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Meshing Motivations:
Individual and Collective Action in the Taiwanese Legislature

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science
by
Nathan Frank Batto

Committee in charge:
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Professor Mathew D. McCubbins
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2007
The Dissertation of Nathan Frank Batto is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2007
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Meshing Motivations:
Individual and Collective Action in the Taiwanese Legislature

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor Gary W. Cox, Chair

My dissertation explores the tension between parochial and general interests. I argue that general interests attempt to accommodate, or mesh with, parochial interests rather than quash or clash directly with them. I illustrate this logic with evidence from the Taiwanese legislature.

The tension between parochial and general interests is a central theme in democratic theory and practice. Systems in which parochial interests dominate are often unworkable because they are often unable to make coherent policy choices and they have difficulty managing common pool resources that belong to the entire nation.
Alternatively, when parochial interests are powerless to check the dominant general interest, the country is vulnerable to kings run amok.

My dissertation explores the tension between parochial and general interests in the Taiwanese legislature. The goal is both theoretical, to offer a general picture of this tension, and specific, to bring Taiwan into the ambit of comparative legislative studies. I argue that those pursuing general interests know that parochial interests exist and are powerful. Whenever possible, general interests seek to avoid direct conflict with parochial interests. Instead, they prefer to mesh, incorporating the parochial interests into their legislative projects to the extent that this does not mean sacrificing their own core interests. I show multiple ways in which parties in Taiwan, like those elsewhere, accommodate parochial interests rather than attempting to suppress them or clash directly with them.

I model legislators as agents of two principals, their parties, who represent general, national, and ideological interests, and their constituents, who represent local, parochial, and particularist interests. Each of these principals can sanction the legislator, aiding or damaging her prospects for re-election. In a multiple principals framework, the challenge for the agent is to maximize positive sanctions net of negative sanctions. Parties help their members both directly – by giving positive sanctions for working toward party goals – and indirectly – by helping them to win positive sanctions and avoid negative sanctions from constituents. Parties accomplish this latter task by making it easier or more difficult for constituents to monitor their legislators’ actions in different stages of the legislative process.
Chapter One

The Tension between Parochial and General Interests

The tension between parochial and general interests is a central theme in democratic theory and practice. As Madison famously asserts in *Federalist 10*, “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere…” While this tension can arise in any system, it is particularly acute in systems in which voters choose a local representative or choose among several party nominees.

Most studies that address this tension attempt to discern whether parochial or general interests are winning out. I argue that this approach is flawed. Rather than trying to suppress or extinguish parochial interests, I suggest that general interests try to mesh with parochial interests. That is, to the extent that it is possible to accommodate parochial interests without sacrificing their own core interests, general interests will prefer to incorporate parochial demands into their own goals. General interests do better to work with, not against, parochial interests.

Political Conflicts

Practical politicians have made dealing with this tension a high priority in a number of countries. Consider some examples.

First, the balance of power between parochial and general interests was a central concern of the Federalist Papers that sought to steer the emerging United States toward a workable form of government in 1789. Debates over the balance of power between the
states and the federal government, whether a republican form of government could control local factions, and the method to elect the president all reflected this tension.

Second, during the Constitutional Convention in Brazil in 1988, delegates were highly concerned with the balance of power between the federal government and the states, especially as concerned control of tax revenues and other financial powers (Samuels 2003: 157-176).

Third, when Thailand adopted a new constitution in 1997, some of the primary goals included curbing the power of rural machine politicians, empowering local governments, strengthening party discipline while simultaneously encouraging parties to cultivate capable politicians with a national perspective rather than traditional, local politicians, and increasing the difficulty of passing a no-confidence vote against the cabinet (McCargo 2002; Sombat 2002; Arghiros 2002).

Fourth, electoral reform in Japan in 1993 was intended to reduce the responsiveness of MPs to pressures from their factions and move Japan toward a system with two cohesive political parties (Curtis 1999: 137-170; Reed and Thies 2001).

Fifth, in Russia the period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has seen numerous political changes directly related to the tension between general and parochial interests. The evolution of the electoral system is emblematic. Yeltsin’s advisors adopted a mixed-member electoral system in 1993 after considering the effect of various alternative on small, regional parties, the fact that Democrats would have a hard time fielding viable candidates in many areas since most of their prominent leaders came from the urban elite, and the Communist Party’s nationwide organization and local influence (Smith and Remington 2001: 29; Moser and Thames 2001). In 1995, the Duma chose to
retain the 1993 electoral system since it struck an acceptable balance between the diffuse support of the Communists, Liberal Democrats, and Yabloko and the concentrated support of Agrarians and deputies elected as independents as well as providing some incentives toward party-building (Smith and Remington 2001: 93-115). In 2005, President Putin pushed through a reform eliminating all the single-seat districts as part of a long-term campaign to concentrate power in the central government through a variety of institutional reforms (Moraski 2005).

**Academic Debates**

There are also raging debates among scholars over the weight of parochial and general interests in the operation of various political systems. Again, consider some examples.

First, in the United States, Mayhew (1974) and Krehbiel (1993) argue that political parties, representing general interests, are powerless against parochial interests and are irrelevant in understanding voting in the legislature. In contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) argue that parties always exert influence over legislative outputs.

Second, experts on Brazil disagree sharply on how influential political parties are in shaping policies in that country. Ames (2001) argues that the incentives to cultivate a personal vote engendered by the electoral system undermine any cohesive party action and drive deputies to bargain individually with the executive over policy outcomes. Figueiredo and Limongi (2000a; 2000b, n.d.) counter that the organization of the legislature ensures that these atomistic incentives are not translated into action. Instead, coalitions of party leaders arrange the agenda, and party members reliably vote as
instructed.

A third crops up in Thailand in the mid-1990s. Most scholars believed that parties did not matter much as political actors. Anek (1996) argues that issue-based party politics did not extend past the Bangkok city limits, a point that is reflected in the utter unimportance of parties in Arghiros’s (1995) case study of elections in a rural village and in Pasuk and Sungsidh’s (1994) study of corruption in Thai politics. However, King (1996) argues that at least one party, the Palang Dharma Party, developed a national following based on its political positions, while Albritton (1996) goes even further, suggesting that several parties have developed national identities and that rural voters had developed an adherence to parties based on their political positions.

Fourth, in Japan there is no question of the Liberal Democratic Party’s hegemony throughout the postwar era, but scholars disagree on whether general or parochial interests dominate the LDP. On the one hand, Thayer (1969) portrays the LDP as a coalition of factions who engage in vicious fights against one another. The players who can most effectively amass a war chest, build up an army of supporters in their *koenkai* organizations, and prevent other LDP candidates from invading their turf are the winners. Platforms and policy have little to do with winning elections (Curtis 1971; Bouissou 1999; Fukui and Fukai 1999). On the other hand, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) argue that the LDP uses factions to solve the collective action problems posed by the SNTV electoral system. The factions allow the LDP to evenly divide its votes among its candidates by carving out geographical and policy-based strongholds, maximizing the number of seats it can win. McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995) and Tatebayashi and McKean (2002) show how the LDP promotes policy specialization precisely to help its
members’ electoral efforts.

Fifth, there is a yet another parallel debate in Russia. Ostrow (2000) sees the Duma of the 1993 as an arena in which there was no connection between partisan influences and policy outputs. Shvetsova (2002), on the other hand, argues that the Communist Party (CPRF) did exercise control over the Duma elected in 1995. The Duma’s executive council was composed of representatives of the political parties, with each party having equal weight regardless of its size. In Shvetsova’s story the CPRF secured control of the executive council by “lending” members to other party caucuses who, in return, followed the CPRF’s dictates. Smith and Remington strike a middle ground, arguing that the parties played a real, but modest, role during both terms. In the 1993 legislature, they suggest that the executive council was powerful and did control the agenda, even if the majority on the executive council did not represent a majority on the floor. In the 1995 legislature, they see mostly continuity. While they acknowledge the existence of the CPRF-led leftist bloc, they do not consider it to be nearly as cohesive as Shvetsova does (2001: ch 3).

What is at Stake?

These arguments are important because the balance between parochial and general interests has profound consequences for the operation of the political system. Systems in which parochial interests dominate are often unworkable because, to name two of the most serious problems, they are often unable to make coherent policy choices and they have difficulty managing common pool resources. Dougherty (2001) illustrates the former problem, describing the difficulties the United States under the Articles of
Confederation faced, first in prosecuting the war against Britain and later in trying to govern the new nation. Since the system required unanimity, any state with a parochial interest could, and often did, block an initiative in the general interest, even in dire circumstances such as an imminent attack by the British army. Likewise, MacIntyre (2001) argues that the Thai government was unable to respond promptly and effectively to the shock of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 because its cabinet typically included at least six parties, each with a veto it could and did exercise whenever a policy threatened its interests. There are literatures in both American and comparative contexts that address the difficulties that governments dominated by parochial interests have in managing common pool resources. In American politics, the subgovernment literature suggests that parochial interests can capture entire sectors of the government and manage them according to their narrow interests (Lowi 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Fiorina 1989). In comparative politics, Persson and Tabellini (1999) argue that both parliamentary and proportional representation systems allow parochial interests more opportunities to seek rents and, consequently, have larger public sectors. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2003) build on this idea, arguing that large parties internalize more of the costs of governing than small parties do, so that governments with many parties in the coalition should have larger public sectors. Hallerberg (2000) suggests that the key is that in single party governments, the Finance Minister can act as a guardian of the public purse. In multi-party coalitions, however, the Finance Minister’s party may have different priorities than other parties in the coalition, and the Finance Minister is more likely to be an agent of his party than of the entire coalition. For this reason, the other parties in the coalition are unlikely to delegate him the power to control aggregate
spending in the first place.

At the other extreme, when parochial interests are powerless to check the dominant general interest, the country is vulnerable to the unenviable specter of kings run amok. This is Madison's famous dilemma: the government must be energetic enough to govern but not so powerful as to escape the control of the governed. Perhaps the best example of this occurred in India under Indira Gandhi. Unlike Nehru, who preferred to deal with strong local politicians, Gandhi centralized power within the Congress Party. When she was convicted for an election violation, her power was so unrestrained that she was able to suspend democracy rather than step down from office (Brass 1990; Wolpert 2000).

Another example of the problems of overly powerful general interests can be found in the erosion of democracy in Venezuela, which has been blamed on partidocracia, the excessive concentration of power by the two main parties (Coppedge 1994; Crisp 2000). South Africa is a much milder example of this problem. Friedman (1995: 570-2) worries that the highly centralized distribution of power in the central government deprived most representatives, even in the ruling African National Congress (ANC), of any influence and suggests that the long-term vibrancy of Parliament depends on finding ways for parochial interests to attain a meaningful voice, either in the legislature or within the ANC.

**The Argument**

My dissertation explores the tension between parochial and general interests in the Taiwanese legislature. The goal is both theoretical, to offer a general picture of this tension, and specific, to bring Taiwan into the ambit of comparative legislative studies.
I argue that those pursuing general interests know that parochial interests exist and are powerful. Whenever possible, general interests seek to avoid direct conflict with parochial interests. Instead, they prefer to mesh, incorporating the parochial interests into their legislative projects to the extent that this does not mean sacrificing their own core interests. In this dissertation, I show multiple ways in which parties in Taiwan, like those elsewhere, accommodate parochial interests rather than attempting to suppress them or clash directly with them.

Taiwan is an ideal case to investigate the tension between parochial and general interests because both are exceptionally strong. On the one hand, Taiwan’s electoral system, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) with large districts, is one of the world’s most extreme systems in promoting parochial influences. In SNTV, voters vote below the level of the party, casting a single vote for a candidate who is often only one of several nominees from his or her party. This encourages candidates to differentiate themselves through parochial appeals (Carey and Shugart 1995). On the other hand, conflict with China and the long struggle for democracy have produced very cohesive parties with nationwide social support (Chu 2001). Most countries lean in one direction or the other. For example, Brazil, Russia, and the Philippines (Rood 2002) feature strong parochial interests but weak national legislative parties. Venezuela, South Africa, and Mexico do have strong parties, but electoral institutions, closed list proportional representation in the former two cases and prohibition of re-election in Mexico (Weldon 1997), dampen parochial influence.

Meshing is, admittedly, a somewhat vague idea. I conceive of meshing as a midway point on a continuum of actions that ranges from surrender and complete
acceptance of all parochial wishes to suppression and complete refusal to grant parochial interests any concessions. Between these two extremes, party leaders try to accommodate parochial interests as much as possible as long as the concessions do not harm the party’s core interests. For example, party leaders may tolerate some wasteful pork so that members can claim credit with their constituents, but meshing party leaders will stop before the amount of pork doled out becomes so great that it puts a harmful dent in the national treasury or negatively affects the party’s aggregate reputation as a fiscally responsible entity.

Mayhew suggests that legislators appeal to their constituents in three ways. They advertise, building up name recognition and a favorable image among their constituents by disseminating positive messages with little policy content, such as kissing babies, attending weddings, or congratulating high school graduates; they claim credit, trying to convince constituents that they are responsible for beneficial policy outputs; and they take positions, making public statements of their stances on controversial questions (1974). When party leaders mesh, they aid legislators in pursuing these three activities.

My approach is also similar to Mayhew’s in another respect. He examines the consequences of individual members’ “single-minded” pursuit of re-election. In the process, he ignores many other features of legislative life, the better to elucidate those consequences. Similarly, I examine the consequences of party leaders’ “single-minded” pursuit of meshing. I also ignore other features, the better to isolate meshing. There are phenomena that some have interpreted as party weakness, such as allowing members to get the committees they want or allowing members to vote their districts on substantive votes. Yet these practices can also be interpreted as meshing. Members do generally
get on the committees they want, but the party retains enough control to discourage wild pork barrelling or other damaging actions. Members do vote their districts on substantive votes, but the parties expect and get better discipline on procedural votes that often have a big substantive impact.

I employ a delegation model with multiple principals to illustrate the logic motivating legislators, parties, and constituents. Because legislators need the support of two actors, their party and their constituents, to achieve their main goal of re-election, I model the relationship between legislators and these two actors as a multiple principal single agent relationship. Parties are the representatives of general, national, and ideological interests, while constituents, which I use as a shorthand term to include local voters, businesses, interest groups, and other political forces with local or particularist interests, represent parochial interests. The principals delegate political power to the legislator by helping attain her primary goal, a seat in the legislature. Likewise, they can punish an unfaithful agent by withholding the resources, such as votes, money, or nominations, necessary to win re-election. In a multiple principals framework, the challenge for the agent is to maximize her payoffs from the principals, a task that is almost always made easier if neither of the principals is dissatisfied with her actions.

Parties help legislators in two ways. First, they directly give out positive sanctions to legislators who help them attain party goals. Second and more significantly, parties indirectly help legislators obtain positive sanctions from constituents. Constituents sanction based on information gained while monitoring. That is, if constituents learn that legislators are being faithful agents, they may give positive sanctions. Similarly, if constituents learn that legislators are being unfaithful, they may impose negative
sanctions. Parties help legislators by making it easier for constituents to monitor actions when the legislators are being good agents and harder when they are being bad agents. In other words, parties vary the difficulty of monitoring so that good legislative outputs are more traceable to particular legislators and bad outputs are less traceable. This manipulation is at the heart of meshing parochial interests with general interests.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

The structure of the rest of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter Two, “Multiple Principals,” is a detailed description of a delegation model with two principals, focusing on how adding multiple principals to the conventional single principal model affects the agent’s calculations. This chapter also provides a clear definition of the actors and their motivations. Critically, parties have a strong incentive to help their members succeed in seeking re-election, and this, in turn, leads parties to seek to accommodate parochial interests.

Chapters Three and Four deal with meshing at the committee stage. One half of the “art” of meshing is that general interests allow parochial interests real and significant influence in some arenas while making sure they do not get out of hand through other mechanisms. For example, parochial interests generally determined committee assignments. However, the other half of meshing is that general interests ensure that parochial interests do not get too out of hand. For example, majority parties used multiple referral to ensure that rent seeking party members usually had to deal with large majorities in committee hearings, thus decreasing their ability to extract excessive rents.

Chapter Three, “Committee Membership,” presents one way in which parties have
tried to mesh their preferences with those of constituents. The system of committee assignments in use during this period allowed legislators to self-select onto various committees according to their needs. In particular, legislators who adopted expensive campaign styles benefited from sitting on committees with extensive rent-seeking opportunities. I show evidence that legislators whose votes were geographically concentrated tended to sit on committees with better rent-seeking opportunities. In contrast, legislators elected from the party list tended to occupy less lucrative committee seats. By allowing this committee assignment system, parties facilitated members’ service to constituents rather than narrowly insisting on advancing their own general interests such as obtaining reliable partisan committee majorities. Critically, when the rules were changed in 2002 to allow parties to control committee assignments, this previous trend largely continued to hold, especially among the majority coalition members.

Chapter Four, “Stacking Committees and Multiple Referral,” examines two ways that the majority party used to prevent their legislators from going overboard in pursuing parochial interests. While legislators were allowed to sit on desirable committees, the majority party tried to ensure that those most prone to seeking excessive rents would be faced with oversized majorities and would not often be in a position to blackmail their party. On the one hand, the parties stood aside as rent seeking legislators all signed up for the same few committees rich in rent seeking opportunities. As a result of the parties’ refusal to step in and solve this tragedy of the commons, the majority usually won large majorities of seats on these desirable committees and no individual rent seeking party member was in a position to unilaterally blackmail her party. On the other hand,
the majority party used multiple referral to stack committees reviewing bills with more loyal members.

Chapters Five through Seven turn to meshing on the floor, particularly in roll-call voting. In Chapter Five, “Roll-Call Loyalty among District and List Legislators,” I search for evidence that general and parochial interests do clash sometimes. Taking advantage of a research design applied in several different countries, I look at whether list or district legislators are more likely to defect from the party line. In fact, list legislators, who only have to worry about what one of their principals, their party, wants, are significantly less likely to defect. This finding implies that when parochial and general interests collide for district legislators, they are likely to side with their parochial interests. That is, parochial interests exist and are powerful. There is a real need for general interests to avoid clashing with them. I test this using an extended beta binomial model on all roll-call votes held between February 1993 and July 2003.

Chapter Six, “Providing Cover,” looks at two ways that parties downplay conflicts with parochial interests in roll-call votes, including calling for roll-call votes at strategic times and the use of procedural votes. Both of these practices fall under the rubric of “providing cover,” a process that makes monitoring more difficult for constituents on questions in which the legislator sides with the party and against the constituents. In other words, the party acts to make legislative outputs that are adverse to constituents’ interests less traceable to the legislator. Successful provision of cover should result in higher party cohesion, and we find evidence that legislators do vote with their party more reliably on roll-call votes in which cover is provided. I test this using an extended beta binomial model on all roll-call votes held between February 1993 and July 2003.
Chapter Seven, “The Financial Disclosure Law of 1993,” looks at how the tension between parochial and general interests played out in the roll-call votes in one battle. Many of the forces depicted in Chapters Five and Six were vividly present in this controversial anti-corruption reform opposed strenuously by the majority KMT. The KMT tried to mesh parochial reform interests into its own by attempting to water down the bill and using procedural tactics, but the opposition responded by denying KMT members cover and forcing them to publicly vote on the most controversial provisions. In this case, parochial forces won a tremendous victory as the most stringent version of Financial Disclosure Law passed. This does not mean that meshing failed. The KMT started with a very weak hand, and almost won a tremendous victory through meshing. It only lost when the opposition turned aside all the meshing stratagems and forced the KMT to rely on brute party discipline.

Chapter Eight, “Conclusion,” reiterates the main arguments presented in the dissertation and examines its implications for how we view political developments around the world. Meshing is one key to forging a sustainable democracy. When parochial interests are too dominant and parties are unable to defend their core interests, the collective good can suffer. Likewise, when parochial interests are too weak and general interests are not forced to accommodate them, parties run the risk of being cut off from their popular base.
Chapter Two

Multiple Principals

Meshing assumes that there are incentives for legislators to represent both general and parochial interests. In this chapter, I explore how the Taiwanese political system engenders these incentives. In particular, I use a delegation model with multiple principals to depict the pressures facing legislators. Because legislators are beholden to both their party and their constituents, they have incentives to fight for both general and parochial interests. This sets up a powerful tension between general and parochial interests that legislators must find some way to deal with. Tilting too far to one principal might endanger their good relations with the other principal. Parties help legislators mitigate this tension by manipulating the environment to allow members to serve parochial interests within limits. In this way, parties help members appeal to parochial constituents while avoiding severe damage to core party interests.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I assume that re-election is the primary goal motivating legislators, define the two actors, party and constituents, most critical to winning re-election, and explain how these two actors contribute to the re-election goal. Second, I provide a brief overview of the standard principal-agent model. Third, I expand the basic principal-agent model to include the case with multiple principals. Fourth, I apply this model with multiple principals to the Taiwanese context, examining how the concrete institutional and political environment affects the
The Re-Election Goal

In this project, I borrow Mayhew’s strategy of viewing legislators as “single-minded seekers of re-election” (Mayhew 1974, 5). Of course, re-election is not the only goal that the literature suggests motivates legislators. The most important alternative goal is the pursuit of “good” public policy (Fenno 1973, Hall 1996; Smith and Remington 2001). Other goals suggested include pursuit of power in the national capitol (Fenno 1973), advancing within the legislature’s internal hierarchy of offices (Wawro 2001), prosecuting the executive’s agenda (Hall 1996), election to other offices (Samuels 2003), and pursuit of personal wealth (Rose-Ackerman 1999).

While these are certainly powerful forces motivating legislators, in this project I assume that legislators always subordinate these goals to re-election. To the extent that the demands of re-election clash with the demands of these other goals, legislators will always give priority to re-election. However, there are some cases in which the legislator has some freedom to choose a course of action, even after considering all her re-election needs. This residual area may be best explained by these other goals. In this project, I will keep in mind that these other goals may affect legislators’ choices and, in the extreme, may alter the substantive conclusions implied by an exclusive focus on re-election. However, I will leave systematic exploration of these other goals and their effects for future research.

Like Mayhew, I do not necessarily believe that the single goal of re-election.
completely determines everything a legislator does. However, I also agree with Mayhew that we can learn quite a lot by assuming that it does, and that the parsimony and clarity gained from assuming that legislators are single-minded seekers of re-election is well worth the complexity and richness sacrificed.

**Parties**

In order to win re-election, legislators need support from two actors. The first of these is the party. Aldrich argues that strategic politicians form political parties in order to win more of what they want more consistently. From the standpoint of collective action and public goods, political parties reduce transaction costs by eliminating the need to form new coalition for every new issue. Parties also help resolve the cycling problems pointed to by the social choice literature by providing the structure to induce an equilibrium. Moreover, the party label serves as a brand name that attracts a core group of supporters in the electorate and also provides economies of scale by linking politicians, such as legislators, to other politicians, such as a presidential candidate. Finally, ambitious politicians are more likely to succeed if they join major political parties (Aldrich 1995, ch 2).

More than any other political actor, parties have incentives to represent general, national interests. Since the party is a standing alliance of politicians, to the extent that the politicians represent a diverse set of parochial interests, the party has to be able to find a balance between all those parochial interests. It cannot favor any single parochial interest too strongly, for this would cause a backlash among other, less favored parochial interests. Further, while parochial interests thrive on the logic of locally concentrated
benefits with diffuse national costs, a national party must consider the total national costs and benefits. This makes policies such as pork, which is beneficial only from a local perspective, much less appealing to the party. Instead, parties should prefer programs that increase the aggregate welfare of the nation.

The party is important to the legislator because it can help her win re-election. In the principal-agent framework, when a party aids a legislator’s re-election efforts, it is delegating authority in the form of some fraction of a legislative seat. Legislators can be elected in one of two ways. Approximately 20% of the legislature is elected by closed list proportional representation. For these legislators, the party determines the rank order of the list and, hence, their future electoral fates. The other 80% of the legislature is elected in multi-member nominal districts by the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). SNTV has been described as a system which fosters extreme personalism (Carey and Shugart 1995). Since candidates often compete against other candidates from the same party, they cannot rely solely on voters’ identification with a particular party label to produce victory. They need to augment the party label with more specific appeals targeted at subsets of party supporters in order to ensure that they get their “fair” share of votes (Thayer 1969; Fukui 1970; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995). In fact, the Meiji oligarchs who designed the electoral system in Japan chose SNTV precisely because they believed the incentives toward personalism would impede the formation of cohesive political parties (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1995). Similarly, the Beijing authorities initially favored employing SNTV in Hong Kong after 1997 for the same reason (Lau 1999). However, there are several ways in which a party can help its candidates win an election in an SNTV system.
First, an appeal to the party label may not be sufficient, but it is not worthless either. Party label is an important informational shortcut (Popkin 1994; Downs 1957). Simply campaigning under a particular label sends a powerful signal that favorably disposes a large segment of the voting public to the candidate.

Second, the party label sends a signal of viability to voters. In a typical SNTV election, there are several viable candidates and several turkeys. Both Reed (1991) and Cox (1997) suggest that there should be at most \(M+1\) viable candidates, where \(M\) is district magnitude. The first battle any candidate has to win is to establish in the voters’ minds that she is among the top \(M+1\) candidates. Otherwise, strategic voters will desert her to avoid wasting their votes. Since major party nominees rarely turn out to be turkeys, candidates nominated by parties have a much easier time winning this preliminary battle than independent candidates do.

Third, parties can serve as coordinating agents to ensure that the right number of candidates are nominated and that each nominee receives an adequate number of votes. In an SNTV system, there are two reasons that a party can fail to win a share of seats proportional to its vote. It can nominate too many or too few candidates, or voters can concentrate their votes disproportionately on a small number of party nominees (Cox and Niou 1994). From the candidate’s point of view, the party should nominate enough people that she can obtain one of the nominations but not so many that there will be too few party votes to go around. More importantly, parties can help to ensure that votes are distributed evenly among all party nominees. This may be done by helping candidates to differentiate themselves geographically or by policy specialization, or it may be achieved more directly by party instructions to voters on which candidates to vote for.
Fourth, party nominees may have access to useful resources. Parties can provide speakers, volunteers, polling information, publicity, and limited financial support, just to name a few resources that are always scarce.

Since 1992, five parties have won more than one seat in the Legislative Yuan.\textsuperscript{1} The Kuomintang (KMT) was formed on the mainland and relocated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war in 1949. From the time it reclaimed sovereignty of Taiwan from Japan in 1945 until it lifted martial law in 1987, the KMT was the only significant legal political party. With its successful economic stewardship and construction of deep ties with local elites, the KMT built a strong foundation for continued rule after the transition to democracy.

Taiwan’s first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), evolved as a movement promoting democracy and Taiwan nationalism. Since its founding in 1986, the DPP has either been the biggest opposition party or, since its victory in the 2000 presidential election, the governing party.

The New Party (NP) was formed in 1993 when a group of young KMT legislators who were dissatisfied with President Lee Teng-hui’s increasingly vague position on unification with China broke away. The NP won 21 seats in the 1995 legislative elections, but it was wracked by internal disputes and rapidly lost popularity.

The last two parties were formed in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. James Soong, a former KMT member who ran for president as an independent and

\textsuperscript{1} A few other parties have won one seat in the legislature. The most important of these is the Taiwan Independence Party which splintered off from the DPP in 1996. Two DPP legislators defected to the TAIP but both lost their re-election bids in 1998. Since Chen’s election as president in 2000, the TAIP has ceased to play an active role in Taiwanese politics.
narrowly lost, formed the People First Party (PFP) in order to consolidate his support and prepare for the 2004 election. The PFP’s strength is drawn largely from former KMT and NP supporters. Lee Teng-hui stepped down as KMT chairman after the 2000 election and was quickly marginalized as the new chair, Lien Chan, adopted a much more conciliatory policy toward China. In the runup to the 2001 legislative elections, Lee formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to provide an institutional voice for his policies. Since the 2001 elections, the five parties have settled into a two-block pattern of cooperation: the KMT, PFP, and NP form the pan-blue camp while the DPP and TSU comprise the pan-green camp (see Table 2.1).

**Constituents**

I use “constituents” as a term encompassing all the actors that can help legislators win re-election at the district level. This group includes two broad subgroups: voters and special interests.

As noted above, 20% of legislators are elected from party lists. These candidates do not have to worry much about individual voters. However, the other 80% of legislators are elected by winning votes in the district. The support of both voters, who actually cast votes, and special interests, who provide resources that allow a legislator to successfully appeal for votes, is crucial.

Fenno (1978) argues that a legislator sees her constituency as a series of concentric circles. Voters are roughly analogous to his two largest circles, the geographic constituency and the re-election constituency. Roughly speaking, these two circles encompass everyone who lives in the district and everyone who voted for the candidate
last time. The re-election constituency is much smaller and more fluid in SNTV elections than in single-member plurality elections. In SNTV, candidates can win with a fairly small percentage of the vote. Moreover, depending on the slate of candidates, voters may back different candidates in different years even though their party or policy preferences remain unchanged. While it is possible that a legislator will focus narrowly on the re-election constituency and ignore all other voters, it is also possible that the legislator will anticipate winning support from a very different coalition of voters from one election to the next and will spread her efforts more broadly across the entire geographic constituency.

Theoretically, it is possible that the preferences of local voters are based on entirely general, national questions. In practice, however, there are strong reasons to expect that voters will have parochial preferences. For one, even if the same issues are important nationally and locally, the balance of power might be different. For example, national health care might be very popular nationally but very unpopular locally. Moreover, there may be issues that are more important to some areas than others. For example, the question of what to do with expended nuclear fuels is more salient in Lanyu Island, where a storage facility was covertly built, than in the rest of Taiwan. Finally, the logic of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs means that local voters generally support local particularist projects, even if they are not nationally efficient.

While individual voters actually provide the votes that elect legislators, legislators find it very difficult to successfully appeal for this support without resources. Parties are one major source of resources; special interests are the other. I define special interests as non-party actors who can provide the resources that legislators need to
campaign effectively.

The most important resource is money. Legislative candidates in Taiwan are largely responsible for financing their own campaigns. Parties generally provide only limited funds. In fact, some parties actually require list nominees to make sizeable donations to party coffers. Moreover, elections in Taiwan are expensive. Chu estimates that DPP candidates in 1995 and 1998 typically spent US$1 million to US$1.5 million, and KMT candidates typically spent US$3 million to US$9 million (2001, 298 n 33). Note that there are almost no uncontested elections; unlike candidates in plurality elections, SNTV candidates have to spend significant amounts of money every election cycle. Legislators also have to spend money in between elections. Almost all legislators maintain several offices in their districts for constituency service, and many also employ large research staffs in Taipei. Because of this heavy financial burden, special interests that can provide money have a large source of influence over legislators.

