchy’.

In 1959, reconstruction and revitalization of the city to accommodate expansion of RJ Reynolds and WSSU destroyed entire neighborhoods. Black neighborhoods suffered the most, and in the 1960s, 600 acres were seized and 4000 families were moved. East Winston, Happy Hills and Kimberly Park, all historically black neighborhoods, were redeveloped. Black businesses were destroyed in the name of ‘urban renewal’, and the majority of blacks relocated to the East side of town. As a result, Winston-Salem is split through the middle by U.S. 52. The West side of town is populated by whites, and the East side of town by blacks. WSSU is on the East side and Wake Forest is on the West side (See appendix III).

In the late 1940s, black workers went on strike and were able to join the Tobacco Workers International Union. However, the union was federally decertified in 1951, and unions never took hold in Winston-Salem. Nonetheless, some blacks won seats on the council in the late 1950s. By 1969, 45 of the 66 schools had integrated. Despite some violence, Winston-Salem was considered to be a ‘progressive’ Southern city, with relatively little unrest compared to its neighbors. In the 1950s and 60s, major employers such as the RJ Reynolds tobacco company and Hanes hosiery stymied the growth of organized labor by providing relatively high wages and pensions to its black employees (Tursi 1994). Moreover, the Reynolds and Hanes families managed to maintain control of their companies by raising wages. Many also speculate that they also frequently bribed local clergy to smooth over racial unrest (Korstad 2007). As a result, Winston-Salem’s prosperity produced a tacit racial tolerance in which the city minimized conflict by maintaining separate lives and communities. This was likely made possible in part because of the abundance of well-paying, steady work, the lack of civic mobilization, unions and a general deference to the city oligarchs.

In the 1980s, however, the economic tides shifted. Much of Winston-Salem’s manufacturing center was bought-out, merged or bankrupt. RJ Reynolds left Winston-Salem in 1987 for Atlanta, and Hanes was bought out in 1979 by Sarah Lee. Winston-Salem was not aggressive about annexations, and as a result suburban flight took over in the 1980s. All Winston-Salem trucking industries collapsed by 1989; U.S.AIR bought Piedmont Air and changed its employment center and deregulation of 1984 forced it to close its plant in the area; and Phillip Morris replaced RJ Reynolds as the largest tobacco manufacturer in the country by 1983. This economic downturn forced Winston-Salem to attract new companies to replace the 13,000 manufacturing jobs that had been lost in the county. Service and retail jobs filled the gap, though Winston-Salem remained a manufacturing leader. North Carolina is also the least unionized state in the United States

---

24 Hanes and RJ Reynolds employed 60% of the workers in Winston-Salem in 1940.
with 3.9% unionization rate as of 2007.\textsuperscript{25} The only visible union force in Winston-Salem is the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) which has successfully organized some agricultural workers and is currently organizing a campaign to pressure RJ Reynolds to improve working condition standards at the tobacco farms it contracts from. There are no unionized state, city or county employees, though the police and fire department are beginning to consider unionization.

As a result, while Winston-Salem quickly recovered economically, until the 1980s, it had been a religious-oligarchic town. As the political power of Reynolds and Hanes receded in the 1970s and 80s, the economy began to expand. In the 1980s and 1990s, Winston-Salem was still bolstered by big tobacco, but it also became a major hub for corporate headquarters in the financial, airline and manufacturing industries, as well as a center for medical research (Tursi 1994). This dramatically increased the number of white collar jobs available in the area, and as a result, many blacks, particularly those educated at Winston-Salem State, a historically black university on the black side of town, moved into managerial and professional occupations. As of 2010, only a small minority of blacks in Winston-Salem were employed in the agricultural and service sectors (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010) (See Appendix IV). Most were employed in white-collar, skilled positions, such as management, health care and professional services. When the centers of the oligarch families left, they also left a dearth of civic leadership. Economic expansion also paved the way for blacks to gain footing in local politics.

In the early 1990s, Forsyth County switched to an open enrollment program in its public school system, effectively re-segregating the county school system. In 1984, a young black man, Darryl Hunt was wrongfully convicted of raping and murdering a young white woman. In 1994, he was exonerated of the rape charges, calling into question the murder. In 2004, another man confessed to the crime, and Hunt was finally released in 2004 and his case was dismissed. At the dismissal, the mother of the slain woman testified that she still believed Hunt was guilty. In 2007, the city settled with Hunt, paying him over 1.5 million dollars for his time spent in prison. Nonetheless, the city continues to be quietly divided by the case.

Many blacks and religious leaders, both black and white, became involved in Hunt’s defense, believing that racism played an important role in his wrongful conviction, while many whites continue to believe that he is guilty. Hunt continues to live and work in Winston-Salem, and while this has little impact on the self-contained black community, whites and their families who support him have been quietly ostracized by former friends and neighbors. As a result, though Winston-Salem residents prefer to engage in a quiet politeness around race, this incident exposed the racial divisions within, and remains fresh in the mind of many residents. In some ways, the segregation of Winston-Salem, like the rest of the South, was forced through most of the town’s history. Now, however, it seems that the separation has been acquiesced to, and in many ways embraced. Newcomers are advised that there are parts of town that blacks can go and parts they can’t, and parts that whites can go, and parts they can’t.

Although Winston-Salem (unlike studies that focus on rural counties of the South) has a solid black middle and upper class, the median income of blacks is still half that of

whites, $32,277 and $51,016, respectively. Approximately 15% of all households in 2000 were below the poverty line, and about 23% of black households, a significant number, but also too low to create a sense of unrest and open discord. As noted above, there are a large number of middle and upper class blacks in Winston-Salem, including older Americans who worked in manufacturing for a number of years and received significant pensions from the RJ Reynolds and Hanes companies. Many blacks work closely with whites, and there are some black families who have settled quite comfortably in white neighborhoods.

Still, many blacks I spoke to reported uncomfortable conversations with white friends and colleagues around race and politics. Many are quite upfront about the separation that continues to exist, and that blacks by and large receive far fewer resources than whites in the county. Some blacks see this as the failure of the black community to stand up for itself. Public schools are known for omitting black history from the curriculum and emphasizing athletics over academic achievement when it comes to black students. There is a categorical sense of distrust between blacks and whites. Some blacks have reported that whites have told them they never thought of them as black, or other make other race-tinged comments that make it difficult to trust those that they might otherwise consider friends. Other more serious problems remain, including racial profiling, school pranks and problems in the court system. There has been a rash of incidents in early 2009, in response to Obama’s election, often against known supporters. It is also rumored that the KKK is gaining strength in surrounding counties. The churches and communities remain largely segregated and race relations can be tense.

While many simultaneously caution that this is slowly changing, race relations are an ongoing struggle. As a result, demographic and political change has come slowly to Winston-Salem. Still, blacks and whites, for the most part, have found that segregation allowed them to peacefully coexist. This tense arrangement maintained a sense of relative safety and non-violence. Its universities and hundreds of churches remain largely divided by race. Drawing from my research, I uncovered that economic stability and politeness prevented political discord and open hostility. Unlike neighboring Greensboro, the site of the first Woolworth’s sit-ins and substantial Civil Rights activity, Winston-Salem remained rather quiet. As each racial group kept to their own side of town, there has been relatively little competition for resources between the two groups, including for housing and employment.

The sudden influx of Latinos has in many ways forced Winston-Salem residents to deal with issues around race, identity and community at a pace they were entirely unaccustomed to. Moreover, the distance between blacks and whites in this community means that incorporation into Winston-Salem is an either-or process. With few exceptions, one becomes part of the black community or white community, irrespective of class and potential for upward mobility. While they may later establish their own communities, as of 2010, Mexicans and other Latinos in Winston-Salem lacked the resources and longevity to establish separate communities. The uniqueness of these circumstances – an open labor market with little competition for resources combined with

26 2000 census.
27 2000 census.
28 According to the 2000 census, approximately 32% of Hispanic households were below the poverty line.
persisting segregation and tension between blacks and whites—is essential in making sense of how newcomers are perceived and integrated into the community.

**DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE**

The 1990s and 2000s marked an explosive period of Latino population growth nationally. This growth was the result of increased migration, high birth rates, and the spreading out of the Latino population from a few key traditional receiving destinations to small towns and suburbs across the nation. By 2000, Latinos represented 12.5% of the U.S. population, outnumbering all other minority groups. A big piece of this change was due to increases in undocumented migration, primarily from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. At its historic height in 2007, the undocumented population reached 12 million, representing approximately one-third of the foreign born, seven million of whom were of Mexican origin (Passel and Cohn 2011). Thus, as of 2010, Mexicans still accounted for just under two-thirds of the unauthorized population nationally.

In addition to this massive growth, Latinos during this period spread out faster than any immigration (internal or external) wave in U.S. history, including the migration of African–Americans from the South to the North at the beginning of the twentieth century. Due to massive migration from traditional receiving destinations as well as Latin America, New Latino destinations in the Midwest and Southeast saw significant Latino population growth, primarily of undocumented Mexican migrants. Most states which had the highest growth in this period are in the Southeast, with states like Georgia and North Carolina now ranking in the top 10 in terms of states with the highest population of unauthorized immigrants, despite having few Latinos just two decades ago. Latino immigrants, authorized and unauthorized, now live in every state and are no longer concentrated in urban areas.

In part, this massive growth and expansive settlement was fueled by a robust, expanding economy in the 1990s and early 2000s throughout the United States, but particularly in previously smaller scale economies such as that of North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia. Moreover, as of 2010, approximately one-third of the foreign-born arrived in the United States after 1999, highlighting the rapidity of population growth and the strength of the economy in its absorption of a massive increase in the labor force (Singer 2009).

While these shifts were undoubtedly part of a significant national trend, in the Southeast, economic growth and Latino population growth significantly outstripped growth throughout the rest of the country. This growth was particularly pronounced in six states: North Carolina (394%), Arkansas (337%), Georgia (300%), Tennessee (278%), South Carolina (211%) and Alabama (208%) (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005: ii). These states, which had very few Latinos prior to 1990 “registered the highest rate of increase in their Hispanic populations of any states in the U.S. between 1990 and 2000, except for

---

29 The number of unauthorized migrants declined only 8% from 2007 to 2011 despite massive immigration enforcement efforts and a nationwide recession (Passel and Cohn 2011). More surprisingly, the number of unauthorized Mexicans declined only slightly to 6.5 million in 2010, a much smaller reduction than anticipated despite a doubling of removals and significant shrinking of the economy.

30 As of 2000, 54% of Latinos resided in the suburbs, a 71% increase in the number of Latinos living there (Suro and Singer 2002). In 2007, just 34% of the foreign-born resided in the primary cities of the top 100 metropolitan areas, indicating a massive change in the lifestyles of immigrant Latinos in the United States (Singer 2009).
Nevada (217%)” (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005: iii). These six states had a collective Latino population of approximately 293,000 in 1990, and rose to 1.2 million in 2000 (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005: 3). Moreover, in the subsequent decade, these numbers continued to increase. Below I examine the regional impact of massive population growth in the Southeast, and how this rapid change set the stage for major policy shifts in the region generally, and North Carolina specifically.

North Carolina
From 1990 to 2000, the North Carolina population of immigrants increased fourfold, with about 300,000 new Latinos (Suro and Singer 2002). Much of the growth that has occurred in North Carolina over the last two decades has resulted from an increase in the Mexican population in the area. As highlighted in Chapter three, this population growth came not only from direct migration streams from Mexico, but also attracted migrants from traditional receiving states, which were experiencing economic decline, particularly California and Texas. The Pew Center estimates that as of 2010, North Carolina had approximately 325,000 unauthorized immigrants, putting it just below Arizona in number of undocumented residents, and that between 65% and 75% of these migrants are Mexican (Passel and Cohn 2011). Still, of the 4.658 million workers in the state, only 250,000 are unauthorized, representing a mere 5.4% of the state work force, just slightly above the national average of unauthorized immigrant workers (Passel and Cohn 2011).

Rapid growth in both wages and employment throughout the region provided a massive incentive to migrate to the Southeast throughout the 1990s, which experienced unemployment below national average levels throughout this period. In addition to expanding the manufacturing sector, states throughout the region added service, agricultural, construction and white collar jobs, resulting in widespread population growth including significant numbers of white and African-American workers who also came to the region during this period (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005). Because the Southeast also has notoriously low rates of unionization, and large employers maintain high levels of political and economic leverage in the region, anti-immigrant pressures in the labor market were low and easily ignored. This regional economic growth is especially important when compared with traditional receiving destinations which experienced economic decline during this period, as well as increased pressure to regulate the immigrant labor force.

The impact in the urban/metro areas of North Carolina has been strongest. As of 2004, 33% of the state’s Hispanic population was concentrated in four counties along the I-40/I-85 corridor: Mecklenburg (12.8%), Wake (9.8%), Forsyth (5.6%), and Durham (4.8 %). Between 1990 and 2004, these four counties accounted for one third of the state’s Hispanic population increase (Kasarda and Johnson 2006: 5). While most North Carolina counties saw significant growth as part of a trend in expanding immigrant settlement throughout the Southeast, this concentrated growth can be explained in large part by the economic expansion of the North Carolina economy in the 1990s, particularly in metro areas where various white collar businesses, particularly finance and medical facilities, set up headquarters. As of 2004, adult male Latino workers living in the state capitalized on this growth, and were heavily concentrated in construction, followed by

31 While approximately 40% of Latinos in the state are authorized or citizens, that number is skewed toward children who represent a much more significant share of the legal resident and citizen population.
service and agricultural work. Women (who were significantly outnumbered by men) were concentrated in service and manufacturing, underscoring the importance of economic expansion in attracting new Latinos to the region (Kasarda and Johnson 2006: 2005).

As throughout the Southeast, this demographic shift occurred alongside general population growth, which also spurred by an expansion in white collar positions in the 1990s (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005:18). In fact, until 2004, despite rapid population growth, the unemployment rate in North Carolina remained below the national average (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya 2005: 20). As a result, there is little evidence that during this period the influx of Latinos to the region represented job losses for non-Latino residents. Rather, their arrival should be viewed as part of a general economic expansion that had relatively few negative repercussions for residents.

The Piedmont Triad area, consisting of Greensboro, Winston-Salem and High Point, was one area of the state that experienced massive economic expansion and subsequent population growth. From 1970 to 1980, Latino growth in the Greensboro-Winston-Salem area grew 17%. From 1980 to 1990, the Latino population had grown by 809% and from 1990 to 2000, 962% (Suro and Singer 2002: 12).

Recent state migration estimates indicate that about half of persons moving to North Carolina are Latinos, and over 75% of those Latinos are Mexican (MPI 2007; Census Bureau 2008). Census data indicates that this is evidence of a significant shift in immigration patterns. In 2000, 55.6% of foreign-born residents in North Carolina were Latino. Moreover, only 2.8% of native-born residents are Latino, indicating the recent arrival of this population to the state (Migration Policy Institute 2007). Since the 1990s, immigrant Latinos, primarily Mexicans, have begun gradually replacing African-Americans in agricultural and industrial work throughout the Southeast, and have also become prominent in the service and construction sectors in North Carolina (Griffith 2006). Through a combination of increased upward mobility among blacks, union busting in meatpacking and agriculture, as well as a shortage of unskilled labor, employers in the region have a great incentive to continue to recruit immigrant labor. Studies indicate that the majority of migrants come to North Carolina through industrial recruiters, family, and community networks, and that the majority of these migrants are arriving without documentation (Kasarda 2006; Massey 2008). Approximately 76% of all Mexican immigrants to North Carolina are unauthorized (Griffith 2006: 20). This push and pull has had dramatic results. As highlighted in Appendix III, there were virtually no Mexicans in the area until the late 1990s.

In Forsyth County, where Winston-Salem is located, the Latino population is now estimated at 12.2% (U.S. Census 2008). From a qualitative perspective, many of my informants who have lived in Winston-Salem for ten years or longer verify the impact of such rapid demographic change on the community, reporting a dramatic shift in the number of Latinos in the area. They noted that when they arrived, it was unusual to see another Latino person while out and about. Now, you could overhear Spanish being spoken in lots of places. Jorge, an Afro-Mexican resident who has been living in

---

32 Assuming a willing pool of labor to work at the current wage rate.
33 It is unclear at this point what %age of these are Afro-Mexican. Mexico keeps no data on race and the U.S. census does not disaggregate country of origin by race.
Winston-Salem for several years explained to me how things used to be when he first arrived:

Jorge: Back then it wasn’t, it wasn’t like a big crowd. It was, it was rare, you know, to see a Hispanic guy like in a store or at the mall. You, you probably, I mean back then if you - you were happy when you see them, saw that. You’d go like, “Oh, hola.” You know? But now it’s just like, there are a lot of us, you know?

Interviewer: Yeah.

Jorge: We’re like invading.

Interviewer: What changed? Why did so many people come over?

Jorge: Yeah, it’s jobs, you know? Um, people were telling people that we’ve got a lot of jobs in the area. I used to own my own company. I used to do drywall. And I used to travel a lot. And it used to be good. I mean, if you have like, like uh, like five or six years. If you were self employed you would get a lot of money. You would probably send some of the money [to Mexico]. You would get paid good. But now it’s like, you got so many, so many of us, you know, that we, every time we ask, bid for a job it’s like, I mean, it’s not even worth it, you know?

The impact of this growth is visible to all residents as supermarkets have shifted their stock to cater to Latino customers, and Latino owned restaurants and bodegas continue to pop up around town. Many of the migrants who came as children remember that as students they were often the only Latino person in their class, and now they make up a significant proportion of the public school system, increasing from less than 1% of the school enrollment population in 1990, to 7.5% in 2004 (Kasarda and Johnson 2006).

Roberto, an Afro-Mexican migrant told me:

Yes, because before, we were very few. When I arrived, there were very few Hispanics. You would fine one or two in a factory. And they treated us well. And after, there were many more, but I think the population really grew a lot here in 2005 or 2004, something like that. But I arrived in 98’, I think. Yes, 98’, I arrived. And no, there weren’t many. There was only one Hispanic store when I got here (Roberto, Oaxaca).

Initially, this new migration was a win-win. Mexicans who settled in North Carolina in the early 1990s advised their families and friends in Mexico as well as in traditional receiving areas, that North Carolina was the place to find work and live a good life without fear. Until 2005, North Carolina was one of 10 states that issued drivers licenses to applicants without verification of citizenship status, and had more than enough work for the Latinos who were arriving in large numbers. New migrants were recruited to the difficult labor of manufacturing, meatpacking, food processing and construction
throughout the state. In Winston-Salem in particular, as many African-Americans continued to rise into the middle class and move away from the city center to the suburbs, empty housing stock was available to Latinos in the black neighborhoods at reasonable prices. Because work was plentiful and the cost of living low, Mexicans did relatively well in the New South, purchasing cars, establishing small independent businesses, and though novel to the area, were free to do as they pleased. This economic expansion was facilitated in large part by open-door immigration into the state, making it relatively easy to settle in North Carolina, particularly in comparison to other regions throughout the country.

However, much like California in the 1990s, North Carolina soon reached a tipping point. The economy was no longer expanding in order to absorb new workers or provide opportunities to move up. Moreover, the population had reached a saturation point, approaching double digits. As a result, Mexicans in Winston-Salem did not suffer discrimination as a result of simply being undocumented. Rather, they experienced a new status – that of being unwelcome. In chapter four, I elaborate this integration process, tracing the impact of massive demographic change in the 1990s, and the subsequent political backlash that followed. I show how this backlash has significant consequences for the experiences of migrant Mexicans in the area, fundamentally shifting the context of incorporation for Mexicans in distinctly racialized ways.
We are not free. We are afraid to – we don’t have the power to leave. We cannot drive with any confidence because we are always thinking that the police are going to stop us. We don’t have licenses- they don’t give us licenses. And it’s worrying because if the police stop you, you get a ticket or have to go to court. Sometimes they will take away your car. And we don’t know if we go some place, if we will be able to return home. We are- we are fearful when we leave to go to Wal-Mart and migration comes, that they will take you, so we always go in fear. We are not free here. (Yesenia, Guerrero)

For Mexicans in Winston-Salem, their daily experience is of continual fear and paranoia. To be Mexican and undocumented means that if you leave the house, the police might show up. If you go shopping, the police might give you a citation regardless of whether you are doing anything illegal or suspicious. Worse, you might not return home.

Yesenia’s description of constant anxiety matches that of civilians living in a state of war or under a repressive dictatorship. These are not the stories of a far-away land however; they are the reports of undocumented immigrants living in North Carolina.

Moreover, these experiences are not simply representations of life as an undocumented migrant at any time or place in the United States. Despite the significant changes to immigration policy and the construction of citizenship over time (Ngai 2004; Glenn 2004), scholars frequently analyze the experiences of immigrants as fixed. However, the experiences of undocumented Mexicans in the United States have shifted dramatically, and they can vary greatly by local context.

In the case of Winston-Salem and much of North Carolina, this has meant severely altering the experience of Mexican migrants living there, arguably reversing the process of incorporation. A few short years ago, these were workers who had less access to social benefits, but were still able to make contributions to local economies, buy cars, homes, participate in the community and raise families. In 2005, in the wake of 9/11 policy changes, their lives worsened so dramatically that they are now literally afraid to leave the house. In recent years, the spread of the Mexican population throughout the country, and the growing set of racial threat nationally has created a new type of outsidersness for Mexicans with very detrimental results. Scholars of Latino identity suggest that this recent shoring up of citizenship boundaries and sweeping generalizations about the foreignness of all Latinos has “uniquely positioned Latinos as permanently foreign immigrants in the imagination of Anglo Americans” (Young 2000: 159). For the Mexicans in my study whose status quickly shifted from valued worker to dangerous non-citizen, the fear of deportation makes racial and ethnic associations an important aspect of daily life.

Beginning in the late 1990s, policy changes culminating in the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005 and the simultaneous spread of local and federal partnerships such as 287(g) that target immigrants, has produced a fundamentally distinct political context for undocumented Latino immigrants in the United States. While the rapid growth of Latino immigrant populations in new destinations and shifts toward more punitive
immigration policies played a significant role in shifting the context of reception for immigrants, which I elaborate on later in this chapter, the most critical shift was the proliferation of 287(g). The primary impact of 287(g) was to instill systematic fear among Latinos, particularly those living in the South and Southwest where the use of 287(g) is most prominent. Racial profiling, wage theft, raids, and mass deportation existed well-before 287(g). What this program did however, was codify these practices in such a way that made them both tacitly legal and public. As a result, Latinos rapidly saw their status decline from a valued worker, to a highly vulnerable position as an unwanted and deportable subject.

This shift in status has been palpable for Latinos in ways that have produced a variety of unintended consequences. I find that in a post 9/11 framework where the federal government is seeking to interpolate and discipline the non-citizen, anti-immigrant actors have seized upon this political opening to initiate anti-immigrant policies at the local level. At the same time, because the impact of 287(g) and other policies is so severe, anti-immigrant forces have extended their power and visible impact in ways that have destabilized and reconfigured social relations between Latino immigrants and other groups.

Now denied the courtesies and basic rights previously afforded to long term residents who were not citizens, immigrants, particularly Latino immigrants, have been forced to rethink their perceptions of the Latino experience. In the remainder of the dissertation, I draw from these conditions to explain how this has politicized and galvanized immigrants to think of themselves as racialized subjects, rather than maintaining a belief in democratic ideals. Moreover, this process may have long term effects among second and subsequent generation Latinos who also become racialized as a result of the blanket targeting of all Latinos as non-citizens.

Building on Chapter three, which outlined the factors that led to increased migration from the Costa Chica and central Veracruz, as well as provided a historical picture of Winston-Salem prior to increased migration, this chapter articulates key demographic and policy shifts that fundamentally altered the incorporation context for Mexican migrants. I outline this process in three parts: demographic change, policy change, and the environment of fear and loathing these two processes produced. In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for understanding the racialization process in Chapter five, arguing that these experiences led to a sense of racialized discrimination among Mexicans, highlighting the importance of shifting policies and local level immigration enforcement in making sense of changes in the racial landscape.

**THE HONEYMOON PERIOD**

In the 1980s and 1990s, Mexicans and other Latinos living in Winston-Salem felt very welcomed and accepted into the community. For many, they had recently left states such as California and Arizona, where, as highlighted in Chapter four, a flagging economy and growing anti-immigrant sentiment made life increasingly difficult for them there. In

---

34 As highlighted in the introduction, racialization specifically refers to being positioned in a stratified hierarchy of social, political and economic relations. I use race to highlight the use of essentialized characteristics in order to determine one’s position in a system of power relations. Therefore being racialized has important consequences for mobilization, and it is never a neutral process. See Fanon (1967) and Omi and Winant (1996) for greater elaboration on race theory as used in this dissertation.
Winston-Salem, not only was there more high paying work (construction and service work, as opposed to agricultural work), but the cost of living was significantly lower. When in North Carolina, some migrants were able to accumulate enough resources to start their own construction crews or begin small businesses catering to the growing Latino population, running small restaurants, food trucks and markets.

Moreover, Latinos were largely under the radar of the state. Not only were there not even mechanisms to count Latinos (official forms until the late 2000s only included blacks, whites and others), but there were no mechanisms to exclude them from a kind of social citizenship. Throughout this period, Mexicans and others were able to get driver’s licenses without social security numbers, giving them not only the flexibility to work and get around easily, but also gave them legitimacy through an official state document.

