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On the Sequential Negotiation of Identity in Spanish-Language Discourse: Mobilizing Linguistic Resources in the Service of Social Action

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On the Sequential Negotiation of Identity in Spanish-Language Discourse:
Mobilizing Linguistic Resources in the Service of Social Action

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Hispanic Languages and Literatures

by

Chase Wesley Raymond

2014
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

On the Sequential Negotiation of Identity in Spanish-Language Discourse:
Mobilizing Linguistic Resources in the Service of Social Action

by

Chase Wesley Raymond
Doctor of Philosophy in Hispanic Languages and Literatures
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014
Professor John Heritage, Co-chair
Professor Claudia Parodi-Lewin, Co-chair

This dissertation takes an ethnomethodologically-grounded, conversation-analytic approach in investigating the sequential deployment of linguistic resources in Spanish-language talk-in-interaction. Three sets of resources are examined: 2nd-person singular reference forms (tú, vos, usted), indicative/subjunctive verbal mood selection, and Spanish-English intersentential code-switching. In each case, we ask: How is it that these elements of language are mobilized by speakers to accomplish identity in the service of social action in interaction?

With regard to 2nd-person reference forms, we illustrate how the turn-by-turn progression of talk can make relevant shifts in the linguistic means through which speakers refer to their hearers. It is demonstrated that these shifts contribute to the objective of an utterance by mobilizing the pragmatic meaning of a pronominal form to embody a recalibration of who the
interactants project they are to one another—not in general, but rather at a particular moment in the ongoing interaction.

In the case of verbal mood selection, we analyze the production of indicative (realis) vs. subjunctive (irrealis) morphology in syntactic constructions that license the use of either mood. It is argued that accounts of verbal mood selection which are based solely on individual-level cognitive realities fall short of explaining the moment-by-moment, dialogic production of morphology in sequences of naturalistic social interaction.

Finally, in examining Spanish-English code-switching practices, we posit a parallel between language discordance and other sorts of nonconforming responsive utterances, arguing that code-switching in second position claims epistemic independence or primacy with regard to the knowledge invoked in the prior turn. Like repetitional responses in monolingual talk-in-interaction, code-switched turns in second position make a structural break with the language terms, constraints, and expectations set up by the first position turn, and thus they agentively resist the design of that previous turn to (re)assert their rights to the knowledge in question.

Through the systematic analysis of this diverse array of interactional resources, it is argued that the deployment of linguistic structure is an integral component of how human identities are (re-)created—in and through social interaction with others. By grounding our inquiry in what Harold Garfinkel referred to as “members’ resources” for producing and recognizing action, we are able to reconceptualize identity as a sequentially-conditioned, malleable, and collaborative achievement between co-participants in talk. The dissertation as a whole thus actively problematizes the commonly held sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic views of speaker identities and situated contexts as immutable constructs, and instead argues in favor of more micro-level conceptualizations of these phenomena as emergent features of the moment-by-moment discourse being co-constructed through the deployment of linguistic structure.
The dissertation of Chase Wesley Raymond is approved.

Adriana J. Bergero

Antonio Carlos Quicoli

John Heritage, Committee Co-chair

Claudia Parodi-Lewin, Committee Co-chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2014
To my family:

To my grandmother, Lorraine,
who taught me to love school.

To my grandmother, Doris, and my mother, Alice,
who taught me to be (what my 4th grade report card referred to as) a “social butterfly.”

To my grandfather, Richard, and my father, Dale,
for being the example of the type of man I want to be.
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Whenever I look at a dissertation, I always read the acknowledgments first. I imagine that most readers probably skip them altogether, but I feel as though they give me a small glimpse at who the writer is as a person, beyond the carefully constructed analysis that is to come.

Although it is typical to begin by thanking the members of one’s dissertation committee, in my opinion these individuals are the final step in a journey that began several years prior. So I’d like to begin by thanking my parents who, from a young age, challenged my emergent understanding of the world and were quick to make me think outside of the box. Because this is a dissertation about conversation, take the following brief exchange between young, nine-year-old Chase and his mother, driving down Harbor Boulevard, as an example of this:

01 CHASE: Why do car dealerships always put out so many balloons?
02 MOM: It’s such a waste of money!
03 CHASE: It’s to get people’s attention.
04 CHASE: That’s dumb. That doesn’t work.
05 Just because you put out balloons doesn’t mean you’re going to get people’s attention.
06 MOM: They got your attention, didn’t they?
07 CHASE: ((wide eyes/mouth))

In addition to my parents, I am extremely grateful to my grandmother, Lorraine, who initially sparked my love for education. One school-related memory of her that I am particularly fond of has to do with those homework assignments that they used to give you for math in elementary school. You would do arithmetic problems inside a picture, and then all of the 7’s would get colored blue, and all of the 9’s would get colored red, and so on; and in the end it would be a colored picture based on your answers. From an early age, I found the coloring aspect of such assignments an enormous waste of time—especially when I could be outside playing, or perhaps building a fort of some kind. Grandma Lorraine would always say, “You do the math; I’ll color
in the picture”. And that’s the way it was from addition, to subtraction, to multiplication, to division. Fortunately, no coloring was required in the writing of this dissertation.

I arrived at UCLA as an undergraduate in the fall of 2005. One of the first courses I took was Spanish Syntax with Professor Claudia Parodi. This introductory class got me hooked on the structure of language, and after working with her throughout my undergraduate career, it was she who put the idea of graduate school in my head. I am honored to have worked with her for nearly a decade now, during which time her emotional support has been as forthcoming as her academic guidance. One of the most important lessons that I have learned from Prof. Parodi has been to seek out novel perspectives—methodological, theoretical, empirical, etc.—to answer questions; and I hope that this dissertation reflects that training.

It was this guidance that initially led me to seek out Professor John Heritage in the Department of Sociology. From John, I not only learned the method of Conversation Analysis, but I was also immediately struck—and I continue to be struck—by his passion for the details that make up human social interaction. His excitement is truly contagious. And while I don’t want to say too many nice things about him here—lest he get ‘peas above sticks’!—I am quite confident that I would not have pursued conversation-analytic research if it were not for his example. (The fact that we spend about three-quarters of our time poking fun at one another and laughing doesn’t hurt either.)

If the guidance I provide to my future students is half as good as the guidance that my two co-chairs have provided me, I will consider that a great success.

Additionally, I am very grateful to Professors Carlos Quicoli and Adriana Bergero for serving on my committee. They embraced the project from the beginning and provided very useful feedback and encouragement throughout the writing process.
I must also thank two other faculty members, Professors Steve Clayman and Tanya Stivers, who have also been instrumental in my training as a conversation analyst and as an academic more generally. I have shown up to both of their offices on several occasions (usually unannounced) with random questions about social interaction; and in each and every case, I left the room with a more complete understanding of the phenomenon in question. I am additionally indebted to Tanya for listening to my complaints and ‘freak outs’ during the preparation of this dissertation, and for always offering support and reassurance to get me back on track. My thanks also to Wendy Fujinami for being my savior for all things administrative (and there were a lot of ‘things’).

MyUCLA tells me that, during my time at UCLA, I have taught 787 students in 21 different courses, across the Departments of Spanish & Portuguese, Linguistics, French & Francophone Studies, Sociology, and Communication Studies. Each day that I spend in the classroom renews my passion for this profession, and I owe that feeling to my students.

My thanks to all of my fellow graduate students for helping me maintain my sanity throughout this process, especially: Mariška Bolyanatz, Franny Brogan, Jhonni Carr, KC Collins, Dwight Davis, Mike DeLand, Becca DiBennardo, Ashley Gromis, Armando Guerrero, Laura Kalin, Lisa Kietzer, Covadonga Lamar Prieto, Laura Loeb, Laura McPherson, Wendy Perla Kurtz, Chris Rea, Kevin Shih, Alex Tate, Ariana Valle, Belén Villarreal, and Kaeli Ward. A special thanks to Ian Romain for countless discussions about Noam, and to Anne White for never providing affiliative uptake to anything I say.

I am also extremely fortunate to have the support of a wonderful network of friends and family outside the walls of graduate school. These individuals are the true heroes because they’ve had to listen to my obsessions with language, so they deserve special thanks for humoring me: Lori and Dan Cruz; the Bettencourts; the Hueys; Rob Zahradka (Churlyn;
Poooor!; Jon (hmmm?) and Nicole (ennnnjoy!) Guillaume; Alba Cornejo (Brandon?) and the Boo Crew; Dr. Henry, Nancy (Most good!) and the Fausto Family; and the Cerros family.

Finally, it should be noted that the majority of this dissertation was written with my dog, Chencho, lying across my lap. Because my analyzing a piece of data or writing a chapter was synonymous with he and I not playing, he in effect dedicated nearly as much time to this project as I did. And while he unfortunately is no longer with us to see the finished product, I like to think he’d like it.
VITA

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**Book Chapters**


Raymond, Chase Wesley. (Frth.). Dialectos, identidades y tratamientos en el discurso cotidiano: Un argumento concreto a favor de los métodos mixtos en las investigaciones dialectológicas y sociolingüísticas. To appear in: Ramón Manuel Pérez and Jimena Rodríguez (eds.), *Volumen colectivo en celebración de la trayectoria académica de Claudia Parodi*.

Approaching the Relationship Between Language, Identity, and Action

One of my favorite comedians, the late George Carlin, confessed in a 2004 interview with CNN: “If I hadn’t chosen the career of being a performer, I think Linguistics would have been a natural area that I’d have loved—to teach it, probably...Language has always fascinated me” (Leopold 2004).\(^1\) An innate curiosity about the uses of language in everyday life was a staple in Carlin’s career from beginning to end. He rose to fame in the early 1970s with his controversial stand-up act entitled “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television”—a routine that would soon force the comedian to defend himself against charges of obscenity at the U.S. Supreme Court. But the profane end of the linguistic spectrum with which he is most often associated was not the only extreme that captured Carlin’s interest. On the contrary, he was also vehemently intrigued by what he dubbed everyday “soft” language.

As a case-in-point of what he was referring to, Carlin described the process of boarding an airplane and listening to the safety procedures prior to takeoff:

[\textit{Mimicking the voice of a stewardess}] “In the unlikely event of a water landing…”
[\textit{He grimaces and looks around, confused.}] Well, what exactly is…a… “water landing”? Am I mistaken… Or does this sound somewhat similar to… CRASHING INTO THE OCEAN?! 

\textit{(George Carlin: Jammin’ in NY, 1992)}

\(^1\) In addition to coursework, my conceptualization of the links between language and identity was greatly influenced by discussions with my colleagues in the Centro de Estudios del Español de Estados Unidos (CEEEUS), in addition to countless one-on-one theoretical and philosophical debates with Ian Romain about how precisely to go about studying the many faces of language. I am indebted to Tanya Stivers for sharing her cross-disciplinary knowledge and experience as I developed this chapter. My thanks also to Covadonga Lamar Preto for her detailed comments on an earlier draft.
This sort of “soft” language formed the basis of Carlin’s admittedly pessimistic point of view that: “By and large, language is a tool for concealing the truth”.

Setting aside for a moment the part about truth, Carlin’s fundamental observation is surprisingly apt given the theoretical and methodological drive of this dissertation: Language is indeed a tool—or better yet, a set of multiple tools. Language does not exist simply to exist, nor does it survive in isolation from us, its users. Rather, it coexists with us, it helps define us, and we use it to do things in our lives. And while one of those actions may in fact be, as Carlin describes, an attempt at masking the truth, we primarily spend our time using the resources of language to accomplish the mundane tasks of everyday social interaction: “requesting, inviting, granting, complaining, agreeing, telling, noticing, rejecting, and so on” (Schegloff 2007a: xiv).²

In the chapters that follow, we focus on some of the specific tools available to speakers of Spanish which allow interactants to construct their identity (or identitïés, as the case may be) in the service of social action—on a moment-by-moment basis as they engage with one another in talk. Such a maximally intimate conceptualization of the relationship between language and identity cannot be taken as self-evident, though, and thus this introductory chapter serves to situate and motivate the present approach vis-à-vis other prevalent methods in linguistic research.

1.1 APPROACHING IDENTITY IN LINGUISTIC RESEARCH

No research topic hits home in quite the same way as do those that deal with the concept of identity. After all, identity describes who we are as human beings and is therefore at the core of everything we do. In a very real sense, we are all already experts in identity because we live our own in every moment of every day.

² Throughout this dissertation, double quotation marks are used to quote exactly from sources. I occasionally use single quotation marks to indicate invented examples or colloquialisms.
A parallel assertion can easily be made about language. Each of us utters about 16,000 words on a daily basis (Mehl, et al. 2007) as we dialogue not only with friends, family, and coworkers, but also with the new barista at the coffee shop and that complete stranger who just asked for directions on the subway. Yet we very rarely think about how to actually carry out social interaction via language—it just happens.

An immediate predicament, then, is how best to deal with these two aspects of being human that we naturally do (for the most part) quite perfectly, day in and day out. Should we attempt to study language and identity in tandem, or is it best to pursue each independently? Moreover, if we choose to investigate them together, how do we intertwine them? And if we analyze each individually, how do we go about separating one from the other? What is gained and what is lost with each methodological and analytical decision regarding the meaning of language and the meaning of identity, as well as the connection between them?

In theory, the rationale for electing one method over another should be clear: A specific sort of question necessitates a specific approach. Unfortunately, though, academic debates are rarely so straightforward. In fact, Deborah Tannen (2002) has noted and criticized the all-too-common practice in academic discourse of employing military metaphors to “defend” one’s own ideas and theories and “attack” those of others. From the generative, experimental, and social linguists in departments of Linguistics, to those in language departments, and from the linguistic anthropologists, language ideologists and discourse analysts in Applied Linguistics and in Anthropology, to the conversation analysts in Sociology and Communication Studies, it is no secret that the study of language is one such battleground over who has the so-called ‘correct’ approach, the illusion of course being that there is only one.

Throughout my interdisciplinary training as a linguist, I have witnessed firsthand the way in which “Unfair criticism often grows out of a failure to understand or appreciate the
disciplinary context in which other researchers are working, and the methodologies they employ” (Tannen 2002: 1665). Considering that the way in which a given (sub)field conceptualizes language and identity is often at the heart of these criticisms—and given the methodological thrust of this dissertation as a whole—it is fitting to tease out briefly how identity factors into the study of language in a few distinct approaches. This discussion will serve not only as a stepwise movement toward the particular method to be employed in the present work, but also as a demonstration of the fact that these approaches are not necessarily in competition with one another as is often presumed; rather, they differ based on their discipline-specific questions, aims, and motivations which compel researchers to view identity in distinctive ways.

1.1.1 Generative Grammar

An example from one end of the identity conceptualization ‘spectrum’ is generative grammar. Take, for instance, the well-known Chomskyan framework of transformational-generative grammar for the study of (morpho-)syntax (Chomsky 1957, et seq.). Within this experimental paradigm, sentences are typically invented and subsequently judged as “grammatical”, “ungrammatical” (*) or something in between (e.g., ?, ??, ???, and so on) (cf. Carnie 2002: 6-12). Only one feature of identity is attended to in this approach: A language consultant must be a native speaker of the language or dialect in question. Given that, it doesn’t matter if s/he is male or female, Black or White, 25 or 45 years of age, at home or in the lab—as long as s/he speaks the target language or dialect natively. This is plainly seen in scholarly works which present grammaticality judgments as facts without reference to how those judgments were acquired (by whom, when, etc.).³

³ See Schütze (1996) for an overview of the use of grammaticality judgments in the development of linguistic theory.
As this all-inclusive view of identity is a basal theoretical claim in generative grammar inquiries, we must remind ourselves of the goals of this specific approach to the study of language. Generative grammar aims to uncover the possibilities of linguistic structure. In other words it asks: What is the human brain capable of processing with regard to language? What is allowed (i.e., grammatical) and what is not allowed (i.e., ungrammatical)? And so the syntactician constantly attempts to stretch and pull and tug on the structure of sentences to discover what limits exist and where they lie. Indeed, as Sportiche, Koopman and Stabler (2014: 43) describe, “this conception defines our field of linguistics as a branch of cognitive psychology”.

Take as an example of this cognitive-experimental process the formulation of a WH-question. In languages like Spanish and English, we can replace a direct object with a WH-word and move it to the front of the sentence to produce a question. Thus, the sentences in (1a) can be transformed into the questions in (1c) through (1b):

(1) a. Juan estaba comiendo zanahorias.  
John was eating carrots.

b. ¿Juan estaba comiendo qué?  
John was eating what?

c. ¿Qué estaba comiendo Juan <qué>?  
What was John eating <what>?

Note, however, the ungrammaticality, in both languages, of the seemingly identical process in going from (2a) to (2c) through (2b):

(2) a. Juan miraba a la mujer que estaba comiendo zanahorias.  
John was looking at the woman who was eating carrots.

---

4 For the sake of simplicity, I have omitted discussion of subject-verb inversion.
b. ¿Juan miraba a la mujer que estaba comiendo qué?
   John was looking to the woman who was eating what

J was looking to the woman that was eating what

Juan was looking at the woman who was eating what?

c. *¿Qué miraba Juan a la mujer que estaba comiendo qué?
   *What was looking J to the woman that was eating what

*What was John looking at the woman who was eating what?

This is known as the WH-Island Constraint: The relative clause [que estaba comiendo qué] or [who was eating what] constitutes an ‘island’ out of which the lower WH-word qué/what cannot escape (Chomsky 1977; Ross 1967). With this simple judgment of grammaticality, we have identified a tiny piece of the generative syntactic puzzle. As we then combine this piece with others, the bigger picture of how the human brain derives, parses, and processes syntactic structures at a more overarching level begins to come together (i.e., notions of phrase structure, A-/A’-movement, successive cyclicity, phases, and so on).

As one can imagine, this stretching and pulling to test grammatical boundaries very quickly becomes quite complicated; and thus an immediate criticism from linguists who do not work within this paradigm is that *People would never say such ludicrous sentences!* However, there is no claim by generative syntacticians that speakers actually produce their convoluted phrases in everyday life—what people actually do in interaction is not their interest. Rather, the emphasis is on human cognitive abilities. This is the classic Saussurian langue vs. parole debate (de Saussure 1959 [1969]; also known as competence vs. performance or I-(nternal) vs. E-(xternal) Language, Chomsky 1986b, 2001: 49, fn. 2); and it is perhaps the most misleading (and consequently criticized) point in all of Chomsky’s writings. I take up this discussion briefly here in an attempt to clarify the situation.

Chomsky, and other generative linguists, argue that naturalistic speech is too “degenerate”—filled with too many false starts, pauses, and so on—to be capable of revealing native speakers’ linguistic competence, i.e., their ability to construct and process grammatical
sentences. Therefore he recommends that I-Language be used to develop an understanding of those cognitive linguistic abilities which are innate—such as agreeing that (1c) above contains completely legitimate Spanish and English questions while those in (2c) sound massively strange. While E-Language, or language in use, can indeed be used to study other aspects of language and its communicative abilities, it is not an adequate method to uncover fine-grained rules like those just described. Following the tradition of philosophers of language like Wilhelm von Humboldt (1999 [1836]), Chomsky fully acknowledges that “Language is a process of free creation,” and that “The manner in which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied. Even the interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation” (1987 [1970]: 152). However, within that freedom of actual use by various individuals, in various contexts, with various interlocutors, he emphasizes that language’s “laws and principles are fixed”. No matter who you are, whom you are talking to, whether you’re at home, at the office or in a court of law: Native speakers of Spanish/English will agree that (1c) is grammatical while (2c) is not. And even though individuals occasionally make ‘mistakes’ when speaking, they still agree that ‘casa blanca’ is correct and normal, while ‘casa blanco’ is not; that ‘this dog’ is perfect, but ‘these dog’ is awful; that ‘Turn the light on’ can become ‘Turn it on’, but ‘Turn on the light’ cannot become ‘Turn on it’. Generative grammar takes such consensuses as its points of departure—as human problems to be investigated rather than simply taken for granted; and the field aims to explicate the cognitive processing restrictions involved in arriving at those opinions.

As Searle (1972) and Goodwin and Heritage (1990) rightly describe, the Chomskyan revolution in linguistic theory became so popular that non-generative approaches to the study of language were/are often excluded from being categorized as Linguistics ‘proper’. But the generative approach to data and theory must not be misconstrued as a proclamation that it is the
only way to study Language as a whole, in all its facets; that is not the claim. The assertion is rather that it is the best way to study innate Internal-Language, or competence. External language, or performance, is explicitly recognized to be a separate issue altogether. Moreover, as Chomsky himself has explicitly asserted: “There is no conflict between those who choose to study intensively the ‘narrow’ question of the basic principles of core grammar, and those who hope to be able to gain some understanding of such questions as, say, the use of language in concrete situations” (1988: 234).

This discussion is intimately connected to the present consideration of the relationship between language and identity, as well as how best to pursue these topics in our research. Precisely because generative grammar is concerned with the universal cognitive processing rules that govern language in humans, individual identities of speakers and hearers, situated contexts and other aspects of real-time language in use are inconsequential for their pursuits; and so they are set aside.

1.1.2 Sociolinguistics

For some questions about language, however, the category human is simply too all-inclusive. Researchers also want to understand specific subsets of humans, and thus some differentiation of human identities must be taken into account if we are to decompose the overarching categorization into meaningful (and analyzable) social subgroups. That is, as the scope of the research inquiry changes, so must our methodological approach to the connection between identity and language.

In a recent article titled “Three Waves of Variation Study: The Emergence of Meaning in the Study of Variation”, Penelope Eckert (2012) very clearly describes three methodological and analytical trends in sociolinguistics, from the 1960s to present day. The author explains that “the first wave of variation studies established broad correlations between linguistic variables
and the macrosociological categories of socioeconomic class, sex, class, ethnicity, and age” (87).

These analyses were inspired by the foundational work of William Labov (e.g., 1966) on the stratification of varieties of English in New York City.

An example of such classic Lobovian sociolinguistics applied to the Spanish-speaking world can be found in Fontanella de Weinberg’s (1974a, 1974b) description of coda /s/-reduction in Buenos Aires. Coda /s/ refers to phonemic /s/ found in syllable- and word-final position. The aspiration process causes words like <estado> ‘state’ and <latas> ‘tins’ to be pronounced as [ɛχ.'t̪a.ðo] and ['la.ta(h)]. Fontanella de Weinberg demonstrated that the amount of reduction of /s/ corresponded to socioeconomic class divisions as depicted in FIGURE 1.1:

![Rate of Aspiration](image)

**FIGURE 1.1: Aspiration of /s/ and Socioeconomic Class in Buenos Aires**

While lower-class high aspiration may be attributed to a lack of education, middle class low rate of aspiration (i.e., maintenance of the prescriptive/‘standard’ [s]) is argued as reflecting a desire to improve their socioeconomic status. Furthermore, male speakers in all classes reduced /s/ more so than did females who maintained the prestige form with higher frequencies, a sex-based divergence that has been observed in numerous languages and societies, as attested to by Wodak and Gertrude (1997), amongst others.

Particularly in Hispanic sociolinguistics, with its deep roots in traditional philology, geographical distinctions have long been used as features of identity for dialectological pursuits. Studies of aspiration, such as those by Fontanella de Weinberg in Argentina, combine with others to develop hypotheses about both synchronic and diachronic variation across the
Spanish-speaking world. Soon, we are presented with panoramic dialectal regions of shared features: *tierras bajas* (coasts/lowlands, which participate in /s/-weakening, amongst other phonological processes) and *tierras altas* (inlands/highlands, which do not) (cf. Lipski 1994; Menéndez Pidal 1962; Parodi 1995, 2003, 2004, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). **Figure 1.2** depicts some of these regions, although aspiration is also found along the Pacific coast (e.g., in La Paz and parts of Sonora and Jalisco).

![Figure 1.2: Aspiration vs. Non-aspiration of /s/ in Spanish-speaking Countries](image)

In Labovian (or “first wave”) sociolinguistics, then, accounting for identity is conceptualized as a process similar to that of checking census boxes: A speaker is male or female, and males do one thing linguistically while females do another. A speaker is upper, middle or lower class, and each socioeconomic class displays distinct linguistic features (cf. **Figure 1.1**). Speakers from geographic region *X* pattern differently than speakers from geographic region *Y* (cf. **Figure 1.2**). Overarching, typically quantitatively grounded results are the objective of this wave in order to give panoramic views of how different sets of stable identities produce
language. Traditional sociolinguists thus do not take shifting, moment-to-moment features of identity into account because they are not relevant to the overall statistical tendencies which analysts are attempting to uncover.

1.1.3 Moving More ‘Micro’: Language in Use

Once again, just as we noted in transitioning from generative grammar’s view of identity (i.e., human) to that of sociolinguistics (e.g., sex, socioeconomic class, geographic region, etc.), these overarching identity categories can prove too broad to allow us to pursue certain questions about language. That is, the context-specific pieces of identity which operate within sexes and socioeconomic classes—those ‘bits’ of identity that are not statistically significant in our analysis of general trends—do indeed become significant if our interests involve the moment-by-moment use of language in everyday life. In fact, Eckert (2012) specifically argues in favor of sociolinguists developing such interests as she lays the theoretical foundation for a contemporary “third wave” in variation studies which views speakers as actively creating their identity with language: “…not as passive and stable carriers of dialect, but as stylistic agents, tailoring linguistic styles in ongoing and lifelong projects of self-construction…” (97-98). Yet even amongst those who agree that identity is an everyday accomplishment that can be realized through language, precisely how that is done is nonetheless a fiercely debated issue.

This dissertation argues in favor of the ethnomethodologically grounded approach to talk-in-interaction known as Conversation Analysis (CA). While the technical details of this theory and method will be laid out in greater depth in Chapter 3, here I outline the rationale behind CA’s fundamental argument of examining identity on a moment-by-moment basis from the point of view of the co-participants themselves in interaction. In other words, when compared to the other methodologies reviewed in this chapter, Conversation Analysis embodies a maximally micro-level interpretation of identity which seeks to understand “the ways in which interactants
particularize their contributions [to talk] so as to exhibit attention to the ‘this-one-here-and-now-for-us-at-this-point-in-it’ character of the interaction” (Schegloff 1972: 115). Indeed there is much overlap\footnote{Note numerous discourse and conversation analysts publishing in the Journal of Pragmatics, for example.} between this school of thought and others with which linguists are more commonly familiar, e.g., pragmatics and discourse analysis (DA); thus, in continuing this discussion, I aim to tease out some of the subtle yet crucial differences that exist between their divergent conceptualizations of identity.

1.2 DISTINGUISHING CONVERSATION ANALYSIS FROM OTHER APPROACHES

Pragmatics is a subfield of Linguistics interested in the ways that context affects the meaning of language (Levinson 1983). It is thus a set of topics which is approached and analyzed from a variety of perspectives and with a variety of methodologies, the objective being to explain how speakers employ language in different situations. The same can be said of discourse analysis in that the term is used to categorize analysis not only of naturally-occurring spoken interaction, but also scripted talk, speeches, written texts, and so on—and with diverse methods. The great majority of work done on Spanish language discourse can be classified under these umbrellas, quite often with reference made to theories of politeness, as we will review in Chapter 2.

Conversation Analysis (CA), on the other hand, is not a topic pursued by diverse methodologies; rather, it is itself both a theory \textit{and} a methodology which examines how humans interact as social beings. In contrast with the linguistic origins of Pragmatics, CA was borne out of the sociological tradition of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967; cf. Heritage 1984b), the relevance being that it does not emphasize linguistic structure as an end goal in and of itself, but instead focuses on \textit{social interaction} between co-participants in talk. As Goodwin and Heritage (1990: 283) put it, “[CA] seeks to describe the underlying social organization—conceived as an
institutional substratum of interactional rules, procedures, and conventions—through which orderly and intelligible social interaction is made possible.” Of course, humans certainly make active use of linguistic structure in how they ‘do’ social interaction, and this is precisely the reason that Schegloff (1991: 46) describes the approach as existing:

at a point where linguistics and sociology (and several other disciplines, anthropology and psychology among them) meet. For the target of its inquiries stands where talk amounts to action, where action projects consequences in a structure and texture of interaction which the talk is itself progressively embodying and realizing, and where the particulars of the talk inform what actions are being done and what sort of social scene is being constituted.

One of the most crucial points of divergence between CA’s conceptualization of identity as compared to that of pragmatics and discourse analysis, concerns the characterizations that analysts make. As Márquez Reiter and Placencia (2005: 79) succinctly explain in their introducing several approaches to Spanish discourse: “For sociopragmaticists, the examination of language as a vehicle for social interaction is also central [as it is in Conversation Analysis], although not from the same perspective”. They go on to explain that:

Most work carried out by Hispanists where CA analytical concepts are employed cannot be labeled ethnomethodological as their work reflects a different understanding of reality. The goal of most Hispanists is to go beyond the description of structures of talk-in-interaction to the explanation of their use in relation to sociocultural factors...

While the authors suggest that, compared to (socio)pragmaticists, conversation analysts are uninterested in “sociocultural factors” (a commonplace critique of the methodology as a whole; cf. Schegloff 1999a), this is an altogether inaccurate criticism. Quite to the contrary, CA is vehemently concerned with the complex layering of multiple (social) factors which contribute to the participants’ identities—including the individual, the society, the situated context and culture, etc.—because interactants can and do embody this complexity in and through their turns-at-talk. But therein lies the fundamental distinction between traditional pragmatics/discourse analysis and the CA approach employed here: The participants in the actual interaction must orient to these features of identity in order for us, as analysts, to take them into consideration from a grounded, ethnomethodological perspective.
(Socio)Pragmaticists and discourse analysts, in contrast, often argue that these sociocultural elements are pre-established and omnipresent, imposing them at the level of the analysis without consideration for the participants’ own understanding of the situation at hand.

The rationale behind the CA point of view is straightforward but commonly misunderstood (and consequently disputed). As Schegloff (1987b: 215) explains:

Indeed, the most serious problem is that early introduction of such linkages to macro-level variables (and, with them, to a compelling political/ vernacular relevance) tends to preempt full technical exploration of the aspects of interaction being accounted for and the micro-level mechanisms that are involved in their production. There is a potential for analytic losses at both the micro and macro levels.

Because our identities are infinitely divisible and so multi-faceted, how different components thereof come to bear on any sequence of talk must be understood as contextualized and content-driven—in the actual interaction—, not superimposed by the researcher in a top-down fashion. Schegloff goes on to give the following example of a doctor and patient interacting in a medical setting:

The fact that they are “in fact” respectively a doctor and a patient does not make those characterizations ipso facto relevant (as is especially clear when the patient is also a doctor); their respective ages, sex, religions, and so on, or altogether idiosyncratic and ephemeral attributes (for example, “the one who just tipped over the glass of water on the table”) may be what is relevant at any point in the talk (219; cf. also Schegloff 1992c).

If we restate this idea using the ‘checking boxes’ metaphor employed earlier to describe sociolinguistic approaches to identity, CA takes the stance that the boxes sociolinguists and discourse analysts check are not always relevant to the participants in conversation (Schegloff 1997; cf. Billig 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1998b, 1999a, 1999c; Stokoe & Smithson 2001; Wetherell 1998). In other words, each moment in interaction requires a reassessment of which boxes are included on the list, as well as which are checked. And furthermore, the interactants themselves have to check them through their contributions to the talk. CA’s conceptualization of identity thus goes beyond the more ‘macro’ features included in sociolinguistic research, entering into the moment-by-moment displays of who participants are to one another at each
point in the ongoing interaction. Who are we, as analysts, to claim that the two participants in Schegloff’s example are doing what they are doing at each moment because one is a doctor and the other is a patient? Or because one is a man and the other is a woman? Or because one is Black and the other is White? What gives those particular ‘identity boxes’ omnipresent salience in the interaction as opposed to others? Other, more finely-grained aspects of identity—which change with each new turn-at-talk produced—are of essential import to how interactions unfold. For instance, Participant A may have primary rights to assess something in a bit of conversation, and the design of his turns-at-talk will embody that state of affairs (cf. G. Raymond & Heritage 2006); but primary rights may go to Participant B thirty seconds later regarding a different assessment, and the interactants’ talk will reflect as well as constitute that shift in identity. Such a micro-level inquiry with regard to language in use necessitates employing a method of analysis which will allow—or, rather, require—us to take such constantly evolving identities into consideration on a moment-by-moment basis—just as do the co-participants themselves in interaction.

This notion of identities being “talked into being”⁶ (Heritage 1984b) has an important impact on the data used in the analysis as well, yet another point of divergence between Conversation Analysis and the other methodologies being discussed in this section. In addition to Pragmatics’ general acceptance of hypothesized/invented examples, the field also presents and examines single utterances (i.e., “speech acts”; Austin 1962; Searle 1969) absent a sequential context. This practice consequently disallows the analysis of sequentially created identities which are evoked, modified, affirmed, defended, abandoned, and so forth on a turn-by-turn basis as an interaction unfolds. In specifically arguing against the conceptualization of

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⁶ This fundamental idea can be traced back to Sacks’s Lectures on Conversation, particularly with reference to Membership Categorization Devices (MCDs) involved in reference to persons (Sacks 1992a, 1992b; cf. Schegloff 1991, 2007a). We reserve detailed discussion of this for Chapter 4 which explicitly examines the deployment of 2nd-person reference options (i.e., tú, vos, usted).
talk as isolated speech acts, Schegloff (1987b: 208) concisely explains that: “Coordination between actors is...present, as are anticipation and modification of coordination. Although a single person seems to have talked, obviously the participants together have produced the bit of discourse, action, and interaction that has resulted” (cf. also Levinson 1981). As will be more explicitly described in Chapter 3, Conversation Analysis is consistently concerned with the positioning of utterances vis-à-vis one another: The formulation and subsequent interpretation of one turn-at-talk is borne out of that which came before it; and that utterance, in turn, establishes a sequentially relevant position in which a next turn will emerge and be interpreted, and so on. It is in this way that CA conceptualizes “context” in interaction: Utterances are “context-shaped” (by what came before) as well as “context-renewing” (in that they create a space in which subsequent action can occur) (Heritage 1989). Instead of the pragmatic (and often discourse-analytic) concept of “context impacting on talk”, CA views talk as “invoking its context” with each new addition to the interaction (Schegloff 1992a: 195). This sequentiality must be taken into account if we are to have a complete understanding of how talk and identities are accomplished in interaction, as opposed to being conceptualized and fixed and immutable.

1.2.1 Criticisms and Responses

The methodological divergences presented thus far have naturally all been points of criticism of the conversation-analytic approach, and I have attempted to provide some justification as to why CA takes the stance that it does on these issues as they have entered into the discussion. For example, as described in the immediately preceding section, the claim that CA does not attend to context is unfounded; CA simply requires context to be invoked and attended to by the participants if it is to come to bear on the analysis at hand. Very often, negative assessments of the methodology are based on these sorts of misinterpretations of the

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7 For related philosophical perspectives, see Bakhtin (1992: especially 279-282), Linell (2009), and Vološinov (1973) on the concept of dialogism.
field’s crucial fundamental underpinnings. (Recall our earlier mention of Tannen (2002) and criticism in academic discourse.) To complement the aforementioned discussion, two additional critiques of the field merit particular attention here given our considerations of how to understand identity in linguistic research.

The first concerns the comparatively restrictive, participant-centered, ground-up approach of CA as one which “ignores” or “disattends” to the more ‘macro’ features of identity which we saw taken into account in sociolinguistic inquiries and which also factor into many (critical) discourse analytic studies (cf., e.g., Billig 1999a, 1999b; Wetherell 1998; cf. also Schegloff’s replies: 1998b, 1999b, 1999c). Claims that conversation-analytic examinations of interaction are altogether ignorant of the impact that social identities such as gender, class, race, and so on can have on talk are quickly found to be unsubstantiated if one contemplates how and why the field treats these issues in the way that is does. Schegloff explicitly attempts to clarify this misunderstanding as follows:

Now let us be clear about what is and what is not being said here. The point is not that persons are somehow not male or female, upper or lower class, with or without power, professors and/or students. They may be, on some occasion, demonstrably members of one or another of those categories. Nor is the issue that those aspects of society do not matter, or did not matter on that occasion. We may share a lively sense that indeed they do matter, and that they mattered on that occasion, and matters for just that aspect of some interaction on which we are focusing. There is still the problem of showing from the details of the talk or other conduct in the materials that we are analyzing that those aspects of the scene are what the parties are oriented to. For that is to show how the parties are embodying for one another the relevancies of the interaction and are thereby producing the social structure (1991: 51, emphasis in original).

The conversation-analytic perspective is not, then, that factors like gender and race cannot/do not contribute to how a given piece of social interaction unfolds. Indeed they can, as Schegloff clearly states above. However, the fact that they can influence talk does not mean that they must. This being the case, CA maintains that the analyst does not have license to impose identity labels as s/he sees fit without reference to the orientations of the actual co-participants in the given interaction. The aim is to understand the concrete means by which identity is being enacted by co-interactants for their own co-interactants.
An example of gender and sexuality indeed coming to bear in conversation can be found in Kitzinger’s (2005a; cf. also 2005b) studies of after-hours medical calls. In these calls, Kitzinger demonstrates that participants consistently reproduce—through their talk—a heteronormative depiction of the family and family life (i.e., heterosexual, married couple, co-resident with their biological, dependent children). As the author explains, “Heteronormativity is embodied in what people do rather than in their beliefs, values, ideologies, or faiths,” and therefore “[it]—like other social norms—is embodied and displayed endogenously, in the details of conduct, and may be studied empirically as such” (478). Thus, the researcher did not ‘check boxes’ for each of her speakers, indicating a priori that a caller was a heterosexual mother with a husband and two children, for example. Rather, the interactants themselves were found to be orienting to those pieces of that caller’s presumed identity, making them salient in and through their turns-at-talk with one another (cf. also Cashman & Raymond, frth.).

A second criticism that merits a particular response is that “culture and commonsense knowledge, of both members and analysts, are largely unexplicated resources in CA” (Stokoe & Smithson 2001: 39). Márquez Reiter and Placencia (2005: 88) explain that sociopragmaticists share this critique of CA. Nonetheless, such claims demonstrate a grave misunderstanding of the foundational goal of CA as a field of inquiry. Discovering “culture and commonsense knowledge” is precisely what conversation analysts set out to accomplish! What is the culture? What are the so commonsensical, so mundane, so taken-for-granted bits of social interaction that make up that culture? And how do we know they are such? The answer is found in the interactants’ orientations to the norms—to the “culture,” to that “commonsensicality”—through their talk. As Heritage (2011a: 266) explains:

If words are open-textured typifications, underpinned by networks of family resemblances, and methodically stabilized in a process involving the mutual elaboration of language and context, then every aspect of culture—and most importantly its back bone of language—is unavoidably and endlessly “emergent” (cf. also Garfinkel 1967: 38-42).
Politeness-based, sociopragmatic researchers often take these “cultural” and “commonsensical” contexts as ‘given’ in their analyses. An example from Spanish is found in Placencia’s (1991, 1992) work on Ecuadorian telephone conversations. Placencia affirms that Ecuadorians convey deference in the openings of calls to unknown individuals (i.e., pre-identification sequence) through the choice of particular politeness formulae and formal address terms such as Tenga la bondad (1992: 81), ‘Have the goodness’ (or, more colloquially, ‘Be so kind’). The author then uses this to situate Ecuadorians in a culture of negative politeness (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987) compared to the British who she claims do not adhere to such norms. Such a conclusion reveals the “underlying sociocultural norms reflected in talk” (Márquez Reiter & Placencia 2005: 99) of specific groups of speakers. While these findings are indeed quite revealing from the point of view of politeness theory, and also from a dialectological perspective, the analysis fails to uncover the orientations of the speakers and hearers themselves. In other words, it may be that the classifications of “deference” and “formality” are being superimposed at the level of the analysis without the actual interlocutors interpreting these elements as such. It is without question in these call openings that the conjugation tenga employs, grammatically speaking, the usted morphology of the verb tener ‘to have’. However, where is the evidence that the Ecuadorians are themselves interpreting this particular instance of usted morphology as displaying deference?

Bringing in a diachronic (socio)linguistic perspective, it is quite commonplace for repeated expressions like Tenga la bondad to become fossilized and lexicalized idioms over time (due to a myriad of sociohistorical factors), thus becoming normalized in the speech community to the point that they no longer carry specifically deferential significance—despite the technical classification of the morphology involved (cf. Bybee, 2003, 2006; Company Company 2006; amongst others). Another well-known example of such an expression is Mexican Spanish’s
Mande / ‘Command/Order\textsubscript{FORMAL} (me to do something)’, used as a response token upon hearing one’s name called. The verb is undeniably conjugated as an \textit{usted} imperative of the verb mandar ‘to command/order’, but pragmatic bleaching has reduced its level of conveyed deference to only semi-formal as evidenced by its use with interlocutors who are otherwise exclusively treated as \textit{tú}.\footnote{A familiar example of lexicalization from French is the expression \textit{Je ne sais quoi}, literally ‘I don’t know what’. Originally an ordinary verb phrase, it was lexicalized to a masculine noun (e.g. \textit{Il avait un je ne sais quoi} / ‘He had a \textit{je ne sais quoi} about him’) before subsequently being borrowed into English as a non-decomposable lexeme.} As a personal point of contrast, in my first weeks living in Argentina, I was playfully made fun of by my Argentine roommates for my use of the antiquated, overly formal (from \textit{their} perspective) Mande response token. In my (at the time) Mexican speech, Mande was my respectful norm, while for my Argentine interlocutors it was explicitly oriented to—in the interaction—as overly deferent and was therefore judged as awkward for our intimate relationship.

These cultural/geographical norm distinctions are thus relevant to dialectology and politeness theory, but they must not be considered \textit{of de facto} import at the level of real-time situated talk-in-interaction. The interactants themselves must demonstrate an understanding of these elements as deferent if they are to be classified as such, just as they must be orienting to race/ethnicity, gender, occupation, etc. if those identities are to be taken into account.\footnote{It is possible that Ecuadorians do indeed display an orientation to formality in these telephone openings, but without more sequential context from these calls, it is impossible to discuss the matter any further.} This point of view is strongly in line with Clyne, Norrby and Warren (2009: 25) who argue for a model in which “politeness is not seen as a pre-existing, static concept or a list of strategies but as something which is discursively constructed by interlocutors”.

1.2.2 Dialect and Dialectology

Discussion of formality/informality naturally brings the concept of dialect to the forefront, especially when making reference to Spanish. In line with the descriptions presented
thus far, pragmatics (and sociolinguistics and Anthropology, for that matter) consistently include detailed explanations of participants and their backgrounds as the goal is to explain how these cultural factors come to bear on the talk. In fact, Clemente (2013) describes this debate as one of the first between conversation analysts and anthropologists, the latter insisting that CA qualify its initial findings as “pertaining specifically to American English”. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) responded with the following:

…that all conversations are in ‘American English’ is no warrant for so characterizing them. For there are many other characterizations which are equally ‘true’, e.g., that they are ‘adult’, ‘spoken’ (not yelled or whispered), etc. That the materials are all ‘American English’ does not entail that they are RELEVANTLY ‘American English’, or relevantly in any larger or smaller domain that might be invoked to characterize them (291, fn. 4, emphasis in original).

Clemente discusses this citation and explains that “Sacks and Schegloff were not arguing against characterizing some segment of talk as American English; however, some conduct could not be characterized as American English a priori” (694-695).

With regard to this particular issue, a compromise between these two divergent perspectives will be pursued in this dissertation. If language is conceptualized as a means through which humans accomplish social interaction, it is important for the analyst to know what specific tools the language is making available for use—and also which ones are not available. This argument expands to dialect as well. In making a claim about an individual’s use (or lack of use) of a specific linguistic feature, we must first know if that element even exists in the speaker’s repertoire. Interactants cannot be held responsible for not using something that they do not have access to.

Exemplifying this idea with reference to some of the substantive topics of this dissertation, how would an analyst go about discussing the use of different 2nd-person address terms (tú, vos, usted) without knowing which options exist for an interlocutor? As will be argued in Chapters 2 and 4, in approaching a new bit of Costa Rican data, for example, it is essential to bear in mind that some varieties of Costa Rican Spanish use usted with all interlocutors
regardless of deferential status (similar to English you), as has also been reported in pockets of Colombia and Venezuela (cf. Álvarez Muro & Freites Barros 2010: 331-335; Bartens 2004), while other varieties pattern more closely with other Central American dialects in maintaining a distinction between vos and usted (Lipski 1994: 224; Moser 2010: 673; Quesada Pacheco 1996). Thus, a researcher would be incorrect in analyzing interactants from one of the former dialects a priori as continuously orienting to formality in interaction—no formal/informal distinction is available in their specific dialect. Similarly, the analysis in Chapter 5 on the indicative/subjunctive morphology distinction applies to dialects of Spanish which maintain that verbal mood difference; many U.S. Spanish speakers (Silva-Corvalan, 1994, 1995; cf. also Raymond 2012b), as well as various rural regions within Latin America (cf. Parodi 1995, p.c.) do not, however. Thus, the social significance that this distinction can achieve for some speakers is not a possibility for others who make use of a dialect that does not possess this specific tool in its toolbox.

In short, while we certainly do not want to base an analysis solely on these sweeping dialectal generalizations, bearing such features in mind will help to ensure that we are only holding interactants accountable for interactional resources that they actually can/do make use of—just as they themselves are doing to one another in interaction.

1.2.3 Summary: Language, Identity, and Methodology

As an introduction to the perspective taken in this dissertation, the present chapter has aimed to illuminate a few distinct methods of conceptualizing language, identity, and the relationship between them. Beginning with the all-inclusive human identity of generative grammar, we slowly adjusted our view as we traveled through sociolinguistics, pragmatics and discourse analysis, before ultimately landing on the participant-centered, maximally micro-level
approach to identity taken by Conversation Analysis. Figure 1.3 below illustrates this stepwise methodological incorporation of more finely-grained, sequentially evolving features of identity.

![Figure 1.3: Incorporation of Features of Identity by Methodology](image)

Each of these (sub)fields conceptualizes the relationship between language and identity in accordance with the research questions being asked. As there is a range of ‘levels’ of identity factoring into questions about language, so too is there a range in how refined a view of identity is employed in a particular methodology.

Let us make a brief analogy to a non-linguistic academic field: Biology. While a behavioral biologist may describe an animal’s fight-or-flight response in terms of its visible cues (hair standing on end, arched back, pupil dilation, etc.), a biochemist might conceptualize these bodily changes as the effect of adrenaline being synthesized by a chemical reaction in the brain. Neither view is more or less correct than the other, nor are they in competition. Both have their rightful place in research, each operating at its respective level of granularity.

In the same way, approaches to the relationship between language and identity should not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives, one being unilaterally the most ‘accurate’ or otherwise ‘better’ than the others. Rather, the approach must correspond to the level of
granularity at which identity is operating in the specific inquiry at hand. It is thus precisely because the particular questions this dissertation seeks to address operate at the level of moment-by-moment interaction that the most micro-level conceptualization of the relationship between language and identity—that of Conversation Analysis—is best equipped to provide insight.

1.3 THE PRESENT DISSERTATION

Given this methodological motivation, we now return to the goal of the present work, as mentioned at the onset of this chapter: This dissertation sets out to provide a conversation-analytic account of some of the resources available for accomplishing identity in Spanish talk-in-interaction. What tools does the Spanish language provide its speakers so that they may realize their respective, evolving identities, co-constructing them with one another, turn-by-turn, in pursuit of their interactional objectives? And furthermore, how do conversationalists selectively employ and subsequently orient to resources from this repertoire in actual interaction?

1.3.1 Conversation Analysis and Spanish-Language Discourse: Chapters 2 and 3

As can be surmised from the discussion included in this introductory chapter, one initial objective of this study deals with the basic issue of methodology and methodological prevalence. Conversation Analysis has reached a point at which cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison is imperative, a lesson that this subfield of Sociology has taken from Linguistics (Fox, et al. 2013). In fact, in Sidnell and Stivers’ recent edited volume, The Handbook of Conversation Analysis (2013), well over half of the 36 total chapters cite such comparisons as a crucial next step in the field; and, indeed, an increase in such research in recent years has reflected this need (e.g., Oh 2010; Stivers, et al. 2009; Stivers, Enfield & Levinson 2010; amongst others). Even with this surge of other-than-English investigation, however, Spanish still remains drastically underrepresented in CA research.
Variation by academic discipline also comes into play here. Language and Linguistics departments are much more familiar with methodologies such as discourse analysis, pragmatics and politeness theory in their analyses of spoken data; and prominent researchers in these discourse-based fields have indeed studied Spanish-speaking populations more specifically (e.g., Bravo & Briz 2004; Dumitrescu 2011; Hamel 1983; Haverkate 1994, 2002, 2004; Márquez Reiter & Placencia 2004, 2005; Placencia & García 2007; just to name a few). Chapter 2 will review many of these approaches to the substantive topics explored in this dissertation. Nonetheless, Spanish and its speakers have yet to receive adequate, systematic study from an ethnomethodologically grounded, conversation-analytic perspective, described in detail in Chapter 3. Moreover, precisely because this methodology is distinct from the various others which linguists are more accustomed to using (and reading), considerable cross-linguistic, topic-specific CA background will underlie the literature reviews of each substantive chapter as well.

1.3.2 Three Resources of Spanish Talk-in-Interaction: Chapters 4, 5, and 6

The objective of the subsequent topical chapters is to then use the tenants of the CA methodology, described in Chapter 3, to illustrate the ways that identity can be (and is) enacted and oriented to for the purposes of social action in actual instances of Spanish interaction. These topics are:

Chapter 4: 2nd-Person Singular (you) Person Reference: Tú, Vos, and Usted,

Chapter 5: Verbal Mood Selection: Indicative/Subjunctive Morphology, and


These themes are linguistically- as opposed to contextually-based in that they are not connected to a specific situation such as a medical or political setting, for instance. Rather, they can be employed by a variety of speakers in a variety of discursive settings—ranging from casual conversation amongst friends to political interviews with presidential candidates—, thus
opening up room for a certain level of generalizability across Spanish interactions. Additionally, the topics above are not convoluted ones which will take the reader by surprise: The fact that most dialects of Spanish maintain a distinction between formal and informal address terms, and between indicative and subjunctive verbal morphology, for example, does not constitute new information from a philological point of view. The existence of these elements as part of the language (as a system) is not under scrutiny, and dialectal variation within that system will indeed be presented in Chapter 2. How these resources are actually deployed sequentially, though, in real time social interaction—and for what social/interactional purposes—is the novelty of the present investigation.

Each of these three topics presents alternatives to the speaker: tú or usted, indicative or subjunctive, Spanish or English (e.g., in answering a question). Nonetheless, despite the availability of both options as ‘correct’ in the strict grammatical sense of the term, the speaker does, in fact, choose one over the other in producing an actual turn-at-talk. In the words of Schegloff and Sacks (1973): Why that now? What did that option accomplish for the speaker and his/her identity at that precise moment that an alternative would not have done as adequately? We aim to examine these choices as instances of interactants’ “exhibit[ing] attention to the ‘this-one-here-and-now-for-us-at-this-point-in-it’ character of the interaction” (Schegloff 1972: 115).

The objective underlying the use of these specific topics is to present examples which are not only empirically and intellectually sound, but also which are accessible to a wide range of researchers—both within Language and Linguistics departments, as well as from allied disciplines such as Sociology, Anthropology, and Communication Studies. Furthermore, in selecting three diverse themes for analysis, I aim to demonstrate the flexibility and applicability of Conversation Analysis—as a theory and a method—to a wide range of (Hispanic) linguistic research agendas. This is not a method suitable only for analysis of syntactic phenomena, say,
or of lexical items. Rather, CA can provide novel insight into the ground-level deployment of a variety of linguistic phenomena which some of the other methods discussed here are not equipped to tackle.

1.3.3 The Corpora of Data

This investigation makes exclusive use of naturally occurring, audio- and/or video-recorded interactions of native Spanish speakers (mono- or bilingual with English). The examples analyzed represent a wide range of Spanish dialects (e.g., Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, United States, etc.) and situations (e.g., casual conversation, radio talk, news interviews, etc.), as well as participant genders, ages, socioeconomic classes, social relations (e.g., friends, family, strangers, etc.), and so on. This variation is purposeful given the goal of describing resources with which various sorts of Spanish equip their interactants so that they may conversationally navigate their respective identities and accomplish their communicative goals. That is, the topics discussed here are not only relevant to, say, Mexican males conversing at home with friends. Rather, multiple dialects possess and make use of these linguistic tools in a myriad of situations.

Data were collected from several sources and constitute various corpora.

1.3.3.1 Casual Conversation

Everyday, mundane interactions make up a large portion of data examined in this dissertation. This is a conscious decision given that ordinary conversation appears to have a “bedrock” or “default” status (Heritage 2009: 305; see also Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974). Most of these data are videotaped interactions in intimate settings, for example: family members eating dinner, friends gossiping and/or working on homework, and so forth.

Some of these casual settings were recorded personally by me, in which cases I typically set up a videocamera and left the participants to interact normally for a time. Snowball sampling
of friends (and friends of friends) make up the bulk of these recordings, as is common in discourse-based research.

Other videos were recorded by students enrolled in Spanish 100A (Spanish Phonetics, Phonology and Morphology) and 100B (Spanish Syntax), upper-division courses for Spanish majors/minors at UCLA. During the first week of each term, students were required to video-record a minimum of 30 minutes of casual conversation, examples of which were shown in class. During the data collection phase, students were unaware of the ultimate research objectives of the recordings, but it was emphasized that the prescriptive ‘correctness’ of the speech was unimportant. Particularly salient in these interactions is the high frequency of Spanish-English code-switching (which also serves as an indication of their being examples of uncensored, naturalistic speech) (cf. Chapter 6). Some Spanish-as-a-second-language students appeared in their own videos, in which case the interactions were excluded from the corpus as only data from native (including ‘heritage’) speakers are included in the present analysis.

I have used some of the data from these corpora, particularly videos of Salvadorans in Southern California, for previous research on dialect contact (Raymond 2012a, 2012c).

