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Author
Allen, Peter Albert

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A Space for Living: Region and Nature in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1939-1969

by

Peter Albert Allen

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Paul Groth, Chair
Professor Andrew Shanken
Professor Kathleen James-Chakraborty
Professor Michael Tietz

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Abstract
A Space for Living:
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by
Peter Albert Allen
Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Paul Groth, Chair

In the decades around World War II, the San Francisco Bay Area in Northern California rapidly evolved into a more complex urban region. A diverse group of architects, landscape architects, and urban planners recognized the social and environmental issues inherent in this regional city. Their vision to combine modernist design with regional inspirations from nature, enacted at the regional scale, gave birth to an “arc of regional modernism” in mid-century American urbanism and architecture.

This vision of regional modernism arose in the 1930s when a group of architects and landscape architects combined ideas from the Modern Movement with inspirations from Bay Area natural landscapes. Often viewed as a unique contrast to the International Style, their philosophy of environmental design was instead an integral part of a modernist architecture more varied than typically understood.

The architecture and urban planning group Telesis presented a vision of urban regional growth—inspired by both Lewis Mumford and CIAM—that included modernist urban renewal and regional urban growth control. Telesis laid the foundations for the Bay Area’s legacy in both urban renewal and the natural open space preservation of the greenbelt.

The Safeway Corporation’s evolving designs for the postwar supermarket demonstrate how one grocery store chain used modern architecture to promote an image of the modern corporation and then used regionalist architectural motifs to obscure the realities of large-scale food distribution.

Better understood as regional modernists, women such as Catherine Bauer Wurster, Dorothy Erskine, Geraldine Knight Scott, and Elizabeth Mock played a substantial role in supporting and tempering the spread of modernism while demonstrating the importance of women in some of environmentalism most significant urban accomplishments. A case study of Bauer presents her history in environmental conservation and regional planning.

Finally, the events at People’s Park in Berkeley in 1969 demonstrate the decline of the arc of regional modernism. Two visions of incorporating nature into the urban fabric collided when the top-down planning vision of regional modernism clashed with the efforts of young designers to create a more collaborative, community-based movement in architecture and planning.
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Chapter One

Introduction: Natural and Urban Space

in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1939-1969

“The greatest opportunity for public service in the world today is comprehensive planning of man’s man-made environment.” Mel Scott, 1943.
Green Spaces and Brown Spaces

The San Francisco Bay Area presents an almost magical contrast between an urbanized realm and a beautiful showpiece of open nature. Each year, millions of tourists visit to pay tribute to San Francisco’s unique combination of natural and urbanized spaces, of built space set against a sparkling ocean bay, open hills, and nearby coastal mountains (fig. 1.1). Even critical architectural historians such as Dell Upton have ruminated on the Bay Area as a perfect feng shui location for a city. For most visitors and scholars, this natural setting is a vision of nature, that is, the Bay and the undeveloped headlands in the distance are natural, “green” spaces. The urbanized zones, the urban renewal plots, the brown zones of heavily polluted toxics are, in contrast, unnatural (fig. 1.2, 1.3). Blue or green natural spaces seem largely unrelated from brown or gray urban spaces. This dissertation, however, argues for the interrelationship between these green and brown spaces. It argues that nature and built space are both societally produced spaces—they are imagined, planned, designed, and contested. Moreover, the conceptual division between these green and brown urban spaces begets a series of contradictions that continues to plague the efforts by citizens to craft a more sustainable urban environment.

Visitors assume the Bay Area natural beauty is purely a production of physical geography. It is worth considering that many cities which now seem very unnatural, once populated such dramatic settings as San Francisco. Boston is an example of a city in which hills have been largely leveled and the city’s relationship to its bay greatly reworked. Seattle is also in a dramatic natural setting and, as Matthew Klingle shows, its urban geography has been heavily rewritten. What city, moreover, had a more natural dramatic location than New York, set on a narrow thumb of a peninsula surrounded by ocean water? Los Angeles, as Richard Walker notes, occupies a spot in many ways more spectacular than San Francisco, but its nature has been dramatically refashioned, including a drastic change in its air quality. Like these cities, San Francisco is a city where nature has been reworked.

For a long time, environmental historians were concerned primarily with the history of conservation and wilderness. Meanwhile, urban and architectural historians were little concerned with nature, except for the design of urban parks within the city, such as Central Park. By the 1990s, a number of historians and geographers began to respond to the calls for the study of urban environmental history. William Cronon argued for the study of the interaction between urban and natural processes, which he termed “urban nature” in recollection of Cicero. Cronon demonstrated how nature’s capital, that is the latent value of natural resources that could be transferred into monetary wealth, was instrumental for city building. Gray Brechin likewise posited the city as a great “urban maelstrom,” reworking nature into new spatial patterns. Both Cronon and Brechin, however, examined how the city reworked nature from afar—bringing natural capital from outside the urban region and converting it to urban capital for the concentration of power in urban social elites. Closer to the urban fabric, a later group of environmental historians eventually turned to the negative impact of technological urban systems on the urban environment, such as sewage or air quality.

A more recent group of urban and environmental historians, however, such as Matthew Gandy and Matthew Klingle, study how cities rework nature within the urban realm through the prism of the social production of space. As Klingle asserts, cities and their natures are both
historical and spatial, and a historical understanding of the production of both natural and unnatural spaces is necessary to properly understand urban nature. Likewise, in examining the relationship between New York City, the production of its urban nature, and social power, Gandy argues that the making of space, even natural space, is underscored by societal power. Nature, as Gandy states, is often the production of an ideological construct that can intensify urban patterns of social stratification. In sum, nature and cities co-evolve over time but this evolution is not disconnected from social power, nor is it uninfluenced by prevailing cultural notions.

At the same time, our most common understanding of how society and culture interact with nature is constantly evolving. Nature itself becomes a problematic term and a shifting category. For the most part, our current attempt to define nature is through the lens of modernity—how modernity has reshaped human relationships with nature. Neil Smith argues that the modern experience of capitalism created a divide between humans and nature that has yet to be resolved. Likewise, in his essay “The Trouble with Wilderness,” William Cronon analyzes how in modern culture the alienation of humans from nature has brought problematic repercussions from even humans most positive efforts to preserve nature through wilderness.

The forces of modernity, however, have not been the only ones at work in remaking nature through urban development. Urban citizens have borrowed other cultural ideas to influence the resistance or, at times, the reaffirmation of the modern production of natural and urban spaces. One of the most significant cultural ideas humans employ, particularly in the field of architecture, to both resist and reaffirm how modernity has reworked nature is the cultural conceit of regionalism. Ideas about regionalism were at work in the social production of the Bay Area’s green spaces, which are, in many ways, a product of the tension between modern urban development and resistive cultural ideas about region and nature.

Influenced by both modernism and regionalism, one of the most significant generations for the production of the Bay Area’s urban and natural settings were the generation of urban planners, landscape architects, architects, and civic activists from the 1930s to the 1960s. In this dissertation, I call the vision that flourished across these multiple disciplines the “arc of regional modernism.” The rise and fall of regional modernism provides a focal lens through which to explore the interaction between nature and urban processes in the creation of both green and brown spaces. A broader historical understanding of regional modernism across multiple design disciplines enables us to better understand the contradictions that arise from the conceptual division between natural and urban processes. To properly understand, for instance, the attempt in architecture to harmonize modernity with nature we must expand beyond architectural analysis, and situate architecture in larger context of urban planning, commercial architecture, general urban growth, and civic activism.

City planners from little children grow

An introductory glimpse into this generation of regional modernists is provided by an early grade school education program from 1944 to 1948, loosely entitled “City Planners from Little Children Grow.” Members of the San Francisco Bay Area group Telesis, a San Francisco urban design and planning advocacy group composed of young urban planners, architects, and landscape architects that I discuss in Chapter Three, joined with members of the San Francisco
Housing Association in a campaign to educate school children from the kindergarten to the third grades in the basics of urban planning. The campaign produced a series of textbooks and classroom exercises that were briefly used in classrooms across San Francisco (fig. 1.4). Written primarily by Telesis member Mel Scott and Telesis collaborator Dorothy Erskine from the San Francisco Housing Association, the program was the Telesis urban vision “between covers.”

As such, the project was intended to introduce students to modernist planning and design with the hopes that some would grow up to be future urban planners, and if not, would at least support the modern planning agenda in the postwar era. The project introduced pre-fourth graders to the functions of the planning department, as well as the concepts of zoning, blight, and planned neighborhoods, while contrasting blighted homes with new planned developments (fig. 1.5). The textbook *San Francisco Today*, for example, introduced students to urban infrastructure and transportation planning, while another, *City of the Future*, documented all that would be accomplished through comprehensive urban planning. One class exercise called “Discover Blight Areas,” asked elementary students to produce a map of blighted neighborhoods with decayed homes. Then, aided by a brochure, “Now is the Time to Plan,” the students learned to tear down and remake Victorian slums into clean, modern architecture.

At the same time, however, the project’s books and exercises emphasized the importance of preserving natural open spaces in the urban region (fig. 1.6). While modern planning would remake the center city, through regional planning, the books argued, nature could be saved to provide healthy outdoor recreation for urban citizens. Presenting a vision of both urban renewal and environmentalism, the project asserted, “If we help the planners, San Francisco will always be a good place in which to live.” The “City Planners from Little Children Grow” program, therefore, not only advocated urban renewal, but was replete with images of preserved open space and a healthy outdoor life in a clean environment. It perfectly exemplified the broader faith in a regional modernist vision for the urban future: to blend modern design and planning with the preservation of the environmental qualities of place, designed and enacted at the regional level.

The idea of teaching grade school students the basics of city planning was surprisingly not an isolated phenomenon, but one carried out in other parts of the U.S. as well. These programs exemplify what Andrew Shanken calls the “culture of planning” that dominated architecture culture during the 1940s. Both the New Deal and World War Two stimulated an interest in planning as the means to solve social problems in the urban environment. The Telesis group, for instance, was founded when young progressive architects like T. J. Kent turned to urban planning to realize a broader social agenda than architecture alone could offer; or when young advocates on social issues like Mel Scott turned to planning as the solution for poverty. These young progressive designers argued, as Scott did in 1941, that the mission to improve the human social condition belonged to “men and women of superior capacity—planners. The future belongs to such men.”

The “culture of planning” provided the background for the heyday of modernist planning in the 1940s and 1950s, when architecture and planning ideas inspired by the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) emerged as the foundation for two destructive decades of urban renewal programs. Across the country, large swaths of historic urban fabrics were rent asunder, transformed in dramatic acts of creative destruction, while corporate America embraced with previously unimaginable enthusiasm the styling of modern architecture; glass, steel, and
rectangular forms ruled the architectural scene downtown. The Telesis group was indeed inspired by CIAM, and in particular the London branch of CIAM known as the MARS group. Complying with our generic understanding of CIAM urbanism, Kent would direct Scott to research and write the first city planning reports advocating the clearance of large plots of acreage in the “blighted” Western Addition neighborhood of San Francisco, and its replacement with CIAM-like towers in the park urban renewal schemes.  

A closer look at CIAM-inspired groups like Telesis, however, reveals a more complex understanding of mid-century American urbanism and architecture. For groups like Telesis, urban renewal was part a larger package of solutions to the key twin problems facing cities then and now: poverty and sprawl. The members of these groups understood that the dynamic processes of urban growth were remaking urban space at the regional level. Attempting to solve one urban problem downtown would therefore fail unless the problem was also addressed at the regional scale. At the regional level, poverty and sprawl were interrelated. Thus, the early advocate of urban renewal Mel Scott would also write the book that played a critical role in the movement Save the Bay, which saved San Francisco Bay from urban development and greatly reduced bay water pollution. Scott also wrote several historical works on planning that stood out in their advocacy of regional planning as a tool for environmental conservation. Likewise, Kent went on to play a significant role in the environmental movement to save open space from urban development with greenbelts, end the dominance of the automobile, and encourage what we now call regional smart growth.

That some of the same people involved in the “modernist” project of urban renewal were also involved in the “post-modernist” project of environmentalism complicates our understanding of both modernist design and urban environmentalism in mid-century America. We tend to think of modernism as opposed to nature, but the attempt to reconnect urban citizens to nature was actually a critical component of the ideology of many strands of modernist architecture, planning, and landscape architecture. These varied modernist visions of nature were different from that of previous generations, as well as the generations to follow, but it was a vision of nature nonetheless. The most crucial distinction for many strands of the generation of modernist designers and planners that stretched from the New Deal era to the immediate postwar era is that they saw their vision of reconnecting urban citizens with nature through both a modern and a regional framework. For a brief couple of decades, professionals in various design and urban fields all saw an interconnected mission to reconnect humans to nature through a prism of the region, giving rise to a cultural arc of regional modernism. This arc would wane in the 1950s and collapse in the 1960s from internal tensions and the pressure of new external philosophies.

**The Arc of Regional Modernism**

Taken together, as a focused look at regional modernism, this dissertation concerns one urban region’s relationship with its natural environment when the concepts of modernism and regionalism emerged and intertwined. The scarce body of work on regional modernism usually refers to the field of architecture and it typically refers to the unique architecture that flourished in California just before and after WWII. As Marc Treib describes it, modernism in architecture stood for a prevailing internationalized aesthetic, free of influence from location, climate, and
client. Regionalists, in contrast, were wedded to local traditions at the expense of current international social, technological, and cultural trends. Regional modernists, however, tried “to create an architecture that simultaneously acknowledged its time and place.”

The study of regional modernism has, however, remained limited to the design of the domestic houses for wealthy clients. This provides an insufficient base to fully understand the interplay between regionalism and modernism, and between nature and the emerging modern regional urban fabric. In this dissertation, I therefore broaden the scope of regional modernism across multiple disciplines, including landscape architecture, urban planning, and commercial architecture. In each discipline, regionalism was the means to re-integrate nature into modern life; through the preservation of regional nature, the fast change of modernity would be allayed by the qualities of place.

In architecture, regional modernism sought to unite modernist principles of design with local materials while being sensitive to the local landscape. In planning, regional modernism sought to use modern planning tools such as land use controls, urban renewal and top-down planning, but to apply them through a regional government in an attempt to preserve the unique landscape characteristics of that region. In landscape architecture, where in many ways regional modernism was most successful, landscape architects sought to redefine the profession from traditional beaux-arts models to modern landscape design, but in a way symbolic of the region. Finally, in commercial architecture, regional modernism briefly flourished, incorporating references to nature with modern forms, before regionalist motifs came to dominate commercial design, obscuring the increasingly un-regional, un-natural, modern industry behind it.

As part of their solution, regional modernists developed an overall philosophy called environmental planning or environmental design, a design philosophy that later underlay the foundation of Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design, which brought planning, architecture and landscape architecture together in one school. We might call environmental design the guiding philosophy of regional modernism. Its most important characteristic was that it sought to unify the multiple design professions into one package: the complete planning and design of the human environment. The human environment included architecture, landscape planning, neighborhood planning, urban planning, and importantly, regional planning. In essence the philosophy, inspired by the CIAM, considered living, work, recreation, and urban services all as one broad planning vision, and it considered it in the framework of the complete urban region rather than through local governments.

While not environmental in today’s sense of the environmental movement, the environmental design movement of the 1930s to 1950s did seek a renewed integration of nature into the design professions. Yet, while universities like Berkeley and similar programs at MIT and Harvard’s Graduate School of Design placed the various environmental professions under one roof, they had, for the most part, little success in actually unifying them. In essence, environmental planning—that is, urban planning and legal efforts to preserve the environment in the urban region—became separated from environmental design, that is the design of the house and the house’s landscape.

The separation of environmental design from environmental planning also obscured the important history of female designers, critics, and activists with mid-century modernism. Women played a central role in the attempt to reconcile modernism with qualities of regional place.
Moreover, while environmental history’s long focus on wilderness conservation highlighted male figures, overlooked is the critical story of environmentalism in the urban region and the profoundly important role played there by women. These female urban environmental activists are often only appreciated as wealthy, married women with plenty of free time and important social connections. While this is an important part of the political power of women, it overlooks that many professional or semi-professional women participated in urban environmental activism. Better understood as regional modernists, women like Dorothy Erskine, who were nonprofessional political catalysts, were joined by professionals such Catherine Bauer Wurster, Geraldine Knight Scott, and Elizabeth Mock.

These women were part of the larger movement of mid-century modernism in architecture, landscape architecture, and urban planning. Their efforts, and those of regional modernists generally, exemplify the diverse strands of modern architecture and modern urban planning that have been overlooked by both historical scholarship and the popular imagination. While urban renewal and international style architecture remain the main images of mid-century modernism, in truth a much greater variety of responses existed in both fields. Thus, I use this dissertation to pose regional modernism not as an opposite of modernism, but as an integral part, expanding our understanding mid-century modernist design, planning, and culture as a whole. To more properly analyze this branch of modern architecture, however, we must consider it within the larger frame of urban spatiality.

The Spatialized Form of Environmental Inequality and Inaction

Writing in 2000, Edward Soja identified a “spatial turn” in geographic scholarship. This spatial turn widened into a transdisciplinary interest as an increasing range of scholars came to realize that the “spatiality of society” is central to historical scholarship and social theory. Central to this spatial interest was the work of Henri Lefebvre, in which he argued that all social relations are eventually spatialized, that is, made into “material and symbolic spatial relations.” Lefebvre was followed at scales either global or local by scholars like David Harvey, Neil Smith, Don Mitchell, Doreen Massey, among many others. Looking back on much of this work, Edward Soja advanced the notion of “cityspace” to foreground the specific spatiality of urbanism, and what he called the “trialectics of cityspace,” or the three scales of urban spatiality. These three scales include physical built space, the conceived space of the imagination—the mental maps and imagined projections of a city—and what Soja called “thirdspace”—the simultaneous real and imagined, actual and virtual space.

Following a similar path, historian Robert Self identifies three scales of urban space: property, political scale, and social imagination. Self then more specifically ties urban spatiality to political power and social inequality, arguing that in the postwar American city, geography is destiny. Likewise, political historian Margret Kohn identifies spatiality as crucial to democracy because it is through the spatial configurations of the urban realm that social relations are naturalized and the practice of urban democracy is enacted. Urban space is thus a “collection of shared dreams or cultural ideas that reproduce social relations,” a space where inequalities in society are materialized, reaffirmed, and solidified into a structural practice. For the most part, this spatial turn has focused on the global and local scales. A landscape
and a spatial scale that have been largely overlooked, however, by the scholarship after this spatial turn is the scale of the urban region and the space of the urban region’s natural landscapes. Both regional scale and natural landscape present a physical space, a space of political contestation, and a space of social imagination. Across the multiple design and urbanist disciplines, the imagined spaces of regionalism and regional landscapes have provided the basis for a space of political contestation over the regional city, and a physical realization of the regional city that have had important social and environmental structural affects for urban residents of the Bay Area. Moreover, these important implications of the structuring of urban space into regional patterns can be seen across cities of the West Coast, and as American cities grew into greater regional metropolises, for American urbanism generally.

The regional city

In response to practical regional urban growth, the idea of the regional city emerged in the social imagination—as an idea about how urban regions should be built and an idea about preserving regional identity through architecture and landscape. Through contested visions of the regionalism and modernism the Bay Area regional city was built—most rapidly in the period around World War II. The metaphorical center of this regional idea was the Bay itself, which provided a constant strong point over the years for arguments that a regional identity existed in the Bay Area. These abstract ideas of the Bay Area were defined by regional planners in the 1940s as encompassing the nine counties that touched to some extent the actual Bay (fig. 1.7). The Bay Area as a regional city now exists as that thirdspace, the real and the still imagined urban space, structuring everyday experience, social relations, and our relationship with nature.

Recent urban historians such as Thomas Sugrue and Robert Self argue that federal policies, supplemented by often overlooked local politics, aided the evolution of urban space in a form that structured the inequality of society and continue to reinforce that inequality today. These scholars argue that traditional urban history has remained focused on a duality of central city and suburb. Recalling Charles Tilly, they present the need to understand the city and the suburb together, in one conceptual and historical framework. That framework is the metropolitan region, and their arguments were preceded by nearly a half-century by regional modernists who also presented the need to understand the city as an entire region.

For instance, in The New Suburban History, the editors Thomas Sugrue and Kevin Kruse overturn the idea that suburbs were separate enclaves, largely white and privileged, resulting from “white flight” from urban centers. Driven in large part by the scattering of job growth across an urban region, suburbanization has been a regional phenomenon that has resulted in a suburban America vastly more diverse ethnically, racially, and in social class than has been understood. That suburban locales are not invariably white, however, does not impinge on the broader argument that metropolitan regions are tremendously segregated physically. The growth of the metropolitan region in postwar American brought with it a “distinct form of spatialized inequality” in the U.S. This spatialized inequality means that where you live determines your access to goods and services such as education, transportation, and tax costs. While urban neighborhoods have always presented some inequality, the shift to the regional metropolis brought a tremendous expansion in the form, quantity, quality, and permanence of this inequality.
With the emergence of a regional “fragmented metropolis,” individual urban polities are in competition with each other for jobs, for residential wealth, and for income from sales taxes. These regional political fragments also compete with each other over how to share the burden of regional problems. Thus the fragmentated units turned inward, defending themselves from each other and from the larger region, and “undermining any enlarged sense of collective political obligation.” As numerous scholars have shown, the federal government has played a profound role in the creation of the fragmented and widespread spatial pattern of the urban region. More recently, David Freund demonstrates in The New Suburban History that the federal government in the immediate postwar era also played a strong role in creating and popularizing a powerful narrative that the private and value-neutral market drove metropolitan change. The emergence of the regional city, and the misimpression that the private market has created its form, has enabled whites to support a urban pattern is entirely segregated on racial lines; yet whites can still claim their support of segregation is not fueled by racial prejudice. Whites can thus “support racial exclusion while insisting that they were not ‘racist.’”

The same can be said for the relationship between contemporary urban citizens and the environment. The postwar metamorphosis from compact urban forms to sprawling urban regions dependent on the private automobile has had profound negative environmental consequences. These consequences are understood and frequently the subject of criticism, yet as I trace in this dissertation since at least the efforts of Telesis in the 1940s the sprawling regional city has resisted most attempts to tame it. The negative environmental consequences are therefore now hard-wired into a form of spatialized anti-environmentalism. This leads to the contradiction in which many urban citizens profess to love nature (and show it by visiting local open space or national parks) and are often pro-environmentalism, yet their cumulative everyday life patterns in the regional city are profoundly destructive. The claims of regionalist architecture, and its later progeny, green architecture, to incorporate nature in design, must be set against this larger regional spatiality of urban patterns that resist a reconciliation with nature. In each case, we must attempt to understand architecture within such an understanding, while attempting to understand how competing thirdsaces of the regional city were contested and emerged.

**Natural urban landscapes**

An important part of urban space is landscape. A number of scholars, particularly in geography and landscape architecture, such as Denis Cosgrove and James Corner, have analyzed landscape as a cultural creation, and as an active agent that shapes human culture. As Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels assert, landscapes are visual ideologies that obscure the forces of social production behind them but also the more plebeian experiences of nature in everyday life. As such, even natural landscapes are cultural landscapes, reflecting the cultural ambitions of certain social groups, often at others expense. Wilderness, for instance, is so entirely pre-consumed and pre-packaged by cultural ideals that are so widely distributed, mostly through images, that the entire concept of wilderness exists only as a socially constructed idea. William Cronon turns the concept of wilderness against itself in his essay “The Trouble with Wilderness.” Wilderness, Cronon argues, is a cultural ideology that has resulted in the further separation of humankind from nature. Because the very premise of wilderness was based on the exclusion of
human existence—humans can only visit, but not reside—it furthers the alienation of humans from nature. Cronon’s arguments on wilderness underscore what Neil Smith calls a shibboleth separating humans from nature that still dominates modern western culture. Cronon, however, followed this duality to its end result: wilderness enables modern humans to feel good about their relationship to nature, when their everyday practices are actually destructive. Because nature as wilderness is separated from everyday human life, nature is not an everyday concern.

Architecture and urban historians have looked primarily at one natural landscape in the city: the urban park. Before the twentieth century, urban nature was indeed defined by picturesque landscaped parks set directly in the city—such as New York’s Central Park and San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park. As Galen Cranz has shown, more functional parks followed in the mid-century and postwar era, and Robert Moses built regional parks for the recreation of the masses around the New York metropolitan region. However, scholars have only begun to consider one of the most important park landscapes to emerge in the twentieth century: regional open space. Yet, the regional greenbelt and the regional recreational park, those preserved spaces of nature within the urban region reached only by automobile, were some of the most important natural “landscapes” to emerge from modernism in the twentieth century. The regional park was a fundamentally new concept that emerged from mid-century modernism, distinct from previous ideas about urban parks in that it was envisioned at the regional level.

Histories of modern architecture focus on the building, or the localized urban renewal project, but not modern architecture’s broader engagement with regional urban planning, regional parks, and the preservation of regional greenbelts. On the other side, histories of urban greenbelts have remained centered on the political contestations of the 1960s. The preservation of these landscapes is therefore typically understood as a product of the 1960s environmental revolution. In fact, these spaces have a deeper history, stemming from the ideology of the 1930s regional modernists. In many cases, this fight was led not by post-modern hippies, but by professionalized or near-professionalized groups of planners, architects, landscape architects, and advocates from the culture of regional modernism.

Cronon and Smith’s ideas lead us to a deeper consideration of this natural cultural landscape. In a rapidly modernizing Bay Area, as James Corner has noted in another context, landscapes were the “soothing antithesis to the placeless frenzy of technological urban life.” While Corner presents the case perhaps too hyperbolically, nonetheless, in the rapid regional growth of the Bay Area, landscape became a tool for the preservation of identity, in this case, a regional identity. Landscape provided an element of stability in resistance to the rapid pace and change of modern urbanism, and was thus, a critical part of modernity itself. As part of a new modernist planning vision for natural recreation for urban citizens, landscape preservation also highlighted the preservation of social relations, while it sought to stabilized the image of a racially harmonious urban society.

The urban greenbelt and the network of preserved natural landscapes were a critical component of the regional modernist vision of the planned regional city. The greenbelt, however, was also part of a larger vision of regional planning to control growth and build a more socially equitable urban region. No where else in the United States was this landscape argued for, fought over, produced, and eventually embraced as much as in San Francisco Bay Area. Both the greenbelt and regional planning would, however, be realized in only fractured, incomplete form.
The important resulting open spaces, however, infused the Bay Area’s physical landscape with the qualities of wilderness. Like wilderness, urban open spaces blind their users to larger environmental, racial, and class issues at stake in planning the city. The ideas of Cronon are therefore quite important for our understanding of these spaces: like wilderness, the easy access to a pure nature, apart of everyday activity, allows urban citizens to feel good about their relationship with nature, no matter what impacts their daily habits might bring.

Race, nature, and regionalism

Landscapes, however, as Don Mitchell has asserted also “lie.”52 They lie by obscuring their process of production, the social interests they serve, and by hiding from their users more complicated facts of their life practices. Landscapes have hidden discourses and are invariably subject to privileging limits on access. Again, as Corner puts it, landscape is a “medium by which evil is veiled and naturalized.”53 These seem like harsh words to describe some of the Bay Area’s most cherished spaces. The rise of urban open space, however, was a phenomenon unique to its time and directly related to the unprecedented rise in both leisure time and automobile ownership. Based in part, as I discuss in this dissertation, on models from Britain and Scandinavia, the landscape of urban open space reached its great peak in the postwar cities of the American west. While the national parks saw an astounding rise in visitor-ship, urban planners and advocates saw preserved urban open spaces as closer landscapes of nature recreation. Scholars such as Matthew Klingle have argued for a Lizabeth Cohen-inspired environmental history of consumption, in which the modern leisure economy is connected to the contested natural landscapes of outdoor recreation.54 Natural greenbelts were imagined from their beginning as a new form of leisure activity for urban populations, but it was a vision specific in class and race, as Klinge writes regarding outdoor recreation in Seattle, the “geography of leisure is also a geography of inequality.”55

The structural inequality of the regional city studied by Klingle, Self, Sugrue, and others therefore also ensures that the access of urban citizens to nature is strongly segregated. A number of environmental historians have argued that much of conservation and environmentalism has been a process of segregating access to natural space along racial and class lines.6 As Harold Pratt recently argued, the “power structures of society are translated into spatial hierarchies of segregation and exclusion. Considerations of class and race are crucial in determining how different groups perceive the environment, which in turn, produces different agendas of [environmental] reform.”57 Thus the “allocation of environmental benefits” even in the most environmentally friendly American cities is a “spatial story of consumption,” though it is also a story of payment—that is how certain urban spaces carry the environmental burdens of the region.58 While the benefits of some forms of nature are reserved largely for a more privileged class, others are stuck with the environmental burdens of urban society: its toxic hotspots, its spaces of intense air pollution, the spaces of its waste and waste treatment.59 This unequal allocation of environmental benefits is underscored between the under-appreciated linkages between urban renewal and urban environmental planning. Groups such as Telesis played important roles in the evolution of both agendas, seeing them as important components of a single regional vision.
Landscape is particularly effective in rendering invisible its effects because it seems so naturalized. Just as it can mask ongoing environmental destruction of everyday life, it also helps to conceal environmental inequalities of a social and racial nature. The emphasis on aesthetic landscapes allowed the early environmentalists of the Bay Area community to ignore environmental problems concentrated in poor urban neighborhoods. By placing the environmental concerns outside of everyday life, by continuing to emphasize nature as an objectifiable, separate reality external from human culture, environmental problems are mistakenly emphasized as separate from everyday human action. Environmentalists engage in forestalling actions while the ways “of being and acting in the world” which lie at the root of our environmental problems, remain unchanged.\(^6^0\)

**Conclusion: The End of Regionalism?**

Regional modernism in architecture is frequently presented as an opposite of international modernism, and a form of architecture that united nature with modern design. This dualistic understanding is a product as much of our limited historical understanding of modern architecture as it is an over generous historical interpretation of regional modernism. As Marc Treib has argued, regionalism is a dynamic and evolving force; rather than a static entity, it is cultural, aesthetic, and environmental.\(^6^1\) In short, it cannot be limited to a redwood cloaked architecture. Moreover to understand the architecture, we must move beyond the simple questions of form and material. How successful, in fact, was the incorporation of regional nature into modern architecture? What did it mean or really accomplish? To take a simple example discussed in the following dissertation, how do we reconcile the nature-incorporating regional modernism of William Wurster in his 1930s domestic work with his pure international modernism for downtown corporations, his firm’s modernist design work for a major grocery store chain bent on the obliteration of natural and regional food production, and his work in modernist campus planning that helped spawn a revolution of student youth and young design professionals in the 1960s? To answer these questions we must move beyond architecture and study the broader culture of regional modernism.

Most of all, regional modernism highlights what Thomas Bender has referred to a “paradox of modernity.” Modernity has proceeded not in a singular unified logic as we often think, but presents a more complicated experience of progress in conversation with the past.\(^6^2\) Bender argues that there were important points of resistance to the modernist vision of urbanism, but that these were also integral components of the modernist vision of urbanism. Indeed, while older theories of modernity narrated a teleological history of forward progress in which universalization eliminated place, recent scholarship has suggested greater complexity. Maiken Umbach and Bernd Huppauf, for instance, suggest that the vernacular has always been a strong, integral sub-current of modernism. Modernity is, in many ways, the complex narrative generated by the interplay between the local and international, between the regional and the global, between space and time.\(^6^3\) In the San Francisco Bay Area, and through out American cities, this conversation emerged from competing cultural ideas about urban space, about how to use nature and region to preserve a needed cultural landscape of archaicism from the onward rush of modernity.
The attempt to combine regionalist thinking with modernist architecture and planning largely faded from both practice and history in the 1950s. Local governments resisted the growth control vision of regionalism, and planning as a whole adopted a dual vision of regional growth promotion and localized urban renewal. As a group of architects and historians put forth a narrative of the pure international style, regionalism in architecture was all but obscured. Though in truth regionalism only disappeared from modernist corporate downtowns and new suburban office parks, while blossoming in domestic and commercial scenes, becoming a dominant design idea of the built landscape. Yet it was a regionalism divorced from both modernity and a true interaction with the nature of its region; it was therefore reduced, often, to exactly the caricature of regionalism that modernists had despised. Modern corporations and commercial establishments were dependent on this make-shift regionalism to appease the anxieties caused by the transformation of social relations, and the tremendous upheaval in the relations between citizens and nature modernity had wrought.

Over the decades, the ideas of regional modernism in architecture returned again and again—as critical regionalism, and authentic regionalism, and as inspiration for today’s green architecture. Regional modernists also provided the basis for a continuing project to protect urban natural spaces from development. As capitol flowed across the urban region, supported by a regional growth coalition of downtown corporations, the U.S. Corps of Engineers, and other federal planners, the regional growth machine was met by the regional modernist planners, architects, and landscape architects who argued for nature conservation, protection of the Bay, and controlled growth.\(^\text{64}\) As I demonstrate here, the model of the garden city with sub-centers protected by greenbelts was realized in only partial form in the Bay Area. The regionalist city was built in the Bay Area, and it realized in the end many aspects of the Garden City model regionalist dream, though only in flawed and partial form.

As increasing the home of the majority of Americans, however, cities are the most important front for positive environmental change in the twentieth-first century. The vast majority of people in this country and increasingly the world live not in central cities, but in urban regions. Building sustainable metropolitan regions is therefore the most needed step in securing a healthy environment. Yet, as Bender notes, quoting Benedict Anderson, citizens must possess a common understanding of a political territory before political action is possible.\(^\text{65}\) In Bender’s call for a new regional politics, he argues that shared everyday regional experiences are a motivation towards shared regional governance—which, as I discuss in the third chapter, is exactly the case made by the environmental planning group Telesis. The representation, imagination of, and history of the regional political territory is therefore imperative for regional politics. If cities are to solve the tremendous ecological problems they face, and if they are to ever address issues of social inequality, then regional citizenship must become part of that bundle of desired and shared urban rights.
Chapter Overview

Chapter Two of this dissertation presents a historical introduction to regional modernism primarily where it is most known, through a review of Bay Area architectural regional modernism as a contrast to international modernism. This chapter also, however, raises critical questions about this regional modernism: what did it really mean? Did it really promise a more humane, socially equitable vision of architecture or a more natural vision of modern architecture? Moreover, in asking just how different was regional modernism from modernism in generally, this chapter concludes that mid-century modern architecture was more varied than traditionally assumed.

Chapter Three focuses on the urban vision of the Bay Area planning group Telesis from 1939 to the 1950. Telesis brought together architects, landscape architects, and urban planners to discuss the Bay Area’s urban growth at a critical time in its evolution. Facing the twin problems of urban sprawl and city-centered blight, Telesis presented a model to control urban growth through regional planning, to protect open space through a regional greenbelt, and to bring modern architecture and nature into the urban center through urban renewal.

Chapter Four confronts the legacy of Catherine Bauer. Bauer is considered the ultimate modernist, the advocate of European-style modernist architecture and the principal architect of the 1937 Federal Housing Act that initiated urban renewal programs with devastating results for U.S. cities. This chapter recasts Bauer as a regional modernist, however, and show that her later advocacy from the 1940s to the 1960s presented a prescient attack on urban renewal and public housing, and strongly argued for regional planning, urban growth control, and policies to halt the increasing racial segregation of American cities.

Chapter Five brings the analysis of regionalism to the commercial settings of the modern designs of Safeway stores. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Safeway embarked on a massive expansion program building largely identical modern stores based on a prototype building in the Marina district of San Francisco. These modernist stores, however, carefully employed regionalist and humanist touches to present a softer vision of the modern corporate food chain to the customer. Regionalist motifs in grocery architecture came to dominate, obscuring the fully modern and capitalist food chain process behind the store facade.

Chapter Six confronts the unraveling of the modernist vision of architecture and planning through an analysis of a specific urban space: People’s Park in Berkeley, California. After a decade of university expansion into nearby urban fabric, largely to build modernist dormitories off-campus, students and citizens revolted to seize their own urban space and craft their own urban vision of community-designed and operated parks. This chapter argues that People’s Park presented two different visions of nature and architecture, and reflected a divided and changing urban planning and architecture professions.

Finally, the conclusion to this dissertation examines the legacy of regional modernism and its relationship to nature for our own current generation’s attempt to reconcile nature to urbanism through green architecture and planning.
Chapter One: Notes


3. The Bay itself, of course, is not typically green in color; it is however green in the sense of a natural seeming open space like the urban green open spaces.


Commenting on the classes, the newly created Director of City Planning Commission (itself a product of Telesis’s efforts and exhibitions) reported in 1943: “It’s a way of convincing the younger generation that they can, in time, control our run-away cities. It’s part of our democratic evolution. We have come to a new stage, that’s all. Some day long-range, comprehensive city planning will be the responsibility of these children.” Helen Lynch (Grant School, San Francisco), “City Planners from Little Children Grow,” The School Executive, October 1943, Dorothy Erskine Papers, 1950-1982, Collection of the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.

For another example, see, Francesca Russello Ammon, “Unearthing Benny the Bulldozer: The Culture of Clearance in Postwar Children’s Books,” paper presented at Society for American City and Regional Planning History Conference, Oakland, California, October 15 - 18, 2009. For a recent example of the same, see Chris Steins and Tim Halbur, Where Things Are, From Near to Far (Los Angeles: Planetizen Press, 2008).


The Western Addition area known by planners as A-1 was San Francisco’s first urban renewal area. Telesis member Vernon de Mars also played a role in planning the A-1 and Geary Boulevard scheme, finally carried out in the mid-1950s. DeMars’s plan did call for some low-rise housing, however, which eventually led to the firm Marquis & Soller’s much praised St. Francis Square. The long planned expansion of the A-1 renewal zone, known as the Western Addition A-2, was not carried out until after 1966, when it included much low-rise housing and rehabilitation projects. The other prime redevelopment zone was the set of three Golden Gateway renewal projects to transform the old downtown produce market into a modern housing and shopping complex, which got under way in the late 1950s with the Alcoa Building by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, and the very Corbusier styled housing towers of Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons. The rest of the Golden Gateway project was finished over the next two decades, providing a handy urban sequence of generational shifts in urban planning and redevelopment. See Richard Brandi, “A Reevaluation of Urban Renewal in San Francisco,” MA Thesis in Historic Preservation, Welch Center for Graduate and Professional Studies, Goucher College, 2008.

For a general review of nature in architecture, see Dell Upton, “Nature,” Chapter 3 in Architecture in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 107-147; Christine Macy and Sarah Bonnemaision, Architecture and Nature: Creating the American Landscape (New York: Routledge, 2003). Upton summarizes the several cultural relationships between western humans and nature that architecture has manifested: the neo-classical, the romantic, the picturesque, the regional, the primitive, and the ecological or green movement.

Planning professionals tend to separate the “regionalists” and the “modernists” as if they were two different generations of planners. In fact, the regionalists were very much modernists, and are thus better called, regional modernists. An easy introduction to regionalism in city planning before World War II is in Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow (2002). Though Hall ignores the diversity of groups advocating regionalism in planning, their links with architecture, and regionalism’s continued relevance after the war.

For an overview of environmental design, see Avigail Sachs, “Research for Architecture: Building a Discipline and Modernizing the Profession,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Architecture, University of California, Berkeley (Jean-Pierre Protzen, Chair) 2009, especially “Introduction.”

Gwendolyn Wright recently presented the first architectural historical survey to include a discussion of regionalism in modern U.S. architecture in, USA: Modern Architectures in History (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), see especially “Chapter Four: Architecture, the Public and the State, 1933-1945,” 113-149. Wright also asserts that a century of “canonical histories” have defined modern architecture as universal in forms and beliefs, a “harmonious consensus” approach she rejects for “an inclusive, dynamic and contested perspective.” Wright, USA: Modern Architectures, 7-8.


Klingle, “Fair Play: Outdoor Recreation and Environmental Inequality in Twentieth Century Seattle,” 123.


The phrases in the quotation here are from Klingle, the rest of the sentence is mine. Matthew Klingle, “Fair Play: Outdoor Recreation and Environmental Inequality in Twentieth Century Seattle,” 147.


The regional growth machine is a concept I hope to develop in the future and is based on Harvey Molotch’s classic definition of the growth machine in urban politics. Harvey Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 2. (1976), 309-332.

Thomas Bender, *The Unfinished City*, 221.
Chapter One: Illustrations

Figure 1.1: The contrast of green spaces and brown spaces in the San Francisco Bay Area. Source: Charles W. Cushman Photography Collection, Indiana University Archives.
Figures 1.2, 1.3: The Bay Area presents a contrast of urban spaces such as the freen outdoor recreation areas and urban renewal plots such as the Golden Gateway Redevelopment, as planned by Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons. Both, however, are products of the modernist vision of urban planning from the 1940s to the 1960s. Source: Photo by author; William W. Wurster/ Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection, 1922-1974, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley, California.
Figure 1.4: Cover of *San Francisco Today*, part of the “City Planners from Little Children Grow” series of textbooks. Source: San Francisco Elementary School Department, *San Francisco Today* (San Francisco Unified School District, 1948).
Dave said, “Do you think some family needs a home more than we need a baseball field? We could go to the playground if it were not so far from my house.”

“Let us look at our neighborhood and find out where there are safe places to play,” said the teacher.

“Look for other good things in our neighborhood, too. Perhaps we shall find ways in which our neighborhood could be improved.”

The children made a map of the city. They drew a picture of their school building
Figure 1.6: Page from *City Planners From Little Children Grow series* showing the need to preserve natural open space areas in the heart of the urban region. Source: San Francisco Elementary School Department, *Fun in San Francisco* (San Francisco Unified School District, 1948).
Figure 1.7: The principal nine counties of the Bay Area that define the region and formed the jurisdiction for regional planning efforts such as that by the Association of Bay Area Governments from the 1960s to the present. Source: Association of Bay Area Governments, available at http://www.abag.ca.gov/overview/aboutbayarea.html.
Chapter Two

Regional Modernism in Architecture,

Landscape, and Planning

If ‘human’ is considered identical with redwood all over the place . . . I am against it . . . If International Style is considered identical with mechanical and impersonal rigorism, down with International Style!” Marcel Breuer, 1948.¹
The Era of Regionalism

“Do we want to have Chicken a la King with Ferro-Concrete Sauce everywhere in our country, or a regional cuisine for everyone?” This somewhat humorous, somewhat cryptic, defense of regionalism came during the 1948 conference “What is Happening to Modern Architecture” at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, a conference called in response to Lewis Mumford’s hailing of the Bay Area’s unique harmonization of modern architecture with regional qualities of place and nature. The defense did not come from Mumford, however, but from Walter Gropius, the principal architect and educator behind regional modernism’s supposed opposite—the dominant International Style. Gropius used the quote while arguing that the “International Style is neither international nor a style,” and defending the original basis for the International Style as itself regional in character.2

Though often overlooked, the 1948 conference was a seminal event in the history of American modern architecture, bringing together almost all its principal players at a critical time in its evolution—the debate pitted Mumford against numerous prominent architects including Gropius, Marcel Breuer, Eero Saarinen, Philip Johnson, Henry R. Hitchcock, and others (fig. 2.1).3 With the war at an end and prosperity and architectural commissions soon returning, the conference demonstrated the confusion over exactly what modern architecture would become in the postwar era. The conference also exemplified the importance of regionalism in early modern architecture, as an alternative to the presumed universalizing force of the International Style. Gropius’s comments, however, and those like him at the conference, also show that our understanding of a divided binary between regional modernism and International Style needs to be complexified. Modern architecture, whether International Style or regional, was much more varied than many historians have presented it.

The conference also brought out questions on the very existence of “style,” and what exactly was the importance of regional modernism in architecture if it aimed only to provide single-family housing to a domestic elite. In the end, the complex questions highlighted by the conference—over what regional modernism meant as a supposed more humane and social architecture—could not be answered at the conference because they could not be answered solely through architectural analysis. Rather the questions led then, as they will lead us now, down other paths: to landscape architecture, to planning, to commercial architecture, and eventually, to architecture’s role in the broader spatial fabric of urban existence. In this chapter, I present an introduction to regional modernism generally, across the several disciplines, as a prelude to that more complex exploration.

Both regionalism and modernism emerged in the early part of the twentieth century, though from very different places.4 Modernism in architecture emerged in Europe in the 1920s, rising in influence over American housing and landscape design most significantly in the 1920s to 1940s, before coming to dominate corporate architecture in the 1950s. Somewhat overlapping, regionalism—at least that variant of regionalist thought that influenced planning and modern architecture—emerged in the 1930s in the United States. Along with art and literature, regional considerations peaked in the 1930s and 1940s in academic disciplines as diverse as history, political science, sociology, geography, and anthropology.5
To take one example, the regionalist school of American painting is often derided as provincial and conservative, a “Revolt of the Provinces,” that rejected the New York modernist art world for a return to sensibilities of the U.S. rural midwest. As noted below, similar criticisms would be directed at regionalist architecture. Regionalist painting, however, often joined modern painting techniques with an appreciation of regional landscapes and the everyday lives of working people. Artists such as Marsden Hartley or Edward Hopper, for instance, turned to the regional landscapes of New England in working communities like Gloucester, Massachusetts (fig. 2.2). The artistic regionalism of the era in painting is, however, perhaps best represented by the Federal Art Programs of the Works Progress Administration, in particular the mural projects installed throughout post offices, libraries, and other public buildings across the country in the 1930s. Most of these murals recalled regional landscapes, history, and current lifestyles or events (fig. 2.3).

For the most part, regionalism was a paired opposite of modernism. As hinted at above, however, regionalism and modernism often intertwined not as opposites, but in partnership. The one field where this unification is recognized is in architecture, primarily in the mid-century architecture of California, and, most exemplary, in the work by a generation of architects in the Bay Area in the 1930s and 1940s who incorporated nature into modernist design to reassert regional identity. This reconciliation of modernism with regionalism grew from what Michael Steiner calls a larger “sophisticated and prolonged effort to forge a regional American architecture and landscape” that stretched from the 1870s until the 1970s.

Regional Modernism in Architecture

Recent scholarship has taken issue with the long-standing idea that U.S. modern architecture was born in the Museum of Modern Art’s (MOMA) exhibition of 1932 curated by Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock, and that American modern architecture then matured with the arrival in 1937 of Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius from Germany to take leadership positions in eastern architectural schools. Nonetheless, the 1932 exhibit, by presenting works of Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius and branding them under a unified International Style, remains the most common understanding of modern architecture’s foundation in the U.S. (fig. 2.4). This understanding, which in many respects emerged under later Cold War ideologies of the 1950s, divorced modern architecture from its roots in social reform programs of Europe and created a style that emphasized pure form, aesthetics, and the architect as an artistic master. This commonplace understanding of International Modernism also obscured a more varied modernist architecture of the prewar period, in particular a history of regionally-inspired modernist works that brought a more human and perhaps more natural modernism.

As Kathleen James-Chakraborty writes, while a small handful of American architects “flirted with the white stucco boxes exhibited by Hitchcock and Johnson,” a larger influence was regional and humanist concerns demonstrated in the work of Frank Lloyd Wright and even the post-1920s regionalist work of Le Corbuser. Indeed, MOMA actually produced a number of exhibitions under the direction of Elizabeth Mock, the sister of Catherine Bauer, that showcased the more diverse strands of modern architecture, especially modernism that was either regional
or more humane. These exhibitions typically encased International Style architects such as Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, and later, Philip Johnson, in a broad variety of domestic works, with West Coast architects and their regional modernism frequently highlighted.

Thus, from MOMA’s beginning exhibit of 1932 a secondary stream of modern architecture was present. While the Hitchcock and Johnson exhibit has garnered most of the historical attention, a second show on housing accompanied the exhibit, put together under the direction of members of the Regional Planning Association of America (discussed below) including Lewis Mumford, Catherine Bauer, Clarence Stein, and Henry Wright. This exhibit emphasized the social problem of housing and brought a regional emphasis to modern architecture. MOMA soon put on another overlooked show in 1935, this time dedicated to modern architecture in California, primarily on Richard Neutra’s work in Los Angeles. The exhibit highlighted Neutra’s distinct modern architecture that incorporated natural themes and western, healthy, outdoor living.

MOMA began the 1940s with another exhibition that captured the confusion on the exact stylistic nature of the Modern Movement in architecture, “What is Modern Architecture” in 1942. The exhibit returned to the definitions of modern architecture offered by Hitchcock and Johnson in 1932 (volume over mass, absence of decoration, and the use of abstract forms), but added “free forms of nature” as a pillar of contemporary style while including much West Coast regional modernist works.

MOMA soon featured regional modernism again in a 1944 architectural exhibition organized by Mock, “Built in the USA, 1932-1944” (fig. 2.5). Mock used the show to highlight the idea that modern architecture had undergone a humanization and “shed its romanticization of the machine.” In a pointed contrast to the International Style exhibit, Philip Goodwin argued in the preface to the exhibit that the museum did not seek to “impose a foreign style” on the United States, but was trying to highlight the “growth of an authentic American style.” The exhibition included several works that blended modernism with regional thought and paired Frank Lloyd Wright’s Falling Water with Le Corbusier’s “experiments with natural materials” (fig. 2.6). The exhibit also included a wide range of West Coast regional modernist work including John Yeon’s Watzek house of 1937, and Harwell Hamilton Harris’s house in Fellowship Park both of which blended wood, the nature of the site, and the spatial flow of modern architecture. Declaring that, “more good architecture is found in California than anywhere else in the United States,” the exhibit focused on the Bay Area’s recent works of regional modernist architects, most notably, William Wurster, but also John Funk and Gardner Daily. John Funk’s Heckendorf House in Modesto, California, just outside the Bay Area, provided the cover image for the exhibition catalogue. Yet, contrary to the idea that California regional modernism was the opposite of East Coast International Style, Mock also included quite regionalist works by Walter Gropius, Edward Stone, Philip Johnson and others on the East Coast.

Still, by the time of MOMA’s 1944 exhibit, the Bay Area was understood as the predominant area for regional modernism in architecture. The Bay Area’s modernism grew out of a long history of incorporating regionalist themes of local nature into architecture, most realized in the career of Bernard Maybeck. Maybeck was a draftsman for San Francisco architect A. Page Brown on one of the Bay Area’s earliest important works of regionalism, the Swedenborgian Church in San Francisco, finished in 1894 for the Reverend Joseph Worcester (fig. 2.7). In the design of the Swedenborgian Church Worcester, Brown, and Maybeck rejected
the traditional English-inspired chapels of Worcester’s native New England for a small, arts and crafts inspired church, with an interior crafted from local madrone branches that echoed local forests, and a plan that recalled the Spanish missions of the region. In his career that followed from his work on the Swedenborgian Church, primarily through works of the first two decades of the new century, Maybeck soon became the “defining figure” of the Bay Area regional tradition. Works such as the First Church of Christ, Scientist in Berkeley of 1910 combined gothic themes (often associated with nature), natural wood that often evidenced structural function, the use of vernacular, earthy, wooden shingled material, and a sense of being integrated with the local landscape through siting and low-rise form (fig. 2.8). In addition, Maybeck was a member of the Hillside Club, whose leader Charles Keeler had forced an urban development model still obvious in upper-class Berkeley today: curved, winding streets that followed natural contours with houses that echoed picturesque themes. Maybeck and the Hillside Club worked to preserve the regional landscape by protecting steams, oaks, and other areas of natural recreation.25

Several decades later, in what is sometimes labelled a “Second Bay Regional Style,” William Wurster carried on the natural and regionalist themes of Maybeck and incorporated them into a casual modernist esthetic. A native of Stockton, California, just outside the Bay Area, Wurster was much inspired by the Scandinavian tradition of regional modernism, best represented by Alvar Aalto,26 a friend and associate of Wurster, and later the 1940s work of Sweden’s New Empiricists.27 Wurster’s humane modernist works such as the Gregory Farmhouse became the “emblem of regionalism” in California (fig. 2.9). MOMA’s 1944 exhibit praised Wurster for producing “straightforward, essentially modern houses well before 1932.” In volume and in space, the building reflected modernist ideas: Wurster applied simplified modern forms, a modern understanding of interior spatial volumes, and a modernist rejection of excessive ornament. In every other way, however, the building showed the influence of Wurster’s interest in vernacular structures such as California barns and ranches, and the natural materials of the region, principally redwood.28 More than anything, however, Wurster’s work rejected ideas of showcasing wealth for a more simplified evocation of modern California living that reflected, nonetheless, the modernist leisure lifestyles of a certain class.29

The Gregory Farmhouse quickly became the most known of these regional modernist works, and the Farmhouse, along with Wurster’s other projects of the 1930s to the early 1950s, such as the Lyman House (1941), the Pope House (1956), and others, remain the predominant examples of regional modernism today (fig. 2.10).30 In general, Wurster’s domestic work of the 1930s and the 1940s can be defined by a number of factors, including the use of clean lines and volumes with native materials inspired by the vernacular architecture of the region. Like a good modernist, Wurster also eliminated traditional small formal interiors for a large “room without a name” that created a sense of openness and movement. Based on his understanding that modern living would provide more leisure time, and that the regional qualities of climate would enable year-round outdoor recreation, Wurster worked to create physical connections between indoor and outdoor spaces (fig. 2.11). Indoor rooms often flowed into outdoor rooms, through large spans of glass or sliding doors to physically and visually connect the domestic spaces such as the kitchen or living areas to the outdoors. Modern landscaping, often designed by Thomas Church, was also employed to integrate the house into its outdoor setting.31 Like the large-small house described below, these houses were mostly small, but used open, flexible spaces and connections...
to outdoor spaces to create a feeling of spaciousness. Wurster was joined in the 1930s and 1940s by architects like Gardner Dailey and John Dinwidde, who also frequently presented a modernist architecture sheathed in redwood.

