Immanent Shakespearing: Politics, Performance, Pedagogy

by

Todd Landon Barnes

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

Requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Rhetoric

and the Designated Emphasis

in

Film Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Shannon Jackson, Chair
Professor W.B. Worthen
Professor Linda Williams
Professor Peter Glazer

SPRING 2010
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Abstract

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Unlike much of the secondary literature on Shakespeare, “Immanent Shakespeares: Politics, Performance, and Pedagogy” labors less to determine what Shakespearean texts might mean than to explore the cultural work these texts do while working in conjunction with contemporary institutions of learning and technologies of performance. Shakespeare studies too often takes the determination (or destabilization) of meaning as its telos, even when it’s largely informed by performance criticism. This project sets meaning aside to focus on how Shakespeare’s textuality gets mobilized through performance in order to produce material effects—effects that exceed and shape semantic meaning. Semantic and hermeneutic vocabularies leave performance scholars very few terms with which they might interrogate performance’s most salient features: duration, embodiment, light, discipline or affect. Making and coming to terms with what Shakespeare can do inevitably involves refiguring the relationship between Shakespeare’s text and performance practices. In the dissertation, I argue that the field of Shakespeare studies too often figures the difference between textuality and performance spatially. These spatial models figure performance in prepositional relation to textuality: performances arise from the text or are interpretations of textuality. Performance has largely been understood as an interpretation of a Shakespearean meaning residing within a static (albeit polysemic) textuality. On stage or on screen, performance is continually represented as exterior to—and is considered over-determined by—textuality. My project, instead, figures the difference between stage/screen and page in terms of time.

This move, from figures of space to figures of time, forces a reconsideration of many disciplinary assumptions (in literary, film and performance studies). Cultural studies’ spatializing tendency, inseparable from the way it often figures difference (as “difference between” two discrete identities), is rooted in a long history of transcendental dialectics. Textuality and
performance are framed, spatially, in terms of transcendence (even when stage-centered criticism tries to invert this relation, prioritizing performance, it nevertheless continues to understand difference within a transcendental relation). My project moves from a transcendental, spatial understanding of difference to one rooted in immanent, temporal duration. Giorgio Agamben recently identified “two different trajectories in contemporary French philosophy, both of which pass through Heidegger: a trajectory of transcendence, which includes Levinas and Derrida and goes back through Hussurl to Kant; and a trajectory of immanence, which includes Foucault and Deleuze, and goes back through Nietzsche to Spinoza.” The dissertation works throughout to illustrate how this shift—from transcendental, spatial constraint to immanent, temporal production—allows for more nuanced discussions of elements constitutive of performance.

The project considers Shakespearean performance within a variety of institutional arenas; different chapters consider reading practices, teaching practices, student performance, theatrical enactment, and new (and old) media engagement. This approach entails a series of interlocking, close, rhetorical readings of particular performances, theatrical/filmic/video/digital media technologies, arts/educational legislation, as well as the institutional discourses accompanying each. These close readings work to refigure the problem of textuality and performance in civic, aesthetic and pedagogical discourses; each chapter, subsequent to this refiguration, ends by proposing innovative, practice-based solutions.

In Chapter One, I build on the critique of spatialized understandings of text and performance outlined in the introduction in order to argue that the humanities’ figuration of difference and power (alongside attendant assumptions about the relationship between self and structure) continues to hide more than it reveals about culture, history, power and performance. In the chapter, I argue for and illustrate what an alternative, immanent critique might look like. The chapter focuses on two “objects” (a methodological term which seems to point to how performance is always already spatialized): 1) a “radical” or “transgressive” performance of Macbush, a contemporary re-imagining of Macbeth, and 2) a seemingly co-opted, official, “normative” performance of Macbeth sponsored by Boeing, the “right-wing” NEA, and the US Department of Defense. The chapter examines these two ostensibly opposed productions by rehearsing a dialectical or “transcendental” critique and using a common (hackneyed) reading of de Certeau’s strategy/tactic distinction—one which emphasizes and prioritizes de Certeau’s interest in space. I then complicate this reading by showing how de Certeau’s figuration of power and performance within the panoptic city already includes an inclination towards an immanent understanding of power’s circulation—one that emphasizes time and complicates the spatial cartographies upon which dialectical movement finds its ground and proper “identity.” Through this immanent reading, I argue that dialectical understandings of culture and power rely upon a particular way of understanding the priority of space, one strengthened by Cold War discourses of cultural fronts and quantitative, incursive movements through homogenous space (both Macbeth and Bush, in prioritizing the stability of space over the contingencies of time, make this same tragic flaw in different ways). Ultimately, I argue that an immanent understanding of culture and power corresponds with contemporary changes in the shape of Empire and new ways of conceptualizing the flows of global capital, ways rooted in performance’s duration and affect. Further, this immanent reading (and the shape of Empire and history correlative to this approach) highlights the dangers of the Left’s reliance upon historical analogies that flatten important differences between Vietnam and Iraq or between Bush and Macbeth.
Chapter Two develops the notion of immanent critique by revisiting dualistic notions of self and structure in film theory and performance studies. In this chapter, I look at the spatial arrangement of spectators, specific media, and apparatuses of projection. Through a reading of Prospero’s Books, a 1991 “new media” film using proto-HDTV technologies and burgeoning CGI graphics software, this chapter looks at film's ability, through these technologies, to trouble film theory’s traditionally spatial understanding of filmic semiotics and the spectator’s relation to the (transcendent) filmic apparatus. This chapter introduces an immanent performance theory to film theory by offering a new reading of the latter’s key texts—from Munsterberg and Armheim, to Balazs and Metz, to Benjamin’s Artwork essay—highlighting along the way each theorist’s relation to the “immanent turn” in cultural studies. Key here will be the role each theorist gives to temporal relations. Particularly useful in rethinking the spectator’s relationship to the (new or old media) apparatus is Benjamin’s notion of “creative innervation”—a term he uses to show how the spectator’s body is productively enlivened, rather than negatively determined, by a technological apparatus which becomes, for him or her, a prosthesis. This chapter puts Benjamin into contact with Deleuze to sketch out what an immanent model of reception might entail once traditional notions of the filmic apparatus’ (over-) determinism have collapsed. This immanent understanding of filmic reception—a productive reception modeled in Prospero’s Books—builds upon various notions of “pseudopresences” and theories of “affective faciality/physiognomy” sketched out by twentieth century film theorists in order to rethink the presence/absence binary and the various ways in which this binary gets unevenly mapped onto the disciplines of theatre and film.

Chapter Three looks at how changing technologies continue to reconstitute the disciplinary gulf between film and theatre. In this chapter, I look at two interlocking performances: Richard Burton’s 1964 Electronovision Hamlet and the Wooster Group’s “new media” Hamlet. Working with Deleuze’s idea of “the theatre of repetition,” and continuing to work with Walter Benjamin’s notion of “creative innervation,” this chapter examines the technologies of repetition each Hamlet employs in order to read, write, and perform with the pre-recorded yet affective and “pseudopresent” specters of history. In July of 1964, three performances of the Burton-Gielgud Hamlet were recorded and edited together thanks to “miracle of Electronovision.” The resulting “Theatrofilm” was then screened for two days in over one thousand theaters in order to give audiences the “liveness” of a Broadway show right in their own local theater. Recently, the Wooster Group has been staging another version of Hamlet, one that utilizes the Isadora and Final Cut Pro platforms to digitally remix and reframe the Burton-Gielgud production as an historical background upon which the company acts. Onstage, The Wooster Group imitates the 1964 Hamlet gesture for gesture in what the group likens to an archeological reconstruction, but I argue for an alternate figuration, one that is less spatial and more temporal in its figuration of history. This chapter uses these two performances (and their contemporary technologies) to ask how the so-called “new” media differently mediate our relationship with the past. I argue that new technological interfaces enable us to engage in historiographical research on stages and screens in ways that are singularly durational and within registers that are incommensurate to the textual historiographies of journals and monographs. Each of the Hamlet productions I treat figures a relation to history, treating the past as an interactive ensemble of images that are engageable yet immutably scripted.

Chapter Four begins my engagement with critical pedagogy as I attempt to rework Freirean accounts of the classroom as a space of cultural contradiction and potential “liberation.” The chapter asks how we might instead see classroom practices as productive of
political, economic and ethical behaviors. Since the 1980s, critical pedagogy has rallied for the inclusion of “hip hop in the classroom” as part of a culturally relevant, Freirean model of connecting language with the lived experience of inner-city youth. But the movement begins to achieve success at the very moment hip hop begins losing its geographic specificity. Recently, a number of programs (“Shakespeare is Hip Hop,” “Shakespeare: the Remix,” and “Shakespeare in Urban Slang”) have sought to connect Shakespeare and hip hop as a way of bridging the divide between the spaces of high and low culture. In this chapter, I examine the strange effects of local, culturally specific pedagogical practices fusing Shakespeare and hip hop which—like the music itself—have been removed, practiced and copied outside of what was once their “proper” space. What happens when suburban youth are asked by their teachers to perform Macbeth in hip hop vernacular? YouTube abounds with blackface Shakespeare. More importantly, though, the chapter rethinks intercultural borrowing and how the logic of “appropriation” falsely frames culture as private property at the same time that young people who identify with remix culture increasingly strive for a “creative commons” and continually challenge the spatial proprieties of culture. This chapter puts the “culture wars” into dialogue with the “copyright wars” and argues that, in a world where the line between public and private properties and spaces is increasingly blurred by virtual localities, digital rights management software and copyleft legal theories, cultural studies needs to rethink the spatial logic of cultural appropriation.

Chapter Five brings immanent critique to the space of the classroom by examining another the Shakespeare teaching docudrama. These films, both fictional and documentary, chronicle “successful” pedagogues and the at-risk students whose lives they transform. In this chapter, I look at a few of these films alongside the No Child Left Behind Act’s legislation on “character education.” Performing a genealogy of the “character education movement” from the Greeks to 21st century US contexts, this chapter looks at the way in which Shakespearean repetitions operate to construct both a particularly American Shakespeare as well as a particularly American characterization of the student body. Centering on Prince Hal’s Saint Crispin’s Day speech, this chapter also explores the way in which discourses of national “character” and their corresponding pedagogies rely upon a particularly vertical (patrilineal, spatial, transcendental) notion of repetition and differentiation, one which might be refigured by Hardt and Negri’s notion of how the immanent multitude operates in time. This chapter moves from the performance of character to a notion of “performing character.” Much as earlier chapters refigured text/performance or apparatus/performance oppositions, this chapter shows how dialectical pedagogies might give way to durational, embodied performance pedagogies.

The dissertation’s concluding chapter, its post-script, uses the pedants of Love’s Labour’s Lost to engage in an interdisciplinary genealogy of the geek. I focus on three figures of the student body’s relation to technology (the bookworm, the computer nerd, and the drama queen) in order to better understand how the “geek” has gained increased importance as a category of social difference and exclusion. The conclusion asks: How does the alterity of the geek historically produce and trouble the mutual exclusivity of love and labor, humans and machines, males and females, the curricular and the extracurricular, and/or the physical and the metaphysical? As a means of overcoming learning’s alienation from the social, the dissertation concludes by introducing a “geek chic” performance pedagogy. This pedagogy uses training in digital video editing to include the social, and often virtual, extracurricular lives of students. Through editing their own performances (as they often already do within the world of social networking sites), students will rehearse the behaviors, gestures, expressions and temporal movements that constitute what we perceive as character. By examining these “character
effects,” students are trained to understand character differently—less as an originary space or cause of performance and more as a legible effect of performative behavior.
This dissertation is dedicated to my students at

John Swett High School, with whom I first learned to Shakespeare.
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Acknowledgements

I am deeply thankful to a number of teachers, readers, editors and interlocutors without whom this research would have been neither possible nor enjoyable. All of this work arises from my fortuitous location at the University of California, Berkeley, where I have been able to easily move between the Departments of Rhetoric, Performance Studies and Film Studies. I am most thankful for Shannon Jackson’s continuous help; her extensive comments and suggestions throughout this process have continually pushed my research to new and exciting places. I have learned so much working as her research assistant and watching her model rigorous teaching, research, and writing practices. If this dissertation serves to put various disciplinary figurations of Shakespeare into productive tension, I have Shannon to thank. I want to thank Bill Worthen for working closely with me as I made my way through the large field of Shakespeare and performance scholarship. Bill’s work on Shakespeare and the relationship between text and performance, as is obvious throughout this dissertation, has served as a point of entry for my entire project. He has been my mentor in Shakespeare and my closest ally in the field. I thank Linda Williams for her consistent guidance in this project. Beyond guiding me through the long history of film theory, Linda challenged and pushed me to make clear the stakes of my engagement with Deleuze. Linda, a generous teacher and reader, was always available to help me in person; more often, though, Linda disciplined my writing by functioning throughout as my imagined reader. Finally, I want to thank Peter Glazer for generously agreeing to help with my project and for providing me with critically needed—often heroic—support at key moments.

I must thank Marianne Constable for bringing Nietzsche, Foucault, Austin and Derrida to life for me. I do not know where I would be today without this experience. This project certainly would not be possible, and if it were, it would not have been nearly as joyful. Without Marianne, I would not know what it means to teach ‘rhetoric’. I am indebted to a number of Shakespeareans for insightfully editing much of this text, particularly Scott Newstok, Ayanna Thompson, and Andrew James Hartley. The work of Bryan Reynolds and the Transversal Collaborators inspired me before I ever entered graduate school, and this inspiration only grew along with our friendship. Any and all contributions I make here to pedagogy would not have been possible without the inspiring research and civic engagements of Pedro Noguera and Ernest Morrell, both of whom opened new worlds to me and taught me the value of praxis. For teaching me the value of film production in education, I am thankful to Jeffrey Skoller. I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to regularly share and revise this work alongside brilliant peers at the Shakespeare Association of America, the American Society for Theatre Research’s Shakespearean Performance Research Group, the Association for Theatre in Higher Education’s Performance Studies Focus Group, and UC Berkeley’s Hip Hop Studies Working Group and Deleuze Working Group.

A number of artists opened their doors to me, making this research possible. I want to thank The Wooster Group’s Liz LeCompte, Reid Farrington, and Kaneeza Schaal, the African-American Shakespeare Company’s Sherri Young, and playwright Michael Hettinger for their energy, insight and candor. Many others deserve my deepest thanks: Carol Clover, Judith Butler, Michael Wintroub, Kristen Whissel, Sharon Marcus, Emily Carpenter, Nina Billone, Mona Bower, Michael Winetsky, Vincent Tafolla, Sonja Bertucci, Brooke Belisle, Norman Gendelman, Matthew Bonal, Daniel Archuleta, Anne Hallett, Gary Budd, Tom Hurley, Terry Fukunaga, Alain Jourdenais, and Maxine Fredericksen—only you know the extent to which your critiques, research, advice, and support have helped me along the way.
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Therefore my verse to constancy confined,
One thing expressing, leaves out difference.

--Shakespeare, *Sonnet 105*

[I]t is rather a question of producing within the work
a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of
all representation; it is a question of making movement
itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct
signs for mediate representations; of *inventing vibrations,*
*rotations,* *whirlings,* *gravitations,* *dances or leaps which*
directly touch the mind. This is the idea of the man of
the theatre, an idea of a director before his time.

--Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*

There is no “being” behind doing,
effecting, becoming.
The “doer” is merely a fiction
added to the deed—the deed is everything.

--Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*
<<An Introduction>>

Surveying an Unstable Field: Formulating a Shakespearean Literary, Cultural, Film and Performance Studies
The vast and varied field of Shakespeare studies has always been a generative site for explorations and debates about the nature of repetition, difference, and adaptation. As Sonnet 105 illustrates, tensions between “constancy” and “difference” often appear within the works themselves. Shakespeare’s privileged location in these inquiries springs largely from the qualitative diversity, massive quantity, and remarkable duration of Shakespearean repetitions. This amorphous thing we call “Shakespeare,” more than almost any other literary or theatrical cultural object, has subtly dispersed itself throughout our history, our language, and our culture in what seems like an infinite variety of material incarnations: in theatrical performance, in the ubiquitous Renaissance festival, in literary spin-offs (from Updike’s Gertrude and Claudius to Kalyan Ray’s Eastwords), in filmic adaptations (from Edgar G. Ulmer’s Strange Illusion to Aleta Chappelle’s Macbett (The Caribbean Macbeth)), in television episodes (from Family Matters to Slings and Arrows), in public educational infrastructures and correctional, rehabilitative judicial programs (from Shakespeare Behind Bars to Macbeth at Sing Sing Prison), in comic books (from Captain America to Japanese anime), in national arts programs, in video games (from the Forest of Arden to The Bard’s Tale), in advertisements, in the form of action figures and other kitsch, and the list goes on ad infinitum.1 Shakespeare’s cultural force and reach need not be argued here or anywhere else; it is self-evident. The question of Shakespeare scholarship, instead, inevitably becomes: “What relationship do each of these Shakespeares maintain with each other? Or with us as spectators or cultural consumers/producers” or, as is more often the case, “What relationship do the Shakespeares of the present maintain with those of the past? Or, what relationship do the Shakespeares of the past maintain with us in the present?” However, when we ask such questions—and we surely should ask such questions—we unfortunately risk lapsing into familiar and timeworn rhetorics of derivation, determination and dialectical relation.

The field of Shakespeare studies remains, by and large, partially frozen in the polarized formation it assumed during the culture wars, with some scholars (more than we would like to acknowledge) arguing for outmoded filial models which value Shakespeare’s text as the locus of sacred originality, transhistorical truth, or humanistic genius while other scholars (continuing in the vein of a 1960s Hegelian-Marxist tradition of cultural hermeneutics) argue, perhaps reactively, that revolutionary potential remains dormant within the text’s polysemy and/or within the radical, oppositional potential of the corpus’ theatrical or filmic performance. Both of these discourses (textual and performance-based), however, arise from constituent historical (as well as ethical and political) cosmologies and discursive regimes that position every Shakespearean historiography as a comparative historiography. This desire to position every Shakespearean difference as a difference between past and present, origin and copy relies upon and is limited by a reductive notion of historical repetition, a particularly spatial notion of repetition which sees every performance as an interpretation of a text (where the text or its “sub-text” raises the specter of a Platonic metaphysics—what Jerome McGann appropriately dubs as a form of textual

When we think of Shakespearean repetition in these spatialized terms, we are forced to figure every adaptation as either radically oppositional or ideologically oppressive. When we determine the relationship “between” two Shakespeares to be one of difference, we mistakenly understand this difference through an external (often transcendental) logic of mediation and determination. Within this understanding of difference, an historical force (discrete from our present moment), a textual integrity, or a technological-ideological apparatus determines what performance can mean or do. This project moves Shakespearean cultural studies in the direction of an alternative logic of difference and repetition as they relate to performance, and this logic is rooted in philosophies of immanence. Furthermore, whereas Hegelian-Marxist imaginings of difference rely upon spatial figures (such as margin/center, superstructure/base, or spatialized time understood as progress) in order to understand difference, repetition and identity, immanent imaginings foreground the importance of time and durational change in the reconstitution of spatial integrity.

In his “La conception de l’a différence chez Bergson,” Gilles Deleuze remarks that “difference is not a determination but, in its essential relation to life, a differentiation.” It is with this subtle but crucial distinction that this dissertation will concern itself. The dissertation asks, “How does thinking in terms of irreducible differentiation or vital difference not subsumed to identity provide a way out of the field’s (often disciplinarily inflected) current impasses?” The vast majority of Shakespeare scholarship consistently positions performances of Shakespeare (and here I mean ‘performance’ in the broadest possible sense), on the one hand, and a more authoritative or simply prior Shakespeare, on the other, into just such a reductive logic of determination, a logic which ignores an immanent understanding of difference all together. Dialectical models figure contemporary Shakespearean performance as either a) determined by the identity of past performances, or b) determining the identity of past performances. Even if this determination works both ways, the dialectical model still imagines difference as an interaction between what it presupposes are two discrete identities. In this way, difference as “difference between” remains subordinate to identity.

Deleuzian difference, however, precedes identity; identity, for Deleuze, exists only after one has banished internal, vital difference (a differing in time which forecloses identity). This dissertation aims to bring this kind of vital difference back into the field of performance studies. The “linguistic turn” in critical studies, for all it has given us—and it has given much—still keeps us treading the same negative ontological ground, a representational ground incapable of positively accounting for the durational and affective “vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps” which are constitutive of performance. What remains to be explored is how Deleuze’s positive ontology might give back to performance studies what it feels it has lost in the wake of critical studies’ fixation on linguistic irreducibility. Antonin Artaud (whose Nietzschean project Deleuze also takes up) once asserted that “[t]o break through language in order to touch life is to create or recreate theater” and that “it is essential to put an end to the subjugation of the theatre to the text.” But how do we talk about “life” behind, below, or beyond language without falling prey to textual idealism’s metaphysics or simply substituting

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behind graphematic or oral language a more fundamental or prior language system (as film studies attempted to do with the Esperanto movement)? These twin dangers will haunt this project, but I am convinced that engaging with Deleuzean immanence is worth the risk if it allows us to move beyond the disciplinary impasses that have stalled performance studies, film studies and literary studies for too long.

This project begins, then, with an attempt to move away from a theater of representation and towards a theater of Deleuzean, differential repetitions. Deleuze argues that the Hegelian-Marxist tradition “remains in the reflected element of ‘representation’, within simple generality” and thus “creates a false theatre, a false drama, a false movement.” For Deleuze—and within this project—historical, cultural, theatrical and filmic movement will be conceived of in ways that push against the false constraints arising when we prioritize identity, stasis, and space over becoming, change and temporality. Philosophies of opposition, from Plato to the modern-day dialectician, begin their analysis of cultural antagonisms by locating oppositions, oppositions that presuppose two identities involved in a mediated struggle. Deleuze urges us, instead, to think of cultural antagonism in terms that are “not opposition, not mediation, but repetition.” In Deleuze’s theater of repetition, “we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters.”

This desire to directly engage the cultural forces figured as constituting (rather than acting ‘upon’) organized bodies and characters, what Deleuze calls the “theatre of repetition” risks pushing us dangerously close to numerous metaphysical, logocentric traps (as is evident in the phrases “directly on the spirit” and “language before words”) which lie in wait at every turn, but as I hope to show, the ethics and politics of such a theatre will be worth the gamble if we risk opening the door, even slightly, to what Deleuze boldly calls the “theater of the future.”

7 Ibid., 10.
8 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 8. Judith Butler, in her Subjects of Desire, is explicit about this risk. Against the ontological, affective multiplicity Deleuze posits as the constitutive substrate of life, Butler argues that “The postulation of a natural multiplicity appears, then, as an insupportable metaphysical speculation on the part of Deleuze.” However, in the preface to the paperback edition, she might be qualifying this claim when she writes that “The final chapters on Deleuze, Lacan, and Foucault . . . represent first forays into material that I have since come to understand deserve [sic] a more complex consideration.” Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; forward to the paperback version, 1999), 214, viii.
Transcendent and Immanent Trajectories

We learn from Daniel W. Smith that Giorgio Agamben has “identified two different trajectories in contemporary French philosophy, both of which pass through Heidegger: a trajectory of transcendence, which includes Levinas and Derrida and goes back through Husserl to Kant; and a trajectory of immanence, which includes Foucault and Deleuze, and goes back through Nietzsche to Spinoza.” In Shakespeare studies, we are already intimately familiar with the Derridean notion of difference (différance). Like Deleuze, Derrida works to destabilize notions of identity and opposition, but unlike Deleuze, Derrida operates on along the trajectory of transcendence by approaching the always already mediated object. We might, here, think of any Shakespearean performance as being always already mediated by bodies, history, the filmic image, or even textuality. Derrida attacks the dialectic by looking at the relations between its two terms (between an initial instance of Shakespeare and its subsequent repetition), showing their difference, their relation through a logic of contagion (the supplement, the pharmakon, the parasite, iterability, etc.). For Derrida, neither term in the dialectic attains purity, plentitude, identity-with-itself, or self-presence, and he shows, especially at the level of language, how each term—lacking the transcendental signified in Man, God, or the Author—is always already ruptured and breached by the Other in an infinitely expanding and determining context. Derrida’s critique of logocentrism (an assumption of pure presence in all its pristine plentitude which is uninfected by a constitutive ontological iterability) has, in some ways, pulled the rug out from under theatrical discourses grounding their arguments against textuality in the “liveness” or “presence” of the theatrical event.

Deleuze is useful here in that he attempts to think “difference in itself” or unmediated difference without falling prey to a metaphysics of presence. This calls for a great effort to risk thinking difference outside of or before representation, to find a sub-representative difference outside of what he calls the “four shackles of mediation”: identity, analogy, opposition, and resemblance (a terrain upon which most Shakespeare studies scholarship is content to rest). At this sub- or non-representational level, before the “rough” formation of an identity that might allow for the dialectic, Deleuze discovers the chaotic, monstrous “milieu of overlapping perspectives, of communicating distances, divergences and disparities, of heterogeneous potentials and intensities.” This is what Deleuze calls the “plane of immanence,” and it comprises the field of differential forces that underlies the rough surface of representational (linguistic or otherwise) epiphenomena. Deleuze argues alongside Foucault that “Power ‘produces reality’ before it represses. Equally it produces truth before it ideologizes, abstracts or masks.” This does not mean that we ignore identity or ideology; instead, it means that these

10 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 29.
11 Ibid., 50.
elements “do not constitute the struggle between forces but are only the dust thrown up by such a contest.”\textsuperscript{13} It is only through such an immanent ontology that we might begin to come to terms with (and create terms with which we might be able to “come to terms”) antagonistic forces struggling within the nonrepresentational, durational and affective movements constitutive of performance. These forces are not forces of signification; they are intensive forces which are not symbolic at all. Brian Massumi, examining image and affect, explains the importance of Deleuze’s shift from semiotics to an immanent cultural theory:

> Approaches to the image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on the semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined (linguistically, logically, narratologically, ideologically, or all of these in combination, as a Symbolic). What they lose, precisely, is the expression event— in favor of structure. Much could be gained by integrating the dimension of intensity into cultural theory. . . . The problem is that there is no cultural-critical-vocabulary specific to affect [or intensity]. Our entire vocabulary has derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure.\textsuperscript{14}

One goal of this dissertation will be to explore how a Deleuzian vocabulary might help us come to a more nuanced understanding of the intensity and temporality of performance.

What is more important, though, will be the way this new immanent understanding of performance intersects with and reinvigorates the politics of subject formation, education, and collective action while it helps us rethink the relation between structure and self. When we bracket and temporarily set aside a logic of determination, the dialectic, and its legacy of oppositional, identity politics and enter Deleuze’s immanent ontology, we do not necessarily move into a level of abstraction far removed from the thrust of these strategies (an accusation leveled against poststructuralism generally and, even from within poststructuralism, leveled at Deleuze specifically). If anything, the transformative potential at the heart of an immanent ontology will only allow our collective efforts towards justice (or towards a more politically and ethically sensitive notion of political action) to become more insidious, more nuanced, more transformative and, most importantly, more appropriately shaped in relation to the shape of sovereignty we today encounter.

The shape of sovereignty, according to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, is undergoing change as we move from a transcendental model of imperialism into an immanent model of Empire. In their book Empire, Hardt and Negri bring Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence onto explicitly political terrain.\textsuperscript{15} For this reason, the work of Hardt and Negri is integral to my project as it describes performance, pedagogy, and politics as they relate to philosophies of immanence. Hardt and Negri argue that in the age of Empire, there is no “outside” or position external to workings of biopower. The describe how “the elements of the so-called superstructure” are now relocated “within the material.”\textsuperscript{16} Hardt and Negri describe their political philosophy of immanence thus: “[w]hat the theories of power of modernity were forced

\textsuperscript{13}Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Foucault}, 29.
\textsuperscript{15}Deleuze’s work is always political, but Hardt and Negri make Deleuze recognizable as a “political” thinker to readers steeped in more Marxist notions of the “political.”
to consider transcendent, that is, external to productive and social relations, is [in Empire] formed inside, immanent to the productive and social relations.”

This enfolded interdependence of inside and outside (structure and self, text and performance, apparatus and spectator) will be crucial for my project. In *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, their follow-up to *Empire*, Hardt and Negri go even further in elaborating the productive biopitical potential of the multitude (a collective without a unifying or oppositional identity which is defined instead by its movement, its acting in common) and its ability to create and transform power relations. In the move to Empire, spatialized differences (inside, outside, mediation between) become less important than temporal flux (transformative movements, the reconstitution of spaces). Thinking in terms of the temporalization of space (as change) instead of the spatialization of time (as movement) will be necessary in developing a new politics of the multitude.

For this reason, my project will continually train its focus on occasions when performing Shakespeare not only “marks” a difference between the authoritative Shakespeares of the past and the insurgent Shakespeares of the present (a spatialized temporality), but when instead, performing Shakespeare, as a durational event (a temporalized space), “complicates,” “creates” and “transforms” the aesthetic and ethico-political relations which constitute our millennial culture. In thinking of Shakespearean production as an event with duration, it might help if we rid ourselves of the nominalized and proper form of the word “Shakespeare.” If productions “of Shakespeare” or productions “of Shakespeare’s texts” are to give way to thinking about Shakespeare as a process by which we produce meaning and change as a culture, we might then try thinking about *Shakespearing*. “Shakespeare” is not a site or space of cultural production; Shakespearing is an activity which produces the texts, the sites, and the institutions which we retroactively imagine as primary. Nietzsche, here, offers the perfect aphorism for this kind of immanence: “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”

Deleuze reminds us that difference is not an external or prepositional relation between two (or even an infinite number of) nominalized and mediated discrete identities. For this reason, it is unproductive to talk about the difference “between” two Shakespeares (a study upon which many a Shakespearean tomb has been founded). Instead, he tells us that difference is an activity, and that “we must therefore say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression ‘make the difference’.” My project will attempt to map out the various ways we, as academics, teachers and artists, might put Shakespeare to use or into movement, in order to

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17 Ibid., 33. Similarly, Foucault argues that “we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests.” *Discipline and Punish*, 27 (my emphasis).

18 D.N. Rodowick, in his seminal introduction of Deleuzean scholarship within film studies, argues that “Understanding duration means conceiving the temporalization of space as change, rather than the spatialization of time as ‘movement’.” This definition of duration will be crucial to my project. D.N. Rodowick, *Deleuze’s Time Machine* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 52.


“make a difference.” I use the expression “make a difference” in order to convey its colloquial sense, inflected as it is by an ethical desire for justice, but I also intend to look at how “making difference” might operate in the ontologically-specific sense evoked by Gilles Deleuze. Ultimately, I hope to show how these twin tasks—the ethico-political desire to make a difference, and the creative and transformative aspirations of an immanent, differential ontology—are already bound up with each other.

This dissertation aims at an intersection (or better yet, an interaction) between theory and practice, and it is guided by the understanding that “[p]ractice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another.”21 Likewise, this project has a twofold methodology: I will be examining how various theoretical understandings of the relationship between Shakespeare and performance have been understood and articulated; also, I will be looking at singular performance practices, durational events—on stages, on screens, in streets, and in classrooms—in order to examine how material practices create and move us towards new theoretical conceptualizations of the field of Shakespeare and performance. Each chapter engages with theoretical frameworks, institutions and performances in roughly two historical moments: what we might call the “long 1960s” and the present. The critical literary and pedagogical theories of the 60s (with their various modes and models of cultural study, informed as much by nineteenth century German Idealism as by French Marxism or Structuralism) are read alongside contemporaneous institutions and performances. Each chapter also aims to show how, in order to come to terms with 20th and 21st century Shakespearing, we must remodel outmoded, space-based and oppositional forms of critique. Each chapter illustrates how we might refigure these spatializing modes and models in order to produce engaging, relevant artistic practices and academic discourses that fully acknowledge and explore both performance’s temporality and the way this thinking-through-time better attunes us to power’s functioning in the millennial age of Empire. We can begin with an examination of the critical debates within the field of “Shakespearean cultural studies” to date.22

22 I take the term “Shakespearean Cultural Studies” from Douglas Lanier’s “Shakespearean Cultural Studies: An Overview,” an article which charts the “past 15 years of scholarship in Shakespeare’s cultural afterlife.” In Shakespeare studies, Lanier points out how the political and theoretical movements of the 1960s (especially as they relate to the study of Shakespeare and Film) were most acutely felt and registered in the 80s and 90s. Shakespeare 2:2 (December 2006): 228-48, 228.
Let us look at the field of Shakespeare and performance as it stands today. To couple the terms “Shakespeare” and “performance” gives local habitation and a name to an emerging field. This new discursive and interdisciplinary space was, in the 1960s, nothing more than an intersection at the shared corner of various disciplines and discourses. Using broad strokes, one might paint these disciplines as literary studies, performance studies, and film studies (along with their respective theoretical counterparts). Within these broad strokes, one might also find traces of semiotics, speech-act theory, anthropology, cultural materialism, deconstruction, new historicism, phenomenology, psychoanalytic theory, or continental philosophy.

This intersecting of disciplinary territories, while providing fruitful and innovative cross-disciplinary approaches to old problems, has also enjoyed its share of conflict. We too often perceive these conflicts as oppositions between various “camps” in the academy, but I’m getting ahead of myself here. At one epicenter of the “culture wars,” we find the “Bardbiz” debate. Those scholars writing from the perceived margins in attempts to de-center the Western canon have historically viewed the terrain of Shakespeare studies as the front line in a war between those who would maintain and those who would attempt to rearrange power relations within both the academy and broader, “popular” culture. Michael D. Bristol, reporting on the front lines of the so-called “Bardbiz affair,” a debate which occurred in the London Review of Books between February 1990 and September 1991, describes the conflict as one fought between cultural critics who view Shakespeare as a “numinous source of binding cultural authority” and a “group of British academics who rally together around the doctrines of cultural materialism.” Within the humanities, these wars continue to rage between what Bristol describes (from what he claims is a middle position) as “an adversarial culture within the academy” and the “apparently naïve view of Shakespearean authority as flowing naturally from the intrinsic properties of the works.” Not much has changed in this regard since the Bardbiz affair. If anything, the only change has been that each camp has become more self-contained, denying the existence of any other camp.

The field of Shakespeare and performance holds within its expanding borders both those accused of naïve, essentialist humanism and those charged with advocating a “disorienting moral relativism,” as well as a number of less extreme or more nuanced positions which manage to escape this crudely-drawn opposition. As these “opposed” discourses converge and overlap, mutually inclusive *topoi* become recognizable as points of contention. Key issues around and through which various disciplinary assemblages congregate include issues of authorship, authority, textuality, performativity, mediation, presence, intentionality, as well as issues of textual and historical fidelity. These key issues are all taken up in what is now often referred to as the “text vs. performance” debate. The contours and history of this debate form a crucial part of my project.

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23 An event which registers the institutional convergence of these terms would be the publication of the Blackwell *Companion to Shakespeare and Performance*, Eds. Barbara Hodgdon and W.B. Worthen (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 12.
27 For the text-performance debate, see W.B. Worthen’s “Disciplines of the Text/Sites of Performance,” and Jill Dolan, Joseph Roach, Richard Schechner and Phillip B. Zarrilli’s
Literature departments have, for the most part, given their exclusive imprimatur to a decidedly “textual” Shakespeare. Even when they spend a significant amount of time and energy working with Shakespeare in performance, it is often just that—the nominal Shakespeare prepositionally predicated by that external thing (of nothing): performance. The view that Shakespeare’s works comprise the textual embodiment of his authoritative intentions available to all successive generations continued (and still continues) long after the proclaimed death of the author. Often within this text-centered approach, the legitimate role of performance remains nothing more than a “realization” of authorial and thus authorized meanings immanent within Shakespeare’s texts. Terence Hawke describes how “[t]raditionally, critics, producers, actors and audiences of Shakespeare have assumed, . . . that the ‘meaning’ of each play is bequeathed to it ab initio and lies—artfully concealed perhaps—within its text.”

Despite this tendency, an increasingly interdisciplinary academe, influenced by a host of alternative, post-Barthesian hermeneutical approaches to Shakespeare’s texts, has allowed for the rise of a strain of “performance criticism” which views “Shakespeare,” whatever this might be, as first and foremost a phenomenon which happens on stage. J.L. Styan, a strong proponent of “stage-centered criticism,” in his seminal book The Shakespeare Revolution, opposes text-centered approaches, arguing instead that “the first and last values of drama are revealed in the response of an audience in a theater, and all else must be secondary and speculative.” Styan was later joined by Gary Taylor and Richard Levin in what may now be seen as only the beginning of many Shakespeare revolutions to come. This new stage-centered criticism provided the much-needed, progressive challenge to the overwhelming popularity of a literary Shakespeare. Stage-centered criticism also, admirably, fought against what Styan claimed was a “chasm between acting and criticism.” Styan and others believed that only a stage-centered approach to Shakespeare could narrow this disciplinary and institutionally-supported gap between theory and practice.

Harry Berger Jr. staged (or penned rather) an intervention into this oppositional debate between Styan’s stage-centered approach and the more traditional literary approaches to Shakespeare. Berger’s intervention, in Imaginary Audition: Shakespeare on Stage and Page, aims at finding a middle ground between what he refers to as “wide-eyed playgoing” and “slit-eyed analysis,” but ultimately his harshest criticism is reserved for those who subscribe to exclusively stage-centered analysis of plays, what he playfully calls the “New Histrionicism.” Berger’s argument calls upon Derridean speech-act theory in order to expose the logocentric commitments of stage-centered critics. Berger’s argument, for what he calls “imaginary audition,” relies upon his key assumption: “as an informed reader, I can easily imagine myself an informed playgoer imagining himself an innocent [wide-eyed] playgoer.” By focusing on the interlocutionary dynamics of a given play, and by virtue of the armchair critic’s ability to


28 Terence Hawkes. Meaning by Shakespeare (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3. I use the word ‘realization’ to refer to Jack J. Jorgens’ figuration of filmic Shakespearing’s relationship to the text, as discussed below.


30 Ibid., 3.

decelerate reading (and thus remove him/herself completely from the constituent temporality of the stage), a careful reader utilizing “imaginary audition” might come to understand how, during performance, a text-as-script speaks and constitutes both its characters and its audience. Here we see Berger (in a Kant-like, ontologically reductive maneuver which yokes the untamable duration of performance to the coherent temporality of the reading subject) developing a new dimension of the “text vs. performance” debate.

This new dimension is one opened up by notions of “performativity” which shift criticism’s focus away from an opposition between mutually exclusive text-centered and stage-centered readings, in order to rethink the relationship between texts and performance. Barbara Hodgdon, in her introduction to the Blackwell Companion to Shakespeare and Performance emphasizes the importance of this shift:

Significantly, the focus here is as much on how performance occurs ‘in between’ these two terms as on how it might be located in one or the other. Implicitly, this work also seeks to further decenter and denaturalize the complex link between ‘Shakespeare’ and ‘performance’—to solidify a move already in process to replace the ‘vs.’ of the text vs. performance debate as well as the idea of Shakespeare ‘in’ performance and to reframe both categories of cultural production and the relations between them.  

This shift allows those working in the field of Shakespeare and performance to move their attention away from static notions of either texts or performance in order to look at how texts and performance operate together in order to generate meaning. This shift, while it still partially retains the dialectical logic of nominalizations and prepositions (from “in” to “between”), goes a long way in destabilizing the very categories it employs (performance, for these critics, becomes a verb which, for the first time is not simply “verbal”). Barbara Hodgdon and W.B. Worthen have been invaluable in advocating for this shift.

W.B. Worthen has long argued against text-centered approaches to Shakespearean performance. However, Worthen has also notably argued that while many stage-centered critics have attempted to highlight the value of performance, they have ultimately only further strengthened the authority of the text. Worthen urges us to examine “the ways in which notions of authority are inscribed in discussions of performance, often at just those moments when the apparent insurgency of performance seems most urgently opposed to that Trojan horse of the absent author, the text.” Hodgdon joins with Worthen in pointing out the shortcomings of this particular strain of stage-centered criticism (in addition to how this shortcoming reveals larger institutional and disciplinary anxieties). She points out how, in order to authorize performance as a legitimate domain of study, this group of performance critics seeks to define performance “as a transparent discourse, one that can be seen through to a substance which (ideally) lies behind it.” This ideal substance lying behind performance, ultimately, is nothing less than the authorized text, the pure vehicle for the author’s unmediated intentions.

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33 Ibid., 2 (my emphasis).
These revolutions in the field of Shakespeare and performance have allowed for new, less reductive arguments about the relationship between textuality and performance. Traditional notions of textual authority have also been challenged by scholars outside of performance studies. In adjacent fields, revolutions in editorial theory and challenges to the New Bibliography have worked to undermine notions of the static identity of Shakespeare’s texts. Leah S. Marcus’ *Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton* (1996) and Stephen Orgel’s *The Authentic Shakespeare* (2001), for example, have pushed theorists of performance even further in their efforts to re-evaluate the relationship between textuality and performance. These new arguments about the relative generativity, instability, and non-identity-with-itself of both Shakespearean texts and performances have spawned new debates, and here the arguments of Michael D. Bristol and Terrence Hawkes might be seen as representative.

Bristol, in his *Big-Time Shakespeare*, attempts to explain “how the value of Shakespeare is sustained and transmitted over time against a backdrop of rapidly shifting cultural frameworks.” The historical continuity of values between Shakespeare’s time and our own, Bristol argues, is possible because of the “latent semantic potentiality” of Shakespeare’s works. Bristol raises interesting and pertinent questions about present performances and their relationship to the historical moment of Shakespeare’s texts. He views historical texts as maintaining a *transcendent* connection to present performance through what he calls “derivative creativity.” According to Bristol, the rich semantic potential latent in “great works” such as those “invested by Shakespeare in his works,” allow successor generations to engage in an extended dialogue throughout history’s *longue durée*. It is easy to see that in his argument Bristol attempts to move away from both text-centered and stage-centered approaches to the relationship between texts and performance. However, his notion of “derivative creativity” ultimately establishes the historical text as the essential, unchanging, protected, and exclusive site of generativity. Within the free-market logic of Bristol’s account, performance, much as in the text-centered approach, retains only the right to realize or derive meanings “sustained” or “transmitted” from “text-immanent” properties. These immanent properties of the text work to determine performance differently in the *longue durée* of history. Bristol, however, has little to say of the *corte durée* of stage time. Furthermore, what Bristol describes as “semantic potentiality” of the original text is secured (copyrighted, even) in the nominal space of its textual origin, an origin which, when predicated by historical changes, allows us to “derive” new Shakespearean products which, though Brand new, still pay royalties to the “semantic potential” inherent in their parent text.

If, for Bristol, Shakespeare provides continuity throughout the *longue durée* because of performance’s propensity towards repetitions of an infinitely expanding Same, Terrence Hawkes’ deconstructive understanding of Shakespearean performances as differential repetitions stands in direct opposition. Hawkes, also following a transcendental trajectory, argues instead that performance engages with Shakespeare’s texts through a practice of citationality, and that the plays “have the same function as, and work like, the words of which they’re made. We use

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36 Ibid., 15.
37 Ibid., 23.
38 Ibid., 13,11.
39 Ibid., 22.
them in order to generate meaning.” Performance, then, becomes a mode of production wherein Shakespeare’s language is used in the register of performance; the texts are cited in order to felicitously perform meaning within various ideological contexts. For this reason, Hawkes’ model of performance rests upon the premise that “Shakespeare doesn’t mean; we mean by Shakespeare.” What remains to be explored by Hawkes’ semiotic, however, is how we might do more than “mean” by Shakespeare. In what ways might Shakespearean performance truly be “performative” and do more than signify? How might performance also do things without words?

Hawkes argues generally, but very convincingly, against a conservative tradition that would view each performance and each new possible meaning generated therein as nothing but an addition to the polysemy of the text (Bristol’s notion of “semantic potentiality”). Instead, he argues that with each new iteration, the possibility of additional meaning opens up the possibility for radically new, “occasional” meanings. In accordance with this logic of iterability, every repetition which claims to extend the identity of the text only opens up the possibility for a differential repetition. In Hawkes’ terms, every “and” hides the possibility for a transformative “or.” According to this model, then, we might view Shakespeare’s texts as an historical archive upon which various conservative citational performances have attempted to pave a continuity which, on its underside, is discontinuous.

Rethinking the text/performance relationship in terms of performativity, as Hawkes does, reverses the priority of the text over performance and allows critics to understand how the text’s meanings might be determined instead by the conditions of performance. Here, we witness a reversal within but not an escape from the logic of determination. W.B. Worthen has labored to point out the pitfalls of conceiving of performance in terms of speech-act theory. He writes that “one of the problems of modeling theatrical performance on Austinian performativity is that it reduces performance to the performance of language, words, as though theatrical performance were merely, or most essentially, a mode of utterance, the (in/-felicitous) production of speech acts.” Critics such as Berger and Hawkes, for all they offer, fall into this trap of conceiving of performance as a strictly verbal or auditory activity without taking into consideration the materiality of theatrical production and the way in which performance cites not language but the durational behavior of bodies.

Stage-centered critics, on the other hand, make the opposite mistake by fetishizing the liveness or immediacy of the actor’s body on stage, making it a model in relation to which the Shakespearean text becomes a derivative copy. Derridean notions of performativity, moving against this logocentric articulation, might be understood as attempting to “overturn” the priority of stage-centered criticism by reasserting the graphematic nature of speech. However, Barbara Hodgdon notes that “while one might take the Derridean critique precisely to deconstruct the

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41 Ibid., 3.
42 Ibid., 6; I use the word “occasional” here to acknowledge the way in which Hawkes describes each iteration as an “occasion” when past and present meanings might converge. On this point, also see W.B. Worthen, *Shakespeare and the Force of Modern Performance*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59.
43 For Hawkes’ distinction between “and” and “or,” see his chapter, “Or” in Hawkes.
opposition between writing and speech, to many critics, Derrida’s undoing of the traditional priority seemed merely to restore the priority of the text.”

Shannon Jackson describes performance’s double duty as a “flexible essentialism” which allows it to “inhabit the essentialist as well as anti-essentialist side of any conceptual binary.” Jackson goes on to note that terms “such as performance and theatre are often used as metaphors for representation and, in other contexts, are invoked to ground the ‘real’.”

