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"Faith" as Cover-up: An Ethical Fable from Early Modern Italy

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We wish to thank the Department of Italian Studies for supporting the lecture and the publication of this issue.
Preface

The goal of this series is to foster scholarship on campus by providing new faculty members with the opportunity to share their research interest with their colleagues and students. We see the role of an academic library not only as a place where bibliographic materials are acquired, stored, and made accessible to the intellectual community, but also as an institution that is an active participant in the generation of knowledge.

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Editorial Board
‘Faith’ as Cover-Up:

An Ethical Fable from Early Modern Italy
Introduction

One of the great pleasures of academic life - though, strange to say, it often goes unappreciated - is that of having colleagues; and a greater pleasure than this - because it is rarer - is that of having new colleagues; and the greatest pleasure of all is having new colleagues of outstanding achievement and stature, the kind who both play a leading role in the development of their subject and make a lasting and memorable contribution to the teaching of students at all levels. If they can also be relied upon to sit on committees and turn up at faculty meetings, any sensible department Chair will think him- or herself to have reached the peak of human felicity, and will very probably begin making arrangements for a lengthy and long overdue sabbatical leave.

As Chair of the Department of Italian Studies, I find myself in that happy position today. It is my pleasure and privilege to present to the wider University community my new colleague Albert Russell Ascoli, who satisfies in exemplary fashion the requirements I outlined a moment ago, and whose arrival at Berkeley sets the seal on the recent and sometimes arduous process through which Italian Studies on this campus have been thoroughly re-vitalized and set on an entirely new organizational footing, after many difficult years of struggle against unfriendly institutional circumstances.

Albert Ascoli holds a Ph.D. in Romance Studies from Cornell University, and taught there briefly before accepting an appointment at Northwestern University in 1982. There he rose through the ranks to become Professor in 1995, holding a number of prestigious fellowships along the way, as well as visiting positions at Yale and UC Berkeley, where he was Chair of Italian Culture in the Fall semester 1995. He is the author of Ariosto's Bitter Harmony: Crisis and Evasion in the Italian Renaissance (Princeton UP, 1987), a book of extraordinary resonance in the field of Italian Renaissance studies, published to universal acclaim and continually cited by scholars following in his footsteps during the last decade. In 1993 he edited, along with another recent arrival at Berkeley, Victoria Kahn, a substantial collection of articles entitled Machiavelli and
the Discourse of Literature (Cornell UP); and a book on Dante, *From “Auctor” to “Author”: Dante and the Invention of Vernacular Authorship* is currently in press. He has published many articles and reviews on medieval and early modern topics, and is presently engaged on a major contribution to the cultural definition of the Renaissance, entitled *Timely Ironies: Essays in Historical Understanding of the Renaissance*. In Albert Ascoli, Berkeley adds another outstanding figure to its rich roster of scholars standing at the heart of early modern studies as they are currently practiced in North America and internationally, and I ask you to join me in welcoming him warmly to our midst.

*Steven N. Botterill, Chair*
*UCB, Department of Italian Studies*
Introductory Remarks

Thank you Steven, for a most generous introduction. I'm grateful to the library staff, and especially to AnnMarie Mitchell, for this opportunity to “inaugurate” myself at Berkeley, and especially to do it in tandem with Ralph Hexter. The paper I'm giving today addresses the relationship between contingency and the ideal. And in itself it blends both. First of all, it was all I had to hand when asked two months ago to do this. Nonetheless, it seems in many ways the perfect introduction to my work, because, in the authors and even in the texts it covers, it goes back very near to my beginnings as a professional scholar and taps into themes that have been consistently central for me (translation: don’t stop me if you’ve heard this one before). Perhaps most importantly, and for better or worse, it displays my basic, and by now rather antiquated, critical practice: close and extensive textual readings, taken as the indispensable ground for speculative engagement with literary, intellectual, political, and other histories. Finally, I would like to note, and not simply in passing, that the book which first opened up this particular problem in Ariosto, as well as many, many others, was Robert M. Durling's now classic study The Figure of the Poet in Renaissance Epic.¹ I am very glad Bob is here today, although I have no hope that even a captatio benevolentiae of this type will keep him, and the rest of my many friends here, from asking the most probing and critical questions after I have spoken my piece.
Niccolò Machiavelli, in the 18th chapter of the *Prince*, entitled "Quomodo fides de principibus sit servanda" [How faith should be kept by princes] provides the following infamous advice to the Medici family, in the process systematically and deliberately violating the most cherished tenets of the moral and political philosophies of his time, and perhaps ours as well:

Quanto sia laudabile in uno principe mantenere la fede, e vivere con integrità, ciascuno lo intende: non di manco, si vede per esperienza ne' nostri tempi, quelli principi avere fatto gran cose che della fede hanno tenuto poco conto, e che hanno saputo con l'astuzia aggrirare e' cervelli delli uomini: et alla fine hanno superato quelli che si sono fondati in sulla lealtà.²

[How praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith and to live with integrity, is known to everyone; nonetheless, we see from experience in these times that those princes have done great things who have taken little account of faith and who have understood how to befuddle the minds of men through their cleverness; and in the end they have exceeded those who grounded themselves in loyalty.]

The faith of which Machiavelli speaks here is clearly not religious faith—the Pauline "argument of things unseen, the substance of things hoped for" [Hebrews 1:11]—but rather an ethical faithfulness. It consists in the making of a promise, the giving of a word, which commits the one who makes that promise to turn his words into reality, according to Cicero's Stoic etymology in the *De officiis*, "quia fiat quod dictum est, appellatam fidem" [I.vii.23: because it enacts what it speaks, it is called faith].³

Chapter 18, in fact, culminates a sequence in the *Prince* where Machiavelli confronts the normative system of moral virtues that had dominated Western culture from the Greeks and Romans through his own day, and argues that what might be personally preferable in moral terms was often not politically efficacious (according to the "the effectual truth of things" [ch. 15: la verità effettuale della cosa]).⁴ *Fides* is not, technically, one of the cardi-
nal, classical virtues enumerated by Aristotle and his heirs, but Machiavelli clearly sees it as paradigmatic, precisely because it mediates explicitly between inner intention and outer experience, between the ethical and personal domain, on the one hand, and the political and public, on the other. Furthermore, his society understood fede in this sense to be the normative bond for all interpersonal and institutional relationships, from the erotic to the diplomatic, and one that sealed a connection between the inner person and the society and state of which he (or she, though the normative Renaissance person is male) is a part, thus harmonizing ethics and politics. Machiavelli's conclusion, obviously, is that ethics and politics cannot always coexist, that the former must typically be sacrificed to the latter. Thus, he says, "a prince, and particularly a new prince, cannot observe all of those precepts on account of which men are considered 'good,' since he is often constrained, in order to preserve the state, to go against his promised faith .... Thus it is necessary that he have a mind disposed to change according to the commands of the winds and the variations of fortune" [uno principe, e massime uno principe nuovo, non può osservare tutte quelle cose per le quali li uomini sono tenuti buoni, sendo spesso necessitato, per mantenere lo stato, operare contro alla fede ... E però bisogna che elli abbi uno animo disposto a volgersi secondo ch'è venti e le variazioni della fortuna li comandano ...]. This last imperative would have been particularly unsettling to a culture steeped in a neo-stoic, but also courtly-chivalric, ethics of faithful outward and inward constancy, as articulated for example in Castiglione's normative description of the ideal cortegiano, who is obliged to be at once loyal to himself and to his princely master, who possesses "integrity of faith and ... an unconquered soul" [I.xviii: [la] integrità di fede e [l'] animo invitto], and who "always is equal to himself" [sempre si vegga esser tale]. What scandalizes most here, however, is not the empirical-historical claim that ethics were and are often violated for political motives; Castiglione himself makes it clear elsewhere that he knows this goes on all the time. Rather, the problem is that Machiavelli is willing to violate the unwritten code, what we might call ideology
today, that prohibits explicitly advocating amoral behavior, however much one may tacitly accept its existence in practice.⁶

In addition, Machiavelli’s treatment of fede not only operates as a hinge between ethics and politics, but also between ethical faith as word of promise and religious faith as the evidence of things unseen (which is always the first of the three theological virtues of Christianity). Machiavelli’s prime example of how faith is to be observed by princes is that perverse prince of the Church, Roderigo Borgia, Pope Alexander the Sixth, and he pointedly recommends acting not only against the ethical virtues, but also “against charity [third and greatest of the theological virtues], against humanity, against religion” [contro alla carità, contro alla umanità, contro alla religione]. Moreover this treatment of fede, which began in terms of the spoken word, ultimately focuses on a question of vision: “thus, it is not necessary for a prince to have all of the above-mentioned virtues, but it is certainly necessary that he seem to have them” [A uno principe, adunque, non è necessario avere tutte le soprascritte qualità, ma è bene necessario parere di averle]. Thus, if the prince must act against religion, nonetheless “let him appear all piousness, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion. Nothing is more necessary than to appear to have this last quality. Men in general judge more with their eyes than with their hands.... Everyone sees what you seem to be, few have touched what you are” [paia ... tutto pietà, tutto fede, tutto integrità, tutto umanità, tutto religione. E non è cosa più necessaria parere di avere, che questa ultima qualità. E li uomini in universal iudicano più alli occhi che alle mani .... Ognuno vede quello che tu pari, pochi sentono quello che tu se’]. Machiavellian, Borgian, papal “faith” works, in short, because of the blind belief of the people in what they see and are told. Lifting the veil on papal machinations, Machiavelli reduces religious as well as ethical fede to the domain of political effects, and at least hints that Christian faith is no more than a convenient ideological fiction concealing the apparatus of sheer human greed for power, a point he explores more fully in the Discourses.⁷ In many ways, then, Machiavelli’s analysis of fede in relation to the institution of the Church names an ideological crisis, to which
Martin Luther's near-contemporaneous redefinition of the nature of Faith offers itself as a solution.⁸

Let us now turn to a contemporary of Machiavelli, Castiglione, and Luther, Ludovico Ariosto, the first edition of whose epic-romance Orlando furioso was published in 1516, one year before we believe the Prince to have taken on its definitive form (though Machiavelli had first composed it in 1513).⁹ The Furioso, dedicated to the Este princes of Ferrara, in whose service Ariosto spent his whole life, purports, among other things, to give a genealogical account of the founding of their dynasty, much as Virgil's Aeneid chronicles the foundation both of Rome and of the gens Iulia, as it retells and embellishes the story of Charlemagne and his paladins. The poem is a narrative tour-de-force, a work of exceptional structural complexity—weaving together the tales of some ten principal characters with those of dozens of minor personages, intercalated allegories and free-standing tales-within-the-tale, not to mention the vaunted and often intricately ironic interventions of the Ariostan narrator the poetic "I" who incessantly comments on his own writing, over the course of forty-six cantos of roughly one hundred octaves each.¹⁰