Wurster, however, was the only architect specifically mentioned when Bay Area regional modernism reached a new audience in one of Lewis Mumford’s “Skyline” articles for the New Yorker in 1947. Mumford was one of the great gurus of regionalism in the early to mid-century, and had explored historical periods of architectural regionalism in books such as Sticks and Stones (1921), The Brown Decades (1931), and The South in Architecture (1941).Ironically, in planning history, Mumford and his cohorts in the Regional Planning Association of America are often derided as being too infatuated with modern technologies, while in architecture, their love of regionalism is derided as too provincial and reactionary. Though greatly influenced by the Arts and Crafts movement of John Ruskin and William Morris, Mumford could not accept its vision of a return to pre-industrial times. Rejecting both romanticism’s inability to engage with the modernity and the inability of modernists to accept the vernacular and local as important, Mumford argued that modern technology had to be assimilated and tamed by human culture to move forward toward the “more richly organic, the more profoundly human.” Mumford then, and regional modernists generally, sought a balance between the universalizing advance of modern technologies, and the importance of local traditions and cultures.

Arguing that the modern “accent is on living, not the machine,” Mumford’s New Yorker article counterposed “sterile and abstract modernism” with the modernism of the Bay Area, the “Bay Region style,” as he labelled it, to his later regret, for his reference was frequently, in Mumford’s opinion, misinterpreted and set off a “tempest” in the field. Mumford used the 1948 New Yorker column to argue that regionalism meant in part the modern architect stepping aside to allow the resident to develop a personal architecture of living, something, Mumford argued, Bernard Maybeck and William Wurster had always practiced. Mumford also argued that the Bay Region style exemplified the passage of modern architecture from its “adolescent period,” to a more mature rejection of dogmatism. Modernist architects, Mumford wrote, could now take the more-familiar machine for granted, and “relax and enjoy themselves a little.”

With its implicit attack on the dogma of the MOMA-sponsored International Style, the New Yorker article led to the debate hosted at MOMA in 1948, at which Mumford welcomed the Bay Region style as a “native and humane form of modernism,” and an “unobtrusive expression of the terrain, the climate, and the way of life.” Yet, if that debate proved anything, it was that neither modern architecture or regional modernist architecture had any clearly defined meanings: the speakers appeared to disagree on everything about modern architecture, including whether the International Style was a style, or whether even, if it was itself regionalist.

The conference, for instance, opened with a defense of the International Style as more inclusive than just functionalism. Art historian Alfred H. Barr, Jr., the former director of the museum, began the conference by declaring that, “we are still fundamentally on the same side.” Functionalism, Barr argued, was a principle of building that stopped short of being architecture, and he rejected the notion that the International Style was any kind of “strait-jacket requiring architects to design cubistic, white stucco boxes on Lally columns.” Barr reminded the audience that Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson’s 1932 exhibition had argued for a “broad and elastic” style as a “frame of potential growth, rather than as a fixed and crushing mould,” and
had developed only three basic shared principles for the new style: an emphasis on volume over mass, regularity rather than axial symmetry, and a rejection of arbitrary decoration. Barr even noted that Hitchcock and Johnson had written that wood would be the most satisfactory material in many regions. Following Barr, Hitchcock pointed out that the master of International Style, Le Corbusier, had already by the 1930s incorporated regionalism into modern form with the Errazuris house in South America and his use of rubble stone in several projects. Hitchcock also praised Frank Lloyd Wright as the Michelangelo of the century, and less an enemy of the International Style than he claimed to be, concluding that there were many possibilities of expression within the frame of modern architecture. Gropius, as discussed above, also argued that the International Style in its original beginnings had been “regional in character” and developed out of the surrounding conditions. Sounding much like Mumford, Gropius argued that the Bauhaus had recognized that the machine could no longer be excluded as part of human life, but had also recognized the need to humanize machine living as early as the 1920s.

The debate did, however, bring out a recurrent critique of regionalism in architecture: that it was provincial, reactive, unimaginative, and, at times, overly conservative. While admitting in 1948 that some regionalism in architecture could be successful, Hitchcock had already partially disdained regionalism in the arts in 1942, writing that, “regionalism has a definite content of sentimentality.” At the 1948 conference, Barr demeaned the Bay Region style as an “international cottage style.” Following Barr, Hitchcock joined in this disparaging of the Bay Area’s cottage style, though as I argue below, there was an element of truth to their argument.

The critique was best represented, however, by Marcel Breuer’s response to a question about the contrasts between the International Style and a more “human” feeling architecture. Breuer retorted: “If ‘human’ is considered identical with redwood all over the place . . . I am against it.” In this Breuer was probably directly criticizing Wurster, who East Coast architects often derided as “redwood Bill.” Breuer’s quotation is perhaps the most cited reference to the 1948 debate, as evidence of the East Coast establishment’s demeaning interpretation of the Bay Region style, but the comment should be put in its wider context. Breuer immediately followed his attack on redwood with an attack on a dogmatic International Style: “If International Style is considered identical with mechanical and impersonal rigorism, down with International Style!” Breuer was, in other words, not rejecting the Bay Region style as much as rejecting the very division of modern architecture between international and human styles based on simplified clichés.

Still, while Henry-Russell Hitchcock jokingly thanked Barr for reminding him that his 1932 text on the International Style had left him “so many emergency exits,” there was quite a bit of refashioning of the International Style compared to the work presented at the 1932 exhibit. In the end, the debate had descended to a confusing argument about whether style existed or not and, if so, how did one define style. The confusion was perhaps best summed up by Frederick Gutheim, who stated that the audience had heard that night a group of speakers that were “all saying the same thing in different words,” and another group of speakers that were all saying the “same thing but meaning different things.”

For themselves, Bay Area regionalists also rejected the very idea of “style” in the first place. Mumford found his conception rejected in a response by Bay Area architects published in Architectural Record in May 1949, in which the group acknowledged commonalities, but
rejected any overall style. Wurster, for instance, called Mumford’s evocation of a Bay Regional style, “unfortunate.” Albert Hill wrote that: “I do not believe any man of integrity feels he is part of or is making a ‘style,’” while John Ekin Dinwiddie called the need to perceive in the Bay Region a style as a “sad commentary on our powers of observation.” Fred Langhorst shuddered at the thought of being part of a style, while Francis McCarthy called “style” a “hastening [of] obsolescence.” Still in the end, the idea of a Bay Area modernist tradition was defended; as Wurster stated, any regional quality to their architecture stemmed from “the fact that buildings which still look fresh and interesting today have been erected in the Bay Area every year since 1895.” Likewise, Gardner Dailey wrote that even if not a style, commonalities in their architecture flowed from a western Bay Area culture that encouraged “individualistic spirit,” and an “original creative spirit.” All of this, of course, was exactly Mumford’s point: that regional modernism in architecture was exemplified by a variety of different styles, that it left room for “personalities as different as Maybeck and Dailey and Wurster and Kump.”

As Sally Woodbridge and David Gebhard would later note, however, the very act of studying the architects brought a “midas-like touch” that established the impression of a unified style. Thus even though organizer Elizabeth Kendall Thompson claimed that her exhibition showed an “individualistic insistence on principle rather than style,” a sense of stylistic unity was presented by an exhibition at the San Francisco Museum of Art in October 1949, “Domestic Architecture of the Bay Region.” The exhibition brought together a summation of Bay Area regional modernism, with works by Anshen & Allen, Ernest Born, Joseph Esherick, Fred Langhorst, John Funk, Henry Hill, Francis McCarthy, Gardner Dailey, and Wurster’s new firm Wurster, Bernardi and Emmons (fig. 2.12). The exhibition featured a large array of responses toward modernist architecture for the single-family house of California, with a variety of roof shapes (flat or not), materials (mostly redwood, but not always) and window usage (often horizontally continuous, but often not). The buildings showed not only the influence of the International Style, but also the influence of Alvar Aalto, New Empiricism, and Wright.

In that exhibit, Gardner Daily introduced the audience to a regional modernist vision of suburban post-war house: the “large-small house.” The large-small house reflected the more informal living patterns of postwar Californians by eliminating numerous small specialized rooms for one large, relaxed social room. The new house therefore worked to eliminate wasted spaces, creating a smaller, more efficient house that seemed larger, and did provide the larger spaces where needed for postwar lifestyles. Service rooms, for instance, were largely gone, as was the basement; meanwhile while waste space, long halls, and stairs were all compressed as tightly as possible. Living spaces, however, were expanded, particularly with the use of a Wurster-like “one very large room.”

Prefacing the exhibition catalogue was an introduction by Mumford, in which he praised modern architecture “embedded in the very character of the region.” Mumford also rejected the false dichotomy of modernism versus regionalism that the uproar over his New Yorker article on the Bay Region Style had wrought. Mumford argued that the Bay Region architecture was throughly modern and varied, but not tied to the tags and cliches of the International Style, that it did not make “a fetish of the flat roof.” Rather than identifying modern architecture with Le Corbusier, modernism in the Bay Area allowed for varied responses and personalities. Modern architecture, Mumford argued, should be reconciled with “the setting of nature, the climate and
topography and vegetation, with all those regional qualities.” In sum, Mumford wrote, “Bay Region architecture both belongs to the region and transcends the region: it embraces the machine and it transcends the machine.”

Taken as a whole, Wurster and the regional modernists considered architecture not primarily as artwork, but as a setting for daily life: “architecture is not a goal . . . architecture is for life and pleasure and work and for people. The picture frame, and not the picture.” This philosophy was perhaps best expressed by William Wurster when recollecting his visit of 1957 to Le Corbusier’s Unité d’habitation in Marseille. Wurster described the building as beautiful, but uninhabitable, while concluding that Le Corbusier was “not an architect,” but one of the most “gifted sculptors in the world.” Le Corbusier’s use of architecture as sculpture was an approach, Wurster argued, that had “nothing to do with the human being.”

Landscape architecture

In his introduction to the large-small house, Dailey had also called attention to the integration of outdoor space into the living fabric of the house. The idea of a separate lawn was rejected for a garden that was part of the house. In this idea, Dailey reflected one of the prevailing attributes of Bay Area regional modernism: the near merger of landscape architecture with architecture. As Wurster had previously declared, architecture and landscape architecture were one thing. This central idea reflected the influence of both regionalism and modernism in the two professions. In each case, design was influenced by a new understanding of modern life, in which technology and the new postwar economy would lessen the requirements of domestic work, reduce transportation demands, while raising living standards. Taken together, these changes would greatly increase leisure time and recreational needs. At the same time, landscape designers, like architects, rejected classic principles of beaux-arts design and adopted new modern forms. As Dailey stated, the idea of the lawn as a “proper setting,” for the house, a sort of “parsley” around the roast, was rejected for more informal lifestyles.

Nowhere else was the conception that landscape and architecture should be integrated into one design and living whole recognized and enacted as in California. These ideas came together in the regional modernist garden in the Bay Area of the 1940s, led first by Thomas Church, and then Garrett Eckbo and his firm Eckbo, Royston and Williams. While not regional in today’s sense of using native plants, the 1940s landscape architects crafted unique expressions into landscapes that were both regional and modern. The freedom from beaux-arts symmetry allowed designers to employ modern, often bio-morphic forms, which vaguely recalled natural lakes, streams or other natural landscapes of the region. Moreover, this new landscape architecture envisioned a modern life in the regional setting of the Bay Area: a life in which modernity’s large amounts of leisure time would take place outdoors in California’s mild climate. These ideas were best encapsulated in Garrett Eckbo’s landmark text of landscape architecture, Landscape for Living, which in 1950 summed up a decade of thought by arguing that the garden was no longer a formal space of pure visual pleasure, but a setting for the “interaction of people and place.” The purpose of landscape architecture was the “formation of that interaction.”

In this sense, regional modernism did present a contrast to International Modernism. As Marc Treib has noted, the modernist fascination with the complex interweaving of spatial
volumes usually ended at the doorstep. For regional modernists, however, spatial volumes of the house inside and the garden outside were merged in one collaborative design approach that enlarged the feel and usable space of the house. Gardner Dailey’s large-small house, for instance, also seemed large because it did away with wasted yard space and integrated outdoor garden space into the overall house plan. As discussed well by Marc Treib, the Donnell garden and pool by Thomas Church in Sonoma, California, was one of the earliest embodiments of these ideas (fig. 2.13). Dell Upton discredits Church’s design, yet by defining the work as nature “shaped to the economy and domestic habits of mid-century Californians,” Upton acknowledges that Church created a garden landscape both modern and distinctly identifiable as regional.

Both the regional modern house and landscape garden were also heavily promoted in the general press, in magazines such as the Henry Luce publications of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*, as well as other major journals such as *Ladies Home Journal*, *House Beautiful*, *Saturday Evening Post*, and more especially, *Sunset*. *Sunset* was founded in 1898, on behalf of the railroad industry, to promote the West Coast as a living and vacation place to East Coast train travelers. In 1914, new owners shifted the magazine’s focus to glamorizing the western lifestyle generally. While promoting western natural wilderness areas as tourist attractions, the magazine substantially idealized an architecture of the West Coast that incorporated nature and region into middle class homes. Thus, *Sunset* moved rather easily from the redwood-shingled Berkeley home, to the California bungalow, to the low-key modernist homes of the regional modernists, in each case promoting an architecture of “western living.” In 1951, *Sunset Magazine* followed much of its readership to the South Bay, moving from San Francisco to Menlo Park, where its new corporate offices perfectly exemplified the regional modernist aesthetic and interaction of landscape architecture. From there, *Sunset* continues to promote a suburbanized vision of regional modernism in architecture and landscape design, a mission that has waned, but continued in some respects to this day.

**Rethinking Regional Modernism**

Regionalism in architecture is tricky business indeed, as Mumford and the Bay Area architects realized themselves at the time. Yet most treatments of the architecture of the time assume modernists of the Bay Area brought a more regional and therefore improved relationship with nature. Regionalism is frequently cited as the effort to build in unison with nature. No one, however, has yet looked critically at regional modernist architecture, nor considered it in the larger picture of regionalism in planning and urbanism. What, taken together, did all this architectural package of regionalism mean for the relationship between Bay Area citizens and the Bay Area’s natural environment?

Regional modernism does indeed present an alternative history to the commonplace understanding of modernism in the United States. However, rather than see it as a second, less travelled road of modern architecture, an opposite of International Modernism, we should use it to break down our understanding of modern architecture as monolithic or binary. This misunderstanding of regional modernism as a binary opposite of International Modernism is a based in understanding of regional modernism as limited in scope to a small collection of single-family houses of the Bay Area, as well as a failure to recognize the diversity of the Modern Movement
in architecture. The Bay Area did present the most complete, sustained package of regional modernist works in American architecture. Yet throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the same ideas were seen in domestic work across the country, if not the globe. This greatly complicates our idea of the region and how we define it. What, for instance, do we make of Harwell Hamilton Harris, who was often labelled a member of the Mumford’s Bay Region style and whose Havens House of 1941 in Berkeley, which combined natural wood with strike abstract geometry and the integration of indoor and outdoor spaces, is one the best examples of regional modernism in the Bay Area? Yet, Harris predominantly lived and worked in Los Angeles, first as a disciple of Richard Neutra. Indeed, many of the best examples of regional modernism are the Case Study houses of the 1940s, a Los Angeles based project of John Entenza featuring many architects working in the Los Angeles region. Looking through the Case Study projects, there is individual difference, but little regional variation between Los Angeles and the Bay Area. Is the region California or the Bay Area? Does regionalism extend to the entire state, despite the immense cultural differences between Los Angeles and San Francisco?

What happens when we extend this regionalism further? Walter Gropius’s small 1937 domestic house in Lincoln, Massachusetts is formally modern, but in many respects quite regional in its use of wood and local stone. One of the most notorious examples of International Modernism is Marcel Breuer’s 1948 model house presented in New York Museum of Modern Art’s courtyard. Breuer’s house, however, was clad in natural wood and looked quite similar in many respects to the small domestic works of California regional modernism. We can, of course, carry this line further afield to the work of Alvar Aalto and the New Empiricists who were acknowledged inspirations for Bay Area regionalists. Once again, the combination was modernist forms and natural wood, with some local stone featured in various elements. Indeed, Le Corbusier himself began his career as a regionalist and returned in the 1930s to the 1950s to regionalist elements such as rubble walls or brick vaults. Have we come full circle to Alfred Barr Jr.’s disparagement of the Bay Region architecture as an International Cottage style?

**Domestic versus institutional**

The divide, in fact, was not between modernism and International Modernism but between domestic architecture and corporate architecture. For corporate, governmental, or other professional clients Wurster’s humane regionalism largely disappeared. His schemes for the United Nations proposal for San Francisco and for the Golden Gateway Redevelopment recalled a Le Corbusian tower more than a redwood-clad regionalist work (fig. 2.14). Wurster’s work as master campus planner at places like the University of California, Berkeley, also appear to have little of the humane quality of places expressed in houses like the Gregory farmhouse. Indeed, much of the debate at the 1948 MOMA symposium broke down exactly on these lines between domestic work and corporate or public work. Barr’s seeming derogation of the Bay Area architecture as an “International Cottage Style” was, in fact, arguing that there was a divide between the designers of institutional work and the “designers of houses.” Identifying similarities between Bay Area, British, Swiss, and Scandinavian architecture, Barr noted one could see that the regionalization of modern architecture in single-family houses was itself an International Style. This new style replaced the *Neue Sachlichkeit* with a *Neue Gemütlichkeit*. 
Barr went on to note that when the master of the international cottage style William Wurster faced the design of an office building or a great project like the United Nations he fell back on “a pretty orthodox version of the International Style.”

In his attack on the Bay Region architecture as a “cottage style,” Hitchcock also meant that the architecture was focused on the individual, single-family, detached residence. This focus, Hitchcock noted, was of little consequence compared with the important housing work in the field of mass and group housing. Marcel Breuer similarly turned the distinction between regional modernism and the machine on its head, arguing that Le Corbusier’s houses were much less “machines for living” than West Coast suburban developments, with thousands of houses in one development laid out in rigid rows or determined curves, though “quite redwoody.” Peter Blake also faulted the regional modernist school for being only concerned with upscale villas rather than the techniques used to produce more and better housing, asking “what, after all, is more human than a roof over a man’s head?” Blake probably best summarized the opinions of modernist defenders at the symposium when he concluded that the Bay Region style is “lots of fun, and . . . a very attractive illustration, but I don’t think it has got very much to do with what we should be trying to do today.”

These comments perhaps ignored the work of Wurster and other Bay Area architects in mass housing seen in their war housing efforts. The comments also ignored the occasional corporate piece that was quite regional and modernist, such as Wurster’s office for the Schuckl Cannery company. Yet, these examples were isolated exceptions and the work in defense housing was also a rare step towards broader housing agenda that arose primarily from the downturn of architectural work in the depression and wartime. For the most part, Barr, Hitchcock, and the other critics were right: the Bay Regionalists combined regionalism and modernism in the domestic realm for single-family, upper-class residences in country settings, but in institutional work avoided regional materials for white towers that echoed the known International Style.

Like Wurster, another early regionalist Pietro Belluschi also reinforced this divide between regional domesticity and modern corporatism. Belluschi had early on crafted fine regional houses modeled after John Yeon and William Wurster. Yet it was also Belluschi that designed America’s first true glass-curtain walled International Style skyscraper with the Equitable Life Assurance Building of 1947 in Portland, Oregon. Thus a regionalist West Coast architect preceded both of New York’s master works of the International Style—the United Nations building of 1951 by Wallace K. Harrison and others; Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill’s Lever House of 1952; and Mies van der Rohe’s Seagram Building of 1958.

More Social, More Humane, More Natural?

Perhaps, however, the crucial difference was in part temporal. Kathleen James-Chakraborty has written that the regional modernist work portrayed by Elizabeth Mock in 1944 was too modest to “give adequate scope to the country’s postwar position as a global superpower.” Regional modernism was fine when crafting a few small houses for the elite or creating imaginary houses on paper for a mass audience in popular magazines. Regional modernism was, however, insufficient when the postwar era brought new prosperity and large-scale building in which the architect served the state abroad in the promotion of its image as a
“soft-weapon” of the cold war; or public institutions such as the university in dramatic campaigns of expansion; or modern international corporations in their attempt to publicize their modern progress and to reinforce American identity in Europe and the Middle East.\(^7^6\)

The division between the elite domestic house and the institutional or corporate setting leads us to further investigate the commonplace notion that Bay Area regional modernism promised a more humane, social, or natural vision for architecture. Given first, that our examples of this regional modernism are small-scale domestic houses for wealthy clients, and second, that the social nature of this art is expressed by somewhat abstract references to regional qualities, we must question just how much of a social art regional modernism was compared to International Modernism. Moreover, we must recognize that the overwhelming aspiration presented by regional modernism was the single family house set in nature. This very specific architectural ambition therefore helped promote a certain suburban vision of idealized domestic life. From Wurster’s early regionalist work, to the MOMA’s Built in the USA show, to the “Domestic Architecture in the Bay Area” show, to Ralph Rapson’s Greenbelt house for the Case Study Houses of the mid-1940s (fig. 2.15), one after another of these regional modernist visions glamorized the single-family house set in an isolated natural landscape. Certainly the domestic vision seemed more humble than International Modernism, but when the “cottage” land pattern was realized it brought devastating results for the environment.

Did regional modernism in the Bay Area succeed to be something more than a cliché? Was it a broader, more “critical,” response to the need to bring modern architecture to a unique place? Ultimately, this question cannot be resolved by looking solely at domestic architecture. The idea that the architecture of the single-family house for wealthy, or upper middle class residents, can define a critical regional response to modernity is by itself flawed. To truly build a modern culture sensitive to regional nature, citizens of an urban region needed to embrace as well regionalism in planning, regionalism in governance, regionalism in social equity, and regionalism in urban environmental planning. An introduction to regionalism and modernism in urban planning is therefore also necessary.

**Regional Modernism in Urban Planning**

The decades just before and after World War II stand out as the great decades for regionalism in urban thinking. Ideas by Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and Lewis Mumford were at the forefront of American thinking on urbanism, as well as how American society should be organized. In the earliest stages of the emerging profession of urban planning, these ideas sought to bring modern centralized and professionalized planning departments together with modern planning techniques of land use control—along with the desire to do all of this on a regional scale as well. These ideas are frequently mistaken as intended to decentralize the city, but in fact, they were based on the understanding that regionalism was happening already. The regional city was being born, and for planning to be truly effective it had to also think regionally.

Mumford was the pivotal figure in bringing regional ideas to American planning and connecting regional planning to regionalist architecture. Despite writing over thirty books, Mumford, one scholar claimed, was “one of the few men who have not ideas but an idea.”\(^7^7\) That idea was regionalism and it stemmed in large part from two grandfathers of regionalist thought in
American urban planning: Patrick Geddes and Ebenezer Howard. The regionalist approach, grounded in these two thinkers, attempted to balance modern urbanism with natural systems. Earlier generations of urbanists, grounded in the Frederick Law Olmsted approach, sought to balance urban growth with nature by creating wholly artificial natures in the form of large picturesque landscaped parks set in the center of urban cities, such as Central Park in New York and Golden Gate Park in San Francisco (fig. 2.16). Urban regionalists of the mid-twentieth century, however, sought first to study the natural landscape of the region and second to guide and control urban development by preserving existing natural landscapes for the recreational use of the regional city. Thus, few large parks or squares were built in the twentieth century before community actions in the 1960s brought renewed focus on small, urban parks. Regionalists sought regional open spaces for urban natural recreation.

The most important influence on the Mumford line of regionalist thinking was Patrick Geddes, a Scottish geographer influenced by French geographers before him, who developed the idea of the “regional survey” to study urban areas through their regional geography (fig. 2.17). Geddes argued that urban planning must begin with a survey of the natural region in which the city sat to understand the natural environment, how humans had responded to that natural environment, and the resulting complex interaction between humans and their environment. In his 1915 *Cities in Evolution*, Geddes identified that new technologies were dispersing humans across a widely growing urban landscape, for which Geddes invented the term “conurbation.” These new roles of technology became the critical idea on which Mumford would base his later arguments for regionalism.

The other grandfather of regionalist thought was Ebenezer Howard and his model of the Garden City developed in 1902 in his book *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*. Despite the work of Peter Hall, Carl Sussman, and others, Howard’s Garden City model is still frequently understood as a model of urban dispersal that sought to isolate people in small rural settlements. Howard’s model, however, was not one of dispersal but one that sought to concentrate populations into compact urban settlements, connected by regional rapid transportation, and separated by protected natural greenbelts (fig. 2.18, fig. 2.19). Howard’s Garden Cities would be of fixed population, but replicating, such that new cities would be formed one after another like, as Mumford would later describe it, cellular division. The model was today’s smart growth presented nearly a full century earlier.

Mumford translated these ideas to the United States, especially in his landmark 1938 *Culture of Cities*, a book of profound importance for Bay Area urban thinkers and all regionalists across the country. Mumford understood the threat of Geddes’s spreading conurbation already well underway in the 1920s and the power of Howard’s Garden City model to prevent the spread of the metropolis into a dispersed, low-density sprawl. Mumford specifically argued that the density required in the urban planning model in Howard’s Garden Cities made the “free-standing house impossible: I am still for the row house in cities.”

Mumford’s chance meetings with the architect Clarence Stein and the writer Benton Mackaye led to the formation of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) in 1923, an organization dedicated to bringing regional thinking to urban development in the United States. A young Catherine Bauer, the architects Frederick Ackerman and Henry Wright, the economist Stuart Chase, and the developer Alexander Bing were all significant members. The
RPAA published their regionalist viewpoint primarily in their collective journal The Survey, usually edited by Lewis Mumford. The Survey included articles espousing regionalism, land conservation, regional cultures, and regional rural development. Like Geddes, members of the RPAA argued that new technologies were freeing residents from the traditional city.

In the first issue of The Survey in 1925, Mumford defined this evolution as America’s “Fourth Migration.” After initial settlement, migrations westward, and migration into urban centers, the twentieth century would bring a fourth migration of people, industry, and offices out of the urban centers, but still within metropolitan regions. Liberated by new technologies, Mumford argued, this migration could not be stopped and any attempts to support the concentration of people in urban centers would “blindly run against the opportunities the automobile opens out.” With this inevitable migration, Mumford and the RPAA argued, there was the opportunity to guide it intelligently, to “turn it to better account by leading it into new channels.” Their main solution was the regional planning of urban areas to balance urban growth within the entire urban region.

The best known RPAA experiment in planning is the rural regional planning of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which reworked a poor regional valley by developing massive dam projects, electrifying and modernizing a rural region, and using regional development to encourage economic growth. The best examples of the RPAA urban thinking, however, are the remnants of their influence found in the New Deal era Greenbelt towns, which were placed within protective greenbelts cooperative communities centered on walkable town squares, community institutions, shared parks, and schools (fig. 2.20, fig. 2.21). Greenbelt towns also included numerous residential densities to attract a broad array of social groups.

At the same time, the RPAA, as part of their larger concern with regionalism, advocated a strong pro-conservation agenda. If regional topography and vegetation were important components for the formation of distinct, successful, and sustainable urban realms, it followed that the unique qualities of a region must be preserved in the face of urban development. Regional planning, as Mumford wrote in the 1925 issue, was “the New Conservation—the conservation of human values hand in hand with natural resources.” At the center of the RPAA’s environmental agenda was Benton MacKaye.

MacKaye was a Harvard trained forester and student of Gifford Pinchot at the U.S. Forest Service. MacKaye extended his wilderness advocacy to a more general concern with the human-nature relationship, which he found centralized in the city-country relationship. MacKaye and the others in the RPAA were thus concerned the expanding urbanization of undeveloped agricultural lands. MacKaye had already laid the ground for Mumford’s later attacks on suburbanization in his 1928 book, The New Exploration: A Philosophy of Regional Planning. In this book, and in numerous subsequent articles, MacKaye argued that the greatest challenge facing regional planners was controlling the automobile. MacKaye critiqued the automobile not only as an agent of physical sprawl and offensive commercialism, of billboards and “hot dog kennels,” but also as the vector for metropolitan culture, an invasive exotic steadily colonizing rural America and erasing its cultural distinctiveness. MacKaye called this combined invasion of automobile and its culture “the overcity,” which would overwhelm the city and its surrounding nature. In contrast, regionalism in planning would ensure connections between city and country, allowing for open
space, self-sustaining cities and towns, and connections for rural life to the cosmopolitan cultural resources of the city.\textsuperscript{93}

MacKaye saw regional planning as a system of “embankments” to hold the “deluge” in spreading urban growth in check. MacKaye felt that as America became increasingly urbanized, and modernity increased leisure time, its citizens would need increased contact with natural wild spaces, which in turn needed to be protected from urban growth. MacKaye’s largely realized proposal for the Appalachian Trail was based on the understanding of continued urban growth in the Appalachian south and Washington, D.C. area and the need to ensure outdoor natural recreation space close at hand. Thus, the RPAA was one of the earliest groups to understand the severe environmental effects of run-away urbanism and to connect environmental philosophy to the urban realm. The group stands as an important counterpoint to the larger history of environmental conservation focused on the preservation of wilderness far from the urban realms.

**Conclusion: The Defeat of Regionalism?**

Regionalists such as those in the RPAA are often painted as the losers in American urban planning development in the postwar era and presented in contrast to the modernists, who achieved substantial large-scale development in the central city. Yet a number of “modernists” envisioned the modern tools of planning to be enacted at the regional level, and in many respects, downtown urban renewal and regional urban growth control were integrated components of the same vision. The separation of the visions of regionalism from modernism in planning would hinder the success of both urban renewal and regional open space conservation in the postwar era. Urban renewal programs could not succeed without growth control and planning at the regional scale; while the natural greenbelt vision of Mumford, MacKaye, and others would only be partially realized through long and costly legal battles or difficulty negotiated transfers of land from federal, state, or local government agencies to park districts. In any case, the historical critiques of urban renewal need to be placed next to our historical appreciation of open space conservation.

At the same time, the historical understanding of regional modernism in architecture must be placed next to a broader culture of regional modernism. While difficult to define as a style, the culture of regional modernism in architecture provided a basis experimentation in harmonizing modern architecture with the qualities of a local place. There was also, however, a culture of regional modernism in urban planning, and indeed, there was a culture of regional modernism in Bay Area commercial architecture as well. In each case, the relationship between the *regionalism* of the project and the *modernism* of the project was fraught with difficulty and ultimately flawed. To continue to explore this flawed relationship, we must turn in the next two chapters to the culture of regional modernism that existed in urban planning in the Bay Area, before expanding our analysis of regional modernism to the commercial realm.
Chapter Two: Notes


4 Of course, both regionalism and modernism have very complicated histories and it is beyond the scope of this current dissertation introduction to explore them. Certainly different ideas about regionalism gained influence in architecture at various times and places around the world before the 1930s, the Catalan Modernisme movement being an easy one to recall. At the same time modernity can be dated to the industrial revolution and the particular urban reaction to it, especially exemplified in late 19th century Paris. For the purposes of this dissertation at this stage, modernism is limited to the early 20th century movement in architecture, the planning responses that shortly followed based on the ideas of Le Corbusier and CIAM; while regionalism is limited to the American version that emerged in the 1930s.


6 Robert L. Dorman, Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). Dorman argues for an intellectual movement for regionalism between the two world wars, but he argues this movement took place not in cities but in small college towns, non-urban artists colonies, and provincial capitals. Region, for Dorman, was posed against all of the modern tendencies urban life represented. Donna M. Cassidy also cites the generalized claim that regionalism in art was reactionary and conservative, in “‘On the Subject of Nativeness,’ Masden Hartley and New England Regionalism,” Winterthur Portfolio 29, no. 4 (Winter, 1994), 227.


21 John Yuan’s 1937 Watzek house was a predecessor to Pietro Belluschi’s domestic regionalist work, discussed in Meredith Clausen, Pietro Belluschi: Modern American Architect (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT University Press, 1994). John Cava writes that the 1948 exhibition gave the notion of a “regional modern architecture credence within the profession and the public alike, both of whom were quickly seeing the stylized conventions of the International Style leading to a dead end.” John Cava, “Thoughts on the Development of a Regional Architecture,” Arcade, Architecture and Design in the Northwest (Autumn, 2001).


Bernard rightly points out that this vision was in many ways a typical picturesque suburban ideal for an affluent class, determined to avoid the area from resembling the working class flatlands below in both urban form and architecture. Bernard, Architecture and Regional Identity, 21. Keeler was a regionalist as well, writing in The Craftsman that, “the city is but a fragment of a broad panorama.” Ibid, 18.

Wurster stated in 1964 about Aalto, “If I have an architectural god, it is he.” Suzanne B. Reiss, “College of Environmental Design, University of California, Campus Planning, and Architectural Practice,” Regional Cultural History Project, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 117. As Dean of MIT’s architecture school at the time, Wurster was also instrumental in getting Aalto the commission at MIT for the Baker House Dormitories in 1948.


Some of the vernacular works that may have inspired Wurster were mentioned by Wurster in his 1954 article, “California Architecture for Living” including: generic redwood barns; General Vallejo's Adobe Ranch (1838) in Sonoma county; the Larkin House (1834) in Monterey; and the Fort Ross Chapel (1825) in Jenner. Wurster, “California Architecture For Living,” California Monthly (April 1954).

Part of Wurster’s humbleness included not being a prodigious writer or theoretician. The main samples of Wurster’s writings are: “A House in the Hills,” Sunset 65 (July 1930); “San Francisco Bay Portfolio,” Magazine of Art (December 1944); “From Log Cabin to Modern House: An Architect Urges a Return to Simple Fundamentals in Planning our New Homes,” New York Times Magazine, January 20, 1946; “The Outdoors in Residential Design,” Architectural Forum (September 1949); “A Personal View,” in Domestic Architecture of the San Francisco Bay Region (San Francisco: San Francisco Museum of Art, 1949); “California Architecture For Living,” California Monthly (April 1954). These articles were all accessed at the William Wurster / WBE Collection, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley.


Alfred H. Barr, Jr., “What is Happening to Modern Architecture? A Symposium at the Museum of Modern Art,” 6-7. Barr also stated that the International Style authors had “made fun of doctrinaire functionalists who designed housing for ‘some proletarian superman of the future.’”

Gropius also stated that Mumford’s comments regarding the Bay Region architecture were exactly the same word modernists used twenty-five years earlier about modernism. “What is Happening to Modern Architecture? A Symposium at the Museum of Modern Art,” 11.


William Wurster et al., “Is There a Bay Region Style?”

William Wurster et al., “Is There a Bay Region Style?”

William Wurster et al., “Is There a Bay Region Style?”


This exhibit had also been proceeded in part when Bay area architecture Ernest Kump gave a lecture on Bay Area architecture in Melbourne, Australia in October, 1948. This speech led to a Kump organized tour of Bay Area architecture across Australia. See R. Boyd, *Victorian Modern* (Melbourne: Architectural Students' Society, Royal Victorian Institute of Architects, 1947); *The Age* (Melbourne, October 9, 1948), 2; citied in Jane Castle, “Vernacular, Regional, and Modern: Lewis Mumford’s Bay Region Style and the Architecture of William Wurster.”


See also, Lewis Mumford and Alfred H. Barr, Jr., “What is Happening to Modern Architecture, A Symposium at the Museum of Modern Art,” 21 (Written letters following the symposium printed along with the symposium contents).


Sally Woodbridge, ed., *Bay Area Houses*, 121.

Suzanna Reiss, “College of Environmental Design, University of California Campus Planning, and Architectural Practice: An Interview,” Interviews on Architecture and Landscape Architects of the San Francisco Bay Area, Regional Cultural History Project, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 98-99; Jane Castle,”Vernacular, Regional, and Modern: Lewis Mumford’s Bay Region Style and the Architecture of William Wurster.” Wurster also made a 1937 visit to view European architecture and found Le Corbusier’s building for the Salvation Army in Paris to be completely unsuited for its purpose.

Gardner Dailey, “The Post-War House.”


Marc Treib, “Aspects of Regionality and the Modern(ist) Garden in California,” in *Regional Garden Design in the United States*, Marc Treib and Therese O’Mally, eds.,(Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1995), 5-6. In this article, Treib develops “three aspects of regionality,” including ecology (the use of native materials or non-native materials in natural orders), idea (the reflection of existing regional culture), function (the predominant uses of the garden as a reflection of the region), and style (the predominance of certain aesthetics in a certain region at a certain time).

This list is based on Andrew M. Shanken, *194X: Architecture, Planning, And Consumer Culture On The American Home Front* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), and on my own extensive reading of these publications from the period.


The Farnsworth House by Mies van der Rohe is the obvious example of a domestic architecture of pure International Style. The Farnsworth House, however, should be recognized as an extremely limited sample of domestic modernism, and one at least from the resident’s point of view, was a failure. See, Alice T. Friedman, *Women and the Making of the Modern House* (New York: Abbeville, 1999).


Of course, one could argue that Belluschi's Portland tower was regional because its heavy use of aluminum reflected the strong aluminum industry in the region and his work with the Bonneville Power Agency around aluminum. See, George L. Clafen, Jr., “Looking For Regionalism in All The Wrong Places,” (unpublished paper), citing Belluschi, “Office Building 194X,” *Architectural Forum* (May 1943), 106-112.


Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 154.

Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 153; Patrick Geddes, Cities in Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1915). Geddes first distinguished between paleotechnic society of the older industrial age, and the emerging neotechnic society evolving from new technologies of power generation, combustion engine, and communications.


Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 88; Carl Sussmann, Planning the Fourth Migration: The Neglected Vision of the Regional Planning Association (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1976). Jane Jacobs was the most famous to criticize the Mumford based planning ideology of the Garden City as one that promoted planned decentralization at the destruction of local urban neighborhood life in The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961). For a more sophisticated discussion of the interrelationship between the Garden City ideas and suburbanization that nonetheless conflates the Garden City ideas with suburbanization, see Greg Hise, Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth Century Metropolis (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999).

Hall credits Howard’s experience as a homesteader in Nebraska, a personal failure for Howard as a farmer, but one in which he realized benefit of granting pioneers free land opening up the possibility of economic development and community growth for those otherwise trapped in cities.


Lewis Mumford and Alfred H. Barr, Jr., “What is Happening to Modern Architecture, A Symposium at the Museum of Modern Art,” 21 (Written letters following the symposium printed along with the symposium contents).

88 Along with the works cited above, for the specific argument that regional planning and the regional city emerged as a planning response to the problem of decentralization, see Andrew Meyers, “Invisible Cities: Lewis Mumford, Thomas Adams, and the Invention of the Regional City, 1923-1929,” Business and Economic History 27, no. 2 (Winter 1998), 292-306.


Chapter Two: Illustrations

Figure 2.1: The cover page for “What is Happening to Modern Architecture?” shows some of the participants and speakers at the symposium. Source: “What is Happening to Modern Architecture? A Symposium at the Museum of Modern Art,” The Bulletin of the Museum of Modern Art 15, no. 3, (Spring 1948).
Figure 2.2: Edward Hopper, Gas, 1940. Source: The Museum of Modern Art, New York, NY.

Figure 2.3: Public Works Administration Mural Art, Fresno Unified School District Administration Building, Fresno, California, 1936. Source: Photo by author.
Figure 2.5: MOMA 1944 Built in the USA Exhibition Catalogue Cover featuring John Funk’s Heckendorf House, Modesto, California, 1939. Source: Museum of Modern Art, *Built in the USA: 1932, 1944* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1944).
Figure 2.6: Frank Lloyd Wright in MOMA 1944 Built in the USA Exhibition Catalogue. Source: Museum of Modern Art, *Built in the USA: 1932, 1944* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1944).
Figure 2.7: Interior, Swedenborgian Church, San Francisco. Source: Leslie Mandelsohn Fruedenheim, *Building with Nature: Roots of San Francisco Bay Architecture* (Santa Barbara: Peregrine Smith, 1974), 35.

Figure 2.8: First Church of Christ, Scientist in a Roy Flamm Photograph from 1955. Source: Roy Flamm Photographs of Buildings Designed by Bernard Maybeck, The Bancroft Library. University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 2.9: Gregory Farmhouse, 1929. Source: William W. Wurster/Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection, 1922-1974, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Figure 2.11: Indoor-outdoor relationship shown by the Carl L. Voss Residence, Big Sur, CA, William Wurster architect, 1931. Source: Roger Sturtevant, Photographer, William W. Wurster/Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection, 1922-1974, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley, California.
Figure 2.12: Cover Page for Domestic Architecture in the Bay Area exhibit. Source: Domestic Architecture of the San Francisco Bay Region, (San Francisco: San Francisco Museum of Art, 1949).
Figure 2.13: Dewey Donnell Pool House. Source: Thomas D. Church Collection, 1933-1977, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley, California.
Figure 2.14: Wurster’s plans for the Golden Gateway redevelopment of San Francisco’s old produce market were very much like a classic Le Corbusian tower. Source: William W. Wurster/Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection, 1922-1974, Environmental Design Archives, University of California, Berkeley, California.
Figure 2.15: Ralph Rapson, Greenbelt House. Source: Esther McCoy: Modern California Houses: Case Study Houses 1945-1962 (Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977).
Figure 2.16: Bird's-eye view of Golden Gate Park, H. B. Eliott, 1892. Source: Robert B. Honeyman, Jr., Collection of Early Californian and Western American Pictorial Material, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Figure 2.18: Howard’s model of the Garden City and greenbelt. Source: Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of To-morrow* (London: Faber and Faber, 1946), 22.
Figure 2.20, 2.21: Greenbelt, Maryland combined modern apartment housing right with more regional styled housing units left, all set on internal circulation pathways separated from the automobile. Source: Photos by author.
Chapter Three

A Space for Living,

The Telesis Legacy in Urban Planning

“Is this the best we can do?” Telesis, 1940.
The “A Space for Living” Exhibit

In some respects, the Telesis exhibit of 1940, “A Space for Living,” marks the beginning of professional city planning in San Francisco (fig. 3.1). Certainly, San Francisco had earlier plans, such as the street grids of Jean-Jacques Vioget and Jaspar O’Farrell, or the visionary Daniel Burnham plan of 1905. Yet at the time, San Francisco was one of the few major U.S. cities without an independent professional city planning department. Planning ideas were dispersed among smaller agencies and neighborhood institutions, and the public had little understanding of city planning as a true profession. The Telesis exhibit would help change all this, making the argument for strong, centralized planning.

As an intellectual meeting group for architects, planners, landscape architects and others interested in discussing the urban environment, Telesis began meeting in mid-1939 in several North Beach apartments or studios. After several months of meetings and the use of a vacant store on Clay Street to assemble their materials, the Telesis show opened at the San Francisco Museum of Art on June 29, 1940, with several hundred in attendance the first night (fig. 3.2). The exhibit was inspired by other CIAM-inspired architectural and urban exhibits of the era, such as that by the MARS Group in London, which several members of Telesis had seen. The exhibit was divided into four distinct sections: “man lives,” “man works,” “man plays,” and “man is served,” and demonstrated an attempt to integrate these various aspects of urban living into holistic, modern approach to planning (fig. 3.3). This approach was reflected in the definition of the group’s name: Telesis meant “progress intelligently planned and directed,” and would evolve into a new concept for urbanism—that of “environmental design,” which united the different disciplines of architecture, landscape architecture and city planning into one common design agenda.

Over the next several months, the exhibit brought in over ten thousand San Francisco residents to view the promise of sound and comprehensive planning (fig. 3.4). The local press acclaimed it as the “first time in the West that the related problems of the surroundings in which men live have been examined so thoroughly and so deliberately for the benefit of the public.” As The San Francisco Chronicle stated, the exhibit asked of San Franciscans, “Is this the best we can do?” while displaying portraits of the squalor of the slums, the dreary places of employment, the lack of outdoor recreation areas, and the inefficiencies of transportation (fig. 3.5). Almost all Bay Area governmental players and the leading members of the civic elite attended the exhibit. Some forty civic leaders became official sponsors of Telesis. Professional support and acclaim arrived from modernist design leaders such as Marcel Breuer, Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Phillip Goodwin, and the New York Museum of Modern Art. The exhibit drew Diego Rivera, who was still in San Francisco after working on his frescos for the 1939 fair on Treasure Island, and gave a positive response for the show’s social concerns, and the way it brought those concerns to public attention. The exhibit also brought Roosevelt brain trust member Rexford Tugwell, who called the show “an encouraging sign of renewed vitality in American democracy,” and responded enthusiastically to the Telesis members: “Well, you're on the right track, keep at it. The ones running things now are going to die off and then you'll be in charge!”

The public enthusiasm the exhibit inspired, and the active leadership of Telesis members, put the city planning profession at the forefront of San Francisco urban growth debates, and built
momentum toward San Francisco developing a true master plan. The exhibit soon led to the creation of a planning department in 1942, with Telesis members as its first staff members. After the short, ineffective tenure of L. Deming Tilton as the first City Planning Director, Telesis founder T. J. Kent was appointed planning director in 1946, where he published the first official city master plan. The exhibit also inspired the San Francisco Housing Association to expand from a housing reform advocacy group to a group concerned with city planning overall, renaming itself the San Francisco Planning and Housing Association. The Association soon released a report, “First Steps to a Master Plan for San Francisco,” in 1941 that presented a Telesis-inspired argument that San Francisco needed to develop a master plan, and indeed borrowed directly from Telesis imagery (fig. 3.6, 3.7). The Planning and Housing Association in turn became San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (later Urban Research Association), the principal non-governmental agency involved with San Francisco urban renewal programs and an important voice in city planning debates ever since. Telesis members would go on to play prominent roles in the majority of the early city planning debates as they “seized the levers of planning power” in the San Francisco region — they assumed principal leadership positions in planning departments around the Bay Area, founded in 1948 the Department of City and Regional Planning at UC Berkeley, and in 1959 the College of Environmental Design (CED) that integrated planning, architecture, and landscape architecture. Telesis members led CED departments for decades, graduating and influencing generations of planners for the Bay Area.

**Telesis in Context**

The few mentions of Telesis in San Francisco histories typically associated the group with the beginnings of urban renewal. Three principal themes, however, dominated the 1940 exhibit: renewing urban slums, slowing down suburban growth to preserve an urban greenbelt, and creating a regional planning agency for the entire Bay Area. These themes remained Telesis’s main points of advocacy, which they carried on through other exhibits, pamphlets, and professional networking over the next decade of their existence. While their agenda did intend to renew urban downtowns, its primary goal was the restructuring of the urban region to control urban growth and ensure that did overwhelm the natural landscapes of the Bay Area. Their 1940 exhibit was the first to highlight the environmental dangers of runaway suburban expansion. “Is this the best we can do?” then was not limited to just housing, but asked the more general question, “Shall we allow our cities to grow in their usual haphazard fashion? Can we afford such waste?” On the verge of the Bay Area’s great post-war suburban expansion, long before today’s smart growth, urban growth boundaries, or New Urbanist regional planning, Telesis presented an urban vision to both contain sprawl and accommodate growth.

Researchers and scholars continue typically to separate modern architecture and urban planning from the grassroots environmental movement that emerged in the 1960s, which is typically credited with the regulations that sought to limit pollution and preserve open space from urban development. Under this interpretation, a “post-modern” movement contested modernist planning regimes. In fact, urban environmentalism was in part a subset of the modernist project in planning. So-called grass roots movements were often collaborative efforts between planners and citizen groups that grew out of Telesis’s emphasis on citizen education.
The Telesis idea of “environmental design” shared a common heritage with environmentalism, for both attempted to unify nature, place, and man’s built environment. As a memo showing a draft Telesis credo exemplifies: the three headlines “new architecture,” “city planning” and “open space,” were drawn across the top, with arrows drawn connecting them, emphasizing that they were co-equal parts of a single vision.  

Members such as T. J. Kent, Mel Scott, Garret Eckbo, Fran Violich, and notable collaborators such as Dorothy Erskine and Catherine Bauer Wurster, all played pivotal roles in the emergence of Bay Area environmental planning mechanisms. From Telesis can be traced the roots of key environmental organizations such as the Bay Area Citizens for Regional Recreation and Open Space, People for Open Space, and others. Telesis members played a role in the 1960s movement “Save the Bay,” which halted urban development on the Bay and laid the groundwork for reducing water pollution. The creation of the two most important mechanisms for protecting the bay as well as the Bay Area’s open spaces—the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) and the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)—were both realizations of Telesis ideas. Theirs was a course not fully adopted, but their solutions underscore some of the region’s most profound environmental solutions.

This vital link between environmentalism and modern planning points out the contradictions of modernity that continue to plague environmentalism and planning today. For instance, it is still not often recognized that environmental politics are a tool of social power and frequently the vision of one class or race, that often fail to integrate the objectives or knowledge of local communities. The same vision of regional environmental design that brought the Bay Area successes such as the protection of the Bay and an open space greenbelt, also brought urban renewal to the region’s dense urban areas that housed the majority of its minorities. That same vision also ignored the spaces of intense pollution that were concentrated in the neighborhoods of racial minorities. Thus, despite the success in preserving open spaces and the Bay, the fixation on landscape preservation and aesthetics concealed the deeper reality of unsustainable everyday practices, and the deliberate ignorance of racialized spaces of intense environmental pollution. In short, this chapter asks the overarching question: are green spaces and brown spaces part of the same urban vision, and, if so, how can we reconcile these two environmental visions to build everyday habits for a more sustainable future?

Despite the success of Telesis’s 1940 exhibition, not all reviews were positive. An editorialist in The San Francisco Chronicle argued that the project was certainly commendable, but did not show anything not already seen in the Bauhaus planning ideas. Stull objected to the sameness of the mass-housing solution: “The rugged individualist American instinctively revolts against mass housing projects, neighborhood units and superblock treatments as Telesis phrases it.” Despite that, Stull’s editorial argued that San Francisco desperately needed Telesis’s larger planning agenda and asked for more concrete planning from Telesis, rather than simple abstract Bauhaus flavored images offered as solutions. The “ideal city on the wall map is,” the editorialist wrote, “an abstract example” rather than a real plan for San Francisco. Over the next forty plus years, real planning ideas is precisely what Telesis members would give the Bay Area.
The Telesis Membership

These Telesis planning ideas grew out of the unique collaborative climate of the Depression and the New Deal, as well as a unique circumstance in which a number of young and local design practitioners came together in a single time and place. Telesis members were, for the most part, young architects or landscape architects, and perhaps the first generation of native Bay Area designers. Many of the Telesis founders came out UC Berkeley’s architecture school, in its old Arts and Crafts building on the north side of campus, known as “the Ark.” Francis Violich would later describe the nucleus of the group as “Old Ark rebels.” Each had adopted a broader concern for social problems during the Great Depression and the New Deal, and turned to planning to solve urban social problems.