In addition to money, special interests may also provide other useful resources, such as volunteers, good publicity, or policy credibility. Campaigns can always use more volunteers to stuff envelopes, hand out literature, knock on doors, and make telephone calls. Some groups might also provide good (or bad) publicity. For example, the Taipei Society periodically publishes a list of the best and worst performing legislators. Other groups might provide publicity regarding a more focused policy area and provide credibility to undergird the legislator’s campaign promises. For example, public praise from the leaders of a local farmer’s association could make a candidate’s promise that she will work to further the welfare of local farmers more credible.

The most important special interests will tend to be businesses. These might be
individual businesses with interests in government activity or regulation. They could also be umbrella groups collective representing numerous individual companies. Often, the legislator or her family is a major stakeholder in the business. In addition to businesses, special interests may include policy advocacy groups, such as environmental, consumer, or Taiwan independence organizations. Other groups, such as farmers’ associations, straddle the line between businesses and advocacy groups.

Special interests are parochial almost by definition, even if many would like to claim that their interests are also in the best interests of the country.

**Principal Agent Models**

In the basic single principal single agent model, a principal delegates authority to an agent to carry out some task. The principal benefits because the agent typically specializes in this task and can perform it efficiently. However, there are dangers to delegation. The agent may have differing interests than those of the principal and may choose to execute the task in a way that is not optimal or is even harmful to the principal. The agent can engage in this shirking behavior to the extent that she\(^2\) has hidden information and to the extent that she can take hidden action. From the principal’s point of view, the challenge is to reap the gains of delegation while minimizing the losses from shirking.

Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) identify four strategies that principals can employ to reduce agency loss, including institutional checks, screening of potential agents, monitoring the agent’s behavior, and sanctioning the agent’s behavior. The principal

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\(^2\) For clarity, I will use male pronouns when referring to principals and female pronouns for agents.
sets up institutional checks by giving one agent the power to veto another agent’s actions. If the agents have competing interests, fewer actions that harm the principal’s interests will be approved by all the agents. However, increasing the number of vetoes increases the difficulty of all action, including action that the principal approves of. Moreover, institutional checks are only effective if the various agents do not have similar interests or conspire against the principal. In addition, a solution that requires numerous agents may be so expensive as to negate the gains of delegation.

Principals can screen potential agents, choosing those who share similar interests, in order to maximize the chance that the agent will act in the principal’s interests even when the opportunity to shirk presents itself. In other words, screening provides some assurance that when the agent has access to hidden information or can take hidden actions, she will still execute her task in a manner beneficial to the principal because her interests are the similar to the principal’s. However, screening may be expensive and difficult. This is especially true if potential agents know that the principal is screening and they try to misrepresent themselves. Moreover, principals cannot always screen their agents. Sometimes the principal only has minimal control over selection of the agent.

Monitoring mitigates agency loss by reducing hidden information and hidden action. There are three basic methods of monitoring. First, the agent can be required to report on what information she has and on what actions she has taken. If the agent reports thoroughly and truthfully, her information and actions are no longer hidden, and she no longer has room for shirking. However, the utility of self-report is limited. The principal may have to expend large amounts of time and energy to consume the reports. Moreover, an agent who wishes to shirk has an incentive to report selectively or
untruthfully. As a result, principals generally seek some other source of information to confirm or supplement the agent’s reports. Direct observation is a second method of monitoring. Shirking is much less likely if the principal is paying close attention. Often, the principal will only directly observe a limited subset of the agent’s activities by holding regular inspections or special investigations. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) liken this type of monitoring to police patrols. However, direct observations are also extremely expensive. Continually peering over the shoulder of the agent takes a lot of time and energy. Taken to the extreme, the costs of direct observation can easily outweigh the gains from delegation. A third method of monitoring is cheaper. Principals can use third parties to monitor their agents. If a third party discovers that the agent is shirking, it can alert the principal. If direct observation is like a police patrol, use of third parties is like a set of fire alarms. Any citizen who sees smoke can pull the fire alarm, alerting the fire brigade to a possible problem. Only then, when the principal has good reason to suspect serious agency loss, does he have to expend time and energy to prevent the agent from taking action harmful to the principal’s interests. Moreover, if the principal can rely on a large number of third parties, he can often gather more comprehensive and more reliable information than he could through direct observation. As with the other two types of monitoring, third party monitoring is not without drawbacks. The principal must have reasonable assurance that the third parties share his interests and will pull the fire alarm when he would want them to. In addition, if the agent has hidden information or can take hidden actions, third parties may be no more able to discern shirking than the principal.

A final way the principal can reduce agency loss is to reward good behavior and to
penalize bad behavior. By changing the payoffs to the agent, the principal can attempt to induce the agent to behave in line with the principal’s interests. However, determining effective compensation schedules is fraught with difficulty. The main problem with this strategy is that the principal often does not observe the agent’s behavior or does not know what kind of behavior is good or bad for him. This is especially true if the outcome does not depend solely on the actions of the agent. When there are other causes, the agent can blame bad outcomes on those other causes rather than on her shirking. One strategy to overcome this difficulty is to reward the agent for good outcomes instead of good behavior. While the principal may not have assurance that the eventual outcome was the best possible outcome that the agent could have engineered, he at least knows whether it is good or bad for him. This solution also has problems. The more the outcome is determined by other causes, the less incentive the agent has to work hard to change the outcome. Also, this sort of sanctioning can give rise to unforeseen incentives: in an effort to produce “good” outcomes and reap high rewards, agents may take actions that are actually not in the principal’s best interests. For example, a corporate CEO who is rewarded for a high stock price might sacrifice the long-term growth of the company in order to achieve a temporary bump in the value of the stock. In general, while the agent must be paid if she is to work at all, it is difficult to design a foolproof plan that would encourage her to be faithful to the principal’s interests.

**Multiple Principals**

When an agent is responsible to multiple principals, each principal must worry about all the normal problems of agency loss. In addition, each principal must worry that the
agent is responding to the interests of the other principals. To the extent that the principals have competing interests, this can be a very serious problem. In other words, when there are multiple principals, the principals must compete for influence over the agent. From the agent’s point of view, the conflicting goals of the principals are a source of both trouble and opportunity. Almost any action is objectionable to at least one principal and may bring down harsh sanctions. However, when the principals vary in their abilities to monitor and sanction, the agent can carry out her task in a way that maximizes her rewards.

Consider a case with \( k \) principals in which there are no institutional checks and the agent is selected by nature. The only methods available to principals to minimize agency loss are monitoring and sanctioning. It is critical to note that these two strategies work together. Principals can monitor extensively and discover that the agent is egregiously shirking, but this knowledge will not affect the agent’s behavior unless the principal can impose negative sanctions. At the same time, without effective monitoring to discover any unforeseen actions, a given set of sanctions may simply give rise to perverse incentives.

The agent’s payoffs from each principal include a fixed term and a term based on performance. These two terms are akin to a flat wage and a commission. The fixed term is the same regardless of how the agent decides to carry out the task, and so it does not affect the agent’s calculus. The second term depends on three variables: the principal’s capacity to monitor, the size of the sanction he can impose, and the degree to which the agent’s action benefits him. Thus the agent’s payoff from the \( i^{th} \) principal for pursuing an action \( x \) is:
\[ Y_i(x) = W_i + M_i S_{ix} + \varepsilon_x \]

- \( W_i \) is the flat wage paid by the \( i \)th principal; \(-\infty \leq W_i \leq \infty\).
- \( M_i \) is the \( i \)th principal’s probability of learning \( x \); \( 0 \leq M_i \leq 1 \).
- \( S_{ix} \) is the size of the sanction the \( i \)th principal will impose if he learns \( x \); \(-\infty \leq S_{ix} \leq \infty \).
- \( \varepsilon_x \) is an error term; \(-\infty \leq \varepsilon_x \leq \infty \).

As noted above, the fixed term \( W_i \) is paid out regardless of the agent’s action, and so she will not consider this term when determining which action to choose. The probability of learning the agent’s actions, or the effectiveness of the monitoring, can vary from zero to one. Principals should only give performance-based sanctions to the extent that they can determine what the agent has done. If the principal has no information about what the agent has done, he will not give a positive sanction. This point deserves reiteration: even if the agent acts in the principal’s best interests and the principal is willing to reward a faithful agent, he will not give a positive benefit if he has no way of knowing that the agent has, in fact, acted in his best interests. In this case, the agent has a clear incentive to help the principal monitor her activities by reporting her activities to the principal or to third parties or by encouraging the principal to engage in direct observation. At the opposite extreme, when an agent takes an action harmful to the principal, she will only be punished if the principal is willing to sanction and he is able to learn about her actions. In this case, the agent has an incentive to make monitoring more difficult.

The size of the sanction the principal can impose is critical. When all principals
only have small sanctions available, the total payoff is also small, regardless of the
principals’ monitoring capacity or which action is chosen. In this case, the agent may
not feel very constrained by the principals and may follow her personal interest in
choosing her action. In most important cases, however, the principals will be able to
impose substantial sanctions. When this assumption holds, the agent’s payoff will
depend critically on her action, and her own personal interests will be less important than
those of her principals. This highlights an important distinction between single
principal and multiple principal models. In the former models, the dominant form of
shirking involves the agent pursuing her own interest at the expense of her principal’s
interest. In the latter models, shirking, as perceived by any single principal, also
involves pursuing other principals’ interests.

In a multiple principal framework, the various principals may have differing
capacities to monitor and sanction. As a result, the agent who seeks to maximize her
payoff may not solve the task in a way that would maximize the total benefit for all
principals. Instead, she may choose an action that favors principals who monitor
effectively and sanction heavily at the expense of those who have lower capacities in one
or both of these areas.

As previously noted, when there are multiple principals, each principal must worry
that the agent is responding to another principal. The way that a principal can seek to
maximize his influence over the agent is to increase the effectiveness of his monitoring
and the size of his sanctions. Holding all else constant, an increase in either of these
terms should cause the agent to choose a course of action slightly more favorable to him.
Of course, when one principal adjusts his capacities, the other principals must also either
adjust their capacities or face a loss of influence over the agent.

Finally, the last term in the equation, $\varepsilon$, is an error term. This term includes the benefit that accrues to the agent from pursuing policy $x$ for non-electoral reasons, such as good public policy, personal financial gains, power in the national capital, higher office, or prosecuting the executive’s agenda. In this project, I will make the assumption that this term is small relative to the other terms in the equation. In other words, I will assume that when the interests of the principals and the agent conflict, the agent will generally put more weight on what her collective principals want than on what she personally wants. This may not always be a tenable assumption, but it probably holds true often enough that the conclusions reached under it are not generally misleading.

**Multiple Principals Applied to the Taiwanese Legislature**

To achieve their goal of re-election, Taiwanese legislators respond to two actors: their party and their constituents. As such, I model the relationship as a multiple principal single agent relationship in which the two actors are principals who delegate authority to the legislator. Both principals expect the legislator to further their interests by acting in certain ways within the legislature. These actions can take many forms, including using the office as a bully pulpit, using investigative powers to oversee government actions, or by changing or attempting to change the laws governing the country. I will focus on the last of these three possibilities. Specifically, I will examine how legislators respond to the interests of the two principals at the committee and floor stages of the legislative process.

As noted above, principals have four methods to reduce agency loss. The first of
these, institutional checks, is relatively unimportant. Constituents generally only delegate to one legislator. Voters, in particular, can only vote for one person. There is no question of a voter delegating redundantly to another agent in order to set up an institutional check. Special interests may do support several candidates, but they face the same problem in setting up institutional checks as parties do. At the floor stage, there is no way for a legislator to veto another legislator’s vote. That is, if a legislator votes against a particular bill on the floor, no other legislator can veto that vote. While two legislators might vote in opposite directions and cancel out each other’s vote, this is not a veto. At the committee stage, bills are sent to one committee. Unlike in the US Congress, where bills have, at various times, been sent to several committees, all of which could veto or alter the bill, bills in the Taiwanese Legislature are sent only to one committee.\(^3\) As a result, institutional checks do not play an important role in reducing agency loss.

The second method, screening, may be very effective in aligning the legislator’s preferences with those of her principals. However, at any particular stage in the legislative process, the screening has already taken place, and its effect is a constant.

In contrast with the first two methods, the principals do rely heavily on monitoring and sanctioning. Moreover, their capacity to monitor and sanction can vary dramatically. This is both because some stages are inherently harder for some principals to monitor, and because the agents conscientiously manipulate the difficulty of monitoring to present themselves in the best light to their principals. As a result, these last two methods of mitigating agency loss are critical to understanding why the same legislator may try to

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\(^3\) As I explain in Chapter Four, many bills are multiply referred. However, the various committees then sit as one large committee when the bill is considered. They do not act separately.
satisfy different principal in different situations.

Monitoring is a recurring theme in the literature on legislative organization and behavior. As explained in the previous section, when neither screening nor institutional checks apply, the principal’s capacity to monitor determines how much of the potential sanction he will pay the agent for a given course of action. If the principal cannot monitor effectively and does not know what the agent has done, he will not pay more even if the agent’s action is good for him. This is somewhat akin to Douglas Arnold’s notion of traceability. Arnold holds that for voters to vote retrospectively, a particular political outcome must be traceable. This requires that three conditions hold. There must be a perceptible policy effect, a specific government action, and a clear contribution by the legislator (1990, 47-51). Arnold is concerned with explaining how legislators can cast politically unpopular votes, and so he stresses that legislators and party leaders will sometimes try to decrease traceability. Just as important, however, is the fact that legislators will often try to increase traceability precisely so voters can see the connection between a political output and the legislator’s actions (100-108). While Arnold only discusses traceability as it applies to voters, the same logic can be applied to other principals. Moreover, if we relax the assumption that principals only respond to policy outputs by allowing them to reward efforts to change policy, the only condition necessary for traceability is that the principal can clearly perceive that his agent has, in fact, taken an action that increases the probability of a favorable policy output. In sum, legislators who hope for positive sanctions seek to increase the effectiveness of monitoring, and hence traceability, while those who fear negative sanctions will try to decrease it.

Each of the three methods of monitoring can be employed. Self-reporting is an
important tool in the legislator’s arsenal. Mayhew argues that there are three types of activities that legislators find electorally advantageous: advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking (1974). The latter two are, in fact, forms of self-reporting.

Credit-claiming involves the legislator’s attempts to persuade her principals that her actions have been instrumental in producing some beneficial outcome (Mayhew, 52-3). She does this by reporting on her actions and, when necessary, explaining how they are related to the outcome. For example, a legislator who wishes to claim credit for the construction of a local bridge might point out how she introduced the bill, shepherded it through the legislature, and voted for its final passage. In this way, her reports make these previously hidden actions known to her principals. Mayhew defines position-taking as “the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors” (61). One of the most important forms of position-taking involves taking a stand by voting one way or the other in a public roll-call vote. By doing this, a legislator establishes a public record of her stance on an issue. This greatly increases the risk of taking hidden action to pursue the opposite goal. If the legislator is discovered to be engaging in such duplicity, she is sure to be subjected to intense criticism. By taking a position, the legislator is reporting her public stance to her principals and decreasing the profitability of contrary hidden action.

Beyond credit-claiming and position-taking, there are other forms of reporting in the Taiwanese legislature. For example, the so-called Sunshine Law requires many public officials, including all legislators, to file annual reports of their immediate family’s wealth. By examining these statements, principals should be able to determine whether legislators are using their positions to reap illicit financial gains. In practice, however,
this is one area in which many legislators would prefer their actions not be traceable. As a result, these legislators have an incentive to shade the truth through such tactics as placing their assets in the names of more distant family members or “forgetting” to list certain assets. These tactics reduce the effectiveness of the self-reporting.

As Kiewiet and McCubbins point out, the effectiveness of self-reporting depends in part on the reports not containing so little information as to be useless or so much information that the principals cannot process it all (1991, 31). Since the party, voters, and special interests all have different abilities to process information, each principal should prefer a different type of report. However, when legislators engage in credit-claiming and position-taking, they control the level of information contained in the reports and can shape the messages for particular principals. Assuming special interests can process higher levels of information than voters, a legislator will report a fairly low level of information for voters and a higher level of information for special interests. Moreover, the special interest-oriented report may be unenlightening to voters. As a result, the legislator can influence how traceable her actions are to different principals by varying the level of information revealed in her reports.

Direct observation is the second form of monitoring. Direct observation, or police patrols, can be extremely expensive and is probably only worth the expense if the potential benefit to the principal is very great or if the direct observation is a by-product of some other activity the principal has already paid for. Voters very rarely engage in direct observation. There are public galleries, but seats are limited and not usually full. Some sessions are televised, giving voters a chance to watch some of the more exciting proceedings such as interpolation sessions or important votes. However, most of what
goes on in the legislature is not televised. Another way that voters could directly observe legislators is to read the transcripts of proceedings, many of which are available online. This requires a considerable amount of time, energy, and expertise. Given the fairly low stakes of any particular action for the average voter, it is simply almost never worth it to engage in direct observation.

Special interests face the same set of opportunities for direct observation as voters, but their cost-benefit calculation is significantly different. First and foremost, special interests have more at stake than voters do. While the costs and benefits of any particular action are fairly low for the average voter, the same action may bestow a windfall or impose a catastrophic cost on a special interest. Because of this, special interests have a greater incentive to monitor their agents closely and may be willing to pay the high costs of direct observation. Second, special interests often already possess considerable expertise in the particular issue area. Direct observation may be more enlightening to them than to voters simply because they are more able to understand the potential effects of particular actions and are, thus, more able to discern when the agent is shirking.

Direct observation is an expensive proposition for both voters and special interests. It is much less expensive for parties. Parties have members involved in every stage of the legislative process who can inform the party leaders when a particular party member is shirking. That is, the cost of direct observation to parties is subsidized by members who attend sessions for purposes other than observation of fellow party members. The observation is simply a by-product. Moreover, since other legislators are usually at least moderately expert in the issues at hand, the party can both observe the actions of a
particular legislator and interpret them. In brief, direct observation is a cheap and highly
effective method of monitoring for parties.

The third method of monitoring is the use of third parties as a network of fire alarms.
There are several different types of third parties that might monitor the agent and act as
fire alarms. First, special interests sometimes have such high stakes at risk that it is
worthwhile for them to directly monitor legislators. This allows them to decide whether
to positively or negatively sanction the legislator. One way of increasing the size of the
sanction is to share what they have learned with other principals who will independently
sanction the legislator in the same direction. Much like the case with credit-claiming
and position-taking, the actor providing the information can shape the message for a
particular audience. That is, the special interest that has directly observed the agent’s
behavior will employ a fairly low level of information if it wishes to target voters, a
higher level for other special interests, and a very detailed level for parties.

Second, the media acts as a fire alarm. The media may be acting as a watchdog.
Investigative reporters are usually on the lookout for egregious cases of shirking such as
corruption. The media may also alert principals to agency loss inadvertently in its
everyday role of reporting the news. Television stations and newspapers usually have a
beat reporter in the legislature to monitor the interesting activities there. These reporters
do not observe all facets of the legislative process, and they do not necessarily observe
the particular actions that would interest the various principals. Except in cases in
which the media is a special interest, the media is not a principal and does not impose
sanctions on legislators. To the degree that it is not a principal, the media also does not
target its information for the purpose of maximizing sanctions in the way that agents and
other principals do. Instead, the media shapes its message to maximize its target audience. For example, an evening news program that targets all adults will transmit a fairly low level of information regardless of whether a higher level of information might have a larger aggregate effect.

Third, the American literature suggests that challengers may be the most effective fire alarm of all. Since a challenger can usually only win if she can persuade some voters to shift their support from the incumbent and this is almost impossible to accomplish when the campaign is focused on the incumbent’s personal qualities, it is usually necessary to change the campaign agenda to issues less advantageous to the incumbent (Jacobson 2001, ch 4). Challengers attempt to do this by searching for issues on which the incumbent is vulnerable and then communicating the incumbent’s shortcomings to the various principals (Arnold 1990; 49, 55). Since the stakes are very high for challengers, they can be expected to be very diligent and thorough monitors.

Challengers may not be such effective monitors in Taiwan. American legislators are elected from single member districts in which there are almost always only two serious candidates. Any vote that the incumbent loses goes to the challenger, and the challenger’s only realistic strategy to win is to take votes from the incumbent. However, in Taiwan’s multi-member districts, this logic breaks down. A challenger may convince voters that a particular incumbent is unworthy of their support, but the challenger will not necessarily be the beneficiary of this shift. The voters may instead decide to vote for a third candidate, especially since there will likely be other candidates from that incumbent’s party whose positions are close to those of the shifting voters. Moreover, challengers may build a winning coalition by appealing to voters who in the previous
election voted for losing candidates, several winning candidates, or a combination of these. Challengers may do better focusing on their own strengths than on the shortcomings of a single incumbent. This difference in electoral systems may deprive Taiwanese voters and to a lesser extent, special interests and parties, of a critical monitoring mechanism.

The fourth weapon that principals can employ in their fight to reduce agency loss is the sanction. The three principals each have different capacities to sanction. The sanctions employed by voters and special interests are fairly straightforward. Voters can sanction by granting or withholding their electoral support. Special interests have the capacity to give or withhold resources that legislators need to win re-election. For both of these principals, the sanction is a simple number of votes or resources gained. Parties possess a wider array of sanctions. Parties can grant legislators party leadership positions both within the legislature and within the party organization. Since the beginning of the 5th term, parties can determine committee assignments. Parties have always had some influence in determining which legislators won positions as committee conveners and members of the Procedural Committee. Parties can reward legislators by helping them to pass pet bills. Parties can discipline members by denying them the right to participate in caucus decisions. At the extreme, parties can deny a legislator access to the party label in her re-election bid or put her so far down on the party list as to ensure electoral defeat.

As this discussion indicates, principals in the Taiwanese political world face a serious challenge in ensuring that their agents remain faithful. Constituents often have difficulties monitoring and possess only extremely crude sanctions. Parties are better at
monitoring and possess a wider array of sanctions, but even they cannot observe or punish every infraction. From the other perspective, this environment is both an opportunity and a challenge to the agents. When the two principals want different things, it is sometimes possible to take an action that may be either undetected or unpunished by the offended principal. However, the fact that the principals know that the agent might be – and probably sometimes is – acting against their interests is a challenge to the agent since the key to being re-elected is to persuade the principal that she is being a faithful agent and should be rewarded.

**Parties and Meshing**

Parties want legislators to be faithful agents and to pursue party goals. However, parties also have another goal: winning large numbers of seats.

There are two classic schools of thought about why parties exist. One, descending from Burke (Sartori 1976, 59) and finding its modern form in the Conditional Party Government camp (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995) holds that politicians who hold common goals form parties to advance those goals. The other, the genesis of which can be traced at least to Machiavelli and has since been espoused by Schattschneider (1942), Schumpeter (1942), and Cox and McCubbins (1993), argues that politicians form parties in order to win the spoils of office. Either way, parties have an interest in seeing their members win elections. Both common goals and the spoils of office are much easier to realize when the party holds a large number of seats.

Since legislators need the support of their constituents to win re-election, parties have an interest in ensuring that legislators are popular with those constituents. In other
words, parties have an interest in helping legislators pursue the parochial interests that will endear them to their constituents. There is a major caveat to this, however. It is only beneficial to parties if the pursuit of these parochial goals is not overly detrimental to party goals. That is, to the extent that individual legislators can satisfy parochial concerns without doing major damage to the party’s image or requiring major changes in the party’s policies, the party may choose to sacrifice some degree of party homogeneity to the larger goal of winning more seats. This is the essence of meshing general and parochial interests. Let us be clear: allowing legislators to deviate from general party goals in pursuit of parochial goals is always costly to the party. There is always a tradeoff. The party’s challenge is to keep these costs under control.

Parties have two critical advantages that allow them to mesh effectively. The first is their ability to act collectively to manipulate the political environment. Parties are generally organized in a way that allows them to act collectively (Michels 1915; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995). This ability to take action at advantageous points in time is crucial in allowing them to manipulate the environment to more effectively mesh general and parochial interests. These actions may be fairly broad, or they may be extremely specific. For example, in Chapter Three we will see how the chamber rules on committee assignments allowed legislators to self-select onto certain committees in order to seek rents that would enable them to more successfully satisfy parochial interests. In this case, parties established a set of rules (or declined until 2002 to modify a pre-existing set of rules) that set a broad set of constraints that allowed individual legislators to take actions beneficial to their parochial interests. In Chapter Four, we see a somewhat more specific action, as parties consider which committee or committees to
refer each bill to on a bill-by-bill basis. The party’s action is even more specific in Chapter Six, as parties decide how to pose particular questions to the floor in order to either obscure or bring light to legislators’ roll call voting choices. In each of these cases, the party’s action is aimed at allowing the individual party members to take actions that will endear them to their constituents while not excessively injuring general party interests.

Second, parties usually have fairly good information about what legislators are doing, and this allows them to determine what actions might be useful for meshing and assess whether parochialism is getting out of control. As outlined above, political parties usually have very good information on legislators’ preferences and actions because their central place in the legislative process allows them to effectively monitor legislators’ actions. More than any other actor, parties can both observe and interpret what legislators are doing. With fairly accurate expectations of what legislators want and might do in different circumstances, parties are able to judge how to best manipulate the political environment. Moreover, after they have tried some manipulation, parties are able to assess the effects of their choices. If things have not worked out as planned, parties can adjust their policies. During the democratic era, parties have tweaked the rules in several ways to adjust the balance between general and parochial interests. For example, they have changed the rules on who can call for a vote, who can introduce an amendment, how committee assignments are determined, how the Procedural Committee is selected, how to deal with resignations by list legislators, and time allotted for members to speak (for the television cameras) on general questions of the day.

In sum, political parties have a strong incentive to mesh general and parochial
interests. Unless they allow their members to maintain good standing with the various parochial interests, their members will face difficult re-election fights. Fortunately, parties have both the ability, through their ability to act collectively to manipulate the agenda, and the information, through their ability to observe and interpret legislators’ actions, to act profitably to manipulate the environment in ways that will allow their members to satisfy parochial demands while not sacrificing core party interests.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have laid out the theoretical micro-foundations of the tension between general and parochial interests. Legislators need the support of both their party and their constituents, but the two principals often want different things. Somehow, legislators need to square this circle. Parties help them do this by manipulating the political context so that legislators are able to do some things that their parochial constituents want. At the same time, parties set limits so that general interests are not severely damaged.

In the rest of this project, we will apply these theoretical to a concrete case: the Taiwanese legislature. In the ensuing chapters, we will find ample evidence of the tension between the general and the parochial, and we will find that the parties have been instrumental in helping legislators to manage this tension.
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Chapter Three

Committee Membership

In order to successfully mesh general and parochial interests, the general interests must allow the parochial interests to attain some real power. Meshing is not simply a code word meaning that the general interests win everything they want all the time. Rather, successful meshing involves making substantial but limited concessions to parochial interests. They must be large enough to satisfy the parochial interests but small enough that they do not cause excessive damage to the general interests.

Committee assignments in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan are a brilliant case study in the art of meshing. In this chapter, I will show how legislators use the committee assignment system to gain membership on the committees that will best allow them to cater to their parochial interests. At times, this pursuit of parochial interests can go so far as to occasionally sully their party label. However, in the next chapter, I will show how parties limit the extent to which it is possible to harm general interests by bolstering party seat shares on certain committees through both the normal committee assignment procedure and through the multiple referral procedure. As a result, the power of parochial interests is considerably watered down on the committees that actually review important bills. In a nutshell, legislators are given positions from which they can and do pursue parochial concerns, but the most important policy decisions are likely to be shaped by more general concerns.
Do Committees Matter?

The first question one must confront is whether Taiwanese committees are important enough to merit consideration. Strom (1998) outlines several criteria for committee importance, and we follow his lead so far as his discussion is applicable to the Taiwanese context. There are several features that should encourage legislators to develop specialized expertise and strengthen the power of committees. Taiwanese committees are permanent, standing committees, not ad hoc committees. There are ten standing committees, increased to twelve in 1999, with jurisdictions that mirror ministerial jurisdictions. Each committee has eighteen slots, increased to twenty-one in 1999. Each legislator can serve on only one committee. This institutional setup should sufficiently divide the policy space so as to facilitate specialization.

Taiwanese committees also have a prominent role in the legislative process. They review bills before, not after, the floor considers those bills. Except for the budget, they can rewrite bills without restrictions. They control their own agenda, and they can hold hearings and compel government officials to testify.

While this discussion makes Taiwanese committees look relatively powerful, the leading experts on the Legislative Yuan have generally been hesitant to acknowledge that the committees are significant institutions. Shing-yuan Sheng points out that committees have failed to accumulate the institutional expertise necessary to exercise their potential power. Taiwanese legislators switch committees too often to become policy experts. Reasons for this rampant switching include the lottery system of committee assignments, the lack of a seniority system, and the encouragement of party
leaders to pack whichever committee is especially crucial for that particular legislative session (2000a, see also Hawang 2003a). Moreover, committees are weakened by having three conveners who are replaced every session rather than one permanent chair (Sheng 2000a). In addition, since the committee assignment system has not always assured that the partisan balance in committees will reflect the partisan balance on the floor, it has been necessary for the floor to review all committee decisions and be constantly ready to overturn them. In January 1999, the legislature gave this common practice legal standing by passing a law institutionalizing inter-party negotiations after the committee stage on every bill. Wang argues that this procedure greatly diminishes committee powers, further reducing the incentives for legislators to develop policy expertise (Wang 2003). Hawang argues that committees are often reduced to glorified press conferences. When legislators sense an opportunity to get press coverage, they flock to committee meetings. However, as soon as the cameras are turned off and the notebooks closed, the legislators desert en masse. Attendance at most committee meetings is so poor that it precludes a thorough review of bills (2003a). Finally, committees do not have an absolute veto over bills in their jurisdiction. If the committee moves to slowly or refuses to pass a bill, the chamber can vote to discharge the bill from committee. In fact, the chamber can choose to bypass committees altogether and simply send a bill to the floor for consideration. By my own count, during the Fourth Legislature, 12.9% of all bills that passed the floor were either discharged from committee or bypassed committees altogether.4

4 This does not include bills introduced during earlier terms. During the fourth legislature, the law was changed so that the legislative calendar is wiped clean at the end of each term. However, during the fourth and earlier legislatures, many bills were passed that had been introduced during previous terms.
These scholars are surely correct in pointing to these factors, all of which weaken Taiwanese committees. However, it is a mistake to go one step further and conclude that because of these factors, Taiwanese committees are “dysfunctional” to the point that the Legislative Yuan is unable to compete with the executive branch as a center for decision-making (Sheng 2000a, 391) and, even more bluntly, that “committees are not an important arena for reviewing bills” (Sheng 2000b, 109).

For one thing, these scholars have not paid enough attention to the legislators who, in spite of the committee assignment system, have stayed on the same committee most of the time. From 1993 to 2001, Table 3.1 shows that 55% of all legislators spent at least four of the six sessions of their term on the same committee, and 16% spent all six sessions on the same committee. In the 2002-2004 period, these figure increased to 75% and 41%, respectively. This group of legislators certainly had the potential to develop some policy expertise. Moreover, the fact that the floor could override committee decisions does not mean that it was costless to do so. For example, if Japanese committees delay, the floor can discharge bills, but Cox, Masuyama, and McCubbins (2000) have shown that even this weak delay power is sufficient to extract concessions from the floor. Likewise, there is a significant cost in time and energy to overturning the decisions of Taiwanese committees.

