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Autocratic Accountability and the Arab-Israeli Dispute

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Albert Burton Wolf

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Chair
Professor Edwin Amenta
Professor Russell J. Dalton

2014
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CURRICULUM VITAE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 2: Authoritarian Institutions, the Arab Street, and the</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process: Do Non-Democratic Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constrain or Inform?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 3: Autocratic Accountability in Wartime: Popular Punishments</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for Defeats on the Battlefield in Non-Democracies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 4: Peacemaking and Political Survival in Sadat’s Egypt</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHAPTER 5: Conclusion</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WORKS CITED</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Authoritarian Political Constraints and the Likelihood of Cooperation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Overview of Hypotheses</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Hypotheses and Observable Implications</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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My family has been continuously supportive through the stressful process of writing a dissertation and completing graduate school. My mother, Frances, has always been a source of sage advice and love. My brother, Andrew, has listened to me talk about my work with his usual good humor. Unfortunately, my father, Burton, did not live to see me receive my Bachelor’s degree. I only hope that he would be proud of this dissertation.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Autocratic Accountability and the Arab-Israeli Dispute

By

Albert Burton Wolf

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Chair

How do mass publics affect authoritarian regimes’ foreign policy choices? Does the interaction between non-democratic regimes and their domestic challengers convey information to their international rivals? When do dictators face domestic political sanctions for battlefield defeats? Is the politics of peacemaking as perilous for autocrats as it is for democrats?

I suggest that autocrats’ foreign policy decisions are carried out in the shadow of popular punishments from the general public- what I refer to as “mass audiences.” Using the Arab-Israeli rivalry as an empirical backdrop, I examine three puzzles that have been repeatedly examined in democratic contexts. First, I examine how the interaction between the incumbent government and the opposition sends costly signals to rival states during peace processes (in this case, Israel). Second, I examine the relationship between peacemaking and political survival in autocracies, with special attention to Anwar Sadat’s hold onto power. Third, I examine how losses on the battlefield affect dictators’ ability to retain office.

I make three general findings. First, using evidence from the peace process with Jordan in the late 1940s and Egypt in the 1970s, I found that by repressing the nationalist
opposition, dictators reassure their external rivals, giving them strong incentives to reciprocate cooperative gestures. Dictators who coopt the nationalist opposition tend to extend their lease on political life but tie their hands in the process, making them beholden to hawkish constituencies and weaken their ability to cut a deal with a rival state.

Second, dictators who fight and lose a war are likely to suffer domestic political punishments from mass audiences. Major defeats, such as those suffered during the Israeli War for Independence and the Six Day War, weaken the dictatorship’s repressive apparatus, making it easier for the domestic opposition to punish an incumbent through mass protests. Third, peacemaking is “risky business” for dictators. Mass publics are likely to protest against leaders who offer concessions to the state’s longstanding rivals because mass publics fear the nation may be exploited by a longstanding rival.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

A recent issue of *The Economist* has a shirtless Vladimir Putin photo-shopped riding on top of a tank under the headline, “The New World Order.”\(^1\) The steady erosion of unipolarity after the United States’ failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq has policymakers and international relations scholars moving away the heady optimism that characterized the end of the Cold War. Instead of seeing mature liberal democracy as history’s endpoint, many are convinced that an authoritarian revival is underway. Dictatorships from North Korea to Iran and Russia populate the ranks of countries characterized as rogue states, while fears grow over China’s development of a blue water navy and its increasing financial leverage over the U.S.\(^2\)

A few years ago peer-reviewed journals were filled with articles on the democratic advantage in world politics. Today, instead of seeing democracies as “powerful pacifists”\(^3\) that make “selective, [but] effective threats”\(^4\) because of their transparency, there is a growing appreciation of the advantages autocracies possess because of their institutional constraints.

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Yet, despite the growing importance of autocracies in world politics, several puzzles remain. Building on literatures in comparative politics and international relations theory, this dissertation examines how the interaction between authoritarian regimes and the general public (or mass audiences) affect their foreign policies and individual dictators’ domestic political survival. Using the Arab-Israeli rivalry as the backdrop I examine two interrelated puzzles. First I examine why some non-democracies are able to ameliorate the security dilemma with their longstanding rivals while others remain locked in costly conflicts. Next, I examine how mass audiences are able to hold dictators accountable for their foreign policy choices in war and peace.

First, I provide an overview of the arguments and their implications for the literature. Second, I discuss the rationale behind the selection of the Arab-Israeli dispute as the empirical backdrop. Third, I outline the main assumptions. Fourth, I distinguish between distinct types of autocracies and explain why this project focuses on fully authoritarian regimes. I conclude by providing a roadmap for the manuscript.

**DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LITERATURE**

This dissertation makes a simple argument: autocrats’ foreign policy choices are made in the shadow of domestic political punishments meted out by their mass audiences. While International Relations (IR) scholars have gained a greater appreciation for the domestic political constraints dictators face, they have largely focused upon the threats autocrats face from elite veto players while either ignoring mass publics or treating them
like powerless lemmings incapable of posing a threat to the incumbent regime. Senior decision-makers operating in the upper echelons of dictatorships, whether it is the ruling party or the military, no doubt have the potential to pose a threat to autocrats’ hold onto office. However, mass publics may revolt and overthrow the entire regime. This revolutionary constraint affects dictatorships’ ability to signal their intentions to foreign states, and determines the severity of punishments for waging peace and losing wars.

*Domestic Signaling in Autocracies and the Reassurance of Enduring Rivals*

Dictators’ public interaction with their nationalist challengers may convey information about their intentions to the nation’s external enemies. The literature on two-level games suggests that hands’ tying provides states with a bargaining advantage; I find the opposite. Repressing the nationalist opposition sends a signal of reassurance by demonstrating that the incumbent regime is willing to pay the costs of suppression and open itself to the attack that it is unpatriotic. This demonstrates that moderates or doves are running the regime, ameliorating the security dilemma in the process. Sadat’s purges of Arab nationalists helped to convince the Israelis and other external actors that he was a moderate that could be worked with.

By coopting the opposition, dictators are able to extend the life of their regimes. However, in doing so they tie their hands, making it difficult to bargain effectively with an external rival by signaling that they are beholden to domestic hawks. Contrary to the

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logic of two-level games, this does not increase their leverage; instead, it raises the likelihood a longstanding rival will simply walk away from a peace process, as Ben-Gurion’s government did from King Abdullah I during the talks that occurred from the late 1940s and the early 1950s.

I have identified a unique domestic signaling technology available to dictators. Fearon draws a sharp distinction between sunk cost and tied hand signaling, suggesting that the only way for states to leverage their domestic political constraints at the bargaining table is through the generation of audience costs. However, audience costs are only expensive ex post. The signals discussed here provide information in much the same way audience costs do because they are costly ex ante. Unlike traditional sunk cost signals they do not involve behaviors such as military expenditures or troop movements.

*The Political Costs of Losing Wars*

Until the second Bush Administration invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003, many International Relations theorists felt that democracies’ advantages in world politics was a result of their domestic political accountability: because their selectorates were broad, casualty sensitive, and punished incompetence, democratic leaders had to pick their fights carefully. As a result, they would only pick wars they could win. Otherwise, they would strike bargains wherever possible. Because autocrats did not have such constraints, they could – and did – engage in reckless behavior that threatened international stability. The

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second Bush Administration’s failures, coupled with pointed critiques of the selection effects argument’s shortcomings, have shown that not only are democracies not as smart and tough as we once thought, but that at least some autocracies may be more prudent than they had been given credit for.⁸

As evidenced by the 1948 and June 1967 wars with Israel, I find that dictators are accountable to mass publics for fighting and losing wars. After these conflicts, mass audiences imposed political sanctions on dictators – up to and including removal from office – as a result of the humiliating defeats suffered on the battlefield. In autocracies, the average person (or median voter) has potent incentives to falsify her preferences about the political workings of the regime. Critics are unlikely to be left alone; instead, they are likely to lose their jobs, face harassment from the tax-man and the police, spend time in prison, or, even, be executed. Knowing this, life is much easier if individuals hide their disgust at the way the nation is governed. Preference falsification makes it difficult for the opposition to locate fellow travelers, leading them and the regime to underestimate the true level of opposition to the political status quo.⁹ The exogenous shock of a major military defeat lowers the costs of protest by damaging the repressive

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apparatus that helps the incumbent regime stay in power.¹⁰ A major defeat also causes the average person to reevaluate whether they would be better off under a different set of leaders. Battlefield defeats demonstrate the incompetence of the incumbent leadership when it comes to providing for the national defense. This gives the general public incentives to rally against the regime and enables the opposition to delegitimate the nominal leadership’s nationalist credentials and portray itself as the true champion of the nation.¹¹

The Political Costs of Peacemaking

In one of the seminal works outlining the logic of why “it takes a Nixon to go to China,” the example of Anwar Sadat is used briefly to illustrate the theory’s central argument: hawks have superior credibility selling dovish policies than dovish parties do.¹² Doves who sell policies of cooperation may be moderates capable of punishing defections from the other side, or they might be extreme soft-liners incapable of punishing a state that cheats on its agreements. A hawk that pursues such a policy reversal is thought to signal demonstrate her moderation – peace would only truly be in the national interest if a hawk endorsed it. Such a

¹⁰ See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 19-33.
signal would also be conveyed to international audiences, who would infer that a moderate hawk would reciprocate cooperative gestures and punish defections.\footnote{Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” \textit{International Organization}, Vol. \textit{23}, pp. 1-38.}

While intuitively plausible, this elegant and parsimonious argument does not capture the political challenges dictators face when pursuing peace with distrusted rivals. Peacemaking with a longstanding rival with whom the state has repeatedly fought is likely to raise the ire of the general public. This is not to imply that the general public in autocracies is bloodthirsty or irrationally belligerent, they are skeptical over the implications of cooperating with the nation’s external enemies.

Dictators such as Sadat who attempt to make peace with rivals do not possess an “autocratic advantage” that leaves them free to do as they wish. Instead, they face the possibility of having to stare down the “street.” Peacemaking not only makes for strange bedfellows on the international stage, but can also see the emergence of a broad-based coalition of anti-regime forces that have little in common other than their shared desire to remove the incumbent government from power. Sadat’s peacemaking with Israel saw the emergence of a series of mass protests that eventually brought together forces from the Muslim Brotherhood to secular leftists that culminated in the Autumn of Fury.

The findings in this chapter complement the new work on the “costly peace.” The conventional wisdom in International Relations theory has long been that war is \textit{ex post} inefficient. However, some rationalist scholars have found that peace is sometimes more costly than war. Chiozza and Goemans began this trend
in an earlier piece that established the rationalist literature on diversionary war.\textsuperscript{14} Another research agenda finds that the interest on debt can compel states to keep fighting even in the face of reasonable settlements.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, Foreign Imposed Regime Changes (FIRCs) are a product of the costs of peace exceeding the costs of war. When relatively powerful states encounter difficulties compelling weaker adversaries to change their policies, it is cheaper to fight than to pay the costs of accommodation.\textsuperscript{16}

**MASS ACCOUNTABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BRINGING THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE (BACK) IN**

The Arab-Israeli dispute offers a series of hard, least-likely cases for the arguments put forth in this project. Despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring in December 2010, social scientists continue to grapple with the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. According to the conventional wisdom, mass publics in the Arab world are highly unlikely to hold dictators to account because of cultural or political-economic constraints.

Scholars such as Robert Putnam have argued that with economic development comes the acquisition of new norms and value orientations necessary for democratic

accountability. Low levels of economic growth and redistribution are responsible for the lack of “modern” values found in Arab states, leading us to expect their publics are unlikely to hold their leaders to account for their policies. Other arguments, such as Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” contend that Islam itself is to blame, suggesting that it has a status-quo bias that leads its followers to accept political situations as part of a divine plan.

Others have argued that rentierism is responsible for the absence of mass accountability. The state is a recipient of rents from foreign aid or the sale of natural resources. Societies are provided public goods but do not pay taxes, preventing the formation of public and private interest groups. This, in turn, prevents the state from being challenged. One of the most popular explanations focuses upon the lack of middle class and private sector autonomy from the intrusions of the state. “Absent the development of independent economic interests separate from the regime, citizens remain bound in close supportive relations with these regimes, which further solidify their rule.”

Taken together, these lines of thinking suggest that because of normative or economic reasons, Arab publics are highly unlikely to take issue with their rulers’ policies and behavior in office. Yet, policymakers have been swayed by the images of the “Arab Street”- defined here as a “threshold constraint, in which certain acts that

violates public opinion on the Arab Street can trigger violence from burning tires to youths throwing rocks at soldiers. Some dictators have used the “street” as an excuse for not enacting political and economic reforms. Others have manipulated the “street” in order to extract concessions from the U.S. For example, in 2005 the Mubarak regime in Egypt responded to American pressure to allow members of the Muslim Brotherhood to stand in the country’s general election as independents. They eventually won 20%, or 87, of the seats contested. The outbreak of the controversy following the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper gave Mubarak an opportunity to rollback this small democratic reform. Mubarak encouraged anti-cartoon protests throughout Egypt and blamed them on the Brotherhood in order to regain support from the U.S., arguing that democratic reforms would lead to the downfall of his regime and the emergence of an Islamic fundamentalist state in Cairo.  

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The arguments developed in this dissertation rest on four simplifying assumptions: first, autocratic leaders seek to remain in office; second, nationalist opposition parties pose a potential threat to the survival of authoritarian leaders and regimes; third, domestic political outcomes within autocracies affect the outcomes of the bargains they strike with other states; and fourth, authoritarian leaders’ domestic political vulnerability must be visible to external audiences in order for their

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attempts at domestic political signaling to affect other states’ foreign policy choices.

First, dictators seek to remain in office because once they lose power they are likely to face post-exit sanctions ranging from imprisonment to exile to execution.\(^{23}\)

Second, the nationalist opposition poses a potential threat to dictators’ incumbency. By pursuing strategies of “rhetorical entrapment”, or pointing out inconsistencies between dictators’ rhetoric and foreign policy behaviors, the opposition is able to impose audience costs.\(^{24}\) This facilitates the opposition’s ability to undermine the regime by organizing anti-foreign protests, which can serve as a tipping point in a cascade of anti-regime sentiment. Anti-foreign protests were what ultimately brought down the Qing Dynasty in 1911.\(^{25}\) Such strategies can also bring extant cleavages within the regime to the fore by making the ruling autocracy look ineffective and dishonest.

Third, domestic political outcomes within autocracies affect the outcomes of the bargains they strike with other states. This assumption builds upon the logic of two-level games, which suggests that domestic and international politics are “inextricably


linked” to one another. The emergence of a new leadership can foster a widening or narrowing of two or more states’ win sets. Relations between the U.S. and Iran in the postwar period exemplify this phenomenon. Throughout the Cold War, its geographic position and resource wealth made it one of the dominoes whose potential fall concerned American decision-makers the most. In fact, one of the initial disputes that helped spark the Cold War was over Stalin’s refusal to remove Soviet troops from northern Iran in 1946. From 1953-1979, Mohammed Reza Shah’s leadership came to be seen as integral to American security. Under the Nixon Doctrine, as part of a wider strategy of retrenchment, the U.S. made Iran one of the “Twin Pillars” responsible for policing the Middle East (the other was Saudi Arabia). America was willing to sell any and all non-nuclear weapons to Iran that the Shah requested. However, in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini lead a revolution that had its roots in opposition to both America’s influence within Iran and the Shah’s body of reforms known as the White Revolution that resulted in the dismantlement of the waqf system. The Iranian Revolution not only inaugurated a 444 day hostage crisis, but the weaponry that the U.S. had once provided to the last Shah had now fallen into the hands of the leaders of the newly minted Islamic Republic. In a similar vein, during

the 1950s China underwent a period of domestic political infighting and ideological radicalization under Mao that lead to the Sino-Soviet split.30

Fourth, in order to serve as a costly signal, authoritarian leaders’ domestic political vulnerability must be visible to external audiences. Domestic political competition within regimes is not always readily observable to outsiders.22 During the 1970s, Rodney MacFarquhar argued that external observers could determine who held political influence in China by examining who was photographed with (and how close they sat next to) Chairman Mao. Despite having witnessed multiple leadership turnovers since Mao’s death, Chinese politics remains opaque. For a couple of weeks in September 2012 before his installation as President, Xi Jinping dropped out of public view with no explanation. The Economist commented, “As with Soviet-era Kremlinology, the study of the goings-on in Zhongnanhai, the Beijing complex where China’s leaders ply their intrigues, is primitive.”31 By contrast, incumbent autocrats’ interactions with the non-elite or popular opposition that operates outside of the regime are more visible to the outside world because the non-elite opposition has no choice but to organize and contest the incumbent regime’s hold on power out in the open.32


32 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
FOCUS OF INQUIRY: FULLY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

The advent of the Third Wave focused many studies of regime change on the differences between democracy and dictatorship. However, many of these studies tended to smooth over the differences among non-democratic regimes. The end of the transitology research program\(^3\) spawned the reverse tendency, leading to a typology of typologies of autocracies, starting with Geddes\(^4\) differentiation between personalist, single-party and military regimes. This study focuses upon the most prominent type of autocracy in world politics: the fully authoritarian regime.

In closed or fully authoritarian regimes, “no viable channels exist for [the] opposition to contest legally for executive power.”\(^5\) Executive power refers to the nominal leadership of the state, such as the Presidency in the case of a republic or the King in an absolutist monarchy. However, many of these autocracies possess nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and elections, while permitting the existence of political parties (although this varies from country to country). In these regimes, elections are often used as a means of distributing rents.

In several instances, fully authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions have been lumped together with competitive autocracies or competitive

authoritarian regimes under the rubric of electoral authoritarianism. This is a mistake. It is true that in competitive autocracies incumbents often use their control of the state to their advantage (e.g., violating their opponents’ civil liberties, manipulating elections, or creating an uneven playing field by gaining control over the media in order to hold office). This makes it difficult, but not impossible, for the opposition to take power. What distinguishes competitive authoritarian regimes (Malaysia under Mahathir, Zimbabwe under Mugabe or Serbia under Milosevic), from fully authoritarian regimes is that the opposition can wrest control of the executive branch from the incumbent using the established rules of the game if its members overcome the collective action problem. This was seen in the Presidential election in Kenya in 2002, when the opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki was able to defeat Daniel Arap Moi’s preferred successor, Uhuru Kenyatta.

The focus upon fully authoritarian regimes requires that some cases be excluded. For example, Lebanon is excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, despite having had a difficult relationship with Israel since 1948, the two states are not coded as enduring rivals. Second, Lebanon is coded as a mixed regime or an anocracy. A second case is the Palestinian Authority (PA). At the time this is being written, there is not an independent Palestinian state. While some have commented on the authoritarian leanings of the Palestinian Authority

(PA)\textsuperscript{39}, the current governing structure in the Palestinian territories more closely resembles that of a competitive authoritarian regime than that of a fully authoritarian regime. The POLITY dataset does not code for either the PA or the Occupied Territories.\textsuperscript{40} Like Lebanon, none of the entities the international community recognizes as the Palestinians’ representatives have been coded as enduring rivals of Israel, even though the status of the Palestinian people has been a frequent point of contestation in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

**PLAN FOR THE MANUSCRIPT**

Chapter two examines how autocracies’ interactions with the “Arab Street” signals their intentions to external rivals and affects the likelihood cooperation will take place between rivals. This chapter discusses how the interaction between the ruling regime and the nationalist opposition conveys valuable information to rival states during peace processes. Repressing the nationalist opposition tends to reassure rivals while coopting or incorporating the nationalist opposition unsettles rival states.

The third chapter examines the relationship between battlefield outcomes and authoritarian political survival. This section focuses upon the 1948 War of Independence and the Six Day War and finds that significant wartime defeats


undermine autocrats’ hold onto office via popular protests.

The fourth chapter examines the politics of peacemaking for dictators. Examining the political implications of Anwar Sadat’s historic overture to Israel, this chapter finds that there is no “autocratic advantage” when it comes to taking costly and surprising steps to ameliorating the security dilemma between enduring rivals. I develop an argument that explains why dictators, like their democratic counterparts, are vulnerable to domestic political upheavals for peacemaking.

The fifth chapter summarizes the conclusion: even personalist dictators who can eliminate elite challengers are not immune to the pressures of mass audiences (such as the “Arab Street”) when conducting foreign policy. This has important implications for IR theory, as it challenges much of what we think we know about the role of autocracies in world politics, as well as policymakers. The latter may be able to use this information in order to better modify their policies to the political incentives of authoritarian regimes they are dealing with.
CHAPTER 2

AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS, THE ARAB STREET, AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:

DO NON-DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS CONSTRAIN OR INFORM?

“Had peace [with Israel] depended on the conflicting interests of the Arab states, then the peace prospects would have been much brighter than they were now. However, each of the Arab states as well as the Arab League cannot free themselves from their public opinion, the fruit of their own agitation.”