In traditional critical formulations, and in the empirical experience of the reader, Ariosto's vision seems worlds apart from that of his now more-famous contemporary. The Furioso's primary focus is on a world of chivalric fantasy—"of ladies and knights, arms and love"—which was already clearly irrelevant to the realities of early Cinquecento Italy nearly a century before Cervantes damned such books as madness.¹¹ To the extent that it does engage the most pressing contemporary ethical and political issues, it most often, at least at an explicit level, reinforces the standing of those in power and adopts positions largely in keeping with the dominant ideologies of a humanist-trained aristocracy. Precisely for that reason, one supposes, the Furioso became the most widely read book in Europe during the sixteenth century.¹²

Still, it is not that difficult to locate significant thematic connections between the two works, or to find little chinks in Ariosto's
ideological armor (and I might add that I have spent a good many years applying a critical crowbar to those vulnerable spots). In an early proem, the typical intervention of the Ariostan narrator at the beginning of each of the 46 cantos that make up the poem, a sentiment is expressed not so far from that at the heart of chapter 18:

Quantunque il simular sia le più volte ripreso, e dia di mala mente indici, si truova pur in molte cose e in molte aver fatti evidentì benefici, e danni e biasmi e morti aver già tolte; che non conversiam sempre con gli amici in questa assai più oscura che serena vita mortal, tutta d’invidia piena. [4.1]13

[Even though simulation may be condemned more often than not, and may give indications of an evil mind, still one finds that in many, many cases it has had evident benefits and has removed harms and blamings and deaths. And this is because we don't always converse with friends in this mortal life, far more shadowed than sunny, brimful of envy.]

These are words that come very close to Machiavelli's justification of the ruthless advice he is giving: “And if all men were good, this precept would not be good; but since they are evil, and would not keep faith with you, you also shouldn't keep it with them” [E, se li uomini fussino tutti buoni, questo precetto non sarebbe buono; ma perché sono tristi e non la osservarebbano a te, tu etiam non l’hai ad osservare a loro].

More frequently, however, the Ariostan narrator seems at the antipodes from Machiavelli, and no more so than in his own discussion of how faith should be observed in the proem that opens the twenty-first canto of the Furioso:

Né fune intorto crederò che stringa soma così, nè così legno chiodo, come la fè ch’una bella alma cinga del suo tenace indissolubil nodo.
Nè dagli antiqui par che si dipinga
la santa Fè vestita in altro modo,
che d'un vel bianco che la cuopra tutta:
ch'un sol punto, un sol neo la può far brutta.
La fede unqua non debbe esser corrotta,
o data a un solo, o data insieme a mille;
e così in una selva, in una grotta,
lontan da le cittadi e da le ville,
come dinanzi a tribunali, in frotta
di testimon, di scritti e di postille,
 senza giurare o segno altro più espresso,
basti una volta che s'abbia promesso. [21.1-2]

[Neither will I believe that a twisted cable will bind a burden, nor a nail fix a piece of wood, more tightly than the faith that embraces a lovely soul in its tenacious, indissoluble knot. Nor by the ancients is Holy Faith depicted as dressed in any other way than in a white veil that covers her entirely, so that a single spot, one sole blemish, can make her ugly. Faith must never be corrupted, whether given to one alone or all at once to a thousand, just the same in a dark wood, in a cave, far from cities and habitations, as before tribunals, before crowds of witnesses, with documents and codicils. Without swearing, or any other more explicit sign, it is enough to have promised one time.]

The passage is as striking for the fervor and absoluteness of its celebration of Faith's defining purity, as for its apparent optimism concerning the possibility that human beings could keep faith in this absolute sense. It is tempting to find a direct connection to Machiavelli here, especially since, as we will see, some of the language of the surrounding text tends to confirm such a hypothesis, though there are serious philological problems involved in defining the nature and even the existence of such a connection. In any case, where Machiavelli violently rips the veil off fede to reveal the interested political motives manipulating religious beliefs and ethical values, Ariosto decidedly replaces the veil in all its pristine, spotlessly white integrity. The faith depicted here is certainly the ethical faith of the promised word, given and kept, ideally conceived and empirically realized. What is more important is that it
is absolutely severed not only from the public domain of politics and law, but indeed from any form of interpersonal commitment whatsoever: the bond is one made between the self and itself. Faith, in other words, is both removed from all instrumental functions (it is not justified by the relations it creates within a social order, and, if directed toward other persons, it can take no account of what sort of person they are, how one feels about them, and so on) and from any historical, cultural specificity. It is common to the classical ancients, to Ariosto's contemporary audience, and to the world of Charlemagne's knights that lies between them in the historical order; it must be observed at any time, and in any place, regardless of conditioning circumstances. In effecting this divorce of Faith from contingency in all its forms, the narrator puts it on an absolute and even metaphysical ground. He even hints broadly at this transcendent al aspect of fede in the poem: he calls it "santa," an adjective usually reserved for the Christian faith itself in the Furioso [cf., 34. 53 and 56; 38.22].

In short, Ariosto "naturalizes" and even "supernaturalizes" again a value and a mode of behavior whose ideological workings Machiavelli so deliberately exposes. Paradoxically, therefore, it might appear that he contributes to restoring, or at least reaffirming, its cultural effectiveness (since ideology works best, perhaps only works, when its character as ideology does not appear). It is curious, however, that in stressing how the value of Faith is lost by the smallest contamination, the Ariostan narrator also points to the possibility that if such a contamination should occur after all, the whole ethos it embodies could collapse. Moreover, it is striking that, just like Machiavelli, although from precisely the opposite direction, Ariosto seemingly severs all direct ties between ethics and politics: Holy Faith must be blindly observed by the individual regardless of interpersonal attachments or community considerations. Finally, there is the curiously tantalizing iconography of personified Faith swathed in its pure white veil—but we will come back to that issue toward the end of my talk.

Now, instead, I want to pursue the process of complicating, conditioning, and rendering contingent the apparently simple,
unconditional, and non-contingent account of faith in canto 21 by another route: by looking closely at the narrative complex that surrounds these two proemial stanzas and that quite clearly furnishes the occasion for making this pronouncement. But before I do that (and in these deferrals I must admit I am imitating Ariosto himself), I have to talk briefly about the Renaissance idea of exemplarity. As most of you know, the basic pedagogical model of medieval and Renaissance culture is that of the *exemplum* and the *sententia* or "sentence." Common alike to ethical, political, historical, and literary writing, the *exemplum* is a narrative pointing toward and illustrating a general principle, called the *sententia*. It is often drawn from history (as is the example of Alexander VI in Machiavelli's chapter), but can equally well be fictive or mythological (as in the famous fable of Chiron, not to mention the simile of the fox and the lion, both also in the *Prince* ch. 18). The *exemplum* has a double epistemological and ethical structure, or to put it differently, it is at once *constative* (it describes something for the reader) and *performative* (it is meant to have an effect on the reader, who puts himself in a relation of imitation or emulation to it). To describe the operation of the exemplum in its ideal form: an exemplary narrative is presented, from which the author deduces a general rule of conduct, which is then in turn made accessible for imitation by the reader using the same exemplum or a related one. Recently, critics of the early modern period have suggested that the historiography and the epideictic rhetoric of exemplarity tended increasingly toward complications in and failures of the straightforward *exemplum—sententia—exemplum* model. On the one hand, *exempla* typically failed to encompass the variations in historical *circostanze* that a Guicciardini or even a Castiglione would insist on accounting for. On the other, they did not address the existential problems that their contemporary readers faced in re-applying the *sententia* in their own individual experience.

The point, of course, is that this Ariostan proem on *fede*, like its fellows, is precisely a *sententia*, suggested by the story of Marfisa, Gabrina, and Zerbino that precedes it in canto 20, and further illustrated, or, perhaps better, "tested," by the complex story-
within-a-story that takes up the rest of canto 21. These exemplary stories, and particularly one of them, constitute the “ethical fable” to which the title of my talk refers. Examining their explicit, and, even more, their implicit, relation to the proem will confirm that Ariosto’s approach to fede is that of problematizing rather than of affirming its nature and function, in a way ultimately more radical than Machiavelli’s (because it undermines the possibility, which Machiavelli obviously embraces, of substituting one general rule [faith must be observed] with another [often, faith must not be observed]). As we will see, Ariosto, too, demystifies the sanctity of Holy Faith, obliquely stripping off the veil of ideological representations, and he does so in a way that opens up a space of moral, political, and even theological reflection, that calls into question all the rules, without quite abandoning the sense that such rules, however inadequate, are necessary both to individual sanity and to collective coexistence.

The immediate occasion for the celebration of fede at the beginning of canto 21, is the case of a Scottish knight named Zerbino, who in the previous canto found himself pledging his word to accompany and to protect a loathsome old woman named Gabrina, equally defined by her brutal ugliness and by her profoundly evil disposition. Now the narrator says of him:

Quella [la fede] servò, come servar si debbe
in ogni impresa, il cavallier Zerbino:
e qui vi dimòr che conto n'ebbe,
quando si tolse dal proprio camino
per andar con costei, la qual gl'increbbe,
come s'avesse il morbo si vicino,
o pur la morte istessa; ma potea,
più che 'l disio, quel che promesso avea. [3]

[he observed his faith, as it must be observed, in every undertaking, and here he showed how much he valued it, when he took himself off his proper road to go with her, which saddened him as much as if he had the plague at his side, or death herself; however, what he had promised did more than his desire.]
Zerbino's behavior is offered as the limit case of a chivalric constancy that despises all external circumstances and even his own dearest interests, not to mention his personal welfare (since his "propio camino" would lead him toward his lost love, Issabella, whose place as the traditional knight's lady Gabrina has structurally usurped; and since Gabrina will soon deliberately lead him into a trap that very nearly ends his life). In fact, this story presents a *fede* so constant and so blind that it is willing to defend its own conceptual opposite, since Gabrina is revealed as the epitome, the exemplar, of treacherous infidelity. In short, setting aside the interested erotic motive that typically subtends the knight's faithful service to his lady, as well as the social-political values that motivate the knight's vows to his signore, Ariosto, through Zerbino, represents the "degree zero" of *fede*.

