Abstract

I develop a method to measure and separate the production misallocation caused by failures in factor markets versus financial markets. When I apply the method to rice farming villages in Thailand I find surprisingly little misallocation. Optimal reallocation would increase output in most villages by less than 15 percent. By 2006 most misallocation comes from factor market failures. I derive a decomposition of aggregate growth that accounts for misallocation. Declining misallocation contributes little to growth compared to factor accumulation and rising farm productivity. I use a government credit intervention to test my measures. I confirm that credit causes a statistically significant decrease in only financial market misallocation. (JEL O47, O16, E13)
1 Introduction

Mounting evidence in the study of economic growth suggests that differences in aggregate resources alone may not explain differences in aggregate output. Economists have now asked whether the allocation of aggregate resources can. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, argue India could raise manufacturing output by 40 to 60 percent if it allocated its labor and capital among firms as efficiently as the U.S., and by 100 percent if the allocations were perfect. Yet their study cannot tell where the observed misallocation comes from. Theorists cannot build accurate models and policymakers cannot design useful interventions unless they know which frictions cause misallocation.

I develop a method to measure and separate the misallocation caused by factor and financial market failures, two frictions that set poor countries apart from rich. With perfect markets each firm's optimal allocation depends only on two sets of parameters: its productivity and the common production function. I use a dynamic panel approach to estimate the parameters and calculate the optimal allocation. I define the increase in output from optimal reallocation to be the total misallocation from factor and financial market failures.

To separate the cost of each market's failure I make a crucial assumption: that all inputs may be instantly and costlessly transferred between firms. As long as all inputs are chosen with equal information about productivity, this assumption lets me model the firm as though it chooses all of its inputs at the same time before it receives any output. Then a perfect factor market lets each firm optimally divide its spending between inputs, letting it achieve the perfect mix.

To understand why, consider a firm that chooses how many workers it will
hire and how much machinery it will operate. Even if the credit market is distorted towards one input—if, for example, it is harder to get a loan to hire workers than to buy machines because the bank can seize the machines if the firm defaults—the firm will still choose the optimal mix of capital and labor as long as the factor markets work. This is because machines owned need not be machines operated. The firm can buy the machines but then immediately rent them out to another firm that can use them more productively. The key insight behind my method is that rental markets break the link between the ownership of an asset and its use.

This insight implies that with perfect factor markets the firm can always achieve the perfect mix. By perfecting each firm’s mix of inputs while holding its scale constant, I place a lower bound on the aggregate gains from perfecting factor markets, and by then perfecting scale I place an upper bound on the gains from subsequently perfecting financial markets. The method always identifies misallocation from mix versus scale, but my key contribution is to show that under the assumptions about costless transfers and timing, perfecting the factor markets would perfect each firm’s mix.

Finally, I decompose aggregate output into three components: an aggregate production function, average firm-level productivity, and the efficiency of factor allocations. I calculate the counterfactual path of aggregate output if growth in any component were shut down. The counterfactuals show how output would have grown if factor allocations had not improved. Finally, I decompose aggregate output into three components: an aggregate production function, average firm-level productivity, and the efficiency of factor allocations. I calculate the counterfactual path of aggregate output if growth in any compo-
nent were shut down. The counterfactuals show how output would have grown if factor allocations had not improved.

Like all methods for measuring misallocation, mine makes assumptions about the production environment. I study Thailand’s rice sector because it fits these assumptions better than the manufacturing sectors studied more commonly. Since rice production is relatively uniform I can estimate a common production function and correctly calculate each farmer’s marginal product, minimizing the spurious misallocation caused by a flawed calibration. Other sources of misallocation like monopoly and taxes are rare in rice farming. Most important, my assumption that inputs may be transferred without cost is not unreasonable. Compared to firms in heavy industry, rice farmers can transfer inputs within a village at relatively little cost.

I find surprisingly little misallocation. The overall cost is 15 percent of output in 1996 and falls to 4 percent by 2008. By then most misallocation comes from factor markets rather than financial markets. Decreases in misallocation contributed little to growth in aggregate rice output relative to growth from factor accumulation and rising average productivity.

Like all structural assumptions, those that underpin my method are simplifications. To confirm that these simplifications do not invalidate my method I study the effects of a government credit program. First studied by Kaboski and Townsend (2011), Thailand’s Million Baht Program created exogenous variation across villages in the supply of credit. If my method is valid it should show that the program reduces misallocation, and the effect should be mainly through my measure of financial market misallocation. As expected, credit has a statistically significant but small effect. A one percent increase in credit reduced
misallocation by 0.1 percentage points, nearly all of which comes from a reduction in financial market misallocation.

