Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance Bonding, and Symmetric Humility

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ABSTRACT

To date, the turn toward market-based regulatory tools in the environmental, health, and safety context has tended to focus on taxes, tradable permits, and information disclosure rules, with comparatively little attention devoted to environmental assurance bonds. This paper argues that environmental assurance bonding offers a particularly attractive regulatory approach for contexts—such as the present state of nanoscale science and engineering—in which both the risk and the benefit sides of the regulatory equation are characterized by great uncertainty. Historical examples and existing scholarly analyses of environmental assurance bonding are reviewed, and the resulting lessons are situated within the larger debate over economic cost-benefit balancing and precautionary approaches to environmental law and policy. In particular, the paper argues that environmental assurance bonding displays the virtue of symmetric humility, paying due heed to the dynamism and complexity both of sociolegal systems such as markets and of biophysical systems such as aquatic ecosystems.

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I.  INTRODUCTION

Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.

H.G. Wells, Outline of History (1920)

On January 30, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies expressing an intention to study and revise the manner in which the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) conducts regulatory impact review, including economic cost-benefit analysis of proposed rules. He wrote:

The fundamental principles and structures governing contemporary regulatory review were set out in Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993. A great deal has been learned since that time. Far more is now known about regulation—not only about when it is justified, but also about what works and what does not. Far more is also known about the uses of a variety of regulatory tools such as warnings, disclosure requirements, public education, and economic incentives. Years of experience have also provided lessons about how to improve the process of regulatory review. In this time of fundamental transformation, that process—and the principles governing regulation in general—should be revisited.

I therefore direct the Director of OMB, in consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, as appropriate, to produce within 100 days a set of recommendations for a new Executive Order on Federal regulatory review. Among other things, the recommendations should offer suggestions for the relationship between OIRA and the agencies; provide guidance on disclosure and transparency; encourage public participation in agency regulatory processes; offer suggestions on the role of cost-benefit analysis; address the role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern for the interests of future generations; identify methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not produce undue delay; clarify the role of the
behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy; and identify the best tools for achieving public goals through the regulatory process.

Under pressure from nongovernmental organizations such as the Center for Progressive Reform, the Executive Order review process was opened up for broader public comment. The resulting input suggested that, despite the President's suggestion that "a great deal has been learned" about the design and impact of regulations, civil society remains deeply split regarding the desirability of regulatory cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a tool for evaluating proposed policies. Numerous commentators focused their suggestions on incremental methodological improvements to CBA, expressing unequivocal support for the core practice of evaluating the content of policies based on their predicted overall impacts on human well-being. Several others, however, raised serious practical and ethical objections to the use of CBA. They offered instead a vision of policymaking much more pluralistic in its conception of value and much more pragmatic in its assumptions regarding the availability and certitude of empirical knowledge of policy effects. Although these commentators tended not to invoke the principle by name, their recommendations followed a course that internationally has come to be associated with the Precautionary Principle (PP). In truth, CBA and the


2. These comments are available at General Services Administration, Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a New Executive Order on Regulatory Review (2009), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp. It bears noting that CBA is typically thought of as an ex post check on regulatory policies, the content of which has been determined according to other criteria such as health-based statutory requirements or qualitative balancing. Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere, CBA has begun to creep into the front end of regulatory decisionmaking, becoming much closer to an ex ante determinant of the content of policies. See Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in Alternative Approaches to Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Dialogue Between Advocates and Skeptics of Cost-Benefit Analysis (Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling, & Richard Morgenstern eds., 2009).

3. The PP is a decision heuristic that counsels erring on the side of safety when scientific uncertainty exists over the potential consequences of an action. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration attempts to capture the desired relationship between the PP and environmental law:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
PP need not be seen as competing—as opposed to complementary—approaches to environmental, health, and safety policymaking. Nor should they be thought of as exhausting the universe of available and commendable approaches to such policymaking. Nevertheless, despite these important caveats, a rather stylized dichotomy between CBA and the PP has come to dominate much of the academic writing in this area.

This divide between supporters of CBA and the PP is related to a more general split within environmental law and policy circles, one so stark and staunchly policed as to occasionally resemble a world of environmental tribalism. In this world, proponents of "cool analysis" and "moral outrage," or what Christopher Schroeder calls environmental "priests" and "prophets," seem unwilling to alter or compromise their positions, leading to a perception that the debate over environmental, health, and safety regulation is based on philosophical differences that simply cannot be overcome. Daniel Farber, for instance, worries that the conflict between "tree huggers" and

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 1991, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). Despite this international recognition, the PP remains somewhat ill-formed in policy discussions. As one commentator put it, "though the precautionary principle provides a useful overall orientation, it is an insufficient basis for policy and largely lacks legal content." Daniel Bodansky, Commentary: The Precautionary Principle, 34 ENV'T 2, 4 (1992). In turn, defenders of the principle contend that it appears ill-formed or devoid of content only when evaluated from the very formalistic and rationalist vantage point that the principle aims to critique. See, e.g., Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Policy and Politics, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15, 16 (Carolyn Raffensberger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999) [hereinafter PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT] ("Like sustainability, [the PP] is neither a well-defined nor a stable concept. Rather, it has become the repository for a jumble of adventurous beliefs that challenge the status quo of political power, ideology and environmental rights. Neither concept has much coherence other than it is captured by the spirit that is challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost-benefit analysis, the powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity. It is because the mood of the times needs an organizing idea that the Precautionary Principle is getting attention.").


“bean counters” reflects an insurmountable divide over whether environmental law and policy should be determined by “willingness to vote” or “willingness to pay.” Of late, those on the “moral outrage”/“philosopher”/“tree hugger” side of the environmental law and policy divide have come in for particularly harsh critique and commentary from their opponents. Supporters of CBA, for instance, have dismissed the PP in strident terms, describing the principle as “incoherent,” “indeterminate,” “paralyzing,” and “literally senseless.” Indeed, proponents of CBA have begun to declare victory for themselves in the risk regulation debate, describing the “first generation debate” regarding CBA’s basic normative desirability as over, and asserting that the important questions today concern “second generation” issues regarding how best to implement CBA in the risk regulation context.

In a recent book, I defend the conceptual coherence and normative desirability of policy approaches, such as those associated with the PP, that reject the idea that environmental, health, and safety law can be adequately addressed from an assumed viewpoint of objectivity. The danger, I argue, is that the attempt to render environmental, health, and safety regulation fully determinable through empirical assessment and formalized decision-

making models—an attempt found most influentially in the methodology of CBA, but associated more generally with the economic regulatory reform project of the last three decades—obscures the relation of agency and responsibility that the political community bears to its decisions. Even robust institutional actors such as nation-states confront forces that lie beyond complete prediction and control, such as the operations of natural systems that escape precise probabilistic understanding, the actions of foreign nations and other non-subjects that depend on and impact shared resources, and the future needs and circumstances of unborn generations that are a necessary, but unknowable feature of any policy decision involving intergenerational consequences. I argue that, within such a decisionmaking context, the political community must always in a nontrivial sense stand outside of its tools of policy assessment, maintaining a degree of self-awareness and self-criticality regarding the manner in which its agency is exercised. The PP encourages such conscientiousness by reminding the political community, as it stands poised on the verge of a policy choice with potentially serious or irreversible environmental consequences, that its actions matter, that they belong uniquely to the community and will form a part of its narrative history and identity, helping to underwrite its standing in the community of communities that includes other nations, other generations, and other forms of life. Such considerations, in contrast, hold no clear or secure place within the logic of cost-benefit optimization, which tends to deny the political community a view from within itself, and to ask the community, in essence, to regulate from nowhere.

This Article seeks to make a more modest, but also more grounded contribution: It argues that the turn toward market-based policy instruments in environmental, health, and safety law has focused unduly on the use of pollution taxes and tradable permits, and that a third market-based instrument, the environmental assurance bond, offers features that should commend it both to “tree huggers” and to “bean counters,” to “prophets” and to “priests.” Especially in the context of a nascent field like nanoscale science and engineering, within which available information regarding potential consequences is highly incomplete and uncertain, the environmental assurance bond is a normatively attractive policy tool because it displays the virtue of
symmetric humility. 15 Promoters of CBA support analytical re-


quirements for regulators that presuppose simplicity, predictability, and manipulability in the environment. In essence, they support something like central planning for the environment, even though they would abhor such planning in the economy. Regulatory reformers do so because they believe that economic incentives are sufficiently powerful—and private interactions sufficiently reliable—to promote overall human well-being with greater success than fallible and corruptible government agencies. Hence, in their view, regulators should be required to overcome a substantial burden of proof before interfering with the dynamism and complexity of the market. Conversely, PP proponents recommend precautionary and protective regulation because they appreciate the fragility and interconnectedness of ecological systems. Hence, they would place a substantial burden of proof on private actors who seek to introduce new substances or technologies, to alter existing land uses, or to otherwise interfere with the dynamism and complexity of the environment. Like the asymmetric humility of their opponents, however, supporters of the PP arguably downplay the severity and significance of these same traits when it comes to sociolegal systems, ignoring problems associated with regulation such as unintended consequences, compensating behaviors, and agency capture.