The key image of the beginning of Telesis is when Jack Kent and Violich set out in 1939 to gather donations for their exhibit, and their first stop was the modernist home of Dorothy Erskine on Telegraph Hill. The meeting brought together the two key founding members of the group, and the key person that would help their group reach a larger, more significant audience. Kent was a native San Franciscan from the wealthy St. Francis Wood district, who had developed a politically active background as a Berkeley architecture student in his early years at the off-campus Stiles Hall—a center for political discussion and activism—where he participated in advocacy on social issues such as racial discrimination, union rights, peace, and racial equality. Through his experience at Stiles Hall and exposure to the inequalities of the depression, Kent became frustrated with his father’s architectural practice and its focus on “families and people who had money.” Kent began to look at “the social significance of architecture as practiced in our society.” No one, Kent lamented, “seemed to be able to do anything about those slums and bad housing for poor people.” It was this failure of architecture that, “made me susceptible to thinking about city planning.” Kent’s social ambitions, however, remained aimless until he returned from a tour of modern housing in Europe in 1939 and met Fran Violich at Berkeley house party. Violich was the first student from California to attend MIT’s city planning school (the nation’s second such school). Kent approached him to ask, “tell me about MIT.” Kent and Violich became fast, kindred souls of planning, and their interest was the driving force in the group’s formation.

Like Kent, Violich was an area native, from the Sunset District of San Francisco, and an architecture student at UC Berkeley, though in landscape architecture, where he learned to relate “the built environment to its own unique native landscape.” Violich had joined Berkeley’s Department of Landscape Architecture, and together with Kent, the two founded Berkeley’s Department of City and Regional Planning. Both went on to lengthy careers of scholarship and planning education. Based on a 1941-42 study tour, Violich published one of the first texts on Latin American Housing and urban planning: Cities of Latin America: Housing and Planning to the South in 1943. Kent published his The Urban General Plan in 1964, a landmark and one of the founding texts for the field of comprehensive urban planning.

The programs of the New Deal, and the contacts made there, played a critical role in the evolution of Telesis. Kent returned to his first planning job at the Berkeley regional office of the National Resources Planning Board. Violich joined the New Deal’s Farm Security Administration, a program to provide housing to migrant workers and dust bowl refugees.
the FSA, Violich united with Vernon DeMars and Garret Eckbo. The three were, as Violich would later note, “highly stimulated by the programs of Roosevelt's Farm Security Administration,” which “woke us up to new possibilities in our fields.” Just as Violich inspired Kent to goto planning school, Eckbo was apparently introduced to landscape architecture through a chance meeting with Violich, then a student in the field at Berkeley (fig. 3.10). In 1936, Eckbo went to Harvard for graduate studies, where with James Rose and Dan Kiley, he would be inspired by Bauhaus refugee Walter Gropius, who brought modernism to the architecture department. Using Gropius as a model for landscape architecture, and significantly inspired by the concurrent Bay Area practice of Thomas Church, Eckbo, Kiley, and Rose would lead a revolt against Beaux-arts formalism in the field. Eckbo published a series of articles in Pencil Points, and with Rose and Kiley, published a series of seminal articles in 1939 in Architectural Record that anticipated postwar modernist landscape design.

Eckbo returned to the Bay Area in 1938 to join the FSA, and he quickly joined the Telesis group. Eckbo would claim the FSA led him to recognize the “importance of social issues in landscape design.” Eckbo’s social concerns would apparently overtake him, for he was so committed to the cause, he briefly joined a Richmond shipyard and worked on the “hot slab,” pounding big steel beams with a sledgehammer. After the war, Eckbo acted out his belief that modernist landscape design could bring about a more equitable society, largely through the design work of the firm he founded with Robert Royston and Ed Williams, which later became Eckbo, Dean, Austin and Williams (EDAW). Eckbo’s canonical 1950 Landscape for Living brought an influential modern approach to California regional garden design.

Eckbo’s companion at the FSA, Vernon DeMars, was one of Telesis’s founding members of 1939 and would become one of the Bay Area’s most important architects of the postwar period (fig. 3.11). After the FSA, DeMars worked on several housing projects, such as Easter Hill Village, and redevelopment projects like the Golden Gateway center. One of DeMars’ most known architectural accomplishments was, with Donald Hardison and Lawrence Halperin, the UC Berkeley’s student center complex, with a group of buildings including Zellerbach Hall. As part of that complex, upper and lower Sproul Plaza, were inspired in part by his and his wife’s love of theater.

DeMars had a life-long interest in the central area in front of San Francisco’s Ferry Building and its great potential to be, as Sproul Plaza became, a thriving urban plaza and social gathering place. In the late 1950s, DeMars worked diligently on several schemes to prevent the planned Embarcadero Freeway from precluding the possibility of a central urban plaza in front of the Ferry Building. In later years, he fought for the demolition of the freeway, and when it was damaged after the 1989 earthquake, he fought against plans to rebuild the freeway or replace it with a ground-level freeway, and for the urban plaza which is so successfully present today.

Meanwhile, at the NRPB, Kent would met Mellier (Mel) Scott, a journalist turned planner, and his wife Geraldine, a landscape architect. The two were passionate advocates who got “hooked on public housing and really did believe it was going to save the world.” After a European tour of modern housing for much of the year 1939, the two returned to Los Angeles and helped found a housing group, the Citizens Housing Council. While soliciting advice from Alice Griffith, San Francisco’s housing advocate, they bumped into Francis Violich, who brought them to the in-progress Telesis exhibit preparations. The Telesis exhibit inspired Scott, who
Scott returned to Los Angeles, to organize a Los Angeles Telesis and put out a second Telesis exhibit there, “Now We Plan.” Through Telesis, Scott later confessed, he began “to understand that housing was only one aspect of the urban environment and that planning was much more important.” He then got involved with writing children’s educational books about urban planning for Los Angeles, which broadened his involvement in planning. A job offer for Mel from the National Resourced Planning Board brought the couple to the Bay Area, and Scott joined T. J. Kent in the NPRB office. Scott remained in the Bay Area and in the planning profession as a consultant and professor, though his real influence would come through his writing. His 1964 *American City Planning Since 1890* became the classic history of the profession and his 1959 *The San Francisco Bay Area, A Metropolis in Perspective* remains the standard text on Bay Area planning history.

Scott’s wife, Geraldine (Gerry) Knight Scott, was an active member of Telesis from the first meetings, and continued to use her base in landscape architecture to play a larger role in recreation planning, housing issues, and raising environmental awareness (fig. 3.12). After Telesis, Scott came to feel that private landscape architecture practice was too limited for her “social conscious had grown . . . very much from all that experience. It broadened my understanding of social.” Much of her postwar work therefore involved the public realm, whether housing, schools or museums, including her best know work the Oakland Museum done with Dan Kiley. Gerry Scott, like many in Telesis, would go on to serve as a prominent professor at Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design, and a role model for future women in landscape architecture.

At the Rural Resettlement Agency, while Vernon DeMars was a staff member designing the layout of migrant labor camps, he met Corwin Mocine and brought him into Telesis (fig. 3.13). Mocine had graduated from Berkeley with a degree in landscape architecture, but Telesis turned him into a life-long planner. He then went to San Mateo County Planning Department to help craft their open-space plan, and was active in Telesis up until the war. After the war Mocine became the first city planning director for Phoenix, before returning to the Bay Area in 1949 to lead the planning departments of Berkeley, and then Oakland. He joined UC Berkeley’s Department of City and Regional Planning faculty in 1961 and later served as president of the American Institute of Planners.

Serge Chermayeff joined Telesis in 1942 and brought in his background working with German architect Erich Mendelsohn and his experience with the British CIAM group MARS. Chermayeff lent new energy and authority to the group, and published an important article on the Telesis program in *Pencil Points*, gaining valuable publicity for the group. For Chermayeff, Telesis reconciled European modernism and regionalism, bringing together Gropius with Lewis Mumford, Raymond Unwin and le Corbusier. The “social costs of unplanned development are becoming greater,” Chermayeff wrote, thereby requiring the designer to use scientific, comprehensive planning and to “acknowledge that the scientific method is the dominant attitude.”

Related members and organizations also played an important role in Telesis. While not formally in Telesis, Catherine Bauer was inspirational and affiliated figure, and attended some Telesis meetings. While teaching at Harvard in the 1940s, Bauer served as editor of the journal *TASK*, prepared by a similar organization of young architects committed to planning. Indeed,
several Telesis members such as Francis Violich, Vernon De Mars, and Garrett Eckbo all wrote for TASK. Bauer’s classic book, Modern Housing, was the guide for many of the young architects/planners on their inevitable European tour of modern architecture.\textsuperscript{49} William Wurster was another inspiration and also a frequent visitor to Telesis meetings—he recalled a Telesis meeting he attended with Erich Mendelsohn in 1953.\textsuperscript{50}

The most important local contact and ultimate long-term collaborator with Telesis was Kent and Violich’s first supporter from 1939: Dorothy Erskine (fig. 3.14). Erskine, along with her husband Morse, were leaders in the San Francisco Housing Association, which was founded in 1910 by Alice Griffith (in some respects Dorothy’s role model) and Dr. Langley Porter to push for housing reform and an end to blighted living in tenements. The group had pushed for San Francisco to establish one of the nation’s earliest public housing authorities, which opened in 1937.\textsuperscript{51} Dorothy and Morse became citizen students of city and regional planning in the 1930s by attending an experimental audit seminar on social issues taught at the UC Berkeley School of Social Welfare by Alexander Meiklejohn and then visiting professor Catherine Bauer. Erskine became more directly involved in planning when she was drawn into a 1937 survey of Chinatown with Alexander Meiklejohn led by Alice Griffith. The survey was an early response the 1937 Federal Housing Act, which required such surveys to demonstrate blight, and thereby qualify for federal funds.\textsuperscript{52} When she became involved with Telesis in 1939, her belief that social problems could only be solved through city planning was completed.\textsuperscript{53}

Erskine’s influential role in San Francisco politics is hard to discern—she had no formal political power, and surprisingly contributed little financially to organizations. Indeed, she gave the young Kent and Violich only ten dollars that first day. However, Erskine emerged as perhaps the most important Bay Area environmentalist of the period from the 1940s to the 1960s because of her role as a grass-roots catalyst. Kent would later claim that, “from Dorothy I learned that citizen effort can make a difference in improving the San Francisco environment and the setting for human life.”\textsuperscript{54} Virtually all Bay Area environmental organizations relied on her for a network of social connections, and for access to important political connections. In a later interview, John Jacobs, then Director of SPUR, attempted to ask Erskine why she had so much influence as a woman. Erskine explained that, at the time, men did not have the time to conduct the research needed, and that only independent woman had the time to accomplish the day-to-day “grind” of writing pamphlets, licking stamps, and making phone calls. On a larger level, Erskine worked from the idea that, “when groups come together, they create new ideas,” and therefore much of her activist work was simply about bringing people together.\textsuperscript{55}

What Erskine did have, then, was time to lobby through letters and personal visits, and time to meet with grass roots organizations and help plan strategy, as well as a home for numerous group meetings. Erskine immediately used her important connections to make an impact for Telesis and their 1940 exhibition. According to Kent, Erskine made sure that the Mayor and the City Supervisors attended the Space for Living exhibit, which in turn ensured their support for the start of a city planning program for San Francisco.\textsuperscript{56}

While far from all the members, these individuals were the principal players in Telesis.\textsuperscript{57} By the summer of 1939 all were in the Bay Area and all shared an interest in finding new solutions to urban problems. Their membership quickly swelled to forty at the time of the exhibition, and over a hundred thereafter. Taken together, these Telesis members were not
radicals intent on the overthrow of government, but they were interested in using education and persuasion to support an agenda of social and political change through planning.58

Environmental (?) Design

“Must the city prosper while men decay?” was the basic question at the heart of Telesis, as noted by the journal California Arts and Architecture in 1940.59 Three principal themes, however, dominated the 1940 exhibit: renewing urban slums, slowing down urban sprawl to preserve an urban greenbelt, and creating a regional planning agency for the entire Bay Area. These themes remained Telesis’s main points of advocacy, which they carried on through other exhibits, pamphlets, and professional networking over the next decade of their existence.

The three themes however, were all interrelated aspects of the Telesis program of environmental design, which emerged from the members’ commitment to achieve social change through planning. At its heart, the Telesis belief in planning to achieve social change stemmed from their experiences in the great depression and New Deal programs. Telesis grew out of the climate of the Depression, and fueled by the “optimism and freshness of the Roosevelt era,” its members assumed planning possessed new possibilities for social reform. Planning and architecture had become tools not just for a “more visually-harmonious architectural and landscape developments, but a more socially beneficial environment as well.”60

The culture of planning

In this sense, Telesis perfectly exemplifies what Andrew Shanken labels the “culture of planning,” in his book 194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front for the New Deal and World War Two periods.61 In an era of heightened anticipation about the future, planning became a cultural mantra in the design fields. Architects re-conceptualized themselves as planners and transformed architectural magazines into organs of planning. Architects embraced planning with vigor—and produced numerous texts and exhibitions on city planning. Architectural magazines such as Architectural Forum, Architectural Record, and Pencil Points all radically altered their content to embrace planning and management. Telesis exemplified the belief that the old model of the artist-architect designing discrete art objects would give way to the “master planner” or managerial model of complete environmental design. As the Los Angeles Daily News would write in their review of the Telesis Los Angeles exhibit organized by Mel Scott in 1941, “[s]cratch an architect today, however, especially a younger architect, and he bleeds community planner’s blood.”62 Telesis was not alone, but part of a like-minded movement of organizations such as Task in Boston.63

Certainly part of this embrace of planning stemmed from the drastic decline in architectural employment during the great depression, and the new job opportunities that were available through the various New Deal agencies such as the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public Works Administration, the National Resources Planning Board, and the Resettlement Agency, all of which were essentially planning organizations. These federal agencies brought in waves of architects and draftsman as site planners and project managers. Government was and,
architects thought, would continue to be their major employer, if they could fulfill a role as planners and managers.

*Architecture has a social purpose, achieved through planning*

The idea that architecture should join with planning, however, was based in more than just the depression era job opportunities. Planning was seen as the best way to accomplish broader social objectives. As Telesis noted in their meeting notes, since the social costs of unplanned development are becoming greater, it is the duty of the designers of the new environment to demand scientific, comprehensive planning for the complete environment. The social objectives for design that nearly every Telesis member brought to the group have been largely documented above. For nearly each member, however, those social objectives would best be accomplished through planning.

Indeed, most of the Telesis members were architects or landscape architects who embraced planning values in New Deal or federal wartime agencies. From these experiences, Telesis believed that society had evolved to a point where the dangers of laissez-faire capitalism were ready to be overcome. As Fran Violich wrote, the advanced state of technology and economic changes were “ready to be applied for socially constructive purposes to bring about what we called in the New Deal language of that time, a “richer and more abundant life’ for individuals and their communities.” The New Deal would not be abandoned in the post-war period, but there would be “a more or less permanent new deal moving cautiously toward even more progressive reforms during our lifetime.”

In the 1940s at least, Telesis members felt that a fundamental change had taken place in the relationship between architecture and society. The old relationship between the architect and the wealthy patron was created through the patronage of wealthy families. Thus, architecture was “art for art’s sake,” while the functional problems of building were already solved—society as a whole got along fine without the services of the architect. Telesis predicted that rising standards of living meant that the masses would rise and readjust the social fabric, creating new social functions and new institutions. The masses were “the new patrons of architecture.”

As the new patrons of architecture, mass society could direct the architect through government, as in fascist Germany or Stalinist Russia, or the architect could take a leading role in educating the mass populace to help lead the masses in the building of a “new democracy of the living.” Thus, the architect could not “afford to solely concern himself as a parasite of a dying class, doing their bidding while ignoring the more basic . . . tasks of low cost housing, city planning, regional planning, schools, union halls, new distribution centers, community centers, parking centers . . . the whole community unit.”

William Wurster explained these ideas in a speech at MIT in 1944, the “old feeling that architecture was the solution of a simple form has given way,” to broader objectives. The basis of architectural study should include not only the isolated building itself, but the its relationship to the people, the community, and all other buildings around it. Architecture was not just about form, but about a project having a “true economic value,” and “a sound place in the community.” This, Wurster said was the link with city planning, as well as the joint project of urban rehabilitation, from which, Wurster stated, “may come the direction for study which will free us
Wurster also stated it more simply before the AIA: “Architecture has left its narrow role in façade making. It is now recognized that one must know and even evaluate the social and economic reasons behind a structure.”

Citing the FSA work of Telesis members Vernon DeMars and Burton Cairns in a speech at UCLA in 1953, Wurster labelled the 1930s a revolution in California architecture, in which architects relearned the simple truth that “architecture is a social art and the importance of all architectural things must be measured by its meaning for people.”

Environmental design, however, also meant that architecture and urban planning should consider more than the physical environment before it. Rather Telesis members asserted that there were “basic social and economic forces at work that bring about a new environment.”

Architecture and planning were based on the inter-relationship between the physical, the social and the economic. According to Violich, both he and Kent learned this from Frederick Adams in planning school at MIT, though the idea was widely shared. The belief that planning was a necessary component of using design to make social change, and the belief that design had to consider more than just physical conditions but economic and social conditions as well, led to the core concept of environmental design: that the various professions involved in planning the built environment for humankind had to be integrated. This idea stemmed initially from the work in the FSA, where Violich recalled: “Vernon and I found ourselves working together with others from the overlapping disciplines of architecture, landscape architecture, site planning, engineering.”

Whether growing from practical experience, or from the larger inspirations of CIAM and Lewis Mumford, Telesis members, “as designers of the new environment,” believed “that this environment cannot be effectively designed by isolated individual efforts” In its first 1940 exhibition, Telesis declared:

A lack of planning for any one of these parts of man’s environment is wasteful enough, but a complete lack of integrating all four of them into a master plan is destructive of the resources of people and of land. How these components of our environment must be integrated in the community, the urban region, and the national region through rational planning and through the use of modern building technology . . . advocated rational interdisciplinary planning of the environment at all scales from region to dwelling.

Moreover, the scale of planning and design had to shift from just building or the city, to the region. As Violich recalled the Telesis group expressed a mutual, “bold reaction by all of us against the sterile distance between architecture and the landscape, and from the city/region and its social/cultural and economic make up.” The shift from the architect to the “new man” would integrate modern architecture with city planning and the preservation of open spaces through regional planning. The sum expression for this was: “Life in a democratic collectivism—on a regional basis.” Telesis organized this life in democratic collectivism around the four key elements of the human environment—housing, work, recreation and transportation (fig. 3.15). The modern architect turned planner would integrate the planning of these four elements into a complete, comprehensive environmental planning.
Democratic collectivism?

To understand democratic collectivism, which was not fully developed or deeply explored by Telesis members, we must move beyond the simple equation between social equality and better housing for all classes. One of the key tenets in the Telesis Credo of 1940 was the “involvement of an informed public in the ultimate choice of potential solutions.” As Corwin Mocine stated the Telesis position in *California Arts and Architecture* in 1941, the average person rejected planning because it offered only restrictions, and therefore only seemed to “interfere with a person’s rights,” and said “thou shalt not.” To be successful, therefore, planning had to engage an informed and supportive public. Planning was seen as a means of increasing citizen participation in the creation of their own environment—though throughout, the designer/planner played the lead role.

We can explore Telesis’s concept of democratic collectivism further by digging deeply into the definition of the word Telesis. Telesis embodied this strong faith in the future in planning, and the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration between related design fields. Both the definition and the roots of the word Telesis expressed this faith. The group chose the word for its meaning: “progress intelligently planned and directed; the attainment of desired ends by the application of intelligent human effort to the means.” Biologist/geologist, turned professor of sociology, Lester Ward (1841-1913) had invented the word in the 1890s to imply a commitment to interdisciplinary planning, deriving it from Greek roots meaning “communication toward an end.” Ward’s scholarly studies had led him to believe that the links between fields were more important than the fields themselves.

Interestingly, while the oral history of Violich/DeMars recalls pulling the word Telesis from a dictionary collection of new words, the word was also described in an article of *The New York Times* in October of 1939, almost exactly the same time the group was searching for a name. The term appeared in New York University Professor Rudolph Binder’s book review of a biography of Lester Ward written by Samuel Chugerman. Chugerman called Ward an “American Aristotle,” and Ward had a strong effect on American social and political scientists of the era. Ward was influenced by biology, and believed that humans were distinguished from lower animals by their ability to use creative intelligence to shape their environment. Ward distinguished between “genetic” factors and “telic” factors, those that were governable by human will. This led Ward to what he called a paradox: free competition can only be secured by regulation. Pure competition was natural law, and the equivalent of being “genetic,” that is solely at the whim of the environment. Cooperation was the result of intelligence, directed toward shaping the environment for the better of society.

The key in Ward’s model was intelligence: social conflicts were a product of inadequate intelligence. Telesis then, was the use of intelligence to “work consciously toward a definite end.” Because democracy was based on emotion, Ward believed, it did not function properly, leading to plutocracies, in which the clever, the avaricious, or the fortunate, get all society’s rewards. Ward also opposed socialism and communism because they created artificial equalities. Instead society could progress through stages called meliorism, stages of increased education and great application of intelligence to society, that would eliminate artificial inequalities. Rather
than force equality—society could move toward a more meritorious, but equitable, society with increasing stages of education and planning. For Ward, Telesis was a process based in the “universal diffusion of the maximum amount of the most important knowledge,” universal knowledge that could counter extreme individualism that resulted in only “genetic” factors. Ward therefore advocated the manufacture of intelligence, and its application, through scientific planning, to “the whole of society.” This is not to say that Telesis members dug deeply into Ward’s philosophy, but it would be hard to find a better principle that more suited the group’s understanding of Telesis and the mission of city planning.

Moreover, while it is commonplace to criticize modernist planning for its failure to engage with the local community, it is important to realize that modernist planners like those in Telesis did have a vision of engaging the citizenry with planning. But it was a Telesis vision that believed educating the general public on planning would convince the public to buy into the planners agenda and trust the path they laid out. This idea of educating the public was the backbone of the later evolution by Telesis members and related citizens for urban environmental advocacy groups.

The local region

Despite all the abstract notions buried within the Telesis concept, it is important to recall that Telesis members did not intend to change the larger world, rather their focus was on their own region. Violich recalled, “Though our concerns were driven by broad visions of social reform, our focus was local.” The intent was to keep environmental design rooted in place, in its regional framework. Environmental design, architecture, landscape architecture and planning within it, should be based on the qualities of the region.

Telesis members were not just intellectually inspired regionalists, however, they were driven by the unique qualities of their own home place. For the most part, Telesis founders, were locals—perhaps the first generation of architects and planners to be born and raised in the Bay Area. Each Telesis member drew inspiration for the unique environmental qualities of the Bay Area. Time and again, when recalling the founding of Telesis, the DCRP, or their early careers, Telesis members evoked the special natural geography of the Bay Area. Violich was inspired in his architecture work “by the appealing qualities of the Bay Area's hills and valleys, shorelines, and ridgetops still in a pristine condition.” Kent in turn was inspired by his role as a native, and argued that those who were born and grew up in the area, knew its spectacular geographic setting in ways that led to a natural, deeply-rooted concern for the health and vitality of the region’s environment.

Violich asserted that the Telesis group was preceded by regional groups such as the Hillside Club of Bernard Maybeck and Charles Keeler; and the later Bay Area style of William Wurster and that as founders of the DCRP, they expanded those regional concepts to the larger Bay Region in the 1950s. Thanks to these precedents, Violich claimed, “we all became deeply aware of the Bay Area as a regional place.” The “prime ingredient” in Telesis and the later DCRP were a “mutual sense of connectedness” that led to a “collective environmental identity.” In his review of the academic history of the DCRP, Violich also wrote that its
founders were not guided by a standard set of generic planning ideas, because they were guided by a “strong sense of the Bay Region, a unique environment of its own.”

Telesis, Mumford and the Garden City

The Telesis exhibition of 1941 Mel Scott put together brought the larger attention of *Time Magazine*. *Time* lampooned Telesis as: “a militant group of Pacific Coast architects who want California to look like a Lewis Mumford dreamworld.” Whether the explicit critical tone of *Time* was correct or not, the ideas of Lewis Mumford and his beloved Garden City were certainly a strong influence on Telesis members.

The Garden City model as advocated by Lewis Mumford and the Regional Planning Association of America provided an important model for applying ideas of regionalism to urban planning, and a model for preserving natural open spaces from suburban growth. Mumford had also personally stimulated a new awareness of Bay Area regional identity, independence and self-reliance—while advocating a “Bay Area Regional Style” in modern architecture. In this respect, Telesis embodied Mumford’s technocratic regionalism, in that the commitment to regional planning stemmed from the young planners’ belief in modern planning techniques and the benefits of new technologies. Violich described both Kent and himself as “kindred disciple[s] of Lewis Mumford.” As Kent described it, Telesis was “talking regionalism because of Mumford—cities, counties, the metropolis, the Bay region.” Kent had received Lewis Mumford’s *Culture of Cities* for a graduation gift in 1938, it had a “tremendous influence” on him, and made him realize “I might be able to make a living by being a city planner.” Likewise, Vernon DeMars obsessively carried the heavy *Culture of Cities* with him on his 1938 tour of Europe. DeMars would later write that the Telesis inspiration for regional and modern planning had come from their visits to Europe, and the writings of Catherine Bauer and Lewis Mumford, as well as their collaborations with TASK and MARS.

Years later, Telesis member Mel Scott would write a history of American city planning and in another book, the history of city planning in the Bay Area. Both books ended with fierce defenses of regionalism and regional planning. Scott virtually channelled Mumford when he wrote in *American City Planning* that the regionalist asks:

> how the population and civic facilities can be distributed so as to promote and stimulate a vivid, creative life throughout the whole region—a region being any geographic area that possesses a certain unity of climate, soil, vegetation, industry and culture. . . . The regionalist attempts to plan such an area so that all its sites and resources . . . may be soundly developed, and so that the population will be distributed so as to utilize, rather than nullify or destroy its natural advantages.

For Telesis, Mumford and Bauer, the garden city model provided the basis for a regional planning mechanism that would rein in the forces of decentralization and sprawl that were already occurring, while enabling the central city to rebound economically, and achieve new functions in the new service based, post-industrial economy. In essence, Telesis adopted and argued for this vision of urban growth: the creation of self-governing regional planning.
authorities that would guide formerly unlimited and unbalanced growth into urban cells surrounded by protected greenbelts and open spaces.

**Telesis and the Greenbelt**

The most direct application of this vision was the greenbelt. Telesis members were greatly influenced by the London Plans of 1933 and 1944, which attempted to realize Howard’s vision of a green belt. Sir Raymond Unwin’s ideas for a “green girdle” were contained in the Greater London Regional Plan of 1933. Unwin’s plan relied on government land purchases to secure the greenbelt, and the 1938 London and Home Counties (Green Belt) Act enabled the purchase of 35,000 acres at cheap prices. Sir Patrick Abercrombie continued Howard’s and Unwin’s vision in the Greater London Plan of 1944.\(^7\) Abercrombie argued in the plan that greenbelts would restrict urban growth, define the outer limit of urban areas, and provide recreation for urban citizens. Brought to America by Lewis Mumford and the Regional Planning Association, Howard’s ideas and the London realization of it underlaid Telesis’s ideas about regional planning and environmentalism.

The importance of natural open spaces, Telesis argued, was being threatened by “a new kind of urban growth.” Indeed, the patterns of the American postwar suburban boom were well established in the prewar and wartime periods. Automobile traffic congestion and suburban growth were well underway as early as the 1920s. The 1920s were the first decade that census-takers noticed the suburbs had a faster rate of growth than the central cities, with some cities, such as New York, showing a remarkable difference in the rate of growth—67% for the suburbs and only 23% for Manhattan.\(^8\) From 1920-1930, suburbs grew twice as fast as central cities, with some suburban cities growing at rapid, over 1000 percent rates.\(^9\) But it has not been sufficiently emphasized the extent to which experts, at least, perceived suburbanization as a significant problem before the postwar era.

**Leisure and recreation**

The need for urban planning was repeatedly tied to a vision of the urban citizen in nature (fig. 3.16). Architects and planners of the 1940s frequently envisioned a new post-war era or prosperity with greatly increased leisure time, that would demand increased recreational spaces. A Telesis exhibition poster, for instance, proclaimed that the postwar era would bring eight hours per day of leisure time (fig. 3.17). The combination of increased leisure time with the automobile and other regional transportation networks meant that recreation would be needed not just downtown, nor in farther away wilderness, but within the regional fabric of the city. Thus the vision of the greenbelt was not only a vision of nature protection, but a fairly technocratic vision of providing outdoor natural recreation for the new citizen of the postwar urban region. At the same time, as the need for these recreational open spaces had increased, they were being threatened by “a new kind of urban growth.”

The 1940 exhibit therefore asked, for instance, “the medieval city could have a greenbelt, why not the modern metropolis (fig. 3.18)?” The exhibit argued for a large part of the city to be dedicated to open green spaces: “Today we could enclose the working space for each type of
activity with a generous buffer strip devoted perhaps to truck gardening or casual recreation.”

A new planning was needed that would “protect for all of us our rightful heritage in good land, pure drinking water, natural recreation areas, and the advantages which our locality affords.” Telesis declared in their exhibit that, “The land and the people: these two make up the environment for each of us.” The Telesis exhibit blamed the congestion of industrial and commercial district and asked why not “bring rural benefits to city dwellers? Bring the agricultural greenbelt to the rescue of our cities (fig. 3.19).”

Against this backdrop, and building on Benton MacKaye and Lewis Mumford’s critiques, Telesis argued in the 1940s that new residential and industrial growth was “bursting into and overrunning the countryside.” Telesis explained that largely because of technological advances and the increasing use of the automobile, suburban living was more convenient and comfortable. Decentralized industry was also more economically feasible. Medium-sized cities are “exploding in the countryside” Telesis argued in 1940. Blighted areas were being left behind while the suburbs were “experiencing mushroom growth . . . The older districts are running down; the new districts are running wild.”

As Violich would remember in 1976, Telesis aimed to guide “the vast upcoming development toward fresh environmental patterns,” to “organize growth so it would not destroy the integrity of Bay Area cities.”

While the “environmental design” vision of Telesis was not an exact enunciation of contemporary environmentalism, the group did have an environmental vision: the greenbelt and planning to prevent urban sprawl. While the “word environment was rarely heard at all those days,” according to Violich, Telesis members “were given the rare opportunity to be first in clarifying and—to an extent—establishing new concepts and approaches for environmental problems.”

As Violich noted, Telesis would “provide the professional inputs to the building of a socially and visually beautiful environment especially oriented to California’s own landscape character and land resources.”

Implementing the greenbelt: regional planning

How would Telesis implement this vision of urban greenbelts? Unlike the medieval city, the 20th century city operated under the American system of capitalism and strong faith in private property. To preserve the greenbelt, Telesis advocated a regional planning entity with powers of land acquisition and ownership. Stopping sprawl, building garden cities, preserving a greenbelt, saving the Bay—none of these things could be accomplished without regional planning (fig. 3.20). Telesis, then, became the first to advocate what has become the mantra of Bay Area environmentalists ever since—the need for regional planning to protect the Bay Area’s unique environment.

By the early twentieth century, a majority of citizens lived within the boundaries of central cities. When populations had expanded in the nineteenth century, the city could often incorporate new territories, as Los Angeles and New York had done. But California suffered from a progressive era “home rule tradition,” which was especially strong in the Bay Area. The “home rule” tradition undermined the ability of the central cities to expand. In the Bay Area of the 1940s, this had resulted in well over 100 local governments making separate land use decisions. Metropolitan regions had become clusters of independent cities. While the functions and patterns
of daily urban life increasingly took place across the metropolitan region, government functions were organized as if each city were an isolated and sovereign island. In such a situation, regional planning offered the only true solution to preserving a greenbelt and planning urban growth (fig. 3.21).

Regional planning had been advocated before in San Francisco: In the 1920s by Fred Dohrmann’s Regional Planning Association and in 1915 when Werner Hegemann crafted his first urban plan, the Report on the City Plan for the Municipalities of Oakland & Berkeley, which applied a regional vision of harbor development, open space preservation and low-rise housing. Hegemann attempted to reconcile scientific urban planning with the historic, cultural, and aesthetic uniqueness of a given city region. But Hegemann’s plan was practically ignored in the Bay Area, and the Dohrmann’s RPA fell apart by 1928, a victim of a lack of financial support, an inability to educate the public, and a lack of strong planning bodies in the area.

Using regional planning and the greenbelt to contain urban sprawl would become the primary message of the Telesis exhibits through the 1940s. “Telesis has considered the problem as a whole, and in its component parts,” wrote San Francisco’s The Downtowner, a publication of the San Francisco Downtown Association, of Telesis’s espousal of regional, comprehensive planning in the 1940 exhibit. Telesis believed that cities such as New York, Boston, and Los Angeles were moving toward regional planning, while San Francisco had lagged behind. Now was the time, Telesis believed, to recognize the importance of planning regionally: “Regional planning has evolved to fill a need not met by city, county, or state planning. Each of these last is limited by an artificial political boundary which seldom has any relation to the economic and social forces of modern life.”

In a statement before the exhibition, Telesis argued that the Bay Area’s regional communities had grown from exuberance rather than “intelligently directed growth.” Because of the lack of planning “exists in our region, we [ ] young men and women in the related professions of architecture, city and regional planning, landscape architecture and industrial design, have come together and formed this group – Telesis.”

In 1941, Telesis was already work on a Bay Area Regional Planning Commission Proposal. In some ways, Kent’s first proposal for regional planning anticipated the eventual form ABAG reached: an agency that was a clearing house of information, that coordinated between local and county planning agencies, and that promoted public understanding of regional planning, but an agency that had limited actual planning powers. The group decided to host a second exhibit to build public support for its proposal. The proposal and the exhibit were to “evoke regional consciousness,” and to lead “the creation and stimulation in the Bay Region of a planning consciousness – of a realization that comprehensive planning is a necessary guide to the physical development of any region.” The California State Planning Board did hold hearings on March 28, 1941 on the proposed San Francisco Bay Regional Planning District, but the proposal apparently went nowhere in the State legislature.

The problems of the expanding metropolis demanded a new planning mechanism—this “new organic technique is known as metropolitan regional planning,” Telesis declared in their second exhibit of 1941. The exhibition, entitled “Regional planning for the next million people, Telesis, the second exhibit, 1949-1950,” was intended to show regular citizens all the regional activities they engaged in during their daily lives, and connect that to the need for planning.
Their publication for that exhibit, which entirely focused on regional planning as a means of containing sprawl and preserving open space was entitled, “Regional Planning Is The Next Step For The San Francisco Bay Area.” In that publication, Telesis wrote, that, “on once quiet slopes where boys flew kites and picnickers munched sandwiches, bulldozers gash roads and surveyors stake out building sites.” Telesis pointed out that there were some sixty-nine cities and nine counties planning within the Bay Area, which had seen a million new residents in the past decade. Any good that positive planning might accomplish could be “completely negated by an unplanned community a mile away.” Telesis argued that piecemeal planning could not solve the problems of transportation, conservation, and recreation; the San Francisco Bay Area needed “regional planning to encompass the entire area.” Instead, comprehensive planning was needed to “take in all the immediate territory in which we work and play.”

Anticipating the postwar growth of the urban environment, and the many urban problems of that growth, Telesis called for regional planning to address the issues of growth. The situation cried “out for a regional solution while such a solution is still feasible.” “To plan [man’s] environment we must find some logical working unit, a unit held geographically by the conformation of land and water, and socially by a community of interest and interdependence of people.” In a section entitled, “What planning can accomplish,” Telesis argued that regional planning would enable even another million people to move to the Bay Area, and still preserve its high quality of life. It would preserve rural areas and open space, and ensure an efficient mass transit system for the whole region.

Corwin Mocine brought the Telesis position for regional planning to the pages of California Arts and Architecture in 1941. Mocine called the solution of transit and traffic as “the first and most urgent task facing a regional planning commission.” Grasping the kernel of the problem that has plagued urban planners for over half-a-century now, Mocine wrote that while the increased use of the private automobile sapped support for rail transportation, it soon created highways so congested that people were turning again to rapid transit only to find that due to lack of patronage and support, rail service was inadequate to meet increased demand. Putting the argument in more human terms, Mocine wrote: “Seeking relief from the city’s congestion, have you moved your home to the country, resolved to commute to work only to be faced with the sudden discontinuance of transit service and the costly and dangerous alternative of driving your car to work over crowded highways?” We, Mocine wrote, “find ourselves caught in a chain of circumstances that grows steadily more costly.” Stating the Telesis position, Mocine argued that the intricate problems of transportation, conservation, and recreation could not be solved “by piece-meal planning in any or all thee cities or even by all the counties and cities working separately.” Mocine concluded:

regional planning has evolved to fill a need not met by city, county, or state planning. each of these last is limited by an artificial political boundary which seldom has any relation to the economic and social forces of modern life. . . regional planning is the most significant new development in the whole field of planning.

Regional planning offered the only potential solution because it alone was comprehensive enough to take in all the immediate territory in which citizens work and play.
By 1948, frustration with limits of these positions and the need for bigger thinking led to the reemergence of Telesis, this time almost exclusively focused on regional planning. Its exhibit, “The Next Million People,” at San Francisco Museum of Art in 1950, celebrated the tenth anniversary of the “Space for Living” exhibit. The 1950 exhibit was the last one and marked the beginning of the end for the group, which lasted only another three years.

In preparation for the exhibit, Telesis would prepare another regional planning proposal in 1949. The statement, incredibly long, was drafted by Kent, Violich, and McCarthy as well as George Duggar, William Spangle, and Sydney Williams and was probably their most ambition planning statement. The plan relied on “decentralization” within a regional planning framework, that would “give the industries and people being attracted to the Bay Area the chance to locate in independent sufficiently communities.”  

It would also create an urban rural boundary that would set aside permanently large water and land areas as open space for recreation, agriculture and other uses. It sought to provide urban families with the benefit of open country and give rural families access to nearby social and cultural facilities. It argued for the reorganization of urban central districts, with increased populations and a new unified and improved regional transportation system. Most dramatically, it would create eight public or quasi-public agencies of landownership, that would own and control the land for the development of new communities, set within open space. It asserted that the sites of new communities, all open space areas, and agricultural zones should be publicly owned, or if privately owned with substantial changes in taxation such that increasing land values for those areas would flow back to the public. It also recognized nine areas of cultural heritage for the Bay Area for areas of special historical or scenic significance, such as Angel Island and Tomales Bay (recall that this predates the national park system’s influence in the Bay Area). And finally, it argued for the historic preservation of key architectural buildings, such as the Montgomery Block in downtown San Francisco.

Telesis submitted the draft statement to a number of noted urban thinkers. Leon Keyserling, then on President Truman’s Council of Economic Advisers, wrote that the subject was explosive, and its principles needed to be handled circumspectly. Lewis Mumford called the statement comprehensive and effective, but warned that the population predictions on which it was based were frequently wrong, and that regional planning needed to be integrated with state planning because much of the Bay Area’s population could adequately be placed in the central valley. F.J. Osborn thought the plan admirable, but felt its principles would not be accepted by the public from which they needed the power to enact such a vision. He warned that his generation had argued for “new towns,” but that gave way to generic suburban expansion. While a demonstration new town surrounded by a greenbelt would certainly encourage future development, with the pace of California’s population growth, it would probably come too late. Osborn therefore argued for a regional planning authority that could restrict open space development, as a model that would impress urban residents and build public support for planning.

Catherine Bauer called it an excellent statement, but warned that as planners they needed to recognize that they frequently demonstrated ignorance to many of the social aspects of housing. She also argued that a powerful regional planning agency might not be accepted at that time. Like Mumford, she wondered if the great mobility of California’s population might open up Bay Area growth to places like the central valley. Most importantly, she argued the document
should be reframed to establish planning as a vehicle that would increase the sense of options and freedom to the urban citizen “consumer.” Citizens needed to feel that planning did not restrict their freedom, but increased their freedom of choice in housing and place, and they would therefore be more enthusiastic about powerful planning agencies.  

Ultimately, in the 1950 exhibit Telesis presented a regional planning agency that would draft a master plan for the Bay Area. This plan would define the desirable land uses for the land resources of the region, ensuring conservation of open space and recreational areas. It would also help maintain community identity by curbing the urban sprawl that threatened to overrun the separateness of different communities. It would also plan for the redevelopment of central cities to ensure that growth could be directed into the city, as well as, into the suburbs. The agency would be funded by the cities and counties who would provide planning representatives, though the agency would have its own director and staff. As Telesis recognized, however, the agency would require the establishment of a strong base of public support regional planning, for which the exhibition was hopefully the first step. Telesis members also played a role in a Regional Planning Agency for the San Francisco Bay Area proposal of 1956, and would go onto participate in the debates over regional planning throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

The greenbelt legacy

Telesis members continued their arguments working especially for greenbelt citizen advocacy groups. These groups became the leaders in the so-called grass-roots environmentalism of the 1960s, but really they were collaborations between Telesis planners and planning-minded citizens that evolved from Telesis’s efforts in citizen education. The attempt to mobilize the general population in planning would bare fruit in the citizens advocacy groups of the 1960s that Telesis members would found, lead, or participate in. Kent, for instance, would go on to be called the “Guru of Greenbelts.” He founded with Dorothy Erksine the Citizens for Regional Parks and Open Space, the first true environmental planning advocacy group in the area, which evolved into People for Open Space, and then into today’s Greenbelt Alliance (fig. 3.22). Kent also worked with noted environmentalists like Alfred Heller and Wallace Stegner, who were on the editorial board of *Cry California*, the magazine providing a damning green critique of unregulated growth.

Most importantly, Kent worked to help create the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), and define its mission. ABAG directly stemmed from the Telesis vision of a regional planning government. Kent’s handwriting is all over the 1960s ABAG preliminary plans, and its “1970:1990” general plan, which were the first plans in America for a true urban greenbelt—though never fully implemented. Kent would go on to write an important book of greenbelt advocacy, *Open Space For The San Francisco Bay Area; Organizing To Guide Metropolitan Growth* (1970). Unfortunately, ABAG could never fully overcome the local home rule tradition, despite repeated and almost successful legislative attempts to turn the agency into a full regional planning entity, or even one with sufficient powers for the regional protection of open space.

The repeated attempts to pass the Milton Marks bill of the 1960s, to create an open space commission for the SF Bay region, largely reflected the Telesis vision. The Marks bill generated enormous popular support for what would be the first great metropolitan open space program in
the nation. Conservative real estate and home rule interests, however, killed the bill in the California Senate Finance Committee by a single vote. The idea lived on in repeated attempts to pass the so-called “Knox bill” to evolve ABAG into a single Bay Area super agency to preserve open space.\textsuperscript{130}

This battle for open space would be extended to the Bay itself, and again Telesis members were involved. Scott, Erskine, and Kent all played critical roles in the fight to “save the bay.” Because seventy percent of the Bay was less than 20 feet deep, the Bay was almost completely fillable, and in many instances, local governments had already sold the legal titles for potential fill sites. The Army Corps of Engineers plans for Bay Area urban development included a 1959 map that showed the Bay filled in so much there was only a single channel left for shipping. The Bay was some of the most valuable real estate in California, and the situation seemed more acute in 1960, when the Berkeley City Council announced plans to fill some 2000 acres of the bay to double Berkeley’s size with housing, commercial space, and industry. In another dramatic example, the Westbay Corporation had similarly approved plans to raze South San Francisco’s San Bruno Mountain and use the soil to fill in twenty-seven miles of San Mateo county shoreline, an area as large as Manhattan.\textsuperscript{131}

Under prodding from Erskine, Mel Scott published in 1963 his study, \textit{The Future of San Francisco Bay}, which described in horrifying terms for the Bay Area public the potential diminishing of the Bay through landfill and shoreline development (fig. 3.23).\textsuperscript{132} The book provided the foundation for civic activism led by the Save the Bay trio of Catherine Kerr, Esther Gulick, and Sylvia McLaughlin. Scott’s research, however, was not just a call to activism—he carefully researched all the different legal titles and governmental jurisdictions that had planning control over the Bay shoreline and potential fill sites (fig. 3.24). Scott therefore not only should the horrifying potential diminution of the Bay to little more than a river, but also demonstrated the need for a regional planning agency that would have real operational authority over the otherwise independent city and county governments. For perhaps the only time, a real citizens movement sprung up behind a regional planning agenda. Save the Bay leveraged wider citizen education efforts and the support of other organizations such as the San Francisco Urban Renewal Association, and used that popular support to develop and pass the legislation that ultimately lead to the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). BCDC, which passed by a single vote in the state senate, emerged as a powerful regional agency, with complete powers to regulate and prohibit development along the Bay’s shorelines.

**Urban Environmentalism and Race**

As both Robert Self and Marilyn Johnson have documented, mass defense migration greatly increased the racial and cultural diversity of the Bay Area, while also causing bitter conflicts between locals and newcomers.\textsuperscript{133} The wartime influx of black migrants provoked fears for whites of social unrest and a disintegration of established racial boundaries. The efforts for regional planning and conservation took place against this backdrop, as conservationists sought to freeze the ideal of the California landscape, while new racialized spaces, and often environmentally polluted spaces as well, were created.
The 1939 Telesis exhibit also articulated a new geography of recreation based on the anticipated economy of post-war America in which leisure time would be dominant. In the post-war era, increased standards of living, and a lessened emphasis on manual labor, meant that more and more Americans would have increased leisure time. Where would America’s spend all this leisure time?

Alexander Wilson also documented how outdoor wilderness recreation evolved from a late-19th century curative holiday for wealth city dwellers, into one increasingly for broader ranks of classes. Middle class, urban dwellers flocked to wilderness on holidays and vacations. As both Wilson and William Cronon have shown, wilderness recreation was part of the larger experience of modernity, in which nature and recreation became something apart from everyday tasks, something that assumed its own schedule and geographical place in the landscape. In turn, nature became an important aspect of modern consumer society. As Matthew Klingle has asserted, we need to connect the modern leisure economy with the “contested landscapes of recreation.” Klingle has suggested that there were complex historical relationships between the new leisure economy and the transformation of urban space in the years before the modern environmental movement, and he documents how the landscapes of Seattle were reworked for the benefit of middle class outdoor recreation.

While wilderness was certainly a critical evolution in the separation of nature from everyday geography and experience, urban open space also played a much less-explored role, though in a more contradictory manner. The fight for urban open space while intended to bring nature to urban citizens, was also an environmental vision limited by class and race. Transportation, for instance, played a critical role in propelling recreation out of the cities for large numbers of the middle class. Urban parks had brought the pastoral rural garden into the city, but the automobile brought wilderness into urban daily life by connecting those urban citizens with the financial ability and leisure time to pastoral wilderness in regional, open spaces. William Cronon has argued that reduction of nature to wilderness, to a leisure activity in which humans were only visitors in a sacred place defined by the absence of humanity, created a “problem.” In essence, the problem of wilderness allowed Americans to ignore larger environmental problems and their role in increasing nature’s ills through everyday practices.

This problem is only magnified at the urban level. Weekend or other brief visits to nature in urban open spaces, dependent already on the automobile, allowed urban citizens to ignore their everyday activities that, when totaled, carry profoundly destructive implications for the environment. At the same time, the fight for urban open space initiated by groups such as Telesis, represented a vision that was entirely singular by race and class. This environmental vision, for instance, completely ignored the creation of spaces of intense urban pollution that was entirely situated in minority neighborhoods. Modern planning brought both urban renewal and urban environmentalist thought as part of the same planning philosophy, while ignoring radicalized pollution.
Telesis and urban renewal

Telesis’s comprehensive environmental vision also included the beginnings of urban renewal. Telesis linked downtown renewal with suburban growth and greenbelt conservation. To stop suburban expansion and save the greenbelt, downtown must also be saved. Thus, the shadows of racial politics and the contestations of center-city and suburban space underscored environmental conservation and ideas of regional identity in the Bay Area.

While the regional planning and greenbelt ideas of Telesis were grounded in the tradition of Mumford, their architectural ideas were firmly grounded in the ideas of Le Corbusier and the Congress of International Modernism. The Space for Living exhibit presented architectural ideas such as the superblock, and declared that the “neighborhood unit and super-block treatment will lend economic stability and safer, richer, living.” The Telesis exhibits of 1941 also drew a sharp distinction between images of “urban blight,” and the clarity, order, and pleasant livelihood of the modernist housing designs that could replace them (fig. 3.25). Sketches by DeMars at the exhibit drew a sharp visual distinction between images of “urban blight,” and the clarity and order of the modernist designs that could replace them (fig. 3.26, fig. 3.27, fig. 3.28).

Through their close relationship with Dorothy Erksine, Telesis was responsible for transforming San Francisco Housing Association into the San Francisco Housing and Planning Association (SFHPA), an ardent supporter of renewal. Erskine is one of the Bay Area’s most famous environmentalists, and symbol of the 1960s grassroots environmental campaigns. But her role in planning and downtown urban redevelopment is often overlooked, and her grass-roots environmentalism has not been reconciled with her role in leading urban renewal. The SFHPA report of 1947, “Blight and Taxes,” widely covered in the press, set the stage for urban renewal by arguing that, “It is more expensive to keep a slum than to replace it (fig. 3.29)” The report contrasted the lost revenue and expenses of the Western Addition with the middle-class neighborhood the Marina, which brought into the city more tax revenues than expenses.

In the racially mixed neighborhood of the Western Addition, the studies and research for urban renewal Telesis members began in 1941 “compromised virtually all of the studies that were carried out in the late forties after the war.” In 1947, before the 1949 U.S. Housing Act provided legal and financial authority for renewal, T. J. Kent had hired Mel Scott to prepare a report exploring the possibilities of urban redevelopment in the Western Addition. The report advocated that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors designate the Western Addition as a “redevelopment area,” and establish a San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. In the report, Scott wrote of “wide stretches of urban blight are breeding grounds for crime and delinquency, cancerous growths that threaten the vitality of the city.” In contrast, Scott presented modern architectural living spaces with broad views of the Bay Area’s natural settings (fig. 3.30). He also noted the failure of zoning ordinances to prevent the “indiscriminate mixture” of uses, resulting in a residential area in which only one-tenth of the blocks were entirely free of commercial or industrial uses. The report led to Scott and Kent’s “New City” Report which advocated the complete erasure of large sections of the Western Addition to be replaced with superblocks set in open space (fig. 3.31, 3.32). Kent, Violich, and DeMars, along with other Telesis members all went on to play a role in the Western Addition redevelopment, though by the 1950s they had moved on and were largely no longer involved.
Erskine and San Francisco Housing and Planning Association played leading roles in establishing San Francisco’s urban redevelopment agency. Erskine convinced Jerd Sullivan, head of the Crocker Bank and a leader in the Association, of the need for renewal. In 1959, under Erskine’s prodding, Sullivan called together the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee which brought together many of the heads of the major corporations based in downtown San Francisco. Erskine was also instrumental in getting the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee to invite Aaron Levine, an urban renewal expert from Philadelphia, to analyze San Francisco’s urban renewal program. Levine’s 1959 report, disparaged San Francisco’s poor renewal efforts and emphasized the importance of urban renewal for saving downtown. The report led to the creation of an independent urban redevelopment agency, free of city hall control, and the appointment of Justin Herman, San Francisco’s would-be Robert Moses, as director of the urban redevelopment program. The San Francisco Housing and Planning Association morphed into the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association, to satisfy federal requirements for a citizen group that would accompany any urban renewal funding. Of course, the idea that the pro-urban renewal members of the SFHPA would adequately give San Francisco citizens a voice in urban redevelopment only highlights how poorly urban renewal programs of the 1950s incorporated citizen participation.

Years later, Kent would note in a speech reviewing the history of Telesis that the solutions for public housing that Telesis had advocated did not prove to be good solutions, and they had never solved the slum housing issue. Scott also lamented that despite Telesis’s work, their social goals in housing were never reached, and instead, “we are still building for the top income levels and the rich.” Unfortunately, the Telesis model did not recognize that complex issues of poverty and housing require more than slum removal and modernist slab designs.

