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Controlling Processes

Tracing the Dynamic Components of Power

by Laura Nader

Ideas about culture are intertwined with notions of control and the dynamics of power. To show how controlling processes work to construct and institutionalize culture, I examine three ethnographic examples of different types of control—(1) moving people to see harmony rather than justice as desirable, (2) inducing women to undergo body-altering surgery under the illusion of free choice, and (3) dismissing the context of scientific work by emphasizing an idealized version of science. The processes involved are partly tailored to the projects at hand and partly reflections of larger cultural configurations. Any society undergoing rapid, continuous change is framed by the social organizations of colonialism and/or industrialism, but on close analysis we see that there is a flow of power and a link between ideas, institutions, and human agency whereby power is double-edged and simultaneously centered and decentered.


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1. This paper was delivered as the 1995 Sidney W. Mintz Lecture to the Department of Anthropology of The Johns Hopkins University on November 20, 1995. I acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of the many colleagues and students who have over the years discussed the ideas in this paper and forged ahead in their own studies of control. In particular, I thank S. Ervin-Tripp, R. Gonzalez, E. Hertz, R. Kliger, J. Martin, J. Ou, and R. Stryker for their contributions in the preparation of this paper.

2. Eric Wolf’s book Europe and the People Without History [1982] most significantly shaped my understanding of the need to erase the boundaries between Western and non-Western history, to make connections that had for too long been absent from earlier efforts to understand diffusion or massive areal conquests. Although Wolf’s book inspired me to document and explain the spread of dominant legal models, Sidney Mintz’s Sweetness and Power (1985), which followed shortly after, coincided with my work on the anthropology of life in the United States seen through the prism of controlling processes and helped ground that work.

3. Mintz was also aware of acts of resistance. For example, his Workers in the Cane (1966) is the biography of a Puerto Rican with deep involvements in union and political affairs, a worker interested in justice who by virtue of his acts was “swept out of average anonymity” [Salz 1961: 106–7]; his actions placed him among the heroes and shakers rather than among the done-to-and-shaken average men, “a man ‘who acts within the limited scope at his disposal and enlarges it, and who is acted upon by the set patterns and circumstances of his existence.”
of power we must employ more knowledge of power structures, controllers, and the repudiation of agency or its glorification as resistance. For me the concept of controlling processes is useful because it allows the incorporation of the full panoply of key concepts—ideology, hegemony, social and cultural control—in the study of both invisible and visible aspects of power working vertically through ideas and institutions (Nader 1980a). In this lecture honoring Mintz's work, I use three ethnographic accounts to trace how and why power is acquired, used, maintained, or lost. These examples employ a contextualized description of processes and dynamics to trace the flow of power and so reveal something about the manner in which cultural ideas—ideas about what it is to be civilized, about standardized bodies, and about the place and meaning of science—are transformed. In that sense this paper is about a methodology for studying power.

The term "controlling processes" refers to the transformative nature of central ideas such as coercive harmony that emanate from institutions operating as dynamic components of power. Although the study of controlling processes looks at how central dogmas are made and how they work in multiple sites (often arrayed vertically), it also focuses our attention on microprocesses; that is, it is the study of how individuals and groups are influenced and persuaded to participate in their own domination or, alternatively, to resist it, sometimes disrupting domination or putting the system in reverse (Nader 1994, 1996a). Because power moves, it is unstable, and sometimes people achieve power rather than being deprived of it. Cumulative tinkering can be a two-way process (Scott 1990) or double-edged.

My task here is twofold. First, I present ethnographic accounts to show how control is redistributed by professions—in law by coercive harmony, in medicine by an ideology of choice, in museology by demystification. In that sense this paper is about a methodology for studying power.

These three ethnographic examples show how controlling processes are manufactured, how they work to shift standards of taste or value, and how they travel through a multiplicity of discourses, sites, and practices. The accounts illustrate what has been normalized, unearthing invisible structures and recognizing frequent departures from reality, to document not only how cultures are invented but how invented cultures work. The study of controlling processes is at some level a response to Mintz's call for an "anthropology of everyday life," a response that brings political and economic issues more prominently into present-day anthropology, whose methodology is rooted in fieldwork. This call for an "anthropology of everyday life" makes necessary my second task—to examine why it is difficult for U.S. anthropologists to examine controlling processes in the United States. As Mintz (1996) reminds us, anthropologists [just like other citizens] are conditioned by their society. This is indicated in the following three examples, which take us through institutions as varied as Christian missions, cosmetics corporations, the military-industrial complex, and the bar for ends as varied as pacification, maximization of profits, and the pursuit of symbolic capital.

How Power Works

STANDARDIZING EMOTION: COERCIVE HARMONY

Wolf (1982) and Mintz (1985) have traced commodities through developing world systems to construct dynamic examples of European expansion, and their work has motivated some of us to trace the movement of ideas. I began to follow what I called the harmony law model, which encapsulates coercive compromise and consensus as a form of behavior modification (Nader 1990). Over a period of 40 years working in a number of different sites, I came to appreciate why anthropologists underestimate the political and economic use of legal ideologies in the construction or deconstruction of culture writ large. As a result of a fine-grained analysis of the harmony law model used in Zapotec courts and an awareness of similar arrangements in international negotiation settings, I began to understand that the coercive power of legal ideologies had been missed by anthropologists caught up in a romantic notion of culture.

Research among the mountain Zapotec of Oaxaca, Mexico, from 1957 to 1969 first led me to distinguish harmony from harmony ideology and then to interpret the use of the harmony law model as a tool of pacification at first contact with Europe. My subsequent fieldwork, not residentially limited and roughly covering the years 1970 to the present, revealed an explosion of alternative dispute resolution in the United States that I also interpreted as pacification by means of harmony ideology and as essentially a response to the 1960s legal rights and access-to-justice movements (Nader 1989). When I shifted my attention to library research on international river disputes (Nader 1995) I found these same alternative dispute resolution techniques being em-
employed. In many settings social scientists sought to explain conflict while at the same time taking coercive harmony for granted.\(^6\)

Although the organization of Zapotec villages is a legacy of the Spanish crown, villages today remain autonomous to the extent to which they manage to keep peace among themselves and exclude outsiders. Zapotec autonomy is enhanced in their courts, where images of the external world are built, self-government is articulated, and ideologies are formed. The harmony law model was likely introduced by the crown and its religious missions. The Zapotec claim as their own the Spanish proverb "A bad agreement is better than a good fight." As I probed, it seemed to me more and more likely that the indigenes, having been thus introduced to the harmony law model, began using it as a tool for restricting the encroachment of external, superordinate power (much as did New England villages of the 18th century) by encouraging harmonious rather than contentious behavior. The Zapotec turned a hegemonic tool into a counterehegemonic technique of control to keep the state out.

When theorists speak of cultural control as hegemonic they are referring not to all culture but to the part that is constructed at one point and spreads much as colonics of people move to or settle in distant lands. As I unpacked theories of control, I turned my attention to classic ethnographies on law in former British colonies in Africa and then to ethnographies on the Pacific regions of Polynesia and Micronesia, searching for connections between Christian missionizing and law. The preliminary review was tantalizing. Why was it that anthropologists commonly reported conciliation among indigenous peoples? The legal historian Martin Chanock (1985), whose work covers the origin, use, and modern consequences of harmony ideology, revealed early connections between local law and Christian mission emphasizing conciliation and compromise through the operation of principles of Euro-Christian harmony ideology.\(^7\) In 1976 I attended the Pound Revisited Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota,\(^8\) and began to study how

6. Interestingly, as with Llewellyn and Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way (1941), based on work in the 1930s, rationalization for how well harmony law models work was sought in the anthropological literature (Gibbs 1963, Nader 1966). In The Cheyenne Way the possibilities for refuting Harvard Law School's legal formalism under the leadership of Landé were enhanced for Llewellyn, a legal realist, by studying a culture that had no written law; experience performed became central.

7. For my purposes Chanock's (1985) synthesis of the data on the missionary presence in what are today Zambia and Malawi from the 1830s onward is revealing of the early connection between local law and Christian missions and goes far beyond anything anthropologists had written about by the mid-1980s. Chanock points to the contradiction between African ideology and practice in the pre- and postcolonial periods. He uses the term "missionary justice" to call attention to the missionary influence in the construction of African "customary" law as encountered by anthropologists in the century following.

8. The Pound Revisited Conference was held in the same place where Roscoe Pound in 1966 delivered his memorable talk to the American Bar Association. "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." The conference was to be a symbolic vehicle for a serious and comprehensive examination of harmony legal ideologies are constructed in modern nation-states of the Western democratic sort, penetrate institutions of society (schools, hospitals, workplaces), and radiate beyond national borders.

By sheer happenstance, as I was working on these materials I began to notice, along with other observers of the U.S. political scene, that Americans had become subdued and apathetic [Nader 1989]. The 1960s had been a time when many social groups in the United States felt encouraged to come forward with their agendas: civil rights, environmental rights, consumer rights, women's rights, Native American rights, and so on. It was a confrontive period marked by sharp critiques of law and lawyers in relation to rights, remedies, and the workings of the judicial system and pushed by concerns with rights and justice. Yet in about 25 years the country had moved from central concerns with justice to concerns with efficiency, order, and harmony, from public concern with the ethic of right and wrong to an ethic of treatment [Claeson 1994], from courts as a dominant symbol for law use to alternative dispute resolution. How had this shift happened?

Although alternative dispute resolution encompasses programs that are called "informal justice"—that is, justice that focuses on mandatory mediation—this is not the same thing as earlier negotiation and mediation. Mandatory mediation-arbitration (in itself a contradiction in terms) replaces contention with "peace" and win-win solutions. The language of alternative dispute resolution is heavily psychological rather than legal, and it has attracted strange bedfellows—right-wing politicians concerned with the prospect of the success of the rights agendas, left-wing activists concerned with improving the judicial process, religious communities, psychotherapy groups, businesses tired of paying enormous sums in lawyers' fees, and administrators wishing to facilitate bureaucratic procedures. Dogmas of harmony and consensus appeal to a wide spectrum of political positions from right to left and, because they have deep cultural roots in American society, leave room for instrumental manipulations and more.

Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, played a pivotal role in the alternative dispute resolution movement from his appointment in 1969 until his retirement in 1986. Burger adumbrated a manner of thinking about social relations, structural problems of inequality, and cultural solutions to these problems that foreshadowed a cultural shift with ramifications procedural legal reform to be accomplished by the year 2000. "Cumulative tinkering" was thought to be a useful strategy, and alternative forms of dispute resolution were suggested to which court business might be diverted. The discourse at this conference extolled the virtues of harmony and efficiency. New tribunals would, it was argued, be needed to divert cases generated by the regulated welfare state and the 1960s rights movements. It was the start of the conservative legal revolution of which, at the invitation of Chief Justice Warren Burger, I was a privileged participant observer. Since that time I have pondered the implications of a rhetoric of consensus, homogeneity, and agreement and the contradictions it poses for a society that exposes the idea of the rule of law as a cornerstone of democratic order.

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far beyond the law. The movement was against the contentious and against concerns with root causes and toward control over the disenfranchised. For the most part the elements of such control were invisible, but they were pervasive. The discourse of alternative dispute resolution was characterized by the use of a restricted language code with formulaics following the pattern of assertive rhetoric: broad generalizations, repetition, invocation of authority and danger, presentation of values as fact and almost no hard data. For the most part the bench and the corporate bar swallowed the chief justice's exhortations—an interesting story in itself, since such acceptance would seem to run counter to lawyer self-interest (Nader 1993). Duncan Kennedy (1982) was right: legal training for hierarchy is preparation for believing the chief justice.8

The point of calling attention to the use of the harmony law model is not to valorize an adversarial model but to attempt to understand how and why legal ideologies shift from tolerance for controversy to the pursuit of harmony over time and with what consequences (Auerbach 1983). Certainly the history of global replacement of adversarial models by harmony models does not indicate that harmony ideology is benign. On the contrary, during the past three decades harmony ideology has resulted in an invisible redistribution of power. The conditions under which preferences in dispute management are historically “shifting commitments” usually involve power in motion.