The environmental assurance bonding approach tries to steer a middle course between these extremes of asymmetric humility. Unlike typical cost-benefit approaches, environmental assurance bonding acknowledges uncertainty regarding the value, resilience, and replaceability of biophysical systems by assessing serious *ex ante* financial responsibility for possible environmental harms. At the same time—and in contrast to strict interpretations of the PP—environmental assurance bonding acknowledges the strength and dynamism of sociolegal systems such as markets by allowing private actors to proceed with potentially beneficial activities despite the existence of a credible risk of harm. Indeed, environmental assurance bonding actively marshals the decentralized decisionmaking power of markets as a force for the development of knowledge regarding uncertain substances and

activities. As such, the policy approach reflects a high degree of what might be called ecological rationality, approaching ill-posed regulatory problems with a pragmatic combination of respect for the power of markets and human technology, and caution before the complexities of nature.\textsuperscript{16} Critically, previous academic discussions of environmental assurance bonds have tended to understate the epistemic challenge facing regulators: They have approached the pros and cons of environmental assurance bonds from an efficiency-oriented perspective in which the "optimal" level of safety incentive can in principle be identified and applied to private actors, rather than from a more dynamic institutional perspective in which a substantial aim of the regulatory project is to influence how we come to know what we will come to know. Indeed, the very feature that commentators tend most to criticize—the requirement that financial assurance obligations be set at a level equal to the worst-case outcome threatened by the regulated activity—in fact represents the very heart of the approach's pragmatic wisdom. Recognizing that for many regulatory issues the "right" or "optimal" level of safety incentive cannot \textit{in principle} be identified, supporters of environmental assurance bonding instead utilize the worst-case outcome approach precisely in order to incentivize the development of greater understanding regarding the regulated activity's potential consequences. The bond helps to enable a transition from a condition of Knightian uncertainty to one of risk, rather than blithely skating over that all-important distinction.\textsuperscript{17}

This Article is organized as follows. Part II draws on complexity theory to describe the regulatory landscape, both as it pertains to biophysical systems such as wetlands and to sociolegal systems such as product markets. As Part II describes, differences in ontological outlook tend to drive differences in scientific agenda: While classically-oriented scientists hope to achieve convergence at the nanoscale by fusing nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science into a single,

\textsuperscript{16} As note \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 76-79, cognitive psychologists have coined the term ecological rationality to refer to choice and judgment heuristics that are well-adapted to real-world decisionmaking environments in which optimific approaches, such as CBA or other formal axiomatic systems, may founder.

\textsuperscript{17} See \textsc{Frank H. Knight}, \textit{Risk, Uncertainty And Profit} 19-20 (1921) (distinguishing between risk, which can be measured using epistemically accepted means, and uncertainty, which cannot).
unified and comprehensive scientific field,18 ecologists, conservation biologists, and other observers of complex adaptive systems emphasize the ineliminable phenomenon of emergence, whereby certain system properties appear at the macroscale in a manner that simply cannot be predicted or explained through an examination of constituent system components alone. Part III argues that the former approach tends to instill in adherents technological optimism and a conviction that human ingenuity and progress generally can overcome any impediments and scarcities posed by the natural world. The latter approach, in contrast, tends to counsel humility and caution in the face of inevitable—and often unpleasant—ecological surprise. Part III further uses the teachings of decision theory and cognitive psychology to reveal complementary inadequacies in the policymaking approaches that are epitomized by CBA and the PP. Finally, in light of these complementary inadequacies, Part IV argues that participants in the risk regulation debate should offer their support for policy tools, such as environmental assurance bonds, that give due respect to the most critical aspects of both CBA and the PP. Reduced to a slogan, ecological rationality demands symmetric humility.

II.
UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT

Managing the risks of a nascent field such as nanoscale science and engineering is a perplexing task, characterized by great uncertainty and seemingly unavoidable tradeoffs. The same properties that make nanomaterials attractive as industrial inputs—namely, their increased reactivity and often dramatically altered optical, electrical, and magnetic behavior compared to macroscale counterparts—also make their toxicity and environmental fate difficult to predict and assess. For instance, given their miniscule size, nanomaterials may penetrate cells more easily than larger materials, a feature that makes them attractive as potential drug delivery devices, but that also raises concerns about possible adverse health effects. Similarly, while scientists expect to achieve a host of breakthroughs in electrical and

mechanical engineering through the use of highly conductive carbon nanotubes that are as strong as steel but that remain remarkably light and flexible, regulators are increasingly concerned that such tubes may share many of the physical and toxicological characteristics of asbestos fibers. Because nanoparticles have a comparatively large surface area to mass ratio, some scientists also believe that they may be significantly more toxic per unit of mass than larger particles of the same chemical. Indeed, some scientists maintain that the nanoscale itself may entail toxic characteristics, irrespective of the particular chemical makeup of any nanomaterial that is confronted by a human subject.

Although the number of studies addressing potential adverse health and environmental effects of nanomaterials has increased significantly in recent years as governments have begun to direct a larger share of public research expenditures to such questions, the area remains riddled with uncertainty. Stark though it may be, this epistemic vacuum does not necessarily distinguish nanotechnology from other subjects of environmental, health, and safety regulation. Indeed, a long recognized hallmark feature of such regulation has been the informational and cognitive limitations that face any regulator's ability to identify, understand, and predict the consequences of risk-creating activities, including the act of regulation itself. Accordingly, a critical challenge for risk regulators is to ensure that their decisionmaking models are ap-


20. For instance, a British scientific report noted in 2004 that "there is virtually no information available about the effect of nanoparticles on species other than humans or about how they behave in the air, water or soil, or about their ability to accumulate in food chains." The Royal Society And The Royal Academy Of Engineering, Nanoscience And Nanotechnologies: Opportunities And Uncertainties x (2004), available at http://www.nanotec.org.uk/report/Nano%20report%202004%20fin.pdf.

21. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 115, 124 (2004) (noting that "pervasive uncertainties are simply assumed by most scholars to be part of the framework within which environmental law must operate"). Esty believes that developments in information technology and other scientific fields will significantly reduce environmental uncertainty and increase the likelihood of regulatory efficacy. As noted infra text accompanying notes 94-98, however, some degree of uncertainty is likely to plague environmental decisionmaking irrespective of scientific progress, given the nature of complex adaptive systems.
appropriately suited to the nature and degree of uncertainty faced, whether the models concern the assessment of ecological or human health hazards, the calculation of economic costs, or some more ambitious integration of the two.

A. Biophysical Systems

As J.B. Ruhl has observed, advances in ecological science have made a “mess” of thinking about environmental law and policy. The romantic notion that nature can be preserved in a stable equilibrium untouched by human influence has long been discredited, not merely by improved theoretical understanding of the inherent dynamism and disorder of ecosystems, but also by increasing awareness of the fundamental interconnectedness between ecosystems and other complex adaptive systems, including especially those that are associated with human activity. To take only the most vivid example, greenhouse gases emitted through fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, and other human activities have contributed to climatic changes that are occurring on a planetary scale, with potential consequences for all life forms in all areas of the globe. Because existing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions will continue to affect the atmosphere for decades or even centuries, the desire simply to “let nature be” no longer generates meaningful guidance for environmental policymaking. Instead, as Ruhl recently put it in a different context, “[t]he reality is that there simply is no way to ‘preserve’ nature without in some sense managing it somewhere with some human-defined purpose.”


24. Daniel Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century 188 (1990) (observing that “life and environment are one thing, not two, and people, as all life, are immersed in the one system”).

25. The spread of invasive species represents a human-influenced problem of similarly global proportions. See generally Harmful Invasive Species: Legal Responses (Marc L. Miller & Robert N. Fabian eds., 2004).

In response to these developments, the concept of “ecosystem management” has arisen with a goal of “integrating scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term.” As conservation biologists and others have emphasized, the long-run integrity of ecosystems is important not merely because non-human life forms within those systems may have some intrinsic value by virtue of their existence alone, but also because humanity depends in numerous ways on the “ecosystem services” that are provided by well-functioning ecosystems and the shifting web of life forms that comprise them. Conversely, ecosystem functioning is affected in a multitude of ways by the behavior of humans, whose macroscale policies and microscale decisions contribute to a state of irrevocable interdependence between social and ecological systems. Accordingly, proponents of the ecosystem management paradigm view their task as one of identifying, monitoring, and sustaining evolutionary and ecological processes, recognizing that those processes occur within a complex of multiple, interconnected systems, including political, economic, and


other sociolegal systems that help to determine the human impact on ecosystems.

Behind the ecosystem management approach lurks an ontology informed by the teachings of complexity theory. In pithy terms, complexity theory suggests that researchers and regulators should expect the unexpected whenever they examine complex adaptive systems such as immune systems, coral reefs, the global climate, the world economy, or even something as seemingly mundane and uncomplicated as a dripping faucet. Complexity theory should be deliberately contrasted with the reductionist focus of the Newtonian tradition in science, which attempts to understand the world by breaking it down into smaller and smaller components for isolated study. Although the reductionist methodology is clearly fruitful for a variety of tasks, a central tenet of complexity theory is that "the reductionist methodology will never lead to a fully predictive theory of any complex system." For instance, researchers may be able to identify the dose-response curve that characterizes the acute toxicity effects of a given nanomaterial on a given species within the splendor of a controlled laboratory environment, but at the same time they may miss entirely the effects of the substance on the species in its broader ecological context. In order to begin to grasp these more dynamic, slippery effects, complexity theory suggests that researchers must adopt a different "pre-analytic vision" of the systems that they are attempting to model.

The pre-analytic vision of complex adaptive systems differs in a number of significant ways from the alternative vision of systems that are comprised by linear, independently-operating components. First, complexity theory presupposes that micro-level interactions between numerous forces or agents within a system give rise to patterns of behavior that are only detectable when

30. See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 936.
32. As is well recognized by philosophers of science, the choice of pre-analytic vision affects fundamentally the nature of the questions that researchers ask and the empirical evidence that they seek. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675, 675 (2003) ("A]analytic effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic effort . . . . [T]his preanalytic cognitive act will be called Vision.") (quoting Joseph A. Schumpeter, History Of Economic Analysis 41 (1954)).
the system is viewed at the macro-level, in its entirety. The ant or termite colony provides a vivid example, as it exhibits extraordinary features such as temperature regulation and geographic orientation that simply cannot be predicted or accounted for by examining the behavior of individual colony members alone. Second, complex adaptive systems often exhibit non-linear relationships and behaviors, such that they do not display mathematical proportionality in the tidy manner assumed by classical science and mathematics. This is not to suggest that the systems are indeterminate, but rather that their rules of operation give rise to stunningly complex and difficult-to-predict interactions. Extremely minor, even immeasurable variations in conditions between two otherwise identically situated systems—such as the presence in one system of the proverbial flapping of a butterfly’s wings—can give rise to dramatic differences in outcome between the two systems only a few evolutionary steps later. The resulting “chaos” is not randomness per se, but rather “order masquerading as randomness,” a state of being that, although deterministic, nevertheless remains irreducibly uncertain.