With the benefit of driver’s licenses and state identification cards, it was easy for newcomers to apply for work, open bank accounts, get small loans, purchase trailers, homes and vehicles, essentially gaining access to the American Dream. At the same time, during this period, border patrolling was less intensive, and until 2007, it was possible to cross the border with only a driver’s license and birth certificate. Since undocumented migrants living in North Carolina could legally purchase a car in their own name, along with insurance and registration, it was relatively easy for newcomers to North Carolina to live a more transnational lifestyle, driving across the border to visit family, check on investments such as small farms and retirement homes, bring gifts and money for friends and family, and check on children and elderly parents.

While I did not ask respondents to reflect on their own identities prior to the shift toward anti-immigrant policies, we can speculate that during this period, there is little reason to imagine that Mexicans in this stage would begin thinking about themselves as minorities. In part, they would have maintained a belief to the American Dream through ample access to both employment opportunities and institutional resources. And in part, they are also maintaining a very transnational existence, reinforcing their connections to home via travel home, as well as the ability to send remittances and invest in properties in their the home pueblos.

As a result, although they may have experienced relatively positive relations with African-Americans, I would conjecture that at this stage, their treatment from blacks was not markedly distinct from whites, nor would they share with blacks the experience of being targeted, and therefore would not be developing a minority consciousness. Moreover, their access to mobility on the one hand, and stronger transnational bonds on the other, would make them more likely to maintain ethnic identities, and/or whiteness.

**POLICY**

Much of the emerging literature on Mexican immigration assumes that the contemporary sense of outsidersness among Mexicans is a fixed characteristic of the Mexican experience. However, while the position of Mexicans as citizens, residents, laborers, and racial subjects have been of significant concern to the United States throughout its history, but particularly after the Mexican-American War. Their position as threats and deportable subjects has evolved over time.

The concept of systematic deportation is new, really only emerging in the early twentieth century under the 1917 Immigration Act, which added excludable categories
and therefore extended deportability beyond the sick and criminal (Ngai 2004: 59). In 1924 all forms of entry without visa or inspection were made illegal, and a land border patrol was created (Ngai 2004: 60). Visas quickly replaced medical inspection, and deportation and enforcement became a key activity of the immigration service. Ngai argues that the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 was the first comprehensive restriction law, creating both quotas and a racial and ethnic hierarchy of favoritism (Ngai 2004: 3).

“Unauthorized entry, the most common form of illegal immigration since the 1920s, remains vexing for both state and society. Undocumented immigrants are at once welcome and unwelcome: they are woven into the economic fabric of the nation, but as labor that is cheap and disposable” (Ngai 2004: 2). Ngai contends that along with new efforts to patrol the border and deport, this act also codified the benefits and boundaries of the white race as well as the Mexican race problem and Asian exclusion, formally bringing together the concepts of race, ethnicity and citizenship and applied them not only to blacks, whites and Native Americans, but all groups that would come to reside in the United States. She notes:

The system of racial classification and regulation that emerged in the 1920s should be seen in the context of a longer historical process of legal configuring within the national state, which had struggled since the late nineteenth century to find a racial logic capable of circumventing the imperative of equality by the Fourteenth Amendment…During the 1920s the legal traditions that had justified racial discrimination against African-Americans were extended to other ethnoracial groups in immigration law through the use of euphemism (‘aliens ineligible to citizenship’) and the invention of new categories of identity (‘national origins’) (Ngai 2004: 8-9).

Mexicans have experienced varying degrees of incorporation over the course of the twentieth century, primarily in relation to their status as laborers. Over the next few decades, Mexicans quickly became associated with illegal immigration through their status as temporary visitors or laborers. In the 1950s, they appeared symbolically as the racialized, illegal alien (Ngai 2004: 247). However, in 1965, the quota system was abolished and ethnic and racial origins were no longer considered viable premises on which to organize immigration protocols.

In the 1970s and 1980s, immigration reform included both increased policing at the border, as well as amnesty to undocumented migrants residing in the U.S. However, it was not until 1986 when undocumented immigration became an important political and measurable phenomenon following the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which served to militarize the border and further restrict federal immigration policy (Abrego

---

35 From 1882 to 1907 only a few hundred immigrants were deported per year, and from 1908 to 1920, this number went up to two to three thousand, though mostly from hospitals, asylums and jails. Prior to 1917, entry without medical inspection was not a reason to exclude migrants (only when an immigrant failed inspection, something that Mexican laborers were uniquely targeted for). Moreover, after five years, immigrants were considered assimilated and settled, creating a de facto statute of limitation on deportations (Ngai 2004).
In the 1990s, the focus became enforcement and increased militarization of the border, with some small concessions, including a visa lottery, but also included more sanctions of employers and the elimination of some social services for immigrants. It was also during this period that states and local governments began to propose punitive anti-immigration policies, largely in connection with demands for welfare reform and the contraction of social services. In an effort to manage these concerns, the last comprehensive immigration reform bill was passed in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). This law was heavy on enforcement and security measures, with new provisions that mandated jail time for some immigration violations, increasing the budget for enforcement, reorganizing asylum, encouraging legal immigrants to become citizens, and creating provisions for greater cooperation between federal agencies, states and local agencies.

9/11 State
From the mid-1990s until 2001, a robust economy kept anti-immigrant discourse relatively subdued. Meanwhile, as highlighted earlier, economic expansion in the U.S. created a pull effect, drawing in record numbers of Mexicans, while the unintended consequences of NAFTA pushed them out. Concern over immigration enforcement remained confined to parts of the Southwest where draconian enforcement stimulated an underground economy of human trafficking and violence. 9/11, however, changed everything, shifting the fear of terrorism to undocumented immigration, forcing the issue back onto the national stage, and directly linking immigration enforcement to terrorism and security. “Much like other national crises in U.S. history, fighting a war against terrorism came to mean fighting immigrants, even though empirical data on the criminality of immigrants has consistently reflected noncitizens’ lawfulness (Hernandez 2008: 39).” While the popularity of scapegoating Latino immigrants as racial, economic or social threats has ebbed and flowed over the course of the twentieth century, this rhetoric has unprecedented legal consequences in the contemporary period. This connecting of undocumented immigration with security dramatically altered the discourse on immigration, shifting our attention to Latinos, primarily Mexicans, as threats to the state. This linking of immigration and security not only instigated a general sense of panic and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the United States, but also inspired a key change from the 1996 laws in terms of how immigration policy can be enforced.

After the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the lack of communication and cooperation among local, state, and federal law enforcement became the subject of intense criticism. Under pressure to deal with illegal immigration, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began to consider extending immigration enforcement responsibilities to state and local agencies. In 1996, the DOJ had asserted that state and local officers do not have the power to enforce civil immigration violations, such as

---

36 See chapter two for a greater elaboration on the push and pull of Mexican immigration in the 1990s.
37 Drawing from Rumbaut and Ewing (2007), Hernandez notes that Latino criminality is largely a myth, as incarceration rates are lowest for immigrants regardless of ethnic group and education level. This holds true for Mexicans and other Latinos that make up the bulk of the immigrant population (Hernandez 2008: 39).
overstaying one’s visa, but have the power only to enforce criminal immigration violations, such as illegal entry into the country. In a 2002 Memorandum for the Attorney General, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) withdrew the 1996 position and instead included that “[s]tates have inherent power, subject to federal preemption, to make arrests for violation of federal [civil and criminal immigration] law” [italics mine] (Arnold 2007: 113-114).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, at the federal, state and local agency levels, this created a great deal of controversy because of the risks to local crime enforcement who worked to build trust between the police and community to encourage cooperation in criminal investigations. There was also concern within the Justice Department about its potential for civil rights violations and concern that the memorandum was an effort by DOJ to receive assistance without training. The use of a Memorandum of Agreement to engage in these partnerships was a way of stemming some of these criticisms (Arnold 2007).

Shortly after, in 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was reconstituted as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was established in March 2003 as the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security. ICE is comprised of five integrated divisions that form a 21st century law enforcement agency with broad responsibilities for a number of key homeland security priorities” (DHS: 2009b). As part of the changes initiated by the Office of Legal Council and the creation of ICE, the earliest 287(g) partnerships were entered into by Alabama and Florida in 2002 and 2003, respectively, and remained the only two agreements between municipalities and the federal government until 2005 (DHS: 2009b). By 2002, DHS and the Department of Justice had cleared the way for states and municipalities to take on the task of immigration enforcement. Still, most localities waited for federal immigration reform, preferring to use the standard channels to deal with an issue that was both controversial and complex.

While the federal government was restructuring security operations to include immigration regulation, the numbers of undocumented immigrants arriving in the United States continued to increase. At the same time, advocates on all sides increasingly demanded a federal plan for immigration reform. Conservatives called for increased enforcement, while liberals highlighted a need for a more efficient and viable pathway for legalization. States and municipal governments argued that they bore the brunt of dealing with new populations and the strain on social services. Despite both executive and Congressional efforts, including significant bi-partisan sponsored bills, all efforts at federal immigration reform failed.

As part of the effort to provide a higher level of security and protect us against terrorism, Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI)38 linked the regulation, supervision and deportation of undocumented immigrants with national security through the successful passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005. Presumably operating under the assumption that terrorists had access to legal documents such as driver’s licenses, the REAL ID Act made it a federal

---

38 Sensenbrenner also introduced the Patriot Act in 2001, and was the main sponsor of HR 44337 in 2005, which introduced criminal penalties for aiding illegal immigration, a highly controversial bill which failed in the Senate, and is widely considered as a major catalyst for the 2006 immigrant protests around the country.
requirement to provide both a social security number and evidence of legal status in order to get a driver’s license, and set guidelines for states to begin enforcing its provisions, making it impossible for persons without legal status to get state identification, and to legally drive. It is in this context that life for Mexican immigrants in North Carolina changed dramatically.

**From Open Doors to Shut Gates**

Rapid economic expansion at first was welcome and necessary for economic growth in North Carolina. Unemployment remained low, and in counties where working class whites and African-Americans were upwardly mobile, Latinos filled a necessary economic void. Immigration policies in the state generally reflected the needs of capital, with low rates of unionization and easy access to resources needed for work, such as driver’s licenses – a commodity only available without verification of status in a handful of states. Indeed, from 1990 to 2000, local and state policy toward immigrants, as well as the community level reception was largely positive. Mexicans whom I spoke with who had lived in the area for 10 years or more noted the shift thereafter, highlighting both the rapid demographic changes in the community, as well as the chilling reception over time.

I spoke to Miriam, an African-American Councilwoman about the Latinos in her district. She explained to me that the welcome mat had been laid out to Mexican labor for some time:

> Because we’ve always had migrant workers. This is, you know- we’re not- the farms are, out in Surry and Stokes, and, and some parts of Forsyth, and Yadkin County. And really and truly Mexican labor was available to the state of North Carolina because of one powerful senator in the United States Senate who was Jesse Helms, from down east where the farmers needed help…And of course the farmers in North Carolina or the thirty years that he was in the Congress, were desperate for farm labor because the, you know, those were almost like tenant farmers and sharecropper places…Yes. And so, Virginia Fox and Jesse Helms were good friends. You know, Jesse Helms was in charge of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, and so we- our borders were open on welcome hinges for that migrant labor that lived in wretched conditions on a lot of farms. Uh, blueberries, tobacco, um, those two big crops down east I know, and tobacco all over the state, so nobody should be shocked that we have Mexicans in, in North Carolina.

As North Carolina has some of the lowest levels of union participation, labor law enforcement and a very high concentration of big business reliant on low and semi-skilled work, it is unsurprising that Republican legislators worked with Congress to ensure a steady stream of labor would flow in. Indeed, as the economy expanded, recruitment of Mexicans only began to increase. At this time, in the 1990s, Elisa, a Mestiza woman who arrived in 1991 from San Nicolas, informed me that the main difference between then and 2008 was that “there weren’t many people here, well, Mexican people. You never would see so many Mexicans. When I arrived, here, there had not been so many Mexicans.”
However, as more migrants arrived, and the national economy began to stagnate, immigrants in the community began to feel the strain.

Well it’s a lot more difficult now. Now it’s more difficult because when I arrived, there was a lot of work. And now there is no work. And well, if you think about it, there is no work, so there is no way to move forward. And if we don’t work, we don’t eat, we have to stop paying rent, stop paying bills. Before, there was a lot of work. Before, it was not as difficult as it is now (Isabel, Michoacán).

Diego from Guerrero shared these sentiments:

Yes, before it was easy. There were a lot of Latino people that were inside of the agencies. And they would help us. We didn’t have problems. I don’t know. But now, after the attack on the twin towers, it’s been a bit more difficult. It started complicated everything. The war, they already had the rules to check on the people more and more. The raids. Now the economy. So, yes, it’s a lot more difficult now.

Despite the fact that the ease with which Mexican migrants had previously navigated life in Winston-Salem was dissipating, it was not only the narrowing of employment opportunities available to Mexicans that shifted their day-to-day experiences. It was the way in which community and state institutions that were beginning to show strain responded to this growth.

Schools in particular were hit hard by this population growth, not only due to the increase in the numbers of children, but the need for new services, such as ESL classes and bilingual staff (Kasarda 2006). Overall however, perceptions about the immigrant population with regard to its institutional tax burden, as well as fears about gang activity and criminality, were way overstated by community officials and the media. Local representatives, including some city council members argued for the passage of ordinances and pressured officials to sign onto 287(g) provisions arguing that they are a drain on resources. Despite overwhelming evidence that for most metropolitan counties, the presence of Latinos represented no net costs, shifting attitudes prompted a complete overhaul of state and local level policies toward Latino immigrants.

North Carolina is currently witnessing a severe state-sponsored backlash to the presence of Latinos. As noted, as of 2004, it was one of 10 states that issued drivers licenses to applicants without verification of citizenship status. In 2005, the governor signed the Technical Corrections Act, determining that social security numbers would be the only acceptable documentation for driver’s licenses. In 1996, the Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) added provision 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), allowing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to

---

39 Not all states are accepting this mandate. 17 states passed legislation rejecting this mandate, and many have expressed concerns that it places undue burden on citizens to prove their status, particularly the elderly and disabled (National Immigration Law Service 2008). North Carolina is not one of those states. It quickly passed the Technical Corrections Act in 2005 to comply with the National Real ID Act, despite the fact that the federal deadline to meet REAL ID standards has been extended indefinitely.
enter agreements with state local governments to authorize certain officers to perform immigration law enforcement if they are trained and sworn in as Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Until 2006, the clause has gone relatively unused. Since then, however, counties in California, Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Virginia, Colorado and North Carolina have signed, North Carolina most enthusiastically.\(^{40}\) 287(g) has become a key mechanism through which deportations occur because of the 2005 Real ID Act, which mandated at the federal level essentially that undocumented persons could not receive government issued IDs, particularly drivers licenses. As a result, local officials under 287(g) can now use IIRIRA to turn over minor offenders, such as those driving without a license, to ICE. Nadine, a white woman who is an adult ESL teacher and manager of programs for undocumented migrants, told me that immigrants were gradually deprived of access to licenses.

First, anyone could get licenses. Then, they switched to I-10s or social security numbers only, then they stopped accepting foreign birth certificates, or matricula, they call it in Mexico, then they switched to only American government issued documents. Now they can’t have a license without a social security number. Then, then couldn’t get plates without a social security number. People have to help them buy and register cars. At that point, people had insurance, and now they don’t, so it’s dangerous too.

Though the 287(g) program is now active in 24 states, North Carolina has eight active county agreements, and at least 20 new requests as of 2008, (one-fourth of requests nationwide) (Capps et al. 2011).\(^{41}\) The only states with more agreement are Arizona and Virginia with nine each (Capps et al. 2011). Though many sheriffs deny that 287(g) intends to get rid of undocumented migrants, a report by the North Carolina ACLU and the Immigration and Human Rights Policy Clinic at UNC Chapel Hill argues that a majority of individuals arrested by 287(g) officers in Gaston, Mecklenburg, and Alamance Counties were arrested for traffic offenses (2009: 46). In addition to the use of 287(g), new state-wide anti-immigrant measures, such as banning undocumented students from state community colleges, underscore the rapidly shifting landscape of North Carolina for Latino immigrants. It should be noted that none of these enforcement measures appeared to be aimed at other ethnic groups. According to the Center for Immigration Studies: “While 287(g) agencies use the authority mainly to identify and process illegal aliens who have committed additional crimes, Congress never intended the

\(^{40}\) According to WRAL.com, former Mecklenberg County Sheriff Jim Pendergraph was the first to launch the 287(g) program in North Carolina, and became a major advocate for the program. Shortly thereafter, he was hired by ICE as executive director for state and local coordination at ICE. He became the regional coordinator for 287(g) programs under ICE. During this period, every Southeast county agreement was designed to be a universal (not targeted) jail based program, similar Mecklenberg County’s agreement. He stepped down in 2008 just prior to the November election, perhaps in part due to complaints that the Southeast region was responsible for the majority of detainers issued for misdemeanors and traffic violations (NC Wanted: 2008; Capps et al. 2011).

\(^{41}\) As of 2011, 72 agreements between local municipalities and ICE have been entered into nationwide (Capps et al. 2011).
program to be limited to that use. Lawmakers intended for local agency partners to use the authority for local law enforcement priorities and according to local needs, which may or may not be the same as federal priorities” (Vaughan and Edwards 2009).

This certainly appears to be the case in the Winston-Salem area. North Carolina has six jail enforcement programs and two targeted programs, all with universal mandates. This means that rather than target specific criminal actors, they treat any crime as a possible opportunity for detention. Moreover, in jail-based programs, officers in the field are not trained by ICE. Any officer can detain someone and bring them into the jail for ICE processing, making it highly likely that pretextual arrests and racial profiling is commonplace.

In Gaston County, for example, 83% of the persons arrested by deputized officers were charged with traffic offenses. In Mecklenburg County of the 2321 undocumented immigrants who were put into removal proceedings in 2007, fewer than five % of the charges against them were felonies and over 16% of the total charges were traffic violations” (Lin, Ramirez and Shuford 2009: 6).

Mecklenburg County in North Carolina, (approximately a two hours drive from Winston-Salem) has processed over 5000 arrests through the sheriff’s department 287(g) program, on par with several Southern California counties. They accounted for 4% of detainers issued nationally in 2010 (Capps 2011: 22). Mecklenburg has a population of about 700,000, only 7% of which are Latino. Along with nine other Southeastern counties, they have accounted for one-third of detainers issued for traffic violations.

All of these Southeastern jurisdictions have deployed the 287(g) program with similar results: a high number of ICE detainers resulting from a focus on traffic offenders. This regional pattern reflects common political pressures that stem from rapid demographic change. North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee and South Carolina ranked first, second, fifth and sixth, respectively, in the growth rates of their foreign-born populations from 1990 to 2009. Rapid growth has provoked a public reaction against the perceived costs of immigrants in these states. Highly politicized debates about immigration...have put pressure on the sheriffs and other elected officials to participate in the 287(g) program and otherwise support measures to reduce unauthorized populations (Capps 2011: 23)

These policies are in place despite there being few financial incentives for communities to participate in these programs. Counties become legally liable for

---

42 287(g) programs account for 10% of people identified for potential removal annually, totaling approximately 186,000 from October 2005-October 2010. 100,000 of these were in the last two years (Capps et al. 2011:18). There are three types, jail based, hybrid and task force models. They can also be enforced as targeted or universal operations and have provisions for checks at various stages of the process (for example, Los Angeles County has a post-conviction check only program). Programs that are universal and jail based have the lowest levels of oversight and are most likely to detain high numbers of level 3 offenders- those who have committed misdemeanors, and are the lowest priority of ICE. Over 50% of such ICE detainers nationally are level 3, traffic violations, or no offense at all (Capps et al. 2011).
violations, and while there is a reimbursement from the federal government so some jails can make a profit, it rarely makes up for the additional personnel costs. In an economic downturn, participating in such programs is an additional drain on community resources without any obvious returns to reductions in crime or alleviating institutional pressures. Sheriffs and community leaders sometimes make the claim that it is a necessary expense to enforce the law, while others are more brazen in their desire to get rid of Latino immigrants, such as the Mecklenburg County sheriff who has stated publicly “We’ve got millions of illegal immigrants that have no business being here” and “This is about homeland security. This is about the sovereignty of our country.” Sheriff Pendergraph’s jail is over 90% Latino, and his programs cost over one million dollars annually (Onge 2006).

In addition to the use of 287(g), and Secure Communities, a program that is identical to the jail based version of 287(g), (of which North Carolina was an early adopter, and site of several pilot programs), is now in effect in 494 jurisdictions in 27 states. Secure Communities, a jail-based program that is managed through agreements with federal and state ID bureaus. It costs 200 million dollars annually, and began in the Southwest, California, Florida and parts of North Carolina. 110,000 people were deported by 2008, only 9% of whom had a serious criminal history. Thirty-nine North Carolina counties have requested a Secure Communities Program, including Winston-Salem (Burrows 2010). By 2013, the goal is to have the program in every jail. Other new state-wide anti-immigrant measures, such as banning undocumented students from community colleges, underscores the rapidly shifting landscape of North Carolina for Latino immigrants. According to state law passed in 2008, except in case of those who meet special conditions of status via conditions of extreme cruelty and abuse, public colleges at all levels were now prohibited “against providing post-secondary education to undocumented or illegal aliens (Ralls 2008).”

As a result, the contemporary situation in Forsyth County in particular, is a highly volatile one. Because all Latinos are being targeted for discrimination, are perceived as non-citizen others, and are often part of mixed status family, Latinos throughout the state live in a general state of fear and anger. Race relations are marked by longtime tensions between whites and blacks in the area now have Latinos added to the mix, and general economic decline creates a general sense of tension and panic in which, under ordinary circumstances, calmness would likely prevail.

FEAR AND LOATHING

As noted above, prior to 2005, Mexicans living in Winston-Salem felt that the atmosphere in the community was good. They were able to get driver’s licenses, it was relatively easy to get employment, housing was plentiful, and schools were working hard to provide support for Spanish speaking children and families. As the population of incoming migrants peaked, however, circumstances quickly shifted. In March 2009, I spoke to Marco, an editor at the local Spanish language newspaper and a Mestizo Mexican who has been working in Winston-Salem on a professional visa, about how Mexicans were faring in Winston-Salem. He noted:

---

43 Studies indicate that Latinos are strongly against such forms of local level enforcement. The Pew Hispanic Center finds that 77% feel that immigration enforcement should be left to federal officials only. Only 15% want local government to get involved (Lopez et al. 2010).
In the beginning, Hispanics here were a novelty. They just were required. Nobody here was willing to take those jobs in manufacturing companies, and also the sort of jobs in construction and the service sector. But, it hasn’t been positive in the last years basically because Hispanics are very new to the area. And in the South, and in North Carolina, people have become very intolerant. The responses to immigration have been putting up barriers that basically aim to identify who came here without authorization...as I told you, though it depends county by county, I can say in general terms, in North Carolina, the responses from the authorities and society haven’t been good in the last four or five years.

Marco went on to explain how 287(g) specifically has been used to target Latinos to find undocumented immigrants in North Carolina and deport them, and how the decision to deprive immigrants of driver’s licenses has created a dragnet to “profile immigrants by the color of their skin”, and deport them, noting that these programs exist only where Latino immigration is high.

Since 2004, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) has greatly expanded its partnerships with local police through the 287(g) program. As of March 2009, more than 950 local officers have been trained and certified through the program under the 67 active Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) in 23 states. However, while the number of MOAs has increased, the numerous problems surrounding them have also become more apparent. Recent reports have found that 287(g) agreements are costing localities millions to implement while ICE provides little oversight and support to the program. Additionally, crime-solving activities are being compromised, the trust between police and community is eroding, and accusations of racial profiling and civil rights violations are on the rise. Furthermore 287(g) agreements are being used as political tools that interfere with the kind of true community policing that protect serve our communities (Immigration Policy Center 2009).

The Immigration Policy Center also reports that 287(g) agreements correlate to growth in Latino populations, not crime. A case study of the ICE Criminal Alien Program (CAP) in Irving, Texas indicates that ICE is not focusing these resources on deporting immigrants with criminal histories. Instead, resources were directed to make significant numbers of arrests for petty offenses, and there is evidence that many lawful residents were referred to ICE by local officials. In fact felony charges only accounted for 2% of ICE detainers. The other 98% were for misdemeanors (Gardner and Kohli 2009). While these numbers refer to the implementation of CAP in a small city in the Dallas metro-area, it is highly indicative of the ways communities are using ICE programs are being utilized to aggressively target Latino residents.
Programs like 287 (g) that are manipulated to harass, detain and deport Mexicans, are being supported at the state and local level by legislators such as Virginia Foxx, Forsyth County’s Republican representative in Congress, whom as Miriam noted, was instrumental in making sure the welcome mat was laid out for Mexican labor in the 1990s. By 2005, however, when she made the move from state senate to U.S. Congress, she quickly became one of the most virulent and visible anti-immigrant agitators in the state, if not the entire U.S. Congress. She has taken on the strictest anti-immigration stance possible, sponsoring bills with such policy stances as: making the United States ‘English Only’; ending citizenship birthrights, building a fence along the border, initiating a 100% ‘sealed border stance’; requiring the Census to count illegal immigrants for redistricting purposes; and preventing any U.S. funds from being used to tip off Mexican government officials to the location of Minutemen and other citizen militias along the border (Foxx 2011). Foxx’s campaigning and public statements are universally anti-immigrant. Of course, she is by no means the only public figure who has made their stance against immigrants known.

