JAPAN’S EMERGING VIEW OF SECURITY MULTILATERALISM IN ASIA

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BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY MULTILATERALISM IN ASIA

A discussion of multilateralism is perhaps best begun by posing the question, what is multilateralism? In the world of international relations, the term *multilateralism* means much more than its simple quantitative definition of relations among three or more parties. John Gerard Ruggie has described the qualities of multilateral institutions as (1) generalized principles shared by members, (2) indivisibility of welfare among participants, and (3) diffuse reciprocity. Generalized principles are rules that govern the behavior of multilateral institution members regardless of individual preferences. Ruggie illustrates generalized principles of conduct by using the most favored nation treatment in the economic sphere and by using collective security in the security sphere. Indivisibility of welfare means that costs and benefits are spread among members; for example, if troubles afflict one country, there would be ramifications for institution members. Their stakes are indivisible. International public goods are good examples of indivisibility. Diffuse reciprocity means that a member of a multilateral institution, in cooperating with other members, expects rewards, not necessarily on every issue all the time, but members do expect to benefit eventually. In other words, benefits to members of a multilateral institution are not immediate but are diffused over a longer timeline. Can we observe this kind of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific today?

In Europe and the Asia Pacific, multilateralism has painted a very contrasting landscape. Europe has a rich history of multilateral cooperation dating back to the European Concert of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, leading to the post-World War II multilateral constructs of the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to name a few.

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In sharp contrast, the Asia Pacific region has experienced nothing on a scale comparable to the European Concert, NATO, or the European Union (EU), though the Southeast Asia subregion established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 for multilateral political and economic cooperation. ASEAN, however, could not gain the kind of substantial momentum during the Cold War that it has today. International relations in the Asia Pacific grew mainly along bilateral lines, leaving the region devoid of intergovernmental multilateralism. Nonetheless, there have been some attempts to create multilateral organizations. On the economic front, in 1968, business leaders in Pacific Rim countries created the Pacific Basin Economic Conference (PBEC) to exchange views, and they have hosted annual plenary and steering committee meetings ever since. In 1980 the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was launched in Canberra following a meeting sponsored by Japan and Australia to examine the idea of economic cooperation in the region. Participation in PECC has been by a tripartite of entities; namely, government officials in their private capacities, members of the private sector, and academia. PECC holds a major conference every two years and sponsors forums and working groups on functional areas such as energy and trade policy; however, PECC did not develop into an intergovernmental process.

On the security front, ASEAN was far from being a multilateral security institution, as indicated in the declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) adopted in the first meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in 1971. Although the governing principle of “freedom” denotes an opposition to communism, the institution, which also upholds neutrality as a governing principle, can be regarded as pursuing a security agenda only indirectly at best.

The United States under the Truman administration considered the idea of a collective security system for the Pacific; the Eisenhower administration pursued the idea further and in 1955 set up the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to counter communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, but its limitations soon became apparent. Asian states were unwilling to discuss embarrassing security problems in the SEATO forums, and the United States was unwilling to have its activities scrutinized by SEATO. The wars in Laos and Vietnam illustrated SEATO’s inadequate handling of counterversion. By the mid-1960s, the SEATO alliance was no longer in the mainstream of security cooperation in Southeast Asia. Following the fall in April 1975 of the U.S. supported regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia, SEATO started to crumble and eventually dissolved on 20 June 1977. Simply put, SEATO did not work. The United States realized its shortcomings shortly after its creation in 1955, and began realigning itself accordingly, although SEATO was kept alive, at least in form, for twenty-two years.

What came closest to a NATO in the Asia Pacific was the ANZUS Treaty or Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which was concluded in 1951. Australia was concerned about a re-militarization of Japan and wanted to have an alliance with the United States. However, as the Cold War progressed, by the mid-1950s the target of ANZUS shifted to preventing the spread of communism.

Nations of the Asia Pacific, therefore, found that a bilateral, rather than a multilateral, approach was more appropriate, particularly for security issues. They opted for mutual security treaties, mainly with the United States, which resulted in the so-called hub-and-spoke type of security architecture in the Asia Pacific.

Why did the Asia Pacific lack regional multilateral security institutions? The factors most frequently cited are the region’s extreme diversity in terms of population, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), economic and political systems, military preparedness, cultural heritage, religion, historical experience, and ethnicity. Differences in population range from China’s, at 1.2 billion, to Brunei’s, at 300,000; per capita GDP ranges from the United States, Canada, and Japan at the high end of the scale to Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos on the low end. Ethnic makeup also ranges from countries like Japan and Korea, which are ethnically homogeneous, to Singapore and Malaysia, which have a dynamic mix of ethnic groups. This diversity among potential members of an Asian multilateral institution has been the major inhibiting factor in creating a regional institution because potential members they do not share common behavioral norms.

Another reason often given for the absence of multilateral security institutions is the lack of a shared perception of threat as well as a lack of shared values to uphold in the Asia Pacific. In the case of NATO during the Cold War, members shared a common enemy in the Soviet Union and had common values, namely liberal democracy, the market economy, and preventing the spread of communism by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, states in the Asia Pacific have been more or less afraid of each other and have thus lacked a perception of a common external threat. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the common
threat for the United States, Japan, Canada, and China (after its confrontation with the Soviet Union). However, threats for other countries were various; Korea’s threat was China, Vietnam’s threat was China, and ASEAN’s threat was domestic instability. During the Cold War, Asia did not have the conditions needed to create a multilateral alliance similar to NATO.

Some scholars have argued that another reason why Asia has long been resistant to multilateralism is because of its history of domination by external powers in the region. Imperial China’s longstanding colonial dominance up until the middle of the nineteenth century was followed by Western colonial domination, and then by the Japanese prewar attempt to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Wary of being ruled by other powers and having their interests marginalized, Asian countries had thus avoided forming a multilateral institution. The loss of sovereignty is not a distant memory in some Asian countries.

This landscape, however, started to change in the 1990s. As a result of growing economic interdependence, including an increase of intraregional trade among Asia Pacific economies, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference was launched as an informal dialogue on economic cooperation in November 1989. Coincidentally, this was the same month the Berlin Wall, symbol of the Cold War, came tumbling down. With the successful evolution of APEC, despite the initial skepticism of such an intergovernmental regional framework, the impetus to create a regional security organization gradually followed.