Third, in addition to sensitivity to minor variations in conditions, complex systems also are characterized by feedback and feedforward loops, in which system components influence other components that, in turn, cause their own effects on the original, as well as many other, components within the system. Cause and effect pathways, in other words, are not terminal and unidirectional. Instead, the components of a system are interconnected through numerous multidirectional paths of relation and

34. To wit, cylindrical termite mounds found in Northern Australia—constructed and maintained by hundreds of thousands of short-lived, sterile worker members—can stretch to 8 meters tall and survive as long as 100 years. The mounds face consistently in a north-south direction such that the sun warms the structure during the morning and evening, while only a thin edge is exposed to the heat of the sun during the day. Worker termites help to further regulate temperature by opening and closing ventilation chambers, by clustering for warmth, and by excavating for cool water droplets, such that the mound system in the aggregate is able to maintain its core temperature with remarkable precision year-round. See J. Scott Turner, The Extended Organism: The Physiology of Animal-Built Structures (2000).
35. See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 946-947.
37. Id. at 22.
38. See Ruhl, supra note 22, at 947-948.
dependence. This state of interconnection often leads to multiplier effects and other self-reinforcing tendencies that render a system's condition at any given time path dependent and, therefore, not easily reversed or altered. For example, if researchers discover that release of a nanoparticle into a habitat destroys zooplankton and leads to a proliferation of algae, which in turn promotes the expansion of a particular species that feeds on the algae, it will be impossible for even the most skilled ecosystem manager to restore the original "equilibrium" that once characterized the habitat. Instead, the system will only be able to continue adapting in some manner or another from its present, path-dependent state.

Finally, an important consequence of these various features of complex adaptive systems is that normal or Gaussian probability theory may be highly misleading when used to predict or describe their behavior. As Farber has discussed, "[c]omplex systems . . . are often characterized by a different kind of statistical distribution called a 'power law.'" Systems that are subject to power laws display a number of peculiar features. Most notably, they typically have "fat tails," in which large or even extreme events appear with a regularity that would be unthinkable from the perspective of normal probability assumptions. Indeed, as Farber notes, "it is possible for a variable subject to a power law to have an infinite variance or even an infinite expected value." In light of their fat tails, large or infinite variances, and other non-Gaussian features, systems governed by power laws are not adequately described by conventional statistical concepts such as the mean or the mode. Indeed, by focusing only on average out-

39. For instance, one classic example of ripple effects from ecology concerned a decline in the availability of forage fish near Alaska's Aleutian archipelago, which caused a decrease in the population of seals and sea lions (a dietary staple of killer whales), which caused killer whales to shift their diet to sea otters, which caused an increase in the population of sea urchins (a dietary staple of sea otters), which finally in turn caused a sharp decrease in kelp forests (a dietary staple of sea urchins). See J. A. Estes et al., Killer Whale Predation on Sea Otters Linking Oceanic and Nearshore Ecosystems, 282 SCI. 473 (1998).


41. Hence, the new paradigm of "non-equilibrium ecology." See Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 23.


43. Id. at 155.

44. Id.
comes in the conventional manner, analysts of complex adaptive systems risk ignoring important—even potentially catastrophic—aspects of the system's behavior. Their mistake, in essence, is to apply a pre-analytic vision of order to a system of chaos. As two pioneering thinkers in the ecosystem management field have written, "in no place can we claim to predict with certainty either the ecological effects of the activities, or the efficacy of most measures aimed at regulating or enhancing them. Every major change in harvesting rates and management practices is in fact a perturbation experiment with highly uncertain outcome, no matter how skillful the management agency is in marshalling evidence and arguments in support of the change."45

B. Sociolegal Systems

The process of Darwinian evolution has long provided the leading metaphorical explanation for the operation of economic markets.46 Naturally, then, as our vision of biophysical systems and evolutionary processes sharpens to include complexity and dynamism as foundational characteristics, so too might our understanding of market operations evolve to embrace such characteristics. Recently, a number of theorists have begun to mine the field of complexity theory for insight into economics in precisely this manner.47 Their findings include nonlinear discontinuities in price dynamics, sensitivity over time to minor variations in conditions, powerful feedback loops that contribute to bubbles and other inertial economic events, and many other hallmark features of complex adaptive systems. Mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, an important intellectual figure in the development of fractal geometry and complexity theory, expects these initial findings to lead in time to nothing short of a revolution in the theory of economics and finance. He argues that, at bottom, "[t]he geometry that describes the shape of coastlines and the

patterns of galaxies also elucidates how stock prices soar and plummet."48

It is too early to tell whether Mandelbrot's vision of a revolutionized economic theory will come to fruition, although the global economic collapse that began in late 2008 has certainly strengthened the case for inclusion of greater systemic analysis of market behavior and greater levels of humility regarding the power of positivistic financial modeling. Even before those events, however, one already could identify traces of complexity theory in much of prevailing thought about markets and regulation. An important theme of the risk reform debate, for instance, has been repeated emphasis on the possibility of "unintended consequences" from regulation.49 Just as ecosystems are believed to be characterized by pronounced and often unpredictable changes due to minor perturbations, markets are said to exhibit "substitution effects,"50 "compensating behaviors,"51 and a host of other unanticipated results that flow from government regulatory interventions. For instance, in one classic example, economist Sam Peltzman argues that highway safety regulations such as mandatory seatbelt laws may lead drivers to reduce their own level of caution, generating an accident rate that is higher


50. See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, *The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation*, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1775 (2002) ("Sometimes a regulation will bring about a risk tradeoff when it effects a shift from one product or process to another, which in turn gives rise to risks of its own.").

51. See Peter A. Veytsman, *Drug Testing Student Athletes and Fourth Amendment Privacy: The Legal Aftermath of Veronica v. Action*, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 325 (2000) (referring to "the theory of compensating behavior, in which people's responses to government regulations are often contrary to the intended effect of the regulation"). See also Bjorn Lomborg, *The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World* 10 (2001) (arguing that "scrapping pesticides would actually result in more cases of cancer because fruits and vegetables help to prevent cancer, and without pesticides fruits and vegetables would get more expensive, so that people would eat less of them"); William N. Evans & Matthew C. Farrelly, *The Compensating Behavior of Smokers: Taxes, Tar, and Nicotine*, 29 RAND J. ECON. 578, 578 (1998) (concluding that higher cigarette taxes may lead some smokers to consume higher tar and higher nicotine cigarettes, thereby counteracting the health benefits that governments hoped to achieve from lower consumer demand attributable to the higher product price).
overall than without the regulation.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, Kip Viscusi contends that child-proof container requirements for medicines may give parents a false sense of security, prompting them to leave drugs within reach of children and leading ultimately to more children at risk than before the requirements were imposed.\textsuperscript{53}

This "law of unintended consequences"\textsuperscript{54} also finds expression within the context of environmental regulation, where commentators often cite failed attempts by government officials to limit fishery harvesting as a particularly telling example. Jonathan Adler provides a succinct summary of this tragicomical tale:

It is now generally accepted that traditional regulatory approaches to fishery conservation have been a spectacular failure. Regulatory controls have typically taken the form of limits on fishing seasons, boat size, fishing areas, equipment and the like. . . . However well-intentioned, such rules often lead to absurd results. License controls and other entry restrictions may limit the number of fishers, but they do not control the amount or intensity of fishing efforts. Mandates on the type of equipment that can be used, an effort to control total catch by mandating that fishers use less-efficient means of catching fish, encourage fishers to increase their investment in additional vessels or gear to compensate for the efficiency losses. Limits on the number of days fished encourage fishers to increase their effort on those days allowed. The results are rampant overcapitalization in fisheries and a destructive derby system in which each fisher races to catch as much as he or she can before the season closes.\textsuperscript{55}

In short, the regulator's attempt to manage fishery harvesting levels through governmental controls is thwarted at each stage by


\textsuperscript{54} See Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 227 (2003) (noting that "the law of unintended consequences" often is invoked to suggest that "imperfect markets might be preferable to imperfect regulations").

unanticipated counter-adjustments and other reactive processes within the commercial fishing market. The lesson of the tale is familiar: The regulator assumes linearity and predictability when, in fact, the system being regulated is complex.

Compensating behaviors are but one way in which government risk regulations are thought to entail subtle, but significant secondary effects. Other claimed "risk tradeoffs"\(^\text{56}\) of environmental, health, and safety regulation include direct or "iatrogenic" effects such as the possibility that "cleaning up Superfund sites, or removing asbestos from buildings, may put workers at risk of exposure and occupational injury"\(^\text{57}\); and "health-health tradeoffs" such as the increased mortality and morbidity that is said to flow merely from the act of expending money on regulatory compliance.\(^\text{58}\) In light of these various tradeoffs, scholars have advocated "risk-risk analysis"\(^\text{59}\) as a mechanism for focusing


\(^{57}\) Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 Risk: Health, Safety, & Envt. 39, 40 (1998). According to Wiener, such "countervailing risks" caused or increased by regulation are "ubiquitous." \textit{Id.}

\(^{58}\) The argument is not as specious as it initially sounds. Proponents of health-health analysis cite the consistent and significant correlation that has been found between individual and family income and health, particularly as measured by longevity. \textit{See, e.g.}, Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 1, 44 (1994) ("Health-health analysis seeks to quantify the expected declines in health and safety that may be ascribed to the costs of complying with a regulation."); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1423, 1452-53 (1996); see also Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 Ecology L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 95 (1994); Randall Lutter, John Morrell, & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 Econ. Inquiry 599 (1999); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 19 (1994). In light of this correlation, supporters argue that any regulation will entail adverse health consequences, so long as compliance with the regulation requires a reduction in income: "regulatory expenditures represent opportunity costs to society that divert resources from other uses. These funds could have provided for greater healthcare, food, housing, and other goods and services that promote individual longevity." Viscusi, supra at 1452. Even supporters of health-health analysis, however, acknowledge that the identified statistical correlation between income and health is far from a demonstration of causation. \textit{See id.} at 1453. Accordingly, the argument linking regulatory expenditures with reduced health depends at its core upon little more than faith in a series of counterfactual assumptions about the opportunity costs of regulation.

decisionmakers on all of the effects that may be expected to come from adopting a particular environmental, health, or safety standard. Such comprehensive risk analysis is thought to be desirable because the adaptive behaviors and activities of market participants evade casual prediction: As the story of hapless fishery management indicates, failure to rigorously cast about in search of unintended consequences before acting may lead regulators to govern ineffectively or, indeed, to cause harm where they intend good.

