Title
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THE CALIFORNIAN EXPERIENCE

by

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ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF POST-INDUSTRIA: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE*

TODD LA PORTE and C. J. ABRAMS

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*Discussions with imaginative colleagues are often catalytic, and we are grateful for a conversation with Warren Ilchman which began the train of notions prompting this paper. We are indebted to Andrew McFarland, Kai N. Lee, Serge Taylor and Stephen Zwerling for thoughtful critiques of earlier drafts. Thanks to them there is greater clarity in our effort and fewer confusions, though some have persisted in spite of their admonitions. We are also very grateful for the most able editorial assistance of Mary Sapsis, statistical assistance from Karen Chase and Roslyn Tuttle, and the typing skill of Linda Harris, all of the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

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California's rapid growth and change over the past century and a quarter have drawn considerable comment. Many of these changes, visible since 1900, reflect features said to typify a society well beyond ordinary industrialization. Social scientists, save for a growing number of historians, do not usually view regions such as the American West as "societies" per se, but insights from the perspective of comparative politics invite this broader view of contemporary California. In adopting it here, we find that the culture west of the Sierra-Nevada mountains takes on an unusual cast.

As a society, California has been subjected to enormous "pressures from the east." In the State's early days, this influence from the more highly industrialized east amounted to a kind of "foreign assistance," accompanying the expansion of the railroads and at their behest. More recently this "assistance" has been part of the direct extension of the interests of the Federal government. Since the '30's California has been the object of several successive waves of technical, military-related, and economic assistance occasioned by the Great Depression, World War II, the Korean War, the "Cold War," particularly its development into the space race, and finally the war in Vietnam. In all five cases, this "foreign assistance" has involved the most sophisticated technology of the particular period and has effected significant concentrations of financial resources, professional capabilities, and technical expertise. The technologies developed in this process span innovations in petrochemicals, agriculture, the transport and aerospace industries, electronics, nuclear energy, medicine and other biological fields, and important innovations in research and development and education. These developments were accompanied by the massive population shifts associated with large scale techno-industrial
growth—mainly immigration into the State. Concurrently, swift social changes have occurred within California, sometimes triggering violence. Many of these disruptions accompanying social changes can be associated with lags of political and social institutions in coping with the problems of rapid growth—lags commonly associated with "future shock." In a sense, California culture can be seen as the product of massively induced social change. It is a culture split into two significantly different sub-cultures, one in the south and one in the north. One could say that these two sub-cultures represent two versions of the future, each with its distinctive character, each with a distinctive response to technologically induced social change.

Insofar as changes in California share certain characteristics with those advanced industrial societies which have served as prototypes of "Post-Industria," we believe that the study of contemporary California can yield a twofold benefit. California may prove an excellent testing ground for present theories of "post-industrialism," while at the same time affording us the opportunity of alternative conceptions of "post-industrial" development. Indeed it is intriguing to view California as one of the first genuinely "post-industrial societies," its development stimulated by many of the factors intrinsic to post-industrialism, factors productive of many political and cultural phenomena included in that vaguely described set of conditions so strikingly different from ones of industrial societies. With our dual aim in mind, our version of "post-industrialism" has been fashioned in the attempt to make that notion more operational. In so doing, we have begun with indicators derived from those characteristics so often used in the literature to describe post-industrial societies. Since the United States is the closest of those
societies that have served as the touchstone for the concept of post-industrialism, we compare California with the United States on the leading indicators of post-industrialism: We shall be noting the dramatic increase in employment in the service sector of the economy, the tipping of the scales in the labor force on the side of the white collar workers over blue collar laborers, the rising affluence of the population over the past thirty years, and other manifestations of post-industrial change. We do not have great confidence that these "post-industrial indicators" will directly reveal the phenomena we seek to describe and understand. Data related to these indicators have all the limits of data collected for other purposes, but they are the only ones presently available.

In this enterprise we do not seek to engage in a definition of the post-industrial society, we are not explicitly taking up any particular version of the post-industrial notion, nor are we intent upon critically evaluating this notion, though there is sore need for this kind of rigorous analytic work. Rather, we are engaged in a speculative venture, initially taking the notions of others about important characteristics of advanced industrial societies and seeing what might be revealed about the particular qualities of California by viewing it as a post-industrial society. Our intent is to begin to explore a way of thinking about the highly advanced industrial society that is California. In the process of this effort, we have formed some alternative conceptions of potential development beyond industrialism; perhaps it is more accurate to say that these conceptions are emerging in a developmental pattern, one stage following another. Their validity must await empirical corroboration.

The Post-Industrial Notion

There is an emerging body of literature which attempts to describe social developments arising out of growth beyond the industrial state. It seems certain to be prompted in part by our penchant to understand events not neatly explained by the conventional wisdom. The clearest message from this
literature is that important elements in industrial society no longer dominate economic, social or political behavior. Social and economic organization is alleged to be undergoing a radical transformation from the industrial to the post-industrial. Something akin to the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society which marked the industrial revolution is said to be occurring within today's advanced industrial states. It is asserted that this transformation will so alter the face of industrial societies as to render contemporary understanding of their organization obsolete.

In our discussion, we are assuming that something out there has genuinely changed for which there is not yet an adequate language of analysis. We shall assert, without elaboration, that in past industrial societies the norms and values of industrial and commercial life came to be held as important criteria for the evaluations and operations of non-industrial institutions. This is to say that efficiency, economies of scale, bureaucratic organization and concerns for productivity, if not those for profits, came to be held as important criteria for the evaluations and operations of non-industrial institutions. This was the case for governmental, military, medical and welfare organizations and for religious or other voluntary organizations and educational institutions alike. The values of industrial organizations came to be legitimate guides to the nature of social life and to the activities of non-industrial institutions. What seems most characteristic of the attempts to describe the post-industrial phenomenon is the argument that this homogeneity of values and beliefs spanning most social institutions no longer exists.

Much of the discussion about post-industrialism has been based on the analysis of and extrapolation from recent trends in advanced industrial societies, particularly the contemporary United States. New trends in the economic order which appear to have significance for the organization of the rest of society
have been assumed to predict something about contours of the near future and
to suggest a broad outline of post-industrial society. Accordingly, the term
"post-industrialism" has been used to identify both the characteristics which
distinguish the most advanced Western societies from their industrial
predecessors and the process of change underlying contemporary social dynamics.

The literature indicates that the shift which marks the transition from
industrial to post-industrial societies has been signalled by a change in the
kind of work in which people engage to earn their livelihods. Thus, a change
in the proportional distribution of employment among various sectors from goods
production to service production and the change of employees' collar colors
signifies a change in the kind of on-the-job work performed. This change has
been postulated both as evidence of a change in the relative importance of the
factors of production as well as evidence of the obsolescence of existing forms
of economic and social regulation. Such evidence, it is claimed, portends
a new society. It is this new work milieu in combination with the increasing
affluence available to the society which is commonly regarded as the factor
promoting value change.7

This change in the distribution of employment among sectors underlies the
rise of the "tertiary" or "service" sector, which is commonly construed to be
the distinctive economic characteristic of a post-industrial society. For
analytic purposes, economies have been divided into three sectors analogous
to the stages of economic development: the primary, the secondary, and the
tertiary sectors. This trichotomy is intended to indicate an historic process
of technological development as well as to separate kinds of economic activities.
The primary sector includes those activities that provide the basic raw materials
needed for living -- carried on in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining; it was
the supporting system of pre-industrial society. The secondary sector, comprised mostly of manufacturing, but including construction,\(^8\) is taken as the stamp of industrial society. It emerged out of the Industrial Revolution's technological advances which stimulated the development of new goods and enabled increased productivity in the primary sector, thereby freeing labor to move to employment in manufacturing. The tertiary sector, comprised of services, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, communication, utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, public services or government work, is considered the supporting system of a post-industrial society. It has allegedly emerged out of the "post-industrial revolution's" technological advances which enable increased productivity in both the primary and secondary sectors, freeing the labor force formerly tied to those sectors to move to still other areas of employment. Just as the description of a society as industrial is not intended to convey an absence of pre-industrial economic activities, but rather the diminished use of human labor by agriculture and mining, so the description of a society as post-industrial should not be taken to imply the absence of industrial economic activities, but simply the signifies reduced use of physical labor in this society. Thus, post-industrialism /a shift to the tertiary sector of the bulk of the labor force.\(^9\) This is the first criterion to be examined with California data in the next section. The other indicator, increase in productivity, will also be examined briefly.

