Family Policy, Women’s Access to Paid Work and Decommodification

By

Alexander Lincoln Janus

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Michael Hout, Co-Chair
Professor Trond Petersen, Co-Chair
Professor Neil Gilbert

Fall 2012
Abstract

Family Policy, Women’s Access to Paid Work and Decommodification

by

Alexander Lincoln Janus

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Michael Hout, Co-Chair

Professor Trond Petersen, Co-Chair

In this dissertation I present a new analytical approach to the study of women’s employment. Using data on 18 OECD countries from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), I model cross-national variation in “the gap” between women’s orientations toward work and family and their employment trajectories over the life course. The existence of a gap at the individual level indicates that a woman followed an employment trajectory that is inconsistent with her work-family orientations—for example, a woman who believes that women should stay at home with young children but who, in fact, worked when her own children were young.

The orientations-employment gap has several advantages as an object of study compared to simply modeling women’s employment behavior. First, the existence of a gap suggests the presence of social structural factors that operate independently of an individual’s work-family orientations and that drive a wedge between their orientations and actual employment behavior. Second, because the gap takes into account women’s work-family orientations, it is possible to distinguish between social policies that support women’s choice to work versus policies that are commodifying in their effects. The distinction between policies that support women’s choice to work and policies that commodify women is important, because work relationships are potentially oppressive, and policies that promote women’s freedom to opt out of work may enhance women’s leverage, individually and collectively, in the market.

Third, the orientations-employment gap uses women’s own psychological orientations as a standard for comparison in studying mothers’ employment rather than men’s occupational outcomes. Because women still shoulder a disproportionate burden of homemaking and childcare responsibilities and suffer employer discrimination based on gender and family status, children may carry significant costs for their mothers, which are reflected in the “gender gap” between women’s and men’s occupational outcomes (see, e.g., Budig and England 2001 and Goldin 1990). However, it is also important to acknowledge the benefits that accrue to individual mothers (and fathers) and the significance of motherhood as a means of self-actualization. Divergent expectations regarding the costs and benefits of childrearing, as well as the sometimes class-specific ways in which motherhood undergirds adult identity, are among a larger number of
factors that produce women’s distinct orientations regarding work and family (Gerson 1985; McMahon 1995). Finally, in modeling the orientations-employment gap, it is possible to examine how women’s work-family orientations moderate the effects of social policies.

In the first chapter I examine whether the effects of childcare-related provisions, labor market conditions, and other factors on mothers’ employment trajectories are moderated by their work-family orientations. I distinguish among women with “domestic” and “careerist” orientations, who appear to prioritize homemaking and a career respectively, and a third group of women with “adaptive” orientations, who believe that mothers should reduce their labor force involvement or withdraw from the labor force entirely when their children are young. While it is important to recognize that women’s orientations toward work and family change in response to life course events and differences across countries in labor market conditions, women’s work-family orientations are not simply a rationalization of the current structure of opportunities and constraints in the environment, as is apparent from the large orientations-employment gaps in many countries. In the main set of analyses in this chapter, I treat mothers’ work-family orientations as fixed.

I find that the effects of childcare-related provisions and characteristics of the labor market in different countries are highly contingent on mothers’ work-family orientations and that mothers generally strive to minimize disagreement between their orientations and actual behavior. For example, my data suggests that mothers pursue distinct compensatory strategies in adapting to high childcare costs: increasing their labor force involvement or reducing their work hours, thus replacing some or all of a childcare worker’s labor with their own. But which strategy a woman adopts depends on her work-family orientations. Mothers with careerist orientations are most likely to increase their labor force involvement in response to high childcare costs, while domestic mothers are more likely to pursue the opposite strategy. Furthermore, from my analysis it appears that mothers with domestic orientations use maternity and childcare leave primarily as a means of extending their absence from the labor force. It is among adaptive mothers that maternity leave has the positive effect on employment usually noted in the literature.

Even though mothers exhibit a remarkable degree of agency in formulating strategies for the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities, family policy regimes in different countries still have important implications for women’s emancipation. In the second chapter I examine variation in the size of the orientations-employment gap between and within countries as a means to assess the emancipatory potential of family policies, broadly defined, in the extent to which they support mothers’ access to paid work (Orloff 1993) and decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990). Despite the importance of decommodification/ commodification as a dimension of variation to earlier welfare state scholarship, the relationship between welfare states, especially as implementers of family policy, and women’s access to paid work has received far greater attention in feminist revisions of welfare state scholarship. But the extent to which welfare states support women’s freedom to opt out of work—that is, their decommodification—is an equally important dimension of welfare state variation because of the link between this criterion and women’s leverage in the market (Esping-Andersen 1990) and the significance of motherhood to some women as a means of self-actualization (McMahon 1995).
The typology of family policy regimes suggested by the results from my second dissertation chapter differs in several important respects from the broad picture offered by previous research. First, I find evidence of tension between the very active involvement of the state in supporting (careerist) women’s choice to work in the Scandinavian countries and women’s decommodification, as illustrated by the large numbers of domestic and adaptive women with young children who are employed in these countries. While my results call into question Esping-Andersen’s (1990) characterization of the Scandinavian countries as highly decommodifying and claims that the package of childcare-related benefits and services available to mothers and fathers in these countries facilitates parental choice (Leira 2002b), my results are consistent with arguments made by several scholars (see, e.g., Andersen 2008 and Graafland 2000) that the viability of the large public social service sector in the Scandinavian countries rests on “reproduction going public” (Hernes 1987). As suggested by the large gaps between domestic and adaptive women’s work-family orientations and employment behavior, however, the Scandinavian countries have ensured women’s high levels of labor force involvement not only by supporting work-centered women’s full-time employment, but by inducing home-centered and adaptive women to work when their children are young. I hypothesize that features of public policy such as individual taxation systems in which the (usually male) breadwinner’s earnings are taxed at a higher rate than those of the second earner (Sainsbury 1999) and work-related conditions that are attached to the receipt of unemployment insurance and social assistance (Andersen 2010) serve as incentives for mothers to enter the labor market.

While the Scandinavian countries are characterized by both their strong support for (careerist) women’s choice to work and domestic and adaptive mothers’ high levels of labor force involvement, only the latter feature distinguishes the Scandinavian countries from the other countries. Thus, my results suggest that the Scandinavian approach to family policy represents only one route through which countries may promote women’s access to paid work. A second major approach to supporting women’s employment can be identified in Britain and the United States, where there is greater emphasis on demand side measures and reliance on the private sector and the family in the provision of child care (Michel 1999; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). However, as suggested by my results, these countries are less effective at supporting the labor force participation of mothers who have lower earning power and cannot afford center child care or the services of a nanny. Even in many countries whose family policies are designed around a “male breadwinner” family model (Lewis 1992), including Austria and Germany in Continental Europe, the gap between careerist women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories is relatively small.

However, while countries adopt distinct strategies in supporting women’s choice to work, each strategy carries unique costs. The very active role of the state in the provision of welfare in the Scandinavian countries rests on the commodification of women, while greater reliance on the private sector and the family in the provision of child care in Britain and the United States have resulted in multi-tiered systems in which the mode of child care used by mothers and the availability of high-quality child care are determined by class. The relatively small gaps between careerist women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories in some Continental European countries such as Austria and Germany may not necessarily point to a distinct strategy for promoting women’s access to paid work, but rather, factors that are held in common among most countries, including principles regarding equal pay and equal treatment in employment that
are embodied in European Union equality law and improved access to modern and more effective methods of contraception such as the pill.

In the third chapter I examine the influence of a wide range of “person-level” factors such as work orientations, human capital characteristics, and family background factors on American women’s employment trajectories using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979. The more detailed information on women’s work histories in this data set enables me to more closely examine the contours of women’s labor market careers and to identify certain critical junctures at which women tend to diverge from one another in their work hours. Specifically, the first critical juncture in women’s labor market careers occurs in the period following the completion of (or a pause in) schooling and preceding childbirth, during which time most women embark on a male-type employment pattern of continuous full-time employment (“careerist” and “steady withdrawal” women) or work part-time (“adaptive” and “domestic” women). The caretaking responsibilities and financial demands that accompany the birth of the first child constitutes the second critical juncture in women’s lives and cause further branching in women’s work histories. An important question that I ask is whether the same factors explain divergences in women’s employment in the period following the completion of schooling and after childbirth. Interestingly, two important components of women’s work orientations (future plans and gender role attitudes) appear to be far more important in explaining divergences in behavior at the first critical juncture than after childbirth.
For Mom and Dad
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iii

Chapter One The Agency Moderation Hypothesis 1

Chapter Two A Reassessment of Existing Typologies 18

Chapter Three Does Preference Theory Apply to the United States? 37

References 55
Acknowledgements

I believe that a successful dissertation must be a collective endeavor. Because I am a fairly reclusive researcher, I know that my dissertation could not have been as good as it is without the mentorship of my dissertation committee members.

Mike Hout has been with me since the very start of graduate school seven years ago. He has always been constructive and supportive in his advice, which has been greatly appreciated. Mike has also always made himself available, which has been equally appreciated. During our conversations at ISSI in the summers, which frequently lasted significantly longer than I had intended on staying, Mike served as a crucial sounding board at times in which I would have otherwise had little contact with the department. Mike has also opened up important opportunities for me, the most important of which was our collaboration on a project on historical trends in educational mobility. I especially appreciated the opportunity to twice attend meetings in Washington, DC to share our findings with other scholars. Finally, Mike has played an invaluable role as a co-chair of my dissertation committee, from helping me to choose a topic at the initial stages, to thinking through with me how to best frame my results, to serving as my guide as I prepared to go on the job market.

I met Trond Petersen on visit day, but it was not until about three years ago when he joined my dissertation committee as a co-chair that we started working together. Trond has been a very trusted academic mentor to me at all stages of my dissertation research. We spent a number of meetings discussing Catherine Hakim’s controversial Preference Theory, and Trond gave me invaluable advice about how best to navigate those waters. Trond also gave me greatly needed statistical assistance with the third chapter of my dissertation and other issues along the way in my dissertation research. But I think that Trond’s most valuable quality to me as an academic mentor has been his consistent encouragement for me to broaden my thinking in a number of ways, especially early on when he pushed me to select a big dissertation topic that addressed larger sociological issues.

Neil Gilbert contributed significant expertise to my dissertation committee in the area of family policy, which turned out to be absolutely essential because of the direction my dissertation research ended up following. I felt like I walked away from each meeting with him with a few new insights and at least one article or book for me to look at, which ended up advancing my thinking further still.

Finally, even though Steve Vaisey was actively involved on my dissertation committee for only one year, he contributed a disproportionate amount of advice regarding technical issues in my first chapter and the framing of my results.

The past year or so with little doubt has been the most difficult period of my life. I also want to thank Mike, Trond, Neil, and Steve for their friendship and their perspective that can only come with experience. My friends and colleagues Lauren Beresford, Nick Adams, Brian An, and Julia Chuang have also been important sources of friendship, camaraderie, and advice during the entirety of my dissertation research and graduate career at Berkeley.
I also want to thank other faculty at Berkeley who, while they did not serve on my dissertation committee, played important roles in my development as a scholar—namely, Sam Lucas, Claude Fischer, Robb Willer, Irene Bloemraad, Sandra Smith, and Leo Goodman.

While I couldn’t have completed my dissertation without the guidance of my committee members, I wouldn’t have been at Berkeley in the first place if it weren’t for my parents. I have certainly come a long way from being born two months premature and special education classes in elementary school. While my parents have provided plenty of financial support along the way, their love, encouragement, and interest in my studies have been most indispensable, and it is why I am dedicating my dissertation to them.

Finally, I don’t think that there is a woman in this world who is more loving and supportive and beautiful in so many ways than my wife Lauren. I know that I couldn’t have made it through the dark days of this past year without her, and I just want to thank her for listening to me and unconditionally supporting me. She has also read my dissertation in its entirety, and I appreciate the wise advice she has contributed along the way. I am looking forward to starting a new life and family with her in the UK.
Chapter One

The Agency Moderation Hypothesis

An underlying concern of cross-national studies of women’s employment has been the extent to which different policy regimes support women’s emancipation, especially with regard to women’s reliance on the family for their economic well-being. Because full integration into the labor force is an important basis of social entitlement across different policy regimes (Sainsbury 1996, Ch. 5; Lewis 2001; Pfau-Effinger 2004; ), feminists have seen the promotion of gender equality in the labor market as important to women’s emancipation. Indeed, the standard against which women’s labor force involvement and occupational advancements have most often been judged are men’s achievements, through an examination of occupational sex segregation (Charles and Grusky 2004; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000; ) and the “gender gap” in work hours and wages (Goldin 1990; Mandel 2011). A substantial portion of the gender gap in labor market outcomes is thought to reflect the costs of children for their mothers (Lundberg and Rose 2000; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007). In contrast to their husbands or partners, women still shoulder a disproportionate burden of homemaking and childcare responsibilities (Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and Waerness 2008) and suffer employer discrimination on the basis of gender and family status (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). As Budig and England (2001) write, “mothers pay a price in lowered wages for doing child rearing, while most of the rest of us are ‘free riders’ on their labor” (p. 205).

Indeed, the benefits of good parenting diffuse widely in the form of children who grow up to be caring, well-behaved, and productive adults (Budig and England 2001; Folbre 1994). But what is less commonly acknowledged are the benefits that accrue to individual mothers and fathers. Divergent expectations regarding the benefits and costs of childrearing (Gerson 1985), as well as the sometimes class-specific ways in which motherhood undergirds adult identity (McMahon 1995), are among a larger number of psychological, socioeconomic, and cultural factors that produce women’s distinct orientations regarding work and family (Gerson 1985; Blair-Loy 2003; ). In this chapter, against the backdrop of arguments that we need to broaden the criteria used to assess women’s labor market outcomes to include their preferences (see Boulin et al. 2006 on the concept of ”decent working time”), I use data on 18 OECD countries from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) to examine the effect of aspects of the policy, economic, and ideological environment on the gap between mothers’ work-family orientations and their actual employment trajectories over the life course.