To date, critics of risk regulation have successfully highlighted the notion that government actions within market environments may cause unanticipated effects that work at cross purposes with the goal of government action. Less well appreciated, however, is the fact that regulations also can entail unintended beneficial consequences.\textsuperscript{60} Researchers studying climate change mitigation policies, for instance, have calculated that the “ancillary benefits” of greenhouse gas mitigation—such as the incidental reduction of other harmful air pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates)—may be as high as $20 per ton of emissions reduced in 1990 U.S. dollars, an amount that is comparable in magnitude to estimates of the direct benefits of climate change policies.\textsuperscript{61} As Samuel Rascoff and Richard Revesz have argued, similar “ancillary benefits have been observed across a broad range of contexts.”\textsuperscript{62} Because the debate over regulatory reform has tended to ignore this reality, however, “[t]he resulting legal and scholarly conclusions about the desirability of regulation [sic] [have been] consistently distorted.”\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 50, at 1791 (“Advocates of risk tradeoff analysis, while aspiring to a more ‘holistic’ approach to regulation, consistently ignore the possibility that regulatory interventions will produce ancillary benefits and not merely ancillary harms.”).


\textsuperscript{62} Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 50, at 1766.

\textsuperscript{63} Id. See also Richard Revesz & Michael Livermore, Retaking Rationale: How Cost Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (2008).
The overlooked phenomenon of ancillary benefits suggests that the interaction between government regulation and markets is more complex than even members of the unintended consequences school tend to appreciate. To complicate matters still further, once analysts decide to include substitution effects or other endogenous behavioral responses to regulation, it is not a large theoretical step to admit that endogenous shifts may also occur with respect to preferences. Markets and other sociolegal systems are not, as many schools of policy analysis assume, characterized by linear, unidirectional relationships between public values and the law, on the one hand, and the law and its subjects, on the other. Rather, the system of relationships among these forces exhibits feedback loops, oscillations, and other characteristic traits of complex adaptive systems, including a state of reciprocal influence between the law and public values. Thus, just as legal policies may affect behavior in complex and unanticipated ways, so too may policies alter the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, including perhaps the very beliefs and attitudes that initially justify a policy choice. As Cass Sunstein has noted, these "preference-shaping effects of legal rules cast doubt on the idea that... regulation should attempt to satisfy or follow some aggregation of private preferences... When preferences are a function of legal rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences." 


65. Id. at 234-35. See also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 178 (2003) (noting that "what people choose often depends on the starting point, and hence the starting point cannot be selected by asking what people choose," and that, at times, this "problem of circularity dooms the market-mimicking approach"); Cass R. Sunstein, FREE MARKET AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997) ("When preferences are a function of legal rules, the government cannot take preferences as given... and the rules cannot be justified by reference to the preferences... "). Cf. Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 75 (1998) (describing conceptual problems created for economic theory when markets "influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities").

Still further complications arise from the fact that government rules, regulations, and requirements may themselves interact and behave as a complex adaptive system, a point that J. B. Ruhl has urged in several articles. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L. J. 757 (2003); Ruhl, supra note 22; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKL. L. J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and
Unintended consequences, ancillary benefits, and endogenous preferences all reflect an important truism identified nearly one half century ago by two economists in a classic article entitled "The General Theory of the Second Best."

In this article, the authors demonstrated that alleviation of one distortion among many in a given market will not necessarily lead to an overall increase in the efficiency of the market. For instance, at any given time, a particular microeconomic inefficiency may be serving to counteract the effects of another inefficiency such that, if the former were eliminated, society might become worse off in the aggregate, not better. Stated more precisely, "if one or more members of a set of optimal conditions cannot be fulfilled, there is no general reason to believe that fulfilling (or more closely approximating) more of the remaining conditions will bring [society] closer to the optimum than fulfilling fewer of the remaining conditions." The macroeconomic efficiency problem is, in that sense, ill-posed: Many of its determining variables and rules of interrelationship are simply unknown, such that the impact that one or more microeconomic adjustments will have on the system as a whole remains shrouded in deep uncertainty.

Although not expressly premised on complexity theory, the General Theory of the Second Best shares much of that theory's preanalytic vision. The theory notes at its heart that the factors determining a macroeconomic equilibrium are so numerous, multifaceted, and interdependent that one simply cannot know whether a microeconomic efficiency improvement will lead to a net improvement at the macroeconomic scale, unless one assumes—contrary to all available evidence—that the microeconomic inefficiency under investigation is the only such inefficiency in the entire system. Participants in the risk regulation debate exhibit some sensitivity to this complexity by examining policy proposals with an awareness that market inefficiencies

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68. Thus, as Duncan Kennedy put it, "[t]here is no reason to believe that summing a series of valid partial equilibrium exercises will yield a valid general equilibrium solution." Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Articles on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 939, 963 (1985).
other than the target of the proposal may exist and may impact the outcomes of government intervention. For instance, analysts forego the unrealistic assumption that users of child-proof medicine containers are perfectly rational, and instead investigate empirically supported cognitive tendencies that lead them to predict a counterintuitive, and counterproductive, parental response. Similarly, rather than assume an absence of additional pollution externalities when evaluating the costs and benefits of climate change policies, analysts instead examine the actual evidence and discover that a host of harmful air pollution effects currently exist that serendipitously would be alleviated by greenhouse gas emissions reductions. In both cases, by attempting to model the welfare consequences of regulation in a highly interactive—and imperfect—world, the policy analyst demonstrates at least partial awareness of the complexity of sociolegal systems.

III. UNCERTAINTY AND COMPLEXITY IN THE MIND

In addition to the external environments that risk regulators aim to influence, such individuals also must grapple with problems of uncertainty and complexity within the mind itself: Even well-behaved, well-understood systems will confound the regulator whose judgment is influenced by psychological tendencies that conflict with the realization of a regulatory goal.69 Within cognitive psychology, a theoretical debate has raged for the last two decades over whether and when heuristic decision-making approaches provide superior results to more analytically formalized procedures.70 Psychologists participating in what has been called the heuristics research tradition claim that individuals often are wise to ignore available, relevant information and to eschew explicit attempts to calculate an optimal result in their personal judgment and decisionmaking.71 According to these theorists, relying instead on heuristic techniques that exploit informational cues and other features of the decisionmaking environment can conserve scarce computational effort while

71. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter Todd, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart 25-26 (1999) (describing decisionmaking heuristics as "useful, even indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory. . .").
achieving a performance level that approaches the results of deliberate optimization techniques. Moreover, they argue that, in many instances, heuristics provide the only ecologically rational manner in which to solve problems given that many, if not most, real world problems are not posed in a manner that permits the identification of an optimal solution, let alone its attainment.72

In contrast to these psychologists, the heuristics and biases research program pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky73 has become associated with the view that individual decisionmaking heuristics frequently are unreliable and that "corrective" measures such as debiasing efforts or legal interventions are necessary in order to better approximate the ideal of expected utility maximization.74 Although at times confused and overblown, the contrast between these two viewpoints is nevertheless instructive for the present Article because it parallels in many ways the debate that has taken place between proponents of CBA and supporters of the PP within environmental law and policy. Moreover, in recent years, participants in theoretical debates over the PP and risk regulation more generally have begun to turn to cognitive psychology and behavioural decision theory for insight and support of their policy recommendations.75 To these theorists, psychological findings offer the potential not only to produce more reliable predictions of behaviour among individuals and other actors that the law is attempting to influence, but also to provide guidance for shaping the content and structure of legal rules themselves, so that they may better resonate with what we know about the human mind.

72. See id. at vii (arguing that simple cognitive heuristics persist because "they are ecologically rational, that is, adapted to the structure of the information in the environment in which they are used to make decisions").
73. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974) (identifying decisionmaking heuristics as "principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations" and which "are quite useful, but sometimes . . . lead to severe and systematic errors").
A. Rationality in Individual Choice

Within the social sciences, one tends to encounter both optimality-based and heuristic-based models of how the human mind accesses and processes information. The former category of models, associated prominently with rational choice theory, encompass fully specified analytic systems in which the processes of decisionmaking are determined by formal rules of logic and computation that can be described with mathematical precision, replicated over multiple trials, and extended across diverse tasks. Optimality-based approaches seek to identify the solution to a problem that is singularly optimal according to a desired criterion, such as expected utility maximization or wealth maximization. Optimization models can be prescriptive, in the sense that they aim to identify the solution that individuals or other decisionmakers should adopt for a given problem, or they can be simply descriptive, in the sense that they aim to predict the choices that decisionmakers will adopt for a given problem. Descriptive models may be further subdivided according to whether they purport to describe the actual processes that decisionmakers utilize in order to solve problems, or whether they instead merely aim to predict the outcomes of decisions, while remaining agnostic on the particular cognitive processes that individuals employ in order to produce such outcomes.

Psychologists in contrast seek to model and understand directly the cognitive processes that individuals use to make decisions. Such researchers differ, however, in the extent to which they believe that heuristic-based models supplant, as opposed to supplement, optimization models. The heuristics and biases research program, for instance, has used experimentally observed departures from rational choice theory to glean insights about the mental processes that individuals utilize when evaluating options and making decisions. Accordingly, many view the heuristics and biases program as leading naturally to a “repair model” research agenda, in which heuristics are thought to offer exceptions or additions to the basic theoretical engine of decisionmaking which remains premised fundamentally on expected utility maximization. The heuristics program, on the other hand, seeks to understand decisionmaking from the “bottom up,” by identify-

76. This section draws on Douglas A. Kysar et al., Are Heuristics a Problem or a Solution?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2005).
ing and modeling the actual cognitive processes that individuals are believed to use for given decisionmaking tasks without regard to any basic underlying model of rational choice. Obviously, this level of ambition in the heuristics research agenda carries a likelihood that the program will for some time appear incomplete to theorists who are accustomed to the parsimonious scalability of rational choice theory.