-Herzl Berger, Member of the Knesset, 1950.41

Why have some Arab dictatorships been able to make peace with Israel while others remain in a state of war? If conflict is inefficient, it makes sense for both sides to reach a series of war-avoiding bargains. Although many have studied how democracies signal their intentions and overcome the security dilemma,42 we still do not know how do autocracies credibly commit to cooperation with their rivals. When rivals bargain with one another, their promises are often less credible than their threats. In peace processes where enemies bargain over issues that can affect the balance of power between them over the long term- such as territory- states often want guarantees that once they have

carried out their end of an agreement by transferring a strategically valuable piece of land, the other side will not renege on its end of the bargain and restart the rivalry from an improved position.\(^{43}\)

The conventional wisdom suggests that domestic political accountability improves the credibility of autocracies’ commitments to use force and pursue cooperation. States prevail in crises by demonstrating that they are tough and resolved, with their leaders bolstering their credibility by tying their hands in front of hawkish domestic audiences. By contrast establishing cooperation among rivals requires that each side demonstrate that it is moderate, preferring to reciprocate cooperative gestures to exploiting a rival.\(^{44}\) (Why) would a hawkish audience punish a leader for reneging on a commitment to cooperation? Highly nationalistic audiences could actually reward authoritarian leaders for reneging on agreements that reassure the state’s longstanding enemies.\(^{45}\) Incumbent dictators can reveal their types to external audiences through their interactions with their domestic oppositions. Autocrats who co-opt the nationalist opposition extend their tenure in office in exchange for making policy concessions and, in the process, raise their domestic political costs of peacemaking. By contrast, dictators who are able to repress their nationalist challengers rely on a minimum-winning coalition


\(^{45}\) Some argue that the generation of audience costs is contingent upon the preferences of domestic audiences for compliance, and this policy preference plays a greater role than audiences’ concern over the nation’s reputation. See Michael Tomz, “Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International Agreements,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, 2002.
for survival and face lower potential audience costs if they should attempt to cooperate with one the nation’s longstanding enemies.\(^4^6\)

This chapter presents an explanation for why some autocracies in the Middle East have been able to cooperate with Israel, but not others. Autocracies are capable of pursuing cooperation through domestic political signaling. In Arab dictatorships, authoritarian rulers’ interactions with the “Arab Street” serve as a valuable source of information to external audiences. These interactions help to convey dictators’ intentions as well as their domestic political vulnerabilities. For many, the term “Arab Street” evokes images of angry, irrational mobs burning American and/or Israeli flags while throwing stones at riot police. In the 1950s and 1960s, these throngs were driven by the emotional rhetoric of Nasser’s “Voice of the Arabs,” while today they may listen to Al Jazeera. It is both a cause and a reflection of public opinion and political contestation – “the force behind the (first) Intifada and the expression of anger over the sanctions on Iraq and the real power that expelled Israel from south Lebanon.”\(^4^7\)

When using the term the “Arab Street,” some have treated the mass publics that participate in it as irrational. Rather than an irrational force, I treat the street as a revolutionary or threshold constraint that leaders of opposition Arab nationalist parties can use to tie authoritarian leaders’ hands through baronial revolts and violent protests.

While some, such as Marc Lynch, have argued for conceptualizing the street as a public sphere that includes new Arab media that goes beyond a political constraint. My conceptualization is simply an analytical simplification that allows me to focus upon a specific set of actors – the nationalist opposition – that attempt to participate in the prevailing structure of contestation.48

Ruling autocrats’ interactions with the Arab Street provides external audiences with information about their intentions. In this project, the term opposition refers to the threats to dictators rule from outside of the regime rather than elites operating within the regime but are critical of an incumbent’s policies. Although dictators face threats from elite veto players as well as their larger societies, the latter is more easily observable to decision-makers in other countries, and, thus, more likely to affect interstate diplomacy.49

Autocrats raise their domestic political costs of peacemaking by co-opting the nationalist opposition. By contrast, dictators who repress their nationalist challengers signal that they rely on a minimum-winning coalition for survival and face lower potential audience costs if they should attempt to cooperate with one of the nation’s longstanding enemies.50

A nationalist is defined as someone who strongly identifies with a particular community and believes this group is entitled to a sovereign state of its own within a

49 On the threats to dictators’ political survival, see Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 74.
specified territorial domain. Nationalists are willing to make violent sacrifices in order to attain or maintain that state’s independence.51 A nationalist political party is functionally similar to other political parties in that it is an institutionalized coalition governed by rules, procedures, and norms that seeks to gain political office and maintain or enhance its support among members of the general public. What differentiates nationalist parties from non-nationalist parties is that nationalists promote their respective nations’ interests to the disadvantage of outside groups.52 Because of this emphasis, nationalist parties are often concerned about encroachments on state sovereignty and openly denigrate, the practices, values, or customs of foreign states.53 These groups’ nationalist protests are treated as “public manifestations” of anti-foreign hostility that are “organized and

52 This definition of nationalism builds upon Ernst Haas’ definition, which sees it as an ideology that makes “assertions about the nation’s claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-state ought to occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one’s nation and others.” See Ernst Haas, “What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?” International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 727-728; see also Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, p. 13; and Henry E. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 3. This definition of a political party sees parties as combining three units: the party in government, the party in the electorate or the public, and the party machine. See John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 3-27. pp. 727-728;
attended by individuals acting in a private capacity, or as part of an independent organization."

First, I discuss the effects that domestic cooptation and repression have on interstate cooperation. Second, I discuss the research design. Third, I discuss the empirical results from the two cases- Israel’s failed attempt to reach a peace agreement with King Abdullah I of Jordan in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the successful peace treaty reached with Anwar Sadat.

AUTOCRATIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In authoritarian regimes, domestic political costs are more easily observable when generated through the incumbent’s interactions with the nationalist opposition than with elite veto players and, thus, more informative to external audiences. In crisis bargaining, leaders’ ability to have their hands tied is often believed to give them an advantage because crises are public wars of nerves where the prevailing side is the one that is able to demonstrate a higher level of resolve. However, in peace processes states are more

likely to reach a war-avoiding bargain with their rivals by demonstrating their moderation and willingness to reciprocate cooperative gestures.\textsuperscript{55}

This section outlines the theory and is broken into two parts. The first part examines the effects that co-opting the nationalist opposition has upon inter-state bargaining, while the second part examines the effects of repressing the nationalist opposition. By co-opting the nationalist opposition, autocracies extend their lease on life in exchange for giving their opponents a place in the politics of the regime and policy concessions. Co-optation forces incumbent dictators to issue demands upon their democratic rivals that make peace more costly than remaining in a state of conflict. The second section examines the effects of repressing the nationalist opposition. In these circumstances, peace becomes cheaper than war for democracies because dictators are answerable to minimum winning coalitions that can be paid off with private goods that exclusively benefit the incumbent regime.

TABLE ONE: AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF COOPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Co-optation of the Nationalist Opposition</th>
<th>Repression of the Nationalist Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extends popular bases of support for the regime</td>
<td>Places incumbent in position of “unconstrained authority”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Policy concessions, rents</td>
<td>Policing, economic opportunity costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on the Likelihood of Cooperation with a Rival?</td>
<td>Lowers it; autocrat is seen as beholden to domestic hawks</td>
<td>Raises it; autocrat establishes bona fides for moderation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Logic of Co-optation

Both co-optation and repression are similar in that they are both strategies of political survival that are designed to secure the regime against being overthrown. However, co-optation is designed to prevent the overthrow of the regime in exchange for providing the nationalist opposition a role in the politics of the state by providing it with the right to contest political offices, policy concessions, and rents, as well as the ability to
enforce bargains reached with the incumbent leadership in order to induce these groups to invest in rather than rebel against the political status quo.\textsuperscript{56}

Because many autocrats do not have independent sources of wealth or revenue, they are forced to provide policy concessions to their domestic challengers in order to broaden the regime’s support at home. However, dictators make their commitments to the opposition credible by delegating decision-making authority to parallel nominally democratic institutions (such as legislatures) where the opposition can participate, organize with other parties, and hold autocrats to account if they should renege on their commitments.\textsuperscript{57} Absent disarmament, the members of the opposition continue to possess the ability to engage in an uprising against the regime but normally have a difficult time coordinating their moves with one another. Nominally democratic institutions enhance the credibility of dictators’ commitments by serving as forums for the opposition to launch “baronial revolts” by lowering the costs these parties incur when they bargain with one another and monitor the dictator’s behavior.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Gandhi, \textit{Political Institutions Under Dictatorship}, p. 100.
While co-optation tends to enhance the long-term survival of individual regimes, the same institutions that ensure leaders’ political survival and make their concessions to the opposition credible “run the risk of generating outcomes that run counter to the ruler’s policy preferences”. As the opposition’s strength grows, so do the number of concessions that incumbent rulers must grant in order to stay in power. With growth in the number of concessions, a gap develops between the incumbent leader’s ideal point and the policies being implemented.

The literature on two-level games establishes that politicians often use their domestic political constraints to extract concessions from other states when they are engaged in international bargaining. This literature is filled with examples of democratic leaders using their domestic constraints to extract concessions from their foreign partners at the bargaining table. Proponents of the audience costs argument contend that when leaders put themselves in a position to have their hands tied or face the loss of high office, their leverage will be enhanced vis-à-vis other states. While this may be true in crises, where states are tempted to bluff over their willingness to use force, it is unlikely to be the case with peace processes, where states attain cooperation with their rivals by demonstrating that they are moderate, or willing to reciprocate cooperative gestures rather than unilaterally defect in pursuit of easy gains.

60 See Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993). In fact many of the case studies in this oft-cited volume find that leaders who attempt to use hands-tying mechanisms seldom get their way, with international bargaining situations often leading to deadlocked or counter-productive outcomes.
Domestic Political Constraints, Hands-Tying, and the Cooptation of the Nationalist Opposition

When nationalists are co-opted, autocrats who “sully the nation’s honor” by pursuing cooperation or détente with a rival state are likely to suffer audience costs.⁶¹ The nationalist parties that challenge authoritarian regimes are often the foremost opponents of cooperation and conciliation residing within the body politic. Nationalists gain from their reputations for hawkishness even if the general population is not highly nationalistic, because when the state is facing rivals who are perceived to be untrustworthy, the populace fears that there is a significant likelihood of conflict. Hard-liners are often seen as more effective agents simply because they are more likely to reject second-rate bargains, forcing an adversary to come back with more generous terms in order to avoid a conflict.⁶²

The potential for suffering domestic political sanctions for pursuing cooperation with a rival state has deterred dictators from engaging in peacemaking in the past.⁶³ Shortly after Israel’s War for Independence in 1949, establishing relations with the Jewish state became a taboo in Arab politics. Egypt, for example, was rumored to be considering a separate peace treaty with Israel, but its leaders ultimately demurred.

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⁶³ This builds upon the logic set out in Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*,

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because the best way to strengthen their domestic standing was by taking a hawkish stand on Palestine. In the future, opposition politicians and protestors would take their cues from Nasser’s “Voice of the Arabs” radio broadcasts to undermine dictators’ legitimacy by challenging their records on Arab nationalist causes such as their willingness to confront or destroy Israel, fight for Palestinian statehood, or pursue pan-Arab unity.

Co-optation of the nationalist opposition signals to external rivals that an autocrat is subject to a “revolution constraint”: should the incumbent dictator challenge this constraint by pursuing peace, he could be overthrown and executed, not to mention replaced by an even more hawkish successor. Because dictators may not only lose office but face personal sanctions, such as imprisonment, exile, or execution, upon leaving their positions, they will demand a high level of inducements in order to offset the threats to their personal and political survival. Because constrained autocrats are likely to be overthrown for pursuing cooperation or détente, democratic leaders worry that the other side has political incentives to renege on a war-avoiding bargain and take their concessions to restart the rivalry on more favorable terms.

The previous discussion leads to the first hypothesis:

**H-1: When an autocracy co-opts the nationalist opposition it decreases the likelihood of cooperation with a longstanding rival**

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65 Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab Public*, p. 36. It is important to note that it was King Farouk and not Nasser who was one of the first Arab leaders to use the power of radio broadcasts to rhetorically entrap his regional opponents. See Michael Doran, *Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
66 See Kydd and Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace.”
Repression is characterized as a “direct strategy” of political survival that utilizes a variety of “instruments of terror,” for tackling threats to dictators’ political survival, including assassinations, torture, imprisonment, and exile. Repression is designed to enable dictators to create the smallest minimum winning coalitions possible. Like democrats, dictators want to have the smallest winning coalitions in order to keep the greatest share of the spoils of office to themselves. Ideally, the minimum winning coalitions would only have one member: the ruling autocrat himself.\(^\text{67}\) Whereas co-optation involves accepting at least some degree of political insecurity and providing the opposition with policy concessions and/or rents, repression is designed to eliminate a dictator’s political insecurity by placing the incumbent in a position of “unconstrained authority and discretion” by eliminating opponents of the regime’s policies.\(^\text{68}\)

Dictators use repression to eliminate challenges that emerge from within the ruling regime or “launching organization”. Autocrats have been known to directly attack some of the main pillars of their own regimes in order to secure their rule, as shown by Stalin and the Show Trials of the 1930s and Hitler’s Night of the Long Knives. The use of repression vis-à-vis political challenges that emerge from outside of the regime follows a similar logic, except that it is more likely to be visible to external observers. In order to


minimize the constraints and challenges dictators face, repression is utilized in order to disrupt the organizations that constitute the opposition by forcing its members to turn against one another. This strategy is also designed to compel members of the opposition to provide information about their activities to the regime. When successful, repression neutralizes threats to the regime’s survival by raising the hurdles to collective action among the activists and political parties that constitute the opposition.\(^{69}\)

Repression’s primary costs begin with producing and enforcing restrictive legislation. These include the expenses of raising and maintaining internal security intelligence services, as well as jails.\(^{70}\) The price that authoritarian regimes pay for repression is illustrated by a quote from the long-serving head of the East German Stasi, Erich Mielke. Erich Honecker, the East German leader, had been impressed by the results of China’s crackdown at Tiannanmen Square in June 1989, and on October 7 ordered a so-called “Chinese solution” in order to quell the thousands of dissidents who had begun demonstrating in Leipzig. Mielke reportedly said to Honecker, “Erich, we cannot beat up hundreds of thousands of people.”\(^{71}\)

Carles Boix argues that the costs of repression are in large part a consequence of groups’ ability to overcome the collective action problem and organize themselves into political organizations, such as parties or unions. When groups, such as nationalists, or,

\(^{69}\) Haber, pp. 698-699.
\(^{70}\) Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens, “International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator,” p. 32; see also Wintrobe, p. 46.
to use Boix’s example, the poor, are politically demobilized and do not have their own organizations to compete for political power, the costs of repression are low. By contrast, where nationalists and other political groups are able to overcome their collective action problems and organize themselves into political units (such as parties), they can “accumulate political resources” that put them in a stronger position to oppose or topple incumbent governments. This is because organizations such as political parties provide their members with the means to threaten autocracies through anti-regime protests, demonstrations, and/or strikes. Repression carries economic opportunity costs as well. Margaret Levi points out that even predatory rent-seekers benefit from a healthy economy. A flourishing economy requires that individual owners of productive assets, namely capital, cooperate with the ruling regime. This is more likely to occur when rulers use carrots rather than sticks.  

The Cooperative Function of Repression

Peacemaking carries (at least) two sets of costs: the concessions that each side has to make to one another in order to bring about an end to the hostilities themselves, and the costs of dissension and upheaval at home. The price of domestic tranquility is not only due to the size of the allowances made to an enemy, but because of the realization that with cooperation comes the inability to recoup sunk costs that have been incurred.

over the course of fighting with a longstanding rival. For some audiences in the Arab world this has meant having to give up reclaiming the entire British Mandate for the Palestinians and accepting the existence of Israel. \(^74\) While the leaders of both hawkish and dovish factions tend to speak in terms of “peaces of the brave,” anyone who attempts to end a rivalry and win the trust of a longstanding adversary runs the risk of being accused of treason. \(^75\)

In two notable examples, autocrats have actually used domestic repression in order to reassure other states. During the EP-3 incident of 2001, where an American spy plane and a Chinese military jet crashed, nationalist protests broke out in China. However, the Chinese government was able to prevent a crisis from escalating and reassured the new Bush Administration by cracking down on the protests. \(^76\) In 1999, some speculated that shortly after King Abdullah II had succeeded his father, King Hussein, as the ruler of Jordan, rather than pursuing additional democratic reforms, he would choose to reassure his foreign patrons by repressing anti-American popular opinion. \(^77\)

Autocrats can broadcast their bona fides for moderation to their external enemies by cracking down on their nationalist opponents at home. Stathis Kalyvas notes, 

\(^74\) However, some have pointed out that popular and elite support for a two-state solution has ebbed after the failure of the Camp David II talks and the subsequent Second Intifada. See Benny Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel-Palestine Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
“Credibility can be signaled by dramatic actions, such as a [political] party’s public denunciation of its central ideological planks (the Godesberg effect) and the purge of prominent radicals.” What Kalyvas writes with respect to political parties also applies to dictatorships. By repressing its nationalist opposition, an autocracy can reassure a longstanding rival that it will keep its end of a war-avoiding bargain. Cracking down on the nationalist opposition leaves autocrats open to charges of being “fifth columns” for foreign influence. However, paradoxically this also gives repression a “cooperative function.” Repression of the nationalist opposition publicly signals to external observers that the state’s decision-making apparatus has not been hijacked or influenced by popular hawks, telegraphing both an incumbent autocrat’s receptivity to reaching a bargain with a rival and the ruling leadership’s minimal domestic constraints.

When an autocracy signals that it is being run by a minimum-winning coalition, cooperation becomes easier with external rivals. Whereas autocrats that are capable of generating audience costs demand huge concessions in order to offset the threats to their domestic and personal survival, it is more likely that democracies will reach bargains with rival autocrats that repress their nationalist opponents. Peace settlements with such dictators can be bought with less expensive private goods that can be enjoyed by the incumbent regime and its supporters to the exclusion of the opposition. Domestic veto players who are critical of a peace settlement can also be paid off with a variety of side-payments and rents that range from luxury goods to patronage positions to their cronies to stakes in state-run industries.

The preceding discussion leads to the second hypothesis:

\[ H-2: \text{ When an autocracy represses its nationalist opposition, it increases the likelihood of cooperation with a longstanding rival.} \]

TABLE TWO: OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H-1:</strong> When an autocracy co-opts the nationalist opposition it lowers the likelihood of cooperation with a relatively stronger democratic rival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H-2:</strong> When an autocracy represses the nationalist opposition it increases the likelihood of cooperation with a relatively stronger democratic rival.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESEARCH DESIGN

This section outlines the research design for the project in the following five parts. First, it provides a definition and measurement for co-optation. Second, it provides a definition and measurement for repression. The third section discusses the dependent variable: rival states’ responses to authoritarian signaling. These strategies range from cooperation and reciprocation to delaying and escalation. The fourth section discusses the case selection rationale and the utility of process tracing in this study.

What is Co-optation and how do we Measure It?

Co-optation is defined as a strategy where the incumbent regime cuts a deal with the opposition in order to maintain its hold onto office in exchange. The opposition agrees to not overthrow the governing regime in exchange for political concessions and the right to participate in the political life of the state. Participation is important because it is one of the means through which the opposition is able to ensure that dictators uphold their commitments. This project largely focuses upon opposition parties’

79 Some, such as Stephen Haber, have adopted a more expansive definition of co-optation that includes the provision of rents to potential revolutionaries, or those with the ability to overthrow the regime, citing the example of military elites in Argentina. However, this project focuses upon partisan legislatures in authoritarian regimes for two reasons. First, it has been largely overlooked in the literature. Two, it is a more public and, hence, more visible means of co-opting the threats that challenge autocrats from outside of the regime itself.
ability to participate in partisan legislatures in authoritarian regimes. Legislatures in the Arab world and in dictatorships more generally serve as barometers of public opinion.\textsuperscript{80} Their transparency facilitates visible signaling to external audiences, making it easier for outsiders to see the domestic constraints autocrats are operating under.

Verba, Nie, and Kim define participation as “those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.”\textsuperscript{81} Contestation refers to individuals’ right and ability to run for public office. Although conceptually distinct, in practice the concepts of participation and contestation often overlap.\textsuperscript{82}

If the autocracy is a single-party regime, one way that autocracies can enable the opposition to participate is by incorporating them into the ruling party itself. Autocrats, such as Lenin and those that established the PRI after the Mexican Revolution, set up political parties in part to facilitate bargaining and resolve commitment problems among competing elites, thus eliminating major power centers’ incentives to compete outside the regime for support.\textsuperscript{83} However, autocracies rarely co-opt the opposition in this manner.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{84} However, in some instances when elites break off from the ruling party, these factions can become political parties that ultimately bring down the regime, as was the case in
This is because a single party is unlikely to be able to incorporate a sufficient range of opposition opinion, whereas multiple political parties are more likely to be able to be an effective instrument in broadening the incumbent dictatorship’s rule by offering them a place in a nominally democratic institution, such as a legislature.  

Autocracies can provide the opposition with the right to contest political offices. Fully authoritarian regimes by definition do not allow the opposition to contest executive offices (such as the Presidency), but may allow the opposition to run for a host of other offices, such as the legislature, which in addition to having prestige can also provide them with access to rents and the ability to approve executive appointments to offices such as the judiciary. MPs often have another advantage: immunity from prosecution. Under Sadat and Mubarak, Members of Parliament (MPs) were not subject to criminal charges during the period they served as legislators. When it comes to serving in the legislature, members of the opposition can either contest elections for seats or be appointed by the leader himself.

Autocrats also decide whether to allow members of the opposition to participate in the politics of the regime as members of a political party or offer themselves as independent candidates for office, restricting members of the opposition from expressing their partisan affiliations. The ability to compel the opposition to forego their political identities is a rough proxy indicating the extent to which the governing regime is calling

the shots. Where opposition party members could stand for election under the banner of their respective parties, this indicates to the outside world that the governing regime must accommodate the desires of the opposition. By contrast, the willingness to restrict candidates from expressing their partisan allegiances suggests that the regime has greater mastery over the structure of contestation governing the state’s politics. For example, under Sadat and Mubarak, members of the Muslim Brotherhood could only stand for parliament as independent candidates, even though individual candidates’ allegiances to the Brotherhood was often well known.

What is Repression and how do we Measure It?

