Communities, Traffickers and the State: The Transformation of Urban Social Policy in Brazil

By

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Abstract

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Academic work on Brazil has long underscored the state’s shortcomings. Past scholarship portrayed a state beset by patronage, held captive to elite interests and mired in inefficiencies that impeded the basic practice of governance. The literature on Brazilian urbanism depicted the state as particularly deficient. State interaction with favelas, disadvantaged communities common throughout the country’s cities, demonstrated state-society relations at their most fraught. The state alternatively neglected favelas, failing to extend to them same services and rights that the formal city enjoyed; abused them, destroying communities through violent demolition campaigns, sanctioning police brutality and colluding with drug traffickers; or exploited them for political gain through clientelistic networks.

In the wake of democracy’s return to Brazil there are many indications of substantial changes to state capacity. These advances demand a re-evaluation of state-society relations and an interrogation of the continued utility of past theoretical frameworks. Through a case study of Rio de Janeiro, this dissertation explores the ramifications of the re-emergence of state sponsored welfare for disadvantaged urban communities. I examine how relationships among the state, favela residents and drug traffickers change with the proliferation of new equalization measures. Through quantitative, geographic and qualitative analyses, my data reveal impressive gains in the scale and reach of recent social policies. New connections linking the Brazilian state with favela residents have emerged. Each conceptualizes and interacts with the other in novel ways. Such achievements, however, are accompanied with the notable cost of further complicating the state’s relationship with drug trafficking. Nevertheless, these developments underscore the need to cease privileging deficit perspectives when analyzing the Brazilian state. The recent social policies reflect a newly re-invigorated beneficent dimension of the Brazilian state, one that warrants closer scrutiny.
To Marcos and Renata who taught me the meaning of home in Rio de Janeiro.
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Introduction

OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION OBJECTIVE

Until recently, the bulk of academic work on Brazil emphasized the state’s shortcomings (Mainwaring, 1995; Schneider, 1991; Skidmore, 2009; Weyland, 1996). Scholarship depicted a state plagued by cronyism, patronage, infighting and inefficiencies that impeded the fundamental act of governance. Weak state capacity contributed to the poverty and inequality that came to characterize Brazil. In the past, to underscore the state’s failings, frequent parallels were made between Brazil’s high Gini coefficient, the globally agreed upon inequality metric, and those of the most underdeveloped countries in Africa.

The work of urban scholars portrayed the Brazilian state as particularly deficient. This branch of research depicted the state as so neglectful of its poor that massive favelas, elsewhere referred to as shantytowns or slums, were allowed to develop throughout the country’s cities. Indeed, favelas have become (in)famous manifestations of the country’s poverty and inequality. State disregard for the poor has also been blamed for the growing domination of favelas by drug traffickers in the 1980s, and the multiple forms of hardship these actors introduced. State-favela interaction was framed in similarly negative ways as favela residents encountered only the state’s most brutal practices. The state destroyed favela homes and entire communities deemed illegal by implementing harsh demolition and resettlement campaigns. The state exacerbated favela violence through armed conflict with drug traffickers. Through patron-client ties, state agents treated favela residents as instruments for political gain and little more (Fischer, 2010; Kowarick, 1980; J. Perlman, 2011; Rolnik, 1999; Valladares, 1978; Zaluar, 1994).

While the above conceptualizations of state-society relations with respect to Brazil’s urban poor were, to varying degrees, accurate in the past, it is crucial to interrogate their continued relevance, especially in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Democracy’s return to Brazil opened the door for a variety of important changes within the state as well as its interactions with wider society. On the macro-level, there are many recent indications that Brazil is forging a new path that deviates from how the state has historically acted. Previously labeled a developing country, Brazil is now considered a middle-income country, and is quickly shedding many of the associations that accompany the “developing country” moniker. Economic fragility and social inequality frequently characterize less developed countries, and these qualities aptly described earlier periods in Brazil’s history. Yet recently, the country has also achieved the greatest advances in the economic and social sectors, and this dissertation explores some of the accomplishments in the latter category.

In the past, Brazil was no stranger to economic tumult. From the late 1970s to the early 2000s the country endured several bouts of inflation, spiking interest rates and currency overhauls. However, new economic policies beginning in the mid-1990s ushered in several years of economic strengthening. These new policies have been so effective that the global economic crisis of 2008, the worst since the great depression, left Brazil largely untouched. Brazil’s economy is robust, growing and poised to be the fifth largest in the world.

A stronger economic position has allowed Brazil to develop other state capacities that were previously quite limited. For instance, in recent years, the country has substantially increased its role in international affairs. In a reversal of fortune, Brazil now lends money to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A few decades ago, Brazil borrowed funds from the IMF and was saddled with stringent repayment conditions. Similarly, while the recipient of foreign aid in the past, Brazil is now sponsoring international development projects, especially in the African region (The Economist, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).
The changes to Brazilian state capacity set the stage for this inquiry that examines the evolution of state-society relations. Of expanding state abilities, this dissertation explores the growth in state-sponsored welfare provision. Greater financial resources are being directed to social concerns. As a result, new government offices, programs and staff dedicated to equalization measures have proliferated. More specifically, I focus on two categories of social policies, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and built-environment interventions, because they demonstrate the strongest re-emergence of state welfare capacity and engender a new relationship between the state and disadvantaged populations. CCTs offer modest stipends to poor households provided that family members complete certain behaviors, such as attending school or visiting the doctor regularly. Bolsa Família epitomizes CCTs and is Brazil’s flagship social welfare program. Built-environment interventions alter the physical landscape of favelas. Through these interventions, urban infrastructure – such as roads, electricity and water – are improved and communities are given new resources such as schools, health clinics and public parks.

Since Brazil has been a highly urbanized country for decades, with the majority of the country’s population living in cities, my research specifically focuses on social policies in the urban context through a case study of Rio de Janeiro. Of Brazilian metropolises, Rio de Janeiro has achieved paradigmatic status for its urban poverty and inequality. The Brazilian state has historically had a very contentious relationship with Rio de Janeiro’s urban poor. This creates a fertile backdrop to assess how state attitudes and actions towards the poor have evolved as well as how the poor have responded to the new role of the state in their lives. In essence, Rio de Janeiro is a sensitive case where the changes in state-society interaction will be more easily discernible than in cities with less poverty, inequality and fraught state-society relations.

With drug trafficker domination in Rio de Janeiro, the state-society relationship cannot be treated as a simple dyad. Any investigation of the relationship between Rio de Janeiro’s disadvantaged populations and the state must also analyze the role of drug traffickers. My investigation focuses on the interaction among three sets of actors: the state, the urban poor – favela residents in particular – and drug traffickers. I employ quantitative and geographic analyses to assess the expansion of social programs across the city of Rio de Janeiro as well as qualitative methods to understand the repercussions these policies create in two of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas: Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos.

On the national scale, the Brazilian state’s renewed commitment to social protection is yielding a substantial impact. Through greater social welfare investment, the poverty and inequality that have long characterized the country are decreasing (The Economist, 2009a). Between 2001 and 2010, Brazil’s Gini coefficient declined from 60 to 54.5, bringing Brazil in line with other Latin American countries. In this same time period, the poverty headcount ratio, the percentage of the population living on less than two dollars a day, was cut in half from 22% to 11% (Osorio, Souza, Soares, & Oliveira, 2011). Bolsa Família is credited with contributing to 20% of the inequality and poverty reduction observed in the early 2000s (Kerstenetzky, 2010; Sátyro & Soares, 2009).

Juxtaposing urban scholarship’s negative view of the Brazilian state with recent evidence of Brazil’s achievements with respect to welfare provision creates a quandary. Urban scholars perpetuate a bad-state narrative, one in which the state alternatively ignores the poor, abuses them or coerces them for political gain. Yet, Brazil’s recent advances in its equalization measures attest to a newly enhanced state capacity, and, consequently, to new state-society interactions. These developments demand a re-evaluation of the bad-state narrative and a new understanding of how the state behaves in the urban context. The suspicion that social scientists have of the Brazilian state prevents an appreciation of how the state has extended its influence in favelas as well as how the relationship linking favela residents to the state has changed. In summary, I seek to answer the
following research question: How do relationships among the state, favela residents and drug traffickers change with the proliferation of new equalization measures?

My data and analyses demonstrate the limited utility of continuing to privilege bad-state narratives in investigations of Rio de Janeiro. In sharp contrast to past state-society relations, recent equalization measures reflect a state that is highly committed to improving the lives of the poor and relies on a logic that is more objective and transparent, rather than personalistic, in order to do so. The welfare gains observed on the national level also hold true for the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian state has rapidly expanded social programs for the urban poor and successfully reached those most in need. A new connection linking the Brazilian state with favela residents has emerged in recent years.

As welfare programs about trafficker domination, built-environment interventions are uniquely positioned to reroute the institutional pathways of control, dislodging reliance on traffickers and binding favela residents to the state in new ways. Moreover, attending to the institutional landscape that the state, favela residents and traffickers share also allows for an appreciation of the productive contribution that trafficker domination can generate. Traffickers are not simply sources of crime and violence. In the context of this investigation, the influence of traffickers on the institutional climate shapes associational life and how favela communities mobilize in response to state-led welfare efforts. More broadly, traffickers serve an important social ordering function affecting the quality of community life.

While the Brazilian state has many important achievements in the area of social policy, these advances are accompanied with notable costs. The state’s progress further complicates its relationship with drug trafficking. On the one hand, the new social policies upset the ties of dependence linking favela residents with traffickers. In their place, new connections are forged binding favela communities to the state. Yet, certain state advances in favelas are achieved only by the state forging a deeper alliance with drug traffickers. The new welfare efforts simultaneously, and paradoxically, indicate a stronger new state capacity, but also reveal state weakness and the continued reliance on a rival authority.

Instead of conceptualizing the recent equalization measures as indicative of a robust and fully-fledged welfare apparatus, it is more fruitful to understand it as a re-emerging capability. Contemporary equalization measures reflect a resurgence of state welfare capacity established in the early twentieth century. At the same time, recent policies deviate from the norms enshrined in earlier efforts in important ways. The state is in the midst of a learning phase as it maintains earlier welfare efforts and initiates novel strategies. This learning contributes to the contradictory outcomes noted earlier: new welfare measures indicative of state strength and weakness.

This chapter reviews the recent policy advances that constitute the core focus of this dissertation: CCTs and built-environment interventions. It then summarizes the conceptual and theoretical grounding used to evaluate the growth and impact of these equalization measures, drawing from the literature on Brazilian urbanism, institutional analysis and associational life to shed new light on state-favela-trafficker interaction. The chapter goes on to summarize the methods used to understand how the relationships among the state, favela residents and drug traffickers change with the proliferation of new equalization measures. An empirical and analytical overview of the main dissertation arguments closes the chapter.

OVERVIEW OF RECENT SOCIAL POLICIES

Of Brazil’s recent social policies I focus on CCTs and built-environment interventions because they represent a novel logic of state aid and embody new forms of state-society interaction. As will be expanded upon in the next chapter, in the past, receiving government support was
predicated on employment in the formal economy. Similarly, formal property ownership has historically been a powerful determinant of the quality of state-society interaction. Starting in the colonial era, possessing formal land titles was essential in order to participate in matters of state governance. Today, proof of legal property ownership is a crucial means by which residents of Brazil’s urban peripheries make claims on the state to ensure that their rights are being met (Hagopian, 1996; Holston, 2009; McCann, 2008; Skidmore, 2009). Without formal land titles, many favela residents experienced the punitive dimensions of the state through favela removal and resettlement efforts. In the past, the beneficial hand of the state was not extended to those whose property or livelihoods fell outside of the formal sector.

With recent social policies, however, formality no longer functions as a prerequisite for state assistance. Through built-environment interventions, irrespective of the legality of the original land occupation, individuals are eligible to receive government aid. Through CCT programs, regardless of employment status, individuals may obtain financial support from the state. With these programs, the state relinquishes its expectation of formality, thereby reflecting a new rationale of governance. Previously, state aid was restricted and highly particular, affecting population segments that already enjoyed a certain level of privilege and stability (Barros, Mendanca, & Rocha, 1995; Sonia Draibe, 2007; Hoffmann, 2003; Malloy, 1977). The CCT’s and built-environment programs reveal a new form of state-society relations in which state actions no longer predominantly cater to elite interests. Abandoning past norms, state-initiated interaction with society has evolved to such a degree that individuals whose lives are highly precarious and who historically received minimal state attention are now eligible to receive state support. CCTs and built-environment interventions thus offer a unique opportunity to analyze the reach and impact of the state’s newly enhanced welfare capacity.

Beginning in 1995 as the product of municipal level policy experimentation, CCT programs multiplied rapidly throughout the country. In 2001, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the federal government introduced two national CCT programs: Bolsa Escola (School Grant) and Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant). In 2003, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launched Fome Zero (Zero Hunger), a broad social welfare program aiming to reduce extreme poverty and hunger in the country. A principal component of this program included Programa do Cartão Alimentação (Food Card Program) in which participants received a stipend each month to assist with food consumption. In 2003, Lula merged the former CCT programs to create Programa Bolsa Família (Family Grant Program). Bolsa Família has three objectives: to alleviate current poverty and inequality, break the inter-generational transmission of poverty through investments in human capital, and empower beneficiary families by linking them to complementary services. Bolsa Família operates by targeting families falling below two income thresholds: the moderately poor (those living off of R$120/per capita/per month) and the extreme poor (those living off of R$60/per capita/per month)\(^1\). Heads of households are entitled to receive the checks if their children complete routine health appointments and maintain school attendance (De Janvry et al., 2005; Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & de la Briere, 2007; Lomeli, 2008). By 2006, Bolsa Família covered more than 44 million people, almost a quarter of Brazil’s population.

The most recent, extensive and widely applauded built-environment interventions are Favela-Bairro and PAC-favela. Favela-Bairro began as a municipal policy in 1993 before receiving external support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 1995. The program expanded quickly and by 2003, Favela-Bairro had reached 105 favelas and received $600 million from the IDB (Bate, 2003; Machado, 2006). In 2010, another phase of Favela-Bairro was announced, but rebranded as Morar Carioca (Carioca Living), with the aim of upgrading all of the

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\(^1\) R$ is the accepted symbol for the Brazilian currency, the real. During the fieldwork phases of this dissertation, US$1.00 equaled approximately R$1.50 to R$2.00.
city’s favelas. Following the Favela-Bairro model, in 2007 the federal government debuted a national infrastructure improvement program known as Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC, Growth Acceleration Program), with PAC-favela urban upgrading, as a core component of its work. Favela-Bairro and PAC-favela share many commonalities. PAC-favela is very similar to Favela-Bairro, but on a much grander scale. It attempts to “reverse social and territorial inequality and realize the Right to the City” for favela residents (MOC, 2011). Thus far, PAC-favela targets the largest favela communities in the city such as Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Complexo de Manguinhos. At the time of writing, the federal government has allocated $R 3,534,952,800 for PAC-favela in Rio de Janeiro.

While the exact program implementation of urban upgrading programs varies slightly depending on the specifics of each neighborhood context, Favela-Bairro and PAC-favela both contain a collection of the following improvements to the built environment: sanitation infrastructure (garbage collection and sewer systems), urban services (water, light, electricity and postal service), spatial reorganization (creating more public space, augmenting pedestrian and vehicular access within the favela and between the favela and the rest of the urban landscape), social services (infant and child care, income generation activities and health clinics), recreational facilities and land tenure legalization (assisting resident to obtain legal land ownership)(Acioly Jr., 2001; Machado, 2006; Pamuk & Cavallieri, 1998).

RIO DE JANEIRO’S POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND FAVELAS

By their very nature, welfare programs target disadvantaged communities. In this investigation I focus on the financial and socio-spatial dimensions of urban poverty and inequality, with an emphasis on favelas. The focus on favelas is important because of the multiple articulations of poverty and inequality that concentrate within these territories. However, precisely defining favelas is challenging since they are not homogenous entities, and the social, physical as well as political qualities that “favela” refers to are dynamic. The term was initially used to describe the informal communities that developed in the late nineteenth century on the hills and mountains that dot the Rio de Janeiro cityscape. The Portuguese word morro, is often used as a substitute for favela and translates to “hill” in English. Over time the “favela” label was used to refer to a wide range of spaces of poverty, inequality and informality. Today, Rio de Janeiro has more than 600 favelas that are home to anywhere between 1 in 3 and 1 in 5 of the city’s residents(Fabricius, 2008; Machado, 2006).

The characteristics listed in the remainder of this paragraph are typical of most favelas. Houses are self-constructed rather than relying on formal contractors or architects. Favela communities develop their own management structures, such a Residents’ Associations, to oversee utility provision and ensure community order. In contrast to formal urban development(Marvin, 2007), favelas progress through an inverse means: it is only after land is settled and buildings are constructed that infrastructure – water, roads and electricity – is added. While formal development proceeds on a large scale, favela growth in incremental, advancing house by house (Fabricius, 2008). Buildings are densely packed and in comparison to the rectilinear format that guides much of the rest of Rio de Janeiro’s built environment, aggregate favela construction seems highly irregular. Although some of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are located on prime real estate, favelas are generally constructed on undesirable territory, be it land that is far removed from the city center, or land that is geologically unstable (thus, fatal landslide and debris flows are not uncommon Davis, 2007). Most favela residents lack security of land tenure and do not own the plots of land on which their homes are built. As a result, favelas are considered illegal land invasions. Prior to the urban upgrades and recent welfare advances, favelas did not have the same access to state-sponsored urban services
when compared to the formal city. Resources that are commonplace outside of favelas – utilities, schools, clinics, etc. – were largely absent in favelas for much of their history. Even today, favelas located in the most remote regions of the city lack such amenities.

This summary of the favela built environment attests to the spatial inequality that favela communities endure. Many residents also cope with economic hardship, and thus favelas are spaces of poverty in the financial sense. Unemployment is high in favela communities, with rates above fifty percent in some areas (Perlman, 2011). Many employed individuals are also poorly compensated for their labor. This is not to say that favelas are exclusively spaces of poverty. Favela communities are home to a range of income categories; however, the majority of households are low income.

Compounding these circumstances are drug trafficking and violence that have become regular occurrences in favelas (elaborated upon in the next chapter). These phenomena were, in part, the product of exclusion and now serve as the basis for continued discrimination. Trafficking and violence have fueled narratives of fear and vice about favelas (Foek, 2005; Updike, 2012) and perpetuated stigmatization of favela residents. Individuals are reluctant to disclose that they reside in favelas for fear of the prejudice such an admission would incur. When confronted with any form of bureaucratic procedure in which residential address disclosure is needed, such as a job application or obtaining health services, individuals will often deny that they live in a favela or claim that they reside in the formal neighborhood immediately adjacent to a favela. In sum, spatial, financial and social marginalization converge within favela communities, creating areas of tremendous welfare need.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

My use of the term “welfare” is grounded in classic conceptualizations of the welfare state. Many investigations of welfare invoke T.H. Marshall, and his definition of social policy as measures that promote “the general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels” (Marshall, 1973, p. 32) aptly describes recent welfare advances in Brazil. As modern state capacity has evolved, a wide array of services has come to receive the label of welfare. Some of these measures, (e.g., those focusing on family leave policies, work time regulations, etc. (Gornick & Meyers, 2005; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005; Morgan, 2006)), represent welfare in a more nuanced form than the way the concept of welfare is used in this dissertation. Additionally, unlike many investigations of the intricacies of contemporary welfare policy, which often study the measures of countries with advanced or historically well-developed welfare apparatuses, such as Europe or the United States, I analyze a more fundamental form of welfare. I use the term welfare in a traditional sense and focus on programs that minimize financial hardship and reduce inequality (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Howard, 2008; Korpi & Palme, 1998).

To understand how state-society relations are currently unfolding with respect to favela communities, this investigation draws from a neo-Weberian framework to conceptualize the Brazilian state. Neo-Weberian perspectives are useful because they view the state as a dynamic entity comprised of different capabilities. Such frameworks resist interpreting the state as a cohesive and coherent organization. Instead, the state is regarded as an agglomeration of different functions, handling responsibilities ranging from the management of financial transactions to the maintenance of order. Furthermore, the actions and advances of one state division can undermine those of another.

The proliferation of Brazil’s social policies is in keeping with the trajectory of many modern states’ augmentation of their capacity to regulate social life and attend to welfare concerns in particular (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Skocpol, 2009; Steinmetz, 1993; Thomas & Meyer, 1984). The
fluidity and fragmentation that neo-Weberian frameworks embody is fitting for the evolution of Brazil’s welfare state that, for many years, suffered due to political opposition (from actors within and outside of the state) as well as bureaucratic inefficiencies. Additionally, neo-Weberian frameworks facilitate understanding the extraordinarily complex relationship the state maintains with drug trafficking. As will be expanded upon in subsequent chapters, some state actions, including welfare provision, attempt to combat trafficker domination, while others perpetuate its existence.

Of state abilities, I focus on the Brazilian state’s emerging welfare capacity. As a newly expanded component of state functions, state-society interactions established through equalization measures can be compared with those created through other state capacities that have previously dominated state linkages with the urban poor. In Rio de Janeiro, the state’s engagement with disadvantaged populations, as portrayed in the bad-state literature, has primarily involved the use of violence, as demonstrated through the harsh tactics used by state security forces, and political coercion, as manifested through patron-client ties (Da Silva, 2008; Gay, 1990; Perlman, 2011; Zaluar, 1998a).

Examining how various scholars perpetuate a bad-state narrative about Brazil necessarily implies an ideal of good governance. Too often in Rio de Janeiro scholarship, the reference for what constitutes good state functioning remains silent. In this dissertation, the use of the terms “good” and “bad” reflect two endpoints of a continuum, an analytical device, to evaluate the evolution of state performance. These labels are clearly simple and reductive, but they help to organize and make sense of the many discourses circulating about Rio de Janeiro and they assist in understanding how the state changes over time.

Since a variety of expectations about good and bad modern state performance abound, further unpacking the definition of these concepts is necessary. Many of the criticisms of the bad Brazilian state closely resemble Weber’s typology of traditional authority. In the past, personal connections exerted enormous influence over the quality of state-society relations and an individual’s life chances in Brazil. For decades, agricultural and subsequently industrial elites dominated politics, shoring up their power through patronage.

Traditional authority in and of itself is not bad, but it has come be understood as antithetical to modern forms of authority epitomized in rational authority. Rational authority establishes regulatory processes as well as clearly defined functions and responsibilities. Under rational authority, allegiance is a function of an individual’s position within a broader organizational system as opposed to devotion to a particular person or adherence to custom, as is common in traditional authority. The triumph of objective procedures levels the influence of personal connections, promoting equality and democracy. Today, prevailing global norms expect state governance to rely on rational bureaucratic authority.

The chief criticisms of traditional authority concern its potential to yield multiple forms of inequality. In contexts where personal connections largely dictate the quality of state-society relations, economic and financial wealth is channeled to narrow population segments, as many cases from the developing to developed world indicate (Barboza, 2012; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; P. B. Evans, 1995). Politically in such situations, state operations and benefits cater to elite interests. Governance consists of the exchange of favors perpetually at the discretion of those with more network influence. The sway of personal connections makes it challenging for a robust rule of law to flourish. Legality can always be circumvented through the right gift or alliance. Unsurprisingly, in contexts where personal connections hold significant weight, corruption is rampant. While elite segments are brought into tighter engagement with the state, rule through personal connections creates distance between the state and non-elites. With de facto state operations determined by whom people know rather than codified law, there is little incentive to make claims on the state since employing official procedures will likely prove less effective when confronted with the
influence of personal connections. As the next chapter will make clear, Brazil’s history is replete with many examples of state-society relations yielding multiple forms of inequality attributable to personal connections and patronage politics.

Weberian thought is further helpful in understanding the changes that these new social policies represent. The equalization measures analyzed in this dissertation signify a shift in the state’s reliance away from traditional authority and a politics based on personal connections towards a greater embrace of rational authority. As expanded upon below, the design and delivery of new welfare initiatives is guided by formal procedures and objective criteria rather than personal connections. In response to these programs, beneficiaries make appeals to the state through institutional rather than through patronage channels.

Relying on neo-Weberian perspectives alone, however, would be insufficient to understand Rio de Janeiro because the fundamental tenet that the state is the exclusive actor that can legitimately use violence within a given territory to enforce order does not hold true (Weber, 2004). Both the formal state and drug traffickers employ violence, just as both possess legitimacy with respect to wider population segments. Trafficker presence forces a broader understanding of the types of authorities governing urban life in Rio de Janeiro and at the same time a closer scrutiny of the processes by which order is established and maintained. Accordingly, I blend neo-Weberian conceptualizations of the state with attention to issues of governance, which I define in a broad sense as rule making and rule abiding. My emphasis on rules draws on institutional analysis, focusing on how social order is constructed and upheld (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Cornell & Kalt, 2000; Migdal, 2001; Singh, Tucker, & Meinhard, 1991). I examine how competing rule systems — promulgated by the state as well as traffickers — become institutionalized as well as de-institutionalized. That is, I analyze how certain forms of domination are inscribed and others are undone.

In investigating the impact of social policies on favela communities I also focus on changes in the quality of associational life among favela residents. The concept of associational life used here is similar to the terms “civil society” and “social capital” that other scholars invoke (Cohen & Arato, 1994; Gittell, 2003).Associational life draws attention to the quality of relationships among individuals and organizations within a community in addition to the connections that play out across community lines. Communities with strong associational lives are those that are better able to unite individuals with diverse interests and objectives, establish a common agenda and secure resources.

METHODS

I analyze the expansion of Brazil’s welfare capacity through a combination of qualitative, quantitative and geographic analysis. More specifically, I draw from fifteen months of qualitative fieldwork conducted between 2009 and 2012, including one continuous year spent living in Brazil during 2010 in addition to shorter field visits before and after this time period. Through regular site visits, I explored the social and physical landscapes of a several Northern Zone communities. In addition to ethnographic observations and casual, everyday conversations with residents, I conducted 70 semi-structured interviews with individuals living in favelas. As much as possible, I selected long-time residents who could speak to the history and evolution of the community, especially in terms of how recent state programs differed from past actions. Through these qualitative methods I trace the growth and reverberations the equalization measures create in favela communities. More specifically, I examine how the state expands its presence in favelas and how favela residents as well as traffickers respond to greater state activity in their communities.

Rio de Janeiro is home to many favelas that could serve as possible sites for academic study. Within the city, I focused my qualitative data collection on the Northern Zone for two reasons.
Much of the existing literature on Rio de Janeiro’s favelas examines those in the Southern Zone (Valladares, 2009). Communities in the Northern Zone are not as well understood. The Southern and Northern Zones also experience distinct forms of poverty and inequality. Communities on the Northern periphery endure more intense economic hardship than those in the Southern Zone. Due to their proximity to the wealthiest neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, Southern Zone favelas also benefit from a unique cultural environment. Exposure to upper classes equips residents of the Southern Zone with a certain competence and gives them access to greater advantages. Individuals implicitly and explicitly learn self-presentation norms that can facilitate overcoming the prejudice that favela residents experience. Living in the Southern Zone also fosters connections to social networks that can help defray the high cost of living in Rio de Janeiro (for instance, by finding an employer who offers a better salary or is willing to help pay for schooling). The Northern Zone lacks such benefits and thus experiences greater welfare need.

Starting with my 2010 fieldwork, I spent time in several Northern Zone communities, including Borel, Andaraí, Caju and Mata Machado, but I focused on Complexo do Alemão (or simply Alemão) and Manguinhos. These two favelas receive similar levels of state support, but associational life following the introduction of state programs has been strikingly different. I juxtapose Manguinhos and Alemão to illuminate important factors mediating the outcomes of state-sponsored interventions.

It is important to note that safety concerns affected my access to favelas and the quality of some conversations with residents. There were occasions when I could not enter a favela due to violence. This was especially the case with Manguinhos. In some interviews, residents could not be forthcoming with information due to norms in their communities. I was never the first to bring up potentially sensitive conversation topics. Instead, I waited for respondents to discuss any potentially sensitive issues. In spite of the differences in access and depth, the data collected indicated distinct social processes unfolding in Alemão and Manguinhos.

In addition to interviews with favela residents I also conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 government staff people responsible for program implementation who worked in the following offices: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS, Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication), Centro de Referência de Assistência Social (CRAS, Social Welfare Reference Center), Secretaria Municipal de Assistência Social (SMAS, Municipal Secretary of Social Welfare), Casa Civil do Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Civil House of the State of Rio de Janeiro), Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (SMH, Municipal Housing Secretary), Programa Saúde da Família (PSF, Family Health Program) and the Canteiro Social do PAC (Social Affairs Office of PAC). Conversations in these interviews centered on the history of government equalization measures as well as the challenges of program implementation.