Finally, additional data were obtained from publically available, on-line databases such as TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007). One particularly useful corpus is entitled “Call Friend” in which individuals in the United States were given a prepaid calling card to make a 30-minute telephone call to a friend or family member, often abroad. While Spanish-speaking callers are the focus of the present study, calls in other languages (English, French, Japanese, etc.) are also available. Data excerpts referenced in the following chapters have been re-transcribed according to the norms of Conversation Analysis (cf. Chapter 3; cf. also Appendices I and II). Whenever

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TalkBank data are used, the reader is invited to visit the project’s website to listen to the phone calls first-hand in combination with the transcripts included here in the text.

### 1.3.3.2 Radio Calls

An internet program called Radioshift\(^{12}\) (by Rogue Amoeba Software, LLC) was used to record two (2) Spanish monolingual (in Mexico and Puerto Rico) and five (5) Spanish-English bilingual (in Chicago, Miami, New York and two in Los Angeles) radio stations. The stations were recorded 24-hours/day for a period of one month, totaling over 96 GB of audio data. On music-based stations, callers call the stations’ DJs to make requests for songs and prizes (such as concert tickets and other giveaways). Some such short interactions will be analyzed here. Other stations which are more talk-oriented invite guest speakers to discuss and debate a variety of current events, quite similar to televised news interviews (cf. Clayman & Heritage 2002).

### 1.3.3.3 Televised News Interviews

A variety of Latin American news interview shows are included in my corpus of ‘institutional’ (Drew & Heritage 1992) Spanish talk-in-interaction. Two programs referenced in the chapters that follow are Peruvian shows called *Prensa Libre* and *Prensa Abierta*, both hosted by the lawyer and journalist, Rosa María Palacios. In these shows, Palacios invites one or more guests to debate a range of sociopolitical topics. During congressional election season, she also invites candidates to the program (on several occasions) to present and discuss their running platforms. In cases where the videos are readily available on-line at time of publication (e.g., through YouTube), their URL addresses will be included as a footnote so the reader can see/hear the data that accompany the transcripts.

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\(^{12}\) My thanks to Gabriel Rossman for suggesting this software, and to Hahan Rahardjo for providing me with the hardware to run it for a full month.
1.3.3.4 U.S. Calls for Emergency Service (to 9-1-1)

Another institutional corpus referenced in the present work is one containing ninety-seven (97) calls for emergency service (cf. Zimmerman 1984) placed by Spanish speakers in the southwestern United States. All of these calls begin with a request by the caller for Spanish-language service, which is subsequently evaluated by the call-taker (Raymond 2014). If deemed necessary, a third-party interpreter is brought on the line to mediate the interaction between Spanish-speaking caller and English-speaking call-taker (Raymond, in prep.).

1.3.3.5 Pediatric Genetics Consultations

These data come from a three-year ethnographic study which recorded a total of 193 clinical visits involving 75 families and four geneticists (Timmermans & Buchbinder 2013). Sixteen of these families were Spanish-speaking, totaling 24 visits in which Spanish was used as the means of communication (17.75 hours of audio data). The infants and toddlers who are the subject of these audio-recorded genetics consultations have either been definitively diagnosed with, or are otherwise at a significant risk of developing, Phenylketonuria (PKU). This metabolic genetic disorder negatively affects the child’s ability to metabolize Phenylalanine (Phe), an amino acid necessary for the synthesis of many proteins such as those in meats and dairy; consequently, a low-protein diet is required in order for their brains to develop normally. The topics discussed in the sit-down consultations with the doctors/nutritionists focus primarily on what foods the parents have been giving the child, including precise quantities of each item. In many cases, parents have been asked to keep a detailed food log to document everything given to the child.
In the subset of encounters analyzed here, a professionally trained, on-staff, bilingual Spanish-English interpreter is typically also present as these parents are monolingual\textsuperscript{13} Spanish-speakers communicating with monolingual English-speaking healthcare providers. The medical center at which these consultations were recorded employs multiple interpreters, and thus a variety of individuals are represented in the data. My previous analyses of this corpus include Raymond (frth.-c, frth.-d).

1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, I have attempted not only to introduce the specific methodology and data that will be employed and engaged throughout this dissertation, but also to motivate those decisions through reference to the questions we are seeking to investigate. In comparing various methods of inquiry, I have argued against the notion that because conceptualizations of the relationship between language and identity are—as Searle (1972a) claims in his discussion of Chomskyan generative grammar vs. speech act theory—“radically different”, they are consequently by definition “in conflict”. On the contrary, approaches to the study of language and identity are intrinsically motivated by the levels of granularity involved, thereby necessitating a variety of noncompeting methods for a diverse range of noncompeting inquests.

As we transition now into the second chapter, in which we review previous work on the linguistic features analyzed in this dissertation, we will consider perspectives from generative, historical, and social linguistics, as well as linguistic anthropology, discourse analysis and pragmatics. These accounts should not be thought of as mere precursors which will dutifully be ‘disproven’ or otherwise ‘done away with’ in the chapters that follow. It is essential to bear in

\textsuperscript{13} While I use the term “monolingual” here to describe these parents, many do have at least some passive competence in English in that they are able to understand some of what doctors say without translation. The interpreter is nonetheless present in case of a misunderstanding.
mind that, in many cases, these researchers were asking one set of questions while here we are pursuing a set which is altogether distinct.

As Cortés Rodríguez (2006) argues, it is now time for new questions to be posited in Hispanic linguistics, anchored in a more systematic treatment of conversational data. The author classifies this as the natural next step given the intellectual history of Hispanic linguistics as a field: Moving slowly from overarching dialectological studies in the 1950s and 1960s, to sociolinguistic studies in the 1960s and 1970s, and then finally to discourse analysis in the 1980s and 1990s. I propose that Conversation Analysis can provide that next step, and this dissertation attempts an illustration of that proposal. In the chapters that follow, we will indeed examine the phenomena at hand in a systematic way, from the ground-up, to shed further light on identity as a moment-by-moment accomplishment of everyday social interaction.
Two Resources for
‘Doing Identity’ in Spanish:
(Socio-)Linguistic Background

Language is the armory of the human mind, and at once contains the trophies of its past and the weapons of its future conquests.

—Samuel Taylor Coleridge
English Poet and Philosopher
(1772-1834)

In the opening paragraph of “On Face-work,” Erving Goffman asserts that co-participants in interaction simply cannot avoid expressing views of identity. He explains that “Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect” (1967: 5). That is, in our exchanges with others, we are constantly putting forth not only a view of our own identity, but simultaneously our understanding of the identity of our interlocutor, of our relationship with that interlocutor, of the ongoing situation that we are co-creating, and so on. As was emphasized in the stepwise methodological discussion of the previous chapter, an in-the-moment and ground-level interpretation of the role that language plays in this process necessitates a reconsideration of the traditional (socio-)linguistic conceptions of identity. We must therefore also reexamine the specific resources of language which are being mobilized to accomplish those identities. As Harvey Sacks once put it in responding to a question from the audience at the 1973 Linguistic Institute: “You cannot find what [interactants] are trying to do until you find the kinds of things they work with” (Sacks 1987: 67).

1 My interest in dialectal variation, which is made evident in this chapter, was inspired by coursework and discussion with Claudia Parodi. My thanks not only to her, but also to the members of the Centro de Estudios del Español de Estados Unidos (CEEEEUS) where the importance of dialectal divergence is always on the agenda.
In this dissertation, we focus on three resources available for participants to “work with” in Spanish talk-in-interaction. These are:

1. 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person singular (you) person reference: \textit{tú, vos} and \textit{usted},
2. indicative/subjunctive verbal mood selection, and
3. intersentential Spanish-English code-switching.

The ultimate goal of the chapters that follow is to demonstrate how these linguistic ‘tools’ can be mobilized in various ways for the purposes of ‘doing identity’ in the service of social action in interaction. The present chapter lays the groundwork necessary to engage in that discussion.

2.1 PRELIMINARIES

Those who are familiar with research in Hispanic and/or Romance Linguistics will surely note that these topics are far from understudied in the literature. In fact, given longstanding trends in the field (particularly in traditional philology), considerable investigation has pursued these phenomena from historical, dialectological and, more recently, generative linguistic perspectives. For example, countless dissertations, books, and articles have been written solely on the 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person singular pronoun \textit{vos}: its evolution, gender-/status-/age-/context-specific usages and stigmas, differing inflectional morphologies, geographical dialectal variation, etc. It is of course impossible to summarize all of this prior research here. So, given the discourse-centered aims of the present dissertation, I focus our discussion on two key issues for each of the above resources: \textit{linguistic description} and \textit{(socio-)linguistic explanation}.

For each of the three phenomena in question, I first \textit{describe}, from a strictly linguistic standpoint, what the phenomenon actually \textit{is}.\footnote{The reader will surely take note of the multiple references in this chapter to the Real Academia Española’s (2009) \textit{Nueva gramática de la lengua española}. This three-volume set of nearly 5,000 pages is an essential resource for Hispanic linguists as, in addition to the prescriptive grammar rules with which the Academia is most commonly associated, the volumes also include an incredible amount of documentation and description of the widespread dialectal variation that exists in the Spanish-speaking world, including extensive citations to primary sources.} For example, what exactly is involved when we
discuss person reference in the context of the Spanish language, and why is 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person reference an issue of particular interest? Similarly, what options exist for verbal mood, and how are those options morphologically encoded in the language? In other words, we first direct our attention to a description of the resources with which Spanish—\textit{as a linguistic system}—is programmed. This discussion will quickly reveal that to speak of “Spanish”—in the aggregate, as a \textit{single} linguistic system—can be misleading given the vast amount of dialectal variation the term encompasses, particularly with reference to the topics analyzed here.

After the description of each resource, I then discuss some of the different approaches and methods that have been employed in previous (socio-)linguistic research to \textit{explain} the existence and/or use of those various linguistic realities. That is, given the overt grammatical (morphological) distinction between the indicative and subjunctive moods, for example, what has been proposed to explicate the deployment of each? The goal of this review is to consider not only where these studies have succeeded, but also to identify what has yet to be accounted for through previous methods.

Through this agenda of description and explanation, I ultimately posit how a sequential, talk-in-interaction approach might shed new light on some of the as-of-yet unexplained uses and features of these linguistic resources.

\section*{2.2 \textsc{2\textsuperscript{nd}-person Singular (You) Person Reference: Tú, Vos, and Usted}}

\subsection*{2.2.1 A Brief History}

In this section, I briefly outline the evolutionary development of the personal pronoun systems of modern Spanish, concentrating on the \textsc{2\textsuperscript{nd}-person (you)}. The relevance of this overview to the present inquiry is two-fold. Firstly, and most basically, I aim to give some

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\footnote{Indeed, this most recent version of the \textit{Gramática} has been criticized as \textit{too} descriptive and egalitarian with regard to dialectal variation, to the point of sacrificing some of the prescriptive governance that many believe should be the true objective of the publication.}
historical grounding (albeit a massively simplified grounding\textsuperscript{3}) as to why 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person pronouns are a particularly salient issue for study in contemporary Spanish. In addition, though, I aim to underline some of the differences that this historical evolution has given rise to in current varieties of the language, demonstrating that we are actually dealing with modern Spanishes, in the plural. This reality will come to bear on the data that we examine in the chapters to come—not only with regard to person reference, but at other levels of the language as well. It is imperative to take note of dialectal variation from the onset of our discussion.

Classical Latin possessed a rich pronominal inventory, particularly with regard to demonstratives. Although its descendant, Vulgar Latin, did not make use of that system in its entirety, it did inherit the 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person options for singular and plural referents, the only change being the merger of long and short vowels over time. This change is shown in TABLE 2.1 below, adapted from Lathrop (2003: 49).\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{2\textsuperscript{nd}-person} & \textbf{Singular} &  & \textbf{Plural} \\
\textbf{you} & Classical & Vulgar & Classical & Vulgar \\
\hline
& \(\text{TU} \rightarrow \text{tu}\) &  & \(\text{VOS} \rightarrow \text{vos}\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Evolution of 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person pronouns from Classical to Vulgar Latin}
\end{table}

Observe that Vulgar Latin, like its Classical predecessor, only differentiated 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person pronouns in terms of number (singular vs. plural); no distinction was made based on the recipient's/recipients' social status or a need to show deference. Penny (2002: 137) explains that this changed in Late Vulgar Latin, “apparently beginning with the Emperor, but then becoming extended to other circumstances where deference or formality of address was appropriate”.

\textsuperscript{3} See Lapesa Melgar (2008) for a much more complete and overarching review of the evolution of the Spanish pronominal system.

\textsuperscript{4} Given that our objective is a general overview for the purpose of better understanding the present study, we restrict our examples to those of nominative case. Changes did occur, though, in other cases as well (dative/accusative). See Lathrop (2003: 48-52) and Penny (2002: 132-139) for a more in-depth discussion.
Reallocating (Britain & Trudgill 1999) an element already present in the pronominal repertoire, Late Vulgar Latin expanded the use of the 2<sup>nd</sup>-person plural form (*vos*) to achieve the goal of status distinction in interaction (cf. also Raymond 2012c for a modern example of pronoun reallocation). This generated a system in which deference was detectable in the case of singular referents, but not with multiple referents, as shown in Table 2.2 (adapted from Penny 2002: 138):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td><em>tú</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td><em>vos</em></td>
<td><em>vos</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.2:** (Non-)Deferential usage of 2<sup>nd</sup>-person pronouns in Late Vulgar Latin

It is from this differentiation in Late Vulgar Latin that Brown and Gilman (1960) famously coined the term *T-V distinction*. From this point onward in time, though, the various dialects of Romance began to amend this distinction in divergent ways. On one end of the spectrum, French halted its 2<sup>nd</sup>-person pronominal evolution here, leaving the *tu* (singular, non-deferential) vs. *vous* (singular, deferential; plural, deferential/non-deferential) distinction still employed today in modern French. In the case of Spanish, however, as *vos* became more widely employed, particularly in the context of increasing world exploration and colonization, the pronoun eventually lost its social deferential significance. By the 15<sup>th</sup> century, new nominal expressions had appeared to take its place in deferential contexts: *vuestra señoría* ‘your Lordship/Honor’, *vuestra excelencia* ‘your Excellency’, *vuestra merced* ‘your Mercy/Worship’, amongst many others (Hughson 2009: 45; Real Academia Española 2009: 1256-1258). An example of this state of affairs is plainly visible in Miguel de Cervantes’s famous *El ingenioso hidalgo don Quixote de la Mancha*, published in 1605/1615, in which Don Quixote refers to his
squire (a simple peasant named Sancho Panza) as tú/vos and receives vuestra merced in return (Real Academia Española 2009: 1251).

By this point in the evolution of Spanish, then, there were effectively three 2nd-person singular pronouns in use: tú, vos and vuestra merced (which eventually simplified phonologically into the fully pronominalized form usted).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>tú</td>
<td>vosotros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary</td>
<td>vos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>vuestra merced &gt; usted</td>
<td>vuestras mercedes &gt; ustedes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.3: Three-way system of deference in Old Spanish**

In due course, the intermediary form vos slowly dropped out of Peninsular Spanish altogether, presumably resultant of a lack of social context which would require its usage. That is, interactants seemed to aim for the ‘extremes’ of deference rather than make use of the (potentially offensive) intermediary reference form. Many of the then-colonies of the Americas soon followed mother Spain’s example, eliminating voseo (use of vos) and maintaining tuteo (use of tú) and ustedeo (use of usted) as the non-deferential and deferential pronominal forms, respectively.5 As is common in cases of geographically widespread change within a language, though, disparate areas incorporate change in distinct ways. In the case of such a simplification of three-way deference to two-way deference, Mason (1995) explains that regions of the New World which were less directly connected to Peninsular rule ended up moving in the opposite

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5 While this particular change seems to have had its origin in Peninsular tendencies, it is important to note that a wide range of other linguistic developments, especially lexical and lexico-semantic, were the product of Spaniards’ contact with the indigenous peoples of the New World. Parodi (1995, 2006) describes how, in addition to the Europeans ‘hispanicizing’ the indigenous population, the indigenous also ‘indianized’ the Europeans to a great extent. See also Parodi (2009b) for an overview of ‘cultural semantics’ as a method of analyzing the linguistic and cultural effects of language contact.
direction, maintaining *voseo* instead of *tuteo* as the non-deferential form (cf. also Lapesa Melgar 1970). And still other varieties sustained a version of the three-way system in its entirety.

### 2.2.2 Modern Spanish: Pronouns and Dialect

Spanish's continued evolution from the three-way deference depicted in Table 2.3 above has since produced distinct pronominal systems in the present-day Spanish-speaking world (cf. Fontanella de Weinberg 1999; Páez Urdaneta 1981; Real Academia Española 2009: 1250-1267). There is, of course, variation which exists within each of these regions; but here I concentrate on the overarching distributions which have been documented in the literature.

Spain’s doing away with the intermediary *vos* form left speakers of Standard Peninsular Spanish with a two-way distinction capable of showing deference with both singular and plural referents (Table 2.4).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>tú</td>
<td>vosotros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td>ustedes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.4: Tú/usted and vosotros/ustedes (e.g., Spain)*

As mentioned above, several regions of Latin America followed Spain’s example in simplifying the system by eliminating the *vos* pronoun from their repertoire. In addition, though, the informal 2nd-person plural *vosotros* (note the historical etymology: *vos+otros*, ‘you+others’) form also disappeared almost entirely from Latin America (with the exception of a few isolated rural areas and ritualized contexts, e.g., Catholic Mass), being replaced by exclusive use of the previously formal form *ustedes* in all 2nd-person plural contexts (Moreno de Alba 2010, 2011) (Table 2.5).

---

6 Note that even this distribution is over-simplified, as there is variation between the plural forms *vosotros* and *ustedes* in the Andalucía region. See Calderón Campos & Medina Morales (2010) for an overview.
Note the reallocated parallel here with the deferential/non-deferential repertoire of Late Vulgar Latin, depicted earlier in Table 2.2.

In consolidating from the three-way to a two-way system of deference, vos was not the only option available for removal: Some regions evolved to eliminate tú instead, maintaining vos in combination with usted (Lapesa Melgar 1970) (Table 2.6). Observe the use of ustedes in all plural contexts, just as seen in Table 2.5.

Exemplifying the fact that simplification is an ongoing linguistic process, Moser (2010: 285-286) reports that usted has now been expanded to almost all communicative contexts—from completely informal to quite formal—in some areas of Costa Rica (cf. Lipski 1994; Quesada Pacheco 1996), as has also been reported in pockets of Colombia and Venezuela (Álvarez Muro & Freites Barros 2010: 331-335; Bartens 2004). In other words, the ability to show deference has

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It cannot go without mention that even in a strongly tuteante/ustedeante country like Mexico, there are still regions (e.g., in the South: Chiapas, Tabasco) where voseo can be heard (cf. Oseguera 2012).
effectively been lost in these zones (TABLE 2.7), leaving its speakers with a system similar to that of present-day English, for example.\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td>useted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2.7: Usted and useted (e.g., pockets of Costa Rica/Venezuela)**

Finally, simplifying the system at all was not a requirement, as is demonstrated by the present Uruguayan pronominal inventory which maintains a complex, three-way system of deference (Elizaincín 1981; Fontanella de Weinberg 1999) (TABLE 2.8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intimacy</td>
<td>vos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>tú</td>
<td>useted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2.8: Tú/vos/usted and useted (e.g., Uruguay)**

The dialectal systems described thus far can be conceptualized as 'cut-and-dried' in that, for the most part, they employ either tú/usted (e.g., Spain, Mexico), vos/usted (e.g., Argentina) or all three tú/vos/usted (e.g., Uruguay) for single referents, and vosotros/ustedes or solely useted for

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\(^8\) As a point of comparison with another dialect of Romance, modern Brazilian Portuguese has followed the same simplification pattern as these varieties of Spanish: slowly eliminating the non-deferential tu form from its repertoire and redistributing the formerly deferential você to both deferential and non-deferential referents. Nonetheless, the social need to distinguish between levels of deference eventually compelled a novel form, o senhor/a senhora (roughly ‘sir/madam’), to grow in prevalence to fill the gap created by você’s use in non-deferential contexts. Observe the exact parallel between this process and that which was described earlier regarding the creation of vuestra merced to fill the gap in Old Spanish when vos had expanded to non-deferential referents. Finally, yet another parallel between modern Latin American varieties of Spanish and Portuguese is seen in the use of the originally deferential vocês for all plural 2nd-person referents, just as is the case with Spanish useted.
plural referents—and the overwhelming majority of their populations follow this practice. That is, education, media and advertisements, casual conversations at home, formal talks with government officials, and so on, all make use of the given country’s single set of deferential/non-deferential references and corresponding morphology (described in the next section).

Nonetheless, the situation in many areas is complicated by both historical and contemporary political and ideological beliefs/stigmas that come to bear on modern usages. Studies in sociolinguistics as well as in linguistic anthropology have demonstrated, across a variety of languages and contexts, that once there is linguistic difference, there will almost surely be opinions as to which option ‘ought to be used’ when, where, with whom, and by whom (cf. Jaffe 2003, 2007; Lippi-Green 1997; Makihara 2007; Messing 2007); and Spanish pronouns are no exception. Accordingly, many countries differ socio-contextually as to which set(s) of pronouns is/are used. Central American countries primarily show an extensive use of vos in everyday interaction (Benavides 2003; Lipski 1994; Páez Urdaneta 1981), but the form has historically been socially stigmatized as uncivilized and inappropriate for ‘official’ situations; thus it has not traditionally been heard in schools or the media, where tú is used in its place. This generates a system such as that depicted in TABLE 2.9 in which tú and vos serve somewhat the same purpose, but in different circumstances.

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9 Our present discussion is necessarily limited; however, numerous other studies on the intricate uses of the voseo (and different types of voseo) in specific non-‘cut-and-dried’ regions are available. In addition to the studies mentioned in the text, see Arrizabalaga (2001) on Peru, Blanco Botta (1982) on Cuba, Quilis and Graeli Stanziola (1989) on Panama, Villegas (1963) on Costa Rica, and Weeks (2005) on Chile, just to name a few.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>tú ~ vos</td>
<td>ustedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.9: Tú/vos/usted and ustedes (e.g., El Salvador)**

Similarly, while Chile is primarily (or ‘officially’) a *tuteante/ustedeante* country, Torrejón (1986, 1991) and Poblete, Pons and Samaniego (2000), describe the flexible use of *vos* amongst upper-middle class (male) youths in various contexts as a possible form of rebellion or nonconformity.\(^{10}\) Systems such as these are constantly in a state of ‘situational flux’ compared to the relatively stable three-way Uruguayan inventory, described above, despite the fact that the same three pronouns are being used. It is therefore quite evident the importance that dialect plays in any discussion of pronoun usage in Spanish.

### 2.2.3 Morphology

Given this distribution of pronominal reference, we must bear in mind that the pronoun itself is only half of the equation: When these pronouns are placed in subject position, they each combine with distinct verbal morphology. Present tense conjugations and corresponding phonetic transcriptions for the various 2nd-person options are shown below for the three verbal classes in Spanish (*–ar, –er, –ir*) to exemplify some of these differences (Real Academia Española 2009: 207).

---

\(^{10}\) My thanks to Mariška Bolyanatz for directing my attention to these Chilean references.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>hablar</th>
<th>comer</th>
<th>escribir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘to speak’</td>
<td>‘to eat’</td>
<td>‘to write’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Singular</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usted</td>
<td>habla  /á.blá/</td>
<td>come /kó.me/</td>
<td>escribe /es.kri.be/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tú</td>
<td>hablas /á.blá.is/</td>
<td>comes /kó.més/</td>
<td>escribes /es.kri.bes/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vos¹¹</td>
<td>hablás /a.blá.is/</td>
<td>comes /kó.més/</td>
<td>escribís /es.kri.bes/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vosotros</td>
<td>hablais /a.blá.is/</td>
<td>coméis /ko.mé.is/</td>
<td>escribís /es.kri.bes/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustedes</td>
<td>hablan /á.blan/</td>
<td>comen /kó.men/</td>
<td>escriben /es.kri.ben/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.10: Present tense morphology and pronunciation**

In the vast majority of dialects, there exists a one-to-one relationship between pronoun and conjugation such that an *usted* pronoun will be paired with a verb marked with *usted* morphology. This is relevant due to the fact that Spanish is a pronoun-dropping language in which verbal subjects are not overtly required, meaning that conjugated verbs are free to occur without an explicit subject (cf. ‘null subject parameter’, Chomsky 1981; cf. also Rizzi 1986). Nonetheless, the inflection on the verb—in addition to the sequential context of the utterance—renders the verb’s subject unambiguous. So the question ¿Hablas español? is unmistakably understood as ‘Do you (tú) speak Spanish?’ despite the fact that the pronoun *tú* is not actually pronounced. This contrasts with ¿Habla español?, which, based on context, would be ‘Do you

¹¹ Due to space considerations, I only include the most prevalent *vos* conjugations here. This morphology is used as the standard in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, but is also used informally in many countries in Central America and in parts of Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador. Nonetheless, other sets of conjugations for *vos* do indeed exist, for example: Azuero/Panamanian and Venezuelan *voseo* (which is identical to the *vosotros* form), and the Chilean *hablai, comi, escribi* pattern. See Benavides (2003), Fontanella de Weinberg (1999) and the Real Academia Española’s *Diccionario panhispánico de dudas* (2005) and *Nueva gramática de la lengua española* (2009: 210-211) for detailed morphological descriptions of these and other systems.
(usted) speak Spanish?’. In each case, the inflectional morphology on the verb effectively carries with it the person reference despite the lack of an overtly realized pronoun in the utterance.

To add one final wrinkle to this panoramic set of descriptions, it should be noted that this one-to-one relationship between pronoun and morphology does not always hold. Those dialects which make use of both tú and vos in varying contexts, particularly in border zones, do have the ability to pair the overt use of one pronoun with the verbal morphology of another. That is, the pronoun vos can be combined with a tú conjugation, or vice-versa, thereby generating quite a rich distribution of levels of intimacy and deference through person reference: tú hablas, vos hablas, tú hablás, vos hablá, in addition to usted habla (cf., on Chile, Torrejón 2010; on Peru, Ramírez 2003; cf. also, Real Academia Española 2009: 1261-1267).

2.2.4 Sociolinguistic Methods for Researching Pronouns

As the linguistic description thus far suggests, the great majority of sociolinguistic research on the pronouns of Spanish has focused on overarching differences: between geographical zones, social class and educational levels, generations, genders, and so on.

Traditional philological analysis of texts generated many detailed studies documenting the variation that exists (and has existed over time) in the Spanish-speaking world. In such studies, literary works have often served as data (e.g., Almasov 1974a, 1974b; Hummel 2010). An example of this method is found in Parodi’s (1978) analysis of dialogue in theatrical works from the 16th through the 20th century in which she illustrates Mexico’s gradual shift from vos/vosotros to tú/ustedes as the societal norm. It is this sort of philological work that has cumulatively resulted in our understanding of the historical evolution of pronouns in Spanish.

‘Sociolinguistics’ as a new field distinct from philology rose to popularity in Europe and in the United States and Latin America in the 1960s with pioneering work by researchers such as William Labov and Basil Bernstein. With this shift came new methods for studying linguistic
variation which have persisted over the years. Most modern sociolinguistic dialectal studies of Spanish person reference have employed a questionnaire/survey methodology—such as that proposed by Lambert and Tucker (1976)—these being administered either via in-person (semi-)structured interview or on paper. Questionnaire researchers invariably categorize their analyses in geographical (dialectal) terms, the size of the target community varying from study to study, for example: a single (zone of a) city such as Orozco’s (2006) discussion of tú/usted in Guadalajara, Mexico, or that of Sanromán Vilas (2010) in Cádiz, Spain; an entire country as in Vargas’s (1974) description of Costa Rican vos and usted; or comparisons of individual countries or dialectal regions such as Solé’s (1970) presentation of correlations between tú/ vos and usted in Argentina, Peru and Puerto Rico, or Schwenter’s (1993) contrast of the uses tú and usted in Spain vs. in Mexico. Recently, Spanish speakers residing outside of what is classically conceptualized as the Spanish-speaking world have also been the subject of sociolinguistic pronominal inquiries, including: Jaramillo (1996) on Mexican-American families, Parodi (2003, 2004, 2009a, 2009c, 2011), Raymond (2012a, 2012c) and Schreffler (1994) on Salvadoran Americans, and Sinner (2010) on Argentine immigrants living in Spain and Germany.

Other, less-frequently mentioned methodologies in the sociolinguistic literature on Spanish pronominal address include participant observation (e.g., Uber 1985, 2011) and more open-ended interviewing. These interviews are often used in attempts to uncover underlying language ideological opinions about various pronoun options—research which could be classified as linguistically anthropological in nature—, in addition to inquiring as to what informants would say in various hypothetical contexts. Murillo (2003), for example, solicited from his informants not only their opinions about today’s terms of address in offices servicing the public, but also their thoughts as to what those terms of address ‘should be’.
To briefly conclude this methodological discussion, the importance of later re-examination of these dialect-specific studies cannot go without mention. Revisiting these data over the years has made it possible to incorporate the countless individual accounts available in the literature into pan-Hispanophone descriptions and explanations which provide excellent overviews of both the commonalities as well as divergences between the different person reference systems in existence in the world’s Spanishes (e.g., Fontanella de Weinberg 1999; Hummel, Kluge & Vázquez Laslop, eds., 2010; Real Academia Española 2009: ch. 16).

2.2.5 A Gap in the Previous Literature

One may have noticed that sequential analyses of actual talk-in-interaction—the subject of this dissertation—were not mentioned in the previous discussion of methods. Indeed, informants’ judgments and opinions have been overwhelmingly solicited and utilized over systematic analyses of natural episodes of interaction in studies of person reference in Spanish. With regard to such methodologies, as will be explained in detail in the next chapter, Sacks (1992: I: 27) plainly comments:

The trouble with [such] work is that they’re using informants; that is, they’re asking questions of their subjects. That means that they’re studying the categories that Members use, to be sure, except at this point they are not investigating their categories by attempting to find them in the activities in which they’re employed.

Elsewhere in his Lectures on Conversation (1992a, 1992b), Sacks describes how speakers are quite typically not cognizant of the complexities involved in everyday interactions (see, for example, lecture 1 on the use of hypothetical data). Thus, to ask individuals what they do when they talk will invariably overlook the fine-grained level of detail which is displayed in natural discourse and which is required if we are to truly understand the “machinery” (Sacks 1984a) of actual, real-time interaction.

When authentic transcripts are offered up for analysis of person reference in studies of Spanish, they are most often the product of dramatizations/role plays (e.g., García 1993) as
opposed to naturally occurring discourse, and/or are comprised of a few short turns devoid of sequential context (e.g., Ferrer 2003; Moser 2003). One specific example of this later case is Blas-Arroyo’s (2000, 2003) work on political debates in Spain.\(^{12}\) While the data are certainly authentic instances of natural discourse, the author almost exclusively presents isolated ‘chunks’ of single-speaker, multi-TCU speech with no sequential progression.\(^{13}\)

The dearth of sequential context contrasts sharply with the maximal emphasis placed on situational context. Pronominal variation within speech communities is conceptualized as principally derived from social context. The Real Academia Española (2009: 1250-1251) gives the example of soccer players treating referees as \textit{tú} or \textit{vos} while on the field, but as \textit{usted} if they were to come into contact with those same individuals outside of the confines of a match. The same sort of variation is reported in Schwenter (1993) in comparing situated contexts that would require \textit{tú} in Spain, but \textit{usted} Mexico—in the same situation, e.g., in a department store—and vice-versa. The overwhelming view in sociolinguistic/variationist studies, then, is that use of a given person reference form is the result of having entered some social context which necessitates its use. But such a view disallows interactants from creating their own local context within that situation, fluidly using a linguistic resource to negotiate—and re-negotiate—identities throughout the course of a single interaction (cf. Heritage & Clayman 2010: 20-22 on the “bucket theory of context”; cf. also Zimmerman 1998). This is precisely the reason why switches between pronouns are typically not discussed: After all, if pronoun usage is connected to the situated context, then as long as the co-participants remain in the same situation, they should continue to use the same pronouns. Nonetheless, data from authentic discourse simply

\(^{12}\) See also de Fina (1995) on pronoun use by single speakers in political speeches in Chiapas, Mexico.

\(^{13}\) Moreno (2011) also analyzes discourse in political debates. Her methodology is a completely quantitative one which, along with Blas-Arroyo, does not take sequential context into consideration in the examination of pronominal choice.
do not align with such a static view of contextual/interactant identity, as we will illustrate in detail in Chapter 4.

When switches are mentioned in the literature, authors do so only anecdotally, as an aside, in typically just a few short sentences (sometimes even in a footnote). Take the following example from Callejas (1983) who studied pronoun choice amongst family members in Santiago, Cuba. She concludes that despite the everyday informal person reference used amongst family members,

el distanciamento puede ser requerido solo para un momento determinado. En este caso el hablante cambia el tú habitual por el usted. Esto sucede en ciertas ocasiones entre marido y mujer cuando uno está disgustado con el otro. Pero más a menudo se oye cuando los padres hablan seriamente a sus hijos o cuando los regañan.

the distancing can be required only for a determined moment. In this case the speaker switches out the habitual tú for the usted. This occurs in certain occasions between husband and wife when one is displeased with the other. But more often it is heard when parents speak seriously with their children or when they scold them.

This is the entirety of the author’s discussion of pronoun switching. Do they occur only in cases of “displeasure” and “scolding”? Other studies have footnotes mentioning the ustedeo de cariño (usted of affection/intimacy) in different geographic zones and speech communities, but no analysis exists beyond brief mention. So one is left to ponder: How, exactly, are these pronominal switches achieved and oriented to by co-participants in talk? What triggers them in the unfolding, turn-by-turn interaction, and what do they serve to accomplish for the interactants?

Various contributors to the important recent 1,193-page volume Formas y fórmulas del tratamiento en el mundo hispánico (‘Forms and Formulas of ‘Person Reference’ in the Hispanic World’), edited by Hummel, Kluge and Vázquez Laslop (2010), acknowledge the need for such a reconsideration of context as it pertains to person reference in Spanish. Many authors include some variation of the following advice for future research in their conclusion sections:

[E]s necesario llevar a cabo estudios pragmáticos y etnográficos, cuyo punto de partida o marco de referencia sean los dialectológicos y sociolingüísticos (sincrónicos y diacrónicos), de tal forma que
se planteen problemas de investigación pragmalingüística de gran envergadura. De esta manera, las investigaciones macro-lingüísticas, cuyos datos hasta ahora se han obtenido a partir de herramientas que controlan determinadas variables (tales como los cuestionarios), podrían complementarse con metodologías que vinculen formas paradigmáticas con patrones de interacción verbal, desde una perspectiva micro-lingüística, eminentemente cualitativa, con datos construidos a partir de corpus conversacionales, espontáneos y discursivos (Vázquez Laslop & Orozco 2010: 264).

“[It is necessary to carry out pragmatic and ethnographic studies which have as their point of departure or background reference to these dialectological and sociolinguistic studies (synchronic and diachronic), so that complex, pragmático-linguistic, investigative questions can be posited. In this way, macro-linguistic investigations, the data for which have until now been obtained through tools that control for determined variables (such as questionnaires), might be complemented with methodologies that connect paradigmatic forms with verbal interaction patterns, from a micro-linguistic perspective, eminently qualitative, with data constructed from spontaneous, discursive and conversational corpora.

Another example is the following:

Así que, en el futuro, se tendrán que llevar a cabo estudios con metodología etnográfica y sociolingüística, y basados en corpus de habla espontánea, para captar posibles variaciones en el uso de las formas de tratamiento (Steffen 2010: 443, emphasis in original).

Thus, in the future, studies with ethnographic and sociolinguistic methodologies must be carried out, based on corpora of spontaneous speech, so as to capture possible variations in the use of person reference.

This is precisely the objective of the analysis in Chapter 4. Given all of the structural complexity which has been widely documented from a sociolinguistic/sociopragmatic perspective and briefly reviewed in this chapter, this dissertation proposes an analysis of the ways in which these person references can be deployed ‘in the moment’ in natural instances of Spanish talk-in-interaction to instantly accomplish shifts in identity. How do interactants position themselves vis-à-vis one another on a turn-by-turn basis as they go about creating their own relevant context in which to accomplish social action? What effects do these real-time displays and (re-)negotiations of identity through person reference have on sequences of interaction? Our aim is thus to examine these reference forms not as isolated speech acts derived from culturally- or contextually-determined politeness requirements, but rather as enactments of identity which are made relevant by previous talk and which come to bear on subsequent talk between co-participants.
Bearing in mind this methodological perspective, it is crucial to highlight that this goal is not synonymous with an attempt to disagree with or otherwise ‘disprove’ that which has been posited by more macro-sociolinguistic researchers such as those referenced above. It would be nonsensical to contest the fact that the average speaker from Mexico City will employ tú and usted in his/her interactions, while the average speaker from Buenos Aires will employ vos and usted, for example. Rather, the goal is to make use of a novel sort of data and analytic methodology to illustrate how these resources can be ‘put to work’ by conversationalists in actual instances of social interaction to enact a wide-range of action- and identity-related tasks.

2.3 VERBAL MOOD SELECTION

The second thematic topic of this dissertation investigates verbal mood selection. The distinction between the indicative and subjunctive verbal moods in Spanish (and Romance more generally) is a familiar topic for a wide range of linguists—structural and applied, social and pragmatic—, the fundamental pursuit being an exhaustive explanation of precisely where these moods can be employed and why. Generative morphosyntacticians and semanticists (as well as those working on the interface between these subfields) often set out to make the division clear through syntactic, lexical and/or underlying cognitive processing rules (e.g., Zagona 2002), while applied linguists hope to illustrate the dissimilarities in a way that will allow learners of Spanish-as-a-second-language to better grasp and correctly employ the language’s complex morphological paradigm (e.g., Isabelli & Nishida 2005). While such approaches are commonplace in the literature, much less research has been conducted on the interactional or discursive functions of mood; and the few investigations available make use of the (socio-)pragmatic, politeness and/or speech act theory models discussed at length in the previous chapter.
Just as was argued in the case of person reference, we posit that examination of naturalistic data will allow us to better understand the actual in-the-moment deployment of these verbal resources. That is, given that Spanish indeed presents its speakers with the option of either the indicative or the subjunctive in various contexts, what do participants accomplish by employing one or the other? In order to approach this question, let us first describe the linguistic resources that speakers of Spanish have at their disposal.

2.3.1 Tense-Aspect-Mood in Spanish\textsuperscript{14}

Although mood is the focus of our specific pursuits, mood is morphologically encoded onto verbs in Spanish simultaneously with tense and aspect (Guillaume 1929). Thus, we must begin by distinguishing these three distinct—but intertwined—dimensions of Spanish verbal inflection before targeting mood specifically (cf. Bosque & Demonte, eds. 1999: ch. 44-53; Real Academia Española 2009: ch. 23-25).\textsuperscript{15}

Both tense and aspect are concerned with time, but each with a different feature thereof. Tense locates a situation on a chronological timeline ranging from the past to the present and into the future. We can then further divide these into a past event which occurred prior to another past event (Juan había estudiado / John had studied), or a future event which will have already occurred by the time another future event is realized (Juan habrá estudiado / John will

\textsuperscript{14} In this subsection, I present various (invented) examples of grammatical/agrammatical sentences to demonstrate the linguistic possibilities and requirements of Spanish. These are included to acquaint the reader with the morphological paradigm of the language and to present previous literature on the topic, not for the purpose of analyzing these sentences as isolated speech acts.

\textsuperscript{15} While the discussion included in this subsection is generalizeable cross-linguistically to a certain point, the specific possibilities and requirements of the Spanish paradigm are the focus here. This is important to bear in mind as these differ cross-linguistically, even within Romance. For example, Italian’s credere ‘to think/believe’ requires the subjunctive mood in inflected subordinate clauses, while Spanish’s creer ‘to think/believe’—from the same Latin root as the Italian version—allows either the indicative or the subjunctive depending on various discursive factors. This is another reason as to why the formal semantics behind subjunctivity (and its triggers) is a particularly complex issue: Given the often language-specific nature of its possible uses, in-depth analyses and data from a wide range of languages are necessary to arrive at universal assertions. Note that, in undertaking such a pursuit, one runs the risk of claiming, for example, that ‘thinking/believing’ in Italian is different than ‘thinking/believing’ in Spanish (or English, for that matter) (cf. Linguistic Relativity/Linguistic Determinism and the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis; Whorf 1956).
have *studied*), and so on. Regardless of what specific temporal moment is being referred to, tense is best conceptualized as a timeline feature (Bello 1980 [1847]).

*Aspect* is separate from tense in that it defines an event’s durative qualities, **perfective** indicating a fully completed action and **imperfective** indicating one which is not yet complete (or a situation in which the completeness or incompleteness of the action is not the focus).

Notice how these two concepts inform the interpretation of the following pair of sentences:

(1) Juan y Maria *comieron* mucho.
    J and M *ate* PERFECTIVE a-lot
    *Juan and Maria ate a lot.*

(2) Juan y Maria *comían* mucho.
    J and M *ate* IMPERFECTIVE a-lot
    *Juan and Maria were eating / used to eat a lot.*

Both of these utterances are situated in the past in terms of their tense; however they differ with respect to their aspect: perfective in (1) and imperfective in (2). The perfective (1) indicates that Juan and Maria’s eating a lot occurred and was completed at a specific point in time in the past. This sentence could thus be referring to a dinner party the prior evening, for example. In contrast, the imperfective (2) does not specify any claim as to the completeness of Juan and María’s past eating. While the tense is still past, the durative or continuative aspect of the action is the aim, as opposed to the concluded aspect observed in (1).

It is crucial to note that both of these phrases could potentially refer to the same specific event (e.g., last night’s dinner party): In (1), expressing that the eating action has been completed is the primary objective of the utterance, while in (2) the same eating event would be ancillary to the enunciation of some other event or description. This aspectual differentiation is coded in the inflectional morphology applied to the verb *comer* ‘to eat’: –*ieron* for the 3rd-person plural **perfective** past vs. –*ían* for the 3rd-person plural **imperfective** past. This richness of verbal morphology marks a sharp contrast between Spanish and English, which is essential to
bear in mind as we now move to incorporate mood (also marked morphologically) into the paradigm.  

Mood is a verbal feature which indicates modality and which is encoded onto verbal conjugations along with the aforementioned features of tense and aspect. The Real Academia Española (2009: 1866) defines this feature as follows:

Tal como se ha señalado en la tradición, un rasgo característico del modo es informar sobre la actitud del hablante ante la información suministrada y, en particular, sobre el punto de vista que este sostiene en relación con el contenido de lo que se presenta o se describe.

As has been described in the tradition, a characteristic feature of mood is to inform the hearer as to the speaker’s attitude toward the information that s/he [the speaker] is in the process of delivering and, in particular, as to the point of view that s/he [the speaker] maintains in relation to the content of what is being presented or described.

A similar description of mood is found in Gili Gaya’s (2002: 131) introduction to the verbal morphology of Spanish:

Entre los medios gramaticales que denotan la actitud del que habla, se encuentran las formas de la conjugación conocidas con el nombre tradicional de modos. Con los modos expresamos nuestro punto de vista subjetivo ante la acción verbal que enunciamos. Podemos pensar el verbo como una acción o fenómeno que tiene lugar efectivamente; nuestro juicio versa entonces sobre algo que consideramos real, con existencia objetiva. Podemos pensar también que el concepto verbal que preferimos es simplemente un acto mental nuestro, al cual no atribuimos existencia fuera de nuestro pensamiento [i.e., irreal], (my emphasis).

Among the grammatical means that denote the attitude of the speaker, one finds the forms of conjugation known by the traditional name of moods. With moods we express our subjective point of view toward the verbal action that we enunciate. We can think of the verb as an action or phenomenon that effectively has a place; our judgment is about something that we consider real, with objective existence. We can also think that the verbal concept that we prefer is simply a mental act of our own, to which we do not attribute existence outside of our thinking [i.e., irreal], (my emphasis).

This potential divergence in “point of view” is what is conveyed through the use of the indicative vs. the subjunctive moods in Spanish, a fact long reported in grammars of the

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16 Note the translation of (2) into English requires the use of additional auxiliary verbs to convey the same aspectual meaning as is expressed in the Spanish sentence through morphology alone.

17 Modality can also be expressed via parts of speech other than matrix (‘main’) verbs, such as on auxiliary or ‘modal’ verbs like the English may, can, could, must, etc., as well as through the nouns (likelihood, requirement, necessity, etc.) and adverbs (potentially, possibly, certainly, etc.). This is the case in Spanish as well, but these are used in addition to and in tandem with the indicative/subjunctive morphological paradigm. In contrast, many modern dialects of English are able to make use of these nominal and adverbial expressions of modality without any verbo-morphological resources. That is, many speakers now accept ‘It is a requirement that you be (subj.) in class everyday’ and ‘It is a requirement that you are (indic.) in class everyday’ as both equally well-formed English sentences, while other dialects only accept as grammatical the former which uses the subjunctive in the embedded clause.
language (e.g., Bello 1980 [1847]; Bosque & Demonte, eds. 1999; Lenz 1920; Roca-Pons 1960; Zamorano Aguilar 2001).¹⁸ Linguists often conceptualize this distinction as one between realis and irrealis: While the indicative solidly positions information in a world of fact, objectivity and reality, the subjunctive denotes contexts

…que suelen llamarse NO FACTUALES (es decir, no reales, no verificados o no experimentados), lo que sugiere que la flexión del subjuntivo podría considerarse la manifestación en forma gramatical de las nociones abstractas que corresponden a esos contextos (Real Academia Española 2009: 1866; cf. also Bello 1980 [1847]: ch. 21).

…that can be referred to as NON-FACTUAL (that is, not real, not verified or not experienced), which suggests that the subjunctive inflection could be considered the grammatical manifestation of the abstract notions that correspond to those contexts.

Let us examine a concrete example, seen in (3) below.

(3) María quiere que Juan estude.
M wants.PRESENT.INDIC that J studies.PRESENT.SUBJ

María wants Juan to study.

The indicative is used on the verb querer ‘to want’ as this verb is referencing an objective reality, namely a want that María has. The speaker of (3) is asserting as fact that María presently has this desire. Moving to the embedded verb, estudiar ‘to study’, however, we do not observe the same objective link to reality. Neither the speaker of (3) nor María is making any claim as to whether or not Juan actually is studying/studies/will study, and the subjunctive is required in this context precisely to signal this disconnect from a specific objective reality. In other words, Juan’s studying does not have the same connection to reality that María’s wanting does, in this utterance.

Reemphasizing the morphological inseparability of mood from tense and aspect in Spanish, these realis/irrealis mood distinctions are not only used in the present tense, but in other tenses as well. In (4) below, the same conditions of reality vs. not-necessarily-reality apply with

¹⁸ As a point of comparison, sociolinguists and historical linguists have noted that French has slowly been ‘losing’ its subjunctive mood over time. Since the 17th century, the indicative has been observed in situations where the subjunctive would typically be ‘required’ (e.g., Templery 1698; cf. Poplack 2006).
regard to María’s wanting and Juan’s studying; the only difference is that now this state of affairs has shifted from the present to some time in the past.

(4) María quería que Juan estudiase. 
Maria wanted Juan to study.

Again, María's wanting is coded with the indicative mood, as the speaker of (4) is presenting this desire as an objective reality. Just as above, however, Juan’s studying lacks such an objective link to actuality, and this is reflected in the use of the subjunctive mood on the embedded verb. Note that, while the reason behind the use of the subjunctive in (4) is the same as it was in (3), (4) makes use of the past subjunctive, encoded via the inflection –ase, compared to the present subjunctive in (3), encoded with –e. In other words, tense, aspect, and mood are inescapably morphologically intertwined in Spanish, each inflected verb carrying with it a complex ‘package’ of communicative content.

2.3.2 Optionality in the Selection of Mood

The subjunctive in Spanish can be used to express various types of modality, including doubts, desires, (future) possibilities, feelings, etc. (Real Academia Española 2009: ch. 25, 42; cf. also, Alarcos Llorach 1999; Bosque, ed. 1990b; Bosque & Demonte, eds. 1999: ch. 44-53; Pérez Rioja 1954). We have argued thus far that what binds all of these together is the certain degree of not-necessarily-reality (irrealis) or subjectivity encoded in the subjunctive morphology, compared to the claim of objectivity and realness (realis) encoded in the indicative morphology. Some of these instances are straightforward as in (3) and (4) above, meaning that no question or optionality exists as to the use of the indicative vs. the subjunctive. But the situation is, in reality, more complex than this black-and-white description initially suggests. This is due to the fact that, in several instances, either the indicative or the subjunctive mood would be able to

19 This naturally only holds for dialects of Spanish that maintain an indicative vs. subjunctive morphological distinction, which does not include all dialects (e.g., some dialects of Spanish in the United States; cf. Lipski 2003; Lynch 1999; Montrul 2007b; Parodi 2008; Raymond 2012b; Silva-Corvalán 1994).
generate a grammatical utterance. Gili Gaya (2002) briefly mentions that the current uses of
the subjunctive mood are the result of “historical, psychological and stylistic” factors which,
over time, have come to bear on these ‘optional’ cases. In addition, the Real Academia
Española (2009: 1887) comments that:

Las alternancias modales constituyen uno de los problemas clásicos de la gramática española. Han
sido examinados por los gramáticos en todas las épocas y se han propuesto para ellas
explicaciones muy diversas de carácter sintáctico, léxico, semántico o pragmático.

Modal alternations constitute one of the classic problems of Spanish grammar. They have been
examined by the grammarians of every time period, and diverse explanations have been proposed
for them, ranging from syntactic to lexical to semantic to pragmatic in nature.

Take, for instance, the modal alternation in examples (5) and (6) below:

(5) Vamos a Córdoba aunque los boletos son caros.
go.1p to C although the tickets are expensive
We are going to Córdoba even though the tickets are expensive.

(6) Vamos a Córdoba aunque los boletos sean caros.
go.1p to C although the tickets are expensive
We are going to Córdoba even if the tickets are expensive.

In example (5), the expensiveness of the tickets is offered up as an objective fact of reality; the
issue is not presented as debatable, and it is the indicative morphology of the verb ser ‘to be’
which accomplishes this. On the other hand, the subjunctive morphology in (6) does not make
any explicit claims as to the tickets’ actual cost. So, while (6) does leave open the possibility that
the tickets are indeed costly, it also concedes that this description may not align with reality,
thereby reflecting the speaker’s state of knowledge at the time of the utterance.

The choice between indicative and subjunctive moods in such ‘alternation’ contexts can
effectively present hearers with morphologically granted access to speakers’ internal mental
states. This is a subtle and yet essential function of mood distinction in Spanish which affects

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20 Such sentences can present considerable difficulty to those syntacticians working within a strictly Minimalist
framework (Chomsky 1995, 2001, 2005) which does not allow for any such optionality in its derivations. See
discussion of this issue in Raymond (2012b).

21 See Lope Blanch (1953: 80, 1968) and Moreno de Alba (1970, 1972) on the historical simplification of the verbal
paradigm in Mexico, specifically.
how utterances are understood (cf. Bosque 1990a; Real Academia Española 2009: 3117). Take the pairs of sentences in (7)-(10) below, which, for the sake of explanation, we will imagine are uttered by a speaker named María.

(7) Lo que dice Juan es cierto.
   it that says.INDIC J is true
   What Juan says is true.

(8) Lo que diga Juan es cierto.
   it that says.SUBJ J is true
   What(ever) Juan says is true.

(9) Busco una bicicleta que es roja.
   look-for.1s a bicycle that is.INDIC red
   I’m looking for a bike that is red.

(10) Busco una bicicleta que sea roja.
    look-for.1s a bicycle that is.SUBJ red
    I’m looking for a bike that is red.

The indicative vs. subjunctive versions of these sentences provide the hearer with information about what the speaker, María, is/is not claiming to know. In (7), María is making a claim not only regarding the truth-value of Juan’s utterance, but also that she, in fact, knows what Juan is saying. This contrasts with (8) in which María presents the information in Juan’s utterance as unknown to her: She is still asserting that Juan is/will be telling the truth, but in (8) she does not assert the same experiential understanding of Juan’s specific ‘saying event’ as was seen in (7).

A similar distinction can be made between (9) and (10). The indicative in (9) tells the hearer that María has in mind a specific bicycle that she is looking for (e.g., she lost her own red bicycle), compared to (10) in which the subjunctive conveys that the specific identity/existence of a red bicycle is not certain (e.g., she is shopping for a new red bicycle but does not know whether or not there are any for sale at the store).
Various syntactic constructions introduce this sort of optionality in subsequent verbal morphology. Some examples are included in Table 2.11 (cf. Real Academia Española 2009: 1873-1876, 1886-1907, 1942-1960):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conjunctions &amp; Adverbs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aunque</td>
<td>‘even though’ / ‘even if’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>como</td>
<td>‘how’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de manera que</td>
<td>‘so that’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de modo que</td>
<td>‘so that’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>después de que</td>
<td>‘after’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donde</td>
<td>‘where’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hasta</td>
<td>‘until’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mientras</td>
<td>‘while’ / ‘until’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>posiblemente</td>
<td>‘possibly’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>probablemente</td>
<td>‘probably’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>quizá(s)</td>
<td>‘maybe’ / ‘perhaps’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>según</td>
<td>‘according to’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>tal vez</td>
<td>‘perhaps’ / ‘maybe’</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbs</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>admitir</td>
<td>‘to admit’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>alegrar</td>
<td>‘to gladden’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>celebrar</td>
<td>‘to approve’ / ‘to be glad of’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confiar</td>
<td>‘to trust’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creer</td>
<td>‘to think’ / ‘to believe’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extrañar</td>
<td>‘to displease’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gustar</td>
<td>‘to please’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parecer</td>
<td>‘to seem’ / ‘to appear’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pensar</td>
<td>‘to think’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>presumir</td>
<td>‘to presume’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sentir</td>
<td>‘to feel’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sospechar</td>
<td>‘to suspect’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.11: Examples of triggers for subjunctive or indicative**

It goes without saying that the turn-by-turn assertion, contestation, and defense of distinct “territories of knowledge” (Heritage 2012a, 2012b) in interaction is intrinsically connected to the ‘doing’ of identity. With each new addition to the talk, the epistemic state of affairs—or “epistemic landscape” (Heritage & G. Raymond 2012)—can shift between the co-participants; and verbal mood selection optionality provides speakers of Spanish with a resource
that can be mobilized to perform the complex interactional work intrinsic to these negotiations of identity.