Nevertheless, one important reason that researchers in the heuristics program seek to build a new decisionmaking model from the bottom up stems from their belief that optimization models offer limited applicability to many real world problems. Specifically, in two different manners, decisionmaking problems may be intractable in that no optimal solution can be identified by any presently available optimization model, let alone actually attained. First, many goals when specified mathematically take the form of "ill-posed" problems; that is, problems that cannot in principle be solved. In this category fall those problems with unknown, vague, or in calculable criteria, and those problems for which an adequate weighting function among criteria cannot be specified. Second, many of the remaining problems that are well-posed are nevertheless computationally intractable. In this category fall those problems that are formally NP-hard—that is, intrinsically harder than the category of problems that can be solved in nondeterministic polynomial time—and those problems that are otherwise practically insoluble given the limits of currently available information technology.

According to researchers in the heuristics tradition, the fact that many problems cannot be solved with traditional optimization-based techniques has both descriptive and prescriptive implications. Descriptively, it raises a further challenge—in addition to the challenge presented by the behavioral findings of the heuristics and biases research program\(^77\)—to the notion that individual judgment and decisionmaking can best be predicted by a model of expected utility maximization. The fact that humans face many problems that do not admit of optimal solutions has made it adaptively desirable over time that humans not seek to replicate optimization-based systems in their cognition, at least not universally. Similarly, in competitive environments, it often is desirable for human subjects to exhibit some degree of "irre-

ducible uncertainty” in their behavior in order to evade precise anticipation by their opponents.78 It is not surprising, therefore, that rational choice theory has proven unable to accommodate a wide range of stable individual behaviors: Such behaviors have evolved in response to decisionmaking environments that often do not themselves conform to the presuppositions of rational choice theory.

Prescriptively, the existence of ill-posed and computationally intractable problems also disrupts the claim of optimization-based regimes to comprehensive application. Due to these types of problems, the limit of the solution frontier for a decisionmaking task in many cases will not be given by rational choice theory or any other available optimization system. Thus, unless one arbitrarily excludes relevant variables or otherwise “edits” the problem in order to yield an optimum solution, some normative benchmark other than conventional rational choice ideals will be necessary in these cases in order to assess the usefulness of decisionmaking techniques. Along these lines, researchers from the heuristics program argue that decisionmaking heuristics generally perform quite well if evaluated according to the criterion of ecological rationality; that is, the fitness of the heuristics for the environment in which they are being deployed, as judged by their relative success at achieving intended aims compared to other realistically possible decisionmaking strategies. Indeed, heuristics researchers argue that a variety of cognitive processes identified in the literature as biases or illusions appear remarkably well-adapted when viewed within the richer ecological context that shaped their development, rather than against a rational choice benchmark that is artificially divorced from many of the constraints that characterize real world decisionmaking.79

B. Rationality in Social Choice

The two dominant paradigms for environmental decisionmaking—CBA and the PP—nicely parallel the two conceptions of rational decisionmaking that compete for acceptance within cognitive psychology. In both debates, a sharp contrast has been drawn between decisionmaking techniques that aim to pursue

optimal outcomes through the application of formal analytical systems and those that aim to achieve realistically satisfactory outcomes through less formalized, more incremental decision-making processes. The former “synoptic paradigm” is reflected both in the expected utility maximization model of rational choice theory and in the applied welfare economic technique of regulatory CBA. Similarly, the latter paradigm of “muddling through” is reflected both in the “ecological rationality” view of decision making heuristics championed by Gigerenzer and others, and in the centuries-old emphasis on foresight and anticipatory care that grounds the PP.

Legal academic treatment of CBA and the PP has likewise tended to parallel the theoretical debate that has taken place within psychology. A few prominent holdouts aside, most scholars writing in the areas of environmental, health, and safety regulation today support the view that CBA is a desirable societal decisionmaking tool that outperforms any other available framework. Moreover, these thinkers often cite evidence from the heuristics and biases literature in support of their claim that CBA serves to discipline and improve collective judgment. Accepting the common interpretation of the heuristics and biases literature that human cognition is prone to systematic error, they argue that CBA helps to overcome such errors by forcing comprehensive, empirical evaluation of policy proposals, including the hazards that a proposal is designed to address, the proposal’s expected behavioural and environmental consequences, and the financial expenditures and foregone opportunities that the proposal’s enactment will entail.

83. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1072 (“The cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis” as premised on the likelihood that “predictable features of cognition will lead to a demand for regulation that is unlikely to be based on the facts.”).
The debate over CBA and the PP would benefit greatly from a broader reading of the psychological literature. Just as supporters of the PP seem to give insufficient regard to the possibility that public demand for regulation may be ill-informed or irrational, \(^8^4\) proponents of CBA fail to confront the possibility that their maximizing exercise may in some instances fail the test of ecological rationality. As the lessons of the heuristics research program suggest, the aspiration to optimize that lies at the heart of CBA may make little practical sense when applied to a world of complexity. To be sure, an important component of the argument in favor of CBA is that, without disciplined quantification, ordinary individuals are prone to ignore the costs and benefits of decisions that appear "off-screen." \(^8^5\) The threat of genetically modified "super weeds" \(^8^6\) looms large, as do the dangers of catastrophic climate change \(^8^7\) or runaway nanodevices that transform the planet into "gray goo." \(^8^8\) Less visible, and therefore less attended to according to proponents of the synoptic paradigm, are the vitamin enriched rice strains, \(^8^9\) the carbon fueled economic gains, \(^9^0\) and the nanoscale cancer cures \(^9^1\) that might be foregone.

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88. See Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us, Wired, Aug. 4, 2000, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html ("Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become known as the 'gray goo problem.' Though masses of uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, the term 'gray goo' emphasizes that replicators able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single species of crabgrass. They might be superior in an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them valuable.").
89. See Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 Tex. Int'l L.J. 173, 200 (2000) (describing "the creation of a new strain of rice fortified with additional Vitamin A" that may combat "vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness and other ills, [and which] affects up to 250 million children worldwide").
90. See Lomnog, supra note 51, at 318 (2001) ("Despite our intuition that we naturally need to do something drastic . . . about global warming, economic analyses clearly show that it would be far more expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay the costs of adaptation to the increased temperatures.").
91. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 179, 186 (2003) (speculating that "specially de-
if society were to abstain from pursuing novel technologies and other risky endeavors. CBA forces such “opportunity benefits”\textsuperscript{92} on-screen by requiring the regulator to analyze all identifiable effects of a proposed course of action, including the various positive courses of action that might be foreclosed by government regulation. As such, CBA promises to systematize decisionmaking in the administrative state, reducing the chance that officials will overlook any potential consequence of government action, whether beneficial or harmful.\textsuperscript{93}

Even assuming that the proper goal of risk regulation is social welfare maximization and that existing techniques for valuing costs and benefits provide “a workable proxy for the criterion of overall well-being,”\textsuperscript{94} the CBA practitioner still must be confident that her tools of risk assessment generate reliable data regarding the human and ecological toll threatened by a proposed activity or substance. It is a common criticism of CBA that the methodology presumes, by its very nature, a level of data and understanding regarding the consequences of risk-generating activities that generally is non-existent. Moreover, by providing a semblance of order and exactitude where none exists, the results of CBA threaten to obscure the actual severity of uncertainties regarding many environmental, health, and safety risks. In light of such concerns, even proponents of the methodology counsel against “the thought that science and economics, taken together, can produce bottom lines to be mechanically applied by regulatory agencies.”\textsuperscript{95} The teachings of complexity theory, however, suggest that the uncertainty critique strikes more deeply than this: It is not merely that CBA may lead to erroneous results, but that it may lead to spectacularly erroneous results.

Unlike many longstanding criticisms of the CBA methodology, this critique cannot be dismissed as striking from outside of the welfarist framework presupposed by the economic reform movement. Instead, if the teachings of complexity theory are sound, signed nanodevices, the size of bacteria, might be programmed to destroy arterial plaque, or fight cancer cells, or repair cellular damage caused by aging”).


\textsuperscript{93} Sunstein, \textit{Risk and Reason}, supra note 13, at ix (arguing that, rather than an attempt to maximize overall well-being, “cost-benefit analysis should be seen as a simple pragmatic tool, designed to promote a better appreciation of the consequences of regulation”).


\textsuperscript{95} Sunstein, \textit{Risk and Reason}, supra note 13, at 154.
then environmental, health, and safety dilemmas will, almost by
definition, present ill-posed problems that contain "nasty sur-
prises" and other intractable features. In such contexts, the de-
liberate attempt to optimize may not represent simply an
imperfect but useful aid to decisionmaking, as CBA defenders
often assert. Rather, it may represent a solution concept that is
fundamentally ill-suited to the problem tasks at hand. Because
of this misfit, we cannot confidently expect that the errors of
CBA will cluster around an "optimal" result—indeed, for ill-
posed problems the very notion of an optimum eludes meaning-
ful description. Instead, we must anticipate that the errors of
CBA are capable of deviating substantially and unpredictably
from decision paths that are easily recognized as desirable, if not
necessarily optimal, through less formalistic decision procedures.

To give one pressing example, future generations may regard
with marvel our present day attempts to meticulously calculate
the costs and benefits of anthropogenic climate change. Such
studies often lead to a conclusion that the economic benefits of
continued fossil fuel consumption more than outweigh the physi-
cal, agricultural, and ecological costs that would be averted by
restricting emissions, at least in the near term. Accordingly, the
optimal greenhouse gas reduction policy under CBA is typically a
rather limited one that should not commence for several decades.
The important lesson from complexity theory, again, is that the
apparent CBA consensus on climate change may not merely be
wrong; it may be wildly wrong. Moreover, it may be wrong as a
matter of consequentialist-utilitarian evaluation, the very domain
in which CBA proponents proclaim their decisionmaking frame-
work to be most adept. Truly rational regulatory decisionmaking
requires some understanding of when it is not optimal to opti-
mize. CBA itself cannot generate such wisdom, for no well-for-
mulated analytical system can be expected to derive its own
demise. Instead, what is required in every case is an independent
judgment—one that is crafted in light of evolving but always in-
complete knowledge, and that is offered in service of reasoned
but always reappraisable moral and political commitments.

