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Electoral Institutions, Ethnicity, and Clientelism: Authoritarianism in Jordan

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Kristen Elaine Kao

2015
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Electoral Institutions, Ethnicity, and Clientelism: Authoritarianism in Jordan

by

Kristen Elaine Kao

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2015
Professor Barbara Geddes, Chair

A surprisingly large proportion of the world’s dictators today hold elections, so much so that scholars have coined the term “electoral authoritarianism” to identify this oxymoronic phenomenon. Yet, the role these elections play in shaping authoritarian politics for the regime and its citizenry alike is undertheorized. Do the specific types of institutions that govern elections under authoritarianism matter? In democracies we see sustained relationships between voters and their elected representatives. Do elections shape enduring citizen-state linkages under authoritarianism or are they simply isolated events of state-society interaction? Moreover, how do electoral institutions under authoritarianism interact with salient ethnic cleavages and local political landscapes? I argue that the way in which electoral institutions are structured have meaningful consequences for citizens living under authoritarianism much as they do for those living in democracies – a fact that is almost completely overlooked in the literature. Taking electoral institutions under authoritarianism seriously, this research analyzes the effects of variations in electoral rules on voter behavior, parliamentarian clientelistic service provision, and ethnically-based citizen-state linkages.

Drawing upon data I collected from over two years of fieldwork in Jordan, I investigate how the Jordanian regime overcomes a classic conundrum for dictators who hold elections: how to cultivate widespread loyalty to the regime while maintaining deep-
seated divisions among the elite and the masses alike to avoid threats to their power from unmitigated collective action. I claim that elections help the ruler solve both sides of this quandary. I leverage shifts in the electoral institutional design throughout history to investigate how different types of electoral institutions are structured to ensure that parliamentarians win their seats with narrow voter coalitions rather than broad-based ones, encouraging parliamentarians to win their seats based on clientelistic rather than programmatic appeals. I explain how the use of a single, non-transferable vote system favors political mobilization on ethnic lines when compared to the use of a single-member plurality system in Jordan. The dataset I draw from comprises of the full election results from 1989 to 2013, parliamentarian constituent casework logs, tribal indices I constructed for each electoral district, more than a hundred qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the elections, as well as a national poll of eligible voters in Jordan.

My empirical evidence demonstrates how elections serve as a reliable mechanism of rent distribution in authoritarian settings, facilitating the purchase of loyalty from tribal sectors of the population who have historically been open to trading support for privileged access to state benefits. Under these conditions, parliamentarians spend all of their time catering to the personal concerns of their constituents rather than pursuing national legislation and they become beholden to the regime for fulfilling their requests. In the final chapter, I show how the rules governing the elections can either enhance or diminish ethnic identity as the basis for political mobilization and distribution of government goods and services long after the elections. These findings are evidence that for citizens living in a dictatorship electoral institutional design plays an important role in their ability to access state goods and services through their member of parliament.
The dissertation of Kristen Elaine Kao is approved.

Ellen Lust

Daniel N. Posner

Barbara Geddes, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2015
To my amazing parents . . .

who came from nothing, worked tirelessly to keep our family free from want,

and made it possible for me to follow my dreams
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PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS


CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In a hall for public gatherings in the North of Jordan, just about an hour outside of the capital city of Amman, I meet the members of the Omari tribe who are holding a primary to select their candidate for the upcoming national poll. In stark contrast to the cumbersome, seemingly illogical process that accompanies almost every bureaucratic transaction with the government (for nationals and foreigners alike) in this country, this event is surprisingly well-organized. The heavy chains and locks that must be removed from the ballot boxes, the spectators scaling the trees and outside walls of the building in hopes of sneaking a glimpse at the results through the windows, and the way in which grown men inside the hall who are there to verify the transparency of the count sink to their knees in prayer as the last few votes are tallied all attest to the importance of the outcome of this vote for those involved.

Before having lived in Jordan, I would never have understood why people living in an absolute monarchy – a non-democracy – would invest so much effort in preparing for elections that fail to result in a change in the leadership of the government. My favorite question to ask Jordanians – taxi drivers, my Arabic teachers, and new acquaintances alike – became: “Did you vote in the last elections?” And if the answer was “yes”, I immediately followed up with: “On what basis did you choose your candidate?” The answers to these questions spurred a whole slew of other inquiries surrounding elections under authoritarianism that this dissertation project investigates. Often, the millions of voters who participate in these events do not realize that they live under dictatorship, the result of the increasingly common phenomenon of electoral authoritarianism through-
out the world today. Of course then, there are also many who do not even turn out to vote.

More than half of the world’s population lives in non-democracies (Freedom House 2015, 7) and electoral authoritarianism is the most prevalent non-democratic system of government today (Schedler 2009). When we think of democracies, elections are among the first things that come to mind. Perhaps this is why so many of my contacts are confused about the type of government they live under because under electoral authoritarianism, elections exist. However, under a competitive authoritarian regime, elections are flawed to the extent that they do not provide meaningful contestation for political power (Przeworski et al. 2000) resulting in a ruling regime that is not selected by the vast majority of the citizenry. Unpacking the effects of electoral institutions on political behavior of the elites and the citizenry at the grassroots level in Jordan is the goal of this dissertation.

In recent years, a burgeoning field of studying authoritarian institutions has emerged. As with all research, parts of this project builds upon the studies of electoral authoritarianism that have come before it, hoping to contribute to the discussion and offer some new insights. Much like this dissertation, these studies seek answers to questions such as: Why do dictators bother to hold costly and potentially risky elections? Do elections serve to strengthen or weaken the autocrat’s hold on power and why? Who stands to benefit from elections in a dictatorship? In particular, scholars have looked at the roles legislatures (Boix and Svolik 2008; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Wright 2008) and elections (Blaydes 2011; Geddes 2006; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Wedeen 2008) play in helping dictators solve problems.¹ Because this dissertation looks at elections through the eyes of the differing levels of society, I consider the findings of these studies as they become pertinent to the discussions in the following chapters.

¹Scholars also consider the role of parties in dictatorships (Boix and Svolik 2008; Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999 and 2008; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). But since Jordan does not have strong political parties, these works have less of an impact on this research.
In other areas, this research project offers new empirical data to provide a different sort of analysis than the studies on electoral authoritarianism that came before it. In the literature, there is a tendency to focus on how holding elections helps the upper echelons of the regime solve problems leaving important questions about what goes on within the rest of the society less well explored. In particular, current research tends to ignore variations in electoral institutional design under dictatorships.\(^2\) Do the specific types of institutions that govern elections under authoritarianism matter? In democracies we see sustained relationships between voters and their elected representatives. Do elections shape enduring citizen-state linkages under authoritarianism or are they simply isolated events of state-society interaction? For example, if vote-buying is rampant then we would expect elections to have only ephemeral impacts on the lives of citizens. Studying authoritarian politics in a setting where tribes play an important role in local politics, opens the door to understanding interactions between electoral institutions and ethnic politics. Should we expect similar outcomes from interactions between institutions and local political landscapes under autocracy as we find under democracy? The answers to these questions contribute to understanding how authoritarian governance works and have broader implications for policymakers, international institutions, and ordinary citizens seeking to promote democracy around the world.

In particular, this latter work builds upon that of Blaydes (2011) and Lust-Okar (2006), who highlight the ways in which elections facilitate distribution. As I hope to accomplish in this dissertation, these works contribute to understanding why voters and elites participate in elections that do not result in substantive policy changes, nor changes in the leadership of the government. I depart from this earlier work in that I consider the particular effects of electoral institution design on distributive outcomes in elections. Because Jordan is an ethnically divided country, I consider the role of electoral institutions in either reifying or diminishing ethnic identity in political behavior. In examining the role of tribes in elections in Jordan, I draw from a large

\(^2\) Some important exceptions include works by Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2001), Lust-Okar and Jamal (2002), and Posusney (1998).
body of literature on ethnic clientelism and conflict from other regions of the world such as Africa (Carlson 2015; Kramon 2013; Posner 2004 and 2005), India (Chandra 2004), and other countries of the Middle East (Corstange Forthcoming).

1.1 Plan of the Dissertation

Drawing upon data I collected from over two years of fieldwork in Jordan, I examine the ways in which electoral institutions are structured have meaningful consequences for citizens living under authoritarianism, much as they do for those living in democracies. We have tomes of research on how electoral systems incentivize different behaviors among voters and candidates as well as parliamentarians and their constituents in democracies. Yet, there remains a paucity of serious empirical analysis of how electoral institutions affect these relationships in authoritarian settings. In the pursuit of finding out whether elections lead to the demise of autocracies, scholars have missed the “micro-level dynamics of authoritarian elections and the ways in which they differ systematically from each other” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 404). In an attempt to fill this gap, my research analyzes the effects of variations in electoral institutions on ethnic politics in the very long-lived dictatorship of Jordan. In particular, I examine voter behavior, parliamentarian service provision, and citizen-state linkages covering the period from 1989 to 2013. Being a study of a single country, this research is by no means representative of the considerable variation in regime structures, electoral institutions, and political landscapes that exist under authoritarianism, but it provides a first stab at unpacking what different types of electoral systems actually do in these settings.

In the following chapters, I explore how the Jordanian regime overcomes a classic conundrum for dictators who hold elections: how to cultivate widespread loyalty to the regime while maintaining deep-seated divisions among the elite and the masses alike to avoid threats to their power from unmitigated collective action. I hypothesize that elections help the ruler solve both sides of this quandary. I leverage shifts in the
electoral institutional design throughout history to investigate how different types of electoral institutions are structured to ensure that parliamentarians win their seats with narrow voter coalitions rather than broad-based ones, encouraging parliamentarians to win their seats based on clientelistic rather than programmatic appeals. I explain how the use of a single, non-transferable vote system favors political mobilization on ethnic lines when compared to the use of a single-member plurality system in Jordan. In the following chapter, I offer empirical evidence of how elections serve as a reliable mechanism of rent distribution in authoritarian settings, facilitating the purchase of loyalty from tribal sectors of the population who have historically been open to trading support for privileged access to state benefits. Parliamentarians in this setting spend all of their time catering to the personal concerns of their constituents rather than pursuing national legislation. In the final chapter, I show how the rules governing the elections can either enhance or diminish ethnic identity as the basis for political mobilization and distribution of government goods and services long after the elections. For voters living in a dictatorship, these findings indicate that electoral institutional design impacts the citizenry’s ability to access state goods and services through their member of parliament (MP).

This dissertation investigates electoral authoritarianism from the viewpoints of the regime, the elite level, and from the grassroots finding significant sub-national variation and reinforcing the need to consider interactions between ethnicity and political institutions in studying this phenomenon. The dataset I draw from comprises of the full election results from 1989 to 2013, parliamentarian constituent casework logs, tribal indices I constructed for each electoral district, more than a hundred qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the elections, as well as a national poll of eligible voters in Jordan. With the help of some very dedicated research assistants, I coded over a thousand letters that parliamentarians wrote to the various arms of the regime on behalf of their constituents over periods from six months to two years by the type of service sought and various other indicators. These caselogs are paired with a novel tribal database I built to better
understand the ethnic landscape of Jordanian electoral districts, which estimate tribal size based on voter registration lists supplemented by interviews with tribal sheikhs, parliamentarians, and regular citizens within each district. With funding from the Governance and Local Development Program at Yale and in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead I conducted a national survey that provides attitudinal data from the Jordanian voters’ perspective on elections, clientelism, and tribalism to reinforce the findings of this dissertation. I posit that studying elections in these settings offers important insights not only into how authoritarian regimes work but also developing democracies around the world that struggle with issues of clientelism.

1.2 Segmentation of the Political Arena While Manufacturing Parliamentary Majorities: The View From the Regime

In this chapter I focus on the question: how do the rules governing elections in Jordan help the regime to manage the political behavior of elites and regular citizens? I examine how the regime attempts to shape institutions to suit its needs, but it must also work with the political structures it has inherited from the past. I offer a basic understanding of the Jordanian political scene and I describe the development of its electoral institutional structure. I also discuss how the regime employs electoral institutions that favor narrow voting coalitions and disincentivize the formation of broad-based political camps or parties as a result of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1989 elections. Between 1989 and 2013, the regime implemented strategic shifts in the electoral institutions from a bloc vote system in which voters have the same number of votes to elect representatives as there are seats in the multimember district to a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in which voters have only one vote to elect multiple MPs within the same district, to a mixed system with SNTV and single member plurality (SMP) districts in which voters have one vote to elect one MP. Empirical ev-

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3The survey was conducted in April of 2014 in cooperation with Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead. For more information, see the appendix to this dissertation and http://gld.commons.yale.edu/research/.
idence spanning this time period demonstrates that the average electoral coalition size has decreased with each subsequent institutional shift so that only about 5,000 votes are needed to win a seat in parliament for all districts, no matter how large or small the district in terms of population.

I argue that these narrow parliamentarian support coalitions encourage political clientelism, yet they are the result of different mechanisms in each type of district. In the urban areas, SNTV creates confusion and hinders the ability of broad-based electoral coalitions to win numerous seats within a single district. I contrast the Jordanian political environment in which the governing incumbents are hostile to political parties with democratic polities (such as Japan and Taiwan) governed by strong political parties under SNTV systems to explain the failure of broad-based political coalitions in Jordanian elections. In smaller, rural SMP districts, the sheer size of the district keeps voting coalitions narrow, engendering close ties and clientelistic relationships between MPs and their constituents.

While the ruler must maintain at least some level of popular support to stay in power, he cannot hope to purchase the unanimous loyalty of all of his citizens. Moreover, the cost of offering each citizen enough to keep him or her satisfied would likely bankrupt the national treasury. Some members of the society will oppose the leader regardless of how much he distributes to them for ideological reasons or otherwise. It makes no sense for the leader to waste limited resources trying to convince hardline oppositionists to join his coalition of supporters. Thus the ruler will logically seek to target redistribution at the specific group of citizens that it expects to be open to trading their acquiescence for access to state resources. In the final section of this chapter, I show how malapportionment and gerrymandering allow the regime to favor a restricted section of the population (tribes as opposed to West Bank origin Jordanians and non-tribal Jordanians) in the elections resulting in parliaments dominated by tribal independents. Tribes are historically known for being the regime’s staunchest supporters and they are well-positioned to take advantage of the clientelistic behavior encouraged among candidates.
in both types of districts. I claim that this segmented political environment is easier for the regime to control, allowing it to pit competing tribal factions against one another in attempts to curry government favor and create barriers to collective action that might threaten its grip on power.

1.3 Elections as an Effective Means for Distribution: The View of the Elected Intermediary

I explore the channels through which dictators use elections to consolidate support among elites in the Jordanian parliament and through them, broader groups within in the society. All dictators need a certain amount of popular support and the distribution of state resources is a common means by which they garner it. However, they face a principal-agent problem in dealing with the intermediaries who are supposed to distribute resources to the masses. In this chapter, I claim that the electoral institutional design used in Jordan creates incentives for officials to distribute resources to the citizens whose support is needed to maintain the regime. By making intermediary posts elective and allowing competition, the crown shifts the burden of monitoring redistribution of state benefits onto citizens in the intermediary’s district. These citizens can vote their elected official out of office if he fails to provide benefits. Being an elected deputy comes with substantial benefits, motivating parliamentarians do their jobs well and ensure they retain their own access to resources.

I empirically demonstrate that parliamentarians spend their time addressing the concerns of their constituents through casework logs I collected in the field. I also show that although the elections are competitive and there is high turnover for individual MPs, when one considers tribal linkages there is actually a high incumbency rate as the same tribes continue to hold seats in the parliament throughout the period between 1989 and 2013. Thus, the clientelistic linkages that are formed between MPs and constituents are stable and enduring. I discuss the long-term advantages of retaining a parliamentary
post within a tribe as well as the more immediate rewards that come along with these positions. Through this mechanism, intermediary elites become beholden to the government for fulfilling constituent favors and eventually lose motivation to pursue their own legislation creation or to carry out their other constitutional duties of monitoring ministry activities and budgets. Thus, the parliament does not serve as a check on the power of the regime but instead provides rubber stamp approvals for its initiatives in the policy realm and helps it to purchase political support at the grassroots. Yet, since any serious contender for office must be able to solicit at least some popular support, this mechanism also allows the King to figure out whom among the mid-level elites in society are “popular” among the people and willing to loyally participate in his game of clientelistic redistribution. Loyal tribes or clans within large tribal confederations often rotate in and out of the seats in parliament, which engenders stability by offering the majority of the regime’s staunchest supporters a good shot at obtaining a piece of the state resource pie every election cycle.

1.4 How Formal Electoral Institutions Affect Informal Distribution Patterns: The View From the Grassroots

Rarely do studies consider the interaction between the local ethnic landscape and the type of institutions in place during elections.⁴ Evidence from the GLD 2014 survey (N=1,489) reveals that access to government services, benefits, and employment are often governed by “wasta” (personal connections) and that parliamentarians are expected to fulfill this function in Jordan. However, not all constituents benefit from their MPs in the same way. I leverage the use of two different electoral systems in Jordan to investigate the effects of electoral institutions on political behavior under authoritarianism. I show that there is very tight competition in SNTV districts with 150 votes or less determining the which candidate wins the seat in many cases and suggest

⁴See Posner (2004 and 2005) for a good example of how electoral institutions shape ethnic politics in Africa.
that these narrow margins of victory add to confusion over who are likely to be the
winners in the elections. I argue that the lack of clear information about front-runners
that is characteristic of the SNTV systems reifies the salience of ethnic identities in
elections as each tribe becomes convinced it has a shot of obtaining a parliamentary
seat.

Employing information on the embedded tribal clan structure I collected in the field
and voter registration lists to estimate tribal size within electoral districts in conjunction
with constituent casework logs of six MPs, I find that in SNTV districts, parliamentar-
ians win their seats solely with the support of their tribes and that they practice more
tribal favoritism in the provision of services. On the contrary, MPs in SMP districts
cobble together more ethnically diverse electoral coalitions to win their seats and they
tend to redistribute benefits more evenly between tribal coethnics and non-coethnics.
I look at which GLD participate are most likely to report having participated in the
last elections. I find that an interaction between not having had a tribal MP in the past
and being registered in an SNTV district drives down voter turnout, whereas having a
history of a tribal MP significantly increases a participant’s likelihood of voting in the
elections. Among those who participated in the election, having had a tribal MP and
being registered in an SNTV also significantly predicts if a voter expects that his MP
will be likely to help her solve personal problems, although so does the respondent’s
socio-economic status with the more wealthy classes expecting more help from elected
representatives than the lower classes. To examine whether only the poor stand to bene-
fit most from clientelism, as much of the scholarly literature on this topic argues, I turn
to the Arab barometer poll from six countries across the Middle East. I find that across
these countries, the upper middle class is significantly more likely than the lower class
to turnout and to have used personal connections to solve a problem within the past
five years, among which, most turned to government officials. This chapter contributes
to our understanding of the role that electoral institutions play in shaping authoritarian
politics.
1.5 Conclusion

The consequences of the Jordanian system include reification of ethnic identity and deepened social divisions leading to a sort of “neo-tribalism”. I conclude with a discussion of how excluding large sectors of the population from government benefits and relying on tribalism as a national identity could be a dangerous strategy for rule. I propose that the themes in this dissertation can translate to understanding other regimes in which people have politically exploitable tribal identities and I offer policy prescriptions for democracy promotion programs. I conclude by providing avenues for future research using the data presented in this dissertation including comparisons to Kuwait which recently implemented an SNTV system for its legislative elections, whether ethnic censuses or political organization results in win seats in elections, and Duvergerian equilibriums or the lack thereof in tribal voting.

The overall puzzle that drives this is research project is how electoral institution design shapes authoritarian politics. Admittedly though, a major limitation of this dissertation is the fact that it only covers one country. We can and should ask: how applicable are the lessons learned about the Jordanian political system applicable to other authoritarian regimes? Similar regimes in which the executive is not elected but the parliament is and where ethnic divides run deep, like Kuwait or Bahrain, might make for easy comparisons. I have some reason to believe similar conclusions can be drawn from Kuwait. This dissertation attempts to draw parallels between electoral behavior in Jordan under SNTV and SMP systems and that found under these systems in other contexts. Parts of this analysis may demonstrate possible weaknesses of these electoral systems for exploitation by powerful politicians who seek to thwart democracy elsewhere in the world.
CHAPTER 2

Segmentation of the Political Arena While Manufacturing Parliamentary Majorities: The View From the Regime

Jordan’s identification with a household (a *bayt*) is an idea officially endorsed by the Hashemites – who belong, after all, to the House of the Prophet – and the National Charter, composed in 1990 as part of King Hussein’s liberal-reform package, stipulated that Jordan as a political institution could be ruled only by the Hashemites and their legitimate male heirs. The (genealogical) limits of acceptable governmental reform were clearly laid out in the charter–so much so that Jordanian politics, if not Jordanian society as a whole, is best analyzed as a manifestation of “house politics,” a mode of domination in which families (the royal one being only the most central and effective) serve as instruments and objects of power (Shyrock and Howell 2001, 247-248.)

2.1 Introduction

The fact that so many current dictators hold elections motivates an assumption that elections must help them hold onto power in some way Geddes (2005). Yet, there is a lot of debate in the literature about whether elections contribute to or detract from the durability of authoritarian regimes and there are a number of studies on both sides of
the argument.

I suspect that much of this uncertainty has to do with the types of electoral institutions dictators institute once they decide to – or are pressured into – holding elections. Dictators – much like the rest of us – are not omniscient. They may inadvertently select electoral institutions that crack the door open for future democratization. Or more astute rulers may select institutions that are advantageous for their hold on power. If the regime is strong enough to withstand the first election, leaders often learn from their past mistakes and adjust the electoral rules in ways so as to prolong their tenure. In choosing to study the phenomenon of authoritarian electoralism in a very long-lived Middle Eastern dictatorship, I have opted to study this latter scenario: how elections can be structured to strengthen authoritarian regimes. In doing so, I posit that in order to better understand why some dictators survive after the initiation of electoral authoritarianism, we need to unpack what actually happens in elections under authoritarian regimes.¹

In this chapter, analysis of elections data from 1989 to 2013 shows how the Jordanian monarchy manages to manipulate electoral rules to favor narrow, tribally-based electoral coalitions at the expense of broad, ideologically-based political parties. I posit that because it only takes a narrow coalition of voters to win a seat in parliament and the electoral rules in place are candidate- rather than party-centered, candidates are motivated to cultivate a personal, clientelistic following. Then I show how the regime uses malapportionment and gerrymandering of electoral districts to circumscribe the pool of state-sponsored beneficiaries, ensuring that the rewards of electoral participation favor the tribal sectors of the population that have historically been pro-regime. Interestingly, two different electoral systems are employed to achieve the regime’s twin goals of fractionalizing the electorate and encouraging patronage provision to tribes to

¹To fully understand why some dictators survive and others fall once they initiate elections, a study would need to consider what happens in situations in which dictators fall. However, this is not the driving question of this dissertation so I leave exploration of this topic to elsewhere. Moreover, some scholarly work sees the shift towards electoral authoritarianism as progress towards democratization (Lindberg 2006a, 2006b & 2009).
manufacture loyal parliamentary majorities. I supplement these claims with the results from a survey of almost 1,500 eligible voters in Jordan.\textsuperscript{2} I also employ information gleaned from more than 100 interviews with Jordanian voters, parliamentarians, and other stakeholders in the society collected in the field between 2012 and 2015 to bolster my arguments.\textsuperscript{3}

### 2.2 Background to Recent Elections in Jordan: Islamists Versus Tribes

In 1952, Jordan was one of the first countries in the region to establish a legislature, but war with Israel in 1967 led to the imposition of emergency law and the suspension of parliament. After more than two decades of a parliamentary hiatus, the acceptance of much needed economic aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to the implementation of an austerity program. Parliamentary elections were reintroduced in 1989 partly as a political pressure release valve to assuage widespread uprisings over the resulting price hikes from IMF imposed cuts in subsidies on bread, fuel, and other commodities.\textsuperscript{4} In reality, preparations for these elections began four years earlier, Since 1989, the Jordanian regime has held six subsequent elections, implementing a series of significant institutional shifts along the way that offer leverage in understanding how electoral rules shape political behavior under authoritarianism.

\textsuperscript{2}This survey was conducted in April of 2014 with support from the Governance and Local Development Program at Yale University and in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead. I report all findings in terms of a rural and urban divide because this survey did not use a nationally representative sample. However, populations from rural and urban areas were randomly selected for participation and can be said to be representative of these types of respondents within the country. Please email me for more detailed findings or go to www.kristenkao.com for more information about the statistical analyses presented in this dissertation. Please see Appendix A to this dissertation and http://campuspress.yale.edu/pgld/research/ for more information about the GLD survey.

\textsuperscript{3}To protect the identities of these sources, I only provide information on the date of the interview and its number. Those seeking further information about these interviews are welcome to contact me at kristenkao@gmail.com.

\textsuperscript{4}The GDP shrank by 14% in 1989 and Central Bank Reserves dropped to a record low (Peters and Moore 2009, 274).
The first of these shifts came in 1993. Four years prior, elections were held under a block vote or at-large plurality system in which each voter had the same number of votes to cast for candidates as there were seats up for contestation in 20 large, multimember districts. Amman, the capital, was split into 6 different electoral districts at this time, with the rest of the districts spread across the remaining 11 governorates in the country. Voters had anywhere from two to nine votes to cast within a single district.\(^5\)

Yet, despite the fact that political parties were outlawed at the time (they were only legalized in 1992) the Muslim Brotherhood did quite well in the 1989 elections, which was a severe shock to the regime. The Brotherhood – whose members constituted only about 4% of the entire pool of candidates (Hamid 2014, 78) – won 28% of the seats and were later joined by 12 independent Islamists giving them significant influence over 43% of the seats in the parliament (Jaber and Fathi 1990, 81). While not a majority, this bloc proved to be an effective source of power (Schwedler 2006); the Islamist bloc threatened to pass a law to segregate men and women in public institutions and garnered enough votes within the Lower House of the Parliament to pass a ban on the production, sale, and distribution of alcohol in Jordan.\(^6\) More importantly, the bloc secured a commitment from the Prime Minister to pursue a 14-point Islamist agenda in exchange for their support during the parliamentary vote of confidence (Mufti 1999, 111).\(^7\) The agenda included many of the concessions the Brotherhood subsequently won during negotiations over the creation of a National Charter. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to capitalize on its electoral victory in 1989, creating a powerful parliamentary bloc that not only pushed through its own initiatives but also brought the regime to the negotiating table concerning the national political program.