Two notions attendant on the assumption of increased productivity further characterize a post-industrial society: affluence and leisure. Increases in productivity per man hour in the manufacture of goods are purportedly manifested in a greater abundance of goods as well as in wage and salary increases. Theoretically, substantial increases in productivity per man hour allow a
shorter work week to occur simultaneously with increased production of goods and increased wages and salaries. To the extent that California is a proving ground for such post-industrial notions, some demonstration of its increased income or shortened work week for some employees may be in order.

The literature suggests that post-industrialism has not only to do with a change in the mode of production but a change in the relative importance of the factors of production, altering therefore the relative importance of various actors in the production process. The labor-intensive industry necessary to increased production in the pre-industrial era and the capital-intensive industry of the industrial era are purportedly followed by the knowledge-intensive industry of the post-industrial era. In the knowledge-intensive industry, technology as the concrete application of knowledge and professionals as its human transmitters apparently become requisite to increased productivity. The increased importance of knowledge as a factor of production leads to the increased importance of the knowledgeable—of the professional technical expert—with a consequent decrease in importance of the capitalist entrepreneur in the production process. An enhanced capacity for planning and regulating economic growth, generated by the development of increasingly sophisticated intellectual technologies, elevates the importance of the planner as the embodiment of technical skill. The investment in planning required to implement technology in industry further enhances the importance of the planner. The predominance of planning is likely to reduce decision rule the emphasis on immediate maximization of profit as a/in industry and to increase attention to long-term trends which may interfere with the market’s regulation of the economy. In combination with the perceived need to mitigate the stresses and strains of rapid growth (such as resource depletion, intolerable
population densities, etc.) this emphasis gives planning and planners a pre-eminent position in the policy circles of a post-industrial society.

(It has been suggested that the emphasis on planning changes the capitalistic ethos and replaces it with something else. We shall be concerned, since a change in ethos cannot be demonstrated, at least to find evidence in California of the increase in the number of professionals and planners said to distinguish the post-industrial society).

Whatever else the concept of post-industrialism is meant to signify it suggests that there has been a decline in the strength of industrial norms and a rise of other norms and values characterizing distinctive features of social institutions. Advanced industrial society appears to have achieved a level of economic development which frees increasing numbers of people from direct involvement with agricultural and industrial production organizations, thus reducing the overwhelming effects of industrial values on other social institutions. With increasing numbers of people able to devote full-time energies to educational, governmental, religious, and service sector activities, we can expect a multiplicity of value orientations to mingle in society.

In the discussion which follows, we will use the term "post-industrial society" advisedly, with no suggestion that one sector's values necessarily dominate those of other sectors. Rather, we mean to suggest a much more differentiated and interdependent situation in which multiple value systems operate within sectors, sectors which have become increasingly dependent upon one another in reciprocal ways. Our understanding of the causal and sequential relations among the variables of post-industrialism suggested by the literature is sketched out, and data is cited which we find relevant to describing California in these terms.
THE DYNAMICS OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

We begin with a caveat: What follows is both tentative and presumptuous, for it presents a scheme for thinking about most of the relationships between technological growth and recent socio-political developments. In so doing, it takes into account many of the factors generally associated with the concept of post-industrialism. We suggest that our scheme is a sensible basis for further research into the structure and dynamics of highly advanced industrial societies. Finally, our view diverges significantly from other speculations about post-industrial societies. Others have been optimistic about progress; we are not.

Stable Post-Industrial

The theories of post-industrial societal dynamics implicit in the literature suggest a society in progress toward an extrapolated future: certain tendencies undergo constant amplification, becoming ever more dominant, shaping events rather than simply following them. The trends emerging from development of sophisticated technologies have been given particular prominence in the literature; hence technology is treated as a crucial "stimulus" variable for subsequent social processes. Our perspective, too, begins with technological possibilities as the impetus to change. Other factors as well result in social changes, but for the moment we shall assume that modern technology is a major source of change in our culture. The strong consensus among writers in the field concerning the consequences of technological change for economic and social change suggests a paradigm similar to Kuhn's "normal science" paradigm. By analogy, we might call what follows "normal post-industrialism." Since this paradigm implies a kind of movement toward
an evolving society never far out of equilibrium, we shall term it "Stable Post-Industria."

Figure 1 represents our attempt to draw together the main structure of arguments relating technological development to changes in basic social patterns. In effect it is a description of social dynamics as inferred from many of the writers on post-industrialism. The schema asserts that industrial or governmental groups, recognizing that a technological possibility is potentially useful, go on to establish organizations of production, distribution, and service which make the possibility an actuality. The literature on technical innovation gives testimony to this process as does that dealing with economic development. Large industrial firms, factories, transport and wholesaling organizations, governmental agencies, and medical and educational institutions adopt new technological devices and systems in order to improve their own capacity to alter the world around them or augment their role in it through their services. When this tendency is widespread throughout a society, such adoption of innovation appears to be necessary simply to maintain a position of competition with other organizations.

One indication that technological innovation stimulates an increase in organizations of production, distribution and service, albeit an indirect one, is increased productivity per person. As technology is introduced to improve efficiency and to multiply human effort many times, productivity per person increases. This increase is well documented for the United States as a whole, and California compares favorably with the overall trend, as Figure 2 depicts. These data are doubly significant for increased production per person is also linked, as we shall see below, to consequent shifts in employment among the various economic sectors.
Figure 1 Dynamics of Stable Post-Industry

Institutional Level

Production Organizations → Industrial Complexes

Distribution Organizations

Service Organizations

Service Complexes (Govt., Ed., Health)

Increased Capacity Available

Increased Public Expectations to Consume and Find Problems Solved

If cause/effect beliefs increase in accuracy, cycle develops in stable pattern
Figure 2  Output per manyear in the United States and California, 1950-1972*  (In thousands of 1958 dollars)

Dollars (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Calif.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.885</td>
<td>10.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8.574</td>
<td>10.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.410</td>
<td>9.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>8.613</td>
<td>9.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>8.588</td>
<td>9.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8.357</td>
<td>9.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>8.341</td>
<td>9.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.203</td>
<td>9.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7.935</td>
<td>9.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>7.701</td>
<td>9.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>7.496</td>
<td>9.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7.167</td>
<td>8.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.048</td>
<td>8.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6.716</td>
<td>8.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6.673</td>
<td>8.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>6.603</td>
<td>8.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6.637</td>
<td>8.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6.336</td>
<td>8.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6.303</td>
<td>7.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>6.113</td>
<td>7.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6.002</td>
<td>7.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.787</td>
<td>7.290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As new technological possibilities emerge, either from within large organizations or from without them, new cycles of adaptation and growth take place: in each phase of this "advance," society's overall capacity for coping with its problems of sustenance and development is augmented. Technological advances with consequent widespread organizational implementation, have released people from the confining necessity for physical labor, especially on the farms and have multiplied the variety of goods available to consumers. This release from agriculture has spurred massive shifts in employment patterns, with significant proportions of the work force leaving the farms to enter manufacturing and/or service employment. Thus, it is argued that there has been a decline in the proportion of people attached to the land and engaged in primary production and a consequent growth in both secondary production organizations and tertiary service activities. Figure 3 presents data indicating these shifts in employment. As the data showing California's increasing share of America's employment might suggest, an overall increase in social and organizational capacity occurs. Such growth in scale is accompanied by increases in the overall demand for natural resources and human skills in order that the growth process be sustained. As cycles of innovation and growth continue, organized complexes of industrial production organizations result, with parallel developments of distribution and service complexes. At the same time the redistribution of employment for California over time and compared to the United States is interesting.