Sheriff Steve Bizzell of Johnston County, North Carolina, a 287(g) applicant, has publicly acknowledged that ‘his goal is to reduce if not eliminate the immigrant population of Johnston County.’ He has described ‘Mexicans’ as ‘trashy’ people who ‘breed [] like rabbits’ and ‘rape, rob and murder American citizens.’ In Alamance County, North Carolina, a 287(g) participant, Sheriff Terry Johnson has expressed similar views, assuming that all undocumented immigrants are Mexican and stating that ‘[Mexicans’] values are a lot different – their morals – than what we have here. In Mexico, there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old girl… They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico’ (Lin, Ramirez, and Shuford 2009: 6-7).

It is these public officials who not only set the tone for public discourse, but also determine the course of policy throughout the state. Studies indicate that there is little effort on behalf of the federal government to prevent officials with histories of discriminatory behaviors and statements from participating in immigration enforcement programs.

While ICE allegedly conducts background checks of individual officers under the 287(g) program, ICE does not appear to evaluate the applicant-jurisdiction’s history of actual or perceived racial profiling or other discriminatory treatment toward immigrants or minorities in that community before entering into an MOA. This means that jurisdictions that are known or perceived to target individuals based on race or ethnic appearance may be given unbridled discretion to enforce the immigration laws. This is particularly concerning in jurisdictions with a sordid history of civil rights abuses. Indeed, ‘some evidence suggests that Hispanics in

---

44 It should be noted that her controversial voting record is not limited to the issues of immigration. She also voted against the U.S. relief package to the victims of Hurricane Katrina and the Matthew Shepard Act.
emerging communities [experiencing Latino growth],’ which includes the Southeast, host to the most 287(g) programs, ‘and rural areas are more vulnerable to the harms of racial profiling than their Southwestern counterparts.’ (Lin, Ramirez, and Shuford 2009: 6-7).

This shift in tone and indiscriminate targeting of Latinos is hardly lost on Mexicans in the area. They find themselves being blamed for the decline in the labor market and being targeted by policymakers, employers, and members of their own communities. Juan, one of my key informants, an Afro-Mexican man who had been living in Winston-Salem since 1995 told me that a friend of his who is a citizen and Latino was sitting on his own porch and the police came and asked him for identification. The friend told them he didn’t have his documents with him on the porch, they were in his house. So the police followed him into the house to wait for him to produce the documents, which he did. He continued:

If I can’t get health care, if I can’t go to community college and get an education, it’s a problem. You know, for an example, if someone robs your house, you can report it, the police will come. But if I am robbed, I can’t report it, because the police will want my ID, and they might deport me. I can’t protect my human rights, I can’t report a crime. People can’t get driver’s licenses now. The bottom line is that if you don’t feel free, you can’t do anything.

Beatriz, a Mestiza Mexican woman in her 20s discussed her sense of confusion with me:

Interviewer: You were saying that a family you saw said the Mexicans were taking their jobs.

Beatriz: Oh, yeah.

Interviewer: Do you feel like a lot of families, American families here, think that about Mexicans?

Beatriz: Well we always hear the same thing in the news. Uh, but I don’t know. I mean, how are we gonna be taking their jobs? I mean, most of the Hispanic men work in construction, factories, or um, I mean, they don’t have really good jobs. Not like Americans. I mean, we don’t have the chance to go to and get a career and be lawyers or doctors or anything. I mean, we, we work in restaurants and places like that. So, well, but I don’t know... In a way since the immigration thing started with uh, George Bush, that he didn’t want to give any legal papers to Hispanics or I don’t know, but well, since this started, we see a lot of differences. Like Americans treating Hispanics really bad. Firing. Uh, they were hiring more American people and they will fire all the Hispanics.
According to a survey of 500 Latino workers in the Southeast by the Southern Poverty Law Center, 41% of respondents have experienced wage theft. They also report systematic abuse of legal guest workers via weak labor laws throughout the South. 47% of respondents know someone treated unfairly by police, with equal numbers reporting that traffic stops were the most common site of abuse, and expressing little confidence in the police. 68% indicated that they faced discrimination and hostility regularly (Bauer 2009).

These numbers are only slightly higher than the national average. Pew Hispanic Center reports that 61% of Latinos say that discrimination is a ‘major problem’, up from 54% in 2007, and finds that 78% of undocumented Latinos feel this way. Moreover, for the first time, the highest number of respondents attribute discrimination to immigration status, and secondarily, to skin color. In previous surveys, language barriers were identified as the biggest cause of discrimination. Moreover, over half (52%) of Latinos say that Americans are less accepting of Latinos than they were five years ago, and 45% of the undocumented foreign-born say that they know someone who has been detained or deported (Lopez et al. 2010). Antonio, the reporter from Michoacán assessed the feelings toward Mexicans in Winston-Salem this way:

My overall feeling is that they are not accepted. That’s my overall feeling. People that have been here even longer used to say that back in the 1990s when someone saw a Hispanic, it was, the first reaction was curiosity. ‘Hey, how are you?’ You know? It was, ‘Good! Hey! So strange to see anyone here!’ The treatment was different. Now, Hispanic is synonymous with…I think Hispanic has a negative connotation now. Hispanic is illegal, undocumented, poor, nothing to offer to the society, criminal, gangster. All sort of negative connotations are together with that phrase ‘Hispanic.’ I remember, sometimes, and especially when it comes to Hispanic and drunk drivers, Hispanic and illegal, Hispanic and gangs, I think that’s what’s in the people’s mind when they talk about Hispanic.

These increasingly pessimistic attitudes of Latinos, particularly among immigrants nationally is only magnified in the context of North Carolina, where a much larger proportion of Latinos are undocumented, and the risk of deportation and discrimination is higher.

In the fall of 2008, in one of my first interviews in Winston-Salem, I spoke with Catherine, a manager at a cooperative bank that had recently opened a branch in Winston-Salem, and targets immigrant clients. She told me:

One of the things that people are really interested in is our mortgage services, we have a lot of people who are interested in buying a home, that want to create stability in their families, who want to be a part of the mainstream. But the political atmosphere makes that very difficult, people want their children to get an education, but these families are definitely going against the grain…things are much more difficult now, particularly the driver’s license issue makes things very difficult. People can’t get to work or take their kids to school, it’s very hard. We hear of people afraid
to leave their homes, and are doing the best they can, they still need to work, to live, but it’s definitely much more hostile.

The shift from trying to purchase homes and become a part of the community to a political atmosphere where people are afraid to leave their homes succinctly describes how the atmosphere has shifted for Mexicans living in Winston-Salem. Mexican immigrants have been successfully targeted as the cause of everything from economic decline to increased crime, to the dissolution of local institutions. This hostility translates into real consequences for Mexican immigrants, and a very real sense of fear. At the Black/Brown conference panel on immigration, Rebecca of the North Carolina ACLU spoke of her racial justice project and the school to prison pipeline, which now impacts blacks and Latinos in the state equally. She then went onto say that parents needed to be educated about this issue, but it was a difficult topic to address because while parents need to learn how to be familiar with the system, and how to advocate for themselves, in some places, school teachers were calling ICE. She gave one example of a student who was disruptive in class, and was sent out, and instead of calling school security or suspending her, the teacher called ICE. The student was now facing deportation.

In this way, for Mexicans in North Carolina, it has not been the fact of being undocumented that has shaped their experiences since arrival. Rather, it is that the meaning and consequences of being undocumented in the same context shifted. For Latinos, the sense that this change is deliberate, political, and the topic of substantial debate, creates a sense of being suddenly and unfairly targeted for discrimination. Elisa, an undocumented single mother from San Nicolas, Guerrero wrung her hands as she explained how she felt about the use of ICE in her community. Her brothers, whom she migrated with several years ago, had already been deported.

Elisa: I feel afraid. I have a lot of fear for my children, well, because if they take me, my children, where are they going to stay? I have my son here, and I think about this a lot...I have to drive because I have to go to work. Or take my children to the doctor, or to do my errands. I have to drive.

Interviewer: But you are always afraid?

Elisa: Yes, I am so afraid, when I see an officer go by or something, I feel sick. I pray to God. I tell him, please God, take care of me.

When I asked Cecelia, who has lived in Winston-Salem since she was a teenager, and is a legal resident, if she was surprised about the recent legal changes in North Carolina. She responded furiously:

My name is Cecelia Ramos. Do you think they- that they’re not gonna arrest me? Or if they question that I’m driving with my friend’s- if my license is legit? Like, seriously... And I’ve always known that I was supposed to do something, change something really big, but I never knew what until this whole thing kind of just starting blowing up. A driver’s
license? And you can’t even get an ID. And it’s gotten to the point where people are so paranoid they get ID’s for their small children. You know? Because I mean there’s people in this state that their parents are in court, and then they don’t come back. Like is that humane? How do you do that to people? And their children are left with the babysitter or whoever. Like they just end up- like how is that even legal?

Although Forsyth County does not directly participate in the 287(g) program, Latinos here, as throughout the state, live in a state of fear. A young undocumented Mestiza Mexican mother I met in Winston-Salem who spoke no English, and had been living in Winston-Salem for about three years advised me on how other undocumented immigrants were faring. I went to visit her with an outreach coordinator from a local Catholic church. As soon as we sat down, she began to tell us that “being a migrant is very hard because you are always afraid.” She noted that when she worked at the factory in a neighboring town, “a few months later it was raided, and lots of people were arrested and sent back to their home countries. You can’t get driver’s licenses, and it’s very hard to cross into the country.” She went on to explain that people died in the desert trying to get here, and that she herself paid someone $3000 to get across because things were so bad in her home town. She sighed, telling us that people make due, but because they were undocumented, they now live in fear. Beatriz lamented the state of affairs in an interview, indicating how much things have changed.

I was talking with my family and it’s been like a year, and its so different now. Probably the law because they sent so many people to Mexico.

Interviewer: How many people do you know who’ve been sent back?

Beatriz: (Counting on her fingers) One, two, three, probably like five or six people, yeah…

Interviewer: Do you feel like things are really different? Are people afraid now?

Beatriz: Yeah. It was this weekend last year? No. It was this year. Well, I don’t remember. Probably two or three months ago, I heard on the radio station that immigration was gonna come. Nobody was going to Wal-Mart or anything. We were so afraid to go outside. So, I mean after one week

---

45 The Sheriff recently confirmed in a public forum sponsored by the City of Winston-Salem Human Relations Department that the Forsyth County Sheriff’s department requested a 287(g) agreement in 2007 and is currently awaiting review from ICE and funding from the County Commissioners to proceed (field notes, May 2009). In addition, watchdog groups such as the ACLU report participation in what is called a ‘wheel and spoke’ phenomenon, in which police will bring persons to jails in neighboring counties in order to process them with ICE.
we got normal, so we went to normal places to buy our food and everything. But when the radio station starts saying things about immigration, that if they know they’re coming, they start calling the factories and places where Hispanics go the most, so we don’t go.

Interviewer: Are people thinking about moving to a different town or state because they’re afraid?

Beatriz: Yeah, I know two or three families who moved. One of them to California. The other one moved to the north. Because they were very afraid that immigration will come and send them to Mexico. I mean, we just don’t know why many Americans – I heard this family in Wal-Mart, they were saying that the didn’t like Hispanics, Mexicans, because we were getting their jobs.

It’s rare to talk with Latinos in Winston-Salem and not hear about the personal costs of enhanced immigration enforcement and negative attitudes toward Latinos. When I asked Yesenia if she has any worries about her status here, she burst into tears as she told me:

We are worried – well, we are all worried, but the mothers worry more because we don’t have a driver’s license, and the truth is we really need one, for our children’s appointments, for school, for everything. We need to go here and there. We need to work…It makes you afraid to drive. Because you say to yourself, ‘if they give me a ticket, how am I going to pay?’ You can’t work and you’ve accumulated a bad driving record. It’s ugly. These are the worries you have with the licenses, because it adds up. There are times when for no other reason than being Hispanic, they stop you. Here, nothing more than being Hispanic…but the police, many police they stop me for nothing, I am in my car – it’s registered, because I don’t have it in my name, but it’s registered. It has insurance. My car is fine, it’s perfect, everything, the lights, everything. And the police, for no reason, I don’t know. They see that I’m Hispanic. They stopped me. They turned on the lights, and they stopped me. They asked me for my license. I said, ‘I don’t have a license.’ And it made me nervous and I cried and I said, ‘My God. What am I going to do?’ Only because I’m Hispanic, because I’m not documented, they do this.

Interviewer: What happened after?

Yesenia: They gave me a ticket. And I had to pay it. It’s a necessity, so I go without food. I say, ‘I have to pay it. I don’t have to eat. I have to look for food someplace, but I have to pay the ticket.’ Because the points they give you [on your license] or later, if you don’t pay, if you don’t pay the tickets, they have an order to arrest you or something…I had to pay the ticket for nothing more than not having a license. I say ‘I don’ drive badly.
I don’t drink and drive. I don’t take drugs. I don’t drink alcohol. I don’t drive but occasionally, no accidents, nothing.

Interviewer: The police, did they give you an explanation as to why they stopped you?

Yesenia: Nothing more than to check me, they said. They stopped me for no reason except to check and see if I was carrying my license... It is very hard. For me, it is very hard. Because I tell you that Hispanics are now seeing the police stop you, and right now, here in Winston Salem, they are restricting driving. If they catch you driving again, you go to jail. And if you leave and if you get caught driving again, and you get deported, even if you have kids. So it goes. The laws are tough right now. Why? I do not know. I do not know.

Stories like Yesenia’s are familiar in communities where universal versions of the 287(g) program are common. Diego from Guerrero sighed as he explained his situation to me.

They try to intimidate us, to close the doors to us, they don’t want to help us much. Along with the fact that they don’t give us licenses, they’ve damaged a lot of people. A lot of us don’t have problems. We don’t have accidents. We don’t drink and drive. We only want to go to work. With this situation, if someone is authorized to give you a ticket—just imagine it. Its 70 dollars that I have to pay if I don’t have my license. And If I’m not working, how will I pay it? And if I don’t pay them, or I don’t go to court, they are going to give me an arrest warrant. And if they arrest me—my family? Then, well, there are a lot of ways that they hurt us. Why? Why do they do this? Why? Because, well because they don’t want us. Right? They don’t want to help us.

Recent studies and policy reports indicate that this feeling is widespread. “In four study counties where traffic operations have resulted in removals through the 287(g) program, community respondents were especially likely to report that immigrants were venturing into public places with less frequency, failing to report crimes or otherwise interact with police, interacting less with schools and other institutions, patronizing local businesses less often, and changing their driving patterns” (Capps 2011: 43). In Cobb County, Georgia, schools reported canceling meetings and events because of the steep drop-off in attendance after the implementation of 287(g). Churches reported declines in attendance, and groups that offered counseling for families experiencing domestic violence saw attendance drop after years of increase (Capps 2011: 43).

Mayra, a Latino job placement officer discussed with me the situation for Latino job seekers. I met with her at the job center, where several African-American and white job seekers were using the computer terminals to apply for work. I sat at her desk while she explained to me how Latinos were faring. Mayra explained that right now, she only has two companies who will accept people without papers. I asked her if she thought it
Mayra: It’s not the economy. It’s the new 287(g) laws, that are causing problems.

Interviewer: Are they hopeful at all?

Mayra: [nodding] Yes, people are hopeful with Obama, but it will never be the same. Some people I know are returning to California and Texas because there is nothing here and the laws are getting very dangerous. Recently a friend’s whole family was taken back to Veracruz. You know things started getting worse in 9-1-1, and after that the focus shifted to immigrants. Hispanics are not the only immigrants, and they had nothing to do with 9-1-1! They are not here to hurt anyone. They are doing ESL, but another problem is that they need people to speak English because it’s an obstacle for many people. The language barrier is a very big issue.

Interviewer: Are people treated differently than they were before?

Mayra: There are more problems than before, more complaints…One woman I know was having a Christmas party… You know, Hispanics take Christmas seriously, it's a big party. And she was just having family over for dinner and a party on Christmas Eve, and her neighbor called the police. Her husband was legal, but she wasn’t. Luckily, she just got a ticket, but people complain a lot about these things. Another young man that I was trying to help who was diagnosed with Schizophrenia and lost his leg. He was sent to the hospital, but he can’t pay for his prescription, his medication, because he’s not documented. I also know a woman with six kids whose husband is going to be deported. And she can’t find work, so I got together a collection for Christmas to get the kids toys so they would have something at Christmas. There are a lot of problems here with domestic violence, and I have contacts at social services because women are afraid to report it and have the police come. I had one woman who was being beaten, but when I tried to help her and explain that she shouldn’t protect her husband when he was hitting her, she changed her number. She just called recently because she needed help getting work.

Interviewer: Are there any other community groups?

Mayra: There are some cultural groups, such as the Iglesia Bautista, but it’s mostly churches…there is a woman in social services, she is a lot of help, but people are scared, and afraid to use social services. A lot of people are getting deported. I hear a lot from families whose members are being deported.
Interviewer: Can you give me an example?

Mayra: One woman I know was stopped at a gas station. Or another, because many Hispanics do their shopping at night, and the police go and pick people up at Wal-Mart. There are a lot of incidents like that.

In Winston-Salem, which is not a 287(g) county, but has 287(g) neighbors, and a Sheriff who is anxious to participate, I observed that on days when there were rumors of checkpoints, church attendance would fall. The police chief, who has stated publicly that he is against such measures, has reported increasing frustrations in getting Latinos to cooperate with police. Spanish language radio broadcasts report checkpoints, and local after school programs must provide their own transportation to ensure that Latino children can participate with regularity because their parents are too afraid to drive. More than one respondent reported to me that she lost her job because they started setting up check points on her route to work, and she didn’t want to take the risk of being stopped by police. “Indeed, one woman living in Johnston County, North Carolina, who is a legal permanent resident and has three citizen children, told reporters that ‘many Hispanics feel as if law officers are looking for excuses to deport them (Lin, Ramirez and Shuford 2009: 4).’”

THE NEW NON-CITIZEN
As a result of these shifts, the post-2005 period marks a fundamentally altered incorporation context for Mexicans that is being replicated across the United States. In Winston-Salem, specifically, immigrants lives’ are shaped be fear and loathing. They now live in a context where it no longer seems feasible to believe in the promise of upward mobility through a prism of achievable whiteness, and those that do are now the exception rather than the rule. They no longer speak of the ‘American Dream’, but rather of the U.S. as a country with a history of racism, of which they are now the primary targets.

Race-based immigration enforcement injures U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who are perceived to be undocumented by subjecting them to unwarranted stops, questioning, and arrests. Although the vast majority of Latinos in the United States are U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents – and are expected to constitute nearly 25% of the U.S. population by 2050 – Latinos have often been singled out as a group for immigration stops and inquiries on innocent racial and ethnic minorities, in particular reinforcing the harmful perception that Latinos – U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike – are presumed to be ‘illegal immigrants’ and therefore not entitled to full and equal citizenship unless and until proven innocent or ‘legal’ (Lin, Ramirez and Shuford 2009: 2).

This convergence of demographic change, backlash and policy change is made that much more difficult in contrast to their experiences just a few short years ago. Indeed as Sara, a young Latina community organizer noted, “the panic around 287(g) is a new fear, it’s been sudden, because it’s just now being used to control the flow of people who come
and go.” As a result, local Mexicans, particularly undocumented immigrants, are drawing on a different repertoire than the traditional immigrant discourse to make sense of life in Winston-Salem. They now see themselves as racialized minorities. In Chapter five, I detail how migrants are making sense of this experience as racialized, and how this interpretation is being reinforced by leaders in the African-American community.
Chapter Five
Blacks May Be Second Class, but They Can’t Make Them Leave:
Mexican Racial Formation and Immigrant Status in Winston-Salem

For Latinos, they are thinking about today, not tomorrow, because they just need to get through the day. It’s probably better that not everyone thinks the way I do, because we might have a problem of suicide. You know, the President is always saying that it's a country of laws, of family values. I don’t see that. The impact of immigration is that the idea of human rights doesn’t mean anything. The UN can say we are human beings, the church can talk about that, and our voices, but it doesn't matter if we don’t have any rights. But it’s not the heart of the problem. The ‘bottom line’, as they say. If we can’t speak as equals, than we can’t really change anything. We really need immigration reform. Some people tell me I’m wanting a pink elephant, but I think it's the only real solution. We have no rights in this country, under this government without it. For Afro-Americans, it’s true that many times their rights are violated. But they can’t send them away. - Juan

For Juan, an undocumented Afro-Mexican man from Guerrero who has lived in Winston-Salem for several years, learned English, provides for his family, and has gotten involved in church and community organizations throughout the city, the dilemma faced by many Latinos in his community is plain. As highlighted in chapter four, Juan articulates the burden of immigration enforcement, using a language of rights to discuss the difficult position of Latinos. He then compares it to the experiences of African-Americans who face many of the same issues, but who are, ultimately, not subject to deportation. There are also more subtle cues here. Juan speaks for all Latinos, though being trampled down by undocumented status is not experienced by all Latinos equally.

What Juan’s comments describe is the process by which ‘Latino’ becomes racialized. While distinct, though not exclusive from ethnicity, it focuses on the experience of discrimination, of being deprived of rights, of social exclusion, and of parallels with other racialized groups. He elsewhere articulates a minority identity, adding another layer to Latinidad by not only drawing parallels with the African-American experience, but articulating a similar status position as grounds for potential collective action.

Drawing on interview and ethnographic data in Winston-Salem, this chapter articulates the racialization process of Mexicans in Winston-Salem as Latinos and as minorities. Here I provide a discussion of how race is made as a result of how immigrants experience local incorporation. In the case of Winston-Salem, I posit that Mexicans have undergone a process of reverse incorporation, in which low receptivity and enhanced enforcement has triggered the development of a minority consciousness among Mexicans. Moreover, while this appears to be common among Mexicans regardless of state of origin and phenotype, it is not necessarily the case for all persons of Latin American origin because of variations in status. In this way, ‘Latino’ is a complex, meaningful term, whose use and growing popularity is racialized. Despite the fact that
Afro and Mestizo Mexicans are both phenotypically and culturally distinct from one another, they assert a shared racial identity as Latinos. I find that while Mestizo and Afro Mexicans are not necessarily close with each other, they nevertheless find similar connections to the black experience that contributes to the production of a racialized identity.

Moreover, both groups distinguish themselves from Puerto Ricans and Cubans, whom they assert are distinctive because of their ‘Americanness’ and possession of legal documentation. These findings suggest that race is not merely a function of phenotype, but rather is produced through a variety of structural factors and experiences. By analyzing the local context, I find that a context of low receptivity along with strong black/white racial divisions and openness from black leaders creates the conditions for a Latino minority consciousness among Mexicans to unfold. I then detail how these new Latinos describe their identities, both in relation to the context of reception and other racial groups.

NEW LATINOS
Because of the hostile context, particularly on the part of whites, Mexican immigrants in Winston-Salem find it difficult to believe in the promise of upward mobility through a prism of achievable whiteness, or by distancing themselves from blacks, and those that do are now the exception rather than the rule. They no longer speak of the ‘American Dream’, but rather of the U.S. as a country with a history of racism, of which they are now the primary targets.

In many ways, in Winston-Salem, the gradual elimination of rights and services available to immigrants over the last several years has created a general sense of distrust and betrayal among Mexicans when referring to whites. The dismantling of rights and privileges has included a mix of national, state and local laws that produce particularly dire consequences for undocumented migrants and are perceived to be constructed by whites. “Past literature suggests that there are three general dimensions of group consciousness: general identification with a group, an awareness of that group’s relative position in society and the desire to engage in collective activity that focuses on improving the situation of that group (Sanchez 2008: 434).” I find that the experience of Mexican migrants and the conditions of reception prompt Mexicans to identify as a group aware of their status, as well as desire collective action, though they often report feeling impotent to act. Moreover, this sense of status is understood relationally, as similar to and aligned with blacks as minorities.

To illustrate this shift toward a minority consciousness, I highlight how my Mexican respondents perceive their experiences in Winston-Salem, their sense of status, treatment, and views on race relations. I divide this section into five parts that speak to this consciousness: From Discrimination to Racial Stratification; Feeling like blacks and Relations with blacks; Relations with Puerto Ricans and Cubans and; Exceptional Cases. Through their own words, I illustrate how the context of reception has shaped the racialization process for Mexican newcomers.

From Discrimination to Racial Stratification
Discrimination is without a doubt the hallmark of a ‘raced’ experience, and therefore plays an essential role in shaping identities. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) find that second
generation youth who define their race either nationally or pan-nationally more frequently reported discrimination. “Experiences of discrimination are powerfully associated with subsequent racial identification either as a potential determinant or as an integral component of a racial minority status. All but the white-identified respondents had significantly endured these experiences by an early age (2001: 189).” While the respondents in my study are all first generation Mexicans, they were no less likely to report feelings of being discriminated against in a variety of contexts. Moreover, my respondents overwhelmingly perceived that discrimination to come mostly or exclusively from whites. Eliana, a young Afro-Mexican woman who was finishing high-school and had come directly to Winston-Salem from Guerrero when she was 12 years old, told me a bit about her experiences. I met Eliana through my contacts at the Catholic Church, where her parents were active parishioners and ushers during the Spanish masses. I inquired as to how she felt Latinos were treated in the schools, and she noted: “They’re treated ok- well sometimes it’s some Latinos feel like they’re being, there’s racism in schools. Sometimes they’re not treated the way they treat other ones [other non-Latino students]. So they feel like they are not being treated right.” When I asked her for an example of this mistreatment, she told me:

Well, once in middle school there was, um, one of our friends, she one time she took a, um, a skirt, and they said it was too short. And then one of the other girls was taking skirts that were even shorter and they didn’t say nothing to them, they just to her would tell her that she shouldn’t be doing that. Or even with the high heels. One of them took high heels and they were like, she was not to take high heels to school. And then, um, the other girls like African-Americans or whites, they took high heels to school and they didn’t say nothing to them. They were like kind of saying that wasn’t fair…Sometimes like when the teachers, they’re like treat-they don’t treat Hispanics the way they treat, um, the other students. They’re treated more harsh.