Burger's legacy is evident everywhere today. A major purpose of environmental conferences, for example, is to see whether the emphasis can be shifted from a win-lose situation to a balance-of-interest approach. American Indians on reservations are being persuaded by negotiators from Washington to take nuclear waste as a win-win solution—climbing out of their misery while contributing to their country (Ou 1996). Timber activists are pressured with consensus meetings. Unions are deluged with quality-control plans whereby workers and management can cooperate in harmony (Gonzalez 1996). Family problems are mediated, and, ironically, in many states such mediation is mandatory (Grillo 1991).9 Ghetto school “troubleshooters” and leaders are taught how to mediate disputes rather than search for justice. In Washington, D.C., there is now a Government Office of Consensus Conference Planning, and we have elected presidents whose preference for consensus has been widely noted. Carol Greenhouse's (1986) work has called attention to the Southern roots of Presidents Carter and Clinton and the latter's position on consensus; her study of a Southern Baptist community in Georgia reveals the cultural roots of an alternative-dispute-resolution explosion in which the contemporary equation of Euro-American Christianity with harmony instills law avoidance, law aversion, and the value of consensus—“a strategy that transformed conflict.” Jerold Auerbach (1983) had already pointed to a recurrent dialectic in the United States between harmony and judicial models of law.

Thus, it appears that in the effort to quell the rights movements of the 1960s and to cool Vietnam-war protests, harmony became a virtue.10 Burger argued that to be more “civilized” Americans had to abandon their reliance on the adversarial model. It was by means of such rhetoric that the present-day “tort reform” movement was born. Though the general public was largely unaware of it, the plan attracted enough attention to shift public emphasis and empathy away from courts and injured plaintiffs. A burgeoning dispute-resolution industry institutionalized the shift from “the acrimonious” to “the harmonious” through an empirically ungrounded discourse about the United States as “overlitigious” (Nader 1994). The powerful tend to become advantaged by alternative dispute resolution, and coercive harmony can be repressive.

There were critics who challenged the assumptions about a litigation explosion, and studies revealed alternative dispute resolution's practice of controlling the definition of the problem and the form of its expression, including the prohibition of anger. In spite of empirical challenges to assumptions and assertions, alternative dispute resolution continued to expand into multiple facets of American life and in a short time became international. What happens when a law reform movement seemingly unfractured by power differences goes international (Nader 1995)? Many textbook descriptions of dispute resolution use...
a standard sequential order of legal evolution that espouses a telos: hierarchically lower societies supposedly evolve from self-help and negotiation to mediation, arbitration, and finally adjudication [Hoebel 1954, Schwartz and Miller 1964]. Many writings on legal evolution have considered the simple presence of courts a sign of societal complexity, evolution, and development; during the colonial era the development of courts was considered part of the "civilizing mission." The International Court of Justice was promoted as the apex of forums for settlement of international disputes by means of adjudication and arbitration. All these positions were ideologically consistent with the works of evolutionary social theorists. Yet by the 1980s and 1990s, just as alternative dispute resolution in the United States was shifting the rhetoric from justice to harmony, so at the international level the notion of "mature" negotiation began to replace the World Court as the standard of civilized behavior. Why this valorizing of negotiation? An international legal scholar [Gong 1984:55] put his finger on the key—elasticity: "The less 'civilized' were doomed to work toward an equality which an elastic standard of civilization put forever beyond their reach." Edward Said [1978] had noticed this earlier when he observed that the valorizing of one cultural form over another is frequently linked to imbalances of power. Now that the "primitives" have courts, we move to alternative dispute resolution, a culturally encapsulated form of international negotiation that has emerged in the United States from the disciplines of law, economics, social psychology, political science, and psychotherapy.

What was different about the new international negotiators was not their practice of mediation or negotiation but their distaste for confrontation, the adversary process, justice acquired by win-lose methods, and equality before the law. They were also linked by an indifference to the international court, which since the emergence of new nations (many of them "Third World") was being used to represent new interests. For example, in 1984 Nicaragua filed suit against the United States, which withdrew from the case and shortly thereafter (along with the U.S.S.R.) withdrew from the agreement to comply with the decisions of the court. Controlling processes are double-edged.

Water resource disputes illustrate the shift of dispute resolution away from adjudication and arbitration toward negotiation. In instances of international river disputes such as those over the Danube, the Colorado, the Jordan, the Duoro, and the Ganges, mention of the International Court of Justice is replaced by phrases such as "mutual learning," "information sharing," "harmonizing," and "cooperation." Zero-sum settlements become "hostile," and information, analysis, and solution are viewed as getting in the way of "constructive dialogue." Under such conditions, mind-games become a central component of the negotiation process. Toxic poisoning is referred to as a "perception of toxic poisoning," and the question becomes how cultural behavior can be used or neutralized. The international "privatization" of justice through alternative dispute resolution centers in the United States is striking, as is the contempt for the judicial process.

Many writers on international negotiation imply the existence of a "universal diplomatic culture" of negotiators. Sometimes justification for such a view is attributed to anthropological research on negotiation, notably the work of Philip Gulliver [1979]. However, what is claimed to be universal here is instead hegemonic, developed in the United States in the 1970s and exported worldwide by an expanding alternative dispute resolution industry, it is a coercive harmony whose primary function is producing order of a repressive sort. In the international river disputes it is the stronger parties that prefer negotiation.

Harmony legal models or adversarial models may originate locally and spread or be imposed for purposes of control or resistance to control, resulting in the redistribution of power. Anthropologists know, of course, that dispute resolution ideologies have long been used as a mechanism for the transmission of hegemonic ideas, and indeed we no longer speak of culture as referring simply to shared traditions passed from one generation to another. The study of structures and activities that cross boundaries, including the boundaries of what has long been shared culture, illuminates places where power may be reconfigured and societies transformed. The question of choice is just such a place.

STANDARDIZING THE BODY: THE QUESTION OF CHOICE

The question of choice is central to the story of how medicine and business generate controlling processes in the shaping of women's bodies. Foucault [1967] demonstrates how changes in the concept of madness led to changes in diagnosis and treatment of the insane and of social attitudes toward them. He describes how changing perceptions of madness in parts of Western Europe from the Middle Ages to the end of the 19th century led to the separation of "mad" persons from the rest of society, their classification as deviants, and finally their subjection to social control. He focuses on the cultural controls that led to the social controls; ideas about madness led to asylums for the mad. A similar incremental process is central to discussions of the commodification of a woman's body [see, e.g., Lock 1993].

Images of the body appear natural within their specific cultural milieus. For example, feminist researchers have analyzed the practice of breast implantation in the United States from the vantage point of the cultural milieu, and in the Sudan [Lightfoot-Klein 1989], female circumcision and infibulation serve to accentuate a feminine appearance. Thus, Sudanese and other African...
women, American women, and others experience body mutilation as part of engendering rites. However, many writers differentiate infibulation from breast implantation by arguing that American women choose to have breast implants whereas in Africa women are presumably subject to indoctrination (and besides, young girls are too young to choose). One of the most heated debates arising from the public health concern over breast implants is whether the recipients are freely situated—that is, whether their decision is voluntary or whether control is disguised as free will.

An informed response to the free-choice argument requires knowing how the beauty-industrial complex works. It requires sensitive fieldwork in multiple sites and an understanding of emergent idea systems in incremental change. Linda Coco (1994) builds upon the insights revealed by Howard Zinn's (1984) *The Twentieth Century: A People's History.* Zinn cites a 1930s magazine article which begins with the statement, "The average American woman has sixteen square feet of skin" (Zinn 1984:204). This is followed by an itemized list of the annual beauty needs of every woman. Sixty years later the beauty-industrial complex is a multimillion-dollar industry that segments the female body and manufactures commodities of and for the body.

As Coco shows, some women get caught in the official beauty ideology, and in the case of silicone-gel breast implants some hundreds of thousands of women have been ensnared. But who gets caught and when is important to an understanding of the ecology of power. The average age of a woman having breast implantation is 36 years, and she has an average of two children. She is the beauty industry's insecure consumer recast as a patient (Claeson 1994). She is somehow deviant; her social illness is deformity or hypertrophy (small breasts). Coco (1994:111) quotes a past president of the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (ASPRS): "There is substantial and enlarging medical knowledge to the effect that these deformities [small breasts] are really a disease which result in the patient's feelings of inadequacies, lack of self-confidence, distortion of body image, and a total lack of well-being due to a lack of self-perceived femininity. . . . Enlargement . . . is therefore . . . necessary to ensure the quality of life for the [female] patient." In other words, cosmetic surgery is necessary to the patient's psychological health.

The plastic surgeon regards the construction of the official breast as art, the aim being to reform the female body according to the ideals of classic Western art. One surgeon pioneering procedures for correcting deformity took as his ideal female figure that of ancient Greek statues, which he carefully measured, noticing the exact size and shape of the breasts, their vertical location between the third and seventh ribs, the horizontal between the line of the sternum and the anterior axillary line, and so forth. In Coco's analysis the exercise of the plastic surgeon's techno-art re-creates a particular static, official breast shape and applies this creation ostensibly to relieve women's mental suffering. The surgeon becomes a psychological healer as well as an artist.

Along with art and psychology, there is, of course, the business of organized plastic surgery, which responds to the demands and opportunities of market economics. By the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a glut of plastic surgeons. The ASPRS began to operate like a commercial enterprise instead of a medical society, saturating the media with ads and even providing low-cost financing. The discourse became a sales pitch. Women "seek" breast implants to keep their husbands or their jobs, to attract men, or to become socially acceptable. Coco calls this "patriarchal capitalism" and questions whether this is free choice or "mind colonization."

Understanding "choice" led Coco to an examination of the power both in the doctor-patient relationship and in the control of information. By various means certain women—the insecure consumers—are led to trust and believe in modern medical technology. What is most important in being "caught" is their internalization of the social message. Coco's conclusion that American women are subtly indoctrinated to recognize and desire a certain kind of beauty presents an interesting possibility. Women "were told by the media, plastic surgeons, women's magazines, other women, and the business world that they could enhance their lives by enhancing their bust lines. . . the social imperative for appearance was personalized, psychologized, and normalized" (Coco 1994:120). Social surveys indicate that, to the extent that women internalize the social imperative, they feel they are making the decision on their own.

Not surprisingly, women whose surgery resulted in medical complications often came to recognize the external processes of coercive persuasion that had led them to seek implants. In some ways, they resembled former cult members who had been deprogrammed: their disillusionment caused them to question the system that had encouraged them to make the decision in the first place (Singer with Lalich 1995). The result was a gradual building of protest against the industry, expressed in networks, newsletters, support groups, workshops, and seminars. As have some former cult members, women have brought suit, testified before lawmakers, and challenged in other ways some of the largest corporations and insurance companies in the land.13 The choice of implants, they learn, is part of a matrix of controlling processes in which women are
subjects. Given the right circumstances it could happen to anyone. In the Sudan (Lightfoot-Klein 1989), the young girl is told that circumcision and infibulation are done for her and not to her. In the United States the mutilation of natural breasts is also done for the re-creation of femininity. Although power is exercised differently in these two cases, Coco notes the similarity: "The operation on the female breast in America holds much of the same social symbolism and expression of cultural mandate as does infibulation in Sudan. Thus, the question of why women choose breast augmentation becomes moot" (1994:125).

Breast implantation is now spreading elsewhere, most notably to China. Will it become a functional equivalent to foot-binding in China as part of the competition between patriarchies East and West? Whatever the answer, many social thinkers agree that people are always more vulnerable to intense persuasion during periods of historical dislocation—a break with structures and symbols familiar to the life cycle—in which the media can bring us images and ideas originating in past, contemporary, or even imaginary worlds.

Feminist researchers have sought to crack controlling paradigms such as those that define women's capacities and those that construct a standardized body shape and determine what is beautiful in women. Our Bodies, Ourselves [Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1971] introduced women to their own bodies as a site for the exercise of power. Works such as Face Value: The Politics of Beauty [Lakoff and Scherr 1984] and The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women [Wolf 1991] are attempts to free the mind from the beauty constructions of cosmetic industries and fashion magazines. Others have written about how the one model of Western beauty is affecting members of ethnic groups who aspire to look the way advertisements say they should.14 As in the example of Sweetness and Power, choice is an illusion, since the restructuring of taste is inextricably linked to shifts in the organization of consumption.

WHO ARE THE CONTROLLERS? THE SCIENCE-IN-SOCIETY DEBATE

The final example of controlling configurations involves a recent controversy at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., over the "Science in American Life" exhibit at the National Museum of American History. The full story of this controversy involves the history of what one can call the new museology, a movement in which a critical anthropology, along with other reflexive disciplines, plays a central role.

