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Electoral Institutions and Information Shortcuts: The Effect of Decisive Intraparty Competition on the Behavior of Voters and Party Elites

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Melody Ellis Valdini

Committee in charge:

Professor Matthew Shugart, Chair
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2006
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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2006
DEDICATION

In recognition of his never-ending support, generosity, care, and love, this dissertation is dedicated to the sweetest person I’ve ever known, Andy Ellis Valdini.
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Without my committee members, this project would have suffered greatly. Thus, my eternal thanks for the time and effort given by Lisa Baldez, Shaun Bowler, Maria Charles, Karen Ferree, and Sam Popkin. Their suggestions and encouragement were fundamental to the completion and to the quality of this dissertation.

And of course, many thanks go to my chair, Matthew Shugart. I feel very lucky that I had the opportunity to work with and learn from a scholar of his quality, and I am tremendously thankful for the many hours he spent reading drafts and chatting about electoral systems at the Solana Beach office. Needless to say, both this project and I benefited greatly from his guidance.

Several professors did not have a formal role in this dissertation, but were there for me at critical moments with advice and suggestions - my thanks go to them as well: Kathy Dolan, Michael Hiscox, Steve Stambough, Karen Shelby, and Thad Kousser.

Also, many thanks to the triple threat- Adam H., Mike D., and Adam Y. Their creativity and style, not to mention their words of wisdom, were frequent sources of inspiration for me.

My parents have all been tireless sources of support and encouragement, and I could not have finished this project without their help. Mo, To, Janna, Dad, and Mom - thank you all so much.

And finally… I have met so many amazing, fascinating people during the past seven years, and I am proud to call several of them my friends. They have all been crucial sources of support, and have provided daily examples of the kind of scholar and friend that I aspire to be. Many thanks and big hugs for: Mike K., Nancy L., Chris A., Emily B., Kathleen C., Carew B., and Jessica T.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Electoral Institutions and Information Shortcuts: The Effect of Decisive Intraparty Competition on the Behavior of Voters and Party Elites

by

Melody Ellis Valdini

Doctor of Philosophy

University of California, San Diego, 2006

Professor Matthew Shugart, Chair

We know that information shortcuts are used by voters, but what affects the cues that voters will take and parties will give? I examine this question through an analysis of voter and party behavior under different electoral systems, and in elections that occur in post-corruption environments. One electoral rule in particular is the focus of this dissertation: the decisive intraparty preference vote. I argue that an electoral system that includes the decisive intraparty preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon cues drawn from specific candidate traits. Further, I argue that party elites anticipate and respond to this voter behavior through varying the
types of candidates selected for the party lists, and thus that the traits of candidates
nominated to represent the parties will vary by electoral system. Additionally, I argue
that an electoral environment of corruption changes the polarity of certain cues, but
that the effect of the corruption and resulting polarity switch is, in part, determined by
the electoral system.

My theories are tested using hypotheses that employ the predicted outcomes
for women’s representation. If voters are using information shortcuts as I predict, and
if these shortcuts have the effects on candidates and parties that I predict, then this
behavior should be reflected in the percentage of women on the party lists and in the
respective legislatures. Thus, I test my theories using cross-national, cross-temporal
regression analyses of the percentage of women legislators and candidates in European
states, as well as through case study analyses of the representation of women in the
legislatures of Ireland and Spain. My findings confirm that the decisive intraparty
preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon trait-based information
shortcuts, and further, that this reliance has a negative impact on the representation of
women in legislatures.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

We know that information shortcuts are used by voters, but what affects the cues that voters will take and parties will give? I examine this question through an analysis of voter and party behavior under different electoral systems, and in elections that occur in post-corruption environments. One electoral rule in particular is the focus of this dissertation: the decisive intraparty preference vote. I argue that an electoral system that includes the decisive intraparty preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon cues drawn from specific candidate traits. Further, I argue that party elites anticipate and respond to this voter behavior through varying the types of candidates selected for the party lists, and thus that the traits of candidates nominated to represent the parties will vary by electoral system. Additionally, I argue that an electoral environment of corruption changes the polarity of certain cues, but that the effect of the corruption and resulting polarity switch is, in part, determined by the electoral system. I test these theories using cross-national, cross-temporal regression analyses of the percentage of women legislators and candidates in European states, as well as through case study analyses of Ireland and Spain.

This dissertation contributes to our understanding of several different aspects of electoral systems and information shortcuts. Because existing scholarship on information shortcuts has been heavily focused on only the United States case, it has neglected to test for the effects of electoral institutions on voter cue-taking. Furthermore, also due to its US focus, current literature has neglected to engage the issue of candidate selection, and the ways in which parties may attempt to give
positive cues through their choice of candidates. This dissertation addresses these deficiencies in the literature through a comparative analysis of information shortcuts. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first comparative analysis of the effects of electoral institutions on the use of information shortcuts. In addition, this dissertation also engages the ‘personal vote’ literature in a new way by considering the negative consequences for legislator diversity when the electoral system creates an incentive for an individualist strategy.

**INFORMATION SHORTCUTS**

Information shortcuts, simply put, are cues or signals that the voters can use in place of being fully informed about each candidate. The most common example of an information shortcut is the party label. Without gathering information about the specific policy stances of the candidate, the voter can use the party label of that candidate to make assumptions about his/her expected behavior in office. As Downs (1957) argues, “with this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues” (98). Thus, the shortcut serves as an ‘inexpensive’ substitute for information; the voter in this context is essentially using symbolism to choose among the candidates. The use of information shortcuts does not mean that the voter is necessarily apathetic or ignorant, but rather that the voter adopts a substitute for full information that requires less time, energy, etc. (i.e., cost) than gathering full information. In fact, as Downs himself asserted, “it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the low returns from data simply do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resources” (259).
Continuing the line of reasoning that Downs began, scholars have argued that while the party remains the most-used shortcut, voters can also use the personal traits and behavior of candidates as substitutes for full information (Conover & Feldman 1989, Popkin 1994). Because the gender of a candidate is one of the ‘cheapest’ bits of information to gather (i.e., in most circumstances a voter need only see a name- not even a picture is necessary to gain this information), it is an obvious response for the voter to utilize a gender stereotype to make a decision. Further, gender seems a particularly apt characteristic to draw conclusions from, because unlike a relatively innocuous characteristic such as brown hair, many studies have concluded that it is quite common for people to attribute different personality characteristics to men (i.e., independent, objective, ambitious, knowledgeable) than to women (i.e., emotional, understanding, gentle, honest).\(^1\)

Building from the scholarship on the typical shortcuts associated with women candidates, my hypotheses are formulated based on predicted outcomes for women’s representation. If voters are using information shortcuts as I predict, and if these shortcuts have the effects on candidates and parties that I predict, this behavior should be reflected in the percentage of women on the party lists and in the respective legislatures. In other words, if X (political context) affects Y (use/effect of information shortcuts), we should see the result in Z (percentage of women in the legislature). Admittedly, this is not the ideal method for testing for the presence and effect of information shortcuts; while common in the literature, the method of drawing

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\(^1\) These studies include, but are not limited to: Ashmore & Del Boca 1979; Broverman et al. 1972, Deaux & Lewis 1984, and Williams & Best 1990.
individual-level inferences from macro-level data has its limitations. However, because information shortcuts are notoriously hard to test for (even if a voter were willing to admit to using them, he/she might not even be aware of their use), this is one of the best methods available.

There are several advantages to using the gender of candidates to test my theories about the use and effect of information shortcuts. First, by looking at a shortcut other than party, I am able to examine the consequences of a relatively under-researched electoral institution: intraparty competition. Second, because the gender of a candidate is one of the easiest bits of information to gather, this shortcut can be effortlessly employed by voters. Third, from a comparative research standpoint, evidence about this trait is relatively straightforward to collect across countries. That is, unlike a candidate trait such as birthplace, I am able to discern candidate gender simply by looking at candidate/legislator names. And finally, candidate gender was chosen as the test trait because it provides insight into the continuing lack of representation of women across countries. Although women have made considerable advances in legislative representation over the past two decades, there is no country that has achieved gender parity, and most are nowhere near it. Thus, this issue remains an important avenue for research.

**THE DECISIVE INTRAPARTY PREFERENCE VOTE**

An electoral system which includes an intraparty preference vote is one in which voters are either given the opportunity or required to express a preference between candidates of the same party. When it is likely that these preference votes
will change the list order (i.e., circumstances in which a change in the list order would not be considered an anomaly), then I refer to the intraparty preference vote as ‘decisive.’ If the electoral rules prevent voters from casting an intraparty preference vote, or if preference votes very rarely affect the list order, then I consider the system to not be ‘decisive.’ This distinction is an important one; if voters are given the option to cast a preference vote but this vote can rarely (if ever) affect the list order, then they may decline to cast a preference vote and in turn, will not need to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts. The ballot below provides an example of what voters are faced with in a system with decisive intraparty competition.

**Figure 1.1:** Exact replica of ballot used to elect the lower house in Ireland
The above ballot is an exact replica of that used to elect the lower house of the Irish parliament, the Dáil Éireann. Like all electoral systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote, this ballot demonstrates that a voter in this system is choosing among members of the same party. Thus, because they select among candidates of the same party, the most common information shortcut, the party of the candidate, is not sufficient information for casting a ballot. This, in turn, causes the voter to search for additional information, and, I argue, creates an incentive for voters to rely upon the personal traits of candidates to make a decision.
Figure 1.2: Ballot used to elect the parliament of Portugal

The ballot in the figure above, used to elect the Assembleia da República of Portugal, demonstrates the choice faced by a voter in an electoral system without intraparty competition. In a system like this (i.e., no decisive intraparty preference vote), voters do not need to choose among candidates of the same party, and are instead selecting among unalterable groups of candidates. I argue that voters in this
system, therefore, will not rely on trait-based shortcuts, and any use of candidate-based cues will be tempered or balanced by the traits of others in the group.

THE AGENDA

My examination of the effect of electoral context on the use of information shortcuts contains four primary sections: First, I examine the effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the voters’ use of trait-based information shortcuts. Next, I investigate the effects of publicized political corruption on the polarity of the information shortcut, and further, I examine whether its effects are dependent on the electoral system. Third, I analyze the responses of parties to both the use and polarity of shortcuts, as seen through variations in candidate selection. And finally, I present case studies of two countries, Ireland and Spain, in which I examine the specific effects of intraparty competition and corruption, as well as party response to these two phenomena, across the legislative elections of the past fifteen years.

The first substantive chapter of this dissertation, Chapter Two, investigates the effect of intraparty competition on the use of information shortcuts. I argue that a consequence of the decisive intraparty preference vote is that it creates an incentive for voters to employ information shortcuts based on the personal characteristics of candidates. Using candidate gender as the ‘test trait’ from which voters draw inferences and employ information shortcuts, I examine the consequences of decisive intraparty competition using two tests: first, a comparison of Japan and Italy both before and after their recent electoral reforms. Second, I employ a cross-country, cross-time database of electoral rules, and find a relationship between the presence of
intraparty competition and the representation of women, providing evidence for my theory that the institution is causing voters to increase their use of trait-based shortcuts. Contrary to the expectations of the literature on intraparty competition, these results demonstrate that while the diversity of certain personal traits may grow in this electoral environment, the increased use of information shortcuts prevents a rise in the diversity of legislator gender.

In Chapter Three, I add a new contextual variable to the model: corruption. I argue that publicized, political corruption can change the polarity of some of the trait-based information shortcuts, causing certain personal characteristics (and the shortcuts drawn from them) to be more or less appealing depending on the context. I employ an original, cross-national database of publicized corruption events to test for changes in the polarity of information shortcuts, and find evidence that the effect of trait-based information shortcuts is dependent on the political context. Again using candidate gender as the test trait from which voters draw inferences, I find that the shortcut that women are “honest outsiders” does not have a constant effect on electoral outcomes; the effect changes depending on whether there has been recent publicized corruption in government. Further, I re-test the effect of corruption within the electoral context of decisive intraparty competition, and find that only in systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote did women candidates see a benefit from corruption. If the decisive intraparty preference vote is present, too many negative trait-based shortcuts are engaged by the voters, and thus women will gain no advantage from corruption.

Chapter Four is dedicated to examining the party elite response to the voters’ use of trait-based information shortcuts through an analysis of candidate selection.
Because voters are indeed more likely to engage trait-based information shortcuts in certain electoral contexts, I argue that parties (i.e., the ‘cue givers’) systematically anticipate and respond to these effects through changes in candidate selection strategies. Using a cross-country analysis of the selection rates of women candidates for party lists, I demonstrate that the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative, significant effect on the percentage of women selected for the lists. I argue that this result is due to the change in selection strategy of party elites, which is driven by the use of trait-based information shortcuts by voters in electoral systems with intraparty competition.

In Chapter Five, I re-examine the hypotheses presented in earlier chapters through a more concentrated analysis of the electoral systems and political corruption of Ireland and Spain. Spain elects their lower house, the Congreso de los Diputados, using an electoral system with absolutely no intraparty preference vote of any kind, while Ireland elects their lower house, the Dáil Éireann, using a decisive intraparty preference vote. In addition, both Spain and Ireland have experienced periods of tremendous publicized political corruption, as well as periods with relatively little corruption at all. Thus, the selection of these two particular states provides variation on the two key independent variables of this dissertation: the decisive intraparty preference vote and publicized political corruption. This variation, in turn, allows me to present a country-specific analysis of the effects of the presence and absence of decisive intraparty competition on the representation of women, as well as the ways in which corruption could be changing those effects.
WORKS CITED


CHAPTER 2: THE SIGNAL OF GENDER: THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL RULES ON THE VOTERS’ USE OF INFORMATION SHORTCUTS

INTRODUCTION

What are the consequences of the electoral system? This question has been answered in many ways, from the effects of electoral institutions on the number of parties, the effects on the use of the personal vote, and the effects on the representation of under-represented groups. I present a new effect of electoral institutions: I argue that decisive intraparty competition, defined as an electoral context in which members of the same parties are competing for the same seats, creates a powerful incentive for voters to employ information shortcuts based on candidate traits when casting a vote. Unlike previous research on intraparty competition, I argue that the voters not only employ the personal traits of candidates as a means for relating to or identifying with candidates, but they also employ traits as information shortcuts, thereby drawing inferences on ability and behavior based on personal characteristics of the candidates. In other words, because voters in this system type select a candidate from within a party, I argue that they are also more likely to use the specific traits of those candidates as information shortcuts.

I test this theory using information shortcuts based on candidate gender. Current scholarship on intraparty competition would predict that this electoral context is positive for women candidates. The logic of this prediction is that gender, just like any other personal trait that sets a candidate apart from her co-partisans and allows her to identify with half of the population, should benefit the female candidate. However, contrary to these assertions, my work challenges the assumption that gender is like any
other personal characteristic. Instead, I argue that the gender of a candidate can activate the use of information shortcuts based on negative stereotypes, which are, in turn, harmful to the candidacies of women. Thus, when an electoral system includes decisive intraparty competition, the percentage of women in the legislature will increase at a slower rate than those systems without decisive intraparty competition.

There are four primary sections to this chapter: First, I discuss the assumptions made by the existing literature on the effects of the intraparty preference vote on legislator heterogeneity. Next, I examine the use of information shortcuts, arguing that their use in the voter calculus is both quite common, and potentially damaging for women candidates. Then, thanks to the electoral reform that provides laboratory-like conditions, I present an analysis of the effects of intraparty competition in Japan and Italy. And finally, I use cross-national, cross-time data to test for the increased use of information shortcuts in the electoral context of intraparty competition.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE DECISIVE INTRAPARTY PREFERENCE VOTE

An electoral system which includes an intraparty preference vote is one in which voters are either given the opportunity or required to express a preference between candidates of the same party. When it is likely that these preference votes will change the list order, then I refer to the intraparty preference vote as ‘decisive.’ The most well-known varieties of electoral systems that include an intraparty preference vote are: open-list proportional representation (e.g., Brazil, Switzerland, pre-reform

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2 The race of the candidate, I would argue, is the other personal trait that functions similarly to gender. However, due to space constraints and the challenge of testing the effects of race across countries, I have chosen not to include it in this analysis.
Italy), single non-transferable vote (e.g., pre-reform Japan), and single-transferable vote (e.g., Ireland, Malta). The candidates of these systems cannot compete solely on the basis of party loyalty, for with several other candidates of the same party in the running, the party label loses power as a means to differentiate among the candidates. As noted by Carey & Shugart (1995), Carey (1997) and Ames (1995) this causes parties to become weaker, diminishing party loyalty among legislators, and pushing national policy issues toward the back of any legislator’s list of priorities. The system, therefore, begins to self-perpetuate, and at its extreme, party labels become so hollow and policy concerns so inconsequential that, even if they wanted to, voters could no longer use them for any meaningful cues or direction. Thus, candidates respond to this system by turning to other means beyond party label to compete with one another.