Another way for autocrats to secure their hold on power vis-à-vis the nationalist opposition is through repression. Repression is defined as a strategy of political survival that is designed to prevent an individual or organization from participating in the political sphere and engaging in the contest for public office. In order to operationalize repression, it is necessary to recognize that individuals as well as political groups, such as

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political parties, can be denied the right to compete for political office or participate in the politics of a state.\footnote{Gerardo Munck, “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime Categories,” in Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 33, 35.}

First, repression is a strategy that is commonly associated with violence.\footnote{Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 46.} Violence counts as a form of repression when it includes physical attacks by the regime’s police or security services against members of the nationalist opposition (e.g., activists, candidates, employees of the party machine, or members of the party-in-government, such as MPs or cabinet ministers), as well as attacks against the party machine’s offices or property. Violence is also used to break up public rallies and protests. Assassinations and executions are not only designed to eliminate individual challenges to the regime, but serve as a demonstration effect designed to deter other members of the opposition from challenging an autocratic incumbent.\footnote{Levitsky and Way, p. 366.} Detention, imprisonment, and forced exile are additional tools of repression that authoritarian regimes utilize in order to restrict the nationalist opposition’s and its supporters’ ability to publicly participate in the political process and contest the incumbent leadership’s tenure in office.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 366-367.}

Repression can be either formal (e.g., legally codified) or informal. When formal, there is an explicit legal ban on members of a particular party from participating in the political process. When informal, an opposition party may technically be allowed to participate in elections but may face practical hurdles that make participation so difficult
that political parties’ candidates no longer bother running. These include large registration fees, selectively imposed tax levies, and general harassment.\textsuperscript{92}

Authoritarian regimes can engage in repression by using violence.\textsuperscript{93} Violence counts as a form of repression when it includes physical attacks by the regime’s police or security services against members of the nationalist opposition (e.g., activists, candidates, employees of the party machine, or members of the party-in-government, such as MPs or cabinet ministers), as well as attacks against the party machine’s offices or property. Violence is also used to break up public rallies and protests.\textsuperscript{94}

An incumbent can also repress the opposition by using formal or informal means to shut down or manipulate the institutions that provide political parties with the ability and access to contest the regime’s decisions and offices. One way autocrats do this is by employing violence to shut down a body, such as the parliament.\textsuperscript{95} For example, in 1957 King Hussein of Jordan banned all political parties and eventually closed the parliament altogether.\textsuperscript{96}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{92} Ibid., p. 365.
\bibitem{94} Levitsky and Way, p. 366.
\bibitem{95} Ibid., p. 20.
\end{thebibliography}
Definition and Measurement of States’ Responses to Domestic Political Signaling in Autocracies: Cooperation/Reciprocation, Delaying, and Escalation in Territorial Disputes

Cooperation is defined as a policy designed to improve relations between two or more states that excludes the use (or threats to use) military force, and consists of an offer to resolve conflicting claims over a disputed good by one side proposing to either divide the good or drop its claims entirely.\(^\text{97}\) Cooperation is typically defined as a set of coordinated policies between two or more states.\(^\text{98}\) However, I extend the use of the term cooperation to include costly signals unilaterally undertaken in order to ameliorate the security dilemma. Many times bilateral or multilateral cooperation only occurs after a series of unilateral signals have been sent.\(^\text{99}\)

Cooperation can take two forms. Some states view cooperation as a quid pro quo, or a means of exchanging a particular good or inducement for improved behavior along a particular policy dimension. However, at other times in the past, states have attempted to use cooperation as a means of bringing about a wholesale revision in a target state’s domestic institutions and overall grand strategy.\(^\text{100}\) Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik policy toward the Soviet Union and Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy toward North Korea are


two prominent examples of this attempted use of catalytic or transformational cooperation. Even Henry Kissinger, one of the twentieth century’s archetypal proponents of realpolitik, believed that détente could be used to undermine the domestic sources of support for aggression within the Soviet Union. In this project, the focus is upon cooperation as a form of exchange rather than as a means of catalytically transforming a target state.

A rival has the option of reciprocating a cooperative gesture by making one of its own, or it can reject cooperation in one of two ways. One option is to adopt a delaying strategy and simply do nothing except reiterate its own claims to the piece of territory that is being contested. A second option is to adopt an escalatory strategy. This involves using or threatening to use military force in addition to reiterating (or increasing) what it claims is its share of the good that is a subject of contestation.

*Case Selection and Process Tracing*

I couple the methods of structured, focused comparison with process tracing in order to test the presented arguments. Here I focus upon domestic political signaling by fully authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions engaged in “homeland disputes.” These territorial discords involve neighboring states that not only disagree

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over the location of land or maritime borders but also may not recognize one another’s existence. I compare two cases: Jordan under King Abdullah I in the late 1940s until the early 1950s, and Egypt under Anwar Sadat. This is because they vary along the critical independent variable of interest: the interaction each regime had with the nationalist opposition.

Some suggest that the test that is the best suited for determining the accuracy of a theory is one that maximizes the differences between the units under examination both longitudinally and spatially. However, focusing upon the authoritarian regimes and territorial disputes that constitute a single rivalry has several methodological advantages. “Given the difficulty of finding two cases that are similar in all respects except the variable to be tested, comparisons within cases are likely to be better controlled than comparisons between cases.” By focusing upon a set of states with the same regime type engaged in a common rivalry with the same enemy, it allows me to control for several potentially confounding factors and determine the effect autocratic signaling has on international bargaining.

There are a couple of factors that make the cases selected hard, least likely tests for the theory presented here. In addition to problems concerning perception and misperception of signals, target states have domestic political concerns of their own when it comes to peacemaking. Many rivalries, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, concern

disagreements over territory; the Arab-Israeli dispute has been particularly difficult to resolve because it has involved disputes where, at one point in time, one of the sides disputed the other’s right to exist, and disputed territory linked to the other’s homeland. Given these circumstances, cooperation not only raises potential audience costs for the autocracy, but for the target state as well.

Even if the incumbent leader correctly perceives the domestic political constraints the autocracy is operating under, leaders who cooperate with their autocratic rivals risk their own domestic political survival. The risk of suffering audience costs only grows as the number of veto players increases because it provides hawks with more opportunities to remove a leader from office. Israel is an exemplar of a state with multiple partisan veto points, on a par with democracies such as Fourth Republic France.
### TABLE THREE: HYPOTHESES AND OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **H-1 Co-optation of the Nationalist Opposition** | • Did decision-makers in foreign governments recognize that the nationalist opposition had been co-opted? Did they recognize that the autocracy had to provide policy concessions to the nationalist opposition?  
• Did democratic decision-makers believe that the costs of peace were “higher” than the costs of no settlement at all or the costs of conflict? Did democratic decision-makers indicate that the autocrat’s demands were tied to his domestic political situation?  
• Did co-optation of the nationalist opposition indicate to decision-makers in rival states that the autocratic regime was not serious about pursuing cooperation?  
• After the autocratic regime co-opted the nationalist opposition, did diplomatic interactions with the rival state remain contentious or even deteriorate? |
| **H-2 Repression of the Nationalist Opposition** | • Did decision-makers in foreign governments recognize that the nationalist opposition was repressed?  
• Did democratic decision-makers believe that the costs of peace were “lower” than the costs of no settlement at all or the costs of conflict? Did democratic decision-makers indicate that peace could be purchased using less expensive private goods?  
• Did repression of the nationalist opposition indicate to decision-makers in foreign governments that the incumbent autocratic leader was more interested in pursuing cooperation?  
• After the autocratic regime suppressed the nationalist opposition, did diplomatic relations improve with the rival state? |

In order to determine whether the suppression or co-optation of the nationalist opposition had a diplomatic impact, one should see that decision-makers updated their
beliefs in light of domestic politics within the autocratic regime. Detailed process tracing is the optimal method to determine whether the relationship between the incumbent autocratic regime and the nationalist opposition fostered cooperation or exacerbated the security dilemma. Andrew Bennett notes, “Process tracing involves looking at evidence within an individual case, or a temporally and spatially bound instance of a specified phenomenon, to derive and/or test alternative explanations of that case.”

Process tracing enables me to determine whether (1) foreign perceptions of domestic constraints within an autocratic rival and (2) decisions to engage in or withhold cooperation were linked to an autocracy’s co-optation or suppression of its nationalist opposition. In order for the signals being sent by an autocracy to be successfully received depends upon the mindset of the decision-makers within the target state. Foreign observers need to understand the domestic constraints within the autocracy, which is difficult given that autocracies are not as transparent as other regimes, such as democracies. Decision-makers within the target state would also need to recognize the status of the nationalist opposition and be able to recognize differences between the opposition and the incumbent regime. Decision-makers in rival states should be able to assess the costs an autocrat was paying for either co-opting or repressing the opposition, and how likely an autocratic leader was to suffer for making concessions in exchange for peace. Finally, autocrats’ interactions with their nationalist opponents should influence democratic decision-makers calculi when it comes to their own costs of peace. In other words, their own expenses should be directly tied to domestic political signaling within

the relatively weaker autocracy.

The argument presented faces two potential endogeneity problems, both of which are mitigated through the use of case studies and process tracing. The first endogeneity problem emerges from the possibility that the unresolved territorial disputes between Israel and its enemies are responsible for domestic repression in authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. Second, politicians are strategic actors that undertake measures that are least likely to result in challenges to their political survival. Because this project is driven by factors integral to authoritarian leaders’ ability to retain office, it is possible that the results are the product of a selection effect.

Scholars beginning with Peter Gourevitch have argued that states’ external environments shape their domestic political makeup. Just as peace is a key ingredient of mature democracy, war fosters authoritarianism. James Lebovic and William Thompson build upon this line of argumentation, suggesting that the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab World during and after the Third Wave was partly due to the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These findings pose a challenge to the argument presented earlier, suggesting that it is the level of interstate conflict that drives the interaction between ruling autocrats and their domestic opponents rather than

domestic political signaling within authoritarian regimes that has played a critical role in ameliorating or exacerbating territorial disputes with Israel.

A second challenge comes from the strategic behavior of politicians themselves. Because politicians in both democratic and authoritarian settings seek to retain office, they can be expected to undertake measures that are least likely to result in challenges to their political survival. Kenneth Schultz argues with respect to audience costs in democracies that direct tests, or tests looking for political sanctions in militarized crises, are hard, least likely tests because of politicians’ incentives to avoid precisely those instances where audience costs would be incurred. Instead, it would be more fruitful to conduct indirect tests, or examine the effects of audience costs on crisis bargaining. Changing the dependent variable from political survival to the outcomes of crises takes leaders’ desire to stay in office into consideration.¹¹⁰

In general, endogeneity problems can be mitigated through the use of case studies and process tracing. Conclusions regarding the validity of each hypothesis do not rest on a simple correspondence or correlation between domestic political signaling and degree of cooperation over territorial disputes between autocracies and their rivals. Instead, conclusions are drawn on the basis of primary and secondary sources that specifically connect Israeli decision-makers policy choices to domestic political signaling in authoritarian regimes.

This section provides the research design. The theory in this chapter applies to fully authoritarian regimes, or autocracies where the opposition cannot contest executive

It also provides the definitions and measurements for key variables, beginning with co-optation and repression of the nationalist opposition. Democracies’ responses to autocratic signaling range from cooperation or reciprocation, where they agree to terminate a territorial dispute with an autocratic rival, to delay (refusing to come to any settlement), to escalation. Escalation is when a democracy increases its territorial demands and resorts to armed conflict.

This section also discussed the case selection rationale and the use of process-tracing. The cases were selected because they make for controlled comparisons: each involves an autocracy involved in longstanding rivalry over territory with Israel. Over time, each regime adopted different strategies toward its nationalist opposition, allowing us to see the effects of domestic signaling upon cooperation between rivals. Process-tracing helps to mitigate the possibility of endogeneity and selection effects.

**CASE STUDY RESULTS**

This section discusses the results from two case studies: the failed attempt to reach an agreement with Jordan shortly after the birth of Israel and the successful peace process with Sadat’s Egypt. These cases are similar along all relevant respects except King Abdullah I was compelled to coopt the nationalist opposition while Anwar Sadat was able to repress his nationalist challengers. I show that coopting the nationalist opposition helped to spoil the peace process between Jordan and Israel while repressing the Nasserist old guard established Sadat’s credibility as a peacemaker.

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111 Levitsky and Way, pp. 7,8.
King Abdullah I has often been described as a “falcon trapped in a canary’s cage” because of the grand ambitions he held for Transjordan.\textsuperscript{112} In the eyes of other Arab leaders, Abdullah’s foreign policy initiatives were geared toward making the Hashemites the dominant force in the Arab world. For nearly twenty years, Abdullah had endorsed the creation of a “Greater Syria,” which would have united Syria, Lebanon and the Palestine Mandate with his kingdom. When British power and influence was fading in the Middle East after the Second World War, Abdullah flirted with the Fertile Crescent Plan. This was put together by Nuri al-Said, the \textit{eminence grise} of the Hashemites ruling Iraq, and would have unified Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon—effectively creating the most powerful Arab state in the region.\textsuperscript{113} In 1947, Golda Meir met with Abdullah and reached an agreement dividing the Palestine Mandate between the \textit{yishuv} (Jewish community) and Transjordan, allowing the latter to occupy the West Bank. However, on the eve of the war, an attempt to prevent the Hashemite Kingdom from joining the Arab coalition against Israel failed, destroying the agreement the two sides reached the previous year.\textsuperscript{114}

In the aftermath of the war and Israel’s victory, two attempts were made to reach agreements that would ameliorate the security dilemma between the two states. The first attempt involved a land-for-peace agreement, whereby Israel would provide Jordan with


\textsuperscript{114} Shlaim, \textit{Collusion Across the Jordan}
a passage to the Mediterranean in exchange for a peace treaty. The second attempt involved a simple nonaggression pact that would be good for five years. Both initiatives were unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{115}

The first set of negotiations began in November 1949. King Abdullah presented what the Israelis saw as an extreme set of demands that include ceding the towns of Jaffa and Lydda, only to remove these claims from the table. Instead, he proposed the Israelis cede the southern Negev to Amman and provide access to the port city of Haifa. While the Israelis balked at the idea of handing over the Negev, they were receptive to the idea of providing Abdullah with a corridor to the Mediterranean. Israel would have to have free access to such a passage, and neither the Jordanians nor their allies, the British, could use it for moving military personnel across the Jewish state. However, the negotiations fell apart over the exact width of the corridor.\textsuperscript{116}

In early 1950, a second, albeit scaled-back, attempt to make peace was made. While initial talks focused on trying to resolve the final status of Jerusalem, they shifted to discussion of a five-year nonaggression pact. The Jordanian proposal included the creation of a committee to discuss a formal peace treaty, and opened the door to a limited resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.\textsuperscript{117} Although the Israelis initially endorsed the agreement, the Jordanian government under Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, the Prime Minister, altered the terms. Instead of a non-aggression pact, any new agreement would be little

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 528; Itamar Rabinovich, \textit{The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 131-132.
\textsuperscript{117} Rabinovich, \textit{The Road Not Taken}, pp. 132-134.
more than an amendment to the armistice that ended hostilities between the two after the 1948 war. Ben-Gurion’s government refused the terms.118

While the first attempt may have faltered due to the gaps in the win-sets between the two sides, why did the second attempt fail? Why did the Israeli government say “no,” especially given the splits within the governing Mapai Party? David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett were the two senior-most members of the Israeli government and the ruling Mapai Party. Sharett served as Ben-Gurion’s Foreign Minister and alternated with him in office as Prime Minister. Despite having worked together for nearly thirty-five years, Ben-Gurion and Sharett were like cheese and chalk. Sharett described the first Israeli leader as “a solitary figure preoccupied with himself, his thoughts, deeds, and emotions,” while Ben-Gurion depicted Sharett as highly intelligent but indecisive: “He knew more about the details of foreign affairs than I did; but when it came to an important problem he didn’t know how to distinguish words from deeds.”119

Aside from their frosty personal relations, each represented distinct schools of thought within Israel’s foreign policy establishment. Having placed little faith in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), Ben-Gurion emphasized the importance of “self-reliance” in security policy. “Our own capacity for self-defense is our only security.”120 The Jewish state had no geographic advantages that would provide

for its safety in an inherently hostile region; the advent of aerial assault meant that even states that at one time relied on geography for safety (such as the United States) were no longer immune from being attacked.\textsuperscript{121}

The totality of the Arab states would only accede to the legitimacy of a Jewish state after Israel had (repeatedly) demonstrated its military superiority. Israel’s rivalry with its Arab neighbors was another chapter in the persecution of the Jewish people that began two millennia earlier.\textsuperscript{122} In a 1958 interview he said, “Peace cannot be achieved until the Arabs, or rather the Arab leaders, will be persuaded they cannot destroy Israel either by economic boycott or by political pressures or by military offensives.”\textsuperscript{123} Offering the newfound state’s rivals concessions in exchange for peace and recognition would not lead to coexistence and security but, rather, would abet aggression.\textsuperscript{124}

Sharett did not oppose the use of force, but was concerned with the deleterious and potentially long-term effects military statecraft may have on reaching a settlement with Israel’s neighbors. In a speech given to a closed group of Mapai members in 1957 (and not released until after his death), Sharett contrasted Ben-Gurion’s school of thought with his own: “[According to Ben-Gurion] If peace comes, that will only be when the Arabs are convinced that this country cannot be brought to its knees. There are better prospects of peace coming because they are convinced of our strength, than through speeches about Israel’s honest and genuine desire for peace...According to the second school of thought, the question of peace must not be lost sight of for one single

\textsuperscript{121} Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 281.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 284.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 283.
moment.”¹²⁵ In contrast to Ben-Gurion, Sharett did not view the Arab states’ enmity toward Israel as unalterable. While he rejected out of hand one-sided, unilateral concessions that would only weaken Israel (such as agreeing to curtail the number of Jewish immigrants it accepted every year), Sharett believed peace could be obtained if the terms of any settlement were mutually beneficial for Israel and its neighbors.¹²⁶ Yet, despite their sharp differences, they agreed that it was necessary to turn down the Jordanians’ offer.

The conquest of the West Bank altered the domestic balance of power within Jordan. The bulk of the new inhabitants of the Hashemite Kingdom were Palestinian. Prior to taking over the West Bank, the Hashemites had faced challenges from the Arab Street within as well as outside of Jordan. Many saw the Hashemites as illegitimate rulers who were placed- and kept- in power by the British. With British patronage, though, came the ability to run the political system in accordance largely with the King’s wishes.¹²⁷

The takeover of the West Bank changed this. The Palestinians now constituted a majority of the population, making rule through brute force an impractical solution. Instead, Abdullah decided to incorporate the Palestinians into the political sphere but rig the system around the edges to the population living in the East Bank – and who favored the King. In order to bring the Palestinians into the political sphere, Abdullah adopted a series of measures. First, effective in 1949, Palestinians were given Jordanian

¹²⁵ Shlaim, “Conflicting Approaches to Israel’s Relations with the Arabs,” p. 184.
¹²⁷ Rabinovich, p. 150.
citizenship. Second, a new election law was put into place that doubled the size of the lower house of the majlis from twenty to forty, and the upper house from ten to twenty. The King never undertook a commitment to appoint Palestinians to the ten additional seats. Moreover, the new reforms evenly distributed the new seats in the lower house of parliament between the East and West Bank. This disadvantaged the Palestinians not only because they constituted the majority of the population but also because they largely resided in the West Bank. In addition, three new Palestinian ministers were added to the cabinet.128

After the de facto annexation of the West Bank, four political parties came to informally dominate the Jordanian political scene: the Ba’ath, the Communists, the Arab Constitutional Party, and the Party of the Nation. A fifth, less organized bloc of unaffiliated leftists also emerged. The Arab Constitutional Party (Hizb al’Arabi al-Dusturi) and the Party of the Nation (Hizb al-Ummah) were largely East Bank, pro-regime organizations. The Communists were left-leaning but held Arab nationalist sympathies.129 Michel Aflaq, a Christian, had formed the first iteration of the Ba’ath Party in Syria in the 1940s. Like Ba’ath Parties in other Arab states, Jordan’s Ba’ath Party was primarily driven by the idea of pan-Arab unity; despite being separated by borders, the Arabs constituted a single nation. The Ba’ath’s raison d’etre was (in theory) to eliminate those borders.130

129 Ibid., p. 115.
Many of the Palestinian politicians who were taking an increasingly important role within the Jordanian polity were openly at odds with Abdullah. Even those described as moderates who served in the cabinet of Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who did not favor the overthrow of the king, “had perspectives and views different from those of Abdullah and felt that they had to respond to the expectations of the public they were supposed to represent.”

When negotiating with the Israelis, King Abdullah suggested that he was willing to risk the fall of the incumbent government if it meant pushing through a peace deal. However, in Israeli eyes it was not entirely clear Abdullah was up to the task. Israeli decision-makers, in particular Ben-Gurion, saw the domestic political changes taking place in Jordan as a sign of the kingdom’s instability and the king’s vulnerability to Arab nationalists.

They also began to question whether the king had control over his own ministers. Not only were the Palestinian ministers who had been brought into the cabinet publicly at odds with Abdullah; some of the king’s Prime Ministers were openly disobedient. During the short-lived negotiations over the future status of Jerusalem, the then-Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, passed a resolution through the Council of Ministers opposing territorial concessions in the holy city to Israel. Abu al-Huda could, if he so choose, to tender his resignation to the king as a matter of principle and position himself as the standard bearer of the Arab nationalist cause within Jordan, rallying the “street”

and popular opinion behind him.\textsuperscript{133} In a similar instance, Samir al-Rifai attempted to prevent a meeting from taking place with the Israelis in early 1951.\textsuperscript{134}

For decision-makers and civil servants in Israel, these events revealed, “by annexing the West Bank the king [Abdullah] gained territory and other political assets but lost much of his control.”\textsuperscript{135} Even the dovish Moshe Sharett viewed the political situation in Jordan as a hurdle to a settlement. In a March 6, 1950 telegram to the U.S. ambassador, the Israeli Foreign Minister wrote, “[T]he crisis in Amman is more than a focal test of strength between king and opposition; it is [a] clash between negative and affirmative forces. Now Amman is the crossroads of the Middle East. Any decision there will affect whole course of history for next few years.”\textsuperscript{136}

Moshe Sasson, a member of the Middle East Department at the Foreign Affairs Ministry (who would eventually become an Israeli envoy to Egypt), in a letter to his father, Eliyahu (who was also a diplomat), summed up the Israeli attitude as the peace talks collapsed:

“As for Transjordan it seems that two distinct concepts have been confused here, a confusion between will and ability. In my mind Abdullah’s candid will to go through with the agreement should not be doubted. But his ability to implement what he wants should be doubted.

\textsuperscript{133} Rabinovich, pp. 132-133. \textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 137. \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 133. \textsuperscript{136} FRUS 1950, pp. 781-782.
And in the term *ability* we include domestic capability from the Jordanian ‘public’ sense…”  

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**Egyptian Domestic Political Signaling Under Sadat**

The enduring rivalry between Egypt and Israel could best be described as a “highly salient relationship” that captured the attention and interest of elites and mass publics in both countries. Of the disputes that collectively comprise the Arab-Israeli dispute, the rivalry between Egypt and Israel had been the most intense. Egypt and Israel had been trapped in a zero-sum conflict for thirty years, having fought repeatedly before the 1979 treaty. Hope of reaching a war-avoiding agreement with Egypt died in the summer of 1954, when an Israeli-run spy ring in Cairo was discovered.