Nelson Graburn (1991) has identified three historic periods in the history of museum exhibits, each reflecting a particular ideology: display of power and status, education of the masses, and empowerment through interpretation. The debate on the function of museums from the native's point of view, focusing on the dynamic relation between the museum and Native Americans, was among the urgent political and epistemological issues of representation and repatriation that reinvigorated anthropological work on museums in the 1970s. Michael Ames (1986) applied Ivan Illich's (1971) idea of de-schooling to museums of the neocolonial type as part of a reflexive, self-critical anthropology of museums. During the late 1970s and 1980s museum studies began to be cross-disciplinary, and there was a heightened awareness of what museums actually do in relation to some of the ideological zeitgeists that Graburn enumerated. Interdisciplinary concerns pointed to the manner in which museums control and subordinate the past (MacCannell 1976) in an effort to portray the "modernization" of America. Museums were recognized as status symbols (Kelly 1987), and criticism of them included an examination of the gendered, racialized construction of natural history exhibits [Haraway 1984] as well as the connections between museums and imperialism attached to notions of "the white man's burden" (Haacke 1986).

All of the above-mentioned research points to the recognition that museums do not exist in a vacuum. It indicates a critical rethinking of the functions of museums and their relations to movements such as colonialism or nationalism and ideologies such as Marxism and capitalism. There is a surprising shortage of ethnographic works analyzing specific controversial exhibits. Two exceptions that come to mind are the Glenbow Museum controversy in Canada (Halpin 1978) and George Marcus's 1990 "The Production of European High Culture in Los Angeles." The critical ethnographic examination of the Smithsonian's "Science in American Life" exhibit by a young anthropologist interested in the contemporary science/anti-antiscience debates [Vackimes 1996] is evidence of what happens when stakeholding becomes incendiary.

Writers locked in these debates often depict so-called antiscience people as "savages," ignorant lay people, or scholars outside the boundaries of a narrowly defined "science." This makes the study of "us" (interested lay people) and "them" (the scientists) imperative, as lay persons become the "natives" struggling for power—a situation, by the way, not so different from the case of the Canadian Cree mentioned in connection with the Glenbow Museum and its sponsors. The Smithsonian controversy contains all the significant political and theoretical issues with which contemporary anthropology has been concerned: displays of power, representation, history and the cultural wars over history, symbolic power and the power of material objects,
education, public participation, culture and multiculturalism, magic, science, and religion, and hegemony. Anthropologists would not have attempted such an analysis a century ago because as a discipline we had not yet achieved the detachment, the experience, and the critical maturity necessary to do so. We first needed to experience colonialism and nationalism, and we needed to focus on the idea of the "Other" in order to recognize colonized roles in our own society and ideological components in the basic operating concepts of our discipline.

The "Science in American Life" exhibit was, as its curator, Arthur Molella (1994), pointed out, about an extraordinarily complex and evolving interrelationship between science and society. A historian of science and a member of the exhibit advisory committee noted that the exhibit "neither attacks nor celebrates science and scientists, but provides museum visitors with an exciting and informative account of science as a human and social enterprise reflecting the society in which it is nurtured and having important social, economic, and political consequences. Isn't that what 'scientific literacy' should be about?" (Weiner 1994). The task of the anthropologist was to examine and analyze the cultural battles over what the exhibit was really concerned with.

Science exhibits often aim at producing awe at the wonder or strangeness of nature, displaying man's conquest over natural forces, or celebrating great scientists and their discoveries and inventions. As Vackimes points out, "Science in American Life" did none of these things. Instead of illustrating "scientific progress," the 22 case studies in the exhibit focused on the impact of science and urged the public to think about the meaning of the development of the contraceptive pill, the atomic bomb, food additives, scientific education, and the advent of coal tar products and the creation of synthetic fabrics, paints, aspirin, and pesticides. Obscure inventors, vaccines and DNA, medical innovations, dyes for blue jeans, radio circuits, and hard water—these were the curiosities in this museum exhibit. Perhaps the material object that most clearly symbolized the different interests of the lay public and some scientists was the relic of a family fallout shelter of the post–World War II years. At first the shelter had seemed to be a sensible technological solution as effective protection from the destructive potential of the atomic bomb, but after the development of the hydrogen bomb it had come to look ineffective. The worry among some scientists on the museum's advisory board was that the shelter would be perceived as a symbol of scientific evil (Molella and Stephens 1995:9).

The exhibit stimulated as outraged a reaction among some members of the scientific community as any representation (or misrepresentation) of the cultures of native peoples. There were implicit and explicit threats to jobs, calls for revisions and reparations, accusations of the demonizing of science. The outraged scientists wanted a script that portrayed the glories of American science and technology, one that celebrated Nobel Laureates. A contextualized scientific representation was considered a belligerent act worthy of characterization as antiscientific. The exhibit, in the spirit of the new museology, elicited a public analysis of the meaning of science and progress in American life, which in turn drew criticism to the Smithsonian for its alleged attack on the sacred scientific establishment. The secretary of the Smithsonian argued for evenhanded exhibits. The "Science in American Life" exhibit is currently being dismantled and reformed for the major benefactor, the American Chemical Society. The "higher superstition" that Gross and Levitt (1994) attribute to antiscientific thinking may belong to us all.

Anthropologists understand the social organization of groups and know that practitioners of Big Science are separated spatially from lay people. They also understand that scientists themselves are differentiated. Our science museums have been the special repositories for the mystery, majesty, and fascination of science, as Vackimes points out. But the Smithsonian exhibit was housed in the National Museum of American History, where the curators apparently penetrated the previously impervious disguise of modern science. As a result of the juxtaposition of meanings, the ethnographer and the curators were able to comprehend the political and sacred workings of "the scientific mind."

The Power of Concepts

FROM SOCIAL CONTROL TO CULTURAL CONTROL

To place controlling processes research in the context of American anthropology, it is important to note the changing place of "social control" relative to "cultural control" in the U.S. social science literature. During the past century notions of control that were themselves hegemonic have given way to an ever more critical approach to the use of disciplinary concepts. Early on, so-effects [of science]." He thinks of Molella's exhibit as evaluating American science when what the curator was attempting was an exhibit on science in American life. In a speech before the American Association of Museums (Minneapolis, May 4, 1996), Heyman made the case for more balanced exhibits by contrasting the role of the curator with that of the academic. He argued that in universities no one is responsible for the opinions expressed by its faculty, their work is attributed. Curators, in contrast, present their viewpoints anonymously, and he quoted a colleague as opining that such anonymity is potentially "authoritarian." Heyman concluded, "Presenting at least two sides of an important issue and letting the visitors know exactly what is evidence and what is interpretation can only enhance broader public understanding." He did not mention satisfying the American Chemical Society, nor did he understand that interpretation is not the same as evaluation.

15 In a personal communication the secretary of the Smithsonian, 1. Michael Heyman, noted that his criticism of Molella's exhibit has to do with "more sensitively balancing positive and negative
social control theorists examined power within the context of an ideological worldview in which harmony and order were assumed to be positively valued. Although the notion of culture in its romantic version also assumed a consensual basis that was hegemonic, anthropologists have increasingly backed away from this notion as well as from related ideas such as social control.

Edward Alsworth Ross (1901) first advanced the concept of social control in the wake of labor unrest in the post-Civil War period. With the abolition of slavery came a reorganization of slavery-based relationships. During that period of rapid industrialization, industrial jobs were replacing those in farming and wage work was replacing self-employment. It was a period of high immigration and of populist political movement, a time when the crisis of control was a central theme of industrial thought. Ross’s work on the human practices and arrangements that contribute to social order and influence people to conform centered on the hegemonic thesis that social order exists because of society’s conscious control of the individual. It took little account of the destitute and the thoughtful, for whom consensual social control was more likely an illusion that served special interests. Theorizers of controlling processes are now at pains to differentiate between control that is consensual and the notion that consensus is control.

In the early 20th century, especially during the period following World War I, labor struggles erupted from Seattle to Boston. The response was brutal: there were firings, repression, retaliatory raids, and massive deportation of immigrant workers and radicals. Such actions were the results of a broad attempt to create a stable workforce. As historians of the period observe, industry’s need for a certain kind of order came to be equated with the needs of the society. Yet the contradictions between repressive police tactics and a democratic government also needed to be addressed. It was in this context that American industry began to produce an apparatus that, though aimed at quieting worker unrest, allows us a glimpse of the social textures of industrialization [Noble 1977]. The move was in the direction of “human management,” and it represented a change in business’s method of social control. “Handling the help” was central to business survival, and the pursuit of peaceful social relations was becoming an important part of modern management. Psychology became the darling of industry in the shift from overt coercion to implicit persuasion.

The development of human management techniques moved away from a conception of workers in their productive capacity toward the organization of labor outside the factory. Business worked to invent a culture that fitted the needs of a new industrial society, the industrial process stretched that culture into the communities and structures in which workers lived, thereby creating a conception of worker that was as different from the traditional one as Brave New World is from 1984. The new managers were creating a modern architecture of daily life in which advertising was dubbed “a civilizing influence.” The goal was the prevention of resistance to industrial culture [Nash 1989, Wallace 1978].

The distinction between social and cultural control allows for the distinction between control over groups or relationships and control of the mind, both part of any controlling process. Increasingly control moved from a social to a cultural mode; social control or overt coercion is culturally less acceptable in a democratic society, and in the late 20th century cultural control is more effective—a notion that European social thinkers were quicker to grasp than their U.S. counterparts [Augé 1982]. Some have argued that the evolution from overt control to subtle cultural control is progress, indicating that the world is increasingly less governed by violence, yet we have in internalized violence the cognitive dissonance that has often led to a good deal of violence.17

Advertising, worker safety and recreation programs, welfare programs, and language and civics classes were control mechanisms that created new traditions for the consumer class of a new industrial order while at the same time training consumers in seductive, subliminal appeals—mobilizing the instinct, civilizing the self, and commercializing expression [Ewen 1976]. Scholars were constructing and debating cultural control and conceptions of culture, and anthropologists were in the middle of such debates. Ruth Benedict (1934) was writing about coherence in culture, Edward Sapir (1924) about “culture, genuine and spurious,” and Franz Boas about the shackles of tradition in the Euro-American transition to modernity. Although anthropologists have written about language, ritual, symbols, and ideology in the light of cultural control, the term “cultural control” itself owes more to the literature on ideology dealing with, for example, science, sexuality, religion, business, politics, and professional domains. Control by means of culture is often implicit and not dramatic and is related to the creation of social categories and expectations and to ideological construction. Sutton et al. (1956) wrote about this, and so did Geertz (1973:193–233).

Ideologies may be said to exist in all societies, although some argue that they appeared only with the French Revolution [Augé 1982:5]. The same French scholars consider civilizational societies of the Western sort to be at the high end of the ideological spectrum and classless societies at “the innocent end” (p. 6). In this usage ideology is characteristic of class difference.18

17. Ellen Hertz (personal communication) suggests that “truth” no longer has the inflammatory/empowering effects that it used to (contrast Watergate with Iran-gate). Something has happened that further disconnects the academy [where much research on power takes place] from society [where many are increasingly apathetic]. A good example is in the area of feminism: power is central to feminist research, but outside the academy feminism is virtually dead.

18. Robert H. Wiebe’s work on the search for order from the 1880s to the 1920s explains the rising importance of power values as justifying control over other people’s behavior. See also Wiebe’s The Segmented Society: An Introduction to the Meaning of America (1975).

19. According to Comaroff and Comaroff (1992), hegemony should be distinguished from culture and ideology in contrast to Gramsci’s view of it as “ideology in its highest sense.”
But systems of ideas, beliefs, and values expressed in literature, professional training, advertising, ritual, and various media and found in various classes are also hegemonic, though naturalized and assumed. Systems of this sort, which spring from central sources, are extremely powerful tools of influence. The study of hegemony portrays the exercise of ideology through class penetration rather than through class domination. If culture refers to shared symbolic meaning from which hegemonic forms are cast, ideologies may be seen as more localized and tightly integrated worldviews, and the two concepts are interdependent. Raymond Williams’s (1977) definition of hegemony (in contrast to Gramsci’s view of it as a totalized state) is something like “controlling processes” (Kurtz 1996).