In fact, even Hsing-yuan Sheng, who stakes out the most extreme position, does not really believe that committees are unimportant. For example, she finds that legislators whose aides judge them to place a higher importance on constituency service than on performance within the legislature are much more likely to have spent considerable time on the Finance, Economics, and Transportations Committees (2000a). This implies that
committees have enough power to allow committee members to affect policy outputs.

One last bit of support for the importance of committees comes from Tien Li-hung, a longtime legislative aide. She paints a picture in which committees are a crucial arena:

The main stage in which bills are reviewed occurs in committees. The so-called immediate answers to questions, where the legislative and executive branches face off against each other, is in committees. Item by item review of the budget, in which legislators with an eye for detail prepare magnifying glasses and calculators while other legislators swallow a mouthful of tea and clear their throats to prepare to yell out bids, this is also in the committees. Some legislators can turn the budget review into a press conference for the minister to explain why he is resigning, or things get to the point where both the opposition party legislators and the governing party’s minister end up crying and sniffing together, and this happens in committees as well (2001, 279).

Parochial Interests and Rent-Seeking

All legislators have to consider parochial interests, but different legislators are beholden to different parochial interests. The most effective way of satiating some parochial interests is to throw gobs of money at them; money is less useful in placating other parochial interests.

Different committees in the Taiwanese Legislature offer their members different opportunities to engage in rent seeking. Some committees offer very rich rent-seeking environments while others do not. I find that legislators whose campaign strategies require them to spend more money are much more likely to sit on money committees. That is, these legislators select onto the committees that allow to most effectively cater to their parochial interests.

From 1993 to 2001, the committee assignment procedure was non-partisan, with
legislators self-selecting onto particular committees. Under this institutional setup, it is perhaps not surprising that individual legislators would choose to self-select onto the committees that would allow them to most effectively satisfy their parochial interests. One might legitimately ask if parties were really meshing, allowing their members real but limited power to pursue parochial interests, because the parties did not have any formal power to determine committee assignments. At best, one might argue that the parties did not change the rules and allowed this system of self-selection to continue. However, the rules were changed in the Fifth Legislature (2002-2004) to allow party caucuses to determine committee assignments. In the Fifth Term, we find roughly the same pattern of legislators with money-intensive campaign strategies concentrated on committees with richer rent seeking opportunities. In other words, even when the parties had the option to suppress parochial interests by changing the pattern of committee assignments, several did not do so. Rather, they preferred to mesh with parochial interests by continuing to allow legislators some space within which they could work to satisfy parochial demands.

**Electoral Strategy and Rent Seeking**

How does campaign strategy relate to rent seeking? Legislators with geographically concentrated votes tend to spend more money on their campaigns than their colleagues with more geographically diffuse votes. These same legislators, in turn, should be more active in seeking rents in order to recoup their heavy campaign expenses.

To understand how geographical concentration is related to spending, let us assume that there are two ideal types of candidates. One employs an organizational strategy
while the other adopts an image strategy. An organizational strategy places a premium on having a network of people connecting the candidate and voters. This organization often has a distinct clientelistic nature, with the key cogs in the machine being members of local factions and individual vote brokers. Motivating this network is expensive, all the more so since the vote brokers often cement their relationship with individual voters with a gift of cash ranging anywhere from NT300 to NT3000 (roughly USD10 to USD100). This can add up quickly since the general rule of thumb is that a candidate can only expect to receive 10 or 15 votes for every 100 votes he or she buys (on factional and machine politics, see Liu 1990; Rigger 1994; Kuo 1995; Chen 1995; Huang 1994; Wang 1998). The other strategy, one focusing on image, is much less expensive. While advertising in Taiwan does not come cheaply, a campaign centered on the candidate’s image might spend a tenth or less the money of a traditional organization-based campaign. While the exact figures are unknown, the relative expense of the two types is beyond question.

In reality, there are probably no legislators who are exact analogues to either of these two ideal types. Legislators who rely heavily on mobilizing organizations almost always make some type of broader appeal to voters, and even nationally famous candidates who “parachute” into a strange district can generally cobble together some sort of organization. While actual legislators are distributed on a continuum somewhere between the two ideal types and the correlation between reliance on organization and spending may not be perfect, it is reasonable to assume that there is a statistical relationship in which the more a candidate relies on organization, the more he or she has to spend.
It is usually possible to tell the two types of campaigns apart by examining the distribution of votes. Organizational campaigns produce very high vote shares in some precincts. Where the candidate has a reliable and influential vote broker, he or she can expect to reap a substantial harvest in ballots. Otherwise, the organizational candidate expects close to zero votes. The vote shares of image candidates usually have a much lower variance. Again, however, this is a statistical rather than a causal relationship.

In brief, candidates who rely on organization tend to use more money in their campaigns. Since they need more money to compete successfully, they should place a higher priority on rent-seeking behavior in the legislature. As a result, they should be more eager to get on the committees that present the most rent-seeking opportunities.

Concentration of the Vote

If an organizational candidate has an effective network in a certain precinct, she can expect a windfall of votes in that precinct. If not, she can expect almost no votes. Looking over the entire district, we would expect her votes to be disproportionately concentrated in a small set of precincts. These precincts often are but need not be geographically contiguous. In fact, the most common pattern is for a candidate to do extremely well in the precincts in her hometown, perhaps in one or two neighboring towns, and in a widely scattered set of apparently random precincts (Batto 1999). While other researchers (Ames 1995a, 1995b, 2001, 2002; Ingall and Crisp 2001) looking at the effects of geographically targeted goods in Brazil and Colombia have stressed the importance of geographic contiguity, contiguity is not important to my organization-based theory of vote concentration.
Elsewhere (Batto 2005) I have developed an index measuring the geographic concentration of the vote, and I use that measure here. Briefly, this measure is based on the chi-square statistic, comparing a candidate’s vote in each precinct to his or her district-wide vote share and summing the deviations. This sum is divided by a theoretical maximum to produce a measure of how concentrated the candidate’s vote is, given how concentrated it could theoretically be.

**Committees: 1993-2001**

The Second and Third Legislatures had ten standing committees: Interior, Education, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Economics, Finance, Transportation, Budget, and Organic Laws and Statutes. In the Fourth Legislature, two committees, Science and Technology and Environment, Health, and Social Welfare, were added. Each committee had up to 18 members (increased to 21 in 1998).

Committee memberships were not proportionally distributed to the various political parties\(^5\). Instead, at the beginning of each semiannual legislative session, each legislator signed up for one committee of his or her choice. If 18 (21 after 1998) or fewer legislators signed up for the committee, they all received membership in that committee. If over 18 (21) legislators signed up, they drew lots to see who would be given the slots. The losers then signed up for committees that still had open slots. At the beginning of each session, this process started anew. There was no seniority system; being on the committee in one session did not help a legislator to get on the same committee in the

\(^5\) There was an aborted attempt to distribute seats proportionally to parties in early 1999, but this fell apart when the parties could not find any satisfactory method of distributing their allotments. The old system was reinstated for the second and subsequent sessions of the fourth legislature.
next session\textsuperscript{6}. As a result, a legislator could be on up to six different committees during a single three-year term in the Legislative Yuan. In fact, legislators commonly switched committees from one session to the next. Only 16% of the legislators who served full terms during this period stayed in the same committee all six sessions of any single term.

In this project, I divide the committees into three groups, which I will call money committees, non-money committees, and others. The money committees include the Finance, Economics, and Transportation Committees, and the Budget Committee in sessions in which it reviews the annual budget. These committees each present a disproportionate number of opportunities for legislators to engage in rent seeking. Shiow-duan Hawang looks at how the Finance Committee dealt with a proposed Credit Union Law in 1992-1993. Credit unions were largely unregulated at the time, and played a vital role in local electoral politics, as most local factions secured campaign funds through credit unions (Huang 1994; Liu 1995; Huang and Liu 1995). While the credit unions wanted to be able to issue credit cards, take advantage of business opportunities previously reserved for banks, and expand beyond their tightly defined geographical boundaries, banks opposed these changes, fearing credit unions would encroach on their business. A further matter of dispute was whether credit unions should have to pay the 5% operating tax, from which they had previously been exempted. While the bill was jointly referred to the Finance and Judicial Committees, proceedings

\textsuperscript{6} One senior KMT legislator explained the lack of a seniority system by pointing to the history of the Legislative Yuan. For years, all legislators had the same level of seniority, having all been elected in 1947. As such, seniority could not serve as a basis for giving certain legislators institutional advantages or property rights (Interview March 23, 1998). In early 2002, the DPP installed a limited seniority system, requiring their three floor leaders to be in at least their third term in the legislature.
were dominated by Finance Committee members, especially by the five members with direct connections to credit unions and the three members on the boards of banks. In fact, the only member of the Judicial Committee who participated much at all was also the only Judicial Committee member with a direct connection to a financial institution. Moreover, legislators with connections to credit unions consistently spoke in favor of clauses advantageous to credit unions while legislators with ties to banks opposed them (Hawang 1998, 22-28).

In a case such as the Credit Union Law, it was quite clear how Finance Committee members might extract rent from the system. However, even when there is no obviously pertinent bill under review, committee members have ways of reaping gains. Hawang reports that committee members usually do not take such an active role in reviewing legislation. Rather, if bills proposed by the Ministry of Finance do not directly affect them, committee members are more likely to pass them without intensive review. However, they can extract two types of rent in exchange for this favorable treatment of government legislation. According to Hawang’s interviews with legislators, the first strategy is to obtain inside information about the financial markets from government officials. This information can then be used to buy and sell securities in financial markets. Second, legislators can persuade the government to invest through its publicly owned banks in certain companies or foundations that they have a stake in (Hawang 2000).

Most observers agree that the Finance, Economic, and Transportation Committees present more rent seeking opportunities than average (Hawang 1998). I add the Budget Committee to this list. Members of the Budget Committee have the right to attend and
vote in every budget review session, regardless of the jurisdictional field. This means that Budget Committee members can choose to concentrate on the areas of the budget most likely to yield rent.

This paper will define the money committees to include the Finance, Economics, and Transportation Committees, plus the Budget Committee during those sessions in which the budget is reviewed.

The second group of committees includes what I label the non-money committees. These include the Judicial, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Organic Laws and Statutes Committees. These committees are the least desired by legislators. While other committees typically filled 95% or more of their available slots, only 72% of the slots on the four non-money committees were filled. This reflects the reluctance of individual legislators to join these committees if others have vacancies. Indeed, many of the members of these committees are legislators who signed up for other committees but lost out in the lotteries.

None of these four committees oversees a large part of the budget. In 2000, only the Education Committee oversaw more than 3% of the national budget. Hawang quotes a Judicial Committee staff member, “when they review the budget [in their jurisdiction], they find that every part is necessary, there is no place you can cut the budget. Thus, it is hardly for them to bargain with the governmental departments for special interests and it is almost impossible to get some special favor for their constituents” (Hawang 2000, 14). The Education Committee oversees a larger part of the budget (8.53%) than the Transportation Committee (6.77%) and is not as bereft of rent-seeking opportunities as the other three non-money committees. Indeed, the
Jin-Wen scandal\(^7\) proved that such opportunities do exist. However, not much of the Education Committee’s portion of the budget is discretionary. There are far fewer opportunities for rent seeking than in the money committees, and the ones that do exist are less lucrative. Moreover, there are more ideological conflicts in the Education Committee, with conflicts over national identity being especially intense. In addition, Hawang (2000) suggests that because many members have backgrounds in education, they are primarily concerned with making good public policy.

The final group of committees is a catch-all category including those committees that do not neatly fit into the money or non-money classifications. Two of these committees, the Science and Technology Committee and the Health, Environment, and Social Welfare Committee, are new committees, established only after the expansion of the legislature in 1998. The other two, the Interior and Defense Committees, have existed for the entire period, are fairly high demand committees, and have sizeable budgets. However, they are not usually mentioned as rich sources of rent. In the case of the Defense Committee, many of the committee members have extremely concentrated votes because they are supported by military veterans and their families who tend to live in the same neighborhoods. This is the only group of legislators with concentrated votes who have supporters with clear and distinct ideological preferences (Batto 1999). Their concentrated votes do not come from an expensive organizational campaign, but from ideological appeals to Chinese nationalism (Chen 1994). As such, it would be a mistake to interpret a connection between the spatial distribution of votes and membership on the

\(^7\) In this scandal, several legislators, many of whom served on the Education Committee, lobbied the Ministry of Education on behalf of parties interested in the future of the Jin-Wen Institute of Technology, a school facing financial difficulties. The scandal involved embezzlement, influence-peddling, and connections with organized crime.
Defense Committee in the same way as for other committees. Finally, I include the Budget Committee during the sessions in which the annual budget is not under review. During these periods, the committee sometimes has important tasks, such as reviewing supplemental budgets, which can be quite substantial. However, at other times, the Budget Committee does not have much substantive work on its agenda. In the remainder of the chapter, I will limit my focus to money and non-money committees.

This produces two binary dependent variables. In each session each legislator either did (coded one) sit on a money committee or did not (coded zero) sit on a money committee. Similarly, in each session each legislator either did (coded one) or did not ( coded zero) sit on a non-money committee.

During the period 1993-2001, because of the self-selection committee assignment system, the need for legislators adopting organization-based campaign strategies to recoup their investments, and the differing rent seeking potential of the various committees, we expect legislators with highly concentrated votes to be over-represented on money committees and under-represented on non-money committees.

**H3.1:** During the period 1993-2001, district legislators with highly concentrated votes will be over-represented on money committees.

**H3.2:** During the period 1993-2001, district legislators with highly concentrated votes will be under-represented on non-money committees.

**List Legislators**

The relative weights of the two principals, party and constituents, are very different
for district and list legislators. District legislators need some support from their parties, but they ultimately must appeal to their constituents to provide votes. List legislators, in contrast, are given their seats by the party leadership. Their electoral prospects are not dependent on appeals to parochial interests to anywhere near the same extent as those of district legislators. As a result, they do not need to build up an extensive war chest to provide them with resources so that they will be able to appeal to parochial interests. Their seats are much cheaper than those of their district counterparts. So from one perspective, list legislators have far less incentive to seek rents than district legislators do. In turn, they have far less need to sit on committees rich in rent seeking potential.

From another perspective, parties can make more demands on list legislators than district legislators. Since list legislators owe their seats to the party and the party can impose more costly sanctions on list legislators, list legislators must be much more responsive to the needs of the party rather than to the needs of their constituents. From the party’s point of view, the need to allow district legislators to pursue rent seeking opportunities means that not many district legislators will want to sit on non-money committees. However, the party needs someone to sit on the non-money committees. List legislators, wishing to be good agents for their dominant principal, should fill this need.

On the other hand, we should not take this too far. Most list legislators are on the list because they represent powerful interests within the party who demand that they be on the list. For example, different KMT list legislators can be identified as representatives of the military, various ethnic groups, the financial sector, various local factions, the party chairman, and so on. The party, which has the final say in making up
the list, is the dominant principal for list legislators, but it is not the sole principal.

This leads us to expect that list legislators should be under-represented on money committees and over-represented on non-money committees.

H3.3: During the period 1993-2001, list legislators will be under-represented on money committees.

H3.4: During the period 1993-2001, list legislators will be over-represented on non-money committees.

The 2002 Reforms

At the end of the Fourth Term, the Legislative Yuan passed a new set of rules that would take effect in February 2002 when the Fifth Legislature convened. These new rules allotted substantive committee seats, Procedural Committee seats, and committee convener seats to each party caucus in proportion with its share of seats in the full chamber. Moreover, each party caucus would henceforth determine which of its members occupied each of these positions. The old self-selection and lottery committee assignment system was completely abolished.

One effect of this new system was that legislators tended to sit on the same committee more often. In the old system, legislators might jump from committee to committee, seeking out the committee that had the most promising mix of bills to be reviewed over the next six months. Even legislators who wished to stay on the same committee were often unable to do so because of bad luck in the lotteries. Table 3.1 shows that during the 1993-2001 period, only 16.1% of all legislators spent all six
sessions of their term on the same committee. 45.0% spent no more than three sessions on any single committee. Under the new system, there was much more stability. In the Fifth Term, 40.7% of legislators sat on the same committee in all six sessions, and only 25.2% spent fewer than four sessions on any single committee.

The new rules unquestionably affected the operation of the committee system. However, we are concerned with whether they affected the patterns of meshing of general and parochial interests. Did the parties use their new powers to suppress parochial interests by taking legislators with concentrated votes off of money committees? Did they send their most loyal members, the list legislators, to sit on the committees with the greatest rent seeking potential in order to assure that scandals damaging to the overall party image would be minimized? Or did they continue the previous patterns, acknowledging the benefits of meshing parochial and general interests?

H3.5a: During the period 2002-2004, district legislators with highly concentrated votes will not be over-represented on money committees or under-represented on non-money committees. List legislators will not be under-represented on money committees or over-represented on non-money committees.

H3.5b: During the period 2002-2004, district legislators with highly concentrated votes will be over-represented on money committees and under-represented on non-money committees. List legislators will be under-represented on money committees and over-represented on non-money committees.
Empirical Results

I test the preceding hypotheses in a series of binary logistic regression models. The dependent variables are the two binary variables indicating whether a legislator did or did not sit on a money or non-money committee in each session. For Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, the independent variable of interest is the candidate’s vote concentration. In the test of H3.1, I expect the coefficient for this variable to be positive. In the test of H3.2, I expect it to be negative. For Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4, the independent variable of interest is a dummy variable coded one if the legislator is a list legislator and zero if he or she is a district legislator. For H3.3, I expect the coefficient to be negative. It should be positive for H3.4. Since H3.1-3.4 deal with the period 1993-2001 and H3.5 deals with the same questions during the period 2002-2004, I use interactive models to examine any differences in the two periods. In each model, the variable of interest is interacted with a dummy variable for the Fifth Term. This produces a coefficient for the variable of interest in each period.

In each model, I also include a set of control variables. First, I include dummy variables for each party. Second, as noted above, concentrated votes for military candidates may not mean the same thing as concentrated votes for ordinary organizational candidates. To deal with this, I control for military sponsored candidates. Specifically, I include a dummy variable for all candidates nominated by the Huang Fu-hsing branch of the KMT. Finally, there is some evidence that socio-economic factors affect how likely it is to construct a concentrated vote (Sheng 1998; Batto 1999). I add variables for the percentage of the population in the legislator’s district classified as farmers or fishers and as having no more than a primary education.
I run tests for the first two hypotheses using only district legislators. I could include list legislators and assume that they have vote concentration values of zero, reflecting the fact that they draw their support from the entire electorate. This is not an unreasonable assumption; indeed, I employ it elsewhere. However, it would strengthen my results, and I wish to show that the patterns here are not dependent on that assumption. Likewise, in tests of the second two hypotheses, I omit variables specific to various candidates and districts and districts, including vote concentration, demographics, and military support, because including them would require me to assume that took nationwide average values for all list legislators. Again, this assumption could be defended. However, none of the results presented here change if these variables are included in the model.

For the sake of presentation, I only present the coefficients of the variables of interest in Table 3.2. For those interested, the full models are presented in Appendix 3.A.

The data presented in Table 3.2 offer strong confirmation of Hypotheses 3.1-3.4. During the 1993-2001 era, legislators with concentrated votes were much more likely to sit on money committees and much less likely to sit on non-money committees. Further, list legislators were less likely to win seats on money committees and more likely to win seats on non-money committees.

Moreover, these trends also hold for the two most important subgroups of legislators, members of the Blue Camp and Green Camp. Briefly, before Chen Shui-bian assumed the presidency in May 2000, the KMT and DPP operated as the governing party and main opposition party. After Chen was inaugurated, the KMT expanded its majority coalition
in the Legislative Yuan to include the PFP and the New Party. This coalition became known as the Blue Camp. Meanwhile, the DPP increasingly cooperated with another new political party, the TSU, and they collectively became known as the Green Camp. For the purposes of this exposition, the Blue and Green Camps refer only to the two big parties before May 2000 and to the wider coalitions after May 2000. For more details, see Chapter Four. During the period 1993-2001, H3.1-3.4 all receive strong support for Blue Camp legislators; in each case the coefficient is highly significant and in the correct direction. For Green Camp legislators, three of the four coefficients are as expected. The coefficient for Green Camp legislators on non-money committees is positive as expected, but it does not reach conventional levels of significance.

After the 2002 reforms were implemented, a different picture emerges. If one merely looks at the entire membership of the legislature, it appears that the trends from the earlier period continue. However, if one looks individually at the two camps, one finds that the Blue Camp legislators are driving this trend. All four of the coefficients for Blue Camp legislators are in the expected direction and significant. Blue Camp party leaders continued to assign list legislators to non-money committees and district legislators with highly concentrated votes to money committees. That is, Blue Camp party leaders continued to allow Blue Camp legislators to sit on the committees most advantageous to their re-election campaigns. In the previous era, the legislators had self-selected onto these committees. During the Fifth Term, the party explicitly endorsed this committee assignment strategy.

A very different trend emerges among Green Camp legislators in the Fifth Term. Only one of the four coefficients is significant and in the expected direction.
Green Camp party leaders obtained the power to assign committee seats, they used it to change the pre-existing patterns. They no longer stacked the money committees with legislators who had highly concentrated votes or prevented list legislators from sitting on these committees. While they did over-represent list legislators on non-money committees, the other three coefficients are not significantly different from zero.

Conclusion

The art of meshing requires that the general interests yield somewhat to the demands of parochial interests. For meshing to be effective, some power must be devolved to the parochial interests; general interests cannot always get everything they want. In this chapter, I examine one way in which Taiwanese legislative parties yielded significant power and influence to their members to pursue parochial interests. During the period 1993-2001, under the set of rules that parties allowed to persist, legislators self-selected onto the committees that allowed them to best advance their re-election strategies. Some legislators used expensive organizational networks to make parochial appeals to their voters. To fund these networks, the legislators preferred to sit on committees with richer rent seeking potential. Of course, this rent seeking did not positively influence the overall party image and so general influences would have preferred to minimize it. However, the imperative of meshing with parochial interests outweighed the need to keep the party image spotless.

The rule change in 2002 sheds additional light on the implicit bargain between party leaders and the rank-and-file. In the Blue Camp, party leaders continued to send legislators with the greatest rent seeking needs to the committees with the greatest rent
seeking potential. In Green Camp, party leaders overturned the previous pattern and did not over-represent any subset of legislators on any subset of committees.

We might speculate as to why the two camps pursued such different strategies. First, anecdotal evidence has always indicated that organizational campaigns were more important to Blue legislators than to Green legislators. Perhaps the Blue Camp party leaders judged that the electoral impact of clamping down on rent seeking would be too devastating for them to countenance. Second, perhaps the Green Camp’s newly won control of the executive is key. Since blue legislators would no longer enjoy the assistance of the executive branch, a factor Cox (1996) has identified as crucial in winning SNTV elections, it became even more imperative for their organization-dependent members to amass large war chests in preparation for the difficult re-election challenges they would inevitably face. In other words, 2002 was simply not the right time for them to change strategies. Conversely, Green Camp legislators could now count on assistance from the executive branch to make up for any losses. Moreover, after decades of KMT dominance, the Green Camp was faced with the challenge of proving its ability to govern. The last thing they needed was a rent seeking scandal in the legislature. As a result, Green Camp leaders might have calculated that they could act to protect the general party image without provoking a major backlash from parochial interests. Third, it is possible that all parties continued the implicit bargain allowing room for parochial interests to operate in the later period. We understand how this worked for Blue Camp legislators. It is possible that Green Camp legislators allowed different forms of parochial interests, such as regional, sectoral, or something else, to inform their committee assignment decisions.
At any rate, it is apparent that general interests from all parties ceded quite a bit of power to parochial interests during the 1993-2001 period, and Blue Camp party leaders continued to do so after 2002. Allowing parochial interests some freedom of action is one important component of meshing. However, for meshing to be successful, this freedom of action must be limited. Parochial interests cannot be allowed to get out of hand. In the next chapter, we will investigate how parties kept committees stacked with parochial interests from getting out of hand and doing serious damage to the party’s general interests.

Appendix Three: Full Models for Data Presented in Table 3.2

Appendix Three contains the full models for the data presented in Table 3.2. Please see Tables 3.A.1 through 3.A.4.
Table 3.1: Highest Number of Sessions Spent on any Single Committee for each Legislator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1-3 sessions</th>
<th></th>
<th>4-5 sessions</th>
<th></th>
<th>6 sessions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># legislators</td>
<td>%</td>
<td># legislators</td>
<td>%</td>
<td># legislators</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Term</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Term</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Term</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd-4th Term</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Term</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table excludes all legislators who entered or left the legislature during the middle of the term and so did not have committee assignments in all six sessions.
Table 3.2: Logit Models of Membership on Money and Non-Money Committees

I: Coefficients of vote concentration. DV is membership on money committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993-2001</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>3327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-3.06</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II: Coefficients of vote concentration. DV is membership on non-money committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993-2001</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>sig</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>-11.09</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-7.35</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>3327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>-10.72</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-11.76</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>-11.44</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
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</table>

III: Coefficients of list legislators. DV is membership on money committees.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993-2001</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>-.949</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.692</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>-1.345</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-1.493</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>-.477</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.720</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV: Coefficients of list legislators. DV is membership on non-money committees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993-2001</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>1.387</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table contains only coefficients for the independent variables of interest. Standard errors and significances for the 2002-2005 period were obtained by reversing the coding for the dummy variable for Term Five for the interactive term and rerunning the model. For the full models, see Appendix 3.A.

Notes: Until the 2nd Session of the 4th Term, the Blue Camp includes only KMT members, and the Green Camp contains only DPP members. Starting in the 3rd Session of the 4th Term, the Blue Camp contains KMT, PFP, and New Party members while the Green Camp contains DPP and TSU members. See Chapter 4 for details on these camps.
Table 3.A.1: Logit Model of Vote Concentration and Membership on Money Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Legislators</th>
<th>Blue Camp Only</th>
<th>Green Camp Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>4.270</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>-.265</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>-.947</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>-.826</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>-.324</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Representative</td>
<td>-1.061</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% farmers, fishers in district</td>
<td>.900</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% elementary or lower education in district</td>
<td>2.198</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.216</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3327</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This model includes only district legislators.
Table 3.A.2: Logit Model of Vote Concentration and Membership on Non-Money Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Legislators</th>
<th>Blue Camp Only</th>
<th>Green Camp Only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>-11.091</td>
<td>1.691</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>-.144</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>.392</td>
<td>.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>.506</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Representative</td>
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<td>.225</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% farmers, fishers in district</td>
<td>-1.178</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% elementary or lower education in district</td>
<td>3.023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.315</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3327</td>
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Notes: This model includes only district legislators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Legislators</th>
<th>Blue Camp Only</th>
<th>Green Camp Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B    SE  sig</td>
<td>B    SE  sig</td>
<td>B    SE  sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Legislator</td>
<td>-.949 .100 .000</td>
<td>-1.345 .138 .000</td>
<td>-.477 .156 .002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>-.244 .081 .003</td>
<td>-.187 .113 .099</td>
<td>-.231 .127 .069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Legislator * Term Five</td>
<td>.257 .185 .164</td>
<td>-.147 .291 .612</td>
<td>.401 .262 .126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>-.063 .070 .366</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>-.852 .173 .000</td>
<td>.051 .389 .897</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>-.056 .130 .665</td>
<td>-.093 .139 .502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>-.160 .272 .556</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.233 .276 .420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.289 .048 .000</td>
<td>-.197 .053 .000</td>
<td>-.461 .074 .000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

| N                          | 4576 | 2557 | 1629 |

Notes: This model includes both district and list legislators.
Table 3.A.4: Logit Model of List Legislators and Membership on Non-Money Committees

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Legislators</th>
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<th>Blue Camp Only</th>
<th></th>
<th>Green Camp Only</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>sig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Legislator</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.387</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>-.146</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Legislator * Term Five</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.428</td>
<td>-.329</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
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<td>.146</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.466</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.258</td>
</tr>
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<td>PFP</td>
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<td>.143</td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.610</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.260</td>
<td>.262</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>-1.364</td>
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Notes: This model includes both district and list legislators.
Chapter Four

Stacking Committees and Multiple Referral

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Taiwanese legislative parties have given their members some space to pursue parochial interests through the committee assignment procedure. In this chapter, we will examine how the parties protect their general interests by ensuring that this space does not grow too large. In particular, we will highlight two strategies. First, parties took advantage of self-interested legislators’ desires to be on the same few committees to obtain larger partisan majorities on these committees. With larger majorities, the ability of any individual to blackmail the party or unduly influence the committee’s decision was reduced. Second, parties used multiple referral to stack the committees reviewing bills in their favor. Before May 2000, when the minority DPP took control of the executive branch, most of these actions were directed against the KMT members who were most likely to damage the overall party image by engaging in excessive rent seeking. After May 2000, they were overwhelmingly directed against President Chen’s Green Camp.

The Blue Camp Majority

The Kuomintang (KMT) dominated Taiwan’s political system through the transition to democracy and well into the democratic era. They won a comfortable majority in the elections for the Second Legislature (1993-5), a razor-thin three seat majority for the
Third Term (1996-8), and another comfortable majority in the Fourth Legislature (1999-2001). Nearly midway through the Fourth Term, Taiwanese politics were turned upside down when the leading opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidency. The DPP’s victory both divided and united the KMT. Many members of the KMT bolted the party to form a new party, the People First Party (PFP). While the KMT maintained a majority in the legislature, its numbers were reduced. At the same time, opposition to the new president, Chen Shui-bian, effectively forced all the pro-unification parties into an alliance. Thus, the KMT, PFP, and New Party (NP), which had split away from the KMT in 1993, began to cooperate as one broad camp within the legislature (Wu, Yu-Shan 2002). This development actually increased the size of the majority, since the NP had previously thought of itself as more an opposition party than as part of a broad, KMT-dominated coalition. The Blue Camp, as this new coalition came to be known, continued to control a majority in the Fifth Term (2002-4). Together, the three parties won 115 of the 225 seats. The Green Camp, which included the DPP and the new Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), controlled the presidency, but it was a minority in the legislature.

In this chapter, when I speak of the majority party or majority coalition, I am referring to the KMT prior to President Chen’s inauguration on May 20, 2000 and the Blue Camp (KMT, PFP, and NP) after that date.

A Political Earthquake: Chen Assumes the Presidency

A key assumption of this chapter is that legislative politics changed dramatically when Chen assumed the presidency. Before that date, the KMT dominated most facets
of government. It controlled the cabinet, it led the bureaucracy, it appointed the judges, it had extensive ties with the military, it maintained a huge party apparatus, it had a close relationship with the media, and it held the most important bully pulpit, the presidency.