Nasser would use the *Voice of the Arabs* radio broadcasts to excoriate his rivals in the Arab world for abandoning the Palestinian cause and for cooperating with Israel (regardless of whether it was true or not). The rivalry between Israel and Egypt continued despite the brief thaw in U.S.-Egyptian relations that in the late-1950s and

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137 Quoted in Rabinovich, p. 147.
early 1960s.\textsuperscript{141} The turnover in the Israeli leadership after Ben-Gurion’s second departure from office did not affect the baseline tensions that characterized relations between the two states. Despite being stuck in a quagmire of his own in Yemen, increasing competition with states like Syria for the mantle of Arab leadership helped to push Nasser into the debacle that became the Six Day War of June, 1967.\textsuperscript{142}

Sadat succeeded Nasser in office upon the latter’s death from a heart attack in September 1970. Observers inside and outside of Egypt did not expect the new president to last in office for very long, predicting that he would be little more than a placeholder. Although he was one of the original Free Officers, Sadat’s nickname was “Gen. Yes-man”\textsuperscript{143} because he did not seem to have any original ideas or an independent power base. After Nasser’s experiences with Abdel Hakim al-Amer, a Vice President who sometimes acted more like a co-President than a subordinate, Sadat was a perfect candidate for the Vice Presidency after June 1967.\textsuperscript{144}

Sadat’s initial strategy of political survival centered on purging the Nasserist old guard from power and preventing them from making a comeback. One of the first moves he undertook was to remove Vice President Ali Sabri and several of his key supporters from power. He ordered the arrest of Sabri and several senior holdovers from Nasser’s

\begin{itemize}
\item Others have translated this as “Gen. Yes-Yes.”
\item Ferris,\textit{ Nasser’s Gamble}, p. 296.
\end{itemize}
presidency. Sadat was fearful that a coup attempt might be instigated by the Soviet Union, which motivated him to reach an accommodation with the United States.

After Sadat removed Sabri and his coterie of followers, he pursued two complementary strategies geared toward repressing the Arab nationalist left: the *infitah* and the restructuring of the Egyptian polity. The *infitah*, or “the opening,” referred to a series of liberalizing economic policies that started with allowing Egyptians to own private property and opening the country to private foreign investment. These policies were designed to dig Egypt out of the poverty it found itself in after Nasser’s presidency and move the country closer to the U.S.

Sadat carefully restructured the Egyptian political sphere by creating a limited opening for the non-Nasserist opposition. He argued that his political reforms would inaugurate a democratic opening for Egypt, signaled by publicly burning the surveillance tapes that belonged to the feared Ministry of Interior and a declaring an end to arbitrary arrests. However, these “openings” were designed to secure his incumbency rather than foster a genuine democratic transition. The new constitution that was implemented expanded the powers of the presidency, allowing Sadat to declare states of emergency, and rule by martial law.

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146 Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention*, pp. 18-19.


After having achieved a “victory” in the October War of 1973, Sadat set about destroying the Arab nationalist edifice that had helped keep Nasser in power: the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). He divided the ruling ASU into three manbars (forums). Two of them would serve as loyal opposition parties: one on the left (the National Progressive Unionist Party, or NPUP), and another on the right (the Ahrar or Liberal Party). The third manbar would become the National Democratic Party (NDP), and would succeed the ASU as the ruling party. Some American experts in the Middle East have long believed that the splintering of the ASU into three separate parties amounted to a democratic opening for Egypt that American policymakers simply failed to take advantage of. However, many members of the Kefaya (Enough!) movement that spearheaded the ouster of Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, from power during the Arab Spring drew a direct causal link between the authoritarianism of 2011 and the peace process. Sadat hoped that by allowing the opposition a limited voice this would reduce their incentives to oppose the regime while mobilizing the support of the public who were disappointed with the status quo.

As part of Egypt’s supposedly democratic opening, Sadat tolerated non-Nasserist parties across the political spectrum. He believed that it would be nearly impossible for Islamists (starting with the Muslim Brotherhood) to cooperate with left-wing parties like

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149 On the perception that Egypt “won” in the 1973 war, see Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win*, pp. 164-204. Much of this perception was due to the fact that Egypt performed better than it had in June 1967.


the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) against his regime. Proclaiming himself the “pious President,” Sadat gave moderate political Islamists a limited role in the structure of contestation in order to counterbalance the left. He ordered the release of several political prisoners affiliated with the Brotherhood who had been jailed by Nasser. While the Muslim Brotherhood was still officially banned, its candidates were allowed to stand in parliamentary elections as independent candidates. Egypt’s performance in the October War of 1973 was even attributed to the religious zealousness of its soldiers.

When Sadat came to power in the early 1970s, observers in both Israel and the United States felt that he was destined to be little more than a placeholder. Although Sadat made two overtures to Israel shortly after succeeding Nasser, Israeli decision-makers dismissed them out of hand. Many in the Israeli intelligence community, namely AMAN (the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Israeli Defense Forces) were concerned that the man once derisively known as “General Yes-Yes” would not last in power, and would be replaced by someone more hawkish, such as Ali Sabri within a year. Aharon Yariv, the head of AMAN (Directorate of Israeli Military Intelligence), felt that Sadat did not have a sophisticated understanding of Egyptian foreign policy. Decision-makers, such as Golda Meir, the then-Prime Minister, were concerned that acceptance of Sadat’s 1971 interim agreements would pre-commit future Israeli

\[\text{\textsuperscript{152}}\text{Ibid., ch. 7; see also Ellen Lust-Okar, \textit{Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 112-125.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{153}}\text{Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics,” lines 8047-8056.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{154}}\text{Hinnebusch, \textit{Egyptian Politics Under Sadat}, pp. 113-114.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{155}}\text{Maoz, \textit{Defending the Holy Land}, p. 418.}\]
governments to completely pulling out the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, Israeli governments rejected Sadat’s contractual peace proposals in February 1971. This provides some cursory evidence that the fact that Sadat was beholden to Arab nationalists compelled the Israel to reject his offer of cooperation.

After the October or Yom Kippur War of 1973, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger brokered a series of agreements between Egypt, Syria, and Israel. After having gone on a whirlwind series of back-and-forth trips between the states that came to be known as “shuttle diplomacy,” Kissinger was able to compel two successive Israeli governments – one under Golda Meir and the next under Yitzhak Rabin – to agree to a series of disengagement agreements along the Sinai and the Golan Heights. These agreements were designed to gradually reduce tensions between the two sides while preventing the Soviet Union from intervening in the region.

After the first two Sinai Agreements were concluded, the peace process between Israel and Syria came to an end. The Asad regime refused to enter into any sort of deal with the Jewish state unless Israel gave up the Golan Heights in its entirety. Why was a comprehensive peace deal reached between Egypt and Israel and none of the other Arab states?

According to the conventional wisdom, the election of Jimmy Carter as President and his willingness to spend political capital early in his term in office is the main reason why Egypt and Israel reached a land-for-peace accord. The U.S. played a significant role

157 Kenneth Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*
in the early stages of building trust between Egypt and Israel from 1973-1975. However, even when a trusted mediator is present, Andrew Kydd points out, “In many cases, the parties do most of the trust building themselves by sending signals to reassure the other side.”\textsuperscript{159} Carter’s initial goal was to complete a \textit{comprehensive} peace between Israel and it’s adversaries, known as the Geneva Process: this meant having \textit{all} of the Arab states recognize the Jewish state and it’s right to exist in exchange for having Israel retrench to the June 4 line and move toward creating an independent Palestinian state. However, neither Sadat nor the newly elected Likud government of Menachem Begin found this to be amenable and choose to work bilaterally.\textsuperscript{160}

The election of Menachem Begin and the Likud Party sent shockwaves through the region and the White House. NSC staffer and Middle East expert William Quandt expressed disappointment in the election outcome in a memo to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and predicted “that [only] a strong and moderate Israeli government would at some point be able to make the difficult decisions on territory and the Palestinians.” He went on to predict, “The Arabs will no doubt read the Israeli election results as signifying an end to the chance of getting to Geneva this year, and possibly the end of any hope for a political settlement, and we may see them begin to take out insurance by patching up quarrels with the Soviets, digging in their heels on peace terms, and acting more belligerently on oil prices. All in all, the short term looks rather bleak in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159} Andrew H. Kydd, “When Can Mediators Build Trust?” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 100, No. 3 (August 2006), p. 449.  
\textsuperscript{160} Stein, \textit{Heroic Diplomacy}, pp. 187-197.  
Quandt’s pessimism was not entirely baseless. Begin had been the head of the right-wing *Irgun* militia during Israel’s War for Independence. The *Irgun* positioned itself as an alternative to the *Haganah*, which was the forerunner of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The self-proclaimed protégé of the founding father of Revisionist Zionism, Zeev Jabotinsky, Begin has been held responsible for the shift toward “Maximalist Zionism.” Begin and his supporters advocated for the creation of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan River, which would include the entirety of the original British Palestine Mandate. In his original political vehicle, *Herut*, Begin opposed Ben-Gurion’s reaching a reparations deal with West Germany. While Begin’s immediate predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin, was not seen as a pushover by merit of his military background, many inside and outside Israel agreed that Rabin and his successor as the standard-bearer of the Labor Party, Shimon Peres, were relatively more dovish than Menachem Begin. He campaigned on an explicitly hard-line platform, opposing any sort of territorial concessions to any of Israel’s longstanding enemies.

However, Sadat and Begin initially found common ground in their shared pessimism over the Geneva Conference that was Carter’s initial preference. Instead of working out an agreement multilaterally, the two sides side-stepped the American president. High-level agents representing the two leaders- Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister and Dr. Hassan Touhamy, the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt and a confidante of Sadat’s- secretly met in Morocco in late 1977. Initially, Egypt agreed to offer Israel a land-for-peace swap that would provide Israel whatever security guarantees

it wanted in exchange for full transfer of the Sinai and creation of a Palestinian state linked to Jordan. While the details remained vague, the Israeli delegation would only pledge to bring the deal back to Begin.\textsuperscript{164} The overture nearly collapsed when the U.S. and Soviet Union jointly voiced their support for the Geneva Conference approach, which called for Palestinian representatives to take part.\textsuperscript{165} Sadat was motivated to take a public approach to the peace process, first making a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly that he intended to go to Jerusalem. Two days later, Begin sent Sadat an invitation to address the Israeli Knesset.\textsuperscript{166}

In his historic speech to the Knesset, Sadat made a commitment to recognize and respect Israel’s right to exist in exchange for withdrawal to the June 4 line and the creation of a Palestinian state—demands that Begin found to be unacceptable. The ensuing negotiations were filled with hurdles and potentially threatening crises over the future of Israeli security installations in the Sinai Peninsula.\textsuperscript{167} However, with American urging, Begin’s government did not walk away from the talks.

In speaking to the Knesset and repressing the Arab nationalist left that challenged his hold onto power, Sadat impressed upon the Israelis as well as the Americans not only that he was he not an Arab nationalist bent on creating a pan-Arab union, but that he made a self-binding commitment to the success of the peace process with Israel. If the peace process were to collapse, it would not only mean the end of Sadat’s government, but would likely have a reverse domino effect. This meant that Arab leaders who were

\textsuperscript{164} Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, p. 430.
\textsuperscript{165} Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 463-464.
\textsuperscript{166} Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, p. 431.
on the fence would likely bandwagon with the more hawkish elements in the Arab street. Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem was made without any evidence of consulting the “street” or the official opposition parties, much less his Cabinet. Although neither side benefited from the prolonged stalemate, it appeared that the Shuttle Diplomacy of Kissinger had run out and a similar approach by either Brzezinski or Vance was unlikely to yield much success.\textsuperscript{168}

The Israelis’ saw Sadat’s overtures as credible even though they had not been promised any compensation should the peace process fail. In particular, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, the Defense Minister, felt that not only was an agreement in Israel’s interest, but that Sadat was an Arab leader who was serious about effecting a conciliatory relationship.\textsuperscript{169} Sadat’s very public repression of his domestic critics and the distance he placed between himself and other Arab leaders after the 1975 Sinai II Agreement imposed costs upon Sadat and Egypt as a whole. If he were to break his word and renege on any land-for-peace agreement, it would effectively destroy his government’s reputation for moderation and honesty. This would also give the Israelis a justification for attacking Egypt and retaking the Sinai.\textsuperscript{170} Sadat’s willingness to incur criticism from the Arab Street, resignations from his cabinet (such as his long-serving Foreign Minister, 

\textsuperscript{168} Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, p. 433-435.  
Ismail Fahmy), all amounted to a dramatic break with the Nasserist past. This solidified his reputation as a moderate even in the eyes of hawkish Israeli decision-makers.\textsuperscript{171}

The Israelis found Sadat’s removal of domestic constraints to be advantageous. The bulk of the terms of the military agreement over the future of the Sinai had been agreed to by the military delegations negotiating in Cairo prior to the Camp David conference.\textsuperscript{172} During Camp David, Sadat was flexible to minimize the degree of linkage between the issue of an Israeli-Egyptian peace and the ongoing problem over Palestinian self-determination, as well as how to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the airfields and settlements constructed in the Sinai Peninsula. Begin, in a move reminiscent of Nixon’s trip to China, placed his own hawkish reputation on the line to push an agreement through the Knesset that would deconstruct the settlements.\textsuperscript{173} The Camp David conference resulted in two accords signed in 1978. The first was the forerunner of the Egypt-Israel Treaty that was signed in 1979. The second of the accords called for a vague plan for Palestinian Autonomy. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, the autonomy plan has been referred to as a “scam” that simply gave the Begin government the flexibility it needed to (1) delay reaching an agreement with the Palestinians, and (2) the political space to formally annex the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{174} Ian S. Lustick, \textit{Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza} (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), ch. 1.
RESULTS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

The two cases examined in this chapter- the failure to reach peace with Jordan in the late-1940s and early 1950s, and the successful peace process with Sadat’s Egypt- show that domestic political signaling in these authoritarian regimes had a decisive impact upon their ability to cooperate with Israel. King Abdullah I’s domestic constraints- exacerbated by the influx of Palestinians after the Israeli War for Independence – made it impossible for him to reach any sort of agreement that was within the Israeli and Jordanian win-sets. By contrast, Sadat’s willingness to run risks and repress Arab nationalists who opposed his domestic and international agenda bought him credibility in the eyes of hawkish Israelis once seen as significant obstacles to peace, such as Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, and Ezer Weizman. Even Ariel Sharon agreed to support the peace agreement when it was put to a vote in the Israeli Knesset.

These results directly challenge the conventional wisdom that domestic hands tying necessarily benefits a state when it bargains with an adversary. As shown by the case of Jordan, hands tying undermined King Abdullah I’s credibility rather than bolstering it. Conversely, the removal of domestic constraints did not make Sadat’s promises look like cheap talk; instead, they conveyed the sense that he was taking a risk by pursuing peace with Israel.

One criticism is that the sample size is simply too small to warrant any sort of generalization about other enduring rivalries that involve fully authoritarian regimes. While the Arab-Israeli dispute is important for policy reasons, from the standpoint of
research design these cases may simply represent two individual data points. This is a fair point that deserves to be examined.

First, the argument presented here is not- and should not be interpreted as- a covering law. In order to gain greater validity, it would have to be tested against other rivalries that involve a variety of issue areas. However, states’ support for and repression of radicals remains a sticking point in many negotiations. For example, India continues to find Pakistan’s protection of Islamic fundamentalists making irredentist claims to Kashmir a source a contention.\(^{175}\) Similarly, Iran’s continued support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are seen as potential deal-breakers in the ongoing nuclear talks with Tehran.\(^{176}\) Pakistan or Iran’s breaking off support for these groups would be seen as strong signals of moderation. Similarly, Jessica Chen Weiss points out that repression of anti-foreign and Chinese nationalist protests during crises has signaled moderation on the part of Beijing.\(^{177}\)

Other cases involving Israel and it’s enemies bear out the logic of domestic political signaling discussed in this chapter. One of the apprehensions Israel had about working with Yasser Arafat in the mid-1990s was his refusal to crack down on the Islamist militant group Hamas. Arafat would, on occasion, imprison members of Hamas only to release them later. For Israelis on the center and the right, this demonstrated


Arafat’s “type”: that he was simply not interested in peace and would rather keep his political options open. Conversely, the late King Hussein of Jordan emulated Sadat’s political strategy by repressing domestic opponents of the peace process with Israel, which helped lead to the 1994 agreement between the Amman and Jerusalem.

One of the implications of these results pertains to the role of “biased” mediators in resolving longstanding conflicts. A biased mediator is one who has strong ties to one of the parties to a conflict. On the one hand, many suggest that biased mediators are the worst mediators, while others suggest that biased mediators are in a superior position to convince one of the parties to a dispute that it is in their best interest to reach an agreement.\textsuperscript{178} American policymakers and pundits alike have long argued that the U.S. is indispensable to reaching a lasting agreement between Israel and it’s enemies. At first glance, American participation and non-participation seems necessary (although not sufficient) for obtaining agreements in the region. While the U.S. balked at getting involved in attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute at the outset of the Cold War, the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ sense that Egypt could be taken out of the Soviet orbit and moved into the U.S.’ sphere of influence tempted the U.S. to become involved in the peace process.\textsuperscript{179} This commitment continued and, arguably, accelerated under the Carter Administration, leading to the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty of 1979. While it is undoubtedly true that Jimmy Carter’s energetic pursuit of peace in the region had an effect, it does not appear that Carter’s personal involvement was, in the eyes of the Israelis, as important as the domestic political risks that Sadat undertook. However,


the U.S. was able to provide important side-payments that made it easier to accept the land-for-peace formula.

CONCLUSION

Do autocratic institutions constrain or inform? Do rival states take autocracies’ commitments seriously, or are they viewed as cheap talk? The conventional wisdom since the end of the Cold War has been that authoritarian regimes cannot make credible commitments in international politics because of their leaders’ inability to generate audience costs, or domestic political sanctions for breaking public commitments. In this chapter, I find this to be untrue when it came to peace processes between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Authoritarian leaders such as King Abdullah I of Jordan and Sadat would have arguably enjoyed a domestic bounce if they had reneged on agreements with Israel or simply walked away from the bargaining table. This directly challenges the logic of autocratic audience costs outlined by Weeks, who suggests that autocratic audiences, like their democratic counterparts, place a premium on the nation’s reputation for keeping it’s word.180

This chapter identifies an alternative mechanism for autocracies to engage in domestic political signaling outside of audience costs. This mechanism hinges upon the incumbent regime’s interaction with its domestic opponents. Unlike audience costs,

which are only visible *ex post*, the costs that dictators incur when either coopting or repressing the opposition are visible *ex ante*, much like sunk cost signals. One avenue for future research would involve examining which of the domestic political signals discussed here is more informative: traditional audience costs or the domestic sanctions spelled out here.

A second avenue for research would examine the interaction between the incumbent regime and the anti-nationalist, or liberal, opposition. One state that would be ripe for this sort of study would be the Islamic Republic of Iran. If repression of the nationalist opposition signals moderation, then suppression of liberals (such as the reform-minded parties in Tehran) should suggest that a state is run by hawks or radicals. Conversely, cooptation of the liberal opposition would suggest that the regime is beholden to outward-looking interests and receptive to cooperation.
CHAPTER 3

AUTOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN WARTIME:
POPULAR PUNISHMENTS FOR DEFEATS ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN NON-DEMOCRACIES

When do authoritarian leaders suffer domestic political punishments for their foreign policy failures? Do mass audiences hold them to account? The idea that democratic leaders are held accountable for the choices they make in international politics is an article of faith among many scholars in international relations. The “democratic advantage” in international politics is partly attributed to their leaders’ accountability to mass publics. Non-democratic audiences are believed to be at a disadvantage because they do not have access to a reliable free press and institutionalized channels for punishing incompetent or reckless dictators.181 Because it is costlier to dislodge an autocrat than a democrat, the literature downplays autocratic accountability to mass audiences.182

Much of this literature has overlooked autocratic accountability to the public through mass protests. This piece conjectures that, like their democratic counterparts, autocratic audiences disapprove of defeats on the battlefield because they reflect that an autocratic leader is incompetent and unable to deliver foreign policy goods in the future. Defeats serve a rallying function, allowing protestors to impose costs by (1) lowering the costs of collective action for other opposition movements and extract policy concessions from the incumbent regime; (2) playing upon elite cleavages that may foster a coup; and (3) foster a breakdown in domestic order, giving rise to the outbreak of a civil war or revolution.

Mass protests against the regime are defined here as the “public manifestation by a group of people of disapproval or dissent” against the governing leadership. The protests under examination here are not the ones organized by the governments themselves and populated by rent-a-crowds. Instead, the phenomena of concern are those demonstrations or marches where the participants are acting in a capacity independent of

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183 Weeks’ work examines autocratic accountability to elite audiences, but not mass publics. A growing number of works in comparative politics take into account the role of the general public, including protests, but do not focus upon the causal impact of failures in international politics. For an extensive discussion of the role protests play in upending dictatorships, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements in Contentious Politics, Third Edition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also Kevin J. O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). A notable recent exception that bridges the gap between IR and Comparative Politics is Jessica Chen Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 1-35. However, one of the significant differences between Weiss’ work and the argument presented here is that Weiss focuses upon how nationalist protests allow autocrats to engage in domestic political signaling in crises, whereas my focus is on their implications for leaders’ domestic political survival after defeats.

184 For an overview of how nationalist protests may jeopardize authoritarian regimes’ hold onto power, see Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” pp. 4-5.
the government, either as members of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or as private citizens. This section outlines how military defeats affect mass publics’ evaluations of authoritarian leaders and proceeds with a discussion of how protests undermine autocrats’ tenure in office. Military defeat comprises two elements: a state’s publicly stated aims and the amount of material damage that it suffers as a result of battle. A state can suffer defeat when it has either (1) failed to achieve its publicly stated aims, (2) done worse than its enemy along a specific metric, or (3) suffered losses because of a conflict, making it worse off than it was before the war.