The decrease in the value of the party label as a cue compels candidates to turn to other means to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Thus, a primary goal of most candidates in this system type is to create a personal, irreplaceable connection with the voters, making those candidate characteristics which facilitate this connection highly sought after qualities. As discussed by Katz (1980), Carey & Shugart (1995), Ames (1995), and Carey (1997), two of the most important candidate qualities are high levels of funding or wealth, so as to allow for personal favors for constituents, and incumbency, for both the value of name recognition as well as for the ability it gives the candidate to use their governmental benefits and access to pork and personal favors. Thus, clientelism and pork-provision become two of the most effective means for garnering support in this system; if the candidate could, he/she would provide enough pork/personal favors to secure a safe win and be done with it. However,
resources are limited, party discipline may preclude it, and competition can be fierce, and thus pork provision is often not the only strategy of a candidate.

In fact, as Ames (1995) notes, the strategies of these candidates to create secure electoral coalitions are almost always multi-faceted and almost never identical with one another. That is, candidates do not typically rely on one strategy or one way of promoting themselves, but rather tailor their respective strategies to the demographic context as well as their own personal backgrounds. This clearly signals the value of the third element of strategy that a candidate in a preference vote system can employ: ‘identifier’ characteristics, those which separate the candidate from the others due to special characteristics that endear him/her to societal groups and perhaps allow him/her access to pre-organized political or social groups/gatherings based on these characteristics (i.e., region of origin, ethnicity, religion, or occupational group). Essentially any personal characteristic that marks a candidate as “different” from the others in his/her party, and that somehow allows constituents to instantly identify with the candidate, could be seen as an advantage (Katz 1980, Carey & Shugart 1995, Ames 1995, Carey 1997, Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005).

One could argue, therefore, that women candidates have an advantage in this realm of strategy, for if one follows the implications made by the literature on candidate strategies in preference voting, being of a different gender from most of one’s competition should be a good thing. Not only would it provide an instant separation from the crowd of candidates within the party, but it would also allow the candidate special access to existing women’s groups. After all, just as candidates from the same region or with the same religious background can form a costless connection
with pre-formed groups based on those characteristics, women should be able to do the same. Shugart (1994) poses this point as a possibility, arguing that in preference systems, women could have an advantage due to the incentives in the system to emphasize personal characteristics that both make one different and that allow one to create personal ties with constituents on the basis of those differences. However, he also posits a competing hypothesis, noting that the “captive supporters” found in the highly clientelistic systems of Japan and Italy may prevent women candidates from using gender to their advantage.

Rule (1994) also expects the intraparty preference vote to be beneficial for women, but uses a different line of reasoning to support her argument. In her reasoning, she appears to be working from the assumption that the parties, not the voters, are functioning to keep the number of women serving in the legislatures low, for she contends that when the electorate is given the option to move women candidates toward the top of the party list in this system type, they will indeed choose to do so. Thus, from this assumption, one could argue that voters, when given the chance, will work in the interest of equality, moving these women closer to the top of the list, and thereby dramatically increasing the chances that the female candidates will be elected.

**INFORMATION SHORTCUTS**

Previous scholarship on gendered information shortcuts has demonstrated that not only do people hold gender stereotypes, but also that they will apply them to women candidates and legislators. Through this work, we have learned there are three
types of stereotypes usually associated with women legislators and candidates: ability, ideological position, and personality traits. Voters’ notions of ability, defined as whether or not the legislator is effective in a particular policy realm, tend to deem women as better able to handle childcare, education, healthcare, and poverty issues, while seeing men as better suited for the policy realm of defense, foreign policy, and crime (Sapiro 1981-82, Huddy & Terkildsen 1993, Matland 1994, Kahn 1994). Scholarship on stereotypes has also demonstrated that voters use gender as a signal of ideological position. Using data from 1986-94 U.S. House elections, McDermott (1997) found that respondents perceive a larger ideological distance between Democratic Women and Republican men than between Democratic men and Republican women. Further, she demonstrates that in low-information contexts (i.e., knowing only the name and the party), voters will view female candidates as more liberal than male candidates of the same party. Work done by Koch (2000) and Huddy & Terkildsen (1993) further supports these findings.3

The final type of gendered shortcut is that of assumed personality characteristics. This line of research often focuses on the belief that women candidates are inexperienced, honest outsiders, free of the deceit and corruption that is often associated with politics (Alexander and Andersen 1993, McDermott 1998, Shames 2003). While these stereotypes could, in some contexts, work to the benefit of women (an idea that I will address in Chapter Three), there are several other stereotypes that could not. For example, based on the results of cross-national surveys given in 25

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3 See Dolan (2004) for results that counter the argument that voters hold automatic ideological stereotypes about women.
countries, Williams & Best (1990) found that citizens are more likely to equate the following adjectives with men: aggressive, ambitious, assertive, courageous, logical, rational, realistic, steady, and strong. On the other hand, the following adjectives are equated with women: dependent, dreamy, emotional, fickle, frivolous, high-strung, meek, submissive, weak, and whiny. There is no doubt that these stereotypes, no matter the context, will tend to advantage male candidates.

**Theory**

I argue that voters are more likely to rely upon information shortcuts based on personal traits in the electoral context of decisive intraparty competition. Intraparty competition, by definition, prevents the voter from using a party cue or shortcut as a tool for distinguishing among candidates. This, in turn, places a demand on the voter to learn more about the policy stances of each candidate within the party, but because there is low incentive for the voter to put effort into gathering this information, the typical voter will determine which candidate best matches their preferences using the least costly method: personal characteristics. Previous scholarship has demonstrated that parties and candidates are aware of the tendency for voters in an electoral context of intraparty competition to employ personal traits in their decisions, and in turn candidates and parties respond to this with an increased emphasis on the personal characteristics of the candidates. However, unlike previous research, I argue that the voters not only employ the personal traits of candidates as a means for relating to or identifying with candidates (i.e., a voter may think “I have red hair, and candidate A has red hair, therefore he’s like me”), but they also employ traits as information
shortcuts, thereby drawing inferences on ability and behavior based on personal characteristics of the candidates. In other words, because the institution drives them to make a specific choice among co-partisans, I argue that they are more likely to use personal traits as information shortcuts.

As a first step in testing whether or not voters are more likely to rely upon information shortcuts based on candidate traits, I isolate one characteristic, candidate gender, as the trait that voters will draw information from. If my theory is correct, then I should see voters employing information shortcuts based on gender more often in electoral systems with decisive intraparty competition than without. However, testing the use of information shortcuts is a difficult task. One cannot simply ask a voter “did you use information shortcuts?” because, even if the voter did employ them, he or she may not be aware of it. Thus, in order to test the effect of intraparty competition on the use of trait-based information shortcuts, I have formulated hypotheses that are based on the predicted outcomes of the voters’ use of these shortcuts. If voters are using gender-based information shortcuts in systems with decisive intraparty competition, then this should have an effect on the proportion of women elected to the legislature.

Existing literature on intraparty competition would predict that an increased focus on candidate gender would increase the proportion of women in the legislature. After all, in every country, at least 50% of the population can relate to or identify with women candidates. However, because I argue that intraparty competition will increase the likelihood that trait-based information shortcuts are used, I cannot predict that we should see a corresponding increase in the number of women in office. I contend that because the information shortcuts based on the female gender are more often negative
than positive, and further, because many of the traits associated with men are also qualities that people tend to look for in a leader, I cannot predict that use of information shortcuts will be to the benefit of women candidates. Instead, I argue that an electoral system which encourages voters to employ trait-based information shortcuts to make a decision (such as a system with intraparty competition) will not have a positive effect on the candidacies of women. Due to the voters’ use of gender-based information shortcuts, this system is detrimental to women candidates.

**Tests: Intraparty Competition and Women Legislators**

In order to determine whether decisive intraparty competition generates the heterogeneity predicted by the existing literature, or instead encourages voters to rely upon gendered information shortcuts that could negatively affect the campaigns of women, I’ve chosen two methods: first, a close analysis of Japan and Italy, and second, a cross-country, cross-time regression analysis. I chose Japan and Italy for the first stage of testing because both of these states, before their recent electoral reforms, were seen as virtually classic examples of the incentives and consequences found in electoral systems with decisive intraparty competition. In both states, while policy concerns remained important, legislators were primarily focused on creating personal, irreplaceable connections with voter cohorts, often through combinations of pork provision and personal ties.

As Carey & Shugart (1995) note in their survey of electoral formulas, Japan’s pre-reform single non-transferable vote system “really (was) a case of every candidate for herself.” In this system, voters were given a single vote to cast in districts ranging
from two to six seats and, unlike the open list proportional representation or single transferable vote systems, these votes did not benefit other candidates in the party at all. Thus, although there remained some party influence due to the nomination control retained by the parties, the high levels of intraparty competition fostered by the inability of the system to allow candidates of the same party to share support caused the parties to play little role in uniting the candidates in a common front of proposed policy changes or ideology. Instead, politicians of the same party campaigned and distinguished themselves by specialization in certain types of constituency service, establishing extensive support networks using any possible personal bond, or by using their influence in tax, budget, and regulatory areas of policy as an incentive for the voters. The local party organizations typically played little role in constituencies with multiple candidates from the same party running, and thus the establishment and maintenance of core support networks, known as koenkai, were especially crucial for the candidate. The koenkai became an obligatory and ubiquitous presence in Japanese politics, proving to be the only efficient means for the candidate to maintain the publicity, service, and contact with voters required to win an election in this state (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth 1993, Bouissou 1999).

Pre-reform Italy had a different electoral system from that of Japan, but one that nevertheless functioned in a very similar way. The open-list proportional representation found before the reforms of 1993 allowed voters to cast up to four preference votes for specific candidates. Katz & Bardi (1980) argue that, while the parties did determine the lists, their role in determining which of the candidates would be elected from that list was non-existent. They note that the margin between victory
and defeat between candidates on the party lists was usually quite small, and further, that it was possible that even when the party won more seats or grew in strength, candidates not receiving enough preference votes could lose. Thus, it appears that this electoral system placed significant pressure on candidates in this arena to run personalistic campaigns, focusing on pork provision and/or identifier characteristics that can give individuals an advantage over others in their respective parties.

Both the Japanese electoral reforms of 1994 and the Italian reforms of 1993 were enacted with the intent to move their respective electoral systems away from the one-party domination, clientelist behavior, and the subsequent corruption that had befallen their structure, and instead shift to a model that would allow both issue-centered campaigns as well as an alternation in power. Because both states faced similar problems, they chose a similar solution: a mixed-member majoritarian system based principally on single-member districts. As Shugart & Wattenberg (2001) explain, this system type is designed to facilitate a two-bloc multiparty system with disciplined national parties as well as to generate incentives for individual legislators to represent local interests rather than clientelist demands. The new electoral systems have accomplished much of this, and thus, although the post-reform systems have not solved all of the troubling issues from before reform,⁴ the change has indeed resulted in positive steps towards increased accountability and representativeness. This is not to say that all candidate-centered or personal vote incentives have disappeared, but rather that they have declined, and that the campaigning and electoral politics of these states have reformed to be more issue-oriented and party-centered (Giannetti & Laver

⁴ See Christensen (1998) for an interesting discussion.
2001). I therefore expect that, when compared to the pre-reform systems, the percentage of women serving in the legislatures of both states will be higher in the post-reform electoral systems.

In order to test whether one could indeed expect a higher use of trait-based information shortcuts in an electoral system with a decisive intraparty preference vote, I will now analyze the rates of representation of women in Japan and Italy both pre- and post-reform. Because the pre-reform electoral systems in both Japan and Italy included a decisive intraparty preference vote, I argue that representation of women in that time period will be lower than representation in the post-reform time period. By examining each case pre- and post-reform, I will be able to hold other social and/or cultural variables constant (i.e., cultural attitudes, negative treatment in the media, and little socialization of women as political figures) that might confound a larger cross-national sample of countries. I will thus be able to better isolate the effects of decisive preference voting on representation in both states by comparing the electoral results both before and after their recent critical system revisions.
Aside from a single outlier, the percentages of women elected in Italy’s pre-reform electoral system (i.e., using a decisive intraparty preference vote) are all lower than the percentages of women elected in the post-reform system. The obvious outlier in the pre-reform system is the election of 1987. This anomaly can best be explained...
by examining the electoral environment in that year - in 1986, several parties established a minimum 25% threshold for women’s representation in the executive boards of the parties (Guadagnini 1993), which no doubt cast a strong media focus on the numbers of women running to serve in the legislature. Thus, this spotlight of free media and attention coupled with an increase in female party leaders could explain the spike in representation. In the following election, the attention faded, and thus the results returned to the expected range for pre-reform representation.
Similar results are found in Japan. Throughout the pre-reform period (during which a decisive intraparty preference vote was employed), the percentage of women in the legislature remains low – the mean percentage is less than 2%. However, in the post-reform system which did not include a decisive intraparty preference vote, the mean jumps to about 6.5%.
As evident from the above comparisons, the percentage of women representatives is indeed higher in the post-reform systems of Japan and Italy. The presence of the decisive intraparty preference vote in pre-reform systems negatively affected the proportion of women serving in the legislature, and the post-reform electoral system without this element of competition has a positive effect on the representation of women. Although this was a small analysis with a limited scope, it provides initial support for the theory that voters tend to employ information shortcuts more in systems with intraparty competition.

In the next phase of testing, I increase the number of cases to include all European countries that employ proportional representation to elect their legislatures. While the increase in the number of cases is beneficial for broadening the scope of the test, the downside is that the near-experimental conditions provided by Japan and Italy are lost. Instead, I have created a database of countries that employ proportional representation, and have coded whether or not their electoral systems include a decisive intraparty preference vote. A table of cases and codings is below.
### Table 2.1: Presence of Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote, by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Mean change in % of women</th>
<th>Range of change in % of women</th>
<th>Electoral System Type</th>
<th>Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1990-2002</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0 – 8.2</td>
<td>Flexible List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1991-2003</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>0.9 – 11.4</td>
<td>Flexible List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1990-2001</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.5 – 3.9</td>
<td>Flexible List</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1991-2003</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-5.5 – 7.5</td>
<td>Quasi-List</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1991-2003</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-4.7 – 9.5</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1989-2002</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>-0.7 – 4.9</td>
<td>S.T.V.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1987-1992</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-4.8 – 5.3</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.4 – 0.9</td>
<td>S.N.T.V.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>-3.3 – 6.7</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1989-2003</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0.7 – 6.0</td>
<td>Flexible List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1989-2001</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-3 – 3.6</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1991-2002</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.1 – 4.4</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>1.4 – 8.6</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1991-2002</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>-4.9 – 6.9</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1991-2003</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2 – 3.5</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2005): [www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org)

To examine whether the effects of decisive intraparty competition continue to hold with an increased number of cases, I am again using the number of women in the legislature as my dependent variable. However, instead of employing the aggregate percentages (as I did with Japan and Italy) I will instead use the election-to-election

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5 While cases that are open or closed list are simple and obvious to code as having intraparty competition or not, coding cases that are flexible list (such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands) are a bit more complicated. For each of these cases, I examined the electoral rules and based my decision on two factors: 1. Was there an opportunity to cast a preference vote, and 2. How likely is it that the preference vote will affect the list order. For example, in the flexible list systems of Austria and Belgium, voters can cast a preference vote, but the quota needed for changing the party-provided list order is very high. Thus, preference votes tend to have little impact on the list order, which would create little incentive for intraparty competition. In Denmark, however, the preference vote has a substantial impact on which candidates will be selected to serve; thus, this country is coded as having decisive intraparty competition.
change in the percentage of the legislature (lower house only) that is women; in other words, I use the difference in the percentage of women serving in the legislature from one election to another. I chose this measure over the aggregate percentage of women for two primary reasons: first, it allows me to test the extent to which the country varies from the general worldwide trend upward. Second, in later chapters I test the effect of corruption across countries, which is best captured by a change variable.

