ROUGH JUSTICE IN BEIJING*

Punishing the “Black Hands” of Tiananmen Square

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1. INTRODUCTION

During late spring and early summer, namely, from mid-April to early June of 1989, a tiny handful of people exploited student unrest to launch a planned, organized and premeditated political turmoil, which later developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing, the capital. Their purpose was to overthrow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and subvert the socialist People's Republic of China....

In order to achieve thorough victory, we should mobilize the people completely, strengthen the people's democratic dictatorship and spare no effort to ferret out the counterrevolutionary rioters. We should uncover instigators and rebellious conspirators, punish the organizers and schemers of the unrest and the counterrevolutionary rebellion... and focus the crackdown on a handful of principal culprits and diehards who refuse to repent.¹

(Chen Xitong, Mayor of Beijing, on June 30, 1989.)

In late 1990, the Chinese government brought formal charges against several dozen of the most prominent leaders of the May-June 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement. Trials held in the first two months of 1991 have resulted in sentences ranging from two to thirteen years for students and intellectuals.

Student leaders convicted and sentenced include Wang Dan, Guo Haifeng, and Wang Youcai (four years); Ma Shaofang and Zhang Ming (three years); and Zheng Xuguang (two years). Western diplomats have characterized these sentences as “light.”² They are certainly lighter than those received by countless others accused

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¹ An earlier version of this article first appeared in NEWS FROM ASIA WATCH, Jan. 27, 1991.

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1. Chen Xitong, Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion (speech delivered by Chen Xitong on June 30, 1989 to the standing committee of the National People’s Congress), BEIJING REV., July 17-23, 1989, at I, XX.


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of "counterrevolution" over the past decade, including an estimated several hundred tried secretly since the June 4, 1989 crackdown. But these student leaders have done no more than peacefully exercise their right to free expression as guaranteed under Chinese law.

It is in the trials of the intellectuals where the full consequences of pro-democracy activism have become apparent. The official conspiracy theory maintains that the students who protested in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989 were all along manipulated and deceived by a "tiny handful" of "behind-the-scene schemers," dubbed by party leaders as the "black hands" of the movement.

One such "black hand" is the pioneering human rights advocate Ren Wanding, who was sentenced to seven years in prison on January 26, 1991. Another is Bao Zunxin, a leading editor and historian who signed pro-democracy petitions during the 1989 movement, sentenced to five years on the same day. On February 12, 1991, leading economist Chen Ziming and journalist Wang Juntao both were sentenced to thirteen year prison terms. Liu Gang, a physics graduate who worked in Chen Ziming's private research institute and whose name appeared third on the government's "21 most wanted" list, received six years.

The sentencing of these top dissidents represents a major step in the Chinese government's campaign of repression against the intellectuals of the democracy movement. Yet these dissidents are only a handful of the several thousand who have been held in China since the military crackdown of June 1989. Trials and sentencing of pro-democracy activists have taken place steadily since the crackdown first began, with at least 50 judicial executions of Chinese citizens in connection with the 1989 demonstrations.

The principal targets of the repression up to now have been the working class participants of the democracy movement, particularly those involved in forming independent labor unions. In addition, workers who allegedly engaged in acts of sabotage or violence against government troops on the night of June 3-4, 1989, or in

3. Chen Xitong, supra note 1, at I.
4. Id. at XV.
6. Others brought to trial on the same day were: Wang Haidong, who like Bao was charged with "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement"; and Li Shuntang, Liu Xiaojing, Yang Junzhong, Zhou Wanshui, Lu Xiaochun and Yu Yongjie, all of whom were variously charged with arson, looting, larceny and blocking traffic. China Charges 8 Dissidents in Tiananmen Protests, N. Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, at A2, col. 3. The outcomes of their trials are unknown as of this writing.
7. See ASIA WATCH, REPRESSIO IN CHINA SINCE JUNE 4, 1989: CUMULATIVE DATA (1990); ASIA WATCH, PUNISHMENT SEASON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA AFTER MARTIAL LAW (1990) [hereinafter ASIA WATCH REPORTS].
demonstrations which erupted afterwards all over China to protest the army's attack in Beijing, were arrested by the thousands. Many were quickly tried as common criminals, receiving harsh sentences ranging from several years to life imprisonment, or even death. Thousands more remain imprisoned without charge in squalid, overcrowded detention centers marked by arbitrary violence and brutality by police guards.  

The immediate objective of this first wave of criminal prosecutions may have been to curtail the possible emergence of a Polish Solidarity-style workers' movement in China. The second wave has been directed, by contrast, at the top student and intellectual leaders of the Tiananmen Square movement, all of whom have faced serious charges of "counterrevolution," the most heinous crime possible in China. Having dealt with the workers, the authorities have proceeded with the more demanding task of identifying and punishing the movement's "sinister masterminds." The trials completed at the end of February, 1991 in Beijing thus represent, in effect, the government's symbolic, public decapitation of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

2. ROUGH JUSTICE

The trials now underway violate both Chinese law and minimum international human rights standards. In fact, under Chinese law they should not be taking place at all. Defendants have been held in detention for periods ranging from thirteen to nineteen months. Yet according to China's Criminal Procedure Law, the maximum period that the police may lawfully detain a person before either releasing the suspect or bringing the case to trial is five and one half months.  

8. See Asia Watch Reports, supra note 7; See also Torture in China, News From Asia Watch, July, 1990, and Yao Yongzhan: A Year in a Chinese Jail, News From Asia Watch, September 1, 1990.

9. According to the Criminal Procedure Law of China (1980), the following procedures and time limits must be observed by the judicial authorities—meaning public security organs (police), procuracies (prosecutor's offices) and courts of law—in order for a detention to be lawful:

A detention warrant must be produced at the time of the initial detention, and the detainee's family or work-unit must be informed within 24 hours (Article 43); additionally, public security authorities must begin interrogating the detainee within 24 hours of his detention (Article 44).

If a formal arrest is to be made, the police must request permission to do so from the procuracy within three days (extendable to seven) of the initial detention, and the procuracy must make its decision within three days of receiving the request (Article 48). Article 48 continues: "If the public security organ or the people's procuracy has not handled a matter in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the detained person or his family has the right to demand release, and the public security organ or the people's procuracy shall immediately release him."

When making a formal arrest, the police must show an arrest warrant and the
In several and perhaps all of the cases, formal notices of arrest were not even issued to either the defendants or their families until late November 1990. By that time, most of the defendants had already been held in jail for well over one year, violating Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Article 48 requires police to apply for and the procuracy to approve formal arrest within a maximum period of ten days following initial detention.

The only lawful means to exceed the five and one half month limitation on pre-trial detention is provided for under Article 92. This article requires the Supreme People's Procuracy specifically to request the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) to grant such an extension. The Chinese government has asserted that the NPC had indeed approved the extensions. However, the Taiwanese delegate Huang Shunshing, a member of the NPC Standing Committee, informed the Hong Kong press corps on January 7, 1991 that he had no knowledge that his committee had granted such approval. According to a report in the Hong Kong Standard the following day,

Huang Shunshing said yesterday that the committee had been told not to discuss the plight of dissidents jailed after the June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests. He said Beijing had used the pretext that parliament should not interfere with the judiciary.

Mr. Huang also said he had not seen a request from the people's procuratorate asking the committee if it could postpone the trials of the dissidents, as required by law, and doubted if such a request was ever made.10

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family or work-unit of the arrested person must be informed within 24 hours (Article 50). Interrogation must commence within 24 hours of making the formal arrest (Article 51).

A detainee may not be held in investigative custody for more than two months, unless "the circumstances of the case are complex and the case cannot be concluded before the expiration of the period," in which case the procuracy may grant a one-month extension of custody (Article 92).

Article 92 further states: "In the event of an especially major or complex case that still cannot be concluded after an extension according to the provisions . . . , the Supreme People's Procuracy shall request the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to approve postponement of the hearing of the case."

If, after concluding their investigations, the police decide to prosecute, they must, within the above time limits, make a formal recommendation to the procuracy (Article 93). The procuracy must then render its decision on the matter within one month, this period being extendable to one and a half months "in major or complex cases" (Article 97). If after receiving the request for prosecution, the procuracy determines that supplementary investigations are required, then these must be completed within one month (Article 99). CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF CHINA (1980).

Therefore, taking all permissible extensions into account, the authorities may lawfully keep a person in custody up to a total of five and one-half months before deciding whether to prosecute or release the suspect.

Several reports indicate\(^{11}\) that the authorities have not actually been holding the pro-democracy leaders under the provisions of the Criminal Law at all. Rather, the leaders have been detained under a special form of administrative detention known as "shelter and investigation" (shourong shencha). According to an October 1989 article published in the official law press, there exists "no legal basis whatsoever" for this action.\(^{12}\) This type of detention, employed on a wide scale, is not subject to intervention or monitoring by the judiciary. The police resort to "shelter and investigation" precisely because it frees them from having to observe the various time limitations on detention as specified in the Criminal Law.\(^{13}\)

Most people detained in this way are held at specified "shelter and investigation" centers; many of the pro-democracy movement leaders now being brought to trial were kept at Qincheng Prison, a maximum security facility for political prisoners located in the outskirts of Beijing and administered by the 13th Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security. Once notorious for brutality toward inmates, Qincheng Prison appears to have improved in recent years. A number of the leading intellectuals held there since June 1989 apparently have been treated relatively well. All have endured continuous solitary confinement, however, and there are persistent rumors that others held at Qincheng - including Bao Zunxin, Wang Peigong and possibly also Wang Dan - have been subjected to particularly traumatic forms of mental persecution that may result in long-term psychological damage.

Reports indicate that the main pro-democracy defendants, including Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, were transferred to Banbuqiao Detention Center prior to their trials. Banbuqiao is a strict-regimen jail located next to Beijing No.1 Prison. The authorities also held key Democracy Wall figures, including Liu Qing and Xu Wenli, at the center following their arrests ten years ago.

Access to defense counsel has been minimal. In November 1990, the Associated Press reported from Beijing that the Ministry of Justice had issued two secret directives—one barring lawyers from defending pro-democracy activists without prior approval from the ministry, and the other forbidding defendants to plead not

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\(^{11}\) See, e.g., Jing Bao [The Mirror], No.1, 1991, at 40.


\(^{13}\) Legally, suspects can only be detained for "shelter and investigation" for a maximum period of three months. But because the police are accountable to no one where this method is concerned, the reality is "a universal problem of case reports not being submitted to the higher authorities and of people being held in detention beyond the proper time limits" for periods "as long as four years." Id. at 32.
guilty without first notifying the ministry.14 The report was further substantiated by a two-person fact-finding delegation from the Hong Kong Federation of Students. The delegation traveled to Beijing on January 1, 1991 and met secretly with the families of jailed dissidents, student leaders and recently-released intellectuals. According to Tsoi Yiu-cheong, secretary-general of the federation:

All the lawyers are required to submit their draft defenses for the scrutiny of their lawyers' offices, which will then submit the defense to the Ministry of Justice for prior approval. The mission learned from sources that the lawyers' defense for the dissidents must be written in the context that the dissidents are regarded as guilty. The lawyers are just allowed to submit mitigation in court.15

These restrictions clearly violate the right to a fair trial and represent only the most recent of a whole series of judicial measures which effectively divest the accused's right of defense of all practical meaning. Chief among these are:

— A longstanding ban on the accused engaging the services of, or having any contact with, a defense lawyer until the state has wrapped up its indictment and the case is ready to go to court.16

— The continued existence of emergency administrative regulations, first introduced during the 1983 “crackdown on crime” campaign, which reduced legal safeguards for the rights of the accused to a dangerously low level so “serious criminals” could be “punished swiftly and severely.” 17

— A strong presumption of guilt, found at each stage of the criminal process and symbolized by the distinctive form of criminal adjudication commonly referred to in China as “verdict first, trial second.”18

In a classic violation of international human rights standards, the trials of the movement's leaders have been closed to the public. Selected family members received tickets to the trials, but no international observers or members of the foreign press corps have been allowed to attend.19 The shortcomings of these trials are further

15. Up to 100 will be sentenced say students, Hong Kong Standard, Jan. 10, 1991.
exacerbated by the fact that those being tried as the "black hands" of the movement had legally and peacefully advocated for democratic change.

The Chinese government has repeatedly stated over the past few years—in response to growing international criticism of its longstanding policy of incarcerating peaceful dissidents—that "there are no political prisoners in China." Having violated the criminal law, such people, the government argues, are simple "criminals." Just prior to the 1989 democracy movement, however, legal opinion in China moved increasingly towards the view that the charge of "counterrevolution" should be abolished and replaced with something less blatantly political. In a book published in 1989, a Chinese jurist frankly pointed out, "Counterrevolution is a political concept, not a legal one." The book even cited, as a reason for abolishing the charge of "counterrevolution," its incompatibility with basic standards of international law:

Abolishing the crime of counterrevolution and replacing it with the crime of endangering the security of the state would benefit China in terms of its struggles on the international level. Since the charge of counterrevolution obviously belongs to the category of political crime, and the international standard holds that there should be 'no extradition of political criminals,' it would otherwise be very difficult for China to bring to justice and punish those counterrevolutionary criminals who endanger the security of the state and then escape from China.20

The official denial that China has political prisoners is also contradicted in a 1986 textbook on criminal statistics. The book is of the "restricted circulation" (neibu) variety, a kind of publication to which all foreigners and most Chinese are denied access:

In our surveys of criminal cases, crimes are generally ranked according to category. The two categories of crime are: those of a political nature, and those of a non-political nature. By political crime is meant counterrevolution. . . .21

The following account of the defendants' long record of pro-democracy work represents an attempt to rectify the grossly distorted version of their activities which appeared in official prosecution indictments. Instead of the "conspiracy" claimed by the prosecution, the facts reveal a consistent pattern of adherence to constitutional norms of behavior on the part of the accused.


3. GENESIS OF THE "CONSPIRACY": CHINA'S DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT, 1976-89

Almost immediately, the Tiananmen Incident was labelled "counter-revolutionary"... They carried out witch hunts in all places of work to find out who had played an active part at the Square during the incident....

China was on the verge of being turned into a fascist state manipulated by a handful of ambitious leaders. The spontaneous action of the Chinese people during the [Tiananmen Square] events helped to thwart their plans and save the nation from being subjected to a tyranny whose consequences would be inconceivable to us today.22

The April 5th Movement

The passage quoted above offers a salutary reminder of the ease with which judgments once written in stone by the Chinese authorities may be erased and then completely reversed following a change of political power in Beijing. The events so glowingly eulogized by the Chinese authorities in this passage occurred not in the spring of 1989, but in the spring of 1976. The “incident” in question refers not to the Beijing massacre of June 4, 1989, but to the April 5th Movement and the repression that followed. This movement bears close scrutiny, as several of the “black hands” tried in 1989 (among them Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming) began their careers of dissent and pro-democracy activism with the events at Tiananmen Square in 1976.