Images in reports such as “New City,” undermine the argument that urban renewal intended to truly provide replacement housing for minorities evicted by redevelopment (fig. 3.33). Indeed, urban renewal was in part, an environmental vision: as I have discussed above, members of groups like Telesis were greatly concerned about the problem of urban sprawl and white flight. To stop sprawl, downtown had to be saved. Urban renewal intended to bring white people back into urban centers, and thus, lessen sprawl. The vision was also in a sense integrationist, as urbanists like Catherine Bauer or T. J. Kent lamented the increased segregation of the U.S. metropolis as whites fled the city. But the method of urban renewal was overtly racist: it used the power of eminent domain to evict black and asian residents, while not providing adequate replacement housing and failing to address racial segregation laws and customs that prevented minorities, even when they had the financial ability, to join in white neighborhoods.

As a powerful reminder, in 1949, the San Francisco Chronicle addressed the issue in an editorial, when a group called the Council for Civic Unity was leading a fight for a city ordinance that would make racial discrimination in housing a misdemeanor. The ordinance was opposed by the San Francisco redevelopment agency, arguing it was best to let the agency to “use its power of moral suasion.” The Chronicle wrote that there was an “obvious moral responsibility to see that minority groups are not excluded” from the new redevelopments. Nonetheless, the Chronicle concluded that if developers faced the threat of a misdemeanor crime, they would avoid development all together: “trust the agency!” concluded the Chronicle.
Conclusion: Urban Visions

Utopian aspirations of controlling the evolution of the Bay Area were put aside with the entrance of the United States into World War II as the drastic increase in the Bay Area’s defense industries dramatically changed the region. The objectives of planning a more rational and carefully considered urban environment were suspended during the war, but then overrun by the postwar rush for urban development. Telesis member Corwin Mocine would later assert, “World War II served to draw the curtain on the planning picture” of the pre-war years.152 The urgency and pressure of war lined the Bay’s shore with shipyards, the hills and in-land areas with housing, extended highways, and developments into un-built areas. With the dramatic wartime migrations of populations, the Bay Area became one of the fastest growing urban areas in the country, increasing forty percent from 1940-1947. The majority of these newcomers settled not in central San Francisco, but in the suburban areas close to defense industries.153 Industrial extensions and residential expansion quickened metropolitan growth and the consumption of landscape in the regional area, overwhelming regional planning’s attempt to control sprawl. These forces as Telesis member Francis Violich would recall, “changed the face, and the personality of the Bay Area.”154

After the war, a more professionalized, strictly functional and utilitarian planning context emerged. Much of the original vision was lost as Telesis members were absorbed into the mainstream of the increasing professionalized planning environment. By the 1960s, former Telesis members in Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design were involved in virulent battles over the ability and propriety of architecture and planning in solving social ills. A new generation questioned not only urban renewal and modern architecture, but also the omnipotence of planners themselves.

Meanwhile, the federal government’s investments in regional infrastructure went far beyond what the regionalists of the 1920s and 30s could have imagined would occur. Planning for the federal and state governments, however became solely about stimulating growth, and the sprawling, corporate-sponsored growth that resulted was the opposite of human-scaled community building that the regional modernists had hoped to promote. With power over land use fragmented among hundreds of counties and municipalities, no means were available to limit or direct the destructive force of large-scale speculation fueled by government subsidies. Meanwhile, downtown business interests, not idealistic planners, emerged as the dominant power in the fight to save downtown.155 The process of urban renewal that Telesis would help to unleash became a story its members would greatly regret.

Regional modernism in planning succumbed to localism as localized planning agencies dominated the planning of the urban region in a fragmented fashion. Environmental planning also fragmented into various regional planning agencies oriented around single-issue political battles. The Telesis exhibits therefore highlighted several eternal planning problems that have haunted the profession for over half a century: how to educate and engage the public in planning; the need for regional planning to truly solve the important environmental, transportation, and planning issues of the region’s cities and counties; and the need to unite architecture, landscape architecture and planning in a comprehensive approach to urban problems. The Telesis history shows that we have been arguing against sprawl and proposing smart growth as a solution for
over 70 years. Yet still the debate goes on, centered on the same issues and proposing the same solutions, and continuing to ignore questions of race and the unequal geography of environmental protection. Meanwhile, the Telesis dream of a sustainable and equitable city remains no closer to reality. The vision of an ideal city that Telesis offered the Bay Area in 1940 was never fully adopted, but its partial realization underscores some of the Bay Area’s most troubled urban spaces, as well as some of its most loved ones.
Chapter Three: Notes

1 Telesis, “A Space for Living,” exhibition catalogue, in Francis Violich, Telesis Records, Environmental Design Archives, College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley.

2 San Francisco did have a planning commission from 1917. It was, however, at the discretion of the mayor and concerned with general zoning rather than true creation of city plans. Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 166-167.


8 Grace Morley, foreword to Telesis, “A Space for Living: An Exhibit at the San Francisco Museum of Art.”

9 “Telesis Works to Make S.F. a Better Place to Live in,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 30, 1940.

10 DeMars, “A Life in Architecture: Indian Dancing, Migrant Housing.”


12 As an example of Telesis being credited for building momentum toward a city planning department and a master plan see San Francisco Department of City Planning, “Progress in City Planning: A Report to the People of San Francisco,” (San Francisco: Department of City Planning, 1948), 4.


16 The quote is from Dan Solomon and at forum the two of us presented at regarding San Francisco Urban Renewal History at the San Francisco Urban Research Association, “Optimism, Modernism, and the Cult of Expertise,” July 15, 2009.

18 “Is This the Best We Can Do?” California Arts & Architecture (Sept. 1940), 20-21.


22 Christopher Stull, “Getting ‘Space for Living,’” San Francisco Chronicle, August 4, 1940.

23 Importantly, Telesis founders were, for the most part, locals—perhaps the first generation of architects to be born and raised in the Bay Area, and this must have led to a greater connection to the region. As Violich argued, the “prime ingredient” in Telesis was the “mutual sense of connectedness” that led to a “collective environmental identity.” Violich, “Intellectual Evolution in the Field of City and Regional Planning,” 8; “Grassroots Origins of the DCRP,” 20.


25 Erskine and Alice Griffith were the top of the list for young Telesis members to seek for sponsors. Etzel, “Interview with Dorothy Erskine;” Erskine, “The San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association, an interview conducted by John H. Jacobs.
Erskine and Griffith also provided important references and contacts for the Telesis members to seek other sponsors, as did William Wurster. “Records of the Eight Discussion, Telesis Meeting at Joe McCarthy’s Studio,” Dec. 28, 1939, T. J. Kent Papers, 1910-1993, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.


MIT was the site of the US’s first school of architecture (1865), and its second school of urban planning in 1932 headed by Frederick Adams, after Harvard founded a program in city and regional planning in 1923. Adams was a direct influence on Violich and Kent from then on.


Violich was chair of the Landscape Architecture Department 1962-1964, hiring and passing on the chairship to Garret Eckbo.

Violich also published Urban Planning for Latin America: The Challenge for Metropolitan Growth (New York: Reinhold Publishing Co., 1987) and served as planning consultant to Sao Paulo and Caracas, and as adviser to educational programs in Venezuela and Chile, to the Peace Corps, the Pan American Union, the Ford Foundation and other organizations concerned with urban planning in Latin America. He was also a passionate lover of the Dalmatian coast and urban issues there, publishing The Bridge to Dalmatia: A Search for the Meaning of Place (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998).


Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study: Environmental Design and Planning in the San Francisco Bay Region 1939-1953,” November 1976, 7, Francis Violich, Telesis Records, Environmental Design Archives, College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley. See also, Violich, “Introduction,” in DeMars, “A Life in Architecture.” (“And I well remember the concern expressed by our respective parents that we were not pursuing traditional practice designing middle class homes and gardens for the then-emerging suburbs of San Francisco and Oakland.”)

37 Garrett Eckbo, “Handwritten Notes;” Suzanne B. Riess, “Letter to Garrett Eckbo,” September 11, 1991, 2, in Garrett Eckbo Collection, 1933-1996, Environmental Design Archives, College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley. There are several contradictions in the notion that the FSA was purely social work in architecture, including that during the depression architects were desperate for almost any commission, and that the FSA migrant housing program only came into existence when the migrant worker problem involved white Americans—after decades of ignoring the housing problems of migrant Latino workers.


41 On the Los Angeles exhibit, see “Now We Plan,” *California Arts & Architecture* (Nov. 1941), 21.

42 Mel Scott, “Telesis: Promoting Good Design In Northern And Southern California.”

43 Knight Scott, “A Woman in Landscape Architecture in California, 1926-1989.”


46 See generally, Corwin Mocine, “A Space for Living,” *California Arts and Architecture* (September 1940); Vernon Armand DeMars, “A Life in Architecture.”


Mendelsohn moved to San Francisco in 1945 on the recommendation of Lewis Mumford.

51 For just one example, in 1958, Dorothy Erskine presented the San Francisco Housing and Planning Association’s argument that had missed out on one million in federal redevelopment grants and was lagging behind other cities in slum clearance and urban renewal. “‘S.F. Missed out on $1 Million in Aid,’” The San Francisco Chronicle, November 21, 1958, 4.

52 Dorothy Erskine, “The San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association, an interview conducted by John H. Jacobs.”

53 On the other hand, she had visited the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, but her return visit in 1937, horrified her, and she became an ardent anti-communist. Fred Etzel, “Interview with Dorothy Erskine.”


55 Dorothy Erskine, “The San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association, an interview conducted by John H. Jacobs.”


57 Telesis membership obviously went through numerous changes, but frequently included in membership lists, meeting notes, or contributor notes, besides the members mentioned above, were: Burton Cairns, Serge Chermayeff, Lars Anderson, John Blayney, Stanley Weisburg, Sydney Williams, Robert Anshen, William Ludlow, Eric Mendelsohn, Ansen and allen architects, Thomas Church Architects, Ernest Born, Eckbo, Royston and Williams landscape architects, Alice Griffith, Donald Kirby, Milton Pfleuger, John Warnecke, Wurster Bernardi Emmons; and cited many as contributors, including: the Maybecks, William Wurster, Alice Griffith, the Tolmans, and Sibyl-Moholy-Nagy as a photographer. See “Telesis Meeting Records,” T. J. Kent Papers, 1910-1993, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.


60 Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study: Environmental Design and Planning in the San Francisco Bay Region 1939-1953.”


63 Catherine Bauer was an editor at *Task* before coming to Berkeley. E. Michael Czaja was also on the editorial board for *Task* in 1942-43, before coming to the Bay Area and joining Telesis.


65 Fran Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study,” 8.

66 Ibid.


72 Violich, Intellectual history,” 11. Violich also cited Frederick Guitheim, the early regionalist and Jacob Crane, the housing pioneer in Washington, Christopher Tunnard of Yale University, and Harvey Perloff of the University of Chicago and later of UCLA's planning school.


76 “Credo,” Handwritten notes from a discussion, undated, in T. J. Kent Archives, Bancroft Library.


78 Mocine, “Planning for the Region,” California Arts and Architecture, 23.


83 Rudolf M. Binder, “Lester Ward, Student of Human Society.”

84 Ibid.


87 Ibid., 20.

88 Ibid., 20-21.

89 Violich, “Intellectual Evolution in the Field of City and Regional Planning,” 8.

90 The Time piece was strongly against planning, noting that “Los Angeles' gangling growth makes everybody happy except U.S. city planners” and implying that city planners would love to burn L.A. down and rebuild anew. “Dream City,” Time Magazine (Nov. 10, 1941). In contrast, California Arts & Architecture offered a positive review of the Telesis Los Angeles exhibit, stating, “you’re a fool if you miss” this exhibition. “Now We Plan,” California Arts & Architecture (November, 1941),17-21.


94 Kent, “Professor and Political Activist: A Career in City and Regional Planning,” 25.

95 Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study,” 5. Violich credited the ideas of Mumford, as analyzed and publicized by Catherine Bauer, as fertilizing Vernon DeMar’s ideas about linking modern architecture to the past, most especially in plazas and boulevards.

96 Mel Scott, American City Planning since 1890 (1969), 221.

97 See generally here Chapter Two of this Dissertation; Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell Press, 2002).

98 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 297.

99 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 319.

100 Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study,” 6.

101 Mocine, “Planning for the Region.”


104 Ibid.


106 Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study,” 3.

107 Violich, “Notes from a Telesis Study,” 8.


109 Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area; A Metropolis In Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); American City Planning since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 215-216.

110 The Downtowner, no. 1090 (October 2, 1940).

111 Mocine, “Planning for the Region,” 45.


114 Ibid.


118 Fukuo Akimoto, “T. J. Kent, Jr., His Formative Years,” 10th International Conference of Planning History (Letchworth, UK), 2002, 12.


120 Mocine, “Planning for the Region,” 23.


122 Ibid.

123 Mocine, “Planning for the Region,” 23.


126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.


On ABAG, the Knox Bills, and the failure of regional planning in the Bay Area see Chapter 7 of this dissertation.


A good example, is when I presented a version of this paper at SPUR itself, and was angrily confronted by an older man, upset that I had attempted to besmirch the reputation of Erskine, one of his idols, by associating her with urban renewal.

“Editorial: Slum Clearance in Dollars and Sense,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 14, 1947; Miriam Roher Resnick, Blight and Taxes (San Francisco, San Francisco Planning and Housing Association, 1947). Blight and Taxes concluded that San Francisco brought in $468,924 in tax revenue over the cost of services to the city, but lost $373,295 in the western addition, a spread of one million every year.


Mel Scott, “Western Addition District: An Exploration of the Possibilities of Replanning and Rebuilding one of San Francisco’s Largest Blighted Districts under the California community Redevelopment Act of 1945” (San Francisco: City Planning Commission, November 26, 1947).


Speaking at the dedication of Crown Zellerbach Building on January 5, 1960, Ambassador J.D. Zellerbach stated: “Our job now is to step up the momentum of redevelopment and to place on a firm footing a strong, durable, cooperative program of citizen participation in city planning and urban renewal. The logical vehicle for an improved program is the reorganized San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association.” SPUR, “You are invited to participate in San Francisco’s future,” leaflet, 1960. Many of the leading SPUR members sat on the boards of the major downtown corporations, and SPUR listed as “corporate members” many of the same corporations that were on the Blythe-Zellerbach committee, the leading proponent of urban renewal. “SPUR Leaflet,” (1970), Dorothy Ward Erskine Papers, 1950-1982, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

T. J. Kent, “A History of the Department of City and Regional Planning,” 3.

Scott, “Telesis: Promoting Good Design In Northern And Southern California.” Scott refers to this in a handwritten note as “trickle-down housing.”

A good example is an April 1967 Symposium that brought together various experts from the American Institute of Architects, the National League of Cities, the Lincoln Foundation, Luce Magazines and other organizations. The Symposium Report concluded that blight was driving middle-income residents from urban centers and along with poorly designed federal tax policies, fueling sprawl growth. Urban Renewal was part of the “whole new urban package” that would draw such residents back into urban centers and realize the social and environmental benefits of “compact, city-centered development.” American Institute of Architects, et al., “What Kind of City do We Want?” (April 1967), Dorothy Ward Erskine Papers, 1950-1982, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.


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Chapter Four

Catherine Bauer:

From Houser to Conservationist

“Open space is like virginity ... once it is gone, it is gone forever.” Catherine Bauer, 1960.¹
**Houser Or Conservationist?**

In 1940, after the tragic death of Telesis member Burton Cairns in an automobile accident, Vernon DeMars inherited Cairns’ position as the District Architect for the Farm Security Administration. The position required him to visit some projects in Idaho and Washington, and DeMars added a visit to Seattle, bringing his wife Betty along. DeMars was driving up a steep hill in Seattle when the couple spotted Catherine Bauer and William Wurster walking hand-in-hand. DeMars knew Wurster from Telesis meetings and Bauer from her book *Modern Housing*, but was surprised to learn they knew each other. The DeMars couple were even more shocked, however, when Wurster announced he and Bauer were on their way to get married. The coincidental meeting was fortunate, for Vernon and Betty DeMars were able to serve as witnesses for the ceremony.

The circumstances of Bauer’s marriage to Wurster are somewhat mysterious, or at least largely undocumented. Bauer was then only a visiting instructor at Berkeley, but the marriage ensured that she would remain a Bay Area resident except for the few years when Wurster was Dean of Architecture at MIT and the couple lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The move west and marriage to Wurster also initiated a second act to Bauer’s career in urban planning that remains largely unexplored. Bauer is known primarily for her work in the 1930s as the American advocate of European modern housing programs, the sole woman in the Regional Planning Association of America, and the leading early advocate of public housing in America. Bauer’s *Modern Housing*, published in 1934, introduced modern European architecture and the idea of public housing to the United States. She is largely credited with pushing through the United States Housing Act of 1937, which created the basis for the U.S. public housing program. She is therefore most associated with federal urban renewal programs that brought often devastating results to minority populations in urban centers across the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.

The image of Bauer as a “houser” presents only a fragmented portion of the story and ignores the longer, later decades of her work in planning and urban thought. Richard LeGates and Frederic Stout, for instance, call Bauer “a true modernist with a faith in large-scale, rationalized housing.” Architect Dan Solomon wonders if the entire history of urban renewal in the United States would have been different if Bauer had gone to Vienna instead of Germany. Recent scholarship also remains centered on Bauer’s approach to modern architecture in her 1934 *Modern Housing*.

Bauer, however, had a successful career after *Modern Housing* and the 1937 Act, and her legacy is substantially more complicated. Hinted at, but largely overlooked, in the biographic literature on Bauer is her environmental concern and love of wilderness. As early as the 1940s, but expanding greatly in the 1950s, Bauer emerged as a strong voice for the conservation of natural and agricultural landscapes and against land-consuming suburban growth, which she labeled “scatteration.” By the 1950s Bauer was using every opportunity to critique the growing environmental problems caused by urban development. Moreover, in a series of articles, speeches, and political programs in the 1940s through the 1950s, Bauer argued that center-city urban renewal was an essentially flawed approach that would be largely ineffective in solving the problem of urban blight unless accompanied by a regional planning program of land...
conservation and sprawl prevention. Without such an approach, Bauer warned, the racial segregation of American cities would only worsen.

Contrary to the houser image then, Bauer often asserted that downtown urban renewal represented a misplaced, backwards-looking planning vision. Moreover, while we consider her an advocate of modernist European architecture, she was also a frequent critic of the urban policies of the Congress of International Modernism and European modernists in America such as Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius. More importantly, as a social critic Bauer argued that the historic function of cities as integrators of numerous ethnic and class groups was being displaced and that cities were becoming segregated by race and class with profound effects for American urbanism and therefore American society.

By 1964, Bauer was far from an advocate for urban renewal or modern architecture. She was instead an urban critic with a deep interest in regional and environmental issues, and someone immensely concerned with the social segregation overtaking American cities. Indeed, Bauer’s strange and sudden death in 1964 makes more sense if we think of her less as a public housing advocate, and more as an advocate of urban open space. On a weekend at their second home at Stinson Beach, while Wurster remained at home, Bauer disappeared while hiking in one of the Bay Area’s great open spaces, Mount Tamalpais State Park. After a day-long search by police and large numbers of volunteer faculty and students from Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design, she was found unexplainably dead off a mountain trail.

The Early Houser

Bauer grew up in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Given her later criticism of urban sprawl and the federal highway policies that supported it, it is ironic that Bauer’s father, Jacob Bauer the Chief State Highway Engineer of New Jersey, was the first to apply the cloverleaf interchange in a major American highway system. In her early years, Bauer was described as a “adventurous young person” of the 1920s, by which many implied her liberated social sense. At an early age, however, Bauer also developed a life-long love of nature from early hikes through the woods with her mother. She became a passionate outdoor hiker and cyclist.

After graduating from Vassar, Bauer spent a year in Paris and first became interested in modern architecture. Her first publication, “Machine-Age Mansions for Ultra-Moderns: French Builders Apply Ideas of the Steel and Concrete Era in Domestic Architecture,” was published in the New York Times Magazine in 1928. In it, Bauer asked why American architects lagged behind in the application of modern technology and materials to domestic architecture, as compared to French architects such as Robert Mallet-Stevens. Back in New York City, she took a job in the publishing industry, which led to her meeting with Lewis Mumford in 1929 when she was twenty-four (fig. 4.1).

Mumford was an established author, though not yet famous or fully established in writing on architecture and urban issues. Though Mumford was married and would never break from his relationship with his wife Sophie, Bauer and Mumford quickly moved from intellectual friendship to intimacy. Mumford introduced Bauer to the circle of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), where she became executive secretary. The RPAA had come together in 1923, largely around Mumford, outdoor conservationist Benton MacKaye,
progressive architect Clarence Stein, and others such as Fredrick Lee Ackerman, Henry Wright and developer Alexander Bing. The organization was the leading progressive voice in the United States on urban planning and the promotion of the Garden City model. The RPAA was also a strong voice in the conservation of outdoor resources.

In 1930, however, the depression resulted in Bauer losing her position in publishing and she set off for several months in Europe, largely using Mumford’s connections to garner introductions in Europe to leading architectural or urban professionals (fig. 4.2). In Frankfurt, Bauer visited Ernst May and his new housing project which she used as the basis of an article when she returned to the U.S. The article she wrote based on that trip beat out Mumford and other more established authors for an essay prize sponsored by Edgar Kaufmann, “Art in Industry,” in Fortune Magazine (fig. 4.3). The successful essay led to grants that funded another trip to Europe in 1932 for more research. This time Bauer travelled with Mumford as he did research for his book Technics and Civilization. Emotionally and romantically the trip was difficult and marked the beginning of the end of their romance. The trip, however, did form the basis for Modern Housing in 1934, which made Bauer a prominent figure in the fields of architecture, urban planning, and housing. The book reviewed European experiments in working class housing, while advocating modern architecture, planned neighborhoods, and integrated social services such as day care. More substantially, Bauer’s book argued that government had an obligation to insure that every citizen had access to clean, healthy, and comfortable housing.

Bauer was now the American expert on European government housing programs and modern architecture in the field of housing. As the oral history of numerous Bay Area architects or planners such as T. J. Kent, Francis Violich, and Vernon DeMars shows, her book was a principal guidebook to European modern architecture on their youthful European tours. At the same time, Bauer’s sister Elizabeth Mock became an advocate of modern architecture at New York Museum of Modern Art, complementing her sister’s interest in housing and architecture.

Bauer, however, also realized that a realistic housing movement would not arise in the United States until substantial political pressure created strong public demand for such a program. As her relationship with Mumford deteriorated, Bauer became frustrated with his inability to use political action to fight for his beliefs. In 1939, for instance, she would write to Mumford praising a draft of his The Culture of Cities, but criticizing it for a presumptuous writing style that meant it would fail to reach the audience it most needed to: political leaders. The immediate problem of the book, Bauer asked Mumford, was: “how can it have more direct effect and influence now?”

The opportunity for political action had presented itself to Bauer in 1934. As she was finishing Modern Housing, Bauer was asked to be executive secretary of the new Labor Housing Conference (LHC). The LHC had evolved from a Philadelphia Hosiery Union, which built the Carl Mackley housing project for its union members with the support of the New Deal’s Public Works Administration, the locus of the federal government’s first experiments with public housing. The LHC aimed to get American unions to fight for a large-scale federally backed program for planned housing developments built on a non-profit basis. With the Mackley houses as their model, Bauer and the LHC aimed to create housing projects that would be initiated by unions or other non-governmental groups and then designed and planned in collaboration with
such members. The Housing Act of 1937 that ultimately resulted from Bauer and the LHC’s efforts, however, was a very different creature than originally imagined.

The New Deal era 1934 Housing Act had established the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), but this agency was deliberately meant to support private housing efforts. Its main purpose was to provide federal insurance for privately financed home loans, a response to the extreme number of foreclosures during the depression. While the Act intended to avoid any federal involvement in private business, the need to meet certain design and siting FHA requirements would have dramatic effects on U.S. housing and urbanism. On the public housing front, the LHC had a bill introduced in 1935 to create a U.S. Housing Authority that would fund up to thirty percent of a project and provide loans for the rest. Importantly, this funding would be available to government agencies and non-government cooperatives and organizations and therefore provided for more citizen participation in the creation public housing projects.

In 1936, Bauer and the LHC gained the support of the American Labor Federation and joined with Senator Robert Wagner to fight for a larger housing bill. The LHC bill was intended for a broad class of citizens, including the middle class, and provided an active role for residents in the creation and design of the program. While Bauer and her labor allies won passage of the 1937 Housing Act, the final bill was so changed that it ultimately represented a failed compromise and a victory for conservative real estate interests opposed to broad public housing in the U.S. Under opposition from the powerful private real estate lobby (the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Real Estate Boards, U.S. League of Buildings and Loans, and the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association), Congress dropped the provision for unions and non-government organizations to create and participate in their own housing programs. Changes to the Act through the Byrd amendment also reduced spending dramatically and limited costs, ensuring that the program would serve only the poorest groups. Under the so-called “equivalent elimination clause” changes to the Act also required that public housing would only be used as part of a larger program to clear and replace slum districts. While Bauer and other advocates sought funds for public housing, the elimination clause ensured those funds would primarily be used to raze sections of central cities and displace residents.

The 1937 Act therefore, as Gail Radford describes it, “marked the institutionalization of a two-tier framework for federal intervention into the housing market.” Through the FHA’s mortgage guarantees, highway building, direct loans to veterans, and national housing standards, the federal government played a dramatic financial and regulatory role in the building of a vast suburban landscape. At the same time, those FHA policies abetted racial policies excluding minorities from that housing landscape. On a second tier, the 1937 Act created a small, poorly funded, and much criticized program for the poorest Americans, mostly minorities, as a program of last resort, whose primary impact was displacement and destruction. Public housing thus became urban renewal. While advocates like Bauer believed that the nation could afford to provide quality housing to its citizens and that a program with broad-based support could encourage multiple classes to participate in public housing programs, the reality that emerged after the war would fail to meet any of those ideals.

With her relationship with Mumford becoming more problematic and her political victory in 1937 seeming less of a victory, Bauer was clearly in need of a change. She first set off for Europe and Russia, intending to update her book Modern Housing or start a second volume. A
London car accident and a set of smashed teeth, however, delayed her trip to Russia. Short on funds, she cut her plan to spend a year in Russia to a short week-long tour of Russia and another week in Sweden and then returned home. She had hoped to reunite with Jacob Crane, a landscape architecture, planner, and housing expert who had worked on Greenbelt cities. That relationship apparently soured as well, and Bauer cabled him not to meet her ship from Sweden when it arrived in New York. When she finally returned home, on October 24, 1939, she found a now long-unanswered letter from President Robert Sproul of the University of California, Berkeley offering her a position as the Rosenberg Lecturer at Berkeley’s new School of Social Welfare for the upcoming spring semester.

Berkeley And Wurster

Bauer must have been immensely relieved. She immediately cabled President Sproul her acceptance and then wrote a more formal acceptance letter, stating that, “it is difficult to imagine a proposal better suited to my own plans at this time.” Naturally, Bauer took a month to drive across country visiting numerous housing projects en route. In January 1940, she was in Berkeley teaching, attending Telesis meetings, and engaging in other planning issues. By March, Bauer wrote back to her friend Bruce Bliven, the Editor at The New Republic that, “I have, as a matter of fact the best job the housing business has turned up yet.” Bauer’s one-year position was soon extended for a second year.

At Berkeley she also reunited with Thomas Church, whom she had met while both were on a cycling holiday in Brittany in 1927. By 1940 Church was the most well-known landscape architect on the West Coast and frequently worked on projects with the California architect William Wurster. In short order, by February, Church was inviting Bauer to accompany him and Wurster on driving trips around the region, often to visit the projects Wurster and Church had done together. In his later oral history, Wurster described their courtship as a series of chance encounters and failed meetings because of their busy lives of teaching and research, but a reading of Bauer’s letters suggests the importance of Church in their early meetings. In either case, by the summer of 1940, when Bauer went to Seattle on a research trip to the Grand Coulee Dam for her later article “The Columbia Basin: Test for Regional Planning,” Wurster had decided to personally follow Bauer to Seattle and to propose marriage. As Bauer would note in a letter to friend Serge Gorodetzky, “I came out here in January 1940 to be a visiting professor . . . And then suddenly I married a very good architect here, William Wilson Wurster, so here I am for good and all.”

The marriage ensured Bauer would spend most of her remaining years in California and at Berkeley. We might also wonder if Wurster’s regional modernism and more humble approach to architecture turned her taste in architecture away from pure internationalism, or if a more humane, regional modernism was already her preference. The marriage is also thought to have changed Wurster, expanding his architectural goals from merely wealthy domestic clients to a broader social agenda. Wurster became immediately involved in public housing architecture, with the Valencia Gardens Housing Project in 1941, and several war housing projects in 1942. By 1942, Bauer noted in a letter that Wurster had “gotten very interested in the planning side of things, and I think he should probably explore it.”
War housing and Cambridge

For Bauer, the acute shortage of housing brought about by wartime migrations within the United States, primarily to cities of the West Coast, highlighted the need for public housing in the United States. Rather than return to Washington to lobby for another, stronger housing bill, however, Bauer remained with Wurster in California and took up the West Coast war housing emergency within a larger planning context. Bauer helped to form the California Housing and Planning Association (CHPA), discussed below, to lobby for regional planning, land conservation, and a solution to the wartime housing emergency. In May 1941, the CHPA helped to organize the so-called Tolman committee hearing in San Diego on wartime emergency housing, which laid the basis for the emergency war housing program that employed well-known architects to build public housing. For a brief period, federally built public housing would be a lauded program, a praiseworthy and critical component of the United States war effort, and largely intended for the white families.

The interest in larger social issues, however (along with a drastic decline in architecture commissions during the war) led Wurster to pursue a graduate degree in planning at Harvard in 1943, bringing Catherine back to the Northeast where they settled in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Wurster’s studies were cut short when he was drafted into teaching architecture at MIT and shortly, thereafter named Dean of MIT’s School of Architecture in 1944. Catherine began teaching planning at Harvard and the two had a daughter, Sadie. Both Wurster and Bauer, however, desired to return to Berkeley and Wurster had long sought leadership over the UC Berkeley’s School of Architecture. In 1950, the pair returned to the Bay Area when Wurster was offered the architecture Deanship at Berkeley. Bauer returned as a professor in the Department of City Planning, where she remained for another fourteen years of active teaching and writing in urban planning (fig. 4.4).

Bauer’s environmental and open space agenda

When Bauer first came to Berkeley in 1938, she made an immediate impression on the local academic community for her love of outdoor adventures. Bauer was the only woman who would make the long bike rides through the North Coast of Marin, and surprised her companions by immediately jumping into the Pacific surf.33 Bauer and Wurster were also frequent visitors to Lake Tahoe, where Bauer, unlike her less outdoorsy husband Wurster, took frequent long hikes in the Sierra (fig. 4.5). Often these hikes were with Alfred Heller, a well-known and devoted California environmentalist whom I discuss below, who must have replaced in her life the spirit of wilderness advocate Robert Marshall, a close friend. Overlooked in the recited tale of Bauer’s infamous affair with Lewis Mumford is her long friendship and possible relationship with Marshall. Moreover, the influence of Marshall took place within the general influence of the RPAA towards conservation represented by Bauer’s friend and colleague Benton MacKaye and Mumford’s own writings against urban sprawl.

Bauer’s friend and colleague, MacKaye, also a leading member of the Regional Planning Association, was among the first environmental conservationists to see the importance of protecting natural open spaces within the reach of growing urban populations. A life-long hiker...
with an interest in regional cultures, MacKaye initiated the idea for the Appalachian trail as a preserved open space and a recreational outlet for the nearby developing urban regions. Much of the RPAA’s agenda centered on his ideas for conservation and the espousal of regional expressions of planning. MacKaye introduced Bauer to Marshall in the early 1930s and the two instantly bonded over their love of wilderness and outdoor adventure.

Marshall was a forester from Montana who extended Aldo Leopold’s landscape ethic into the concept of wilderness preservation. His doctoral dissertation, “The Problem of Wilderness,” defined the principles that shaped the wilderness preservation movement. The work identified wilderness as containing two essential traits: no mechanical transport and no permanent human inhabitants. In 1935, Marshall, MacKaye, and Leopold launched The Wilderness Society, which called for the designation of certain wilderness areas to be set aside from any development and led eventually to the passage of The Wilderness Act in 1964. In comparison to the National Park System, the National Wilderness Preservation System intended to preserve those areas that were largely untouched and undeveloped by humans and preserve them as such. Marshall asked Bauer’s advice on the agenda for the wilderness society and she responded with a lengthy letter supporting the concept, underlying its potential importance to working Americans, but warning of the dangers of snobbish elitism in wilderness conservation.

After Marshall’s early unexpected death while sleeping on a train in 1939, Bauer penned an obituary letter published in The New Republic. Bauer praised Marshall as “a mouthpiece for the wilderness society.” She noted that he was the first to offer the “first major recognition of the recreational value of our forests and wilderness,” and that he was “passionate enough to know that the fight is worth while even though it may be a generation before the masses of the people have the chance to find pleasure and recreation in them.” Bauer would eventually address the American Wilderness Society in 1961, in an important speech entitled “The Urban Octopus,” in which she argued that urban planning was necessary to resolve conflicting demands on wilderness.

**Scatterization**

While Marshall fought for wilderness far from the city, Bauer, like Mumford and Mackaye, understood the importance of similar spaces of wild nature within reach of urban populations, and the threat of unrestrained urban development to those spaces. While sprawl is currently our popular term for this trend, Bauer called it “scatterization” and presented an important critique of it as early as 1943 in “Cities in Flux: A Challenge to the Postwar Planners,” published in American Scholar. Highlighting the massive movement of populations in the wartime economy that put some fifteen million civilians on the move, with another eleven million leaving home for military service, Bauer wrote of the unsettled nature and undetermined future for Americans: “all in all 1/4 to 1/6 of our population is in a state of flux physically and physiologically.” Yet Bauer understood that the war had merely intensified existing trends in urbanism and national migration: “The trek of industry and industrial population to the West and South is no temporary freak. Instead, it marks the rapid acceleration of long-term trends essential to the nation’s social and economic progress. Urban historian Carl Abbott calls this movement primarily to the western United States the onset of an American “westward tilt.” In places like
the Bay Area, the dramatic increase in population was labelled by historian Marilyn Johnson, borrowing an often used phrase of the time, a “second gold rush.”

Increased urbanization in West Coast cities was, therefore, an existing trend only increased by World War II. Bauer also highlighted a more important trend—that of urban decentralization, which, “speeded up by the war, must now be seriously faced.” This movement was tied to a historical desire for open space, better neighborhoods, and “the freedom of private homes and gardens.” But now the automobile and the “growing taste for outdoor life” had turned the movement “into a stampede.” Moreover, Bauer recognized industry as a major driver of suburbanization: “industry moved to the outskirts for equally cogent reasons.” Bauer asserted that for both industry and new residents the desire for outdoor life would be “frustrated more often than not . . . as urban congestion and confusion rolled out to engulf them.”

Bauer’s critique continued in a 1945 article in *The Economist*. In an article that served as a survey on American housing trends, Bauer moved from a discussion of American public housing to larger land use problems. Bauer linked the problems of public housing and scattering together and blamed both problems on urban land speculation and “mass-migration to the suburbs.” This migration had resulted in “rapidly emptying the cities of practically everyone who could afford to get out.” Bauer pointed out that between 1930-1940 many older cities lost population for the first time, even while the metropolitan regions were increasing. Bauer warned the end result of this trend was the “stagnation and eventual bankruptcy of the central city.”

**The Garden City and Sprawl**

At the same time, in his *City Development, Studies in Disintegration and Renewal* of 1945, Lewis Mumford had presented one of his strongest attacks on the problem of urban sprawl. Bauer penned a review of the work and praised Mumford’s claim that, “we have had the alternative of humanizing the industrial city or dehumanizing the population . . . so far we have dehumanized the population.” Like Mumford, Bauer claimed that the Garden City movement was the only logical means of guiding the irresistible forces of decentralization toward a balanced regional environment.

As perhaps Bauer’s most important intellectual mentor, Lewis Mumford surely had an influence on Bauer’s thinking about the relationship between cities and the natural regions around them. Bauer’s development of a regional interpretation of cities and their need for a more environmentally sustainable urban growth had its roots in Mumford’s philosophy and the culture of the RPAA. Despite the work of Carl Sussman as long ago as 1976, many commentators still continue to see the organization solely as decentralizers, when much of their agenda was focused on channeling sprawl into denser patterns of growth. As Sussman and others have shown, while solving the problem of the urban slums was part of the agenda, an equal or more important ambition was to solve the environmental problem of urban sprawl already evident in the 1920s. One of their most important legacies is the idea of bringing conservation into the urban realm instead of remote wilderness.

were responses to an article by Lloyd Rodwin, then just a young graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, who had attacked the Garden City model. Mumford strongly rebutted the charge that the RPAA sought purely decentralism—stating that it was “an injustice” to link Howard’s model with decentralists. Such criticisms of the Garden City, Mumford argued, could only be explained on the theory that such critics “read Garden Cities of Tomorrow blindfolded, since the vices they denounce have nothing to do with either the general or specific proposals for the Garden City.” Mumford argued that the Garden City model simply posited that a million people grouped in a number of Garden Cities, separated by natural greenbelts, and linked together by modern transit, had advantages over a million people in one sprawling city. The openness the green belt provides was “a factor for speed,” allowing Garden City residents to travel faster through undeveloped open spaces than commuters could under congested conditions. Mumford argued that Howard’s idea of building on virgin territory was nothing different from what regular suburban real estate developers were already doing, but planning could direct it developments into patterns properly planned for the preservation of natural open space and for the insurance of adequate transportation networks.

Bauer’s piece directly followed Mumford’s and lamented that the “Garden City movement in its original form was never deader in this country.” Anticipating many later critiques, Bauer wrote that the Garden City “phase itself has been popularly corrupted to signify nothing more than a segregated upper-class suburb of orderly, one-family houses.” Even Radburn and the Greenbelt towns, the most serious American efforts at the Garden City had become strictly “dormitory communities.” Bauer lamented that the British were far ahead in adopting the Garden City model, praising the London Plan of 1944 as “outstanding” because it limited the exterior spread of development and ensured protected open space. Bauer was not, however, ready to “bury the Garden City movement.” Rather it was still possible that “a metropolitan region” would devise the tools “to prohibit fringe development and guide new building into satellite communities [for] a healthy balance of home and shops, work and play, building and open space.”

Mumford and Bauer returned in a special issue on housing and urban development issues in *The Nation*, published on May 15, 1948 (fig. 4.6). The special issue was intended as support for the then pending Taft-Ellender-Wagner (T.-E.-W.) housing bill, which was a response to the dramatic housing shortages of the immediate post-war years. T.-E.-W. was a comprehensive, omnibus housing solution in which public housing was packaged together with support of private housing, and was the predecessor of the 1949 Housing Act, though in 1948 it passed without a public housing program, which had been stripped by the efforts of Senator Eugene McCarthy and Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The version of the T.-E.-W. that passed therefore ignored the recommendations of the writers in *The Nation’s* special issue (as well as President Truman) who sought to bring rural, suburban, and urban housing under one legislative umbrella. This was important, because the writers in the Nation all saw public housing’s eventual success tied to the problem of urban sprawl. Mumford came out with his oft-repeated attack on suburban dispersal in his *Nation* article, “Cities Fit to Live In.” Criticizing suburbanization’s tendency to “heap people into spreading metropolitan districts,” Mumford asked, “do we want this movement to continue?” Mumford argued that the trend would “wipe out the local balance between city and country and
require those who seek recreation in rural areas to travel even greater distances to have even a glimpse of nature." Bauer followed in The Nation’s special issue with her article, “The Freedom of Choice.” In “Freedom of Choice,” Bauer put the desperate need for new housing into the larger debate over sprawl and urban redevelopment. Much of Bauer’s language, however, was pulled from a larger report she had participated in, the report of the National Association of Housing Officials (NAHO) and the National Public Housing Conference (NPHC). Bauer repeated Mumford’s critique of sprawl in more direct language: “if we follow the line of least resistance, and merely let the sprawl continue, every already insoluble urban problem will simply be redoubled.” Unless the movement to decentralize “both population and industry” could be redirected, Bauer wrote, traffic congestion, blight, the loss of open space, urban segregation, and local government tax problems would all continue to worsen. Most importantly, Bauer zeroed in on the question of choice, that experts alone could not determine what exactly people wanted in their housing, but what the citizens would want was a broad variety of choices. Giving them a choice between a suburban house far from work with no neighborhood facilities, and noisy, sunless city apartment was “no choice at all.” The big job of experts, Bauer concluded, was “to make such real choice possible.”

The California Housing and Planning Association

In 1941, Bauer had teamed together with a broad array of architects, planners, and reformers to form the California Housing and Planning Association (CHPA). Howard Moise became the organization’s president, with Bauer as vice-president. Included on the organization’s letterhead were planners such as T. J. Kent, Francis McCarthy, Samuel May, Mel Scott, L. Deming Tilton, and Albert Evers; architects or landscape architects such as Vernon DeMars, Garrett Eckbo, Richard Neutra, Gregory Ain, and Gardner Dailey; and general advocates such as Morse Erskine, Carey McWilliams and Walter Packard. Like the San Francisco Housing and Planning Association, which had just morphed from a housing reform group into a planning advocacy group, the CHPA put housing into a broader planning agenda. The organization had three distinct goals: first, to help solve the emergency wartime housing crisis; second, to work towards a post-war program of urban redevelopment, subsidized housing, and the rehabilitation of rural housing; and third, to work towards the application of modern planning in both town and country through regional planning. Bauer wrote that the CHPA’s housing agenda was specifically not confined to public housing but a broader planning agenda with public and private housing components. Bauer also emphasized that the CHPA would argue to decentralize the federal government’s involvement with housing to local housing authorities, who would be guided by an active and engaged public. The CHPA was a group intended to stimulate this public involvement in housing and planning issues.

In her statement for the founding of the CHPA, Bauer wrote that, “in California we must not lose sight of the fact that rural and suburban development are at least equally important” as urban redevelopment. Bauer’s CHPA statement argued that the “critical problem in outlying areas is due to the rapid growth of shack-towns and cheap subdivisions,” first by Dust Bowl migrants and now by incoming war workers. She noted that, “hundreds of square miles of land fringing agricultural and industrial centers alike have been chopped up into mean, disorderly and
The CHPA therefore cast the civic problem of suburban growth, rural slums, and blight as related problems that were all increasing rapidly, with very little being done either to remedy them.

**Growth Control in the 1950s**

In the 1950s, Bauer would expand her critique of unguided urban growth. To start with only one of numerous articles, Bauer wrote in the *Architectural Forum* of September 1956 an article entitled: “First Job: Control New City Sprawl.” In twenty years, Bauer predicted an increase of 55 million more people living in metropolitan regions, but with at least 46 million moving from the central city to the fringe. Suburban population growth, she predicted, would double. At a time when American planning was primarily concerned with urban redevelopment and blight, Bauer argued that the failure to address this suburban expansion was “perhaps the most notable shortcoming of American planning today.”

The problematic reality of suburban decentralization led Bauer to a 1956 speech, later published by the American Institute of Planners, that posed the question—“Do Americans Hate Cities?” In it, she stated that the mass suburban migration was obviously:

> a self-defeating goal if any large proportion of the population pursues it. And from the start this drive mainly promotes the fantastic scattering of outlying development, a kind of kiss of death which prematurely blights all the surrounding agriculture and wild areas that it sought to embrace.

Bauer then wrote a substantial article on the environmental issues of sprawl entitled, “The California Environment: Must it be Ruined by Growth and Prosperity?” Bauer praised the unique Californian environment—“Nowhere in the world has the quality of the physical environment played a more important role in the culture and economy of a whole vast region than it has in California.” She linked the culture of California and the West Coast to its environmental setting:

> We Californians are therefore by and large self-selected to care about our physical surroundings. We are the people who came West because we thought we could live better out here. Almost universally, we like sun, scenery, flowers, water, mountains, houses with yards, barbecue parties, outdoor sports, camping, fishing, and a taste of real wilderness now and then.

Bauer continued to write what has become an all too familiar argument—growth was destroying the California dream. Almost everyone, Bauer wrote, “would agree there is a spreading sense of doom about the California environment. But since the war a great many people have come to feel that growth is an ever-advancing invincible enemy.” The problem of growth was becoming an environmental threat: “We’re steadily losing ground in the quality of the California environment . . . there is more scatination, chaos and blight than there was, a longer journey to work, less amenity at home, a wider spread of suburban sterility, with natural beauty and recreation areas less accessible or entirely spoiled.” In this sense, what was unique about
California was being lost, “California will soon be just another New Jersey or grim Chicagoland . . . Progress has come to have a rather hollow sound.”

In 1954, Bauer created a draft urban growth and development plan for then candidate for governor Richard Graves. Graves was a Bay Area resident, a lecturer in Berkeley's Department of Political Science, and executive director of the League of California Cities. When Pat Brown decided it was not yet his time to run for Governor, the Democratic Party drafted Graves to run against Goodwin Knight, who had ascended to the governorship following Earl Warren's appointment to the U. S. Supreme Court and would defeat Graves that fall. (Interestingly, Pat Brown failed to support Graves, prompting Graves to reject Brown’s request for support in the next campaign.) Bauer’s “A Growth Plan for California—the Graves Program,” was only a rough sketch of a political program. Nonetheless, the document could still serve any politician running today on a pro-environmental campaign of smart-growth.

Bauer argued that the “California we all love is being destroyed before our eyes by rapid, haphazard growth. The most frightening immediate threat is perhaps to the California landscape itself, undoubtedly after climate, our most priceless natural asset.” Using a sequence of statistics on impending metropolitan growth, Bauer argued that, “California’s historic fame as a unique and wonderful place, the land of opportunity and pleasant living” was ending. Haphazard, unplanned growth was destroying the “invitation of climate, open space, pleasant country-side, dramatic mountains and seacoast, that lures people and enterprise here.” Bauer’s political document railed that, “smog increases, and air pollution, water pollution, land desecration, are everywhere.” Most directly, the landscape of California was under threat—there “is ugliness where there used to be beauty, dreary and often misplaced subdivisions where there used to be the most productive agriculture and the finest recreation in the entire United States.” Bauer’s Graves Program included a section on the environment, and one on the urban fringe crisis, as well as asserting the need for comprehensive planning for metropolitan areas, progress toward better unified administration, and rational boundaries for municipal government. The Graves Program also would undertake state-wide study of urban encroachment on agriculture and its implications, to provide a basis for effective conservation and zoning policy. It is interesting to ponder a Graves victory for Governor and Bauer perhaps finally having real governmental influence.

After the Graves defeat, Bauer continued to use urban planning speeches and articles to assert that natural resources were under threat from metropolitan development. In “The California Environment: Must It Be Ruined By Growth And Prosperity?” from 1960, Bauer lamented the weakness of zoning as the basic tool of regional urban planning. Zoning could do some of the job, Bauer wrote, but the proper exercise of the police power in zoning could not extend to the permanent protection of open space against development. Bauer therefore praised the California Open Space Act, adopted the previous year, as the most notable legislative achievement in the nation in the struggle to preserve open space, “Open space is like virginity,” Bauer wrote, “once it is gone, it is gone forever.”

In her report Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, Bauer highlighted a fundamental tension of West Coast cities—the tension between a nature ethic in which urban citizens sought access to nature and the new form of urban development that was threatening to destroy it. Bauer argued that because “we liked nature so much,” under the
Western nature ethic, too many citizens were pushing out to buy as much land as possible. This could not work in the long term because of the millions more residents California would have to expect. “More important” that anything else, Bauer argued was the “wholesale destruction of open space and natural amenity.” What was being lost was the “diversity of experience and opportunity that comes from having both city and country close at hand, urban development and natural or cultivated open space, private yards and public wild areas.”

**California Tomorrow**

Bauer’s interest in environmental conservation took a more active political form when she helped to found California Tomorrow with Alfred Heller and Sam Wood. Heller was a long-time Sierra Club member and writer in Nevada City, California, who became greatly angered at a state plan to place an interstate freeway directly through the town. Heller took over a local newspaper and became its editor, using it to fight against the freeway plan from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. The work introduced Heller to state and local planning, and he was appointed to the local planning commission. Heller then came up with the idea for a lobbying group on the need for strong urban planning to protect the environment from suburban development. Heller realized that there were no environmental groups outside of wilderness conservation that could work to protect natural landscapes within urban areas.

Heller’s interest in planning also led to an introduction and friendship with Bauer. When Heller sought someone to help start his lobbying group, Bauer recommended Samuel Wood to him, who Bauer knew from his work as a legislative consultant to the California Assembly Committee on Conservation, Planning, and Public Works from 1953 to 1958. Like Bauer and Heller, Wood believed that planning was necessary to balance urban growth with the protection of natural resources such as water and open-space.

Heller and Wood founded California Tomorrow as a non-profit corporation in 1961 and Bauer was an incorporator of the group and served on its Board. The group quickly published two important publications, *California, Going . . . Gone* in 1961, and *The Phantom Cities of California* in 1963. Bauer provided editing and overall content advice for both publications, which argued that environmental concerns needed to be expanded from wilderness conservation to the environment threatened by over-development. While arguing for regional government, the California Tomorrow books were perhaps the first books to really warn of the postwar hazards of overdevelopment and of freeway expansion. The group soon became a much larger advocacy organization with headquarters in San Francisco and Los Angles. In 1965 the group began publishing *Cry California*, a quarterly magazine on environmental issues and the problem of suburban growth and an important magazine for environmental and conservationist groups of the 1960s. The group would publish a model program of state planning in its *California Tomorrow Plan* in 1971, and of regional planning in *Democracy in the Space Age: Regional Government Under a California State Plan* in 1973.

The urgency Bauer expressed in numerous writings and speeches to safeguard the natural resources of California and the nation led UC Berkeley president Clark Kerr to promote her in 1960 to draft the paper on national physical environmental goals for the President’s Commission on National Goals. The President’s Commission was a privately funded body spearheaded by
President Dwight Eisenhower, to develop a set of national goals and objectives with fifteen separate chapters. In her resulting chapter, “Framework for an Urban Society,” Bauer would draw a direct link between the national goals of environmental quality and the need to create a planned pattern of development. “Framework for an Urban Society,” was a powerful environmental statement on balancing urban growth with environmentalism, as well as more practical issues such as worsening traffic congestion caused by unbalanced urban development.79

Segregation And Urban Renewal

As early as 1945, in her review of Mumford’s City Development, Studies in Disintegration and Renewal, Bauer asserted that while “we fiddle around with central reconstruction, we are leaving almost untouched that primary necessity: the integration and protection of communities in the outlying areas with surrounding open space reserved for rural and recreation pursuits.”80 How could the reconstruction of urban centers be “fiddling around” to the person who was the driving force behind the urban renewal legislation of 1937?

Bauer already understood that suburban development and racial restrictions prevented minority access to white suburbs and would lead to more socially and racially segregated cities. Unless something was done to stop this increasing social isolationism, minorities would be left behind in increasingly impoverished neighborhoods no matter what style of architecture was used in urban renewal. Thus, renewal programs would be unsuccessful, even harmful, unless accompanied by some sort of growth control planning at the regional level. Contrary to the prevailing interpretation of Bauer solely as an advocate of public housing, Bauer made a strong argument that to solve urban blight required solving the problem of suburban sprawl.