When performance on stage is viewed reductively as representation, all performances become textualized and come under the purview of literary models of analysis. Alternately, when performance is viewed as the authentic or ‘real’ ground of textual copies, we find ourselves verging dangerously close to reductive essentialist and/or logocentric hermeneutics. The two-dimensionality and repeatability of performances of filmic Shakespeare only further complicate this tension. However, because filmic Shakespearing complicates the opposition between a “static” textuality and an “ephemeral” performance register, it is from within this field that we might find fertile ground for critique.

**Medium Theories and Apparatus Theories: The Stage and the Screen**

As we move from studies of the stage to studies the screen, we encounter similar problems, but with the addition of a whole host of new material variables. Worthen argues that “the theatre is an arena that uses print in nonliterary ways, ways that resist the reiterative ideology of print.”

For Worthen, performance “reconstitutes the text, it does not echo, give voice to, or translate it; performance does not cite the text—printed or otherwise.”

If performance, in part because of its constituent ephemerality and variability, resists the iterative logic of print, what might we be able to say about filmic performance? While it might be clear that filmic performance, like stage performance, “reconstitutes” the text, film’s ontological repeatability and serial composition, at the same time, seem to move it closer to the logic of print. Discussions of filmic adaptation, historically dominated by notions of film as language, have largely echoed the textualizing rhetoric of those examining adaptation from page to stage.

Jack J. Jorgens’ 1977 *Shakespeare on Film*, the first book-length examination of the subject, viewed filmed Shakespeare as either a presentation, an interpretation or an adaptation of an authoritative text. The question a striking majority of subsequent critics have asked when approaching filmic adaptation has been whether or not a film’s treatment of a text communicates (presentation), interprets (limitation) or transforms (adaptation) what Bristol has called the “latent semantic potential” of the text.

This tripartite categorization (presentation, limitation, adaptation), much to my surprise, continues to figure prominently in crucial disagreements regarding Shakespeare on film and its

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45 Ibid., 3. While many critics have seen Derrida as reasserting the primacy of the text over performance, I think that this notion, in part, stems from a careless or incomplete reading of Derrida. Derrida plays a much more complicated role in this debate. For example, when the primacy of the text is restored, it often brings along with it vestiges of the texts previously assumed plentitude (something with which Derrida would never agree).


48 Ibid., 58.

relationship to the perceived plurality of the text. While theories of radical adaptation (e.g. those which go “off book” and discard Shakespeare’s language) have often been ignored, arguments dealing with presentation and limitation have spurred much controversy. An interesting and now famous debate between Graham Holderness and Catherine Belsey brings the text-performance debate into the field of film while simultaneously introducing discourses of medium theory and political theories of ideology. Belsey argues that while a play-in-performance “interprets the text” and therefore necessarily “narrows the plurality of possible meanings,” filmed Shakespeare goes even further in reducing this plurality. For her argument, Belsey borrows from apparatus theory in order to illustrate how modern, proscenium theater (with the introduction of perspective staging) and realist film (with its close-ups and invisible editing techniques) radically determine and delimit the text’s semantic potentiality (or the potential that text might have fully expressed on the chaotic Elizabethan thrust stage). For these reasons, she claims film is inherently a conservative medium.50

Against Belsey’s formulation, Holderness argues that if “the text can be reproduced [on film] in a virtually unrecognizable form, then the plurality of the text is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”51 Furthermore, Holderness argues that film, even realist film, far from naturalizing ideology, actually has the ability to break naturalist conventions and “emphasize the spectator’s awareness of the camera as a constructive device, not a window opening on reality.”52 I do not think that Belsey and Holderness disagree as much as they agree on the power of the apparatus (however characterized) to negatively determine meanings inherent in the text.

What the Belsey-Holderness discussion really points to are two issues more fully developed in the history of film theory: 1) apparatus theory’s assertion that the filmic medium necessarily determines meanings in line with the dominant (transcendent) ideology with which it shares a “structure,” and 2) the dialectical relationship between textuality and visuality. The first issue is most notably articulated by Jean-Louis Baudry who, likening the cinema to Plato’s allegorical cave, argued that the spectator, once interpellated into the filmic apparatus, is also potentially interpolated into its ideology. Like Belsey, Baudry argues for the “ideology inherent in perspective,” but like Holderness, he also asserts that an estrangement from this perspective might serve as “denunciation of ideology, and as a critique of idealism.”53

The second position, the idea that film’s visual register dialectically reduces or determines its textual, linguistic, or audio register, is also a reoccurring theme in the history of film theory. Scholars of Shakespeare on film have often employed this logic. For example, Michèle Willems’ asserts that “[o]n the stage all the other signs are subordinated to speech (in monologue, dialogue or aside), while on the screen words are secondary; the dialogue follows the image.”54 Film theory goes into a bit more depth, and I think Sergei Eisenstein’s dialectical

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52 Ibid. 74.


54 Michèle Willems, “Verbal-Visual, Verbal-Pictorial or Textual-Televisual? Reflections on the BBC Shakespeare Series,” in *Shakespeare and the Moving Image: the Plays on Film and*
notion of audio-visual counterpoint serves as an interesting instance of this theme, and I would like, here, to explore it more fully.

Eisenstein’s dialectical notion of audio-visual counterpoint presupposes the possibility of an absolute “correspondence” between sound and image. Eisenstein suggests that sound and image together form something akin to what he describes as “the monistic ensemble,” a synthesis—or rather, what we might call an absolute synaesthetics—among “the various categories of affect.” In describing the combinatory effect of “visual and aural images,” Eisenstein advocates for the development of “a new sense: a capacity of reducing visual and aural perceptions to a ‘common denominator.’” After an experience with Kabuki theater, Eisenstein, in what can be generously described as an awkward gesture, credits the Japanese with this “new sense,” reasoning that their “non-differentiated perception” results from the late onset of capitalism in Japan. Nevertheless, he seems in this reasoning to infer that those fully interpellated into capitalism must regain the ability to perceive this “common denominator.” But how might we conceive of a relation between the visual and the audio in a way that does not position a reduction to absolute correspondence as its telos? How might we try to understand these distinct forces in a way that does not strive towards a negative, dialectical synthesis which effaces difference? Might there be a more ontologically positive formulation of the audio-visual equation?

Eisenstein helps us in this task when he later qualifies his statement regarding the “common denominator.” He writes:

And yet we cannot reduce aural and visual perceptions to a common denominator. They are values of different dimensions. But the visual overtone and the sound overtone are values of a singularly measured substance . . . visual as well as aural overtones are a totally physiological sensation. And, consequently, they are one and the same kind.

This qualification will motivate Eisenstein to develop the notion of the filmic fourth dimension. We might see this dimension, one that adds time and movement to the three-dimensional space of the film, as constituting the film’s durational performance. Before introducing the filmic fourth dimension, an overtonal dimension in which sight and sound might meet on an equal plane, collide and synthesize through the dialectic—before I see + I hear = (determines) I feel—we are given a brief opportunity to affirm and retain this difference and keep film’s reception indeterminate. For a moment, these different modes of perception become irreducible.

Michel Chion, theorist of film sound, might help us intervene before Eisenstein’s dialectic forces the audio and the visual to collide and form a determined meaning. Chion argues that this type of “linear interpretation . . . reduces the audio and visual elements to abstractions at the expense of their multiple concrete particularities, which are much richer and

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56 Ibid., 24.
57 Ibid., 26.
58 Ibid., 70.
full of ambiguity.”

According to Chion, conceiving of the (non-) relation between the audio and the visual as one of resolvable contradiction “implies a prereading” of this relation based in convention. How then might Eisenstein use audio-visual counterpoint in any but a conventional way? It is clear now that this reduction through abstraction implies a predetermined understanding of how each polysemic element of the shot, through performance, will be reduced, *determined*, and *communicated* to the audience.

A rewriting of Eisenstein’s notion of audio-visual counterpoint would necessarily constitute a rewriting of his theory of montage. Instead of seeing cinema as that which combines shots that we understand as “single in meaning,” we might see their polysemy as irreducible by focusing on that difference which escapes the dialectic. Eisenstein tells us that “conflict within the shot is potential montage,” and we might begin our task of rewriting by examining this “potential.” What happens to the unrealized potential within the shot which, marginalized as it may be by soft focus and other plastic techniques, never makes its way into the dominant overtone? What if, in the performative and affective register of the fourth dimension, we recognize the need to relocate “potential,” removing it from within the filmic text and reinserting it into the spectator’s engagement with that text?

Walter Benjamin’s work in film theory, surprisingly, offers us this kind of opportunity. Benjamin also offers us an opportunity to relate these ideas to the apparatus theory earlier discussed. Where apparatus theory generally focuses on the apparatus’ over-determining structure, Benjamin instead writes that film “provides the equipment-free aspect of reality [the masses] are entitled to demand from a work of art, and does so precisely on the basis of the most intensive interpenetration of reality with equipment.” Benjamin’s characterization of the “intensive interpenetration of reality with equipment” relocates the mediating function of the determining, transcendental apparatus, making the new apparatus *immanent* to the social field. Here, we see Benjamin foresight, as he prefigures the coming of Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*. From there, Benjamin is able to claim that the *most important social function of film is to establish equilibrium between humans and the apparatus.* This immanence and immediacy allows for a reorganization of power within social space. No longer does the apparatus determine, negate, or alienate the audience; a new audience, with a new *physis*, is constituted by the productive, constitutive forces of the apparatus. Benjamin continues: “The aim of revolutions is to accelerate this adaptation. Revolutions are innervations of the collective—or more precisely, efforts at innervation on the part of the new, historically unique collective which

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60 Michel Chion, 38.
61 Sergei Eisenstein, 30.
62 Ibid., 38
64 Ibid., 117.
has its organs in the new technology.”\textsuperscript{65} This concept of innervation—a positive biopolitical production \textit{within} rather than negatively determined \textit{by} technology—sets the stage for an immanent understanding of Shakespearean performance’s relation to filmic technologies. More importantly: Benjamin’s idea of an innervated spectator, one immersed within and constituted by the technological apparatus, forecasts the potential for the new media to allow us to Shakespeare and be Shakespeared differently.

\textbf{An Immanent Turn}

As we have seen, within performance, film, and literary studies, the text/performance debate, for too long now, has been approached and framed through a series of related dialectical oppositions: the page vs. the stage, the stage vs. the screen, the screen vs. the audience, liveness vs. mediation. These dialectical oppositions are often set up in order to advocate for the superiority of a particular methodological or disciplinary approach to whatever might be seen as an authentic or essential “Shakespeare.” Within each dialectic, one term is given “originary” attributes (a structuring plentitude, authority, polysemy, etc.), allowing it to become a “model” and further allowing it to relegate the opposing disciplinary approach’s object to the status of a derivative, reduced, etiolated, or determined “copy.”

My intervention in these fields begins by advocating for a Deleuzean understanding of the relationship between textuality and performance. For this next revolution in our thought to occur, we must attend to two of Deleuze’s insights on this matter. First, Deleuze argues that language, or the articulable is incommensurate with the visible and the sensible. He argues against those who see the filmic image (and we could think of performance in general here as well) as an \textit{analogical} extension of language or textuality. Deleuze insists, “there is neither causality from the one to the other nor symbolization between the two.”\textsuperscript{66} Against the notion that the articulable is isomorphic with the visual or sensible, Deleuze strongly asserts their anisomorphism. These qualitative \textit{differences in kind}, between word and image or between texts and performance, between representation and experience, have consistently and mistakenly been treated as simple \textit{differences of degree}. As we saw before, Bristol’s understanding of “latent semantic potential” gave textuality a quantitatively superior role in performance. Stage-centered critics, on the other hand, saw performance as the quantitatively superior force in the \textit{determination} of meaning. This ability to measure and compare quantitatively is the product of a spatializing tendency that allows both forms to be placed within the space of a unified and homogenous representational register. Deleuze would argue that both of these articulations fall prey to the error Bergson calls the “false problem”: “the obsession \textit{in all its aspects} with thinking in terms of more and less.” This thinking quantitatively in strict terms of “more and less” pushes us to see “differences in degree where there are [irreducible, qualitative] differences in kind.”\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{67} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Bergsonism}, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 17-21; This section on intuition and false or nonexistent problems is extremely rich, and it ties together two strands of thought which this dissertation will deal with: first is an examination of differences in degree and kind (and their relation to perception/recollection and time/space composites), and second, the ability of such false problems, as they are used by
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Secondly, Deleuze moves the text/performance problematic from a terrain of representation onto a terrain of movement and thought. D. N. Rodowick, in *Deleuze’s Time Machine*, argues that “Deleuze’s preference for the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce over the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure” allows him to propose a semiotic (as opposed to a semiology) which understands signs as “not equivalent to language but rather to thought.”68 This thought, conceived of as images of thought, for Deleuze, is material and in movement. Rodowick goes on to describe Deleuze’s Peircian semiotic as one in which thought “is neither immaterial nor specular, but *behavioral*, an ‘action just as real, just as historical, just as behavioral as operating a machine.’”69 This semiotics of behavior—a semiotics which deals with bodies, movement, affect, duration and thought—provides a new starting point for both film and performance studies. Deleuze’s influence in the former is minimal, while his affiliation with the latter is almost nonexistent.

However, if we listen to W.B. Worthen’s recommendation to those examining the text/performance relationship, he asks that we recognize the materiality of the theater and the way in which performance cites not language but behavior; in this plea, we can already hear performance studies inviting a Deleuzean intervention. My aim is to adequately answer this call. This project, through the chapters described below, will attempt to rethink the familiar problems of the field outside dialectical logics of model and copy or structure and signification, models that have dominated the terrain of Shakespeare and performance for too long. Instead of continually working within and against dialectical constructions of model and copy, we must make a move to look at the relationship between copies and the movement and behavior of the simulacra. This need moves us to Deleuze, who argues that our focus should be trained not upon “the distinction between the Model and the copy, but rather between copies and simulacra” because it is the movement of the simulacra which “contests both model and copy at once.”70

This is the move which constitutes Deleuze’s immanent ontology, what has been called his “transcendental-empiricism”: the simulacra, that which was “eluding the Idea climbed up to the surface, that is, the incorporeal limit, and represents now all possible ideality, the latter being stripped of its causal and spiritual efficacy.”71 The Idea which, within the dialectic, was seen as transcendent to materiality, disappears, and we see materiality now as that which transcends the immanent flux of movement and behavior. It is here, in this movement against the dialectical logic of Models and copies, that we will find the utility of Deleuze’s differential ontology, and here is where we can introduce temporality, movement, duration, affect and change into the homogenizing and reductive discussions of Shakespeare and performance. We must shift our focus away from static and nominal conceptions of a text or a performance in order to enter into a new dimension which gives depth and movement to the problems with which we are all too familiar.

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69 Rodowick, 39 (my emphasis).
71 Ibid., 7.
Overview of the Chapters

Chapter One seizes upon Lady Macbeth’s claim that she can see “the future in the instant,” and explores the way duration is collapsed and time gets spatialized in the play. The chapter focuses on two “objects” productions: 1) a “radical” or “transgressive” performance of Macbush, a contemporary reimagining of Macbeth, and 2) a seemingly co-opted, official, “normative” performance of Macbeth sponsored by Boeing, the “right-wing” NEA, and the US Department of Defense. The chapter examines these two ostensibly opposed productions by rehearsing a dialectical or “transcendental” critique and using a common (hackneyed) reading of de Certeau’s strategy/tactic distinction—one which emphasizes de Certeau’s interest in space. I then complicate this reading by showing how de Certeau’s figuration of power and performance within the panoptic city already includes an inclination towards an immanent understanding of power’s circulation—one that emphasizes time and complicates the spatial cartographies upon which dialectical movement finds its ground and proper “identity.” Through this immanent reading, I argue that dialectical understandings of culture and power rely upon a particular way of understanding the priority of space, one rooted firmly in Cold War discourses of cultural fronts and quantitative movements through homogenous space. Reading the NEA’s founding documents alongside the Iraq Study Group report, I argue that the Bush administration’s confidence in static space, like Macbeth in Dunsinane when the “wood began to move,” encountered “terror” when it encountered temporal changes in the space of the battlefield. Ultimately, I argue that an immanent understanding of culture and power corresponds with contemporary changes in the shape of Empire and new ways of conceptualizing the flows of global capital, ways rooted in performance’s duration and affect. Further, This immanent reading (and the shape of Empire and history correlative to this approach) highlights the dangers of the Left’s reliance upon historical analogies that flatten important differences between Vietnam and Iraq or between Bush and Macbeth.

Chapter Two looks at The Tempest, particularly at Prospero’s claim that he lost his dukedom when, immersed in his books, his brother Antonio was able to eliminate the “screen between the part he played/And him who he played it for” (1.2.107-8). The chapter explores this relation between immersion in books and the usurping power of screen technologies. I use Peter Greenaway’s 1991 film, Prospero’s Books, to show how Prospero uses magical technologies (a combination of books, theatre and cinematic phantoms) in order to reassert his authority. I argue that like Prospero, Greenaway’s film, uses a magical proto-HD, digital video technology to reassert film’s ability to “get over the book.” This chapter develops the notion of immanent critique by revisiting notions of self and structure in film theory and performance studies. In this chapter, I look at the spatial figuration of spectators, specific media and apparatuses of projection, paying particular attention to the way Prospero’s Books’ technologies trouble film theory’s traditionally spatial understanding of film spectatorship, filmic semiotics and their relation to the (transcendent) filmic apparatus. This chapter introduces an immanent performance theory to film theory by offering a new reading of film theory’s key texts—from Munsterberg and Armheim, to Balazs and Metz, to Benjamin’s Artwork essay—highlighting along the way each’s relation to the “immanent turn” in cultural studies. Key here will be the role each theorist gives to temporal relations. Particularly useful in rethinking the spectator’s relationship to the (new or old media) apparatus is Benjamin’s notion of “creative innervation” and the model of productive reception it implies. This chapter also sketches out what an immanent model of reception might entail once traditional notions of the filmic apparatus’
(over-) determinism collapse.

Chapter Three examines Hamlet’s claim that “the time is out of joint.” In order to explore Hamlet’s notion of temporal disjunction, I look at two interlocking yet temporally discrete performances: Richard Burton’s 1964 Electronovision Hamlet and the Wooster Group’s “new media” Hamlet. Continuing to work with Walter Benjamin’s notion of “creative innervation” and Deleuze’s idea of the “the theatre of repetition,” this chapter examines the technologies of repetition each Hamlet employs in order to read, write, and perform with the pre-recorded yet affective specters of history. In July of 1964, three performances of the Burton-Gielgud Hamlet were recorded and edited together thanks to “miracle of Electronovision.” The resulting “Theatrofilm” was then screened for two days in over one thousand theaters in order to give audiences the “liveness” of a Broadway show right in their own local theater. Currently, The Wooster Group is staging another version of Hamlet, one that utilizes the Isadora and Final Cut Pro platforms to digitally remix and reframe the Burton-Gielgud production as an historical background upon which the company acts. Onstage, The Wooster Group imitates the 1964 Hamlet gesture for gesture in what the group likens to an archeological reconstruction, but I argue for an alternate figuration of this doubling and acting in common between past and present (one that is less spatial and more temporal in its figuration of history). This chapter uses these two performances (and their respective technologies) to ask the following questions: How can the so-called “new” media differently mediate our relationship with the past or with what are perceived to be singular performances of the past? I argue that new technological interfaces enable us to engage in historiographical research on stages and screens in ways that are singularly durational and within registers that are incommensurate to the textual historiographies of journals and monographs. Each of the Hamlet production I treat figures a relation to history, treating the past as an interactive ensemble of images that are temporally discrete yet finite, engageable yet immutably scripted.

Chapter Four begins looking at critical pedagogy and the space of culture in the classroom. Since the 1980s, critical pedagogy has rallied for the inclusion of “hip hop in the classroom” as part of a culturally relevant, Freirean model of connecting language with the lived experience of inner-city youth. But the movement begins to achieve success at the very moment hip hop begins losing its geographic specificity. Recently, a number of programs (“Shakespeare is Hip Hop,” “Shakespeare: the Remix,” and “Shakespeare in Urban Slang”) have sought to connect Shakespeare and hip hop as a way of bridging the divide between the spaces of high and low culture. In this chapter, I examine the strange effects of local, culturally specific pedagogical practices fusing Shakespeare and hip hop which—like the music itself—have been removed, practiced and copied outside of what was once their “proper” space. What happens when suburban youth are asked by their teachers to perform Macbeth in hip hop vernacular? YouTube abounds with blackface Shakespeare. More importantly, though, the chapter uses Macbeth’s notion of “borrowed robes” in order to rethink intercultural borrowing and how the logic of “appropriation” falsely frames culture as private property at the same time that young people identifying with remix culture increasingly strive for a “creative commons” and continue to challenge the spatial proprieties of culture. This chapter puts the “culture wars” into dialogue with the “copyright wars” and argues that, in a world where the line between public and private properties and spaces is increasingly blurred by virtual glocalities, digital rights management software and copyleft legal theories, cultural studies needs to rethink the spatial logic of cultural appropriation.
Chapter Five brings immanent critique to the space of the classroom by examining another kind of Shakespeare film: the Shakespeare teaching docudrama. These films, both fictional and documentary, chronicle “successful” pedagogues and the at-risk students whose lives they transform. In this chapter, I look closely at two of these films (Why Shakespeare? and The Hobart Shakespeareans)—both a part of the NEA’s “Shakespeare for a New Generation” initiative—alongside the No Child Left Behind Act’s legislation on “character education.” Performing a genealogy of the “character education movement,” this chapter looks at the way in which the NEA’s Shakespearean repetitions highlight and continue the practice of using Shakespeare’s early modern British “characters” to teach contemporary American “character.”

Chapter four focuses on Prince Hal’s “St. Crispin’s Day” speech as performed for the NEA’s Dana Goia by Timothi Lee. Lee was one of Rafe Esquieth’s students at Hobart Elementary School in Washington DC, the teacher and school featured in The Hobart Shakespeareans, a film about using Shakespeare to Americanize and inspire immigrant students. The chapter rethinks Prince Hal’s notion of the “band of brothers” in terms of Hardt and Negri’s multitude, while putting their notion of “affective labor” into conversation with No Child Left Behind’s “Character Education Program.” This chapter also explores the way in which discourses of national “character” and their corresponding pedagogies rely upon a particularly vertical (patrilineal, spatial, transcendental) notion of repetition and differentiation, one that might be refigured by Hardt and Negri’s notion of how the immanent multitude operates in time. This chapter moves from the performance of character to a notion of “performing character.” Much as earlier chapters refigured text/performance or apparatus/performance binaries, this chapter shows how dialectical pedagogies might give way to durational, embodied performance pedagogies.

In my Post-Script, I build on the dissertation’s research to advocate for a new performance pedagogy, one we might embrace “after the script.” Through a reading of Love’s Labour’s Lost’s Don Adriano de Armado, I focus our attention on the bookworm who fears he’ll “turn sonnet.” I examine the play’s anxiety about being enmeshed by learning technology, while illustrating how books, stages and computers have produced the unhip “geek” in ways that inflected by race, class, gender and normative standards for comportment. I examine how Shakespeare has been mobilized to teach character and how Shakespeare’s historical association with the book and with the stage has produced classed and gendered notions of the “bookworm,” the “computer nerd” and the “drama queen.”

By offering a brief genealogy of three figures of the student body’s relation to technology, the dissertation’s final section aims to understand how the “geek” has gained increased importance as a category of social difference and exclusion. As a means of overcoming such social alienation, the chapter introduces a “geek chic” performance pedagogy. This pedagogy uses training in digital video editing to include the social, and often virtual, extracurricular lives of students. Through editing their own performances (as they often already do within the world of social networking sites), students will rehearse the behaviors, gestures, expressions and temporal movements that constitute what we perceive as character. By examining these “character effects,” students are trained to understand character differently—less as an originary space or cause of performance and more as a legible effect of performative behavior.

This Post-Script goes on to connect Shakespearean cultural studies with the emerging field of “geek studies” in order to examine how Shakespeare’s early modern dramatic geeks are figured and performed by today’s bookworms, drama queens and computer nerds. Taking up the pedants, scholars and lovers of Love’s Labour’s Lost, this final chapter situates performance
practices and scholarship within a history that continually redefines the proper relation between extracurricular love and academic labor, between affective labor and scholastic performance. The chapter addresses the following questions: from the University Wits to Renaissance Pleasure Faires, how do early modern and postmodern discourses mobilize the figure of the geek in order to delimit the proper modalities of knowledge and performance? How do today’s interdisciplinary tensions between performance studies, “Literature,” and studies of the new media correlate with historical figurations of the geek as drama queen, bookworm, or computer nerd? How is the Shakespearean archive constituted and configured in relation to early modern and postmodern figurations of geeks and their awkward marriage of the social body with technologies of learning and performance? How does the alterity of the geek historically produce and trouble the mutual exclusivity of love and labor, humans and machines, males and females, the curricular and the extracurricular, and/or the physical and the metaphysical? In conclusion, the dissertation argues that new digital video technologies enable geek chic performance pedagogies capable of reconfiguring the relation between student bodies, textuality and the performance of affect.
George W. Bush’s “Three Shakespeares”:

Macbeth, Macbush,

and the

Theater of War

Thy letters have transported me beyond
This ignorant present, and I feel now
The future in the instant.

--Lady Macbeth, Mac. 1.5.56-8
In November 2006, on the day before election polls opened, George W. Bush rallied a Florida crowd: “We're involved in a global struggle, and we will face the enemy where we find them, no matter what the theater of war is. The most important theater, however, is Iraq.” What are we doing when we speak of a “theater of war”? How are we to understand relationships formed through such interactions of the political and the aesthetic: the politics of theater and the theater of politics? Why do we speak of one activity in terms of the other? Joseph Roach offers an interesting reading of this figurative reversibility. He notes that the “command over bodies individually and in ensembles constitutes a technology of power of the utmost importance in military and theatrical history: the deployment of moving bodies in exactly the right places at exactly the right times, and in the right relationships with one another.” Roach’s astute observation, part of a larger Foucauldian discussion of power and bodies on stage, is not without an awareness that the repressive power exerted “over bodies” which allows them to be “deployed” is possible only because power is first and foremost a productive biopolitical force. So what might this mean for the agency of the soldier or the actor who is seen to be “under” the power of larger strategic forces?

While the question may seem familiar, I would like to take this opportunity to investigate anew this awkward figuration of theater as war in order to understand more thoroughly how practices of war and practices of theatrical performance might interact differently, in ways unaccounted for by their repeated metaphorical coincidence. How might an examination of the spaces constituted and inhabited by these war theaters and theaters of war help us to escape reductively dialectical conceptions of “difference between” (which shuttle us back and forth between these slippery signifiers, from tenor to vehicle and back again) and allow us to rethink the concept of unmediated “difference itself”? In our global age, as space and time continually reorganize themselves in relation to the changing shape of Empire, we must recognize the need to think differently about the seeming convergence, coincidence, and mutual exclusivity of each side of the deceptively simple equation theater = war.

In order to rethink our understanding of theatrical practices, as well as practices of war, I would like to address a recent event within the terrain of “Shakespace,” a term Bryan Reynolds and his collaborators employ to describe “the particular articulatory space through which discourses, adaptations, and uses of Shakespeare have suffused the cosmopolitan landscape transhistorically.” More importantly, though, I want to interrogate the often limiting spatial logic both politicians and academics often employ when examining how performances (be they military or theatrical) operate within the broader cultural terrain. The event I would like to

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74 This desire to think “difference itself” which is not reducible to “difference between” is born out of Deleuze’s immanent ontology. For more on the idea of “difference itself,” see Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 28-69.
explore, an event ever more visible and therefore less avoidable, presents itself to our attention as a series of productive intersections between Macbeth and George W. Bush.

A provocative instance of this intersection occurred in August of 2006 when President Bush discussed Shakespeare with Brian Williams of MSNBC. Bush told Williams, “I was in Crawford and I said I was looking for a book to read, and Laura said, ‘You oughtta try Camus.’ I also read three Shakespeares . . . I’ve got an eclectic [pronounced “eck-el-ectic”] reading list.”

According to Kenneth T. Walsh of US News and World Report, Macbeth was in fact one of Bush’s “three Shakespeares.” This intersection between Bush and Shakespeare, while it might seem “eck-el-ectic,” is in fact only part of a varied and prolonged history of engagement. In the time since September 11th, a number of performances have sought to place Shakespeare into dialogue with the Bush administration. In particular, a number of productions calling themselves Macbush have suffused our cultural landscape. The ubiquity of the title Macbush itself serves as a symbolic representation of a particular conjunction; it gives local habitation and a name to this overlap within Shakespace between what we might call, following Reynolds’ transversal poetics, Macbethspace and Bushspace.

I would like to offer, first, a traditional, limited “overview” of this space. This preliminary synoptic overview of Shakespace, while helpful as a first step, nevertheless methodologically enacts the very representational fiction this essay ultimately aims to trouble. However, before we can challenge this reductive spatializing tendency, it might be helpful to enact this tendency if only to make it visible and therefore available for critique.

Shakespace: a Synoptic View

To my knowledge, the first intersection between Macbeth and the Bush Administration, occurring in August of 2003, was Michael Hettinger’s The Tragedy of Macbush, which had a limited run at the Alice Arts Theater in Oakland, California. In Hettinger’s play, Macbush is forced to confront a Middle-Eastern king named Ranquo. When I spoke to Hettinger, he told me that Macbush was staged in order to force a “threshold experience,” a haunting encounter with the rest of the world. He called this “the necessary experience of human consciousness trapped by codifying forces that define it.” In April of 2004, eight months before the election, Harold Bloom’s satirical piece entitled Macbush: the Tragicomical History of Dubya the Great, King of America and Subsequently Emperor of Oceania appeared in Vanity Fair. This text gives us Bloom the archivist, presenting the foul papers, “conjecturally restored,” of a play written in 2004 during the transition from “American Plutocracy to the Oceanic Empire,” a transition

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78 An earlier Macbush (written by Robert A. Anderson, directed by Alan Woods), a critique of George Herbert Walker Bush, was actually performed at Ohio State University as early as 1992. For more information, see Michael Grossberg, “No-Holds-Barred: ‘Macbush’ OSU Takes Chance with Partisan Anti-wr [sic] Satire,” The Columbus Dispatch. Oct. 20, 1992, 8E.

79 Michael Hettinger, Interview with the Author (April 2005).
which took place “20 years after the date set by the prophet Orwellius.”\textsuperscript{80} It features such characters as Richard, Duke of Helliburton and Lady Leeza of Stanford. Two months later, activist street theatre in Ireland earned the attention of CNN as reported in an article that reads: “Irish protestors used Shakespeare to blitz George W. Bush on Saturday, invoking Macbeth, a ghost and a witch to cast a spell on the U.S. president and drive him, symbolically at least, from Irish soil.”\textsuperscript{81} Organized by Ciaron O’Reilly, this staging of Macbush was planned to coincide with a larger protest which would interrupt Bush’s attendance at the EU-US summit.\textsuperscript{82}

As part of a greater, thousands-strong march, activists swarmed together to perform the role of Birnam Wood; each carried large cardboard trees bearing the names of dead Iraqi children (See Figures 1 and 2). The banner leading the demonstration depicted a US flag and crown engraved with the word ‘Macbush’ atop a castle turret. The banner cites Lady Macbeth: “Here’s the smell of the blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand” (5.1.47-8).\textsuperscript{83} Meanwhile, the real George W. Bush, unwittingly playing his part in the performance, was holed up at Dromoland Castle, about a mile away from the march, his schedule

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{figure1.jpg}\hspace{1cm}\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{figure2.jpg}
\caption{“Forests of Gestures” \hspace{2cm} Ciaron O’Reilly as Banquo}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{80} Harold Bloom, “Macbush: the Tragicomical History of Dubya the Great, King of America, and Subsequently Emperor of Oceania,” \textit{Vanity Fair} (April 2004), 286.
\textsuperscript{82} Ciaron O’Reilly is best known for allegedly disarming two US warplanes, once in 1991 and once in 2003. O’Reilly played the role of Banquo, a US soldier killed in Iraq. Comine Butterfly, a human rights activist best known for being shot in the leg by an Israeli soldier while trying to rescue children in the Jenin refuge camp, played the role of Lady Macbeth (the original Lady Macbeth was arrested at the airport on the morning of the protest), and she read the names of dead Iraqis.
\textsuperscript{83} All citations of Shakespeare refer to the Arden editions (2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Editions as indicated in the bibliography) unless otherwise specified.
only slightly changed as a result of the events. Two months later, back in the US, Randall David Cook and the Splinter Group’s King Macbush II: a Shakespearean Tragedy of War, Greed and Strategerie [sic], a play which billed itself as “a raucous political satire of the ruling Bush dynasty and its royal court” appeared off Broadway and ran from the beginning of the Republican National Convention until election night. Since Bush’s reelection, numerous amateur texts and productions of Macbush have continued to appear, like the ghost of Banquo, lurking in every dark corner of Shakespace. If we expand Shakespace to include the virtual spaces of the Internet, we find that various search engines currently provide anywhere from six to twelve thousand results for the query “Macbush.” From The Huffington Post to YouTube, these results include everything from brief, casual asides to sustained meditations in the form of blogs, cartoons, poems, videos and full-length plays.

In order to better understand the way in which these productions operate within Shakespace, I would like to turn to Michel de Certeau’s politics of space, in particular, to the possibly all-too-familiar distinction he makes between “strategies” and “tactics.” To review: for de Certeau, there exist two primary “modalities of action”: strategies and tactics, each with their own unique relation to space. Strategies are actions which begin from a localized and officially sanctioned locus of power. They work within and expand their own terrain, benefiting from the stability of a properly recognized field. De Certeau notes that a strategy “postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats . . . can be managed.” Tactics, on the other hand, much like the productions of Macbush we’ve been looking at, occur within a space which is not their own. Those who engage in tactics are not authors, but instead function in the way de Certeau describes readers. He likens readers to travelers, arguing that they “move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write.”

Like nomads who move into or across the proper space of another, challenging laws which regulate and restrict movement and appropriation, these performances of Macbush, which we might locate at the margins of Shakespace, threaten to infect and disrupt naturalized notions of an authorized or authentic Shakespeare—a seemingly non-ideological or “literal” Shakespeare which hides its politics as it attempts to delimit the parameters and possibilities of what

85 For Arianna Huffington’s meditations on Macbeth and Bush, see her article “Bush: of Mojo and Macbeth,” Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/bush-of-mojo-and-macbeth_b_9640.html. I would like to thank Scott Newstok, a collaborator whose work on Shakespearean appropriations in politics parallels my own, for drawing this and many other Macbush references to my attention. For an insightful look at presidential appropriations of Shakespeare, particularly the Bush/Prince Hal connection, see Scott Newstok’s “‘Step Aside, I’ll Show Thee a President’: George W as Henry V?” Pop Politics Website. http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2003/05/01/George-W-as-Henry-V.
87 Ibid., 36.
88 Ibid., 174.
Shakespeare might mean or do for us today. De Certeau describes the construction, naturalization and policing of the “militarily organized surfaces of the text”:

[L]iteral meaning is the index and the result of a social power, that of an elite. By its very nature available to a plural reading, the text becomes a cultural weapon, a private hunting reserve, the pretext for a law that legitimizes as “literal” the interpretation given by socially authorized professionals and intellectuals.  

While we might acknowledge any reading or performance as potentially dangerous to this literality, many of these texts and performances of Macbush are explicit in their desire to challenge what Reynolds refers to as Shakespace’s “official territory.” Most of these appropriations fully rewrite the text of Macbeth, engaging with and often destabilizing at once both Shakespeare’s aesthetic authority as well as Bush’s political authority until the implication of one within the other becomes apparent. Tactical engagements, lacking their own proper authority, instead make metaphors of the dominant order. According to de Certeau, the tactical maneuver consists in forcing this order to “function in another register” We might understand many of these performances as moving transversally between two dominant orders: the register of Shakespeare’s aesthetic authority and that of Bush’s political authority.

If these performances constitute tactical maneuverings, elsewhere within Shakespace, within what we might, through this synoptic lens, see as its strategic spaces, a very different intersection between Bush and Shakespeare has emerged. Beginning in 2003, a large offensive of strategic ground forces was deployed against these Shakespearean terrorists in what might be seen as an effort to reassert the authority of Shakespace’s official territory. Heading this operation was the National Endowment for the Arts’ Bush-appointed conservative chairman, Dana Gioia. After capturing the congress in 1994, Republicans proceeded to slash NEA funding by nearly 40 percent. However, since Bush’s election in 2000, funding has continued to increase. Since 2000, the budget of what I will call the “New NEA” has rebounded 28 percent (a nearly 27 million dollar increase). Almost all this new funding was reserved for Gioia’s “favorite” program: Shakespeare in American Communities, “the largest tour of Shakespeare’s works in American history.” Serving as honorary chair for this project is none other than Laura Bush. The late Jack Valenti, controversial former Chairman and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America and “special assistant” to President Johnson, served as her co-chair.

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89 Ibid., 170-1.
90 Bryan Reynolds, Performing Transversally, 11.
91 Michel de Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life, 32.
Along with these chairs, the NEA has established a “players guild” of “arts experts and actors,” a group that includes an assorted mix of personalities: Harold Bloom, Michael York, Julie Taymor, Jane Alexander, James Earl Jones, Michael Kahn, and Hilary Duff.²⁴

In October 2003, the New NEA’s tour began. In an authorizing ceremony, members of Congress spearheaded the tour by performing a Shakespearean skit on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress—Rep. Cass Ballenger (R-NC), Rep. Mark Kirk (R-IL), Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA), Rep. Thomas Petri (R-WI), Rep. Jack Quinn (R-NY), Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA), Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY) and Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI)—donned Elizabethan costumes and crowns as they performed “excerpted lines from Shakespearean plays King Lear, Measure for Measure, Macbeth and others” (See Figure 3).²⁵ Within the performance, the metonymic coincidence of crown and Capitol operates temporally in order to illustrate and solidify the unbroken historical continuity of US political power in relation to the legacy of Shakespeare’s aesthetic power.²⁶

![Figure 3: Congress in Costume](image)

Spatially, this congressional performance, enacted by “representatives” of particular states, serves as a synecdochic performance of the NEA’s larger three-phase strategy to expand Shakespace’s official US territory. Couching the arts in strategic, military rhetoric, the NEA imagines each “phase” of Shakespeare in American Communities through cartographic representations of space. The NEA Web site offers a series of Flash-animated maps charting the movement of its theatrical crusade.

²⁶ For more on Shakespeare’s role in the constitution of American culture, see Michael D. Bristol’s Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare. (New York: Routledge, 1990).
The NEA’s maps topographically simulate the crusade’s movement by animating a series of static snapshots. Each snapshot depicts the US populated by an increasing number of symbolic stars; each star seems to represent, at once, both the state’s synecdochic relation to the national whole and Shakespeare’s marked presence in the state. Like the Shakespeare in American Communities logo, which superimposes the Droeshout portrait onto the stars and stripes of the US flag, these Flash-animated maps place stars in each state in order to reconstitute the US as Shakespace’s official territory. As the maps illustrate, the first “phase” of the program strategically saturated the country by treating each state of the union to a healthy dose of federally-sanctioned Shakespeare.

Additionally, in 2004, the NEA forged an unprecedented partnership, one which deepened the NEA’s pockets and increased the tour’s scope to include performances at a number of military bases. That million-dollar partner was the Department of Defense, and the play performed in this military tour was, of course, Macbeth. Gioia remarked on the alliance, saying that he was “delighted to make cultural history by putting the NEA and the Department of Defense into the same sentence.” The partnership would not end there. The NEA Web site and its recent newsletters present many current programs resulting from this merger, such as “Operation Homecoming: Writing the Wartime Experience” which culminated in both a book, Operation Homecoming: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Home Front in the Words of US Troops and Their Families (Random House, 2006), and its filmic adaptation, Operation Homecoming: Writing the Wartime Experience (Dir. Robins, 2007). The subsequent book tour (which included travel to a number of military bases) and film were both sponsored by the Boeing Company, a sponsorship that would allow the NEA to fund two more major initiatives involving the military community.

99 A 2006 NEA Newsletter (vol. 6) devoted to the program comments on Operation Homecoming: “The program was the second partnership between the Arts Endowment and the
A synopsis of our analysis so far might present the following: on the one hand we have a strategic deployment by the NEA and the Department of Defense to expand and fortify the boundaries of Shakespace’s “official territory.” On the other hand, we have seen how tactical productions such as those of *Macbush* have entered the proper Shakespearean spaces in order to transform this territory. But this “synopsis” is just that, a view which comes by way of condensation and the elimination of internal difference. Such synopses are unable to account for the possibility that strategies and tactics might not, in practice, maintain this mutual exclusivity.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze reminds us: “every time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we should ask what such a situation presupposes.” He goes on to argue that these oppositions “presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild, or untamed differences; a properly differential and original space and time; all of which persist alongside the simplifications of limitation and opposition.”

Too often we in Shakespearean cultural studies succumb to this desire for opposition, separating out the radical, alternative, or subversive Shakespeares from the more orthodox, conservative or oppressive Shakespeares. This critical practice strategically enacts the very logic

Department of Defense (DOD), following DOD's support for the NEA's Shakespeare in American Communities program on military bases. The Boeing Company enthusiastically signed on as a sponsor, a partnership that has since led to Boeing's involvement in two more Arts Endowment initiatives: Great American Voices, which brings selections from opera and musicals to military bases, and the Big Read initiative to encourage American communities (including military bases) to discuss great works of literature.”

100 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 50.
101 Diane E. Henderson, in *Alternative Shakespeares 3*, acknowledges this problematic. She asks, “Alternative to what?” More importantly, she asks “[I]s the very desire for the new and ‘the next big thing’ so thoroughly enmeshed within the logic of global capitalism that alternativity has itself become merely a sign of the status quo?” We might understand the indiscernibility between alternativity and the status quo as marking both a change in the shape of Empire and the
“oppositional” critics claim to “oppose.” Herein lies the problem of an outmoded oppositional methodology that falsely opposes the new critical aesthetics of close reading to the political readings of cultural materialism, as if close readings were not always, already political and political readings equally aesthetic.

But how else might we understand Shakespace? One possibility lies in thinking outside, or rather inside, the opposition itself. While it appears we are dealing with two dialectical forces in direct opposition, and while much criticism often frames similar antagonisms in such a fashion, I would like to spend the remainder of this essay arguing otherwise, or rather, I would like to argue differently. In this I would like to heed the call of Roland Barthes who once asked us to “Let difference surreptitiously replace conflict.” Barthes went on to explain how difference “is not what makes or sweetens conflict; it is achieved over and above conflict, it is beyond and alongside conflict. Conflict is nothing but the moral state of difference.”

In Shakespearean cultural studies today, it is becoming increasingly clear that a commonplace rhetoric of conflict, with its broad dialectical strokes, fits the durational singularity of performance too loosely and fails to account for the specific work performance in fact does. Thinking too dialectically about “strategies” and “tactics” can create similar problems if these highly nuanced practices become static categories of moral difference through which we classify particular performances (the conservative, strategic ideological expansion of the Branagh franchise as opposed to the subversive, tactical unmasking or demystification of this “ideology” by some more local, more mobile, or more anarchic “appropriation”). For example, what might we make of the fact that the “subversive” street theater in Ireland was organized and performed by a group of Catholics? More troubling would be any effort to position Ciaron O’Reilly, who describes himself as a Catholic Worker Christian Anarchist, into either pole of this dialectic. In order to escape a rhetoric that eliminates internal difference in favor of an opposition between a) transcendent power and b) the local subversion of this power, we must fully commit to the perspective of what a non-dialectical strain of philosophy describes as the plane of immanence. Deleuze and others have used this term to describe a non-representational stratum within which immediate, affective, haptic, and temporal encounters maintain their multiplicity by remaining open to contingency, chance and polychrony. On the plane of immanence, epiphenomenally moral differences dissolve as they become complicated by the singularity of each event. An immanent approach to Shakespearean performance resists allowing the politics of difference to be reduced to the procrustean identities which structure dialectical opposition.

The shape of this methodology also differentiates itself in that it focuses less on what the determined, hermeneutic spaces of representation mean and more on what the durational, behavioral technologies of performance do and create. Alongside Terence Hawkes’ crucial observation that “we mean by Shakespeare,” we might also ask what we “do with Shakespeare”

necessity for an immanent methodology capable of describing Shakespeare’s changing place within a new logic of global capitalism. For Henderson’s comments on the function of the alternative, see her “Introduction” to Alternative Shakespeares 3, Ed. Diane E. Henderson. (New York: Routledge, 2008).


103 What becomes equally clear here is how these terms as well (“ideology” and “appropriation”) begin to function as both shorthand and shortcut away from the singularity of performance.
Alongside critical questions of meaning, we might consider what we “do with each other by way of Shakespearean performance.” This shift in focus moves us beyond the “linguistic turn” and returns us anew to a prior conception of the aesthetic as a temporal synaesthetics of embodied, sensual experience. In the remainder of this study, I would like to gesture towards this type of immanent approach.

**Shakespace: An Immanent View**

The synoptic, Archimedean point through which we have so far understood Shakespace has, through what I would argue is a false distinction, presented us with two spaces: Shakespace’s strategically maintained “official territory” and the marginal spaces of these alternative Shakespeares which tactically maneuver within and against the spaces carved out by more officially sanctioned performances. When we delimit and map out antagonisms within Shakespace in these reductive and rigidly spatial terms, not only does our methodology mirror the strategic logic that we originally set out to critique, but we also ignore the lessons we might have learned from de Certeau. From de Certeau, we learn that the panoptic power maintained through such mapping can only be secured through a fundamental “misunderstanding” of local practices, one which fails to understand (or “stand under” in order to “understand”) the way in which a topographical surface viewed from on high serves only as a representation of what’s below.  

What is important to note here is that strategies maintain the ability to project themselves across legible space only when we “misunderstand,” or forget, the conditions that made this movement possible. In fact, we might wonder if these strategies ever occur at all outside of the tactical, temporal movements that create and sustain them. Is it possible that the fiction of the transcendent “strategy” is made believable and maintained only when we stop understanding or attending to the immanent movement of tactical practices?