Data in Figure 3 can be interpreted as evidence that implementation of technological innovation in the primary and secondary goods producing industries was responsible for the shift in employment.
associated with post-industrialism. When dated, post-industrialism is usually considered to be a post World War II phenomenon and to have emerged sometime prior to 1956, when for the first time in the United States the percentage employed in white collar occupations exceeded that in blue collar occupations.

In 1920, employment in the United States was not equally distributed among the three sectors (primary, secondary, and tertiary or service). Yet their correspondence at that time (28.9%; 30.8%; and 40.2%, respectively) was the closest it was ever to be, for by 1970 the distribution was to become 4.5%, 31.3%, and 63.6%, respectively. But by 1920 in California there was not even this rough parity. Already in this State primary industry was employing only slightly less than a fifth of the labor force (19.7%), secondary industry less than a third (28.6%), and tertiary or service industry over one half (51.9%) of all employees in the State. By 1970, California's tertiary sector, with 69.4% of the employed, far outdistanced both the primary sector, whose employed had fallen to a miniscule 3.6%, and the secondary sector, which claimed 27.0%. This apportionment, on its face, appears to be quite consistent with the industrial/post-industrial thesis, i.e., with a rapid decline in agriculture during the heyday of industrialism, followed by an even more rapid decline, heralding the onset of an entirely new era. Yet there also appears to be a contradiction to what is implied in that thesis, namely the release of labor from agriculture to manufacturing in the industrial period and the release of labor from manufacturing to the service sector during the post-industrial period: Between 1920 and 1940, the labor released from agriculture showed up in the service industries, while between 1940 and 1960 manufacturing realized this increment. This reshuffling was
Figure 3  Percent Distribution of Employment in Industry by Sector in the United States and California, 1910-1970*

*Includes Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing industries since 1920, and Mineral Extraction as always under 3% of the total.

**Includes Manufacturing and Construction industries (with Construction always under 8% since 1940).

***Includes Trade, Finance Insurance and Real Estate, Transportation Communication and Utilities, Public Administration, and the Service industries.

*See Table A in the Appendix for the percentages and raw figures from which these graphs were derived.
even more pronounced in California, where between 1940 and 1960 nearly all the labor percentage released from agriculture was regained in manufacturing. This apparent contradiction is somewhat resolved, however, when we note that California's service sector already claimed the lion's share of the employed, and especially when we also note that between 1960 and 1970 the shift in employment in both areas followed the predicted pattern. Indeed, if a high percentage of a labor force employed in the service sector is meaningful as a crucial indicator of post-industrialism, and if we take the percentage employed therein in the United States in 1960 as a standard by which to judge, California has been post-industrial at least since the 1920's and since then has continued to become ever more so.

Just as these data indicate a shift in employment among industries, a similar pattern is also apparent for occupations. Table I indicates that not only does California follow the trend in the increase of white collar workers and the corresponding decrease of blue collar and farm workers, but it leads that trend. Already by 1950 California white collar workers outnumbered their blue collar neighbors. For the United States as a whole this did not happen until some time between 1950 and 1960, probably about 1956. By 1970, over half of those employed in California were in white collar occupations, a figure which was ahead of the distribution for United States generally.

Like other indicators we have used in our discussion, these two indications of employment shifts within California suggest indirect evidence that the attitude profiles of the working population may be changing. We argued above that a shift of overall emphasis from direct engagement in rural or industrial production to a preponderance of workers in service and/or white collar work was likely to decrease the application of industrial
### TABLE I DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AMONG MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA, 1950, 1960, and 1970 — in percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Occupations*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1950, 1960 percentages total less than 100 because of unreported occupations, approximately 1% and 5%, respectively.

Source: Data compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Populations*
values to other institutions in a society. That is, since more employees
become engaged in work related to servicing people rather than related to
producing things and products exclusively, the probability emerges that
a number of values will be mixed in the culture, represented by groups
deriving economic sustenance from pursuing them. We would expect these values to
be played out in the appearance of social and political issues reflecting
such a diversity. To be sure, many other conditions contribute to such a
differentiation of value expressions. We suggest that such a development
is massively enabled by the kinds of shifts characterized by the data in
Figure 3 and Table 1.

Perhaps the most important feature of Stable Post-Industria is the
cycles of increasing social and organizational capacity that occur as the
various organizational complexes become more differentiated and inter-
dependent. Regular bodies of statistics available for the period do not
yield a direct indication of this characteristic, so we must rely on rough
surrogates. When technical organizations are astutely arranged and coor-
dinated they find great mutual advantage in the business of production and
distribution of goods and services; the advantage spills over to consumers
and the public-at-large. Such arrangements require joint efforts for
continued operations; thus we could expect increases in transportation
capabilities, financial organizations, and trade activities implemented for
the sake of improving communication and interaction among production, dis-
tribution and service activities. This is to say that indirect indications
of interdependence may be seen in variations in the relative employment
figures related to transport, etc.
These activities, normally assigned to the service sector employment, are presented in Figure 4. The data are a bit ambiguous in terms of our argument. In California there has been a dramatic increase in trading activities. But transportation employment fluctuates in such a way that it is not clear how it might relate to our reasoning. One possible interpretation is that there has been a lag, at least as reflected in percentages of employees relative to other sectors, in the development of adequate transportation capabilities. Were this interpretation actually valid, it would point to a failure of policy and programs in keeping up with the needs of an increasingly interdependent system. We could then expect public outcry and complaints to be much in evidence throughout urban California.

With the development of increasingly capable and interdependent organizational complexes, we can expect the public to come to think of society as actually having the resources and the technical skill to solve the problems confronting it. At the same time, managers and policy makers respond to the increased organized complexity with a greatly heightened sense of the need to plan and to coordinate in order to assure that the flow of reciprocally needed resources will be maintained.¹⁷ They fear that if coordination breaks down the materials, funds, and human resources needed to keep the complexes functioning may be interrupted and services halted; that many people will be put out of work and that social disruption will increase intolerably. Thus, increasing organized complexity brings with it a growing insistence that the uncertainties endemic to any complex system be reduced. To the degree this occurs, we expect greater proportional investment in coordination skill and information management. Planning units would be developed to provide the intellectual resources necessary for effective action and for reducing uncertainties
Figure 4 Percent Distribution of Employment Among Industry Groups in the Service Sector in the United States and California, 1910-1970*

Percentage
40 -
35 -
30 -
25 -
20 -
15 -
10 -
5 -
0 -

US
CAL

1910 1970
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate

CAL % US
US

1910 1970
Transportation, Communication, Utilities b)

CAL % US
US

1910 1970
Trade

CAL % US
US

1910 1970
Services a)

CAL
US

1910 1970

a) Includes Professional Service, Domestic and Personal Services, Business & Repair Services, Entertainment and Recreational Services, and Public Service industries.

b) Includes Utilities only since 1940.