So what kind of regional security order has evolved in the Asia-Pacific, if any? First let us consider the three major types of regional security mechanisms and then view them in the Asia Pacific context. They are (1) a collective defense institution that requires a common threat or an enemy shared by member states, such as NATO; (2) a concert-type multilateral security cooperation short of collective defense alliance or enforcement mechanisms necessary to deter an aggressor state, such as the European Concert or entente cordiale after the Napoleonic War—a concert regulates relations among major powers by sharing information about capabilities and intentions and by creating norms of cooperation; and (3) security dialogue forums, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Of these three types of regional security mechanisms, Asia does not have the first type and will most likely be unable to create one in the foreseeable future. Asia does not embrace the second type of structure encompassing the whole region, since countries do not share strong enough incentives to act together. Each country seems to have its own concerns and threats that are not necessarily shared by the whole region. However, some Asian countries have formed issue-specific coalitions such as the cases of Cambodian peace in the early 1990s and the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) formed in the mid-1990s to manage the question of nuclear power development by the DPRK.

Meanwhile, in the 1990s several of the third type of architectures, security dialogues, have emerged in the Asia Pacific. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the most notable example. Some subregional security discourses have the potential to work as a concert of powers, if they do not do so already.

**JAPAN’S MULTILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION UNTIL THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

During the Cold War, bilateralism—or more specifically a bilateral alliance with the United States—was at the core of Japan’s security policy, leaving little room for multilateralism. This is an inevitable consequence of the dearth of multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific as well as of the bitter taste left in Japan’s mouth from experiences of the period prior to World War II.

Japan made its debut at a multilateral forum for the first time after the Meiji Restoration (1867) when it was invited to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as one of the victorious powers of World War I. Up until that point, an alliance with the United Kingdom had been the mainstay of Japan’s foreign relations. In Paris, having been selected to be a part of a supreme executive Council of Ten, which consisted of two delegates each from the five major victorious powers, “Japan felt that it was finally recognized as a power not only in Asia but also in the world.” Reporting on the Paris Peace

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Conference, the Japanese media trumpeted that Japan had finally become a “first-class country.”

In the ensuing negotiations, however, the Japanese contribution was dismal, because the delegation, headed by Kinmochi Saionji, was instructed from Tokyo to simply follow the majority positions expressed at the Peace Conference, in particular that of the United Kingdom, unless an issue was to undermine Japanese interests. When the creation of a draft committee on a Covenant of the League of Nations was discussed on 25 January, according to the U.S. daily newspaper *The New York Sun*, “delegations in turn made speeches to favor the creation of the League of Nations. What attracted the attention of the attendees was the Japanese delegation who buried their heads in their notebooks busy taking notes and did not utter a word.” Silent during most of the Paris Peace Conference, Japan failed to fulfill its role as a first-class country and subsequently was humiliatingly dubbed the “silent partner.”

Another multilateral forum Japan was invited to attend was the Washington Naval Conference held from November 1921 to February 1922. The United States took the initiative to convene the conference to control the naval armament race. The conference produced the Washington Treaty, reducing the number of warships and carriers to a ratio of 10:10:6 among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, respectively. Since Japan wanted to achieve the ratio of 10:10:7, the conference left Japan terribly dissatisfied. More importantly, the conference also terminated the U.K.–Japan alliance, which had been the core of Japanese foreign policy, and replaced it with the Four-Power Treaty on the Pacific, committing to respect the sovereign rights of signatories, that is, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The conference also produced the Nine-Power Treaty on China signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, China, and Portugal. This treaty committed signatories to honoring the sovereign right, independence, and territorial and administrative preservation of China; and it aimed to prevent any further aggression of Japan into China.

The United States introduced these multilateral treaties in order to end the U.K.–Japan bilateral alliance that had been the core of Japanese foreign relations and that had supported the Japanese war against Russia and China. But the new multilateral treaties produced at the Washington Conference were much weaker than the bilateral Japan–U.K. alliance, which, in retrospect, left Japan feeling somewhat insecure. Therefore, Japan sought a new, stronger alliance after the Washington Conference, leading to the subsequent Axis alliance with Germany and Italy and to World War II.

Despite Japanese dissatisfaction over the outcome of the Washington Conference, then-Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara did try to honor the Versailles–Washington System and to maintain multilateral cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom. Although some in Japan argued that the time was ripe for further expansion into China in order to take advantage of Chinese domestic instability at the time, Shidehara honored the Washington agreement of nonintervention. In 1927, the United Kingdom and subsequently the United States asked Japan to join their alliance by sending Japanese troops to China when Shanghai, inhabited by many foreigners, including Japanese, was about to be hit by the Chinese reformist army. Shidehara rejected the request. In his foreign policy, with the exception of dispatching Japanese troops to China, Shidehara collaborated closely with the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, he worked relatively more closely with the United States than with Japan’s traditional ally, the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka, who rose through the ranks of the Japanese Army, was dissatisfied with the Washington system. When Tanaka later succeeded Shidehara as foreign minister in April 1927, he took a different approach than his predecessor, however, and did not hesitate to use military force to secure Japanese interests overall and in China in particular; for example, Tanaka sent troops to Shandong Province in June 1927. Tensions escalated, culminating with a railway explosion that later became known as the Manchurian Incident of September 1931.

The League of Nations was concerned with this Japanese expansionism in China and sent an investigatory mission headed by Victor A. G. B. Lytton in response to a Chinese request. Based on the mission’s findings in 1932, a resolution was adopted on 24 February 1933 charging Japan with undertaking aggressive activities in China; the vote on the resolution showed forty-two in favor, one against (Japan); and one abstention (Thailand). Japan responded to the accusation by withdrawing from the League, of which it was a founding member, in March 1933. The League of Nations’ response to the Manchurian Incident did not help to enhance Japan’s sympathy toward multilateralism. From that point on, Japan was isolated from the

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8. Ibid., *Rinen naki gaiko*, p. 156.
international community—except Germany and Italy, with whom Japan entered World War II in alliance—until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed nearly two decades later.

Emerging from World War II in defeat, Japan was very anxious to return to the international community, the symbol of which in the eyes of the Japanese was accession to the UN. In the 1950s Japan had embraced a very idealistic image of the UN to the extent that it expected the UN to protect Japan’s national security. This euphoria or idealism about the UN, however, was short-lived. With the paralysis of the UN collective security by the Cold War divide, Japan naturally leaned on the U.S.–Japan security alliance for security and foreign policy; this reliance was well reflected in what has been called the Yoshida Doctrine, which was established as Japan’s foreign policy during Shigeru Yoshida’s tenure as prime minister until December 1954.