Domestic audiences have to be both able and willing to remove a dictator from power. Losses in war not only make it easier for mass audiences to remove an incumbent leader from power, but provide them with incentives to protest. Defeats weaken the coercive apparatus that dictators use to stay in office, reducing the costs of opposing an incumbent. Defeats also lead the public to revise their retrospective and prospective evaluations of incumbent dictators downward. Exogenous shocks like a major military defeat create a focal point for disgruntled members of the public to reveal their true preferences and identify other like-minded members of the opposition.

Examining the fate of autocratic leaders who fought and lost wars against Israel, this piece focuses upon Arab leaders during Israel’s War for Independence and the Six Day War. Contrary to the received wisdom, this piece finds that mass protests were

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185 Ibid., 6-7.
186 These definitions of defeat are based upon the definitions of material victory in Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, *Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 25.
187 This builds upon Weeks’ logic of the costs of coordination and turnover in “Autocratic Audience Costs,” pp. 38-42.
inspired by major defeats on the battlefield, leading to the imposition of political sanctions up to and including dictators’ removal from office.

This piece proceeds in six sections. The first section discusses the theory. The second section discusses the research design. The third section discusses the fate of Shukri al-Quwatli, the first dictator of Syria, during Israel’s War for Independence. The fourth section discusses the political sanctions imposed upon the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria after the Six Day War of 1967. The fifth section discusses counterarguments and implications for the literature. The sixth section is the conclusion.

MILITARY LOSSES AND AUTOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE MASS PUBLIC

According to the conventional wisdom, liberal democracies’ advantages in world politics stem from their leaders’ accountability to mass publics. Because democratic leaders can be removed from office from the people who pay the costs of war through taxes or military service, they are compelled to choose their targets carefully. By contrast, autocrats are depicted as largely unaccountable to their domestic populations. This allows them to engage in reckless and provocative behaviors that raise the likelihood of war. The American invasion and occupation of Iraq has lead some to question

\[188\] See Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 2.
democracies’ prudence when it comes to picking their fights.\textsuperscript{189} Despite recent research in comparative politics on the domestic political constraints faced by dictators, international relations theorists have been slow to question whether autocracies are pickier than we thought before the Iraq War of 2003. While there have been numerous tests on the political costs of war for democrats, little is known about the effects of military outcomes for dictators.\textsuperscript{190} This section lays out how mass audiences hold dictators accountable for their foreign policy decisions. In order for authoritarian leaders to be held accountable, domestic audiences must be able to pay the costs of ouster and expect to benefit in some way from a turnover in national leadership.\textsuperscript{191} Defeats on the battlefield serve to lower the costs domestic audiences are likely to run into when attempting to overthrow an incumbent dictator while battlefield outcomes inform autocratic audiences’ retrospective and prospective evaluations of dictators’ competence and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{190} The literature on democratic accountability for war is enormous, starting with the literature on casualty sensitivity. For an overview of the literature, see Peter D. Feaver, John C. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Kristin Sharp, and Jason Reifler, “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection,” Annual Reviews in Political Science, Vol. 9 (2006), 477-502.
\textsuperscript{191} See Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs,” on costs of ouster and costs of turnover. However, it is important to note that Weeks’ discussion of these costs focuses at the level of elites rather than mass audiences.
How Do Protests Undermine Dictators?

The conventional wisdom in comparative politics has been that the major source of threats to incumbent dictators comes from elites operating within the upper echelons of their own governments. These elites usually come from the military, since they constitute the security apparatus that helps to maintain the governing regime’s grip on power. While recent events surrounding the Arab Spring would leave little doubt that mass publics pose a potential threat to dictators’ hold onto power, this constraint has been underappreciated by students of authoritarianism. This is because the general population faces collective action problems when it comes to removing an incumbent dictatorship from power. The removal of an ineffective dictator is a public good that few citizens want to pay for because it necessitates that they risk their jobs and lives.

The general public poses a potential threat to dictators because of their potential for revolt. This is evidenced by the sophisticated institutions dictators create to reduce this threat. In some cases, given these institutions’ design, even where citizens have a choice, “...they are constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compel them to remain loyal to the regime” despite their preferences. These strategic dilemmas come in

the form of access to rents and patronage. These institutions include (but are not limited to) legislatures, elections, and party machines.

What threats do the mass public using protests as an instrument of political contestation pose to dictators? First, initial protests lead by “early risers” can serve as “tipping points” signaling the beginning of the breakdown of a regime. Once protests begin, the costs of collective action become lower for other disgruntled individuals and smaller movements, which can lead to a bandwagon effect or “information cascade” against the regime. Such developments signal that it is now acceptable to publicly oppose the incumbent authorities. Tarrow notes that first-movers “make claims on elites that can be used by ‘spin-off movements,’ which have fewer resources. Their actions can reveal unsuspected or formerly passive allies both within and outside the system.”

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share of the political pie. This allows initial protests to become a tipping point that can ultimately leads to the regime’s demise.  

Second, protests can reveal and promote splits among veto players within the regime, hastening the likelihood of a coup. Elite splits are one of the leading sources of autocrats’ turnover in office. Governing elites may sense that the current system’s days are numbered. In the wake of defeat, the most likely initiator of such a putsch is the military. It is the institution that is most likely to be blamed for the loss and targeted for large-scale purges and organizational reforms. The military is not only an institution that secures the nation from foreign invasion. It is an important channel for distributing patronage and rents among the selectorate. In order to maintain their power and access to rents, leading officers are well positioned and motivated to mount a coup against the incumbent leader. A coup is a means for the military- and other elites- to secure their sources of rents and, in the eyes of the public, restore the nation’s reputation by holding an incompetent leader accountable. To prevent a coup or the entire overthrow of the regime, protests may spur dictators to pay policy costs, or alter the substance of ongoing

206 This builds upon the logic of audience costs, in which domestic audiences remove leaders who back down in crises in order to restore the state’s reputation for keeping its commitments. See Alastair Smith and Alexandra Guisinger, “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises,” Journal of Crisis Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 2 (July 2002), pp. 175-200. (}
policies. Dictators may also feel compelled to incur personnel costs, or the costs associated with replacing members of the regime in high-ranking or highly visible positions with new individuals.

Third, protests can bring down a regime by instigating a revolution or by fostering a breakdown in domestic order. Conservative beneficiaries of the status quo may choose to counter-mobilize in response to anti-regime protests. This dynamic may spiral out of control, reducing the state to a set of competing interest groups jockeying for advantage. The Alawites who constitute the National Defense Forces (NDF) and the ad hoc Shabiha militias in Syria are one example of conservative beneficiaries who counter-mobilized in reaction to the Sunni opposition seeking to topple Bashar Asad’s rule.

Military Performance and Mass Publics’ Evaluations of Autocratic Leaders

While it is relatively inexpensive to remove and replace democratic leaders, it can be costly and difficult to remove dictators from power. While constitutions protect democratic politicians’ critics from harassment and imprisonment, autocracies make no

207 The term “policy costs” was dubbed by Jack L. Snyder and Erica Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (August 2011), pp. 437-456. In this piece the authors refer to the substantive costs of a particular policy.
208 Weiss, p. 16.
such guarantees. Unlike democracies, dictatorial leaders’ terms in office are not determined exogenously.\textsuperscript{211} This means that dictatorial politics takes place in the shadow of violence.\textsuperscript{212} This is not to say that dictators rely on force alone to govern or that peaceful transfers of power never occur. In fact dictators rely on various combinations of sticks and carrots to retain the loyalty of elite veto players and the general population rather than coercion alone.\textsuperscript{213} Where there are no regularized procedures for removing leaders from office, the only remaining means that remain for removing leaders from power are coercive.\textsuperscript{214}

Without regular or non-coercive means for removing incumbents from power compels both elite and mass audiences to rely on the threat of violence in order to bring about leadership change. This also forces dictators to rely on repressive apparatuses, such as the military, to allow them to maintain their hold onto office. Theda Skocpol points out that defeats are particularly dangerous for autocratic leaders because losses weaken such organs of coercion.\textsuperscript{215} Even in the wake of a loss, members of the public still have to calculate whether they will be better off under a new set of leaders than they are under the current incumbent. Losses in war not only make it easier for mass

\textsuperscript{211} Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 104, No. 3 (November 2010), p. 435

\textsuperscript{212} Svolik, ch. 1.


\textsuperscript{214} Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, \textit{Leaders and International Conflict} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 44. It is important to note that Chiozza and Goemans and Debs and Goemans assume that all dictatorships lack institutions allowing for peaceful, non-violent removal of incumbents. While this is true for some dictatorships, other dictatorships, such as Mexico under the PRI, had mechanisms in place that would allow for leadership turnover in high office without violence.

\textsuperscript{215} See Theda Skocpol, \textit{States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Debs and Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” p. 435.
audiences to remove an incumbent leader from power, but provide them with incentives to protest. Defeats lead the public to revise their retrospective and prospective evaluations of incumbent dictators downward. Exogenous shocks like a major military defeat create a focal point for disgruntled members of the public to reveal their true preferences and identify other, like-minded members of the opposition.

Unfavorable outcomes on the battlefield are likely to lead mass audiences to revise their retrospective evaluations of dictators downward. Leaders who achieve “positive” outcomes are more highly valued than those who achieve “negative” outcomes. Losses demonstrate that an incumbent simply cannot handle the job. However, different voting rules establish different standards for what constitutes a “good” and “bad” outcome for the nation.\(^\text{216}\) For instance, a dovish voter would see entering into any conflict as a “bad” outcome; a casualty sensitive voter could reward leaders for going to war as long as it yielded a small number of casualties; a hawkish voter is likely to reward leaders for going to war irrespective of costs, punishing those who fail to eliminate threats. However, the “defeat phobic” voter supports “a mission as long as it is seen as terminating in success.” These are usually median or swing voters.\(^\text{217}\) These citizens are likely to attribute losses to a dictator’s incompetence.

Citizens can make prospective and retrospective judgments simultaneously. Leaders who lose on the battlefield are unlikely to be able to produce foreign policy


\(^{217}\) Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 237. It is important to note that this does not suggest that all voters are defeat phobic and there is likely a varied distribution of preferences in authoritarian societies just as there is in democratic ones.
“goods” in the future. There are a variety of goods that leaders may deliver, from objective/material goods (such as territory won and lost or whether or not a foreign leader has been deposed) to normative goods (e.g., defending the nation’s honor and reputation for resolve).218

Mass audiences’ evaluations of dictators’ effectiveness are facilitated by rhetorical entrapment. Critics of the regime point out inconsistencies between the government’s words and promises on the one hand, and the policies they manage to deliver on the other.219 Under dictatorships, mass publics have potent incentives to engage in “preference falsification,” or openly express approval of the regime when they actually dislike or despise it.220 However, rhetorical entrapment allows for “rightful resistance”: or, opposition to the regime becomes a form of patriotism, allowing the regime’s critics to portray themselves the true defenders of the nation. The incumbent dictator shown to be responsible for having caused lasting damage to the “national project” that can only be reversed upon his removal from office.221

218 I am using goods in the sense of a policy or item that is non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable.
220 Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 21. Kuran points out that everyone engages in one form of preference falsification or another during their lifetimes. For instance, when we go to a friend’s home for dinner and compliment the meal when it was not appetizing.
Politicians generally want to avoid defeat on the battlefield: to preserve their place in history, to maintain their grip onto political power, and to maintain their nation’s position in the international system. Intuition tells us that autocrats have particularly strong incentives to avoid defeats because when they lose their offices they are also likely to suffer punishments that include execution.\textsuperscript{222} Selection effects will potentially influence the results of any study of the effects of defeat on autocrats’ tenure in office.\textsuperscript{223}

Wartime defeats are “off the equilibrium path” in that they are not welcome by strategic actors, making such cases part of a biased set. Some may question how much we could learn from these cases. When it comes to the study of autocratic accountability in wartime, defeats can tell us a couple of things. First, defeats can demonstrate whether or not an accountability mechanism is present. Second, even if an accountability mechanism is present, by studying military defeats we can learn if the mechanism(s) operate as hypothesized.

In order to determine whether autocrats are held accountable for their behaviors in wartime, the approach that is the most fruitful is to focus on defeats suffered at the hands of states within politically relevant dyads. Major military defeats serve as focal points to rally the opposition against the regime, crowding out all other domestic political phenomena competing for the public’s attention, such as the state of the nation’s

\textsuperscript{222} I find later on that there is not a selection effect in operation here. Instead, the authoritarian leaders under examination were behaving according to what Chiozza and Goemans labeled the “fighting for survival” mechanism.\textsuperscript{223} Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution}, Vol. 45, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 32-60.
economy. A military defeat focuses attention on the incumbent leader’s failure to effectively lead the country during a national security crisis.\textsuperscript{224} A military defeat is defined as when a state fails to achieve its publicly stated aims on the battlefield, leaving it worse off than was before the war, finding itself at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the adversary it just finished fighting.\textsuperscript{225}

A politically relevant dyad is a pair of states that share a border or include at least one major power. Politically relevant dyads constitute the population of states most likely to fight with one another.\textsuperscript{226} A rival refers to a state with whom a war has been fought in the past; an enduring rival is a state that has been fought with repeatedly over the same set of issues (such as territory). Although elites and mass publics have limited attention spans, they are highly likely to pay attention to the state’s relationship with politically relevant powers because they pose the most likely threat to the nation’s survival, constituting a salient relationship.\textsuperscript{227} Defeats at the hands of a politically relevant nation—particularly one with whom the state has fought with in the past—represent a potent opportunity for mass audiences to rally against the incumbent regime while establishing their patriotic \textit{bona fides}.

In order to measure domestic political sanctions against democratic leaders, we can examine fluctuations in public opinion polls, fate of legislative initiatives, and whether an incumbent was deposed from a party leadership position in an internal ballot

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{225} Johnson and Tierney, \textit{Failing to Win}, p. 25.
\end{itemize}
or removed from office in an election. Mass protests against the regime are defined here as the “public manifestation by a group of people of disapproval or dissent” against the governing leadership. The protests under examination here are not ones organized by the governments themselves that are populated by rent-a-crowds. Instead, the phenomena of concern are demonstrations or marches where the participants are acting in a capacity independent of the government, either as members of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or as private citizens.\textsuperscript{228} I use the terms mass protests, anti-regime protests, and protests interchangeably.

Political sanctions against the regime itself can vary in terms of their intensity. At the first rung of the ladder, there are no punishments whatsoever; protests do not break out and the autocratic government faces no political costs for its performance on the battlefield. At the next rung in the ladder are anti-regime protests that compel leaders to agree to changes in policy or personnel, pay the costs of repression to disperse the opposition, or a combination thereof. The next rung in the ladder sees protests resulting in a leader’s removal from power. The incumbent leader is overthrown by a coup initiated by elites operating within the upper-echelons of the regime itself to protect their access to patronage and rents. However, at this level of punishment the deposed dictator is left unpunished after leaving office. At the successive rung, the ousted leader is subjected to \textit{post-exit} punishments (e.g., incarceration, execution, exile). In both of these scenarios all aspects of the regime remain the same \textit{except} for the change in nominal leadership. At

\textsuperscript{228} Weiss, pp. 6-7.
the final rung, domestic order breaks down, resulting in either a civil war or a revolution that removes the *ancien régime* in its entirety.²²⁹

I focus on the effects that significant military defeats had upon dictatorships in the Middle East. Specifically, I focus upon the first Arab-Israeli War (or the War in Palestine) and its effects upon the first dictatorship in Syria in the late 1940s. I then construct a structured, focused comparison²³⁰ between the three major participants (and defeated parties) in the Six Day War: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. I focus upon authoritarian regimes in the Middle East locked in a longstanding rivalry with Israel for a couple of reasons. By focusing upon a set of relatively similar states across several variables (e.g., regime type, identity of the external rival, time period, war being fought, etc.) allows me to determine whether military defeats on the battlefield were responsible for the outbreak of mass protests, and mass protests were responsible for political sanctions imposed upon incumbent dictators, rather than some extraneous factor, such as poor economic performance.²³¹

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The Palestine War began in November 1947 and lasted approximately twenty months, formally ending in July 1949 with a ceasefire between Israel and Syria. The conflict began as a civil war between the Arab and Jewish Zionist inhabitants of the British Mandate. Pressure from the Arab Street upon various Arab states to intervene began shortly after the first shots were fired. Between 1947 and May 1948, pro-war riots, protests, and demonstrations in Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad put pressure upon Arab governments demanding that they intervene upon the side of the Arab inhabitants of the British mandate against the Zionists. Shukri al-Quwatli’s government did little to assist the Palestinians, having declined various militias’ requests for arms (Landis, p. 194). The deaths of roughly 600 Palestinian civilians killed in the village of Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948 by the Irgun and Lehi militias only served to tie several Arab leaders’ hands even further. By the time the Arab inhabitants of the mandate (hereafter referred to as Palestinians) had been defeated and Britain’s withdrawal was made complete, many leaders felt that they faced a choice between intervening in the fight or risk facing their own ouster from high office.

Historians have noted that multiple factors played a role in compelling the various Arab states to intervene in the conflict after it became increasingly clear that the Palestinian side was going to lose to the Yishuv (Jewish community) and its armed forces, the Hagannah. These pressures included individual governments’ interest in counter-
balancing one another. However, another significant factor was the pressures individual leaders and regimes felt from the Arab Street. Azzam Pasha, the then-Secretary General of the Arab League (and former Foreign Minister of Egypt), said at the time that Arab leaders were likely to be assassinated if they did not intervene in Palestine. Mushin al-Barazi, the then-Foreign Minister of Syria, echoed a similar sentiment, noting that popular demands clamoring for war were “irresistible.”

Sir John Bagot Glubb (“Glubb Pasha”), the British head of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s Army, noted several years after the war that it was the “[Arab] Street” that pushed Arab statesmen to go to war, rather than any clear strategic rationale: “The Arab statesmen did not intend war...But in the end they entered [Palestine] and ordered their commanders to advance as a result of pressure of public opinion and a desire to appease the [Arab] ‘street.’” Glubb went further, arguing that the Arab losses incurred during the war could have been avoided if the politicians had simply listened to their military

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232 Some historians go so far as to argue that there was no such thing as a united Pan-Arab front against Israel. Instead, states like Egypt and Syria entered the fighting in order to counterbalance Jordanian expansionist aims. See Michael Doran, Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

233 The term Arab Street is frequently used in press and academic accounts, but two contradictory definitions of the concept are used interchangeably. The first treats the Arab Street as a popular or revolutionary constraint; the second treats it as a public sphere. For purposes of ease and exposition, this paper utilizes the former definition. For a fuller treatment of the concept of the Arab Street and an argument for why it should be treated as a public sphere, see Marc Lynch, “Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere,” PS: Politics and Society, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 55-91.


235 Ibid., line 2639.
commanders: “The politicians, the demagogues, the Press and the mob were in charge—
not the soldiers. Warnings went unheeded. Doubters were denounced as traitors.”

Even a figure like Shukri al-Quwwatli was not immune to the pressures emanating from the Arab Street to intervene in the Palestine war. Quwwatli had been intimately involved in the struggle for Syrian independence from France, as a leader of the National Bloc that briefly dominated anti-colonial politics in Syria. While false optimism, or one side’s overconfident belief in its own military capabilities and effectiveness, is often seen as a leading cause of war that autocracies are particularly vulnerable to,\(^{237}\) insiders within the Syrian government did not appear to fall prey to it. In fact Adil Arslan, one of Quwwatli’s advisers, noted in his diary before Syria intervened that fighting the Yishuv was unlikely to be successful: “Because we have a small and and ill-equipped army, we cannot stand up to the Zionist forces if they should suddenly decide to launch a strike at Damascus.” Despite having (on paper) 10,000 soldiers in the army, only one brigade was ready, and its own commander lacked confidence in their readiness.\(^{238}\)

Partly due to the pressures from the Arab Street, Quwwatli emulated and at times strove to out-do his Arab counterparts’ jingoistic rhetoric over the conflict. King Farouk of Egypt stated that his primary goal was to save the Palestinians after having been routed

\(^{236}\) Ibid., lines 2614, 2687.
\(^{238}\) Morris, line 3754.
by the military forces of the Yishuv. He stated that the mission was “to re-establish security and order and put an end to the massacres perpetrated by Zionist terrorist bands against Arabs and humanity.”

Not to be outdone, Quwwatli drew an analogy between the Zionist victory and the Crusades, having said, “Overcoming the Crusades took a long time, but the result was victory. There is no doubt that history is repeating itself.”

Rather than promising to save or protect the Palestinians, Quwwatli went further, positing, “Our army has entered Palestine with the rest of the other Arab states’ armies to protect our brothers and their rights and to restore order. We shall restore the country to its owners, we shall win and we shall eradicate Zionism.”

The states of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan entered the fighting in Palestine on May 15, 1948; six days later, on May 21, the Syrian army suffered a defeat in Degania, south of Lake Tiberias, that resulted in three hundred of its soldiers being wounded or killed (Landis, p. 196). The Syrians were eventually forced to retreat. The early military setbacks sparked anti-regime protests throughout the country. However, the government initially made countermoves to regain the public’s trust. On May 24, Quwwatli sacked the Defense Minister. Shortly thereafter, he replaced the Army’s Chief of Staff with Col. Husni al-Zaim. The shifts at the upper echelons of the regime were designed to appease public opinion in the face of Syria’s humiliation. However, this reshuffle failed to satisfy the general public (Landis).

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239 Ibid., line 2698.
240 Ibid., line 2693.
241 Ibid, line 2698.
Three days of violent protests broke out from late November through December 1, resulting in the death of one person and leaving fifty-seven others wounded. These protests further destabilized the Syrian political scene. The cabinet called upon the military to establish a curfew in Damascus. This repressive measure exacerbated tensions, leading to the spread of riots to the city of Homs. Quwwatli sacked the incumbent Prime Minister, Mardam, replacing him with Khalid al-Azm. In the meantime, Col. Zaim was tasked with imposing martial law throughout the country.