Hegemonic control in the form of mind colonization takes on great importance in the 1990s in relation to an understanding of what Christopher Lasch calls “the social transformation implicit in technological change, the transformation of American culture by advertising, the mutual dependence of industry and education” (quoted in Noble 1977:xiii)—in sum, the controlling ideologies of an industrialized state which in only a few decades became hegemonic.

Anthropological research on domination and resistance has shown the power of cultural control. Cultural control when it is hegemonic is impersonal, embedded, and often invisible, and even those who in fact exercise it may not understand its extent, thinking of it as only marketing. Yet, certainly since Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), those who study video games, sexual preoccupations, standardized testing, television programming, and advertising have been aware of the presence of such forces, which channel our time, our behavior, our values, and our notions of what is to be old, beautiful, sexy, or clever. These forces are often nonideological or anti-ideological, although they are defended in terms of ideological constructs such as free-market competition, free and open science, meritocracy, or self-realization.

Most critical scholars today back away from ideological definitions of their basic operating concepts. Legal scholars noted early that changing the questions asked in criminology altered paradigmatic categories from social control to cultural control (Chambliss 1982). The traditional question of criminologists—why is it that some people commit crimes while others do not—was no longer pertinent in the face of civil rights demonstrations, antiwar protests, the middle-class use of marijuana and cocaine, and blatant criminality and tax or regulatory evasion by giant corporations and political leaders. The question instead became why law defines some acts as criminal and not others. And attention then focused on how law as ideology works as a vehicle for consolidating or maintaining power relations and, by means of hegemony, achieving widespread consent.

Anthropologists often discuss control in terms of conformity. Bronislaw Malinowski (1932 [1926]) in his work on the Trobriand Islanders developed the notion of reciprocity as the guiding principle in maintaining conforming behavior. Edmund Leach (1977) discussed conformity in relation to domination; earlier, Dorothy Lee (1959) contrasted cultures that celebrate freedom without using the word with U.S. culture, which has the word but is characterized by much conformist behavior. Elizabeth Colson (1974), questioning the transition between internal and external controls, argued that centralized authorities are both limiting and liberating. I am more particularly concerned with the control that emanates from diffused power entering the minds of participants across temporal and spatial boundaries. This is not a new phenomenon; religious conversions, the divine right of kings in Europe, the mandate of heaven in China are all part of world history. What is new is multiplicity and delivery systems, for example, to young children by marketing, virtual reality, and television, and the time lag of awareness that may result. Controlling processes travel as people and institutions travel, and each person, each group, each object, each institution contributes to diffusion and transculturation (Wolf 1982).

In modern ideologies, science, technology, and the idea of progress are prominent symbols in relation to control. Anthropologists sometimes use labels such as “traditional” and “modern” to challenge the notion of progress as the rationale for European global expansion. Yet the idea of progress is still used as justification, for example, for conquest, education, genocide, slave labor, proselytizing, exploitation of natural resources, and gambling on American Indian reservations and in promulgating legal policies, beauty standards, and hierarchy in science. The European notion of progress was implanted in the Third World (and in the Fourth World, often by Third Worlds) as a goal amounting to modernization. As Norbert Elias (1978) reminds us, “the civilizing process” does not discriminate.

In the United States democratic process is necessarily in conflict with the way in which economic and symbolic power works. When the use of social control becomes less culturally acceptable, especially for the middle class, the use of cultural control becomes more central to the whole mechanics of power, and with it.
the cognitive dissonance associated with living in a world that does not work in the idealized way.

CULTURE DEBATES

Understanding debates about culture includes viewing culture as a historically based idea, some say a romantic Germanic idea—essentially hegemonic social criticism directed against the disintegrating effects of industrialization [Boorisky 1994:243–305]. Idealized 19th-century culture assumes a consensual basis at a period when cultural nationalism was rooted in ethnic and folk traditions during the rise of nation-states in Europe. Along with industrialization these traditions helped shape the culture concepts used today [Keesing 1976:307]. However, contemporary uses of culture by powerful political entities (Farmer n.d.) are not easily explained as romanticism or social criticism. Power holders may manipulate culture to control others much as cult leaders do their followers. A prime example of the use of cultural arguments by the fundamentalists of the political right works to articulate a politics of exclusion [Stolcke 1995] based on an alleged propensity in human nature to reject strangers.

Anthropological concepts are, of course, influenced by their times. In the period before the awakening of anthropologists to analyses of cultural hegemonies, anthropologists were commonly preoccupied with purity. As Mintz [1970:14] reminded us, “old Coca-Cola signs, a cuisine littered with canned corned beef and imported Spanish olives . . . all observed within the reach of radio and television. . . . these are not the things anthropological dreams are made of.” As a form of advocacy, anthropologists were also preoccupied with studying culture and society as “standardized behavior,” not random and unorganized “savagery” [Siegfried Nadel, quoted in Moore 1994:365]. Dell Hymes [1972] reminded us that there was strong resistance to publishing studies of acculturation in the official journal in the 1930s on the ground that they were “not anthropology”; some anthropologists even stopped studying Indians in the 1930s because they had become “just like any other minority group” and, therefore, presumably had lost their culture. Similar observations about what anthropologists did and did not study in Africa were made by Siegfried Nadel [1947] in his work on the Nuba and by Isaac Schapera [1938] in his work among the Tswana. Culture in their time was “common identity,” which unfortunately often excluded the culture and influence of colonizers. Even by 1974, the call to “study up” was thought to be “a kind of muckraking anthropology” [Kaplan 1974]. The study of the cultures of power, as in Richard N. Adams’s study of Guatemala [1970], was not mainstream.

Not surprisingly, as the search for an anthropology concerned with the widest issues of modern life accelerated, the magnifying glass landed on the culture concept. In Reinventing Anthropology [1972] Hymes reminded us that by separating the notion of culture from the notion of shared heritage Sapir had made room for the study of, for example, “traveling ideologies.” Culture was more than shared heritage. Leading anthropologists began to situate local peoples in larger currents of world history, recognizing that culture cannot be theorized in isolation from the social conditions in which it arises. The work in this vein of Nash [1979], Gaventa [1980], Willis [1975], Wolf [1982], and Mintz [1985] is significant, as is that of their critics and admirers [Asad 1973, 1987; Taussig 1989–90; Roseberry 1989].

The notion of hegemony as flexibly expressed by Antonio Gramsci [1971] implies that some systems of thought develop over time and reflect the interests of certain classes or groups in the society who manage to universalize their beliefs and values. Dogmas reinforce controls as they are produced and reproduced by intellectual elites—academics, writers, representatives of the mass media, and so on. Without getting into the difficulties of interpreting Gramsci, along with the idea of discourse the notion of hegemony is a useful tool for working one’s way through culture debates. A key factor in constructing dogmas is the restriction of discourse on alternative conceptions of reality, accomplished through what Foucault [1980] terms the construction of “true discourses.” Since there are many ways of conceptualizing reality, what becomes accepted as truth depends on the intimate association of power and knowledge. Like Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Foucault’s notion of true discourses emphasizes the manner in which individuals internalize power and control. What we see depends on what we know. What we know depends in part on how knowledge or knowing is produced and by whom and when and how it is filtered by experience. Ethnography gains in significance when placed in larger global and historic frameworks, in complex macroprocesses, because combining understanding at the level of experience with the abstractions of impersonal processes is bound to reveal hitherto invisible processes and contingencies. The contemporary appeal of Foucault has, however, drawn us away from Mintz’s concern with normative exercises of power.

In the United States, culture may appear natural and inevitable because it is deliberately made to appear so by the manipulation of cultural images that articulate what people should be, should think, should buy (not that they always do). A strong belief in free will often impedes understanding of how lives are changed by cultural practices that are external to the individual and intended to modify individual behavior, for example, through political propaganda or economic marketing. Anthropologists witness and experience the construction of culture for financial gain. We are a marketing society. Yet for the most part our professional stance has been somewhat analogous to that of the anthropologists of the colonial period, who were criticized for writing about “pure native” culture before it disappeared while all around them native cultures were changing. When we close our eyes and minds to the possibilities
of ethnographic research in taking a vertical slice of contemporary colonizers and colonized, we still practice anthropology in much the same way. In spite of recent gains we still ignore the ramifications of the commercial world and the multinationals—as if they were not changing every one of us, whether consciously resistant or not. More and more, modern technologies, population movements, and changing social organizations make us captives of our cultures (Henry 1963).

On Home Ground

"Crappy corporate culture," the cabby said as we passed Union Square's Nike and Disneyland sites. "Where'd you get your education?" I returned. "Same place you did, lady. Look around—it's everywhere." "Hrm," I thought, "The French call it American culture." When we work in our own society as "native anthropologists," the implicit view of cultures as systems of shared values or meanings limits our ability to see the historical shape of the cultural or to recognize the deliberate invention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Although we consciously construct concepts to challenge ideological hegemony, the continuing shortage of ethnographic analyses of cultural hegemonies at home signals the persistence of this naive view.

The dilemmas of the anthropologist working at home are recognized by the biographer of the 19th-century Smithsonian ethnographer James Mooney (Moses 1984). In attempting to explain to white American intellectuals, missionaries, and government agents and the reading public why Native Americans practiced the Ghost Dance and why there was a Sioux outbreak of violence in 1890 (Mooney 1896), Mooney violated two unwritten rules that still restrict possibilities for native anthropologists in the United States. First, he offered an explanation that went to root causes, attributing the outbreak of violence to the conditions of the white society. By not limiting the social field to the implicit view of cultures as systems of shared values or meanings limits our ability to see the historical shape of the cultural or to recognize the deliberate invention of tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Although we consciously construct concepts to challenge ideological hegemony, the continuing shortage of ethnographic analyses of cultural hegemonies at home signals the persistence of this naive view.

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21. For example, William M. O'Barr (1994) has pioneered in this direction. In Culture and the Ad: Exploring Otherness in the World of Advertising he presents a model for understanding advertisements that is meant to be useful to those who oppose professional advertising. See also O'Barr and Conley (1992). For an excellent use of vertical-slice analysis, see Tauxe (1993).

22. Moffatt (1992) notes that "anthropologists have done more research in the United States in the last dozen years than in the entire history of the discipline" (p. 205). However, the number of professional anthropologists studying up in the United States using a vertical-slice perspective is still minuscule in Moffatt's bibliography. In some ways the possibilities for studying American cultural hegemonies looked more promising in 1983, when Spindler and Spindler spoke about studying up as a moral imperative. The Spindlers mentioned as an example Messer's (1981) edited volume Anthropologists at Home in North America. See M. Nazi Shahran (1994) for a discussion of the predicaments of a native Afghan who is both honored and marginalized as an anthropologist, a Muslim, and an Afghan in two antagonistic cultural traditions.

Sioux "culture," he made a connection. Second, he compared Native American and European religious revitalization as if they were equivalent, thereby questioning the positional superiority of white culture. His work offended the sensibilities of the powerful, including anthropologists, and eventually he was denied access by government officials to Indian reservations.

The story of James Mooney foreshadowed activity during two world wars and the cold war, when hysterias about red, pink, and socialist politics became commonplace and encouraged self-censorship. The general avoidance of issues of power generated a failure of ethnography. This failure in itself gives special value to contemporary works that make connections between experience and macroprocesses. The point here is that while culture theory critics usually deal with our description of the so-called Other, similar arguments apply to native anthropologists working on home ground.

Henry (1963), Lee (1959), and Hymes (1972) must have discovered when they read reviews of their works that there was widespread discomfort among anthropologists about describing our culture "as it is," especially when tacit assumptions regarding state or corporate power were examined. This discomfort can be addressed only through awareness of controlling processes inside and outside of academia (Furner 1975, Nader 1997) aimed at producing conformity and selective blindness. Selective blindness—depending on our conceptual categories rather than on ethnographic realities—kept us, for example, from predicting the revolution in highland Peru (Starn 1994).