Economists started measuring misallocation in response to evidence that financial markets in poor countries do not allocate capital efficiently.\(^1\) Communal divisions inefficiently concentrate capital among incumbent garment manufacturers in India (Banerjee and Munshi, 2004); lending arrangements fail to perfectly insure households in Nigeria (Udry, 1994); and entrepreneurs could reap large returns with small capital investments in Sri Lanka (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008).

Until recently, however, few studies tried to quantify the aggregate costs of misallocation, prompting Banerjee and Duflo (2005) to emphasize the question and its implications. Jeong and Townsend (2007) explored the idea with a structural model in which credit constraints prevent households from buying capital and switching sectors. Their model reproduces much of the change in Thailand’s Solow residual even with zero technological progress. With some exceptions (e.g. Benjamin, 1992; Petrin and Sivadasan, 2013), the recent literature has focused mostly on financial markets—markets for credit and insurance—rather than factor markets, where households hire labor and rent land and capital.

By contrast, Hsieh and Klenow’s study (2009) calculates the cost of all misallocation regardless of the source. They build a model of monopolistic competition in which distortions to the price of output and capital cause misallocation between firms. The authors derive the aggregate gains to reallocating factors

\(^1\)In addition to those I cite in the main text, other recent papers on misallocation include Restuccia and Rogerson (2008); Banerjee and Moll (2010); Peters (2011); Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2012); Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2008); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009); Jones (2011); Osotimehin (2011); Alfaro and Chari (2012); Moll (2010); David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2013); Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2014); Sandleris and Wright (2014); Keniston (2011).
within manufacturing industries and plug in production functions calibrated with U.S. data. They give evidence that India and China’s distorted markets explain why these countries have more misallocation than the U.S., though their method does not explicitly link misallocation to its cause. I too compare the actual allocation to optimal allocations, but I show how to link misallocation to factor market versus financial market failures. Midrigan and Xu (2013) approach a question similar to mine with a different method and find a similar answer. Instead of measuring misallocation caused by financial market failures, they calibrate a model of credit-constrained firms and find it cannot predict much of the variation in the marginal product of capital.

To my knowledge this paper is the first to split misallocation into the contributions of factor versus financial markets, and I find factor markets are no less important than financial markets. I also measure misallocation under weaker assumptions than some earlier work. For example, I estimate the production function instead of assuming U.S. parameters apply to Thailand. Finally, compared to papers that calibrate and simulate structural models, I link misallocation to its sources under weaker functional form assumptions about how markets fail. When my assumptions about timing are satisfied the method works under a fairly general set of imperfections.

2 The Method

Models of farm production must deal with the problem of non-separability, meaning the household as a consumer cannot be treated separately from the household as a producer. The constraints and imperfections that cause misallocation also break separability (Singh et al., 1986; Benjamin, 1992). Thus the
household’s optimization is a nearly intractable dynamic problem.

But I show that this dynamic problem need not be solved. Assuming the farmer’s observed choices do solve the problem, I need only derive whatever choices the farmer would have made under perfect factor and financial markets. I show that with perfect markets the dynamic problem collapses to a simple static problem. From this I derive the optimal allocations. Most importantly I show that when my assumptions are met, perfect factor markets eliminate all distortions to the farmer’s mix.

2.1 Environment

In every year $t$ the farmer aims to maximize her discounted lifetime utility from consumption, given a per-period utility function $u$ that depends on a vector $\gamma_i$ that captures her individual preferences (most importantly, risk-aversion). She solves

$$\text{Maximize } \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j u(C_{i,t+j}; \gamma_i)$$

To earn income she uses capital $K$, land $T$, and labor $L$ to produce farm revenue $y$. Her output also depends on Hicks-Neutral productivity, part of which ($A$) she anticipates when choosing factors while the rest ($\phi$) is random and unanticipated. I normalize $\mathbb{E}[\phi] = 1$. Her revenue is

$$y_{it} = A_{it} \phi_{it} K_{it}^{\theta_K} T_{it}^{\theta_T} L_{it}^{\theta_L}$$

Let $X$ be a vector that contains the land, labor, and capital used in production. They may come from her stock of owned factors $X^o$ or those she rents from factor markets $X - X^o$. She may buy factors $I$, and owned factors depre-
ciate at rate $\delta$. The law of motion for owned assets is

$$X_{it}^o = I_{it} + (1 - \delta) \otimes X_{i,t-1}^o$$

where $\otimes$ is the element-wise product. To make the notation simple I assume no
time to build, meaning investment is immediately productive, but all I require
is that as soon as the investment does become productive it can instantly and
costlessly be transferred to a different farmer.