2.3.3 Previous Pragmatic and Semantic Accounts of Mood in Spanish

With regard to the aforementioned (and other) triggers, Hispanic linguists have categorized the subjunctive as marking a proposition as non-assertive, thereby creating a dichotomy between it and the indicative, marking assertion (e.g., Klein 1975; Terrell & Hooper 1974). Mejías-Bikandi (1994: 892) later reformulated this dichotomy in positing that the indicative is used “when the intention of the speaker is to indicate that the information expressed in that clause is contained in the domain that represents some individual’s view of reality” (cf. the subjunctive which is used when such an intention is not present, or when there is a lack of such a conceptualization of reality), and the preceding discussion supports this view.

In recent decades, pragmatic approaches to Spanish mood have based themselves in particular theories such as Gricean conversational implicature (Bustos 1986; Bustos & Aliaga 1996), politeness (Haverkate 1991, 2002, 2004) and relevance (Ahern & Leonetti 2004; de Jonge 2001, 2004, 2006; Lunn 1987, 1989). Each has the goal of an overarching and exhaustive explanation of modal possibilities and restrictions in Spanish; and, as can be expected, each of these methods has received critique from the others.

Haverkate (1991, 2002, 2004) argues that the fundamental function of the subjunctive is not to inform the hearer about an event, but to present it as preconceived information, explicitly or not, in the previous context. De Jonge, working within relevance theory (RT; cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986), alludes to the notion of the “Communicative Principle of Relevance” in his critique of Haverkate. This Principle states that “Every act of ostensive communication (e.g., an

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22 Although not the focus of the present analysis, it should be noted that several generative accounts of mood in Spanish (and Romance) are available in the literature. See, for example, Kempchinsky (1986, 1995), Giorgi (2009), and Schlenker (2005). Also relevant from a cross-linguistic perspective is Stowell’s (2008) syntactic analysis of what he calls the “English konjunktiv II”.

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utterance) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Ahern & Leonetti 2004: 36), and strikes an interesting parallel with Sacks’ (1984a) notion of “order at all points".

Bearing this RT Principle in mind, de Jonge (2006: 167) contends the following on the basis that new talk is always informative:

Cabe señalar además que el significado postulado por Haverkate [1989: 98] es de índole negativa, lo cual intuitivamente no se ajusta bien al valor del signo lingüístico: si la función pragmática del subjuntivo NO es la de informar, queda la pregunta de cuál es su función (emphaisis in original).

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the meaning postulated by Haverkate [1989: 98] is negative in nature, which intuitively does not settle well with the value of the linguistic sign: if the pragmatic function of the subjunctive is NOT to inform, the question remains as to what its function is (emphasis in original).

De Jonge goes on to explain that the factuality of the event is irrelevant with the use of the subjunctive; the subjunctive indicates that there is an alternative relevant in the context, independent of the real situation of the event in question (169). This is a slight variation from Lunn (1987, 1989) who had previously posited a simple difference in the degree of relevance between the indicative (high relevance) and the subjunctive (low relevance), a distinction which was claimed to allow the hearer to ‘pay less attention’ to subjunctive expressions compared to indicative ones.

Lunn (1989: 689) also reminds us of another crucial point: the existence of variation among speakers. The data used by the authors above are varied, but all involve one or more of the sources discussed earlier: invented examples, isolated speech acts, literary texts, etc. Again, just as was seen with person reference, very rarely are contextualized, sequential progressions offered up for analysis. When authentic data are presented, they are typically short excerpts usually accompanied by politeness analyses (e.g., Haverkate 2002: 168). In light of the variation that Lunn mentions, this is yet another reason that isolated speech acts and hypothesized examples will not allow us to see actual interlocutors’ orientations to what they are doing with their talk.

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While I have attempted to highlight a few of the more prominent pragmatic and semantic accounts of indicative/subjunctive alternation in this section, it should be evident from this brief discussion just how divergent and even contradictive the previous literature on the subject is. Indeed, as the Real Academia Española (2009: 3114) itself summarizes, despite widespread agreement as to the importance of studying mood alternation,

No existe, sin embargo, en la actualidad una teoría de la modalidad aceptada de manera unánime por todos los autores. Los términos y los conceptos que se han aplicado a esta parte de la gramática en los estudios clásicos y en los modernos han recibido definiciones variables, cuyos límites no siempre se deslindan con precisión en la bibliografía.

There does not exist, however, today a theory of modality which is unanimously accepted by all authors. The terms and concepts that have been applied to this part of the grammar in both classic and modern studies have received variable definitions whose limits are not always defined with precision in the literature.

2.3.4 An Alternative to ‘Individual-Level’ Analyses of Mood

The analyses of mood referenced in the previous section can often be paraphrased as the following: ‘The sentence X is well-formed/appropriate with the subjunctive if the speaker believes Y,’ or, alternatively, ‘The sentence X cannot be grammatical/appropriate with the indicative if the speaker believes Y’. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to such formulations as individual-level analyses as they tend to operate at the level of the individual speaker. These studies attempt to ‘get inside’ this hypothetical individual’s mind and predict/govern what s/he can and cannot say ‘correctly’.

An alternative to this line of theorizing is to rethink language, mind, and world dialogically, as suggested in the very title of a recent book by Per Linell (2009). Rather than analysts attempting to nail down the truth-value semantics of verbal moods inside an isolated speaker’s head—which, as we will discuss further in Chapter 3, often proves an insurmountable task—let us instead attempt to identify the interactional import of moods by way of their deployment in authentic interaction. How might the co-participants themselves be getting inside each other’s heads to carve out and negotiate “territories of knowledge” in interaction by way of
verbal mood selection? After all, even if an exhaustive explanation of when and where a specific mood can appear were readily available, that would only constitute a description of the repertoire itself. We would be in the same position as we were in the previous section on person reference (e.g., describing a dialect as possessing tú and usted in its repertoire). The infamous ‘so what’ question would still remain: Given the existence of these tools, how do interactants actually mobilize them in real episodes of talk? When either the indicative or the subjunctive mood can generate a grammatical or pragmatically ‘appropriate’ utterance, what interactional ‘work’ does one do that the other does not, and vice-versa? And how does the deployment of one mood or the other affect the unfolding talk-in-interaction through co-participant orientation to that decision?

We must reiterate that the present line of inquiry does not share the same analytic goals of previous studies. Just as was done earlier with respect to person reference, here we take the interactants’ understanding of mood as given. The present study will not assess whether one mood or another is theoretically correct/grammatical/appropriate in a given turn because we are dealing with actual talk: It is not up for debate whether the indicative or the subjunctive can/should be used in turn X, for example—the fact is that the speaker said what s/he said. The question we explore in Chapter 5 is what sequentially conditions that choice, as well as what that choice serves to achieve for the interactants.

2.4 INTERSENTENTIAL SPANISH-ENGLISH CODE-SWITCHING

The third, and final, substantive topic of this dissertation, pursued in Chapter 6, is a systematic analysis of interactional code-switching. Code-switching is, as Bullock and Toribio (2009a: 1) simply put it, “the ability on the part of bilinguals to alternate effortlessly between their two languages”. Despite this straightforward and almost carefree definition of the practice, however, code-switching has sparked a significant amount of heated intellectual debate over the
years; and the extreme surge of research on this bilingual ability over the past two decades in particular has only served to fuel the fires of controversy.

2.4.1 The Early Days

Prior to this relatively recent surge in research, bilinguals who code-switched were thought of as having a “deviant behavior pattern” (Weinreich 1953: 74) because “there are perhaps no syntactic restrictions on where the switching can occur” (Lance 1975: 143). Code-switching was therefore not considered amenable to legitimate academic study as it operated at the level of the aberrant individual, and hence was both agrammatical and asystematic.

Due to the fact that alternating between languages had been so long conceptualized as random, the first studies in code-switching were purely descriptive in nature, exemplifying that sentence X was indeed grammatical and possible (accepted by speakers), while sentence Y was agrammatical and impossible (not accepted by speakers), with researchers occasionally incorporating quantified results into their analyses (e.g., Gumperz & Hernández 1969; Pfaff 1975, 1979). As it turned out, code-switching was—and is—actually quite orderly, and every bit as syntactically governed as monolingual grammars. Pfaff (1979) and Poplack (1979, 1981) were then amongst the first researchers to begin to combine these orderly descriptions into general theories of language, in essence positing initial answers to the question: What can bilingual speech tell linguists about the structure of human language more generally?23

Since these somewhat controversial beginnings, research on code-switching has not only gained wide-spread acceptance amongst linguists, but it has also increased exponentially in sheer popularity. Linguistic investigation of the phenomenon encompasses a wide range of methodologies, including those from generative linguistics (from a variety of subfields),

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23 An interesting parallel can be drawn between the intellectual history of code-switching and that of everyday talk-in-interaction, both of which were initially thought of as disorderly and too ‘messy’ for serious academic study. The following Chapter 3 will explore this latter trajectory in more detail from a methodological point of view.
cognitive and psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, language acquisition, pragmatics, (critical) discourse analysis, linguistic anthropology, and also Conversation Analysis. Despite this seemingly boundless array of approaches to a single practice, all are more or less interested in answering the same basic question: Where do switches occur and why? The reason for the varied methodologies becomes clear when one realizes that not only is this question easier to pose than it is to answer, but that it also necessarily brings about various other uncertainties as well—not the least imperative of which being: What, exactly, even counts as a ‘switch’? (cf. Álvarez-Cáccamo 1990, and Franceschini 1998, on the meaning of ‘code’ in code-switching). As a result, many researchers today continue struggling with some of the same, seemingly ‘basic’ issues that were being debated in the foundational studies from over four decades ago.

2.4.2 Linguistic Research on Code-Switching

Given the multiplicity of approaches to code-switching, here I draw attention to some of the more essential terminological and methodological distinctions—and critiques thereof—in an attempt to describe where code-switching research as a whole presently finds itself. After presenting this foundation, I move on to discuss interactional approaches to the phenomenon, in particular highlighting what questions these investigations have left unanswered.

The first terminological distinction that was initially posited by researchers, and which is relevant to our discussion here, is between intersentential and intrasentential switches, the former occurring at the boundaries between complete sentences, the latter occurring mid-sentence. Invented examples, taken from Raymond (2012b), are included below to illustrate these possibilities. Intersentential switches can occur between speakers, as in (11), or within the same speaker’s talk, as in (12) and (13).

(11) A: ¿Quieres algo de comer? (=Do you want something to eat?)
    B: Yes, please. I’m hungry.
Such switches have received a considerable amount of study from discursive researchers who were originally inspired by the work of Gal (1978, 1979), Gumperz (1982), and Auer (1984). Indeed, these perspectives will be discussed in the following section. However, from a grammatical/structural (e.g., morphosyntactic) point of view, they are relatively uninteresting: a complete, grammatical sentence in Spanish (full CP) followed by a distinct, complete, grammatical sentence in English (another full CP), or vice-versa. The great majority of non-discourse-based studies—particularly morphosyntactic, but also phonetic/phonological, work—has thus focused on intrasentential code-switching, such as that seen in (14) and (15).

(14) A: Necesito otro **pencil** porque no puedo encontrar el mío.

(15) A: Necesito otro **lápiz** because *I can’t find mine*.

* I need another pencil because *I can’t find mine*.

Note that these switches can consist of a single word, as in (14), or continue in the switched language to the end of the sentence, as in (15). Generative syntactic studies, such as those working in the Chomskyan (1995, 2001) Minimalist framework, have aimed to detail out where such intrasentential alternations can (and cannot) occur (e.g., Rubin & Toribio 1995; MacSwan 1999, 2000; Toribio 2001). In some of my own work, I have argued that the Minimalist framework may require modification if it is to be capable of accounting for bilingual speakers’ grammaticality judgments with regard to subjunctive vs. indicative mood selection in embedded clauses (such as those which were discussed in the previous section) (Raymond 2012b). It cannot go without mention that the same critiques which are applied to generative linguistic studies of monolinguals are also applied to generative linguistic studies involving bilinguals and code-switching (e.g., debate over the superior importance of linguistic competence vs.
performance, etc.). As this discussion was already taken up in detail in the previous Chapter 1, I will not repeat it here.\(^{24}\)

Moving away from purely structural approaches, a well-known sociolinguistic account of code-switching is found in Myers-Scotton’s (1993, 2002) ‘markedness theory’, which attempts to shed light on the social motivation behind speakers’ alternation between languages (inter- as well as intrasententially). The proposition is part of a larger group of theories called Rational Choice (RC) models and states that “speakers have a sense of markedness regarding available linguistic codes for any interaction, but choose their codes based on the persona and/or relation with others which they wish to have in place” (Myers-Scotton 1993: 75). In other words, speakers arrive to communicative events with all of this information predetermined, and subsequently use it for communicative ends based on their comparing various rights-and-obligations (RO) sets. In arguing against this model, Meeuwis and Blommaert (1994: 400) explain that, according to Myers-Scotton, “Interaction merely consists of the reproduction or reification of pre-existing social meaning, and itself is not creative”. Minimalist syntacticians (e.g., MacSwan 2005) and conversation analysts alike have also argued quite strongly against the model. Li Wei’s (1998: 159) CA-based argument is that Myers-Scotton’s theory is applied at the level of the analyst: “It is…hardly the way conversation participants themselves interpret each other’s linguistic choices and negotiate meaning”.

Observe that, in order to do the sort of analysis that Myers-Scotton proposes, a certain amount of ethnography is required so that the analyst becomes intimately aware of the social values of the languages present in the community, an approach which is also necessary if one is to examine code-switching practices from the “we-code” vs. “they-code” perspective that

\(^{24}\) It merits brief mention that promising new research is currently being conducted on the ‘interfaces’ between generative and sociolinguistic methodologies, for example in the emergent field of sociophonetics (Thomas 2002). Bullock (2009) and Bullock and Toribio (2009c), for example, have investigated Voice Onset Time (VOT) at the precise moment of switches such as in (14) and (15), demonstrating Spanish-English bilinguals' ability to maintain distinct phonological categories for voiceless stops.
Gumperz (1982) originally posited (cf. Gafaranga & Torras 2002). A slightly different approach to ethnography is used in anthropological studies of languages and cultures in contact (and, by extension, of code-switching practices). A very grounded, ‘ethnography of communication’ (Hymes 1962) approach is found, for example, in Ana Celia Zentella’s (1997) study of Puerto Rican children growing up in New York. On the linguistic side of her study, Zentella not only describes the structure of what she calls “Spanglish”, but also the social meaning thereof and the socialization process that leads to these overarching tendencies.

Another salient ethnographic study is Norma Mendoza-Denton’s (2008) in-depth analysis of gang-affiliated Latina girls’ interactive practices. Compared to Zentella, Mendoza-Denton focuses less on the technical/structural aspects of bilingual talk and more on the involved languages’ symbolic meanings. Take her explanation of a specific switch below:

“Tschhh, don’t EVEN talk to me in Spanish, ‘cause your Spanish ain’t all that,’ yelled Patricia, in English. Fighting words, since both Norteñas and Sureñas had a claim to authentic Mexican-ness, and both understood Spanish to be symbolic of that claim. The switch to English was intended to circumscribe the boundary of the right kind of Spanish, and to imply that Lupe could not speak it well enough” (207).

Symbolic uses being attached to languages in specific contexts is also evident in Rusty Barrett’s (2006) study of the employment of Spanish and English at “Chalupatown,” an Anglo-owned Mexican restaurant in Texas. Barrett elucidates the central role that employees’ language practices play in “reinforc[ing] racial segregation and inequality in the workplace” (163).

Also under the academic umbrella of linguistic anthropology is work in language ideologies, or individuals’/groups’ beliefs about language(s). As may be expected, research based in dissimilar contexts reports dissimilar results (cf., e.g., studies in Niño-Murcia & Rothman, eds. 2009). Hill (1998), for example, describes Spanish-Nahuatl code-switching in Mexico and explains that speakers disparage mixing elements of Spanish into Nahuatl. She claims that members of this community interpret code-switching as a disrespectful practice, which deviates from “legítimo mexicano” (or, ‘legitimate Nahuatl’). On the contrary, Montes-

Lastly, symbolic uses of language as part of political discourse have also been documented as part of the ideology perspective of language contact, for example Woolard (1985) on Catalan in Spain and Makihara (2007) on Rapa Nui on Easter Island, Chile. The geographically specified grounding of all of these anthropological studies demonstrates the importance of context in code-switching analyses: The role(s) that Spanish plays in the Nahuatl-speaking regions of Mexico or the Catalan-speaking areas of Spain can and do differ from those which it plays in the English-speaking southwestern United States, for instance.

2.4.3 Sequential Approaches to Code-Switching: Restricting the Sequential Context

While some of the approaches described in the previous subsection do indeed make use of naturally occurring contexts and interactions, the methods employed to analyze those data can be referred to as “symbolic” rather than “sequential” (Cashman 2008). As such, the same methodological issues which were discussed in the first two sections are again relevant here. The most salient difference between anthropological/sociolinguistic and sequential analyses concerns the orientation of participants, the former approach allowing analysts to interpret interactants’ motivations and assess the relative relevance(s) of their various identities, and the latter requiring the participants themselves to be the ones orienting to these features. The great majority of studies on conversational code-switching make use of the former approach, including discourse-analytic investigations. As Li Wei (1998: 157) explains, “analyst-oriented, theory-driven, top-down approaches continue to proliferate and dominate current studies of code-switching”. That the same few ‘bottom-up’ authors will be repeatedly cited in the literature review in Chapter 6 is a testament to this fact. Nonetheless, given the methodological thrust of this dissertation, I maintain that a sequential approach will allow us to uncover some of the
detailed, systematic intricacies of how code-switching operates and what it can be used for in bilingual talk-in-interaction.

In Chapter 6, I will review previous conversation-analytic research on code-switching and argue that it is too broadly focused. By this I mean that it fails to take into consideration the methodical, micro-level switches which occur turn-by-turn in bilingual interaction. CA researchers have thus far taken stretches of talk in which switches are present and analyzed them one after the other. While this is indeed a ‘sequential’ approach, it is too varied and all-encompassing to allow us to identify the specific functions of different code-switches. By looking at the same repeated sequential context—responsive turns—across a variety of speakers and interactions, I aim to uncover some level of preference organization which can then, in turn, be used to make sense of switches vs. non-switches in these sequences. This analysis as a whole simultaneously embodies a concrete argument for a bottom-up approach to code-switching more generally: The use of several micro-level studies such as this one to build up to more overarching theories of code-switching as a general social and discursive practice.

2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has provided a critical review of the literature on the three linguistic resources under examination in this dissertation: 2nd-person singular person reference, verbal mood selection, and intersentential code-switching. Each of these has been set up as capable of accomplishing some ‘work’ with regard to the ongoing management and negotiation of identity in interaction. Contrary to the vast majority of methods, approaches, and data sources reviewed in this discussion, I maintain that neither the identity of the interactants nor that of the context should be conceptualized as static or otherwise simply ‘given as-is’. Rather, co-participants in talk are actively making use of the myriad of linguistic (and other) resources at their disposal—such as those described here—as they sequentially and collaboratively make relevant and invoke
different identities in the service of social action, *in and through their ongoing discourse with one another.*

The present discussion has aimed to uncover gaps in our current understanding of the linguistic resources under consideration; and in doing so, we have put forth a host of new questions which previous accounts have been unable to answer. We now find ourselves in need of an alternative approach which *is* capable of providing some insight on these issues. This alternative theory and method, known as Conversation Analysis (CA), is the topic of the following chapter.
Conversation Analysis (CA): Theory and Method

So we have an undiminished opportunity to overlook the relevant facts with our very own eyes.

What sorts of animals are to be found in the interactional zoo?

—Erving Goffman
“The Interaction Order”
American Sociological Review (1983: 2, 6)

The previous chapter has left us with quite a few unanswered questions.

The most fundamental among them is this: If, as I have argued, the theoretical and methodological approaches employed in previous research on the topics of this dissertation have failed to yield adequate answers to the sorts of questions we are asking, what then might an alternative approach look like? The present chapter aims to motivate the use of Conversation Analysis (CA) as that alternative approach—as an appropriate means by which to shed new light on these (and other) complex and long-debated themes in (socio)linguistics.

In order to establish the relevance of this chiefly sociological approach for traditionally linguistic inquiries, both sides of the conversation analytic ‘coin’—theory and method—must be clearly situated. Thus the first step we must take is a step back. In Chapter 1, I argued for a conceptualization of language not as an end in and of itself, but rather as a set of tools or resources for accomplishing social action. What, exactly, is meant by ‘social action’? And how are we to understand the links between the use of language, the ‘doing’ of identity, and the production of

1 The structure of the first half of this chapter was inspired by John Heritage’s social theory graduate seminar titled “Lineages of Conversation Analysis”, in addition to my (repeated) reading of his Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology (1984b). My thanks not only to John, but also to the other participants in the seminar, especially Kevin Shih, with whom I have had many a stimulating discussion about the development of social theory.
social action? A detailed look at the specific role that language plays in human sociality is certainly where we are headed; but we cannot manage that task without first considering the larger framework of which language is a part.

In what follows, we construct the theoretical side of Conversation Analysis by tracing the historical development of a ‘theory of action’ in the social sciences, the objective being a stepwise convergence on the theory to which we will ultimately subscribe. Language will slowly but surely maneuver its way into our discussion as we arrive at the maximally micro-level notion of action-in-interaction. After this theoretical foundation has been laid, we will transition into the use of Conversation Analysis as a method, illustrating the details of the approach with naturalistic data of the same sort that will form the base of the topical chapters to follow.

3.1 A BIT OF HISTORY: BUILDING A THEORY OF ACTION

The question *Why do humans do what we do?* is an amazingly easy one to ask, but an incredibly complex one to answer. A considerable part of this complexity derives from the fact that humans are, on the one hand, individuals, and on the other hand, members of social groups; and these two facets of our humanity are constantly being negotiated as we go about producing action. Even Max Weber, unquestionably a *macro*-sociologist, touched on these two, inextricably linked aspects of the human condition—in the very first paragraph of *Economy and Society* (1922) no less—by writing: (1) that action is “human behavior to which the acting individual (or individuals) attaches a subjective meaning”, and (2) that this behavior becomes *social* “if the acting individual takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course” (1978 [1922]: 3). But the work of early European theorists such as Weber, Durkheim, Marshall and Pareto presented more of a problem than a solution: Actions have this duality—being individual and subjective, but also social and collaborative—so how can/should researchers go about examining them?
3.1.1 Making the Connection: Individual to Community

At the beginning of the 20th century, progress toward a comprehensive understanding of social action was severely hindered by the reigning theory of Behaviorism in Psychology (e.g., at Harvard and Chicago). This was due to Behaviorism’s insistence that only actions which were externally observable were available to legitimate scientific inquiry, with controlled experimental methods being the ‘appropriate’ way to engage in such research. Furthermore, the Positivists of the time insisted that research be performed purely on measurable outcomes (e.g., rates, quantities, etc.) (Heritage 1984b: ch. 2; Parsons 1937: pt. 1). Because ‘social action’ was deemed an inherently subjective concept that proved difficult to measure quantitatively, it remained unexamined, and individuals’ inner thoughts were banished accordingly to the realm of the unknowable.

In *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), Talcott Parsons made a first attempt at legitimizing the pursuit of those aspects of social action which were supposedly ‘subjective,’ ‘unobservable,’ and therefore ‘unknowable’. In this sense, he “sought to answer questions where others [had] not even seen the possibility of a question” (Savage 1981: 235; cited in Heritage 1984b: 304). Parsons broke down systems of action into what he argued were their irreducible elements, called ‘unit acts’. As part of his Voluntaristic Theory of Action, unit acts included (1) an actor, (2) an end, (3) a current situation, and (4) a mode of orientation. This decomposition of action—not present in either Hobbesian Utilitarianism’s notion of ‘intrinsic rationality’, nor in Positivism’s reliance on hereditary factors and environmental conditioning—introduced the feature of *effort exerted over time* in which the process is “seen primarily in terms of its relation to ends” or its “‘attainment,’ ‘realization,’ and ‘achievement’” (Parsons 1937: 45). In this view, actions do not just happen randomly, but rather choices of specific actions are made amongst alternatives and according to rules in order to attain the ends that the actor has as his/her
objective. Additionally, Parsons claimed to argue in favor of a particular conceptualization of ‘subjectivity’ that was, in a sense, less subjective. He proposed dealing with actions, phenomena and events “as they appear from the point of view of the actor whose action is being analyzed and considered” (ibid.: 46, emphasis in original; cf. also Heritage 1984b: 10-13).

Essential to Parsons’ description of the social system were the means by which an actor internalizes the institutionalized norms and rules of what the ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’ ways of achieving one's ends are. Parsons defined a culture as “a system of generalized symbols and their meanings” into which actors are socialized through a desire to maximize positive reinforcement and minimize social sanctions (1983: 140, ch. 8). Through his expansion of Freud’s concept of the superego, Parsons’ theory of the individual actor as embedded in the social system effectively “provide[d] for pursuit of private interests and ensure[d] the interests of the collectivity” (Parsons & Shils 1951: 39). The social sciences, Parsons argued, must take this connection into consideration if meaningful, general theories about human action are to be formed.

3.1.2 Rules and Norms: Normative vs. Interpretive Paradigms

While Parsons was indeed successful in establishing the existence of strong ties between individual actors, their actions, and the larger social milieu of which they are a part, this connection came at a price. The Parsonian normative paradigm (cf. Wilson 1971) viewed action formation as a deductive and rule-governed ‘grid’, of sorts, in that actions were static, deterministic and predictive: Humans internalize the rules of their culture and then conduct themselves in accordance with those ‘given’ rules and conditions to thereby achieve their goals. Circumstances are thus “treated as if they are already pre-established or pre-defined,” “the actor’s thoughts and feelings [being] viewed as simply ‘intervening variables’” (Heritage 1984b: 108, 22). Heritage and Clayman (2010: 21) describe this view of context as the “bucket theory”

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2 Heritage (1984b: 11) comments that, with this exertion of effort, “Parsons particularly sought to counteract the tendency which he identified in the German idealistic tradition to view action as simply an automatic ‘emanation’ of cultural ideals.”
which “assumes that interaction accommodates to fit the context rather as water does to the bucket…the bucket is not significantly altered by the interactions it contains.” That is, there is no attention given to how interactants reason about the situation, how they engage and interpret their environment and thereby deal with and shape the context. Actors are nothing but “judgmental dopes” (Garfinkel 1967: 68) who simply do as their culture commands, these cultural values determining actors’ behavior, in a sense, “behind their backs” (Heritage 1984b: 30; cf. also Garfinkel 1952: e.g., 145).

Such an approach contrasts sharply with the interpretive paradigm in which “definitions of situations and sanctions are not explicitly or implicitly assumed to be settled once and for all by literal application of a pre-existing, culturally established system of symbols” (Wilson 1971: 69). On the contrary, “meanings and definitions of situations are constituted and have their objectivity established through the interpretive process of interaction rather than by reference to a body of culturally given common definitions” (78). Thus, actors involved in interaction make choices (i.e., actions) based on the choices of others with whom they are interacting. Actions are therefore both “retrospective and prospective” simultaneously (68).

The interpretive perspective has significant ramifications as we begin to incorporate language into this emerging theory of action, particularly with regard to intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is concerned with shared knowledge and understanding between individuals: not only what I know and what you know (individually and independently), but also what I know that you know, what you know that I know, and so on. By focusing on the end-goal, Parsons made the assumption that intersubjectivity was guaranteed and recognizable to participants due to the institutionalization/internalization of the meanings of words used in
As a consequence, the road traveled on the way to this end-goal was essentially lost.

In beginning to look at the “common-sense knowledge” involved in producing everyday social interaction, Alfred Schütz (1962) took issue with this tacit assumption. He argued that the process which leads up to the Parsonian end-goal is of crucial importance precisely because there is no guarantee of intersubjectivity in action: Whatever we understand is a contingent and collaborative achievement, one which is achieved moment-by-moment between the interactants (cf. also Schegloff 1986). This being the case, researchers should, Schütz posited, aim to build an explanation of those constructs that the actors themselves are using to “establish, maintain, reproduce, restore and alter temporally extended courses of action” (Heritage 1984b: 76)—without backwards-looking prejudice as to what they “ought to” have done according to the “rules” of the culture (Parsons 1983: 134). Despite this significant theoretical step forward, though, Schütz himself could not offer any methodological way to actually investigate these notions of intersubjectivity; and thus, as Heritage (1984b: 72) explains, “it is not surprising that many who may have found Schütz’s theoretical work convincing have, nonetheless, been disinclined to engage in research based directly on Schützian assumptions”.

### 3.2 BRINGING THEORY TO THE ‘GROUND LEVEL’

#### 3.2.1 Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology

In a very real sense, the work of Harold Garfinkel embodies a fusion of Parsonian and Schützian theories of action (cf. Heritage 1984b, 1987, 2011a). Parsons proposed a set of internalized rules to solve the Hobbesian ‘problem of order’, but that consequently rendered norms far too deterministic of actions in a directly causal relationship. Schütz moved away from

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3 See Parodi (2009b) for a ‘cultural semantic’ model of language and culture contact which explains how the meanings of words can shift as new cultural items enter the daily lives of members of a society—that is, the processes through which re-institutionalization and re-internalization of the semantic content of a given lexeme can occur.
rules as determining action, focusing instead on the joint understanding of the processes involved in achieving action; but he was then unable to explain the existence of (and motivation for) a social order, and was at a loss with regard to how to systematically investigate the intersubjectivity he claimed was so essential to a theory of action.4

The critical missing piece of the puzzle—which Garfinkel provides, thereby melding these two schools of thought—is a tangible method of analysis which is capable of exploring how these abstract theories actually operate ‘at the ground level’—that is, in real life interaction. He called this approach ethnomethodology. In his own words: “I use the term ‘ethnomethodology’ to refer to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life” (Garfinkel 1967: 11; cf. also 1974). That is, how is it that persons go about their daily lives, make sense of the world, and get things done with one another? What was particularly novel about Garfinkel’s approach, though, was how researchers were to investigate these questions about action. He writes that, as a whole, his book, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), seeks:

to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical sociological reasoning as topics of empirical study, and by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena in their own right. [The] central recommendation is that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings ‘account-able’. The ‘reflexive,’ or ‘incarnate’ character of accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux of that recommendation (1).

This “reflexive” nature of “account-ability” can be illustrated with the simple example of one person waving ‘hello’ to another who, in turn, returns the wave: The second waver displays his understanding of the first wave—the first waver’s action, the first waver’s in-the-moment identity as being some sort of greeting-giver, the first waver’s beliefs about the second waver’s in-the-moment identity as a potential greeting-recipient, and so on—by doing a wave in return.

4 For an explicit discussion of and comparison between Parsonian and Schützian theories of conduct, see Garfinkel (1960).
This fundamental methodological breakthrough for our development of a theory of action centers around the ‘documentary method of interpretation’ in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 3). The actual appearance of the action itself is what everyday interactants are using for their own interpretations, so those actions should be the ‘documents’ that researchers use and analyze as well. In other words, researchers need not extrapolate and create abstract theories to interpret beyond what the members themselves are doing right then—for example, waving ‘hello’ (cf. also Mills 1940). Although it may happen through a number of distinct means cross-culturally, humans across the globe are engaging in their own processes of “practical sociological reasoning”, performing “taken for granted” sociology on a daily basis as they go about achieving sense-making—and that is where we must dedicate our attention (Garfinkel 1967: 8).

As a result of this emphasis on the actual accomplishment of sense-making, the documentary method of interpretation encourages the exploration of single cases as the basis for in-depth analysis, Garfinkel’s long-term study of ‘Agnes’ (an “intersexed” individual) (1967: ch. 5) and various famous ‘breaching experiments’ (1963, 1967: ch. 3) serving as a cases-in-point. Garfinkel’s aim in his ‘breaching experiments’ was “to start with a system with stable features and ask what can be done to make for trouble” (1963: 187). For example, his (1963) study used player behavior in simple games such as tic-tac-toe, chess, and bridge to tease out how trust factors into interaction: As a player, I expect that the same set of rules applies to you as does to me; and furthermore I expect that you expect that of me as well. This is an important point as it allows each of us to hold the other accountable for “deviations” or “breaches” from these expected actions—precisely because we have this trust relationship while engaging in playing the game. In this sense, the trust is both prospective as well as retrospective (195; cf. Wilson 1971, discussed above). The “trouble”, as Garfinkel called it, comes in when the experimenter
then explicitly erases one of the other player’s tic-tac-toe marks and replaces it with one of his own; or when he does not place his mark inside one of the designated boxes, but rather on a line instead. How does the other player make sense of and deal with such a deviation from the game’s norm? Garfinkel was fundamentally interested in how participants actively make attempts at logically rationalizing these moments of ‘weirdness’—filling in the intersubjective gaps as they occurred, one after the next, in the interaction—to construct an understanding of daily life.

The methodological choice to pursue finely-grained analysis of individual cases merits additional attention here given the ever-more-common trend of generalizability across situations, across contexts, across populations, etc. in contemporary social science research. It is undeniable that generalizability is an important feature of investigation, and those more overarching explanations are indeed necessary. However, Garfinkel reminds us that: “in every actual case, without exception”, “on any occasion whatsoever”, and “in that particular case” the explanation still has to hold up (1967: 6, 32, emphasis in original). Indeed, those overarching, often theoretically informed, explanations are designed to explain individual instances, and so we cannot do away with (the details of) those individual cases in our analyses or consider them in some way inferior (cf. also Schegloff 1987a). This is yet another reason as to why a set of Parsonian determinate rules—no matter how specific and detailed—will consistently be insufficient and inadequate in providing a theory of social action (cf. Bloor 1978; Blumer 1969: 18; Hart 1960: ch. 7; Louch 1966: ch. 4). Whenever an action is undertaken, it is a specific project that was elected over other alternative projects—in that context—, and that is why each and every one is a “socially organized artful practice” (Garfinkel 1967: 32).

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5 Other examples include parents’ reactions to their children pretending to be boarders in their own homes, student-counselors giving contradictory advice, and medical students being told their personal rating of a ‘potential applicant’ was the opposite of everyone else’s/the applicant’s reality (Garfinkel 1967).

6 Note the parallel here with various other qualitative research methods (e.g., ethnography).
Language begins to play a more explicit role in ethnomethodology as we incorporate Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of ‘family resemblances’, which Garfinkel combines with an expanded conceptualization of ‘indexicality’. Heritage (2011a) illustrates these complex concepts by comparing robins, turkeys, ducks, penguins and cassowaries. He explains that “we are happy to call the animals ‘birds’ because…overlapping similarities with a range of other bird species are good enough for us not to worry too much about the differences” (265; cf. also 1978). This is massively consequential for real-time interaction due to Garfinkel’s fundamental assertion that participants engage in meaning-making with one another by invoking the context of utterances (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970). Thus, continuing with the same example, uttering ‘I’ve just put the bird in the oven’ is perfectly intelligible to a hearer on Thanksgiving as referring to a turkey or chicken, and not to a penguin, despite the fact that the word ‘bird’ can—and indeed does—refer to penguins (and not to turkeys or chickens) in other contexts (e.g., ‘The birds in the animated movie Happy Feet are so lifelike!’) (Heritage 1984b, 2011a). It follows, then, that we simply cannot “at the outset know what the common understandings consist of” because “what the parties talked about [cannot] be distinguished from how the parties were speaking” (Garfinkel 1967: 28-29, emphasis in original), this necessary standpoint being inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophical claim that “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (1953: §116; cf. Cavell 1968: ch. 2). Heritage (2011a: 266) summarizes the larger theoretical consequence of such a conceptualization by underscoring the intimate and innate connection that it establishes between language, context, and action (also cited in Chapter 1):

If words are open-textured typifications, underpinned by networks of family resemblances, and methodically stabilized in a process involving the mutual elaboration of language and context,

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7 Note that all individual family resemblances are not identical cross-linguistically. In Spanish, for instance, putting a píjaro (bird) in the oven does not make sense. But this does not diminish the fact that other resemblances do exist in Spanish. Wittgenstein’s notion is thus a more overarching one that applies to humans’ use of language at a cross-linguistic level.
then every aspect of culture—and most importantly its back bone of language—is unavoidably and endlessly ‘emergent’.

3.2.2 Goffman and the Interaction Order

Garfinkel’s development of ethnomethodology had serious consequences for the conceptualization of human social action, as well as the role that language plays in the process of producing those actions. Indeed, as Heritage (1987: 250) describes:

Garfinkel's view of language and social relations is thus one which opens up completely new fields of investigation while raising profound and complex questions about the nature of speech, speaking and other forms of communicative action...The older views of language rendered it as a transparent, unresearchable entity. Garfinkel's observations 'naturalize' language and place the analysis of accounts and accounting practices on a par with the analysis of other forms of practical action.

Heritage goes on to explain, though, that, while surely a step in the right direction, “this treatment generates more problems than it resolves”:

Within this view, language is understood as a resource through which social participants intervene in action situations, but the 'frameworks' and 'mechanics' through which words are assembled into accounts and these accounts are 'attached' to real-world situations remain open to empirical study (ibid., my emphasis).

Enter Erving Goffman who advocates the study of talk-in-interaction as an institutionalized social domain in its own right—‘institutionalized’ to the extent that we might be capable of detailing out those ‘frameworks’ and ‘mechanics’ which constitute the domain itself. With the single, four-sentence opening paragraph of “On Face-Work” (1967), Goffman lays the theoretical groundwork for how talk is ‘attached’ to those real-world situations. He writes:

Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line—that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and though this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him (ibid.: 5, my emphasis).

Goffman thus effectively places us in a world in which there is no ‘time out’. Because our actions position us socially vis-à-vis one another, without exception, others are constantly forming
interpretations and understandings of our selves (cf. 1959), our identities, and our actions—
whether we want them to or not. We live our lives ‘in the eye of the beholder’, and we are thus held
accountable by those beholdlers (i.e., our co-participants in interaction). Motivation—which was
somewhat vestigial for Garfinkel who viewed the achievement of understanding as the primary
constraint on interactants—is therefore reintroduced by Goffman as an absolutely essential
ingredient for our theory of action precisely due to this web of accountability within which
actors are constantly operating.

The “work” that Goffman describes in “On Face-Work” refers to the fact that, moment-by-moment, we find ourselves juggling (1) what we really want to say, with (2) the pressures of
interaction itself.8 (Note the similarities and differences between this point of view and that of
our first quote by Max Weber (1978 [1922]).) We continually strive not only to affirm our own
face needs but those of others as well, working within the infrastructure of interaction which

Although he had outlined the fundamental underpinnings of the ‘interaction order’ in
some of his previous writings (e.g., 1964, 1967, 1971), his Presidential Address to the American
Sociological Association is particularly illuminating due to his audience: ‘traditional’
sociologists who view the world in terms of “social structures such as relationships, informal
groups, age grades, gender, ethnic minorities, social classes and the like” (1983: 2). To the
members of this audience, Goffman mentions that no sociologist would find it odd to study the
“behavioral settings that sustain interaction” in “factories, airports, hospitals, and public
thoroughfares” (4). And yet, the day-in, day-out accomplishment of routine, everyday interaction
remains “ill-explored” and/or “neglected” (1964). This is precisely what Goffman sets out to

8 Goffman makes distinctions between “wrong face”, “out of face”, and “shamefaced”, each of which finds
participants making judgments about and dealing with the identities enacted through these faces.
change: “promote[ing] acceptance of this face-to-face domain as an analytically viable one…whose preferred method of study is microanalysis” (1983: 2).

According to Goffman, interaction is an institutional entity in its own right, and the interaction order comprises an intricate, sequential matrix of interactional rights and obligations which are connected to considerations of ‘face’, motivation, and identity—all realized and deployed through action. Crucially, then, these are not the concerns of isolated individuals; rather, they are resultant of the “syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another (1967: 2).

As with Garfinkel, Goffman argues in favor of more in-depth analyses, though admittedly at a more ‘micro’ level than Garfinkel. Goffman (1964), for example, essentially presents a counterargument to the sociolinguistics of the day: He is not interested in collecting several dependent variables and then correlating them with social categories such as gender, socioeconomic class, level of education, and so on. While admitting that variables can certainly be produced in aggregated, statistically significant correlation with those traditional social distinctions, he underscores that each was nonetheless produced in-the-moment, for those interactants, on that occasion—and that is where his focus is. It cannot go without mention, though, that Goffman was not attempting to delegitimize traditional sociolinguistic methods. In fact, he explicitly states: “I do not believe that one can learn about…[for example] the systematic phonological shifts within the dialects of a speech community by extrapolating or aggregating from particular social encounters among the persons involved in any one of these patterns” (1983: 9). This is a crucial point given our discussion, in Chapter 1, of the importance of electing a methodological approach which corresponds to the specific questions the researcher is asking. In this case, Goffman illuminates the study of the interaction order as indeed “a substantive domain in its own right” (2)—but not as the be-all and end-all way to
approach the study of language in society as a whole. Indeed, he goes on to explain that “even within the domain of face-to-face interaction, what some students accept as the smallest (and in that sense, ultimate) units of personal experience, others see as already a hopelessly complex matter requiring a much more refined application of microanalysis” (9).

3.2.3 Theoretical Répris

To review: While Garfinkel was able to push us beyond the Parsonian conceptualization of rules as determinant of action, and get us down to the ‘ground level’ with ethnomethodological research (incorporating Schütz’s work on intersubjectivity), he could not tell us where to go from there. The achievement of sense-making is surely paramount to interactants, but what are the tools or “mechanics” (Heritage 1987: 250) by which that ‘practical reasoning’ actually gets accomplished, and what is the actors’ motivation for doing so?

Contrastingly, Goffman does provide us with interactants’ motivation through his theories of ‘face’ and identity, and he successfully establishes the interaction order as a worthily autonomous, sequentially-based, institutional system in its own right; however the specifics as to how actors actually define and realize their goals remains unaccounted for. Furthermore, Goffman’s work is largely theoretical, with little to no methodological systematicity or empirical evidence to back up or test his claims (cf. Kendon 1988; Schegloff 1988a).

So, by the 1960s, we find ourselves in need of a sufficiently ‘micro’ analytic methodology that will allow us to investigate how participants accomplish identifiable actions as the ground level of social interaction. This sets the stage for the emergence of Conversation Analysis.

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9 Another significant point that is not typically mentioned in reviews of Goffman’s work is the repeated emphasis that the author places on the need for research into cross-cultural/cross-linguistic/cross-societal variation (1984: e.g., 2, 5, 10, 11). Kendon (1988), for example, critiques Goffman for his all-too-Western approach. While it is certainly true that Goffman’s theorizing was based on Western social interaction, it is also true that he qualified his findings as such—by way of (now-outdated) terminology such as “what one finds, in modern societies at least, is...” (1984: 11, my emphasis). More to the point, he explicitly states, at the onset of his speech, that “isolating the interaction order provides a means and a reason to examine diverse societies comparatively, and our own historically” (ibid.: 2, my emphasis). In other words, contrary to some critics, Goffman actually appears to be quite intrigued by the prospect of investigating non-Western social interaction.
3.3 SYSTEMATIC MICROANALYSIS: THE BIRTH OF CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

Conversation Analysis emerged in the late 1960s as the product of the work of Harvey Sacks in association with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Sacks and Schegloff were students of Goffman at the University of California, Berkeley, who were also in close contact with Harold Garfinkel at UCLA (Schegloff 1992d). The conversation-analytic theory and methodology established by this new generation of academics managed to effectively weave together the perspectives of Garfinkel and Goffman, thereby resolving many of the limitations inherent to each in isolation and taking the study of talk-in-interaction to an entirely new level (Maynard 2013; Sidnell 2010: 9).

While still a student, Sacks (1963) published a criticism of both statistically averaged (cf. sociolinguistics) and theoretically idealized (cf. generative) methodologies as incapable of answering the questions he was interested in, fundamentally “on the grounds that they necessarily blur the specific features of the events under investigation” (Heritage 1984b: 234). His response was to look at the actual events themselves, and data in the form of audio-recorded interaction provided a way to do precisely that:

It was not from any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation of what should be studied that I started with tape-recorded conversation, but simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I had studied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they wanted to be able to disagree with me (Sacks 1984: 26; cf. also 1992a, 1992b).

This passage from Sacks should make evident why the present chapter did not begin with language as its focus, but rather with action. Although verbal language is indeed a primary means through which action is accomplished between human interactants, it is conceptualized here as a resource, a vehicle through which social inter-action between co-participants occurs and can be systematically investigated. In this same vein of argumentation, it is fitting to mention that other, non-linguistic resources can be mobilized (with or without vocalization) in the service of social interaction as well, including gaze (C. Goodwin 1981, 2007; Kendon 1990a; Rossano
2013; Rossano, Brown & Levinson 2009), embodied gestures (C. Goodwin 2000; M. H. Goodwin 2011; Kendon 1986) such as pointing (C. Goodwin 2003a, 2003b, 2004; M. H. Goodwin 2006; Kendon 2003), nodding (Stivers 2008), head-shaking (Kendon 2002), eye-rolling (Alim and M. H. Goodwin 2010), and even overall spatial organization (Kendon 1990b) and body torque (Schegloff 1998a). While the vast majority of approaches in Linguistics explore languages and their grammatical structures as ends in and of themselves, Conversation Analysis seeks to uncover the actions that co-participants in interaction are doing with those grammatical structures (and various other details and resources) in any given bit of talk.

The above quote by Sacks also stresses the importance of naturalistic data for conversation-analytic research, as was outlined in the introductory chapter of this dissertation as a fundamental distinction between this approach and others (e.g., pragmatics in Linguistics). In the same article, Sacks goes on to critique the fact that countless authors in the social sciences begin their argumentation with “‘Let us suppose that such and such happened,’ or ‘Typical things that happen are…”’ (1984a: 25). He maintains that “however rich our imaginations are, if we use hypothetical, or hypothetical-typical versions of the world we are constrained by reference to what an audience, an audience of professionals, can accept as reasonable”, as well as by what the analyst’s imagination can conceive of; so let us instead “start with things that are not currently imaginable, by showing that they happened” (ibid., my emphasis).

3.4 EXAMINING INTERACTION: CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AS A METHOD

The development of a theory of action—from Parsons and Schütz, to Garfinkel and Goffman, and ultimately to Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson—has provided us with the necessary foundation and appropriate mindset to undertake the analysis of action in interaction at a sufficiently micro-level of detail to approach the questions posed in this dissertation. Indeed,
these theoretical lineages from which Conversation Analysis has emerged are visible in Heritage’s (1984b: 241) synthesis of the approach:

The basic outlook of conversation analysis can be briefly summarized in terms of three fundamental assumptions: (1) interaction is structurally organized; (2) contributions to interaction are contextually oriented; and (3) these two properties inhere in the details of interaction so that no order of detail can be dismissed, a priori, as disorderly, accidental or irrelevant.

In the remainder of this chapter, we aim to deconstruct and illustrate what is meant by these assumptions, as well as how they come to bear on the analysis of interaction.

3.4.1 The Why that now? Question

Sacks (1984a, 1992a, 1992b) argued against the conceptualization of detailed interactional phenomena as inherently disorganized. He proposed that we should proceed instead by assuming that there is “order at all points” (1984a: 22). At each and every point in interaction, interactants have an infinite number of resources at their disposal—i.e., ways of ‘saying the same thing’; and yet this speaker chose this way, at this moment, with this co-participant in talk. Crucially, s/he did not choose one of those countless other, supposedly ‘equivalent’ resources. This reality causes CA, as a method, to repeatedly ask a single question: Why that now? This question functions at all levels of detail—not only in terms of content, but also in terms of design—and constitutes the question that the interactants repeatedly ask themselves. Thus we are interested not only in what a speaker said, but also how they said it (cf. Garfinkel 1967: 28-29, referenced above).

Take the simple question in (1)10 below, which is uttered by one friend to another in the context of attending class the following week:

(1) ¿Vas a ir? (pro) go to to-go

Are you going to go?

A few possibilities of affirmative responses to such a question are seen in (2):

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10 In these invented examples, ‘pro’ is used in the morphological gloss when the overt pronominal subject is dropped.
All of these answers are affirmative, meaning that they all convey that the speaker is indeed planning on going to class. And yet, they each do something slightly different in tandem with this affirmation. The type-conforming response in (2a), for example, accepts the terms and presuppositions of the question as it was uttered (cf. Raymond 2003). A repetitional response such as the one in (2b), on the other hand, has been shown to “assert epistemic rights over information in an agentive way,” in a sense ‘pushing back’ on the terms of the question as it was designed (Heritage 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Heritage & Raymond 2005, 2012; Stivers 2005). Thus, while arguably conveying the same informational content in terms of the answerer’s intention to go to class, the design of each answer does different and additional interactional ‘work’ for the
co-participants with regard to the negotiation of their respective, in-the-moment identities.\textsuperscript{11} (Recall from Chapter 1 the maximally micro-level conceptualization of identity that we are adopting here.)

Now let us examine the actual entire sequence on which these invented responses were based.

(3) Going to class: Blanca/Isabel\textsuperscript{12}

01 BLA: Y participación.
and participation
And participation.

02 \(\rightarrow\) Pero no he ido a [c(l)ase. hah hah hah
but no have.is gone to class
B(l)ut I have n(h)ot gone to c(l)ass. hah hah hah

03 ISA: [hah hah hah

04 BLA: .hhh Así que::
so that
hh So:::

05 Ni va mal. Pero: De hecho:-
not even goes badly but of fact
It’s not going badly. Bu:t. In fa:ct-

06 (0.2)

07 No han contado: participación.
no have.3p counted participation
They haven’t counte:d participation.

08 \(=\)No van a empezar hasta:#:
no go.3p to to-start until
They’re not going to start to unti:#:1

09 Hasta este martes.
until this Tuesday
Until this Tuesday.

10 \(\rightarrow\) Así que no tengo [que ir.
so that no have.1s that to-go
So I don’t have to go.

\textsuperscript{11} See Beach and Metzger (1997) and Stivers and Heritage (2001) on the epistemically downgraded “I think so” as a response (cf. (2d)). See Stivers (2011) on the use of “of course” (cf. (2g)) to contest the presupposition of askability.

\textsuperscript{12} The transcription conventions used for CA transcripts—e.g., for intonation, pitch, voice quality, overlap, breathing, laughing, and so on—are outlined in detail in Appendices I and II.
As it turns out, although indeed producing an affirmative response, none of our hypothesized answers was the one that Blanca chose to use in her response in line 12. While this may appear to be a simple type-conforming answer like “sí” (yeah or yes in Spanish), she code-switched into English to do it. She did not say “sí”; just like she did not say any of the other options we laid out in (2a-g). So, we ask, why that now? What did Blanca gain interactionally by producing a language-discordant answer in line 12 that some other answer design would not have done as adequately? While we will have to wait until Chapter 6 to explore this question more completely, we have included this example here as an illustration of the need for authentic, naturally produced data: Nothing in interaction can be assumed, invented or simply taken for granted because every bit of detail—at every moment—‘counts’.13,14

As analysts, we are interested in the Why that now? question precisely because it is the question with which interactants themselves are concerned on a moment-by-moment basis. Take the following example (4) in which two friends are finishing preparing dinner. The meal is just about ready, and at this point Brenda realizes that she forgot to take the cheese out of the freezer. She takes it out just prior to line 1 below and subsequently asks Gomero whether or not he thinks it will melt (i.e., thaw) in time for the meal. Observe how the sequence continues after this initial question.

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13 This level of detail is reflected in the way in which conversation-analytic data is transcribed (Jefferson 2004; cf. also Hepburn & Bolden 2012; Ochs 1979).
14 The brief discussion of this example has glossed over (and therefore taken for granted) another crucial point in this interaction which will be topicalized in the next section. For now, note simply that Blanca understood perfectly the ‘where’ that Isabel’s question was referring to in line 11, despite the fact that ‘to class’ is completely elided from the turn. Such an elided question can only be understandable to the interactants if they take into consideration the sequence as a whole (i.e., the talk that came prior, cf. line 2).
Brenda’s question in lines 1-3 is a polar (yes/no) interrogative through which the speaker topicalizes the thawing of the cheese as an item on the interactional agenda. The declarative syntax combined with the extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) of the time reference “hoy?” / today? also reveal Brenda’s own stance that the cheese will likely not be of any use during their meal that is just minutes from commencing. This turn may thus also serve to provide an account for the lack of cheese when the couple sits down and begins eating. While Brenda’s turn may be simultaneously accomplishing this variety of interactional objectives, structurally it is formulated as a question which makes relevant an answer from Gomero: Either Gomero does think the cheese is going to thaw in time to be used at their meal, or he does not.

Gomero, though, does not produce one of these type-conforming answers in his response. Instead he asks himself Why that now?: Why has Brenda just produced this question? And he displays his understanding of that ‘why’ through his response in line 5, a directive to put
the cheese in water to resolve the cheese-thawing problem. In lines 6-7, Brenda in turn demonstrates her understanding of this directive as indeed a suggestion to speed up the thawing process—and thus as an appropriate response to her original question—by challenging the validity of that suggestion as a good one: “Pero si lo pones en agua, no crees que se va a hacer feo?” / But if one puts it in water, don’t you think that it is going to get yucky? The conditional framing of this second inquiry is prefaced with “pero” / but, thereby initiating the turn as a contrasting point of view from that which came prior. Furthermore, the question is produced with the negative interrogative “no crees que…” / don’t you think that… format. Again we ask: Why that now? The question could have been designed as “Pero si lo pones en agua, crees que se va a hacer feo?” / But if one puts it in water, do you think it will get yucky?. Alternatively, it could have been designed as “Pero si lo pones en agua, (yo creo que) se va a hacer feo.” / But if one puts it in water, (I think that) it will get yucky.—without any interrogative formulation whatsoever. But it was not designed in either of those (or any other) ways! It was designed as an interrogative, with the “no” / not. So, why?