As early as 1945 then, Bauer argued that it was useless to “tackle economic blight without dealing with the entire metropolitan region as a single organic entity.”81 Likewise, in her article in The Nation in 1948 adjacent to Mumford, Bauer tied the problem of blight and scatterization together. Again quoting the NAHO/NPHC Report, Bauer argued that for “the past five or ten years we have concentrated on how to get rid of the slums and redevelop blighted areas,” but that, “the timing and emphasis turn out to have been sadly misplaced.” Instead, the critical problem of the day was not “slum replacement, but the location of housing in unbuilt areas.”82

Indeed, Bauer concluded that guiding and controlling hinterland development was probably far more important than any direct planning action on the city center. In the Economist in 1945, she lamented that there was no live Garden City movement in America to state the alternative to scatteration and “redevelopment” and thus “clarify the conditions on which central reconstruction can be largely successful.”83 The success of renewal programs was therefore “likely to be very limited if practically all the additional lower-income and minority people in the entire region must be accommodated” in the center cities. Instead, Bauer argued for a serious effort to provide residential opportunities throughout the urban region for minorities.

By the 1950s, Bauer was criticizing the vast suburban FHA developments that, “in the proud name of neighborhood planning,” resulted in “identical little boxes” for families equally identical in age and income, and even more standardized in race.84 At a talk at Mills College in Oakland, California, in 1953, Bauer labeled the localized planning of suburban governments as
“the organizational effort to exclude minority races, by many neighborhoods to keep them lily white by excluding minority races, especially oriental and negros.”

In “Do Americans Hate Cities?” from 1956, Bauer argued that federal and state policies promoted social segregation—by dwelling type, by income, by age group, and by race. This was resulting in a sort of “neo-feudal society” that was inappropriate for democracy. Bauer lamented the loss of social diversity which traditionally had been the stimulus for a tolerant and urbane culture. Bauer ultimately warned of what she called “metropolitan specialization with a vengeance,” referring to “solid ghettos for the underprivileged in less than a generation, while the newer suburbs remain lily-white and strictly middle-class.”

Those that see Bauer solely as an advocate of modernist public housing ignore her 1957 article in the *Architectural Forum*, entitled “The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing,” one of the earliest sustained criticisms of large-scale public housing projects as concentrated racialized ghettos. While Bauer is a frequently paired opposite of later critics of modernist design like Jane Jacobs, “Dreary Dreadlock” preceded Jacobs, Colin Rowe, Denise Scott-Brown and Robert Venturi in their more recognized attacks on modernist planning and housing. “The Dreary Deadlock” article must also be placed next to an earlier article in the *Architectural Forum* in 1956. In “First Job: Control New City Sprawl,” Bauer tied the failure of housing programs to address the unresolved issue of suburban sprawl and argued that, “people who look to urban renewal to solve our city problems for the next 20-25 years have been fast asleep, ignoring the inevitable impact of population growth and metropolitan expansion.” Bauer’s arguments were so strong that the editors of *Architectural Forum* felt it necessary to include an Editor’s Note defending urban renewal: “despite the importance of Bauer’s essay we will not give up the importance of [urban] renewal.”

In a 1961 talk, Bauer attributed the emphasis on renewal rather than growth control to misdirected urban renewal polices of the East Coast brought to the West Coast:

Federal housing and renewal policies are largely shaped by eastern leaders and are not entirely suited to our own local conditions. The emphasis is all on ‘renewal, redevelopment, rehabilitation, rehousing, reorganization’ . . . redoing what was badly done before. While our problem is not so much the past as the future, how to cope with growth . . . We haven’t made all their mistakes and still have another chance to avoid them.

Bauer saw a connection between the urban planning profession and a resulting increase in social isolationism and segregation. In 1962, she argued that the problematic planning principled had emerged in the 1920s with an official purpose to uphold the dominant social order. Early planners such as Ernest P. Goodrich and Harland Bartholomew were primarily concerned with planning as a restrictive tool, and the era saw the rapid adoption of zoning, with the basic idea of creating specialized parts of the city for different functions. Bauer argued that real estate interests welcomed this principle, and the increasing scale of specialized building operations fell readily into the pattern. Planning therefore created the rationale for a social and functional specialization at a much larger regional scale, just when the automobile began to stimulate the suburban exodus.
All this led Bauer to the now obvious conclusion in her 1963 report for Berkeley’s Institute of Governmental Studies, “Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area,” that the greatest growth in population was outside the center city but inside the metropolitan region. The physical pattern of scattersation was leading to the loss of open space, but it was also linked to the social pattern of sharp divisions by income, race, and age between older cities and newer outlying communities. Bauer argued that the problem of improvement was not just a matter of replacing a fixed amount of obsolete real property but of improving the development process itself to obviate the continual creation of asocial conditions. Remarkably for the person who is thought of as being responsible for bringing in the European modern design principles to solve housing problems, Bauer argued that the basic weakness was not in the physical architecture of housing but in the fundamental process of migration and assimilation. Better housing design alone would not solve their problems—better education, better economic opportunities, and a greater degree of social integration area were at least equally important.

In a harsh and prescient attack on city planning of 1964, “Are Cities Obsolete,” Bauer wrote that planning was “still mainly orientated toward fixing up the past, rather than shaping the future.” While the profession was “confronted with continuous outward expansion—with the vista of cities where today there are only farms and vineyards—planning seems to rivet its attention squarely on yesterday.” Billions were being spent on renewal and redevelopment, but for Bauer, “the challenge of tomorrow—the shaping of the metropolitan community that must provide for the 46 million more Americans outside central cities—goes unheeded, by and large.” Bauer concluded that what happened in blighted areas depended directly on what happens in suburbia. This was particularly true in California, she argued, with the high rate of in-migration and metropolitan growth, and the increasingly high cost of suburban homes, and the racial restrictions against minorities.

Research on Segregation

These concerns led Bauer to embark on a program of statistical research into the problem of racial segregation. The first aspect of her research demonstrated the increasing problem of segregation, and the second attempted to disprove the theory behind redlining. Overall, this research was intended to show that the issue of housing could not be solved by urban renewal alone, and without a broad movement against racial policies in housing, the concentration of minority poverty would only increase, ultimately dooming public housing programs to failure.

Bauer reported that in 1940-1950 San Francisco’s population rose 22.2% to 775,357, but at the same time its nonwhite population had risen an astounding 137% to 81,469. Indeed, according to Bauer nonwhite demand for housing was rising not only because of in-migration but also because of a general rise in income levels during this time due primarily to jobs in war or war related industries. In her 1963 Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, Bauer argued that the rise in purchasing power and rising incomes were expanding nonwhite demand, yet the effective market for new homes had nevertheless contracted. Bauer’s research showed that for the lower third income group, almost no FHA insured homes were provided, and that only fourteen percent of the FHA houses were available for the lower half of income. Based on her research, Bauer concluded that due to the restrictive efforts of the FHA
and the increasingly pronounced role of racial prejudice, the “number of negros in suburban tracts is almost nil.”

In an undated report for the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal organization, probably from the early 1960s, “Are Housing and Renewal Regional Problems?,” Bauer presented a statistical table showing that from 1950 to 1960, the population of Bay Area’s nine counties had increased thirty-six percent to 3.6 million. Yet, the three central cities of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose had lost four percent of their population and were now thirty-four percent of the total, while the other counties had increased seventy-two percent in population. More disturbing for Bauer, the nonwhite population of those counties had fallen to nearly four percent while it had increased in central cities from twelve percent to twenty-two percent. At those rates Bauer estimated that by 1980, the Bay Area would have a population of over seven million, but fifty-four percent of the central cities population would be nonwhite, while the non-center city counties would hold eighty-three percent of the total population with less than five percent of them as nonwhite.96

Bauer also set out to investigate banking and real estate standards behind redlining to both understand and disprove that the practice was necessary. In a 1951 study she explored the “effects of recent nonwhite purchases on market prices of single family residences in San Francisco.” She conducted interviews with real estate people and used quotations from real estate materials and books to describe popular theory. Bauer thus painted a picture of the real estate industry as driven by a belief that racial mixtures would drive down real estate values. In one instance, Bauer quoted a real estate professional:

> the effects of racial infiltration are often discussed among the lending fraternity, and, although we have no factual evidence to present in summary form, we are unanimous in the opinion that it harms values . . . a single negro in a block in the Sunset District would be like a caution flag to us to note the trend of the neighborhood and would probably be sufficient to influence our loans downward in that area.97

Bauer’s interviews with forty-five Bay Area real estate salesman found that only five believed the introduction on nonwhites would not devalue property, the rest insisted on losses of ten to twenty percent of value.98 Bauer then attempted to show statistically that the popular theory that nonwhite purchases drove down price values was false. Her research showed that in 1949-51 nonwhite purchase and occupancy did not result in price behavior that popular theory would predict.

The Integrating Function of the City

The increasing isolationism of suburban communities and the creation of racialized urban spaces deeply offended Bauer’s notion of the historical function of cities—to integrate various members of societies across class, race, and ethnic divides. The classic concept of a city that has existed since prehistoric times, Bauer wrote, was compact with a definite shape, and it always included a wide variety of people, poor and rich, with different cultures and languages. Moreover, Bauer argued the historical city was always run by a single government that provided
whatever common services were required, and it was supported by a single, equitable tax base. Bauer argued that, “we have [lost this essential tradition] in the disintegrated metropolitan region with its schism between city and suburb, and its autonomous specialized parts.” The metropolitan area still included the heterogeneous population always attracted and required by an urban economy, but it had no legal or political identity:

> the cities are merely random fragments of the whole, battling for their independence but with very uneven resources and tending more and more to serve socially specialized groups of citizens . . . the rich, the poor, the nonwhites, middle-class white families with children. Racial divisions are of course, most dramatic.99

Writing that, “new concepts of urban and regional structure are all important,” she therefore called to “restore the function of the city,” by unifying it “at the regional level” and growing “better balanced communities within the region.”100

Unfortunately, Bauer recognized that in the Bay Area, geographic and social divisions were sharpened and institutionalized by the local government structure and the tradition of home rule. Political divisions tended to promote increasing conflict between central cities and suburban communities, due to rising economic and social differentials. Bauer argued that the emerging suburban zeal for “home rule” was less a reflection of high Jeffersonian principle than it was of a new kind of class warfare or isolationism which boded ill for metropolitan unification on any voluntary basis. The great historic function of the city, Bauer argued, as the essential means of integrating all kinds and levels of people and their activities, had been lost in scattered one-class enclaves and ghettoized older communities.101

**Conclusion: The Citizen And Choice**

In 1961, the Sierra Club—whose members had long ignored the environmental issues present in urban regions—invited Catherine Bauer to speak at their biennial wilderness conference. In a speech entitled the “Urban Octopus,” she argued that urban planners and wilderness advocates such as the Sierra Club faced a common enemy: “the urban octopus, spreading its tentacles farther and farther out into natural areas.” Bauer urged the club to support open space legislation in Congress, but the Sierra Club still did not follow her plea.102 It would take until much later for many wilderness conservation groups to expand their definition of conservation to include open spaces within the expanding metropolitan region.

To build support for political action in the absence of groups like the Sierra Club, Bauer called for a renewed conceptualization of an “ideal city” at the popular level. Bauer argued that the modern city was the organ of a democratic society and as such, ideas about its development needed to be presented to citizens for debate. Choice, Bauer argued, was exactly what citizens lacked in housing and urban lifestyles. The dramatic changes in the building industry and federal policies developed during the war and immediate post-war meant that the shape and nature of housing decisions were being made at the larger level of broad public policy or the large corporation, and in only a small degree at the level of the individual.
At the same time, the potential importance of the citizen’s role as citizen and voter was magnified because housing and urban form were largely shaped at the public level. Bauer argued that there must be a more effective process than what existed to help citizens decide what kind of city the citizens wanted, to guide the official representatives and planners. It was vital to have some clear cut image of the desired city to be. “Otherwise,” Bauer wrote, “either chaos happens, or a Robert Moses situation happens, in which one man controls all the housing and planning and public works agencies, and his concept of an ideal New York is not synonymous with the public.”

What Bauer felt was missing was the public debate of the big alternatives. The primary vehicle for presenting alternatives to future urban development that emerged from the urban planning profession was the so-called “long term master plan.” Bauer argued that the plan failed to engage citizens in the future development of their city because the master plan was centered on a scientific process, carried on by professionals, with an end vote by the city council. In this case, the issues of long-term implications were never publicly posed to the citizens at large. Indeed as early as 1943, Bauer declared that, “more experts with more power” was not in any case the whole answer. Instead, the question for American democracy was to engage citizens in their own choices.

The big choice that confronted modern cities was between centralization versus some form of decentralization or sub-centralization. Instead of citizens making the choice, the decision was being made for them. The big alternatives, Bauer argued, still needed to be dramatized in terms of shape, size and social-economic structure, particularly in the regions that were still in the process of rapid urbanization. “My own California is a good example,” Bauer argued, and it might still turn up “an array of ardent and battling Utopians to inform the citizens of the big decisions ahead.”
Chapter Four: Notes


3 In his oral history, Wurster spends barely a page on his courtship and marriage of Bauer. Bauer’s archival collection does include a few brief mentions of their relationship. The oral histories of Vernon DeMars and T. J. Kent are the other sources on their relationship and Bauer’s move to Berkeley. See William W. Wurster, “College of Environmental Design, University of California, Campus Planning, and Architectural Practice,” an oral history conducted by Suzanne B. Riess, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1964; DeMars, "A Life in Architecture.”


5 Just one example is provided in Richard Walker, The Country in the City: The Greening of the San Francisco Bay Area (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 132-143. Walker describes Bauer as the leading housing reformer of the day, and then goes on to discuss Bay Area environmentalism and the fight for open space, without mentioning Bauer’s arguments and work in support of that fight.


10 Radford, Modern Housing for America, 64.

11 Oberlander and Newbrun, Houser, 5,10.


For more on the RPAA, the Garden City model, and regionalism in planning, see Chapter two and three of this dissertation.

*Technics and Civilization* (New York: Harcourt Press, 1934). In this book Mumford reviewed the historical role of technology in shaping urbanism and civilization generally; and expanded on Patrick Geddes’s ideas of ages of technology: the eotechnic, paleotechnic, and neotechnic.


Catherine Bauer Wurster (hereinafter CBW), CBW to Lewis Mumford, undated, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

On the Hoisery Workers Union Carl Mackley Houses see Radford, *Modern Housing for America*, 111-146.

Radford, *Modern Housing for America*.


The literature on the FHA’s practice of “redlining” is substantial and largely based on Kenneth Jackson’s *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). My colleague Ocean Howell argues that Jackson’s reading of redlining is in part flawed because regional branches of the HOLC interpreted redlining differently, often without a racial bias, and that racial exclusions were less important than the FHA’s requirements against mixed use. See Ocean Howell, “In the Public Interest: Space, Ethnicity, and Authority in San Francisco's Mission District, 1906-1973,” PhD Dissertation, Architecture, University of California, Berkeley, 2009.

CBW to Lewis Mumford, Undated, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
One of my favorite Bauer lines in her letters: “Don’t meet boat probably best take advantage clean wide break baby you’re crazy but I can’t help and like Mussolini won’t fight.” CBW to Jacob Crane (cable), undated, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Bauer was the first Rosenberg Lecturer, but exactly why Bauer was selected is still unclear. Both Kent and DeMars denied influencing the decision and had no recollection of how she was selected. DeMars, in “A Life in Architecture.” The Rosenberg Foundation was a San Francisco based foundation that supported initiatives in health, public education and planning, including donations to the San Francisco Housing and Planning Association. The Rosenberg Foundation, “1937-1946: Ten Years of Community Service” (San Francisco: The Rosenberg Foundation, 1947). Kent recalls meeting Bauer in DeMars’s oral history: “I got to know her because I'd met Mumford, and Mumford said, "Get to know Catherine," when I came back in ’39. Bingo! But there was a whole new dimension to city planning, architecture, landscape architecture, the whole thing, because she was saying, we have to find a way to overcome this weird trip in our society that just ruins everything for the poor people in the cities. And then, within a short time, she said, "My God, we did the wrong thing!" [chuckles].” T. J. Kent, in DeMars, “A Life in Architecture,” 151.

CBW to President Sproul (cable), Oct 24, 1939; CBW to President Sproul, Oct 26, 1939, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

CBW to Bruce Bliven, March 14, 1940, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

CBW to unknown, Jan. 21, 1940, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. In the letter, Bauer lamented, “it was the other guy I fell for on that trip but he's still a WPA artist.”

See for example, CBW to John McAndrew (curator, Department of Architecture, Museum of Modern Art, New York), Feb. 17, 1940; CBW to Betty and Rudi, Feb. 23, 1940, in which Bauer discusses going on a ski trip with Wurster and Church; and CBW to unknown, Jan. 21, 1940,” also discussing trips with Church and Wurster, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.


CBW to Serge Gorodetzky, May 2, 1941, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

For Wurster’s war housing work, see my chapter two in this dissertation.

33 See, for example, CBW to Lydia and Curt, June 18, 1942, in which Bauer describes cycling across the Golden Gate Bridge to Sausalito, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

34 On Mackaye, see Chapter Two of this dissertation; Larry Anderson, Benton MacKaye, Conservationists, Planner, and Creator of the Appalachian Trail (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

35 Oberlander and Newbrun, Houser, 145.


39 Ibid.

40 Oberlander and Newbrun, Houser, 264.


42 CBW, “Cities in Flux,” 75.


44 Historian Roger W. Lotchin lays out the argument that the war merely increased existing trends in population movement westward, arguing against the war as a “second gold rush.” Lotchin, The Bad City in the Good War: San Francisco, Oakland, and San Diego (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).

45 CBW, “Cities in Flux,” 75.

46 CBW, “Cities in Flux,” 77.


Taft-Ellender-Wagner (T.-E.-W.) Housing Bill was a predecessor to the 1949 Housing Act intended to stimulate desperately needed housing construction in the immediate postwar period. The bill intended to build fifteen million new homes in the following ten years, primarily through an expansion of direct federal loans, federal loan guarantees, and low interest rates. About eight percent of the housing program was for redevelopment and public housing. T.-E.-W. passed the U.S. Senate in 1948, but only after Senator Eugene McCarthy, who had close connections to private mass homebuilders such as William J. Levitt, had succeeded in stripping the T.-E.-W. of its public housing component. The Bill passed and President Harry Truman reluctantly signed the Bill, issuing a statement that he had urged Congress to pass a comprehensive bill, and instead Congress had presented him with an “emasculated housing bill, which fails to include several of the most important provisions,” including low-rent public housing and rural housing. See Senator Allen J. Ellender, “What T.-E.-W. Provides,” The Nation (May 15, 1948), 532; Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987); Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Upon Approving the Housing Act,” (August 10, 1948), in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12975.


See for instance, CBW, California Housing and Planning Association Letterhead, 1942; CBW to Miss Chase, May 8, 1941 (There will be no “real planning without enlightened public action.”); CBW to Harlan Barrows, May 5, 1942 (“The fact that planners so seldom set out to enlist public support for such things just happens to be one of my deep-seeded phobias.”); CBW to Eliot F. Noyes (Museum of Modern Art, New York), March 11, 1942 (stating that there is a great need to educate the public on the housing picture); Letter to Eliot F. Noyes, Feb. 1, 1942, (Threatening to resign from the National Committee on Housing Emergency because it has not emphasized the local housing authority and engaged citizens); CBW to Clark Foreman (telegram), Nov. 21, 1941, (“Believe me the whole future of this business depends on strengthening or at least recognizing local housing and planning agencies.”), Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Of course, this is exactly what happened, though without the engaged and active citizenry that Bauer hoped for—still, we have ample historical analysis about the federal renewal programs, but little about how local housing authorities created quite different programs at the local levels. But see Paul Groth, Living Downtown: The History of Residential Hotels in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 273-281.


CBW, “Do Americans Hate Cities?,” 188.


CBW, “The California Environment.”

CBW, “The California Environment.”

See for example, “The Challenge of Urban Growth in Western States,” Talk to the Northwest Assembly, Yakima, Washington, September 8, 1961 (“Until quite recently we never paid much attention to our cities . . . but . . . we began to see that the end result of the whole development process is urbanization.”). Similarly, in her speech “Are Cities Obsolete?” before the Oakland Junior League, on January 14, 1964, Bauer argued that while only 12% of the nine-county Bay Area was urbanized in 1960, at current levels of growth and at the same rate of decreased densities, by 1970, 75% of the nine counties would be developed, leaving only the most completely unbuildable land or water left. Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

CBW, “The California Environment.”


Oberlander and Newbrun, Houser, 262-263.


United States President's Commission on National Goals, Goals for Americans; Programs for Action in the Sixties, Comprising the Report of the President's Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for the Consideration of the Commission (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960). Bauer sent letters to Sweden for information on their national policy on the environment. In the statement, Bauer wrote, “Our affluence is wonderful, but if we really want to achieve a better environment, we may have to learn how to balance our expenditures a little more carefully in terms of necessary costs and real benefits. This could mean encouraging a development pattern that wouldn’t require an even longer and more costly journey to work.” Oberlander and Newbrun, Houser, 262-263.


87 CBW, “Do Americans Hate Cities?,” *Architectural Forum*, 188.


92 CBW, *Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area*.

93 CBW, *Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area*, 16.

94 Bauer argued that minorities were “forced to live in a few old cities because they cannot find housing anywhere else . . and with most of the middle and upper class white families living in newer outlying communities.” “Are Cities Obsolete,” Oakland Junior League, Oakland, California, January 14, 1964. She made the same argument to SPUR around the same time in “Are Housing and Renewal Regional Problems?” San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association, August 15, undated year, Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

95 CBW, *Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area*.

96 CBW, “Are Housing and Renewal Regional Problems?”

98 In her research, Bauer was assembling a great review of literature on racial issues in the real estate industry of the 1940s. CBW, “Draft Real Estate Report.”

99 CBW, “Belated Challenge,” 17; see also CBW, “Are Cities Obsolete?”


101 CBW, Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, 22.


104 CBW, “Cities in Flux: A Challenge to the Postwar Planners.”

105 CBW to Bill D. (handwritten note), Catherine Bauer Wurster Papers, 1931-1964, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (“Robert Fishman should be sued for libel. I’m outraged.”).
Chapter Four: Illustrations

Figure 4.2: Source: H. Peter Oberlander and Eva M. Newbrun, *Houser: The Life and Work of Catherine Bauer* (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 72.
Figure 4.4: Catherine Bauer at work. Source: H. Peter Oberlander and Eva M. Newbrun, *Houser: The Life and Work of Catherine Bauer* (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2000)
Figure 4.5: The Outdoorsy Catherine Bauer. Source: “Exploration, research, activism, and other women's work: “New Exhibit at Doe Highlights the Bancroft Library's Wealth of Documentary Resources,” *The Berkeleyan* (March 31, 2005).
Housing for America
A Ten-Year Program

The welfare of the people must take precedence over the interests of speculative builders and mortgage lenders. If a famine, a dearth of clothing or medicine—or a housing shortage—finds private enterprise unable to meet the people’s needs, it is the duty of the government to intervene: to supplement the activities of private enterprise or, if necessary, to do the whole job itself. Only when business operations are again adequate, is it time for the government to withdraw. This is the theory that justified government intervention in the war housing emergency. It is no less valid during a peace-time emergency.

A housing program for America should have the following goals:

- Construction of 15,000,000 new urban and rural homes is the most tenable government-subsidized housing for those unable to afford any other decent type of self-supporting housing for the middle-income group. The T-E-W bill is a step in that direction.

- Construction of all slums.

- Promotion of future slums through practical building and standards, acceptance of which shall be the motion of federal housing assistance.

- Demolition of cities that will provide decent homes at reasonable cost in decent neighborhoods, with the joint effort of the government and the federal housing assistance.

- Demolition of structures in which no discrimination based on race, color, or creed is practiced or allowed.

- A home for every veteran needing one.

- Housing for the elderly as a right.

- Continuance and strengthening of rent controls until the supply of houses has caught up with the demand.

- Sounder private ownership through government insurance that will secure owners against the risk of default due to illness, unemployment, or other hazards.

- A sound mortgage system, with loans by government agencies if private money is unavailable or private interest rates excessive.

- A revitalized, stabilized building industry achieved through large-scale government-sponsored undertakings.

- Rationing of critical materials to assure distribution according to need.

- Prosecution of monopolies and outlawing of unfair practices that limit construction or rig the prices of materials.

- Establishment of a new Cabinet post for Housing and Community Planning.

A SPECIAL SECTION OF THE NATION • MAY 15 • 1948

Figure 4.6: The Special Issue of the Nation Devoted to Housing. Source: The Nation (May 15, 1948).
Chapter Five

Region and Nature in the Modernist Supermarket:

The Marina Safeway Prototype

“To paraphrase a famous dictum, the store of today is a machine for selling.” Architectural Record, 1948.1
Khrushchev and the Modern American Supermarket

In September 1959, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived at the brand new ultra-modern Safeway in the Marina district of San Francisco (fig. 5.1). Khrushchev was on his tour of the United States, a second act to his more famous kitchen debate between then Vice-President Richard Nixon. San Francisco was his second stop on the tour, and in Los Angeles, his car had been pelted with tomatoes, he had a bitter exchange with the Los Angeles mayor, and he had exploded with anger when security denied his long-desired visit to Disneyland. The first stop went so badly, Khrushchev threatened to terminate his visit and fly home early. The large, warm reception Khrushchev and his family received in San Francisco did much to restore a sense of welcome, and his decision to continue the tour.

The Marina Safeway was a critical component of the visit. The modern supermarket became an “evocative cultural symbol” in the Cold War and was frequently deployed as a symbol of American prosperity. While the kitchen debate in Moscow was famous for its combativeness, Khrushchev left a friendly visit to Safeway impressed. In his speech that night, he thanked the store manager, and declared that, “I am truly filled with admiration over what I saw.” The Safeway experience was probably in mind, when Khrushchev later reviewed the trip: “I have come here to see how the slaves of capitalism are living. I see that the way they live is not bad at all.”

The Safeway store of the 1950s is perhaps the peak of the supermarket industry’s experimentation with modern architecture. The store model was created in a collaboration between in-house Safeway architects and the noted San Francisco architectural firm Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons. The Marina store was, moreover, a prototype that would stretch commercial architectural modernism across the western United States as Safeway built nearly identical stores from California to Arizona and Washington, in cities and towns like Portland, Oregon, or Butte, Montana. When Safeway embarked on their international expansion in the 1960s, the Marina prototype reached as far away as Australia. Despite the store’s broad reach, geographer Richard Walker provides the only historical mention of the Safeway store to date in his recent *The Conquest of Bread: 150 Years of Agribusiness in California*. Walker attacks Wurster’s design as “Corbusier-inspired,” as symbolic of the “symptomatic layout of retail modernity,” and as the final stage-set of capitalist dominated agribusiness.

Wurster, however, was a strong opponent of Corbusier’s architecture and best known as the leader of the Bay Area’s second regional movement in architecture, “regional modernism,” which sought to blend modern architecture with a sensitivity to regional qualities, climate, and sense of place (fig. 5.2). The limited scholarship on regional modernism remains focused on houses for wealthy clients. What happens when we extend this study to the commercial sphere? What happens when we extend the vision of a singular architect to that of his larger commercial firm, as Wurster became Wurster, Bernardi, and Emmons in 1945? The architecture of a supermarket prototype spread across the western globe not only provides an example of regional modernism on the larger scale, but presents deeper questions about the role of architecture in highlighting or obscuring the methods of commercial production behind the facade.

This deeper look into the question of regional modernism greatly complicates our understanding of regionalism in architecture. Regionalism has, of course, long been a concern for
vernacular historians who have studied how traditional architecture forms respond to local regions. We have rarely, however, considered modern architecture to be regional. In doing so, however, we can begin to consider the qualities of regionalism beyond the architectural facade, but in the interior store layout, and even further, to the larger processes at work behind architecture—in this case, for example, the food production system behind the grocery store architecture. Architectural historians have largely ignored the vernacular spaces of the grocery store, and in particular, the brief dominance of modern architecture in grocery architecture. The seminal work in the field is Richard Longstreth’s *The Drive-in, The Supermarket, and the Transformation of Commercial Space in Los Angeles, 1914-1941*. Longstreth demonstrates how the retail space of one major American city—Los Angeles—developed a more modern form in response to increasing dominance of the automobile in the prewar period. Vernacular and architectural historians, however, have yet to extend Longstreth’s work to the postwar era.

Additionally, the emphasis on the automobile as the primary determinant of supermarket form creates the impression of inevitability in the supermarket’s architecture, location, and eventual dominance of the food trade. Two other strong works on supermarkets, however, by James Mayo and Tracey Deutsch remind us that we need to consider the overall political economy of the grocery store. Rather than pure architecture, supermarkets are better considered as particular cultural landscapes. As geographer Don Mitchell writes about the California agricultural landscape, such landscapes are produced, in ways that, “lie” about their identity. The gleaming, new modernist Safeway facades hid great complexities and contestations (fig. 5.3). Modern grocery stores were points of social conflict and insecurity about the intense modernization of American eating habits. Such stores were also points of resistance as some consumers often rejected the supermarket vision. Safeway recognized this tension and attempted to find a balance between nationalization and overall standardization of the chain store experience with regional expression to suit customer demands. Designers of the new stores adopted modern processes while attempting to humanize them for the customer through architecture. Regionalist motifs outside and inside combined with interior spatial arrangements that recalled the regionalist connections with farmers or farmers markets. Regionalism became the dominant architecture of grocery retail, as chain stores sought to obscure the modernity of the food chain from the American food consumer.

**The Rise of the Safeway Supermarket**

The growth of Safeway gives us a good summary of the history of the grocery chain store and the eventual emergence of the supermarket. Safeway has long been headquartered in the Bay Area, and considered a Bay Area corporation, but Safeway’s true home store is in American Falls, Idaho (fig. 5.4). Similarly, while Safeway was for a long time the dominant retailer in the western United States, it was initially founded in large part by East Coast capital.

M. B. Skaggs opened Safeway’s rootstock store in 1915 in American Falls and the store was quite different from the standard western grocery store. These older stores relied heavily on credit, offered home delivery, and maintained a large staff of sales clerks, necessitated by the “counter and wall” system. In this system, store goods were arranged on wall shelves behind a counter and were only available through a clerk, who frequently set or negotiated the price (fig.
5.5). Though we tend now to idealize the small-time storekeeper, Deutsch points out that the requirement to negotiate price and credit with clerks was often fraught with social tension over issues of race, gender and class. The later promise by chain stores of largely equal treatment to all customers, and promises of autonomy for women shoppers, were a large part of their appeal.\textsuperscript{15}

According to Skaggs, he had never seen a “cash-and-carry” grocery store, which were still very few in the United States, but he had heard of them and thought they made sense (fig. 5.6).\textsuperscript{16} The new cash-and-carry system adopted by the chains had three essential characteristics: (1) they ordered in large bulk amounts to achieve significantly lower prices and focused on a high-volume of sales at low profit margins; (2) they eliminated customer credit and home delivery; and (3) they eliminated the counter-and-wall system with its clerks for self-service of pre-packaged goods.

*The corner chain Safeway*

We might call the 1920s the true era of the regional grocery store chain, as many small chains emerged to cover a given region, and often came to dominate in their area. In the early 1920s, Skaggs United Stores expanded across Idaho, Montana, and into Oregon. In 1925, a study by the emergent “Chain Store Association,” which included grocery and well as other retailers, revealed that Skaggs was making far more profits than almost any other chain. In turn, Skaggs was elected president of the Chain Store Association.\textsuperscript{17} Skaggs’s success garnered the attention of the East Coast banking establishment, especially the new firm of Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch had just purchased a small grocery chain in southern California, Sam Selig Stores, which they had renamed Safeway Stores, and needed someone with grocery experience to run it.\textsuperscript{18} By this point, Skaggs already had 428 stores across the western states and a proven record of earning fantastic profits in the trade.\textsuperscript{19} After Skaggs rebuffed initial approaches, founding partner Charles Merrill himself traveled to Portland, Oregon, in 1926 for a long series of meetings with Skaggs. Merrill persuaded Skaggs to run a new corporation that merged the two grocery store chains. Long afterwards, Charles Merrill would recall the creation of Safeway Stores as one of his greatest successes and the headline of his obituary in *The New York Times* hailed him not just as the founder his stock brokerage firm, but also as a pioneer for having “Set Up Safeway Stores (fig. 5.7).”\textsuperscript{20} Skaggs also realized that the potential of the company meant it would outlive any one individual; therefore, he felt a personal name was inappropriate for the long-range future of the company. So after 18 months as Skaggs-Safeway, the stores all became: Safeway.\textsuperscript{21}

The 1920s saw an explosion of growth by other grocery chain stores as well, which was documented by early chain store historians such as Godfrey Lebhar. Kroger for instance, grew from 799 to 5,575 stores in the decade, and A&P, by far the largest, expanded from 4,600 in 1919 to 15,000 in 1929, becoming the first retailer to break one billion dollars in sales.\textsuperscript{22} By 1930, according to some studies, up to thirty percent of all American grocery shopping was done in chain stores.\textsuperscript{23} Skaggs retired from Safeway in 1941,\textsuperscript{24} but over those fifteen years, with the backing of Merrill-Lynch, he led the company on a spate of expansion by purchase, buying up or merging with smaller chains primarily in the West, but by 1928 Safeway was also in Washington, DC, and Texas.\textsuperscript{25} Looking back years later, *Safeway News*, playing with the metaphor of the
chain store, described it as a “era of mergers, when expansion was rapid and companies were forged link by link into sturdy chains.” By 1931, Safeway had expanded to 3,400 stores.

Today, chain stores are typically associated with the building of new stores in suburban areas, yet much of the early growth of chain stores was accomplished through the buying up of smaller stores or chains in dense urban areas. Safeway’s locational strategy at this time, for instance, was to find numerous locations in the city that were accessible for young mothers to walk to the store with their children. Thus, the early chain stores dominated the smaller local neighborhood stores in well-developed urban neighborhoods. Safeway had numerous small corner stores throughout San Francisco, small western cities, and even New York City.

The anti-chain movement

In the late 1920s, in response to the dramatic growth of chain stores and their ability to buy up or merge with smaller local chains, a strong anti-chain movement developed. Raising important questions around antitrust, the rights of labor, and whether control of food production would ultimately be determined at the local region or at the national level, the movement culminated in the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936. The movement demonstrates that chain stores were not accepted by all, and that at times, their practices were not fully legal.

As James Mayo shows, between 1927 and 1930, state legislators introduced 169 different anti-chain bills. While many of the different proposed bills outlawed stores greater than five in number, the main strategy that developed was an anti-chain store tax. In 1930 and 1931 the US Supreme Court issued rulings that supported state graduated taxes on chain stores, and advocates were building a legislative case against chains. Chain store advocates later argued that this increased the tendency to close smaller stores and build larger stores.

Often chain store practices were also in potential violation of anti-trust laws. Because of their large purchasing power, chain stores could use their leverage to force suppliers to give them lower prices than traditional stores. The Robinson-Patman Act attempted to bolster the United States antitrust provisions to outlaw price agreements between suppliers and stores that discriminated between grocery companies and prevented chain grocers from under-cutting local stores to drive them out of business. The Robinson-Patman act did not fully resolve antitrust considerations for chain grocery stores, however. The large chains like Safeway and A&P would continue to be subject to frequent antitrust actions by the U.S. Department of Justice, as the American government wrestled with the question of just how large and dominant these chains should become. A&P, at one point, was the object of Department of Justice recommendation to be a “trust-bust” and broken back into smaller regional chains. Likewise, Safeway would be found guilty of several antitrust violations in the 1940s and 1950s.

At the same time, as Tracey Deutsch documents, consumer cooperatives emerged in the 1920s and boomed in the 1930s, offering a strong alternate version of the mass distribution of food. Their growth depended on the depression-era distrust of the large corporation and shoppers’ desire to experience control over the grocery store themselves. Already in 1922, the Cooperative Society of America was the largest chain grocer in Chicago. The dramatic growth in consumer co-ops during the period suggests that many Americans “envisioned a radically
different kind of mass retailing.” Cooperatives even found a role in Rexford Tugwell’s greenbelt cities program, as the main grocery for towns such as Greenbelt, Maryland (fig. 5.12). This greatly worried commentators like Business Week Magazine, especially because many of the Greenbelt store’s customers were young children, dangerously exposed to the “un-American” cooperative movement.

By the 1930s, small independent grocers continued to largely control the shopping landscape, and seemed to be regaining sales and market share that they had lost to chains in the 1920s. Independents offered personal attention and services the chains could not. Some analysts predicted that as competitive pressures forced supermarket retailers, who relied on their low prices to attract customers, to slimmer and slimmer profit margins, their service would so decline that customers would be driven back to independents.

The supermarket

New changes in grocery store sales techniques, however, would soon revolutionize the industry. The supermarket, originally developed by independents would ultimately be embraced by chain grocers. Along with a mounted public campaign to defeat the anti-chain movement, the adoption of the supermarket would propel chain stores to their position as the dominant supplier of American food.

Changes in grocery retail architecture were driven by changes inside the store. In the 1920s, retailers focused on a limited number of easily handled goods: canned items, staples, and other prepackaged goods. Meats and produce were generally not included because they required skilled employees. In the 1930s, this model began to change greatly. The first step was the so-called combination store of the late 1920s which brought grocers together with butchers or produce stores. Chain stores at first resisted the trend, but by the 1930s the Chain Store Association was promoting through its publication Chain Store Age the larger combination stores with their greater array of goods.

Richard Longstreth has documented how the automobile dramatically affected the layout of grocery markets in urban space. While originally grocery markets were part of the general retail strip focused on pedestrian traffic, by the 1920s market owners were looking for solutions to the overwhelming problem of the day: automobile parking (fig. 5.13). Initial designs included the L-plan on corner sites that provided a parking lot filling the corner, with various retail and grocery establishments filling out the L-block. The L-Blocks were thus combination stores with a mutual parking lot often combing grocery with butchers and produce markets.

The term “super market” was first used by William Albers for his Albers Super Market in Cincinnati in 1933, but the concept really originated in Southern California in the 1920s, as Longstreth documents, when Ralph’s Grocery Company constructed large stores with self-service interiors laid out according to category. These stores were the first to be truly large, up to 5,000 square feet, ten times the size of early stores. Ralphs, however, was a small regional chain, and the supermarket idea only began to expand when independents developed the idea on the East Coast. The large stores saw real growth in the 1930s, when independent grocers and retailers moved into vacant factories or warehouses, finding an advantage in the Depression’s business decline, and offered self-service, bulk pricing, and a large array of goods. Michael
Cullen opened his first store, King Kullen, in 1930 in Queens, New York and soon opened other, larger stores over 5,000 square feet, with substantial parking for the new suburban customers, and low prices.\textsuperscript{43} Dubbing his stores the “World’s Greatest Price Wrecker,” Cullen used bulk amounts of goods to cut prices, and substantial advertising in news papers and radio to draw in customers. Robert Otis and Roy Dawson opened the first Big Bear store in an abandoned factory building in Elizabeth, New Jersey in 1932, with 15,000 square feet devoted to groceries. The 1930s, then, saw the growth of many different kinds of supermarkets—small regional chains, independents in abandoned warehouses, multiple vendors under one roof, and super-sized consumer cooperatives.

The Chain and the Supermarket

Overall, the 1930s were tough years for the grocery chain store. Chain store shares of grocery sales declined from forty-four percent in 1933 to thirty-six percent in 1939.\textsuperscript{44} Anti-chain taxes and legislation were limiting profits, while consumer cooperatives and independent supermarkets regained sales from the smaller neighborhood stores, which were primarily chains.\textsuperscript{45} The success of these stores convinced existing chain stores of the need to switch to larger stores.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, some contemporaneous retail analysts argued that independent’s move into large abandoned factories previewed the later development by chains of supermarkets.\textsuperscript{47}

The return of chain stores

With the loss of sales in the 1930s into the 1940s, the chain store strategy of lower prices, standardized products, and centralized corporate control, all appeared to be an insufficient marketing model. Thus, “faced with both political and economic uncertainty, chain stores recreated themselves” in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{48} Retail groceries essentially adopted a two pronged strategy. The first was to organize and mount a public campaign in support of the chain store image. The second was to retrench by shifting to supermarket stores, but upgrading the supermarket for middle-class and upper middle class consumers. Modern architecture would play a key role in presented a new highly modern, upgraded supermarket.

In response to the wave of anti-chain legislation, court victories, and increasing general sympathy, the chain stores organized the American Retail Federation and the California Chain Stores Association. These associations lobbied both producer and consumer on the power of chain stores. To the producer, the association argued and demonstrated its ability to move massive amounts of product quickly. To the consumer, the association argued and demonstrated that it could deliver goods more inexpensively than non-chains. The associations first victory was to defeat a proposed California Chain Store Tax in 1935. In 1938, they defeated Wright Patman’s sponsored federal tax bill that the chain store industry had labelled a “death tax.”\textsuperscript{49} The real shift back to chain stores, however, would come with the arrival of World War Two.

The political requirements of meeting the war effort encouraged the growth of the chain supermarket. The limited supply of food goods, for instance, meant markets had to seek out other profitable goods, hence hastening the shift to non-foods in grocery stores. Here, chain stores leveraged their ability to stockpile large amounts of grocery and non-grocery goods, and the
larger supermarket spaces allowed the stockpiling of non-food goods. Labor shortages also increased the trend towards self-service. The great increase in self-service meat departments in the Los Angeles region, for instance, was frequently attributed to labor shortages.\textsuperscript{50} Gas rationing lessened the ability of traditional stores to provide delivery, one of their prime service advantages over supermarkets. Wartime price ceilings also lessened the ability of traditional stores to use higher profit margins to compete economically with chain stores that relied on high volume.\textsuperscript{51} Chain store adoption of vertical integration also helped shield them from wholesalers who raised prices in wartime, reducing profits for grocers who remained subject to price controls.

Perhaps most important, however, were increased regulations by the federal government including standards, supply rationing, and price controls which favored the large chains. While the government was involved in regulating production and price to some extent as early as 1940, the entry into war in 1941 quickly led to food rationing and price controls. By the end of 1942, ninety-three percent of all foodstuffs were covered by price controls.\textsuperscript{52} Rationing and the collection of ration points was a complicated process for the grocer, especially since the federal government frequently changed policy, procedures, and rationing standards (often to meet political pressures in Congress). It was simply much harder for the smaller, independent grocery to keep up with the complicated accounting required by war regulations. Nor were independents easily able to keep up with enforcement procedures. Finally, often overlooked is that the Korean War and the Defense Production Act of 1950 continued price controls and extensive regulation for many grocery goods to 1953.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Chain stores upscale the supermarket.}

At the same time, chain stores sought to move beyond being defined by low prices, and to be known for respect, quality goods, and good service. To adopt the supermarket to this mission, the supermarket had to be remade to attract upper class customers. The first step in upgrading the supermarket was to attack the impromptu nature of the depression-era independent supermarket’s adoption of old factory spaces and garish historical themes. Derided by chain store operators as the “wild animal stores,” since so many adopted animal names (Big Bear, Big Tiger, Big Bull),\textsuperscript{54} independent supermarkets were also labelled “cheapies,” which many believed would not survive the unique climate of the depression.\textsuperscript{55} In 1939, for instance, \textit{Progressive Grocer} called these stores, “monstrosities,” and “very strange stores indeed.”\textsuperscript{56}

The second step to update the supermarket was a public campaign to praise the new chain supermarkets as icons of modernity. Much of pro-supermarket analysis was provided by Max M. Zimmerman, the “Genius of the Supermarkets,” author of numerous reports and articles covering the prodigious growth of the early super markets.\textsuperscript{57} Zimmerman is frequently cited in grocery store histories, but without acknowledging his role as pro-supermarket advocate. In the late 1930s, Zimmerman created, edited, and published \textit{Super Market Merchandising} magazine to promote supermarket expansion. He also self-published books several books including \textit{Super Market, Spectacular Exponent of Mass Distribution} (1937), \textit{The Super Market Grows Up} (1939), and eventually, \textit{The Super Market: A Revolution in Distribution} (1955) published by McGraw Hill. By 1939, Zimmerman was the noted authority on chain stores and super markets.\textsuperscript{58} Writing in 1946, Zimmerman argued that the supermarket would revolutionize the grocery habits of
consumers. He also noted, however, that it would challenge the best minds of advertisers, and keep the research divisions of food product sellers, manufacturers, and advertisers very busy in stimulating demand.  

The third step, if the chain store industry was to convince the middle and upper class customers that the new supermarket was more than a “monstrosity” defined by its low prices, was to give the stores an updated, modern look. In 1946, Zimmerman predicted what this updated modern building might look like for food shoppers in the postwar era. The stores would be the most modern in construction and design. They would be planned and designed by some “of the best known architects.” They would be large, up to 25,000 square feet, equal to twenty-five prewar grocery stores combined. Forty percent of them would be in urban centers. They would be surrounded by large parking lots, but those lots would be handsomely landscaped. Inside, the store would be almost entirely self-service, and a frozen foods section would be expanded greatly. New products and packaging would dominate the store, backed up by the latest in research and promoted by the latest in advertising. Many of these new products would be non-grocery goods. And, according to almost every analyst or store executive, the new customer would be a she. This new supermarket, Zimmerman and others argued, would “reward her with increased goods for her dollar and greater leisure for her other interests.” In the 1950s, Safeway would adopt in full, this vision of the modern supermarket.

**Safeway’s Modern Supermarket of the 1950s**

The emergence of Keynesian economics with the New Deal brought increased focus on increasing consumer purchasing power and consumption as the critical leverage mechanism to jump start and sustain a healthy economy. In the postwar period, supermarkets became a key node for stimulating increased consumption, as well as demonstrating America’s increasing purchasing power.

In 1949, Safeway’s executives declared an end to the postwar reconversion efforts and reactivated its store construction program. Setting a dramatic course of expansion, they made plans to replace all the smaller non-standard stores with newer, standardized supermarkets. In 1950 Safeway committed $145 million to build one thousand new stores over the next five years, along with the necessary plants and warehouses. In comparison, in 1944, the entire U.S. grocery industry had committed $132 million to build all new supermarkets. In the mid-1950s, Safeway was building 150 new stores on average each year. Safeway was not alone, of course; in the 1950s an average of three supermarkets opened every day.

Safeway’s ability to build so many new stores was based in part on its “buy-build-sell-lease” method of financing property, developed in 1936. Safeway rarely owned the land on which it operated a supermarket. Rather it purchased property and then sold to a landlord who leased the land back to Safeway. This policy allowed Safeway to avoid long-term commitments to real estate of uncertain potential. If a location proved to be unprofitable, Safeway could simply leave when the lease expired. The policy also enabled Safeway to preserve its financial capital for store expansion, rather than have it tied up in real-estate; Safeway claimed to rely on a revolving fund of only ten million dollars to finance the construction and furnishing of new stores. Safeway also loved to use its various landlords as store boosters or for promotional
reasons—touting the many actors, actresses or sports superstars, as well as everyday Americans that were Safeway landlords.  

Small numbers of larger stores

At the same time that Safeway initiated its store building campaign and was on an incredible expansion in sales, the total number of stores went down. We can see this clearly in the maps of Safeway stores in its annual reports (fig. 5.14, fig. 5.15). In 1937, there were over 3000 stores, while in 1947 there were 2393 stores, and in 1949, barely 2,000 stores. Indeed, the number of Safeway stores fell quite dramatically from 1945 onwards, bottoming out in 1956.  

This seems quite odd, until we recall that the older chains were primarily the smaller neighborhood stores. In 1939, Progressive Grocer predicted that as supermarkets grew they would steal sales from the neighborhood stores. Acting on this prognostication, chain stores began closing their smaller neighborhood stores before losses put them into the red. In 1953, The Wall Street Journal noted on its front page the general trend for “Bigger, Frillier Stores,” in a “Record Building Boom.” The paper noted that while overall store building was slightly less than the 1940 high, the stores that were opening were substantially bigger than ever before. According to the Journal, the overall number of grocery stores in the U.S. had dwindled to 25,000 overall, but sales had soared from $4.5 billion in 1933 to $12 billion in 1951, and average annual sales per store had increased from $46,000 to almost $600,000. Another report shows the number of all grocery stores declining from 560,549 in 1939 to 384,626 in 1954, while sales went from $10 million to almost $40 million. The so-called supermarkets, then defined by Zimmerman as a single store selling a wide-variety of goods under one roof with annual sales of $375,000, increased from 300 in 1932; to 9,575 in 1945; to 14,217 in 1950; and to 29,920 in 1958.

Safeway, like others, was closing its smaller stores and opening large supermarkets. The 1949 Annual Report noted that its new stores would be spread out across a larger territory than was customary, but that larger size, increased parking space, and the speedier shopping at the new stores would more than compensate for the increased distance that customers would have to travel. In the first three years of the 1950s, Safeway built 409 new stores and remodeled 365 stores, but closed 487 stores. In 1954, for example, Safeway opened thirty-nine brand new stores in the United States, but closed seventy-eight.

Before the war, the largest Safeway stores were 6,000 to 7,500 square feet, and provided parking for twenty cars. Safeway’s vision of the new store in 1949 was of stores that were larger—from 15,000 to 30,000 square feet—with increased parking for up to 250 cars, and interiors that had air-conditioning, self-service meats, an enlarged frozen foods section, and refrigerated produce. The new Safeway stores of the 1950s cost on average between eleven and thirteen dollars per square foot. In regions like the Bay Area, residents saw a supermarket building boom in the 1950s. While Safeway built four stores per year in 1955 and 1956, nine stores were built in 1958 in the Bay Area alone. In December of 1958, Safeway announced a larger, twenty-five million dollar expansion plan to build thirty-two new stores in the Bay Area, as well as a 200,000 square foot warehouse in Richmond.
Increasing sales and profits

Whatever the size, in the new larger stores one thing remained constant—increasing annual sales per store (fig. 5.16). These new stores brought astounding overall growth to Safeway. When Safeway was incorporated in 1926, its 750 stores sold $50 million worth of grocery goods. Safeway’s 1949 Annual Report for instance, shows 1937 weekly sales of $1,700 per store increased to $10,200 in 1949. By 1953, Safeway average weekly sales per store were over $15,000.

Moreover, supermarket chains like Safeway were gaining an increasing share of the overall business. In 1917 the large chains did about twenty-seven percent of the overall trade, but by 1953, they were doing forty-four percent. By 1955 supermarkets accounted for fifty-five percent of all sales, and by 1958 they brought in sixty-nine percent of all grocery sales. By the mid-1960s, they accounted for over seventy percent of sales, even though the definition of supermarket had increased from stores that sold over $300,000 to ones that sold over $500,000 annually. Chain stores, those with over eleven stores, took up seventy percent of the supermarket sales (fig. 5.17). Based on research conducted by Business News, Safeway increased sales 277% and A&P 253% in 1951. Safeway was among the leaders in an incredible surge of profits and sales for the industry. Total sales of grocery goods rose from 14 billion in 1945 to 46 billion in 1959. By 1961, grocery sales of 50 billion made it the largest American industry by sales.

Safeway annual reports from the late 1940s into the 1960s reflect this prodigious growth, with almost each one reporting record sales or profits (fig. 5.18). 1947 saw Safeway top one billion dollars in sales for the first time ever. In 1953 Safeway again broke all previous sales records, and in 1954, Safeway broke sales records again, pushing past $1.8 billion. Safeway boasted of adding 14,000 new employees from 1950 to 1954. In 1957, Safeway became the first western headquartered business in history to top two billion in sales, only the third retail sales company to ever break that mark, and one of only sixteen companies to ever record sales over two billion. All the others were headquartered east of Chicago (fig. 5.19). By 1959, when Safeway recorded yet another record year, sales topped 2.3 billion. While Safeway still lagged behind A&P nationwide, it was the second largest retailer in the nation, and the largest retailer in the western US.

What drove all this growth?

Where did this phenomenal sales growth come from? The Wall Street Journal article of 1953 described the supermarket building boom and attributed it to the general increase in population, the movement to suburban locations and the need for new grocery stores there, and post-war prosperity that allowed for more and better grocery purchasing habits. Indeed, increased prosperity brought millions more in income to middle-class Americans to shop with. As the Vice-President of the National Association of Food Chains Rilea Doe told the association at its 1956 meeting, the current era was the highest count of gainfully employed Americans in history, and increased incomes meant increased grocery sales. Population growth meant that American food expenditures would increase one billion dollars annually. Of course much of this growth was concentrated in metropolitan regions where supermarkets were concentrated.
The U.S. was fifty-seven percent urban in 1940, sixty-four percent urban in 1950, and seventy percent urban in 1970. Moreover, population growth shifted west, and population growth exploded in precisely those states where Safeway was concentrated. As Safeway noted in its 1956 Annual Report, the bulk of their new store openings were concentrated in California, Nevada, and Arizona, the fastest growing states in the 1950s. The West also led in supermarket adoption by customer, in 1950 supermarkets took two-thirds of all grocery sales in California, versus only one-half nationwide.