A closer look at the circumstances that tie Zerbino to Gabrina suggests, however, that we may well want to consider this limit-case not as definitional of chivalric ideology, but rather as parodic, even subversive of it. The sequence of events begins when the exemplary, yet obviously exceptional female cavalier, Marfisa, decides to undertake the protection of Gabrina, going so far as to dress her up in elegant, yet here ridiculous, garments, so that she, Marfisa, can fulfill the traditionally male chivalric role of defending a lady against the insults of another knight (just as she had recently attempted a rather more perverse version of the same in the just-completed "homicidal women" episode). The double substitution of a female for a male knight, and an old and ugly lady for a young and beautiful one, may also be seen as a move in the direction of a "degree zero" of chivalric values enacted for their own sake (much in the mode of Don Quixote), but at the same time is clearly parodic. In fact, the parodic effect is precisely what Marfisa counts on—since Zerbino's laughter at the ridiculous spectacle of a hag in damsel's clothing lets her draw him into a battle in which she affirms her chivalric superiority by trouncing him. The parody is completed when rather than the victor keeping the lady, as in tradition, she is foisted upon the loser, Zerbino.
In any case, one could argue that by inflicting Gabrina on Zerbino, Marfisa, and through her Ariosto, are punishing him for his unchivalric laughter at the over-embellished hag and offering him the opportunity to redeem himself by proving his absolute faithfulness under the most degraded and trying conditions. The value of faith, however, is soon put to a rather more menacing test. When Gabrina learns that the previously unknown knight is Zerbino, she reveals that she knows him to be the lover of the Princess Issabella, whom he believed killed after her capture by a gang of violent thieves. Gabrina, who, not coincidentally, had assisted the gang and kept an eye on Issabella for them, reveals one part of the truth (that Issabella is still alive) while concealing another (that she has been rescued by Orlando), and fabricating an outright lie calculated to cause Zerbino the maximum pain possible (that Issabella has been repeatedly raped by her captors) [20.107, 134-141]. The odiousness of Gabrina is thus established both for Zerbino and, especially, for the reader, and Zerbino’s continuing constancy to her becomes conspicuously heroic, as the proem to canto 21 then makes plain. At the same time however, a complicating factor not contemplated either by Zerbino or by the narrator in his proem emerges: what happens if one has made more than one commitment, pledged one’s faith in two directions, and these pledges come into conflict? Zerbino’s attachment to Issabella, after all, also comes under the rubric of fede; yet he blindly chooses to keep his word to the worse person, and to defer his pledge to the other. How then can one, no matter how one tries, keep from staining the absolute purity of Faith’s white veil?

This problem, however, is not made explicitly thematic in the text here (although it will be in dramatic fashion elsewhere in the Furioso), and it clearly does not prevent the narrator from drawing his proemial sententia from the exemplum of Zerbino, and from going on to give further illustrations in canto 21. In fact, as the new canto unfolds, Zerbino’s fede to Gabrina is immediately put to an even harsher test. The chivalric odd couple runs into another knight, Ermonide by name, who insists that Zerbino surrender Gabrina to him, since she has deserved death because of her many
evil deeds. Zerbino refuses, not because he does not believe her culpable, but because of the promise made. Ermonide challenges Zerbino to an adjudicatory combat, trusting, according to another of the fundamental tenets of the chivalric code, that whoever “s'appiglia al torto” [7: defends evil] will be defeated. Instead, he himself is defeated and gravely wounded, despite being in the right where Gabrina is concerned. This brings out another and less pleasant implication of the narrator's radical separation of faith from the judicial system: maintaining faith is not at all without social consequences; it can harm the innocent and protect the guilty [cf. 28: “in perpetuo per punizione/ condannò l'innocente”].

An appalled Zerbino then listens as the wounded Ermonide recounts the crimes of Gabrina against his brother, Filandro. This story takes up the rest of the canto and becomes a veritable allegory of the conflict between Faith (personified by Filandro) and Infidelity (embodied, of course, by Gabrina), further exemplifying, or rather counter-exemplifying, the proemial sententia. The formal complexity of this exemplum within an exemplum is itself noteworthy (if typically Ariostan), and I will return to it. Let me anticipate, however, that it has the double function of: 1) countering and undermining the simplicity of the sententia with the multiplicity of contingent and divergent examples with which it is juxtaposed; and 2) creating a kind of “meta-exemplarity” by inserting Zerbino, previously himself an exemplar of Faith, into the circumstances of a reader of an exemplary text, and thus figuring the troubled and troubling interpretive relationship between Ariosto's sententious exemplarity and his readers. This, by the way, is why Ermonide has the name that he does, “son of Hermes,” since Hermes is the God of messengers and hence of the interpres or hermeneut.

Ermonide's tale echoes the Biblical story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife, as well as the classical myth of Phaedra and Hippolytus (and is further connected to the latter by being set in a post-classical Greece redolent with tragic allusions). It runs as follows. Filandro is the dear friend of one Argeo, who in turn is
married to Gabrina, in those days as young and beautiful as she now is old and decayed, but equal in corruption. She conceives a violent passion for Filandro, but her attempts at seduction are met with his firm resolution to remain absolutely faithful to his friend, leading to a decision to get himself out of harm's way by fleeing the country. Gabrina, however, cleverly plays on the equivocal appearance of his flight to convince her husband, Argeo, that it was Filandro who attempted to seduce her, and who, she claims, feigning violated innocence, raped her when he could not succeed otherwise. Argeo believes implicitly in his wife's story, hunts down his erstwhile friend, wounds him (Filandro refusing either to fight his friend or to tell the truth about Gabrina), and takes him back to the castle, where he is imprisoned in a tower.

Though now reduced to a circumstance in which his friend no longer believes in or reciprocates his faithful friendship, Filandro continues to resist Gabrina's seductions, thus apparently confirming his status as exemplar of the radical conception of faith presented in the proem. Gabrina, however, hits on an insidious plan to have her way. During an extended period when Argeo has ostensibly gone off on a pilgrimage (in fact he is only away during the day, returning late at night, surreptitiously, known only to Gabrina),29 she tells Filandro that a neighboring cavalier, one Morando, is importuning her to grant him sexual favors and that, while she would like to resist him, in Argeo's absence she cannot. She then proposes that Filandro demonstrate his true faithfulness to his friend by helping her to dispatch said Morando. She will, she says, feign consent; and when Morando has entered into her darkened bedroom, Filandro will then go in and kill him. This he does, only to discover that his sword has mortally pierced the very friend with whom he thought to keep faith. In an understandably traumatized and weakened condition, and with the threat of having his crime exposed and his reputation tarnished for ever, Filandro finally gives in to Gabrina's sexual demands, and together they leave the country. In a coda, then, we discover that Gabrina soon tired of the now thoroughly disheartened Filandro and plotted to have him poisoned by a corrupt doctor. She forces the doctor to
drink poison as well, but he manages to tell all to Filandro's family, including his brother Ermonide, before he dies. All in all, a very curious exemplification of the virtue of fede, which, for that reason, bears considerable scrutiny.

There is no doubt that from the outset the story is presented as a gloss on, and perhaps an exemplification of, the proemial hymn to Faith. In a pair of stanzas, Ermonide defines a symbolic and absolute opposition between Gabrina and Filandro, which raises them to the level of personifications of Vice and of Virtue respectively:

... costei, più volubile che foglia
quando l’autunno è più priva d’umore,
che ’l freddo vento gli arbori ne spoglia,
e le soffia dinanzi al suo furore;
verso il marito cangiò tosto voglia,
che fisso qualche tempo ebbe nel core;
e volse ogni pensiero, ogni disio
d’acquistar per amante il fratel mio. [15]

[... She, as flighty as a leaf when autumn has deprived it of all moisture, so that the cold wind despoils the tree and blows the leaves along in its furor, [she] soon changed her will toward her husband, who had been fixed for some-time in her heart, and turned every thought, every desire to acquiring my brother as a lover.]

While on the other hand:

... né si saldo all’impeto marino
l’Acrocerauno d’infamato nome,
né sta si duro incontra borea il pino
che rinovato ha più di cento chiome,
che quanto appar fuor de lo scoglio alpino,
tanto sotterra ha le radici, come
il mio fratello a’ prieghi di costei,
nido di tutti i vizii infandi e rei. [16]

[never did Acroceraunus of infamous name stand so firm against the sea’s assault, nor against the north wind that pine, which has renewed its growth a hundred times, and
which appears above the mountain crag just so far as its roots are buried underground, as did my brother against the prayers of her, nest of all vices unspeakable and guilty.]

On this side: the withered leaf, empty of vital essence, impotent, dragged by the irresistible power of the wind, figure both of internal passions and of external changes brought about by capricious Fortune. (Note, by the way, both that Gabrina is later repeatedly compared to Fortune [20, 35] and that Ariosto’s description of her thus matches almost exactly Machiavelli’s ideal prince who needs “a mind disposed to change according to the commands of the winds and the variations of fortune” [my emphasis]). On the other side: the sea-cliff Acroceraunus, feared by mariners, against which the tempestuous sea, itself perennially a figure of Fortune, batters vainly, and the deeply-rooted evergreen tree which in its stand against the winds reverses the deciduous, caducous flight of Gabrina as leaf.³⁰ Constant, unshakable faith (strangely associated, however, with an “infamous name”) set against its labile, helpless, contingent opposite: both represented in terms not of human history and society, but, again, thoroughly naturalized.

In the stanzas that follow, the narrator and Filandro’s own words will align him precisely with Faith in the very same neo-stoic language of the proem. Replying to Gabrina’s continuing erotic solicitations, Filandro will respond: “No, no, never hope that my true faith will ever be other than what it usually is, even if against everything I am due it befalls me that I receive for it such a harsh reward and that the world think me less than good” [32: No, no, ... aver mai spene/ che non sia, come suol, mia vera fede,/ se ben contra ogni debito mi avviene/ ch’io ne riporti si dura mercede,/ e di me creda il mondo men che bene], and later “Go ahead and tell me what you want, because, such as I have ever been, so I propose always to be... though the world and my fortune be against me” [45: Narrami pur quel che tu vuoi, che quale/ sempre fui, di sempre esser ho proposto/ .../ e siami contra il mondo e la mia sorte].

Nevertheless, as we have already seen, the story categorically refutes these claims to a timeless inner and outer constancy. By the
time Filandro has been induced to murder Argeo, the figurative terms that defined the two in opposition to each other have been completely inverted, in a simile that describes his chaotic mental state when he learns the truth of what he has done:

Come ne l'alto mar *legno* talora,
che da duo *venti* sia percosso e vinto,
ch'ora uno inanzi l'ha mandato, et ora
un altro al primo termine respinto,
e l'han girato da poppa e da prora,
dal più possente al fin resta sospinto;
cosi Filandro ...