The legislature was an important, but complementary, piece in the KMT’s political machine. It was much more likely to make minor adjustments to government policy than to determine the fundamental thrust of those policies. When Chen won the presidency, all of this changed. The DPP seized control of the cabinet, directed the bureaucracy to pursue its goals, and wielded the power of appointments. Suddenly, the legislature, in which the Blue Camp still held a sizeable majority, became the last redoubt of Blue Camp power.

This bitter partisan divide shaped political struggles from nearly the first days of the new Chen administration (Wu, Yu-shan 2001, 2002; Wu Jaushieh Joseph 2002; Rigger 2002). Almost immediately, the Blue Camp picked fights over the Labor Standards Law and the administration’s clumsy response to the Pachang Creek tragedy. For months, the Blue Camp insisted that, since they held a majority in the legislature, the president should appoint a Blue Camp member as premier. When President Chen instead appointed a DPP stalwart, Chang Chun-hsiung, to the premiership in October 2000, the Blue Camp declared that he was persona non grata in the legislature. Premier Chang turned up the heat by immediately halting construction on a nuclear power plant project that the KMT was strongly committed to and the legislature had already budgeted funds

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8 In July 2000, four construction workers were caught in the river bed of the Pachang Creek when it suddenly flooded. The country watched in horror on live television as the workers struggled for several hours to resist the current. Several emergency rescue attempts were botched, and the workers were eventually swept away. The public was further angered by the national government’s attempts to dodge responsibility.
for. Since the constitutional mechanisms for resolving this legislative-executive conflict were inadequate, a great struggle ensued to determine which branch would prevail. The Blue Camp went so far as to launch a recall petition to remove Chen Shui-bian from office. In February 2001, the executive finally capitulated, agreeing to resume construction on the nuclear power plant. However, the Blue Camp continued to obstruct the executive’s political agenda. In fact, in the December 2001 legislative elections, President Chen’s constant message to voters was to give his party more support to overcome Blue Camp obstructionism.

From this very brief sketch, it should be apparent that May 2000 marked an important watershed in Taiwanese politics. Before that date, the KMT dominated the scene and had to worry primarily about maintaining intra-party unity. Afterwards, inter-party struggles dominated Taiwanese politics.

The Blue Camp’s Problem

The Blue Camp faced two problems in assuring that they did not lose control of committee hearings. First, they had to worry about internal challenges. As we have seen in the previous chapter, certain types of Blue Camp legislators were concentrated on certain committees. Image-oriented district legislators and list legislators dominated the non-money committees, such as Organic Statutes, Judicial Affairs, Education, and Foreign Affairs. Much more problematically, organization-oriented district legislators dominated the money committees, including Economics, Finance, Transportation, and Budget. Organization-oriented legislators, who we have identified by their geographically concentrated votes, needed to sit on these committees rich with rent
seeking potential in order recoup enough money to pay off the last campaign’s expenses or to prepare for the next costly campaign. From the party’s point of view, it was acceptable to permit these organization-oriented legislators to engage in enough rent seeking to protect their seats, but it was not acceptable to allow this rent seeking to spiral out of control and endanger the entire party’s public image. This problem dominated the KMT’s consideration during the period before May 2000, when their biggest challenge was how to protect the general party interests against blackmail from internal factions.

Second, the Blue Camp had to worry about external challenges from other parties. The haphazard committee assignment procedure used prior to 2002 was well-suited to the authoritarian era. Partisanship was irrelevant since almost everyone was a KMT member. Legislators could serve in the areas that they felt were the best for them, and, since membership was completely reshuffled every six months, losers could always wait until next time. In a partisan environment, however, this system posed challenges to the majority party. Legislators overwhelmingly signed up for the plum committees. Sometimes the lotteries were kind to the majority, granting seats to just the right number of majority members. However, the lotteries were often too stingy or too generous for majority party interests. If the majority party won too few seats, it lost control of the committee. If it won too many, nearly all of its members might be concentrated on a few committees and the majority party might lose control of some of the less popular committees.

In fact, the majority party often did lose control of committees. During the both the Second and Fourth Terms, the majority held about 60% of the seats. If we consider
each committee in each session an independent case, even with these broad floor majorities, the Blue Camp could not control a majority of seats 21 of 132 times. During the Third Term, with a razor thin floor majority, the KMT could manage majorities in less than half the committees, only 28 of 60 (see Table 4.1).

The rules were changed in 2002 so that committee slots were apportioned based on how many seats each party held in the full chamber. In effect, this meant that the Blue Camp was given eleven seats on each committee to allocate as it liked while the Green Camp had only ten seats. This rule change mitigated but did not completely solve the problem of majority party control. Since the Blue Camp had only 115 members but 132 slots to fill, it could not always ensure that it would hold a majority. For example, in the third session, the Blue Camp only filled seven of its slots on the Education Committee while the Green Camp filled all ten of its available slots. However, if we compare the Third and Fifth Legislatures, it is apparent that the new system worked better for the majority party. With an even narrower floor majority than in the Third Term, the Blue Camp held a clear majority on forty of the seventy-two committees.

While the Blue Camp faced the problem of losing its majority on selected committees throughout the democratic era, we would expect that they took the problem much more seriously after Chen Shui-bian assumed the presidency and partisan warfare intensified in May 2000.

**Strategies for Majority Party Control of Committees**

In his study of partisan balance in committees in the US House of Representatives, Philip Kloha (2004) lays out three strategies by which majority parties assure that they
can control committee outcomes: loyalty, size, and stacking. First, the majority reserves for its own members a proportion of the committee seats equal to its proportion of seats in the whole chamber. To the extent that it can rely on loyalty from its own members, the party should be able to dominate committee proceedings. There are two variants of the loyalty strategy. In the first, the party simply puts its people in place, lets them pursue their sincere preferences, and expects to win more often than not because its members share common preferences. In the second variant, the party acts to increase party discipline. If, on any given choice, a legislator has a certain probability $p$ of voting with the party, the party might, through various incentives, try to increase that probability to $p+e$, $e>0$. By increasing party loyalty from its own members, the party expects to win more frequently.

This project provides numerous hints that Taiwanese parties have been attempting to use the loyalty strategy, especially the second variant. Most of the rules changes during this period have empowered parties, giving them more carrots and sticks with which to augment party discipline. For example, parties won the right to call for roll-call votes, assign committee and convener seats, and review all committee decisions before the floor stage. Moreover, in Chapter Five, we will find that party cohesion in roll-call voting has been steadily increasing over the democratic era. As such, it would not be surprising if parties have also attempted to use the loyalty strategy to obtain better committee results. However, I do not have any systematic evidence to present at this stage.

Sometimes party members are unreliable. When the majority is slim and the committee is small, the defection of a single member can cause defeat. To deal with this prospect, American parties employ the second stratagem: increasing the size of the
Kloha shows that, for example, the majority should suffer fewer defeats in an eighteen-member committee with a ten to eight majority than in a nine-member committee with a five to four majority.

The size of substantive committees has been fixed at eighteen in the Second and Third Terms and twenty-one in the Fourth and Fifth Terms. There is one tantalizing exception: the Procedural Committee has always been bigger than substantive committee. Prior to the Fourth Term, the Procedural Committee had twenty members. Since the Fourth Term, it has had thirty-six members. As a control committee, the Procedural Committee would be the logical place to find any of these strategies. It also is possible that parties used the multiple referral system to gain the advantages of size, but I have not found any convincing evidence of this.

Parties can also employ the third classic strategy: stacking the committee with extra majority members beyond what their floor representation would entitle them to. In the US House, the control committees are commonly stacked (Cox and McCubbins 1993), and stacking is more prone to occur when majorities are small and when the committees are small.

I argue that stacking has been the most important component of Blue Camp efforts to maintain control of committees. The Blue Camp has stacked the committees in its favor in two distinct ways. First, prior to May 2000, the KMT used the self-selection committee assignment mechanism to let its rent-seeking members control themselves. The KMT seat share was disproportionately high on the committees popular with KMT members with highly concentrated votes. That is, the KMT members who were most likely to try to hold out against the party’s policy in order to blackmail their party for
rents were usually sitting on committees with larger KMT majorities, thus limiting their ability to successfully extract rents. Second, the Blue Camp used the system of multiple referral to ensure control. Prior to May 2000, multiple referral was used primarily against rent-seeking KMT members. After May 2000, it was used primarily against other parties. The remainder of this chapter delves into these two types of stacking in greater depth.

**Letting the Blackmailers Hang Themselves**

In the previous chapter, we learned that the legislators who were most likely to try to extract rents, those with highly concentrated votes, sat disproportionately on the committees that provided the most fertile rent seeking environment. If the KMT delegations on the Finance, Economics, Transportation, and Budget Committees were composed entirely of legislators seeking to blackmail the party at every opportunity and extract the maximum rents possible, the KMT might be faced with a severe problem. In this nightmare scenario, parochial interests would run wild wreaking untold damage to the party’s general interests.

A single legislator has maximum bargaining power and can extract the most rent when his defection is sufficient to allow the other side to win. If two defections are necessary, there are many more problems (Groseclose and Snyder 1996). There might not be two legislators who wish to defect. If there are two potential defectors, they may face large transaction costs in finding each other, determining how much rent to extract, and how to divide the spoils. The more defections are necessary, the less bargaining power the potential defectors have. Returning to Taiwanese committees, the larger the
KMT majority, the less power any KMT member has to blackmail his party, and the more easily rent seeking behavior can be controlled.

In fact, the problem was not as severe as it might have been for the KMT because the KMT tended to have a higher share of seats on the committees with the KMT members most prone to seek excessive rents. A simple regression model shows this pattern. In the regression shown in Table 4.2, the dependent variable is difference between the percentage of seats on a committee held by the Blue Camp and the percentage of seats held by the Blue Camp in the full chamber. The independent variable of interest is the average vote concentration for the Blue Camp legislators. This variable is obtained by taking the average of the Blue Camp legislators on the committee, as defined earlier. List legislators are assumed to have a concentration value of zero, reflecting their dependence on votes from the party’s supporters in the entire electorate rather than any from any specific locale.

I divide the data into five periods, demarking new terms and our periods of interest. We are interested in the correlation between vote concentration and seat share in three distinct periods: before Chen’s election in May 2000, between Chen’s election and the rule change in February 2002, and after the rule change. To this end, dummy variables for the Second, Third, and Fifth Terms as well as the Fourth Term both before and after Chen’s election are included.

The two dummies representing the latter two periods of interest (the Fourth Term after

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9 I could use the more intuitive variable used in Table 4.4, percentage of seats held by Blue Camp members with high vote concentration. However, I fear that since the dependent variable also measures seat share, some might object that the two variables are positively correlated because more seats means more seats, not because of the theoretical reasons provided. In fact, both operationalizations produce the same general trends.

10 One might object that a value of zero is unreasonable since, as pointed out in the previous chapter, list legislators do, in fact, worry about particular interests. However, they almost certainly do so to a lesser extent than district legislators. In this sense, zero should be understood as a value lower than that for any district legislator rather than any indication of absolute dependence on the party.
Chen’s election and the Fifth Term) are interacted with the average vote concentration of Blue Camp legislators on the committee to produce separate coefficients for each era. For ease of presentation, I run this model without a constant rather than omitting one of the time periods. As Table 4.2 shows, prior to May 2000, the coefficient for average vote concentration is positive and significant. During this period, a higher average vote concentration among KMT members on a particular committee generally went hand in hand with larger KMT majorities on that committee. To put it another way, the committees that featured KMT members who might be most likely to blackmail the party in order to seek rent were limited in their ability to extract rent because those KMT members had less bargaining power due to the KMT’s larger majorities.

There are two ways in which this result might have come about. First, the KMT might have actively tried to achieve it. The KMT might have identified potential problem committees and encouraged more of its members to obtain seats on them. There are two main problems with this. First, the committee assignment procedure was non-partisan and self-selecting prior to 2002, so the KMT had no way of ordering its members to select particular committees. Moreover, supposing that it was able to steer members to particular committees, the legislators most vulnerable to party pressure were list legislators. However, since list legislators are considered to have a vote concentration of zero, they would lower the committee’s average vote concentration and weaken the finding. At any rate, we have seen in Chapter Three that list legislators generally did not sit on money committees. Second, the lottery provision made it impossible for KMT to ensure that, even if they did steer members to particular committees, they would actually obtain those seats.
The second possibility, that the KMT passively watched its potential rent seeking members fall victim to a collective action problem, is more likely. While the potential rent seekers would likely have been able to extract more rent in the aggregate had they been able to create only narrow KMT majorities on money committees, each individual was better off being on a money committee than not on one. Since they all made individual decisions about which committee to sign up for, the great majority of potential rent seekers signed up for one of the money committees. This meant there were a large number of KMT members chasing a small number of seats. Inevitably, some lost out in the lotteries, but the properties of random numbers meant that the large numbers of KMT members signed up for these valuable committee seats eventually translated into committees stacked with large KMT majorities. One important purpose of a political party is to solve collective action problems for its members (Aldrich 1995), but in this case, the collective action problem worked to the benefit of the party as a whole. Since the party, the actor most equipped to solve the problem, chose not to act, the problem remained unsolved. In essence, the KMT looked on contentedly while the potential rent seekers handcuffed themselves.

After May 2000, we expect partisan considerations to replace regulation of internal factions as the Blue Camp’s priority. We might expect that the Blue Camp would try to coordinate its members such that each committee had a solid Blue Camp majority, even if this meant giving a little more bargaining power to its internal factions. However, between May 2000 and February 2002, the period with a hostile executive branch but still under the old set of rules, the relationship between vote concentration and Blue Camp seat share barely changed. The coefficient for vote concentration is still positive and
nearly as large in the second period as in the first, though it is no longer clearly
significantly different from zero. The standard error is much larger, but that is hardly
surprising in light of the much smaller number of cases falling in this period. We can
reasonably interpret this result as indicating that the previous trend continued to hold.

There are two competing possibilities for why the relationship did not change
immediately after May 2000. First, the Blue Camp enjoyed a comfortable majority in
the chamber, and, as Table 4.1 shows, this translated into outright majorities on 90% of
the standing committees during the Fourth Term. Perhaps the Blue Camp had a large
enough margin that they felt they could pursue secondary goals, such as regulating
internal factions, without sacrificing their primary partisan goals. Alternatively, the
rules had not yet been changed. The Blue Camp had no formal mechanism to steer
members toward certain committees, and so the collective action problem remained.
Without a new institution, there was no way to overcome individual incentives for
legislators to self-select onto the few, most desirable committees. From this perspective,
the collective action problem hurt the party, preventing it from turning its floor majority
into committee majorities on nearly 10% of the committees.

In the Fifth Term, everything changed: the Blue Camp had only a narrow majority,
the rules were changed, and the relationship between vote concentration and seat share
became insignificant. This third period makes perfect sense in light of our theory. The
Blue Camp, needing to pursue its partisan goals, changed the rules to solve the collective
action problem and ensure Blue Camp control of as many committees as possible. With
a razor-thin majority, it had little space for consideration of secondary goals such as
regulation of internal factions.
The Multiple Referral Process

In addition to passively letting its own members stack committees in its favor, the Blue Camp strategically used multiple referral to assure itself control of the committee stage. In this section, I will describe the multiple referral procedure used in Taiwan with a particular focus on the role played by the Procedural Committee.

When a bill is submitted to the legislature, the Procedural Committee determines which committee should hear the bill. If the Procedural Committee determines that two or more committees have jurisdiction over the bill, it can multiply refer the bill to all of them. One committee is designated as the lead committee. The conveners of the lead committee are responsible for scheduling the hearing and chairing the meeting. However, the committee that meets to hear the bill is a joint committee consisting of all the members of all the individual committees that the bill is multiply referred to. All committee members, regardless of whether they belong to the lead committee or to a secondary committee, have equal voting rights. For example, the hearing for a bill referred to the Interior, Defense, and Organic Statutes Committees would be scheduled and chaired by a convener of the Interior Committee, but all sixty-three members of the three committees would have equal voting rights.

One basic assumption is that the Procedural Committee acts as an agent of the majority party. While proceedings of the Procedural Committee meetings are not

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11 The floor could theoretically change this decision and assign the bill to a different committee or committees. In practice, changes are exceedingly rare. The floor almost always accepts the Procedural Committee’s recommendation as a matter of course.
12 This form of multiple referral is somewhat different from the forms commonly practiced in the United States. “There are three types of multiple referral: joint referral of a bill concurrently to two or more committees; sequential referral successively to one committee, then a second, and so on; and split referral of various parts of a bill to different committees for consideration of each part” (Oleszek 1996, 101).
published, there is anecdotal evidence that it is a highly partisan body. Academic literature on this topic is far more rare. The only paper to address the Procedural Committee to date is Hawang’s (2003b) study of media reporting on the Procedural Committee which provides systematic evidence that newspapers are more likely to mention the Procedural Committee when the party controlling the Procedural Committee is different from the party controlling either the floor or the executive. That is, the Procedural Committee becomes a more important and controversial body when partisan decisions are required.

This assumption may strike some as extremely problematic since the Blue Camp has not always controlled a majority on the Procedural Committee. Prior to 2002, the Procedural Committee was elected from the substantive committees, with each committee electing two or three members by SNTV.\textsuperscript{13} As with SNTV in general elections, this system has produced a partisan balance that is roughly, but not perfectly, in line with the floor balance. In the Second through Fifth Terms, the Blue Camp has held 58.3\%, 54.2\%, 58.6\%, and 53.2\% of the Procedural Committee seats, respectively. In the Second and Fourth Terms, this was almost exactly the same proportion as the Blue Camp held in the full chamber. In the Third and Fifth terms, their seat shares on the Procedural Committee were slightly higher than their seat shares in the full chamber, but this difference is not statistically significant. Usually, one can find several of the parties’ floor leaders on the Procedural Committee, though neither the Speaker nor the Vice-Speaker has ever served on it. While the partisan balance is generally close to that

\textsuperscript{13} One reason I am hesitant to make too much of the partisan balance of the Procedural Committee is that the membership records are not as well kept as for other committees. There are significant discrepancies in the rosters listed on the websites of the Legislative Yuan (www.ly.gov.tw) and the National Parliamentary Library of the Legislative Yuan (www.npl.ly.gov.tw).
of the floor, there is no guarantee the majority party will win a majority on the Procedural Committee. Indeed, they failed to procure an absolute majority of the seats five times. The KMT held exactly half of the seats in Session Two of Term Two and in the first three sessions of Term Three. In addition, it held only nine of twenty seats in Session Six of Term Two. In addition, since there is no proxy voting or block voting by party, the Blue Camp could also temporarily lose control of the Procedural Committee if it failed to mobilize all of its members to attend meetings. Indeed, we see an example of this in Chapter Seven.

Yet I believe that the Procedural Committee generally took actions in line with Blue Camp goals for several reasons. First, when the KMT failed to win an outright majority on the procedural committee, no standing coalition was formed between parties. Rather, party leaders insisted that they would cooperate on a bill-by-bill basis. The KMT would have been included in many, probably most, of these coalitions. Indeed, with exactly half the seats in four of the five sessions in question, it had the power to block any decisions it did not approve of. Second, if the Procedural Committee had taken actions that severely damaged the KMT, the KMT could have used its majority on the floor to overturn these decisions. Admittedly, this was more plausible in when the KMT had a comfortable majority in the Second Term than when it had a tiny and unreliable majority in the Third Term. Third, Hawang argues that the conflicts in the Procedural Committee were qualitatively different in the Third and Fourth Terms. In the Third Term, opposition majorities used the Procedural Committee for position-taking purposes. The most severe fights were over whether Vice President Lien should be allowed to concurrently serve as Premier, when and how Lien should report to the legislature, and
funding for the controversial Fourth Nuclear Power Plant project. They did not generally use the Procedural Committee to advance a broad legislative agenda. In contrast, in the Fourth Term, the Blue Camp used its control of the Procedural Committee to block most of President Chen’s legislative agenda (Hawang 2003b). Finally, we have no reason to believe that the DPP and New Party opposed the KMT’s goal of reining in rent seeking. Those two parties had no reason to help KMT members accrue resources that might make them more formidable campaigners in the next election cycle. In short, even though the KMT lost absolute control of the Procedural Committee at times, we have some reason to believe that the Procedural Committee was usually making decisions in line with KMT goals.

We assume that the Procedural Committee does not have much flexibility in determining the lead committee. That is, a bill dealing with education reform pretty much has to go to the Education Committee as the lead committee. However, we assume that the Procedural committee has more flexibility in deciding whether to refer bills to multiple committees. For example, if the bill also affects local governments or government organization, the Procedural Committee can often make defensible arguments either that the Interior and Organic Statutes Committees should also hear the bill or that the bill deals primarily with education and so the Education Committee should have exclusive jurisdiction. In some cases, the Procedural Committee’s hands are tied by precedent. For example, almost all bills dealing with the Income Tax Law were referred exclusively to the Finance Committee. However, not every bill has a recent precedent, and one also finds examples in which precedent was not respected. We assume that, at least sometimes, partisan strategies enter into the Procedural Committee’s
decisions to or not to multiply refer a bill.

**Multiple Referral and Stacking**

When Kloha refers to stacking in the US House of Representatives, he means that the majority party gives its members extra seats beyond those which its floor majority would entitle it. For example, a party with 55% of seats on the floor might expect to hold five seats on a nine member committee. However, the majority party can stack the committee either by stealing one of the minority party’s seats, giving it a six to three advantage, or by adding a tenth seat, giving it a six to four advantage. Either way, the party’s seat share in the committee exceeds its seat share on the floor.

Stacking through multiple referral works somewhat differently. The basic idea is that the majority party looks for instances in which the majority party has too few members on the lead committee and then adds committees with larger delegations of majority party members. This is done on a case-by-case basis, so that the overall effect should be to increase the majority party’s share of seats on full reviewing committees as compared to lead committees, and, much more importantly, to increase the proportion of reviewing committees on which the majority party controls a majority.

If we consider the set of all government bills, Table 4.3 shows that, of the 1111 government bills that were multiply referred, the blue camp’s share of seats increased slightly from 54.1% on the lead committees to 54.7% on the full committees. More importantly, while the Blue Camp only held majorities on 57.0% of the lead committees, this percentage increased to 63.9% on full committees.

To look at this more carefully, we examine whether multiple referral is more
common when the Blue Camp holds relatively few seats on the lead committee.

H4.1: (Stacking for Partisan Advantage): Multiple referral should be more common when the majority party holds a smaller share of seats on the lead committee.

Moreover, stacking can be externally directed, or it can be internally directed. It might be a strategy aimed at stripping opposition parties of their committee majorities, or it might be a strategy aimed at ensuring that potentially disloyal members of the majority party do not have as much leverage to blackmail their own party. If stacking is primarily intended to control internal party factions, we should be able to find evidence of this.

H4.2: (Stacking to Regulate Rent Seeking): Multiple referral should be more common when the majority party members on the lead committee are more likely to engage in rent seeking.

In fact, we have reason to expect that both types of stacking are important. Prior to May 2000, we expect stacking to be primarily internally directed. After that, it should be more externally directed.

H4.3: (Timing): Stacking to regulate rent seeking should be more common before May 2000. Stacking for partisan advantage should be more common after May 2000.
I use two logistic regression models to examine these hypotheses.\textsuperscript{14} I examine the set of all government bills introduced during the 1993-2004 period. 2240 bills were introduced; of these 158 were never assigned to committees. The remaining 2082 bills form our set of data. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the bill was multiply referred and 0 if it was only referred to a single committee. There are two independent variables of interest. In the first model, it is the Blue Camp’s extra margin of seats on the lead committee. This variable is defined as the Blue Camp’s share of seats on the lead committee minus the Blue Camp’s share of seats on the floor. If stacking for partisan advantage predominates, the coefficient for this variable should be negative. In the second model, the independent variable of interest is the percentage of seats held by Blue Camp legislators on the lead committee who have highly concentrated votes.\textsuperscript{15} I considered all district legislators whose vote concentration value was above average to be highly concentrated. All list legislators are considered to have low concentration. Altogether, 946 (36.3\%) of 2609 Blue Camp legislators were classified as highly concentrated. If stacking to regulate rent seeking predominates, the coefficient of highly concentrated Blue Camp legislators’ seat share should be positive. As with the previous section, we examine these relationships both before and after May 2000. Again, I include a dummy variable for the period of Chen’s presidency and interact this dummy with the two independent variables of interest.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} I use two separate models instead of putting all the variables into one model because my theory is about rent seeking legislators, not about rent seeking legislators after controlling for Blue Camp seat share. However, if all the variable are put into one model, none of the results are different.

\textsuperscript{15} I could operationalize this variable using the average vote concentration variable from Table 4.4. The results are substantively identical. I prefer the present variable because percentage of seats held by people likely to engage in rent seeking seems more intuitive.

\textsuperscript{16} One could argue that the period after Chen’s election should be subdivided into periods before and after the rule change, as in the previous section. However, there is no significant different in the independent
The models also include two types of control variables. Since bills assigned to different lead committees have different propensities to be multiply referred, I include dummy variables for each committee. Organic Statutes, the most common lead committee, is the omitted category. Similarly, there were differences in the likelihood of multiply referring a bill in different periods of the democratic era, and these differences may not all have been due to the factors suggested here. To control for this, I include dummy variables for each legislative term. Again, I run this model without a constant.

In the period prior to May 2000, we find that the coefficient for Blue Camp extra seat share margin is positive and significant (Table 4.4). This is exactly the opposite of what we expected: the Blue Camp was more likely to multiply refer a bill when the Blue Camp’s seat share on the lead committee was large, not small. Clearly, they were not using multiple referral for partisan advantage. A glance at the other model suffices to explain their strategy. The coefficient for seat share of legislators with high vote concentration is positive and significant during this period. Bills were more likely to be multiply referred when the committee was full of KMT members interested in seeking rents. We expected that the Blue Camp’s primary consideration during this period of unified government would be regulating its internal factions, and this is exactly the picture that the data paint. Partisan considerations were pushed aside in order to dilute rent seekers’ bargaining power.

After May 2000, the picture immediately changes. The coefficient for Blue Camp variables of interest between these two periods. Likewise, there is no significant different in the independent variables if the period of unified government is divided into periods in which the Blue Camp did and did not control the Procedural Committee. This latter finding should provide some support for the assumption that the Procedural Committee was acting as an agent of the Blue Camp even when the Blue Camp did not have an absolute majority of committee members.
extra seat share margin becomes negative and significant, while the coefficient for seat share of highly concentrated legislators is not significantly different from zero. Here, partisan considerations dominated. When the Blue Camp had smaller delegations on lead committees, they multiply referred bills to several committees in order to increase their seat share. Regulation of internal factions ceased to a driving concern; propensity to seek rents was unrelated to multiple referral.

The Impact of Stacking on Minority Parties

I have argued that, after May 2000, the Blue Camp stacked committees to ensure a favorable partisan balance against other parties. A skeptic might be justified in asking just how effective this strategy was. If we look at the Fifth Term, which falls entirely within the post-May 2000 period, there is ample reason to doubt. Even after all the stacking, the Blue Camp, which always had a floor majority, managed to control majorities in only 36.9% of the 241 full committees reviewing multiply referred government bills (Table 4.5). Is this an example of majority party control?

In fact, things were not so bad for the Blue Camp. In many cases, the Blue Camp could forge a working majority even when they were formally a minority by bringing one or two independent legislators into their coalition. For various reasons, the dozen or so independent legislators holding seats in the Fifth Term generally preferred to cooperate with the Blue Camp rather than with the Green Camp. In this project, I have concentrated on the majority party because that is where the political science literature instructs us to focus. However, in this case, we might get a more vivid impression of the effects of stacking by looking at the effects of multiple referral on the fortunes of the
Green Camp.

If we focus on the rows for the Fifth Term in Table 4.6, we find dramatic evidence that the Blue Camp’s stacking strategy was devastating to the Green Camp. Of the 681 government bills sent to committees in the Fifth Term, only 241 were multiply referred. Of these, the Green Camp had a majority on 130 (53.9%) of the lead committees. In contrast, the Green Camp had a majority on only 12.7% of the bills not multiply referred. It appears that the dominant factor in the Procedural Committee’s decision of whether or not to multiply refer a bill was whether the green camp had a majority. Moreover, when the Procedural Committee did choose to multiply refer a bill, it almost always stripped the Green Camp’s majority away. While the Green Camp had majorities on 53.9% of lead committees, it maintained this majority on only 7.9% of the full committees. During the Fifth Term, the Blue Camp consistently and successfully stacked committees to ensure that the Green Camp would not have a majority.

Conclusion

The art of meshing general and parochial interests involves two contradictory steps. First, general interests must accept that they will not win everything that they want. Parochial interests have to be allowed some power to pursue and attain some of their goals. In the previous chapter, we saw that parties countenanced a committee assignment system that put members highly likely to engage in rent seeking activities on committees richest in rent seeking opportunities. This was potentially highly beneficial.

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17 In previous tables, I define a majority as strictly greater than 50%. In Table 5, I define a majority as greater than or equal to 50% because this definition illustrates the point more starkly. In fact, the great majority of Green Camp “majorities” are cases in which the Green Camp holds exactly half the seats.
to the individual members and the parochial interests that they represented.

Simultaneously, it was potentially highly damaging to the general interests represented by the political parties. Second, in order to keep the losses incurred by parochial interests under control, general interests have to find some way to limit the extent to which parochial interests can pursue and attain their goals. Meshing is not simply a nicer sounding way of describing divide-the-dollar games or pure pork-barrel politics. In this chapter, we have seen how parties have used the same committee assignment system that allows space for parochial influence to limit the extent of that influence. In addition, we have seen how parties have used the multiple referral procedure to systematically stack committees with larger and more reliable majorities.

During the period prior to May 2000, the KMT enjoyed unified control of the government. The greatest threats to KMT power came from within the party. Since meshing is, in the end, a way of keeping a party relatively unified, it is not surprising that we see meshing in its purest form during this period. The KMT’s focus was on ensuring that its members did not seek excessive rents. We have identified vote concentration as a proxy for propensity to seek rents, and KMT actions during this period were intended to keep legislators with highly concentrated votes under control. The KMT declined to solve their collective action problem in committee assignments, assuring that the party would be overrepresented on committees popular with legislators with highly concentrated votes. Further, it selectively used multiple referral to ensure that bills to be sent to committees dominated by legislators with highly concentrated votes would be somewhat protected by adding more legislators from other committees.

In May 2000, the KMT lost control of the executive branch. This dramatically
transformed politics in Taiwan. The Blue Camp’s primary challenge was no longer simply maintaining internal harmony. Rather, they faced a real possibility that the Green Camp would use its control of the executive branch to dominate politics. As such, the Blue Camp tried to use its majority in the legislature to defend its partisan goals. We have seen that the Blue Camp stopped using multiple referral to regulate its own members and began using it to strip away Green Camp committee majorities.

