Abstract

Metin Heper discusses the formation of Turkey’s identity, which came to encompass both an "Eastern" and a "Western" (or European) dimension. Against this background, Heper discusses three main issues within the politics of Turkey that have remained problematic from the perspective of the EU: Islam in politics, nationalism and the consideration of Turkey’s ethnic minorities, and the political role of the military. Based on the "identity history" of Turkey, Heper puts forward some suggestions about how the alleged divide between East and West, and Islam and Europe, may be bridged. The paper concludes by exploring the possibility that an intellectual departure from the concept of a "shared civilization" towards the idea of "sharing a civilization" may contribute to the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean region.
The present author spent the 1986-1987 academic year at the University of Manchester, U. K. as a research fellow. On one occasion he asked a faculty member there who taught Politics in the Middle East, what kind of material on Turkey he uses in his course. The response he received was, “Well, in my course we don’t cover Turkey; after all Turkey is not really a Middle Eastern country.” A few days later he directed the same question to another colleague who offered a course on European politics. He again received a “really” answer.

The fact that Turkey is construed to be neither completely European nor Middle Eastern makes it an interesting case study for the purpose of the present volume, the editors of which plausibly argue that the security community they would like to see develop around the Mediterranean should be a pluralistic one and thus should rest on the sharing of identities, and not on a shared identity. That Turkey is the only Muslim country with a fairly well consolidated democracy is an additional reason to focus on the experience of that country because, as the editors again sensibly argue, pluralistic security communities can only flourish in those regions which are socially constructed in such a manner that they would transcend cultural and civilizational borders.

The editors of the present volume also do not neglect to point out that cross-cultural and even more importantly cross-civilizational projects have become all the more important in the post-9/11 period when the (earlier) idea of “clash of civilizations” was revived. In the post 9/11 era, Turkey took its position on the side of the USA in the latter’s war on terror to the
extent to which its democratic institutions, including its Parliament, allowed it.\footnote{Since November 2002, the country is ruled by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) government; although it is often referred to as a religiously oriented party, the leaders of the AKP, though pious themselves, define the government they have formed as a “conservative-democratic” government. The latter argue that although they themselves are pious Muslims their government is a secular one, and as such the Turkish experience refutes the “clash of civilizations” argument.}{2}

It should also be noted here that Turkey has become an Associate member of what is today the European Union (EU) in 1963, and particularly during recent years, in its quest to become a full member of the EU Turkey has not rejected the “normative power” of that Union and took important steps to conform its political and economic system to the norms designated at Maastricht and Copenhagen.

The last but not least reason why one should include Turkey in the present study which is based on the assumption that a long-lasting peace and harmony in the region would develop only if the individual countries would go through a process of learning themselves and as such the adaptation of the individual countries to this new world would primarily be the upshot of an endogenous rather than an exogenous change. Turkey has been one of those exceptional countries that started to transform its identity from an Eastern to a Western, from the end of the eighteenth century onward, by its own volition.

In what follows, first, the Ottoman and Turkish attitudes and values that came to have a close semblance to those of the Europeans and the causes behind that particular development are taken up. Secondly, the issue of if and to what extent the seemingly problematic issues of Islam in politics, nationalism, and the role of the military in politics in Turkey interfered with the growing similarities between the European and the Ottoman-Turkish attitudes and values is addressed. Finally, by keeping in mind the lessons one may derive from the Ottoman-
Turkish experience, some suggestions are offered on how one should proceed in starting to build a pluralistic, loosely coupled security environment around the Mediterranean.

**Turkey and the West**

Starting in the last decades of the eighteenth century, the Turks gradually came to have a European vocation, which was facilitated by their close contact with the West. Following the foundation of the Ottoman state in 1299, a great deal of mutual acculturation had taken place between the Byzantines and Turks. During the later centuries, Christians, Jews, and Muslims similarly influenced each other in the empire that the Turks built. The Turks either fought their European adversaries or had trade relations with them. Many European merchants, scholars, and others traveled on the Ottoman lands; quite a few came to stay. Some converted to Islam. The latter played an important role in establishing communications and maintaining links between the Turks and Europeans.³

From the early fifteenth century to the second part of the sixteenth century, as their empire expanded on three continents – Africa, Asia, and Europe – the Turks found themselves in the midts of European politics. For example, on different occasions, Francis I, the king of France and a candidate for the Hungarian throne, requested the help of Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (reigned: 1520-1566) against the Hapsburgs. Although from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire experienced a virtually constant decline it never became a colony. Consequently the Turks never harbored a deep resentment toward the Europeans. Thus, when they started to continuously lose against them in the battlefield, they did not hesitate to "borrow the infidel’s ways in order to overcome them.” For instance, as early as 1719, they sent an ambassador to Paris in order to find out those aspects of the European civilization that they could usefully adopt.⁴
The fact that as compared to the contemporary Islamic states the Ottoman Empire was the least Islamic was also a contributory factor to the ease with which the Turks turned their face to the West. Islam played a relatively less significant role in the Ottoman statecraft because it was recognized that Islam regulated basically the personal life and interpersonal relations of the Muslims, and that as such it had little to contribute to public affairs. More significantly, having developed into an empire that comprised several religions, sects, and/or ethnic groups, the Ottoman state could ill afford to impose an orthodox version of Islam upon the mosaic in question. The Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenians, and Jews constituted separate religious communities. For the most part, their clergy and lay heads who had authority concerning church administration, worship, education, and charity as well as the supervision of the civil status of their co-religionists, governed these communities.

From circa sixteenth century onward, a secular state philosophy based on the notions of “necessity” and “reason” competed with Islamic prescriptions. During the nineteenth century, when in other Muslim countries efforts were made to reconcile Islam with modernization, the Turks subscribed to the so-called “cast-iron theory of Islam,” the idea that Islam had remained far behind the contemporary developments and could not be adapted to them.