Because of the relatively few data points, an o.l.s. regression is not appropriate for this analysis. Instead, a simple comparison-of-means test can demonstrate if the trends found in Japan and Italy are found cross-nationally as well.
Figure 2.3: Effect of Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote on the Change in the Percentage of Women Legislators.

When the electoral system includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, the percentage of women in the legislature increases, on average, by about 1.5%.

However, when there is no decisive intraparty competition, the percentage of women increases by about 3.5%. Using a two-tailed T-test (see Appendix), I have tested whether the difference between these two means is caused by chance. While the p-
value very narrowly misses the .05 standard (p= .058), it is close enough to significance to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the means. This result is what my theory would predict: when voters have the opportunity to cast a decisive intraparty preference vote, women candidates fare less well than when there either are no preference votes, or when such votes are not decisive. In other words, the proportion of women in the legislature increases at a slower rate in systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to better understand and predict the consequences of an electoral system with decisive intraparty competition, this chapter has explored the relationship between competition among co-partisans and the use of information shortcuts based on candidate traits. Using candidate gender as a test trait, I found support for my theory that decisive intraparty competition affects the likelihood that voters will rely upon information shortcuts based on personal traits of candidates. One implication of these results is that, contrary to the assumptions made by the existing literature, we should not expect candidates in a system with decisive intraparty competition to all have an advantage if they are different from one another; in short, not all personal traits are innocuous or even beneficial tools for the voter to either identify with or disregard. Certain traits, such as the gender of a candidate, may activate information shortcuts that carry negative connotations, which will, in turn, decrease the likelihood that a woman is elected. In the following chapter, I examine the consequences of a new context, corruption, on information shortcuts, and am able to deconstruct and
change the premise that the use of information shortcuts will always have a negative impact on the candidacies of women.
APPENDIX

.ttest changefromlastelection, by(prefdecis) unequal

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf.Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.4828</td>
<td>.6706</td>
<td>3.9677</td>
<td>2.1199   4.8456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.6391</td>
<td>.6795</td>
<td>3.2588</td>
<td>.2299   3.0483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.7517</td>
<td>.4968</td>
<td>3.7838</td>
<td>1.7568   3.7466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8437</td>
<td>.9547</td>
<td>-.0711</td>
<td>3.7586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom: 53.1213

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ha: diff &lt; 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff != 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff &gt; 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t = 1.9311</td>
<td>t = 1.9311</td>
<td>t = 1.9311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &lt; t = 0.9706</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CHAPTER 3: THE FLUID EFFECTS OF INFORMATION SHORTCUTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

During the years of 1992-1994, Italians witnessed hundreds of resignations and arrests of government officials and representatives. Operation “mani pulite” (“clean hands”), a massive corruption probe that investigated and subsequently dismantled the Italian government, was in full swing during this period, implicating representatives in every level of government and from almost every party. Many legislators, both local and national, were involved in political scandals so outlandish that they are difficult to imagine. For example, shortly after the legislative elections of 1992, a government commissioner was forced to take over the city council of Reggio Calabria following the arrests of 25 of its 50 members. The culmination of the “clean hands” fervor occurred in 1993, when Bettino Craxi, the leader of the Socialist Unity party and former prime minister, was forced to resign. In that same month, three cabinet ministers resigned due to suspicion of corruption, including the minister of justice. Less than four weeks later, two more ministers resigned, pushing the government to the brink of collapse.

In the legislative election of 1994, the first post-corruption probe election, the percentage of women elected to the legislature increased from 8.1% to 15.1%. While the new electoral system certainly played a role in this increase, the drop in
representation in the elections of 1996 and 2001 demonstrates that the reformed electoral system does not tell the whole story. This trend, frequently found in other countries as well, is the focus of this chapter. I argue that significant political events, operationalized here as publicized corruption in government, change the effect of information shortcuts. That is, the effect or polarity of information shortcuts is not constant; the political environment of the elections can affect the meaning of the shortcut and thus the consequences of this voter behavior. To test this theory, I again employ the female gender as the “test trait” from which voters draw information. Using an original, cross-country database of corruption incidents, I find corruption to have a positive effect on the electoral fortunes of women candidates. This demonstrates, I argue, that information shortcuts do not have a consistent effect; in a context of corruption, the information shortcut that women are ‘honest outsiders’ works in their favor. Without corruption, however, this shortcut is detrimental to the candidacies of women; the polarity varies depending on the political context. I then repeat the tests, this time including the variable of whether or not the electoral system employs a decisive intraparty preference vote, and find that this electoral institution continues to have a significant negative effect. In an environment with corruption, the predicted change in the percentage of women is higher in systems that lack a decisive intraparty preference vote than in those that include it.

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6 In 1996, the Chamber of Deputies consisted of 11.1% women. In the election of 2001, the percentage increased to 11.5%.
A NEW PREMISE: INFORMATION SHORTCUTS AS POSITIVE FOR WOMEN

In the previous chapter on decisive intraparty competition, I drew on the premise that information shortcuts based on the female gender are negative; that is, when a voter uses information shortcuts drawn from the female gender, these will signal negative behavioral traits about the women candidates. Thus, we should expect the use of information shortcuts to have a negative effect on women candidates, and in turn the proportion of women in the legislature should increase at a slower rate in systems with decisive intraparty competition.

However, contrary to my premise of the constant and persistent negative effect of female stereotypes, some scholarship has demonstrated that the context of the election is important for determining whether gender-based stereotypes have a positive or negative effect on the candidacies of women. Kahn (1996), for example, provides us with one of the first investigations of the effect of the electoral context on the representation of women. In her comparison of US senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns, she argues that the environment of a gubernatorial campaign is more favorable to women candidates. She finds that traditionally “female” issues are associated with the governor’s office (e.g., education, health care, drug abuse, environment, etc.), opposed to the traditionally “male” issues associated with the role of senator (e.g., foreign policy, trade, economy, and defense). Thus, in one context, the information shortcuts associated with female candidates’ ideological position and ability could benefit a woman candidate, while in the other electoral context, the same shortcut could be detrimental to a woman’s campaign.
In other words, the voters do not change; it is the context of the election that determines the effect of the gendered shortcut, not a transformation of the voters’ view of women.

Burrell (1994), on the other hand, sees the polarity of the gendered stereotype as much more stable. Using examples from the Congressional campaigns of women candidates in 1992, she argues that women were seen as “agents of change,” and that, thanks to the House banking scandal, the gendered traits of honest and outsider have now become positive characteristics. Burrell thus concludes that “the stereotypes that once haunted women who sought to be political leaders have not faded away, but rather that voters have come to value those qualities more in their politicians” (33). She does concede that these stereotypes “could have a backlash in future elections” (33), but does not consider the point further.

While Burrell points to the House banking scandal as the impetus for the change in the polarity of stereotypical female traits, she does not fully consider the importance of political context. That is, rather than conclude that voters have changed, it could be more useful to our understanding of voter behavior to test if voters really have changed, or if the switch in polarity of this information shortcut was due simply to temporary contextual events.

Thus, the next step in this analysis is to test whether the effect of information shortcuts is constant or is context-dependent. In order to test for changes in this effect, I begin by isolating a particular stereotype or shortcut that is frequently drawn from the female gender: the belief that women candidates are “honest outsiders,” free of the deceit and corruption that is often associated with politics (Alexander and Andersen
1993, Shames 2003). McDermott (1998) demonstrates the voters’ use of the “honest outsider” shortcut through a quasi-experiment that employed telephone surveys. One of the findings of her research was a correlation between the likelihood of choosing a female candidate and concern for ethics: those respondents who felt that “ethics in government” was one of the most important problems in California were more likely to prefer the hypothetical woman candidate for governor. Lisa Baldez (2002) provides an example of this shortcut in action through her acknowledgment that women’s groups in Chile are employing the stereotype of ‘outsider’ to their advantage. She finds that even though many women were active in political parties, they used a strategy of claiming to be non-partisan so as to mobilize voters against the parties in the opposition. Because the voters did indeed assume that the women were political outsiders, this political strategy proved to be effective. Further, evidence of the tendency for voters to view women as more honest can be found in results from several U.S. surveys. Through asking voters to provide the “typical” characteristics of female candidates, these surveys found that “honest” and “trustworthy” are two of the most common traits associated with women candidates, but rarely with men. Thus, there appears to be a tendency for voters to assume that women candidates are more honest and that they are outside of the political sphere, and further, a tendency for women candidates to emphasize these traits when it is to their advantage.

I argue that recent corruption in government causes the voters’ use of the “honest outsider” shortcut to have a positive effect on their perceptions of female candidates. After an incident of corruption, I argue that the voters view this stereotype

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as positive: rather than be ineffective, voters in this environment view the female candidate as automatically unaffiliated with the scandals, and as a ‘clean’ or honest alternative. However, under normal, pre-corruption conditions, the use of this shortcut casts a negative light on women candidates: the problem with an “honest outsider” is that these traits imply of a lack of connections and experience, which in turn causes the voters to assume that the woman candidate will not be an effective legislator. Thus, it is the context of each election that determines whether the shortcut will be positive or negative for the candidates’ campaigns.

**Test**

To test the theory on the contextual effects on information shortcuts, I have chosen to employ a cross-country comparison of the changes in the percentages of female legislators both before and after incidents of corruption. If this theory is correct, then these changes in the polarity of the shortcut should be reflected by the proportion of women elected in post-corruption versus pre-corruption elections. Thus, I would expect the percentage of women holding legislative office to increase more in elections that occur after incidents of corruption in government than in elections that do not occur in the environment of corruption.

This method of testing is novel in two ways: first, cross-country research is extremely rare in the field of information shortcuts. The vast majority of analyses employ elections and candidates in the United States only. Second, the most common methods for testing for the presence and effects of gendered shortcuts are surveys, experiments, and investigations of campaign commercials. I have chosen to use none of the above, and instead create hypotheses that can be tested through an analysis of
corruption incidents and their subsequent effects on aggregate numbers of female representatives. By using a new method, I extend these analyses outside of the campaign and outside of the US, and examine how national events and factors exogenous to the specific campaigns could be affecting the use and polarity of information shortcuts.

While there are many available measures of corruption, there are no existing measures that are ideal for this analysis. Some, such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, are good for a general sense of corruption, but not as valuable for both inter- and intra-country comparison due to the very low variance and large confidence intervals of the scores. Others, such as the measure recently created by Golden & Picci (2005)\textsuperscript{8}, reflect the inner workings of government, but do not measure the awareness of the voters of the increasing or decreasing levels of corruption. The ideal variable for corruption for this analysis must include this element of awareness or consciousness; it is impossible to measure how corruption is affecting the representation of women without assurance that the majority of voters are at least aware of corruption in the environment.

Because I could not find an existing corruption measure that suited the needs of the theory, I assembled an original data set. My data-collection process was as follows: I began by searching two websites that have each created databases of stories in major newspapers over the past three decades: Keesing’s Record of World Events

\textsuperscript{8} This technique employs the difference between the quantity of public infrastructure and the cumulative price paid by the government for public capital stocks as a measure of corruption.
and Lexis-Nexis. Both websites allow key word searches, and thus I employed the search terms of “corruption,” “scandal,” and the country name. I then created six dummy variables to serve as my independent variables, each designed to pick up a different level or type of corruption, and coded these variables based on the newspaper articles flagged by the two websites. The dummy variables are as follows: any corruption since the last election, any corruption within 6 months prior to the election, more than one incident of corruption, more than five incidents of corruption, corruption involving executive, cabinet member, or parliamentary leader, and woman as participant in corruption. Corruption allegations are quite common (which, one could argue, decreases the likelihood that they register in the voter calculus), and thus allegations were included only in the variables of “any corruption since last election” and “any corruption within 6 months of the election.” For all of the other corruption variables, an actual trial or resignation was necessary for the incident to be recognized in the coding. All types of corruption are included in the coding, with one exception: corruption that involved any sort of personal romantic or ‘love-child’ scandal. I chose to not include this brand of corruption because I would argue that many voters view personal scandals differently than those committed in the public sphere. Because of this, voters may not have the same reaction to it as they do public scandal, and its presence in the data set could, in turn, cloud the results. The dependent variable for this analysis is again the change in the percentage of women in the legislature from

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one election to the next. The chart below demonstrates the effect of corruption on the change in the percentage of women.

**Figure 3.1:** Effect of presence and absence of corruption on the change in the percentage of women in the legislature
This chart demonstrates that during times of corruption, more women are entering office than during periods without corruption. In post-corruption elections, the percentage of women in the lower house of legislatures increases by 3.84%. However, in elections that occur in an environment with no corruption, the average increase in the percentage of women is 1.92%. Using a two-tailed T test with unequal variance, I have determined that the difference between the means is significant (p = .0571, see Appendix for test result). Thus, there is a systematic difference in the rate of women entering office which is driven by corruption.

**BRINGING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM BACK IN**

As I have demonstrated above, corruption has a positive effect on the representation of women. The question is, however, is the effect of corruption strong enough to overcome the negative effect of decisive intraparty competition? If, as I argue, the presence of the decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative effect on women candidates (due to the many negative information shortcuts that voters are likely to engage), but that the presence of corruption has a positive effect on the electoral fortunes of women candidates (due to the switch in polarity of one information shortcut), then what will happen to the representation of women in systems with decisive intraparty competition that are also in a period of corruption?

I argue that the decisive intraparty preference vote will continue to have a powerful negative effect on the percentage of women entering office, even during times of corruption. Because this institution creates an incentive for voters to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts, and because many of the shortcuts associated
with women candidates are based on negative stereotypes of personality traits (e.g.,
weak, whiny, irrational, gentle, submissive, etc.), the positive effect of corruption will
be muted. While corruption may cause the polarity of one stereotype, the “honest
outsider,” to be positive, the other shortcuts associated with women will continue to be
negative, and will continue to cause voters to assume that, even though women will be
more honest and less affiliated with corruption, their other personality traits will
prevent them from being good leaders. Thus, the hypothesis is as follows: After
corruption, the change in the percentage of women will be increasing at a slower rate
in electoral systems that include decisive intraparty competition than in those that do
not include the decisive intraparty preference vote. In other words, the number of
women entering office will be lower in electoral systems that include decisive
intraparty competition than in those without.

To test this hypothesis, my dependent variable is again the change in the
percentage of women representatives. There are two independent variables: the
presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote in the electoral system, and the
presence of publicized corruption in government at any point since the previous
election. Because leftwing parties tend to run more women than rightwing parties
(and thus a change in seats held by leftwing parties could cause a change in the
number of seats held by women), one control variable is also included: the change in
the percentage of seats held by leftwing parities.  

---

10 I ran test models with several other possible control variables: per capita income, the total number of
seats in the legislature, the number of years since women’s suffrage was granted, the year of the
election, and two composite variables developed by the Human Development Report that were designed
to pick up the effects of culture (known as the “GDI” and “GEM”). I chose to remove these variables
from the final model for two reasons: first, there is no theoretical justification for including them. That
Table 3.1: Regression Results: Intraparty Competition and the Representation of Women in the Legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Change in Percentage of Women in Lower House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Preference Vote</td>
<td>-1.08 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>2.75 (1.31)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Preference Vote &amp; Corruption</td>
<td>-2.94 (2.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing Party Seats (change)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.83 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
Adj. $R^2 = 0.205$

Standard errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01.