This does not mean that meshing general and parochial interests ceased to be important to the Blue Camp when they lost the presidency. There is still evidence of meshing, even with the strong incentives to put partisan considerations above all else. In the previous chapter, we saw that the Blue Camp continued to put legislators with highly concentrated votes on money committees, even after the rules were changed in 2002. In this chapter, we found that the trend of Blue Camp overrepresentation on committees with higher average vote concentration was weaker after 2002, but it was still marginally significant. More importantly, the change in the rules in 2002 allowed the Blue Camp to increase control over its members. Whereas in the past, legislators did not owe their committee seats to anyone but themselves (and sometimes to their good luck in lotteries), after 2002 parties doled out committee seats. Excessive rent seeking could now be punished by stripping away that seat and putting the offending legislator on a less desirable committee. Finally, it might also be the case that divided government allowed the Blue Camp to be less vigilant in protecting against excessive rent seeking. Divided government brings divided political responsibility, and it is reasonable to expect that the negative consequences of some rent seeking might be blamed on the DPP executive branch. For example, targeted spending for popular parochial interests such
as stipends for retired farmers, new roads, or better health care benefits might bust the budget, but that is generally considered the executive’s, not the legislature’s, responsibility. In these cases, the Blue Camp might be happy to let its members go wild seeking reeking rents at the Green Camp’s expense. Meshing after May 2000 was clearly much more complex, but the patterns found here are consistent with the idea that the Blue Camp continued to give some, but not too much, space to its members to pursue parochial interests.
Table 4.1: Partisan Balance of Individual Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>% committee seats held by blue legislators</th>
<th>St. dev. of % committee seats held by blue legislators</th>
<th>Committees with a blue majority / total</th>
<th>% committees with a blue majority</th>
<th>% chamber seats held by blue legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>46 / 60</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>28 / 60</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>65 / 72</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>54.7 / 62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>40 / 72</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>179 / 264</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The blue camp is considered to have a majority if its seat share is strictly greater than 50%. The percentage of committee seats held by blue legislators is different from the percentage of chamber seats held by blue legislators at the beginning of the term because some legislators did not serve a full term and others switched party affiliations. Each committee in each session is considered to be an independent case. For example, in Term Two, there were ten committees in six sessions for a total sixty cases. Percentages of chamber seats are calculated at the beginning of the term; these figures changed somewhat over the course of the term due to party switching, resignations, and deaths. The two figures for Term Four are the KMT’s seat share at the beginning of the term and the wider Blue Camp coalition seat share upon the establishment of the PFP in April 2000, respectively.
Table 4.2: OLS Regression Model of Vote Concentration and Blue Camp Seat Share on Substantive Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 1: Model</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Vote Concentration</td>
<td>1.915</td>
<td>.505</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration * Term Four (after Chen)</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration * Term Five</td>
<td>-1.296</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Two</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Three</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Four (before Chen)</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Four (after Chen)</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 2: Independent Variable in Different Time Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concentration, 1993-May 2000 (before Chen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration, Term Four (after Chen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration, Term Five</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=264; Adj R^2=.084. The dependent variable is the Blue Camp’s seat share on the lead committee minus the Blue Camp’s seat share in the full chamber. Average Vote Concentration is the mean vote concentration value for all Blue Camp legislators on the lead committee. The standard errors and significance levels for the two later periods were obtained by reversing the coding for the period dummies for computing the interactive term and rerunning the model.
Table 4.3: Blue Camp Control of Committees Reviewing Government Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiply referred?</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Lead Committee</th>
<th></th>
<th>All Committees</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% blue seats</td>
<td>St. Dev.</td>
<td>% blue majority</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The blue camp is considered to have a majority if its seat share is strictly greater than 50%.
Table 4.4: Logit Models of Blue Camp Seat Share and Average Committee Vote Concentration and Multiple Referral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 1: Model</th>
<th>Model One</th>
<th>Model Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra Seat Share Margin</td>
<td>1.661</td>
<td>.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra Seat Share Margin * after Chen</td>
<td>-4.592</td>
<td>1.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High concentration share</td>
<td>3.892</td>
<td>.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High concentration share * after Chen</td>
<td>-4.908</td>
<td>1.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Chen</td>
<td>-.785</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Committee</td>
<td>-1.638</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>-2.980</td>
<td>.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>-1.459</td>
<td>.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>-2.194</td>
<td>.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-1.946</td>
<td>.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>-3.115</td>
<td>.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.624</td>
<td>.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>-2.186</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Affairs</td>
<td>-2.378</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
<td>-1.896</td>
<td>.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare, Health, Environment</td>
<td>-2.476</td>
<td>.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Two</td>
<td>2.462</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Three</td>
<td>2.726</td>
<td>.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Four</td>
<td>2.154</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Five</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>.227</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 2: Independent Variable in Different Time Periods</th>
<th>Model One</th>
<th>Model Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extra seat share margin, before Chen</td>
<td>1.661</td>
<td>.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra seat share margin, after Chen</td>
<td>-2.931</td>
<td>1.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High concentration share, before Chen</td>
<td>3.892</td>
<td>.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High concentration share, after Chen</td>
<td>-1.015</td>
<td>.854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=2082. The dependent variable is coded one if the bill was multiply referred. Extra seat share margin is the Blue Camp’s seat share on the lead committee minus the Blue Camp’s seat share in the full chamber. High concentration seat share is the percentage of seats on the lead committee held by Blue Camp members with above average vote concentration values. The standard errors and significance levels for the two later periods were obtained by reversing the coding for the period dummies for computing the interactive term and rerunning the model.
Table 4.5: Green Camp Control of Committees Reviewing Government Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiply referred?</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>% green seats</th>
<th>Committees with a green majority</th>
<th>% green majority</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% green seats</th>
<th>Committees with a green majority</th>
<th>% green majority</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>35.4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>199</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.3</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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<td>432</td>
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<td>53.9</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>241</td>
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<td>total</td>
<td></td>
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<td>186</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The green camp is considered to have a majority if its seat share is greater than or equal to 50%.
Chapter Five

Balancing Constituent and Party Interests in Roll Call Votes

The central problem that legislators face is balancing the interests of their two main principals, their party and their constituents. When the interests of these two principals overtly clash, the legislator is faced with the hard choice of which principal to satisfy. Of course, one way to get around this problem is to make sure that the clash is not overt so that one or both of the principals does not realize that there is a fundamental divergence of interests. When the problem is hidden, legislators do not have to offend either one of their principals. Providing cover will be the topic of the next chapter. In this chapter, I assume that there is no easy way to avoid the conflict of interests and explore whether legislators respond to their parties and constituents in predictable ways. In particular, I adopt a research design that has been used in several different countries, taking advantage of Taiwan’s mixed electoral system to examine differences in defections from the party line among legislators elected from nominal districts and those elected from the party list. List legislators are much more concerned about their party than about what constituents think, and they should be much more likely to toe the party line even when that party line is unpopular with constituents. District legislators, in contrast, face a much more difficult balancing task, and they will be more likely to side with their constituents even if that means violating party discipline.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section reviews the literature on
party loyalty among district and list legislators and draws a testable hypothesis. The
second section introduces the data, variables, and methods to be used in this test. In the
final section, results are presented and discussed.

**Loyalty Among List and District Legislators**

Legislators’ most important goal is to win re-election. Both the party and the
constituents help district legislators to achieve this goal. The party lends its label by
nominating them and provides various resources during the campaign while constituents
provide some resource and, more importantly, the votes that actually re-elect the
legislators. Because the support of both principals can help or hinder the re-election
effort, district legislators must satisfy both of them when making voting decisions in the
legislature.

The balance of the two principals is different for list legislators. List legislators are
elected from a closed list. The party determines who will be on the list and what their
ranks on the list will be. In the current Taiwanese system, voters do not vote directly for
the list. Instead, all the votes for the various district candidates are added up by party,
and this determines how many seats each list wins. This makes it essentially impossible
for voters to single out a particular list candidate for individual electoral punishment.
The party, however, can strip list a legislator of his seat by expelling him from the party
(whereupon they may replace him with the next person on the list) and/or deny them
renomination on the list.

In short, district legislators must balance the demands of both the party and their
constituents. In contrast, the party is often the only significant principal for legislators
elected from the party list. Because of this, list legislators should place a much heavier weight on the party’s demands when deciding how to vote. While district legislators might be pressured by their constituents to defect from the party line, list legislators should almost never face such pressures.

Scholars have examined differences in voting patterns between list and district legislators in several different countries. Kulishek and Crisp (2001) put all Venezuelan legislators into four categories ranging from low to high incentives to develop a personal vote. For all parties, the incentives for district legislators to develop a personal vote is higher than those for list legislators. Defections in roll-call voting are rare and difficult to document in Venezuela. In fact, Kulishek and Crisp do not examine the actual roll-call votes since the votes are secret. Instead, they only learn of defections if a legislator publicly explains why he or she defected in the course of the parliamentary debate. Using this data, they find that the legislators who do defect are more often those who have high incentives to cultivate a personal vote. List legislators do defect sometimes, but the ones who do defect tend to come from parties with fairly open nominating procedures. In our terms, these open nominating procedures give constituents more access to the party lists. They cannot be considered to have only a single principal, and so it is not surprising that they might defect more often than those legislators who do have a single principal.

In Mexico, the differences in incentives may be minimized because re-election is not permitted and because the practice of double-inclusion means that most candidates appear on both the district and list portions (Weldon 2001). Even so, a far higher percentage of deputies elected from districts than from lists claim that they sometimes
defect from their party line (Moreno 1998).

Russia presents a more complex result. List legislators from a particular parliamentary caucus do not differ significantly in their voting behavior from district legislators from the same caucus. However, caucuses dominated by list legislators are significantly more cohesive than caucuses dominated by district legislators (Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998).

Mayorga (2001) claims that district legislators in Bolivia do not behave differently from list legislators; both types tend to follow the party line. He argues that this is because nominations for both types of legislators are controlled by the parties. However, he does not offer any concrete data to support this impression.

Herron argues that the existence of double candidacies clouds the picture in Ukraine. What matters is not the type of seat a legislator holds, but her electoral path. District legislators from safe districts defect more often than district legislators from unsafe districts because the latter might need to rely on the party list in the future. List legislators from further down on the list are less likely to defect than those from higher up (2002). This finding is readily understandable in terms of multiple principals. The party wields a much heavier sanction, potentially granting or denying a seat, to district legislators from unsafe seats but who also run on the list. Legislators from safe district seats can better afford to please their more parochial principals. Likewise, being moved down a notch on the party list is not a big sanction for those at the top of the list, but is potentially disastrous for those nearer the bottom.

While the evidence from other countries tends to be consistent with the argument that list legislators are less likely to defect from the party line, in none of the cases cited
is there a clean and unequivocal test demonstrating that this is indeed the case. Each
case has some extenuating circumstance or less than perfect data. As such, it is
premature to suggest that this evidence is conclusive.

As this short review of the literature suggests, the key to the hypothesis is that list
goingators have only a single principal, while district legislators must respond to multiple
principals. However, list legislators with electoral ambitions outside the list do not
always act as if they have a single principal. Some list legislators hope to run for a
district seat in the future. Others plan to run for higher elected office. Still others have
moved from a district seat to a list seat because they did not want to put themselves
through another grueling and expensive campaign. In cases such as these, list
legislators might not want to ignore demands from constituents. The party still looms
larger for list legislators with outside electoral ambitions than for district legislators.
For all list legislators, the party has the ultimate sanction: the ability to take away their
seat in the legislature. As a result, we would expect the loyalty of list legislators with
outside electoral ambitions to be somewhere between those of district legislators and list
legislators whose political ambitions are confined to remaining on the party list.

H5.1: List legislators should display a higher degree of party loyalty than district
legislators.

H5.2: List legislators who do not aspire to elected office beyond the party list should
display a higher degree of party loyalty than list legislators who do aspire to other
elected offices.
Data and Variables

The data used in this chapter include all the roll call votes held during the ten and a half years from the beginning of the Second Legislature in February 1993 to the end of the Third Session of the Fifth Legislature in July 2003. This includes a total of 1056 roll-call votes.

The dependent variable in this chapter is support for the party line. This requires a definition of the party line which, in turn, requires considering two main questions. First, we must determine whether the party took a position on a particular roll-call vote, and, if so, what that position was. Second, we must determine how the individual legislators voted.

Parties do not always take on a position. It is only fair to discuss loyalty to the party line when there actually is a clearly defined party line. I define the party line as the majority position of voting members when at least 33% of the party caucus does vote. I use 33% turnout as the threshold because only 33% of legislators are required for a quorum. If less than 33% of the caucus votes, then the party is not considered to have taken a position. Note that even when more than 33% of the caucus votes, a party will not always have a position. Sometimes there are enough legislators who vote “present” that neither “yes” nor “no” obtains a majority. In addition, while the party line could conceivably be “present,” I choose to focus on the more unambiguous “yes” and “no” lines. At any rate, cases in which a majority of a caucus voted “present” are very rare. Finally, sometimes party caucuses will choose to boycott a vote altogether. In this case, turnout will be far lower than 33%. If the walkout is a planned and organized strategy, it would be reasonable to claim that the party line should be “abstain.” However, this type
of vote is observationally equivalent to votes in which the party is completely indifferent and an overwhelming majority of members simply do not bother to vote due to lack of interest. As a result, I focus only on cases in which at least one-third of party members took a position on a roll-call vote in my data set.

After defining the party line, it should be a fairly straightforward task to determine whether each party member supported or defected from that position. However, abstention once again complicates the question. In situations in which their party had taken a position, 24.3% of the time, party-affiliated legislators did not cast a vote at all. How are we to regard these votes?

There are two obvious reasons that a legislator would choose not to vote. She might be too busy with other matters to vote, or she might deliberately dodge the vote in order to avoid an open disagreement with one of her principals. If the former is the case, then we have no reason to believe that the legislator actually opposed the party line on the specific question. There may be a conflict between her principals over how her time is best spent, as she might need to spend time on constituency service or fund-raising in order to more effectively appeal to her constituents. However, since there is no apparent disagreement over policy, we can simply treat these as missing cases and focus on the legislators who did actually vote. However, if legislators are missing votes as a substitute for voting against the party line, then they are deliberately not supporting the party line, and we must treat these as cases of defection. The main problem is that these two types of abstention are observationally equivalent.

This leaves us with three possible strategies. First, we could consider all the missing votes to be missing data, use listwise deletion, and analyze the remaining cases.
However, since we have reason to suspect that at least some of the missing votes are really defections, this is not a satisfactory solution. Second, we could consider all of the missing votes to be defections. However, this blanket solution, which is really just a form of cheap imputation, is also unsatisfying since we have reason to believe that only a minor portion of the missing votes are actually defections.

I adopt the third solution, imputing how the absent legislators and the much smaller group who voted “present” would have voted had they shown up and been forced to choose a side using Honaker, Joseph, King, Scheve, and Singh’s (2001) *Amelia* program to impute a “yes” or “no” vote to every legislator on every roll-call vote. I compare these imputed votes to the party line to determine whether or not the legislator was loyal to or defected from the party line on each vote. It is crucial to note that imputation does not fundamentally alter the joint distribution of the data. As long as the variables in the analysis model are also in the imputation model, the structure of the data is not changed. Details on the imputation procedure are in the appendix.

As Table 5.1 shows, defection from the party line is fairly rare. Among actual votes “yes” or “no” votes cast by party affiliated legislators when the party took a position, only 1.7% were defections from the legislator’s party’s position. Among the imputed votes, the defection rate was about 5 times higher, 7.5%. This is as expected, since we assume that many legislators missed votes precisely because they did not want to openly defect from the party line. Overall, 3.2% of the votes were defections. In other words, if all party affiliated legislators had voted every time their party took a position, they would have voted with their party nearly 97% of the time.

Defections have decreased over time. In the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Legislatures, the defection
rate was 3.8%. This decreased to 2.5% in the 4th Legislature and to 1.2% in the first half of the 5th Legislature. Considering only the two major parties, KMT legislators have been less cohesive than DPP legislators. KMT legislators defected 3.8% of the time while DPP legislators only defected 2.1% of the time. This difference is somewhat exaggerated because there were more KMT legislators in the earlier terms, when party discipline was more lax for all parties, and more DPP legislators in the later terms, when party discipline was tighter. Nevertheless, DPP legislators have been less likely to defect from the party line than their KMT colleagues in all terms. There are also differences among different types of issues, with defection being most likely when the question at hand deals with economic regulation or health, education, or welfare.

With only 1.7% defections in the actual votes or 3.2% defections when the imputed votes are included, one might ask whether defections are so rare that we have any evidence that legislators are responding to any other pressures besides that of their party. That is, with so few defections from the party line, is there any evidence at all that legislators pay heed to their constituents? In fact, there is. If legislators only responded to their parties, they would always vote the party line and the majority party would always win. However, sometimes legislators do not vote with their party, and this affects outcomes. The majority KMT (or majority KMT-PFP coalition in the 5th Legislature) lost 87 (8.2%) of the 1056 roll-call votes in the dataset. Often this was due to mobilization failures. Of the 87 majority losses, the imputed data suggest that the KMT would have been able to reverse the outcome in 52 of the cases if all legislators had voted. In these cases, KMT legislators did not necessarily sense conflict between their party and constituents on the specific question at hand, but they did perhaps believe that
they could further their prospects by spending their time away from the legislature. If they were doing constituency service, for example, they were responding to their constituents’ interests. However, these interests are not necessarily orthogonal to the party’s interests. Instead, this indicates that the party caucus and leadership were simply ineffective at stage-managing the legislative process. In contrast, in the remaining 35 majority losses, the imputed data indicate that the KMT would have lost even if turnout had been 100%. These losses were caused by defections from the party line, not by poor stage-management. In these cases, large numbers of KMT legislators voted against their party, almost certainly because they wished to vote with their constituents. Given that party and constituent interests do not clash very often, these 35 cases of majority losses caused by defections from the party line are strong evidence that legislators do respond to their constituents.

**Tests**

Hypothesis 5.1 suggests that list legislators should be more loyal to the party line than district legislators because list legislators need only respond to one principal, the party, while district legislators are responsible to two principals, the party and the constituents. Moreover, Hypothesis 5.2 states that list legislators who have no ambitions beyond the list should be more loyal to the party line than list legislators who have ambitions for an electoral career outside the party list. While it is straightforward to determine which legislators are elected from party lists and which are elected from districts, it is harder to determine which of the list legislators are ambitious. I rely on observed behavior, considering all list legislators who have run for any elected office
other than a position in the legislature on the party list during the period 1992-2004 to be ambitious.

The dependent variable in the model is support for the party line. The independent variables of interest are either a dummy variable coded one for list legislators and zero for district legislators or two dummy variables, one coded one for all list legislators and zero otherwise and the other coded one for ambitious list legislators and zero otherwise. I also include four types of control variables to minimize the danger than some third variable is driving the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. First, since the various parties have differing levels of party cohesion and one could imagine a scenario in which the more cohesive parties took positions only on procedural votes while the less cohesive parties took positions only on substantive votes, I include dummy variables for the DPP, New Party, PFP, and TSU caucuses. The KMT is the omitted category. Second, levels of cohesion have varied over time. To eliminate the possibility that there were more procedural votes in periods of high cohesion and more substantive votes in periods of low cohesion, I include dummy variables for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Legislatures. The Second Legislature is the omitted category. Finally, levels of cohesion were different on different types of content. It is possible that the procedural votes were taken primarily on the less internally divisive issues such as military and security while the substantive votes were taken predominantly on more internally divisive issues such as economic regulation. To control for this possibility, I coded the content of every vote according to the issue under consideration. These were then grouped into twelve broad categories: (1) government organization, (2) budgets for government agencies, (3) internal matters of the Legislative Yuan, (4) military and
security issues, (5) public works, state-owned enterprises, and government contracts, (6) the environment, (7) economic regulation, (8) farmers and land, (9) relationships with citizens of the PRC and reparations to victims of government injustices during the martial-law era, (10) health, education, and welfare, (11) crime and the judicial system, and (12) votes which involved two or more laws or were purely procedural with reference to no particular law. I included dummy variables for the first eleven categories, while purely procedural votes were the omitted category. Fourth, in the next chapter, I will argue that party loyalty is higher on procedural votes than on substantive votes. I include dummy variables for three types of procedural votes, including sending an item to committee, changing the floor agenda, and all other procedural votes. This classification scheme will be further discussed in the following chapter. Substantive votes are the omitted category.¹⁸

The simplest way to test this hypothesis would be to define the dependent variable as a binary variable coded one if the legislator voted with the party line on the particular roll-call and zero if she defected. Then one could simply run a probit or logit model. The main problem with this is that it assumes that the probabilities of defecting from the party line are independent across all cases. In fact, there is good reason to believe that some votes will be more controversial than others, and the probability of defection will be higher on these votes. In other words, we will likely see what biologists refer to as “litter effects.” I will incorporate these litter effects into my model by using an

¹⁸ The categories of purely procedural votes in the content coding scheme and procedural votes in the procedural-substantive coding scheme overlap but are not identical. For example, a vote to adjourn (perhaps to avoid discussion of the Labor Standards Law) would be considered procedural in both variables. A vote to stop discussion on Clause 2 of the Labor Standards Law would be in the content category of economic regulation and procedural in the procedural-substantive variable. A vote on whether to pass Clause 2 of the Labor Standards Law would be coded economic regulation and substantive.
extended beta binomial model. In this model, each type of legislator (list or district) in each party on each vote is a unit of analysis, or a litter. For example, in early 1993, each roll-call vote could have yielded four groups: KMT district legislators, KMT list legislators, DPP district legislators, and DPP list legislators. For each type of legislator in each party on each vote, there are \( x \) legislators, \( y \) of whom vote with the party line and \( x-y \) of whom vote against it. The extended beta binomial model uses \( x \) and \( y \) as the components of the dependent variable, with each case having \( x \) trials and \( y \) positive outcomes. If the probability of voting with the party line on the \( i \)th party-vote is \( \pi_i \), then the assumption of a logit or probit model is that \( \pi_i = \pi_j \) for all \( i \) and \( j \). In contrast, the extended beta binomial model assumes that the \( \pi_i \) vary according to a beta distribution. The beta distribution has two parameters. The beta constant in the eventual output of the extended beta binomial model may be interpreted similarly to a standard regression coefficient. The other parameter, \( \gamma \), reflects the degree to which the \( \pi_i \) are heterogeneous, or, equivalently, the degree to which the votes of each individual legislator are positively correlated. If \( \gamma > 1 \), the \( \pi_i \) are overdispersed, and there is more variance than one might expect among the votes of the legislators. If \( \gamma < 1 \), the \( \pi_i \) are underdispersed, and there is less variance than one might expect among the legislators’ vote choices. If \( \gamma = 1 \), the \( \pi_i \) are constant across votes, and logit or probit models are appropriate. For more on extended beta binomial models, see King (1989) and Palmquist (1998).

**Results and Discussion**

There are two models to test the two hypotheses. The first contrasts list legislators
and district legislators. In the second model, list legislators are divided into two groups, so that each party caucus on each vote is now divided into three groups: district legislators, ambitious list legislators, and non-ambitious list legislators. As in the first model, list legislators are contrasted with district legislators. However, the list legislators are further contrasted with the subset of ambitious list legislators.

In Table 5.2, Model A, we expect the coefficient of the dummy variable for list legislators to be positive. In fact, it is positive and significant. List legislators are, in fact, much more likely to vote the party line than district legislators are.

In Model B, we once again expect the coefficient of the dummy variable for list legislators to be positive. In contrast, the coefficient for ambitious legislators should be negative, though somewhat smaller in magnitude than the coefficient for all list legislators. In fact, the two coefficients are in the direction expected and significantly different from zero. Moreover, the sum of the two coefficients is positive (0.7063) and significantly greater than zero (Z=10.43). In other words, both groups are more likely to toe the party line than district legislators are, but within the group of list legislators, those who have an eye on an electoral career are more likely to defect from the party line than those who do not.

This finding in Taiwan complements and enhances findings from other countries. While the evidence in other countries seems to point to stronger loyalty for list legislators than district legislators, there are enough caveats to make one hesitate. The results from Taiwan are much firmer. Unlike results from Mexico or Venezuela, they rely on actual votes rather than public declarations of how one voted or survey results asking the legislator whether he or she sometimes defects. Unlike the cases in Russia or Mexico,
they are not complicated by the practice of double-inclusion, running simultaneously in a
district and on the list. Furthermore, unlike in Russia, the composition of party caucuses
is fairly constant in Taiwan, with list members making up about a fourth each caucus.
Finally, the SNTV system for district legislators effectively makes all district seats
marginal. As such, there are no legislators from safe seats who can rely entirely on
party votes complicating the findings, as in the Ukraine. In Taiwan, we can
unequivocally declare that list legislators are more loyal to their party line, defecting at
less than half the rate of their district counterparts (1.7% to 3.6%). Finding a strong
result like this in a clean test case provides added confidence that the same result would
hold in all the other countries if only they had better data or did not have some
institutional complication such as the double-inclusion rule.

Finally, this finding illustrates the fundamental balancing problem that legislators
face. Legislators, especially district legislators, have to worry both about what their
party wants and what their constituents want. Sometimes, the two principals want
different things, putting the legislator in a difficult position. When push comes to shove,
legislators often choose to side with their constituents rather than their parties.
Obviously, parties do not wish to see frequent defections, and so they have an incentive
to ensure that their members are rarely forced to confront such difficult choices. The
next chapter will explore how parties provide cover and ease the difficulty of balancing
party and constituent interest for their members.

**Appendix Five: Imputation of Missing Votes**

One of the central questions of this dissertation is whether legislators will support
their party’s line in varying situations. Answering this question is complicated by the fact that legislators’ behavior often does not provide a clear answer to whether they did or did not vote with their party since they often choose not to vote at all. From 1993 to mid-2003, party-affiliated legislators had 177,926 opportunities to vote on motions in which their parties took a stance. 43,248 (24.3%) times, they did not vote, and they voted “present” another 1341 (0.8%) times. Absentee rates among independent legislators and on votes in which the party did not take a position were even higher, so that a full 31.4% (63,668 of 203,156) of all votes were neither “yes” nor “no.” How are we to treat these votes?

There are two obvious reasons that a legislator would choose not to vote. First, she might be too busy with other matters, such as performing constituency service, running the family business, or taking a European vacation with her family. Second, she might deliberately dodge the vote in order to avoid offending some subset of supporters. For example, if the party favors a motion that her constituents overwhelmingly oppose, the legislator might simply miss the vote, claiming that she was busy with some other matter such as performing constituency service, running a family business, or taking a European vacation with her family.

The main problem is that these two cases are observationally equivalent, but they imply very different treatments of the missing votes. If legislators are merely busy and are not dodging all the difficult votes, then we can simply treat the absent votes as missing data and concentrate on the legislators who did vote. However, if legislators who want to break party discipline generally do so by declining to vote rather than voting against the party line, then these votes cannot simply be considered as missing data.
They are votes against the party line.

Various scholars deal with the problem of absent legislators in various ways, none of them particularly satisfying. Most literature on the US Congress simply deletes the missing votes, treating them as missing cases. For example, this is the method adopted by the Poole and Rosenthal’s widely used NOMINATE algorithm (1997), Jackman, Rivers, and Clinton’s (2000) IDEAL program, and Heckman and Snyder’s (1998) factor analytic approach. In Latin America, Morgenstern (2004) analyzes Rice scores calculated only on the legislators who show up. Effectively, he assumes that the legislators who do not show up vote with exactly as much loyalty as the members of their parties who do show up. Barry Ames (2002) takes a somewhat more nuanced approach in analyzing Brazilian votes. He obtained lists of all legislators whose absences were excused by party leaders and counts them as missing data. All other legislators are coded as defecting from the party line.

I attempt to cut through this problem by imputing how the absent legislators would have voted had they shown up. King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001) argue that multiple imputation is superior to simply deleting cases with missing data or using some other form of “cheap” imputation, such as assuming that all legislators who did not vote were, in fact, breaking parting discipline. Listwise deletion is preferable to multiple imputation only under very rare conditions, none of which hold in the case of the Taiwanese legislature. Using King et. al.’s terminology, votes are missing at random (MAR), rather than missing completely at random (MCAR). That is, it is possible to predict which votes are more likely to be missing using other variables in my data. Moreover, we have strong reason to believe that the data are not non-ignorable (NI),
though, by definition, it is impossible to prove this conclusively. Data are NI if the probability that a cell will be missing depends solely on the unobserved value of that cell and if there are no other variables that can predict what the value would be. As I will show, there are several variables in my data that are strongly associated with whether a legislator will vote. Since there is good reason to believe that votes in the Taiwanese legislature are MAR, imputation of the missing votes is justified.

King et al. suggest that the imputation model should include all variables in the subsequent analysis models as well as any other variables that might help to predict the missing values. Including variables in the analysis model that were not in the imputation model will produce biased coefficients, usually toward zero. This requirement proved to be the biggest challenge in imputing missed votes in the Taiwanese legislature. Multiple imputation algorithms require substantial computing power. While the *Amelia* program written by Honaker, Joseph, King, Scheve, and Singh (2001) is faster than other algorithms, it is intended for datasets with a few thousand cases rather than the roughly 200,000 cases in my dataset. I was forced to engage in a series of tradeoffs between the requirement to include all relevant variables and the practicalities of producing an imputation model that would not require fanciful amounts of computer memory.

Attendance

To show that the data are more likely MAR than MCAR or NI, I construct a probit model of attendance. That is, I show that several variables are strongly related to

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19 However, King suggests that this criterion may not be so important if the variables in question are fully specified (email communication from Gary King, Feb. 9, 2005).
whether or not a legislator will vote in any given roll-call division.

I argue that legislators consider their two main principals, their party and their constituents, when deciding whether to vote. The party may provide differing incentives to vote for several reasons. First, legislators will be more likely to vote if their party takes a position for or against the motion. Without internal consensus, the party will not spend any effort mobilizing its members. If the party has no position, the legislator cannot demonstrate that he is a good agent by voting the party’s position. Similarly, legislators will be less likely to vote if their party takes a position abstaining from the vote. I operationalize this with a variable coded 1 if the party takes a position for or against the motion, -1 if the party’s position is to either abstain (defined as over 80% of the caucus abstaining) or vote present, and 0 if the party takes no position at all.

Second, legislators will be more likely to vote if their party takes a position and the party that is their party’s major antagonist takes an opposing position. Since the two parties are public enemies, there may be a need to take clear public positions. One way to do this is by a show of unanimity. Moreover, since the major antagonist is, by definition, one of the two biggest parties, the possibility of defeat is significant. Every vote is needed to avoid this outcome. I operationalize this concept by creating a variable that is coded 1 if the party takes a position for or against the motion and its major antagonist takes the opposite position, and 0 otherwise. The KMT, NP, and PFP’s major antagonist is the DPP; the DPP and TSU’s major antagonist is the KMT.

Third, legislators are more likely to vote if their party is on the winning side. Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that the majority party’s need to stick together in order to win votes is an important reason that it tends to have better discipline in the US House
than the minority party. Similarly, I argue that members of a winning coalition on any particular vote will be more likely to show up since one fewer vote for the minority will not change the outcome but a defection from the majority might. To measure this, I create a variable coded 1 if the party’s position wins the vote, -1 if the party’s position loses, and 0 if the party does not take a position.