I inquired as to why she though that was, and asked her what race her teachers were. She laughed and replied that “there’s no Hispanic teachers in my school.” I pressed her on whether she thought there were differences between how the black teachers and white teachers treated students. She nodded affirmatively, saying “Well, black teachers are more nice to all the students than white ones.” Although this is fairly minor form of discrimination, Eliana distinguished not only between how Latinos were treated compared to others, but how they were treated by blacks vs. whites. While not all Mexican respondents reported a personal experience with discrimination, they firmly believed that such occurrences were commonplace and reflected their diminished position in American society. When I later asked Eliana, her about the position of Latinos in society, she quickly responded that she didn’t “think they have any power.” She also informed me that whites had the most power, then blacks, then Latinos, but that blacks and Latinos were similar, and treated similarly in town. When I asked her how this translated to relations in her school, she noted:
It’s like almost- at my Middle School it was like more African-American people and Hispanics. There were like almost no white people in there, so- and they all get along, so that wasn’t a problem in there. High school, same thing. It’s most African-Americans and Hispanics and like 5% white people. And Hispanics and African-Americans they get very well.

I inquired as to how close this relationship was- whether students actually have relationships with one another. She nodded and said, “Yeah, they’re talking, like, they actually go out together like they like go to parties together or something like that, go to the movies.” This connection between the parallel treatment of blacks and Latinos, as well as the low status of Latinos generally, and the relations between blacks and Latinos was an important feature of how many Mexicans in my study understood their position in Winston-Salem society. A sense of anti-Latino discrimination was a key lens through which all of their understanding about race, ethnicity and social relations were formed.

Yesenia had only been in Winston-Salem since 2002, coming there after spending a few months in California from Guerrero. She walked across the border while pregnant, and soon after joined her family in North Carolina. However, these family members kept her in the house, and so she quickly met a husband, a Central American with residency to remove her from that situation. Unfortunately, he became abusive, and so she went from one bad scenario to another. She speaks little English and has few contacts outside of the church programs, which are staffed by mostly Latina and white women volunteers. She worked briefly, but had been out of work for a few years and volunteered regularly in the church. Yesenia described her thoughts on North Carolinians this way: “Well, there are all types here. Here there are all kinds of Americans. There is the type of redneck American that will inculcate their children with this racism against Hispanics, against African-Americans. They inculcate them this way and because of this there is a lot of violence between students, between young people that attack Hispanics. Because their parents inculcate them. That’s what I think.” Her sense that there is a white racist community and knowledge of the word ‘redneck’ surprised me, as she knew very little English, and spent little time socializing outside of her neighborhood and church, suggesting that ideas about white racism were widespread.

Recent scholarship on Latino newcomers suggests that discrimination “plays a fundamental role in determining not only one’s racial attitudes, but also one’s racial or ethnic identification (Golash-Boza 2004: 28).” In other words, to recognize discrimination and status is to recognize race (Feagin 2002; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Sanchez 2008; Portes and Magaly Sanchez 2010). While Latinos of various backgrounds are subject to discriminatory practices, Mexicans are uniquely positioned in the U.S. context to suffer the brunt of anti-Latino and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Ramon was a Mestizo undocumented worker from Mexico City, who arrived in the U.S. in 1996, and had also lived in California before making his way to North Carolina. I met Ramon through his sister, who also attended the same church as Yesenia. Ramon however, was not a member, though was very close to his family. Ramon clearly felt that whites looked down on him, and was defiant when I asked him how he thought whites perceived him. He told me that whites saw him:

---

46 When respondents refer to Americans they always mean white Americans, unless otherwise noted.
As a person who does not give up. That, I don’t allow…the Americans that don’t like the way I am because I don’t let a – if an American is doing something wrong, I will tell you. And if I’m doing something right, and he says it's wrong…I do not quit. I do not let some American tell me what is wrong. And that's what they do not like, a Hispanic to answer them. And I've always said this. They say, "The worst thing we find is a Mexican with, with attitude. With attitude." I always say. I say, "I will not leave. I do not leave for any American. For no one.” And this bothers them…They don’t like it. Because of this, I think they don’t want us. [Laughter] And the blacks, they are more calm. They are more relaxed. So for that, almost no Americans want us. And me, even less.

Ramón was just as clear with his view on racial stratification. Later in our interview, I described to him that race relations in the past in Winston-Salem had positioned whites above blacks. I asked him if he thought things had changed and how Latinos now fit in.

Eh, for me it’s no more than two. So how I see it, is that the whites always want to be better, and below is always everyone else. Above Hispanics and below is everyone, Chinese, Mexicans, blacks, everyone. But whites always want to be above. For them, it’s the way they see. For them it doesn’t matter if you’re brown, white, yellow, blue. They are white, and because of that, they feel good. Or, they believe in nothing more than two races, and they want to treat you bad forever. But then you know, that, no. The blacks are a race, we are another, and they are above us because they are from here. As though one comes to take something that is theirs. But the Americans, they only think of themselves. I don’t know how they think, but they only think of themselves.

I asked Ramon more specifically if ever felt more discriminated against by whites. He answered:

Yes. They say to Hispanics -- and because of it Hispanics are always afraid of Americans -- because they always say it. “I’m going to call immigration.’ Or, ‘You are illegal.’ And all of that. Yes, because to me, they’ve never said anything. But I have seen that is what they do. Yes I know that is what they do.

In our conversation, Ramon dismissed the fear of whites that he felt many undocumented Mexicans had, committing himself to defying whites, suggesting that he would not be intimidated into leaving Winston-Salem or North Carolina, highlighting his ‘attitude’, a remark that is reminiscent of African-Americans being reminded to ‘remain in their place’ in the Jim Crow South. Like Ramon, even in cases where respondents did not directly experience any discrimination from whites, they spoke as if it were only a matter of time. When asked how she thought Latinos were treated on the job compared to blacks or whites, Adrianna from Guerrero told me “I think there is some of everything, truthfully. Because there are some whites who are also racist, even though, thank God,
the majority that I have encountered have been good people. The people that I know, I have welcomed, but the majority, well, no.”

**Connections with Blacks**
Contrary to their suspicion of whites, as highlighted above, many of my respondents made sense of their status and discrimination by comparing themselves and their experiences with whites to those with blacks. Race is a relational, socially constructed concept that is understood in relation to other groups. Minority status, however, also requires a sense of commonality with others – that their shared status also inspires common cause and action. Similarity and affinity are key ways in which such status is experienced. In particular, Mexicans make sense of their own sense of discrimination and relations with blacks by relating it to what they perceive as blacks’ experience with discrimination. Sanchez indicates that not only does the perception of pervasive discrimination and sense of status impact perceptions of Latino commonality (2008), but my findings in this particular context indicate that perceived discrimination also increases perceived commonality with blacks. Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that “racialization occurs through a juxtaposition of normative affinities between Latinos and ‘Americans’ (read, whites) and individuous tacit contrast between Latinos and blacks (Padin 2005: 55).” In other words, it is not only their negative views of whites that matter, but their affinity toward blacks.

Jorge, a young Afro-Mexican man who left Mexico when he was 11, moved to California for several years before his parents relocated to North Carolina for better work opportunities. The joined an uncle in 1994 who had been living in Winston-Salem for several years and helped his father find carpentry work. Jorge told me: “I’ve got a lot black friends. We listen to the same music, we have the same outlook you know, we are the same, like family…black people here, they treat you like a friend, like a brother. White people here, they just treat you like another guy.” However, both groups, Mestizo and Afro, refer to local structural and social barriers faced in the context of reception, as well as a relatively more open reception by blacks in asserting a general sense of closeness in comparison to relations with whites. Jorge continued,

I’m more comfortable around, with the black, with the black people…’Cause uh, where I used to live when we first moved I mean, my community was black. I didn’t have no white people around me. I had to deal with them. I used to be- and my dad he used to be nice to them but he would make me do stuff for them, especially if they were old people…And I would like hate that, you know? Like it was saying I want to be part of your community.

When I asked Jorge if the feeling was mutual and whether he was were accepted into the community, he noted:

Yeah… You know, we got so, so many things in common with black people. We’re so loud. [Laughter] I’m just kidding. I mean, we enjoy the same things. Uh, like music. We go crazy about music. We go crazy about food. We go crazy about spending time with friends and family. My mom,
who’s like my hero, my mentor, and I respect that from a black guy. My mom is my mom. You don’t talk about my mom. And that’s the way we are. You know?

When I inquired with Ramon about whether he saw similarities between blacks and Latinos, he made similar points, drawing what he saw as cultural similarities between the two groups:

Well, they are the same, they are not the same in terms of race and all of that, but I believe that they think the same. Because the blacks like to have fun like Hispanics, and the blacks like to have nice things like the Hispanics. The blacks don’t care about spending their money on a car, and Hispanics don’t either. They don’t care about spending money on clothes and all that. And the whites, yes. They whites, “oh, no, we aren’t going to eat in this restaurant because it’s very expensive. Or, ‘we aren’t going to buy a new car because it’s very expensive.’ And I believe that because of this, Hispanics and blacks are more similar than them. It’s like the say on the radio, it’s easier to see a car, a car – the Hispanics and blacks want cars. It’s easier to put on rims than get insurance [Laughter] The blacks and Hispanics are the same.

Later, when asked if he ever has any conflicts with African-Americans at work, he responded:

No, I think on the contrary, they give me more opportunities because many of the jobs that I’ve been on, in the job that I have now, there are people that speak almost no English, and with me, I can speak more English, and fluent Spanish, I help out. “Come here and help me translate.” Or, “Tell them what to do.” Or, they give more opportunities to me because I can, because I’m Hispanic, because as a Hispanic I can speak two languages and all that. And to me its never affected me, or well, I’ve never been ashamed or affected negatively for being Hispanic. They like to say, they say… when I go with my friends, they say—and you’ll see this is curious, the Americans say ‘Mexican,’ and to me they always say, ‘Blaxican.’

We laughed about this and he nodded emphatically, saying “to me this is what they say.” I inquired as to how this relationship worked out at his job, which was in construction. He informed me that most of his co-workers were black and ‘American’, and that he got along with all of them. However:

Listen, I get along with, with the Americans, I get along well, but by chance I get along better with blacks. I get along much better with them, and well, I’ve never had any problem with anyone, not with Americans, not blacks, but I have better relationships with blacks.
When I pressed him on why he thought this was the case, he stated:

It’s because since I left school, like I told you, I worked in construction and in factories, and I don’t know. My friendships always have been with blacks and I began to rely more on them. I learned to talk like them and everything, and well, I don’t know. My best – I have more black friends than Americans. To this day I still work with a lot with them and some that I don’t work with any more and on the weekends they talk to me just to see how I’m doing. Sometimes they come over to my house. There is one black guy who is 45 years old, but he looks very young, and he always says that my mom is his mom. He’s always been a good friend of the family, and is still. And he goes to my house and we eat together or whatever – I have good relationships with them, curiously, yes.

Interviewer: Why do you say it’s curious?

Ramón: Because supposedly, supposedly they say that blacks and Hispanics don’t get along. And I’ve seen in many places that they don’t, they still have fights between them. They go around starting these things. And I no, well. I, it’s just much easier to call a black person a friend than an American. Me with the Americans I don’t know why I really can’t—we collide a lot. As if they do not like what I do and I do not like what they do. I don’t know why. I don’t know. And with blacks, well, we get along and we get along and we play. We say things. Here we get along…I get along with blacks, yes, because they’ve gone through what we are going through. You know the problems that they’ve had for years, from slavery and all that. The Americans have treated the blacks badly to this day. They have the same problem that we have: racism. And because of this, we get along better. At least, I do with them. Yes. Because we know what it’s about. And there are times that, at work, we are there playing, and between the blacks and I, we say the evil things that Americans do.

Ramón and Jorge both were comfortable English speakers, and therefore had a lot more opportunities to not only meet blacks and whites, but to get to know them better. Still, they seemed highly disinclined to develop relationships with whites. Others, like Yesenia, an Afro-Mexican woman from Guerrero, would seemingly be hard pressed to see similarities between herself and African-Americans. Elsewhere in our interview she noted concerns about the behaviors of many Latinos and African-Americans in her neighborhood and gets along with the White volunteers at her church. She also spoke very little English. But still, when asked if she felt she had more in common with white or African-Americans, she noted “mmm, well for me with both, with both. For me its the same… For me it’s the same, but for the whites, I’m not equal. [Laughter] I am equal with the African-Americans for the whites. And that’s what I see. What I think.” When I asked her about similarities between blacks and Latinos, she then elaborated, “well, like I said, we are equal. Equal. For me, everything, I don’t know, but for me everything is
equal. All of us, we are all, we are all undocumented. We all arrive in this country undocumented, but the whites don’t accept this. They don’t accept this.”

As Yesenia’s comments highlight, in the view of the Mexicans in my sample, even those that strongly asserted a sense of equality between themselves and whites, nonetheless felt that whites did not share this sense of equality. Moreover, they specified that this treatment was not limited to Latinos, but to all non-whites. In their view, African-Americans have been subject to maltreatment at the hands of whites for generations, and Latinos are newly subject to their discriminatory treatment. Eliana, who felt that Latinos experienced more discrimination in school, went on to describe the similarities between Latinos and African-Americans. When I asked here how she felt about African-Americans personally, and the relationship between the two groups, she noted:

Uh, I think—excuse me—Hispanics and African-Americans are more close than other races because of, of- African-Americans were like slaves before and then Latinos they are sometimes not treated right either, so they’re kind of more close together because of that, more than anything else.

She went on to note say that she has “a lot of friends that are African-Americans at school. We’re like close, we have a pretty good friendship.” While for whites, she said she had no personal relationships at all. She noted that she did feel close to African-Americans generally, stating that things between blacks and Latinos are: “Close. You know, not real, real, close but yeah, close.” When I pressed her on what she meant she elaborated: “I mean, I don’t know it’s just sometimes. Hispanics and African-Americans sometimes they don’t get along too well. Most of the time they do. But it’s not really, real close like they can’t live without each other, but it’s close.” It would be surprising for Eliana to feel so strongly about African-Americans that they could not live without one another. Indeed, she sets a high standard for closeness, in which “really, real close” would mean co-dependence. Still, good relationships, equal status and a lack of intergroup discrimination is no less significant.

Others were more succinct in their assessment of relations with African-Americans. Diego, a Mestizo immigrant from Acapulco who arrived in North Carolina approximately 10 years ago to meet up with his wife and sister. I met Diego through a contact at the small white and Latino church. When Diego was asked how he thought African-Americans perceived him, he said:

Them? I believe that they too have suffered a little discrimination on the part of whites, because the whites believe they are superior to everyone. They too have suffered a lot. Because I have talked with some, and they are closer with Hispanics than with whites. So, there are people of color that think that – that they are closer to us. A lot. Others no. But I have better experiences with these people. With people of color because they have told me, some have told me that, that the whites always think they are better than us or them.
Jesica, an Afro-Mexican immigrant from Guerrero, arrived in Winston-Salem in 1994, as a minor, returned to Mexico and then went back for a few years to help her parents before returning again as an adult. She was an active member in the white and Latino church. When I asked her about her relations with other racial groups, Jesica told me that she felt closer with blacks. When I pressed her on why, she noted:

Because I think we feel the same. With the blacks, we feel the same. Not all, but, yes, because they were immigrants here too, to this country. Even though now they have more, more opportunities than we do, but we came for the same thing.

Interviewer: The blacks came to work?

Jesica: That is to say, they were immigrants, the same, like us. Even though the blacks, I mean to say, have already become like our children. By this she means that they are now citizens.47 But their parents before the blacks were immigrants like us. And so, well, they already have more opportunities. So, I identify more with them.

Even though Jesica seems to be somewhat misinformed about the history of both African-Americans and whites (who were also immigrants), she is clear about her identification with African-Americans because of what she perceives as shared status. Most frequently, however, Mexican respondents described the relationship between blacks and Latinos in a more straightforward way. I met Maritza, an Afro-Mexican immigrant through a contact who attended ESL classes at the Catholic Church. She had originally settled in California with her siblings whom she crossed the border with, before making her way to North Carolina with one of her sisters. When asked if she felt she had more in common with whites or blacks here, she didn’t hesitate to say “blacks.” When I pressed her on why she said blacks, she noted, “because well, like us, they don’t want us here, and they wanted them gone. Or rather, they felt the same as we feel now.”

Similarly, Elisa, who is Mestiza and from San Nicolas, and has been living in the U.S. for 18 years (eight in California before coming to Winston-Salem) works at a local retirement home as a waitress, where she has been for nine years. She loves her job, and while she notes that she gets along well with the clients and supervisors who are mostly white, she considers the other staff, who are mostly African-Americans, her friends. She also lives in a multi-ethnic neighborhood, and noted that she feels close with her neighbors who are black, and “are good people.”

Importantly, affinities were also reported as mutual support, as others noted that they were more likely to get support from African-Americans than from whites, particularly in relation to increased hostility from whites. At a meeting for undocumented immigrants at the public library, Silvia, one of the Latinos in attendance, reported that she met a black woman at the DMV a while back when she was getting a license and had her check to prove her address. The black woman advised her not to use her paycheck at the counter because if it had a fake social security number or did not match her other IDs, they would take her identification and enter it in, and they could turn her in. She thanked her, and was grateful to the woman for the advice not to show those documents.

47 By this she means that they are now citizens.
Diego explained to me why he felt he had more in common with African-Americans than with whites:

Well, I have more respect for the African-Americans. I’ve respected them more. I feel less rejected from them then from whites. Yes…on the TV, I’ve noted that, they fight for some common causes, more often the Latinos with African-Americans… its more similar between us. We are closer than with the whites. I’ve seen more on television them fighting for a cause almost, for the same thing between them. But whites, almost never. The don’t mix much.

Interviewer: Not whites?

Diego: No, I haven’t seen much. The majority are always against the things they they’ve done- sometimes they are against the African-Americans and the Hispanics.

Later, Diego and I were discussing how he thought things might unfold in the future, and whether he thought that relations between blacks and Latinos in the future might turn into something more political. He was thoughtful in his response:

I think so. I imagine so, and I would like it if it were true because they, they have suffered in a sense. They have also had their leader, Martin Luther King, that also fought for their rights. Then, I believe they identify more with us because they also lived in a situation like us. It can happen some time in some moment. But now the president is something new. It’s never happened before. And he is helping not just the African-Americans. He is not only make a difference for them. Or for Hispanics. He is doing something for all of the nation. And there are presidents who have come before, I imagine, at best, they didn’t do much for the African-Americans. Less for the Hispanics. Right? And in what he is, his cabinet, his group of people, they haven’t often had many African-Americans inside of the government. They are now making changes. But it’s been difficult.

For the Mexicans in my study, the experience of being discriminated against and feeling as though they were a lower status than whites was intertwined with how they saw the experiences of African-Americans, as a population that has also been discriminated against and poorly treated. Moreover, these perceived similarities also produced a host of other social and cultural links between the two groups, resulting in positive attitudes as well as positive relations. This view of closeness with blacks, however, did not extend to all Latinos. Rather, while Mexicans perceived that they shared a status with African-Americans, many Mexicans in my study did not see the same similarities between themselves and other Latinos. In their view, the status of Puerto Ricans and Cubans in particular, but also other Latinos, drove a wedge between them.

This distinction is important because it suggests that while racialization is taking place, it is very much attached to experiences of status discrimination and therefore
creates some very important caveats in our understanding of how racialization and pan-ethnic identities unfold. While Mexicans here are clearly asserting a sense of minority status and understanding themselves as a racialized Latino group, the nevertheless are equally quick to point out that other Latinos, particularly those that do not share their documentation status, are not likely to consider themselves to be Latinos in the same way, nor treat Mexicans as part of an affinitive group.

It’s about Status: Not like Puerto Ricans and Cubans

Scholars who examine interracial relations tend to gloss over distinctions in the Latino community, while simultaneously pointing out that Pan-Latino identity is a predictor of a sense of linked-fate with African-Americans (Kaufmann 2003). Status is a key differentiation between Latinos as well as an important mechanism for producing racial identity. This pan-Latinoness cannot be taken for granted, however, as Mexicans are quick to report a perceived hierarchy within the Latino community, in which Puerto Ricans and Cubans are perceived to view themselves more as American, with legal status and access to resources. Central Americans are located in the middle, with access to refugee status and visas, and Mexicans at the bottom. In realms where pan-Latino identity does emerge, it tends to develop as part of an identity in which the experience of migration and discrimination comes to be viewed in racialized terms. “Diverse origins interact with contexts of reception to give rise to different political concerns among the foreign born that mold, in turn, the politics of subsequent generation (Portes and Rumbaut 1996: 96)”. The ways that Mexicans experience life in the United States are not necessarily the same as other Latinos who may arrive with differential access to rights and status. In this way, pan-Latino identity is not universal, but rather a racialized perspective that is not necessarily shared by all Latinos in this context. The Mexican population in the United States is unlike other Latin American groups. In addition to their large numbers and long history of migration and labor in the United States, they also are unique in terms of the circumstances of their migration. Puerto Ricans are citizens and have only been migrating in significant numbers since the 1930s. Cubans have had refugee status since the 1960s, and for most of the twentieth century, Cuban migrants have been largely middle class. Other groups such as Salvadoreans are more similar in that they are more likely to be undocumented laborers, but they also have had access to refugee status, and their migration streams are considerably smaller and more recent (Telles and Ortiz 2008: 12).

In my findings, my respondents made similar distinctions, talking about themselves as Latinos or Hispanics, particularly with regard to discrimination, but differentiating themselves from Puerto Ricans and Cubans specifically, who, despite having a large Afro-descendant population, were reportedly fundamentally different than Mexicans. In a meeting for a non-profit group that wanted to begin providing support to Latinos in the Winston-Salem community, at the end of the meeting I asked Juan, who was a member of the group, if there was discrimination among Latinos, and if so, was it more national or what was the distinction. He said that there “was definitely.” I asked what kind, was it skin color, or nation or something else. He said that “some of it was national, but not really skin color. Mostly, it was an issue of status.” I asked what he meant by this, and he explained that “some people, they have good jobs, or papers, they speak English, and there is a divide between them and other Latinos.” I asked what they
do, do they speak to you, and he said yes, they speak, but “there is a sense that they are above you, they don’t want to have anything to do with you. That’s the main divide.”

Cecilia, another Afro-Mexican and member of the group who is a legal resident and had been living in Winston-Salem for several years after moving from California, put it more pointedly: “Yeah, that’s why also I think, you know. I think Puerto Ricans, they are considered, you know, Americans. So then I think they put themselves up like, I don’t say it to be negative, but, it’s not everybody, but it’s like they think of themselves like, “I’m not Mexican.” Mexico’s like, you know. And I know people from El Salvador and they’re not like that. But I think they have better, um, I don’t want to say status but it’s— they own homes and they own cars and they’re, you know, they’re living with jobs that are stable and things like that. So I think it’s just because most people from Mexico are not here legally. So, anyway, there’s the thing that all Hispanic people are Mexican.

Jorge responded similarly: Well, they don’t, they don’t see themselves as- well, we ever make a mistake like say calling a Puerto Rican like, Mexicano, oh, they get mad. They’d be like, you know, we’re from the third world, you know? They’re really, they really get really insulted like, you know, even calling them Mexican.

There is some slippage or uncertainty as to where Central Americans fit in this stratified Latino framework. In part this is because Mexicans are aware that Central Americans may be undocumented, have refugee or other legal status. Diego had a similar perception of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, but lumped together Mexicans and Central Americans:

The Puerto Ricans, the Cubans, well, they feel that they are American. They don’t have, they discriminate against us because in their country they are obligated to speak the English language, and they learn it. In our country there are a few years that we begin in elementary school to learn the language, and they teach the English language, it’s required. Before, no. You have to pay an academy to learn, or a school where you have to pay to go, like here…And the majority of Puerto Ricans, or all of them, almost all of them have papers. Right? They are citizens too. They mark the difference between us.

Interviewer: And it’s the same with Central Americans, or no?

Diego: Yes, the same [as Mexicans]. But they can defend themselves a little more because they have more opportunities to get a work visa. If a Puerto Rican says to a Salvadoran, “Nothing, you are less than me.” “I also have papers.” So, they can defend themselves in that sense.

When I asked Yesenia, who felt a strong connection between African-Americans and Latinos, whether she thought there was some kind of order or stratification in the Latino community, she quickly pointed out who she thought, thought was on top. “Like the Puerto Ricans. Or the Salvadorans. They all can easily get visas or residency, and they don’t like Mexicans.” She continued, “No, no. They don’t like us at all. Because they presume that because they enter legally, and we enter illegally, that we are illegal. A lot of them offend us, humiliate us with that.” When
I asked her about those Central Americans who might also be undocumented, she said: “Yes but, yes, but even if they don’t have documentation, they don’t like Mexicans. Because they say a lot, that here the Americans and the African-Americans say that they are Mexicans and they don’t like that they say that. They always say “You are Mexican” and they later say “No. I am not Mexican.””

Enrique, who joined his brother in Winston-Salem in 2003, was no different in his assessment that Cubans and Puerto Ricans had an elevated status compared to Mexicans:

Look, I think that the Cuban that comes here in the United States, he already has permission to work. And they- have papers. And the Puerto Rican is the same, they have papers. In contrast, we, when we come here, we don’t have anything. We don’t have rights. And that’s the difference between us.