As demonstrated in the findings of Brambor, Clark, & Golder (2005), if there is an interaction term in the model, it is not possible to determine the effect of each variable simply by examining the coefficients and significance levels. Instead, Clarify\(^{11}\) is used to generate predicted values and assist in interpretation.\(^{12}\)

---


\(^{12}\) Additionally, I ran the model in Table 3.1 as a split sample (i.e., no interaction term). The results were the same: Corruption has a significant, positive effect in systems that lack a decisive intraparty preference vote, but is not significant in systems that have decisive intraparty competition.
The predicted values above provide several results: First, in a system with a decisive intraparty vote, corruption has no significant effect. That is, whether or not corruption is in the environment, the predicted change in the percentage of women is an increase of 1.5%. Further, the predicted values also demonstrate that in an environment with corruption, the predicted change in the percentage of women will be higher in systems that lack a decisive intraparty preference vote than in those that include it. Clarify predicts that corruption will cause the percentage of women elected to increase by 5.58% in systems with no decisive intraparty preference vote, but will cause an increase of only 1.46% in systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote. A first difference test was used to test whether the difference between electoral system types in the context of corruption is significant, and confirmed the difference at the 95% confidence level. These results, therefore, provide support for my theory that a decisive intraparty preference vote is powerful enough to dampen any positive effects of corruption. In other words, the effect of a change in the polarity of one gender-based shortcut is not powerful enough to overcome the negative effects of the electoral system. These results demonstrate again, as chapter two demonstrated, that systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote are better for the election of women candidates. In other words, in electoral systems in which voters are not using trait-
based information shortcuts to differentiate one candidate from another, women candidates fare better.

The predicted values generated by Clarify present another interesting result: In a system without the decisive intraparty preference vote, the presence of corruption has a positive effect on the change in the percentage of women elected. Clarify predicts that in an electoral system with no decisive intraparty preference vote, the change in the percentage of women will be greater in post-corruption environments (An increase of 5.58%) than in those environments without corruption (an increase of 2.78%). A first difference test was used to test whether the difference between corruption and no corruption in this electoral context is significant, and confirmed the difference at the 95% confidence level. This result presents a theoretical paradox: If, as I argue, voters are using trait-based shortcuts less in systems with no decisive intraparty preference vote, then why would women candidates in this electoral system type see a benefit from corruption? That is, why would corruption have a significant effect on the percentage of women elected in an electoral environment where voters are relying less on trait-based shortcuts?

I assert that there are two reasons why there is an effect of corruption in this electoral system: the effect of list rank, and the effect of the cognitive difference between voting for a group versus voting for an individual. First, regarding list rank, the effect of corruption in this system type illustrates the importance of list order in electoral systems without an intraparty preference vote. In this electoral system, list order is crucial; the decisions by party elites of which candidates will fill the top, middle, and bottom slots of the list have a powerful, direct impact on the electoral
fortunes of the candidates. By placing a candidate at the top of a major party list, party elites virtually guarantee this candidate’s election. Further, placement at the top of the list will cause that candidate to become the “face of the party” – candidates in this position will receive more media attention, and thus the pictures, histories, and policy stances of these individuals become both easily available as well as strongly associated with the identity of the party. Party elites in this system, therefore, are presented with an excellent opportunity for strategic association when deciding which candidate will fill the top list position. Qualifications such as prior electoral experience and origin of the candidate certainly enter into their strategy (Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen 2005), and, due to the many information shortcuts associated with gender, the gender of the candidate must enter into their decision calculus as well. During periods after publicized corruption in government, a female candidate placed as the “face of the party” causes voters to associate the entire party with this individual, and sends a silent, subconscious message that the party is less corrupt. In other words, by placing a woman at the top of the list (a position guaranteed to call attention to them), party elites are strategically engaging the ‘honest outsider’ shortcut in an effort to cause the voters to associate the entire party with sincerity and integrity. After periods with no corruption however, a woman in this top seat could send a message that the party elites do not want to send (i.e., that the party is weaker, naïve, moving left on the ideological scale, etc). Thus, the increase in women after post-corruption periods is, I argue, due to party elites strategically engaging shortcuts through list rank manipulation.
But what about the negative shortcuts also engaged during post-corruption periods when a women candidate is the “face of the party”? She is the honest outsider, but what about the negative stereotypes that she is “weak” and “whiny?” If her honesty improves the reputation of the party, might her “whininess” or “weakness” worsen their reputation? My answer is no. I argue that negative stereotypes in this electoral environment have a lesser impact due to the fact that the ballot requires voters to select the candidates as an inalterable group, not as individuals. The cognitive difference between selecting a group versus selecting an individual is the key: when voters select candidates as a group, their calculations are different than when they are selecting an individual. When a voter selects a group of people rather than a specific person, I would argue that the assumptions made about their personality traits are balanced against one another. That is, because of the ballot, voters perceive these candidates more likely to work as a group, and therefore assume that the traits of one will be balanced by the traits of another. This is not the case when a voter selects from a pool of individuals. Rather than assume a group working together, this electoral mechanism creates an assumption of individualism, and thus the voters’ perception of the candidate in office is different. Further, because of the ballot structure, the campaign behaviors of candidates further support the voters’ assumption of individualism in systems with an intraparty preference vote. Those campaigning in systems with this electoral structure have an incentive to emphasize their individual contributions, but those in systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote have less of an incentive to focus the attention of the voters on their individual achievements. This is not to say that individual accomplishments become
unimportant, but rather that there is less of an incentive to emphasize them to the voters. To the best of my knowledge, political science literature has yet to test the effects of ballot differences on the cognitive processes of voters\textsuperscript{13}, but recent research in psychology provides support for the theory that there is a significant cognitive difference between voting for a group versus voting for an individual.\textsuperscript{14}

**Conclusion**

In an effort to better understand and predict the consequences of significant political events on election results, this chapter has explored the relationship between publicized corruption in government and the polarity of information shortcuts. Using candidate gender as a test trait and a database of corruption, I found support for my theory that contextual events affect the polarity of information shortcuts. Further, I tested the effects of decisive intraparty competition in the new contexts of pre- and post-corruption, and found a consistent negative effect of this institution on the representation of women. In the following chapter, I change the perspective of the analysis and examine the consequences of these results on candidate selection by party elites.

\textsuperscript{13} In a future iteration of this project, I hope to receive funding to perform experiments that test the effects of these different electoral systems on the cognitive processes of voters.

\textsuperscript{14} This research demonstrates that, even when participants are given exactly the same information, their impressions and cognitive processes change depending on whether they are judging a group or an individual (Sanbonmatsu et al. 1987, McConnell et al. 1994, Hamilton & Sherman 1996, Susskind et al. 1999, Sherman et al. 1999).
APPENDIX

```
. ttest changefromlastelection, by (corruptionsincelastelection) unequal

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

----------------------------------
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.927273</td>
<td>.6365936</td>
<td>3.656952</td>
<td>.6305741 3.223971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>.7484206</td>
<td>3.742103</td>
<td>2.295336 5.384664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.751724</td>
<td>.4968335</td>
<td>3.783772</td>
<td>1.756832 3.746616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diff</td>
<td>-1.912727</td>
<td>.9825399</td>
<td>-3.885078</td>
<td>.0596235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
----------------------------------
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom:  51.1928

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0  Ha: diff > 0

| t        | P < t |  P > |t| | P > t |
|----------|-------|------|---|------|
| -1.9467  | 0.0285| 0.0571| | 0.9715|
```


CHAPTER 4: THE STRATEGIC USE OF INFORMATION SHORTCUTS: THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL RULES ON CANDIDATE SELECTION BY PARTIES

INTRODUCTION

Until this point, this dissertation has focused on the voter. I have argued and presented evidence that the electoral system affects the types of information shortcuts employed by voters, and have found that the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote increases the likelihood that the voters will engage information shortcuts based on the personal traits of candidates.

This chapter is dedicated to examining the question of electoral institutions and information shortcuts from a different perspective. Instead of focusing on the voters, this chapter examines the elite response to this voter behavior; if voters are indeed more likely to engage trait-based information shortcuts in certain electoral contexts, do the parties (i.e., the ‘cue givers’) systematically anticipate and respond through changes in candidate selection strategies? In other words, with the knowledge that voters are more likely to rely upon personal traits in systems with decisive intraparty competition, are parties strategically presenting certain types of candidates with that voter behavior in mind? In short, does the electoral system affect the cues that parties give?

I argue that the electoral system does indeed have a significant influence on candidate selection decisions by party elites. Specifically, if a decisive intraparty preference vote is included in the design of the electoral system, parties will anticipate the voters’ increased use of trait-based information shortcuts, and in turn offer a slate of candidates with personal traits that voters can easily engage as shortcuts. However,
in a system without a decisive intraparty preference vote, party elites will alter their selection strategy. Without the electoral incentive to focus on personal traits of each candidate, the voters will not be as likely to engage trait-based information shortcuts, and thus the party elites will no longer need to prioritize offering candidates with characteristics interpreted as positive. This is not to say that it loses all importance, but rather that it is less important in this electoral context than it is in a system with a decisive intraparty preference vote. Unlike existing literature on candidate selection, this chapter unpacks the single member district versus proportional representation dichotomy, thereby contributing to the relatively under-developed field of intraparty competition. Further, this chapter also contributes to the literature on information shortcuts: previous research on the incentive of party elites to add members from under-represented groups to the lists focuses on the signal of ‘equality’ that the list would send, as well as the signal of ‘your group will have an impact in our government.’ However, this chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, the first discussion of the ways in which candidate selection is affected by the voters’ use of negative shortcuts. That is, research on candidate selection and information shortcuts has never engaged the concept of heuristics that party elites may be trying to avoid activating in the voters’ mind.

My test of this theory employs an original data set of party lists and a cross-country comparison of the number of women candidates on party lists in systems both with and without a decisive intraparty preference vote. Based on an argument of changing information shortcuts, I demonstrate that the electoral system does indeed affect the types of candidates selected for the lists.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous research on the effects of electoral systems on candidate selection has focused on two main threads. The first thread concerns the effects (or lack thereof, according to Gallagher & Marsh 1988, Lundell 2004) of electoral rules on the level of centralization of candidate selection (Czunowski 1975, Epstein 1980, Matthews 1985). The other common thread on the subject of candidate selection and electoral systems, and the focus of this chapter, addresses the “who” rather than the “how.” Unlike the discussion of centralization, there is relative agreement on this aspect of candidate selection. We know that regardless of the system, candidates with traits such as incumbency, party loyalty, personal wealth, and roots in the district that they will represent are valuable to party leaders. The value of each of these traits varies by electoral system (Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen 2005), but there is no electoral system in which any of these personal characteristics are seen as negative or off-putting.

Personal traits such as gender, race, or religion, however, are another story. In proportional representation systems, one of the primary concerns of the selectors is to present a “balanced” ticket (Gallagher & Marsh 1988, Ware 1996, Goetz 2003, Norris 2004). The “balance” of the ticket refers to the inclusion of candidates from all relevant social cleavages (e.g., race, religion, class, gender, and whatever else is deemed an important difference in that cultural context). The appeal of a balanced ticket to selectors is clear - by choosing candidates that belong to a variety of subgroups, party elites achieve two of their most important goals: First, they satisfy factions within the party, thereby ensuring their continuing commitment. Second, they cheaply and easily broaden the appeal of the list to the voters. That is, by selecting
representatives from each of the relevant subgroups, party elites cast a wider net and signal to groups that their concerns will be addressed by the party. This, in turn, attracts a greater number of voters without any messy shifts in ideology and without alienating other rank and file members (usually). However, if the elites choose to ignore subgroups and instead select an undiversified list, the costs in terms of negative publicity and alienation are high.

The irony, however, is that the very traits that are required to diversify the list and broaden appeal in the proportional representation system are seen as repellant in single member district systems. As Gallagher & Marsh (1988) point out, “qualities which selectors might feel, accurately or otherwise, could be electoral liabilities in a party’s sole candidate, like being a woman or a member of an ethnic minority, are needed for purposes of balance when several are being picked” (260). Thus, the power of the electoral system over candidate selection is clearly evident. Depending on whether the system is PR or SMD, parties have different strategies for the types of candidates that they are looking for: in one electoral context, selecting candidates that have of variety of personal characteristics is a necessity. But in the other, diversity is both unnecessary and perhaps even damaging to a party’s electoral fortune. What is not yet known, however, is how other electoral variables may change candidate selection strategy. The purpose of this chapter is examine the effects of another electoral variation by going beyond the PR versus SMD dichotomy, and instead analyzing the ways in which differences within proportional representation affect candidate selection. Not only will this provide much needed research in the area of candidate selection, but it will also provide insight into the irony of diversity discussed
above. By unpacking proportional representation and analyzing the effects of differences within this system, we can gain a greater understanding as to why traits that are valued in a group setting are considered negative when the candidates are alone.

THEORY

When a voter uses an information shortcut to make a decision among candidates, it does not go unnoticed. While it is of course impossible to know which heuristics each individual voter employed at each election, survey data and electoral results present patterns of voter behavior over time, thereby illuminating well-known trends such as the incumbency advantage or the distaste for ‘carpetbaggers.’ Party elites, driven by a vote maximization goal, have every incentive to look for these patterns, and to learn what sorts of candidates are appealing to voters. Their knowledge is in turn demonstrated through their candidate selection decisions; by examining the types of candidates selected for party lists, we are shown the qualities that parties have determined to be appealing to voters.

Thus, because voters are engaging trait-based information shortcuts differently depending on whether or not the electoral system includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, party elites will change their candidate selection strategies depending on whether or not this electoral institution is present. Decisive intraparty competition, by definition, prevents the voter from using a party cue or shortcut as a tool for distinguishing among candidates. As argued in previous chapters, this institution will cause the typical voter to determine which candidate best matches their preferences.
using the least costly method: personal characteristics. Parties under this electoral context, in turn, anticipate the voters’ turn to personal traits as substitutes for full information, and construct their lists with this in mind. There continues to be the incentive to ‘balance’ the list with diversity, but, because voters are more likely to engage personal traits as shortcuts, there is a counter incentive against diversity. Information shortcuts are often based on stereotypes, and stereotypes about members of the ‘out-group’ (e.g., women, people of color, etc.) are more likely to be negative than those about members of the ‘in-group’ (e.g., men, caucasians, etc). Party elites, therefore, must temper the required ‘balance’ with an awareness that voters may engage negative stereotypes when considering among the candidates. The use of these negative shortcuts could be powerful enough to drive the voter away from the party altogether, and further, could even change the reputation of the entire party.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, because of the increased use of trait-based shortcuts by the voters in this electoral context, party elites will use a selection strategy that allows just enough diversity for ‘balance,’ but not so much that the negative shortcuts drive away voters.

In systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote, however, the selection strategy of party elites is different. The voters must select the candidates as an inalterable group, not as individuals, and thus the engagement of trait-based shortcuts by the voters changes in several ways: first, the party label can be relied upon in the voter calculus for quick, relatively low cost decisions, and thus the incentive to examine specific candidates, and rest decisions on specific candidate

\textsuperscript{15} For example, consider a situation in which a party runs only women candidates. Because of the stereotypes that women tend to be more leftwing, voters will interpret the high number of women candidates as a signal that the party is moving left on the ideological scale.
traits, declines. This is not to say that voters are unaware of who is on the list, but rather that they do not need to rely on information shortcuts to choose among them. Further, unlike systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote, the list order causes candidates at the top of the list (i.e., the “face(s) of the party”) to be more well-known than those that are ‘hidden’ in the middle or bottom of the list. Thus, while the incentive to ‘balance’ the list remains, party elites do not need to be as concerned that diversity may trigger negative stereotypes about candidates or the party.