Complementing the above qualitative data, I also conducted quantitative and geographic analysis on data maintained by various government offices. More specifically, I merged data from the following sources: census data housed by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, Brazilian Geographic and Statistical Institute), welfare data managed by the MDS and violence data collected by the Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP, Institute of Public Security) and the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS, the National Public Health System). These data sets were then integrated with geographic data from the Rio de Janeiro SMH. The result is a unique, original dataset that permits analysis of the evolution of equalization measures over time, across space, and in relation to a variety of social indicators. The above mentioned government offices do not share data with each other. Consequently, their respective analyses rarely include insights beyond simple descriptive summaries (e.g., frequency counts). The advantage of my dataset is that it allows for more sophisticated analyses about the factors facilitating and impeding welfare growth, with implications for both academic scholarship and public policy.
Throughout my quantitative analyses, I examine the strength of the association between neighborhood poverty and the extent of welfare services available or number of welfare beneficiaries enrolled in government programs. States with high-functioning welfare systems should display a strong association between poverty and welfare receipt. For these analyses, poverty is defined in financial terms in relation to Brazil’s minimum wage. At the time of my investigation, the minimum wage was approximately R$500 a month (or roughly US$275).\(^2\) Earlier formulations of the conditional cash transfer programs tied benefits to the minimum wage. For instance, households earning one half the minimum wage were eligible to receive one stipend while those earning one-quarter the minimum wage were able to receive another stipend of greater magnitude. I retain this conceptualization and define poor households as those earning up to half the minimum wage.

Assessing the predictive power of poverty on welfare receipt permits an assessment of the efficacy of the state’s new welfare capacity. Given the novelty of Brazil’s welfare expansion and a history of inequalitarian state-society interaction, poverty may or may not be strongly predictive of welfare expansion.

I also investigate the socio-spatial aspects of poverty and inequality by examining the relationship between favelas and welfare implementation both quantitatively and qualitatively. Through statistical and geographic analyses, I analyze how the presence and size of favelas helps or hinders the distribution of welfare programs and number of beneficiaries at the neighborhood level. Favelas present certain practical challenges for social welfare implementation. As discussed in more detail below, favelas appear to lack a legible organizational layout, making navigation of these communities challenging. The frequency of violence also impedes access to and circulation within these areas. Statistically analyzing the strength of the association between favela size and welfare distribution offers additional insight into how well the state’s new welfare capacity is at reaching populations in need in favelas.

**DISSERTATION OUTLINE AND ARGUMENT SUMMARY**

To understand how relations among the state, favela residents and traffickers change with new equalization measures, this dissertation is divided into the following four chapters and conclusion. The first chapter establishes the necessary historical background to appreciate the innovative advances that recent equalization measures represent in terms of state-society relations. The second examines the evolution of equalization measures at the city scale. An analysis of the implications of welfare advances must be preceded with a precise documentation of newly expanded welfare activity. Using quantitative and geographic analyses, the second chapter explores the distribution of welfare programs across Rio de Janeiro neighborhoods during the first decade of the twenty-first century and attempts to identify the principal factors facilitating or impeding welfare expansion. My findings reveal a state that is far from neglectful or abusive of the urban poor, but one that has achieved great strides in terms of identifying and supporting those in need. State welfare provision is greatest in neighborhoods experiencing the greatest levels of poverty. Furthermore the strength of the association between poverty and welfare receipt increases over time, suggesting that the state’s ability to reach disadvantaged populations improved over the ten-year time period. In contrast to past equalization efforts, state welfare capacity is not a transient phenomenon, instead it endures and intensifies.

The second chapter provides compelling justification for relinquishing the bad-state narrative in describing Brazil. Given its relative novelty, the state’s recently enhanced welfare

\(^2\) With Rio de Janeiro as the most expensive city in Latin America, it is extremely challenging to meet basic needs while living in the city on a minimum wage income.
capacity is remarkably effective in reaching beneficiaries. Furthermore, the rationale guiding program implementation is grounded in objective indicators. Whereas in the past, receiving state support was highly dependent on favors and personal connections, my analyses indicate that poverty is, and becomes, an increasingly important predictor of welfare receipt. This suggests that the Brazilian state is less susceptible to the complex web of patron-client ties that have historically hamstrung egalitarian state-society interaction. Through the implementation of welfare services, the Brazilian state displays rationality emblematic of modern states and stereotyped as lacking in developing country governments.

Additional quantitative analyses also assess how equalization measures affect neighborhood and city life by specifically examining how violence changes in the wake of welfare program implementation. None of the welfare measures examined have a strong enough effect to be captured statistically, but those that operate at the community level, such as built-environment interventions, demonstrate greater potential for doing so than those that function on the individual level, such as CCTs. This suggests that the decrease in Rio de Janeiro’s violence is attributable to factors other than welfare expansion.3

The third and fourth chapters explore the proliferation of welfare programs with a focus on Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos. The third chapter investigates the changes to the institutional configurations governing state, favela and trafficker interaction with the expansion of equalization programs. Prior to the recent proliferation of social policies, as noted earlier, the state interacted with favela communities at a distance, allowing trafficker domination over these regions. This history and these relationships are upended with the introduction of new social programs. The third chapter explores how trafficker authority is undone and how the state struggles to insert itself into favela communities in new ways.

Attending to Rio de Janeiro’s institutional landscape allows me to conceptualize both the state and traffickers in original ways. As a newly strengthened state capacity, equalization measures confront the challenge of becoming institutionalized. That is, the connection linking favela residents to beneficial state services must take root and grow. In the Rio de Janeiro context, this process of institutionalization is not straightforward. The new welfare services deviate sharply from other state interventions and alter engrained pathways linking the state and the urban poor, and as such demand new resources and tactics on the part of the state. Furthermore, the growth of state welfare competes with trafficker created institutional structures. In order for state welfare services to flourish, trafficker authority must be compromised.

The state and traffickers have long confronted each other in hostile ways. My focus on the processes of institutionalization and de-institutionalization brings to light the subtle means through which state-trafficker combat can also play out. In spite of the state’s most aggressive efforts – brutal police campaigns, often involving the deployment of specially trained military forces4 – trafficker authority has endured in favelas. Guns and caveirões5 have proven to be less effective in challenging trafficker domination because they do not offer an alternative institutional structure on which residents can base behavior. Trafficker authority may temporarily diminish in the wake of state-sponsored attacks, but in the absence of a new institutional framework, residents continue to rely on trafficker rules.

Of social policies examined in this dissertation, built-environment interventions have the greatest potential to undermine trafficker domination and instantiate a new institutional structure.

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3 It would be tempting to interpret the rise of state welfare activity and the decrease in city violence as a causal process, but my analysis provides little support for such an assertion.

4 e.g., Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE, Special Police Battalion).

5 Armored tank-like attack vehicles.
This is observed most strongly in Complexo do Alemão where residents begin to depend less on traffickers and look to the state for support and to adjudicate problems. This is not to say that the state is entirely successful in cultivating an alternative institutional structure. In some ways, such as through the provision of formalized urban services that circumvent the control of residents’ associations and traffickers, the state is quite effective in inserting a new system of rules. In other instances, the built-environment interventions cause tremendous upset, provoking the ire of residents with the potential of creating further distance between the state and favela communities. However, the perceived state failures are useful because they prompt residents to view the state as an object of critique in a new way. In the past, the state was faulted either for its negligence or brutality. Now, the state is criticized for how it delivers public goods. The importance of this evolution should not be underestimated because it reflects a change in how residents perceive the state and themselves. The creation and implementation of new social policies reflects a change in state-society relations on the part of the state. By making claims on the state in response to the disruption that built-environment interventions cause, favela residents mirror this change and are also enacting a new form of state-society interaction.

Examining the changing institutional structures shaping state, favela and trafficker interaction also contributes new insights into socio-spatial dynamics. Built-environment interventions are praised for their ability to transform human behavior. However, the history of urban upgrades in Rio de Janeiro yields inconsistent outcomes. Some communities appear largely unaffected by the interventions; whereas others change considerably. Attempting to understand what mediates these varying results requires more than analytically ambiguous de Certeau-ian arguments that social life will always trump the expectations of urban planners, designers and architects (Certeau, 2002; Gieryn, 2000). Of built-environment interventions, PAC-favela possesses greater potential to alter social behavior in the long term because of the cross-scalar connections the program creates. Linking favela residents to actors and processes beyond the favela community allows new behaviors to take root, be supported and become institutionalized. Other modifications to the urban environment that alter a more circumscribed socio-spatial territory, and are more insular in nature, are unlikely to contribute to long-term changes. With these latter conditions, the normative environment and mechanisms of control remain narrowly confined and as such readily fluctuate.

The fourth chapter examines why community responses to the introduction of new social programs in Alemão and Manguinhos are so different despite the many other commonalities they share. The two communities possess several of the same attributes that can foster or impede the quality of associational life. Both are equally poor, were once industrial labor centers of the city, receive the same types of government interventions and are controlled by the same drug gang. Yet, violence diminished in Alemão, but remains a regular phenomenon in Manguinhos. Civil society flourishes in Alemão, but languishes in Manguinhos. The fourth chapter explores the reasons behind such divergent outcomes, implicating the nature of trafficker rule. More specifically, I draw attention to the importance of how trafficker power is institutionalized in favela communities and its implications for associational life.

Traffickers are frequently understood as the source of social ills. Exclusively focusing on the hardship that traffickers cause misreads the productive contribution their presence may allow. Trafficker domination shapes the conduct of favela life in innumerable ways. In addition to distributing and selling drugs and weapons, traffickers provide an important governance function to favelas. Some scholars frame traffickers as proto-states as they manage responsibilities failing under the jurisdiction of modern states (Arias, 2006a; Leeds, 1996). I corroborate and extend this understanding of traffickers, but emphasize trafficker contributions beyond the direct provision of good, services, and employment. Trafficker presence can establish a coherent normative framework
affecting the social life of favelas distinct from the immediate delivery of money or consumable goods. In communities such as Alemão, where trafficker power is strong and deeply engrained, residents possess a clear understanding of permissible social conduct. Paradoxically, in this community, strong trafficker rule yields greater behavioral liberty because residents understand what is and is not allowed.

Trafficker rule across favela communities is seldom uniform. Where trafficker power is weak or traffickers compete with rivals for control, as in Manguinhos, a robust rule system cannot be constructed. Rather than the absence of rules, multiple, partially instantiated rules circulate. Residents lack a stable and transparent appreciation of acceptable behavior. Instead, residents are perpetually sensitive to the competing rule systems roaming their communities. This yields a second paradox: weaker trafficker domination creates more hardships for residents. The fourth chapter underscores the importance of conceptualizing traffickers as more than criminal or violent actors, and focuses on the social ordering their presence creates.

The process of rule-making occurs in a web of social relations. An investigation of the conflicting state and trafficker regimes of rule raises the inevitable question of how those dominated negotiate and contest rules that are placed upon them. The precursor to either acquiescence, abiding by rule systems, or activism, challenging them, is found in the quality of associational life (Bruch, Ferree, & Soss, 2010; Dietz, 1998). Accordingly, the forth chapter also examines how favela residents and the associational life they create changes in response to both state and trafficker rule systems. The structure of Alemão’s institutional climate provides the stable foundation for a civil society to flourish. Manguinhos, in contrast, does not possess the same institutional fixity. Lacking such a cornerstone, Manguinhos’ associational life flounders.

The importance of the institutional climate counters traditional theorizations of associational life among disadvantaged populations. Other frameworks emphasize the importance of practical assets such as time, money or familiarity with organizing techniques (Cohen & Dawson, 1993; Gittell, 2003; Kim & Bearman, 1997; Lawless & Fox, 2001; Woolcock, 1998). These resources are undoubtedly important, especially as immediate precursors to community mobilization. My analyses indicate that the institutional context matters more. Such a conclusion makes sense if we conceive of the myriad of factors influencing associational life as a pathway following a particular sequence. An understanding of permissible conduct on a cognitive, and even visceral, level must precede any use of available resources. Communities may be flush with practical assets, but they amount to little without a solid comprehension of acceptable behavior. Institutional environments are essential to ensuring the certainty of this knowledge and allowing diverse forms of associational life to develop.

Attending to the quality of the institutional landscape that the state, favela residents and traffickers occupy permits a new appreciation of the contributions traffickers may create for the communities they dominate. Traffickers cannot be exclusively understood as criminals, and must also be conceptualized as institutional architects capable of shaping behavior that is far removed from the proximate sale of drugs and weapons. The freedom and constraint that trafficker rule conditions sets the stage for very different community responses to state-led equalization measures in Manguinhos and Alemão.

CONCLUSION

In both academic discourses and the vernacular, favelas are also known as auto-constructed communities. The modifier “auto” simultaneously refers to the independence and ingenuity of favela residents, but also betrays the separation that these communities experienced from the formal authority of the state. Favelas are self-created because they have historically been spaces where the full influence of the state did not reach. With this separation, favela communities developed unique
systems of rule that established the conditions for state-favela interaction to unfold in pernicious ways. However, this distance is eroding as recent equalization measures bring the state and disadvantaged populations together in new ways.

This dissertation examines the growth of state welfare capacity and makes several important contributions to the literature on Brazilian urban poverty and state-society relations. Most importantly, the data collected provide substantial justification for no longer privileging the bad state category of arguments to describe Brazil. My analyses reveal a state that is highly effective in identifying and supporting disadvantaged urban communities. State-society interaction can no longer be conceptualized in terms of neglect or abuse. The establishment of new welfare offices, increases in federal spending for equalization measures and creation of new social policies guided by an objective rationale all attest to a novel understanding of societal needs on the part of the Brazilian state as well as a new ability to address these concerns. Similarly, the community mobilization that arises in response to welfare program implementation reveals a new understanding of the state on the part of favela residents. The adversarial state-favela relationship, epitomized in state-led favela demolition campaigns, has been replaced with supportive and accommodating state-favela relationship.

Although this dissertation focuses on Brazil, the data and analyses provide insight into the changing nature of contemporary state-society relations in the Global South more generally. Less developed countries are routinely criticized for their treatment of disadvantaged populations, in urban contexts or otherwise. Yet, these countries are also increasingly sites of great social policy innovation. The Brazilian case examined here attests to the importance of directing attention to the ways in which states previously understood as deficient may be evolving away from the behaviors that earned them such labels in the first place and enacting novel models of governance. In the past, the Brazilian state was known for its neglect and ill treatment of poor communities. Now, such descriptors hardly capture the totality of state-society interaction given recent state-led welfare advances. This dissertation is a first step towards the development of a new framework to understand such a shift in state-society relations in Brazil and beyond.
Chapter 1 – Brazilian Social Policies and the Urban Condition

INTRODUCTION

In order to appreciate the novelty of state-society relations being constructed through contemporary Brazilian social policy, it is vital to understand the evolution of Brazil’s welfare capacity as well as how the Brazilian state has previously conducted itself in the urban realm. To these ends, this chapter provides the historical context for the dissertation. It reviews the evolution of Brazil’s welfare system over the twentieth century, contrasting earlier state efforts with the recent social policies analyzed in this dissertation. The chapter goes on to summarize how scholars have previously understood state-society relations as manifested in cities. Earlier investigations emphasized the Brazilian state’s ill treatment of the urban poor. State interaction with favela communities is portrayed as overwhelmingly detrimental. The occasional instances of state support directed to favela populations that break with this pattern of state abuse are either ephemeral or extended for private gain. Subsequent chapters demonstrate how current state actions distinguish themselves from past behavior, underscoring the need to re-conceptualize the Brazilian state as deficit perspectives fail to capture the totality of current state-society interaction.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRAZILIAN WELFARE STATE

Prior to 1930, state-sponsored social welfare existed only minimally and primarily focused on the education sector. From 1930 onwards, however, new forms of state support accompanied Brazil’s rapid industrialization beginning with the first Getúlio Vargas regime. Importantly, formal employment functioned as a consistent prerequisite to the types of state aid initiated under Vargas’ rule, a requirement that continued for many decades. In 1930, Vargas created the Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões (IAPS, Institute for Retirement and Pensions). As the first federal government venture of its kind, the IAPS signaled the onset of national oversight and management of welfare concerns. Earlier health and social security benefits had been limited to state employees. With Vargas, similar benefits were extended to the private sector (Malloy, 1977). Subsequent revisions to labor union structure, including the establishment of the country’s first minimum wage regulations, promoted a stronger integration between the state and working classes. These changes helped Vargas earn the nickname O Pai dos Pobres, The Father of the Poor.6

While a crucial step forward in terms of Brazil’s social policy evolution, state support was highly uneven. Financed through a combination of employer and employee contributions, protections remained tied to the formal labor market (Draibe, 2007; Holston, 2009; Hunter & Sugiyama, 2009), thereby privileging urban male workers. Early state benefits bypassed rural workers and those employed in the informal labor market. At points in Brazil’s history, more than half of the country’s economically active population was employed in the informal labor market (Carneiro, 1997; Henley, Arabsheibani, & Carneiro, 2009; Telles, 1993), sharply limiting the reach of state-sponsored welfare support. Benefits were further differentially extended to professions and unions explicitly recognized by the state, yielding a highly heterogeneous system of state aid dependent on employment type. The segmented and controlled benefit structure during this era earned the label of “regulated citizenship” (Santos, 1979; Skidmore, 1990).

The advances under Vargas’ first tenure set the tone for social policy for subsequent decades. Until the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, social welfare provision did not change

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6 A somewhat ironic title given that many of Vargas’ reforms barely affected some of Brazil’s disadvantaged populations. Through other policies, such as requiring literacy as a prerequisite to vote, the poor remained marginalized.
substantially, but notable gains were made in terms of expanding benefits and increasing protections to new population segments. With the 1961 Lei Orgânica da Previdência Social (LOPS, Organic Law of Social Security), social security was equalized among all workers in the benefit system, minimizing the discrepancies among formal professional categories. With the 1961 Lei Orgânica da Previdência Social (LOPS, Organic Law of Social Security), social security was equalized among all workers in the benefit system, minimizing the discrepancies among formal professional categories. The Fundo de Assistência e Previdência do Trabalhador Rural (Funrural), established in 1963, provided retirement pensions to those who previously worked in the rural labor market, as long as they could prove formal employment. Extending social security coverage to rural populations helped to diminish the urban–rural bias in government sponsored social support. In 1972, similar benefits were accorded to domestic workers and the self-employed, again with the limitation that only individuals demonstrating proof of formal employment had the right to receive state aid. In 1974, the Renda Mensal Vitalícia (RMV, Lifelong Monthly Income) established a monthly income for the elderly poor previously employed in the formal sector (Sônia Draibe, 1995; Hunter & Sugiyama, 2009; Kerstenetzky, 2010).

Complementing the expansion of social protection programs, the Brazilian government increased its investment in housing development. In 1964, the Brazilian government established the Serviço Federal de Habitação e Urbanismo (SFHU, Federal Service for Housing and Urban Development) and the Plano Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Plan). These endeavors sought to increase home ownership among low-income population segments through new financing mechanisms and construction projects. However, as with other equalization measures, housing policy also demonstrated a bias favoring the more stable, formal and affluent classes. The bulk of state financing mechanisms, intended to foster home ownership among lower income groups, instead benefited the middle and upper classes (Kowarick & Banduki, 1994; Skidmore, 2004; Weyland, 1996).

Organizational restructuring within the state facilitated the promulgation of new social policies of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1964, the Fundação Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor (FUNABEM, National Youth Wellbeing Foundation,) was established to promote and manage social policies affecting youth from the federal to municipal levels. In 1967 the Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social (INPS, National Social Security Institute) was created to unify the management of all social security and pension programs. The Legião Brasileira de Assistência (LBA, Brazilian Assistance League), originally established to assist families of soldiers participating in World War II, became an important federal office shaping social policy implementation at the state and city levels. These efforts were then consolidated under the Sistema Nacional de Assistência e Previdência Social (SNAPS, National Social Welfare and Assistance System) in 1977 (Behring & Boschetti, 2008). The Banco Nacional de Habitação (BNH), founded in 1964, led equalization measures dealing with housing, with responsibilities similar to those of the SFHU mentioned above. The creation of new government bodies specifically dealing with social welfare concerns was part of greater government centralization occurring under the military dictatorship at the time. In spite of these policy advances and governmental reorganizations, by and large, state-led support measures continued in much the same way they had in the past: highly segmented, reaching narrow portions of the population and catering to those with stable social positions.

During these years, welfare was not a top priority for the state. Instead, the country aggressively pursued economic development objectives, prompting a tight alliance between the state and private capital. The secondary importance given to welfare is one reason why it historically remained minimal in Brazil. Limited state-sponsored welfare benefits are also part of broader

7 With the exception of public- versus private-sector employees. Government staff continue to receive generous benefits to a much greater extent than private-sector staff.
8 In the United States foundations are typically non-governmental entities, but in Brazil, foundations may be an extension of the government or separate from it.
patterns of inequality that have historically characterized Brazilian society. This is attributable to a combination of the state’s organizational structure and political culture and to state-society relations that have catered to the interests of elite classes (Sônia Draibe, 1995; Skidmore, 1990; Weyland, 1996).  

The very size of the Brazilian state also posed problems for the establishment of a cohesive welfare system. During the military dictatorship, the Brazilian state grew to “leviathan” (K. Weyland, 1997, p. 84) proportions. The establishment of new welfare offices, some of which only lasted a few years due to organizational restructuring, also provides an indication of the bureaucratic inefficiencies that worsened under military rule. Different government offices had overlapping spheres of authority, creating a cumbersome bureaucracy weighing down political procedures and policy implementation. With such a large state apparatus, internal coordination became challenging and infighting across government divisions was common.

In terms of political culture, patronage has a long history in Brazil. In the early years after the country’s founding, the landed elite dominated the political landscape and maintained their power by providing protections and favors to the less privileged masses, in exchange for their political support. With the expansion of the state over the twentieth century and the country’s industrialization, agrarian land owners required new mechanisms to ensure their position, just as the military rulers at the time needed the influence and consent building at the command of the landed elite. Clientelism served these twin needs and facilitated the control of Brazil’s increasingly urban population (Hagopian, 1996; Skidmore, 2009).

In the urban context, by the 1980s the residents’ associations of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas emerged to play a key role in the patronage transaction pathway linking politicians to favela residents (Diniz, 1982). Today, these associations continue to serve as important brokers, but so too do drug traffickers dominating favela territories. Contemporary clientelism in Rio de Janeiro can manifest on a small scale, between politicians and clusters of individuals, and on a larger scale, between politicians and entire neighborhoods and regions (Gay, 1990; Zaluar, 1985). Both politicians and clients focus on personal, short-term gains that can be achieved through gifts. In the extreme, the provision of public goods becomes secondary to ensuring that the transactions between patrons and clients function smoothly (Ames, 2009; Weyland, 1996). The political time horizon is cut short with a focus on immediate needs, thereby rendering political participation, debate and progress superficial.

The return of democracy in 1985 offered an opportunity to reshape state operations and state-society interaction, but rather than decline, patronage politics intensified in the years immediately after the end of the military dictatorship (Weyland, 1997). Increasing government spending and decentralization created a context ripe for clientelism’s growth, with new resources and channels to distribute patronage goods (Hagopian, 1996). Following the end of the military dictatorship, the absence of a robust alternative to clientelism for achieving political agreements and electoral success also fueled its continued practice.

Welfare provision at the time easily fed into patron-client pathways. For instance, the flagship social program of the Nova República, the label given to the post-dictatorship years, was Programa Nacional do Leite, the National Milk Program, which provided milk to low-income families throughout the country. It served as a vehicle for extending clientelistic ties to new population segments (Skidmore, 1990). In short, the behaviors that had become institutionalized within Brazil – politicians directing state resources for private gain or to the advantage of a narrow range of

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9 Other factors include uneven economic development, creating extremes of sophisticated and rudimentary systems of labor and capital (Hunter & Surigyana, 2009), as well as fragmented collective action efforts among the lower classes (Weyland, 1996).
beneficiaries – combined with an inefficient organizational structure, impeded the promulgation of redistributive social policies and the creation of a robust social safety net.

The overview presented thus far has focused on federally-initiated endeavors. Sporadic improvements of the state’s welfare capacity also took place at the sub-national level. Most notably, Leonel Brizola, governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro during and after the country’s transition to democracy, made several advances benefitting the poor and favela residents in particular. Brizola championed the establishment of schools and daycare centers in favelas, the provision of water as well as electricity in these regions, and the reduction of police brutality directed towards favela inhabitants. While important, these policies were highly personalistic, forcing a heavy reliance of the poor on an individual politician, thereby making any welfare advances precarious. Once Brizola left power in 1987, these measures were quickly dispensed with. As the product of a single individual rather than the result of broader political buy-in, welfare gains remained ephemeral (Arias, 2006b; McCann, 2008).

It is important to note that from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s macro-economic factors also hindered broader social policy development. As with many countries of the Global South, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 left Brazil saddled with substantial foreign debt. In order to finance its repayment obligations, Brazil received assistance from the IMF. To satisfy the conditions accompanying IMF support, Brazil made massive reductions in public spending. Domestic debt also become increasingly burdensome during this period, prompting then President Fernando Collor de Mello to reduce a public sector that had become immense and disorganized by closing public agencies and dismissing government staff. Changes in healthcare spending illustrate the impact of the macroeconomic difficulties on state welfare efforts. By 1993, federal health spending was approximately $40 per person, whereas four years earlier spending had been $80 per person (Draibe, 2002; Weyland, 1997).

This is not to say that government welfare efforts were completely curtailed during the structural adjustment era. In spite of the pressures to decrease government spending and make substantial reductions in some services, the Brazilian government also introduced new social policies, including unemployment insurance and food assistance programs (Lustig, 1995). Nevertheless, social protection efforts did not expand to the degree that they had in prior time periods. Available government support was insufficient to address greater demand for social services that resulted from increased levels of poverty and inequality, brought about by the economic turmoil of these years.

As the above overview has made clear, the origins of Brazil’s present day equalization measures emerged in the early twentieth century. Despite fits of growth, state welfare support remained narrow in scope, limited to those in the formal labor market and enmeshed in the culture of patronage politics pervasive in Brazil. As will be detailed in the subsequent section, the contemporary Brazilian welfare state is novel in terms of its magnitude and the populations benefitting from its programs as well as its structure and operations.

THE NEW BRAZILIAN WELFARE STATE

A few years after the return of democracy, Brazil’s welfare system expanded dramatically. In 1988, Brazil created a universal health-care system – Sistema Unificado de Saúde (SUS, Unified Health System) – offering nation-wide preventative and clinical care. In 1993 the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC, Continuous Stipend Benefit) expanded welfare benefits considerably, allowing for universal coverage of the elderly and disabled living in households earning no more than one-fourth the minimum wage per resident. In 2004, O Sistema Único de Assistência Social (SUAS, Social Assistance System) was established as part of a broader wave of government decentralization, giving
the public greater access to a variety of human service programs. Unlike past segmented forms of state aid, these measures signaled that the Brazilian state was moving towards greater inclusion through its social protection policies. None of the aforementioned social programs require formal labor market participation. Public messaging promoting these programs emphasizes universal accessibility and no prerequisite of formal employment in order to participate (Behring & Boschetti, 2008; Draibe, 2007; Garay, 2010). The social policies at the heart of this dissertation are part of this trend of greater social inclusion.

This wave of social policy proliferation was part of a broader strengthening in the state’s welfare capacity. Financially, in the early 2000s government spending on social welfare efforts grew dramatically, both in absolute terms and relative to Brazil’s GDP. In 1999, the country spent just over R$191 trillion Reals or 6.12% of its GDP on welfare. Six years later these figures had increased to just over R$240 trillion Reals or 12.39% of its GDP (Behring & Boschetti, 2008). Although spending on pensions and disabilities constitute the largest proportion of all social funds, the social assistance resources allocated to new anti-poverty initiatives also increased. In 2002, spending for the programs that became Bolsa Família constituted 23% of social spending under Cardoso; by 2006, this figure had increased to 38% under Lula (Hall, 2006; Kerstenetzky, 2010).

In addition to the new policy measures and financing, organizational changes further enhanced state welfare capability. In 1993, the federal government established the Conselho Nacional de Assistência Social (CNAS, National Social Welfare Council), an advisory board composed of government staff and civil society representatives with the aim of ensuring that government services met public needs. In 2003, the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (CDES, Social and Economic Development Council) was established as a forum for greater dialogue with and input from civil society leaders in the development of social and economic policy. In 2004, Lula created the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS, Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication) consolidating the management of welfare measures that had previously been administered by various government ministries. Past state leaders enacted similar reorganizations, but those of the post-dictatorship years distinguish themselves from what came before by making government bodies transparent and accessible to the public. Furthermore, government restructuring moderated the bureaucratic inefficiencies left from military rule. The Brazilian federal government attempted to create a more streamlined organizational structure with minimal duplication (S. M. Draibe, 2002; Hall, 2006).

Accompanying new state policy and structures were changes in the state’s relationship with civil society. During the dictatorship, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operated primarily as activists, mobilizing to protest military rule. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, NGOs transitioned from opposing the state to collaborating with it (Acioly, 2001; Braga, 2012; Gohn, 1997). In the years shortly after the re-establishment of democracy, welfare implementation relied heavily on NGOs (Landim, 2002; Yasbek & Paz, 2003). NGOs gained increasing prominence and responsibilities through government partnerships to implement a variety of social services (Acioly, 2001; Koslinski & Reis, 2009).