*For the percentages and actual raw numbers from which these graphs were derived, see Appendix, Tables A and B.
risked by misdirected actions undertaken in the face of changing environmental, industrial and political conditions.\textsuperscript{13}

As yet there are no easy ways of measuring the degree to which planning has become expected and sought in local, state and federal agencies or in industry and other large organizations. That there has been a remarkable growth in the perceived need for increased competence in planning is the impression conveyed by the number of new schools and programs in planning, business administration and public policy where training and curriculum emphasize planning skills. More systematic measurement of the social investment in coordinative skills is difficult, but some indication of the managerial or coordinative capacities of a society may be obtained from the percentages of people employed as professional administrators, lawyers, industrial engineers, planners, public officials, bankers, etc. Our assumption is that as the complexity of economic, political and social life increases, more attention will be paid to its coordination. To the degree this is the case, we expect a slow rise in the percentages of administrative positions within the labor force. As population and organizational infrastructure grow, so grows the proportion of those charged with coordinating it.

Figure 5 shows the changes in the overall proportions of administrative skills in the employment pool for California and the United States. Clearly California, until the last decade, led the rest of the nation in its engagement with staffing coordinative roles. Notably there was a huge absolute increase in these positions, though it was not quite as great as the enormous absolute growth of the total labor pool. Somewhat unaccountably, the sixties witnessed an overall relative decline in the proportions of Californians occupying such positions. The last half of that decade also
Figure 5 Proportion of Employed with Coordinative Skills to Total Employed in the United States and California, 1940-1970*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Calif. % U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>$\frac{4,527}{76,554}$ 5.91%</td>
<td>$\frac{528}{10,319}$ 5.12%</td>
<td>11.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$\frac{3,416}{67,990}$ 5.02%</td>
<td>$\frac{353}{5,761}$ 6.13%</td>
<td>10.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>$\frac{2,695}{59,230}$ 4.55%</td>
<td>$\frac{230}{3,902}$ 5.89%</td>
<td>8.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>$\frac{2,431}{45,166}$ 5.38%</td>
<td>$\frac{132}{2,476}$ 5.33%</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numerator = employed with coordinative skills; denominator = total employed

"Numbers are in thousands"

*See Appendix for source citations and explication.*
included the onset of social upheaval and an increase in a sense of lost control over social institutions.

Other data add detail to this picture. As a society grows and becomes complex, especially in its services to citizens, resources for public governance, on the one hand, and resources for knowledge based services, on the other, could be expected to increase as well. In a sense, these capacities are benchmarks of societies beyond industrialism. Figure 6 shows a very substantial and sustained investment in both. The curves of increased employment in the public service and public administration industries speak for themselves. They support the more intuitive sense of growth felt by many. But the increases in proportion of those professionally employed are the most dramatic of all our data. Since 1950 there has been a truly phenomenal increase in the absolute and the proportional employment in the knowledge based industries. California has led the nation, and as is the case for indicators we have used, the rest of the country is coming to be more and more like California in this respect. But the data in Figures 5 and 6 also report an apparent anomaly. While there has been a sharp and continuous increase in the proportion of all those employed in public administration in California, there has been a relative decline in all coordinative roles within public and private organizations, suggesting perhaps that the managerial capacities of the private sector may have suffered a relative decline. To the degree this is the case and it results in a general decline in the capacity for the private sector to anticipate and deal with greater inter as well as intra sector interdependence, it is likely that the public sector would be turned to with demands for service and coordination. It would also be likely that the large population influx would make it difficult or impossible for California government to deal effectively with such demands.
Figure 6 Percent Distribution of Employment Among Service Industries in the United States and California, 1910-1970*

*For the percentages and actual raw numbers from which these graphs were derived, see Appendix, Tables A and B.
We have experienced a time in which large organizations in industry and government have, indeed, altered the face of the physical and social landscape. In a sense the 1960's was the high water mark of confidence in large-scale efforts to do the improbable. Much has been invested in hopes and expectations that large organizations can and will solve whatever problems are thrust upon them. At the same time, the unanticipated results of using this high capacity for problem solving have occasioned an increasing number of social and environmental surprises, which in turn have stimulated an even greater penchant for planning and policy studies. Time and again, the emphasis upon the gathering of knowledge as a support for decision making is underscored, auguring the ascendency of a new elite composed of those who have access to and control of specialized information. New complexes of techno-political direction have arisen: groups of educated men and women have been brought together as planning units; advisory commissions, study and policy groups, and regulatory agencies, whose manifest mission is to provide knowledge and political acumen for control over the many related industrial, distribution, and service complexes which have evolved.

In this milieu of increased capacity, investment in planning, and production, the public's expectations have risen in accordance with the increase in perceived capacity to solve social problems. Accomplishments once thought of as unlikely or physically impossible have now become commonplace. In fact, for many the meaning of "impossible" seems to have changed significantly. What was once "impossible" no longer is; what is meant by "impossible" now is likely to be "politically difficult." Such confidence in attitude seems to mark private, governmental and
individual expectation equally. We have argued already concerning both real and perceived public capacity. Such expectations will probably increase at the personal level as individual affluence increases. Figure 7 leaves little doubt about the relative and absolute growth in spending power of the Californian compared with that of other Americans. It is quite likely that such increases will sustain the public's hope that rising affluence can be used for more consumption and will contribute to an impatience about unresolved social, economic and resource problems.

In the context of a society taking on the character we have outlined, what might be expected about its politics? We suggest that it is the politics of psychic reassurance, a politics taking on the paradoxical cast of promise and reassurance and latent uncertainty. Perhaps it is almost the politics of anxious hope, hope that the system can in fact be run efficiently enough to ensure the realization of the things we now believe are possible. But such is the mantle cloaking a contradictory undertone of latent confusion associated with complexity beyond comprehension. Public figures try to assure us that confusion can be moderated; they try to persuade the citizenry that all is well and that the machines of government and industry really do operate as advertised—or can be made to if only a change of administration is won.

With widespread perception of improved capacity to produce, distribute and serve the public, expectations of both elites and the public escalate, and planning units and regulatory agencies proliferate to assure that potential capacity is realized. At the same time, a sense of potential breakdown rears its head, stimulating a complementary enthusiasm for ever more rational decisions and organizational actions. In the scenarios of
Figure 7  Per capita Personal Income in the United States and California, 1945-1972*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Cal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,478</td>
<td>5,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>4,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>4,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,698</td>
<td>4,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,412</td>
<td>4,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>3,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>3,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>3,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,574</td>
<td>3,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>2,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,368</td>
<td>2,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>2,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,215</td>
<td>2,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>2,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>2,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>2,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>2,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>2,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>2,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

writers on Post-Industria, the emphasis on the rise of a technocratic elite and on the increased importance of knowledge-based action suggests that the quality of theoretically based knowledge is adequate and will be put to effective use. Thus, one gets the sense from much of the literature that all will be relatively well in our post-industrial future.

In such a future, planners and leaders could have a clear understanding of the wants the public has been able to articulate reasonably well and these leaders could have adequate causal knowledge about the socio-economic dynamics of the system. That being the case, there would be some assurance that the problems associated with economic growth, system coordination, and institutional development can be kept minor. Such a situation would naturally lead to the ascendency of the new "knowledge elite" coming to power perforce of its special capacities for using knowledge effectively, thus winning devotion from leaders and the public. The crucial and assumed condition in this description of stable post-industrial dynamics is the ability of this new knowledge elite to develop significantly improved causal knowledge about the behavior of social and economic systems and to act upon it. If this ability proves out, presumably continued affluence will result; and new socio-cultural patterns may emerge, engendered by affluence and freedom from economic scarcity. Cultural developments, relatively untroubled by great social and political surprises, might well become based on the "new scarcities" of information, coordination abilities and time that Professor Daniel Bell discussed recently. New value orientations would emerge, and perhaps they are emerging. In a sense this interpretation could be applied
to the Swedish case as described by Hancock elsewhere.