[As on the high seas a ship that is struck and overcome by two opposing winds—now it is pushed ahead by one, now pushed back to its point of departure by the other—which have whirled it round and round, until it is mastered by the stronger, just so Filandro]

Now he is the one overpowered by the winds, now he is prey to the tempestuous sea that as a figurative "Acroceraunus" he once resisted, now his is the helpless divided consciousness that previously seemed attributable to Gabrina. Particularly noteworthy is the word used in Italian for ship, *legno*, which synecdochically identifies the vessel with the wood from which it was made, recalling both the deciduous leaf that was Gabrina and the rooted pine that imaged Filandro himself and, what is more important, echoing that figurative piece of wood [again "*legno*"] fixed by the nail of Faith in the first lines of the canto. Just as strikingly, Gabrina has taken on all those attributes of firmness and constancy, albeit constancy in evil, that had earlier been assigned to Filandro, and earlier still to pure white Faith herself: she has pursued her desire single-mindedly and in the end compasses her "*voler tutto*" [55: will entire]. The *verità effettuale della cosa*, then, is that, in this story at least, Machiavelli's insistence on the efficacy of faithlessness seems to be right on target.

What is most interesting, however, is how the story describes the *process* of Filandro's conversion from faith to faithlessness, and
how our understanding of what faith consists of changes as he
does. The ideal faith in the proem is the product of a single act of
absolute will that can only blindly reaffirm itself over and over,
without reference to external circumstances or unforeseen contin-
gencies. Filandro, however, quickly discovers that in practice the
maintenance of faith requires an active confrontation with circum-
stances that are usually ambiguous and frequently hostile, under
which one has to decide how best to adapt one's behavior to the
exigencies of the moment. For example, when he first encounters
the adulterous desires of Gabrina, he finds himself perplexed as to
how to react, with the result that:

[Ellesse per servar sua fede a pieno,
di molti mal quel che gli parve meno.
Tra molti mal gli parve elegger questo:
lasciar d'Argeo l'intrinsichezza antiqua] [18-19]

[In order fully to keep his faith, he chose of many evils that
which seemed least to him. Of many evils it seemed to him
that he should choose this one: to abandon his long-stand-
ing intimacy with Argeo.]

The paradox is evident: in order to blind itself to contingencies,
faith must see, interpret, and choose among several contingent modes of action in such a way as to keep itself intact. Unfor-
fortunately, this choice is not, as we might wish, an absolute one
between white and black, good and evil, like that featured in the
proem; rather, it is between many evils. Filandro's choice, which
has the unhappy side-effect of making him look unfaithful to Argeo
rather than faithful, thus opens onto an ethical relativism which
rapidly slides in the direction of a Machiavellian pragmatism, like
that articulated in chapter 21 of the Prince: "one finds things or-
dered in such a way, that one never attempts to flee one complica-
tion without running into another; but prudence consists in know-
ing how to understand the qualities of these complications, and in
taking the least bad as a good" [si truova questo nell'ordine delle
cose, che mai non si cerca fuggire uno inconveniente che non si
incorra in uno altro; ma la prudenza consiste in sapere conoscere
le qualità delle inconvenienti, e pigliare el meno tristo per buono].
Subsequently, Filandro's final collapse is expressed in words that come even closer to those of the Florentine secretary: "of the two thoughts [to kill Gabrina or to give in and have sex with her], he adhered to the lesser evil" [53: de' duo pensieri, al manco rio s'apprese].

Furthermore, this type of choice, difficult even when one clearly sees what the alternatives are, is made far more difficult by the fact that Ariosto's world, no less and perhaps even more than Machiavelli's, is made up of deceptive appearances, where just when it seems that you have to deal with one thing, it turns out to be the opposite of what you thought. The most spectacular example of this is Gabrina herself, who repeatedly manages to conceal her unfaithful aims beneath the appearance of fidelity. When Filandro flees, as I mentioned earlier, she confesses spuriously to Argeo that she has been forcibly violated by his friend, begging him to kill her so that her "immaculate and white spirit" [23: spirito imaculato e bianco] may be severed from its "filthy husk" [immonda scorza]. Later, and even more surprisingly, she manages to persuade the blindly credulous Filandro of the sincerity of her intentions in the plan to kill "Morando." In this world turned upside-down, Gabrina, like Roderigo Borgia, almost always manages to command faith in her faithfulness, while, as she points out to Filandro: "This fidelity of yours, what is it worth to you, since everywhere it is taken for perfidy?" [30: 'Questa tua fedeltà,' dicea, 'che valti/ poi che perfidia per tutto si stima?']. There is even reason to think that Filandro's devotion to Argeo is not itself what it appears to be—an exemplification of disinterested Faith—but rather an interested, homo-erotic attachment. The primary signal, of course, is his name, which should be glossed as "lover of men," but the hellish scene in which he violently penetrates his friend's naked body in a darkened bedroom is disturbingly suggestive as well.

Finally, the narrator is careful to present us with a casuistry of faith, that is, with a number of quite convincing possible exceptions to the apparently absolute rule of the proem. For example, Gabrina, in persuading her husband to punish Filandro for his
alleged violence, notes that "that which is done by force" need not contaminate the person forced [22-23: quel che si fa a forza]. When further on she weaves another fable, this one designed to entrap Filandro rather than Argeo, she affirms, and Filandro tacitly assents to the affirmation, that it is not necessary to observe faith when you have made a promise under duress, since "when the result of fear, a contract is worth nothing" [43: fatto per timor, nullo è il contratto]. Gabrina, of course, uses the casuistry of faith broken by force and of promises made to the perfidious to compass nefarious ends—but both examples would apply equally to the case of Filandro, who wants to keep faith with Argeo even after being unjustly wounded and imprisoned by him, and who will eventually keep his promises to Gabrina, although they were obviously extracted by force.

Filandro, it goes without saying, is unaware of any of these complications that attach themselves to the absolutist ethics of faith shared with the Ariostan narrator and so moves blindly toward a dénouement in which his faith will not only go unrecognized, will not only not benefit its object (i.e., Argeo), but will itself become the instrument of Argeo's and his own undoing. Having revealed to Filandro the supposed threats of the fictitious Morando and explained how she has kept him at bay with promises she has no intention of keeping, she then proposes the scheme of murdering him. What pushes Filandro over the edge, however, is her challenge to him that he give evidence of "the faith that you boast of in yourself" [44: la fè di che ti vanti]. At precisely this point, then, Filandro gives sharpest definition to his faith, as we saw earlier: "Go ahead and tell me what you want because, such as I have ever been, so I propose always to be" [45], and promptly accepts her insidious challenge.

One might argue, reasonably enough, that he should see through Gabrina, who has presented him with lie after lie, betrayal after betrayal, and that even if he does not see through her, he should know better than to think that killing a helpless foe in bed is reconcilable with the pure values of faith. Yet, it is precisely
the nature of this absolutist faith, as the story has carefully suggested, to act blindly and thoughtlessly, and to choose “lesser evils” in the name of maintaining its supposed integrity. In short, what Filandro then does is clearly presented as the natural consequence of his vaunted faith. The following passage first reports Gabrina’s words to Filandro, then Ermonide’s comments:

‘A te non graverà prima aspettarne
ne la camera mia dove non luca,
tanto che dispogliar gli faccia l’arme,
e quasi nudo in man te lo conduca.’
Cosi la moglie conducesse parmi
il suo marito alla tremenda buca;
se per diritto costei moglie s'appella,
più che furia infernal crudele e fella. [47]

Come ordine era dato, il tutto avvenne
che ’l consiglio del mal va raro invano.
Cosi Filandro il buon Argeo percosse,
che si pensò che quel Morando fosse. [48]
Con esso un colpo il capo fesse e il collo;
che cercando di giovar, fece all’amico
quel di che peggio non si fa al nimico. [49]

[‘To you it will be no trouble to wait for me in my bedroom, where no light shines, just long enough so that I can make him take off his armor, and bring him into your hands almost naked.’ Just so it seems to me that the wife led her husband to the terrifying pit; if one can rightly call her a wife, more cruel and vicious than an infernal fury ... As the order had been given, so all befell; since the counsel of evil goes rarely in vain. Thus Filandro struck good Argeo, because he thought him Morando. With a single blow he struck off his head and his neck... so that, seeking to help, he did that to his friend, than which one could do no worse to an enemy.]

The iconography of the darkened bedroom, which becomes a “terrifying pit” where, echoing Dante’s Inferno [4.151: ove non è che luca], “no light shines,” and which is presided over by the
image of an infernal fury, is designed to reveal that Filandro has descended into a diabolical world, a Hell on earth.35 Not only has his faith gone unrewarded; it has led him to become the treacherous inverse of all he thought himself to be.

Most telling is the phrase “con esso un colpo,” used to describe the fatal blow with which he murders the object of his fede in the name of keeping faith; these words derive directly from the lowest circle of Dante’s Hell, the circle of the traitors [Inferno 32.62]. Closer inspection reveals that the canto is shot through with infernal intertexts, beginning with Zerbino finding Ermonide “in mezzo del camin” [4: in the middle of their way], which most frequently derive from the paradigmatic episode of treachery, that of Ugolino in cantos 32 and 33, and stretch out to include Zerbino along with Filandro. The series began already in canto 20, where the silent hostility of Gabrina and Zerbino was described in terms deriving directly from Ugolino’s mute and helpless response to his children’s suffering [20.144; cf. Inferno 33.47-48]. The still innocent Filandro’s imprisonment in a tower [28] also seems designed to recall Ugolino and especially his children’s fate; while much later, his unfulfilled wish to “tear [Gabrina] apart piece by piece with his teeth” [52: coi denti la stracciava a brano a brano] directly echoes the wrathful sinners in Inferno 7, but clearly suggests Ugolino’s “fierce meal” [33.1: fiero pasto] as he gnaws away at his enemy Ruggieri. The culmination of this sequence comes in the lines that describe Filandro’s final collapse:

cosi Filandro, tra molte contese  
de’ duo pensieri, al manco rio s’apprese.  
   Ragion gli dimostrò il pericolo grande,  
oltre il morir, del fine infame e sozzo

...........

Voglia o non voglia, al fin convien che mande  
l’amarissimo calice nel gozzo.  
Pur finalmente ne l’afflitto core  
più de l’ostinazione poté il timore.  
   Il timor del supplicio infame e brutto  
prometter fece con mille scongiuri,  
che faria di Gabrina il voler tutto [53-55; emphasis mine]
Thus, Filandro, among the many conflicts of his two thoughts, adhered to the lesser evil. Reason showed him the great peril, not of death only, but of an infamous and tainted end... Will he or will he not, in the end it is necessary that he direct the bitterest chalice to his gullet. Then finally, in his afflicted heart, fear did more than stubbornness. The fear of unspeakable and brutal torture made him promise with a thousand oaths, that he will do the will entire of Gabrina.