**Test**

If parties are varying their candidate selection strategies depending on the electoral system, then we should expect systematic differences in the traits of the candidates chosen for lists in systems with decisive intraparty competition versus those without. As I have done in previous chapters, I isolate one trait, candidate gender, as my test trait. Like other personal characteristics, voters use this trait as a source for information, employing it to make assumptions about the policy stance, leadership ability, and attitudes of the candidates. However, unlike other characteristics such as electoral experience or hair color, this trait can trigger information shortcuts based on negative stereotypes, which could in turn have a negative impact on the number of women selected for the lists. If voters are more likely to use trait-based information shortcuts, as they are in systems with decisive intraparty competition, then party elites will temper the need for balance on the lists with an awareness that some voters will activate negative stereotypes when they see women candidates. This, in turn, will cause parties to use different candidate selection
strategies depending on the electoral system, and we should see evidence of this in the percentage of women on party lists.

Thus, the hypothesis is: The presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote in a proportional representation system will have a negative effect on the percentage of women selected for the party lists. In other words, parties are less likely to nominate women for lists in electoral systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote. As in earlier chapters, this is an indirect test of the effect of information shortcuts. The logic is as follows:

![Diagram of the logic of the indirect test of information shortcuts](image)

**Figure 4.1**: The logic of the indirect test of information shortcuts

To assemble the data used in this analysis, I collected the lists of candidates for one legislative election in five countries: Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, and Luxembourg. These countries were chosen because they provided adequate variation in the independent variable: presence or not of a decisive intraparty preference vote in the electoral system. In addition, the case selection choices were limited due to the
difficulty of finding publicly available party lists from past elections, and due to language barrier issues.\textsuperscript{16}

It is important to note that while the electoral systems of Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg all use a proportional representation system that includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, there is a significant difference among the systems. Luxembourg and Switzerland both use an open list proportional representation system, however Ireland employs a single-transferable vote system (STV). In an STV election, voters are asked to not only select their favorite candidate, but to also rank order their preferences. Then, as candidates hit the quota and are chosen as winners (or dropped as definite losers), their votes transfer to the next preference. Unlike open list systems, parties in STV do not present party lists. Each party has several candidates running under the label in each district (which one could refer to it as a list of candidates)\textsuperscript{17}, and a vote for a candidate does not benefit the party as a whole. Thus, this system is considered more candidate-centered than many other types of PR.\textsuperscript{18} While these differences are important, the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote, I argue, is a strong enough similarity to justify grouping them in one category. That being said, in order to demonstrate that anomaly of STV is not driving the results of this chapter, each analysis will be performed both with and without Ireland.

\textsuperscript{16} One of the first priorities in the future of this project is to add more cases to the analysis of this chapter. Ideally, later drafts will include lists from Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden.
\textsuperscript{17} For ease of discussion, I frequently refer to party lists throughout this chapter and I do not make the distinction that parties in Ireland do not present formal lists.
\textsuperscript{18} Though, as Gallagher (2005) points out, the vote-transfer mechanism of this system essentially requires that candidates of the same party behave as a team. This is in stark contrast to the pre-reform PR-SNTV system of Japan, in which “LDP candidates could openly regard each other with animosity” (524).
Before running the data, I removed all parties from the analysis that either had no winners in any district or no incumbents in any district. In other words, only parties that either won a seat or ran an incumbent were included in the data set.\textsuperscript{19} I chose to remove these lists due to my concern that parties with essentially no chance to win may have different goals than that of just vote maximization. This, in turn, could affect their choices for candidates. If, for example, the goal of a party is not to win any seats, but rather to call attention to an issue or cause, their candidate selection strategy may be very different from those parties with the goal of winning seats. Additionally, approximately 220 candidates in Switzerland (out of a total of 2,858) ran on lists that were reserved entirely for either all men or all women – these lists were also removed from the analysis. One final group was removed from the data set: any candidate that ran as an “independent” (defined as not being affiliated with any political party).

After gathering the lists and removing the non-winning/no-incumbent parties, I coded the genders of the candidates based on the names provided on the lists. I began by collecting common male and female names from websites devoted to baby names\textsuperscript{20}, and then coded the names on the party lists based on this collection. If the name was common and, according to the baby name websites, highly correlated with a particular gender (i.e., Thomas is almost always male, Betty is almost always female), then no further investigation was done - the name was coded based on the

\textsuperscript{19} If a party won a seat in hypothetical district 1, but not in hypothetical district 2, both lists remained in the dataset. So, if a party wins in one district, I assume that it had a chance to win in others. Admittedly, this assumption is not true in all cases. However, the analysis required to determine the chance of winning of each party in all districts is very high-time constraints prevent it.

\textsuperscript{20} The following websites were used: www.babynology.com, www.thinkbabynames.com, and www.babynamenetwork.com. If one website disagreed with another regarding whether a name was male or female, the name was considered androgynous and picture evidence was collected.
recommendation of the baby name websites. However, if the name was either uncommon or androgynous (i.e., Pat could be either male or female), then I searched for a picture of the candidate in question. If no picture was found, the candidate was removed from the analysis.

Each data point in this analysis is a party list, and a total of 729 lists were used in this data set. The dependent variable is the percentage of women on each list (number of women on list divided by list size). The independent variable, as in earlier chapters, is whether or not the electoral system includes a decisive intraparty preference vote (coded as a dummy). A table presenting a comparison of means in systems with and without the decisive intraparty preference vote is below.

### Table 4.1: Comparison of mean percentage of women on lists by electoral system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System Type</th>
<th>Average % of women candidates on party lists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote</td>
<td>25.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table demonstrates that in electoral systems that include a decisive intraparty preference vote, the average percentage of women candidates on a party list is 25%. However, in systems without this electoral institution, the average number of women candidates jumps to 42%. Using a two-tailed T-test with an assumption of unequal variance, I determined that the difference between the means is statistically

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21 The list of names coded as automatically male or female ended up containing more than 40,000 names. Thus, it seems too long to include with this document, but I am happy to provide it if necessary.  
22 Out of the 6821 candidates eligible for the data set, 109 were removed due to unclear gender.
significant at the .01 level (see Appendix I for full T-Test Results). The following table repeats the above analysis, but Ireland is removed from the data set.

**Table 4.2:** Comparison of mean percentage of women on lists by electoral system, Ireland Removed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System Type</th>
<th>Average % of women candidates on party lists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote</td>
<td>28.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Decisive Intraparty Preference Vote</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even without Ireland, the effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote is clear: in systems without it, the percentage of women on the party lists is substantially higher than the lists of electoral systems that include it. A difference of means test was performed on these results (a two-tailed T-test with an assumption of unequal variance), and the difference was again found to be significant at the .01 level (see Appendix I for full T-Test Results).

While the above results provide a good start to demonstrating the relationship between electoral system and candidate selection, a simple comparison of means is not sufficient due to the other variables that could be affecting the number of women selected for party lists. Thus, several variables need to be controlled for: first, as in earlier chapters, whether or not the party is in the leftwing of the ideological scale can affect the likelihood that women are chosen for the lists. If a party is on the left, then it would be expected to add more women than those parties on the right. This variable is coded using the methods discussed in chapter three. Next, the percentage of incumbents on the list could have a powerful effect on the number of women selected
to run. If, for example, there are several male incumbents on the list, then this would have a negative effect on the percentage of women chosen to run. On the other hand, if there are several female incumbents, this would provide a boost to the percentage of women selected for the list. Thus, the effects of the percentage of both male and female incumbents on the lists should be controlled for. And finally, the effect of district magnitude, defined as the number of legislators to be elected in the district, needs to be controlled for as well. As district magnitude increases, as should the number of women selected for the lists.

The table below presents the results from the ordinary least squares regression employed to test the hypothesis on the relationship between decisive preference vote and percentage of women on the list. It is a virtual certainty that the lists of candidates within each party are influenced by one another (i.e., the Social Democrat list in District A is not completely independent of the Social Democrat list of District B) Thus, because I cannot assume that the lists are independent within each party, the observations are clustered by party.
Table 4.3: Ordinary least squares regression of percentage of women on lists by electoral system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Percentage of List Held by Women Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Preference Vote</td>
<td>-15.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing Party</td>
<td>7.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of List Populated by Female Incumbents</td>
<td>6.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of List Populated by Male Incumbents</td>
<td>-2.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2 = 0.188$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

*p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01.

The above results demonstrate that a decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative, statistically significant effect on the percentage of women selected for the party lists. If an electoral system does not employ a decisive intraparty preference vote, the percentage of the list spots held by women is, on average, about 35%. However, if the electoral system does include a decisive intraparty preference vote, the percentage of list spots held by women is, on average, about 19%. The control variables were all found to have significant effects as well. If a party is on the left of the ideological scale, the percentage of women on the party lists will be almost 8% higher than parties on the right. Further, as one might imagine, as the percentage of

---

23 I cannot include fixed effects because the primary independent variable is a fixed effect. However, I did cluster errors by country so as to address the potential for omitted cultural variables unique to each country. Further, I performed a sensitivity analysis in which I ran the model without each one of the cases to ensure that the results aren’t being driven by one country; the model remains significant even with each country removed- see Appendix for regressions.
female incumbents on the list increases, the total percentage of women on the list increases as well. Also quite predictable is the contrary result: as the percentage of male incumbents increases, the percentage of women on the list decreases. And finally, district magnitude has a positive, statistically significant effect on the percentage of women on the lists; as the district magnitude increases, as does the percentage of women selected.

CONCLUSION

Using a cross-country database of party lists, I have demonstrated that variation within proportional representation alone is powerful enough to change the candidate selection strategies of party elites. When the electoral system includes intraparty competition, fewer women are selected for the lists. Without intraparty competition, however, the number of women on the lists increases. I have argued that this difference is due to the elite awareness of the electoral system’s affect on voters’ use of trait-based information shortcuts. In systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote, voters are more likely to rely upon personal characteristics of candidates on the list so as to choose among them. While some of these personal characteristics can signal positive traits (i.e., electoral experience signals knowledge and expertise), others, such as being female, can activate negative stereotypes about women leaders. Thus, when voters are given the opportunity to vote for individuals, not just a group, women become more risky candidates.

In earlier chapters, corruption (and the change in the polarity of gender-based shortcuts associated with it) was not enough to overcome the negative effect of
intraparty competition on the number of women elected. In the following case study chapters, the effect of corruption is examined again, with more attention given to the effects of particular incidents on the parties involved, as well as to the resulting effects on candidate selection decisions.
APPENDIX I

T-Test to determine if difference between means is significant (all countries):

```
.ttest womvscand, by(open) unequal
```

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>.4211818</td>
<td>.0066136</td>
<td>.1118469</td>
<td>.408164 .4341996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>.2503864</td>
<td>.013718</td>
<td>.2890551</td>
<td>.223426 .2773467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>.3173007</td>
<td>.0092622</td>
<td>.2502496</td>
<td>.2991171 .3354844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom: 620.743

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ho: diff &lt; 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff != 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff &gt; 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t = 11.2151</td>
<td>t = 11.2151</td>
<td>t = 11.2151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &lt; t = 1.0000</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-Test to determine if difference between means is significant (Ireland Removed from Data Set):

```
.ttest womvscand, by(open) unequal
```

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>.4211818</td>
<td>.0066136</td>
<td>.1118469</td>
<td>.408164 .4341996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>.2846532</td>
<td>.0123456</td>
<td>.1876364</td>
<td>.2603283 .308978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>.3601796</td>
<td>.0072559</td>
<td>.1649815</td>
<td>.3459249 .3744343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1365286</td>
<td>.0140055</td>
<td>.108985</td>
<td>.1640721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom: 357.214

Ho: mean(0) - mean(1) = diff = 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ho: diff &lt; 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff != 0</th>
<th>Ha: diff &gt; 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>t = 9.7482</td>
<td>t = 9.7482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &lt; t = 1.0000</td>
<td>P &gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

Core regressions with one country missing:

```
. regress womvscand open leftwing fincumb mincumb distmag if ireddummy==0, cluster (clusterparty)

Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 516
F(  5,    51) = 18.45
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3223
Number of clusters (clusterparty) = 52
Root MSE = 0.13661

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>womvscand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leftwing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fincumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mincumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distmag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

```
. regress womvscand open leftwing fincumb mincumb distmag if spaindummy==0, cluster (clusterparty)

Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 596
F(  5,    41) = 26.84
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1739
Number of clusters (clusterparty) = 42
Root MSE = 0.24323

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>womvscand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leftwing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fincumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mincumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distmag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
. regress womvscand open leftwing fincumb mincumb distmag if norwaydummy==0, cluster (clusterparty)

Regression with robust standard errors

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| womvscand |       |           |       |      |                      |
| open     | -.147776 | .0205458 | -7.19 | 0.000 | -.1890435 -.1065085  |
| leftwing  | .0828244 | .0304346 | 2.72  | 0.009 | .0216946 .1439542   |
| fincumb   | .0792696 | .0285175 | 2.78  | 0.008 | .0219905 .1365488   |
| mincumb   | -.0306281 | .0142857 | -2.14 | 0.037 | -.0593219 -.0019343 |
| distmag   | .0046986 | .0010465 | 4.49  | 0.000 | .0025967 .0068006   |
| _cons     | .3345736 | .0246765 | 13.56 | 0.000 | .2850095 .3841378   |

Number of clusters (clusterparty) = 51
Root MSE = .24932

Number of obs = 577
F( 5, 50) = 25.41
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1473

. regress womvscand open leftwing fincumb mincumb distmag if luxdummy==0, cluster (clusterparty)

Regression with robust standard errors

|          | Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|----------|-------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| womvscand |       |           |       |      |                      |
| open     | -.1600341 | .0208988 | -7.66 | 0.000 | -.2019707 -.1180975 |
| leftwing  | .078013 | .0258421 | 3.02  | 0.004 | .026157 .1298689    |
| fincumb   | .0697857 | .0224384 | 3.11  | 0.003 | .0247599 .1148116   |
| mincumb   | -.0312409 | .0134767 | -2.32 | 0.024 | -.0582839 -.0041979 |
| distmag   | .0042489 | .0009884 | 4.30  | 0.000 | .0022654 .0062323   |
| _cons     | .3514017 | .0213348 | 16.47 | 0.000 | .3085903 .3942131   |

Number of clusters (clusterparty) = 53
Root MSE = .22929

Number of obs = 705
F( 5, 52) = 29.45
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1892
. regress womvscand open leftwing fincumb mincumb distmag if switzdummy==0, cluster (clusterparty)

Regression with robust standard errors

|                           | Coef.  | Std. Err. |     t  |     P>|t|   [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------------------------|--------|-----------|--------|--------|--------------------------|
| open                      | -0.172 | 0.023     | -7.40  | 0.000  | -0.219                  | -0.124 |
| leftwing                  | 0.040  | 0.022     | 1.81   | 0.079  | -0.005                  | 0.086  |
| fincumb                   | 0.084  | 0.033     | 2.53   | 0.016  | 0.017                   | 0.152  |
| mincumb                   | -0.045 | 0.015     | -2.98  | 0.005  | -0.076                  | -0.014 |
| distmag                   | 0.004  | 0.002     | 2.14   | 0.039  | -0.000                  | 0.008  |
| _cons                     | 0.374  | 0.021     | 17.28  | 0.000  | 0.330                   | 0.418  |

Number of obs = 522
F( 5, 37) = 24.26
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1881
Number of clusters (clusterparty) = 38
Root MSE = 0.24299
WORKS CITED


CHAPTER 5: WHAT A DIFFERENCE AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM MAKES: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF IRELAND AND SPAIN

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine the hypotheses presented in earlier chapters through a more concentrated analysis of the electoral systems and political corruption of Ireland and Spain. Spain elects its lower house, the Congreso de los Diputados, using an electoral system with absolutely no intraparty preference vote of any kind, while Ireland elects its lower house, the Dáil Éireann, using the archetypal decisive intraparty preference vote. In addition, Both Spain and Ireland have experienced periods of tremendous publicized political corruption, as well as periods with relatively little corruption at all. Thus, the selection of these two particular states provides variation on the two key independent variables of this dissertation: the decisive intraparty preference vote and publicized political corruption. This variation, in turn, allows me to present a country-specific analysis of the effects of the presence and absence of decisive intraparty competition on the representation of women, as well as the ways in which corruption could be changing those effects.