Space constraints prevent a thorough overview of the vast amount of research on the design of questions here (cf., e.g., Boyd & Heritage 2006; Brown & Levinson 1987; Escandell Vidal 1999; Garrido Medina 1999; Hayano 2013; Heinemann 2006; Heritage 2002b, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Heritage, et al. 2007; Pomerantz 1984; Raymond 2003; Ridruejo 1999; Schegloff 2007b). This literature will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5 with regard to the verbal morphology involved (indicative/subjunctive). For now, we note simply that the negative interrogative format is used as a vehicle for making assertions (Escandell Vidal 1999: 2956; Heritage 2002b; Sánchez López 1999: 2608). The design of Brenda’s lines 6-7 thus allows Brenda to put her divergent point of view on the table, so to speak, while simultaneously making relevant a second-pair part answer from Gomero (not shown).
Working our way through the turn-by-turn contributions to this exchange provides us with a concrete example of how turns are designed and produced within sequences of talk as participants ask themselves *Why that now?*. Analyzing sequences of interaction at this level of granularity reminds us of the importance of recipient design (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974) based on interactants’ evolving, co-constructed identities: It’s not just that *Brenda* ‘in general’ designed her talk for *Gomero* ‘in general’, but that the Brenda of this specific moment in the sequence designed her turn for the Gomero of this specific moment in the sequence. Recipient design therefore allows identities to constantly be created, re-created, projected, maintained, negotiated, and altered on a moment-to-moment basis in and through interaction.

3.4.2 Sequential Organization and ‘Nextness’ in Interaction

The *Why that now?* question allows us to provide further concrete evidence against a speech act theory conceptualization of interaction, discussed in Chapter 1 (cf. Austin 1961, 1962; Searle 1962, 1972b, 1979). In fact, the previous Extract (4) illustrates the most fundamental problem with the notion of speech acts: their isolated nature. After all, we—including Brenda and Gomero above—do not run around blurting out isolated utterances which are born out of nothingness and produce nothingness in turn. On the contrary, turns-at-talk are both *context-shaped* and *context-renewing*: They are produced and interpreted in a space that was set up by previous talk, thereby demonstrating an orientation to and understanding of that previous talk (Heritage 1984b; Sacks 1987, 1992a, 1992b; Schegloff & Sacks 1973); and they simultaneously set up a space in which a next turn-at-talk will be produced and subsequently interpreted (Schegloff 1972; cf. also the aforementioned discussion of turns and actions being simultaneously ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’). As Levinson (1981: 477) describes and evidences in his aptly titled article “The Essential Inadequacies of Speech Act Models of Dialogue”, interactants orient “not [to] the utterance taken singly, but in the slot it occupies in a
conversational sequence”. Take the following Excerpt (5) as evidence of the import of sequentiality and ‘nextness’ to co-participants in talk.

(5) La tía: Laura/Tomás/Román

01 LAU: Y esa es m(h)i única tía que la trato de ‘vos’.
       and that is my only aunt that her treat.1s of ‘vos’
       And that’s m(h) only aunt that I treat as ‘vos’.

02   .hh U:hm

03 A mis primas,
   to my cousins.F
   My cousins,

04 que somos este: cercanas,
   that are.lp uhm close
   that we’re uh:m close,

05 pero solo las que somos cercanas.
   but only those that are.lp close
   but only with the ones that we’re close.

06 por[que nosotras misma::s,
   because we.F selves.F
   because we ourse::lves,

07 TOM: [La tía de ella e:s, (0.2)
        the aunt of her is
        Her aunt i:s, (0.2)

08 TOM: Lesbian.
        lesbian
        A lesiban.

09 LAU: -> Y qué tiene que ver mi t(h)ía
        and what has that to-see my aunt
        And what does it matter my a(h)unt

10  -> que s(h)ea le(h)sbi(h)an(a::)
     that is.SUBJ lesbian
     that sh(h)e’s a le(h)sbi(h)a:n.

11 TOM: I↑:: donno. Es algo más interesante que . . .
        is something more interesting that
        It’s something that’s more interesting than . . .

In example (5), Laura is talking to her two friends, Tomás and Román, about her recent trip to Guatemala. Prior to his excerpt, Laura had been explaining how unusual it was, from her Southern Californian perspective (cf. Parodi 2004, 2009a, 2009c, 2011; Raymond 2012a,
2012b), that the pronoun vos was the everyday norm in Guatemala (cf. Chapter 2). This excerpt begins with her accounting for this strangeness by reference to the fact that the only people with whom she uses vos in the United States are her aunt (line 1) and her close cousins (lines 3-5). At this point, Tomás comes in to inform Román that the aunt whom Laura just mentioned is a lesbian (lines 7-8). Such a turn could potentially constitute a ‘deviant case’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967) to our claim of the significance of ‘nextness’, thereby providing evidence in favor of a speech-act explanation of dialogue: Speakers produce and interpret individual speech acts as independent from one another in interaction, with little to no regard for what came prior in the talk. However, this explanation is entirely inadequate from the point of view of the interactants themselves: Laura responds to Tomás’s comment by explicitly asking what such a turn is doing in this sequential space, given that their present discussion is about person reference forms (lines 9-10). Thus turns-at-talk are not just speech acts that occur in isolation, but rather are produced and oriented to within a sequence: “Coordination between actors is...present, as are anticipation and modification of coordination. Although a single person seems to have talked, obviously the participants together have produced the bit of discourse, action, and interaction that has resulted” (Schegloff 1987b: 208).

3.4.3 Demonstrable Relevance in Interaction

Crucially, it has been the actors themselves who have displayed these orientations to one another in our examples. Conversation Analysis focuses its attention on that which is ‘demonstrably relevant’ to the participants in the actual interaction (Schegloff 1997). Take, for example, the following instance of repair in Excerpt (6), taken from an interview between Peruvian journalist Rosa María Palacios and candidate-for-congress Martha Chávez regarding human rights violations.

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16 Cf. also Levinson (1979: 365), who argues that both that “the nature of speech acts and the application of Grice’s [1975] maxims are dependent on the nature of the activity in which talk is conducted”.

(6) *Usted to Tú*: Rosa María Palacios and Martha Chávez on *Prensa Libre*

33 CHA: [No no. No [El genocidio es una (.)
    no the genocide is a No no. No Genocide is a (.)

34 tipificación que se da a partir del año=
typification that self gives to to-leave of-the year=
=dos mil tres para nosotros,=
two thousand three for us =two-thousand three for us,=

35 -> =Y usted sabe perfectamente Rosa María,=
    and you know.usted perfectly R M And usted know perfectly Rosa María,=

36 -> =O tú sabes Rosa María.
    or you know.TÚ R M Or tú know Rosa María.

37 (((audibly/visbly already out of breath by the end of line 35)))

38 .hmmm que
    that .hmmm that

39 (.)

40 Los tipos penales (. ) son (. ) ((timeline with hands))
   the types penal are Penal classes (. ) are (. )

41 [a partir de que se tipifican (. ) ((timeline))
   to to-leave of that self typify from their classification (. )

42 PAL: [((raises hand))

43 CHA: En adelante para los hechos que suceden allá. ((timeline))
    on forward for the deeds that happen there Onward for those deeds which occur there.

Repair deals with problems of hearing, speaking or understanding in conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977; cf. also Jefferson 1987; Kitzinger 2013; Lerner & Kitzinger 2007; Schegloff 1979b). What has prompted Martha Chávez to judge the “usted sabe” formulation of *you know* as inadequate, repairing it with “tú sabes”? Both of these options are completely

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17 Recall from Chapter 2 that both *tú* and *usted* are translated as the 2nd-person singular *you* in English. Therefore, we have consciously left the words ‘tú’ and ‘usted’ in the transcript glosses to clarify precisely which of these *you’s* is being used at any given moment.
intelligible and accomplish the same ‘act’ of referring to the interlocutor (Palacios); and yet the speaker nonetheless chooses to halt the progressivity of her turn-in-progress and reformulate the turn. Yet again we ask: Why that now? The inability to explain cases of (self-)repair such as this is yet another inadequacy of speech act theory: We cannot see the motivation behind such instances of repair without taking into consideration what occurred prior in the interaction as well as the intents and “higher level goals” (Levinson 1981: 484) revealed through those prior actions. We reserve comprehensive analysis of this example for Chapter 4 in which these “higher level goals” will indeed be discussed. 18

The vehemently bottom-up approach to sociality that is embodied in CA’s requirement of ‘demonstrable relevance’ serves to guard against analyst-imposed interpretations of the talk which may have little to do with the understandings of the actual speakers themselves. Particularly with identity-related themes, the conversation-analytic method maintains that those specific pieces of identity must be consequential for and attended to by co-participants in talk if they are to be incorporated into the analysis. That is, they must be “talked into being” (Heritage

18 Given our earlier discussion of polarity in question design, consider the following additional example of repair in which Tomás halts the formulation of his turn in order to reverse its polarity. This is done in response to the immediately prior turn (and sequence) of disagreement regarding laundry mat prices.

(A) Prices at the Laundry Mat

18 LAU: Para la lavandería sabes cuánto se usa?:
for the laundry-mat know.2s how-much self use.3s
At the laundry mat do you know how much it costs?

19 TOM: [Son menos.
are.3p less
It’s less.

20 LAU: Para la lavandería?
for the laundry-mat
At the laundry mat?

21 TOM: Uh huh,

22 LAU: Nuh uh:

23 TOM: -> [Cuesta menos. No cuesta menos?
Costs.3s les- no costs.3s less
It costs les- Doesn’t it cost less?

one fifty no
One fifty? No.
at the ground level in order to form part of the account the analyst is putting forth (Schegloff 1997; cf. also Billig 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Stokoe & Smithson 2001; Wetherell 1998). This being the case, Schegloff (1988a) argues that, on the whole, studying co-participants in talk-in-interaction requires focusing on “what they are doing, on how they are doing it, on the demonstrable uptake of that doing by co-participants, and on how the participants together shape the trajectory of the interaction” (100, emphasis in original).

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, AND ACTION

In the introductory chapter, we cited a quote by Schegloff (1991: 46) which describes Conversation Analysis as existing:

at a point where linguistics and sociology (and several other disciplines, anthropology and psychology among them) meet. For the target of its inquiries stands where talk amounts to action, where action projects consequences in a structure and texture of interaction which the talk is itself progressively embodying and realizing, and where the particulars of the talk inform what actions are being done and what sort of social scene is being constituted.

This chapter began by tracing the lineages of conversation-analytic theory in order to explain what is meant by ‘action’ from a specifically social perspective. While this is indeed a dissertation in Linguistics and not in Sociology, I have aimed to demonstrate that as humans produce language while engaging in talk with one another, they are invariably and simultaneously producing action as well—and that action is inherently social in nature.19 The theoretical thrust of Conversation Analysis is the study of this convergence which is realized in and through talk-in-interaction. As Fox, Thompson, Ford, and Couper-Kuhlen (2013: 739-740) explain with regard such a cross-disciplinary agenda:

Although CA and Linguistics have come to the study of language from quite distinct directions…the last three decades have seen a growing interest on the part of linguists in the details of talk as interaction, and a corresponding increase in the interest on the part of CA practitioners in the ways that linguistic resources shape interactional practices. This increasing cross-fertilization has led to a striking body of literature with shared assumptions, and common goals, as

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19 Although well beyond the scope of the present inquiry, it should be noted that conflicting perspectives exist with regard to whether language evolved specifically to enable communication of this sort, or whether the cognitive creativity provided by language simply allowed communication as a side effect.
all of the practitioners come to appreciate the significance of linguistic form in human social interaction, and grasp its deeply dynamic, situated and reflexive nature.

Precisely because talk-in-interaction is the “primordial site of human sociality” (Schegloff 1992d, 2006), the details of language-in-use cannot be examined in isolation from the very social actions and identities that those linguistic details are being mobilized to accomplish—moment by moment in interaction.

From a methodological perspective, then, why should we, as analysts, care about the little ‘bits and pieces’ of talk—whether or not there was a pause, or rising intonation, or positive or negative polarity on that question, or a code-switch in the answer? Because the interactants themselves care. It is they who are sequentially producing these socially consequential ‘bits and pieces’; and it is they who are sequentially orienting to them as such in the contexts of the unfolding interactions that they are actively co-constructing with their interlocutors. And, as Schegloff (2007b) repeatedly emphasizes: “Only by observing [all of these organizations of practice] all together will we understand how the stuff of social life comes to be as it is,” and “Only by understanding them one by one will we get to a position to observe them all together” (264).
2nd-Person Singular (you) Person Reference: *Tú, Vos, Usted*

Taco King: “Hey, what are you doing on my corner?!”
Roger: “Hola, Taco King. ¿Cómo estás?”
*(Taco King smacks Roger’s pamphlets out of his hand)*
Roger: “Oh… Guess I should’ve used the formal ‘usted’.”

—*American Dad!*
(season 2, episode 3)

PERSON REFERENCE has been a topic of inquiry in the analysis of interaction since its earliest conceptions.¹ Like linguists, philologists, and grammarians before him,² Harvey Sacks became interested in how conversationalists navigate the vast repertoire of resources at their disposal to refer to others in talk, proposing a novel method of investigating these uses in his *Lectures on Conversation* (Sacks 1992a, 1992b). While some of this work—particularly on Membership Categorization Devices (or MCDs)—has since, in Emanuel Schegloff’s (2007c: 462) words, “faded from central attention”, recent cross-linguistic and cross-cultural research has once again highlighted the fundamental significance of person reference to our understanding of how linguistic structure is used to accomplish action (cf., e.g., Blythe 2013; Enfield & Stivers 2007).

This chapter examines 2nd-person singular (*you*) person reference in Spanish, which, depending on the dialect in question, can include up to three pronominal options from which to

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¹ Previous versions of (segments of) this analysis were presented at the 88th Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (LSA) in Minneapolis, MN; at the 98th annual National Communication Association (NCA) Convention in Orlando, FL; and at the School of Communication and Information at Rutgers University.

² See, for example, the first comprehensive grammar of the Spanish language: Antonio de Nebrija’s *Grammatica dela Lingua Castelliana*, first published in 1492. While this volume was not nearly as widely circulated as the author’s grammar of Latin, it nevertheless presented a quite detailed explanation of the early Spanish pronominal system, including norms of usage.
choose: *tú*, *vos*, and/or *usted*.

Sociolinguistic—and, in particular, traditional dialectological—approaches to forms of address in the Spanish-speaking world have focused primarily on documenting the *inventory* of differing speech communities: Which pronominal forms exist for a given group of speakers based on geographic origin, socioeconomic status, age, gender, and so on? This is plainly visible, for example, in the categorization of dialects as *tuteante* (users of *tú*) vs. *voseante* (users of *vos*) varieties (Fontanella de Weinberg 1999; Lipski 1994; Páez Urdaneta 1981; cf. discussion in Chapter 2). Indeed, Calderón Campos and Medina Morales (2010: 199) go as far as to assert that “almost all research” on pronominal variation in the Spanish-speaking world since the Second World War, due to the influence of Brown and Gilman’s (1960) seminal work, “The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity,” has subscribed to this methodological paradigm. Nonetheless, these studies, Calderón Campos and Medina Morales observe, routinely fail to “take into consideration other components like context, situation, or linguistic attitudes” (199).

Reflecting the growing interest in the use of spontaneous conversation within Linguistics more generally, a variety of authors in recent years have highlighted the need for a methodological shift toward naturally-occurring discourse as the means by which to analyze forms of address in Spanish (e.g., Steffen 2010: 443; Vázquez Laslop & Orozco 2010: 264). Yet even despite such explicit calls to arms, research has largely continued to focus on the *composition* of speakers’ pronominal inventories rather than what interactants actually do with their inventory on a turn-by-turn basis as they engage in interaction with others. So the question remains: How are T/V options from interactants’ repertoires *mobilized* in the moment for the

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3 Some dialects permit combinations of one of these overt pronouns paired with the verbal morphology typically associated with another, thereby generating more than three ‘types’ of recipient reference (cf., e.g., Páez Urdaneta 1981; Torrejón 1986). Nonetheless, the data analyzed here do not display any such combinations; thus we leave discussion of this phenomenon for future research.

4 Note, for example, the special tutorial panel on “Documenting Conversation” (organized by Jeff Good and Olivia Sammons) at the 2014 Linguistic Society of America Annual Meeting.

5 But see Blas-Arroyo (1994) for a Hymesian perspective, and Moser (2010) for a politeness account based on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) concept of ‘face’.

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purposes of social action? That is, how are recipient reference forms ‘put to work’, so to speak, to *get things done* through language (Austin 1962)?

In addressing these questions, the present study illustrates the ways in which conceptualizations of *identity* and *context* as static or ‘given’ are inadequate when examining the sequentially-motivated, action-based goals of real co-participants in talk. As we will see, interactants do not simply arrive at a context or situation and suddenly conjure up a preconceived, corresponding identity that endures until the interaction is complete (cf. Heritage & Clayman 2010 on the “bucket theory of context”). On the contrary, co-participants themselves actively co-construct their immediate context, “talking it into being” (Heritage 1984b) on a turn-by-turn basis as they create their relevant, respective identities with one another. In this chapter, I argue that 2nd-person reference forms, by way of their underlying pragmatics, are an especially productive tool for accomplishing this task as each usage provides a new opportunity to recalibrate who the speaker and hearer are to one another, what context they are co-creating, and what actions are being attempted within that context—not between the interactants ‘in general’, but rather *at that precise moment in the discourse*. Furthermore, I posit that the ability to mobilize recipient reference forms in this way may constitute a common interactional feature between dialects (and even languages) which are otherwise divergent in terms of their pronominal inventories.

In what follows, we first give some cross-linguistic background on the study of person reference in naturalistic talk-in-interaction. Next we focus on 2nd-person reference in particular by briefly reviewing the pronominal forms available to speakers of Spanish, as well as the array of grammatical resources which inherently invoke these forms. The majority of the chapter is then dedicated to the detailed examination of various, contextually-diverse excerpts of Spanish

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6 See Auer and di Luzio (1992), Gumperz (1982a, 1982b), and Hymes (1964) for similar perspectives of context as dynamic.
data which illustrate how interactants can mobilize linguistic resources for recipient reference to negotiate their respective identities and thereby accomplish social actions on a turn-by-turn basis in talk. We conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of this analysis, as well as outlining potential avenues for future research.

4.1 PERSON REFERENCE IN INTERACTION

So multiple and complex are individuals’ identities that an immediate task for speakers arises in the need to single out some aspect(s) of those identities to be used in/as the reference. As Schegloff (1991: 49-50) explains in describing Membership Categorization Devices (MCDs):

…the fact that someone is male, or is middle aged, or is white, or is Jewish is, by itself, no warrant for so referring to them, for the warrant of “correctness” would provide for use of any of the other reference forms as well. Some principle of relevance must underlie use of a reference form, and has to be adduced in order to provide for one rather than another of those ways of characterizing or categorizing some member.

Given the array of possible and equally “correct” formulations available to refer to others, the fact that this speaker selects this option at this moment illustrates how the design of a reference form can, in Sacks’ (1992: 597) words, be “relevant for the doing of some activity” (cf. Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1996). In the case of reference to 3rd-persons, for instance, Stivers (2007: 94) describes what she calls alternative recognitionals as follows:

Whereas unmarked reference forms (most commonly names in English) are neutral with respect to the action being deployed in the speaker’s turn, alternative recognitionals are designed to be fitted specifically to the action in which they are embedded and therefore to work to convey the action or account for it.

Thus, when a son is conversing with his mother and elects to use the marked form “your other son” instead of the unmarked form (i.e., his brother’s name), more than just referring is taking place. An additional social action, such as complaining, is being brought about through the design of the person reference (81-82).

In producing a reference to a person, speakers naturally make use of the resources provided to them by the structure of their specific language. Distinct social-interactional work
has been shown to be accomplished in Korean, for instance, through the use of demonstrative-based quasi-pronouns that distinguish between proximal (i ‘this’) and distal (ce ‘that’) co-present 3rd-persons. Contrary to traditional grammars of the language, Oh (2007, 2010) illustrates that the choice of quasi-pronoun is not based purely on physical spatial organization, but instead takes into account the identities being invoked though the ongoing talk. One example finds a mother conversing with her daughter and her daughter’s friend/schoolmate (2010: 1227-9). When the mother mentions something to the friend about giving birth to her daughter, she uses the proximal quasi-pronoun to refer to her daughter given that she (the mother) has primary epistemic rights over this information (cf. Heritage 2012a, 2012b; Raymond & Heritage 2006). Moments later, though, she uses the distal pronoun to refer to her daughter in the context of school performance given that the daughter’s schoolmate is more knowledgeable about her daughter in this arena than she (Mom) is. Although the physical distance between the interlocutors remained unaltered, the social identities made relevant through the ongoing talk shifted, and thus so did the linguistic resources being deployed in the speaker’s turns.

Moving beyond analyses of 3rd-person reference forms, research on the design of 1st- and 2nd-person references, although comparatively sparse, offers parallels to these findings which link linguistic reference to identity and action. In their examination of 1st-person singular I vs. plural We, Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) argue that orientations to particular recipients, together with the communicative objectives of a turn-at-talk, play a crucial role in the selection of the reference form (cf. also Schegloff 2007a), with repairs from one pronoun to the other serving to resolve issues of epistemic authority and responsibility.7 Similarly, Hepburn, Wilkinson, and Shaw (2012) present examples of repaired self- and recipient reference designs in English—i.e., the use of the pronoun I vs. a noun phrase, or the pronoun You vs. a noun phrase—and make

7 On (self)-repair more generally, see Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977).
the case that such repairs “are routinely not limited to fixing problems of understanding but are also used in the service of the interactional task at hand” (175). Finally, from a contact-linguistic perspective, in Raymond (2012b) I demonstrate how speakers of Salvadoran origin navigate who is ‘Salvadoran-born’ and who is ‘non-Salvadoran-born’ through the deployment of the 2nd-person pronouns tú and vos. The intricacy with which interactants deploy structures from their respective languages to refer to one another therefore illustrates the substantial import placed on the invocation, management, and negotiation of co-participants’ complex identities in real-time, moment-to-moment discourse.

The analysis presented here expands our understanding of person reference by unpacking the sequentially-motivated, action-based deployment of 2nd-person (T/V) formulations in Spanish. Before looking at the data, let us briefly review the grammatical resources and options that exist in (dialects of) the language.

4.2 RÉPRIS: LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND ON SPANISH

Spanish is typically categorized, both popularly and academically, as a language possessing an explicit T/V distinction (Brown & Gilman 1960): tú/vosotros(as) (and their corresponding morphologies) being the non-deferential, socially-intimate or ‘informal’ references, and usted/ustedes (and their corresponding morphologies) being the deferential, socially-distant or ‘formal’ references. Such a distribution, seen below in TABLE 4.1, describes the majority of speakers of (standard) Peninsular Spanish.8

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8 Although note that even this distribution is over-simplified as there is variation between the plural forms vosotros and ustedes in Andalucía. See Calderón Campos & Medina Morales (2010) for an overview.
While the Peninsular Spanish dialect depicted above suffices to exemplify a pronominal system with a T/V distinction, the pan-Hispanophone distribution of pronouns is considerably more complex (cf. the recent 1,193-page volume *Formas y formulas del tratamiento en el mundo hispánico* ('Forms and Formulas of Person Reference in the Hispanic World'), edited by Hummel, Kluge & Vázquez Laslop 2010). Indeed, we will see some of this variation in the examples that follow.

Regardless of the dialect in question, though, it is essential to recognize the relative richness of Spanish-language morphology when compared to a language like English. In addition to the subject pronoun references themselves (*tú*, *vos*, *usted*), various other grammatical features correspond to and pair with those reference forms, even when the subjects themselves are not pronounced as in cases of pro-drop. A few of these features (verbo-morphological, object pronominal, and adjectival) are seen in Table 4.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd-person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-deferential</td>
<td>tú</td>
<td>vosotros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferential</td>
<td>usted</td>
<td>ustedes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1: Example of a T/V Pronominal System in Spanish**

**Table 4.2: Grammatical Features Invoking Person Reference**

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That is to say, at each and every grammatical position in which reference to some 2nd-person may appear—no matter the part of speech—, the 2nd-person must obligatorily be categorized as tú, vos, or usted. Moreover, conversationalists undoubtedly recognize how they are being referred to by way of this multiplicity of resources, even without the explicit use of the subject pronoun. Take the following Excerpt (1), in which two Los Angeles-based friends—one of Costa Rican origin and the other of Mexican origin—are comparing college degree requirements, as a brief example of this.

(1) Costa Rican and Mexican Spanish in Contact\(^\text{10}\)

| CR: | Pero qué clases estaba tomando though:. Like—
|-----| But what classes were usted taking
|    | Ud Usted
|    | took. 

| CR: | Oka:y.

| CR: |Qué clase has estado tomando.
|-----| What class have tú been taking

Some varieties of Costa Rican Spanish use usted with all interlocutors regardless of deferential status (similar to English you), while others pattern more closely with other Central American dialects in maintaining a distinction between vos and usted as non-deferential and deferential forms of address, respectively (Lipski 1994: 224; Moser 2010: 673; Quesada Pacheco 1996). The Costa Rican speaker in this exchange may thus be using her default familiar reference form of usted, or, alternatively, she may be using usted specifically to avoid the use of vos, a form which is highly socially stigmatized both within Costa Rica as well as in several Spanish-speaking communities in the United States (Quesada Pacheco 1996: 107; Parodi 2003, 2004, 2009, 2011;

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\(^{10}\) Transcripts are glossed with translations that include “tú”, “vos”, or “usted” to make explicit which form of you is being used.
Raymond 2012a). Regardless of this speaker’s particular motivation for doing so, however, the fact remains that her Mexican interlocutor, whose dialect maintains a pragmatic distinction between tú and usted, finds such a reference oddly/inappropriately deferent as a default form between social equals. In response, the Mexican speaker specifically orients to and problematizes this reference form in line 3. In this particular case, his CR interlocutor acquiesces to his preference for tú in lines 4-5—still avoiding the stigmatized vos—, and the interaction progresses onward. Note, though, that the ustedeo of CR’s initial talk in lines 1 and 2 is conveyed only through verbal morphology “estaba” (cf. tú ‘estabas’), an indirect object pronoun “le” (cf. tú ‘te’), and a possessive adjective “sus” (cf. tú ‘tus’)—not through the explicit use of the pronoun usted. Similarly, CR’s acquiescence to tú in line 5 is realized morphologically: “has” (cf. usted ‘ha’). Thus conversationalists are plainly seen to be (i) orienting to the uses and social/interpersonal significance of these pronominal options at the ground level of interaction, and (ii) doing so even without overt (subject) pronouns.

Even when taking into consideration the vast amount of dialectal variation that exists amongst different speech communities, as described in Chapter 2, research on Spanish person reference most frequently assigns one pronoun to one (sort of) interlocutor, very often as the product of questionnaire/interview methodologies (cf., e.g., Jaramillo 1996; Orozco 2006; Murillo 2003; Sanromán Vilas 2010; Schreffler 1994; Schwenter 1993; Solé 1970; Vargas 1974; amongst many others). Such sociolinguistic inquiries regularly report, for instance, that ‘Dialect X uses tú with friends and family and usted with strangers or in certain situated contexts’, or, ‘In Dialect Y, usted is used with grandparents, but all other members of the family receive vos’. But are friends and family in Dialect X really always tú—in each and every turn-at-talk? And are strangers really always usted? Or are these reference forms, and their corresponding linguistic
structures, interactional resources which can shift repeatedly across the course of interaction; and if so, how?

When pronominal shifts are mentioned in the literature, authors typically do so only anecdotally, as an aside, in just a few short sentences (sometimes even in a footnote). As a case in point, Quesada Pacheco (1996: 107-108) asserts that, in some Costa Rican dialects, “it is the conversational situation and the mood that decide one or another pronoun, meaning that one can go from usted to vos even in the same conversation”. But this is the entirety of the author’s discussion of pronoun switching; we are left to imagine how this actually occurs. Similarly, other authors mention the spontaneous uses of the usted de distancia, de enojo, de cariño, and de confianza (usted of distance, anger, affection/intimacy, and trust, respectively) (e.g., Hummel, Kluge & Vázquez Laslop 2010: 16); but again these analyses do not offer any description of how 2nd-person reference form switches are systematically achieved and oriented to by co-participants in sequences of talk. That is, what triggers them in the unfolding, turn-by-turn interaction, and what do they serve to accomplish for the interactants?

Similar to the strategy used by Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) and Oh (2010), described above, here we target moments of change from one reference form to another (e.g., tú/vos to usted, or usted to tú/vos). We illustrate the ways in which such in-the-moment switches—from an unmarked to a marked design, or from a form whose underlying pragmatics conveys social distance to one invoking social intimacy, or vice-versa—can actively be ‘put to work’ in sequences of interaction to recalibrate speaker and hearer identities and thereby accomplish social action.

4.3 DATA AND ANALYSIS

In an effort to demonstrate that the phenomenon presently under analysis is not bound to any particular situated context, we will discuss examples from both institutional talk (e.g.,

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11 The audio data for Excerpts (11)-(14) are publically available through TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007).
calls to 911, political interviews; Drew & Heritage 1992b) as well as everyday, ordinary conversation (e.g., casual chats at home amongst family members, phone calls between friends). Similarly, several varieties of Spanish are represented in the data that follow to underscore that the moment-to-moment negotiation of identity through person reference is not a feature unique to any single region of the Spanish-speaking world. Rather, as the examples below illustrate, switches in person reference formulation are mobilized in a range of situations and by persons who can be characterized in terms of a range of dialects, genders, ages, relative social statuses, and relationships.

4.3.1 Institutional Talk

Compared to the unconstrained nature of ordinary talk, participants’ communicative objectives in institutional contexts are more easily identified in connection with their institution-relevant identities (Drew & Heritage 1992a). For instance, in a call for emergency service (i.e., ‘call to 911’), the caller’s overall goal is naturally to attain whatever service s/he is requesting (e.g., ambulance, squad car, etc.); and his/her turn-by-turn use of language demonstrates an active orientation to that goal (Zimmerman 1992a, 1992b, 1998). Let us therefore take advantage of the “special and particular constraints” (Drew & Heritage 1992a: 22) of institutional talk as a first step in our analysis of 2nd-person pronoun deployment.

Excerpt (2) below comes from a 911 call placed in the United States. After an interpreter is brought on the line (Raymond 2014), the caller\footnote{Although not shown to be oriented to by the co-participants in the interaction, the phonology and morphosyntax of the caller and call-taker reveal them to be Mexican(-American) and Argentine, respectively. Again, this is mentioned simply to emphasize that these phenomena are not dialect-specific.} begins to describe a man who has threatened his life. As discussed in detail in Raymond (in prep.), this particular problem presentation is launched, in line 52, from an entitled position more normally used in calls for customer service (Tracy 1997; cf. Curl & Drew 2008).
(2) Call to 911: “Mirá”

50 INT: Buenos días. (.) Cuál es su emergencia? 
Good days what is your USTED emergency

51 (0.2)

52 CLR: -> Bueno mirá: e- Yo te e- Yo: te digo:. (.)
Well look IMP VOS I you VOS um I you VOS I-tell

53 (.) Yo vengo de Nueva York.
I come of N Y
(. I am from New York.

54 (1.0) Y:: (0.5) Vengo hace poco que:
and I-come makes little that
New York. (1.0) A::nd (0.5) I came only a short time ago

55 (.) y resulta que:
and results that
(. and it turns out that:

56 (0.3) hay un hombre que me amenazó de muerte,
there is a man that me threatened of death
(0.3) there is a man that threatened my life

68 INT: Mkay. M=-

69 CLR: -> =Me entendés?
=Do vos understand me?

70 (0.2)

The interpreter opens this stretch of talk by characterizing the caller as usted in line 50 through the possessive adjective “su” / your (cf. tú/ vos ‘tu’). Using the deferential person reference form in this professional/institutional interaction attempts to invoke a context of ustedo mutuo, or ‘mutual respect’. The caller, however, does not reciprocate, instead using the non-deferential (or at least neutral) vos imperative “mirá” / look (line 57). The sequential juxtaposition of this non-deferential form immediately after the interpreter’s deferential design launches the caller’s problem presentation in a way that encodes an asymmetric social relationship with the call-
taker/interpreter. Furthermore, this turn preface as a whole marks an overt disjunction from and redirection of the interpreter’s question (Sidnell 2007) as the caller begins his own extended telling: “Yo te e- Yo: te digo:” / I’ll te- um I’ll tell you. (line 57), again using the non-deferential form via the indirect object pronoun “te”. Thus, from the very onset of his initial turn, this caller has placed himself in what Tracy (1997) refers to as a “customer service” as opposed to “public service” frame—highly entitled to receiving the service he is requesting. This distribution of identities continues through to the conclusion of the problem presentation with the non-deferential “Me entendés?” / Do vos understand me?.

Nonetheless, one might argue that such an explication of identity is analyst-imposed: Where is the orientation of the interlocutors themselves that vos is non-deferential and thereby invokes one set of respective identities while usted is deferential and invokes another? In response to this question, we consider a later stage in the call.

After the sequence shown above, the interpreter relays the caller’s problem presentation to the call-taker in English. Following this is the interrogative series (Zimmerman 1984) in which the call-taker asks for clarification on a few points (i.e., where this man is currently, what prompted the initial altercation with the caller, etc.). Finally, in Excerpt (3) below, a response to the request for service is given.

(3) Continuation of (2): “Mire”

114 911:  Okay .hh Well unfortunately: I have to have an exact address on
115 where this person i:s .hh I have to have a name and a date of
116 birth so I can look up to see if this person .hh has warrants
117 before the police can do anything. (0.2) .hh If he’s in Norridge
118 then he’s gonna have to contact the Norridge Police Department
119 (0.2) .hh but they’re gonna need the same information.
120 (0.7)

. .
. .
((Interpreter translates lines 114-119))
125 CLR: ( ) exactamente e-
126 ( ) exactly eh-
127 (1.0) porque: yo: quise investigar que era en verdad que because I wanted to-investigate that was in truth that
128 me decían que este tipo había sido buscado they were telling me that this guy had been wanted
129 (. ) e: buscado por la policía, muy bien? looked-for by the police very well
130 (0.5) Yo lo busqué: y sí tengo toda la información I him looked-for and yes I have all the information
131 (0.5) fecha de nacimiento: apellido: nombre tengo todo y en date of birth last-name name I have it all and in
132 qué año empezó él .hh a cometer (0.5) estos crímenes (1.5) what year he started .hh to commit (0.5) these crimes (1.5)
133 -> Me entiende?
  me understand.USTED
  Do usted understand me?

In lines 126 and 133, we see that the caller has suddenly shifted from addressing the call-taker (or interpreter) as vos, to using usted morphology. In fact, these are precisely the same verbs in identical discursive positions as observed above in Excerpt (2), providing us with two ‘minimal pairs’ of sorts: A turn-prefatory imperative in the case of “mirá:” (line 52 of Excerpt (2)) which is now “mire:” (line 126 of Excerpt (3)), and pursuing understanding after the completion of a telling in the case of “me entendés” (line 69 of Excerpt (2)) which is now “me entiende?” (line 133 of Excerpt (3)). The respective stances of these interactants have thus been altered through

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13 These switches also demonstrate that even seemingly routine pragmatic expressions—often referred to as ‘discourse markers’—can nonetheless remain morphologically complex enough to convey the pragmatic (and
the mobilization of linguistic resources for person reference. In particular, the caller has moved from someone entitled to demand service in Excerpt (2), to someone invoking a more supplicant position in Excerpt (3). This of course invites inquiry into what prompted this change, and also what the caller achieves—in social interaction terms—by making it.

This caller has just been informed that the ‘gates to service’ will not be opened—meaning that his request for emergency service is moving toward a rejection, as well as overall call closure. In response, he transforms the way he presents himself by beginning to actively defer authority to the call-taker, announcing that he has acquired “exactamente” / exactly (line 125) the information she is telling him he needs to acquire in order for service to be granted. In effect, through these turns, the caller is doing “being cooperative” (Sacks 1984b). Furthermore, he assures the call-taker that he did not go looking for this information because, for example, he is a paranoid, trouble-seeking individual. He explains in lines 127-129 that he had heard rumors about this man, and that is why he looked up the information. Thus this was, in Heritage and Clayman’s (2010: 77) terms, a “specifically unmotivated act” which frames the caller’s request as more legitimate and less questionable.

Switching person reference forms is an essential aspect of this recalibration of identities which was made relevant by the call-taker’s interactional move toward the rejection of service. The caller’s switch from non-deferential vos to deferential usted mobilizes the deferential pragmatics of the new reference form in tandem with the content of his turns and thereby demonstrates an orientation to both the identity he was previously claiming, as well as the identity he is now creating. This shifted landscape of identities allows the caller to satisfy his newfound need to actively show respect for the call-taker’s authority, which in turn serves his overall objective of attaining institutional service. Particularly crucial to the present analysis is socially relevant content of person reference forms, and therefore are able to sequentially change their morphological composition in accordance with speakers’ goals for action (cf. also Excerpts (11)-(13) below).
that such a transformation of identities—achieved through the mobilization of linguistic structure—was not predetermined at the onset of the interaction, but rather was made relevant sequentially through the turn-by-turn progression of the talk.

Turning to a different dialectal region and institutional context, the following set of examples are taken from a Peruvian political interview show called *Prensa Libre*, hosted by a prominent lawyer named Rosa María Palacios (PAL). In Excerpt (4), a piece of which was shown in the previous Chapter 3, Palacios interviews Martha Chávez (CHA), a candidate running for Congress to represent Lima for the 2011-2016 term. The topic of discussion here is Chávez’s stance on human rights and violations thereof, something for which the candidate has been widely criticized. The default or unmarked reference form between interviewer and interviewee has been *usted* for the entirety of the interview (as seen, e.g., in line 14). In lines 36-37, however, there is an instance of self-repair by Chávez to suddenly—and only momentarily—treat Palacios as *tú*.

(4) *Prensa Libre*: Rosa María interviews Martha Chávez

14 CHA: *Sabe usted* Rosa María.=
*know.USTED you* R M
*Usted know* Rosa María.=

15 =La vez pa{sada yo aquí creo que lo mencioné.
the time past I here I-think that it I-mentioned
=The last time I was here I believe I mentioned it.

16 {((quick point at table))}

17 PAL: [Mm,

18 CHA: {.hhh [La convención americana >de< derechos humanos,
the convention american of rights human
.hhh The American Convention >on< Human Rights,

19 {((pointing authoritatively))}

20 en el cuarto artículo,
in the fourth article
*in the fourth article,*

116
cómo habla de la pena de muerte [dice, when talks of the penalty of death says when it talks about the death penalty says,]

PAL: [°°M,°°]

CHA: ((pointing)) Que incluso los condenados a pena de muerte= that included them condemned to penalty of death That e:ven those sentenced to the death penalty=

=tiene derecho siempre a amnistía o indulto. they-have right always to amnesty or pardon =have the right always to amnesty or pardon.

PAL: [Sí= yes

PAL: ={por supuesto. for supposed

CHA: ((nodding)) Y entonces. and then And so.

Si las personas que [(sean) culpables] if the persons that are guilty If the people who (are) guilty

PAL: [Salvo que sea ] genocidio. unless that is genocide

CHA: ↑↑No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No no: No-no: Genocide is not even mentioned there.

Pal: (((voice crack)))

CHA: [No no. No ] El genocidio es una (.)

no the genocide is a

No no. No Genocidio es a (.)

tipificación que se da a partir del año= typification that self gives to to-leave of-the year
classification used starting in the year=

dos mil tres para nosotros,= two thousand three for us two-thousand three for us,
usted sabe perfectamente Rosa María, =
and you know. USTED perfectly R M
And usted know perfectly Rosa María,=

[O tú sabes Rosa María.
or you know. TÚ R M
Or tú know Rosa María.

[[(audibly/visibly out of breath by the end of line 36))

.hhhh que that

([^.)

Los tipos penales (.) son (.) ((timeline with hands))
the types penal are
Penal classes (.) are (.)

[a partir de que se tipifican (.) ((timeline))
to to-leave of that self typify
from their classification (.)

PAL: [((raises hand))

CHA: [En adelante para los hechos que suceden allá. ((timeline))
on forward for the deeds that happen there
Onward for those deeds which occur there.

PAL: [.hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh

PAL: Muy bien. Entonces no va a haber cambio en la posición.
very well then no goes to to-be change in the position
Very well. So there is not going to be change in the position.

At the beginning of this excerpt, Chávez makes reference to her last appearance on the program and expresses her dissatisfaction with how amnesty laws are currently being applied in Peru, her claim being that terrorists are receiving the benefit of amnesty while members of the armed forces, for example, are left in jail. Chávez legitimizes her perspective on the issue through line 24, not only vocally by explicitly citing a specific article of a legal document (lines 18-24), but also gesturally through pointing (lines 15-16, 18-19, 23).

Nonetheless, in line 29, Palacios challenges Chávez’s interpretation of the document in question by citing an exception to the law, namely that those convicted of genocide and sentenced to death (like those to whom Chávez has been referring) are not eligible for pardon or
amnesty in the way that others are. Chávez’s multiple saying (Stivers 2004) asserts her own knowledge from second position on the basis that “genocide” is not specifically mentioned in the document being debated (line 30). She justifies this claim by stating that the legal category of “genocide” is a new one which came into effect in 2003, and that Peruvian law does not permit retroactive application of contemporary legislation to violations from years prior—something which Rosa María Palacios is presented as knowing “perfectamente” / perfectly (line 36). In invoking this knowledge, Chávez first addresses Palacios as usted, just as she has done for the first ten minutes of the interview, but immediately repairs this reference to tú (lines 36-37). As mentioned earlier with reference to Lerner and Kitzinger’s (2007) analysis of shifts in 1st-person reference forms, such instances of self-repair are particularly noteworthy because either reference design would technically be ‘correct’; that is, there is no need to repair the original usted reference in order to better understand who the referent is (as is often the case with 3rd-person reference formulations). Here, the reference is to Palacios either way. What Chávez judges as problematic is the initial pairing of usted with the social action being attempted through the turn. She therefore abandons the turn-in-progress to replace the reference form with one that she judges as more appropriate or adequate for her intended action, namely tú.

Lines 36-37 constitute a preface which frames the forthcoming legal information as shared knowledge between interviewer and interviewee, both of whom are lawyers. Chávez’s overt switch from usted to tú actively invokes shared common ground (Clark 1996) with her interlocutor by embodying, through the linguistic reference, co-membership in this ‘lawyer’ category and thus equal access to the legal knowledge she is about to put forth. This moment of ‘alikeness’ through a socially-intimate reference form thus attempts to shed some of the institutional context of the talk and establish a more affiliative local context by cleansing the potential defensiveness of the initial use of usted, as well as that of the upcoming turn as a whole.
(cf. Jefferson 1974b). Moreover, because the co-participants’ identities are now presented as aligned after a sequence riddled with confrontation and disalignment, what Chávez is about to say (lines 39-42/44) is launched from a base in sincerity (Clayman 2010; cf. also Clayman 2013), objectivity, and therefore indisputability—which is the primary objective of the preface as a whole. Indeed, Palacios does not challenge this perspective, but rather paraphrases the final answer and the interview moves on to a new topic.

Excerpt (4) illustrated a sequentially-conditioned identity shift in the news interview context—from usted to tú—for the purposes of social action. But speakers’ objectives can make relevant shifts in the opposite direction as well—from tú to usted.

Another Prensa Libre interview is shown in Excerpts (5) through (8). The interviewee in this case is Gonzalo Alegría (ALE), also a candidate for Congress in Peru. While Palacios employs her standard usted throughout her questioning (just as in the previous interview with Martha Chávez),14 Alegría treats Palacios as tú.

(5) Prensa Libre: Gonzalo Alegría: “Un ejemplo”
09 PAL: [Mm,
10 ALE: [Te  doy  un ejemplo. 
you  I-give an example
   I’ll give tú an example.
11 Actualmente. Por decir[to-tell-you.TÚ
   presently   for to-tell-you.TÚ
   Presently. Just to tell tú. Eh?
12 PAL: [m,

As in the previous example, this unmarked distribution of person reference (Palacios → Alegría: usted; Alegría → Palacios: tú) is not demonstrably oriented to by the participants themselves at

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14 The fact that Palacios uses solely usted in these examples also provides evidence against some form of accommodation (Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991) as the (primary) driving force behind these switches, particularly in the case of switches that move from usted to tú—i.e., away from Palacios’s norm (cf. Excerpt (4)).
each and every turn. Nonetheless, as the interview progresses, identities and action objectives change—and so do Alegria’s person reference forms for Palacios.

Just as in the interview with Martha Chávez, in Excerpt (6) below, the interviewee is forced to respond to a challenge by Palacios regarding his understanding of and position regarding an issue. Contrary to the strategy employed by Chávez, however, when Palacios displays her epistemic primacy over the laws involved in what Alegria is proposing (lines 72-76), Alegria’s “bueno pues”-prefaced (Raymond, frth.), twice-hedged, and noticeably mitigated response shifts to usted, invoking the form’s pragmatics of deference to effectively yield authority on this matter to his interlocutor (lines 77-78).

(6) Prensa Libre: Gonzalo Alegria: “Arbitrios municipales”

68 ALE: Hay una cosa que se llaman there-is a thing that self call There is something called

69 los arbitrios municipales, the judgments municipal municipal judgments,

70 PAL: Sí, yes Yes,

71 ALE: Que se aplican a los bienes mueble[s. that self apply to the goods property That are applied to real estate

72 PAL: -> [No!],

73 -> (0.2)

74 PAL: -> Los arbitrios se aplican para pagar servicios públicos. the judgments self apply for to-pay services public The judgments are applied to pay for public services.

75 -> Y solamente pueden ser cobrados= and only they-can to-be charged And they can only be charged=

There may be gender-based divergences at work here which explain this unmarked distribution. Nonetheless, our interest is in the shifting from unmarked to marked forms to accomplish social action. See Enfield (2007) for discussion of unmarked forms.
for the service that self borrow effectively

[Bueno pues tal vez
good well that time
Well then perhaps

Then perhaps what I should say to usted then

It’s called <property> tax.

The pronominal shift in this stretch of talk (line 78) is sequentially motivated and action-oriented in that it actively acknowledges an asymmetrical distribution of knowledge with regard to tax law. The move from tú to usted in response to Palacios’s knowledge-based objection serves to temper the potential defensiveness and oppositionality of the turn-in-progress in the same way that the move fromusted to túb did in the previous exchange with Martha Chávez. Thus while the underlying pragmatics of usted and tú can indeed carry with them the notions of social distance and intimacy, respectively, in a given dialect (Brown & Gilman 1960; Brown & Levinson 1987), the ground-level significance of invoking such distance or intimacy is no more automatic or predetermined than the identities of the interactants themselves. Rather, the interactional relevance of these pronominal options is action- and sequence-conditioned by way of the moment-by-moment negotiation of identities in and through the ongoing talk
The fact that recalibrating the speaker-hearer relationship is an emergent process is further demonstrated in this same interview given that Alegria’s pronominal switch is not a permanent one, as seen in Excerpt (7) below. Despite Palacios’s attempt to bring the discussion of taxes to a close (lines 101, 103) and launch a new topic via the shift-implicative “Ahora” / now (line 105), Alegria insists on describing his campaign plan which was previously derailed by Palacios’s legal questioning in Excerpt (6) above. In shifting back to his own territory of knowledge (i.e., his running platform) over which he has epistemic primacy, Alegria simultaneously shifts back to tú as he reaffirms his “promise” (line 106) for economic change in Lima. While this does constitute a shift back to Alegria’s unmarked pronominal norm for Palacios, use of a socially-intimate form in this turn simultaneously invokes a sense of commonality with the interviewer (and potentially with the at-home viewers as well), which naturally serves to enhance the credibility of the promise (cf. Austin 1962).

(7) Prensa Libre: Gonzalo Alegria: “Te concreto”
((lines 83-100: PAL explains how taxes are created))

101 PAL: Esa es la situación.
That is the situation.

102 ALE: Mhmm.

103 PAL: Y eso >lo sabe usted muy bien.<
And that it know. USTED you very well

104 ALE: [Bue-

105 PAL: Ahora.
now

106 ALE: [No Pero yo yo te concreto: de que . . .
No but I I you Tú I-promise of that

Now.
Alegría continues to employ tú for several turns as the topic of discussion moves to transportation reform. At this point, he references his master plan for a new Central Station in Lima, a topic which unambiguously lies in his epistemic domain. Nonetheless, as we have already seen Palacios do several times, she again interrupts his proposal to announce that the project he is describing was already begun in 2006 by Mayor Luis Castañeda.

(8) Prensa Libre: Gonzalo Alegría: “Perdóneme”

150 PAL: Eso se llama la Estación Central... .hhh
That self calls the station... .hhh
That’s called Castañeda’s Central Station... .hhh

151 (0.5)

152 ALE: E-Bueno pues. Perdóneme: que: (. ) que le diga: E-Well okay. Pardon me ((usted)) that (. ) that I tell usted:

153 Yo no sé si Castañeda tiene ese proyecto o no,
I no I-know if C has that project or not
I don’t know if Castañeda has that project or no,

. .
. .
. ((RM describes what Castañeda’s project is/was))
. .

165 PAL: La Estación Central está frente al Palacio de la Justicia.
The station central is front to the palace of the justice
The Central Station is in front of the Justice Hall.

166 ALE: [Ah bueno.
good
Ah okay.

Here, upon receiving yet another objection from Palacios, Alegría mobilizes a person reference design that will align with and reinforce the face-saving action being attempted in his turn (lines 152-3). Thus, yet again, Alegría’s morphological switch from tú to usted (“Perdóneme” / Pardon me (usted), and “le”, line 152; cf. tú ‘perdóname’, and ‘te’) demonstrates an orientation to the identities and actions which have been made sequentially relevant in the talk, and he deploys linguistic reference forms in accordance with those in-the-moment identities and actions.
The institutional interactions analyzed in this section problematize the view that 2nd-person pronoun selection is altogether predetermined or otherwise fixed based on immutable interactant identities and/or the context of situation (Firth 1957; Halliday 1973; Malinowski 1923) in which they find themselves. As we have demonstrated, a so-called ‘formal’ context such as a political interview, for example, does not portend the a priori use of a ‘given’ set of identities or reference forms from beginning to end. On the contrary, interactants create the institutionality of their context through the turn-by-turn (re-)creation of their institutional identities—which they can also make moves to shed (cf. Heritage & Clayman 2010; Zimmerman 1998)—and recipient reference forms are one linguistic means through which this is accomplished.

Paralleling Oh’s (2010) research on Korean pronouns which are coded for degrees of spatial distance, pronouns in Spanish are unambiguously coded to convey degrees of social distance. Notwithstanding, as we have illustrated, the ground-level invocation, as well as the in-the-moment pragmatic connotation, of social distance/intimacy is not only based on relatively ‘static’ aspects of identity such as social class, age, gender, etc.—or even on institutional roles such as caller/call-taker or interviewer/interviewee—, but also on the various in-the-moment, sequentially-determined features of identity which are made relevant through interactants’ pursuit of their goals for social action.

4.3.2 Everyday Talk

Ordinary conversation, Heritage (2005: 109) observes, “encompasses a vast array of rules and practices, which are deployed in pursuit of every imaginable kind of social goal, and which embody an indefinite array of inferential frameworks”. Given that institutional talk typically involves a reduction and specification of this range of discursive practices (Heritage & Clayman 2010), it comes as no surprise that the sequential negotiation of identity through
linguistic reference forms occurs in mundane, everyday conversation as well. Moreover, because co-participants in ordinary conversation are not orienting to specific goals that are tied to institution-relevant identities, the variety of identities enacted in everyday interaction is considerably more wide-ranging. Thus, just as in a call to 911 or a political interview, a casual conversation between a mother and daughter can call for the (temporary) recalibration of the speaker-hearer relationship at a particular moment based on the action(s) being attempted within the sequence-in-progress.

Straddling the divide between institutional and ordinary interaction is talk between radio hosts and those who call in to make song requests, as seen in the call below placed to a Latino radio station in Los Angeles. While the participants eventually do orient to the institutional nature of the call (i.e., making a request for a song to be played), this institutionality is not demonstrably relevant to the interactants at all points (Schegloff 1992c). The opening and initial sequences of such calls pattern more closely with those of ordinary telephone calls (Schegloff 1968, 1979a) than with institutional calls (Wakin & Zimmerman 1999; Zimmerman 1984).

In Excerpt (9), observe how the host (Tina) moves from tú, the default/unmarked norm of Los Angeles Vernacular Spanish (LAVS) (Parodi 2003, 2004, 2011; Raymond 2012b; cf. also Parodi 1999), to usted as the interaction progresses and the caller’s (Yvonne) origin and overall identity become more ambiguous.

(9) Morning Call to Latino 96.3

\[\begin{array}{ll}
01 & \text{TIN: } Cómo \text{ te llamas mamita.} \\
   & \text{how yourself.TU call.TU mom.DIM} \\
   & \text{What’s tú name beautiful.} \\
02 & \text{CLR: } \text{Yvonne! Yvonne!} \\
03 & \text{TIN: } Cómo \text{ estás mi reina?} \\
   & \text{how are.TU my queen} \\
   & \text{How are tú doing my queen?}
\end{array}\]
04 Apenas te estás levantando verdad?
just yourself.TÚ are.TÚ rising true-
TÚ are just now getting up right?