Consequently, the founders of the Republic (established in 1923) could adopt the following dictum of a late Ottoman intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet: “There is no second civilization. Civilization means European civilization. It must be imported with both its roses and thorns.” They thus started a radical social and cognitive change program, which has been referred to as “cultural revolution.” The major goal was the secularization of polity and society. Having arrived at the conclusion that Islamic institution alone was to be blamed for the demise of the Ottoman Empire (“because it stood in the way of more comprehensive reforms to save the Empire”), the founders aimed at creating a new Turk that would not take his/her cues from Islam, but for this purpose s/he would draw upon his/her own reasoning faculties.
other things, they abolished the Caliphate, the symbolic head of all Muslims in the world; replaced the religious courts by their secular counterparts; introduced a Western educational system from the grade school to the university; substituted the Latin alphabet, the common origin of European culture, for traditional Arabic-Islamic script; adopted the European theater and music as well as law codes from different European countries. The new Civil Code of 1926, taken intact from Switzerland, aimed at emancipating people from Islam in their social and economic life. The ultimate goal pursued by the founders was the *reformation* rather than the *renaissance* of Islam. The school textbooks of the 1920s contained such prescriptions as, “A Muslim truly worthy of that name has to love his country, respect the laws of the Republic, submit to the progressive guidance of the state officials, apply scrupulously the principles of good hygiene, consult a doctor in the case of an illness to avoid being the cause of an epidemic, and work energetically for the development of his country.”\(^\text{11}\)

These and other reforms came to have a significant impact on the identity of the Turks and on their views about the role Islam should play in their daily lives. Empirical data show that increasingly being a Muslim was no longer an essential dimension of the identity of the people. In the late 1960s, when asked, “How do you see yourselves?” 50.3 percent of the workers in a textile factory in the city of Izmir (Smyrna) on Turkey’s Aegean coast considered themselves as “Turks” and 37.5 percent as “Muslims.” In a 1994 nationwide survey, 69 percent identified themselves as “Turks”, 21 percent as “Muslim Turks”, and only four percent as “Muslims.” (Another four percent said they were “Kurds”, and the remaining two-percent mentioned other ethnic identities.) It was only a century ago that people in that same country had identified themselves as either a “Muslim” or “non-Muslim.”

Turning now to the issue of the role religion should play in the daily life in Turkey, in a 1986 survey, only seven percent of a national sample thought that the country should be ruled in accordance with the Shari’a (Islamic) Law.\(^\text{12}\) Later research (1999) has shown that only one
percent of the respondents took Shari’a in its true sense, for example, stoning to death of an adulteress or cutting the hand of a thief. The rest viewed it as an ambiguous set of rules for leading a moral life. In 1996, in the city of Konya, one of the most religiously conservative cities in Turkey, people preferred at schools English-language curriculum to intensive religious instruction.  

In the Republican period, Islam in Turkey evinced strong signs of the Durkheimian version of religiosity, by providing basically a means for group solidarity. Many people made resort to religion when they sensed a feeling of alienation. A 1971 study found that in the socio-economically least developed provinces in the country attendance to the Qur’an courses was the lowest and in the most developed ones attendance at those schools was the highest. According to another 1971 study, mosque-going was highest among those recent urban migrants who were not economically successful and/or were devoid of traditional social support. Islam in Turkey was also perceived as a source of moral principles. As it is noted below, this was the original motive for establishing religiously oriented parties in that country.

At the turn of the century, Turkey for the most part was made up of people who were cognitively Westernized. For instance, very few people voted for a party just because it was a religiously oriented party. On the other hand, for many people Muslim and other communitarian values continued to be significant. Thus, as noted, the present-day Turkey can be considered both an Eastern and a Western country. However, as noted, in that country the tradition has not been an obstacle to the flourishing of the modern. Turkey continued to make progress in its economy and democracy. The country’s recent efforts for becoming a full member of the EU accelerated both of these processes. In Turkey, there is also a thriving private sector. The Turks have managed to substitute an export-oriented economy for an import oriented one, thus resolving their chronic balance of payment problem. Not unlike several other countries, from time to time Turkey too faced economic crises; however, Turkey
always managed to set its economy right in a relatively short period of time. As noted, at the turn of the century, Turkey was the only Muslim country with a functioning democracy. Except for a handful of Islamic, leftist, and rightist radicals, democracy has long become “the only game in town.” Last but not least, Turkey has developed extensive relations with countries both in the North and in the South.¹⁵

Although Turkey has both an Eastern and a Western face its Western credentials are more apparent. On the one hand it is a member of the Organization of Islamic countries. On the other hand, it is a member of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Turkey is a candidate country for the EU. To many countries, Turkey is a dependable ally with a relatively stable economy and a functioning democracy. These two characteristics go a long way to render Turkey politically stable and free from irredentist aspirations.

The Turks continue to modernize their country sometimes despite the West. Turkey applied to the European Economic Community—the predecessor of the EU—as early as 1959. It was made an associate member in 1963. Ankara asked for full membership in 1987. However, Turkey was not made even a candidate state until 1999. By 2004, Turkey was still not promised a date for the start of full membership negotiations. It is true that some Islamists and some members of the secularly oriented intelligentsia with Third Worldist inclinations are against Turkey’s developing closer relations with the EU countries. However, a great majority of the Turks continue to think that Turkey should go on modernizing their country by drawing upon Western models. Around 70 percent of the Turks are of the opinion that their country should join the EU.

Islam in Politics
The primary rationale behind the founding of the first openly religiously oriented party in the Republican period (National Order Party—*Milli Nizam Partisi*-MNP) (1970-1971) was not that of promoting *Shari’a* rule in Turkey, but rather that of upgrading morality and virtue in that country. The idea for this what may be considered as the Islamic version of Protestant Ethic came from a certain Mehmet Zait Kotku who was then Sheikh of the *Nakshibandı* Order. According to the MNP program, new generations of people in Turkey were to be patriotic, self-sacrificing, respectful to private property, and equipped with the latest know-how so that Turkey would be the leader country in the scientific, technological, and civilizational race. The National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-MSP) (1973-1980), the successor party to the MNP, further elaborated this view by arguing that the state was responsible for promoting moral development. The latter was perceived as a prerequisite for material development. The MNP-MSP project aimed at revitalizing some tenets of Islam presumed to lay dormant in the conscience of the people. As it is patent, the programs of the two parties did not take Islam as an end in itself (a religious goal), but as a means for material development (a secular goal). In the same vein, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*-RP) (1983-1997), the successor party to the MSP, talked about “Just Order” (*Adil Düzen*), referring to a social order that was both “rational” and “just.” The RP too had a secular mission -- that of fulfilling the twin goals of political stability and economic development.