The first tenet of the Yoshida Doctrine was for Japan to belong to the Western camp in the Cold War divide, particularly placing its alliance with the United States as the core of Japanese foreign policy. The second tenet of the doctrine was to rely on U.S. military force to defend Japan from external threats based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and in return to provide base facilities for U.S. military forces in Japan. Yoshida aimed at minimizing Japan’s own defense preparedness and prioritized economic reconstruction over military buildup. The third tenet of the doctrine was to emphasize economic diplomacy. Yoshida underscored close economic relations with the United States, with its abundance of raw materials and a huge market for Japanese manufactured products, as well as collaboration with the international economic community.

The Yoshida Doctrine prevailed more or less throughout the Cold War. Although Japan enunciated “UN-centered diplomacy” as one of the three pillars of its foreign policy when it joined the UN, the paralysis of the UN itself along the Cold War divide did not leave much room for Japan to truly exercise this policy. This left Japan with bilateral relations as a main venue for its foreign policy. Japan was not in a position to lead multilateral security relations, given its constitution and the role of the Self-Defense Forces designated as defense only. Some scholars argue that Japan’s aggressive past in East Asia prevented it from taking any initiative in multilateral settings for fear that neighbors in the region might harbor deep suspicions about its true intention.9

As a matter of fact, proposals on multilateral security cooperation came from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev first proposed an Asian Community on Security in 1969. The region received this proposal as mere propaganda at best. Later, when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a Pacific Ocean Conference along the lines of the Helsinki Conference in his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, and a regionwide security consultative community with a seven-point proposal in his Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988, the region, including Japan, again received Gorbachev’s proposals as mere propaganda. Moreover, the Soviet proposals included a freeze on naval forces in the western Pacific, limitations on air and naval forces around the Korean peninsula, and nuclear-free zones for Korea and for the Indian Ocean; Japan saw the proposal as aiming at naval disarmament to the advantage of the Soviet Union, since in the Asia Pacific theater the Soviets had inferior naval capabilities and superior ground power vis-à-vis the United States. Japan also saw the Soviet Union’s proposal on a multilateral forum as a means to drive a wedge into the Japan–U.S. security alliance. Thus, Japan did not take up the Soviet proposal for multilateralism in the Asia Pacific.

POST–COLD WAR EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S SECURITY MULTILATERALISM

Around the end of the Cold War, regional multilateral proposals emerged from countries other than the Soviet Union. In 1990, when Australian and Canadian foreign ministers first proposed an Asian version of the CSCE, the region was not ready to accept the idea. Whereas Canadian external affairs minister Joe Clark’s proposal was an adaptation of the CSCE to the North Pacific, the Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans proposed that the whole of Asia adopt CSCE and call it CSA.

These proposals, strongly influenced by the success of the CSCE, were received coldly, if not rejected outright, by ASEAN, China, and the United States.10 Japan also rejected a “CSCE” idea

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9. On Japan’s reputation problem, see Barry Buzan, “Japan’s
10. In July 1990, Senator Gareth Evans, Australian Minister for
on the grounds that security imperatives are different in the Asia-Pacific region from those in Europe and therefore require different mechanisms to maintain security. Specifically, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in July 1990 stated that it was too early for an Asian CSCE.11

In August 1990 Japan’s Foreign Ministry rejected both the Canadian and Australian proposals by saying that “Japan doubts if such a grouping could produce fruitful results. . . . Conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region would be better settled through meetings of the concerned parties rather than at an international security forum.”12 Japan argued that Asia needed Asian solutions for its security needs, tantamount to a web of bilateral alliances. Japan was still very skeptical of the virtue of security multilateralism that might undermine its bilateral alliance with the United States, with memories of the 1920–21 Washington Conference in mind. Japan was also said to be concerned that a CSCE-type security construct would obstruct the settlement of the Northern Territories issue.

The Nakayama Proposal

As signs of the Cold War have dissipated, however, Japan has seen the new Russia, the traditional advocate of security multilateralism in the region, pursuing democracy and sharing more or less the same values as Japan. This transition has led to a change in the Japanese position on regional security cooperation.

Japan reversed its position conspicuously on regional security multilateralism after Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo in April 1991, which marked the first visit by the head of the Soviet Union to Japan. During his visit to Japan, Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union no longer opposed the U.S.–Japan alliance.13 This removed Japan’s concern about Russia secretly wanting to drive a wedge into the Japan–U.S. security alliance with multilateral security proposals and signaled a shift in Japan’s foreign policy toward Russia, from disengagement to engagement. As a manifestation of this shift, Japan announced during Gorbachev’s visit that it welcomed Soviet participation in PECC.14

Japan’s next step was taken by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in his speech at the ASEAN-PMC in July 1991. He proposed the creation of a multilateral security dialogue within the ASEAN-PMC framework. This initiative represented Japan’s first regional security initiative since the end of World War II. However, Nakayama’s proposal did not get much support in the meeting. Prior to this proposal, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in ASEAN countries (ASEAN-ISIS) met in Jakarta in June 1991 to discuss its recommendations to the fourth ASEAN summit to be held in Singapore the following year. The meeting adopted the memorandum entitled “An ASEAN Initiative for an Asia-Pacific Political Dialogue,” which proposed looking into the creation of a multilateral security framework, Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific, or CSPAP, using the existing institution, namely ASEAN-PMC. The meeting declared as follows: “[ASEAN] should be a creative initiator as well as an active participant . . . for maintaining peace in the region. . . . We propose that at the end of each PMC an ASEAN-PMC–initiated conference be held at a suitable retreat which will allow for the appropriate ambience for the constructive discussion of Asia-Pacific stability and peace.”15

Immediately following the ASEAN-ISIS meeting in Jakarta, the Foreign Office of the Philippines hosted the Conference on ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s. This conference made similar proposals to enhance and expand the function of ASEAN-PMC for a security dialogue.16 This new ASEAN position on regional security cooperation was said to have stemmed from its concern about a possible withdrawal of the U.S. military from Asia.

Regional security cooperation was designed to be an insurance policy in the case of an American departure. Some in ASEAN cite Japan as a reason for creating a multilateral institution in the Asia Pacific. Kusuma Snitwongse of the Thai In-

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15. ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), A Time for Initiative: Proposals for Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, pp. 9–10.
stitute for Strategic Studies, for example, argues that “ASEAN members are concerned that if there is a rupture in the U.S.–Japan military alliance or if the United States reduces its military operations, Japan might be left with the feeling that it has to undertake its own defense.” Kusuma also noted that “the U.S.–Japan conflicts over trade issues appear at times disturbing, fraught with the potential to create a decisive rift between the two countries.” 17

Ambassador Yukio Satoh, then Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s Intelligence and Analysis Bureau was invited to the Jakarta and Manila meetings held in June 1991. He agreed with the ASEAN participants that the time was ripe for establishing an Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue, which led him to recommend the proposal to then-Foreign Minister Nakayama. Nakayama’s proposal was in line with the recommendation of the ASEAN-ISIS conference held in Jakarta.