Learning from its mistake, the regime implemented a “one-person, one-vote” system for the following elections.\(^8\) While the phrase “one-person, one-vote” usually de-

\(^5\) Three joint seats were set aside for the Circassian/Chechen minorities and nine seats for Christians.
\(^6\) The ban on alcohol passed in 1992, but it had no legal force (Frej and Robinson 1996, 14).
\(^7\) All but one of the Muslim Brothers complied with the vote of confidence (Mufti 1999).
\(^8\) 1993 and 1997 followed essentially the same districting scheme with the exception of Aqaba being split off from the governorate of Ma’an in 1997.
scribes a fundamental principle of fair elections, in the Jordanian case it refers to the maintenance of multimember districts with a single-vote rule, known as a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. Current literature on Jordanian electoral politics explains the drop in the Islamists’ share of parliamentary seats from 43% in 1989 to 29% in 1993 on the Jordanian regime’s decision to switch from a multiple vote to SNTV system, which forced voters to choose between the patronage-providing tribal candidate and the Islamist candidate, favoring the former. Lust-Okar accounts for the loss of Islamist seats in the parliament as follows: “When granted multiple votes, individuals often cast some votes for candidates who they believe will supply them with resources, and other votes for those who represent their ideologies. When restricted to one vote, however, voters cast their ballot for personal interests” (Lust-Okar 2008, 92). In other words, the switch to an SNTV system shifted the focus of the elections for voters from an ideological battle to one in which voters cared mostly about their own access to resources. Table 2.1 provides information on how Islamists have fared in Jordanian elections, showing that they have done increasingly poor in the elections over time.

A parallel argument follows that for elected elites, the parliament shifted from a forum for negotiations with the King over policy (Gandhi 2008) to an arena for contests over publicly-funded patronage or “competitive clientelism” (Lust-Okar 2006; see also Lust-Okar 2006b and 2009). The present study builds upon this influential work, assuming that the purpose of legislatures in authoritarian regimes is – at least in part – to distribute clientelistic rents. However, while the competitive clientelism argument is a very important insight, it does not fully explain the mechanism behind why broad-based political coalitions or parties do poorly in Jordanian elections. Political parties in other areas of the world are known for “machine politics” by which they organize

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9These figures include Muslim Brotherhood members and independent Islamists who won their seats on ideological platforms.
11The Jordanian parliament of 1989 is featured in Gandhi’s (2008) argument that authoritarian legislatures are forums for policy negotiations rather than simply areas for clientelistic distribution, however, I find that in subsequent years no parliament ever gained the same level of power over policy negotiations.
mass campaigns to buy off voters through patronage. This practice is widespread throughout the developing world (Stokes 2005; Fox 1994; Wantchekon 2003).

The competitive clientelism argument also assumes Islamists provide a purely psychological or ideological benefit for voters. But in fact, Islamists in Jordan – and the Muslim Brotherhood specifically – offered a wide range of clientelistic benefits to their supporters during this time period. A number of scholars see the social or “shadow-state” services such as education, healthcare, and welfare that Islamist organizations provide as contributing to the success of Islamist parties in parliament in the past (Clark 2004a, 2004b, and 2010; Lust-Okar 2009a). Seeking an explanation for why secular parties with broad ideological appeal fare poorly in elections across the Arab world, Ottoway and Hamzawy (2007) emphasize that Islamist candidates often link their religious message to the social services they provide and the patronage systems they have built up. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, for example, runs a charity institution

Table 2.1: Muslim Brotherhood Outcomes in Elections in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that had a budget of approximately 1 billion USD in 2006 (Clark 2010, 127), dwarfing those of all other non-governmental organizations in Jordan with the exception of the charities patronized by members of the royal family. This Islamic charity comprises of 55 centers including hospitals, medical clinics, and educational facilities throughout the country, employing almost exclusively Muslim Brotherhood members (Clark 2010; Wiktorowicz 1999). Personal interviews with parliamentarians and Brotherhood members also identified the Muslim Brotherhood’s capacity to provide services funded by zakat (alms that every Muslim is obligated to provide if he or she is able to do so) as a major reason they did well in the 1989 elections.\footnote{Personal Interview #25 4/4/12; Personal Interview #92 5/29/2012.} Additionally, the Brotherhood has made deep inroads in Jordan’s professional syndicates which provide significant patronage for the middle class. They recently took 70% of the seats for the more than 100,000 member strong Teacher’s Association elections\footnote{The teacher’s syndicate in Jordan was only legalized in recent years, but the Muslim Brotherhood’s impressive win in the elections suggests that it has historically held a high degree of influence in this organization.} and they are said to have grown the Jordanian Engineers Association’s assets from 10 million USD in 1990 – when they took over its leadership – to 70 million USD by 2000, which they use to help their members buy expensive items like cars, land, or houses (Henry and Wilson 2004, 204).

A deeper consideration of how the electoral systems affect voter behavior offers a more nuanced understanding of not only why Islamists do poorly in Jordanian elections, but also the near absence of other political parties in Jordanian politics today. My approach differs from the scholarly work that comes before it by arguing that elections in Jordan are about segmenting the political environment, which 1) dilutes the threat of broad-based, anti-regime collective action during the elections; 2) makes the formation and maintenance of clientelistic relationships easier and; 3) allows the regime to limit the beneficiaries of state assistance making this redistributive system affordable. I explore each of these claims in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
In response to bottom-up pressures, for the 2003 elections the number of electoral districts jumped from 21 (1 was added in 1993) to 45, and the number of seats in parliament increased from 80 to 104. Importantly, 18 of these districts became single-member and remained so for the following four elections in 2003, 2007, 2010 and the local districts of 2013.\footnote{In 2003, six seats were also reserved for the top percentage of votes obtained in a single district by a woman candidate. This quota was increased to 12 seats in 2010 and to 15 seats in 2013, although in 2013 each of the 12 governorates as well as each of the 3 Bedouin districts were allocated a women’s quota seat. The rules for obtaining a seat remained the same except the woman were now only competing against women in the other districts within her governorate, rather than the whole country. Thus, women are running in their own competition, under different electoral rules than those of their male counterparts and so I exclude them from this analysis. These quota seats have been omitted from the data analysis conducted in this paper, unless otherwise noted, due to the fact that competition for these seats is not run according to a regular SNTV or single member plurality system.} Earlier work on Jordan leaves out these single member districts run under plurality rules (henceforth referred to as SMP) when analyzing competitive clientelism in Jordanian parliamentary politics. The outcome of the 2003 reforms was 45 smaller electoral districts with only 60% remaining under the SNTV system and 40% becoming SMP.

I argue that the Jordanian electoral institutional design encourages the segmentation of the political environment and reliance on clientelistic politics. In urban cities, where the potential for the formation of broad, ideologically-based political coalitions is higher, the use of an SNTV electoral system handicaps political camps with broad-based appeal in elections and creates confusion among voters. In sparsely populated rural areas, an SMP (also known as a first-past-the-post) system in highly gerrymandered, small districts that favor regime loyal tribal areas. In the literature on Jordanian politics, much is said about tribes being favored by the electoral system, but the details of how this happens are often overlooked. In this chapter, I explain why tribes continue to be the dominant identity for voting coalitions to coalesce around in SNTV districts, which are the most common type of district in Jordan. I argue that this system has historically been advantageous for the regime because, as Baylouny highlights, “groups organizing on a kin basis were not able to be national parties... kinship associations limit the group to a small constituency, preventing it from being national. Issues
dominating kin associations are confined to internal ones” (2010, 147).

2.2.1 The Utility of Narrow Electoral Coalitions for the Regime

Narrow winning electoral coalitions serve two purposes for the regime: 1) as opposed to a political environment dominated by broad-based political camps, a fractionalized electorate is easier for the regime to control; 2) narrow coalitions disincentivize programmatic politics in elections, increasing candidate reliance on clientelistic relationships to win their seats. Surveying electoral institutions across the Middle East, Jamal and Lust-Okar (2002) note that monarchs prefer electoral institutions that disperse power among multiple political groups within the society so that it can play them off of one another. Numerous centers of power make it difficult for any one person to gain enough power to challenge the dictator and diminish the chances for unified collective action between different elites. Writing in 1969, Abu Jaber noted that in Jordan, “democratic institutions are used to increase rather than decrease the ‘personalization’ of power” (249). Keeping with the ruling strategy of its predecessors, the regime – armed with a wide array of tools for persuasion of parliamentarians ranging from outright coercion through the mukhabarat (secret service) to pecuniary benefits funded by the state – wants parliamentarians to develop narrow, personal voter coalitions so it can offer targeted support to preferred candidates during elections and to undermine those who might pose potential threats to the regime’s grip on power.\(^\text{16}\)

Electoral institutions that fractionalize the electorate into narrow vote coalitions make it so that parliamentarians can rely on their personal reputations of particularistic politics, patronage provision, and vote buying to win seats in parliament. I categorize all of these activities as different aspects of political clientelism. Hicken identifies the dyadic, hierarchical, contingent, and iterative nature of clientelistic relationships as what sets them apart from other types of relationships (2011, 290). These relationships

\(^\text{16}\)Most contacts I spoke with believe the mukhabarat’s influence to be limited to isolated cases, but they do play role in the elections (Personal Interview #35 1/22/13; Personal Interview #25 4/4/12; Personal Interview #90 5/23/2012; Personal Interview #92 5/29/2012).
are dyadic and hierarchical because they are formed between two people or parties in which one has a higher socio-economic status than the other. They are contingent and iterative because each party seeks to benefit from his or her participation in the exchange and they expect this relationship to continue to be ongoing (Hicken 2011, 290-293).

Systems that promote clientelism incentivize candidates and voters alike to care more about the provision of particularistic benefits rather than what are known as programmatic benefits, which are aimed at benefiting a larger number of voters, are more stable over time, and tend to be based more on ideology (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes et al. 2013). Programmatic refers to the idea that candidates attract voters through a political program, which means a well-structured collection of policy positions that they have either pursued in office previously or have publicly declared intention to pursue once in office (Cheeseman et al. 2014; Lindberg and Morrison 2006, 101). Particularistic benefits are the exclusive rewards or private transfers that compliant clients expect to obtain from their patrons.

For the purposes of this research, I consider vote buying to be a subset of clientelism, involving “the individual, immediate, and private exchange of goods, services, or cash for electoral support, usually in violation of legal norms” (Hicken 2007, 51). I do this for simplicity’s sake because although a one-shot exchange of cash or gifts for a vote may seem to violate the iterative nature of a clientelistic relationship, in reality the client is likely to expect the same transaction to take place in subsequent elections, particularly if the candidate wins a seat. Furthermore, some definitions of vote buying provided in the literature encompass particularistic benefits voters receive long after the elections including access to government services, jobs, or financial aid, etc. Candidates usually use a mix of vote buying strategies and other clientelistic tactics to secure a personal following (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Golden 2003; McVey 2000; Arghiros 2000).  

17My future research agenda seeks to parse out the differences in the relationships associated with
To understand what promotes vote buying and political clientelism in elections we can examine how strong democracies of today overcame these obstacles in the past. Studies on this topic build upon an argument put forward first by Cox (1987) explaining that the decline in patronage and vote buying as vehicles for winning elections in Britain was due to the growing size of voting populations contained within electoral districts. Assuming the budget available to a candidate attempting to purchase votes does not rise and the cost of a vote does not decline as the number of voters in their constituencies increases, larger districts will lower the expected utility of vote buying in elections. Building upon Cox’s work, Stokes et al. (2013, Ch. 8) posit that industrialization led both to population boom and the rise of the middle class in the United States and Britain, making votes too expensive for politicians to purchase individually and forcing them instead to turn to pursue more public policies aimed at serving either the entire nation, the district, or at least a group of multiple voters.

Another way in which larger electorates are expected to inhibit vote buying and clientelism is by making coordination between candidates, vote-buying brokers, and voters more difficult. Stokes et al. (2013 Ch. 8) and Hicken (2007) conclude from examples of electoral systems around the world where vote-buying died out that large electorates complicate the process of clientelism. Clientelistic machines require detailed knowledge of the voter base so that candidates are able to target the most vulnerable populations with benefits catered to their specific needs, meaning that “economies of scale are basically absent in clientelist politics” (Stokes et al. 2013, 29). Trust between the client and the patron must run deep as each relies upon the honor of the other to carry out his side of the deal, sometimes in violation of the law. The voter takes a risk that the MP may not provide him with promised benefits either due to lack of capacity or otherwise. The candidate relies on the voter to cast a ballot for him in the elections, but has no way of monitoring that this actually occurred. The use of secret ballots in modern elections has greatly increased the value of trust in clientelistic transactions.
Larger districts are also associated with urban environments which offer increased anonymity, social diversity, and greater opportunities for economic autonomy for voters, breaking down established patron-client networks and making their re-establishment much more difficult. Changes of residence are more common in the cities where buying a home is made more difficult by higher demand, reducing the ability of candidates and brokers to keep track of their clients (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 39). Furthermore, urbanites are more concerned with local public-goods or pork-barrel issues like crime protection or traffic congestion reduction measures than citizens in rural areas (Hicken 2007, 56). These trends are expected to hamper the ability of candidates to win a seat in parliament based on a platform of clientelistic politics in large, urban districts.

Yet the premise that large electoral districts leading to reduced candidate reliance on vote buying and clientelism rests on the prior assumption that candidates in more populous districts must cater to larger numbers of voters in order to win their seats. Hicken sums up this argument thus: “All else being equal, the larger the district, the larger the amount of money required to buy a winning number of votes and the weaker or less dense the social networks needed to distribute money and monitor compliance” (2007, 21). The existence of multimember districts in somewhat ethnically segregated cities in Jordan render this logic invalid. In both SM and SNTV districts, parliamentarians run campaigns based on their personal reputation for helping out the community, a process which begins long before their attempts to cash in on favors for votes to win their seats in parliament.18 As a result, in this study I focus attention on the size of voter coalitions needed to win a seat in parliament rather than relying on the size of the electorate to indicate incentives for political clientelism within the electoral system. Because “cultivating client loyalty via the use of personal patronage takes consistent generosity over time, and most candidates lack the resources necessary for such a sustained investment” (Hicken 2007, 54), this system allows the regime to capitalize upon

18Personal interview #61 9/23/12; Personal interview #45 8/14/13; Personal interview #82 12/20/13
its access to the vast resources of the state.

2.3 Learning to Engineer Elections as a Regime-Survival Strategy in the Early Years: 1989-2002

In this section, I focus on electoral behavior in SNTV districts in Jordan from 1989 to 2002, leaving consideration of what goes on in SMP districts and more recent years (2003-2013) for the next section. I explain the theory behind why SNTV electoral system puts broad-based, political coalitions based on ideology at a severe disadvantage in elections. I use information I collected in the field including the full election results to empirically demonstrate how the use of a divisive electoral system in densely-populated, urban areas of Jordan leads to narrow voting coalitions, particularly as the size of the district gets larger in terms of numbers of voters.

There are three major reasons that the SNTV system hinders candidates running on an ideological or programmatic platform associated with a broad political coalition and instead favors candidates with personal followings. First, SNTV systems cause intra-coalition or intra-party competition, forcing candidates to figure out ways to distinguish themselves from other like-minded candidates within the same district. Second, broad coalitions – a coalition that hopes to win more than one seat in a district – tend to be conservative in nominating candidates to run in the elections, winning less seats than their true vote share might yield under proportional representation (PR) systems because SNTV rules complicate calculations of optimal nomination. Third, a broad-based party must be highly organized and have well-disciplined voters in order to evenly distribute support among each of their candidates within a district.

In general, scholars agree that candidate-centered electoral systems motivate the cultivation of a personal following rather than inspiring voter support on an ideological basis because voters associate their political well-being with an individual MP and not
a political party or coalition as a whole.\footnote{Compare this to PR systems in which voters cast ballots for parties competing for a percentage of the seats within a district as a coalition rather than for individual candidates. Even in open-list proportional systems – in which voters can cast preference ballots for certain candidates within the list – the overall percentage of votes won by the entire party is the broader goal of candidates and voters in elections.} While certain conditions help other types of candidate-centered systems overcome this issue, the SNTV electoral system augments the incentives for candidates to rely upon a personal support coalition. This is because unlike in most other electoral systems, the SNTV system results in both inter- and intra-coalition competition (Cox 1996). Under SNTV any broad coalition of candidates is contending for votes against other electoral coalitions, while candidates within the same political coalition are simultaneously competing for votes against each other. Thus, within a given district, party platforms no longer differentiate between candidates. Under such conditions, political alliances – even between candidates who share the same issue positions – are difficult to forge. This scenario is unique to SNTV because majoritarian systems usually do not have multimember districts in which multiple seats are up for contestation all at once and voters only have one vote to cast. In order to distinguish themselves from other contenders with whom they share similar issue positions, candidates in SNTV districts tend to resort to the development of personal followings (Cox and Thies 2000). Likewise, due to intra-coalition competition between candidates, the SNTV system disincentivizes concentration on policy issues for candidates and parliamentarians (Reed 1994). Moreover, because like-minded candidates attract similar types of voters, the tendency to compete for the same votes with other candidates from the same party is common under SNTV, hurting the party’s overall success in the elections.

Figuring out the optimal number of candidates a party should run in a district is also made more complicated by SNTV electoral rules. A political coalition wants to run as many candidates as it believes it can win seats for in each SNTV district – no more because this will spread its votes too thinly resulting in none of its candidates winning a seat and no less in order to maximize its influence in parliament. The problem is that SNTV systems make it difficult for large voting coalitions to know the optimal number
of candidates to run because this number depends on accurate information of just how strong support for the party is as well as knowledge of about how strong support for competing parties might be (Lijphart, Pintar, and Sone 1986; Cox 1996). Running just one too many candidates by miscalculating one’s support by just a few percentage points of the popular vote within the district could cost a strong party all of the seats it nominates candidates for. As a result, parties tend to under-nominate candidates in SNTV districts, winning less seats than they would under a PR system due to the severe punishment for over-nominating (Lijphart, Pintar, and Sone 1986).

Much of the confusion about how many candidates a coalition should run in the elections results from the fact that the SNTV system also complicates the process of coordinating behavior among voters. Trouble will arise if party supporters fail to spread out their votes evenly among the coalition’s candidates, for example, by flocking to vote for the favorite candidate who will win with more votes than needed and leave too few votes for other coalition candidates to be successful (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995). In order to win multiple seats successfully, parties must discipline their voters to divide themselves into evenly distributed groups behind each of their preferred coalition’s candidates.

Imagine a scenario in which a coalition knows it has the support of around 4,050 voters and it expects that around 1,000 voters are needed for each candidate to win a seat. First, the party must decide whether to risk running 4 candidates and trust in its ability to organize its voters correctly into groups of about a thousand or instead to play it safe by running only 3 candidates, giving itself and its voters a sizable error margin of about 1,050 votes. In either case, the party must devise a means for counting its numbers of supporters, which involves a tricky guessing game of separating out sincere supporters from those who promise votes but may not honor the deal at the ballot box, and it must construct a system for dividing its supporters into evenly divided groups of supporters for each of the coalition’s candidates.

Under the bloc vote system, like Jordan had in 1989, coordination across multiple
candidates during elections is much less difficult than under an SNTV system. A party can simply nominate the same number of candidates as seats in each district and have its supporters vote for its entire slate. Compare this to the SNTV system where a party must figure out a complicated numbers game of how many candidates to nominate in each district and get its voters to cooperate by splitting themselves up into even groups behind each candidate (which requires cooperation from candidates as well). As Mufti highlights:

“These are difficult imperatives [to achieve], requiring a level of party organization and electoral sophistication beyond the capabilities of most newly licensed parties in newly constituted parliamentary systems such as Jordan’s... The fact that the IAF’s share of total votes hardly changed between 1989 and 1993 (15.6% and 16.0%, respectively) suggests that changes in the electoral system account for much of the decline in its fortunes. In six districts, for example, it appears to have fielded one candidate too many, whereas in three others it ran one candidate too few. Assuming that the IAF’s votes reflected party rather than personal sympathies – in other words that it would have received the same number of votes no matter how many of its candidates ran and who they were – these nomination and vote-distribution errors cost the party a total of 11 chamber seats.” (1991, 119-120).

The bloc vote system was a particularly advantageous setup for the Muslim Brotherhood, which might not have been the first choice among many voters, but represented an ideology and policy program with which many Jordanians identified with to some extent in addition to the particularistic benefits it conferred upon its members. At this point in time, political parties were still outlawed – as already noted – and the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed very high name recognition having been the most organized and longest established social movement running candidates. Even today, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most widely recognized political party in Jordan. 59% of respondents in the GLD survey in both rural and urban areas agree that Islamist par-
liamentarians are less corrupt than other parliamentarians. The Brotherhood was also able to convince some strong East Bank tribal candidates to join them, which made sense since these candidates could then count on votes from among their tribe and aim to win one of the (anywhere from one to six) other votes of a larger demographic through their affiliation with a larger political program. Under these conditions, most voters are likely to expend some votes on each of the different candidates that represent their cross-cutting ethnic or political identities.

Large districts — both in terms of numbers of voters and numbers of seats — magnify the problems of candidate nomination optimization and voter coordination under SNTV. Likewise, the more broad-based the electoral coalition in terms of numbers of supporters and therefore in terms of the number of seats it expects to win within a district, the more difficult coordination problems among both its candidates and its voters are to overcome. The increase in numbers adds to the confusion and exacerbates problems of collective action during the elections. For all of these reasons, narrow political camps that concentrate all their efforts on winning just one seat within an electoral district have a much easier time under SNTV rules than broad-based coalitions. The nomination optimization and voter coordination problems associated with SNTV often results in the formation of numerous minority parties over broad-based ones or the fractionalization of large parties within the system (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010).

2.3.1 Why Parties do Poorly Under SNTV Rules in Jordan

In countries where decision-making power is centralized in the hands of a dictator — who usually expects to hold onto his position until death — elections are structured to serve the purposes of the dictator. In fact, the SNTV electoral system is said to be

---

20 Would you say that you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the statement), “Islamist parliamentarians are less corrupt than other parliamentarians? 4. Strongly agree (11.4%) 3. Agree (47.5%) 2. Disagree (31.4%) 1. Strongly disagree (9.7%).
born of a desire to undermine the electoral success of opposition groups by the early 20th century Meiji oligarchs of Japan (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1998: 44–46). If we accept that electoral rules shape voter behavior in similar ways around the world, then in other polities that employ an SNTV electoral system, we would expect a similar outcome to result. However, in other polities around the world that employed this system, large political parties have managed to do quite well. In this section I offer some final explanations of why strong political parties are absent from the Jordanian political scene by taking a look at other examples of these systems at work in other areas in the world before moving onto analysis of the empirical evidence.

Japan employed the SNTV system to elect both its upper and lower houses from 1947 to 1994. Because SNTV was used for an especially long time in Japan, it serves as a good starting point for understanding how this system typically works outside of Jordan. Beginning in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated politics in both houses and was a ruling coalition member until 1993. In order to continue to win a large proportion of the seats under SNTV elections in Japan, a party needed to have an extremely high degree of central organization among party leaders and discipline among both party candidates and voters. While the LDP demonstrates that these obstacles can be overcome, it is not an easy feat and is extremely costly. Observers have attributed personal-vote seeking in general and the exchange of gifts for electoral support in particular to the incentives built into Japan’s electoral system” (Cox and Thies 2000, 39-40).

21 Similar arguments are made in Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1998, 23-25) and McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995, 43).

Part of the LDP’s dominance derived from its luck in being the first party post-WWII to have won a majority in the Diet. With control of the government came a high degree of centralized power, including the ability to pass legislation concerning elections in its favor and control of governmental purse strings. Rosenbluth and Thies explain the puzzle surrounding how Japan’s largest political party “managed to win
repeated majorities (of seats, if not always of votes) despite an electoral system that required *intraparty competition within each electoral district*, setting up internecine blood feuds that threatened continuously to tear the party (or any would-be large party) into several pieces” (2010, 53 emphasis in original) by arguing that the LDP was highly centrally organized, allowing it to support a series of parallel “personal political machines” for each of its candidates and divvy up expertise in policy areas among those competing within the same district (2010, Chapter 4). Although political contenders organized under party labels in Japan, in reality each candidate campaigned on an individual platform, cultivating a personal clientele of voters.

A number of studies argue that the logic of the SNTV system systematically advantages electoral coalitions that have the backing of the central government (Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 1996; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010; Batto and Kim 2012). Unlike opposition parties, the party in control of the central state can use a combination of tools to better coordinate its candidates including pecuniary benefits, access to governmental services, and – especially under authoritarian settings – the employment of its coercive apparatus. Batto and Kim study the use of SNTV throughout Taiwan’s transitions between authoritarian and democratic rule and find that this coordinative advantage is magnified under authoritarian settings because the ruling party “has far greater and much more exclusive access to the state resources than its democratic counterpart. It can likewise deploy these same resources against its opponents with far less restraint” (2012, 356). These devices may induce candidates to either run or drop out of the race and could strengthen the backing of weak candidates and convince strong candidates to ease back their campaigns (Cox 1996).

Japan’s LDP held power for over 50 years, demonstrating the ease with which a ruling regime can exploit SNTV systems to prolong their tenure in power. The difference is that in Jordan, the ruling party is replaced by the King and his winning coalition. Since a single political party does not have control over the central government that can organize candidates and voters to overcome the obstacles SNTV presents for
broad-based coalitions, Jordanian parliamentarians win their seats with the support of personal voting coalitions as independents.

2.3.2 Empirical Analysis of Election Data: 1989-2003

In this section I explore the outcomes of the implementation of the SNTV system in Jordan and empirically validate the arguments I outline above.\footnote{All calculations are based on data that omit the quota seats reserved for Christians and Circassian/Chechens unless otherwise stated. There is only one district that switches from being classified as an SNTV district to an SM district due to this coding. The logic behind this decision is that these seats run on a different electoral system than that of most of the districts in Jordan and these districts tend to be significantly smaller in terms of voters than the regular districts.} Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1 show the extent to which the switch to an SNTV system in 1993 led to a reduction in candidates’ average voter coalition size, particularly as the district magnitude increases. The average voter coalition size dropped by anywhere between 9 and 20% of the votes cast in the district between the bloc vote system employed in 1989 and the SNTV system initiated in 1993. Moreover, notice that in 1989, the more seats and population in the district, the higher the number of votes winning candidates secured, whereas under SNTV, electoral coalitions are small no matter how large the district is in terms of numbers of voters or population. The last column in this table – the “threshold of exclusion” – offers a measure of the propensity of an electoral system to favor narrowly cast voter coalitions. This threshold gives the minimum vote share a coalition must win to guarantee that they will win a seat, even under the worst of circumstances. The lower the number in this column, the less incentive there is for a voting coalition to widen its electoral base (Lijphart, Pinar, and Sone 1986; Grofman 2001, 300-301). The formula for this calculation is:

\[
\frac{v}{v + m} \times 100\%
\]

in which \( v \) is the number of votes accorded to each voter and \( m \) is the number of seats assigned to the district (the district magnitude). For comparison, under the bloc vote system in 1989, the threshold of exclusion for all districts was 50%. Under the SNTV system though there is an inverse relationship so that as the number of seats and popu-
lation in a district increases, the threshold of exclusion decreases. It ranges from 33% for dual seat districts to just 12.5% in the 7 seat district of Balqa.\textsuperscript{23}

Table 2.2: \textit{Average MP Coalition as \% of Popular Vote and \# of Votes Under SNTV}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Seats</td>
<td>26% (4,777)</td>
<td>17% (4,162)</td>
<td>17% (4,057)</td>
<td>20% (5,205)</td>
<td>99,254</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Seats</td>
<td>33% (8,273)</td>
<td>16% (5,323)</td>
<td>15% (3,479)</td>
<td>13% (4,375)</td>
<td>184,254</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Seats</td>
<td>26% (11,003)</td>
<td>8% (5,385)</td>
<td>9% (4,331)</td>
<td>11% (7,020)</td>
<td>361,850</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7 Seats</td>
<td>27% (12,278)</td>
<td>7% (3,621)</td>
<td>7% (4,690)</td>
<td>7% (3,518)</td>
<td>344,862</td>
<td>16.7%-12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{23}Data are from Hourani et al. (1998, 2003, and 2007), and Kao (2015).