I find that there is significant cross-national variation in the gap between mothers’ work-family orientations and labor market trajectories and that family policies, opportunities in the labor market, and the ideological context in different countries play an important role in accounting for variation in the orientations-employment gap. Consistent with what I call the agency moderation hypothesis, I find that mothers’ responses to the broader policy, economic, and ideological environment are highly contingent on their work-family orientations.
Women’s Work-Family Orientations

Hakim’s Preference Theory has been especially influential in Europe over the past twenty years and has provoked a lively debate around heterogeneity in women’s work-family orientations and the implications of women’s work-family orientations for their labor market behavior. Hakim (2000; 2003a) distinguishes among three groups of women, whom differ from one another with respect to the importance of a career versus family as a means of self-actualization and the strength of their commitment to either priority. The middle group in Hakim’s typology, adaptive women, is the largest and most diverse group of women and includes women who want to combine work and family without either taking priority. Work-centered women’s ideal employment trajectory is the stereotypical male career of continuous full-time employment, while, at the opposite end of the spectrum, home-centered women’s prioritization of family life and strong commitment to a traditional sexual division of labor in the home leads them to show little interest in employment after marriage and childbirth. Hakim points to five developments which she says underlie the diversification of women’s preferences and employment in modern societies: the contraceptive revolution, the equal opportunities revolution, the expansion of white collar occupations, the creation of jobs for secondary earners, and the increasing importance of attitudes, values, and personal preferences in determining women’s lifestyle choices.

However, scholars have leveled several criticisms against Hakim’s work—most importantly, that she exaggerates heterogeneity in women’s lifestyle preferences by underestimating the proportion of the female population that is adaptive in orientation (Crompton and Harris 1998; Procter and Padfield 1999). These and other researchers, furthermore, have questioned what they see as Hakim’s underemphasis of social structural factors in explaining women’s preferences. Johnstone and Lee (2009), using data from the Australian Longitudinal Study on Women’s Health, find statistically significant bivariate associations between women’s preferences and 19 of 28 sociodemographic, physical health, and psychological well-being variables, although, when controlling for the 19 statistically significant variables in a regression model, 10 of the variables fall below statistical significance.

Below, I present some evidence that is pertinent to these debates. Furthermore, highly regulated countries that offer “institutionalized solutions” to the problem of reconciling work and family responsibilities are included in the analysis, to which, by Hakim’s own admission, her perspective may be less applicable. Liberal and laissez faire societies such as Britain and the United States, by contrast, are characterized by a situation of “structural ambiguity” (Gerson 1985). Childcare-related services and benefits may be either “familializing” or “defamilializing” with respect to childcare and either “commodifying” or “decommodifying” with respect to parents’ labor and are often designed around and encourage a particular model of the family, women’s labor force involvement, and the division of housework and childcare responsibilities at home (Leira 2002a). Thus, in those countries in which family and labor market policies play a more active role in socializing the costs of raising children by supporting mothers and fathers in their roles as workers and/or carers, the ability of certain groups of women to fully realize their ideal mix of work and caring responsibilities at different points in time may be significantly reduced.
However, as I argue in the following section, while “institutionalized solutions” to work-family conflict may be experienced as constraining among some mothers who do not aspire to the different models of the family and women’s labor force involvement that various family and labor market policies are designed around and encourage, different policy and economic contexts leave at least some space for the exercise of women’s agency in pursuing their labor market careers. Succinctly, I am suggesting that mothers’ work-family orientations may moderate the influence of social structure, including family policies and labor market opportunities, on their employment.

The Agency Moderation Hypothesis

This hypothesis, which I refer to as the agency moderation hypothesis, emphasizes what Emirbayer and Mische (1998) refer to as the “practical-evaluative element” of agency, which is primarily oriented toward the present and involves “the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments” among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presenting evolving situations” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971). Women’s work-family orientations, broadly conceived, enter into these practical-evaluative processes through the characterization of problematic circumstances in terms of schemas from past experience and deliberation over plausible choices taking into account future projects. Thus, the agency moderation hypothesis points to processes of characterization and deliberation that may differ according to past habits and schemas, on the one hand, and plans and aspirations, on the other, that result in potentially divergent labor market careers through the differential take-up of childcare-related benefits and pursuit of labor market opportunities.

In highlighting actors’ agentic capacity, it should be considered that actors make “situationally based judgments” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:994) not only self-reflexively but through deliberation with others, including their spouses, coworkers, and friends, and within family, institutional, and national contexts in which particular cultural schemas or social structural factors may be more or less influential (Blair-Loy 2003; Gerson 1985). Blair-Loy (2003), for example, contrasts “the schema of work devotion” and “the schema of family devotion,” whose sharply different assumptions about what makes life worthwhile and competing demands for women’s time cause women to perceive a career and children as irreconcilable commitments. For Blair-Loy, these “cultural understandings” not only shape our “personal understandings,” but different cultural models help define the expectations of significant others in people’s lives. In the analysis we take seriously these perspectives that emphasize the dependence of women’s work-family orientations on family, institutional, and national contexts. Nevertheless—as illustrated by the large gap between orientations and behavior in most countries and the diversity of mothers’ orientations within similar policy, economic, and ideological contexts—it is clear that mothers’ work-family orientations are not simply rationalizations of the current structure of opportunities and constraints in their environment.
**Family Leave Policies and the Cost of Childcare**

Family leave policies, which in most countries are designed around a family model in which women are secondary contributors to family income, should be most appealing to adaptive women, and, on balance, probably have a positive effect on their employment (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Ch. 8; Ruhm 1998; Pettit and Hook 2005; ). Among work-centered women, by contrast, as Halrynjo and Lyng (2009) argue in their study of Norwegian mothers’ withdrawals from careers in law and consulting, family leave may actually have a negative effect on labor force involvement. They describe a three-stage process in which women who are initially committed to a career are exposed to “the schema of family devotion” (Blair-Loy 2003) as an alternative source of identity through the take-up of family leave. Then, upon their return to work, they are confronted with the impossible situation of simultaneously having to fulfill the work hours and flexibility requirements of “the schema of work devotion” (again, see Blair-Loy 2003) and the demands of involved motherhood. Hence, feelings of personal inadequacy lead them to find a less demanding and more family friendly position.

Finally, in line with their preferred work-family reconciliation strategies, I hypothesize that home-centered women should use more generous family leave provisions primarily as a means of extending their absence from the labor force. This may especially be the case in Austria and Germany and, to a lesser extent, Finland, where the policy models assume or at least make significant allowances for at home care, leave periods are extremely generous, and, as suggested by preliminary evidence for Austria and Germany, the reentry rate into the labor force is low (Bruning and Plantenga 1999).

Early childhood education and care programs include center-based day care, family day care (which is provided in a home setting by a professional) and preschool early education programs, and in most European countries is funded by a combination of parental fees, government tax credits, and child allowances (Kamerman 2000; OECD 2012). Whereas family leave policies are designed to ensure women’s long-term labor force attachment by providing mothers with anywhere from several weeks to a few years off from work and thus at least temporarily famializing child care, the intent of early childhood education and care programs is to commodify the labor of even mothers with young children. The price of child care is an important determinant of access, and most studies have found evidence of a negative relationship of childcare costs with mothers’ employment and work hours, including in Britain (Viitanen 2005), Germany (Wrohlich 2011), the Netherlands (Wetzels 2005), Sweden (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992), and the United States (Connelly and Kimmel 2003).

On the one hand, we would expect that the employment of work-centered women would be most responsive to changes in the price of childcare and other factors affecting access because of the importance of childcare services to maintaining a high level of labor force involvement. On the other hand, among those women who would not otherwise be acting in accordance with their ideal employment trajectories, high childcare costs might give rise to distinct compensatory strategies. Specifically, work-centered women could respond by working longer hours to pay for higher childcare costs, while home-centered women could pursue the opposite strategy and reduce their labor force involvement, thus replacing some or all of a childcare worker’s labor
with their own. Thus, the direction of the effect of high childcare costs on work-centered women’s employment depends on the relative influence of the hypothesized tendency of high childcare costs to drive these women out of full-time employment by lowering the opportunity cost of staying at home and the hypothesized compensatory strategy of increasing labor force involvement among those work-centered women who otherwise would be working part-time or at home caring for their children full-time.

**Labor Market Opportunities**

Two developments, the expansion of the service sector and the increasing availability of part-time work, have transformed the occupational structure of all advanced economies (Kozmetsky and Yue 2005; Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998) and have increased the number of jobs that are appealing and open to women. Wives continue to take greater responsibility for housework and child care than their husbands even in relatively egalitarian countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden (Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and Waerness 2008). Thus, part-time work, through a reduction in the overall number of hours worked, would seem to be an effective strategy for dealing with “the second shift” (Hochschild 2003). However, the prevalence of part-time jobs in the service sector is probably not the only reason for the high levels of sex segregation between the service and manufacturing sectors in most OECD countries (Charles and Grusky 2004). Service sector jobs may be more accessible to women because they are less susceptible to sex stereotyping than most blue collar jobs (Charles 2005; Roos 1990).

The availability of part-time work should best facilitate the realization of adaptive and home-centered women’s ideal or preferred employment trajectories, which, by definition, entail significant periods of part-time employment. Formulating hypotheses about the attraction of service sector employment to different groups of women is more difficult because of the paucity of research outside of the United States that examine employer adoption of family-friendly policies across the economy (Appelbaum et al. 2006). Nevertheless, based on scattered findings, it appears that jobs in the service sector—especially those in public and non-profit social services and finance, insurance, and real estate—are more likely to exhibit the tradeoff of higher levels of remuneration for greater flexibility in the form of telecommuting, flextime, compressed work weeks, self-scheduling, job sharing, and paid vacations (Erler 1999; Galinsky and Bond 1998; Lewis 1999Appelbaum et al. 2006; ). Therefore, we expect that service sector jobs should be most appealing to adaptive and home-centered women and that the availability of these types of jobs would have a positive effect on adaptive and home-centered women’s levels of labor force involvement.

**Access to Modern Forms of Contraception**

The spread of modern forms of contraception—especially the contraceptive pill, the IUD, and sterilization—is a technological revolution that has given women greater control over their fertility and thus their employment situation than ever before (Hakim 2000, Ch. 3; Murphy 1993; Westoff and Ryder 1977). However, modern forms of contraception have not spread evenly to all countries. Among the countries in my sample, women (aged 15-49 years, married or in a union) in Japan (44 percent) and Austria (47) easily have the lowest rates of contraceptive use (Castro-Vazquez and Kishi 2007). While I anticipate that improved access to contraception should
encourage all women’s labor force participation to some degree, career-centered and adaptive women should have the greatest interest in using contraception to limit their fertility and to prevent unplanned disruptions from work.

**Data**

I analyze data on 18 countries from the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) 2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles III module. I focused on married or partnered mothers whose youngest child was school age or older at the time of the interview, who comprised 43 percent of the female sample (n = 14,913). I restricted the analysis to mothers whose youngest child was at least school age, because only these women possessed a sufficient amount of employment experience after the birth of their youngest child to enable the differentiation of adaptive and home-centered employment trajectories. Older women with children who have left school are included in the analysis. After missing values of husband’s earnings were imputed using information on husband’s work hours and occupational status, 4,242 (66 percent) were available for the work trajectory model and 5,003 (78 percent) were available for the model in which work-family orientations is the dependent variable.

The main country-level characteristics in the statistical models are an index of maternity leave plus childcare leave, the average net cost of childcare, the percentage of jobs that are in the service sector, the percentage of part-time jobs, an indicator of access to contraception, and a country-level gender ideology index. In addition, the unemployment rate is included as a measure of labor market demand.

The data for the maternity leave index comes from Anne Helene Gauthier’s Family Policy Project, much of which is published in Gauthier’s (1996) book *The State and the Family: A Comparative Analysis of Family Policies in Industrialized Countries*. To construct the maternity leave index, 1995 data on months of maternity leave that had been multiplied by the income replacement rate for maternity leave was summed with 1995 data on months of childcare leave that had been multiplied by the income replacement rate for childcare leave. The average net cost of childcare indicator, which is based on 2004 data from OECD’s (2007) report “Benefits and Wages 2007,” captures the net childcare fees paid for full-time care by a two-earner couple where the primary earner makes 100 percent of the average worker’s earnings in a country and the secondary earner makes 67 percent of average earnings.

1995 data on the percentage of jobs that are located in the service sector and the unemployment rate in each country come from LABORSTA, the International Labour Organization’s labor statistics database. Individual-level data from the 2002 ISSP was used to construct the part-time jobs indicator.

The indicator of contraceptive access is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a respondent lives in Japan or Austria and equals 0 otherwise. I believe that this indicator of contraceptive access is superior to a quantitative indicator such as the percentage of women of reproductive age using contraception. Since the most recent year for which contraceptive use
data is available in a given country ranges from 1988 to 2008, across-time variation in contraceptive use likely obscures variation in access to contraception between countries. It is clear from the literature and available quantitative data that access to contraception is markedly worse in Japan and Austria compared to the other countries in this study. However, as a robustness check on my results, I ran a supplementary analysis with a quantitative indicator from the United Nations Social Indicators Database.

Finally, the country-level gender ideology index was constructed based on the work-family orientations questions from the 2002 ISSP. This variable is the difference between the percentage of women in a country identifying as home-centered and the percentage of women in a country identifying as work-centered. Thus, positive values on the index indicate more conservative work-family orientations.

Educational attainment, husband’s earnings, and age are included in the statistical models as individual-level characteristics.

The ISSP work trajectory question asks respondents if they worked “outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all” at four different stages of the life course: “after marrying and before you had children,” “when a child was under school age,” “after the youngest child started school,” and “after the children left home.” I categorize mothers’ employment trajectories as work-centered, adaptive, or home-centered on the basis of their employment status during the first three life stages and limit the analysis to those who have at least one child who is school age or older. The work-centered employment trajectory, as it is defined for the purposes of this study, is characterized by continuous full-time employment. In adaptive trajectories women’s employment responds to the exigencies of each life course stage. They are employed full-time before they have children, either part-time or not at all when the youngest child was very young, and either full-time or part-time when the youngest child was school age. I assign all remaining respondents who have lower levels of labor force attachment before they have children or when a child was school age to the home-centered category.