These differences are not insignificant, as Jones-Correa and Leal find that Mexican Americans are more likely than Puerto Ricans and Cubans to identify as Hispanic or Latino, but less likely to identify as Spanish or American (1996: 223). The distinctions being made by the Mexicans in my study are not limited to this case. In Portes and Magaly Sanchez’ 2010 analysis of Latino immigrant attitudes in the urban Northeast, they find that 63% of respondents recalled incidents of discrimination primarily by whites, but also by other Latinos, specifically Puerto Ricans.

Moreover, recent work suggests that Latinos across the board are reporting higher levels of personal experience with discrimination, as well as perceive that discrimination against Latinos is widespread. In Fraga and colleagues Latino Lives in America (2010), 64.7% of Latinos surveyed reported being treated unfairly from whites, whereas only 8.4% were unfairly treated by blacks. A higher number, however, 12.6% reported being treated unfairly by Latinos (2010: 75). In their focus groups, moreover, they found that when probed on relations between Latinos and whites, and Latinos and blacks, Latinos reported discrimination originating from whites against Latinos, and Latinos against blacks but not from blacks against Latinos (2010: 86). Later, some Latinos in their focus group point out their frustration with poor treatment from Latinos by referencing better treatment from blacks.

Exceptions

There were some exceptions, however, to this sense of distance from whites and identifying with blacks. Isabel, a Mestiza woman from Michoacán, arrived in the United States via Arizona. She was smuggled by an American Indian tribe who then transferred her to a family member in Phoenix before she reunited with her husband in Winston-Salem. She was a friend of a member of the church that was primarily white and Latino. Unlike the vast majority of Mexicans in my sample, she indicated that she felt closest to whites.

Because for whatever reason, blacks cannot be trusted. Basically, because we have, how do I say it? Because they, the African-Americans, they almost never work. They just live off the government that helps them with
their rent, with their food, and almost, there are a lot of people who don’t work, that do nothing more than find evil things to do, find houses to rob, and I, I feel that the whites are the ones that put forth more effort and there are fewer whites doing bad things than African-Americans.

However, at the same time, while Isabel didn’t have positive relations or feelings toward blacks generally, she felt strongly that the president was especially equipped to help Latinos precisely because he is black. She explained, “we have hope in him. Because we know that he- they also have had difficult things and for many years, it’s true, that they also had bad experiences like that. I think that Obama understands us more than the other presidents that there have been.” When I clarified that this was specifically because he is black she reiterated:

Because he is black. Because they also suffered a lot of discrimination and they already killed their own people, right? And I think that he is, he is moved to do something for us. And he, the fact that before in his campaign he said that he would do something for us. Now he still stands. That’s what he said in his campaigns. Because other presidents when they gain power, they’ve already forgotten their promises that they’ve made and they don’t mention them again. And this president continues to say the same thing.

When I asked her if she extended this view to other blacks, she explained:

Isabel: I think so yes, I think that they understand more, in that aspect. Because, well, they had been slaves and when someone came and saved them from slaver and now, we, we have created this hope that someone will come also, and save us from slavery. We don’t know when. We don’t know how, but we know that there is a committee and that nothing less than Obama send the command to the whole committee, but we know that God has his hand in it, and it’s going to happen. Something is going to happen. Something good for us.

Her ideas about whether whites could sympathize in the same way however was more complex.

Because you see, basically, when in Obama’s campaigns or- All the rumors that they said, well, and we see discrimination sometimes. And, I have heard, well in the news. I’ve heard it. I haven’t had- I haven’t had the experience of discrimination directly, but what you hear is that there are people that like us, and those that don’t. There are people that say “You come to my country and invade my country. Go back where you came from.” And other say, “My country is your country.’ We’ve had a marvelous experience two weeks ago here. Here, this church, is composed by Americans. They are the ones that provide the money for it to exist. And two weeks ago we had a dinner. Everyone that came brought dinner for them. There were maybe 60 Americans that came. And it was so nice
that we felt that we could stay there, that the Pastor he is in charge of all the Presbyterian churches, he said, “Thank God for the food that was delicious. Everything was very good, and one thing I want to say is: My country is your country.

Isabel, who has had some notably positive experiences with whites, and perceives blacks to be lazy, nevertheless believes that the President will more seriously consider her interests as a Latina precisely because he is black. These complex views most frequently emerged among Mexicans who reported very positive experiences with whites. Still, though Isabel did not trust blacks generally, attended this church where there were ample opportunities to have good experiences with whites, and reported an incidence where such a positive experience occurred, she still made distinctions between the ability of blacks vs. whites to sympathize with Latinos.

Others had no formative experiences or only negative experiences with both blacks and whites, and therefore were hesitant to relate to either group. Armando, a Mestizo Mexican from Oaxaca, who lived in California for eight months before moving to Winston-Salem in 2003, explained that he did not know whether he had more in common with whites or blacks. He explained that “there are people, black people who are good, and there are white people that are good also. So I can’t say one.” However, when he thought about it for a few more minutes he amended his earlier thoughts, and affirmed that he thought “more with blacks”. When I pressed as to why, he indicated:

Well, because well, because the blacks, or, because I think, I’m not saying its this way, but I think that what’s happened to the blacks is more of what’s happened to us [Latinos]. Even from here. I think that the black person has also had what’s happened to us with whites, because he is black, not white. At best, they also discriminate against the blacks, although they are from here.

Only a small number of respondents had an unequivocally negative opinion of black Americans, approximately 10% of the sample of Mexicans. These respondents reported particularly bad experiences with African-Americans, which they perceived to be racist or discriminatory.

Alma is a Mestiza Mexican immigrant from Guerrero, who arrived in the U.S. ten years ago, coming to Winston-Salem after first migrating to California for a few months. She returned to Mexico, briefly with her children, but there was no work there. She is now thirty, and works in a local factory. She’s also an active member in the white and Latino church. Alma was one of the few in my study who reported only negative experiences with blacks and only positive experiences with whites. She explained to me why she did not feel close to blacks and felt that she was more like whites.

Because I saw a black woman that was very, this black woman – you see that someone is racist because they make faces at you, and how they whisper. They say things and because doesn’t know English they think that – they look at you with mean eyes…One time I went into the
bathroom and a black woman was leaving and almost ran into me. And she said to me, “Stupid, can’t you see?” And then my friend said, “Don’t talk to her that way. She didn’t see that you were in the bathroom. Why didn’t you put down the lock? When you enter you lock it. And she started swearing at us.

She later reported that when she was leaving work, the husband of the woman saw her and her friend in the parking lot, and began swearing at them and threatened to destroy her car. She was afraid and intimidated because she felt that because they were from here, they could call immigration on them. She almost did not return to work, but the white manager intervened and told them that if something happened that he would call the police. The manager also spoke to the husband and wife, and diffused the tension. Alma then noted:

Yes, the blacks are more, more racist than not, as you can see. And Americans are too, they say, but for my I’ve never met an American like that. Never. For me the Americans are very amiable, very good people and because honestly, I’ve never been bothered by an American man or woman. So I feel fine. I know an American woman named Tania. Every five months, because she has a daughter the age of mine daughter, she always brings me cloths. Always. And because of this, I say that I don’t have anything to say about the Americans. Them no. They are good people. But the blacks, yes, they are bad.

She then went on to tell another story about her neighborhood, when her daughter came home crying that someone was going to kill her and not to open the door because her black neighbor was swearing and yelling that she through a rock at the window and woke the baby. He was also carrying a gun. It turned out that it was the white neighbor’s child who hit the window. The white mother translated for her, and defended her, telling the black man that he was being racist, and scared all of the children. Understandably, those who had experiences like Alma’s were more likely to report feeling closer to whites, and discriminated against by blacks. Still, even Mexican immigrants like Alma noted “the white people, yes, they are always on top. Right? They have good jobs. The blacks do too, but they are more lazy. And we as immigrants that don’t have papers, well, the truth is, we are always in fear and anguish.”

As Portes and Rumbaut argue, race and ethnicity have always been constructed and “forged in interaction between individual traits and contextual variables. It is therefore not impossible that these supranational identities will take hold and come eventually to define groups so labeled to others, as well as to themselves. The history of immigration certainly supports this possibility (Portes and Rumbaut 1996: 135-6)”. If we understand race not as a function of phenotype, but more about social and political exclusion, then Mexicans (but necessarily other Latinos) are undoubtedly becoming raced. Moreover, in many ways, Latino identity in many new immigrant destinations is constructed not only through a sense of discrimination, but also through experiences with African-Americans, who are the only other significant minority group. Their presence combined with a hostile anti-immigrant climate provides a rather narrow set of minority frames from which newcomers can draw.
It also distances them from other Latinos who do not face the same issues of status and therefore fear and discrimination. These connections are not only evident in self-report. In Chapter six, I draw heavily on my ethnographic findings to highlight how these frames work together leading not only to a minority racial consciousness, but a sense of closeness with blacks and distance from whites on the ground.
Since 2005, Winston-Salem’s Human Relations Commission has put on a series of community forums with the moniker “Beyond Soul and Salsa.” Originally instituted to dispel stereotypes between the African-American and growing Latino communities, these small neighborhood forums have grown into one of the commission’s most successful community-wide events. Their purpose is to bring together African-American and Latino community leaders, officials, and town residents to discuss issues facing both Latinos and African-Americans. Indeed, as early as the second meeting in 2006, they began to address topics such as relations with the police, getting involved in elections, and community activism. The forums increased to twice per year, shifting locations across the city to various halls, churches and YMCA’s. Fueled by free pizza and soda and aided by simultaneous translation, community members gather at churches and YMCAs across the city to discuss unfair policing (setting up checkpoints and racial profiling), immigration policy, fair housing laws, economic development, institutionalizing a state lottery, gangs, and the disproportionate representation of black and Latino youth in the city’s alternative school.

Overwhelmingly the literature on intergroup relations finds that these two racial groups are in conflict. However, these forums, though often focused on controversial topics, never resulted in audience members haranguing each other. At the eighth forum, in May 2009, they took on the pending 287(g) partnership between city or county police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as the topical focus of the evening. The local Sheriff was invited to discuss his interest in the program and hear the concerns of the community. During his time, he noted that the following:

The 287(g) program is offered to sheriff’s department to get training for sheriffs in jails to make an alien inquiry to determine their status. Now, these are self-detected individuals – they have committed a crime and are in jail – and its only when in processing for violation of a state or federal law. The INS database program is not in place in Forsyth. It’s in seven counties, and 25 more have asked for training. Forsyth asked for training in 2007, and we have not yet been offered the training. We have not had that training but we are on the list... It would only come into play when someone is arrested. It can be anything from driving without a license to murder. They are self-detected. These are people who have violated the law. We do now48 have an intake procedure and talk to everyone to inquire using standard interrogation for criminal alien processing and make an inquiry with ICE. In the future, we will probably have a 287(g) program, but it depends on funding and staff.

48 He is insinuating that they recently received approval to participate in the Criminal Alien Program (CAPs).
During the question and answer period, Spanish-speaking and African-American community members presented a united front as they addressed the Sheriff, voicing their disdain for police checkpoints in their shared neighborhoods, plans for the implementation of 287(g), and their mutual distrust of the Sheriff. In response, the Sheriff evaded their questions with pursed lips and assurances that his office was only interested in upholding the law. Immigration advocates in the audience disputed this assertion, vocalizing that participation in such programs is entirely voluntary. After the meeting, the Sheriff lingered at the dais looking uncomfortable while community members milled around munching on pizza, chatting with neighbors and discussing the Sheriff’s remarks, all while keeping an eye on wayward children who ran around the room together.

There are few empirical studies that seek to explain increasingly commonplace scenes such as these, in which immigrant Latinos and African-Americans come together as a community with a sense of mutual recognition and support, rather than competition and hostility. Social scientists have written extensively about intergroup relations over the last several decades in large part because of their relationships to three key social processes: as precursors or obstacles to political mobilization; their role in shaping community relationships, particularly in terms of facilitating strong or weak social ties that are linked to well-being; and as indicators of how groups come to understand themselves relationally, specifically within the context of social hierarchies. The literature on intergroup relations is therefore expansive and robust. However, the bulk of this literature, including the more recent inter-minority relations scholarship, overwhelmingly finds racial and ethnic groups to be in conflict. As a result, we know very little about the emergence of positive intergroup relations. In this chapter, I argue that my study of Winston-Salem suggests that current theories fail to account for scenes such as these, in which Latinos and African-Americans come together as a community with a sense of mutual recognition and support, rather than competition and hostility.

Building on the intergroup relations and assimilation literatures, I find the emergence of closeness, arguing that a sense of a shared status, an absence of resource competition, sustained positive contact between African-Americans and Mexicans, and the development of a ‘common enemy’ in whites, facilitated the conditions for intergroup closeness between African-Americans and Mexicans. While the circumstances in this case study are in many ways unique, the factors at work here in Winston-Salem, such as integration into suburbs and small towns, and an increasing sense of anti-Mexican sentiment, are increasingly found in new destination communities throughout the United States.

Until the 1970s, studies of race relations have largely focused on black-white relationships. In recent decades, however, massive changes in immigration patterns have shifted some of the focus to inter-group relations between minority groups. In particular, despite the fact that many scholars and activists argue that blacks and Latinos share political and economic interests, much of the literature on black/brown relations assess relations between the two groups to be negative and in conflict (Kaufmann 2003; Marrow 2008; McClain et al. 2006; McClain et al. 2007; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002). This finding is primarily a result of competition for limited resources, including jobs, housing and political representation. Moreover, rather than see themselves as having interests in common, many scholars find that Latinos predominantly see themselves as closer to whites, actively distancing themselves from association with
African-Americans and any possibility foreclose social or political relations (Marrow 2008; Forman, Goar and Lewis 2002). Indeed, there are numerous structural and cultural reasons why these findings dominate the literature, including patterns of resource competition, labor market competition and intercultural stereotypes (Marrow 2008; McClain et al. 2006; Niemann et al. 1994; Waters 1999).

My examination of Mexican incorporation into Winston-Salem, North Carolina, however, uncovers a case in which cooperation and closeness with African-Americans is common, and racial distancing from whites is the norm. Through my fieldwork, I found that closeness between blacks and Mexicans emerged in three key ways: a sense of physical and social closeness; a sense of solidarity and shared discrimination or consciousness; and through an emergent sense of collaborative political mobilization and linked fate.

**POSITIVE INTERRACIAL RELATIONS**
In this chapter, I explain that by and large, Mexicans are not distancing themselves from blacks. Instead, as highlighted in Chapter five, many Mexican migrants are seeing themselves as close to blackness as a way to make sense of their experiences of discrimination and exclusion. Because the black community in Winston-Salem is stable, relatively affluent, and leverages some political control, Mexicans’ experiences living in black neighborhoods where they share institutions and space creates opportunities for positive social contact. Moreover, Latinos’ concentration in black neighborhoods means that contact with blacks is more frequent and, due to a longstanding sense of black/white tension that makes it difficult to incorporate into both groups, may juxtapose both groups, as collective minorities, against whites. While not a sufficient condition, it also allows for a sense of shared status and community to develop among blacks and Latinos.

This sustained contact and lack of competition along with increased anti-immigrant sentiment at the state level and among many local whites, facilitates a shared status – the sense of Mexicans being discriminated against as Latinos, and the sense that African-Americans are discriminated against as blacks. In this study, many Mexicans see whites as part of a hostile and discriminatory power structure that seeks to exclude them, similar to the perceptions about whites held by many blacks in the community. Many African-Americans (though not all) actively facilitate these connections through a discourse that highlights their connections to Mexicans in calling for racial tolerance and social justice, while whites who are also attempting to adopt a social justice perspective create a distinct moral discourse that focuses on tolerance. And yet simultaneously, this produces a sense of ‘othering’ from whites. While certainly not universal, these divisions dominate the discourse in such a way that together they produce a narrative framework of closeness between African-Americans and Mexicans, and distance from whites.

**Proximity and Contact**
As noted above, as the Winston-Salem economy shifted and expanded in the 1990s, blacks increasingly moved out of the rental and lower quality housing units. The less expensive, lower-quality housing created an easy pocket of available housing stock for new Latinos to move into black neighborhoods. Although the increased use of services and local institutions created inevitable growing pains, these realistic concerns did not result in sustained conflict between the two groups. I spoke with an Afro-Mexican
migrant, Juan, who has been living and working in Winston-Salem for over 10 years. I asked him if there were tensions between the African-Americans and the Latinos here in Winston-Salem.

I have heard this, that there is a lot of tension, but that’s not been my experience. I live in a black neighborhood, and I’ve never had any problems with my neighbors. People are very nice, and we get along well. I think some of the tensions come from the problem of language, that we don’t speak the same language, and in any place where you have two groups that are different, with different values or cultures you will have some kind of clash, but I haven’t had any problems. My children attend a mostly black school, and they don’t have any problems.

Instead, despite the fact that the relationships between many adult Mexicans and African-Americans is made difficult by a language barrier, the proximity of the two groups within the neighborhood appears to have facilitated positive contact. Miriam, an African-American councilwoman in a predominantly African-American and Latino district in North Carolina, indicated that relations in her district were good, and even improving. To illustrate her point, she noted that while the language barrier was difficult, she knew of several families who bonded through their children who played together. In one example, this bond eventually resulted in an invitation to dinner for the Mexican girl and her parents at the African-American home.

Another respondent, Linda, a young Mestiza Mexican woman who was very shy, very poor, and spoke no English, told me that she had an African-American neighbor who stopped by regularly to check on her, sometimes bringing something for her children. Other Mexican respondents indicated that while they didn’t speak the same language as African-Americans, they often greeted each other in the mornings, having pleasant conversations in which neither understood much of what the other was saying, but made a point of connecting in that way. Indeed, some of my respondents report a familial connection to African-Americans, professing more similar social and cultural styles than with their Mestizo Mexican counterparts from the Northern part of Mexico. Jorge, an Afro-Mexican resident of Winston-Salem told me that all of his friends were African-American because “that felt like home.”

In general, Mexicans respondents pointed to the relative openness of African-Americans to socialize with Mexicans compared to whites. As detailed in Chapter five, many of my Mexican respondents explicitly reported that blacks were friendlier people, and they were more likely to greet and talk to one another than to whites. Several of my respondents indicated that they did not know any white people at all, and therefore either had no opinion of them or did not trust them. Even in cases where Mexicans and whites came into regular contact, it did not often result in close relations. In a local church that has a growing Latino population, a white volunteer with the Latino community outreach programs confided that she’s been working with the outreach programs for 10 years, but didn’t know any of the Latino participants’ names until recently. She felt too uncomfortable to build a relationship. Despite their shared experiences in the church, she didn’t seem to think they had anything else in common.
As illustrated in previous chapters, proximity to blacks and absence of competition over key resources such as housing facilitated positive contact and social relations in ways that were unlikely to occur between Mexicans and whites. Moreover, even under circumstances where regular contact was facilitated, but not due to shared institutions and neighborhoods, relationships between Mexicans and whites did not develop. Mexican and African-American, neighbors, however seemed to have become more invested in building friendly relationships within their shared communities. This positive contact, combined with an absence of resource competition and no sense of threat, played a key role in facilitating closeness between African-Americans and Mexicans in Winston-Salem.

The literature on social contact and whether increased contact results in a decrease in negative attitudes toward each other is mixed (Hood and Morris 1998; Ellison and Powers; Quillian 1996; Welch et al. 2001). Most of this work focused on black/white interactions, neglecting how contact changes interminority relationships. The findings outlined here fit Oliver and Wong (2003), study on interminority contact, which theorizes that such social contact reduces, rather than exacerbates tensions, and can reduce intergroup prejudice in multiethnic settings. They also find that while there can be tensions on the municipal level, contact at the neighborhood level is key in reducing those tensions. Moreover, they find that economic and racial contexts are important factors to consider when examining interethnic perceptions (2003: 508).

As detailed in Chapter Five, this sense of closeness extends to the political realm, in which Mexicans point to their own experiences of discrimination, stereotyping and harassment, the use of laws and political institutions to instill fear and take away rights, the need for political change and a new ‘civil rights movement’ and their relative physical proximity to blacks in making this analysis. Mexican immigrants also point to African-American figures from Martin Luther King to President Obama as their role models, further linking them to African-Americans49. At a town-hall meeting on the implementation of 287(g) in nearby Greensboro, a mid-30s Latino man read from his notes to address the county Sheriff, who had recently announced his plan to join the program.

I am happy to be here, and am enjoying the opportunity to see you in the hot seat. You noted that there were 68 Hispanics in the jail and 43 illegals. What was their crime? My second question is that if I tell you I’m illegal, would you take me to jail? [A young Latina sitting next to me in the audience whispers that she wanted to say that, but she wouldn’t]. You say you have to enforce the law, but when I read history, in the 1960s and 1970s, and about Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement, he was talking about laws, but he stood up to those laws, because those laws were wrong.

The mixed audience of blacks, whites and Latinos, cheered and applauded his comments and his courage. These declarations of a parallel plight were not only commonly made by

49 It should be noted that respondents were not asked any questions about Civil Rights or black history, nor were they prompted with any information about black history. They were asked what they thought of the local, state and federal governments, as well as the president, but no “racial” prompts were given.
Mexicans but are also embraced and applauded by black community leaders who encourage both local blacks and Latinos to think of their plight in relation to the experiences of blacks.

**Shared Exclusion**

For Mexicans in North Carolina, it has not been the fact of being undocumented that has shaped their experiences since arrival. Rather, it is that the meaning and consequences of being undocumented in the same context shifted. For Latinos, the sense that this change is deliberate, political, and the topic of substantial debate, creates a sense of being suddenly and unfairly targeted for discrimination. Recent studies suggest that Latino immigrants nationally perceive their situation to be deteriorating, and that one in ten Latinos (both immigrant and native-born) have been stopped in the past year and asked about their immigration status and that two-thirds of Latinos worry a lot that they or someone close to them will be deported (Lopez and Minushkin 2008). In part, this perception of being discriminated against in what appears to be an arbitrary way, gives Mexicans the sense that they are being treated unfairly without cause - a process they perceive as racializing. Moreover, this perspective is bolstered by local institutions in which responses from key figures are stratified by race.

Programs like 287 (g) that are manipulated to harass, detain and deport Mexicans are being supported at the state and local level by local white legislators, such as Virginia Foxx, Forsyth County’s Republican representative in Congress, whom as Miriam noted, was instrumental in making sure the welcome mat was laid out for Mexican labor in the 1990s. By 2005, however, when she made the move from state senate to U.S. Congress, she quickly became one of the most virulent and visible anti-immigrant agitators in the state, if not the entire U.S. Congress. She has taken on the strictest anti-immigration stance possible, sponsoring bills with such policy stances as: making the United States ‘English Only’; ending citizenship birthrights; building a fence along the border; initiating a 100% ‘sealed border stance’; requiring the Census to count illegal immigrants for redistricting purposes; and preventing any U.S. funds from being used to tip off Mexican government officials to the location of Minutemen and other citizen militias along the border (Foxx 2011). Foxx’s campaigning and public statements are universally anti-immigrant. Of course, she is by no means the only public figure who has made their stance against immigrants known.

Sheriff Steve Bizzell of Johnston County, North Carolina, a 287(g) applicant, has publicly made it clear ‘his goal is to reduce if not eliminate the immigrant population of Johnston County.’ He has described ‘Mexicans’ as ‘trashy’ people who ‘breed like rabbits’ and ‘rape, rob and murder American citizens.’ In Alamance County, North Carolina, a 287(g) participant, Sheriff Terry Johnson has expressed similar views, assuming that all undocumented immigrants are Mexican and stating that ‘[Mexicans’] values are a lot different – their morals – than what we have here. In Mexico, there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old girl… They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico’ (Lin, Ramirez, and Shuford 2009: 6-7).

---

50 It should be noted that her controversial voting record is not limited to the issues of immigration. She also voted against the U.S. relief package to the victims of Hurricane Katrina and the Matthew Shepard Act.
It is these public officials who not only set the tone for public discourse, but also
determine the course of policy throughout the state. Studies indicate that there is little
effort on behalf of the federal government to prevent officials with histories of
discriminatory behaviors and statements from participating in immigration enforcement
programs. This targeting of Latinos is strongly felt by Mexicans in the area. They find
themselves being blamed for the decline in the labor market and being targeted by
policy makers, employers, and members of their own communities. Beatriz, a young
undocumented Mestiza woman from Guerrero whom I met through contacts at the
Catholic Church, discussed her sense of confusion with me, in which we she recounted to
me an incident where she overheard a family in Wal-Mart saying that Mexicans were
taking their jobs.

Interviewer: Do you feel like a lot of families, American families here,
think that about Mexicans?

Beatriz: Well we always hear the same thing in the news. Uh, but I don’t
know. I mean, how are we gonna be taking their jobs? I mean, most of the
Hispanic men work in construction, factories, or um, I mean, they don’t
have really good jobs. Not like Americans. I mean, we don’t have the
chance to go and get a career and be lawyers or doctors or anything. I
mean, we, we work in restaurants and places like that. So, well, but I don’t
know… In a way since the immigration thing started with uh, George
Bush, that he didn’t want to give any legal papers to Hispanics or I don’t
know, but well, since this started, we see a lot of difference. Like
Americans treating Hispanics really bad. Firing. Uh, they were hiring
more American people and they will fire all the Hispanics.