As the number of seats and the size of the district increases, coordination problems under SNTV intensify. The largest SNTV districts in terms of population are associated with MPs winning seats with the narrowest support coalitions in terms of both percentages of the popular vote in the district and numbers of votes.\textsuperscript{24} This is the opposite of what occurred in 1989: more populous districts yield larger winning voter coalitions

\textsuperscript{24}Offering the crucial insight that size of district in terms of numbers of voters matters in determining the threshold of exclusion, Grofman (2001) explains a different formula for obtaining the number of votes needed to ensure a win in legislative elections. This equation is as follows:

\[
\frac{qm}{m + 1}
\]  

(2.2)

where \( q \) is the number of voters within the district and \( m \) is district magnitude. By this measure, 2 seat districts in 2013 still require a coalition that is much larger than those in districts with 3, 4, or 5 seats (13,648 versus 9,308, 7,436, and 8,315 votes respectively.

\textsuperscript{24}The finding that large SNTV district magnitudes yield narrower vote coalition is not new, see Cox (1997), Cox and Thies (2000), and Fournier and Kohno (2000).
both as a percentage of the voter population and the numbers of votes cast. Numerous interviews with candidates and former parliamentarians from 1989 confirm that there were broad voting coalitions based on shared ideology and political platforms, but that these coalitions fell apart with the implementation of the SNTV system.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the initiation of an SNTV electoral system in urban areas of Jordan favors minority parties or narrow political coalitions.

2.4 Learning to Engineer Elections as a Regime-Survival Strategy in Recent Years: 2003-2013

In the previous section I discussed what goes on in the urban areas of Jordan. The regime employs an SNTV electoral system in urban electoral districts to hinder the ability of broad-based political camps to organize and win multiple seats during the elections. Yet, 40% of the districts in Jordan are SMP, meaning that each voter is

\textsuperscript{25}Personal Interview #43 3/29/13; Personal Interview #18 9/9/12.
granted only a single vote to elect a single parliamentarian from the district and the candidate with the highest vote total wins the seat, without regard to whether or not the candidate won a majority of votes within the district or surpassed some threshold proportion of popular vote. This section focuses on how the regime keeps politics personal in the rural areas as well, maintaining the narrow voting coalitions it obtains in SNTV districts albeit through different means.

2.4.1 Empirical Analysis of Election Data 2003-2013

Recall that the end result of the 2003 reforms was 45 smaller electoral districts and dual system of SMP (40% of the districts) and SNTV (60% of the districts) districts. In this section I argue that while the regime runs a different type of electoral strategy in each area, it still manages to accomplish its primary goal of ensuring MPs win seats with winning coalitions that are narrowly targeted – and therefore very personalized – in all districts. As explained, the SNTV system facilitates this process as it pushes candidates to cultivate a “personal vote” rather than a voting coalition based on ideological underpinnings. Likewise, SMP districts are expected to result in a high degree of personalness between voters and their MPs since the connection is more direct between them than in a PR system; voters select individual candidates rather than parties and there is only one MP in charge of the district so that voters can more clearly make the connection between him and their well-being. The key to understanding how the regime keeps electoral coalitions in rural areas to a minimal and manageable size is to keep in mind that the size of a voting coalition is also a function of the size of the electoral district.

Digging deeper into the election results between 1993 and 2013\textsuperscript{26} reveals that SMP

\textsuperscript{26}In 2010 the regime decided to implement a somewhat bizarre “virtual district” (da’ira wahmiya) district system in which each SNTV district was split into as many SMP “virtual” districts as it was accorded seats. The districts were “virtual” because they had no geographic boundaries. Candidates chose one of these “virtual” districts to run in – without knowledge of whom their competitors would be – which made it so that no strategic calculations about entering the race as a candidate could be made. Moreover, this electoral scheme further complicated voter calculations about which candidates would be
districts are much smaller than the SNTV districts, not only in terms of general population – as might be expected because more seats should mean a higher population – but also in terms of eligible voters per seat. For example, in 2013 the smallest SM district contained just over 8,000 eligible voters and the largest had just over 83,300 eligible voters. SNTV districts are much larger: the smallest SNTV district had close to 34,500 eligible voters with the largest SNTV district contained close to 365,000 eligible voters. In this year, there was an average of just under 28,000 eligible voters per parliamentary seat in SMP districts compared to an average of about 41,000 eligible voters per seat in SNTV districts. As district magnitude increases, the degree of underrepresentation increases as well; in districts with 5 seats each MP serves an average of over 54,000 voters. Below I discuss other aspects of malapportionment in Jordan to a larger extent, but here I want to highlight that MPs in SNTV districts represent a higher number of eligible voters than MPs in SMP districts, therefore one should expect MPs in SNTV districts to need to win more votes in order to win their seats. Yet the data reveals that all electoral districts in Jordan from 1993 to 2013 required about the same number of votes for a candidate to win a seat regardless of the number of voters in the district.

most likely to win as they often did not know which competitors each candidate was facing until just before the elections. The theory I lay out in this paper is not meant to explain how voting coalitions formed under these alternative electoral rules and elections were never run under these rules again, so I exclude the 2010 data from this analysis. However, for this year the average SNTV coalition was 4,447 votes while the average SMP coalition was 4,584 votes.
Table 2.3: Average Electoral Coalitions as # of Votes 1993-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SNTV Electoral Coalitions</th>
<th>SM Electoral Coalitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9,303</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4,407</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5,482</td>
<td>3,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,137</td>
<td>3,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>4,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2: # of Votes to Win a Parliamentary Seat 1993-2013

Table 2.3 provides detailed information on the average voter coalitions in terms of numbers of votes won by candidates in SMP versus SNTV districts during this time period. Figure 2.2 shows that despite a few outliers, the average voter coalition backing
MPs was about the same size regardless of the number of seats accorded the district even though districts with more seats have many more voters. In 2013, candidates won seats with anywhere between 15,326 and 675 votes and only 2 of 108 elected officials won more than 10,000 votes. For all districts between 1993 and 2013, a candidate needed only win an average of just over 4,800 votes to secure a seat in parliament.

The information in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the same ruling strategy applies to rural SMP districts as in urban SNTV districts: all MPs win their seats with narrow, personal voting coalitions. One of the most commonly cited reasons MPs in both types of districts gave during for their electoral success during personal interviews was the personal relationship they had with their voters. Of the GLD survey participants who are registered in SMP districts, about 50% responded that they personally knew candidate in the parliamentary election and the same proportion have had a tribal member elected to parliament, while 35% have attended a meeting with an MP. The numbers are lower for those registered in SNTV districts, but they still reflect a surprisingly high level of “personalness” between MPs and their constituents: 41% of those registered in SNTV districts knew a candidate, 36% have had a tribal member elected to parliament, and 27% have attended a meeting with an MP. These figures indicate that in both rural and urban areas of the country, relationships between constituents and their elected representatives are indeed very close and personal.

### 2.4.2 Why Parties do Poorly Under SMP Rules in Jordan

Under normal democratic circumstances, SMP districts are expected to encourage larger voting winning coalitions than those found in multi-member districts. In other settings, SMP districts tend to produce a system in which two large electoral camps

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27The first question reads: Did you know someone personally who ran in the last elections that took place on January 23, 2013? 1. Yes 0. No. The second question reads: Has a member of your tribe (ashireh) ever been elected to parliament? 1. Yes 0. No 2. I am not a member of a tribe (ashireh). The third question reads: Have you ever attended a meeting in which an MP appeared? 1. Yes 0. No.
dominate the elections (Droop 1869; Duverger 1954).\textsuperscript{28} Yet, I have shown here that the regime keeps these districts very small, making them ripe for political cooptation through access to patronage from the regime and hindering support for candidates who run on programmatic party platform.

Moreover, much like many of the countries in the developing world the bulk of development in recent decades has occurred in the cities, leaving rural areas poor and highly dependent on the state for economic assistance. These areas are neither growing in population nor are their populations moving up the socio-economic ladder – in fact they are declining on both accounts as people move to the cities in search of jobs. Thus, the need for assistance is high. Respondents registered in rural SMP districts report having a member of their family work in the public sector at a rate that is 12 points higher than those in urban SNTV districts (67\% versus 55\%), which was found to be significantly different in a two-tailed chi-square test (p<.000). Others also highlight that unemployment rates in urban areas are lower than in the rural areas and that these areas are much more reliant on the public sector for wages (Lust-Okar 2009; Baylouny 2010). Once again, because the regime controls the largest pot of resources in the country and it can selectively favor both regime-compliant candidates and MPs with access to these resources.

Rural areas in Jordan are also less densely populated and tribes are more clearly segregated allowing the regime to carve out districts to either favor traditional political allies or mitigate the electoral strength of potential opposition by including more than one large tribe within a single district, stoking ethnic competition. In these areas, gerrymandering allows the monarchy to selectively reify and reinforce ethnic divisions among the population. All of these issues hinder the formation of broad-based parties in elections.

\textsuperscript{28}In future research, I plan to test whether or not Duverger's law holds in Jordan's electoral districts by checking to see if two tribes tend to dominate the elections in these districts from 1993-2013.
2.5 Circumscribing the Pool of Beneficiaries: Favoring Tribes in Jordanian Elections

In the final section of this chapter I consider how the regime manufactures parliamentary majorities while segmenting the political arena. In an environment of competitive clientelism the limits of the state budget oblige incumbents to figure out ways to offer privileged access to state benefits to certain sectors of the citizenry, cutting out a significant proportion of the population. While most other autocrats rely on the formation of a hegemonic political party and artificially restricted membership within these parties to limit redistribution, the Jordanian regime uses ethnic cleavages to limit beneficiaries. In this section, I examine how the regime affords to maintain this system of patronage through circumscribing the pool of beneficiaries to include only the regime’s core supporters. Many studies on clientelism show that leaders cater to their core supporters, spending much less effort on trying to convince outsiders to join their side (Ansolabehere & Snyder 2002, Stokes 2005, Dunning & Stokes 2010). Cox and McCubbins note that for incumbents “core supporters... are well-known quantities. The candidate is in frequent and intensive contact with them and has relatively precise and accurate ideas about how they will react” (1986, 378–9). In addition to employing an electoral system that favors narrow coalitions that are about the size of the average kinship association (Baylouny 2010, 144) – hindering the ability of broad-based ideological movements to do well in elections – the regime gerrymanders and malapportions the electoral districts to favor tribes.

Autocrats usually rely on an inner circle of trusted allies and advisors who have a significant amount of power. While it is always difficult to know precisely whom the upper echelons of the regime’s winning coalition entails in any autocracy, in Jordan it comprises of at least some of the members of the royal family and King’s appointed advisers who occupy positions in the royal court (al-diwan), serve as ministers or Senators, and head various branches of the government. Mufti offers a guess of between
8 and 10 individuals at maximum who helped the King through the tumultuous period in 1989 when riots led to the re-establishment of parliament and elections (1999, 108). But most rulers also rely on a secondary, larger circle of supporters – the “second stratum” (Binder 1978) – to further engage the broader citizenry and strengthen their rule. In the Jordanian electoral context, the secondary circle of the ruler’s winning coalition is dominated by citizens of East Bank tribal origins over those from Palestinian origins who make up the majority of the population (Baylouny 2010; Alon 2007; Lust 2005; Ryan 2000).

From the very beginning of their rule, “the Hashemites stitched together tribal alliances to govern their territories mainly through the personal relationships they developed with the dominant tribal sheikhs accompanied with transfers of large sums of money and honorary titles in exchange for their allegiance” (Alon 2007, 16). This historical precedence today means that East Bank tribes are more likely than others in the Jordanian society to want to maintain the status quo. While ethnic divisions are socially constructed and the lines between ethnic groups are blurry in all societies, in Jordan the majority of those who do not come from traditional East Bank origins are of Palestinian descent.29 There are complex and hotly contested debates over who makes up the “urduni-urduni” (Jordanian-Jordanian) sector of the population and who makes up the “urduni-filistini” (Jordanian Palestinian) sector of the population in the country. Many or perhaps even most Jordanians of Palestinian origin see themselves as Jordanian, but some hard-line Jordanian-Jordanians may consider them to still be guests, expecting them to return to Palestine should peace with Israel ever become a reality (see Ryan 2010b). Most of the Palestinian origin population in the country has citizenship, which was granted to all refugees who came to Jordan before 1967. Due to the sensitive nature of this ethnic divide, there are no official statistics on the proportion of the population that is of Palestinian descent from the Jordanian government, but most educated estimates place their proportion of the citizenry at around 60% or more. Being

29It is important to note here that there are tribes that are considered to be East Bank with roots in Palestine.
of Palestinian origin does not necessarily mean that a person is anti-regime. Many – particularly those in the wealthy business class – are staunch backers of King Abdullah and some of his top advisers are of Palestinian background. However, for the most part, the regime structures elections to favor the population it counts on as its staunchest supporters: the East Bank tribes.30

Tribalism remains a prevalent form of social organization today. From childhood, the tribe instills a sense of familial duty and honor among its members to comply with tribal norms. In elections, about two-thirds of GLD respondents who report being members of tribes believe that it is one’s duty to vote for a member of their tribe, despite social desirability bias against reporting such norms.31 Beyond these behavioral influences, tribalism is embedded within formal state institutions. The “sheikh al-masheikh” (literally the sheikh of the sheikhs) of the largest tribe in Jordan, Daifallah al-Qulab, described for me last April how the state court will wait until the tribes have come to an agreement among themselves before sentencing a perpetrator in such cases.32 If money for the deceased is paid, for example, the sentence will be significantly reduced. Such arrangements have considerable popular support. 30% of participants in the GLD Jordan 2014 survey registered in rural districts and 26% of those in urban districts prefer that this sort of tribal law be employed to solve issues involving murder, and another 58% in both types of areas prefer a mix of tribal and civil law.33 Among the 559 respondents (of 1,479) who contacted an MP within the past five years, 56% reported that they contacted this MP in particular because he or she is a member of their tribe or family in SNTV districts compared to 63% in SMP districts, while about 15% or less

30 The Palestinian origin population is also severely underrepresented in other governmental institutions. For example, the Minorities at Risk dataset notes that only 4 of 28 ministers and 9 of 55 senators in Jordan were of Palestinian origin in 2006. For further information on this project, see: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=66302.
31 The question read: “In your opinion, is it your duty to vote for a member of your tribe.” 1. Yes (SNTV 66%; SMP 65%).
32 Personal Interview #93, Zarqa, 6/8/2014.
33 The question reads: If, God forbid, a son of your ashireh (ibn ashirehtak) were to be killed by the son of another ashirah, which is better suited to resolve this type of dispute? 1. Tribal law (al-aatwa / jalwa) and tribal leaders; 2. The formal court system and governmental officials; 3. Both together?
reported it was because they are a member of the party they support.] 34.

I posit that there are three main reasons why tribes do well in Jordanian elections: 1) tribes have firmly entrenched organizational mechanisms that help them do well in elections that favor narrow voting coalitions and clientelistic relationships; 2) the regime gerrymanders districts to favor certain tribes and; 3) the electoral districts are malapportioned to accord tribal areas higher representation in the parliament than is warranted by the size of their constituencies.

2.5.1 Why Tribes do Better in Jordanian Elections

At their most basic level, tribes are segmented communities based on putative kinship ties. They are segmented because contained within them there are a series of divisions (al-qabila, al-batan, al-fakhth, al-‘ashirah, al-hamla, al-khams) receding in size down to the nuclear family (al-usra or al-‘a’ila). For the purposes of this research, tribalism might best be thought of as a cognitive way of looking at the world, an ideology of believing oneself to be part of a tribe, submitting to the social norms, informal rules, and formal laws governing that tribe, and relating oneself to the rest of the world through the lens of that tribe. It is “a state of mind, a construction of reality, a model for organization and action” (Tapper 1990, 56). 35

In settings where information about the elections is unclear, tribes have significant advantages. First, tribes can more easily overcome the issue of lack of information that complicates the problem of voter coordination in these districts. As semi-autonomous communities al-‘asha’ir (the clans) already have built-in systems for resolving internal conflicts. These systems make it easy for tribes to organize and coordinate behavior among their members and to avoid the problem of vote-splitting among numerous can-

34 Why did you contact this deputy specifically (speaking of the most recent time)? Was it because he/she is... a member of your tribe or family? 1. yes (41.8%) 0. No (58.2%); ... a member of the party that you support? SNTV: 1. Yes (10.2%) 0. No (89.8%); SMP: 1. Yes (15.4%) 0. No (84.6%)

35 For more on this way of conceptualizing ethnicity, see the following works: Jenkins(1997), Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov (2004), and Brubaker (2004).
candidates that larger political coalitions face in elections. For example, as *al-‘asha’ir* in Jordan learned that running multiple candidates in SNTV elections eliminates their chances of winning of seat in parliament, tribes hold primaries to select a single consensus candidate. Some tribes have very formal primaries including the use of a secret ballot, while others rely on a more informal meeting between a select group of the most prominent members of the tribe to choose the candidate. A formal primary often involves the printing official tribal ballots and a computerized tribal database to track who votes, ensuring that no one can vote twice. The ballots are deposited into boxes that are organized alphabetically to prevent long lines. These boxes are secured with heavy chains and large locks and kept under the close watch of the electoral committee in the center of a room filled with tribal elites as well as voters. Figure 2.3 shows one of these tribal primaries.

Many of the participants in tribal primaries like this one told me that their tribe’s election are more transparent, free, and fair than those run by the country. Moreover, a number of tribes and clans have established strict institutions to ensure candidates will abide by the results of the tribal primary. Jordanian MPs describe the signing of tribal contracts and the depositing of large sums of cash (up to 25,000 JOD) with the tribal electoral committee to ensure that losing primary candidates would not run in the national elections. Qualitative interviews with voters and candidates alike indicate that tribal primaries can be a rather effective strategy for avoiding vote-splitting. Primaries may not always prevent another “renegade” candidate from the tribe from running in the national election, but they often do manage to direct the vast majority of the tribe’s votes towards a single candidate. When asked: “If someone’s family or tribe decides to support a candidate, is he or she obligated to cast a vote for the candidate?” 49% of the

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36 Women are almost always excluded from such events because, as one MP described it, “we want females just to relax at home.” Personal interview #54, Mafraq, 7/9/2012.
37 Personal interview #54 7/9/2012.
38 In Kuwait, where tribes often keep detailed databases of their voters, large tribes divide their voters into groups of roughly even sizes by the first letter of their last name. I have heard of this sort of strategy employed by parties in other SNTV systems like Japan. Why no large tribes or parties have attempted this tactic in Jordan is a mystery.
Figure 2.3: *Tribal Primary Ballot*
GLD respondents in SMP districts and 47% of respondents in SNTV districts agreed that the voter is obligated to cast their ballot for the candidate. These figures may be low due to social desirability bias surrounding this question that results from the fact that most Jordanians know tribalism is not considered to be “modern”. Even within the Sunnah, the record of the sayings and traditions of the Prophet, tribalism is considered to be detrimental to the healthy functioning of society.39.

After the primary election, a meeting is held in which the selected tribal candidate and prominent tribal members give a series of speeches. These speeches center around similar messages concerning the importance of having a tribal member elected to parliament and, in pursuit of this goal, the need for financial support for the tribal primary winner’s election campaign. In this way, small al-‘asha‘ir within a larger umbrella tribal confederation can be likened to well-disciplined ethnic parties.

2.5.2 Gerrymandering Districts to Favor Tribes

In addition to being particularly suited for political organization during elections, tribes are more clearly segregated in rural areas which allowed the regime to draw district boundaries to either favor a single large tribe or include two or more strong tribes within the same district stoking competition between them. In these areas, gerrymandering allows the monarchy to selectively reify and reinforce ethnic divisions among the population, favoring certain tribes over others. Figure 2.4 shows the electoral district map covering the period between 2003-2013. To better understand how the 2003 redistricting affected the constituencies, one need only to remember that before 2003 each district was an entire governorate. On the map, each governorate is represented by a different color. Most governorates (except for Jerash, Mafraq, and Aqaba) were carved up into numerous districts to ensure certain tribes within those areas win parliamentary seats. Only Amman remained relatively unchanged, gaining one extra district. Each of

39See Sunan Abu Dawud, 5102
the Badias are deserts where Bedouin voters tend to live, but these districts are not territorially defined and voters are registered in these districts on basis of their family names. This is why there are small circles of Badia districts included among other districts. The Bedouin quotas protect minority rights yet (much like the other quotas for Christian and Chechen/Circassian populations in the country) they overrepresent these traditional supporters of the King.

Figure 2.4: Electoral Map 2003-2013

Additionally, the electoral rules are also stacked in the favor of rural, tribally dominated areas. For example, voters are registered to cast ballots within the district where they reside, unless they prefer to register in the district their father or grandfather registered in, a special category known as “abna’ al-dai’ra” (sons of the district). This provision in the law ensures that urbanization trends do not deprive rural tribes of power.

\[40\text{Bedouin refers to the nomadic tribal origins of the populations in these areas.}\]
2.5.3 Malapportionment to Favor Rural, Tribally-Dominated Areas

No account of Jordanian electoral politics would be complete without an analysis of how the regime favors rural areas of the country through gerrymandering and malapportionment.\footnote{The competitive clientelism argument presented by Lust-Okar (2006; 2009) considers malapportionment. However, I provide a fuller analysis here.} The Head of Elections at the Ministry of Interior insists that the drawing of districts is done in a fair way, taking into consideration both the size of the population within the district and the geography of the country.\footnote{Personal interview #89 1/20/2013.} Yet, in reality, urban areas of Jordan are grossly underrepresented (i.e. their share of the parliamentary seats is less than their share of the country’s voting population) in parliament in terms of numbers of registered voters in the district (Hourani and Yassin 1998; Hourani and Al-Taher 2009; Ryan 2010a; Ryan 2005). The regime seeks to favor rural areas for a number of reasons.

First, for the regime, the densely populated, urban areas of the country have the greatest potential for collective action that could pose a threat to its power. As noted above, the Muslim Brotherhood’s success in the 1989 elections taught the regime to avoid the formation of broad-based political coalitions that might challenge its initiatives once in parliament. 70% of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates came from the three largest urban centers of Jordan: Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid. These are also the areas of the country with higher proportions of Palestinian origin candidates (Lust-Okar 2006; 2009).

Second, because rural districts are smaller in terms of population than urban ones, a handout goes a lot further in these districts. Much like many of the countries in the developing world, the bulk of development in Jordan in recent decades has occurred in the cities leaving rural areas poor and highly dependent on the state for economic assistance. Respondents registered in SMP districts report having a member of their family work in the public sector at a rate that is 12 points higher than those in SNTV
districts (67% versus 55%), which was found to be significantly different in a two-tailed chi-square test (p<.001). Others also highlight that unemployment rates in urban areas are lower than in the rural areas and that these areas are much more reliant on the public sector for wages (Lust-Okar 2009b; Baylouny 2010). This is evidence that populations in these areas are more reliant on the regime for financial support. MPs from overrepresented districts are essentially cheaper for the regime to buy the support off.

A widely accepted principle of fair elections is equality of representation, ensured by assigning MPs to roughly equal populations of voters. I demonstrate that high malapportionment exists between Jordan’s electoral districts with more populous districts suffering from the worst underrepresentation. In Table 2.4 I use the percentage of the total population of registered voters\(^{43}\) within each district multiplied by the total number of seats in parliament, to find the theoretical number of parliamentary seats a district would have under perfectly proportional electoral rules. I divide the number of seats actually accorded the district by the number of seats it should have under perfectly proportional rules to figure out how much over- or underrepresented the district is and then I subtract this number from 100. A district with perfectly proportional representation based on registered voters would be 0.

Table 2.4\(^{44}\) displays the extremes of the disproportionate distribution of parliamentary seats among electoral districts in Jordan from 1989 to 2013. Note that the smallest electoral district in 1989 in Jordan had 7,165 voters per representative and had a representation of 155% above perfect proportionality; the largest district had 40,541 voters per representative and 45% less than the level of representation in parliament its population of registered voters would warrant under perfectly proportional representation. However, providing the extremes of representation could be misleading if the figures

\(^{43}\)Registered voters per district is the only indicator for the size of the district that I have spanning all years since 1989.

\(^{44}\)This data includes quota seats for minorities that tend to overestimate the amount of representation accorded to an area because usually these seats represent minorities that collectively make up a small proportion of the total population of the country. The women’s quota is also not included.
are outliers and seats are distributed proportionally among all other districts. Thus, I provide a measure of overall malapportionment used by Samuels and Snyder (2001) to compare 187 electoral systems around the world. This measure is found by adding together the absolute value of the difference between each district’s proportion of allocated seats (of all seats) and its proportion of registered voters (of all registered voters) and dividing the final result by 2. The formula for this measure is:

\[
MAL = \frac{1}{2} \sum |s_i - v_i|
\]

(2.3)

where \(s_i\) is the proportion of seats accorded a district and \(v_i\) is the proportion of registered voters of that district. For comparison, the worst malapportionment (MAL) measured in the study by Samuels and Snyder (2001) was Tanzania (1995) at 0.2619, followed by Korea (1996) at 0.2075, and Ecuador (1998) at 0.2040.

Table 2.4: Trends in Voter Representation in Jordan from 1989-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voters per MP (Least)</th>
<th>Voters per MP (Most)</th>
<th>Best Represented</th>
<th>Worst Represented</th>
<th>MAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>24,478</td>
<td>131%</td>
<td>-52%</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7,165</td>
<td>40,541</td>
<td>155%</td>
<td>-45%</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,815</td>
<td>83,625</td>
<td>186%</td>
<td>-52%</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td>61,368</td>
<td>280%</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,697</td>
<td>50,037</td>
<td>253%</td>
<td>-47%</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7,555</td>
<td>46,277</td>
<td>202%</td>
<td>-49%</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>6,733</td>
<td>49,352</td>
<td>223%</td>
<td>-44%</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2003 redistricting scheme caused the worst violation of the principle of equality of representation in Jordan’s modern electoral history. With a MAL score of 0.2668 in this year, Jordan surpassed the worst malapportioned country in the Samuels and
Snyder (2001) study. The smallest district in 2003 comprised of only 7,043 voters per representative and had parliamentary seats equal to 380% (that is 280% over perfectly proportional representation); the largest district of the 2003 elections had just over 51,368 voters per MP with only 44% of the representation it deserved under perfect proportionality. In 2003, the average number of registered voters per district of all districts that were underrepresented in parliament (72,776) was more than double the average number of registered voters per district of all districts that were overrepresented in parliament (27,969). Figure 2.5 indicates that malapportionment favors the sparsely populated areas of Jordan.