In categorizing mothers as work-centered, adaptive, or home-centered, I rely on ISSP’s question on work-family orientations, which has the great advantage of being analogous to the employment trajectory question and thus allows the calculation of a gap between women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories. Respondents are asked if “women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all” (italics mine) at the four different life course stages and are categorized as work-centered, adaptive, or home-centered using the same procedures used to classify women’s employment trajectories. My operationalization of the work-centered and home-centered groups is consistent with the work of Hakim, except that measures of what could probably be termed ideals were used rather than measures of preferences, which are closer to what is actually preferred and are more predictive of behavior than ideals. Nevertheless, preferences and values are often related to each other (Hakim 2003b; Hofstede 2001).
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of women’s work-family orientations by country among all female ISSP respondents and the analysis sample, from which childless women, single women, and mothers whose youngest child is not yet of school age are excluded (see also Figure 1.1 for the distribution of work-family orientations among the analysis sample). Among the mothers in the analysis sample (2nd through 4th columns of Table 1.1), the percentage of work-centered mothers in most countries generally falls somewhere between 3 and 15 percent, the percentage of adaptive mothers ranges between 56 and 88 percent, and the percentage of home-centered mothers is generally between 10 and 32 percent. The percentage of work-centered mothers in the countries that could be classified as liberal and laissez faire in their social policies (Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States) either fall outside of or fall at the low end of the bounds of what Hakim’s Preference Theory predicts. When childless women and the other groups that are excluded from the analysis are added, however, the figures for work-centered women are a few percentage points higher in most countries.
Methods

The analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first stage of the analysis, I use hierarchical multinomial logistic regression (Snijders and Bosker 1999) to examine whether the effects of various resources and constraints differ according to women’s work-family orientations:

\[
\frac{\log \left( \frac{\Pr(Work_{ij} = m)}{\Pr(Work_{ij} = M)} \right)}{\Pr(Work_{ij} = M)} = \gamma_{00}^{(m)} + \gamma_{10}^{(m)} WO_{1ij} + \gamma_{20}^{(m)} WO_{2ij} + \sum_{h=3}^{p} \gamma_{h0}^{(m)} x_{hij} + \sum_{k=1}^{q} \gamma_{0k}^{(m)} z_{kj} \\
+ \sum_{k=1}^{q} \gamma_{1k}^{(m)} WO_{1ij} z_{kj} + \sum_{k=1}^{q} \gamma_{2k}^{(m)} WO_{2ij} z_{kj} + \mu_{0j(m)} + \mu_{1j(m)} WO_{1ij} \\
+ \mu_{2j(m)} WO_{2ij} + \sum_{h=3}^{p} \mu_{hj(m)} x_{hij} + R_{ij}, \text{ (Eq. 1.1)}
\]

Where the outcome is the log-odds of being in category \( m \) compared to category \( M \) of the employment trajectory variable. \( WO_{1ij} \) and \( WO_{2ij} \) are dummy variables for work-centered and...
adaptive women, respectively; \( \sum_{h=3}^{p} x_{hij} \) are the individual-level variables besides work-family orientations; \( \sum_{k=1}^{q} z_{kj} \) are the country-level variables.

The orientations-employment gap is not only a function of work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered mothers’ employment trajectories, but the distribution of these groups in a country. Thus, in the second stage of the analysis, I estimate a hierarchical linear model to explain variation in mothers’ work-family orientations:

\[
\text{Log} \left[ \frac{\text{Prob}(Val_{ij} = m)}{\text{Prob}(Val_{ij} = M)} \right] = \gamma_{00}(m) + \sum_{h=1}^{p} \gamma_{h0}(m)x_{hij} + \sum_{k=1}^{q} \gamma_{0k}(m)z_{kj} + \mu_{0j(m)} + \sum_{h=1}^{p} \mu_{hj(m)}x_{hij} + R_{ij}, \ (Eq. 1.2)
\]

Where the outcome is the log-odds of being in category \( m \) compared to category \( M \) of the work-family orientations variable and the other parameters and variables are defined as in Equation (1).
Results

Cross-National Variation in the Gap Between Partnered Mothers’ Work-Family Orientations and Employment Trajectories

A gap between women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories may indicate the presence of structural factors that operate independently of their orientations. As shown in Figure 1.2, the percentage of mothers for whom a gap exists between their work-family orientations and employment varies significantly across countries. Countries with the highest percentages of such women include Portugal and Spain in Southwestern Europe; Finland, Sweden, and Norway, but not Denmark, in Scandinavia; and Japan. Furthermore, in this group of countries with the exception of Spain “positive” gaps are more prevalent than “negative” gaps. That is, many women’s actual levels of labor force involvement in these countries exceed their ideal employment trajectories—for example, a woman who has a work-centered employment history but is adaptive in her work-family orientations. Figures 1.3 through 1.5 show the orientations-employment gap among work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered mothers separately.

Source: 2002 ISSP

Figure 1.3. Orientations-Employment Gap Among Work-Centered Mothers
Figure 1.4. Orientations-Employment Gap Among Adaptive Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP

Figure 1.5. Orientations-Employment Gap Among Home-Centered Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP
Explaining Mothers’ Employment Trajectories

The effects of the parental leave index and the average net cost of childcare were both consistent with the agency moderation hypothesis. Generous parental leave provisions appear to have a positive effect (p < .05) on adaptive mothers’ chances of following an adaptive employment trajectory compared to a home-centered trajectory, while home-centered mothers appear to use parental leave primarily as a means of extending their absence from the labor force (Table 1.2). However, the coefficients representing the effect of parental leave on work-centered women’s employment trajectories failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Mothers can pursue one of two compensatory strategies in the face of high childcare costs: increasing their labor force attachment or reducing their work hours, thus replacing some or all of a childcare worker’s labor with their own. Following the agency moderation hypothesis, I anticipate that women should pursue the strategy that is most consistent with their work-family orientations. This proposition is supported by the data. For adaptive and home-centered mothers, living in a country in which childcare costs are high decreases (p < .01) the odds of following a work-centered employment trajectory compared to a home-centered (and adaptive) trajectory. For work-centered mothers, on the other hand, high childcare costs increase (p < .05) the odds of following both a work-centered and adaptive employment trajectory compared to a home-centered trajectory.

Consistent with the agency moderation hypothesis, adaptive and home-centered women employed in labor markets in which part-time work is widely available are more likely to find themselves in employment trajectories that are consistent with their work-family orientations. The percentage of part-time jobs decreases (p < .05) adaptive mothers’ odds of following a work-centered employment trajectory compared to a home-centered (and adaptive) trajectory. The percentage of part-time jobs also decreases (p < .01) home-centered mothers’ odds of following an adaptive employment trajectory, but, interestingly, not adaptive women’s odds of being in an adaptive trajectory.

The coefficients representing the effect of the availability of service sector jobs on mothers’ employment trajectories were statistically insignificant with the exception of one. Rather than stimulating mothers’ labor force involvement, the availability of service sector jobs decreased (p < .05) home-centered women’s odds of following a work-centered employment trajectory compared to a home-centered trajectory. It could be that home-centered women, who have less human capital than work-centered and adaptive women at least as measured by ISSP’s educational attainment variable, are less likely to be employed in jobs that offer employees control over their working time. Indeed, many of the jobs in the service sector that offer employees greater work-life flexibility such as those in finance, information technology, health care, and professional services require higher educational credentials (Galinsky and Bond 1998; Appelbaum et al. 2006).

Living in a country in which modern and more effective forms of contraception such as the contraceptive pill are more widely available increases work-centered mothers’ odds of following both a work-centered employment trajectory (p < .05) and an adaptive employment trajectory (p < .01) compared to a home-centered trajectory. Surprisingly, improved
contraceptive access appears to have a negative effect on home-centered women’s odds of being in a work-centered employment trajectory. This suggests that the estimates may be downwardly biased and points to the limitations of my indicator of contraceptive access, which is a dummy variable that essentially captures all factors not controlled for in the regression model that differ between Japan and Austria and the rest of the sample. Nevertheless, the interaction between mothers’ work-family orientations and their employment trajectories is strong, statistically significant, and in the expected direction.

Table 1.2. The Effect of Country-Level Variables on Employment Trajectories Among Work-Centered, Adaptive, and Home-Centered Mothers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Country-Level Variables</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
<th>Effect on Values-Employment Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work-Centered</td>
<td>Adaptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of parental leave index</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>.05 (.09)</td>
<td>.07 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
<td>.05 * (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>-.11 * (.05)</td>
<td>-.09 * (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of avg. cost of childcare</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>.09 * (.05)</td>
<td>.11 * (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>-.04 ** (.02)</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>-.11 ** (.02)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of % service sector jobs</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>.03 (.08)</td>
<td>.09 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>.02 (.04)</td>
<td>-.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>-.10 * (.04)</td>
<td>.01 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of % part-time jobs</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
<td>-.06 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>-.06 * (.03)</td>
<td>.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
<td>-.06 ** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of % unemployed</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>-.17 (.09)</td>
<td>-.22 * (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>.02 (.06)</td>
<td>-.07 * (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>.05 (.05)</td>
<td>-.08 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of access to contraception</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>2.95 * (1.38)</td>
<td>4.72 ** (1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>-.11 (.68)</td>
<td>.27 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>-.179 * (.73)</td>
<td>.47 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of domestic work values</strong> among mothers with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work-centered values</td>
<td>.01 (.07)</td>
<td>.05 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptive values</td>
<td>.03 (.02)</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home-centered values</td>
<td>-.07 * (.03)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles III module

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The effect sizes are to the left of the standard errors and represent the main effect for home-centered women and the main effect plus the relevant interaction term for work-centered and adaptive women. The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 4,242.

*p < .05 **p < .01
Overall, evidence for a causal effect of the country-level indicator of gender ideology on mothers’ employment trajectories is unimpressive. Only home-centered women living in countries characterized by a more conservative gender ideology context are less likely (p < .05) to follow a work-centered employment trajectory compared to a home-centered trajectory and thus tend to have a smaller orientations-employment gap. Gender ideology context does not have a statistically significant effect on home-centered women’s odds of following an adaptive employment trajectory, however.

The interaction between mothers’ work-family orientations and the individual-level variables provide further support for the agency moderation hypothesis (Table 1.3). Overall, better educated women are more likely to pursue a male-type employment trajectory of continuous full-time employment, but the effect of educational attainment is strongest among work-centered women (p < .01). The relative magnitude of the coefficients representing the effect of educational attainment on work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered women’s odds of following an adaptive employment trajectory are also consistent with the agency moderation hypothesis, but only the coefficient for adaptive women is statistically significant (p < .01). With regard to husband’s earnings, home-centered women appear to be more likely than either work-centered or adaptive women to take advantage of a high family income to reduce their labor force involvement.

Table 1.3. The Effect of Individual-Level Variables on Employment Trajectories Among Work-Centered, Adaptive, and Home-Centered Mothers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of educational attainment among mothers with</th>
<th>Work-Centered</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
<th>Effect on Values-Employment Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…work-centered values</td>
<td>.69 ** (.22)</td>
<td>.46 (.24)</td>
<td>NEG NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…adaptive values</td>
<td>.43 ** (.07)</td>
<td>.30 ** (.06)</td>
<td>NEG NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…home-centered values</td>
<td>.28 * (.11)</td>
<td>.03 (.11)</td>
<td>POS NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of husband’s earnings among mothers with</th>
<th>Work-Centered</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
<th>Effect on Values-Employment Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…work-centered values</td>
<td>-.06 (.05)</td>
<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
<td>NS NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…adaptive values</td>
<td>-.09 ** (.02)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>NS NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…home-centered values</td>
<td>-.20 ** (.07)</td>
<td>-.05 (.05)</td>
<td>NEG NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Effect of age                                    | -.02 ** (.00) | -.02 ** (.00) |                       |

Source: 2002 ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles III module
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The effect sizes are to the left of the standard errors and represent the main effect for home-centered women and the main effect plus the relevant interaction term for work-centered and adaptive women. The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 4,242.
*p < .05   **p < .01
Explaining Mothers’ Work-Family Orientations

Since the aggregate-level gap between work-family orientations and employment is not only a function of work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered mothers’ employment situation, but the distribution of these different groups of women in a country, I examine variation in mothers’ work-family orientations in the second stage of the analysis. In most countries adaptive and home-centered women are less likely to find themselves in employment trajectories that are consistent with their work-family orientations than work-centered women (Figure 1.3). Thus, factors which tend to increase the number of women in a country who identify as adaptive or home-centered should also widen the country-level orientations-employment gap.

Mothers adapt their work-family ideals in response to both individual capacities and resources and constraints in the larger environment. At the individual level, women’s educational attainment increases (p < .01) the odds of having work-centered andadaptive work-family orientations compared to a home-centered orientation (Table 1.4). At the national level, the percentage of service sector jobs has a positive relationship (p < .01) with the odds of having a work-centered orientation, while the percentage of part-time jobs has a negative relationship (p < .01) with the odds of having a work-centered orientation. Neither of these variables, however, influences the odds of being adaptive in orientation. The estimated positive effect of the unemployment rate (p < .05) on the odds of having a work-centered orientation appears to be driven primarily by the high unemployment rate and the large number of women who claim to be work-centered in Spain.

### Table 1.4. Determinants of Work-Family Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Work-Centered</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td>.45 ** (.08)</td>
<td>.27 ** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's earnings</td>
<td>-.03 (.18)</td>
<td>.01 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth cohort</td>
<td>.02 ** (.01)</td>
<td>.01 ** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental leave index</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.03 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. cost of childcare</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% service sector jobs</td>
<td>.07 ** (.02)</td>
<td>.00 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% part-time jobs</td>
<td>-.05 ** (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% unemployed</td>
<td>.08 * (.03)</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to contraception</td>
<td>.04 (.37)</td>
<td>.01 (.55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles III module
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 5,003.
*p < .05  **p < .01

**Discussion**

In this study I present the gap between mothers’ work-family orientations and employment trajectories as an aggregate-level measure of the success or failure of 18 OECD countries in meeting the needs of work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered women. As I
discover in the analysis, family policies, opportunities in the labor market, and the ideological context in different countries play an important role in accounting for variation in the orientations-employment gap.

In most highly regulated countries, including the Scandinavian countries and most of the Continental European countries, there is a relatively weak correspondence between mothers’ work-family orientations and actual labor force behavior. The large gaps in these countries point to the limited scope of “institutionalized solutions” to the problem of reconciling work and family responsibilities. In Norway and Sweden the low cost of childcare, as suggested by the regression analysis, combined with incentives in the tax structure, serves as an inducement to adaptive and home-centered women to enter the labor market. Even in Finland, which has been held up as a model of how to promote women’s choice through a constellation of services and benefits that cater to different groups of women (Bruning and Plantenga 1999; Leira 2002a), it is clear that the large majority of adaptive women in this country are working more than they think is optimal (see Figure 1.3). In Austria and Germany, whose policy regimes, in contrast to the Scandinavian countries, are designed around the male breadwinner family (Bruning and Plantenga 1999; Lewis et al. 2008; Pfau-Effinger 2004), the overall gaps between mothers’ work-family orientations and actual labor force behavior are also large. While extremely generous leave periods in these countries may facilitate home-centered mothers’ withdrawal from the labor force, which is suggested by the negative coefficients for the effect of parental leave among home-centered women in the regression analysis, the low wage replacement rates that accompany these leaves may explain why the gaps between home-centered women’s work-family orientations and behavior in these countries are still substantial (see Figure 1.3).