In the first section of this chapter, I discuss the similarities of Spain and Ireland, demonstrating that these two particular countries have more in common than one might expect. Next, I test the effect of both the presence of the decisive intraparty preference vote (Ireland) as well as the absence of it (Spain) on the use of trait-based information shortcuts using, as in previous chapters, the percentage of women elected to the lower house. I expect that the rate of growth of the percentage of women in the
lower house of Ireland will be much slower than that of Spain due to the incentive to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts created by the Irish electoral design. Then, I re-introduce the variable of publicized political corruption, and examine its consequences in the different electoral systems of Ireland versus Spain. As in previous chapters, I expect the effect of corruption to be fluid, causing an increase in the representation of women in Spain (where the electoral system does not include a decisive intraparty preference vote), but having no effect in Ireland, where the lower house is elected using a decisive intraparty preference vote. In the final section of this chapter, I focus solely on Spain, and present preliminary findings on the effect of corruption on the list rank positions of women candidates.

THE CASES: SPAIN AND IRELAND

Spain and Ireland, while different in their electoral design, have many structural and cultural similarities. Because my dependent variable is a measurement of the representation of women – which is something that can be affected by a multitude of other variables – it is particularly important to note the similarities between these countries, thereby demonstrating that these similarities are not causing the different results. That is, by selecting two countries with many elements in common, I am able to establish that particular socioeconomic, political, and cultural variables are not driving the vastly different rates of female representation found in each country.

Some of the most important similarities are the most obvious. Both of these states are found in Western Europe, and both are advanced, postindustrial countries.
As discussed by Inglehart & Norris (2003), the term of “postindustrial” refers to a high score on the Human Development Index, and was created to designate those countries that are the most affluent. Only 20 countries in the world have been labeled as postindustrial, and both Ireland and Spain meet the criteria for category of development.

Another human development indicator, the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) also places Spain and Ireland in very similar positions. This index was created to specifically measure the level of gender equality in a country through a comparison of the life span, standard of living, literacy rate, and per capita GDP of men versus women, and is presented as a continuum in which a score of 1 equals perfect equality between genders, and a score of 0 equals complete inequality. Spain and Ireland earn nearly identical scores: In 1997, Spain scored 0.888 and Ireland received 0.892. At the next point of measurement, 2002, Spain received 0.916 and Ireland scored 0.929.

Neither Spain nor Ireland employs legal quotas to elect their legislatures. A “legal quota,” defined as an electoral law or constitutional amendment that mandates a certain number of women as either aspirants, candidates, or elected officials (Dahlerup 2006), is the most comprehensive brand of quota because it is not voluntary and often includes a sanctioning mechanism to punish those parties that do not comply. The “voluntary party quota” is the other most common type of gender quota, and is

24 The Human Development Index is produced by the United Nations Development Program, and provides a standard scale that measures literacy rates, life expectancies, education levels, and per capita GDP.

25 The Gender-related Development Index was also created by the United Nations Development Program. This link provides more information and full data: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_196_1_1.html

26 But it is important to note that just because a country has a legal quota in place, that is no guarantee that it will be effective- the legal quota in place for the National Assembly of France is a classic example of an ineffective legal quota.
employed by some of the parties in both Ireland and Spain. While this quota type is less effective because it, as the name suggests, is voluntary and lacks the sanctioning factor, it is important to note because its presence could have an effect on the number of women candidates selected to run and serve in office. The effect of these quotas in Spain and Ireland is relatively minimal, but will be discussed later in this chapter.

The presence of Catholicism in the history and culture of a country has been found by some to have a negative effect on the representation of women (Rule 1987, Norris 1997, Paxton & Kunovich 2003), though recent research has also demonstrated that Catholicism has no effect on the success of women candidates (Reynolds 1999). Catholicism is by far the dominant religion in both countries: 88.4% of citizens identify as Catholic in Ireland, and 94% of citizens identify as Catholic in Spain. However, even though high numbers of citizens in both countries identify as Catholic, Spain is known as the more secular, less traditional of the two. Thus, while these countries are similar in their Catholic history and identification, and even though there is no established conclusion on the effect of Catholicism on the representation of women, the possible impact of this difference should be kept in mind.

The general cultural perception of women, and of their proper role in home and work environments can also have a significant effect on the percentage of women in office. There is no perfect method for measuring the overall cultural stance on the role of women, but the Eurobarometer can provide some insight into the general citizen stance in each country. A question included in the 2005 Eurobarometer on “Social

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Values, Science, & Technology” is particularly apt for addressing this issue. The question asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women.” The results, by country, are in the figure below.

![Figure 5.1: Percentage of respondents who agree with the statement: “on the whole, men make better political leaders than women,” by country](source: Eurobarometer)

**Figure 5.1:** Percentage of respondents who agree with the statement: “on the whole, men make better political leaders than women,” by country

I have chosen to include other European countries in this figure so as to demonstrate the large variation among states. For example, comparing a country such as Denmark, where 14% agree with the statement, to Greece, where 40% agree with

28 Complete results from this survey can be found at the following web address: ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf
the statement, demonstrates an obvious cultural difference between these states. Spain and Ireland, however, are essentially the same: In Spain, 20% of respondents agreed that men make better political leaders than women, while in Ireland, 21% of respondents agreed. This is, admittedly, a blunt measure for culture; I am certainly not suggesting that the Irish and Spanish cultures have the same perspective on the role of women—nothing can be done to hold all of the cultural effects constant. What this does demonstrate, however, is that Spain and Ireland are at least similar in their views on the value of women in political office. This, in turn, gives credence to the argument that there are more than cultural differences are driving the difference in the proportions of women in government in these two countries.

**THE DECISIVE INTRAPARTY PREFERENCE VOTE: IRELAND vs. SPAIN**

Since 1922, the electoral system used to elect the members of the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of parliament of Ireland, has been proportional representation (PR). The PR family of electoral systems is quite common in Europe, however the type of proportional representation employed in Ireland is a relatively rare variant known as the single transferable vote. As discussed in earlier chapters, this brand of electoral system is different from other types of PR because it does not involve party lists. The voters must select specific candidates on the ballot, and vote shares for each party are not converted into a proportional number of seats. Though, as Gallagher (2005) points out, while this electoral system does not guarantee a proportional conversion of votes

---

29 Malta is the only other country in the world that uses STV to elect their lower house of parliament. STV is seen more frequently in upper houses and regional assemblies.
to seats, the results are typically more proportional than those found in a majoritarian system.

Each voter receives only one vote, but the voters are given the opportunity to rank multiple candidates in order of their preferences. In practice, this means that a voter marks his/her top preference with a ‘1’, the next preference with a ‘2’, and so forth. Every single vote, therefore, has the possibility of transferring from one candidate to another in the case of a definite loss or win of the most preferred candidate(s). Further, each electoral district has a magnitude of 3-5 seats (the country average is 4), which creates an obvious incentive for each party to ensure that multiple candidates are running in every district. Thus, even though they have only one vote, an Irish voter will typically see 10-15 candidates when he/she looks at the ballot.

The Irish electoral design, therefore, includes the archetypal decisive intraparty preference vote. When voters cast a vote in this system, even if they choose to decline the option to rank multiple candidates, the voter is expressing a preference among multiple candidates within the same party. The presence of this preference vote will, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, have a negative effect on the success rate of women candidates due to the incentive created by this system for the voters to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts to choose among the candidates. Because the majority of shortcuts based on the female gender are negative stereotypes, the increase in the use of trait-based shortcuts will cause a decrease in the success of women candidates. Thus, due to the presence of this electoral institution, I expect that the proportion of women in the Dáil to increase at a very slow rate.
Spain, on the other hand, is a different story. For much of the twentieth century, Spain was a dictatorship ruled by Francisco Franco. After his death in 1975, the country successfully transitioned to a democracy, and, in 1977, held their first democratic elections since the civil war. Just as in Ireland, the lower house of parliament, the Congreso de los Diputados, is elected using proportional representation. The version of PR employed in Spain, however, is vastly different from the one used in Ireland. Rather than vote for a person, voters in Spain are only able to vote for a party. Like other list PR systems, parties present lists of candidates in each constituency, and the total vote tally for each party determines the percentage of the party list that will enter the legislature. But, unlike open-list PR systems, voters cannot alter the list order. Thus, because party decisions, not voters, determine the order in which candidates are elected, this system is known as “closed-list” PR.

Spain, therefore, is an ideal example of an electoral system with no decisive intraparty preference vote. Because they are not choosing among candidates of the same party, voters in this system are, according to my theory, less likely to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts to make their decisions. Without the incentive to engage trait-based shortcuts, the success rate of women candidates will increase. I expect, therefore, that this electoral design will have a positive effect on the success rate of women candidates, and thus that rate of increase in the percentage of women in the legislature will be higher in Spain than in Ireland.

When comparing the aggregate totals of women serving in legislatures, it is crucial to first discuss the possible effects of gender quotas. As I mentioned earlier, there are no legal quotas in either the Spanish or Irish legislature, but there are
voluntary party quotas. These quotas, however, are not powerful enough to dramatically affect the election results; they are self-enforced, and the majority of parties in both Ireland and Spain do not use any sort of gender quota at all. Thus, while the presence of voluntary party quotas could have a small effect on the number of women legislators, their design and presence in these two particular countries is nowhere near powerful enough to be driving these results.

---

30 Only one party in Spain, the PSOE, a major party based on a democratic socialist philosophy, employs a gender quota. In 1988, the PSOE instituted a 25 percent quota for the candidate lists, which called for 25% of the list slots to be held by women. This could be part of the explanation for the 5% increase between the election of 1986 and 1989, but it is unclear how effective this quota was - no list order requirement was included in the quota, which means that women could be placed at the bottom of the lists with little chance for election, but the party would appear as if they met the quota. In addition, this quota was voluntary, so there was no sanctioning mechanism in place if any of the lists did not adhere to the 25% women rule.

In 1997, the PSOE quota was revised to require that 40% of the party posts and elected legislative seats be held by women. This change could have affected the last two data points for Spain in the above figure, the elections of 2000 and 2004. In Ireland, three parties, all of them minor, employ gender quotas: In 1991, the Labour Party instituted a 20% quota for women candidates, and increased it to 25% in 1995. In 1993, the Democratic Left instituted a requirement that 40% of their candidates be women. And in 1997, the Green Party created a 40% quota for women candidates. Information on the gender quotas of Spain and Ireland was gathered from three sources: The Global Database on Quotas for Women (http://www.quotaproject.org), Threlfall, Monica. 2005 “Towards Party Representation in Party Politics” Gendering Spanish Democracy Eds. Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins, and Celia Valiente. Routledge: New York.125-161, and Galligan, Yvonne and Rick Wilford. 1999. “Gender and Party Politics in the Republic of Ireland” Contesting Politics: Women in Ireland, North and South Eds. Yvonne Galligan, Eilis Ward, and Rick Wilford. Boulder: Westview Press.149-168.
Even though the levels of representation of women are increasing at very different rates, the most obvious element of the figure above is the general trend upward over time in both countries. This trend reflects what is seen in almost every country in the world: as years pass, the percentage of women in office increases.

However, while both countries do demonstrate increases over time, the rate of growth is vastly different. Since the first election in 1977, the average growth in the percentage of women in the Spanish lower house is a 3.75% increase at each election. In Ireland, however, the growth rate is much slower - since 1977, the average increase in the percentage of women is 1.15%.
In general, the mid- to late-eighties marks the time when women began increasing their presence in politics and making strides forward in representation. Thus, examining the percentage of women in the legislature since that time could be a more accurate measure of the trends found today. Since the 1986 legislative election in Spain, the average growth rate is even higher: the percentage of women in the Congreso increases by an average of 5.18% at every election. There is little change, however, in the growth rate in Ireland: since 1987, the average increase is 1.22%. The difference between the rates of increase of these countries, I argue, is due in large part to the electoral system used to elect their lower houses. In Spain, where there is no decisive intraparty preference vote, the growth rate much higher than that of Ireland, where voters are faced with an intraparty preference vote and are relying upon trait-based information shortcuts in response.

**Corruption**

Both Spain and Ireland have experienced periods of publicized political corruption of extreme proportions, preceded and/or followed by years of relatively few scandals. This provides an opportunity to study both the effect of corruption on the representation of women, as well as the ways in which each electoral system modifies this effect. In the pages that follow, I discuss the publicized political corruption that occurred in the years before each election, and map out each significant incident on a timeline. The purpose of this is to establish when the most extreme publicized political corruption occurred, and to test its effect on the percentage of women candidates and office holders. I argue that, depending on the electoral system, corruption will have a
different effect on the representation of women. In other words, corruption does not cause an automatic increase in the percentage of women candidates and winners – its effects are fluid, and dependent on the electoral system.

If the electoral system includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, then corruption will have no effect on the rate at which women are entering office. If, however, the system does not include a decisive intraparty preference vote, then publicized political corruption will have a positive effect on the rate at which women are entering office. The reason why the effect of corruption is fluid is, I argue, because voters are more likely to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts when they are casting a ballot in a system with decisive intraparty competition. The majority of the trait-based shortcuts drawn from the female gender are negative, and thus, even when corruption changes the polarity of one shortcut (honest outsider), there are still many negative stereotypes being engaged (i.e., “she’s not a corrupt insider, but she’s submissive, irrational, and whiny”). In this electoral system type, therefore, because voters are selecting an individual, and are in turn both focusing on individual traits as well as assuming a more solitary, independent representative, women candidates will receive little, if any, benefit from corruption. However, when voters are in a system without decisive intraparty competition, a crucial shift occurs. Voters in this system vote for an unalterable group, not an individual, and thus they will balance the traits of the candidates in that group against one another. Further, because voters select an unalterable group, they are less likely to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts drawn from particular individuals, and if they do, any negative trait-based shortcuts will be balanced or checked by others in the group.
In addition, because party elites in a system without decisive intraparty competition are constructing unalterable lists, they can control who is serving as the ‘face of the party’ by placing them at the top of the list. When it is to their benefit (i.e., post-corruption), they can move women to the top of the list in the hopes of engaging the positive trait-based shortcut of honesty. This, in turn, allows them to be more responsive to corruption than parties in systems with decisive intraparty competition, and thus better able to increase the visibility of women candidates when it is of the most benefit to the party. Women candidates in this electoral system, therefore, will receive a significant benefit from corruption.

**CORRUPTION IN IRELAND**

At no point in time has Ireland been a country without corruption scandals. From the Locke Distillery Scandal of 1947 to the tumultuous career of former Prime Minister Haughey, examples of political corruption are peppered throughout Irish history; when analyzing scandals in this country, it is not a question of “if” but rather of “how much.” That being said, the volume of publicized political corruption scandals leading up to the 2002 legislative election is far and away the most extreme; Corruption of this severity and frequency had never before been matched. Before I describe the corruption found in the period of 1997-2002, however, it is important to set a standard with which to compare it. Thus, I will begin by discussing the incidents of corruption found in the two previous elections, and will then discuss the events leading up to the 2002 election.
During the period of 1989-1992, two significant political scandals occurred. While these incidents both involved officials at the highest posts of government, they also both revolved around events that occurred several years before, in 1982. The first incident was revealed in 1990, and involved a man serving as deputy prime minister and defense minister, as well as running as a candidate for president, Brian Lenihan. In January of 1982, the prime minister at the time (Garrett Fitzgerald of Fine Gael) asked the president to dissolve parliament due to a failed vote. Lenihan, a member of the party in opposition, Fianna Fáil, opposed the dissolution and was accused of calling the Irish president in January of 1982 so as to pressure him to not dissolve parliament. He later denied making this call, then admitted this in an interview, and then subsequently recanted his statements from the interview – his final position on the matter was that he did not make the phone call. In response to this behavior, many members of parliament called for his resignation. He refused, but Prime Minister Haughey chose to remove him from government rather than face a no confidence vote.