Figure 2.5: (Mis)Representation 1989-2013

By 2013 not much changed. The numbers for registered voters are presented in Table 2.4, but I was also able to find numbers of eligible voters by electoral district for this year. Eligible voters in each district provide a more accurate number for analyzing malapportionment because many voters will decide not to turn out at different rates.
based on characteristics of the districts, including their size and the level of competition between candidates. There was an average of just over 28,000 eligible voters in SMP districts in 2013 with the smallest such district having 8,079 eligible voters, while there was an average of over 123,000 eligible voters in SNTV districts with the smallest such district having 34,651 voters. 84% of respondents registered to vote in SMP districts claim to have a tribal identity compared to 68% of those in SNTV districts. More shockingly, when taking into account eligible voters the measure of malapportionment soars to 0.454.45

2.6 Conclusion

I started this chapter by offering a brief overview of Jordanian elections. I explained how the electoral systems in place in Jordan favor narrowly-targeted voter coalitions and handicap broad-based electoral coalitions or parties. Within each electoral system employed in Jordan I demonstrated how the central government – wary of the potential power broad-based political movements could have should they win a majority of seats in parliament – disincentivizes the formation of political parties programmatic politics in elections. For candidates, if one can win with a narrow personal coalition, the idea of attempting to form a larger coalition with other candidates is less appealing as highlighted by Baylouny: “Becoming independent, provided that the electoral system furnishes seats for fewer votes, enables a candidate to skip a party organization and its battles” (Baylouny 2010, 153).] Finally, I showed how the regime circumscribes the pool of beneficiaries of the electoral system.

45Yet, in this respect, the regime has not been able to keep up with urbanization. The proportion of the districts that are SMP has remained the same since 2003, but the proportion of seats in parliament elected in these districts has declined over time. Seats won under SMP rules made up 16% of all of the seats in parliament in 2003 and 2007, dropping to 15% in 2010, and 12% in 2013, mostly due to the addition of quota seats for women but also because of an additional 27 seats elected under a national proportional list system in 2013. Not including the quota seats, SMP districts elected between 18 and 19% of the parliamentary seats between 2003 and 2013.
CHAPTER 3

Elections as an Effective Means for Distribution:
The View of the Elected Intermediary

The Jordanian political system is a clear reflection of the Emirate days. The Kingdom’s centre of gravity is a powerful monarch who alone can delegate authority. This prerogative was established with Abdullah I’s power to nominate all posts, from officers in the Legion to government employees to tribal judges. Therefore, once the British had left there was nothing to balance the power of the King. The highest executive power, the government, is nominated by him, and therefore completely dependent on his support. Therefore real power rests in the King’s court (Alon 2007, 153).

In the last chapter I explained a theory of how the regime employs different types of electoral institutions to encourage certain behaviors among voters and elected officials in Jordan. In this chapter, I focus the discussion on the effect of the electoral institutions on elite behavior after the elections are over with. The goal of this chapter is to understand what elections do at the elite level and to show how elections can be used to ensure the formation of stable clientelistic channels through which the regime can funnel benefits to supporters. It follows a theory laid out by Gandhi and Przeworski (2007, 1280) that under authoritarianism “partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler’s survival. By broadening the basis of support for the ruler, these institutions lengthen his tenure”. I bolster this theory by providing empirical evidence of how the regime broadens its support basis among elites and the grassroots alike.
Much scholarly work describes how the provision of state resources in exchange for political support is an essential component to keeping power in competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes because as much as they might like to, dictators cannot rule a country alone. Elections serve a number of purposes for the regime in dealing with local elites and accomplishing its goal of purchasing public support. Authoritarian leaders want some governmental resources to reach the grassroots level to drum up popular support for the regime, but this requires them to rely on a large network of intermediaries to distribute these resources. Consequently, they delegate power to intermediary elites but they have to figure out a way to make sure this power is wielded correctly and while some level of corruption is to be assumed, keeping a lid on the amount of corruption in any government is necessary for maintaining power lest the public coffers be bled dry. Somewhat competitive elections shift the burden of monitoring the distribution of state resources through these intermediaries from the regime onto the citizens in their districts, whose future welfare depends upon them and who can vote them out of office if they perform poorly. By creating incentives among elected officials to do a good job of patronage provision, elections solve a primary principal-agent problem for leaders.

Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, rarely does scholarly work on elections provide data from primary resources to examine clientelism. In this chapter, I analyze constituent case work records I collected from six Jordanian parliamentarians. These data offer important insights into the inner workings of clientelism and empirically establish that benefits are actually reaching constituents under authoritarianism explaining – at least in part – why voters turnout to participate in undemocratic elections. I offer evidence of how clientelism plays an important role in citizens’ lives not only during Jordanian elections, but long after the last vote has been tallied.

After the elections, the regime maintains divisions between mid-level elites by pitting each parliamentarian against the others in the fight for patronage, diminishing their
ability to unite in opposition against the regime’s initiatives.\(^1\) Constitutionally, the Jordanian parliament is set with the tasks of creating, passing, and/or amending legislation, monitoring ministers and ministerial activities, and overseeing governmental budgets. Yet as much as they may try, MPs report that pursuing legislation of their own making is a very difficult uphill battle due in part to the rules governing activities under the dome and in part because voters expect them to focus their efforts on delivering personal favors. Over time MPs become beholden to the various appointees of the ruler’s central coalition and they often end up trading compliance with the regime’s agenda for continued access to government resources. Through this system of clientelistic competition the regime renders the parliament constitutionally defunct and replaces it with an institution for tending to the particularistic concerns of its winning coalition. As in much of the developing world, having a personal connection that can serve as intermediary to ease transactions between the citizen and the state – on all levels – is highly valued. Throughout the Middle East, both the person serving as the middleman and the process of obtaining preferred access to state benefits is known as “wasta”. This system of patronage provision through elections engenders stability in Jordan because the same tribal families continue to hold onto parliamentary seats.

### 3.1 The Role of Vote Buying and Clientelism in Elections

Having established that Jordanian elections are won with narrow electoral coalitions in the last chapter, I examine the consequences of electoral rules that fractionalize the electorate: rampant political clientelism. Elections encourage the formation of clientelistic relationships by offering ordinary citizens a “good” that is desired by elites and can be used to trade for favors from elites (Huntington and Nelson 1976, 55-56). In the last chapter I identified vote buying as a subset of clientelism, but here it is necessary to analyze how the two differ in terms of what they accomplish for patrons in elections.

\(^1\)Wright (2008) discusses further how this sort of divide and conquer strategy within the legislature is common in autocracies.
Much scholarly work argues that the Achilles heel of clientelism as a means of purchasing political support is that when the ballot is secret, voters can take the resources and then vote for whomever they want. The puzzle this work deals with is: if ballots are secret and no one knows who voted for whom, how can patrons be sure that their voters followed through? In her model of vote buying and clientelism, Stokes (2005) argues that in order for vote buying to work, parties must be able to monitor voters in order to condition the provision of rewards upon their behavior. She describes a series of laborious techniques party machines in Argentina employ in order to gather information about voters’ preferences and make educated guesses about who voted for the party and who did not. Numerous other studies also describe situations in which patrons go to great lengths in order to monitor their clients (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Levitsky 2003). For Stokes this presents a situation of “perverse accountability” in which a party uses the threat of withholding goods to hold voters accountable for casting their ballot for the party, in contrast to what is usually expected in democratic elections where voters give up their “goods” (their votes) to the party during the election relying on the threat of withdrawing support in the next electoral cycle to hold that party accountable. This idea shows up in her later work as well, where “not just arranging to bribe but holding the bribe’s recipient to account [is] a costly matter, one that [is] labor-intensive, requiring close and continuous contact between large numbers of electoral agents and individual voters” (Stokes 2013, 29).

In the Argentinian case, many voters believe that party operatives can find out which candidate they voted for. Stokes provides a statistic from a national survey that “37% of the sample responded that party operatives can find out, 51% that they cannot, and the remaining 12% didn’t know (total sample size: 2,000)” (2005, 318). But in Jordan, 83% of GLD respondents in SMP districts and 79% of those in SNTV districts either “completely agree” or “agree somewhat” that no one knows whom they voted for unless

\[\text{In her article, Stokes does not distinguish between vote buying and clientelism. She is not alone in this tendency. Kitschelt and Wilkinson define clientelism as “the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (2007, 2).}\]
they told someone. This pattern is similar in other areas around where the world where the party machine theory does not hold up, including in Africa (Kramon 2013). Moreover, the regime does not have a party machine to collect information about the actions of voters nor does it seem invested in monitoring their votes.

Like Stokes (2005) I believe that in order to make this system work properly, the relationships between clients and patrons must be ongoing and not a one time transaction. However, we differ in why we think that these repeated interactions matter for vote-buying. For Stokes, they provide a means for the party to hold voters accountable – the voter will be cut off from all future support if the broker finds out that they failed to comply. She posits that this undermines democracy. In my view, these long-term expectations encourage both prospective and retrospective voting, challenging the very premise of perverse accountability. The mechanism at work here is no different than that of a normal democracy: elected representatives work to please voters in hope of being re-elected through continued service provision and close contact with their constituents. The elections serve to systematize clientelistic exchanges. Patrons are “paid” for their performance as service providers every election cycle. If what the voter really wants is a future benefit or even just the comfort of having a contact in office, the patron can feel confident the voter will cast her ballot properly. Democracy is undermined because elections have become all about personal clientelistic favors, which I argue below engenders parliamentarian reliance on the regime and undoes the legislature’s role as a check on the power of the executive.

In Jordan and elsewhere, I posit that it is the expected long-term benefits voters expect to receive from patrons that really drive them to the polls. Even in Argentina, Auyero describes the importance of party brokers turning clientelistic relationships into “problem-solving networks” for voters, noting that these “networks are neither frozen

3The question reads: How much do you agree with the following statement: No one else knows whom I vote for, unless I tell someone. 4. Agree completely (SNTV 42%; SMP 40%) 3. Agree somewhat (SNTV 38%; SMP 43%) 2. Disagree somewhat (SNTV 13%; SMP 13%) 1. Disagree completely (SNTV 8%; SMP 5%).
timeless structures nor the intended outcome of a politician’s calculated or cynical action. They result from long-term regular interactions that, although usually inaugurated by a founding favor, must be continuously cultivated and practiced” (2000, 67). The benefits that the party network provides – much like tribal networks in Jordan – often comes in the form of simple advice for constituents long after election day is over. In countries where personal connections are important for easing important life transactions – such as renewing a driver’s license, securing employment, or even getting married – having a connection in the parliament is extremely important. In this sense, the future promises of candidates to provide personal services to a voter can be thought of as indirect vote buying because unlike in direct vote buying, no cash or other types of goods exchange hands during the election period. The voter is in a sense investing in the candidate’s willingness to help her out in the future, often in non-pecuniary ways.

3.1.1 The Role of the Tribe in Ethnic Clientelism

In other settings, the ruler’s party machine penetrates neighborhoods and close-knit social networks in order to find out information about voters. In the Jordanian case, tribes and small districts make the creation of a party machine superfluous for the regime. For clientelism to work in both cases candidates must cultivate personal relationships with voters to engender trust that he will be there for them should they need help in the future. This research complements recent scholarly work in places where coethnicty between voters and clients contradicts much of the findings from other areas of the world where party machines are necessary for the maintenance of clientelistic relationships. Much of this research has been conducted in Africa, although there are some exceptions. These countries tend to be ethnically divided – by which I mean some ascriptive characteristic is salient in politics and in particular, election. They are widely considered to be developing and tend to have weak political parties that are not expected to be able to make meaningful, national policy changes outside the realm of being able to divert governmental benefits to their district.
When voters value the promise of future access to goods and services once a candidate has access to the resources of the state – perhaps even years after the elections – more than outright handouts of cash or other goods during the elections, it is of the utmost priority to cast votes for a trustworthy candidate whom they can easily monitor and hold accountable for his actions. As highlighted above, tribes in Jordan can never be sure if individual members voted for their candidate, particularly in recent elections in which international organizations have offered technical support in running the elections.\textsuperscript{4} But they offer patrons a solution in place of party machine networks.

The importance of the tribal structure in clientelism in places like the Middle East and Africa is multifaceted. Tribes maintain regularized contact between patrons and clients. In the GLD survey, more than 70\% of respondents in both SMP and SNTV districts say they attend tribal events at least once or twice a year, if not more.\textsuperscript{5} According to a Center of Strategic Studies survey in 2000, 60\% of Jordanians attend kinship association activities monthly (Center for Strategic Studies 2000). Baylouny (2010, Chapter 4) finds that since the reintroduction of the parliament in 1989 the number of “kin mutual aid associations” based on tribal identities has exploded. She argues that this is because after the IMF economic liberalization scheme Jordanians could no longer rely on state welfare, so they began creating kinship groups to turn to for help in times of need.

In most places where patron client relations follow ethnic lines, ethnic groups have a long history of providing a social safety net for their members. Tribes create informational shortcuts for voters (Ferree 2003; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005), allowing them to make decisions about what they expect in the future, based on the past record of the

\textsuperscript{4}Chandra (2004) highlights how village members will monitor the polling stations in order to keep track of who turns out for the elections. Kinsmen of candidates will watch who turns out and who does not in Jordan as well as elsewhere in the Middle East. Some candidates even have computer systems with the names of all the tribal members or expected voters and they will start making phone calls in the last hours to those who were not accounted for. This can provide great information on turnout, but the voter can still cast a ballot as she pleases once inside the voter booth.

\textsuperscript{5}The question reads: “How often do you attend ceremonies or events organized by your tribe/asheerah? 1. Never; 2. Once or twice a year; 3. Once or twice a month; 4. Once a week or more.
tribe in helping out the community. In Jordan for example, important life events like weddings and funerals are often arranged and funded by the tribe. 30% of the GLD respondents in SNTV districts and 40% of those in SMP districts report having had their asheerah or tribal council fund help themselves or a member of their family cover the expenses of a wedding, a funeral, a medical expense, or other expenses. Thus, there are entrenched norms of reciprocity among tribesmen. Beyond money, tribes offer protection. More than half of the GLD respondents in both types of districts report that their tribe has helped themselves or a family member solve a dispute with another party. It is this past performance of the tribe as a whole that voters rely upon to make educated guesses about their tribal candidate’s future performance in using his position to help out their community.

I am not the first to notice that voters rely on ethnic cues to provide information about the future performance of candidates in elections in the developing world, where voters do not expect that their MP to succeed in implementing public policies. In Jordan and a number of other cases around the world where patronage provision occurs along ethnic lines, coethnicity is the key to overcoming credibility issues between voters and representatives. In places as varied as India (Chandra 2004), Zambia (Posner 2005), Uganda (Carlson 2015) and Habyarimana et al. (2009), Lebanon and Yemen (Corstange Forthcoming), and Kenya (Kramon 2013) scholars find that ethnic cues help voters to differentiate between credible campaign promises of patronage provision from those that are unreliable. Employing a voting simulation experiment Carlson (2015) finds that a record of goods provision matters for voters only when a candidate is a coethnic. Likewise, Chandra finds that ethnic groups organize themselves in order to maximize their access to patronage based on the premise that “the only credible promises are those made by coethnics” (2004, 62). An embedded survey experiment finds that descriptions of cash handouts in exchange for votes only paints a positive im-

654% in SNTV districts versus 59% in SMP districts.
7This study looked at presidential elections, but the findings are applicable to legislative elections as well.
age of the candidate when he is a member of the voter’s ethnic group (Kramon 2013). Others find that in comparison to non-coethnics, coethnics are better able or at least believe themselves to be better able to gauge characteristics of other coethnics, track down coethnics, and are more likely to favor each other and cooperate as well as sanction once another for failure in these realms (Habyarimana et al. 2009). Coethnic votes are “cheaper” to buy than votes from other communities because ethnic social networks help coethnic patrons reduce transaction costs and sanction defectors easier (Corstange Forthcoming). Deeply embedded norms of reciprocity convince voters that coethnics will cooperate once in office, whereas non-coethnics are considered more likely to shirk.

Thus, coethnicity between the voter and the candidate creates a strong accountability mechanism for both voters and MPs to carry out their respective roles of casting ballots for tribal MPs and redistributing the benefits of the office. In Jordan, more than 80% of respondents to the GLD survey either agreed or strongly agreed that one should worry about being cheated when dealing with people outside of one’s own clan or tribe.\(^8\) This finding resonates with a common saying in Jordan that is said to have Bedouin roots: “Me against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, and all of us against the stranger.”\(^9\) On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is “not at all important” and 10 is “very important”, between 36 and 37% of GLD interviewees who are members of tribes responded that having a member of their asheerah or tribe elect a representative to the parliament is a 10.\(^10\) I posit here that all of these are important features of ethnic voting that cannot be overlooked in the Jordanian case, however I argue in the next chapter that the salience of ethnicity also depends on the type of electoral institutions.

\(^8\) This number did not vary greatly between respondents registered in SM (87%) versus SNTV (83%) districts. The question reads as follows: Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: One should worry about being cheated when interacting with people outside of one’s own family or tribe.

\(^9\) See Potter and Dulai (2014) for use of this quote elsewhere in the Arab world.

\(^10\) Respondents were shown the scale on a tablet screen before being prompted to answer. In SNTV districts, 68% ranked the importance of having a tribal member in office between 6 and 10 and in SMP districts 67% ranked it between 6 and 10.
governing the district.

This is also not to say that direct vote buying does not occur in Jordanian elections. Accounts of voters selling their ballots to multiple buyers during the elections abound in the literature on vote buying. However, insights from the field indicate that direct and indirect vote buying serve different purposes for patrons. Following recent research on vote buying, I posit that immediate transfers of goods in exchange for political support are most often used by patrons as a mechanism of showing strength. Handouts of cash, food, and other goods during the elections signals to voters that a candidate is capable of providing goods and renews clientelistic relationships (Kramon 2013), reminding them that she is generous, seeking to help out their community and themselves should they need it. Direct vote buying gets voters excited for the elections and turns them out at rallies and at the polls (Nichter 2008). Beyond the candidate, the regime or party in power may employ vote buying tactics to signal to potential challengers that it is invincibility. Geddes (2008), Magaloni (2006) and Wedeen (2008) all cite the ability of elections to demonstrate the power of the regime to mobilize large swaths of its population to turnout, discouraging would be challengers. Magaloni (2006) in particular argues that elections provide information about the level of control the regime has and the support it enjoys within the population at large. At the candidate level, a similar mechanism may be at work.

Where outright vote buying – the immediate exchange of money for a vote – is employed, informal interviews with voters revealed that candidates will have the voter swear upon the Quran that they will cast their votes for them. However, voters also reported that usually they can swear to vote for multiple candidates and still get away with taking multiple handouts. 81% of respondents to the GLD agree that if one swears upon a Quran to vote for a candidate, he or she is obligated to follow through on that committed.11 With my collaborators on the GLD survey, in the future I plan to better

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11 The question reads: "If someone swears on the Quran to vote for a candidate, is he or she obligated to cast a vote for the candidate?" 1. Yes (80.8%) 0. No (19.2%). There is only a 1% difference between respondents in SNTV versus SM districts).
pinpoint where vote-buying is more likely through analysis of a list experiment on this topic that we embedded in the survey. From observations in the field, this form of outright vote buying seems to be a more common occurrence in the SNTV urban areas of the country.

However, I argue that a candidate can win his seat through direct vote buying alone; personal reputation for the provision of services is a necessary quality to win a seat in the Jordanian parliament. I provide evidence to back up this position in the next section. I find that these relationships do not fit well within most traditional models of vote buying and are often discounted in other contexts.

### 3.2 Why Voters Participate in Undemocratic Elections

In the Middle East, personal networks are often referred to as *wasta* or sometimes – more colloquially – as “vitamin wow” because it is such a necessary part of life that it is likened to an essential nutritional supplement with the word “wow” serving as a double entendre being both the name of the first letter of the word *wasta* in Arabic and the English word for a sensational success. More literally, *wasta* can mean either the intermediary who obtains the favor or the act of his intercession on behalf of someone to obtain access to what might otherwise be unobtainable (Al-Ramahi 2008, 37). In Middle Eastern countries, access to government services, benefits, and employment are often governed by *wasta*. Among GLD survey respondents, more than two-thirds in both types of districts see *wasta* as being “essential” or “very useful” in obtaining a job in the public sector. Beyond jobs, 54% of GLD respondents in both SNTV and SMP districts consider *wasta* to be “essential” or “very useful” in obtaining a building permit, driver’s license, school registration, etc. The Arab Barometer found that 23% of Jordanians used *wasta* within the last five years to take care of a problem, and among

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12 The question wording reads as follows: Is *wasta* not useful at all, slightly useful, moderately useful, very useful, or essential in obtaining a 1) building permit, driver’s license, school registration, etc. or 2) job in the government sector for the two different questions.
those who reported using it, 54% said their was	a came from government officials including parliamentarians (Tessler et al. 2006). I do not mean to imply here that every governmental service in Jordan requires was	a, just that it is significantly more difficult and time-consuming to navigate the bureaucracy without it. Moreover, MPs are not the only source of was	a for Jordanians.

3.2.1 Clientelism at work

I try to do well for my people, I don’t want to be a na’ib al-khidamat (a ‘service’ parliamentarian). When I do was	a for someone then he will take the place of someone else who deserved it. If I do was	a for someone who scored a 70 in the place of 80 or 90 then that is not right. I have to provide services though... (Personal interview with a Jordanian MP #48 7/9/12).

In this section I provide empirical evidence of clientelism at work in Jordan, supporting the idea introduced in the last chapter that the electoral system in place encourages clientelistic relationships. This idea is not lost on Jordanians either, in the words of a one former Jordanian Senator (who is also a sheikh of his tribe): “Due to the electoral law... there is a “vitamin wow”system“13. To investigate how clientelism in Jordan works, I went to the parliament. When I asked the MPs how they help the members of their community, many brought out folders filled with letters they had written to various branches of the government (the Cabinet, the Royal Court, and public institutions) to fulfill personal requests made by their constituents. For example, if a voter has a sick relative in the hospital and cannot afford to pay the bill, he or she will go to his parliamentarian. The parliamentarian will write a letter asking the regime-appointed minister of health to forgive the debt. One MP talked about his success in bringing home a member of his asheerah that had gotten into a car accident in the United Arab Emirates. After 35 days of being in a coma, the MP managed to get the King to send a

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13Personal interview #62, Amman, 10/29/2013
private medical plane to bring back him back to Jordan (Personal interview #21 7/9/12). I collected more than a thousand of these letters from six parliamentarians on topics ranging from getting a son a job to connecting electricity to a home to freeing a tribal member from jail, etc.

The MPs who provided comprehensive data for analysis here represent constituencies across the northern, central, and southern regions of Jordan and include one female who won her seat on the women’s quota. The other five MPs are split between SNTV and SM districts.¹⁴ Five of the six MPs were selected as a consensus candidate for their tribe through formal primaries or meetings held prior to the elections, with the exception being the female MP although she noted that without the help of her tribe, she would not have won her seat.¹⁵ All of the MPs were elected in 2010 except for two, who were elected in 2013. One of the MPs is also from Palestinian roots.

The case work logs cover periods ranging from six months two years, detailing the types of services sought by constituents, the reasons for the request, and the names of the beneficiaries.¹⁶ Some – but not all – offer information about whether or not the regime approved the benefit.¹⁷ This data allows for an empirical analysis of the types of requests MPs are expected to deal with and sheds some light on those most often granted by the government.

The overwhelming majority of requests processed were for employment and for outright financial aid (see Figure 3.1). Letters for employment (shown in blue) sought to help constituents obtain recruitment into the armed services, appointments to jobs in public institutions, transfers from certain departments to others, promotions, etc. and range from 6 to 67% of all the requests the MPs processed. Financial aid requests

¹⁴To protect the identities of the candidates as this information is somewhat sensitive, I do not reveal the names of the MPs who provided me this data.
¹⁵Personal interview #9 6/4/12.
¹⁶There is a correlation between the period of time and the number of requests made each MP and there does not seem to be any sort of pattern between which MPs provide more or less services.
¹⁷Unfortunately, many of the requests were still being processed when I collected them and so I do not have a confirmed outcome for them. Moreover, the MP of Palestinian origins informed me that he only kept records of services that were completed for the most part.
(shown in red) could include the forgiveness of payment for a traffic ticket or a fine for some other violation of the law, financial aid for students, pecuniary charity for the poor or unfortunate, public sponsorship of a patient who cannot afford to pay his hospital bills, etc. and range from 21 to 87% of the services processed by the MPs. Educational enrollment were requests (shown in green) made on the behalf of students to be admitted or transferred into a school, usually at the university level, or the appointment of students to university seats under the royal benevolence (*makrama*) system, making up anywhere between 0 and 4% of requests. I also created a category for services that could be attributed to helping out a group of voters or the nation as a whole, which I labeled “public services” (shown in purple) and represent anywhere from 1 to 6% of the MP’s services. Finally, I coded for cases of pure personal favors to the constituent such as helping a Syrian relative gain entry into the country or attending an *aatwa* (dispute resolution meeting between tribes). As expected, the focus on particularistic benefits greatly outweighs efforts spent on provision of public services.

The results of this inquiry provide important insights into the inner workings of patron-client relationships in the developing world and establish . This explains – at least in part – why voters participate in authoritarian elections. The figures above also provide rates of approval for the two most common requests, however it is important here to take note of the small number of cases used for this analysis. Unfortunately, most of these requests were still being processed when I collected them, so I only offer data on those that had a recorded outcome at the time of collection. The government was much more likely to approve financial aid requests at a rate of between 80 and 95%, rather than employment in a public institution rate of between 40% and 80%.

While these figures are likely biased towards being on the high end due to the low

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18 There were not enough cases to provide meaningful analysis of the two least common types of requests. Furthermore, the number of cases for which I had approval or denial information concerning financial aid from MP 1 and employment from MPs 2 and 5 are very low. Conclusions drawn from these data are somewhat speculative. I include them in the analysis though because they do not vary too much from the general trend found among the requests other MPs made and to offer full information from all the data collected. The overall trend seems to be that employment and financial aid are the most common categories of service.
Figure 3.1: Service Provision Types

MP 1: N=347
- Employment (51% Approved, N=91)
- Financial Aid (88% Approved, N=16)
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal favors

MP 2: N=87
- Employment (80% Approved, N=5)
- Financial Aid (82% Approved, N=44)
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal Favors

MP 3: N=442
- Employment (49% Approved, N=769)
- Financial Aid (86% Approved, N=44)
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal favors

MP 4: N=620
- Employment (50% Approved, N=54)
- Financial Aid (95% Approved, N=38)
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal Favors

MP 5: N=957
- Employment (70% Approved, N=7)
- Financial Aid (74% Approved, N=23)
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal services

MP 6: N=511
- Employment
- Financial Aid
- Education
- Public Services
- Personal services
numbers of cases I had where a final decision was made and the very real possibility that MPs attempted to provide me with more information on their successes or perhaps even only keep accurate records about the cases they have accomplished rather than those they have failed to secure (as is the case with MP 6), the data make clear that some benefits from authoritarian regimes actually reach constituents. This tendency makes logical sense, as a single or limited hand out of financial aid is less taxing on the government’s budget than providing a wage and employment benefits for an undefined number of years. These findings also leads one to wonder: if requests for financial aid or employment are fulfilled at such high rates, why doesn’t every Jordanian citizen request such services from his or her MP(s)? In the next chapter I demonstrate that not all citizens can expect to receive benefits.