The changes in state welfare capacity documented in this dissertation suggest another evolution in the state-NGO relationship. Beginning in the early 2000s with the onset of increased state-sponsored equalization measures, the state began to expand its involvement in areas previously handled by civil society organizations. The combination of new government financing mechanisms, operational structures and policies signal a shift away from relying on NGOs and indicates an augmented state role in social protection delivery. In the aggregate, these developments reflect a new political culture shaping novel forms of state-society interaction. Many scholars situate the onset of these changes with the Cardoso administration beginning in 1995. Cardoso was more effective than his predecessors in pulling the
state out of the quagmire of patronage in which it had been enmeshed for decades. For instance, Cardoso closed the LBA, the federal office influencing state and municipal social policy, due, in part, to the clientelistic relationships and misuse of funds it fostered. The political combat and high rates of political turnover that had previously characterized intra- and inter-party dynamics also started to wane during and after Cardoso’s tenure. Electoral volatility, defined as the change in the proportion of votes for a political party, has declined substantially in the Chamber of Deputies, one of the bicameral houses of Brazil’s congress. In the years immediately following the transition to democracy, electoral volatility averaged 43% in the first three electoral cycles, but fell to 27.6% by 2006. In the realm of social policy, substantive dialogue and collaboration are beginning to replace political enmity as representatives from one party build upon and expand policy initiatives by a rival party (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2009; Power, 2010). During Lula’s tenure, much political debate focused on changing the legal status of Bolsa Família to guarantee its permanence. In contrast to prior forms of state aid, equalization measures are in the process of becoming less tied to specific individuals and instead institutionalized through laws guaranteeing their longevity.

While these advances are impressive, some researchers question the extent to which these reforms have benefitted the poor. Concerns center on whether welfare efforts have met the needs of Brazil’s most disadvantaged population segments. The tendency noted earlier for state housing support to be channeled to more affluent groups holds true for a range of social policies. A 2001 World Bank study revealed that close to half of social security spending went to the wealthiest ten percent, while only one percent of these benefits reached the poorest decile (Draibe, 1995; Hall, 2006; Skidmore, 1990). Most social security benefits are accessed through a proportional contribution system, and do little to redistribute income to those excluded from the formal sector. Others have argued that the retirement pensions are an important contributor to the income inequality of Brazilian cities (Hoffmann, 2003).

Still others point out how present-day efforts at social policy reform are stymied by the success of past social policy advances, especially pensions. The pension system spawned powerful political groups that have repeatedly impeded attempts to create new redistributive policies. Cardoso tried to lower the top tier of federal pension benefits four times, but each was defeated due to lobbying by beneficiaries, who were some of the most well-paid government staff (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2009; Skidmore, 1990). Elites effectively hold the state captive, making it challenging for government resources to be redirected to other population segments (Weyland, 1996). In the face of such obstacles, new social policies have concentrated on increasing access to state services rather than changing income distribution. Entrenched political interests have also shaped these new measures in such a way that the population segments previously enjoying state benefits prior to the recent spate of reforms received still greater benefits within the newly enhanced welfare system. Furthermore, a substantial opportunity cost accompanies the pension system. Some argue that the funds currently consumed through pensions would make a bigger impact on reducing poverty and inequality if directed to health and education (Hunter & Sugiyama, 2009). While the proliferation of social policies appear to advance a new state interaction with disadvantaged populations, they may also conceal entrenched interests and power hierarchies. As such, state-society relations may continue in much the same way as they have in the past.

**RIO DE JANEIRO’S URBAN CONDITION**

The characterization of the state that comes across through recent social welfare policies is quite different from the state depicted in the urban literature. In this latter category of scholarship, the state is overwhelmingly portrayed in negative terms. According to such bad-state narratives, the state is absent in the lives of the poor, neglectful of their needs or abusive of their wellbeing. With
its emphasis on how structural factors shape favela existence, the urban marginality literature, gaining prominence in the 1970s, opened the door for a wave of scholarship critically examining the state’s role in perpetuating urban poverty and inequality. Scholars drawing on the marginality literature positioned state absence as a defining trait of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. As illegal settlements, many favela residents did not meet the preconditions of formality in order to receive state aid. Consequently, state assistance largely bypassed these communities in the past. The city is depicted as having a fragmented landscape: areas of formal state presence punctured by islands of state neglect (Da Silva, 2008; Leeds, 1996; O’Donnell, 1993). Most recently and most influentially, the rhetoric of state absence is frequently found in Janice Perlman’s latest book (2011) examining forty years of favela evolution.

Yet, the dispossession that favela communities experience is more than simply the product of state neglect or passivity. Deliberate government actions have made favela existence all the more challenging. Since their inception in the late nineteenth century, the state has long maintained an adversarial relationship with favelas (Fabricius, 2008; Perlman, 1976). In the early twentieth century, favelas were considered a transitory phenomenon, a blemish on the path to greater modernity. City laws and zoning policies deemed favelas illegal (Abreu, 2008). Under the Vargas dictatorship in the 1930s, zoning attempted to prevent favela formation, but ultimately proved unsuccessful. When legal codes and policies were ineffective in controlling favelas, state actions become increasingly interventionist. From the 1940s onward the state began forcibly removing favela communities from areas considered important for the city’s urban development and relocating residents to the city periphery (Burgos, 1998). Following the military coup of 1964, state action towards favelas became more hostile. In 1968, the federal government created Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana (CHISAM, Coordination of Social Housing in Metropolitan Area) that deemed favelas aberrations and their removal essential to the social and economic life of the city. Military dictatorships established the lofty goal of removing all informal settlements from the city (Perlman, 1976). Harsh demolition and resettlement campaigns became increasingly common. Between 1965-75, informal settlement removal destroyed 70 favelas and displaced 139,000 residents (Arias, 2006b; Davis, 2007; Oliveira, 1996; Pamuk & Cavallieri, 1998; Perlman, 2004). In addition to being financially costly, these campaigns were incredibly brutal. They destroyed the networks and connections that favela residents used to obtain employment or secure social support. Because of the disruption they caused, the removal and relocation programs only served to replicate the conditions they sought to eliminate: resettlement communities were disorganized and plagued with criminal violence.

By and large state treatment of favela communities was incredibly detrimental; however, state action cannot be understood as entirely negative. The state’s harsh treatment was broken up with occasional beneficent acts. Table 1 below summarizes improvement programs directed toward favela communities in the years following WWII and prior to the return of democracy to Brazil. In addition to the measures summarized in the table, the Brazilian state constructed several conjuntos habitacionais, public housing projects, throughout the twentieth century. Over time and with informal urban development, some conjuntos habitacionais, such as the well known Cidade de Deus, concentrated the social ills often associated with poverty and became areas plagued with violence and crime. Yet many other conjuntos habitacionais are well maintained and operate as zones of order and safety amidst the favelas that have grown up around them. These programs often go underappreciated by scholars wedded to bad-state narratives. The measures reveal the fluctuating quality of state-society relations. Residents confront substantial state generated hardships, but also enjoy occasional moments of state support. Together the sequence and evolution of these efforts demonstrates an increasingly beneficent side of the state. The urban and social policies examined in
this dissertation build off of these earlier state efforts to ameliorate poverty and inequality in Rio de Janeiro, but to a greater degree.

Table 1: Government Programs Benefitting Favelas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Program Overview</th>
<th>Government Division</th>
<th>Year Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-Hígênicas (SERFHA)</td>
<td>Infrastructure improvement</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro – City</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fudação Leão XIII (becomes part of the Brazilian state, previously a religious organization implementing an array of favela support programs)</td>
<td>Infrastructure improvement</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro – State</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companhia de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (CODESCO)</td>
<td>Supporting housing and infrastructure development through the provision of low interest loans, building materials and machinery to residents</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro - State</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promorar-Projeto Rio</td>
<td>Infrastructure and built-environment improvements to the Maré favela</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programa de Eletrificação nas Favelas-LIGHT</td>
<td>Provide electricity infrastructure to favelas</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projecto Mutirão</td>
<td>Collaborative construction with favela residents focusing on transportation and sanitation infrastructure</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro – City</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cada Família um Lote</td>
<td>Land titling and regularization program</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro – State</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos (CEDAE)</td>
<td>Water and sanitation program for favelas</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proface Program de Favelas da Cedae</td>
<td>Water and sewage for close to 60 favelas</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>1983-85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Burgos, 1998; Perlman, 2011; Valladares, 1978, and field notes.

Although the end of military rule in Brazil opened the door for many beneficial opportunities, it also introduced new forms of hardship. The country experienced dramatically
increased levels of violence with democracy’s return. In the early 1980s, Brazil’s homicide rate, approximately ten per hundred thousand people, was similar to that of the United States. By the end of the decade, it had more than doubled. Violence became especially pronounced in urban areas. By the early 1990s, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Recife, the country’s largest metropolises, had homicide rates greater that forty per hundred thousand people (Caldeira & Holston, 1999). Within cities, violence concentrates disproportionately in and around favelas, as Figure 1 below makes clear.

**Figure 1: Violence Intensity – Green (low) to red (high) and favela location (blue)**

The rise in violence is frequently blamed on drug trafficking. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Brazil became an important node in the cocaine trade linking Latin America with markets in Europe and North America. Paralleling global demands were new consumer markets within Brazil’s major cities. Cocaine came to dominate recreational drug use, supplanting marijuana consumption and production. An immense and complex apparatus developed supporting the distribution and sale of cocaine. With an irregular built environment, confusing and illegible to outsiders, favelas became ideal locations for the clandestine storage as well as distribution of drugs and weapons. In Rio de Janeiro, drug traffickers quickly came to dominate many of the city’s favelas. With high levels of unemployment, favelas also provide a steady supply of labor to the drug trade. Residents of all ages – from children keeping watch for police to adolescents serving as soldiers, carriers or dealers – are involved in the drug trade. Three main drug factions govern the majority of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas: the *Comando Vermelho* (CV, the Red Command), the *Terceiro Commando* (TC, the Third Command) and *Amigos dos Amigos* (ADA, the Friends of Friends). Gangs fight each other
for greater control over favela territory and the drug trade. This inter-gang rivalry is one explanation for the increase in violence Rio de Janeiro experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.

The state’s response to the drug trade also exacerbated violence throughout Rio de Janeiro, further reinforcing the bad state persona. Police forces in Brazil have a long history of brutality. Due to entrenched norms and a separate, police-specific, legal system, the police were effectively allowed to carry out extrajudicial measures with impunity (Caldeira & Holston, 1999). Police abuse disproportionately affected the poor and police brutality also targets favela communities (IPEA-FAPERJ, 2008). In 2003, of the 900 people killed by the police, 75% were from favelas (Jeter, 2003). In 2007, in a single day, police forces killed 19 Complexo do Alemão residents citing self-defense as justification. Forensic evidence later revealed that many of these fatalities resembled execution-style killings with victims in restraints or defenseless positions (HRW, 2009). The police often collude with drug traffickers in the sale of narcotics and weapons, thereby perpetuating the violence and illegality that they are ostensibly attempting to quell (Goldstein, 2003).

**CONCLUSION**

The social policies examined in this dissertation are not the first articulations of Brazil’s welfare capacity. State sponsored protection began in the early twentieth century, but was highly restricted, favoring certain groups over others. Despite piecemeal growth to include new population segments in the ensuing decades, state-sponsored welfare remained confined to those employed in the formal labor market or possessing formal land titles, leaving many bereft of state support. The Brazilian government displayed occasional periods of welfare growth, but as the product of particular individuals, these moments failed to translate to a durable institutional strengthening of state welfare ability. Any gains were quickly lost once the incumbents advocating for such measures no longer held office. The frequent use of small-scale welfare measures in patron-client channels also impeded the development of a broad robust state welfare capacity. The fact that Brazil earned a reputation for its poverty and inequality for much of the twentieth century in spite of existing state welfare commitments, provides an indication of the limited scope of the state’s welfare abilities.

Conditional cash transfers and built-environment interventions are part of the re-emergence of the Brazilian state’s welfare capacity taking place in recent years. Importantly, these measures are not simply an extension of past forms of state aid, but represent a novel logic of assistance and reveal a deeper understanding of the lived experience of Brazil’s poverty and inequality on the part of the state. Today, the state is implementing programs that reach a broader section of the public, irrespective of their relationship to formality. Populations previously unaccustomed to governmental support are brought into a tighter engagement with the state.

Not only do these actions differ with respect to earlier iterations of state welfare, they deviate sharply from portrayals of the state common in urban scholarship. To be sure, the state demonstrated profound disregard for disadvantaged populations in the past. Yet, continuing to describe the Brazilian state as predominantly neglectful or abusive of the urban poor holds waning relevance when recognizing the substantial commitments the state has made to welfare improvement over the last two decades. A beneficent dimension of the Brazilian state has re-asserted itself in recent years and deserves greater recognition. The subsequent chapters will detail the growth and impact of these developments in Rio de Janeiro’s disadvantaged communities.
Chapter 2 – Emerging State Presence: Implications of Recent Welfare Advances for Rio de Janeiro’s Poor

VINGETTE

White lab coats stand out in the favela. Against a bricolage backdrop of various colors, materials and textures – corrugated orange clay tiles, rough grey cement and smooth tangled black wires – and an orchestra of urban noise – music from corner bars, motorcycle engines revving and combes10 blaring their travel routes through loud speakers – clean white lab coats are easily discernible. This attire belonged to two community health agents (Agentes Comunitários de Saúde) walking slowly up one of the hills of Complexo do Alemão. One agent carried a plastic tray filled with assorted medical supplies, the other a notebook and pen. As the agents ascended the morro, they made house calls, checking in on residents in need of medical care.

INTRODUCTION

Urban peripheries are frequently depicted as areas of state neglect or mistreatment. Yet, the above vignette suggests that Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are not as overlooked or abused by the state as much academic literature would suggest. The goal of this chapter is to reconcile an emerging inconsistency in the scholarship on Brazilian urban poverty and social policy. On the one hand, through in-depth qualitative investigations of a handful of communities, the urban studies literature emphasizes how the state is either absent in the lives of the poor, or present in a harmful way. Yet, increasing evidence of the great strides Brazil has made with respect to poverty and inequality alleviation would seem to question the continued relevance of such arguments. However, most of this line of work focuses on national- or regional-level trends, making extrapolation of macro-level phenomena to illuminate city-specific conditions challenging. The discrepancy between the two categories of scholarship underscores the need to develop a new analytical perspective on the relationship between the state and the urban poor in Brazil.

Through quantitative and geographic analyses of equalization measures implemented in Rio de Janeiro between 2000 and 2010, I overcome the shortcomings inherent in both categories of research. While urban scholars focus on the inner workings of a few select communities, my analyses examine city-wide conditions. By setting the city as the scope of my investigation, I also contribute a new layer of granularity that political scientists have yet to provide.

Moving beyond concerns of empirical scale, my data and analyses corroborate the conclusions of political scientists. The advances in Brazil’s welfare capacity observed on the national and regional levels are mirrored on the city level for Rio de Janeiro. The state is neither absent in the lives of the poor, nor does it interact with them in a detrimental manner. Instead, the state has made substantial progress in supporting disadvantaged urban residents. The growth of Brazil’s welfare programs reflects a state that is able to identify and reach needy population segments. The systematic expansion of equalization measures further suggests a state that relies on objective decision making rationale rather than personal connections to carry out social protection efforts. This represents a notable advancement given the predominance of patron-client relations in Brazil’s governance history.

STATE-FAVELA RELATIONSHIPS

To fully appreciate the novelty and implications of recent welfare advances, it is first necessary to understand how the state has historically interacted with favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

10 Minivans used as informal public transportation throughout Rio de Janeiro.
Literature characterizing the Brazilian state as a bad state abounds. The predominant variation of the bad-state narrative is evident through the extensive discourse emphasizing state absence in favelas. State absence, in turn, is blamed for a variety of hardships that favela communities experience ranging from the lack of basic urban services (glaringly at odds with the country’s wealth and prosperity) to drug trafficker domination (da Silva, 2008; Fischer, 2010; Perlman, 2011).

Another shade of the bad state is conveyed through the literature describing police corruption and brutality. The police often collude with drug traffickers in the sale of narcotics and weapons, or provoke attacks on rival gangs. Given endemic corruption within Brazil’s police, favela residents are unsure if security forces act to ensure safety and order or instead exacerbate criminality and violence (Arias, 2006c; da Silva, 2008; Goldstein, 2003). In the extreme, some scholars have argued that favelas “are better off without the presence of the state when the state is represented by police and security forces” (Leeds, 1996, p. 77).

Violence introduces substantial practical challenges to welfare implementation in favelas. Just as violence disrupts the daily routines of favela residents, preventing them from leaving their homes to attend school or go to work, it also impedes state services from entering and functioning in the community. Violence has the power to erode any inroads that state welfare efforts achieve. For instance, in a qualitative interview, one Manguinhos resident lamented his inability to use a newly constructed health clinic due to the unpredictability of area violence. He then detailed a story of a neighbor who died because an ambulance refused to enter the neighborhood due to concerns about violence. In his own words “the clinic doesn’t really function, sometimes there is a problem, when residents are very sick, but there is gunfire in the streets and they cannot cross to access the clinic.” Yet, in certain spaces and times, as the opening vignette suggests, state services are successfully implemented in spite of the frequency of violence.

A third manifestation of the bad-state argument is present in the many investigations attesting to the deeply entrenched norm of clientelism in Brazil. State-sponsored benefits trickle down into favela communities through nested hierarchies of patron-client ties. Clientelism is so intertwined with welfare provision that it receives its own term, assistencialismo11, in Portuguese. The benefits of social policies are subject to the fickle whims of middlemen. In favelas, drug traffickers have come to play the role of key intermediaries negotiating the relationship between politicians and residents. Rights and benefits guaranteed by the state become distorted and transformed into privileges dispensed at trafficker discretion (Arias, 2006c; Gay, 1998; McCann, 2008). Thus, welfare benefits are not stable and enduring but precarious and ephemeral. Political participation on the part of favela residents is also rendered superficial, inauthentic and transient.

The bad-state narrative is not exclusively confined to behavior taking place within favela territory; it also applies to Brazil’s governance more generally. The country’s political culture and structure further impede efficient and effective public administration. Following Brazil’s transition to democracy, political power was decentralized across federal, state and municipal authorities. Competition and combat characterized the interaction across these government divisions. In particular, state level politicians pursued their own agendas, effectively undermining the central government’s efficacy and authority. Political infighting across government levels was so intense that it temporarily halted the municipal-led built-environment interventions from 2007-2010. These efforts were re-initiated in 2010 due to greater cooperation across the city, state and national scales. In the extreme, some scholars label Brazil as almost “ungovernable” as goals established by centralized federal power are constrained by intermediate level actors (Borges, 2011; Fenwick, 2009).

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11 The small-scale and transient provision of benefits, e.g., food and clothing, often directed to secure political allegiance of the poor.
Others have depicted the Brazilian government as mired in bureaucratic chaos with occasional “pockets of efficiency” (Evans, 1995; Tendler, 1997).

Exacerbating the effects of these hierarchical political tensions is the novelty of the state’s welfare activities. The early years of social policy experimentation and implementation indicate organizational immaturity and clumsiness on the part of the state. For example, the execution of *Fome Zero*, one of *Bolsa Família*’s precursors, pursued a diverse range of social change objectives including land reform, improvements to agricultural infrastructure, food stamps and nutrition education. The program suffered due to the scattered array of aims it sought to achieve. The non-governmental organization (NGO) sector also criticized the program’s complex financing mechanisms, involving commitments by the national government, NGOs, private sector and public donations, because they forced NGOs to compete against the government to secure scarce funds. Other predecessors to Bolsa Família were administered by separate government ministries despite the fact that they all targeted similar disadvantaged populations: the Ministry of Education managed *Bolsa Escola*, the Ministry of Health oversaw *Fome Zero*, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy handled *Auxílio Gas*. Each program maintained distinct operational structures, financing mechanisms and data collection processes, creating costly duplication inefficiencies (Garay, 2010; Hall, 2006).

**RECENT WELFARE ADVANCES**

While violence, political inefficiencies, clientelism and corruption continue to affect favelas, they do not capture the totality of state-society interaction. What is currently unfolding between the state and favelas falls outside of the above categories and descriptors. Examining recent equalization measures illuminates changes to the state-favela relationship. Of recent welfare advances, I focus on two categories of programs in particular: the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and urban upgrades, epitomized in Favela-Bairro and PAC-favela. Through these measures the state is brought into a novel relationship with disadvantaged communities, one that does not fit with prevailing conceptualizations of the state as neglectful or abusive of the urban poor. Instead, these policies represent a stronger demonstration of the beneficent side of the Brazilian state that has manifested itself in Rio de Janeiro’s past but in precarious and short-lived ways.

The conceptual basis of these programs indicates a new form of welfare delivery that deviates from past equalization efforts. The CCTs and urban upgrades represent a shift away from formality as a precondition for state aid. In the past, a formal job and legal land title served as fundamental means through which disadvantaged populations made claims on the state. For almost the entire twentieth century, receiving state aid was predicted on a job in the formal sector. Jobs that offered *carteira assinada* (employment card) were highly sought after because of the public benefits that accompanied such positions. Either explicitly or implicitly, throughout Brazil’s history property ownership was a precondition to political participation. In the Colonial Era, property was one of the factors needed to be considered a man of good standing and allowed to participate in governance affairs. Today, residents of Brazil’s urban peripheries place tremendous value on demonstrating legal home ownership because obtaining other rights and services from the state hinges on such proof. With formal land title, residents are empowered to demand more rights and services from the state (Hagopian, 1996; Holston, 2009; McCann, 2008).

With conditional cash transfers and urban upgrades, the prerequisite of formality is done away with. Instead, poverty – in a most fundamental sense – is all that is required to gain state benefits. Today, through Bolsa Família, individuals earning less than R$120 a month are eligible to receive the conditional cash stipend regardless of their employment status. The urban upgrading programs also represent a remarkable shift in state attitudes and practice because in earlier eras, informal urban settlements were deemed illegal and the target of destruction. Now, through urban
upgrades, informality becomes the prerequisite for state assistance. Favela residents are eligible to receive a variety of urban services and legal title of their homes despite the fact that occupying that territory was originally considered unlawful. In short, through these recent equalization measures, the state displays a deeper recognition of the social realities of dispossession and the actions needed to overcome these difficulties. Concomitantly, the state relinquishes a narrow definition of welfare in favor of a more encompassing one.

Organizational and operational factors further distinguish recent social policies from earlier equalization efforts. The structure and implementation of Bolsa Família bypasses the state-level government, establishing a direct link between national- and municipal-level authorities. In the past, municipal governments were more financially dependent on state legislators who determined the distribution of tax revenues to cities. With Bolsa Família, city mayors negotiate with a single central national government ministry, freeing them of the burden of dealing with the intermediate rungs of government (Fenwick, 2009).

Additionally, the specific way it is implemented on-the-ground makes Bolsa Família less prone to political capture. Built environment interventions, in contrast, remain vulnerable to the influence of personal connections. After completing a one-time registration process, beneficiaries receive an ATM-like card to access their monthly stipends. With this technology, individuals are less reliant on personal connections to receive benefits. Bolsa Família offers a wider scope of beneficiary coverage than do upgrading programs, which are more discrete and confined, in terms of populations and areas affected. In theory, any household meeting certain income requirements may receive Bolsa Família. While many favelas warrant upgrading, only a few receive the program. Since the rationale for upgrading selection is not as transparent or as objective as a poverty threshold, the program is more susceptible to being guided by political motives. Upgrades can more easily feed into patron-client ties, with politicians directing benefits (e.g., construction jobs or apartments in newly constructed apartment buildings) to woo or reward followers.

These advances in social policies do not square with the depictions of state-society relations in the literature on Brazilian urban poverty. Past work has left scholars wedded to bad-state narrative in which the state is either unwilling or unable to support disadvantaged communities. The above characterizations of the state as absent, corrupt, violent, exploitative or riddled with inefficiencies do not fully capture empirical reality, and as such, do not offer the analytical purchase needed to understand contemporary state-society developments. The bad-state discourse thinking in a direction that is of limited analytical utility, focusing attention on what the state is not doing or how it is falling short. This perspective occludes an understanding of how and why the state has been able to extend its beneficial influence into favelas and establish a new relationship with the urban poor. If the bad-state perspective is heeded, insufficient attention is given to the ways in which the state is present in the lives of the poor and the reverberations this activity engenders. Bad-state arguments have also become analytically facile. Implicit in this critique of the bad state is an expectation of what good and proper state behavior consists of. However, this ideal remains largely silent and rarely theorized. Little discussion is given to analyzing the evolutionary trajectory of the Brazilian state and how state-society relations develop over time. If we no longer privilege the bad-state line of thought, refrain from implicitly contrasting Brazil’s state-society relations with those found in the U.S. or Europe, and instead compare Brazil’s progress to its own history, the Brazilian state appears remarkable rather than deficient.

OBJECTIVES

To more precisely understand recent welfare advances and develop an accurate portrait of state-favela relations, this chapter has two objectives. The first is to understand the geographic
distribution of new welfare efforts in the city of Rio de Janeiro and how program delivery differs across city regions and neighborhoods. The second objective is to analyze the factors mediating the distribution of welfare programs, that is, what factors facilitate or hinder the growth of equalization measures. More specifically, I focus on three related, yet distinct, aspects of the urban experience for Rio de Janeiro’s disadvantaged populations: poverty, informal urban settlements and violence. While these factors cluster together and often co-occur, the analyses presented below disentangle the influence of poverty, informal settlements and violence on welfare expansion to understand each variable’s unique contribution.

The analyses described thus far treat the receipt of welfare programs as an outcome variable. Available data also allows for an examination of welfare programs as an independent variable and violence as a dependent variable. In comparing the different categories of equalization measures, built-environment interventions would seem to have the greatest potential for reducing violence. Built-environment interventions alter the public sphere. In contrast, income transfers target individuals, independent of their neighborhoods or social context. Since urban upgrades affect communities and shared spaces, rather than individuals and private spaces, they have greater potential to upset the norms, structures and resources that support violence. Collective processes play an important role in fostering group consciousness and routines. Altering the collective sphere can change shared norms. Of the two, Bolsa Família is a more passive program. Participation in the conditional cash transfer program occurs on an individual household basis. Families can participate in Bolsa Família without substantially altering the broader social fabric in which they live. Bolsa Família is also unlikely to have an impact on violence because the program does not affect the population segments most involved with violence. Families are no longer allowed to receive Bolsa Família benefits once their children become adolescents and this age group is frequently recruited into the drug trade.

The distinction that I am drawing between individual versus supra-individual processes and outcomes is related to discussions among American urban sociologists about neighborhood effects: the potential for geographical, spatial and residential factors to influence a variety of social outcomes (Harding, 2010; Massey & Denton, 1993; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Wilson, 1990). Echoing points first articulated in the Chicago School’s analysis of cities, a core feature of the extensive debates on neighborhood effects is that community-level outcomes are attributable to factors that are not simply the aggregate of individual-level characteristics. Subsequent research on the built environment also attests to the power of space to shape behavior, routines and norms (Caldeira, 2001; Gieryn, 2000; Hayden, 1997, 2002; Holston, 1989). This suggests that interventions targeted at individuals and those targeted at the community will produce different outcomes. Thus, I hypothesize that neighborhoods with upgrading programs will experience less violence in the years after program implementation, while Bolsa Família will have minimal association with any changes in violence.

12 See chapters 4 and 5 for a deeper discussion of the changes that built environment interventions engender.
METHODS

The above objective and hypothesis were tested using the databases summarized in Table 1, below. All data were geographically coded to the neighborhood level. The equalization measures selected are not a completely exhaustive list of all social policies carried out by the Brazilian government, but they do represent some of the largest social assistance spending targeted to disadvantaged populations since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985. Analyzing these policies will reveal whether the Brazilian government is charting a new course with respect to marginalized populations or if these social investments are an extension of how state-society interaction has played out in the past.

Table 1: Data Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Years Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Census</td>
<td>Population count</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human development index level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favela size (households and population counts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>Favela size (geographic)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favelas receiving built-environment upgrades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Location of deaths (as a proxy for violence)</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Public Security</td>
<td>Location of deaths (as a proxy for violence)</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>Household beneficiaries of Bolsa Família</td>
<td>2001-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>Location of other federal social welfare programs: social welfare clinics, food banks and meal programs</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESULTS AND ANALYSES

Welfare Program Growth

Bolsa Família enrollment has grown rapidly between 2001 and 2009, as diagrammed in Figure 1 below. Over these years three distinct time phases are observed: a slow ramp up of beneficiaries between 2001-2002, a period of rapid enrollment growth between 2003-2006, and a slowing and slight decrease in beneficiary enrollment from 2007-2009.
The growth of urban upgrading efforts is more variable than Bolsa Família’s. Figure 2 below documents the number of favelas receiving upgrades between 1995 and 2010. The number of favelas in a given year receiving upgrading programs fluctuates during these years, and does not display a steady increase, as does Bolsa Família. Built-environment programs grow between 1995-1999, decrease from 2000-2006 and increase most rapidly from 2007-2010. Together, Figures 1 and 2 attest to the growth in state sponsored welfare activities affecting Rio de Janeiro.
Welfare Program Distribution: Descriptive Statistics

The figures above illuminate growth trends at their most general. Geo-coding data on equalization programs, beneficiaries and other indicators of welfare need enables a deeper analysis of the expansion of state welfare capacity. Figure 3 contrasts income distribution in Rio de Janeiro with Bolsa Família enrollment figures. With the map on the left, darker green indicates a greater proportion of the neighborhood earning less than minimum wage. With the map on the right, the darker purple indicates a greater proportion of eligible neighborhood households receiving Bolsa Família in 2009. The distribution of color intensity is approximately equal across the two map images. By 2009, Bolsa Família was more active in neighborhoods with the greatest need. Thus, not only is there an increase in state welfare capacity, the state also does a good job of targeting this assistance.