However, population growth, the shift to urban areas in the west, and increased prosperity were not the only factors behind exploding supermarket sales. Most tellingly, even with higher incomes, Americans were still spending the same percentage of that income on food as they did before the war, although industry analysts had expected that percentage to decline. Economists had long argued that as income went up, the percentage of disposable income spent on food declined. Additionally, other analysts reasoned that because of reduced costs, the typical basket of grocery goods that had cost a family twenty-five percent of their income before the war, would now only cost them sixteen percent of their income. Thus, economists and analysts were surprised that while family income tripled over the twenty years up to 1960, the percentage of income spent on food remained in the twenty-five percent range.

The answer, of course, was the increased spending on newly created products. As Rom Markin noted in his 1963 economic analysis of supermarkets, growth was driven by two sets of forces, the external demand forces such as increased population growth, and the internal supply side forces, such as increased advertising to stimulate demand and the creation of new products to expand demand. The desire to maintain the twenty-five percent of disposable income level required the creation of more new grocery products and heavy advertising to stimulate demand. While a store in 1945 might carry 3,500 items, the grocery store of 1959 carried over 8,000 goods. Paul Willis, the president of the Grocery Manufacturers of America, argued that grocery stores sales were increased by deliberate efforts and research into the creation of new products. According to Willis, in 1959, 7,000 scientists were at work developing new products, and the Grocery Manufacturers were spending $100 million annually on food research and development. Two-thirds of the items in a typical basket were new compared to 1946.

Many of these new products were aimed squarely at working women. Supermarket retailers realized that many of the wartime female workers did not return to housewife status but took on full or part-time work often in the new positions created in the emerging office culture. As Vice-President Rilea Doe had stressed to the National Association of Food Chains, more women were working than anytime in American history, with thirty percent of female spouses working, double that of 1940. The new products transferred homemaking work from the kitchen to the food processing plant, or as 1950s business analyst Paul Willis described many of the new products had the maid service and kitchen “built-in.” Thus, processed and pre-packaged foods saw phenomenal growth: frozen vegetables grew by 1,600%, and frozen fruits and juices by 1,200%. Much of this increased cost however, was also the shift to “derived foods,” food products reconstituted into unnatural eatable forms with the increasing addition of chemicals. American eating habits were more often products of industrial production rather than the individual farm or kitchen.

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At the same time, grocery stores were increasingly relying on non-grocery goods to stimulate profits. The *Wall Street Journal* in 1953 attributed the need for large stores in part to the increased presence on non-grocery goods for sale: “One more reason for their bigness: The trend to stock more and more goods and services besides food.” The *Journal of Marketing* reported in 1954 that there was a rapid growth in non-food items in supermarkets. Supermarkets primarily shifted to non-grocery goods because they believed they could be sold at higher profit margins, since the low prices on groceries were what attracted customers to the stores. The *Wall Street Journal* estimated in 1953 that while groceries were marked up 17% on average, non-grocery goods were marked up 40% in supermarkets (fig. 5.20).

The new store interior was increasingly the result of scientific study into consumer habits, as well as studies to increase efficiency. Much of this scientific research was dedicated not to overall efficiency but to the art of stimulating the “impulse buy.” Zimmerman reported that seventy-five percent of all women shoppers bought one or more items on impulse, and a full fifty percent bought one-third of their items on impulse. Stimulating the impulse decision thus was critical, and a legion of internal design techniques, display techniques, and packaging details were researched and created for just that purpose. By 1956, eighty percent of all supermarkets had piped-in music and air-conditioning. The grocery shopping cart, invented in 1937 by Sylvan Goldman for his Standard Food Stores in Oklahoma City, enabled shoppers to collect large amounts of goods, but really its purpose was to help stimulate the impulse buy through easy collection and transport.

*Safeway stores from modernism to regionalism*

At the heart of this outstanding growth was the modern supermarket, which developed its architectural form in response to the supermarket industry's desire to stimulate these changes in consumer habits (fig. 5.21). As the *Architectural Record* noted in 1948, “to paraphrase a famous dictum, the store of today is a machine for selling.” *Architectural Record, Progressive Architecture*, and other journals all listed critical objectives for supermarket design. In essence, these objectives can be distilled down to three principal forces that drove the architecture of the modern supermarket. The first was to the need to house such a large amount of goods, but to do so in one unified space. *Progressive Architecture*, like other journals, argued that sales were increased by an enclosed unified interior space with the fewest possible columns or other points of fixed obstruction. The second principal force was the long embrace of the so-called open-front, referring to an almost completely open glass facade that put the whole interior of merchandise on display for passersby (fig. 5.22, fig. 5.23). In the words of *Architectural Record*, by showcasing an interior of merchandise, the open-front was an “advertisement” that could not be “excelled by advertisements in papers or radios.” The third force was to provide a unique visual identity for the store in the urban landscape, wherever it might be in the country.

*Safeway’s early architecture was the product of its sub-company, Franklin Design Services, composed of architects who were primarily technical-school graduates. These architects responded to the three forces in different ways in the early 1950s. First was the need to maintain a unified interior space while the supermarket had to carry an increasing amount of goods, including non-grocery goods. Thus, some system of wide roof-spanning trusses were
needed. By 1949 the Safeway architects had developed two basic prototypes: the flat roof such as a store in Oxnard, California (fig. 5.24, fig. 5.25), and the doomed roof such as a store in Walnut Creek and the San Francisco Duboce and Market store (fig 5.26, fig. 5.27). In either case, the traditional open-front at street level largely remained open to provide identity to motorists, a tall rectangular sign was incorporated in the building, largely a streamlined version of the art deco signs of the 1940s when supermarkets briefly mimicked the movie palace. In contrast, the Marina store prototype of San Francisco of the late 1950s would incorporated all three of these principal forces into a unified, highly-modern, exterior architecture (fig. 5.28).

The Marina store prototype

While we tend to think of post-war retail spaces expanding into outlying areas with, or ahead of suburban growth, this was not always the case. Indeed, stores like Safeway also sought distinctly urban locations, though to be successful in areas with high land costs, Safeway sought prominent urban thoroughfares to increase retail sales. The San Francisco Marina site was at the base of a wealthy neighborhood, Pacific Heights, adjacent to a more middle-class area, the Marina, but also on a major thoroughfare leading to the Golden Gate Bridge and suburbs north (fig. 5.29).

More established urban locations, however, came with a pre-existing neighborhood fabric, and in this case, Safeway’s plans for expansion in the Marina were opposed by local residents. A neighborhood group, the Marina Civic Improvement and Property Owners’ Association, opposed the supermarket as incompatible with the existing residential character of the neighborhood. After nearly a year of court battles, however, the final grant of the building permit was made on January 15, 1959. Safeway had a two-pronged response to the opposition. The first was to upgrade the planned store by turning to Wurster, Bernardi, and Emmons to revamp the prototype store design, making it cleaner, lower and more modern (fig. 5.30). The second was to connect the store to San Francisco's history and region.

Intended to be the “prestige store for Safeway in the West,” the Safeway Marina Store opened on June 24, 1959, where Quentin Reynolds, Safeway’s local division manager, called the store a “landmark that will not soon be surpassed.” The interior of the Safeway store was dominated by vast graceful “Gulum” wood arches developed in large part by Wurster’s firm (fig. 5.31). Like all good modern architecture, the new Safeway store expressed its functional structure; the front façade provided a visual expression of the expansive interior. As Progressive Grocer noted about the store, the wide expanses of glass drew attention to the open spaces provided by the clear-span store construction. At the same time, the exploded size of the glass facade updated the traditional open front for the automobile age. This was especially the case at night, to attract evening commuters to the store, the glass facade gleamed against the dark backdrop, drawing commuters into its snare (fig. 5.32). Because the stores were so recognizable, they provided instant corporate branding at the architectural level. The facade, the curve, and the sign all worked together to create an architectural corporate identity immediately visible as Safeway. Safeway spread the successful Marina prototype across the Bay Area and the western United States, appearing from Ashland, Oregon, to Lincoln, Nebraska, to Butte, Montana, and even as far off as Australia (fig. 5.33, fig. 5.34, fig. 5.35, fig. 5.36).
As its second response to neighborhood opposition, however, Safeway attempted to link the store to regional history and local architecture, dubbing it the “neighborhood food store (fig. 5.37).” A full-page ad in the San Francisco Chronicle announced the store’s opening. While the ad announced that the “American supermarket has become the phenomena of our time,” the ad also linked the store to Safeway’s thirty-five year history in the region, calling it to Safeway’s “half a lifetime of service” to San Francisco (fig. 5.38). The ad placed the new Safeway firmly among other great San Francisco architectural landmarks, positioning it between famous Coit Tower on the left, and to the right, Bernard Maybeck’s Palace of Fine Arts, and below the Golden Gate Bridge. The ad recalled that the store was linked to an unchanging San Francisco “of days of mist, rifts of fog, days of bright sun and fresh sea air.” Safeway used the opening ad to argue that the “architect, the artist and builders,” could create stores that, “blend with the neighborhoods they serve.”

The Marina store highlighted several techniques that linked the modern store to local regional history, which Safeway used throughout the country. Perhaps recalling the New Deal, Safeway used exterior mural paintings to evoke local history and place (fig. 5.39). The mural technique became common in new Safeways, especially of the Marina store type, such as in Santa Barbara, or Ashland, Oregon, or Neosho, Missouri (fig. 5.40, fig. 5.41, fig. 5.42).

A second technique was to reflect regional settings through exterior walls constructed of local stone, which became a frequent metaphor for regionalism. While the wall was essentially a standard element of the Marina prototype, Safeway claimed each store was regional because of the local stone. A Utah store and a store in Big Bear, California, as well as the Marina store all exemplified the use of native stone to appear regional (fig. 5.43, fig. 5.44). Exposed wood was another material sometimes employed to regionalize the modern architecture, as exemplified by a stores in Oxnard and Oakland, California (fig. 5.45).

Another technique was to humanize store interiors with natural materials, store layout, or graphics. On the one hand, the Marina Store interior was the ultimate modern store. Shoppers faced a large 21,000 square feet space, which initially required pocket-sized maps of the store’s layout for potentially overwhelmed shoppers. Safeway customers could watch as store butchers placed meat on a mechanized conveyor belt that ran through a packaging machine to wrap the meat in cellophane, and was then automatically weighed and priced. Customers could also see a redesigned check-out cashier station, based on scientific studies of cashier movements that moved the cash drawer behind the cashier. Though one Safeway cashier ruefully reported the need to watch out, “or you would get whacked in the rear.”

At the same time, an array of interior layouts and iconography sought to allay tensions around the modern shopping experience. Architect Don Emmons stated of his work on Safeway store interiors: “the first problem was to minimize the vast . . . square feet area, and the design we worked out goes back to the ‘farmers’ market’ type of operation; a series of small shops housed under one roof, with each shop having is own identity.” While the first supermarkets were simply open layouts, the new Safeway stores created carefully studied and analyzed mini-markets that acted as specialized zones to increase purchases (fig. 5.46).

More generally, Safeway developed numerous visual metaphors for farm life that both recalled traditional food production and served to provide immediate visual identification of the location of the bakery, or butchery in the vast store. These interior mini-markets became one of
the most long-lasting interior architectural devices for supermarkets. Even today, supermarkets typically combine vast open spaces, long rows of grocery goods and frozen foods, and specialized mini-markets for more traditional goods: the bakery, the butchery, the wine shop, etc. Each of these mini-markets feature, then and now, independent graphics and logos that frequently recall idealized visions of pastoral life.

For instance, a new store of the Marina type of 1962 in Millbrae, California, just south of San Francisco, sought to humanize the modern store by breaking up the vast interior spaces, while emphasizing regional themes along with modernist architecture. Situated directly on El Camino Real, a major thoroughfare traced along the main Spanish road through Alta California, Safeway restored one of the Mission Bells planted in the 1920s to highlight regional Spanish heritage (fig. 5.47). Once again, the store’s exterior walls included murals of California historical scenes, as well as local stone. Inside, Emmons used variations in ceiling heights and treatment, and a variety of materials such as glazed brick, mosaic tile, natural wood, etc., all to give visual emphasis to distinct departments. Vertical redwood strips were dropped from the ceiling to humanize the interior and increase the barn feel of the interior (fig. 5.48, fig. 5.49).

Finally, it should be noted that Safeway adopted an overall policy of encouraging stores to fit into regional architecture, especially when called for by local codes or dominant architectural themes of a place. Safeway News noted that the company actually had “not adopted any firm style of design as a standard Safeway store building,” and instead, “tries to confirm and alter its architectural plans to fit local patterns.” Safeway noted that: “We always seek to satisfy local tastes and make our new stores a welcome asset.” Thus, we have Safeway stores of the 1950s that adhere to regional architectural standards—such as a ranch style Safeway in New Mexico; a colonial in Richmond, Virginia; brick in Leesburg, and urban in Manhattan (fig. 5.50, fig. 5.51, fig. 5.52).

The Duboce Safeway, Regional Food Supply versus the Food Chain

What, however, did the architectural story underneath all these modern and regional architectural devices really mean? Returning to another Bay Area Safeway store allows us to dig deeper into ideas of regionalism, by investigating a contest over how food would be delivered to urban residents. We can therefore move beyond investigating modernism and regionalism at the level of the architectural facade and begin to penetrate the economic system behind it.

Once again providing a counterpoint to the notion that supermarkets were tied to new suburban expansion, Safeway opened what was then the largest store in its history in 1954 on the corner of Market and Duboce in the near exact center of San Francisco (fig. 5.54). The building came in over a then astonishing 38,000 square feet of store. Outside were two acres of parking and a 80-foot high freestanding sign tower that proudly proclaimed “Safeway.” Although Safeway joked that they didn’t expect the store to become the biggest money-maker in the neighborhood, due to the presence of the United States Mint directly behind it, this store would go on to lead all Safeway stores nationally in total sales for decades. The opening ceremonies were attended by all the Safeway executives, the San Francisco Mayor, and a huge crowd of customers, who shortly had the new 12 checkout stands “humming.” On display
were the latest in food showcases, including enough frozen food shelves to reach, according to Safeway News, a mile in length.

Behind the grand opening celebration was another history of contestation, and in this case the conflicts went directly to how food should be delivered and purchased. The site chosen was also the site of San Francisco’s first farmer’s market, a very successful alternative method of food delivery that was truly regional. Preceded by other central urban farmers markets, like those in Oakland, Seattle and Los Angeles, the San Francisco Farmers’ Market grew out of the experience with urban Victory Gardens in World War II.

First we need to differentiate between the traditional urban marketplace, the more modern produce market, and the twentieth century farmers market. Public marketplaces had of course been around since the beginning of the American settlement, and many fine urban market places remain on the East coast, such as Fanueil Hall in Boston and Eastern Market in Washington, D.C.136 These urban market halls for farmers largely do not exist in the West, where the produce market arose. The produce market is a gathering place for produce wholesalers and distributors, and for stores and restaurants to visit to buy their produce from the wholesalers. Importantly, the produce itself can, and frequently does, come from most anyplace in the globe. Produce markets were typically founded around the turn of the century, such as Los Angeles’s market in 1909. San Francisco’s started around the same time and was located near the waterfront so that produce could be offloaded from the piers. While the Public Works Administration of the New Deal did fund some new public markets, the federal government became more directly involved in the post-war era, funding and encouraging the movement of produce markets to areas outside of the central urban areas, clearing the downtown sites for urban renewal projects.137 San Francisco’s for instance, was moved to South San Francisco, clearing the site for the Golden Gateway urban renewal program.

The contemporary farmers market, on the other hand, was a gathering place for farmers from the region to directly sell to the customer, eliminating the middleman wholesalers and distributors. This produce was supposed to be local and sold by the independent farmer, though both these definitions were a bit fuzzy. The Los Angeles farmers market, for instance, was founded in 1933 when a group of farmers pulled their trucks into a vacant lot and began selling their produce directly to customers who drove to the market. Another example is Seattle’s Pike Place market, founded in 1907 as a price revolt against middleman who over-priced local produce; when a small group of farmers began driving their wagons directly into the city. In any case, farmer’s markets brought customers and farmers into direct contact and the system was truly regional—only food from the surrounding region was supplied.

The San Francisco Farmers Market was largely the product of civic activism led by John Brucato, a Sicilian immigrant who had completed graduate studies at UC Davis, who worked as vintner and oversaw the San Francisco Water Department’s holdings of farmland. In World War II, Brucato also began writing for the San Francisco News on victory gardens and soon became the manager of the Citizens Committee for San Francisco’s Victory Garden program. Brucato helped expand victory gardens to virtually every park and vacant lot in the city, with 800 gardens in Golden Gate Park alone.138 At the same time, World War II labor shortages greatly reduced canning operations and limited the ability of farmers to deliver their goods to stores in the city. Brucato sought a way to help farmers sell goods, and bypass the distribution system which was
resulting in tremendous mark-ups and high prices in the city. He first attempted to organize
groups to travel directly to farms, but realized with gas rationing, it was cheaper and easier to
bring the farmers to the city, once a week. Brucato and his group settled on an abandoned plot of
land in the nearly geographic center of the city (fig. 5.55, fig. 5.56).

The idea of a farmers market had to be approved by the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors, where it was resisted by the wholesale produce merchants and the grocery industry,
groups that had tremendous influence through donations to the city supervisors. The farmers
market was approved, but only in a limited form: as a war-time emergency and limited to crops
that were “spoiling.” The market opened on August 12, 1943, and by the first weekend, the
market was immensely successful, with residents seeking the fresh products and reduced prices,
while farmers made important direct profits in wartime (fig. 5.57, fig. 5.58, fig. 5.59).

At war’s end, the market faced termination. Although the supervisors expressed surprise
at the market’s tremendous success, under pressure from wholesalers they refused to renew the
market’s lease. In response, market supporters placed on the ballot an initiative to continue the
market (fig. 5.60). The November 6, 1945, vote in favor of continuing the farmers market was
hailed as the largest landslide in city history: an 85.4% approval. A year later, however, the
Board of Supervisors again forced the market out, arguing the ballot initiative had not included
approval of any funds. Realizing they would never defeat the wholesalers at such a central
location, market supporters placed another ballot measure to fund the market in a new location if
necessary. In 1946, San Francisco overwhelmingly approved an initiative to spend $100,000 in
tax dollars to establish a permanent farmer’s market on a new site. Land was donated and a
compromise worked out that moved the market in 1947 to Alemany Boulevard in South San
Francisco, a site at the far southern edge of the city adjacent to city housing projects. The market
at first struggled with its poor location and continuing restrictions, but over time remained.

Nonetheless, there is a tremendous difference between a farmers market in the nearly
exact center of the city and one on it southern edge, in an area associated with public housing.
One wonders what impact a farmers market in the prime central location would have had on the
area’s retail food industry. Instead city residents had to wait until 1981 for a small farmers
market in Civic Center Plaza, and really until 1991, when a farmers market moved into
downtown waterfront land created by the tearing down of the earthquake-damaged Embarcadero
Freeway. The Embarcadero Market was so successful, that by 2000 it morphed into the current
Ferry Building farmers market, an immensely successful must-stop for every tourist, food
connoisseur, and chef. The resurgence of the farmers market is tied to a national movement of
increased interest in regional and local food as part of a more environmentally friendly,
sustainable and healthy means of eating. How much sooner, and more substantially, might these
trends have returned to the American diet if central urban locations had continued to house
farmers markets rather than Safeways?

The 1960s Stores: From Modernism to Pseudo-Regionalism

By the late 1950s, the pure clear-span front facade was being modified by additions, such as
roman arches, gables, and more variegated massing. Progressive Grocer’s review of modern
store design in 1961 concluded that store operators were seeking distinct store exteriors less like
the boxed rectangular shape. Markets consistently strove to be different to stimulate customer
identification, and the facade became the locus of unique store identities. While many New
England chains, such as A&P and Stop and Shop went increasingly to New England colonial
styles, other modernist stores sought to break up the plain facade with all sorts of additions:
roman arches, the ribbed gable, the large V Gable, new lettering, and the addition of different
materials. The entrance canopy became a popular design element to both protect customers
from the weather, and to provide architectural stimulation (fig. 5.61). Scalloped canopies broke
up the straight lines that might otherwise dominate a store and give it “an institutional
appearance” while unifying the front facade of an expanded store.143 The Bay Area Cupertino
Safeway provides an excellent example. (fig. 5.62). In many ways, grocery store design began to
resemble the “googie” architecture of Los Angeles’s 1950s era coffee shops and fast food
chains.144 Modernism became a cosmetic device instead of an expression of functionalism. In
retrospect, one cannot but notice a generic similarity between segmental arched vaults used for
supermarkets canopies around the country, and Louis Kahn’s use of similar arches in the Kimble
Art Museum begun in 1967.145

The flourishing of modernist decorative elements was the final spasm of the grocery
store’s acceptance of modern architecture. Instead, the experiments in regional themes seen in
small doses in the 1950s, became the dominant motif in the 1960s. Philip Langdon has noted the
shift in fast food architecture in the late 1960s to an architecture that sought to be more
expressive of region and local natures. Playing off Lewis Mumford, Langdon calls this the
“browning of America,” referring to both the greater use of brown colors in fast food historical
revivalism, and the increasingly disconsolate national mood.146 This “browning,” represents an
increasing regionalism in retail architecture (fig. 5.63). Rock walls were more in evidence, but
gave way to more historical brick, pseudo-wood, and eventually, fake adobe. Reviewing the
changes of the 1960s, Progressive Grocer noted that stores were increasingly seeking to blend
the “store’s design with the community, reflecting the area’s heritage and testing new shapes”147
The modernist uniform box style of the 1950s was finally out, as additional stores sought to
become more regional: blending into the landscape, being framed by hills or trees, reflecting the
heritage or traditions of the region, or simply displaying earth tones. Progressive Grocer noted
the use of cupolas and clap-boarding in New England stores, and stores that looked like local
brick houses in St. Louis, as examples of the adoption of “prevailing local architecture,” through
which the “the store, though brand new, takes on the appearance of a long-time fixture in the
community.”148 As Progressive Grocer stated, store designers often distilled the architectural
styles of the region and emulated them in their final design.

Eventually, any theme became acceptable. It did not have to be regional in matching the
local region, it just had to embrace some theme. So in a review of “regionalist” stores by
Progressive Grocer included a New Orleans themed store in Glendale, California and at Guido’s
Market in West Chicago. Progressive Grocer also highlighted in other issues regionalist stores
such as colonial Williamsburg modeled Staubs in St Louis; a Kentucky Bluegrass horse barn
grocery store in Tulsa, Oklahoma; an English court theme in Appleton, Wisconsin; an old world
street in Madrid at the Pantry Food Market in Arcadia, California; and a replica of Paris’s soon to
be destroyed Les Halles market at the French Market in Overland Park, Kansas. Regionalism
became more and more, a reached for metaphor unrelated to reality. Was Joe Guidone’s Food
Palace really more regional because of an unevenly pitched, stonework tower, and old fashioned lettering complete with Jos. instead of Joe, supposedly helped to “age” its modern look?\textsuperscript{149}

**Safeway: An International Corporation**

In essence, the regionalism of these stores was only skin-deep, a decoration of their facades. Behind that facade, however, was a very non-regionalist truth. As supermarket expert Edward Brand wrote in 1963, “Today’s supermarket represents the last word in the modernization of . . . the food industry.”\textsuperscript{150} By the 1960s the industry was completely dominated by national and international capital concerns. Richard Walker argues that branch banking was invented by urban banks to usurp county banks and maintain hegemony over capitol flows between the city and outlying rural regions.\textsuperscript{151} Likewise, through merger, acquisition, and expansion, the large grocery chains were able to seize profits from smaller regional chains and independents. This had devastating economic effects on the regional level. As James Mayo argues, the centralization of store managerial operations destroyed regional economies and eliminated an entire chain of local employment opportunities for small towns and neighborhoods. Moreover, as Tracy Deutsch argues, wartime federal food policy makers shifted from decentralized democratic methods of regulation and stimulus to form alliances with large, centrally managed corporations that could more easily adhere to national standards. This was the emerging post-war political economy of the grocery trade: emphasis on high consumption, the female consumer, and a food chain whose elements were determined by nationalized standards and international capital concerns.\textsuperscript{152}

Indeed, during the immediate postwar years, Safeway had grown from a smaller regional chain into a prodigious national chain. By 1955 Safeway was employing almost 50,000 people in various positions.\textsuperscript{153} Safeway had developed an elaborate range of mechanisms and technologies to support this national operation, including their own in-house research center, called Oxford Business Surveys. With 50 employees based in Oakland and another 400 part-time employees scattered across the country, Oxford conducted surveys on all types of questions relevant to Safeway operations, and conducted some 15,000 interviews a month on consumer preferences for instance. In a typical year, Oxford produced some 700 survey reports.\textsuperscript{154} Safeway even created its own business library to handle all the various informational needs of the company: the Lansing Library dubbed as one of the finest most modern business libraries in the country and as “busy as Grand Central Station.”\textsuperscript{155}

As Safeway’s national organization displaced traditional markets, it had to create new regional facilities to serve a national system of distribution. One of the most important was the grocery warehouse, to which grocery goods were shipped from all over the world, and then routed to local stores. In 1949, Safeway announced plans to build giant distribution centers at each of its regional headquarters throughout the country (fig. 5.64). The distribution centers were enormous, single-story warehouses intended to reduce the necessary costs of getting food products from the supplier to the Safeway retail store.\textsuperscript{156} The major Bay Area Safeway center was located in Richmond, California, closer to the newly emerging east bay suburbs. Inventory control and supply flow management became critical aspects of the national grocery industry.
With the birth of the supermarket and the large chain system, the volume of sales became so large it led naturally to the development of a system of vertical integration. The economies of scale that resulted from being able to develop their own food processing and distribution systems increased the large chain stores competitive advantage.\textsuperscript{157} Of all the grocery chains, Safeway was perhaps the most active in vertical integration of products. Typically, Safeway primarily developed its system of vertical integration through merger and acquisition and began the process in the late 1920s. Lucerne Milk Company, for example, was one Safeway’s earliest purchases in 1928. The company only had one milk producing plant at the time in Oakland, California, but by the 1950s Safeway had thirteen Lucerne production plants, almost one for each of the corporation’s fifteen divisions.\textsuperscript{158} In 1954, Safeway had forty-one different warehouses in the United States and Canada, nineteen bakeries, ten milk plants, six coffee roasting plants, fifteen cheese-making plants, and numerous plants for canneries, fish processing, and candy manufacturing.\textsuperscript{159} While vertical integration was often justified because it ensured supply, it primarily allowed Safeway to lower costs while reaping a profit on both the manufacture and sale of grocery goods.\textsuperscript{160}

From the 1950s on, Safeway had stores in Canada as well as the U.S. In the 1960s, Safeway expanded to become a true international corporation by reaching across borders to first Australia, then England and eventually, Western Germany. Safeway embraced a regional look in England and Germany, but for the most part brought its modernist Marina store look to Australia. The bulk of Safeway’s domestic store expansion in the 1960s, however, was an extensive program to expand existing stores. Barely a decade after its first large store campaign, Safeway found the supermarkets of the 1950s too small. These stores expansion largely ignored the pure modernist expressions of the 1950s stores and began a process of cloaking architectural modernism in layers of dense regional motifs. The famed Marina Safeway was expanded in the mid-1960s from 20,370 square feet of store space to 31,850.\textsuperscript{161} The Duboce Safeway was remodeled to look like a Marina prototype store in the 1950s, and then remodeled and expanded in the 1960s, and again in the 1990s. Today, the store presents a architectural palimpsest of successive generations of commercial architecture design.

In every city or major town across the western US, modernist Safeways of the 1950s and early 1960s can be found, often cloaked in layers of additions and regionalist stuccos. Other stores remain, however, in nearly original condition, as perfect examples of the 1950s or early 1960s modernist Safeway stores. These stores are found all across the smaller towns and cities of the west where economic growth has been limited. These fossils of mid-century commercial architecture remain as instant markers of the postwar period of small town sorting in which capital disinvested itself from smaller regional economies of small-scale cities and towns, as capital shifted its investment to global cities. A store in Lovelock, Nevada, for instance, sits adjacent to two perfect examples of post office and courthouse work of the Works Progress Administration, as significant examples of far away architectural intrusions in a small western town that seems also abandoned today (fig. 5.65). Places like Butte, Montana, on the other hand, showcase the more divided history of investment: one store sits as an untouched showcase of an early 1960s Safeway Marina Safeway; while another has been remodeled several times and now appears thoroughly un-modern in design (fig. 5.66). A walk around the back of the store, however, reveals the signature curve of a Marina Safeway, still unmodified (fig. 5.67).
Inside the successful urban regions, however, where multiple generations of investment have reworked the stores, many of the remaining intact Marina Safeway are subject to a more permanent remodeling effort. Safeway’s latest store remodeling campaign follows a process of to give stores an updated, urban condo look. Many are now subject to Safeway’s latest store remodeling campaign, intended to demolish old stores and build new stores with an updated, urban condo look (fig. 5.68). In debates over these new stores, zero attention is given to the historical legacy of these stores. Whether we celebrate their legacy or not, their unique architectural importance should be recognized.

Conclusion: Contrasting Ideas About Regionalism

By 2000, food in the US typically travels between 1,500 and 2,000 miles from farm to plate, twenty-five percent more than in 1980.162 As numerous scholars and commentators have argued, most Americans still know very little about where their food comes from. They know even less about the environmentally destructive agriculture that is behind it, nor that it is built on a system of exploitation of cheap international migrant labor. The United Farm Workers realized this separation when in 1969 the Union declared a boycott of Safeway as part of its national grape boycott to win basic labor rights for farmworkers (fig. 5.69, fig. 5.70). Dolores Huerta was largely responsible for organizing the boycott of grape sales, and returned to San Francisco in February 1969 after reaching an agreement with the larger A&P chain not to sell California grapes.163 Safeway—some of whose directors were also principals in the grape agribusiness—refused to take the grapes off their shelves and worked to encourage antiunion public relations efforts.164 Safeway asserted in public that high farm labor costs were the reason for high food costs, though much of the increased labor costs were due to shift to more packaged, prepared goods and that Safeway’s accounting included manufacturing and warehousing costs in the same category as farmer costs.165

Just as the modern office building employed architecture to create a modern public face that was completely separated from the gritty industrial environment of manufacturing,166 the supermarket separated consumers from the gritty reality of food production. Moreover, just as in the office, American modern architecture changed the notion of progressive from liberal politics to one that implied a modern, innovative corporation. Thus, decidedly non-liberal companies such as Safeway, Kroeger, A&P, and the National Tea Company were all popularly considered progressive because modern architecture symbolized their emphasis on new business innovations.167 Rather than symbolize the progressive politics of the labor movement or the cooperative movement for consumers, modern supermarket architecture symbolized the modern corporation, while hiding its non-progressive treatment of labor and the environment in the fields.

Regionalism was the ultimate winner of supermarket architecture, though it was increasingly an abstract caricature of the region. We must ask ourselves, what is more regional? The unique modernist designs of Safeway in the Bay Region, or the regional themed stores that followed? In the end, however, whether modern or regionalist, the architecture of the supermarket chain served to disconnect Americans from their own food production and to aestheticize the disturbing aspects of the new factory production.
The Marina Safeway’s most famous appearance is in Armistead Maupin’s *Tales of the City*. In one of the classic works of recent San Francisco fiction, Mary Ann, the main female character and her friend Connie head to the Marina Safeway not for groceries, but instead, go to the “Social Safeway,” as the place “by local tradition” for single women to meet single men. As Maupin writes, putting Safeway’s neighborhood friendly imagery in ironic spotlight:

A dozen cardboard disks dangled from the ceiling of the Marina Safeway, coaxing the customers with a double-edged message: Since we’re neighbors, let’s be friends.
And friends were being made.

Later in the novel, Mary Ann’s housemate and friend Michael, describes picking up a man at the Duboce and Market Safeway, which from his standpoint, as a gay male, is “a lot cruisier.”

Maupin’s novel was heavily based on reality, and still today the Marina Safeway is often referred to as “dateway,” while the Market and Duboce Safeway is often referred to as “gayway.”

Maupin’s novel, then, reminds us that localism and regionalism do live on in these highly modern stores. Rather than in the architecture, however, regionalism lived on the shelves themselves, and in the unique practices of the patrons who visited the stores. As shown in numerous editions of *Safeway News* or contemporary newspaper accounts concerning supermarkets, supermarket operation were frequently enlivened by the diversity of its workers and customers (fig. 5.71). When a Safeway opened in 1951 in the Spanish Harlem of Manhattan, for instance (one of the forty-three locations Safeway had in Manhattan in 1951), it garnered attention in *The New York Times* for its distinct Puerto Rican theme. While the interior architecture replicated the modern Safeway design, *The Times* pointed out the distinctiveness of the goods stocked on the shelves: a great increase in Puerto Rican imports and special fruits and vegetables to appeal to the Puerto Rican community. The supermarket of today is invariably cloaked in regional motifs that attempt to recall the region. As Maupin and *The New York Times* article of 1951 recognize, however, the true evidence of regionalism, however, is hidden in their food products and in the manners of its shoppers and clerks.
Chapter Five: Notes


8 While Wurster’s name is atop the firm and is the architect most associated with these stores, as best I can tell, the principal architect was Don Emmons.


Thomas Carter and Bernard Herman have called regionalism a “main tenet” of vernacular architecture research and that many of the “best examples of vernacular architecture research adopt a regional perspective by exploring the close link between built form and local culture.” “Introduction: Toward a New Architectural History,” *Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture* 4 (1991), 2.


Deutsch, “Making Change at the Grocery Store,” 52.


Sam Selig is generally attributed with naming his stores Safeway, but in *Safeway News* Skaggs claims it was the Merrill firm. Lemes, “An Interview with M.B. Skaggs,” 3; “The Story of Safeway Stores, Inc.,” *Safeway News* 6, no. 2 (Mar-April 1951), 2-3.


“25 Years Ago Today” *Safeway News* 6, no. 2 (Mar-April 1951), 1.
According to the M. B. Skaggs interview, Safeway entered new markets by opening new stores in: Santa Barbara, CA, 1927; Nebraska, 1927; Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1927; Redwood District, California, 1927; San Francisco, CA, 1928; and by purchasing of existing store chains: H. C. Chafee Stores in California, 1927; Arizona Grocery and Pay’n Takit of Arizona, 1928; Various stores in western Canada, 1928; Piggly-Wiggly Pacific Company, Oakland, California, 1928; Sanitary Grocery Stores, Washington, DC and Baltimore, Maryland, 1928; Bird Grocery Stores, Kansas City, Missouri and Dallas, Texas, 1928; Piggly Wiggly Western States, Southern California, 1929; and Skaggs of Santa Rosa, 1929. Lemes, “An Interview with M. B. Skaggs,” 5.


Donald C. Fiske, “Evaluation of Vertical Integration In The Chain Food Industry With Special Emphasis on Safeway Stores, Inc.,” Master’s Thesis, Business Administration, UC Berkeley, January 17, 1955, 41. By the time of Fiske’s report, all 3,400 stores had been either closed or remodeled and Safeway was down to 1,998 stores.


Chain stores were defined by the US Census as a single owner operating four or more stores. Carl Dipman, Editor, Progressive Grocer, “Merchandising Trends in the Food Trade, with Special Reference to Super-Markets,” The Journal of Marketing 3, no. 3 (Jan. 1939), 272.


The first cooperative in California was the Cooperative Union Store of 1867 in San Francisco, which lasted only a short time. Cooperatives, however, were popular in rural life as early as the 1870s as part of the Grangers or Farmers Unions. A Rochdale Cooperative wholesale business was organized in Oakland and San Francisco in 1899, and by 1906 there were 100 cooperative stores in California. In 1913, a Pacific Cooperative League had some success but imploded from organizational difficulties. The 1920s saw a real decline in cooperatives, before a large rebound in the 1930s. Robert Neptune, *California’s Uncommon Markets: The Story of the Consumers Cooperatives, 1935-1976* (Richmond, CA: Associated Cooperatives, Inc, 1977), 4-7.

Deutsch, “Making Change at the Grocery Store,” 190.


Longstreth, *The Drive-in, The Supermarket*.

Longstreth, *The Drive-in, The Supermarket*.

Despite Longstreth’s analysis of Los Angeles, King Kullen is still frequently claimed to be the world’s first supermarket. See for instance, [http://www.kingkullen.com/aboutus.asp](http://www.kingkullen.com/aboutus.asp)


Grocery trade analysts struggled mightily with the definition of supermarket. In general they were defined as doing a certain amount of sales—$250,000 a year in 1939 by some analysts—and being a self-service, cash and carry business. But different analysts could, and did, use a different amount of sales volume, greatly changing the statistical number of supermarkets in existence. See Carl Dipman, Editor, *Progressive Grocer*, “Merchandising Trends in the Food Trade, with Special Reference to Super-Markets,” *The Journal of Marketing* 3, no. 3 (Jan. 1939), 270.


52 Deutsch, “Making Change at the Grocery Store,” 270.


60 M. M. Zimmerman, “Tomorrow’s Super Market,” 388.

61 Deutsch, “Making Change at the Grocery Store.”


Ibid., 14.


Markin, *The Supermarket: An Analysis of Growth*, 20, 24

Mueller & Garoian, *Changes in the Market Structure of Grocery Retailing*, 3. Total retail sales were 170 billion in 1954, with grocery sales of 40 billion being the largest percentage. Ibid, 8.


Ibid.


111 “Supermarket Surge,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 1. The WSJ cited a survey by *Supermarket News* that found that 97% of supermarket owners were planning to increase non-grocery goods that such sales increased by ten percent from 1952 to 1953. See also Horn, “Merchandising Non-Food Items Through Super Markets,” 380.


114 Ibid.


116 These three “forces” are my own creation, and essentially a condensed summary of the most important elements of supermarket architecture identified by journals like *Progressive Grocer*, *Architectural Record*, *Progressive Architecture* and the like.


122 “Marina Safeway Opens!,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 24, 1959, 7.


125 “Safeway Opens its Marina Store,” *San Francisco Chronicle*.

126 “Safeway Opens its Marina Store,” *San Francisco Chronicle*.


“This is Safeway,” *Safeway News* 10, no. 8 (August 1955), 2.


Helen Tangires, *Public Markets*.


Certainly there are numerous differences, starting with that the visual appearance of the arches are based in the functional work of the cycloid vaults that define the building. Still, it is interesting that historians relate Kahn’s work in Fort Worth to le Corbusier’s work in India, such as the Sarabhai House, but not to generic architecture of the American landscape. This is not to say that generic grocery store architecture was the precedent for Kahn’s work, it is just to provide yet another example of the failure to explore the similarities and linkages between high modern architecture and generic commercial modernism. On Kahn generally, see David B. Brownlee and David G. De Long, Louis I. Kahn: In the Realm of Architecture (Los Angeles: Museum of Contemporary Art; New York: Rizzoli, 1991); Klaus-Peter Gast, Louis I. Kahn: The Idea of Order (Berlin: Birkhauser, 2001); Patricia Cummings Loud, The Art Museums of Louis I. Kahn (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

Langdon, Orange Roofs, Golden Arches, 133-165.


Ibid, 5.


“This is Safeway,” Safeway News 10, no. 5 (May 1955), 4-5.


160 Fiske, “Evaluation of Vertical Integration in the Chain Food Industry With Special Emphasis on Safeway Stores, Inc.,” 45.


164 Susan Ferris and Richard Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields, Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers Movement (Orlando, Fl.: Harcourt Brace, 1997), 148, 138-139. Safeway’s own labor relations were marked with frequent strife throughout the 1950s.


167 Deutsch makes this point in part, “Making Change at the Grocery Store,” 76.


169 “News of Food: New East Side Supermarket a Far Cry From Old Cracker-Barrel Grocery,” The New York Times, May 26, 1951, 28. The article notes how some standard products such as cheese or frozen orange juice would not sell in the store, but fresh produce such as peppers, bananas and greens sold very well, and the store sold an outstanding 600 quarts of milk per day, 1600 quarts on a Saturday.

Chapter Five: Illustrations

Figure 5.1: Khrushchev at the Marina Safeway, 1959. Source: Life Magazine (September 1959).
Figure 5.2: Wurster’s offices for the Schuckl Canning Company in 1942 exemplify his regional modernist approach, this time in the corporate office setting. Redwood is blended with a toned-down modernist facade. William Wurster architect. Source: Roger Sturtevant, photographer, William W. Wurster/Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection, 1922-1974, Environmental Design Archives. College of Environmental Design. University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 5.3, The Marina Safeway, 1959. Source: San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library.
Figure 5.4: M.B. Skaggs and Safeway President Robert McGowan point to American Falls, Idaho as the birthplace of Safeway Stores. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.5: Counter and Wall Store, Lutey’s Grocery, Butte, Montana. Source: Kent Lutey, “Lutey Brothers Marketeria: America’s First Self-Service Grocers,” *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 28, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 53.
Figure 5.6: The interior of the original American Falls Store of M.B. Skaggs. Source: Safeway News.
MERRILL SERVICE
TO BE HELD HERE

Rites Tomorrow in Church of the Ascension for Founder of Stock Brokerage Firm

BENEFACTO R OF SCHOOLS

Pioneer in Providing Advice to the Small Investor—Set Up Safeway Stores

A funeral service for Charles Edward Merrill will be held tomorrow at 11 A. M. in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Ascension, Fifth Avenue and Tenth Street.

Mr. Merrill, a directing partner of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, investment banking and brokerage firm, died Saturday night at his home on Dune Road, Southampton, L. I., at the age of 70. He founded the investment firm in 1914.

He had been a benefactor of many of the nation’s educational and religious institutions. His gifts went to more than fifty colleges and universities, including the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania, the Brookings Institution and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Charles Edward Merrill

that is the lot of most new Wall Street enterprises.

There was time out from Wall Street for Mr. Merrill during World War I. He enlisted in the United States Army and served as a first lieutenant in the Signal Corp’s fledgling air service.

The ingenuity of Mr. Merrill and his partner was tested when they won their first big selling victory. They underwrote the McCrory Stores, a real coup for a firm with no capital.

Persons associated with Mr. Merrill long regarded his creation of Safeway Stores as one of his greatest successes. By 1953, Safeway Stores was the nation’s second largest food chain. As a sideline—one that was extraordinarily successful—Mr. Merrill had received Mr. Merrill and his associates many honorary degrees.

Charles Edward Merrill

began Family Circle, a mass of...
Figure 5.8: Downtown San Francisco Safeway Store of the 1930s. Source: San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library.

Figure 5.9: A San Francisco corner store from the 1920s. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.10: A Safeway in Hanford, CA, 1935. Source: San Joaquin Valley Library System.

Fig 5.11: A New York corner Safeway. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.12: Greenbelt, Maryland Cooperative Market. Photo by author, 2009.
Fig 5.13: 1940s Safeway with adjacent parking lot, but the store otherwise keeps an urban look. Source: San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library.
Figure 5.14, 5.15: Maps shows number of Safeway stores in 1945 and in 1954. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5-16: Safeway News Chart compares increasing sales per store with declining number of stores. Source: *Safeway News.*

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Figure 5.17: Chart shows supermarkets gaining 71.5% of all food sales by 1972. Source: Ron J. Markin, *The Supermarket: An Analysis of Growth, Development, and Change* (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1963)
Figure 5.18: Typical cover of Safeway News and the annual reports from the 1950s, showing new high sales. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.19: Chart shows increasing Safeway sales 1936-1960. Source: Safeway News.

Figure 5.20: An increasing percentage of sales went to non-food items. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.21: Safeway News ties the change from the old grocery store to the new Marina Safeway to its graph of increasing sales. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.22, 5.23: Two uses of the traditional open-front store design, Lutey Stores in Butte, Mt, 1914; and a Safeway Store, Fall Brook, CA 1939. Source: Kent Lutey, “Lutey Brothers Marketeria: America’s First Self-Service Grocers,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 28, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 57; Pomona Public Library - Frasher Foto Postcard Collection.
Figure 5.24, 5.25: Two examples of the flat-roofed Safeways of the early 1950s—a Safeway store in Oxnard, California and a promotional store image. Source: *Safeway News.*
Figure 5.26, 5.27: Two examples of the industrial domed Safeways with more traditional fronts: Duboce and Market, San Francisco, 1954 and Walnut Creek California, 1955. Source: Safeway News; San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library.
Despite being one of San Francisco’s best examples of 1950s modernism with a signature architect’s name behind it, a prototype that was spread across the United States, and having appeared in the classic San Francisco novel, Armistead Maupin’s *Tales of the City*, the Marina Safeway store appears in none of the area’s architecture guides. The Marina Store is directly across from the Fort Mason Center, at North Point and Marina Boulevard.
Figure 5.31: Gulum-laminated wood strips-arches dominate the Marina store interior. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.32: The Marina Store at night lured in drivers on their way home from longer work shifts, especially female shoppers who were more likely to be working in the post-war era. Source: Pleasant Family Shopping, available at http://pleasantfamilyshopping.blogspot.com.
Figure 5.33: A Lake Oswego, Oregon store also demonstrates the facade function at night.
Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.34: Another example of many Marina-styled stores in Ashland, Oregon. Source: Safeway News.

Figure 5.35: Another example of the many Marina-styled stores in Lincoln, Nebraska. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.36: The Marina-styled stores even reached abroad to Melbourne, Australia. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.37: Safeway proclaims it’s modern Marina store to be a “neighborhood food store.”
Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.38: Safeway announced the opening of the Marina store with a full page ad linking the store to other great architectural monuments of the region. “Marina Safeway Opens!,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 24, 1959, 7.
Figure 5.39: The murals by local artist John Garth were presented as part of the Marina store’s opening celebrations. Source: San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library.
Figures 5.40, 5.41, 5.42: Three examples of the use of murals to promote regionalism on modern stores. Source: Safeway News.
Figures 5.43, 5.44: Two examples of the use of rock walls to promote regionalism, The Marina Safeway entrance and a store in Holliday Utah from the 1960s. Source: Safeway News.
Figure 5.45: An Oakland, California store used wood panelling instead of rock to create a more regional feel. Source: Safeway News.
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Chapter 6
The End of Modernism?

People’s Park, Urban Renewal, and Community Design

“Although knowledge has no visible bulk, it requires space as surely as students do.” University of California Chancellor Clark Kerr.1
From EFL to Violence

The demonstrations in support of People’s Park in Berkeley, California, in the spring and summer of 1969, resulted in some of the most violent events of the generation. The decision by local residents and young activists to seize an abandoned piece of University property to create a community park, and the subsequent decision by the University of California Regents to evict park users and fence off its property, led to a spiraling of violence. Governor Ronald Reagan, acting under existing power of martial law for Berkeley, called in the National Guard, and for a month Berkeley remained in a virtual state of siege as violence escalated between student activists, Alameda County police, and the National Guard. For the first time ever, the United States used tear gas from a helicopter on its own citizens, spraying UC Berkeley’s Sproul Plaza in an attempt to disperse a crowd (fig. 6.1). Local Alameda County police, known to be particularly violent toward student demonstrators, fired buckshot-loaded rifles directly into crowds, wounding many, and killing one former student, James Rector.

Almost forty years later, the slim campus planning publications of the Educational Facilities Laboratories (EFL), buried deep in the library stacks, seem far away from the violence of People’s Park and the death of James Rector. This chapter argues, simply, that they are not. The Ford Foundation founded EFL in the late 1950s to advocate for modern architecture and planning on American universities, and in critical Cold War countries such as Germany. UC Berkeley campus planners, like those at many large universities, developed relationships with EFL, particularly in residential hall design, as part their larger decade-old adoption of modernism in campus architecture and planning. Supported in part by EFL, UC Berkeley embarked on a project to build high-rise dorms, surrounded by open lots, for up to 9,000 students. The new dorms were also the culmination of a long process of University expansion into the largely residential neighborhood just south of campus, including the plot of land that became People’s Park.

The few historical treatments of People’s Park have situated it as a continuation of the radicalism of the Free Speech Movement, or in the context of the general anti-Vietnam war movement, which was certainly an important element of the events (fig. 6.2). This focus, however, leaves out the linkage between student protest and the legacy of modernist planning, as well as the reflection in those protests of tremendous changes in the architecture and planning professions. At the same time, most histories of campus architecture ignore the link between the modernist university’s expansion and student unrest. In his history of post-war university planning, for instance, Stefan Muthesis writes that, “the student movement is of less relevance here . . . because less of a link was constructed between the unrest and the nature of the campus plan or architecture.” Muthesis continues, “the unrest in the USA was essentially more concerned with matters external to the university.” The events at People’s Park, however, and the similar upheaval at Columbia in 1968, in which students rebelled against the University expansion into Morningside Heights Park, show otherwise. While certainly external events were crucial, at both Columbia and Berkeley, radical politics and anger at University participation in government military programs melded together with a rejection of modernist design and planning at the local level.
Architecture and planning, then, were integral to the story of 1960s student violence and revolt. This, however, is not simply another story of how modernist architects and planners run roughshod over a local community, or applied international design forms of modernism wiped out local sense of place. Instead, this paper uses the story of People’s Park to overcome the dichotomy between the idea of modernist architectural expansion on one hand, and the post-modernist, nature-loving youth on the other. As the focus of an intensely symbolic battle over public space, the literature on People’s Park is primarily first hand, and heavily biased to the left or right. Even academic publications, however, continue to describe modernist architecture and planning as opposed to nature and place, while the post-modern sensibilities of student activists are responsible for the rise of environmental ethics.

The decision to expand the University into the neighboring urban fabric was in part, however, a vision of nature, grounded in ideas about how to provide natural open space to students and local residents. People’s Park therefore presents a more complex narrative of modernism and its relationship to nature, as well as a merging of ideas about community participation in design from both within and outside the academic architecture and planning communities. Moreover, because an urban renewal project was the backdrop for People’s Park, the park presents another opportunity to overcome the large blind spot in historical literature on urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s, when it changed in response to calls for community development and more sensitive architectural design in historic neighborhoods. Finally, People’s Park demonstrates the emergence of new paradigms in architecture and planning centered on community-led design, and the influence on minority professors and students towards a more socially equitable profession. The increased presence of minorities forced architects and urban planners to confront their failed legacy of urban renewal programs, and to seek out new experiments in solving the crisis confronting the American city.

The dramatic expansion in Berkeley’s student population, the University’s need to expand physically, and the dramatic population changes to the south Berkeley campus neighborhood all influenced student protest movements. Student protest movements, however, also helped to shift architecture and planning to new paradigms more inclusive of the community and minority populations. “Architecture, housing, and city planning,” Catherine Bauer wrote during World War II in anticipation of its end, “are pre-eminently arts of peace.” By the 1960s, however, the division between the social rhetoric of modernist architects and their real impacts in the urban and university environments had placed these arts of peace at the center of civic battle.