These casework logs demonstrate that voters really can expect to receive benefits form their elected representatives, explaining – at least in part – why they turn out to participate in the elections. Jordan boasts a turnout rate that is consistently higher than 50% – in other words higher than the turnout rate of many democracies. This analysis also empirically establishes that benefits are actually reaching constituents under authoritarianism. Clientelism is not the only reason citizens turnout in Jordanian elections. As mentioned, some voters receive outright hand-outs of cash or they are pressured to vote for a certain candidate by important figures in their lives, including friends, family, or their boss. Some voters see it as their national duty to vote or they would feel honored to have a family member or a personal connection in office. But the number one answer I receive when I ask Jordanians why they vote is that they hope to secure a social safety net for their family, a contact in parliament who might be able to help solve their family’s problems in the future should they need it.19

Because relations are so personal between voters and parliamentarians, there need not be a strict monitoring mechanism for ensuring that voters actually vote for the candidate, because as Figure 3.1 indicates, it is truly in voters’ interest to have a personal

19Personal Interview #16 7/9/2012; Personal Interview #72 12/9/2013.
patron in office. Since *wasta* is not a one-shot deal and is something everyone in the society relies upon to get even mundane tasks like renewing a license done, voters sincerely want a patron in office to help them out. This is not to say that elections are the only means by which citizens secure *wasta*, but having connections to an MP is a major asset for any citizen in Jordan.

### 3.2.2 MPs as Personal Patrons

Importantly, this pattern of having a personal patron within the parliament extends across socio-economic, gender, as well as ethno-national divides. Notice that different MPs have different strengths. MP 5 proudly told me that he had a long history of working within various branches of the government and the many connections he made during this time make him a good parliamentarian. The data also reveals that both the woman MP and the MP of Palestinian origins are able to provide services on par with their counterparts. For the woman MP, the question is why she would do so since she is not running on the same electoral system as the other MPs. For the West Bank origin MP the question is why the regime would provide him with services if he is not part of the favored East Bank tribal population.

The answer as to why the woman MP is compelled to provide services lies in the fact that the quota system electoral rules also favors narrow winning electoral coalitions. Currently, there is a women’s quota seat allocated to each of the 12 governorates as well as each of the 3 Bedouin districts. To win one of these 15 seats through the women’s quota, a female candidate must get the highest percentage of the popular vote within a district in her governorate or one of the Bedouin districts. In other words, women are competing for seats not only against other women within their district, but with other women within their governorate (for those who are not officially recognized as a member of a Bedouin family). So, for example, if a female candidate running in Irbid district one comprising of the central city of Irbid wins 7,000 votes, in the 2013 elections she would only have won 10% of the vote; whereas if a woman running in
Irbid district nine comprising of the rural town of al-Westiyeh won just 1,000 votes, she would have won 11% of the vote in 2013 and she would have won the woman’s quota seat for the governorate of Irbid over the candidate in Irbid district 1, who actually won a higher number of votes and can be said to represent more of the population.

In the introduction chapter I described the inner circle of the regime’s support coalition. In addition to the King’s family members and the East Bank tribes, I mention the economic elite of Amman. MP #6 falls into this latter category. Before taking office, he was the General Manager of a publicly traded company in Jordan. He holds a PhD from the US, is an active member of the engineering syndicate, sits on the board of two other companies, and is the chair of two charitable organizations. This MP comes from an elite class of Palestinian origin Jordanians.

As noted in the last chapter, Palestinians tend not to be as tribally-oriented as East Bank Jordanians. Much of this has to do with the fact that Palestine was considerably more urbanized than Jordan when Palestinians originally fled and the act of fleeing severely weakened what tribal linkages there were. Yet, in recent years, Palestinians have made inroads in the parliament by reviving their tribal alliances. In the next chapter, I show that despite being of Palestinian origin, the data indicates that this MP won his seat based on this revival of Palestinian tribal ties during the elections. As is expected under SNTV rules, he behaves in a similar way to the rest of his counterparts who won their seats with tribal backings – which I confirm with empirical data in the next chapter.

Conceptualizing vote buying as a mix of singular handouts during the elections and the formation of stable clientelistic networks weakens the traditional logic that it is mostly the poor who participate in clientelism (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Chubb 1982; Stokes 2005; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004). Wasta spans across all classes – the businessman who wants to gain a leg up in his contract with the government or ensure his bid is selected, the rich family who needs their farmland to be re-districted so they can build a villa or housing complex on it, the rich man’s son who did poorly in his
tawjihi (high school exit exam) but still wants to get into university, etc. In the next chapter I explore this claim in more detail.

3.3 The Role of Clientelism in Supporting Autocracy

Conventional wisdom considers the exchange of votes for goods and services to be deleterious to democracy. Results from the GLD survey reveal that around 75% of respondents in Jordan see the exchange of their vote for outright payments of money or gifts as illegitimate, whereas almost 50% approve of the exchange of a vote for government services.\(^\text{20}\) These figures indicate that Jordanians are aware that the outright exchange of one’s vote for money or gifts is detrimental to society or perhaps undemocratic, but they may see the exchange of a vote for a personal service as part and parcel of democracy and good governance. And they are not totally off the mark in thinking this. A large body of scholarly work documents the importance of constituency services offered by legislators at all levels of government in developed democracies for re-election (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984). Freeman and Richardson (1996) define casework as ‘legislators’ efforts to help constituents with their problems: cutting red tape, negotiating with state agencies, providing information, and assisting with government jobs”. Notice that this definition is very similar to the meaning of wasta I provided in the last chapter as the primary service Jordanian MPs provide for their communities. All legislators spend at least part of their time doing casework. Why then do we worry about clientelism?

The difference in Jordan is that parliamentarians are kept expending nearly all of their energy in office on casework, rather than focusing their efforts on creating legislation to address the nation’s problems or serving as a check on the power of the executive branch. Numerous interviews with Jordanian parliamentarians from all over the country describe how as much as they would like to focus on their ideas for improving the coun-

\(^\text{20}\)The three survey questions read: In your opinion, if one accepts (money / gifts or food / a service) from a candidate, is he or she obligated to cast a vote for this candidate? 1. Yes; 0. No.
try with the proposal of national legislation or broad-sweeping public projects, they get bogged down in addressing the particularistic needs of their constituents.\textsuperscript{21} Jordanian MPs behave like those in other SNTV systems where “each candidate attends scores of funerals, weddings, and other celebrations within the constituency each year (Cox and Thies 2000, 39-40) to maintain a personal machine. One MP explained how every Tuesday his office in town is open all day to the public. On an average day he meets with anywhere from 150 to 170 constituents. He records all of their requests in a computer so he can organize them, then he writes letters to the government and visits the proper ministries, sometimes even bringing constituents with him to the ministers’ offices. He laments his inability to work on broader legislation and complains that even when he does find the time write bills, they never make it to the floor because he does not have the energy to follow through with them. Instead, he is kept busy maintaining personal connections by attending all the funerals and marriages of his tribal members.\textsuperscript{22} These sorts of obligations are not captured by the constituent casework logs.

When asked what their daily job entails, MPs in Jordan typically provide three answers: 1) the reviewing, amending, and/or passing of legislation; 2) the monitoring of ministry budgets and affairs and; 3) the provision of personal services to their constituents. However, this last (unofficial) pursuit creates a conflict of interest in carrying out the first two duties of the office and MPs often end up trading approval of legislation, budgets, and other ministry affairs for personal services for their constituents.\textsuperscript{23} One parliamentarian described this scenario for me employing a common phrase in Arabic:

\begin{quote}
The MP is “\textit{bain a-narain}” (between two fires) the fire of the citizens and the fire of the government. The fire of the government puts pressure on the parliament members by refusing to give them anything if they challenge the government’s actions. You have to balance between what your people
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21}Personal interview #88, 3/18/14; Personal interview #14 7/9/12; Personal interview #60 9/29/13.
\textsuperscript{22}Personal Interview #7, Amman, 5/17/12.
\textsuperscript{23}Personal Interview #25 4/4/2012.
need and what the government wants... You agree to a law even if you don’t believe it is good law, because you may need something from the government to avoid the other fire – the citizens (Personal interview #14 7/9/2012.)

MPs become beholden to the various branches of the regime for fulfillment of the favors they request. When the Ministry of Health requests an increase in its budget or a change in the legislation that the regime sees as favorable, the minister can call upon all the MPs who need help with fulfilling healthcare requests from their constituents to vote accordingly. One MP reported that in exchange for the building of a school in his constituency, he gave the government his vote of confidence. Through this mechanism, elite opposition to the crown’s initiatives is stifled. Even if MPs manage to coordinate and organize themselves into cohesive parliamentary blocs, the regime is able to pick off members of a coalition one by one until it is left without power. Furthermore, the regime holds the ultimate wild card: if a parliamentarian gets too close to a national deal, the minister can simply be shuffled out of the cabinet or the parliament can be dissolved. One MP described his frustration after months of hard work on projects for his community with a specific minister led to nothing once that minister was dismissed and the his replacement refused to honor the deals he had made. Another MP from the 2010 parliament explains:

People demand that you are in the community and with them all the time. When you become an MP you do not have enough time to do that. I would come home at midnight and only then could I start reading the laws. People approach you for things they know that you can give help in, but as an MP they approach you for everything. They believe that an MP can do anything. But in reality we do not differ from a normal citizen... We tried to work with colleagues and ministries to help set the comprehensive

\[24\text{Personal Interview #5 10/29/2011.}\]  
\[25\text{Personal interview #7, Amman, 5/17/12.}\]
insurance law, there was a discussion about this, but [the parliament was] dismissed very quickly and in such a short time that we couldn’t finish our work (Personal interview #60 9/29/13.)

When candidates can rely on a narrow winning coalition bound together by personal relationships, there is no hiding from being held accountable by voters. The end result is that instead of creating legislation to help the nation as a whole, MPs end up competing with one another to gain access state resources. Over time, MPs lose motivation to pursue their own legislation creation or to fulfill their other constitutional duties of monitoring ministry activities. These findings are consistent with those of studies conducted on clientelism in other places around the world (see Lindberg and Morrison 2008). The system keeps elites and their constituents alike dependent on the regime for personal hand-outs, giving them a vested interest in its continued reign.26 As Mufti points out, particularly with respect to the SNTV district, “for the Palace, of course, these outgrowths of SNTV – opposition disarray and factionalism, personalistic rather than ideological politics – all boded well for its attempt to promote liberalization without creating an overly radical and obstreperous legislature” (Mufti 1999, 119). The proportion of the districts that are SM has remained the same since 2003, but the proportion of seats in parliament elected in these districts has declined over time. Seats won under SMP rules made up only 16% of all of the seats in parliament in 2003 and 2007, dropping to 15% in 2010, and 12% in 2013, mostly due to the addition of quota seats for women but also because of an additional 27 seats elected under a national proportional list system in 2013. Not including the quota seats, SMP districts elected between 18 and 19% of the parliamentary seats between 2003 and 2013. This somewhat dreary outcome begs the question: if holding office is just about spending time securing personal services for constituents, why do elites expend so much time, money, and effort running in authoritarian elections?

26See Boix and Svolik (2008) for an explanation of how a legislature helps dictators to monitor elected elites and contributes to stability in authoritarian regimes through mechanisms not discussed here.
3.3.1 Incumbency Through Tribal “Inheritance”

Much like running in elections elsewhere in the world, candidates in Jordan expend considerable time, money, and effort in pursuit of a seat. Candidates report spending upwards of $40,000 on campaigning and numerous hours visiting voters in their homes for months running up to the elections.\(^{27}\) In a country where the average GDP per capita is just over $5,000 a year, this is an exorbitant expense. Elites covet a seat in parliament for myriad reasons. The most obvious is that a seat comes with increased prestige in their communities. But beyond this psychological benefit, elected officials gain some degree of power as well as substantial pecuniary benefits from their positions. For example, MPs have access to personal discretionary budgets with which they can help out their communities by hiring local staff and providing jobs. Their direct access to ministers – who have the ability to do everything from forgive a debt owed to a public institution like a hospital or a school to selecting where development projects will be based – is another important benefit. This access has the potential to result in lucrative business deals from inside knowledge of public projects and the ministers doling out the contracts (Lust-Okar 2009b). MPs personally gain lifelong pensions and a duty-free car. Pensions were estimated to be worth at minimum 1,500 JOD ($2,100) per month in 2012. For perspective, compare this figure to the average monthly wage in Jordan of just over 350 JOD (490) in 2009 (Obeidat 2012). Cars in Jordan are subject to additional taxes and duties amounting to 81.25% of the car’s value. Other luxuries afforded to MPs include full diplomatic passport privileges (Ryan 2012) and immunity from prosecution while parliament is in session.\(^{28}\) Moreover, most MPs feel a duty to run on behalf of their families, many of which have gotten used to having a personal patron in parliament.

While it is widely assumed in the literature on electoral behavior that the primary

\(^{27}\)Personal interview #36, Madaba, 1/22/13; Personal interview #54, Mafraq, 7/9/2012.

\(^{28}\)For more information on Article 86 of the Jordanian Constitution, which grants parliamentary and cabinet members immunity from detainment and prosecution see: http://www.representatives.jo/app/Public/Member/Viewa.asp?Company_ID=2667.
goal of elected officials is to obtain re-election (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974), in Jordan I find that mid-level elites will work hard in office in order to ensure the future success of their own political careers outside of the chamber and the continued power of their tribes within it. Even if they’re not personally re-elected, MPs can expect a member of their tribe to “inherit” the seat and therefore reap the broader benefits of the office for their extended family. My data shows that while turnover rates for individual parliamentarians are quite high, the same prominent tribes continue to win seats in parliament by organizing pre-election meetings or primaries to ensure rotation of the seat among the various branches or clans within the tribe. With each round of elections, the new tribal MP serves as a political connection for the former deputy and reciprocally the previous MP can offer him access to governmental resources associated with his new position, should he obtain one. Even if the former MP simply returns to the private sector, casework data I collected from parliamentarians demonstrate that during his tenure in the parliament, he is able to place many of his kin in various public sector positions and so the cycle of *wasta* continues. For voters and elites alike, *wasta* is a major motivation for political participation.

The premise that elections serve as a reliable means of state distribution relies on the prior assumption that elected officials seek reelection. Yet, Hourani et al. (1998) note that in the 1997 elections, half of the deputies did not run again and 75% of the previous parliament did not return. This indicates that among the 50% of the previous parliamentarians who ran in the elections, only 25% won their seats again. Compared to re-election rates in democracies around the world, this is quite a high parliamentary turnover rate. Table 3.1 shows just how low incumbency rates are for the Jordanian parliament between 1993 to 2013.29

Scholars of electoral authoritarianism often argue that it is in the dictator’s interest to keep regime supporters rotating in and out of power. Geddes points out that “unstable

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29These figures includes quota seats for minorities and for women. It does not include the 27 seats run on the national proportional list system in 2013. I exclude these seats from analysis because it was a new system so that incumbency measures would not mean the same as they would for these other seats.
personal networks” prevent elected intermediaries from “developing autonomous bases of support” (1999, 133) through which they might challenge the dictator. Likewise, Gandhi and Lust (2009, 410) cite high turnover rates in Egypt and Jordan in concluding that they strengthen authoritarian regimes. According to Lust-Okar (2006 & 2009), “weak parties, little coordination over entrance, and patronage-based voting” in Jordan results in “little continuity across the parliaments” (2006, 463). The idea that parliamentarians do not keep their seats contradicts two central arguments laid out in this chapter about how the Jordanian regime maintains power: 1) selection of electoral institutions that encourage MPs to develop stable, personal coalitions of supporters and; 2) the incentive of reelection to make MPs accountable to their constituents for delivering benefits while in office. Below I propose a different way of measuring incumbency in Jordan that cause suggestions for rethinking these aspects of prior research.

I suspect that many MPs do not attempt to run for their seat again in order to open it up for “inheritance” by another tribal member. Much as Samuels (2003) describes in Brazil, MPs may well have plans to advance his political career by pursuing a position at another level of government. If MPs do a good job of patronage provision in

<table>
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<th>% Incumbent MPs</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

parliament, they may be rewarded by the regime with appointments such as minister, governor, or ambassador once their tenure in parliament is up. For example, regime-appointed Senators are often former MPs. This is also not a one-way street. MPs also report having sought out a seat in the parliament after having held other positions in the government, even positions of higher stature. However, elected officials have incentives to carry out their patronage provision duties because they hope that the voters will continue to elect a member of their family into office. The former MP can rely on his tribe’s newly elected MP to continue to provide him with *wasta* and he himself can also serve as a source of *wasta* should he manage to secure another position of public service. As one Jordanian voter explained when asked what was appealing about the candidate he voted for: “[He] has a relative in the municipality, in the security, and in the university, and so he can really offer help in many areas.”

This rotation of parliamentary power between different branches and clans within the tribe maintains a stable personal network of supporters, but again, these coalitions tend to be quite small and so do not pose a serious threat to the crown.

Just under 60% of respondents to the GLD Jordan survey felt that the same tribes always win parliamentary seats in their districts, regardless of whether the respondent is registered in an SM or SNTV district. Categorizing each MP by his or her broader tribal affiliation reveals that just 126 different tribes held the 580 parliamentary seats that were contested from 1989 to 2013. More shockingly, only 41 different tribes held over half of all the parliamentary seats in the Jordanian legislature since 1989.

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30This is not to say that individual MPs do not run again. Winning at least twice has its benefits. For example, in order for former MPs to be appointed to the Senate, they must have been elected at least twice in the parliament. Winning a seat twice demonstrates to the regime that the parliamentarian is doing a good job and is well-respected by the people in his district.

31Personal interview #45 8/14/2003; .

32Personal interview #98 5/7/15.

33The difference is 2% with 58% of respondents registered in SM districts agreeing compared to 60% of those in SNTV districts. The question reads as follows: Do you feel that the same tribe(s)/ashirah or a’asha’ır always win parliamentary seats in your local district? 1. Yes 0. No.

34This figure excludes quota seats for women and Circassian/Chechens, as well as the 27 seats run under the national proportional list system in 2013. This figure also lumps all Palestinians in as one tribe. Palestinians do not win that many seats in parliament in general, so the dividing lines are usually between West and East Bankers rather than between Palestinian factions.
and just 68 different tribes held over two-thirds of them during this time period. By contrast, only 104 seats or 18% were held by Palestinians, despite the fact that they make up more than half of the population of the country. Bolstering the argument that the regime carved out SMP districts to favor East Bank tribes, Palestinian origin Jordanians won only 5 (5%) of their seats in these districts between 2003 and 2013.

Thus, during elections in Jordan a certain sector of the population is targeted with privileged access to state benefits. Tribes or clans within large tribal confederations rotate in and out of the seats in parliament, which engenders stability by offering the majority of the regime’s staunchest supporters a good shot at obtaining a piece of the state resource pie every three to four years and makes it so that the regime does not have to buy off all of its supporters at the same time. Once in parliament, MPs seek to maintain family reputation to have the seat be perpetually “inherited” by their family members, creating a cycle of wasṭa. If tribes expect to have staying power in the parliament, then their MPs have serious incentives to provide services.

This stable system of sharing power among elites has long roots in the past. In research on Jordan conducted over four decades ago, Al-Jaber (1969, 242) describes “a gentleman’s agreement that ‘this time is for me, next time for you’” between tribal family members which ensures the rotation of the parliamentary seat among various branches of the tribe. In his history of the formation of the state of Jordan, Alov concludes that “a few dozen families – many shaykhly families – which dominated Transjordan in 1946 still enjoy prominent status. Now the third generation holds power” (2007, 155). This analysis suggests that there is much we can learn by studying politics at a sub-national level and really understanding who are the winners in authoritarian regimes as well as how institutions are shaped to favor them.

35In reality, this figure is probably low because many of these families are likely related to each other by marriage and in counting the different tribes.
3.4 Conclusion

Somewhat competitive elections provide a systematic, reliable means to align the interests of these intermediaries with the center. Elections serve as a means of regularizing clientelistic exchanges, creating stable relationships of trust between patrons and clients through which they can funnel government resources from the center to the favored sectors of the population. Structuring elections to favor this type of clientelistic relationship also provides all sorts of information to the regime. It learns whom among the elites and grassroots it can count upon to trade political support for access to state resources, and it subsequently creates reliance on the regime among these sectors of the population. Elections also separate out the elites who are popular and charismatic enough to generate a loyal following for purchase from candidates who are unable to drum up support for the regime. The regime can then target resources to these charismatic leaders. Moreover, the incentives for deputies to supply their districts with benefits also encourage the flow of information about local grievances and problems from the grassroots to the center, as deputies try to obtain resources that would help to alleviate these issues (Geddes 2005). Gathering information about what is really going on at the grassroots is a major problem for dictatorships because local officials have incentives to lie in order to make themselves look successful. Electoral institutions help dictators solve these problems.

36 The Senate also provides services for constituents, but because they are not elected, there is no mechanism to make sure they actually do this and they do not seem to engage in service provision at the same level as parliamentarians do (Personal interview # 62). Senators tend to be a group of prominent figured within the society, again most from prominent tribal backgrounds, who are cycled through various positions within the government. Sometimes, the regime will offer these seats to parliamentary candidates who just missed winning a spot in the elections and have the proper credentials. This bolsters the idea that the regime values individuals who are popular among the grassroots as supporters.
CHAPTER 4

How Formal Electoral Institutions Affect Informal Distribution Patterns:
The View From the Grassroots

In the second chapter of this dissertation analysis of elections data from 1989 to 2013 shows how the Jordanian monarchy uses two different electoral systems to favor narrow electoral coalitions in urban versus rural areas, encouraging candidates to cultivate a personal, clientelistic following rather than rely on programmatic politics to win their seats. However, these two systems result in the fractionalization of the electorate through different means. In that chapter, I lay out a theory about how the SNTV system confuses voters and parties, making strategic voting calculations and collective action difficult in during the elections while SMP districts are kept sufficiently small to allow for political success through clientelism. In this chapter, I find that while personal relationships between voters and their MPs are common in both SNTV and SMP districts and the same sorts of ethnic divides exist throughout Jordan, different electoral institutions can either enhance or diminish the salience of ethnic divides as a basis for political mobilization.

More specifically, in this chapter I hypothesize that the lack of information voters have about the potential success of candidates under SNTV rules diminishes their ability to engage in proper strategic voting, leading to intense competition between candidates who win their seats with narrow, ethnically-defined electoral coalitions in settings where ethnicity is already a salient social divide. In these districts, coethnic
trust as a mechanism for overcoming lack of information in elections as I describe in the last chapter is crucial. I provide evidence that “ethnic censuses” (Horowitz 1985) – whereby ethnic groups that participate in elections will vote perfectly along ethnic lines – exist to a much higher extent in SNTV districts compared to SMP districts in Jordan. By contrast, the use of SMP rules in small districts allows voters to make educated guesses about the popularity of candidates, leading many of them to abandon weak candidates in favor of more popular ones and encouraging cooperation and compromise with other voters on a consensus candidate. The electoral institutions governing these districts encourage inter-ethnic electoral alliances.

Moreover, I examine how electoral institutions incentivize different patronage provision strategies among winning candidates long after the last ballot in the elections is cast. Extending the analysis of the parliamentarian casework logs presented in Chapter 3, I show that MPs in SNTV districts practice ethnic favoritism in service provision, targeting their “core voter” tribal constituency with benefits from the state. MPs in SNTV districts have to be strict about catering to “core voters” because competition for a seat is fierce, making the cost of losing one’s tribal votes very severe. On the other hand, I show that MPs in SMP districts distribute benefits to more ethnically diverse constituent bases. I argue that this is because it is clearer which candidates are the most likely to win in SMP districts, candidates who have a good shot at winning the seat (i.e. are from a large tribe, branch, or clan within the district) are encouraged to seek out swing voters through making alliances with voters from different backgrounds. Thus, I demonstrate in this chapter that SNTV districts reify the salience of ethnic divisions both during elections and long after the last ballot is cast in the form of ethnic favoritism in clientelistic redistribution, whereas SMP districts encourage interethnic electoral alliances as well as patronage distribution that cannot be explained by ethnic divides. Importantly, this research finds a strong link between electoral outcomes and service provision even in a setting of authoritarianism.

In the final section of this paper, I bolster these findings with analysis of who turns
out in Jordanian elections from the GLD 2014 survey of almost 1,500 eligible voters in Jordan, showing that having a tribal connection and being registered in an SNTV is highly correlated with electoral turnout whereas it is not in SMP districts.\(^1\) I also employ information gleaned from more than 100 interviews with Jordanian voters, parliamentarians, and other stakeholders in the society collected in the field between 2012 and 2015 to supplement my arguments.\(^2\)

This research explains why it is necessary that we seriously consider the role of electoral institutions and ethnic structures at the sub-national level under both democracy and electoral authoritarianism in determining political outcomes. An overall implication of the findings in this chapter is that there is nothing inherent about ethnicity alone that produces clientelism or hinders democracy. I empirically demonstrate that the type of electoral institution employed—even in authoritarian settings—has significant effects on the role ethnicity plays in elections.

The first section of this chapter analyzes electoral behavior under different types of institutions to explain why ethnic favoritism occurs in some contexts but not others. The following section offers empirical evidence that the basis of clientelistic networks in SNTV districts is ethnic, whereas in SMP districts it is not. I then consider how these institutional differences affect voter turnout and voter perceptions of whether MPs are likely to help them solve their personal problems. In the final sections of this chapter I present a new model of thinking about clientelism that incorporates the long-term relationships patrons develop with voters and I contrast this model against those that only consider outright or direct vote buying. This analysis challenges common assumptions

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\(^1\)I conducted this survey in April of 2014 with support from the Governance and Local Development Program at Yale University and in collaboration with Ellen Lust and Lindsay Benstead. I report all findings in terms of a rural (SMP district) and urban (SNTV district) divide because this survey did not use a nationally representative sample. However, populations from rural and urban areas were randomly selected for participation and can be said to be representative of these types of respondents within the country. Please see the Appendix A of this dissertation and the http://campuspress.yale.edu/pgld/research/ for more information about this survey. Please email me for more detailed findings or go to www.kristenkao.com for more information about the statistical analyses presented in this dissertation.

\(^2\)To protect the identities of these sources, I only provide information on the date of the interview and its number.
about who are the targets of clientelistic systems and shows how electoral institution type affects governance and citizen perceptions of the elections even in authoritarian settings.

4.1 Electoral Institutions, Information, and Ethnic Politics

This section focuses on developing the theory about how lack of information available to voters concerning candidate competitiveness in SNTV districts strengthens ethnic divisions where ethnicity is already a salient social divide, whereas transparency in SMP districts encourages inter-ethnic cooperation during the elections despite ethnic divisions that exist within the society. Under other types of majoritarian systems, if a voter knows that her most preferred candidate has a very low chance of winning, she is more likely to abandon that candidate for one that may not be quite as preferable, but has enough support to potentially win the seat and is closer to the voter’s true preferences than the alternative candidates (Cox 1997). This strategic behavior reduces the number of viable candidates in the race, leading to compromise among voters and broader-based electoral coalitions for parliamentarians. But SNTV systems make strategic vote calculations more difficult because multiple candidates win seats within a single district. Particularly in a setting like Jordan where the campaign period is limited to a few short months and the media is restricted – meaning that voters have very little time or means to get to know the field of candidates let alone which candidates are the most likely winners – the SNTV system results in many “wasted” votes on candidates who will not win and likely never had a viable chance of winning.