The vector of “owned” factors $X^o$ includes family labor, which I assume ex-
ogenous for notational simplicity (making labor decisions endogenous changes
nothing, as the production outcome depends only only labor employed on the
farm, not labor supplied). I assume family labor and hired labor are perfect sub-
stitutes, though relaxing the assumption does not change the main results (see
Appendix 6.4).

Thus far the problem is entirely standard and leads to an efficient produc-
tion outcome. But now I introduce market imperfections and constraints that
distort the outcome. Farmer $i$ faces a set of rental prices $w$ that may differ from
those others pay. This is the first factor market imperfection. Together with the
assets she buys at prices $p$, her total farm expenditure is

$$z_{it} = w_{it} \cdot (X_{it} - X_{it}^o) + p \cdot I_{it}$$

In every period the farmer must meet her budget constraint. Any farm expend-
diture beyond gross interest on her savings from last year $R^{bb}_{it}$ is borrowed at
gross rate $R^z$ and repaid after the harvest. I allow the interest rate paid to vary
with the amount of land owned, as the bank might offer lower rates to those
who can offer collateral. (It changes nothing to let the farmer offer capital or other assets as collateral.) The constraint is

$$\lambda : \quad c_{it} + b_{it,t+1} = y_{it} - R_{zit}(T_{it}^o)(z_{it} - R_{b_{it}})$$

where $\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier. The gap between the interest rate on borrowing versus savings is the first financial market imperfection. A second imperfection, which is implicit, is that since the farmer lacks perfect insurance her consumption may be correlated with the unanticipated shock $\phi$. The effect on her decisions depends on her risk aversion.

The third financial market imperfection is a flow-of-funds constraint. The farmer must buy and pay rents to all factors before planting. To finance these payments she may borrow beyond her savings, but only up to a limit $\bar{z}$. It too may depend on how much land she owns and may differ across farmers, perhaps because some farmers have more cosigners or rich relatives. Also, some fraction of her purchases of factors $I$ may not count one-for-one towards the constraint because the bank is more willing to finance hard assets it can seize if she defaults. Let the vector $0 < \zeta \leq 1$ capture what fraction of each dollar is discounted for each asset. The constraint is

$$\omega : \quad z_{it} - R_{b_{it}}b_{it} - p \cdot (\zeta \otimes I_{it}) \leq \bar{z}_{it}(T_{it}^o)$$

where $\omega$ is the Lagrange multiplier.

Finally, there may be missing or limited rental markets for land, labor, and capital. For example, if property rights are weak a farmer may refuse to rent out land for fear that the renter will squat. The farmer cannot rent in more factors
than $\overline{X}$ or rent out more factors than $X$. The constraint, together with Lagrange multipliers, is

$$\lambda, \kappa : X_{it} \leq X_{it} - X_{it}^o \leq \overline{X}_{it}$$

The timing is as follows:

1. The farmer learns anticipated productivity $A_{it}$

2. The farmer buys factors $I$ and rents factors $X_{it} - X_{it}^o$, borrowing if necessary. Any purchased assets can immediately be used in production or rented out\(^2\)

3. Uncertainty is resolved and production completed

4. The farmer pays off her loans and makes consumption and savings decisions

This timing effectively assumes there is no cost in time or money to transferring factors between farmers, and all factors are chosen with equal information about productivity.\(^3\)

### 2.2 Perfect Choices and Distortions

The farmer’s optimal choice of capital satisfies

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\(^2\)In fact, all I require is that as soon as the asset is usable it is costless and takes no adjustment period to allow someone else to use it. Clearly building a tractor or a granary takes time, but since my optimal allocations simply move factors between farmers the real assumption is that moving a tractor or renting space in a granary takes little time.

\(^3\)If farmers are risk neutral the information assumption can be relaxed to require equal information about only idiosyncratic productivity.
\[E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}]A_{it}K_{it}^{-(1-\theta_K)}T_{it}^{\theta_T}L_{it}^{\theta_L} - (R_z^{\circ}T_{it})E[\lambda_{it}] + \omega_{it})w_{it}^{K} + \kappa - \kappa = 0\]

Optimal land and labor choices satisfy similar conditions. Note that \(\zeta\), which captures how some assets are easier to collateralize than others, does not appear. This is because buying a tractor and using that tractor are not the same. What matters for her production decision is not the price she paid for the tractor or the ease with which she borrowed funds to buy it. All that matters is the opportunity cost of farming it herself, which is simply the rent \(w_{it}^{K}\) she earns by letting someone else farm it.