The April 5th Movement, occurring several months before Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, marked China's long-delayed exit from the chaos and suffering of the Cultural Revolution and initiated the era of reform and modernization associated with Deng Xiaoping. On April 5, 1976, security forces violently suppressed mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square by Beijing citizens mourning the death of Premier Zhou Enlai and protesting the repressive policies of the Cultural Revolution. Hundreds were injured and many more imprisoned. Initially, the demonstrations were condemned as “a serious counterrevolutionary incident”.23 Following Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978, however, the demonstrations were declared to have been in reality “a wholly revolutionary action” by the people of Beijing, a patriotic protest movement against Deng's enemies, the "Gang of Four."24 Almost overnight, the legions of “counterrevolutionaries” imprisoned after

the demonstrations were transformed by the Party-controlled media into "the heroes of Tiananmen." 25

Perhaps the most famous entry in The Tiananmen Poems, the anthology which celebrated that 1978 rehabilitation, was a short poem written in early 1976 by a 17-year-old high school student. The poem marked the death of Zhou Enlai and expressed the young author's anger at attempts by the Gang of Four to outlaw public mourning of the event:

In my grief I hear demons shriek;
I weep while wolves and jackals laugh.
Through tears I shed to mourn a hero,
With head raised high, I draw my sword. 26

In a footnote, the anthology states, "This poem was considered by the Gang of Four as the most counterrevolutionary." 27 Jailed for several months, its author was eventually released and declared a victim of the Gang. Deng Xiaoping's new government rewarded his bravery with a position on the Communist Youth League Central Committee. The name of this erstwhile teenage "counterrevolutionary" was Wang Juntao.

Another of those Deng hailed as one of "the heroes of the Tiananmen Incident" was a 24-year-old man, secretly filmed making a rousing speech to a large crowd of demonstrators outside the Great Hall of the People during the protests of April 5, 1976. Although denounced on national television by the Gang's publicists for carrying out "counterrevolutionary incitement," the speaker, who the authorities referred to at the time only as "Crewcut Shorty" (Xiao Pingtou) because of his distinctive appearance in the secretly-shot film, was never actually identified or caught.

By a strange irony of fate, during the several months the Gang searched for the villains of the Tiananmen Incident, "Crewcut Shorty" safely resided in the one place where the authorities would never think of looking, a prison. Already a convicted "counterrevolutionary," he was released from prison in Beijing on April 4, 1976 prior to his transfer the following day to a labor camp to serve out the remainder of his sentence. 28 Thus, he was able to deliver his impromptu speech in Tiananmen Square against the Gang, and then report back to the police as scheduled without arousing any

26. The Tiananmen Poems, supra note 22, at 24. Note, however, that the book wrongly identifies the author of the poem as being "a young factory worker from Shaanxi Province."
27. Id.
28. Chen was first labelled a "counterrevolutionary" in July 1975, when a letter he wrote to a friend of his, in which he expressed criticisms of the "Gang of Four," was intercepted by the police. Chen's own account of this incident and of his activities during the April 5, 1976 Tiananmen Incident appears in 2 Documents of the Chinese Democratic Movement 114-17 (C. Widor ed. 1985).
suspicion. Only close friends and relatives knew the real identity of "Crewcut Shorty." Chen Ziming—master-to-be of inconspicuous pro-democracy activism—had made a characteristic first appearance on China’s political stage.

Democracy Wall

The official rehabilitation of the Tiananmen Incident led directly to the next major wave of open dissent and pro-democracy activity in China—the famous Democracy Wall Movement. Named after the long stretch of wall at Xidan in central Beijing, where wall-posters and samizdat-style bulletins calling for democracy and human rights first appeared in the winter of 1978, the movement initially received the support and endorsement of Deng Xiaoping himself. Deng regarded the young poster-writers as a useful source of popular leverage in the power struggle he waged against hardline Maoist elements in the Party leadership. Once he defeated his Party enemies, however, Deng promptly dispensed with these allies. In early April 1979, just before the third anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident, he ordered the initial suppression of the Democracy Wall activists.

The most famous of those arrested in this first sweep was Wei Jingsheng, editor of the unofficial magazine Exploration and author of a pioneering article entitled The Fifth Modernization, which identified political democracy as the essential prerequisite for Deng’s “Four Modernizations” of the economy. Sentenced in November 1979 to 15 years' imprisonment for “counterrevolution,” Wei has been held in harsh conditions of solitary confinement ever since.

Another major casualty of the April 1979 crackdown was a young worker, Ren Wanding, who on January 1 of that year posted a “19-Point Manifesto for Human Rights” on Democracy Wall. Ren founded the first-ever organization dedicated to human rights in China, the China Human Rights League which incorporated the manifesto into its founding charter. Imprisoned for four years, Ren upon his release resumed his unofficial human rights activities. In late 1988, on the tenth anniversary of the founding of Democracy Wall, he wrote an article published in The New York Times calling upon student activists to speak out on behalf of imprisoned Chinese dissidents. Ren, who went on to make many speeches in Tiananmen Square during the May-June 1989 protest movement, was arrested several days after the June 4 massacre. On January 26, 1991 Ren was sentenced to seven years in prison.

In the fall of 1979, Deng Xiaoping ordered the closing down of Democracy Wall. The Wall’s activists continued, however, to pro-

duce large numbers of unofficial pro-democracy bulletins and magazines and organized nationwide liaison networks through which they developed and promoted their plans for China's peaceful democratization. The final crackdown came in April 1981. Dozens of the movement's leaders were arrested; many were tried and convicted in the summer of 1982 on charges of "counterrevolutionary" activities. The top leaders, especially the young workers, received sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years' imprisonment. Xu Wenli, editor of the unofficial journal April 5th Forum, and Wang Xizhe, a prominent theoretician in the movement, are still (like Wei Jingsheng) held in solitary confinement today. The fate of several others tried at that time is unknown.³⁰

These various individuals were, in a certain sense, the "black hands" of the Democracy Wall period. Their harsh punishment undoubtedly guided judicial authorities in conducting the trials of the 1989 democracy movement leaders. Similar to their Democracy Wall counterparts, the "black hands" of 1989 were tried within days of each other, having spent between a year and 18 months in detention, the standard length of time needed by state prosecutors in sewing up cases against the "enemies of the people."

As mentioned above, the government's crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement focused almost entirely on the young workers, people like Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli and Ren Wanding, the movement's leading activists who ran most of the unofficial journals. The crackdown left unscathed almost all of the college students and intellectuals who played active and important roles in the movement. It is from this key group of pro-democracy figures, the students and intellectuals of the Tiananmen Incident and Democracy Wall, that several of those tried or about to be tried for their "counterrevolutionary crimes" during the 1989 democracy movement are drawn.

In staging the trials of the movement's main veterans, notably Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming,³¹ the authorities may be attempting to settle accounts that go as far back as 1976. Both of these individuals were leading organizers of Beijing Spring, one of the most influential unofficial journals of the Democracy Wall period. Wang Juntao, then a student at Beijing University and still bathed

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³⁰. He Qiu, editor of the Guangzhou unofficial journal ROAD OF THE PEOPLE, was arrested in April 1981 and later sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. According to an Asia Watch source, He Qiu was released on schedule in April 1991. Another leading theorist of the Democracy Wall movement, Chen Erjin, was also arrested in April 1981 and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Nothing has been heard of Chen since then. A book length manuscript written by him in 1974-75, On Proletarian Democratic Revolution, was published in the unofficial Beijing journal APRIL FIFTH FORUM, edited by dissident Xu Wenli, in June 1979. A full English translation of Chen Erjin's work appears in CHINA: CROSSROADS SOCIALISM (R. Munro ed. 1984).

³¹. See Appendix I.
in glory as a “hero of the Tiananmen Incident,” served as deputy chief editor and wrote many articles for the magazine. Chen Ziming, a second-year student at the Beijing Chemical Industry College at that time, played, as always, a key but inconspicuous and undesignated role, contributing occasional articles and overseeing operations.

The magazine was less radical in content than many of the other Democracy Wall publications, notably Wei Jingsheng's *Exploration*, which rejected Marxism in its entirety and bluntly demanded human rights and Western-style liberal democracy. *Beijing Spring*, however, more accurately represented the movement's majority view, which held that the Party could be reformed and eventually persuaded to carry out political democratization. Thus, the main task of the unofficial movement was to exert grassroots pressure from below to support Deng Xiaoping's program of reforms from above.

In fact, the group had close ties with some of Deng's leading associates. Their articles were reprinted in internal bulletins of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and other key reformist think-tanks. Moreover, in the summer of 1980, Wang Juntao held a four-hour meeting with Hu Yaobang—the future Secretary-General of the Party, whose death in April 1989 sparked the Tiananmen Square movement—at which an intense exchange of views reportedly ensued between the two on China's strategy for democratization.32

Much later, when an associate of Wang was arrested after the June 4 massacre in Beijing, one of the arresting police officials told the man's family, “Our squad has been carrying out surveillance of Chen Ziming's group for more than ten years.”33 Apparently, a special unit from the Ministry of Public Security, operating out of a small booth in the bus park behind Democracy Wall at Xidan, was set up for this purpose in late 1978. The same police officers were retained to carry out this task after the establishment of the Ministry of State Security in 1983.

**THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS**

The year 1980 marked the high-point of the campaign by senior progressives in the Party leadership to introduce a program of cautious democratization. The move, which soon proved abortive, was initiated by Deng himself in a series of speeches that year calling for “reform of the political structure.”34 A key facet of the plan

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33. Source wishes to remain anonymous.
entailed the holding of direct popular elections to the local People’s Congresses in the winter of 1980-81. While these local legislative bodies were largely powerless (their responsibilities limited to such matters as overseeing traffic control and garbage disposal), the election procedures included, for the first time, a provision for the nomination of independent candidates. This opportunity was eagerly seized upon by student pro-democracy activists determined to test the limits of Deng’s renewed promises of democracy, and by others who had escaped the April 1979 crackdown against Democracy Wall.

The elections, which began at factories and workplaces in Shanghai in April 1980, were most hotly contested on the university and college campuses of the capital. At Beijing University and elsewhere, in probably the first modern-style election campaign ever held in China, dozens of student candidates stood forth, each with his or her own distinctive platform and manifesto, backed by impromptu squads of publicists and campaign managers. The list of main candidates in the elections read like a Who’s Who of China’s future dissident movement: Hu Ping, a young research student in philosophy and chief editor of the influential Democracy Wall journal *Fertile Soil*, which carried devastating articles by Hu on China’s need for freedom of speech and independence of the press; Wang Juntao, who came in second place to Hu in the Beijing University campaign only after delivering a controversial speech arguing that Mao had been a “great peasant leader and agrarian revolutionary” rather than, as tradition had it, a “great Marxist”; Fang Zhiyuan, a student of international relations who drafted an unofficial press law and campaigned nationwide for its public endorsement, and who later—together with Hu Ping—went on to lead the U.S.-based Chinese Alliance for Democracy, the first overseas organization of mainland Chinese dissidents; and, last but not least, Chen Ziming, who was successfully elected to represent his college in the local legislature.

The campaigns sent shock waves through a Party establishment long accustomed to regarding the People’s Congress system as being no more than a rubberstamp. Chen Ziming and Hu Ping were both barred from taking up their duly elected positions as people’s deputies. The authorities hastily introduced regulations to prevent any such further unseemly examples of free local elections. Furthermore, all the independent candidates received undesirable job placements upon graduation. During the campaign, Wang Juntao had ignored officials who threatened, “If you continue with this, your future is finished.”35 After graduation, he was sent to work in a remote physics research center in Fangshan County.

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35. Source wishes to remain anonymous.
China's minister of Civil Affairs passed judgment on the whole affair some months later when he said, "During the elections a tiny minority of people made use of the opportunity afforded by the election of people's representatives to carry out so-called 'election contests.' In disregard of the socialist legal system, they spread anarchy and ultra-individualism, conducted secret 'link-ups' and expressed outrageous and inflammatory views. . . . We must resolutely oppose this."

The Student Demonstrations of Winter 1986-87

In addressing virtually every manifestation of pro-democracy sentiment since Deng Xiaoping came to power, Chinese authorities have repeatedly claimed that "a tiny minority" of deviant elements bears responsibility for misleading China's docile and pliant masses. This claim reached the height of absurdity during the massive Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, when more than a million Beijing citizens gathered spontaneously to demonstrate solidarity with the fasting students. The authorities made the same charge in the winter of 1986-87, when tens of thousands of students took to the streets of Shanghai, Beijing and other cities, calling for greater democracy and human rights. Yet while the authorities have attempted to minimize the importance of these protests in the face of such popular mass action, China's democracy movement can no longer be dismissed as the orchestrated conspiracy of a few "black hands."

In the early 1987 crackdown, Hu Yaobang, the Party's general secretary, was swiftly forced from power for allegedly condoning the student unrest. Without Hu to orchestrate the crackdown, certain Party elders came out of retirement to take charge. They blamed the demonstrations on three leading intellectuals: Fang Lizhi, the famous dissident astrophysicist; Liu Binyan, China's leading investigative journalist and critic of the abuse of official power; and Wang Ruowang, an elderly writer and longtime fiery critic of the authorities.

In pinning the blame on only three intellectuals, Beijing authorities had to resort to more subtle ideological gymnastics. The Party did not even try to make a causal link between the activities of the three men and the nationwide demonstrations. Instead, the three were stigmatized as being the embodiment of "bourgeois liberalization" or Western influence.

Thus, the scene was set for the forthcoming show trials of the 1989 Tiananmen movement's "black hands." The Party no longer had to demonstrate that concrete actions of "conspiracy" produced

37. Arrested after June 4, 1989, Wang was not released until November 1990.
concrete results of "counterrevolution." Henceforth, the authorities would only need to show sufficient traces of "bourgeois liberalization" in the form of books, articles or statements by the accused to clinch their case. Any concrete actions by the victims of this process, such as holding meetings or undertaking private pro-democracy initiatives, could then—regardless of their true nature and purpose—be used as collateral proof of the fundamental political charge.