A Concluding Comment

Malinowski 1932 (1926) recognized that controls operate most effectively through symbols that society places beyond the jurisdiction of its formal and social control system. Mintz illustrated how ideas linked to the disparities of power grow and are nurtured through interlocking institutions. Cultural control is often the result of incremental, not abrupt, change, and when it is achieved incrementally it is powerful indeed because it slides in rather unnoticed and comes to be considered natural. The controlling processes I have described here have gradually come to seem natural: in the first exam-

24. The historian Hugh Macmillan (1995) reminds us that over 50 years ago Max Gluckman made the same kind of connection in his definition of the social field in the southern part of Africa. He sought to explain the paradox of "cleavage, opposition and relative stability" by drawing upon a number of sources: "the Marxist theory of contradiction, the Freudian notion of ambivalence, Gregory Bateson's idea of 'schismogenesis,' the work of Edward Evans-Pritchard on 'situational selection,' and of Meyer Fortes on 'fission and fusion.'"

25. Hugh Gusterson (1993) eloquently addresses this question in his discussion of ethnographic writing on militarism or any contested terrain that strains the conventional pursuit of objectivity while also exempting elites from scrutiny and facilitating control of oppositional groups.
people, "harmony" became desirable as the natural order of things; the existence of "choice" was assumed in the second and strengthened by the belief in individualism; and in the last "science" was envisioned as separated from society.

Two of the many events described in the examples were counterhegemonic. The Zapotec adopted coercive harmony in their construction of barriers against colonial domination and for autonomy. Museum curators adopted a new museology as a tool of empowerment. Individuals may move in and out of various controlling processes, be caught by them, and remake them as did the women who had breast implants. The same controls may be effective across class lines, as in the events leading to the spread of harmony ideologies from the ghettos to the workplace to environmental activism. Implicit persuasion is easier to manage than overt coercion.

A catholic view of culture, one that recognizes that the world is always only partly integrated or coherent or in effect only partly shared, changes the questions we ask and the perceptions we mold. If there is general value to be derived from this line of research, it is not only in the documentation of how controlling processes work to change behavior without force and violence or the unmasking of power but also in the recognition of how quickly they can do so. Considering counterhegemonies implies possibilities for general cultural deprogrammings, including a questioning of basic assumptions that may be impediments to anthropologists working on home ground. The relationship between colonizers and colonized studied by anthropologists in some ways parallels the interaction between industrialists and their target populations [Mintz 1996]. Power is implicated in both settings, and so is resistance. The colonizing of minds and bodies does not differentiate between subjects, and yet—why is still unexplained—we know even less of industrial subjects than we do of colonized ones.

Comments

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Nader's analysis of controlling processes is the product of profound reflection over four decades in various social and cultural contexts. Therefore the theoretical-methodological proposal that she offers here manages to articulate theoretical concepts with suggestive insights on the processes of control operating in various aspects of everyday life. In a concise exposition she weaves together ideology, hegemony, social control, and cultural control in order to reveal the visible and hidden facets of power encrusted and reproduced in social institu-

tions and in "common sense" constructed as a cultural system [Geertz 1994].

Nader shows the dynamic nature of central ideas such as harmony, civilization, choice, beauty, and science from the analytical focus of control as a strategy for constructing power. She uses three ethnographic examples drawn from the North American sociocultural universe to demonstrate how and why power is constructed and used, how central dogmas are configured, and how individuals and groups are influenced and subtly persuaded to accept them as natural and value them positively.

The distinction between social and cultural control proves central to the analysis of controlling processes, the former establishing control over groups or relations and the latter seeking control over ideas. Nader locates the beginnings of this process of differentiation in the emergence of industrial capitalism, whose need for peaceful labor and social relations led to the elevation of order and harmony to the status of positive universal values and replaced open coercion with control by persuasion. Control has increasingly shifted from social or coercive to cultural or persuasive, since the latter has proved culturally more acceptable in the modern world and also more effective. Violence is considered "uncivilized" except when it is exercised in the name of civilization.

What Nader does not expressly say is that the idea of harmony that in the United States has been understood as virtue and civilization—as opposed to conflict or violence, understood as vice and barbarism—or as the natural order of things and a sign of progress is part of an ideological paradigm of cultural superiority. Just like the universalized stereotype of beauty, which leads to a broad spectrum of values and attitudes ranging from "voluntary" mutilation to racism, the "convictions" of a hegemonic paradigm, once reified, internalized, positively valued, and socially reproduced, allow the classification of the social behaviors and phenOtypes of other cultures or subcultures according to criteria ethnocentrically defined from a supposed maximum level of "civilization."

Since there are many ways of conceptualizing reality, Nader argues, what is accepted as truth depends on the intimate association between power and knowledge. Therefore, it might be added, the hegemonic paradigm is capable not only of cataloging but, through the processes of cultural control, of expanding beyond national boundaries, being introduced to the different social groups in question, and persuading them of its veracity and superiority—re-creating in other cultures standardized values and tastes arising in the dominant societies. It could be argued that this is a consequence of globalization, understood as the intensification and extension of social relations to a world scale, which generates shared meanings and values [Giddens 1991:69]. However, we cannot avoid noticing that the general acceptance of this model of reality, which creates in the consumers of hegemonic culture the false impression of consent or choice, contributes to stigmatization, self-
deprecation, and the maintenance of hegemonic power and the status quo in social groups in opposition. Based on the idea of civilization and progress, persuasive cultural control—at times subliminal—is also coercive. It generates colonized and selectively blind mentalities at the same time that it justifies as civilizing the processes of social control (conquest, genocide, proselytization, exploitation of resources) in "less civilized and progressive" regions.

Finally, an aspect of Nader’s work that interests me because it is evidence of acute self-knowledge is the question why social scientists, especially in hegemonic "sive" regions. It generates colonized and selectively blind mentalities at the same time that it justifies as civilizing the processes of social control (conquest, genocide, proselytization, exploitation of resources) in "less civilized and progressive" regions.

Nader’s essay is one of the rare contemporary instances of a theoretical formulation grounded in the anthropological tradition, this would in itself be sufficient reason to congratulate ourselves on its appearance in an era in which our discipline seems too ready to forget its historical trajectory. At the same time it is a work that explores and analyzes the presence of cultural mechanisms that have often gone unnoticed by social analysts. We have here, then, an essay proposing a theoretical formulation that is intended to be a useful analytical tool, and I propose to comment on it on both these levels. I would first point out, however, in keeping with certain recent (and not so recent) concerns of the academic community, that the anthropologist is not just an author but also an interested reader; therefore my reading of the essay is not the only one possible, and in it will be apparent my interest in linking it to the analysis of the ethnic question in Latin America, a theme to which I have devoted my professional career.

The study of the processes of cultural control and their dramatic linkage to power is a venerable concern in anthropology, expressed in the early preoccupation of Malinowski with symbols situated outside formal systems of control. The coercive capacity of these symbols lies not in their institutional character but in their deep internalization by members of a society. They form part of what Berger and Luckmann (1968) have called "the constituted real"—part of the structure of plausibility of a norm, a culturally constructed order of meaning but presenting itself as self-evident and consistent with the normative order the particular society that generates it. In this sense it would not be inappropriate to recall Durkheim’s concept of “mechanical solidarity,” conceived as a shared state of consciousness. The idea of this kind of solidarity might help us to understand the mechanisms of symbolic power—the capacity of cultural symbols to become embodied in the structures of societies and to orient their collective behaviors. Within this perspective the ethnographic examples offered here, especially that of aesthetic medicine and the notion of physical beauty, are clear.

Even the essay under discussion may not, however, be free of the mechanisms inherent in the controlling processes it analyzes and the "coercive harmony" that they generate. Nader is a distinguished representative of U.S. anthropology, an academic tradition with a certain tendency to feed on itself and consciously or unconsciously to exclude the traditions of other countries, especially those that have been considered more as objects than as subjects of professional practice. Thus the coherence and historical legitimacy of this anthropology are based on an appeal to its own trajectory and exponents. In this sense it is configured as a discourse of academic power whose community of protagonists is also involved in coercion aimed at a certain collective harmony based on participation in a unitary discourse. I base these observations on the absence in this essay of references to works by Latin American authors that might have contributed to the variety and richness of its analysis such as the theory of cultural control proposed by the Mexican Guillermo Bonfil Batalla (1986), the formulations on cultural production and consumption advanced by the Argentine Néstor García Canclini (1990), and the notes of such Brazilian colleagues as Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (1976) on interethnic ideological configurations, Renato Ortiz (1980) on popular cultures, and Gilberto Velho (1987) on complex societies. All these works contain important reflections on hegemonic ideological configurations and the cultural control mechanisms that they entail. It is worth mentioning that despite the citation of Gramsci there is no reference to such neo-Gramscian Italian anthropologists as L. M. Lombardi Satriani (1973, 1974), whose work can be considered a classic study of the processes of articulation between dominant and subaltern cultures that further illuminates the power relations involved in controlling processes.

Finally, it may be pointed out that Nader’s conceptual construction is valid for the analysis of contemporary ethnic processes. One of the characteristics of present-day neocolonial contexts in Latin America arises from the configuration of “coercive harmonies” whose expressions assume the legitimacy of situations of political and cultural domination and subordination. The internalization of this constituted reality by many indigenous peoples has led them to the cultural suicide that we call ethnocide. The processes of control developed by the multiethnic Latin America states, on the assumption that they are unification formations, have sought to instrumentalize political power in order to repress cultural diversity. With the emergence of de-
mands on the part of indigenous peoples, this situation is changing. Thus it is apparent that the consensus generated by the manipulation of power is susceptible to transformation based on ideological redefinition and the consequent political practice.

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Nader has done a superb job of showing how ethnographic research can reveal some of the ways in which unchallenged hegemonic cultural forms support the wealth and power of economic elites. She addresses the important and challenging question of why people so frequently seem to endorse and participate in cultural patterns that from a different perspective might be counter to their own long-term interest. Surely there are controlling processes at work that convince us that the cultural transformations we experience are inevitable and involve impersonal forces beyond our control. Or is the system really working for everyone's benefit and in a way that is likely to continue forever?

Nader's example of the rising importance of dispute resolution through mediation aimed at harmony and consensus rather than conflict and justice is a critical reminder of how subtle and persuasive controlling processes can be in a global commercial culture, even as they favor the interests of those in power. I accept her argument that similar harmony approaches were undoubtedly fostered by missionaries and civil authorities who sought to control indigenous groups on the colonial frontiers. Certainly, as she points out with her Zapotec example, contemporary indigenous groups can use harmony and consensus to fend off state power. However, I suspect that harmony and consensus were already intrinsic features of daily life in autonomous small-scale cultures where they served internal ends.

While Nader's perspective has major implications for our understanding of power in global-scale cultures, it also applies to our general understanding of autonomous small-scale cultures and ancient civilizations. For example, as Nader points out, anthropologists may have overemphasized the idea that tribal cultures were harmonious systems of belief and practice to which everyone happily consented. Certainly in any culture "power holders may manipulate culture to control others." However, there was necessarily much less total social power in small-scale cultures and power was more widely distributed than in either ancient political economies or global-scale commercial cultures. Hegemonic power of the Gramsci type could not exist in the absence of economic elites or an upper class. Furthermore, where tribal societies were organized as direct democracies, consensus was less likely to be coercive because all concerned individuals or groups could mediate on relatively equal terms. This could work as long as everyone knew who was most powerful and as long as support or consent could be freely given or withheld.

Even though hegemonic power in the global culture is by definition seldom resisted because consent is unconsciously internalized in the minds of those who are being controlled, there are real human agents directing this power and benefiting from its application. A crucial feature of hegemonic power in global-scale commercial cultures is that human agency is virtually invisible. There are powerful economic elites who ultimately direct the global culture's controlling processes, but they are largely anonymous and their power is difficult to avoid. With a few notable exceptions, the world's largest individual stockholders, the most powerful CEOs, the most influential corporate directors are not household names. Few people could even name the five largest multinational corporations.

I agree completely with Nader that anthropologists need to study the world of commercial business. It is the source of the most transforming power in the form of finance capital. We also need to look behind the often invisible controlling processes and identify the principal corporate owners and directors who are the primary beneficiaries of power. Like Mooney, we need to go to "root causes" and risk offending those who occupy the positions of greatest commercial power. Perhaps the central hegemonic myth of the global culture is our belief in "the economy" imagined as an impersonal, irresistible force and the parallel belief that a perpetually growing economy, as measured by gross domestic product, will benefit everyone. In this regard it is not surprising that the economist Lester C. Thurow (1996) recently used the geological principles of plate tectonics to explain how economic forces shape the world. What could be less subject to human control? Are we therefore to think that sweeping cultural transformations in today's world such as shifting investment to the lowest-paid workers are like volcanoes and earthquakes? However, I conducted a careful sort of Securities and Exchange Commission filings and found that in 1994, instead of plate tectonics, just ten individuals helped direct 37 American companies whose combined assets of $2 trillion represented nearly 10 percent of all corporate assets in U.S. for profit businesses. As long as everyone believes that the economy is beyond human control and can grow forever, the elite will be able to resist more equitable redistributive change.