While different policy regimes may present difficulties for certain groups of women, my results also suggest, consistent with the agency moderation hypothesis, that different policy and economic contexts leave at least some space for the exercise of women’s agency in pursuing their labor market careers. Mothers creatively use generous family leave provisions, take advantage of certain opportunities in the labor market, and adopt distinct compensatory strategies in the face of high childcare costs so as to minimize any discordance between their work-family orientations and actual labor force behavior.

However, this is not to say that women’s work-family orientations are determinative. While the effect of work-family orientations in a model with full controls is very large and highly statistically significant, there are still significant gaps between women’s ideal and actual employment trajectories in most countries. Women are determiners of their own behavior only to the extent that the larger policy and economic environment allows. But they try to make the best of their situation.
Chapter Two
A Reassessment of Existing Typologies

The numerous studies on the relationship between family policy and women’s employment offer valuable insights into an important mechanism through which welfare states affect women’s and their families’ economic well-being (Van Der Lippe and Van Dijk 2002 for reviews, see Gornick and Meyers 2003 and ). However, despite the significance of women’s market ties to their financial autonomy, most of these studies provide an incomplete analysis of the emancipatory effects of social policies. Because investigators rarely have incorporated information on women’s orientations toward work and family into their analyses, they are unable to distinguish between women who are working by choice and women who have been compelled to work by constraints in their environment and, as a result, policies that promote women’s “access to paid work” (Orloff 1993) and policies that commodify women. The distinction between policies that support women’s choice to work and policies that commodify women is important, because work relationships are potentially oppressive, and policies that promote women’s freedom to opt out of work may enhance women’s leverage, individually and collectively, in the market (Esping-Andersen 1990). Thus, in addition to promoting women’s employment opportunities, women friendly policy regimes should support women’s “decommodification” or freedom to opt out of work.

In this chapter I introduce the gap between mothers’ work-family orientations and actual employment trajectories as an index of the extent to which different family policy regimes are “friendly” toward women by supporting their “access to paid work” (Orloff 1993) and “decommodification” (Esping-Andersen 1990). Based on an analysis of data on 15 OECD countries from the International Social Survey Program, I find that differences across countries with regard to these two indicators of the emancipatory potential of family policy regimes differs in important respects from the broad picture suggested by previous research. Specifically, some of the same countries that are most effective in promoting women’s employment opportunities provide little support for women’s choice to opt out of work. Furthermore, the large majority of countries in the analysis are at least moderately effective in supporting women’s choice to work, although distinct strategies carry with them distinct costs.

The Welfare State, Gender, and the Foundations of Women’s Emancipation

Over the past 30 years, feminist scholars of the welfare state have made significant contributions to our understanding of women’s relationship to the welfare state (as citizens, employees, clients, wives, and mothers), the gendering of social rights, and interrelationships among the state, market, and family in the provision of welfare (Sainsbury 1996; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999, see, e.g., Gornick and Meyers 2003, Hernes 1987, Lewis 1992, Pateman 1988, and Orloff 1993, ). Much of this work has been cast as a response to Esping-Andersen’s threefold typology of welfare state regimes, of which the degree of “decommodification” or the extent to which “citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary” is a central analytical dimension (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). However, feminist scholars of the
welfare state have questioned the extent to which Esping-Andersen’s typology is applicable to women’s complex relationship to the welfare state, especially as mothers and wives, and addresses the conditions for women’s emancipation (Lister 1994; Orloff 1993). As has been noted in multiple comparative studies, women, in contrast to their husbands or partners, still shoulder a disproportionate burden of homemaking and childcare responsibilities in all developed countries (Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and Waerness 2008), a circumstance that has implications for women’s employment opportunities and the receipt of social entitlements based on labor market status. Orloff (1993) suggests that decommodification needs to be supplemented with two additional criteria: “access to paid work,” which Orloff argues provides independence and enhanced leverage within marriage, and “the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household” (independently of a breadwinner’s income). These criteria are related in that lowering barriers to women’s labor force participation has been one of two primary strategies, together with paying women to stay home with their children, of providing women with greater economic autonomy and greater freedom to enter and dissolve relationships without regard to economic necessity (Orloff 1993; Pateman 1988). Relatedly, in contrast to decommodification and its stress on independence from the labor market, Lister (1994) proposes the concept “defamialization” to highlight women’s economic independence in relation to the family.

Implications of Different Family Policy Regimes for Women’s Emancipation

Against the backdrop of feminist critiques of welfare state scholarship, investigators have identified cross-national differences in childcare provisions, broadly defined, that they argue have specific implications for mothers’ access to paid work and decommodification (and thus, as a result, their defamialization) (for overviews, see Bettio and Plantenga 2004, De Henau, Meulders, and O’Dorchai 2006, and Gornick and Meyers 2003). The highly regulated Scandinavian countries have been pointed to as offering a model of how to socialize the costs of rearing children through a combination of family and labor market policies that reward mothers and fathers in their roles as both workers and carers. It is argued that extensive childcare provisions, in the form of publicly funded childcare services and gender egalitarian parental leaves, available to Scandinavian women and women in Belgium and France promote their access to paid work. In the English-speaking countries—Australia, Britain, and the United States—the state is subordinate to the market and family in welfare provision. Private provision of child care is encouraged through a combination of targeted cash benefits and tax credits. Finally, in some Continental European countries—Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain—investigators have argued that women’s decommodification and a “male breadwinner” family model (Lewis 1992) has been supported, although the objectives of policy instruments have been changing in important ways in some of these countries (for a summary, see Table 2.1).
The welfare state affects women’s employment opportunities both as a provider of childcare-related benefits and services and as an employer (Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Gornick and Jacobs 1998; Hernes 1987). The Scandinavian welfare states have played a very active role in supporting women’s participation in the labor force with regard to both of these dimensions of welfare state activity. Indeed, Hernes (1987), in a seminal work on the relationship between welfare states and Scandinavian women’s political empowerment, has written that a major transformation in women’s work has been the process of “reproduction going public,” which, in the case of the Scandinavian countries, means that women’s caring labor has increasingly become state-organized in schools, hospitals, childcare facilities, and nursing homes. In the welfare state’s role as a provider of childcare-related benefits and services, the Scandinavian countries offer publicly funded early childhood education and care (ECEC) programs that serve all children under compulsory school age. These programs are also of very high quality with regard to various metrics concerning group size, staff-child ratios, and caregiver qualifications, and parents’ income-related fees are usually less than 10 percent of the average wage (Kamerman 2000). However, Norway is somewhat of an outlier among these countries in that concerns about facilitating mothers’ employment and gender equality have been less important as rationales behind public childcare provision than in either Denmark or Sweden. There is also evidence of significant unmet need for childcare among families with children less than three years old (Ellingsaeter and Gulbrandsen 2007).

### Table 2.1. Categorization of Countries Based on Their Family Policy Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Group</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed Supports for Mothers’ Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden</td>
<td>most developed policy package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroup 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, France</td>
<td>underdeveloped leave provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Male Breadwinner&quot; Family Model Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Germany</td>
<td>long child care leaves and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain</td>
<td>underdeveloped day care services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Developed Supports for Mothers’ Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Britain, Switzerland</td>
<td>least developed policy package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Developed Supports for Mothers’ Employment

The welfare state affects women’s employment opportunities both as a provider of childcare-related benefits and services and as an employer (Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Gornick and Jacobs 1998; Hernes 1987). The Scandinavian welfare states have played a very active role in supporting women’s participation in the labor force with regard to both of these dimensions of welfare state activity. Indeed, Hernes (1987), in a seminal work on the relationship between welfare states and Scandinavian women’s political empowerment, has written that a major transformation in women’s work has been the process of “reproduction going public,” which, in the case of the Scandinavian countries, means that women’s caring labor has increasingly become state-organized in schools, hospitals, childcare facilities, and nursing homes. In the welfare state’s role as a provider of childcare-related benefits and services, the Scandinavian countries offer publicly funded early childhood education and care (ECEC) programs that serve all children under compulsory school age. These programs are also of very high quality with regard to various metrics concerning group size, staff-child ratios, and caregiver qualifications, and parents’ income-related fees are usually less than 10 percent of the average wage (Kamerman 2000). However, Norway is somewhat of an outlier among these countries in that concerns about facilitating mothers’ employment and gender equality have been less important as rationales behind public childcare provision than in either Denmark or Sweden. There is also evidence of significant unmet need for childcare among families with children less than three years old (Ellingsaeter and Gulbrandsen 2007).
Complementing the provision of high-quality, publicly funded childcare services, these countries further support women’s employment by allowing mothers and fathers to take time off from work to care for young children. Generally, maternity leave provisions, especially those that replace a high percentage of previous wages, may increase the supply of female workers by encouraging them to find employment before having children in order to subsequently qualify for maternity leave and by enabling them to return to work more quickly than otherwise after childbirth (Pettit and Hook 2005; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Berger and Waldfogel 2004; ). In Finland, Norway, Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, Denmark not only are parental leave provisions generous with respect to both the duration and level of benefits, but specific elements of the leave policies in these countries are especially likely to promote gender equality in women’s and men’s employment and caring responsibilities (Bruning and Plantenga 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). For example, in an effort to promote fathercare by “gentle force,” all of these countries reserve part of the parental leave period for fathers. Norway’s “daddy quota,” which came into effect in 1993, has been a notable success in that 70 to 80 percent of eligible fathers take it up (Leira 2002a; Leira 2002b; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010).

Like Finland, Norway, and Sweden, Belgium and France offer developed supports for working mothers, including publicly funded preschools (the école maternelle) that are available to all children regardless of parents’ income or employment status (Kamerman 2000). However, unlike the Scandinavian countries, parental leave provisions in Belgium and France are characterized by inegalitarian elements that may discourage some women from returning to the labor force and men’s take-up of benefits. Furthermore, in France, until 1994, leave was only available upon the birth of the third child. In this year mothers with two children became eligible for the three-year leave, and monthly benefits were increased to around 450 euros (Morel 2007; Lewis et al. 2008; Bruning and Plantenga 1999; ). It should also be noted that while in France mothers with 3- to 5-year-olds do not encounter problems in accessing childcare services, there is sometimes a shortage of places for 2-year-olds (in which case the children of working mothers get preference) (Kamerman 2000). Indeed, both France and Belgium have placed increasing emphasis on subsidies to support noninstitutional forms of care, such as a private nanny who cares for a child in the parents’ own home or a registered childcare worker who cares for children in her home (Lewis et al. 2008; Morel 2007).

“Male Breadwinner” Family Model Countries

Although childcare-related benefits and services differ in important ways between Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, studies of the policy frameworks in these countries argue that a “male breadwinner” family model (Lewis 1992) is strongly encouraged. In Austria and Germany and several other European countries a combination of pressure from conservative and/or centrist parties and movements, economic circumstances such as high unemployment and fiscal pressures on the welfare state, and the resonance of these policies among the general public who are grappling with issues related to work-life balance have led governments, since the mid-1980s, to adopt childcare leaves, which offer substantially more time out of the labor force than parental leaves, combined with (relatively modest) cash benefits for at-home child care (Morgan and Zippel 2003). Childcare leaves are taken almost entirely by mothers. In Austria and...
Germany only 2 percent of the recipients are men. The long duration of childcare leaves, combined with the fact that eligibility for the childcare allowance is independent of prior labor force experience, probably explains the negative effect of these leaves on mothers’ employment. Compared to the European countries that offer childcare leaves, return rates among leave-takers who had been employed before childbirth are exceptionally low in Austria (40 percent) and what was formally West Germany (60 percent) (Bruning and Plantenga 1999; Morgan and Zippel 2003).

Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, furthermore, have underdeveloped early childhood education and care (ECEC) programs (Kamerman 2000; Tietze and Cryer 1999; Wrohlich 2008; Wetzels 2005; Hoem, Prskawetz, and Neyer 2001; ). According to data from 1993, only 3 percent of Austrian children, only 4 percent of West German children, and 8 percent of Dutch children, younger than 3 years old, were served by publicly funded ECEC services. The percentage of children in ECEC programs was considerably higher (50 percent) in what was formally East Germany (Tietze and Cryer 1999). Nonetheless, Wrohlich (2008), using a partial observability model that leverages information on certain children who are known not to be restricted in their access to child care facilities, estimates that there is large unmet demand for childcare in both the former East Germany and the former West Germany. The unavailability of spaces in childcare facilities represents a significant obstacle to women’s employment because of the expense of alternative arrangements such as hiring a nanny (Wrohlich 2008). In the Netherlands the passage of the Child Care Stimulation Act in 1990 and a second piece of legislation in 1994 has resulted in a dramatic increase in the provision of formal childcare. Indeed, the number of formal childcare spaces tripled between 1989 and 1995. However, as in Germany, there still appears to be a significant unmet need for childcare, and the majority of children are served by informal arrangements at all ages (Wetzels 2005).

Portugal and Spain are also included among this group because of the absence of extensive childcare provision in these countries, especially among children younger than 3 years old, combined with maternity and childcare leave that, while generous with respect to duration, is characterized by inegalitarian elements, including substantial periods of unpaid leave and, in the case of Portugal, only one week of (paid) leave earmarked exclusively for fathers (Kamerman 2000; Tietze and Cryer 1999; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010). While Spain reserves an enormous 156 weeks of leave for fathers, only two weeks are paid (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010).

**Underdeveloped Supports for Mothers’ Employment**

As liberal welfare regimes, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States share important features, including the subordination of state intervention to the market and the family and an emphasis on means-tested programs (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Esping-Andersen 1990; ). In Australia and the United States for-profit sector provision of child care has become increasingly important and has been stimulated by a variety of cash benefits and tax credits that are targeted toward low-income families with children, such as the Childcare Benefit and the Parenting Payment in Australia and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Child Care Development Fund Block Grant in the United States (Brennan 1994, 2007b;
Demand side measures have been an important element of childcare policy in the United Kingdom as well since the Family Income Supplement was introduced in 1971. The Family Income Supplement was replaced by the Family Credit in 1988, which expanded eligibility, and most recently in 1999 the Family Credit was replaced by the Working Families’ Tax Credit, which is more generous for all categories of recipients (McKay 2002; Wincott 2006). While the combination of targeted cash benefits and tax credits provided to low-income single-parent and couple families are comparatively generous in these countries by international standards (Bradshaw and Finch 2002), the supply of affordable and high-quality child care remains a problem (Brennan 2007a; Gordon and Chase-Lansdale 2001; Hofferth 1996). For example, Gordon and Chase-Lansdale (2001), who examine data from the 1990 US Decennial Census on the number of childcare workers in different communities, find evidence of significant unmet need for center child care in nonmetropolitan poor areas and, to a lesser extent, nonmetropolitan mixed-income areas. Maternity leave provisions in these countries are either unpaid (Australia and the United States) or provide meager cash benefits (the United Kingdom); are subject to various eligibility criteria; and, in the case of the United States, are short in duration (12 weeks, Australia: 52 weeks, United Kingdom: 65 weeks) (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2010).