In many ways, the gradual dismantling of rights and services available to immigrants,
particularly Latinos, over the last several years has created a general sense of distrust and
betrayal among Mexicans when referring to whites.51 Whites are contrasted negatively as
both feared and mistrusted in part because many Latinos have little to no contact with
them, and in part because they see whites as the power structure that deprives
undocumented migrants of the various rights and privileges they need to work and live in
North Carolina. One Mestiza Mexican woman told me that Anglos learn Spanish so that
they can use it against Latinos. She continued, “You have to be careful. They say they are
friends, but they are really racist.” Few Mexican immigrants maintain that the U.S. is an
egalitarian state in which everyone succeeds with hard work. Instead, they see that
African-Americans are treated as second-class citizens, and that Mexicans have no rights
at all.

Indeed, instead of viewing themselves in competition with blacks, many Mexican
migrants to Winston-Salem are seeing themselves as similar to blacks as a way to make

51 The dismantling of rights and privileges has included a mix of national, state and local laws that produce
particularly dire consequences for undocumented migrants. This includes the requirement of social security
numbers to receive state issued identification, drivers’ licenses and plates; the implementation of 287(g)
programs; the requirement that all state employees be screened for documentation; reduced social services
eligibility and the barring of undocumented persons from community colleges.
sense of their experiences of discrimination and exclusion. Put another way, Afro-
Mexicans and Mestizo Mexicans interpret their experiences to mean that they share a
sense of racialized discrimination with African-Americans. When I asked Ramon, a
Mexican immigrant from Mexico City, what relations were like between blacks and
Latinos, he noted “With black people, we get along because they have gone through what
we go through. They know the problems that we’ve had for years, from slavery and all
that. The Americans [whites] have treated blacks badly to this day. They have the same
problem we have: racism. And because of this, we get along better.”

In other words, this growing sense of reverse incorporation as the result of both
negative attitudes and policies not only produced a sense of minority status in Latinos,
but also triggered a perspective of shared minority status with African-Americans. Prior
to 2004, few exclusionary policies were on the books, and discriminatory practices were
relatively uncommon. As early as 2004, efforts to link the African-American and Latino
populations began, but they also tended to be somewhat weak. As the anti-immigrant
rhetoric increased, so did the sense among African-American leaders that Latinos were
entering a realm of discrimination that was contrary to their views on Civil Rights, and
frankly, not so different from their experiences in the recent past.

In the Spring of 2003 and Fall of 2004, many African-American clergy and
political and union leaders in the area participated in the Immigrant Worker Freedom
Rides, accompanying immigrant workers to Washington, D.C., to lobby for immigration
reform and labor rights. Shortly thereafter, in the spring 2005, Congress passed the REAL
ID Act, which made social security numbers a requirement for receiving state
identification. While no mandates have been issued regarding this law to date, North
Carolina quickly adopted the measure as state law, effectively revoking driving and other
privileges of state residence to its hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants.

Locally, June 2005 marked the first of the Winston-Salem Soul and Salsa series,
initiated by the Human Rights Commission (and led by an African-American woman) to
improve relations between Latinos and African-Americans. As the level of enforcement
increased, so did the level of involvement of African-American leadership in
immigration, as well as shared minority issues. These efforts grew in tandem. As anti-
immigrant attitudes and enforcement increased, so did the level of outreach from local
African-Americans. The experience of being targeted by the state for harassment,
policing and removal was something that local African-Americans understood, and felt a
moral obligation to respond. As several of my respondents expressed, their declining
status meant that Latinos were becoming more like African-Americans in the sense that
they too were the target of racism.

**Black Leadership**

The 2008 election in Forsyth County was marked by a stark contrast of vitriolic, often
hateful discourse against Latino immigrants on the one hand, and hopeful rhetoric
regarding the rise of a populist African-American leader on the other. When I asked
Ramon about his thoughts on the President, he offered:

> I think things will be different. I believe it. To start, he’s black. He knows
black people’s problems, and Hispanic people’s problems. He has his own
past, his history and his experience with these problems. He knows what
worries us and I believe that he is going to help because before, all of the
[past presidents] were Americans [whites], and they had no interest in
Hispanics or blacks. They- well that’s why they were worried when they
said the president would be black. How will there be a black president
when there’s always been whites? But now everything is going to change.
Imagine it… Now the world is changing. Soon, there will be a Hispanic
president…It’s changing right now. It’s not the same as it always was
because before there was always a white president who made laws for his
own people. And now, with this black president, I believe things will
change a lot. I believe in the next election he will be re-elected. I believe
and hope so.

Ramon’s feeling that black leaders could address Latino issues in a way that whites had
not or could not, was not unusual. Moreover, there were various examples at both the
national and local level that seemed to substantiate Mexican claims regarding the
importance of black leadership. The National Black Police Association signed a letter to
President Obama demanding an end to the 287(g) program in 2009. The 2010 executive
director wrote an op-ed voicing his organization’s opposition to 287(g), Secure
Communities, and Arizona’s SB1070 law in the Washington Post. Similar letters by local
chapters of the organization have been submitted across the country (Hampton 2010;
WESPAC 2008).

Conversely, the National Sheriff’s Association, which locally, is exclusively older
white men, passed a 2010 resolution in support of ICE enforcement program (Sheriff’s
Association 2010). Despite the important roles played by white liberals in advocating for
immigrants, they are frequently overshadowed by the political right, facilitating the
perception that discriminatory practices are divided along racial lines. African-American
leaders emerged as an important counterweight to the anti-immigrant discourse. Policies
such as 287(g) and Secure Communities are promoted locally by white sheriffs, political
figures and a conservative media. The voices that condemn these policies, however,
come from the Democratic members on the Winston-Salem city council, a coalition of
liberal and moderate blacks and whites.

Many Mexican immigrants perceive that whites participate in discrimination
against Latinos, while blacks do not. When I asked Diego, an undocumented Mestizo
immigrant from Guerrero, what his experiences were whites were like, he indicated that
he had “more bad experiences” with whites.” He continued, “in some places that I go, in
a restaurant, or in a store, I’ve had more bad experiences with the whites. With people of
color, no.” I asked him if he would explain further with an example.

Diego: An example is if I ask them for something and, or I ask them
something, they don’t answer me. They look at me and turn around. Well,
there are some white people who if I park my car next to them, they turn
on the security alarm on in their car. They think I’m going to rob them
[laughter]. This is what I’ve noticed many times, many times. And, well,
it’s easy to understand what they are doing, what they want me to
understand, with these things that they do. Or they clutch their bags.
Interviewer: Oh?

Diego: It’s the same thing you see with someone of color. They do the same thing.

Interviewer: The whites do it to the people of color?

Diego: Yes, of course, of course. And with people of color, I’ve never noted it. Never have I seen someone close their bag or clutch their purse because they see me walking next to them. So.

Locally, the African-American police chiefs in Winston-Salem and neighboring Greensboro refused to endorse any local-federal enforcement partnerships. Black council members were vocally against any enhanced policing that targeted Latinos in their districts. Leaders explained this concern in two ways. In part, they felt it was unfair, discriminatory and created obstacles in their ability to build good relations with their constituents.

But they also noted that black families were being affected by this increased policing. Because checkpoints, raids and other forms of targeted policing against Latinos took place in neighborhoods that were also heavily African-American, blacks such as Dr. Johnson felt that they too were being caught up in a dragnet of racial profiling, discriminatory policing and a general lack of interest in improving conditions for the minorities of Winston-Salem. Dr. Johnson expressed a serious passion for improving Raymond High School, a failing high school in town that is 90% black and Latino, and with a less than 50% graduation rate. The city’s popular Soul and Salsa forums highlight topics from preventing a statewide lottery (because blacks and Latinos are more likely to spend limited funds on it) to gangs, to economic development and fair housing, and the use of tazers by the police force. At a 2006 forum, a Latina woman in the audience asked the police captain:

Hispanics are more and more receiving the kind of treatment that African-Americans are getting on the street from police, and I speak from personal experience, but it was frightening and I was terrified. What is frightening is that both communities are identifiable by color, most of the time, and that makes them targetable. And the difference between the two is that Hispanics are perceived to be from a different country.

Later, an African-American lawyer in the audience comments:

Are there things to do in the community to resolve this, and this is the idea of forums like, this which is obviously a step, but what can we do to bring the communities together in a way so that some of these issues can be addressed, I mean we can’t deal with the national issues, we’ve gotta start

52 The Winston-Salem police chief from 2004-2008 was an African-American woman, replaced in 2008 by a white man. The new chief however has so far maintained that he would keep the policy of the previous chief to decline to participate in immigration enforcement.
here at home. Because the difficulty I’ve seen with the Hispanic community and us coming together and then bringing it together with the African-American community because we have some of the same issues in common. What is it can we do? What is there that we can do so we can get together and take that step in that direction, we’re here talking about it, but anybody with ideas that can help...to get the communities together and see what we can do to improve the situation for both communities, not just the Hispanic community.

These public expressions of concern regarding issues that face both the Latino and African-American communities were not isolated incidents, but rather were part of an ongoing effort to build coalitions around their shared issues and status.

As noted in Chapter one, in the Fall of 2008, a two-day conference was held in neighboring Greensboro that included civil rights activists, church leaders and union organizers from Greensboro, Winston-Salem and other surrounding communities with the purpose of forging black/brown relationships. Gathering in a local Baptist church and community center, various pastors and community representatives, African-American and Latino, spoke to the similar structural conditions faced by black and brown communities – problems with gangs, poor schools, employment, institutional discrimination, violence and exploitation. Reverend Rivera, however, spoke to the relationships between African-Americans and Latinos that emerges from shared communities. Speaking in Spanish to the mixed audience, he noted:

Sometimes blacks don’t understand the difficulties on the Latino community...My wife lost her license and cannot get it renewed, and she can’t leave to go anywhere. When the black community in my church realized this, they went to the house and said that they didn’t know that I was illegal. I live in an Afro-American community, and they got together 100 signatures asking the department of immigration not to deport me. They spoke with lawyers and the police chief not to work with ICE. Latinos can’t do this, they can’t ask for that, but blacks can. The office of human relations includes a black pastor who is open to seeing the experience of Hispanos. We have the potential and capacity to work together to create a difference in our communities. I’m happy with the support of the black community, and the church is a good place for this, to understand the story of what’s happened...In the Afro community, leaders have emerged to talk and work with us. They don’t speak Spanish, but they are there with us, working to bring our communities together.

This sense of empathy and support from African-American neighbors and fellow church members is anchored by a discourse of shared discrimination. Many black leaders argue from the pulpit and elsewhere, that as civil rights leaders, they must speak out against the situation facing Latinos in their communities, in part because their experiences are not so different from the racism they faced less than a generation ago. Moreover, the impact of increased surveillance has real consequences for African-Americans living in the same neighborhoods as Latinos. Checkpoints that are set up on
major streets create dragnets in which police are free (and often do) profile both Latinos and African-Americans. So in various ways, as highlighted by the popularity of the Soul and Salsa forums, blacks see that their fates are, in real ways, tied to the experiences of Latinos in their community.

To articulate this stance of shared experiences, conference workshops linked the black codes and reconstruction to the Bracero Program, Jim Crow to anti-immigration measures, and the current state of black and Latino communities generally. Local organizations have specifically come forward to advocate on behalf of Latinos within the context of advocating against discrimination and for minority rights. In a speech on worker’s rights at the same conference, Mr. Phillips, a heavy set African-American man and union leader, spoke of his participation in the ‘Freedom Rides’ in which activists, church members, and community members chartered buses to Washington DC to advocate for immigration reform in 2004. Speaking in a preacher’s cadence and wearing a charcoal gray suit, he noted to the audience that the members of his union didn’t understand why he would be riding the bus with Hispanics from a nearby town. He lectured:

Employers divide workers along race, gender and immigration status. That is the history. It bugs me when I see black folks talking about them folks. Them folks. Them folks, having benefits, riding up to the office in a Cadillac – you were in his position three years ago, don’t forget! We’re not going to let employers do that to us this time. Divide and conquer. Immigrants can’t participate. ‘Ought to just pack ‘em up and send ‘em back. Well, that’s a whole lot of packing to do, and it makes no sense…In Morristown it’s the same thing, black workers saying “the immigrants are taking our jobs, having babies.” What are you smoking and drinking? It must be good! I don’t know though, anyone who knows me know I don’t drink or smoke (he chuckles to himself). We must be a voice for immigration reform – as human beings, we need to do this. We are connected!

Mr. Phillip’s statement, in which he goes on to quote Dr. Martin Luther King, specifically admonishes blacks who don’t see the connection between the struggles of African-Americans and Latino immigrants in the community. He draws on the stereotypes of black welfare recipients of the 1980s, along with pointed connections between the Civil Rights Movement and immigration reform, woven through a discourse of a common humanity. Those words resonated, as evidenced by shouts of ‘Amen!’ from the crowd and spontaneous applause. Moreover, he encouraged Latinos in the audience to stand up and tell their story. Many did, some shyly, struggling to find the English words, others holding back their emotions, all testifying to how they were being abused and manipulated on the job.

These efforts to draw parallels between the African-American and Latino experiences were explicit attempts by African-American leadership to stir a sense of shared status and mutual support. As important leaders and powerful rhetoricians in the

community, their message seemed to resonate strongly with Latinos, who, as highlighted in Chapter five feel isolated and are looking for ways to make sense of their rapidly declining circumstances. For everyday African-Americans, however, the incentives for investing in the well-being of Latinos were not nearly as high.

**Everyday Blacks**

As detailed in Chapter Three, an important piece of the local context is that competition between African-Americans and Latinos in the labor market was low, in large part because they did not occupy the same sectors of the labor market. Because there has been little to no competition between these groups, there was less motivation for hostility, and more room for positive relations between them. In addition to the long history of higher wages and sustained employment opportunities for African-Americans, the white ruling class invested in segregation by establishing independent institutions for blacks, including hospitals and schools.

The historically black college, Winston-Salem State, was established at the turn of the century with broad community support, providing ample opportunities for local African-Americans to receive advanced education. African-American professionals were employed in black hospitals and schools, establishing a black middle class early on in Winston-Salem history. While there are certainly poor African-Americans in the community today, as Winston-Salem underwent economic expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, blacks benefitted from expanded opportunities in health care, financial services and other white collar jobs. By contrast, Latinos, particularly Mexicans, are largely undocumented, with low levels of education and English ability. As a result, they are heavily concentrated in the service, labor and construction sectors of the economy (See Appendix IV). As a result, everyday blacks are less threatened by newcomers than in other contexts. They are also relatively highly educated, and therefore more committed to middle class ideals.

Nevertheless, despite the strong, pro-immigrant stance taken by African-American leaders, it’s not a given that everyday blacks would agree. After all, while there is little competition for jobs and housing, population growth has placed a strain on local school systems and other municipal services. Indeed, some of the African-Americans I encountered during my ethnographic observations grumbled about the increased resources being provided to Latino children that were never offered to their own, or that the prevalence of non-English speaking populations meant that they were forced to accommodate them by posting Spanish language signs. A black bookstore owner put it this way:

> I am not happy at how Latinos are taking over. The test scores, for example, of black children in the 3rd grade at my school have remained flat, while Latino children are improving, because they are getting more resources. I know this because I was a teacher, and was at this school. Also, other immigrants didn’t get this attention before, they just had to adjust and integrate like everyone else. They didn’t get any special language programs. And you know the Doctor’s office nearby was closed, and a clinic for Latinos was opened in its place. I just don’t think it’s fair. I have nothing against Latinos personally, but it just isn’t fair.
Others even reported suspicions that Latinos were beginning to think that they were better than their black neighbors. Still, much of this commentary was tempered with qualifications about how they were felt this had more to do with those in charge of distributing resources, and perhaps their latent racism, than a patent dislike for Latinos themselves. Still others were very clear that they had no issue with Latinos and understood that it is a difficult choice to move to another country in order to provide for one’s family.

Moreover, as noted above, African-American neighborhoods are being affected by the increased police presence in their neighborhoods and institutions. Police did not focus on Latinos to the exclusion of profiling African-Americans. To the contrary, they simply expanded the net, harassing both groups. Because African-Americans shared institutions but did not compete extensively for resources, they did not develop a significant sense of threat in relation to Latinos. Instead, they began to emphasize their shared interests and status, highlighting the racism and discrimination experienced by their communities collectively. As most everyday blacks represented a significant, upwardly mobile sector of the population, the growing presence of Latinos offered a demographic advantage (shifting Winston-Salem to a majority-minority community) without any real competition.

**Solidarity and Collaboration**

As a result, African-Americans began to express a strong sense of solidarity with Latinos, seeking out opportunities for collaboration and support for both shared concerns and specific immigrant issues, while simultaneously working to establish a broad base of African-American support under the banner of Civil Rights. From the migrant perspective, while some sympathetic whites may be willing to open their doors and provide social services, African-Americans are willing to ride the bus with them to Washington in support of legislating immigration reform and making statements against enforcement policies in their communities. As Eliana, the student I mentioned earlier explained: “In church, they work together. African-Americans help when like Latinos want to, I don’t know how, like I know a lot of African-Americans, who want the Latinos who are here illegally to become legal, and they like try to do something to help them.” When I asked her if they received the same support from whites, she demurred, noting that some do, but it’s not the same as with blacks. The separation of whites and blacks in this community reinforces these distinct perspectives, producing a set of alliances that trouble the paradigm of black/brown conflict.

**DISTANCE FROM WHITES: FROM THE STRANGER TO THE ENEMY**

Despite significant and important efforts made by progressive whites in the community, Mexicans’ experiences with whites are qualitatively different from experiences with blacks. Whites are the face of enforcement and attempts at negative incorporation by the state, even as some whites attempt to take a progressive stance through social services and as advocates for immigrant rights. Below I outline how relations between Mexicans and whites are constructed in Winston-Salem, and the role of Mexican-white intergroup dynamics in shoring up positive relations with African-Americans.
**Progressives: The Stranger**

In North Carolina, as in many places, religious institutions are highly segregated. Though many churches, both white and black, are publicly advocating for immigrants, the discourse within white churches is distinctly different. Rather than building on a framework of Civil Rights as an articulation of connectedness, white churches articulated a discourse of ‘The Stranger,’ asking members and church leadership to ‘welcome the stranger in their midst’.

As noted at the outset of this dissertation, at a meeting for various faith leaders on the issue of immigration, the pastor, a middle-aged white woman, Rev. Miller invited the community of faith leaders (mostly white) to respond to the issue of immigration by highlighting passages from the Bible. Following her speech Rev. Greene, another pastor in a nearby Methodist church gave a presentation, in which she lamented that “we often lack compassion for immigrants who are often isolated and alone”. She went on to suggest that the faith leaders present begin to volunteer, because this was a way to “start to build a bridge between whites and Latinos”. She went onto lament the attitudes in her own family that focus on illegality and assimilation, imploring the audience to talk to their own families about their fear-mongering, and to use their position of trust to build tolerance by “connecting and opening up hearts”.

In invoking a biblical history of migration while simultaneously reminding the faith leadership present that they are to ‘welcome the stranger’, the pastor summarized the discourse in the white churches around immigration. There are links in terms of the immigration experience, but they are deep in the past. In the present, their role is to welcome the stranger. The call here is to a general Christian, moral sense of tolerance, and to reach out to what is in some cases an intolerant community, and implore them to do what is right. While admirable and important, this contrasts significantly with Mr. Phillips, who briefly points to the Bible, but then brings his social message to the present, highlighting the 1960s and 1980s, and admonishing those who don’t realize that they are brothers in arms. For many African-Americans, the call is not about tolerance, or a general moral duty, but a personal sense of justice and identification with the experiences of the Latinos in their community.

Moreover, these discourses move beyond the confines of leadership meetings and conferences via the Spanish language newspaper, which is often present at these local events, and is read throughout the community. Additionally, churches in Winston-Salem are the civic institution. The language and discourses adopted by the faith leadership, therefore, have the potential to structure the language and discourse of the entire community. These pro-immigrant stances do not alone create the connections between migrants and the larger community. But in tandem with the conditions of low competition and shared status, they go a long way in shoring up the connections between Latino immigrants and African-Americans.

**Majority middle**

As noted above, many of my respondents reported that blacks were friendlier people, more likely to greet them or talk to them than whites, and that they were more likely to know and talk to their African-American neighbors than whites.

---

54 The free paper is widely available, and printed in three city editions.
As reported in Chapter five, many Mexicans did not seem to know any whites at all. When I prepared a talk at Wake Forest, I was advised that the students there would largely be unaware that immigration even exists in the city. White adults who were not actively involved in volunteer work with Latinos had only encountered them in the new Compare foods that replaced a Lowe’s in the Southside neighborhood. Their children were not likely to encounter them in significant numbers in school, and unless they were Catholic and overlapped with the Spanish masses, were unlikely to see them at church. Others who did live in neighborhoods with increasing Latino populations were not particularly malicious, but irritated with the habits of their neighbors. David, a Councilmember in a mostly white, but increasingly diverse ward, explained the situation:

David: Mostly though, I would say that the main changes have been culture clash situations. In a lot of the homes where Hispanics are living, there are a lot of extended families, so they have multiple cars, and may work different shifts, so the cars are coming and going at different hours. You’ve heard about this front yard ordinance?

Interviewer: No, I haven't, what’s that?

David: Well, a lot of these families have their cars parked in the front yard, and the Anglo neighbors are not used to it. So there has been a noticeable number of complaints. I spend a lot of time investigating whether the complaints are legitimate or not.

Interviewer: Are they mostly legitimate complaints?

David: [Shakes his head no and smiles] mostly back and forth. Sometimes there is noise or something, but generally it’s just people complaining. The front yard parking ordinance would prohibit parking in the front yard of homes unless on a paved driveway or driving pad, or something like that. Most of the complaints are coming from areas where there are a lot of students and working households that are primarily Latino families.

Interviewer: Are any of the neighbors speaking out against the ordinance?

David: There are some, there are people who grew up, you know, like I did, in areas that were more working class, but Anglo, that grew up with people parking in the front yard, and it was no big deal. So they don’t see this as an issue ... And the people who make the complaints, 99% of them begin with the phrase, ‘I have nothing against them, but…’ so people don’t seem to want to create problems. They complain about their housing values, but nobody can sell their house these days, so I think it’s just a culture thing.

Certainly, many whites expressed kindness or polite indifference to the Latino residents of Winston-Salem. But with few exceptions, their efforts were not enough to trump the
view that they were part of the oppressive class. For most Latinos, even when they had no negative interpersonal experiences with whites, and in some cases, even very positive experiences, the overwhelming sense of structural discrimination and anti-immigrant discourse was more important than any of these encounters.

**Enforcement**

Among most of the Mexicans in my study, whites are contrasted negatively as both feared and mistrusted in part because many Latinos have little to no contact with them, and in part because they see whites as the power structure that deprives undocumented migrants of the various rights and privileges they need to work and live in North Carolina. One Mestiza Mexican woman told me that Anglos learn Spanish so that they can use it against Latinos. She continued, “You have to be careful. They say they are friends, but they are really racist.” At a meeting for church organizers, a Latino community organizer advised us that “The Greensboro Sheriff, however, has publicly stated that he will deport anyone who calls the police, and that isn’t right. So immigrants are only safe in the cities where the police chief is not working with ICE.” Marco, another Latino community organizer, described the situation in North Carolina this way:

> North Carolina is trying to put police at churches and other places to arrest innocent Latinos. Really, this is the local government trying to respond to a broken system of the federal government... There are now two minutemen groups in North Carolina, and no evidence that things will improve. Nobody is stopping them with their ‘John Wayne style’, their ‘estilo vaquero’.

For Mexicans in Winston-Salem, enforcement is synonymous with whiteness. The experience of discrimination, combined with a sense that African-Americans empathize with that experience and support them, are key in producing connections between the two groups. In a context in which competition for resources is not an issue, and Latinos are settling into stable, resource-rich minority communities, it is the most salient framework in which race relations are produced. The set of conditions I outlined above produces a sense of closeness with African-Americans, which is reinforced by positive and inclusive leadership on behalf of black leaders. Closeness with whites, on the other hand, is undermined by whites’ visible position in determining anti-immigrant policy, and social and spatial distance at the community level.

**BLACK/BROWN SOLIDARITY**

The experience of institutional discrimination, combined with a sense that African-Americans empathize with that experience and support them, are key in producing connections between the two groups. In a context in which competition for resources is not an issue, and Latinos are incorporated into stable, resource rich minority communities, it is the most salient framework in which race relations are produced. This set of conditions produces a sense of discrimination and social closeness with African-Americans, which is reinforced by spatial closeness and positive community relations.

In Kaufmann’s analysis of the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (2003) which examines both pan-ethnic and interracial closeness, Kaufmann finds that Latinos neither
have a strong sense of pan-ethnic or racial identity, and only 33 % report identifying strongly with either blacks or whites (204). Seventy-five percent of blacks report a sense of commonality with Latinos, and 61 % report a commonality with whites. Moreover, she finds that Latinos who identify as black or perceive high levels of discrimination against Latinos do not perceive themselves to be closer to blacks. What does affect closeness or affinity is a sense of Pan-Latinoness, which she argues is a form of collective minority status.