Suppose markets are fully perfect. With perfect insurance, the unanticipated shock does not affect the shadow value of consumption \((E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}] = E[\lambda_{it}]E[\phi_{it}]\)). With perfect credit markets, farmers pay the same borrowing rate \((R_z^{\circ}T_{it} = R_z^{\circ})\) and the liquidity constraint does not bind \((\omega_{it} = 0)\). With perfect factor markets, farmers pay the same rental prices \((w_{it}^{K} = w_{t}^{K})\) and factor market constraints do not bind \((\kappa_{it} = \kappa_{it} = 0)\). Then

\[
\theta_K A_{it}K_{it}^{-(1-\theta_K)}T_{it}^{\theta_T}L_{it}^{\theta_L} = R_z^{\circ}w_{it}^{K} = \theta_K A_{jt}K_{jt}^{-(1-\theta_K)}T_{jt}^{\theta_T}L_{jt}^{\theta_L} \quad \forall j
\]

The expression implies marginal products are equalized across all farmers in the village. Moreover, the optimal choice depends only on current variables, meaning the choice that solves the static problem solves the dynamic problem.

Now suppose factor markets are perfect, so \(w_{it}^{K} = w_{t}^{K}, \kappa_{it} = \kappa_{it} = 0\), but
financial markets are not. Then the optimal choices of capital and land satisfy

\[
E[\lambda_{it} \phi_{it}] \frac{E[y_{it}]}{K_{it}} = \frac{1}{\theta_K} \left( R_{it}^z(T_{it}^o) E[\lambda_{it}] + \omega_{it} \right) w_t^K
\]

\[
E[\lambda_{it} \phi_{it}] \frac{E[y_{it}]}{T_{it}} = \frac{1}{\theta_T} \left( R_{it}^z(T_{it}^o) E[\lambda_{it}] + \omega_{it} \right) w_t^T.
\]

Divide the capital condition by the land condition:

\[
\frac{T_{it}}{K_{it}} = \frac{\theta_T w_t^K}{\theta_K w_t^T} = \frac{T_{jt}}{K_{jt}} \forall j
\]

The condition implies capital-land ratios are equalized across farmers throughout the village, and by similar logic the land-labor ratios are as well. In short, if factor markets are perfect the farmer can choose the right mix of inputs even if financial markets are imperfect, and the right mix again is the static optimum.

One can rewrite (2) as

\[
\frac{T_{it}}{K_{it}} = \frac{1 + \tau_j T_{jt}}{1 + \tau_i K_{jt}}
\]

where \( \tau_i = \tau_j = 0 \) if factor markets are perfect.\(^4\) The \( \tau \) term matches up to the “capital distortion” of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), but in my model it vanishes when factor markets are perfect. Thus, I have given the distortion an economic interpretation.

\[^4\]

\[1 + \tau_i = \frac{(R_{it}^z(T_{it}^o) E[\lambda_{it}] - \omega_{it}) w_t^K + \kappa - \pi}{(R_{it}^z(T_{it}^o) E[\lambda_{it}] - \omega_{it}) w_t^K + \kappa - \pi} \]


2.3 Optimal Allocations

How would perfect markets allocate the aggregate factor stock? Since perfect markets make the solution to the farmer’s dynamic optimization equal the period-by-period static optimum, I can suppress time subscripts.

Suppose \( i \) is a farmer in village \( I \) observed to use \( \bar{K}_i, \bar{T}_i, \bar{L}_i \). The observed factor stocks are \( K_I = \sum_{i \in I} \bar{K}_i \) and so on, and they do not change because I only reallocate the village’s existing resources. (In Section 8 I consider reallocating resources between villages as well.) With aggregate stocks pinned down, I can ignore the supply side of the market and normalize \( R^z = 1 \). Use (2) to eliminate \( T_i \) and \( L_i \) from (1) and define the production returns to scale \( \sigma = \theta_K + \theta_T + \theta_L \), which I assume is less than one. Combine with the market clearing condition \( K_I = \sum_{j \in I} K_j^* \) and solve for the optimal allocations with fully perfect markets:

\[
K_i^* = \frac{A_i^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in I} A_j^{1-\sigma}} K_I
\]

(3)

Optimal land and labor are similar. Call farmer \( i \)’s output with perfect allocations \( y_i^* = A_i \phi_i (K_i^*)^{\theta_K} (T_i^*)^{\theta_T} (L_i^*)^{\theta_L} \).