05 CLR: NO: Ya estoy manejando desde las seis de la mañana.
-> [eh'toj] [deʃde] [sej]
o already I-am driving since the six of the morning
NO: I’ve been driving since six this morning.

06 TIN: Y usted de dónde es Yvonne.
and you from where are.USTED Y
And usted where are usted from Yvonne.

07 Que yo le escucho un acentito.
that I from-you.USTED I-hear an accent.DIM
Cuz I’m hearing a little accent from usted.

08 CLR: De Panamá!
from P
From Panama!

09 TIN: Panamá? Qué rico!
P how rich
Panama? How awso:me!

10 CLR: Sí!
yes
Yeah!

11 TIN: Qué canción te puedo poner mamita?
what song to-you.TÚ I-can to-put mom.DIM
What song can I play for tū beautiful?

Tina’s default reference form tū continues through the opening and into the launch of a how-are-
you sequence during which she asks if the caller is just waking up (lines 3-4). In her first multi-
unit turn, the caller responds that she has actually been awake and driving for a few hours:
“NO: Ya estoy manejando desde las seis de la mañana.” / NO: I’ve been driving since six this 
morning. (line 5). Undoubtedly orienting to Yvonne’s aspirated/elided coda-position /s/
consonants in “estoy” [eh'toj], “desde” [deʃde], and “seis” [sej] (cf. [es'toj], [desde], and [sejs],
respectively), which are not features of the local dialect (Parodi 2003, 2004, 2009, 2011;
Raymond 2012a), Tina does not take up Yvonne’s news about driving, but rather initiates an
and-prefaced post-expansion to uncover a ‘missing’ element of Yvonne’s preceding talk (Bolden
2010), namely where she is from (line 6). Tina accounts for this question in her immediately subsequent turn by explaining that she detects “un acentito” / a little accent from the caller.

Tina’s questioning of the caller’s identity is accompanied by a switch from the default tú to the marked usted, the syntactic fronting of the pronoun (“usted de dónde es”, cf. ‘de dónde es usted”) and use of a proper name “Yvonne” (cf. “mamita” / beautiful, line 1; “mi reina” / my queen, line 3) serving to further underscore this new identity framework. The mobilization of the topicalized (and thereby emphatic; Bolinger 1972a; Miller 1996) usted form in this turn actively highlights the sequentially-produced sense of social unfamiliarity between the interactants: After hearing line 5, Tina is no longer confident of this caller’s identity as a co-member of the Los Angeles speech community, and the switch in reference form pairs with the action of the question itself to embody this social distance and lack of access to who the caller is at this moment. Once this identity-based distance is resolved and an affiliative relationship is re-created amongst the interactants in lines 8-10, interpersonal familiarity is restored by a shift back to the familiar tú person reference, coupled with a return to the diminutive term of endearment “mamita” / beautiful, as the host begins to invoke the institutional objective of the call (line 11).

Although it might be tempting, from our discussion thus far, to dismiss the negotiation of identities as relevant and necessary only when interactants are relatively unknown to one another, this is certainly not the case. Family members and close friends can mobilize linguistic reference formulations in the service of social action in the same way as do individuals whose relationships with one another are less established.

Take the extended Excerpt (10), for example, between a Guatemalan mother and her daughter. Prior to this segment of talk, the interactants have been discussing the daughter’s boyfriend whom Mom portrays as quite the freeloader. The daughter then vaguely alludes to having recently (yet again) lent him some money. We enter the exchange as Mom is attempting
to unpack this bit of news that her daughter has just hinted at, explicitly verifying “Que le distes dinero?” / Vos gave him money? (line 3). After receiving confirmation that her daughter did indeed lend him sixty dollars (lines 4-16), Mom undertakes a multi-turn assessment of this event before transitioning into a reciprocal story-telling, or ‘second story’ (Sacks 1992a), in which she describes having been similarly taken advantage of by a family friend. Observe the sequential shifting of Mom’s treatment of her daughter from their unmarked vos to marked usted and then back to vos as she makes relevant distinct identity landscapes to accomplish various social actions across the progression of this stretch of talk.

(10) Guatemalans: Mother and Daughter
01 DAU:     De °qué?:°
             of what
             About °what:°
02         (1.0)
03 MOM:     Que le distes dinero?
             that to-him you-gave.VOS money
             Vos gave him money?
04 DAU:     ((sigh, eyebrow raise, looks up))
05         ((looks down, fiddles with hands))
06         (0.7)
07         (0.7)
08         (0.7)
09         (0.7)
10         (0.7)
11         (0.7)
12         (0.7)
13         (0.7)
[de último se lo paré:- (. ) paré "dando. ((mini nod))
of last to-him it I-sto: (. ) I-stopped giving
in the end I end- (. ) I ended up giving it to him.

[[(eye contact))

(2.5) ((eye contact maintained))

MOM: <Increíble.> ((eye contact maintained))
    incredible
    <Increíble>

(1.0) ((eye contact maintained))

<Increíble "hija mía".> ((eye contact maintained))
    incredible daughter mine
    <Incredible "daughter of mine">

(1.0)

Pero no sé cómo es que usted deja que le
but no I-know how is that you let.USTED that to-you.USTED
But I don’t know how it is that usted let=

((looks down))

=afecte semejante cosa si usted ya <sabe.>
    affects similar thing if you already know.USTED
    =this sort of thing affect usted ifusted already <know.>

(0.7)

Ya <sabe.>
    already know.USTED
    Usted already know.

DAU: ↑Porque me molesta:.No importa cuántas veces
    because me bothers no matter how-many times
    ↑Because it bothers me:. It doesn’t matter how many times

<uno oiga algo,> (0.5) siempre va a doler.
    one hears something always goes to to-hurt
    <one hears something,> (0.5) It’s always going to hurt.

( .)

MOM: ((nodding)) "Ya sé."
    already I-know.
    "I know."

(0.7)

"Ya sé.° Sí (. ) Igual (lo/yo) llamé:- Fausto:
    already I-know yes same him/I I-called F
    I know what you mean. Yes (. ) Same (him/I) called- Fausto:
Hablé con él por teléfono. Lo llamé:. (.) I talked with him for telephone him I-called I called him on the phone. I called him.

Y le dejé mensaje. and to-him I-left message And I left him a message.

Y es que con tu papá (.)
and is that with your vos dad and so with vos dad (.)

el otro mes, . . .
the other month next month, . . .

The familiar pronominal norm of vos between these two interactants is demonstrated morphologically in Mom’s initial request for confirmation in line 3. Following this, through lines 4-16, the daughter details how she “ended up” (line 14) lending her boyfriend the money he was requesting. Throughout this second-position telling, there are several signs of hesitation, including pauses (lines 7, 10, 13) and variations in gaze alignment and embodied action (lines 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16). The recounted event is thus noticeably offered up as reprehensible in that, through its design, the daughter is already pre-orienting to the sanctioning stance she expects Mom to take upon its conclusion. Indeed, Mom’s fixed gaze and facial expression paired with silence during the telling (lines 9-10, 12-13, 15-16) already begins a negative assessment of these events by structurally aligning with the action of story-telling (i.e., by suspending the normal rules of turn-taking; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974) but refusing to provide any overt affiliation (Goodwin 1984; Stivers 2008; cf. also Goodwin 1986; Schegloff 1982).

The pair maintains eye contact for nearly three seconds (lines 15-16) before Mom comes in with a low-volume, stretched “<Increíble.>” / <Incredibly.> in the following line 17. This gaze continues through the pause in line 18, and through the repetition of “Increíble” in line 19, which is combined with an expanded nominal form “mi hija” / daughter of mine (Stivers
This vocative design explicitly references the intimacy of the mother-daughter relationship, but in a notably marked way compared to the default form ‘mi hija’ / *my daughter*, pronounced [‘mi.xa]. Following this, seemingly in direct conflict with the closeness just invoked in her previous turn, Mom switches to the *usted* reference form, which she uses through the end of line 25 for a total set of six morphological references of this sort in rapid succession.

Mom’s deployment of *usted* unambiguously mobilizes the pronoun’s underlying pragmatics of distance, just as we have seen in previous examples (cf. also Callejas 1983). But why is that distance relevant here, and what does it serve to accomplish?

The sequential positioning of these turns illustrates the use of marked *usted* as part of an assessment sequence: Mom is effectively embodying a (moral) stance toward the just-completed telling (cf. C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin 1987, 1992). Mobilizing a shift in person reference form at this precise moment in the interaction allows Mom to negatively assess the events conveyed in the telling by depicting the part of her daughter that would do such a thing and then ‘let it affect her if she already knows’ (lines 21-25) as socially distant or unknown to her.

This meaning is even clearer when we take into account the juxtaposition of *usted* with the immediately prior vocative “°hija mía°” / °daughter of mine°. Given that it is common practice throughout Latin America to use *usted* to refer to young children (both to teach deferential forms from an early age, as well as to reprimand) (Lipski 1994), the pairing of *usted* with “°hija mija°” indexes the respective identities of misbehaving child and chastising parent, even despite the fact that this daughter is now in her late twenties.

In the immediately subsequent turn (lines 26-27), the daughter responds to this linguistic invocation of social distance—and the negative assessment/sanction action that this distance was mobilized to achieve—by offering up an account which is noticeably emotionally charged: raised pitch and volume, careful pronunciation, upward gaze (lack of eye contact). Mom
affiliates with this show of emotion ("¡Ya sé!" / "I know", lines 29/31), thereby making a move to reestablish a sense of intimacy and common ground with her daughter through a reciprocal troubles-telling ("Igual yo..." / Same I..., line 31) (Jefferson 1988). By the time the next turn that mobilizes a 2nd-person reference is produced in line 41, usted has been abandoned and the interactants have returned to the intimacy of vos as Mom narrates a similar experience that recently happened to her. That is, with the negative assessment complete and a new affiliative action now underway, a recalibration of identities—and therefore of person reference formulations—is once again made sequentially relevant, and the story-telling continues.

Interactions amongst close friends can similarly occasion shifts in identity as co-participants progress from one action to the next in naturalistic talk. The following examples (11) through (13) are taken from a telephone call between two friends of Colombian origin, Botero and Armando, both of whom are currently studying abroad. In the first excerpt below, the two friends are sharing some recent happenings from back home in Medellín and beginning to talk about their activities abroad. Their baseline vos eo is used throughout this discussion.

(11) Colombian friends: Weather

04 ARM: Mi papá me estuvo contando que se está=
        my dad me was telling that self is
        Mi dad was telling me that they’re=

05 =armando también la de trote allá; hhh .hhh
         =also getting together the everyday one there; hhh .hhh

06 BOT: Ah hijo de m:ad.  >Yo no sabía hom.< hhh ((slurred))
        ah son of moth(er) I no knew ma(n)
        Ah son of a m:oth.>I didn’t know man.< hhh

07 ARM: Imaginate.  Pero (b)ueno(hh).
        imagine-self.IMP.VOS but good
        Imagine. But well(hh).

08 En fi:n.
       in end
    A:nyway.
The pair continues with vos as its unmarked reference form, as seen above in (11), across several more turns before Botero launches a complaint telling in line 46 below. He explains that he had made plans to go to a museum during the hours of free entry, but it was raining at the time so he was unable to go. This telling is then transformed into a general complaint about his living situation abroad: “Esta pobreza Ave Mar(ía)” / This poverty My God (line 54).

In addition to the distancing relational work that usted has been mobilized to accomplish in previous examples, sociolinguistic research on pronominal forms in Colombian dialects of Spanish has documented the use of usted to display extreme familiarity/closeness, this form alternating with vos as the other pronominal option in the speakers’ repertoire (Buesa Oliver & Flórez 1954; Lipski 1994: 213-214; Montes Giraldo 1982; Placencia 2010; Uber 1985). This sort of reference is referred to in the Hispanist tradition as the “usted de cariño/confianza” or “usted of love/trust” (Hummel, Kluge & Vázquez López 2010: 16). In this example, Armando’s mobilization of ustedeo (beginning in line 56) actively invokes closeness and works to establish a common, familiar identity with Botero while offering a “bright side” response (Jefferson 1988) to Botero’s overall negative assessment of his “poverty” while living abroad.

(12) Colombian friends: Wait
48 Es gratis de diez a la una.
is free of ten to the one
It’s free from ten to one.

49 =y llö(vi dé diez a u(hh)na. hah hah hah
and rained of ten to one
=and it rained from ten to o(hh)ne. hah hah hah

50 ARM: [hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah

51 BOT: hhh entonces yo ya después no iba a pagar hermano.
then I already after no was-going to to-pay brother
hhh so like afterwards I wasn’t going to pay brother.

52 ARM: [hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah

53 BOT: [hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah hah

54 BOT: Esta- Esta pobre:za Ave Mar.
this this poverty ave M
This- This po:verty My God.

55 ARM: [HHH! Ave María. .hhh

56 Botero lleva un- lleva
Botero usted have been a- usted have been there

57 =un mes y medio.papito.=
a month and half dad.DIM
=a month and a half.man.=

58 =Espérese a que se acostumbre.=
wait-self.IMP.USTED to that self.USTED adjust.USTED
=Wait until you adjust.=

59 BOT: =[No y yo: es que::
no and I is that
=No and I: it’s that::

60 ARM: =[Yo ya- (. ) A mí-
I already to me
=I already- (. ) I’ve-

61 (.)

62 ARM: A mí ya me: ya me anestesié herman(o).=
to me already myself already myself anesthetized brother
I’ve already I’ve already anesthetized myself brother.=

63 BOT: =ha ha

64 ARM: =[A mí ya las cosas como que
to me already the things like that
=To me things already it’s like that
Advice-giving constitutes a potentially face-threatening action (Brown & Levinson 1987) given that it inherently presupposes an asymmetry of knowledge, understanding, abilities, or other feature(s) of identity between the interactants (Heritage & Sefi 1992; Hutchby 1995; Jefferson & Lee 1992). When recipients resist being given advice, they problematize the assumption that such an asymmetry existed in the first place.
In his multi-unit turn in lines 55-58, Armando attempts to comfort his troubles-telling interlocutor by offering advice: Despite the various negative events which have happened so far, he reminds Botero that he has only been abroad for a month and a half, and it naturally takes time to adjust to living in a new location. Armando’s switch to usted in this utterance is one linguistic resource through which the speaker attempts to temper the potentially threatening nature of the action-in-progress by invoking interpersonal closeness. As seen in some of the previous exchanges, this switch in 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person reference form is paired with a turn-prefatory address term of sincerity (“Botero”), as well as a turn-final, diminutivized term of endearment (“papito” / man). In recasting his relationship with Botero as an intimate one through the use of usted and citing himself as an example of how to successfully deal with the complications involved in living in a new place (lines 62/64-65), Armando works to construct a local context of a shared experience which better aligns with and accounts for his action of comforting/advice-giving (Stivers 2007).

Despite this newly-invoked framework of identities and a quiet token agreement in line 66, Botero overtly resists Armando’s presumed experienced stance in lines 67-69 by re-entering his troubles-telling. This telling is quickly put to an end by Armando who again invokes the epistemic high ground in lines 71-72, this time injecting a series of laugh particles into his turn to further mitigate the advice-giving action: “No pero espere que golpes como e(h)se l(hh)e esp(hhhhh)eran” / No but wait ((usted)) because knocks like th(h)at are wai(hhhhh)ting for u(hh)sted (cf. Jefferson 1984a). This second round of comical advice-giving approaches jovial commiserating but still inherently mobilizes the common experience between the friends to account for the ability to offer advice. Botero enthusiastically affiliates with the joking/complaining action of this turn through a laughter-filled increment which is phrasally
parasitic on Armando’s turn: “De(h)sde l(h)a m(h)atr(h)ícula de la Univers(h)ida(h)d!” / Ev(h)en fr(h)om enr(h)olling at the univ(h)ers(h)ity! (line 74).

Following this sequence, Armando offers a second story in which he describes in more detail his own monetary troubles abroad. As usted was mobilized in the service of advice-giving, and that action is now complete, this new sequence includes a switch in pronominal reference back to vos, thereby returning to the baseline reference form for these two interlocutors.

(13) Colombian friends: My knock

76  ARM: .hhh hh £Golpes como ese le esperan much-£= knock like that for-you wait many
   .hhh hh £Lots of knocks like that are waiting for usted£=

77  =Una batalla por otra hasta >fin de año.<= one battle for other until end of year
   =One battle after another until >the end of the year.<=

78  -> =Ya te conté más o menos el [golpe=
   already you I-told more or less the knock
   =I already told vos more or less the knock=

79  BOT:  [sí: sí sí sí. yes
   yea:h yeah yeah yeah.

80  ARM: -> =Yo te había contado bien el golpe ↑mío.
   I you had told well the knock mine
   =I’ve already told vos all about ↑my knock.

81  BOT:  Sí sí [yo sé.
   yes yes I know
   Yeah yeah I know.

82  ARM:  [A mí a mí a mí me:,
   to me to me to me me
   To me to me to me:,

83  A mí me:::
   to me me
   To me:::

84  BOT:  Ha sido más duro.
   has been more hard
   It’s been worse.

85  ARM:  A mí me desmoralizaron por ↑completeto. .hhh
   to me me demoralized for complete
   They demoralized me ↑completely↑. .hhh
Thus, just as we saw in the mother-daughter exchange in (10), these two friends were able to transition (i) out their unmarked person reference form (vos) and into an alternate form (usted), and then (ii) out of that alternate form back to an unmarked design. Such switches serve to invoke distinct landscapes of identities which correspond to the sequentially-relevant actions of the turns in which they are embedded.

The final example we will analyze reinforces the salience of sequence organization in the selection of linguistic reference. It is also taken from a phone call between two Colombian friends and illustrates the same switch to usted in the service of establishing intimacy that we saw in the exchange between Armando and Botero above. In Excerpt (14) below, Ana is telling Guadalupe the recent goings-on in her/her family members' lives. Using the baseline reference form for these interactants, Ana prefaces the announcement that her eldest sister, Doli, is currently in Colombia with “oíste,” / did vos hear, (line 2) to safeguard against this information being less than newsworthy for Guadalupe (Sacks 1974, 1992a; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Guadalupe enthusiastically affiliates with this news in line 6, thereby prompting Ana to narrate some of Doli’s adventures in Colombia through line 24. When Guadalupe comes in in overlap in line 25 to show affiliation with this telling, Ana immediately interrupts that turn-in-progress
to announce that she has another piece of gossip to share which is particularly scandalous, namely that a relative of hers has a year-and-a-half-old child that no one in the family knew about prior to the trip to Colombia. The switch in person reference design (line 27) used to make this announcement serves to enhance the speaker's claim of above-average newsworthiness.

(14) Guadalupe and Ana: Chisme

01  GUA:   No: pero: _
        no but
        No: but

02  ANA:   Ay oíste, =
        ay you-heard
        Ay did vos hear, =

03  =Tengo a mi hermana en Col- la: mayor, Doli?
    I have to my sister in C the eldest D
    =I have my sister in Col- the: oldest, Doli?

04  GUA:   Sí_?
        yes
        Yes__?

05  ANA:   [está en Colombia.
        is in C
        is in Colombia.

06  GUA:   SÍ:H?
        yes
        YEA:H?

. .
. . ((Ana describes Doli’s adventures to/in Colombia))
. .

22  ANA:   .hhhh Entonces Doli se fue para allá un tiempo;
         then D self went for there a time
         .hhhh So Doli went away to there for a bit;

23  Ay mi hija se encontró con su viejo amo:r, =
    ay my daughter self found with her old love
    Ay my dear she found herself with her old lo:ve, =

24  =[Y ella está feli::z feli[z.porque encontró >>°°( )°°<<.
    and she is happy happy because found
    =And she is ha::py happy.because she found >>°°( )°°<<.

25  GUA:   =[↑.hhh [Está que no quiere=
         is that no she-wants
         =↑.hhh So she doesn’t want=
26 \[vol-\-to-come-ba(ck)\] = to come ba-

27 ANA: \[Óigame\] Otr otro chisme! 
\[listen-to-me.IMP.USTED\] other gossip
\[Listen up ((usted))\] More gossip!

28 GUA: ↑↑ hh! \("q(h)ué\"\)
what
↑↑ hh! \("w(h)at\"\)

29 ANA: tch Usted no sabe una cosa.
you no know.USTED a thing
tch Usted don’t know something.

30 Que: el marido de ella el viejo?
that the husband of she the old
Tha:it he r her husband th- the old guy?

31 GUA: [Mm.

32 ANA: [Con la sobrina,<recuerda?]
with the niece remember.USTED
With the neice,<does usted remember?

33 GUA: Sí sí sí.
yes
Yeah yeah yeah.

34 ANA: \[Óigame\] tiene una niña d-de (.)
\[Listen-to-me.IMP.USTED\] he has a girl of
\[Listen up ((usted))\] he has a girl w- who’s (.)

35 Año (.) y medio.
year and half
a Year (.) and a half.

. . ((ANA continues with story; GUA responds affiliatively))
. .

59 ANA: .hh Furioso.Que cómo es possible.
furious that how is possible
((the dad)) .hh Furious.That hów is it possible.

60 .hhhhh En parte es bueno para nosotros sabés por qué?
in part is good for us you-know.VOS for what
.hhhhh In part it is good for us vos know why?

61 GUA: [Mm.

62 ANA: [.hh Porque como- decían que nosotros=
because like they-said that we
.hh Because like- they were saying that we=

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As seen in the previous exchange, here Ana’s “¡Oiga otro chisme!” / Listen up ((usted)) More gossip! (line 27) invokes a sense of extreme intimacy. This sequential shift constitutes a marked reference form and serves to categorize the gossip to come as also marked: This is not just another piece of ordinary news; this is special gossip. Pre-announcing the news in this way not only allows Ana to regain the interactional floor, but it also signals to Guadalupe what sort of uptake will eventually be expected in response to this telling (Maynard 2003; Scheglof 2007b: 37-44; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Note that this reference form is mobilized across the entirety of the telling, maintaining the level of excitement of this news (cf. lines 29, 32, and 34).

The sequence of events involved in this piece of gossip is brought to a close in line 59, after which the teller (Ana) begins to offer some commentary on those events as a whole. At this point, given that the story itself has been told and excited affiliation has been provided by the recipient, Ana shifts back to the unmarked vos form in line 60 as part of her transitioning out of the action of gossip-telling and into an assessment thereof: “En parte es bueno para nosotros sabés por qué? / In part it is good for us vos know why?. The friends continue their commentary on the events of the telling across several turns which use this baseline form.

The examples in this section have illustrated that, just as was the case in institutional settings, ordinary talk between familiar interactants can make relevant the recalibration of identities over the course of a single interaction. Linguistic resources for referencing recipients combine with various other aspects of turn design to invoke a landscape of identities that can best accomplish the sequentially-conditioned objective of a given turn-at-talk. Precisely because co-participants’ respective identities are not pre-established or otherwise immutable—even in
discourse between friends and family—, neither are the reference forms that those interactants use to refer to one another.

4.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In his famous work on variation in sentence structure, Dwight Bolinger (1972b: 71) observes that:

There are situations where the speaker is constrained by a grammatical rule, and there are situations where he chooses according to his meaning...; but there are no situations in the system where 'it makes no difference' which way you go. This is just another way of saying that every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other.

This chapter has examined the real-time production of 2nd-person singular (T/V) references in Spanish talk-in-interaction, a choice which is inherently not constrained by any grammatical rule because all of the options make reference to the speaker's singular interlocutor. In line with Bolinger's claim above, far from “making no difference”, selection of a reference form in Spanish demonstrates an orientation to, as well as a mobilization of, the underlying pragmatics of the different pronominal options in a given dialect's repertoire. In a particular dialect, usted may typically embody a sense of deference or distance between the interlocutors, while tú may convey sameness and social intimacy. Nonetheless, as we have demonstrated, social distance or intimacy between co-participants in interaction is not absolute or static (cf., e.g., Brown & Gilman 1960: 255), but rather can be transformed over the course of a stretch of talk.

Precisely what makes social distance or intimacy relevant at any specific moment is linked to the goals of the turn in which the reference form is deployed. 2nd-person reference formulations constitute a set of linguistic resources which serve to invoke landscapes of identities, create local contexts, and thereby aid in the accomplishment of social action. Moreover, because person reference designs are inherently deployed in conjunction with social actions, and because social actions are inherently shaped by the sequences in which they occur,
the discursive import of these pronominal options is also an emergent and co-constructed feature of the ongoing discourse.

The examples analyzed here were purposefully selected to represent (i) several dialects from across the Spanish-speaking world (e.g., some tuteante, others voseante), (ii) variations in individual-level demographic features (e.g., gender, age, social status), (iii) a variety of relationships between the interactants (i.e., from complete strangers to best friends and relatives), and (iv) a range of situational contexts (i.e., institutional and ordinary settings). In each case, speakers demonstrated an ability to mobilize person reference formulations in accordance with their interactional objectives. These pronominal shifts are summarized sequentially in Table 4.3 below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TALK</th>
<th>EXCERPT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>UNMARKED</th>
<th>MARKED</th>
<th>UNMARKED</th>
<th>MARKED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>911 call: Caller (ARGENTINE) to Interpreter (MEXICAN)/ Call-Taker</td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> (produced initially by interpreter)</td>
<td><strong>vos</strong> invoking 'high entitlement to service' following interpreter’s <strong>usted</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prensa Libre: Chávez to Palacios (PERUVIAN)</td>
<td><strong>usted</strong></td>
<td><strong>tú</strong> invoking 'shared knowledge'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prensa Libre: Alegria to Palacios (PERUVIAN)</td>
<td><strong>tú</strong></td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> invoking 'asymmetrical access to knowledge' for face-saving</td>
<td><strong>tú</strong> invoking 'my knowledge' as promise</td>
<td><strong>usted</strong></td>
<td>invoking 'asymmetrical access to knowledge' for face-saving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio call-in: Caller (PANAMANIAN) to Host (MEXICAN)</td>
<td><strong>tú</strong></td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> invoking 'unfamiliarity'</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>tú</strong></td>
<td>re-invoking 'familiarity'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talking about boyfriend: Mom to Daughter (GUATEMALAN)</td>
<td><strong>vos</strong></td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> invoking 'unfamiliarity' for negative assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>vos</strong></td>
<td>re-invoking 'closeness'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talking about living abroad: Armando to Botero (COLOMBIAN)</td>
<td><strong>vos</strong></td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> invoking 'shared experience' for advice-giving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>doing 'being ordinary' for second story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gossiping: Ana to Guadalupe (COLOMBIAN)</td>
<td><strong>vos</strong></td>
<td><strong>usted</strong> invoking 'extreme closeness' for newsworthiness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>doing 'being ordinary' for story commentary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.3: Sequentially-Conditioned, Action-Based Shifts in Person Reference Forms**

In moving from an unmarked to a marked 2nd-person reference form, or vice-versa, a speaker effectively recalibrates who speaker and hearer are to one another at that moment. This altered state of affairs, made relevant by the sequence in which the turn occurs, reveals the
speaker’s interpretation of the pragmatic and interactional significance of the former reference in addition to that of the new one. The newly established landscape of identities, “talked into being” (Heritage 1984b) through the use of the reference form, is deemed by the speaker to be better fitted to the action that s/he is aiming to accomplish with the utterance. These new identities may actively reduce the social distance between the interlocutors—for example, to emphasize shared access to knowledge based on a mutually shared identity (ex. 4); or, alternatively, the in-the-moment social distance between co-participants can be amplified—for example, to embody and underscore a relative lack of shared common ground (ex. 9). Crucially, shifts in identity do not happen to speakers, but rather are embodied by speakers in the service of action. In Excerpt (12), for example, Armando’s shift to the extreme intimacy of usted actively invokes the commonality of experience through which the speaker can both account for and also mitigate the inherently face-threatening action of advice-giving. In mobilizing linguistic resources such as 2nd-person reference forms in this way—to create identities for the purposes of social action—, interactants not only demonstrate an orientation to the meanings of those resources, but they also simultaneously re-create or renew those meanings on a turn-by-turn basis in actual talk.

Once the action (or series of actions) being attempted through the invocation of these novel identities has been completed, a speaker can then shift back to the co-participants’ unmarked form. But these shifts back to an unmarked design are also themselves marked in that they constitute a sequential departure from the immediately prior reference formulation—mobilizing the formerly unmarked form now “for another first time” (Schegloff 1996b: 455). Accordingly, these switches too are recalibrations of the identity landscape and thus occur at sequentially-motivated, action-relevant points in the ongoing talk. In example (7), Gonzalo Alegría transitions to the marked usted form to invoke an asymmetrical distribution of
knowledge regarding tax law in response to Palacios’s challenge of his plan. The switch back to
\textit{tú} comes once that action is complete and a new one (promising) makes relevant the sense of
common ground that \textit{tú} is better equipped to achieve in Peruvian Spanish. Similarly, in the last
example (14), Ana mobilizes a shift to \textit{usted} to mark a piece of gossip as particularly
newsworthy, maintains that reference form throughout the telling, and shifts back to \textit{vos} when
the activity of telling concludes and commentary on the events recounted therein begins.

Thus any shift—be it unmarked to marked, or marked to unmarked—is shaped by the
turn- and sequence-in-progress: Sequential contexts can make particular actions relevant, actions
make relevant landscapes of identities which are best aligned to particular interactional goals,
and linguistic reference forms—including switches—are one structural resource through which
these local, moment-by-moment identities can be invoked. Simultaneously, because person
references can be mobilized to embody relevant identities which aid in the achievement of
action and, in turn, compose sequences of talk, person reference forms help shape the emergent
context and overall sequence organization of the interaction as well (Schegloff 2007b). Such
linguistic tools allow co-participants in discourse to continuously recalibrate and re-create their
context as they progress through talk. The discursive significance of 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person pronominal
options is therefore not only constituted by, but also helps constitute, the moment-by-moment
negotiation of context, action, and identity in interaction.

4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

What this analysis has aimed to do is essentially “bring words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein 1953: §116; cf. Cavell 1962). While 2\textsuperscript{nd}-
person reference formulations in Spanish do indeed carry with them certain pragmatic notions
of, for example, social distance and intimacy, their significance in real-time discourse is
considerably more complex. As co-participant identities are not predetermined or static, but
rather are emergently mobilized in the course of interaction, the ground-level discursive meaning of the linguistic forms used by interactants to refer to one another in talk is equally emergent.

Methodologically, this analysis embodies a shift in the linguistic study of reference forms—combining sociolinguistic research on the inventory of options with investigation of the moment-by-moment deployment of those options in sequences of interaction. The dialects of Spanish analyzed in this study were diverse in terms of their pronominal repertoire—e.g., tuteante vs. voseante—; and it would have been common practice to analyze speakers from Los Angeles, California separately from those from Medellín, Colombia, for example. Alternatively, we could have taken as our point of departure the participants’ genders, racial characteristics, or relative socioeconomic statuses vis-à-vis one another, or the sort of situated context in which they found themselves. Nonetheless, as Schegloff (1987b: 228) points out, “On the other side is the stance that finds in every discovered variation the challenge to find and articulate some yet more general account that allows the variants to find an appropriate place under its umbrella”. Here we posited that a common feature linking these otherwise quite divergent dialects of Spanish, and cutting across individual-level features of identity, is the more general discursive practice of mobilizing T/V reference forms to create emergent identities which are relevant for social action. Although speakers of some dialects (e.g., Colombian Spanish) may make more active use of this strategy than speakers of other dialects, the ability to shift 2nd-person forms in accordance with one’s sequentially-conditioned, in-the-moment objectives appears to exist cross-dialectally as a “members’ resource” (Garfinkel 1967).

This naturally invites the question as to just how universal such an interactional strategy might be. We focused here on a two-way distinction: tú and usted, or vos and usted. How might other dialects that have three or more options (e.g., Chilean, Uruguyan, etc. Spanish) fit into
this paradigm? Furthermore, what systematic role does the mobilization of other forms of
address for 2\textsuperscript{nd}-persons—e.g., terms of endearment (mi hija, ‘my daughter’) and/or diminutive
constructions (Anita, ‘little Ana’)—play in combining with these pronominal and grammatical
resources to produce action in interaction?

Looking cross-linguistically, do other languages with a two-way pronominal split (e.g.,
French tu and vous; Russian ты and вы) share shifting as interactional resource? What about
certain dialects of Portuguese which possess tu, você, and o senhor/a senhora, or the various
registers and their corresponding references in Japanese? In a similar vein of comparison,
languages without multiple 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person pronominal reference forms (such as English) may be
using alternative linguistic practices in the same sequential contexts to accomplish similar action
objectives, thereby revealing the potential universal relevance of those objectives despite
variation in the linguistic resources used to achieve them.

Given the diversity that exists in the world’s languages with regard to pronominal
systems (cf. Braun 1988), further cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison of naturalistic
discourse, in diverse settings, will allow us to better examine the ways in which social and
cultural norms for referring to one’s interlocutor are being invoked, oriented to, and thereby re-
created—not in the abstract, but rather at the ground level of situated talk-in-interaction, as
interactants linguistically co-construct identity for the purposes of social action.
5 Verbal Mood Selection: Indicative vs. Subjunctive Morphology

The roughest message you might pick out of what I shall say is that in dealing analytically with conversations, you must be at least cautious in the use of what you’ve been taught about grammar.

—Harvey Sacks
Lectures in Conversation (1992a: 334)

We concluded the previous chapter, which examined the ground-level deployment of 2nd-person singular (you) references in Spanish, with the following quote from American linguist Dwight Bolinger (1972b: 71):

There are situations where the speaker is constrained by a grammatical rule, and there are situations where he chooses according to his meaning...; but there are no situations in the system where ‘it makes no difference’ which way you go. This is just another way of saying that every contrast a language permits to survive is relevant, some time or other.

In this chapter, we investigate another linguistic contrast which has been permitted to survive in various dialects of Spanish, namely the verbal mood distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive. As in the case of person reference, our aim is to illustrate that this morphologically explicit division is connected to interactants’ sequentially-motivated, action-oriented identities, which are made relevant in and through the ongoing talk. Thus, again in line with what Bolinger affirms above, it is not the case that “it makes no difference” which option is used.

While the previous chapter on person reference straddled the lexical and morphological divide given that reference forms in Spanish can be conveyed via an overt pronoun/adjective in addition to a verbal conjugation, in this chapter we move more fully to the level of morphology. As this level of linguistic structure has received considerably less attention in interaction-based studies compared to the lexicon, syntax, and prosody, we launch our discussion of the
expression of modality with reference to these other, more well-studied linguistic resources. Following this, the indicative vs. subjunctive (or *realis* vs. *irrealis*) modal distinction that exists in Spanish (and other dialects of Romance) is introduced, with particular emphasis on the so-called ‘optional’ cases wherein the syntax of the utterance licenses the use of either mood in the subordinate clause.

Once this foundation has been laid, we move on to demonstrate how the modal distinction in Spanish can be mobilized and oriented to for the purposes of accomplishing social action in interaction. That is, this morphological division is not one which exists only in grammar books; rather, speakers make use of morphology in talk to achieve their communicative objectives. The present analysis thus actively argues against the position that, in ‘optional’ cases, “the choice between the indicative or subjunctive may be more or less arbitrary” (Haverkate 2002: 35). Given that turn-level actions are shaped by (as well as shape) the sequences in which they occur, we analyze the sequential features of talk which serve to condition and motivate the use of one mood over the other in any given utterance. We conclude with a discussion of morphology more generally as a profoundly social, action-based, identity-driven linguistic resource which cannot be fully understood without taking sequential context into consideration.

5.1 MODALITY IN INTERACTION

5.1.1 Linguistic Resources for Expressing Modality

Epistemic modalities (including evidentiality) communicate to a hearer the level of certainty or amount of evidence a speaker has for the proposition expressed in an utterance. As a wide range of researchers have illustrated cross-linguistically (e.g., Aikhenvald 2004; Chafe & Nichols 1986; Egan & Weatherson 2011; Palmer 1994), languages as systems provide their speakers with a variety of resources through which to express modality—from the lexicon, to
syntactic structures, to prosodic contours. Lexically, for example, the inclusion of *auxiliary verbs* or *adverbs* can serve to adjust the illocutionary force or propositional content of the turn in which they are embedded, such that a definitive claim like ‘Steve will *certainly* arrive before six’ becomes a more hedged ‘Steve will *probably* arrive before six’. Similarly, asking a question with *interrogative* syntax (e.g., ‘Will Steve arrive before six?’) conveys less epistemic access than the same question formulated as a *declarative* or as a declarative with a *tag* (e.g., ‘Steve will arrive before six,’ or ‘Steve will arrive before six, right?’) (Heritage 2012a, 2012b; Heritage & Raymond 2012; cf. also Pomerantz 1988). And ‘Steve will arrive before six.’ (with *falling* intonation) has been shown to express more epistemic certainty than ‘Steve will arrive before six?’ (with *rising* intonation) (Couper-Kuhlen 2012; Selting 1992).

Particularly salient in cross-linguistic studies on the expression of modality is the use of *particles*—lexico-grammatical resources which straddle the interface between morphology and syntax—to convey a diverse array of modal and evidential stances. One example is the Mandarin turn-final particle *ba*, roughly translated as ‘I guess’ in Cheung (1994: 166):

(1) Zhe ge Hanzi bu dui ba.  
   this CL character not correct PRT
   *This Chinese character is wrong, I guess.*

The particle *ba* in (1) above informs the hearer that the information contained in the speaker’s utterance (i.e., the wrongness of the Chinese character) is pure speculation—not derived from first-hand knowledge, hearsay, inference, or any other source. By contrast, an alternative turn-final particle in this same position would have claimed access to the knowledge in question as indeed derived from one of these other sources (cf. also, on Japanese, Hayano 2013; Hayashi 2010).

Despite this variety of studies from methodologically diverse perspectives, the uniquely *morphological* expression of modality and evidentiality appears to have thus far evaded discourse-
based inquiry. Indeed, mobilization of the morphological resources of language as a whole constitutes a significantly understudied area in interactional research, in which more granular levels of language such as whole words (even those which are morphologically complex) and their ordering often receive the most systematic attention. Accurately reflecting the field’s present state of affairs, Mazeland’s (2013) “Grammar in Conversation” chapter in Sidnell and Stivers’ (2013) *Handbook of Conversation Analysis* mentions morphology only in reference to its interface with syntax, as in the case of modal particles, mentioned above. Such discursive approaches to *morphosyntax* have asked, for example: How can repair at the morphological level inform our understanding of a syntax-for-conversation (Fox, Hayashi & Jasperson 1996; Ono & Thompson 1995; Schegloff 1979; Uhmann 2001)? What can morphosyntactic resources such as complementizers (Tanaka 2001) and negation (Ford 2001) tell us about turn-taking and sequence organization? How are linguistic resources like particles used to project TCU completion points across languages (e.g., Steensig 2001; Tanaka 2000a, 2000b)? Such research—much of which operating within the framework of Interactional Linguistics (IL) (Selting & Couper-Kuhlen, eds. 2001)—rightly underscores that morphological features of language cannot be separated from the syntactic structures in which they are produced any more than a single turn-at-talk can be separated from its sequential context. However, examining morphology solely as a window into syntax also obscures the essential, interactionally relevant work that *morphological resources themselves* can accomplish for co-participants in talk. Here we aim to illustrate that, just as the lexical, syntactic, and prosodic levels of linguistic structure can be deployed to express modality in the service of social action, so too can the options provided by a language’s morphology.
5.1.2 Epistemic Modality

Modal distinctions—through whatever resources are available in a given language—are intrinsically linked to questions of epistemic stance and status in interaction (Heritage 2012a, 2012b; cf. also Kamio 1997; Labov & Fanshel 1977; Pomerantz 1980). As Heritage (2013: 370) describes:

Within Conversation Analysis (CA) research into epistemics focuses on the knowledge claims that interactants assert, contest and defend in and through turns-at-talk and sequences of interaction. The topic involves a remarkable confluence between the disciplines of psychology, linguistics and sociology that finds a singular and unique expression within conversation analytic investigations.

Epistemic status is the access, knowledgeability, and rights that an individual has to some domain of knowledge. Epistemic stance, then, “concerns the moment-by-moment expression of these relationships, as managed through the design of turns-at-talk” (ibid.: 377). That is, for conversation analysts, epistemic modality goes beyond the purely individual, cognitive issue of a speaker having or not having access to a piece of knowledge, into the socially motivated stances that co-participants take—vis-à-vis one another—as to their rights to that knowledge.

Identity finds itself at the core of this epistemic coordination. As one illustration, G. Raymond and Heritage (2006) describe how two interactants consistently orient to the identities of GRANDPARENT and NOT GRANDPARENT as they discuss grandchildren. While the participants do not explicitly preface their turns with “As a grandparent, I…” or “Not being a grandparent, I…”, they can nonetheless be seen to mobilize a range of interactional resources to categorize one another accordingly as they progress through various assessment sequences. Navigating these “epistemic landscapes” (Heritage & G. Raymond 2012) is thus an intrinsically moment-by-moment feature of social interaction. As co-participants in talk discuss one topic, for example, SPEAKER A may have primary rights; but as the conversation progresses and new knowledge is introduced into the discourse, SPEAKER B may transition into having epistemic primacy—and the design of the interactants’ turns can reflect this epistemic shift. These turn-by-
turn negotiations highlight the sequentially conditioned, collaboratively achieved, continuously evolving nature of identity at the micro-level of interaction.

Precisely because epistemic rights and responsibilities are co-constructed in and through ongoing talk, the various linguistic resources that accomplish this dialogic navigation merits continued targeted inquiry. Here, using as a case in point the indicative vs. subjunctive modal distinction in Spanish, we will argue that morphology is one additional level of language through which socially and interactionally relevant epistemic expressions can be conveyed, oriented to, and negotiated between co-participants.

5.2 MODALITY IN SPANISH

5.2.1 Linguistic Background

Recall from Chapter 2 that Spanish (and other Romance dialects) possesses a morphologically overt distinction between indicative and subjunctive moods, which is obligatorily encoded onto verbal conjugations along with tense and aspect. Suffixes are added to the verbal root/stem to generate various tense-mood-aspect combinations, as is seen in Table 5.1 below which contrasts indicative and subjunctive morphologies, in both the present and past tenses, for the verb *hablar* / ‘to speak’.
The distinction between the indicative and subjunctive moods is typically conceptualized as one between realis and irrealis. The use of the indicative asserts knowledge and information as real, factual, objective, and specific (i.e., realis), while the subjunctive denotes some ‘other-than-real’ state of affairs. The irrealis state acts as a gloss which includes not only instances of clear unreality, but also information which is presented as in some way unverified, uncertain, inexperienced, unspecific, etc. Thus the subjunctive in Spanish is used to express various irrealis knowledge states, including: doubts, desires, feelings, possibilities, potential future courses of action, and so on (Alarcos Llorach 1999; Bello 1980 [1847]; Bosque 1990a; Pérez Rioja 1954; Pérez Saldanya 1999; Real Academia Española 2009: ch. 25, 42; Riduejo 1999; Rivero 1977; Terrell & Hooper 1974).

Reflecting the inherent connection between morphology and syntax mentioned above, syntactic structures can require the use of the indicative or the subjunctive in embedded clauses for the production of a grammatical utterance. Take contrast between (2) and (3) below:\n
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### Table 5.1: Sample Tense-Mood-Aspect Combinations in Spanish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tense—Aspect:</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past—Imperfect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mood:</td>
<td>Indicative</td>
<td>Subjunctive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yo</td>
<td>hablo</td>
<td>hable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tù</td>
<td>hablas</td>
<td>hables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usted, Él, Ella</td>
<td>habla</td>
<td>hable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nosotros</td>
<td>hablamos</td>
<td>hablemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vosotros</td>
<td>habláis</td>
<td>habléis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustedes, Ellos, Ellas</td>
<td>hablan</td>
<td>hablen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^1\) Imperfect subjunctive suffixes vary dialectally between these and the -ase formulations: hablase, hablases, hablase, hablásemos, hablaseis, hablasen.

\(^2\) Following standard linguistic notation, an asterisk (*) denotes ungrammaticality.
In (2), the matrix verb *dudar* / ‘to doubt’ separates Juan’s studying (or lack of studying, as the case may be) from an objective reality. Positioning the informational content of this utterance in the realm of irrealis thus renders the use of the subjunctive (*estudie*) obligatory, the indicative (*estudia*) generating an ungrammatical sentence. On the contrary, the certainty expressed in the matrix clause of (3) actively affirms that Juan’s studying is an event which occurs in the world of objective fact. Therefore, in (3), the indicative mood is required on the embedded verb, and the subjunctive is disallowed.

Nonetheless, as we described in greater detail in Chapter 2, syntactic structure alone cannot always account for the production of indicative or subjunctive morphology. In several instances, either mood would be able to generate a technically grammatical utterance, thereby introducing optionality into the equation. Some examples of constructions which permit either indicative or subjunctive morphology are included in Table 5.2 (cf. Pérez Saldanya 1999; Real Academia Española 2009: 1873-1876, 1886-1907, 1942-1960; Riduejo 1999; cf. also Raymond 2012b):
### Table 5.2: Examples of triggers for subjunctive or indicative

Choice of mood in these and other ‘optional’ cases can act as a window into speakers’ minds by revealing what knowledge they present themselves as possessing (*realis*) and not possessing (*irrealis*). Imagine, for instance, that two children, Juan and María, are deciding which game to play, and their parent issues one of the following morphologically-distinct directives:

(4) Hagan lo que quiere Juan.
Do what Juan wants to do. (i.e., that specific game that Juan mentioned)

(5) Hagan lo que quiera Juan.
Do whatever Juan wants to do.
Through the indicative mood in (4), the speaker claims access to knowledge of the game that Juan wants to play (e.g., hopscotch). Such an utterance would be appropriate, for example, if María had just suggested one game and Juan had suggested another, in which case the identity of ‘what Juan wants’ is known to the parent and so it can be firmly positioned as realis knowledge. On the contrary, the speaker in (5) does not claim to know what, specifically, Juan wants to do (regardless of whether or not s/he actually does know). The irrealis framing of this utterance is what conveys the whatever sentiment in ‘Do whatever Juan wants to do’.

This range of ‘optional’ cases has long been a debated topic of inquiry in Hispanic Linguistics. Indeed, the Real Academia Española (2009: 1887) itself concisely describes that:

Las alternancias modales constituyen uno de los problemas clásicos de la gramática española. Han sido examinados por los gramáticos en todas las épocas y se han propuesto para ellas explicaciones muy diversas de carácter sintáctico, léxico, semántico o pragmático.

Modal alternations constitute one of the classic problems of Spanish grammar. They have been examined by the grammarians of every time period, and diverse explanations have been proposed for them, ranging from syntactic to lexical to semantic to pragmatic in nature.

This chapter attempts to readdress this “classic problem” from the profoundly social perspective of Conversation Analysis. Given Sacks’ (1984a) fundamental notion of “order at all points”, morphological optionality, such as that which exists in these modal constructions in Spanish, invites inquiry into what a speaker achieves—in co-constructed, social interaction terms—through the mobilization of one mood or the other. We ask: When either the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood could generate a grammatically correct sentence, are both moods socio-interactionally interchangeable? Or, rather, can modal resources be deployed in the service of speakers’ social action agendas? This chapter aims to provide an answer to these questions by ultimately examining the sequential motivations for the production of one mood over the other in a given turn-at-talk, as well as the effects that that morphological selection can have on the ongoing interaction.
5.2.2 A Brief Note on Dialectal Variation and its Implications for Analysis

In order for a speaker to mobilize verbal mood distinctions as interactional resources, s/he must actually possess such a distinction in his/her idiolectal morphology. As analysts, we cannot hold speakers accountable for producing and orienting to resources which they do not have and/or cannot recognize. This point is relevant for the present inquiry in light of the reported simplification/loss of subjunctive morphology amongst (bilingual) heritage speakers of Spanish in the United States (Lipski 2003; Lynch 1999; Montrul 2007b; Silva-Corvalán 1994). Although these and other researchers often cite contact with English as the driving force of simplification, many monolingual rural dialects of Spanish are already subjunctive-less prior to immigration/bilingualism (Parodi, p.c.; cf. progressive loss of subjunctive morphology in monolingual French, Poplack 2006). Regardless of the cause, though, the indicative is the only mood which is encoded at the morphological level for several (U.S.-based) speakers of Spanish; and when this is the case, the indicative/subjunctive distinction clearly cannot be used by those speakers to present knowledge as realis vs. irrealis.

Due to such speaker-level variation (Lunn 1989: 689) and the objectives of the present study, it was necessary to require that a speaker actively produce both verbal moods in a variety of phrasal and sequential contexts if s/he was to be included in the corpus from which excerpts were drawn for subsequent analysis. If a speaker combined an adverb like probablemente / ‘probably’ with the indicative in one case, we needed to verify from other talk by that speaker that his/her grammar also allowed that lexical item to be paired with the subjunctive (cf. analysis of Excerpts (7)-(8), (13)-(14), and (15)-(16), below). Such a conservative selection criterion served to guard against analyst-imposed interpretations of the data which would have failed to align with interactants’ own understandings of the ongoing talk.
5.3 VERBAL MORPHOLOGY AND SOCIAL ACTION

In this section, we demonstrate, by way of the modal distinction in Spanish, how sequentially-conditioned morphological resources can be deployed to construct identities and thereby achieve speakers’ communicative objectives in interaction. A necessary first step in the accomplishment of this task is verifying that interactants themselves produce and orient to the morphological expression of realis (indicative) vs. irrealis (subjunctive) verbal moods as epistemic resources in their understandings of ongoing talk. That is, it must be shown that this distinction is not merely a prescriptive one which is declared by the Real Academia Española but which has little to do with speakers’ actual use and interpretation of the language. This discussion of naturally produced utterances simultaneously provides a foundation for illustrating the ways in which morphology can contribute to the social action of the turn in which it is embedded. Following this, we move on to situate those turn-level actions within sequences of action in an effort to demonstrate how morphological resources deployed within turns-at-talk are both shaped by as well as shape the ongoing discourse between co-participants. Finally, we use the verb creer / ‘to think/believe’ to offer a preliminary examination of how the sequentially-conditioned realis/irrealis distinction can be used as a practice in the design of questions.

5.3.1 Realis vs. Irrealis as Epistemic Resources

In this first section, we concentrate on the communicative work that morphology accomplishes at the turn level of interaction. This is potentially a difficult task as turn-level actions are inherently motivated by the sequences in which they occur, just as morphology is inherently connected to the syntactic structure in which it is deployed. Nonetheless, our immediate aim is to illustrate that indicative vs. subjunctive morphology is produced and subsequently oriented to by co-participants as distinct and meaningful in turns-at-talk in Spanish.
The first Excerpt (6) below is taken from a pediatrics genetics consultation between a Spanish-speaking mother, an English-speaking nurse, and an interpreter who mediates the interaction between them. At this point in the visit, the nurse has asked if Mom has any questions that she would like the doctor to answer when he arrives for the visit. One of the questions Mom poses concerns what sort of childcare is required for her special-needs infant, as she is planning to return to work soon and will thus no longer be able to attend to his strict dietary needs during the day. In response to an initiation of repair by the interpreter (line 1), Mom begins to reformulate her question by explaining what has prompted her inquiry. Observe the interpreter's lexical translation, in lines 7-8, of Mom's original subjunctive relative clause (line 5).

(6) Genetics: Babysitter with license³

01 INT: A qué se refiere.  
      to what self refers
      What are you referring to.

02 NUR: So, 

03 MOM: Porque me dijeron pues que necesito darlo  
      because to-me they-told well that I-need to-give-him
      Because they told me well that I need to give him

04 a cuidar con: una persona que tenga licencia de  
      to to-care with a person that has.SUBJ license of
      to someone who has a license to

05 cuidar los- de niños especiales?  
      to-care the of children special
      care for the- special children?

06 INT: -> Ah:: I- was told that I need to give: e uh::m
07 -> .hhh find him someone to take care of him,
08 -> who has a <license> for special needs

³ All transcripts include .INDIC and .SUBJ in the morphological gloss (2nd line), for indicative or subjunctive, respectively. Note that this is only marked in optional cases and other cases of relevant interest. Instances which syntactically require one mood or the other for the purposes of grammaticality are not under examination here, and thus a detailed morphological gloss of such conjugations is not included in an effort to alleviate unnecessary confusion.
In Mom’s original recounting of the instructions she was given, the verb relating the person (in the main clause) and the license (in the embedded clause) is tener / ‘to have’ (line 5). The subjunctive morphology on the verb presents the ‘person who has a license’ as not linked to a specific reality—that is, as not an actual, identifiable individual who exists in the world and to whom Mom was instructed to give her child for care. Use of the indicative (i.e., tiene) in this embedded clause would have also generated a syntactically grammatical utterance, but such morphology would have conveyed the existence of a particular licensed person (e.g., a specific childcare provider that the hospital recommends) whom Mom was told to contact.

Through her translation in lines 7-11, the interpreter attends to Mom’s construction of the licensed caregiver’s identity as an irrealis one. Although there was no buscar / ‘to look for’, or encontrar / ‘to find’, produced in the original utterance, the interpreter nonetheless reveals the ‘other-than-real’ semantic content of Mom’s subjunctive verb by self-repairing “I need to give uh:m” (line 7) to “.hhh find him someone…who has a <license>” (lines 8-9). Because Mom—through her subjunctive morphology—presented the instructions she received as being to contact a non-specific licensed individual, it follows that she will need to find such an individual herself. In the translation, then, the irrealis identity of this licensed person is communicated to the nurse as effectively as possible given the resources available in English. Note that this lack of access to the definite identity of the childcare provider in question is then even subsequently topicalized by the nurse in line 12.

Looking now at a monolingual context, Excerpts (7) and (8) are taken from a phone call between two Dominican friends, Apolina and Carlos. In the first exchange below, Apolina is finishing a lengthy telling in which he recounted various research projects that colleagues of his
have been developing. He concludes by explaining that, because some of these individuals are working with governmental and international organizations, their work has been quite well funded (line 1), and this high level of funding is “probablemente” / probably going go be extended in the future (lines 4-5).