In particular, notice that the locution “fear did more than stubbornness” is evidently patterned on the words “più che ‘l dolor potè ‘l digiuno” [33.75: fasting did more than sorrow] with which Ugolino closes his desperate monologue, describing his death by starvation and insinuating the possibility that he turned cannibal on the dead bodies of his innocent children. And note the special horror of Filandro’s case, a one-time innocente who has been metamorphosed into an Ugolino.36

The moral of the fable, we now seem to understand, is the exact opposite of the proem that introduced it. In a world where appearances invariably deceive, it is no easy matter to know what might constitute keeping faith, much less to succeed in keeping it. Faith in the end has no practical, ethical, or political value—since its pure intentions never match up with the works it does. The notion of faith as a human work which ties two individuals together through language is revealed as totally impracticable in a world of shifty appearances and mutable desires. Faith, in fact, serves best as a screen, a cover-up in best Machiavellian fashion, to conceal the workings of its ethical opposite, the most shameless infidelity and the most bestial treachery imaginable. More horrifying still, the attempts of the truly faithful to realize themselves in the contingent world of history are themselves likely to be expressed in a phenomenology of betrayal. It is telling that the one promise Filandro is finally able to keep is the one by which he submits himself, “will he or will he not” to the “will entire” of Gabrina. He would, Ermonide says, have revenged himself on her “if his faith and his vow, great and harsh bridle, had not held him
back" [56: se la fede e il giuramento, magno e duro freno, non lo ritenea].

Again as in Machiavelli, the demystification of ethical faith as promise ultimately reaches out to infect religious faith, the mode of vision that constitutes the "evidence of things unseen" and that should provide the transcendental underpinnings for human virtue. Early on, when Filandro realizes that Argeo and everyone else are going to mistake his faith for infidelity, he tries to recuperate faith as a value through recourse to trust in God's vision: "it is enough that my innocence [and true faith] is discerned by the One who sees all and who can restore me through eternal grace" [32: basta che inanti a quel che 'l tutto vede, e che mi può ristorar di grazia eterna, chiara la mia innocenzia si discerna]. Nonetheless, this desperate attempt to ground moral fede in religious belief cannot keep him from translating faith into its diametrical opposite. The passage just quoted makes plain the savage irony that has subverted both ethical and religious faith: "Will he or will he not, in the end it is necessary that he direct the bitterest chalice to his gullet...." Filandro, shattered at the realization of what he has done, drinks, like Christ in Gethsemane, from a metaphorical though still bitter chalice, which signals not his faithful sacrifice to the Will of God, but his ultimate submission to Gabrina's "will entire" and to his eventual death at her hands by a literally poisoned chalice.37

In this world, it appears, Christological self-sacrifice is not redemptive but useless, while God's place as "the One who sees all" is usurped by the demonic Gabrina, whose "blind irrational appetite" [35: cieco appetito irrazionale; cf. 34] does not prevent her from obtaining absolute control over the situation, achieving, at least temporarily, a "situational" omnipotence. It is not surprising, then, that we have seen her identified with such comprehensive principles of evil as "death itself" [6], twice with an infernal fury [47, 56], twice with the Goddess Fortuna [20, 35], and here, allusively, with God the Father himself, the all-seeing, all-powerful intelligence who orders reality and disposes of destinies, moved
by a primal instinct of love (here, obviously, lust, *cupiditas*). The most remarkable of the implicit identities of Gabrina, however, is another, and to it I will return shortly. For now, however, it is important to note that although Gabrina clearly lives up to these passages that equate her with the principles of evil, of negation, of radical mutability, she could not by herself martial the irresistible force that she comes to embody over the course of the canto, a point on which Ariosto insists by making her last trick, the murder of the doctor, backfire on her. Rather, what invests her with this power is precisely Faith itself: the foolish credulity of Argeo in her Phaedrean fable of rape; the blind devotion to Argeo that leads Filandro into the hellish bedroom; the misbegotten promise that makes Zerbino wound unto death Ermonide on her behalf.

At this point let me return at last to Zerbino, that other exemplar of Faith and figure of the reader, for whose benefit the story of Filandro has been recounted precisely to discourage him from "keeping faith" with Gabrina as he had promised. When the story finally draws to a close, needless to say, Zerbino feels even worse than before about the commitment he has undertaken now that he is, as the narrator says, "instructed and wise" concerning his companion [70: instrutto e saggio]. Yet, far from having truly learned the lesson of Filandro's story with its revelation of the true nature of faith, he is doomed to repeat it blindly. This outcome had been anticipated from the outset. At the very beginning of the canto Zerbino's blind commitment to faith was expressed in language that anticipated Filandro's downfall while offering a first recall of Ugolino's last words. As you have already heard, he hates Gabrina as if she were "death itself, but what he promised did more than his desire" [3: potea/ più che 'l disio quel che promesso avea]. Returning again to canto's end we find Zerbino's impotent hate reaffirmed in corrosively ironic words: "now he hates her so much that he cannot bear to look at her," or, in a more literal translation, "he hates her so much that he can't see her" [70: or l'odia si che non la puo vedere]. Just like Filandro's, Zerbino's faith leads him into a blindness that makes Gabrina's true nature and the true nature of faith itself effectively invisible to him. When he goes on
to insist that he defends Gabrina, in the process wounding a repre-
resentative of justice and protecting a person responsible for at
least three murders, “because otherwise his faith would be con-
fused” [68: altrimenti la sua fè sarebbe confusa] that blindness and
the primordial confusion that invests the value of absolute ethical
faith are even more evident.

In the little time that remains, I propose to reassess the rela-
tionship between the Ariostan analysis of faith and the Machiavel-
lian, which began as an apparent opposition, by comparing the
recommendation of faithlessness in chapter 18 of the Prince and
the affirmation of absolute faith in the proem to canto 21, and
which subsequently has seen a dramatic convergence of Ariosto
with Machiavelli in terms that may well seem to have derived di-
rectly or indirectly from the Prince. There is a great temptation to
argue that the convergence is complete, that the world where
Gabrina triumphs is the same one in which Alexander VI and Cesare
Borgia reign supreme; that, as a consequence, both authors have
effected a radical severing of idealist ethics from the practicalities
of political, that is, historical, and intersubjective life.

Another reading is possible, however. After all, Gabrina, un-
like Alexander VI and his son Cesare, is certainly not held up as
any sort of model for imitation, except to the degree to which it
may be necessary for a good person to fight fire with fire (as sug-
gested in my very first quotation from the Furioso). More impor-
tantly, it could be argued that canto 21, rather than advocating
what Machiavelli advocates, reveals hidden, ahistorical, and meta-
physical premises behind the only apparently pragmatic rules ex-
pounded in the Prince and suggests the possibility of an alterna-
tive perspective, one that would redefine ethics and its relation-
ship to politics, rather than discarding it entirely. After all, Gabrina's
evil only triumphs because of the self-imposed blindness of Zerbino
and Filandro, their advocacy of a thoroughly ahistorical and non-
contingent, and hence radically inhuman, ethics of faith. On this
reading, the key to Ariosto's canto is the revelation, standing
Machiavelli on his head, that it is precisely the ethically absolutist
conception of faith that makes treachery the inevitable mode of politics, or, to put it more extremely, that Gabrina and Faith are inseparable and indistinguishable.

As if in confirmation of this scandalous development, a close comparison of the iconography of Holy Faith in the proem with the language describing Gabrina reveals a consistent identification between the two. Take for example the narrator's description of Gabrina's ceaseless scheming to compass her desires:

Ma il cieco suo desir, che non assonna
del scelerato amor traer construtto,
cercando va più dentro ch'alla gonna
suoi vizii antiqui, e ne discorre il tutto.
Mille pensier fa d'uno in altro modo,
prima che fermi in alcun d'essi il chiodo. [34]

[But her blind desire, that never sleeps in seeking to achieve that criminal love, goes searching beneath the surface (literally: "dress" or "outer clothing") among her ancient vices, and considers them all. She has a thousand thoughts of one and another way before she fixes her nail in any of them].

The language of the proem recurs throughout: "antiquity," the juxtaposition of "one" and "one thousand," the nail as metaphor of tenacity and constancy. The decisive connection, however, is that gonna or outer garment beneath which she hides her vizii antiqui, though, as noted earlier, she had just convinced Argeo that her "filthy husk," or contaminated outer surface, really conceals "a spirit immaculate and white" [23]. Together these references take us back to the primal metaphor of Faith in the first stanza, which was depicted by the ancients "as dressed ... in a white veil that covers her entirely, so that a single spot, one sole blemish, can make her ugly." In retrospect we might realize that the proemial image itself reveals as well as conceals the Gabrinian truth about Holy Faith. A first step is to go back to those ancient painters invoked in the proem. The reference is specifically to a Horatian ode in which it is said that "alba rara fides colit velata panno" [I.xxxv.21-22: rare faith worships with a veiled garment]. In the original, however,
Horace sings the praises not of Faith but rather of Fortune, speaking instead of Faith as well as of Hope, as one of the unstable goddess's handmaidens, worshipping [colit] at her altar. Even more curiously the Latin poet dwells extensively in the poem on the treacheries of friends and the violent betrayals of civil war. Thus, the narrator's and Filandro's neo-Stoic claim that Faith exempts the self from the fragmentation to which changeable Fortune might subject it is undermined from the outset. And, since Gabrina is also identified with Fortuna, her dominance over Filandro is implicitly predicted.