Despite the fact that all three political parties formally had platforms that did not aim at bringing back the *Shari’a* rule, all of them were closed for having “tinkered with the secular premises of the Republic” -- the MNP and RP by the Constitutional Court and the MSP by the 1980-1983 military interveners. The grounds on which they were banned included their attempts to turning a well-known former Byzantine Church in Istanbul (Haghia Sofia) into a mosque, rendering Friday a weekend day, and objecting to the compulsory eight-year secular education, which was recommended by the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*-)
Necmettin Erbakan, a Professor of Engineering who had obtained his Ph.D. in Germany, led the MNP, MSP, and RP. Erbakan himself may not have been a subscriber to political Islam. However, the appeasement policy he pursued toward the radical members of the parties in question as well as of the media plus his own occasional provocative statements (probably made to the gallery) prepared the end of these political parties.

The last religiously oriented party that was also closed by the Constitutional Court was the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) (1997-2001), the successor party to the RP. This party differed from the earlier religiously oriented parties in two important respects. First, its leader Recai Kutan was more moderate than Erbakan. Secondly, this party was split into two factions, one of them being the liberal faction that attempted to put an end to the party’s too close an attachment to Islam. However, because the orthodox faction of the party had the upper hand (with some outside help from Erbakan), the FP too was closed by the Constitutional Court.

Although none of the four religiously oriented political parties could survive in a political regime the constitution of which forbade political parties based on Islam, from 1970 onward these parties had consistently moved from the margins of the political spectrum to its center. As compared to the MNP, the MSP tended to view the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EU, in a more positive light. The party was for “reform” only in some specific political institutions, and acted more carefully about what to say, when, and where.

The RP in turn perceived secular and Islamic world views as compatible. The party defined secularism as the freedom to practice one’s religion according to one’s beliefs, without harassment. The RP also for the first time began to criticize the members of the secular parties not as “false Muslims”, but as “incompetent politicians.” In its political discourse the RP made references to “pluralist society,” “basic rights and liberties,” “more democracy,”
“privatization,” “decentralization,” and “globalization.” It was also in the RP period that women began to attend party congresses, and men began to wear neckties.

In the following FP period, secularization was defined in a more liberal direction: now religion was not going to interfere in the affairs of the state and the state should have left religion alone. The party members were to avoid delivering sermons to the people; instead, they were expected to contribute to public policy making. Intra-party criticisms began to take place. At party congresses, party members challenged chairpersons for the leadership position. Women attended the party congresses with their hair uncovered and took their places in the municipalities controlled by the party and in Parliament. Some of these women even consumed alcohol openly.

Upon the closure of the FP, not one but two successor parties were established. They were the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP). The SP is led by Kutan. The party contains within its ranks some members of the orthodox factions of the earlier religiously oriented parties. However, the party is more moderate than its predecessor. In any case, it keeps a relatively low profile. Still, in the November 2002 national elections, in all probability because of its closeness to Erbakan the party could not return members to Parliament.

The AKP, led by charismatic Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was founded by members belonging to the liberal faction of the SP. It is true that Erdogan takes Islam as his basic reference. However, he derives from Islam a set of moral principles only for personal and to some extent communal life. He once observed: “My reference is Islam at a personal level. Politically speaking, my reference is the Constitution and democratic principles.” He wishes people to elevate themselves to a higher pedestal of virtue, not through the establishment of a state based on Islam, but through personal self-improvement. He does not make a distinction between practicing and non-practicing Muslims. He reasons that they were all created by God.
and, therefore, they are all equal. He is against discriminatory behavior toward non-Muslims too. His municipality in Istanbul (1994-1998) helped renovate not only mosques, but also churches and synagogues in that city. Following the truck-bombing of two synagogues in Istanbul, now as prime minister, Erdogan visited the Chief Rabbi in Istanbul and conveyed to him his condolences. He was accompanied by a 70-strong AKP delegation that included several ministers. This was for the first time in Turkish political history that a prime minister had visited the Chief Rabbi. Erdogan once said: “I don’t think a person who is a genuine believer would harm the community no matter what his religion is. In all believers one comes across tolerance, love, and an instinct for helping fellow human beings.” In the wake of the truck-bombing of the two synagogues in Istanbul, he called on everybody to pool their resources in the combat against terrorism, adding that no monotheistic religion would tolerate, let alone encourage, terrorism.

Erdogan thinks that a religiously oriented party is not a communal entity, embracing only a given religious, ethnic, or a similar group. As such it should open its arms to everybody. As such it should open its arms to everybody. As a political leader he believes in consultation in the widest extent possible. Erdogan is for intra-party democracy. In the past, his discourse was colored by themes and concepts derived from Islam. Consequently, his detractors accused him of being a subscriber to Islamic fundamentalism. He was even given a prison sentence of ten months. Erdogan now left behind his habit of using Islamic terminology. He now thinks that one should no longer call a struggle “jihad” (holy war) when one is not trying to spread Islam by force and, similarly, one should not say s/he is for Shari’a when one is not interested in de-secularizing the constitutional and legal system of the country.

At the November 2002 national elections, while the orthodox SP was wiped out of Parliament the moderate AKP garnered the plurality of votes and formed a majority government. Although the secularist camp in general and the secularist military in particular
have not looked with sympathy to a government by the AKP, because of their belief in democracy as an *end* rather than as a *means*, they have given the benefit of the doubt to that government. In turn the latter, led by Erdogan, has not disappointed at least the moderate elements of the secularist camp. Erdogan depicted the new government as “conservative democratic” rather than Islamic. Indeed, the AKP government placed such delicate issues as the turban issue -- the ban on the wearing of turban in “public places”, i.e. at universities, state offices, and Parliament -- on the back burner. When there were objections by the secularist camp to even the wives of cabinet ministers attending official functions with their hair covered ministers began going to such functions without their wives.

Turning from what some of the things it did not do to some of the things it did, the AKP government made strenuous efforts to make Turkey a full member of the EU that included Prime Minister Erdogan’s official visits to several EU countries, adoption of the bulk of the measures the EU has posited as prerequisites for accession, maintaining close relations with the US and Israel, and even lectures in other Muslim countries in the Middle East about the virtues of secularism (at the meetings of the Organization of Islamic Countries as well as bilateral visits).