(7) Funding⁴

01 APO: Y están pagando muy bien.
and are paying very well
And they are paying very well.

02 (0.2)

03 CAR: “Bueno” (no?)
good
“Good” (right?)

04 APO: [Y <probablemente> eso se va = se va:
and probably that self goes self goes
And that’s <probably> going to going to:

05 (. ) a extender.
to to-extend
(. ) to get extended.

06 (. )

07 CAR: Por lo menos algunas cosas están funcionando entonces.
for it least some things are functioning then
At least some things are going well then.

The morphology employed in line 4 reveals just how probable the speaker (Apolina) believes this extension of funds to be. Although the assertion of getting more funding is still mitigated through the use of the adverb “probablemente” / probably, the indicative allows the speaker to take an epistemic stance which depicts this future event as nearer to a realis fact. Use of the subjunctive “vaya” in place of “va”, although also grammatical in this utterance, would have conveyed a lower level of certainty than Apolina deemed appropriate for the propositional content of this turn. While we save detailed discussion of this point for the next section, this relatively high level of certainty corresponds with the speaker’s overall interactional project of

⁴ The audio data for Excerpts (7) and (8) are publically available online through TalkBank (MacWhinney 2007).
praising/telling good news about his colleagues and former students: The subjunctive would have effectively put a damper on the speaker’s stance toward his telling by signaling doubt and/or less certainty that funding will continue. Observe that Carlos affiliates (line 7) with the positive spin that this concluding turn offers, thereby tacitly accepting Apolina’s just-expressed near-certainty that extended funding—and more good news in general—is on the horizon for the third parties under discussion.

Let us examine what happens just a few turns later in this interaction as the participants shift topics. In line 35 below, the same speaker (Apolina) produces the same syntactic structure using “probablemente” / probably; but this time, he initiates self-repair on an indicative formulation in the embedded clause to produce a subjunctive one.

(8) Raúl Félix’s Visit

31 CAR:     Gua::u. Qué bien.[°Apolina:°]=
            how well        A
            Wo::w. How great.°Apolina:°=

32 APO:     [e-            ]=

33 APO:     =Entonces,=
            then
            =So,=

34 CAR:     =>Qué [bien.<
            how well
            =>How great.<

35 APO:     [Probablemente tenem-
            probably       we-have.INDIC  we-have.SUBJ  to
            We’re probably havi- (.) having=

36 APO:     =Raúl Félix por aquí.
            R    F    for here
            =Raúl Félix around here.

36 CAR:     Eh: y: e[s-

37 APO:     [que estuvo por aquí hace como:: (.) dos meses.
            that was    for here does like    two months
            who was around here li::ke (.) two months ago.

38 CAR:     Y qué dice Raúl.
            and what says R
            And what does Raúl say.
Transitioning to a new topic, Apolina announces, in lines 35-36, that it is probable that Raúl Félix is going to be nearby. Contrary to the near-realís modality achieved in the previous excerpt by pairing the adverb with the indicative, here such an epistemic stance is explicitly deemed inappropriate by way of the speaker's self-repair to subjunctive morphology: “tenem(os)” / ‘we have (indic)’ quickly becomes “tengamos” / ‘we have (subj)’ (line 35). Although the subjunctive is often associated with the description of future events, the fact that Raúl’s arrival will occur in the future cannot alone account for the production of the subjunctive in this instance of repair: Future indicative morphology, as was used in the previous example (7) (i.e., “vamos a tener” / ‘we’re going to have’; “tendremos” / ‘we will have’), could have been used as the repair proper here but was not (cf. also Excerpt (13) below). Thus something more than just temporality is at issue in this turn.

Although both verbal moods are capable of producing grammatical sentences in this speaker’s idiolect, they are oriented to as accomplishing distinct interactional work. As a result, Apolina halts the progressivity of his turn-at-talk in order to mobilize a morphological resource which will better express his epistemic stance toward the propositional content of his utterance. The outcome is an assertion which is doubly mitigated: through the turn-initial adverb “probablemente” / probably and also through the subjunctive’s irrealís expression of ‘less-than-factuality’ ultimately produced in the embedded clause.

In response to Apolina’s announcement, particularly given that a repaired reformulation cannot erase the fact that an initial design was originally produced (Jefferson 1974), Carlos orients to the subjunctive’s comparatively downgraded level of epistemic access to Raúl’s plans by inviting expansion on the subject: “Y qué dice Raúl” / And what does Raúl say (line 38), the and-prefacing of which potentially serving to elicit continued elaboration on just how probable Raúl’s visit actually is (cf. Bolden 2010; Heritage & Sorjonen 1994). Indeed, Apolina himself
had already displayed an orientation to the need to elaborate on this less-than-certain announcement by competing in overlap to produce the increment in line 37: If Raúl has been in the area recently, perhaps it is less of a stretch for his hearer to imagine him being there again.

Taken together as a ‘minimal pair’, Apolina’s turns in Excerpts (7) and (8)—and the responses that they elicit from the recipient—illustrate the interactional import of morphological distinctions in Spanish and allow us to propose a gradient of epistemic stance. The utterances in (9a-c) below show successively decreasing expressions of epistemic certainty—that is, a transition from the unmitigated, objective world of realis (9a), to the adverbally mitigated but morphologically indicative (9b), to the adverbally mitigated and also morphologically subjunctive (9c).

(9) a. Va a México.
   goes to Mexico
   He's going to Mexico.

   b. Probablemente va a México.
      probably goes.INDIC to Mexico
      He's probably going to Mexico.

   c. Probablemente vaya a México.
      probably goes.SUBJ to Mexico
      He's probably going to Mexico.

Mobilizing morphological resources in tandem with various other indicators of epistemic stance (e.g., lexical, syntactic, prosodic) as in (9a-c) is an incredibly pervasive interactional practice in Spanish. In fact, deployment of modal morphology to qualify one’s access to knowledge can even result in the production of utterances which many speakers would deem ungrammatical at face value or in isolation (e.g., Bosque 1990a: 36; Bustos 1986: 201; Rivero 1971; but see Bell 1980; Carlsson 1970). This is the case of line 2 of Excerpt (10) below, which immediately caught my attention precisely due to its potential prescriptive ungrammaticality.

In Excerpt (10), a Mexican professor and one of her teaching assistants are discussing the
details of the upcoming study abroad program which they will be leading. The assistant asks the professor if there will be internet access available in the hotel where the group is staying. The professor’s response in line 2 seems to provide an answer to this question, but the content of the turn is so hedged that it is interactionally oriented to by both parties as if it were a non-answer (Stivers & Robinson 2006).

(10) CWR: FN: 5/27/11

01 ASST: Hay internet allá en el hotel? 
there-is internet there in the hotel
Is there internet in the hotel?

02 PROF: Fíjate, sí creo que haya internet. 
pay-attention-yourself yes I-think that there-is.SUBJ internet
Y ’know, I do think that there is internet.

03 ASST: Yo les escribo [para preguntar entonces. 
I to-them write for to-ask then
I’ll write to them and ask then.

04 PROF: [Escríbeles a ver qué te dicen. 
write.IMP-them to to-see what you they-say
Write them and see what they say.

05 PROF: Si no, nos compramos una de esas cositas. 
if no ourselves we-buy one of those things.DIM
If not, we’ll buy one of those little things.

06 ASST: Sí, una maquinita de esas. 
yes a machine.DIM of those.
Yes, one of those little machines.

In affirmative declaratives, as is the case here, the verb creer / ‘to think/believe’ is typically said to require the indicative mood in the embedded clause. In line 2, though, the professor employs subjunctive morphology on the embedded verb haber / ‘to be’ to create “haya”. This modal positioning in the realm of irrealis, combined with the turn-initial “fíjate” / ‘y’know’ (cf. Look-prefacing in English; Sidnell 2007) and the prosodically stressed “creo” / ‘I think’, convey an epistemic stance which depicts the speaker as possessing little to no actual access to the informational content produced in her turn. That is, these linguistic resources portray this
assertion is simply a presumption or a guess about knowledge which lies outside of the speaker’s epistemic domain.

The massively downgraded epistemic stance produced in the professor’s ‘answer’ does not suffice to bring the questioner up to a knowledgeable position regarding the availability of internet at the hotel (Heritage 2012b). As a result, there is no change-of-state token (Heritage 1984a) or post-expansion in third position which progresses the talk forward. On the contrary, the assistant almost sequentially deletes the professor’s non-answer by stating, in line 3, that he will write to the hotel to ask. Note that, in line 4, the professor comes in in overlap at the first possible transition-relevance place (TRP) (Clayman 2013; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974), demonstrating her own orientation to the uninforming nature of her previous turn. Moreover, she expands this sequence for another turn in line 5 by affirming “Si no, ...” / ‘If not, ...’, thereby further revealing her lack of true epistemic access to the territory of knowledge under discussion.

By effectively granting hearers access to speakers’ inner beliefs, opinions, and understandings about the content expressed within a turn, indicative and subjunctive moods actively contribute to the communication of epistemic stance in Spanish-language interaction. Morphology is thus one additional linguistic and discursive resource which can play a vital role in co-participants’ navigation of the various pieces of knowledge and information which are “talked into being” (Heritage 1984b) on a moment-by-moment basis in and through interaction.

5.3.2 Realis vs. Irrealis in Sequences of Action

The previous section focused on the turn-level communicative abilities of indicative vs. subjunctive morphology in Spanish talk-in-interaction. We demonstrated that this realis/irrealis distinction is not one which exists only in prescriptive grammar books, but rather is indeed an effective resource which speakers deploy and orient to as they navigate “epistemic landscapes”
in talk. In what follows, we situate turn-level epistemic concerns within sequences of action. We ask: How can sequential organization (Schegloff 2007b) make interactionally relevant the production of one epistemic stance over another for the purposes of social action, and how is morphology mobilized as a resource for accomplishing those stances and actions?

Given that the indicative and the subjunctive moods convey distinct meanings of reality and 'other-than-reality', let us begin by illustrating how that distinction can be used to constitute a turn’s sequentially-motivated action. The following example (11) is taken from a conversation between two friends, María and Rosa. María has recently had various t-shirts printed which she plans to sell as part of a school fundraiser. Here, she is showing the differently colored samples to Rosa who has expressed interest in purchasing one to support the cause. As in examples (6) and (8) above, the verb tener / ‘to have’ again makes an appearance in lines 6, 10, 11, and 14, with both indicative and subjunctive morphologies.

(11) Camisetas: María/Rosa

01 MAR: Yeah, Y (.) este es mi color favorito. yeah and this is my color favorite
Yeah, And (.) this is my favorite color.

02 ROS: Sí, yes

03 (0.5)

04 ROS: °(Como que se [ ] )°
like that self
°(Like it )°

05 MAR: [Y el turquesa. and the tourquoise
And the tourquoise.

06 ROS: Es que tener: (.) muchas?
is that I-have.INDIC much
It’s just that I ha::ve (.) a lot?

07 por lo de: mismo de la danza,
for it of same of the dance
because o::f the same from dance,
In lines 1-5, María suggests various shirt colors to Rosa. In response, in line 6, Rosa accounts for her indecisiveness and also incipiently rejects María’s suggestions by describing her present reality: She already has many shirts like these from being involved in dance organizations (mentioned earlier in the conversation). This simple utterance uses the indicative to make this connection to the world of objective fact. In continuing to look through the color choices, the subjunctive is introduced in line 10, and repeated in line 11, accompanied by upward-facing-palm hand gestures.

By way of the subjunctive morphology in lines 10-11, combined with her non-vocal behavior, Rosa is able to actively ‘do searching’ for a shirt. The subjunctive mood places the identity of the ‘color that she doesn’t have’ squarely in the realm of irrealis—that is, the realm of the unknown. Because the interactional project underway is the selection of a shirt for purchase,
actively displaying a lack of epistemic access to which shirt color she does not yet own is what accomplishes the social action of searching or thinking. This unknowing of color is oriented to by María who offers up a new candidate color in line 12 with “verde,” / green. María positively assesses that option in line 13, but immediately goes on to explain that she already “has”—back to the indicative, as this is knowledge to which she presents herself as having unmitigated epistemic access—a lot of shirts in that color in line 14.

This example demonstrates how co-participants are able to attend to the moment-by-moment invocation of realis and irrealis knowledge bases, not only as indicators of epistemic access and inaccess, but as such, also as resources through which social actions can be realized. Furthermore, given that turn-level actions are made relevant by and simultaneously constitute the overarching sequences and projects in which they occur, morphological resources also depend on and contribute to the sequential organization of talk.

While speakers inherently possess epistemic primacy over their own feelings, opinions, understandings, and actions, and thus have more freedom in adopting a stance toward such knowledge (as was just the case in Excerpt (11)), hearers may have primary rights over knowledge which exists outside of the speaker’s personal domain. This is the case in Excerpt (12) below, taken from the same sort of interpreter-mediated genetics consultation as we saw in (6) above. Here, in discussing her child’s daily food intake, Mom announces that she has experimented with giving her oatmeal that had pears in it (lines 1-2). Given that her daughter did not like this food item (lines 3, 14-15), the nutritionist suggests that she try alternative oatmeals with different fruits (lines 20-23). In the translation of this suggestion for Mom, the interpreter’s subjunctive morphology downgrades her own access to the knowledge invoked in the turn, thereby demonstrating respect for Mom’s epistemic authority over past and future food selection (lines 26/28).
(12) Genetics: Oatmeal

01 MOM: Yeah. Sabe que le di el de:: (. ) avena? yeah you-know that to-her I-gave the of oatmeal
Yeah. You know know I have her the one wi::th (. ) oatmeal?

02 con: (. ) que (tiene peras). with that has pears
wi::th (. ) that (has pears).

03 [Pero no le gustó. but no to-her pleased
But she didn’t like it.

04 INT: [Mm.

05 INT: Mhm.

06 Yeah I tried (. ) que se llama oatmeal?
that self calls oatmeal
it’s called oatmeal?

07 O cómo.
or what
Or what.

08 MOM: Se llama: duh Quahker::,
self calls (the) Q
It’s called duh Quahker::,

09 NUT: °The Quaker?°

10 INT: Yeah:. I tried the-

11 I guess the Quaker [oatmeal. The one that ha- Yeah.

12 NUT: [Quaker Oatmeal, uh huh, uh huh, Q

13 MOM: Di sh[i tay-

14 NUR: [°She didn’t li[ke i:t° She didn’t like i:t,

15 INT: [She didn’t like i:t,

16 INT: The bayby o{ne.

17 NUT: [Oh the baby on{e?

18 INT: [Yeah.

19 MOM: [uh huh,

20 NUT: . hhh Some of them h-com:e uh dry mixed with u:m-

21 Or- in a jar mixed with: you know

22 Bananas or apples already too. If she-

23 [°I dunno if she°

24 INT: [Hay algunos que ya vienen en un frasco, there-are some that already come in a jar

25 INT: Mezclados co:n . hhh con plátanos o manzanas;
mixed with bananas or apples
Mixed with . hhh with bananas or apples;

26 No sé si quiera no I-know if you-want.SUBJ/she-wants.SUBJ
I don’t know if you want/she wants
Although the nutritionist’s line 23 drops out in overlap before producing a verb in the embedded clause, the interpreter completes this turn in the translation: “No sé si quiera (subj.) probarlos” / ‘I don’t know if you want/she wants to try them’ (lines 26/28). The subjunctive morphology on the verb querer / ‘to want’ is ambiguous as to whether it takes Mom (the hearer) or Mom’s child as its subject (i.e., whether Mom wants to try giving different oatmeal to the child, or whether the child herself wants to try eating different oatmeal) (cf. TABLE 5.1). In either case, though, Mom has primary rights to the knowledge at hand.

The subjunctive mood employed in the interpreter’s utterance actively defers authority to Mom by positioning Mom’s (or her child’s) wants/desires outside of the interpreter’s epistemic reach. Particularly given that this directive immediately follows an informing (lines 24-25) which inherently places Mom in an unknowledgeable position, mitigating the stance embodied in the subsequent turn’s action safeguards against directing Mom to do something that she has already done or already knows about (Heritage & Sefi 1992). Use of the indicative in this instance would have conveyed a more definitive (realis) presupposition on the part of the interpreter that Mom was unaware of these alternative oatmeals; and thus the turn as a whole would have constituted a stronger push that she try them now that she has been made aware of their existence. As it turns out, such a push would have been socially inappposite: Mom comes in immediately to display her independent knowledgeable access to the sort of oatmeal being

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introduced into the interaction (line 27), and both the nutritionist and the nurse confirm that
“Gerber” is indeed the brand to which they are referring. Thus by actively embodying deference
to Mom’s primary rights over her own territory of knowledge, morphologically-coded verbal
mood was one of the resources which effectively contributed to the development of a positive
interpersonal relationship between the co-participants in this medical visit (Raymond, frth.-c,
frth.-d).

When interactants produce announcements and tellings about third parties who are
known in common, the epistemic landscape becomes more complex than just what the speaker
knows about the hearer and what the hearer knows about the speaker. This is because, in
addition to the epistemic stance that a speaker takes toward the knowledge invoked in his/her
telling, there are also the stances that hearer takes toward that stance as well as toward the events
of the telling overall. In Excerpts (13) and (14) below, we illustrate how morphological resources
are sequentially motivated in that they serve to help interactants navigate these intricate
epistemic contingencies.

Prior to the start of Excerpt (13), Aydett has been telling her aunt (Nancy) about her
brother’s (Jason) difficulties in playing on the city’s basketball team: numerous problems with
the coach, time commitments, and so on. Line 6 below is prefaced with an emphatic “Pero:” /
But which launches an announcement that Jason has recently begun participating in a business
club (lines 6-8/10-11). In response, Nancy immediately orients to and affiliates with the relative
‘bright side’ formulation of this announcement (compared to the preceding bad news about the
basketball team) in lines 12-13.

| 06 | AYD: Pero: me dijo que:::
     | but me he-told that
     | But: he told me that: |
Comenzó a estar (.) yendo a unas clases, started to be (.) going to some classes
No a unas clases.=A un club. not to some clases to a club
Not to some clases.=To a club.
[Oh:. 
De:: de esos de manejar (.). uh:m negocios.y of of these of to-manage business
One of those for managing (.). uh:m business.and
gru[po de eso,
Group of that
A group for that,
[Oh. Pues talvez: so maybe
Oh. So maybe:
se va para eso. [si no va: en-en el equipo.
self he-goes.INDIC for that if no he-goes on on the team
he’ll go for that. if he doesn’t go: on-on the team.
[.hhh Sí. yes
hhh Yeah.

The preface to Aydett’s turn in line 6 sets up this announcement-to-come as a contrast with her immediately prior telling of bad news. It is her recipient, Nancy, who then comes in in overlap to explicitly relate the sequentially adjacent tellings: Since things are going so badly with basketball, perhaps Jason will continue with this club instead of playing on the team. The “pues” / so preface in line 12 creates an overt link between the tellings while the adverb “talvez” / maybe defers authority over this information to the teller, Aydett. After all, Nancy just found out about this business club only a few turns ago (cf. change-of-state tokens in lines 9 and 12), and so some epistemic mitigation as to Jason’s future plans with this organization is interactionally appropriate. Nonetheless, Nancy’s mobilization of indicative morphology actively affiliates with the stance that Aydett has sequentially established with regard to the information in her announcement: Nancy depicts Jason’s decision to continue participating in
the business club over continuing to play basketball as a *realis* event, thereby aligning with the contrastive, positive framing Aydett used to launch the announcement. Use of the subjunctive, on the other hand, would have run the risk of conveying a certain level of disbelief that Jason would make such a decision by portraying his participation in the club over basketball as *irrealis*, thus disaffiliating with Aydett’s sequentially contrastive ‘bright side’ framing. In sum, although Nancy has no independent rights or access to this knowledge—and only just found out about the business club less than three seconds ago—, the morphology of her turn invokes some level of access in order to support the stance that her co-participant has taken regarding the information. The original teller immediately accepts this affiliative formulation in overlap in line 14.

While using the indicative/subjunctive mood distinction to convey *access* to knowledge can be a resource for accomplishing affiliation in interaction, so too can the embodiment of *inaccess* to knowledge. Indeed, this occurs as the same pair of interactants above continue their discussion of Jason’s new business club in (14) below. Prior to this excerpt, Aydett mentions that one of the club’s projects is for Jason to design his own start-up business. In response, Nancy asks if he has already decided what sort of business he is going to plan (line 31), but Aydett does not know (line 32). In the post-expansion after this question-answer sequence, Nancy produces another turn with *talvez* / ‘maybe’—just as in lines 12-13 from Excerpt (13) above—, but this time she pairs the adverb with subjunctive morphology (line 40).

(14) Business Club Project

31  NAN: [Ya tiene idea de qué (.) quisiera hacer?
already he has idea of what he would like to do
*Does he already have an idea of (.) he’d like to do?*
32 AYD: No sé:. no I-know
I don’t know.

33 [Cuando yo estaba allí;
when I was there
When I was there;

34 NAN: [Oh:::

35 AYD: No sabía:. Estaba (.) agarrando opciones.
no he-knew he-was getting options
He didn’t know. He was (.) looking at his options.

36 [A ver sus opciones pero.
to to-see his options but
To see his options but.

37 NAN: [Ah::.

38 AYD: No sé;
no I-know
I don’t know;

39 [“Puede”
he-can
“He can”

40 NAN: [Talvez a estas alturas ya lo haiga:” (.) hecho.
maybe to these heights already it he-has.SUBJ done
Maybe by this point he has already (.) done it.

41 AYD: [Sí.
yes
Yeah.

42 NAN: [Sería divertido a ver- [qué escogió él.
would-be fun to to-see what chose he
It would be fun to see- what he chose.

43 AYD: [Sí:. A ver qué.
yes to to-see what
Yeah:. To see what.

Contrasting Nancy’s turn here with that which she produced in the previous excerpt presents us
with another ‘minimal pair’ of the *probablemente* / ‘probably’ sort we saw in Excerpts (7) and (8)
above: We have the same speaker, talking about the same third party’s actions, producing turns

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6 *Haiga* is an archaic form of the present subjunctive conjugation of the verb *haber* / ‘to have (done something)’. The modern prescriptive formulation is *haya*, reflecting the weakening of intervocalic /g/. Nonetheless, *haiga* is still used in various rural Latin American dialects, as well as in the rur-urban Los Angeles Vernacular Spanish (LAVS) (Parodi 1995, 2009a, 2009c, 2011).
prefaced with the same adverb *talvez* / ‘maybe’, yet here she uses subjunctive morphology while in the previous Excerpt (13) she used the indicative. This once again underscores the need to move beyond the level of the turn and take into account sequential organization in describing the motivation for—and the interactional work accomplished by—morphological resources such as mood in talk.

Although Nancy is *no more or less personally knowledgeable* about Jason’s business plan assignment (Excerpt (14)) than she was above with regard to his decision to continue or cease playing basketball (Excerpt (13)), the indicative was used earlier to affiliate with the direction and stance of Aydett’s telling, while the subjunctive is used here to affiliate with Aydett’s *lack* of knowledge just expressed in lines 32-33/35-36. That is, Nancy’s individual epistemic status is identical in both cases, but the epistemic stance she takes is not. Using the indicative (i.e., *hay*) in response to Aydett’s non-answer in Excerpt (14) would have constituted a face-threatening sanctioning action by potentially suggesting that Aydett *should* have access to the requested knowledge about her brother but does not. By separating from actual, objective reality the event of Jason having already decided on a business plan, the subjunctive mitigates the propositional content of the turn and serves to absolve Aydett from responsibility for not possessing this knowledge.

The mobilization of indicative or subjunctive morphology in an utterance is not only shaped by turn-level contingencies such as syntax, but also by the larger sequences in which those turn-level contingencies occur. Sequences of action can render certain epistemic modalities relevant—for example, for the purposes of affiliation or deference—and morphological resources can be used to help speakers achieve those social actions and communicative objectives.
5.3.3 **Realis vs. Irrealis as a Practice: The Case of Question Design**

Given that the subjunctive mood conveys that the speaker does not have access to a given bit of knowledge, it is not surprising that it is frequently used in the design of questions. While previous research on formulating questions in Spanish has indeed described mood alternation as a pragmatic/rhetorical device (e.g., Bosque 1990a; Lastra & Butragueño 2012; Moreno de Alba 2003; Ridruejo 1999), the sequential motivation for the use of that device as a social resource remains largely uninvestigated (but see Lavandera 1983). In this section, we offer a preliminary analysis of how the realis/irrealis distinction can become specifically relevant as speakers design their questions to fit the discursive context being co-created with their hearers (Goodwin 1979). In other words, the goal here is to move the indicative/subjunctive modal divide outside of the personal psychological reality of the individual speaker, into the interactive social space being constructed between the interactants.

From an interactional perspective, questions inherently place the questioner in an unknowledgeable [K-] position vis-à-vis the answerer's knowledgeable [K+] one, and questioners become co-knowledgeable upon receiving the answer to their inquiry (Heritage 2012b). In questions which would grammatically allow either indicative or subjunctive morphology in Spanish, use of the subjunctive achieves—in social action terms—a genuine request for information due to the display of epistemic neutrality (cf. Bell 1980; Klein 1977; Rivero 1971). Of course any question design sets a topical agenda and invites affirmation of the stance contained therein simply through the question being uttered (Bolinger 1978; Heritage & G. Raymond 2012); but the subjunctive’s inherently hedged, *irrealis* nature does not actively *push* for an affirmation due to the speaker not claiming any access to knowledge of the true answer. Use of the indicative, on the other hand, steps slightly away from requesting information from a completely unknowledgeable position, revealing the speaker’s own beliefs.
(Bustos 1986; Rivero 1971) and thereby generating a social action that I argue patterns more closely with requests for confirmation. This parallels Heritage’s (2012b) distinction between question designs in English such as “Are you married?” vs. “You’re married, aren’t you?”, the former claiming less knowledge of the answer than the latter. A similar distinction between the (more-knowledgeable) indicative and (less-knowledgeable) subjunctive moods is diagrammed as in Figure 5.2 below:

**Figure 5.2: Creer / ‘to think/believe’ questions in Spanish**

*(Adapted from Heritage 2012b: 7)*

Consider the following extended example, taken from the Peruvian political interview show *Prensa Libre*, in which we see a ‘minimal pair’ of questions beginning with “usted cree que…” / *do you think that*…. Here, Rosa María Palacios (PAL) interviews Martha Chávez (CHA), a candidate for Congress in 2011 who had previously run unsuccessfully for president of
Peru in 2006. Chávez is a member of the Fuerza 2011 party and an avid supporter of former president Alberto Fujimori. Particularly relevant for the data under consideration here is that the candidate has been widely criticized for her comparatively “radically” (line 4) lenient stance toward violators of human rights (cf. the La Cantuta investigation, her public categorization of the judges of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as “leftist terrorist-sympathizers”\(^7\), her popular nickname Martha “Colina” Chávez, the significance of which will become clear later, and so on). The first Excerpt (15) below includes the opening question of the interview, immediately following Palacios’s introduction/welcome to the program. Palacios uses the subjunctive to formulate a yes-no interrogative as to whether Chávez believes there are two positions regarding human rights, perhaps even within the interviewee’s own political party.

(15) Prensa Libre: Palacios/Chávez (April 11, 2011)

01 PAL: .hh Usted cree que en el caso de derechos humanos
       you think that in the case of human rights
       .hh Do you think that in the case of human rights

02 haya (.) dos posiciones tal vez también en el Fujimorismo
       there-are.SUBJ two positions perhaps also in the Fujimorism
       there could be (.) two positions perhaps also in Fujimorism

03 .hh eh Rafael Re:y: Uste:d
       uh R R you
       .hh uh Rafael Re:y: You:

04 .hh representando posiciones más radicales.
       representing positions more radical
       .hh representing more radical positions.

05 .hh y otros .hhh más e:h <concesivas>, Más amplias?
       and others more concessive more broad
       .hh and others .hhh more u:h <concessive>, More broad?

06 CHA: .hh No: yo no creo eso Rosa María.Los derechos humanos o
        no I do not believe that R M The human rights or
        .hh No: I do not believe that Rosa María.Human rights either

        se respetan o no se respetan.=
        self respect or no self respect
        are respected or are not respected.=

\(^7\) See Schmidt (2006).
Through the use of the *irrealis* subjunctive in the design of this question, Palacios places knowledge of Chávez’s beliefs in the realm of the unknown. This helps the interviewer accomplish what appears to be a genuine request for information, in the conversation-analytic sense of the phrase. Indeed, such an analysis parallels previous pragmatic studies which posit that the use of the subjunctive in questions can reflect the speaker’s epistemic neutrality (Bustos 1986: 224, 252), uncertainty (Gili Gaya 2002: 135), or the existence of relevant alternatives (de Jonge 2006: 169). However, what I would like to emphasize in this example is that it would be a mistake to claim that Palacios is *actually* “uncertain with respect to the truth value of the embedded proposition” (Haverkate 2002: 115). On the contrary, it is undeniable that Palacios is quite well versed in the ins and outs of Chávez’s political career, including her publicly stated opinions on human rights and violations thereof, as Palacios plainly demonstrates later in this (as well as in other) interviews. Thus, the interviewer’s epistemic *access* to Chávez’s beliefs cannot be all that is involved in this mood choice.

With this question formulation, Palacios is effectively ‘doing being’ neutral and unbiased—an intrinsically *social* action as opposed to an individual-level cognitive reflection of a true lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker. By virtue of the question being asked, it does indeed put forth the proposition that two positions could exist within Fujimorism with regard to human rights (Bell 1980; Klein 1977; Rivero 1971). Beyond that, however, the question’s morphology does not claim access over the answerer’s inner thoughts on the issue, and therefore it does not pressure the answerer to confirm the veracity of something that the questioner is claiming to already know about her. Thus, contrary to Haverkate’s (2002: 75) assertion that the
subjunctive reveals the “presupposition of the speaker concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition”, in this sequential context the subjunctive effectively allows Palacios to not reveal her own beliefs about what she is putting forth by not claiming any epistemic authority over this information. It is through the subjunctive mood’s invocation of an intersubjective state of epistemic inaccess that the interviewer in this instance is able to achieve the display of neutrality despite the fact that she is undoubtedly not, in reality, epistemically neutral.

In terms of sequential position, a display of epistemic neutrality via the subjunctive is appropriate in the context of the opening question of an interview. Nonetheless, as the interview continues and more answerer knowledge is invoked within the interaction, subsequent questioning can be designed to reflect the questioner’s sequentially granted access to the answerer’s epistemic domain. This is precisely what occurs in Excerpt (16) below as Chávez continues her answer to Palacios’s human rights question, including putting forth her opinion as to the role that the government should play in protecting rights and trying those who violate them (lines 27-45). These turns are already hinting at the evidence which was recently used to convict the infamous Colina Group less than a year prior to the interview. Before discussing the transcript, let us offer some brief background on this court case as it directly bears on the analysis of the interaction.

The Colina Group was a death squad secretly created in Peru during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) to eliminate leftist guerilla individuals and groups who belonged to the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru movements. The Colinas were responsible for the massacres at Barrios Altos (November 3, 1991), Santa (May 2, 1992) and La Cantuta (July 18, 2008), in addition to various other individual ‘disappearances’. President Fujimori originally signed a law which granted the Colinas amnesty due to their having acted as part of the armed forces/police. The judicial branch of the Peruvian government quickly judged this law
unconstitutional only to find its power to review amnesty laws revoked by Fujimori to once again ensure that the Colinas would not be tried in a court of law. Finally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that these amnesty laws were unjust, and the Colinas were tried on various counts of murder. A lengthy trial brought to light much physical evidence (cf. lines 35/37 below), including individual human remains and mass graves, and sentences were handed out from 15-30 years to the Group's various members on October 1, 2010. Observe how this trial becomes topicalized in the interview between Palacios and Chávez.

(16) Continuation of (15): lines 11-26 omitted for the sake of brevity

27 CHA: Entonces, .hhh e:: Los derechos humanos están allí. the rights human are there
So, .hhh u::h Human rights are there.

28 Son de todos. They are of all
They are everyone’s.

29 -> Y así como: es lamentable la muerte de alguien, and as like is regrettable the death of someone
And as regrettable as the death of someone is,

30 (.)

31 -> Es lamentable también que se quiera matar civilmente a is regrettable also that self want to-kill civilly to
It is regrettable also to want to civilly kill

32 -> personas sin proseguirlas sin base= persons without to-prosecute-them without base
persons without prosecuting them without foundation=

33 -> =sin ninguna prueba without any proof
=without any proof

34 .hh mandarlas a procesos que duran veinte años, to-send-them to trials that last.INDIC twenty years
.hh sending them to trials that last for twenty years,

35 PAL: ((calmly)) [Pero si sí hay pruebas. but if yes there-are proofs
But if indeed there is evidence.

36 CHA: [.hhh [No?}
Y si sí ha-sí hay daño.

And if yes there-if there-is damage

And if indeed there is damage.

Si hay prueba que se condene: Rosa María.

If there-is proof that self sentence R M

If there is evidence let them be sentenced Rosa María.

And if indeed there is damage.

Si hay prueba que se condene: Rosa María.

If there-is proof that self sentence R M

If there is evidence let them be sentenced Rosa María.

And if indeed there is damage.

Y si sí ha-sí hay daño.

And if yes there-if there-is damage

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And if yes there-if there-is damage

And if indeed there is damage.

Si hay prueba que se condene: Rosa María.

If there-is proof that self sentence R M

If there is evidence let them be sentenced Rosa María.

And if indeed there is damage.

Si hay prueba que se condene: Rosa María.

If there-is proof that self sentence R M

If there is evidence let them be sentenced Rosa María.

And if indeed there is damage.

Y si sí ha-sí hay daño.

And if yes there-if there-is damage

And if indeed there is damage.

Si hay prueba que se condene: Rosa María.

If there-is proof that self sentence R M

If there is evidence let them be sentenced Rosa María.

And if indeed there is damage.
Fueron sancionados Rosa María.

They were punished Rosa María.

No pero usted cree que (.)

No but do you think that (.)

son bien sancionados hoy?

they-are.INDIC well punished today

they are justly punished today?

Yo no podría decirlo.

I couldn't say.

No he estudiado el caso de ellos.

no I-have studied the case of them

I have not studied their case.

Yo sí [por ejemplo sí puedo decir porque he estudiado=

I yes por example yes I-can say because I-have studied

I am able for example to say because I have studied

Yo no podría decirlo.

I couldn't say.

No he estudiado el caso de ellos.

no I-have studied the case of them

I have not studied their case.

El caso del >Presidente Fujimori< me he leído=

the case of >President Fujimori< I myself have read

the case of >President Fujimori< I myself have read

todas las más de doscientas páginas de su sentencia,

all the more of two-hundred pages of his sentence

all of the more than two hundred pages of his sentence,

Mhm.

Que está <mal> condenado, mal juzgado.

that he-is badly convicted, badly judged

That he is <unjustly> convicted, unjustly judged.

Es un (. ) inocente que está preso.

is a innocent that is imprisoned

He is an (. ) innocent man that is imprisoned.

Ahora en el caso de la gente del grupo Colina

now in the case of the people of the group C

Now in the case of the people of the Colina Group

No conozco el detalle de su caso.

no I-know the detail of their case

I do not know the detail of their case.

Pero lo que sí sé

but it that yes I-know

But that which I do indeed know
es que fueron condenados (por ( ) militar.
is that they were sentenced for military ( ).

PAL: [Bueno muy bien. good very well Okay very well.

((continue discussing what the Colina sentence actually was))

With her indicative (realis) portrayal of “twenty year-long” court cases (line 34), Chávez makes an implicit reference to the Colina case which lasted roughly that length of time. In response to Palacios’s question about cases in which evidence and damage are presented (lines 35/37), Chávez agitatedly concedes that if there is such evidence, the individuals should be sentenced (line 37). Although Chávez goes on to affirm that the State should demonstrate the possibility of punishing human rights offenders (lines 40-41), she maintains that it should not use this power to persecute those who “han defendido la sociedad?” / have defended society honestly (lines 44-45). Chávez’s use of the indicative across these relative clauses (lines 34, 44) reveals her epistemic stance that such individuals—i.e., those who have defended society honestly but who have been subsequently unjustly persecuted through lengthy court cases—do indeed exist. That is, they are not offered up as hypothetical, speculated, or up for debate as would have been conveyed by the irrealis subjunctive (i.e., “personas que defiendan (subj.) la sociedad”).

Through these implicit references, Chávez indirectly topicalizes the Colina Group (even beginning in line 31), thereby prompting Palacios to bring the topic to the surface of the interaction in lines 46-47 via explicit reference to the case by name. In contrast with the formulation put forth in lines 1-2 of the previous Excerpt (15), in this question Palacios follows the verb creer ‘to think/believe’ with the indicative mood: “Usted cree (.) que el grupo Colina merece (indic.) sanción? / Do you (.) think that the Colina Group deserves punishment? (lines 46-47). The indicative mood in the design of this question is both a reflection as well as a mobilization
of the interviewer’s sequentially acquired access to the hearer’s domain: On the one hand, Chávez has morphologically expressed her belief across the sequence that specific, realis individuals (i.e., the members of the Colina Group) have defended society honestly and have thus been unjustly punished. On the other hand, though, she has conceded that when there is proof of human rights violations (as there was in the case of the Colinas), the government must demonstrate its ability to deal out punishment (lines 38/40-41). These potentially contrasting points of view allow Palacios to formulate her question in a more adversarial way (Clayman & Heritage 2002b) by pushing for confirmation of a point of view which she knows to be socio-politically preferred but simultaneously detrimental to Chávez’s campaign.

What exactly is at stake if Chávez were to agree with Palacios’s strong, indicatively formulated question? Recall that Chávez is an avid supporter of Alberto Fujimori. As Fujimori was the one behind the Colina Group’s formation and subsequent activities, agreeing that the Colinas were indeed guilty and had indeed been justly punished would mean that the same opinion applied to the case of Fujimori. In short, Chávez would undermine her entire political platform (and two-decade career) by conceding that the Colinas were guilty. Thus, although Palacios is unambiguously aware of Chávez’s belief that the Colinas were not guilty, she uses the indicative here to push for agreement that they were justly convicted. If Chávez gives in to the request for confirmation, her career can be called into question in the way that we just described; and if she goes against the preference of the question, she presents herself as siding with evidenced death squads (cf. lines 35/37). The indicative mood thus helps accomplish the interviewer’s more overarching project of posing hard-hitting, campaign-relevant questions in the journalistic context (cf. Clayman & Heritage 2002a, 2002b).

These contingencies cause the interviewee to attempt to back away from the question in line 49, offering a non-conforming, transformative answer (Stivers & Hayashi 2010)—that the
Group’s members were already sentenced—after a pause. The posed question, however, was not whether or not the group had been sentenced; both interactants already know this to be fact. The question elicited Chávez’s opinion as to the justness of said sentence. In overlap, then, Palacios reformulates her question to highlight her awareness that the group’s members have been sentenced and that she is not asking about whether or not they were punished, but rather the interviewee’s opinion of the punishment: “Pero cree que están (indic.) bien sancionados?” / But do you think that they are justly punished? (lines 50-51).8 Despite this reformulation, the indicative mood—and the epistemic push it carries with it to answer in the affirmative—remains.

Again Chávez attempts to answer a different question with her transformative response in line 52. Palacios enters in overlap in line 53 to yet again restate the question, prefacing it this time with an overt “No pero…” / No but… to indicate that Chávez’s repeated transformative responses have not answered the question as it was posed. This third formulation of the question also changes the verb estar (line 51) to ser (line 54). While both of these are translated to English as ‘to be’, the second (ser) carries a more permanent and somewhat more impartial connotation compared to estar which can be interpreted as temporary or otherwise not finalized. This change is combined with the absolute time reference “hoy” / today in line 52 (Raymond & White, in prep.), emphasizing that the question at hand concerns the interviewee’s opinions about the currently-being-served sentences, not the moment in which those sentences were decided in the past (which is what Chávez’s transformative answers have been attempting to draw attention to). The epistemic push of the indicative mood is yet again employed in this turn. Finally, Chávez produces a non-answer in lines 55-56 and moves to discuss the specific case of ex-president Fujimori (lines 57-63), even underlining her epistemic primacy as to the facts of his

8 Note the direct parallel here with David Frost’s pursued questioning of British Prime Minister Edward Heath as to his thoughts of his main political rival at the time, Harold Wilson: “But do you like him?” (Clayman & Heritage 2002a: 197-198)
case in lines 59-60. When she returns to the Colina Group in line 64, in a continued resistance to the push of the question, she again simply states that she “does indeed know that they were punished”. Palacios abandons the line of questioning after this turn (line 68), and the topic shifts to what the punishments actually were.

The extended *Prensa Libre* example highlights the fact that co-participants in talk do not always mobilize morphological resources for mood in order to demonstrate respect for and alignment with their respective stances toward knowledge. Epistemic stances can be used to perform disaffiliative and pressuring actions in addition to the affiliative ones which we saw in earlier examples.

Let us consider one final example of disaffiliation from a conversation between an aunt (Carmen) and her niece (Alejandra). The pair is discussing the construction of a doghouse for their dog, named Big Boy. Prior to Excerpt (17) below, Carmen has expressed her belief as to what the house should look like and where it should be placed. In line 1 below, Alejandra begins to launch an overt disagreement—“Pero no sé si: le-” / *But I don’t know if he-*, but abandons it in favor of a description of her own idea for how to build the structure and where to put it (lines 2-3/5). Carmen explicitly disagrees with this idea in line 6 and produces an imperative to make it small, as Alejandra suggests, but place it outside of the other dog’s area. Alejandra then utters a code-switched “*Why:*” (line 7) (cf. Chapter 6), and in response, Carmen pushes back on the epistemic presuppositions inherently embodied in Alejandra’s alternative plan (lines 9-12).

(17) Building a Doghouse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>01</th>
<th>ALE:</th>
<th>Pero no sé si: le-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>but no I-know if to-him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>But I don’t know if he-</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>02</th>
<th>Porque- what I’m thinking is hacer una chiquita?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>because to-make a small.DIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Because- what I’m thinking is make a small one?</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[Así? like-this
Like this?]

[Mhm,

Y ponerla adentro de esa.
and to-put-it inside of that
And put it inside of that one.

No. Hacele chiquita pero la dejás afuera.=
no make.IMP-it small.DIM but it you-leave outside
No. Make it small but leave it outside.=

(.

<Porque:> di-Tú crees que el: el perrito
because you think that the the dog.DIM
<Becau:se> di-You think that the: the dog

se va a quer- El Big Boy se va a
self goes.INDIC to wan- the B B self goes.INDIC to
is going to wan- Big Boy is going to

querer meter allí adentro?= to-want to-place there inside
want to go inside there?=

=Él no se va a meter allí adentro.
he no self goes.INDIC to to-place there inside
=He’s not going to go inside there.

Yeah he will!

The design of Carmen’s question in lines 9-11 mobilizes the realis semantics of the indicative—not to describe the reality of what the dog will want to do, but rather to convey the speaker’s unmitigated access to her hearer’s interpretation of what the dog will want to do. We see plainly from the progression of the sequence, as well as in the direct assertion in line 12, that Carmen herself does not believe that Big Boy will want to go into a doghouse that is placed inside their other dog’s pen. Thus, the morphology of the embedded clause cannot be a simple reflection of the speaker’s point of view regarding the truth value of the embedded statement, as then we would expect use of the subjunctive to separate this assertion from reality (cf. Havertake 2002). Carmen’s realis epistemic stance is produced in the service of social action within the sequence-
in-progress: In line 7, Alejandra challenged the validity of Carmen’s idea, and Carmen, in turn, responds by undercutting the presuppositions on which Alejandra based that challenge. While the subjunctive in this question’s design would have constituted an actual request for information, the indicative portrays this ‘requested’ information as already known to the speaker, thus constituting a demonstration of the speaker’s access to her interlocutor’s epistemic domain. Indeed, Carmen does not wait for an answer, but rather immediately ‘corrects’ her interlocutor’s ‘mistaken’ understanding in line 12. Carmen presents herself, via the indicative morphology employed in her turn, as possessing unmitigated access to Alejandra’s beliefs; and because she possesses this access, she claims an ability to undermine Alejandra’s counterargument ‘from the inside’.

In using mood distinctions to claim authentic, realis access to hearers’ opinions, beliefs, and bases of knowledge, speakers/questioners can actively step into hearers’ territories of knowledge, effectively pushing hearers/answerers into an epistemic corner. Although a questioner may be well aware that an answerer does not actually believe what s/he is being asked to confirm, the indicative can be used to push the answerer to either concede to the point of view, or overtly disagree—with each of these options possessing its own risks. Furthermore, just as in cases of affiliation, such disaffiliative turns are sequentially motivated and contribute to more overarching interactional projects.

5.4 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we have examined various syntactic designs in Spanish which license the morphological expression of either the indicative or the subjunctive mood in their embedded clauses. In such cases of apparent ‘optionality’ in the use of language, Sacks (1988/89: 51-52) asks: Is the situation as simple as ““Pick a correct answer. Get a list of correct answers. Any one of them is okay by virtue of being correct”? He quickly concludes that “that’s just not the way it
works”. Indeed, as we have demonstrated here, while both the subjunctive and the indicative moods can be grammatically correct at the level of an isolated utterance, both are not socially and interactionally equal in context. Rather, speakers make their modal selections for a reason, and hearers, in turn, orient to those formulations, thereby reaffirming that there is “order at all points” (Sacks 1984a) in discourse—including at the morphological level.

Because stances and actions are inherently conditioned and motivated by the sequences in which they occur, morphological features are intimately connected not only to their turn-level (syntactic) structure, but to sequential structure as well. Although initially a seemingly binary distinction between the realis indicative and the irrealis subjunctive moods in Spanish, this morphological dichotomy provides for a far more complex system in actual situated interaction, as illustrated through the excerpts analyzes here. Recall the gradient proposed in (9a-c), repeated below as (18a-c), with (18b) epistemically downgraded from (18a), and (18c) epistemically downgraded from (18b):

(18) a. Va a México.
    goes to Mexico
    He's going to Mexico.

    b. Probablemente va a México.
        probably goes.INDIC to Mexico
        He's probably going to Mexico.

    c. Probablemente vaya a México.
        probably goes.SUBJ to Mexico
        He's probably going to Mexico.

As morphology works in tandem with other linguistic resources (adverbs, negation, etc.), it can convey a range of epistemic (and other) stances and thereby accomplish social action in interaction. Even this simple three-way distinction of decreasing epistemic certainty can be further divided by incorporating an additional adverb like muy / ‘very’. The utterance “Muy probablemente va a México” / He’s very probably going to Mexico exists between (18a) and (18b)
on the epistemic continuum, thus illustrating the malleability of claims to knowledge as they are invoked in the Spanish system.

The existence of a continuum of knowledge as it is constructed between speaker and hearer, invites future inquiry into the gradation of how knowledge is claimed in discourse. Morphology’s interaction with other linguistic resources moves us beyond a dichotomous ‘what speaker knows’ vs. ‘what hearer knows’—or even a ‘speaker knows better’ vs. ‘hearer knows better’—system, into a system which takes into consideration absolute vs. relative levels of knowledge as that knowledge becomes co-constructed between the participants. In Excerpts (13) and (14), for example, as Aydett and Nancy discussed Jason’s plans, the morphological selection between moods was not based solely on which interactant knew more about the plans in question. Rather, salient interpersonal work was accomplished as the design of Nancy’s turns managed to defer epistemic authority to Aydett while at the same time affiliating and supporting Aydett’s actions. Continued investigation into the interplay between morphology and other linguistic resources may thus act as a window into how more fine-grained epistemic work is achieved between co-participants in talk.

By discursively negotiating what they and their interlocutors know, interactants simultaneously (re-)create who they are to one another on a moment-by-moment basis. In actively deferring epistemic authority to Mom when issuing her a mitigated directive concerning her child, the interpreter in Excerpt (12) not only orients to but also reestablishes the salience of Mom’s parental identity within this context. We also saw, in the last example (17), that verbal mood can constitute part of a disaffiliative, challenging action if the speaker claims a knowledgeable identity over information located in his/her hearer’s epistemic domain. Nonetheless, whether used to invoke a knowledgeable or unknowledgeable stance,
whether for the purposes of affiliation or disaffiliation, modal selection within a turn is shaped by as well as shapes the communicative goals of the larger sequence-in-progress.

This attention to sequential organization is the key feature which distinguishes the present analysis from previous accounts of mood in Spanish. As Mithun (2008: 113) summarizes, discursive analyses of the sort put forth here may often go unnoticed:

...in part due to traditional methodologies of grammatical analysis that have focused on the structure of individual sentences in isolation. When longer stretches of unscripted speech are examined in a variety of genres, higher-level structures are more likely to appear, and their variety becomes more evident.

Mithun goes on to state that “An awareness of processes of extension beyond the boundaries of the sentence can alert us to structures we might otherwise miss. They can also contribute to our understanding of the reasons behind certain basic morphological and syntactic patterns”. Analysis of isolated utterances, devoid of sequential and interactional context, will inherently overlook the profoundly social motivations behind the deployment of these linguistic resources. While a single turn can indeed reveal a speaker’s own access to and stance toward knowledge through the use of the indicative or subjunctive mood, those stances are made relevant and conditioned by the contingencies of the in-progress interaction—and furthermore, speakers are conveying those interactionally motivated epistemic stances to their co-participants in talk. That is, as we specifically demonstrated through the ‘minimal pairs’ in Excerpts (7)-(8), (13)-(14), and (15)-(16), the issue is not only what knowledge an individual speaker technically has or does not have access to, but also how that knowledge is “talked into being” (Heritage 1984)—designed, constructed, reconstructed, and subsequently attended to as part of the ongoing social interaction. Thus, given that it is a means through which aspects of interactants’ in-the-moment social identities can emerge in discourse, morphology is as much a social resource as it is a linguistic one.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The present chapter has provided an initial demonstration of the interactional work that the \textit{realis}/\textit{irrealis} distinction can accomplish in Spanish talk-in-interaction. Sequences of interaction give rise to turn-level identities which this modal distinction helps speakers to achieve. Reconceptualizing the morphological level of linguistic structure in this social way—that is, “dialogically” (Linell 2009)—lays the groundwork for a wide range of future investigations, both on Spanish as well as cross-linguistically.

Given that verbal mood is mobilized and oriented to in social interaction, what systematic \textit{practices} might exist which make use of the \textit{realis}/\textit{irrealis} dichotomy? For example, we posited an initial hypothesis that questions which include the verb \textit{creer} / ‘to think/believe’ can be designed to claim more or less access to answerers’ epistemic domains and thereby constitute requests for confirmation or requests for information. This seems to be one practice through which speakers can do ‘being neutral’—or not—in their design of questions. Do similar practices exist in the formation of other action types (e.g., offers/requests; Curl 2006; Curl & Drew 2008)? And how might certain situated contexts like courtrooms or news interviews make use of these practices in pursuit of their institution-specific identities and objectives (cf. Drew & Heritage 1992a)?

Recall from our introductory discussion that some dialects do not possess an indicative/subjunctive morphological distinction and only produce indicative constructions. From a contact linguistics perspective, one might ask what interactional ramifications occur when such subjunctive-less speakers come into contact with subjunctive-users who may orient to the lack of its use by their interlocutors.

Finally, here we have concentrated on the dichotomous \textit{realis}/\textit{irrealis} modal divide, as it exists in Spanish. However, various languages morphologically encode the expression of
knowledge in other ways as well (e.g., directly experienced knowledge vs. hearsay vs. supposition, and so on). What epistemic hierarchies exist between these non-binary resources, and how are they sequentially conditioned to accomplish social action?

Despite how purely ‘linguistic’ morphological elements may initially seem, this chapter has illustrated just how intrinsically social their usage can be in situated interaction. It took an interactional, sequence- and action-based approach to provide insight into the meaning and significance of these resources in real-time talk. In conclusion, we cannot help but wonder what other so-called “classic problems” of (Spanish) grammar might be similarly ‘unproblematized’ by moving beyond the level of the single utterance, connecting linguistic phenomena with social action in interaction.
Research on code-switching—“the ability on the part of bilinguals to alternate effortlessly between their two languages” (Bullock & Toribio 2009: 1)—has seen many developments in recent decades.¹ Long conceptualized as random, chaotic, and speaker-specific, numerous studies have aimed to illustrate just how orderly and systematic language alternation practices actually are. Code-switching thus constitutes a site of substantive convergence for researchers from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives—from grammatical, to prosodic, to socio-interactional—, the majority of them seeking to answer the same deceitfully simple questions: Where do these switches occur, and why there?

The present chapter approaches these questions through a conversation-analytic lens and further evidences the orderliness of code-switching as a socially and interactionally meaningful resource for co-participants in talk. Notwithstanding, our analysis diverges from previous conversation-analytic accounts of code-switching in that we examine not extended sequences of talk which include multiple code-switches, but rather the same sequential context on multiple occasions, across a variety of speakers—namely, language discordance in responsive turns.

¹ Previous versions of (segments of) this analysis were presented at the 24th Conference on Spanish in the United States / 9th Conference on Spanish in Contact with Other Languages at the University of Texas, Pan American; and at the 41st Annual Linguistic Association of the Southwest (LASSO) Conference at Indiana University/Purdue University in Fort Wayne, IN.
The chapter is structured as follows: We begin by reviewing previous research on code-switching in naturalistic interaction, with particular emphasis on what I view as misinterpretations (and therefore misapplications) of conversation-analytic theory and method. This discussion will also serve to problematize the explanatory potential of “doing being bilingual” analyses, which were mentioned briefly in Chapter 2. We then move on to describe the sequential position of interest for the present analysis by underscoring the intrinsic social and interactional work that responsive utterances can accomplish in monolingual talk. In addition, before in-depth discussion of a variety of examples of code-switches produced in this sequential context, we highlight the distinctiveness of the present corpus of data compared to those of previous researchers (e.g., Cashman 2005; Gafaranga & Torras 2002; Li Wei 1994, 1998, 2002; Torras i Calvo 1999).