Peaceful evolution: the "plot" thickens

Finally, the charge of "peaceful evolution" had to be added before the official conspiracy theory could be extended to encompass the entire 1989 Tiananmen Square protest movement. According to the authorities, domestic and foreign enemies of socialist China had purportedly pursued this alleged plot of "peaceful evolution" ever since the early 1950s. As life-long exponents of violent revolution, China's aging rulers strongly resented the methodology in question. After the June 4 massacre, Deng declared that the aim of "peaceful evolution" consists of nothing less than the founding of a "bourgeois republic" in China.38 It is this objective that worries the Party elders most. As the People's Daily explained on December 1, 1989:

The international reactionary forces... will work in coordination with the turmoil created in socialist countries, in an attempt to force them to make concessions to them so that socialist countries may 'peacefully evolve' into capitalist countries, thus turning those socialist countries into their vassal states. Imperialists have openly declared that their principle is to implement political pluralism and market economy in socialist countries; in other words, they want to implement the bourgeois multiparty system and rotatory term of office, while driving the Communist Party out of office and eventually restoring capitalism.39

China's surviving Long Marchers, having faced no significant military threat since the late 1960s, suddenly discovered in the course of the 1989 protest movement that their hold on state power was being eroded by the forces of internal social change. For them, the erection of the "Goddess of Democracy" in Tiananmen Square in late May 1989 was a concrete symbol of the crime of "peaceful evolution."

The students: preparing for 1989

If the pro-democracy intellectuals were the movement's thinkers and strategists, the students were its active vanguard. As organizers of the massive street demonstrations and the occupation of Tiananmen Square, student leaders such as Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng maintained much higher profiles than the intellectuals during the events of April-June 1989. They proved to be highly adept at the tactics of mass activism, skillfully deploying such techniques of non-violent protest as hunger strikes and peaceful sit-ins to generate sympathy and support from the general public.

The students planned and prepared for the events of spring 1989 for some time. Eager for an opportunity to resume the large-scale student protest movement of the winter of 1986-87, they identified 1989 as the most auspicious moment. Shen Tong, a leader of the student “dialogue delegation” which tried to negotiate with the government during the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, later remarked:

We all knew that a major political event would trigger demonstrations, which would snowball quickly into a nationwide movement. Nineteen eighty-nine was a year of significant anniversaries: the tenth anniversary of the Beijing Democracy Wall, the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC, the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the bicentennial of the French Revolution.40

Moreover, on April 15, 1989, when Shen (who now studies in the U.S.) learned of the death of Hu Yaobang, the student leader said, “I was very happy, not that he had died, but that our opportunity had arrived.”41

Throughout 1988, Wang Dan, Liu Gang, Shen Tong and other student leaders in Beijing organized campus discussion groups to explore ideas of democracy and greater freedom as found in the major works of Western philosophy. Wang’s “Democracy Salon” and Shen’s “Olympic Institute,” both based at Beijing University, regularly invited such prominent dissident intellectuals as Fang Lizhi to address their meetings. Even Bette Bao Lord, wife of the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing, attended the gatherings.

However, the scope of these student leaders’ advance plans for pro-democracy activity during 1989 fell far short of the massive protest movement which eventually transpired. Many of the student organizers who initially led the movement, including Wang Dan, were surprised and even dismayed at the way in which the protests snowballed to encompass other, non-student sectors of society—notably the workers. The more radical student leaders such

41. Id.
as Chai Ling and Li Lu, who rose to prominence during the week-long hunger strike and who later escaped to the West, played no major role in the advance preparations for the movement during 1988. Thus the authorities, in their efforts to pin the "conspirator" label on most of the student leaders arrested and tried, find themselves severely hampered by the facts.

The starting point for the 1989 pro-democracy movement was December 1988, when Ren Wanding, in a letter addressed to the foreign media and international human rights organizations, called for an investigation into the status of still-detained Democracy Wall activists and students held since the winter 1986-87 demonstrations. A month later Fang Lizhi, in a move unprecedented for a leading Chinese intellectual, sent a personal letter to Deng Xiaoping appealing for the release of all prominent political prisoners, including Wei Jingsheng. Fang's bold move inspired at least four similar initiatives by other intellectuals in early 1989; most significant among these was a petition signed by thirty-three prominent writers and poets, including Bao Zunxin. This petition, presented to the National People's Congress (China's parliament), requested blanket amnesty for imprisoned dissidents. China's intellectuals, cowed for so long by decades of persecution and humiliation under Mao, had finally started to speak out.

4. PREPARING FOR THE "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REBELLION": THE CHEN ZIMING GROUP

The students and intellectuals played complementary but different roles in the complex social processes that culminated in the Tiananmen Square movement. One group of intellectuals in particular—consisting of some of the most prominent of the "black hands" tried in Beijing—worked mainly through an unofficial, privately funded network of research institutes founded as early as 1985 by Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao. Using advanced survey techniques, the group produced a series of pioneering studies of the social impact of Deng's economic reforms. The studies often drew radical conclusions, identifying in the reforms' continuous expansion of economic and individual autonomy the seeds of a powerful resurgence of "civil society" in China. Such a society offered a gradual blossoming of new interest groups, civic bodies and lobbying organizations, increasingly finding their own voices and generating a mounting chorus of demands for social—and eventually political—pluralism across the country.

Previously, the pro-democracy movement had relied on a strategy of grassroots pressure aimed at encouraging bolder reforms from above. The movement's leading intellectuals at this stage, however, began to focus on the task of extending horizontally the
processes of social autonomy and diversification which Deng's reforms had triggered. For more than a decade, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao maintained that true democracy would be the product of a thorough, organic reformation of social and cultural relations in China. Such changes would primarily depend upon economic diversification as the foundation for other forms of pluralism. By the late 1980s, this process was well underway.

Contrary to the government's claim, the leading intellectuals never showed the slightest interest in "seizing power" or "fomenting chaos and unrest" as a means of achieving their goals. They were well aware of the damage produced by several decades of such methods. Instead, these intellectuals sought to institute social change through the analysis and dissemination of information concerning the reforms. Thus, in raising the specter of "peaceful evolution" and suggesting that it represents an even higher and more insidious form of aggression against the state, the government attempted to justify its repression of a movement characterized principally by reason and non-violence.

The "blackest of the black hands"

Beginning in the early 1980s, Chen Ziming started to organize the first network of independent civic organizations in the history of the PRC. Funds raised privately by Chen and his colleagues financed the entire operation, which centered on an institute set up by Chen in late 1986 called the Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI). The record of this extraordinary enterprise stands as one of the major untold stories of the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement.

Not surprisingly, the names of leading members of Chen's group—Wang Juntao, Chen Xiaoping, Zheng Di, Bi Yimin, Fei Yuan and of course Chen himself—figure prominently on the list of those arrested after June 1989. Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the heaviest charges leveled so far against any of the 1989 pro-democracy activists have been reserved for Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, who were charged with the capital "counterrevolutionary" offenses of "subverting the government" and "seeking to overthrow the socialist state." In a recent internal speech, Premier Li Peng reportedly labeled Wang and Chen as "the black hands behind the black hands" (heishou de heishou). 43 Li insisted to his Party col-

42. Bi Yimin was reported in late 1990 to be under some form of house arrest at his home. Fei Yuan was released in late summer 1989; for details of the government's allegations against Fei, see THE CASE OF WANG JUNTAO, Appendix VII: Verdict in the Case of Luo Haixing, Li Peicheng and Li Longqing, in this same issue. The fate of Li Shengping is not known.
leagues that until these two "old tigers of four dynasties"—a reference to their participation in all the major pro-democracy movements in China since 1976—were finally crushed, the regime would know no peace.

The crucial role played by Chen and Wang in developing those ideas which provided the foundation for the 1989 movement, and the severity of their charges and prison sentences, justify a detailed account of the group's activities throughout the 1980s. Other key leaders of the 1989 movement also made major contributions to the pro-democracy cause. However, few have struggled for so long and as persistently for democratic ideals as "Crewcut Shorty" and the young poet, who in 1976 penned the immortal line, "With head raised high, I draw my sword". Their story provides fitting testimony to the struggle of all those currently detained in China on account of their efforts to achieve a more open, just and rational society.

Early activities

As described above, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao both began their pro-democracy careers during the April 5th Movement of 1976 and at Democracy Wall. Several other members of the group also began their activities around that time. Min Qi and Bi Yimin, who went on to join Wang's Beijing Spring editorial board in 1979, were both imprisoned for several months in 1976 for their participation in the Tiananmen Incident. Li Shengping also started working with Chen and Wang at the time of Beijing Spring. Two others, Zheng Di and Fei Yuan, both students in the economics department of Beijing University, joined the group in 1980. They were active during the 1980 election campaign at the university, serving as advisers in the "electoral support groups" of two independent student candidates.

The group drifted apart after graduation in 1981-82. Chen Ziming was admitted as a graduate student in the biochemistry department of the China University of Science and Technology in Hefei (where Fang Lizhi would later work). He soon dropped out and took a job as an assistant researcher at the Philosophy Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing.

Fei Yuan received a graduate position at Beijing University, but was denied admission because of his involvement in the 1980 election campaign. He returned to work in his hometown in Zheji-
ang Province and in 1983 was successfully admitted to Beijing University graduate school. Fei later worked as a teacher at the Central College of Finance.

In 1983, Wang Juntao quit the low-grade job allocated to him at Fangshan and traveled throughout central and southern China. He eventually settled at the Central China Normal University in Wuhan. (Several students from this college, including Li Haitao and Liao Baobin who played active roles in the 1989 movement, were subsequently placed on “wanted” lists and arrested; Li Haitao was later sentenced to four years imprisonment.) Wang's ideas were consistent from the outset; in his view, the key to achieving the goal of “national enlightenment” was education.

While in Wuhan, Wang set up his first enterprise, the Jiangnan Private Coaching School. In the course of this project he met Xie Xiaojing, who later became a core member of Chen Ziming's SERI group; Liu Weihua, who was placed under house arrest after June 4, 1989 because of his association with the group; and Liu Danhong, who later became head of a SERI research institute established by Chen's wife (Wang Zhihong), and was also arrested after June 4, 1989. (Xie Xiaojing went into hiding after being put on the wanted list. Sometime in 1990 Xie, using his real name, published an appeal in the Hong Kong press on behalf of Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao. Xie resurfaced in early 1991; as of this writing, he has not yet been detained.) All these people helped Wang Juntao run his school. However, the local authorities soon barred Wang from running the Jiangnan school on the pretext that he was “not a citizen (sic) of Wuhan municipality.” The school was effectively taken over through the appointment of a loyal party member as headmaster.

Like many other pro-democracy intellectuals prior to June 1989, Wang Juntao was at times strongly attracted by the theory of “neo-authoritarianism,” which argues that the presence of a strong and enlightened leader, vested with exceptional executive powers, may provide the best possibility for a rapid transition from autocracy to pluralism. The theory's critics (including Chen Ziming), who were perhaps all too well vindicated by the events of June 1989, argued that such a system can always be usurped by an unenlightened despot.

Meanwhile, in 1983 Chen Ziming conducted a social survey on “youth values.” Faced with neither assistance nor funding, Chen simply sent the questionnaires to his friends around the country. Fewer than 1000 replies were received and analysis was limited, due in part to the lack of a computer. The survey, however, was the first privately-conducted public opinion poll in the history of the PRC.
Min Qi, who never attended a university, had become an editor of *Social Sciences in China*, one of the main publications of the prestigious CASS. Because of his job, Min Qi, later a key member of SERI, had extensive social connections. He also conducted many pro-reform conferences and symposia during the 1980s.

Until the late 1980s, when he became a leading associate of SERI, Chen Xiaoping had no contact with Chen Ziming’s group. Born in Hunan in 1960, Chen Xiaoping studied at the University of Politics and Law in Beijing, and then in 1983 entered Beijing University as a masters’ degree student in constitutional law. After graduation, he became a professor at the University of Politics and Law and then deputy director of the university’s constitutional law research office. He first became politically active during student protests in September 1985 against latter-day Japanese “economic imperialism.” Taking advantage of the movement to raise pro-democracy issues, Chen designed a famous wall-poster at Beijing University denouncing a recent government ban on student demonstrations as being “in violation of the Constitution.” He actually signed his name to the poster, thereby gaining instant celebrity among his fellow students. He also became a major focus of investigation by the authorities after the protests ended. Despite intense pressure, however, he refused to recant his views.45

Organizational evolution

In 1980 Chen Yizi, a prominent Party cadre and associate of Zhao Ziyang, set up the Research Group on China’s Rural Development, the first major policy think tank of the Deng Xiaoping era. This group’s findings helped pave the way for the subsequent decollectivization of agriculture and the dismantling of the People’s Communes, perhaps Deng’s most significant innovation since his return to power in 1978. Chen Yizi went on to become a prominent actor in the 1989 pro-democracy movement and was placed on a top wanted list after June 4. He escaped from China and now lives in the U.S.

In 1984, when urban economic reforms were first implemented, Chen Yizi’s group split into two separate organizations: the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic Structure (RIRES), which focused on the problems of urban economic reform, and the Research Institute for China’s Rural Development. These organizations, as official bodies sponsored by the Party-state establishment, received generous funding and extensive office accommodations.

45. Chen Xiaoping turned himself in to the authorities soon after the June 4, 1989 crackdown. He was tried and convicted on charges of “counterrevolution” on February 12, 1991, but was then released for allegedly having “shown willingness to repent.”
After June 4, 1989, however, the authorities regarded RIRES and the ill-fated Research Center for the Reform of the Political Structure (RCRPS) as hotbeds of “bourgeois liberalization.” Gao Shan, formerly the deputy director of RCRPS, was arrested during the 1989 crackdown and is thought to be one of those shortly to be put on trial as a “black hand” of the pro-democracy movement. Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang’s personal secretary, also played a key role in the work of the RCRPS. Thus, Chen Ziming’s private research network, centered on SERI, in effect constituted a parallel, unofficial version of these various government sponsored think tanks.

At its height in the late 1980s, the SERI network included several different institutes, a weekly economics journal, a printing plant capable of producing thousands of book-length titles, a publications distribution company, a fully equipped computer data-processing center, and a small fleet of cars for staff use. In addition to a full-time complement of several dozen paid researchers and employees, many of whom had pagers (still very rare in China), SERI could draw on the research and writing skills of several hundred prominent academics and social scientists across the country.

Whereas Chen Yizi’s RIRES focused almost exclusively on economic reform issues, Chen Ziming’s SERI group concentrated on social issues and problems arising out of the economic reforms. This fundamental difference between the two eventually resulted in SERI gaining more popularity and prestige among China’s reform-minded intellectuals.

Chen Ziming and his colleagues established their own private research organizations instead of working in the official reform-oriented institutes because several of them had served time in prison for their pro-democracy activities. Even for those who were rehabilitated, records of their imprisonment remained in personal dossiers (kept by the government on all citizens), which effectively barred them from employment in the official reform think tanks.