We have attempted thus far to show the plausibility of considering California as a society which exhibits many of the structural characteristics of "post-industrialism." We have depended heavily upon the indicators other writers have used in charting changes in societies they say are associated with developments "beyond industrialism." We have also nominated a set of relationships making explicit some of our notions about the underlying dynamics of this development. Two things can be said thus far: First, it appears that California as a society is, indeed, well beyond simple industrialism. If we can put much confidence in the indicators others have used, California is well into a post-industrial condition. Therefore, it appears to be an excellent candidate for intensive study.

Second, the scheme outlining some of the dynamics of Stable Post-Industrialia, derived largely from the literature, rests heavily upon the assumption that advances in knowledge have paralleled and will continue to parallel the swift changes in social interaction prompted by the multiple social complexes we have noted. We question whether this is a viable assumption.

What follows is a departure from other visions of the post-industrial future. It is much more speculative than our preceding discussion and is, in a sense, in the pre-hypothesis stage. A good deal of the impetus for our effort comes from a deep uneasiness about applying the stable post-industrial notion to the California experience. It may be that those notions cannot be appropriately applied to the society of the West Coast, but in the spirit of attempting to understand the changes "out there" which seem to go beyond the conditions of industrialism, we present the concluding part of this paper.
Unstable Post-Industria

In the "stable" post-industrial society, experts may indeed be said to be expert, for the causal knowledge upon which they base action is in a significant sense correct; knowledgeable policies could shape events in desired directions. The condition of adequate causal knowledge and effective implementation could be met. In the face of rapid and extreme social change, however, an equally plausible condition may obtain: one in which leaders and their knowledgeable assistants have great difficulty in determining what is desired by a population inflicted with a mild state of disorientation. This difficulty is compounded when the validity of the cause-effect beliefs held by these experts for predicting the dynamics of economic, social and political life diminishes. That their validity will diminish is extremely likely if the character of the social science theory relied upon by these experts derives mainly from simple social systems. These theories will prove grossly inadequate when applied to highly complex systems. We argue that to the degree that the beliefs about causality underlying the construction and implementation of policy are mismatched with the economic, social, and political conditions to which they are applied, the dynamics of stable post-industrial societies begin a process leading them ultimately to instability. In a sense, "unstable" Post-Industria is the second stage of post-industrial development. An alternative pattern of political development associated with advanced industrial society, it is directly related to the quality of knowledge about social operations, organization, and coordination.

Our conception of Unstable Post-Industria, drawn schematically in Figure 9, was in the main developed in our attempt to understand what seems to be happening within California's society. It bespeaks our uneasiness
in directly and definitively applying the "normal" post-industrial notion to this experience, even though its vestiges are clearly present within it. Something in the application jars us. A number of indications that the promise of the post-industrial condition has not been realized confronts those of us who live in California...

A post-industrial system approaching an unstable condition retains certain features of Stable Post-Industria noted above: (1) increasing apparent organizational capacity to deal with social problems and production demand; (2) increasing public expectation to consume; and (3) increasing importance attributed the knowledge producing and using classes in dominant institutions. But accompanying this continuity is the emergence of two additional tendencies; (4) increased perception of the growing number of social, economic and management problems; and (5) an increased sense that the failure of social, economic, and political programs is unjustified.

These two latter conditions issue from the widening disjuncture between the character of the social and environmental problems associated with social complexes of production, distribution, and services and the established institutions of coordination and control designed by an older order for coping with these problems. In the very act of attempting to solve social and production problems, government and industry, operating on erroneous assumptions about the social dynamics behind these problems, promote programs which increase organized complexities and reduce the potential for effective control. Thus, the large-scale programs of government and industry designed to promote social benefit and stability lead in fact to an increasing number of unpleasant surprises, for decision makers and for citizens and consumers. The issue here has nothing to do with questions about the
Figure 8 Transition to Unstable Post-Industrial Juncture

Juncture of Causal Knowledge

Institutional Level

(From Fig. 1)

Complexes of Intended Control

Planning Agencies

Mass Level

Increases Capacity and Public Expectation to Consume

Political Uncertainty

Increased Failure

Political Dissent

New Personal Search for Meaning

Personal Malaise, Alienation

New Political Ideologies

Alter Character of Political Milieu

Alter Character of Social Milieu

* If cause/effect belief increase in error, continue through transition
malevolence, self-interest, or incompetence of industrial or governmental leaders. Rather, we are contending that the cause-effect beliefs they hold and upon which their institutional processes are developed correspond less and less to what is actually happening in the world. To the degree this is the case, the knowledge-elite falters, its promise unrealized. Then experts are expert only on what is past, on matters of relative simplicity applicable to an older scheme of things. These leaders, then, cannot predict nor speak rightly of the future, yet they must continue to prescribe for it somehow.

We are suggesting that events and actual conditions have outrun the capacities of experts, both public and private, to understand them well enough to plan reasonably effectively. Policy making and implementation are as much error making as they/productive of desired outcomes. To be sure, many things cause policy failure and exacerbate social problems. That notwithstanding, the futuristic vision of the post-industrial writers implicitly asserts that knowledge-based policy produced with the backing of cadres of science-rooted experts probably suffices for anticipating disruptive external forces or at least for responding to them in ways flexible enough to prevent an increase in social problems. But that vision does not appear fulfilled at present, nor is there much reason to believe that it will be in the near future. The increase in emphasis on planning and policy studies can in fact be seen as an indicator of significant past failure in these areas. It is possible, indeed probable, that an increasing number of presently constituted policy studies and plans will not, as some apparently believe, lead to the resolutions of the problems stimulating the policy studies and plans in the first place. Thus, it is quite possible to have a situation in which there are parallel
increases in perceived policy failure, in the number and intensity of social problems, and in public expectation that we should be able to overcome them.

In combination, then, the major characteristics of Unstable Post-Industria amount to an intensification of the paradox noted earlier, and with it people's heightened perception of that paradox: the bewildering coexistence of society's impressive potential for dealing with its problems but its equally impressive inability to do so effectively. Whatever the methods we employ in the high hopes of solving our problems, they seem to produce many new ones, often without solving the original ones. Still, we must act; and our official actions are of necessity based on what we think we know. A deep confidence in the generally held perspectives on economic and social problems and in the institutions that have been developed to deal with them almost by definition must inform the actions of leaders and their planners. What other conceptual basis do they have upon which to rationalize their acts? But what if there is a growing number of negative social surprises and apparent policy failures?

It is reasonable to assume that continued and increasing perceived policy failure and negative surprises will result in fundamental uncertainties about the orthodox bases for political decision making and about the socio-political ideologies and the institutions they have spawned. If this uncertainty grows sufficiently intense, some kinds of measures for reducing it will be taken. Similarly for individual responses regarding one's own personal future: If one encounters increasing numbers of negative surprises in the events of his everyday life, it is likely that, after a time, he may become infested with doubt about his basis for experiencing the world. As his uncertainty grows more intense, it is certain that he will seek out some way of dealing with it.
Many and varied are the sources of political and personal uncertainty. How much of this uncertainty may be traced to the planning and policy failures of large institutions is, of course, an empirical question. Yet in an increasingly interdependent economic and social system, the behavior of large institutions and the leadership prompting their action clearly have a significant influence on events. While planning or policy failure may not be the only or the single most important source of uncertainty, we assert that it is one of growing importance. Certainly the experience of living in California leads one to resist putting much confidence in the acumen of public or private leaders, their planners or policy programs.