The analysis itself is divided into three sections. First, we examine code-switched responses to polar (yes/no) questions in Spanish, in which “sí” or “no” is the sequentially relevant, unmarked, ‘preferred’ (in the conversation-analytic sense of the term) response. Next, we analyze code-switched responses to other sorts of first actions (i.e., informings, announcements, and assessments) in Spanish, in which something other than a simple “sí” or “no” is made sequentially relevant. Throughout the presentation of examples, we argue against the view that these responses have been borrowed (and are thus not ‘true’ code-switches) by providing evidence of a variety of code-switched lexemes and clauses which can appear in this same sequential position and serve to accomplish the same intrinsic interactional work. Finally, examples of code-switches in the opposite direction (English first turns and Spanish responsive turns), as well as a few excerpts from other language pairs and speech communities—Sicilian dialect/Italian in Sicily, English/Greek Cypriot Dialect in London, French/Kinyarwanda in Belgium, and English/Hebrew in Jerusalem—are included to highlight that the interactional
meaning uncovered here is indeed brought about *sequentially* as opposed to *symbolically*. That is, the code-switch can *itself* act as a resource in bilingual talk-in-interaction without tapping into preconceived notions about the symbolic social meaning of the switched-into language. These additional language pairs also aim to demonstrate the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural reach of the present claims.

The chapter’s discussion reinvokes and reconceptualizes the “doing being bilingual” analysis as well as contributes to the debate over what should (and should not) be considered a code-switch. We re-invoke the identity work of code-switched responsive turns as opposed to their non-code-switched ‘equivalents’ in bilingual talk-in-interaction, and also emphasize the primary importance of sequentiality in the interpretation of responsive turns more generally. The chapter concludes by arguing in favor of a truly ground-up theory of code-switching, offering a variety of suggestions for future research toward that objective.

6.1 SEQUENTIAL APPROACHES TO CODE-SWITCHING

The sequential approach to bilingual conversation was pioneered by Peter Auer (1984) in his book by the same name. Auer argued that context could not be taken as given (as it is in other approaches to language use; cf. Chapters 1-3), but rather as something which is shaped, maintained, and changed by participants continually in the course their talk (1990: 80). Perhaps the most crucial difference between the sequential/CA approach and other non-sequential methodologies is this idea of in-the-moment, participant-negotiated understandings of courses of action. In Auer’s (1984: 3) words:

...there is an analytic interest in *members’* methods (or procedures), as opposed to an interest in external procedures derived from a scientific theory. In short, our purpose is to analyze *members’ procedures* to arrive at local interpretations of language alternation (emphasis in original).

Interactants possess a range of tools which can be implemented in discourse, including not only lexico-grammatical signals, but also prosody, gaze, body movement, etc. Álvarez-Cáccamo
(1990, 2000) draws on Gumperz’s (1982) discussion of these various contextualization cues in characterizing language choice as one such “communicative code”: Switching from one language to another carries meaning in interaction just as do shifts in prosody, gaze, and the like. As Li Wei (1998: 164) explains, based on Auer’s original work: “The sequential organization of alternative choices of language provides a frame of reference for the interpretation of functions or meanings of conversational code-switching” (emphasis in original). It is thus not necessary to analytically require that one language be used to do one thing interactionally, while another language is used to do something different as in symbolic analyses (Sebba & Wooffit 1998). Rather, it is the switch itself, in sequential context, which “triggers an interpretation first and foremost by the interactants themselves, and secondarily by the analyst” (Li Wei 2002: 177).

An important development on this front has been Gafaranga’s (1998, 1999) proposition of a “preference for same medium talk,” a modification of Auer’s original “preference for same language talk”. Gafaranga argues that a state of language alternation may itself be the norm or “default option” (Meeuwis & Bloommaert 1998) in interaction, compared to other instances in which language alternation is oriented to by interactants as requiring repair. Gafaranga’s data come from Kinyarwanda-French bilinguals, amongst whom the author comments that “language alternation is not experienced as an activity of worry because participants are locally doing being bilingual in French and Kinyarwanda” (2001: 1922, emphasis in original). The argument is that no preference exists for a single code to be used between these interactants who are perfectly content to converse in a medium of language alternation.


Consonant with Gafaranga’s analysis above, a variety of researchers have described the more overarching deployment of code-switches as a means by which speakers can enact their dual identity through “doing being bilingual” (e.g., Cashman 2001, 2005; Ervin-Tripp 1973;
Gafaranga 2000, 2001, 2005; Gafaranga & Torras 2002; Kramsch 1998; Spolsky 1998). While this is certainly a valid and useful conceptualization of the phenomenon on a macro-conversational scale, resting on the claim that participants are “doing being bilingual” does not make any attempt to analyze the import of individual switches within that medium.

The situation complicates itself further when we consider the labeling of codes in code-switching. Gafaranga and Torras (2002) adhere to a CA approach in maintaining that the participants themselves must orient to a shift if analysts are to categorize it as such. They reference their own written transcripts and describe that “some stretches of talk are categorized as French while some others are categorized as Kinyarwanda”, but that “participants themselves do not make this distinction” (11). They thus conclude that such shifts should not be analyzed as code-switches. A similar claim is put forth in Gafaranga (2005: 290) where the author warns against analyst-imposed conceptualizations of language as being “idealized and ‘ideologized’ abstraction[s] with a name”, affirming that “the alternate use of two languages itself may be the code the participants are using” (cf. also Maschler 1998; Meeuwis & Bloommaert 1998; Oesch Serra 1998). It should be noted that some Minimalist syntacticians working on code-switching phenomena share this same stance, namely that language labels are nothing more than sociopolitical divisions which do not reflect what is in the mind of the actual language user (e.g., MacSwan 1999).²

This line of argumentation rightly asserts that analysts working within a CA framework should not label the languages within an interaction a priori from a monolingually biased perspective (cf. Auer 1984: 28)—e.g., this turn is English, that turn is Spanish. However, adhering to this fundamental ethnomethodological tenet does not preclude discovery of sequentially

² Nonetheless, other researchers concentrate on the ungrammaticality of code-switching at various morphosyntactic points (e.g., Belazi, Rubin & Toribio 1994; Pfaff 1979; Poplack 1979, 1981) and thus maintain that, as Toribio (2001: 214) puts it: “It is undeniable that language systems may make reference to sub-classes of lexical items; in the case of the monolingual, these may be specified as Class 1 and Class 2 or as Dialect A and Dialect B, in the case of the bilingual as Lexicon₁ and Lexicon₂, or as Lexicon_{Spanish} and Lexicon_{English}.”
motivated and systematically produced turns which—by way of their very production—illustrate
the participants’ own understanding that two distinct languages are present in the interaction,
with switching between them constituting an interactional resource. In other words, I argue that
it is equally analytically problematic to presuppose that multiple linguistic realities (i.e.,
‘English’ and ‘Spanish’) are produced “unnoticeably” in the service of “locally doing being
bilingual” (Gafaranga 2001: 1922) as it is for analysts to presuppose that switches are inherently
noticeable. A truly bottom-up approach to bilingual conversation will allow the interactants
themselves to sequentially ‘draw lines in the sand’—or not—between languages, without
imposing presuppositions in either direction.

To be clear, I do not take issue with analyses which posit that, when speaking in a
‘language alternation medium’, switches in language are not oriented to by participants as talk
requiring repair. Nor do I disagree that code-switching is indeed a way that interactants can
actively accomplish their multiple identities through language. But even with these
epistemological considerations, we are still faced with our original question given Sacks’
foundational notion of “order at all points”: Why did the speaker switch languages at this specific
point X instead of at another point Y? Both switches would have equally maintained the
“language alternation medium” as well as locally accomplished “doing being bilingual”.
Furthermore, given that the speaker is bilingual, s/he could have relevantly continued with the
same language and not switched at all. Nonetheless, the speaker opted for point X—
significantly not point Y, and significantly not continuing the same language—to realize a
switch. What social action is such language-discordance accomplishing by being placed at that
specific point and not at another? That is, to modify the infamous and omnipresent conversation-analytic inquiry: Why that switch now?³

6.3 DATA FOR THE PRESENT ANALYSIS

6.3.1 Restricting the Participants

As outlined in Chapter 1, the nearly two-hundred hours of data that we will use here come from a corpus comprised of over four-hundred fully competent bilingual speakers of Spanish and English.⁴ These are either friends, co-workers, or family members engaged in everyday, casual conversation with one another, and code-switching is present (to varying degrees) in all of their speech.

Restricting our analysis to this sort of interlocutor is, in and of itself, a crucial difference from many previous studies. Cashman (2005), for example, looks at Spanish-English code-switching as a resource used in the presence of English-speaking monolinguals. Li Wei (1994, 1998, 2002) examines parent-child interactions which involve Cantonese and English in England and acknowledges the divergent linguistic competence/use across generations: Given that the parents are immigrants to the English-speaking country, their linguistic abilities in English may be less developed than their Cantonese ones, a reality which can then affect their code-switching behavior, preferences, and abilities (cf. Lipski 2005). Gafaranga (2001: 1917, example 9) and Gafaranga and Torras (2002: 7, 15, examples 5, 12) also present examples in

³ Criticisms of the sequential approach to bilingual talk-in-interaction very closely parallel those posited to argue against such an approach to monolingual talk-in-interaction (cf. Chapter 3). One example is Myers-Scotton’s (1998: 36) assertion that the CA methodology is unable to analyze marked choices and motivations. Nonetheless, as we review later, research on a range of conversation-analytic topics from marked vs. unmarked person reference (Stivers 2007; cf. Sacks & Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1996), to type-conformity and preference structure in question-answer sequences (cf. Heritage 2012a, 2012b; Heritage & G. Raymond 2012; Pomerantz & Heritage 2012; G. Raymond 2003; Sacks 1987; Stivers 2004, 2005, 2011) reveal this claim to be unfounded. For example, when asked the question “Are you going to the party tonight?”, the three distinct answers “Yes” vs. “I am” vs. “Of course” accomplish three distinct social functions in the ongoing interaction, and the latter two could be called “marked” choices vis-à-vis the first in that they deviate from the expected default. Given the existence of such expectations and preferences, systematically employed, “marked” alternatives can indeed be shown to have interactional import in bilingual conversation as well.

⁴ While a few of these recordings include parents and other family members who are monolingual speakers of Spanish or L2 speakers of English, we are only analyzing the responsive turns of their natively bilingual co-participants.
which lexical gaps are cause for language alternation. In particular, the last of these interactions includes Spaniards interacting with a British waitress in an Irish pub. The authors describe this as an instance of language negotiation and incorporate it into their general conceptualization of code-switching; but it cannot be assumed that such L2 interactions function in the same way as those of native bilinguals. This is not to say that Gafaranga and Torras’s findings are invalid by any means; rather, they simply answer distinct questions which concern intercultural communication and second-language pragmatics as opposed to native speaker discursive practices. In contrast, here we are interested in the use of code-switching by native bilinguals in an effort to eliminate these confounding variables related to competence in the two languages.

6.3.2 Restricting the “Now” in “Why That (Switch) Now”

Previous researchers have often elected to examine stretches of discourse which include multiple code-switches back and forth across the various sequences contained in the excerpt. On the one hand, an inherent advantage of such a method is that it allows for a more complete picture of what the participants are doing across several sequences of talk. On the other hand, though, such analyses can lose sight of the fact that each code-switch is produced in its own local context and may thus be accomplishing particular interactional work by virtue of occurring in that position. Analytically grouping together multiple switches which occur in divergent sequential positions therefore runs the risk of masking the specific discursive significance of each within its particular sequential context. This prohibits the analysis from considering the micro-organizational practices which structure moment-by-moment bilingual talk, making it difficult to move past the overarching “doing being bilingual” analyses described above.

In order to restrict the “now” in “why that (switch) now” to a repeated, systematic sequential context—as well as to resolve the aforementioned issues that emerge with regard to participant linguistic proficiency and lexical access—we limit the present inquiry to switches
which occur in responsive turns: for example, in the answer to a polar (yes/no) question, or in the assessment of a news announcement. As we review in the following section, the design of first actions sets up discursive preferences for what is to come in second position, with choice of language being no exception. Given our epistemological discussion in the preceding section and Auer’s (1998: 13) warning that “there may be systems [i.e., languages] that are ‘objectively speaking’ very distinct but nevertheless seen as non-distinct by the users,” we aim to demonstrate, through repeated analysis of the same sequential context, that interactants are indeed orienting to the presence of two distinct languages in interaction and taking advantage of that reality to accomplish social action in bilingual talk.

6.4 SEQUENCE STRUCTURE IN INTERACTION: FIRST AND SECOND POSITION

The adjacency pair is the basic form of sequence structure in interaction (Schegloff 2007). A first action (such as a greeting, an invitation, or a request for information) opens up a space and makes sequentially relevant a corresponding second action (such as a reciprocal greeting, an acceptance/declination, or an answer). Even when separated by numerous insert sequences, each composed of its own adjacency pair, interactants can be seen to hold one another accountable to the fact that an initial first-pair part (FPP) was put forth and thus a second-pair part (SPP) is still due. In the brief exchange below, for example, a child reformulates her original question twice in search of uptake from her mother.

(1) Heritage & Clayman (2010: 24)

01 CHI: Q-> Have to cut the:se Mummy.
02 (1.3)
03 Won’t we Mummy
04 (1.5)
05 Won’t we
06 MOM: A-> Yes
Note that what the question actually was is not judged as problematic in this exchange: The child’s reformulations do not repeat the main verb (“cut”) or its object (“these”), but rather elide these initially semantically indispensible elements of the utterance and only include the auxiliary verb (“won’t”). The questioner thereby demonstrates her interpretation that Mom has heard and understood the initial question despite failing to provide a response. This then gives the child the interactional license to push for an answer in subsequent turns.

First position is a socially meaningful one in interaction. By initiating sequences of action, speakers in first position inherently present themselves as having a right to receive a responsive action. Indeed, when second speakers cannot comply with what was elicited in a first action, they often use their responsive turn to account for that failure to answer (Heritage 1984b; Stivers & Robinson 2006; cf. also Stivers, et al. 2009). For instance, while the son in Excerpt (2) below is not able to offer an answer to his father’s second question (lines 4-6) as he was to his first one (lines 1-2), he nonetheless provides a second-pair part to account for his lack of answer and close the sequence.

(2) 2012.F.100B.03, 2:57

01 DAD: FPP1-> Te están chequeando el trabajo?
   you they-are checking the work
   They’re checking your work?

02 SON: SPP1-> Sí.
   yes
   Yes.

03      (0.5)

04 DAD: FPP2-> Y::::, Y qu-cómo te han visto,=
   and and wha-how you they-have seen
   And wha-how’s their impression of you,=

05    =qué te han dicho?
   what you they-have said
   =what have they said to you?

06 SON: SPP2-> ↑No sé. ↓Pues: la verdad.
   no I-know well the truth
   ↑I don’t know. ↓To tell you the truth.
   ↑To tell you the truth.
Not only do first actions make relevant second actions, but they also set preferences as to the design that second action will take. Questions, for example, set topical and action agendas, embody presuppositions, convey an epistemic stance, and incorporate preferences for a particular sort of answer from the recipient (Bolinger 1957; Clayman & Heritage 2002a, 2002b; Heinemann 2006; Heritage 2002, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Heritage & Raymond 2012; Raymond 2003; Sharrock 1974). For instance, although both asking about the recipient’s desire for dessert, the formulation “Do you want some cake?” prefers a “yes” response, while “You don’t want any cake, do you?” grammatically pushes for a “no” response. More overarching social preferences can also play a role here: In the case of a physician asking a patient if s/he smokes, the socially preferred answer in that medical context is in the negative, and the grammatical design of the question can either reinforce or cross-cut that social preference (Schegloff 2007: 76-78). Furthermore, Raymond (2003) has demonstrated that polar (yes/no) questions prefer “yes” or “no” as the first item in a response in English (cf. also Stivers 2010), which is the case for Spanish as well. In such sequences, as we saw in lines 1-2 of the previous Excerpt (2), the answerer accepts the agendas and presuppositions as put forth in the question and affirms the state of affairs it offers up.

This emphasis on first position actions does not mean, however, that speakers of responsive turns are defenseless against the constraints established by their first speaker interlocutors (Schegloff 1972, 2007; Sacks 1987). Particularly in the question-answer sequence, much research has investigated the linguistic resources that second speakers mobilize in what Stivers (2010) has called the ‘answer possibility space’ to ‘push back’ on the design of questions. In English, for example, as we review in greater detail later, repetitional responses go beyond simply affirming the state of affairs presented in the question, and instead confirm the proposition by agentively asserting the answerer’s primary epistemic rights over the knowledge invoked in
the prior turn (Heritage & Raymond 2005, 2012; Stivers 2005). Similarly, *oh*-prefaced responses mark questions as inapposite due to the presuppositions they embody or their relevance to the current course of action (Heritage 1998; cf. also Fox & Thompson 2010 on clausal responses). In addition, Stivers (2011) describes *Of course* as a response which problematizes the very asking of the question in the first place by conveying that only one answer is possible; it thus presents the knowledge being requested as already available or known to the questioner.

Despite the dearth of sequential research of this sort on Spanish-language data, these claims seem to hold for Spanish and other languages as well. Take the following example (3) in which Brenda and Clara are discussing the difference between being a “drinker” vs. being a “drunk”. Brenda maintains that calling someone “borracho/a” (which could be translated either way) is offensive (lines 14-15), and thus her brother having recently used this adjective to describe her is uncalled for. Clara then asks, in lines 16/18, if Brenda thinks her brother interprets the word in the same charged way as she does. Brenda’s *oh*-prefaced “por supuesto” / *of course* in line 19 highlights the inappositeness of Clara’s question given the progression of the talk thus far—particularly line 15—in a way that a simple type-conforming “*sí*” would not have done.

(3) Drinking (Brenda/Clara)

14 BRE: Para mí es ofensa.  
for me is offense  
To me it’s offensive.

15 Para nosotros es ofensa.  
for us is offense  
To us it’s offensive.

16 CLA: Q-> [Tú crees que él [ah la mi-  
you think that he it se-  
You think that he ah sees it-

17 BRE: [Yo e- que sí  
I that yes  
I e- that yes

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Observe that, immediately following the “oh por supuesto” second-pair part, Brenda goes on to expand upon and further justify her feelings of being offended (line 20). Second position speakers thus are not left at the mercy of their first position co-participants in interaction, but rather possess an array of discursive tools with which to address the various socially relevant attributes embedded within first actions.

It is important to highlight that, in one view, the aformentioned linguistic resources are all equivalent to one another in the sense that they each provide the ‘same’ (i.e., an affirmative) response. That is, if Brenda in the above Excerpt (3) had produced “sí” or “oh sí” instead of “oh por supuesto”, her interlocutor would still have understood Brenda’s beliefs about her brother’s interpretation of the potentially offensive term under discussion. Similarly, if the son in the earlier Excerpt (2) had produced “por supuesto” / of course instead of just “sí” / yes, the father would have attained the same knowledge that his son’s employers are checking his work. But responsive turns do more than simply provide this basic sort of knowledge: They accomplish essential social and interactional work as co-participants navigate their respective identities on a turn-by-turn basis. This is due to the fact that turns-at-talk consistently reveal speakers’ understandings of who the interactants are to one another. Misalignments in these understandings have the potential to open up small fissures in the ongoing interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer, and so second speakers can make use of a range of resources to quickly ‘seal over’ these cracks in the moment before they have the chance to
expand as the talk progresses. Crucially, these responsive turns (like in Excerpt (3)) need not constitute surface-level, over-the-top productions of disagreement and disaffiliation, but rather they “inexplicily yet insistently” (Heritage 1998: 291-296) adjust interlocutors’ identities at the micro-interactional level. In the remainder of this chapter, we describe how code-switching can act as an additional second-position resource for such identity work in bilingual talk-in-interaction.

6.5 CODE-SWITCHING IN SECOND POSITION

Taking as a point of departure Li Wei’s (1994) sequential description of code-switching and preference organization, I argue that code-switched responsive turns are used as a resource to agentively mark epistemic independence or primary rights to the knowledge invoked in the first-position turn. As we will illustrate, these first-position turns vary in terms of their action-type (i.e., requests for information/confirmation, informings, assessments, announcements), but they have in common their inherent placement of the second speaker in an epistemically vulnerable or relatively downgraded position—be it through the underlying presuppositions that first-position turns intrinsically embody, or be it simply by virtue of their having ‘gone first’. I provide evidence that language discordance in response to such turns constitutes part of the ‘answer possibility space’ (Stivers 2010) of bilingual speakers, performing similar interactional work to that of other nonconforming/marked responses. These utterances themselves may be first-pair parts or second-pair parts, but they all occur in a subsequent position vis-à-vis a prior turn’s action. Furthermore, these switches may be turn-prefatory (Schegloff 1987), or the switched-into language may continue through the entirety of the turn. Nonetheless, in each case, the turn-initial language discordance makes a structural break with the language terms, constraints, and expectations set up by the prior turn and thereby works to agentively resist it. It is this structural break that serves to actively underscore the second speaker's rights to the
“territory of knowledge” (Heritage 2011, 2012a, 2012b) that was invoked by the previous speaker.

In the analysis below, first we examine code-switched responses to polar (yes/no) questions in which “sí” or “no” is the interactionally preferred response. Next we look at code-switched responses to other first actions, including informings, announcements, and assessments. Finally, we move beyond Spanish-English bilinguals and apply the present analysis to data from other language combinations.

6.5.1 Code-Switched Responses to Inquiry

Building on Raymond’s (2003) analysis of type-conformity, Heritage and Raymond (2012: 183) describe that unelaborated, type-conforming responses to polar questions accept the terms of the question unconditionally as it was designed, “exerting no agency with respect to those terms, and thus acquiescing in them”. This is, in part, due to their complete indexical dependence on the question. In contrast, the authors argue, repetitional responses diverge from straightforward anaphoric answers given that they “resist the field of constraint exerted by the question” in the following ways:

(i) they modify the terms of the question by confirming, rather than simply affirming, the propositional content of the prior yes-no question; (ii) they exert agency with respect to those terms, asserting more authoritative rights over the information at issue, than the questioner had already conceded through the design of the question; and (iii) relative to yes-no responses, they are associated with sequence expansion (186).

In the exchange below, for instance, Cindy is telling her father about a field trip that she and her mother took to a local restaurant. After announcing that the “zero freezer” was her “favorite part” (lines 1-3), her father makes a declarative understanding check with “(It was) zero degrees in there?” (line 5). Mom and Cindy each respond to this question in a different manner.

(4) Freezer

01 CIN: An’ my favorite (0.2) part was going in
02 thuh z- (0.3) uhm_ thuh z:ero freezer.
03 Zero below.
While Mom’s passive “Mm hm:” in line 7 acquiesces in the terms set forth by Dad’s utterance, Cindy’s repetitional response in line 8 departs from type-conformity and resists the design of the question by actively breaking the responsive turn’s structural dependence on the questioning turn. As Cindy had just provided this information herself in line 2, the repetition asserts agency over the matter being addressed by ‘confirming’ rather than ‘affirming’ the proposition raised by the questioner (Heritage & Raymond 2012).

Similarly, in the brief question-answer sequence below, B’s repetitional response can be seen to agentively resist on the terms of A’s question, actively situating this knowledge in B’s own epistemic domain.

(5) Sacks (1987)

A: How about friends. Have you friends?
B: I have friends. So called friends. I had friends.
Let me put it that way.

The initial turn-constructional unit (TCU) “I have friends” exerts agency over this information in a way that a type-conforming, acquiescent “Yes” would not have done. In this case, the answerer even uses this resource as part of a fuller resistance to this line of questioning overall, as is seen in the rest of B’s turn.

Here I argue that code-switched responses to inquiry occur in a similar context and perform similar interactional work in bilingual talk as repetitional responses have been shown to accomplish in monolingual talk. In the same way that repetitional responses make an agentive, structural break with their questions, so do code-switched responses agentively break
concordance with the language selection employed in their question. In this way, although still indexically dependent on the prior turn, code-switched responses nonetheless resist the design of the question by not simply acquiescing in the implicit language terms put forth by the questioner. Code-switched responses thus ‘push back’ on their questions by “assert[ing] the respondent’s epistemic and social entitlement to the matter being addressed” (Heritage & Raymond 2012: 192). As we will demonstrate, this may be triggered by a variety of question designs—e.g., a questioner indicating doubt about something that the answerer just asserted, a questioner making an inference from prior talk or otherwise presupposing something that the answerer did not intend, and so on. Nonetheless, in all cases, in contrast with language-concordant turns, code-switched responses are produced “for cause” (Raymond 2003), namely to “claim more epistemic rights over the relevant information than the original yes-no question conceded” by agentively resisting the linguistic “field of constraint” exerted by the prior turn (Heritage & Raymond 2012: 192).

In the first example (6) below, Yianeth is discussing study abroad programs with her friend, Henry. While Yianeth has been describing her preferred program (based in Barcelona) for several turns, immediately prior to this segment Henry offers up a potential downside to the program: The residents of the city use Catalan (which Yianeth does not speak) in their day-to-day interactions instead of Spanish. In line 1, Yianeth counters by explaining that the university offers classes in Spanish, so she would nonetheless be able to complete her required coursework for the Spanish major. Henry interprets this explanation to mean that Yianeth is not interested in learning Catalan while she is abroad, and formulates his question accordingly in lines 3-4. Yianeth’s code-switched response in line 6 subsequently marks this question’s design as inapposite.
(6) Clases de catalán

01 YIA: Pero podría:: (0.2) tomarlas en espaňol.
   but I-could to-take-them in Spanish
   But I cou::ld (0.2) take them in Spa::nish.

02 HEN: and no to-you would-please
   And you wouldn’t li::ke hh.

03 YIA: aprender el catalán?
   to-learn the Catalan
   to learn Catalan?

04 YIA: -> ↑Yeah.

The and-prefacing (Heritage & Sorjonen 1994) and negation (Bolinger 1957; Heritage 2002b) used in the construction of Henry’s question is a response to the but-prefaced contrast that Yianeth’s line 1 seemed to establish between the language of her classes (Spanish) and the language of greater Barcelona (Catalan). Henry’s formatting of his turn in this way embodies an attempt to ‘connect the dots’ that appear to be underlying what has been said in the sequence; but in doing so, he steps deeply into Yianeth’s epistemic domain and thereby increases the field of constraint being placed on the answerer. From Yianeth’s perspective, the design of this question about her desire to learn Catalan (or not) jumps to a conclusion that she herself had not intended: Taking literature and culture courses in Spanish would not preclude her from taking a Catalan language class as well. Thus, in contrast with a type-conforming “sí” response, which would have accepted the terms of the question and tacitly legitimized the presuppositions contained therein, she produces a delayed, prosodically highlighted, code-switched “↑Yeah.” response. The language discord between this turn and the prior serves to agentively resist the

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5 In this chapter, the code-switches under examination are boxed. Although various other instances of code-switching are seen in the transcripts (e.g., intrasentential so and like), these are not boxed as they are not the focus of the present analysis.
inherent presupposition from which this question was launched, while simultaneously asserting
the speaker’s authority over her own desires and plans.\textsuperscript{6}

Before moving on, we must clarify that this “yeah” is unambiguously produced with
American English phonology: [jæ]. This is not Spanish “ya” / already, pronounced [ja] or [ya],
which moreover would have been pragmatically inappropriate in response to this particular
question. The same token is clearly produced in Excerpt (7) below, in which Angela and Ruben
are discussing a new line of clothes recently released by the company Adidas. Here Angela is
describing the coloring of a particular pair of shoes she saw in the catalogue and wants to
purchase, using the color of the shoes she is currently wearing for comparison: “Los zapatos
son: más oscuros, azul que este…” / The shoes are: darker, blue than this… (lines 1-2). Upon
hearing this, Ruben interrupts to ask if the shoes being used for comparison are Adidas brand as
well (line 4). Angela immediately provides a code-switched “↑Yeah.” response to this request
for confirmation.

\textsuperscript{6} Unfortunately the couple is interrupted at the end of this excerpt. However, when the interactants return to this
topic, Yianeth explicitly teases apart what was incorrectly presupposed by Henry’s question (cf. Excerpt (12)).

\begin{verbatim}
(6a) Continuation of example (6)
01 YIA: Por eso. (.) Podría:: for that I-could
      That’s why. (.) I cou::ld
02      So- (. ) Tomar clases de catalán:, to-take classes of Catalan
      So- (. ) Take classes in Catalan:
03      (0.2)
04      Pero a la misma vez pod(r)ía:: but at the same time I-cou::ld
      But at the same time I cou::ld
05      tomar clases de cualquier otro: (.) materia. to-take classes of whatever other subject
      Take classes in whatever other: (.) subject.
06      (0.2)
07 HEN: Es verdad.
      is true
      That’s true.
\end{verbatim}
(7) Adidas

01 ANG: Pues. Los zapatos son: más obscuros,
well the shoes are more dark
Well. The shoes are: darker,

02 azul que este pero no: ((using own shoe for comparison))
blue than this but no
blue than this but no:

03 como:::
like
li::ke

04 RUB: -> [Esos son de Adidas?
those are of A
Those are Adidas?

05 ANG: Yeah.

06 RUB: Oh wow.

07 ANG: Estos son los d- del año pasado.
these are those of of-the year past
These are the one f- from last year.

08 .hhh Estos son los zapatos que uso para:
these are the shoes that I-use for
 .hhh These are the shoes that I use for:

09 (.)

10 para ensayar.
for to-train
for training.

Here Angela produces a code-switched response to agentively mark her primary rights to the information invoked in Ruben’s question. Similar to Excerpt (4) above between Cindy and her father, from Angela’s point of view, she has already implicitly conveyed that her shoes are indeed Adidas brand by using them to compare with the new line being offered by the company. The language-discordant response thus works to resist the design of the question which infringes on Angela’s rights to knowledge, confirming rather than affirming the information contained therein. Note also that, following Ruben’s affiliative appreciation in line 6, Angela expands the sequence to further describe her current shoe situation.
Another example of push-back through a code-switched “Yeah” response is seen in Excerpt (8) in which Raquel is informing Berta of what happened the day prior at the hospital where the two work. While the telling has been going on for several turns, Raquel pauses in line 1 to qualify her narration as second-hand, admitting that she only has access to Grace’s side of the story. Setting aside the complexity of the story’s events, note simply that Raquel quotes the supervisor (whom Raquel, Berta, and Grace all share in common) as having accused Grace of “shop talking” (i.e., talking inappropriately about work-related matters with others while off the clock). Observe how Berta responds to this telling, as well as how Raquel responds to those responses, in lines 10 and 14 below.

(8) 2013.Sum.100A.03, 4:30

01 RAQ: Porque yo no más estoy oyendo la parte de Grace. Because I’m only hearing Grace’s side.

02 BER: Mhm,

03 RAQ: >(Y luego)< pienso que le preguntó like > (And then)< I think that she asked her like

04 (.). Quién era. (.). Quién es la que está hablando.= who was who is the one talking,=

05 =Y ella dice, =And she says,

06 ↑Oh. .tch Es que tú también estabas involucrada en esto. is that you also were involved in that ↑Oh. .tch It’s that you too were involved in that.

07 (0.3) ((Berta takes a bite of food))

08 RAQ: [P e r o -]= but
But=-

09 BER: -+ [De veras?= ((mouth full)) of truth Really?= ((mouth full))

10 RAQ: =Ye:a::h. ((single nod, raised eyebrows))
Berta’s line 8 “De veras?” / Really? is a common token of ritualized disbelief in Spanish, used to categorize the prior talk as news and to invite further elaboration (Heritage 1984a: 339-344; Jefferson 1981: 62-66). Raquel’s emphatic, code-switched response to this newsmark—“YEa:h.”—orients to the disbelieving nature of this utterance and reasserts her knowledgeable stance regarding what the supervisor said to Grace. The single nod and raised eyebrows reinforce this stance nonvocally. Raquel then returns to her telling in line 12 before being interrupted by another demonstration of disbelief from Berta in line 13. This request for confirmation is, like line 8, affiliative with the overall stance that Raquel is taking toward the events of her telling; but again it accomplishes that affiliation by ritually calling into question Raquel’s report (cf. example (4) above). The code-switched “YEa:h.” again pushes back on the prior turn to agentively confirm the speaker’s legitimate access to the knowledge being recounted, thereby re-solidifying the exceptional newsworthiness of the telling as a whole.
Mobilizing language discordance to actively resist the design of a question can also occur in the negative. Just as we have seen between Spanish *ya* vs. English *yeah*, there is again an unequivocal phonological distinction between Spanish’s pure, open vowel *[no]* and English’s diphthongized/labialized *[noʊ]*, despite their being orthographically identical. In the following Excerpt (9), Aydett’s line 5 constitutes a code-switched turn given that it clearly mobilizes the latter in response to her interlocutor’s Spanish-language question. Here, Aydett has been describing how she recently “took everything out” of her bedroom and then reorganized it, and that she needed to recruit her brother to help her with the difficult and time-consuming task. Nancy interrupts to inquire what made the project such a difficult one, offering one potential reason in line 3.

(9) Reorganizing bedroom

01 AYD:     A ayudarme. Pero, to to-help-me but
            To help me. But,

02          Ya en--
            already in
            Already in--

03 NAN:     =Quitaste todo lo que tenías allá en las paredes? you-took-down all it that you-had there on the walls
            =Did you take down everything you had in there on the walls?

04          O [Qué sacaste. Tu ropa? O qué. or what you-took-out your clothes or what
            Or what did you take out? Your clothes? Or what.

05 AYD: ->   [.hh No:] [A-]

06 AYD: ->   Saqué mi ropa:,
            I-took-out my clothes
            I took out my clothes,

07   ->   Y luego cambié cómo estaba mi cama:,
            and then I-changed how was my bed
            And then I changed how my bed was,

08   ->   Y los [muebles y todo, and the furniture and all
            And the furniture and everything,
Here, similar to in Excerpt (6) above, the questioner (Nancy) jumps to a specific conclusion about the meaning of “taking everything out” of the bedroom (i.e., removing everything from the walls; line 3), which Aydett did not intend. Indeed, she even interrupts Aydett’s in-progress telling to do so, thus disaligning with Aydett’s more overarching interactional project (Stivers 2008). Aydett’s negative response, produced in overlap, is dispreferred in that it goes against the affirmative grammatical preference of the question. While previous researchers (e.g., Auer 1995; Li Wei 1994, Milroy & Wei 1995) have already documented the general use of code-switches in dispreferred turns such as this one, I maintain, as we have seen, that such code-switched responses furthermore mark the preceding question as problematic due to the questioner having inappropriately intruded into the answerer’s epistemic domain. Aydett’s response then ‘pushes back’ on this intrusion by breaking with the language-based constraint and expectation inherent in the question’s design. Furthermore, Aydett’s turns following the code-switch both provide an answer to the reformulated \textit{wh}-version(s) of the question (line 4) as well as actively work to correct the incorrect presupposition contained in Nancy’s original polar question from line 3.

Another case involving a similar jump to a conclusion occurs in (10) below in which Isabel provides a candidate answer to her own question as to what sort of tamales Blanca ate at the dinner she recently attended. After the overlap of “pollo” / \textit{chicken} from each speaker in lines 12-13, Blanca makes a linguistic break with the preceding turn to agentively re-claim authority over this knowledge given that she herself was the one who attended the dinner and ate the tamales (cf. Lerner 2004).
(10) Tamales

08 BLA:  .hhh Estaba bueno pero  
            was   good  but  
            .hhh It ((the restaurant)) was good but

09 [Estaban bien::  
      were   well  
      They ((the tamales)) were really::

10 ISA:  --> [De qué eran.  
              of what were  
              What were they ((the tamales)) made of.

11 BLA:  De[::  
          of  
          O:::f

12 ISA:  --> [De pol[lo?  
              of chicken  
              Of chicken?

13 BLA:  [pollo.  
          chicken  
          chicken.

14 BLA:  #Yeah.#

An even more ‘on-record’ example of epistemic tension between this same pair of friends occurs in Excerpt (11) below. Leading into this example, Blanca has been describing her busy weekend of events—work, family party, picking up a book from the library, and so on. Despite the intended ending of the telling in line 2, Isabel provides a conti

ner in line 3 which prompts Blanca to re-complete the story explicitly in line 6. At this point, Isabel offers a multi-modal assessment of Blanca’s weekend driving in lines 5 and 7, pointing back and forth with an exhausted facial expression to symbolize the amount of driving that would have been implicated in attending all of the events Blanca has described. In response, Blanca calls into question Isabel’s understanding of the telling (line 9).
(11) Dos veces a Downey

01 BLA: Y:::
and
A:::nd

02 Y otra vez regresé aquí.
and other time I-returned here
And again I came back here.

03 ISA: Mm:,

04 BLA: Y: uh:m
and
A:nd uh:m

05 -> (0.7) ((Isabel: negative headshake))

06 BLA: Y [ya
and already
And that’s it

07 ISA: -> [Blanca? ((pointing from local to distal to local))

08 (0.5)

09 BLA: >No no.< ((response to line 7))

10 (0.5) ((Isabel opens eyes widely/leans in))

11 ISA: -> Te fuiste entonces dos veces a la casa.
yourself you-went then two times to the house
So you went two times to the house.

12 BLA: Yeah. Dos veces regresé a Downey,=
two times I-returned to D
Yeah. Two times I went back to Downey,=

13 ISA: [hah hah

14 BLA: ={sin ll- llegar a mi casa.
without to-arrive to my house
without ar- arriving at my house.

15 ISA: ={Entre un d-Entre un fin de semana.
between one between one end of week
In one d-In one weekend.

16 BLA: Entre de,
between of
In,

17 ISA: hah hah hah hah!
Although Isabel’s line 7 is offered up as an assessment to Blanca’s telling, Blanca’s multiple saying “>No no no<” conveys the stance that Isabel should halt the course of action that she is embarking on (Stivers 2004). We will discuss responses to assessments in greater detail in the following section, but for now note that the code-switched phonology on the multiple saying marks the preceding assessment as inappropriate based on Blanca’s primary access to her own weekend activities. What is important to highlight at this point is simply that this turn effectively accuses Isabel of not understanding (or not adequately paying attention to) the events of Blanca’s telling.

Isabel pushes back on this accusation in line 11 by vocalizing what her gesture and facial expression from lines 5 and 7 were meant to convey. In an attempt to save face in this sequential context, Isabel builds the declarative assertion with turn-internal emphasis and period intonation, thereby directly infringing on Blanca’s epistemic domain. Blanca’s code-switched “Yeah” response, combined with the turn’s repetitional design of “two times” and lexical substitution of “to the house” to “to Downey”, serves to agentively confirm ownership of the knowledge invoked in her telling as opposed to acquiescing to the terms of Isabel’s line 11.

As a final example, while “Yeah” and “No” very frequently (and understandably) occur as code-switches in response to polar questions, other turn-initial particles can constitute switches and accomplish similar agentive work. In the following example, Jessica and Camila are discussing their relative levels of school spirit in light of a recent win by the university’s football team. Jessica announces, in lines 2-3, that she has never attended a game during her time as an undergraduate. Camila aligns and affiliates with the newsworthiness of this announcement via the repetitional newsmark “N:unca:? / N:ever:?”, which is immediately confirmed through a repetition by Jessica (lines 4-5). Camila then initiates an additional post-
expansion sequence in line 7 which asks about going to the “Rose Bowl”, their university’s home stadium. In response, Jessica produces a code-switched, well-prefaced turn.

(12) Rose Bowl

02 JES: En: el tiempo que he estado aquí, *in the time that I have been here*

In: the time I’ve been here,

03 Nunca he ido a un juego. *never I have gone to a game*

I’ve never been to a game.

04 CAM: [Nunca?: ?
never
N:ever?:

05 JES: [ Nunca. =
never
Never. =

06 JES: =Y: [( )o:::
and
=A:nd ( )o:::

07 CAM: [ Pero ni al Rose Bowl para[::
but nor to-the R B for
But not even to the Rose Bowl to:::

08 JES: -> [Well He ido al=
I have gone to-the
Well I’ve gone to the=

09 JES: -> =Rose Bowl. a corre:r.  
R B to to-run
=Rose Bowl. to ru:n.

10 CAM: 0[:h.

11 JES: -> [Porque soy de Pasadena so de unos cinco minutos de allí, 
because I am of P so of some five minutes of there
Because I’m from Pasadena so a few minutes from there.

12 CAM: [Ahah?

13 JES: -> .hhh He ido a corre:r hhhh o a eventos, 
I have gone to to-run or to events
.hhh I’ve gone to ru:n hhhh or to events,

Camila’s turn in line 7 launches a post-expansion which is grammatically parasitic on the preceding sequence. This question conflates Jessica’s never having been to a game with never
having been to the Rose Bowl. Although the turn expands the sequence in order to further affiliate with the newsworthiness of the announcement (as we saw in previous excerpts), it also constitutes a potential threat to Jessica’s face by placing her in an inexperienced position with regard to the Rose Bowl. This action embodies a step into a territory of knowledge over which Jessica undeniably has primary authority: her own past.

*Well*-prefacing in monolingual English interaction projects that the speaker will most likely produce more than one turn-constructional unit (TCU) as part of a demurring response (Heritage, frth.), and indeed, here Jessica projects that she will require more than one TCU in order to tease apart the two elements of her past which the design of Camila’s question has inappropriately conflated. But given that Spanish provides two turn-initial particles which have been argued to accomplish similar work to English *well*—namely *bueno* and *pues* (Briz & Hidalgo 1988; García Vizcaíno & Martínez-Cabeza 2005; Landone 2009; Raymond, frth.-a; Stenström 2006)—, what additional interactional significance does the code-switched preface convey that the language-discordant (Spanish) options do not? By switching languages to produce “well” in this utterance, Jessica not only highlights the multiple-TCU nature of her response, but also marks the preceding question as having presumptuously and inappropriately stepped into her epistemic domain. The code-switch thereby signals and accounts for the fact that the multiple TCUs to come have been deemed necessary due to this knowledge-based intrusion. Indeed, the content of the turn proper (lines 8-9, 13) goes on to correct what was incorrectly presupposed in Camila’s question, including offering an overt account for why the speaker is familiar with the Rose Bowl despite not having attended any football games (line 11).\(^7\) On the whole, then, Jessica’s code-switched turn actively works to resist the novice identity that Camila’s question formulation attempted to assign her in line 7. Language alternation can thus be seen as a

\(^7\) Note also the change-of-state token (Heritage 1984a) in line 10, through which Camila displays that she has been informed by Jessica’s response in lines 8-9.
resource though which participants are epistemically negotiating their relative, in-the-moment identities.

Polar questions in Spanish make relevant a “si” or “no” in the responsive turn. However, as has been demonstrated in a range of monolingual contexts, various non-conforming responses can work to problematize different aspects of the design of their preceding questions. In this section, we have illustrated how language-discordant responsive utterances actively work to resist questions which, through their construction, in some way infringe on the answerer’s rights to knowledge. By departing from the language used in the design of the question, code-switched responses make a structural break with the expectations of, and field of constraint established by, their questions, in the same way as do repetitional responses in monolingual (English) discourse. This interactional resource can be laminated onto and mobilized in tandem with other responsive turn designs (e.g., prosodic emphasis, well-prefacing, multiple sayings) in providing “inexplicit yet insistent” (Heritage 1998: 291-296) epistemic ‘push back’ on the first speaker’s turn. Language-discordant responses to inquiry thus work to agentively (re-)assert the answerer's primary authority over the knowledge invoked in the question.

6.5.2 Code-Switched Responses to Informings, Announcements, and Assessments

Informings, announcements, and assessments are similar to questions in that they inherently carry with them various epistemic presuppositions. Given that speakers are not supposed to tell hearers something that the hearers already know (Sacks 1992a; Terasaki 2004 [1976]), informings and announcements, as first position actions, convey the belief that the recipient of the news was previously unaware of the information contained in the utterance. Similarly, as Heritage (2002a: 200) explains, “A first assessment can index or embody a first speaker’s claim to what might be termed ‘epistemic authority’ about an issue relative to a second
or to ‘know better’ about it or have some priority in rights to evaluate it” (cf. Raymond & Heritage 2006). Thus, just as we saw in response to questions in the previous section, respondents to these other sorts of first actions can find themselves in need of (re-)asserting their rights to knowledge after having been placed in an epistemically downgraded position. In bilingual talk-in-interaction, code-switched responsive turns are a means by which second speakers agentively resist the design of first actions, breaking language concordance as a means of carving out the boundaries of their “territories of knowledge”.

Following Heritage (2002a), we begin by considering cases of code-switched agreement, in which second speakers agree and/or affiliate with first speaker claims in a way that simultaneously embodies a claim of epistemic independence. We then examine instances of code-switching in which epistemic access becomes the basis for disagreement or disaffiliative moves within the sequence.

6.5.2.1 Affiliation and Agreement Responses

In this first set of cases, first speakers express knowledge to which second speakers subsequently claim independent or primary access through language discordance. Let us begin with a responsive turn that is overtly epistemic—not only via language alternation, but lexically as well. In Excerpt (13), roommates Brenda and Eugenia are in the midst of preparing dinner for a friend, Gomero, when the pair realizes that they are out of sour cream, a necessary condiment for when the meal is ready. Gomero suggests that the group drive to the grocery store a few miles away, but Brenda counters that there is a small market downstairs “donde venden todo” / where they sell everything (line 3). In line 6, Brenda expands her description of this market by offering an additional assessment that it is “muy caro” / very expensive. Eugenia then uses a code-switched response in line 9 to display her independent epistemic access to the store and its prices.
(13) Corner Store Prices

01 BRE: No.=Es que hay un mercado chiquito:, no is that there-is a market small.DIM
No.=It’s that there is a little market,

02 (.)

03 donde venden todo. where they-sell all
where they sell everything.

04 GOM: °Mhm.°

05 (.)

06 BRE: Pero está muy caro. but is very expensive
But it’s really expensive.

07 (0.5)

08 GOM: [heh(De(h)is)

09 EUG: —Te cobran como::: you they-charge like
—They charge you like:

10 (0.5)

11 -> Casi un dólar más. almost a dollar more
Almost a dollar more.

12 -> Uno cincuenta más. one fifty more
One fifty more.

13 (0.3)

14 GOM: Por qué? for what
Why?

Brenda’s assessment of the store in line 6 is primarily directed toward Gomero (the roommates’ guest), and inherently portrays this information as news for him—particularly given that she just informed him of the existence of this store in her immediately prior turn. Although Eugenia is at the stove cooking, she too has been an active co-participant in the ongoing interaction (cf.
Thus there are two interactional forces at work here which occasion the use of an agentive, language-discordant turn by Eugenia in line 9.

First is the basic negotiation over access to knowledge. By virtue of occurring in first position, Brenda’s assessment claims authority over a territory of knowledge that one of her hearers (Eugenia, her roommate) has equivalent access to. Eugenia’s emphatic and language-discordant “I know” (line 9) serves to register that, although she is in agreement with Brenda’s first assessment, she has independent epistemic access to this information and thus is able to assess the market for herself. Indeed, she immediately goes on to cite the specific price differences at the market in question (lines 10-13), thereby providing concrete evidence which justifies the code-switch’s claim of independent knowledge.

An additional consideration, though, is the design of second assessments. Pomerantz (1984) argues that second assessments, in order to be heard as affiliative and agreeing, should be upgraded vis-à-vis first assessments. In his examination of second assessments prefaced with oh (another epistemic resource), Heritage (2002b: 200) argues that agentively displaying epistemic independence in response to assessments ensures that the second speaker’s agreement will not be interpreted as having been “fabricated on the instant to achieve agreement” and thus as a “coerced action with a field of constraint that is established by the first”. Here we see that the epistemic independence achieved by a code-switched second assessment can be mobilized toward the same affiliative objective. Thus, in this sequence, the language-discordant turn can be seen as occasioned both by a desire to agentively assert access to knowledge after having been placed in an epistemically downgraded position, as well as by the social pressure to provide a second assessment that is appropriately affiliative.

Another instance of “I know” occurs in Excerpt (14) in which two aunts (Tina and Angie) are collectively chastising their niece (Lidia) for having spent a lot of money on a pair of
boots. The niece attempts to justify the purchase by explaining that, for every pair of shoes sold, the company sends one additional pair to a developing country. This account for her actions is somewhat less than successful as both aunts respond that, if Lidia is truly concerned for those living in impoverished areas, she should send them money directly. Of interest to the present analysis is that the first aunt (Tina) offers this assessment of Lidia’s explanation in lines 1-2, and then the second aunt (Angie) repeats (in overlap) the same assessment and adds an account in lines 3-5. In response, Tina produces an emphatic, code-switched “I know” (line 6) to signal her own independent access to this now-explicit account.

(14) Shoes

01 TIN: Te conviene mejor mandarles el dinero,
you is-advisable better to-send-them the money
It’s better for you to send them the money,

02 Mandarle el dinero a los pobre[s >allí,<
to-send-them the money to the poor >there,<
To send the money to the poor >there,<

03 ANG: [E- Mándaselos allá:, send-it-to-them there
E- Send it to them there,

04 ANG: Van a darles más de (.) tres pares=
are-going to to-send-them more of three pairs
They’re going to give them more than (.3) three pair=

05 =de zapato[s allá.
of shoes there
=of shoes there.

06 TIN: -> [I know.

07 (0.2)

Tina’s language-discordant turn not only claims her independent rights to the knowledge expressed in Angie’s turn, but it also serves to re-assert that it was she herself (Tina) who first offered up this assessment in lines 1-2. Although Angie has offered up a specific reason why “te conviene mejor mandarle el dinero” / it’s better for you to send the money there, the assessment itself was originally Tina’s. The code-switch produced in this environment therefore, on the one
hand, provides agreement with Angie’s turn, but it simultaneously resists Angie’s near sequential deletion of Tina’s initial assessment by re-invoking independent epistemic access to it.

Language-discordant responses to announcements, as seen in the following segment (15), follow a pattern which is similar to language-discordant responses to assessments: Code-switch to assert independent epistemic access, frequently followed by an account or justification which evidences that independence. Here, two teachers (Juana and Elizabeth) discuss student participation in the classroom. Juana begins by recounting something that her interlocutor had previously said to her: “Cada persona es un recurso” / Every person is a resource (line 5). Elizabeth confirms her agreement with this statement in line 8, in overlap with which Juana launches an and-prefaced post-expansion to highlight how teachers will never realize this about their students unless they ask (lines 9-12).

(15) Cosas que compartir

05 JUA: Como dice Cada persona es un recurso. 
like you-say every person is a resource
Like you say Every person is a resource.

06 (.)

07 JUA: C:ada per[ona. 
 every person
E:very person.

08 ELI: [Cada persona tie[ne tanto para dar. Sí. 
 every person has much for to-give yes
Every person has so much to give. Yeah.

09 JUA: [Y tiene tantas experiencias, 
And has much experiences
And has so many experiences,

10 JUA: Y tantas (.)
 and much
 And so many (.)

11 Pues tantas cosas que compartir con los demás. Y 
well much things that to-share with the others and
Well so many things to share with everyone else.

12 Y nunca lo sab- lo sab- lo supieras. 
and never it know- it know- it you-would-know
And you never kno- you kno- you wouldn't know it.
si no le preguntas. Si no:
if no to-him you-ask if no
if you don’t ask them. If you don’t

ELI: -> Right. = Porque no hay tiempo, Estamos todos ocupados, =
because no there-is time we are all busy
Right. = Because there’s no time, We’re all busy, =

JUA: [No. No hay tiempo.
no no there-is time
No. There’s no time.

ELI: -> = Están los niños, =
are the other kids
= The other kids are there, =

JUA: [Mhm,

ELI: = Y nadie... .
and no one
= And no one... .

Elizabeth’s turn-initial, code-switched “Right.” in line 14 asserts her independent access to the knowledge invoked in Juana’s utterance. In addition, Elizabeth immediately justifies her epistemic claim by providing an account as to why teachers would not be able to engage at such a personal level with each student (lines 14/16), which Juana agrees with in lines 15 and 17.

Excerpt (16) below returns us to the triadic interaction between roommates (Brenda and Eugenia) and their dinner guest (Gomero) (cf. Excerpt (13)). Here, while washing dishes after the meal, Eugenia topicalizes part of a telling by Brenda, namely that people eat tacos made with eyeballs (lines 1-2, 9). Both Brenda and Gomero come in in overlap to assert that people do indeed eat eyeballs (lines 3 and 4), with Brenda further expanding the sequence to display her surprise that Eugenia is not familiar with this custom (lines 5-6). In response, Eugenia’s facial expression turns to one of disgust as she repeats “El ojo?” / The eye? again in line 9. Gomero then makes an announcement in line 10 that Brenda herself has eaten one such taco, and Brenda responds by claiming that knowledge as her own with a code-switched “Yeah”.
(16) Eyeball tacos

01 EUG: De ojo?:
from eye
From eye?:

02 Cómo de ojo porque la-
how from eye because the
What do you mean from eye because the-

03 BRE: De [ojo:.
from eye
From eye:.

04 GOM: [El ojo: [El ojo.
the eye the eye
The eye: The eye.

05 BRE: [No has visto?
no you-have seen
You haven’t seen it?

06 BRE: Que se coman ojo?
that self eat eye
That they eat eye?

07 "Okei."?

08 (0.2) ((Eugenia turns with face of disgust))

09 EUG: El [ojo?
the eye
The eye?

10 GOM: [Brenda comió. ((points to Brenda))
B ate
Brenda ate one.

11 BRE: => Yeah.

12 => Me- traté un taco para [(saber )
myself I-tried a taco for to-know
I- tried a taco to (taste/know )

13 EUG: [De ojo de qué anima:l.
from eye from what animal
From eye from what a:imal.

14 (.)