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When anthropologists studying their own societies still believed that power had a specific center, notions such as ideology, cultural production, alienation, and false consciousness retained precise meanings, and the anthropologist's task was clear. We gave priority to the study of underprivileged groups, and at the heart of our minute descriptions of these groups' practices was an effort to lay bare forms of alienation. As leftist political parties and other more or less organized forms of mak-
ing revolutions lost their credibility, we also came to realize that power was not a group of institutions that enforced the subservience of citizens but rather a force permeating all realms of social life with no real center and no one to invent power tactics. Our ethnographies began to be oriented by a series of new notions seeking to revise the concept of alienation. Though we continued to focus on underprivileged groups, at the heart of our minute descriptions of the same manifestations as before was the attempt to show that these manifestations were permeated by forms that challenged domination. Drawing inspiration from Gramsci, we focused on the resistance strategies that organized social practices among the popular sectors. Thus we produced a new kind of romantic view of popular culture in which power, counterhegemony, and resistance are central analytical categories. However, insofar as these categories are used pervasively to approach all domains of social life in the same way, they run the risk of becoming empty concepts.

Nader’s text is welcome in that it proposes a method for approaching the study of power. Her distinction between social control and cultural control is already broadly accepted when it comes to discussing hegemony. Nevertheless, the way she works with controlling processes and especially her ethnographic examples lead us to the analysis of the specific forms that power takes on and point out the traps it sets for practices intent upon contesting it.

In discussing different types of controlling processes, Nader revives Mintz’s legacy and reintroduces the perspective gained from “studying up,” showing the suitability of anthropology for the study of a society in which freedom of choice constitutes a supreme value and, at the same time, harmony rather than justice is desirable—in short, a society that has an aversion to empty concepts. Nevertheless, the way she works with controlling processes and especially her ethnographic examples lead us to the analysis of the specific forms that power takes on and point out the traps it sets for practices intent upon contesting it.

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These agents, under the guise of scientific neutrality or politicize the discussion in domains that because they strength of these predatory groups, is it possible that the shapes re seen as the victims of a "body beautiful" are not configured politically offer certain agents the opportunity to exercise a sort of metapolitical mandate. Without denying the industry might serve other kinds of empowerment? In this set of examples. The political clout of popular community activists, pressure exerted by a multinational corporation, and the opinion of some scientists seem only to be sociologically analogous in that they all can cause problems for the museum curator—which tells us more about the vulnerability of curators than about the power exercised by their critics.

What is most attractive about Nader's analysis is that she is dealing with serious political issues in the world we inhabit and encouraging anthropologists to make relevant statements about those issues. I am not convinced that a wide-ranging definition of "power" is helpful. The presentation of more data in any one of the categories she has chosen to exemplify her argument and a detailed demonstration of how the processes of "incremental control" work in specific cases would make the analysis more persuasive and useful. But whatever flaws there may be in her argument, Nader is to be congratulated for confronting a major theoretical problem and reminding us that what is happening in our own political system should also be grist to our mill.

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In 1972 Nader made a celebrated appeal to anthropologists to analyze the workings of power in their own society by "studying up." In the present article, situating her approach to an anthropology of power within a broader genealogy of anthropology, she expands the force of her original appeal by showing its continuing relevance and by elaborating on its theoretical underpinnings. Briefly, those theoretical underpinnings consist of a broadly Gramscian form of marxist analysis inflected by Foucault's writings on power. Nader borrows from Marx a technique of analysis that emphasizes the illusory nature of certain choices [here, the choice to have breast augmentation or settle for dispute resolution] in Marx, the choice to sell one's labor] when these choices, though presented as free, are constrained and coerced. From the Gramscian tradition she borrows a focus on hegemony—decentered and uneven processes of ideological domination that naturalize the workings of power. Nader blends this marxist perspective with a Foucauldian impulse to critique the authority of experts, to challenge liberal narratives of progress, and to
emphasize the multiple sites through which power circulates and from which it originates.

In this comment, writing as an anthropologist of science, I will discuss Nader’s treatment of breast augmentation and the Smithsonian exhibit—her second and third case studies. I believe it is no coincidence that two of the three case studies in this article concern scientists, while Nader’s 1972 article on studying up made little reference to science as a site of power. As the “culture wars” give way to the “science wars” (Ross 1996), the world-transforming power of capitalism increasingly depends on the leveraging of science and technology, the power of technoscience misused to harm the environment irrevocably or end human life is clear, new medical and computing technologies are integrated into the routine daily practices of the self, and news stories that begin “Scientists say . . .” are part of the white noise of public discourse. In other words, science is an integral part of our society’s hegemonic project. Its technological innovations mediate our social subordination, its frontiers shape our desires and fantasies, and its practitioners have inherited the old power of the church to decode our sufferings and to tell us autoritatively what is and shall be.

As the ideology that claims not to be one, science as a social project derives part of its power from its ability to claim objectivity and impartiality. Nader counters these claims by showing the ways in which science is a cultural project allied to particular interests and ideologies in society, but she does this in a Gramscian rather than postmodernist vein—that is, without getting mired in the constructivist debates about scientific knowledge that have recently produced such a backlash (Gross and Levitt 1994, Sokal 1996). In her discussion of breast augmentation she shows how expert medical discourses work in alliance with “the beauty-industrial complex” and patriarchal fantasies of the womanly body to reshape the subjectivity of women and to redefine health and normality in ways that may have irreparably damaged the bodies of thousands of women. In her discussion of the “Science in American Life” exhibit at the Smithsonian she uses the controversy produced by this unconventional exhibit to highlight our museums’ usual construction of scientists as unproblematic authority figures whose achievements constitute the dotted lines of progress narratives. Her analysis, using anthropology’s comparative method, works throughout to reframe the familiar so that we see it anew. Breast augmentation looks different once resituated as a neighbor to female circumcision, and the rhetoric of traditional science museums seems less friendly once one recognizes its affinity with older hierarchical representations of the savage other.

Nader’s article does suggest two questions. First, what other issues might profit from a similar analysis? Controlling processes that draw on the authority of science can be found among cigarette companies, the alternative healing industry, corporate polluters, and pharmaceutical companies, to name a few. For example, in an era when U.S. pharmaceutical executives are saying that one-third of the world’s population may be taking psychiatric medication within two decades (Harper’s Index 1997), current attempts to redefine previously normal moods and behaviors as disorders cry out for anthropological analysis.

Second, although Nader tells us that “sometimes people achieve power, rather than being made increasingly powerless,” she does not systematically theorize how this happens. In the final analysis, in addition to understanding how controlling processes work, we need to know how to subvert and unravel them.

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“It is in the United States,” observes French anthropologist Denys Cuche, “that the concept of culture was to receive its warmest welcome, and in North American anthropology its most remarkable theoretical development. In this particular scientific context, research on the question of culture and cultures has developed in a genuinely cumulative and uninterrupted fashion” (1996:39). In commenting on Nader’s study of “controlling processes,” it is helpful to begin by situating her within this particular scientific context; indeed, were it her style, Nader could make a strong claim for membership in cultural anthropology’s most aristocratic lineage, descending as she does in a direct line from Boas through Benedict, Sapir, and Mead to Kluckhohn. Reading Nader’s place in the American anthropological tradition is instructive both for the light it sheds on the history of the discipline and for the hints it provides as to the discipline’s links with the competing multi-discipline of cultural studies.

From its beginnings, the study of culture in American anthropology has had a critical edge, although, as Marcus and Fischer (1986) demonstrate, the form and force of this criticism have varied enormously. Boas self-consciously opposed the term “culture” to the misplaced concept of “race” found in contemporary explanations of difference. Mead focused on the concept of culture to illustrate the formative effects of group values on individual personality but always with an eye to the role of cultural dissent within American society. Geertz engages in a kind of cultural criticism when he uses cultural others to hint at alternative ways of conceiving reality (1973:145). However, it is when the notion of culture is examined culturally—when anthropologists begin to look for what is hidden by the concept of culture as well as what it illuminates (Hymes 1969)—that the critical promise of cultural anthropology comes of age. Nader’s analysis of “cultural control” should be seen as part and parcel of this progressive refinement of critical anthropology’s analytic toolkit.

However, this development is not a mere outgrowth of “the discipline.” In contemporary American academia, Nader’s critical cultural anthropology intersects and overlaps with that less venerable (but eminently
venerablizable) “body” of thought called cultural studies. Cultural studies share Nader’s emphasis on the ideological functions of culture and, more important, her insistence that these functions be viewed dynamically: hegemony can be harnessed to counterhegemonic ends just as counterhegemonic currents can be shunted back into the hegemonic mainstream. Cultural studies in their more recent guise also share Nader’s interest in what Sapir labeled “traveling ideologies,” systems of thought and values that cross and challenge national boundaries in the form of material objects, technologies, institutions, and cultural productions. An important question, then (one that I can only ask, not answer here), is what motivates and sustains this confluence of interests and emphases. I am certainly not the first to notice that the sudden concentration on “culture” in the academy has itself many of the markings of a controlling process. We should ask what each stream of thought tells us about the other and what both are “doing” on and/or to the American academic scene.

In this interrogation, we will find, I think, that Nader’s grounded analyses frequently send us in more fruitful directions than the various approaches found in cultural studies. The examples of controlling processes which Nader examines in her article alert us to certain defining moments in the process of cultural control: (1) sudden and undisputed changes in discourse paradigms, (2) the recombination of allies and enemies along new battle lines, with consequently strange bedfellows, and, perhaps most characteristic, (3) the stigmatization and radical exclusion of one position in what should rightly be considered a debate. While each of these elements can be detected in the odor of blitzkrieg that surrounds the arrival of cultural studies in the United States. I will discuss only the last of them here, for it is the most paradoxical.

At first sight, nothing could be more foreign to cultural studies as a movement than the radical exclusion of anything whatsoever. But that is precisely the point. Within the cultural studies movement, “multiple perspectives” is a principle, a starting point, not an observation or a conclusion. And the one “perspective” it must exclude is that according to which we can determine once and for all what a given cultural phenomenon is really all about. [By way of contrast, in her analysis of “harmony ideology” Nader presumes that it is possible to distinguish harmony “genuine and spurious.”] But—and this is paradox number two—the radical stigmatization of “univocality” in cultural studies, far from encouraging a variety of “voices,” appears in fact to stifle debate, for if one is not amidst the circles of the initiated it is frequently impossible to know what to debate against. For reasons that were originally commendable [a principled concern about cultural domination], practitioners of cultural studies uphold a series of rules governing how, in Nader’s terms, “the thoughtful” are allowed to speak for “the destitute.” Nader does not imagine that she is speaking for others, dominant or dominated, rather, she sees herself as drawing conclusions from observations and critical reflection. Conclusions ventured are conclusions with which others remain free to disagree. Thus—paradox number three—Nader’s empiricism more adequately allows for the possibility that “the destitute” and “the thoughtful” might, on some occasions, actually be the same people and that they can speak for themselves.

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Writing in the 1980s, the literary critic Terry Eagleton insisted that we are “in the process of waking from the nightmare of modernity, with its manipulative reason and fetish of the totality.” In making this claim he joined forces with those who argued that grandiose meta-narratives had to be jettisoned together with beliefs in progress and absolute truths. In their place would be the “laid-back pluralism of the postmodern” and a denunciation of the “nostalgic urge” (1987). A decade later, Nader’s thoughtful paper, designed to provide a methodology for the study of power, shows us clearly that, far from being laid-back, our era is one in which the forces of the modern persist unabated, the urge for control, whether it be for economic or symbolic gain, is clearly evident across the domains of law, science, and body politics. Nader seeks to expose certain of the controlling processes present in the United States today—less visible than formerly, no doubt, but nevertheless powerfully present to the discerning eye as naturalized forces continually at work. Explicitly following Mintz’s lead, Nader argues for an anthropology of everyday life, one that reveals potential sites of dispute in which competing values are mobilized as power ploys. More striking, however, is the damping down of possible dissonance through the hegemonic power of scientific and legal institutions and discourse and an associated ethics of practice dominated, in the case of body politics, by an ethos of rational choice and, in law, by a form of dispute resolution that Nader characterizes as coercive harmony.