In his now-familiar essay, “Walking in the City” de Certeau narrates his experience of looking down on Manhattan from atop the World Trade Center. This panoptic gaze, what de Certeau calls a “solar Eye,” simulates the vantage point and the proper locus from which strategies might project their movement across the surface of urban space. If we zoom out and place ourselves once again atop the World Trade Center, we can see around us, on the ground, the various legible places carved out by authorized performances: Shakespace’s “official territory” or “green zone.” But the towers are no longer present, and this disaster, this tragedy, brings us to ground zero, to the level of the pedestrian as it simultaneously offers us an opportunity to witness something else: the tactical movements of theatrical production. The surface of the city as seen from the twin towers served only as a representation of the city’s upper limit, underneath which tactical practices have always abounded. September 11, as an event, temporally disrupted our ability to pretend to the permanence of proper spaces. This temporal disruption should also prompt us to

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104 Terence Hawkes, *Meaning by Shakespeare* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3. I am not alluding, here, to Austinian performativity. I am not suggesting that we look at how we “do things with words”; rather, I am suggesting that we supplement discussions of performativity with an understanding that we also do things without words.


106 Ibid., 92.

107 In a similar vein, Linda Charnes argues that “The events of September 11 did not ‘change’ things so much as they abruptly shoved an already rough beast out of what remained of its
re-imagine the dynamics of Shakespace and the tactical movements of theatrical production. We might then imagine these movements as *immanent to* rather than *at the margins of* Shakespace’s official territory.

De Certeau himself moves in the direction of immanence when he begins to question the very possibility of interminable strategic transcendence. In “‘Making Do’: Uses and Tactics,” a chapter which must be factored into any discussion of “Walking in the City,” de Certeau briefly imagines something like Deleuze’s plane of immanence. Hypothesizing the absence of a place outside strategic power, de Certeau writes the following:

> There is no longer an elsewhere. Because of this, the “strategic” model is transformed, as if defeated by its own success: it was by definition based on the definition of a “proper” distinct from everything else; but now that “proper” has become the whole. . . . One would thus have a proliferation of aleatory and indeterminable manipulations within an immense framework of socioeconomic constraints and securities: myriads of almost invisible movements, playing on the more and more refined texture of a place that is even, continuous, and constitutes a proper place for all people. Is this already the present or the future of the great city? 

When Shakespace assumes the contours of de Certeau’s city—when the “refined texture” of this smooth space is coupled with the “proliferation of aleatory and indeterminable manipulations”—we, as scholars and critics, must, in response, fine-tune our rhetoric. In this new city, as we move away from the old dialectical notions of negative “determination,” we will find it necessary to invent and create novel and nuanced modes of analysis. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, contemporary practitioners of a philosophy of immanence, argue that the transformative moment de Certeau imagines has already come to pass. In *Empire* they write that “it may no longer be useful to insist on the old distinction between strategies and tactics” because “[i]n the constitution of Empire there is no longer an ‘outside’ to power.”

> If we must imagine an outside to power, we can only do so responsibly by reconceiving the term “outside” not as a space but as a differential, temporal contingency; we give it the name “chance.”

In Shakespace today, we live in the transformative moment of de Certeau’s “great city.” We are no longer dealing with a dialectic between strategies and tactics. We are no longer dealing with a dialectic between an officially sanctioned *Macbeth* and a marginalized or unauthorized *Macbush*. The relationship between strategies and tactics is not an opposition of two discrete identities with different *degrees* of authorization, degrees negatively determined by proximity to or inclusion within a center. Instead, and in more positive terms, we must attend to what we are, in fact, dealing with: the difference in *kind* between textuality and cartography as static, spatial *representations* and an understanding of theater as dynamic movement and durational *practice*.

hiding.” For more on Charnes’ fascinating look the changing shape of political psychology in the new millennium, see her *Hamlet’s Heirs: Shakespeare and the Politics of a New Millennium.* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

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110 For more on this re-conceiving of the outside as chance, see Gilles Deleuze’s *Foucault*, trans. and ed. Seán Hand. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 70-93.
This difference in kind has already been partially explored in performance studies’ text-performance debates. Scholars such as W.B. Worthen have long argued for the ontological incommensurability of Shakespeare’s dramatic texts and what is all-too-often reductively perceived as strategic performances “of” those texts. In a recent essay, Worthen argues the following:

[I]n Performance Studies the theatre is typically taken to exemplify an ideologically overdetermined, even oppressive institution for the straightforward reiteration of the dominant cultural values inherent in “the text.” Here, the archive of dramatic theatre is opposed to the resistant, subversive performances that transpire largely outside the sphere of dramatic performance, a performance repertoire taken to be subversive precisely because it is not “text-based.”

Worthen’s use of the terms “archive” and “repertoire” are taken from Diane Taylor’s *The Archive and the Repertoire* in which the cultural archive is understood to include “maps,” “literary texts,” and “all those items supposedly resistant to change.” More subversive for Taylor is the repertoire, which includes “all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge.” Worthen has long argued against a performance studies rhetoric which falsely places the performance of scripted drama within the cultural archive under the assumption that this type of theater, unlike more mobile forms of performance, merely interprets or reiterates a static, textual archive. The difference in kind Taylor notes, however, is not without merit, and we may note an affinity here between the archive/repertoire distinction and de Certeau’s strategy/tactic distinction. Problems only arise when we mistakenly see dramatic performance as a mode of absolute textual repetition, when we see differences in degree between text and performance where instead we should see incommensurate differences in kind.

If, like Worthen, we do not see the performance of scripted drama as a practice which is overdetermined by the priority of the text, might we then be able to extend this understanding to what we earlier understood as the NEA’s strategically overdetermined tour of *Macbeth*? If the performance of scripted drama has ever been as overdetermined as some scholars suggest—if such performances have ever maintained the possibility to act as a repetition of the Same—would this not most likely have occurred in the ideal aesthetic and political context created by the conservative New NEA? The belief Worthen describes, a belief in the textually overdetermined performance, is, ironically, a belief shared by both left-leaning performance studies scholars and the right-wing architects of NEA. I want to now take a closer look at these architects by taking a genealogical detour through the “origins” of the National Endowment for the Arts, paying particular attention to the way in which the logic of ideological overdetermination functions as both fear and fantasy.

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112 Qt. in Ibid., 214-5.
Before President Johnson signed the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 into law, the impetus towards this legislation had already been announced by President Kennedy. In a 1963 speech at Amherst in honor of Robert Frost, a speech recognized by the NEA as a precursor to its own formation, Kennedy called for a “full recognition of the place of the Artist in America.”\(^{113}\) In the speech, Kennedy struggles to define and delimit the place of the Artist in America. He first offers his auditors the vision of an artist dwelling and critiquing American culture from a location outside the American mainstream. He argued that “if sometimes our great artists have been the most critical of our society, it is because their sensitivity and their concern for justice . . . makes [them] aware that our Nation falls short of its highest potential.”\(^{114}\) While the artist him or herself may remain located at the margins of culture, the product of the artist, the art itself, for Kennedy, was expected to transcend the spatial and oppositional logic of inside and outside. Kennedy argued famously that “Art is not a form of propaganda; it is a form of truth.” He continued, noting that “In free society art is not a weapon and it does not belong to the spheres of polemic and ideology. Artists are not engineers of the soul. It may be different elsewhere.”\(^{115}\) This “elsewhere” conjures up a new space, an absolute “outside,” far removed from the margin upon which the American artist toils. A margin, after all, is still marginally inside as well as out. “Elsewhere” suggests a space apart. In Kennedy’s original speech, penned by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., we find the unnamed absence animating this view of art, this “elsewhere.” In an earlier draft of Kennedy’s speech, he would go on to place America’s aesthetic policy in direct opposition with the Soviet Union’s ideological aesthetic policy.\(^{116}\) For Kennedy, a loving critique from the periphery was fine, but overtly ideological art, art that took a political stand, was to remain forever outside, “elsewhere.”

Michael Brinson, in his insightful book *Visionaries and Outcasts: The NEA, Congress, and the Place of the Visual Artist in America*, highlights this speech as a pivotal turning point for the arts in America. He points out how, in the 1960s, attitudes towards the arts were often contingent upon America’s attitude towards its rivals during the Cold War. He cites Livingston Biddle, the third chairman of the NEA, who remembers how “it was close enough to the McCarthy period so that artists were equated on occasion with Communism.”\(^{117}\) Brinson goes on to argue quite convincingly, by giving his readers passages from the hearing leading up to the formation of the NEA, that the organization from its inception had adopted a rhetoric of purification and incorporation. In short, the NEA’s goal was to perform a *strategic expansion of America’s foreign policy into the terrain of culture*. Much like many of those steering the NEA today, the implicit hope of those supporting early NEA legislation was that “non-ideological” art—art which *transcends* the political—might, in this way, reveal the “true” superiority of American aesthetics as they faced off against the “ideological” art of the enemy.


\(^{114}\) Ibid., 87.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., 87.


After Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson assumed power and, as part of his Great Society, signed the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 into law. The NEA’s desire to bring artists into the mainstream can only be understood in relation to the nation’s desire to fortify its cultural borders, to separate out, we might say, those “who are with us from those who are against us.” Here, we see the fulfillment of de Certeau’s insight into the panoptic city’s strategic formation, which demands, first of all, the repression of “all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would compromise it.”¹¹⁸ This paranoid fantasy of purification and the related anxiety it expresses about the encroachment of illegible or illegitimate bodies constitute the first rule of strategic operations. However, this rule remains more honored in the breach than in its impossible observance. More accurately, we might say that strategic operations begin through an ‘attempted’ or ‘imagined’ repression of pollutants which might compromise their intention. This ‘imagined’ repression serves as the foundation upon which the projected fantasy of successful strategic operations rests. Nevertheless, success often remains just that: a projected fantasy.

Such fantasies, however, always produce actual, material consequences. In the same year the NEA was formed, the war in Vietnam was escalating, and along with the escalation of warfare came a boom in surveillance technologies. Satellite film surveillance such as that provided under the CORONA program, and mapping sophistication, as exemplified by the new National Mapping Division, gave the Department of Defense the “solar Eye” imagined by de Certeau, and this cartographic obsession only further fueled the nation’s explicitly spatial understanding of Cold War politics.¹¹⁹ The war was imagined as a strategic battle for influence over an increasingly-visible global terrain. The perspective of the solar Eye soon became what seemed the only method for representing global politics. In a 1963 hearing, Senator Claiborne Pell argued in favor of the creation of the NEA. He said, “I believe that this cause and its

¹¹⁹ For more on the CORONA program or the creation of the National Mapping Division, see John Cloud’s excellent article, “American Cartographic Transformations during the Cold War.” *Cartography and Geographic Information Science* 29.3 (2002): 261-282. It is also interesting to note how Jack Valenti (honorary co-chair of the NEA’s *Shakespeare in American Communities* program), when he served as special assistant to President Johnson, was consulted and informed of these technological developments, like the following, which comes from a 1965 declassified memorandum addressed to Valenti from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense: “Four RG-13A aircraft, containing highly accurate navigation systems, are being equipped with electronic survey devices and precision aerial mapping cameras. The resulting information will satisfy high priority military needs for worldwide maps, charts and geodetic data for the primary benefit of limited war forces such as U.S. Strike Command,” “Air Force Is Preparing 4 Aircraft for World-Wide Mapping and Photography in Support of Urgent National Defense and Intelligence Requirements,” Report for the President. (Apr. 13, 1965), Secret to Unclassified. (Sanitized copy released Oct. 5, 1977). Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, Subject Reports, DOD, April 1965. Report. Department of Defense. Secret. See also, a memorandum on “HORNET, a TV-guided Anti-Tank Missile,” Report for the President (Mar. 2, 1965) Secret to Unclassified, (Sanitized copy released Oct. 5, 1977). Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, Subject Reports, DOD, Mar. 1965. Report. Department of Defense. Secret.
implementation has a worldwide application; for as our cultural life is enhanced and strengthened, so does it project itself into the world beyond our shores."\(^\text{120}\)

The NEA’s strategic fantasy, its desire to spatially project its cultural life beyond its own shores, is only achievable through a concomitant banishment of temporal contingencies. The 1965 National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities Act makes this desire to repress temporal change explicit. The NEA’s constitution begins with a definition of its purposes. One key purpose states that, in order to “achieve an orderly continuation of free society . . . the Federal Government must transmit the achievement and values of civilization from the past via the present to the future, and make widely available the greatest achievements of art.”\(^\text{121}\) According to this formulation, temporality is figured as a pure channel through which values are transmitted; time is spatialized “widely” as a map upon which art travels “from” one place, “via” another, and “to” yet another.

De Certeau observes that the spatialization of time marks the second tendency of strategic operations. He argues that strategies operate through “the substitution of a ‘nowhen’, or of a synchronic system” for a more dynamic or diachronic system. He goes on to argue that “univocal scientific strategies, made possible by a flattening out of all the data in a plane projection, must replace the tactics of users who take advantage of ‘opportunities’. ”\(^\text{122}\) The United States military’s inability to deal well with the tactics and contingencies it met on the ground in Vietnam, and its inability (then and now) to divine a timetable for either victory or withdrawal, place the American engagement in Vietnam (and in Iraq) within a “nowhen” and highlight the failure of this strictly spatial understanding of practices. We are reminded of Macbeth’s own spatial dilemma when he says, “I am in blood / Stepp’d in so far, that, should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go o’er” (3.5.135-7). Hardt and Negri, in the sequel to *Empire*, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, offer this useful insight. They write: “The old-fashioned war against a nation-state was clearly defined spatially, even if it could at times spread to other countries. . . . By contrast, war against a concept or a set of practices, somewhat like a war of religion, has no definite spatial or temporal boundaries.”\(^\text{123}\) The twentieth-century Cold War against Communism as a “concept” and the twenty-first century war against Terrorism as a “practice” are two very separate historical events; however, what unites them in the public imagination is how US foreign policy in each instance fails to recognize the shortcomings of a purely spatial logic of strategy.

While we can safely assume that the Bush administration has no desire to repeat the history of Vietnam, the United States military’s strategic policy on the ground tells a different story. Hardt and Negri describe the traditional, imperialist army as a force that “generally operates from the base of its own sovereign territory across relatively clear and established lines of battle.”\(^\text{124}\) Contemporary counter-insurgency forces in Iraq, ignoring the spatial and temporal


\(^{122}\) Michel de Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 94.


\(^{124}\) Ibid., 56.
singularity of the battlefield, continue to blindly repeat the now-ineffectual spatial strategies of the traditional army. The Baker Institute’s “Iraq Study Group Report,” released in December of 2006, reported the following: “Currently, the U.S. Military rarely engages in large-scale combat operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of ‘clear, hold, and build’—‘clearing’ areas of insurgents and death squads, ‘holding’ those areas with Iraqi security forces, and ‘building’ areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects.” Even though the U.S. rarely participates in “large-scale combat operations,” this strategy of “clear, hold, and build” obeys a traditional spatial logic which envisions victory as the maintenance and expansion of homogenous space.

As I write today, Bush has just given a speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention in which he invokes the lessons of Vietnam. After acknowledging that “history cannot predict the future with absolute certainty,” Bush goes on to argue that we can “learn something from history,” emphasizing that the past can hold “lessons applicable to our time.” As his speech builds, the rhetoric of historical determinism strengthens as he cites past military victories as examples that should “give us confidence that the hard work we are doing in the Middle East can have the same results we’ve seen in Asia and elsewhere.” History, for Bush, becomes an engine generating repetitions of the Same. But Bush has already prefaced these statements by acknowledging the lack of “absolute certainty” history allows us in determining the future. However, where history fails us, a divine metaphysics intervenes to pick up the slack. At the close of the speech, Bush emphasizes the repetitive sameness of historical events: “the Nazis,” “the Imperial Japanese,” “the Soviet Communists,” and now “Islamic extremists.”

Historical determinism becomes metaphysical overdetermination as he declares each ideological enemy “destined for the same fate.”

Bush and those on the Right, however, are not alone in their desire to see Iraq as a repetition of the Same. The Left also finds increased traction in framing the Global War on Terror as “overdetermined” by the war in Vietnam. What the Left unfortunately misses is the way in which this desire for analogy and determination effaces the singularity of each event and as a result strengthens the Bush administration’s strategic logic. The rhetoric of Bush’s divine metaphysics is echoed by bumper stickers and YouTube videos that figure terrorists and the president respectively as the inevitable repetition of Hitler and the Nazis. In succumbing to Goodwin’s Law, both sides of the aisle fail to realize the inadequacy of analogy.

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127 Ibid.
128 Composite images of George W. Bush and Adolph Hitler are now commonplace. For an example of this rhetoric on YouTube, see Whippedcreamshampoo’s video Macbush, Never Was the President available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HhB2_MBovLk.
129 Godwin’s Law (also dubbed “Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies”) playfully asserts that as an online argument continues, the probability of an analogy with Hitler occurring approaches one. For more on Godwin’s Law and the frequent employment of Nazi analogies in the US Senate, see Mark Leibovich, “The Comparison that Ends the Conversation: Senator is Latest to Regret Nazi Analogy,” Washington Post (June 22, 2005): C01.
War on Terror is not a pure analog of Vietnam; by the same token, we might also observe that Bush is not a pure analog of Macbeth. While the war in Vietnam and the Global War on Terror might in fact be two singular unrepeatable events, what does continue to repeat is a foreign policy rooted in a strategic, spatial logic of expansion.

**Why Macbeth?**

When we think about this similarity between the Cold War strategy and that of the Global War on Terror, it seems fitting to note that in 1965, the year the NEA was signed into law, a University of California graduate student named Barbara Garson sat down in Berkeley to write a fifteen-minute skit based on *Macbeth*. Her appropriation of Shakespeare would cast the Texan President Johnson and his first lady, Ladybird Johnson, in the lead roles. The title of the play was *Macbird!* It’s been almost forty years since *Macbird*’s extended run in the sixties, but the play resurfaced again in September of 2006, this time directed by Ellen Dempsey at The Century Theatre outside Washington D.C. We might ask: why this sudden resurgence?

In order to understand the sudden resurgence of *Macbird!* we must ask an even more important question: why *Macbeth*? What is it about Johnson’s situation in Vietnam or Bush’s situation in Iraq that lends so easily to analogies and appropriations of *Macbeth* and not some other play? One answer is this: Bush’s strategy in Iraq and Johnson’s strategy in Vietnam, like Macbeth’s strategy in Dunsinane, commit the same fundamental error, and it is the error to which all strategies are heir. Their purely spatial logic cannot conceive of tactical, temporal change occurring at the ground level. They only know static places and are unable to conceive of immanent, tactical practices, *temporal* practices capable of reconstituting official places.

Witness Macbeth’s shock when his spatial relationship with Birnam Wood is suddenly transformed, when the “wood began to move” (4.5.35). Macbeth can only think, “We might have met them dearful, beard to beard, / And beat them back home” (4.5.6-7). Even Macduff expresses this strategic logic when he exclaims, “front to front, / Bring thou this fiend of Scotland, and myself” (4.3.232-3). However, Malcolm’s tactical decision to “shadow / The numbers of [their] host, and make discovery / Err in report of [them],” defies the logic of traditional warfare (5.4.5-7). Such “surreptitious creativities” as de Certeau calls them, are unimaginable within the framework of Macbeth’s (and Macduff’s) logic of strategy. De Certeau describes these tactical practices and their invisible, illegible movement below the limits of the solar Eye: “If it is true that *forests of gestures* are manifest in the streets, their movement cannot be captured in a picture, nor can the meaning of their movements be circumscribed in a text.” De Certeau likens these illegible movements occurring below the readable surface of the city to Derrida’s “wandering of the semantic.” Might there be a relationship between this hurly burly detouring from the literal, proper spaces of the city and Macbeth’s inability to solve the semantic riddle of the witches’ “of woman born”?

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130 By 1967, *Macbird!* was a hit in New York and enjoyed an extended run in Los Angeles, launching the careers of actors like Stacy Keach and Rue MacLanahan of Golden Girls fame.
133 Ibid., 102.
134 Ibid., 102.
De Certeau argues that strategies “reduce temporal relationships to spatial ones.” They “pin their hopes on the resistance that the establishment of a place offers to the erosion of time.” Early on in Macbeth, in act one, Lady Macbeth enters the synchronic space necessary to achieve her strategy. As a result of the witches’ proleptic pronouncements, she is dislodged from the “ignorant present,” a present ignorant of what chance the future might bring. Instead, she sees “the future in the instant” (1.5.57,58). She develops a timeline, a teleological spatialization of time that (like the NEA’s Flash-animated maps) meets out homogenous segments of time in a series of predictable instants. This spatialized time gives us nothing but an endless repetition of the Same in which “To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow/Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,/To the last syllable of recorded time” (5.5.19-21). For the Macbeths, time is a traceable line that has already been drawn and represents a future which “anticipat’st [their] dread exploits” (4.2.144). De Certeau notes that through such spatializations of time, “time and movement are thus reduced to a line that can be seized as a whole by the eye and read in a single moment, as one projects onto a map the path taken by someone walking through the city.” In the end, a representation, a simulacrum, stands in for practice. Might Lady Macbush have made the same mistake?

Strategic Tactics, Tactical Strategies

Laura Bush and the NEA mapped out each phase of Shakespeare in American Communities, but what, in fact, did happen on the ground? What theatrical practices did the Alabama Shakespeare Festival engage in? What kind of Macbeth did the troops actually see? The NEA’s official statement, as included in their press release, declares that the military performances aim to show “the Shakespearean truth that peace can be more perilous than war” and “that the most challenging and dangerous battles are confronting the enemy within.” So this is the true Macbeth and the “non-ideological” message the NEA and the Department of Defense paid so dearly to deliver to our troops. Or is it? According to Director Kent Thompson, “Macbeth deals with the issues confronting military leadership today—what happens when the greatest warrior a country has decides he will be King at any price. It’s also a fascinating study in the self-creation of a tyrant. It suggests that moral principles must never be compromised for power or ambition.” This explanation was published in another press release, an action that Thompson was later chastised for by the NEA, even though they had approved the release weeks earlier. Later, according to The Economist, Gioia stated for the record that “the choice of Macbeth reflects no underlying message.” In order to understand which Macbeth the troops actually saw, we must move away from the strategic discourse of press releases which speak

136 Ibid., 38.
137 Ibid., 35.
against (contra-dict) one another while seeking to determine the “underlying meaning” of the performances. Instead, we might take an immanent approach, moving to the level of the pedestrian in order to examine the temporal and behavioral practices that gave force to the NEA ground troops’ performances.

We are privy to these experiences because Kent Thompson, along with other members of the Alabama Shakespeare Festival such as Paul Hebron (Duncan, Old Man) and Kathleen McCall (Lady Macbeth), published online articles and blogs detailing their experiences performing Macbeth.141 These narratives, occupying the same virtual spaces of the Internet as those Web pages offering self-published versions of Macbush, have become as accessible as, if not more accessible than, the ostensibly strategic spaces of “official” press releases.142 This co-occupation of both central and marginal discourses within the same space accelerates and reflects the becoming-immanent of Empire. If the shift from Imperialism to Empire is defined by the shrinking and eventual disappearance of an outside to power, paradoxically, strategies tend to lose the exclusivity of their proper place; as a result, strategies become tactical and move in a common space while tactics, operating on this same common plane, take on strategic proportions. Movement and signification, on the plane of immanence, become both tactical and strategic as the distinction between the two begins to blur.

We see the changing shape of Empire reflected in the form and content of the actors’ blogs. In her blog, Kathleen McCall represents herself as anything but an unthinking agent of the New NEA’s strategy. Instead of describing the tour as a strategic opportunity for the NEA to use Macbeth to wed Shakespeare’s aesthetic authority to the military’s political authority, she describes the military tour as a chance for soldiers and their families, many of whom had never attended a Shakespeare performance, to “mingle with a bunch of raving liberals.”143 As much as

141 Amy Scott-Douglass has also been following the Alabama Shakespeare Company’s military tour. She has observed NEA meetings, attended the opening and closing performances of Macbeth, and interviewed many of those involved. As exhibited in her previous book Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars. (New York: Continuum, 2007), Scott-Douglass’ highly-nuanced, narrative fieldwork will also provide readers access to the troops’ experience on the ground. This recent work, as yet unpublished, was delivered as “Shakespeare Goes to Washington: Military and Civic Programs during the 21st Century,” Shakespeare and the Civic Symposium. Hosted by Sharon O’Dair. Hudson Strode Program in Renaissance Literature. University of Alabama. 14 April 2007.

142 Linda Charnes, in Hamlet’s Heirs: Shakespeare and the Politics of the New Millennium, warns us against the problems inherent in a “culture in which all kinds of information are presented simultaneously as if they were equally noteworthy,” noting that our inundation by a multitude of seemingly-equal information debilitates our “ability to access the credibility of certain claims.” We must heed Charnes’ insightful warning; however, the dangers of this technocultural shift need to be tempered by a discussion of this shift’s equally beneficial democratizing and anti-imperialist potential.

143 Kathleen McCall, “Tour of Duty: ASF’s Lady Macbeth and company bring Shakespeare’s soldiers to life for the U.S. military,” American Theater (February 2005). Later in her article, McCall hints that the mutually exclusivity of these two groups (soldiers’ families and “raving liberals”) belies the complexity of the encounter. We learn that the actors are met backstage by two-star Major General Robert Mixon, Alabama Shakespeare Company member Chris Mixon’s brother.
it exposed soldiers to new environments, the tour also offered the acting company an opportunity to inhabit the military’s “official territory”: in hangers, on submarines, in military prisons, and within what McCall describes as the “contained world” of military communities.\textsuperscript{144} McCall recounts how at Camp LeJeune in North Carolina, she and two other actors navigated a marine obstacle course. Here we might imagine Kathleen McCall moving her body “through the mud and up ropes,” sharing a space and acting in common with the marines who make up her audience.\textsuperscript{145} McCall writes, “I ended up banging both my elbows, scratching up my right forearm and giving myself a wooden splinter, and fire ants made their way up my pants.”\textsuperscript{146} The spatiotemporal habituation of McCall’s body to the contours of the obstacle course transforms the camp, and the theater within it, into a singular yet shared space beyond the distinction between strategies and tactics. De Certeau calls the singularity of an individual’s movement through space “style,” and describes it as a “way of walking through a terrain, a non-textual move or attitude.”\textsuperscript{147} This idea of style as non-discursive somatic timbre illustrates the virtually limitless means by which one moves from beginning to end of any obstacle course, be this trajectory upon the often pre-scripted field of the page, the stage or the battlefield.

In his blog, Paul Hebron describes traveling from one military base to another, performing in gymnasiums, movie theaters, and aircraft hangers adjacent to stealth bombers. He writes: “Night after night we come into a strange space, and find ways to make that particular place work for us and for the show.”\textsuperscript{148} Just as the tactical performances of Macbush appropriated the space of Shakespeare’s text and molded it to suit their own purposes, the NEA’s “official” Shakespearean troops also tactically maneuvered, inhabited and transformed the Department of Defense’s “official territory.” They did so, however, not from the margin but from within.

Hebron’s journal is replete with vivid anecdotes that give us first-hand accounts of how the Alabama Shakespeare Company negotiated the time and space of their military tour. Despite the fact that each location was strategically researched ahead of time, once on stage, the company was forced to tactically manage a host of unanticipated complications. Hebron observes that “even with all that legwork, there are a million little unforeseen issues and difficulties that come up at each venue. It’s unavoidable. It’s part of what makes touring different from any other theatre experience: wonderful, frustrating and ultimately unique.”\textsuperscript{149} This tactical management, like Malcolm’s use of Birnam Wood, necessarily involves temporal improvisation and the ability to make use of the unique properties of each space. Often, this improvisation involves altering the body of the tactician him or herself. Hebron notes that in many of the gymnasial locations sound unexpectedly reflected off of the walls creating an echo effect that both actors and audiences found disorienting. The company immediately improvised; they brought in “baby monitors” to sonically anchor the actors in relation to their voices, and they experimented with finding the “right balance of pitch, tone and volume to minimize” what

\begin{footnotes}
\item[144] Ibid., n.p.
\item[147] Michel de Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life}, 47.
\item[148] Paul Hebron, “Impressions from the Road,” n.p.
\item[149] Ibid., n.p.
\end{footnotes}
Hebron playfully refers to as the “vocal rebound.”\footnote{Paul Hebron, n.p.} Actors, experienced in theories of improvisation, might share these skills with soldiers who, on the field of battle, fear nothing more than the enemy’s improvisational tactics. The buzzword encapsulating the troops’ greatest fear in Iraq has undoubtedly been “improvised explosive device,” a term only nominally tamed by the acronym IED.

Offstage, members of the cast continued their improvisational tactics as they attempted a daytrip into Canada. Hebron remarks that this was the first time since September 11\textsuperscript{th} that he had attempted to leave the country. When the actors reached border security without the necessary official documentation to proceed, they were forced to improvise. Hebron invoked the company’s proper affiliation with the US military in an attempt to transcend the border. He then joked with the border official, forging an affective relation:

We’re part of this touring Shakespeare company from Alabama that is touring military bases across the whole country, that is, America, and well, since we had the free time we just thought why not cross over into beautiful Canada . . . and then come right back, you know [what] I mean? Besides, Detroit is such a dump.\footnote{Ibid., n.p.}

The border official, successfully affected, “snort[ed] in some form of agreement” and waved the actors through the checkpoint.\footnote{Ibid., n.p.} Like the actors, she maintains a “strategic” role as a border official. However, what she and the actors also know is how easily performers slip between roles and allow strategies to blur into tactics. On the way back into the US, the company encountered a seemingly identical situation. Hebron tells us that he repeated his earlier joke about Detroit, but that the repetition of the line, on this occasion, fell flat. Hebron repeated his initially felicitous script, but this time affective relations between performer and audience were not the same. The meaning and text of his script had not changed; what had changed, however, was the style and the affective force of the encounter. As Hebron began conjuring his next line, the whimsical guard nevertheless waved them through.

De Certeau understands popular, tactical practices such as those practiced by the theater company and the border official by citing what the French idiomatically call “la perruque.” Translating literally as “the wig,” la perruque might also be loosely understood as “the false cover.” To practice the art of la perruque is to move undercover, to disguise tactics as strategy. De Certeau writes, “La perruque is the worker’s own work disguised as the work of his employer”; he also notes that the act involves “diverting time” belonging to one’s employer.\footnote{Michel de Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life}, 25.} Hardt and Negri allow us to put an interesting spin on the idea of la perruque when they observe that the rise of immaterial and affective labor (labor whose product is information and affective relations) “blurs the distinction between work time and nonwork time, extending the workday indefinitely to fill all of life.”\footnote{Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire}, 66. For more on “affective labor” and “immaterial labor,” see pages 64-69.} The Alabama Shakespeare Company’s excursion across national...
borders makes positive use of this particular type of self-willed alienation. As labor time slowly encroaches upon “free” time until the two are no longer discernable, *la perruque* likewise expands to include stealing more than time. When employers begin regulating employee *affect*, employees respond by using this official affective behavior as a means towards unofficial ends (“Do you know who I work for?” as screamed by the irate customer) as much as they use their unofficial behavior for official ends (nepotism, sexual relations in the workplace, or the increasing ubiquity of networking parties). The actors, when crossing the border, use their professional status and improvisatory skill to achieve non-professional ends. The border agent responds in kind by improvising a non-professional affective relation while acting in an official capacity.

What did Laura Bush say about these tactical maneuvers masquerading as official NEA strategy? Or Dana Gioia? *Nothing*. Neither attended a single performance. Instead, they asked Kathleen McCall to come to Washington and perform a monologue. In responding to the changing shape of Empire, we must recognize, along with the Alabama Shakespeare Company, what Macbeth and the Bush administration do not: the way in which collaborative, bilateral affective relations give force to our performances. This recognition involves shifting our attention away from what we say and towards what we do, away from the colonization of space and towards a fuller intimacy with time. It demands a new adaptability and improvisatory posture in relation to the contingencies of one’s surroundings. In short, it means understanding *theatrical style* as the temporal, affective, collaborative practice of everyday life. Imperialism’s synoptic fantasy of strategic movement still shapes US foreign policy as much as it shapes the NEA’s cultural agenda, but this model of sovereignty is becoming increasingly complicated by the hyper-mobility and temporal dexterity of the multitude.

In the end, we do not have a dialectic or an opposition between the NEA’s seeming aestheticization of politics and the Irish protestors’ overt politicization of aesthetics. We must examine not simply how we represent politics, but instead remain attentive to the politics of representation. How do we conceive of or represent Shakespeare? How do we understand the shape of antagonisms in Shakespace? Do we conceive of Shakespace as the Bush Administration does, as a sterile promontory unaffected by time, as a static map upon which we can count out or deploy, one, two or “three Shakespeares”? Are differences in Shakespace something one calculates quantitatively, like books on a shelf (five conservative Shakespeares and one alternative Shakespeare)? Or, on the other hand, might we learn to see Shakespeare as something much more dynamic, as something more than a discrete or partitive noun. Might we really begin to see Shakespeare instead as an affective practice: as a reading or a performative event with a qualitative duration—in short, might we see Shakespace as a *temporalized* space on the plane of immanence where qualitative change happens despite all of our best efforts to strategize? Only then will we be able to find *difference* in to-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow.

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155 It must be noted here that this new affective flexibility extends, for the most part, to those involved in immaterial, affective labor. Furthermore, making positive use of this self-willed alienation involves a new form of “passing” in relation to national, racial and/or gendered matrices, an act further complicated for those citizens lacking the (or bearing the wrong) somatic signifiers.

156 Kent Thompson, n.p.
Like one
Who, having into truth by telling of it,
Made such a sinner of his memory
To credit his own lie, he did believe
He was indeed the duke, out o’th’substitution
And executing an outward face of royalty
With all prerogative.

--Prospero, Tem. 1.2.94
In Chapter One, I explored the disjunction between the temporality of political performances and their representation in cartographic and representational spaces. This chapter has a similar aim, but focuses more on the disjunction between durational performance, seemingly-static bibliographic representations, and the strange hybridity of film, which, through its combination of unique duration and print-like repeatability, troubles the identity of both textual and theatrical media.

*The Tempest*, often noted for its metatheatricality, is perhaps Shakespeare’s greatest meditations on mediation. The play is an exploration of the magical powers of representation and their seemingly oppositional relationship to the (often forced) labor of bodies responsible for producing these representations. In Act I of Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, Prospero tells Miranda how his obsession with books led to the loss of his Dukedom. He explains:

> And Prospero the prime Duke, being so reputed
> In dignity, and for the liberal arts
> Without a parallel; those being all my study,
> The government I cast upon my brother
> And to my state grew stranger, being transported
> And rapt in secret studies. (1.2.75-77)

Prospero, trapped in his ivory tower, seems unable to wed practice to theory. We might, in this regard, characterize Prospero in the way Iago disdainfully characterizes Michael Cassio, as one who “never set a squadron in the field” but values instead “bookish theoric, / Wherein the togged consuls can propose/As masterly as he. Mere prattle without practice” (*Oth.* 1.1.21-4). This liberal arts “schoolmaster” and bibliophile becomes estranged from “worldly ends” as he becomes “rapt” in the virtual world provided by his books (*Tem.* 1.2.172, 89). In his opening lecture to Miranda, he tells her how his loyal advisor, Gonzalo, provided him with his library:

> Knowing I loved my books, he furnished me
> From mine own library with volumes that
> I prize above my dukedom. (1.2.66-8)

Prospero schools Miranda on how his usurping brother, Antonio, was “like one / Who, having into truth by telling of it, / Made such a sinner of his own memory / To credit his own lie, he did believe / He was indeed the duke, out o’th’ substitution” (1.2.99-103). Antonio’s usurpation seems performative; his falsehood becomes truth by way of its *telling*. This truth telling retroactively alters the very thing it cites: memory. Through a mendacious linguistic performance, Antonio adapts himself to the role of duke. Antonio’s adaptation is successful, and he achieves this substitution by presenting the “outward face of royalty” (1.2.104). In order for Antonio to cleanly assimilate himself to Prospero’s role, he must eliminate any mediating substance. Prospero describes this process:

> To have no screen between this part he played
> And him he played it for, he needs will be
> Absolute Milan. (1.2.107-9)
Antonio does not become Prospero. However, through imitation and a mendacious citational practice, he does manage to interpellate himself authoritatively into the traditional structures of authority. He is “indeed” or “in deed” the Duke through his actions, but even as the actions he repeats place him in the role of Prospero, he inhabits this role with a difference. This difference, one which must be (ef)faced from the “outward face” in order for him to fully become “Absolute Milan,” is in the text described as a “screen.” The screen, between inward and outward, between the model and the copy, seems to make impossible any attempt on the part of the outward copy to fully embody the inwardness of the original model. The screen contaminates, preventing Antonio from becoming “absolute [literally, ‘unmixed’ or ‘not dependent’] Milan.” But what is the nature of this or any other “screen”? Might the cinematic “screen” function like the one Prospero describes in the sense that film’s surface art never fully repeats the embodied presence of an original performance? Or is it possible that such screens are always already constitutive of performance itself? How might Antonio’s “outward face of royalty” trouble linguistic notions of performativity by insisting that part of Antonio’s successful playing—part of his effacing of this screen—relies upon the convincing affective expressions of his face? What is the relationship between the outward face, affect, and other modes of figuration?

Early film scholar Hugo Münsterberg refers to a similar “screen” or barrier in his discussion of the relationship between theater and film. Münsterberg explains how, like Antonio with Prospero, “the whole moving picture play arose from the slavish imitation of the drama and began only slowly to find its own artistic methods.” Later, Münsterberg discusses a reversal, in which the theater engages in a “dramatic usurpation of the rights of the photoplay.” Münsterberg finishes his history by stating that “We are aesthetically on the borderland.” And so we are. I would like to begin here, in this aesthetic borderland, or at what Bazin refers to as the perceived “unbridgeable gulf between stage and screen.”

I would like to examine two performances, one filmic and one theatrical, which might be said to inhabit this borderland: first and foremost will be Peter Greenaway’s film *Prospero’s Books* (1991); my examination of Greenaway’s negotiation of this unstable terrain will be supplemented by a brief anecdote about my attendance at a 2005 performance of *The Tempest*, which was directed by Tim Carroll at Shakespeare’s Globe Theater in London. If we enter this

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157 Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan gloss this use of ‘screen’, citing *OED* sb. 4a: “a means of securing from attack; anything which intervenes obstructively,” Ibid., 156.

158 In thinking about the relationship between the ‘face’ and ‘figuration’, we should never lose sight of their shared etymology (the face as *figure* in French). Importantly, ‘figure’ signifies both the body itself (*OED* 4a “of a living being: bodily shape,” 4b “the bodily frame,” 5a “an embodied (human) form,”) and its artificial representation or illustration in theatrical or bibliographic terms (*OED* 8b “style of living, ostentation, display, arch.,” II9a “the image, likeness, or representation of something material or immaterial,” 9b “an imaginary form, a phantasm, obs.” 11b “one acting a part, obs. rare,” 11c “a person dressed in character,” IV18 “a written character.”). *Oxford English Dictionary*, 3rd ed. s.v. “figure.” www.oed.com.


160 Ibid., 181; Münsterberg’s abandoned portmanteau word, ‘photoplay’, registers this dwelling on the borderland between photography and theatre.

borderland along two fronts, we can begin to examine two figures struggling with issues of adaptation: the screen actor, struggling like Antonio to efface the “screen” between himself and the character he attempts to embody, and the man upon the stage, the “flesh-and-blood actor” who engages in re-presenting an original performance, an origin from which he is separated by another type of screen: the text and page itself. My goal in this chapter will be to look at the ways in which each performance attempts, either on stage or screen, to represent or make “present” its ostensible origins. In order to fully understand this aesthetic borderland, it will be necessary to focus on how both theatrical and filmic performances (as well as critical discourses which take such performances as their object of study) perceive and re-constitute their historical, textual, and/or embodied origins as well as the ways in which these media (along with their champions) attempt to invest their performative representations with the “presence” of these origins.

Performance at the Globe: Restoring the Aura

In 2005 I made a pilgrimage to one of the newly constructed sacred sites of Shakespeare studies: Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre on London’s Bankside in the Borough of Southwark. The project of reconstructing the Globe began when the American actor Sam Wanamaker, after seeing a replica at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1933, visited the supposed site of the original theater in 1949. In 1970, Wanamaker founded the Shakespeare Globe Trust, which was “dedicated to the reconstruction of the theatre and the creation of an education centre and permanent exhibition.” The new Globe opened to the public in 1997 at a location less than a block away from the site of the “original” Globe Theatre. To enter the reconstructed Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre is to experience a strange encounter with the specificity of space and the long duration of history. For a price, this living monument offers locals and tourists a chance to experience the “original” context within which Shakespeare’s plays had their performative force. Despite the fact that the Globe is actually a reproduction of a reproduction (the original Globe theatre burned down and was rebuilt during Shakespeare’s lifetime), the Globe operates as a Ouiji board of sorts, using Shakespearean texts to bring the dead into the present for our amusement.

If the new Globe is a museum, and I would argue that it is, the “authentic” Shakespearean performance serves as its artifact, as the “original” work of art the Globe alone is able to provide and of which every other performance is a reproduction. Walter Benjamin, whose artwork essay has become a touchstone for any study of aesthetic reproduction and originality, tells us that the “uniqueness of a work of art is identical to its embeddedness in the context of tradition.” Few

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162 André Bazin, 95.
165 It is interesting to note, here, that according to Andrew Gurr, in the last two centuries “more than twenty reconstructions of Elizabethan playhouses have been launched,” Jean Wilson, 739n1.
authors represent this embeddedness in Western tradition more than Shakespeare. The guiding philosophy of the Globe is that through this tradition one might encounter an “authentic” Shakespearean performance, a “true” engagement with history. The Globe tells us in their program that “Techniques used in the reconstruction of the theatre were painstakingly accurate. ‘Green’ oak has been cut and fashioned according to 16th-century practice and assembled in two-dimensional bays on the Bankside site.”

Against this painstaking accuracy, W.B. Worthen, the scholar most responsible for the holy site’s demystification, has argued that while “performance at the Globe appears to cite the ‘original’ circumstances of Shakespearean drama . . . what performance reproduces is not an origin, but the illusion of originary behavior.” By presenting the illusion of originary behavior, performance at the Globe becomes definitive of ‘performance’ itself. Richard Schechner has famously noted that “Performance means: never for the first time.” Performance strives to achieve what Schechner calls “restored behavior.” Interestingly, in order to describe “restored behavior,” Schechner relies upon a filmic metaphor:

The habits, rituals, and routines of life are restored behaviors. Restored behavior is living behavior treated as a film director treats a strip of film. These strips of behavior can be rearranged or reconstructed; they are independent of the causal systems (personal, social, political, technological, etc.) that brought them into existence. They have a life of their own. The original ‘truth’ or ‘source’ of the behavior may not be known, or may be lost, ignored, or contradicted—even while that truth or source is being honored. How the strips of behavior were made, found, or developed may be unknown or concealed; elaborated; distorted by myth and tradition.

Like Antonio, who tries to eliminate the “screen” between himself and the part he plays, the great Globe itself, along with the contemporary Shakespearean actor, also stands in for an historical other. The Globe’s architecture and the goodly frame of the contemporary actor, through their performance, repeat what they attempt to replace, but these repetitions act as what Joseph Roach calls “surrogation,” acts which stands in for a past in a present which will always exceed and shape it. Even in live performance, it becomes clear that we only ever encounter the past (be this an historical past or one of tense) through the “screen” of the present.

The “flesh-and-blood” actor on the stage at the Globe therefore fails to make history fully “present.” Mark Rylance, the Globe’s long-time artistic director and the actor playing Prospero

167 Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre, 5.
170 Ibid., 164.
in the 2005 performance of *The Tempest* serves as a substitute for his Jacobean predecessor. At the Globe, try as we might, we never fully encounter the early modern; we encounter only surrogates. The “liveness” of the theater and the context of tradition encourage us, however, to believe that we can. Nevertheless, contemporary spectators, placed in the “presence” of the flesh-and-blood actor, still find themselves caught within the actor’s aura, what Benjamin defines as a “strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be.”173 At the Globe, we still see what Benjamin describes as “the desire of the present-day masses to ‘get closer’ to things, and their equally passionate concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness.”174 The Globe, like most theaters, protects the actor’s aura, an aura bound to the actor’s embeddedness in the context of tradition. In order to protect this aura, this uniqueness in time and space, a ticket to the Globe (mirroring the regulations governing many a museum and live event) unequivocally states that “the unauthorized use of a camera, videocamera [sic.] or any other sort of recording equipment is strictly forbidden.”175

I brought my camera anyway, and with a simple gesture, a snap, I shoot Mark Rylance on stage. This “unauthorized” gesture buries Rylance along with the history he attempts to enliven. He becomes another Shakespearean ghost. Even as I “snatch [him] from the flow of time,” and engage in what Bazin calls the practice of “embalming the dead,” I am still unable to bring him closer.176 I fail in my desire to triumph over the vicissitudes of time, and I am unable to fix Rylance’s figure/face within the rectangular frame of my camera’s aperture. My camera’s autofocus (a technology which incorporates the manual power of adjustment, taking it out of my hands) instead captures the border of heads that separate me from the stage; the actors’ faces are still too distant. The past becomes clearly divided by its place in the present and the context of tradition reveals itself to be nothing but a reproduction of the past in the present. The actor’s face is a blur. The theatre hides the face of the actor.