I also include Switzerland among those countries with the least developed policy packages. Switzerland has a federalist system of government in which the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels are involved in family policy. Until recently, federal involvement in family policy has been confined to the legal protection of working mothers. The cantons, on the other hand, have been the primary source of cash support for families with children, which for a long time was the most important area of Swiss family policy. Maternity leave provisions, however, are much less developed, and it was not until 2004 that a nationwide maternity leave scheme was introduced at the federal level (14 weeks with an 80 percent wage replacement rate). During the late 1990s, subsidies for child care centers were significantly increased in the major cities, and many cantons made costs for child care tax deductible, although substantial variation remains across cantons with regard to both support for day care and cash assistance to families (Armingeon, Bertozzi, and Bonoli 2004; Kuebler 2007).

In the analysis I examine cross-national variation in the gap between mothers’ work-family orientations and employment trajectories as a means to assessing the picture of family policy regimes suggested by previous research with respect to two important criteria: the extent to which family policy regimes support mothers’ choice to work, as indicated by the gap between careerist women’s work-family orientations and employment behavior, and the extent to which they support mothers’ decommodification, as indicated by the orientations-employment gap among domestic women. First, I discuss the data and estimation strategy that were used.

**Data**

I analyze data on 15 countries from the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) 2002 Family and Changing Gender Roles III module. I restricted the analysis to mothers whose youngest child was school age or older at the time of the interview, who comprised 52 percent of the female sample (n = 14,913), because only these women possessed a sufficient amount of employment experience after the birth of their youngest child to enable the differentiation of
adaptive and domestic employment trajectories. After observations with missing values were deleted using listwise deletion, 6,571 (84 percent) were available for the statistical analysis.

Educational attainment, marital status, and age are included in the statistical models as individual-level characteristics. Educational attainment is a five-category variable that distinguishes among respondents who have no formal qualification or the lowest formal qualification in a country, have less than a secondary degree, have completed a secondary degree, have completed some postsecondary education, or have completed a university degree. Marital status is a binary variable that distinguishes respondents who are married or “living as married” from those who are widowed, divorced, separated, or single.

To determine whether a “gap” exists between a respondent’s work-family orientations and employment behavior, I compare their responses to two questions. The ISSP work trajectory question asks respondents if they worked “outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all” at four different stages of the life course: “after marrying and before you had children,” “when a child was under school age,” “after the youngest child started school,” and “after the children left home.” I categorize mothers’ employment trajectories as careerist, adaptive, or domestic on the basis of their employment status during the first three life stages and limit the analysis to those who have at least one child who is school age or older. The careerist employment trajectory, as it is defined for the purposes of this study, is characterized by continuous full-time employment. In adaptive trajectories women’s employment responds to the exigencies of each life course stage. They are employed full-time before they have children, either part-time or not at all when the youngest child was very young, and either full-time or part-time when the youngest child was school age. I assign all remaining respondents who have lower levels of labor force attachment before they have children or when a child was school age to the domestic category.

In categorizing mothers as careerist, adaptive, or domestic, I rely on ISSP’s question on work-family orientations, which has the great advantage of being analogous to the employment trajectory question and thus allows the calculation of a gap between women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories. Respondents are asked if “women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all” (italics mine) at the four different life course stages and are categorized as careerist, adaptive, or domestic using the same procedures used to classify women’s employment trajectories. My operationalization of the careerist and domestic groups is consistent with the work of Hakim (see, e.g., Hakim 2000), except that measures of what could probably be termed ideals were used rather than measures of preferences, which are closer to what is actually preferred and are more predictive of behavior than ideals. Nevertheless, preferences and values are often related to each other (Hofstede 2001).

Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of mothers’ work-family orientations by country. The percentage of mothers who have careerist work-family orientations in the 15 countries falls somewhere between 3 and 16 percent, the percentage of adaptive mothers between 55 and 86 percent, and the percentage of domestic mothers between 6 and 40 percent.
Methods

To estimate the size of the orientations-employment gap among the different groups of women in each of the 15 countries, I use a fixed effects multinomial logistic regression model in which the effects of women’s work-family orientations and the other covariates are estimated separately for each country:

\[
\log \left[ \frac{\text{Prob}(Work_i = m)}{\text{Prob}(Work_i = M)} \right] = \alpha_{00(m)} + \alpha_{0j(m)} + \sum_{h=1}^{2} (\beta_{h0(m)} \text{ort}_h + \beta_{hj(m)} \text{ort}_h) + \sum_{h=1}^{4} (\beta_{h0(m)} \text{edu}_h + \beta_{hj(m)} \text{edu}_h) + \beta_{50(m)} \text{mar}_i + \beta_{5j(m)} \text{mar}_i + \beta_{60(m)} \text{age}_i + \beta_{6j(m)} \text{age}_i + R_{ij}, \quad (Eq. 2.1)
\]

Where the outcome is the log-odds of being in category \( m \) compared to category \( M \) of the employment trajectory variable; \( \alpha_{00(m)} \) is the intercept or value of the log-odds for the baseline.
country; $\alpha_{0j(m)}$ are 14 fixed parameters that represent the difference in the log-odds between country $j$ and the baseline country; the $\beta_{h0(m)}$’s in the model represent the effect of the individual-level covariates—women’s work-family orientations, education, marital status, and age—on the outcome; and each group of $\beta_{hj(m)}$’s represent the difference between country $j$ and the baseline country in the effect of each covariate.

Even though model (1) is a fixed effects model, it does take the nesting structure of the data into account by allowing the estimation of separate effects for each country (Snijders and Bosker 1999). While such models result in the estimation of a very large number of parameters compared to either a random effects model or a standard fixed effects model, it enables me to recover explicit estimates of the log-odds or probability for each country.

The Orientations-Employment Gap

The existence of a gap at the individual level indicates that a woman followed an employment trajectory that is inconsistent with her work-family orientations—for example, a woman who believes that women should stay at home with young children but who, in fact, worked when her own children were young. The percentage of mothers for whom a gap exists between their work-family orientations and employment trajectories varies significantly across countries (Figure 2.2). Countries with the highest percentages of such women include Portugal (79 percent) and Spain (58 percent) in Southwestern Europe; Finland (63 percent), Norway (57 percent), and Sweden (68 percent), but not Denmark (42 percent), in Scandinavia; and Belgium (60 percent) and France (59 percent). Furthermore, in this group of countries with the exception of Spain “positive” gaps are more prevalent than “negative” gaps. That is, many women’s actual levels of labor force involvement in these countries exceed their ideal employment trajectories—for example, a woman who has a careerist employment history but is adaptive in her work-family orientations.

Figures 2.3 through 2.5 present the predicted probabilities from the multinomial logistic regression model of following a domestic, adaptive, and careerist employment trajectory among domestic, adaptive, and careerist mothers respectively. Thus, the predicted probabilities in these figures represent the size of the orientations-employment gap controlling for differences in the distribution of women’s age, educational attainment, and marital status across countries. The size of the orientations-employment gap among the different groups of women can be viewed as an index of the extent to which different countries are “friendly” toward domestic, adaptive, and careerist women by enabling them to pursue an employment trajectory that is consistent with their work-family orientations. Based on the broad picture of cross-national differences in family policy regimes offered by previous research (refer to Table 2.1), we would expect that the Scandinavian countries and Belgium and France, the “developed supports” countries, are friendliest toward careerist mothers—that is, the orientations-employment gap among careerist mothers is smallest in these countries; Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, the “‘male breadwinner’ family model” countries, are friendliest toward domestic women; while the orientations-employment gap should be smallest among adaptive women in the English-speaking countries and Switzerland.
All of the male breadwinner countries with the exception of Portugal are above average in their friendliness toward domestic mothers (Figure 2.3). However, the orientations-employment gap among domestic mothers is relatively small in several other countries as well, including three developed supports countries, Belgium, Finland, and France, and two underdeveloped supports countries, Australia and Switzerland.

With regard to the orientations-employment gap among adaptive women, all of the underdeveloped supports countries are above average in their friendliness toward adaptive women (Figure 2.4). However, again, the size of the orientations-employment gap in several countries is not consistent with our expectations. The orientations-employment gap among adaptive women is also relatively small in two developed supports countries, Denmark and Norway, and two male breadwinner countries, Germany and the Netherlands.

In the large majority of countries (13 out of 16), including the developed supports countries, fewer than 40 percent of careerist women are following an employment trajectory that is not consistent with their work-family orientations (Figure 2.5). Only in the Netherlands and Switzerland have the majority of careerist women worked less than they consider optimal over the life course.
Figure 2.3. Orientations-Employment Gap Among Domestic Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP

Figure 2.4. Orientations-Employment Gap Among Adaptive Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP
Two indexes, which are based on calculations of the magnitude of the orientations-employment gaps, provide additional information about countries’ “friendliness” toward different women. The first index (EI 1), which is equal to the ratio of the odds of no gap among careerist mothers compared to the odds of no gap among domestic mothers, is a measure of the extent to which countries favor careerist women compared to domestic women (Figure 2.6). Only Norway and Sweden, according to EI 1, show a statistically significant bias (p < .01) in favor of careerist mothers. For Denmark EI 1 is marginally statistically significant. EI 1 for the other “developed supports” countries is not statistically significant, because, even though the orientations-employment gap among careerist women is relatively small in these countries, the gap among domestic women is only slightly larger. Only the Netherlands, on the other hand, shows a statistically significant bias (p < .01) in favor of domestic mothers, while for Switzerland, in spite of the small value of the odds ratio, EI 1 is just marginally statistically significant (p < .10).

The second index (EI 2) is the odds of adaptive mothers following a careerist employment trajectory (or a “positive gap”) compared to adaptive mothers following a domestic trajectory (or a “negative gap”) (Figure 2.7). An examination of countries’ rankings on EI 2 reveals that in three out of the four countries that “favor” careerist women over domestic women according to their scores on EI 1—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—adaptive women are statistically significantly more likely (p < .01) to follow a careerist employment trajectory than a domestic trajectory. By contrast, among adaptive women in Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for whom a gap exists between their work-family
Figure 2.6. Ratio of Odds of No Gap Among Careerist Mothers Compared to Odds of No Gap Among Domestic Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP
Notes: † p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01

Figure 2.7. Odds of a Positive Gap Compared to a Negative Gap Among Adaptive Mothers

Source: 2002 ISSP
Notes: † p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01
orientations and employment trajectories, a positive gap is statistically significantly less likely (at least $p < .05$) than a negative gap.

Table 2.2 categorizes the countries as “careerist biased,” “domestic biased,” “adaptive friendly,” and “bifurcated” using the five measures that are based on the size of the orientations-employment gap. In most or all careerist-biased countries, which includes the Scandinavian countries and the United States, the orientations-employment gap among careerist mothers is small; the gap among careerist mothers is statistically significantly smaller than the gap among domestic mothers; and among those adaptive women for whom a gap exists between their work-family orientations and employment trajectories, a positive gap is statistically significantly more likely than a negative gap. On the other hand, in most or all domestic-biased countries, which includes Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, the orientations-employment gap among domestic mothers is small; the gap among careerist mothers is statistically significantly larger than the gap among domestic mothers; and among adaptive women a positive gap is statistically significantly less likely than a negative gap. I call these countries careerist- or domestic-biased, not friendly, because not only are these countries friendly toward careerist or domestic mothers in the sense that the orientations-employment gap among these groups is small, but the gap among adaptive mothers in these countries exhibits a distinct bias in the domestic or careerist direction.

Table 2.2. Categorization of Countries Based on the Orientations-Employment Gap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gap Among Work-Centered Mothers</th>
<th>Gap Among Home-Centered Mothers</th>
<th>EI 1</th>
<th>Gap Among Adaptive Mothers</th>
<th>EI 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Careerist Biased</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>Medium Careerist$^\dagger$</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Small Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Large Small</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Large Small</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Careerist</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>Careerist$^\dagger$</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Biased</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Small Medium</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Small Medium</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Small Large</td>
<td>Domestic$^\dagger$</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive Friendly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bifurcated Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Small Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Medium Small</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 ISSP
Notes: $^\dagger p < .10$, ns $p \geq .10$. 

31
In Britain, the only “adaptive friendly” country, the size of the orientations-employment gap among adaptive women is substantially smaller than any other country. In the “bifurcated” countries, which include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, the orientations-employment gap among adaptive mothers is medium to large in size like the careerist biased and domestic biased countries. However, unlike these other countries, the gap among adaptive mothers has no clear bias in either the careerist or domestic direction. In both Britain and the bifurcated countries, furthermore, while the orientations-employment gap among careerist mothers appears to be somewhat smaller in magnitude than the gap among domestic mothers, in none of these countries is the difference statistically significant.

I also examined whether the size of the orientations-employment gap is related to mothers’ educational attainment (Table 2.3) and marital status (Table 2.4). The results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 come from a multinomial logistic regression model with triple interactions between women’s educational attainment or marital status, women’s work-family orientations, and dummy variables indicating country groups. A fixed effects multinomial logistic regression model involving interactions for each country was also estimated to check the robustness of the results from the first model.