The AKP government came to adopt a balanced approach to the USA and EU. While it has strived hard to make Turkey conform to *acquis communataire* it did not turn its back on the USA with which Turkey has had a strategic alliance since the latter joined NATO in 1952. That alliance had its ups and downs; however, on the whole the two countries continued to have amicable relations. The USA’s war on terror against Iraq without the backing of the United Nation’s (UN) Security Council in general and despite the strong opposition of such critical members of the EU as France and Germany in particular turned out to be an acid test case for those relations. On the eve of the war, the AKP government submitted to Parliament a resolution to allow the deployment of some American troops in southeastern Turkey along the
Iraq border and the transit passage of some other American troops through southeastern Turkey on their way to Iraq. Some influential groups in the political establishment in Turkey opposed it. The President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, argued that Turkey could not give support to a war that did not have the blessing of the UN. The secularly oriented opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), too did not provide support basically for political reasons and also because the CHP and the bulk of the secular intelligentsia in Turkey continued to perceive the AKP as deadly threat to the secular Republic. The CHP and the intelligentsia in question have attributed to each and every AKP program and policy an ulterior motive. In their view, the AKP has been continuously engaged in *takiyye* (dissimulation) – hiding its “true intention of bringing to Turkey a state based on Islam, or Shari’a rule.” Consequently, the CHP has thus resolved to undermine whatever the AKP government tried to do. A sizeable group of the AKP parliamentarians, too, were against the government’s resolution. Some among the latter had Kurdish backgrounds and as such in all probability they thought Turkey’s involvement in the war would have made an independent, or at least an autonomous, Kurdish entity to be set up in the wake of the impending war more difficult. Some other AKP parliamentarians continued to have sympathies toward the Third Worldist tendencies, which were entertained by the AKP’s predecessors and the Felicity Party.

In the event, the resolution was defeated in a rather close vote. However, soon afterwards the AKP government was successful to obtain the approval of Parliament for the transit passage of American planes as well as for the deployment of the Turkish troops in Iraq in the post-war period to help the Allied troops and administration in the latter’s efforts to stabilize the country and achieving that country’s transition to democracy. In January 2004, Erdogan made a state visit to the USA which further mended fences between Turkey and the USA. In a presentation that Erdogan made at Harvard University during that visit, he pointed out that
there are those who claim that the EU countries and the USA come from different planets, and he stated that the planets in question are in the same solar system and as such they share many values, which are also dear for Turkey. His perception of the USA and EU along these lines must have been helped by the fact that during his visit to Washington, D.C. he realized that the US-Turkey relations would now progress toward a strategic-economical-political cooperation from a solely strategic one. That a little after his State of the Union Speech in January 2004 in which he categorically stated that the US does not need a “permission slip” from others for defending its homeland, the US’s President George W. Bush turning to the UN for the latter’s help in the smooth transition of Iraq to democracy and that more generally the US no longer tending to support authoritarian regimes and, instead, striving to bring democracy, though still basically by force rather than resorting to “normative power,” should have further convinced Erdogan that the USA and EU share similar ideals.

In his presentation at Harvard University, Erdogan also argued that the EU is not a union of coal and steel, it is not first and foremost an economic union, nor is it a Christian club. He stated that since what holds together the EU are certain values, the most important of which is democracy, the EU should admit into its ranks Turkey, too, because although the 98 percent of its population is Muslim Turkey has always had a Western vocation.

**Nationalism**

Until the late nineteenth century, ethnicity was an alien concept to the Turks. As already noted, in the Ottoman Empire there were only two identities—Muslim and non-Muslim. It was the Europeans that coined the terms “Turk” and “Turkey.” For the Ottoman Turks, the term “Turk” meant no more than an unrefined person. When in the nineteenth century the bulk of the non-Muslims exited the Empire to establish their own independent states, the Turks attempted to hold the country together by making resort first to Ottomanism (because some
non-Muslims were still around), and second to Islamism (when virtually all non-Muslim elements had left).¹⁹

It is true that from the late nineteenth century onward the Turks began to use the term “Turk” in its ethnic sense; however, it was used in a defensive manner. They started talking about the good qualities of the Turks. However, they did not look down upon other ethnic groups. The rationale behind their acting in this manner was to regain their self-confidence and do away with the inferiority complex that they had begun developing as a consequence of having continuously lost against their European adversaries from the late sixteenth century onward.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, there were two conceptions of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. One was based on shared culture. According to this version, the *indigenous culture*, which was sharply differentiated from *civilization*, constituted the basic bond that held people together and turned them into a nation. The second conception of nationalism was based on language. This version had the ultimate aim of integrating the Anatolian Turks with the Turks in Russian Central Asia.²⁰ Having no policies of irredentism, Atatürk (founder of the Republic) and his associates chose to adopt nationalism based on shared culture.

Atatürk argued that the peoples in Anatolia belonging to different religions and ethnic groups had lived together for several centuries and consequently had gone through a mutual acculturation process. Consequently, when the Republic was proclaimed what these peoples shared in cultural terms was far greater than those on which they differed. Atatürk pointed out that when the need arose to give these peoples a common name, the term “Turk” was chosen because at the time it was the most familiar term.²¹
It follows that the founders of the Republic subscribed to cultural rather than ethnic nationalism. They took “Turk” as a nominal term, that is, as a means of reference rather than definition. They perceived the Turkish nation as a mosaic. In their submission, the Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Lazes, and other ethnic groups together made up the Turkish nation. At the time, Atatürk who was later criticized by his detractors for the “exclusiveness of Atatürkism regarding the ‘other’,” even talked of “the peoples of Turkey” rather than the “Turkish people.” Along the same lines, at the Lausanne Peace Conference, which was convened following the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), the Turkish delegation led by İsmet İnönü readily agreed to granting to the different elements of the nation such cultural rights as expressing oneself in one’s own language and celebrating one’s special days.