The San Francisco and Los Angeles areas as well as rural California have been witness to a series of social and political phenomena we might understand to be manifestations of social discontinuity. These phenomena are also evidence of response to increasing levels of political and personal uncertainty. Instances of political tumult evident in California's recent past and the emergence of extremism on both right and left are testimony to this discontinuity and uncertainty. A great deal has been written about the consequences of this kind of political disaffection. In California the visible results have been social upheaval and dissent. Political extremism on the right has been evident in the enthusiasm for the Christian anti-Communist Crusade, the development of the John Birch Society, and para-military groups such as the Minutemen. These movements have issued principally from Southern California. Somewhat parallel, leftist-tinged movements in the North have also been evident: the rise of the "New Left," the "Yippies," the "Free Speech Movement" and its various student progeny in the long saga of campus unrest, and other groups engaging in the "politics of confrontation," much of which took the form of anti-war demonstrations. All such factions have
attempted to prompt fundamental changes in the political structure, their ideologies are a scattering of neo-Nazism, extreme nationalism, pacifism, environmental radicalism, and Gay Liberation.

Concurrent with political dissidence, personal alienation and malaise have also increased among many sectors of California's society. These are perhaps less visible but equally important socially. In Southern California periodic renewals of neo-fundamentalist religious movements have occurred now particularly evident in the growing numbers of zealots known as "Jesus Freaks." The San Francisco area for its part has seen a significant turn to Oriental religions. Buddhist communities have attracted many disillusioned with the materialism of Western values. The Hare-Krishna youngsters are a more evangelistic example. Another type of response may be seen in the mystic cults which extend even to devil worship. Such have found a surprisingly large following among the displaced. In both Northern and Southern California, the encounter group mystique, the drug culture, and other loosely organized manifestations of the search for alternative life styles have been sufficiently in evidence to prompt a rash of popular commentary. In a sense, Northern California and Southern California might be seen as two visions of the future, each with its lessons of development amidst confusion. Each region has responded dramatically to massively induced social change. What may develop in the future is difficult to foresee.

Both the search for new patterns of social and political life and the attempt to recover the familiarities of older forms seem a natural consequence of increased leisure time newly available to individuals. We have developed an economy which has freed people from tight attachment to agriculture and factory labor. Indeed, most of our population is freed of those activities
which over long hours sap physical and psychic energies, thus precluding for the
citizenry both motivation and time for introspection and reflection on public matters.

But the forms of response to this affluence in time and energy seem to be
born more from uncertainties about the public order and personal relations
than from an image promising an exciting, self-actualizing future within a
social order which distributes its wealth in just fashion. California's
response, echoed in many other parts of the United States, has been a
search at two levels: a search for altered political ideologies and a
search for new patterns of personal meaning. These searches have not had
the optimistic undertone implicit in the views of many of the "stable post-
industrialists." Instead, there has been much to suggest the slightly frantic
tone of Toffler's notion of "future shock." Even the hopeful strivings of
the various ethnic groups in California have this quality, and their search
is characterized more by disillusion and bewilderment than by a sense of
promise.

Our recognition of the disparity between these widespread negative-tinged
reactions and the positive promise at least potential in the bounties of an
advanced industrial society underlies our conception of Unstable Post-Industrialia.

There is some evidence that in California political activism has become
much less attractive and that the doctrines of neo-fundamentalist and mystical
religious movements have increased their drawing power. But whatever the
forms popular movements take, if they are followed by sufficiently large
numbers of people, they will alter the political and social milieu within
which technological development and government operate. It is likely that
new forms of social organization will emerge—perhaps they are already
emerging—which are not simply extrapolations of familiar forms. The dynamics
of this process in the recent past and its probably extension into the near future are the focus for a series of research questions set forth below.

THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA AS AN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

We believe that the Californian experience since, say about 1940, can provide an apt setting for examining the more detailed dynamics of technological development and socio-political change. The series of relationships hypothesized in Figures 1 and 8 is intended to be seen as a network of linkages tracing a sequential, chronological development and positing significant causal relationships. As such, they can be put to the test in the context of the Californian experience whether or not the experience proves to be a prototype of the future changes expected to occur in societies a bit slower in industrial and technical development. Whatever turns out to be the case for California, two levels of research problems confront us, one descriptive, the other analytic.

A much better description of the relationship between technological development and industrial-distributive-service development is needed in order that more finely detailed indicators may be developed. Without such indicators, hypotheses will be difficult to test. An important initial hypothesis is that as technological developments have become more complex and more sophisticated, the organizations associated with their development and with the consequent distribution of technical output have themselves become more complex internally and more interdependent with other organizations. Thus, the first order of business should be an exploration of the character of technological development and the patterns of stimulus/response shown by various industrial and service organizations. A second and related hypothesis asserts that meanwhile, with some time lag for learning, the public's level of expectation about "normal" services begins to increase.
In other words, a higher and higher level of service and rate of consumption becomes considered an allowable minimum.

A third hypothesis is one more in keeping with the conventional way of conceptualizing the post-industrial phenomenon/the connection made between the type of employment (and/or the type of employing organization) and the sort of values likely to be held by the employees. A much better understanding of the process by which divergent deeply held social values are shaped by industrial as opposed to service activity is necessary if we are to continue to use this gross occupation indicator with much confidence. Examination of these major hypotheses adds up in a sense to methodological research aimed at increasing the confidence we can place in the meaning of indicators which, on their face at least, seem rather indirect signs of the behavior under scrutiny. Such a project may be possible for the California case, though the outlines of the effort are not clear at present.

The relationship between those holding knowledge and their consequent participation in planning and advisory councils is also crucial for the whole post-industrial argument. A fourth hypothesis asserts that as the complexity of techno-organizational development increases, there is increasing need felt by institutional leaders to include those who have knowledge in determining the policies of industrial-governmental complexes. A corollary to this hypothesis is that the use of knowledge enables an improvement of complicated institutional relationships, sufficient for the system to continue operating without undue surprise or difficulty.

An expectation of stability and limited surprise, however, does not make much sense any longer for those of us who live in California; too many things seem out of control. But the effective coordination of the system with the assistance of a knowledge elite may well have been the case at some time
in the recent past. The question becomes one of the degree to which knowledge based policy has been closely related to stability. What were the characteristics of the situation and the state of knowledge and its use that prompted this alliance of knowledge-based coordination? When, if ever, did this condition begin? To what degree is it still the case? Has there been an erosion of expert effectiveness in institutional guidance? To what factors might such a decline in effectiveness, if not in participation, be attributed?

This line of research points straightaway to the second part of our schema—to the transition to "Unstable Post-Industria" charted in Figure 8. There are many indications that the promised improvements in the "quality of life" implicit in writings on post-industrialism have not been realized in California's society. There is widespread uncertainty and controversy about the role of government, the costs of public services have skyrocketed, systems of welfare run amuck, and medical programs do not function well. In one area of production and services after another the system flounders. In short, the State does not strike people as nearly so attractive as it once did.

The series of relationships outlined in Figure 8 might partially describe what is happening. A fifth hypothesis is that as the quality of knowledge about system dynamics declines, there is in fact an increasing number of policy failures; programs do not work anywhere nearly as well as the public has been led to believe they should. As a result, there is more investment in the planning function and at the same time there is a growing recognition of numerous social problems. Some way of testing this hypothesis may be worked out, though the problems of gathering data on such sensitive materials is bound to be considerable. Indirect indicators
may have to fill the gap. Yet such a test is crucial to the argument. If the quality of cause-effect beliefs has not declined, and there is still erosion in public and private programs, another story is implied. On the other hand, the sense of program failure may not adequately reflect what has, in fact, happened; then some way of accounting for that perception is in order.