Another reason for the group’s preference for private research institutes involved their basic interests and agenda. Since the 1980 election campaigns, the group had openly declared that their primary aim was to promote the democratic reform of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese society as a whole. Furthermore, their emphasis on the reforms’ social consequences and problems was far too sensitive for the authorities. In fact, SERI and its affiliate bodies were the only organizations specifically devoted to exploring these issues.

46. See Appendix I.
47. See Appendix I.
48. Significantly, Bai Nanfeng and Yang Guansan, heads of the only department in
Since 1976, Chen Ziming and his friends constantly talked about the need for democracy, freedom and human rights. The group’s motto was “social justice.” Chen’s first attempt to systematically research these topics came in 1982-83 when he set up a body called the “Employment Group.” The effort quickly failed, however, because authorities refused to recognize and fund the project as a part of the official think tank network. The lesson Chen drew from this experience was that, henceforth, he would need to become his own fundraiser.

The Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI)

At the end of 1985, Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Min Qi, Li Shengping, Wang Zhihong (Chen’s wife), Zhang Lun, and Yang Baikui and Chen Zhaogang (both of whom were arrested after June 4, 1989 but were later released) began to make preparations for setting up a private research institute. The success of Chen Yizi with RIOES and the prevailing liberal atmosphere of the time had provided inspiration.

Money, however, was their first problem. Some of them sacrificed prestigious and reasonably well-paid jobs in order to undertake their risky venture. Chen Ziming gave up his post at CASS; Li Shengping his job as editor of the journal Encyclopedic Knowledge; Min Qi his editorial position at Social Sciences in China; and Wang Zhihong her job in a small work-unit, where she had been a branch delegate in the Communist Youth League. Such sacrifices were significant, especially in 1985 when there was still no free-labor market and the prospects of success for the research institute were slim. However, Yang Baikui and Chen Zhaogang, both assistant researchers in the Politics Institute of CASS, and Zhang Lun, a sociology student at Beijing University, were able to keep their existing positions after joining the new group. (Zhang Lun was one of only two leading members of SERI who escaped from China after June 4, 1989.)

In 1983-84, Wang Zhihong, using her Communist Youth League credentials, joined with Chen and Li Shengping in taking advantage of a newly relaxed government policy to obtain permission to set up a small book distributing firm, the Beijing Books and Journals Distribution Company. This step provided both funding and an opportunity to develop contacts.

Later, in the autumn of 1985, the group established two correspondence colleges; this was a novel but popular idea, since the government approved of such schools. The two colleges were the

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RIES that dealt with non-economic issues, the Social Research Office, were both arrested after June 4, 1989; they were released only in the fall of 1990.
China Trade and Finance Correspondence College and the China Correspondence College of Administration. The group placed advertisements for student enrollees in the national press, including the China Youth Daily. The response was overwhelming. Almost 250,000 students nationwide enrolled in the two colleges. Initial receipts amounted to 15 million yuan [US$3,176,553], which resulted in a clear profit of 10 million yuan.

The danger of the authorities labeling the group as "capitalist profiteers" was thus considerable. However, the group legally registered the enterprises and found a state-run work-unit to provide them, as required by law, with the requisite "affiliated" (gua kao danwei) status. 49

Initially, the government officially recognized degrees and diplomas issued by correspondence colleges. In the spring of 1989, however, it withdrew this recognition because of the great proliferation of such colleges. As a result, the State Education Committee closed down Chen's two colleges.

Chen Ziming's group followed all the laws and quickly became rich well beyond the objective of a "ten thousand dollar household." Deng Xiaoping dangled this target tantalizingly before the Chinese people as an incentive for them to set about "enlivening" the economy. The group channeled most of the profits directly into the founding and operation of research institutes, with only a tiny portion allocated to staff salaries. Chen Ziming paid himself only 150 yuan per month (US$32); Min Qi received 180 yuan; and Wang Juntao took home a mere 100 yuan. Right up until the moment they fled Beijing after the June 4 crackdown, Chen and his wife lived in a small single room rented from Chen's parents.

In August 1986, at the height of the political reform movement, Chen Ziming's group established their first research organization, the China Institute of Politics and Administrative Science. The institute published a bi-monthly journal called Political and Administrative Studies, edited by Guo Xia, a researcher at the official Higher Party School. This magazine was distributed unofficially (as in the case of the Democracy Wall journals). The institute focused on administrative law (the fashionable issue in 1986) and sponsored several conferences on topics ranging from the problems of the intellectuals to foreign policy and government administration.

A storm erupted over one of these meetings: a symposium on "military-political science," held in collaboration with young teachers from the Central Military Academy and chaired by a staff re-

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49. Many state units eagerly provided this kind of service because it automatically brought them a "management fee" of five to ten percent of the affiliate enterprise's profits.
searcher from the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. When word of the conference reached the ears of the Party's Central Military Commission, official fury boiled over and the whole matter was intensively investigated. All army participants were severely criticized. From that moment on, Chen Ziming had increasing difficulty in finding work-units willing to bestow the necessary "affiliate" status upon his various institutes.

In the winter of 1986-87, a serious split occurred in the group. Li Shengping departed (though without any significant following of personnel) and set up a new organization named the Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute. Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Min Qi, Wang Zhihong and Fei Yuan, showing a Marxist-Leninist flair for such things, promptly established a rival organization called the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI). They left their former office at Yangfangdian, near Muxidi and the Military History Museum (the scene of some of the worst killing by troops on the night of June 3-4, 1989), and moved into large new premises at Shuangquanbao, in the vicinity of Desheng Gate. The center consisted of more than sixty offices on two floors.

Initially Fei Yuan headed SERI, with Min Qi serving as general secretary. There were over forty employees in all, including more than ten full-time researchers (all of whom had resigned from their former jobs in order to join), typists, secretaries, computer operators, data entry staff, librarians and archivists. In addition, the institute had more than 200 unofficial affiliated researchers—including graduate students, university professors, and staff from the various government-sponsored think tanks such as RIER. The institute undertook numerous major research projects and social surveys, all funded by SERI's own funds. SERI had vast contacts, and its publications and ideas exerted great influence in many official circles. As a result, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao became the objects of deep respect and admiration among wide sections of China's intelligentsia.

Structure and Activities

The core of SERI consisted of four academic research departments: the Political Science Department, the Psychology Department, the Economics Department, and the Sociology Department. In addition, there were a number of support sections—science and research, public relations, liaison, accounts, library materials and videotapes. The four main departments developed rapidly,
spawning numerous subsidiary centers and institutes. The affiliate relationship of these latter groups to SERI was not generally known. Thus, they often appeared to be independent and separate units. As expansion continued, the four research departments became mere formal containers for all the various subsidiary centers and institutes that soon emerged.

1) The Political Science Department

This department was the least procreative of the four in generating affiliate organizations, but was one of the most productive. In 1987, for example, the department carried out a pioneering nationwide survey entitled, “A Survey of the Political Psychology of China’s Citizens.” The survey, designed by professional statisticians working at SERI and mainly carried out by Wang Juntao and Chen Xiaoping, gathered altogether 1.5 million items of response data. The preliminary findings, released in late 1987, were reported extensively in the liberal, Shanghai-based newspaper, *World Economic Herald* (whose chief editor, Qin Benli, was later held under house arrest from May 1989 until his death from illness in April 1991). Reports on the survey also appeared in more than ten foreign newspapers and journals. The final analyzed results, with commentary written by Min Qi, were published in February 1989 in a book entitled *Chinese Political Culture: Socio-Psychological Factors in the Delayed Birth of a Democratic Politics*. On the inside cover of the book was printed, in large characters:

Dedicated to Wang Juntao, Chen Xiaoping, Li Ping, Zhang Lun, Fei Yuan, and all the other comrades striving to establish civic culture.

The survey found that ordinary Chinese citizens had limited knowledge of democracy. While the survey did not specifically cover the topic of human rights, the issues of freedom of speech and freedom of association were addressed. Respondents often declared that these rights should not exist. The questionnaire also included false options, such as, “Does democracy mean ‘democratic centralism’?” (i.e. Leninist control), and, “Does democracy mean ‘the masters acting on the people’s behalf?’”. Fourteen percent of respondents actually endorsed the latter option. As Andrew Nathan points out, however, in his recent book, *China’s Crisis*:

In this survey, high percentages of citizens expressed pride in living in a socialist country and supported the notion that the Party

undertook research projects on behalf of large industrial and construction companies, and had probably raised about one million yuan by June 4, 1989. The Beijing Technology Development Center was a computer software company, also founded mainly for fund-raising purposes. Its printing plant printed SERI’s publications, but also raised funds for the network by printing books for other organizations. The Huaxia Readers Club only began late in 1988.
should take the lead in all things. At the same time, 94 percent of the respondents felt that “every person has a share of responsibility for the fate of the country,” 58 percent agreed with the statement “China now has a certain amount of democracy, which needs to be further perfected,” and a strong majority believed that people should be permitted to speak up when the Party makes mistakes.51

The SERI survey concluded, “China’s democracy movement must begin, first of all, with a process of cultural renewal and enlightenment.” SERI printed and distributed three thousand copies of the book, which remained on sale for only a few days after the June 4 massacre. Like all other books produced by SERI, it is now banned in China. The Political Science Department produced other publications, including a book by Chen Ziming entitled A Guide to Contemporary Politics, and a 12-volume series entitled Famous Thinkers which introduced the works of Western writers such as Nietzsche, Weber, Sartre and Freud.

Another major project undertaken by the department was the compilation of a book entitled A Handbook of Chinese Politics. Jointly edited by Chen Xiaoping and Min Qi, this massive work, which covered Chinese politics for the reform decade of 1978-87, would have been the first unofficial study of the subject ever published in China. Intended to be the first in a series of handbooks on the social sciences, the book set forth the current organization and functions of China’s present political system and also introduced the full range of SERI’s ongoing research projects on the topic. The book was already in finished manuscript form by June 4, 1989, but had not yet been printed. Truckloads of armed police and soldiers raided SERI’s offices around June 10, 1989 and seized the manuscript.

The loss of this manuscript was, however, but a small part of the much greater destruction of intellectual effort and suppression of free expression which occurred during the raid. A total of 26 manuscripts, including both original works and translations of contemporary Western political thought prepared by the Political Science Department, were also seized.

2) The Psychology Department

This department early on developed into the Human Resources Testing and Evaluation Center (HRTEV) headed by Xie Xiaqing (whose present whereabouts are unknown) and Wang Zhihong. The center’s staff conducted mainly employee aptitude and ability tests on behalf of outside companies. It also performed studies for the government, such as a study on how to evaluate gov-

ernment personnel which focused on methods used in the West. No other similar organization in China could do this kind of work.

A former associate professor at the Central China Normal University in Wuhan, Xie Xiaoqing quit his job in 1988 to head HRTEV. While the center did not actually publish any books, several manuscripts were with the printers at the time of the June 4 crackdown.

3) The Economics Department

This part of SERI started slowly. In March 1988, however, the department, headed by Fei Yuan and Wang Juntao, bought a newspaper called the Economics Weekly for 300,000 yuan. The newspaper's director was He Jiadong, 60 years old and formerly a deputy director of the official Workers Publishing House. Fei Yuan served as the deputy director of Economics Weekly, and Wang Juntao was assistant to the chief editor.

The journal contained eight pages per issue, with print runs in the tens of thousands. Its influence was immense, approaching that of Qin Benli's World Economic Herald. The main attractions were the regular feature articles by Wang Juntao discussing the various social and economic problems created during the decade of reforms. The journal was similar in emphasis to World Economic Herald; however, because of space allowances, it published longer and more analytical articles. Indeed, Qin Benli is reported to have said, "In terms of predicting and analyzing [China's] economic situation, providing critique and comment on the economic reforms, and in the quantity of its output of articles on economic theory, the Weekly went way beyond the Herald."52

4) The Sociology Department

The department's first activities, carried out between 1987 and 1988, consisted of a series of public opinion surveys on reform of the civil service system; reforms "to separate the Party from the state"; reform of the employment system; and "diversification of the resource allocation system." These surveys led, in March 1988, to the establishment (under the SERI umbrella) of China's first independent public polling center, the Opinion Research Center of China (ORCC). The center was headed by a woman who formerly did research at the Social Research Office of RURES and was employed as a lecturer in the Sociology Department of People's University.

From the outset, the center used by far the most advanced and scientifically sound social survey techniques in China. The center

52. Jing Bao, Jan. 1991, at 44.
also had the best computers available. To ensure the quality of the sample designs, the center hired three Chinese graduates of Michigan University's Survey Research Center and ten academic consultants from Beijing University, People's University, and CASS. The main projects conducted by the center included the following:

— "Survey of the views and aspirations of delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC)." This project, carried out in April 1988, was a resounding success. It established the center's reputation as a frontrunner of the pro-democracy movement. The center sent questionnaires to 1200 people's representatives on the NPC, receiving full responses from as many as 1100. The survey had two aims: to discover the delegates' political and legal knowledge levels (findings: "extremely low"), and to obtain the delegates' views on the hot topic of reform of the political structure. Ten major Chinese newspapers, including the People's Daily, and Hong Kong's Wen Hui Bao, reported the survey's results.

— "Survey of the thoughts and ideology of university students." This nationwide survey, the results of which were also published in the People's Daily and other major newspapers, explored the students' views on such topics as values, the job-placement system for college graduates, and, provocatively enough, their views on the student demonstration movement of winter 1986-87. Most students felt very disillusioned about the latter issue. A common response was, "There's no point. We just want to get on with our studies now."

— In May 1988, ORCC carried out a survey investigation into the problem of the so-called "secularization" or "worldly-ization" of society (shehui shisuhua) — meaning, in the Chinese context, the problem of how to end the prejudiced view that money is something "dirty." The project's findings were prominently reported in Qin Benli's World Economic Herald in late 1988.

— Also in May 1988, ORCC began preparation of two series of books: Translated Works of Contemporary Sociology, covering Durkheim, Comte and others; and Basic Theory of Contemporary Sociology. A total of fourteen titles in these series were ready for publication, either in manuscript form or already typeset and sent to the printers, by June 4, 1989. After the massacre, all were confiscated and banned.

— "A survey of political participation among China's citizens." Conducted in December 1988, this survey was a pilot study in preparation for a forthcoming national survey on the same topic. (Because of the June 1989 crackdown, however, the latter never took place.) It was, as Andrew Nathan explains, one of the most significant of all ORCC's projects:

The study was designed, among other purposes, to collect
the first set of reliable data on the political attitudes of China's citizens. In the pilot study, [the] respondents showed extremely high levels of attention to political news in newspapers and on radio and television. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents said they were interested in politics.