Figure 4 displays a similar analysis for the location of urban upgrading programs and the distribution of poverty within the city. Income appears to be less strongly associated with receiving upgrading. Neighborhoods with intermediate levels of poverty have more upgrading programs. Areas with the most extreme poverty, generally those in the western part of the city, do not benefit from as many built-environment programs. This suggests that factors beyond financial need influence the delivery of built-environment programs. The distribution of built-environment programs

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Note: This proportion exceeds 100% for some neighborhoods because eligibility is based on census data from the year 2000 and enrollment from the year 2009. Given demographic growth in the intervening years, the number of households receiving Bolsa Família in 2009 exceeds the number deemed eligible in 2000 and results in a targeting measure above 100%. Nevertheless, this calculation provides a useful indication of the appropriateness of Bolsa Família implementation.
programs approximately mirrors the city’s population density, occurring more frequently in the more populated southern and northern areas of the city.

**Figure 3: Income Distribution and Bolsa Família Enrollment.**
Looking more closely at the factors shaping welfare program distribution, Table 2 below summarizes descriptive statistical analyses examining the qualities of neighborhoods with favela upgrades in comparison to neighborhoods not receiving these programs. In short, favela upgrades target the disadvantaged neighborhoods with greater homicides, more favelas, lower human development, more poverty and more social services.
Table 2: Independent Sample T-tests – Urban Upgrading.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neighborhoods without Upgrades</th>
<th>Neighborhoods with Upgrades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicides 2002-2006</td>
<td>58.49</td>
<td>82.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides 2006-2010</td>
<td>241.36</td>
<td>452.69**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favelas</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>7.64 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favela houses</td>
<td>713.23</td>
<td>3,002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favela residents</td>
<td>2,532.07</td>
<td>10,768.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human development index</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population earning less than minimum wage</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>20.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social welfare programs</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hhs PBF</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1,672**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Similar t-test analyses cannot be performed comparing neighborhoods with and without Bolsa Família beneficiaries since the program is ubiquitous across the city. As an alternative, neighborhoods were classified into terciles with high, medium and low levels of Bolsa Família enrollment. As with the statistical descriptive analyses of the upgrading programs, neighborhoods with greater Bolsa Família enrollment were also neighborhoods with greater homicides, more favelas, more favela households, more favela residents, lower HDI, more poverty and more social welfare programs. These descriptive statistical analyses indicate that the state is most active in areas experiencing the greatest hardship, defined in both economic and social terms.

**Welfare Program Distribution: Regression Analyses**

The previous geographic and descriptive analyses are helpful in providing an understanding of the qualities affecting the geographic distribution of equalization measures in broad-brush strokes. However, many of the variables examined above co-occur and influence each other, and the analyses discussed thus far cannot disentangle these interactions. To overcome this limitation, I performed a series of regressions to understand how each of the above factors, treated as independent variables, influences a neighborhood receiving either welfare program. Regressions are advantageous because they allow an understanding of the relative weight of a single independent variable in the context of others.

With respect to Bolsa Família, three sets of regression analyses were performed reflecting the three distinct time periods mentioned earlier: slow ramp up, rapid growth and declining growth. In each time period, the total number of houses receiving Bolsa Família in a neighborhood is the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{14} The results of these regression analyses are summarized in Tables 3, 4 and 5 below.

\textsuperscript{14} A separate set of regressions, not reported here, were run using the total number of houses receiving Bolsa Família divided by the total number of houses eligible to receive the program (as a measure of targeting) as the dependent variable outcome. The same associations found in regression Tables 3-5, were also found with this set of regressions.
Table 3: Receiving Bolsa Família, 2001-2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Number of Neighborhood Households Receiving Bolsa Família</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as a favela household</td>
<td>-20.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as poor</td>
<td>224.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number favelas per square km</td>
<td>-533597.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households in a neighborhood</td>
<td>.0024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favelas with upgrades in prior years in a neighborhood</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-42.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Receiving Bolsa Família, 2003-2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Number of Neighborhood Households Receiving Bolsa Família</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as a favela household</td>
<td>-13.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as poor</td>
<td>1,625.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number favelas per square km</td>
<td>4788854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households in a neighborhood</td>
<td>0.0196***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides 2002-2006 in a neighborhood</td>
<td>-3.428***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favelas with upgrades in prior years in a neighborhood</td>
<td>34.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction term: homicides &amp; poverty</td>
<td>24.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-243.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Receiving Bolsa Familia, 2007-2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Number of Neighborhood Households Receiving Bolsa Familia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as a favela household</td>
<td>-78.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as poor</td>
<td>1804.50***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number favelas per square km</td>
<td>2.48E+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of other welfare programs in a neighborhood</td>
<td>62.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households in a neighborhood</td>
<td>0.0181***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides 2006-2010</td>
<td>-.842***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction term: homicides &amp; poverty 2006-2010</td>
<td>8.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of favelas with upgrades in prior years in a neighborhood</td>
<td>71.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-226.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Across all three sets of regressions, at the neighborhood level, the proportion of households classified as poor is the strongest predictor of receiving Bolsa Familia. This association intensifies over time. When comparing the 2001-2002, 2003-2006 and 2007-2009 time periods, a one percent increase in the proportion of poor households results in a 2.24, 16.25 and 18.04 increase in the number of neighborhood households receiving Bolsa Familia, respectively. The increasing magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the state is learning to implement this program more intensely and effectively. Over time, the state is doing a better job of differentiating between the poor and the non-poor as well as reaching those most in need of its services.

Looking at the relationship among equalization measures, there appears to be a weak association between Bolsa Familia and other social welfare services as well as the upgrading programs, and neither relationship is significant. Between 2007 and 2009, the presence of other welfare programs increases Bolsa Familia enrollment by approximately 60 beneficiaries per neighborhood. Neighborhoods with favela upgrading programs experience an increase in roughly 70 Bolsa Familia beneficiaries. For greater context, in either case, this translates to less than two new Bolsa Familia beneficiaries a month. The relatively weak association between other welfare programs and Bolsa Familia as well as urban upgrades and Bolsa Familia suggests that these programs are reaching different segments of the broader pool of disadvantaged populations. On the one hand, this may be an advantageous strategy if needs are differentially distributed across different segments of the poor (e.g., for some populations income may be more important than housing). On the other hand, this approach is not ideal to the extent that disadvantaged groups share the same needs (e.g., those in need of housing are also in need of income) 15.

15 The similar gains in Bolsa Familia beneficiaries due to other welfare measures and urban upgrading has implications for public policy decisions. If social policy objectives seek to increase Bolsa Familia enrollment, providing other welfare services may be a more efficient and effective means of achieving this goal. Urban
Homicides appear to be a slight hindrance to receiving Bolsa Família, but this effect is quite low. Given that homicides and poverty co-occur to a high degree, as the above mentioned descriptive analyses make clear, it is unlikely that homicides occur in neighborhoods that are less poor, which would be an alternative explanation for the result obtained. Moreover, the negative contribution of homicides, -3.4 in the 2003-2006 time period and -.84 in the 2007-2009 time period, is overwhelmed by the strong positive contribution of poverty, based on an examination of the effect of these variables independently, 16.2 in the 2003-2006 time period and 18.04 in the 2007-2009 time period – as well as the interaction term between the two, 24.26 in the 2003-2006 time period and 18.04 in the 2007-2009 time period. The fact that homicides have such a minimal effect is impressive in its own right and suggests a certain deftness on the part of the state. Historically, favelas are prone to violence and on a very practical level, high rates of violence impede a wide range of social processes, welfare provision included. The results of these regressions indicate that the state is able to extend its reach, as manifested through Bolsa Família, in spite of the frequency of homicides within favelas and thereby support residents. While past literature emphasizes the state’s role in the production and perpetuation of violence in favelas (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Leeds, 1996; Lins, 2002), these results reveal a new quality of state-favela interaction, that of the state supporting disadvantaged residents.

As with the Bolsa Família data, regression analyses were performed for the urban upgrading programs over two time periods: 2000-2006 and 2007-2010. Rather than an OLS regression, logistic regressions analyzing the independent variables influencing the odds of receiving an urban upgrading were used and are summarized in Tables 6 and 7, below.

**Table 6: Urban Upgrading, 2000-2006.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>UPGRADE (OR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as a favela household</td>
<td>195.6558**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of neighborhood households classified as poor</td>
<td>.0040938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households in a neighborhood</td>
<td>1.000024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides 2002-2006</td>
<td>.9987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides interaction term poverty</td>
<td>1.023164**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.2239193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>158</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>.2230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main determinant of receiving an urban upgrading program changes across these two sets of logistic regressions. The percentage of neighborhood households in a favela is a stronger predictor of receiving an urban upgrade in 2000-2006, with an odds ratio of 195.6, than it is in 2007-2010, with an odds ratio of 12.9. In 2007-2010, poverty becomes the strongest factor, with an odds ratio of 250, a substantial increase from .004 in the 2000-2006. This suggests that the state is using different criteria in deciding where to execute built-environment programs in 2007-2010 than in 2000-2006. Favelas are home to a variety of lower income class segments. The shift in criteria from the proportion of neighborhood households classified as a favela household to the proportion of a neighborhood living in poverty represents a more sophisticated engagement on the part of the state. Earlier built-environment interventions were determined by the appearances of the built environment; whereas, later interventions reflect a deeper understanding of urban existence and needs, independent of aesthetic concerns.

As was the case with receiving Bolsa Família, homicides appear to have little influence on the implementation of built-environment programs, with an odds ratio close to 1, indicating a neutral effect of homicides on receiving the upgrades. Again, this attests to the skill of the state in delivering equalization policies. The regularity of homicides does not thwart urban upgrading programs. Such an achievement with the urban upgrading programs is especially compelling. As noted earlier, the channels of state-society interaction established through Bolsa Família are relatively passive. After completing an initial registration procedure, beneficiaries have limited contact with state staff. Urban upgrading programs, by comparison involve a much more intimate and sustained engagement between the state and beneficiaries with construction often lasting years. The fact that the state can accomplish this in contexts with frequently occurring homicides attests to its ability to deliver services in difficult circumstances.

The limited association between receipt of both categories of welfare programs, Bolsa Família and the urban upgrades, and homicides is important in another sense. Many welfare scholars further a cynical notion of the state by arguing that welfare programs function as a means of social control. Most famously, Piven & Cloward (1993) posit that welfare is extended to mollify rebellious social segments. If this were the case in the Rio de Janeiro context, we would expect to observe a strong positive association between neighborhoods with the most volatility and welfare. Yet the data do not support such a relationship. Homicides neither attract nor dissuade state welfare activity. Rather than interpreting welfare measures as guided by ulterior motives, they can be read on their own terms, as an attempt to support those in need.
Unlike Bolsa Família, the built-environment programs in the 2007-2010 period are associated with receiving other social welfare programs. With at least one of the other welfare programs established in 2005, the chances of also receiving a built-environment program more than doubles. The causal pathway may in fact go both ways, improvements to the built environment may facilitate the entrance and establishment of other welfare services. This find could reflect greater coordination of welfare programs on the state’s part with certain city regions selected to receive a variety of services. The results could also indicate different implementation styles across program categories. In order to be successful, the built-environment programs and other welfare programs hinge on the physical presence of the state, as manifest through the construction of a new road or establishment of a new school. Bolsa Família, in contrast, does not display this same place-based dependence, and the regression models reveal minimal association among Bolsa Família and other welfare measures. The benefits and behavior that Bolsa Família entails require minimal physical infrastructure. The state is able to enroll Bolsa Família beneficiaries without having a strong prior physical presence.

Overall, the explanatory power of the logit models is low, as indicated by the pseudo-R-squared ranging between .20 - .22. This suggests that variables other than the ones included in the model do a better job of predicting the receipt of an urban upgrade. The fact that the poverty, violence and favela variables do not hold substantial explanatory power suggests that other criteria not examined in the regression model influence the roll out of the built-environment efforts. When asked about the rationale guiding built-environment programs in qualitative interviews, government staff made vague references to political factors, but did not go into specifics. Interviews with residents of favelas receiving upgrades were more illuminating, and hinted at the importance of personal connections influencing program receipt. Individuals interpreted receiving urban upgrades as the product of earlier advocacy efforts linking their communities to city and national level politicians.

The long-standing Rio de Janeiro tradition of personal ties shaping the distribution of political benefits may well apply to the built-environment measures. The variables related to poverty, violence and favelas account for more of the variance observed in receiving Bolsa Família than they do with receiving the built-environment programs. The R-squared ranges for the Bolsa Família models are .5 - .85. Thus, these factors are more central to the state’s logic of Bolsa Família implementation. As a program that came about after the built-environment programs, this suggests another dimension of learning. Earlier welfare programs are not guided by as clear a rationale or as clear an understanding of population needs as are later programs. This finding also supports other literature positing the declining influence of personal ties in Brazilian politics in favor of bureaucratic rationality (Fenwick, 2009).

**Welfare Effects on Violence**

Table 8 below presents OLS regression results comparing the impact of different welfare programs on the change in violence between 2006 and 2010. The 2006-2010 period was selected because by these years, Bolsa Família and the urban upgrade programs had been implemented for a sufficient amount of time that their social impact should be discernible. Between 2006-2010, the average neighborhood homicides rate decreased 14% from 63.10 per neighborhood per year to 54.27 per neighborhood per year. Thus, sufficient variation also exists with homicide as a dependent variable to assess the extent to which welfare programs contribute to this change.
Table 8: Violence Change Scores, 2006-2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Change in violence 2006-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent households in favela</td>
<td>17.30912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent poor households</td>
<td>77.7366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>.0028186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of other social welfare programs</td>
<td>.9157145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrades in previous years</td>
<td>-19.10841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households receiving Bolsa Familia in previous years</td>
<td>.0080573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-52.39304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>.1520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of state programs, the upgrades have the strongest association with violence reduction between 2006-2010. As anticipated in the hypothesis, Bolsa Familia has virtually no impact on violence reduction. Neighborhoods with an upgrade in prior years had 19 fewer deaths in 2010 than in 2006. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. The above regressions examine change at the neighborhood level. Some investigations of neighborhood effects suggest that this level of analysis may be too narrow since city-wide factors or those of adjacent neighborhoods may be the main drivers fueling violence or its abatement (Sampson et al., 2002). Factors that are not neatly confined within neighborhoods, such as Brazil’s improving economic situation on the national scale, may be important factors contributing the increasing safety Rio de Janeiro has enjoyed in the 2000s.

It would be tempting to interpret the concomitant decrease in violence and growth in welfare programs as a causal relationship between the latter and the former; however, my quantitative analyses do not support such a claim. Many policies and social programs assume that improving the economic conditions as well as the services available to disadvantaged community residents can reduce violence. For instance, this logic guides the U.S. Housing and Urban Development’s recent Choice Neighborhoods program, attempting to change disadvantaged neighborhoods by improving housing and access to educational and support services (HUD, 2012). Elsewhere in Latin America, programs grounded in a similar rationale and with components resembling urban upgrades have successfully demonstrated a reduction in violence (Weaver & Maddaleno, 1999). Yet, in Rio de Janeiro the relationship between equalization measures and violence reduction is not strong enough to be captured statistically. Other variables, outside of those examined in the above regression, may exert a stronger role in violence reduction.

To contextualize these regression results and identify patterns in violence, homicide data for 2006-2010 was geo-coded and configured using inverse distance weighted surface interpolation¹⁶ and

¹⁶ Inverse distance weighted (IDW) surface interpolation is a means by which data reflecting information for known geographic points can be configured to generate information across other geographic positions for which data is unavailable. In this case, homicide data was originally coded on a neighborhood level. However, this data configuration does not accurately capture the variation in homicides across space. Imagine the case of two adjacent neighborhoods, one with a homicide rate of 100 per 10,000 people and the other of 1 per 10,000 people. The lived experience of violence across these two neighborhoods may not be as abrupt as a change from one to one hundred, and likely lies somewhere in between these two values. IDW surface interpolation is a means of smoothing these values by creating a new layer of information. This new smooth
is depicted in Figure 5, below. Figure 6 provides additional context in interpreting these images by portraying the distribution of poverty and favela location across Rio de Janeiro. In 2006 violence was more evenly distributed across the city than it is in 2009. The violence reduction over time is not confined to the wealthier zones, like Ipanema and Copacabana. The Northern Zones, containing many favelas and poorer population segments, also enjoy fewer homicides. Violence remains high in the western regions of the city. Given the punctuated and isolated nature of urban upgrades, it is unlikely that they contribute to such widespread changes in the homicide rate. The effect captured in the OLS regressions above may have less to do with the built-environment programs themselves and may instead be due to other factors.

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surface best fits the available data points and is calculated by giving more weight to those points that are geographically closer to a particular point than those that are further away from that point. This calculation is performed with all originally available data points and then combined to generate the new layer of information.
Figure 5: Violence Trends, 2006-2010.

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Legend
Homicides per 10,000 people
- 0 - 20
- 21 - 40
- 41 - 60
- 61 - 80
- 81 - 100
- 101 - 120
- 121 - 140
- 141 - 160
- 161 - 180
- 181 - 200
- 201 - 220
Figure 6: Poverty Distribution and Favela Location
(sources: IBGE, 2000; IPP, 2010)

Legend
Percentage of Households earning less than minimum wage
- 2% - 9%
- 10% - 15%
- 16% - 22%
- 23% - 29%
- 30% - 36%
CONCLUSION

The above analyses demonstrate the inadequacies of continuing to conceptualize the Brazilian state in primarily negative terms. Between 2000 and 2010, Rio de Janeiro experienced a substantial increase in social welfare provision. In this decade, the number of households receiving Bolsa Família increased forty-fold and the number of favelas benefitting from urban upgrading programs doubled. The state is clearly making progress in terms of reaching disadvantage populations. Moreover, this is not simply welfare growth in general terms at the aggregate city level, but targeted expansion reaching the populations most in need. Such sophisticated welfare developments are most evident with Bolsa Família enrollment. Over the ten-year time span, neighborhoods with the greatest proportion of poor households are consistently the neighborhoods with the highest number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries.

Looking more closely at the factors influencing welfare program distribution across the city, poverty, rather than informal urban settlements or violence, is the most important factor. In early time periods, the proportion of neighborhood households classified as favela was the variable most associated with receiving the built-environment interventions. However, in later time periods this variable holds less explanatory weight and poverty becomes most strongly associated with receiving the urban upgrades. Violence, as captured through homicides, has a minimal effect on welfare program distribution. The fact that violence has such a limited influence on welfare expansion suggests a certain robustness of the state’s emerging welfare capacity, with the successful delivery of state services in spite of the obstacles that violence presents.

Poverty’s strong association with welfare program distribution is important in another sense. It suggests the state’s reliance on a rational logic instead of the personal ties that have dominated past state-society interaction in Brazil. When governance depends on whom you know, as patron-client ties do, the logic of state action is highly mutable, subjective and non-decipherable to outside groups. The above quantitative analyses reveal a legible governance logic that employs objective and stable criteria. This is an important progression for the Brazilian state and corroborates other research describing the declining preeminence of personal networks shaping state-society interaction.

In terms of the impact of welfare programs, supporting the aforementioned hypothesis, the strongest relationship exists between the built-environment interventions and violence reduction. This association supports research on socio-spatial relations attesting to the power of the built environment to shape human behavior. The fact that the relationship between the built environment and violence does not achieve statistical significance suggests that non-spatial factors also contribute to Rio de Janeiro’s increased safety.

The analyses presented above demonstrate how far the state has evolved since arguments of state absence and abuse were commonplace. Vestiges of these latter qualities undoubtedly continue to affect contemporary urban existence. However, these past conceptualizations fail to recognize important recent advances in state-society relations in Brazil. The increasing size and strength of Brazil’s welfare capacity disrupts the bad-state category of arguments and forces recognition of the emerging beneficent side of the Brazilian state.
Chapter 3 - The Challenges of Becoming Everyday: Establishing the Quotidian State in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas

VIGNETTE

As part of PAC-favela, several of the houses located on a hill in Complexo do Alemão have been demolished to widen the road leading up to a new funicular station under construction. As I was walking up this hill, with the rubble of the houses that used to be there on either side of me, I noticed a handful of traffickers walking in my direction. Each carried an automatic weapon, a few had additional ammunition strapped across their chests. Traffickers are such a regular part of the lives of this community that the other people walking up and down the same path as I seemed largely unaffected by the presence of such individuals and weaponry. The traffickers continued further down the path. One stopped to shake hands, chat and trade jokes, news or gossip with one of the construction men working on the PAC funicular station. The construction worker wore a white hardhat and royal blue government-issue overalls with the words “Education, Health, Peace” written across the back of his uniform. Here were two individuals associated with two very different authorities: the formal state and drug traffickers. The predominant discourses on traffickers and the state promote the idea that these authorities fiercely oppose each other, but on this day the interaction between the two was intimate and even jovial.

INTRODUCTION

The above vignette illustrates the complexities engendered when the Brazilian state augments its presence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. While new government-sponsored equalization measures strive to extend the state’s governance over regions in which it previously had minimal contact and bring benefits to certain population segments, these gains are achieved through a deeper reliance on drug traffickers. This chapter examines the multiple institutional configurations that shape favela life and how these change with the introduction of recent welfare measures.

Amidst the myriad of institutional forms governing social life, the state is often considered to be the ultimate arbiter. The state reigns supreme over other institutions because it can establish and alter the rules of the game by which all others abide (Bourdieu & Farage, 1994; Fligstein, 1991; Singh et al., 1991). Yet, in many parts of the world, the state is not the exclusive dominant actor shaping social life. States are mired in “ongoing battles among groups pushing different version of how people should behave” (Migdal, 2001, p. 12). These rivals can take many forms from religious groups (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan) to separatist factions (e.g., until the recent peace treaty, ETA in Spain using cultural claims to justify their right to independence).

In Rio de Janeiro the state has long struggled with how to govern the city’s favelas, where its presence has historically not been as strong or influential as it is in the formal city. Drug traffickers exacerbate this tension through their domination and brutal defense of favela territories. In their daily existence, favela residents must negotiate the influence of two institutional actors: the state and drug traffickers. In the past, the formal state operated at a distance from favela communities, interacting with them intermittently and in coercive ways. In the wake of state neglect and exploitation, drug traffickers established state-like rule in favelas, enforcing their mandates through violent means (Arias, 2006a; Leeds, 1996; Lessing, 2008).

Today, the country’s rapidly expanding welfare capacity engenders novel confrontations between the state, drug traffickers and favela residents. Here, I focus on one category of equalization policies: built environment interventions taking place in Rio de Janeiro. My findings illuminate the complex processes by which new state authority attempts to institutionalize itself in favelas as well as undermine entrenched trafficker legitimacy. This evolution is far from un-ambiguous and produces
substantial flux for favela residents as the demarcations of institutional authority are blurred and new rules are promulgated. The state struggles to assert a new identity vis-à-vis the urban poor as an everyday and supportive state, rather than as an episodic and coercive one. Yet, the state is fettered by the legacy of its past actions. Paradoxically, the urbanization programs simultaneously advance a new beneficent side of the Brazilian state while fostering a deeper state entanglement with trafficker power. Thus, while certain neighborhoods may experience greater access to and contact with the state, for the city as a whole, a dual state-trafficker blended authority structure endures.

In the sections below, I draw from the literature on developing world urbanism to map the institutionalized configurations among the Brazilian state, Rio de Janeiro’s disadvantaged populations and drug traffickers; and discuss the disruptions to these relationships when the state expands its presence in the city’s favelas.

PAST INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

In order to fully appreciate the implications of current state-society interaction in Rio de Janeiro, it is important to situate what is presently happening in the city in the broader historical context of state interaction with the urban poor in Brazil as well as Latin America more generally. Past scholarship fixates on the separation between the state and the urban poor, the violent and brutal interactions that erupt between the two, and state exploitation of the poor for political ends through patron-client ties. Within favelas, residents have developed robust self-governance mechanisms through residents’ associations, community driven administrative boards managing a host of urban services and collective affairs. Trafficker domination has strengthened favela self-governance through the promulgation of social norms and codes, but also has undermined the quality of life through the perpetuation of violence. State-trafficker relationships are equally contradictory: at times the state establishes partnership with trafficker for political ends, while at others the state and traffickers engage each other as fierce enemies. The following sections review the institutionalized linkages among the state, favela communities and drug traffickers in greater detail.

THE STATE AND THE URBAN POOR

Two of the most frequently emphasized qualities of state-society interaction in contexts of urban poverty are that of state exclusion of the poor and state absence in the lives of the poor. Historically, tactics of exclusion took many forms, preventing the equitable allocation of state protections. The most successful tactics of exclusion included requiring literacy as a condition to vote (given the high levels of illiteracy in the country, this regulation effectively barred many poor from political participation until the 1980s); selectively distributing rights to those in the formal labor market while denying similar benefits to the informal sector; and maintaining a complicated and costly bureaucracy making the legal system virtually inaccessible to all but the most elite (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Holston, 2009; J. E. Perlman, 2004; Santos, 1979). The state operated at a distance from the poor, denying them the same benefits it bestowed on the non-poor.

Related to state exclusion of the poor is state neglect of the poor. Discourses about the absence of the state in the lives of disadvantaged populations gained popularity with the scholarship on urban marginality of the 1970s and remain influential today. As a sample of some of the rhetoric used to portray state-society relations, two influential scholars studying Rio de Janeiro describe the city’s poor communities as “frequently ignored by the state” (Leeds, 1996, p. 77) or as suffering from a “vacuum where the state should be” (Perlman, 2011, p. 182). This language perpetuates an understanding of the city as a fragmented landscape: areas of formal state presence punctured by islands of state abandonment (O’Donnell, 1993).
During the 1980s, urban poverty worsened with the growing influence of neoliberal ideology. Many urban scholars frame the state’s adoption of neoliberal policies – prioritizing the market and promoting the retrenchment of the state – as the root cause of a variety of urban ills (Davis, 2007; Portes, 1989; Wacquant, 2007). With the onset of structural adjustment, Latin American countries endured significant economic turmoil resulting in increased levels of unemployment, informal employment and inequality for vast population segments (Babb, 2005; Portes, 1989; Roberts & Portes, 2006). Poor communities in Rio de Janeiro grew dramatically during these decades of economic uncertainty. In the 1980s, favelas grew at more than 5 times the rate of the non-favela city; in the 1990s, favelas grew at more than 3 times the rate of the non-favela city – the largest comparative growth figures since the end of WWII (Perlman, 2004).

With the retrenchment of the state, non-state authorities emerged to fill the void, and conflict between the two contributed to escalating violence throughout the urban realm, in poor areas in particular (Caldeira & Holston, 1999; Holston, 2009). With limited state presence and a built environment conducive to clandestine activity, favelas provided a fertile context for the drug trade. From the 1980s onward, traffickers came to dominate many of the city’s favelas. Rio de Janeiro’s battle with drug traffickers exemplifies the power struggle between state and non-state authorities at its most intense, but this phenomenon was present in varying degrees throughout Latin America as urban residents became increasingly involved with assorted gangs, militias and cartels (Sanchez, 2006). These organizational bodies coupled with economic hardship led to a rise in criminal activity in cities. Criminality was a source of violence in its own right, but promoted further violence by eliciting the brutal hand of the state seeking to quell social unrest and maintain order (Auyero, De Lara, & Bellomi, 2012).

Government security forces in Rio de Janeiro are notoriously violent. In 2008, the rate of police killings in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 6.86 per 100,000 people, was more than six times that of São Paulo at 0.97 per 100,000 people, and more than fifty-seven times that of the United States at 0.12 per 100,000 people (HRW, 2009). Police-related homicides in favelas are especially brutal, with many deaths demonstrating signs of execution-style killings, but fraudulently claimed as self-defense. Such state-sponsored violence exacerbates the lived experience of urban poverty and inequality.

The police brutality and corruption that is common in recent years is the most recent manifestation of long-standing pattern of state-sponsored violence. In earlier decades, state brutality took the form of harsh favela eradication campaigns. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the height of favela removal efforts, the Brazilian government removed more than twenty-three thousand favela dwellings (Portes, 1979; Valladares, 1978) to make way for massive new transportation systems or fuel real-estate speculation. Thus, when the state entered the lives of the poor, it exerted a largely pernicious influence.

This is not to say that the poor are entirely passive when subject to state neglect or abuse. At various points in Brazil’s history the urban poor have demonstrated robust political mobilization (Schneider, 1991; Stokes, 1991). During Brazil’s military dictatorship, factories were subject to government surveillance in an attempt to mollify political resistance, so urban peripheries became the site of political organizing (Kowarick & Banduki, 1994). Later, in the 1980s, social movements spearheaded by favela residents brought an end to the disastrous favela demolition and relocation campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s (Oliveira, 1996). During my fieldwork I observed this agency reassert itself again as favela residents organized community meetings and protests against the city government’s plan to demolish their homes as part of the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic games. Favelas are thus home to tremendous capacity for collective action that can be either unlocked or thwarted under particular circumstances.