Now suppose factor markets are perfected but financial markets left untouched, which means farmers choose the optimal mix of factors. Equation 2 gives the optimal mix but not the overall scale for each farmer. Any assumption about scale would define the allocation, so I consider a hypothetical case in which the farmer takes her original choices—those I observe in the data—and trades them in the perfected factor markets as though they were endowments. Let \( K_i^+ \) be the farmer’s new choice of capital while \( \bar{K} \) is still her original choice. Then the value of her new choices must add up to the value of her endowment,
as determined under the new prices $w^{K+}, w^{T+}, w^{L+}$:

$$w^{K+} K_i^+ + w^{T+} T_i^+ + w^{L+} L_i^+ = w^{K+} K_i + w^{T+} T_i + w^{L+} L_i$$

I effectively drop the farmers into an Edgeworth economy where their original input choices are like endowments. The farmer choosing a profit-maximizing mix of factors behaves like a consumer choosing a utility-maximizing bundle of goods. The resulting allocation is easy to compute and perfects each farmer’s mix while leaving her scale untouched. Each farmer’s allocation may differ from what she would choose given perfect factor markets and no extra constraints on scale. But under an assumption I explain in Section 2.4, gains from moving to the computed allocation are a lower bound on true misallocation from imperfect factor markets.

Again taking $K_I = \sum_{j \in I} K_j^+$ as the market-clearing condition, the allocations under perfect factor markets are

$$K_i^+ = \frac{1}{\theta_K + \theta_T + \theta_L} \left[ \frac{\theta_K}{K_I} K_i + \frac{\theta_T}{T_I} T_i + \frac{\theta_L}{L_I} L_i \right] K_I$$

(4)

Optimal land and labor are similar. Call farmer $i$’s output with perfect factor markets $y_i^+ = A_i \phi_i (K_i^+)^{\theta_K} (T_i^+)^{\theta_T} (L_i^+)^{\theta_L}$.

### 2.4 Costs of Misallocation

For each of the three scenarios, aggregate output in village $I$ is the sum of each farmer’s output under that scenario. Call actual aggregate output $Y_I$, output with fully perfect markets $Y_I^*$, and output with only perfect factor markets $Y_I^+$. I use two measures of misallocation: the gains making markets efficient, and
the fraction of efficient output achieved. The gains from reallocation (or simply “misallocation”) measure how much output a village loses from misallocations. The fraction of efficient output achieved (or “efficiency”) compares the real world to the world with perfect markets and appears naturally in the aggregate production function I derive in Section 2.5. Define

\[
G_I = \frac{Y_I^* - Y_I}{Y_I}, \quad G_{I \text{FACT}} = \frac{Y_I^+ - Y_I}{Y_I}, \quad G_{I \text{FIN}} = \frac{Y_I^* - Y_I^+}{Y_I},
\]

\[
E_I = \frac{Y_I}{Y_I^*}, \quad E_{I \text{FACT}} = \frac{Y_I}{Y_I^+}, \quad E_{I \text{FIN}} = \frac{Y_I^+}{Y_I^*}.
\]

The gains from perfecting each market add up to the overall gains \(G_I = G_{I \text{FACT}} + G_{I \text{FIN}}\), and overall efficiency is the product of factor and financial market efficiency \(E_I = E_{I \text{FACT}} \cdot E_{I \text{FIN}}\). The overall gains are a decreasing function of efficiency \(G_I = \frac{1}{E_I} - 1\).

My measure of factor market misallocation \(G_{I \text{FACT}}\) may not equal the true gains from perfecting factor markets. I compute factor market misallocation by holding each farmer’s scale of production fixed, but if factor markets actually became perfect a productive farmer would probably increase her scale. Factor market failures might directly distort a farmer’s scale—for example, if she had to pay more for all inputs. Alternatively, a perfect mix might make farming more profitable (and a larger scale more attractive) because the farmer can allocate each dollar to the factor she needs most. Proposition 1, which I prove in Appendix A.1, formalizes this argument:

**Proposition 1** Let \(\tilde{K}_{i^+}\) be the level of capital farmer \(i\) would choose if factor mar-
kets were perfected, financial markets left untouched, and the endowment constraint were not imposed. Assume $\mathbb{E}\left[A_i((\tilde{K}_i^+)^\sigma - (K^+_i)^\sigma)\right] > 0$. Then in expectation $G_I^{FACT}$ is a lower bound on the true gains from perfecting factor markets and $G_I^{FIN}$ an upper bound on the true gains from subsequently perfecting financial markets.