96. Farber, supra note 42, at 146.
97. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and
it a "fundamental error" to assume "that proponents of cost-benefit analysis are
committed to arguing that the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis ought to be the sole
criterion used to determine who should be given the relevant legal entitlement").
This argument from complexity should be distinguished from the long-standing complaints of scholars that CBA and other formalistic aspects of the regulatory rulemaking process can lead to a situation of "paralysis by analysis." This traditional objection to CBA—that its enormous informational demands bog down the policymaking process to such a degree that, when viewed in light of administrative time and resource constraints, CBA becomes pragmatically irrational—might be thought of as mirroring the category of informationally and computationally daunting problems that the heuristics research paradigm has identified as inappropriate for resolution through optimization procedures. A second, more fundamental objection to CBA, however, is that its subject matter often takes the form of ill-posed problems—that is, problems whose imperviousness to resolution is not driven by a lack of information or computational capacity, but by features inherent to the problems themselves. Because complex adaptive systems contain irreducible levels of uncertainty that cannot be assumed to be of minor significance, such systems by their nature are likely to present ill-posed problems. In such cases, the heuristics research program advises the adoption of decisionmaking principles far more pragmatic—and often more overtly normative—than the optimization standard of CBA.

As proponents of CBA would be quick to point out, however, the non-optimizing approach of the PP (and related policy approaches such as best availability technology requirements or safe minimum environmental standards) does not come without cost. Most notably, the PP is ill-designed to consider and manage the risks of regulation itself, including the risk that cautious regulation may entail significant opportunity costs. Although one can mount a variety of defenses for this apparent asymmetry, they

99. In my recent book, see supra note 14, I argue that the intended domain of the PP has been mischaracterized by its opponents. Rather than an analytical device that aims to provide specific guidance on how to choose and behave in specific policy contexts, the PP is better understood as a moral maxim operating at the level of collective agency, akin to the Hippocratic adage—"first, do no harm"—applied to physicians at the individual level. Like the PP, the Hippocratic adage also appears to be insensitive to the opportunity costs of behaving with precaution; for that reason, no physician would unthinkingly follow its literal restriction, e.g., by refusing to reset broken bones, inject medicines with painful needles, or undertake other harmful treatments in service of a greater therapeutic benefit. Properly understood, I argue, "first, do no harm" is not only, or even primarily a behavioral prescription. It is instead a subtle, but steadfast reminder to the professional so cautioned that her actions carry distinctive moral weight and that her patients stand in a position of vulnerability and dependency on the careful exercise of her judgment. It is a re-
are fragile defenses that depend at bottom on a wider degree of agreement regarding the need for a fundamental value shift away from economic growth and allocative efficiency toward human flourishing and environmental sustainability as the basic desiderata of social choice. Moreover, even if one accepts the contention of PP proponents that environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking is characterized by deep and abiding uncertainty, it is still far from clear that extreme conservatism is appropriate as a general response to uncertainty. After all, John Rawls—whose difference principle for distributive equity focused attention on the least well-off member of society, much as the PP aims to focus attention on the worst-case outcome threatened by environmentally uncertain activities—argued that exclusive focus on the worst-case would not be appropriate for determining “how a doctor should treat his patients.” Proponents of the safe minimum standards approach within environmental economics also tend to hedge their positions, arguing that fidelity to safe minimum standards should yield when the costs of precaution become “immoderate” or “unacceptably large.” Within the legal literature, Farber similarly allows for departure from his strong “environmental baseline” approach to policymaking “when costs would clearly overwhelm any potential benefits” from precautionary regulation.

Although critics sometimes argue that these various safety valves suggest a latent efficiency criterion within the precaution-
ary approach, there is an important distinction that prevents the PP from collapsing entirely into CBA, even granting the addition of some form of cost sensitivity: The PP’s understanding of cost is much broader than the notion presupposed by CBA. As Richard Bishop wrote in a seminal article on the safe minimum standards approach, the determination of “[h]ow much [cost] is ‘unacceptably large’ must necessarily involve more than economic analysis, because endangered species involve issues of intergenerational equity.” Similarly, advocates of the PP typically contemplate an open, pluralistic process for making determinations about when and how to apply the principle, suggesting that the decision to relax its dictates might be premised on a wide range of appropriate reasons. Given the momentous and context-specific ethical implications of such determinations, PP proponents are simply unwilling to allow mechanical devices such as risk aversion or option value premiums to substitute for considered, democratic judgment. The problem, though, is that PP proponents fail to provide adequate substantive guidance as to how these various safety valves should be implemented. Given that society is to avoid serious or irreversible harm unless the costs of doing so become “intolerable,” how is the notion of intolerability to be understood and operationalized? The PP raises this question and rightly emphasizes that its resolution is far more complicated and value-laden than the CBA procedure would indicate. To date, however, the PP has failed to provide a compelling resolution of its own and has instead tended to turn to a richer substantive framework such as the sustainability paradigm, or simply to equate sound policymaking with the results of an idealized democratic decisionmaking process. In either case, as even its proponents acknowledge, “imple-

104. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 269 (2001) (“[T]he strongest argument for the precautionary principle—that some risks are so huge that they absolutely must not be run—becomes meaningless unless we are ready to consider probabilities.”); J. Rolfe, Ulysses Revisited – A Closer Look at the Safe Minimum Standard, 39 AUSTRALIAN J. AG. ECON. 55 (1995).

105. Bishop, supra note 102, at 10.

106. See The Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, available at http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w (“The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected parties.”).

plementation of the [PP] in a consistent and broadly acceptable manner has been fraught with philosophical, legal, political, and scientific problems.”

IV.
THE PROMISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSURANCE BONDING

An agreeable compromise between the extremes of CBA and the PP may be found in the form of environmental assurance bonding, a policy tool that has been remarkably understudied in the academic and policy literatures, despite the vast increase in attention paid to market-based regulatory instruments over the past three decades. As this Part explains, the environmental assurance bonding approach acknowledges the uncertainty and complexity of biophysical systems by attaching serious financial consequence to the causation of environmental harm, including even those worst-case harms that can be perceived to be theoretically plausible, though not presently estimable. The approach also, however, acknowledges the strength and dynamism of sociolegal systems by allowing market actors to proceed with potentially beneficial activities despite the existence of a credible risk of harm. Indeed, the assurance bonding device actively marshals the decentralized decisionmaking power of markets as a force for the development of knowledge regarding uncertain substances and activities. As such, the policy tool reflects a high degree of ecological rationality, approaching ill-posed regulatory problems with an aggressive combination of respect for the power of markets, incentives, and technology, and caution before the complexities of nature.

A. Symmetric Humility

Before addressing more concrete aspects of the environmental assurance bonding device, it is helpful to observe at the theoretical level that CBA and the PP suffer from complementary blind spots—blind spots that should be recognized as such by partisans in the debate even from within their respective theoretical frameworks. For instance, CBA begins with an assumption that government regulatory efforts are especially likely to lead to unintended consequences, lost opportunities, interest group distort-

tions, and a variety of other harmful perturbations of the various complex systems that comprise the regulated market. In order to guard against such harms, proponents of CBA urge a decision-making framework that aspires to comprehensive rationality. They believe that requiring regulatory choices to be premised on an explicit and exhaustive accounting of the choices' costs and benefits will force government officials to more reliably promote the public interest than under less formalized decisionmaking procedures.

The limitation of CBA, however, is that it fails to appreciate the parallel manner in which human perturbations of the environment are likely to lead to unintended, unpredictable, and potentially harmful outcomes. Decisionmakers faced with such complex and uncertain problems must resort to a more pragmatic and incremental approach to policymaking, one that includes criteria for guiding action in the absence of a demonstrable optima and that affords flexibility in the face of constantly evolving information regarding the need for and the consequences of regulatory action. CBA instead tends to presume static, linear, well-behaved biophysical systems that regulators can model and manage with precision. In essence, proponents of CBA accept the teachings of complexity theory with respect to sociolegal systems, but not biophysical systems, a critical shortcoming that casts doubt on the belief that CBA is the most ecologically rational approach to environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking.109 Importantly, one need not suspend the strictly consequentialist-utilitarian philosophical premises of CBA in order to reach this conclusion. Rather, the ecological irrationality critique strikes against CBA on the methodology's own terms. It accuses CBA, in essence, of being insufficiently empirical.

The PP, on the other hand, is premised on the bedrock assumption that biophysical systems are complex, uncertain, and easily perturbed. Indeed, much of the confusion in the literature regarding the merits of the PP stems from a failure to acknowl-

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109. Such asymmetry is well-demonstrated by the frequent conclusion of CBA and risk-risk analysis proponents that technological interventions provide the most cost-effective manner in which to respond to the climate change problem. Such "geoengineering" interventions—which include cloud-seeding, ocean carbon sequestration, atmospheric dust dispersion, and a host of other ambitious scenarios—reflect an assumption of simplicity and controllability within biophysical systems that proponents of the synoptic paradigm would never accept with respect to sociolegal systems. This asymmetry is especially curious given the historical derivation of market metaphors from evolutionary biology. See supra text accompanying note 46.
edge that environmental decisionmaking often must proceed on the basis of dauntingly little understanding regarding the objects of regulation. When critics of the PP purport to identify harmful consequences of behaving according to the principle’s dictates, they generally assume a stable and relatively complete state of knowledge. Proponents of the PP, on the other hand, regard environmental decisionmaking as an inherently uncertain, evolving, and dynamic process, and they therefore seek to offer a decision-making principle that is procedurally rational. By providing that “[p]reventive action should be taken in advance of scientific proof of causality,” and that “the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof of safety,” the PP incorporates a default assumption of harm and surprise from human alteration of biophysical systems, and promotes a structure for revising the assumption in light of improved knowledge and changed circumstances.