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173 Walter Benjamin, 104-5.
174 Ibid., 105.
176 André Bazin, 9.
A New Presence: Benjamin, Bazin and Metz on Strips and Scripts

Whereas theater tries to enliven a textual history in the present, cinematic adaptation aims to re-present theater’s performative engagement with history. Cinema’s engagement with history, one that seems to include performance’s engagement with texts as a discrete subset, involves a delicate double conjuring. For this reason, narrative cinema always operates as both itself and performance. Peter Greenaway’s *Prospero’s Books* provides a useful example of this doubling as it strains to cinematically capture the presence of both John Gielgud as Prospero while at the same time connecting that performance to a larger, historical performance tradition. Moreover, this performance tradition (as we have seen with much performance criticism) figures performance as the citation or repetition of an antecedent textuality. Greenaway, too, imagines cinematic performance as rooted in a prior textuality:

This strategy [of keeping characters mute and allowing Gielgud’s authorial Prospero speak for them] is made especially significant in a project that deliberately emphasises and celebrates *the text as text, as the master material on which all the magic, illusion and deception of the play is based*. Words making text, and text making pages, and pages making books from which knowledge is fabricated in pictoral form—these are the persistently forefronted characteristics.\(^{177}\)

The importance of this triple conjuring—grounded as it is in the “master material” of the text—is best expressed by Lia Hotchkiss in her discussion of the film. For Hotchkiss, cinema’s “other is not simply the filmed performer; it is also that older art of literature and performance, the theater.” Cinema must bring to life both photographic images and the “originary” behaviors these performances claim to re-present. Film strips must enliven “strips of behavior” which repeat/surrogate the master strip/script, the text. Greenaway complicates his apparent priority of the text, however, when, in an interview with Marlene Rodgers, he critiques what he calls “dominant cinema, which itself seems to be simply an illustrational medium, illustrating novels all the time.” Greenaway’s film acknowledges and complicates this doubling, and his filmic treatment of Shakespeare’s play—a play already all-too-aware of its own theatricality—constantly plays upon what Greenaway highlights as the recursive relation between image and text, copy and model, authored and author. Greenaway’s screenplay explicitly notes how “In this script it is intended that there should be much deliberate cross-identification between Prospero, Shakespeare and Gielgud. At times they are indivisibly one person.” We might add Greenaway to that matrix of cross-identification. But before we approach Greenaway’s recursive cinema-theatre-text triumvirate, we should pause to review how these three modes of representation have been figured in relation to one another throughout the history of film studies.

The cinematic image has been historically figured as a mere shadow of the actor’s more-primary performing presence; he is a walking shadow, a poor player, a signifying absence. Walter Benjamin acknowledges the how the actor’s body is figured in terms of absence, citing Pirandello’s observation that the screen actor is “exiled not only from the stage but from his own person . . . his body has lost its substance.” Pirandello goes on to describe how the filmic apparatus “will play with his shadow before the audience, and he himself must be content to play before the apparatus.” Later, Christian Metz’ psychoanalytic semiotic would continue in this vein, calling the cinematographic image an object’s “shade, its phantom, its double, its replica in a new kind of mirror.” Both critics figure cinematic representation as a secondary, alienating medium, one which etiolates and repeats a more primary presence.

Against all this talk of shadows and death, it is important to note that both Benjamin and Metz, while acknowledging the cinema as a dance of shadows, still fight against the idea of cinema as complete absence. This desire to figure cinematic representation alongside more

180 It is interesting to note that Greenaway, in figuring the relation between text and image, alludes to the theatrical relationship between Ben Jonson and Inigo Jones: “basically Ben Jonson was interested in the word, and Inigo Jones was interested in spectacle. And there’s a way they had to fashion their two opposing interests to make a coherent whole, in order to present their masques. And in a way that is also the quandary of cinema . . . it’s very interesting to try to find a filmmaker who can bring the word and the spectacle together,” qt. in Marlene Rodgers and Peter Greenaway, 11.
181 Peter Greenaway, Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 9.
182 Walter Benjamin, 112 (my emphasis).
183 Christian Metz, 45.
primary modes of representation (rather than transcendent to and therefore ‘outside’ of the more constitutive textual and/or embodied modes of representation) pushes Metz and Benjamin closer to the immanent philosophies discussed in chapter one. Instead of figuring cinema as a medium through which embodied presence is repeated as absence, they attempt to articulate a cinematographic form of presence. This attempt to define a new cinematic presence begins with André Bazin, for whom the photograph of a performance retains the trace of the actor’s body. For Bazin, “the photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it… [I]t shares, by virtue of its very process of becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.” This “process of becoming” is the photograph’s “automatic genesis” which “distinguishes it radically from the other techniques of reproduction,” techniques which rely too heavily upon the human body to mediate reality. While Bazin’s desire to free the photographic image from the constraints of space and time seems like a Kantian desire to relocate spatializing and temporalizing operations within the intuition of the transcendental viewing subject, this is not altogether the case. Bazin is careful to reinsert the object in a constitutive temporality. Although the photograph “embalms time,” according to Bazin, with cinema, “the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, change mummified as it were.” The photograph, reconceived as that which retains the trace of

184 André Bazin, 14.
185 Ibid., 96.
186 Kant writes “If we do not this treat [space and time] as objective forms of all things, the only alternative is to view them as subjective forms of our inner and outer intuition, which is termed sensible, for the very reason that it is not original, that is, is not such as can itself give us the existence of its object. . . . But however universal this mode of sensibility may be, it does not therefore cease to be sensibility. It is derivative (intuitus derivatives), not original (intuitus originarius), and therefore not an intellectual intuition,” Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 90. Here we see Kant equating the time and space with the mind’s sensible (non-transcendent) forms of experience; each of these terms (space, time, the sensible), then, through their link to experience, become devalued as “derivative,” as “not original.” Theodor Adorno, in his lectures on Kant’s Critique, notes that “On the one hand, he perceives, like no one before him, that time is a necessary condition of knowledge, and hence of every instance of allegedly timeless knowledge, and that it exists as a form of intuition. On the other hand, he perceives the passage of time as a kind of flaw, and something that truly authoritative knowledge ought to avoid,” Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 11. These ideas will be taken up more fully in Chapter Three.
187 André Bazin, 14-15; Alongside this figuration of “change mummified,” we might read Nietzsche’s claim that philosophers (like Kant in the above note) lack historical sense: “They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it, sub speci aeterni—when they make a mummy of it. All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not,” Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1968), 45.
the model is given duration through cinema, and this transformation allows for what Bazin refers to as “pseudopresences.”

In addition to the fact that the copy in fact is the model for Bazin, he goes on to show how it can be perceived as such for the spectator. He begins by drawing attention to the element of “proximity” inherent in spectators’ notions of presence. Because cinema, though the close-up, can bring the performance closer to the spectator, Bazin proposes a new equation for understanding the spectator’s seeming spatio-temporal coincidence with the actor. Through this radical reformulation of presence, Bazin is able to claim that “it is no longer as certain as it was that there is no middle stage between presence and absence.” According to Bazin, although we might not be a “direct witness” to the represented spectacle, what is lost through this secondariness can be recaptured “thanks to the artificial proximity provided by the photographic enlargement.” The spectator accepts this proximity, and it subsidizes what is lost in the spatio-temporal economy of presence. For this reason, and because the image holds the trace of the model, Bazin is able to claim that “it is false to say that the screen is incapable of putting us ‘in the presence of’ the actor.”

Christian Metz makes a similar claim. For Metz, what the theater makes present, the cinema gives “in effigy.” However, despite this figuration of cinema as absence, Metz goes on to point out how the cinema is capable of representing that absence in detail, presumably through the close-up. This detailed absence, however, exists for the spectator in “a primordial elsewhere, infinitely desirable (never attainable), on the other scene which is that of absence and which nonetheless represents absence in detail, thus making it very present, but by a different itinerary.” Again, the spectator, through psychic compensation and what Metz calls “a prosthesis for our primordially dislocated limbs,” is able to engage with film as a pseudopresence.

Benjamin had already offered a very different reconfiguration of presence, a reconception that again involved an “equilibrium between human beings and the apparatus.” Benjamin’s reconfiguration at once involves revolutionary possibility and a political risk. In the same way that Kracauer calls the turn to photography the “go-for-broke game of history,” Benjamin discusses the perilous potential of the film actor, the actor without an aura. The film actor, dislodged from the authority of tradition and collective experience, can serve as a revolutionary figure for the masses. Benjamin tells us that for the first time, “the human being is placed in a position where he must operate with his whole living person, while foregoing its aura.” The actor’s mode of experience (tending towards Erlebnis), in its inability to connect with the longue durée of Erfahrung (a subjective experience organized in relation to continuous, collective

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188 André Bazin, 97.
189 Ibid., 97.
190 Ibid., 98.
191 Ibid., 97.
192 Christian Metz, 61.
193 Ibid., 4.
194 Walter Benjamin, 117.
196 Walter Benjamin, 112.
experience grounded in common sense), mirrors the experience of the alienated spectator. Benjamin gambles upon the possibility of what Miriam Hansen describes as the “spatio-temporal reorganization of experience,” or what Benjamin refers to as productive “innervation.”

This innervation might occur at both the level of production and reception. The actor might then be brought closer to the spectator at the expense of his individual uniqueness, his unique presence in the “tissue” of the here and now. The seemingly distant screen actor, because of this “creative innervation” or what Benjamin calls “a highly productive use of the human being’s self-alienation,” is paradoxically brought closer and connected to the spectator whose mode of experience he shares and reflects. Benjamin’s leveling maneuver, in which both spectator and spectated occupy a shared, immanent terrain—a terrain upon which they are both grounded through an experience (Erlebnis) constituted through an enmeshment with shocking technologies—troubles the continuity of the longue durée. The transcendentalist spectator no longer views the mediated spectacle; instead, mediated spectator and mediated spectacle meet on the common ground of a new form of experience. Both the spectator and actor exit the stage of traditional presence and find themselves meeting elsewhere, by another means. The actor wagers his human nature, puts it into play so to speak, and in return gains a “second nature,” a “new physis” through which he is able to establish a pseudo-co-presence with the spectator.

Prospero’s New Physis

In Prospero’s Books, John Gielgud might serve as an example of Benjamin’s revolutionary film actor, one who engages in “test performances” which “take revenge on [the spectators’] behalf” by placing the apparatus “in the service of his triumph” through creative innervation. Benjamin cites Pirandello’s observation that the film actor is exiled from his body and the stage. Prospero is the exiled hero par excellence. Banished on his island, Greenaway’s Prospero rehearses his revenge. His body is divided and dispersed, appearing to the spectator in many places at once; he is in the pool, in his library, and patrolling his kingdom at one and the same time. Greenaway’s filmic Prospero hears all, and speaks for all through voiceover. If Prospero’s voice must be divided, he makes a virtue of necessity and uses this divided—or rather multiplied—voice to exercise power over and through the patriarchs of Milan.

Prospero’s new physis is made possible—and explicit—through Greenaway’s use of a revolutionary digital technology. In 1990, Greenaway compares his technology to “the Guttenberg revolution.” He is worth quoting at length:

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199 qt. in Miriam Hansen. “Room for Play: Benjamin’s Gamble With Cinema,” Canadian Journal of Film Studies. (Spring, 2004), 2 ; Benjamin 113.
200 Ibid., 4.
The newest Guttenberg technology—and to talk of a comparable revolution may not be to exaggerate—is the digital, electronic Graphic Paintbox. This machine, as its name suggests, links the vocabulary of electronic picture-making with the traditions of the artist’s pen, palate and brush, and like them permits a personal signature. I believe its possibilities could radically affect cinema, television, photography, painting and printing. . . . The paintbox can change the shape, form, contrast, colour, tone, texture, ratio and scale of any given material. . . . If infinite reproduction is required, then as far as the digital paintbox is concerned, there is no fear of quality loss.²⁰²

In 1990, the technological capabilities of Greenaway’s digital Paintbox were indeed revolutionary. The UK’s Quantel’s digital Paintbox (Quantel is a portmanteau for “QUANtized TELevision”), first released in 1981, was originally used to produce television graphics for news programming (mostly for titles, banners, and weather graphics). In 1973, Quantel “developed the first practical analog to digital converter for television applications.”²⁰³ By 1990, Quantel was competing with Adobe’s now-familiar Photoshop software (Quantel would go on, in 1996, to sue Adobe for alleged “infringement of five of their patents”).²⁰⁴ In the 1986 BBC documentary Painting with Light, intermedia artist David Hockney experiments with Quantel’s Paintbox program. As Hockney manipulates the electronic stylus, he comments on what he perceives as the lack of mediation:

I’m actually drawing on a [pause] just a blank board, and it leaves no marks behind, so, what you’re actually seeing is the original. There’s no piece of paper left. You’re not drawing on a piece of paper. You’re drawing [pause] you’re drawing actually directly onto this TV screen where you’re seeing it now, in a way. There is no distance between you and the mark being made, actually . . . It doesn’t exist in any other form . . . This is merely a piece of lighted glass you’re looking at . . . [We’re used to watching a painter across the] distance of the camera from the piece of paper [and color is lost in this distance] . . . Here, there isn’t any distance. That color is the color.²⁰⁵

Prospero seems to hint at such a magical technology when he gives up his magic and drowns his book; when the “insubstantial pageant [has] faded,” he points out that it will “leave not a rack behind” (4.1.155-6). Greenaway makes creative use of this lack of distance between original and reproduction. This equilibrium between apparatus and artist gets illustrated Prospero’s Books in

²⁰² Peter Greenaway, Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 28.
²⁰⁵ Painting with Light, VHS, directed by Geoff Dunlop (1986; Beverly Hills: Pacific Arts Video/British Broadcasting Company/Griffin Productions, 1988). Available online at: http://www.ucpress.edu/blog/?p=732; It’s also fascinating to note that today Hockney, at age 71, is being recognized for making art on his iPhone. For more on this, see Emma Barnett, “David Hockney Paints with His iPhone,” The Daily Telegraph (April 30, 2009).
one scene in particular, a scene of Prospero’s *becoming-image*. In this scene, Prospero is figured as both author and authored. After gathering the Milanese patriarchs together for a feast in the woods, Prospero appears above them as an image. Greenaway’s screenplay describes the scene as follows:

There is a great crash—the mechanical droning we associate with Prospero’s magic—there is thunder and lightning and ear-splitting musical effects with great rhythmic insistency. . . . In his eyrie in the pyramid up above—Prospero is on his feet and angrily declaiming. His voice—as Ariel—changes to his voice as himself.  

The film is composed of many such photographic insertions and superimpositions. These inserts, like overlays or windows, normally function like a split-screen, allowing the viewer to see events taking place in two discrete locations. However, in this scene the seemingly-extradiccet insertion becomes magically diegetic: Prospero *appears as* image above the patriarchs. From this two-dimensional image, Prospero speaks (his voice morphing between bodies, first heard as the screeching Ariel, then as himself), rains down lightning, and drops an apparently three-dimensional Ariel. The image then dissolves into an actual space. What was first a virtual window superimposed onto the filmic background is now a balcony from which he speaks (see Figure 7). On the renaissance stage, this would be called the “heavens.” His intermedial magic horrifies the court.  

Peter Donaldson notes Prospero’s appropriation of Greenaway’s digital technology:

Digital image technology is present in the film by analogy: the multiple ‘windows’ summoned and dismissed by Prospero’s ‘art’ evoke the scene of digital composition; the quill pen with which Prospero writes has acquired functionalities of the electronic stylus; the repeated shots of Gielgud’s writing fingers may allude to the medium of composition through the ambiguity of the word ‘digital’, which can refer to works of the hand or the effects of computation . . . Prospero is a double for Greenaway, the digital cinema artist, as much as for Shakespeare the playwright.  

Prospero’s body becomes the reproductive technology it engages with; the flesh and blood digit becomes digital. The organic becomes synonymous with its mechanical means of reproduction. Greenaway emphasizes this congruence when he writes, “The camera takes flight, like a bird—and flies towards the largest of pyramids.” Prospero then walks to the window of the pyramid; he “sits at the aperture and looks down. The camera follows his gaze downwards.”

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In this way, Bazin’s observation that the copy is the model, in Greenaway’s film, is nowhere better expressed than through Prospero, who is always both at once. The patriarchs are no match for Prospero’s creative innervation because in contrast to Prospero’s technological body, the royal party is depicted theatrically. Douglas Lanier points out that their “elaborate black doublets, ruffs the size of cartwheels, and corkheeled shoes with puffball tassels—costumes that severely inhibit the actors’ ability to move—effectively convey their neurasthenia, their enervated overcivilisation.”

We are invited to read this “enervation,” a cutting of the sinews, against Prospero’s technological innervation, the enlivening of nerves. Prospero tests his power, using his technological magic to “shock” his enervated usurpers with a bolt of lightning. His technology robs them of their strength. As they draw their swords, Prospero tells them “Your swords are now too massy for your strengths / And will not be uplifted.”

At this, the overcivilized patriarchs become literally enervated, unable to hold their swords.

In its depiction of the royal party, Greenaway’s film also enters the borderland between film and theater. In addition to the weight of traditional authority the royal party’s garments carry, two curious aspects of their royal attire stand out above the rest: gigantic hats which cast a shadow upon their faces and large lace blindfolds. The characters’ vision does not seem inhibited by these blindfolds; rather, it is the spectator’s vision that is impaired. The royal party

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211 Peter Greenaway, *Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest*, 130.
is distant, and because of these blindfolds, we are unable to see the actors’ faces.\(^{212}\) The spectator is screened off from the satisfaction of the close-up. When Ferdinand arrives on the island, he comes under Prospero’s spell, this time through another reproductive technology: Prospero’s daughter Miranda. Unlike the royal party, when Ferdinand enters the properly filmic space through his encounter with Miranda, he exclaims, “Space enough / Have I in such a prison.”\(^{213}\) Like Prospero, the innervated Ferdinand has made positive use of his exile. Through Ariel, Prospero’s magical medium, Ferdinand’s hat and blindfold are removed. It is Mark Rylance. We see his face in close-up. A few scenes later, we see Prospero give up his magic, and this leads to his subsequent enervation—and his re-insertion into the context of tradition from which he has so long been exiled. He falls back into tradition as he promises his daughter to Ferdinand, the Milanese royal heir. With this gesture, Prospero begins his reengagement with an historical line of succession, with the *longue durée* of historical experience. Greenaway’s direction for this scene:

Prospero’s usual control is momentarily lost—he looks surprised and crestfallen . . . at Ariel’s unaccustomed escape and at the pen that has also symbolically deserted him.\(^{214}\)

 Appropriately, this scene is depicted upon what is clearly a theatrical and bibliographic mise-en-scène; the Laurenziana Library—that which holds books—in this scene is a paper façade that we earlier saw folded out of a book. Curiously, in this scene, we are, as on the stage, distanced from the characters. As the camera begins a slow zoom, we expect to come face-to-face with the characters. Instead, as the camera gives the illusion of an increase in proximity, we notice that the faces have been edited out. In the place of the face, we end up with nothing but a speaking blur. As on the stage of the Globe Theatre, the actor’s face eludes us.

**The Face of Things: Balázs and Deleuze**

On film, the actor’s body is freed from time and space, and as his body becomes liquidated, so too does tradition and the aura. However, Benjamin refers to “the human countenance” as the “last entrenchment” of cult value as it recedes with the rise of exhibition value. It is in old photographs that we last see the aura though the “cult of remembrance of dead or absent loved ones.”\(^{215}\) What, then, are we to make of the close-up in film? Might the close-up give nature a new face? If the age of technological reproducibility gives the actor and the spectator a new body, might it also, through a new form of remembrance and pseudopresence, give them new faces? Might the stage actor, the faceless conjurer of history, through the “second technology” of film, be able to give us that which tradition and the theater, the “first technology,” hid from us?\(^{216}\)

One of the first film critics to argue for the importance of both the close-up and the face was Béla Balázs. For Balázs, the close-up is not merely a “naturalistic preoccupation with detail

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\(^{212}\) In a discussion of the face on stage, W.B. Worthen drew these blindfolds to my attention.

\(^{213}\) Peter Greenaway, *Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest*, 106.

\(^{214}\) Ibid., 134.


\(^{216}\) Ibid., 107, 117.
... good close-ups radiate a tender human attitude in the contemplation of hidden things, a delicate solicitude, a gentle bending over the intimacies of the life-in-miniature, a warm sensibility. Good close-ups are lyrical.”

According to Balázs’ “anthropomorphic poetics,” film, as a “new machine” will give actors “new faces.” Balázs claims that “the camera close-up aims at the uncontrolled small areas of the face” and that it is thus “able to photograph the subconscious.” Gertrud Koch notes that this observation inspired Benjamin’s thesis on the optical unconscious. The filmic close-up, then, can show us the actor in a way the stage, with all its distance and ephemerality, could never show us. While the stage might give us the “flesh-and-blood” actor, Balázs tells us that the close up takes us out of space and time, presenting us with “another dimension: that of physiognomy.” The face in close-up is “not a figure in flesh and bone, but an expression,” a feeling or an affect that, existing outside space-time, is “rendered visible by means which are” within time and space.

Balázs believes that a close-up gives us new insight into nature. Similarly, Siegfried Kracauer argues that a “consciousness caught up in nature is unable to see its own material base” and that photography allows the world to reveal itself to us as it exists outside human perception. In this way, we see the face and the world as never before. With the close-up of the face, we see both seeing and that which sees differently. Balázs explains:

> Blurred outlines are mostly the result of insensitive short-sightedness and superficiality. We skim over the teeming substance of life. The camera has uncovered that cell-life of the vital issues in which all great events are ultimately conceived; for the greatest landslide is only the aggregate of the movements of single particles. A multitude of close-ups can show us the very instant in which the general is transformed into the particular.

As a student of Bergson, Balázs saw the close up functioning outside space in the same way a note within a melody carries meaning because of a relation which exists outside of time: an instance of the particular is individuated only through its atemporal relation to the dividuated whole. With one note, we conjure the others.

Gilles Deleuze takes up this Bergsonian project where Balázs leaves off. More than this, though, Deleuze continues Bazin and Benjamin’s project of reconstituting presence through cinematic technology. He tells us that we must again return to the problem of presence, and in this return he brings us back to Bazin:

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219 qt. in Gertrud Koch, 173.
220 Bélla Balázs, 61.
221 Siegfried Kracauer, 61-2.
222 Ibid., 55.
223 Ibid., 62.
When André Bazin takes up the problem, he looks for a sense in which there is a different mode of presence, a cinematographic one, which rivals that of theatre and may even outdo it with different methods. But, if cinema does not give us the presence of the body and cannot give us it, this is perhaps also because it sets itself a different objective . . . The camera must invent the movements or positions which correspond to the genesis of bodies, and which are the formal linkages of their primordial postures.  

Deleuze does not want cinema to show us the signifying presence of human bodies; this, for him, is the job of the stage. Instead, the cinema must invent or create that expressive force which allows for the signifying body’s constitution in the first place. Where for Bazin, the photographic copy retained the trace of the model and therefore was the model, and where for Benjamin, the innervated spectator might see the reproduction as a new kind of engageable presence, Deleuze sees film’s potential to harness the powers of the false in order to show that “what is false is not simply a copy, but already the model.” His insistence upon film’s ability to “make a model out of appearances” presupposes a new way of seeing, one which is not centered on the localizable subject in the world, but rather upon the nomadic subject who creates itself within a world which already appears to him as a “bad” film. Here, in the world that makes models out of appearances, we see the fulfillment of what Bazin refers to as photography’s ability to create a “hallucination that is also a fact.” Rather, we see the way in which hallucinations become or produce fact. Facticity, here, is shown to be a product of its figuration (rather than the reverse). Deleuze’s reversal of the relationship between models and copies—like Antonio’s use of “th’ outward face of royalty” through which he produces “truth by telling of it”—is a move towards immanence. In this sense, Deleuze follows a Nietzschean reversal of the relationships between model and copy, between imitation and instinct, between a truth and the lies that produce it. Here is Nietzsche:

Imitation is a means employed by all culture. By this means instinct is gradually produced. All comparison (primal thinking) is imitation. . . . Inculcation of a second nature by means of imitation.

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225 Ibid., 146 (my emphasis). I do think, however, that Kracauer almost recognizes this filmic possibility when, in his essay on photography, he states that “The disorder of the detritus reflected in photography cannot be elucidated more clearly than through the suspension of every habitual relationship among the elements of nature. The capacity to stir up the elements of nature is one of the possibilities of film.” This possibility, for Kracauer, allows “consciousness to establish the provisional status of all given configurations” of nature. Siegfried Kracauer, 62.
226 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 146, 171.
227 André Bazin, 16.
Antonio’s “royalty” is exposed; so too is Prospero’s. “[T]h’outward face of royalty,” which Prospero seems to oppose to something more inward, something more natural, reveals itself as product of activated props and pageantry: in short, temporal performance.

The face is the ostensible threshold between inside and outside. The face is a surface, as in “prima facie,” “on the face of things,” or when we take something “at face value.” It signifies even as it withholds what we imagine to be a subterranean significance. In this way, the face is figured textually: we “read a face” even as we acknowledge a “sub-text” that is thought itself. Deleuze wants to trouble this formulation. For Deleuze, the close-up’s role, paradoxically, is to reveal an expressive, primordial posture by creating it. The close-up no longer gives the spectator the flesh-and-bone presence of the actor; it gives instead a durational pseudopresence, an expression of the temporal conditions that allow the actor to appear present in the first place. In a comment that mirrors Bazin’s discussion of the copy and model, Deleuze states that the close-up is not of the face; it is the face. This immanent syntax (in which the mediation of a prepositionally constrained object gives way to grammar in which nominalized doer is retroactively and temporally produced by the deed) reminds us of how there is no performance “of Shakespeare,” only Shakespearean performances: Shakespearing.

If we imagine the face as a medium between inside and outside, the close-up shows us our error. If we imagine the image as a medium between us and an imagination, the close-up’s apparent immediacy shows us our error. The face is not a medium; the face of things—things that clearly lack interiority—teaches us this. Deleuze tells us that “Each time we discover two poles in something—reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements—we say that this thing has been treated as a face [visage]: it has been ‘envisaged’ or rather ‘faceified’ [visagéifiée], and in turn it stares at us [dévisage], it looks at us . . . even if it does not resemble a face.” The face is both potentially receptive as an “immobile,” “organ-carrying plate of nerves” and potentially “intensive” in its “micro-movements.” The face receives; the face emits. The face is not a close-up of an “action-image,” it does not stand in a synecdochic relation to an actualized state of things; rather, the face is facialized as an “affective-image” when it is abstracted from the security of its spatial coordinates and when individuation is suspended. The face does not mean or signify; it expresses. The features of the face escape their outline through “lines of flight”; “it expresses the possible without actualizing it” in space. An image is facialized when it loses its individuation, when it moves from a register of quantity to one of quality. An actual face loses its individuation through the close-up, but any image, not necessarily a face, can also become facialized when it is deterritorialized and the space of the image becomes “any-space-whatever”; it is this aspatiality which is also generative of the affection-image.

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230 Ibid., 88 (my emphasis).
231 Ibid., 87, 90.
232 Ibid., 103.
233 Ibid., 98.
234 Ibid., 110.
In her fascinating essay, “Numbering Prospero’s Books,” Peggy Phelan notes that “virtually every frame of Prospero’s Books operates on at least two planes of space-time.”\textsuperscript{235} While we can agree that, as she says, there is the space and time of both “Shakespeare’s” story and its narration/unfolding within the film, I would argue that Phelan’s fascination with numbers in some ways reduces the force of Greenaway’s film. The film never operates on any discrete plane. There are at least three narrative levels upon which the film operates: the level of plot which Prospero writes, the level in which he writes, and above all of this, we have what Metz calls the level of filmic “enunciation [the énonciation],” the level which gives or tells us the other two.\textsuperscript{236} The spectator, however, is unable to find steady ground on any of these three levels; these registers constantly blur and become each other. The image of Prospero writing the actions of his characters is often interrupted by the characters themselves. We see Prospero appear within scenes we know he is writing. We see characters he may or may not write, such as Miranda, interacting with those he writes. \textit{He himself is both written and writing.}

Greenaway gives Prospero what Derrida refers to as “the middle voice, a certain nontransitivity” which “may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed into an active and a passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this repression.”\textsuperscript{237} Greenaway’s deconstruction of this divide provides what Martin Jay refers to as “an emancipatory gesture, allowing some more primordial operation to reemerge.”\textsuperscript{238} Through the film’s middle voice, this free indirect discourse, we are both outside and inside Prospero’s imagination, to the point that the distinction between inside and outside dissolves. We see Prospero and suspect we see as him when he usurps the enunciative functions of the film. Few places exist within the film that are not “any-space-whatever.” We constantly wait for characters to settle down into some place, into some “state of things,” but, more often than not, we are prevented as each (double) image expresses a Deleuzean faciality.

The technology of Greenaway’s film, operating largely on the z-axis through dissolve, superimposition, and the use of multiple frames, will not allow itself to be translated into a state of things. Deleuze draws upon Kafka’s two notions of modern technology (and here we might keep in mind Chapter One’s troubling of the strategy/tactic distinction). The first he calls “communication-translation,” which is a technology which “ensures our insertion and our conquest in space and time.” The second, “communication-expression” involves technologies that “summon up phantoms on our route and turn us off course towards affects which are uncoordinated, outside co-ordinates.”\textsuperscript{239} This is the “nontransitivity” to which Derrida refers, and this is Greenaway/Prospero’s technology. Like the animated drawings within the pages of Prospero’s books, each superimposed frame twitches in micro-movements upon multiple, receptive atmospheric backgrounds; this is the new face of the second technology, and its stare, unreadable and “shocking” to most, seems to invite the innervated spectator.

\textsuperscript{236} Christian Metz, 3.
\textsuperscript{237} Qt. in Martin Jay, “Experience Without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel,” \textit{Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time}. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 57.
\textsuperscript{238} Martin Jay, 57 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{239} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1}, 100 (my emphasis).
The Face of the Text: Literal Places and Any-Spaces-Whatever

The faceicity of Greenaway’s film, while it occurs throughout, is most prominent in his use of writing. Lia Hotchkiss points out how “the film de-emphasizes The Tempest as an embodied performance in favor of stressing its textuality, both as language—written and spoken—and that physical object called the book.” But this textuality is embodied in that Greenaway stresses the vitality and intensity—the faciality—of the text. The text does not communicate meaning. It is not a medium; it is, rather, an actor with a face. In order to see how the text works as a face in Prospero’s Books, we might look back to Metz as he struggles to create a semiotics of film. Even while Metz tries to maintain a distinction between a film’s enunciation and its statement in order for critics to keep their eye on what is cinematic about a film (its enunciation), Metz argues that when critics interpret a film’s plot and dialogue, the “script has ceased to be [the film’s] signified.” He acknowledges the way in which “every signifier itself needs to be a signified and that every signified, in turn, can but be a signifier” and that, critically, “this constant back and forth is precisely the work of the symbolic.” Metz’ observation on the difficulty of disentangling these signifiers and signifieds is highlighted in Greenaway’s film. The film begs the question: is Greenaway’s Prospero a signified of Shakespeare’s text, or is Shakespeare’s text the ultimate signified of Greenaway’s filmic enunciation? In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari build upon this recursivity, this ability of language to escape its outline:

The signified constantly reimports signifier, recharges it or produces more of it. The form always comes from the signifier. The ultimate signified is therefore the signifier itself, in its redundancy or ‘excess’ . . . [T]his pure formal redundancy of the signifier could not even be conceptualized if it did not have its own substance of expression, for which we must find a name: faciality. Not only is language always accompanied by faciality traits, but the face crystallizes all redundancies, it emits and receives, releases and recaptures signifying signs.

Shakespeare’s text, in Greenaway’s film, does not function as a signifier that is “translated” into a state of things; rather, the faciality of the text is highlighted in all its recursivity. At times the text is even superimposed upon the face of the actor who speaks.

The faceicity of the text in Greenaway’s film is noteworthy in its blatant deterritorialization. Greenaways’s textualized “screenplay” depicts the film’s opening scene, when Prospero writes The Tempest’s first speech act, the plaintive call “Boatswain!”:

For four seconds, a large close-up of the word ‘Boatswain’, handwritten on a blank sheet of crisp off-white paper, fills the screen . . . the camera is close enough to see the texture

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240 Hotchkiss, 96.
241 Metz, 31.
of the paper and to watch the black and shining ink slowly dry. For the moment, there is no clue whatsoever where this handwritten word on paper is situated.  

Although the text is represented—in all its deterritorialized materiality—as a handmade (digitally inscribed) manu-script, it functions like its copy: print. As with Bazin’s notion of the “automatic genesis” of photography, print functions as a mechanical reproduction of what was once mediated by the body—by physical digits. In Greenaway’s film, the script’s ability to mechanically—and digitally—detach itself from any context, to potentially reflect and refract any state of things it encounters mirrors the possibilities of print, script’s decontextualized copy. Because of this, the script as model can be seen as a model already constituted by its copy. The original, scriptural work of art—Shakespeare’s text—as it exists within a traditional “state of things” which would limit its meaning, in Greenaway’s film, escapes tradition and reveals its face. According to Deleuze, in the face, which is the limit of the sign, “what is retained is not principally the sign’s relation to a state of things it designates, or to an entity it signifies, but only the formal relation of sign to sign insofar as it defines a so-called signifying chain.”

Deleuze’s point here is to stress how signs refer to each other “only to the extent that they are deterritorialized.”

So how does this deterritorialized script operate? Judith Butler, working with Levinas’ notion of the face, makes a claim very similar to Deleuze’s. She writes, “The face, if we are to put words to its meaning, will be that for which no words really work; the face seems to be a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense, the sonorous substratum of

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243 Peter Greenaway, Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 43 (my emphasis).
244 Ibid., 124.
245 Ibid., 126.
vocalization that precedes and limits the delivery of semantic sense.”

The space of the face is not a space at all. Butler likens it to a sound, and sound is a performance constituted through temporal performance. Greenaway acknowledges that, like the face, Prospero’s magic is itself a sound. After Prospero repeats ‘Boatswain’ a number of times, the screenplay reads:

At once, far off . . . begins a rumbling, droning noise—like a thousand distant flying machines—like the sound of an armada of mechanical birds—a noise reminiscent of implacable, massive stage machinery in a masque or pageant that is several streets away. It is not one sound but many sounds combined. It is the sound of Prospero’s magic.

This sound, deterritorialized, could potentially signify many things, many states of affairs. But this is the sound of Prospero’s (and Greenaway’s) art: a blending of the mechanical and the organic (“mechanical birds”). It is the sound of stage machinery, pageantry, and the mask. It is the sound of a performance constituting its objects, the sound of a face producing the interiority it pretends to mask.

Roland Barthes’ notion of the text works against the grain in just this way, as an opening of a “passage, an overcrossing” or a “heterogeneous variety of substances” which stretch out “to the limit of the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.).” The “text,” for Barthes, exists in an “any-space-whatever,” and is opposed to the “work” of art which is caught up and frozen in history and tradition. History and tradition constitute the literary “work” of art as origin, a state of things, which in turn becomes generative of copies, iterations, shadows of the work. Barthes asks us to reverse the relation between work and text, to see the way in which the text “decants the work (the work permitting) from its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice.” In this way, the work ceases to become an origin; instead, it can be seen as an actualization of textual activity that has been nominalized—frozen into a state of things. Barthes’ notion of the text struggling to free the work represents an attempt to bridge the gap between what he calls the “readerly” and “writerly” prose, a distance that for Barthes is historically created and preserved.

This preserved distance erodes in the first five minutes of Prospero’s Books. We see the deterritorialized, facialized text when Prospero, appearing both infantile and senile, stands in a swimming pool and begins to write his revenge. He begins composing The Tempest (both the play and the storm) with the word ‘boatswain’. As he writes, he speaks the text. We see and hear the text as it is written and spoken, but its enunciations and repetitions are multiple. In total, we hear the word twenty-four times: a number that I imagine would give Peggy Phelan great

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247 Peter Greenaway, *Prospero’s Books: A Film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest*, 43.


249 Roland Barthes, 162 (my emphasis).

Each time Prospero speaks the word, we hear a repetition with a difference in pitch. Each variation reshapes the original; high pitches express urgency and low pitches express an imperative. These aural test performances rehearse and reshape the text, which is legible and even superimposed on Gielgud’s literal face. These repetitions give the text its own face by illustrating its receptive and refractive qualities and powers. Each time Prospero speaks, he is able to rewrite the text several times over. The text evacuates its “original” sense, its traditional meaning, as the repetitions show us how language might play upon and against its own limits. The “work” becomes “text” and the “readerly” becomes “writerly” as Prospero’s repetitions show us how the traditional work is constituted in the first place: through productive play.

Maybe this is the reason why both Prospero and Ariel end this game of repetition with a burst of childish laughter. Prospero, the exiled bookworm, has finally learned what studying his “works” could not have taught him. He learns what his brother Antonio knew much earlier: the power of pageantry, the mask, performance—how to “[have] into truth by telling of it.”

Prospero is not the only one in need of a lesson in the power of performance. Unfortunately, the idea of a facialized and writerly text runs contrary to how Bazin sees the script operating. Bazin maintains an unwavering respect for the stability of the text; for him, “the text determines the mode and style of the production; it is already potentially theater. There is no way at one and the same time of being faithful to it and turning it aside from the direction it was supposed to go.” The best theater can do is try to capture the scriptural work within its theatrical context. What I would see as Bazin’s shortcoming here is most likely due to his view that the work, as part of reality, must be respected as a model. Bazin’s work-as-model formulation only allows him to see performance, filmic or otherwise, as becoming-model by carrying the trace of the originary work. Unlike Deleuze, who sees the model as already made out of appearances, Bazin claims that the “potentialities of theater” are already “embedded in the text.” He goes on to claim that “there is no way of adapting the text without disposing of it and substituting something else, which may be better but is not the play.” At one point, Bazin comes close to a more radical conception of the text, but even then, he backs away. He argues that to adapt theater to the conventions of cinema would require altering the text and thereby creating a “new work.” Bazin doesn’t recognize, like Barthes, that this is always already the practice of performance.

Metz, on the other hand, highlights the filmic text’s potential to rewrite the work. Like Barthes, who saw the work as that text which attempts to close on the signified, Metz also sees how film, like the work, attempts to create its diegesis as an ultimate signified:

The fiction film is the film in which the cinematographic signifier does not work on its own account but is employed entirely to remove the traces of its own steps, to open immediately on to the transparency of a signified, of a story, which is in reality manufactured by it but which it pretends merely to ‘illustrate’, to transmit to us after the

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251 In her essay, “Numbering Prospero’s Books,” Phelan stresses the importance of the number 24 as both the number of filmic frames-per-second and the total number of books in Prospero’s library.
252 André Bazin, 84-5 (my emphasis).
253 Ibid., 84.
254 Ibid., 84.
255 Ibid., 83.
event, as if it had existed previously (= referential illusion): another example of a product which is its own production in reverse.\footnote{256}

Metz’ observation that the enunciative function of film creates a diegesis it purports to merely illustrate is particularly relevant to filmed productions of Shakespeare, most of which claim to efface themselves as they present us with the “work” itself. These films never acknowledge the way in which they engage in a practice that retroactively produces that work. Hotchkiss points out how Greenaway’s screenplay acknowledges this as it explicitly performs its own filmic origins. Through the example of Greenaway’s screenplay—a book calling itself “a film of Shakespeare’s The Tempest”—Hotchkiss illustrates the possibility of an “origin reshaped by its progeny.”\footnote{257} We might find here, as an extension of her argument, the way this process works in reverse; we might see Greenaway’s film itself rewriting and performing its own literary origins.

Like Metz, Benjamin understands the possibility of a spectator who engages with and writes rather than simply consumes a text. Barthes refers to the “Boredom experienced by many in the face of the modern (‘unreadable’) text, avant-garde film or painting” as a symptom of the modern spectator’s inability to engage with the text. Inured to their role as passive consumers, modern readers react with boredom and shock. However, by absorbing the new technology through this boredom, Benjamin’s innervated spectator encounters the work without the aura a traditional context casts upon it. For this reason, Benjamin anticipates Barthes’ claims about the readerly and the writerly when he claims that “at any moment the reader is ready to turn writer” and “thus the distinction between author and public is about to lose its basic character.” It is through the deterritorialized text, the text without its aura, the facialized text, that “the reader gains access to authorship” and begins dismantling the authority of the work itself.\footnote{258}

In giving Shakespeare’s text a face, Greenaway’s film helps us to navigate the strange borderland Munsterberg claims exists between theater and cinema. However, the film also shows us that what Bazin called the seemingly “unbridgeable gulf” is no longer so unbridgeable. The divide, in fact, may have never existed in the first place. What Greenaway’s film shows us through its manipulation of space and time is also what is always already the case with flesh-and-blood performance in general. What we learn from his film about the relationship between representation and presence, between the copy and its original, can be equally applied to performance itself. W.B. Worthen notes that even theatrical performance “recalls and transforms the past in the form of the present.” For Worthen, both filmic and theatrical performance involve “not the replaying of an authorizing text, a grounding origin, but the potential to construct that origin as a rhetorically powerful effect of performance.”\footnote{259} Greenaway’s film illustrates a relationship between language and its embodied and filmic performance, but this lesson can be applied elsewhere, in any space whatsoever. Through this lesson, we begin to see that even on the stage of the Globe, we are always, in part, creating and shaping that which theater claims to be making present, be it history, bodies, tradition, or authority.

\footnote{256}{Christian Metz, 40 (my emphasis).}
\footnote{257}{Lia Hotchkiss, 109.}
\footnote{258}{Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” 114.}
\footnote{259}{W.B. Worthen, 64.}
<<Chapter THREE>>

Innervating Hamlet:
Richard Burton’s Electronic Body
and
The Wooster Group’s Digital Stage

The time is out of joint. O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right.
Nay, come, let’s go in together.

--Hamlet, *Ham.* 1.5.96-8
Historical Collaborations

In the previous chapter, we looked at how Peter Greenaway’s *Prospero’s Books* illustrated a new form of engageable, cinematic pseudopresence. We were particularly interested in how Greenaway’s technologies produced a temporal, affective expressivity which exceeded semantic registers, and with how these registers provided spectators with a temporal performance which exceeded the space of the text, the stage or the screen. This chapter will continue looking at how tradition gets embodied in John Gielgud’s person, but this time we will be less concerned with Gielgud’s image and more concerned with his voice. This chapter, on Gielgud’s direction of Richard Burton in *Hamlet*, and on the Wooster Group’s recent “new” media production of *Hamlet* (which includes projected scenes from the Gielgud-Burton *Hamlet*), might transition by way of an anecdote about Peter Greenaway’s 2005 *Tulse Luper VJ Tour*.

In Club 11, on June 17, 2005, Peter Greenaway began VJ-ing. Kenta Motomura defines VJ-ing (Video Jockeying) as follows:

> Corresponding to the music and the atmosphere, the VJ simultaneously outputs images on screens or monitors in the club. This live creation is similar to a musician playing an instrument. The VJ uses a visual mixer, video camera, and personal computer with VJ software as the visual instrument. The visual materials are self-made animation, video movie, and samplings of ready-made images. The VJ mixes or switches these materials and makes an original visual expression.

Alongside DJ Radar, Peter Greenaway “projected the 92 Tulse Luper stories on the 12 screens of Club 11.” Acting as what he calls a “real time image conductor,” Greenaway blurred the lines between cinema, musical orchestration, live performance, and dance. The performance was so successful that Greenaway expanded his tour, performing in Milan, Barcelona, Zurich, Amsterdam, Sao Paulo, Rio, Moscow and many other cities. Greenaway, in what we might see as a continuation of his aims in *Prospero’s Books*, figures the *Tulse Luper VJ Tour* as a project of rebirth or reanimation. The project’s slogan “Cinema is dead; long live cinema” registers this tension between death and reanimation. In a video interview on his website, Greenaway cites the invention of the remote control as the end of cinema, a moment that

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260 Kenta Motomura, “Media Literacy Education in Art: Motion Expression and the New Vision of Art Education,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 37:4 (2003): 8-64, 63. This is but one definition. Mia Makela draws a distinction between those participating in VJ culture and those creating “Live Cinema,” saying “Live cinema describes work which is in essence artistic, to differentiate from VJing [sic], which can resemble visual DJing. DJs don’t produce their own material, they mix music, the same way as VJs can mix already existing material.” For more on VJ culture and live cinema, see Mia Makela, “The Practice of Live Cinema,” *Media Space Journal*, Issue 1 (2008). http://media-space.org.au/journal/issuel.html.

261 Peter Greenaway, “Tulse Luper VJ Performance,” *Peter Greenaway Website*. http://www.petergreenaway.info/content/blogecategory/30/57/

262 Ibid. n.p.
simultaneously inaugurates “live” interactivity and puts cinema to death. Greenaway condemns cinema to death with the following enumeration of its faults:

Bang. That’s the end. Cinema is passive. You look at it in the dark. What the fuck are you doing in the dark? Man is not a nocturnal animal. It’s looking in one direction while the world is all around you, and you have to sit still in your seat for two hours. So we have to break all of those boundaries down. So what I’m interested in is the sort of post-cinema phenomenon . . . [this post-cinema has to be] non-narrative . . . present tense . . . related to multimedia . . . related to interactivity . . . [the VJ/DJ phenomenon] brings back the body again, the concept of sweaty dancing . . . it involves the entire problem of 5000 years of theatre [that] needs to come back into it. The cinema is moribund and dead and boring now.263

Greenaway’s desire to emancipate the spectator from her ties to a moribund medium is symptomatic of broader discourses in film studies stressing the (theoretical or practical, perceptual or somatic) activity of spectatorship. When Greenaway describes VJ technologies through figures of revitalization, what he reanimates is an infinitely older cultural desire to use mimetic technologies to simultaneously memorialize, re-member, and reanimate the past. But what happens when these technologies no longer just mimetically repeat the actions of the past? What happens when technologies allow us to re-animate and refigure the historical affects and spaces with which we temporally interact?

Greenaway points us towards innovative technologies through which we might begin answering such questions. Like Greenaway’s use of proto-HD technology in Prospero’s Books, Greenaway’s experiments in “Live Cinema,” once the province of the avant-garde, have again entered the mainstream. In the past few years, we have witnessed a number of collaborations between the bodies of the live performer and prerecorded performances of the past. Celine Dion baffled audiences of American Idol, when she seemed to perform a “live” duet with a computer-generated Elvis Presley; Alicia Keys followed suit when, at the 2008 Grammys, she seemed to perform alongside Frank Sinatra.264 These recent historical collaborations bring the persons of the past into the present, but we can just as easily imagine the opposite: placing “live” performance within the past. David Lee Fischer’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari: The Remix (2005) does just that. Fischer does not describe his remake of Robert Wiene’s original Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919) as an adaptation; he describes the film as a VJ might, as “more like a remix of a song.”265 The film is not even properly a “re-make” because its entire mise en scène is, one might say, “copied and pasted” from digitized copies of the original 35mm film. The actors act within the spatial contours of the original production, walking down its roads and moving within its cramped rooms. The relatively inexpensive film was shot in nine days on an entirely greenscreen set. The DVD featurette details the process: “Background images, or digital plates, were captured directly from an original 35mm print of the film and then used as an on-set and

264 “Duets with the Dead: Artificially Unintelligent,” Entertainment Weekly (February 22, 2008), 16.
real time reference guide for the actors.” Judson Pearce Morgan, the actor playing Francis, remarked, “Working on greenscreen, you had to completely depend on the other actors because you’re in the middle of a no-man’s-land. You can see on the screen where you’re standing in this world.” Digitized actors modulate their movements and interactions with each other (they “depend” on each other), but they negotiate this dependency by monitoring their shared relationship with the filmic spaces of the past.