Fourth, legislators are more likely to vote if the margin of victory is small. In these cases, the legislator may have a chance to sway the outcome in a desired direction. Even if the individual is indifferent to the substantive outcome of the vote, the party may sanction more heavily in these cases, making it worthwhile to show up. I measure this factor by taking the absolute value of the difference between the votes for and against the motion in question.

Fifth, different parties will make differing demands on their legislators. Some parties may demand that their legislators always show up, while others may be more lax. As noted above, the literature on the US Congress suggests that the majority party should demand higher attendance standards. However, it may also be the case that parties develop differing expectations of members for reasons exogenous to the legislature. For example, the DPP may have needed to act collectively during its formative years as the illegal opposition to the authoritarian KMT government and developed a norm of adherence to the party line which has carried over into the democratic era. To capture these differences, I include dummy variables for all parties except the KMT.

In addition to party influences, legislators are faced with differing incentives to vote from their constituencies. First, list legislators are more likely to vote than district legislators. List legislators have only one principal, the party. While district legislators
must spend time and energy catering to their constituents’ needs (constituency service, rent-seeking off the floor, press conferences, etc), the primary demand of a list legislator’s principal is that he be a good soldier in the legislature. I measure this with a dummy variable for list legislators.

Second, list legislators who have ambitions to run for office in a nominal district will be less likely to vote than list legislators who have no electoral ambitions outside the party list. In other words, list legislators who are thinking about running for office in a district will act more like district legislators than other list legislators will. I measure ambition for list legislators with a dummy variable coded 1 if the list legislator has run for any public office outside the party list during the period 1992-2004.

Third, legislators may vote more often depending on the content of the bill. Some types of legislation affect certain constituencies more than others. While it is difficult to determine ex ante which legislators are responsive to which interest groups, we may be safe in assuming that there will be variance. I have coded all votes into nine categories. These nine categories are the same as the twelve mentioned in the main text, but in order to minimize the number of variables in the imputation model, I combined several categories. Legislative Yuan internal issues were collapsed into the category of government organization, and the three categories of environmental issues; health, education, and welfare; and crime and judicial issues were collapsed into one category. I include dummy variables for eight of the nine categories, while the omitted category includes purely procedural votes and votes with unclear substantive content.

Fourth, the partisan composition of the district should affect attendance. If the ratio of people who identify with the legislator’s party to people who do not identify with any
party is high, the legislator should be more likely to vote. If his district is full of identifiers, the legislator can appeal to constituents by showing that he too is a loyal party member and fully supports the party line. On the other hand, if the ratio is low, there are lots of independent voters in the district. Consistently voting the party line will do little to attract these voters. The legislator might be better off concentrating on constituency service or other activities outside the chamber. I measure this by pooling responses to standard party ID questions in telephone surveys conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University for the year before, of, and after each election.\footnote{This yields estimates for 1995, 1998, and 2001. However, I am not able to obtain reliable estimates for 1992 since only a few surveys were conducted during the 1991-1993 period, and respondents still exhibited lingering fears of answering these politically sensitive questions. Because of this, and because electoral results changed very little from 1992 to 1995, I use the 1995 estimates for 1992.} For each electoral district, I divide respondents into blue camp identifiers (KMT, NP, and PFP identifiers), green camp identifiers (DPP, TSU, and Taiwan Independence Party identifiers), and non-identifiers. I take the ratio of identifiers with the legislator’s camp to non-identifiers. While the ratio is important, the absolute number of identifiers is also relevant. Regardless of how many non-identifiers there are, if the number of identifiers is sufficient to elect the legislator, he should try to cater to them by faithfully showing up and voting the party line. I measure how the importance of identifiers in the legislator’s re-election coalition by first identifying both blue and green identifiers and candidates. I divide the percentage of identifiers by the number of candidates from that camp, and then further divide this by the theoretical threshold of election (100%/(m+1)).

Fifth, legislators whose electoral strategies produce geographically concentrated votes should be less likely to vote than those whose votes are spread more diffusely over the entire district. Legislators who garner high percentages of votes in certain areas tend
to be supported by their friends and neighbors rather than by voters with similar ideological interests. Because of this, any vote, especially on a sensitive issue, is likely to alienate some supporters. Abstention can be an attractive strategy. I use a measure of concentration developed elsewhere (Batto 2005).

In addition to these party and constituency-based factors, I include several control variables and variables that I will use in other analysis models. First, I include dummy variables for the third, fourth, and fifth terms. In fact, there is reason to expect higher voting in the third and fifth terms. While in the second and fourth terms, the KMT enjoyed comfortable majorities, it had only a three-seat majority in the third legislature and the KMT-PFP coalition had only a two-seat majority in the fifth legislature. Since the partisan balance was so close in the third and fifth legislatures, any given legislator had a higher likelihood of casting the decisive vote. As a result, more legislators may have adopted a standing decision to always show up and vote.

Second, I add demographic controls for education level, economic structure, and population density. Education level is measured by the percentage of residents in the electoral district who have a university degree or higher. I measure the economic structure of the district with the percentage of residents who have an official classification as either farmers or fishers. Population density is less straightforward. Taiwan has large, lightly populated mountainous regions juxtaposed with densely populated flat areas. When an electoral district contains mountainous regions, its population density appears to be low. To avoid this bias, I take the natural log of the average population density of eligible voters in each township in the district, with each township’s density weighted by its number of eligible voters.
Third, I include dummy variables for procedural votes and for roll-call votes requested by the KMT and DPP.

Fourth, I include regional dummy variables. Since including a dummy variable for each of the electoral districts would have led to too many variables to run *Amelia*, I use the larger electoral districts used for legislative elections between 1972 and 1989.

Table 5.A.1 shows the results of two probit models with attendance as the dependent variable and the aforementioned independent variables. Since some of the variables have missing values for list legislators, one model includes only district legislators and the full set of variables while the other includes all legislators but only the variables with no missing values. In both models, almost all the variables are highly significant and in the predicted direction.

This is strong evidence that we can predict which values will be missing by examining the other variables in the data set. In other words, this is strong evidence that the data are MAR rather than MCAR or NI. As a result, imputation of the missing votes is an appropriate research strategy.

**Imputation**

I impute the missing votes using the Amelia program. I consider votes to be missing both if the legislator did not cast a vote and if she voted “present.” All the independent variables used in the attendance probit model were used in the imputation model with three exceptions. Because of the size of the data set, I had to run the imputation model separately for each term. This eliminated the need to include dummy variables for each term. In addition, all the roll call votes on farmers’ issues occurred in
the fourth term, so that dummy variable was not included in the other three imputation models. Also, the various party dummies were only included in the terms in which those parties existed. Finally, I included two variables not in the attendance models. I added two dummy variables for party lines of “yes” and “no.”

The imputation yielded five data sets which were used to produce all the results presented in Chapters Five through Seven. Each model was run on each of the data sets and then combined using the algorithm listed in the Amelia user manual (Honaker et. al. 2001).
Table 5.1: Support for and Defection from the Party Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imputation Status</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unimputed Vote</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>133337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputed Vote</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>44589</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Term (1993-5)</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>52511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Term (1996-8)</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>59151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Term (1999-2001)</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>47158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Term (2002-July 2003)</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>19106</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>102468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>58149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>10993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1079</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Term (1993-5)</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>13957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Term (1996-8)</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>30714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>21045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7392</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Term (1999-2001)</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>28920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1191</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Percent Supporting</th>
<th>Percent Defecting</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Term (2002-July 2003)</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1079</td>
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</table>
Table 5.1: Support for and Defection from the Party Line (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Govt organization</th>
<th>96.8</th>
<th>3.2</th>
<th>38419</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt agency budgets</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>21855</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Yuan internal issues</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Security</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works, SOEs, govt contracts</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>16810</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4742</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; land</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC nationals, pre-1987 reparations</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, education, welfare</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime, judicial system</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>18007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Substantive</th>
<th>96.5</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>112403</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Procedural</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>65523</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send item to committee</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change floor agenda</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>21988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other procedural votes</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>32449</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If KMT calls for the vote

| KMT                                          | 97.7        | 2.3  | 16227|
| DPP                                          | 98.6        | 1.4  | 8144 |

If DPP calls for the vote

| KMT                                          | 96.4        | 3.6  | 2346 |
| DPP                                          | 99.4        | 0.6  | 1824 |

List or District

| District                                     | 96.4        | 3.6  | 136397|
| All List                                    | 98.3        | 1.7  | 41529|
| Ambitious                                   | 98.1        | 1.9  | 19774|
| Non-ambitious                               | 98.4        | 1.6  | 21755|

Grand Mean 96.8 3.2 177926

Notes: Cell entries are the percentage of legislators supporting or defecting from their party’s position on roll-call votes. Cases include each party-affiliated legislator’s vote on each roll-call vote on which his or her party took a “yes” or “no” position from the beginning of the 2nd Legislature in February 1993 to the end of the Third Session of the 5th Legislature in July 2003. These data are calculated using the means of five imputed data sets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2: Extended Beta Binomial Model: List and District Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All List Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious List Legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Yuan internal issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works, SOEs, govt contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC nationals, pre-1987 reparations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, education, welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime, judicial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send item to committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change floor agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other procedural votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The cases in Model A include a group of list legislators and a group of district legislators for each party caucus and each roll-call vote in which the party caucus had both district and list legislators. That is, the New Party in the 2nd Term, the PFP in the 4th Term, and the New Party in the 5th Term are excluded because those caucuses were comprised entirely of district legislators. The cases in Model B are the same as in Model A, but each party caucus is split into three groups: district legislators, non-ambitious list legislators, and ambitious legislators. Both models include only cases in which the caucus took a clear “yes” or “no” position. This table shows the combined results of models run separately on five imputed data sets.
Table 5.A1: Probit Model of Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District Legislators</th>
<th>District and List Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=138505</td>
<td>N=193230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Take a Position?</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed by Enemy Party?</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Winning Side?</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Victory</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t organization</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t budgets</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Security</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works, SOEs, govt contracts</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, Welfare, Education, Crime</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Regulation</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and Land</td>
<td>-0.532</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC nationals, pre-1987 reparations</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio: identifiers to non-identifiers</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiers in Re-election Coalition</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List (has run in a district)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei, Ilan Counties; Keelung</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Miaoli</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung, Changhua, Nantou</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Penghu</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taitung, Hualien</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung City</td>
<td>-0.481</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Votes</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll Call requested by KMT</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll Call requested by DPP</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd term</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th term</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th term</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% pop. with university degree</td>
<td>-2.301</td>
<td>0.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% pop. who are farmers or fishers</td>
<td>-0.474</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of vote</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population density</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Legislators from Kinmen, Lienchiang, and Aboriginal constituencies are excluded due to missing data.
Chapter Six
Providing Cover

In the previous chapter, we have seen that legislators have to balance the interests of their two main principals, their party and their constituents, and that sometimes these interests conflict, putting the legislators in a difficult position. In some of these cases, legislators choose to vote against their party, a decision that occasionally causes the party to lose. In this chapter, we explore two strategies that parties can adopt to help their members avoid being put in a position of having to choose between satisfying their party or satisfying their constituents while ensuring that party goals are not sacrificed. These strategies both fall under the umbrella of “providing cover.” Parties provide cover to their members, making it easier for legislators to do what the party wants them to do, by making it more difficult for their constituents to see the unpopular things that they are doing. Cover makes it difficult for constituents to trace responsibility back to the legislator and allows the legislator to satisfy her party while not angering her constituents. In this way, the legislator is able to mesh the preferences of her two principals. This does not mean that their preferences are brought into perfect alignment and that the tension is resolved, but effective cover does imply that constituents are less likely to perceive the discrepancy or suspect the legislator of putting her party’s interests first.

One strategy that parties use to provide cover for their members is to seize control of the agenda and use that power to ensure that questions that party members want to vote
on are the only roll-call votes held. In a case such as the US House of Representatives, the majority party is often portrayed as having complete control of the agenda, so that all business conducted is business that the majority party wants to see conducted (Cox and McCubbins 1993). However, in many legislatures, including the Taiwanese legislature, the majority party is not able to exercise monopoly control over the agenda. Instead, there is a constant battle over control of the agenda, with the various parties seeking to arrange business in a way that minimizes the difficulty that their members face in balancing party and constituent interests. In this chapter, I will construct a model of one aspect of this battle, the choice to hold a roll-call vote. Evidence will be produced that demonstrates that party loyalty is higher in roll-call votes that a party wants, presumably those votes that provide cover to its own members or deny it to antagonist party members, than in roll-call votes that competitor parties want.

A second strategy to provide cover is through the use of procedural votes. Substantive votes are often highly visible and usually easy to interpret. Procedural votes are usually far less visible, and constituents tend to have a harder time both in interpreting the importance and impact of procedural votes and in tracing the results of these votes back to their legislator. In other words, procedural votes make it more difficult for voters, who are not experts in legislative procedure, to monitor their legislators. As a result, legislators can weight the party’s interests more heavily than the constituents’ interests when balancing the two against each other. Several scholars have documented the greater propensity of legislators to vote with their party on procedural votes than on substantive votes in the United States Congress. I provide evidence that this pattern also holds in the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan.
The Choice to Hold a Roll-Call Vote

One of the main dangers in using roll-call data is that it is subject to severe selection bias. The set of roll-call votes we observe is not a random sample (VanDoren 1990; Snyder 1992; Sinclair 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2002; Snyder and Ting 2005). By the time a question come to a vote, strategic floor leaders have decided to put it on the agenda, to pose the question in a particular way, and to have a public vote on it. At each of these stages numerous other potential questions and alternatives have been winnowed out. Once on the floor, only some issues are decided in a public roll-call vote. In this section, I look at when and why parties choose to hold roll-call votes and how this choice affects roll-call voting patterns. In particular, I argue that some roll-call votes are held to enable or force legislators to take a public position so that their constituents will be better able to monitor their actions. This higher monitoring capacity makes legislators more likely to vote with their constituents, even when this means that they must vote against their party.

The starting point of this argument is that voting is a choice. In Taiwan, there are several methods for resolving disputes. The Standing Order of the Legislative Yuan lists five ways in which the legislature can vote. These include (1) a voice vote (aye or nay, or asking if anyone objects), (2) voting by raising hands, (3) using the machine to vote, (4) (secret) voting by paper ballot, and (5) an oral roll-call (in which each legislator’s name is called and she announces her vote). The first, second, and fourth methods are anonymous, while the fifth method establishes a clear record of each individual’s behavior. Machine voting can be either secret or public. In practice, paper ballots are
used only at the beginning of each term to elect the speaker and vice-speaker while oral roll-calls are constitutionally required in a veto-override attempt and rarely used otherwise.

The great majority of votes are one of three types: voice votes, machine votes in which individual votes are not recorded, and machine votes in which individual votes are recorded. I will call these voice votes, secret votes, and roll-call votes. All three of these options are commonly employed; seemingly the members of the legislature have a choice to make. So, who makes this choice, and how do they make it?

**Who Calls for Votes?**

I assume that parties, rather than individuals, factions, committees, or other subsets of legislators, are the actors who chose to (or not to) call for roll-call votes. This is a key assumption, so it behooves us to determine how often it holds in the actual data.

The Standing Order of the Legislative Yuan gives the speaker the discretion to choose any of the first four methods of voting listed above. The fifth method, an oral roll-call, is only employed if at least 50 legislators or a party caucus demand it. The Standing Order also provides that 30 or more legislators can demand a machine roll-call vote. At the beginning of the Fourth Legislature in 1999, party caucuses were also given the right to ask for a roll-call vote. Thus, there are three methods for a roll-call vote to be held: a party caucus may demand it, a group of 30 legislators may demand it, or the speaker may use his discretion to opt for a roll-call vote. The first method clearly does not violate the assumption that parties call for all votes, and but the second and third methods might.
A group of 30 legislators might be a subset of a legislative party acting at the behest of the entire caucus, but it could also be a coalition of legislators from different parties. For example, during the Fourth and Fifth Terms, only one roll-call vote was demanded by a group of legislators. 45 legislators drawn from all the parties asked for a vote on whether to bring a very controversial revision to the Labor Standards Law to the floor. We should note that party discipline was nearly perfect on the ensuing vote, with only two legislators breaking ranks by voting “present.” However, this does not necessarily mean that any of the party caucuses wanted to publicly vote on the question. It is probable that this case is a violation of the assumption.

During the Second and Third Terms, party caucuses did not have the power to ask for roll-call votes, and most of the roll-call votes were requested by members’ petitions. Many times, the lead cosigner was a floor leader of one of the party caucuses. However, many of the petitions were also organized by other legislators. While the party caucuses probably organized many of these petitions, others crossed party lines, and still others were perhaps organized by minority factions within a party. In short, it is difficult to determine how many or which of these petitions constituted violations of the assumption that parties are the important actors.

The speaker has some degree of discretion, and it might be the case that the speaker causes some votes to be decided by a public roll-call vote when all party caucuses would prefer some other method. Indeed, there is no indication of a party caucus or anyone else requesting the roll-call vote in many instances in the Taiwanese Legislative Gazette. The question is whether the speaker was acting independently in choosing this method or whether he was simply implementing the wishes of the parties without forcing them to
make a formal request.

On the one hand, the speaker is an agent. Whether the principal is the majority party or coalition, all parties, the floor, or some other actor is open to debate. In any principal-agent relationship there always exists the possibility that the agent will act contrary to the interests of the principal. However, in a highly observable context such as whether to hold a roll-call vote, it is unlikely that the agent could repeatedly go against the interests of the principal and avoid sanctions. The point here is that a speaker who forced unwanted roll-call votes onto the legislature would probably invite sanctions from party caucuses. On the other hand, there may be situations in which the speaker decides that the potential payoffs are worth the risk of the possible sanctions. Moreover, even if the speaker is acting on behalf of parties, it might not be possible to determine which specific parties he is working for in each instance.

To sum up, we can be sure that parties are the key actors when party caucuses formally demand the roll-call votes, but we cannot be so sure when a group of legislators puts together a petition or the speaker chooses that method. In practical terms, we cannot be sure that any of the roll call votes in the Second or Third Legislatures meet this assumption, but we can be sure about almost all of the votes in the Fourth and Fifth Legislatures.

**Why Hold a Roll-Call Vote?**

Having established that voting is a choice and identified a subset of cases in which parties are the actors who make this choice, we now examine how parties might benefit by exercising the right to hold a roll-call vote.
There are two major reasons that a party might prefer to hold a public roll-call vote rather than some other type of vote. First, roll-call votes are useful for position taking. Second, roll-call votes require higher transaction costs, and parties may threaten to impose these costs on other actors in the legislature as a bargaining ploy.

Votes to Take Positions

Legislators take positions on issues to highlight their popular stances, force their opponents to reveal unpopular stances, or to construct a record that might be useful in the future. If a party asks for a roll-call vote in order to take a position, it is implicitly assuming that the position will, at least marginally, help its members gain the support of constituents in some way. The most likely way is by affecting both party and candidate images.

A roll-call vote is a piece of concrete information about a legislator’s behavior that helps principals monitor their agents. Rather than trying to figure out from other evidence what the agent is doing, the principal can simply observe how the legislator votes on a particular issue. Of the legislator’s principals, constituents are far more likely to benefit from the information imparted by a roll-call vote than are parties.

From the party’s point of view, roll-call voting does not significantly lower the price of monitoring. Parties generally collect very good information on what their members want in order to set an agenda popular with the rank and file. Moreover, they usually need to know more than simply whether an individual legislator is for or against a particular bill. They also need to know how important the issue is to her, which specific clauses she supports or opposes, whether she might compromise and at what price.
Whip organizations are specifically designed to facilitate this kind of information flow. By the time the roll-call vote occurs, parties should know not only how their members will vote, but also why they are voting that way. Since the party has already invested a great deal in learning about the preferences of legislators, roll-call votes do not significantly lower their monitoring costs.

Parties may, on rare occasions, learn from roll-call votes. For example, in 1972 German Chancellor Willy Brandt faced a no confidence vote which he was widely expected to lose. His *Ostpolitik* policy was highly unpopular with some members of his Social Democratic Party, and a few were expected to defect from the party line in the secret vote. Brandt triumphed by invoking party discipline to require that all SDP legislators remain in their seats and abstain from voting. Since an absolute majority of all members was needed to pass the no confidence vote, the opposition, with no SDP defectors, fell two votes short. What Brandt did was to effectively turn a secret vote into a public vote for SDP members. Any member who had wanted to defect from the SDP line would have had to get out of his or her seat and vote, a highly visible action (Tsebelis 1990: 97). However, this does not prove that the party learned from the vote. Brandt probably had a good idea before the vote which members might defect. By forcing any defectors to oppose him publicly, he could have justified using party sanctions to punish them. The critical point is whether he would have had to justify his actions to party activists or to ordinary voters. If party activists would not have accepted the imposition of party discipline on members who Brandt and other party leaders were sure had defected in a secret vote, but the same activists would have accepted such punishment after observing the defections in a public roll-call, then the
party, as a collective unit, learned from the roll-call. At the same time, this example from three decades ago in a country halfway around the world from Taiwan serves as an illustration of how difficult it is to find a case in which the party might learn from a roll-call vote. On the whole, it is convenient to assume that constituents learn from roll-call votes but parties do not.

If roll-call votes can convey useful information to constituents, does this information affect electoral outcomes? While it is unlikely that many voters consciously decide which candidate to support based solely on roll-call behavior, it is probable that roll-call votes do affect aggregate electoral outcomes by affecting party and candidate images.

Party and candidate images function as information shortcuts. Voters rationally choose not to be fully informed about politics because the costs of collecting all the necessary information to make a fully informed choice far outweigh the benefits of making such a choice. Instead, they use information shortcuts as a means of getting to the same decision with far less effort. Of course, there is a risk that they will not learn the right information and make a different decision than they would have with better information, but the low cost of the shortcut makes this risk acceptable (Downs 1957; Popkin 1994).

In most democratic systems, the most widely used shortcut is the party label. The party label is an aggregate of the party’s stances on the various issues. A voter might find the party label to be a very useful heuristic if she almost always finds herself agreeing with a certain party (Popkin et. al. 1976; Fiorina 1981). In Taiwan’s SNTV system, voters usually need to choose one of several candidates from a party. In recent years, increasing numbers of voters have chosen to rely on another shortcut provided by
the party: parties have increasingly given instructions on how to coordinate votes among all nominees by telling voters to vote for a certain candidate based on their date of birth or ID number. However, a majority of voters still claim to decide whom to vote for based on the candidates’ individual qualities. One shortcut that may help them make this decision is the candidate image.

Except for newly established parties, Taiwanese parties tend to have well defined party images. While other methods such as campaign speeches, published position papers, or press conferences may be more effective in defining the party image, these would be undermined if the party voted differently in a roll-call vote. For this reason, parties always want their caucuses to vote together. On the one hand, any defection from the party line exposes the party’s inner divisions, muddies the party image, and reduces the credibility of the party’s commitments to particular policies. It is harder for a party to argue that it is the pro-labor party, for example, if several of its members have voted against reductions in the workweek. On the other hand, unanimous voting helps to transform the party from a group of individuals into a unitary actor and minimizes any impression of disunity, indecisiveness, confusion, or incompetence (Palmer 1995).

Candidates’ images are not as clearly defined. Sometimes a legislator can carve out a well-defined and widely-known niche in a particular policy area. For example, Lin Chih-chia is well known as a leading advocate of children’s welfare. Generally speaking, however, legislators’ positions on specific issues are not very widely known. One reason for this is that in Taiwan’s SNTV system, other candidates do not have a strong incentive to serve as third-party monitors and so may not bring unpopular votes to the attention of voters. For this reason, it is not unreasonable to assume that candidate
images are defined in terms of differences with the better-known party images. There are two general areas in which the differences might be most common. First, specific legislators represent a specific geographic area within the district. Voters might expect that the legislator to hold the same position as the party on all the issues but also work extra hard to secure benefits for her hometown. Roll-call votes should not affect this part of a legislator’s image. Second, the legislator might gain a reputation as a party renegade or as someone who consistently toes the party line. While a single defection from the party line might not seep through to the voter, repeated defections might. In other words, at election time, a voter might remember that the legislator voted against her party on something and is, depending on his point of view, not just a party automaton or not a reliable party voter.

In sum, while voters may not pay close attention to roll-call votes, they benefit more from the information imparted by these votes than parties do. Voters use the information they glean from roll-calls to update their party and candidate images. Specifically, they can clarify whether parties’ actions on issues are consistent, and they can infer whether individual legislators are party loyalists or tend to defect from the party line. In short, roll-call votes are relatively easy for voters to monitor, so any sanctions are based disproportionately on these votes.

Note that the point of this discussion is not that parties do not affect the way legislators vote. One of the underlying assumptions of this project is that they do. The point of this discussion is that any changes in the way a legislator votes because the vote is a voice vote, secret vote, or roll-call vote are driven by how the legislator expects voters to react.
This leads us to two hypotheses concerning roll-call votes called for taking positions:

H6.1A: In a position-taking vote intended to highlight one’s own party’s unity, the cohesion of the party demanding the vote will be greater than or equal to the cohesion of the other parties.

H61B: In a position-taking vote intended to highlight the disunity of another party, the cohesion of the party demanding the vote will be strictly greater than the cohesion of the other parties.

Votes to Raise Transaction Costs

A party might also demand a roll-call vote in order to raise transactions costs. Raising transaction costs can often be an effective bargaining ploy. By threatening to gum up the works, a party can effectively present other parties with the option of making concessions or facing extremely high costs to get anything done. When this tactic is employed near the end of a session, the delaying tactics may be impossible for a majority to overcome and may confer veto power on a minority. In this case, the majority either makes concessions or fails to pass anything on its agenda. One aspect of this tactic is that it is only observed when it fails. A successful threat will extract concessions from the majority, and the minority will never actually demand the roll-call vote. Only when the majority feels that the concessions are not worth the extra transaction costs and refuses to budge will the minority need to decide whether to actually carry out its threat. In some cases, the minority will decide not to impose the transaction costs. However, a
party that issues empty threats faces future credibility problems. For this reason, the dominant strategy is to impose heavy costs. Another aspect is that, unlike position-taking votes in which there is a single key vote, there is no key proposal at hand. Costs may be imposed by demanding a vote on any decision, important or not.

If the vote is intended only to raise transaction costs and has no position-taking component, then it should not affect party or candidate images. As such, legislators should be concerned only with their party’s position on the issue and not with their constituents’. For this reason, legislators should always vote the party line on transaction cost-raising votes, regardless of who calls for the vote.

H61C: In a vote intended to raise transaction costs, the cohesion of the party demanding the vote should not differ significantly from the cohesion of the other parties.

Other Types of Votes

There are other reasons that a party might demand a roll-call vote. Sometimes, a different outcome might result from a roll-call vote than from another type of vote. Willy Brandt’s transformation of the secret no confidence vote into a public vote for his party members is one example. He was widely expected to lose the secret vote, but he won the actual vote. Supersonic transport (SST) funding is another example. Through the 1960s, the US Congress funded a program to develop the SST. By the early 1970s, the program had become increasingly unpopular as public concerns over the economic inefficiency and the environmental impact of the program grew. However, the votes
were all secret votes taken in the Committee of the Whole, and the strong support of the aerospace industry was sufficient to sustain funding. In 1970, the Legislative Reorganization Act permitted recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole. When the SST came up for funding again in 1971, it was defeated. Several political commentators attributed the defeat to the fact that the question was decided in a public roll-call rather than a secret vote (Bibby and Davidson 1972, 276; Kravitz 1990, 390-391; Rosenbloom 1981).

On the whole, however, it is fairly unlikely that the way in which an issue is decided will tip the balance between winning and losing. The two sides must be fairly balanced to start with, and enough legislators must vote differently in a roll-call vote than they would in a secret vote to change the outcome. In this case, the party calling for the vote may actually be less cohesive than the other parties. Any loss incurred by displaying its disunity may be offset by the payoff reaped from winning the vote. While some roll-call votes might be held to obtain a different outcome, I assume that this motive for calling a roll-call vote is far less common than a position taking or cost-imposing motive.

In some legislatures, votes are held for purely procedural reasons. For example, many votes in the US Congress are held to establish when other votes will be held, enabling members to set their schedules without fear of missing important votes. In fact, these types of procedural roll-call votes are largely absent in Taiwan. Probably this is because no one has an interest in deciding these types of questions publicly, so a more efficient voice vote or secret vote will suffice.

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21 I thank Kevin Roust for informing me of these types of votes.
Providing Cover With Procedural Votes

If legislators react to two principals, their party and their constituents, then they should try to avoid situations in which the two principals want them to take different actions and both principals can easily monitor their actions. One of the most important cases of this conflict can arise in roll-call voting when the party’s position is unpopular with the constituents. In this situation, the party can provide cover by using procedural votes to ensure that the conflict between party and constituents is less obvious to the constituents. In other words, the party can make effective monitoring more difficult for the constituents by making the legislator’s actions less traceable (Arnold 1990).

Constituents are more able to understand substantive votes than procedural votes. Substantive votes are more directly and obviously related to the outcomes they care about than procedural votes. Moreover, substantive votes tend to get more coverage in the media. Another way of stating this is that constituents pay a smaller cost to monitor substantive votes than procedural votes. Like in the Drunkard’s Search, since monitoring of substantive votes is cheaper, that is where constituents are likely to focus their efforts. The result of this is that constituents’ sanctions are smaller on procedural votes than on substantive votes. Relatively speaking, this should increase the weight of the party in the legislators’ considerations on procedural votes. In turn, this should lead to higher party cohesion on procedural votes.

This pattern has been observed in the US House, most notably by Rohde (1991), Sinclair (2002), and Cox and Poole (2002). Rohde was not explicitly concerned with the difference between procedural and substantive votes; rather he wanted to show that changes in the cohesion of the majority party were not due to changes in the numbers of
different types of roll calls. To this effect, he showed that cohesion increased in all categories after the reforms of the early 1970s. As a side benefit, Rohde’s data also revealed that majority party cohesion was consistently higher on procedural votes than on substantive votes. However, Rohde did not discuss this finding, much less offer any reasons for it. One question that this test leaves unanswered is whether cohesion is higher on procedural votes because of something that parties do. It could be that legislators always vote their sincere preferences and procedural votes are simply more likely to divide legislators’ preferences along party lines.

Sinclair is explicitly interested in comparing procedural and substantive votes. She stresses that parties use procedural votes to “provide cover” for their members. That is, members can vote for a procedural question that may be hard for constituents to understand rather than a substantive question that may be easy to understand. Sinclair’s test holds the substance (and members’ preferences) constant by comparing votes on the rule for a bill with votes on the bill itself. When the rule is a closed rule, the substance is exactly the same. In these cases, Sinclair finds that majority party members are much more likely to vote “yes” for the rule than on the final passage vote. Minority members display the opposite pattern.