By late March 1949, Quwwatli’s government had resolved to enter into armistice talks with the Israelis and bring the war to a formal end. Despite their losses on the battlefield, far from being war-weary the Arab Street saw this as a sign of capitulation on the part of the incumbent regime. With the news of the government’s decision to negotiate an end to the conflict with the Israelis spreading throughout the country, protests broke out in the east coast city of Latakia on March 27. The protestors reportedly opposed any sort of negotiations or meetings with the Zionists over Palestine.242

The military began taking its cues from the protestors rather than the Quwwatli government. In so doing, Col. Zaim overthrew Quwwatli and seized power on March 30. By the next day, Quwwatli, al-Azm, and several of their supporters in Syria’s nascent parliament had been arrested in what proved to be a bloodless coup (MEJ, p. 327). Zaim subsequently dissolved the parliament and declared himself President of the republic, making him the first of Syria’s many military dictators. Zaim himself would last less

242 Insert footnote from MEJ chronology; other secondary sources.
than four months in the position of President before being overthrown himself. The precedent established during the Palestine War would be repeated sixteen times before Hafez al-Asad consolidated power in the Corrective Revolution of 1970 (Seale, pp. 44-45- first Seale book; cite other sources).

Contrary to the Kantian story often told about unaccountable dictators, Syria’s defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War resulted in mass audiences holding a dictator accountable for his regime’s failures. Multiple protests initially imposed political costs upon Quwwatli’s regime. In order to retain office, Quwwatli reshuffled his cabinet and had the military declare a curfew. However, by the time it became apparent that the defeat was irreversible and the regime signaled that it was willing to sue for peace with Israel, protests erupted once again. The military, led by Col. Husni al-Zaim, overthrew the civilian government in a bloodless coup to increase its share of political power and stave off efforts at reform. Quwwatli was briefly imprisoned and then went into exile in Egypt.243 This first case shows that dictators, like democrats, can be held to account for losses on the battlefield.

AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND THE SIX DAY WAR

The long-term causes of the June 1967 war were the competition over water resources between Israel, Syria, and Jordan from 1964-1967 (known as the “war over water”). Other causes included the recurrent conflicts within the demilitarized zones

243 However, unlike many dictators, Quwwatli later made a comeback in Syrian politics. He played a role in bringing about the union with Syria and Egypt in the later 1950s.
(DMZs) between Israel and Syria, and Nasser’s competition for the leadership of the Arab world with other Arab dictators.

Among the shorter term causes included the new Ba’ath regime in Syria sending Egypt, via the Soviet Union, an untrue report indicating that Israel had mobilized its armed forces along the Israeli-Syrian border. Syria intended to compel Egypt to mobilize its forces in order to deter an Israeli invasion. The mobilization, along with the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the closing of the Straits of Tiran, had the opposite effect. Instead of deterring an Israeli attack, pressure mounted upon the incumbent government of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to strike first. Eshkol’s government attacked the largely unguarded Egyptian air force in early June 1967 to devastating effect before taking the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.244

The leaders of the three main Arab participants of the Six Day War—Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—suffered political punishments because of their poor performance during the war. Nasser’s Egypt was rocked by mass protests, forcing him to pay limited policy costs. King Hussein’s Jordan was forced to contend with the machinations of

244 Although there have been several books written on the Six Day War, a few books stand out. One of the early leading military discussions of the conflict is Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). See also Michael Brecher and Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1974), for a useful, English language treatment of the first available Hebrew language sources on the conflict. For more recent treatments of the war, see Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Oren wrote this before taking office as Israel’s ambassador to the U.S. For a more recent discussion of the international dimensions of the conflict along with a more diverse set of historiographical viewpoints, see Wm. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim, eds., The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Palestinian guerrillas that lead to the breakdown of law and order for a time in Jordan. The strongman and *de facto* leader of Syria, Salah Jadid, became embroiled in a prolonged power struggle with the Defense Minister, Hafez al-Asad. As a result of the conflict he eventually was overthrown in 1970. However, unlike Nasser and King Hussein, for Syria the accountability mechanism occurred entirely at the elite rather than the mass level.\textsuperscript{245}

This section proceeds in three parts. The first part discusses the effects that the loss suffered during the Six Day War had upon Nasser’s political fortunes, while the second section proceeds to discuss the war’s implications for the Ba’athist regime in Syria. The concluding section examines the political consequences of the June War of 1967 for King Hussein of Jordan.

*Nasser After the Six Day War*

For many historians, Nasser was able to spin the Suez Canal War of 1956 (dubbed the “War of Triple Aggression”) as a political victory because both of the superpowers weighed in against the U.K., France, and Israel, further bolstering Nasser’s stature throughout the Arab world.\textsuperscript{246} However, many have been hard-pressed to argue that the Six Day War of June 1967 was in any way analogous. Within the first few hours of


Israel’s preemptive airstrikes on June 5, most of the Egyptian air force had been destroyed. Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, the military chief, ordered an immediate withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, allowing Israel to conquer the territory and its oil supplies in three days. Within five days of fighting, Nasser’s army had suffered over ten thousand casualties.247

For many historians, 1967 marked a turning point in Nasser’s presidency from which he never recovered. Not only was his reputation damaged throughout the Arab world, he was also forced to call upon the Soviet Union for assistance in rebuilding Egypt’s decimated armed forces.248 Dubbing the Six Day War the naksā, Arabic for “the setback,” Nasser offered his resignation on the fifth day of the war, June 9, 1967. Initially accepted full responsibility for the defeat shortly after having learned that Israel had crossed the Suez Canal. Instead of naming Amer as his successor, he transferred presidential powers to his Vice President, Zakaria Mohieddin. However, an outpouring of support from the mass public emerged throughout Egypt as well as the Arab world urging Nasser to reconsider his decision.249 Some western observers present in Cairo at the time, such as the Canadian ambassador, R.M. Tesh, questioned whether Nasser’s resignation was actually a ploy designed to rally the public behind his regime. Tesh suspected that the mass protests had been organized by the ruling political party. Ploy or not, Nasser rescinded his resignation on the last day of the war, June 10. However, he

still accepted the resignations of Amer, Defense Minister Shams Badran, and several senior members of the general staff.\(^{250}\)

Amer had been both one of Nasser’s oldest and closest confidants as well as his most likely challenger, although there is little in the way of evidence that Amer himself ever contemplated challenging Nasser for the presidency before the Six Day War.\(^{251}\) However, the armed forces were Amer’s power base, serving as the source of his patronage network. This led many of Nasser’s closest aides to question how Amer’s supporters would respond if their source of rents suddenly dried up. Prior to his abysmal performance during the Six Day War, Amer was not held responsible for the Egyptian military’s poor performances during the Suez Crisis or the intervention in Yemen. Nasser preferred stability to provoking a confrontation with Amer who, in turn, was able to continue to build up his patronage network in the military through the failed intervention in Yemen, and up until June 1967.\(^{252}\)

Nasser began an overhaul of the armed forces’ command structure. Following up on Amer’s resignation, Nasser sacked fifty senior commanders, named new commanders of the air force and navy as well as a chief of staff, and, finally, on June 19, 1967, named

himself as Prime Minister. Shortly after having been sacked as Field Marshal, Amer went into self-imposed exile. He began contacting officers who also feared that they, too, were about to be scapegoated for the outcome of the war by Nasser. Knowing Nasser would be out of the country for the Arab League summit in Khartoum, Amer and his disgruntled acolytes decided to initiate a coup on September 1, 1967. Nasser caught wind of Amer’s plan and on August 27 sent a military battalion to arrest Amer at his home in Giza. This signaled the beginning of a major purge that lead to the arrest of over 1,000 people, including Amer, the former Defense Minister Shams Badran, nearly 300 senior generals and several members of Amer’s family. Although the circumstances remain a matter of debate, Amer died during the interrogation that followed his arrest. Some historians suggesting that he was given the option of committing suicide by ingesting poison, while others contend that Amer was executed by military police. Shortly after Amer’s death, the state-sanctioned press, beginning with Al-Ahram, began deflecting the blame for the defeat suffered during the Six Day War away from Nasser himself by scapegoating the military for its inflexibility and for being caught off guard by Israel’s air attack.

Throughout the Arab Cold War, Nasser had used popular anger over what he depicted as weakness in the struggle with Israel to gain an advantage over rivals in the region. Nasser now realized that the very forces that he had once been considered the undisputed leader threatened him. It was imperative to not only see off potential threats

254 Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble, p. 37; Oren, Six Days of War, p. 320
from within the regime, but to secure the regime against a revolution from the public.\textsuperscript{257} Beginning in late July 1967, Nasser attempted to buy the public’s quiescence by repeating his resignation speech performance: acknowledging the public’s disapproval of the war’s outcome, accepting (limited) personal responsibility, and scapegoating the military.\textsuperscript{258} The strategy largely worked until late February 1968.\textsuperscript{259}

On February 20 the tribunal tasked with punishing the air force officers who were held responsible for negligence during the war gave the accused commanders sentences of not more than fifteen years. Nasser’s strategy of scapegoating the military for the war resulted in popular “blowback” as many Egyptians believed these sentences were insufficiently harsh.\textsuperscript{260} The first riots against the regime broke out on February 21, 1968 partly by accident. The protests had initially been organized to take place in the city of Helwan by the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU) among industrial workers. However, the city police had never been informed and stepped in to repress the protests. The police’s efforts at repression had a cascade effect which lead to the outbreak of student protests against the regime in Cairo. Many of the students began to point to the gap between what the regime had promised it could achieve in several areas- including the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{257} For Nasser, his hold on domestic political power depended in large part upon his foreign policy successes. See Raymond William Baker, \textit{Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
\item \textsuperscript{259} Stephens, \textit{Nasser}, p. 533.
\end{itemize}
struggle with Israel- and what it had actually brought to fruition, making these the worst protests Egypt had seen since the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952.\footnote{Steven A. Cook, \textit{The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 101-103.}

In addition to these domestic political pressures, Egypt was faced with having to continue to pay off nearly $2 billion in foreign debt. This task was made even more difficult from the loss of revenues from the Sinai oil fields, Suez Canal shipping, and the decline in tourism. Nasser was only able to replenish the state’s coffers by receiving subsidies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya on condition that Egypt continue its rivalry with Israel.\footnote{Laura M. James, “Egypt: Dangerous Illusions,” in Wm. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim, eds., \textit{The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Kindle Electronic Edition: Chapter 2, Location 1963.} Contrary to the expectations laid out by rationalist theory, Nasser was experiencing both domestic and international pressures to maintain an aggressive stance against Israel despite having recently suffered a humiliating loss that made cooperation more costly than conflict.\footnote{This complements aspects of the “costly peace” discussed by Branislav Slantchev, “Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 106, No. 4 (November 2012), pp. 787-809.}

The ongoing civil unrest compelled Nasser to unveil the “March 30 Program” on national television. Sold as a broad-scale blueprint for reform, Nasser’s presentation began by blaming Amer and the military- whom he referred to as “reactionary culprits”- for having been responsible for Egypt’s defeat. The new program promised the further democratization of the ASU and would grant additional personal freedoms, including the curbing of the secret police. This was approved in a national referendum on May 2. After subsequent elections to the ASU Congress later that July and the National Assembly went off with little excitement, a new round of student protests broke out in
three cities: Alexandria, Mansoura, and Assiut. These protests railed against the lack of military progress in reversing the naksa. Unlike previous protests, though, these included participants from a broader range across the political spectrum, from members of the Muslim Brotherhood on the right to students on the secular left.²⁶⁴

Despite the protests, fissures did not emerge among the elite ranks of the regime itself because of Nasser’s purges. In contrast to the protests and riots that characterized 1968, 1969 proved to be fairly quiet. Nasser had managed to abandon many of the promises enshrined in the March 30 program while he continued to consolidate his hold onto power. As his health began to deteriorate in what would prove to be the last year of his life, Nasser retained the presidency, served as Prime Minister and as head of both the National Congress and the Supreme Executive Committee of the ASU.²⁶⁵

It is important to note that Nasser faced greater criticism from his regional counterparts for cooperating with Israel instead of continuing to fight, as evidenced by Arab states’ responses to the ceasefire that ended the War of Attrition. The War of Attrition lasted from 1969 to 1970 and consisted of a series of tit-for-tat military strikes between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal. Nasser’s aims were to gain territory close to Suez and to compel Israel to cease its air raids into Egypt.²⁶⁶ The United States intervened out of concern that the conflict would escalate into a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and so Secretary of State William Rogers brokered a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in August, 1970 (a month before Nasser died). Nasser did not face criticism for his conduct of the war itself. However, elements of the PLO as well as the

²⁶⁶ Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention*, p. 18.
governments of Iraq and Syria condemned the agreement as “defeatist” and accused Nasser of “capitulation.” Because Nasser died shortly after having concluded the agreement, it is impossible to say whether the Rogers Initiative would have resulted in domestic political sanctions for Nasser.

Nasser was able to avoid being removed from power after the Six Day War by purging the military shortly after the conflict. This allowed him to survive a coup attempt a few months later by his longtime protégé, Amer. It likely prevented the emergence of another coup when protests erupted in early 1968, having allowed Nasser to remain in office until his death in 1970 by making limited concessions to opposition protestors.

Asad and the Six Day War: Defeat, Authoritarian Infighting, and the Corrective Revolution of 1970

Syria is often seen as the state most responsible for the outbreak of the Six Day War because of the erroneous intelligence it fed to Cairo and Moscow. The loss of the Golan Heights placed Syria at a military disadvantage vis-a-vis Israel while removing its access to the three main tributaries of the Jordan River. These losses resulted in the overthrow of the de facto leader of the regime, Salah Jadid, as well as the removal of the nominal (but largely powerless) leader of the regime, Hashim al-Atasi, by the Defense

Minister, Hafez al-Asad. However, this process of authoritarian accountability largely took place at the elite level and was not motivated by mass protests.

Prior to the outbreak of the Six Day War, Syria had been governed by an ideologically radical Ba’athist regime. The naksa exacerbated the rivalries at the upper echelons of the regime itself. The defeat motivated Hafez al-Asad, the Defense Minister, to launch an all-out campaign to correct Syria’s radical foreign policy and remove his longtime colleague, Salah Jadid, from office. In the immediate aftermath of the war, a series of mutual recriminations broke out over who was responsible for Syria’s defeat. In the run-up to the June War, the new Ba’athist regime (which had only taken power in 1966) saw its role in the Arab world as analogous to the self-appointed role of China in the Communist world: radical-in-chief, ever-ready to criticize any attempts to reach accommodation with its bloc’s leading nemesis, Israel. Prior to June 1967, the ruling elite had been (relatively) cohesive and united. The loss of the Golan Heights lead to a


271 It is important to note that datasets such as Archigos list Al-Atasi as being the nominal leader of Syria during this period. While Al-Atasi was the President, he was only a figurehead. When discussing who governed the country, insiders in Syrian politics would often refer to the “duality of power,” or Asad and Jadid, as the true governors of the country. See Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Press, 1988), p. 148.


split in the regime, with the civilians continuing to advocate for a hawkish foreign policy toward Israel while the military took a less assertive line.\textsuperscript{274}

The more radical-leaning school, lead by Jadid, sought to continue what had been dubbed the “Arab Cold War” between radical and conservative, western-leaning regimes.\textsuperscript{275} For Jadid and his partisans, Syria was the “beating heart of Arab nationalism,” and other regimes were either “defeatist,” or “reactionary,” and he called for their overthrow. For Jadid, the rivalry with Israel should be treated as a “popular war of liberation” that was to be carried out by Palestinian guerrilla groups sponsored by Syria.\textsuperscript{276} By contrast, Asad advocated for a more pragmatic approach to confronting Israel. While still a proponent of maintaining an armed struggle against the Jewish state, Asad advocated renewing Syria’s ties with the more conservative Arab monarchies in order to help finance a new arms buildup.\textsuperscript{277} The split between Asad and Jadid became a competition between the army (Asad’s power-base) and the party (Jadid’s power-base).\textsuperscript{278}

Asad decided on a course of action that would sever the civilian half of the Ba’ath party’s control over the military, starting with the eviction of Jadid’s remaining loyalists from the armed forces.\textsuperscript{279} In February 1968 Asad replaced the army chief of staff, Ahmad al-Suwaydani, with his childhood friend Mustafa Tlas. By scapegoating Jadid’s

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\textsuperscript{277} Ma’oz, \textit{As’ad}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{278} David Roberts, \textit{The Ba’th and the Creation of Modern Syria} (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987), p. 93.

\textsuperscript{279} Tabitha Petran, \textit{Syria} (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 82-83.
allies in the armed forces for Syria’s defeat, Asad was able to remove Jadid’s influence from the military. After sacking al-Suwaydani, Asad removed Ahmad al-Mir, who was both a supporter of Jadid’s and had been the commander on the Golan. In time, Asad moved to deny civilian party members access to the active party branches in the army and forbade officers from having contacts with the civilian party. This effectively created two competing Ba’ath party structures dueling for political control.280

Asad finally overthrew Jadid in November 1970, dubbing it the “Corrective Revolution.” It has often been suggested that it was Syria’s disastrous intervention in the Jordanian civil war known as “Black September” that finally precipitated the coup.281 Some scholars suggest that Asad refused to provide air support to the Syrian military during the conflict as part of the struggle with Jadid.282 According to Asad’s most favorable Western biographer, Patrick Seale, Asad himself largely agreed with the operation.283 By September 1970, Asad had largely consolidated power. However, in a final attempt to resurrect his political fortunes, Jadid called an emergency meeting of the Ba’ath Party leadership at the end of October to order to bring Asad back into line. However, Asad had the armed forces arrest his remaining opponents on November 13, 1969- one day after the party congress came to a close. The coup was almost entirely bloodless, taking three days to complete.284

Syria’s leadership during the Six Day War came to power in a coup in 1966. The more radical half of this leadership, Salah Jadid, was deposed three years after the

280 Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 143-150.
282 For a synopsis of this argument, see Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 52-53.
283 Seale, Asad, p. 158.
284 Ibid., pp. 163-165.
country’s humiliating defeat at the hands of its longstanding rival, Israel. The more radical half of the ruling duopoly was held accountable for the state’s loss on the battlefield. After the defeat of the Six Day War, the lesson that Jadid and his loyalists took away from the conflict was that Syria was insufficiently aggressive toward Israel and needed to take a harder line toward both Jerusalem and other Arab states. Asad had the opposite reaction: rather than doubling down on the radicalism that got Syria into the Six Day War in the first place, a more measured foreign policy was necessary in order for Syria to survive.

Asad’s struggle for domestic political supremacy mirrored Nasser’s in several important ways. The man who would put an end to Syria’s endemic political instability did not have Nasser’s personal charisma. But, like Nasser, Asad pursued a policy of scapegoating his enemies for the defeat while engaging in a series of purges that would remove all challenges from the military. Through his position as Defense Minister, Asad was able to outmaneuver his civilian counterpart, Salah Jadid: first by consolidating his grip over the armed forces, then by blaming Jadid’s allies in the military for the loss of the Golan Heights, and finally by isolating the radical civilian party apparatus from exercising control over the military.

However, this case contradicts the argument put forward in this paper. While military defeat on the battlefield did foster the political battle that took place, the mass audience outside of the regime seemed to have little to no input. An exhaustive overview of news chronologies, starting with those compiled by the Middle East Journal, shows that there were no protests or strikes that occurred in Syria during the three-year period

\[285\text{ In contrast to Nasser, Asad scapegoated the civilian decision-makers instead of his own military powerbase.}\]
under investigation here. The Syria case shows that elites, such as the military under Asad, have little tolerance for defeat. While the military may have instigated the coup against Jadid in order to protect its access to rents, it is apparent that Asad and his supporters were also concerned that the more radical Ba’athists were likely to lead Syria down a path of isolation and persistent belligerence that would come at the expense of weakening the country.

**King Hussein and the Six Day War: Military Defeat and the Preservation of the Hashemite Throne of Jordan**

In his memoirs, King Hussein wrote of the Six Day War, “I have to admit that once June was over, it took me a long time to understand, digest and face up to what had happened. It was like a dream or worse yet, a nightmare.”\(^{286}\) In terms of territory, Jordan lost the West Bank, which included the Old City of Jerusalem. The Hashemites used their custodianship of some of Islam’s holiest places to legitimate their rule.\(^{287}\) Even before June 1967, the Hashemites had faced challenges from Arab nationalists who saw

\(^{286}\) Quoted in Oren, *Six Days of War*, p. 320.

\(^{287}\) For centuries the Hashemites had been the keepers or sharifs of Mecca and Medina, but after having been ejected from southern Arabia by the al-Saud in the early 1920s were placed on the thrones of Iraq and Transjordan. The Hashemites of Jordan made territorial gains during the first Arab-Israeli war, conquering the portion of the mandate of Palestine known as the West Bank. In 1958 the royal family of Iraq was overthrown, reducing the Hashemites’ holdings to Jordan.
the monarchy as a puppet of the British. The loss of the Old City had the potential to exacerbate King Hussein’s problems with the Arab Street.

The West Bank was important to Jordan for economic reasons, as it was responsible for as much as forty per cent of Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), contained half of the kingdom’s inhabited land and industrial capacity as well as one fourth of its farmable territory. Jordan was also forced to absorb between 175,000-250,000 Palestinian refugees from the West Bank. Furthermore, Jordan also lost seven hundred soldiers (with an additional 6,000 missing or hurt), and all of its air force. Seven out of eleven of its army brigades were rendered useless.

The Six Day War resulted in an influx of Palestinian guerrillas who sought to use Jordan as a base for launching border raids against Israel, challenging the Hashemite monarchy’s ability to rule. This resulted in a breakdown in law and order throughout the kingdom and, eventually, a civil war. While many Palestinian guerrillas received support from Syria, King Hussein obtained backing from the U.S., his erstwhile adversary, Israel, and Egypt, allowing him to retain office.

King Hussein did not face a political threat in the form of a palace or military coup. Many elites within the regime were dependent upon the King’s favor to maintain their access to rents and patronage. Instead, the influx of Palestinian refugees that resulted from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank lead to several guerrilla groups’

290 Ibid., pp. 252-254.
using the Hashemite kingdom as a staging ground for raids against Israel.\textsuperscript{291} Although none of these groups, starting with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or the PFLP, initially sought to take over Jordan, their presence became seen as an unacceptable imposition upon the monarchy’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{292} The raids that they conducted into Israeli territory would impose costs against Israel and raise the likelihood the Jewish state would retaliate against the Hashemite Kingdom. The guerrilla groups had little respect for Jordanian laws or rules, resulting in a near-total breakdown in domestic order and the eruption of a civil war.