Table 2.3. The Effect of Educational Attainment on the Orientations-Employment Gap in the Different Country Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiple Options Providers</th>
<th>Employment Trajectory</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
<th>Careerist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.87 ** (0.18)</td>
<td>0.72 ** (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.59 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>-0.93 ** (0.21)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>-0.83 (0.65)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.37)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.47 (0.32)</td>
<td>0.83 ** (0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>1.09 (0.91)</td>
<td>1.33 (0.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.34)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.32 (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>&lt;-10 ** (1.02)</td>
<td>-0.52 (1.05)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Biased</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.53 ** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.75 ** (0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.03 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>-0.46 * (0.20)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.29 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>-1.92 ** (0.53)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.43)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underdeveloped Supports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.52 ** (0.18)</td>
<td>1.32 ** (0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.46 (0.51)</td>
<td>1.22 (0.67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>-0.48 * (0.20)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.84 ** (0.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>&lt;-10 ** (1.00)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.76)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP’s 2002 Family & Changing Gender Roles module.
Notes: * p < .01, ** p < .05.
Because families are responsible for a significant share of the costs of child care services in many countries, we might expect the gap between women’s work-family orientations and employment trajectories to be related to women’s earning power or their net opportunity cost of staying at home. We are especially interested in the effectiveness of countries in supporting the choice to work among careerist mothers with different levels of educational attainment. While we should be cautious in interpreting these results because of the relatively small number of careerist women, in the “underdeveloped supports” and “domestic biased” country groups and the second subgroup of “multiple options providers” highly educated (i.e., those with at least some postsecondary education) careerist women are significantly more likely to be following a careerist employment trajectory compared to a domestic trajectory than less educated women. In fact, highly educated careerist women are almost completely absent from the group following a domestic trajectory across these countries (Table 2.3).

Table 2.4. The Effect of Marriage on the Orientations-Employment Gap in the Different Country Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Trajectory</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Adaptive</th>
<th>Careerist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple Options Providers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Biased</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underdeveloped Supports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Women</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Women</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>Baseline Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careerist Women</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISSP’s 2002 Family & Changing Gender Roles module.
Notes: * p < .01, ** p < .05.

The differential treatment of single and married mothers in social provision, especially with respect to the centrality of the principle of maintenance and the importance of assistance programs in social provision for single mothers (Hobson 1994; Sainsbury 1996), may have implications for mothers’ labor force participation by marital status in many countries.
Differences in women’s employment by marital status appear to be greatest in the “underdeveloped supports” countries and, within this group of countries, among domestic women. The results indicate that there appears to be greater support for the choice to stay at home among domestic women who are married (Table 2.4).

**Discussion**

The typology of family policy regimes presented in Table 2.2 differs in several important respects from the broad picture offered by previous research. First, in contrast to claims that the package of childcare-related benefits and services available to mothers and fathers in the Scandinavian countries facilitates parents’ choice regarding work and family responsibilities (see, e.g., Leira 2002b), as well as findings of an apparent affinity between decommodification defamilialization in welfare provision (Guo and Gilbert 2007), I find that substantial percentages of domestic and adaptive mothers in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but not Finland, are being commodified. Indeed, it is well-known that the very active involvement of the Scandinavian states in welfare provision is only possible through a seemingly impossible combination of collective financing via high marginal effective tax rates and a high employment rate (Andersen 2008; Kolberg and Esping-Andersen 1991). That is, the viability of the large public social service sector in the Scandinavian countries rests on the transformation in women’s work of “reproduction going public” (Hernes 1987). As suggested by these results, however, the Scandinavian countries have ensured women’s high levels of labor force involvement not only by supporting careerist women’s full-time employment, but by inducing domestic and adaptive women to work when their children are young.

While a large body of literature highlights policies that support women’s choice to work, less attention has been paid to other incentives to participate in the labor force. Individual taxation systems (in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) in which the (usually male) breadwinner’s earnings are taxed at a higher rate than those of the second earner combined with meager tax relief for a dependent wife (in all of the Scandinavian countries) effectively penalize male breadwinner families (Sainsbury 1999). In addition, Andersen (2010) points out that, far from “subsidizing leisure” or “paying people for not working,” the Scandinavian countries attach conditions to the receipt of unemployment insurance and social assistance such as documented active job search, job training, and participation in education programs. With regard to the United States, the only non-Scandinavian country in the careerist bias group, work requirements have had a long history in the provision of social assistance, which may help explain the moderate positive gap among domestic mothers (O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Schoen 1996-97; Rose 1995; ). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF in 1996, mandated that a recipient participate in work-related activities—for example, subsidized or unsubsidized work, job search and training, community service programs, and education—after they have received assistance for a total of 24 months. Furthermore, benefits are cut off after a total of 60 months. Each state has the option of exempting single parents with a child under one year of age from the work requirements (Schoen 1996-97).

The careerist bias countries are characterized by both the small orientations-employment gaps among careerist women and the large to moderate percentages of domestic and adaptive
women working. However, only the latter feature distinguishes the Scandinavian countries and the United States from the other countries. In 12 out of the 15 countries careerist women’s probability of following an employment trajectory that is not consistent with their work-family orientations is less than .40, and in 8 countries this probability is only .30. The apparent effectiveness of the large majority of countries in supporting (careerist) women’s choice to work may, in part, point to the existence of factors that are held in common among most or all of the countries, including principles regarding equal pay and equal treatment in employment that are embodied in European Union equality law (Heide 2001; Blanpain et al. 2007; ) and improved access to modern and more effective methods of contraception such as the pill (Coleman 1996). However, marked differences in family policy do exist across countries. Thus, these results also suggest that countries may follow distinct routes in supporting women’s choice to work. Each strategy, furthermore, carries unique costs.

Liberal countries’ emphasis on demand side measures and reliance on the private sector and the family in the provision of child care have resulted in multi-tiered systems in which the mode of child care used by mothers and the availability of high-quality child care are determined by class (Brennan 2007a; Michel 1999; Wincott 2006). Thus, these countries are far more effective at supporting the labor force participation of mothers who have greater earning power and can afford center child care or the services of a nanny, which is consistent with the significantly smaller orientations-employment gap among highly educated careerist women in these countries (refer to Table 2.4).

Despite the state’s more direct role in the provision of child care, with regard to both subsidizing costs and improving supply, in the male breadwinner model countries, the availability of affordable, subsidized child care remains an issue (Kamerman 2000; Wrohlich 2008; Wetzels 2005; ). Thus, similar to the liberal countries, access to paid work should be strongly related to mothers’ earning power, which, again, is consistent with the results in Table 2.4.

In the Scandinavian countries the very active involvement of the state in the provision of childcare-related benefits and services and unconditional support for (careerist) women’s choice to work, regardless of educational background or marital status (Table 2.4 and 2.5), rests on the commodification of domestic and adaptive women. While women’s employment is an important basis for social entitlements, even in the Scandinavian countries (Sainsbury 1996), and has implications for women’s economic independence in relation to the family, domestic and adaptive women’s commodification is not totally benign. Among women who would otherwise be relegated to jobs in the public social service sector, employment may be viewed as a limited means of self-actualization. In short, the relevant choice for some women may not be between homemaking and a powerful and elite position within an organization, but between raising one’s own children and taking care of another’s.

Even though some of the same countries in which the state is most actively involved in supporting careerist women’s choice to work are among the least effective in supporting domestic women’s decommodification, there does not appear to be a fundamental contradiction between women’s access to paid work and decommodification as criteria of welfare provision, as demonstrated by the case of Finland. The orientations-employment gap is small among both
domestic and careerist women in this country, and there do not appear to be differences by educational attainment or marital status in women’s access to paid work. In contrast to the other Scandinavian countries, Finland was an early adopter of home-care allowances and childcare leaves (Leira 2002b). Both of these measures are similar in many respects to policies adopted in some of the Continental European countries and support women’s choice to stay at home.
Chapter 3

Does Preference Theory Apply to the United States?

The labor force participation rates of mothers, especially those with young children, have increased dramatically during the post-World War II period. Despite important patterns of convergence among racial ancestry groups during this period, differentials in employment status have widened along other dimensions (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Leibowitz and Klerman 1995; Spain and Bianchi 1996). The most recent available evidence suggests that women exhibit an enormous amount of heterogeneity with respect to their employment careers and that, even today, only about one-third of women follow a trajectory of uninterrupted labor force participation around childbirth (Hynes and Clarkberg 2005).

Scholars who study women’s employment have identified a number of factors as important in accounting for variation in women’s labor force participation, including women’s human capital (Becker 1994; Bryant and Zick 2006), spousal earnings (Bryant and Zick 2006; Mincer 1962), fertility delay (Herr 2009; Miller 2010), and aspects of women’s family and socioeconomic background such as parental SES (Warren, Sheridan, and Hauser 2002) and growing up in a two-parent family (Biblarz and Raftery 1999). However, little attention has been given by scholars in the United States to the role of women’s work orientations both as a direct determinant of their labor force behavior and as a mediator of structural opportunities and constraints. In this paper I assess the explanatory power of women’s work orientations alongside a host of other personal and background factors using detailed information on women’s employment histories from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. I find that, overall, both women’s future plans and attitudes toward the sexual division of labor rival the importance of other factors such as test scores and family structure in accounting for women’s diverse employment trajectories. However, work orientations are far more important in explaining divergences in behavior before childbirth. Second, women’s gender role attitudes appear to mediate the effects of their human capital and age at first birth.

The Influence of Structural Factors on Women’s Employment

In addition to the presence of children and women’s caretaking responsibilities, a number of factors have been identified as important in accounting for variation in women’s labor force participation. Scholars who adopt a human capital perspective emphasize the importance of women’s mental and physical endowments in improving their income prospects, thus raising the opportunity costs of leaving the labor force after childbirth (Becker 1994; Bryant and Zick 2006). Consistent with this perspective, a number of studies have demonstrated that women with superior educational qualifications have a higher rate of labor force participation and work longer hours than less educated women (Barrow 1999; England, Garcia-Beaulieu, and Ross 2004; Hynes and Clarkberg 2005; Kahn and Whittington 1996). The relationship between women’s educational attainment and their employment has been strengthening over time (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Leibowitz and Klerman 1995), is maintained across racial ancestry groups (England, Garcia-Beaulieu, and Ross 2004; Kahn and Whittington 1996), and survives the imposition of demographic and other socioeconomic characteristics. However, because of
marital homogamy, or the tendency to select a spouse with similar characteristics, highly educated women are disproportionately married to high-earning men (Blackwell and Lichter 2004), a circumstance that works against the pull of earnings opportunities in the labor market (Bryant and Zick 2006; Mincer 1962). Yet it is clear from studies which include measures of husband’s earnings that the effect of this variable, while generally statistically significant, is unimpressive in size (Blundell and Macurdy 1999; Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Leibowitz and Klerman 1995).

Delaying motherhood may protect women against some of the employment-inhibiting effects of children by reducing their conflict with human capital investment activities in early adulthood such as completing high school and obtaining early work experience (Klepinger, Lundberg, and Plotnick 1999). Studies that focus on non-teen mothers find that women who have their first child at later ages generally work more hours and spend less time out of the labor force, controlling for other factors, than women who did not delay motherhood (Herr 2009; Miller 2010). Miller (2010), for example, uses information on biological fertility shocks (such as miscarriages) to instrument for age at first birth and finds that motherhood delay leads to an increase in work hours of 6 percent per year of delay. Studies that look at the effects of subsequent births provide additional evidence on the relationship between fertility timing and women’s employment and suggest that the timing of subsequent births may not be as consequential for women’s work hours (Angrist and Evans 1998; Bronars and Grogger 1994).

Aspects of women’s family and socioeconomic background may also be associated with their employment patterns. A number of studies of educational and occupational intergenerational mobility document the correlation between the attainments of parents and their offspring (Beller and Hout 2006; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Hout and Janus 2011). Beller and Hout (2006) contend that slower economic growth and the concentration of economic growth among the wealthy have slowed occupational mobility in the United States and that the average correlation between destinations and origins today ranges from 0.30 to 0.40. However, the effects of father’s occupational status and mother’s and father’s education on occupational standing are largely indirect, and respondent’s education and cognitive ability mediate their effects (Warren, Sheridan, and Hauser 2002).

A number of studies have also documented that children who grew up in single-mother families have lower levels of educational attainment, are employed in lower status occupations, and make less money as adults than children from two-biological-parent families, although there is some disagreement in the literature about causality (Biblarz and Raftery 1999; Biblarz, Raftery, and Bucur 1997; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Powell and Parcel 1997). Biblarz and Raftery (1999) argue that the varying conclusions of previous research on the causality of family structure can be explained in part by the different sets of control variables employed. They find that single mothers’ greater likelihood of unemployment and higher probability of working in a lower status occupation help to explain the association between the parental configuration in the family of origin and socioeconomic outcomes. However, Biblarz and Raftery still find a relationship of family structure with respondents’ educational attainment and occupational status in the model with full statistical controls.
Preference Theory

While most single-country studies of women’s labor market behavior emphasize the importance of human capital characteristics, husband’s earnings, and family and socioeconomic background factors, there is a growing literature, especially in Europe, that has sought to examine heterogeneity in women’s preferences for a career and family and to determine the role of women’s work-family preferences in explaining their employment behavior. Most of the scholars in this literature are reacting to a set of highly controversial claims that have been laid out by the British sociologist Catherine Hakim as Preference Theory (Hakim 2000, 2003a). In this section I summarize Hakim’s arguments regarding the heterogeneity of women and the importance of women’s preferences both as a direct determinant of their employment behavior and as a mediator of structural opportunities and constraints, while in the following section I discuss several criticisms of structural opportunities and constraints permits (Hakim 2000).

Hakim distinguishes among three groups of women, whom differ from one another with respect to the importance of a career versus family as a means of self-actualization and the strength of their commitment to either priority. The middle group in Hakim’s typology, adaptive women, is the largest and most diverse group of women and includes women who unexpectedly develop successful careers in response to economic opportunity and “drifters”—that is, “women with no definite ideas about the life they want, who respond to opportunities as they arise or not, and who modify their goals quickly and repeatedly in response to the changing social and economic environment” (Hakim 2000:166). Thus, the defining characteristic of the adaptive group, for Hakim, are their mixed objectives and ambivalent attitudes regarding a career versus family. Adaptive women sometimes resemble work-centered or home-centered women in terms of their employment behavior, but only if the structure of opportunities and constraints permits (Hakim 2000).

Work-centered and home-centered women have very different priorities, but they share an equally strong commitment to their respective goals. Work-centered women’s ideal employment trajectory is the stereotypical male career of continuous full-time employment, while, at the opposite end of the spectrum, home-centered women’s prioritization of family life and strong commitment to a traditional sexual division of labor in the home leads them to show little interest in employment after marriage and childbirth. For Hakim, home-centered women’s prioritization of family over a career does not imply that these women never engage in market work. For example, a not insignificant proportion of home-centered women may work until marriage or childbirth with the aim of maximizing financial and social short-term rewards. However, it remains the case that when there are competing family responsibilities, home-centered women work only in extreme circumstances, such as divorce, or if their job is very convenient.