Nonetheless, neither the ASEAN-PMC dialogue partners nor even the ASEAN members received this proposal warmly. Thus, the question remained as to why the proposal was not accepted at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC meeting. Various explanations were given. Some observers strongly underscored the lack of prior consultation with member states before submitting the official proposal and the fear of Japan assuming a leadership role in regional security. Another plausible explanation is that the memorandum was for the next ASEAN summit held in Singapore in February 1992, and the Nakayama proposal surfaced too soon in an official setting. Some scholars have pointed out that ASEAN, which wanted to expand the membership of a new security forum beyond ASEAN-PMC members by including China, Russia, and the DPRK, was uncomfortable with Nakayama’s idea of limiting membership to ASEAN-PMC. Moreover, ASEAN members were uneasy with Nakayama’s proposal to create a Senior Official Meeting (SOM) for a new security forum, since ASEAN did not want to create an image that the PMC would be perceived as a security forum rather than a more general economic forum. 18

Notwithstanding this rather unsuccessful experience, Japan remained supportive of the idea of a regional security dialogue. 19 Two years after Nakayama’s proposal, in July 1993, the ASEAN-PMC in Singapore did agree to create the ARF along the lines that Nakayama had proposed. By this time, others in the region had also shifted their positions about a multilateral security dialogue. ARF held its first ministerial-level meeting in July 1994 in Bangkok between the ASEAN ministerial and PMC meetings.

Clearly ARF was created as the third type of security mechanism described earlier, namely, a security dialogue. ARF agreed to promote dialogue in political and security issues of common interest and concern in the Asia-Pacific region and committed to a gradual three-stage evolution from (1) confidence building and (2) preventive diplomacy to (3) a body capable in the longer term of developing approaches to conflict resolution as stipulated in the Second ARF Chairman’s Statement made in Brunei in August 1995. Japan has been supportive of the ARF since its inception, if not earlier, by chairing and hosting a variety of ARF meetings.

**Japan’s Engagement in Track-one Security Dialogues in the Asia Pacific**

In the 1990s Japan has been very forthcoming in promoting bilateral political/security/military dialogues (Figure 1). These bilateral dialogues have laid the groundwork for Japan’s engagement in multilateral security dialogues, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Since the creation of ARF, Japan, mainly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and subsequently the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) since 1996, has been a strong supporter of the process. In addition, the JDA has taken its own initiatives in hosting track-one dialogues, as shown in Figure 2, and in January 1997 created an International Policy Planning Division in the Bureau of Defense Policy to promote these dialogues. This activism is a reflection of a change in the Asian security landscape, namely the disappearance of the bipolar structure, as reflected in the 1995 National Defense Program Outline.

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19. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made several initiatives promoting security multilateralism. In his address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. in July 1992 he noted that Japan would like to create and engage in political dialogues using ASEAN-PMC as a forum to enhance mutual reassurances. Prime Minister Miyazawa also alluded to a security dialogue in his address to the CSIS Councilors meeting in Tokyo in October 1992 and a major policy address in Bangkok in January 1993.
The forerunner of this new policy can be found in the 1994 findings of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa’s Special Advisory Committee on Defense Issues, which produced a report calling for new defense policies comprising enhanced indigenous defense capabilities, the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and utilization of multilateral security forums. This report served as a basis for a new National Defense Program Outline adopted by the Murayama Cabinet in 1995 that revised the 1976 National Defense Program Outline.

The new outline alludes to the intensified interdependence of nations and recognizes the future roles of defense capability: (1) national defense, (2) response to large-scale disasters and various other situations, and (3) contributions toward creating a more stable security environment. The third role embraces promoting security dialogues and exchanging defense officials. Since 1997, the JDA’s annual white paper, Defense of Japan, has included a separate section devoted to this role entitled “Contributions to the Creation of a More Stable Security Environment.” The section acknowledges the importance of a stable security environment as one of the roles of defense capabilities and notes that this can be achieved “by increasing the transparency of each country’s armaments and defense policy, and by deepening mutually trustful relations through dialogues and exchanges among defense authorities.”

The JDA is actively taking part not only in Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) of the ARF but also in the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) regarding cooperative activities such as UN peacekeeping activities as well as search-and-rescue capabilities.

In addition to the ARF and the bilateral defense exchanges ranging from port calls to senior officials’ visits, JDA and its affiliated organizations have taken initiatives in hosting multilateral forums to promote exchanges in the region in the 1990s in response to the new thrust of the National Defense Outline, as shown in Figure 2. For example, the JDA has hosted a forum for defense authorities in the Asia-Pacific region since 1996 by inviting defense policymakers from countries in the region, the third meeting of which was held in October 1998. The National Institute for Defense Studies has provided a venue for a multinational security dialogue every year since 1994 by inviting mid-level military officers from countries in the Asia-Pacific region for the Asia-Pacific Security Seminar. Sixteen countries attended the fourth meeting, held in November 1997, and discussed their security policies, the security environment in the Asia Pacific, and confidence building.

Moreover, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has been participating in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) ever since its second session. The WPNS has been held every other year since 1988; its goal is to further mutual understanding among countries in the West Pacific area. Japan hosted the fifth WPNS in 1996. The MSDF also organized the first seminar of Naval Academies in the Asia Pacific and had exchanges of information between instructors who attended from the United States, Russia, Australia, and the ROK. The ASDF has hosted International Seminars on International Air Defense by inviting Air Force Academy personnel to exchange views on the training of senior officers since 1996. Japan has also participated as a formal member in the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) since the twenty-fourth meeting in 1995. PASOLS is a forum for developing trust through the exchange of information regarding logistical support among the thirty Asia-Pacific countries participating.

When former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton announced a new Joint Security Declaration in 1996, which reaffirmed the continuing importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, they also embraced multilateral security dialogues and cooperation by stating that “The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed
that the two governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and, eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.”

Furthermore, reflecting the intensive bilateral summits held in the fall of 1997 among Northeast Asian countries, Japanese prime ministers have since encouraged the creation of additional multilateral dialogue processes, particularly in Northeast Asia where such a process at the track-one level is lacking. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, in his General Policy Speech to the Diet on 16 February 1998, stated that “the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region hinges on Japan, the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation building mutual ties based on confidence and cooperation.”

Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi in his foreign policy speech on the same day further stated that “in the Asia-Pacific region, to which Japan belongs, it is essential to ensure cooperation among Japan, the United States, China, and Russia towards the establishment of a framework for peace and stability in the region. I believe that as these quadrupartite relations evolve, we should be aware of the possibility of the four nations meeting together in the future to have discussions on various matters of mutual concern.”

Prime Minister Obuchi in the summit meeting with President Clinton in New York on 23 September 1998 alluded to further regional multilateral dialogue and stated that “although I am fully aware that it would not be realized immediately, looking towards the future we should look into the creation of a forum to discuss security and confidence building of Northeast Asia.”

Japan’s Engagement in Track-two Security Dialogues in the Asia Pacific

Supplementing the track-one process, as shown in Figure 3, track-two multilateral dialogues have flourished since the mid-1980s in the Asia Pacific and continue to evolve, amounting to more than one hundred meetings in 1997. This is evidence of the tremendous growth of multilateral security dialogues in the region from almost none a decade ago.

Here, a definition of tracks one and two might be in order. Track-one, or the first track as it is sometimes called, represents the official governmental channel for political and security dialogue. Participants in track-one meetings attend as representatives of their respective states. Discussions, though often informal in terms of style or setting, are assumed to be official statements of national policy. The principal track-one organization in regional security for Asia is the ARF. The term track-two was coined in 1982 by Joseph Montville of the Foreign Service Institute to describe “methods of diplomacy that are outside the formal governmental system.” In literature on Asia-Pacific security, track-two, or the second track, is the unofficial channel for political, economic, and security dialogue in the region. Track-two meetings and organizations are typically made up of scholars as well as civilian and military officials acting in their private or unofficial capacities.

The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the most inclusive track-two dialogue in the Asia Pacific. According to Seizaburo Sato, the idea emerged among Amos Joe Jordan of CSIS, Jusuf Wanandi, and Seizaburo Sato in an airplane on their way back from a PECC meeting in Hawaii as they agreed that a security version of PECC should also be created. Han Sung-Joo, from South Korea, later joined this seed group. The idea was proposed officially at a meeting of Asia-Pacific think tanks in Seoul in November 1992. It was the fourth meeting on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific organized by the Pacific Forum/CSIS, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and the ASEAN-ISIS. Participants of the meeting agreed that “conditions were ripe for the creation of a PECC-like institutional process focusing on security issues.” The meeting adopted the Seoul Statement, and the CSCAP Steering Committee was formed.

CSCAP is a multilateral, nongovernmental organization that links regional, security-oriented research institutes. Participating countries form member committees composed of academics, busi-

ness executives, security specialists, and current foreign ministry and defense officials. CSCAP has created working groups on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), comprehensive and cooperative security, maritime security cooperation in the North Pacific, and a study group on transnational crime. The formal charter of CSCAP was approved by the steering committee in Lombok, Indonesia, in December 1993. Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga of CSCAP-Japan, who co-chaired the CSCAP Steering Committee, added momentum to the CSCAP process by facilitating Chinese participation in December 1996, making the institution even more inclusive. The DPRK attends CSCAP through Pyongyang’s Institute of Disarmament and Peace and attends steering committee meetings and the CSBM and North Pacific Working Group meetings. CSCAP is the most inclusive security dialogue in the Asia Pacific, as Figure 3 shows, and seems to be aiming to be a track-two in support of the ARF, since its working groups take up much of the ARF agenda.

The subregion of Northeast Asia has the strongest vestiges from the Cold War era, including the divided Korean Peninsula and thorny territorial issues. Because of its rivalries and distrust, the subregion remains one of the toughest areas in terms of security relations in the world. Thus, even an organization as limited as the ARF, which is still at the phase CSCE was at during the Cold War, had difficulty establishing a foothold in Northeast Asia. However, the subregion has witnessed improvements in the security outlook, aided partly by bilateral summits held in the fall of 1997 as well as by the Four-Party Talks currently underway. The subregion, taking advantage of this momentum for cooperation, has proposed subregional cooperative processes, including an idea to create a subregional development bank, the creation of ANEA (Association of Northeast Asian Nations), and a Northeast Asia Energy and Environment Community. The latter has particularly been promoted as a feasibility study for a natural gas pipeline from Irkutsk to China and eventually to Japan.

In the subregion of Northeast Asia, numerous track-two dialogues are flourishing.30 A notable example, which Japan has supported, is the North Pacific Working Group of CSCAP, which is now attended by all the North Pacific countries, including the DPRK. Another example is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), which was launched in 1993. Its origin traces back to the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). In September 1990, Canadian foreign minister Joe Clark proposed NPCSD, which held seven conferences and workshops between April 1991 and March 1993 on topics such as unconventional security issues, regional confidence-building measures, and the connections between history, culture, and the prospects for regional security cooperation. Participants in NPCSD included academics and officials in their private capacities from Canada, China, the DPRK, Japan, Mongolia, the ROK, Russia, and the United States.31

Professor Susan Shirk, then Director of University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) attended the last meeting of NPCSD in March 1993 and saw value in multilateral security/political discourse like NPCSD. She approached the Clinton administration and others informally with an idea for hosting a track-two conference for Northeast Asia, less inclusive than NPCSD. The reaction to her proposal from the State Department was positive.32 Professor Shirk invited government and academic persons from China, Japan, Russia, the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK to attend the planning conference in July 1993 for a track-two multilateral conference on security in Northeast Asia. The meeting supported her proposal and agreed to call the conference “the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).” It was agreed that two academics and two government personnel from each of the six countries would attend. It was also agreed that NEACD would operate on the basis of consensus. The agenda of the meeting was agreed to include security issues as well as nontraditional security issues such as economic and environmental issues, the latter of which has always been included in the dialogue agenda.

The first meeting of the NEACD was held in October 1993 in La Jolla, California, at which it was agreed to expand the participation of defense representatives by extending invitations for participants from both the defense ministries and the armed forces of each participating country.

30. East West Center of the University of Hawaii sponsors the Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAFE), since 1991, which discusses peaceful prosperity of Northeast Asia more from nontraditional security.


JAPAN'S EMERGING VIEW OF SECURITY MULTILATERALISM

NEACD has been unique in pioneering the involvement of military uniformed personnel in the security dialogue process of a multilateral forum. Since the NEACD’s initiative in this vein, the subregion has witnessed more frequent exchanges among defense personnel both bilaterally and multilaterally. Today there are many dialogue forums involving uniformed personnel, as is the case in the Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security Issues.