The assumption states that with perfect factor markets the most productive farmers will increase their scale relative to the actual outcome.\(^5\) The only reason the assumption might fail is if factor market failures somehow compensate for financial market failures, such as if the farmers who cannot get bank loans can rent land more cheaply than everyone else, and they are also the most productive farmers. The scenario is implausible in a poor rural village, where those shut out of financial markets are usually shut out of factor markets as well.\(^6\)

### 2.5 Decomposing Aggregate Output and Growth

Growth accounting traditionally measures changes in per capita output and not per firm output. To match the literature I decompose the growth in the village’s rice output per household instead of per farmer. Suppose $\mathcal{I}$ is the set of all households (rice-farming or otherwise) in village $I$, and let $\mathcal{Y} = \frac{\mathcal{Y}}{|\mathcal{I}|}$ be per household rice output. Let $Z_{it} = A_i \phi_{it}$ denote overall productivity, $Z_{It}$ its mean and $\tilde{Z}_{it}$ deviations from the mean. I use overall productivity to be consistent with traditional growth accounting (which computes an overall Solow residual) and because it is difficult to split aggregate shocks into anticipated and unantici-

\(^5\) Capital simply stands in for scale of production. I could have phrased the proposition in terms of land or labor just as easily because the ratios of all factors are fixed by (2).

\(^6\) The proof is an equivalency result, so if the assumption failed and $\mathbb{E}[A_i((\tilde{K}_i^+)^\sigma - (K^+_i)^\sigma)] < 0$, the computed gains would be an upper bound. In the knife-edge case where $\mathbb{E}[A_i((\tilde{K}_i^+)^\sigma - (K^+_i)^\sigma)] = 0$ the computed gains equal the actual gains.
anticipated parts. 7

Then

\[ \mathcal{Y}_t = Z_t E_t \cdot \frac{1}{|T|} \sum_{i \in I} \tilde{Z}_{it} (K_{it})^{\theta_K} (T_{it})^{\theta_T} (L_{it})^{\theta_L} \]

\[ = Z_t E_t F(K_{It}, T_{It}, L_{It}; \{ \tilde{A}_{it} \}, \{ \tilde{\phi}_{it} \}) \]

Recall from (3) the optimal factor allocations \( K^*_{it}, T^*_{it}, L^*_{it} \) are only functions of the aggregate stocks and relative productivity. Taking the relative productivity distribution \( \{ \tilde{A}_{it} \}, \{ \tilde{\phi}_{it} \} \) as a parameter, \( F \) is a function of only aggregate capital, land, and labor—the aggregate production function.

I can derive a similar decomposition for sample-wide output \( \mathcal{Y}_i \), but since households were sampled into the survey in multiple stages the decomposition must weight villages by their size. Let \( \kappa_{It} \) be the population of village \( I \) as a fraction of the total population of all villages surveyed, and let \( \chi_{It} = \frac{\kappa_{It} Y_{It}}{\sum_{i} \kappa_{it} Y_{it}} \) be the share of sample-wide output it produces under optimal within-village allocations. Let \( Z_t = \sum_{I} \chi_{It} Z_{It} \) denote the output-weighted mean and \( \tilde{Z}_{It} \) deviations from the mean of village productivity. Let \( E_t \) be sample-wide allocative efficiency with reallocation still within villages. Trivial algebra shows \( E_t = \sum_{I} \chi_{It} E_{It} \), which means

\[ \mathcal{Y}_t = Z_t \cdot E_t \cdot \sum_{I} \tilde{Z}_{It} \kappa_{It} F(K_{It}, T_{It}, L_{It}) \]

\[ = Z_t E_t F(\{ K_{It}, T_{It}, L_{It} \}) \]

\[ \text{(5)} \]

7For example, how much of a district-year dummy is anticipated? The distinction does not matter for within-village reallocation but will affect how much growth is assigned to anticipated versus unanticipated aggregate productivity. Rather than make an arbitrary and misleading distinction I combine the two and call the result overall productivity.
Since reallocation is within-village, the sample-wide aggregate production function depends on the aggregate factor stocks of each village.