Shakespearing, and performance more generally, is often understood as a rather simple relationship between the past and the present. This simplistic model is also a textual model, which understands the past as residing in Shakespeare’s words on a page. This embalmed textual past is then brought to life through performance. Unfortunately, “performance” in this model, often means little more than “speech.” Visitors to Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre can visit its Shakespeare museum, where they are provided technology to engage is such “performance.” In 2000, the New York Times’ Wilborn Hampton visited the museum and wrote the following:

A favorite exhibit consists of four booths where one can hear great actors performing familiar Shakespeare speeches. . . . John Gielgud does ‘Howl, howl, howl!’ from ‘King Lear’ and reads three sonnets, and in another booth different actors interpret the same monologues from Hamlet. There are eight ‘To be or not to be’s,’ ranging from Herbert Beerbohm to Richard Burton. . . . After hearing the pros, I was ready for the main attraction, a sort of Shakespeare karaoke in which you choose a scene from one of eight plays to act in. The monitor scrolls through your lines, then you are allowed a practice run-through. When you’re ready for your take, you punch a button and a voice gives you your cue. You deliver your line, punch the button again, and your invisible co-star responds. At the end, you hear a playback of the scene.

Is this “Shakespeare karaoke” a “new media performance” or a lesson in elocution? To what extent is this dialogue with history a “performance” at all? Where have “five thousand years of theatre” gone? It seems that in Fischer’s Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, so much more is at stake than the repetition of words on a page. This chapter looks at The Wooster Group’s recent Hamlet, a performance that does more than simply recite the past. Their Hamlet—like Fischer’s Cabinet—engages with more than just the text of the past; The Wooster Group interacts within, against, and among the digitally projected spaces and affects of the past. What I want to explore, here, is how we might rethink film historiography, when our encounters with history are not simply textual or graphic. What happens when the historical “object” we study, while bound by the iterative logic of print, also possesses the attributes of an engageable, affective, sonic performance? And what if our mode of history writing is itself also a mode of performance? How might we recast “historiography” as “historio-cinematography,” when the “historiography of cinema” no longer means “the writing of the history of cinema,” but points to the possibility of the live performance of cinematic history writing. I hope to explore Shakespearing’s role the

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267 Ibid. It’s interesting to note that Ron Vawter, founding member of The Wooster Group, also played Dr. Ramirez in Peter Sellars’ 1991 film The Cabinet of Dr. Ramirez. Kate Valk played “Sue” in the same film.
birth of such an immanent historio-cinematography. Ultimately, this cinematic history writing will operate as a genealogy, redirecting historical energies and allowing us to imagine new futures. This cinematic history writing will also help us to think of history temporally, pushing us to think beyond the “difference between” past and present. The “difference between” past and present is already a spatialized difference, a spatialized representation between two Shakespeares. Immanent Shakespearing recognizes that there is no space between past and present; there is only time.

**Between Origin and Originality**

Ben Brantley of the *New York Times* described The Wooster Group’s recent performance of *Hamlet* as a “sophisticated form of karaoke.”²⁶⁹ The Wooster Group’s new media *Hamlet* enacts Shakespeare’s play against the backdrop of Richard Burton’s 1964 “Electronovision” performance. The now-digitized 1964 film is continuously projected upon a screen covering the upstage wall, and the Wooster Group’s actors seem to imitate its action gesture for gesture. When the film cuts to a long shot, the actors keep up with the apparatus, scurrying upstage; when the 1964 cameras capture the stage from the side, the Wooster Group rotates their mise en scène (which is entirely mobile). Their performance’s media landscape also includes three flat-screen monitors facing the audience, three digital camcorders capable of real-time streaming, and four monitors on each side of the stage serving as body prompters through which the performers modulate their bodies in relation to the bodies of the actors in the 1964 film. The Wooster Group describes their performance as an attempt to reconstruct “a hypothetical theater piece from the fragmentary evidence of the edited film, like an archeologist inferring an improbable temple from a collection of ruins.”²⁷⁰ However, the historiographical impulse driving the Group towards a reconstruction of Burton’s “original” performance maintains a constant tension with the Group’s larger mission to deliver the technologically avant-garde and “original” performance the public expects from them.

The equally innovative 1964 production of *Hamlet* presents a similar temporal tension. The performance brought together an interesting pair: John Gielgud and Richard Burton, a classical and mellifluous voice and an explosive and athletic body. Burton, of course, was also famous for his voice. Gielgud, catachrestically eliding the distinction between voice and body, refers to Burton’s “athletic voice.”²⁷¹ In the trailer for the “electronically filmed” version of the stage performance, Richard Burton tries to seamlessly bind past and future, origin and originality, by inviting the audience to witness what will be, retroactively from the perspective of the future, an “historic event.” Burton, authorized under Gielgud, inserts himself within the *Hamlet* Tradition, and this in turn authorizes what will be his innovation. The film’s trailer

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begins with the date, 1602, superimposed on an illustration of the Globe. Then, over a series of lap dissolves, Burton narrates the viewer through a succession of Hamlets beginning with the original Hamlet, Richard Burbage, and ending with John Gielgud, an actor/director with whom Burton tells the viewer he has been “privileged” to work. After moving backwards to establish his performance’s seamless connection to its historical origin, Burton moves forward, touting the performance’s originality and innovation. We are told that “This has never happened before. . . . This is the theater of the future.”

Every actor of scripted drama must at once come to terms with the ambivalence constituting any concept of “originality.” The Janus-faced concept of originality is always self-divided and looks in two directions simultaneously: towards the past as origin and towards a future wherein that past might be reconstituted as something new. Every performance must insinuate itself within this temporal dispersion, between the dead and the not yet living, between remembering the past and forgetting just enough to break from the past and create room for the future. For this reason, every actor is already Hamletian. The actor, like Hamlet, looking before and after, continually struggles against a time that is “out of joint.”

If every actor is always already Hamletian, this quality becomes doubled when the role the actor plays is, in fact, Hamlet. From the perspective of the actor in rehearsal, the role’s grave origin returns as a textual apparatus and a performance history demanding respect and needing to be managed or remembered by the body in anticipation of a future performance. From the perspective of the character, the past returns as a Ghost, a speaking, moving image, an audiovisual apparatus, a motion picture of the past (“Look where it comes again.” “Mark me.” “Remember me.”). Both the actor and the character, then, are poised between an intractable and originary historical apparatus and an anticipation of a future performance of the new. But what is the relationship between this weighty past and a future performance claiming the name of Hamlet? Often the relationship is figured in terms of “more or less”: performance is too often framed as being over or under-determined by the textual or historical forces from which we imagine it arises. We see performance as delimiting or expanding an originary host of possibilities, potential, or polysemy. To frame the relationship between texts and their performance—or between historical origin and future originality—in terms of “more or less” exempts us from the task of re-thinking difference’s relationship to time and repetition.

In this chapter, I would like to take up these two interlocking performances of Hamlet, each of which illustrates this tension between the fixed monuments of the past and an anticipation of the future, between the origin and the new, in order to engage in this re-thinking of difference’s relationship to time and repetition. In addressing and embodying the relationship between origin and originality, these performances take on no less than the philosophy of historical change and its relation to repetition. The temporal disjointure facing the actor gets

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technologically reified in these “new media” performances, and this reification both occludes and reveals particular ways of understanding the relationship between origin and originality. My aim here will be to examine how these performances make the most of new media technologies in order to re-negotiate a time understood to be “out of joint” in ways that exceed a dialectical logic of (over or under) determination.

This phrase, “the time is out of joint,” has continually appeared in philosophical treatises of difference and repetition. Nietzsche, Derrida, and Deleuze all take up the Northern Prince’s temporal crisis in their work.275 We are probably most familiar with Derrida’s use of Hamlet’s phrase in his “hauntology,” where he uses this phrase in order to describe a mode of “being-with specters,” a mode which counter-actualizes the linguistic injunction of the past in order to create an unexpected future-to-come. Derrida’s genealogical undertaking, like much of his work, operates against the dialectic at the level of linguistic or textual mediation. For Derrida, a new future is possible because the incommensurable difference between living and dead, between presence and absence, has collapsed as a result of deconstruction’s undoing of the metaphysics of presence. Our presence to ourselves, like our encounters with the past, is always already mediated by language. Rooted in the limitations and possibilities of language, Derrida’s mediation—akin to a necromantic understanding of a “medium,” one who delivers textual messages but fails to make ghosts present—operates within the paper confines of a glorified Ouija board. While Derrida’s cardboard Hamlet speaks in a divided, multiple voice, the embodied, new media performances of Hamlet I will be looking at instead move and dance within a technology more akin to the crystal ball. The originary Hamlet that the Burton/Gielgud ensemble and the Wooster Group aim to encounter (or recover) is not a citational, graphematic Hamlet. This crucial difference pushes us beyond the “linguistic turn” and thus requires an alternative historiography, or what we might more appropriately call historiocinematography. I introduce the concept of “historio-cinematography” in order to distinguish between the static, textual graphics of a pre-moving image history and the fluid archive of performance behaviors available to historiographers looking at the motion-pictured past. More useful for this task, but maybe less familiar, is Gilles Deleuze’s evocation of Hamlet’s temporal imperative. Deleuze’s differential ontology works alongside Derrida’s hauntology, but it follows a different, immanent trajectory, which I hope to show opens up the possibility for what we might call a mode of “acting-with specters” or a mode of “acting-in-common-with history” through collective

innervation. But before we move forwards, let us go back and take a closer look at these performances.

Living Monuments: Burton’s Innervation

Viewing the Burton Hamlet on film (or more likely, on DVD) today, we cannot help but note that the nearly bare set of this mock “rehearsal” performance does not look like the setting for what we might call a “new media” performance. John Gielgud writes the following in the 1964 Playbill: “This is a HAMLET acted in rehearsal clothes, stripped of all extraneous trappings, unencumbered by a reconstruction of any particular Historical Period. This performance is conceived as a final run-through, as actors call it.” Gielgud’s disavowal of any desire towards historical reconstruction increases the “liveness” of a production that, ultimately, finds its historical setting in the moment of the performance’s enactment, in 1964. However, the performance uses its technology in two very provocative ways. The first and most salient innovation lies in the “miracle of Electronovision.” The Electronovision Corporation’s film was constructed through a process called Theatrofilm, a now obsolete proto-pay-per-view technology aimed at making live events (boxing matches, musical performances, and stage plays) available to remote audiences while still giving them the sense of “being there.” The process’ inventor, Bill Sargent, is still considered the “pioneer” of pay-per-view.

John Colleran, the director of the filmed version of the play, operated a mixing console in order to edit the live feed of nine TV cameras onto a kinescope (TV monitor). This edited mix was then dubbed onto 35mm film by placing the film camera in front of the kinescope monitor and synchronizing their scanning rates. The edited film, ultimately a composite of three separate performances, was then distributed to over 1,000 theaters for four screenings shown on two days in September. In this way, the film attempted to overcome space and time by bringing what was touted as the experience of a “live” Broadway show to local theaters throughout the US.

This Theatrofilmic process, however, might not be the most interesting aspect of the production. What actually happens on stage inverts the production’s stated intentions: instead of capturing the “live” via cinema, the stage production captures the cinematic within the “live.” I would like to look more closely at the technology of the Ghost as a proto-cinematic form, which, functioning as a mise en abyme of the production’s formal tensions, seems to haunt the liveness of the stage. Working against the notions of liveness touted by the production, in Richard Burton’s Hamlet, the Ghost appears technologically as an early form of pre-recorded sound.

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276 For more on the immanence/transcendence divide, see Daniel W. Smith’s “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought” in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi (New York: Continuum, 2003), 46-66.
278 “Trailer.”
280 Philip K. Scheuer, “Electronic ‘Hamlet’ Meets Test Today,” Los Angeles Time (Sept. 23, 1964), D15. For more on Electronovision and issues of “liveness,” see Laurie E. Osborn’s “Speculations on Shakespearean Cinematic Liveness,” The Shakespeare Bulletin 24:3 (2006), 49-65. This democratizing impulse should be considered in relation to the democratizing impulse of the NEA explored in Chapters 1 and 5.
The voice of the Ghost, pre-recorded by Gielgud, (a tape the cast and crew call the “Ghost tape”) is accompanied by the projection of a giant, moving shadow of the Ghost’s head on the upstage wall. Richard Sterne, the actor playing the Gentleman, kept a journal of the company’s rehearsals. He writes that an “actor standing in the wings in front of a spotlight behind the stage-left tormentor created a shadow which moved as the Ghost spoke” (See Figure 9). The shadow was initially (during the early Toronto performances) a moving shaft of light, which was timed according to Gielgud’s movement across the stage. Sound effects, timed to his footfalls, also accompanied the Ghost tape. When Burton asked Gielgud “How tall is this ghost?” Gielgud responded, “My height.” In this way, the projection, at one time, held the trace of Gielgud’s body in motion. At one point, in rehearsal, Burton pauses mid-line as the ghost’s projection appears. Gielgud coaches Burton, saying “And you made such an enormous pause on ‘I’ll call thee . . . Hamlet!’ I thought for a moment you were going to say ‘John Gielgud.”

The Ghost with which Burton interacts, then, is a hybrid apparatus comprised of the projected shadow of a live actor and the pre-recorded tape of a famous former Hamlet. Burton’s interactions with this temporally and ontologically divided form rehearse the sensory-motor skills that new technologies, such as the live remote-viewing technologies of pay-per-view, will require of the actors and spectators of the future.

The projected shadow functions in a particularly cinematographic fashion in its first, silent appearance. When Horatio and the sentinels first see the Ghost’s shadow, they slowly turn to face the shadow on the upstage wall. Marcellus points at the wall, exclaiming “Look where it comes again.” Turning their backs to the Lunt-Fontaine theater audience (and the Electronovision cameras), the gazes of actors align with those of the spectators, and all face the upstage wall. As a result of this turn, the audience perceives what cinematically amounts to an over-the-shoulder shot. We are lead to believe that the shadow is not a shadow of the Ghost but is, in fact, the Ghost-itself.

Moments later, however, the actors turn again and begin addressing the Ghost while facing the audience. In this near 180-degree turn, the audience feels itself displaced; what was just before them is now behind them. Familiarity with cinematic convention, however, lets them know that they have just experienced a shot-reverse-shot and that they now occupy the point of view of the Ghost. The actors did not turn at all. The stage did. As a result, the shadow is transformed from the ghost-itself into the Platonic shadow-copy of a figure standing in what is understood to be an off-screen space. The ghost is a projector whose projection interacts with the live actors. The audience, throughout this performance, must slowly adjust to this mixing of the live and the historical, the origin and the new.

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281 Regarding this shadow, one might here think of the proto-cinematic phantasmagorias that so obsessed Walter Benjamin. For more on phantasmagoria, see Margaret Cohen’s “Walter Benjamin’s Phantasmagoria,” New German Critique 48 (Autumn, 1989), 87-107.
283 Ibid., 20.
284 Ibid., 66.
Figure 9: Set Design Image from Richard L. Sterne's *John Gielgud Directs Richard Burton in Hamlet* (New York: Random House, 1967)

Figure 10: Hamlet meets the Ghost/Shadow/Projection. Still from Richard Burton's Hamlet
As will be reflected in the live editing of the Electronovision film (and the pay-per-view technologies of the future), perspective on the live can change instantly, and the audience must become receptive to the possibility that change in space does not necessarily equal change in time. As the Ghost exits, the lights go up and the Ghost film ends.

When the Ghost film resumes, Burton and the Ghost face off. The silent film becomes a talkie, and we have an opportunity to witness a multimedia interaction between the living body of the actor and the pre-recorded and fixed historical voice of the Ghost of Hamlet's past. Gielgud’s famed phonographic recordings and radio broadcasts were already available and widely consumed at the time. In William Redfield’s memoir, he cites Burton as saying, “I grew up on Gielgud—his recordings, his writings, and the stories my father told me about his acting. . . . It’s old-fashioned now, I think. . . . I don’t think audiences want that sort of business any more.”  

Gielgud, already familiar with the technologies of Shakespearean audio recording, returned to the recording studio in 1964 to experiment with sound effects and record the company’s “Ghost tape.” Douglass Lanier notes that Gielgud is the “twentieth-century’s most frequently recorded audio performer of Shakespeare.”  

For Hamlet, Gielgud was constantly in and out of the recording studio, and the tape itself was edited, re-recorded, and re-edited in order to adjust the duration of its pauses to accommodate Burton’s live responses (Burton often accompanied Gielgud in the recording studio). The Ghost tape was initially (for the Toronto performances) manipulated spatially in playback with “the new multichannel speaker system” as Gielgud “experimented with shifting the directions of the sound so that [hic et ubique] it seemed to rotate all about the set and give a sense of omnipresence.” This effect was later dropped in favor of a single (mono) playback. Sterne tells us that Burton would often arrive early “to work with the Ghost tape,” rehearsing his interaction with the past, interpolating himself into the lacunae left by Gielgud’s pauses.

Most interesting of all, perhaps, is the fact that this information about how Burton interacted with the Ghost tape is available to us because Richard Sterne secretly sneaked a tape recorder (which was hidden in a briefcase) into each and every rehearsal. The emergent technology of the compact cassette tape, as it turns out, was introduced into the US concomitantly with the Gielgud-Burton Hamlet, in 1964. Originating in Europe with the Dutch brand Philips, the compact cassette tape had many uses. According to early instruction manuals, their chief use was the creation of a “talking family album” which could serve as “a family ‘memory’ device.” Tape recordings, themselves, functioned like the Ghost in Hamlet, who urges his son: “Remember me.” In early promotional materials, the sound tape was often equated with amateur photography, but sound’s superiority over the image was stressed. Philips advertised that sound “remains vivacious and binds people together more forcefully than no

286 For more on William Redfield’s memoir, see his Letters from an Actor (New York: Limelight Editions, 1984), 83-84.
289 Ibid., 39-54.
matter what picture. In a person’s voice we encounter his personal moods; in the sound of a running machine we can hear force and speed; the sound of birds connects us with nature.” The sound cassette, they claimed, “may engulf and entirely absorb you again; you do not only hear it again, you experience it all over.” This new technology, Philips claimed, could serve to strengthen “family ties.” All of these advertised uses come into play as the Ghost tape allows Hamlet to re-experience his father’s voice, strengthening their family ties. Sterne recounts (in a dramatic form reproduced by the secret rehearsal tape) how the ability of tape recording technology to “connect us with nature” was explored in a surprising way during their rehearsal of Ophelia’s mad scene:

Gielgud: I want to avoid real flowers, but perhaps we’ll have to use them. . . . I want something that looks like weeds. (His eye is caught by a pile of plastic recording tape, unraveled on the floor under the stage manager’s desk.) Couldn’t we get a large bunch of this?

Young: (Who had been splicing tape all weekend to have the rehearsal tape ready) Oh, we’ve got plenty of that.

Gielgud: Well, let’s try it.

On June 30 and July 1, 1964, when the Electronovision camera crews arrive, sight is added to these familial sounds, and Burton encounters two filmic apparatuses: one on stage and one off. We see Burton temporally bound on both sides by cinema. Interacting with a cinematic ghost from the past and simultaneously acting in the knowledge that his performance will ultimately be captured in a future film, Burton finds himself squarely within the actor’s temporal paradox as he desperately tries to wed origin and originality together. When the Ghost’s shadow falls upon the stage, Burton turns his back on the audience, and in the now-familiar over-the-shoulder shot, we see him writhing like a mute audience somatically responding to a horror film. When Burton’s Hamlet, the “observed of all observers,” turns to observe the Ghost, he joins the audience, and they are instructed by his somatic reception of what is ultimately a snuff film centered on the Ghost’s tortured body.

The flattening and erasure of the King’s body-as-shadow is not the only torture here. Burton’s Hamlet, at the moment of his encounter with the cinematic ghost, seems equally tortured, even “shocked” by the apparatus. The question arises: can Burton’s “sinews, grow not instant old / But bear [him] stiffly up” (1.5.94-5)? As Kevin Kelly of the Boston Globe notes

291 Karin Bijsterveld, 616.
292 Richard L. Sterne, 70.
293 At a time when Burton was being criticized for “selling out” to Hollywood and leaving the stage behind, this confrontation has an added, metaphorical force.
294 Richard Burton’s Hamlet.
in his review of the Boston performance, “Here, for once, is no niddling neurasthenic posing after ghosts.”

Burton’s visceral Hamlet struggles against the alienating and determining effects of the apparatus, of history, and of the Ghost of Hamlets past. Originality will not be determined by an enervating commitment to origins. Instead, Burton’s Hamlet strives for what Walter Benjamin calls “innervation,” the concept explored in Chapter Two in relation to Greenaway’s/Prospero’s magical technologies.

Benjamin, in the second (1936) and third version (1939) of his famous artwork essay, republished and re-translated as “The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility,” includes a number of references to the concept of “innervation” which are curiously absent in the more dialectical and widely-read fourth version (the version which fell under that shadow of Adorno’s editorial hand). “Innervation”—the enlivening of nerves through repeated, shocking encounters with technologies of modernity—overcomes “enervation”—the deadening and desensitizing of the nervous system in response to an alienating modernity. In the second version of the artwork essay, Benjamin cites Pirandello’s observation that the “little apparatus will play with [the actor’s] shadow before the audience, and he himself must be content to play before the apparatus.” For Burton, this shadow play is literalized in relation to the Ghost projection. Under capitalism, the Frankfurt School observed, human-human relations give way to human relations with alienating objects, be these objects the apparatus of the workplace, the camera’s disembodied eye, or the commodity itself. As a result, the continuity of traditional experience (Erfahrung) is reorganized, and as the human sensorium builds up its resistance to the shocking experience of modernity (Erlebnis), this shock paradoxically becomes the only form of experience possible. The solution, for Benjamin, to overcoming the technological apparatus’ alienating and shocking effects on the human sensorium, would be to retrain human apperception. In the essay’s second version, he also writes, “The function of film is to train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily.”

This innervative retooling of perception hopes to overcome the opposition on both human sides of the technological apparatus and therefore constitute a new mode of both production and consumption, performance and reception.

297 Miriam Bratu Hansen’s work on this crucial Benjaminian key word has been invaluable to studies seeking to understand the new media’s relationship to the body. This paper is largely indebted to her mesmerizing work on Benjamin, especially in Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street,” Critical Inquiry Vol. 25, No. 2 “Angelus Novus”: Perspectives on Walter Benjamin. (Winter, 1999), 306-343. I am equally indebted to my colleague Brooke Belisle, with whom I have had many inspiring and helpful conversations about innervation.
299 For more on Benjamin and Experience, see Martin Jay’s “Experience Without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel” in Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 47-61.
Burton’s body strives towards innervation as it faces a filmic apparatus on both sides: on one side, a proto-cinematic shadow of the past which appears as a ghost to which he is spectator, and on the other side, the Electronovision film of the future appears to which he is an actor. Burton’s body is both a site of reception and expression. His mastery of this opposition, however, will require that he dissolve the shocking, oppositional quality of this encounter. He will not be fully innervated until equilibrium exists between actor, apparatus, and audience. Only then will actors and audience have achieved “the most important social function of film” which, according to Benjamin, is “to establish equilibrium between human beings and the apparatus.” But Burton’s equilibrium is not complete. After all, Burton interacts with the shadow of a live actor. At the level of image, Burton’s interaction with the monument of the past is an illusion courtesy of a live, Oz-like man behind the curtain; he does not encounter an affective, moving, indexical trace of the past. At the level of sound, his temporal mastery is limited to and determined by the lacunae left for him by Gielgud’s fixed recording. Full innervation will not come until 46 years later with The Wooster Group’s performance.

The Wooster Group: Time on Its Joint

The Wooster Group’s Hamlet may appear, at first, like “a sophisticated form of Karaoke,” but it soon becomes apparent that if this is karaoke, it must be the karaoke of the future. As soon as Scott Shepherd walks onstage, he appears to control the now indexical, affective film. Taking a seat facing the audience, Shepherd looks down at the monitor at his feet, initiating his play with the words “Play that movie.” After a few moments, he tells the control booth, situated behind the audience, “Okay, you can fast-forward to the ghost.” When Barnard Hughes, the actor playing Marcellus in the 1964 performance, walks on stage, Shepherd expertly laughs and tells the audience, “That’s Bernard Hughes. He was in Midnight Cowboy.” At this point, Shepherd sits on stage as an audience to the Burton film, complicating the audience/performance dyad by introducing an audience within the performance—nothing new, really. What is new is that his audience-within-the-performance provides us, the external audience, with a model for productive reception. Already interesting is the way theatre includes cinema (a inversion of how we normally think of filmed—or as Bazin would say “canned”—theatre). In more structuralist terms, we might say that theatrical diegesis becomes extradiegetetic to the filmic diegesis (a move towards metadiegesis) as Shepherd provides a form of commentary that, from the point of view of the present tense of performance, is exterior and

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302 Peter M. Boenish argues that theatre incorporates other arts in a way qualitatively different than other media. He writes, “While computers indifferently digest any other medium in their giga-byte stomach of the microprocessor, theatre apparently very generously provides the stage to other media entirely according to their own will. Theatre behaves as a fully transparent medium, a remarkable camera lucida, without any palpable fingerprints of its mediatization stamped on the primary media it relies on so heavily,” “Aesthetic Art to Aisthetic Act: Theatre, Media, Intermedial Performance,” in Intermediality in Theatre and Performance, eds. Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006): 103-116.
transcendent to the (diegetic) historical experience of the Burton performance. This cinematic-theatrical Russian doll soon collapses when, after telling the booth to “Go, uh, to that speech about Julius Caesar,” Shepherd, in what can only be described as a possession by ghosts, slowly begins moving his body along with the actors on screen. His initial, transcendent, (meta or extradiegetic) posture towards the film dissolves as the limit, which at first divided him from the past, becomes effaced (remember Antonio’s effacement of the screen in Chapter Two). Shepherd, as the innervated actor described by Benjamin, establishes equilibrium and finds his “organs in the new technology.” He enters into a dimension in which he is both spectator and performer at the moment the two become indiscernible and meet at a degree zero in relation to the now-digital apparatus. As both active spectator and productive consumer, Shepherd’s Hamlet flaunts his integration with a digital apparatus that both determines and is determined by him to such an extent that “determination” ceases to adequately describe their relation.

The logic of determination relies upon the existence of an external difference between two discrete identities, between a model and its copy. To focus our attention upon the difference between the present of Shepherd’s copy performance and the model performance of a filmic past is to remain within the dialectical logic of a mediated “difference between,” a difference which the innervated, active spectator was supposed to overcome. Audiences and critics who focused solely on this difference between, after a few minutes, became bored by the Wooster

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performance and dismissed it as a pure gimmick.\textsuperscript{305} These critics, remaining within this dialectical logic which focuses on the difference between the discrete representations of a past (recollection) and the present (perception), understood time “out of joint” in a narrowly particular and reductive (“gimmicky”) fashion.

There is a more expansive way in which time is “out of joint” in the Wooster Performance. In one of Gilles Deleuze’s lectures on Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, he cites Hamlet’s “time is out of joint” in order to distinguish between a bent, circular time rotating around and subordinated to the \textit{movement} and the \textit{change} it measures (time on its joint) and a time which, “freed from the events which made up its content, its relationship to movement overturned,” becomes straightened into a homogenous, empty line of time (time out of joint).\textsuperscript{306} The musical mind might imagine the distinction, here, as being the difference between one orchestra playing with a massive metronome (ordinal, time out of joint) and another playing along with the time signature of a conductor’s hand. The conductor’s hand is touched by its interaction with the orchestra. It obeys no exterior law, and yet one cannot say it disobeys the law; it is not lawless. In fact, it constitutes the law, not every second, but in each wavering and ephemeral moment. Think of the greatest crescendos, wherein a peak is formed at the music’s highest note; the sound hovers as if on the edge of a precipice, and time is full of \textit{tension} and \textit{anticipation}. The conductor feels the note along with the musicians and the audience. When the note finally falls, it is impossible to say who \textit{determined} it. The hand of the conductor does not measure change; it is change (time on its joint). The hand labors. It does not labor \textit{in} time. Its labor is time \textit{itself} in the creation of difference.

But how is this pure “difference” produced through cardinal time not just another metaphysics of presence? Butler seems to argue that it is. In \textit{Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France}, she writes, “The postulation of a natural multiplicity appears, then, as an insupportable metaphysical speculation on the part of Deleuze.”\textsuperscript{307} The natural multiplicity Butler refers to is this kind of temporal, affective gesture, what she calls a “reification” of “natural multiplicity.” But the temporal dimension of this multiplicity, I would argue, makes reification impossible, and “natural” is not the same thing as what Deleuze (following Nietzsche) would call the “pre-individual.” Butler is closer when she casts doubt on what she defines as “natural or metaphysical structure said to exist prior or posterior to linguistic or cultural law.”\textsuperscript{308} We must ask again, in the wake of the linguistic turn, whether this is necessarily so. Butler continues: “The critique of the cultural reification of desire as lack [Deleuze’s position in \textit{Anti-Oedipus}] engages in its own form of reification through an appeal to an ontologically invariant multiplicitous affectivity.”\textsuperscript{309} Only when time is already off its hinge does this even become possible.

This reductive time out of joint is the time of the Kantian Understanding and its active \textit{a priori} synthesis. Deleuze aims, in his lecture on unhinged time and elsewhere in \textit{Difference and Repetition}, to rework Kant’s notion of active synthesis on the part of the Understanding by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{305} Matthew J. Bolton, “Hamlet (Review),” \textit{Shakespeare Bulletin} 25:3 (Fall 2007): 83-86, 85.
\item \textsuperscript{308} Ibid., 215.
\item \textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 214.
\end{itemize}
giving to Intuition the power of passive synthesis. He writes that after Kant’s Copernican Revolution “The past is no longer the immediate past of retention but the reflexive past of representation, of reflected and reproduced particularity. Correlatively, the future also ceases to be the immediate future of anticipation in order to become the reflexive future of prediction, the reflected generality of the understanding . . . . In other words, the active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of the imagination.”

Unhinged time is the time of a cause separated from and determining its effect. It is a linear time unhinged by a consciousness that constructs representations of a past identity and coordinates them in relation to the projected identity of the future. It is a time that makes “cowards of us all” as Reason separates us from the noumenal, durational quality of an action without identity. It is the time of an apparatus that, like Gielgud’s recorded pauses, determines the productive movement capable of occurring within it. Cardinal, durational movement becomes ordinal through its subordination to a transcendent, empty, homogenous, and spatialized time. As a result of this operation, expectancy and anticipation become prediction.

This ordinal time—the representational, quantified, spatialized time of the page—reduces the cardinal, durational quality of a time inseparable from movement it measures. One way to think through this difference would be to think of two different ways of doing push-ups. With ordinal time, one subordinates the body to a transcendent measure, with each military dive towards the ground announced with “1-2-3,” the goal being to get towards a teleological goal (e.g. 100, or more modestly, 20). Two spatial positions are valued and constitute movement: up and down. Push-ups, according to cardinal time, on the other hand, would look more like movements through the plank pose in yoga. As one moves through the plank position to another (downward dog or chaturanga dandasana), movement is coordinated with breath. Movement is enjoyed as the space in between “up” and “down” is experienced (but it is not experienced as being between). The movement takes as long as it takes. No one keeps count.

Does Scott Shepherd predict Burton’s movements? Or is does his body open and connect to Burton’s in anticipation? Reid Farrington, The Wooster Group’s video director, notes that, beginning with their production of Poor Theatre, the “live video mix that was coming at the performers [was] different every night and they used it to inform [the actors’] choices for improvisational dance.” The goal was to “keep Scott on his toes.” This openness and receptivity is exactly what Nietzsche refers to as “that subtle thrill which the possession of intellectual light feet communicates to all the muscles!”

Shepherd’s light feet rehearse new, embodied temporal relations with digital apparatuses. Farrington highlights how audiences respond to this rehabituation of the body: “I think the


311 Like Deleuze, Benjamin, contrasting calendar time with clock time, once described the “homogenous empty time” which is nothing less than the myth of progress itself. Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arent, (New York: Random House, 1998), 261.


audience responds to that. I think they see a performer trying to keep up with their environment on stage and that’s a very real thing.”

When Benjamin writes that film’s role in the modern world will be to “train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily,” we, as readers of the contemporary cultural landscape, can easily imagine a world in which the apparatus’ scope has become total. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, inheritors of Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, have already begun theorizing a world shaped by a tendency towards “immaterial production” and “affective labor,” both of which create “not the means of social life but social life itself.”

Within this world, which is the word of The Wooster Group’s Hamlet, the mediating apparatus is no longer a power transcendent to production or consumption, but instead is constituted within and alongside the bodies of subjects who find they inhabit a new technological body, a second nature or a “new physis.” Hardt and Negri describe this transition from transcendence to immanence:

What the theories of power of modernity were forced to consider transcendent, that is, external to the productive and social relations, is here formed inside, immanent to the productive and social relations. Mediation is absorbed into the productive machine.

What Hardt and Negri call the “multitude” had already been forecast by Benjamin when he imagined a “new, historically unique collective which has its organs in the new technology.”

The collapse of mediation implied by his concept of innervation puts Benjamin, along with Deleuze, Hardt, and Negri, into the trajectory of philosophers of immanence. With the absorption of mediation into the social, we begin operating on what Deleuze calls the “plane of immanence,” a plane without mediation which allows for immediate, affective, and haptic encounters with a past that is in movement and cannot be reduced to linguistic mediation or the spatialized distance between two discrete identities.

In the Wooster Group’s performance of Hamlet, we might say that the initially perceptible difference between past and present slowly, like a troubled filmic interstice, “dissolves.” What, at first, appears as Shepherd’s mimetic Hamlet imitating the past soon reveals itself as a copy caught in the act of refashioning its model. What the audience, at first, perceived to be the 1964 film soon takes on new contours and temporalities. Richard Burton flickers in and out of the film. He is tinted red. Particular gestures are isolated, cut out, silhouetted, or altogether removed through a process the Group appropriately calls “ghosting.”

Most noticeable of all these innovations is the uneven temporality of the film, which moves in fits and starts with variable speeds, alternating between fast and slow motion. Elizabeth

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314 Reid Farrington, Interview with Ed Purver.
316 Miriam Hansen, “Room for Play: Benjamin’s Gamble With Cinema,” Canadian Journal of Film Studies (Spring, 2004), 2
319 Reid Farrington (Video Director, The Wooster Group), in discussion with the author, December 2006.
LeCompte explains this effect in a technical note: “We have digitally reedited the Burton film so that the lines of verse, which were spoken freely in the 1964 production, are delivered according to their original poetic meter.” LeCompte protests too much. Her professed desire for origins, here, masks the innovative temporality this reediting introduces. The bodies of the live actors adroitly move with the jerkiness of the fast-forwarded film on the upstage wall, and with as much finesse, they can return to, or dip below, the normative frame rate. Their performance becomes a dance, and they most often perform with the film, forgetting the monitors that surround the stage like so many unnecessary safety nets below expert trapeze artists.

The entire film has been digitized and re-edited with Apple’s Final Cut Pro. This non-linear editing software gives the Wooster Group’s technical team, headed by Reid Farrington, the opportunity Prince Hamlet never had to set time right by reasserting the cardinal quality of movement. Farrington, who can take credit for introducing the computer to the Wooster Group’s repertoire, praises Final Cut Pro’s ability to transform “the once-relentless media” of film into a “malleable and porous thing which performance can move in and out of.” When Gielgud and Burton collaborated on the Ghost tape, and “the pauses left between the Ghost’s lines did not time out to Burton’s readings” “[n]otes were made on this and the tape was sent out for re-editing.” This process of standardizing and mastering timing took days, even weeks. Farrington notes that new software, above all, “changes the speed at which work can happen,” and as it “keeps moving faster.” Moreover, Farrington points out that the company is “speeding that process up by putting an in-ear receiver in a performer’s ear and feeding him a

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320 The Wooster Group, “Program Note.”
321 Reid Farrington, in discussion with the author.
322 Richard Sterne, 30.
text and having him respond immediately.”323 The Wooster Group no longer needs to “predict”; they can focus on “anticipation.”

The Final Cut Pro software interface presents its user with a viewer, a canvass, and a multi-track timeline upon which the user sorts and contorts multiple audiovisual registers.

![Figure 12: Apple’s Final Cut Pro Interface](image)

Any of the film’s original movements, once “captured” and digitized, are freed from the abstract line of time and become infinitely malleable within this interface. Always visible in the viewer, each captured movement’s now-flexible duration may be expanded or contracted as easily as it may be superimposed on another image. These non-linear fragments of movement, cut from the abstract line of time, take on new life as portable, cardinal gestures. The temporal horizontality of the image track works variably with its multiple vertical layers, and as a result, sequentiality is always ready to become simultaneity.

The Wooster Group’s *Hamlet* uses Final Cut Pro in conjunction with Troika Ranch’s Isadora, “a graphic programming environment for Macintosh [that] provides interactive control over digital media, with special emphasis on the real-time manipulation of digital video.”324 Isadora gives users and performers real-time control over multiple video environments, allowing all of Final Cut Pro’s variables to be activated at different degrees, at any time, and in response to the live performer’s body.325 The company does not use the technology to determine

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323 Reid Farrington, Interview with Ed Purver.
325 Although The Wooster Group does not make use of it, Troika Ranch, the artistic collective behind Isadora (fronted by media artist/software designer Mark Coniglio), has also created body sensors that connect bodies to computers. Troika describes them as “sensory systems that allow
movement in advance (as with the Gielgud-Burton production); in fact, the opposite happens once software becomes capable of keeping pace with and pushing against the company’s bodies. Farrington tells us that Isadora “allowed us to work faster than our company’s worked . . . Isadora keeps us on our toes. Everybody in the room is trying to keep up with each other because of this software.” As we saw with Cabinet, their dependency on each other increases alongside the power and speed of the apparatus. Through Isadora’s multiple environment management software, digitized, historical footage becomes manageable at the moment of its projection in the present in the same way the actors’ “live” bodies, captured and digitized via real-time video streams, are equally ready to become a projected image. Both origin and originality, in this mixed, shared environment, interact on the same immanent plane. For example, in the Wooster Group’s Hamlet, when Polonius (Roy Faudree) is stabbed behind the arras, a flatscreen monitor is lowered to the floor, hiding the actor’s body. Instantly, Polonius’ image, captured in real-time, appears on the monitor. The actor’s body is gone, but his body-as-image remains. No one, at this point, seems to detect a difference between the two.

With Final Cut Pro and Isadora, live video can be captured, altered, filtered or composited with historical video, and all of this can be done “on-the-fly” in real-time. In this way, historical performance and live performance begin to touch on the plane of immanence, and acting-in-common with history becomes possible in a way unimaginable according to a dialectical logic of difference between. In the final moments of The Wooster Group performance, a silhouette of the audience appears on the upstage wall, superimposed on a dying Hamlet who speaks to the “mutes or audience to this act.” These final moments bring home the main point: this performance has been, all along, a model of productive reception. We are encouraged to engage with the historical movements that we encounter and recast them through a productive consumption that goes beyond a possessive and nominative logic of “appropriation.”

Ultimately, these performances illustrate how new technological media are interfacing with a collectively innervated multitude and allowing audiences to animate, use and act-in-common-with history. New media technologies such as Final Cut Pro and Isadora, because they lend us a new flexible temporal dexterity, allow the innervated audience to dance with the dead, reanimating and re-editing historical energies in the present. This new form of digital genealogy, rather than paving over the lacunae of history with linguistic representation, explores the organization of bodies in our filmic past and opens up new possibilities for the technopolitics of the future. Digital genealogies, such as The Wooster Group’s Hamlet, give a computer to get information about what a physical body is doing in the real-world.” For more information about these sensory systems, see their “Hardware Overview” at http://www.troikaranch.org/hardware.html

326 Reid Farrington, Interview with Ed Purver.
327 Richard Burton’s Hamlet.
328 This idea of “use” which goes beyond and annihilates the nominalized “proper/propre” spaces of “appropriation” will be explored more fully in the next chapter.
329 This idea of representation paving over the lacunae of history comes from Michel de Certeau’s The Writing of History, where he writes: “[S]criptural representation becomes ‘full’; it fills or obliterates the lacunae that are to the contrary the very principle of research, for research is always sharpened through lack. Put otherwise, the text makes present, it represents through an
productive audiences the tools they need to recast history’s force in the present by creating affective counter-actualizations that move beyond difference between, beyond representation, beyond appropriation, and beyond linguistic notions of resignification. This theatre of innervative repetition is what Deleuze’s, echoing Burton’s earlier claim, called the “theater of the future.”

But what does the theatre of the future bring? What are the political stakes of rethinking difference and repetition in this way? How will this synaesthetic historiography work? At the very least, we become capable and adroit citizens, better able to relate to our labor and our pleasure (and the ways in which they interpenetrate). I would call this training a literacy, but only in the broadest and least Literary sense. We might call it aptness—an expressivity that is also receptivity. It involves repeating a gesture while simultaneously producing and being disciplined by it. This is what Nietzsche calls a “noble education, being able to dance with the feet, with concepts, with words.” When this “noble education” is dramatized, spectators will see and experience the labor they engage in while spectating. If this labor is experienced as time on its joint (immanent duration), it is not ‘determining’, it does not diminish our ‘agency,’ it is not ‘alienating’. But this experience with cardinal time can do more. It calls the very possibility of alienation into question, and shows the ways in which, when we misapprehend time, labor and our relationship to performance technologies, alienation becomes possible in the first place.

Leading Deleuze scholar James Williams describes such an experience with cardinal time as the desired, genealogical experience:

An experience does not lie in the opposition of subject and object, or experiencer and experienced, but in a coming together that requires neither subjective nor objective identity. Oppositions and contradictions arise because we fix the movements of real difference. Without these movements there would be nothing to fix and without them we could not explain why ‘fixed things’ change.

An embodied performance pedagogy, which allows for difference beyond “difference between,” allows for such experiences (and that is why I will be turning to pedagogy in the remaining chapters). A performance pedagogy (and that is what The Wooster Group is participating in) engages the body, and its technologies teach the body new relations with the world. We can learn how to better experience and produce (or develop intimacies with) our environments. Our adaptation alongside these environments has always involved fostering intimacies with and becoming habituated to a variety of technologies. Our technological horizon is not now broader, so much as it is different. Synaesthetic historiographies rehearse creative possibilities and alternative habituations to these environments. Participants don’t just “read about it.” They can experience these technological environments (even these technological histories) in action: the


331 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 77.
screens, cameras, audiences, voices, affects, bodies, software platforms, the hypomneses inherited from the past alongside those of the present.

Hamlet’s interaction with his father’s ghost is an engagement with history, but this interaction is no longer alienating. Hamlet, as a repetition of his father, doesn’t repeat the Same thing he cites. This sounds paradoxical, but with time on its joint, they do it together; they act in common. There is an exchange unregulated by homogenous time or a market that would see past and present as discrete commodities. Guilgud, Burton, Shepherd: they repeat each other, but they reconstitute each other at the same time. They discipline each other’s bodies. Shepherd speeds up Burton, and after enough practice, Burton has digitally altered Shepherd’s gait. Burton’s facial tic solicits tears from Kate Vaulk. I’ve danced with them all. And as our bodies push up against each other, we reshape conventions and remake what is possible in the world. This is the dance of what Nietzsche calls the “Dionysian man,” who “enters into every skin, into every emotion; he is continually transforming himself.”

In the next chapter I will look at our students, but it is clear that this “theatre of repetition,” allows us to act in common with the historical or cultural Other. What’s more, this needn’t be an encounter that spatializes a difference between our-selves and our-others. We should be teaching our students to engage a multitude of performance technologies, technologies that include, but go beyond, the book. Students might instead go outside and perform with their others, remembering and reconstituting nature, even and especially when they might, as Gielgud suggests, “avoid real flowers” and substitute instead celluloid petals or binary blades of digital grass. The Wooster Group can teach us how to do this. Reid Farrington, repeating Gielgud without citing him, urges us to learn how watching the “refresh rate on monitors is like sitting next to a fireplace.”

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333 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 84.
334 Reid Farrington, Interview with Ed Purver.
<<Chapter Four>>

Hip Hop Macbeths,
“Digitized Blackness”
and the
Millennial Minstrel:
Illegal Culture Sharing
in the
Virtual Classroom

Neither a borrower nor a lender be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend
And borrowing dulleth th’edge of husbandry.

–Polonius, Ham. 1.3.74-76
From “Difference Between” to “No Difference”

Chapter Three illustrated how The Wooster Group, through the use of new media editing and projection technologies, was able to interact and to act in common with the specters of history. What I stressed about this interaction was how these technologies (Isadora and Final Cut Pro) negotiate the past and the present on the same immanent plane. In the Wooster Group’s *Hamlet*, the “difference between” two discrete historical moments gets refigured, allowing for new temporalities to emerge. Facile notions of “repetition” are challenged, and the line between the analog and the digital blurs. All of these innovations, however, do not come without political risks. On the other side of the Scylla of “difference between” lies the equally dangerous Charybdis of “no difference.” If Chapter Three illustrated the dangers of seeing too absolute a difference between the past and the present (of ignoring the ways the past constitutes and informs the present, as well as the ways in which present frames our ability to see the past), this chapter looks at the ways contemporary pedagogical endeavors, in an effort to make Shakespeare relevant, seek to erase the difference between the past and present. It also frames interactions between borrower and borrowed that cross dangerous cultural territories. The chapter also concerns itself with what happens when contemporary performance interacts with a cultural other that is not simply (if it were ever simply) an historical other. This chapter also registers a shift in the focus of my project. This chapter inaugurates an analysis of how performance, technology, and politics intersect with issues of pedagogy, a subject with which the rest of this dissertation will be concerned.