The fact that SNTV employed in other contexts like that of Taiwan has also resulted in

3Strategic voting can also occur in SNTV systems when voters abandon candidates from the same party that are too popular in an attempt to elect more candidates from that party. However, prior studies also show that SNTV complicate the process of voters figuring out this sort of behavior without strict guidelines from party organizers (Reed 1990; Cox 1994 & 1997; Fournier and Kohno 2000). If parties are capable of organizing and information is made more clear, for example by being able to gain the trust of voters and learn organizational skills over time, this sort of strategic voting may result. Yet, in the Jordanian case where parties are not well-organized nor widely popular, this type of strategic voting is not likely to exist. I plan to run analyses on the data I have collected in Jordan to explore this claim.
incidences of “wasted votes” (Batto 2008) strengthens this argument and extends it to contexts outside of Jordan.\(^4\)

Within reason, electoral competition may take place at the tribe, branch, or clan level, whichever level is just large enough to produce a minimum winning electoral coalition. In Jordan I find that because voters and candidates seek out minimal winning electoral coalitions, political competition in what might be thought of as ethnically homogeneous districts from a national perspective often cleaves along sub-tribal, clan lines. In both SNTV and SMP districts, competition may fall along tribal or clan lines. For example, three districts in Jordan are reserved for Bedouins and these districts are also SNTV, currently with three electoral seats each. During elections, these umbrella tribes break along branch divisions. Different branches may even have their own sheikh clans from which many candidates are likely to come. If we were to measure the ethnic group along clan lines alone, we would often find that sheikh clans are very small in comparison to the rest of their branch and certainly in comparison to the size of the tribe. Thus, the largest tribes do not always win the seat. It is necessary to figure out the correct nested ethnic identity that is salient in local politics before assessing electoral alliances and ethnic clientelism. Likewise, although there are many small SMP districts in which one tribe dominates so that clans or branches compete for political prominence during the elections, there are also SMP districts with a number of large tribes or clans competing for the single parliamentary seat. This is important to note because I argue that it is electoral system type that determines the salience of ethnicity in politics, not how many ethnic groups exist in the district.\(^5\)

\(^4\)I have yet to find a study on the interaction between ethnic identity and the use of the SNTV system in Taiwan, but I suspect that this is because the salient ethnic cleavage divides the country into roughly 85% Han Chinese and 14% Taiwanese. This type of ethnic divide is not expected to result in the same outcomes as we see in Jordan, where there are a multitude of salient ethnic identities for political mobilization to coalesce around.

\(^5\)Nonetheless, Corstange (Forthcoming) argues that ethnic homogeneity versus heterogeneity plays an important role in determining how much clientelistic distribution goes on and (Gao 2010) finds that higher ethnic heterogeneity increases public goods provision to an area. There may be a systematic relationship between the number of ethnic groups within a district (ethnic heterogeneity) and inter-ethnic rivalry. Further research should be conduct along these lines and I discuss possibilities further in the conclusion to this dissertation.
In the last chapter I noted that in both types of districts, more than 80% of voters do not trust people who are not from their clan or tribe demonstrating that tribes are a salient cleavage within the society.\(^6\) In SNTV districts where numerous tribes or clans have a viable chance of winning the parliamentary seat, this statistic lends support to the idea that voters may not be able to credibly commit to selling their votes to another tribe nor rely on a non-coethnic to provide future access to goods and services. Yet, because electoral strategizing is clearer in SMP districts, non-coethnics gain leverage in elections because they are able to play the role of swing voters, particularly if they already know their tribe is too small to have a shot of winning a seat on its own. In more rural communities characterized by tight-knit social relations, if the MP shirks on his duty to provide for the voters he has made promises to, he will lose honor and risk him and his family being ostracized from the community. GLD respondents in SMP districts report that most people in the neighborhood or village in which they live know each other compared to 70% of those in SNTV districts. The difference is not as striking as one might expect, but the question is biased towards showing that there are tight-knit relationships because it asks the respondent to only consider their neighborhood or village and not the entire voting district.\(^7\) While tighter social networks in SMP districts may play a role in MP-constituent connections, more important is the fact that voters can clearly identify one MP who is responsible for taking care of them, they can hold him accountable. Thus, in SMP settings, the role of ethnicity in overcoming informational shortcomings is less pronounced in local politics.

\(^6\)This number did not vary greatly between respondents registered in SM (87%) versus SNTV (83%) districts. The question reads as follows: Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: One should worry about being cheated when interacting with people outside of one’s own family or tribe.

\(^7\)The question reads: To what extent do people know each other in the neighborhood/village in which you live? 1. Few people know each other: SNTV 10%, SMP 3%; Some people know each other: SNTV 19%, SMP 12%; Most people know each other: SNTV 70%, SMP 85%.
4.1.1 Reification of Ethnicity as an Informational Shortcut in SNTV Districts

As evidence of the theory I lay out about the complications SNTV systems create for strategic voting, I use the average constituency competition rates from elections held in both types of district between 2003 and 2013. The data shows that the SNTV system creates fierce competition for a seat in comparison to SMP districts, wherein candidates tend to win their seats with a comfortable margin. A widely employed rule of thumb in the field of election studies is that if a race is decided by less than 10% of the total votes cast in the district, it can be said to be competitive. Table 4.1 shows the difference between the last winner and first loser within a district as a percentage of all votes cast in the district in Jordan from 1993 to 2013, except for 2010. I leave the results of the 2010 elections out of this table because these elections were not run under normal electoral rules. For reference, in the 2002-2004 US elections, the proportion of House races decided by less than 10 percentage points was only 7% of all races in the country (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006).

Between 30% and 40% of all the seats won in 1993 and 1997 – when there were only SNTV districts in the country – were won by a margin of less than 150 votes. In fact, throughout the history of modern elections in Jordan has not been uncommon for parliamentary seats to be won by a margin of less than ten votes. As Cox (1997, 105-106) describes in his seminal work on the SNTV system in Japan, it is precisely when the margin of victory is very narrow that information about the competitiveness of candidates becomes opaque for voters. This small margin of votes entices every tribe in

8In 2010 the regime decided to implement a somewhat bizarre “virtual district” (da‘ira wahmiya) district system in which each SNTV district was split into as many SMP “virtual” districts as it was accorded seats. The districts were “virtual” because they had no geographic boundaries. Candidates chose one of these “virtual” districts to run in – without knowledge of whom their competitors would be – which made it so that no strategic calculations about entering the race as a candidate could be made. Moreover, this electoral scheme further complicated voter calculations about which candidates would be most likely to win as they often did not know which competitors each candidate was facing until just before the elections. The theory I lay out in this paper is not meant to explain how voting coalitions formed under these alternative electoral rules and elections were never run under these rules again, so I exclude the 2010 data from this analysis.

9Fournier and Kohno (2000) argue that in Japan, party labels helped voters to overcome informational gaps in order to achieve some forms of strategic voting, but as described in Chapter 2, such labels do not
Table 4.1: **Average Constituency Competition in Jordanian Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SNTV Competition</th>
<th>SMP Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the district with anywhere close to 5,000 voters – the average number of votes obtained by winning candidates in elections from 1993 to 2013 as shown in Chapter 2 – to run a candidate; because these districts tend to be very large, there are many tribes that fit the bill. In 2003, SNTV seats were contested by twice as many candidates on average compared to seats in SMP districts.\(^{10}\) More candidates are to be expected in larger districts with more seats, but this fact reinforces the idea that SNTV rules promote confusion about which candidates are actually viable and which ones are not in the elections. As one MP from a large SNTV district explained, “there is a lack of knowledge about how many votes [a candidate] should gain... They don’t use statistics... Everyone thinks that he is the winner before the election. Everyone thinks he is popular.”\(^{11}\)

Moreover, tight competition raises the stakes for candidates of losing even one core voter. In SNTV districts, informational shortcuts like ethnicity provide an easy means of separating out trustworthy voters from the rest for candidates. Likewise, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, deeply embedded norms of reciprocity within tribes convince voters that coethnics will direct patronage towards coethnics once in office, whereas non-coethnics are considered more likely to shirk. I explore this argument later on in

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\(^{10}\) Seats in SNTV districts were contested by on average 22 candidates compared to just about 10 candidates on average for SMP districts.

\(^{11}\) Personal interview #60 9/29/13.
4.1.2 Interethnic Cooperation in SMP Districts

I argue that because SMP districts are small and characterized by tight-knit social networks so that information about electoral competition is clear, the electoral environment encourages inter-tribal cooperation and coordination among the broader tribal population. Candidates who have a good shot at winning the seat (i.e. are from a large tribe, branch, or clan within the district) candidates are encouraged to seek out potential swing voters in the form of non-coethnics. Coethnic trust in these scenarios diminishes in importance as an accountability mechanism between voters and elected representatives because there is only one MP to keep track of. Tight-knit networks within smaller, rural SMP districts also make it more difficult for an MP to renege on his promises without exacting a social cost for himself and his family. The mechanism tying voters to patrons in these districts is similar that used by political party machines, in which brokers are sent out to coordinate behavior among narrow communities of voters who are not necessarily ethnically connected. Once all the brokers are added together, the party is able to create a large coalition of supporters. An ethnographic account in Argentina offers insight:

Keeping up the relationship depends on the capacity of the broker to maintain the strength of this tie, something largely contingent on his or her capacity to deliver. As it turns out, this capacity is finite and dependent on other factors. A broker can get jobs, deliver medicine, do “essential” favors, and assist someone as if he or she were part of the recipient’s family but only for a restricted number of persons. The most powerful broker in the slum, Matilde, has no more than a hundred individuals bound to her through strong ties, out of a voting population of more than seven thousand (Auyero 2000, 74).
To better understand how coordination and compromise occurs in smaller districts in which elections are transparent, I provide a detailed case study of an SMP district in the south of Jordan. In 2003, a town called Wadi Musa became an independent SMP district from the rest of the governorate of Ma’an with a registered voting population of about 10,000, constituting 130% over what would be considered perfectly proportional representation for such a small number of citizens. This district is almost completely dominated by the Bani Laith tribe, so that very few of its registered voters come from families outside of this tribe.\(^{12}\) While the GLD did not sufficiently cluster sampling to be representative at the district level, it can provide some limited insights into politics in this district. 56% of the respondents in this district say they have had an MP from their tribe or clan, which is about 5 percentage points higher than all respondents from SMP districts and is about 18 percentage points higher than those in SNTV districts. Thus, more members of this community are likely to feel a connection with their tribal member than those in SNTV districts. Additionally, members in this community likely feel a strong connection to one another as 74% of voters in Wadi Musa claim that they personally know most people that live in their neighborhood/village, compared to about 68% in other SMP districts and 55% in SNTV districts. In this district, GLD respondents are twice as likely to respond that they have attended a meeting in which an MP appeared than those in SNTV districts.\(^{13}\)

In the 2003 elections, the Shrour clan ‘ashirah won the parliamentary seat because they held a tribal primary and focused their votes on a single candidate. They won the seat with just over 2,000 votes. In response, for the following election in 2007, the other clans in the district got together and decided to make a pact to rotate the parliamentary seat among them and exclude the Shrour clan. The first rotation went to the ‘Alaya clan whose candidate won with 4,585 votes, despite the tribe being only around 1,400 voters strong in the previous election. The applicant pool went from seven candidates

\(^{12}\)Based on the registered voter lists of 2010 and 2013.

\(^{13}\)In Wadi Musa this figure is 53%. In other SMP districts this figure is around 34%, whereas in SNTV districts it drops to 25%.
in 2003 to just three in 2007\textsuperscript{14} and two of those candidates were from the ‘Alaya clan, with the second place finisher being from the Shrour tribe. In the 2010 elections, it was the ‘Obeidiya clan’s turn to win the seat in the district, and again they made up two of three candidates who ran, winning the seat with about double the number of votes as registered voters for the tribe.\textsuperscript{15} The Bani ‘Ata clan won a seat in the most recent round of elections in 2013 according to the same agreement.

Dr. Adel Tweissi, a former Minister of Culture from Wadi Musa, explained the process in further detail.\textsuperscript{16} Each tribe has its turn to nominate as many candidates from its ranks as it chooses,\textsuperscript{17} but the other tribes in the district (with the exception of the Shrour) determine the specific candidate who will win the election. To facilitate the process the males of the other tribes (women are excluded from the process) meet to nominate just five representatives and cast ballots in the primary election; an election with formal ballot boxes is then held before the nationwide elections to determine which candidate should run. Through this process the other tribes will gain some familiarity with the selected candidate and he will owe his seat to them; the candidate will be expected take care of both the people who voted for him and his own tribe once in parliament.

While the particulars of the pact between certain tribes in Wadi Musa is not necessarily typical, they are also not unique. An MP from the main district of Ma’an informed me that before the switch in 2003, his tribe was the largest in all of the governorate and they had an agreement that each branch of the tribe would get their shot at the seat with the backing of the entire tribe.\textsuperscript{18} I also heard of the same sort of deal occurring in Karak where one MP noted among the tribes within his single member district, “we often make these deals that if you support me now I will support your

\textsuperscript{14}One female candidate ran for the women’s quota in both 2003 and 2007.
\textsuperscript{15}One female candidate ran for the woman’s quota.
\textsuperscript{16}Personal Interview #46, Amman, 8/25/2013.
\textsuperscript{17}Each smaller sub-clan (fakhth) under the clan will usually put up a candidate for the primary election.
\textsuperscript{18}Personal interview # 45 8/14/13.
family’s candidate later on or vice versa”. This candidate also noted that there are more than 18 tribes within his district to make deals with, but it is easy to tell who will be first or second-placed in the elections before they occur.

To back up the claim that MPs are more consensus candidates in SMP districts versus those in SNTV districts Table 4.2 offers evidence that after the introduction of SMP districts run under plurality rules in 2003, MPs in these districts won their seats with much larger voting coalitions as a percentage of the popular vote within the district for parliamentarians. By 2013, as voters learned how to organize under the new SMP rules, winning electoral coalitions in these districts were about twice as large or more compared to those found in multi-member districts. This is to be expected as each MP takes more of the share of the popular vote away, but the point is that each MP represents a small section of the total electorate within the district, encouraging fractionalization of the electorate and competition between competing factions rather than agreement among voters on a consensus candidate.

Table 4.2: Average Winning Coalition as a % of the Popular Vote in Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of District</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Clientelism at Work: Empirical Evidence of Who Gets What

In the last section I posited that different electoral institutions can either motivate or disincentivize inter-ethnic cooperation. Thus, understanding the local ethnic geography is important for comprehending incentives for MPs to distribute to entire communities or practice ethnic favoritism. Through further analysis of the case work logs of six

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19 Personality interview # 32 4/1/2013.
current and former parliamentarians in Jordan, I look at the more intimate details of ethnic clientelism. Following the groundbreaking work of Posner (2004; 2005) I also find that a combination of the ethnic landscape and the types of electoral institutions in place affect how decisions about voting are made. Extending this research, I argue that it is important to consider the sub-national effects of how institutions interact with ethnicity in forming clientelistic networks and patronage provision long after the last ballot is cast.

I investigate how the two systems – SNTV and SMP – affect patronage distribution in Jordan at the individual level. A growing body of literature on clientelism around the world argues that during elections voters make choices based on expectations that co-ethnics will funnel future benefits to them (Chandra 2004, Posner 2005, Carlson 2010 & 2015, and Kramon 2013). Yet, empirical evidence of whether or not patronage is actually funneled towards coethnics versus non-coethnics is not directly monitored in most of these studies. I find that the type of institutions governing the elections plays a large role in determining whether ethnicity will serve as the basis of patronage distribution or not. I analyze the constituent case work logs of six current and former parliamentarians who won their seats under different types of institutions, offering empirical evidence that the basis of clientelistic networks in SNTV districts is ethnic whereas in SMP districts it is not.

To examine how clientelism in Jordan works, I asked MPs how they help the members of their community and many brought out folders filled with letters they had written to various branches of the government (the Cabinet, the Royal Court, and public institutions) to fulfill personal requests made by their constituents. For example, if a voter has a sick relative in the hospital and cannot afford to pay the bill, he or she will go to his parliamentarian. The parliamentarian will write a letter asking the regime-appointed minister of health to forgive the debt. I collected more than a thousand of these letters from six parliamentarians on topics ranging from getting a son a job to connecting electricity to a home to freeing a tribal member from jail, etc.
The MPs who provided comprehensive data for analysis here represent constituencies across the northern, central, and southern regions of Jordan and include one female who won her seat on the women’s quota. The other five MPs are split between SNTV and SMP districts.\textsuperscript{20} Five of the six MPs were selected as a candidate for their tribe through primaries, with the exception being the female MP – although she noted that without the help of her tribe, she would not have won her seat.\textsuperscript{21} All of the MPs were elected in 2010 except for two, who were elected in 2013. One of the MPs is also from Palestinian roots demonstrating that this behavior cross ethnic and social divides. The case work logs cover periods ranging from six months to two years, detailing the types of services sought by constituents, the reasons for the request, and the names of the beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{22}

Last names offer a pretty accurate estimation of tribal origins in Jordan.\textsuperscript{23} To find evidence of whether or not the MPs in Jordan are practicing ethnic favoritism in their provision of state services and benefits to constituents, I gathered information on the embedded clan structures of the largest tribes from the tribal sheikhs within each MP’s electoral district. In order to create the most accurate family tree I could for each tribe, I cross-referenced this information with scholarly texts (Rawabdeh 2010; Peake 1958; Azizi 2001) and websites on tribes in Jordan, as well as with the MP of the district himself.\textsuperscript{24}

In order to understand whether MPs favor coethnics in the provision of state resources, I had to first determine which of these levels is significant for the electoral

\textsuperscript{20}To protect the identities of the candidates as this information is somewhat sensitive, I do not reveal the names of the MPs who provided me this data.

\textsuperscript{21}Personal interview #9 6/4/12.

\textsuperscript{22}There is a correlation between the period of time and the number of requests made each MP and there does not seem to be any sort of pattern between which MPs provide more or less services.

\textsuperscript{23}Females do not take the last name of their husband. I was told time and again that women vote with their husband’s tribe. But there is no reason to believe that rates of in-marriage and out-marriage will differ significantly between tribes.

\textsuperscript{24}For families or clans that are listed under two tribes, I split the number of voters between tribes. This is admittedly not an exact science, but it was the closest estimation of tribe size I could gain access to. It is rumored that the regime has this information stored somewhere, but I was never able to find someone with access to it.
politics of the district through interviews with MPs and voters on the ground within the district.  

From voter registration lists of the year the MP was elected, I estimate the sizes of the tribes and clans within the electoral district by counting how many registered voters are members of the MP’s tribe and figuring out what percentage of the potential electorate they make up, since not all registered actually turn out to vote. I also calculate the percentage of all the requests the MP made to the government that were on behalf of members within his tribe and his clan. Finally, I check whether a disproportionately high amount of services are requested for the MP’s coethnics in comparison to the number of voters his tribe/clan has registered within the district.

Table 4.3 provides the information I gleaned from the constituent case work database I created. The first column of table 4.3 contains the MP’s ID number while the second identifies the type of district he or she was elected in. The third column presents an estimate of the size of the MP’s tribe based on their percentage of registered voters. The fourth column displays the percentage of all the requests the MP processed that were for his or her coethnic tribal members. Column five shows the difference between the share of requests the MP processed for his coethnics and the share of registered voters in the district who are from the MP’s tribe. If the number in column five is close to zero, there is no evidence that the coethnic constituents are receiving larger than their fair share of services, as the MP would be serving coethnics at a rate that is similar

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25 For each district, I found at least 3 confirmations from local sources that the ethnic identity I employ for this measure is the salient identity within the district.
26 The letters for which I know the regime’s response to are also analyzed to check whether the MP’s tribe receives a disproportionately high rate of acceptances or denials. I find no difference between SNTV and SMP districts.
27 Relying on voter registration lists to estimate the size of the tribe within a district could introduce bias because different tribes may register at different rates. However, because I look only at successful candidates in this analysis, I am only concerned with capturing the approximate size of the largest – or at least one of the largest – politically active tribes in the district that have a major incentive to get all their eligible members to register to vote. It could be that the largest tribe in the district refuses to engage in politics, but that places this tribe outside the realm of this study. Moreover, the actual sizes of smaller tribes, which may have less of an incentive to vote, are irrelevant to my argument.
28 Notice that no politician is purely “ethnic” in his or her service provision. The MPs studied in this sample still offer more than half of the services they provide to non-coethnics. This implies that politicians are not always self-serving and calculating or perhaps that they try their best to keep the general electorate somewhat satisfied.
to their proportion of the entire population of constituents in the district. The higher the number in the fifth column, the more the evidence there is that ethnic favoritism in service provision exists because benefits are disproportionately being funneled to the MP’s coethnics. A negative number in column five – as in the case of MP #1 – indicates that patronage is being directed away from the MP’s coethnics because he is serving them even less than their share of the registered voting population warrants.

Table 4.3: MP Service Provision and Tribal Constituent Favoritism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MP</th>
<th>District Type</th>
<th>Tribe Size</th>
<th>% Registered Voters</th>
<th>% Requests for Tribal Members</th>
<th>% Requests - Tribe Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In an attempt to understand why MPs practice more ethnic favoritism in SNTV districts compared to those in SMP districts, I ran analyses of tribal voting rates within the district. Table 4.4, allows for analyses of the rate of tribal voting in the district and the effect of type of electoral system on the size of voting coalitions. The first two columns are the same as the previous table showing the MP’s ID number and the type of district the seat was won in. Low numbers in column three indicate a strong tendency towards tribal voting in the district as the difference between the tribe’s share of registered voters of all voters registered in the district and the share of votes all of that tribe’s candidates won in the election are similar; the higher the number in the third column of Table 4.4, the less likely it is that coethnicity between the candidate and the
voter explains the electoral outcome.\(^{29}\) If the number in column three is negative – as in the cases of MPs #1 and #2 – it indicates that tribal candidates won a higher share of the district’s popular vote than their tribe’s share of registered voters and that members of other tribes must have voted for them. In the case of MP #2, the tribal candidates won just under 10,000 votes more than the number of registered voters their tribe has in the district. These candidates must have constructed more diverse voting coalitions than those who rely solely on a tribal political base for votes. For the positive figures in column three, higher numbers would signal weak tribal discipline among the MP’s tribal voters as they have voted for candidates from outside the tribe. This does not seem to be the case in any of the districts. The fourth column presents the percentage of the total number of votes cast in the district that the candidate won as a measure of the size of his electoral coalition, and the last column in Table 4.4 describes the type of district the MP won in.

Tribal voting as a mechanism for the provision of state resources and services is worrisome for pro-democracy advocates if it results in unequal access to these goods for citizens. As Wantchekon explains: “Theoretically, clientelism threatens liberal democracy because it encourages elected officials to favor certain citizens over others. For example, patrons may redirect national resources – collected at the expense of all citizens – from initiatives to develop the nation’s economy to filling the pockets of a select group of clients” (2003, 401). Column five of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that MPs #1 and #2, who won their seats in SMP districts, not only won them with a much larger voting coalition than the other candidates (double the percentage or higher), but they also tended to distribute provide *wasta* to their coethnic constituents at proportions that are less than or almost equal to their tribe’s share of the registered voters in the district.

\(^{29}\)See Posner (2005, 218) for a more detailed explanation and another example of using this technique to estimate tribal voting tendencies in Zambia. Here again reliance on voter registration lists as a measure of a tribal size could be questioned. If anything, reliance on voter registration lists underestimates the size of tribes because a tribe cannot register more voters than it has members who are eligible to vote. In this case, the results might be biased against showing that voting along tribal lines occurs. Yet, I find strong differences indicating a lack of tribal voting in SM districts.
Table 4.4: MP Service Provision and Tribal Constituent Favoritism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MP Type</th>
<th>Tribe Size</th>
<th>% All Votes for Tribal Members</th>
<th>% Registered - % Tribal Votes</th>
<th>% All Votes MP Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, they did not necessarily practice ethnic favoritism. Voters also appear to vote along tribal lines at lower rates in SMP districts compared with the SNTV districts. However, the MPs who ran under SNTV rules won their seats with lower percentages of the total votes cast in their districts and grossly favored their tribal coethnics over other constituents in the district when providing personal services. This data indicates that for constituents registered in SNTV districts, there is a need to be from the same tribe as the winning MP to be sure of gaining access to services. In conclusion, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate that in SNTV districts, ethnic censuses determine the winners of parliamentary elections and voters can expect to be rewarded on an ethnic basis by their elected representatives. By contrast, in SMP districts parliamentary candidates rely on interethnic voter coalitions to win their seats and ethnic biases do not explain their resource distribution patterns.

Moreover, the results of this data analysis demonstrate that the tendency for MPs to

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30 Whether ethnic favoritism occurs because the MP purposely funnels services to coethnics and does not process requests from outsiders or because constituents that share a tribal affiliation with their MP have a higher propensity to contact their MP than non-coethnics (and therefore a higher rate of requests sent on their behalf) cannot be understood from this data alone. In either case, the institutions in place either encourage ethnic favoritism or discourage it.
favor coethnics in Jordan crosses social divides. The woman MP (#3) is practicing as much tribal favoritism, or perhaps even slightly more than her male counterparts. I posit that this is because she won her seat under encourages fractionalization of the electorate and confusion for voters just as the SNTV system does, as explained in the last chapter. Bush and Gao (2013) analyze the use of these gender quotas nationally and show that they favor small tribes in the elections. Furthermore, the MP of West Bank origins (MP #6) is also playing the same ethnic favoritism game. Interviews with Christian and Circassian as well as Chechen quota MPs also reveal tendencies to vote along tribal lines within these communities. Therefore, there are ethnically or religiously defined districts specifically carved out for Bedouins, Christians, and Chechens/Circassians. Although I do not have formal data to show it, I suspect that they distribute along tribal lines within their own communities as well. This policy aids in ensuring representation of these minorities within the parliament, but at the same time, it focuses the elections on ethnic divides.

Most accounts of life in Jordan describe how tribalism is a more dominant social force in the rural areas compared to the urban areas, where it is drowned out by ethnic diversity and reduced need for a social safety net based on ascriptive ties. As noted in chapter two, 84% of respondents registered to vote in SMP districts have a tribal identity compared to only 68% of those in SNTV districts. However, what this analysis suggests is that there is just as much – if not more – tribal voting and tribal favoritism in the distribution of government goods and services in the urban areas of Jordan as there is in the rural areas. This contradicts much of the previous research that implies that service MPs are limited to rural areas (Lust-Okar 2009, 128). My argument is not that the daily life in the rural areas of Jordan is less tribal, because it certainly is not. Instead, I hypothesize that SNTV electoral institutions encourage ethnic competition within SNTV districts and favor the political mobilization of tribes. What remains similar across both districts is that voters have strong personal relationships with their

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31 Personal interview # 48, 7/9/12; Personal interview #35 5/22/13; Personal interview #26 7/25/12.
MPs: 40% of respondents in SMP districts report contacting their MP for particularistic benefits within the last five years compared to 34% in SNTV districts.32

4.3 Electoral Institutions, Ethnicity, and Voter Turnout

In the following section, I consider how the interaction between institutional differences in elections and the ethnic landscape of the relevant political unit affect voter turnout. I have shown that MPs and voters in SNTV districts behave differently than those in SMP districts concerning service provision as well as voting. But do these findings extend to electoral behavior on a national level?