Paradoxically, anthropology in its study of the Other has a history of parochialism. Extensive research from the 1960s on in connection with Japan, often characterized as the first country beyond the Euro/American axis to “modemize,” showed indisputably that convergence theories of modernization were inappropriate (Austin 1976). Nevertheless, this research, soon vastly augmented by accounts from other arenas in the “developing” world, did little to decenter a belief in the “West” as dispensing modernity to the non-Western world. The Comaroffs (1993) have noted that one virtue of a recent preoccupation with “postmodernity” has been that it has forced us to recognize the ideological and profoundly historical aspects of modernity. Increasingly there is a recognition of the many modernities, all active participants in the global economy; the dichotomous opposition of tradition/modernity with its associated nostalgia is now firmly pried open. It is in this
climate that Nader, among a growing number of anthropologists, has turned to the cultural hegemonies at work in the United States and other "developed" sites. The West is finally exoticized, just a little.

One of the pervasive myths of our times is, of course, that science is epistemologically free—that its truth claims transcend human agency and therefore by definition issues of power are not involved in the production of scientific knowledge or in its practice. Current vituperative debates epitomized by a recent exchange in the *New York Review of Books* about the "hoax" that Alan Sokal perpetrated by having a sham scientific article reviewed and published in *Social Text* (see Weinberg 1996) reveal major fissures in our beliefs about science. It does not take a cultural analysis to demonstrate that science and its associated technologies are integral to the perpetuation of global inequalities or that, for example, pharmaceutical companies directly inflict misery on many peoples of the world through greed and deception (a combination of bad science and false advertising). But a cultural analysis, as opposed to a discourse analysis, as Nader points out, permits us to unmask "non-agentive" forms of power (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) encourage us to look at the intersections of discourses as they are acted out in daily life, to work across domains, but without assuming a coherence to culture. It is then possible to comprehend, for example, if indeed the widely touted values of health as virtue, bodily control, informed choice, and autonomous decision making, to name a few, all currently fostered in both political and biomedical discourse, are indeed hegemonic as we believe them to be. An anthropology of body politics suggests otherwise and reveals that women's responses to a whole range of biomedical technologies are motivated primarily by a pragmatism in which they seek to fulfill desired reproductive and health-related objectives (Lock and Kaufert 1997). Behavior appears to be remarkably unhindered by values embedded in medical discourse, and medical technologies are often made use of merely to facilitate culturally motivated goals. That which is naturalized, the taken-for-granted, must be exposed before the dialectics of domination and resistance come into play, but neither theories of unwitting compliance nor theories of mindful resistance to dominant ideologies provide much explanatory power. Anthropologists must insist on complexity, thus challenging the hegemony of simplification, a powerful form of incremental control at work in society today.

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The analysis of power and how it operates in society, central to the critique of anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s, was detailed with the turn to issues of individual empowerment as the involution of anthropology pro-

gressed into the 1990s. Armed with advances by Sidney Mintz in the analysis of material culture and its manipulation and by Foucault in selected aspects of discourse analysis, Nader has revitalized the issues of power. Her approach to analyzing cultural conditioning by controlling agencies adds depth and range to the cross-cultural study of power relations. In contrast to the social-control model that dominated discussions of power in earlier decades, she addresses the issue of how versions of truth become accepted in culture and how these serve particular interests. Juxtaposing three disparate types of control—the harmony model in law courts, the "free-choice" model in consumption circles, and the idealized version of science in museology—she questions processes that are usually assumed in the master narratives of structuralism yet are the very stuff of hegemonic accord. Class conflict is part of the picture, neither dominating nor yielding to the discourse of cultural control.

No anthropologist is more adept than Nader in locating the controlling process by which power is translated into behavioral norms. Her life work has been dedicated to showing how these institutionalized norms reinforce power structures as people engage in or resist their own domination. From law courts to government bureaucracies to consumer complaint departments she has explored the frustrations of plaintiffs, defendants, clients, and consumers as they wander their way in the mazes of their own culture in search of justice.

In "Controlling Processes," Nader grounds her analysis of power in three settings: law, medicine, and museology, in which vulnerable populations encounter ideas, institutions, and agencies that become institutionalized in their behavioral repertoire. In each setting the "hidden persuaders" (to use a cliche first decoded in advertising) of coercive harmony in law, of choice in medicine, and of mystification in science work indirectly to achieve ends that are not always imagined by the actors.

The most convincing model of coercion comes from Nader's long-standing interest in legal processes. Moving from Zapotec law courts, where she envisions colonial missionary programs emphasizing conciliation and compromise, to alternative dispute resolution, she shows how the 1960s critique of social injustice was defused with concerns of order and the courts, under the guidance of Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Warren Burger, moved toward control of the disenfranchised. She follows this theme of controlling processes in the Indian reservations' acceptance of nuclear waste, the quality-control plants in which workers and managers cooperate in harmony, and finally international dispute settlement. Her approach enables one to penetrate the screens that mystify power relations in the field. I have seen one aspect of harmony work at the Pittsfield General Electric Plant, where I did fieldwork in the 1980s. The growing dissatisfaction with the organization of work in missile and "defense" production and the anxiety created by massive layoffs in "peaceetime" power-transformer production were diffused by quality-control circles that sabotaged the grievance machinery
put in place by the unions, substituting a managerial agenda for the workers' definition of what a grievance was. Nader's linkage of the cultural aspects of control with the power structure is a critical methodology for analyzing the apparent compliance of workers in what President Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex."

Nader calls upon ethnographers to define more clearly who benefits from harmonizing disputes. How do culturally accepted norms modify behavior apparently structured on class premises? Our fieldwork experiences indicate the subtlety of these constraints in ways that have not easily fit into the master paradigms. I recall a work stoppage on Mother's Day in the Bolivian tin-mining community of Oruro when an irate and troubled workforce had cornered the management in a demand for improved technology to enhance production (a strange reversal of worker/managerial responsibilities in itself). The anger of the workers was mollified by a joke interposed in the heated discourse by an adroit manager. Diverting the call for upgrading production that was the thrust of the workers' grievance, he said, "Let's talk about conditions of work: we have just inaugurated a new wing to the hospital and added an obstetrician to the staff—you know, he's the man who makes a living sticking his hand up women's vaginas." When the workers laughed at this male hegemonic ploy, I knew the strike was lost.

Complexity is indeed the leitmotif of an analysis of the relationship between power and cultural control. Shifting to the apparently trivial domain of how power operates in the body-enhancement syndrome, Nader shows how feminine "choices" contrive to entrap women in a manufactured consensus of beauty. Here the question of whose power is enhanced is more salient than in the case of legal structures and the ideology of harmony. Nader tells us that the same cultural control system may offer harmony across class lines. Is it female subordination when we confront a beauty industry in which female as well as male corporate executives profit? Are upper-class women even more victimized by the lure of liposuction and face-lifts than lower-class ones simply because of their greater disposable income? Or is there a glass ceiling beyond which extremely wealthy women do not have to conform to canons of beauty put in place for the strivers? Clearly class differences in definitions of female beauty and consumers cannot easily be decoded from advertisements for medical procedures. Inherited wealth may relieve even women of the need and desire to be sexually attractive. The normative approach taken by Nader to this phenomenon falters in coming to grips with the cultural-to-structural leap she handles so spiritedly in her analysis of the harmony model in law, but it clears the path for further breakthroughs as we gain more insight into these contested arenas of culturally defined behaviors.

The link between power and culture is even more diffuse in the case of the new museology and science. Fifty years ago museums served a power structure in their idealization of science and scientists as heroes. The iconography of Teddy Roosevelt astride a horse in front of the Museum of Natural History with barefoot "natives" trailing in his wake left nothing to be guessed about the natural scientist and his subjects. So too does the statue of indigenous savages at the custom house that is now the site for the National Museum of the American Indian. Yet today, as Nader shows, the directors of museums are engaged in a self-critique and they have gained the academic backing to confront the scientific elites in their very citadel, the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History.

In detailing the move from social control to cultural control, Nader enhances our awareness of the multiple dimensions of control as consensual and consensus as control. Drawing from both Gramsci and Foucault to develop the shift from control over groups or relationships to control over mind, she shows the strengths and gaps in each. While Gramsci provides a sense of how certain classes may manage to universalize their beliefs and values, Foucault describes the many devious paths by which they become accepted as truth. The article is, indeed, a coup that enables us to count the advances of ethnographic theory and method.

Just as some structuralists neglected the strictures of cultural control, those who like to situate themselves in the never-never land of cultural abstractions have neglected the channeling conditions provided by socially constituted structures of control. Hewing to the historical materialism of Sidney Mintz, Eric Wolf, and those who set the pace for reediting anthropology in the 1970s, Nader has charted a new course that brings the anthropology of everyday life back into the center of a stage that has been bereft of people, things, and the stuff of culture.
ministration when a different political party comes to power. The continental European situation is a relevant case for comparison: a strong and tenured administration remains in place government after government, since it stands for "the state" whoever the rulers. This factor alone forces every government to pursue consensus rather than confrontation. On top of this, except during the fascist period in Germany and Italy every continental European government in this century has been a coalition of several parties. This has forced any party with government ambitions to practice consensus rhetoric and develop a harmony model, since everyone will be everyone else's coalition partner over the years. Those who do not pursue harmony in one way or another deny themselves the possibility of assuming power. One consequence is that a very solid social security and health insurance system was developed after World War II (with an average of 6% poor in Western Europe today). Even the European Union, which is still basically a freemarket union, does not question this redistributive system controlled by states. It is only with the reemergence of a "wild" or deregulated capitalism in the most recent decade that the social and political harmony project is coming under attack in Europe. American, Japanese, and European insurance lobbies seem to be going in for the kill, but the political world seems to be countering this move. My point is that the political institutions (two-party system or not, political administration or not, etc.) on the two sides of the Atlantic (except the U.K.) give the notions of consensus and harmony significantly different content. This grants Nader's point but qualifies it.

2. The examples Nader uses are very telling. The use of "culture" as a device to institute control is well documented, but I want to add one point that is heavily debated in political and social science circles in Europe and the United States. In extreme rightist circles in Europe the notion of "race" is being dropped in favor of that of cultural identity. In practice, race is replaced by culture, yielding a radical rejection of multiculturalism (by most center-right parties as well) as intrinsically impossible, threatening to pollute the identity of all involved. Moreover, it is argued, immigrants will only be able to live happily in their own cultural context, meaning the country they came from. The idea and practice of "ethnic cleansing" by various groups in warring former Yugoslavia was welcomed by rightists and officially recognized by the international negotiators (in conflict, I should add, with the UN Charter). My point here is a critical one: What happens in this type of discourse and practice is a double shift that should be of concern to anthropologists. In the first place, political discussions are readily "culturalized," as Nader points out, but in addition the range of the "cultural" seems to expand to the point that it becomes a politically useless catchall. At the same time, however, an essentialist interpretation of culture is smuggled in, replacing race and reinforcing the old notion of "common identity": culture is seen as an essence, a well-defined, unalterable rock-bottom of identity. Of course, essences cannot be negotiated and can only be betrayed in making peace with the "enemy." Political scientists (such as Kriesberg, with his conflict-escalation studies) and anthropologists know how identity grows, decays, changes all the time. Anthropologists should take up the challenge and show how indeed dynamics is of the essence and how context, narratives, and individual-group relations continually constitute identities. I do not say that Nader denies the dynamics (to the contrary), but I think that an explicit antiessentialist perspective is needed.

Reply

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As many of the comments indicate and some specifically point out, there is a burgeoning public literature on state and corporate control in which recognition of control as a naturalizing process is salient. Less frequent are writings by First World anthropologists about the First World. In this situation public intellectuals can contribute to the anthropological literature on the conformity and subordination of First World citizens, something that Third World peoples cannot often imagine.