Define $g^V_t$ as the log change of any variable $V$ over baseline. Since $g^Y_t = g^Z_t + g^E_t + g^F_t$, I can decompose growth in per household rice output into the contributions of improvements in productivity, improvements in factor allocations, and aggregate factor accumulation. By setting $g^Z_t$ and $g^E_t$ to zero, for example, I can examine how output would have grown if the rice sector had made no improvements to productivity or efficiency.

3 Context and Assumptions

My first assumption, which lets me measure overall misallocation from factor and financial market failures, is that all misallocation comes from these two sources. Comparing the original allocation of land, labor, and capital to the allocation that equalizes marginal products does not work if measured marginal products differ for other reasons. For example, the econometrician might miscalculate marginal products and find misallocation where there is none. He may assume the wrong technology or incorrectly assume firms use the same technology. Unanticipated productivity shocks might change firms’ marginal products after they choose their factors, making the allocation look inefficient even when markets are perfect. Real forces other than weak factor and financial markets might also drive marginal products apart. Firms may pay different taxes, have adjustment costs, or be monopolists.

Such issues cause fewer problems in rice farming than in manufacturing. Rice production is relatively uniform. Though not all farmers in Thailand grow
the same type of rice, they grow each variety following a similar technique. And unlike in many developing countries nearly all farmers use modern pesticides and fertilizers. Figure 1 shows that nearly 100 percent of my sample uses modern farming technology (fertilizers or pesticides) throughout the entire sample period. This is not to say everyone farms rice identically, but rather that assuming a common production function for rice is safer than assuming one for manufacturing. Since identifying the sources of anticipated versus unanticipated productivity is easier in rice production—a farmer knows his own talent but does not know whether rats will eat his harvest—it is easier to model productivity as described in Section 5.2.

Monopoly, taxation, and adjustment costs are less likely to distort the rice sector. Rice is a commodity and Thai farmers are all price-takers who sell their output to mills and merchants at market prices. In Shenoy (2014) I show that farmers’ selling prices move with the international rice price. Though the government often supports prices, price subsidies will affect all farmers equally and leave allocations unchanged. Thailand’s farmers grow rice more commercially than their Indian or Chinese counterparts, but they enjoy a similar freedom from taxes. Of the roughly 1500 survey households who reported any agricultural activity in 1996, only eight reported paying land taxes. Less than two percent of rice farmers in the monthly survey report paying any income tax.

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8 The farmer seeds a nursery plot and transplants the seedlings to a flooded paddy where they grow to adulthood. Farmers fertilize and apply pesticides until the rice matures and they harvest, thresh, dry, and sell the grains. According to the International Rice Research Institute, most of Thailand’s farmers use this lowland rain-fed method to grow their rice.

9 Thailand was an early ally of the U.S. during the Cold War and received American aid to modernize its rice sector in the 1960s. Despite fears to the contrary, both small and large farmers adopted the new seeds and fertilizers. The adoption of fertilizer was so rapid that, according to Baker and Phongpaichit (2009), a Japanese anthropologist visiting in 1970 found “Villagers who had described the local rituals to him only a decade ago now exclaimed ‘the rice spirit is no match for chemical fertilizer.’”
The assumptions I make about functional forms are also more plausible among farmers. Hicks-Neutral productivity, for example, may not hold in manufacturing and services. But since a rice farmer’s inputs work to make a single product, year-to-year productivity shocks like poor rainfall will damage the end crop rather than the contribution of the workers versus the tractors. Decreasing returns to scale, which I assume in my derivations, is plausible because rice

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10 Clearly building a tractor or raising a bullock takes time. But with perfect factor markets, whatever capital exists in the village can flow to the farmers who can make best use of it as long as there are no costs to exchanging factors. This is what matters for measuring misallocation.
farming in Thailand is still labor-intensive; a large farm and a large workforce is harder to manage than a small one. It is harder to reason whether or not farm production is Cobb-Douglas. Though this assumption is standard in the literature on misallocation, I show that it approximates reality in Appendix A.6.\footnote{The general model and procedure I present in Appendix A.4 does not require any assumptions beyond concavity, decreasing returns, and twice-differentiability. But estimating a more complicated production function requires stronger assumptions about productivity and factor input choices.}

By using a household survey I avoid the problem of selective attrition. Even if a household stops farming it remains in the panel and re-enters my sample if it starts farming again. Thus the farmers and factors I observe give an accurate reflection of the current state of the rice sector.\footnote{The main caveat is that I must exclude from the sample farmers who farm only once because I cannot calculate a fixed effect for them. If they are severely over- or under-allocated, villages will falsely appear efficient. A one-time farmer, however, can only enter and exit if the rental or purchase markets work well. As villages with efficient markets have little misallocation, if anything the bias works towards finding too much misallocation because the efficient villages receive less weight in the sector-level calculation of efficiency.}