Because the SMP districts are small and the distribution of benefits is not purely along ethnic lines, voters in these districts likely feel that they have a fairer shot at gaining access to the state’s pot of resources through their MP, while those in SNTV districts likely know that they do not. As shown in the previous section, in SNTV districts the MP’s inner circle are those who are members of the her tribe and because ethnicity tends to be ascriptive and therefore immutable, voters in SNTV districts who are from the wrong ethnic group are much less likely to have access to state benefits through their MP. Building upon this premise, I expect that being registered to vote in an SNTV and not having a tribal MP connection to depress the likelihood of voter turnout, whereas having a tribal MP in such districts will increase electoral participation. In SMP districts, I do not expect having a tribal MP or not to matter as much because distribution is not ethnically based. See Table 4.5 for a depiction of the hypothesis I am testing in this section. I use data from the GLD survey to empirically test if there is an interaction effect of the ethnic background of a voter and the electoral district type she is registered to vote on voter turnout.

32The question reads: In the last five years, how many times have you or a member of your household tried to contact an MP (to seek help with a personal problem, a social or economic problem in your community, or to express an opinion)? 0. Never, 1. 1 or more times.
Table 4.5: **Effect on Voter Turnout**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of District</th>
<th>Tribal MP</th>
<th>No Tribal MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>High Turnout</td>
<td>Low Turnout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Average Turnout</td>
<td>Average Turnout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.3.1 Empirical Strategy

In this section I analyze variables that may predict voter turnout from the GLD 2014 data. To examine who turns out in Jordanian elections, I run a logistic regression on the following question: did you participate in the last parliamentary elections?\(^{33}\) Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use logistic regression to estimate the extent to which registration to vote in an SNTV district versus an SM district predicts voter participation.\(^{34}\) Official country statistics from the Independent Electoral Commission find a 72% turnout rate in SMP districts versus a 57% turnout in SNTV districts. The GLD data finds a 70% turnout rate in SMP districts versus a 56% turnout rate in SNTV districts. The fact that these two measures are not far off from one another attests to the reliability of the GLD data. Thus, the two main independent variables the theory I lay out above focuses on most in this analysis are 1) the type of electoral district the respondent is registered to vote in; and 2) whether the respondent has a tribal MP. The first variable was easily coded at the beginning of the survey once the person responded which electoral district he or she is registered to vote in. The second variable is derived from a question asking the respondent if the he or she has ever had a Tribal MP. Eligible voters who claim to have had a tribal MP in the past and therefore have more access to the benefits of the regime should be more likely to

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\(^{33}\) Three questions before this the respondent was reminded that the last parliamentary elections took place on January 23, 2013.

\(^{34}\) I also ran this model using a mixed effects logistic model in an attempt to account for random effects that may exist due to differences in districts and found that the same variables remained significant as predictors of voter turnout. I used a Bayesian Information Criterion test to determine the appropriate model and found that the mixed effects model was not significant.
turnout. More importantly, the interaction between a respondent having a tribal MP and being registered in an SNTV district should predict higher turnout than a respondent being registered in the same type of district who is without a tribal connection to the regime. For SMP districts, having had a tribal source of wasta in the parliament should not matter as much for turnout because services are not distributed solely through tribal channels.

In addition to these two independent variables of interest, I control for other variables that I believe to be associated with turnout in Jordan to rule out alternative explanations for the findings. I start from the premise that if a respondent are anti-regime he or she is also less likely to turn out in elections. This assumption stems from the fact that elections are a regime initiative and for the most part the opposition boycotts them, thus participation can be considered to be an act in support of the regime. From the rational choice perspective, if we accept the argument presented earlier in this paper that elections are all about clientelism and not about policies, only those who expect to benefit from the elections – who are also the most likely to have connections to the regime – are likely to turn out in the elections. There are a number of different ways to attempt to measure opposition to the regime in Jordan, despite the bias against admitting being anti-regime.

Islamists are highly skeptical of the fairness of the elections, to the point that they resort to boycotting these elections. In recent years they have called for replacing current regime with a “true” constitutional monarchy based upon the European model – in which the King is more of a figurehead than an actual ruler of the country. The question I use to assess support for Islamists in the model asks respondents: “On a scale of 1 to 10, where would you place your preferences if 1 means that the most preferable candidate or list is one that does not have any Islamist orientation and 10 means that the most preferable candidate or list is one that has an Islamist orientation.”

The highly salient ethnic cleavage that exists between East Bank versus West Bank origin Jordanians could affect the results of this analysis. Low election turnout rates
in districts – where Palestinian origin Jordanians are thought to be concentrated – are widely cited as indicating their disillusionment with the regime’s reform process (Ryan 1998, 192; Lust 2009, 13). The Palestinian origin population is also often cited as making up the majority of the Islamist movement in Jordan (Lynch 2004; Wiktorowicz 2001, 86-7; Clark 2004, 89; Brand 1995, 55). Moreover, there is considerable evidence that West Bankers are discriminated against by the electoral system (Lynch 2004; Lust 2009). All of these factors should lead one to expect that Jordanians of Palestinian background tend to see the elections in a negative light. Thus, I include a variable asking the respondent where his or her family hails from, dichotomously coded “1” for claiming to be Palestinian origins and “0” for all other possible responses.

The upper class is expected to be more supportive of the regime because they are doing well under its rule and therefore have a vested interest in its continuation. On the other hand, the poor may need money and therefore may be less satisfied with the regime causing members of this group to be more negative about its initiatives. Alternatively, most research on clientelism suggests that the poor may be targeted more often for vote buying and clientelism because they are more easily enticed by financial benefits (Stokes 2005; Chubb 1982; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Blaydes 2010; Auyero 2000). Therefore, the lowest classes may turnout at higher rates; thus, I control for class in this model. Furthermore, I include a variable to control for northern, central, and southern regions because they are said to differ from one another culturally.37 Beyond

35 Yet, there is also considerable doubt about the idea that Palestinian origin Jordanians dominate the Muslim Brotherhood or broader Islamist following in Jordan. The Public Opinion Poll Unit at the Center of Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan found that about 39% of Muslim Brotherhood supporters are of Palestinian background, with 60% of the party’s supporters being of East Bank background (Moaddel 2002, 117, 119). In 2007, the number of candidates and parliamentarians associated with the Brotherhood were evenly split across this divide (Rumman 2007, 60). Robbins finds that “there is no statistical difference in support for political Islam between individuals of Jordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin, although the sign on the coefficient reveals that individuals of Jordanian origin tend to be more supportive overall.” In none of his analyses using the Arab Barometer data did being of Palestinian origin significantly predict support for political Islam (2009, 28).

36 I also ran the model with a different measure of socio-economic status that asked if the respondent’s household was struggling, had enough money to cover basic needs but no more, or had enough money to be able to save. This alternate measure was insignificant in predicting perceptions of vote buying and selling when controlling for other factors.

37 The southern region speaks a dialect and practices a way of life that is more closely associated with
these variables, I also control for factors that are considered important in understanding responses in all individual-level surveys including age and gender.  

4.3.2 Findings and Discussion

Because I believe there is a need to cluster the errors by the 12 electoral districts to capture potential correlations between observations that come from the same district, the second model presented in Table 4.6 is necessarily parsimonious dropping variables I do not believe have a large effect on the outcome variable and are not significant in any model I ran. I drop gender because males and females turnout out at similar rates in Jordanian elections, although males turnout slightly less than females partly due to the fact that active military members cannot vote and the Jordanian military is large enough to make a difference. I also take out education as it does not seem to be a meaningful predictor of turnout, unlike in elections in democracies. Many other studies on political clientelism do the same, noting that in systems where turnout is more likely about clientelism than ideology, education is unlikely to be a significant predictor of it. Interestingly, desire for an Islamist candidate does predicts higher turnout but not to significant level, perhaps because many people may simultaneously prefer an Islamist but also benefit from having a patron elected to office. Finally, in this model, I drop origin from the regressions because it does not seem to have a significant effect on turnout. This may be because there is some bias against identifying as Palestinian in the population or perhaps the Jordanian government has sufficiently integrated this population so that generations born in Jordan see themselves as Jordanian. In the

38 Income and education tend to be highly correlated, although in the Jordanian case they are not necessarily so. I ran these models including a variable for level of education and across all models, it never seemed to be a good predictor of turnout. I also thought about including a size of district variable, but I found that this variable is highly correlated with the SNTV versus SMP divide at 0.77.

39 I include a fuller model in the online appendix to this paper at www.kristenkao.com.

40 In general, surveys in Jordan have low percentages of respondents reporting Palestinian identity. For example, the first wave of the Arab Barometer data collected in 2006 from Jordan has only 26% of respondents claiming Palestinian identity despite estimates from trustworthy institutions that they make
interest of saving space, I do not post only the results of the control variables that had a significant effect on the outcome and class, because it will become a relevant factor later on in this chapter. Finally, for the third model, I include an interaction term between having had a tribal MP in the past and being registered in an SNTV district.

As expected in the theory I have laid out, across all models voter turnout is negatively associated with being registered in an SNTV district at a significant level. In the parsimonious model (#2) with robust standard errors clustered at the district level, being registered to vote in an SNTV district predicts that a voter is about fourteen percentage points less likely to turn out to vote. Having had a tribal MP in the past is positively associated with turnout, increasing the probability of turning out by about seven percent, holding all other factors at their means. Being registered in an SNTV district is significantly associated with lower turnout, while having a tribal connection in the parliament correlates with higher turnout at a significant level across the first two models.

Interestingly, the middle and upper middle classes are more likely to turn out to vote in comparison to the lowest class. Although this finding is not significant, it is notable because others studies on clientelistic systems find that the rich do not turn out in elections. I posit that this is because the wealthier are likely to benefit *wasta* connections through MPs. This is an argument I pursue further below. Increases in age are strongly correlated with higher turnout in elections across all models, indicating that older respondents realize benefits associated with elections that the young do not. Finally, compared to the north, turnout is less likely in the central and southern regions, significantly so for the central region across all models.

up 60% or more of the population (Tessler et al. 2010). The GLD Jordan survey has only 9% of the population responding that their family is originally from Palestine. These low figures could signify that Palestinians have fully adopted Jordanian identity and do not see themselves as being originally from Palestine.
Table 4.6: District Type and Turnout in Jordan’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNTV × Tribal MP</td>
<td>0.479**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>−0.612***</td>
<td>−0.619***</td>
<td>−0.825***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal MP</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.226*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Class</td>
<td>−0.0351</td>
<td>−0.0434</td>
<td>−0.0232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>0.0851</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Class</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>0.0517</td>
<td>−0.0362</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>−0.416**</td>
<td>−0.471**</td>
<td>−0.487***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>−0.0282</td>
<td>−0.180</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0186***</td>
<td>0.0211***</td>
<td>0.0212***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0052)</td>
<td>(0.0057)</td>
<td>(0.0058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.0212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
<td>(0.273)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 1318 1368 1368

Model 1: Standard errors in parentheses.
Models 2 & 3: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
4.3.3 Interaction Effects of Ethnicity and Electoral Institutions

In the third model I examine how the interaction between a respondent having had a tribal MP in the past and the type of district that respondent is registered in affect her likelihood of turning out in the elections. From the data I presented above on “ethnic censuses” in SNTV districts, we would expect that voters in these districts with a history of having a tribal MP to turn out at higher rates. Those without a tribal MP to rely on for access to state benefits should have less of an incentive to participate in elections. Moreover, a tribal connection should not greatly predict whether or not a citizen participates in elections in SMP districts.

Figure 4.1 shows the relationship in more detail. I use dashed lines rather than solid ones to indicate that this figure is not showing a continuous relationship. As expected by the theory I laid out above, a respondent registered in an SMP district who has historically had a tribal MP is predicted to turnout to vote at more or less the same probability as a citizen registered in the same type of district without a tribal MP, and the difference is not large. For citizens registered in SNTV districts, the marginal effect of having a tribal MP on voter turnout is about 13 percentage points higher holding all other factors at their means, a substantial increase in electoral participation. Contrasting the worst case scenario to the best case, assuming that having had a tribal MP in the past (and therefore an expectation of the possibility of having one in the future) and being registered in an SMP district is the best case scenario because one can expect to be the most secure when it comes to benefiting from the elections, a respondent without a tribal MP in an SNTV district is about 21 percentage points less likely than a respondent with a tribal MP in an SMP district to turn out to vote. As expected from the theory I derive from the MP constituent casework logs, citizens who live in SMP districts are more likely to turnout, regardless of whether they have a tribal MP or not (the difference in predicted probabilities of turnout is just about two percentage point)s. I argue that

\footnote{Although the variables in question are not continuous, the figure demonstrates the relationship between two discrete moments in a way that description cannot.}
Figure 4.1: **Interaction Effects of District Type and Tribal MP on Turnout**

![Graph showing interaction effects of district type and tribal MP on turnout](image)

- **Predicted Probability of Turnout (95% CIs)**
- **Axes:**
  - No Tribal MP
  - Tribal MP
- **Lines:**
  - SMP District
  - SNTV District
this is because voters without a tribal MP in an SMP district can still expect to gain
from participating in elections and getting a non-coethnic patron elected, as the data on
constituent casework demonstrated. For voters in SMP districts, the mechanisms tying
patrons to constituents is different than the coethnic ties that determine patron-client
relationships in SNTV districts. The SMP voter lives in a small town where personal
networks are tight and everyone knows everyone. Non-coethnic voters can sanction
MPs in these settings for failure to provide services. In SNTV districts however, voters
cannot be sure of which candidates are most likely to win and lack of information in
elections encourages them to turn to what they can count on for access to services: an
ethnic connection with their MP. Moreover, after the elections are over, blame for a lack
of service provision is harder to assign because there are multiple MPs. Given these
findings, models of vote choice in Jordan need to consider how electoral institutions
and ethnicity interact.

4.3.3.1 Tribal Wasta

To bolster the findings of the previous section and solidify the notion that electoral
institutions shape the role of ethnicity in elections, I test whether voters in SNTV dis-
tricts only expect personal help from their MP if they have a tribal connection to him
when compared to voters without a tribal connection and to voters in SMP districts.
The exact wording of the question used as the dependent variable is: if you had a per-
sonal problem in the future that one of the parliamentarians could do something about,
do you think he or she would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful?
This question gets more at the heart of what I argue clientelism is about in the context
of Jordan: wasta – those long-term relationships involving an exchange with an inter-
mediary in a position of power. Overall, 11% of respondents thought MPs would be
very helpful, 45% of respondents thought they would be somewhat helpful, and 44%
of respondents thought they would not be very helpful.

Given the nature of the dependent variable, I employ ordered logistical regression to
estimate which sectors of the population are most likely to expect help from their MPs.
In the first model I include all the variables used in the model to analyze voter turnout
because I believe there is a correlation between people who turn out to vote and the
likelihood they think their MP will help them out. Thus, I control for level of education,
class, age of the respondent, as well as the region the respondent is registered to vote
in. I also expect the same independent variables of preference for an Islamist candidate,
East Bank versus West Bank origin, having had a tribal MP in the past, and being
registered in an SNTV versus SMP district to be relevant. In this model, however, I
include a dichotomous variable for whether or not the respondent participated in the last
elections. I include this variable because the last model led us to believe that Jordanians
who are registered in an SNTV district and have a history of having a tribal MP are
the more likely to turn out in elections versus those without a tribal connection to the
regime. In this model, we should expect that voters who participated in the elections
are more likely to think their MP will help them, thus I include a control variable to
account for this condition.

Again, I cluster errors at the district level to account for correlations that may exist
between respondents within the same electoral district.\textsuperscript{42} As Table 4.7 shows I find
that, as expected, if the respondent has a tribal MP she believes an MP will help her.\textsuperscript{43}

In this model, the marginal effect of a respondent being registered in an SNTV
district, having participated, and having had a tribal MP in the past versus not having a
history of a tribal MP and being registered in an SNTV results in a ten percentage point
increase in the likelihood of expecting that an MP will be very helpful with personal
problems, holding all other factors at their means. Compared to those without a tribal

\textsuperscript{42}I also ran a mixed effects logistic model to account for fixed effects that may exist due to differences
between districts. I used a Bayesian Information Criterion test to determine that the mixed effects model
was not a better fit, yet the findings are robust to its use.

\textsuperscript{43}Again I included measures for origin and preference for an Islamist candidate, but I found neither of
these variables to be statistically significant nor did the improve the fit of the model. Model 3 could not
handle more control variables with clustered errors. Without clustered errors, the interaction is significant
at the $p < 0.010$ level. I drop all insignificant variables from the table to make space. Please email me
or go to the online appendix for this dissertation at www.kristenkao.com for more information.
Table 4.7: Perceptions of MP Helpfulness with Personal Problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNTV × Tribal M × Voted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0838*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>−0.200</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
<td>−0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal MP</td>
<td>0.594***</td>
<td>0.537***</td>
<td>0.754***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>0.399***</td>
<td>0.379**</td>
<td>0.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.011*</td>
<td>−0.011**</td>
<td>−0.013**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0046)</td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
<td>(0.0041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Class</td>
<td>0.493*</td>
<td>0.423*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>0.893***</td>
<td>0.851***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Class</td>
<td>0.776*</td>
<td>0.765*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>1.074***</td>
<td>1.111***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Somewhat Helpful” Constant</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.348*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.389)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Very Helpful” Constant</td>
<td>3.017***</td>
<td>2.769***</td>
<td>2.014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1271</td>
<td>1312</td>
<td>1314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Models 1: Standard errors in parentheses.
Models 2 & 3: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
MP and who did not vote in the elections, the marginal difference is 13 percentage points. At the other end of the scale, a participant in the elections in an SNTV district who has never had a tribal MP is 19 percentage points more likely to think that an MP would not help her out with a personal problem despite being able to when compared to a participant who has had a tribal MP in the past, meaning that not having a tribal MP raises expectations that the MP will not help out the voter by a substantial degree. More strikingly, citizens registered in SNTV districts who did not turn out to vote and have never had a tribal MP in the past are about 30 percentage points more likely to say MPs are not helpful, holding all other factors at their means.

Contrast these results with a difference of about three percentage points between a voter registered in an SMP district with a Tribal MP versus not having one reporting that their MP would be very likely to help them out. In terms of an MP not being likely to help out in SMP districts there is a ten percentage point increase in the likelihood that a non-voter without a tribal connection does not expect her MP to be helpful compared to one with a tribal MP. These findings indicate that 1) among voters, have a tribal MP in the past is not a significant predictor when it comes to expectations of personal help from an MP, as the findings from the analyses of tribal voting indicate earlier in this chapter and; 2) among those who do not turn out in the elections in SMP districts, Jordanians with a history of having a tribal MP are still less likely to think their MP will refuse to help them with personal problems. This latter finding hints at the idea that a tribal connection is not completely meaningless in SMP districts, just that the role of ethnicity is diminished when compared to SNTV districts.

In Table 4.8 I present the same model, except it includes only respondents who participated in the elections. I do this for a few reasons. This model allows me to examine the interaction between having had a Tribal MP in the past and district type among those who participate in the elections, while also controlling for more variables that are I believe have a significant effect on whether a voter expects her MP to be helpful with a personal problem, including the respondent’s age and her self-reported
class. In the earlier model the three-way interaction between participation, ethnicity, and electoral institutions forced me to drop most control variables from the model. The findings are also easier to interpret because there is only one interaction and the theory is more applicable to voters rather than non-voters, who may have a wider variety of reasons for staying home than whether or not they can rely on an MP’s help.\textsuperscript{44}

Holding all other factors at their means, the interaction between having had a tribal MP in the past and being registered in an SNTV district raises the likelihood that the respondent expects her MP to be very helpful by nine percentage points versus a respondent without a tribal MP in the same type of district. Thus, SNTV voters with a tribal connection expect help from their MPs with their personal problems, whereas those without a tribal connection are substantially less likely to share this view. The difference between SMP voters with or without an ethnic connection to the regime is just three percentage points, providing evidence that coethnicity is not as important in an SMP district in shaping voter expectations that an MP will be very likely to offer personal help during times of need.

At the other end of the spectrum, an SNTV voter without a tribal connection is again 19 percentage points more likely than a voter with a tribal MP to believe their MP would \textit{not} be helpful in solving their problems, even if they had the ability to do so. The difference among voters in SMP districts is eight percentage points, with a tribal connection driving down the belief that an MP would \textit{not} be helpful. Thus, having a tribal connection to an MP still matters in SMP districts for cultivating trust that MPs will help a voter solve her problems, just not to the extent that it does in an SNTV district.

These findings are evidence that understanding politics in Jordan requires an understanding of the interaction between clientelism, ethnicity, and electoral institutions.

\textsuperscript{44}In the online appendix to this dissertation, I include the same model of only those who did not participate and find that the interaction is no longer significant. I argue that this is because the absence of an expectation of help from an MP cannot be expected to predict failure to turnout to the elections by itself. Please email me or go to www.kristenkao.com for more information about the statistical analyses in this dissertation.
Table 4.8: **Voter Perceptions of MP Helpfulness with Personal Problems.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SNTV × Tribal MP</td>
<td>0.497*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>−0.101</td>
<td>−0.0015</td>
<td>−0.2387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal MP</td>
<td>0.566***</td>
<td>0.513**</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.013*</td>
<td>−0.014**</td>
<td>−0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0055)</td>
<td>(0.0050)</td>
<td>(0.0051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Class</td>
<td>0.596*</td>
<td>0.494*</td>
<td>0.520*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>0.951***</td>
<td>0.937***</td>
<td>0.950***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Class</td>
<td>0.856*</td>
<td>0.859*</td>
<td>0.894*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.354)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Upper Class</td>
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<td>1.443***</td>
<td>1.455***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Somewhat Helpful” Constant</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>−0.0138</td>
<td>−0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Very Helpful” Constant</td>
<td>2.839***</td>
<td>2.435***</td>
<td>2.347***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Models 1: Standard errors in parentheses.

Models 2 & 3: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
They also strengthen the arguments I make throughout this dissertation about elections in Jordan helping to connect citizens from East Bank tribal origins with benefits in urban SNTV areas. In rural areas, most people have East Bank tribal connections and although their specific tribe may not win the seat, they still benefit from their MP because he was pushed to make a broader electoral coalition than his own tribe. Below, I delve into the striking findings concerning class and likelihood of obtaining *wasta* from an MP.

### 4.4 A New Way of Conceptualizing Vote Buying and Clientelism

In the last chapter, I posited that *wasta* is a clientelistic benefit that appeals to all classes, but it may target them in different ways given the disparate nature of their needs. In clientelistic political systems around the world, the rich are less likely to participate in elections because – the argument goes – they do not reap the benefits of clientelism in the way that the poor do (Stokes 2005; Chubb 1982; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Blaydes 2010). Yet, these studies downplay the role of indirect vote buying, in which the candidate offers future access to benefits or services once he gains office in exchange for their votes today. Stokes includes measures for help from a patron within the last year in her analysis of vote buying but the question is narrowly targeted to seeking help only from “the most important local political figure” that the respondent previously identified in the survey and the help having been within the last year (2005, 322). Moreover, this model does not fit in contexts where personal connections are important for citizen-state interactions; in these contexts, I argue, elections may have a different meaning for rich voters than poor voters, but both are involved in clientelistic exchanges. For poor voters handouts of cash, gifts, food are likely important for getting them to turnout in elections, but for the rich, *wasta* or personal connections to solve problems they might run into in the future such getting a business licensed or getting a
visa for their maid.\footnote{I did not originally code the MP casework logs in a way to capture this dynamic, but I plan to do so in future versions of this research to provide evidence that the rich really do use MP connections in this way. Yet while MPs spend the vast majority of their time serving as wasta for their constituents, they are not the only source of wasta for citizens in Jordan.}

Questions on the Afrobarometer, for example, ask only about whether a candidate or someone from a political party offered the respondent something like food or a gift. These questions and studies that test scenarios based on the effects of small handouts are biased towards finding that poor voters participate in clientelism because the rich are less likely to be enticed by such offerings. I find that in the Middle East, where countries tend to be middle-income or higher, political clientelism – the exchange of one’s vote for particularistic goods and services – does not only target the poor.\footnote{An important exception is Blaydes (2010), who acknowledges the potential influence of long-term clientelistic relationships in elections, but finds that the illiterate tend to turn out in the highest numbers in Egypt, bolstering her argument that the poor are the targets of political clientelism in these elections. Egypt may be an exception to the findings I present below, but more research is needed to understand why Egypt and not other countries in the Middle East.}

### 4.4.1 Class Considerations from the GLD Jordan Survey

Although class does not link directly to the arguments I make in this chapter concerning electoral district type and ethnicity affecting political outcomes, it is worth considering because my findings contradict the findings of other studies on clientelism. For example, Booth and Seligson (2006) find that the poor are more likely to turnout in election in Latin American, while Bratton (2006) and Kramon (2013) find that the impoverished in Africa and Kenya specifically are the most likely to participate in elections. Yet, in Jordan, notice that in Table 4.6 the findings for class are somewhat variable and no class level alone is significant. For the second and third models, the middle class and upper middle class are expected to be more likely to turnout to vote than the lowest class. What is important is that the findings do not indicate that participation in Jordanian elections is limited to the poor. While I focus on the interactional effect of ethnicity and electoral institutions on voter behavior in this chapter, this section has implications...
for other settings where ethnicity is not a politically salient feature of clientelism.

When district effects are taken into account in the last two models the overall marginal effect of class on voter participation is significant at the $p < 0.001$. To better understand why this is the case and to visualize the relationship between district type, class, having had a tribal MP, and turnout, I plot the marginal predictions of turnout for self-perceived class level and each different combination of the interaction between having a tribal MP and district type. Figure 4.2 shows that while all classes except the upper class are more likely to turn out compared to the lowest class, the upper middle class is the reason the average marginal effect of class overall is significant in this model. An upper middle class citizen registered in an SMP district is about 11 or 12 percentage points more likely to turn out than the lowest class citizen in this type of district regardless if she has a tribal MP or not. In an SNTV district, an upper middle class citizen is about 15 percentage points more likely with a tribal MP and 13 percentage points more likely without one to cast a ballot than the lowest class citizen in the same situation. Importantly, the general theory that those who do not have a history of having a tribal MP and are registered in an SNTV district (shown in green) are the least likely to turn out to vote compared to other voters holds across classes. Thus, more wealthy citizens can be expected to turnout in clientelistic elections in Jordan. Of course, this also depends on the local political landscape. Although the coefficient for the upper class is negative for turnout when this group is compared to the lowest class, analyzing the data in light of an ethnic and institutional interaction reveals that in an SNTV district, an upper class citizen with a history of a tribal connection in parliament is 13 percentage points more likely to participate in the elections than a citizen of the same class background who has never had a tribal MP. Again, the difference between those registered in SMP districts is not substantially different (two percentage points).

This trend holds for the models considering the helpfulness of an MP with constituent problems. The dependent variable in this model is the response to this question: if you had a personal problem in the future that one of the parliamentarians could do
Figure 4.2: Effects of District Type and Tribal MP on Turnout Across Class
something about, do you think he or she would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful? Tables 4.7 and 4.8 shows that the all class higher than the lowest class significantly predicts if the individual believes their MP will help them with a personal or family problem. Self-identifying as being from the lower class versus the upper class predicts that the respondent is 34 percentage points more likely to report that they think an MP would not be helpful in helping her with her problems, a very substantial difference in perceptions of one’s MP. By contrast, a GLD respondent in the upper class is 12 percentage points more likely to report that an MP would be very helpful in helping out with a personal or family problem compared to a respondent in the lower class.