In turn, the 1924 Constitution introduced civic nationalism. It stipulated that those who profess loyalty to the Republic were Turks. Consequently, legally speaking, the nationalism enunciated by the 1924 Constitution took the non-Muslims living in Turkey too into the fold of Turkish nationalism. There is a need for the qualification of “legally speaking,” because, despite the clear-cut provision in the Constitution, in practice Turkish nationalism continued to display unmistakable signs of cultural nationalism. In the 1940s and 1950s, one came across strong anti-non-Muslim sentiment in Turkey. One such instance was the 1942-1944 Capital Levy, which was enacted to tax unearned wealth that, it was thought, had accrued to some people through black market transactions. Those were the years when quite a number of goods were in great shortage in Turkey because of the World War II. In the event, only the non-Muslims were taxed, and many to their gills. Another example were the 1957 anti-Greek demonstrations in Istanbul in the heat of the escalating conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. It was reported that the demonstrations in question had been planned by the government but had gotten out of control and had ended up in the deliberate destruction of many shops in downtown Istanbul, many of which were owned by non-Muslim citizens of the
country. In recent decades, there has been no such anti-Muslim sentiment in Turkey, even when several Turkish diplomats were killed by the Armenian organization ASALA. On the eve of a Christmas Day (2003), Erdogan congratulated this sacred day of the Christian citizens of Turkey by declaring, “I share with great happiness the feelings of love, solidarity, and tolerance which are always felt intensely on the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Christ, and view them as the common values of humanity. I pray to God that this anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Christ would be an occasion for glad tidings for everybody.”

It should be noted that in the late 1930s and 1940s some Turkish intellectuals referred to Kurds in Turkey as “mountain Turks” (because for long the Kurds had lived in the high fastnesses of southeastern Turkey), and some Turkish statesmen talked of “blood” and “descent” as the constitutive elements of the Turkish nation. These developments led some students of Turkey to argue that the Turkish Republic’s nationalism was neither civic nor even cultural nationalism, but that it was ethnic nationalism. What this view neglected to take into account was that the intellectuals who referred to the Kurds in Turkey as “mountain Turks” did not belong to the public decision-making circles in Ankara. In any case, the target group of these intellectuals was “communists,” and not non-Turkish ethnic groups in Turkey. Still, after a while, the intellectuals in question were tried in the courts for being champions of ethnic nationalism and, thus, ethnic separatism. The discourse of some Turkish statesmen at the time that also smacked of ethnic nationalism, was an outcome of the policy of appeasement that Turkish government then pursued against the German government’s efforts to persuade Turkey to try to liberate the Turkic groups under the Soviet yoke and thus oblige the Soviets to engage some of their troops in the Asian front. As soon as it became apparent that the Germans were losing the war that discourse was discontinued.

Such isolated and/or short-lived diversions toward ethnic nationalism in Turkey came only in the wake of a number of intermittent Kurdish uprisings in 1925-1938. From the early 1940s
to the present and even in the post-1984 period when until recently there were armed clashes between the separatist PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) and government forces, the Turks have not on the whole entertained ethnic nationalism. They developed an unmistakable hostility to the PKK, but, leaving aside some exceptions, not to the Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin as a whole.

From the late 1960s to the present, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) carried the nationalist flag in Turkey. The bulk of the intelligentsia in Turkey has always viewed this party as an extreme right party. It is true that in his youth (1940s), its leader Alparslan Türkes had toyed with the idea of ethnic nationalism. At the time, he had pointed out that those who spoke Turkish with a different accent could not be considered a proper Turk. Later, however, Türkes abandoned such ethnic nationalist discourse and adopted cultural nationalism. He came to the conclusion that only those people having similar feelings and aspirations made up a nation; in mature Türkes’s opinion the Turks and the Kurds had a common culture and thus they together constituted a homogeneous nation.

During the 1970s, the MHP too took it upon itself the mission of defending the country against Communism. In Türkes’ submission, Turkey was going through a spiritual crisis. In order to overcome that crisis there was a need to revive the Turks’ authentic communitarian values. Türkes was also preoccupied with the goal of modernizing the country. In order to accomplish that goal in the shortest possible time he was not averse to resorting to authoritarianism. He also kept his distance from the outside world.

All the while, the party had no problems with the Kurds. Even during the post-1984 period when the Kurdish separatism reached it nadir in Turkey, Türkes did not have harsh words concerning the Kurds. On the contrary, he made important contributions to the prevention of the rise of an anti-Kurdish sentiment in the country. In the post-1980 period, Türkes shed his
earlier authoritarianism; he became a seasoned and respected politician who sought harmony and consensus in politics.\(^{30}\)

Türkes died in 1997. Since then Devlet Bahçeli is the leader of the MHP. The MHP was the member of a coalition government with the center-left Democratic Left Party (Demokrat Sol Parti-DSP) and the center-right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) in 1999-2002. Bahçeli acted as deputy prime minister in that government. According to Bahçeli, the markers of nationalism are neither race, nor ethnicity, nor imperialism. Bahçeli has a civic notion of nationalism. His nationalism is based on measured patriotism. Bahçeli once said: “It is not important which particular identity the [Kurdish] people in the southeast think they have. What is important is that they should be of the opinion that Turkey is indispensable for them.”\(^{31}\) On another occasion, Bahçeli declared: “It would not bother us if a Kurd is called ‘Kurd’ as long as that statement is not made with the ultimate aim of disrupting national unity in this country and putting an end to the unitary structure of the Turkish republic.”\(^{32}\) Along the same lines Bahçeli thinks that “Nobody should take advantage of ‘being a Turk’ and so discriminate against other ethnic groups. The word “Turk” needs to be used in a nominal sense: we call everybody ‘Turk’ since we have to call everybody who lives in this country by a common name.”\(^{33}\) In Bahçeli’s opinion, a political party should not represent only one ethnic group. Not unlike Türkes, Bahçeli is also interested in elevating Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization. However, unlike young and semi-mature-Türkes, Bahçeli has no problems with democracy. In Bahçeli’s view, “democracy would foster respect for different views and ideas and thus make a significant contribution to social peace and harmony.”\(^{34}\)

Bahçeli’s nationalism is also open to outside world. As he once put it, “If there is a national state there would be a national identity; if there is a national identity there would be nationalism. However, this would not mean that nationalism in question should be an inward-looking one.”\(^{35}\) Bahçeli thinks that the Turkish economy should fully integrate with the world
economy. He views globalization as a fact of life and, unlike Türkes, Bahçeli thinks that the Turks should adopt universal values.