Our last observations involve the patterns of value and ideological changes apparently abroad in our society. The argument can be summarized in a sixth, summary hypothesis: that for citizens and consumers, simultaneous perceptions of increasing failure in government and private programs, of increasing social capacity to deal with public problems, and an increasing or constant expectation to consume products and services leads to feelings of uncertainty about their personal futures. Granted, such a relationship may not exist in fact; if it does not, then there can be no direct connection between perceptions of capacity, consumption, and social failure and political dissent or personal malaise. But if it does, it must be explored and its affinity to the emergence of new political ideologies and to the significant increase in the number of people following alternative lifestyles established.

Let us say that all the relationships we have asserted about reality are so. Our task is not over; we have merely taken the descriptive steps. New obligations come forth. If our notions have merit, it is in their usefulness in ordering a series of relationships in sensible ways. But that feat does not explain what has been going on. Explanation must await a more searching series of studies, studies which can be put into perspective by our final set of questions:
What is it about technological development that prompts the increased organized complexity of social, economic, and political institutions?

What is it about the character of social science knowledge that prompts an erosion of quality in the face of such increased organized complexity?

What is it about the sense of uncertainty which results in an impulse to search out either a new political ideology or a new religious emphasis or orientation?

Finally, what would it be about an altered political or social milieu that would shape future technological development in ways different from those of the past when, unconstrained by social and political values, such development was seemingly driven by a simple faith in progress through technology.
REFERENCES


2 From the perspective of comparative politics, California may be viewed as a society whose political system has a high degree of internal integration but is yet tightly bound to the society to its east through economic and political ties. Accordingly, the effects of exchange between the two societies can be examined, as well as can the impact of external influences upon California emanating from the East.

3 Particularly dramatic examples (and ones drawn from the extreme ends of our chronological spectrum) are (1) the "Bloody Thursday" confrontation on the San Francisco waterfront in 1934 between I.L.W.U. dockworkers and the National Guard, which triggered a general strike in the Bay Area; and (2) the frequent clashes in the late 1960's between anti-war demonstrators and city police, county law enforcement personnel, and the militia.
We accept the term "post-industrial" with some uneasiness. It has come to mean many things to many people, and in a descriptive sense it discloses more ambiguities than it clarifies. We adapt it here in part heuristically—as an exercise—and in part metaphorically—as symbolic of the situations facing highly advanced industrial societies.


We are grateful to our colleague Martin Landau for discussing this vital point with us.
For an association of affluence with post-scarcity values, see Ronald Ingelhard, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *APSIR* 65:4 (December 1971), pp. 991-1017. For an argument challenging the idea that new "social experiences and needs" are traceable to the disappearance of the old industrial work milieu, on grounds that the industrial work milieu is not being appreciably reduced, see Robert L. Heilbroner, "Economic Problems of a 'Postindustrial' Society," *Dissent* (Spring 1973), p. 165.

Heilbroner adds transportation and utilities (usually grouped in the tertiary sector and mining (usually grouped in the primary sector) to the secondary or manufacturing sector as well. This regrouping appears to be behind his contention that the work milieu has not altered significantly and that the change in the distribution of employment has been from agriculture to services rather than from manufacturing to services (*Ibid.*, p. 164). We note that Daniel Bell follows the same grouping of tertiary industries as we do here. See *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*.

Whether the shift in employment has been neatly patterned after this scheme (i.e., from agriculture to manufacturing during the industrial revolution and from manufacturing to services during the "post-industrial revolution") or whether it has been one from agriculture to services and manufacturing is a debated matter. Heilbroner, "Economic Problems...," and Kenneth Boulding "Is Scarcity Dead?" *Public Interest* (Fall 1966) suggest that the shift has been from agriculture to services. We present data in the following section which bears on this debate.

The assertion that leisure and affluence will continue to increase in the future as they have in the past has been controverted; see, for example, James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1972).

12 This conception of technology and organization builds on the assumption that technology must be embodied in social organization before the promise of the physical concept and machines of the technology can be realized. It also means that without widespread distribution of the technology little social change will result. Thus, it is not technical potential nor theoretical capacity which makes a difference in a society's operation, but the combined action of new capabilities with the organizations to carry out technically based operations on the physical world in sufficient volume to alter experience for large numbers of people. For a full discussion of this point, see T. R. La Porte, "Technology and Society: Fundamental Conceptions for analysis," Ch. 1 of La Porte et al., Social Change, Public Response, and Regulation of Large Scale Technology... Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (December, 1972).

13 As with other indicators used in this paper, increased productivity is, in a sense, a surrogate indicator. A more straightforward indication would be a careful charting of the actual degree and magnitude of technical innovation's active introduction into the work processes. But we are not blessed with such data and will have to settle for the less precise and the indirect data available from economic statistics. We are equally handicapped in measuring other aspects of post-industrial dynamics. To wit: A rough indicator of innovative efforts (and hence of general productivity) can be found in federal, state, and private sector expenditures for research and development. A review of relevant data shows that California compares favorably with the patterns for the whole United States both in the degree of increase and in the relative proportion of R&D efforts. See, for example, National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research and Development and Other Scientific Activities (Surveys of Science Resources Series NSF 72-317, Vol. XXI) p. 154ff; National Science Foundation, Research and Development in State Government Agencies -- Fiscal Years 1967-1968 (Survey of Science Resources, NSF 70-22), p. 62ff; National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry, 1970 (Surveys of Science Resources Series NSF 72-309), pp. 50-51; and National Science Foundation, Resources for Scientific Activities at Universities and Colleges, 1971 (Surveys of Science Resources Series, NSF 72-315), pp. 30-39; 43-51. See also Jay D. Starling, "Extra Incrementalism in Science Spending:
Toward an Understanding of Exceptional Policy Outcomes," University of California, Berkeley, Space Sciences Laboratory, Internal Working Paper no. 115 (May, 1970). Preliminary investigation suggests that California commands a disproportionate share of the nation's research and development activities in all fields and on all counts (expenditures, professionals, etc.).

14 See Appendix for numerical tables supporting Figures 3 and 4.

15 The term "organized complexity" as opposed to unorganized complexity distinguishes the type of structural complexity based on relatively tight internal interdependence from that describing the complex interaction and behavior of atomic particles, voters, and buyers in a market system. The essential difference is in the degree of internal interdependence among individual components. This distinction, originally advanced by Warren Weaver, "Science and Complexity," American Scientist 36 (1948), became the initial basis for a series of related studies in the effects of "organized social complexity"; see Todd La Porte, ed., Organized Social Complexity: Challenge to Politics and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

16 There are no effective measures of interdependence at this time. Patterns of internal interdependence are most difficult to chart; adequate measures of this intuitively sensible phenomenon must await developments both in concept and statistics. See Ibid., Chapt. I, VI, and VII.

17 See note 15.


19 One early manifestation of this situation in California government was Governor Edmund Brown's attempt to enlist the aerospace industry in seeking solutions to social problems like welfare, waste disposal, and crime. See Ida Hoos, "Systems Analysis as a Technique for Solving Social Problems," University of California Space Sciences Laboratory, Reprint. no. 88 (1968).