The most immediately striking thing about the image of Faith's veil, however, is that it is ostentatiously not a direct presentation of Faith as such at all. We do not see it/her because it/she is entirely covered. Rather we confront a written Ariostan re-presentation of Horace's poetic re-presentation, of the unspecified ancient painter's representations of an allegorical garment that in turn purports to represent Holy Faith that remains hidden beneath. In other words, the proem, which offers a seemingly transparent account of Faith's purity, instead presents Faith as pure representation, as opaque surface lying over a hidden mystery (thus it is indeed "the evidence of things unseen"). The heart of that mystery, which remains obscure to Filandro, to Zerbino, and to most readers of the Furioso as well (judging by the critical history), is Gabrina herself who repeatedly disguises treachery in the vestments of its opposite number. In this light it seems particularly significant that in the penultimate stanza of the canto in ostentatious symmetry with the visual-pictorial imagery of the proem, Gabrina's attempt to conceal her fury at Zerbino's new-found knowledge of her true nature is described as follows: "In her heart she was swollen with poison, while in her face [literally, "what is seen"] she was otherwise depicted" [71: Nel cor era gonfiata di veneno, e nel viso altrimente era dipinta; my emphasis]. In other words, not only is Gabrina the dialectical opposite number of Faith, not only does she parody its appearance and its values to achieve duplicitous ends, she may well also represent an essential truth about the conflicted, contradictory, and even destructive character of the early modern ideology of neo-classical fides.
If, after experiencing Ariosto’s thorough deconstruction of the writing of ethical exemplarity, along with the ethics of faith itself, one still wished to derive a *sententia* from this episode, it would probably differ significantly from that proposed by Machiavelli. In the first place, it would suggest that severing ethics from politics, private commitment from public responsibility, is not the solution, as Machiavelli implies, but the problem; it is precisely the anti-contingent, ahistorical character of the traditional ideology of *fides* that renders it unusable in the dynamic social-political crises of the early Cinquecento. If Ariosto himself gives a direct answer to the “question of faith,” it is certainly fragmented, partial, and conditioned—but perhaps most clearly stated in this passage from the penultimate canto of the poem (and from an episode that was only added in the 1532 edition), where Bradamante, Ariosto’s warrior-heroine, debates the choice between keeping faith with her parents and to a vow specifically made before the emperor Charlemagne, or with her beloved Ruggiero, to whom she has pledged herself:

Basti che nel servar fede al mio amante,
d’ogni scoglio più salda mi ritrovi,

.........
Che nel resto mi dichino incostante,
non curo, pur che l’inconstanzia giovï:
pur ch’io non sia di costui [Leone, Ruggiero’s rival] torre astretta
volubil più che foglia anco sia detta. [45.101]

[It is enough that in keeping faith with my lover, I shall be found firmer than any cliff .... I care not that in the rest I decline into inconstancy, assuming that inconstancy serves its purpose. As long as I am not constrained to marry that guy, let me be called as flighty as a leaf.]

As I have argued elsewhere, Bradamante’s words deliberately recall and conflate the qualities that first defined Gabrina and Filandro in opposition to each other. This is true even at the level of the individual phrase. She is both Filandro as “cliff” and Gabrina as “leaf.” The proposed solution would lie not with either the utopian ethics of the proem to canto 21 or the amoral Machiavel-
lian politics that opposes it, but rather with a tactical idealism, a fidelity prepared to compromise itself in order to maintain itself and to negotiate its way between personal and political relationships according to the requirements of the situation.

This proposal remains entirely hypothetical, however. Bradamante's resolve is never put to the kind of narrative test that Filandro, Zerbino, and, for that matter, her beloved Ruggiero⁴⁴ take and fail.⁴⁵ Perhaps it would be sounder to claim that the Furioso, rather than attempting to solve Machiavelli's question at all, instead implicitly stages an ethical double bind (which, of course, they, like Zerbino, may well never perceive), namely, the apparent necessity and the near impossibility of squaring ethics with politics, enduring values with historical contingency, which then leaves its readers to fend, that is, to see and to choose, for themselves. As this comment might suggest, I believe that Ariosto deliberately creates a circumstance in which the ethical-epistemological drama of faith can be acted out in relation to his own text. At issue are the reader's credulity before the narrator's affirmations, on the one hand, and on the other, the narrator's willingness to give his word, that is, the words of his poem, and to remain faithful, constant, to them. At the very beginning of the poem, after all, the whole of the Furioso is insistently represented as the fulfillment of the poet's promise [1.2-3].⁴⁶

This drama is sponsored first of all by the elaborate analogical arrangement that puts Zerbino in relation to Ermonide's tale and Filandro in relation to Gabrina's fictions, just as the reader stands in relation to Ariosto's text. Nonetheless, the true key, once again, is the image of the veil that covers faith. The veil, as I'm sure you all know, is the traditional figure of obscure and oblique poetic representation, of allegory in other words. In addition to its omnipresence throughout medieval and early modern poetics,⁴⁷ Ariosto makes specific use of the trope, notably in conjunction with the figures of Alcina and Cassandra.⁴⁸ On the one hand, then, Ariosto may be figuring himself as an Ermonide, who tries to expose Gabrina's faithlessness, but whose exemplary moral tale cannot or will not be understood by its readers. (Ermonide thus anticipates
Ariosto's later use of the figure of Cassandra.) More prominently, and more scandalously, since the veil can figure both Ariosto's equivocal representations of Faith and Gabrina's outright fabrications of it, one can argue that a possible equation is created between Gabrina and Ariosto (as earlier between the author and Alcina), both presenting a morally impeccable surface, both concealing devious designs beneath it. There is, of course, an essential difference: while Gabrina's appropriation of the simulacrum of Faith for the purposes of sexual infidelity and murderous betrayal commands its victims' belief and has devastating consequences, Ariosto consistently subverts his own claims and those of poetry more generally to truth telling and to absolute moral authority. This, after all, is the poet whose most famous lines expose the inevitably interested motives of writers that warp history's truth beyond all recognition:

Non fu si santo né benigno Augusto
come la tuba di Virgilio suona.
L'avere avuto in poesia buon gusto
la proscrizion iniqua gli perdona.

.......
Omero Agamennon vittorioso,
e fe' i Troian parer vili et inert;
e ... Penelopea fida al suo sposo

........
E se tuo vuoi che 'l ver non ti sia ascoso,
tutta al contrario l'istoria converti:
che i Greci rotti, e che Troia vittrice,
e che Penelopea fu meratrice.

[35.26-27]

[Augustus was neither as holy nor benign as the trumpet of Virgil makes him out to be. Having had good taste in poetry pardons the injustice of his proscriptions. ... Homer made Agamemnon victorious and made the Trojans seem vile and inert, ... and Penelope faithful to her husband .... But if you wish that truth be not hidden from you, turn all history to its contrary: because the Greeks were routed, Troy victorious, Penelope a whore.]

Ariosto, in short, embraces a destiny of textual infidelity, then
faithfully records his, literature's, and history's endless betrayals. As I hope I have shown, however, he also has defined in extraordinary detail the ethical, political, metaphysical, and textual stakes at risk in understanding and practicing the virtue of faith and has exposed the internally contradictory and self-defeating logic of an ideology in a way that goes beyond even Machiavelli's brilliant if brutal analysis.

It's true. Believe me.
Footnotes

1. Robert M. Durling, The Figure of the Poet in the Renaissance Epic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 167: “there is hardly an episode [of the Orlando furioso] which does not revolve around the theme of fidelity and betrayal." I am in agreement with Durling as well that there is a fundamental engagement with moral issues in the Furioso [p. 135], though we certainly disagree at several points on what this engagement might consist of.

2. This and all subsequent quotations are taken from Niccolò Machiavelli, Il principe e i discorsi, ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1960). All translations from Italian are my own.


6. In prior work, including both Ariosto's Bitter Harmony: Crisis and Evasion in the Italian Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) and "Machiavelli's Gift of Counsel," I have argued that early Cinquecento authors of Italy, and indeed of Europe more generally, found themselves engaged with an interlocking complex of political, social, intellectual, and ultimately "ideological" crises in Italy and then throughout Europe. I have addressed the question of "ideology" more specifically in a forthcoming essay: "From the Unseen to the Unsaid: Faith and Ideology between Machiavelli and Luther."

7. See especially Book I, chapters 11 and 12 in the Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio.

8. Very much like Machiavelli, Luther subverts the notion that human beings will or even can effect the faithful keeping of promises on their own
(specifically he consigns such promises and especially the subcategory of religious vows to the despised realm of “works”). Unlike Machiavelli, of course, Luther stresses the possibility of believing faithfully in God’s Word and in His power to keep promises to us. It is noteworthy that Luther’s revolt dates from the same years as the Prince itself, that both have Pope Leo as a primary interlocuter, and that both undertake strong critiques of the Church as institution. Cf. “From the Unseen to the Unsaid.”

9. The reading I am proposing is in many ways applicable to any one of the three editions of the Furioso, though the canto and stanza references given are to the third and final edition, published in 1532. Canto 21, originally canto 19 of 40, underwent only slight revision in the later editions, though I will indicate later on a couple of significant additions which sharpen, without altering, the basic thrust of the episode. We will also see that important episodic additions to the 1532 Furioso, notably those contained in cantos 37 and 44-45, are developed in specific ways out of the original Filandro-Gabrina materials. An indispensable tool for studying the revisionary process of the Furioso is the diplomatic edition edited by Santorre Debenedetti and Cesare Segre (Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso [Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1960]). On the revisionary process and the specificities of the various editions, see, inter alii, Gianfranco Contini, “Come lavorava l’Ariosto,” in Esercizi di lettura (Turin: Einaudi, 1939, 2nd ed. 1974); Eduardo Sacconne, “Clorindano e Medoro, con alcuni argomenti per una lettura del primo Furioso,” in Il soggetto del “Furioso” e altri saggi tra Quattro e Cinquecento (Naples: Liguori, 1974), pp. 161-200; and “Prospettive sull’ultimo Ariosto,” MLN 98 (1983), 55-69; Alberto Casadei, La strategia delle varianti: le correzioni storiche del terzo “Furioso” (Lucca: Pacini Fazzi, 1988); “Breve analisi sul finale del primo Furioso,” Studi e problemi di critica testuale 44 (1992), 87-100, and Il percorso del “Furioso” (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993); and the concluding pages of a forthcoming essay of my own, “Ariosto’s ‘Fier Pastor’: Structure and History in Orlando furioso,” in Ariosto: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Massimo Ciavalollea and Roberto Fedi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

10. For the narrative “I” of the Furioso see, first of all, Durling. For discussion of the poem’s complex structure and extensive bibliography on it, see “Ariosto’s ‘Fier Pastor’.” This reading of canto 21 further illustrates claims made there and in Ariosto’s Bitter Harmony concerning the interplay between the distinct formal elements of the poem as a whole and of its individual cantos.

11. The picture of a playful Ariosto abstracted from the world of history into a fantastic world of his own making, though now widely contested in the criticism, has had numerous prestigious supporters among the poem’s readers, most prominently Francesco DeSanctis, “Ariosto” in Storia della
This position, curiously, and Benedetto Letteratura as a in Parker and Romance: different consistency rhetorical sity Press, Ariosto"; sull'ultimo present proclai... that this position is in fact justified by the text, to the extent that it is a consistent rhetorical pose adopted by the Ariostan narrator, though to very different ends than those asserted by the cited critics.


13. Citations are from Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, 2 vols., ed. Emilio Bigi (Milan: Rusconi, 1982).