The general theory about district type and having a coethnic connection to the regime holds in this model as well. A respondent who is a member of the upper class and registered in an SNTV district is 14 percentage points more likely to report that an MP would be very helpful than a similar respondent without a coethnic MP in the past, and is 21 percentage points more likely to believe this than a respondent in the same district with a tribal MP but identifies as being from the lowest class. Compared to a lower class respondent in the same district without a tribal MP, the upper class citizen is 26 percentage point more likely to expect their MP to be very helpful. At the other end of the scale, a respondent in the lowest class who has not ever had a coethnic MP is 20 percentage points more likely than a respondent from the same socio-economic background with a history of a coethnic MP to report that her elected representative would not be helpful, and 49 percentage points more likely to believe this than an upper class respondent with tribal connections. These differences are not nearly as stark among respondents from SMP districts. Table 4.9 shows the predicted probabilities for the upper versus lower classes by type of electoral district the respondent is registered in and history of a coethnic MP or lack thereof.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{47}The number of cases in some of these columns gets as low as 7, however the same principle argument holds when the interaction is not considered: upper class respondents expect much more help from their MPs and lower class respondents are much more likely to expect that an MP would not help them, despite having the ability to do so.
Table 4.9: Interaction of Electoral Institutions and Ethnicity Across Class

**MP Would Not Be Very Helpful**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>District Type</th>
<th>Coethnic MP</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>61%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**MP Would Not Be Very Helpful**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>District Type</th>
<th>Coethnic MP</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MP Would Be Very Helpful**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>District Type</th>
<th>Coethnic MP</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MP Would Be Very Helpful**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>District Type</th>
<th>Coethnic MP</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.2 Targeting the Rich with Clientelism in the Middle East

While I cannot replicate findings concerning the interaction between having a tribal MP and being registered in different types of electoral districts outside of Jordan because most other datasets do not account for important sub-national variations in electoral institutions or coethnicity that I have found affect voter turnout, I attempt to show that the relationship I find in Jordan concerning wealth, electoral turnout, and clientelism holds in other contexts where clientelistic relationships matter in elections. In order to do so, I use data from the first wave of the Arab Barometer (Tessler et al. 2008) to test this hypothesis across Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, and Lebanon.\(^{48}\) Overall, about 43% of respondents said yes in response to the question: Did you participate in the most recent elections on [date]? Due to the dichotomous nature of the question and the fact that I am analyzing data across multiple countries, I employ a mixed effects logistic regression to account for fixed effects of each country to examine whether upper classes use *wasta*.\(^{49}\) The model is necessarily sparse to be able to account for country fixed effects.

To extend my investigation of the relationship between wealth and turnout, I include a measure of family monthly income.\(^{50}\) Table 4.10 shows that while members of the highest income level are significantly associated with lower turnout, those who come from an upper middle income background are significantly more likely to participate in the elections when compared to members of the lowest income level. Being from the highest income background decreases the probability of having turned out in the

---

\(^{48}\)This wave of the Arabarometer also includes Morocco but I was not able to include it in this model because the income indicator used was not on the same scale as the other countries. I find the similar outcomes for this country though and I present the model for Morocco as well as individual country regressions in an online appendix at www.kristenkao.com. The results are robust to dropping Lebanon out as well, which I checked because Lebanon’s income only has nine levels rather than ten. In the future, I plan to update this analysis to include both the second and third waves of the Arab Barometer data.

\(^{49}\)I used a Bayesian Information Criterion test to determine that a mixed effects logistic is the appropriate model for this analysis.

\(^{50}\)The Arab Barometer originally has income levels organized as deciles but I collapsed these groups to be able to include Lebanon on the same scale as the other countries and to make this model more comparable to the one I run in Jordan with five levels of class. The findings are robust to the use of both measures of income.
elections by five percentage points, holding all other factors at their means. But this contrasts to the upper middle income bracket in which a voter is four percentage points more likely to report having voted in the elections. Respondents from middle income and lower middle middle income sectors of society also report higher electoral participation than those in the lowest income level, but these findings do not achieve statistical significance. These findings are robust to the exclusion of Jordan, demonstrating that it is not this case that drives these results. The overall conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that members of all classes participate in elections across the Arab world, despite clientelism being commonly cited as the primary reason why voters participate in these elections. Finally, both age and being male significantly correlate with turnout, but the coefficients are omitted to make space in the table.51

I claim that wasta is important for individuals of all classes in contexts outside of Jordan as well and because it is, models of clientelism should start taking more long-term relationships into consideration. The first wave of the Arab Barometer from 2006 also includes a question asking whether the respondent has used wasta in the last five years, which I use to test this hypothesis across Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, and Lebanon.52 The wording of the question is: During the past five years, have you ever used wasta to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem? Overall, 30% of respondents said yes to this question. Notice that the wording of this question gets at the use of personal connections (wasta) to solve personal or neighborhood problems, which are equivalent with the particularistic or club goods that are offered in clientelistic exchanges. Due to the dichotomous nature of the question and the fact that I am analyzing data across multiple countries, I employ a mixed effects logistic regression to account for fixed effects of each country to examine whether upper classes use wasta.53

51Please email me for more detailed findings or go to www.kristenkao.com.
52Again, I include a model of Morocco separately in the appendix because the income indicator used was not on the same scale as the other countries. I find the similar outcomes for this country. The results are robust to dropping the case of Lebanon as well.
53I used a Bayesian Information Criterion test to determine that a mixed effects logistic is the appro-
Table 4.10: **Voter Turnout in the Arab World.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Income</td>
<td>0.0754</td>
<td>(0.0946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>0.200*</td>
<td>(0.0990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Income</td>
<td>−0.233*</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>0.506***</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>0.565***</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate’s Degree</td>
<td>0.703***</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University or Higher</td>
<td>0.827***</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.307***</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Constant</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
In the model presented in Table 4.11, I had different variables to work with than those from the GLD survey. To investigate the relationship between wealth and *wasta* I again include a measure of family monthly income and find that compared to the lowest income level, all others are more likely to have used *wasta* in the past five years. The two highest income levels are significant across a more complex model that controls for education level and one that does not. Being from these income levels increases the probability of having used *wasta* in the past five years by by six and seven percentage points respectively when compared to the lowest income bracket while holding all other factors at their means. In this model, I find that being unemployed has a negative effect of the use of *wasta*, so I include it in the model and find that being employed predicts a respondent will be five percentage points less likely to use *wasta*. Males are much more likely to have used personal connections to solve personal problems than females in this model, whereas older respondents are significantly less likely to have used them in the past five years. Again, these findings are robust to dropping out the case of Jordan.

Of course not parliamentarians are not the sole source of *wasta* for citizens of countries in the Arab world. Among those who report that they have used *wasta* in the past five years to solve a personal problem the six countries included in the Arab Barometer, about 17% reported having gone to MPs. The categories for the Arab Barometer on this question are not mutually exclusive though: another 25% of respondents reported that they went to government officials, 13% went to governorate officials or other community leaders, and 14% went to traditional leaders such as the head of their tribe. In Jordan specifically, 20% went to parliamentary members, 29% went to government officials, 6% to governorate officials or community leaders, and 19% to traditional authorities.

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54 Again the findings are robust to the use of income deciles rather than five levels of income.
55 The model is robust to the exclusion of this variable. We do not have this measure in the GLD data for comparability.
Table 4.11: Use of Wasta in the Arab world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.363***</td>
<td>0.369***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0740)</td>
<td>(0.0738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>−0.227**</td>
<td>−0.254**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0805)</td>
<td>(0.0786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Middle Income</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>0.0441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Income</td>
<td>0.0250</td>
<td>0.0624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Middle Income</td>
<td>0.251*</td>
<td>0.307**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Income</td>
<td>0.291*</td>
<td>0.354**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.00773*</td>
<td>−0.00965***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00301)</td>
<td>(0.00273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.713</td>
<td>−0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Constant</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 4710 4719

Standard errors in parentheses

* \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \)
4.5 Conclusions and Further Reflections

This research analysis suggests institutions may play a more powerful role in shaping political behavior than primordial sentiments. It challenges the theory of “ethnic censuses” whereby ethnic groups that participate in elections will vote perfectly along ethnic lines (Horowitz 1985). I show that electoral institutions can either strengthen or weaken the salience of ethnicity in elections. I find that in Jordan “ethnic censuses” may explain what goes on in large, urban SNTV districts, but in small SMP districts it does not. Furthermore, this research demonstrates that electoral institutions affect citizen access to state benefits, even under authoritarianism. In an ethnically divided society, redistribution is more evenly spread across the population in SMP districts in contrast to SNTV districts, where it targets coethnic voters. In previous chapters, I noted that the ruling strategy of co-opting tribes with patronage from the central state is rooted in the colonial foundations of the country. The data analyzed in this chapter indicates that elections serve as a modern means for ensuring the continuation of this system of distributive inequality in Jordan.

For developing democracies – and in particular, places like Afghanistan and Kuwait that have recently implemented SNTV systems to elect their national legislatures – this research has substantive implications. I discuss these examples in more depth in the conclusion to this dissertation. Policymakers and organizations interested in democracy promotion should seriously consider the ethnic landscape of the country and the incentives different types of electoral institutions engender before supporting the implementation of one type of system over another. Moreover, this chapter has further challenged common notions about how clientelism works, positing that the wealthier classes and the middle to upper middle classes in particular are likely to engage in clientelistic relationships with people in power in societies where such relationships are the norm.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

I started this dissertation wondering how electoral institutional design shapes authoritarian politics and interacts with local ethnic and social cleavage structures. I asked the following questions that are largely ignored in the current literature on electoral authoritarianism: do the specific types of institutions that govern elections under authoritarianism matter? Do elections shape enduring citizen-state linkages under authoritarianism or are they simply isolated events of state-society interaction? And should we expect similar outcomes from interactions between institutions and local political landscapes under autocracy as we find under democracy? In this final chapter I summarize the argument I present in this dissertation as well as the supporting evidence provided in chapters two through four and I propose pathways for potentially fruitful future research based on these findings.

5.1 Summary of the argument and evidence

I suggest that to answer these questions we need to disaggregate the effects various institutional components of elections in authoritarian settings have on politics in order. There is a tremendous amount of research on elections affect political behavior at the elite and individual citizen level in democracies – the same sort of effort should be made to understand how they work under authoritarianism as well. In more general terms, my argument starts from the premise that “institutions matter” in authoritarian settings. The electoral institutional design under authoritarianism determines whether electoral
behavior among candidates and voters will be based on clientelistic or programmatic goals. Like Carey and Shugart (1995) who identify a scale of which electoral systems encourage the reliance of candidates on programmatic versus personal appeals in elections, I recognize that while all elections will have aspects of both of these types of politics, some will encourage one more than the other. In chapters two and three, I argue that the higher the propensity of the electoral institutional design to favor the formation of personal, clientelistic relationships among voters and candidates, the more the legislative branch becomes reliant on the executive as MPs simply cannot afford to maintain its support base. A lack of an independent legislature weakens a cornerstone of democracy: the separation of powers. Throughout this dissertation, I show that the form clientelistic relationships will take depends in large part on the interaction between electoral institutions and local social and ethnic cleavages on the ground as well as the historical legacy of rule. Certain electoral institutions can serve to either enhance or diminish the role of ethnicity in voting behavior and rent distribution among MPs.

In chapter two the empirical evidence I provide demonstrates that two different electoral systems result in narrow electoral coalitions for MPs through different means, with the overall result being the cultivation of personal, clientelistic relationships between MPs and their constituents. The SNTV system fractionalizes the electorate through lack of transparency and confusion among voters about the likely outcome of the elections, motivating a turn to ethnic identity as an informational shortcut for assessing the trustworthiness of MPs. On the other side of the coin, SMP districts in Jordan are gerrymandered to be small and tend to be located in rural, tribally-oriented areas where the regime’s most reliable support lies. In both cases, voters with a traditional East Bank tribal connection are favored by the electoral system.

The constituent casework logs and elite interviews presented in chapter three show that parliamentarians in Jordan expend a lot of effort on collecting and responding to the personal requests of their constituents. Over time, the fulfillment of these constituent request make elected officials reliant on the regime and beholden to its various
branches. In addition to the fact the head of the government is not elected, the lack of an independent legislature to serve as a check on the Crown’s activities is a major reason why Jordan cannot be considered to be a democratic country despite the fact that its parliamentarians are elected. Analysis of the tribal backgrounds of MPs from 1989 to 2013 reveals that the same tribes have been holding onto a super majority of parliamentary seats over this time period. Thus, elections offer a reliable means of rent distribution and contribute to the formation of stable, enduring clientelistic relationships between elites and the grassroots.

Chapter four focuses on the interaction between electoral institutions and the ethnic composition of districts in the Jordan. Many studies on ethnicity in other electoral contexts claim that it is important in determining voter preferences, but they do not provide empirical evidence of why it remains important election after election. In most cases, it is assumed that ethnicity increases the trust of voters that their MPs will carry out their promises. However, I propose that this mechanism works under certain types of electoral institutions but may be less important under others. Analysis of the size of tribes within districts and the proportion of constituent services directed towards the MP’s tribe indicates that elected officials in SNTV district win their seats with tribal support coalitions and help out their coethnics at a disproportionately high rate. In SMP districts, parliamentarians rely on a more ethnically diverse voter base and we cannot predict their distribution patterns using ethnic identity. These findings are backed up by Jordanian respondents in the 2014 GLD survey. Among respondents registered in an SNTV district, reported turnout rates among voters who have had a coethnic elected to parliament in the past are substantially higher than those without a history of a tribal MP, whereas the a coethnic MP connection does not affect report turnout in SMP districts to the same extent. Likewise, respondents are much more inclined to believe that their MP would not help them out despite being able to in a time of need if they are registered in an SNTV district and have not had a coethnic MP in the past compared to those who have had a tribal MP before. On the other hand,
voters expect their MP to be very likely to help them with their personal problems in SNTV districts when they have had a coethnic MP versus when they have not. Again, differences across SMP districts exist, but they are not nearly as strong, indicating that coethnicity is still important in these districts, but it is not crucial in determining expectations of MP helpfulness.

Finally, chapter four also contributes a different way of thinking about political clientelism by considering the exchange of a vote for promises of future help from an elected official to be of crucial importance. First, this conceptualization of clientelism takes the focus off of outright vote buying, which occurs in combination with these other longer term promises of help, but are a subset of the larger relationship that patrons develop with clients during the elections. Secondly, by taking into consideration measures of longer term clientelistic expectations between voters and their patrons, this research challenges the notion that the poor are the most likely to benefit from clientelism. Evidence from analysis of voter turnout and reliance on wasta from government officials in the Arab Barometer data indicates that the relationship between the wealthy and MPs may extend beyond Jordan to the rest of the Arab world.

5.2 Further Research and Policy Considerations

A substantive lesson learned from this research is how democracy can be thwarted through the very institutions that are supposed to ensure it. Hundreds of millions of dollars a year are spent on democracy promotion each year. Programs that seek to establish real democracy should seriously consider how electoral institutions will interact with the ethnic and social landscape of each country within which they work. Like Jordan, many developing countries around the world suffer from rampant political clientelism. I demonstrate how in Jordan the use of SNTV combined with large, populous districts and SMP combined with small, gerrymandered districts – can promote the formation of clientelistic relationships, making voters and parliamentarians alike reliant on the in-
cumbent regime. This dissertation draws parallels between electoral behavior in Jordan under SNTV and SMP systems and that found under these systems in other contexts. Chapter three suggests that clientelism hinders democracy by threatening the independence of the legislature from the executive, a necessary component for the prevention of the abuse of power by one branch of government. Parts of this analysis demonstrates weaknesses of SNTV and SMP electoral systems susceptible to exploitation by powerful politicians who seek to thwart democracy elsewhere in the world. In order to break the detrimental cycle of clientelism, democracy promotion efforts should consider supporting the implementation of electoral systems that incentivize broad-based cooperation among citizens rather than narrow ones.

Another theme from this dissertation that deserves deeper scrutiny is the relationship between direct vote buying and longer term clientelistic relationships. These two phenomena likely serve different purposes for different types of regimes. I suspect that vote buying serves much more as a turn-out and demonstration mechanism of the representative’s (and by extension the regime’s) power. This discourages potential opposition from entering the political realm for fear of failure and nothing but negative results - identifying oneself as a member of the opposition can be costly. For regime supporters, it signals that the representative is favored and is able to provide and it may serve to maintain the voters’ faith in the clientelistic relationship (Kramon 2013). But clientelistic relationships are much more about establishing and sustaining a core base of voters/supporters. Through this mechanism, elections can serve as a reliable means for maintaining these relationships and funneling resources from the center to the grassroots for dictators.

I argue that there is a need to take into account the interactional effects of experience with clientelism, ethnicity, and electoral institutional design to understand vote choice in Jordan. Modeling the effects these three factors in determining vote outcomes separately, as much of the existing literature does, fails to capture reality. In Jordan, where the crown has no need for a political party because it is not elected, ethnicity can serve
as the conduit for machine politics. However, in other regions like Africa, the executive is elected and yet many incumbents rely on ethnicity as a conduit for rent distribution. Future research should examine where and why ethnicity becomes the conduit for clientelism versus political party machines, keeping in mind that much the answer to these questions may have to do with regime type and the goals of incumbents. An important avenue for future research lies in analyzing which types of dictators institute which types of electoral systems and which types of regimes prefer which types of electoral institutions.

Recent studies argue that clientelism in more ethnically heterogeneous areas tends to lead MPs to focus on the distribution of more private goods to their constituents in order to be able to cut out those who are not from his or her ethnic group, whereas MPs in more ethnically homogeneous groups will seek to offer their constituencies more club goods like the building of schools and hospitals in the district (Corstange Forthcoming; Ejdemo, Kramon, and Robinson 2015). I am unable to fully evaluate this argument because I do not have data on club goods provision in Jordan. In her study of local elections in Jordan, Gao (2010) finds that higher ethnic heterogeneity increases public goods provision to an area. These findings should motivate further inquiry into the question: what effects do ethnic heterogeneity versus homogeneity as well as the ability of ethnic groups to coordinate their activities determine distributional outcomes? Moreover, how does this effect differ under varying types of electoral institutions?

As I noted in the introduction, this dissertation offers empirical evidence from just one country. This limitation motivates the question: do the lessons we learn from Jordan apply to other contexts? An obvious next step would be study the interaction between electoral institutions and local political structures in an expanded sample of authoritarian regimes. Similar regimes in which the executive is not elected but the parliament is and where ethnic divides run deep, like Kuwait or Bahrain, would make for easy comparisons. Kuwait moved from a limited bloc vote system (similar to an SNTV system except voters have less votes to cast than there MPs elected in the district)
to an SNTV system with 10 member districts in 201. The Kuwaiti political system has similar tribal and urban-rural divides as those in Jordan, but it adds a layer of religious sectarianism. I have shown that in the case of Jordan, SNTV focuses political competition and distribution of rents on ethnic divides within the society. Will the same fate occur in Kuwait? Afghanistan provides another opportunity for extending the findings of this research. The country has used SNTV to elect its legislature since 2005. Preliminary research in this country suggests that outcomes are similar to those in Jordan in that candidates win their seats with very narrow political coalitions, hindering incentives to form broad-based political parties with many races being determined by ethnic censuses (Reynolds and Carey 2012). Bahrain is a monarchy with severe ethnic and sectarian political divides with parliamentarians running in SMP districts, which could provide for a useful comparison to the Jordanian case.

As of 2011, in addition to Jordan, Vanuatu, the Pitcairn Islands, Afghanistan, Thailand and Indonesia use SNTV for legislative elections. Thailand and Indonesia use SNTV to elect their Upper Houses only. Puerto Rico employs SNTV to elect a limited proportion of their upper and lower houses as well. In the past, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all used the SNTV system for parliamentary elections. All of these countries provide arenas in which to test the generalizability of the findings of the evidence presented in this dissertation. In particular, the diversity of social and ethnic landscapes these cases offer could contribute to a deeper understanding of how this political system interacts with ethnicity to shape electoral outcomes. Moreover, there is a considerable debate over whether Duvergerian equilibriums should be expected under SNTV (see Cox 1997 versus Fournier and Kohno 2000). A context in which ethnicity drives the formation of political coalitions could offer new and exciting insights concerning this debate.
5.3 Final Thoughts

The consequences of the Jordanian system include reification of ethnic identity and deepened social divisions leading to a sort of “neo-tribalism”. The ruling strategy of excluding large sectors of the population from government benefits and relying on tribalism as a national identity could prove to be a dangerous one. Perhaps with an eye on this, the regime has announced that there will be a new electoral law governing the next elections. It already experimented with the implementation of a national list system for 27 of the 150 seats in parliament in 2013. I plan to follow these developments in further research and collect empirical evidence on the outcomes of these reforms.
A multistage stratified sample design was employed to select participants for inclusion in the survey. The sample was first stratified by region (north, central, and south) and district size within each region (small and large). Twelve electoral districts were purposively selected for inclusion in the study. Another stratification occurred to ensure an approximately even balance between gender of the respondents.

Within each electoral district included in the study, 25 households were randomly selected from each 1 of 5 randomly selected blocks using a sampling frame based on the 2004 census. In an attempt to include respondents living in newer buildings who might differ qualitatively from those living in older buildings, all replacement inter-

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1 Some scholars note that the culture in the south of Jordan is more akin to that of the Arab Gulf region, while the culture in the north is more akin to that of the rest of the Levantine region. In some instances, this means that tribes might be either more or less sedentary and/or reliant on agriculture versus livestock for their livelihoods. In the modern era, this distinction should not greatly affect the results of this survey or conclusions drawn from it concerning the current state of politics in Jordan. There are other notable differences between the different areas of Jordan. The sample is stratified by region to make sure that these differences are represented.

2 A purposive selection method was employed to ensure a large enough sample of rural and tribal populations, who might not be sufficiently sampled in a standard PPS sample of eligible voters in Jordan. The sample includes a representative mix of single member and multi-member electoral districts, taking into consideration the tribal dynamics and level of electoral competition that exist in each district. Cluster sampling at the electoral district and block levels made the project feasible within budget constraints. All together, there is no reason that these districts should not be representative of all the electoral districts in Jordan, but it should be kept in mind that they were not randomly selected for inclusion in the study nor are they weighted to adjust for the different sizes of the populations living in these areas.
views come from buildings that were built after 2004. The Kish method was used to select the specific respondent within each household for participation in the survey. The final survey dataset includes a total of 1,499 completed face-to-face interviews\(^3\) carried out on tablets in April of 2014 with eligible Jordanian voters.

footnoteFor the purposes of this survey, an eligible Jordanian voter is anyone who is a Jordanian citizen, 18 years of age or older, who could be eligible to vote within his or her lifetime should he or she choose to be. For example, members of the security forces are currently ineligible to vote, but as they may some day become eligible, they were included in the sample. Non-registered, eligible voters were also kept in the sample as they may someday choose to register. living and/or registered in one of 12 purposely chosen electoral districts.\(^4\) This survey design resulted in higher clustering of respondents to facilitate the survey’s interest in understanding relationships between members of the same neighborhood or community.

A.2 Data Collection Procedures

The questionnaire was developed through collaboration between Professor Ellen Lust (Yale University), Professor Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), and Research Fellow Kristen Kao (University of Gothenburg). Local partnership with an experienced and highly reputable survey implementation firm, Middle East Marketing Consultants lead by Tony Sabbagh, facilitated the translation of the questionnaire into the local Arabic dialect, the creation of a complex sample design suitable for the needs

\(^3\)Completed for the purposes of this survey are interviews for which the interviewee made it to the end of the survey. All of these interviews have the majority of questions answered. In the dataset there are a total of 1,863 observations, but this includes observations that are considered incomplete (see section below on “Incompletes”).

\(^4\)Jordanian citizens are not required to register in the electoral district in which they reside if their family originates from one of the other electoral districts. Therefore, we took voters who were either registered in one of the 12 districts, regardless of where their residence is. We included unregistered voters in the sample if they were eligible to vote and they resided in one of the 12 districts included in the sample. In the last elections it was more difficult to get one’s district changed outside of the district of one’s residence.
of the study, the recruitment and training of fifty enumerators and supervisors, as well as the swift implementation and supervision of the survey in the field. Data collection was carried out from April 21, 2014 to April 28, 2014 employing tablet computers in face-to-face household interviews. Forty enumerators and ten supervisors\textsuperscript{5} were trained for two days prior to the implementation of the survey, after which they were sent out into the field in teams of five (four enumerators to each supervisor). Every attempt was made to have data uploaded to the main database in Amman every evening over Internet, and Kristen Kao analyzed the results each evening to check for errors or inconsistencies.

A.3 Constructed Variables

A.3.1 Incompletes

Incomplete surveys in the dataset are the result of a variety of issues. Refusals, in which either the person answering the door or the participant selected by the Kish table refused to participate make up one type of incomplete survey in the dataset. Another example would be a survey in which the participant decided to stop participating halfway through the questionnaire. Towards the end of the survey it became apparent that some of the surveys took 20 minutes or less to complete. The researchers involved in the project concluded that these surveys were too short to be considered to be realistic, and so part of the final two days of the survey were spent replacing these surveys. If the interview took less that 20 minutes, it is marked as incomplete under the variable “Complete”. Analyses of this dataset should be carried out keeping these issues in mind, dropping these surveys from analyses where appropriate.

\textsuperscript{5}In the data, the first 10 surveyors are actually supervisors whose tablets were only employed for practice or in times of emergency should another tablet fail in the field. This is recorded in the “srvyr” variable.
A.3.2 Differences Between Districts

The variable “Sntv” captures the dividing line between multi-member versus single member districts, the former of which are run under a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system (coded as a “1” in the data) versus the latter, which are run under a single member district plurality (SMP) system (coded as a “0” in the data).\(^6\)

Descriptive statistics for the districts included in the survey are provided in Table A.1 below. Access to this survey data will be available on the Governance and Local Development Program website in 2017 or 2018.

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\(^6\)In Jordan, this distinction can be said to correlate with urban-rural divides. To truly understand urban versus rural distinctions in responses, information of population density at the district level would be required for each interview. This information proved to be too difficult to obtain. I provide district eligible voter population data from 2013 from the Independent Electoral Commission in Jordan and full district population numbers from 2010 because it is the most recent year for which population information separated by electoral district was obtainable. This population information comes from the 2011 Statistical Yearbook put out by the Department of Statistics in Jordan.
Table A.1: **Descriptive Statistics for the Electoral Districts in the Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Pop. 2010</th>
<th>Eligible Voters 2013</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>SNTV</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma’an 2</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>13970</td>
<td>8278</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafileh 2</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>22490</td>
<td>11874</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’an 3</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>30050</td>
<td>15286</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun 2</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>32810</td>
<td>17513</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid 8</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>34910</td>
<td>20082</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa 2</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>46840</td>
<td>31272</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafileh 1</td>
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<td>54510</td>
<td>35273</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa 3</td>
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<td>56390</td>
<td>33949</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>158</td>
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<td>Jerash</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>187500</td>
<td>89059</td>
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<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amman 4</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>391580</td>
<td>242292</td>
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<td>261778</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>450040</td>
<td>273858</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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