The second political scandal of the years of 1989-1992 involved Prime Minister Charles Haughey himself, and again concerned events of 1982. Haughey was not by any means considered a ‘clean’ politician, but had, until this point, been able to escape the consequences of the many accusations of corruption made against him over the years (hence his nickname of “the vampire”). A few months before the legislative election of 1992, however, he chose to resign when a former colleague declared that he had proof to support allegations that Haughey had ordered the
bugging of two prominent journalists’ telephones. Haughey never admitted any wrongdoing, but chose to retire shortly after this charge was filed.31

The years of 1992-1997 were, for the most part, uneventful. The one significant event of publicized, political corruption occurred in May of 1995 when Hugh Coveney, the Minister of Defense, was forced to resign from the cabinet after it was revealed that he pressured a state-owned company, the Irish Gas Board, to award a contract to his former firm. It was not until nearly the end of this period, in December 1996, when publicized, political corruption re-entered Irish politics. Michael Lowry, the Minister of Communications, Energy, & Transport, was accused of accepting a large monetary gift from Ben Dunne, founder and head of the department store chain “Dunnes Stores.” Lowry never admitted guilt, but resigned shortly after the accusation was made. In February of 1997, similar allegations against former Prime Minister Charles Haughey spurred the formation of what was known as the “McCacken Tribunal” and/or the “Dunnes payments tribunal.” This tribunal was formed to address accusations that Ben Dunne had also paid Haughey over IR£1.1 million during his tenure as prime minister. However, when the legislative election occurred on June 6, 1997, Haughey was denying all charges, many witnesses had not yet testified, and the tribunal had yet to pass any sort of verdict. At the time of this election, therefore, a storm was brewing, but there was little consistency to it beyond just accusations.

31 My primary source for the timeline of corruption in Ireland is newspaper articles. Too many articles were used to include citations in the text, and thus I have created a special section of the Works Cited page called “Works Cited- Ireland Corruption.” Any direct quotes from newspapers will be cited in the text.
Everything changed during the period of 1997-2002. When the McCracken Tribunal came to a close in August of 1997, the report published by the tribunal found that both Haughey and Lowry had received considerable amounts of money from Ben Dunne, and that both has neglected to report the payments. Further, the report recommended prosecution of former Prime Minister Haughey. In response to this report, the Dáil established the Moriarty Tribunal to further investigate the findings, and to determine if the gifts from Dunne had influenced political decisions of Haughey and Lowry. In May 1998, Hugh Coveney, the former Defense Minister, was questioned by the Moriarty tribunal due to his connections with the accountant who assisted Haughey and Dunne in coordinating the unreported monetary gifts. One week later, Coveney fell off of a cliff (it was never established whether the fall was suicide, murder, or an accident). In December of that same year, tax official Ronan Kelly determined that Haughey did not owe back taxes on a gift of over IR£1 million that he admitted receiving. Kelly, however, was the brother-in-law of the current prime minister, Bertie Ahern, who had served in the government of Haughey and frequently referred to him as a mentor. While Ahern denied any involvement beyond appointing his brother-in-law to the position, this decision caused an uproar in both the public and the Dáil.

Shortly after the creation of the Moriarty Tribunal, the Flood Tribunal was established in October, 1997 to investigate Foreign Minister Ray Burke. Burke was accused of accepting a large, undeclared payment from a developer in exchange for granting planning permission on 700 acres of land in Dublin. In addition, Burke was accused of selling Irish passports to a Saudi businessman while serving as the Minister
of Justice in 1990. Within weeks of the creation of this tribunal, Burke resigned. Through the testimony of developers, it was also revealed that fifteen Dublin councilors had also accepted cash from a developer. The testimony indicated on record that these were bribes, and that the councilors supported the new development in question only after receiving the money.

The Flood Tribunal subsequently turned their attention to Padraig Flynn, the sole European Commissioner representing Ireland in the EU. Allegedly, Flynn received, failed to report, and kept a donation of IR£50,000 intended for his party, Fianna Fáil, in the 1980s. He denied this accusation, but the situation exploded when the current Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern, was accused of having knowledge of and neglecting to report Flynn’s actions. Neither person ever admitted guilt, but the Flood Tribunal continued its investigation for several years. In May of 2000, the Flood Tribunal determined that over a 17 year period in politics, former Prime Minister Haughey received gifts of more that IR£8 million.

As the tribunals continued, several other political figures were accused and indicted on corruption charges. Denis Foley, a Fianna Fáil TD, resigned in 2000 after proof surfaced that he held offshore accounts which contained undocumented, untaxed money. During this same period, another Fianna Fáil TD who was serving on the Ethics Committee, Liam Lawlor, was also accused of financial corruption, and was sent to prison for refusing to cooperate with the Flood Tribunal’s inquiries into the allegation. Shortly thereafter, Ned O’Keeffe, the Minister of State with responsibility for food, resigned after it was revealed that O’Keeffe failed to declare his ownership of a pig farm and feed mill. Not only had he voted on legislation that would affect his
farm (without revealing his personal interest), but he also neglected to follow a “voluntary quality assurance scheme” created by the government to prevent the spread of disease. Bobby Molloy, another Minister of State and a member of the Progressive Democrats (the party in coalition with Fianna Fáil), was also forced to resign during this period. While never admitting intent to influence the judge, Molloy admitted that he did attempt to contact a judge during the sentencing phase of a trial on the behalf of the defendant, a father who raped his 9 year-old daughter.

As the 2002 election drew closer, the accusations and exposures of corruption slowed. Two significant events in 2002, however, served to remind any forgetful voters of the political corruption uncovered since the previous election. First, the Council of Europe, an independent political organization created to defend human rights and standardize legal practices across the continent, investigated the corruption in Ireland in January, 2002. Their report suggested that there was more corruption in Ireland than just what was officially reported, saying “while these high-profile cases may be isolated, they could also be the tip of the iceberg.”

The second event that propelled corruption back to the forefront was the beginning of the 2002 legislative campaign. When the election date was announced, not only did newspapers begin relentlessly recapping the corruption of the past years (with sensational titles such as “Contemplating five more years of clientelism” and “Lest we forget…”), an article composed of an ‘A to Z’ on corruption and Prime Minister Ahern’s possible

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involvement in all of it,\footnote{“Lest we Forget…” Sunday Tribune 28 April, 2002: 12. Lexis-Nexis Academic: World News Topics. Online. 10 June 2006.} but in addition, some opposition parties made the past corruption part of their campaigns. The Green Party was particularly focused on corruption, presenting several measures to “clean up politics” at their annual convention. Further, they also included statements referencing corruption in the introduction of their party manifesto:

The Celtic Tiger has been behaving like an Industrial Age alley cat. The current Tribunals are slowly revealing that not only were the established parties pursuing corrupt policies, but that many of the politicians who supported them were and are corrupt and dishonest. Green Party/Comhaontas Glas elected representatives have been to the fore in insisting that corrupt practices in land rezoning and cronyism are investigated.\footnote{“Green Party Manifesto: Election 2002.” Ireland, 2002: Introduction section: Page 2.}

While the intervals of time before the 1992 and 1997 elections were not without corruption, publicized political corruption in Ireland was clearly at its peak during the period of 1997-2002. Thus, if there are effects of corruption on the percentage of women in the Dáil, they should be most evident in the results of the 2002 election. However, because the Dáil employs an electoral system that includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, I argue that there will be no effect of corruption in this electoral context. That is, because the decisive intraparty preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts, and because many of the shortcuts associated with women candidates are based on negative stereotypes of personality traits (e.g., weak, whiny, irrational, gentle, submissive, etc.), the positive effect of corruption on the electoral success of women candidates will be muted. Therefore, based on the results from previous chapters, I would expect no
relationship between corruption and the percentage of women in the legislature in Ireland.

![Diagram showing change in the percentage of women elected to the lower house in Ireland under different corruption contexts.]

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union - www.ipu.org

**Figure 5.3:** Change in the percentage of women elected to the lower house in Ireland under different corruption contexts

The figure above demonstrates that publicized, political corruption has little, if any, effect on the percentage of women in the Dáil. In 2002, at the height of publicized political corruption, the percentage of women increased by about 1%. This is more of an increase than that of the 1997 election (where the percentage of women in the Dáil
actually decreased by 2%), but is much less of an increase than that of 1992. In the 1992 election, there was low corruption, and the percentage of women in office jumped by 6%. This result provides support for my theory that a decisive intraparty preference vote is powerful enough to dampen any possible positive effects of corruption on the election of women.

**CORRUPTION IN SPAIN**

Corruption scandals have never been absent from the politics of Spain- the Franco years were notorious for the amount of corruption present in government. Since the democratization of Spain, however, publicized political corruption had decreased dramatically, leaving most citizens with the assumption that, with a few exceptions here and there, political corruption was not even close to the levels found under Franco. The events leading up to 1996, however, broke that assumption: the level of political corruption preceding that election year was extreme and unprecedented. To best present the context of the 1996 election, I will again describe the surrounding election years as well.

During the years between the 1989 and 1993 legislative elections, publicized political corruption was relatively absent. There were, however two notable exceptions. First, in January of 1992, Minister of Health, Julian Garcia Valverde, was forced to resign after admitting to making illegal land purchases while president of the state railway. And the second and much more serious incident: the Filesa Affair. In May of 1991, the Spanish attorney general began investigating the allegation that the PSOE had been using a consulting companies, one of which was called “Filesa,” to
channel illegal funds to PSOE electoral campaigns. Employees of the consulting firm named PSOE senator Jose Maria Sala and PSOE congressman Carlos Navarro as the bosses of the company, and shortly thereafter, Navarro resigned. In 1992, the case was sent to a Supreme Court judge for a full investigation and, three days before the election of 1993, the judge had planned to announce his findings. The PSOE, however, successfully convinced the judge to wait until after the election to reveal his decision - the judge’s statement explained that he did not want to “distort the election result.”

Thus, when the voters went to the polls on June 6, 1993, there had been no formal conviction of anyone involved in the Filesa affair, and much of the information surrounding it had not yet been released.

The period from 1993 to the election of 1996 was the height of publicized, political corruption in Spain. In 1994, Mariano Rubio, the former governor of the Bank of Spain (1984-1992) who played a significant role in developing Spain’s economic policies was accused of tax fraud. This was not the first accusation of fraud against Rubio - only a few months before, Rubio was accused of providing confidential economic information to a small investment bank that shortly thereafter collapsed. Shortly after the charges were filed, Rubio was arrested and sent to prison. In response, Carlos Solchaga, Minister of the Economy, resigned his seat in parliament due to his close relationship and well-known support of Rubio.

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37 My primary source for the timeline of corruption in Spain is newspaper articles. Too many articles were used to include citations in the text, and thus I have created a special section of the Works Cited page called “Works Cited- Spain Corruption.” Any direct quotes from newspapers will be cited in the text.
Also in 1994, Luis Roldán, the head of the Civil Guard, was arrested for bribery and misappropriation of funds in a scandal unrelated to Rubio affair. Within weeks of his arrest, Roldán escaped from custody, went missing, and fled the country (he was later caught and arrested again, but was out of the country for several weeks). The PSOE government was accused of allowing Roldán to escape because he threatened to expose corruption of other members, and thus Antonio Asunción, the Minister of the Interior, resigned in response. Roldán was true to his word with respect to exposing more corruption: after his arrest, he accused José Luis Corcuera, the Minister of Justice, of being a key part of his system of illegal funding and bribery, causing Corcuera to resign.

In response to all of the publicized political corruption of 1994, Baltasar Garzón resigned as head of the national anti-drug campaign and from his seat as a member of the Congreso. Garzón was a former judge with a reputation for honesty, and resigned from the government due to what he referred to Prime Minister González’s “passive attitude” about corruption.38

The year of 1995 brought with it the most explosive corruption scandal: the GAL scandal, also known as the “Dirty War.” In the beginning of this year, an investigation began into accusations that in the mid-1980s, the PSOE government was directly involved in the murders of 23 members of the Basque separatist group, the ETA. The accusations charged the Ministry of the Interior with using a secret fund to create and fund the GAL, an anti-terrorist liberation group. Jose Barrionuevo and José

Luis Corcuera, were former ministers for Prime Minister Gonzalez during the period of GAL death squad killings of the mid-1980s, and both were accused of being involved in the GAL kidnappings and the payment of hush money. Witnesses within the government testified that the death squad killings were officially organized and condoned, and in turn, Rafael Vera, the former state Secretary of Security, was jailed for covering up GAL activity.

1995 also included the resignations of the Deputy Prime Minister Narcs Serra, the Minister of Defense Julian Garca Vargas, and the chief of Spain’s Secret Service, Emilio Alonso Manglano, after it was revealed that many government figures, including King Juan Carlos, had their phones illegally tapped by Spanish intelligence. In addition, the Filesa affair was concluded in 1995 when 39 people were charged with illegal financing, including the former PSOE treasurer, and several bank chairmen.

The legislative election of 1996, therefore, occurred after unprecedented corruption. One month before the election, Prime Minister Gonzalez did an interview with the newspaper “El Mundo” in which he acknowledged the damage that had been done, saying “if it were not for corruption, we would win the election relatively easily.”39 As expected, his party, the PSOE did not win a plurality, and the Partido Popular (PP) in coalition with the moderate Catalan Nationalists (CiU) took over the government.

Since 1996, there have been two more legislative elections: one in 2000 and the following in 2004. Neither the span of 1996-2000 nor the span of 2000-2004 had

publicized, political corruption anywhere near what Spain experienced from 1993-1996. There were, however, two incidents of note. The first occurred one month before the election of 2000, when the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Manuel Pimentel, resigned after a senior aide in his department was accused of funneling money to companies owned by aide’s wife. The second occurred in 2001, when the Foreign Minister, Josep Pique, was accused of involvement in the fraudulent sale of a company before he was minister. He denied all accusations, did not resign, and did not lose his seat. Thus, because the years of 1993-1996 held the most extreme corruption, and because the Congreso is elected with a system that does not include a decisive intraparty preference vote, I would expect the biggest increase in the percentage of women in office to occur at the 1996 election.
Figure 5.4: Change in the percentage of women elected to the lower house in Spain under different corruption contexts

The extreme corruption during the years of 1993-1996 makes a difference: the biggest increase in the percentage of women in office occurred in 1996. Those years with lower corruption, in contrast, had the lowest increases in the percentage of women who won. When comparing the above results to those of Ireland, the effect

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40 The increase found in the election of 2004 comes close to that of 1996, but I would argue that the jump in representation of women of that year is due, in part, to the fact that the PSOE dramatically increased their presence in the Congreso (they gained 39 seats). The PSOE is a left-wing party, and parties on that end of the ideological spectrum tend to run more women. Thus, their increase in seats
of corruption appears fluid: in Ireland, where there is a decisive intraparty preference vote, corruption has little, if any, effect on the percentage of women in office. In Spain, however, where there is no decisive intraparty preference vote, corruption has a positive effect on the number of women who enter the legislature. These results, I argue, demonstrate the voters’ changing use of trait-based information shortcuts. In Ireland, where the electoral system creates an incentive to rely upon the personal traits of the candidates to make a decision, there are too many negative stereotypes about women being activated for corruption to have a positive effect. But in Spain, where voters are not relying upon trait-based shortcuts to decide among candidates, and further, where voters are considering any trait-based shortcuts that are activated in the context of a group whose traits can balance one another, corruption has a positive effect on the representation of women.

Another way to analyze the effect of corruption in Spain is to examine the rankings of women candidates across time. Because the candidate lists in Spain are unalterable (i.e., there is no decisive intraparty preference vote), observing the differences in the rankings of women candidates over time can provide insight into the changing strategies of party elites. Ideally, this type of analysis would compare the rankings of women candidates found in the years 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2004. However, the candidate lists for 1993 are not yet available to me, and thus only the last three elections are in the following tests. This is, admittedly, not ideal because

would surely bring in a higher proportion of women than a seat increase of any other party. Further, the PSOE is the only party in Spain with a voluntary party gender quota and, while it is difficult to know how effective the quota was, it could certainly be a factor here.