Rather than insist on quantification as a predicate to decision-making, proponents of precaution ask that environmental, health, and safety regulation instead become infused with a “culture of humility about the sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge.” Sophisticated proponents of the precautionary approach perceive it to be a mechanism for reforming public and private institutions, such that the burden of uncertainty regarding industrial substances, technologies, and processes is distributed in a manner that is believed to be more equitable, more conducive to the development of vital risk information, and, ultimately, more socially desirable. As Brian Wynne has observed, “the precautionary approach involves much more than shifting the threshold of proof to a different place in the same available body of knowledge. The different social premises which that shift implies also open up the possible reshaping of the natural categories and classifications on which that scientific knowledge is constructed.”


hoc focus on particular risks, as critics claim, but rather from an appreciation for the systemic forces that shape what we do and do not know about hazards in general. For instance, critics of the precautionary approach often ask whether precaution requires removing existing asbestos materials from schools, hospitals, and other buildings, given that such removal would pose its own hazards to workers and others. Through examples such as this one, critics contend that the precautionary approach fails to allow decisionmakers to balance the "opportunity benefits and substitute risks" caused by a given policy proposal, leading them to conclude that "the real problem with the principle is that it offers no guidance—not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including regulation."

A fully realized precautionary approach to asbestos, however, would have begun long before the substance had been used in countless applications throughout homes, businesses, and other spaces, creating path-dependencies and other constraints that now give rise to the perception of "opportunity benefits and substitute risks" that are said to confound the asbestos removal decision. In fact, humans have long known that asbestos fibers pose serious health concerns. Properly implemented, the precautionary approach would have sought assurances of safety and examination of available alternatives long before asbestos became insinuated into nearly every corner of the industrial economy. The risk-risk critique perceives the precautionary principle only through a still lens, when the principle is intended to promote a moving reorientation.

The teachings of decision theory and complexity theory suggest that there may be much merit to such an approach, even if one's goal is simply to promote overall utility. The nature of complex adaptive systems counsels an incremental approach to policymaking—one that specifically contemplates a state of evolving, yet perpetually incomplete information, and that asks its decisionmakers to constantly monitor and adjust policies in light of changed circumstances toward identified goals that are themselves subject to monitoring and adjustment. Decisionmakers, in other words, should engage not in optimization, but in something closer to the approach that Charles Lindblom

113. Sunstein, supra note 92, at 81.
famously termed "muddling through," and that now forms the basis of a significant and well-developed literature on adaptive ecosystem management. Thus, even within the comparatively narrow philosophical framework of CBA, the PP can be seen as an intelligently designed heuristic device that may be more ecologically rational than deliberate optimization techniques, at least when one considers the administrative toll of cost-benefit calculation and the fact that much of environmental decisionmaking concerns ill-posed problems that do not admit of optimal solutions.

The PP, however, also has a blind spot. When read to require affirmative action to guard against all environmental, health, and safety risks that meet some threshold of scientific credibility and significance, the PP quickly threatens to become an unrealistic and unworkable device. As proponents of CBA have taught us, any attempt to guard against environmental, health, and safety risks—including risks that pose catastrophic or irreversible consequences—inevitably will entail a series of ripple effects in the market that may themselves cause harm. The fact that the empirical literature documenting such ripple effects is fairly weak to date does not mean that the effects should be excluded wholesale from consideration. Such an exclusion would represent the very kind of reaction to uncertainty that the PP generally aims to avoid. Properly understood, therefore, the PP can only offer a starting point for societal discussion, a default assumption of extreme conservatism that is to be pondered, contested, and overcome through rules of procedure and substance about which the PP has little to say.

Table 1 reflects these complementary blind spots of CBA and the PP, showing that each methodology exhibits a measure of respect for complexity in only one domain as between biophysical and sociolegal systems. Table 2 then suggests that the complementary blind spots of CBA and the PP can be expected to cause the respective methodologies to err in predictable directions in the face of uncertainty. For instance, given the dearth of information regarding the environmental, health, and safety risks of many applications of nanotechnology, such as the free release of nanoparticles into ecosystems, regulators following either decisionmaking paradigm will tend to display bias with respect to the

115. See Lindblom, supra note 81.
116. See Kelman, supra note 49 (providing an early but still powerful critique).
type of error that they incur. By generally presuming that biophysical systems are well understood, resilient, and replaceable, CBA will tend to favour Type I errors, in which regulators permit the release of nanoparticles that turn out to be harmful, rather than entertain the opportunity cost of prohibiting an activity that might be beneficial. In contrast, the PP through its asymmetric precautionary trigger will tend to favour Type II errors, apparently content to lament “what might have been” rather than actively permit ecological harm from potentially risky substances or activities.

Assuming that deep scientific uncertainty will continue to attend much of risk regulation, the question then becomes how to accommodate such uncertainty within the regulatory framework. The CBA approach seems to assume that uncertainty is simply addressed out there, through institutions and procedures that lie beyond the reach of the policy decision under inspection. This approach comports with the general permissiveness adopted in market liberal societies toward private action. Following the harm principle articulated by John Stuart Mill, such societies tend to place the burden on government regulators to persuasively demonstrate the reality and severity of an action’s harmful effects before it may be curtailed. A basic thrust of the PP approach to environmental law and policy is precisely to upset this longstanding allocation of the burden of proof, particularly in areas that are thought to be characterized both by scientific uncertainty and by the potential for serious or irreversible harmful effects. At present, nanoscale science and engineering appears to be just such an area. Thus, a strict interpretation of the PP would counsel blocking wide deployment of nanoparticles and other fruits of nanoscale science and engineering, at least until their safety and efficacy had been demonstrated to the satisfac-

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tion of regulators. Such a conservative stance may be undesirable for the reasons described above: Nanoscale science and engineering research promises potentially dramatic benefits, in addition to risks, including benefits that may themselves take the form of improvements to environmental sustainability and human health.

What is needed, then, is some mechanism for exhibiting symmetric humility—that is, awareness of and respect for the problems of uncertainty and complexity as they characterize both biophysical and sociolegal systems. Environmental assurance bonding offers promise in this respect.

B. Environmental Assurance Bonding

Under an environmental assurance bonding scheme, before commencing an activity with uncertain but potentially serious adverse effects, regulated firms would be required to post a bond “equal to the current best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages.” The bond would be returned to the firm “if and when the agent could demonstrate that the suspected worst-case damages had not occurred or would be less than originally assessed.” If damage did occur, the bond funds would be available to rehabilitate the affected environment or to compensate injured parties. Such an approach “combines the ‘polluter pays’ principle with the ‘precautionary’ principle, providing for internalization of costs where harm is possible but damages are uncertain.” In essence, the bonds work to shift the burden of proof off of regulators and onto the promoters of potentially harmful actions, just as supporters of the PP have long advocated. However, unlike a strict interpretation of the PP—

119. Id. (emphasis in original).
121. See Common, supra note 15, at 215-16; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 552-53 (stating that environmental assurance bond “systems can shift much of the burden of proof from the public to the producer in resolving uncertainty as to damages associated with new products”); Gerard, supra note 15, at 189 ( “[T]he burden shifts the burden of proof of a legal dispute from the damaged party to the polluter”); Ian Bowles, David Downes, Dana Clark & Marianne Guérin-McManus, Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 209, 234 (1998). The degree to which the burden of proof actually is shifted
which might ban a proposed activity, substance, or technology until its promoters had successfully demonstrated the absence of risk—the environmental assurance bonding approach allows private action to proceed, albeit under the revised incentive structure created by the bond-posting requirement.¹²²

A variety of policy design considerations would need to be addressed. For instance, environmental assurance bonds might be used either to guarantee performance of an environmental standard, such as reclamation of a former mining or logging site to a specified set of conditions, or to guarantee payment of a predetermined amount of money, such as a level of damages estimated to be necessary to compensate third parties for harm that might be imposed by an uncertain activity. In addition, the financial instrument actually used to satisfy a bonding requirement could take one of several forms: (1) collateral bonds such as cash deposits, certificates of deposit, letters of credit, or security pledges, (2) so-called “self bonds,” which consist of legally binding promissory obligations from regulated entities that pass certain tests of financial soundness, or (3) surety bonds which constitute a guarantee from a third party to either perform the defaulted obligation or pay funds to the regulating agency. The surety bond approach is likely to be the most attractive, both because it tends to be associated with lower costs for regulated firms,¹²³ and because it offers the prospect of marshalling the information-generating and risk-evaluating capacities of surety companies in service of environmental policy goals. Surety companies would price bonding services based not only on the creditworthiness and compliance history of the regulated firm, but also on the estimated likelihood and severity of harm occurring. This would create a strong incentive for firms to reduce the uncertainty surrounding their proposed activities, either by investing in the advancement of scientific knowledge or by switching to less dan-

¹²² Cf. David A. Dana, (this issue) (helpfully distinguishing between “precautionary certification” and “precautionary study”).
¹²³ See Ferreira & Suslick, supra note 15, at 43.
gerous alternative activities. Thus, in the competition for capital, those projects, products, or technologies posing less severe potential environmental impacts would obtain a cost advantage over alternatives.

From the perspective of regulated firms, environmental assurance bonds may provide a more equitable policy tool than alternatives such as environmental taxes or auctioned pollution permits. Because taxes and auctioned permits impose a nonrefundable fee applied at the time of use, they presuppose an accurate prediction of the long-term costs of the regulated activity. When regulators lack such an accurate prediction, currently imposed environmental fees run the risk of overdetering private activity. The environmental assurance bond, on the other hand, explicitly allows for uncertainty by requiring a pledge of funds to cover the worst-case scenario, but allowing periodic refund of such funds as uncertainty dissipates. Under the environmental assurance bonding approach, so long as accounting and tax treatment of pledged amounts is properly aligned, the efficiency advantages of economic incentives can be reaped without unduly penalizing current economic agents for the cost of unknown future damages.