Thus, implicit in Hakim’s argument is a fundamental conflict between a life centered on a career and homemaking. These are mutually exclusive activities, and a woman cannot have both. Indeed, Hakim argues that even though no more than half of work-centered women are childless, “work-centered women have children in the same way as men do: as an expression of normality, and as a weekend hobby” (Hakim 2000:164). While most scholars who study women’s employment recognize that the pursuit of a career alongside family responsibilities requires a
high level of ingenuity, especially in light of constraints deriving from [add citations and constraints here], some scholars point to ideologies that portend negative consequences for a potential career, children, and personal well-being as an additional factor in discouraging women who seek both a career and a vibrant home life (Blair-Loy 2003; Gerson 1985). Regardless of the exact balance between material and ideological constraints, however, it would seem that both factors cause many women to focus their energy more than they otherwise might.

No single factor, according to Hakim (2000), explains variation in women’s work-lifestyle preferences. Based on her reading of a number of studies by psychologists and sociologists, Hakim points to a diverse array of social background, personality, human capital, and psycho-physiological factors as explaining a career orientation, including high self-esteem and self-confidence, instrumentality, high levels of educational attainment, high scores on achievement tests, single-sex education, highly educated parents, being an only child, and high testosterone levels. Hakim emphasizes that differences among work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered women on each of the variables is substantively small, although she does not rule out a larger cumulative impact.

Preference Theory’s hypotheses about the diversity of women’s preferences and the connection between women’s preferences and behavior are most applicable to countries that have entered a “new scenario” in which women have a true choice about how to spend their lives. Hakim (2000) points to five developments which she says underlie the diversification of women’s preferences and employment in modern societies: the contraceptive revolution, the equal opportunities revolution, the expansion of white collar occupations, the creation of jobs for secondary earners, and the increasing importance of attitudes, values, and personal preferences in determining women’s lifestyle choices. Hakim argues that since these five changes were completed relatively early in the United States and Britain, these countries serve as excellent positive test cases for Preference Theory.

In a more recent book Hakim (2003a) contrasts the situation of women living in Britain with those living in Spain, a country that has fewer employment opportunities for secondary earners, weaker employment protections against sex discrimination, and in which modern forms of contraception are less widely used and less widely available. Hakim finds that the nature of the similarities and differences among work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered women are largely consistent with expectations in both countries. Work-lifestyle preferences cut across social classes, income groups, and educational levels. Furthermore, women’s preferences appear to be a better predictor of their labor force involvement in Britain than in Spain, a finding that is consistent with the expectations of Preference Theory that there should be a stronger connection between preferences and behavior in “new scenario” countries.

**Reaction to Preference Theory**

A number of criticisms have been leveled against Preference Theory, but in this paper I focus on three: women are less heterogeneous with respect to their preferences than Hakim claims (Crompton and Harris 1998; Johnstone and Lee 2009; Procter and Padfield 1999; Cf. Doorewaard, Hendrickx, and Verschuren 2004); women’s preferences are often a reflection of social structural opportunities and constraints (Crompton and Harris 1998; Crompton and
Lyonette 2005; Doorewaard, Hendrickx, and Verschuren 2004; Johnstone and Lee 2009; McRae 2003; Procter and Padfield 1999); and Preference Theory underemphasizes the importance of social structure in explaining women’s outcomes (Crompton and Harris 1998; Crompton and Lyonette 2005; Kangas and Rostgaard 2007; Procter and Padfield 1999; Cf. Marks and Houston 2002). Hakim (2000) argues that while the majority of women (about 60 percent) in liberal and laissez faire societies such as Britain and the USA are adaptive in orientation, a significant minority of women are strongly committed to either a career (20 percent) or homemaking (20 percent). Several scholars, however, have argued that Hakim exaggerates women’s heterogeneity with respect to their preferences. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted with 79 young adult British women, Procter and Padfield (1999) argue that many women who, prima facie, could be categorized as career oriented or family oriented, in fact, want both. Similarly, Crompton and Harris (1998) argue that many of the doctors and bankers in their study had “multi-stranded” rather than “single-stranded” orientations. One implication of such critiques is that women are less heterogeneous than Hakim claims because few women have a clear primary commitment to a career or homemaking and thus cannot be categorized as work-centered or home-centered. Second, these arguments run contrary to Hakim’s assertion that it is not possible to have a successful career alongside a vibrant home life and that this fact is reflected in women’s preferences.

Scholars have also objected to Hakim’s claims that no single factor appears to be especially important in explaining variation in women’s work-lifestyle preferences and that “the three lifestyle preference groups cut across social class, education and ability differences” (Hakim 2003a:247). On the one hand, findings from several studies support Hakim’s claim that a number of factors probably account for women’s preferences. Johnstone and Lee (2009), in an analysis of data from the Australian Longitudinal Study on Women’s Health, find statistically significant bivariate associations between women’s preferences and 19 of 28 sociodemographic, physical health, and psychological well-being variables, and, when controlling for the 19 statistically significant variables in a regression model, 9 of the variables are still statistically significant. On the other hand, investigators examining Hakim’s claims have found a robust relationship between women’s preferences and measures of educational attainment and income. Educational attainment and a measure of economic need are statistically significantly related to work-lifestyle preferences in Johnstone and Lee’s study, and, when controlling for other factors, education remains statistically significant, but not economic need. Doorewaard, Hendrickx, and Verschuren (2004) use data from 16 European countries to examine the reasons that women return to the labor market after childbirth, which, according to Preference Theory, should differ depending on whether a woman is work-centered, adaptive, or home-centered in orientation. They find that women with higher levels of educational attainment and who are financially better off are more likely to reenter the labor market because they like their work but are less likely to reenter for money reasons.

The finding of an association between women’s preferences and socioeconomic factors has important implications for Preference Theory. This finding not only suggests that socioeconomic factors must be controlled for in order to obtain unbiased estimates of women’s preferences on their employment, but the purported causative relationship between women’s preferences and employment behavior could be spurious. Several studies have, in fact, examined this possibility and Hakim’s claim that in “new scenario” countries “work-lifestyle preferences
become the main determinant of women’s choices between family work and market work, and the principal determinant of employment patterns” (Hakim 2000:276) and have come to different conclusions. In an analysis of data on six countries (Britain, Finland, France, Norway, USA, and Portugal) from the International Social Survey Program’s 2002 Family module, Crompton and Lyonette (2005) examine the influence of women’s attitudes regarding women’s employment and men’s involvement in household tasks and promotion aspirations on couples’ working arrangements. Overall, Crompton and Harris find little evidence of a relationship between women’s attitudes and hours worked. However, Kangas and Rostgaard (2007), relying on the same ISSP module for a somewhat different subset of countries (Denmark, England, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden), attribute a greater causal role to women’s preferences even after controlling for a variety of structural factors and institutional factors such as the generosity of parental leave and childcare benefits. Finally, in a study of British women, Marks and Houston (2002) uncover what is perhaps the most impressive evidence to date of a link between women’s attitudes and employment behavior. They find that attitudes toward motherhood and mothers as primary carers, work commitment, and beliefs about whether and how children benefit from childcare are all powerfully related to women’s odds of working full-time (compared to not working) and that three of these four scales are related to women’s odds of working part-time.

Data

I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. NLSY79 is based on a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women who were 14 to 22 years of age when first surveyed in 1979. This survey was administered annually from 1979 to 1994 and then every two years starting in 1994. Information on a variety of topics has been collected, including characteristics of jobs held, work experience, education and vocational training, family and socioeconomic background characteristics, marital and fertility history, and attitudes. The response rate remained above 90 percent until the 1996 interview year. Since that year the response rate has fallen further, and in 2002 it was 80.9 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005). My analysis includes women from the black and Hispanic oversample. Thus, in creating the sampling weights a correction was included for potential bias introduced by the oversampling of blacks and Hispanics. I restricted the analysis to women who had at least two years of employment history information before the birth of her first child and at least fourteen years of information after her first birth because of this study’s interest in how women’s work hours change as their children mature. Women were also dropped from the sample if they had not completed their schooling—that is, if they were still enrolled when their first child was born or, if they recently left school, they reported that they left because of their pregnancy. These two restrictions reduced the number of observations to 3,137.

A significant number of observations were missing on respondent’s educational attainment, husband’s earnings, and father’s education and occupational status. I estimated separate imputation models for each variable (as opposed to using a procedure such as multivariate normal regression which allows for the simultaneous imputation of several variables) so that insignificant variables with missing values could be excluded from each imputation model, thus maximizing the number of imputations. Missing data on respondents’ educational attainment was imputed using information on mother’s and father’s education and
the respondent’s Armed Forces Qualifying Test score, which reduced the number of missing observations on this variable from 538 to 120. Husband’s earnings was imputed using information on his occupational status and work hours (missing values reduced from 980 to 937). Finally, when information on either father’s educational attainment or occupational status was unavailable, nonmissing values on one of the variables were used to impute missing values of the other. This procedure successfully replaced all of the missing values on both variables with imputed values.

**Methods**

I employ group-based trajectory modeling (Nagin 1999, 2005) to categorize women into a finite number of groups on the basis of their employment histories and to identify factors that are important in explaining group membership. In contrast to other methodologies for analyzing individual-level developmental trajectories such as hierarchical linear modeling and latent curve analysis that assume a continuous distribution of growth curves, group-based trajectory modeling allows the identification of distinctive and relatively homogeneous clusters of individual trajectories (Nagin 1999, 2005). There are two key outputs of interest to investigators in group-based trajectory analysis: the predicted trajectory for each group and the probability of group membership. The former quantity efficiently describes the behavioral profiles of each group and allows the investigator to determine the distinctiveness of each group by comparing the expected trajectories and the confidence intervals around these estimates. The probability of group membership provides an estimate of the percentage of respondents following each trajectory. The investigator, furthermore, can explore the composition of and the determinants of membership in each group by modeling the probability of group membership as a function of individual-level covariates.

At the present time group-based trajectory modeling can accommodate trajectories that are defined by a series of count data (the Poisson distribution), binary data (the binary logit distribution), or censored normal data. I estimate the following censored normal model to examine how women’s work hours change over time across groups:

\[
y_{it}^* = \beta_0^j + \beta_1^j FB_{it} + \beta_2^j FB_{it}^2 + \beta_3^j FB_{it}^3 + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (Eq. 3.1)
\]

where \(y_{it}^*\) is a latent variable representing individual \(i\)’s level of labor force attachment at time \(t\) given membership in group \(j\). The latent variable, \(y_{it}^*\), is equal to observed work hours when values of the latent variable are positive. However, when \(y_{it}^*\) is negative, it is assumed that observed work hours equal 0. A cubic polynomial relationship is assumed between labor force attachment and months preceding/following first birth. \(\beta_0^j, \beta_1^j, \beta_2^j, \beta_3^j\) determine the shape of the modeled trajectory and are superscripted by \(j\) to denote that the coefficients are not constrained to be the same across the \(j\) groups. The number of groups in the model is specified by the investigator. In applications models with different numbers of groups are compared, and the best model according to fit statistics such as Schwarz’s (1978) approximation of the Bayes factor is selected.
I am not only interested in describing the work hours profiles of different groups of women, but examining what factors predict group membership. I estimate the following multinomial logistic regression model:

\[
\pi_j(x_i) = \frac{e^{x_i\theta_j}}{\sum_j e^{x_i\theta_j}}, \quad (Eq. 3.2)
\]

where \(\pi_j(x_i)\) is the probability of individual \(i\)'s membership in group \(j\) given \(x_i\); \(x_i\) is a vector of individual-level variables; and \(\theta_j\) are the parameters of the multinomial logistic regression model and capture the effect of \(x_i\) on the probability of group membership. The user-written SAS procedure TRAJ (Jones and Nagin 2007) was used to simultaneously estimate the \(\beta_j\) parameters in Equation (1) and the \(\theta_j\) parameters in Equation (2) via maximum-likelihood estimation.

**Results**

*Women’s and Men’s Work Orientations*

Before I discuss the results from the group-based trajectory analysis on the relationship between women’s work orientations and employment behavior, I examine the distribution of women in the NLSY:79 sample with respect to two important components of their work orientations: future plans and attitudes toward the sexual division of labor. I also compare women with men on these two dimensions.

Based on my results it is apparent that women do not possess a unitary orientation toward work and family. Women are also significantly more heterogeneous with respect to their future plans, but not gender role attitudes, than men. When asked about “what [they] would like to be doing” at age 35, about 3 in 4 women (74 percent) responded “some occupation” or “present job,” while the remaining one-quarter of women (26 percent) chose “married, family” (Table 3.1). In response to the same question, however, nearly all of the men in the NLSY:79 said that they planned to be working at the same or a different job (98 percent) when they are 35 years old.

**Table 3.1. Women's and Men's Future Plans at Age 35**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present Job</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Occupation</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married, Family</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
Notes: The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 2,863.

I also examined women’s and men’s responses to three different questions that probed their gender role attitudes. When asked whether they “strongly agreed,” “agreed,” “disagreed,” or “strongly disagreed” that “a woman’s place is in the home, not in the office or shop,” only 10
percent of women strongly agreed or agreed with this statement (Table 3.2). In response to a question about men sharing housework responsibilities, a similarly meager percentage of women expressed disagreement or strong disagreement (8 percent). However, 26 percent strongly agreed or agreed with a statement emphasizing the beneficial consequences of a traditional division of labor for individual well-being. On each measure men are more conservative in their gender role attitudes than women, although the differences are not dramatic.

Thus, overall, the questions on future plans and gender role attitudes offer a picture of moderate heterogeneity among women. As just noted, men’s attitudes toward the sexual division of labor also vary, but they are significantly less heterogeneous with respect to their future plans, at least as measured by the trichotomous index available in the NLSY:79, than women. In regards to Hakim’s Preference Theory, I cannot say whether the NLSY:79 data confirms or disconfirms Hakim’s assertions regarding the distribution of work-centered, adaptive, and home-centered women. The question on future plans does not allow for the possibility that a woman can aspire for some balance between work and family responsibilities (an adaptive woman in Hakim’s typology). Aspirations and gender role attitudes perhaps should also be viewed as more stable dispositions than preferences and thus, while related, are distinct from preferences (Hofstede 2001). But for our purposes it is sufficient to note at this point that women exhibit meaningful heterogeneity with respect to their future plans and gender role attitudes (especially in regards to the implications of a traditional division of labor for well-being), and therefore it is worthwhile to ask to what extent variation in women’s work-family orientations are predictive of their behavior.