The respondents demonstrated strong aspirations for more democracy. In a question on the role that the National People's Congress ought to play, 65 percent felt it should either "convey the masses' opinions to the government" or "set laws and represent the citizens in supervising government," while only small numbers assigned it more passive roles or felt unable to comment.

Seventy-two percent agreed with the statement that "democracy is the best form of government" and 79 percent disagreed with the proposition, "If we implement democracy in our country now it will lead to chaos." Sixty-two percent agreed with the statement, "A country can't be run well if it has too many political parties," and 55 percent did not agree that "If people's thinking isn't unified, society will be turbulent." At the same time, the questionnaire revealed a reservoir of trust in the government; for example, nearly half the respondents said they would expect to receive fair treatment if they sought the help of a government organ.53

Three western sources funded the ORCC survey on political participation in China: the U.S. National Science Foundation; the Ford Foundation; and the Fund for the Reform and Opening of China, established in 1986 in Beijing by the prominent Hungarian-born financier, George Soros. Even before the June 1989 crackdown, the Chinese authorities—doubtlessly anticipating the "peaceful evolution" theme—compiled a dossier on Soros, accusing him of using the Fund as a cover for CIA-backed espionage activities in China. After the crackdown, official reports fingered Chen Yizi, head of RIRES and co-chairman of Soros' China Fund, as also being deeply involved in the plot. Zhao Ziyang's chief aide, Bao Tong—who personally authorized the Fund's establishment in China—has been held by the authorities since June 1989. If the respondents to the ORCC survey knew of these sinister circumstances at the time, perhaps they would have been much more guarded in their answers. More probable, though, is that the allegations would have sharply diminished their remaining "reservoir of trust in the government."54

53. A. NATHAN, supra note 51, at 197-98.

54. Sadly enough, in light of SERI's main objective, Soros' own conclusion on the affair was:

It became clear to me that I had made a mistake in setting up a foundation in China. China was not ready for it because there was no independent or dissident intelligentsia. . . . The foundation could not become an institution of civil society because civil society did not really exist.

ORCC carried out SERI’s final project during May 13-20, 1989, the week of the student hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. It was a two-part “Survey of opinions and attitudes regarding the 1989 student movement.” The first part tested the student’s views; the second tested the views of the general populace of Beijing. Both parts were conducted on a “door to door” basis. Another poll on the same subject was carried out by Beijing Normal College through interviews conducted on the streets. This poll was defective in that those surveyed were by definition the most likely to be sympathetic towards the student movement. Sure enough, the poll found that over 90% of those interviewed supported the movement. The ORCC survey also found a majority in favor of the students’ actions, but smaller in number than in the Beijing Normal College poll. In addition, most of ORCC’s respondents, although supportive, still agreed with the statement, “The student movement won’t be able to achieve anything.” And a majority of the students themselves were concerned that the authorities would eventually retaliate against them. The statistical data from this historic poll are still inside China, so the full findings are unknown.

5. AN ACCOUNT BY A LEADING MEMBER OF SERI: THE GROUP’S ROLE IN THE 1989 PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

What follows is a direct translation of an account given to Asia Watch in October 1990 by a leading member of the SERI research network. This person, who left China after the crackdown, has requested anonymity.

"After 1986, the economic reforms stagnated and political structural reform failed to get off the ground. By 1988, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao started to have strong premonitions that a large-scale movement for democracy and freedom would take place in China during 1989. Therefore, in late 1988, Chen and Wang decided to conduct a dialogue with other concerned scholars and prepare for the forthcoming 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement in 1989. They met with Liu Weihua, head of the Scientific Research Section of SERI (Liu was put under house arrest at his home in Wuhan after June 4), and rented several rooms at the State Council’s No.2 Hostel at Xizhimen in Beijing as the location of a several-month long conference.

"A whole host of specialists were invited to the conference. Academics from the economic field came to discuss China’s economic crisis and its future prospects; political researchers came to assess the prospects for China’s reform of the political structure; historians came to analyze the lessons drawn from previous revolutions and reforms, and to consider what inspiration these might of-
fer for the present problems of reform; and artists and writers came to discuss the contribution that a cultural enlightenment could make towards raising the civic quality of the Chinese people.

"This forum at the No.2 Hostel greatly influenced Beijing’s intelligentsia. It was the first time intellectuals had the chance to exchange views on such matters systematically. (Official state-run research institutes were unwilling to convene discussions of this kind and those who desired such activities had neither the financial capability nor the necessary social contacts.) However, the series of conferences angered the Ministry of State Security. Soon after the first day of the conference, the guards at the hostel entrance began to pay close attention to all the participants. They prevented them from coming and going freely and, in the end, the participants were barred from using or occupying the rented rooms.

"During this period, Liu Gang was busy organizing a series of discussion sessions (also known as democracy salons) at Beijing University. Liu invited Fang Lizhi and his wife, and Bette Bao Lord, wife of the former U.S. ambassador in China, to give talks at the salons. These activities provided Beijing University, the main base of previous student movements in China, with an atmosphere of keen expectation and excitement in the months leading up to the 1989 democracy movement. Agents from the Ministry of State Security soon began to subject Liu Gang to constant harassment. If he stayed for a night at a certain dormitory, then that night or the next morning policemen or officials from the university’s security section would be sure to visit him. In the end, he suspended his activities and left for Anhui to carry out a social survey. After his return, he worked for two months at the Opinion Research Center of China. But at the beginning of 1989, he again threw himself into the task of preparing and organizing for the democratic movement.

"In February 1989, the poet Bei Dao and thirty-two other intellectuals jointly launched a campaign to obtain signatures for an open letter to the Communist Party Central Committee and the National People’s Congress in an appeal for the release of political prisoners. Nearly all of the leading personnel of SERI signed this letter.55

"On April 15, Hu Yaobang died. That evening, Chen Xiaoping met with other young lecturers at the University of Politics and Law to prepare wreaths. The following day, a Sunday, Chen Xiaoping and the lecturers, together with several hundred students,

55. The names of SERI personnel do not, in fact, appear on published lists of the 33 signatories to this petition. However, their names do appear on other similar petitions (for example, the May 20 Intellectuals’ Vow) circulated around the same time; and it is possible that, like many others, they signed the Bei Dao petition at a slightly later date than the original 33 signatories.
carried a wreath measuring two meters in diameter on a flatbed tricycle, pedaled by Chen, to the Monument of the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. In universities and colleges around the capital, big-character posters and slogans commemorating Hu Yaobang and criticizing the government appeared.

"On April 21, the Beijing Students Federation was established at Beijing University. Liu Gang, the only non-student member of the federation's leadership, was the main organizer. Because of Liu's special connection with SERI, the student movement benefitted from the leadership abilities of people with many years of experience of fighting for democracy in China. Thus, from the outset, the 1989 movement was remarkably well organized and strategically advanced. On behalf of SERI, Chen Ziming donated 3000 yuan to the Committee.

"On the evening of April 21, the Beijing Students Federation organized about 200,000 university and college students in the capital to march to Tiananmen Square. They wanted to get there before the curfew so they could participate in the memorial gathering for Hu Yaobang the following morning. Chen Xiaoping and Liu Suli organized a column of marchers from the University of Politics and Law. At the forefront of the column, students carried a huge placard bearing clauses from the constitution protecting civil rights. That evening, all of the SERI committee members went to the Square to be with the students.

"The student movement rapidly gained momentum. The publication of a hostile People's Daily editorial on April 26 greatly sharpened the confrontation between the government and the students. From April 30 to May 2, SERI's committee members booked into the Xiangshan Villa to hold a series of meetings on the situation. Those present at the meetings included Chen Ziming, director of SERI; Wang Juntao, deputy editor-in-chief of Economics Weekly; Chen Xiaoping, editor of the Handbook of Politics; Min Qi, also editor of the Handbook; Liu Weihua, head of the SERI Scientific Research Section; Zheng Di, deputy editor of Economics Weekly; Fei Yuan, deputy director of Economics Weekly; Xie Xiaoqing, director of the Beijing Human Resources Testing and Evaluation Center (HRTEV); Wang Zhihong, deputy director of HRTEV and Chen Ziming's wife; and Bi Yimin, head of SERI's Beijing Contemporary Institute of Applied Technology and the deputy director of ORCC. The meetings mainly focused on discussing the developing situation and assessing SERI's various options.

"The consensus at the meeting was that the student movement was an epochal event in the history of China's struggle for democracy and freedom. It would give the Communist Party the motivation it needed to begin a process of self-reformation, and would be a watershed in the ten-year reform program. Opinions differed, how-
ever, on the question of whether SERI should involve itself in the student movement, and if so, how and to what extent. Some members of SERI stressed how difficult it had been, in the face of surveillance from the Ministry of State Security and the Public Security Bureau, and all the difficulties created by other state departments, for SERI to develop into an influential research institute. SERI was economically independent with its own news media and several dozen full-time researchers, who had already produced real and substantial results. In their view, SERI should proceed very cautiously during the movement to avoid providing the Ministry of State Security with an excuse to close down the institute. Other members of SERI, headed by Wang Juntao, took the view that since SERI was formed voluntarily by a group of people who worked for many years to establish democracy and freedom in China, and the organization’s goal was precisely to strive for political democracy, their choice was clear. If they hesitated to participate in the student movement, SERI could lose forever its leading position of advocacy in the democracy movement and would suffer an immense loss of status among the intellectuals in future.

“The committee members finally decided that they would give the student movement its utmost support by providing help and guidance, but SERI would not stand in the forefront. The People’s Daily editorial of April 26 had talked about ‘an extremely small number of people with ulterior motives [who] continued to take advantage of the young students’ and on this basis defined the movement as constituting a ‘turmoil.’ Thus, avoiding justification of that analysis was important.

“On May 4, Wang Juntao, Zheng Di, Fei Yuan and others initiated a demonstration march by journalists in the capital. Although the march consisted of no more than 200 people, it gave a tremendous boost to the already huge May Fourth demonstration when the journalists hoisted placards demanding press freedom and joined the student marchers at the Square.

“By May 19, the eve of martial law, all the SERI’s various sections began to participate actively in the movement. The Economic Weekly broke through the news blockade by reporting accurately about the student movement every day. Between May 13 and 20, ORCC carried out two public opinion surveys (as referred to above) which revealed support for the movement among Beijing residents and disappointment among students with the government for the way the movement was handled.

“On May 20, martial law was imposed in Beijing. At 10 a.m., SERI committee members met at the Jimen Hotel in the northwest of Beijing to discuss the rapidly changing situation and the measures that SERI should take. The meeting decided that as the Communist Party had taken a stand in direct opposition to the people
and the student movement had entered its most difficult moment, SERI would plunge itself into the movement regardless of the possible consequences for itself.

"In a short period of just over ten days, SERI changed its contact point from the Jimen Hotel to the Dongfang Hotel, then to the Beiwei Hotel and back again to the Guoyi Hotel; nevertheless, it remained under twenty-four-hour surveillance by the Ministry of State Security. The authorities had bugged SERI's telephones and the committee members' pagers and plainclothes personnel followed SERI's leaders. Still, none of the members felt intimidated.

"On May 22, under the leadership and organization of Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, the Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital (JLGACC) was formed (also known as the Patriotic Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital for Protecting the Constitution). The JLGACC set up various constituent bodies: a theory and research section, strategic section, information section, fund-raising section, propaganda section, liaison section, deployment section, logistics section and security section. The JLGACC and its propaganda Section published a four-page daily broadsheet called News Flash. The broadsheet carried news, commentary and the decisions and documents of the JLGACC. News Flash was printed at the Monument to the People's Heroes and had a considerable impact on the student movement. At the end of May, the JLGACC started to publish the People's Voice (a weekly journal), but as it turned out, only one issue was printed on June 2.

"Beginning in May 22, the JLGACC held meetings every morning at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to consider the rapidly developing situation and discuss what the students' strategy should be. A representative from the student leadership was always present. Sometimes it would be Wang Dan, sometimes Chai Ling, and sometimes Wuer Kaixi. The JLGACC became, in effect, an advisory center for the student movement, especially towards the latter part of the movement when the students at the Square had become completely exhausted and their dialogue with the government had reached a total stalemate. The question of whether to remain in the Square or retreat back to campus had become the main focus of dispute among the students and their leaders alike. Hence, the leadership function of the Joint Liaison Group became ever more prominent.

"Almost all the principal personnel of SERI visited the Square regularly. Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Chen Xiaoping, Liu Gang, Zheng Di, Min Qi and Bi Yimin were to be found in the tents of the students at the Square almost every day. Chen and Wang often held long talks with Wang Dan and Chai Ling to explain their viewpoints and help them to analyze the situation in order to grasp the moment.
There were three non-student leaders in the Command Center to Protect Tiananmen Square: Liu Gang, who served as head of the Logistics Section; Liu Suli, who was the Liaison Section head; and Zhang Lun, leader of the Student Pickets. These three SERI researchers had enormous impact and influence during the latter part of the student movement. On May 27, the Liaison Section of the JLGACC organized a press conference for more than 100 local and foreign journalists. And on May 28 it initiated and organized the Worldwide Chinese Demonstration March.

When 350,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army finally placed Beijing under siege, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao decided that the situation was rapidly heading towards major bloodshed. At a meeting on May 28, the JLGACC proposed that the students retreat from the Square on May 30. Divided in their opinions, the student leaders eventually vetoed the proposal.

At 4 a.m. on June 4, a director of one of the SERI institutes, having witnessed soldiers opening fire and killing people, called from a public phone booth near the Square to inform Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao and other SERI leaders of the situation. Later that same day, as the killings continued throughout the city, Chen Xiaoping called to confirm that Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were still alive. We urged them to go into hiding immediately, but they said that they would remain in the capital as long as a possibility existed for continued activity.

During the several days following 4 June, none of SERI’s principal personnel prepared to go into hiding. All of them held important positions. They felt they had a responsibility to stay behind and look after their various institutes. In addition, they wanted to monitor the situation. Thus, they were unwilling to leave Beijing before the situation had finally become clear. This was why SERI suffered such heavy losses during the crackdown. Seven of SERI’s top leaders were arrested; one escaped abroad; another is now in hiding in China; one is under house arrest; and the present whereabouts of another are unknown. Chen Ziming and his wife, Wang Zhihong, were arrested together in Zhanjiang, Guangdong in October 1989, with several of Chen’s relatives. Wang Zhihong (recently released) was six months pregnant at the time of her arrest, and is said to have later suffered a miscarriage in prison. Wang Juntao was arrested in Hunan around the same time. Liu Gang was also arrested. His mother died in November 1989, and his father was later found to have liver cancer. The wives of other SERI leaders who were arrested or escaped now have to raise and look after their children single-handedly.
6. CONCLUSION

The crimes of Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, and the other "black hands" of Tiananmen amount to no more than the activities recounted above. The facts, all of which are known to China's Ministry of State Security, contrast sharply with the charges leveled by the Chinese government. The intellectuals in question, with their long experience as pro-democracy activists, attempted to provide guidance to the student demonstrators in 1989 and to steer them toward realistic channels of protest that might minimize the chances of violent confrontation. They made, however, little headway. Their advice was often disregarded by the students in Tiananmen Square, most notably when they failed to persuade the students to evacuate the Square in advance of the impending crackdown. The idea that they somehow masterminded the entire protest movement and dictated its unfolding strategy is absurd.