In "The Cold War and the University" Noam Chomsky [1997:176] speaks of the "near uniformity of subordination to domestic power in the U.S. prior to the 1960s" and of the "inability of American intellectuals, including most of the dissidents on the Left, to break out of the constraints of the propaganda system." He continues (p. 186), "To this day we cannot face the elementary fact that the United States attacked Vietnam"—for Chomsky a most amazing propaganda achievement. The achievement is classic manipulation: "The U.S. . . . managed to transfer the blame to the Vietnamese . . . the reversal passes smoothly, virtually without comment, probably even without awareness." Chomsky explains this as the natural feature of a business-run society, a society based on forms of manipulation and deceit such as those found in marketing and advertising. Rik Pinxten writes in a similar vein about the Gulf War and the ensuing censorship that was "silently tolerated" (1993:101). Comparisons with other countries make his points even clearer. The Russians knew that they had invaded Afghanistan and Russia was not the injured party.

The Canadian prize-winning essayist and novelist John Ralston Saul pursues a parallel course in The Unconscious Civilization (1997). He argues that the 20th century, like no other, has been an age of ideologies to which citizens of the Western world have succumbed willingly. Among the forms of tyranny he mentions are fascism, marxism, corporatism, bloated management, and obsession with technology. Saul comes closer when he includes tyrannies such as free-market
capitalism, the social sciences, neoconservatism, and psychotherapy, which he argues are all based on “certainties” as rigid and narrow as those doggedly held by the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and Fascists. These authors, as well as the commentators on my paper, are also reaching for an understanding of the means by which ideologies, as distinct from other forms of culture, create patterns of subordination and conformity. The commentators also point to the problems in studying such phenomena.

For example, Barabas asks why social scientists have such difficulty examining the controlling processes operating within their own society. Is it a reluctance to see themselves as objects of control and reproducers of hegemony? She argues that the paradigm of cultural superiority (what Edward Said [1978] earlier called positional superiority) blinds mentalities while justifying as civilizing the processes of control. Debord questions the suitability of anthropology for the study of a society in which freedom of choice is so highly valued that it is difficult to politicize the discussion in domains that are not configured politically. Hertz zeroes in on a key difficulty for the anthropologist, the contemporary stigmatization of univocality that makes one unable to take a position. There is challenge, she says, “when the notion of culture is examined culturally—when anthropologists begin to look for what is hidden by the concept of culture as well as what it illuminates.” Only by so doing can we unmask the nonagentive forms of power that Lock assigns to the belief that the West is dispensing modernity to the non-Western world. In spite of the recognition of many modernities, powerful organizations like the World Bank or the IMF operate with only one, as in the colonial period, with the West still dispensing civilization.

Yet other kinds of difficulties are articulated by Drucker-Brown, whose position is similar to the notion that respect for work within residential boundaries necessarily makes the work better. Although Drucker-Brown remains unconvinced that a wide-ranging definition of “power” is helpful, Debord reminds us why it is. Excellent ethnographic work in anthropology made us realize that power did not have a specific center in a group of institutions that enforced citizen subordination—that it was also a fluid force permeating all aspects of social life. We have learned to look at ideology and cultural production empirically. And, as Bodley reiterates, we had to look at hegemonic power in global-scale commercial cultures, where human agency is virtually invisible. Control indeed has multiple dimensions and different forms—centralized, implicit, direct democracy, and the dimensions found within social groups—but we have moved from a model of static social control to a model that recognizes the fluidity of an entrepreneurial kind of power, “street smarts.”

The beauty of this kind of work is that it generates new perspectives on questions that anthropologists have long struggled with. Bartolomé wants to know what the underlying processes are that produce ethnocide. Bodley’s concern is with “inevitability,” a concept that dovetails with Bartolomé’s recognition of the inevitability syndrome as a means by which cultural transformations are sold. The inevitability syndrome is linked with the hegemonic myth of global culture whereby “the economy” is imagined as impersonal. Debord alludes to the relation between a life of choice and a body no longer perceived as natural and unchangeable, an ideology of choice and the idea that victims are responsible for their own suffering—an idea related to what Chomsky refers to as “the reversal.” Hertz recognizes the stifling of debate by the opposition of multivocality and univocality in cultural studies and elsewhere, while Lock recognizes the key to propaganda—simplification, in an age of bureaucratic entanglements. Pinxten notes how multiculturalism is being replaced by cultural identity, a destabilization of the social and political harmony project. All of these ideas are important. But June Nash’s example of the Bolivian tin managers’ joke that shifted the workers from the management paradigm to the male/female paradigm indicates the effectiveness of controlling processes and the fragility of the human mind.

Gusterson is quite right that in my earlier paper on “studying up” I did not yet recognize science as integral to hegemonic goals. Why I do not exactly know, except that I believed that science and technology had no ideology. What disabused me of this notion was more than a decade of research on energy science and technology, in which scientists themselves taught me how to distinguish science from something else, such as science as religion. Not all could make such distinctions, but those who could were eloquent, especially in the dozens of letters they wrote me after the publication of “Barriers to Thinking New about Energy” (Nader 1981). I was analyzing controlling processes in the energy field: conservation is feminine, nuclear is macho, solar is not intellectually challenging, and other notions of the “inevitability” of the growth syndrome. Interestingly, my support structure did not emanate from contemporary sociocultural anthropology but from figures like A. L. Kroeber, who analyzed progress as an idea akin to religion, and R. Heizer, an archaeological anthropologist who dealt with the significance of technology and knowledge in general over thousand-year time spans.

Some years ago, after a provocative talk on the human dimensions of breeder reactor technology, a distinguished Brazilian nuclear physicist came up to the podium and said to me, “Yesterday I was lonely. Today I am not lonely.” I must confess that that is the way I feel after reading these comments. Nash perceives the problem—there has been a derailing and an involution in anthropology. Why is something I have been trying to figure out (Nader 1997), but I still do not completely understand how we came to move away from our empirical strength just when we needed a critical methodology to link cultural control with centers of power accumulation. Just as many, politicized by the cold war and a glimmer of what colonialism was about, were beginning to examine the processes by which power is translated into behavioral norms, just as indirect con-
trol over groups and relationships by control of the mind was gathering momentum came this fogging process, this delight in the abstract. I sometimes refer to the cultural critique movement as epistemological radicalism. I was inspired by the confusion of my students, oscillating between paranoia and "trustanoia"—between thinking that someone is out to get us when no one is and thinking that someone is taking care of us when no one is. Somewhere in between lay some kind of empirical reality that called for the ethnographic study of controlling processes.

Although I cannot do justice to all the stimulus in the comments, I would like to respond to the interest in the interaction between harmony, choice, and science. As Bodley reminds us, belief in the economy as an impersonal, irresistible force that will benefit all is a powerful cover for the specific observations indicating that a few actors are driving the machine. The idea of rational economic actors’ maximizing their utility by free choice among alternatives forms the core of a premise that all private choices are free of coercion. In the Chicago School version of law and economics, only the state is coercive, not the market—a belief that contributes to the maintenance of hegemonic power not only in the general population but also among anthropologists. Further, the Chicago School’s version of law and economics declares that courts imposing liability awards interfere with free choice, and so they move to delegalize.

Earlier conservative legal theorists argued that the common law is a counterpart to the market and its rules should follow market rules. Hence the common law in this earlier view is superior to regulation. My point is that instrumental theorists feel free to choose between courts, regulation, and alternative informal systems depending on what they are trying to achieve. It is a dynamic “street smarts” that we are grasping.

The idea of harmony in the contemporary United States today is publicly aligned with peace. In this model there is no U.S. conception of an alternative to harmony that is not divisive. Democracy becomes harmony while debate is contentious, even antidemocratic. This is what Lock refers to as a dampening down of possible dissonance and what I have called a flattening process. Again, because lines of power are blurred, context and complexity are critical components. The dynamics help us to understand when consensus is useful, when confrontation is of the essence, as with the “wild” capitalism moving in Pinxten’s Europe, and for whom.

If fluidity is of utmost importance, so too is Debert’s notion of subject matter that is not configured politically. She speaks of communitarian ideals that travel across borders as if they were not political. In an article in Mother Jones [D’Antonio 1994] the discussants on “I or We” rarely questioned the processes of the master narratives. Only Chomsky got to the control point: “Community . . . [was] designed in the 1930s by the corporations, when they became terrified by the collapse of their society brought on by the Wagner Act and the labor movement. They developed new techniques to control the population and inculcate the concept of living together in harmony—all Americans. . . . And Them—the outsiders trying to disrupt.” So the fine analysis that Drucker-Brown calls for would indeed require that we identify different kinds of harmony, distinguishing what I have called organic harmony [her raising and all that] from the selling of a political idea—communitarianism—favoring the traditional family, moral instruction in school, and crime control policies that would limit some of our rights. As critics have pointed out, Americans felt a strong sense of community when they put American-Japanese in concentration camps in the 1940s. Of course such ideologies are double-edged and have multiple uses, which is my point as well as Pinxten’s in his sharply underlined example of the two faces of Christianity—love thy neighbor and holy war.

In the breast implant case the double edge is complex. There are those who argue that for some women breast implants are empowering, their pragmatic response to everyday life. Indeed these women are empowered, as the saying goes, to roam in a four-cornered cage of someone else’s design. Should they have that choice? The answer to that question would embroil us in issues of informed consent, truth in advertising, truth in science. But the issue for ethnographers is description of the processes by which, as Nash notes, power is translated into behavioral norms stigmatizing people, making them responsible for their cosmetic bodies or their emotions—which become sites of moral laxity or vigilance. The potential for anthropological research has barely been tapped, because the transforming powers of commerce or unregulated capitalism are too infrequently configured politically.

Finally, several of the comments speak about the future, about the potential of politically configuring the mundane or “normal” of an anthropology of everyday life that is not “bereft of people, things, and the stuff of culture” [Nash]. Yet, it is Gusterson’s two closing questions that stop me in my tracks. They are specific: Which other issues might profit from a similar analysis? And how do we theorize how people achieve power from powerless positions? The example he cites in relation to the first question—that of pharmaceutical executives predicting that one-third of the world’s population may be taking psychiatric medication within two decades—is arresting. The final colonization is the colonization of the mind, and I would give this area top priority as a research question for anthropologists because cultural control plays such a central role in this movement. The redefinition of previously “normal” moods and behavior as disorders is an area that some of the commentators have researched, and although increasingly of interest it does not yet constitute a research focus in anthropology such as, for example, gender studies. Think of it: This is the biological era, and some anthropology departments are phasing out biology and/or research questions relating to biology. Here is where we need to analyze the premises—the culture, if you will—of anthropology as we proceed and in order to proceed.

Another area that cries out for anthropological analysis is the “many modernities” that Lock speaks about.
The U.S. military was able to decimate an Iraqi population in the name of the backwardness of that population, with special reference to the Arab treatment of Arab women—a view that gave us the moral right to bomb innocent women and children in Baghdad. In congressional hearings I heard the same argument recently: "They treat their women like chattels." The other modernities can often see through these First World tactics better than citizens of the First World who believe. Also, they belong to civilizations older than ours that are still intact, while Westerners commonly deny that there are civilizations in the plural, each contemporary with the others.

Gusterson’s second question about theorizing people achieving power is one we worked on in *Energy Choices in a Democratic Society* [Nader 1980b]. Since we were writing scenarios for the year 2010, we searched for structural means of empowerment such as increasing self-employment levels to diversify the economic base. We also tried to increase options by decoupling tightly coupled beliefs; here we were getting into questions of mind colonization. Decoupling beliefs such as "less energy means less technology" or "big is necessarily better" or "small is necessarily beautiful" touches how people think. One future, for example, was a high-technology/low-energy one—an impossibility for many participants. We also used scientific standards of evidence to indicate the role of superstition in high-technology thinking, which served to empower the marginalized scientists. In pedagogical terms, knowledge was power. It required lack of conformity, because those who conformed lost a certain kind of power. The course I teach on controlling processes liberates some; for example, one student said, "At least I know what I'm up against." She had learned how to put the system in reverse. From this angle, how the powerless become empowered is not so different from how the powerful got their power. What is different is the leveraging potential, something that is included in the social-movement literature.

For me anthropology is the freest of scientific endeavors because it potentially does not stop at boundaries that interfere with the capacity of the mind for self-reflection. Ethnography, with all its flaws, has been an influential force, and making connections is still an important part of what anthropology is about. Making connections is also an increasingly endangered talent as people are moved to know more and more about less and less, thereby creating a parochial anthropology, another contradiction in terms.

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