20 For a more complete discussion of the emergence of the politics of psychic reassurance, see T. R. La Porte, "Complexity and Uncertainty: Challenge to Action" in La Porte, op. cit., Ch. X.
The Coming of Post-Industrial Society

La Porte, "Complexity and Uncertainty"

One of the more important factors for both the United States and California is the close economic and political bonds each has with other societies. In varying degrees each is only modestly in control of its own future.
FIGURE 2


FIGURE 5


A detailed list of the 2a occupational categories considered to require coordinative skill is on file with the authors and available to interested readers. Occupations so designated were totaled and compared to the entire labor force including the military. Census data for 1940-1970 are not strictly comparable because of major shifts and extensions of occupational categories occurring from census to census. For example, "accountants, auditors, bookkeepers" comprised a non-professional category in the 1940 census, but in the two subsequent censuses "accountants" was designated professional, while "auditors" and "bookkeepers" remained non-professional categories. Later changes in census categories make it difficult to determine for our purposes in what areas of "business administration," for example, coordinative skills are requisite. Figures in Table 5 are to be taken as more-or-less accurate indicators of the correlation of coordinative skills to other skills throughout the labor force.

FIGURE 7

### TABLE A

Distribution Among Sectors of Employment in Industry for U. S. and California

Percentage figures 1910-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors of Employment</th>
<th>Primary Sector Industries</th>
<th>Secondary Sector Industries</th>
<th>Tertiary Sector Industries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Categories</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.98</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>23.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric., For., Fish.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>32.46</td>
<td>26.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Extraction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>40.26</td>
<td>47.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Serv/Admin. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>7.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom., Pers., Bus. &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Serv., Entert.,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>100.01</td>
<td>99.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1Construction under 8% of Secondary Sector since 1940.

2Public Administration as an employment category has been in use since 1940.

3Percentage discrepancies 1940-1960 in Grand Total category are due to industry-not-reported.
### Table B: Distribution of Employment Among Major Industry Groups in the United States and California, 1910-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ag., For., Fish.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>12,388,309</td>
<td>10,936,026</td>
<td>10,722,467</td>
<td>8,559,134</td>
<td>7,033,591</td>
<td>4,349,884</td>
<td>2,840,488</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>88,197</td>
<td>272,947</td>
<td>334,968</td>
<td>273,488</td>
<td>298,119</td>
<td>267,760</td>
<td>233,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10,665,812</td>
<td>10,471,988</td>
<td>8,449,463</td>
<td>6,908,647</td>
<td>4,256,734</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>322,024</td>
<td>265,871</td>
<td>286,642</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry, Fish.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>241,806</td>
<td>270,214</td>
<td>250,469</td>
<td>109,671</td>
<td>124,944</td>
<td>93,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>12,944</td>
<td>7,617</td>
<td>11,477</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. Extractions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>965,169</td>
<td>1,090,223</td>
<td>984,323</td>
<td>918,853</td>
<td>930,968</td>
<td>654,006</td>
<td>630,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>23,358</td>
<td>24,698</td>
<td>39,743</td>
<td>45,892</td>
<td>30,308</td>
<td>25,973</td>
<td>34,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10,856,545</td>
<td>12,831,879</td>
<td>14,110,652</td>
<td>10,670,087</td>
<td>14,685,482</td>
<td>17,513,086</td>
<td>19,837,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>115,296</td>
<td>430,631</td>
<td>636,564</td>
<td>415,721</td>
<td>763,680</td>
<td>1,391,166</td>
<td>1,614,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2,087,564</td>
<td>2,357,346</td>
<td>2,357,346</td>
<td>2,357,346</td>
<td>2,357,346</td>
<td>2,357,346</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>153,310</td>
<td>182,767</td>
<td>182,767</td>
<td>182,767</td>
<td>182,767</td>
<td>182,767</td>
<td>182,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3,633,265</td>
<td>4,257,684</td>
<td>6,081,467</td>
<td>7,497,743</td>
<td>10,507,331</td>
<td>11,792,645</td>
<td>15,372,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>209,399</td>
<td>436,619</td>
<td>552,160</td>
<td>872,608</td>
<td>1,081,730</td>
<td>1,575,721</td>
<td>1,575,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans., Comm., Ut.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>124,848</td>
<td>199,228</td>
<td>156,333</td>
<td>254,300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>533,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, Fin., Ins.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1,718,458</td>
<td>3,111,635</td>
<td>4,025,324</td>
<td>2,974,681</td>
<td>3,119,610</td>
<td>2,259,630</td>
<td>3,638,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>133,405</td>
<td>253,320</td>
<td>119,959</td>
<td>179,417</td>
<td>291,367</td>
<td></td>
<td>443,165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1,711,275</td>
<td>2,171,251</td>
<td>3,253,884</td>
<td>3,390,427</td>
<td>4,238,789</td>
<td>6,723,318</td>
<td>14,142,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>116,412</td>
<td>235,386</td>
<td>218,510</td>
<td>378,012</td>
<td>732,864</td>
<td>1,503,263</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Serv &amp; Pub. Admin.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>431,442</td>
<td>738,525</td>
<td>856,205</td>
<td>1,415,283</td>
<td>2,514,469</td>
<td>3,202,890</td>
<td>4,201,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>45,579</td>
<td>60,741</td>
<td>94,298</td>
<td>246,230</td>
<td>339,826</td>
<td>485,453</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic &amp; Pers. Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>154,841</td>
<td>294,075</td>
<td>237,522</td>
<td>263,043</td>
<td>326,668</td>
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<td>339,314</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bus. &amp; Repair Services</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>883,313</td>
<td>1,307,669</td>
<td>1,610,728</td>
<td>1,610,728</td>
<td>1,610,728</td>
<td>2,394,487</td>
<td>317,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>69,778</td>
<td>130,260</td>
<td>197,717</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>636,974</td>
<td>949,543</td>
<td>849,298</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>246,339</td>
<td>358,126</td>
<td>761,430</td>
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<td>Entert. &amp; Rec. Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>493,433</td>
<td>502,879</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
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<td>76,795</td>
<td>81,864</td>
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<td>Industry not Reported</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>729,540</td>
<td>843,325</td>
<td>2,608,085</td>
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<td>Cal.</td>
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<td>46,218</td>
<td>268,983</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL ALL OCCUPATIONS</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>1,512,760</td>
<td>2,500,644</td>
<td>2,475,581</td>
<td>3,902,278</td>
<td>5,761,433</td>
<td>7,484,690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes to Table B

1 Further information on sources, methods of computation and lacunae may be obtained from the authors.


3 The most recent U.S. data are less reliable for comparative purposes, because of census category proliferation and collapse, than data of previous decades when categories remained more parallel from census to census. Neither U.S. nor California 1970 figures for Entertainment and Recreation available from Census sources.

4 Number employed in Agriculture in California in 1910 categorized as "farmers" in 1910 California census data source. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Census, Statistics for California 1910 (1914), p. 638. This source differentiates "farmers" from "wage earners," the category containing the figures shown here for Manufacturing and Mineral Extraction (Mining).

5 California figures for 1960 and 1970 not entered because most up-to-date source available combines figures for forestry, fishing, and agriculture. But see Table A above for percent distribution.

6 Calculations for U.S. in this category for 1940, 1950, and 1960 based on 1960 census figures for a wide variety of wholesale and retail activities and outlets.


8 The 1960 U.S. Census data, the source providing the U.S. figures for 1940, 1950, and 1960 also include real estate and other fields not counted here in their "clerical" category.
The 1960 U.S. Census source distinguishes Professional Services as either "government" or "private." The present table combines those figures for this category, which for 1940 includes figures based on welfare, religious, and non-profit organizations and for 1940, 1950, and 1960 on hospital and other related services.

In the 1960 Census data which provides the U.S. figures here for 1940, 1950, and 1960 "public service" figures are derived from number employed in public administration.

Figures for 1940 and 1950 taken from California Census data in the 17th Census of the U.S. (see note 7), Table 31: "Industry Group of Employed Persons by Sex for the State 1950 and 1940," pp. 5-70.