Why, then, have these intellectuals received such harsh punishment in their trials? The answer seems to lie in the goal they have worked for over a decade to achieve, namely, the fostering in China of a strong civic culture. The 1989 movement was a resounding vindication of Wang's and Chen's "civil society" project. The term "citizens" (shimin), for example, which Beijing residents never before used in reference to themselves, was spontaneously adopted during April-June 1989 as the only term which could adequately express the meaning of their popular movement. No longer content with its traditional, Party-designated role as "the masses," the Beijing public displayed a newfound sense of civic responsibility, and demanded that the Chinese leadership acknowledge this role.

In this light, the pathbreaking work undertaken by SERI to analyze the changes being wrought in Chinese society by Deng Xiaoping's reforms was particularly threatening to the authorities. Through their use of modern methods of public opinion polling, the SERI researchers challenged the Party's claim to represent the interests and views of the general populace. Those views could now be directly ascertained, without the need for any intermediary. The attempt in late May 1989 by Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao and the other so-called "black hands" to unite and coordinate the disparate protest activities of the students, workers, and intellectuals within the framework of the JLGACC doubtless sealed their fate. But in the eyes of the authorities, what probably constituted their greatest crime was the attempt—patiently pursued through social-scientific research for more than a decade—to create the preconditions for the free flow of political information, and hence, for the gradual emergence in China of a truly modern and democratic polity.

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APPENDIX I: THE FATES OF OTHER CHINESE PRO-DEMOCRACY LEADERS

BAO TONG, 57, a senior adviser to ousted Party secretary-general Zhao Ziyang, was last reported to be under house arrest at the Central Party Organization Department guest house.¹ According to the source, a full investigation into Bao Tong's pro-democracy involvement turned up "no criminal evidence," but other reports have suggested that he may still be brought to trial. Bao was arrested several days prior to June 4, 1989, and according to Shijie Ribao, was held in solitary confinement for several months in Qincheng prison on a severely inadequate diet. While other inmates of Qincheng reportedly received good treatment, Bao "remained the exception."²

Bao Tong, labelled a "black hand" conspirator behind the 1989 turmoil, originally was accused of leaking state secrets by revealing the plans for the imposition of martial law at a May 17, 1989 "plotters meeting" attended by leading members of various research institutes. He was criticized by name in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989 speech to the National People's Congress Standing Committee.³ A draft scheme for political reform put together by Bao prior to the crackdown was viewed as "anti-party" by the conservative, anti-reform members of the party leadership.

Prior to his arrest, from January 1988 until June 1989 Bao Tong was director of the Communist Party's Research Center for the Reform of the Political Structure, and was a member of the Central Committee. He is identified with the reformist views of his mentor, Zhao Ziyang, and was Deputy Director of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy when Zhao was the Commission's director. According to an article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, Bao rejected Western-style democracy as being "irrelevant" for China.⁴

BAO ZUNXIN, a former magazine editor and associate research fellow at the Institute of History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was sentenced on January 26, 1991 to

¹. South China Morning Post, June 27, 1990.
³. Supra note 1.
five years in prison. He was described as having "repented." 5 Bao was tried January 15, 1991 at the Beijing Intermediate Court for "agitating counterrevolutionary propaganda." 6 A philosopher and leading intellectual, now in his early fifties, he was notified on November 24, 1990 that he had been charged. 7 Bao, an Anhui Province native, was arrested at home on July 7, 1989, shortly after the authorities' issuance of secret warrants in June 1989. 8 His name appeared on a government "wanted list" dated September 1989, under the heading: "Major criminals on Ministry of Public Security wanted lists who have now either been caught or have turned themselves in."

Bao reportedly is held in Qincheng prison; however, according to an Asia Watch source, he was seen in September 1990 in an army hospital. "Small, frail and in poor health before his imprisonment, he looked no more than 70 pounds, scrunched in a wheelchair." According to a second source, Bao made several suicide attempts after discovering that the authorities had used statements made by him in prison as the basis for arresting several other pro-democracy figures. He is said by the source to have developed signs of mental illness and to require daily medication for heart disease and high blood pressure.

Bao was prominently mentioned in Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989 report, "Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counterrevolutionary Rebellion." Chen singled out Bao for his involvement in the production of several major pro-democracy texts: the May 13, 1989 big-character poster, "We Can No Longer Remain Silent"; the May 14 "Our urgent appeal concerning the current situation," jointly made by twelve intellectuals; and the "May 17 Declaration" (see below). Bao also had argued strongly against the imposition of martial law and had tried to organize his fellow intellectuals to form an independent organization and to support demonstrating students.

Between February and May 1989, Bao also authored several pro-democracy petitions which were circulated among intellectuals for signature. A February 28, 1989 petition demanded the release of political prisoners, including Democracy Wall activist Wei Jingsheng. One in mid-April called on

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the government to heed student demonstrators’ demands for
dialogue and to eschew violence. Another asked the govern-
ment to rescind its decision to restructure a subsequently
shuttered Shanghai liberal newspaper, the World Economic
Journal. The “May 17 Manifesto” was the last petition which
Bao helped write. The document, which equated Deng
Xiaoping with past Chinese tyrants, read in part:

The Qing Dynasty died 76 years ago, but China still has an em-
peror without an emperor’s title—a senile and fatuous autocrat.
Down with autocracy. The autocrats can come to no good end.
Rule by old men must end.9

During the first half of the 1980s, Bao was acting chief editor
of the journal Dushu (Reading), which advocated intellectual free-
edom and openness to the West. From 1983 to 1987, he was editor-
in-chief of the book series Weilai Congshu, (Toward the Future), a
series which introduced new concepts in western social science and
humanities to its Chinese readers. A number of leading younger
intellectuals, now in exile, sat on its editorial board.

Bao was dismissed from his post and expelled from the party
on August 9, 1989 for “stubbornly clinging to bourgeois liberalism
[and] fanning . . . the recent students’ unrest . . . .” In July 1989, he
and nine other authors were banned by the State Press and Publica-
tions Administration.

Bao had been allowed to correspond with his wife. At Chinese
New Year 1990 he was granted a family visit, but since January 24,
1990 there has been no exchange of letters nor had his wife heard
any further news of him prior to the November 1990 indictment.10

CHEN XIAOPENG, 29, a constitutional law expert who worked
to revamp China’s constitution and was outspoken in support of
constitutionally guaranteed basic freedoms, was convicted of sedi-
ton on February 12, 1991, but was released “for voluntarily giving
himself up to police and showing willingness to repent,” according
to Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency.11 According to one
source, Chen did not admit guilt; rather, he told the court he would
have liked to overthrow the “corrupt government.” He went on
trial at 8:30 AM on February 5, 1991 in the east courtroom of the
Beijing People’s Intermediate Court, according to a notice posted
outside.12 Although Chen was arrested shortly after June 4, 1989,
the specific charges against him have never been made public.
Chen’s activities in May-June 1989 included organizing the Beijing

10. Amnesty International, ASA 17/60/90.
1991 (NEXIS, Omni file).
12. Higgins, Crucial Sedition Trial Opens in Peking, The Independent, Feb. 6,
1991, at 10 (NEXIS, Omni file).
Citizens Autonomous Federation and exhorting them to support student protestors. He also was active in earlier student-led protests in the mid-1980s. Chen was a colleague of Yan Mingfu, now purged, who was a close associate of deposed Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang.

**GAO SHAN**, a 34-year-old economist and deputy director of the Research Institute for the Reform of the Political System of the Communist Party Central Committee, was arrested in late June, 1989. According to Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30 speech to the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Gao Shan took part in a meeting on May 19, attended by about twenty leading members of state research institutes, which called for an emergency meeting of the Standing Committee in light of the decision by the Politburo to impose martial law. Gao thus stands accused as one of those who leaked information about the impending imposition of martial law. Gao is a graduate of Beijing Normal University. He was a member of the Rural Development Research Group from 1982 until his most recent affiliation and is a close associate of Bao Tong (see above), former chief advisor to Zhao Ziyang. Gao Shan also acted as adviser to the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic Structure. He is detained in Qincheng prison and reportedly has been tortured.

**GUO HAIFENG** was sentenced to four years in prison on January 26, 1991 by the Beijing Municipal Intermediate People's Court. He was convicted on charges of counterrevolutionary sabotage for attempting to set fire to an armed vehicle. Guo and three other activists, who may or may not be students (Yao Junling, Chen Lai and Li Chenghuan), went on trial on January 9, 1991 according to notices posted outside the court, but the trials were then recessed briefly. The court did not notify families of the trials, and relatives had to search for lawyers who would help them attend the sentencing and file appeals. Guo, 24, a student at Beijing University and at one time chairman of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was seized by troops in front of Zhongnanhai (the residence compound of China's leaders) around 2:00 AM on June 4, 1989, shortly after the arrival in Tiananmen Square of vanguard contingents of the PLA. According to a Beijing Radio report, Guo was captured "on the spot by the martial law enforcement troops while he and a gang of ruffians were trying to set fire to an Army unit's armored vehicle." An official press report said Guo had intended to set fire to the former imperial gate in Tiananmen Square.

on which Mao's portrait is mounted. On April 22, 1989, Guo and two other students knelt on the steps of the Great Hall of the People in an effort to submit a seven-point petition to the government calling for the posthumous rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang, former secretary-general of the Party. Guo also participated in the April 29, 1989 "dialogue meeting" with government spokesman Yuan Mu. Guo reportedly was badly beaten after his arrest.

Han Dongfang, 27, a railway worker in the Fengtai Locomotive Maintenance Section, Beijing, and the founder and leader of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation (BWAF), was released from Qincheng Prison into the care of his family on April 28, 1991. At the time of his release, Han was seriously ill with an advanced and undiagnosed case of tuberculosis. Legal proceedings against Han have reportedly not been dropped, and he may be reimprisoned at any time. In addition, Han's family was reportedly told by the authorities that it would have to bear all expenses for his medical treatment. Han went into hiding on June 4 but was unable to remain underground for long; he turned himself in to the authorities on June 19, 1989 and was held incommunicado from then until his release. Originally held in solitary confinement in Paoju Lane Detention Center in Beijing, Han reportedly was in March 1990 transferred to Banbuqiao Detention Center and charged with the crime of "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement." (Attached to Beijing Prison No.1, Banbuqiao is a notorious detention facility where several leading figures from the Democracy Wall movement were held in the late 1970s.) Shortly after his transfer to Banbuqiao, however, Han was reportedly told that he would eventually be tried not as a political prisoner but as a "common criminal."

The Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation was formed by a group of workers on May 19, 1989, the eve of the declaration of martial law; it was labeled as "counterrevolutionary" by the authorities on June 2, but was not formally declared illegal until June 8. Apart from a small, short-lived workers group which was set up in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, in the winter of 1980, Han Dongfang's BWAF was the first independent labor organization in China since the founding of the People's Republic. The BWAF's Provisional Charter, adopted in Tiananmen Square on May 28, 1989, made clear the organization's intent to operate openly and in full conformity with the laws and constitution of the PRC. Shortly before the crackdown, Han Dongfang said: "I'm not afraid. One can always find ways to survive. I just want us to be able to build an

organization that can truly speak for the workers.”

The BWAF tent-headquarters in Tiananmen Square was the first target of attack by the massive PLA force which arrived in the square in the early hours of June 4. Many of the BWAF’s members and leaders, together with those of similar workers’ organizations in other cities throughout China, were rounded up and arrested in the subsequent crackdown, and the authorities appear to have reserved their harshest treatment for this category of detainees. Before his arrest, Han Dongfang led protest demonstrations against the secret detentions of three members of the BWAF in late May, 1989. He successfully negotiated for their release, but was later accused on this count as being a “leading instigator of attacks on the Public Security Bureau.” On June 14, Han’s name headed the government’s “most wanted” list of pro-democracy workers.

Liu Gang, 29, was tried and sentenced on February 12, 1991 to six years in prison on the charge of “conspiring to subvert the government.” Xinhua, the official Chinese News Agency, reported that his was a “mitigated sentence” because he had “acknowledged his crimes and showed willingness to repent.”

Liu, who was able to choose his own defense lawyer, went on trial February 6, 1991 in the No. 1 courtroom of the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court; the trial lasted three and one-half hours. During the proceedings, Liu spoke for one hour in his own defense. He did not admit to sedition charges, asserting that what he had admitted to under prison interrogation was invalid and should be discounted, since it had been extorted from him by the interrogators under threat of death.

Liu, who graduated from Beijing University in 1987 with a degree in physics, was number three on the government’s list of “most wanted” students. In addition to his pro-democracy activities in the spring of 1989, which included organizing student leaders from all major Beijing colleges, Liu had been active in student protests in the mid-1980s and after graduation had established campus “democracy salons” to discuss controversial political ideas. He was associated with the SERI think tank headed by Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming.

Liu was arrested on June 1989 in Baoding, Hebei Province and has been in solitary confinement since May 1990, two months of which were spent in leg irons. The New York Times reported that, as a punishment for an offense which is not clear, Liu spent several

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days with his arms lashed behind him in a painful position. Liu’s mother was not permitted a prison visit before her death from cancer. His father, a cadre in the Liaoning Province Public Security Bureau’s “complaint” department, was finally allowed to meet with his son. The visit took place a week before Liu’s trial, when his father learned of the indictment. He was given permission to attend the trial.

LIU XIAOBO, 35, the controversial literary critic and author, was convicted of “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” on January 26, 1991, but was exempted from punishment. According to Xinhua, Liu “committed serious crimes but has acknowledged them, showed repentance and performed some major meritorious services.” According to one diplomat, he may have been released in response to U.S. pressure.

Liu went on trial January 16, 1991, according to the notice posted at the Beijing Intermediate Court. His wife received official notice of the arrest on November 17, 1990. According to Shijie Ribao, Liu’s parents were permitted to attend his trial.