The DPRK participated in the planning session but did not attend the first meeting and has been consistently absent ever since, despite repeated overtures toward Pyongyang by members of the NEACD. The inclusion of the DPRK in the NEACD was regarded as essential in light of the security scene in Northeast Asia, and its absence has haunted the process.

Nonetheless, the NEACD has maintained its momentum, and since the first meeting has met every eight to twelve months. The second meeting was held in Tokyo in May 1994, the third in Moscow in April 1995, the fourth in Beijing in January 1996, and the fifth in Seoul in September 1996. The NEACD agreed to continue the process to the second round, and thus the sixth meeting was held in New York in April 1997, the seventh in Tokyo in December 1997, and the eighth in Moscow in November 1998.

In addition to a plenary, the NEACD created two study projects in 1995 on principles governing inter-state relations in Northeast Asia and mutual reassurance measures.33 The first study project completed its work, and NEACD adopted a set of principles at the Tokyo meeting in December 1997; these principles included sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, countries refraining from the threat or use of force against each other, commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights, promotion of dialogue, information exchange and transparency on security issues of common concern, and economic cooperation, as well as transnational issues such as organized crime, illegal immigration, and cooperation in humanitarian assistance. The second study project, mutual reassurance measures, led to the defense information-sharing working group, which has been underway since 1997.

Japan has supported the NEACD process since its very beginning as reflected in its sponsorship and hosting of the second and seventh plenary as well as the study project on mutual reassurance measures in Tokyo. In addition, Japan is co-chairing the Study Project on Defense Information Sharing. There seems to be a consensus among Japanese participants that the NEACD has offered an unofficial venue for members to voice their frank views and has cultivated reassurance among members.

On the other hand, the chronic absence of the DPRK at NEACD meetings has lessened the value of the process, since the Korean peninsula is the common major concern of Northeast Asia. The DPRK seems to be interested in talking only to the United States and nobody else in the region, believing that the rest of the countries, including Japan and the ROK, will follow whatever agreements the DPRK reaches with the United States. The DPRK, however, does attend track-two meetings with larger geographical footprints like CSCAP and its North Pacific Working Group, but they do not attend subregional processes like the NEACD because of a fear of being singled out in the discourse.

Views are divided as to whether the NEACD should be upgraded to the track-one level before the DPRK joins. Some participants are in favor of upgrading the NEACD to track-one level soon and keep inviting the DPRK. Others insist that the NEACD should be kept at the track-two level until the DPRK joins, otherwise the DPRK will never come to the NEACD meetings. Some observers suggest that the NEACD member countries recommend that DPRK participate in the ARF to enhance the DPRK’s engagement in the regional security discourses. Meanwhile, some observers no longer consider NEACD a track-two process, but a track-one process moving ever closer to track-one status with a dominance of government personnel.

Despite the chronic absence of the DPRK from the NEACD meetings, no one interviewed in Japan negated the value of the NEACD or suggested terminating the process. The assessment of the NEACD process, however, is varied. Some observers rate the NEACD highly for pioneering contacts among uniformed personnel, paving the road for frequent exchanges among countries in Northeast Asia at the governmental level, and warming the overall relations in the subregion. Others feel that the NEACD has not made any substantive contributions to the security of the region but acknowledge that the simple survival of the

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33. Since CBMs originated in an environment where there were clearly identified adversaries, Japan has suggested that mutual reassurance measures are more appropriate in Asia where the complex feelings and concerns that Asians hold toward each other are more ambiguous. This idea was used by the Japanese government in its preliminary paper to the ARF. See “Japan’s View Concerning the ASEAN Regional Forum” in Summary Record of the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting, Bangkok, 23–25 May 1994, Annex I. The paper referred to the need for “measures to increase mutual reassurance,” saying that “CBM is too narrow a concept to cover all the measures needed.”
NEACD since 1993 in itself is an achievement. They all agree that ARF is a regionwide process promoting transparency but is not well equipped to consider security matters in Northeast Asia simply because of its geographical footprint and because a process like NEACD is needed.

Another example of the track-two process in the subregion functioning in a minilateral format is the Trilateral Forum on North-Pacific Security Problems, which was launched in early 1994 by three nongovernmental think tanks from Japan, the United States, and Russia. The think tanks are the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Carnegie Foundation of the United States, and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of Russia. This forum is a track-two dialogue among Japan, the United States, and Russia, the three countries rotating as host. The forum has completed the second round in its sixth meeting in Tokyo in December 1998.

The Trilateral Forum was originally established to enhance the security dialogue between Japan and Russia that had been weakened because of the Northern Territories issue. By bringing the United States into the process, an attempt was made to melt the ice between Japan and Russia. Although academics participated and led the proceedings, the Trilateral Forum was close to a track-one since it involved participants from foreign and defense ministries, including uniformed personnel. The process has contributed to lowering the Russo-Japan psychological fence. This effect has been demonstrated by recent stepped-up defense exchanges, including mutual visits of senior officials, bilateral military talks since 1996 (as shown in Figure 1), and mutual visits of naval ships. It further led to the first visit by a Japanese defense minister to Russia in the spring of 1996 and the subsequent visit of the Russian defense minister to Japan in May 1997.

In the summer of 1998 another trilateral track-two process, this time involving only Japanese, American, and Chinese private experts, was launched in Tokyo, and its first meeting was held in January 1999. According to media accounts, “although Japan and the United States wanted to launch it as a track-one forum, China rejected the idea, insisting it was premature to let government officials participate in such a forum.”

The Trilateral Forum of Japan, Russia, and the United States has focused on expanding the security dialogue between Japan and Russia beyond its territorial disputes; The Japan, America, and China Conference, or JAC Conference, aims (according to publicized information) at developing three sets of bilateral relations in a balanced manner to remove any misunderstanding or miscalculations. Although the forum is at the track-two level, governments (at least the Japanese government) are behind the scenes in promoting this dialogue.

Although the number of track-two dialogues in the region is growing, a challenge lies in whether or not they can influence policymaking. These processes produce publications and recommendations that are often submitted to the respective governments of participating representatives, international organizations, and regional organizations in the Asia Pacific. While ASEAN-ISIS has had a conspicuous impact on the creation of ARF and AFTA by its reports, the effects of other dialogue processes have remained less visible so far and have lacked tangible results. Nonetheless, dismissing these processes simply as talk shops is not a fair assessment. These multilateral security dialogues have been instrumental in removing unwarranted concerns and misunderstandings in the region. Defense exchanges between Japan and Russia involving uniformed personnel that were unimaginable in the beginning of the 1990s are now well accepted and promoted. The Asia-Pacific security dialogue processes cannot supplant, but can supplement the bilateral security architecture of Asia by providing a multilayered, multidimensional forum of bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and multilateral security relations/dialogues.