Modernism, the Multiversity, and Campus Renewal

As one historian of university planning, Paul Turner, has stated, American university architecture is “shaped by the desire to create an ideal community and has often been a vehicle for expressing the utopian social visions of the American imagination.” By the 1950s, the emerging utopian vision was a new kind of educational institution—the “multiversity.” This utopia was in large part the vision of Clark C. Kerr, who coined the term in a series of lectures at Harvard and in his 1963 book *The Uses of the University*. Kerr, the Chancellor of Berkeley beginning in 1952, was appointed by the Regents to be the first President of the UC system in
1958. Kerr led the effort to create the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education, which defined the multiversity and landed Kerr on the cover of *Time Magazine* (fig. 6.3).10

The multiversity evolved, in part, out of the immense population growth to universities brought on by the postwar G.I. Bill, in-migration to California, and California’s commitment that every resident was entitled to higher education regardless of income. The so-called Strayer Report, for instance, adopted by the UC Regents in 1948, prepared to grow the California’s higher education enrollment to over 300,000 by 1960 to meet increased demand.11 To meet such demand, the liberal arts college system was replaced by a three-tier system of junior colleges, state colleges, and universities, each now envisioned as largely “professional” in focus.12 The University of California system, with its multiple campuses, hundreds of scientific research programs, and affordable education for all, became the country’s premier multiversity. As Don Mitchell has noted, however, under the vision outlined by Clark Kerr, the university would also play a leading role in not only making society more rational and managerial, but also making political conflict rational and quiet as well.13

Modernist design and planning became the primary tools for those seeking to create the physical spaces for this managerial utopia.14 Professional bodies and research groups such as the EFL and the Society for College and University Planning were founded and dedicated to campus planning.15 Richard Dober, a graduate of Harvard’s Graduate School of Design laid down his vision of the new science in his 1963 book *Campus Planning*, which became the classic textbook on campus planning.16 The rationality of a “systems approach” espoused by Dober and EFL was especially well received at UC Berkeley, where systems analyst expert C. West Churchman had founded the graduate study of operations research and argued that systematic-based thinking could improve the human condition.17

Under the EFL and Dober, “utmost rationality” pervaded all considerations.18 Rather than outdated notions of architectural design, their systems approach required an analysis of physical need, the translation of that need into space requirements, and the creation of a systematic building program to satisfy those requirements. Architecturally, the approach aimed to bring “systems” building components to allow universities to build more inexpensively large amounts of flexible space gathered into “planning modules,” that is, distinct buildings for each distinct teaching or administrative unit. As Dober would write in his campus planning text, “rarely do people eat, sleep and work in a single environment,” and therefore, all such functions should be separated.19 Or as Berkeley architecture professor Sim van der Ryn would later critically reflect in a report written just prior to the People’s Park events, the “modern campus is zoned into sectors, each one for a different discipline or activity.”20 Overall, these texts espoused the “tower in the park” models, and were replete with images of modernist academic towers.21

Advocates of modern campus planning also rejected the Beaux Arts ideal of a unified and grand composition for campuses, exemplified by a 1949 Joseph Hudnut article in *Architectural Forum*.22 Importantly, in their rejection of this long-standing campus design principle, modern campus planners also abandoned the notion that building programs should be limited to the actual campus. Nationwide, campus plans pushed the university outward into surrounding urban fabric and neighborhoods. Thus, modern planning advocates helped universities transcend classical principles of visual order and instead erect new buildings wherever they could on, or off, a campus.23
Like other schools, UC Berkeley embarked on a massive program of post-war modernist design and architecture to meet a large surge in enrollment. Before the war the job of directing campus planning had belonged to a single architect from the Architecture Department. In 1949, however, the University created the Office of Architects and Engineers, which was run by a combination of Regents and the Dean of Architecture, but relied frequently upon outside planning professionals and institutions. The Office directed a wave of new buildings of modernist design across campus in the 1950s and 1960s, including large-scale modern buildings like Kroeber Hall (1959) by Gardner Dailey, Wurster Hall (1964) by Vernon DeMars, Joseph Esherick, and Donald Olsen, and Zellerbach Hall (1967) by Hardison and Vernon DeMars.

William Wurster, who returned from MIT in 1950 to become Dean of the Architecture School, joined with Clark Kerr to direct the Office. Today, Wurster’s architectural designs remain an emblem of Bay Area “regional modernism” that balanced abstract International Modernism with a sensitivity to local materials and site. This interpretation is based, however, on the focus of architectural historians on Wurster’s early domestic work that ignores his large body of 1950s commercial and institutional work. These works showed little of redwood clad domesticity that historians have used to define Wurster’s regional modernist architecture. An important example of these were Wurster’s plans of the 1950s, most importantly the 1955 Long Range Development Plan, reflected EFL and Dober’s ideas (and before them, the Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne or CIAM) that buildings be pulled together in “tight groups, reflecting functional relationships.”

It would be a mistake however to paint Wurster’s plans and Berkeley’s architecture in the 1950s and 1960s as pure international modernism, when they still reflected long-standing Bay Area commitments to regionalism and humanism. Indeed, Wurster argued that while corporate modernism might be appropriate in the business world, on campus it would be “often brutal and inhuman in scale and there will be great revulsion against it in a later day.” He argued against the “mass feeding [which] gives a mass mind,” and against buildings that, “tend toward iron conformity.” Wurster was joined by a number of other Bay Area architects from the regional modernist tradition. Along with the modernist campus towers above, therefore, we must cite the work of Joseph Esherick, who in buildings such as Anthony Hall (a.k.a. the Pelican Building) in 1957 crafted fine tributes to the Bay Area tradition of Maybeck and others. Likewise, Vernon DeMars and landscape architect Lawrence Halperin together crafted Berkeley’s new student center and plaza which, while often disliked for is modernist concrete styling, successfully combined Bay Area references with historical European allusions to recall the historical function of European plazas as social gathering places—a fact demonstrated in the 1964 Free Speech Movement.

It was Wurster’s commitment to regionalism in another respect that ultimately led to the conflict at People’s Park: his love of nature and sense of place. As early as 1945, Wurster was preaching the preservation of campus open space to conferences on campus planning. At a “Design in Practice” conference talk that year, Wurster argued for a campus “greenbelt of natural beauty” with no buildings, and concluded that only twenty-five percent of a campus should be covered with buildings. In later talks, Wurster described the Berkeley plans of the 1950s as intended to preserve nature, stating that the twenty-five percent requirement and the grouping of buildings into tight clusters would “allow these greenbelts to exist as major areas.”
argued that there was a strong desire to preserve the trees and natural landscape of Berkeley “lest we lose our gifts of nature and change an exciting landscape into a prosaic one.”

Land acquisition and the plans of the 1950s

Importantly, the open-space vision inherent in Wurster’s and The Office of Architects and Engineer’s plans, when matched with a dramatic increase in students and institutional programs, practically mandated a dramatic campus expansion into the neighboring city. Before the war, Berkeley’s student population was just over 10,000, but by 1951 it was 15,000, and by 1964, UC Berkeley’s student population had more than doubled to 27,500. To meet increased space requirements, the twenty-five percent requirement, and the desire for natural open space, the University had no choice but to expand into the neighboring city. “Land,” Wurster frequently emphasized in his speeches of the 1950s on campus architecture, was perhaps the “overriding issue of today.”

The 1951, 1955 and 1956 campus plans therefore committed UC Berkeley to acquire large plots of land outside the campus to develop residential halls, administrative buildings, and specialized sports fields (fig. 6.4). Berkeley’s 1951 planning report, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” pronounced that, “long ago all resemblance to the vision of 1897 ceased to be.” It argued that outdated “concepts of monumentality” would “straight-jacket” university planning and “deprive it of its open spaces, its natural beauty and true monumentality.” Instead the plan called for an “organic campus plan,” that preserved the dominance of open space and the natural beauties of the site,” by appropriately grouping buildings.

The 1951 plan estimated forty to fifty acres of additional land would be required for expansion while preserving open space and the values of the existing campus. Most of this space was dedicated to residential halls that would “be built to the maximum height permissible” to conserve land. The 1951 plan also advocated the demolition of all “obsolete” buildings on campus with the sole exceptions of South Hall, the Faculty Club, Senior Hall, and “possibly Bacon Hall.” Likewise, in 1952, the Board of Regents estimated that 25,000 additional students would be attending UC Berkeley, and they established that twenty-five percent of them would need university housing. The Regents proposed acquiring forty-four additional acres of land to accommodate this influx of students. Ironically the report used a Winston Churchill catch-phrase that would become popular with later contextualists: “we shape our cities--and then our cities shape us.” The report worried that dramatic growth of west coast cities threatened to overrun the campus with metropolitan growth--would the campus become “urbanized,” or should it “adjust its planning to maintain the dominance of its open space?”

All of this thinking was brought together in the most comprehensive statement of campus planning of the era, the 1956 campus plan (fig. 6.5). In 1956, the UC Board of Regents created a Committee on Campus Planning, with Wurster, Chancellor Clark Kerr, a Regent, and Louis 264
DeMonte, then head of the Office of Architects and Engineers. The Committee promptly produced Berkeley’s first Long Range Development Plan (LRDP). Given the anticipated influx of students, the 1956 Master Plan committed to a ten-minute walk time between classes, the twenty-five percent minimum building density, the clustering of academic groups, the demolishing of many older buildings, and the minimizing of automobile circulation on the campus through perimeter parking.\(^{40}\)

The 1956 LRDP also specifically outlined a program of nature conservation in a section entitled, “Landscape, Regional Scenic Assets, and Historical Features.” Here the plan stated that, “every measure will be taken to preserve the beauties of the natural setting of the campus. The natural groves and woodlands of Strawberry Creek will set the prevailing feeling for the campus landscape.”\(^{41}\) At the same time, after an earlier report by landscape architect Lawrence Halperin in 1954, Wurster and the Committee brought in landscape architect Thomas Church to integrate nature more finely into campus design through his regional modernist landscape design.\(^{42}\) Church produced a landscape architecture plan for the campus that set off several natural areas for protection, removed car traffic and parking from much of the campus, and highlighted the nature through volcanic, “regional,” dark stone walls that lined campus pathways.

The 1956 plan, however, as the other plans before it, included expansion into a densely inhabited, largely residential neighborhood area just south of campus, bisected by the commercial strip of Telegraph Avenue. Older housing stock, mostly shingled, dominated this area. A 1961 survey, for instance, showed that fifty-one percent of the buildings were built before 1910, sixty-six percent were built before 1920, and less than seven percent were built after 1940.\(^{43}\) The Master Plan therefore committed the University to a plan of expansion based on the destruction of privately owned housing. The 1956 plan alerted homeowners that their land would soon be subject to the University’s power of eminent domain.\(^{44}\) The campus planning office’s quest for natural open space, combined with the increase in program requirements, had therefore resulted in a program of urban renewal in the surrounding neighborhoods.

Operating under the LRDP, in the early 1960s, the University acquired several large plots in the South Campus area, razed existing buildings, and began construction of a series of high-rise dorms (fig. 6.6). The UC Regents had authorized funds in 1945 to house the intended twenty-five percent of students target, but was unable to initiate a residence hall program until the 1956 plan, when the firm Warnecke and Warnecke won a competition to house 800 students in four units in the south of campus area. The project expanded to three sites, each with four nine-story buildings along the periphery of the 2.7 acre site, dubbed Units I, II, and III. While residential dorms now housed thirteen percent of the student population, eighty percent of them were in new Warnecke and Warnecke towers. Once built, the new towers hovered over the site that would become People’s Park, the new dorms provided visual evidence of the University’s intent to remake the South Campus area (fig. 6.7).

At the time, the University did not foresee that its plan for expansion would run into an emergent student population that would reject high-rise dorms for more flexible living arrangements, and would lament the deterioration of the historical and social fabric of neighborhoods. Nor did the University anticipate a youth population that viewed modernist architecture as symbolic of institutional topdown power. The concern by campus architects and planners for preserving nature on campus meant little to the new generation that questioned why
the University should destroy existing neighborhoods, or why the University could dictate how nature would be integrated into the architectural fabric of the larger community.

Perhaps just as importantly, however, by the mid-1960s, the postwar building boom was at an end, as was the boom in state funding and student population. With the UC Regents seeking to contain costs, they refused to fund new the residential halls. Moreover, as discussed below, demand for dormitories greatly declined because of changing student preference. Why then did the University go ahead with its plans to purchase large tracts of land in the South Campus area, such as the People’s Park site, and then raze existing properties? The answer can be found in a failed plan for urban renewal by the City of Berkeley.

Urban Renewal and the South Campus

From the late 1950s on, the University and the City of Berkeley undertook, sometimes together and sometimes apart, a campaign to designate the South Campus as an urban renewal district. Just as the University was plotting its expansion into the area, the city began planning for its own urban renewal program with a 1957 study titled “Urban Renewal in Berkeley.” The report authorized the appointment of an urban renewal staff committee and began the complicated process outlined under federal law, which required cities to make a finding that the renewal zone was “blighted,” though federal law gave virtually no direction on standards to make that determination. The Berkeley Planning Department shortly thereafter issued another report titled, “The Problem of Blight in Berkeley” on January 15, 1958. The report borrowed the “Oakland census tract approach” from the Oakland City Planning department. This approach first analyzed each tract by census data and applied penalty scores for various factors such as the percentage of dwellings older than 1920. A “block by block” approach followed the census tract approach (fig. 6.8). This approach employed a visual evaluation by planning officials that applied penalty points for various criteria such as the state of repair, the condition of plantings, the presence of commercial or industrial uses, and other health and safety hazards including visible rubbish. Thus, based on visual evidence of deterioration and census data showing that a large percentage of buildings were older than 1920, the Berkeley Urban Renewal Agency could designate an area as “blighted, deteriorated and deteriorating.” By 1960, the city had hired William B. Nixon as the Urban Renewal Coordinator for the City of Berkeley.

At first, the urban renewal scheme focused on the more heavily blighted areas in the western Berkeley flatlands, a stretch of land that, when connected to West Oakland, formed the heart of the East Bay “ghetto” and was the birthplace of the radical Black Power movement (fig. 6.9). Berkeley renewal reports showed that the South Campus area was located far from the more blighted areas in the flats. The South Campus area, however, presented two important conditions not present in the more blighted flats that would encourage the renewal effort. First, and most important, was a critical provision in the 1959 amendments to the National Housing Act that enabled the city to credit any money spent by the University, to be used as the city’s contribution to the renewal effort. Under the typical urban renewal scheme, the federal government paid for two-thirds the cost and the local city renewal agency covered the other third. The 1959 amendments, however, enabled the city to apply $3.5 million the University had already spent on land acquisition. Pro-
renewal papers such as the Berkeley Daily Gazette billed the plan as “An $11 Million Plan That Would Cost ‘Nothing.’”\textsuperscript{50} Urban Renewal Coordinator William B. Nixon declared it, “Our Twentieth Century Bonanza.”\textsuperscript{51} As Nixon exclaimed, the urban renewal plan would give Berkeley “$8 million in federal renewal grants without spending a single cent of local tax money!”\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{The changing south campus population}

Urban renewal in the South Campus area had a second critical attribute: the plan would address the problem of the rising beatnik element in the area. Indeed, the South Campus area had gone through profound demographic changes in a short time, as both students and non-student youths poured into the South Campus area. Looking back on Telegraph Avenue’s rising Bohemia, Fred Cody, the owner of a landmark local bookstore, wrote that the “South Campus began more and more . . . to exult in a life style that set it apart from most other parts of the city.”\textsuperscript{53}

Several population shifts were at work during this time. The first shift happened in the early 1960s when a growing numbers of students began to move off-campus for their residential choices. A UC Report showed that the trend towards apartment living increased dramatically after 1963, and by 1970 applications to live in Berkeley residence halls were nearly half that of the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{54} By 1965, vacancy rates in the Warnecke and Warnecke towers were over ten percent, and by the late 1960s, residence halls were “facing an ever increasing vacancy rate,” and the University began to close some resident towers out of necessity.\textsuperscript{55} Student rejection of these housing options was in part due to cultural changes including a rise in sexual freedom, and social activities that necessitated more private, flexible, and individual living arrangements. With the increase in sexual freedom, experimentation in drug use, and other social freedoms, the supervised life in dormitories was excessively constrictive.

Sim van der Ryn’s 1967 report on Berkeley residence halls, based on research conducted by his architecture studios, found that students disliked the dorms as “institutional” and greatly restrictive of individual preferences, behaviors, and personal privacy.\textsuperscript{56} Meanwhile, from the late 1950s on, developers had built many cheaper two or three story modernist apartment buildings in the South Campus area. Students, however, derided these buildings as “plastics,” and instead preferred the older housing, even if it was poorly maintained, as “symbols of warmth and freedom.”\textsuperscript{57} As a result, students moved in large numbers into the older single-family homes in the South Campus area, whose owners transformed them into rooming houses and ad-hoc apartment buildings with flexible living spaces.

The second population shift occurred during the 1964 Free Speech Movement, which brought national attention and an influx of non-Berkeley youth.\textsuperscript{58} From all over the country, attracted by the atmosphere of political dissent and the growing bohemia of Telegraph Avenue, youth poured into the area.\textsuperscript{59} The increase in population placed tremendous pressure on the housing stock of the South Campus area. As the Real Estate Research Corporation reported: “[P]ast demolition and apartment replacement rates at these campuses would be sufficient were it not for the fact that a growing number of non-student renters will be competing for apartments.”\textsuperscript{60} By 1970, the 20,000 white, twenty-something, \textit{non-students} living in south 267
Berkeley were the majority. From his bookstore on Telegraph Avenue, Fred Cody described the influx as “a second gold rush.”

The third population shift resulted from the 1951 and 1956 University master plans themselves. The plans alerted most property owners in the South Campus area that the University would use eminent domain to purchase their land and demolish the structures. The plans thereby created a disincentive for proper maintenance and, by 1969 many long-term, stable residents had vacated the area. Many of these residents blamed the deterioration of the neighborhood on the University. They argued that no hippies had lived on their block until the University announced the plan to tear down existing houses. Local activists such as Rowena Jackson criticized the University’s neglect: “They made the mistake of not tearing them down immediately, and then they were squatters who lived in there. It just got to be really bad.”

The blight of bohemia

Like urban renewal’s more general relationship to racial politics, the Berkeley city plan was related both to blight as an architectural phenomenon and to the “undesirable” population shifts south of campus. Urban renewal became a tool that pro-renewal citizens could use to control Berkeley’s non-student youth populations. As local reporters made clear, the City Renewal Agency had conditioned its designation of blight on the “‘sociology’ of the place, which had changed from single family to multiple occupants, without the necessary ‘physical’ change.” Pro-renewal citizens sought redevelopment of the area in part because they were aghast at the “intrusion of the nationwide Beatnik element in their part of town and the image of Telegraph Avenue as ‘America’s Left Bank.’” Supporters asserted that the neighborhood should be razed because it harbored a concentration of hippies, radicals, rising crime, and a drug culture. Conservative Berkeley City Council member Don Mulford argued that the University should proceed with demolition to eliminate a “human cesspool.” A Police Department presentation and report given to the City Renewal Agency offered further evidence that bohemian blight underlay the renewal effort. The Police Department argued that narcotics crime had become so serious in the area that, “the neighborhood must be completely renewed if it is ever to become a crime free area in which Berkeley can again take real pride.”

The centerpiece of the blight concerns was the decline in the quality of the single-family housing stock into dilapidated student apartments and rooming houses. One renewal report argued that original single-family homes now had “problems of adequacy of light, ventilation, sanitation, interior room arrangements and obsolescence” from their conversions. According to the renewal agency, seventy percent of the South Campus area buildings were built before 1930 as single-family homes, but now their owners had transformed them into youth housing, resulted in a decaying physical condition (fig. 6.10). A report by Sim van der Ryn found a fifty percent increase in the number of apartments in the area, mostly accomplished through conversions.

The city’s urban renewal plan and its defeat

The city’s urban renewal plan was quite different from the modernist schemes of the University’s residence halls or most other earlier urban renewal plans. The formal urban renewal
plan for the South Campus area was first publicly declared in 1961, followed by a 1962 preliminary urban renewal scheme within the general master plan, and finally adopted in 1965 as the Urban Renewal Plan for the South Campus Project (fig. 6.11). Within the general goal of eliminating blight, the plan emphasized that there was “considerable latitude for creative planning.” T. J. Kent, the chair of Berkeley’s city planning department, and a Berkeley City Council member, emphasized that the plan was about conservation and rehabilitation rather than large-scale clearance. The plan called for the rehabilitation of historic structures wherever possible, and a high degree of owner participation. It was structured around three types of renewal: conservation, where the city helped private property owners with maintenance and improved existing public facilities; reconditioning, where the city would increase and expand housing code enforcement; and slum clearance. The plan divided the area into land already purchased by the University, where the University would demolish some fifty-nine deficient buildings, while the rest of the renewal zone would be governed by the city largely as a conservation area. The plan also sought to minimize the disruption, displacement, and relocation of renewal, while maintaining the current range of housing types and rents.

Much of the plan centered on how to fix Telegraph Avenue, the overloaded central commercial corridor. The renewal agency primarily proposed that Telegraph Avenue become a pedestrian shopping mall along the lines of the Pomona Mall, which was cited as an example that beautified downtown, eliminated traffic, and promoted pedestrian shopping. The plan noted that these actions would “enhance the prosperity of the Sather Gate shopping district,” while preserving the “feel” of the district. But various other similar plans were debated, such as one proposed by Vernon DeMars to turn Telegraph Avenue into a one-way street with widened sidewalks (fig. 6-12).

As a whole, then, the plan sought an urban renewal that aimed to preserve the historic residential feel of the district while enhancing shopping opportunities. The historicism of the renewal plan carried with it a hidden agenda to restore a time before the 1960s youth made the area their home. Unfortunately for renewal supporters, the plan was opposed not only by the leftist youth, which was to be expected, but also by the city merchants who were supposed to have supported it. Thus, despite the promise of free federal funding and the sensitive approach, an unusual coalition of residents and merchants emerged to oppose the renewal plan.

Opposition to the project was led by the Sather Gate Merchants Association, a group of local merchants and landlords. Merchants worried about losing customers when automobile traffic declined, and insisted all they really wanted was increased parking in the area. Residents were skeptical that the neighborhood suffered from blight, resented the planning process, and disliked dictation from an outside agency. At the same time, other conservative city leaders demonstrated an automatic dislike of renewal programs, as several city councilman stated they would reject renewal outright, no matter what the plan.

Students and youth argued that the plan would raise rents and force them out of living situations they were quite happy with. As one student argued at a hearing on the renewal plan: “Even Thoreau would have liked my abode—cheap and woody and about 90 years old.” Another student’s response was exemplary when he asserted that those forced out by renewal would only be offered “sterile, treeless, yardless, high rent apartments.” Many also resented the planned destruction of some Telegraph Avenue businesses (particularly coffee houses). Taken together,
the renewal opposition was a broad, unusual coalition of left-wing youths, merchants, and conservative council members, who all disliked the lack of local control that the plan represented.

In the end, the plan was defeated in a “surprise vote” by the Berkeley City Council in 1966, ending six years of renewal studies and efforts. Berkeley’s vice-mayor Arthur Harris concluded simply: “The merchants and the people in the area just don’t want it. They don’t get the concept.” Thomas Cook and council member Wilmot Sweeney blamed the unanticipated high cost of new earthquake standards that would apply to all buildings in the renewal area. Reporters also hinted that city council members did not want to appear as “starry-eyed liberals” pushing through an unwanted plan in an election year. The rejection of free federal funding was unprecedented and reflected just how much the average citizen had come to oppose urban renewal’s top-down planning.

Without the support of the city, the University was left to implement the urban renewal plan on its own. For ten years it had placed a large section of the South Campus neighborhood under the threat of its intended acquisition under eminent domain. It had purchased several large blocks in the area, and agreed to include those and other purchases as part of the larger urban renewal plan that was now defunct. A new Chancellor, Roger Heyns, entered office in 1965, and he pushed to complete the university acquisition program to stabilize the neighborhood. In 1967 Heyns presented to the UC Regents a resolution to purchase the remaining sites, he reported the “University’s partial responsibility for the deterioration of housing, the high crime rate in the area, and the rise in the area of ‘hippie concentration’ and rising crime.” He also admitted that “many residents held the University responsible for the deterioration of housing and other property in the South Campus area,” and that the University shared “some of the responsibility” for the area’s deterioration.

It was Heyns’ interpretation, then, that the University was responsible for the social deterioration of the South Campus area, and this led him to push for purchasing the remainder of allocated property in the Master Plan. Specifically, he pushed to purchase block 1875-2, the People’s Park site, which at 2.8 acres was the largest unpurchased lot. Overall, during the 1960s, the University had used its power of eminent domain to purchase over forty-five additional acres and destroy older buildings in order to make way for new dormitories and parking lots. Homeowners were unhappy because the University offered only fifty to seventy-five percent of the market value of the property. In the end, the University destroyed hundreds of existing low cost housing units, which the students increasingly preferred, to build high-rise dormitories that many students would shun (fig. 6.13). In 1967, the University finally purchased the plot of land destined to be People’s Park and sent out eviction notices to the residents of the four-block parcel with little notice. As one student would later report:

I lived on the future site of Peoples Park from September to December 1967. My rent was only $48 per month but the living conditions were very satisfactory. The housing in the area was generally very nice, old brown shingle houses, both single family and student housing. I didn’t even know that the University had any interest in the land when I received a three day eviction notice from the University.
during Fall quarter exams. . . [my] house on Dwight Way stood vacant until the middle of 1968.  

The student was not alone. Several reports indicated that the University evicted many students in the weeks before their final exams. The 1967 purchase brought the total number of acres acquired by the University up to forty-five, forty-one of which had been residential plots. Demolition lasted until December 1968.  

Unfortunately, funding had sharply declined under the conservative governorship of Ronald Reagan who was elected in 1967. The great era of the multiversity utopia, of university expansion and building, was at an end. Meanwhile, after demolition, the University left the People’s Park site vacant (fig. 6.14). The question now remained: what to do with the site?  

Building the Park  

By April of 1969, the site of People’s Park had been empty for a year. It had become a mud-soaked vacant block that served as an impromptu parking lot. Ruts, garbage, weeds, old foundations, and the randomly parked cars of numerous students filled the site. Mike Delacour, a law student, decided that the site would make a good place for outdoor rock concerts. He gathered other locals, including Wendy Schlessinger, Stew Albert, members of the Berkeley Yippies (such as Art Goldburg) to discuss creating a park at the site and hosting regular events. The group bought an ad in the local left-wing newspaper The Berkeley Bard announcing that there would be a work gathering on Sunday, April 20 to create a park. Delacour and the others were somewhat surprised when several hundred residents including families, professors, students, residents, and most surprisingly, hippies (who Delacour and the others had always considered too lazy for such work) showed up carrying shovels and ready to work (fig. 6.15). Someone brought a tractor to excavate the foundations of old housing the University had demolished. The park eventually expanded to fill the entire block. Overall, the park had an impromptu air, even though a local landscape architect, Jon Read, had been enlisted in its design (fig. 6.16). At one end was the stage for music and “free speech.” Meandering paths connected other various planned areas, such as the “people’s garden.” A child’s play area was also added, which proved especially popular with neighborhood parents as no other local parks existed in the area at the time. On the other end from the stage a tree grove and flower gardens were planted. The park plan continued to evolve, however, as various groups tried out new ideas.  

Over the next three and a half weeks, the project ballooned, drawing in thousands of local residents, students, and professors. Estimates suggested that as many as a thousand people a day were working or using the park during the week and as many as 4,500 people were using the space on the weekends. Even Black Panther co-founder Bobby Seale showed up to visit the park and was clearly impressed. He asked the organizers: “You mean you just took the land without asking anyone?”  

Seale had an obvious and important point. UC Berkeley at first tolerated the seizure of their property, with Vice Chancellor Earl Cheit and Chancellor Roger Heyns promising not to take action, though the University now announced plans to build a soccer field on the site. As discussed below, Heyns, a People’s Park negotiating committee, and faculty from Berkeley’s
College of Environmental Design had also agreed on May 8th, to provide the CED three weeks to study and develop alternatives for the park. On May 13, however, perhaps under prodding from the UC Regents and Governor Ronald Reagan, Heyns ordered the park cleared and a chain-link fence established around the park to reassert university property rights. Early on the morning of May 15th, police cleared the park and established the fence.

The action resulted in a mass demonstration of some 3,000 people, who were marching from Sproul Plaza to the park when they meet Berkeley police and California Highway Patrol Officers. Reagan’s personal representative at Berkeley, Edwin Meese III, later President Reagan’s Attorney General, ordered in the Alameda County Officers, known locally as the “Blue Meanies” for their violent reputation. As noted above, the officers loaded rifles with birdshot and buckshot and fired directly into the crowds, killing one and wounding hundreds. Pictures published in the San Francisco papers the next day showed officers taking direct aim at protesters running away (fig. 6.17).

Governor Reagan ordered in 2,700 members of the National Guard and for the next two weeks violent clashes ensued (fig. 6.18. 6.19). Activists alternated between violent acts such as the throwing of rocks and stones, and peaceful acts of “love” towards National Guard troops (giving flowers, displaying nudity, passing out free drugs). The Alameda County police and National Guard responded with mass arrests and the heavy-handed use of tear gas, while police brutality on the scene and in jails was well documented by the press and participants.101 Caught in between were local residents and the academic community. Across campus, classes were cancelled due to spreading tear gas and the fear of violence (fig. 6.20, fig. 6.21).

The Support for People’s Park by the Architecture Profession

Repeated statements of the People’s Park creators and supporters indicate they saw their project as a challenge to tower block architecture, to the lack of community involvement in planning, and to the University’s unwanted expansion beyond campus borders. To take just one example from many of the anonymous leaflets:

We understand the calculated attempt by the authorities to clean up the South Campus area to be an attempt to oppress and destroy that part of the community which puts the challenge to their arbitrary, irresponsible use of power . . . The question again is control. We believe that the people in the community should control their resources . . . it was our adherence to these principles of community control and community participation that led us to the belief, on which we acted, that the unused lot should be made productive as a park.102

Indeed, the movement to create the People’s Park took place against a background of rising community rebellions against federal urban renewal programs. The movement had begun in the Bay Area as early as 1955, when the so-called “Freeway Revolt” halted the construction of a major urban freeway through Golden Gate Park, and San Francisco became the first major city to halt the urban freeway building mania.
By 1969, however, the events at People’s Park, like the events in Columbia University in 1968, drew widespread support from architecture students and faculty. The events therefore exposed deep fault lines in the professions over the ability of modern architecture or planning to make positive social change. Earlier generations, such as Telesis, envisioned planners and architects remaking urban built space into new forms as a means to improving social equity and increasing citizen access to green nature. This mission was deeply undermined by the complicity of architects and planners in the failure of urban renewal and their collaboration with downtown capital in the creation of urban freeways and new urban spaces that proved to be largely inhospitable. Support for community architectural “takeovers” therefore grew within the profession as part of a search for more flexible paradigms of planning and design that sought increased community participation in design. In these new ways of thinking, the architect or the planner would take on a role less of director, and more of a consultant role.

These ideas about community design grew out of the architectural profession’s attempt to come to grasp with the deep problem of the urban ghetto after the failure of urban renewal projects to create a more socially equitable architecture. Moreover, this new focus on community participation had much to do with an increased presence and voice of the minority architects and architectural students. At its heart, the architectural, landscape architecture, and planning professions were beginning to understand the importance of control by citizens over their own environments. While, planners had a longer history of professing the need of community participation, the failure to adequately realize that need led many in the design community to support more activist interventions in community participation. As the California Monthly concluded in 1969, the “surprising support that the park issue engendered among many people in the community may have been due to a growing sense of alienation from, and lack of control over, the physical form the city was taking.”

Changing architectural and planning paradigms

By the late 1960s, academic architecture, landscape architecture, and planning departments were deeply divided internally over the modernist project, and indeed, if architecture and urban planning should have any social mission at all. Less than a generation after becoming the dominant paradigm on campuses, modernism was under attack from within the profession. Significant critiques of renewal and rational planning proved influential in planning circles by individuals including Jane Jacobs (1961), Martin Anderson (1964), and Herbert Gans (1962). In architectural schools, meanwhile, renewed appreciation of historical and regional styles of building was being taught through the works of Vincent Sculley, Robert Venturi, and Denise Scott Brown.

This was particularly true at Berkeley, where tremendous changes took place in the College of Environmental Design (CED) faculty during the 1960s. Charles Moore, Donlyn Lyndon, Christopher Alexander, Joseph Esherick, Christopher Tunnard, and others in the architecture and landscape architecture departments reemphasized history, local materials, and the human scale. Moore and Lyndon had begun work on Sea Ranch in 1963, a tribute to local vernacular architecture. Esherick joined the Berkeley architecture faculty in 1952, but by 1960s was trying to redefine architectural education away from design based in aesthetics
towards design the grew from specific inhabitants and their uses. At the same time Roger Montgomery joined the CED faculty in 1967 to start a new degree program in urban design. Montgomery, who would back the People’s Park movement, was already arguing for new forms of urban housing such as low-rise planned unit developments and condominiums. By 1976, for instance, he would write critically of modernist urban renewal: “Architectural invention reaches those at the bottom of the social stratification system only when upper-middle class professionals design for them without their participation.”

Also joining the faculty in 1966 with Roger Montgomery was another supporter of People’s Park, Donald Appleyard. As a planner, Appleyard shifted the focus of urban study from transportation and traffic flow to what made neighborhoods and streets more livable for the residents. He thus became a “humanist urban planner” more interested in how people solved their own environmental problems, and how urban planning might assist them. In the 1960s, Appleyard was beginning his path-breaking studies that would culminate in 1982’s Livable Streets, one of the first research books to lay out the negative social effects of cars on cities. Appleyard saw the urban environment as a place of political struggle, and argued for decentralized user control by communities over their own environments. Appleyard used People’s Park as an example of “symbolic action,” and at the time of his death in 1982, was working on a manuscript, in part inspired by People’s Park, that faulted planning professionals for ignoring the symbolic content of the environment—professionals “de-symbolize the environment to handle it on a neutral, technical level.”

Urban Parks, minority professionals, and community planning

Architectural history typically represents the period of the 1960s and 1970s as a time when design fashions changed from modernism to post-modernism, usually referring to a handful of authors, Robert Venturi and Jane Jacobs foremost among them. This simplified history overlooks a broader social agenda that emerged in the 1960s including multiple experiments by the generation after modernism that continued architecture’s mandate for social change through community planning. The events at People’s Park and the participation of young students and professors in those events, took place against a back drop of an increased minority presence in architectural schools, and an increased effort by architecture, planning, and landscape architecture to become directly involved with the community, often through direct work in the heart of the abandoned city. Much of the new effort focused on empty abandoned lots left behind in inner cities. In the early 1960s, concerned landscape architects, such as Karl Linn in Philadelphia began to realize that vacant urban lots presented an opportunity for open space in densely populated urban areas. Linn’s 1961 Mellon Street Park in Philadelphia, built by a neighborhood group and students, was an experiment that established the interim use of privately owned but undeveloped land for community use.

Simultaneously, minority architects and minority student organizations played increasing roles in architecture education throughout the 1960s and 1970s. At Berkeley, student organizations such as Berkeley’s Black Architectural Student Association (BASA) and the Chicano Architecture Student Association (CASA) gave black and Latino students a voice for change in architectural education. Both groups pushed support for affirmative action programs
that sought to increase minority faculty and areas of study. BASA called for more black professors, courses in African architectural history, and an expanded program of community development in which students could receive academic credit for work in community. CASA demanded that Latino student membership match state population levels—fifteen percent in 1973—and to end the heavy emphasis on European architectural history. CASA also called for resources and academic credit to support work in the “barrio.” Initially, the calls of CASA and BASA, as well as affirmative action requirements, had some impact on minority hiring and curriculum changes.

Moreover, although the programs would peak in the 1970s, by the mid-1960s, many architecture schools were adopting some of the goals the minority activists had set forth, through experimental programs to engage in the urban “barrio,” or “ghetto” directly. Several architectural schools including Columbia, Harvard, the Pratt Institute, and Berkeley appeared to be working directly with the community through non-profits and developing course studios that relied on community design, including so-called “urban field stations,” or “community design centers.” At Columbia, architectural students and young faculty had created in 1964 the “East Harlem Studio,” which became in 1968 the Architect’s Renewal Committee of Harlem. In each case, students and faculty worked directly for the community in Harlem. Quintana, then teaching at Columbia, helped merge these studios into the Real Great Society Urban Planning Studio that brought together former gang members and Columbia architecture students. One student later emphasized that the studios emphasized the community’s right to development by people who “looked like them,” as opposed to “los blanquitos liberales.”

In January 1969, the architecture department at Berkeley gave their approval for a new course on community design and an option for a community design emphasis in the A.B. degree program. The new course and emphasis stemmed from the belief of some in the department of the growing need within inner-city neighborhoods and minority communities for trained architects and designers. Berkeley also developed field stations in San Francisco’s Western Addition and other areas. In Berkeley’s Landscape Architecture Department, a report of 1969 asserted that after ten years of failed sporadic attempts to improve blighted urban areas, the concept of community participation in neighborhood parks was emerging as a new tool for solving inner city problems. The ideas at Berkeley and Columbia were not limited, but broadly endorsed by organizations such as the American Institute of Planners and the American Society of Landscape Architects.

At the same time, the creation of People’s Park also took place against the backdrop of the emergence of the Black Panther Party in nearby Oakland. Black Panther members were frequently on Telegraph Avenue and the group presented a radical attack on post-war liberalism’s urban development schemes. After decades subject to white urban planning, the Black Panther Party presented a “Declaration of Independence” from the urban plantation. Just as early student radicals in the Free Speech Movement were inspired by their volunteer efforts in Southern civil rights campaigns, student radicals of the late 1960s borrowed freely from radical black power movements in a struggle against the business and political elite. Rather than negotiate through complicated University power structures that they no longer believed in, the young residents simply took direct action and transformed the vacant lot to their own use.
The idea of an architectural non-profit field station in the “barrio” never became a permanent institution. However, the idea that students should break past the standard program, seize control of their own education, and that design should come from the local community first, rather than from the trained architect down, were powerful motivations that would play out in the spatial contest over People’s Park.

Architecture and planning professionals and people’s park

During the two weeks of conflict over People’s Park, a number of architecture and urban planning faculty who saw the possibilities for community participation in design argued for its expression in a community led park. The most frequent critic was Professor Sym Van der Ryn, who went on to become California’s State Architect and a leader in the emergence of the sustainable architecture movement. As the new head of the University’s Committee on Housing and the Environment, he attacked the obscure internal planning process of the University. In 1969, he issued a report on the events at People Park. The report argued that: “The fact is that at every level our public institutions and local governments are failing to meet fundamental needs and people are trying to do something about it.” Throughout these events, he noted, observers had seen “a failure of archaic procedures for making decisions” about land use.” Mostly, Van der Ryn criticized the planning approach of the multiversity: “Our strongest impression of the planning process in the University of California system and at Berkeley is that it is obscure . . . the obscurity of the process breeds suspicion and often anguish over what they have done.” Van der Ryn continued: “We expect that a university (of all places) would consciously seek to plan with the community and not for it . . . it is clear that the present planning methods are simply not good enough.”

In a separate publication, Van der Ryn argued that the park “appeared to satisfy real and pressing human needs. People’s Park was a “constructive and appropriate use” of the site, Van der Ryn argued, and “for the first time, hundreds of young people felt the sense of performing meaningful work towards creating a place of their own.”

Van der Ryn concluded: “Our position from the beginning has been that the People’s Park represented an interesting and important phenomenon that called for an equally creative response by the University.”

Other architectural professionals also weighed in on behalf of the park. An all-day “Teach-in to Support People’s Park” brought together Berkeley planning Professors Donald Appleyard, John Dyckman, and Roger Montgomery, in addition to Van der Ryn and Alan Temko (fig. 6.22). Temko, then architectural critic for the San Francisco Chronicle and eventual winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his architectural criticism, called the park the “most significant advance in recreational design since the great parks of the late nineteenth and twentieth century.”

Robert Greenway, the Director of planning at the UC Santa Cruz campus was also present and argued that the park filled a need for a “physical and psychic space and represents a different set of ethics than Reagan-style California.” Perhaps carried away, Greenway argued, “put your bodies on the line . . . tell the national guardsmen to ‘go ahead and shoot’ . . . Your vision should not be one park but thousands of parks.” Thomas Hoving, director of the New York Metropolitan Museum and former parks chief of New York City, also spoke and argued that the park was “getting people to build something beautiful,” and that the “crushing out of People’s Park” was an act of “obscene stupidity by people in high places.”
The three departments of Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design offered significant support for a community maintained park. The Department of Landscape Architecture prepared a 32-page document for the Academic Senate Policy Committee outlining in detail historical precedents for a user-developed park. The report asserted that the “feeling of helplessness” for community members was even more frustrating because the provided parks reflected “outdated concepts of design,” with “rigid and inflexible formulations [that] do not recognize the specific qualities of the communities in which they are situated.” The report also cited to Thomas Hoving that, “We have had enough of the swing, slide, and sand box stereotype, the black topped, link fenced asphalt prison.”

Numerous CED faculty members, including Spiro Kostof, Roger Montgomery, Corwin Mocine, and Richard Meier, as well as historians such as Carl Schorske signed a public letter from Berkeley faculty in May 1969 for publication in the Los Angeles Times and other newspapers. The letter called on Governor Reagan to remove the National Guard from Berkeley and stop the escalation of violence. Moreover, students and faculty of the CED teamed together for a survey to support the park and argue against University claims the park was a public nuisance. Under the direction of professors Roger Montgomery, Donald Appleyard, Clare Cooper, and others, over seventy students volunteered to conduct an opinion survey in the neighborhood around the park. While the University based its initial decision to fence off and close the park on an argument that neighbors complained about noise and drug use in the park, the CED survey of 931 households found that 94% did not agree that the park was a nuisance. The survey found that a clear majority favored keeping the community-run park, while only ten percent of respondents were in favor of the University maintaining control over the park for University purposes.

On May 6th, Chancellor Heyns gave Van der Ryn’s Committee on Student Housing and Environment three weeks to come up a constructive solution to the park dilemma. This lead to two proposals by the CED to save the park. Both reflected the experiments in community-led design and architectural field stations then being undertaken or planned in the design school. The first proposed creating a non-profit organization to run the park on behalf of the local community. Eighty-one percent of local residents in the CED survey supported the idea. William Wheaton, the Dean of the CED, and a noted housing and planning expert, assembled a team of lawyers, law students, and CED students to develop a non-profit corporation that could take over operations of the park and provide the University a legal option for relinquishing the park. Wheaton and the team worked all night to file incorporation papers in Sacramento to meet a deadline for presentation to the UC Regents. Wheaton also testified on the plan before the Berkeley City Council on May 25, 1969, and presented a paper that cited non-profit experiments in Philadelphia, Oakland, and San Francisco as precedents for community developed and managed parks.

The second CED proposal, also presented in late May 1969, was to turn People’s Park into an “experimental field station” in community design and planning that would be under the responsibility of the CED. The experimental field station idea would allow the park to survive while providing a means to study ways to involve community action groups in civic planning. Mike Delacour, a principal park founder, supported this idea: “The idea [is] that we’d be specimens in some kind of laboratory and they’d all come and observe us.” The CED faculty
voted overwhelmingly for a resolution in support of CED sponsorship of the park. The resolution asserted that: “The spontaneous development of a community park offers an opportunity to study an on-going process of participatory design,” and concluded that, “experts in the field of community planning have long recognized the value of a process in which citizens participate directly in establishing and fulfilling their needs.” Advocates touted the field station model as a way to allow students and faculty to test new concepts in park design and recreational equipment directly with the community.134

Negotiating the park

On May 21, in response to the CED proposals and Chancellor Heyns’s May 6th request for alternative park proposals, the loose coalition of park leaders assembled as the People’s Park Negotiating Committee, offered Chancellor Heyns four different options for the park that would be acceptable to park users, including the proposal for an experimental CED field station, the Wheaton proposal for a non-profit to run the park, and a plan to lease the land to the city to operate the park.135

By this point, the idea of preserving a community maintained park in some form had received widespread support throughout the UC system. The heavy-handed and violent tactics of Governor Reagan and the Alameda Sheriffs Department, widely covered in the national press, as well as the obvious need for park space in Berkeley, pushed moderate residents and students to support the park. Numerous votes in late May 1969 demonstrated support for the park. In a student wide referendum, Berkeley students voted overwhelmingly to support the park’s survival and indicated their desire that the park continue to be managed by the citizens and students of the Berkeley community. The referendum of 14,969 students saw the largest turnout in campus history, and 85% of the student voters voted for the park. The Academic Senate, comprised of faculty members, supported the park and opposed Governor Reagan’s violent tactics. A report for the Academic Senate prepared by Professors Frederick Berry, Thomas Brooks, and Eugene Commins on the people’s park violence asked: “The question then, is whether the genuine intentions of those actually in control of the park were truly part of ‘a deliberate and planned attempt at confrontation,’ rather than a larger, mainstream community movement? The answer, the report declared, was no.136 The Academic Senate then voted 642 to 95 (87%) for a statement that Reagan should reverse course and remove the National Guard troops. The Berkeley City Council followed with an 8-1 vote requesting Reagan to remove the National Guard and for a solution to keep the park. Protests were also occurring throughout campuses of the UC system in support for the park.

Chancellor Heyns finally admitted that the park was a favored option for residents and students and presented a plan on June 20, 1969 to the UC Regents to lease the area to the city for use as a park. During the presentation, UC President Charles Hitch stated: “There is no question that a park of this kind is desired by a large majority of Berkeley students . . . and by many sincere and responsible citizens of Berkeley.” Heyns added that while leasing the land to the city to maintain the user-developed park entailed risks, it would “restore a spirit of community to the town and campus.”137 Nonetheless, despite the lack of funding or need for further dorms, the UC Regents voted against the park proposal and re-endorsed the plan to build either residence halls
or an unneeded soccer field. In their opposition, the UC Regents were led by the rising star in American conservative movement, Governor Ronald Reagan. Both continued to see the park as a symbolic battle against student radicalism, one to which they could not give in.

**Conclusion: Preserving the Park**

After weeks of violence, both Governor Reagan and the moderates in Berkeley were looking for a peaceful solution. A planned Memorial Day parade insured that the opportunity presented itself. Moderates in Berkeley worked to ensure the parade would provide an example of a Berkeley at peace and used peace marshals, parade directors, and thousands of donated flowers, to ensure the parade happened without violence. The march of 30,000 people was so successfully peaceful, that it did much to restore a sense of quiet to Berkeley (fig. 6.23). Governor Reagan, by this point, had been looking for a chance to remove the National Guard in the face of increasing residential, citizen, and academic pressure, and the peaceful event gave him the excuse he needed to remove the National Guard. A few incidents occurred over the rest of the summer, but for the most part, the People’s Park violence was over. The University remained committed to the idea of building high-rise dorms on the site well into the 1980s, when it finally did reach a compromise to lease the plot to the city for use as a park. This in turn sparked a new round of controversy over the issue of homelessness and the symbolic battles over the park continued.

People’s Park is now a city park, but tensions over the political issues have never subsided, and continue to limit its growth and use. The University and the City of Berkeley have continued to discuss and debate proposals for renewing the site. Today the park has a fragile, temporary air to it, as if at any moment the University could end its lease and reclaim its property for any of its numerous building projects. This process has been complicated, however, by the multiple disputes with the City of Berkeley over a new University program of expansion into the city. The expansionist University with a large-scale building campaign, backed by private corporate capital, has returned. The University again finds itself immersed in conflict with the city over several planned expansions, most notably, the planned destruction of one of the areas few remaining original oak groves for a new football facility (fig. 6.24). Both nationally and locally, observers have forgotten People’s Park as a historical site of community action. The park has instead become a major site for homeless of Berkeley to encamp. The one thing People’s Park did not become is a park that serves the local community of residents or students, who avoid the park almost completely.

Speaking in February 1969, Sym Van der Ryn proposed a humorous way to use architecture to curb student protest: he proposed that Reagan and his Regents build one of Buckminster Fuller’s huge geodesic domes to cover Berkeley and control the climate. Anytime political tensions heated up, a blast of artic air could soothe the tensions (fig. 6.25). After all, “You would never see large protests in Ann Arbor or Cambridge in January, and it would be a cheaper investment than “maintaining a standing army of police.” Like Van der Ryn’s comments, this chapter has argued for a link between student protest movements of the 1960s and the modernist paradigms of architecture and planning. It has also argued that architecture students and faculty became involved in 1960s protest movements as part of a process of inventing new design.
paradigms. The idea of community participation in design did seem to have some impact in
urban planning, where Paul Davidoff in the 1960s defined the “advocate planner,” and spawned a
legacy of community planners/activists.\textsuperscript{141}

In architecture, however, the concept of the community design center or the urban field
station has been all but abandoned. Minority participation in architectural design sadly seems to
have peaked in the 1960s, and especially appears to have declined with the end of affirmative
action. As Professor of Comparative Literature Kristin Ross wrote in her book on the May 1968
riots in France: “it is the role of the democratic theorists/historian is to uncover submerged
counter histories of democratic practice that can expand our definition of democratic politics.”\textsuperscript{142}
This is as true in histories of design, architecture and planning as it is in the history of politics.
We do not have to return to the violence of May 1969, to remember that incorporating the
community into the creation of public spaces can be an agent of making political change through
architecture, planning, and design.
Chapter Six: Notes


2 See for instance, Educational Facilities Laboratories, *College Students Live Here; A Study of College Housing* (New York: Educational Facilities Laboratory, 1961); *Case Studies of Educational Facilities* (New York: EFL, 1961).

3 The Ford Foundation in the Cold War era was often involved in supporting soft cold war efforts and served as a conduit for CIA funding of the arts for the Cold War efforts. See Frances Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000).


5 The best historical overview of events is provided by W. J. Rorabaugh, *Berkeley at War, the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1990). Additionally, see, Stanley Irwin Glick, “The People’s Park,” (PhD Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1984). Don Mitchell has provided two other important scholarly accounts, primarily of events after 1969 in Mitchell, “Iconography and Locational Conflict from the Underside: Free Speech, People’s Park, and the Politics of Homelessness in Berkeley, California,” *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (March 1992), 152-169; “The End of Public Space? People’s Park, Definitions of the Public and Democracy;,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 85, no. 1 (March 1995), 108-133. Mitchell has been called one of the foremost practitioners of spatial theory today, and uses People’s Park in each case to make arguments about the role of space in politics and geography. In “Iconography,” Mitchell argues that public space forms the arena for symbolic struggles between multiple groups and actors that are constantly being renegotiated symbolically. Thus, social conflicts over legitimate behavior are transferred to conflicts over location. In “The End of Public Space,” Mitchell uses the battle over the University and the city’s redevelopment plans for People’s Park in the early 1990s, which sought to eliminate the sizable homeless population from the park as a way to investigate the nature of “public space” in the contemporary city.

7 Contemporary or later activist accounts include: Professors Frederick Berry, Thomas Brooks, Eugene Commins, “A Report on the People's Park Incident” (Berkeley, 1969); Robert Scheer, “The Dialectics of Confrontation: Who Ripped off the Park,” in *Ramparts* (August 8, 1969), 42-53; Claudia Baker, et al., “A Case Study of Urban Ecology and Open Space: People’s Park,” (Berkeley, 1983); Robert Freeman, *That Patch of Ground Called People’s Park* (Berkeley Creator’s Association, 1970); Claire Burch, “People’s Park Then and Now,” (VHS, 1995). Other reports include, Eli Leon, Witness Statements relating to People’s Park and General Unrest in Berkeley,” (Berkeley, 1969). In general, the leftist literature paints the University’s excursion into the South Campus area as a blatant land grab, a continuation of urban renewal plans by both the University and the city intended to curb the rising cultural bohemia of the Telegraph Avenue area.


9 Ibid.


12 The Office of Architects and Engineers, University of California, Berkeley, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” December 1951, 14.

14 Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, 6.


17 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer of a first draft of this piece submitted to JSAH for the reference to C. West Churchman. Churchman founded the first inter-disciplinary department in Operations Research and published the field’s first textbook, Introduction to Operations Research in 1957, which was highly successful in promoting the field. Interestingly, Churchman’s system’s theory seems somewhat post-modernist, he argued that one could never have complete knowledge of an entire system, but should nevertheless seek to improve those systems while guided by a critical, ethical compass. And he argued for operations research to be an interdisciplinary social science, grounded in philosophy, rather than the pure technical discipline it became. Churchman died in 2004. Werner Ulrich, “An Appreciation of C. West Churchman,” Systems Practice 1, no. 4 (1988), 341-350, updated and published at Werner Ulrich’s Home Page, “A Tribute to C. West Churchman,” http://www.geocities.com/csh_home/cwc_appreciation.html (updated March 12, 1996) (last accessed November 29, 2008).