The challenge King Hussein faced from the Palestinians was partly the result of historical mistrust of the Jordanian royal family. King Abdullah, Hussein’s grandfather, had been unpopular among the Palestinians because he annexed the West Bank during Israel’s war for independence.\textsuperscript{293} The Hashemites were seen as working in concert with Israel to prevent the emergence of an independent Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{294} When the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in the mid-1960s, a competition emerged between King Hussein and the PLO over who was the legitimate representative of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{295} Prior to the Six Day War, King Hussein had embarked upon a national identity project that would “Jordanize” the Palestinians and reduce popular

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{291} Barnett, \textit{Dialogues in Arab Politics}, pp. 174-182.
\bibitem{292} Kerr, \textit{The Arab Cold War}, pp. 133-145.
\bibitem{295} Kerr, \textit{The Arab Cold War}, pp. 140-145.
\end{thebibliography}
challenges to the monarchy.\textsuperscript{296} The Six Day War and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank dealt a blow to Jordanization, emboldening the PLO to start launching more border raids from Jordan into the Jewish state.\textsuperscript{297}

The PLO was not a unitary actor; instead, it consisted of multiple factions. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) were the two most hawkish groups,\textsuperscript{298} while Yasser Arafat’s Fatah initially sought to avoid a conflict with Jordan.\textsuperscript{299} By September 1970 the fedayeen established their own government in Irbid, prompting King Hussein to crack down on the PLO. Hussein was worried about Syria’s involvement in the Jordanian civil war. Nasser repaid the King’s loyalty during the Six Day War by criticizing both Syria and Iraq for supporting the PLO and undermining Jordanian sovereignty. The Egyptian president went on to argue that guerrilla tactics against Israel were unlikely to result in the liberation of Palestine, and disunity among the Arab states was likely to prolong the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Fearful that the Hashemites would be replaced by a radical left-wing regime friendly to Moscow, the United States and Israel also supported Amman against the PLO.\textsuperscript{300}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{296} Dan Schueftan, “Jordan’s Israel Option,” in Nevo and Pappe, eds., \textit{Jordan in the Middle East}, p. 259.
\bibitem{297} Ibid., p. 262.
\bibitem{298} Sayigh, \textit{Armed Struggle and the Search for a State}, pp. 150-151, 262-268.
\end{thebibliography}
By the end of September 1970, 3,000 Palestinian fighters and civilians had been killed, and the bulk of the guerrillas who survived were expelled to Lebanon.\footnote{Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Arab-Zionist Conflict, 1881-2001* (New York: Vintage, 2001), pp. 372-374.} Nasser brokered an agreement between King Hussein and the PLO (known as the Cairo Agreement) that allowed the PLO to continue to maintain bases in Jordan but required them to obey Jordanian law. However, neither side abided by the agreement. In October 1970, Wasfi al-Tall was made Prime Minister of Jordan for the third time and made the elimination of the PLO in Jordan his main priority. This campaign against the PLO consisted of a series of “mopping-up operations.”\footnote{Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 262-263.} al-Tall was assassinated thirteen months later in Cairo by the offshoot of Fatah known as Black September.

Like Nasser and Asad, King Hussein was able to remain in office despite Jordan’s defeat during the Six Day War. However, the loss of the West Bank not only overturned the policy of Jordanizing the Palestinians as a means of reversing their campaign for an independent state, but emboldened the PLO to start a more aggressive campaign of border raids against Israel from Jordan. These ongoing border raids amounted to a challenge to Hashemite sovereignty. King Hussein initiated a crackdown on the fedayeen in September 1970 that resulted in their expulsion to Lebanon. After the Cairo Agreement had been signed, King Hussein’s Prime Minister, Wasfi al-Tall, continued to pursue a hardline policy designed to eliminate the remnants of the PLO.

In Jordan’s case, the Six Day War imposed domestic political costs upon the Hashemite kingdom that lead to a near-total breakdown in domestic order and a civil war. The influx of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank brought with it a series of
Palestinian guerrilla groups that disliked the Hashemites almost as much as they despised the Israelis, in part because of King Abdullah I’s collusion with Israel to prevent the emergence of an independent Palestinian state in the late 1940s. After the war, many Palestinian guerrilla groups saw Jordan as having been insufficiently strong against Israel and used it as a staging ground for raids against Israel. This is similar to the raids that were conducted against Israel in the first decade of its independence. However, unlike the raids conducted against Israel in the early 1950s, the guerrillas very presence threatened to destabilize Jordan and, possibly, remove King Hussein himself from power.

With the support of Nasser and the tacit support of Israel and the U.S., the King was able to take a harder line against the Palestinian groups challenging Jordanian sovereignty, eventually resulting in their expulsion to Lebanon.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY**

Using qualitative case studies, I find evidence that dictators can be held accountable for fighting and losing wars on the battlefield. Of the cases examined (Syria in 1948, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in 1967), all of the dictators with the exception of Salah Jadid in Syria in 1967 were exposed to domestic political sanctions from the general public as a result of their losses on the battlefield. I now consider questions that may arise from these findings.

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Critics may contend that my findings exaggerate the causal importance of mass constraints by ignoring authoritarian regimes where incumbent leaders are immune to public pressures. However, this concern is not called for. Studies such as Svolik’s book suggest that dictators have to deal with dual threats from regime insiders and the mass public simultaneously. Recent advances in the comparative study of authoritarianism have demonstrated that dictators go out of their way to neutralize the revolutionary threat posed by mass publics. Protests are the most likely avenue through which the general public can bring about the overthrow of incumbent dictators.

Even if protests are capable of bringing down authoritarian regimes, what evidence is there that the demonstrations that broke out in the cases examined in this paper are not anomalies? It is important to remember a couple of things. Two major social revolutions—the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution of 1911—were the outgrowth of military defeats. Mass protests were sparked by Nicholas II’s army’s defeat by Wilhelmine Germany. These protests ultimately brought about the overthrow of the Russian monarchy, which in turn brought about the Kerensky government.

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305 Milan Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, ch. 1
306 See Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*, chs. 1, 2.
308 I recognize that each of these revolutions were extraordinarily complicated phenomena; I am not reducing them to a single variable. Building upon Skocpol’s argument in *States and Social Revolutions*, I am simply suggesting that each was influenced by defeats on the battlefield.
Similarly, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 came after the Qing Dynasty was repeatedly defeated by Meiji Japan.  

Manipulation of Public Opinion by Dictators  

Authoritarian leaders are traditionally depicted as ruling over relatively closed societies. The general public, in turn, has little to no access to the free press. This should limit the public’s ability to hold dictators to account because they cannot monitor dictators’ behaviors. However, this depiction of the relationship between autocrats and the general public is problematic.  

When it comes to the Middle East, Arab leaders frequently invoke the threat posed by the “Arab Street” to their political survival when bargaining with their Western patrons. After the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a set of cartoons that depicted the image of the Prophet Muhammad, riots broke out in Cairo. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the demonstrations. Mubarak was seeking to gain leverage from the domestic fallout over the cartoons by

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telling the Bush administration to stop pressuring his regime to pursue democratic reforms or it would enable the Brotherhood to take power.\textsuperscript{312}

Beyond domestic political signaling and other instrumental uses of domestic political pressures, Arab leaders have been afraid of being overthrown by mass publics that tuned into radio broadcasts critical of their policy positions on Israel starting in the Palestine War and continuing to the present. Starting in the early 1990s, satellite television stations such as \textit{Al Jazeera} and the spread of internet access helped to bring about the development of a public sphere, or “sites of communication within a society in which members of an identifiable public discuss matters of collective concern.”\textsuperscript{313}

The media is not the only source of information for mass publics in democracies, let alone autocracies. For example, personal communication networks can be an important source of information that may encourage defection away from an incumbent.\textsuperscript{314} However, events in people’s everyday lives, such as fluctuations in the price of gasoline and foodstuffs, can also affect their evaluation of incumbents’ competence.\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{312} Jytte Klausen, \textit{The Cartoons that Shook the World} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 63-82.


\textsuperscript{315} See Samuel Popkin, \textit{The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns} (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Popkin does not argue that the media does not matter; instead, voters can pick up information about politics through daily life as well as the media.
Microfoundations

Why do some citizens in authoritarian regimes protest against dictators who fight and lose on the battlefield, but not others? What motivates the former? What keeps the latter at home? These questions remain unanswered in this paper. The best way to answer questions like this would be through a list experiment administered in a non-democracy.\textsuperscript{316} This paper posits that citizens place a premium on dictators’ competence; leaders who fight and lose wars show that they do not know how to manage the country’s military affairs, motivating them to protest. However, when it comes to understanding individual citizens’ motivations to protest, it looks for causal effects rather than causal mechanisms. Uncovering these microfoundations through an experiment would be a useful avenue for future research.

CONCLUSION

According to the conventional wisdom established by Kant, dictators are unaccountable for their failures on the battlefield. This lack of culpability is believed to make dictators more willing to run risks that raise the likelihood of conflict. However, it is an open question as to whether dictators are actually punished for making mistakes that lead to wartime defeats. This paper fills this gap in the literature, finding that mass publics punished a set of Arab dictators who lost the wars they fought against Israel.

\textsuperscript{316} For the pioneering work on list experiments, see Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, \textit{The Scar of Race} (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993).
Shukri al-Qwatli, the civilian dictator of Syria shortly after it obtained its independence from France, was forced from power after having lost the Palestine War. Mass protests broke out shortly after the Syrian army started losing to the Haganah. After it became clear that Syria would sue for peace, the mass public inspired the army, lead by Col. Husni al-Zaim, to overthrow al-Qwatli and seize power. The Six Day War had similar results. Mass protests erupted in Egypt starting in February 1968, compelling Nasser to make policy concessions. Israel’s conquest of the West Bank resulted in a refugee crisis for Jordan. This also brought about the crossover of a large number of guerrilla groups that decided to use Jordan as a base for launching raids against the Jewish state. These raids were a challenge to the Hashemites’ monopoly over the legitimate use of force within Jordanian borders that ultimately resulted in the Jordanian Civil War of 1970. The Six Day War resulted in a domestic power struggle in Syria that brought about Salah Jadid’s ouster. However, this was not inspired by domestic protests.

These findings have a few implications for international relations theory’s treatment of authoritarian regimes in world politics. It undermines the claim that autocrats are unaccountable to their publics. Despite the collective action problem that non-elites may face when it comes to forcing incumbent dictators out of power, foreign policy failures can serve as a focal point to rally members of the public together to protest and overturn the domestic status quo. If autocrats also pay attention to the domestic consequences of losing wars, they may also be more selective when choosing their foreign policy initiatives than previously thought.

There are a few avenues for future research. One potential avenue for future research that was previously discussed involves the microfoundations of anti-regime
protest. Another avenue involves whether some types of authoritarian regimes are either more resistant (or more vulnerable) to protest in the face of military defeat than others. A third avenue for future research builds upon the logic of Reiter and Stam’s “selection effects” argument. Are the autocracies that are the most vulnerable to post-war protests more selective when it comes to the fights they pick or join? Are the autocracies that the least vulnerable to protests more reckless when it comes to starting or joining Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)? How selective are these regimes relative to democracies?

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317 Scholars have elaborated upon multiple types of autocratic regimes. Many use Geddes’ typology, which distinguishes between personalist, military, and single-party regimes, as a jumping off point. See Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 51-88.

318 See Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.
CHAPTER 4:

PEACEMAKING AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN SADAT’S EGYPT

What are the domestic political consequences of peacemaking for dictators? The conventional wisdom suggests that nations are better off reaching settlements that allow them to avoid the costs of war. The effectiveness of cooperation with autocracies is of interest to policymakers and international relations theorists alike. Debates over issues from the First Step Agreement with Iran or China policy have focused on whether engagement (defined as attempts to influence the behaviors of a target state through the positive inducements) works. States sometimes cooperate with their rivals with the expectation that engagement will bolster the political fortunes of moderates in the target regime.

For others, the word dictatorship is synonymous with wanton aggression. Leaders from Adolf Hitler to Idi Amin and Saddham Hussein evoke images of the stereotypical autocrat: warlike and repressive provocateurs, willing to engage in high-risk conflicts with a throw of the dice. New research indicates that dictators experience political

benefits from conflict that extend their tenure in office.\textsuperscript{322} Peacemaking may prove to be politically costly for such leaders because it demonstrates their incompetence to key domestic audiences.

This paper advances a new argument to account for the relationship between international cooperation and authoritarian political survival. When dictators make peace with their states’ enduring rivals, or states with whom they have fought at least six times in the past twenty years,\textsuperscript{323} they create a focal point for their critics in the general public to rally around. This makes it easier for members of the general public to reveal their \textit{true} preferences and protest against the incumbent regime, allowing members of the opposition to portray themselves as genuine patriots.

This piece makes three contributions to the literature. First, this deepens our understanding of how cooperation affects autocrats’ hold onto political power by integrating insights from the comparative study of authoritarianism with international relations theory. Second, this piece brings the mass public in autocracies into the study of domestic politics and international relations. Much of the literature upon autocrats’ domestic political survival focuses upon the pressures they face from other elites, while downplaying or ignoring the threat posed by the average citizen to dictators’ political survival. Third, this study helps provide insight into the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli rivalry.

\textsuperscript{323} Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, \textit{War and Peace in International Rivalry} (Ann Arbor, MI: 2000), p. 143.
I use the terms cooperation and peacemaking interchangeably. Cooperation refers to measures designed to improve relations between two states and ameliorate the security dilemma. Although traditionally cast as a series of coordinated moves, it may include unilateral, non-competitive policies designed to convey restraint to a state’s rival.\textsuperscript{324} The terms political sanctions and political punishments are used interchangeably. They refer to the punitive measures visited upon leaders who make peace. When autocrats leave office, they are likely to suffer \textit{post-exit} sanctions, or punishments that include incarceration, exile, or execution.\textsuperscript{325}

Anwar Sadat faced growing criticism and domestic challenges as a result of his role in the peace process with Israel. Sadat was roundly condemned for having abandoned the Palestinians as well as the Arab nation for having pursued a “separate peace.” The ratification of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of 1979 brought about a crescendo of criticism and anti-regime protests, with Sadat being held responsible for having facilitating Israel’s intervention in Lebanon in 1978 as well as its strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Even elements of the handpicked opposition turned their backs on the peace process. Sadat met domestic challenges by adopting increasingly repressive measures. However, the tit-for-tat that characterized his interactions with the critics of normalization with Jerusalem culminated in the Autumn of Fury of 1981 and his assassination during a military parade commemorating the October War of 1973.

The first section discusses the political costs of peacemaking for dictators. The second section discusses the research design. The third section discusses the relationship


between Sadat’s peacemaking with Israel and the outbreak of the Autumn of Fury. The fourth section discusses implications and counter-arguments to the piece. The fifth section is the conclusion.

THE POLITICAL COSTS OF PEACEMAKING FOR DICTATORS

Nations often forego opportunities to cooperate with their rivals because they fear being taken advantage of. This leads states to selectively engage with their enemies. Smith suggests that patterns of interstate cooperation can be attributed to states’ attempts to manipulate the domestic balance of power within target regimes to their own liking. He posits that leadership turnovers in dictatorships are likely to lead to improvements in their relations with their rivals and “sour slightly if relations had previously been poor.” In autocracies where anti-Western/pro-Soviet groups reigned supreme, the U.S. was more likely to forego cooperation in favor of strategies of containment and isolation in hopes of undermining the incumbent regime’s tenure. By contrast, where a pro-U.S. regime was in power, America was more cooperative in order to help the incumbent increase the amount of goods it could provide to its supporters, and boost its hold onto office.

If fighting is ex post inefficient, three explanations account for the recurrence of war over time: incomplete information, commitment problems and the indivisibility of

327 Smith, p. 856.
328 Ibid.
The treatment of cooperation as cheaper than war has gained law-like acceptance among most international relations theorists. However, a growing literature suggests peace is sometimes inefficient. For example, when the anticipated long-term costs of deterrence are greater than the costs of war, states are likely to be tempted to fight now so they can enjoy the “peace dividend” sooner. The costs of debt repayment can also make peace ex post inefficient because states can only repay their debts by winning the conflict, making cooperation more expensive than war. Finally, long shadows of the future, once considered to be critical to fostering collaboration, provide states with incentives to fight rather than collaborate with their rival neighbors.

If, like the costs of war, the costs of peace are borne by societies as a whole, why should the costs of cooperation be directly translated into political sanctions for leaders? Peace imposes a direct toll upon dictators in the form of an opportunity cost. War can have benefits that are not available to leaders during peacetime, such as allowing incumbents to eliminate the opposition, gamble for resurrection, and demonstrate their competence in military affairs.

States’ relationships with their enduring rivals are highly salient to mass and elite domestic audiences. Longstanding aims against external rivals are tied to a regime’s legitimacy to rule, making it harder to find adequate substitutes to resolve a conflict. The Arab-Israeli antagonism, for example, has persisted for such a long period of time that its resolution could present a challenge to the identity of some regimes in the Arab world because the in-group’s existence is contingent upon constructing Israel as an enemy “other.”

Peacemaking with a rival state may provide a dictator’s domestic critics with a focal point to coordinate their opposition against the incumbent. Authoritarian politics often takes place in the shadow of violence, compelling both ordinary citizens to falsify their preferences. The true level of public disapproval does not appear because citizens as well as elites fear retribution, from losing sources of patronage to harassment from local and state authorities to imprisonment and execution. When critics publicly voice approval of the regime, this leads the public and the regime to underestimate the strength of the opposition. Only a small number of ideologically committed individuals reveal their true criticism of the regime.

Average citizens are likely to wait for an opportune moment to express their disapproval and identify other like-minded critics. Peace settlements serve as a focal

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336 Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*.
point for critics to organize among themselves and protest against the regime. Autocrats who cooperate with long-standing rivals become vulnerable to “stab-in-the-back” accusations.\(^{339}\) This provides the opposition with an opportunity to challenge the regime’s legitimacy by portraying themselves as the only true patriots in the country.\(^{340}\) Mass protests can undermine a regime by creating schisms among key veto players, leading to a coup. They may also cascade into an all-out revolution or civil war.

Because the relationship between peacemaking and political survival in autocracies has been largely overlooked, there are few competing arguments to examine. Many theories suggest autocrats are unaccountable for their foreign policies. Selectorate theory argues dictators are free to pursue whatever policies they want as long as they provide their winning coalitions with private goods.\(^{341}\) Elites within the regime who are responsible for leadership turnovers are unconcerned with the leader’s ability to provide for national security and other public goods.\(^{342}\) They operate according to a motto of “steal from the poor, give to the rich.”\(^{343}\) David Lake’s powerful pacifists argument

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suggests we are unlikely to see challenges to autocrats because the public faces high costs when it comes to controlling the state.\textsuperscript{344}

\textbf{RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS}

When scholars are searching for linkages between foreign policy and domestic political survival, methodological difficulties may arise because leaders place a premium on retaining office. This is because decision-makers are unlikely to pursue policies that will jeopardize their hold on office, making it difficult to determine if the political repercussions hypothesized by a particular theory exist.\textsuperscript{345} Some Arab leaders have refused to reach peace agreements with Israel for fear of being overthrown or assassinated. In 1954, Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett opened a secret channel through the CIA to negotiate with Nasser. Nasser told his American interlocutors that he was likely to be assassinated by one of his own people if it became public knowledge that he was negotiating with the Israelis. He ended the talks once it was discovered the Israelis were operating a spy ring in Cairo.\textsuperscript{346} After the Six Day War, Israel made a secret peace offer to Jordan and Egypt that included a land-for-peace deal. However, when he was a teenager King Hussein stood next to his grandfather, King Abdullah I, when a radical Palestinian assassinated him for attempting to make peace with Israel. King Hussein of

\textsuperscript{344} David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37
Jordan rejected the deal because he was afraid that he would also be assassinated for accepting a deal with the Jewish state. These illustrative examples show that selection effects make it difficult to find evidence of domestic political sanctions in the real world. Direct tests are thus harder tests because they are biased against finding confirmatory evidence.

Case studies are useful for determining the existence of hypothesized causal mechanisms that link political survival to foreign policy decisions. I use the term causal mechanism to refer to “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced.” This paper examines the impact Anwar Sadat’s peacemaking with Israel had upon his domestic political survival. The logic of selection effects suggests that we should not see challenges to Sadat because of his political savvy. Many autocrats face ex post punishments upon leaving office. These range from banishment to incarceration to capital punishment. One would expect dictators to be particularly careful about the policies they pursue in order to protect themselves. Sadat in particular had a strong understanding of the Egyptian political scene, given that he was one of the few of the remaining original Free Officers who had managed to weather several of the political

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storms that beset Nasser’s regime.\textsuperscript{352} Upon becoming President, Sadat sought to restructure the Egyptian polity in order to ensure his political survival. He purged the Nasserist old guard and eventually broke up the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The ASU was split into three “platforms” that included regime-sponsored opposition parties designed rally mass support behind the regime.\textsuperscript{353} The case study method is advantageous because it can help to illuminate (1) whether the pursuit of a deal with Israel actually led to the outbreak of mass protests against the regime, and (2) if those protests were responsible for Sadat’s assassination.