14. There is an illustrious line of critics who have studied the theme of ethical faith in Ariosto and assigned it a fundamental place in the poem and among the poet's most important values. They include, in addition to Durling [see note 1 above], Giorgio DeBlasi, "Ariosto e le passioni," Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, 129 (1952): 318-362 and 130 (1953): 178-203 [esp. pt. 2, pp. 180 and 199]; Saccone, "Clorindano and Medoro" and "Prospettive sull'ultimo Ariosto"; Peter DeSa Wiggins, Figures in Ariosto's Tapestry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), especially p.48. This essay constitutes an extended critique of their position(s), developing ideas first presented telegraphically in Ariosto's Bitter Harmony [pp. 62n39, 284-285nn44-45, 329-331 and nn]. Critiques complementary to my own are in Neuro Bonifazi, Le lettere infedeli (Rome: Officina Edizioni, 1975), and Sergio Zatti, Il "Furioso" fra "epos" e "romanzo" (Lucca: Pacini Fazzi, 1990), pp. 99-105 et passim. The first critic of the staging of the theme of faith in the Furioso, particularly in relation to Ruggiero, Ariosto's principal genealogical hero, was his heir and rival, Torquato Tasso, as Margaret Ferguson [Trials of Desire: Renaissance Defenses of Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 62-70] has demonstrated.

15. Machiavelli's letter to Lodovico Alemanni of December 17, 1517, tells us that he knew and admired the poem and that he believes Ariosto should reciprocate (but hasn't); there is only limited evidence of a possible Ariostan
debt to the *Prince*, and no direct proof of personal acquaintance. Even the direction of possible influence has to be questioned, since the *Prince* was begun before the *Furioso* appeared and may have circulated as early as 1513 (to judge by the famous letter to Francesco Vettori of December 10 of that year), but was only put in final form, still with restricted circulation, in 1517. Homologies of language between chapter 18 and canto 21 could thus be explained as 1) Ariosto's borrowing from Machiavelli; 2) Machiavelli's echoing of Ariosto; 3) both authors drawing on a common Ciceronian source [see notes 30-31 and 34 below]; or 4) both authors engaging with a fundamental ideological issue in terms generally available in the period. Pursuit of a specific connection might follow both biographical and intertextual avenues. Ariosto had connections, which he at one time believed to be close, with the Medici family and had spent considerable time in Florence, notably two months between 1512 and 1513 [See Michele Catalano, *Vita di Ludovico Ariosto*, vol. 1 (Geneva: Olschki, 1931), pp. 353-355]. Thus a meeting was at least hypothetically possible. The textual evidence is almost as slim, at least for the 1516 *Furioso*. In addition to the language of "lesser evils" discussed further on, possible echoes of the treatment of the "new prince" and especially his "cavalier" observance of *fede* in the *Prince* are to be found in canto 9, stanzas 61, 63, 83. The episode was added in 1532, however. One particularly tempting convergence is to be found in the fact that both authors inscribed extremely complicated relations with Giovanni de' Medici, Pope Leo X, into their texts, as I have suggested in "Machiavelli's Gift of Counsel" and "Ariosto's 'Fier Pastor'." In fact, the most plausible Ariostan echo of Machiavelli comes not in the *Furioso*, but in the later *Satira IV* (ca. 1523), which seems to attack Leo using language derived specifically from chapter 18 [see Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, p. 27n51]. Among the few critics who have addressed this issue are Charles Klopp, "The Centaur and the Magpie: Ariosto and Machiavelli's *Prince*," in Aldo Scaglione, ed. *Ariosto 1974 in America* (Ravenna: Longo, 1976); Giuseppe Mazzotta, "Power and Play in the *Orlando furioso*," in Ronald Bogue and Mihai Spariosou ed., *The Play of the Self* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 183-202; and Zatti, p. 153. Ferguson, p. 65, too, sees an analogy between the satire of courtly *fede* in Ruggiero and chapter 18 of the *Prince*.

16. *Pace* Saccone, who avers that Ariosto values an ethical faith which is "né astratta né soggettiva, ma mondana e intersoggettiva" ["Clorindano e Medoro," p.197] and which is constitutive of social relations.

17. It is a *topos* of Ariosto criticism that the poem and its author are not concerned with transcendental and metaphysical values (e.g., DeSanctis; Croce; Thomas M. Greene, *The Descent from Heaven* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963]; DeBlasi; Donato), but rather with moral and secularly
“humanistic” concerns, and in particular that in the Furioso the value and
the valence of faith are ethical rather than religious [Saccone, “Clorindano e
Medoro,” p. 174; Wiggins, p. 22]. While it is certainly true that Ariosto
often treats religion in a “cavalier” and demystifying way, as the use of “St.
John” in cantos 34-35 alone would prove, it is also true, as the adjective
“santa” begins to suggest and as this reading will demonstrate more exten-
sively, that the poet recognizes the way in which his moral categories cannot
be easily separated from the transcendental grounds in which they are tradi-
tionally rooted (again, a comparison with Machiavelli might be instructive:
see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Traditions [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975],
for the preeminent statement of Machiavelli’s role in shifting Western thought
from a transcendentally to a historically grounded notion of temporality).

18. The terms are those of John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy
of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), drawing on
the work of John Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. Urmson and M.
course, the Renaissance rhetorical tradition already reflects a thorough un-
derstanding of the concept of language as action.

19. On this process, see Ariosto’s Bitter Harmony, p. 86 et passim. Cf. Carlo
Delcorno, Exemplum e letteratura tra medioevo e rinascimento (Bologna: Il
Mulino, 1989).

20. Karlheinz Stierle, “L’exemple comme histoire, l’histoire comme example,”
Poétique 10 (1972) 176-198; Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence and Skepti-
cism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), and “Virtù
and the Example of Agathocles”; John D. Lyons, Exemplum: The Rhetoric of
Example in Early Modern France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
and, especially, Timothy Hampton, Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Ex-

21. See, for instance, Guicciardini’s repeated criticisms of Machiavelli’s ten-
dency to derive a general rule from one set of historical circumstances and
then to apply it to very different circumstances (Considerazioni intorno ai
Discorsi del Machiavelli sopra la “Prima deca” di Tito Livio).

22. On the function of the proems, see Durling, p. 135 et passim; Mario
Santoro, “Nell’officina del narrante: gli esordi,” in Ariosto e il Rinascimento
(Naples: Liguori, 1989), pp. 51-81; and Ascoli, “Ariosto’s ‘Fier Pastor.’”

23. Canto 21 has been relatively little studied by Ariosto critics, not even
those most concerned with the theme of faith (Saccone takes stanzas 1-2 as
an epigraph, but gives no reading of the canto). An exception is Franco Masciandaro, “Folly in the Orlando furioso: A Reading of the Gabrina Episode,” Forum Italicum 14 (1980) 56-77, though he does not address the question of fede. More recently, see Zatti, pp. 102-104.

24. Zerbino provides a potent link to the larger thematics of faith in the Furioso—he is tangentially connected to the Cloridano-Medoro episode that Saccone reads as exemplifying faith in the Furioso; he is the “fiancé” of Issabella who later becomes a martyr of faith after his death; he is the erstwhile friend of Odorico, an arch-betrayer; he makes a close connection to the madness of Orlando (Orlando rescues him just before falling into madness; his attempt to salvage the mad Orlando’s discarded armor leads to his death). As we shall see, however, the episode has other resonances than those provided specifically by Zerbino.

25. I refer to Marfisa’s insistence that she be allowed to complete the double test that involves defeating ten male cavaliers and sexually satisfying ten women in a single night. The narrator allows that she planned to fulfill both tasks using the same implement, a sword. On the problematics, and violence, of gender reversal in this episode and others in the Furioso, see John McLucas, “Ariosto and the Androgyne: Symmetries of Sex in the Orlando Furioso,” Diss. Yale University, 1983, abstract in DAI 44 (1984), 2784A.

26. This episode, and in fact, much of Ariosto’s poem, tests not only the ethical norms of Renaissance culture, but also its normative categories of gender. The male/female opposition is no more stable in Ariosto’s world than is that of faith and infidelity, to which it is so often linked. For relevant discussions see Durling, pp. 150-160; Santoro, “L’Angelica del Furioso: fuga dalla storia,” and “Rinaldo. La difesa dei diritti della donna,” both in Ariosto e il Rinascimento, pp. 111-166; McLucas; Deanna Shemek, “Of Women, Knights, Arms and Love: The Querelle des Femmes in Ariosto’s Poem,” MLN 104 (1989) 68-97; Valeria Finucci, The Lady Vanishes: Subjectivity and Representation in Castiglione and Ariosto (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Maggie Gunsberg, “Donna Liberata?: The Portrayal of Women in the Italian Renaissance Epic,” The Italianist 7 (1987) 7-35; Pamela Benson, The Invention of Renaissance Woman (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1992); Cinzia Sartini-Blum, “Pillars of Virtue, Yokes of Oppression: The Ambivalent Foundation of Philogynist Discourse in Ariosto’s Orlando furioso,” Forum Italicum 28 (1994) 3-21; as well as my essay, “Il segreto di Erittonio: politica e poetica sessuale nel canto trentasettesimo dell’Orlando furioso,” forthcoming in Lina Bolzoni and Sergio Zatti, ed., La rappresentazione dell’alterità nel Cinquecento italiano, (Lucca: Pacini-Fazzi, 1998). As will become obvious shortly, Gabrina, in addition to being the epitome of “infidelity,” is also the paradigmatic object of misogynistic diatribe.
27. Ermonide's words, and later Filandro's surrender to Gabrina [53.8: "al manco rio s'apprese"], echo the most famous of Petrarchan lines, "veggo 'l meglio et al peggior m'appiglio" [Rime CCLXIV.136], which in turn derives from the Pauline Christian critique of the fallen human will "non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio" [Romans 7:15]. The absolute commitment of faith defined in stanzas 1 and 2, involves a paradoxical affirmation of the will in order to cancel itself out (choosing once, you can never choose again), which results, ironically, both in Filandro's choosing the lesser among many evils [18-19] and in his submission "will he or will he not" [54.5] to the "will entire" of Gabrina [55.3] in language which echoes Christ's sacrifice of his will to the Father's [see note 37 below]. On the problematics of "will" in the humanist Renaissance and in the Furioso, see Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, pp. 76-82, 222-224, 365-367, et passim.

28. On the allusive use of the Hippolytus myth in the Furioso, and especially in the poet's treatment of his first patron, and the titular addressee of the poem, Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, see Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, pp. 36, 58, 383-388. Its presence in this episode is another signal of the centrality of canto 21 to the Furioso as a whole.