Liu, who was described by some students as their “spiritual tutor,” was arrested on June 6, 1989; the arrest was not announced until June 23. At that time, state radio, television and print media said Liu had close ties to Hu Ping, head of the U.S. based organization Chinese Alliance for Democracy, which publishes the journal China Spring. Although Liu did not advocate violence (in fact, he urged students and others to return weapons obtained on the night of June 3-4, 1989), he was accused by the authorities of “instigating and participating in the rioting” and of supporting armed resistance.

On April 26, 1989, Liu returned from the United States, where he had been a visiting scholar at Columbia University’s East Asian Institute, to take part in the democracy movement. He was one of four men who started a second hunger strike at the base of the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square on June 2, 1989. In a declaration issued that night, the four stated: “Through our hunger strike, we want also to tell the people that what the government media refers to as a small bunch of troublemakers is in

23. N. Y. Times, supra note 19.
27. South China Morning Post, Nov. 28, 1990.
fact the whole nation. We may not be students, but we are citizens whose sense of duty makes us support the democracy movement started by the college students . . . .” The four successfully negotiated the withdrawal of students from Tiananmen Square just before dawn on June 3, 1989, which may be the “meritorious services alluded to in the Xinhua report.” Two of the men involved were released in 1990; one has been deported.

By the time of his arrest, Liu, like many other activists, was advocating multiparty democracy, freedom of expression and association and strict implementation of the Chinese constitution, which guarantees most basic rights. He has been reviled continuously by the Chinese media. In an article entitled “The ‘Black Hands’ Make Clear Their Position—Exposing the Fugitive ‘Elite’ of Turmoil,” reprinted in People’s Daily, Liu is accused of returning to China under the auspices of the “China Democracy and Unity League” (presumably a reference to the Chinese Alliance for Democracy) in order to “participate in plotting the turmoil.” He is further accused of having stated, in an “instigation” speech at Beijing Teachers College, “I am not afraid of being blamed as a ‘black hand.’ On the contrary, I feel proud of it . . . .” Another alleged comment, “We must organize an armed force among the people to materialize Zhao Ziyang’s comeback,” reportedly has been used against him.

A native of Jilin province and a graduate of Jilin University, Liu was a faculty member in the Chinese department at Beijing Normal University. He finished his doctoral dissertation there on the aesthetics of Chinese literature in 1988. Liu has strongly criticized some of the older Chinese intellectuals, particularly in “Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals and Politics,” an article published when Liu arrived in New York in 1989.

Liu was held in Qincheng Prison until his release. His family was permitted a visit during the Chinese New Year in late January 1990. He is married to Tao Li, a teacher at the Beijing Language Institute. They have a young son.

LIU ZIHOU, 34, a staff member at the Beijing Aquatic Products Company, went on trial on January 11, 1991 according to a notice posted outside the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court. Liu was charged with the potentially capital offense of “gathering crowds and [engaging in] armed rebellion.” The authorities have refused, however, to disclose the length of Liu’s prison sentence. He was arrested on June 18, 1989 together with fifteen others, described as

“mostly vagrants and idlers,” who were trying to flee China. Liu Zihou is alleged by the authorities to have been the head of the “Capital Workers Special Picket Corps,” an offshoot of the “Beijing Citizens Hunger Strike Corps.” The group, which set up “freedom camps” of tents at Tiananmen Square, is accused of burning military vehicles, setting up roadblocks to stop the army from enforcing martial law and helping erect the “Goddess of Democracy” statue. According to a Beijing radio broadcast, the group’s members had tried to flee Beijing after troops moved into the Square on June 3-4, 1989.

LU JIAMIN, 45, an associate professor of politics at China Labor College (an institution for training cadres of the official labor organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions), and secretary-general of the Labor Movement Society, was released on January 26, 1991 without trial. He and 17 others (including Liu Suli, Chen Po, Xiong Yan and Zhou Yongjun) were found to have “committed only minor crimes and [to] have shown repentance and performed meritorious services.”

Lu was originally charged with “counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation.” Lu was due for release prior to the start of the Asian Games in late September, according to the report, but his unrepentant attitude, evident in his alleged statement that he would never regret his participation in the pro-democracy movement, reportedly resulted in his indictment.

According to Lu’s wife Zhang Kangkang, the well-known writer, Lu had been held in Qincheng Prison, Beijing, from July 11, 1989 onwards. He was imprisoned once before, for a three year period which started in 1969. He was an editor of the unofficial journal Beijing Spring during the 1978-79 Democracy Wall movement.

MA SHAOFANG, WANG YOUCAI, ZHANG MING, AND ZHENG XUGUANG were sentenced on January 5, 1991 by the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court. All four were on the list of “21 Most Wanted Students” issued by the Chinese authorities shortly after the June 1989 crackdown and were the first “most wanted” student leaders to be tried.

Zhang, a 24-year-old Qinghua University automobile engineering student and No.19 on the list, was sentenced to three years in prison as was Ma, a 25-year-old former student at the Beijing Film Academy, who was No.10. Zheng, 21, an engineering student at

the Beijing Aeronautics Academy and No.9 on the “most wanted” list, drew a two-year sentence. Wang, a 24-year-old Beijing University physics graduate and No.15 on the list, was handed a four-year term. Some defendants were also deprived of their political rights for unstated periods. Fan Shumi, a spokesperson for the Beijing Intermediate Court, said Zhang and Zheng were tried in open court and the Washington Post reported Xinhua as saying that more than sixty Beijing residents, as well as relatives of the defendants, were present when the sentences were announced. Foreign journalists and international observers were barred from the trial.

Zhang and Zheng reportedly went on trial November 27, 1990. According to an official notice seen posted outside Beijing Intermediate Court on November 28, 1990 Zhang, a Jilin native and a key figure in the Beijing Student Autonomous Federation, was charged with counterrevolutionary agitation and propaganda. Zheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was charged with counterrevolutionary agitation and propaganda and trying to escape from China, according to the official notice of his indictment posted on November 27, 1990. According to Xinhua, defendants were tried separately, so the trial dates of the other seven are unknown. Nonetheless, official notices posted outside the courtroom charged them all with counterrevolutionary crimes.

All those sentenced, as well as the two who were released, were accused of “inciting subversion against the people’s government and the overthrowing of the socialist system during the 1989 turmoil and rebellion.” Some of the prisoners, though the report did not specify which ones, were also found guilty of “organizing and directing” attempts to impede members of the armed forces charged with enforcing martial law in Beijing; others were guilty of “assembling crowds to disturb public traffic and seriously undermining public order.”

Zhang Ming reportedly was arrested before September 13, 1989 in Shenzhen while trying to escape to Hong Kong. He was held in Qincheng Prison. Zheng Xuguang, a native of the Mi District in Hunan Province, was arrested, probably in late July 1989 in Guangzhou, also while attempting to escape. According to unoffi-
cial sources, Zheng's friends were permitted to deliver supplies to him in Qincheng Prison in October 1989, but were not permitted to see him. It is not known whether Zheng had any visits from his family during his incarceration. Wang Youcai, once the general-secretary of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was arrested sometime between June and September 1989. He had attempted to organize continued student resistance in Shanghai after the June 3-4, 1989 crackdown in Beijing, according to Renmin Ribao. Wang also was mentioned in “Facts about the Shanghai Riot,” an article published in Wen Hui Bao on June 28, 1989 which condemned many leading dissidents. Ma Shaofang, a native of Jiangsu Province and an associate of student leader Wuer Kaixi in the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, reportedly turned himself in to the authorities on June 17 in Guangzhou. His arrest followed a June 13, 1989 state television broadcast of “wanted posters” for twenty-one leaders of the student movement. Ma allegedly made speeches during the protests and with three other student leaders held a May 21, 1989 meeting with government representatives. He was probably detained in Qincheng prison.

REN WANDING (REN AN), a 46-year-old accountant from Beijing, was sentenced to seven years in prison on January 26, 1991 by the Beijing Municipal Intermediate People's Court. According to Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency Ren “was found guilty of grave crimes and showed no repentance.” Ren was placed on trial January 8, 1991, but according to court officials the trial, which was closed to reporters, was recessed the following day. Ren, who had been charged with counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement, is one of the few activists from the Democracy Wall period (1978-79) who took an active role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement. During the movement, Ren made numerous public speeches, as he had since late 1988, calling for the release of political prisoners. He also wrote and distributed articles calling for freedom of expression and the rule of law. Ren was accused in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989 speech, as one of the people who “spread a lot of fallacies” at a 1989 “democracy salon” at Beijing University.

After June 4, 1989 Ren reportedly sought sanctuary at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, but was turned away. He was arrested on June 9 at about 8:00 PM and probably held in Qincheng prison. His arrest was never officially acknowledged until he was officially charged in November 1990. According to his wife, Zhang Fengy-

47. Washington Post, supra note 4.
ing, who was an accountant at the Sociology and Economics Research Institute, Ren was charged in March 1990, earlier than current accounts indicate, with “counterrevolutionary incitement.” Zhang has consistently been denied permission to see her husband, reportedly in poor health, though she has been permitted to send books and clothing. Ren Wanding is the father of a 12-year-old girl.

When the crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement came in 1979, Ren, as founder of the China Human Rights League, was denounced by the authorities as a non-Marxist, as was Wei Jing-sheng, China’s most famous imprisoned dissident. Ren was arrested for the first time in April 1979 and spent four years in prison. His initial sentence was extended when, rather than making an acceptable self-criticism, he wrote two volumes attacking the government. In 1988, on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Democracy Wall, Ren wrote an article for the New York Times in which he called upon activist students to speak out for those in prison and on the business community to make any investment in China conditional on an end to the government’s suppression of dissidents.

WANG DAN, 23, one of the top student leaders of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing, an organizer of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation and No.1 on the list of “most wanted” students, was sentenced on January 26, 1991 to four years in prison and one year’s deprivation of political rights. According to Xinhua, Wang “committed serious crimes but has shown such repentance as confessing his own crimes and exposing others.” Wang, who went on trial on January 23, 1991 according to a notice posted outside the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, was charged with “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement.” The trial reportedly lasted three hours and his parents were not notified of the proceedings until the morning of the trial. The New York Times reported that Wang neither admitted “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” nor did he say that the student movement had been a mistake. Wang’s lawyer, from the Beijing No.1 Law Office, was selected for him by the government. She said she could defend Wang only on the basis that he was guilty.

Family friends reported a notice of indictment was sent by the

Beijing Public Security Bureau to Wang's family on November 23, 1990, at which time they were informed that only family members would be permitted to attend his trial.\(^{57}\) Wang’s father, an assistant professor of geology at Beijing University, and his mother, a researcher at the Chinese Revolutionary History Museum, had difficulty finding a lawyer for his defense.\(^{58}\)

Wang, a native of Jilin Province and a history major at Beijing University, was arrested on July 2, 1989 after meeting a Taiwanese journalist to ask for help in fleeing from China; his arrest was officially acknowledged in August 1989. As of mid-1990, he reportedly had been held in solitary confinement in Qincheng Prison and required to write confessional materials every day. He has been permitted to write letters and friends are permitted to deliver clothes. A friend of Wang reportedly received a postcard from Wang in early 1990 urging him to “keep up the effort.” In February 1990, a U.S. State Department official reported that Wang’s family had “recently” visited him.

Before the crackdown, Wang studied recent political developments in Eastern Europe and wrote an article advocating similar reforms for China. In 1988-89, he was a key organizer of seventeen open-air “democracy salons” at which those attending were urged to discuss controversial subjects. Officials have cited these as evidence that Wang agitated the unrest. They have also accused him of doing the bidding of dissident astrophysicist Fang Lizhi.\(^{59}\) In the same dispatch, UPI reports on a May 1989 article by Wang:

We make no attempt to conceal the aim of the current student movement, which is to exert pressure on the government to promote the progress of democracy. People's yearning for democracy, science, human rights, freedom, reason and equality, which lack a fundamental basis in China, have once again been aroused.

WANG PEIGONG was released on March 8, 1991 after spending almost twenty-one months in isolation in Qincheng prison.\(^{60}\) According to reports, the 46-year-old renowned playwright is tired and extremely thin. Arrested in Guiyang, probably on June 30, 1989, Wang was reportedly charged on June 7, 1990 with “counterrevolutionary activity and the harboring of student leader Wuer Kaixi.”\(^{61}\) Police allegedly discovered documents belonging to Wuer Kaixi at Wang's Beijing home. Although Wang was never tried, a police report at his release said that investigation had established guilt. He was exempted from prosecution because of his “good attitude.”\(^{62}\)

\(^{60}\) Reuters, Mar. 10, 1991.
\(^{61}\) Hong Kong Asia Television, June 7, in FBIS, June 7, 1990.
Wang, who publicly renounced his membership in the Communist Party to show support for the democracy movement, wrote a play called "WM" about the Cultural Revolution. In it he described the ordeal of young urban men and women sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. The work was banned in 1985 and according to a World Journal report, the propaganda department has told all news media to continue to criticize "WM."  

WANG YOUCAI, see Ma Shaofang above.

XIONG YAN, 26, a post-graduate law student at Beijing University, was released without trial on January 26, 1991 (see Lu Jiamin). Xiong, a Beijing Students Autonomous Federation member, and No. 21 on the government’s “21 most wanted” students list, was seized on a train outside Datong, northeast of Beijing in Shanxi province on June 13, 1989. According to the South China Morning Post, Xiong was one of a number of student leaders who met with Premier Li Peng on May 18, 1989. At that meeting, he was quoted as saying, “We believe, no matter whether the government does or not, that history will recognize this movement as a patriotic and democratic movement . . . . The people want to see whether the government is really a people’s government or not.”

There was no news about Xiong, a native of Shuangfeng, Hunan Province, from the time of his arrest until his release. He probably was held with other political offenders in Qincheng prison.

YU ZHENBIN, 28, a cadre from the Qinghai Provincial Archives Bureau, was sentenced to twelve years in prison for organizing a “counterrevolutionary clique” in Qinghai in June 1989. The date of his sentencing is unclear. According to Renmin Ribao, Yu, who was arrested on June 27, 1989 near Xining City, organized the illegal “Chinese People’s Democratic Opposition Party Alliance” in order to overthrow the Communist party and “seize power.” He also allegedly wrote and distributed leaflets calling for a revision of the Chinese constitution, the establishment of a new central government, and an end to one-party rule.

ZHAI WEIMIN, a student leader who ranked sixth on the Chinese government’s list of the “21 most wanted” students was arrested in May 1990. His arrest was confirmed by an official at the Student Affairs Office of the Beijing Economics Institute, according to a July 19, 1990 Hong Kong Television broadcast. He reportedly is held at Qincheng Prison, and may be brought to trial soon.