Apart from these intense moments of effective political agency, a more routine form of political engagement linking favela residents and the state is clientelism. As is true elsewhere in Latin
America (Auyero, 2001), clientelism has a long history in Rio de Janeiro. In favelas, political contenders offer small-scale improvements in exchange for political support (Gay, 1993, 1998). What clientelist practices reveal is state agents interacting with poor communities in an instrumentalist fashion. The state engages with favelas because they are a useful source of votes. Clientelism, in its most generic and abstract sense, conjures notions of entire regions or neighborhoods falling prey to the coercive tactics of a single political agent. In the Brazilian context, individuals are presented with a dizzying array of candidates during elections, making widespread political capture by a single individual challenging. Furthermore, among incumbents, political allegiances often straddle party lines, complicating attempts to channel machine politics to the benefit of one political party. Obtaining rigorous evidence of clientelism is challenging, but the strongest indication of patron-client ties that I observed during the 2010 elections occurred on a very micro-scale. Candidates entered favelas giving small gifts to residents in the forms of t-shirts or food, distributed while hosting a churrasco (barbeque). Many of my contacts and interviewees in both Alemão and Manguinhos indicated that this behavior was typical during election season. They quickly expressed frustration with this tactic, claiming that once elections were over, politicians would forget about their needs and life would continue much as it had before.

The aforementioned state engagement with the poor takes place in very charged, fraught and intense circumstances – tactical exclusion, violent skirmishes and political exploitation – all of which play out to the detriment of the poor. Rather than being a regular and everyday part of the lives of favela residents, the state is instead episodic and coercive in its presence.

**FAVELA RESIDENTS, RESIDENTS’ ASSOCIATIONS AND TRAFFICKERS**

The patterns of state exclusion and neglect produce another institutionalized norm within favela communities: self-reliance. Disadvantaged urban populations have developed complex support structures and means of securing livelihoods in the shadow of state abandonment (Holston, 2009). One of the key characteristics of favelas is that they are auto-constructed. Residents build their own dwellings with the help of local labor and expertise rather than using private sector companies and adhering to formal building codes (Fabricius, 2008). In addition to being self-constructed, urban services in favelas are also self-managed. Many favelas have residents’ associations, organizational bodies staffed by residents to deal with community proceedings and oversee the provision of services that are fundamental to contemporary urban life: water, electricity, internet, mail, television, etc. Interviewees and members of the residents’ associations themselves have described these organizational bodies as “subdivisions” (sub-prefeitura) of the city government. This parallel is fair given that residents’ associations carry out many of the same functions of the city government, but do not receive official government recognition.

Residents’ associations are the favored channel through which the formal state establishes contact with and gains entry into favelas. For instance, at the inauguration of a community recreation center in Alemão, state politicians made a point to surround themselves with members of the community’s residents’ associations and praise the strength of their relationship. Residents’ associations are thus an important contact-point with the state and can influence how the state’s investment affects the rest of the community. Although residents’ associations lack de jure authority, the state’s actions towards them give them de facto legitimacy. For example, from 1996-2010,

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17 Related to the instrumentalist engagement with the urban poor to secure political support is state interaction with poor communities to prevent political opposition (Collier 1976; Piven & Cloward 1979; Bromley 2002). Under these circumstances, the utility of poor communities to the state remains the same: a source of votes, but the stakes are higher. The poor could conceivably be a substantial threat to incumbents and hopefuls as well as upset to the established patterns of political processes.
through the Community Street Cleaners program (Gari Comunitário), the city government collaborated with residents’ associations to carry out garbage collection in approximately three hundred of the city’s favelas. In 2010, the final year of the program before the city government assumed full responsibility for all sanitation services, contracts with residents’ associations were valued at R$26 million. Such alliances with the state give residents’ associations access to tremendous financial resources and, more importantly, legitimacy to govern favela affairs. This outsourcing of state action strengthens the episodic character of the state, but deviates from the coercive nature of the state described earlier. Rather than implement services directly, the state, in essence, subcontracts with residents’ associations and remains at a distance from favela communities. Unlike past behavior, however, the state is not exclusively using the poor for political gain and is instead attempting to offer favelas the same services that the formal city enjoys. Thus, there are multiple layers and contradictory qualities to state-favela interaction that resist depicting the state in wholly positive or negative ways.

Further strengthening the government-like quality of residents’ associations, favela households pay a monthly “tax” (on the order of R$5, roughly $3.00 in Alemão and Manguinhos) so that the association has resources with which to carry out its management functions. Each time I visited residents’ association offices they were abuzz with activity. A line of waiting residents snaked out the door as staff organized and separated mail, handled the payment and processing of utility bills, or scheduled meetings between residents and the head of the residents’ association to resolve personal issues. Residents’ associations are clearly governance structures as they preside over community affairs and regulate permissible behavior.

Residents’ associations are also often, but not always, under the sway of local drug traffickers. The former is neither entirely dependent on nor autonomous from the latter, their relationship defies a simple linear hierarchization of subservience and domination. As one favela resident and activist expressed to me “it is a myth to think that everything in the community must pass through the sieve of traffickers, everyone focuses on them [traffickers] too much, there are things they need their approval and things that do not.” Although I never directly observed any clear indication of an alliance between drug traffickers and members of residents’ associations (since obtaining concrete empirics on trafficker activity is challenging), residents frequently alluded to the collusion between the two. Some individuals offered subtle hints as to the quality of the relationship: “the residents’ association has a certain friendliness with the drug traffic” [Manguinhos resident]. Others were more specific, in a discussion with one resident about the taxation systems benefitting the residents’ association one resident proclaimed “my payments go to the residents’ association, which, in turn, pays traffickers” [Alemão resident]. This payment structure gives residents’ associations license to operate under trafficker rule, but also establishes a chain of command for the oversight of urban services. For instance, if the pirated cable television network malfunctions, both the residents’ associations and traffickers are implicated in correcting it.

Many people I spoke with expressed some dissatisfaction with residents’ associations and skepticism about their ability to support community interests due to their alliance with traffickers. “[T]he president of the residents’ association is based on the taste of the local power [traffickers], sometimes they [traffickers] put those that they want in power” [Alemão resident]. As a result, the “residents’ association is allied with the traffickers, it offers no real representation, it is a false representation” [Alemão resident]. “Today you would be very infantile to think that the residents’ association represent the interests of the community” [Borel resident].

18 In the future, the municipal government’s urban cleaning company (Companhia Municipal de Limpeza Urbana, Comlurb) will manage favela trash collection. Employees will be required to take a public exam to secure employment, replacing staffing procedures at the discretion of the residents’ associations.
This is not to say that residents’ associations are entirely corrupt and devoid of value. They provide an important management function to favelas. Yet, because residents’ associations are intertwined with traffickers, actions that support the residents’ associations also sustain trafficker rule. The fee that traffickers earn through the household tax is obviously small in comparison to the revenue of the drug and arms trades, but paying this fee is a symbolic acceptance and legitimation of a process and organizational structure. Through a tax system, individuals come to recognize themselves as subjects to a higher authority (Bourdieu & Farage, 1994) and in so doing validate that hierarchical structure.

Traffickers not only extract an extra tax from favela residents. They also engage in rule-making that affects the broader favela community and is not limited to residents’ associations. One of the most important tenets of trafficker rule is the understanding that residents will not betray traffickers to state authorities. Residents are expected to keep silent about trafficker affairs and assist them during police raids (e.g., hiding drugs) (Lessing, 2008). Trafficker governance is not confined to periods of conflict with state security forces; it also penetrates the ordinary and regular components of favela existence. One Manguinhos resident indicated that traffickers had the power to dictate where residents could live and how residents walked through the community, prohibiting them from entering territory controlled by a rival gang. He recounted a horrific instance of traffickers killing youth from a territory controlled by a rival gang for traversing through a neighborhood area dominated by an opposing gang as a testament to how seriously traffickers expected residents to adhere to their mandates. Some scholars depict traffickers as proto-states since they offer services that have come to be expected of modern states, such as maintaining internal security, establishing norms and rules, and distributing social benefits (Leeds, 1996). Trafficking provides a source of jobs and income (however precarious and risky) to residents who are otherwise unemployed, underemployed or poorly compensated for their labor. Traffickers also offer social support to communities, be it in the form of emergency loans, new housing, medication, settling interpersonal disputes or punishing behavior that deviates from community norms (e.g., rape or spousal abuse) (Goldstein, 2003; Lessing, 2008). The examples presented later on in this paper of traffickers threatening residents to quit jobs or to abandon their homes to allow for PAC-favela construction offer further indication of the extent of their control.

In sum, a two-tiered governance structure organizes favela life. Residents’ associations provide the first stage – a level of bureaucratic organization that residents typically encounter to handle routine issues. Traffickers provide the second layer of governance and are the ultimate authority in these communities when certain issues arise. Physical force and intimidation constitute the core foundation of trafficker rule, but the scope of trafficker influence affects many aspects of favela life far removed from violence. Sporadic benevolence and social support tempers trafficker brutality.

**STATE AND TRAFFICKERS**

The formal Brazilian state does not have a monopoly of rule over urban territory in Rio de Janeiro. The duality of state and trafficker rule is a deeply engrained structure that has lasted for decades in Rio de Janeiro (Zaluar, 1998b). The nature of the relationship between the state and traffickers is incredibly complicated and vacillates between adversarial and accommodating. This conflict shapes state-society relations in fundamental ways by fueling violence, corruption and clientelism. Since the escalation of the drug trade in the 1980s, favelas have become infamous for violence. As the domain of drug traffickers, favelas are subject to intense police campaigns as the government attempts to quell trafficker power and limit drug related activity (IPEA-FAPERJ, 2008). The police are notorious for their human rights abuses and the brutal measures they employ to combat the drug trade, resulting in substantial harm to bystanders unrelated to drug trafficking.
Between 2002 and 2006, Alemão and Manguinhos were among the communities that had the highest fatality rates in the city (ranging between 57 and 1,852 per 100,000 people) (IPEA-FAPERJ, 2008). In the past, violence was so extreme in Complexo do Alemão that Médecins Sans Frontières, the international NGO that typically offers medical care services in emergency situations brought on by war or natural disasters opened a facility in Alemão between 2007 and 2009. During my fieldwork, residents of both Alemão and Manguinhos referred to certain corridors of the neighborhoods as the Gaza Strip (“Faixa de Gaza”) because of the intense levels of violence that had occurred in the past. In Manguinhos, the risk of future violence was greater, and residents warned me to stay away from the Gaza Strip at nighttime.

At its most intense, violence extends beyond favela territories. During my fieldwork in November 2010, in retaliation to a new police program attempting to pacify favelas, traffickers paralyzed the city by bombing middle-class neighborhoods, burning cars and attacking police stations. In response, schools and business closed and city streets were more quiet than usual with residents avoiding public spaces as a precautionary measure (Freitas, 2010; Gomes, 2010). The 2010 events were not isolated occurrences and mirrored those occurring earlier in the decade, when traffickers assaulted public transportation buses and forced businesses to close in the city’s central business district and Southern Zone in 2002 and 2003 (Freitas, 2010; Gomes, 2010).

The high levels of violence are an extension of the state-trafficker rivalry. Yet, the interaction between these two sets of actors is not always adversarial. At times, collaboration occurs between certain state agents and traffickers. The police are infamously corrupt, often colluding with drug traffickers in the sale of narcotics and weapons, or provoking attacks between rival gangs. In Goldstein’s (2003) ethnography of Rio de Janeiro, favela residents use the term “police-bandit” to convey the ambiguity in understanding whether police who enter their communities are criminals, part of the state or some combination of both. During my early fieldwork in June of 2008, government soldiers detained three favela youth from a community controlled by the Comando Vermelho drug gang, and transported them to a favela controlled by a rival group, Amigos dos Amigos. Although the youths were not gang members, the soldiers wrote “CV” on their foreheads to signal affiliation with this gang before handing them over as a “present” to armed Amigos dos Amigos guards. With this deliberate provocation, the youth were tortured and killed (Tardáguila, 2010). The callousness of these actions attests to the intensity of the corruption endemic within Rio de Janeiro’s security forces, the coziness that they can selectively establish with drug traffickers and the disregard they have for favela residents.

State-trafficker interaction is not exclusively limited to behavior that is as overtly illegal or brutal. With the rise of the drug trade, politicians rely on traffickers to secure political patronage of favela residents by coercing and threatening residents to support particular parties or candidates (Arias, 2006c; J. Perlman, 2011). Thus politicians can directly buy compliant clients from traffickers, rather than catering to favela residents directly. As a result, favela residents are effectively distanced from political participation because their engagement with the state is the product of duress. Figure 1, below, summarizes these relationships.

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19 The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora.
Figure 1: Summary of the past institutional configurations among the state, favela residents, residents’ associations and traffickers.

NEW INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

Since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, the Brazilian government has made considerable advances away from the in-egalitarian distribution of rights, violence, corruption and clienteleism that characterized previous eras. This is especially true in the realm of social policy. In 1988, Brazil established a universal healthcare system; from the early 1990s to the early 2000s a series of pension reforms were passed extending protections to the elderly and disabled; started in 1995, income transfer programs, epitomized in Bolsa Família, have become increasingly prevalent and cover close to a quarter of Brazil’s population (Economist, 2008; Garay, 2010; Hall, 2008); in 1993, the government established a universal social welfare system, formalizing and expanding the state’s welfare activity; and many policy spheres (including urban planning, municipal budgets and healthcare) operate through participatory councils, creating new forms of state inclusion and venues of public engagement in political processes (Baiocchi, Heller, & Silva, 2008). These changes demand a re-evaluation of the institutional configuration previously linking the state with the country’s disadvantaged populations.

My data speak to how new national level commitments to equalization measures percolate down to affect daily favela life in Rio de Janeiro. Favelas are immense territories. As such, the state
cannot be equally active in all regions, contributing to variable outcomes across neighborhoods. With the uneven advance of the state, the reverberations observed in some areas are inconsistent or contradict those observed in others. As the state expands its presence in favelas through urbanization programs, the institutional configurations previously determining state conduct and supporting trafficker authority are thrown into flux. New rule systems, norms and networks of power emerge as a novel institutional architecture is constructed. These changes generate tremendous ambiguity for some residents, while offering new avenues to interact with the state for others. As the state furthers a new identity with the urban poor of Rio de Janeiro, it also advances its control over some favela territories while at the same time deepening its relationship with traffickers. The subsequent sections detail the new state-driven institutional configurations taking hold in favelas, the processes by which the previously established institutional structure is undone and the fallout these changes generate.

CONFUSION AND INDETERMINACY

What comes across most strongly from my fieldwork is the indeterminacy that results from institutional transformation. Residents felt tremendous confusion and ambiguity in response to the changes PAC-favela brought to their lives. The chief complaint that I heard repeatedly about PAC-favela concerned the lack of information. Residents rarely knew the details of what was happening in their neighborhoods. In part, this is attributable to the complex administrative structure used to realize PAC-favela projects. Financial resources for PAC-favela come from the federal government, but the responsibility for implementing the projects is devolved upon the Rio de Janeiro state and Rio de Janeiro city government offices, who in turn contract out with a variety of private companies (architecture firms, engineering companies and NGOs). The communities receiving PAC-favela are also divided into different regions so that some areas are under the authority of the state government while others are under the authority of the city government. Certain public works, such as the installation of funicular stations as well as the provision of urban services (e.g., water and sewer systems), fall under the federal government’s authority, while other changes to the built environment, including the installation of new schools, are managed by the municipal government. Favelas are subject to a patchwork field of authority with areas divided into different jurisdictions such that residents on the same street must identify and negotiate with different sets of organizational actors and chains of command and, as a result, receive different benefits.

Very few of the residents that I interviewed and observed had a clear sense of what was occurring. For instance, although PAC-favela has been operating in Manguinhos since 2007, one resident was given just a few weeks’ notice that her house would be demolished as part of PAC-favela construction. This was not an isolated occurrence, but a story I heard repeatedly throughout my fieldwork. During a separate site visit to Manguinhos, I noticed that several houses in one area of the community were spray-painted with both red and blue markings. Residents indicated that the blue markings appeared first followed by the red paint a few weeks later. When I asked what these meant, residents seemed unsure and indicated that they might have something to do with various decisions by the government about which houses will be removed and which houses would remain unaffected. None of the individuals I spoke with could offer a timeline about when their houses might be demolished and when they would be asked to leave.

The use of spray paint to relay messages is an interesting re-appropriation by the government of communication methods used by traffickers. Walls on main streets in favelas are often spray painted with announcements from traffickers. Many of these tags demonstrate pride in gang membership (e.g., extolling the virtues of one gang while deriding another). Others are guidelines for community behavior (e.g., “Any driver that hits a pedestrian will have to answer to us”
Amigos dos Amigos). The use of spray paint associated with PAC-favela generates confusion because the meaning of the message and the authority behind the message are unclear.

Residents are also subject to conflicting recommendations from the new and previously existing organizations in their communities. As discussed in detail below, on the one hand, communities receive new organizations and staff to support community life and field any complaints or concerns about PAC-favela. Through these new channels, the state is attempting to advance a new understanding of itself in favelas: the state as provider of social goods and the state as problem solver. Yet, for reasons that are unclear, established organizations advise residents not to use these new resources. Residents in one area of Manguinhos slated for demolition were upset at the prospect of losing their homes and frustrated at the state’s compensation offers. A handful of residents contemplated organizing a broader community mobilization to express their concerns to PAC-favela offices in order to obtain greater financial remuneration. However, these residents were discouraged from doing so by members of the residents’ association, but were not given a reason as to why. Other Manguinhos residents suggested that the residents’ associations gave this recommendation at the behest of traffickers who were attempting to curtail PAC-favela related community protests – I return to issues of trafficker support of PAC-favela later on in this chapter. Two institutional frameworks espousing conflicting messages are active at the same time. Residents are caught in a limbo: presented with new opportunities, staff and channels to express their concerns and meet their demands, but dissuaded from doing so by organizational actors that previously managed community interests. Whereas in the past, residents had a clear sense of what resources and actors to look towards to resolve problems, they must now negotiate more doubt.

**NEW OPPORTUNITIES**

Through the infrastructure upgrades, the state is literally building new physical connections to favelas. New human resources accompany these changes to the built environment. PAC-favela communities receive a *Canteiro Social* (Social Construction Site), an office physically located in the communities with staff fielding to address community concerns. This office regularly holds meetings to update the community about the progress of the urbanization efforts, solicit community input and field any complaints about the construction. Favela-Bairro communities also receive a *Posto de Orientação Urbanística e Social* (POUSO, Urban and Social Orientation Post) office with similar responsibilities to the Canteiro Social. Thus, in terms of human resources and organizational structure, through these urbanization policies, the state is quite literally closer to the urban poor than it had been in the past. Prior to Favela-Bairro and PAC-favela, community residents would have to venture to the downtown or to the wealthier Zona Sul to access municipal or state level government staff.

These offices are also important portals through which key benefits can be accessed. When I shadowed POUSO staff, the most frequent request that residents made concerned the procedures for obtaining formal legal title of their homes. Official ownership gives residents greater security, which is a remarkable advance given that just a few decades ago the permanence of favelas was in doubt with the state’s massive demolition and removal campaigns.

With respect to PAC-favela, the Canteiro Social also connects residents with employment opportunities. In almost all interviews and in the majority of discussions, residents would lament the lack of adequate employment and express a desire for more professional advancement. Perlman’s (2011) impressive longitudinal study documents that between 1969 and 2003, the percentage of favela residents reporting being unemployed for more than six months increased from 32% to 51%. The Canteiro Social helps residents to secure PAC-favela construction jobs. One resident of Alemão
indicated that 50% of PAC-favela workers are local hires. The Canteiro Social in both Manguinhos and Alemão also offer job training and placement services to residents for positions outside of favelas. The importance of employment opportunities should not be underestimated. Earlier, I noted that one of the benefits (although this term should be used with reservations in this context), of drug trafficking is the employment it offers to young men in favelas. With the advance of the state, favela residents have another means to secure a livelihood and receive support.

Through concrete and material changes, a new quality of the state becomes knowable to the poor and is observable in the change in affect and opinion of favela residents. One resident of Alemão described PAC-favela as “a new way of government interaction, the government can access Alemão more easily, and the community can access the government more easily – in all senses.” The physical changes lay the foundation on which new cognitive ideas travel. Rather than view the state in predominantly negative terms, people come to see the state as knowable in a new way and see it as a beneficial resource. As another Alemão resident expressed, “PAC is the good side of the government, it brought a new look for the community.” The choice of the word “look” is interesting because it can be interpreted in two ways: how the community is seen by others and how the community sees itself. PAC-favela yields other important cognitive changes, as the statement offered by one long-time Alemão resident describing his friends and neighbors reveals: “they no longer think of themselves as poor, they have expectations now.” Again the word choice is telling because an expectation is not simply a desire, it is a judgment of merit. Residents believe themselves to be deserving of something more. PAC-favela brings changes in terms of how residents perceive the state, the community and themselves.

**NEW RULES FAVORING STATE AUTHORITY**

Accompanying the new expectations of the state are new rules. Besides improving favela life, PAC-favela and Favela-Bairro also allow for greater state control. The responsibilities of the POUSO offices reveal control imperatives in their most visible form. One of the principal mandates of POUSO offices is to limit favela growth. A longitudinal evaluation found that favelas with POUSOs grew 1.22% over a ten-year period while those without POUSOs grew an average of 7.51% (Vial & Cavallieri, 2009). Residents must submit requests for permission to the POUSO to carry out any new construction. POUSO staff can authorize the destruction of any illegitimate structures. In this capacity the POUSO role is very much one of policing and surveillance. The self-reliance and autonomy that favela residents enjoyed in the past is thus undermined as communities are subject to new government rule systems. In one Favela-Bairro community, the tensions between POUSO staff and residents were obvious. Unlike other offices I visited, this office remained virtually empty, few residents entered asking for information or assistance. While walking around the community, residents avoided contact with the director of the POUSO office as she patrolled the neighborhoods barking orders to residents about permissible behavior.

Dynamics of control also unfold in a more subtle way through the change in the management of urban services as a result of new PAC-favela construction. Through PAC-favela the state is actively trying to upset the channels of dependence and authority that previously existed in favelas. Individuals receiving new houses represent the greatest loss to the residents’ association and trafficker power structure. Formalized urban services accompany these new dwellings. Bills for water, electricity, gas and television are paid directly to utility companies and service providers rather

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20 Other interviewees noted that entrepreneurial residents began selling drinks and food to the construction workers. PAC-favela directly and indirectly serves as a new source of employment for favela residents.

21 There are certainly negative reactions to PAC-favela as well; these will be discussed elsewhere in the dissertation.
than to the residents’ associations. Each of the new buildings also has a union (sindicato), an organizational body charged with similar responsibilities as residents’ association, to manage building affairs. As a requirement to live in these buildings, residents must also attend classes and workshops administered by the government on how to live in formal rather than auto-constructed dwellings. PAC-favela has thus carved out and removed areas from the jurisdiction of residents’ associations. In their place the state has installed new physical structures, organizational forms and modes of living that promote further independence from the residents’ associations (and indirectly traffickers). In a discussion with three members of one of the residents’ association in Alemão, one individual indicated “before PAC we took care of all water, now we take care of the areas PAC does not deal with…if PAC works are abandoned, we will reassume that responsibility.” In essence, PAC-favela is creating new rule systems, structures to reinforce these rules and new spaces where these rules are valid. At the time of investigation and writing, only a few of these new apartments were ready to receive residents; thus, it was too early to assess how residents’ associations would respond to this threat to their authority.

Demolishing existing housing and relocating residents to new buildings undermines the basis of support available to residents’ associations and traffickers, and establishes new allegiances between the state and the urban poor. Across the city PAC-favela has the objective of reaching 30,000 families. In Manguinhos, plans call for the construction of 2,549 new houses (PAC-Habitação, 2010). These figures underestimate the number of individuals removed from the dependence pathway previously linking them to residents’ associations and traffickers because they do not capture the number of individuals forced to relocate due to the demolition of their homes as part of PAC-favela construction.

This rerouting of control and management of urban services disrupts the previously entrenched institutional framework in which residents’ associations and traffickers dominate the favela. With traffickers and residents’ associations prevented from reproducing their authority, the state is able to expand its power. Interestingly, unlike past state-trafficker confrontations that erupted in overt violence, the struggle for control unfolds in a quiet, subtle and almost hidden manner. Moreover, in socio-spatial analyses, large-scale spatial changes are privileged as drivers for social change. My findings attest to the importance of not favoring large-scale spatial changes as powerful determinants of social behavior. If we shift our gaze from the macro-spatial changes – not the avenues, funicular system or community centers – but to the micro-spatial changes – the infrastructure, wiring, electricity and plumbing – this gives us greater insight into the control mechanisms of spatial transformation. Space that is non-visible, not a regular or immediately discernible component of the built environment, has the potential to bring about substantial changes.

PAC’s small-scale infrastructure highlights the importance of tracing the relationships and social networks beyond the immediate social-spatial context in question. The new physical infrastructure – water pipes, electricity lines, television cables – and management structure link actors that inhabit and use the newly constructed space to actors and processes outside of and removed from that region. With the arrival of PAC-favela, residents begin to seek the assistance of formal sector service providers based beyond the favela. Importantly, past patterns of self-governance inscribed in a limited geographic territory are upset as residents shift their help-seeking

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22 In a site visit to Alemão one week after the massive police campaign in late November 2010, one of my informants pointed out to me that police and government officials were particularly concerned with removing the illegal cable and internet systems previously available in the community and installing formalized services. While walking around Alemão we observed several workmen on the roofs of buildings removing wires and installing new cables. This is another instance of the importance of micro-infrastructure.
behavior and direct it to outside actors instead of residents’ associations and traffickers. Attending to cross-scalar linkages gives a clearer view of the impact of spatial changes. Moreover, these cross-scalar connections have greater potential to institutionalize behavior for long-lasting effects. Cross-scalar linkages lock-in behavior because there are more actors and forces pressuring behavior to unfold in a particular way. Upsetting cross-scalar linkages is difficult because it requires either disrupting the connections across levels or successfully dominating all levels involved.

Institutionalization is unlikely when the scope of spatial transformation is confined to a single scale (e.g., a new road, a new public park) because under these circumstances, there is a perpetual turnover in the use, meaning and rules of that space. Authority in that single space is all that is needed to re-inscribe a new meaning or rule. Such facility, in turn, contributes to a perpetually transient duration of domination. PAC-favela unghes some of the ties of dependence formerly linking residents to residents’ associations and traffickers and connects them to the formal sector and the state. With these new pathways, favela residents have new perceptions and expectations of the state and formal service providers and rely less on residents’ associations and traffickers.

**BEYOND CLIENTELISM**

My argument about the importance of infrastructure in shaping social life is similar to the contributions of studies examining clientelism in Latin American urban peripheries (Collier, 1976; Stokes, 1991). As mentioned earlier, the tale of current or would-be politicians offering goods in exchange for political patronage is a familiar one in Rio de Janeiro and other metropolises throughout the continent. It is tempting to interpret PAC-favela as another instance of clientelism. Many residents perceived PAC-favela projects to be another means for the government to gain political allegiance among the city’s poor. One individual in Alemão described his fellow residents as “thinking of it [PAC] in terms of a gift – a house, a fridge, tranquility, a school – who gave me these things? Lula. I can’t vote for Lula, so Dilma it is. There is an exchange to be re-elected….” Another resident echoed these ideas, saying that PAC “works help Lula, going to have a positive effect on the elections, going to aid the permanence of this political party.” These quotes are certainly suggestive of clientelism, but they could also describe typical political interaction. After all, political relations that do not receive the label of clientelism are also transactions relations (e.g., taxes and votes in exchange for rights and benefits). Clientelism may or may not be occurring with PAC-favela, but it is not the totality of what is transpiring.

Clientelism in the sense of a direct exchange of public benefits for votes is not evident in residents’ experience of PAC-favela projects. Residents do not perceive PAC-favela as being directly related to a political candidate besides the president. Rarely in discussions and interviews would residents mention another politician working at the city or state levels or discuss specific political parties besides the President’s Workers’ Party. Given their proximity, favelas residents are more likely to have contact with lower level political figures. Yet even in the weeks before the election, when campaigning was most intense, residents made little mention of politicians besides Lula. No residents indicated that PAC-favela had made them change their mind about their political behavior. PAC-favela may be so generic a public good that it allows multiple political agents to claim credit for its delivery. It may also be that Lula’s first term in office had already changed the attitudes of the poor. By the time PAC-favela started, midway through Lula’s second term, the poor were already supportive of him and his allies and thus needed no further convincing. Whereas in the past, while under trafficker rule, residents had a clear sense of the hierarchical power structure in favelas and whom to turn towards to secure favors. PAC-favela operates differently, not as a system of favors, but by building further support for Lula. Residents’ opinions about PAC-favela are indicative of general political preferences rather than the establishment of new actors and goods involved in patron-client transactions. Furthermore, as noted above, tremendous confusion exists among
community residents about the actors responsible for PAC-favela. Residents do not have a clear understanding about whether state offices, the municipal government or any one of the many subcontractors are responsible for a particular component of PAC-favela implementation. This confusion makes it difficult for prospective patrons to make credible claims of aiding the community, thereby impeding patron-client ties from functioning.