Sinclair’s test cleverly controls for preferences by selecting a subset of roll call votes. Cox and Poole (2002) show that this pattern also holds for a much larger data set. They control for preferences by using a spatial model to estimate the positions of legislators and bills and show that Rice Indices of party differences are higher for procedural votes than other types of votes. Cox and Poole interpret this as proof that parties systematically exert more pressure on procedural votes than on substantive votes.
Drawing on the US literature, we have two main reasons why cohesion might be higher on procedural votes than on substantive votes. The first is that parties do something to ensure this result. The second is that votes are driven purely by preferences, and preferences are simply better aligned with party membership on procedural votes.

There are at least three versions of what parties might do. These three stories are largely complementary, so it is very possible that they are all in operation. First, party pressure might be constant across votes, and any difference comes simply from the withdrawal of constituents’ pressure on procedural votes. Second, parties might strategically act to provide cover for their members on certain votes. Third, party pressure might be systematically greater on procedural votes than on substantive votes.

The first scenario is the simplest. The only variable that changes is the constituents’ monitoring, and this is the sole reason for changes in party cohesion. One possible complication comes from Krehbiel (1993). He argues that if party caucuses are simply groups who vote together because they share similar preferences, then party influences are insignificant, and legislators always vote the way they do because of constituency pressures. In procedural votes, the constituents’ smaller sanctions provide lesser guidance to legislators. Taken to the logical extreme, if constituents give no sanction at all on procedural votes, and the parties never give any sanction, the legislator will have no reason at all to vote in any particular way and will simply flip a coin. If this interpretation is correct, then parties should be more cohesive on substantive votes, when they will act as a collection of like-minded individuals, than on procedural votes, when they act randomly. On the other hand, if the party exerts any influence at all, then
removing the constituents’ influence should allow the legislators to simply vote the party line, yielding higher cohesion on procedural than substantive votes.

In the second scenario, party leaders provide cover for legislators by not forcing them to vote on substantive issues on which their constituents and party disagree. Instead, party leaders avoid defeats or embarrassing votes by strategically arranging the agenda such that the key votes are buried in obscure procedural motions that the constituents usually ignore or in huge omnibus votes that may be interpreted in many different ways. Then, after this key vote has passed (assuring final passage of the controversial bill), leaders allow the conflicted legislators to vote against the party in the final, substantive vote (Sinclair 2002). This scenario is different from the first in two respects. One, party leaders work to make sure that procedural votes are difficult for constituents to interpret. That is, the more the constituents and the party disagree, the more necessary it is to obscure the connection between the procedural vote and the substantive outcome. Because of this, the set of procedural votes on which party cohesion might be low is artificially truncated since party leaders choose the specific vote least likely to spur defections. Two, because passage of the bill has been assured by the procedural vote and party leaders want to help their members remain popular with constituents, party pressure might not be constant on substantive and procedural votes. Instead, party pressure might be lower on substantive votes as party leaders encourage their members to vote against the party and please their constituents. Both of these effects should make parties more cohesive on procedural votes than on substantive votes.

In the third scenario, party leaders might increase pressure to vote with the party on procedural votes in order to assure absolute control of the agenda. In the second
scenario, parties manipulate the agenda to find the procedural vote that legislators will vote for under normal party pressure. In the third scenario, parties assure cohesion not so much by finding the alternative that all their members agree on, but by imposing very heavy sanctions on defectors in substantive votes. In the second scenario, the party might lower pressure on substantive votes; in the third scenario, it raises pressure on procedural votes. Again, this should yield more cohesion in procedural votes than in substantive votes.

In sum, the American literature provides very strong theoretical reasons to believe that party cohesion should be substantially higher on procedural votes than on substantive votes. The same general effect should hold in Taiwan because the main premises of the argument are met there as well as in the U.S.A. In particular, parties and constituents sometimes have conflicting interests, and legislators sometimes try to resolve this tension by making the consequences of their actions less traceable to their constituents through the use of procedural maneuvers. Thus,

H6.2: Party cohesion should be higher on procedural votes than on substantive votes.

Data, Variables, and Tests

This chapter employs the same data and methods and most of the same variables that were used in the previous chapter. To recap, the data set includes all roll-call votes held between 1993 and July 2003. All the missing votes, that is all the votes of legislators who were either absent or voted "present," have been imputed so that every legislator is associated with a "yes" or "no" vote on every question. The dependent variable, loyalty
to the party line, is a binomial variable coded one if the legislator votes with the majority position of the caucus when at least one third of the party members show up to vote.

The control variables, including dummies for the content of the bill, the term during which the vote was held, and the caucus’ party, remain the same. This chapter also uses the same statistical model, the extended beta binomial model. The independent variables of interest will be described below.

Hypothesis 6.1 deals with the party cohesion when different parties demand the roll-call vote. Theoretically, there are three different types of votes. On votes in which the party calling for the vote stakes out a popular public position, that party should have very high cohesion. The other parties may or may not also have high cohesion, but on average, we expect the party calling for the vote to display cohesion at least as high as the other parties. On votes in the party calling for the vote forces a rival party to publicly take an unpopular public position, the rival party should have low cohesion. Since the purpose of the vote is to contrast the popular stance of one party with the unpopular stance of another party, we expect the party calling for the vote to display a higher level of cohesion than its rival. On votes in which the goal is to raise transaction costs, we expect all parties to display high levels of cohesion. In practice, it is very difficult to determine which votes are held for which purpose. In fact, many, if not most, votes are held for more than one of these reasons. As a result, it is impossible to test Hypothesis 6.1 by simply dividing the votes into three subsets and examining party cohesion on each subset when different parties demand the vote. Instead, we are forced to lump all roll-call votes together with the expectation that, if all three types of votes are represented in the sample, the cohesion of the party calling for the vote will be greater than that of a
rival party.

One of the assumptions that this model rests upon is that the parties call for the votes. As noted above, we cannot be sure that roll-call votes requested by members’ petitions or by the speaker conform to this assumption, so this section will only use roll-call votes formally requested by party caucuses. Since party caucuses did not formally gain this right until the beginning of the Fourth Legislature in February 1999, this section is restricted to data from the Fourth and Fifth Legislatures.

For practical reasons, we further restrict the tests in this section to examining the cohesion of the KMT and DPP caucuses. For one thing, the overwhelming majority of votes that were called by a party caucus were called by one of these two parties. There simply are not many cases of votes demanded by other parties. For another, as the two biggest parties, the KMT and DPP are each other’s main antagonists. When the KMT demands a vote to embarrass another party, that other party is usually the DPP, and vice-versa. As a result, we expect the results of position-taking votes to be the clearest with respect to these two parties.

Furthermore, we restrict the data to votes on which both parties take a position. It would not make sense to compare the cohesion of the two parties if one of them declined to take a position.

To test Hypothesis 6.1, we use an extended beta binomial model with the same set of control variables employed in the previous chapter. Supposing we ran the model only on votes called by the KMT (Table 6.1, Model A), a dummy variable for the DPP should have a negative coefficient. Similarly, running the model only on votes called by the DPP (Model B) should yield a positive coefficient for the DPP caucus dummy variable.
In fact, since the DPP has such higher cohesion than the KMT, both coefficients are positive. However, the latter (2.0576) is much larger than the former (0.5447). In order to determine whether there is a significant difference in the two coefficients, I combine the two sets of votes and fully interact all the variables in the model with a dummy for whether the DPP called for the vote (Model C). The expectation is that the interaction of the DPP calling for the vote dummy and the DPP caucus dummy will be positive. In fact, it is positive and significant. In other words, the model implies that, while the DPP is more cohesive than the KMT on both types of votes, the gap is much wider on votes that the DPP wants than on votes that the KMT wants.

Hypothesis 6.2 predicts higher party cohesion on procedural votes than on substantive votes. In the American literature, the second generation tests by Sinclair (2002) and Cox and Poole (2002) cleverly control for the possibility that preferences are systematically different on substantive and procedural votes and that this, rather than anything that the parties do, is responsible for the higher cohesion on procedural votes. Unfortunately, neither of these solutions is appropriate for Taiwan. Sinclair’s test relies on votes on rules. There is no equivalent of a rule in Taiwan, much less the vote on a rule. Cox and Poole’s test is built on the assumption of unidimensionality in a two-party system. In a multi-party system with changing coalition patterns among the various parties, it may not be so straightforward to estimate the spatial positions of legislators and bills. As a result, we are forced to rely on what might be considered a first generation test, one much closer to Rohde’s than to Sinclair’s or Cox and Poole’s. The general spirit of this test is simply to compare party cohesion on all observed procedural votes with all observed substantive votes.
Of course, there are different types of procedural votes. In my data set, I distinguish among three categories, including votes to send items to committee, change the floor agenda, and a catch-all “other” category that includes votes to stop discussion, extend or adjourn the session, and various other rarer types of procedural votes. The first two types are particularly fundamental to a party’s efforts to control the agenda. Decisions on whether to kill a bill before it ever reaches committee, to pull a bill from a committee for consideration on the floor, or to bypass the committee review process altogether and send the bill straight to the floor have a major impact on which decisions the floor will eventually have to make. Similarly, votes attempting to change the day’s agenda on the floor to move a particular bill up to the head of the line determine whether the legislators will be forced to confront particular decisions. If the theoretical reasoning underlying the expectations for higher party cohesion on procedural votes is correct, the effect should be strongest for procedural votes to send items to committee or to change the floor agenda.

To summarize, I test Hypothesis 6.2 by ascertaining whether procedural votes in general and votes to send items to committee or to change the floor agenda in particular are associated with higher party voting cohesion. Once again, an extended beta binomial model is used with the expectation that the coefficients on the dummy variable for procedural votes (Table 6.2, Model A) and the dummy variables for sending items to committee or changing the floor agenda (Model B) will be positive. This is exactly what we find. In Model A, the coefficient for procedural votes is positive (0.1623) and significant (Z=2.85), as expected. In other words, legislators are significantly more likely to vote with their party on procedural votes than on substantive votes. In Model
B, the coefficients for sending items to committee and changing the floor agenda are both positive and significant, as expected. That is, among the procedural votes, these two categories, which are most directly linked to control over the agenda, are the ones in which party cohesion is the strongest.

**Discussion**

This chapter provides evidence that parties actively seek to minimize the tension between general party and parochial constituent goals in roll-call voting in two very specific ways. These two specific methods of providing cover are part of a much broader pattern across a wider set of contexts in which parties mesh their preferences with those of constituents in order to minimize the chance that either principal will become disgruntled with their legislator.

In Taiwan, the roll-call vote is, itself, an instrument that parties use to highlight instances of high agreement between their own positions and the positions held by the constituents of their members. Alternatively, it can be used to spotlight instances of high disagreements among the principals of legislators from other parties. Parties employ this instrument selectively in an effort to manipulate the agenda to their best advantage.

Similarly, procedural votes are another tool that Taiwanese legislative parties use to downplay or de-emphasize any tensions between what the party wants and what the constituents want. Parties use procedural votes to make unpopular substantive consequences more difficult for constituents to trace back to their legislators. In particular, legislators are much more likely to vote with their parties during the
procedural fights to control the agenda than on the substantive votes that take place once something actually makes it all the way to the floor.

While I have singled out these two phenomena as examples of how parties act to resolve the parochial vs. general tension in Taiwanese roll-call votes, they are merely part of a larger pattern. For example, in roll-call votes in the U.S. Congress, parties use tactics such as special rules, omnibus bills, and filibusters to make it harder for voters to trace unpopular results back to their legislators (Arnold 1990; Sinclair 2002). Picking and choosing which questions to vote on and changing the day’s floor agenda or selectively sending or removing bills from committee are simply some of the tools that Taiwanese legislators have found it convenient to employ at this time to mitigate the ever-present tension between what parties want and what constituents want. There are almost certainly other tools presently employed in Taiwan to achieve the same end, and some of the tools found in other contexts might potentially be used in Taiwan as well. The methods used to produce of cover vary; the tension between parochial and general interests guarantee that there will always be demand for it.
Table 6.1: Extended Beta Binomial Model: Who Calls for the Vote?

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Interaction Terms

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Notes: Model A includes roll-call votes requested by the KMT. Model B includes roll-call votes requested by the DPP. Model C includes roll-call votes requested by either the KMT or DPP. All three models include only roll-call votes on which both the KMT and DPP took a clear “yes” or “no” position. This table shows the combined results of models run separately on five imputed data sets.
### Table 6.2: Extended Beta Binomial Model: Procedural Votes

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Notes: The cases in Models A and B include each party caucus on each roll-call votes on which they took a clear “yes” or “no” position. This table shows the combined results of models run separately on five imputed data sets.
Chapter Seven

The Financial Disclosure Law of 1993

The previous two chapters have explored the difficult balancing task that faces legislators when their principals, their party and their constituents, do not agree. When put in this unenviable situation, legislators often feel obliged to side with their constituents against their party. As a result, parties have an incentive to make sure that their members are not faced with this kind of extremely stark choice. Parties alleviate the tension facing legislators while ensuring a better outcome for themselves by providing cover so that constituents find it more difficult to trace unpopular outcomes back to their legislator.

The previous chapters provided large-N statistical evidence in support of the balancing and cover arguments. In this chapter, I take a very different approach, examining the experience one caucus dealing with one controversial bill, looking at how the KMT legislators acted in the battle over the Financial Disclosure Law (FDL) in 1993. This bill was extremely popular among the general public but opposed strenuously by the KMT. In the legislative procedure, the KMT tried to provide political cover for its members to water down the bill while the KMT’s opponents tried to deny them that cover. In the end, KMT legislators were forced to make highly visible votes on amendments that their voters supported, and the KMT members deserted their party in droves. However, in examining the desertions, we find exactly the patterns predicted. The legislators least
likely to defect were the ones who we would predict faced less pressure from their principals to support the law.

**Background**

In mid-1993, Taiwan’s slow and steady transition to democracy was nearing completion. With the retirement of representatives elected on the mainland in 1947 and the first complete elections to the Legislative Yuan, one of the major institutional barriers to democracy was crossed. One of the first acts of the new legislature in 1993 was to confirm a new premier in office. In fact, the confirmation of Lien Chan marked the victory of President Lee Teng-hui’s Mainstream Faction in an intense struggle for control of the KMT. The outgoing premier, Hau Pei-tsun, was the leader of the old-guard Non-Mainstream Faction, which had its power base in post-war émigrés from the mainland in the military and security apparatus as well as in the state bureaucracy. With the growing importance of elections, Lee was able to displace the Non-Mainstream Faction by building a new coalition of native Taiwanese business magnates and local faction leaders.

These new elements extracted a cost from Lee, the KMT, and the government for their political support. During the booming 1980s, people who had been accustomed to Taiwan’s famous income equality became increasingly concerned about the growing gap between rich and poor as well as the increasing power of big business. Unlike in the past, when the KMT stood apart from big business, there was a growing perception of the governing party as the representative of the rich and powerful (Chu and Lin 1996). Similarly, the KMT became increasingly associated with the local factions who largely
shoulde red the burdens of winning elections. Most faction politicians campaigned on
clientelistic appeals and relied heavily on organizational muscle to deliver votes. This
style of campaigning is extremely expensive, and factions were commonly associated
with shady practices including graft, influence-peddling, and associating with gangsters.
Many also gained control of local credit unions and misallocated funds to finance their
operations. Of course, the KMT, now beholden to the tycoons and local bosses, was not
willing to step in and curb questionable business practices.

By the early 1990s, there was a growing dissatisfaction among the general public
with money politics in general. It was a promising atmosphere for a package of political
reforms, and the opposition proposed a program of what they call “Sunshine Bills.” The
first of these Sunshine Bills was the FDL, requiring public officials to declare their
financial assets.

From the DPP’s perspective, the FDL was overwhelmingly positive. It would
strike at the KMT’s electoral capacity by diminishing faction politicians’ ability to
compete for votes, it would help unravel the party-state complex left over from the
authoritarian era, its public declarations would provide a goldmine of ammunition for
enterprising reporters and DPP politicians seeking to expose KMT corruption, and the
political fight over the passage of the law would clearly burnish the DPP’s image as
honest and fair while tarring the KMT as the corrupt representatives of special interests
resistant to a badly-needed reform. A small number of DPP legislators ran traditional,
money-oriented campaigns and had extensive dealings with financial interests, and some
of these DPP members might have covertly opposed the FDL. However, these members
were always a minority and certainly did not dare openly oppose the bill.
Within the KMT, interests were more complex. Most members did not support the FDL because it struck at the foundation of their own political power. A majority of Mainstream KMT legislators were members of local factions or representatives of big business. However, while they controlled the party and defined its interests, they did not have a dependable majority in the legislature. The KMT won 102 of 161 seats in the 1992 election, including eight candidates who won without receiving an official KMT nomination, but many of these KMT legislators could not be relied on to vote with the party.

Non-Mainstream members were much more likely to support the reform. While it might weaken the party as a whole, it would do so by disproportionately striking at the Mainstream Faction. The most vocal KMT supporters of the FDL belonged to the New KMT Alliance, a group of Non-Mainstream legislators. The leader of the New KMT Alliance, Chao Shao-kang, had been a member of Hau’s cabinet until 1992, and he and several other members of the New KMT Alliance had been elected without winning an official KMT nomination because the Mainstream Faction had used its control of the party machinery to deny them nominations. Six members of the New KMT Alliance would eventually break from the KMT in August 1993 to form the New Party, but during the battle over the FDL, the New KMT Alliance’s relationship with the KMT was ambiguous. Some members were already preparing to split away while several other members and sympathizers were more committed to remaining in the party.

There was also another group of legislators within the KMT who supported the FDL. Many of these legislators were associated with a group called the Public Policy Round Table (hereafter: Round Table). This group, which included both Mainlanders and
native Taiwanese legislators such as Wei Yung, Ting Shou-chung, Lin Chih-chia, and Hsu Chung-hsiung, was composed of image-oriented KMT legislators advocating good-government reforms.

**The Different KMT Factions’ Principals**

For simplicity, we consider all KMT legislators to be one of four types: money-oriented, list, policy-oriented, and Non-Mainstream legislators.

The money-oriented legislators, those representing big businesses or local factions, dominated the KMT and defined its position. Their constituents were against the reform. It is important to recall that constituents can be subdivided into voters and special interests. The voters may have been in favor of the FDL, though it is likely that people who supported these particular legislators were not the citizens most concerned with corruption and money politics since they voted for faction leaders and big business representatives in the first place. The special interests, in contrast, were dead set against the FDL. Anti-corruption laws struck directly at the heart of their enterprises and endangered their futures. This group of legislators needed large amounts of money to buy the organizational muscle and renew the personal ties necessary to run an effective campaign. These intense interests against the law far outweighed the voters’ tepid interests for it. The money-oriented legislators wanted to kill the FDL, though they certainly would not have minded doing so quietly and inconspicuously. Since the money-oriented legislators were able to define the KMT position, there was little tension for these legislators in balancing the party’s and the voters’ interests. We expect them to support the party line.
The logic of list legislators was explored in depth in Chapter Five. It is very difficult for constituents to punish or reward list legislators. Because of this, list legislators generally look to satisfy only one principal, their party. They do not need to worry whether their actions are popular with constituents as long as they do what the party wants. We expect KMT list legislators to support the KMT position against the FDL.

The policy-oriented legislators faced a clear dilemma. While the KMT opposed the FDL, their constituents strongly favored it. Moreover, in the same way that we might expect that citizens supporting money-oriented legislators might not be terribly worried about corruption and money politics, it is likely that the people who voted for the policy-oriented legislators were precisely the citizens most concerned about these problems. In addition, the policy-oriented legislators generally ran issue-oriented campaigns rather than organizationally based campaigns. Their political success depended on convincing voters that they held shared ideals rather than on building up immense war chests. While this group was committed to their party, we expect them to bow to the pressure from their voters unless the KMT could provide sufficient cover to make their actions untraceable.

The Non-Mainstream legislators faced a similar situation. Their voters were also strongly in favor of the FDL. However, Non-Mainstream legislators had less of an incentive to satisfy their party than policy-oriented legislators did. The Mainstream dominated KMT was not particularly interested in giving positive sanctions to Non-Mainstream legislators, regardless of their actions on the FDL. The policy-oriented legislators were potential Mainstream allies on other issues; the
Non-Mainstream legislators were not. As a result, we expect the Non-Mainstream legislators to be even more responsive to their voters than the policy-oriented legislators are and to defect from the party line frequently.

**Defining Groups**

While it is easy to identify list legislators, it is not easy to identify members of the other three groups. Unlike Japanese factions, Taiwanese legislative factions do not have membership rosters, and they are not institutionalized or permanent. Membership is extremely unstable, with different newspaper reports identifying different people as members of a faction from day to day. There were always legislators on the fringes of the New KMT Alliance who were sometimes identified as members, sometimes as sympathizers, and sometimes not considered not to be part of the faction. If this was true for the New KMT Alliance, one of the best known and most stable of the KMT’s legislative factions, it was even truer for the Round Table, a faction that disappeared soon after the FDL showdown.

Rather than attempt to identify the people most likely to defect from the KMT, I attempt to identify the legislators in the two groups most likely to support the party line. Identifying the 23 list legislators is straightforward. Identifying big business and faction legislators is harder, though not impossible. I rely on two sources. The post-election coverage of *Xin Xinwen* (The Journalist), Taiwan’s most respected and influential political magazine, includes a story on the success of candidates supported by business conglomerates. The story identifies 20 successful candidates, 19 of whom were KMT members, with extensive ties to financial conglomerates (*Xin Xinwen* 302: 97-100).
second source identifies local faction politicians. A table in an article by Teh-fu Huang, a leading scholar of Taiwanese local factions, lists the percentages of votes gained in each district by faction candidates (Huang 1994: 82, Table 2). It is a relatively straightforward task to reconstruct Huang’s coding to obtain these figures. Using this coding, 46 legislators, 45 of whom were KMT members, can be identified as representatives of local factions. There is quite a bit of overlap between these two lists, so that we can identify a total of 48 KMT members, none of them elected from the party list, who were either business or faction representatives. These 48 legislators should be unlikely to defect from the KMT party line.

As noted above, 94 KMT nominees won seats as well as eight other KMT party members who ran without a KMT nomination. Several of the eight, including Chao Shao-kang, Wang Chien-hsuan, Hsieh Chi-ta, and Chou Chuan, never reconciled with the KMT leadership and eventually split off into the New Party. Three other New Party founders, Yu Mu-ming, Lee Ching-hua, and Chen Kuei-miao, were nominated by the KMT. In June 1993, this was the core group opposing the KMT leadership. All were nominally KMT members, but since they had only tenuous ties that they would eventually break, I do not consider them to be members of the KMT caucus. On the other hand, two (Su Huo-teng and Chen Ching-pao) of the other four legislators who won without a KMT nomination did eventually return to the party and become members in good standing. I code them as KMT members. The same applies to the third member, Wu Yao-kuan. Unfortunately, Wu died suddenly in May 1993. The fourth member, Chen Che-nan, defected to the DPP almost immediately after the election. Finally, Lin Yuan-shan, a legislator elected as an independent, joined the KMT after the election.
This leaves the KMT caucus with 95 members (94 after May 17). With 23 list members and 48 money-oriented members (47 after May 17), we classify the other 24 KMT members as either policy-oriented or Non-Mainstream legislators.

**The Legislative History of the Financial Disclosure Law**

At the heart of the FDL were the so-called “four mandatory” provisions. The stringent versions of the bill made it mandatory for officials to report all their financial assets (*qiangzhi shenbao*), for the government to ensure transparency by publishing these declarations (*qiangzhi gongkai*), for all assets above a certain minimum to be put into a blind trust (*qiangzhi xintuo*), and for penalties including fines and jail terms to be imposed for non-compliance (*qiangzhi chufa*). There were a few other points of contention, including whether the law should apply to village heads and lower-level bureaucrats and which agency should be responsible for receiving the asset declarations. However, the KMT chose to give in on all substantive provisions except two. First, they would not accept public disclosure of financial assets. Where the opposition coalition wanted to publish the asset declarations in a journal that would be made available in any library, the KMT preferred to require anyone wanting to see the declarations to get special permission from the Control Yuan. Second, the KMT would not accept putting assets into mandatory trusts.

The first stages of the FDL’s journey went relatively smoothly. When the Second Legislature convened for regular business in March 1993, the first bill that the Organic Statutes Committee took up was the FDL. Lu Hsiu-i (DPP) convened four joint meetings of the Organic Statutes, Interior, and Judicial Committees on March 11, 18, 24,
and 31, passing the bill in the last meeting. The committee had five different versions of
the bill to work with, including four member bills that generally featured more stringent
provisions and a government bill with much more lax provisions. However, as the
committee discussed the bill, the government representatives compromised and accepted
the tougher versions. Eventually, the parties reached a consensus and signed a formal
party-to-party agreement supporting the stringent version of the bill. Notably, both
KMT committee members and KMT government representatives, including Minister of
Justice Ma Ying-jeou, agreed to this version of the bill. The committee hearings were
conducted very amiably, and Lu was praised for having efficiently brokered a deal that
satisfied everyone (United Daily News (UDN), April 24, 1993, p 4; UDN, April 1, 1993,
p 3).

About a week later, the KMT began publicly expressing reservations about the bill,
especially the transparency and trust clauses. There was a backlash among both elected
officials and high government officials who did not want to comply with the proposed
rules. KMT whip Liao Fu-pen suggested that the bill should be shelved until after the
local elections scheduled for November. The KMT was careful to attempt to mollify
public opinion, as it would throughout the entire debate, by stressing that it was not
against the other portions in the FDL. Indeed, Liao hinted that the KMT would not
attempt to kill the bill; rather he would use delaying tactics to minimize any public outcry
(UDN, April 10, 1993, p 4).

The opposition response to the KMT’s new stance was defiant. Chen Shui-bian,
the DPP whip and member of the Procedural Committee, declared that he would use his
turn as Convener of the next Procedural Committee meeting to put the FDL on the floor
agenda and dared the KMT to try to revise it. Ting Shou-chung, a KMT member but a member of the Round Table faction and a staunch supporter of the FDL, declared that if the KMT tried to overturn the committee bill, he would insist on using public roll-call votes so that the public could assign blame (UDN, April 10, 1993, p 4).

In fact, the DPP was successful in putting the FDL on the floor agenda. The Procedural Committee met on April 13, with Chen Shui-bian as chair. The KMT should have been able to dominate the Procedural Committee since it held twelve seats and the DPP held only seven. However, one of the KMT seats belonged to Ting Shou-chung, so the real balance of power on fights over the FDL was eleven to eight. On this day, the KMT failed to mobilize its members, and the DPP motion to put the FDL on the floor agenda carried by a vote of six to four (UDN, April 14, 1993, p2). In response to this defeat, the KMT caucus and cabinet held a meeting on the April 14 at which they decided to use their majority on the floor to change the agenda before consideration of the bill began (UDN, April 15, 1993, p1). However, early on the morning of April 15 before the legislature began its proceedings, they reversed this decision and decided to let discussion of the bill begin. One reason they decided to let the bill go forward was the threat of public roll call votes. Ting Shou-chung reiterated his threat to request public roll call votes, and New KMT Alliance member Chou Chuan prepared a petition with the necessary signatures for a public roll call vote in case the KMT tried to change the agenda (UDN, April 15, 1993, p1; UDN, April 16, 1993, p2).

In the event, the KMT did not need to worry that the bill would quickly pass the

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22 There were twenty members on the full committee. The last member, Chu Kao-cheng, was an independent who supported the stringent version of the FDL. However, Chu was almost never present at the legislature. In fact, he was absent for 81% of all the roll call votes taken during the term, including all of the votes taken in the first session.
floor. There was immense demand among legislators to speak on this bill. Over fifty legislators signed up to speak, and many of the ones who thought their turn might never come invented procedural questions as excuses to express their views on the bill. During the two days that the bill was considered on the floor in April (the 15th and 29th), the floor conducted a general discussion and never advanced to clause-by-clause consideration. This need to talk effectively delayed the bill until at least the beginning of June, since May was devoted to passing the national budget.

In late May, as the battles over the budget wound down, the question of the FDL heated up again. The DPP put pressure on the KMT by announcing that all the members of its legislative caucus would publicly report their assets in a news conference scheduled for June 18. Facing the realization that the DPP intended to make the FDL a central issue in the November campaign and to avoid the appearance of having been pressured by the DPP members’ disclosures, the KMT decided to take the issue off the table by passing a watered-down version of the bill in early June (UDN, May 25, 1993, p3).

There was a problem with considering the bill in the first week of June. As rewards for “hard work,” several government ministries had arranged for their associated legislative committees to take fact-finding junkets overseas during this week. As a result, the KMT was missing about twenty of its members from the Economics, Finance, Defense, and Foreign Affairs Committees (UDN, June 1, 1993, pp 1, 2; UDN, June 11, 1993, p2). The KMT’s first option was to recess for the week. However, the vote to recess was taken late at night on May 28 after the end of the budget battle when many KMT members had already left and was handily defeated. The KMT might have used its control over the Procedural Committee to delay consideration of the FDL, but its
control was increasingly tenuous. One of its members had died, reducing its majority to two votes.\(^{23}\) Moreover, three other members seem to have been absent and possibly were overseas.\(^{24}\) In any event, the FDL was put on the agenda, and the KMT decided to try to stall until its members returned on June 8.

The opposition wanted to pass the bill quickly. They were worried about both the return of the KMT members and the possibility that one of the factions in the opposition coalition might defect and strike a deal with the KMT. To this end, Chen Shui-bian pleaded with his troops to economize on time by keeping silent or at least keeping their speeches short (UDN, June 2, 1993, p 2). More dramatically, the DPP and New KMT Alliance floor leaders introduced a proposal that the entire bill should be voted on as a single package. At one stroke, this would have averted most of the KMT’s stalling tactics, ensured that the opposition coalition was not divided by some clever KMT amendment, forced KMT members to vote publicly against either their party or their voters, and passed a bill advancing their interests. However, this proposal was quickly withdrawn. Members did not want it for two reasons. Publicly, they feared that allowing package votes would set a dangerous precedent. The Legislative Yuan was just starting to flex its muscles, and legislators were hesitant to yield their power to comb through legislative changes clause by clause. Perhaps more importantly, passing the bill in a quick package vote would have deprived many of them of the opportunity to make a credit-claiming speech on the floor of the legislature. In fact, immediately after the package vote was mooted, one DPP legislator began his remarks with the disclaimer that

\(^{23}\) KMT Procedural Committee member Wu Yao-kuan died on May 17, 1993.