Recent studies examining the 2006 Latino National Political Survey (2007) have found results that lean far more toward a sense of commonality and linked fate with blacks. In particular, the 2006 survey includes data on North Carolina, where 58 % of Latinos said that African-Americans doing well matters some or a lot for Latinos doing well, and Latinos from all states reported having more, rather than less, in common with African-Americans (Jones-Correa and Hernandez 2007). While this is national survey data, and thus glosses over many important distinctions in the Latino population, it points to a far more complex, and perhaps shifting, picture of race relations than popular media would have us believe. In particular, my respondents’ perspectives fit Kaufmann’s discarded discrimination hypothesis quite well, which states: “Latino/black affinity is rooted in perceived discrimination and shared outsider status” and therefore “Latinos who perceive high levels of anti-Latino discrimination, would also be the most likely to sense commonality with blacks” (2003: 202). This finding is in stark contradiction to Bobo and Hutchins’ (1996) assertion that racial alienation leads to perceptions of competitive threat, suggesting that conditions matter in determining whether commonality or threat emerges.
Chapter Seven
Looking Toward the Future

The intergroup relations literature argues that racial and ethnic relations, particularly between minority groups, are rife with conflict and competition. Moreover, the immigration literature suggests that relations with African-Americans are particularly poor in part because upward mobility is achieved by avoiding associations with blacks. However, in the case of contemporary Mexican migrants in Winston-Salem, I find the opposite processes emerging. Rather than a sense of closeness with whites, this dissertation analyzes a case in which Mexicans express a sense of closeness with blacks, and are increasingly viewing themselves as minorities and as similar to blacks.

In the wake of massive shifts in Mexican immigrant settlement, particularly in the American Southeast, this dissertation sought to explain if and how Mexicans in these new immigration destinations would be racialized, and relatedly, how their presence affected race relations. Because the central questions in this dissertation depend on variations between local receiving contexts, it makes an important contribution to the literature on immigrant incorporation and interminority relations by explaining how local context shapes key experiences that in turn direct both racialization processes and shifts in race relations. In sum, this dissertation advances the literature by providing an exception that proves the rule, allowing us to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how race relations and racial identity are shaped at the local level.

The experiences of Mexican migrants in the Winston-Salem area of North Carolina reveal that context matters greatly in shaping race and race relations. While much of the emerging literature on the New South are case studies of local immigrant incorporation, very little work has been published on shifting contexts due to the rise of municipal level enforcement post-2005. In Winston-Salem, a combination of an increasingly stifling regime of immigration policies and Latino settlement into middle class minority communities has deeply altered the ways in which immigrants are incorporated. Moreover, this context plays an important role in shaping Latino identities and race relations, producing a sense of collective minority status in ways that may have been unlikely in previous decades because of the major shift in immigration enforcement; and in traditional destinations where minority communities are more diverse and working class. In particular, this study provides new evidence of the impact of local immigration enforcement in creating growing sense of discrimination and racialization among immigrants. It also highlights what local enforcement regimes look like on the ground, suggesting that the role of expanding enforcement through local agents and municipal governments may play an important role in the shaping of race relations. This will likely be more pronounced as the federal government rolls out more enforcement programs such Secure Communities, with few options to opt out or craft alternatives.

This case study also shows that race and class are both at work in constructing race relations. By investigating settlement in a middle class town, it shows that minority status is not synonymous with the underclass, and integration into middle class minority neighborhoods reduces the level of competition between non-white groups. Instead, non-white groups may instead unite under the umbrella of racialized status, as minorities, and potentially advocates for one another with regard to shared interests. Indeed, the rapid
spread of immigrants to new destinations suggests that incorporation into diverse middle class neighborhoods with significant upwardly mobile minority populations is increasingly more likely to occur, and the findings described in this dissertation may be very suggestive of future incorporation trends in new destinations, particularly the New South.

In this way, the complexities of local context play an important role in structuring race and race relations. In the case of Helen Marrow’s Latinos in rural Eastern North Carolina (2008), for example, using a context of reception perspective, it is not surprising that she finds hostilities between African-Americans and Latinos. In her case, anti-immigration policies had not yet taken effect, demographic changes were less dramatic and less heavily Mexican, and job competition for all Latinos and African-Americans in those communities was very high. Moreover, Hispanic experiences were analyzed in aggregate without unpacking potential differences between them in terms of race, region and culture. Finally, because they were overwhelmingly poor and working-class, and possessed little political power, African-Americans themselves lacked the standing in the community to play a role in ameliorating the tensions that did exist. In this study, the factors that I have outlined above that can lead to minority consciousness are not present.

By focusing on key factors including political incorporation, labor market and resource competition, demographic change, and existing race relations, this dissertation questions assumptions frequently made in studies of immigrant incorporation, namely that blacks and browns are always in conflict, and that newcomers who seek upward mobility avoid minority status, preferring association with whites. In highlighting local conditions and examining a case in which black/white racial meanings that hinge on segregation and distance, dramatic demographic shifts, a stable economy and low resource competition, heightened anti-immigrant policy, and an empathetic black leadership, Winston-Salem provides an example of the importance of local factors, and how in certain cases, a minority oriented identity among Mexicans can emerge.

In this way, this dissertation complements the existing literature by taking the mechanisms at work in various case studies seriously, and using them to provide a new set of tools for understanding new immigration settlement patterns across the United States. The findings in this study suggests that exceptional findings need not be counterintuitive if we apply a local context analysis to understanding race and incorporation, and can provide important insights into community level change elsewhere.

**Discrimination and Policy**

Recent studies examining the 2006 Latino National Political Survey have found results that indicate that the findings presented in this dissertation may become more widespread, leaning far more toward a sense of commonality and linked fate with blacks. In particular, the 2006 survey includes data on North Carolina, where 58 % of Latinos said that African-Americans doing well matters some or a lot for Latinos doing well, and Latinos from all states reported having more, rather than less, in common with African-Americans than with Whites (Jones-Correa and Hernandez 2007). While this is national survey data, and thus glosses over many important distinctions in the Latino population, it points to a far more complex, and perhaps shifting picture of race relations than popular media and the literature on intergroup relations would have us believe. Indeed, there is growing evidence that we might extend Dawson’s claim that solidarity is produced among blacks through racial
hostility and reinforced through social networks, to the experience of Latinos in the Winston-Salem area (1994). This would be line with Portes (1990) who finds that Latinos and African-Americans have similar responses to discrimination and often collaborate on these grounds.

Indeed, as immigration settlement patterns change throughout the country, Mexicans now find themselves in a variety of small southern and Midwestern towns and suburbs where their presence is challenging, and in many cases, not welcome. And yet, from the 2006 marches in which Spanish translations of We Shall Overcome were sung in Jackson, Mississippi (Vasquez et al. 2008) to Al Sharpton’s many press conferences in Arizona in May of 2010 condemning its new anti-immigrant laws, to the 2010 “Reclaim the Dream” March and Rally in Washington, an increasingly visible alliance between African-American leaders and Latino leaders and community members appears to be emerging. In preparation for the August 2010 march, Melanie Campbell, President of the National Coalition on Black Civic Participation, told reporters that the African-American community was united “on several issues. We want meaningful immigration reform. We want to get more people to work in the black community” (Stewart 2010).

Nor is this effort one-sided, with immigration rights activists reaching out to African-Americans through radio ads, and coalitions, such as the alliance formed between the North Carolina NAACP and El Pueblo Latino rights group in Raleigh (Thompson 2010). Recent efforts throughout the South to pass draconian immigration enforcement laws in Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina indicate that as Mexicans face greater legislative scrutiny and outright discrimination, greater contestation over citizenship and belonging appears to create a sense of a collective minority status among at least some Latinos and blacks.

Moreover, these patterns suggest that it is possible that minority consciousness may remain in the Mexican community into the second-generation, perhaps in part because of a transition to bilingual youth who are more able to establish greater material contact – that is, building social, economic and political relationships with African-Americans – and in part because though they themselves are citizens, they remain part of mixed status families, whose parents, aunts, uncles, cousins and grandparents are at risk. “U.S. citizen children of both undocumented and legal immigrants often live in deep fear of permanent familial separation or deportation (Mather and Foxen 2010: 4).” Because many Mexican families are mixed status and Mexicans are targeted because they are perceived to be undocumented, future generations will likely become increasingly political in concrete ways in response to pervasive discrimination.

As a result, we might predict that the continued socialization of Mexicans as minorities and as ‘denizens’ (Oboler 2000) who will maintain a strong minority group consciousness. This would be a marked difference from the proposals of some immigration theorists (Fuchs 1990; Gordon 1964; Marrow 2008) who view later generation Latinos as trending towards political views that are most similar to whites. As migration continues to expand throughout the suburbs of the South where economic competition is low, anti-immigrant sentiment is high, and black/white tensions remain strong, similar distinct racialization patterns in those locations may emerge.

**Resource Competition**

109
From NAFTA to a potential double-dip recession, national economic policies can have significant unintended consequences for communities, shaping not only access to the labor market and migration, but also structuring relations between groups who may be forced to compete for the same resources. In the case of Winston-Salem, Latinos and African-Americans were not in the same labor market sectors, and Winston-Salem’s status as a stable, middle class community stymied the impact of resource competition. As Latinos increasingly choose to settle in suburbs and exurbs, they are increasingly likely to encounter similar situations in which native born community members are likely to have significant resources and education, distinguishing them from immigrant newcomers who participate in different sectors of the economy. However, as recent Pew Reports indicate, recessions and other forms of economic decline disproportionately impact both blacks and Latinos, suggesting that increasing economic instability will also have significant consequences for intergroup relations. In traditional destinations, it is likely that the impact of these shifts will be detrimental, if not devastating. Still, it is unlikely that new destinations will remain unscathed.

**Receiving Contexts**

While this dissertation focuses on the New South, it also provides insights into race relations and racialization processes in traditional destinations, many of which are also undergoing a significant transformation. The Northeast, particularly the New York City and Boston areas have always seen a large influx of immigrant newcomers, but have also recently experienced a significant uptick in the number of Mexicans settling in the area. Because these are large metropolitan areas that have resisted pushes to engage in local level immigrant enforcement, Mexicans in those areas may still be experiencing the relative security of invisibility and access to resources available to those Mexicans in North Carolina prior to 2005. At the same time, tighter job markets and a larger core of immigrant labor along with a high cost of living may make it highly unlikely for positive relations between both African-Americans and Mexicans and Mexicans and other immigrants, to emerge. Without a strong sense of discrimination and a significant level of resource competition, it is unlikely that Mexicans in New York will develop a strong sense of being racialized, nor will they develop a sense of minority status and positive interminority relations- at least not as rapidly and tenaciously as Mexicans in Winston-Salem. Without a significant change in policy, such a rapid development is unlikely to emerge.

In cities like Phoenix however, where municipal immigration enforcement and anti-Mexican immigrant sentiment has been strong and swift in recent years, Mexicans are highly likely to develop a racialized identity. However, because Mexicans are overwhelmingly the largest ethnic group in the area, and there are no other significant minority populations (the largest other group is African-Americans at 6%), there are few opportunities to develop interminority relationships of any kind, be it competition or alliances. As a result, while hostilities toward Mexicans come overwhelmingly from whites, interminority relations are essentially a non-issue in these contexts.

Other traditional receiving areas such as Chicago are harder to predict. Illinois politicians have been on the forefront of pro-immigrant activism, including serving as sponsors for the DREAM Act. Chicago also has very long history of immigrant settlement, including significant multi-generational populations of Mexicans and Puerto
Ricans. In the past, political alliances have emerged between African-Americans and Latinos to elect representatives such as Mayor Harold Washington, but Chicago’s history of racial tensions is equally robust. Latinos have also been able to leverage significant political power on their own, suggesting that while they may be experiencing a growing sense of racialization, they are less likely to depend on other minority groups to make sense of their experiences and therefore shape their racialized identities. While we know little about how race is emerging in these different communities, what is clear is that variation is certainly an important piece of the puzzle. Studies of these communities that examine the factors outlined in this study can provide important insights into how race, ethnicity and race relations emerge and change in different contexts.

**Interminority Relations and Racialization**

To extend this case beyond relations between African-Americans and Latinos, it is important to highlight the salience of status and local context. While shared culture and national origin are important, the ways in which newcomers experience their position within a hierarchy of social relations are essential to the ways in which they develop identities, both individually and as a group. Historically, distancing oneself from African-Americans has been a successful strategy by which newcomers established access to resources, effectively making race relations in America. By the same token, experiences of blocked mobility, negative incorporation and seemingly arbitrary forms of discrimination must also be made sense of. These processes of building identities out of experiences that are felt at the group level are what makes and remakes race in America over time.

By this logic, while race may persist as an essential category that structures social relations, there is no reason to assume that the experiences and practices of groups will remain static over time. The findings in this study as well as national level data indicate that Latinos, particularly Mexicans and to a lesser extent, Central Americans, are increasingly likely to experience and perceive discrimination in way that racializes them as minorities. Moreover, as whites continue to decline demographically, the voices of those who are experiencing a sense of racial threat are likely to grow increasingly louder, undermining efforts to build positive relations between whites and racial minorities, but also provide legitimate motivations for interminority coalitions. As in Winston-Salem, this process may contribute to a growing sense of widespread interminority cooperation and shared status, as long as resource competition remains low.

Because these factors are contingent, whether the findings in this study are generalizable or resilient is dependent on the stability of context, specifically regarding the factors I have outlined above. Still, while Mexicans continue to dominate migration streams, birth rates, and represent a clear majority of the Latino population, as shown in this dissertation, significant differences in status can create divisions within the Latino community, which in many traditional destinations, can create long term obstacles for panethnic unity and political mobilization.

Where Asians and other immigrant groups fit into this paradigm is less clear, as they are a much smaller segment of the population, are still highly concentrated in traditional receiving areas and not a key target for anti-immigrant rhetoric and enforcement. Many non-white newcomers arrive either with documentation or as refugees, providing them some shelter from the increasingly racialized discourse of
citizenship. Moreover, the importance of racial meanings brought from the home country, as well as more transnational relationships may create significant obstacles for panethnic unity. Looking toward longstanding special status populations such as Cubans may provide more clues as to how these groups will become racialized, as well as how they might relate to one another.

Asians in particular present a sticky case, in part because there is such a wide variety of not only status and human capital, but also complex inter-ethnic relationships due to longstanding international Asian conflicts. Scholars of panethnicity have found Asian-Americans to have relatively weak panethnic ties, and these ties have only occasionally resulted in significant political coalitions (Espiritu 1992; Lee 2008). Others have seen their social status swing dramatically in a short period of time, particularly South Asians. Rapid shifts in the political landscape for arguably elite Asians such as the Japanese and Arab-Americans quickly impacted subgroup identity in favor of a panethnic/racialized designation that was not easily adopted by other groups. Broadly speaking, Pacific Islanders and Southeast Asians are more likely to be similar to Mexicans in terms of human capital, but are also likely to have protected status as refugees. By and large, I speculate that Asian immigrants are unlikely as a group to develop a strong panethnic identity, or strong minority ties. As a group, Asians are highly likely to become upwardly mobile over time, suggesting that the structural and social obstacles they face are not significant enough to trigger a strong sense of racialization.

However, Filipinos may be an important exception to this pattern. A significant proportion of the Asian immigrant population, Filipinos are more likely to arrive in the United States as undocumented immigrants and bring with them lower human capital than other Asian groups. There are also signs that Filipinos are more likely to identify as minorities, and see minority status as a basis for political action. Filipino organizations have been visible advocates against immigration enforcement in Los Angeles and are integrated into hip-hop communities in San Francisco. Some Filipinos reject Asian identity altogether, choosing instead to identify as Latinos, drawing on the history of Spanish colonialism to articulate these ties (Ocampo 2011). While Filipinos are highly likely to settle in traditional receiving destinations, their status and patterns of identification suggest that they might behave more like Mexicans in a similar context.

Caribbean immigrants have long represented a key population that has failed to develop close relations with African-Americans. Haitians, however, may be an underexplored exception, particularly because their higher likelihood to be undocumented, suffer discrimination and lower levels of human capital make it likely for them to have experiences similar to the Mexicans in this study. Some scholars have indeed found that Haitians are highly likely to identify as minorities and with African-Americans. In South Florida, Stepick and Stepick highlight that the context is positive for Cubans and less receptive context for Nicaraguans, and other Central Americans. They note that for Haitians however, the reception is extremely negative at all levels - local, regional, federal – and that as a result some Haitians go undercover, passing as African-Americans (Stepick and Dutton Stepick 2009: 13). In this context, racism pushes the two groups together to provide mutual support – a case in which assimilating into the native born minority has social, political and economic advantages (2009: 14).

Currently, African and European immigrants are unlikely to behave similarly to Mexicans, at least within the current political and racial paradigm. That isn’t to suggest
that these patterns will not change, but that on-going, qualitative, community-level studies such as this one may be particularly well-suited to reveal new patterns of intergroup relations on the ground, specifically among non-citizen populations whose views are not easily captured through political participation data such as voting and political representation. More multi-sited ethnographies that are designed to capture intergroup relations in different contexts and between different groups will be important contributions to the study of intergroup relations as demographic patterns continue to shift over time.

**What’s Next?**

Throughout the 1990s, scholars and journalists, reflecting on recent demographic trends, asserted that the United States was in the process of an important racial transformation. Herbert Gans entered into this debate in the late 1990s with his piece, “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-first Century United States” (1999), arguing that rather than focus on the new “face” of America, what we were really witnessing was a reconfiguration of racial hierarchies, in which what he terms ‘the old white/non-white dichotomy’ would be replaced by a new ‘black/nonblack’ bimodal category, with a third reserve category for groups who do not yet fit into the new racial dualism (1999: 371). Gans asserted that while the rules would change slightly – though importantly, not for blacks, who would remain at the bottom – race would only become further entrenched.

In response to Gans’ proposal, a variety of race scholars (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Lee and Bean 2007, 2010; Marrow 2009a) have entered the debate through the lens of examining the history of U.S. racial stratification as a historically black/white divide, (defined as a white/nonwhite color line) and offering their theoretical prediction as to whether that paradigm will hold. I argue that while each scholar makes an important contribution to our understanding of race within each study’s empirical context by telling us where the color line will emerge, color line theorizing does little to reveal the mechanisms through which the line is drawn. While color line research may empirically examine local contexts, acknowledge local variation and distinct factors in producing racialization, it treats them as exceptional processes within a national system, rather than the core of racialization itself.

I argue that new racial formation patterns will not be represented by national color lines, but by patchwork quilts of race relations determined by local conditions. “As a result of these new immigration patterns, Latino population enclaves are forming in parts of the United States where ‘race relations’ have traditionally been defined in black and white. The newcomers are bound to strain, perhaps even precipitate a redefinition, of the dominant black-white axis of racial distinction. The context of immigrant reception along the moving frontier of Latino immigration will be shaped by processes that define the place of these newcomers in relation to whites and blacks (Padin 2005: 50).” To understand these patterns, future studies should continue to consider the local as well as the differences between arriving newcomers. While there is much that we don’t know about future immigration patterns, the unintended consequences of policy and economic change, this dissertation provides new tools for understanding and predicting how race and ethnicity may change at the community level.

I show here that political integration, particularly in the form of immigration enforcement, is an essential factor to consider, alongside existing race relations, labor
market conditions and resource access, in making sense of racial formation. Moreover, distinct circumstances await different immigrant groups in terms of local institutions (states, legal, government assistance, access); regional context (labor market, neighborhoods) and social perceptions (variation across space in terms of place of origin and interpretation by host society). By using a context of reception perspective, future scholarship on newcomers, racialization and race relations can highlight the important variation between contexts and levels of receptivity, as well as identify some key factors through which this variation is shaped.
REFERENCES
Abrego, Leisy Janet. 2006. “‘I Can’t Go to College Because I don’t have Papers’: Incorporation Patterns of Latino Undocumented Youth.” *Latino Studies* 4: 212-231.


Faith Action International House. 2009. “Newsletter: Public Forum on 287(g) in Guilford County Will This Program Damage Human Relations and Public Safety?” Greensboro, NC.


121


McClain, Paula D., Monique L. Lyle, Niambi M. Carter, Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto,


Merenstein, Beth Frankel. 2008. Immigrants and Modern Racism: Reproducing


National Sheriff’s Association 2010 Resolutions. 2010. “National Sheriffs’ Association


Appendix II: Dot Matrix Maps of Demographic Change in the Triad Area 1970-2010

Distribution by Race and Ethnicity: Piedmont Triad Area, 1970*

* 1970 data unavailable for census tracts in Surry, Stokes, Guilford and Montgomery counties.


Distribution by Race and Ethnicity: Piedmont Triad Area, 1980*

* 1980 data unavailable for census tracts in Surry and Montgomery counties

Distribution by Race and Ethnicity: Piedmont Triad Area, 1990

Source: Minnesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System. Pre-release Version 0.1, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 2004. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, SF1, Table NP00A.

Distribution by Race and Ethnicity: Piedmont Triad Area, 2000

Source: Minnesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System. Pre-release Version 0.1, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 2004. 2000 Census of Population and Housing, SF1, Table NP00A.
Appendix III: Chloropleth Maps of Demographic Change in Winston-Salem, 1970-2010

African American Population in Winston-Salem by Census Tract, 1970

Hispanic/Latino Population in Winston-Salem by Census Tract, 1970

African American Population in Winston-Salem by Census Tract, 1990

Hispanic / Latino Population in Winston-Salem by Census Tract, 1990

## Appendix IV: Education and Occupational Data by Race for Winston-Salem

### Forsyth County 2000 Census Summary File: Educational Attainment by Race over 25 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Male; Educational attainment; Less than 9th grade</td>
<td>5,425 (58.5%)</td>
<td>3,846 (41.4%)</td>
<td>9,271 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,7335 (46.5%)</td>
<td>7,7317 (53.5%)</td>
<td>14,465 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 9th grade</td>
<td>2,146 (23.1%)</td>
<td>1,330 (14.3%)</td>
<td>3,476 (37.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th-12th grade no diploma</td>
<td>1,347 (14.5%)</td>
<td>896 (9.7%)</td>
<td>2,243 (24.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>924 (10.5%)</td>
<td>764 (8.2%)</td>
<td>1,688 (18.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College, no degree</td>
<td>440 (4.7%)</td>
<td>376 (4.1%)</td>
<td>816 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Degree</td>
<td>86 (0.9%)</td>
<td>136 (1.5%)</td>
<td>222 (2.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>241 (2.6%)</td>
<td>172 (1.9%)</td>
<td>413 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate or Professional Degree</td>
<td>241 (2.6%)</td>
<td>172 (1.9%)</td>
<td>413 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White alone; not Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Male</td>
<td>14465 (43.2%)</td>
<td>14639 (56.8%)</td>
<td>29,104 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,032 (43.2%)</td>
<td>26,337 (56.8%)</td>
<td>46,369 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 9th grade</td>
<td>1,530 (3.3%)</td>
<td>1,672 (3.6%)</td>
<td>3,202 (6.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>black non-Hispanic</th>
<th>AIAN non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian non-Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th-12th grade no diploma</td>
<td>3377</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3902</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>7279</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>6710</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>7634</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>14344</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College, no degree</td>
<td>4357</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6685</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>11042</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Degree</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2154</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree</td>
<td>2436</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3713</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6149</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate or Professional Degree</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2199</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% = % of racial/ethnic group

---

**EEO Residence Data Results for Winston-Salem city, North Carolina, 2000, %ages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>black non-Hispanic</th>
<th>AIAN non-Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian non-Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Civilian Labor Force</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>54.50%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>34.50%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Civilian Labor Force</strong></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.90%</td>
<td>27.80%</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
<td>15.10%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Civilian Labor Force</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.10%</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>19.40%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management, Business and Financial Workers</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77.40%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management, Business and Financial Workers</strong></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56.10%</td>
<td>45.90%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management, Business and Financial Workers</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43.90%</td>
<td>31.50%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Science, Engineering and Computer Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78.20%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Science, Engineering and Computer Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>69.80%</td>
<td>54.30%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>5.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Science, Engineering and Computer Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30.30%</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>4.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Healthcare Practitioner Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>74.30%</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>18.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Healthcare Practitioner Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40.10%</td>
<td>33.60%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Healthcare Practitioner Professionals</strong></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>59.90%</td>
<td>40.70%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>15.80%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Professional Workers</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72.80%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>23.50%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

148
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Males</th>
<th>Total Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Professional Workers</td>
<td>38.40%</td>
<td>29.60%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professional Workers</td>
<td>61.50%</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>16.30%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>37.80%</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>8.60%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>47.20%</td>
<td>36.90%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Support Workers</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Support Workers</td>
<td>75.10%</td>
<td>42.80%</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>28.70%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and Extractive Craft Workers</td>
<td>96.60%</td>
<td>46.00%</td>
<td>23.00%</td>
<td>26.10%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation, Maintenance and Repair Craft Workers</td>
<td>86.60%</td>
<td>53.50%</td>
<td>9.30%</td>
<td>22.90%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Operative Workers</td>
<td>55.80%</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>27.10%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Operative Workers</td>
<td>44.20%</td>
<td>9.50%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Material Moving Operative Workers</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
<td>48.40%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>37.20%</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Material Moving</td>
<td>75.40%</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Material Moving</td>
<td>24.60%</td>
<td>8.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
<td>32.70%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers and Helpers</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27.80%</td>
<td>28.90%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90.30%</td>
<td>31.60%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers and Helpers</td>
<td>24.60%</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>34.00%</td>
<td>44.60%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Service Workers</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>42.10%</td>
<td>33.50%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Service Workers</td>
<td>78.50%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10.30%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Service Workers</td>
<td>21.50%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>34.90%</td>
<td>53.10%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers, except Protective</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>17.90%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers, except Protective</td>
<td>36.70%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22.50%</td>
<td>35.10%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers, except Protective</td>
<td>63.20%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
<td>43.80%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, No Civilian Work</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Since 1995</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>20.60%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, No Civilian Work</td>
<td>48.10%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Since 1995</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16.30%</td>
<td>23.10%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, No Civilian Work</td>
<td>51.90%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Since 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix V: Immigration Policy Glossary

**American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU):** Founded in the early 1920s, the ACLU is a national organization with local chapters that aims to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties that the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee. They have several topic areas, including an active immigrant rights’ program.