Rather than interpreting PAC-favela as part of patron-client ties, I contend that PAC is part of a different political project, one that attempts to bind favela communities to the state through new practical linkages and cognitive schemas. Political scientists often fixate on the politics of the ballot box (De La O, 2006; Stokes, 2005). While elections are undoubtedly crucial aspects of politics, they do not define the entirety of political behavior. Under conventional frameworks analyzing clientelism, the state only has relevance during election season, state-society interaction remains shallow and transient. Every few years the state, drug traffickers and favelas come together for brief dalliances, only to assume separated and distanced positions shortly thereafter. The integrity of each actor’s sphere of authority is preserved; no substantial losses or advances in the respective power bases are observed. Clientelism presents no real threat to undermine drug traffickers’ authority, nor does it permit the state to substantially increase its presence in and authority over Rio de Janeiro’s peripheries. The new form of state presence that PAC-favela represents changes the basic form of political connection between the state and its citizens. While the clientelism narrative had greater pertinence in explaining state-society relations in the past, it has waning relevance today and does not fit the entirety of what is unfolding in the city. Providing social investment to secure political support during elections is different than social investment to sway the allegiance from traffickers to the state. The latter requires a more fundamental shift in the institutional frameworks structuring state-favela interaction.

Political scientists’ focus on elections is not surprising given that in formal politics the possibilities for action – who can act, who decides, what constitutes acceptable action, etc. – are delimited by voting and other, openly visible forms of political activity. The ability to govern is predicated on winning political office. Obviously, trafficker governance is not dependent on formal elections and instead operates with a rule system that is more nebulous and less fixed. State and trafficker institutions rely on different logics; they are social systems that function on different currencies. The majority of the political science literature frames clientelism as a contest with the allegiance to political parties at stake. Political actors attempt to secure the favor of the poor while preventing competitors from doing the same. This contest is among actors and groups playing by the same rules of the game. With the recent social policies, the state is confronted with the challenge of wresting power from a rival whose authority is based on a different logic and making the state’s own logic viable.

**DEEPER STATE-TRAFFICKER ALLIANCES**

The advance of state authority does not unequivocally foretell the demise of trafficker power. In this context, power is not a zero sum game. Even as the urbanization programs build new linkages between citizens and the state, both PAC-favela and Favela-Bairro engender a deeper intertwining of the state with drug traffickers. In Alemão and Manguinhos, residents confided that the state had brokered a partnership with traffickers to ensure that PAC-favela works were completed in a timely manner and with few interruptions. Residents of Favela-Bairro communities reported similar agreements: in order to access and safely operate in trafficker-dominated territory, state agents agreed to trafficker requests (e.g., repairs and modifications to their personal residences and altering design plans to preserve the integrity of trafficker territory). In comparing the two urbanization programs, the intensity of the state-trafficker alliance is greater with PAC-favela than Favela-Bairro.
The state has many incentives for the construction to proceed smoothly. On an international scale, Rio de Janeiro is under closer scrutiny as it prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. For Brazil, 2010 was an election year. PAC-favela is the brainchild of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). There was therefore tremendous pressure for the projects to be viewed as a success to boost the chances of PT candidates winning the elections. In the media, former President Lula went so far as to claim Dilma Rousseff – then presidential candidate, now president – as “the mother of PAC” (Freire, 2008).

Repeatedly in interviews and casual discussions, residents claimed that the state was paying the traffickers approximately R$9,000 a month (roughly $5,000) to prevent community mobilization against PAC-favela. Residents were advised not to protest by members of the residents’ association or were threatened directly by traffickers. In Alemão I learned how traffickers harassed and threatened with death one resident who refused to accept the compensation and relocation offered by the government for destroying his house as part of PAC-favela construction. In another instance, displeased at the tactics of a Canteiro Social staff member fomenting community mobilization against PAC-favela, traffickers put pressure on the Cateiro Social and the staff member was subsequently fired.

Traffickers have historically had tremendous influence on favela life. The urbanization programs furnish traffickers with new sets of resources, in the financial the material senses, but also, and most importantly, in terms of legitimacy to act on behalf of the state. The deepening alliance between state and traffickers is an indication of the state’s inability to enter and control favela communities. The only way of providing public goods is to use non-state means. Here then is a paradox of the urbanization efforts: in order to promote a formal and equitable urban landscape, informal channels are employed. Informality and competing authority structures are not reduced, but strengthened, at least in the near term. PAC-favela and Favela-Bairro are originally state programs, but in their execution draw on trafficker authority. The outcome is not exclusively a state product. The newly urbanized space is the result of a hybrid state-trafficker authority.

In the administration of this equalization measure are remnants of how the Brazilian state interacted with favela communities in the past – brokering deals with certain strongmen in favelas who then coerced the larger populations to comply. The exploitative qualities of the Brazilian state that were previously dominant endure in the state’s present day incarnation, even as it attempts to augment its welfare functions. There is tremendous fluidity in the roles and actions of the state and traffickers. They are alternatively autonomous, dependent, collaborative and adversarial. Given this fluctuation in the integrity of the authorities governing favela life and the rules they espouse, it is unsurprising that favela residents must negotiate the substantial ambiguity in their lives discussed earlier.

Further suggesting the blending of state and trafficker authority is the change in the quality of state-sponsored violence. In November 2010, the Brazilian government launched the largest police campaign targeting favelas in Rio de Janeiro’s history. The operation involved 2,600 people from all branches of the state’s security services – the military, civil and federal police as well as the armed forces. The police campaign focused on Alemão and Manguinhos in an effort to quell a wave of trafficker violence provoked by the recent government pacification program mentioned earlier. Interestingly, despite the number of troops and amount of military equipment, the police raid in Alemão was remarkably bloodless, while Manguinhos endured comparatively more fatalities. The relative peacefulness of the state takeover of Alemão suggests a deal between traffickers and the state. Alemão is infamous as an epicenter of trafficker activity and was once described as an “emporium of drug and arms trafficking” (Extra, 2010). State forces did not lack sufficient resources, in terms of armament and personnel, to attack traffickers. Precedent would predict that the state would not be timid about violent assaults on traffickers. Yet, despite ample means available
and the weight of history, intense violence did not transpire. Instead, the state dominated a major trafficker stronghold with relative ease. Claims of state success, conquest, the defeat of traffickers and the end of trafficking in Rio de Janeiro conceal the complex entanglement of state and trafficker authority.

The pathways of the new institutional architecture linking the Brazilian state with favela communities are diagramed in Figure 2 below. The relationships depicted occur to a greater degree in Alemão than in Manguinhos, and the ramifications of these changes are explored in the next chapter. The connections outlined in Figures 1 and 2 are taking place concurrently, rather than one supplanting the other. In the new configuration, brutal and supportive trafficker interaction with favela residents is interrupted through state aid and the construction of new housing complexes. The episodic and coercive nature of state-favela interaction is replaced with a more permanent and supportive state presence. State-trafficker interaction does not deviate substantially from how the two actors have behaved in the past: they are simultaneously adversarial, as the state attempts to supplant trafficker domination, and accommodating, as the state intensifies its reliance on traffickers to accomplish its objectives.

Figure 2: Summary of the current institutional configurations being constructed as the state attempts to expand its presence in favelas.

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23 Rather than a pernicious form of state-violence being unleashed upon Alemão, violence was transformed into theatre and spectacle. The media coverage of these events perpetuated the bombastic aspects of violence through images more appropriate for a Hollywood action movie than news. In such a situation, violence operates as an empty threat, a potential that never comes to pass.
CONCLUSION

The state’s social investment in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas encroaches upon drug trafficker authority and upsets the historically engrained equilibrium between these two actors. The state challenges trafficker power by attempting to disrupt the ties of dependence linking favela communities to traffickers. Residents are introduced to new regimes of rule as they are given access to dimensions of the state with which they have historically had little contact. In this process, residents endure substantial ambiguity as the power structures that previously governed their lives have waning relevance and they are exposed to new sources of support and regulation. The state-society relations that built-environment interventions engender deviate from how the state has previously engaged with favelas. This is not a state that interacts with favelas only during transient moments of violence or coercion. Instead, it is a state that is attempting to establish itself as a quotidian part of favela life. These advances are not without difficulty. As the state forges a new identity with the urban poor, it struggles to overcome the weight of precedent. The state cannot entirely escape its past behavior as the new equalization measures come at the cost of deeper entanglement with drug traffickers. Certain neighborhoods may enjoy greater state presence than they had previously experienced, but at the city level, the duality of state-trafficker authority is preserved. The city is subject to a shifting landscape of authority. The arrival of new state presence in Alemão simply displaces trafficker activity to other neighborhoods. State power becomes more spatially inscribed, while trafficker power becomes more fluid and less tied to a specific geographic location.
Chapter 4 – Why Some Drug Traffickers Are Better than Others

INTRODUCTION

The favela complexes of Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos are remarkably similar. Both are located in the northern periphery of Rio de Janeiro and were once part of the manufacturing heart of the city. Today, the socio-economic profiles of the two are nearly identical, each receives similar quantities of state support, and the same drug gang governs these regions. Yet recent state-led equalization measures in these communities opens the door for wildly different social responses. Alemão enjoys a decrease in violence and a thriving civil society. In contrast, in Manguinhos, fatal violence remains a regular part of life and civil society languishes, lacking the mobilization intensity it once possessed.

This chapter investigates the reasons behind such divergent outcomes focusing on two distinct processes: the nature of trafficker rule in each community and how residents, in turn, respond to the rules that are placed upon them. Going beyond typical conceptualizations of traffickers as an exclusively detrimental social force, I examine the productive contribution their presence allows. Although the same drug gang governs both areas, the trafficker–favela resident relationship plays out very differently in the two communities. Trafficker power in Alemão is robust and centralized, creating rule systems that are fixed and known. With this certainty, Alemão’s civil society understands the permissible extent of community mobilization under trafficker rule, and maximizes this opportunity space. Furthermore, the singularity of trafficker rule means that any trafficker hostility to community organizing emanates from one known source, allowing for more possibilities for creative adaptation, bending but not breaking trafficker dictates. Residents establish new connections with one another and with non-favela actors, while abiding by trafficker mandates. Centralized trafficker rule also diminishes the intensity and regularity of violence. Tranquility, in turn, creates a context where new interpersonal associations and claims making can occur with greater ease.

In contrast, Manguinhos endures a fragmented trafficker structure, with power spread among multiple groups lacking a clear hierarchy. With several sets of traffickers espousing different norms, the rule systems in Manguinhos are variable and indefinite. As a result, residents must deal with greater doubt in terms of knowing which sets of trafficker regulations to follow. The lack of clarity about acceptable behavior undermines associational life and compromises the efficacy of civil society. The presence of multiple trafficker groups also creates a fertile context for violence, perpetuating the regularity of violence in the neighborhood and further complicating mobilization efforts.

While traffickers are a profoundly important structuring force in favelas, it is important to understand community dynamics distinct from their influence. Trafficker rule does not negate residents’ agency, yet residents of Alemão and Manguinhos make use of their abilities varying degrees of success. The divergence in outcomes between Alemão and Manguinhos is also due to the mobilization tactics that actors in each community pursue. Actors involved with organizing efforts in Alemão readily collaborate with others and create a context that invites and nurtures the contributions of new participants. By comparison, mobilization in Manguinhos remains small-scale and isolated, residents display minimal effort to form broad-based coalitions of actors and new participants remain at a distance from the organizing efforts unsure of how to be involved.

Civil society actors across these two communities behave contrary to what the American sociological literature on associational life of the urban poor would predict. Communities possessing certain resources (chiefly, money, time and knowledge) are more like to display greater and more
effective mobilization (Cohen & Dawson, 1993; Lawless & Fox, 2001; Wilson, 1990; Young, 2003). Yet, closer scrutiny of Alemão and Manguinhos reveals that the latter benefits from many such resources, but has substantially weaker community mobilization than the former. Juxtaposing Alemão and Manguinhos reveals that civil society vibrancy is less dependent on individual or community resources, and hinges on the normative milieu that surrounds individuals and into which individuals are reared. Since it is traffickers, more so than the state, that establish the stable context conducive to civil society mobilization, it is thus important to understand traffickers as more than perpetrators of violence and appreciate the wider implications of their domination.

BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL GROUNDING

My use of the term “associational life” is akin to the concepts of civil society and social capital employed by other scholars (Cohen & Arato, 1994; Gittell, 2003). In investigating associational life I examine the quality of relationships among individuals and organizations residing within a community as well as how these actors relate to entities existing beyond their community. Vital intra-community dynamics include the ability of individuals to self organize, establish links across diverse interests groups, marshal resources and set agendas. It is further crucial that individuals and groups forge connections with agents outside of the immediate confines of their community, especially those operating at larger scalar levels, such as corporations or the state. Strong abilities in both of these dimensions are needed if community groups are to be successful in identifying and articulating their concerns as well as ensuring that their needs are met (Baiocchi et al., 2008; Woolcock, 1998).

I focus on associational life to expand contemporary understandings of trafficker presence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. Academic investigations of traffickers portray Rio de Janeiro’s drug gangs as overwhelmingly deleterious to social life. While it is true that certain gangs may occasionally provide welfare support, employment opportunities and state-like governance of urban services to residents, their net contribution to the community is negative. The lower end of the continuum of detrimental trafficker behavior includes siphoning external resources for personal gain (e.g., using Favela-Bairro building materials and contracted labor to improve personal residences); engaging in political coercion (e.g., pressuring residents to vote for particular parties or candidates (Gay, 1990; Perlman, 2011)); and selling drugs. Traffickers cause further hardship by threatening community leaders and activists. In the 1990s over one hundred members of residents’ associations were killed because they deviated from trafficker preferences (McCann, 2008). Similarly, other community leaders have been banished from their neighborhoods for their mobilization efforts (Perlman, 2011). Such a context hostile to leadership thwarts the development and expression of community interests. Traffickers cause the most hardship through interpersonal violence. Clashes between traffickers and the police as well as between rival gangs are well known, as is the risk to bystanders caught in the crossfire during these confrontations. Horrific executions reveal traffickers at their most insidious. In 2002, traffickers in Alemão killed Tim Lopes, an undercover investigative journalist with O Globo conducting a story on baile funk dance parties in favelas, by cutting his limbs off and burning him alive. In short, traffickers are often depicted as brutal tyrants creating miserable lives for those under their domination (Misse, 2008; Tardáguila, 2010).

Traffickers undoubtedly constrain associational life, but they do not flatten it. Extreme portrayals of trafficker rule occlude an understanding of the social spaces that trafficker power does not touch as intensely. Some scholars (Arias, 2006b; Lessing, 2008; Misse, 2007) provide more nuances on the nature of trafficker-community relations and detail the varying levels of legitimacy, protection and accommodation that each affords the other. However, these accounts emphasize the contributions of traffickers to this dynamic and always examine community behavior with respect to
immediate trafficker actions (e.g., codes of silence that pervade many favela communities preventing residents from discussing trafficker affairs with police authorities, or residents protecting traffickers by stashing weapons and drugs in their homes). What remains unexplored is the social life that grows in the presence of traffickers, but does not directly involve traffickers in proximate social interactions. Deviating from this trend, this chapter attends to the interstices of trafficker rule and the social behavior that occurs in and around their command.

In the sections below, I present a brief overview of the history and similarities between Alemão and Manguinhos, summarize past and present state support of these communities, analyze the vibrancy and decline that these neighborhoods currently experience, detail the structure of trafficker rule and map recent fluctuations in the distribution of violence in each region.

ALEMÃO AND MANGUINHOS: OVERVIEW

Alemão and Manguinhos are located in the northern periphery of Rio de Janeiro. Both were part of the city’s industrial center that began to develop in the 1920s and grew most rapidly following the Second World War. Table 1, below, lists the industries operating in Alemão and Manguinhos between the 1940s and 1980s. This industrial base attracted migrants seeking better employment opportunities, quickly fueling informal urbanization around these manufacturing facilities and eventually giving rise to the large favela complexes that engulf these regions today. Understanding the principal sources of employment in these areas is important because in Brazil, the labor sector was a key source of political mobilization. Worker activism became especially strong in the 1970s and played a crucial role in expanding the pro-democracy movement during the military dictatorship (Avritzer, 2002; Collier & Collier, 2002). Given that Alemão and Manguinhos were heavily reliant on the manufacturing sector in these decades, the economic and social profiles (including associational life) of these communities were also historically quite similar.

### Table 1: Companies Operating in Alemão and Manguinhos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alemão</th>
<th>Manguinhos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Coca-Cola</td>
<td>-Gillete</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Skol (brewery)</td>
<td>-General Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Heliogás (gas distribution)</td>
<td>-Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicações – EMBRATEL (telecommunications)</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Rio de Janeiro Refrescos (refrigerator manufacturer)</td>
<td>-Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento – CONAB (agriculture supply)</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Poesí (lingerie manufacturer)</td>
<td>-Cooperativa Central de Produtores de Leite – CCPL (Central Milk Producers Cooperative)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Souza Cruz (cigarette manufacturer)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (FASE, 2011; Fernandes & Costa, 2009; VDC, 2011)

With the onset of the drug trade in the 1980s crime escalated throughout Rio de Janeiro and in favelas in particular. Violence became so intense that many companies closed down operations in the most dangerous areas. A 2003 study determined that between 10-13% of commercial spaces in and around Alemão had been abandoned (Araújo, 2010; Bottari, 2007). In both Manguinhos and Alemão, many buildings that were once used for manufacturing and warehousing have been converted to informal housing.

Company closures undermined the economic vitality of these regions as many residents lost a means of earning a livelihood. Today, the socio-economic profiles of Alemão and Manguinhos are
nearly identical, as Tables 2 and 3 summarizing income distribution and level of human development indicate²⁴.

Table 2: Income Distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bairro</th>
<th>Households without income</th>
<th>Households earning up to half of minimum wage</th>
<th>Households earning one-half to full minimum wage</th>
<th>Households earning between one-full minimum wage to twice minimum wage</th>
<th>Households earning between twice minimum wage to three times minimum wage</th>
<th>Households earning more than three times minimum wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alemão</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE, 2000 ²⁵

Table 3: Human Development Index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bairro</th>
<th>HDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alemão</td>
<td>0.4741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos</td>
<td>0.4729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE, 2000

STATE SUPPORT

State-sponsored welfare services to Alemão and Manguinhos are also quite similar. Most recently, as part of PAC-favela both Manguinhos and Alemão received new community centers (offering educational and professional development activities), residential buildings, recreational areas, health clinics and schools. Prior to the onset of PAC-favela the two communities benefitted from almost identical quantities of state services as summarized in Table 4 below. Alemão has more than twice the population of Manguinhos. According to the 2000 census, Alemão contained 18,219 households compared to 8,926 households in Manguinhos (IBGE, 2000). Thus, the effective welfare presence of the state on a per household basis is not as strong in Alemão as compared to Manguinhos.

²⁴ The human development index is a composite measure of health, education and economic indicators. Higher values indicate greater development. Many European countries have values of 0.9 or above while most sub-Saharan African countries have values below 0.5.

²⁵ For context, in 2010 the minimum wage was approximately $R500/month (or US$ 350/month), a small amount given that Rio de Janeiro is the most expensive city in Latin America and daily round trip transportation costs can consume between $R7-$R10/day.
Table 4: State-Sponsored Social Services Available in Alemão and Manguinhos Prior to PAC-favela.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Alemão</th>
<th>Manguinhos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to State Hospitals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to CRAS (social welfare clinic)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to CREAS (emergency social welfare clinic)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IPP, 2010; SMAS, 2010

Slight differences between Alemão and Manguinhos exist in the federal government’s flagship social program, Bolsa Família. Table 5, below, summarizes enrollment and targeting levels in the two communities. Given Alemão’s larger size, it is unsurprising that it contains roughly twice the number of households benefitting from the conditional cash transfer program. In many years, the targeting is approximately equal across the two. Altogether, state-sponsored welfare and social services are comparable in Alemão and Manguinhos.

Table 5: Households Receiving Bolsa Familia, 2001-2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bairro</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alemão (total households)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão (% households receiving BF of those eligible)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos (total households)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos (% households receiving BF of those eligible)</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MDS, 2010; calculations by author

SOCIAL POLICY AND ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE

Understanding the degree of state involvement in these regions is important because social policies can hone or hinder associational life. At a minimum, social policies allow beneficiaries greater contact with state staff and services. Through these interactions, individuals learn a new vocabulary, sense of worth and civic skills. Social policy implementation can thus influence claims making and the motivation to formulate demands in the first place. However, an increase in the provision of social services may not necessarily strengthen associational life. Several scholars find that the establishment of welfare policies can create active and passive political constituencies (Campbell & Morgan, 2005; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Skocpol & Amenta, 1986). For instance, the development of Social Security in the United States fostered greater political activism on the part of senior citizens because individuals had access to new resources, while welfare recipients became less political involved due to the degrading procedures to prove eligibility. Since Alemão and
Manguinhos receive similar types of state services, it is unlikely that the content and structure of these programs are responsible for the divergent outcomes observed between these communities.

Whether or not social policies are activating or undermining depends both on the design of the policies as well as the social contexts in which these policies are realized. By their very nature social policies attempt to ameliorate inequalities, and disadvantaged communities endure substantial challenges to associational life. Precarious labor market participation, crime and social isolation coalesce to impede the urban poor from improving local community conditions (Wacquant, 2007; Wilson, 1990). Poverty and its ripple effects undermine community organization, preventing connections among residents as well as between residents and local organizations. Disadvantaged areas lack trust, shared information and an established normative framework to foster greater community vitality (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005). At the same time, some scholars contend that poverty is not as enervating as Wilson and others portray. Extreme poverty may operate as a catalyst for mobilization and community engagement. Past a certain poverty threshold, those with the most to lose (e.g. welfare recipients facing reduced benefits in the face of welfare reform) are incentivized to act (Lawless & Fox, 2001; Young, 2003).

The work of Brazilian scholars mirrors points established in the North American literature. With high rates of poverty and violence, favelas are depicted as territories of distrust where individual survival needs trump other concerns (Da Silva, 2008; De Jesus, 2001). Frequent violence impedes a host of social processes from routine daily practices to those requiring more substantial effort, such as community organizing. Supporting the threshold effect model, when faced with the threat of demolition and removal, Rio de Janeiro’s favela communities successfully mobilized from the late 1960s through the 1980s to end these campaigns (Oliveira, 1996). A robust manifestation of this organizing power was observed with the establishment of Federação das Associações de Moradores de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ), a city-wide alliance of favela dwellers united to advocate for favela permanence (McCann, 2008). Yet, arguments about the disorganizing and isolating effects of poverty, as well as extreme poverty promoting community action, cannot account for the differences between Manguinhos and Alemão, since these frameworks would predict approximately the same outcomes in each community.

To account for the success of community mobilization among poor population segments, other scholars rely on a resources framework. Under this rubric, certain practical and cognitive assets are crucial to furthering associational life and political claims-making (Cohen & Dawson, 1993; Gittell, 2003; Lawless & Fox, 2001). Disadvantaged areas possessing the time and money to devote to organizing as well as the networking skills and the know-how to nurture linkages with fellow residents as well as external actors, are more likely to have a stronger associational life than communities lacking these resources.

Closer scrutiny of Manguinhos and Alemão reveals that the former possesses many of these resources. Counter intuitively, however, Alemão’s civil society flourishes while Manguinhos’ languishes. Of social programs, PAC-favela provides the strongest catalyst for new forms of associational life. As previous chapters have made clear, PAC-favelas introduces substantial novelties and turmoil to favela residents. Receiving new apartment complexes, formalized urban services, and access to schools and clinics comes at the cost of destroying existing ways of life. The substantial threat of losing a home or business due to the demolitions performed as part of PAC-favela construction prompted civil society mobilization in both communities, but to varying degrees of success. Alemão’s robust mobilization suggests that factors besides practical and cognitive assets are more important in shaping associational life.
Manguinhos – Initial Civil Society Mobilization and Trafficker Threats

Manguinhos’ limited community mobilization is surprising since the community possesses many attributes that could facilitate associational life. Manguinhos has access to resources that curtail the traditional barriers to community mobilization among the urban poor. The region benefits from a major government public health research center, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fio-Cruz), located in the center of the community. Fio-Cruz offers a variety of assets – financial, spatial, intellectual and human – that if harnessed correctly, could encourage mobilization. Fio-Cruz employs many Manguinhos residents in its daily operations (in roles ranging from maintenance to research), giving them greater financial stability than others in the neighborhood enjoy. The center also offers a space of physical safety, sheltering students and staff from surrounding violence. Space, and safe space in particular, is at a premium in densely occupied favelas, making Fio-Cruz’s easily accessible meeting rooms an incredible asset. Fio-Cruz also offers a variety of graduate programs and maintains several libraries, and thus operates as an intellectual resource for the community. The center’s approach to public health is more radical than what is promulgated in North American public health institutions. Courses in human rights, activism and critical theory are commonplace. Students and residents have exposure to ideas and techniques that encourage community organizing. As a government facility, residents of Manguinhos are also in a better position than residents of other favelas to get connected to state staff and civic leaders, thereby acquiring the skills needed to effectively work with politicians and have their voiced heard. The aggregate of these factors could foster civil society action (Bruch et al., 2010; Dietz, 1998; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1979), but I observed precisely the opposite. Residents of Manguinhos only partially leverage the assets available to them, instead their mobilization is stymied.

In 2007, Manguinhos residents organized to form a new voluntary association to combat the violence in their community. With PAC-favela’s arrival, the group began to address community concerns about PAC. In the initial months of PAC construction, the community meeting had roughly two hundred attendees. In 2007 the group was successful in getting the Vice-Governor and the Vice-Secretary of Habitation of the State of Rio de Janeiro to attend a community meeting and discuss residents’ concerns. Residents also published a newsletter for Manguinhos, disseminating information about how others could learn more details of PAC-favela. The copy of the newsletter that I obtained listed specific government offices along with staff names where individuals could direct their concerns, and summarized the most common community reactions to the project.

This community mobilization soon drew the negative attention of drug traffickers. As discussed in previous chapters, residents in both Alemão and Manguinhos indicated that the state had brokered a partnership with traffickers to ensure that PAC-favela works were completed in a timely manner and with few interruptions. Consequently, traffickers intimidated residents to prevent large-scale opposition to PAC-favela, but with greater reverberations in Manguinhos than in Alemão. Residents who were active, vocal and had the most sway over the community began receiving death threats from traffickers and were prohibited from further mobilization. During one community meeting, the arrival of a particular community leader was met with surprise by other attendees because it was well-known that he had be warned not to get involved with further mobilization efforts. To partially abide by trafficker threats, he remained silent during the meeting. Leadership, rather than being an asset in Manguinhos, became a liability. In an environment hostile to community participation and without strong guidance, attendance soon dwindled. Over time the community newsletter was also dispensed with in response to trafficker threats. Several individuals indicated that Manguinhos had been “demobilized” as a result of the PAC trafficker-state alliance. Manguinhos’ organizing trajectory mirrors that of other communities whose associational life and community leadership are constrained by traffickers (Arias, 2006a; McCann, 2008; Perlman, 2011).
Manguinhos – Civil Society Mobilization after Trafficker Threats

In the wake of trafficker threats and in a context hostile to further organizing, community mobilization floundered. Traffickers clearly establish the parameters for acceptable civil society action in Manguinhos, but it is also analytically important to examine the distinct process of how favela residents respond to trafficker rule systems imposed on them. Manguinhos residents who participated in community organizing activities following trafficker threats were unable to harness the assets at their disposal. Some of these resources became obstacles to strengthening associational life, and this was very apparent with Manguinhos’ intellectual capital. Access to Manguinhos’ intellectual capital stifled community dialogue. Students and professors of Fio-Cruz (including residents and non-residents) attended community meetings and made contributions that encumbered the mobilization process. At times their input was excessively academic, with sophisticated language and concept choices (e.g., references to social theorists) that other Manguinhos residents were unlikely to understand. In subsequent meetings participants mocked some of the graduate students and professors for being so longwinded and expressed mild frustration that the meetings always ran over the two-hour allotted time. Other contributions were incredibly vague as individuals made unfounded generalizations about all favelas of Rio de Janeiro. For instance, in several community meetings, one graduate student repeatedly declared in an adamant tone of voice “99.9% of Rio’s favelas are controlled by traffickers, there is not a single favela that is free from the traffic”. This misinformation did not further a constructive understanding of local community issues. It offered no foundation on which residents can act; instead, stereotypes were perpetuated. Still others contributions were so far removed from the daily life of Manguinhos residents as to be irrelevant (e.g., discussing the growth of China and its detriment on Brazil). Such ideas failed to fuel group discussion. Once uttered, the statements were met with a bewildered silence or an abrupt change in the subject of discussion. Although guided by good intentions, these insights prevent the development of a coherent and robust community mobilization. Much like (Auyero & Swistun, 2009) analysis of political passivity in the shantytowns of Buenos Aires, Manguinhos resembles a case of a community penetrated by sources of knowledge that prevents residents from making sense of their situation and acting on it in a constructive way.