**Hip Hop Shakespeare**

Twenty years ago, Shakespeare scholars might have believed they had seen all of the Shakespeare performances widely available on video. Five years ago, they realized that they might never see all of the available video adaptations of *Macbeth*. This year, they know that they will never see all of the hip-hop *Macbeths* available on YouTube. A staggering number of hip-hop *Macbeths* currently circulate in our globally networked, multimedia environment, and this constellation of performances seems to constantly grow and change. This coincidence of *Macbeth* and hip hop culture has structured major motion pictures like Gerald Barclay’s *Bloody Streetz* (2003) and Greg Salman’s *Mad Dawg* (2004), as well as stage performances such as Ayodele Nzinga’s *Mac, A Gangsta’s Tale* or Victoria Evans Erville’s NEA-sponsored *MacB: the MacBeth Project*. Even “mainstream” theatrical performances have begun incorporating hip-hop aesthetics: for example, Rupert Goold’s recent *Macbeth*, starring Patrick Stewart and Kate Fleetwood, featured rapping witches, and Sir Ian McClellan recently produced a rap version of *Sonnet 18*. Perhaps the most productive site for the intersection of hip hop and *Macbeth*, though, has been within pedagogical programs like Flocabulary’s Stephen Greenblatt-endorsed *Shakespeare is Hip Hop*, Tonia Lee’s *Shakespeare in Urban Slang*, or Aaron Jafferis and Gihieh Lee’s *Shakespeare: the Remix*. In this chapter, I would like to examine the strange effects of

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336 For more information on these productions and programs, see Lee, Tonia. *Macbeth in Urban Slang* (New York: Urban Youth Press, 2008), and the following Web sites: “Flocabulary”
local, culturally specific pedagogical practices fusing Shakespeare and hip hop which—like the music itself—have been cut, copied, pasted and practiced outside of what was once their “proper” domain.

“Confusion now hath made his masterpiece.
Most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope
The Lord’s anointed temple and stole thence
The life of the building.” (2.3.62-65).

Like thousands of other YouTube members, high schooler “MadskillzMan” (Matt Dacek) decided to upload and share his senior English project, Macbeth Act V: Revenge of the Ghetto, with the global community. Of the hundreds of student performance projects I have seen which rework Shakespeare through hip hop, Revenge of the Ghetto serves as a representative example, not an exception. The 23-minute video remixes and re-contextualizes the final act of Macbeth, setting it in the present-day “streets of Cleveland.” The soundtrack moves between the hip-hop beats of Chamillionaire, the jazz guitar riffs of Marcus Miller and the nasal lyricism of Cypress Hill’s B-Real. Elizabethan verse is transformed into hip-hop vernacular. Martin Luther King Jr. is evoked alongside other African-American cultural icons. The political drama of Macbeth’s Scotland is uprooted and transplanted into the inner-city economies of drugs and violence. In these respects, MadskillzMan’s video is not unlike other productions aiming to trouble the line between high and low culture, between an isolated, European early modernity and Black Atlantic postmodernity. It seems as though these students have followed instructions.

But the video presents numerous problems that should give us pause. Revenge of the Ghetto quickly reveals itself to be a minstrel show. In their project, the all-white cast awkwardly cites hip-hop vernacular in ways definitive of performative infelicity if not what hip-hop legal scholar Imani Perry awkwardly dubs “performative inauthenticity.” Affective gestures seem contrived, awkwardly timed, or “unnatural,” illustrating how “the performance of blackness backfires when it finds itself in unwitting or unaware hands.” Perhaps most striking is how Revenge of the Ghetto’s performers enact their cultural remix against the backdrop of a green-screen digital milieu that allows them to virtually walk alongside the black pedestrians of an


339 Imani Perry, Prophets of the Hood: Politics and Poetics in Hip Hop (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 27. This expression “performative inauthenticity” registers a lack of awareness of how the Derridean/Butlerian performative operates against the very idea of authenticity.

anonymous inner city. At one point in the video, Macduff engages in antiphonic dialogue with a
digital crowd of hip hop superstars which he casts as his solders; the crowd is a collage that pulls
together images of Ja Rule, DMX, Method Man, Nelly and Eminem. Their mouths are
animated, and they signal their approval: “We’ll do it! Yeah!” Unlike the rest of the video’s
dialogue, the approval ventriloquized through these constrained and authenticating “black”
bodies is not spoken in what Mark Anthony Neal terms “sonic blackface.”

In Revenge of the Ghetto, signifiers of African-American cultural heritage are sampled,
casually tossed around and recontextualized, making the struggles of the civil rights movement
seem as fungible as the digital media through which they are now represented. King’s “I Have a
Dream” speech is evoked alongside an image of Gary Coleman (TV’s Arnold from Different
Strokes) with a caption reading, “Keep your pimp hand strong” (a citation of 2007’s Date Movie,
itself a parodic pastiche of pop culture). With no lived memory of previous generations’
struggles, the millennial generation parodically pillages the icons of the past, creating strange
mashups of the present. Is it, as Perry notes, a combination of “the speed of late-capitalist
production with the theater of freedom in the post-civil rights era that facilitates nostalgic
sensibilities without tradition”? Matt Dacek is not the only artist desecrating the culturally
sacred, stealing lives and creating masterpieces of confusion with these “mad skillz.” YouTube
abounds with hundreds of hip-hop Shakespeares, many of which resonate to great effect but most
of which, to invoke Eric Lott, seem products more of theft than love. In many ways, Macbeth
2007 is illustrative of a strange sea change in the politics of racialized representation in the age
of digital reproduction.

“When the battle’s lost and won.” (1.1.4)

The increasing ubiquity of the phrase “Hip Hop Shakespeare” might sound to us like a
triumph for critical pedagogy, a rich spoil paraded home from the culture wars. I know that in
the years I spent learning and teaching hip hop and Shakespeare with low-income, “at-risk” hip-
hop youth, forging connections between these disparate cultural performance practices was a key

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341 Jeffery O. G. Ogbar, Hip Hop Revolution: the Culture and Politics of Rap (Lawrence, KS:
342 Imani Perry, 57.
critical pedagogical practice which allowed my students to connect language to life.343 Many of the aforementioned hip-hop Macbeths, without a doubt, succeed in accomplishing important cultural work.344 This critique is in no way meant to undermine, in toto, the labor of these valiant frontline cultural warriors. Yet, the slippery fact remains that the culture war is often simultaneously a battle both lost and won. As Revenge of the Ghetto illustrates, aligning Shakespeare and hip hop does not guarantee the ways in which this alignment will be received or reproduced. As Lila Abu-Lughod reminds us: “If the systems of power are multiple, then resisting at one level may catch people up at other levels.”345 I would like to explore other, potentially more productive ways of understanding encounters between Macbeth and hip hop, ways that might keep us from jumping Jim Crow while playing the Upstart Crow.

When faced with the apparently novel connection between Macbeth and hip hop, one is tempted fall back on what Foucault called the “old questions of the traditional analysis.” This approach asks: “What link should be established between disparate events? How can a causal succession be established between them? What continuity or overall significance do they possess?”346 However, the question we should be asking here is not “Why Shakespeare or Macbeth and hip hop?” The first order of business we must attend to when looking at hip-hop Shakespeare or even hip-hop Macbeth would be to immediately dismiss any surprise we may feel at the novelty of this encounter. Both hip hop and Shakespeare occupy massive territories in our cultural imagination, and given our increasingly-networked collage culture, we should express no dismay at their coincidence. After all, neither “Avian Shakespeare” nor “hip hop hummingbird” come close to producing what technophiles have come to call a “Googlewhack”: a search query producing only one result. Examples are numerous for anyone wishing to produce a “novel” study on Avian Shakespeares.347 What these examples illustrate are the refined contours of a networked culture in which conjunction is the norm, disjunction the exception. For this reason, dismay at the coincidence between Shakespeare and hip hop, apart from being naïve, only works to hide the numerous techno-structural and semantic forces at work in their increasing interaction. Audiences are often polarized in response to these cultural intersections, responding with either wide-eyed astonishment or dismissive distain; however,

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343 A sampling of 1980s/1990s cultural warriors articulating the need for hip hop in the classroom would include the work of Omowale Akintunde, Houston A. Baker, Jr., Stephen G. Brown, Peter McLaren, and many others.
344 The rich complexity and local specificity of Nzinga’s West Oakland production and the rich historical and cultural background of both hip hop and Shakespeare provided in Jafferis and Lee’s pedagogical program stand out as particularly useful models of this encounter between hip hop and Shakespeare. Flocabulary, with the help of the renowned producer and remix artist 9th Wonder, stood out as having, for the most part, the most lyrical and musical sophistication. The rest of the Shakespeare raps I heard were laughable and insulting because they exhibit a lack of experience with or understanding of the lyricism and dexterity valued by hip-hop culture.
347 Months after offering “avian Shakespeares,” as an example of the random pairing of Shakespeare with any object of interest, I was shocked to encounter James Edward Harting’s The Birds of Shakespeare (London: J. Van Voorst, 1871) at a used book store.
both reactions arise out of the same desire for historical and cultural analogy. The analogy either works or it fails. When it does “work,” the dangerously reductive premise and conclusion structuring too many arguments, reviews and productions remains intact: Shakespeare and hip hop are the same, hip hop is the Shakespeare of today, or to cite the title of Flocabulary’s program and school tour, “Shakespeare is hip hop.” Nearly all the hip-hop Macbeths I have seen on YouTube have been structured by this overzealous analogy. These analogical performances produce visions of a static history in which only the mise en scène changes. Signifiers change, but the signified remains the Same. Kings become kingpins, horses become Hummers, and knives become nines. Unfortunately, most Youtube performances (and their corresponding pedagogical sourcebooks) mobilize the worst of urban clichés in order to signify their recontextualization.

In Revenge of the Ghetto, Macbeth asks Seyton for his “bling” (jewelry) instead of his “armor.” Compared to more typical analogies, with their desire for an impossible, transparent equality, this analogy’s exceptional clumsiness contains a productive disequilibrium. The bling/armor analogy illustrates how these performances might potentially activate a similitude that preserves and highlights—rather than erases—difference. This preserved difference might function as a way of inviting classroom discussions around historical change and cultural singularity. How is the “bling” logic of late-capitalism operating differently than the heraldry of feudal armor? How does each operate differently to solidify notions of identity? More often than not, however, hip-hop Shakespeares operate according to an analogic of the Same that irons out seams of difference between two discrete historical identities in order to make old robes as habitable as new ones. This desire for “equality” between past and present deploys Absolute analogy in order to seamlessly cut and paste hip hop’s “folk” traditions within the long duree of Shakespeare’s high cultural authority; however, this desire ultimately only further buttresses arguments for Shakespeare’s universal or tranhistorical relevance.

These tranhistorical equations collapse the thick duration of history, reducing history to nothing more than a continuous and progressive repetition of the Same. These discourses seem to be telling our students, “Yo groundlings! Shakespeare has already discovered moral stories which, if translated properly today, might empower or teach you about the postmodern complexity of your world!” This breed of analogical fallacy pervades many a “liberatory,” “progressive” pedagogy. Many well-intentioned teachers utilize this tranhistorical, analogical moral valuation in the service of a multicultural canon-reformation project that seeks to erase the line between high and low culture. This project, more often than not, seeks to make strange bedfellows of the postmodern and the early modern—but it’s always a procrustean bed. And sometimes students respond with Revenge of the Ghetto. Gerald Graff, in describing the 19th century academe, hints at the ubiquity of this problem:

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348 Flocabulary (Blake Harrison and Alex Rappaport), Shakespeare is Hip Hop, CD, Flocabulary, 2007.

349 This is not always a canon reformation project. As often as Shakespeare is appropriated in order to trick school boards into including hip hop in the curriculum, I imagine that hip hop is also appropriated in order to trick students into adopting Shakespeare.
What originates in an ambitious cultural and educational theory becomes detached from the methodology devised to carry it out, leaving students to grapple with the methodology without any notion of why they are doing so.\textsuperscript{350}

Hip-hop Shakespeares, however, might radically change shape if educators instead focus on performance’s ability to register and rehearse historical change and cultural difference. Hip-hop Shakespeare pedagogies might instead seek to explore with students how the historical analogies enacted by these performances falsely connect struggles of the past continuously with those of the present. Instead of teaching students that all things are equal (adding an historical blindness to rival attempts at race blindness), educators might help students explore the changing difference between the early modern and the postmodern, between elite and popular culture.

Wrapping Shakespeare in a hip-hop mantle does not guarantee the interest—let alone the historical understanding—of hip-hop youth. In fact, these thinly-dressed hip-hop pedagogies always contain the potential to totally misfire, especially when teachers presenting these programs speak from a place far-removed—geographically or generationally—from lived, material experiences with hip hop culture. Often teachers ask students to perform “hip hop Shakespeare” when in fact, the parallel they are stressing is between Shakespeare’s verse and the meter of “rap.” When these students write raps but cross boundaries with their bodies, are we to be surprised? What the students need is dramaturgy. Paul Gilroy has stresses the lack of focus on performance:

This orientation to the specific dynamics of performance has a wider significance in the analysis of black cultural forms than has so far been supposed. Its strengths are evident when it is contrasted with approaches to black culture that have been premised exclusively on textuality and narrative rather than dramaturgy, enunciation, and gesture—the pre- and anti-discursive constituents of black metacommunication.\textsuperscript{351}

Is it because educators think of Shakespeare as fundamentally a text that, when they assign “hip hop Shakespeare” performances, they do not see how they are asking students to move their bodies in ways others might find offensive? In an effort to make Shakespeare “relevant,” educators stress the connection between the plays and youth culture. Often, educators appropriate the speech of youth in efforts to create excitement about material. Youtube has many videos of teachers rapping. The student comments that follow them are usually far from kind. When baby boomers try on the linguistic cultural practices of youth, their warped and potentially offensive—yet parodic and comedic—performances often slip into what we might call an alienating “youth-drag.” Teachers who engage in this youth-drag show how little they acknowledge how quickly history moves, how there is already cultural difference separating their idiom and that of their students.

This focus on youth culture and its relation to culturally relevant pedagogies has its own institutional history. Paulo Freire, critical pedagogy’s seminal philosopher, is often narrowly remembered as an advocate for pedagogical frameworks “constituted and organized by the

students’ view of the world, where their own generative themes are found.” Hip hop culture, as a result, has been touted by many critical educators as the authentic “ur-text of cultural resistance” within which one finds the authentic “thematic universe” of marginalized youth. However, Freire’s avocation plays out of tune unless one also considers that the role of the critical educator is to “re-present” that universe to the people from whom she or he first received it—and ‘represent’ it not as a lecture, but as a problem.” When hip hop enters the Shakespeare curriculum today, however, it does so from globally-mediated mass-cultural sources, not from experience with students or local communities; furthermore, hip hop enters as the ostensible solution to a canonical problem, not as what it is: a cultural formation equally fraught by its constitution within problematic historical, sociopolitical forces. Freire’s progressive humanism, expressed through the often-broad strokes of his Hegelian dialectic, is too often understood as an injunction to simply reverse the cultural direction of what he described as “cultural invasion”:

[T]he invaders are the authors of, and actors in, the process; those they invade are objects. The invaders mold; those they invade are molded. The invaders choose; those they invade follow that choice—or are expected to follow it. The invaders act; those they invade have only the illusion of acting, through the action of the invaders.

Although Freire subtly undercuts the absoluteness of this formulation throughout his work, this notion of invader’s active authority and the oppressed’s passive, illusory existence nevertheless continues to persist in pedagogical practices that imagine Shakespeare’s equality with hip hop as the telos of a progressive narrative steadily approaching wider racial and economic equality. But if we no longer take Shakespeare to represent transcendent, absolute authority and power, and if we no longer take hip hop to represent pure, local authenticity untouched by power, how else might we understand the balance of their interaction? For this reason, instead of asking “Why Macbeth and hip hop?” we must start asking ourselves and our students “How Macbeth and hip hop?” What is the nature of this mix?

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353 Peter McLaren, Revolutionary Multiculturalism: Pedagogies of Dissent for the New Millennium (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 169; Freire, 90. McLaren acknowledges this error, writing that “gangsta rap does not constitute a master trope of urban criticism, an ur-text of cultural resistance but is read differently by different groups.”  
354 Paulo Freire, 90 (my emphasis). It is worth noting, here, that Deleuze (in his critique of Hegel) reformulates Freire’s notion of the “problem posing pedagogy” when he writes that “false problems” originates in the classroom: “It is the school teacher who ‘poses’ the problems; the pupil’s task is always to discover the solutions. In this way we are kept in a kind of slavery. True freedom lies in a power to decide, to constitute problems themselves. . . . the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way it is stated (i.e., the conditions under which it is determined as problem),” Gilles Deleuze, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Bergsonism (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 15-16.  
355 Paulo Freire, 133.
“We still have judgment here, that we but teach
Bloody instructions which, being taught, return
To plague th’inventor.” (1.7.8-10)

One way to begin answering this question would be to look at how these cultural practices were approached in the last decades of the 20th century. In the 80s and 90s, while Shakespeare studies was interrogating its origins and the corpus’ constitution within the matrix of authorship and authenticity, hip hop studies was struggling to legitimize itself as a field, to authenticate and authorize its status as a “legit” art form. In the wake of the author’s death and Foucauldian projects stressing the subject’s contingent formation, Shakespearean cultural studies worked to de-authorize, de-value, and de-mystify (even de-humanize) the idea of a metaphysical, transhistorical Shakespeare. Meanwhile, hip hop studies preoccupied itself with humanizing a history of dehumanized representations, recuperating authentic folk cultural forms (“keeping it real”), tracing, valorizing or debating origins across time and space (Afro-Atlantic, uniquely American?), and legitimizing and lending authority to the aesthetic products of marginalized communities. The two projects did not seem to be in tension but instead collaborated along the unified revolving axis of cultural revolution. Now this revolution is coming to an end, but its end has left cultural studies looking for something “real” or “vital” after the death of theory while hip hop studies—in the wake of hip hop’s oft-proclaimed death at the hands of mass culture—critically examines its own complicity with the auratic cult of authenticity it now strives to disrupt. In the age of Alternative Shakespeares and the global mainstream commodification of hip-hop culture, we need to adjust the terms of the debate in order to understand how hip hop meets Macbeth.

We need to find ways to critically destabilize authority and authenticity in both high and low culture instead of just, hurly burly, replacing one authoritative commodity with another while remaining within the same economy of authenticity. One way to destabilize the origins of Macbeth and hip hop would be to point out Macbeth’s collaborative identity and textual

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356 Houston E. Baker Jr., Michael Eric Dyson, bell hooks, and many others were critical voices in this endeavor.
358 Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar’s Hip Hop Revolution: the Culture and Politics of Rap, Tricia Rose’s seminal Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in America (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1994), and Byron Hurt’s film Beyond Beats and Rhymes (2006) are exceptional in this regard. Ogbar’s book takes as its task the “discussion of hip-hop authenticity and ‘realness’ in a historical context that reflects the awareness and sensitivity to problematic black images such as the minstrel” (5). Rose’s nuanced analysis of rap always balances “the importance of authorship and individuality in rap music” with an acknowledgement of how hip hop’s use of sampling and repetition “indicate the importance of collective identities and group histories” (95). Hurt’s film brilliantly investigates notions of “authentic” black maleness in relation to hip-hop’s sexism and homophobia.
instability (all those interpolations!) alongside the idea of the “studio gangster” in hip hop. We could talk about how both studio gangsters and Shakespeare remix history in the service of authority. As Dr. Dre invents a criminal origin in order to construct street authority, Shakespeare remixes Scottish history in order to construct the origins of King James’ authority. But the discourses of the culture war packaged these cultural artifacts as stable commodities to be traded or protected, appropriated or re-appropriated within a unified and coherent economy of value. Shakespeare and hip hop were understood as cultural properties within a restrictive market of exchange. They could be stolen, or they could be preserved. They could be public, or they could be private. Shakespearean cultural studies attempted to open and share high cultural treasures with the masses while hip hop culture attempted to close off and protect hip hop from the mainstream. The title of the Folger Library’s Shakespeare Set Free series testifies to the desire for open access to Shakespeare. Paul Gilroy explains the inevitable opening of hip-hop culture:

[T]he globalisation of vernacular forms means that our understanding of antiphony will have to change. The calls and responses no longer converge in tidy patters of secret, ethnically coded dialogue. The original call is becoming harder to locate. If we privilege it over the subsequent sounds that compete with one another to make the most appropriate reply, we will have to remember that these communicative gestures are not expressive of an essence that exists outside of the acts which perform them.

Now, the whole world is listening. The exclusive, essential secret has become untethered from its origin. Halifu Osumare, in her article on hip hop dance appropriation in Hawaii, illustrates hip-hop protectionism’s complicity with the property logic it seeks to oppose: “[i]n true counter-hegemonic subcultural stance, underground hip hop positions itself in proprietary opposition to the commercialization of rap music and hip hop dance. . . . which seeks to protect itself from the all-encompassing field of late capitalism in the postmodern era.” Here, Osumare insists on the ability of a “transnational underground” to protect, from below, against a transcendent “commercialization.” But her “proprietary opposition” does not hold. Hip hop becomes transnational because it is commercial. What Osumare calls an “underground” seeking “to protect itself from the all-encompassing field of late capitalism” ignores the strict meaning of ‘all-encompassing.’ As we saw in Chapter One, in the age of Empire, there is no “underground” any more than there is an ‘outside’ to power. Osumare speaks of hip hop’s desire to copyright its gestures in order to protect them from late capitalism, but the law of property is

359 Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar explains the performativity of the “studio gangster’s” authority by arguing the following: “That no member of [N.W.A., “Niggaz Wit Attitude”] was ever in a gang or served time in prison did not produce cries of figurative plagiarism. . . . hyperbole is intrinsic to rapping. . . . Thus, non-African Americans who aspire to represent the real do so by celebrating the same activities that performers like N.W.A., Geto Boys, Ice-T, and other gangsta rappers had established as standards of ghetto authenticity in the late 1980s,” 45.

360 Paul Gilroy, 110 (my emphasis).


362 Ibid., 41.

363 Ibid., 41.
never undone by an oppositional ownership. Tricia Rose has astutely observed the irony of hip hop propriety, arguing instead that “[r]edefining the constitution of narrative originality, composition, and collective memory, rap artists challenge institutional apparatuses that define property, technological innovation, and authorship.”

Instead of framing transactions between Shakespeare and hip hop within a “free market” of fungible commodities which move unchanged across differences of class, race, space and time, we might ask our students to interrogate the changing logic of an appropriation game which attempts to determine what types of culture are deemed “proper,” who gets “props,” and who gets to own or reproduce whose cultural “property.” Contained etymologically within the idea of appropriation is the structuring principle of property ownership. We might ask our students and ourselves how the very term “appropriation” might be leading us astray. As technological transformations redefine how cultural property is created and exchanged, so too do laws restricting the ownership and reproduction of cultural property. As the “copyright wars” feed off of meats baked at the funeral of the culture wars, Stanford legal scholar and spokesman for copyleft culture Lawrence Lessig highlights the tenacity of the either/or logic subtending both wars: “The ‘copyright wars’ have [led] many to believe that the choice we face is all or nothing. . . . Either we’re about to lose something important that we’ve been, or we’re going to kill something valuable that we could be. Whoever wins, the other must lose. This simple framing creates a profound confusion.” (34).

How might Shakespeare studies and hip hop studies escape this confusion?

“Black spirits and white, red spirits and gray, Mingle mingle, mingle, you that mingle may.” (4.1.44–5)

Revenge of the Ghetto’s “sonic blackface,” without a doubt, participates in the American minstrel tradition. Undoubtedly, our gorges rise at the video’s horrid racism; we are unsettled as we watch the video strengthen and continue a tradition of violent, racialized misrepresentation. However, we can learn from this video if we refuse to reduce and dismiss its performance as a “mere racist appropriation.” Esther Godfrey points out how “[t]o a new millennium American society increasingly ambivalent about the existence of racial categories, the theatricality of minstrelsy and other metaphorical blackface performances serves dual purposes—dismantling stereotypical notions of racial identity while recreating and affirming them in the process.”

Even African-American hip hop artists do not escape playing into this duality. Many hip hop scholars, and a whole host of hip hop artists, take it as a given that many African-American hip hop stars continue in the tradition of the minstrel. One could argue that the “ambivalence” Godfrey points to is nothing new and has always been the case with minstrelsy. In fact, Eric Lott

366 Kenneth Muir notes that these lines are an interpolation from Middleton’s The Witch, Act V, scene ii. Thus, the line enacts the collaborative and intertextual mingling of which it speaks.
367 Esther Godfrey, 3.
368 Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, 12.
bemoans the way studies of blackface have oscillated between mutually exclusive notions of “wholly authentic or wholly hegemonic,” and his study goes a long way towards escaping this “stubborn dualism.” Similarly, W.T. Lhamon’s *Raising Cain: Blackface Performance from Jim Crow to Hip Hop* stresses minstrelsy’s ability to occupy both sides of the dualism by noting that while blackface performance “enacted an identification of whites with blacks, it also encouraged racialist disidentification. While both could go on simultaneously, they might also go on separately.” The mutual exclusivity of these oppositions rarely holds when intercultural performance is embodied and put into practice.

Lhamon’s genealogy of blackface performance highlights Catherine Market at the turn of the 19th century in Manhattan, a site wherein black and white bodies were highly mixed and “there was an eagerness to combine, share, join, draw from opposites, play on opposition.”

Lhamon points out how the “relative integration of these streets was not usual” and how it produced the “mingled behavior” which marked the market as a site where difference could be displayed and transgressed. Likewise, Lott stresses how “frontier towns” were “not coincidentally the most important centers of blackface innovation.” Both Lhamon and Lott cite 19th century butcher and historian Thomas F. De Voe, who remembers black performers dancing during their holidays in Catherine Market:

> So they would be hired by some joking butcher or individual to engage in a jig or *breakdown*. . . . those that could and would dance soon raised a collection; but some of them did more in ‘turning away and shying off’ from the designated spot than keeping to the regular ‘shake-down’, which caused them to be confined to a ‘board’, (or shingle, as they called it,) and not allowed off it.

Lhamon points out that the “shingle” is a recurrent trope connecting the urban dances in Catherine Market with “cornshucking dances” on southern plantations, with the minstrel stage, and with “further connections in the Atlantic world.” What interests Lhamon is that the dancers sometimes made more money by “turning away and shying off.” He argues that “already [in] these early North American instances of black performance coming into commerce there is this turning away,” this “reserving gestures for which the patron thought he paid. . . . This shingle scene shows black performers early toying with the way patrons think they control black gestures.” During these early performances, the shingle marks a permeable boundary between inside and outside, between public and private cultural property. These gestures enter “commerce” with a simultaneous gesture of retreat. Lhamon highlights the problematic fungibility of these cultural gestures:

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371 Ibid., 3.
372 Ibid., 3, 19.
373 Eric Lott, 47.
374 Qt. in W.T. Lhamon Jr., 9, and Eric Lott, 41-3.
375 W.T. Lhamon, Jr., 9.
376 Ibid., 9-12.
Once paid for, wasn’t a gesture owned, then, by the buyer? Maybe a gesture could be sold and retained, too. Maybe marketing of gestures exhibited this complexity of cultural property: that it was saleable but never exclusive property. You could buy it and you could sell it, but you could not own it. Maybe the step overtook the stepper.377

Where are these gestures today, and who owns them? The “shingle” is easily recognizable as a critical site of today’s hip hop culture. The portable cardboard or linoleum (‘lino’) square upon which b-boys (breakdancers) dance the contemporary “break-down” maintains a connection to the performances in Catherine Market. Danny Hoch, hip hop artist at the Hemispheric Institute, gives us another hip hop origin narrative rooted in New York City, one that places the black gestures in a liminal space between the circulation of private properties and their public reuse:

The 1970’s saw an acceleration in manufacturing and a proliferation of cardboard packaging that had never been seen before. It was also a time where New York City apartment dwellers were replacing their linoleum floors of the 50’s and 60’s with carpet. The sanitation department was notorious for underserving poor neighborhoods and leaving heaps of trash in the street, along with copious amounts of cardboard and linoleum. The backspin, windmill, glide and headpin would not have been invented were it not for young people re-appropriating these two mundane items.378

These two performances—in Catherine Market and in 1970s New York City—sketch out the proprietary indeterminacy inherent in historical gestures. These stories highlight the permeable boundary—as thin as cardboard—separating shared, public performance and the private, material conditions which constrain, produce and haunt such performances. Both Lhamon and Lott point out the frontier town’s unique role in negotiating these unstable boundaries. Where are today’s frontier towns? Where might we find today’s Catherine Market?

“What seem’d corporal, / Melted as breath into wind.” (1.3.81)

The virtual frontiers of cyberspace are producing, like frontier towns before them, a virtual mingling of behaviors, a new way of viewing, performing, and modifying the habits of the body in relation to race. Acknowledging that millennials’ habitus is “profoundly impacted by the virtual space of the Internet,” Osumare notes that “the synthesis of globally proliferating popular culture body styles with local movement predilections” forms what she calls the “Intercultural Body.”379 This fusion of the global and the local enabled by the virtual spaces of the Internet—what some are now calling the “glocal”—produces intercultural, glocal bodies which take on an increasing ability to incorporate gestures that are “not indigenous, but assumed, yet not contrived.”380

377 W.T. Lhamon Jr., 15.
380 Ibid., 38.
When Macbeth gets news of his promotion, Banquo comments that “New honors come upon him, / Like our strange [foreign] garments, cleave not to their mould, / But with the aid of use” (1.3.143-5). Likewise, these intercultural gestures, as “strange garments” or “borrowed robes” escape their local “mould” and are globally naturalized through the “aid of use” (1.3.107). In this way, the natural mother is bypassed, and when a local space can easily “unfix [its] earth-bound root,” we see the birth of new, timely bodies illegally “ripp’d” from digital wombs (4.1.112; 5.10.16). As we saw in Chapter One, throughout Macbeth characters are dumbfounded by the shortcomings of a logic too rooted in static spaces, a logic unable to imagine production processes in which trees unfix themselves from spatial anchors and identities, like MacDuff’s, are produced outside of normative modes of reproduction.

The Internet, with its virtual frontiers, like Catherine Market, blurs distinctions between private and public cultural property, but they also disrupt the distinction between private and public space. The private spaces and properties of the Internet have become radically charged with public potential. As a result, the priority given to the “local” and the regional, in hip-hop and Shakespearean cultural studies needs to adjust. The relationship between the value of protected local culture and the value of private property is revealing its axiomatic character. We can no longer fetishize “local” cultural tradition while innocently ignoring the implication of this valuation within the broader logic of private property. The private is no longer clearly and always distinct from the public; it always maintains the potential to “go public”; this publicized privacy, in turn, can just as easily return to a new local privacy. A student’s English project finds its way into a dissertation as easily as anonymous inner-city pedestrians find their way into a high-schooler’s English project.

The Internet repeats Catherine market’s liminality, but it does so with a difference. This difference comes as a result of the shift from analog appropriation to digital sampling and the kinds of copying and sharing each makes possible. In describing the “copyright wars,” Lessig’s pertinent analysis articulates a conflict between what he calls RO (“read only”) culture and RW (“Read/Write”) culture—terms taken from “permissions” attached to computer files. A phonograph’s grooves analogically hold the trace of sound waves once written upon it, and when played, the needle is moved along the inverse trace of these vibrations. This RO technology, because it is analog, is difficult and expensive to rewrite. Nevertheless, hip hop arguably begins its life when Grandmaster Flash, through technical know-how, invents the cross fader and places his hands on a pair of records. He remembers: “I had to go to the raw parts shop downtown to find me a single pole throw switch, some crazy glue to glue this part to my mixer, an external amplifier and a headphone. What I did when I had all this soldered together, I jumped for joy.”

Fusing tactile dexterity and electronic expertise, Flash moves his hands back and forth on ostensibly RO records. This analog rewriting, however, still remains connected to the labor

381 For an example of the obstinate “priority given to the local,” see Imani Perry, 18-21, where she argues that applying the “richness of postcolonial theory” to “hip hop can prove difficult because while postcolonial critics concern themselves with international and transnational identities emerging from the so-called postcolonial condition, hip hop is far more concerned with region and local specificity.” 20.
382 Lawrence Lessig, 28.
of Flash’s hands. With the shift to digital technologies, the body’s labor is reduced to a minimum, and its immediate contact with the medium with which it mingles may not exist at all.

Lessig points out how “the ‘natural’ constraints of the analog world were abolished by the birth of digital technology. What before was both impossible and illegal is now just illegal.” In the same way, what geography, segregation and fears of miscegenation once made impossible, the birth of glocal, digital performance now makes possible. Digital characters in Revenge of the Ghetto illustrate this dissociation from the analog world as they walk through digital alleyways inscribed with graffiti pieces that still retain the anonymous traces of the movement of the writer’s hand which carefully rewrote his or her environment. Madskillzman “throws up” his own pieces on digital walls: they read “crack house” and “left coast.” But this rewriting is different. The writer is less exposed to the history of blood and bodies which once labored to write. Like the nineteenth century blackface minstrel, Madskillzman’s crew “never make[s] such permanent allegiances to their performances of Other.” They instead make only a “temporary visitation into the world of the Other.” Madskillzman’s cast might easily return to the comfort of their homes, removing their digital blackface. They might say, with Lady Macbeth, “a little water clears us of this deed” (2.2.64).

An important distinction between the effects of RO and RW culture is best explained by Lessig: “One emphasizes learning. The other emphasizes learning by speaking. One preserves its integrity. The other teaches integrity. One emphasizes hierarchy. The other hides the hierarchy.” Lessig’s analysis stresses both the freedoms and the dangers presented by digital RW culture. Revenge of the Ghetto pretends to an integrity found by transcending hierarchical difference, but the difference, paved over through analogical fallacy, persists in hidden form. Digital integrity will only be learned when this difference can be revealed, preserved and highlighted.

In the strangest moment in Revenge of the Ghetto, this difference peeks through with all the power of the repressed in its unruly return. In a flash, Madskillzman seems to acknowledge the analog conditions of possibility that allow for his digital tale. His Macbeth cries, “Not even all the perfumes made by all the sweatshops in India could wash away that smell off my hands.” The video then cuts to an image of sweatshop workers with a caption that reads “This film was brought to you by sweatshops!!” The sweatshop workers work below a Wal-mart logo that has itself been rewritten as “Che-Mart.” The image is striking in what it reveals about the ghosts haunting Revenge of the Ghetto: real, analog bodies still exist, and they are filled with blood. Blood flows in the history of an analog labor that produces the freedom of the digital. Unlike Macbeth, Madskillzman never drives his knife into the body of those occupying the position he usurps. Instead, Madskillzman’s virtual Macbeth exists in a space wherein he can assume a “digitized blackness” as he “washe[s] the filthy whit[e]ness” from his hands and continues surfing on the incarnadine virtual sea (2.2.46).

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384 Lawrence Lessig, 38.
385 Revenge of the Ghetto.
386 Esther Godfrey, 31.
387 Lawrence Lessig, 87-8.
Revenge of the Ghetto begins by introducing its characters to the beat of Chamillionaire’s “Ridin’,” a song about racial profiling. The refrain repeats, “Try to catch me ridin’ dirty.” But this is not Chamillionaire. It’s the famed parodist “Weird Al” Yankovich singing “White and Nerdy.” The lines go, “I wanna roll with the gangsters, but so far they all just think I’m white and nerdy.” Yankovic goes on to list every stereotypical white and nerdy activity, from computer savvy to spending every weekend at the Renaissance Faire. According to these criteria, Revenge of the Ghetto’s digital Shakespeareans certainly qualify as “white and nerdy.” Against the imitations of blackness towards which Madskillzman’s video pretends stands his acknowledgement of his own whiteness. His Macbeth claims, “I remember when I was a child, a little white child, and I used to be scared of the dark.” We might see in these moments how Madskillzman’s video is a meditation on whiteness as much as it is an interrogation of blackness. The video constantly engages with “hyperwhiteness,” “a whiteness so white it destroys the aura of normality that normally attends white people.” Revenge of the Ghetto claims to be “A Production by the Whitest Kids in Your Class,” a citation of the popular HBO race parody The Whitest Kids U’Know. Does Madskillzman, in foregrounding and making-visible his own whiteness, imagine his project as a parody? And if so, what is the object of this parody? What he does not understand is what Judith Butler explains: “Parody by itself is not subversive, and there must be a way to understand what makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively disruptive, truly troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated as instruments of cultural hegemony.” Clearly, Madskillzman did not receive instruction on this difference.

As we continue renegotiating the relationship between RO and RO/RW culture, between copyright and copyleft, between the de jure restrictions and de facto freedoms to copy, we must remain focused on how Shakespeare and hip hop intersect. Now, more than ever, we need to focus our attention on the ethics of copying the anonymous, constitutive forces of history without

390 Benjamin Nuggent, American Nerd: The Story of My People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 10; For more on Nuggent’s use of Mary Bucholtz’ notion of ‘hyperwhiteness’ in relation to the “nerd,” see Nuggent, 91-93; See also this dissertation’s Post-Scrip for a discussion of the link between Shakespeare and the figure of the nerd.
391 Qt. in Esther Godfrey, 18.
enslaving these cultural-historical forces within the logic of private property, authenticity, or the authority of origins. This is “the way” Butler hopes for. We will have to experiment with mixing culture without yoking historical and cultural difference to the homogenous temporality of a “progressive” Sameness. Only then will we, along with our students, learn to mashup culture without shedding blood. Only then can we begin to teach and understand how the proprieties of intercultural performance pedagogies stake out what constitutes “fair use” in and between the digital and the analog world.

Lessig observes that, historically, “as the range of technologies that enabled people to ‘copy’ increased, so too did the effective scope of regulation increase.” As these regulative powers increase, we can easily imagine how they might produce a stronger desire to copy across cultural lines. Lessig makes this point about intellectual property, but again his point might easily extend into the realm of cultural property:

The expectation of access on demand builds slowly, and it builds differently across generations. But at a certain point, perfect access . . . will seem obvious. And when it seems obvious, anything that resists that expectation will seem ridiculous. Ridiculous, in turn, makes many of us willing to break the rules that restrict access.

As the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) wages war on young people for sharing culture, their repressive tactics only increase the desire against this taboo. In the wake of the culture wars, the Left’s political project has been warped into a distorted image of the “politically correct police.” The image of this police officer has ironically assumed the function of censor, encouraging a raceblind cultural silence about difference. Countless times I’ve heard students, interpellated by this officer, say in response to a sexist or homophobic comment, “That’s racist.” For them, racism has become disconnected from race as difference is flattened and framed as the Same.

I would like to end by recounting an episode in a recent film, Be Kind, Rewind (2008), one of a number of films this year including blackface minstrelsy. In the film, itself about problems of remixing and copyright, Jack Black’s character, Jerry, blackens up in order to play “Fats Waller,” a local legend born in the video store where his character works alongside his partner Mike, played by conscious hip hop icon Mos Def. In order to save their boss’ local video store from developers, the two have to remake versions of all the films in the store (Jack Black demagnetized them all). The two workers remix each film using Michel Gondry’s “D.I.Y.” (Do-It-Yourself) bricoler aesthetic. This plan might have worked, but the developers discover their scheme and threaten to press charges against them for copyright infringement. As a last ditch effort, Mike tries to have the video store protected as an historical landmark, citing the fact that the legendary Fats Waller once lived there. As it turns out, though, this “local” legend is not so local. Fats Waller, it turns out, never lived in their town. Nevertheless, the townspeople, sensing their desperation, decide that they can remix and rewrite history itself. One citizen says, “Our past belongs to us; we can change it if we want.” One by one, the townspeople begin contributing stories about memories they have of Fats Waller.

They decide to make a “new” and “original” movie about Fats Waller’s history in their town. But this re-mixing of history, like the mixing in Revenge of the Ghetto, all starts to spin

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392 Lawrence Lessig, 101.
393 Ibid., 44.
out of control when Black arrives in blackface, singing “I ain’t misbehavin’.” Everyone stops. A needle scratches on a record. Jerry does not understand what he has done wrong. He can only say, “I’m fat! Fats is fat; that’s his name, so I thought I could . . . [looking at Mike, dressed as Fats] He’s not even fat!” Jerry cannot tell one form of difference from another. The video store manager, Mr. Fletcher (played by activist actor Danny Glover) takes Jerry outside and into the depth of the frame. We cannot hear what he says, but we can see him jumping Jim Crow.

Simple censure or silence about the vicissitudes of difference will no longer suffice. Our censure and silence, as they repress, produce a confusion in students who, as a result, remix the culturally sacred in an attempt to locate the secret contours of a difference which has been erased by analogy. Our students will continue to copy and share regardless of how they understand this practice. This is what terrifies the Recording Industry Association of America and motivates its war on copyright infringement. Let it not terrify cultural studies.
“There are schools in this country where children take the pledge each morning to be respectful, responsible and ready to learn—it’s an interesting idea—where virtues are taught by studying the great historical figures and characters in literature; and where consideration is encouraged and good manners are expected.” —George W. Bush, June 19, 2002, White House Conference on Character and Community
The previous chapter interrogated pedagogical practices so concerned with making Shakespeare relevant that they carelessly efface differences between early modern and post-modern culture. In an attempt to justify the teaching of Shakespeare in a climate where “culturally relevant” practices are key, teachers miss opportunities to teach students about historical change. In this last chapter, I would like to return to the NEA program I began with, *Shakespeare in American Communities*, but this time I would like to look more closely at its pedagogical component: *Shakespeare for a New Generation*. In my first chapter, I focused on the NEA’s desire to deploy a populist Shakespeare smoothly across national space; in this chapter, I look at how the NEA’s attempt to master space is matched by attempts to deploy Shakespeare evenly across time, from generation to generation. While the NEA, through pedagogical programs stressing “character education,” strives to maintain historical continuity from generation to generation, they also express anxiety around the very “newness” of the titular “new generation.”

I want to begin by engaging in Bush’s “interesting idea” as cited in the chapter’s epigraph. In order to produce classrooms where “consideration is encouraged and good manners are expected,” Bush suggests we look at “great historical figures and characters in literature.” Let’s look at how Shakespeare depicts the transmission of cultural values alongside the rehabilitation of character. This is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Prince Hal’s transformation into King Henry V. At the beginning of *King Henry V*, the Archbishop of Canterbury describes this miraculous transformation:

The courses of his youth promised it not.  
The breath no sooner left his father’s body  
But that his wildness, mortified in him,  
Seemed to die too; yea, at that very moment,  
Consideration like an angel came  
And whipped th’offending Adam out of him,  
Leaving his body as a paradise  
T’envelop and contain celestial spirits.  
Never was such a sudden scholar made,  
Nor never came reformation in a flood  
With such heady currence scouring faults,  
Never Hydra-headed willfulness  
So soon did lose his seat, and all at once,  
As in this king. (1.1.24-37)

The catalyst for this transformation, the death of the father, Henry IV, occurs in the same moment as (“at that very moment” “and all at once”) transcendental intervention in the form of the Flood.\footnote{This “flood” evokes both the “Great Flood” and, as T.W. Craik points out, “the cleansing (scouring) of the Augean stables by Hercules, who diverted a river through them,” Ibid., 124.} Hal’s antediluvian faults are washed away by “reformation in a flood,” which scours his faults and restores him to an even earlier, prelapsarian temporality, making “his body as a paradise.” However, what troubles Canterbury’s metaphysical rhetoric is his personification of “consideration” (Bush’s keyword in my epigraph). It is Hal’s material experience in beholding his father’s body—his “consideration” or “meditation upon” this event—that gives rise to the metaphysical intervention. This experiential beholding allows “consideration” to act “like an angel,” applying the whip and disciplining “his body which, as a result, envelopes and contains “celestial spirits.”

Canterbury’s attribution of metaphysical agency is further troubled by his later claim that Hal’s “art and practic part of life / Must be mistress to this theoret” (1.1.51-2). Hal’s “art and practic,” his practical experiences, which are here figured as distinctly feminine, are authoress to his rehabilitated character and its attendant “theoret.” When Canterbury gives a metaphysical cause to Hal’s transformation, of course, his attribution of this cause is fraught with dramatic irony because, in \textit{King Henry IV, Part I}, we learned that Hal premeditated this transformation. He tells us in soliloquy how his “reformation, glitt’ring o’er [his] fault / Shall show more goodly” than if he had shown no fault (1.1.208-9). Hal concludes his soliloquy with the promise of “Redeeming time when men think least [he] will” (1.1.212).\footnote{William Shakespeare, \textit{King Henry IV, Part I}, ed. A.R. Humphreys (London: Thompson Learning, Arden Shakespeare, 1960, 2000), 1.2.208-212.} Canterbury admits, ultimately, that Hal’s transformation is no miracle. He tells the Bishop of Ely that “miracles are ceased, / And therefore we must needs admit the means / How things are perfected” (1.1.67-9).

Canterbury and Ely, in this moment, participate in a larger discourse around the training of character and the transmission of values from one generation to the next. Shakespeare himself, in re-staging the transformation of King Henry V, repeats this history on stage for a “new generation” of British subjects. The clerics of the NEA, today, participate in a similar project.

\textit{Shakespeare for a New Generation}

On October 28, 2003, Capitol Hill was abuzz with performances of Shakespeare. The night served as an inauguration and celebration of the NEA’s \textit{Shakespeare in American Communities} program, what Gioia calls “the most ambitious program in the history of the NEA.”\footnote{Dan Stone, Producer, “Teaching Shakespeare,” \textit{Introduction to Shakespeare}, 24, Compact Disc, 2003.} Gioia notes that it is the “largest government-sponsored theatrical program since the Federal Theatre Project of the WPA era.”\footnote{Dana Gioia, “Chairman’s Message,” \textit{Shakespeare in American Communities} (NEA Publication, August, 2008), 1; Available for download: http://www.arts.gov/pub/SIAC4.pdf.} The initiative, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, is divided into phases, and includes Phase One: the “largest tour of Shakespeare’s works in American history,” and Phase Two: a pedagogical outreach program which aims to engage
students in every state of the union. The pedagogical phase of the program is called *Shakespeare for a New Generation*. *Shakespeare for a New Generation* (*SNG*) has two component parts: the NEA provides grants to local theater companies (at least 35 each year), allowing them to tour (and provide workshops at) local middle and high schools, and they have also provided a multimedia teacher’s kit distributed to teachers across America free of charge.