41 Other than the most recent election, these lists are not available online. The only school in the US that has the book of 1993 lists is the Hoover Institute.
without the 1993 lists, I am unable to discuss the change in the positions of women candidates from pre-corruption 1993 to the corruption of 1996. However, even without 1993, I can present preliminary findings on the effect of corruption on the list rank of women candidates.

Following the logic of my previous hypotheses, I would expect that during times of corruption in Spain, more women candidates would be positioned at the top of the party lists. By making women the “face of the party” in post-corruption election, parties can purposefully try to engage the positive gender-based shortcut of “honest outsider” in their favor, and use the shortcut to reflect honesty on to the reputation of the entire party. Negative gender-based shortcuts would, of course, also be engaged by making a woman the face of the party, but will be less important to the voter because of the cognitive difference of voting for a group rather than an individual (i.e., the ‘balancing effect’ discussed in chapter 3).

In order to test the effect of corruption on the list rank of women candidates, I gathered the names of all candidates who ran for election to the Congreso in the years 1996, 2000, and 2004. Then, just as I did in Chapter 4, I removed all parties from the analysis that either had no winners in any district or no incumbents in any district. Further, I also removed any candidate that ran as an “independent” (defined as not being affiliated with any political party). Next, again following the procedures detailed in Chapter 4, I coded the genders of the candidates based on the names provided. I began by collecting common male and female names from websites.

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42 A complete explanation for this decision can be found in Chapter 4.
devoted to baby names\textsuperscript{43}, and then coded the names on the party lists based on this collection. If the name was either uncommon or androgynous (i.e., Pat could be either male or female), then I searched for a picture of the candidate in question. If no picture was found, the candidate was removed from the analysis. The candidate lists for the Cortes include both the main or primary candidates, as well as lists of substitutes; no substitutes were included in the following test.

\textsuperscript{43} The following websites were used: www.babynology.com, www.thinkbabynames.com, and www.babynamenetwork.com. If one website disagreed with another regarding whether a name was male or female, the name was considered androgynous and picture evidence was collected.
The figure above presents the percentage of women candidates placed at the top list position (i.e., ranked as number one) in each election year. Of the total number of women candidates who ran in post-corruption election of 1996, about 7.5% held the top list rank. In the election that followed, the low corruption election of 2000, only 5.5% of the women who ran were placed at the top of the list. This difference provides evidence for the theory that the corruption of 1996 caused party elites to purposefully try to activate the “honest outsider” cue by making more women the face of the party.
However, while that result is promising, no firm conclusions on the validity of the theory can be made due to the 2004 list rankings: of the women candidates who ran in that election, 8.5% held the top ranking on the list. Because of the relatively low level of corruption before the 2004 election, this result is unexpected. The 2004 result could simply be an outlier, perhaps the effect of another variable that intervened in the 2004 election campaign – without additional election years, it is difficult to know.

**CONCLUSION**

In an effort to provide a more detailed analysis of the effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote and publicized political corruption, this chapter focused on the representation of women in Spain and Ireland. Using legislator gender as a test trait, I compared the electoral results of these two countries and found support for my theory that the presence of decisive intraparty competition causes voters to rely more upon trait-based information shortcuts than they would in a system without that electoral institution. In addition, by testing the effect of publicized political corruption on the percentage of women elected, I found evidence for my theory that the effects of corruption are fluid, and dependent upon the electoral system. Finally, I introduced the issue of list rank position, and tested whether corruption influenced where women were placed on party lists. While some preliminary evidence supported my theory that corruption will cause party elites to place women at the top of the list, the results are inconclusive. This is clearly an area for future research.


WORKS CITED - SPAIN CORRUPTION


CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Giovanna Melandri, a legislator in the Italian Camera dei Deputati and currently serving as Minister of Sport in Prodi’s cabinet, first ran for legislative election in 1994. This election was the first since the conclusion of the “Mani Pulite” corruption probe, in which literally hundreds of local and national representatives were accused and convicted of political corruption. In her campaign, Melandri ran with a slogan that called attention to her gender as well as to the stereotype that women are honest outsiders: “parola dei donna” – translated as “the word of the woman.” When I interviewed her about this race, she explained that she chose that slogan because “after the corruption scandals… being a woman was something which was useful.” In future races, however, her slogans emphasized neither her gender nor any stereotypes about honesty. She explained that “in 1994/95, it (being a woman) was a benefit- I think it’s not a benefit anymore… women are considered too naïve, they don’t exercise power… you need to be harsh and hard-hearted.”

The experience of Giovanna Melandri illustrates the power of information shortcuts, as well as the importance of studying the contextual effects on the cues that voters will take and parties will give. The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the effect of an electoral rule, the decisive intraparty preference vote, on the voters’ use of trait-based information shortcuts and, in turn, on the candidate selection decisions of party elites. In the first substantive chapter, I examined the effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the voters’ use of trait-based information

44 Melandri, Giovanna. Personal interview. 25 May 2005.
shortcuts through a cross-country analysis of the percentage of women serving in the legislature. I found that when there is no decisive intraparty preference vote, women tend to do better, and when there is a decisive intraparty preference vote, women tend to do worse. I argued that this difference is explained by the voters’ reliance upon trait-based information shortcuts in the systems with decisive intraparty competition.

Next, I demonstrated that the way in which information shortcuts are interpreted – and how they affect women candidates – depends on the political and electoral context of the race. In particular, I found that in elections after publicized political corruption, the “honest outsider” shortcut benefited women, but that this effect was not constant across all electoral systems - only in systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote did women candidates see a benefit from corruption. If the decisive intraparty preference vote is present, too many negative trait-based shortcuts are engaged by the voters, and thus women will gain no advantage from corruption.

In the fourth chapter, I examined the party elite response to the voters’ use of trait-based information shortcuts through an analysis of candidate selection. Using a cross-country analysis of the selection rates of women candidates for party lists, I demonstrated that the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative, significant effect on the percentage of women selected for the lists. This result, I argued, was due to the change in selection strategy of party elites, which is driven by the use of trait-based information shortcuts by voters in electoral systems with intraparty competition.
And finally, to confirm the plausibility of these findings, I presented detailed case studies of two countries, Ireland and Spain. From the Ireland case, it was confirmed that the decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative effect on the success of women legislators, and that publicized, political corruption provides no benefit to women running in this electoral system. The discussion of Spain, however, demonstrated that more women win in systems without decisive intraparty competition, and that corruption is beneficial to women candidates in this electoral environment. Together, these cases present a real-world picture of the specific effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote and corruption, as well as party elite response to these two phenomena, across the legislative elections of the past fifteen years.

Contributions

In addition to the specific findings on the effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote, this dissertation makes a number of important contributions. First, I expand the existing analysis of information shortcuts outside of the United States case, offering the first analysis of the interplay between electoral systems and information shortcuts in comparative perspective. Second, this project extends existing work on candidate selection by going beyond the dichotomy of PR versus SMD to explore the effects of electoral rule variation within PR. Third, I address the broader literature of the “personal vote,” adding an understanding of the effect of negative stereotypes drawn from personal traits. And finally, this work contributes importantly to our understanding of the issues and inequalities involved in the representation of women.
in legislatures. The electoral success of women candidates works well as a test of the other issues at stake here, but it is also a critically important issue in its own right; women continue to be consistently underrepresented in politics across the globe. Gaining a better understanding of the electoral mechanisms and perceptions behind this trend is crucial.

One of the most important contributions of this dissertation was its investigation of the effect of electoral variables on the use of information shortcuts. Because existing scholarship on information shortcuts has been heavily focused on only the United States case, it has not before addressed the consequences of electoral variables on the shortcuts engaged in the voter calculus. My findings suggest that the electoral design affects the types of information shortcuts engaged by voters, and therefore, that we should consider information shortcut variation as a consequence of electoral reform and design. In addition, previous scholarship on information shortcuts has employed surveys, experiments, and investigations of campaign commercials to test for the use and effects of information shortcuts. I chose to use none of the above, and instead created hypotheses that can be tested through an analysis of electoral institutions, corruption incidents, and their subsequent effects on aggregate numbers of female representatives. By using a new method, I extended these analyses outside of the campaign and outside of the US, and examined how national events, institutional structure, and factors exogenous to the specific campaigns are affecting the use and polarity of information shortcuts.

The subject of candidate selection by party elites was also engaged by this dissertation. Existing scholarship has neglected to investigate whether candidate
selection strategies change depending on the type of proportional representation used to elect the legislature. Instead, its focus has been on the PR versus SMD dichotomy, and on demonstrating that selecting candidates with a variety of personal traits (i.e., diversity) can be beneficial in PR systems but harmful in SMD systems (Gallagher & Marsh 1988, Ware 1996, Goetz 2003, Norris 2004). This dissertation opened up the category of PR, and examined whether or not diversity on the candidate lists is indeed beneficial in any and every type of PR. Using a cross-country analysis of the selection rates of women candidates for party lists, I demonstrated that the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote has a negative, significant effect on the percentage of women selected for the lists, and thus that we cannot assume that regardless of the type of PR, diversity is a priority for selectors. Instead, I argued that the presence of decisive intraparty competition changes the selection strategy of party elites; because of the use of trait-based information shortcuts by voters in electoral systems with intraparty competition, diversity is not as beneficial as it is in lists in electoral systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote. By unpacking proportional representation and analyzing the effects of institutional differences within this system, we are given a greater understanding as to why traits that are valued in a group setting are considered negative when the candidates are alone.

Beyond the contribution to our knowledge of the use and effect of information shortcuts, this project also expands the scope of the literature on the consequences of the personal vote. Existing literature on the relationship between electoral institutions and the personal vote has demonstrated that the share of a candidate’s support that is drawn from personal qualities rather than partisan alignment is affected by electoral
variables such as district magnitude, the presence of a preference vote, and use of separate representatives for each geographical region (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987; Bowler & Farrell 1993; Carey & Shugart 1995; Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen 2005). Current scholarship has also demonstrated that candidates pursuing an individualistic strategy will tend to emphasize personal traits that the voters will find appealing. Examples of such traits include city of origin, previous service in the legislature, military service, etc. My findings, however, present a new dimension to our understanding of the consequences of the personal vote. I found that in systems with a personal vote, we cannot assume that candidates will draw support from their personal traits because there are certain personal attributes could have a negative effect on the voters’ perceptions of them. While they can work to de-emphasize or even hide those traits, some attributes, such as race or gender, can be engaged by the voter without the consent of the candidate. In turn, if voters are associating the gender or race of the candidate with negative stereotypes, the candidate will be less likely to win than in a system with no personal vote. In other words, we should not assume that candidates can completely control which of their personal attributes are noticed and engaged by the voters, and thus we must account for the fact that when an electoral system draws attention to the individual, this could have negative consequences for diversity.

Because I used the representation of women in legislatures as a way to test for the use of trait-based information shortcuts, this dissertation also contributes to our knowledge of the effect of electoral systems on the number of women elected to office and selected to run. Existing research on the intraparty preference vote had concluded that this electoral institution would have a positive effect on women’s representation:
Shugart (1994) argued that women could have an advantage due to the incentives of intraparty competition to emphasize personal characteristics that both make one different and that allow one to create personal ties with constituents on the basis of those differences. Rule (1994) also expected intraparty competition to be beneficial for women, but uses a different line of reasoning to support her argument. In her reasoning, she works from the assumption that the parties, not the voters, are functioning to keep the number of women serving in the legislatures low, for she contends that when the electorate is given the option to move women candidates toward the top of the party list in this system type, they will indeed choose to do so.

Thus, from this assumption, one could argue that voters, when given the chance, will work in the interest of equality, moving these women closer to the top of the list, and thereby dramatically increasing the chances that the female candidates will be elected. More recently, the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, a group of constituents in British Columbia chosen to research and select a replacement for the existing legislative electoral system, released a report in 2004 that agreed with Rule’s logic and prediction for the positive effects of intraparty competition. In their report - which was sent to every household in BC - they justified their choice of STV (the archetypal decisive intraparty preference vote system), saying:

BC-STV increases choices, allowing voters a much greater say in determining who will be their local representatives. It allows voters to choose between candidates and parties, it lets voters show which candidates they prefer and in what order, and it ensures that their preferences count. *This will provide increased opportunities for candidates from underrepresented groups.* (my emphasis)  

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Gallagher (2005) does not agree that intraparty competition will be beneficial for women, but argues that it will not be harmful either. After discussing the possible reasons for the low percentage of women serving in the Irish legislature, Gallagher states that their electoral system is not at fault, saying “there is in fact no reason to suppose that matters would be much different under a different electoral system.”

The results of my dissertation contradict the arguments of all of the above authors. Using comparative, cross-temporal analyses as well as discussions of case studies, I have demonstrated that fewer women are elected by voters and selected by party elites in electoral systems that include a decisive intraparty preference vote. When the electoral design does not include a decisive intraparty preference vote, it is almost as if a ‘natural’ gender quota has been built into the system – the absence of this electoral rule virtually guarantees that more women will be elected. The importance of this finding cannot be overstated: it is crucial that, in our debates of which electoral system is “best” and when we are employed as expect advisors for the redesign of electoral systems, we have full knowledge of the consequences of the electoral designs that we recommend. Women have made considerable advances in legislative representation over the few decades, however the majority of western countries, including those considered “advanced” democracies, consistently fail to elect legislatures that even come close to reflecting the gender breakdown in society. This mass under-representation silently reinforces inequalities of the past, demonstrating without words that women are unfit or unable to hold power and lead nations.

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Further, as women become more equal in society, these disproportional governments that have not kept pace with feminist gains alienate citizens from the decisions of leaders, threatening the legitimacy of democracy itself. The issue and causes of under-representation, therefore, should not be taken lightly, and the effects of electoral design on the percentage of women running in office must be considered and addressed by every scholar who is advising electoral reform.

**Further Research**

This dissertation also raises some interesting questions that I will pursue in further research. First, I would like to perform an experiment in which I am able to directly observe how the voters’ decision process changes when faced with choosing among unalterable groups of candidates versus individual candidates. I have theorized that voters will balance the traits of the candidates who are presented as an unalterable group, but when given the opportunity to choose specific members of that same group, voters will not balance the traits of likely winners but rather assume that their legislator of choice will behave in a more solitary, individualistic manner. An experiment will allow me to analyze this further, and to examine the way that the cognitive processes of voters depend on and respond to differences in the ballot. In addition, an experiment such as this will allow me to further test my theory that certain electoral rules cause voters to rely more upon trait-based information shortcuts than others.
Another avenue for future research addresses the question of when and why parties implement voluntary gender quotas. Because of my finding of the positive relationship between corruption and the representation of women in systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote, I would like to examine how this might impact the implementation and effect of gender quotas. That is, if, during post-corruption periods, it is beneficial to the parties in this electoral environment to call attention to their women candidates (i.e., their “honest outsiders”), then party elites in this context should be more willing to institute voluntary quotas and be more likely to follow existing quota laws. I would, therefore, expect more quotas to be created and respected during an election year after publicized, political corruption.

In addition, I would also like to extend the analysis of the effects of electoral variables found in this project with an examination of the effect of single-member districts versus proportional representation on the use of information shortcuts. Countries that employ mixed-member electoral systems offer near-experimental conditions for examining the effects of these different electoral configurations, and will thus serve as excellent cases for this type of analysis. I would like to compare the use of the party cue in both tiers of this electoral system, as well as investigate the variation in the use of trait-based information shortcuts. Additionally, I will compare the use of information shortcuts across different mixed member systems, with specific attention given to learning whether the effects of this system change when it is compensatory (i.e., when there is linkage between the tiers).

Finally, I would like to further address the effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote on diversity through an analysis of how this electoral rule affects the
electoral success of candidates from under-represented racial, ethnic, and religious groups. If, as I have argued, voters are engaging stereotypes as trait-based information shortcuts, then this should affect more than just women candidates – I should find more diversity of every kind in legislatures elected in systems without the decisive intraparty preference vote.
WORKS CITED