The limited PAC-related mobilization success is also attributable to broader group dynamics beyond the influence of Fio-Cruz students and professors. The group lacked a consistent focus. From week to week meetings discussed a range of issues including the burgeoning crack epidemic, Afro-Brazilian pride, health services, violence, employment and urbanization policies. With such a scattered agenda, it was challenging to sustain wider community interest and inspire collective action. This is not to say that Manguinhos was completely devoid of community organizing. In the course of my fieldwork, residents successfully sponsored self-help sessions focused on women’s empowerment and youth development. While certainly beneficial, this type of organizing seeks to affect change within an individual rather than change between the community and external actors. I rarely heard suggestions of collaborating with other organizations within and outside of Manguinhos. The strongest instance of this latter type of robust organizing occurred with a conference to address garbage and sanitation. Fifty residents along with government staff working on PAC met to discuss how PAC’s projects could better improve sanitation. By-in-large, community mobilization in Manguinhos remained isolated and fragmented.

Weak civil society mobilization was mirrored in the emotional affect of participants. Residents attending weekly Manguinhos meetings did not display the same passion and excitement that Alemão residents did. The weekly meetings were consistently sparsely attended. On average each had about four to five residents participating. Occasionally, residents new to the meeting would show up, but would stop attending a few weeks later. After a few months of participating in these
meetings one young woman, in a discrete aside to me, expressed frustration at the meetings “every week they do the same thing, talk, talk, talk but they don’t do anything. We’ll see how much longer I keep coming.”

**Alemão – Trafficker Threats and Civil Society Vibrancy**

As in Manguinhos, Alemão residents indicated that the state had forged an agreement with traffickers to prevent community protests of PAC-favela. The state-trafficker alliance, however, impedes associational life to a lesser extent in Alemão than in Manguinhos. This is not to say that Alemão residents are free from trafficker intimidation. In response to trafficker coercion, one resident was forced to leave his job as part of the PAC community engagement team for being too contentious and rabble-rousing. Other individuals indicated that some residents who were protesting the demolition of their homes and refused to accept the state’s compensation package were threatened by traffickers to accept state offers of relocation and remuneration. One lifelong Alemão resident captured the paradox of freedom and constraint that residents experience: “everything you do has to be well thought out so it does not bother others [referring to the traffickers] and others don’t bother you. But at the same time, there is a liberty here, a liberty of expression, a freedom to live with them [again, referring to traffickers]. The parallel power does not stop you from having freedom, if you are cautious, they never took that away – our freedom.” This quote reveals that Alemão residents enjoy greater opportunities to realize their agency, but in a context that is not entirely free from conditions.

In Alemão, civil society responded dramatically following the increase in state-led social support. Mobilization related to PAC-favela was more vigorous than what Manguinhos residents demonstrated. Community meetings were consistently well attended, averaging fifteen to twenty residents, and at their largest, community gatherings drew more than fifty individuals. Discussions demonstrated a sustained and coherent focus. Speakers took the time to explain their situations, ideas and strategies. No one individual dominated the discussion. During and after community meetings residents would eagerly trade information, e.g., cell phone numbers, photocopies of laws and codes, referrals to NGOs, recommendations of lawyers, and suggestions of specific government offices to access. Community frustrations about how government intervention was unfolding in Alemão was frequently linked to a pragmatic response. Actions ranged from small-scale behavior, such as getting connected with another resident with more expertise, to more robust behavior, such as protesting demolitions by standing in front of bulldozers poised to wreck buildings. In so doing, Alemão residents displayed a more sophisticated means of community organizing than their Manguinhos counterparts.

Several residents indicated that the residents’ associations of the twelve neighborhoods within Alemão began to cooperate more starting in 2007. Individuals indicated that the residents’ associations were previously more isolated. “You have to understand that Alemão is a huge complex, and before, the residents’ associations were very much focused on their own thing, things in their own community.” Yet, from 2007 onwards, as another individual stated, “all the presidents of the residents’ associations united and committed to improving the community or things would not get better.” For instance, members from different residents’ associations collectively met with state staff to coordinate the new state activities PAC-favela brought to Alemão. Various explanations circulated for the increase in partnerships among residents’ association. Some attributed the collaboration to an emerging consensus that a broader community response was needed to stem area violence, others indicated that greater state presence contributed to the unification of the residents’ associations, while still others suggested that the domination of Alemão by a single gang (discussed below) was a driving factor. Prioritizing the influence of these factors is challenging; nevertheless, the fusion of these processes promoted residents’ association cooperation.
In Alemão, civil society growth is not limited to actions related to PAC-favela. During my 2010 fieldwork, the NGOs that I observed enthusiastically collaborated with one another, assisting with grant writing, needs assessments and program implementation.\(^{26}\) For example, one community planning session to brainstorm youth development needs successfully drew a variety of more than 30 stakeholders including NGO leaders, staff from government welfare offices, parents and adolescents. Collective organizing efforts leverage partnerships to a greater degree in Alemão than in Manguinhos.

NGO-sector growth is an additional component of civil society flourishing in Alemão. One long-time resident estimated that before the start of PAC-favela in 2007, Alemão had approximately 10 NGOs operating in the region, and by 2012, this number had increased to more than 30. This figure underestimates the extent of NGO activity because it does not include programs taking place in Alemão but launched by organizations physically based outside of the community. When I returned to Rio de Janeiro in 2012, the streets of Alemão were peppered with flyers, banners and advertisements for social programs (e.g., youth groups, cultural events, education assistance, etc.) and new NGOs. The NGO sector had developed a greater presence and visibility in Alemão than it had in the past.

The expansion of state presence foments civil society mobilization, associational life intensified as new connections were formed among residents as well as between residents and actors outside of Alemão. It is remarkable that Alemão’s civil society is as vibrant as it is because it lacks the resources commonly associated with successful organizing. It does not have the same financial, intellectual or spatial assets and proximity to political power as Manguinhos does. The catalyst for Alemão’s mobilization is not dependent upon these resources. A far more important variable influencing associational life in these communities is the structure of trafficker domination.

**TRAFFICKER RULE**

It is clear that trafficker rule is a crucial factor influencing civil society responses to new state interventions in both communities. The same drug gang, the Comando Vermelho (CV), dominates both Alemão and Manguinhos. Yet, control by the same gang belies substantial differences in the quality of governance and everyday favela life. Looking more closely at the texture of governance in these regions, drug traffickers in Alemão have exclusive control over the community. Residents described Alemão’s parallel power as “centralized”, “unified” and capable of “strong mediation” among the Complexo’s inhabitants. To help me understand trafficker power, one lifelong Alemão resident stated “only when things affect others is trafficker permission needed, if no one minds, then traffickers do not need to be involved. If one neighbor wants to do a puxadinha\(^ {27}\) on their house, they have to get permission first so other neighbors don’t get upset and people can still use the alley way”. Trafficker influence is not limited to issues as utilitarian as the use of shared space; it extends into intimate affairs within private residences. Individuals offered the examples of traffickers resolving marital conflicts involving a husband determining the appropriate manner to respond to his unfaithful wife. Combining these examples with the above cited example of Alemão traffickers forcing a resident out of a job associated with PAC’s community engagement efforts illustrates that residents respect trafficker authority over a broad swathe of social life, including but not limited to employment, common space and domestic affairs.

\(^{26}\) Of NGOs, the well-known Afro-Reggae was especially successful in bringing together different community stakeholders. Meetings sponsored by Afro-Reggae were always the most well-attended and vociferous.

\(^{27}\) A colloquialism to express the physical expansion of a building such as building a patio or wall on what was previously public space.
The CV has a long history in Alemão. Apart from a momentary loss of power lasting a few months in 2007, the CV has controlled most of the neighborhoods in Alemão for decades. Later on in 2007, the CV expelled a rival gang controlling the one neighborhood not under its rule, thereby ensuring that Alemão was the head (“cabeça”) of the CV gang commanding a huge jurisdiction: operations within Alemão, the city of Rio de Janeiro and beyond the municipality. Residents further mentioned that traffickers in Alemão maintained communication ties with trafficker bosses in prison. Traffickers in Alemão are a deeply entrenched, stable, well organized and powerful institutional force.

In contrast, in Manguinhos, trafficker power is dispersed among several different gang leaders. Residents described traffickers as “fragmented” and prone to conflict. Both individually and collectively, traffickers in Manguinhos control a smaller drug trade area in and around the community. Manguinhos residents made no references to local CV gangs communicating with superiors in jail, suggesting that local gangs are less central to CV operations. Trafficker rule in Manguinhos, while still powerful, is disjointed and less steady. Precisely because residents felt greater unease with traffickers, it was challenging to get more detailed information on the nature of trafficker rule beyond the above descriptors.

How traffickers equip and conduct themselves reflects the different positions these communities occupy in the hierarchy of the drug trade. In Alemão I would regularly see large firearms (e.g., automatic machine guns) while in Manguinhos I observed primarily smaller and older weapons (e.g., pistols and rifles). The process of regulating favela borders was more sophisticated and formal in Alemão than in Manguinhos. During one of my early site visits to Alemão, three trafficker guards raised their automatic weapons in my direction as I approached a checkpoint. Only after my contact, an NGO director who was born and raised on that same street waved to these guards were the weapons lowered and we were allowed to proceed up the hill. These guards had also positioned themselves strategically so that they could easily take refuge while maintaining attack positions behind walls and physical barricades, in case I had been a hostile intruder. I routinely observed this level of armament and tactical organization in the earlier stages of my fieldwork, prior to the November 2010 police operation (discussed below).

In Manguinhos the process was considerably more lax. The adolescents guarding the favela entrance left their weapons casually strewn on a table as they sat slouched and distracted in chairs nearby, the air smelling of marijuana smoke. My guide (a non-resident) was able to talk his way past the guards with friendly smiles and jokes. We then proceeded to walk through various neighborhoods in the community in search of our contact, a long-time resident, had failed to show up at the agreed upon location. In Alemão, I never would have been allowed to walk freely in the community without a resident as a guide. Manguinhos’ porous boundaries suggest a less organized and rigidly structured trafficker presence.

Differences in the quality of trafficker rule hold important ramifications for associational life in Alemão and Manguinhos. Where multiple and conflicting drug gangs are present, residents are beholden to the expectations, norms and regulations of many authority structures. Each gang leader has “their own perspective on problems” in Manguinhos. Residents must negotiate with multiple rulers and rule systems in dealing with the dilemmas of routine life. As a result, the diversity of options for social behavior is severely restricted. Residents remain in a state of limbo, forced to maintain sensitivity to what rules to follow and what sets of actors to obey. The opportunities for social life are reduced both explicitly through trafficker rules and threats, but also in-directly because a condition of perpetual learning makes it difficult to establish the limits of an authority. These fluid authority structures undermine civil society mobilization because community organizers never completely know what constitutes acceptable behavior.
Contrast this to the social processes that can develop in the presence of one stable drug gang. Social life simply is not as confined. Since a single and well-integrated drug gang has dominated Alamão for some time, residents have a clearer sense of what is and is not considered acceptable. Residents live with greater clarity of trafficker domination. When an authority structure is singular, as in Alemão, there exist more possibilities for creative adaptation on the part of the governed. In essence, individuals know how to bend, but not break, the rules to meet their needs. This certainty of rule gives rise to greater associational life. The opportunity space for interpersonal interaction in Alemão is greater than it is for Manguinhos. It follows that Alemão's civil society mobilization, itself the product of interpersonal interaction, is also stronger.

How residents talk about traffickers conveys the sense of liberty and constraint that they enjoy depending on the nature of trafficker rule. In Alemão residents were very forthcoming with information about traffickers. They demonstrated little reluctance in discussing traffickers and casually referred to their influence in the community, often during our first encounter. This was conveyed most clearly when one Alemão resident began describing the relationship between traffickers and his neighborhood’s residents’ association while three armed gang members stood five meters away. He displayed minimal hesitation expressing his dissatisfaction with how traffickers had corrupted the residents’ association’s ability to authentically represent community concerns because traffickers selected who participated in residents’ association activities. In Manguinhos, on the other hand, trafficking was a much more sensitive issue. If the course of my conversations with residents began to relate to the drug trade, the discussion would awkwardly fizzle as utterances became shorter and stilted, or taken in a different direction entirely. Only when discussions took place outside of Manguinhos and only after several months of establishing a relationship with them were individuals slightly more expressive about trafficking in their communities.

VIOLENCE

In addition to rule systems, the organization of trafficker power influences civil society dynamics by establishing the propensity for violence. Historically, both Manguinhos and Alemão are known as extremely dangerous parts of the city. Individuals in both communities pointed out the areas that had earned the nickname of Gaza Strip because of the frequency of violence that took place there. Violence was so extreme in Complexo de Alemão that Médecins Sans Frontières, an international NGO that typically offers medical care services in emergency, crisis and conflict situations, opened a facility in Alemão between 2007-2009 to provide medical and psychological support to residents.

The structure of trafficker rule in Manguinhos exacerbates violence. In territories with multiple and overlapping gangs, each gang provokes and engages in conflict with rivals in pursuit of domination. Such confrontations often capture the attention of and provoke responses by the police, thereby perpetuating more violence. Violence is a routine part of Manguinhos life. At weekly community meetings in Manguinhos, I would frequently hear residents lamenting instances of trafficker-related violence and fatalities. Residents would arrive at meetings in a state of sadness and frustration. Discussions of the loss of life vacillated between remorse and anger that area youth had limited opportunities besides trafficking and the violence it entailed.

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28 This trafficker influence on the composition of the residents’ associations does not limit broader community mobilization because the residents’ associations are not the only organizational body that residents can use to express their concerns.

29 This example also illustrates the state’s earlier inability or unwillingness to offer similar services to Alemão.
Yet violence plays out differently in Alemão. Given prevalent understandings and data documenting high rates of violence in Alemão, I expected to encounter a conflict-ridden community. Instead, Alemão appeared quiescent. Residents described Alemão as enduring a period of relative tranquility in recent years. During discussions with residents and at weekly community meetings, I rarely heard references to violence. Prior to the massive police campaign of November 2010 (elaborated on shortly), residents described only one instance of violence, a minor skirmish with the police that resulted in no fatalities.

In regions where there is a single dominant drug gang, different trafficker-community relations unfold. In communities that have been ruled by one gang for a significant amount of time, traffickers are tightly integrated into the surrounding social fabric. Because of this, violence operates with more certainty. The traffickers have parents, wives, girlfriends and children in the community. When raids, by rival gangs or by police, are imminent, traffickers will warn their personal connections. This news will quickly travel throughout the favela and precautions are taken to minimize the damage to the community. For instance, schools will close early and send children back to their homes so that they are not caught in the crossfire. These descriptions corroborate work by other scholars documenting occasional trafficker support for community well-being (Goldstein, 2003; Lessing, 2008; Misse, 2007).

This same sense of reliability is not seen in all areas. I experienced differences in violence predictability—ambiguity first hand. In November 2010, the Rio de Janeiro government launched the largest police campaign in the city’s history in the Northern Zone to quell a recent wave of trafficker violence (in response to a new police pacification campaign30, traffickers blew up cars and buses as well as attacked police posts throughout Rio de Janeiro). The police campaign targeted Alemão and Manguinhos. My friends in Alemão warned me of potential police activity and advised me not to visit the community. However, my friends in Manguinhos were not as well informed. I attended a community meeting in Manguinhos a few hours before the police activity became especially intense. Later on that evening in Manguinhos one of my contacts, a community-leader well connected to the ebbs and flows of community happenings, was caught off guard by the violence and lost his apartment as a result of police-trafficker combat.

Quantitative data from the Institute for Public Security and Public Health system partially corroborate my qualitative data on violence in these two communities, see Tables 6 and 7 below. Manguinhos experiences more fatalities than Alemão, both absolutely and relative to the larger population. Interestingly, the quantitative data do not mirror the sentiment expressed in qualitative interviews that Alemão is enjoying greater peace than it has in past years. In looking at the quantitative figures, neither Alemão nor Manguinhos demonstrate a substantial change in fatalities following the initiation of PAC-favela. However, the quantitative data capture homicides only, and the tranquility that residents refer to may be non-fatal violence.

30 The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora.
Table 6: Homicides Neighborhood Level 2002-2006 (source: SUS 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Level</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alemão</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão deaths per 10,000 people</td>
<td>0.1537</td>
<td>0.1537</td>
<td>0.3075</td>
<td>0.6439</td>
<td>1.2878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos deaths per 10,000 people</td>
<td>1.6098</td>
<td>3.2196</td>
<td>2.5757</td>
<td>0.6439</td>
<td>1.2878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPEA-FAPERJ, 2008; SUS, 2006

Table 7: Homicides Neighborhood Level 2006-2010 (source: ISP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Level</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alemão</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão deaths per 10,000 people</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2302</td>
<td>0.4613</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manguinhos deaths per 10,000 people</td>
<td>3.8636</td>
<td>20.6059</td>
<td>17.0642</td>
<td>9.9810</td>
<td>5.4734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISP, 2010

Examining violence at the level of the neighborhood is somewhat of an abstraction since violence and its effects are not neatly confined within a neighborhood (Sampson et al., 2002). To better capture the social experience of violence – that is, how violence clusters in certain areas and how its influence diminishes with distance – surface interpolation is needed. Map Series 1 displays surface interpolation images using homicide data from 2006-2010. This data confirms sentiments expressed in qualitative interviews. Both Alemão and Manguinhos experience moderate to high rates of fatalities between 2006-2007. However, beginning in 2008, violence begins to diminish in Alemão, but continues to permeate and surround Manguinhos to a higher degree.
Map Series 1: Homicides in Alemão and Manguinhos between 2006-2010.
Alemão is the upper most neighborhood outlined in white, Manguinhos is the lower neighborhood outlined in white.

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homicides per 10,000 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 80</td>
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<tr>
<td>81 - 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>101 - 120</td>
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<tr>
<td>121 - 140</td>
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<tr>
<td>141 - 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161 - 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181 - 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201 - 220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Sources: ISP. Data Configuration: Inverse Distance Weighted interpolated surface.
The vicissitudes of violence profoundly affect favela existence. Violence impedes such elementary social processes as going to work or school and interacting with neighbors. Residents of Alemão revealed that they would spend several hours, and in some cases, a few days, in their homes to avoid gunfire taking place beyond the front door. They would then show me the pock-marked façade of their homes as evidence of the proximity of the bullets. Violence became so routinized that some even chuckled as they remembered the cabin-fever and boredom they experienced because they could not leave their residences.

It goes without saying that violence also affects more complex social processes such as community organizing. One community meeting in Manguinhos was particularly sparsely attended after a police skirmish took place earlier in the day, resulting in the death of a schoolgirl. Two residents who faithfully attended the community meetings started off the evening’s session announcing news of this tragedy, lamenting the loss of life as well as the limited productiveness of the meeting since few residents would attend due to fear or sorrow. In contrast, centralized trafficker rule is better able to establish tranquility. In Alemão robust CV governance yields two mutually reinforcing conditions that support civil society development: knowledge of acceptable conduct and a peaceful context for conduct to play out.

**CONCLUSION**

By positioning traffickers as an exclusively detrimental force, existing academic literature misconstrues their full contribution to favela life. While traffickers unquestionably generate profound hardship, those that establish stable rule yield two important effects: less violence and clarity of conduct. In Alemão, the frequency of violence tapers and operates with greater predictability. Individuals also experience less doubt in determining permissible behavior and social life proceeds with greater liberty as a result. Together, these two conditions allow for and reinforce a vibrant community response when recent state-led social projects furnish residents with a new target of critique. With known rule systems and less violence, Alemão residents express their agency through new connections, organization and claims making. Manguinhos lacks Alemão’s consistency of governance. Civil society actors are ensnared in ambiguity, unsure of the trafficker mandates to follow and violence continues to haunt their daily lives. While clearly possessing agency, a robust and constructive civil society response remains frustrated in Manguinhos.

My research supports other scholarship attesting to the importance of institutional and structural conditions affecting associational life (Fligstein, 1991; Schofer & Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). The contrast between Alemão and Manguinhos indicates that individual and community level assets are not as consequential in determining associational life as is the broader institutional climate. The advantages that Manguinhos enjoys – greater employment stability, intellectual capital, and safe space – amount to little in a context prone to violence and in which residents must learn and negotiate multiple authority structures. Although Alemão lacks Manguinhos’ assets, its stable institutional architecture is more hospitable to associational life.

Compounding these differences are the distinct mobilization styles residents within each community pursue. It is tempting to interpret the organizing tactics as a direct result of trafficker structure and influence, but to do so relieves favela residents of agency and responsibility. To be sure, the quality of trafficker governance in Manguinhos impedes community mobilization, but associational life also suffers because of the manner in which residents attempt to organize. Trafficker threats make community mobilizing sessions vulnerable to the influence of overly academic organizers who pursue fractured and isolated agendas. Similarly, associational life in Alemão is comparatively stronger, in part because of how traffickers rule, but it is also due to the
organizing techniques that Alemão residents employ. Residents readily collaborate with one another and sustain a pragmatic action-oriented focus.

Returning to the importance of structural and institutional factors, analyses of civil society emphasize the importance of contributions made by the state. The relationship between the state and civil society is highly variable. On one end of the spectrum of interaction, the state antagonizes civil society, attempting to undermine its existence. At the same time, the state also establishes conditions that facilitate civil society functioning. Indeed, the pacification of social life through the centralization of control, order and violence by the state is seen as a fundamental precursor to a rich associational life (Elias, 2000). More proactively, the state encourages civil society’s existence by furnishing both symbolic and practical resources such as legitimacy and finances (Skocpol & Amenta, 1986). This body of work assumes that the state establishes the cornerstone upon which larger institutional stability is built.

In Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, the state is not the exclusive provider of institutional stability. As the above empirics and analysis make clear, traffickers provide the important contribution of establishing rule systems that guide everyday conduct. In so doing, my analysis expands upon existing theorizations of traffickers. Past research conceptualizes the contribution that traffickers offer favelas in material terms. Working in the drug trade allows some residents to earn more money. Traffickers can assist families in need of emergency loans. Trafficker domination also stabilizes the receipt of water, electricity and other urban services. I argue that the greatest trafficker contributions are intangible – in the form of knowledge of permissible conduct. The direct provision of tangible goods is important, but so too are the contributions traffickers make to the normative climate at levels beyond the immediate transaction of material goods.

My research also complicates conventional understandings of traffickers and gangs more generally. In the Brazilian, Latin American and North American literatures, gangs are presented as the source of social ills (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Jankowski, 1991; Rubio, 1997; Venkatesh, 1997). These organizational bodies are nearly synonymous with violence. Yet, brutality is not their only contribution to social life. By reducing the uncertainty of violence in favelas, stable trafficker rule can also, paradoxically, serve as a pacifying force. This contribution is unique in comparison to how the positive impact of gangs is commonly framed. The occasional benefits gangs provide, e.g., supporting community upkeep and services, assisting with voter turn-out and registration efforts, etc., operate as Faustian bargains. While these endeavors help community life in some respects, they are accompanied with sacrifice. The voter turn-out campaigns that Jankowski documents resemble clientelism as ghetto residents are encouraged to vote for specific candidates rather than exercise free political choice. Vankatesh (1997) observes that members of the community advisory board overseeing housing project affairs suppress their true opinions and do not discuss their dissatisfaction with gangs once drug trade revenues are directed to community improvements projects. In these instances, accepting the kind hand of traffickers comes at the cost of political compromise. Certainly there are cases when trafficker activity provokes similar sacrifices on the part of favela residents. Yet their presence also indirectly enhances associational life. It is important to conceptualize traffickers as more than sources of hardship or providers of consumable goods.

**POST-SCRIPT**

Civil society intensification is not the only important change to Alemão. Private sector capital has followed on the heels of state intervention and growing civil society movements in Alemão. As an early mover, Santander Bank, one of the largest banks in the world, opened a branch office in Alemão in May 2010. The bank is not located on the edge of Alemão, close to the formal city, it is situated well within the community on a main street regularly used by residents and
traffickers. I often observed armed traffickers lounging by the bank’s entryway painted in Santander’s signature red and white colors. By 2012, Bradesco and ITAU, two Brazil-based banks, had followed, opening offices and ATMs located in or nearby recently constructed PAC-favela structures. In May of 2011, Coca-Cola and Santander co-sponsored a Peace Challenge marathon to raise money for local NGOs. Not coincidentally, the marathon route followed the same trajectory used by drug traffickers when fleeing the community during the November 2010 police campaign.

In addition to banks, retail stores previously accessible only outside of Alemão have opened up new locations inside the community. Six months after the police operation, the telecommunications companies Embratel and Sky were in negotiations with the city government to offer discounted favela-specific packages to Alemão residents (following a similar roll-out in September 2010 in Cidade de Deus), in an attempt to limit illegally pirated television and internet services. In February of 2012, Casa & Video, one of Brazil’s largest consumer goods stores, opened in Alemão.

The arrival and proliferation of private sector actors in Alemão is important for many reasons. Pragmatically, residents have increased access to services to which they were previously denied or were otherwise difficult to obtain. By hiring local labor, these organizations provide a much-needed source of income for residents. It also signals the reversal of the trend of capital flight from the favelas due to security concerns starting in the 1980s. Perceptions of Alemão have changed considerably. It is no longer predominantly associated with drug trafficking, nor is the state the primary external entity interacting with the community. The private sector, often considered conservative and risk-averse, seeks to establish a new relationship with Alemão and its residents. In the past, favelas were characterized as spaces of exclusion and deprivation. With the multitude of actors creating connections in Alemão, the past definition of favelas is of waning relevance. Stronger civil society activity in Alemão is one factor helping to change the popular understanding of favelas.
Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

Increasing evidence exists attesting to the significant advances in the capabilities of the Brazilian state. These changes are apparent in an array of policy areas, ranging from the impressive macro-economic successes the country has enjoyed in recent years to its growing clout in international affairs. In spite of these developments, some scholars continue to rely on theories based on earlier iterations of Brazil’s governmental structure, operations and performance. The evolution of the Brazilian state demands closer scrutiny and new analytical understandings of the country are vital.

This dissertation focuses on one division of the Brazilian state undergoing an impressive resurgence: its ability to take care of the country’s disadvantaged populations through new equalization measures. More specifically, the dissertation explores how the state’s re-invigorated welfare capacity affects the relationships linking the state, favela residents and drug traffickers through a case study of Rio de Janeiro. The focus on the interaction between the state and disadvantaged urban populations is especially important for a variety of reasons. The majority of Brazilians live in cities, yet most of the recent investigations of state welfare advances examine national, regional and rural outcomes. Little information exists illuminating how macro-level social policy changes affect the urban realm. Furthermore, the recent welfare progress deviates sharply from how the state is understood through urban scholarship on state-society interaction. This dissertation demonstrates the inadequacy of prevailing discourses depicting the Brazilian state as deficient. Instead, the successful welfare advances observed on the national and regional levels also reach city populations. The state is actively learning how to reach disadvantaged communities and has already made impressive progress in doing so.

PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE BRAZILIAN STATE

A wealth of literature predisposes analytical thought to conceptualize the Brazilian state as somehow bad. We have come to understand the country’s state apparatus as mired in bureaucratic inefficiencies and infighting that impede political decision-making. Many investigations reveal how various elite interest groups have co-opted the state, ensuring that state operations further their needs at the expense of perpetuating multiple forms of socio-economic inequality. Academics make frequent reference to the norm of patron-client ties that pervades state-society interaction and impedes full democratic functioning.

The “bad-state” category of arguments is particularly acute in urban scholarship. Analyses of the state-favela relationship emphasize the state’s multiple shortcomings. In this line of work the Brazilian state is alternatively presented as negligent, harsh or exploitative. The state was faulted as inattentive and ineffectual, for allowing favelas to develop in Brazilian cities in the first place (Abreu, 2008). Once favelas had firmly taken root in the urban landscape and favela prevention proved futile, the Brazilian state intensified its favela eradication efforts through massive favela demolition and relocation campaigns. These measures were condemned as abusive for destroying thousands of favela homes and livelihoods. Favela removal was further disparaged as poorly thought out since it only served to re-inscribe poverty and inequality in new geographic territories rather than ameliorate these conditions. In the face of growing favela activism, the Brazilian state was also criticized for failing to extend the same urban services that the non-favela city enjoyed. Throughout these developments, police brutality further exacerbated state-favela interaction and reinforced the state’s
pernicious persona. The Brazilian state implicitly condoned such actions by doing little to reign in the excessive tactics police forces used when interacting with favela communities. Other agents of the state were hardly much better. Those vying for political power rarely interacted with favela residents in anything other than an instrumentalist fashion, offering small-scale goods of transient duration in exchange for political support.

The bad-state perspective gained prominence through the urban marginality literature of the 1970s. This lens brought much needed attention to the structural factors that shaped the lives of the urban poor and undermined the prevailing “culture of poverty” arguments that blamed favela residents for their own dispossession. Yet, state-society relations have evolved considerably since the late twentieth century and to such a degree that a new analytical framework is essential. Today, the continued endurance of the bad-state discourse burdens analytical thought, preventing an understanding of current state-society dynamics. Scholars invoking the marginality perspective fail to appreciate important contemporary changes between the state and the urban poor. This dissertation distinguishes itself from other scholarship by demonstrating the limited utility of the bad-state category of arguments through a documentation and analysis of recent welfare advances.