**The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (HR 44337, also known as the Sensenbrenner Bill):** The Sensenbrenner Bill was introduced by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) in 2005, and passed the house, but did not pass the senate. Widely considered the catalyst for the immigration reform protests of 2006, the bill would have built new fences along the border, increased border surveillance, would make illegal entry a crime, smuggling a federal offense, a crime to knowingly aid undocumented entry, and various other forms of border control and enforcement. Some of the more extreme provisions of the bill included a $3000 fine for voluntary removals, a minimum sentence of 10 years for fraudulent documents, and would make it a crime to assist anyone who lacks authority to reside in the U.S.

**Criminal Alien Program (CAP):** A program through which ICE places federal immigration officers in federal and state prisons and local jails to screen inmates for immigration status and to determine which noncitizens should be taken into immigration custody.\(^{55}\)

**Development, Relief and Education of Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act):** The DREAM Act is a bi-partisan sponsored bill first introduced in 2001 by Senator Orrin Hatch, but more recently championed by Senator Richard Durbin. The DREAM Act would provide conditional permanent residency for persons between the ages of 12 and 35 who have lived in the U.S. for five consecutive years, and either attended a U.S. high school, completed a GED or accepted to an institution of higher education. Once a person applies and is accepted, they must enroll in a higher degree program or the military, and complete two years either in the military or degree program within six years of the application date. Once 5.5 years have passed, the individual can then apply for legal permanent residency. Passage of the DREAM Act would provide a pathway to legal residency for youth, particularly those who were brought to the U.S. as minors.

**Department of Homeland Security (DHS):** The Department of Homeland Security was instituted in 2002 under the Homeland Security Act. In 2003, the agency combined 22 different government agencies, including INS which was re-named and reorganized as ICE. The department aims to coordinate agencies in order to prevent terrorism and enhance security; secure and manage our borders; enforce and administer our immigration laws; safeguard and secure cyberspace and; ensure resilience to disasters.

**Department of Justice (DOJ):** Lead by the Attorney General, the mission of the Department of Justice is “To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to

\(^{55}\) Capps et al. 2011: 60.
provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.” The Department of Justice directs federal criminal prosecutions, including immigration enforcement through advice provided by the Office of Legal Counsel.

**Immigration Act of 1917 (Also known as the Asiatic Barred Zones Act):** Extended the Chinese Exclusion Act over President Wilson’s veto to exclude immigrants from the continent of Asia. It also excluded the poor, gays and lesbians, mental and physical handicaps and various other ‘undesirable’ persons. A literacy test and medical evaluation was also imposed.

**Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 (IRCA) (Also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act):** Amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve enforcement and made it illegal to knowingly hire undocumented workers, as well as offered amnesty to continuously residing undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States before 1982.

**Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE):** Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the second largest investigative agency in the federal government. Created in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, it is the federal government’s primary immigration enforcement agency.

**Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS):** The INS was created in 1933 to manage United States immigration and naturalization policy. The INS was disbanded in 2003 and most of its functions were transferred to ICE in 2003.

**The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA):** IIRIRA reorganized several provisions for increased border patrols and enforcement, changed the procedure for deportation, including new rules pertaining to terrorism and national security. 287(g) was one such provision aimed to address high level criminals, particularly human and drug trafficking.

**Immigration and Nationality Act (INA):** The statute originally passed in 1952 and has been amended several times, most notably in 1965 to abolish the national quota system in favor of a family and skills-based system. The INA contains the code governing immigration matters and delegates authority to enforce immigration law.

**Immigration Reform Protests of 2006:** In response to the Sensenbrenner bill and a general lack of federal response to the call for immigration reform, millions of people across the country participated in coordinated demonstrations from March through May 2006 in a peaceful call for comprehensive immigration form.
**Johnson and Reed Act of 1924 (Also known as the Immigration Act of 1924):**
Changed immigration statues to set quotas for entry for immigrants from various countries who were not in a non-quota category (this included wives and unmarried children of U.S. citizens under 18, academics, students under 15, and residents of the Western hemisphere). Asians continued to be barred, and all non-white persons continued to be ineligible for naturalization under the Naturalization Act of 1790 (the naturalization act of 1870 extended citizenship to Afro-descendants, and the 1952 naturalization act finally prohibited gender and racial discrimination).

**Memorandum of Agreement (MOA):** The official agreement negotiated by ICE with state or local authorities that delineates the powers and responsibilities of the latter under the 287(g) program. The Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and certain state or local elected officials in participating jurisdictions (e.g., governors, county supervisors, or mayors) must sign the agreements.  

**North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA):** A free trade agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico, signed on January 1, 1994. All restrictions and duties were phased out gradually, and were completely phased out by 2008. In 2010, NAFTA partners purchased over 31 billion dollars in agricultural exports. This has been a major source of displacement for small scale Mexican farmers who can no longer compete with American grain prices.

**Proposition 187 (Also known as the Save Our State Initiative):** Proposition 187 was a voter initiative passed by the voters of California in 1994. This initiative would have barred or restricted immigrant access to a variety of state institutions, including public schools and health care. Virtually all of the provisions of proposition 187 were determined to be unconstitutional, and were never put into force. Many argue that the proposition was intended as a deterrent and to register dissatisfaction with the state of economic pressure on California.

**REAL ID Act:** Enacted in 2005, REAL ID (proposed by Representative Sensenbrenner) changed the federal standards for driver’s licenses and state issued identification cards. It also had some provisions for asylum and border enforcement. In addition to certain standards for what ID cards must contain, it also required that ID applicants show evidence of legal status and social security number. This process makes it illegal for undocumented persons to obtain state identification and complex for many visa holders, as well as those who do not already hold government identification. Set to be effective as of 2008, all 50 states have filed for extension, and many states have expressed opposition, including passing legislation against the mandate, with support from organizations such as the ACLU. DHS has ruled to extend compliance to 2013, though a small number of states have complied voluntarily shortly after the passage of the law, and have taken a very pro-REAL ID stance, including North Carolina.

---

**Section 287(g):** Section 287(g) is a provision from the IIRIRA that authorizes the federal government to enter into partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies, which enable the latter to perform certain immigration enforcement standards.58

**Secure Communities:** A program through which ICE uses federal databases to screen the status and previous immigration violations of inmates in state prisons and local jails. Screening is integrated into existing procedures for checking arrestees’ fingerprint data against FBI databases for the commission of other federal and state crimes. In participating jurisdictions, prints are automatically forwarded to ICE, and ICE officers notify state and local officials if inmates may be subject to removal.59

**2002 Department of Justice Memo:** In 2002, the Department of Justice issued a memo that affirmed the provisions set forth in 1996 through the 287(g) provision, stating that state and local agents have the authority to arrest undocumented immigrants in violation of federal law. The memo was written by the Office of Legal Counsel and issued by Jay S. Baybee who also wrote several controversial memos regarding the interrogation of terrorism suspects. This memo has been cited as a roadblock for lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice over the 2010 Arizona legislation, particularly since the Obama administration has not withdrawn the memo. In general, the memo is considered an important legal opinion in support of municipal level immigration enforcement.

---

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
Appendix VI: Methodological Appendix

Winston-Salem, NC is a small manufacturing city in the bible belt of the South. However in recent years, much of the economic growth in the city has taken place in the health care and construction sectors of the economy. For many studies of this type, sites of employment are often observed. In many cases, this makes sense, as individuals spend much of the day at work, and migrants in particular are often defined by their role in the labor market. However, when I began my study, many of the migrants in Winston-Salem were employed in construction crews or in service work, or alternatively, were beginning to be displaced from the labor market due to the economic downturn and increased immigration enforcement. The workplace for undocumented Latinos is a high risk site, where migrants are in a very vulnerable position, often working under false documents and at risk for workplace abuses. Because of these risks, I was concerned that I would encounter difficulties developing relationships and getting accurate information. Due to these issues, I chose to focus on the city as a whole, and opted to use three churches as my primary sites of entry and contact. I chose churches for a number of reasons.

First, in the Southeast, and particularly in this community, churches are the primary civic organization. They also provide a number of services to newcomers, particularly immigrants, creating an incentive for immigrant participation beyond the religious. Latino immigrants are highly religious, and therefore likely to seek out churches more than other forms of civic participation. Church membership also has a low risk. Congregants are not required to pay money, provide identification or reveal any information that would put them at risk. This means that economic fluctuation and changes to enforcement would have relatively little impact on churches, as compared to other institutions. This means that participation is relatively stable. Finally, churches are one of the few organizations that have political leverage in the city, and can provide additional protections and resources for its membership.

Recognizing that churches can vary widely, I chose three churches with extensive programming for immigrants, but with different theological orientations, and located in three different areas of the city. As noted in the introductory chapter, the first was a Catholic church, which held separate masses and services, as well as had a chapel to serve its Latino population, which was very large and overwhelmingly Afro-Mexican. This church was considered to be the most progressive of the Catholic churches in town, and also had a school attached. The English masses were predominantly white, but also had significant numbers of African-Americans and Latinos. This church was located near a main artery road of the city, and therefore was accessible by bus. It was also close to downtown. The chapel was located in the downtown area, which is easily accessible. The second church was a small independent Christian church, founded by a couple from Peru and consisted primarily of Latinos. It’s location near a trailer park attracted many Mexicans from the neighborhood. It also received funding and support for after school and parenting programs, whose staff and volunteers were almost exclusively white. The third church was a progressive Methodist church with a multiracial congregation and several community outreach programs, including community organizing, food banks, health clinics and other services for the poor. Most of the individuals who took advantage of these services were black and Hispanic, and volunteers were of all races.
Still, I was well aware that not all Mexicans would be interested in or able to participate in religious services. Therefore, I triangulated my access to Latinos in two ways. First, I used the contact made through the churches as informants, and use snowball sampling techniques to get in touch with other Mexicans who were not church members. Second, I developed this ethnography as a community-wide project, and also made observations and recruited interviewees in variety of other sites, including the human relations department, the local library and community college, ESL courses, after school programs, the downtown YMCA and various public locations, conferences, town halls, events and festivals. I also interviewed city officials, non-profit managers, immigration lawyers, political campaign volunteers, journalists and professors. I also visited and attended meetings at the three universities in town. By developing contacts and recruiting in these various locations, I did my best to capture a heterogenous group of migrants, as well as get a more holistic picture of the dynamics at work in Winston-Salem that affect immigrant integration, racial formation and race relations.

Nevertheless, the process of gaining access to informants was not without difficulty. Many Mexicans were suspicious of outsiders and reluctant to engage with me without significant assurance from other community members that they trusted. Others were simply difficult to get ahold of. Many immigrants that I met had no phone or email address, making it difficult to arrange meetings. Because of these obstacles, it was necessary for me to establish relationships with a number of trusted community members in order to access the Mexican community. For that reason, it was essential that I lived in Winston-Salem for an extended period in order to develop my status as a friendly and trustworthy community member over time. Finally, I suspect that my status as a young, female student was an advantage in gaining access to a variety of respondents, in that I did not appear threatening. Furthermore, some of my informants indicated that my ability to speak Spanish and my somewhat ambigious ethnic appearance suggested to some that I too, was Mexican, and therefore could be trusted. While these were inaccurate assumptions, they nevertheless provided opportunities for access that might otherwise not have been available to me.
Formal and Informal Interviews with Latinos in Winston-Salem, NC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Race/Color*</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juan</td>
<td>8, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatriz</td>
<td>7, Mexican, (indigenous, Afro, white)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andres</td>
<td>3, Mexican, white</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>5, Puerto-Rican/Spanish</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda</td>
<td>6, Mexican (indigenous, white)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos</td>
<td>6, Mexican, (indigenous/white)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emanuel</td>
<td>3, Mexican, (indigenous/white)</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liliana</td>
<td>3, Mexican-American</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio</td>
<td>3, Mexican, (white, indigenous)</td>
<td>Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge</td>
<td>7, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marisol</td>
<td>7, Nicaraguan</td>
<td>Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco</td>
<td>2, Mexican (white)</td>
<td>Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecilia</td>
<td>6, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliana</td>
<td>6, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego</td>
<td>4, Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yesenia</td>
<td>7, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabel</td>
<td>6, Mexican (indigenous, white)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliana</td>
<td>2, Mexican (white)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisa</td>
<td>4, Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flora</td>
<td>6, Mexican (indigenous, white)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camila</td>
<td>4, Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicia</td>
<td>5, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesica</td>
<td>6, Afro-Mexican</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1, white (German)</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paola</td>
<td>4, Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramon</td>
<td>3, Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Race/Color</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viviana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esmeralda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PR/Dominican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alma</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandra</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armando</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritza</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Afro-Mex (white, indigenous, Afro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Afro-Mex (white, indigenous, Afro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selena</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mexican (white)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mexican (white, indigenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberto</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Afro-Mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marisa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrianna</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexican (unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercedes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>afro-mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>white hispanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mestiza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mexican, Mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>mestizo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Race/Color scale: 1-10, 1 is very light (pale blonde), 10 is very dark (espresso)*
Interview Schedule

Interview Topics for: Afro-Mexican respondents and other migrants or Latinos:

Personal/Background Info

*I am going to begin by asking you a series of questions about your background and your experience with migration*

1. Where are you from originally (country, state, town)?
2. When and how did you come to the United States? Winston-Salem?
3. How did you choose to migrate to Winston-Salem?
4. How long have you lived in the U.S.? In Winston-Salem?
5. Do you have concerns about your documentation status?
6. Have you had any negative or positive experiences as a result of your documentation status?
7. If you do not have documentation, do you plan to obtain documentation, return to Mexico or migrate elsewhere?
8. Are you married? If so, where is your partner from?
9. Do you have children? If so, were they born in the U.S.?
10. Do you have other family in the U.S.?
11. Do you attend church here in Winston-Salem? Can you describe your church?
12. What race do you belong to in the U.S.? Have you heard of a group of Afro-descendant Mexicans here?

Employment/Education

*Now I am going to ask you a series of questions about your job or school and experiences in the workplace and school*

Work

13. What is your job/profession? Where do you work, or where did you most recently work?
14. How would you describe your experience at your place of work?
15. How would you describe race relations at your place of work?
16. What other jobs have you had since you arrived in the U.S.? Can you describe these work experiences?
17. Can you describe how you got these jobs? Describe the steps.
18. How has the economy impacted you?
19. How do you think race affects you on the job? How do you think it affects your interactions with your employer and co-workers?
20. How do you feel your immigration status impacts your ability to get work? To succeed in the workplace?
22. How do you think Latinos are treated compared to African-Americans? Whites?
23. Can you describe what you think employers think of Latino workers?
24. Can you describe what you think African-American and or white workers think of Latino employers?
25. How do you think the work ethic of Latinos compares to African-Americans? Compared to whites?

School

26. What is your education level?
27. Did you attend school in the U.S.? What years? What schools?
28. How do you think race impacted your experience or your children’s experience in school, if at all?
29. Are you satisfied with your education level? Why or why not?

Both:

31. How do you think race has impacted your access to opportunity in school or at work?
32. How do you think Latinos are faring in school and the labor market?
33. What do you think about the level of opportunity available to Latinos in Winston Salem?
34. What do you think about the opportunities available to Latinos here compared to your home town? Compared to other parts of the United States?

Community Views
Now I am going to ask you a series of questions about your views and experiences in your community
35. What neighborhood do you live in and how did you come to live there?
36. What do you think of your neighborhood?
37. Who lives there? (Ages, racial/ethnic groups, types of families)
38. How has the community changed since you arrived, if at all? Why do you think these changes have occurred?
39. Is there anything about your neighborhood or Winston-Salem generally that reminds you of home?
40. How close do you feel toward your neighbors?
41. What conflicts have emerged that you are aware of? Please describe them.
42. How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?
43. Do you feel as though you live in a close community? Please describe why you think that is.
44. If you could move to another neighborhood in Winston-Salem, where would that be? Why?
45. Would you prefer to leave Winston-Salem? Leave North Carolina? Why or why not?
46. I asked you about your church earlier. How does your church or other churches play a role in how Latino immigrants are treated in Winston-Salem, if at all?

Race Questions
Now I am going to ask you a series of questions about your views on your own race and identity
47. How has living in the U.S. and Winston Salem affected your view of your own racial identity?
48. Do you think that people identify more by their state or nationally by their home country, or as Latinos/Hispanics? Why or why not?
49. What do others (blacks, whites, other Latinos) consider you? Why do they say this? Can you give examples of these experiences?
50. Do people ever misrecognize you or assume you are from a different racial group? Can you give an example of this experience? What do you do in those circumstances?
51. How do you think your family impacts your views about race and race relations?
52. How do you think your gender impacts your views about race and race relations?
53. How do you think African-Americans perceive you?
54. How do you think whites perceive you?
55. How do you think Latinos perceive you?

Now I will ask you some questions about your experiences and relationships with other races and ethnicities
56. How close do you feel to African-Americans generally in Winston-Salem?
57. How close do you feel to whites generally in Winston-Salem?
58. How close do you feel to Latinos generally in Winston-Salem?
59. How would you describe your personal relationships with African-Americans? Whites? Other Latinos? Afro-Mexicans?
60. How close do you feel generally to whites, Afro-Americans and other Latinos? To Afro-Mexicans?
61. How would you describe the relationship between whites, African-Americans and Latinos? Examples?
62. Do you feel you have more in common with whites or African-Americans? Why?
63. What similarities, if any, exist between African-Americans and Afro-Mexicans? How would you describe them? In your opinion, why do these similarities exist?
64. What similarities, if any, exist between African-Americans, and Latinos? How would you describe them? In your opinion, why do these similarities exist?
65. How would you describe relations between African-Americans and Afro-Mexicans? Can you give me any examples? Afro-Americans and Latinos generally?
66. Under what circumstances do you come into contact with African-Americans? Can you describe these interactions?
67. Describe any conflict that you have experienced with African-Americans personally, or you have heard of between African-Americans and Latinos from friends or relatives.

68. Under what circumstances do you come into contact with whites? Can you describe these interactions?

69. Describe any conflict that you have experienced with whites personally, or you have heard of between whites and Latinos from friends or relatives.

70. Describe any or the most recent experience of discrimination or stereotypes (if any) from African-Americans.

71. Describe any or the most recent experience of discrimination or stereotypes (if any) from Whites.

72. Describe any or the most recent experience of discrimination or stereotypes (if any) from Latinos.

73. What group do you believe discriminates against you the most? Can you explain why you believe this is the case?

74. Describe any efforts (if any) at mobilization or action for a common cause from African-Americans that you have experienced or know of. Any action between whites and Latinos?

75. Describe any efforts at mobilization or action on behalf of Latinos or immigrants from African-Americans that you experienced or know of. Any action by whites on behalf of Latinos?

76. How accepted do you feel by other existing racial or ethnic groups other than Latino? Please describe why you feel that way.

77. How would you describe the generational differences in how different races interact?

78. Do you see any interracial dating or marriage? Does it happen often? Between who? How do others in the Afro-Mexican or Latino community respond to interracial dating or marriage?

79. Typically, in the past, people have described race relations in Winston-Salem as whites on top and blacks on the bottom. Do you think that migration has changed the way racial groups are ordered in Winston? How do Latinos fit in? How do Afro-Mexicans fit in?

80. Do you believe that African-Americans and Latinos are treated similarly? Please explain why or why not.

81. How do you think race relations in Winston-Salem have changed, if at all?

82. How do you think the level of segregation in Winston-Salem has changed, if at all?

Latinos and Immigration:

Now I will ask you a series of questions about Latinos and race relations among Latinos

83. How would you describe the divisions, if any in the Latino community? Please describe between whom and give examples.

84. How would you describe the level of closeness in the Latino community?

85. Do you think there are generational differences in how Latinos think about race and race relations? Please explain.

86. How do you think your experience of race is different than other Latinos in the community, if at all?

87. Please describe the differences between Afro-Mexicans and other Latinos.

88. Please describe the similarities and differences between Afro-Mexicans and Dominicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans.

89. Are there conflicts between Afro-Mexicans, Dominicans, Puerto Ricans or Cubans? If so, between who and why?

90. Do you see Latinos as a group becoming more or less politically active? Why do you believe this?

91. How do you think the larger Winston-Salem community views Latino migrants?

92. What differences do you see in how people view Afro-Mexicans compared to other Latino migrants?

Now I will ask you a series of questions about immigration

93. How do you view new migrants to the community? Are they different than previous migrants or other groups?

94. Why do you think new migrants are coming?

95. How do you feel about the issue of immigration and the changes to the laws here in North Carolina?

96. What, if any, are the divisions in the Latino community around the issue of immigration?

97. Have you had any experiences with ICE or know anyone whose had experiences with ICE? What happened? How do you feel about ICE?

98. How do you feel the change in laws and the issue of immigration impacts your daily life? Please describe.

Now I will ask you a few questions about the local government and institutions here

99. What are your feelings about the local government and services here? Do you feel you are treated fairly?

100. Do you believe that whites, African-Americans and Latinos are treated equally by the local government?
101. Do you think what happens to African-Americans in this country has something to do with what happens in your life?
102. Do you think what happens to whites in this country has something to do with what happens in your life?
103. How do you feel about the State government?
104. Do you believe that whites, African-Americans and Latinos are treated equally by the state government?
105. What do you think of the state government’s way of dealing with the immigration issue?
106. How do you feel about the Federal government? Has it changed because of the new president?
107. What do you think of the federal government’s treatment of Latinos? It’s way of dealing with the immigration issue?
108. Do you believe that whites, African-Americans and Latinos are treated equally by the federal government?
109. What do you think WS will look like 5-10 years from now? How will things be for Latinos?
Interview Topics for: Native Born Community Members, Employers and Officials:

Personal Information:
- What is your educational attainment/occupation?
- How do you feel about race relations at your place of work?
- How do you identify racially/ethnically?
- What do others consider you to be racially? Do people ever misrecognize you?
- Do you feel closer to certain racial groups than others?
- How would you describe race relations in Winston-Salem?
- How do you feel about the community in which you live? Do you feel it has changed in the last 10-15 years due to migration?
- How do you feel about the schools their children/other family members attend? Do you feel it has changed in the last 10-15 years due to migration?
- Do you attend a church in Winston-Salem? Do you feel that churches play a role in how Latinos are integrated into the community? Do you feel your church has changed in the last 10-15 years due to migration?
- Do you see generational differences in how people are indentifying racially and interacting with other groups?
- Do you think your opinions are affected by being a man (woman), or married (single)?
- What are the major reasons, in your opinion, for conflict or social closeness between racial groups in Winston-Salem?

Immigration Generally:
- How do you view new migrants to the community? Are they different than previous migrants or other groups?
- Why do you think they are coming? How do you think they get here?
- How would you classify them racially?
- Do you see Latinos as competition or positive contribution in the labor market? Explain.
- Do you see Latinos as a burden or positive contribution in schools and other institutions? Explain.
- Are you concerned with immigration? How do you feel about migrants who do not have citizenship?
- Have you had any interactions with migrants? What are some examples?
- Do you feel that the community has changed as a result of migration?
- How do you think whites in Winston-Salem perceive Latinos? African-Americans?
- How do you think the local government treats Latinos? African-Americans?
- Do you think see Latinos as problematic or positive contributors to the community?
- What do you think of the changes to state law regarding immigrants (access to licenses, community colleges, 287(g))? ICE? What changes do you think need to happen regarding immigration at the local, state and national level?

Race Questions:
- Do you see differences within the Latino community? Divides? Please describe.
- Are you aware of the Afro-descendant Mexican community? Do you have a sense of how they are different or similar to other Latinos?
- Have your views on Latinos/blacks/Whites changed as a result of the rises migration?
- Do you think having more Latinos affects what people think about their own identity? Racial group?
- How do you think others (blacks or whites) view migrants?
- How do you think employers (teachers, health care providers) view migrants?
- Have you heard of Latino immigrants experiencing discrimination or stereotypes?
- Have you experienced discrimination or stereotyping from migrants/Latinos? Whites? African-Americans?
- Have you ever heard of or you yourself misrecognized someone thinking they were Latino or not, or a migrant or not? Describe the experience.
- How do race and ethnic relations in the community impact you in your interpersonal experiences?
- How do race and ethnic relations impact you in your interactions with employers and co-workers?
- How do race and ethnic relations impact you in your interactions with schools, government or other institutions?
- How do race and ethnic relations impact you at church or in your neighborhood?
- Do you think what happens to Latinos in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?
- Do you feel you have more in common with whites, African-Americans or Latinos? [choose the two other groups]
- Do you see benefits to being black/white/Latino/other group?
- How close do you feel to Latinos? African-Americans? Whites?
- How close do you think Latinos are to blacks? Whites?
- How close do you think Afro-Latinos are to blacks? Whites?
- Do you see much interracial dating or marriage? Between what groups? Why you think this is (or isn’t occurring)?
- Describe the relationship between Hispanics and blacks; Hispanics and Whites; Afro-descendants and blacks; Afro-descendants and whites
- Do you think that the three racial groups have been re-ordered in terms of status here in Winston? How do you think Afro-Mexicans fit in?

Other:
- Can you tell me a little bit about what your organization (business, etc,) does?
- How do you think immigration has changed your organization?
- What do you think Winston-Salem will look like 5-10 years from now? For Latinos? For others?