Table 3.2. Women's and Men's Attitudes Toward the Sexual Division of Labor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Division of Labor 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Division of Labor 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men Should Share Housework</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men should share the work around the house with women, such as doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NLSY79
Notes: The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 2,885-2,910.
Factors that are Related to Women’s Work Orientations

Women’s future plans and attitudes toward the sexual division of labor are related to a number of demographic and human capital characteristics. Both women with career aspirations and women with liberal gender role attitudes have fewer children, enter motherhood at later ages, and are less likely to be married than women with family aspirations and women with traditional gender role attitudes (Table 3.3). Racial ancestry is also related to women’s future plans and gender role attitudes, but in different ways. Women with career aspirations are more likely to be black (and less likely to be white or Hispanic), whereas women with liberal gender role attitudes are more likely to be white (and less likely to be Hispanic). Women with career aspirations and women with liberal gender role attitudes are also better educated and have higher AFQT scores than other women. However, while husband’s earnings and the family background characteristics (with the exception of family intactness) were related to women’s gender role attitudes, there were no statistically significant differences between women with career aspirations and women with family aspirations on these variables. The demographic (except for number of children and age at first birth), human capital, and family background characteristics were also entered into binary logistic regression models as independent variables to predict women’s future plans and gender role attitudes (results available from the author upon request).
Controlling for all of these factors, years of education was the only statistically significant predictor ($p < .01$) across both models. Furthermore, while the test of the global null hypothesis was statistically significant ($p < .01$) for both outcomes, explained variation was low (future plans $R^2 = .03$, gender roles $R^2 = .06$).

On the one hand, women with distinct future plans and attitudes toward the sexual division of labor differ according to a number of demographic and human capital characteristics, although differences on these variables are generally greater between women with liberal and conservative gender role attitudes. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the regression analysis results, the cumulative power of these factors to explain variation in either women’s aspirations or gender role attitudes is small. Thus, these results are consistent with Hakim’s arguments about the independence of women’s work-family orientations and the irreducibility of women’s orientations to any one variable (or even an aggregation of factors). At the same time, however, because many of the univariate correlations are still statistically significant, it will be important to include the demographic, human capital, and family background characteristics in the group-based trajectory analysis to deal with spuriousness in the relationship between women’s orientations and employment trajectories.

**Women’s Work Hours Trajectories**

In group-based trajectory analysis it is the investigator’s role to specify the number of distinctive and relatively homogeneous groups into which individuals will be classified. I first compared models with one to six groups and cubic polynomial trajectories assumed for all groups. According to the Bayesian information criterion (Raftery 1995), the six-group model was the best-fitting model. However, the model with four groups was ultimately chosen because it is significantly more parsimonious than the six-group model, and it captures the main trends in the data.

Figure 3.1 plots the modeled and observed trajectories for each group of the four-group model. As can be seen from this figure, the model fits the data well. The trajectories predicted by the model closely follow the observed trajectories except for the months directly preceding and following childbirth because of sudden shifts in observed labor force behavior. At one end of the spectrum are the 40 percent of women who follow a “careerist” trajectory, which is characterized by high levels of labor force involvement and full-time work hours throughout the life course. At no time does the average number of hours worked per week dip below 30 except for a very brief time around childbirth. The 19 percent of women who follow a “domestic” trajectory, by contrast, have very low levels of labor force participation and low average work hours after childbirth. Not until their first child reaches 10 years of age do their work hours begin to increase. Interestingly, however, this group’s labor force involvement is substantially higher before childbirth and mirrors the work hours trajectory of the “adaptive” group.
In between the careerist and domestic groups lie women who follow either an adaptive (25 percent of women) or “steady withdrawal” trajectory (15 percent). Whereas the labor force behavior of careerist and domestic women is characterized by remarkable constancy in the first fourteen years after childbirth, the adaptive and steady withdrawal trajectories are considerably more dynamic. While the steady withdrawal trajectory initially mirrors careerist women’s high levels of labor force involvement before childbirth, the average work hours of women following a steady withdrawal trajectory do not recover to the same levels as careerist women’s in the months after childbirth, and by the time their first child reaches five years of age their average work hours are less than half of careerist women’s average work hours. The employment trajectory of the adaptive group, by contrast, initially shadows domestic women’s work hours, but in the years after childbirth the employment profile of adaptive women is practically the inverse of the steady withdrawal trajectory. That is, adaptive women’s work hours rise just as steadily as the steady withdrawal group’s work hours decline until the first child is 8 years old, at which point the employment profiles of both groups begin to level off.

While the steady withdrawal group is the smallest of the four groups, it still encompasses 15 percent of women. This group has perhaps been undertheorized in previous research, and the precipitous drop in labor force involvement in the years following childbirth among this group is distinct from the employment experiences of the majority of women with “high-flying” careers.
(Hewlett 2002), stay-at-home mothers (Hays 1996), and women who seek a more equal balance between work and family, for whom an important strategy is to temporarily withdraw from the labor force or reduce their labor force involvement when their children are young (Hynes and Clarkberg 2005; Spain and Bianchi 1996, Ch. 7).

Women’s four distinct patterns of labor force involvement suggest that they face two critical junctures in their careers. In the period following the completion of (or a pause in) schooling and preceding childbirth, most women embark on a trajectory of relatively high labor force engagement and full-time work (careerist and steady withdrawal trajectories, about 35 hours per week on average) or part-time work (adaptive and domestic trajectories, about 23 hours per week on average). During the first months of their newborn’s life, women confront a second critical juncture. About three-quarters of the women (73 percent) with high levels of labor force engagement before childbirth continue on a path of full-time work (careerist trajectory), while the remaining one-quarter of these women (27 percent) decrease their labor force involvement in the ensuing months and years. Two points deserve mention here. First, the observed and predicted trajectories in Figure 3.1 represent mean or expected trajectories for each group. Thus, there are no doubt some women in the domestic group, for example, who have never worked at a job. Second, and relatively, the age at which mothers face these two critical junctures varies across individuals and may not be the same for all societies. For example, the absence of generous mandated maternity leave benefits in the United States may cause the decision point regarding the reentry into market work to arrive earlier than it otherwise might.

**Explaining Trajectory Group Membership**

A number of factors, including women’s work orientations, were important in explaining trajectory group membership (Table 3.4). Both family-related future plans and traditional gender role attitudes, after controlling for a number of demographic, human capital, and family background factors, statistically significantly ($p < .05$ for future plans, $p < .01$ for gender role attitudes) reduced women’s odds of following either a careerist or steady withdrawal trajectory compared to a domestic trajectory. Neither of these components of women’s work orientations, however, distinguished between adaptive and domestic women. Surprisingly, among the human capital factors, only AFQT score was related to trajectory group membership. Women with higher AFQT scores were more likely to follow either a careerist ($p < .01$) or steady withdrawal trajectory ($p < .05$).

With regard to the demographic factors, the effect of age at first birth on women’s membership in the careerist ($p < .01$) and steady withdrawal trajectories ($p < .05$) was statistically significant but nonlinear. Based on the estimates of the age term and the age-squared term, we can say that the effect of a one-year increase in age at first birth from 18 to 19 increases the logit for the careerist trajectory by $.1759 (.52 \ast 19 -.0093 \ast 19^2 -.52 \ast 18 -.0093 \ast 18^2)$. But from ages 28 to 29 the effect of this variable begins to turn negative. An increase in age at first birth from 31 to 32, as estimated by the model, actually decreases the logit for the careerist trajectory by $.0659 (.52 \ast 32 -.0093 \ast 32^2 -.52 \ast 31 -.0093 \ast 31^2)$. The effect of age on membership in the steady withdrawal trajectory is similar. However, age has no statistically significant effect on belonging to the adaptive trajectory.
Marital status does not appear to affect trajectory group membership. Being white, however, statistically significantly decreases women’s odds of following either a careerist (p < .01) or adaptive trajectory (p < .01) compared to a domestic trajectory.

The model was estimated on a subsample of married women to examine the effect of husband’s earnings. The coefficients for this variable are also reported in Table 3.4. While all three coefficients were in the expected direction, only the coefficient representing the effect of earnings on membership in the careerist trajectory was statistically significant (p < .05).

Thus, work orientations, AFQT score, age at first birth, racial ancestry, and husband’s earnings were all helpful in explaining membership in the careerist trajectory, and four out of these six variables were helpful in distinguishing women following a steady withdrawal trajectory. Among the personal characteristics, only racial ancestry distinguishes adaptive women from domestic women.

The effects of father’s occupational status, father’s education, and mother’s education were not statistically significant, a result that is consistent with an oft-replicated finding in the status attainment literature that the effects of these variables are largely indirect (see, e.g., Warren, Sheridan, and Hauser 2002). However, I do find a positive effect of growing up in a

Table 3.4. The Effect of Women's Future Plans, Gender Role Attitudes, Human Capital, and Family Background on Their Employment Trajectories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employment Trajectory (Baseline: Domestic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Careerist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-Related Future Plans</td>
<td>-.34 * (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Gender Role Attitudes</td>
<td>-.27 ** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>.01 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFQT Score1</td>
<td>.12 ** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Birth</td>
<td>.52 ** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Birth (Squared)</td>
<td>-.01 ** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-.09 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband's Earnings2</td>
<td>-.07 * (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-.96 ** (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Occupational Status3</td>
<td>-.05 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td>-.07 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother's Education</td>
<td>.05 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intact Family</td>
<td>.47 ** (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td>-.16 ** (.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Decile change.
2 10,000-dollar change.
3 10-point change.

Source: NLSY79
Notes: The estimates are based on weighted data. N = 2,545.
two-parent family on following either a careerist (p < .01) or adaptive trajectory (p < .05), which may in part be due to single mothers’ greater likelihood of unemployment and higher probability of working in a lower status occupation (Biblarz and Raftery 1999). Furthermore, number of siblings has a statistically significant (p < .01) negative effect on membership in the careerist and adaptive trajectories compared to the domestic trajectory.

Interactions with Work Orientations

To examine the possibility that the effects of the demographic, human capital, and family background variables on women’s employment trajectories differ according to their work orientations, I first constructed a series of descriptive plots with the covariates on the x-axis and the percentage of women belonging to each trajectory group on the y-axis. In each of the plots, to explore the possibility of interactions, separate series were plotted for women with work-related and family-related future plans and women with liberal, moderate, and conservative gender role attitudes. Based on an inspection of these plots, two variables, years of education and age at first birth, appeared to interact with women’s gender role attitudes. The effects of none of the variables, however, appeared to differ between women with work-related and family-related future plans.

However, while the descriptive plots allow one to examine the functional form of the relationships and to detect any departures from linearity among different groups of women, only regression analysis is able to control for confounding variables and to determine whether a relationship is statistically significant. In the next stage of the analysis, I added linear interaction terms to the multinomial logistic regression model explaining trajectory group membership and specified a linear effect for education and a quadratic effect for age at first birth. Even though the relationship between AFQT score and trajectory group membership did not appear to vary across women based on an inspection of the descriptive plots, I also added an interaction term for AFQT score because this variable, like educational attainment, is an important index of women’s human capital and could be similarly conditioned by women’s gender role attitudes.

The effect of women’s educational attainment on trajectory group membership is highly contingent on their gender role attitudes (Figure 3.2). The employment behavior of both women with liberal and conservative gender role attitudes responds to differences in educational attainment, but in different ways. Better educated women who possess liberal gender role attitudes are more likely to follow a careerist trajectory and less likely to follow an adaptive trajectory than women with fewer years of education. On the other hand, among women with conservative attitudes toward the sexual division of labor, better educated women are more likely to follow a steady withdrawal trajectory and less likely to follow a domestic trajectory than less educated women. However, years of education does not appear to affect these women’s probability of membership in either a careerist or adaptive trajectory. The results look very similar for women’s AFQT scores, although the interactions are perhaps slightly smaller in magnitude (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.2. Effect of Women’s Education on Employment Trajectory by Gender Role Attitudes

![Graph showing the effect of women’s education on employment trajectory by gender role attitudes.](image)

Figure 3.3. Effect of Women’s AFQT Score on Employment Trajectory by Gender Role Attitudes

![Graph showing the effect of women’s AFQT score on employment trajectory by gender role attitudes.](image)
The employment behavior of women with liberal gender role attitudes responds more strongly to fertility delay than women with conservative attitudes toward the sexual division of labor (Figure 3.4). Specifically, the probability of membership in the withdrawal trajectory rises more strongly at later ages among women with liberal gender role attitudes than conservative women. At the same time, membership in the adaptive trajectory decreases most strongly among women with liberal attitudes at later ages.

Figure 3.4. The Effect of Fertility Delay on Women’s Trajectory Group Membership by Gender Role Attitudes

Discussion

In this chapter I examined the influence of a wide range of “person-level” factors such as work orientations, human capital characteristics, and family background factors on American women’s employment trajectories using data from NLSY79. The more detailed information on women’s work histories in this data set enabled me to more closely examine the contours of women’s labor market careers and to identify certain critical junctures at which women tend to diverge from one another in their work hours. Specifically, the first critical juncture in women’s labor market careers occurs in the period following the completion of (or a pause in) schooling and preceding childbirth, during which time most women embark on a male-type employment pattern of continuous full-time employment (“careerist” and “steady withdrawal” women) or work part-time (“adaptive” and “domestic” women). The caretaking responsibilities and financial demands that accompany the birth of the first child constitutes the second critical juncture in women’s lives and cause further branching in women’s work histories. About three-quarters of the women with high levels of labor force engagement before childbirth continue on a
path of full-time work ("careerist" women). The remaining one-quarter of these women decrease their labor force involvement in the ensuing months and years ("steady withdrawal" women). Among the women who worked part-time early in their labor market careers, by contrast, there is a greater drop in work hours at childbirth. "Adaptive" women’s labor force involvement rebounds as their children mature, while "domestic" women stay out of the labor force.

Thus, the categorization of women in my typology was based on their employment decisions at both critical junctures. An important question that I asked is whether the same factors explain divergences in women’s employment in the period following the completion of schooling and after childbirth. Interestingly, two important components of women’s work orientations (future plans and gender role attitudes) appear to be far more important in explaining divergences in behavior at the first critical juncture than after childbirth. This is also true for the human capital and demographic factors in the analysis including women’s test scores, husband’s earnings, and age at first birth. However, while these variables were less important in explaining divergences in women’s behavior at the second critical juncture, these factors are still relevant to explaining the contours of women’s work profiles throughout their lives. The further branching in women’s employment trajectories after childbirth could be explained by differences in maternity leave and childcare benefits offered by employers, workplace flexibility, family crises (e.g., divorce or illness), the husband’s contribution to childcare and housework, or other unobserved factors.
References


56