In this domain of security discourse, the recent cases demonstrate that Japan is no longer a reluctant player—a label associated with Japan during the Cold War regarding political and security affairs. On the contrary, Japan is a strong supporter of track-one processes, such as the ARF, and is becoming proactive to the extent of initiating some new multilateral track-two dialogues in the Asia-

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34. It was further agreed in Kawana in April 1998 that the two countries will extend such exchanges by mutual visits of the Chairmen of the Joint Staff Council, and by joint search-and-rescue exercises by the Self-Defense Forces and Russian Forces. 35. Hisane Masaki, “Trilateral Security Forum Set; Japan, U.S., Russia to discuss Northeast Asian Issues,” Japan Times, 15 October 1998, pp. 1–2.

36. Edward Lincoln, Japan’s New Global Role, Brookings Institution, 1993, pp. 2–3. Dennis T. Yasutomo in his book The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy (St. Martin’s Press, 1995, p. 177) asserts that “if judged by its economic and financial performance and resources, Japan entered the 1990s as a great power; if judged by its economic and financial performance and resources, Japan entered the 1990s as a great power; if judged by its global prominence and political performance, it was a middle power; if judged by its international agenda-setting and rule-making leadership record, it was a small power.” So-called revisionists in the United States have labeled Japan a free-rider in multilateral organizations because it has remained uninvolved in world affairs.
Japanese Proactive Approaches to Security Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific

The conspicuous shift in Japanese policy on security multilateralism from reluctance to proactiveness seems to have taken place between Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo in April 1991 and Nakayama’s proposal in July 1991. Why and how has Japan shifted its position in the 1990s?

Japanese policymakers give the demise of the Cold War divide as the most compelling reason for Japan’s endorsement of security multilateralism in Asia. With the end of the Cold War, Asia lost one pole of the Cold War’s bipolar structure, the Soviet Union, and the vacuum of power created by its collapse generated security concerns in some quarters in the Asia Pacific. Despite high expectations after the end of the Cold War, symbolized by phrases like “peace dividend,” Cold War vestiges remain in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the tensions between China and Taiwan and between the DPRK and the ROK. In addition, there are territorial disputes left unresolved in the region, such as the Northern Territories between Japan and Russia, the Spratley Islands, the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute between the ROK and Japan, and the Senkaku/Daiyoutai dispute between Japan and China. Almost every country in Asia has some sort of territorial issue with one or more of its neighbors; the question is how to garner security in the region. Should it be along bilateral lines as during the Cold War? Or does the new power distribution demand a new approach to security?

The other pole of the Cold War, the United States, has remained intact and remains a global power; nonetheless, countries in Asia began to doubt whether the United States will remain committed in the Asia Pacific as they witnessed reductions in U.S. forward-deployment forces immediately after the end of the Cold War. Although this concern was eased after the United States’ declaration that it would maintain a forward deployment of 100,000 troops in its 1995 and 1998 East Asia Security Report by the Department of Defense, Asian countries remain concerned about an eventual reduction of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific. Meanwhile, the post–Cold War world presents an agenda that cannot be fully responded to by the United States alone. The security agenda has expanded to include issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the migration of refugees, all of which demand multilateral approaches.

On the other hand, the United States after the end of the Cold War has asked for more burden sharing for regional and international peace and security, implying that it is no longer in a position to defend the Asia-Pacific alone. This implies that the region ought to seek multipolar peace rather than unipolar peace. In other words, the region has entered into an age of *pax consortis* where leading countries in the region must lead together to maintain peace and stability.

All of these elements have contributed to Japan’s perception that the region is more prepared for security multilateralism. Furthermore, Japan has aspired to play a more international role in political affairs commensurate with its economic power. This sense was further enhanced during and after the 1990–91 Gulf War when Japan was harshly criticized for not contributing enough despite its $14 billion contribution to the allied effort. This experience sent a message that Japan should take a more proactive role in security as well. However, Japan’s aggressive history in the region makes it difficult to take unilateral initiatives, particularly in the realm of security, because of the possibility of evoking concerns among other Asian nations about Japan’s remilitarization or the memory of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The multilateral avenue seems more benign. These factors lead Japan to multilateral security dialogues.

Japan’s attitude has not been completely unified, however, but has some variance in its support of multilateralism. Some observers in Japan argue that states in the Asia Pacific have conflicting interests. Uncertainties in Asia—above all, the more immediate possibility of conflict on the Korean peninsula—require Japan to maintain and strengthen its bilateral alliance with the United States as the sole viable and dependable means for Japanese national security. This argument has been further enhanced after the missile test launch by the DPRK in August 1999. This group, who previously tended to regard security dialogue processes like the ARF as unsustainable and doomed to collapse, have gradually shifted their position to accept and admit the emerging multilateral security dialogues as enmeshed alternatives so long as they

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37. According to Tatsuō Akaneya, this position is represented by, among others, Masashi Nishihara of the National Defense Academy, former diplomat Hisashiko Okazaki, member of the House of Councilors Motoo Shina, and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In journalism, it is reflected in the largest daily newspaper, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and monthlies like *Chuo Koron* and *This is Yomiuri*. Tatsuō Akaneya, “‘Japan,’” in Paul B. Stares ed., *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*, Japan Center for International Exchange, p. 185.
do not undermine the existing security structure, namely the U.S.–Japan security alliance.

Some Japanese observers believe that the end of the Cold War has widened the choices for regional security cooperation and that peace and stability in Asia represent an indivisible benefit for states, satisfying one of the three qualities of multilateralism. They strongly support the ARF and ultimately the security community and even argue that a multilateral security forum will pave the way to free Japan from the U.S. military umbrella. This view, however, is not predominant in Japan today.

A majority of Japanese opinion leaders accept the view of welfare indivisibility and acknowledge the virtue of transparency measures in the ARF and other processes in sharing defense and defense policy information by exchanging white papers and policy papers. At the same time, however, they strongly believe in maintaining the Japan–U.S. security alliance. They do not pursue creation of a security community to replace the U.S.–Japan bilateral alliance; yet they value a security dialogue like the ARF as a process for confidence building and for improving the security climate but do not regard them as viable enough to replace the bilateral security alliances. The predominant views expressed in Japan are that security multilateralism, though at the level of security dialogues, is worth pursuing so long as it does not undermine bilateral alliances.