**PEACEMAKING AND AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SURVIVAL:**

**SADAT AND THE AUTUMN OF FURY**

Rationalist theories of conflict conclude that war is *ex post* inefficient while cooperation, or reaching bargains that allow states to avoid the costs of war, is cheaper. While this may hold for states-as-unitary actors, it is unclear whether these same incentives translate into political boons for individual leaders. This section tests this argument by examining the political costs of cooperating with Israel for Anwar Sadat. Sadat sought peace with Israel as a means of coup-proofing. Upon entering office Sadat had been seen as little more than placeholder who would not be able to last beyond a year in the presidency. In order to coup-proof his regime and improve the Egyptian economy,


Sadat attempted to reach out to the west through a series of reforms known as the *infitah*, or “the opening.” In order to get closer to the United States and recover the Sinai, it would be necessary to make peace with Israel.\textsuperscript{354}

Sadat’s most notable accomplishments with respect to peacemaking came after the October War of 1973. Many observers of Egyptian politics have argued that the October War was initiated by Egypt out of frustration that Israel had not responded to overtures made soon after Sadat became President. Although there is insufficient space to recount the history of the conflict, Sadat was also motivated by a desire to bring the United States to the table in order to help broker a land-for-peace agreement that would result in the return of the Sinai.\textsuperscript{355}

Egypt and Syria’s surprising military effectiveness early in the conflict spurred American intervention to bring the war to an end and negotiate a series of ceasefires. After the war, Sadat accelerated the *infitah’s* Open Door to the west and took part in Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy to reach two cease-fires with Jerusalem, known as Sinai I and Sinai II. The Sinai I Agreement had been agreed to in December 1974. It was a ten-point memorandum in which Egypt agreed to reopen the Suez Canal and remove its forces from the west side of the canal, while the United States would provide photos obtained through aerial reconnaissance to both sides instead of putting into place a United Nations monitoring force. The Sinai II Agreement was agreed to in September 1975. This agreement bound both sides to agree not to use military force to resolve disputes and returned the oil fields in the Sinai to Egypt. The United States was able to keep Israel at

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the negotiating table by promising not to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as long as it refused to accept the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242 and 338.\textsuperscript{356} It also made side agreements with Israel with respect to arms shipments, guarantees over oil supplies, and a commitment to Israel’s security from attack from the Golan Heights if an agreement were reached with Syria.\textsuperscript{357}

By 1977, the Egyptian economy had failed to take off while the peace process was stalled. When the government attempted to cut the bread subsidy in response to IMF and World Bank pressure, bread riots broke out in several major cities, including Cairo. These proved to be the worst riots the country had seen since the fall of King Farouk nearly twenty-five years earlier. Feeling the only way to relieve Egypt’s dire economic straits was through greater access to American markets, Sadat backed down on the cuts and redoubled his efforts at reaching an agreement with Israel.\textsuperscript{358}

Eleven months after the Bread Riots, Sadat made a groundbreaking trip to Jerusalem where he addressed the Knesset. In September 1978, Egypt and Israel concluded the Camp David Accords. The accords had two frameworks, the first of which included a vague call for an autonomous Palestinian entity; the second framework established the principles for a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. While the former framework went largely unfulfilled, the latter established the broad outlines of the Egypt-Israel Treaty of 1979, including withdrawal of the Israeli military and civilian

\textsuperscript{356} UNSC 242 established the principle of “land for peace” and called for Israel to return to the June 4, 1967 borders in exchange for recognition. UNSC 338 was the ceasefire that ended the October War of 1973. The PLO accepted UNSC 242 in the early 1990s.


presence in the Sinai in exchange for returning the Sinai to Egypt, free Israeli passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, recognition of the Jewish state, and normalization of relations between the two erstwhile foes. The accords also included a pledge for billions of dollars in aid and military assistance from the United States on an annual basis to both sides. The Egypt-Israel Treaty brought about the demilitarization of the Sinai and implemented the schedule for its return to Egypt and the normalization of relations.\footnote{Quandt, \textit{Peace Process}, pp. 200-204.} Although Sadat bolstered his popularity with Egypt’s effectiveness during the October War of 1973, pursuing peace with Israel was unpopular contributing to the intense protests known as the “Autumn of Fury,” and culminated in his assassination in October 1981.

This section proceeds in two parts. The first part discusses Sadat’s strategy for domestic political survival, while the second section examines the political consequences of peacemaking with Israel.

\textit{Sadat’s Strategy for Domestic Political Survival}

The enduring rivalry between Egypt and Israel could best be described as a “highly salient relationship” that captured the attention and interest of elites and mass publics in both countries.\footnote{Anne E. Sartori, “Leadership Incentives, International Rivalry, and War,” Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3, 2006, pp. 7-9.} Of the disputes that collectively comprise the Arab-Israeli dispute, the rivalry between Egypt and Israel had been the most intense. Egypt and Israel had been trapped in a zero-sum conflict for thirty years, having fought repeatedly before
the 1979 treaty. Hope of reaching a war-avoiding agreement with Egypt died in the summer of 1954, when an Israeli-run spy ring in Cairo was discovered.\footnote{Zeev Maoz, \textit{Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009), pp. 399-404.}


As previously discussed in Chapter Two, Sadat succeeded Nasser in office upon the latter’s death from a heart attack in September 1970. In order to handle the challenges from within the regime and from the populace itself, the new Egyptian President pursued a two-pronged strategy.\footnote{Ferris, \textit{Nasser’s Gamble}, p. 296.} First, he eliminated Nasserist holdovers operating within the upper-echelons of the regime, starting with Vice President Ali
Sabri. Sadat was fearful that the coup attempt might have been instigated by the Soviet Union, motivating him to reach an accommodation with the United States.

Next, Sadat began the process of opening the country to foreign investment known as the *infitah* (the opening). This would undermine the beneficiaries of import-substitution in the old guard while helping dig Egypt out of its post-1967 economic slump. Sadat also moved to eliminate the Nasserists’ grip on power by reformatting the structure of contestation. He made public shows burning the feared Interior Ministry’s surveillance tapes while implementing a constitution that concentrated the powers to declare states of emergency and rule by martial law within the presidency itself. After having achieved an unexpected victory in the October War of 1973 and concluded the Sinai Agreements with Israel, Sadat broke up the ruling Arab Socialist Union into three separate parties referred to as *manbars*, or forums. Two of them would serve as loyal opposition parties: one on the left (the National Progressive Unionist Party, or NPUP), and another on the right (the *Ahrar* or Liberal Party). The third *manbar* would become the National Democratic Party (NDP), succeeding the ASU as the ruling party. Sadat hoped that by allowing the opposition a limited voice this would reduce their

incentives to oppose the regime while mobilizing the support of the public who were disappointed with the status quo.\textsuperscript{370}

As part of Egypt’s democratic opening, Sadat tolerated parties across the political spectrum, believing it would be nearly impossible for Islamists (starting with the Muslim Brotherhood) to cooperate with left-wing parties like the National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) against his regime.\textsuperscript{371} Proclaiming he was the “pious President,” Sadat gave political Islamists a limited role in the structure of contestation in order to counterbalance the left. He ordered the release of several political prisoners affiliated with the Brotherhood who had been jailed by Nasser.\textsuperscript{372} Egypt’s performance in the October War of 1973 was attributed to the religious zealousness of its soldiers.\textsuperscript{373} Coupled with repression, these maneuvers were designed to eliminate the Nasserists’ influence in Egypt.

\textit{Peacemaking and Political Survival: Cooperation with Israel and the Autumn of Fury}

After the conclusion of the Six Day War, on June 19, 1967 Israel made a secret overture to Egypt and Syria via the Johnson administration offering a land-for-peace arrangement. A few days later, Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, told the Israelis a few days later that the Egyptian and Syrian governments had rejected the

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., ch. 7; see also Ellen Lust-Okar, \textit{Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 112-125.
\textsuperscript{372} Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics,” lines 8047-8056.
\textsuperscript{373} Hinnebusch, \textit{Egyptian Politics Under Sadat}, pp. 113-114.
Three months later the Arab heads of government agreed to the “three no’s” of the Khartoum Resolution: no recognition of Israel; no direct negotiations with Israel; and no peace treaty with Israel. Although some Arab leaders privately disagreed with both the tone and substance of the Khartoum Resolutions, they feared the political repercussions of publicly dissenting. Many Arab leaders felt that after the Six Day War, their domestic survival would be imperiled if they attempted to reach a deal with the Jewish state.

Public criticism of the peacemaking with Israel accompanied much of Sadat’s diplomacy throughout the 1970s. However, the opposition grew to a fever pitch after the signing of the formal treaty with Israel because Egypt had made a separate peace with the Arab nation’s long-standing enemy without concern for the Palestinians, and was, in their eyes, facilitating Israeli aggression. This was evidenced by the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1978 and the attack on the Osirak reactor in the summer of 1981. A separate peace was more likely to undermine rather than enhance Egypt’s security: the safety of Egypt could only be guaranteed if it negotiated a treaty with Israel in concert with the rest of the Arab nation (qawmiyyah).

Sadat began reversing on the domestic opening of 1976 by cracking down on the critics of the peace treaty. He secured passage of the treaty by rigging the referendum and repressing Arab nationalists who opposed the peace process. 329 MPs approved the treaty on April 11, 1979, while the plebiscite received 99.5% of the vote. Foreign

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374 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, p. 407.
378 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 268.
journalists taped government employees stuffing ballot boxes. In the June parliamentary elections, the National Democratic Party (NDP) won a resounding 86.4% of the vote, while another 8% went to opposition parties that largely supported the treaty. Of the thirteen MPs who signed a letter to Sadat that criticized the treaty, two were re-elected (one of whom rallied his supporters to carry machine guns to polling places in order to ensure a fair count).\(^{379}\)

In May 1980, Sadat attempted to enhance his popularity by lifting Nasser’s “state of emergency” decree. However, this was an empty gesture as arbitrary arrests and twenty-four hour surveillance of the treaty’s critics continued.\(^{380}\) To stem the growing opposition to his regime, he reached out to the supporters of the Islamist opposition’s supporters by holding a referendum that, if passed, would state that Islam was the source of all laws. However, the referendum also included changes such as the elimination of term limits and codified the “Law of Shame.” The “Law’s” stated goal was to protect public morals by banning what the regime termed false or misleading news; in fact, it made it possible to prevent the critics of the 1979 treaty from running for public office.\(^{381}\)

The opposition parties’ ideological differences did not prevent them from voicing their opposition to Sadat’s policies.\(^{382}\) Instead, the peace treaty became a focal point for opposition parties to concentrate their efforts. Even one of the original components of the ASU that had been broken off to form part of the “loyal opposition,” the NPUP, rejected the peace process. The party was led by a handful of former Free Officers and

\(^{379}\) Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, p. 37.
\(^{380}\) Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World, pp. 60-66.
\(^{381}\) Brownlee, pp. 40-41.
\(^{382}\) Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World, pp. 112-125.
Nasirists and Arab nationalists were its core members.\textsuperscript{383} Its leaders argued that Sadat’s foreign policy failed to bring Egypt the prosperity that had been promised but had isolated Cairo from the rest of the Arab world.\textsuperscript{384}

After the bread riots of 1977, Sadat initiated another purge of the leftist opposition by passing laws forbidding non-violent protests.\textsuperscript{385} In 1978 Sadat created another loyal opposition party, the Socialist Labor Party (SLP). It was supposed to split the NPUP’s constituency in half by attracting middle class liberals who opposed the Islamists.\textsuperscript{386} However, the SLP also turned its back on Sadat as well. After initially endorsing the 1979 treaty, the SLP came to oppose normalization as long as Israel did not return to the June 4 line and there was no Palestinian state. This contributed to the SLP’s popularity, leading it to spearhead a mass protest against the opening of the Israeli embassy in February 1980.\textsuperscript{387}

Sadat adopted Islamist symbols,\textsuperscript{388} relying on political Islam to counter the nationalist left. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood had been content with a limited political role as long as its members did not have to suffer the harsh punishments imposed upon them during the Nasser era and were able to organize without harassment.\textsuperscript{389} However, Israel’s intervention in Lebanon in 1978 motivated the Brotherhood and similar groups to criticize Sadat’s foreign policy, arguing that Israel continued to occupy Muslim holy lands. Normalization would only pave the way for

\textsuperscript{383} Hinnebusch, \textit{Egyptian Politics Under Sadat}, p. 187.  
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., pp. 193-194.  
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., pp. 181-182.  
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., p. 167.  
\textsuperscript{388} Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics,” lines 8086-8095.  
“Jewish cultural and economic penetration...put[ting] the Arab world in danger of being swallowed up [by Israel].”

By May 1980, the peace process served as a focal point for the opposition to coordinate against the regime. The Lawyers’ Syndicate joined the opposition and helped opponents of Sadat’s coordinate with one another. By summer of 1981, these forces joined with the other syndicates in the country to oppose the treaty with Israel. The opposition cited the Knesset’s passage of a law making Jerusalem the indivisible capital of Israel and the Begin government’s attacks on the PLO in Lebanon as evidence that Sadat had abandoned the Palestinians and was helping promote Israeli aggression.

The regime’s continued support for normalising relations with Israel contributed to the outbreak of the protests known as the Autumn of Fury. By September 1981, nearly 1,500 of Sadat’s critics, including the Coptic Pope, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the brother of the man who would murder Sadat, were arrested. Khalid al-Islambouli and three fellow Islamic fundamentalists assassinated Sadat during a military parade on October 6, 1981 that was commemorating the October or Yom Kippur War of 1973. al-Islambouli later said that he was primarily motivated by the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Treaty of 1979.

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393 Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, p. 41.  
IMPLICATIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS

Using the case of Sadat’s peacemaking with Israel, I found that pursuing cooperation with an enduring rival could undermine a dictator’s domestic political survival. Contrary to the received wisdom, these challenges emerged from the general public rather than elites operating within the regime. I now consider questions and counter-arguments pertaining to my findings.

Don’t most international relations theorists believe autocracies are averse to cooperation?

Starting with Kant, some theorists have argued that non-democracies’ domestic structures and normative commitments predispose dictators to ignore policies of accommodation. Others have hypothesized that non-democracies’ tendency to engage in rent seeking is what breeds an imperialist bias in their foreign policies. However, none of these theories spell out the actual mechanism linking peacemaking and political survival. Kant suggests that dictators are at war with their own subjects, hypothesizing that cooperation will occur when established republics replace non-democracies. His work has no place for peacemaking or the political consequences of peacemaking by

dictators. Lake’s powerful pacifists argument suggests that we should see threats to autocrats from rent-seekers at the elite level because the public faces high costs of controlling the state. Sadat faced challenges from elites early in his presidency. However, he managed to consolidate power, only to later face challenges from the public.

What about other cases of peacemaking and political survival?

As previously mentioned, dictators such as Nasser and King Hussein avoided cooperating with Israel for fear of the political consequences. However, there have been other cases of dictators suffering political punishments for risking peace. King Abdullah I was interested in making peace with Israel after the war of 1948. However, Jordan’s territorial gains during the war forced the King to take into account the demands of a large number of Palestinians who were now part of the Hashemites’ kingdom. The Palestinians refused to accept a non-aggression pact with Israel that would freeze a territorial status quo they viewed as unjust. The political deadlock in Jordan contributed to Israeli apprehension over the negotiations with Amman and paved the way for Abdullah’s assassination by a radical Palestinian.

There are some cases where leaders did not suffer political setbacks for peacemaking. Mao was able to work with Nixon during the Cold War, and King Hussein was able to reach an agreement that established relations with Israel in 1994. The

absence of political repercussions for either dictator may have been due to the nature of the concessions required for peace. In the early 1970s, the U.S. distanced itself from Taiwan and did not require China to relinquish its claim to the island, while the agreement between Jordan and Israel only involved small territorial swaps between the two states.

*Will Dictators Suffer Political Sanctions for Cooperating with Non-Rivals? What About Cooperating With States With Whom They Have “Poor” Relations but are Not Their Enduring Rivals?*

It is important to note that this piece does not suggest that all forms of cooperation are hazardous to dictators’ political health. This argument does not suggest Tito’s or Ceausescu’s ability to work with the U.S. during the Cold War should have undermined their ability to retain office. Instead, autocrats are likely to be punished if they cooperate with states they have repeatedly fought in the recent past. As for cooperation between states that have poor relations but are not rivals: I use enduring rivalries as an admittedly high threshold for “bad” relationships between states. Some states may have a hostile relationship but do not engage in a sufficient number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) to constitute an enduring rivalry, such as the U.S. and Iran. However, the dynamics of this particular relationship are analogous to rivalries in terms of historical mistrust. At the time this is written, it is too early to determine whether the First Step Agreement will undermine either Supreme Leader Khamanei’s grip on power or President Rouhani’s incumbency. However, shortly after Barack Obama was elected President, Iranian hard-liners expressed fears that a rapprochement with the U.S. could
destroy the regime itself: “If we resolve it [issues between America and Iran], we will dissolve ourselves.”

CONCLUSION

This piece provides a first cut into the political consequences of peacemaking for non-democratic leaders. When dictators pursue cooperation with their nations’ enduring rivals, they risk their political survival. Autocracies often use foreign antagonisms as a means to legitimate their rule. When longstanding conflicts are resolved, they provide their domestic challengers with a focal point to organize against the regime and present themselves as a patriotic alternative to the incumbent. Ensuing protests threaten to unseat the nominal leadership by unleashing a secondary bandwagon of opposition movements, or by promoting a coup or revolution. In Egypt, peacemaking with Israel lead to the Autumn of Fury and the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

However, there are additional avenues for future research. The first direction begins with determining the results obtained here are generalizable beyond the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli dispute. A second direction is whether autocrats’ domestic pressures give them a bargaining advantage with their rivals (as arguments on hands-tying suggest), or if they make dictators seem unreliable and untrustworthy. A third direction to investigate is whether these same domestic pressures increase the credibility of secret diplomacy. Dictators who are likely to be punished for pursuing cooperation send a costly signal of their benign intent when they “go private,” or pursue secret

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diplomacy with an enemy. When they talk to an adversary behind closed doors, dictators are putting their domestic political survival in the target’s hands: if the target choose to make the content of the negotiations public, it could destroy the dictator’s hold onto power.  

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The research conducted in this dissertation makes four significant contributions to the literature. First, the signaling argument moves beyond the audience costs argument to discuss an alternative form of domestic political signaling available to authoritarian leaders. Like the audience costs argument and theories that build upon it (such as Schultz’s *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*), it suggests that the interaction between the incumbent government and the opposition can provide information to external states. However, there are notable differences. As noted, audience costs are only expensive *ex post*: in other words, leaders only suffer these sanctions *if* they renege on an agreement. However, the domestic political signals discussed here are costly *ex ante* and are more easily observable to external audiences. Schultz emphasizes that domestic political signaling in democracies is informative because of the value of biased information: because the opposition has incentives to expose bluffs, whenever it endorses the incumbent government’s public threats to use force foreign states are likely to be convinced of the credibility of the democracy’s commitment to fight. The domestic opposition’s access to private information, such as its ability to read intelligence agencies’ reports, is partly what makes its judgments so important to external audiences.\(^{402}\)

\(^{402}\) For a critique discussing the limits of opposition parties’ access to intelligence agencies’ information in the U.S., see Chaim D. Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the
According to Schultz’s logic, because opposition parties in autocratic regimes have no access to decision-makers’ private information, the interaction between the regime and the opposition should provide little insight to the outside world about the government’s intentions. I show that through the tools of repression and cooptation, dictatorships can use their domestic political constraints to send costly signals to outsiders.

Second, this work provides an important insight into the causes of cooperation. Geoffrey Blainey wrote, “For every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace.” Autocracies’ ability to cooperate with their rivals has been an issue of significant interest to American policymakers during and after the Cold War. However, we still know relatively little about why some of their signals are dismissed as cheap talk while others are taken seriously. The examination in this dissertation helps to begin to fill this gap.

Third, on a related note we know even less about the politics of peacemaking in autocracies. While the topic of democracy and cooperation has been covered from multiple angles and issue areas, the impact peacemaking with rival states has upon dictators’ tenure in power has been unexamined. In bringing the mass public in, I show that cooperating with an external adversary is not only risky because of the potential for getting the sucker’s payoff, but because it can set off a cascade of anti-regime sentiment that may damage the regime’s ability to hold onto power. I find that the Autumn of Fury


was not only the outgrowth of discontent over food prices, but general unhappiness with
Sadat’s pursuit of a settlement with Israel.

Fourth, autocrats have traditionally been portrayed as unconstrained decision-
makers at war with their own subjects. When it comes time to pay the bill for an
unsuccessful conflict, dictators do what they will but their citizens suffer what they must.
The recklessness of a Saddam Hussein immediately comes to mind. However, I find the
idea of the irresponsible, unaccountable autocrat to be a myth: as shown by the 1948 and
June 1967 wars with Israel, dictators who are subject to humiliating losses risk incurring
the wrath of the Arab Street.

THE AUTOCRATIC DIFFERENCE

At the end of each chapter I briefly discuss potential future avenues for research.
I return to some of these themes here. This dissertation explores authoritarian regimes’
ability to signal their intentions when bargaining with longstanding rivals with whom
they have territorial disputes. One obvious avenue for future research would be to
examine whether the signaling technology is effective across issue areas other than
territorial disputes between rivals, such as disagreements over nuclear proliferation and
support for non-state actors, such as guerrillas and terrorist organizations. A supplement
would examine whether the signaling technologies found in fully authoritarian regimes
were also found to be in existence in the Palestinian Authority (PA).

There are a few avenues that are worth exploring with respect to popular
constraints and the military effectiveness of authoritarian regimes. One involves
examining the selectivity of autocracies with respect to entering into Militarized
Interstate Disputes. A logical extension of the arguments here would suggest that regimes that are especially vulnerable to popular overthrow should be more selective about the fights they pick. If the argument here is correct, the more vulnerable a regime is, we should see two trends: especially vulnerable regimes should generally shy away from fights; and second, they should win the fights they pick. While the elaboration of a new typology of autocratic regimes is beyond the scope of this chapter, it has been suggested that regimes where the fate of the elites in the regime is decoupled from that of the leader himself are especially sensitive to mass protests. Treatments of dictatorships, such as Weeks’ work on autocratic audience costs, provide a useful starting point for determining elite accountability of nominal dictators.

Finally, a more comprehensive examination of the political costs of peacemaking and war is necessary. While this dissertation marks a first step in comparing the costs of military defeats to the costs of peacemaking, more research is needed. The competing risks models used by Chiozza and Goemans examine the political consequences of fighting versus not fighting, but say little about the effects of cooperation upon individual leaders’ ability to retain office.

404 See Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War; Scholars have elaborated upon multiple types of autocratic regimes. Many use Geddes’ typology, which distinguishes between personalist, military, and single-party regimes, as a jumping off point. See Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 51-88.

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