\(^{24}\) KMT Procedural Committee members Shih Tai-sheng, Liu Cheng-hung, and Chang Wen-i did not either speak on the floor or vote in a roll-call vote during this week. Further, Shi Tai-sheng was a member of the Economics Committee, the committee that apparently accounted for most of the absent members.
he had planned to skip his turn speaking in the general debate so that they might pass the bill today, but because the possibility of a package vote meant that he might not have any future opportunities to speak, he was forced to take some time to express his views (LY Gazette vol. 82, no. 35: 15). As in April, the need to talk ate up most of the time on June 1. With opposition grandstanding, KMT delaying speeches, and a lunch break forty minutes longer than usual because of an air-raid drill, the floor had barely started clause-by-clause review of the bill before the allotted time expired and they had to move onto other business. There was only one roll-call vote taken, on the wording of the purpose of the law.25

On June 4, the opposition tried again, this time with the stated intent of passing the law. As before, lawmakers spent most of the day making speeches rather than actually voting on the clauses under review. The KMT also employed some dilatory tactics. In addition to making a few long-winded speeches, the KMT offered eight separate amendments on Clause 2, which concerned who would be required to report their assets. While this was a minor point of controversy, the KMT had been perfectly willing to compromise and there was certainly no substantive need for eight separate amendments. Rather than spend the time to hold roll-call votes on each amendment, the DPP caucus requested an early recess for lunch so that they could work out some compromise with the KMT. Unfortunately, the two sides were unable to agree, and after lunch they prepared for a marathon of meaningless voting. However, they avoided this by failing to attain a quorum. Clause 2 was set aside temporarily, and discussions were held on Clauses 3, 4, and 5. Votes on these less controversial clauses were also postponed.

25 This was a dilatory vote, but it did reflect the basic lines of cleavage over the FDL.
At about three o’clock, the floor finally began consideration of Clause 6, the clause concerning transparency. After another hour of discussion, Chen Shui-bian called for a vote to stop discussion and proceed to a vote on the clause. At the time, even though about half of the DPP caucus was missing, the opposition coalition members on outnumbered the loyal KMT members by about 43 to 25. However, the KMT frantically called as many members to the floor as it could, and Speaker Liu Sung-fan stalled for about a half an hour by allowing one more long-winded speech, debating with members on points of order, and discussing whether the new electronic voting system was broken or whether members simply were not voting correctly (UDN, June 5, 1993, p3). By the time the vote was closed, the KMT had mobilized sufficiently to defeat the motion 55 to 40. Since it was nearly 4:30, the end of the allotted time for consideration of the FDL, the DPP caucus proposed a motion that the session be extended until 8:00. By the time that debate over this motion finished, the vote was taken, and it was announced that the motion had failed 50 to 42, it was already 5:00, and the Speaker declared the floor would have to put aside the FDL and move on to other business.

The KMT had missed a golden opportunity. When they realized that they had a majority on the floor, they should have voted for the motions to stop discussion and extend the session. They could have used their majorities to ram through their watered-down versions of the controversial clauses and declared victory. Indeed, as the Speaker stalled and the KMT ranks swelled, some of the New KMT Alliance and Round Table members realized with horror that they were on the verge of losing everything. In fact, several of them voted with the KMT to ensure that the motions failed (UDN, June 5, 1993, p3).
Why did the KMT fail to take advantage of this opportunity? One possibility is that they simply did not realize their advantage quickly enough and communicate a new set of instructions to their members (UDN, June 5, 1993, p3). Another possibility is that the KMT expected this temporary advantage to melt away as the night wore on because many of its (money-oriented) members would leave for meetings, appointments, and banquets. Indeed, one report cited this expectation as the reason that the DPP wanted to extend the session until 8:00 (UDN, June 5, 1993, p3). A third possibility is that the KMT leadership doubted that their party discipline would hold together on a public roll call vote on the highly salient substantive clauses as it had on the less easily interpreted procedural votes to stop discussion and extend the session. Indeed, Lu Hsiu-i, the legislator who had shepherded the bill through committee and was its primary advocate on the floor, argued that the reason that Chen Shui-bian went ahead with the vote to extend the session even after losing the vote to stop discussion was that he believed the KMT’s discipline would wilt under the pressure of a public roll call vote (UDN, June 7, 1993, p2). Perhaps the most likely reason is that the KMT was simply sticking to its original strategy of stalling until its members returned from their overseas junkets. KMT leaders expected that, with their superior numbers, they would prevail the following week.

In the wake of this near disaster, the furious New KMT Alliance and the Round Table leaders accused the DPP of purposely trying to kill the bill through a clever procedural tactic. They claimed that Chen purposely brought up the motion when he knew there were not enough supporters present so that the DPP members who were there would all be able to vote for it while still effectively ensuring that an emasculated version
of the bill, if any, would be passed. In this way, the DPP members who were against the FDL would not have to declare their assets, yet the DPP would still be able to claim a position against corruption. Better yet, if the FDL failed, the DPP could continue to use the issue to bash the KMT in the upcoming local elections (Xīn Xīnwen 327: 23; UDN, June 5, 1993, p3).

After the weekend, with almost all of the KMT legislators back from their overseas trips, the two sides prepared for the showdown on June 8. On June 7, the New KMT Alliance held a strategy session among its members. After the June 4 loss, they feared the DPP might sell them out and cut a deal with the KMT to block the bill. To preclude this, they decided to use public roll-call votes to decide all controversial issues (Xīn Xīnwen 327: 23). By making the roll-call public, they would be able to blame the DPP if its members did not show up (UDN, June 6, 1993, p2), and they would force the KMT members to vote against a popular measure, tarring the KMT party image as corrupt.

On June 8, legislators once again spent all morning discussing the various clauses. However, unlike in previous sessions, many legislators who had signed up to speak chose to forgo this right, and the debate moved along quickly until all the clauses had been discussed. At around 3:30, the time had come to start voting.

The KMT tried one last gambit, offering two watered-down amendments to the two controversial clauses. Since amendments are voted on before the committee bill, if an amendment had passed, KMT members would never have had to vote on the most stringent versions. Unfortunately for the KMT, these alternate amendments failed. The KMT’s amendment to Clause 6, which would have required reporting but not disclosure of assets, failed 50 to 66. The KMT caucus was split, with 11 members
voting against and 4 voting present. On the subsequent vote, to report and disclose, KMT party discipline collapsed. The motion passed as the majority of the KMT caucus actually voted against the party’s position and for the stringent clause. The outcome on Clause 7, whether to require mandatory trusts, was similar. The KMT offered an amendment that would merely require officials to report any large transaction within 30 days. This amendment failed as 12 KMT members defected to the other side. On the subsequent vote to require placing assets into trusts the KMT caucus once again splintered, with 23 members voting for the clause. Note that in both cases, KMT members were much more loyal on the vote for the KMT amendment than on the subsequent vote for the more stringent measure. The remaining clauses were passed without much difficulty, and the bill finished its second reading.26

On June 11, the chamber convened again for what was expected to be a non-controversial third reading. The third reading is intended to allow corrections to any grammatical errors and revise the language to make it more elegant or precise. Legislators are not supposed to make any substantive changes to decisions taken in the second reading unless the clauses of the bill contradict each other. In most cases, the third reading is perfunctory, but on the FDL, there were numerous amendments proposed to polish or clarify the language. Discussion on what the clauses meant took several hours. When the sides finally agreed on the language, KMT whip Liao Fu-pen surprised everyone by objecting to the bill’s passage, claiming that the changes had altered the substantive meaning of the bill. Since there were not enough legislators present to vote

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26 The floor is supposed to wait until the next chamber meeting to pass the third reading so that legislators have time to review the wording of the bill and make sure there are no obvious technical flaws. Sometimes, especially at the end of a semi-annual session, the floor waives this requirement and proceeds immediately to the third reading.
and it was already 4:30, the bill was put aside.

Liao’s maneuver only bought the KMT four more days of bad publicity, as the KMT was roundly condemned in the media for this intransigence. On June 15, the chamber met again and after another full day of wrangling over the wording, it finally passed the bill.

The Influence of General and Parochial Interests

One reason that the battle over the FDL is a milestone in Taiwanese legislative history is that it was one of the first cases in which the new democratic logic manifested itself so dramatically. In previous legislative battles, the KMT could rely on its brigades of legislators elected in 1947 to raise their hands in support of the party’s position. The KMT government had become accustomed to telling its members what was expected of them and seeing its orders obeyed. Now, after the retirement of the senior legislators and the election of all seats in 1992, all legislators had to worry about constituents as well as their party. The need to appeal to voters was much stronger than the KMT had anticipated. Liao Fu-pen, the KMT whip, had been confident that his members would show up and vote with the party (UDN, June 9, 1993, p3). Instead, many of them broke ranks and defected to the opposition.

The need to appeal to voters caused the opposition coalition problems as well. They would like to have moved quickly and passed the FDL, but time and time again, their members preferred to use the chamber floor to make speeches rather than to take votes. This resulted in a classic tragedy of the commons dilemma. Each opposition member wanted the bill to pass quickly, and they would have preferred no one to make a
speech. Individually, however, they could not resist the temptation to make a quick
speech. Collectively, they did the KMT’s dirty work, stalling until June, until the KMT
members returned from overseas, and even delaying the final passage of the bill.
During the debates on April 15 and 29 and June 1, 4, and 8, DPP and future New Party
members got up to speak 76 times. During the same time, KMT members spoke 72
times. Since many of these KMT speeches were by FDL supporters, it is possible that
the FDL supporters made as many as two-thirds of all the speeches. Since stalling
played straight into the hands of the bill’s opponents, this is a dramatic illustration of the
need to appeal to voters.

The FDL in Committee

One of the more surprising aspects of the FDL’s path through the legislature is that it
passed so smoothly through committee. If the KMT wanted to block the bill, it should
have done so at this stage before public pressure became irresistible. However, the
KMT had not yet taken a stance against the stringent version of the FDL. It did not take
this antagonistic stance until the first two weeks in April, when party leaders began
hearing the opinions of the money-oriented legislators who dominated the party. Why
didn’t these legislators make their opinions known while the bill was in committee?
The answer is simple yet revealing. They simply were not there: money-oriented
legislators played almost no role in the committee hearings.

One reason that faction and business legislators were missing is that few of them sat
on the committees with jurisdiction. In Chapter Three, we found that a self-selection
mechanism governed the committee assignment process, and that rent-seeking legislators
preferred to sit on committees with rent-seeking potential. The FDL was jointly referred
to three committees. The lead committee, the Organic Statutes Committee, had almost
no rent-seeking potential. One of the other committees, the Judicial Affairs Committee,
also offered few rent-seeking opportunities, while the third committee, the Interior
Committee, had slightly better prospects for rent-seeking. Only ten of the KMT’s
twenty-four members on the three committees are coded as faction or business
representatives. However, two of these were party caucus leaders who were probably
busy with other matters, and another two were supporters of the FDL.

If one looks at who participated in the debate over the FDL, the money-oriented
legislators are even less prominent. Over the four committee hearings, legislators spoke
118 times. On the lead Organic Statutes Committee, eight of the ten members spoke.27
The two who never spoke were the two faction members. In fact, of the ten
money-oriented members on the three committees, only the two who supported the FDL
ever spoke. The only faction legislator who was an opponent of the FDL to speak was a
member of the Defense Committee. He spoke a mere two times, and he did not have
voting rights. To put it starkly, the relevant committees, poor in rent-seeking
opportunities, were shunned by money-oriented legislators more concerned with
satisfying their individual parochial interests. Moreover, those faction and business
legislators unlucky enough to end up on these undesirable committees did not waste their
precious time participating in committee hearings.

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27 The hearings were relatively dominated by the lead Organic Statutes Committee. 80% (8 of 10) of
Organic Statutes members spoke during the hearings. Only 20% (6 of 30) of Interior and Judicial Affairs
members spoke, not much higher than the 8% (10 of 121) of all other legislators who spoke during the
hearings. The Organic Statutes members spoke 44 times, the Interior and Judicial Affairs members spoke
36 times, and other legislators, who have speaking rights but not voting rights, spoke 38 times.
The outcome of the committee hearings was a bill that was better for reform and image-conscious legislators than the KMT would have preferred. In the same way that an Economics Committee loaded with money-oriented legislators might produce a bill more skewed toward their parochial interests than the entire caucus would prefer, the members of the Organic Statutes Committee collected their parochial “rent” in the form of more stringent provisions. The composition of the committee clearly affected what was passed. Moreover, the committee bill eventually passed the floor with only minor revisions. However, this was not merely a case of parochial interests run amok. The committee version was too much for the KMT to stomach, and the party attempted to reverse the committee’s decision on the floor. Had events played out to the KMT’s expectations, a watered-down bill would have passed the floor, allowing the reform-minded members to claim credit for passing an anti-corruption bill while not fundamentally challenging the interests of the money-oriented legislators. Parochial interests would have won a substantial, though acceptable, concession while general interests were protected. In fact, the KMT nearly obtained this result on June 4 and was shocked when it was unable to obtain it on June 8.

Finally, the overseas junkets that many legislators took in the first week of June are an apt metaphor for rent seeking in legislative committees. The junkets were not a convenient excuse for image-oriented legislators to be out of the county when a controversial vote was taken. If that had been the case, the KMT money-oriented and list legislators would have constituted a majority who could have passed their favored version of the bill. In fact, the legislators who were overseas were predominantly Economics and Finance Committee members, and twenty of the twenty-two KMT
members sitting on these two committees were faction or business legislators. Why were they out of the country just at the time their votes were needed to defeat the FDL? The fact that the relevant ministries scheduled junkets for the week after the budget was passed is a tip-off. The rent-seeking legislators who packed the Economics and Finance Committees, the two committees in richest in rent-seeking opportunities, were likely being paid off by the ministries for good behavior during the first session with an overseas junket.

The FDL on the Chamber Floor

The maneuvering over the FDL vividly illustrates the importance of providing or denying cover. One way to provide cover is to make the key vote a less easily interpretable procedural vote rather than a clear and transparent substantive vote. The KMT succeeded in providing this kind of cover on June 4 when it successfully opposed the opposition coalition’s attempt to stop discussion and move to a substantive vote on the controversial clauses and then to extend the session until the FDL was passed. While the ultimate substantive effect of the two votes was similar, KMT legislators found it much easier to stand with the party when the vote could be presented as a technical procedural matter. 43 KMT legislators voted on both the vote to extend the session and the stringent clause in the FDL. 16 voted with the KMT both times, and 5 voted against the KMT both times. Most interestingly, 21 voted with the KMT not to extend the session but against it to accept the stringent version of Clause 6. In other words,

28 Ideally, we would compare the vote to stop discussion on Clause 6 with the vote on the stringent version. However, there is a problem with the data on the vote to stop discussion. The Legislative Gazette names 45 legislators for and 45 against whereas the final tally is listed as 40 for and 55 against. Because of this, I substitute the vote to extend the session. This substitution does not substantively change the findings.
about half of the KMT legislators who voted both times toed the party line when a procedural vote provided cover but defected when the substantive vote denied them cover.

Similarly, the KMT tried to provide cover by offering watered-down amendments for two most controversial clauses. While these amendments were substantive votes, the logic is much the same as that for procedural votes. The watered-down amendment can provide cover. In this case, if the amendment requiring reporting but not public disclosure had passed, KMT legislators would have been able to report to their constituents that they had voted for reporting of assets and claim to be leading the fight for clean government. This obscures the issue since there was never really any doubt that this would pass, but it is nonetheless harder to interpret than a vote against the version requiring reporting and disclosure. 53 KMT members voted on both the watered-down and stringent versions of Clause 6. 23 voted with the party both times, and 11 voted against it both times. The remaining 19 legislators voted with the KMT on the watered-down amendment but against it on the stringent amendment. On Clause 7, the pattern was similar though less dramatic. Of the 56 KMT members who voted on both the KMT and opposition versions, 35 voted with the KMT both times, 11 voted against it both times, and the remaining 10 voted with the KMT on the watered-down version and against it on the stringent version. Cover made it much easier to stand with the party, and in both cases a large number of KMT legislators who were loyal when cover was provided subsequently defected when cover was missing.

In the wake of the opposition coalition’s near disaster on June 4, the New KMT Alliance and the Round Table accused the DPP of purposely trying to scuttle the FDL.
In effect, they were accusing the DPP of using a procedural vote to provide cover. DPP members would not have actually needed to vote against the substantive clause, and many voters would have had a hard time tracing responsibility for the death of the bill to a missed procedural vote. The response of the New KMT Alliance and Round Table was to complain to the media about this maneuver, explaining exactly what the DPP had done. They were trying to effectively turn the vote back into a substantive one by helping the voters trace the responsibility for the substantive outcome back to this procedural vote. If, unlikely as it seems, the DPP was trying to kill the bill, the New KMT Alliance and Round Table’s strategy was successful. Four days later, the DPP was back in the coalition that helped to pass the FDL.

More generally, the opposition continually used public roll-call votes as a weapon to make KMT legislators’ votes more traceable to their constituents. Time and time again, they promised to ensure that every important decision was made in a public roll-call vote. The KMT leaders were aware that public roll-call votes could make a difference. Vice Premier Hsu Li-teh, speaking with a group of KMT caucus leaders, argued that any votes taken should be secret votes so that legislators would not be pressured by the demands of a minority of citizens (UDN, June 2, 1993, p2). Most caucus members told the caucus leaders that they would vote against the stringent measures if they could do so secretly. However, many of these same legislators told the caucus leaders that they would not be able to vote for the party’s position in a public roll-call vote since they did not dare openly take such an unpopular position. They were willing to let the party collectively shoulder the blame, but they would not accept any individual responsibility (UDN, June 3, p2). In our terms, they were willing to vote with the party as long as their actions were
not traceable to their voters. In fact, the eventual roll call votes were even more accessible to regular voters than normal public roll call votes. The FDL was such a salient issue that the *United Daily News* printed a table on June 9 showing how each legislator voted on the stringent versions of Clauses 6 and 7.\(^{29}\) KMT legislators wishing to vote with their party against these popular clauses had no cover at all, and, not surprisingly, party discipline collapsed.

It is clear that the stringent version of the FDL passed because many members of the KMT defected from their party line. What we have not yet shown is that the members who defected were the ones whose voters disagreed most vehemently with the party line. As explained above, members of the Round Table and New KMT Alliance should have been expected to defect, while faction members, representatives of conglomerates, and list legislators should have been most likely to stay loyal to the party line. In fact, an extended beta binomial analysis\(^ {30}\) of the four controversial roll-call votes on Clauses 6 and 7 show that this is exactly what happened.\(^ {31}\) Using voting with the party line as the dependent variable and dummies for legislators associated with factions or conglomerates and for list legislators as independent variables, we find that both dummy variables have positive coefficients. The coefficient for list legislators is significant at the p<.05 level, and the coefficient for money-oriented legislators is significant at the p<.20 level (Table 7.1). In other words, these two groups of legislators were, as expected, less likely to

\(^{29}\) The *United Daily News*, one of Taiwan’s two newspapers of record, published 79 stories about the FDL on its first three pages from June 1 to June 11.

\(^{30}\) See Chapter Five for an explanation of extended beta binomial models.

\(^{31}\) On the second vote, the vote to report and disclose assets, the KMT’s position is defined as “against” even though a majority of party members voted in favor of the measure since we know from outside sources what the party position was. In the previous two chapters, the KMT position on this vote is defined as “for” since it is impossible to find outside sources and confirm each party’s position on each roll-call. This erroneous coding should bias results toward zero. It is possible that there are other cases like this in the full data set. In short, the results in the previous two chapters are conservative.
break ranks and vote for the more stringent versions of the FDL. The omitted category, which presumably contains New KMT Alliance, Round Table, and other KMT legislators more concerned with what the voters wanted than what the KMT leadership wanted, was far more likely to break party discipline.

This is not the normal pattern for money-oriented legislators. Looking at all the other roll-call votes in the Second Legislature, one finds that these legislators were generally far less loyal than both list legislators other KMT legislators. In other words, the FDL presented a clear case in which faction and conglomerate legislators behaved far more loyally than normal.

**Conclusion**

This chapter presents a concrete illustration of the patterns laid out in the previous chapters. KMT legislators were caught between supporting their party and supporting a popular position. When push came to shove, the KMT legislators we identify as having the least tension between their party and their constituents were, in fact, the least likely to defect from the party line. However, this was but the last step in the game. There were several examples of parties acting to alleviate the tension for their own members or exacerbate the tension for members of other parties. The DPP caucus was either guilty of a mobilization blunder or attempted to use a procedural vote as a means to kill the FDL without actually voting on the substance. The New KMT Alliance decided to demand public roll-call votes in order to deny DPP and KMT members cover, forcing them to take a public position that might be at odds with the preferences of their constituents. The KMT tried to avoid forcing its members to vote on the most stringent version of the
bill by substituting a water-down amendment, a tactic that, with much the same logic as a procedural vote, would have made it more difficult for voters to trace responsibility for the toothless law to their legislators.

One might argue that the FDL is a rather strange choice to illustrate the logic of meshing for at least two reasons. First and foremost, the KMT lost. The purpose of meshing is to accommodate parochial demands while not sacrificing core party interests. In this case, the core KMT interest in less stringent regulation was clearly compromised. Second, this project has, especially in Chapters Three and Four, tended to portray rent seeking as helpful to parochial interests and protecting the party image as a general interest. In the case of the FDL, these seem backward. The people engaged in dirty money politics represent the general party interest while the people who would clean up the corruption are casted as representatives of parochialism. In fact, these are strengths, not weaknesses, of the example.

The KMT ultimately lost the fight over the FDL, so it seems reasonable to ask if parochialism ran out of control. However, this is the wrong question because it assumes that parochialism was easily controlled in the first place. In fact, this case serves to illustrate just how strong the forces of parochialism are. When faced with a stark choice between general and parochial interests, legislators overwhelmingly opted to side with parochial interests. The only way that the party could possibly have won was to mesh general and parochial interests, and the KMT tried repeatedly to do just this. As we have seen, it was very nearly successful. The KMT lost only after its attempts at meshing were exhausted and it had to rely on brute party discipline. Rather than simply noting that the KMT lost, we should ask whether meshing increased the KMT’s chances
of winning. Clearly, it did. To put this more abstractly, meshing general and parochial interests serves not allow unfettered parochialism but to give general interests a better chance at prevailing. Meshing strengthens general interests.

Finally, casting corrupt legislators as representing general party interests and reformers as representing parochial interests serves to illustrate the generality of the problem. It is easy to understand how rent seeking and corruption can be associated with parochialism and might severely damage the general party interests. In fact, this is a common pattern of struggle between parochial and general interests, and I focus on it in Chapters Three and Four. However, parochialism can take many forms; it is not simply pork. High-minded policy can also be parochialism at times. The context, not the content, determines what is general and what is parochial.
Table 7.1: Extended Beta Binomial Model of Party Loyalty Among KMT Legislators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>4 FDL Votes on Clauses 6 and 7</th>
<th>All other 2nd Term Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money-oriented</td>
<td>.826</td>
<td>.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
<td>1.365</td>
<td>.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta Constant</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma Constant</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents the combined results of the model on five imputed data sets.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

A seemingly never-ending stream of angst over how democratic legislatures operate flows from the pens of political pundits. One has only to open the daily newspaper to see a concerned journalist wringing her hands over the cozy relationships between politicians and special interests or an indignant editorial decrying excessive and wasteful pork. Where are the great statesmen of yore who looked out for the broad interests of the entire nation?

Academic scholars have also questioned whether the legislators they observe are pursuing any common goals. To single out one particularly famous example, Grant McConnell questioned who representatives in the American system represented and what they strove to achieve. He argued that, “…a substantial part of the government in the United States has come under the influence or control of narrowly based and largely autonomous elites. These elites do not act cohesively with each other on many issues. They do not ‘rule’ in the sense of commanding the entire nation. Quite the contrary, they tend to pursue a policy of noninvolvement in the large issues of statesmanship, save where such issues touch their own particular concerns” (1966, 339). In McConnell’s view, members of Congress were only looking out for their narrow interests, or, more precisely, the narrow interests of the elites who controlled them. If there was any hope at all, it came from forces outside of the Congress. “Fortunately, not all of American
politics is based upon this array of small constituencies. The party system, the Presidency and the national government as a whole represent opposing tendencies. To a very great degree, policies serving the values of liberty and equality are the achievements of these institutions. Public values generally must depend upon the creation of a national constituency” (McConnell 1966, 8). Keep in mind that when McConnell wrote this, the United States had recently faced down the dangers of fascism but had not yet become bogged down in Vietnam, it had begun to address the unfairness of the Jim Crow system, and it had a booming economy with a fairly equitably division of wealth. Even in a period in which the United States seemed to have been capable of facing a myriad of challenges, McConnell argued that the system of representation made cohesive Congressional action impossible. Presumably, any successes had come in spite of Congressional action, not because of it. Was McConnell’s argument strengthened because this was a “most difficult case,” or was he simply overlooking something?

McConnell and others arguing in the same tradition are missing the point. What they see as abandonment of the legislative arena to particularist interests is only half of the story. It is true that legislators are concerned with satisfying their parochial principals. In fact, we might be legitimately concerned if elected representatives did not seek to defend the interests of their constituents. At the same time, legislators have often managed to pursue general goals. They do this because, in contrast with McConnell’s portrayal, they are highly integrated into the party system, and political parties, more than any other actors, have an interest in pursuing broad, national, general goals. However, pursuing these general goals requires first obtaining political power, and that, in turn, may depend partly on how effective individual legislators are at
satisfying their constituents’ parochial demands. Because of this, parties will often try to accommodate parochial demands, so long as they do not do excessive damage to the general party goals. That is, parties mesh parochial goals into their own general goals. Pundits have often noticed that the parochial goals are attained and cried foul. What they have paid less attention to is that general goals are also often attained. Satisfying parochial interests is not necessarily a sign of a legislature with no direction; rather, it is often the hallmark of successful meshing and a strong, healthy party system.

How does meshing work in practice? In this dissertation, I have explored some of the ways in which parties mesh general and parochial goals in the Taiwanese legislature. The broader comparative literature suggests a few other methods. We might group these various techniques into three categories: meshing in committee assignments, meshing in roll call voting; and meshing in constructing legislative packages.

The first category is meshing in committee assignments. In this dissertation, I argued that Taiwanese parties countenanced a system in which legislators more likely to engage in rent seeking won a disproportionate number of seats on money committees. However, I further argued that the majority party ensured that these legislators did not have too much power to blackmail their party through judicious use of multiple referral. High demanders got onto the committees they preferred, but the majority party ensured that those committees had oversized majorities so that the high demanders could not do excessive damage to general party goals (Chs. 3 and 4).

The literature from the United States also indicates the presence of meshing in committee assignments. Shepsle (1978) famously shows that committee assignments are systematically related to constituency interests, and this finding has often been cited
as evidence that individual legislators are not controlled or even influenced by their parties and that special interests, iron triangles, or subgovernments determine policies. However, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that this pattern is part of a much richer web in which parties play a central role. Committee assignments are not automatic. Loyal party member members are more likely to get desirable committee assignments than disloyal ones.

Even more importantly, there is a clear difference in the ways that committee assignments to different kinds of committees are treated. Some committees have uniform externalities. These committees, including the classic “control” committees, affect all members of Congress in roughly the same way. In other words, these committees deal with issues that are likely to be broad, national, and general. As we might expect, these uniform externality committees are not packed with preference outliers. Rather, parties assign these committee slots to members who vote with the mainstream of party opinion. Other committees have targeted externalities. The policies passed by these committees, which include classic pork-barrel committees such as Agriculture, Interior, and Merchant Marines and Fisheries, affect some members much more than others. That is, these committees deal with questions that are more likely to be particularist and parochial. In striking contrast to the uniform externality committees, the targeted externality committees are full of preference outliers. In other words, Shepsle’s pattern of unrepresentative committees is strongest precisely in the committees in which catering to parochial demands can do the least damage to general party goals. Party leaders put “interested” legislators on appropriate committees so that they can satisfy their constituents and continue to be elected, but the key party goals are not
determined by “interested” legislators or by preference outliers (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

The second category is meshing in roll call voting. While many studies have noted that legislators do tend to vote with their constituents, this is exactly what we would expect to see if parties mesh general and parochial demands. Parties should arrange things so that the outside world, especially constituents, sees legislators voting their districts while still managing to pass the policies critical to their general goals. Arnold (1990) discusses the idea of “traceability.” Legislators want their constituents to be able to trace responsibility back to them for some actions but not for others, and parties can help them in this enterprise. One way to make unpopular votes less traceable is to turn them into procedural questions. Procedural questions are more difficult for constituents to interpret than equivalent substantive questions. In this dissertation, I have shown that party cohesion is higher on procedural roll call votes than on substantive roll call votes in Taiwan (Ch. 6). This pattern has also been established in the literature on the US Congress (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2002; Cox and Poole 2002).

An alternative to asking legislators to cast an unpopular vote with the party on a murky question is to allow them to vote with their constituents against the party. If the vote is not expected to be close, allowing a few members to vote with their constituents will not change the outcome, but it may endear legislators to their voters. At the other extreme, parties may demand more loyalty on close votes (King and Zeckhauser 2003; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Some legislators face more pressure from their constituents to defect from the party line than others. Mixed electoral systems provide a particularly clear illustration of this, since district legislators have reason to be much
more responsive to parochial interests than do list legislators. We would expect meshing party leaders to hold district legislators to a much lower standard of party discipline, and, indeed, we find that district legislators are more likely to defect in roll call votes (Ch. 5; Kulishek and Crisp 2001; Moreno 1998; Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998).

Another method of meshing in roll call voting is to selectively allow some roll call votes to take place while disallowing others. In this dissertation, I have examined how parties can make it easier or more difficult for members of their own party or for members of antagonistic parties to toe the party line by demanding certain roll call votes (Ch. 6). Sinclair describes another use of selective votes in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Rules Committee gives each bill a special rule indicating which amendments will be allowed and what order they will be voted on. The majority party can use this power to allow its various factions to take a position voting for a version of the bill popular with their constituents before finally passing the party’s preferred version of the bill. Thus, legislators can credibly claim to be voting with their parochial interests while simultaneously upholding the general party interests (Sinclair 1997, 24-26).

The third category is meshing in constructing legislative packages. One tactic employed by party leaders in the U.S. House is to construct omnibus bills. By putting unpopular measures in with popular ones, party members can vote for unpopular measures critical to general party interests without overly offending their constituents (Sinclair 1997). A related tactic is to combine general and specific bills. Party leaders effectively buy the votes of party members whose constituents oppose a particular
measure with pork. These party members can claim to their constituents that they had to vote for the unpopular bill to get the desirable pork. Meanwhile, as a result of this “greasing the wheels” of government, the general party policy is passed (Evans 2004; Cox and McCubbins 1993, Appendix 4).

This brief review of the literature is not meant to be an exhaustive cataloguing of all possible past or future meshing techniques. Doubtless, there are still many techniques that will come to light with further research.

What this review does show is that many phenomena that have been cited as evidence that parties are impotent are, in fact, indicative of exactly the opposite. Those who presuppose that democracy ought to operate in a clean and straightforward way fail to understand that democracy is inherently messy. Different citizens have different priorities, and elected representatives have to struggle to reconcile these differences. Rather than deploring on the various side-payments to parochial interests, we might do better to admire the ingenuity that practical party politicians have shown in figuring out ways to advance their general interests even in the face of parochial opposition.
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