Challenging policy questions would need to be addressed regarding the interaction between the environmental assurance bonding system and the tort system: Would the ex ante incentive of the bonding system be seen to preempt the ex post incentives of the liability system? Would firms be entitled to set off amounts claimed for environmental harm by regulators under the bonding system against tort liability awards received by plaintiffs on account of the same harm?

The most difficult analytical and practical aspect of environmental assurance bonding is the determination of what precise amount of financial assurance must be pledged. The existing economic literature tends to assume that the role of environmental assurance bonding is simply to guarantee performance according to some prescribed environmental, health, or safety standard. Moreover, as David Gerard has stressed, "bonding

124. Id. at 51.
125. See Intarapravich & Clark, supra note 15, at 66, and Ferreira & Suslick, supra note 15, at 51, for discussions of this issue.
127. See Ferreira & Suslick, supra note 15, at 50 ("Setting the appropriate bond requirement (amount) may be one of the greatest predicaments within a bonding
promotes regulatory compliance, but it in no way suggests that the standard promulgated by the regulations is necessarily efficient." Thus, commentators see the chief benefit of bonding requirements to be one of mitigating the risk of default, rather than serving more general environmental policy goals. Likewise, commentators tend to believe that well-known damage valuations are necessary for environmental assurance bonding schemes to be effective. Such discussions implicitly assume that regulators operate in a well-characterized policy space, wherein thorough empirical understanding of hazards enables regulators to determine the "optimal" level of precaution. An alternative viewpoint would regard the generation of empirical understanding to be part and parcel of the policymaking process itself, such that a partial aim of the bonding requirement would be to shift society closer to an epistemic position in which it even makes sense to talk about "optimal" levels of precaution. From this perspective, bond-posting requirements would not be set at an "optimal" level, but at a level commensurate with the worst-case harm scenario that is threatened by a proposed activity and that meets some threshold standard of plausibility. This approach would require the development of new analytical tools for imagining and characterizing uncertain threats. Proponents of precautionary environmentalism regard such tools as long overdue. Nevertheless, some commentators argue against setting bond requirements according to worst-case scenarios on the ground that reputational costs and ex post tort liability threats

system. If bonds are set too low, the system may not provide the desired incentive effect. On the other hand, setting bonds too high may discourage investment in the sector.

129. Id. at 195 ("The underlying motivation [for bonding systems] is the high default risk on the side of the agent.").
131. Experience with worst-case scenario analysis could have been better developed had the National Environmental Policy Act been consistently interpreted to require such analysis. But see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989). Guidance provided by the Council on Environmental Quality represents one effort to develop a threshold standard of plausibility for worst-case scenario analysis, although observers believe that the guidance in practice has deterred agencies from undertaking valuable consideration of extreme possibilities. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (requiring agencies to evaluate "reasonably foreseeable . . . impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason"), and Hodas, supra note 15, at 44 (critically assessing the CEQ regulations).
provide additional compliance incentives to firms, placing the "optimal" bond requirement at a level less than the worst-case extreme.  

Again, this argument emerges from a policy framework in which scientific understanding and empirical information are treated as exogenous inputs into the policymaking process, rather than features of policy spaces that environmental assurance bonds themselves might aim to influence.

This discussion should not be read to suggest that the environmental assurance bonding approach is free of limitations. To begin with, actual historical experience with the policy instrument in the context of mining reclamation has generated decidedly mixed results. In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act in light of the large number of mining sites that lay abandoned and reclaimed across the country. The Act establishes performance requirements for the reclamation of completed mining sites and requires mining permit holders to either achieve the requirements or pay an amount necessary for public entities to achieve them. In addition, permit holders are required before the commencement of operations to submit a reclamation plan and post a reclamation bond in order to ensure compliance with the reclamation requirements. Despite the apparent theoretical advantages of bonding as an incentive device for environmental compliance, use of the device in the mining sector has repeatedly disappointed, chiefly due to the unwillingness of regulators to demand bond amounts at levels adequate to ensure coverage of actual reclamation costs. Colorado’s Summitville Mine, for instance, required over $150 million in reclamation costs due to water contamination from the use of cyanide leaching at the site, yet the financial assurance bond posted for the mine had been only approximately $5 million. The Summitville subsidiary and its parent company filed for bankruptcy, abandoning the site to the

132. See Gerard & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1100.
133. Reclamation bonds also have been required in Canada, Australia, and several nations in Southeast Asia. See Intaraprayich & Clark, supra note 15, at 61 tbl.1.
134. See, e.g., Craig B. Giffin, West Virginia's Seemingly Eternal Struggle for a Fiscally and Environmentally Adequate Coal Mining Reclamation Bond Program, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 105 (2004); Gerard, supra note 15, at 194 (noting that a General Accounting Office study in 1986 determined that of 556 hardrock mining operations in ten states on Bureau of Land Management lands, only one operator had been required to furnish a bond); Todd S. Hageman, Comment, Environmental Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Oil and Gas with Coal Surface Damage Statutes in Oklahoma: Bonding Producers and Operators to Land Reclamation, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1993).
Experiments with environmental assurance bonding in other regulatory areas confirm that the problem of understated bond amounts is significant. In Indonesia, for instance, the government required the posting of restoration bonds in order for firms to obtain logging concessions, yet the per hectare bond fee was set at only a fraction of actual reforestation costs, thus leading to widespread forfeiture of posted bonds rather than actual environmental performance.\(^\text{136}\)

Additionally, the uncertainty, complexity, and long latency periods likely to be at issue for many environmental, health, and safety risks—including those that might eventually be identified in relation to nanotechnology—create a practical impediment to the implementation of an environmental assurance bonding system, given that cause-effect relationships are likely to be especially difficult to predict and quantify.\(^\text{137}\) As David Gerard notes, “[s]urety providers may respond to [such] uncertainty by requiring a higher percentage of the bond amount as a premium, requiring substantial collateral, or simply refusing to underwrite the bond.”\(^\text{138}\) Of course, this limitation may actually be a policy strength, in that a further option for the surety provider would be to require the regulated entity to better develop scientific understanding of the environmental, health, or safety threat at issue. Developing private information regarding the likelihood of the regulator’s worst-case scenario thus would become a task with economic benefit to the firm, rather than an exercise that firms arguably have positive incentives not to pursue under current law.\(^\text{139}\)

Proponents of the PP might also argue that, in the event a proposed activity is deemed to be non-coverable by the financial industry, then society should be relieved that the activity will not

\(^{135}\) See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, Ensuring Long-Term Protection of Water Quality at Colorado Mine Sites, 30 Colo. Law. 83 (June 2001).


\(^{137}\) Gerard & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1100 (“[B]ecause of increased uncertainty as time horizons expand, surety providers are unlikely to underwrite bonds over time horizons where there is considerable uncertainty.”).

\(^{138}\) Gerard, supra note 15, at 191 n.6.

\(^{139}\) See Dana, supra note 122 (this issue); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 Duke L.J. 1619 (2004); Mary Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 137 (1995).
proceed. After all, the point of the environmental assurance bonding requirement is to incentivize ex ante consideration of potential ex post harms, whenever those harms might possibly occur. If surety providers are unwilling to offer bonding services at a price that industry will bear, then powerful evidence exists that the potential harms are significant in relation to potential benefits. An alternative approach—one more solicitous of private economic activity in its long-term effects—would be to apply environmental assurance bonding requirements as part of a phased "stewardship regime," in which initial bonding requirements are replaced over time, first by a publicly-managed but industry-financed pooled fund insurance mechanism and, eventually, by a full public assumption of responsibility and liability for the potentially harmful effects of the regulated substance or activity.140

A final concern stems from the possibility that bonding requirements might impose liquidity constraints on firms that, in turn, slow investment and innovation. Liquidity constraint problems are alleviated in part through the use of third-party surety firms.141 Alternatively, if firms are required to post collateral bonds directly, then posted funds could be made interest-bearing and fully refundable such that, even while in escrow, they might be used to collateralize loans for other investments. Again, this approach would have the advantage of creating incentives for private actors to develop better knowledge regarding the likelihood and severity of worst-case risk scenarios, since that information would be necessary to properly estimate the value of the collateral bond in the secondary market. More generally, however, the threat posed by environmental assurance bonding schemes to capital availability is one that, at least for promoters of the PP, should not necessarily disqualify such schemes from consideration. Markets only work to optimize under a given set of constraints; for too long in the eyes of PP proponents, industrialized nations have failed to fully include environmental externalities within the set of constraints governing private economic behavior. By institutionalizing a stance of symmetric humility, long-term economic and development equilibriums will be shifted toward a "softer," more environmentally sensitive path. In that sense, a retraction of capital availability under an envi-

140. See Gerard & Wilson, supra note 15, at 1102.
141. See Gerard, supra note 15, at 191.
Environmental assurance bonding regime would simply represent the transformation of a growth economy to a sustainable economy.

V. Conclusion

Physicist Richard Feynman famously presaged the field of nanotechnology by observing that “there’s plenty of room at the bottom.”142 The teachings of complexity theory suggest that there also is ample room at the top, where our reductionist habit of subdividing scientific investigation and knowledge into separate, narrowly delineated subject areas has left a gap of awareness and comprehension regarding complex adaptive systems. Moreover, just as scientists expect to achieve interdisciplinary convergence at the nanoscale—fusing biology, physics, chemistry, and information technology into a single atomic science—so too must policy analysts seek convergence at the macroscale, integrating moral philosophy, economics, psychology, and legal knowledge into a unified, pragmatic framework for societal risk decisionmaking. CBA and the PP represent complementary attempts to manage such a convergence, focusing on the threats posed to human well-being when regulators display insufficient respect for the uncertainty and complexity of, respectively, markets and ecosystems. Despite—or perhaps because of—these deliberate focal points, each decisionmaking paradigm is flawed by a failure to recognize the challenges posed by uncertainty and complexity in the alternative sphere of concern. In order to fully address the issues that threaten our environmental future, policymakers must therefore begin to embrace an ethic of symmetric humility. One concrete method for doing so is through greater use of environmental assurance bonding.