On the other hand, in Bahçeli’s opinion, Turkey’s articulation with the outside world should not have major adverse effects on that country. He thinks that people everywhere would live in peace and harmony if their relations are based on global justice. In Bahçeli’s estimation, Turkey should not terminate its relations with the EU. However, Bahçeli thinks that some Europeans are trying to promote Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. He argues that such efforts may lead to the emergence of a new cultural cleavage in Turkey, which it would be difficult to resolve by democratic means. He points out that the EU should not display a double-standard concerning terrorism, adding that in all international legal charters terror is considered as an act against humanity. Bahçeli thinks the EU should make a clear distinction between terror and human rights, and calls upon the EU to refrain from engaging in unjust behavior against the Turks. Despite his reservations about the EU Bahçeli is not against Turkey’s becoming a full member of that Union. In the 1999-2002 period, he supported the government’s efforts to move Turkey in that general direction.

The Military

The Ottoman Empire was founded by a warrior class. Consequently, the military occupied a prominent place in the governance of the new state. The military also played an important role in Turkey from the end of the nineteenth century to the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. It first became the object and then the subject of modernization. The graduates of the modern military schools opened in the last decades of the nineteenth century played a prominent role in the removal of Sultan Abdülhamid II (reigned from 1876 until 1909) from his throne and the reinstatement of the constitutional monarchy in 1909. In the 1912-1918 period when the Committee of Union and Progress, made up of intellectuals, civil servants, and officers, controlled politics from behind the scenes, officers were involved in the day-to-
day politics. This did not augur well for professionalism in the military. The military took its lesson; the idea that ultimate authority should belong to civilian governments and, therefore, the military should stay out of politics to the extent it can help it became a maxim to which the military faithfully subscribed to this day.

Being for long the subject of modernization, the military believed in rational democracy; in their submission politics consisted of intelligent debate among the well-intentioned and knowledgeable persons for finding out what was best for the country. This led them to take power into their own hands in 1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983. Some students of Turkish politics have attributed the active role the military played in that country to the “military’s being power hungry” and/or “its organic relations with the propertied classes.” These arguments are less than satisfactory. In 1960, the military was concerned with the growing threats to secularism as well as the beginning of a fratricide between the members of the political party in power (Democratic Party—Demokrat Parti-DP) and the opposition party (CHP). In 1971, the pitched streets battles between the left and the right militants prompted the military into action. Their reason for the 1980 intervention was “the threat of political Islam” as well as the glimmers of ethnic terror. In each case, the military came to the conclusion that the politicians in power were not competent enough to deal with the critical problems the country faced.

Since they believed that the ultimate authority belonged to civilian governments each time they took power into their own hands, officers felt an obligation to justify their act. In 1960, they found solace in a report prepared by the then most prominent professors of law that the military had recruited. The professors argued that by resorting to anti-constitutional acts the DP had lost its political legitimacy. In the subsequent interventions, they referred to the 1961 Constitution and the Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces, both of which rendered the military responsible for averting threats to internal as well as external security of
the country and authorized it to use force, if absolutely necessary. In the event, the military in Turkey has not considered its interventions in politics as an exploitation of their power but as a legal responsibility they could not shirk.41

As in the last decades of the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century too the military continued to be the object of modernization. Particularly following Turkey’s joining NATO in 1952, the military became a modern and professional institution. As such, the colonels’ coup of 1960 where several young officers had become members of the Junta, was in later years not looked upon with favor. This was because such coups could easily politicize the military that in turn would have had adverse effects upon their professionalism. Consequently, the 1971 and 1980 interventions turned out to be generals’ coups. Also from 1961 to 1980, the scope of what should the intervenors concern themselves with was consistently narrowed down.

A further step that the military took in order to distance itself from active politics to the extent possible was putting an end to their practice of taking power directly into their own hands. Thus, in 1997 when they came to the conclusion that the coalition government of the religiously oriented Welfare Party and the secularly oriented True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) were rather lax toward what they considered to be a serious threat arising out of political Islam they harshly criticized the government in the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK),42 gave briefings to the members of the higher judicial tribunals, university administrators, and the media, and encouraged the people to turn off and on the lights in their places as part of a generalized protest toward the government. Under such pressure the government had no option but to resign. On that occasion, then President Süleyman Demirel who had successfully tried to de-escalate the political crisis in question, argued that the commanders serving in the MGK had been not acting as the representatives of the military, but as top experts on security matters. The military readily agreed with this particular interpretation.43
In recent decades, the military has considered political Islam and ethnic nationalism as the two most critical threats for the internal as well as external security of Turkey. They have consistently sent unmistakable messages that concerning those two issues they could not remain inactive if appropriate measures were not taken. On one such occasion then Chief of the General Staff, General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu, pointed out that “if necessary the 1997-spirit would continue for thousand years.” On the other hand, the military has wished to see not only the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, but also its deepening. Thus the military has been for Turkey’s becoming a full member of the EU. This is what once then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Yasar Büyükanit, said: “Turkey’s membership in the European Union is a must for the fulfillment of Atatürk’s grand design of modernization. In any case, Turkey’s European Union project overlaps with its social, political, and economic projects.”

Present Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, too declared that “the Turkish Armed Forces had always acted as the pioneer of modernization in Turkey. Turkey’s accession to the European Union will help finally realize that goal.”

Because the military thinks Turkey belongs to the EU, it did not object to have more civilians in the MGK. It also gave its consent to the constitutional amendments that the MGK should no longer “notify the government of its recommendations,” but that it should “make suggestions to the government as a consultative organ” and do it when required, not it itself taking the initiative. Furthermore, the military had no qualms about a constitutional amendment that would have made it possible to challenge the constitutionality of the legislation enacted during the 1980-1983 military intervention, the removal of the military judge from the State Security Courts, and the secretary-general of the NSC being a civilian.

In fact, the military urged the government to complete Turkey’s homework of adapting the Turkish legal system to the Maastricht and Copenhagen criteria as soon as possible. Critical here was the clash of opinion within the 1999-2002 coalition government about the abrogation
of the death sentence, and broadcasting and education in Kurdish. While the other members of the coalition government looked at these changes with favor, the Nationalist Action Party of Devlet Bahçeli was for a while not enthusiastic about them. The party was of the opinion that the abrogation of death sentence and, therefore, not carrying out the death sentence given to Abdullah Öcalan by the court, the former leader of the separatist PKK, which was held responsible for the death of close to 35,000 people from 1984 to the present, would severely hurt the feelings of the relatives of those so perished. Furthermore, according to that party, broadcasting and education in Kurdish would have led to the partition of Turkey.