66. Id.
69. FBIS, May 10 and July 19, 1990.
Zhai Weimin, 22, from Henan Province, went into hiding after June 4, 1989, and managed to evade arrest for almost a year. While in hiding, he continued his work on behalf of the democracy movement through an underground group, the Democratic Front for the Salvation of China, organized in early 1990. Details of the underground group were disclosed by Zhai to Western journalists in a secret news conference which he gave in Beijing in March 1990. Zhai said that more than sixty people had participated in a secret conference held by the Cooperative Committee of the Democratic Front for the Salvation of China in Beijing in February.\(^\text{70}\)

**Zhang Ming**, see Ma Shaofang above.

**Zhang Weiguo**, 45, was released in Shanghai on February 12, 1991. According to a Shanghai Foreign Affairs official, he showed “understanding of [his] crimes.”\(^\text{71}\) Zhang reportedly cannot leave Shanghai and must maintain contact with the police. The Shanghai Procuratorate reportedly told Zhang they had evidence that in late May 1989 he had fabricated “revolutionary slogans charging that the Li Peng-Yang Shangkun clique was attempting a coup and that he had tried unsuccessfully to ensure that these slogans would be used during anti-government demonstrations . . . [W]hile these deeds were against the law, they did not constitute the crime of making counterrevolutionary propaganda and instigation.”\(^\text{72}\)

Zhang, a journalist and Beijing bureau chief for the World Economic Herald, was seized on June 20, 1989 in Jingshan near Shanghai, and formally arrested September 20, 1989 on charges of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. He was first held in a detention center on the outskirts of Shanghai, then moved to Shanghai No.1 Detention Center where he shared a cell with common criminals. Zhang denied that during his incarceration he reportedly undertook a one-week hunger strike at a time when he expected to be sentenced in secret without a trial. Rather, Zhang said from his home in Shanghai after his release, “he insisted his case must be judged solely by the law books.” Zhang, speaking of prison conditions, said, “For the first six months I was required to study political propaganda and to undergo questioning. Later my family brought me books . . . .”\(^\text{73}\) Zhang, who developed a heart problem soon after his arrest, reportedly played a key role in organizing and feeding information to the Herald, one of China’s most liberal newspapers. He also tried to institute legal proceedings to protest the way in which the newspaper was closed down in May

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1989 by then Shanghai party secretary Jiang Zemin. At the time of his release, a Shanghai official said Zhang had "written big character posters everywhere."

ZHENG XUGUANG, see Ma Shaofang above.

ZHOU YONGJUN, formerly a fourth-year student at the University of Politics and Law in Beijing, arrested sometime in June 1989, was released without trial (see Lü Jiamin).\(^7^4\) He reportedly was charged with carrying out counterrevolutionary propaganda.\(^7^5\) A 23-year-old Sichuan native, Zhou reportedly was imprisoned in Qincheng Prison in Beijing.\(^7^6\)

Zhou was a founding member of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation. He was one of three students who on April 22, 1989 knelt for several hours on the steps of the Great Hall of the People and asked to be allowed to hand over a petition to the authorities. On April 23, 1989 Zhou was elected the first chairman of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, which represented twenty-one universities and colleges in the capital. He was dismissed from this post on April 28 after he declined to support the April 27 demonstration march protesting the Renmin Ribao editorial of the previous day, which condemned the student movement as "turmoil" and a "planned conspiracy." The protest march drew massive public support. Zhou continued to play an active role in the pro-democracy movement, however, taking part in the Tiananmen Square hunger strike and later serving, under the name WAN TIE, as a legal adviser to the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation.

\(^7^6\) Shijie Ribao [World Daily News], Apr. 12, 1990; see also Xin Bao, Apr. 12, 1990.
Wang Dan, Student Leader, sentenced to four years:

“More than thirty years ago, Khrushchev’s secret report to the CPSU, the Polish and Hungarian events, and our own Hundred Flowers Movement provided moments of scintillating possibility for an international communist movement hovering on the edge of irrelevance. The saddest thing was that each was followed by a long period of military-autocratic rule in those countries. Today, however, Eastern Europe is again reminding us of the spirit of 1956 . . . .

“What is happening in Eastern Europe should teach us two things. First, we see that the dictatorship of one party (or some similar system known by a different name) should be abandoned, the introduction of democratic politics being a major trend in socialist development. It is now obvious that a refusal to reform the political system is an attempt to protect vested interests, and is against the tide of change. Second, the promising developments in those countries must be attributed to the ceaseless efforts of the opposition inside both the party and the general population. Their prolonged and untiring efforts in pursuit of freedom of speech and the protection of human rights is responsible for the creation of a healthy political atmosphere. It also reaffirms that democracy is not a gift, but the product of struggle from below by the people themselves. In this struggle, the educated elite must play a leading role by acting as the vanguard.

“We think that the path taken by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is the only way to save socialist countries from their internal crises. Political developments in China must learn from these countries. Let us bluntly state: Only when China follows in the footsteps of these Eastern European countries will full democracy and full development be successfully accomplished.”


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Ren Wanding, Human Rights advocate, sentenced to seven years:

“In the final analysis, the 1976 Tiananmen Incident was a movement for human rights. The significance of human rights is more far-reaching, profound and enduring than anything else . . . . The citizens demand freedom of thought, freedom of speech and the release of everyone in the country found guilty of offenses connected with these two freedoms.
"Citizens demand that a national referendum be held to elect state leaders at all levels . . . and that the state uphold the law and punish those Party and state leaders who violate the law . . . . State ownership of the means of production should be gradually abolished in a transition to social ownership.

"Citizens demand realization of the Marxist doctrine that a socialist society is one in which everyone can develop freely. Any socialist country’s form of government is a continuation of the traditional form existing under capitalism. Without the material civilization of capitalism, socialist democracy and freedom cannot survive . . . . We must not only draw on Western science and technology but also on Western traditions, democracy and culture.

"Let ideas smash through the confines of prisons. Let freedom spread far and near. Let the wise people of China share the treasures of all mankind. Let the suffering generations enjoy freedom. Let the younger generation be spared suffering. Eliminate class prejudices and ban deceptive propaganda.

"Secret police and the Party committee of a unit have no right to arrest citizens or investigate them. The secret police system is incompatible with socialist democracy. Citizens demand its abolition . . . . We are 'citizens of the world.' We demand that the borders be thrown open, trade be promoted, culture exchanged and people be allowed to work abroad.

"The China Human Rights League appeals to governments around the world, to human rights organizations and to the general public to support our cause."


* * * *

Wang Juntao, sentenced to thirteen years:

"The purpose of this election should be to choose delegates who truly represent the will of the people and dare to reflect their views and wishes, and who will solidly uphold the people's interests. Those elected should replace, and provide a counterbalance against, our corrupt, muddleheaded, manipulative, untutored and apathetic 'emperor-like' bureaucrats and politicians . . . .

"If I am elected as a people's representative, I will strive to defend the interests of the people and will fight against any threat to those interests from the corrupt bureaucrats and politicians. My reason for standing as a candidate is to try to promote the political democratization of China. Regardless of whether I am elected or not, I will continue to struggle towards this lofty goal for the rest of my life."

The Mayor of Beijing:

"[The] so-called 'democratic salon,' 'freedom forum' and various kinds of 'seminars,' 'conferences' and 'lectures' mushroomed in Beijing's institutions of higher learning. The 'democratic salon' presided over by Wang Dan, a Beijing University student, sponsored 17 lectures in one year, indicative of its frequent activities. They invited Ren Wanding, head of the defunct 'Human Rights League,' over to spread a lot of fallacies about the so-called 'new authoritarianism and democratic politics.' At one point, they held a seminar in front of the Statue of Cervantes, openly crying to 'abolish the one-party system, force the Communist Party to step down and topple the present regime.' They also invited Lu Shuxian, the wife of Fang Lizhi, to be their 'advisor.' Li fanned the flames by urging them to 'legalize the democratic salon,' 'hold meetings here frequently,' and 'abolish the Beijing Municipality's ten-article regulations on demonstrations.' All this prepared, in terms of ideology and organization, for the turmoil that ensued."

CHEN XITONG, Mayor of Beijing, June 30, 1989.

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Fang Lizhi's Letter to Deng Xiaoping:

"Chairman of the Central Military Commission Deng Xiaoping: 'This year is the fortieth year since the founding of the People's Republic of China and also the seventieth year since the May 4th Movement. There will certainly be many commemorative activities centering on these anniversaries. However, in comparison to the past, there are many more people today than before who perhaps are concerned about the present and even more concerned about the future. They harbor the view that the two commemorations will bring forth new hope. In view of this, I sincerely suggest to you that on the eve of these two dates, a general pardon be granted nationally, and in particular, that Wei Jingsheng as well as all similar political prisoners be released.

'I think that regardless of how one evaluates the acts of Wei Jingsheng, the freeing of this man, who has already served approximately ten years in prison, would be a humanitarian act that will promote an excellent social atmosphere.

'This year is also coincidentally the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. No matter how one views this event, the freedom, equality, fraternity and human rights it symbolizes have been accorded universal respect by mankind. Thus, I again sincerely hope that you will consider my suggestion, and in doing so, add new esteem to the future.'
Appl e by Liu Suli’s Wife:

“I am Chang Jingru, wife of Liu Suli who was actively involved in the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Beijing. Two days ago, I received the message that a formal arrest warrant for my husband had been issued by Beijing Procuratorate on November 24, 1990. The charge is ‘counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement,’ and the trial is now pending.

“Mr. Liu Suli, 30 years old, was a lecturer in public administration at the China University of Politics and Law. He headed the liaison department of the Beijing United Consultative Committee at Tiananmen Square during the 1989 pro-democracy movement. He was arrested on June 17, 1989 and detained thereafter at Beijing’s Qincheng Prison. I have not seen him at all since then.

“I came to the United States to continue my education at the end of November 1989. Until today, I have kept silent in the hope that my husband would be released. I never imagined that the result of all my waiting would be a formal arrest warrant.

“My husband loves his country very much. What he did during the 1989 pro-democracy movement was aimed at promoting the reform of China. He insisted on the principles of peace, rationality and non-violence. He committed no crime against his country and he should not be punished.

“During his childhood, he received a head injury which was never completely cured and which sometimes still makes him suffer from temporary loss of memory. I have been told that he often suffers from headaches in prison and is unable to sleep. I am so concerned about my husband’s state of health.

“We have a happy family. Our three-year-old son is too young to understand why he cannot see his dear dad. He needs his dad, and the love of both parents. My husband should be able to live in freedom and to enjoy his fundamental rights as a human being.

“As a wife and a mother, I appeal to the Chinese government: Please release my husband and let him receive basic medical care and treatment.

“I appeal to all who are concerned about the fate of those arrested in China since the June 4 Democracy Movement of 1989: Please help my husband to regain his freedom.”

CHANG JINGRU, November 30, 1990.

* * *

1. Liu Suli was released without trial on January 26, 1991.
Intellectuals’ Vow

“As intellectuals, we solemnly swear on our honor, on our entire conscience, on our bodies and souls, on every shred of our dignity as human beings:

We shall never betray the struggle for democracy built on the lives and blood of the patriotic students; never seek any excuse whatsoever for our own cowardice; never again allow our past humiliations to be repeated; never sell out our own consciences; never surrender to dictatorship; and never acknowledge the present last emperor of China as our lord and master.”

_Open Declaration_ by Bao Zunxin, Yan Jiaqi, Su Xiaokang and seven other intellectuals, issued in late May 1989. Bao, Yan and Su were all placed on government wanted lists after June 4, 1989. Yan and Su both escaped from China. Bao Zunxin was arrested, tried, and sentenced to five years imprisonment.

* * * *

Declaration of the Capital Liaison Group

1. The Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital (JLGACC) shall be known for short as: “Capital Liaison Group.”

2. The Capital Liaison Group is based on the present, great Patriotic-Democratic Movement. It has been spontaneously organized, and is a mass organization of the workers, intellectuals, cadres of the state apparatus, young students, patriotic-democratic elements, peasants and people engaged in business.

3. The goal of the Capital Liaison Group is to unite the different sections of people in the capital. We call on all patriots from different sections, and from all parties and factions, to take action to set up a patriotic-democratic united front, so that the democratic forces can grow and increase in strength, and the republic can be taken along the road of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and civilization.

4. The immediate goal of the Capital Liaison Group is to mobilize all patriotic people to actively assist the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation and other autonomous organizations in the higher education field, and to support resolutely the present Patriotic-Democratic Movement to the very end.

5. The immediate tasks of the Capital Liaison Group include:

   a) With the help of professional journalists, to produce an unofficial publication that will reflect the true feelings and sentiments of the people — to be called _Voice of the People_.

   b) To organize citizen patrol groups to assist the students in maintaining order in the capital, that normal life and social stability may be guaranteed.
c) To mobilize the masses from all sections of the community to do everything possible to resist martial law and thoroughly defeat the conspiracy of military rule imposed by the small clique of autocratic elements.

d) To study strategy and tactics for the furthering of the movement, providing reliable information, practical theories, and suggestions for solving the problems of all patriotic organizations.

e) To coordinate the patriotic elements of all sections of the community so that purposeful, prepared, organized, forceful and united actions can be undertaken against the minority of autocratic forces and in support of the university students.

f) To collect opinions and suggestions from all patriotic elements of the community. Endless effort will be devoted to promote the further growth and improvement of the Capital Liaison Group.

6. The Capital Liaison Group will have the following departments: theory and research, strategy and tactics, information, fund-raising, propaganda and agitation, liaison, coordination, supply, editorial board of the “People’s Voice”, publication and security departments.

7. The Capital Liaison Group bases its action on the will of the majority of China’s citizens. The Capital Liaison Group supports the Constitution and will work within the Constitution, although it feels that the constitution still needs to be amended and perfected.

8. The sole condition for the dissolution of the Capital Liaison Group will be: that after extensive and sufficient polling of public opinion, it is found that the majority of the Chinese people no longer feel that it should continue to exist. Unless this happens, no other factors or force should be able to bring about its dissolution. The hatred and repression directed at us by the autocratic forces will only lead to the further growth and maturity of the group.

9. The Capital Liaison Group is in a condition of continuous development. It is hoped that the patriotic elements and organizations of all the various sectors of society will give their sincere help and guidance. All help and support, whether material or otherwise, will be welcomed. All sectors of the community and people from all walks of life are also welcome to join the organization.

Long Live Democracy! Long Live the People!
Long Live Freedom! Long Live China!
Unite and Pursue the Democracy Movement to the End!

* * * * *

May 25, 1989