29. Ariosto's plot is still more complex than this summary makes it: Argeo is carrying out the charade of a feigned pilgrimage—always the product of a faithful vow—in order to entrap the real Morando, his neighbor and mortal enemy, who, however, never actually makes an appearance. The subplot is important not only because it gives Gabrina scope for her evil designs, but because in it Argeo demonstrates that he, too, is treacherously inclined, and hence especially unworthy of Filandro's fede.

30. These images have important literary precedents which emphasize the moral and metaphysical stakes in the Gabrina/Filandro opposition, while suggesting both the richness and the ironic complexity of the canto's intertextuality. The autumn leaves recall the souls crowded on the banks of Acheron in Virgil's Aeneid [6.309-310] and Dante's Inferno [3.112-114], while the pine is a descendant of that tree, its branches reaching as far towards Heaven as its roots extend towards Hell, to which Aeneas is compared as he successfully resists Anna's passionate pleas on Dido's behalf [4. 441-446]. Most interesting, is the reference to Acrocaeraunus, whose "infamato nome" ironically anticipates Filandro's subsequent infamy [55.8; cf. 44.8, 51.7, 54.2], which derives from Horace's Ode, I.iii.20 (Horace, Odes and Epodes, trans. C.E. Bennell, in The Loeb Classical Library [London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1914, rpt. 1952], all subsequent references are to this edition). That poem is in turn addressed, with obvious polemical overtones, to Virgil and attacks the mad, hubristic attempts of men to rival the gods with their deeds: "expertus vacuum Daedalus aera/ pinnis non homini datis/ perrupit
Acheronta Herculeus labor./ Nil mortalibus ardui est:/ caelum ipsum petimus stultitia" [34-38]. The implication is that Filandro's hubristic trust in his own powers of faithfulness are doomed to disaster.

31. Both Machiavelli and Ariosto may well have been thinking of Cicero's consideration of casuistical arguments for choosing the "minima de malis" [De Officiis III.xxxix.105] in matters of faith, arguments which Cicero rejects, however.

32. Ariosto's thematics of distorted vision and deceptive appearances is defined early in the Furioso: "Quel che l'uom vede, Amor gli fa invisibile/ e l'invisibile fa vedere Amore./ Questo creduto fu; che 'l miser suole/ dar facile credenza a quel che vuole" [I.56.5-8]. See Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, p. 317n, and compare Durling, p.176: "the basic action of the poem ... is that of seeing clearly, seeing things in all their complexity."

33. For an important, if at times overstated, discussion of phallic swords and other homosexual motifs in the Furioso, see McLucas. Note the possible obscene wordplay in stanza 47: "tremenda buca."

34. Cicero not only provides a normative Stoic definition of the sanctity of fides [De Officiis III.xxxix.104], but also an extended discussion of specific cases in which expediency dictates that promises should not be kept, especially when keeping the promise will do harm: "Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam neque semper deposita reddenda" and "Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta; facere promissa stare conventis, reddie deposita commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta" [III.xxv.95]. He is, however, reluctant to accept many "casuistical" arguments in favor of breaking faith, including the argument concerning promises constrained by force [III.xxxviii.103], and the notion that there is no obligation to keep faith with the faithless [III.xxxviii.102; 106].


36. It is important to note that while several of the Dantean echoes [i.e., those in 20.144; 21.4, 47, 52] were present in the 1st edition, the crucial
connections to Ugolino emerged fully only in 1532, when the words “con esso un colpo” were added [49.1], the phrasing at 54.7-8 is modified to highlight the echo of Inferno 33.75, and a second echo of that passage is inserted in 3.7-8 [see text below]. The elaboration of a Dantean language of treachery in the later edition seems to have its radiant center in canto 17, and to determine a number of significant choices throughout the revisionary process, as I have argued in “Ariosto’s ‘Fier Pastor’.” For scholarship on the 1532 edition, see note 9 above, as well as Conor Fahy, L’“Orlando furioso” del 1532 (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1989).

37. The echo, of course, is from Matthew 26:39: “Mi pater si possibile est transeat a me calix iste/ Verumtamen non sicut ego velo sed sicut tu,” a chapter which also stands behind the thematics of will in this passage, particularly in the terrifying parodic echo of Christ’s submission of his will to God the Father’s: “Fiat voluntas tua” [26:42] [see note 27 above]. It is likely as well that Ariosto was thinking of the symmetrical and opposite “calix diaboli” of which Paul speaks in 1 Corinthians 10:21. The chalice also points toward the chalice of the Eucharist. Ariosto offers up parodic chalices, and Eucharistic travesties, on several occasions in the Furioso [see Ariosto’s Bitter Harmony, pp. 327, 337, 363n177]. There is a potential connection here to Ugolino as well, since, as John Freccero [“The Bestial Sign and the Bread of Angels (Inferno 32-33),” Yale Italian Studies 1 (1977) 53-66; now in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 152-166], has shown, the cannibalistic imagery of Inferno 32-33 constitutes a parody of the Eucharist.

38. In the first (1516) edition of the Furioso stanza 20.5-7 of canto 21 (then canto 19) reads “…che ogni difesa e schermo/ Gli fa debil Fortuna e la nuova arte/Di questa falsa…” In the final (1532) edition stanza 20.6 condenses these lines into “gli disipa Fortuna con nuova arte.” By compressing the coordinate forces of Fortuna and Gabrina into a single subject, Ariosto is in effect suggesting an equation of the two.

39. I would argue that Gabrina functions as a counterpoint to and a double of the “poet-God” in the Furioso. On the Ariostan narrator as poet-God, see Durling [pp. 123-132 et passim], and Ariosto’s Bitter Harmony, pp. 295-297 and nn.

40. When first seen again in canto 20, the older Gabrina is wearing a black “gonna” [106], which, however, she then exchanges for the dress of unspecified color worn by Pinabello’s consort. “Gonna” and “velo” are again brought together, now in strict conjunction, in a moment of disguise and deception in the very next canto when Ricciardetto, “sotto un vel bianco in feminil gonella” passes himself off as woman in order to sleep with Fiordispina [XXII.39].
41. The oft-mentioned affinity of Ariosto for Horatian satire has rarely been discussed in depth. For counter-examples, see Giorgio Petrocchi, "Orazio e Ariosto," Giornale italiano di filologia, n.s. 1 (1970); David Marsh, "Horatian Influence and Imitation in Ariosto's Satire," Comparative Literature 27 (1975). See also note 30 above.

42. I have argued both in Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, pp. 330-331 and n122, and "Ariosto's "Fier pastor," that the Ruggiero-Leone-Bradamante episode added in 1532 is, in effect, a rewriting of canto 21 which brings its themes and problems into the principal narrative of the poem at the point of closure. The larger narrative-structural parallel is obvious: both episodes focus on a love triangle between two men, who become fast friends, and a woman, in which one of the parties commits a self-destructive act of violence (the duel) against the person he most loves in the world, in the name of keeping a faithful promise. More specific connections come in the form of a shared Greek locale (these are the only two episodes to have this feature); the fact that both Ruggiero and Filandro are treacherously captured and imprisoned in towers; the presence in the latter episode of a character named Androfilo (whose only function appears to be that of recalling Filandro's name); as well as several precise verbal recalls [see note 43 below]. Similarly, the Marganorre episode in canto 37, also added in 1532, contains a character named "Cilandro," probably echoing "Filandro"; a treacherous murder to further an adulterous love with an unwilling partner; and poison delivered by means of a eucharistic "calice". On the revisionary process, see again notes 9 and 36 above. Saccone, "Prospettive," sees the additions in cantos 44-46 as bringing a qualification and a complication to the straightforward endorsement of fede in 1516; this paper has demonstrated that the problematic of faith is present from the first edition.

43. Throughout the episode, Ariosto duplicates the words and images of canto 21, as this sampling shows: "qual sempre fui, tal esser voglio" [44.61.1]; "o me Fortuna in alto o in basso ruote...immobil son di vera fede scoglio/ che d'ogni interno il vento e 'l mar percuote" [61.4-5]; "si ch'ogni modo, voglia ella o non voglia/ lasci Ruggier da parte, e Leon toglia" [73.7-8]; "come si dice che si suol d'un legno/ talor chiodo con chiodo cacciar fuori./ Nuovo pensier ch'a questo poi succede, le dipinge Ruggiero pieno di fede" [45.29.5-8]; "la crudeltà che usa l'iniqua vecchia/ contra il buon cavallier..." [41.1-2]; "l'eloquenza del Greco assai potea/ ma più de l'eloquenza, potea molto/ l'obbligo grande" [56.1-3]; "Ma non più quercia antica o grosso muro/ di ben fondata torre a borea cede./ né più all'irato mar lo scoglio duro" [73.1-3]. The language of fede and promessa is thick in cantos 44-45 as well.
44. On Ruggiero's crucial involvement with the theme of faith throughout, see the pages in Tasso cited by Ferguson [pp. 62-65; cf. note 14 above], as well as Saccone, "Clorindano e Medoro" and "Prospettive"; Wiggins, pp. 68-69 et passim. It is no coincidence that this paradigmatic definition of Ruggiero's conflict between faith to his Lord and faith to his love echoes the same Dantean passage that so haunts the 1532 version of the Gabrina-Filandro episode: "Potea in lui molto il congiungale amore, ma vi potea più il debito e l'onore" [40.68.7-8].

45. As Ferguson, pp. 66-70, noted some time ago, the same episode stages the last of Ruggiero's many failed attempts to negotiate his way between two promises—in this case his promise to Leone and his betrothal to Bradamante—leading him to the brink of suicide by starvation from which he is rescued only by a deus ex machina in the form of the magician Melissa [see also Saccone, "Prospettive"]). The episode thus juxtaposes two responses to the dilemma of keeping faith, transposing them from the marginal and polarized case of Gabrina vs. Filandro into a situation in which the moral stakes are far less clear, though very high. Unlike Filandro, however, neither Bradamante nor Ruggiero is actually forced into taking the full consequences of their potentially extremely destructive choices (Bradamante's choice of Ruggiero would break faith with both her parents and her leige-lord; Ruggiero's choice of self-negation will also constitute a betrayal of Bradamante).

46. On vows or promises and poetry see Ascoli, "Liberating the Tomb."


48. In canto 46 the tapestry of Cassandra, an evident figure of the poem, is referred to as a "velo" [84.3-5]. Alcina, a demonic double of the poem and of the poet both, hides her true nature under a textual veil in canto 7 [15.7, 28.6]. See Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, pp. 159-166, 230-231, 389-390.

49. On Ariosto's use of multiple "figures of the poet" in the Furioso, see Ariosto's Bitter Harmony, pp. 37-38 et passim; on Alcina as poet-figure, pp. 126-132 et passim; on Cassandra as poet-figure, pp. 39, 389-93.

WORKS CONSULTED


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