The multimedia kit “includes films, an audio guide, a teacher’s guide” a series of posters and timelines of Shakespeare’s life, and a collection of monologues students can use to engage in “recitation contests.” The NEA boasts that through *SNG*, “more than one million high school students have now seen a professional production of Shakespeare.” More than 2,000 cities have been visited by more than 75 professional companies; the NEA proudly asserts that, as of May 2008, they had provided “4,100 performances and 9,000 workshops.” Video Placement Worldwide, the distributors of the multimedia teacher’s kit, claimed in 2005 that “over 25,000 free, multimedia resource kits are now in the hands of eager teachers across the nation.” Gioia, in 2008, could claim that 55,000 copies had been requested and “have been used by more than 20 million students.”

Part of the New NEA’s plan to “zero in even more on a new generation of theatergoers” includes “a partnership with the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention” under the U.S. Department of Justice, which will provide additional grants to perform Shakespeare for youth involved with the juvenile justice program. The NEA aims to uplift at-risk students who, like Prince Hal, with “courses vain” have spent their youths in “companies unlettered, rude, and shallow,” their “hours filled up with riots, banquets, sports” (*HV* 1.1.54-6). In 2006, Laura Bush, representing the President’s Committee on the Arts and Humanities and the National Endowment for the Arts, presented the *Shakespeare in the Courts* program with its ten-thousand dollar “Coming Up Taller” award. Shakespeare in the Courts, a collaboration between *Shakespeare & Company* and trial court Justice Paul E. Perachi of the Berkshire Juvenile Court in Lenox, Massachusetts, establishes a legislative framework wherein juvenile offenders have the option of performing Shakespeare in lieu of community service or

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401 Dana Gioia, “Chairman’s Message,” 1.
402 Ibid., 1.
404 Video Placement Worldwide, “Acclaimed Shakespeare Teaching Program Enters Third Phase.” http://www.vpw.com/news/fall2005/page2.htm; interesting to note, here, is that I ordered one of the toolkits only to find out after it arrived that my school already had one in their library.
405 NEA, *Shakespeare in American Communities* (2008), 17.
jail time. According to Judge Perachi, the lessons learned through Shakespeare will eventually pay off. He cites a former participant who stopped him on the street saying, “Hey Judge, I’ve got a job now. I’m doing good. It’s a new me.”

But how does the NEA guarantee that at-risk students who interact with Shakespeare will reap the “good” imagined to be the natural product of this encounter? In Chapter One, we saw how the NEA’s long-distance strategy of theatrical deployment risked all when it encountered the temporal practices of local tactics. I must admit that over the last year I have practiced my own tactics, becoming a part of the NEA’s Shakespeare for a New Generation program myself. When the African-American Shakespeare Company, based in San Francisco, was awarded a grant from the NEA to perform their hip hop Macbeth for at-risk students, I decided to meet up with them at Willow High School, an alternative school in the Bay Area. Once there, I assisted Artistic Director Sherri Young in engaging students in theatre games. This led to a job as dramaturg for the AASC’s current production of Othello, and I recently designed a curriculum for the AASC’s teacher-artists to use as they tour Othello at under-funded high schools in the Bay Area. But while the NEA outsources pedagogical and theatrical labor to local sources, exposing them in the process to tactical opportunities, how might the “multimedia kits” function differently? What do these kits aim to do?

I would like to spend the remainder of this chapter paying closer attention to the NEA’s production of what I’ll call “Shakespeare teaching docudramas.” The first production is Why Shakespeare? (2005), a short film funded and produced by the National Endowment of the Arts. The DVD, not currently for sale, is the centerpiece of the SNG multimedia kit. The film addresses students directly and is narrated in large part by Dana Gioia. It features celebrities such as Tom Hanks, Michael Richards, Martine Sheen, and William Shatner, along with professors, actors and students narrating their experiences with the “transformative” power of Shakespeare. I will devote equal attention to Mel Stuart’s The Hobart Shakespeareans (2005), a made-for-television PBS documentary that follows Los Angeles elementary school teacher Rafe Esquith as he uses Shakespeare and performance to teach a class composed entirely of non-native English speakers. Rafe Esquith, who has also written two books on teaching, was awarded the National Endowment for the Arts’ National Medal of Arts by President Bush. He is the first teacher in the history of the NEA to receive this award. Esquith is also directly connected to Shakespeare for a New Generation; the NEA has established a “players guild” of “arts experts and actors,” a group which includes Esquith, along with Harold Bloom, Michael York, and (somehow) Hilary Duff. This chapter examines how these two films, along with the multimedia kit’s Audio CD, “Introduction to Shakespeare,” participate in the cultural

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409 For more on this experience, see my review. Todd Landon Barnes, “MacB: The Macbeth Project, Shakespeare Bulletin 27:3 (Fall, 2009): 462-68.
411 The Hobart Shakespeareans, DVD, directed by Mel Stuart (2005; POV/PBS, 2006). Esquith provides this demographic in The Hobart Shakespeareans, and in Dan Stone, Producer, “Teaching Shakespeare.”
transmission of “character” while they simultaneously market themselves—and the Shakespeare they construct—as “transformative,” “rehabilitative” or even “Americanizing.”

**The Shakespeare Teaching Docudramas: Situating the Films**

*Why Shakespeare?* and *The Hobart Shakespeareans* are part of a larger group of Shakespeare films released between 2004 and 2005. They come as an aftershock to the quake that was the 1990s “renaissance of Shakespearean cinema,” during which time Hollywood provided Shakespeare scholars a number of films to study: Baz Luhrmann’s *William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet* (1996), Julie Taymor’s *Titus* (1999), Richard Loncraine’s *Richard III* (1995), John Madden’s *Shakespeare in Love* (1999), a number of teen films based on Shakespeare’s plays, and a series of films directed by Kenneth Branagh—*Henry V* (1989), *A Midwinter’s Tale* (1995), *Hamlet* (1996), and *Love’s Labour’s Lost* (2000). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many thought the renaissance was over. One sign of its decline was the end of Branagh’s success. *Love’s Labour’s Lost* was not a box office success, and his next project *As You Like It* (2006) failed to secure theatrical distribution. Instead, it was picked up by HBO films and went straight to cable. These teaching docudramas inaugurate a new era and provide new objects for the study of Shakespeare on film. Whereas the films of the 1990s allowed scholars to examine our contemporary moment’s relationship with our early modern past, the Shakespeare teaching docudramas go one step further; these Shakespeare films themselves are already self-reflexive meditations on our relationship with the Shakespearean past.

One film of the new era, *My Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet for a New Generation with Baz Luhrmann* (2004), registers with its title both its target audience, a “New Generation,” and its indebtedness to the renaissance of Shakespearean cinema. The documentary follows Patterson Joseph, an established African-British actor and first-time director, as he, under the tutelage of Baz Luhrmann, attempts to stage a production of *Romeo and Juliet* for London’s famed Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts, a theater under the patronage of none other than Her Majesty the Queen of England. Joseph’s goal will be to cast a group of locals, all of whom have never acted, from his own working-class neighborhood of Harlesden, in order that they might, as narrator Reginald D. Hunter tells us in voiceover, penetrate “the very heart of the British theatrical establishment.”

Half of the film follows Joseph and his “new generation” of actors; the other half joins Baz Luhrmann in his palatial Australian mansion as he teaches the acting troupe and the viewer about Shakespeare’s contemporary power. Luhrmann, however, never actually visits Joseph in Harlesden. Acting as what the narrator calls a “long-distance mentor,” Luhrmann’s connection to Joseph and the cast is completely mediated via satellite.

*Shakespeare Behind Bars*, which appeared at Sundance in 2005, serves as another example of the Shakespeare teaching docudrama. This documentary follows Curt Tofteland

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415 Ibid.

416 Ibid.

417 *Shakespeare Behind Bars*, DVD, directed by Hank Rogerson (2005; Santa Fe, NM: Philomath Films, 2006).
and his group of inmate-actors as they stage a production of *The Tempest* as part of the Shakespeare Behind Bars program at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex in LaGrange, Kentucky.\footnote{For an extensive ethnography of the Shakespeare Behind Bars program, see Amy Scott-Douglass’ *Shakespeare Inside: the Bard Behind Bars*. (New York: Continuum, 2007).} The recurring premise of the film is that through the rehearsal and performance of *The Tempest*’s magical tale of forgiveness and redemption, the inmates are able to come to terms with the gravity of their own crimes. As of now, the Shakespeare Behind Bars program, started in 1995, is the only correctional Shakespeare film available. However, Tofeland’s program is not unique in bringing Shakespeare into a correctional context. In her book on the Shakespeare Behind Bars program, Amy Scott-Douglass highlights many similar programs, such as Agnes Wilcox’s Prison Performing Arts production of *Hamlet* at a maximum-security prison at the Missouri Eastern Correctional Center near St. Louis.\footnote{Ibid., 62.}

Were we to take a strictly generic approach to Shakespeare teaching docudramas such as *My Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet for a New Generation with Baz Luhrmann* and *Shakespeare Behind Bars*, we might easily assume that they come as a direct result of earlier films with similar qualities: fictional films set in classrooms which characterize Shakespeare as a transformative force in the lives of young people. These proto-generic ancestors might include fictional films illustrating Shakespeare’s transformative power when taught by a powerful teacher, films like Peter Weir’s *Dead Poet’s Society* (1989) or Penny Marshall’s *Renaissance Man* (1994). Additionally, we might see the way in which these films mark a confluence between three forces: older “teacher films” such as *Goodbye, Mr. Chips* (1939/1969/2002), *Stand and Deliver* (1988), *Mr. Holland’s Opus* (1995), and *Dangerous Minds* (1995), the 21st century fascination with reality television, and the contemporary documentary renaissance so closely affiliated with the Bush administration.\footnote{For more on the renaissance of the documentary and its association with George W. Bush’s administration, see Steven Mitz’ “Michael Moore and the Re-birth of the Documentary,” *Film and History: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies*. 35.2 (2005) 10-11.}

The taxonomist of Shakespeare on film might insert this emerging genre somewhere between what Jack J. Jorgens classified as “adaptation” and the more standard “Shakespeare documentary,” a group that includes a variety of educational films about the life and times of Shakespeare.\footnote{Jack J. Jorgens, *Shakespeare on Film*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 1-35. See for example the *Standard Deviants School Shakespeare Superpack* (2004), PBS’ *In Search of Shakespeare* (2003), or the A&E Biography series’ *Biography-William Shakespeare: Life of Drama* (2004).} At this crossroads between fictional adaptation and factual restoration, the Shakespeare teaching docudrama problematizes any generic taxonomy and begs for a new kind of film scholarship, one that can account the contemporary institutional and pedagogical discourses that give rise to and are produced within these films. I would like to instead address the more specific institutional, discursive and practical forces that shape the production of these films, forces which a strictly aesthetic, formalist or genre-based study might elide. Instead, it is within the larger institutional and discursive context of the NEA, education and rehabilitation that I would like to look more closely at Mel Stuart’s *The Hobart Shakespeareans* and Lawrence Bridges’ *Why Shakespeare?*
While Shakespeare studies has focused on the many pedagogical uses of filmic Shakespeare in the classroom, none that I am aware of takes on these new films, films which embed this very problematic within their diegesis.\footnote{422} But how is this problematic explored in the diegesis of these films? What do these films and their paratexts say about Shakespeare’s place in our current historical moment? Only through an attentiveness to the institutional and discursive context of these two films can we see how both operate to both solidify Shakespeare’s place in relation to American cultural history and to interpellate perceived “at-risk” or “marginalized” youth into a particularly narrow vision of American culture.\footnote{423} But in order to more fully understand this institutional context as well as the relationship of these two films to each other and to this context, we must first move to Capitol Hill on October 28, 2003.

“This Story Shall the Good Man Teach His Son”

On October 28, 2003, Rafe Esquith, the star teacher in The Hobart Shakespeareans, was in attendance on Capitol Hill, alongside Dana Gioia and Laura Bush. Joining Esquith was a group of Hobart Elementary students who performed monologues at the ceremony. Also taking the stage that night, we remember from Chapter One, were eight members of congress who donned Elizabethan costumes and performed a skit composed of excerpts from Shakespeare plays. Unlike the students, however, the congressional actors read from scripts.\footnote{424} In a particularly illuminating scene of Why Shakespeare? Dana Gioia calls that evening’s performance “one of the most powerful and memorable experiences” he has ever had with live theater. He recounts that “oddly enough” the most powerful and memorable moment came as he watched “an elementary school kid from Hobart Elementary recite the Saint Crispian’s Day speech from Shakespeare’s Henry V.”\footnote{425} He continues:

Now this little boy had been raised in a non-English speaking home. And as he built this magnificent speech towards its climax, I found myself weeping, and I was terribly embarrassed by this, but I noticed finally when it was over—and this was in the US Capitol—I looked around the room, and everyone else was crying too.\footnote{426}

\footnote{422} For examples of scholarship dealing with the use of Shakespeare on film in the classroom, see H.R. Coursen’s Teaching Shakespeare with Film and Television: A Guide. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997) or Jo McMurtry’s Shakespeare’s Films in the Classroom: A Descriptive Guide. (North Haven: Archon, 1997)
\footnote{425} Why Shakespeare?
\footnote{426} Why Shakespeare?
As Gioia narrates, the film presents the viewer with footage of students in Rafe Esquith’s classroom practicing fight choreography; this footage is intercut with still images of Hobart student Timothi Lee reciting the St. Crispian’s Day speech. In one of the photos, Lee stands on Capitol Hill, sawing the air with his hand while an enormous *Shakespeare in American Communities* logo towers directly behind him. The logo—the Droeshout Portrait of Shakespeare emblazoned on an American flag—takes up one third of the frame, and the student’s uplifted hand almost seems more Pentecostal than theatrical. After Gioia is done narrating this event, the film presents yet another reenactment of the October event, as a different Hobart student recites the British monarch’s call to war. At the end of the speech, as the actors face begins to fade, we see an American flag in the background upon which—at the moment the soundtrack, trumpeting “Yeager’s Triumph,” the theme from *The Right Stuff*, builds to an affective crescendo—the *Shakespeare in American Communities* logo leaps to the screen (see Figure 18). Imagining the events of October 28th, I cannot help but wonder if Laura Bush was present during President Bush’s similar call to arms, an event that occurred at a press conference earlier that day on Capitol Hill where Bush spoke on the situation in Iraq.⁴²⁷

This series of moments in the film highlights many of the key tropes employed by both films. First, the mapping of the Droeshout portrait upon not one, but two American flags serves to embed Shakespeare’s narrative of British imperial expansion firmly within a markedly American backdrop.

This inscription of Shakespeare onto a distinctly American landscape is recurrent throughout *Why Shakespeare?* Rural landscapes of Colorado, Texas and Arizona, along with churches and farmhouses with American flags hanging from windows, continually punctuate the film’s Shakespearean monologues, while the names of US cities cascade across the screen in order to illustrate the scope of Gioia’s “populist” project.

Image 17: Gioia’s Populist Project

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This practice of Americanizing Shakespeare is part of a larger discursive formation, one which reaches beyond the history of the NEA’s recent appropriation of Shakespeare. Historian Lawrence Levine has traced the Americanization of Shakespeare back to the 1830s, when Alexis de Tocqueville commented, “There is hardly a pioneers hut that does not contain a few odd volumes of Shakespeare. I remember that I read the feudal drama Henry V for the first time in a log cabin.”

In An Introduction to Shakespeare, the supplemental audio CD that accompanies the teacher’s kit distributed by the NEA, Gioia cites this passage in Democracy in America. However, he adds without pausing or acknowledging the end of Tocqueville’s quotation, that “one such log cabin belonged to the family of Abraham Lincoln, a frontiersman whose formative reading consisted mainly of the King James Bible, Blackstone’s lectures on English law, and Shakespeare.” This desire to relocate de Tocqueville’s reading of Henry V into Lincoln’s log cabin reveals a larger, widespread desire to place Shakespeare within America’s lineage of cultural patriarchs.

On An Introduction to Shakespeare, Gioia provides students with another American origin narrative: “When the English colonists sailed for the new world, they brought only their most precious and essential possessions with them, including the works of William Shakespeare.” According to James G. McManaway, this is simply not true. He writes, “It seems unlikely that Shakespeare would have been known to many of the colonists in the early, perilous years, whether they sought fortunes in Virginia or a religious haven in Plymouth. Nor is it likely that many copies of Shakespeare were to be found among their books.” While it may be true that performances of Shakespeare appeared in the US as early as 1750, what Gioia crucially fails to acknowledge is that these performances of Shakespeare were more than likely understood as British performances. Theater historian Peter A. Davis notes that at this time, “[t]heatre, like all other British commodities, had become politicized” in the years leading up to American Revolution, and that theater was known to be “suited to extravagant royalist tastes.”

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429 Doug Stone, 3.
430 Doug Stone, 3.
432 Peter A. Davis, “Puritan Mercantilism and the Politics of Anti-Theatrical Legislation in Colonial America” in The American Stage: Social and Economic Issues from the Colonial
part because theaters were considered the site of tensions between royalists and revolutionaries (this tension did not soon die out, culminating in the Astor Place Riot of 1849 surrounding William Macready’s performance of Macbeth). Despite this, Gioia goes on to stress the unifying function Shakespeare played in the formation of the nation. According to Gioia’s lesson, a “young nation brought together under a unique constitution and collective will found common ground in the love of Shakespeare.” Gioia’s “young nation,” “under” the constitution and with Shakespeare as a “common ground” finds itself positioned vertically between two equally important “foundational” narratives. This spatial metaphor positions the works of Shakespeare and the US Constitution as mutually illuminating paratexts, as the two founding documents which constitute what it will mean to become American.

In the early 20th century, America’s figurative relocation of Shakespeare onto American soil became literal when, in 1932, Henry Clay Folger—an avid collector of Shakespeareana—opened his library. Today, the Folger Shakespeare Library can tout itself as “home to the world’s largest Shakespeare collection.” The library’s physical location in Washington D.C. literalizes Shakespeare’s centrality within the American imaginary. The Folger Shakespeare Library sits just east of the Supreme Court, the Library of Congress, the Jefferson Memorial, the US Senate and House office buildings, and the US Capitol itself. William Slade, the first director of the Folger library remarked on its location saying, “a line drawn from the site of the Folger Shakespeare Library Memorial through the Capitol building and extending onward, will all but touch the monument to Washington and the memorial to Lincoln—the two Americans whose light also spread across the world.” Today, the Folger Library, sponsored by the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, is initiating a new program of its own: *Shakespeare in American Life*. As part of a larger exhibition, the library has created a “radio documentary” broadcast on both Public Radio International and online. The Folger radio documentary provides a detailed history of intersections between Shakespeare and American culture. Sam Waterston, who narrates the series, notes:

> From the very beginning, Americans have sought to make Shakespeare an honorary citizen. Whether we’ve done that or not, one thing is clear, and that is that on the stage, within the realm of performance, Americans have certainly made Shakespeare our own,

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434 Doug Stone, 3

435 Folger Shakespeare Library, “Shakespeare in American Life,” advertisement; see also www.folger.edu; Also interesting to note here is Michael Bristol’s point that at this time key manuscript purchases, like the Harmdsworth collection which allowed the Folger library to become a “world-class research library,” are concomitant with the economic decline of European estates. For more, see Michael Bristol’s *Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

436 qt. in Michael Bristol, 76
Waterston repeatedly articulates his skepticism regarding America’s desire to “naturalize” Shakespeare as a citizen; however, he is less ambivalent about the American appropriation and possession of Shakespeare in the “realm of performance.” This desire to use Shakespeare to blur the British-American distinction also has a long history. Charles Mills Gayley, professor of English and Classics at the University of California, Berkeley at the turn of the twentieth century, in his book *Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America* (1917) writes:

> The adventurers and planters of Virginia, in later years when Shakespeare was writing *Troilus and Cressida*, *Coriolanus*, and *The Tempest*, were of his blood and temper, the blood and temper of the forefathers of many of us today. Their adventures and failures, their faults and virtues, are our history, Anglo-Saxon and American, as well as theirs.  

Here we see, through shared, paternal bloodlines, the imagination of a common character and a shared temperament. In this way, citation of the Shakespearean archive, as with the Freudian Archive discussed by Derrida in *Archive Fever*, “can only illuminate, read, interpret, establish its object, namely a given inheritance, by inscribing itself into it, that is to say by opening it and by enriching it enough to have a rightful place in it.” This motif—Shakespeare’s ability to erase national boundaries and enrich the body of the past with the mark of the present—continues in *Why Shakespeare?* and *The Hobart Shakespeareans*.

In *The Hobart Shakespeareans*, Esquith remarks that every year he takes his students on field trips to Washington DC. The class website provides photographs of the students visiting the Folger Shakespeare Library. This annual trip (a pilgrimage of sorts) is supplemented by another trip to either colonial Williamsburg, Gettysburg, or Mount Rushmore. The film shows us a series of images chronicling these trips, and we follow Esquith’s current students on their trip to Washington DC, where they visit the Capitol, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial. Later, at a Halloween party hosted by his wife, Esquith makes the following comment, one that gets repeated in various versions throughout the film:

> I want these kids to be Americans. And a lot of them are new to this country, or have not been in this country that long. At the end of the year, when I ask them, “What are you?”

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440 The class website is located at www.hobartshakespeareans.org.

441 In the film, Esquith explains that these trips are funded by a former student who went on to major in business and came back to incorporate Esquith’s class as an NPO.
I want them to say, “I’m an American. I’m as American as George Washington or Abraham Lincoln. I’m as American as Frederick Douglass. I’m one of them.”

Esquith’s America is founded on the flattening of difference and the “unity” found through a paternal identification with America’s “founding fathers.”

If we move back to Capitol Hill on October 28, 2003 and to Gioia’s narration in *Why Shakespeare?*, we might note that what moves him—the content of Henry’s speech—is itself a pedagogical tale which involves the teaching and transmission of a gentlemanly, patrilineal heritage:

Old men forget; yet all shall be forgot
But he’ll remember, with advantages,
What feats he did that day. Then shall our names,
Familiar in his mouth as household words […].
Be in their flowing cups freshly remembered.
*This story shall the good man teach his son,*
And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by
From this day to the ending of the world
But we in it shall be remembered,
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition. (*HV* 4.3.49-63)

Henry claims that “this story will the good man teach his son,” the tale of a “band of brothers,” a telling of which will allow the names of these patriarchs, through their sons, to be “freshly remembered” after others, those excluded who “find their manhoods cheep” are long forgotten.\(^{443}\) Within the narrative of *Henry V*, British honor, embodied in the synchronic, horizontally aligned fratriarchy of the “band of brothers,” in order to survive, must be passed down vertically, that is, patrilineally and diachronically through the generations. The preservation of honor depends upon the unimpeded repetition of a tale that, each time it is told, allows the honor of this fratriarchy/patriarchy to be “freshly remembered.”\(^{444}\) Participation in this fraternal order will transform its members, incorporating the “vile” and “gentl[ing] his condition.” Most important, though, is the fact that what moves Gioia here is not simply Harry’s speech, but the fact that a young boy, as he says, “raised in a non-English speaking home,” through Shakespeare, appears to have heeded Harry’s call and been interpellated into a new, gentlemanly heritage.

Michael D. Bristol, in his book *Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare*, writes, “The idea that Shakespeare is a founder or creator of a specifically American experience of

\(^{442}\) *The Hobart Shakespeareans.*

\(^{443}\) *The Hobart Shakespeareans.*

\(^{444}\) “Honor,” here, is what is at stake. Remember, in the speech, Henry says, “But if it be a sin to covet honour/ I am the most offending soul alive. . . . I would not lose so great an honour/ As one man more, methinks, would share from me,” William Shakespeare, *Henry V*, ed. T.W. Craik. (London: Thompson Learning, Arden Shakespeare, 2000), 4.3.28-32
individuality and of collective life is articulated by Ralph Waldo Emerson, who described him famously as ‘the father of the man in America.’ The distinction here between individual and collective life is part of what is at stake in the transmission of Shakespeare from generation to generation, from the “father of the man in America” to the man himself. From the collective band of brothers, a tale must be passed on to the individual, providing for the individual the “common ground” to which Gioia earlier referred. This common ground is that which allows the individual to connect with other individuals of a shared heritage; Shakespeare, in this way, allows for the construction of a brotherhood when one takes on Shakespeare-as-common-“father of the man in America.” Here we must think of the infinite reversibility of the national slogan *E Pluribus Unum* (out of many, one; out of one, many, *ad infinitum*).

The figuration of Shakespeare as a patrilineal inheritance occurs frequently in both these films and seems to unite the men of each film within a contemporary band of brothers—at least those who do not “find their manhoods cheap” (*H5* 4.3.66). In *Why Shakespeare?* many of the interview subjects invoke these paternal memories. For example, Poet David St. John reminisces, telling students “My father would read [me] Shakespeare, his father read him Shakespeare.” St. John calls Shakespeare a “gift . . . a parent gives you.” Similarly, Rafe Esquith, in his film, exclaims, “I love Shakespeare because my father read it to me as my bedtime story when I was a little boy. It’s what I was raised on.” In this way, as these teachers share their experiences with Shakespeare, the address of the film itself becomes a new tale that will provide a common ground for “the next generation,” a term upon which many of these films and their institutional sponsors remain fixated.

In *Professing Literature*, Gerald Graff’s compelling genealogy of Literature’s place in the American academy, he describes how the “old college derived its moral atmosphere from the patriarchal figure of the college president” who “often taught every student in the senior class in the central course in moral philosophy.” These “fathers” of the “old college” faculty (which Graff dates from 1828-1876) were largely “unspecialized and recruited from the clergy, religious orthodoxy outweighing prowess in scholarship.” During this time, debate raged between two pedagogical schools: the rhetorical-analytical-philological methods—rooted in the classical practice of extensively glossing linguistic elements of literature (a tradition of which Kittredge was perhaps the last defender)—and an emerging school emphasizing performance and declamation. The philological school, which figured etymology as ancestral genealogy, espoused what Graff calls a “romantic view of language” as “a kind of linguistic ‘essentialism’.” Within this philological school, the view that language was “an expression of

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445 Michael Bristol, 3.
446 *Why Shakespeare?*
447 Ibid.
448 *The Hobart Shakespeareans.*
451 Gerald Graff, 30.
national character came to inform Germanic and romance philology.\(^{452}\) So while the philologists secured Shakespearean poetry’s place as the essential source of “national” identity, the declamatory school focused on the “spiritual realization of literature through oral reading, an echo of earlier Quaker and Protestant evangelical appeals to the authority of faith over the encumbering externals of formal churches, rituals, and doctrinal disputes.”\(^{453}\) Graff provides Hiram Corson, chairman of Cornell’s English Department in the 1890s and author of *The Voice and Spiritual Education* (1896), as an exemplary proponent of the declamatory school. At Cornell, “He recalled his childhood experience of reading and being corrected by his father.” Graff tells us that “encouraged by the [patriarchal] president, Corson let himself go, thundering Shakespeare to his classes,” sometimes in the school chapel “to the accompaniment of organ music.” In ways that we might imagine repeat and recall Prince Hal’s transformation and call to memory, Corson’s thunderous lectures allowed him to establish a tradition wherein he “would be credited in *generations of reminiscences* with inspiring conversion experiences in heretofore indifferent students.”\(^{454}\)

The NEA’s Shakespeare, ostensibly for a “New Generation,” continues forward by citing the history of this Romantic, evangelical patrilineal tradition. Worth noting here, however, is that Dana Gioia himself did not learn Shakespeare from his father. Alternatively, he recalls his childhood memory of Shakespeare this way: “I remember my Mexican-American mother reciting passages of Shakespeare that she had to memorize in school, which awakened me in some ways to poetry.” However, in eighth grade, his teacher, a nun, could not understand what he was saying, so she held him and a friend after class. Gioia says, “She made us memorize a dialogue from Shakespeare as training in diction, to teach us how to speak in a way people could understand.” Through memorization, that is to say an internalization and repetition of Shakespeare, Gioia’s in comprehensible mother tongue was tamed as he learned again “how to speak.” No wonder, then, that Gioia finds Timothi Lee’s performance so moving. Lee, whose father we learn did not read him Shakespeare, occupies a similarly curious position within the historical trajectory of this patrilineal American heritage. As an outsider, his presence, “in the US Capitol,” highlights the precariousness of the process of *interpellation*, threatening, as it does, an end to the seamless historical transmission of values. As if to shore up the possibility of things going wrong (through a kind of performative infelicity), congress waits in the wings, clutching their scripts and holding steady their crowns.

This brings us to a crucial question regarding the *act* of cultural transmission: what kind of “gift” is Shakespeare to give? How does it affect the receiver, the giver, or the relationship between the two? Michael Bristol discusses the act of giving tradition as a gift, noting that “[i]t is in this moment that the possibility of a cultural abyss or rupture opens up. Since the possibility is always present within what we call tradition, we can never understand the cultural phenomenon as a process of undisputed succession.”\(^{455}\) As useful as Bristol’s study of Shakespeare’s *longue durée* in America is, what he misses is that this “possibility” is actually a necessity; all repetitions reconstitute the past according to and within the materiality of the present. The idea of undisputed succession relies upon the possibility of an infinite repetition of the Same, the dream of conservatism *par excellence*. For Bristol, Shakespeare’s text maintains an

\(^{452}\) Gerald Graff, 30.

\(^{453}\) Ibid., 46.

\(^{454}\) Ibid., 48 (my emphasis).

\(^{455}\) Michael Bristol, 40.
infinite reserve of meaning, enough to provide each generation a new Shakespeare; however, none of these performances reconstitute the possibilities securely located in this textual reserve. For this reason, all performances participate in what Bristol calls “derivative creativity.” The possibility of a differential repetition, in this case the possibility that Gioia or Lee continue speaking an accented Shakespeare or even go as far as to teach their sons (or their daughters!) this Shakespeare, threatens to disrupt the continuity of historically sedimented beliefs and ideas.

The possibility of an American Shakespeare begins, however, with exactly this type of disruption. The making-American of Shakespeare, the appropriation and disassociation of Shakespeare from the longue durée of British history, has as its condition of possibility this potential for change. This change, this naturalizing of a British Shakespeare as American, is exactly the kind of performative maneuver students need to rehearse in order for them to make of their inheritance a truly differential repetition. We must accept that Shakespeare can be made American because it is only by recognizing this possibility that we allow for the agency of students such as Gioia or Lee. Because of the threat posed by such a differential repetition, the Americanization of Shakespeare, as well as the Americanization of youth through Shakespeare, involves an interpellative process that must be continually maintained through performance.

Judith Butler’s discussion of performative speech and its ability to exceed interpellation is useful here in thinking about dramatic performance. Butler writes that “such speech is, however, vulnerable to failure, and it is that vulnerability that must be exploited” if any genealogical counter-actualization is to occur. She goes on to note how “the appropriation of such norms,” and here we can think of the appropriation of normative performances of Shakespeare, “to oppose their historically sedimented effect constitutes the insurrectionary moment of that history, the moment that founds a future through a break with the past.” For this reason, simply locating the Folger library in the heart of the nation’s capital cannot serve to permanently Americanize Shakespeare. Like Harry’s tale of the “band of brothers,” these normative, ritual performances of Shakespeare must be continually and successfully repeated. In this light, the congressional skit on Capitol Hill or the NEA’s Shakespeare for a New Generation and the films it has inspired take on a more specific ritual function. In pedagogical discourse, teachers, configured as part of the ideological state apparatus, have also been understood to fulfill this Althusserian interpellative function. But let us take a closer look at this often dialectically-configured relation between teacher and student.

Back to the Classroom: Taking Attendance

My goal here is to participate in the kind of “effective history” which Foucault highlights as being part of any Nietzschean genealogical critique. Judith Butler describes such a genealogical critique as a methodology which “investigates the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices,

457 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech, 12.
458 Ibid., 159.
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin.”” Furthermore, my hope is the utopian one: that an examination of the contemporary and historical role of institutions, discourses, and practices in the construction of “Shakespeare” as naturally “rehabilitative,” “virtuous,” or even as “American” might lead to more ethical practices, institutions, and discourses on Shakespeare. It is towards this more ethical pedagogy which the rest of this chapter tends. C. Colwell expresses genealogy’s utopian tendency by noting that “genealogy functions by decomposing the particular series along which events have been organized in order to create a different series for those events . . . genealogy counter-actualizes events, returns to the virtual structure of events, in order to re-actualize them in another manner.”” In this genealogical project, I hope to show the unique role educators might play in this project of counter-actualization.

Rituall y, the teacher stands in front of the class, and before any business can begin, “hails” each student, calling out names after which each student responds, “present.” But to what extent can a teacher guarantee each student’s “presence” in the classroom. How much of each student’s experience exceeds the teacher’s interpellative call. In what other ways might teachers “secure uptake.”” In The Hobart Shakespeareans, Rafe Esquith talks briefly about his “money system,” a system which has been “emulated around the world.”” We get more insight on the matter in a lecture Esquith gave for the Lavin Agency. In the lecture, Esquith talks about how students in his class are interpellated into American capitalism and taught the “principle of ownership.”” His comments are worth quoting at length:

> I wanted my kids to understand America, so I decided—I think you’ll get a big kick out of this—our economic system. When children come into class . . . they have to apply for a job . . . The problem is, they have to pay rent to sit at their desks. The closer they sit to the front of the room, the higher the rent is; it’s a better neighborhood. Now I’m so devious, that I do not pay them enough money to be able to make their rent at the end of the month. And if you cannot make your rent at the end of the month, you’re evicted from your seat and you have to sit on the floor as a homeless person; however, I give them thousands of opportunities to make extra money, by doing extra assignments, by working hard, by doing good deeds, and by the end of the month, not only can they pay their rent, [but] for the children who are really frugal and conservative with their money, if you can save up triple your rent, you can buy your seat, call it a condominium, and then you don’t have to pay rent anymore, to teach them the principle of ownership [applause], and the really clever kids, the really clever kids, save their money, and buy other kids seats, and charge them rent every month.”

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462 The Hobart Shakespeareans.
464 Rafe Esquith (my emphasis).
Esquith’s pedagogy, a nightmarish model epitomizing the models critiqued so thoroughly by the critical pedagogy movement in the last half of the twentieth century, mirrors the rhythm and mode of production of a particular form of capitalism. The classroom as factory metaphor was a mainstay of many twentieth-century critiques of schooling, most notably in the critiques of Samuel Bowels and Herbert Gintis. Reflecting recently on their landmark study, Schooling in Capitalist America, Bowles and Gintis remember their structuralist argument: “Schools accomplish [socialization] by what we called the correspondence principle, namely, by structuring social interactions and individual rewards to replicate the environment of the workplace.”

In this model, as in Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the dialectical struggle between the teacher’s authority and the student’s desire for liberation corresponds to a larger dialectical class struggle. But does this classroom-factory metaphor continue to provide traction in the post-Fordist economy of late capitalism? Freire sought an alternative to what he saw as the “banking concept” of education composed of a dialectic consisting of an authoritative teacher and passively receptive students. Today, however, this banking concept does not begin to describe how late capitalism functions in the classroom. The dialectical “banking” model cannot adequately account for the capitalist logic of Esquith’s classroom, a room in which students are often moving, performing, playing music and engaging with each other.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri offer an interesting alternative to the dialectical classroom-factory metaphor. In their book Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, they argue that unlike industrial models of capitalism, “the contemporary scene of labor and production . . . is being transformed under the hegemony of immaterial labor, that is, labor that produces immaterial products such as information, knowledges, ideas, images, relationships, and affects.” Education takes on an increasingly important role within this contemporary scene. Because of the prevalence of immaterial labor, the transcendent, linear Taylorism of an older capitalism is becoming increasingly outmoded by the Toyotism of newer, immanent, and networked configurations of labor. In line with this change, I would like to work towards reconfiguring the linear, patriarchal pedagogy of the “band of brothers” by creating an immanent, networked understanding of how Shakespearean pedagogy might function under newer forms of capitalism. We might call this the pedagogy of the multitude.

Hardt and Negri’s recent study introduces us to a new form of biopower which involves the more than just a regulation of the products of capitalist production. The dominance of this new form of biopower, a signature of late capitalism, works to regulate subjects’ “character.” Hardt and Negri call this “affective labor,” and note that “one indication of the rising importance of affective labor . . . is the tendency for employers to highlight education, attitude, character, and ‘prosocial’ behavior as the primary skills employers need.” With the increasing demand for affective in the marketplace, it comes as no surprise to see Shakespeare’s plays, and Henry V in particular, figured as a corporate toolbox of character-building exercises.

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467 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 108 (my emphasis).
Along with paying rent for your seat, affective labor seems a prerequisite at Hobart Elementary, as throughout the film the students cry and cheer in unison in the face of what Esquith calls the “powerful stuff” of literature. This cultish, affective uniformity saturates Rafe Esquith’s classroom throughout The Hobart Shakespeareans. This is made poignantly clear when veteran Shakespeare actor Sir Ian McClellan visits Hobart Elementary; he remarks, “I don’t know why it is that I always want to cry when I’m in this room.” One review of the film stresses this affective dimension: “the students become emotional over the words. Actually emotional!” We also see this connection between Shakespeare’s language and the “heart” in Why Shakespeare? Ben Donenberg, Artistic Director for the LA Shakespeare Festival highlights what he sees as the affective power of Shakespeare’s meter: “Dum-dum. Shakespeare’s telling you or sharing or reflecting the heartbeat of his characters and asking your heart to synch up with theirs; that’s all iambic pentameter is.”

Affective labor infuses every aspect of Esquith’s classroom. Posted prominently in his classroom, Esquith’s twin mottos, pedagogical slogans which sound more like corporate missions, are repeated throughout the film: “There are no shortcuts” and “Be nice. Work hard.” Esquith remarks on his mottos and classroom “culture”:

Once they’re in a culture of excellence, I don’t care what color they are—they do fine. You talk about political correctness—I mean, we actually have classes now like ‘How to teach Latino kids mathematics’ or ‘how to teach Asian children’ and this—you know, two and two is still four. We’re making it so complicated. . . . I don’t care what your background is, you remember those things [Be nice. Work hard], you’re going to do fine.

469 The Hobart Shakespeareans.
471 Why Shakespeare?
472 The Hobart Shakespeareans.
Out of many, and through repression of difference, comes a unified “culture of excellence” achieved through affective labor. Esquith defines this “culture of excellence” as “a culture where people are good to each other, where hard work matters, and character matters even more.” Historically (and histrionically), Shakespeare has been appropriated to play a role in such affective labor, and his plays continue to do so. Michael Bristol points out that “most accounts of the history of Shakespeare’s reception in America presuppose an identification of his work with cultural goodness, wise teaching, and civilization.” In the 19th century, before Freire stigmatized the lecture-based “banking pedagogy” (lectures were considered a “threatening innovation”), embodied performance pedagogies were the norm. Through rote memorization and recitation, the body and character of the student was disciplined, “vile” conditions gentled in the process. Graff tells us that against today’s professionalized (lecture-driven) exegeses, in the 19th century, “great literature was essentially self-interpreting and needed no elaborate interpretation. That is, its ‘spirit’ naturally communicated itself at the mere contact with it.”

Alongside Jacksonian populism and the decline of the American aristocracy came the “reigning conception of literature as a public or civil discourse fit for socializing future citizens.” The declining aristocracy, according to Graff, “felt curiously displaced from rising sources of power and influence” in an increasingly industrialized America. As this displacement increased, college life (an increasingly removed Ivory Tower) became a retreat from the industrial demands required by a new America. The college’s curriculum was “designed to form gentlemanly character rather than to train directly for a vocation.” In Esquith’s classroom, we see the return of this “culture of excellence,” but this “new generation” finds itself within an entirely new economy. However, the behavior and affect—the “gentlemanly character”—which found itself displaced from the industrial economy of the nineteenth century, has found a secure home in the immaterial labor economy of the 21st. It is no wonder, then, that this idea of Shakespeare as both a civilizing and moral force from which “cultural goodness” can be learned returns as a central part of the Bush administration’s No Child Left Behind initiative.

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is a way to refer to the reauthorization, under the Bush Administration, of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). A major component of Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act focuses on a re-birth of “character education.” Of character education, George Bush said the following: “Every child must be taught these principles. Every citizen must uphold them, and every immigrant, by embracing these ideals, makes our country more, not less, American . . . a nation of character.” 1998’s Senate Resolution 176 states, “concerns about the character training of children have taken on a new sense of urgency as violence by and against youth threatens the physical and psychological well-being of the nation.” Bush builds on this “crisis” in his No Child Left Behind Act.

473 Michael Bristol, 1.
474 Gerald Graff, 32.
475 Ibid., 20.
476 Ibid., 42.
477 Ibid., 21.
479 Peter Smagorinsky and Joel Taxel, The Discourse of Character Education: Culture Wars in the Classroom (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005), 139.
Character education tends to resurface during times of moral crisis, times in which the strength of national identity seems to be on the wane; that is to say, it resurfaces constantly.

The history of the idea of “character education” is closely linked to a long history of moral education. Throughout its history it has had many names: from “religious education” to “moral education,” to “civic education” and “service learning.” While the term “character education,” arose largely as a euphemistic secularization of Christian instruction, it can also be tied to attempts in the mid-19th century by protestant schools to incorporate immigrant Catholics.480 In the America of the 1830s, with the expansion of free public schools, character education attempted to reinforce the “values of the home” in these schools; most important was that “the children of others—particularly immigrants—learn and practice them as well.” Of course, we might locate the link between aesthetics and the molding of character at the very origins of Western drama, in Aristotle’s idea that katharsis’ purging of emotion might make the vile gentle.482 We can even hear Plato’s influence in leading conservative educator Thomas Lakona’s slogan for the contemporary character education movement: “Good Character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, and doing the good.”483 Lickona, like Rafe Esquith, argues that “objectively good human qualities . . . . basic human values transcend religious and cultural differences and express our common humanity . . . our common moral ground, what unites us rather than what divides us.”484 Predictably, many object to this desire to efface difference (which occurs, importantly, as invocation of “the human” serves to both “transcend” and “ground” difference). B.E. McClellan writes that “this scheme showed little tolerance for cultural diversity, and there can be no doubt that reformers expected it to play an important role in eliminating the differences that set immigrants off from the mainstream American life.”485 With the rise of psychology and logical positivism, attempts were then made by counter-reformers to ground “transcendent” character. Character drifted into personality, and these new reformers (led by Jean Piaget’s student, Lawrence Kohlberg), worked to adapt “character” to fit within “contextual and processural belief systems.”486 Most recently, feminists critics of Kohlberg’s positivist emphasis on the (usually white male) individual—critics like Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings—have emphasized the value of “the affective,” arguing that “moral emotions and sentiments” stimulate moral action as ‘care’. This (more imminent) strain of character education is rooted in the “philosophical tradition based on feelings and relationships that includes David Hume.”487 This debate, throughout the 20th century, resulted in three general approaches to character education in the US. Robert W. Howard summarizes this division:

481 Ibid., 190.
484 Ibid., n.p.
485 Qt. in Robert W. Howard, et al, 191.
486 Peter Smagorinsky and Joel Taxel, 28.
Traditional character educators who rely on a finite list of virtues may differ in the number included in their lists, but have few doubts that the virtues are universal and on reflection, will supersede the narrow interests of any individual or identity group. The developmentalists have a tradition that emphasizes social justice. They see universality embodied in developmental stages rather than a set of virtues and see resolution through a careful examination of competing claims being judged in terms of rational ethical principles, most notably based on justice. In contrast, the caring approach does not claim universality and questions both traditional character education and developmentalists in their shared liberal tradition. The liberal tradition is seen by proponents of caring as placing too much emphasis on individualism and rationality.\textsuperscript{488}

While President Bush is clearly an advocate of the traditional character education movement, the No Child Left Behind Act reauthorizes and strengthens the Partnerships in Character Education Program (CEP), a more inclusive, umbrella initiative of the Department of Education.\textsuperscript{489} Since reauthorization, the Character Education Program’s funding has “increased from $8 million per year to $25 million.”\textsuperscript{490} Forty states have legislated character education programs, and ten make it mandatory.\textsuperscript{491} Some states even go as far as mandating the “virtues” or “character traits” which are to be taught. For example, Georgia’s education code focuses on the following traits: “courage, patriotism, citizenship . . . punctuality, cleanliness, cheerfulness, school pride, respect for the environment, respect for the creator, patience, creativity, sportsmanship, loyalty, perseverance, and virtue.”\textsuperscript{492} The Character Education Program is guided by eleven principles which are structured to address equally the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions of education.\textsuperscript{493}

Arts education has always aimed at engaging these axes of education: the cognitive, affective and behavioral. These dimensions of the affective labor, implicit in Esquith’s

\textsuperscript{488} Robert W. Howard, et al, 199.
\textsuperscript{489} Bush declared in a campaign speech in Gorham, NH, “For about three decades, many American Schools surrendered this role [where teachers do not “defend the rules”]. Values were ‘clarified’, not taught. Students were given moral puzzles, not moral guidance.” Qt. in Peter Smagorinsky and Joel Taxel, 129.
\textsuperscript{491} Character Education Partnership, “Character Education Quantified,” http://www.character.org/ site/c.gwKUJhNYJrF/.
b.1049045/k.183F/Character_Education_Quantified.htm.
\textsuperscript{493} Paul J. Dovre’s “From Aristotle to Angelou: Best Practices in Character Education,” in Education Next, (Spring, 2007), 40. See also Glanzer and Milson, where they define the recent character education movement, authored largely by conservative Thomas Lickona, as “a comprehensive approach to character education in that it emphasizes the cognitive, the affective, and the behavioral domains of education.”
classroom in *The Hobart Shakespeareans*, are explicitly formulated in *Why Shakespeare?* when Gioia points out that “art educates our emotions, our physical body, our senses and our imagination.” The institutional citation of this pedagogical rhetoric by the National Endowment for the Arts, the Department of Education, and the Bush administration—all forces which come to bear on these films—aims to securely and permanently interpellate students into a particular, unified, and traditional set of affective and behavioral standards—standards defined as American.