Security dialogues, however, successful in confidence building, cannot defend Japan nor the region from conflict or wars once they occur.

These are well illustrated in the actions taken in the 1990s. Japan, which had traditionally been skeptical of multilateral institutions in Asia, has become more forthcoming in supporting and creating bilateral and multilateral security forums to enhance mutual reassurances while maintaining its alliance with the United States. In some people’s view, this is in the international public good for Northeast Asia. In fact, Japan’s host-nation support to the United States is about $6 billion a year, which covers two-thirds of its costs, having increased from one-third ten years ago. The present amount is significantly higher than the host-nation support provided by the ROK and Germany.

Some question why Japan is proposing a series of trilaterals and quadrilaterals rather than multilaterals. In multipolar Asia, leading countries must lead. The United States, China, Japan, and Russia are important players for peace and security in the region, and it is essential to forge good partnerships and confidence among these leading countries. The Trilateral Forum on North-Pacific Security Problems has been launched to improve relations between Japan and Russia with the support of the United States. The JAC Conference aims at removing unwarranted concerns and misunderstanding between two respective countries, namely Japan and China or China and the United States. Japan finds significance in solidifying its alliance with the United States and also in improving relations with other leading powers in the region like China and Russia. This approach of creating minilateral, including the United States, to enhance Japan’s relations with leading powers in the region is one way to resist some attempts to drive a wedge between the two countries.

Another question often asked is why Japan takes initiatives in launching track-two dialogues instead of operating at the track-one level. This is not a proactive choice by Japan, but rather a reflection of the preferences of other regional powers for track-two. The region includes less open countries that feel more comfortable with track-two discourse than with track-one because of sensitive and potentially controversial issues. To date, China has been reluctant to initiate dialogue at the track-one level but is not averse to engaging in dialogue at the track-two level.

Those track-two processes that are closer to track-one and sometimes called track-one_ are predominantly attended by government officials. Yet some of the participants insist on keeping the process at the track-two level so that they can have a free flow

38. According to Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, this position is represented by “left-wing politicians like hard-liners in the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and progressive academics centering around such journals as Sekai and Gunshuku Mondai Shiryo. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in Japanese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 1997; pp. 485–86. Tatsuo Akaneya has indicated academics belonging to this school as Yoshikazu Sakamoto of Meiji Gakuin University and Shigeto Tsuru of Hitotsubashi University. He also added the Asahi Shinbun. See Akaneya Tatsuo, ibid., p. 186.

39. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates that “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

40. Many in the government, including those in MOFA, as well as academics seem to take this position. This position is represented by Sato Seizaburo of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Yoshinobu Yamamoto of the University of Tokyo, Kumiko Inoguchi of Sophia University, and former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi.

of views and discussions, making it a good testing ground for new ideas. In the case of Japan, some track-two dialogues are closely supported and controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Japan Defense Agency even though the official organizers are think tanks—most frequently semigovernmental ones. Track-two dialogues are ways to promote contacts and confidence building among officials in areas in which governments are not yet comfortable in meeting as government officials.

**WHAT LIES AHEAD**

How does Japan wish to garner peace and security in the next millennium? Although potential flash points remain in the Asia Pacific, particularly in Northeast Asia, Japan ought to maintain its bilateral alliance with the United States to defend itself for contingencies, but the multipolar region demands cooperation, if not *pax consortis*, as the security agenda broadens beyond a traditional military one.

Security multilateralism, particularly the current Asia-Pacific security dialogues, are somewhat fragile; and multilateral security institutions may collapse due to divergent interests among members. More importantly, multilateral cooperative security institutions cannot be effective in fighting and defending against armed conflicts. Nonethelss, multilateral security cooperation has the virtue of warming regional relations and promoting confidence and trust, thus removing unwarranted concerns and accidental miscalculations.

Despite criticisms that these forums are mere talk shops bearing no tangible results, they provide venues for people in the region to meet regularly to exchange views and help to improve the overall security ambience. Moreover, track-two processes have been instrumental in creating and supplementing track-one processes, such as PECC to APEC and CSCAP to ARF. Here, multilateralism has developed bilateralism by accommodating bilateral meetings during the multilateral forums, while improvements in bilateral relations have enhanced multilateral activities. Trilaterals or quadrilaterals that Japan has launched and composed are issue-specific, ad hoc coalitions that could be dismantled when their original mission is accomplished. Otherwise, they might invite skepticism if not a backlash from countries left outside of such minilateral forums. Or they could be extended in terms of duration and membership if common interests are shared and to gain more permanency.

Although the region may not be able to create a NATO-like institution, it can forge an ad hoc *entente cordiale* among some willing powers to solve specific issues such as reunification of the Korean peninsula, of which KEDO is a harbinger. What has emerged in the Asia Pacific is multilateral security cooperation in varying degrees. Although a single process may not be able to garner peace in the region, scattered pieces of multidimensional security mechanisms when harmoniously linked like a jigsaw puzzle may lead to regional multilateralism. ✨

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42. Cooperative security has been defined and interpreted in a slightly varying way. Some include collective security in cooperative security, whereas I put collective security outside of cooperative security, with an understanding that cooperative security aims at preventing armed conflicts through confidence building, arms control, and disarmament. For details, refer to Akiko Fukushima, “Japanese Foreign Policy: A Logic of Multilateralism,” 1999, Macmillan.
Figure 1. Japan's Bilateral Principle and Military Ministerial Talks with Asia-Pacific Countries
Figure 2. Multilateral Security Dialogues in Which the Japan Defense Agency Has Participated or Hosted

A. Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region
B. International Seminar on Defense Science
C. Asia-Pacific Security Seminar
D. Western Pacific Naval Symposium (JDA hosted the fifth meeting)
E. Research exchange with Southeast Asian Nations
F. International Cadet Conference
Figure 3. Examples of Asia-Pacific Security Dialogues in Which Japan Is Currently Involved

- ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) (Since 1994)
- CSCAP (The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific) (Since 1993)
- NEACD (North East Asia Cooperation Dialogue) (Since 1993)
- Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security Issues (Since 1994)
- JAC Conference (commenced 1999)
- Security Cooperation among China, Japan and U.S.A in East Asia (Since 1996)
- Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security Issues
  - Japan, U.S.A
  - Russia
  - DPRK (Taiwan)
- ROK (DPRK)
- Asia–Pacific Roundtable (Since 1986)
- Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, India, EU, Mongolia
- Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea

Track One
Track Two