In the past, the military too had thoughts along the same lines. Recently, however, the military softened its position. It suggested that the death sentence should be abrogated, but along with it, another amendment should be made so that those sentenced to life imprisonment should never benefit from an amnesty. In the past, the military was against broadcasting in Kurdish too. The military now thinks that news in Kurdish can be broadcast with the proviso that it should be broadcast only on one of the state TV channels and at designated hours. According to the military, education in Kurdish is unacceptable, because Turkish is the official language of Turkey, which is a unitary state. However, for teaching different mother tongues that exist in Turkey, including Kurdish, special courses can be offered to the fourth and fifth-year students of grade schools following the regular class hours. Thus, when in the summer of 2003 such liberal provisions were enacted by Parliament into law, the military accepted them with good faith.

It is patent that not unlike the Turks in general, officers too have a European vocation. However, not unlike the MHP, the military too thinks that Europe should be cognizant of the threats Turkey faces to its internal and external security and, therefore, should not impose on Turkey measures that would imperil Turkey’s vital security interests. The generals argue that none of the European countries are under the threats that Turkey faced for a long time and
continues to face. They point out that no European country would have supported terror organizations if they had taken as target the partition of a neighboring country of theirs, had made the exporting of its regime to one of their neighboring countries a state policy, and had shown on its official maps the part of the territory of a neighboring country within its own borders. They argue that in none of the democratic countries such as the Germany, France, and US democracy and freedom of speech could be exploited for separatist aims. They make it known that if some international organizations and European countries force Turkey to make a choice between full membership in the EU and Turkey’s national and territorial integrity the military’s choice would be the latter. The military complain that in none of the international platforms did Europe grant Turkey its rights. They state that Europe did not support Turkey’s Cyprus policy; it backed Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and frequently placed the genocide issue, which Turkey rejects, on the agendas of their parliaments. Still, the military emphatically points out that whether or not Europe considers Turkey as a country belonging to Europe, Turkey is of Europe. It is so because the civilizational roots of the Turkish Republic are mostly in Europe.47

It should noted that the military’s perception that Europe does not want Turkey to be in its fold sometimes prompts certain top generals to toy with the idea of Turkey further promoting its relations with some other countries. On one occasion, then Secretary-General of the National Security Council, General Tuncer Kilinç, argued that since the EU had an unfavorable attitude toward Turkey that country should seek ways and means of further developing relations with Iran and the Russian Federation. This comment started a heated debate in Turkey. Chief of the General Staff, General Kivrikoglu, however, clarified the military’s approach to the issue in question. General Kivrikoglu argued that one should scrutinize General Kilinç’s comments carefully and not jump to hasty conclusions. He pointed out that Turkey would, of course, develop relations with such countries as Iran, but it cannot
have cordial relations with such a country. In Kivrikoglu’s opinion, no officer in Turkey could think of setting aside Turkey’s civilizational mission which is Western oriented. By taking this particular position Kivrikoglu once more implied Turkey’s first preference—that of becoming a member of the EU because Turkey perceives itself as belonging to the same civilization with the EU countries. In early August 2003 a similar exchange took place between again General Kiliç and present Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök. At the end of August of the same year, General Kiliç and a few other generals who thought along the samelines were retired. Since then, similar isolated statements continued to be made by some generals though less frequently. However, the Chief of the General Staff no longer states the view of the military in general on this matter, because on such occasions several leading members of the media protest such statements, point out that individual generals cannot talk on behalf of the military, and that taking a negative stance toward the EU is not in the best interest of the country. Faced with such determined opposition, the individual generals who expressed their opinions take back their statements. To use the terminology of the editors of this volume, in recent years, Turkey has made considerable progress toward the “civilian power” substituting for the “military power”, which in any case was not continuous and extensive.

**The Turkish Experience and Security Community in the Mediterranean Region**

The Turkish experiment in nation-building and democracy may be a model for the countries around the Mediterranean. It would show that what was once a traditional-Muslim country can become a relatively respectable member of the international community while retaining some its indigenous characteristics. It was, of course, Japan, not Turkey, that first achieved that feat. However, the fact that Turkey achieved the gigantic transformation in question has a special significance because it has taken place in a particular civilizational
framework – that of Islam –, which according to the Orientalist thought could not be capable of realizing even much less spectacular reforms.

On the whole, the editors of this volume, too, seem to be rather pessimistic concerning this issue. They view “engaging Islam in a dialogue of civilization” as an almost insurmountable task and, consequently, they “do not believe that a Mediterranean pluralistic security community will happen in their life times.” Admittedly, there are important obstacles for an intellectual and political shift on the part of many Middle Easterners toward a sympathetic attitude concerning the project that this volume addresses itself. However, there are also reasons to be optimistic. The unexpected does happen. Who would have thought that the Soviet Union could have collapsed so suddenly? Who would have thought Muammar Qaddafi would have begun to act in a more accommodating manner in his relations with the West?

Turning to the Mediterranean South and East as a whole it is possible to point to some recent developments that may be the harbinger of more substantial transformations in the foreseeable future. In the wake of the two serious earthquakes during which Greeks and Turks rushed to the help of the other, there has been a considerable amelioration of the conflict between the two countries. Consequently, they have come quite close to solve their half-a-century old conflict over Cyprus (March 2004). One comes across a similar weariness of big questions and a turn to a new, more pragmatic, less ideological politics in the Arab Middle East, too. As compared to Nasser and Sadat periods, under Mubarak Egypt has adopted a middle of the road policy in the conflict between fundamentalist Islam and secularism. In recent years, Iran has made progress, though a limited one, toward a non-Ayatollah regime much faster than could be predicted in the wake of the 1979 revolution. Although in many countries authoritarian regimes remain intact, there is a growing yearning for change. In the process such issues as violations of human and civil rights, demands of minorities, and projects of reform have become of the public debate and discourse. More generally, the fiscal
crises that the Arab regimes faced during recent years led some of them, though cautiously, to “bring the society back in.” They began to privatize their economies, political parties were formed, relatively honest elections were held, voluntary associations started to spring up. Such countries as Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Kuwait made considerable progress toward democracy.