While this institutional appropriation of both Shakespeare and the affective force of performance may seem repressive, Hardt and Negri remind us that behind biopower’s repressive tendency lies the immanent possibility of biopolitical production. As with the Americanization of Shakespeare, as soon as these institutional patriarchs—Lickona, Bush, Gioia or Esquith—cross their fingers and hope students reproduce a repetition of unified Sameness, they also necessarily open up possibilities for differential repetitions. The potential always exists for what Hardt and Negri call the “multitude,” the practice of singularities acting (but not being) in common. When students act in common without the (transcendental or fundamental) mandate that they be identical, we allow the space of the classroom to be transformed by the student experiences which had earlier exceeded the teacher’s interpellative call; this excess is the quality of the multitude. Hardt and Negri define the multitude as “an irreducible multiplicity” in which “the singular social differences that constitute [it] can never be flattened into sameness, unity, identity, or indifference.” We might imagine a classroom in which difference is expressed and not sublated into unity, or a nation whose motto is *Pluribus* without *Unum*. Who knows? A new Shakespeare may even play a part and/or come as a result of this change, one we might more accurately call “Shakespeare for a new generation.”

When we look at the affective labor in Esquith’s classroom, we must remember that affective relations work both ways. The affective labor to which the actor submits is reciprocated by the affective labor of spectatorship. Remember: it was the little boy raised in a non-English speaking home who made the chairman of the NEA weep, and although everyone in the capital was weeping, we cannot assume that their weeping is identical. Although they act in common, I like to imagine that Gioia weeps because he “freshly remembers” a different and singular Shakespeare, maybe the one taught to him by his mother.

We should also consider the possibility that the affective bonds created through acting in common in performance—in Esquith’s class or through the NEA’s many sponsored activities—maintain the capacity to work horizontally, forging new social bonds and alternative subjectivities. Maybe *Shakespeare in a New Generation* functions horizontally as much as vertically. 19th century American academe imagined Shakespeare’s texts as the site of cultural goodness that might be transmitted (“like an angel”) by students’ “consideration.” The NEA might imagine that their films have a similar transformative power. But the multimedia kit sent to classrooms across America do not, through consideration, gentle students’ vile condition, interpellating them within an American, patriarchal history of Shakespearing; instead, the filmed behaviors of students performing Shakespeare elsewhere give students viewing these films a sense of acting-in-common with others of their generation. Against Esquith’s request that

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494 *Why Shakespeare?*
496 Jacques Rancière makes a similar claim our misconception of film and pedagogy’s power to transmit cultural values across the ostensible gap separating spectator and spectacle, student and
students “forget about all the crap you do on video games” and his demand that students “kill [their] television,” these teaching docudramas forge horizontal connections between students. In Why Shakespeare?, an unnamed student remarks that she enjoys “just becoming involved with different type[s] of people and their beliefs. . . . this has helped me think of different ways.” Another student tells us that she benefited from the opportunity to “be someone who is not me.”

Affective bonds cultivated and acted out between students of this “new generation” allow for the Shakespearing of a New Generation. Hardt and Negri, in their newest book, Commonwealth, stress the power of an affective labor which—rather than creating happy workers for employers or emotionally receptive students for evangelical teachers—holds the democratic, horizontal production of the common as its end. They write that “Solidarity, care for others, creating community, and cooperating in common projects [are for the poor] an essential survival mechanism” and that “love is a process of the production of the common and the production of subjectivity. This process is not merely a means to producing material goods and other necessities but also in itself an end.”497 For these reasons, my conclusion will explore student relations to bibliographic, computational and theatrical technologies, focusing on how these material technologies foster immanent relations between students, their labor and their love.

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Geek Chic Shakespeare:
The Bookworm, the Computer Nerd, and the Drama Queen

Love goes toward love as schoolboys to their books,
But love from love, towards school with heavy looks.

--Romeo, RJ 2.2.156-7

You kiss by th’book.

--Juliet, RJ 1.5.109
This “post-script” aims to conclude my project by rethinking our relation to learning technologies in an era after the dominance of the “script.” I also here advance a digital performance pedagogy that might correspond to this “post-script” era. In order to do this, I want to look at a few of the tropes we use to understand student affectivity in relation to various technologies. The tropes I want to look at—the “bookworm,” the “computer nerd,” and the “drama queen”—directly correspond to the media (books, new media, and theatre) and the disciplines (literary, film, and performance studies) I have been concerned with throughout this dissertation. I want to interrogate the historical formation of these tropes in order to help us create a productive, relevant, and interdisciplinary pedagogy for the new millennium. Finally, throughout this post-script, I will attempt to set these multimedia “characters” against notions of “character” advocated by the Bush Administration’s No Child Left Behind Act.

In Chapter Two, we saw how Prospero’s obsession with books was refigured in Greenaway’s film, and how, through new media technologies, Prospero’s bookwormish enervation was transformed into a productive innervation. Chapter Three considered innervation while examining how The Wooster Group’s “computer nerds” harnessed the Final Cut Pro and Isadora in order to invent new stage technologies, all of which allowed for the production of new “drama queens.” But what constitutes a bookworm, a computer nerd or a drama queen? How have these characters changed over time? The previous two chapters looked at pedagogical attempts to examine “character” by erasing the “difference” between early modern and the “postmodern.” I showed how, when our schools too strongly assert these equivalencies, they also collapse the thick duration of history, leading our students to believe that their world and its characters have not changed much since the plays were first performed. Timothy Hampton notes that the problem with early modern dramas is that “they present themselves to us as accessible. They stage emotional crises—‘psychological’ crises, if you will—that seem familiar and current. Yet these dramas constantly draw upon understandings of how the body works that are radically alien and barely comprehensible to modern readers.”

Is there a way to make Shakespeare relevant without reinforcing in our students’ minds what W.B. Worthen calls “the more traditional, romantic views of the universal, transhistorical application of Shakespeare’s ‘characters’ to human experience”? Remember, this was the methodology of Bush’s character education.

I would like to conclude this dissertation by making a final shift in focus. Rather than asking the question “How do we make Shakespeare hip?” as I did in Chapter Four, I would like to take another tack, and ask “Why is academic labor, generally, and the study of Shakespeare in particular so bound up with the unhip?” Why is the study of Shakespeare so often figured as epitom of geekiness? Consider an especially relevant comment by Foucault:

> We need to know why our society considers it so important to show that learning is something sad; maybe it’s because of the number of people who are excluded from it. Imagine what it would be like if people were crazy about learning the way they are about

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sex. They would knock each other over in a rush to get into school. It would be a complete social disaster.  

Foucault implicitly acknowledges three crucial aspects of our problem: first, the sad passions that too often attend learning; second, the possibility that this sadness is somehow associated with learning’s exclusivity—someone or something gets left out; the third moment of Foucault’s formulation suggests that a solution to this problem lies in a possible analogy between learning and an erotics which borders on disastrous social madness.

Foucault’s analogy, which he formulates as an “erotics of learning” reminds me of Romeo’s sad passion upon leaving Juliet when he says, “Love goes toward love as schoolboys from their books, but love from love, toward school with heavy looks” (*RJ* 2.2.156-7). This rhetorical antithesis, where erotic proximity is analogous to scholastic distance in the play of the prepositions “toward” and “from” echoes the antithesis Romeo imagines exists between learning and love. However, Romeo’s forced distinction between loving and learning is continually undercut throughout the play, as when Juliet tells him, “You kiss by the book” (1.5.109). The mutual exclusivity of learning and loving Romeo professes belies the truth that Romeo, in fact, cannot keep the two straight. Romeo’s obsession with his script, as evidenced by his invocation of the metaphysical figures of Petrarchan conceits (those suns, stars and moons) distract him from the material, terrestrial, erotic object which stands before him. Juliet chides him, “O Swear not by the moon, th’inconstant moon, / That monthly changes in her circled orb / Lest that thy love should prove likewise variable” (2.2109-11). But what do we call Romeo’s confusion, when love intersects too much with learning technologies? The answer, I will argue, lies in the figure of the geek.

According to today’s consensus barometer, Wikipedia, “geek” is currently defined as “a person who relates academic subjects to the real world outside of academic studies.” Most academics, however, call this ‘praxis’. According to this definition, we might all hope to be geeks. This presupposition gets confirmed as we read on to find that “persons have been labeled as or chosen to identify as physics geeks, mathematics geeks, engineering geeks, sci-fi geeks, [and here’s my favorite part of the list—we might even mistake it for the MLA conference program:] computer geeks . . . movie and film geeks, comic book geeks, theatre geeks, history geeks, music geeks, art geeks, philosophy geeks, literature geeks, historical reenactment geeks and roleplay geeks.” What I find interesting in this definition are those who have “chosen to identify” as geeks. What was once a pejorative marker of difference has come to signify an affectionate difference. It brings to mind other such once-pejorative racial and sexual terms that are now being lovingly employed in acts of self-identification.

Clearly, the meaning and use of the term “geek” is caught up in an historical, political and social struggle. Unlike the *Wikipedia* entry, the *OED* defines “geek” quite differently as “An overly diligent, unsociable student.” We learn that the word’s etymology is rooted in the

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Foucault speculated that if learning is sad that “maybe it’s because of the number of people who are excluded from it.” It seems that today’s classrooms now must come to terms with two forms of exclusion. Those traditionally marginalized and excluded from school—the hip, those proverbially ‘too cool for school’—represent one kind of exclusion. We should not forget, here, how this ‘hip’ student has been historically figured in terms of class and race (as poor and non-white). However, as Chapter Five discussed, with character education’s increasing emphasis on immaterial affective, social products of educational labor, we find another group excluded: the geeks, a group traditionally figured as hyperwhite and less than male.\footnote{For more on the gendering and racializing of the ‘nerd’, see below, Benjamin Nuggent, \textit{American Nerd: The Story of My People} (New York: Scribner, 2008), 73-95, and Lori Kendell, “‘White and Nerdy’: Computers, Race and the Nerd Stereotype,” Available through the University of Illinois’ Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship (IDEALS). http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/1792.}

This double exclusion (of both the hip and the geeky) constitutes the sadness of today’s classroom.

It seems to me that Foucault’s concern with academic labor’s relation to love is one he shares with the discourse of \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost}. What we saw sketched out in Romeo’s relation to love and books gets extensively worked out through the “notorious geck[s] and gull[s]” of \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost}—the two plays were written and performed, we imagine, at roughly the same time (\textit{TN} 5.1.342). In both \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost} and Foucault’s disquisition, something seems excluded or “lost” at the frontier between labor and love, either through their mad commingling, or through their radical separation. In an effort to reconcile today’s ‘geeks’, whose labor and love too closely coincide, with students who are proverbially ‘too cool for school’, I’d like to turn, now, to the “figures pedantical” of \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost}, the play most directly concerned with the problem of the “learned fool” (5.2.408, 5.2.72).\footnote{William Shakespeare, \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost} (Arden Shakespeare, Third Series), ed. H.R. Woudhuysen (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1998). All citations of \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost} refer to this edition unless otherwise stated.} In taking up these early modern figurations of labor and love, I want to examine how these seemingly-static characters move unevenly through history, from renaissance humanism and into the ostensibly post-human humanities. How does the character of the “learned fool” arise from material technologies, producing different figurations of the geek throughout history, and what role might a Shakespearean performance pedagogy play in winning back love’s labors?

**Navarre’s “Book-Men”: Early Modern Emotional Technology**

What is a bookworm? How is this student body figured? Like a worm, the body of the book geek is hunched, bent, deformed, disengaged with the social, inward. We “curl up with” a book. The bookworm is both literal and figurative, but interestingly, the figurative (geeky) use is documented before the literal (entomological) use. The \textit{OED} defines a “book-worm” as “one
who gets his chief sustenance out of books” and cites the first occurrence of the word, interestingly, in a play, not a book.\(^{505}\) In Ben Jonson’s *Cynthia’s Revels* (1600), part of the famous *poetomachia*, the character Crites is bullied and called “a whore-sonne booke-worme, a candle-waster” (CR 3.2.2-3).\(^{506}\) This difficult interdisciplinary dialogue initiates a form of bullying which ‘sets the stage’ for today’s text-performance debates.

These debates take center stage in *Love’s Labour’s Lost*. In this play, King Navarre convinces his court (composed of the Lords Berowne, Longaville, and Dumaine, along with Don Adriano de Armado, a visiting Spanish courtier, Holofernes, a pedant, and Sir Nathaniel, a curate) to promise to engage in exclusive study. Their task will be to spend their days and nights in academic *labor* and to avoid the threat of erotic *love* represented by women. This conflict of love and labor comes to a head when the Princess of France and her court (Ladies Rosaline, Maria, and Katherine and their attendant, Lord Boyet) arrive to settle an ancient land dispute.

In act one of *Love’s Labour’s Lost*, the King of Navarre and his “book-men” gather to “subscribe to [their] deep oaths” to study and wage “war against [their] own affections” for three years (2.1.26; 1.1.23; 1.1.9). Learning begins with this *exclusion*. They have already sworn orally, but the King requires that their oath-taking be documented. However, the sophistic and sensualist Berowne questions the efficacy of the King’s “little academe” (1.1.13). Berowne attempts to “reason against reading,” characterizing the futility of the Academy thus:

> Why, all delights are vain, but that most vain  
> Which, with pain purchased, doth inherit pain:  
> As painfully to pore upon a book  
> To seek the light of truth, while truth the while  
> Doth falsely blind the eyesight of his look.  
> Light seeking light doth light of light beguile. (1.1.72-77)

Neal L. Goldstein and others have argued convincingly that *Love’s Labour’s Lost* performs a cogent expression and a satirical critique of renaissance humanism’s Neoplatonic academies—with their attendant desire to yoke the passions to the rule of reason.\(^{507}\) In the above lines, Berowne highlights the physical pain and strain reading causes the body, pain that leads to blindness rather than enlightenment; Berowne’s chiasmatic repetitio (“light seeking light doth light of light beguile”) deflates the King’s metaphysical aims by doubling the light of the Platonic assent and relocating it within the materiality of early modern physiologies of vision. Against Navarre’s edict to transcend “the army of the world’s desire,” Berowne, throughout the play, voices a desire to connect productive labor with sensual or erotic—rather than ideal, Platonic—*love*.

As satire, *Love’s Labour’s Lost* seems intent on bringing Navarre’s geeks down to earth. Similarly, this dissertation has been invested in a tradition of “immanent” critique that seeks to level the Neoplatonist’s “transcendental” relation between metaphysics and epistemology. This

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\(^{507}\) Neal L. Goldstein, “*Love’s Labour’s Lost* and the Renaissance Vision of Love,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 25:3 (Summer, 1974), 335-350; See also Ronald Berman, “Shakespearean Comedy and the Uses of Reason,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* LXIII (1964), 1-2.
tradition begins with the sophists, and continues through Spinoza, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze. It is this tradition—with its emphasis on the materiality of affects, humors, and behavior, that Gail Kern Paster refers to when she argues that “early modern bodies have an affective immanence and lability supported rather than contradicted by humoral theory . . . It is the immanence of the passions, the power of the passions, that early modern binaries seem intended to counter in the quest for self-sameness—the manly constancy—so prized by humanist thought.”

Love’s Labour’s Lost registers the tenacity of such an “affective immanence” by enacting the futility of its negation.

Something gets lost when love’s labor escapes the material world and gets channeled towards the metaphysical. In thinking again about Foucault’s observation that the sadness attending learning forecloses the possibility of social erotics, we might turn to Deleuze, who gives us insight into the student’s sadness as he examines Spinoza’s treatment of the sad passions. Deleuze describes the conditions of possibility for the man of sad passions saying, “This is possible because the sad passion is a complex which joins desire’s boundlessness to the mind’s confusion, cupidity to superstition.”

For Deleuze, the man of sad passions prefigures Nietzsche’s man of ressentiment, the physically weak man who is unable or “denied the chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of beasts of prey.” Like the man of ressentiment, the man of sad passion mourns the loss of a metaphysical plane upon which he might properly enact his love or revenge. But even as he mourns the loss of metaphysics, this transcendental plane receives the whole of libidinal investments. By prioritizing the transcendental, superstitious life to come, the man of ressentiment attempts to negate the body’s humors and their interaction with the passions. Armado senses the futility of this negation when he says, “If drawing my sword against the humor of affection would deliver me from the reprobate thought of it, I would take desire prisoner” (1.2.58). Berowne too acknowledges the desire to be “love’s whip, / A very beadle to a humorous sigh, / A critic, nay, a night-watch constable, / A domineering pedant o’er the boy” (3.1.170–2). This ascetic idealism, this desire to suppress Cupidity with pedantry, what we might appropriately call the nihilism of the nerd, comes as a result of an erotic investment in metaphysics at the expense of the material world: again, superstition meets cupidity.

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In the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Spitzweg, like Shakespeare before him, satirically represented the bookworm in his painting *The Bookworm*. Here we have the image of the hermetic, paper universe of the disheveled bookworm. The myopic bibliophile, now in the 19th century, is a Cartesian brain in a jar with no need for nor consciousness of his body. His shortsightedness, as he holds an open tome just inches from his face belies the fact that his mind is “somewhere else” or “in another world.” We might note the section of the library in which Spitzweg’s bookworm lives: Metaphysics. Here again we have Deleuze’s formulation: superstition is wedded to a “boundless” yet deformed and misdirected cupidity. The bookworm, today, continues to hold these resonances. Bespectacled, disengaged and secluded in an ivory tower with his or her “head in the clouds,” the bookworm is all theory and no practice.

Throughout *Love’s Labour’s Lost*, the material technology of the book is sought by the book-men as a means to metaphysical ends; however, we see these same technologies constantly threaten to foreclose the possibility of their desired end—the end of transcendence and emancipation from affection for the sake of dispassionate knowledge. We learn from Adrian Johns, in *The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making*, that early modern book learning was not yet conceived of separately from manual labor and “hands-on” learning: “Human beings perceived letters on a page through the mediation of their bodies; the passions were emotional, physiological, and moral responses of the human body to its surroundings, and thus played an
The idea of ingesting and digesting bibliographic technologies, within the discourse of early modern physiology, was no mere metaphor. Paster makes clear that “for the early moderns, emotions flood the body not metaphorically but literally, as the humors course through the bloodstream carrying choler, melancholy, blood and phlegm.”\textsuperscript{512} Neoplatonism’s fantasy of emancipation relied upon a combination of habituation and representation. In order to avoid affective contagion, the body had to be habituated to open the understanding to representations of passions without letting actual passions control the imagination. Johns notes, “Reading itself depended upon a habituated passion. . . . regarded as essential for English gentlemen. Without effective control of the passions, human beings remained slaves to their own corporeality, denied the freedom of action definitive of the gentle state” (we might, here, remember the 19\textsuperscript{th} century gentlemanly education discussed in Chapter Five).\textsuperscript{513} An 1870 letter to the editor of The Phrenological Journal and Science of Health might serve to show how the humoral theory of the early modern bookworm adapted itself alongside the post-Cartesian phrenology of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century:

As I am a poor boy and a close student, and expect to be a bookworm the rest of my days, tell me if one whose temperaments are very nearly equal the lymphatic and bilious about five, while sanguine and nervous are four, can study from sixteen to eighteen hours a day without injuring himself? If you think it will cut off my existence, please tell me, for the sake of frail humanity. I am temperate in eating, use no tobacco, and drink nothing stronger than water.\textsuperscript{514}

The editor responds that this intense study violates “the laws of physiology,” and that if the solicitor might cut down on his study time, he might “become altogether more of a man in all respects.”\textsuperscript{515}

The early modern imagination recognized the rarity—if not impossibility—of a “man / That is not passion’s slave” (Ham. 3.2.71-2); pre-Cartesian humoral theory frames subservience to one’s corporality as inevitable. But this corporality is also figured as being informed and infected by a character’s imbrication within bibliographic technologies. Throughout \textit{LLL}, we see manuscript and printing technologies “imprinting” the hybrid book-men. Boyet, reading King Navarre’s “face’s own margin” comments to the Princess that Navarre is “affected,” his heart “with [her] print impressed” (2.1.235). The clown, Costard, comically responds to Berowne that he will serve as his page: “I will do it, sir, in print” (3.1.167). Moth—whose name sounds like the French ‘\textit{mot}’ and who literally serves as Armado’s “page”—comments that Holofernes and Nathaniel have “been at a great feast of languages and stolen the scraps.” Constable Dull responds brightly, saying “I marvel that thy master hath not eaten thee for a word” (5.1.35-39). Dull, Nathaniel tells us, “hath never fed on the dainties that are bred in a book. He hath not ate paper, as it were; he hath not drunk ink” which makes him “only an animal, only sensible in the

\textsuperscript{512} Gail Kern Paster, 14.
\textsuperscript{513} Adrian Johns, 405-6.
\textsuperscript{514} “Bookworm,” \textit{The Phrenological Journal and Science of Health} (Nov. 1870), 364.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid., 364.
duller parts” (4.2.24-7). Dull’s name, character and sensibility are constituted by his exclusion from bibliographic technology.

Nathaniel frames the dangers of bibliographic technology in binary terms (inclusion/exclusion), but Johns highlights the way in which the subject matter contained in books was also understood to have a variety of material effects on the body: mathematics could focus the imagination, while romances threatened blindness, derangement, or even death.\footnote{Adrian Johns, 381-3; See also Richard Darnton’s “History of Reading,” New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Second Edition, ed. Peter Burke (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001): 157-187.} He points out that Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy “endorsed the reading of learned books, not that of romances, to counter melancholy.”\footnote{Adrian Johns, 381} Witness the romantic Armado’s fear that his melancholy love for Jacquenetta will reduce him to the book: “I am sure I shall turn sonnet. Devise, wit; write, pen; for I am for whole volumes in folio” (1.2.175-77). The phrase “turn sonnet” is generally understood to mean that Armado will “turn a sonnet” as one “turns a phrase.” However, H.H. Furness remarks “Armado does not here mean, I think, that he will compose sonnets, but that, so permeated, so saturated, is he with love that he will become the abstract sonnet.”\footnote{Horace Howard Furness, A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare: Love’s Labour’s Lost, Second Edition (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1906): 56.} Debates on the significance of this line suffer from a refusal to accept how this ambivalence (between authoring and being) would not have existed in the same way within early modern notions of reading. Within early modern discourses of “affective immanence” the phrase “turn sonnet” registers the way in which by producing writing, one becomes writing. One who reads, in this way, takes on the character of “a reader.”

What we must remember, here, is that these characters are always already “whole volumes in folio.” They are dramatis personae. It is only by engaging Shakespeare’s paper corpus with acting bodies—within contemporary regimes of somatic, affective behavior—that we can produce character as an effect of performance. Many critics have argued that Love’s Labour’s Lost has no characters. Coleridge famously remarked that the play’s “dramatis personae were only embryos of characters.”\footnote{Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “From Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare and Other English Poets,” in Love’s Labour’s Lost: Critical Essays, ed. Felicia Hardison Londré (New York: Routledge, 2001): 56; Also worth noting is Miriam Gilbert’s comment that critics perhaps find “the characters so intoxicated with language that they seem merely witty speakers rather than characters worth exploring.” In Shakespeare in Performance: Love’s Labour’s Lost (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993): 3.} I would argue that the characters, rather, are a particular type of character that, like today’s geeks, do not fully emerge from their relations with learning technologies. As a result, these “characters” have since become illegible according to the logic of the autonomous, post-Cartesian “proprietary body.”\footnote{Katherine Rowe, “Humoral Knowledge and Humoral Cognition in Davenant’s Macbeth,” in Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion, 174.} There is perhaps no play that better resists character so efficiently, making clear to its readers that “character” does not exist in some metaphysical elsewhere beyond or beneath the text, but instead comes to life as an effect of performance.
“Computer Nerds”: Twenty-first Century Scantronic Characters

In its much shorter history, the computer nerd has been figured differently. Like the bookworm, the computer nerd is isolated, but he is also paradoxically “connected.” I say “he” because the computer nerd is most often gendered in this way. Lori Kendell, a leading scholar of “geek studies,” writes of “nerd masculinity,” that the “nerd stereotype includes aspects of both hypermasculinity (intellect, rejection of sartorial display, lack of ‘feminine’ social and relational skills) and feminization (lack of sports ability, small body size, lack of sexual relationships with women).” This gendering is quickly changing if not disappearing altogether. The OED defines computer nerd as “a person who pursues and (obsessive) interest in, or is extremely knowledgeable about, computers and is often regarded as lacking other interests or knowledge, boringly studious [or] socially inept.” Again we encounter social ineptitude. The OED also registers a semantic shift in the usage of “Computer Nerd.” First, before the dot.com bubble, as early as 1983, the OED cites an editorial in the Los Angeles Times investigating the nature of the “computer nerd.” The article looks at a popular book titled The Official Silicone Valley Guy Handbook. The cover of this book shows us the early 80s figure of the computer geek. A caption reads “Hey pleasure unit! Punch my code” and “A Total Guide to Digit Heads: How to Maintain, Program and Interface with Silicon Valley Guys.” The “computer nerd” is simultaneously figured here as both a cyborg and as a human with a misplaced erotic desire for technology. Like Jonson’s theatrical character commenting on book-worms, here we have a book poking fun at computer geeks. A semantic shift in the term occurs when we begin seeing articles with titles like “computers are no longer just for geeks.” This shift registers the desire to retroactively construct a memory of the computer geek as “other” in order to appeal to tech-curious or newly plugged in consumers within an emerging web-based marketplace. It’s interesting to note that the movement to bring technology into schools occurs alongside the growth of this emerging marketplace.

This shift notwithstanding, the computer geek continues to be figured along the lines of the bookworm: disconnected socially and yet always connected to an “elsewhere.” Another crucial aspect in the figuration of the computer geek involves a particular kind of neurasthenia. The bookworm is often figured as effete or devitalized—even emasculated—but the bookworm’s neurasthenia seems to come from a heightened sensitivity to the social. The computer nerd’s neurasthenia, however, is more closely associated with “repetitive stress injuries” and the desensitizing shock effects of technology. Within the last few years, we have begun to hear stories of computer nerd death. In Korea, which boasts the highest percentage of “plugged in” citizens in the world (around 90%), the government has built a network of 140 Internet-addiction

524 For more information on the figuration of the computer nerd as a ‘cyborg’ in the sense Donna Haraway gives the term, see Lori Kendell, “Nerd Nation: Images of Nerds in US Poplar Culture,” 263.
counseling centers.” “Internet addiction,” is a disorder acknowledged as early as 1996 in the journal *Cyberpsychology and Behavior*. We might speculate that above and beyond death, the real fear surrounding cyber neurasthenia stems from the fear of dehumanization, the fear of becoming, affectively, if not physically, like a computer.

Berowne’s climactic monologue in Act Four invokes a similar fear of neurasthenia. In this speech, Berowne allows the courtiers to change sides in the battle against affection; they become instead “affection’s men-at-arms” (4.3.286). Berowne highlights book learning’s narrow exclusivity and stresses how learning which comes from elsewhere—in this case from the body of the beloved—impresses and enlivens a character’s manifold sensuality. Berowne disdains how the temporality of reading and “other slow arts entirely keep the brain” (4.3.298). Instead, he advocates a love of the most sensuous kind, which “lives not immured in the brain, / But with the motion of all the elements / Courses swift as thought in every power” (4.3.302-4). This learning—one that connects the body to its environment—makes no distinction between the “motion” of the elements and the “emotions” of the body. This learning enlivens rather than enervates the body, making its students’ sensory apparatuses “more soft and sensible / Than are the tender horns of cockled snails” (4.3.311-2). Berowne’s erotic pedagogy, with its focus on quickened duration, change, and sense, produces a tongue that “proves dainty Bacchus gross in taste” (4.3.313).

Berowne’s speech, and its shift from mind and soul to body, engages in what Goldstein has called *LLL*’s “mockery of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of the senses.” Here, Berowne anticipates 21st century discourses on educational reform, specifically those critiquing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001’s exclusive focus on standardized testing. NCLB requires states to set grade objectives, tests students, and then sanctions underperforming schools. The National Education Association has successfully introduced the idea of “teaching to the test” into the American vernacular, taping into educators and parents’ oft-articulated fear that testing technologies are sapping our students’ character. Early modern psychophysiology teaches us that, much as Armado the bookworm risked “turning sonnet,” our test-taking computer nerds risk “turning computerized test.”

Scantron, the company dominating 80% of the standardized testing market describes itself as the “company [best] known for defining the market for the rapid, accurate and reliable capture of student performance data.” These technologies not only “capture” student performance; they circumscribe the exclusive conditions within which student performances can be legibly produced. Foucault clearly articulates the way examination technologies historically produce character. He describes how examination technologies participate in “turning real lives into writing” for purposes of classification, training, correction, exclusion and normalization.

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528 For more on the relation between “motion” and “emotion,” see Gail Kern Paster’s “Introduction: Reading the Early Modern Passions,” in *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, 1-20.
529 Neal L. Goldstein, 340.
530 See the Scantron website: www.scantron.com/solutions.
And while this normalization “functions as a procedure of objectification,” it also functions as “subjection.” While these technologies repress, censor, and exclude, they also—in more positive terms—produce what we call ‘character’. What kind of characters are today’s schools producing? Benjamin Nuggent, in his compelling cultural history, *American Nerd: The Story of My People*, comments on the social backlash against the ostensible dehumanization of the humanities following the rise of computing machines in the 19th century:

> [R]eason is no longer quintessentially human; spontaneity is. People more inclined towards logical deliberation than spontaneous expression have started to become somehow less than totally human, falling into a state of alienation from the rest of humanity, dragged into the orbit of the machine and the rational, unable to convince the rest of us to consider their emotional lives seriously.

The visibility of this antagonism, according to Nuggent, has increased the legibility of Asperger’s Syndrome, ADD, ADHD and other affective “disorders.” In recognition and support of difference in student populations and learning styles, the National Education Association and affiliate organizations have begun protesting the Scantronification of the student body; like Berowne, they are calling for “multiple measures” of assessment. A 2007 open letter addressed to the US House and Senate education committees—with 117 signatories composed of leading education scholars such as Linda Darling-Hammond, Michael Apple and Pedro Noguera—insists: “Using multiple measures of performance assessments will provide for a focus on higher-order thinking skills and the application of these skills in ways that will prove critical as our children take their place as citizens in our knowledge economy.”

Increasingly, bipartisan efforts have been made to address what critics have cited as NCLB’s mechanized devaluation of achievement in the arts and physical education. As we saw in Chapter Five, NCLB seeks to remedy these shortcomings through a supplemental emphasis on character education. So while NCLB’s larger testing regime focuses on documenting the progress of students on paper, the Character Education Program is expected to mould the bodies and characters of students. NCLB purports to address this psychosomatic national “crisis,” but we might also want to look at the ways in which it simultaneously feeds the beast it attempts to tame.

We might note the ways in which performance and technology are figured as both the problem and solution to America’s economic and psychosomatic well-being, what we might call that future state of “the student body.” The future of the No Child Left Behind Act, scheduled for renewal in 2010, will be decided by the next administration, and at the time of this writing, Obama and McCain have already begun hinting at possible changes. One recent intervention

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532 Ibid., 194.
533 Benjamin Nuggent, 53.
occurred in August of 2008, when four major education groups joined in an effort to replace NCLB with what they are calling “One Giant Leap for Kids.” In their Public Service Announcement, the campaign called on each candidate to “make K-12 student access to education technology and modern learning environments a top national priority” arguing that “today’s students and teachers need more than a sprinkling of technology literacy to thrive. They need to learn to leverage 21st Century tools to think critically and creatively, collaborate across cultures and distances, and innovate.”

So while NCLB focuses on documenting the progress of students on paper, character education is expected to mould the bodies and characters of students. But what One Giant Leap for Kids seems to be asking is how technology figures into student labor. Both Obama and McCain have expressed a desire to leverage technology in order to test multiple types of learning, but how might technology integrate students and bridge the gap between the cognitive and the affective?

Enter Don Adriano de Armado, Drama Queen

If the bookworm and the computer nerd are marked by an absence of affective dexterity, the drama geek is marked by affective excess. If the bookworm sits alone, rapt in the world of metaphysics, and if the computer nerd is a fixed node in a virtual network, the drama queen is all too “present,” all too embodied and flamboyantly mobile. The move from “geek” to “queen” also genders the drama fanatic, forcing the figure of the drama queen to participate at once in discourses which have historically feminized the drama’s artifice as well as queer discourses which aim to interrogate the exclusivity of feminine sovereignty.

The idea of the “drama queen” figures prominently in the popular culture of the early 1920s, first appearing in a Washington Post editorial advocating male solitude and mourning the loss of a separate, masculinized space, “a room of his own,” within the feminized domestic sphere of the household. The author warns that if the man “is thwarted in his effort to enjoy [male hobbies] he may either go to the dogs or the drama queens, become short-tempered, sullen, grouchy, and eventually feel in a way that he is a failure.” So even early on the term “drama queen” was employed to hint at the dangers of an infectious feminized and hyper-socialized affectivity. An article in the Journal of Homosexuality explains the contemporary associations surrounding the “drama queen” in San Francisco’s Castro District:

Drama, although it is dispersed like gossip by word of mouth, is also performed before audiences. Dramatic behaviors and interactions, dramatic narratives, dramatic performances, and the role of the “drama queen” are all informed by an aesthetic that reflects conventions as to what comprises a dramatic event. The essential feature of a dramatic event is that it entails conflict, typically with one person becoming angry and attacking another person in some way. Any arena in which there are rules of conduct that

537 Wright, Richardson, “Father is Placated by Having Room to Pursue His Hobbies: Editor Says Head of Family Likes Solitude on Certain Occasions.” The Washington Post, (Dec 10, 1923): n.p.
can be broken has a potential for drama. “Drama queens” have a flair for becoming embroiled in conflict and generating dramatic events. But the “drama queen’s” skill goes beyond behavior. The “drama queen” is also a consummate storyteller who knows how to construct and perform dramatic narratives.\textsuperscript{538}

In \textit{Love’s Labour’s Lost}, Don Adriano de Armado takes on this role. Armado, described in the play as the “braggart,” provides the court with “recreation,” and Navarre claims he will “use him for [his] minstrelsy” (1.1.159, 174). He is the first to break the vow of chastity, and his relationship “drama” is the first to enter Navarre. It is also worth observing that critics have long noted how Armado’s “homosexuality is strongly suggested.”\textsuperscript{539} Armado is described before we see him as one ravished by “the music of his own vain tongue” (1.1.164). It is Armado whom the King charges with organizing the \textit{LLL} ’s final play within a play—the Pageant of the Nine Worthies—what Armado calls “some delightful ostentation, or show, or pageant, or antic, or firework” (5.1.104-5). Armado’s love for theatrical ostentation is doubled by his fondness for pedantic pleonasm. While Armado is the first to get lost in the “Taffeta phrases, silken terms precise, / Three-piled hyperboles, spruce affection” and “figures pedantical,” he will not be the last (5.2.406-409). As with the rest of the court’s engagement with bibliographic technologies, Armado’s enmeshment in sonnets and theatrical technologies can only be remedied, ironically, by twelve months of labor and a stripping down of all ostentation. They will endure the “austere insociable life” full of “frosts and fasts, hard lodging and thin weeds” (5.2.793,5).

The use of the term “drama queen” was also employed in the early 20s to refer to those women who ruled the theatrical stages of New York. But what’s more interesting is how at the same time this term was also being applied to the melodramatic queens of the screen. Film historian Ben Singer, highlights the ubiquity and popularity of the silent “serial queens” throughout the early 20s. He notes how these heroines, depicted on and off screen performing amazing feats of physical dexterity, helped redefine the way female bodies could potentially maneuver within a newly technologized urban space. Singer notes the historical fluidity of the drama queen’s connection to “melodrama.” He writes that “‘Melodrama’ as it is used today is all but synonymous with a set of sub-genres that remain close to the hearth and emphasize a register of heightened emotionalism and sentimentality: the family melodrama, the maternal melodrama, the woman’s film, the weepie, the soap opera, etc.”\textsuperscript{540} But this was not the understood sense of ‘melodrama’ when audiences went to go see the serial queen melodramas. Singer continues: “the term’s crucial, defining connotation in this period related not to pathos and heightened emotionality but rather to . . . action, thrilling sensationalism and physical violence.”\textsuperscript{541} When we note the “nerves of steel” required to jump from moving car to moving train, we began to sense how “drama queens” like Pearl White and Helen Holmes overcame neurasthenia and redefined the potential of the female body by embracing urban technologies.


\textsuperscript{541} Ibid., 95.
One of Singer’s goals in his piece is to illustrate how these screen queens worked to reconfigure modernity’s relationship to shocking technologies—film in particular—in order to overcome the alienating and devitalizing neurasthenia endemic to urbanization. The serial queens, in Singer’s piece, teach film buff’s how to achieve equilibrium between the body and technology. Benjamin’s notion of innervation plays a pedagogical role here similar to that which we saw it play in Chapters Two and Three. When the distinction between technology and nature, nomos and physis, breaks down, the innervative retooling of perception supported by a training in digital video might constitute a new mode of both production and consumption, performance and reception, one which involves our students in a new kind of praxis that allows their digital selves to be recognized within the paper world of the schoolroom. Today’s students already have their “organs in the new technology,” but many fear that our cyborg students are neurasthenic and character-less computer nerds. How might we remedy this sadness and redirect their erotics back into the material and communal world of the classroom where they can act-in-common with Others? We might call this new student “geek chic.” In order to establish the conditions for the emergence of this student, we must integrate what the drama queen and the screen queen have to offer the computer nerd and the bookworm.

The sad passion that attends the enervating technological interfaces of the bookworm, the computer nerd, or even the math, science, and business geeks seems to match up with alienating structures of the labor sector. The professionalism and specialization that earns cultural capital within the classroom comes at the expense of something social. And if geeks are rewarded in the academic setting, what exactly are we rewarding? What kinds of “student bodies” are excluded from these rewards? I want to end by advancing a pedagogy through which the distinction between the specialized geek and the socially chic might break down. Through such a pedagogy, I hope, we might rid ourselves of the stigma that makes being included in learning as “sad” as being excluded. What would it mean to bridge the geek and the socially chic? Would it mean integrating media? If we think of these media tropes as, in part, staking out disciplinary territories, what would it mean for the academy if we decided to give a little bit of drama to the computer nerd, a little bit of computer science to the drama queen?

Last year, I helped supervise an acting-for-the-camera workshop in the Theater, Dance and Performance Studies Department at Berkeley. First, we set up variations of mise en scene and various camera/microphone setups. Undergraduate Performance Studies student then performed scenes for a number of takes, each time adjusting for the apparatuses and in accordance with advice given by professional screen actress Karen Grassle. The actors then saw the raw footage and discussed their performances. Later, these tapes were edited by a group of graduate students in a film production course. The actors, unfortunately, did not take part in this process. Labor was divided between Film Studies and Performance Studies. Afterwards, the actors were given the final cut as a gift. What if we reimagine this exercise, allowing the actors to edit their own performances? How might this have changed the experience? My hunch is that the students would have learned much more, at the same time that the exercise might have felt more familiar, more relevant, and more connected to their everyday virtual performances. In our students’ contemporary world, performed identities are virtually produced and negotiated everyday, as they construct and edit multimedia profiles on Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, Flickr or Youtube. How might editing their own performances have taught students about the connection between “getting into character” and performing their “own” character?

That this exercise was falsely divided between performers and editors is symptomatic of the false binary that has continually structured the Shakespeare classroom. Teachers assume
there are two options when teaching Shakespeare through performance (and much of the
research affirms this): watch the plays on film or perform scenes for the class (and often this
‘performance’ is nothing more than a recitation). These are no longer our only options. We can
teach our students immanent Shakespearing.

However the tenacity of the linguistic turn (which textualizes both film and theatre)
dangerously convinces us that the subject is linguistic, letting us do away with a particular kind
of embodied, affective praxis. When performative speech acts become the only praxis, and
acting is reduced to recitation, what gets occluded here? What kinds of affective structures do we
end up cultivating in our students?

Movement, sound, affect, image, expressivity and the subtle contours of the body each, in
part, exceed the linguistic. The tendency towards affective labor, which includes a temporal
dexterity that encompasses all these forms, on the one hand, demands recognition of bodily
affect in excess of speech. On the other hand, in the postmodern scene of labor, the corporate
devotion to the linguistic reflects and maintains the undying, academic fascination with the paper
subject. Public relations handbooks dictate what we say without acknowledging how and what
we perform with the majority of our affective apparatuses. In this way, the affective structures
of the body become a contested site with both productive and repressive potential. We see this at
presidential press conferences, when we are all aware of the fact that politicians and corporate
spokespersons say one thing with their words and another with their bodies and faces. Time
after time we see it with celebrities who, apologizing for some racist or sexist faux pas, remind
us of when we were children and our parents used to say, “Now say it like you mean it.” The
ironic space between linguistically saying and affective meaning is an embattled theatre of war.
How might we help our students come to terms with these affective demands of the 21st century?

Using digital video editing software (such as Final Cut Pro, iMovie, or Windows
moviemaker—the last two of which are native to the Mac and Windows operating systems) and
working with text-based performance, such as that offered by Shakespeare, allows students to
Shakespeare—to experiment with the infinite affective permutations of the body that exceed the
register of textual, linguistic repetition (much as we saw Gielgud’s Prospero Shakespearing in
Chapter Two). While the text remains the same, when we make the text do something by
engaging it with bodies and temporality, we have not only become more interdisciplinary, we
have also integrated historical experience into the horizon of the student’s lived experience.

Students, armed with cameras, will return to their neighborhoods to gather footage. The
fourth wall of the classroom is broken when students begin to see one another’s houses, parents,
bedrooms, or dogs. The whole student begins to appear in this footage. This abundance of
footage compiled from multiple takes will force students to choose aspects (facial expressions,
camera angles and setups, props, rhythms, cadences, various lenses and foci) from different
versions of a scene. They can even experiment with different Folio-Quarto arrangements. If we
give them the opportunity, they might come to realize the flexibility and temporal dexterity
inherent in each cardinal shot, how each shot doesn’t simply mean like a text; each shot performs
in relation to texts, bodies, sound, light and software.

Editing digital performance will provide students with a strange mirror within which to
view their own characters. Lacanian Psychoanalytic film theory is well known for seeing film
within the dialectic of the mirror stage, as a site of identification. This often leads to a model of
the subjected subject, which espouses a particular understanding of linguistic and social
interpellation, one that focuses on the repressive, deterministic power the filmic apparatus in
relation to spectatorial lack. A bit more Foucault shows us power’s productive element and
allows us to imagine a social praxis that doesn’t “liberate” the subject or determine the spectator’s mindless submission to a repressive ideology. Instead this pedagogy might show us the ways in which we are constituted (for better or worse) and how we might use all our technologies to act-in-common. The immanent, non-dialectical film and performance theories explored in this dissertation teach students to look at how technological changes, such as Web 2.0 and the democratization and piratezation of software, allow the screen to stop being a mirror. When the mirror literally mirrors the subject—that is, when the actor and editor/spectator are one and the same—the mirror, paradoxically, no longer mirrors. The editor experience is something akin to the strange feeling one has while hearing his or her own voice playback on tape: it is a strange dis-identification. The suturing mechanisms and identificatory structures operative in film and theatre turn on themselves as students begin to dis-identify and see their own “character” as Other; they see the self as a character effect produced through temporalized movement and affective labor. This is not a becoming-conscious (or what Freire calls “conscientização”); instead, this is a becoming Other.

Teaching through digital performance means teaching students about duration, about the temporal quality of forms that exceed the space of the page; it means teaching them skills necessary in the post-script world. Freire gets at this and even cites Bergson in order to stress the temporal aspect of praxis. At one point, he defines praxis as:

[T]hinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved. [He goes on to quote Pierre Furter, who writes] The goal will no longer be to eliminate the risks of temporality by clutching to guaranteed space, but rather to temporalized space . . . The universe is revealed to me not as space, imposing a massive presence to which I can but adapt, but as a scope, a domain which takes place as I act upon it.542

Here, Freire points to the lessons of Chapter One, and how students need to see how space is constituted through temporal (often affective) practices.

Digital Performance pedagogies teach this lesson by denaturalizing and de-nominalizing the “safe metaphysical space” in which we place ideal notions of “character.” This might have been a lesson for the characters in Love’s Labour’s Lost. A digital performance pedagogy might accomplish this by illustrating the “primordial postures” which are constitutive of what we perceive as character. Both performance and digital editing allow for the rehearsing of behavior, gesture, affect images (close-ups), relations with props and temporal movements, all of which produce “character effects.”

In ways analogous to our early modern counterparts, with the rise of affective labor, the labor one performs is becoming increasingly confused with the labor one is—the labor of being—as employers more and more seek to hire knowledgeable and adaptable personalities. Within this increasingly socialized marketplace, where the distinction between product and laborer is slowly eroding, the product schools create is no longer just a worker capable of creating a product; instead, schools are expected to create the social product itself. Now, more than ever, it is incumbent upon us to attend to the relations between bodies, learning technologies, and the affective products they produce.

When Benjamin advocated forgoing the aura and using rather than opposing filmic technologies he gambled with the future; he sacrificed the superstition of the aura for the material and collective powers of filmic technology. He and Sigfried Kracaur called this the “go-for-broke game of the historical process.”[^543] Today we are faced with a similar gamble. Do we give up our superstitions about the authenticity of “affect” and moral character in order to gain a better understanding of how affective character is performed and distributed? If we decide to take this gamble, it means that in addition to talking to one another “across the disciplinary aisle” we also need to start producing things together and acting-in-common. Engaging our selves and our students in multimedia projects that unite digital video with the performance of historical, scripted drama might be a good place to meet, to bring together the bookworm, the computer nerd, the drama queen and the film buff. Our students are already doing this. They are already getting ‘geek chic’.

Performance studies (especially a performance studies concerned with the role of technology in constituting character), while once a marginal discipline, should in this regard take center stage in producing this geek chic pedagogy. Like Berowne, performance studies should explore an ecology of affective enmeshments within “multiple” learning materialities, materials which do not hide Ideal Characters, but rather produce character as an “effect” of our performative engagements. Performance studies has long understood the role of various material technologies in producing character effects. Although the “character” of the geek moves unevenly through history, we can see the contemporary relevance of early modern notions of the permeable, humoral body—how the lover of learning’s character is constituted by relations with material technologies; it is not radically different than the way we now understand the “immanent affectivity” of testing procedures or the disciplined production of affective labor, both of which have become hallmarks of the post-humanist humanities. Whereas early modern bookworms kissed by the book while eating paper and drinking ink, today’s students might learn to modify their somatic behavior to new technologies. Our students are already learning to perform character on stages and social networking sites. The task for Shakespearean pedagogy will be to include these labors of love in the classroom. Only then will we have a “geek chic” pedagogy that weds labor to love without remainder.

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