Either explicitly or implicitly, the majority of criticisms of state-society relations in Brazil are grounded in the juxtaposition between Weberian notions of traditional and rational authority. The country displays many of the detrimental sequelae associated with traditional authority. Governance was heavily influenced by personal connections, yielding public policies catering to a narrow range of interests. For instance, a regressive tax system and government benefits directed to the upper classes are clear indications of a state catering to elite population segments, with little will or ability to provide broader protections. Similarly, for decades redistribution and equity concerns were far removed from the state’s agenda while industrialization and urbanization were prioritized.

Patron-client ties are the most pervasive manifestation of traditional authority in Brazil. The norm of patronage and the corruption that it permits are so entrenched in Brazil that it continues to affect state function even after more than a decade of democracy’s return. In many ways the social policies examined in this dissertation signal a new form of the Brazilian state. Yet the politicians spearheading these transformations cannot entirely escape the legacy of patronage politics. President Lula is credited with championing a pro-poor agenda. In 2003, he entered office professing his intention to rise above the corruption and cronyism that was so common in Brazil’s past. However, the 2005 Mensalão controversy, one of the largest political scandals in the country’s history, attested to the continued endurance of clientelism and the intensity of its hold on the Brazilian government. High-ranking officials within Lula’s Worker’s Party masterminded an extensive system of monthly bribes using public finances to legislators in exchange for political support. Twenty-two politicians, including Lula’s chief of staff, lost their positions or resigned in the wake of the scandal.

Given that corruption extends to the highest levels of Brazilian government, it is unsurprising that it also pervades the lower tiers of the state apparatus that disadvantaged populations have a greater chance of interacting with. The police corruption and brutality that favela residents encounter on a frequent basis is normalized because they are an extension of the wider system of politics based on personal connections. Illegal transgressions and deviations from expected professional responsibilities are excused with the right connection or gift.

The illegality that patronage allowed to be tolerated is not limited to actors within the state. The weak rule of law that a politics based on personal connections fostered also enabled illegal trafficking to function with limited police and judicial interference. In the extreme, state forces colluded with traffickers in the trade of weapons and drugs. The norm of patronage facilitated the emergence of a powerful authority rivaling the formal state. As a result, favela residents have been forced to navigate the standards of these two authorities as well as the violent confrontations between them. In short, the predominance of a politics of personal connections gave rise to multiple
layers of inequality in Brazil, many of which coalesced, placing favela residents at a distinct disadvantage.

**TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRAZILIAN STATE**

While these descriptions held more sway in the past, the contemporary Brazilian state resists being understood in the same way. The state-society interaction observed as part of this dissertation cannot be categorized as emblematic of traditional authority and therefore bad. The data and analyses point to a shift away from governance based on traditional authority towards an increasing reliance on rational authority. The Brazilian state welfare apparatus is more developed than it has been in the past. New policies target and reach population segments previously overlooked by the state. Operationally, these measures rely on formal procedures and staff rather than personal connections.

Part of what allows this dissertation to offer novel insight on state-society relations is the investigative and methodological approach of the research. Many studies of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas employ qualitative tools. While these techniques can produce innovative analyses, they fail to illuminate broader social processes beyond the communities studied. In an effort to increase generalizability and identify wider trends, scholars stitch together various empirical examples gleaned from different areas. Yet, this pastiche of data is often biased to the extreme and harsh aspects of favela existence. In these empirical narratives, the state is depicted in its most brutal and callous form. As such, it difficult to appreciate the state’s role in daily favela life that is less dramatic and fraught. The research approach that dominates the Rio de Janeiro scholarship makes it virtually impossible to understand the Brazilian state as anything other than bad.

My dissertation resists privileging the bad-state line of argumentation as well as sensationalistic accounts of favela existence. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative data facilitates the establishment of an analytical perspective unencumbered by bad-state discourses. The quantitative and geographic analyses of Rio de Janeiro as a whole contextualizes the in-depth studies of Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos and reveal a state that has achieved remarkable success with its newly enhanced welfare efforts. At the same time, the new welfare advances are not without complications. The data gathered in Alemão and Manguinhos also reveal the continued endurance of elements of the bad state. Residents of Manguinhos frequently lamented the fatalities caused by police-initiated attacks and residents of both communities indicated that the state brokered a deal with traffickers to ensure timely and problem free PAC-favela construction. Aspects of the bad Brazilian state undoubtedly remain and continue to influence state-society relations. However, juxtaposing the quantitative data at the city level with the qualitative community level data, prevents an analysis that simply corroborates bad-state arguments. Instead, a neutral and open-ended research approach is formed that captures important new developments with Brazil’s evolving state-society relations.

**EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL SYNOPSIS**

This dissertation set out to understand changes in the relationship among the state, favela residents and drug traffickers with Brazil’s recent social policy expansion. The data presented in earlier chapters attests to a substantial evolution in state-society interaction. The state demonstrates greater political will to assist disadvantaged population segments than it has in the past. Crucially, the goal of supporting populations in need is neither simply aspirational nor empty populist rhetoric used to drum up political support. Instead, concrete progress towards welfare aims have been achieved. The numerous improvements in the state’s welfare ability are observed financially, organizationally and programmatically. As part of the state’s evolution, greater financial support has
been directed to social policies, government offices dedicated to welfare efforts have been restructured and enhanced for greater efficiency and reach, and new equalization measures have proliferated.

As the quantitative and geographic data demonstrate, the state displays the ability to identify and reach populations in need. Neighborhoods with the highest level of poverty are also consistently those with the greatest concentration of welfare programs and beneficiaries over the first decade of the twenty-first century. With Bolsa Família, Brazil’s flagship social welfare effort, poverty is a powerful predictor of neighborhood-level enrollment in the program, and the intensity of this association increases over time. In the early years of the built-environment interventions, the number of favela households in a neighborhood is the strongest predictor of neighborhood level program receipt. In more recent iterations of the built-environment programs, however, poverty becomes the strongest predictor of whether or not neighborhoods will receive the intervention, trumping the influence of the number of favela households. Thus, over time poverty becomes a consistent predictor of welfare performance.

Importantly, current developments are not merely an enlargement of the forms of state aid set in motion during Vargas’ rule. What unfolds today is grounded in a novel logic of state assistance. In the past, government support did not extend beyond the formal sphere. Only those with formal land ownership or employment could legitimately claim the right to state support. Now, formality does not occupy as central of a position. Individuals can receive state aid without regard for the legality of livelihood or housing. This is an important conceptual shift, and by implementing these new forms of welfare, the state displays a deeper recognition of the lived experience of urban dispossession. The state understands that poverty and inequality are not phenomena that exclusively affect those within the boundaries of formality, but in fact become more severe with greater distance from formality.

New state-society relations are not exclusively confined to changes occurring within the state. How favela residents interact with the state also evolves with the advance of new welfare initiatives. This comes across most tellingly in Complexo do Alemão where residents, both individually and collectively, make new claims on the state. Manguinhos residents also attempt to make similar assertions, but because traffickers frustrate their efforts, analytically understanding their conceptualization of the state remains comparatively less well developed. Examining the mobilization efforts of Alemão residents indicates that the objectives of contemporary favela activism are very different from those of a few decades ago. At the height of favela removal and resettlement campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, favela residents mobilized to prevent the destruction of their homes and communities. The state-favela relationship was an adversarial one. Favela residents sought distance and protections from a pernicious state. Residents perceived the state as largely negative, and activists’ claims centered on the right to belong in the city. Recent community mobilization is grounded in a distinct belief system. Today, favela activism seeks better protections within a beneficent state. Favela residents expect better treatment from the state and fault the state’s delivery of public services. The contestation at stake no longer questions whether favelas should exist in the city, but instead focuses on how they should exist in the city.

In addition to new goals and objectives, data from Alemão further indicate that the process of claims-making has evolved to a more sophisticated form. As in earlier decades, Alemão residents employed traditional activism tactics, such as protests, rallies and the use of their own physical bodies as barricades to prevent favela demolition and new PAC-favela construction. In addition to

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31 At the same time, the urban redevelopment in Rio de Janeiro associated with the Olympic Games and World Cup reveals the return of the destructive state. Many favela communities are currently at risk for removal to make way for new sports facilities and hotels.
these techniques, residents carried out more complex forms of resistance by researching legal codes, hiring lawyers and disseminating legal information to fellow residents. The two types of activism are distinct in that the former relies on the resources, chiefly people and place, internal to favela communities. The latter, leverages the tools and procedures of the state to defend favelas, resources and techniques that historically existed beyond the grasp of favela residents. Whereas in the past favela communities and the formal state occupied distinct and distanced positions from each other, now there is a deeper comingling of the two.

Greater ambiguity surrounds the changes in the relationship between the state and traffickers. Multiple competing conclusions can be drawn depending on the analytical perspective used. Examining Complexo do Alemão, independently of the rest of the city, would suggest that state authority has achieved notable gains over and against traffickers. The built-environment interventions unsettle the ties of dependence linking favela residents to residents’ associations and traffickers, and in their place forge stronger connections between residents and the state. This comes across most strongly with the social dynamics associated with the new PAC-favela housing. Instead of relying on residents’ associations and traffickers, residents of the newly constructed apartment complexes depend on formal service providers based outside of the Alemão in order obtain utilities as fundamental as water, electricity, internet and telephone. At the same time and examining city-wide trends, the traffickers that once dominated Alemão have simply been displaced to other areas of the city. Thus, with the advance of the state, trafficker activity becomes less tied to a specific territory, but nonetheless endures. The events in Manguinhos also clearly indicate that trafficker activity can continue, largely unaffected by state welfare advances. Manguinhos experiences similar levels of state aid as does Alemão. However, unlike Alemão trafficker violence has not subsided in the years following state intervention. Instead, violence from both traffickers and the state continues to haunt daily community life. Evidence from both communities suggests an even deeper collusion between state and traffickers through deals brokered to ensure timely construction of the built-environment interventions. The hybrid state-trafficker power formed in order to implement certain equalization measures undermines interpreting new welfare efforts as indicative of stronger overall state capacity. In order to implement the built-environment interventions, the state fuels the strength of its main rival. Thus, state welfare advances do not unequivocally foretell the demise of trafficker power.

Although the state-trafficker relationship remains complex, the dissertation reveals new insight into the relationship between traffickers and favela residents. Prevailing conceptualizations frame traffickers as detrimental social actors. The most generous of perspectives recognizes the occasional beneficence that traffickers may offer in the form of financial or material support. Yet, these depictions continue to emphasize the overall pernicious effects of trafficker presence. I do not contend that traffickers are a net positive for social life, but it is important to more closely scrutinize the quality of their domination. Juxtaposing Alemão and Manguinhos brings to light the productive contribution that trafficker presence may allow. In communities like Alemão, a robust and centralized trafficker power provides an important social ordering function. With such trafficker dominance, a certainty of conduct diffuses through the community, influencing a tremendous range of behaviors, including actions far removed from immediate and tangible trafficker actions. The reverse also holds true. In communities like Manguinhos, where trafficker domination is dispersed among several competing factions, social life is less stable. Multiple standards of conduct circulate and compete with one another, creating greater fear and doubt for residents.

This certainty versus ambiguity holds important ramifications for how associational life unfolds in favelas. Counter-intuitively, stronger trafficker domination observed in Alemão gives rise to a more vibrant associational life. Equipped with a solid understanding of permissible behavior, favela residents maximize this field of opportunities. In Alemão, the activism surrounding PAC-
favela construction is sophisticated, intense and collaborative, as is the community mobilization unrelated to the built-environment interventions. New connections within and outside of Alemão are established. In contrast, incomplete trafficker domination in Manguinhos does not permit greater associational life, but precisely the opposite. Residents are forced into a taxing position of constant awareness, perpetually sensitive to new rules and actors enforcing those expectations. A solid understanding of permissible conduct never emerges, making a strong and vibrant associational life unlikely.

The tremendous influence of the institutional climate of favelas documented in this dissertation challenges analyses positing the importance of individual and community assets in furthering associational life. Investigations of community mobilization among disadvantaged groups in American cities point to the vital role of practical resources such as the time to devote to organizing, finances to cover any costs accompanying the mobilization, as well as the expertise to build connections among community members and allies with political influence. To be sure, these skills are undoubtedly important, but they occur further downstream in the larger sequence of organizing behavior. Devoting time, spending money, and forging connections in pursuit of activist aims is predicated on a thorough understanding of permissible conduct derived from the institutional climate. As the Manguinhos case powerfully indicates, community assets amount to little if the norms dictating how those resources are employed are either ambiguous or constantly changing. In comparing Manguinhos and Alemão, the former possesses greater resources that would facilitate community activism. Manguinhos has access to financial, spatial, intellectual and political assets that Alemão lacks. Yet, community organizing in Alemão is considerably more vibrant because the institutional structures governing behavior are legible and stable.

CONTEXTUALIZING RECENT WELFARE ADVANCES

The recent welfare advances certainly cannot be considered the only instances of good state performance in Brazil. As mentioned earlier, Rio de Janeiro State Governor Leonel Brizola enacted several pro-poor policies during his tenure in government. To this day, older favela residents fondly refer to Brizola as one of the few government officials who “ever did anything…who ever cared for favela residents” [long time Complexo do Alemão resident]. Brizola’s policies constituted an important use of state resources to mitigate some of the socio-spatial inequality that characterized the favela–non-favela divide.

Other policy spheres also display evidence of good government. Indeed, “pockets of efficiency” are found in a variety of programmatic areas. Several impressive examples occurred in the North-Eastern state of Ceará, where state-society relations changed dramatically in the years shortly after the return of democracy. Prior to 1987, Ceará’s health indicators were abysmal, some of the worst in the country and continent. Yet, by 1992, infant mortality had been cut by more than one-third. The revamped health programs were so successful that they were replicated throughout Brazil and Latin America. Public health measures were not the only instances of effective program delivery. Similar good performance also took place with the state’s employment programs and small business development (Tendler, 1997).

At the national level, instances of good government have also contributed to Brazil’s rapid industrialization over the twentieth century. These changes became especially pronounced following WWII with President Kubitschek’s Metas Plan aiming to achieve fifty years of development within five years (Faucher & Baggio-Huerre, 1980). Brazil quickly transformed from an agricultural country primarily producing raw materials for export to the most industrialized and urbanized country in Latin America by the century’s end. State-led intervention played a decisive hand in fostering domestic industrial production, a diminished reliance on foreign goods and greater self-sufficiency in
the world market. The state expanded its participation in a variety of industries including steel, petrochemicals, electricity and transportation. Nationalization and state control over these key industries had a multiplier effect, spurring further industrial development reliant on the aforementioned sectors. In order to establish the financial conditions conducive to such growth, the state also created the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, the National Economic Development Bank or BNDES, in 1952 to provide the necessary capital, when foreign investment provided little to none. All together, these efforts proved highly successful from a macro-economic standpoint. Until the late 1980s Brazil’s GDP grew at close to 6% each year on average, including the “miracle” years of 1968-1973 when annual GDP growth rates reached 11% (Baer, 1978; Faucher & Baggio-Huerre, 1980; Fox, 1980).

The aforementioned examples reveal good state performance understood in multiple ways. The social policy gains achieved with Brizola deviated from years of state neglect and ill treatment of disadvantaged populations. His efforts revealed glimmers of Brazil’s potential to achieve greater equality in state-society relations. The Ceara case illustrates the ability of state offices to dramatically transform themselves from ineffective and inefficient organizational units to those that are highly successful in addressing social problems. Similarly, the state’s role in furthering the country’s industrial development demonstrates its capacity to achieve impressive productivity gains in nascent professional and industrial fields despite being surrounded by a sea of political inefficiency.

As impressive and important as these gains were to Rio de Janeiro and Brazil’s history, they suffered from the same weakness: all were highly dependent on state personnel rather than state institutions. This is observed most strongly with Brizola’s policies for Rio de Janeiro that were spearheaded by a single individual. Ceara’s achievements were attributable to the government staff’s dedication to their jobs and personal connections with the communities benefitting from state programs. Similarly, many of the industrial advances of the mid-twentieth century were the result of a specific constellation of individuals across the public and private sectors. Given the alignment between select industrialists and state agents, the rapid economic growth that industrialization yielded was also accompanied with increasing economic inequality. The Brazilian economic miracle increased the incomes of the wealthiest Brazilians, while doing little to redistribute the gains from the macro-economic successes to wider segments of the population.

Continuity, expansion and durability are obvious challenges when political processes are highly dependent on incumbent personnel. As previously mentioned, many of Brizola’s achievements were dispensed with once he was no longer held office. Personal connections both fueled and frustrated industrialization. The aforementioned successful instances of industrial development were the product of a specific network of personal connections through which political elites protected and supported private sector advances. As such, they confronted the same longevity obstacles as did Brizola’s accomplishments. Additionally, these “pockets of efficiency” abutted another powerful form of personal connections: webs of patron-client ties favoring entrenched interest groups. The prevalence and intensity of patronage politics impeded the pockets of industrial efficiency from achieving broader economic advancements (P. B. Evans, 1995).

Analyzing the recent expansion of welfare efforts examined in this dissertation attests to a mode of state operation distinguishing itself from previous instances of good government. Both the qualitative and quantitative data suggest a greater reliance on state institutions instead of particular people. During interviews and discussions, residents talk about the state as an organizational rather than a personal body. Throughout my fieldwork, the names of specific political parties or individuals were hardly mentioned. Apart from the occasional reference to Brizola or Lula, residents conceptualized the state as an entity and seldom personalized current state actions and benefits to a specific individual. Quantitatively, the statistical analyses reveal the strong predictive power of poverty on welfare receipt. On the surface, this may appear intuitive, but given the legacy of
patronage politics in Brazil, the use of objective indicators to guide policy implementation is impressive. The fact that poverty has as strong of an influence as it does on welfare distribution implies a diminished role for the influence of personal connections. To be sure, personal relationships and patron-client ties undoubtedly continue to shape state-society relations. Such interactions often occur clandestinely, making qualitative and quantitative capture of patronage challenging. Nevertheless, the data and analyses collected as part of this dissertation suggest less of a role for personal networks in dictating state-society interaction.

It is tempting to interpret Brazil’s growing welfare capacity as an indication of the country becoming similar to those of the North Atlantic. With more equalization measures, Brazil appears to more closely resemble those countries with more well-established welfare apparatuses. However, Brazil deviates from the model established by these other countries in a crucial way. The interventions examined in this dissertation represent an undeniable augmentation of state welfare capacities, which is remarkable given long running debates about the slow demise of the welfare state in the United States and Europe. Beginning in the late1970s, the growing influence of neoliberal ideology pressured states to curtail their welfare activities (Harvey, 2007). Conservative economists considered welfare an impediment to productivity and profitability by creating disincentives to work and invest (Offe, 1982; Quandango, 1988). In the United States, the growing momentum of neoliberal ideology culminated in the watershed 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Over time, welfare in the United States became more restrictive, invasive and punitive. Social services were cut, and beneficiaries endured more obligations and scrutiny of their personal lives in order to receive state aid (Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001; Soule & Zylan, 1997). Instead of state intervention, neoliberalism popularized the belief in free markets as the best means to ensure social safety as well as prosperity and emphasized individual responsibility rather than collective or state-led responsibility for wellbeing (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Harvey, 2007). State retrenchment also set the stage for social protection activities to be ceded to non-governmental organizations (Ferguson, 2006).

Brazil’s growing welfare capacity simultaneously challenges and fulfills neoliberal ideology. Instead of state retrenchment or the outsourcing of welfare responsibilities to other entities, the state itself plays a much stronger role in safeguarding the wellbeing of disadvantaged populations. As such, the growth of Brazil’s welfare capacity is decidedly non-neoliberal, suggesting Brazil’s resilience to global pressures. At the same time, conditional cash transfers can also be considered an extension of neoliberalism by emphasizing the importance of market transactions and individual responsibility. With the cash stipends, recipients are given greater ability to participate in the market that they otherwise would not be able to access to the same degree. Apart from the conditions accompanying the stipends, recipients are given the autonomy to decide how to best spend the money to meet their needs, a substantial difference from the excessively interventionist welfare state criticized by conservative politicians.

Brazil continues to be susceptible to neoliberal influence in other ways. Both Cardoso and Lula advanced pro-poor legislation during their presidencies, just as both continued and intensified neoliberal economic policies established by their predecessors. Under their tenures, the country experienced further privitization, trade liberalization and reduced state protections that are hallmarks of neoliberalism (P. Evans & Sewell, 2012). Thus, it would be premature to contend that the changes examined in this dissertation are part of Brazil embarking on a post-neoliberal era. The fact that Brazil maintains neoliberal economic policy as well as welfare strategies that defy and fulfill neoliberalism at the same time, portends a potential challenge to neoliberalism’s hegemony and an unbundling of the fundamental tenets of neoliberal ideology. At the very least, the seemingly paradoxical manner in which neoliberalism manifests in Brazil emphasizes the need to reevaluate the definition of neoliberalism in the twenty-first century.
The social policy advances documented in this dissertation are part of broader changes occurring within the Brazilian state. There are several indications of the declining influence of personal connections in policy sectors distinct from social welfare. One of the most powerful examples can be observed with the creation of participatory budgeting procedures. With the 1988 Constitution, participatory governance councils established new vehicles for public involvement in policy development at the municipal level. To date, councils have been established in a variety of content areas ranging from health to urban planning. The forums wield considerable political power and can influence policy design, monitor program implementation, set agendas prioritizing issues for future attention and designate funding allocations. Participatory councils are important because they signal a democratic opening, a dismantling of the privilege of personal connections that has long dictated state-society interaction in Brazil (Avritzer, 2009; Baiocchi et al., 2008). With time, additional participatory planning mechanisms have been established at other government levels. For example, the CNAS and CDES, referred to in the introduction, are additional participatory forums operating at the federal level allowing greater public involvement in social policy development. Together, these vehicles demonstrate the great strides Brazil has achieved towards fulfilling the egalitarianism fostered through rational authority.

Additional judicial changes within the state’s operational structure further reveal the increasing relevance of rational authority. This is most apparent with the measures surrounding electoral behavior and attest to a growing momentum in Brazil attempting to limit the role of clientelism and curb political corruption more generally. In 1999, Law 9840 passed through popular initiative, making clientelism, as manifest through vote-buying, illegal. Previous laws enacted in 1932 and 1965 also criminalized vote-buying and made the offense punishable through fines and prison terms. However, due to judicial inefficiencies and minimal political will, vote buying effectively operated with impunity. Law 9840 has been enforced to a much greater degree than its these earlier measures. Between 2000-2008, close to 700 politicians were removed from office for vote-buying throughout Brazil (Nichter, 2011).

In 2010, the Brazilian government enacted another anti-corruption measure, *Ficha Limpa* or, the Clean Record policy. The law prevents individuals with court convictions or records of electoral crimes from running for office for eight years. Previously, individuals with criminal records would seek political office for the legal immunity or rent seeking opportunities that the positions provided. Although it remains too early to understand the full impact of Ficha Limpa, early signs point to the establishment of an effective screening process. During the first municipal elections to take place under the law in October of 2012, Brazil’s electoral council reviewed close to 3,000 out of the 480,000 candidates for possible infractions of the Clean Record law (Braga, 2012). Eighty-seven cities could hold new elections because of concerns that the victorious candidates were in violation of the Ficha Limpa regulations. The first federal elections with Ficha Limpa in effect will occur in 2014.

Thus far, the analyses and discussions have largely focused on contextualizing Brazil with respect to its own history and recent developments. It is also important to examine the extent to which Brazil’s developments offer insights on events unfolding in other regions of the world.

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32 Other processes within the Brazilian state also reflect the increasing role of rational authority. In the late 1980s Brazil’s President had the authority to appoint more than fifty thousand government positions. For comparison, the President of the United States typically appoints a few thousand positions. By 2005, Brazilian Presidential appointees fell to twenty-one thousand. Furthermore, applicants were required to complete an entrance exam for seventy-five percent of these positions, a clear fulfillment of one of the key components of Weber’s definition of bureaucratic organization (Evans, 1995).
Equalization measures, both conditional cash transfers and built-environment interventions, are widely replicated throughout the globe. The mere adoption of these strategies does not necessarily attest to the same sorts of changes in state-society relations documented in this dissertation. Each policy must be examined with respect to the history and context of implementation. The verve with which the international community has embraced conditional cash transfers may in fact signal the opposite sorts of developments occurring in Brazil. To the extent that conditional cash transfers are pursued to the exclusion of other welfare approaches, they can indicate a narrowing of state welfare capacity. Brazil is not immune to this concern (Draibe, 2007), but thus far conditional cash transfers are part of a broader portfolio of state-initiated welfare policies and programs, and as such represent a broadening of state welfare.

Brazil is not the only country to challenge conventional definitions of neoliberalism as well as traditional conceptualizations of state welfare. There are indications that much of the novelty in both reframing the meaning of contemporary neoliberalism and developing social policies will come from low- and middle-income countries. For instance, around the same time that Brazil began experimenting with conditional cash transfers, so too did Mexico through its Progresa and Oportunidades programs. These efforts offer stipends as long as poor households complete health, nutrition and education activities. In South Africa, discussions and mobilizations have continued for close to a decade over the prospects of a basic income grant. Through this policy, all South Africans, regardless of income, would receive a small cash stipend free of any conditions (Ferguson, 2007). This suggests that less developed countries have greater potential as sites of social policy innovation. In part, this is attributable to the fact that these regions are also home to greater welfare need. Creativity in the design of equalization measures may also be due to the fact that these areas have historically had minimal state welfare capacities. This provides less developed countries with greater freedom to experiment with welfare program creation. The older and more entrenched forms of state welfare provision found in the United States and Europe can hamper new policy development. Current debates in the North Atlantic center on whether or not to expand or curtail previous forms of state aid. Earlier forms of welfare constrain the field of possibilities, and radically new welfare strategies are largely absent from political discussions.

LOOKING FORWARD

As impressive as Brazil’s achievements are, it is important to question the longevity of these changes. The election of President Dilma Rousseff following Lula is an encouraging sign for the state’s ongoing investment in equalization measures. Rousseff also hails from the Workers’ Party and shares many of the same ideological commitments as her predecessor. In 2011, the year after Rousseff’s election, the second iteration of Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC 2, was launched. With PAC 2, the state continues to invest in urban upgrading programs among other infrastructure improvement projects. As previously mentioned the city of Rio de Janeiro launched the third iteration of Favela-Bairro under the rebranded title of Morar Carioca in 2010. Thus, built-environment interventions appear to occupy a solid position on the country’s political agenda for the short-term future.

With respect to the conditional cash transfers, new welfare initiatives are being created building off of the infrastructure created through Bolsa Família. In 2010, several states and municipalities introduced Vida Nova, the New Life program, to complement Bolsa Família. Vida Nova offers an additional stipend to families in extreme poverty along with counseling and skills training. The following year, the state of Rio de Janeiro initiated similar initiatives, Renda Melhor, the Better Salary program, and an offshoot directed to youth, Renda Melhor Jovem. As with Vida Nova, Renda Melhor provides additional financial support complementing the Bolsa Família stipend while
also offering support groups and skills training. Through Renda Melhor Jovem, students are given increasingly large stipends if they complete higher education levels. The support that equalization measures enjoy at the national level is mirrored at the state and city levels as politicians devise forms of welfare aid tied to the flagship federal program. These developments reveal the increasingly important role that Bolsa Família plays in accessing state benefits, and bodes well for the program’s continued endurance.

The social policy advances made in the early twenty-first century have survived several bouts of political succession across the federal to municipal scales. This is particularly important because leadership transitions often prevent policy maturation, growth and continuity. Welfare concerns in Brazil have transitioned from occupying a peripheral position in political debates and consciousness and are becoming thoroughly mainstream. Politicians from various points along Brazil’s ideological spectrum recognize the importance of social protection measures and pledge support for their continued expansion.

These events combined with the processes and outcomes analyzed in this dissertation are encouraging omens for the continued permanence and strengthening of welfare functions within the Brazilian state. The social policy gains achieved thus far have already profoundly transformed how the Brazilian state interacts with disadvantaged urban populations. In Rio de Janeiro, state-society relations involving the city’s poor were quite fraught. For much of the twentieth century, the state’s interaction with the city’s disadvantaged populations alternatively fluctuated between callous disregard and brutal intervention, with occasional moments of beneficence. Beginning in the late 1990s, the state expanded welfare efforts in novel and important ways. With these measures, the state established a new relationship with the urban poor that deviated from both past state treatment of these population segments as well as from how welfare had been implemented since the early twentieth century. Through conditional cash transfer and built-environment interventions, the state relinquishes its prerequisite of formality and extends support to wider swathes of the public. In addition to meeting basic needs, these programs change how beneficiaries conceptualize and interact with the state. The state and favela communities are less adversarial than they have been in the past as each seeks and makes accommodations for the other. Equally important to these outcomes is the process by which such results are achieved. The reliance on personal connections and patronage so prevalent and intense in Brazil’s past, gives way for a stronger role of formal procedures. These changes are not problem-free. As the state learns how to reach communities and support populations with which it previously had a contentious relationship, it perpetuates its entanglement with drug traffickers. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state has achieved several important accomplishments in recent years that cannot be appreciated through bad-state discourses. The re-emergence of Brazilian social policy underscores the need to think beyond marginality and deficit perspectives in understanding contemporary state-society interaction in Brazil.
References


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LULA+MANDA+POPULACAO+COBRAR+DE+DILMA+ANDAMENTO+DO+PA Ch.html