15 BRE: Se me hace de vaca?
self myself makes of cow
It seems to me from a cow?

16 No s[é. No más-
no I-know no more
I don’t know. Just-
Although Gomero’s line 10 serves to support (in the environment of repeated displays of disbelief by Eugenia) Brenda’s assertion that people really do eat eyeball tacos, it simultaneously constitutes a step into co-present Brenda’s epistemic domain. Brenda’s code-switched “Yeah.” works to agentively claim independent authority over this knowledge and thereby enhance the validity of this apparently suspect telling as a whole. Note that the subsequent expansion and explanation launched in line 12 go on to provide further evidence that both backs up the legitimacy of the telling as well as more concretely describes Brenda’s first-hand knowledge of eyeball tacos.

Instances of repair, as in the following example (17), are particularly useful cases in revealing co-participants’ own differentiation between language-concordant and language-discordant responsive turns. Here, two friends (Olivia and Maribel) are discussing how to best display the international postcards they each recently acquired. In lines 12-13, Olivia announces that she bought some corkboard and put up just two of the cards because she does not want to poke holes in them (e.g., with pushpins). Observe how Maribel abandons the monolingual response in line 15—cutting off the Spanish “Yo tam-(poco)” / *Me neither*—in favor of the code-switched “Yeah”.

(17) Postcards

12 OLI: A-en L-Fui y lo agarré, in I-went and it I-got
A-in L-I went and I got it,

13 Y (.) puse nada más como: do:s. and I-put nothing more like two
And (.) I just put li:ke two:.

14 Porque no- tampoco no [los quiero agujer|ar. because no either no them I-want to poke holes
Because I don’t want to put holes in them either.
As a response token, “yo tampoco” / *me neither* would have accepted Olivia’s first position authority on the issue and thereby conceded to Olivia having been the one who was initially concerned about damaging the postcards by poking holes in them. Such a turn would therefore run the risk of being interpreted as ‘agreeing just to agree’. Maribel orients to these epistemic contingencies by initiating repair on her in-progress agreement to instead produce an agentive, language-discordant response “Yeah.”. As in several previous examples, although indeed affiliative and in agreement with the content of the first speaker’s turn, the code-switch is used as a resource for Maribel to register that she had decided on this course of action *independently* of her interlocutor’s first action—she is not simply following Olivia’s lead on this matter. Again, the second speaker follows the code-switch with a sequence expansion that supports her claim of having already thought about the poking-holes issue prior to this interaction (lines 16-17).

As one last example of agreement, consider the following Excerpt (18) which occurs about a minute after Excerpt (8) above. Here, Raquel is continuing her telling of what transpired at the hospital where she and her interlocutor, Berta, both work. After explaining how their supervisor has been punishing several of their friends and colleagues for not being on-task while at work, Raquel describes how she recently went into the back room before she clocked out and found the supervisor doing non-work-related tasks on the computer (lines 1-3). Berta then affiliates with her interlocutor’s observation (and clear negative assessment of the supervisor) by
offering up her own information as to what this individual does while on the clock: “Está con sus clases.” / She’s doing her classwork. (line 4).

(18) 2013.Sum.100A.03, 5:50

01 RAQ: Y fui atrás, y estaba en la computadora and I went back and she was on the computer
And I went into the back, and she was on the computer

02 =haciendo cosas que no era relativo al trabajo. = doing things that no were relative to the work
=doing things that didn’t have to do with work. =

03 =Y dije (.) [↑What? and I said (.) ↑What?
=And I said (.) ↑What?

04 BER: [Está con sus clases.]
She is with her classes
She’s doing her classwork.

05 RAQ: -> Exactly. ((single head nod))
06 BER: [°°( )°°
07 RAQ: Dije:, Mejor si- Si no puedes estar aquí . . . I said better if if no you can to be here I said, Better if If you can’t be here . . .

Lerner (2004) describes how, in collaborative completions such as this, the ‘owner’ of the information often produces a responsive turn which serves to re-establish his/her rights over the telling. Here, while simultaneously accomplishing affiliation and agreement with her interlocutor, Raquel’s language-discordant response in line 5 re-claims first-hand, independent access to knowledge over what their supervisor does during work hours. With this moment of affiliation completed and the epistemic boundaries once again in check, she immediately continues her telling in line 7.

6.5.2.2 Disaffiliation and Disagreement Responses

As one might expect, not all first position announcements, informings, and assessments are responded to with agreement and affiliation. Marking epistemic independence or primacy through a code-switch in a responsive turn can be relevant in disaffiliative and disagreement
contexts as well. While previous examinations of disaffiliative code-switched turns have focused on responses to *specific* action-types like requests and offers (Auer 1984; Li Wei 1994, 1998), as well as in more overtly oppositional interactional projects (e.g., Cromdal 2004; M. H. Goodwin 1998), here we continue to construct a more overarching, sequential explanation which is based in participants’ negotiations of rights to knowledge.

In Excerpt (19) below, Kim has just completed a telling in which a friend, Michelle (known to her interlocutor), “rudely” refused to lend her money for lunch when she forgot her wallet. In line with the previous analysis of question-answer sequences, first we see a newsmark from Beatriz in line 1 which is responded to with a code-switched “Yeah.” in line 2 (cf. Excerpt (8)). Following this, Beatriz announces that Michelle has bought lunch for her (Beatriz) before (line 3). Following a newsmark from Kim, Beatriz hypothesizes that this most recent event may have been the result of Michelle not having any money. Kim then uses a code-switched response to re-assert her assessment of the situation in line 6.

(19) Lunch

01 BEA: En serio? in serious
Really?

02 KIM: [Yeah.

03 BEA: [Ella me ha comprado los lounches. she me has bought the lunches
*She’s bought lunches for me.*

04 KIM: Eh?

05 BEA: >A lo mejor< porque no tiene dinero::.
to it better because no she—has money
>Maybe< it’s because she doesn’t have money::.

06 KIM: -> [ Mm—(0.2) ] I know pero, but
Mm—(0.2) I know but,

07 KIM: [((finishes chewing))]

239
Beatriz’s announcements in lines 3 and 5 are massively disaffiliative with the complaining stance that Kim is taking toward the events of her telling. Line 5 in particular calls into question the very status of this event as a complainable offense by giving the supposed culprit (Michelle) a pardonable account for not lending Kim money on this occasion. Kim’s code-switched response in line 6 reaffirms her independently formed assessment of the situation by presenting herself as already having considered the possibility that Michelle did not have any money at the time: Even if it had been the case that Michelle did not have any money, she could have at least said so (line 8). Turn-initial leveraging of epistemic authority as a precursor to subsequent disagreement in this way is a feature of repetitional responses as well (Heritage & Raymond 2012: 188-190). This turn thus works to re-assert Michelle’s “rudeness” as a complainable event and legitimize the telling, while at the same time renewing her bid for affiliation from her recipient in light of the previous threats to face.

A more ‘on-record’ epistemic disagreement is seen in example (20) below. Here, Jenny and Moyses debate Moyses’s timing waking up and arriving to work. This is a particularly interesting case given that individuals are typically presumed to possess primary rights over the happenings of their own lives. These interactants, however, are boyfriend and girlfriend who live and sleep together; thus the boundaries of the territories of knowledge involved in their morning routines are blurred. As a result, across the following sequence, Jenny claims unmitigated access to Moyses’s schedule from earlier that morning, while Moyses works to maintain primary authority over the events of his own life.
(20) 2013.Sum.100A.17, 9:25

01 JEN: Te tienes que levantar temprano?
yourself you-have that to-get-up early
Do you have to get up early?

02 MOY: A las seis.
at the six
At six.

03 (1.0)

04 MOY: Ya en[:
already in
Already in:

05 JEN: [Hoy te levantastes tarde.
today yourself you-got-up late
Today you got up late.

06 MOY: Cuatro horas.
Four hours
Four hours (from now).

07 No↑
no
No↑

08 (0.2)

08 JEN: -> ↑↑Y:e:ah::=

09 MOY: -> =Cómo me levanté tarde=
how myself I-got-up late
=How did I get up late=

10 -> =si lleg[ué temprano,
if I-arrived early
=if I arrived early,

11 JEN: [Te levantastes] a las siete:
yourself you-got-up at the seven
You got up at seven.

12 (0.5)

After asking what time Moyses has to get up tomorrow, Jenny offers an assessment of his getting up today: “Hoy te levantastes tarde.” / Today you woke up late. (line 5). Moyses, in line 7, rejects this period-intonated assertion. In response, Jenny uses a prosodically emphatic, code-switched “↑↑Y:e:ah::=” to renew her previous claim (and corresponding assessment) of her interlocutor’s lateness, which she bases in her independent knowledge of the time Moyses got
up. The divergent territories of knowledge at work here are evident in the subsequent overlapped lines 9-11: Jenny continues to build her assessment of lateness with respect to the time Moyses got up (which she shares access to), while Moyses rejects that assessment by referencing the time at which he arrived to work (which he alone has access to). Indeed, Moyses never disagrees with Jenny’s claim that he got up at 7:00AM. The disagreement in this sequence was thus a result of a negotiation of rights to knowledge, with the language-discordant responsive turn being mobilized to agentively claim epistemic access and thereby assert some level of authority over the issue being debated.

As one final example of code-switching within the context of disagreement, recall from Chapter 5 our discussion of the following disaffiliative exchange between an aunt (Carmen) and her niece (Alejandra). The pair is discussing the construction of a doghouse for their dog, named Big Boy. Prior to Excerpt (21) below, Carmen has expressed her belief as to what the house should look like and where it should be placed. In line 1 below, Alejandra begins to launch an overt disagreement—“Pero no sé si: le-” / But I don’t know if he—, but abandons it in favor of a description of her own idea for how to build the structure and where to put it (lines 2-3/5). Carmen explicitly disagrees with this idea in line 6 and produces an imperative to make it small, as Alejandra suggests, but place it outside of the other dog’s area. It is in this context that Alejandra then produces a code-switched “Why.” (line 7).

(21) Building a Doghouse

01 ALE: Pero no sé si: le-
       but no I-know if to-him
       But I don’t know if he-

02 Porque- what I’m thinking is hacer una chiquita?
  because to-make a small.DIM
  Because- what I’m thinking is make a small one?

03 [Así?
    like-this
    Like this?
CAR: [Mhm,]
ALE: Y ponerla adentro de esa. And put it inside of that.
CAR: No. Hacele chiquita pero la dejás afuera. No. Make it small but leave it outside.
ALE: Why:
CAR: <Porque:> di-Tú crees que el: el perrito because you think that the the dog. DIM
se va a querer meter allí adentro? He no self goes.INDIC to go inside there?
ALE: -> Yeah he will!

Carmen’s line 6 is a directive—and, in this sequential context, an assessment as well—of how to best construct and place the new doghouse. In line 7, Alejandra’s response claims understanding of her aunt’s proposal in and of itself, but not the reasoning behind it. This problematizes the legitimacy of the proposal as a proposal. Note that, although the code-switched utterance constitutes a first-pair part, it is nonetheless produced in a responsive position vis-à-vis Carmen’s proposal. Carmen subsequently attempts to epistemically justify her point of view by targeting the implicit presupposition on which Alejandra based her challenge (lines 9-11) (cf. discussion in Chapter 5). In response, Alejandra does not acquiesce to being informed by this announcement. Instead, she produces a language-discordant, repetitional response which ‘pushes back’ on Carmen’s presupposed (i) equivalent access to what Alejandra believes, and (ii) superior access to what their dog will (not) want to do. At its core, the surface-level disagreement in this excerpt
is a reflection of the interactants’ negotiation of their respective epistemic identities, with the code-switches functioning as resources to claim (and re-claim) authority over the territories of knowledge invoked in the sequence.

6.5.3 Cross-Linguistic Evidence

Based on the examples included above and the larger dataset used for this analysis, it may be tempting to draw two conclusions at this point. The first is that, given that the speech under examination here is recorded from Spanish-English bilinguals, code-switches from Spanish to English agentively invoke epistemic primacy or independence due to English being the socially more ‘powerful’, ‘official’, or ‘A-variant’ language within the heteroglossic dyad (cf. Fishman 1967). The second is that code-switching in responsive turns to realize epistemic work is a community-specific practice unique to the speech of Spanish-English bilinguals (in Southern California). In this section, I present a variety of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural examples in an effort to demonstrate that both of these assumptions are incorrect.

Let us begin by addressing the first of these potential misconceptions. It is true that Spanish constitutes the base language in the majority of the interactions included in the present dataset; and as a result, code-switches into English (such as those which we have presented thus far) are the most frequent. However, members of this bilingual speech community can also use English as their base language, in which case code-switches into Spanish are used to mark epistemic primacy or independence in responsive turns. This is consonant with previous conversation-analytic (e.g., Auer 1984, 1998) findings which maintain that it is the switch itself—as opposed to the direction of the switch—which is used to accomplish social action in bilingual talk. Furthermore, as we have argued here to be consonant with the function of repetitions in second position, it is the existence of structural break with the expectations of, and field of constraint established by, the prior turn which allows for epistemic work to be realized. This
analysis thereby underwrites the direction of the switch, as a structural break can be
accomplished by moving from Spanish to English, or English to Spanish.

In example (22) below, Vanessa announces to her aunt (Irene), that a family friend has
just found out that she (the friend) is pregnant and having a baby girl (lines 1-2). This
announcement gives rise to a more general observation by Vanessa that “Everyone’s getting
pregnant right now.” in line 6. Irene offers the exception of Marisol in line 7, which receives
acceptance and laughter from Vanessa. At this point, Vanessa announces her belief that Marisol
(and her partner) will not be having kids “Anytime soon.” (line 10), which she explicitly
assesses as a positive decision (lines 13/15-16). Observe Irene’s language-discordant response to
this first position assessment.

(22) 2013.Sum.100A.15, 10:55

01  VAN:  She’s pregnant.=
02          =and she found out today that she’s having a girl.
03  IRE:  Aw:=How ni[ce.
04  VAN:  ↑↑I know::: I’m so happy for her. (.) (    )
05 (0.7)
06  VAN:  Everyone’s getting pregnant right now.
07  IRE:  tch Except Marisol.
08  VAN:  Except M(h)aris:hhhh
09  IRE:  [hah hah hah hah hah=
10  VAN:  =I don’t think they’re gonna have kids Anytime soon.
11  IRE:  “You don’t think anytime soon,”
12  VAN:  hmm mm,
13  VAN:  Which is good.
14  IRE:  Mmhm?= 
15  VAN:  =Cuz they’re not being selfish and just,=
16  =⇒I’m gonna have a kid.
17    IRE:  −−⇒ No mientras: (.]
18          no while
19          No as long as: (.[
20  −−⇒ los dos estén de acuerdo está bien m’hija,=
21          the two are of agreement is good my-child
22          the two agree it’s fine dear,=
23  VAN:  =[ M m h m, ]
24  IRE:  ={(vamos) que]
25          we-go that
26          =(let’s go) that
The collaborative no-prefacing (with Spanish phonology) of Irene’s code-switched second assessment (beginning in line 17) clearly indicates that this turn is built as a response to Vanessa’s first assessment (Mendoza-Denton 1999). Irene’s utterance does not actually disagree with Vanessa’s point of view regarding Marisol’s decision, but it does introduce a consideration that the first assessment (with its unreserved positivity) apparently failed to recognize. Language discordance in this turn is used to claim the epistemic high ground that is needed in order to make this qualification of the preceding assessment.

Another instance of epistemic independence being marked through a code-switch from English to Spanish occurs in Excerpt (23) below. Here, Dora describes her first day of school and announces that she arrived late to one of her classes. There are two buildings called “Public Affairs” on the campus of the university that these friends attend, and Dora accounts for her tardiness by explaining that she went to the wrong one. One of her interlocutors (Ceci) affiliates with this confusion through a code-switched turn in line 9 which claims that the speaker— independent of the present telling—has also made the same mistake.

(23) 2013.Sum.100A.21, 5:30

01 DOR: [I was late.
02 CEC: [((nodding))
03 (3.0)
04 DOR: I WAS L:ATE cuz I went to the other= =s:tupid P(h)ublic Affairs building,
05 ANN: Mmm:::
06 CEC: [Oh the Public Affair[s.
07 DOR: [Ye::a::h.
09 CEC: -> Yo también pensé que era ese.
   I also thought that was that-one
   I too thought it was that one.
In line 7, Ceci’s change-of-state token and repetition demonstrate her understanding of Dora’s telling and assessment. In addition, she produces a code-switched line 9 which indexes her own independent experience in having been confused by the two buildings with the same name. Epistemic independence is agentively mobilized here in the interest of supporting the speaker’s interlocutor: The turn functions to affiliate with Dora’s telling and assessment of the building names as “sːtupid”—not only by referencing mutual experiential knowledge, but also by doing so with an epistemically marked, language-discordant design. Ceci thus orients to the potential “inference that [her] response is fabricated on the instant to achieve agreement” (Heritage 2002b: 200) by using a code-switch to convey the independent and un-coerced nature of her responsive action.

These two brief examples clarify that it was not the intrinsic ‘power of English’ that indexed epistemic authority in our previous excerpts, but rather the sequential positioning of English in response to Spanish. Similarly, in these most recent two cases, it was not the intrinsic ‘power of Spanish’ which served to index epistemic authority, but rather the sequential position of Spanish in response to English. Thus it is the code-switch itself—that is, the sequential juxtaposition of language-discordant turns—which accomplishes social action in bilingual talk-in-interaction through the structural break with the language constraints set by the prior turn, not the ordering of the languages which make up that juxtaposition. We will discuss the theoretical (and methodological) implications of this argument in greater detail in the following section.

Let us now consider the second issue mentioned above: Is the ability to assert rights to knowledge in responsive turns through code-switching a practice that is unique to the speech of Spanish-English bilinguals (in Southern California)? Reviewing data excerpts from a range of published analyses of naturally-produced bilingual discourse suggests that this social and
interactional resource is a pervasive one which is used in a variety of other situations of language and dialect contact. Below we reproduce a few examples from distinct language pairs and describe how the present, knowledge-based account of language discordance in responsive utterances can shed light on data from other speech communities as well.\(^8\)

In presenting the following Sicilian dialect/Italian example (24), Alfonzetti (1999: 191) says: “Two shop assistants are speaking ill of a colleague of theirs, who is envious of one of them because she has been promoted head of their department”. Note how Y’s assessment in line 3, designed to be affiliative with her co-worker’s (X’s) take on the situation, constitutes a step into X’s epistemic domain. X’s responsive turn—“Cetto, cetto!” / Of course, of course!— mobilizes a turn-initial code-switch to agentively assert primary authority over the content of the prior utterance, which simultaneously serves to affiliate with Y’s compliment.

(24) Sicilian Dialect (plain) / **Italian** (bold)
(Alfonzetti 1999: 192; modified)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Sicilian</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td><em>Aviss’a ffari tririci.</em></td>
<td><em>She’d need to win the pools.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td><em>O mi nni vàiu n pensioni (opuru) si nni va macari idda.</em></td>
<td><em>Either I would have to retire or she would go.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td><em>Tu ommai n’a viri cchiù a idda.</em></td>
<td><em>You by now are far ahead of her.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td><em>Cetto, cetto!</em></td>
<td><em>I’ve still got seven years of work left.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td><em>Fossi idda cchiu nnica è.</em></td>
<td><em>Maybe she’s younger.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar sequence is found in Paraskeva’s (2010) analysis of London-based Greek-Cypriots, reproduced as (25) below. Here, the author describes that the three female speakers are looking online for a particular watch: B is operating the computer, while A and C are standing

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\(^8\) Note that the notation conventions vary across these excerpts as not all of the previous authors used the Jeffersonian (2004) system. However, I am confident that this will not affect our discussion here given the level of granularity at which the present argument is based.
next to her, looking at the screen, and directing B to click on various items. Observe how A’s code-switched response works to re-claim knowledge over what the current task is, namely to find a specific (black) watch, after a failed attempt at doing so in line 3.

(25) English (plain) / Greek-Cypriot Dialect (bold)
(Paraskeva 2010: 117; modified)

01 A:     Yea go a bit further this way. There you go!
02 B:     Go↑! ((laugh follows her utterance))
03 A:     That’s it!
04 B:     No that’s got a white.
05      That’s white tan through it.
06 A:     Like the black thi:s. (showing a particular watch))
07 A:     Oh ok!
08 B:     No: you don’t want that=

09 A: => Οι χέλουμεν μαύρον!
       No we-want black
       No we want black.

10 (8.0)

Again, line 9 still constitutes agreement with B’s line 8, but the code-switched design insists that A has independent authority over this knowledge.

Gafaranga (2001) presents the following excerpt (26), taken from French-/Kinyarwanda-speaking Rwandese refugees living in Belgium, to illustrate the ways in which various identities (linguistic, national, educational, etc.) can become relevant and intertwined in interaction. He explains that “civil war has just erupted in Zaire and participants are talking about the consequences this is going to have on Rwandese refugees in that country” (1911). Code-switched responsive turns are produced by B and C after A’s announcement in lines 1-3.

(26) Kinyarwanda (plain) / French (bold)
(Gafaranga 2001: 1911; modified)

01 A:     ubu rero ab (.) ((C helping A to wine))
          no Zairians Zair (.)((C helping A to wine))
02       -> buretse (.) abazayirwa bagiywe gutan-
          wait a minute (.) Zairians are going to
In place of a change-of-state token, which would have acquiesced to having been informed by A's statement, B offers an assessment. As Gafaranga describes: “Although the threat of expulsion applies only to refugees in Zaire, B generalizes it to apply to all Rwandese refugees, including current participants. This allows him to shape his talk such that he can be seen to be speaking for the whole group of Rwandese refugees”. The French-language code-switch that launches B’s assessment thus serves to claim an independently-formed, knowledgeable identity over the current refugee situation; and Participant C does the same in personifying a Zairian point of view in line 7.

While the previous three excerpts involved knowledge over which one/multiple of the co-participants possessed intrinsic rights (e.g., inner/shared thoughts, opinions, desires), the last example illustrate negotiations over information about third parties, which constitutes an inherently more debatable epistemic territory. In this English/Hebrew interaction, two relatives (Grace and Shira) are discussing whether or not differences between boys and girls are innate, using their own children for comparison. As Maschler (1994: 340) describes:

The women conclude that it’s impossible to compare Talia [Grace’s daughter] and Yo’av [Shira’s son] because they are so different physically (lines 5-12). Grace then mentions another boy in their family, Gad (line 13), who is of the same build as Talia, and not necessarily of a very different personality (lines 16-18). Before Grace completes the comparison, Shira strongly agrees (lines 14-15), both with two occurrences of English right, as well as with the Hebrew naxon.
Although Maschler argues that “Hebrew naxon and English right occur at the same point in the discourse” and thus claims that “the words are indeed functional equivalents of each other, at least in that context” (339), the present analysis maintains that the code-switched version of the response is precisely what helps accomplish the “strong agreement” (340) that the author perceives in this turn. Particularly given that the first two language-concordant responses are produced in overlap with Grace, Shira’s third, language-discordant “naxon” highlights her equal, independent epistemic access to Gad’s body type now that she is interactionally ‘in the clear’.

6.6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This chapter began by re-asking a seemingly simple question that has been posed many times before: Where do code-switches occur, and why there? While we do not pretend to have answered this question in its entirety, we have proposed a method of doing so which takes the primacy of sequential position as its analytic point of departure. By restricting the sequential environment of interest, we were able to repeatedly examine the social and interactional significance of language-discordance across a range of speakers and languages, and in response to a variety of initial actions, to arrive at an explanation of what code-switching in responsive utterances accomplishes in bilingual talk-in-interaction.
The present analysis supports previous research (Auer 1984, 1995; Li Wei 1994, 2005) that describes the interactionally dispreferred nature of code-switched turns. We drew a parallel between language discordance and another class of nonconforming responsive utterance, namely repetitional responses, in arguing that code-switching in second position claims epistemic independence or primacy with regard to the knowledge invoked in the prior turn. These prior turns vary in terms of action-type (i.e., requests for information/confirmation, informings, assessments, announcements), but they have in common their inherent placement of the second speaker in an epistemically vulnerable or relatively downgraded position—be it through the underlying presuppositions that first position turns intrinsically embody, or be it simply by virtue of their having ‘gone first’. As previous work on monolingual discourse has demonstrated, second speakers can then design their responsive utterances in ways which (re)assert their rights to the knowledge in question. Here we have demonstrated that, in addition to the range of resources (lexical, syntactic, prosodic) that monolingual speakers possess, participants in bilingual talk-in-interaction can utilize language discordance as a resource for negotiating epistemic matters as well. This is due to the fact that language-discordant turns in second position make a structural break with the language terms, constraints, and expectations set up by the first position turn, and thus they agentively ‘push back’ on the design of that previous turn.

The multiple examples presented in this analysis underscore that the invocation of epistemic independence can be a resource for accomplishing a range of social and interpersonal objectives in interaction: (dis)agreement/(dis)affiliation, legitimization of an assessment, correction of a presupposition, and so on. This argument is supported by the fact that many of these code-switched turns are often expanded to include an account for or explanation of why the second speaker has primary authority over the knowledge at hand. In this sense, as Álvarez-
 Cáccamo (1990) argues, code-switching can be conceptualized as a contextualization cue (Gumperz 1982) which can be laminated onto elements of responsive turns in much the same way as prosody can be laminated onto a lexical item. Here we have offered an epistemic account of the specific significance that such a contextualization cue can invoke in interaction.

### 6.6.1 Ideological, Borrowing, or Sequential?

The structure of this analysis and the data included herein were selected to proactively combat incorrect assumptions about the nature of code-switching in responsive turns to claim epistemic rights. We addressed two of these in the last section of the analysis by presenting examples of code-switches from English to Spanish, as well as by including excerpts from a variety of other language pairs. It was argued, then, that this interactional resource: (i) is not due to solely ideological/hierarchical/diglossic differentials which give one language more ‘authority’ than the other, and (ii) is not unique to Spanish-English bilinguals.

An additional counterargument to the present analysis might look something like the following: Even conceding to the epistemic line of reasoning developed here, one could claim that these are not instances of ‘true’ code-switching, but rather that certain items have been borrowed into this contact variety of Spanish to accomplish epistemic work in bilingual grammar (cf., e.g., Lipski 2005; Pfaff 1979; cf. also Bybee 1985).

While such an argument might have been persuasive if we only saw a minimal, finite set of response tokens (e.g., “Yeah” and “I know”), an analysis based solely on borrowing is not able to account for the wide range of responsive turns which appear in the dataset. Looking just at a handful of the Spanish-English examples in the corpus, we have: ‘Yeah’, ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Nope’, ‘Nuh-uh’, ‘No way’, ‘Well’, ‘Right’, ‘Exactly’, ‘Why’, ‘I know’, etc., in addition to full clausal/phrasal turns such as ‘Yeah he will’, ‘So pretty’, ‘I don’t think so’, ‘You don’t even know qué es [‘what it is’]’, and ‘Like little snacks ‘n stuff’. Furthermore, these items are not
phonotactically adapted into Spanish as typically occurs in lexical borrowing (Lipski 2005); instead they maintain their distinctively American (Southern Californian) English phonological realizations from the very onset of the code-switched turn (cf. Bullock 2009; Bullock & Toribio 2009). Thus, while some of the more frequent of these response tokens may indeed be on their way to becoming incorporated borrowings, here I argue in favor of a more parsimonious model which considers all of these items as a single, natural class of code-switches given the common interactional work they accomplish vis-à-vis language-concordant responsive turns. That is, the coexistence of both ‘Sí’ and ‘Yeah’, for example, contrasts with the fully-integrated status of borrowed items like English ‘so’ which has almost completely replaced the Spanish equivalent ‘así que’ in the speech of Spanish-English bilinguals in the United States (Silva-Corvalán 1994: 173; Torres 2002). Nonetheless, it is quite probable that systematic deployment of code-switching in a given sequential context, as we have seen here, indeed constitutes a key factor in the semantic/pragmatic modification and integration of loanwords in bilingual communities over time (cf. Bybee 2006).

6.6.2 “Doing Being Bilingual”—Revisited

This discussion allows us to return to the “doing being bilingual” analyses which we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Recall Gafaranga’s (2001: 1922) claim that, in his data, “language alternation is not experienced as an activity of worry because participants are locally doing being bilingual in French and Kinyarwanda” (emphasis in original). He asserts that no preference exists for a single code to be used between the interactants who use language alternation as their medium. Thus, as Gafaranga and Torras (2002: 12) contend, “although two languages are used, participants do not take any notice of the difference between the two. In other words, they do not orient to the two languages as two distinct realities”.

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The basis for Gafaranga’s ethnomethodological claim is sound: Participants themselves must orient to the notions of, for example, ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’ as distinct if conversation analysts are to analyze switching between them as significant. Nonetheless, I maintain that, as analysts, we cannot presuppose that ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’ are “unnoticeable” to interactants for the purposes of “locally doing being bilingual” any more than we can presuppose that they are noticeable. Through repeated examination of the same sequential context, the present analysis has allowed us to interrogate these divergent possibilities to uncover participants’ own understandings of the linguistic code(s) they produce in talk. We have demonstrated that it is through their very production of responsive turns that interactants make distinctions between language-concordance and language-discordance—and therefore simultaneously between the languages ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’ (cf. Auer 1998). By systematically mobilizing language-discordance to accomplish socially relevant work in bilingual interaction, participants are—at the ground level of situated talk—re-constructing what is ‘Spanish’ and what is ‘English’ at the same time as they re-construct what is ‘being bilingual’. It is the interactants themselves who are ‘drawing lines in the sand’ between ‘Sí’ and ‘Yeah’, between ‘no’ [‘no] and ‘no’ [‘noʊ], and between ‘pues’, ‘bueno’, and ‘well’ through their sequential production of these utterances. It is Maribel herself, in Excerpt (17), who explicitly abandons the language-concordant “yo tam(poco)” / me neither in favor of the language-discordant “Yeah”, thereby revealing her orientation to the distinction between ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’ while at the same time mobilizing that distinction to achieve the epistemic objective of her responsive turn. We thus argue in favor of a reconceptualization of “doing being bilingual” as a medium in which the interactants meaningfully and systematically make use of language discordance for the purposes of social action.

Despite this reconceptualization, the present analysis supports Gafaranga’s more granular idea of “same medium speech” in viewing language alternation as not a deviant or
otherwise remarkable practice in bilingual talk. Rather, switching is a normative option (cf. Meeuwis & Bloomaert 1998) which factors into the normative repertoire of bilingual interactants. Thus, in responsive turns in which epistemic independence or primacy is deemed interactionally relevant by a speaker, it is not surprising to find a code-switch in place of language concordance in bilingual discourse, in the same way that it is not surprising to find a repetitional response in place of a type-conforming answer in monolingual English discourse. This thereby expands our understanding of the resources which can be used for epistemic work while simultaneously underscoring the fundamental salience of rights to knowledge in human social interaction as a whole.

6.6.3 Theories of Language Contact

The present analysis of bilingual practices not only contributes to our understanding of discourse, but also to the theoretical study of languages and dialects in contact. Researchers investigating a wide range of linguistic phenomena in situations of language/dialect contact consistently report outcomes such as simplification and accommodation (Kerswill 2002; Siegel 1985; Silva-Corvalán 1994, 1995; Trudgill 1986), leveling (Otheguy & Zentella 2012; Shin & Otheguy 2009), and, more recently, incomplete acquisition (Montrul 2008, 2009; Montrul & Potowski 2007). These speakers are thereby often depicted—albeit usually implicitly—as somehow communicatively ‘deficient’ compared to their monolingual (i.e., ‘standard’) counterparts who possess a wider repertoire of linguistic resources from which to choose.

What we have seen here at the discursive level, however, reminds us that speakers can also gain interactionally relevant tools through language contact. For example, as discussed in Excerpt (12), monolingual English has well-prefacing, and monolingual Spanish has bueno- and pues-prefacing. Interactants in bilingual talk not only have access to the social and interactional significance of well, bueno, and pues in language-concordant turns, but they are also able to
mobilize each of these in language-discordant sequential positions. The same is true of other resources such as multiple sayings (e.g., Excerpt (11)). In addition to the basic discursive meaning of the preface or the multiple saying, code-switching on these items laminates an account of epistemic independence and epistemic authority onto these turns-in-progress which their language-concordant equivalents do not. Bilingual speakers are thus found to have an additional set of resources for social action when compared to their monolingual counterparts. At a more overarching level, this suggests that contact linguistic theory might benefit from further exploring the idea of complexification in addition to simplification, particularly with regard to the moment-by-moment use of linguistic structures in interaction (Raymond 2012c; Trudgill 2011; cf. Britain & Trudgill 1999).

6.7 CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The present analysis serves to remind us that humans, as social beings, will make active use of their linguistic and interactional repertoires—including switching between them—for the purpose of social action. In this light, research on language concordance and discordance in talk is crucial for our understanding of human social interaction as a whole. Just as studies of code-switching phenomena have influenced the development of formal syntactic theory more generally (e.g., Muysken 1995), so too will continued discursive studies of code-switching contribute to a more general understanding of what Goffman called the “syntax of interaction” (Goffman 1971: 171-202; cf. Goffman 1967, 1984).

Although seemingly contrary to how a sophisticated dissertation chapter is ‘supposed’ to conclude, one of the theoretical thrusts of the present inquiry has been explicitly to not make any claim as to what code-switching accomplishes ‘in general’ in interaction. As we reviewed in Chapter 2, as well as in the background to this chapter, far too often do analysts take long stretches of talk with multiple switches and make a preemptive, all-inclusive assertion as to what
language alternation ‘does’ in bilingual talk. In Li Wei’s (1998: 157) words, such “analyst-oriented, theory-driven, top-down approaches continue to proliferate and dominate current studies of code-switching”. However, because different switches are produced in different sequential positions, they are inherently subject to divergent sets of interactional contingencies which must be taken into account.

Here I have pursued the same sequential context—responsive turns—across a variety of speakers in order to minimize sequence-based variation and uncover the systematicity of language alternation in that position as it relates to the accomplishment of social action. A natural next step, then, in addition to continued cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison, is to examine additional sequential contexts. Contrary to being made relevant by, and working within the preferences established by, preceding turns as in the case of the second position utterances analyzed here, first position turns accomplish important agenda-setting work in interaction—initiating sequences of action, establishing preferences, and so on. Li Wei (2005) has examined code-switched initiations of requests; what other action-types frequently occur with a code-switched design, and what interactional work does this accomplish for the co-participants? Undoubtedly more complex is the necessary analysis of turn-internal switches—both at turn-constructional unit (TCU) boundaries as well as within TCUs. It is only after the systematic, in-depth examination of language alternation in distinct sequential positions that we will be able to bring these findings together and thereby construct a more overarching theory of code-switching in general in bilingual talk-in-interaction.

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9 Examination of such turns may uncover parallels with syntactic analyses as well (e.g., ‘Free Morpheme Constraint’, Poplack 1980; ‘Functional Head Constraint’, Belazi, Rubin & Toribio 1994).
Conclusions:
Identity as an Interactional Achievement

The notion of identity—as well as conflicts which can arise from questions thereof—forms the heart of Franco-Lebanese author and member of the Académie française Amin Maalouf’s (1998) essay Les identités meurtrières (literally: ‘Deadly Identities’). In this work, the author writes: “L’identité n’est pas donnée une fois pour toutes, elle se construit et se transforme tout au long de l’existence” / ‘Identity is not given once and for all, it is constructed and transformed throughout one’s existence’.

While many researchers in the social sciences may agree with Maalouf’s observation in the abstract, relatively few incorporate a fluid interpretation of identity into their actual research. Take, for instance, the conceptualization of racial identity: “Even in disciplines where race is viewed as socially defined, most empirical studies continue to treat race as a fixed attribute of a particular individual” (Penner & Saperstein: 2008: 19628; cf. Davis 2001; Gossett 1997; Omi & Winant 1997; Telles & Lim 1998; Zuberi 2000). That is, race typically enters research as an unchanging, independent variable which will be correlated with or influence changing, dependent variables. But Penner and Saperstein explicitly problematize this view using longitudinal data from a representative sample of 12,686 Americans. They report that individuals who are/have been unemployed, incarcerated, or impoverished are both more likely to be seen by others as black as well as self-identify as black, and less likely to be seen by others and self-identify as white, and thus that “race is not a fixed individual attribute, but rather a changeable marker of status” (2008: 19628). Findings such as these invite social scientists of all sorts to reconsider how
we (should) understand and work with a concept that is as complex and multi-faceted as is human identity.

This dissertation has aimed to illustrate how elements of language—as tools for accomplishing social action—both reflect as well as constitute the processes of identity construction and transformation that we saw in the above quote by Maalouf. Crucially, this process is not one which occurs within the isolated individual, but rather it happens in and through our interaction with others. As Antaki, Condor, and Levine (1996: 479) put it:

> [Identities] never just appear, they are always used; they only make sense as part of an interactional structure..., and they are highly flexible. The participants use their identities as warrants or authority for a variety of claims they make and challenge, and the identities they invoke change as they are deployed to meet changing conversational demands (emphasis in original; cf. also Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985).

It is through the mobilization of the resources of language that our flexible identities are enacted, oriented and responded to, and thereby made relevant in moment-by-moment social interaction. As opposed to the census-like practice of checking boxes for an individual’s sex, age, socioeconomic status, and so on, here we have argued in favor of an understanding of identity as a sequentially-conditioned, malleable, and collaborative achievement between co-participants in talk.

### 7.1 WHERE WE HAVE BEEN

Methodologically, this dissertation has aimed to provide a concrete argument in favor of breaking down disciplinary boundaries in order to provide more comprehensive explanations of social phenomena through the deliberate intertwining of diverse perspectives. Recall Schegloff’s (1991: 46) description of Conversation Analysis as existing:

> at a point where linguistics and sociology (and several other disciplines, anthropology and psychology among them) meet. For the target of its inquiries stands where talk amounts to action, where action projects consequences in a structure and texture of interaction which the talk is itself progressively embodying and realizing, and where the particulars of the talk inform what actions are being done and what sort of social scene is being constituted.
Indeed, here we took as our point of departure a range of previous investigations into the morphosyntactic, semantic, and sociolinguistic aspects of person reference forms, verbal mood selection, and code-switching. While the existence of these linguistic features themselves was not particularly remarkable from a strictly philological or grammatical point of view—e.g., it is not a novel discovery that various dialects of Spanish possess formal and informal 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person reference forms—, our objective was to use an ethnomethodologically-grounded, conversation-analytic lens to reexamine their sequential deployment in actual instances of naturalistic discourse. How is it that these elements of language are mobilized by speakers to accomplish identity in the service of social action in interaction?

Chapter 4 investigated the use of the 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person reference forms tú, vos, and usted. We illustrated that these forms of address, by way of their underlying pragmatics, are an especially productive tool for realizing co-participants’ respective identities as each usage provides a new opportunity to recalibrate who the speaker and hearer are to one another, what context they are co-creating, and what actions are being attempted within that context—not ‘in general’, but rather at that precise moment. This naturally allows for shifts in identity to occur over the course of a single episode of talk: When a candidate for political office is describing his own plan for transportation reform, he may treat the interviewer as tú; but as soon as the interviewer issues a challenge to that plan, she suddenly receives usted from the interviewee. This overt pronominal shift both reflects as well as constitutes a shift in the landscape of identities being invoked between the interactants for the purposes of social action. In the chapter’s conclusion, it was posited that the ability to mobilize 2\textsuperscript{nd}-person reference forms in this way may constitute a common interactional feature between dialects (and even languages) which are otherwise divergent in terms of their pronominal repertoires.
Chapter 5 analyzed the use of indicative (*realis*) vs. subjunctive (*irrealis*) morphology in syntactic constructions that license the use of either mood. It was argued that accounts of verbal mood selection which are based solely on individual-level cognitive realities fall short of explaining the moment-by-moment production of morphology in naturalistic social interaction. Through careful examination of several segments of talk, we were able to move beyond a dichotomous ‘what speaker knows’ vs. ‘what hearer knows’—or even a ‘speaker knows better’ vs. ‘hearer knows better’—system, into a system which takes into consideration absolute vs. relative levels of knowledge as that knowledge becomes co-constructed between the participants. This was clearest in the examples in which Aydett talked about her brother Jason’s plans with her aunt Nancy. Here, the morphological selection between moods was not based solely on which interactant knew more about the plans in question: Nancy was equally lacking in knowledge for both of her *talvez*/*maybe*-prefaced turns, and yet one used the indicative and the other used the subjunctive. We argued that salient interpersonal work was accomplished through this modal selection process as the design of Nancy’s turns in each case managed to defer epistemic authority to Aydett while at the same time affiliating and supporting Aydett’s actions. Thus, in sum, we illustrated that speakers make their modal selections for a reason, and hearers, in turn, orient to those formulations, thereby reaffirming that there is “order at all points” (Sacks 1984a) in discourse—including at the morphological level.

In Chapter 6, we drew a parallel between language discordance and other sorts of nonconforming responsive utterances, arguing that code-switching in second position claims epistemic independence or primacy with regard to the knowledge invoked in the prior turn. Like repetitional responses in monolingual talk-in-interaction, code-switched turns in second position make a structural break with the language terms, constraints, and expectations set up by the first position turn, and thus they agentively resist the design of that previous turn to (re)assert their
rights to the knowledge in question. This analysis allowed us to concretely illustrate, following Auer (1998), that *through their very production of responsive turns*, interactants make distinctions between language-concordance and language-discordance—and therefore simultaneously between the languages ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’. For instance, it was Maribel herself who explicitly abandoned the language-concordant “yo tam(poco)” / *me either* in favor of the language-discordant “Yeah”, thereby revealing her orientation to the distinction between ‘Spanish’ and ‘English’ while at the same time mobilizing that distinction to achieve the epistemic objective of her responsive turn. We thus argued in favor of a reconceptualization of “doing being bilingual” as a medium in which the interactants meaningfully and systematically make use of language discordance for the purposes of social action.

### 7.2 WHERE WE ARE HEADED

Overall this dissertation has aimed to push (socio)linguists beyond the conceptualization of identity as an individual attribute, and toward an understanding of identity as a socially constructed (and re-constructed), emergent phenomenon. This more micro-level conceptualization of identity is relevant for the study of language because, as we have illustrated, the use of language is an integral component of how these identities are created—in and through social interaction with others.

In the specific case of Spanish, Cortés Rodríguez (2006) asserts that this is the natural next step in the intellectual history of Hispanic Linguistics, a field which has transitioned from overarching dialectological studies in the 1950s and 1960s, to sociolinguistic studies in the 1960s and 1970s, and then finally to different forms of discourse analysis in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. also Fox, et al. 2013). This dissertation has illustrated how Conversation Analysis, both as a theory and as a method, can provide researchers of Spanish-language discourse with an increased level of systematicity in their analyses. We purposefully selected a diverse range of
linguistic phenomena (lexical, morphological, morphosyntactic, pragmatic), to demonstrate the rich capability of CA to advance our understanding of a range of “classic problems of Spanish grammar” (Real Academia Española 2009: 1887). In the case of the phenomena analyzed here, as well as in future conversation-analytic studies of Spanish, by grounding investigations in “members’ resources” (Garfinkel 1967) for producing and recognizing action, we are able to see how identities are invoked through the real-time use of language and thereby ‘put to work’ in interaction.

Although recognized decades ago that sociolinguistic variables are in part discourse-conditioned (Labov & Fanshel 1977: 139), it is only relatively recently that spontaneous conversation has begun to make significant headway as a viable source of data in linguistics research in the United States. This is best evidenced by the special tutorial panel titled “Documenting Conversation”, organized by Jeff Good and Olivia Sammons, which recently took place at the 2014 Linguistic Society of America Annual Meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Continued documentation of cross-linguistic variation at the conversational level will, on the one hand, undoubtedly provide us with a better understanding of what divergent options exist in distinct linguistic systems and can therefore be mobilized in the service of social action. On the other hand, though, as emerged in our discussion following the panel’s conclusion, this same process will also uncover the commonalities that transcend individual languages to reveal universalities in human social interaction (cf., e.g., Enfield, et al. 2013; Stivers, et al. 2009; Stivers, Enfield & Levinson 2010).

Nevertheless, as Goffman reminds us, there will always be traditionalists and purists who will question the legitimacy of studying a phenomenon as seemingly ‘trivial’ as everyday conversation, insisting that “human social life is only a small irregular scab on the face of nature” (1983: 17). But the level of detail involved in social interaction merits careful, systematic
investigation if for no other reason than the simple fact that it is part of what makes us human. It is the means by which we construct our selves, our identities, our actions, and an entire “kaleidoscope of conjoint human conduct from shaking hands to making love” (Heritage 2009: 306).

So interaction may very well be this small irregular scab on the face of nature…“But,” Goffman says, “it's ours”.
APPENDIX I: Transcription Conventions

The data used in this study were transcribed according to the conventions layed out in Jefferson (2004), further exemplified in Heritage & Clayman (2010: 283-287).

1. Font

All of the transcripts make use of the font [Courier]. This is done deliberately as Courier is a monotype space font, meaning that each character (letter, punctuation, space, etc.) is given the same amount of horizontal space. This is contrary to fonts such as [Times New Roman] or [Calisto] (the font used for the prose of this work) which are proportional space fonts. Using a monotype font allows the reader to follow a transcript’s ‘flow’ more objectively, as proportional fonts can give the impression that words are shorter/longer than they are in relation to surrounding speech.

2. Layout

Each new line of transcript is numbered, and those line numbers are used to refer to specific points in the transcript in the prose analysis. The number is followed by a 3-letter abbreviation of the speaker of the line. Following this abbreviation begins the transcription of the individual’s speech. When a new speaker begins, the 3-letter abbreviation for that speaker is placed before his/her line.

The Spanish language lines in the transcripts are glossed in the following way:

### ID:          Original Spanish (with the CA conventions outlined below)
Morphological English gloss (without CA conventions)
English gloss (with approximated CA conventions from original)

For example:

01 CLR:     Eh (. ) habla español? 
um     speak.2s.USTED Spanish
Um (. ) do you speak Spanish?

Only the original lines of text are numbered, not the morphological gloss nor the English gloss.

3. Punctuation

Punctuation is not used for grammatical purposes in CA transcripts, but rather to show intonation (pitch) at the end of a turn-constructional unit (TCU). In this work, we generally make reference to four distinct intonational contours, with the following symbols used to indicate them:

- Question/Rising      ?    (question mark)
- Period               .     (period)
- Comma/Continuing     ,     (comma)
- Flat                 _     (underscore)

See APPENDIX II for spectrogram/pitch tracked examples of these intonational contours.
4. Overlap/Latching

Overlap refers to more than one individual speaking at the same time. To indicate this, brackets are used: left-side brackets “[” indicating where the overlap begins and right-side brackets “]” indicating where the overlap ended (if detectable). Note the following example in which a 911dispatcher overlaps with the interpreter’s speech:

(4.1) Overlap

102 INT:     (.) I’m gonna have to ask for clarification on
103          the street, [cuz I’m not able to under*stand [him.
104 911:     [O’kh- ]                         [Oh no=
105          =problem. (.) Thank you.

An equal sign (usually at the end of one line and the start of an ensuing one) indicates a “latched” relationship, meaning no silence at all between them. In the following example, there is no break between the end of interpreter’s line 28 and the beginning of 911’s line 29. They are not overlapped, however, which is why brackets are not used.

(4.2) Latching

28  LLa:     May I verify >the or<ganization please,=
29  911:     =>Mm↑hm< Newland County nine one one,

5. Other Notation

5.1 Single Parentheses

(0.5) Numbers in parentheses indicate periods of silence, in tenths of a second.

(.) A period in parentheses indicates a silence less than two-tenths of a second in length.

(está) Words in parentheses indicate that the transcriptionist is unsure about what exactly was said. This occasionally occurs in overlapped speech or when outside noise interferes with the recording. Parentheses are left empty if something was said but an approximation of the speech is not provided, e.g.: ( ).

5.2 Emphasis/Volume/Pitch

(está) Underlining indicates stress or emphasis. The underline is placed under whatever part(s) of the word(s) are emphasized. Note that this is not general lexical or phrasal stress, as every word has a stressed syllable and every phrasal contour shows stress at some point in its production. This is marked stress or emphasis which is beyond that of normal word itself. In this example, está (is) already has lexical (phonological) stress on the
syllable -tá; however, the speaker emphasized this part of the word further with pitch, increased amplitude, etc., and so underlining is used to indicate that added stress.

**ESTÁ** Capital letters indicate extremely loud or emphasized speech, often yelling.

es↑tá Up (↑) and down (↓) arrows indicate marked pitch rises/falls.

°está° Degree signs (°) indicate speech produced with lower volume compared to the surrounding talk.

### 5.3 Angle Brackets (Greater-than/Less-than Symbols)

<no está> < > around a word or phrase indicates that the speech within the symbols is stretched out longer than the surrounding speech.

>no está< > < around a word or phrase indicates that the speech within the symbols is condensed, rushed or ‘squished’ compared to the surrounding speech.

está.<Per A single less-than symbol indicates that the word following it is coming directly after the previous word, without any silence, called a ‘left push’. This often occurs between what would typically be considered separate turn-constructional units (TCUs), but the beginning of the second TCU is jumpstarted right next to the end of the previous TCU.

### 5.4 Colons

está: Indicate a lengthening of the sound just preceding the colon.

está::: More colons indicate more lengthening.

### 5.5 Hyphen

cla- Indicates an abrupt cut-off of a word which results in the production of a glottal stop. In this example, the Spanish word claro (clear) was cut off before reaching completion.

### 5.6 Non-words

hhh Aspiration/exhalation. More h’s indicate a longer aspiration. Also used to indicate breathing and laughter particles within words, e.g.: cl(hh)aro.

.hh h’s preceded by a period indicates an in-breath.
((sung)) Transcriptionist notes are indicated in double parentheses. Examples include descriptions of tone or pronunciation, e.g.: ((Spanish pronunciation)), to indicate aspects of the speech which other transcript notations cannot adequately portray.

-> Arrows in the margin point to lines of the transcript which are analyzed in the body of the text. The arrows may be numbered as well, e.g. 1--> or =>. Bolding is also used to draw attention to particular features within an arrowed turn.
APPENDIX II: Intonation Terminology and Exemplification

As described in APPENDIX I, most transcripts in this study include four (4) intonational contours. These are given in the chart below with a brief description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intonation Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Question”/“Rising”</td>
<td>Rising pitch at end of TCU</td>
<td>Hello?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Period”/“Falling”</td>
<td>Falling pitch at end of TCU</td>
<td>Hello.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Comma”/“Continuing”</td>
<td>Slightly rising pitch at end of TCU</td>
<td>Hello,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Flat”/“Level”</td>
<td>Level pitch at the end of TCU</td>
<td>Hello_</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE II.1: Intonation Terminology**

To exemplify what is meant by each of these descriptions, observe the following waveform, spectrogram and pitch track of the sentence: *Habla español?* (Do you speak Spanish?).\(^1\) An International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) transcription of the sentence is below the spectrogram, each segment lining up with where it appears in the spectrogram.

In the spectrogram (the bottom half of this image), the horizontal lines (thick, fuzzy and shaded black) are called formants. The lowest of these indicates voicing, meaning that the vocal chords

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1 Audio files were taken from various transcripts analyzed in this work. They were originally cropped and edited using the computer program Audacity (version 1.3.9) by Crook, et al. Waveform, spectrogram and pitch analyses were performed using Pratt (version 5.2.12), by Boersma and Weenink.
were vibrating to produce a sound at that time. Notice that there is a break in that lowest fuzzy band on the [s] and [p] consonants (in the center of the image). This is due to these constants being unvoiced.

More importantly for our discussion here, though, is the thin (not fuzzy) line that is laid over top of the spectrogram. This is called the pitch track. As the name suggests, it tracks the pitch (frequency measured in Hertz (Hz)) of the speech throughout the excerpt. Note again the same ‘break’ in the line that we saw before at the point of [sp]. As these two consonants are produced without using the vocal chords, they do not have a vocalized pitch to be tracked in Hertz, so the track stops momentarily.

As it is difficult to see superimposed on the spectrogram, here is the same pitch track in isolation:

![Pitch Track](image)

Note the rise in intonation at the end of this phrase on the last syllable [ńól] of Habla español? The pitch rises approximately 100 Hz from the [a] to the end of [ńól]. This is an example of Question (Rising) Intonation.

The other types of intonation are each exemplified below.

Figure II.2: Pitch Track: Question/Rising Intonation (Habla español?)

Note the rise in intonation at the end of this phrase on the last syllable [ńól] of Habla español? The pitch rises approximately 100 Hz from the [a] to the end of [ńól]. This is an example of Question (Rising) Intonation.

The other types of intonation are each exemplified below.
Period (Falling) Intonation

Phrase: In Loring.

**Figure II.3: Pitch Track: Period/Falling Intonation**

Note how the pitch falls on the last syllable –*ring* in “Loring”. Here we see a gradual drop off toward the end of the phrase, which is common, but instances of period intonation can be more abrupt as well.
Comma (Continuing) Intonation

Phrase: It's thirty one sixty four,

The pitch slightly rises at the end of the phrase (about 20 Hz) on the word “four”. But note that this rise is not nearly as high as the 100 Hz rise from our first example of Question Intonation with “Habla español?” This is called Comma or Continuing Intonation, which is the intonation used when continuing in lists, for example. Think of giving someone your phone number and pausing after the first three numbers to let the person write them down. The slight rise in pitch that is common at the end of those three numbers is a method of recognizing Comma/Continuing Intonation.

**Figure II.4: Pitch Track: Comma/Continuing Intonation**
Flat (Level) Intonation

Phrase: They are fighting out there_

There is no change in pitch at the end of the phrase on “there”. The pitch frequency (Hertz) remains level.
Recall that each of these intonational types is transcribed with *punctuation*. Therefore, a phrase which is grammatically a question can have falling intonation and thus be marked with a period, *not* with a question mark.

*Phrase:* Newland 911 what’s your emergency.

![Pitch Track: Period/Falling Intonation on Question](image)

**Figure II.6: Pitch Track: Period/Falling Intonation on Question**

The opposite scenario—a grammatically declarative statement with question/rising intonation—can occur as well.
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