18 The University plans continued with development supported by funds from the EFL. One of the primary projects was a university residential building system (URBS), which would use a “systems approach” to student housing and would improve “function performance at lower cost.” EFL, System Feasibility Study for University of California Student Housing (San Francisco: Building Systems Development, October 4, 1965), 1; University Residential Building System, A Project of the University of California, “Phase III Report (Berkeley: Office of the President, University of California, Berkeley, February 1970), 1.

19 Dober, Campus Planning.


22 Helfand, The Campus Guides: University of California Berkeley.


26 Muthesius, The Post War University, 47.

27 Wurster became involved in campus planning issues nationally, including consulting for the University of Washington, Trinity University in Texas, and Brigham Young University, and gave several speeches on campus planning. See for example, “Campus Planning,” Unknown Conference, July 1959; “Keys to Campus Planning,” Conference of the Western Association of College and University Business Officers (Salt Lake City, Utah), May 3, 1960, William W. Wurster/Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons Collection (1922-1974), Environmental Design Archives. College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley.

28 Wurster, “Campus Planning.”


30 Wurster, “Campus Planning;” “Keys to Campus Planning.”


32 Wurster, “Campus Planning;” “Keys to Campus Planning.”

33 The Office of Architects and Engineers, University of California, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” December 1951, 3-4. The so-called “Sputnik Shock” on the late 1950s would also dramatically increase science programs and buildings in the UC system. The role of the University in science research, much of which went to support the development of new war technologies would play a profound role in alienating the students of the 1960s from their so-called parent, the University.

34 The Office of Architects and Engineers, Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” 4.
35 The Office of Architects and Engineers, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” 4.

36 The Office of Architects and Engineers, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” V-2.

37 The Office of Architects and Engineers, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” IV-8.

38 See, Richard Bender, et al., Campus Planning Study Group, “Urban Design Studies for the Berkeley Campus,” (Berkeley, 1978). The Campus Planning Study Group was spearheaded by Alan Jacobs, T.J. Kent and Fran Violich to research campus planning history and prepare a new, more historically sensitive plan. Richard Bender directed the group and Meredith Clausen appears to have done much of the writing. Sally Woodbridge and Richard Bender noted in a later personal meeting with the author that the study group did much to bring historic preservation to campus architecture.

39 The Office of Architects and Engineers, University of California, “Planning the Physical Development of the Berkeley Campus,” IV-2.

40 Actually demolished were the Anthropology Museum, Bacon Hall, the Decorative Arts and Annex, the Faculty Club Garages, the 1880s Observatory, existing Greenhouses, and many other smaller and temporary buildings.


45 The 1957 program was described in the 1958 planning report, Urban Renewal Staff Committee, Berkeley Planning Department, “The Problem of Blight in Berkeley,” January 15, 1958.

Urban Renewal Staff Committee, “The Problem of Blight in Berkeley.”

Urban Renewal Staff Committee, “The Problem of Blight in Berkeley.”


Van der Ryn and Silverstein, “Dorms at Berkeley: An Environmental Analysis,” 23-25. Van der Ryn argued the dorms suffered from an “institutional syndrome,” because they were based solely on providing maximum square footage for an “ideal student” of one schedule, one set of preferences, and one set of values.


The bohemia on Telegraph Avenue actually got its start from the University policy banning political activity within the Sather gate and on campus. Thus, political activists, beginning, notably, with Adlai Stevenson campaign, anti-McCarthyism and the civil rights movement, gathered on the approach to the Sather gate, on Telegraph.


Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, 145.

Pat and Fred Cody, “A View from the Avenue,” 141-142.


The Daily Californian, March 9, 1966.


Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War, 150.

Berkeley Police Department, “Staff Presentations at Hearing Regarding South Campus Renewal,” March 14, 1966.

Thomas Cook, “South Campus Urban Renewal Project, Description of Physical Characteristics,” (Berkeley) March 14, 1966. Thomas Cook, the city’s second Urban Renewal Coordinator, lamented at the renewal agency hearings in 1966, that the “South Campus area has . . . evolved from an area of fine single family homes to an area which consists largely of apartments and rooming houses.”


There is limited, but emerging work on the more flexible approach of urban renewal in the 1960s and 1970s. In 2007, I presented a paper based on this research at one of two panels at the Society of Architectural Historians concerned new approaches to the study of urban renewal.


Davidsen, “Housing Possibility seen in Urban Area.” William Nixon even floated the idea that some land could be sold at low cost to non-profits for low cost housing.


Roger March, “Sather Shopping Area Controversy, Parking Space vs. Urban Renewal,” *The Daily Californian*, Mar. 17, 1964. The DeMars plan seems, in fact, to be the one that was eventually carried out in large part.

Turpin, “Southside Renewal Plan Draws Opposition.”

March, “Sather Gate Shopping Mall?”


Turpin, “Urban Renewal Controversy Rages.”


Ibid., 32.

Nearby Willard Park, aka Ho Chi Min Park was not officially opened until 1971. Funds to purchase the property for that park had just recently been approved in 1968, and the plan for the park was only approved in April 1969, during the People’s Park protests. Indeed, many claimed that People’s Park greatly stimulated the city of Berkeley to step up its park efforts, and the city did attempt to assuage protesters at People’s Park by announcing its plans for Willard Park. Another nearby park--Ohlone Greenway also arose from the People’s Park events. That land was originally BART property used to construct the BART subway, which BART intended to sell or lease for development. After People’s Park was filed in, however, Berkeley citizens seized this property for a “People’s Park Annex.” BART eventually reached a compromise to grant the land to the city for use as a park, providing a telling counterpoint to the University, as does today’s success of Ohlone way to the problems that continue to plague People’s Park.

There are no good descriptions of exactly how the park was laid out. I have based this description on the brief reports of park supporters (who are more interested in telling the story of the University shut-down of the park and the ensuing violence), and on a visual analysis of the various photographs of the park. For a good published collection of photographs see Alan Copeland, ed., People’s Park Berkeley (New York: Ballantine, 1969).


The efforts by Telesis discussed in Chapter 3 to engage citizens in planning through education and exhibitions is one earlier historical example of planners attempt at community participation. Indeed, the idea seems to be widely shared in planning culture of the 1940s. As Andrew Shanken shows, The New Deal’s National Resources Planning Board, for example, called for citizen participation in planning, especially in its pamphlet Action for Cities of 1943. Andrew Shanken, Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 21-23; Action for Cities, A Guide for Community Planning, Published Under the Sponsorship of American Municipal Association, American Society of Planning Officials, and International City Managers’ Association (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1943). See also, Susanne Cowan, “Planning to the People: Creating a Public Forum for Planning in Britain, 1941-51,” Phd Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, forthcoming.

“Goodwill, Learning and The Rule of Reason have Become Battle Casualties-Perspectives on People’s Park Crisis,” California Monthly (October 1969), 10.


For one example of the confusion wrought by the changes of the late 1960s in the College of Environmental Design, See Richard Bender (Dean of the CED), “The Coming Years: A Statement Presented to the College of Environmental Design,” (Berkeley: College of Environmental Design, 1976). Bender laments that the department has not kept up with the “social and political demands which are being emphatically voiced,” and states that many of the professional planning and design skills of the 1950s “are becoming obsolete.” Bender concluded that, “Environmental design is challenged by a series of major problems.”

Christopher Tunnard for instance, published in 1953 The City of Man which called for a renewed appreciation of art in city planning as it had been historically practiced and rejected contemporary planning and recalled Camillo Sitte’s The Art of Building Cities. In 1955, Tunnard published with Henry Hope Reed American Skyline in 1955, which praised classical and historical principles of planning and architecture over the contemporary modernist approach. Tunnard and Reed, American Skyline: The Growth and Form of our Cities and Towns (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955); Tunnard, The City of Man (New York: Scribner, 1953); Camillo Sitte, The Art of Building Cities: City Building According to its Artistic Fundamentals, Charles T. Stewart, trans. (New York, N.Y., Reinhold publishing corporation, 1945).


For an example of the Architecture Department’s desire to meet Affirmative Action goals above all others, see Faculty Appointment Review Committee, “Priorities and Recommendations for Faculty Appointments, 1973-74,” (February 21, 1973), Claude Stoller Collection, 1957-1996.


See Frederick Berry, Thomas Brooks & Eugene Commins, “A Report on the People's Park Incident,” (Berkeley, 1969), 5, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Temko was also cited in an editorial opposed to People’s Park as saying, “You are starting a new era in democratic city planning and more power to you.” “Views on Violence” Sun City News, 5 June 1969.


Ibid.

For a history of these purpose built playgrounds see Susan G. Solomon, American Playgrounds: Revitalizing Community Space (Hanover, Nh.: University of New England Press, 2005); Galen Cranz, “Changing Roles of Urban Parks: From Pleasure Garden to Open Space,” Landscape 22, no. 3 (Summer 1978).
130 Department of Landscape Architecture, Report to the Academic Senate (May 1969), in William L.C. Wheaton, Dean, College of Environmental Design, “Documents on People's Park: A Collection of Memos, Reports, etc. on People's Park, Berkeley, California, 1969,” Rare Collection, Environmental Design Library, College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley.


133 San Francisco Chronicle, July 14, 1969, 1, 7.


135 The Daily Californian, May 21, 1969.


140 See for example, Carolyn Jones, “UC Oaks May Face the Ax,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 21, 2006; “Battle over Trees at Cal Football Stadium is Heading to Court,” San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 18, 2007.


Figure 6.1: Teargas is sprayed on Sproul Plaza, May 1969. Source: AP Photo, Bettmann Collection, Corbis Images.
Figure 6.2: The Vietnam War and political campaigns against the military-industrial complex were an integral part of 1960s student protests; but so too were issues of planning and architecture that played out in distinctly spatial frameworks. Source: Theresa Loewenberg photographer, July 4, 1969, The Bancroft Library Archives, University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 6.3: Clark Kerr on the cover of Time Magazine. Source: Time Magazine, Oct. 16, 1960.
Figure 6.4: This 1978 drawing from the Campus Planning Study Group nicely highlights the campus expansion plans of the 1950s. The People's Park site is show as the center grouping of new towers, closest to the campus. Source: Richard Bender, et al., Campus Planning Study Group, “Urban Design Studies for the Berkeley Campus,” (Berkeley, 1978).
Figure 6.5: 1956 Long Range Development Plan, The People’s Park site is the grouping of residential blocks on the right side, off of campus, the center of the three blocks, and the one closest to campus. Committee on Campus Planning, University of California, “Long Range Development Plan For the Berkeley Campus,” (Berkeley, 1956).
Figure 6.6: The 1962 Long Range Development Plan continued the University’s plan of expansion into the south campus area. Committee on Campus Planning, University of California, “Long Range Development Plan For the Berkeley Campus,” (Berkeley, 1962).
Figure 6.7: The Warnecke and Warnecke towers as built and portrayed by Sim van der Ryn’s 1967 report on dormitory living. Source: Sim van der Ryn and Murray Silverstein, *Dorms at Berkeley: An Environmental Analysis*, (Berkeley: University of California Center for Planning, 1967).
Figure 6.8: This page from Blight in Berkeley Report. This page demonstrates how the determination of "blight" was largely based on a visual analysis of adapted single-family housing. Source: Urban Renewal Staff Committee, Berkeley Planning Department, “City Building Deficiencies Survey,” (Berkeley: Berkeley Planning Department, 1960).
Figure 6.9: Berkeley Planning Department’s analysis of blight in Berkeley. The darkest reddest area are equivalent to the department’s analysis of the most blighted areas. The flats are the darkest red areas to the far left near the green marina area; the People’s Park site is a pink square across from the green of the campus, nearly directly below the “58.” Source: Urban Renewal Staff Committee, Berkeley Planning Department, “The Problem of Blight in Berkeley,” (Berkeley: Berkeley Planning Department, January 15, 1958).
Figure 6.10: The transformation of older residences to apartments for youths was an important part of the determination of blight. Source: Urban Renewal Staff Committee, Berkeley Planning Department, “City Building Deficiencies Survey,” (Berkeley: Berkeley Planning Department, 1960).
Figure 6.11: This image in the *Daily Californian* in 1965 showed the large reach of the designated south campus urban renewal district, and wondered about the shopping potentials of renewal. Source: *The Daily Californian*; City of Berkeley, Urban Renewal Agency, “Urban Renewal Plan for the South Campus Project (Berkeley: City of Berkeley, December 1965).
Figure 6.12: One of the Telegraph Avenue schemes published in *The Daily Californian* in 1966, probably the DeMars plan, and much like what was eventually carried out. Source: *The Daily Californian*
Figure 6.13: This image from *The Daily Californian* in 1961 shows the destruction of housing to make way for the residential halls that were actually built, as in Figure 6-7. Source: *The Daily Californian.*
Figure 6.14: The empty People's Park site. Source: Alan Copeland, ed., *People’s Park Berkeley* (New York: Ballantine, 1969).  

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Figure 6.15: Working on clearing the site. Source: Alan Copeland, ed., *People’s Park Berkeley* (New York: Ballantine, 1969).
Figure 6.16: This hand drawn leaflet showed the park in early May during its creation. Source: Richard York contributor, Graduate Theological Union, University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 6.17: This photograph from the San Francisco Chronicle showed an Alameda County Officer taking direct aim at a fleeing protestor. Source: *San Francisco Chronicle* May 1969, in Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, “People’s Park Clippings Files, 1969,” University of California Archives.
Figures 6.18, 6.19: National Guard protect the People’s Park site. At top, Maybeck’s Christ Church is in the background. Source: Berkeley Public Library.
Figure 6.20: Violence extends down Telegraph Avenue during the May riots. Source: Ed Krishner photographer, available at http://www.peoplespark.org/69gall4.html.
Figure 6.21: Berkeley students attempt to attend classes in May, 1969. Source: AP Photo, In The Pacifica Radio/UC Berkeley Social Activism Sound Recording Project: Anti-Vietnam War Protests in the San Francisco Bay Area & Beyond Collection, University of California Media Resources Center.
ECOLOGY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

TEACH IN

The battle for a people’s park in Berkeley has raised questions that go far beyond the immediate objects of public attention. They are questions about the very survival of a city and about the propriety and legitimacy of the sea to which we put our land. The question raised by this basic conflict has us asking us all: the world of power, politics and the institutional shape of American society on the one hand, and world of ecology, conservation and the biological shape of our environment on the other.

The people’s task is a project of which our masters may see itself. A project which destroys violence in order to liberate it does no service in building human values just so that people may enjoy them. It is not at all tragic that efforts of the sort serve chuckery. It is only when we can serve the people. It is the use of the earth. Our cities are essential centers, our lands are all future resorts; our wildlife are commercial resources.

Our cities are increasingly unlivable. The streets are nothing to any form of human existence. Our new centers to no represent native’s forest in tomorrow’s America. Our plans are financial centers; our lives in our past resorts; our wildlife are commercial resources.

The history of America is a history of hostility and conquest. We have chased ourselves socially and politically in conquest and transfer-encourage, in order to “progress” to salvation, human and environmental, in bosom of men, beard-foot of lumber.

Ecology and Politics are on important partners in social issues. We have called a teach-in for Wednesday, May 28, to focus attention on those areas of concern. Join us in lower Sproul Plaza from 5-9. 00. We will have many speakers as well as music and exhibits from the ecology fair.

Sponsored by ART Locals 1574 and 1795

wEDNESDAY MAY 28

JOIN US

* Last minute additions include: Dennis Kuvier, U.C. Rene Trouve, and the Committee.

Figure 6.22: Leaflets from the Teach-in on People’s Park Issues. Source: “People’s Park-Berkeley-1969, Dissident material, general,” The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Figure 6.23: The Memorial Day parade remarkably restored a sense of peace to Berkeley. Source: Richard Friedman Photography, Oakland California, available at http://rchrd.com/photo.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion: The Decline of

Regional Modernism?

“Authentic regionalism . . . treats the irrerelevantly employed glass box and the tacky version of the Arabian Nights as . . . architectural enemies.”1
The Decline of Modernism

The profound changes in the architectural profession of the 1960s illustrated by the events at People’s Park brought an end to the dominance of the Modern Movement in architecture and planning. Reyner Banham declared that the modern movement ended in 1970, while Charles Jenks labeled the demolition of the modernist Pruitt-Igoe housing tower in 1972 as the date modernism died. As we have seen with Safeway, commercial architecture continued to experiment with modern architecture in the early 1960s, but by the end of the decade stores turned primarily to an architecture replete with regionalist motifs. Indeed the stories of both Safeway and of the young designers who participated in People’s Park reflect a renewed interest in historic and vernacular architecture, though in very different ways.

Reflecting this renewed interest in vernacular architecture, regionalism seemed to return to contemporary Bay Area architecture of the 1960s with the work of Joseph Esherick and Charles Moore. Most significantly, the vernacular and the regional were direct inspirations for Moore’s work with Donlyn Lyndon, William Turnbull, Richard Whitaker (MLTW), and the landscape architect Lawrence Halprin at Sea Ranch, California in 1965. Like Wurster’s earlier work from the 1930s, the MLTW firm was directly inspired by vernacular barns of the northern Californian coast, but sought to inject contemporary architectural ideas into a vernacular shell. Though, as David Gebhard points out, while regional modernists of the 1930s-1940s introduced modern ideas of free-flowing, largely horizontal spaces, architects of the 1960s were more inclined to vertical, spatial complexity.

Sea Ranch is often presented as a seminal moment in the shift away from International Style focused architecture toward a renewed inspiration for regionalism (fig. 7.1). Yet, set against the longer history of Bay Area regional modernism, Sea Ranch marked not a return of regionalism but its finality. The combination of traditional wood use, vernacular inspiration, and the spatial practices of contemporary architecture, all set harmoniously into a natural landscape was not a new turn of events for Bay Area architecture, but a continuation of regional modernism from the 1930s. This unique set of practices was not carried forward, however, in the Bay Area or elsewhere in the U.S. Sea Ranch did become a nationwide model for new suburban housing, becoming as Roger Montgomery has put it, “a national condominium vernacular.” Variations of the Sea Ranch wood-clad vertical box were found all across the nation. (Indeed the spatial interiors with strong vertical spaces continue to define the main social room of much of the new suburban design.) The replication of Sea Ranch’s Northern California regionalism wherever it might prove commercially viable recalls the generic use of regionalist motifs by commercial corporations such as Safeway.

Rather than continue to investigate how region, nature, and contemporary architecture might be intertwined, the 1980s saw the rise of postmodern architecture, which incorporated regional and historical themes, but often in absurdist characterizations of architectural elements that rarely extended past formal use. As Mary McLeod has written, “the postmodern use of regionalism rarely extended beyond surface image,” and the designs were “mere fabrications, without any real cultural roots.” A good example of the new architectural regionalism in the Bay Area, as Peter Booth Wiley points out, was provided by Ace Architects Darrell Place house
which purposely recalled the Bay Region style by borrowing, exaggerating, and combing various elements from the Bay Area’s architectural history (fig. 7.2).7

Meanwhile, the unique combination of regionalism and modernism in architecture would largely fade from public consciousness by the 1950s. Most prominently, the regional modernist tradition in architecture was left out of the history books as the many various strands of modern architecture was reduced to one narrative: that of International Modernism. The standard bearer of the Modern Movement, Sigfried Giedion, would create an idealized, progressive history of modernism in his Space, Time & Architecture (1941) and later Mechanization Takes Command (1948). Giedion and the subsequent work by Nikolaus Pevsner presented the story of modern architecture most commonly understood today: that of a universalizing architectural standard form that grew from European precedents but found its greatest success in the United States, where it represented the most progressive international architecture. Progress, however, was defined by forward technological and economic progress, not social politics.

For most Americans, along with public housing towers such as the Pruitt-Igoe, the dominant visual image of modern architecture became the pure International Styled buildings downtown, best represented in the Bay Area by Crown-Zellerbach building (1959) in downtown San Francisco (fig. 7.3). The focus on corporate office buildings and a few Miesian high-rise housing towers reaffirmed the narrative of architectural modernism defined by Giedion and Pevsner. When the story of the Bay Area’s regional modernism was finally mentioned by architectural historians, it was defined as a unique, limited example set in opposition to this image of the International Style.8 This duality only reinforced a monolithic understanding of the modern movement in architecture, obscuring the more complex history of the great many paths taken by architecture in the mid-twentieth century.

Critical Regionalism

Thus, the two scholars who would issue calls for regionalism in the 1980s oddly began the same decade with histories of modern architecture that completely ignored the history of regional modernism in architecture. Kenneth Frampton in his 1980 Modern Architecture: A Critical History failed to include any recognition of regional modernism, while William Curtis’s Modern Architecture Since 1900 mentioned Bernard Maybeck and William Wurster only in passing.9 Yet, both Frampton and Curtis would issue significant calls for regionalism in contemporary architecture in the 1980s and 1990s. Only a few decades after its peak, these scholars seemed to have forgotten regional modernism had existed at all.

In part a reaction to the perceived placelessness of international style modernism, Critical Regionalism evolved from the increasing role of French and German philosophy in the architectural discourse of the 1970s. In particular, Critical Regionalism recalled the influence of Martin Heidegger and his essay, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” which issued a renewed call for the influence of place on human existence.10 First coined by Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis, the term Critical Regionalism referred to a regionalism that was inspired by local ecologies and historical particularities, but also more self-reflective and engaged in a more critical understanding of those histories. Kenneth Frampton popularized the idea with an article in 1983, “Toward a Critical Regionalism.” For Frampton, the universalizing effects of modern
technology, globalization, and a uniform culture had resulted in the end of local culture at the hands of a universal, banal civilization. Critical Regionalism also sought to be inspired by local vernaculars, but the movement was concerned with avoiding any scenographic elements and instead sought to craft an architecture of “resistance” to the increasing dominance of global capitalism. Critical Regionalism, Frampton argued, would be “opposed to the sentimental simulation of local vernacular,” and it would accomplish this by inserting “reinterpreted vernacular elements as disjunctive episodes within the whole.”

Despite Frampton offering a so-called six points of Critical Regionalism, it remained hard to define as a new model of architecture. Moreover, Frampton’s ideas about inserting vernacular architectural elements as “disjunctive episodes,” in resistance to global capitalism proved insufficient. As architecture, Critical Regionalism remained firmly embedded and supportive of capitalism at the global, national, and local scale. No wonder then, that it was followed by other renewed calls for regionalism, such as those by Curtis, who issued a call in the 1990s for an “authentic regionalism,” which would reject both the “irrelevantly employed glass box and the tacky version of the Arabian Nights” as “architectural enemies.”

Unacknowledged by Frampton and Curtis, their search for a critical or an authentic regionalism merely continued the debate set forth at the 1948 Museum of Modern Art symposium, where Mumford and the various pioneers of the Modern Movement in architecture had argued whether the Bay Area regional modernism could be a true reflection of regional place and society, or was it merely a shallow recollection. That Frampton and Curtis did not reach back to these debates underscores the general absence of regional modernism in historical study. Indeed the first survey of American modern architecture to discuss regional modernism seriously, Gwendolyn Wright’s USA-Modern Architectures, was not published until 2008.

By that time, modernism had returned to the global stage and the American architectural scene. In many cases this modernism echoed the search for regional and natural connections that mid-century regional modernism had presented nearly a half century before. Much of this search centered on the attempt to “green” modern architectural form. Whether in the era of regional modernism, Critical Regionalism, or green sustainability, however, architecture was enmeshed in a complex web of new technologies and a modernizing political economy. Like regional modernism then, Green architecture must also be understood in the broader context of modernity in urban planning, regional urban development, and environmental planning. Before briefly considering the new era of green architecture’s promise to reconcile the built environment with nature, we must therefore consider the failure of regional modernists to carry forward the vision laid out by Telesis, T. J. Kent, Catherine Bauer, and others to reform this modernizing political economy through a regional planning vision for the Bay Area. The failure of regional modernism in planning and land use has had important implications for contemporary green architecture’s attempt to save the environment, one green building at a time.

The Failure of Regional Planning

In the 1940s Telesis had foreseen the environmental and social problems that the regional spread of urban development would bring, and issued calls for a regional planning government to manage growth and preserve urban open space. From the 1940s to the 1960s, Catherine Bauer
had consistently argued for the need for some sort of regional governance and regional citizenship to handle the issues of the postwar urban region. Telesis members T. J. Kent, Mel Scott, as well as associates like Dorothy Erksine spent much of the 1950s and 1960s fighting with other environmental advocates to get a regional environmental planning agency for the Bay Area. This regional agency was to have been an environmental supra-agency for the Bay Area, controlling urban growth into dense patterns, preserving open space, saving the Bay from development and pollution, and ensuring the strong regional transportation infrastructure needed for more sustainable regional land use.

In California, the legislative leader in the regional planning fight was John T. Knox, whose district included much of the Bay Area’s eastern populace. Elected in 1960, Knox was instrumental in passing the California Environmental Quality Act, the state’s version of the National Environmental Planning Act. Knox would spend the better part of a decade submitting a series of bills, collectively known as the “Knox bills,” that sought to pass regional planning for the Bay Area. Knox, in fact, came at times within one vote of getting such an agency approved. Regional planning, however, faced difficult questions such as how the agency would be funded; how its membership would be determined through election or appointment; and exactly what scope of powers the agency would have. A Bay Area regional agency was also opposed by Southern California legislators who feared regional planning in the Bay Area would lead to regional planning in Southern California.

Yet, the most substantial force opposing regional planning was California’s uniquely strong home rule tradition. Home rule was a progressive era tradition that invested land use power at the city or county level, and those local governments fiercely defended that power from any outside influence. Home rule had a powerful underlying philosophy that governance was best enacted at the smallest level possible, a philosophy even supported to some extent by regionalists such as T. J. Kent. In essence, however, it was about governmental power, as many cities and counties of the Bay Area region simply refused to give up any land use decisions to a regional agency. Moreover, home rule’s ideological defense of local control over land use—the image of the small town defending its right to control its own land-use decisions—was in many respects a mirage. Suburban growth in the postwar era was driven primarily by the creation and incorporation of new towns within counties. The county then, became the primary unit controlling urban regional growth, and much of suburbanization occurred when counties took over unincorporated land to create new cities within their jurisdiction. In the 1950s alone, for instance, over one hundred new cities sprang up in the Bay Area and Los Angeles area.

Despite Knox’s efforts, and the later occasional efforts by others, regional planning remained a failed dream for Bay Area environmentalists. Instead, a minimum of regional planning was achieved for issues such as water pollution and to a limited extent, transportation, through single-use agencies, in what some have called “vertical planning.” Vertical planning provided the basic planning needed to sustain urban growth, but little of the planning framework to build a more sustainable urban region. Indeed, vertical planning only increased fragmentation in the planning system, by entrusting issues that might share common problems and solutions with different governmental bodies. Moreover, vertical planning was entrusted to specialists on the issue and did little to promote a sense of regional identity for the average Bay Area citizen. In
the end, while most Californians lived in urban regions, governmental jurisdiction did not match the increasing reality of a regional urban system.18

In the end, three significant exceptions stand out as legacies of the fight for regional planning. The first is the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). BCDC emerged from the 1960s fight to save the San Francisco Bay from development and pollution. Faced with extensive plans to develop the Bay with more bridges and highways, and to fill large swaths of the Bay to develop more housing and office parks, the Save the Bay movement emerged, led by three Berkeley women: Kay Kerr, Sylvia McLaughlin, and Esther Gulick.19 Telesis members such as T. J. Kent and Dorothy Erskine again played important connective roles, and Telesis member Mel Scott wrote the book many considered indispensable in promoting the movement, Saving San Francisco Bay. Scott’s book presented the threats to the Bay in dramatic terms and strongly argued for the Bay’s role in regional identity and physical beauty. Scott also highlighted that the only way to save the Bay from development and pollution was through regional planning—because so many different jurisdictions controlled separate parts of the Bay, only a strong regional organization with power over local jurisdictions could adequately prevent growth and pollution. As the Save the Bay movement reached a critical mass, Bay Area legislators passed through the California State legislature a 1965 bill to create a regional planning agency centered on the Bay itself. At first a temporary agency embodied only with powers to study the issues of Bay development, the Save the Bay movement pushed through legislation in 1969 to make the BCDC permanent (fig. 7.4). The 1969 legislation also granted the new agency enormous power: the right to approve or disapprove all land use permits that touched the San Francisco Bay.

The second important, though vastly less-successful, exception to the failure for regional planning was the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). ABAG was founded by the Bay Area Council, largely to divert the then significant push for true regional planning into a less powerful agency. Composed of members appointed by city and county governments and thus, serving under their control, ABAG was largely an advisory agency with little real power. Through a number of the Knox bills, a push in the 1960s was made to make ABAG part of a true regional planning agency combining all the various regional agencies into one supra-regional government. Other legislation sought to strengthen ABAG into an agency with significant powers to regulate the development of open space across the region. The agency would therefore be a sort of greenbelt-focused version of the BCDC agency. In 1970, ABAG was able to develop a significant plan to promote greenbelt planning in its “Regional Plan for the San Francisco Bay Region, 1970 - 1990,” the first real plan in the U.S. to establish a substantial vision for a regional urban greenbelt.20 Because ABAG, however, never evolved into an agency with significant land use powers, its “1970-1990” vision remained, in large part, on paper.

The third exception is the Bay Area Regional Rapid Transportation (BART) rail network which emerged as early as 1948 (fig. 7.5). Over the next twenty years, the BART plans would have a long and difficult gestation, and even today the system is frequently derided by historians as much as by its current riders. Robert Self, for instance, condemns BART as another urban renewal project akin to federal highways in its displacement of a poor minority neighborhood in West Oakland.21 Certainly this is an important point, but Self overlooks BART’s later role as one of the most important transportation networks for minorities and the working class citizens and
well as its longer environmental history. While urban historians have consistently presented the field of urban planning in the 1950s as obsessed with the building of highways, they have left overlooked a series of plans for non-automobile, regional transportation, beginning as early as 1946 with San Francisco City Planning Department proposals for a modern rail transport system (fig. 7.6). In many instances, regional rail and regional freeway transportation were planned side by side (fig. 7.7).

The partially realized result of this planning and advocacy was the BART Commission of 1951 that evolved to develop a master rail transportation plan for the Bay Area region and is perhaps the first non-automobile vision for regional transportation in the United States in the postwar era (fig. 7.8). From the start in 1951, the BART Commission cited the need to preserve the historic growth pattern oriented around regional and sub-regional centers. BART was, in a sense, a renewed first step toward regional awareness and reduced reliance on the automobile. As B. R. Stokes noted, it was a commitment to a regional “way of life in which an attractive alternative transportation system to the automobile will exist; and in which the urban environment will be geared to creating greater harmony between man and nature.” At the same time, the BART Commission saw itself as part of the broader regional planning agenda, with the powers to carry out a general regional land-use plan.

The incomplete realization of BART was part of the larger failure for regional planning in the Bay Area, and indeed, regionalism generally. That failure had profound effects for the Bay Area, and since that failure was shared across that nation, the inability to channel urban growth through regional planning meant that the postwar era brought a well-known dramatic expansion of American cities horizontally across the landscape. Moreover, while prescient regionalists such as Catherine Bauer had worried greatly about the increased segregation of American cities by race and class, a host of federal policies and legal decisions encouraged a structural racial imbalance in American urbanism that persists today.

**New Regionalism?**

Attempts to solve this unsustainable land pattern came from architecture and planning quarters in the 1990s, primarily through calls for smart growth and New Urbanism. Bay Area environmentalist planner Peter Calthorpe proposed a return to regionalism as part of a larger New Urbanist inspired agenda. His idea of the “transportation oriented development (TOD),” seeks a return to railroad-era suburban subdivisions that built compact communities around transportation hubs. Yet, Calthorpe’s “New Regionalism” stands out for its lack of historical acknowledgement of mid-century regional planning. Without regional planning, moreover, the idea of the TOD remains a suburban vision, and Calthorpe’s New Regionalism, like much of New Urbanism generally, only provides more promotional materials for suburban development. Indeed, despite the great publicity in the 1990s for New Regionalism, New Urbanism, and smart growth, the spread of urban sprawl, the use of automobiles, and the use of less efficient automobiles, all increased.

Without a regional environmental planning mechanism, earlier advocates of open space protection such as T. J. Kent and Dorothy Erskine turned to localized campaigns through organizations such as People for Open Space to stop urban growth. The sections of that greenbelt
vision that did emerge grew from these localized, piecemeal efforts of open-space activists, accomplished largely through the legal mechanism of the land trust. This story, as documented by geographer Richard Walker and a handful of the participants in the political battles, is an impressive legacy of open space preservation. In some respects, then, the failure to create a regional planning agency had the positive effect of helping to spawn a grassroots movement that engaged Bay Area citizens more directly in the fight to improve their own urban nature. In the end, the failure to realize a top-down regional planning mechanism in the vision of Telesis, must be compared to this grassroots legacy that might never have arisen, or at least arisen as passionately, if planners had been able to “plan” the regional open space movement. Still, because the grassroots open space movement remained focused only on local, heavily litigious battles, it could never achieve the comprehensive greenbelt vision Telesis offered the city in 1940, nor could it ever properly direct regional urban growth into compact urban pattern. Thus, in spite of an impressive history of preserving open space, the Bay Area has, at-best, a fractured and incomplete legacy as a sustainable urban region.

The Bay Area’s new fashion for green architecture continues to promote the Bay Area’s apparent environmental credentials. Residents and political leaders of the Bay Area remain smug about the region’s progressive environmental record, but that smugness is largely undeserved and based on the “baubles and trinkets” of green design rather than the real structural changes necessary in land-use policy at the regional level. As an example of these contradictions, a closer analysis of two green buildings built in the first decade of the new century demonstrates how larger structural issues can limit the ability of architecture—whether in the age of regional modernism or in green architecture—to promote a more sustainable relationship with nature.

San Francisco’s Academy of Sciences and New Federal Building

A contemporary building that combines ideas of regionalism, nature, and modernism is the new California Academy of Sciences building opened in San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park in September of 2008 (fig. 7.9). Designed by Renzo Piano, and in essence a set of stone and clear glass boxes with steel columns inserted into a natural landscape, the building brought contemporary architecture into a picturesque park previously dominated by beaux-arts museum pieces. The building also provides an excellent example of what we might call “neo-regional” modernism, for Piano’s design summarizes attempts to unify thinking about regionalism, nature, and modern architecture.

While the regional modernists of the mid-century had been primarily native architects who united modernist forms with local materials, the California Academy is different. Piano is, of course, a world famous Italian architect, and like other contemporary “star-architects,” travels the planet for numerous projects, rather than remaining rooted in one place (fig. 7.10). No local redwood or other local materials were used, nor does any element obviously call out to the region’s unique architectural history. The Academy does, however, offer, in part, a regionalist approach to modernist architecture.

Piano spent a large amount of time, weeks of time over many months, at the site. He often sat directly across from the site for long periods of time in study. It was on one of those contemplating visits that Piano looked at the hills in the background and was inspired to design.
the green, undulating building roof that would recall the local landscape. The earthen roof then, clothed in native vegetation is itself a regional expression. Piano’s building also demonstrated an intense understanding and use of local climatic conditions through open ventilation and natural lighting to cool and illuminate the building. In many ways, therefore, Piano thought about regional climatic conditions on a much deeper level than the mid-century modernists did.

As the world’s largest building to receive a platinum LEED rating, and one of the U.S.’s best examples of “green architecture,” the Academy promises a more sustainable relationship with nature. The natural roof not only integrates the building into its park setting, but the roof’s natural vegetation absorbs heavy winter rains to reduce pollution causing run-off and provides energy-reducing insulation. Moreover, Piano reminds us that some of the most important, challenging, and unfortunately forgotten, tasks for the architect are to carve out space in buildings for the flow of natural light and air. Thus, almost encased in natural earth, light wells and ventilation channels penetrate the building to deliver ambient light and natural ventilation, greatly reducing energy costs while providing a more natural work environment (fig. 7.11). The building also relies greatly on recycled materials, such as used blue jeans for insulation, recycled steel beams, and numerous other green attributes such as solar panels and radiant floor heating. Additionally, in a gesture both to recycling and toward recalling the local history of the building, Piano left one solid original wall from the prior museum version in the building’s front facade.

Despite all these gestures toward sustainability, the Academy of Sciences is still situated within a larger urban structure that makes its ecological vision difficult to realize. A comparison of the Academy to the nearby Conservatory of Flowers generates some important, subtle criticisms of the Academy and the new wave of green architecture. Designed for wealthy land owner James Lick in 1876, the San Francisco Conservatory was donated to the park after Lick’s death and completed in 1878. Inspired by London’s Kew Gardens by Decimus Burton in 1848, Victorian conservatories were a popular phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century United States, especially in cities of the West. San Francisco’s Conservatory of Flowers was one of the earliest such garden houses, and probably the first design of the noted firm Lord & Burnham, which later designed many of the most well-known American conservatories, including the New York Botanical Gardens and the United States Botanic Gardens in Washington, D.C.

What can the latest in green architecture have in common with one of the oldest wooden conservatories in the United States? Both buildings collect, study, house, and offer for public view a catalog of natural items: the conservatory collects plants, and the Academy features biodiversity with marine and reptile life, and plant ecologies. In each case, nature is reduced to a museum set piece. In many ways, the two buildings therefore represent disturbing visions of our future relationship with nature. Just as Neil Smith and William Cronon have warned of our alienated relationship with the nature of wilderness, the Academy and the Conservatory present visions in which humans only interact with natural species as if they were museum pieces, rather than wild plants and animals. The exhibits must therefore be set against the rapid extinction rates caused by human activity for many species, which may ensure that our future experiences of much of nature will only be in such controlled, museum settings. Both the Conservatory and the Academy are also modernist icons of their day that represent the idolization of technology in architecture and society. Conservatories were the first...
buildings to demonstrate the possibilities of new glass materials and the structural possibilities of iron beams. These experiments reached their peak with the Crystal Palace, which in many ways became an early icon of modern architecture.38 Likewise, the Academy of Sciences highlights the latest in modern materials and architectural techniques, and our increasing reliance on technological contrivances.39

Finally, both the Academy and the Conservatory present architecture and technology as a solution to society’s complicated problems. The new spatial possibilities of glass and iron (and in turn steel) highlighted by the conservatories became the basis of the new modern architecture of the early twentieth century, and in turn, modernism’s claim that architecture could solve important social problems. The technology highlighted by green architecture of the early twentieth-first century also presents itself as a solution to the profound environmental issues facing society. It is true that drastic changes in how Americans design buildings is a part of a more sustainable future. Architecture alone, however, no matter what the technology, cannot solve these problems. In can be part of the solution, but only more far-reaching changes in the structure of American society will led to a more sustainable pattern of human living. By fetishizing technological solutions, green architecture allows American citizens to avoid the more important necessary lifestyle changes necessary at home, in the workplace, and in transportation.

Another recent San Francisco building also exemplifies the contradictory relationship to nature that green architecture represents. Morphosis, a firm led by Thom Mayne, designed the Federal Building in mid-downtown San Francisco as a building that, like Piano’s Academy of Sciences, laudably reduces its energy footprint (fig. 7.14). The new Federal building is actually remarkable for being the first postwar office building of such a scale to do without automatic air conditioning, relying on instead a second skin that is adapted to local climatic conditions and ensures adequate air flow through the building and a regular temperature.40

Both the Academy and the Federal building are also perfect examples of a trend toward large office buildings and skyscrapers that proclaim their greenness in architecture, which David Gissen labels “Big and Green.”41 Despite the claims of Thom Mayne that his Federal Building rethinks the American office environment, these big and green skyscrapers represent business as usual in their approach to American society. Ultimately what is the impact of a small percentage reduction in energy on a single building when it is not accompanied by structural changes in American land use policies? The most obvious effect, for example, of the new Academy was the tremendous increase in automobile traffic into that area of the city and into the park itself. The building’s opening also brought increased stress on pedestrian and cyclist users of the park, ultimately bringing social conflict between park users who wanted weekend days closed to automobiles, and museum users who sought free parking close to the museum.42

Likewise the Federal Building requires thousands of workers, most of whom travel by automobile, to travel into central San Francisco and assemble in a mammoth building. Leah Shahum, director of the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, has lamented that neither the Academy or the Federal Building building thought about providing bicycle parking to encourage alternative, nonpolluting transportation.43 Moreover, as Christopher Hawthorne, the architectural critic for the Los Angeles Times, points out, the Federal Building contains much wasted energy in Mayne’s excessive use of steel beams to construct unnecessary, but dramatic, architectural feats, such as the soaring and folding roofline.44 Thus, both the Academy and the Federal Building
represent substantial investments of funds to create an architectural showpiece, while the investments to improve urban public transportation systems, which would have made the buildings and the region substantially greener, have been left by the wayside. In other words, neither building’s design process included consideration of its relationship to the regional urban fabric and the transportation systems that brought workers or visitors to its green architecture.

Likewise, despite some notable and important exceptions, green architecture continues the problematic relationship between environmentalism and racial justice. Dell Upton has appropriately criticized green architecture for failing to address real issues of social diversity and environmental justice.45 As Upton points out, most new green communities, like most New Urbanist communities, more resemble upper class suburbs and resorts than ecological utopias. In the urban realm, the isolated examples of green domestic design remain a luxury good for a small wealthy, and largely white, elite.46

In this sense, green architecture again recalls the vision of nature presented by the architecture of regional modernism. The architecture of this vision promised a more integrated living pattern with nature by recalling the natural qualities of the region, by integrating the architecture into natural landscape, and by opening up the interiors to the outdoors to enable residents to more completely enjoy outdoor living. The regional modernist vision of architecture, however, was based in a certain class ideology of increased wealth and leisure time. In the postwar era, the dreams of urban advocates such as Catherine Bauer for sharing such a prosperity across class and racial lines quickly faded. Finely clad redwood architecture and integrated indoor-outdoor living remained the province of an elite, white class, just as green architecture largely does today. Green architecture therefore, like regionalism before it, must be understood in a broader context of modernity in urban planning, environmental planning, landscape architecture, and corporate architecture and development. To properly analyze green architecture, we must similarly understand how it connects to larger land use patterns, the lifestyles of its inhabitants, and to the larger spatial flows within the region, across the nation, and throughout the globe.

The Regional Scale of Urbanism

In a recent talk at MIT, David Harvey attempted to redefine what we mean by the “right to the city,” which is usually defined as the access of citizens to the public spaces of the city. As Harvey points out, however, cities are constantly being remade by society, and in turn, shaping human existence. More often than not, this urban change just happens, and citizens rarely feel they have a role in that change. The right to the city, then, is not just about access, but about the right to guide and shape what the city will be like. In a sense, all utopias are like this, an attempt by humans to express a desire to take control of their own evolutionary path. Telesis, for instance, embodied this idea: seizing control over the evolutionary path of urban development. As they stated in their 1940 Space for Living Exhibition, urban development and growth was already happening, so “why not plan a little?” in order to guide that growth.

As Telesis and the other figures featured in this dissertation realized, however, the shape of the city in the twentieth century was changing to one profoundly regional. In the decades around WWII, the “instant city” of San Francisco rapidly evolved into an “instant city region.”47
Jobs and population were spread across a more complex and variously centered urban region (fig. 7.15). Although regional modernists such as Telesis and Catherine Bauer argued for a regional urban vision that could sustain regional identity and citizenship, the rapid emergence of the regional city brought a great increase in driving habits, but little increase in a sense of regional urban citizenship (fig. 7.16). Regional identity, however, plays an important role in identifying regional issues and presenting necessary regional solutions.

The definition of a region is obviously fuzzy, and where an urban region ends is never an exactly definable task. That does not mean however, that the scale of the urban region is not one constantly being negotiated, contested, enacted, and existing. The urban scale of the region is therefore an important one for historical analysis as well as for contemporary political action on environmental and social concerns. To answer Harvey’s call for a right to the city, in which citizens had a role in the shaping of their own urban environment, we must think about the various scales of urban living, including the regional scale.

By the twenty-first century city, the increasing urbanization of the American and world populations had grouped the great majority of into urban megaregions (fig. 7.17). If the new century is to become more sustainable, cities will play the leading role in that movement and thinking on the regional scale can play a central role in that evolution of a more sustainable urban life. Architecture that is more sensitive to regional climatic conditions will help develop (again) building traditions that will use less energy and produce less waste. In this sense, the architecture of regional modernism still offers a positive example of small scale housing, sensitive to regional climate, and ingrained with its natural setting. The regional planning vision of Telesis and Catherine Bauer is also still a necessity to balance regional urban growth and direct it to compact urban form that promote less automobile transportation and preserve urban open space. The lesson of Safeway emphasizes that, whatever the architecture, food supply on a regional level can help overcome the drastically negative environmental effects of factory food production and global food trade. Finally, as shown at People’s Park, political activism and community participation in design and planning—as well as the engagement of the planning and architecture professions in such activism and community planning—provides an inspirational lesson for contemporary planners, architects, landscape architects, and activists.
Chapter Seven: Notes


5 Gebhard, “Introduction,” in Woodbridge, Bay Area Houses, 22.


8 See for example, Pierluigi Serraino, NorCalMod: Icons of Northern California Modernism (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2006).

9 David Gebhard, “Forward,” in Woodbridge, Bay Area Houses, x.


14 Gwendolyn Wright, USA: Modern Architectures in History (London: Reaktion Books, 2008), 239-240. And Wright’s treatment is barely two pages.


18 Elisa Barbour, Metropolitan Growth Planning in California, 1900–2000, 3.


The failure to extend BART to Marin County, for instance, was in part a fear of the racial change BART could bring to the area, and today’s lack of minority populations in Marin can be attributed in part to the lack of BART transportation. April Harris made this comment in the question and answer session after presenting her paper, “Uniqueness of Marin City 1942-1945: A ‘Successful’ Social Experiment in Race Relations During WWII,” at The Society for American City and Regional Planning History, The Thirteenth National Conference on Planning History Oakland, California (October 15-18, 2009).


The quote is from Leah Shahum, Comments at “The Post-Carbon City: Planning for Abundance In An Era Of Dwindling Resources,” at San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Symposium, (August 11, 2009).


That is, if we ignore the extrapolation that recycled blue jeans recall San Francisco's history in the creation of the modern blue jean industry through its native corporation Levi’s.


The most important counterpoint here is that the Academy uses its exhibitions to warn of the dangers of alarming plant and animal extinction rates, as well as the threat global warming poses for increasing such extinction rates. To some extent, the modern collections of the conservatory also incorporate such warnings in their exhibits. Despite these warnings, because both museums have little impact in changing American lifestyles overall, the overall point remains: both present an example of our future relationship with nature defined largely in museum settings.

While the design of the Conservatory, for instance, allowed the building to adapt to changes in climatic conditions by controlling airflow through various glass panels that could be opened and closed by a manual hand-crank, the Academy relies on computers to control the operation of shades and panels as they need to be opened or closed to maintain a constant temperature. The new Academy therefore requires intensive computer usage to, contradictorily, save energy. While early modernist works idolized the machine through the demonstration of high-tech structural elements and the new spatial volumes they enabled, works of neo-modernism rely as much on mechanical gadgetry as on structure. From nineteenth-century Victorian architecture to twentieth-first century green design, then, we can see an increasing idolization of technology in architecture.

Thom Mayne of Morphosis and his client the federal government’s General Services Administration realized that San Francisco’s climate, which has a delta of only twenty degrees, provided a perfect opportunity to attempt a naturally-ventilated office building. See Nicolai Ouroussoff, “More Openness in Government (Offices, That is),” *New York Times* (March 14, 2007), B1; Charlotte Cuthbertson, “Thom Mayne: Pushing Architecture’s Nature,” *The Epoch Times* (March 10, 2009); Joann Gonchar, “Morphosis and Arup Engineers Create Dynamic Form that Follows Function for The U.S. Federal Building In San Francisco,” *Architectural Record* (August 2007), 96-107. Despite, however, the idea of providing freedom to its office inhabitants over their own air flow, the Morphosis building relies on computers to program the opening and closing of a second skin around the building, to maintain proper temperature. Like the Academy, therefore, it requires intensive energy use to save energy.


See for example, Wyatt Buchanan, “At meeting, public is split on Saturday closure at Golden Gate Park,” *San Francisco Chronicle* (April 10, 2007); Rachel Gordon, “Study isn't last word on GG Park road closure,” *San Francisco Chronicle* (Feb. 16, 2007).


In the sphere of domestic architecture, green is simply a luxury item often over-glamorized with all sorts of other smart technology. A $1.5 million dollar “green” home from 2007 in San Francisco’s less expensive Glen Park neighborhood was recently profiled for its “wealth of features worthy of a James Bond movie,” including electronic gadgetry that tracks the sun to open and close shades, rain sensors to control motorized skylights, and an application to control temperature, lights, and shades from one’s iPhone. Tracey Taylor, “S.F. Home Makes Most of Steep Infill Lot,” San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 27, 2009. To be fair, the house does represent relatively dense urban infill in contrast to suburbanization. But at 1850 square feet for a two bedroom, one wonders how far that type of density will bring the Bay Area towards sustainable urban patterns.

The term instant city was applied to San Francisco by Gunter Barth in Instant cities: Urbanization and the Rise of San Francisco and Denver (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

Figure 7.1: The vision Sea Ranch offered promoted natural and regional living, and was often the source of commercial advertising or cloning for developments. Source: Windsor Publications for the University of California, “University of California Centennial Berkeley Campus,” (Beverly Hills, CA: Windsor Publications, 1968).
Figure 7.2: Darrell Place house by Ace Architects in 1986 combined generic elements of the Bay Region Style in an almost random seeming fashion. Source, Ace Architects.
Figure 7.3: Crown-Zellerbach, 1959. Source Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, LLP.
Figure 7.4: BCDC continues to work to fulfill its mission to protect the environment of the San Francisco Bay through regional planning. Most recently, BCDC research has shown the affect of global warming on the Bay shoreline—a sort of opposite mission from its original mission of protecting the Bay from infill development. Source: BCDC, “Living with a Rising Bay: Vulnerability and Adaptation in San Francisco Bay and on the Shoreline” (April 7, 2009).
Figure 7.5: An early Bart planning map from 1957. Source: Parsons Brinckerhoff/Tudor/Bechtel, “Engineering report to the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District,” (San Francisco: Parsons Brinckerhoff/Tudor/Bechtel, 1961).
Figure 7.6: San Francisco in the late 1940s and early 1950s proposed multiple plans to increase rail transit in the city, including this 1950 transit plan. Source: San Francisco Department of City Planning, “A Subway and Rapid Transit System for San Francisco: Report to Mayor” (San Francisco, 1950).
Figure 7.7: A San Francisco City Planning document of the Mission Freeway and BART transit stop shows regional rail transportation planned alongside regional freeways. Source: De Leuw, Cather and Company, and Ladislas Segoe and Associates, “Report to the City Planning Commission on a Transportation Plan for San Francisco, November 1948," (San Francisco: Department Of City Planning, 1950).
Figure 7.8: The original BART map exemplified its connection to nature by including the Bay Area’s open greenbelt, a gesture largely meaningless for BART transportation reasons. Source: Bay Area Rapid Transit District.
Figure 7.9: California Academy of Sciences, Renzo Piano, architect, 2008. Source: San Francisco Citizen.
Figure 7.10: Renzo Piano watches his roof open to allow natural light in. Photo by author, Renzo Piano, “The True Story of the Design of the New Academy,” Lecture given at the California Academy of Sciences,” (Sept 26, 2008).
Figure 7.11: California Academy of Sciences with the roof open to allow in fresh air, with green roof visible. Source: Photo by author, Renzo Piano, “The True Story of the Design of the New Academy,” Lecture given at the California Academy of Sciences,” (Sept 26, 2008).
Figure 7.14: San Francisco’s new green Federal Building. Thom Mayne, Morphosis Architects, 2007. Source: Morphosis Architects.
Figure 7.17: Seventy percent of all Americans live in one of seven large urban regions. Source: Regional Plan Association, “America 2050,” in Gabriel Metcalf and Egon Terplan, “The Northern California Megaregion,” The Urbanist (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research, Nov/Dec. 2007).
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