A more substantial political opening may be in the cards now that Israel’s Sharon began talking of withdrawing Israeli settlements from certain areas and re-routing the fence between its country and a potential Palestine state; a solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which also, of course, needs the Palestinians to reciprocate in comparable terms, may facilitate the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and decrease the general tension in the area. That the US began striving to bring democracy to the region rather than support authoritarian regimes there may erase from the minds of the people in the region the image of the US as the “Great Satan”, provided, of course, that the democracy in question would not allow sectarian and ethnic conflict to flourish, and instead it would introduce accountability in government and raise the socio-economic life standards in the region.

Is it not possible within the framework of the present project to accelerate the change in the region, the glimmers of which we have recently begun to witness? Above, some of the causes behind the Turks’ partial borrowing from an “alien civilization” during the Ottoman period were taken up. One factor that has not been so far mentioned and which, in fact, enabled the Turks in the Republican period not to borrow partially from another civilization but instead taking the bold step of crossing the civilizational border altogether was the re-interpretation of that other civilization by the founder of Turkey – Atatürk. The latter made the argument that what passes as Western civilization was, in fact, the property of all nations, because they all contributed to it at some point or another. Atatürk stated that the civilization that the Turks were going to join was “contemporary civilization”, not “Western civilization.” With this
reasoning it was easy for the founder of the Republic to make the argument that the Turks were not going to make a transition to an “alien civilization.”

The editors of this volume argue that “the Barcelona Process has to confront the notion that region building in the Mediterranean means engaging Islam, a civilization that is bitter and resentful, that is very different from the West and that does want to converge, if by converging… [it is meant] the adoption of liberal way.” They then suggest that among other things “the development of shared narratives and myths” would help to engage Islam in the Barcelona Process. The Turkish transformation suggests that it would help greatly if what are emphasized are those particular myths and the narratives about certain past and present components of the Western and Eastern civilizations that have close affinity to each other. This “cross-cultural” rather the “universalistic” strategy would facilitate the members of different civilizations not only to tolerate but to have respect toward each others’ civilizations. Once this happens what previously seemed to be alien may begin to become first palatable then even desirable.

If this argument does not miss the mark, the Barcelona Project should help people around the Mediterranean substitute “contemporary civilization” for “Western civilization,” and openly acknowledge the contributions the countries around that sea too made to that common contemporary civilization. This may break the ice and lead the peoples in the region to have a fresh look at the project of developing a pluralistic and loosely coupled security environment in their region.

Did the Mediterranean south and east actually make contributions to the contemporary civilization and are there indeed similarities between the civilizations of the people around the Mediterranean? One should keep in mind that all of the three monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – have drawn from the ancient Middle East, from Greco-Roman antiquity, and from Jewish revelation and prophecy. It is not, therefore, surprising
that their tenets concerning, for instance, morality are not dissimilar. The tenets in question may be viewed as ethical values common to the three monotheistic religions. Also, it was the people who once lived in the Mediterranean East that acted as a conveyor belt between ancient Greek and Chinese civilizations on the one hand and the present-day European civilization on the other.

Turning to Islam itself, in contrast to Islamic history in general, the classical Islamic thought carried with it ideas that were not alien to democracy; in fact, with some reservations, it may be suggested that the opposite was true. The classical Islamic idea of sovereignty drew upon the notions of election, contract, consensus, and accountability. It is true that the electorate was never carefully designated nor was any procedure of election ever formulated, but the elective principle remained central at least to the Sunni jurisprudence. That jurisprudence also stipulated that if the Caliph (earlier, the Prophet’s successor, later a Muslim ruler in general) failed in his duties, he could be removed from his office. Consequently, in theory at least, the Muslim ruler was not above law. The Sunni jurisprudence also contained the idea of consultation; it was stipulated that ruler should consult with suitably qualified advisors. It is true that the consultation in question had no relation to the representative principle for the ruler was to consult in order to make sure that he correctly interpreted the God-given law, but the consultative principle of the classical Islam at least took a stance against one-man rule.53 Islam has not looked upon Judaism and Christianity as false. Muslims philosophers referred to Aristotle as the First Master.54

It is well known that feelings of shame and guilt are quite pervasive in some countries around the Mediterranean. The proposed shifting of gears may help to convince the people in the south and the east of that region that such an institution as democracy, considered by the bulk of the people there as Western, i.e. the handiwork among others of the “Great Satan”, is not an altogether Western institution. Consequently, the feelings of shame and guilt and the
resulting bitterness may be replaced by feelings of honor and satisfaction and therefore by an accommodating attitude. People in the Mediterranean south and east as well as the people in the Mediterranean north would no longer think of the 9/11 as the upshot of clash of civilizations, but as a consequence of the terror deriving from a particular history that they no longer consider their own or the consequence of a legacy perpetuated by some Muslims who are unaware of the fact that none of the monotheistic religions condone violence that target innocent people. In the process, countries around the Mediterranean would view each other with less prejudice and more open-mindedness. This new perception on their part would increase their willingness to cooperate. They would think that they have similar legacies with the people that up to now they have thought of as “the other.” This would start an endogenous change based on a crucial learning process that has been the trademark of the Turkish experience - a transformation to which the editors of this volume as well as Etel Solingen’s chapter in this volume too attribute great significance.

Notes and References

1 See below for an elaboration.


4 Ibid.


9 Serif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,” International Journal of


However, upon the Iraqi opposition and the American administration’s decision, Turkish troops were not deployed in Iraq.


*Sabah* (Istanbul daily), December 24, 2003.


On this party, see Mustafa Çalık, *Siyasi Kültür ve Sosyolojinin Bazı Kavramları Açısından*


35 Nihat and Cemiloglu, *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Milliyetçi Hareket*, p. 12


42 At the time, the MGK was made up of prime minister, ministers of interior affairs, foreign affairs, and defense, chief of the general staff, and four force commanders and was chaired by the president of the Republic. It made recommendations to the government on matters related to the internal as well as external security of the country.


51 For a view along the same lines see, Bassam Tibi, “The Cultural Underpinnings of Civil Society in the Middle East: Islam and Democracy – Bridges between Civilizations,” in
Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Perrson, ed. *Civil Society and Democracy in the Muslim World.*
Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Turkey, 1997


54 Tibi, “The Cultural Underpinning of civil Society in Islamic Civilization,” p. 25