Finally, my method assumes I can model the farmer as though she chooses and pays for her inputs at the same time. This assumption lets me interpret distortions to mix as factor market misallocation. This assumption is reasonable if the cost of transferring land and capital between farmers is small and the farmer has equal information about productivity when choosing all inputs. I have already argued adjustment costs are small. The information assumption is clearly a simplification. The farmer will know more about rainfall and other random events later in the season when hiring workers for harvest. The question is whether the variation in productivity caused by this new information is large compared to what the farmer knows at planting and what is known only after harvest. If the assumption fails, the measures of misallocation would respond incorrectly to an exogenous injection of credit. But I show in
Section 7 that the measures do respond as they should, suggesting the simplification is not too extreme.

4 Data

I construct my sample from the Townsend Thai Annual Household Survey (1997). The Townsend Thai Project collected a baseline survey of households from four rural provinces. The Project subsampled one third of the survey villages and resurveyed the sampled households every year to construct a panel. It later added two more provinces and sampled new households to counter attrition. I use the rounds collected from 1997 through 2009. The survey response period is June of the previous year through May, so I label the period covered by the 1997 survey as 1996. The Project followed sixteen of the villages excluded from the annual survey to collect the Townsend Thai Monthly Household Survey (2012). I use the first two years of the monthly survey throughout the paper to confirm facts not found in the annual survey. I use district-level precipitation data computed from the University of Delaware Climactic Project and NASA's Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission. I also test my micro measures of productivity in the Online Appendix using agro-climactic suitability data from the FAO.

Land is the number of rai (6.25 rai = 1 acre) of paddy the household cultivated (whether owned or otherwise). Labor is the sum of hired and family labor in days worked. Hired labor is the household’s expenditures on farm workers divided by the median daily wage in the village. Using the median wage is not ideal, but the survey does not ask directly about the amount of labor hired and the within-village variation in unskilled wages is relatively low (the coefficient of variation is less than 0.19 for most village-years). I count the number of house-
hold members who report being unpaid family laborers with primary occupations in farming of any sort (or who mention “FIELDS” in a freeform response). The annual survey gives no information on the days each member worked. Instead I use the more detailed labor data in the monthly survey to calculate the median days any individual works on his family’s fields (conditional on working any), and multiply the median—60 days—by the number of family laborers counted in the annual data.

Capital is the sum of the value of owned mechanical capital, the value of owned buffalo, and the value of rented capital and expenses (including intermediate inputs). I do not compute the value of owned capital using perpetual inventory because households do not report the value of assets they sell, meaning I cannot measure disinvestment. Instead I assign a purchase value to each asset the household owns. I deflate and depreciate the purchase value of assets owned at baseline. For assets acquired afterwards I use the purchase price. The survey only reports assets in classes, so if the household has multiple assets of the same type I must treat them as if they have identical value and use the most recent purchase price (most households own one or fewer assets of any type). If I cannot identify a price I drop the asset from the calculation (I can identify a price for the vast majority). I then depreciate the purchase price to get the value in a given year assuming 2 percent depreciation for structures (House and Shapiro, 2008), 10 percent depreciation for machines, and (I treat them as vehicles) 20 percent depreciation for tractors (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Owned mechanical capital in a year is the total value of the assets. I treat intermediate inputs—seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and fuel—as capital with a 100 percent depreciation rate. I add maintenance, which I treat as investment
that takes immediate effect. I then add the purchase price of rented capital, which I approximate with total rental expenses divided by an interest rate of .04 plus the average rate of depreciation for all types of capital (a user cost).\textsuperscript{13} Finally, I add the value the household reports for its buffalo. Since households do not report whether they rented out their capital I cannot lower it to reflect how much they actually use. The error might inflate estimated misallocation because unproductive farmers who rent out their machinery will appear to have too much capital.\textsuperscript{14}

To borrow the expression of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), my procedure “heroically makes no allowance” for measurement error. Yet my measures of land, labor, and capital are noisy. Though I address one type of measurement error in Appendix 5.2, measurement error is a limitation of any study that takes a model seriously. This limitation makes it critical that I validate my measures of misallocation in Section 7.

In Section 5.2 I model productivity using several catastrophes the household reports about its income. I use indicators for illness, death in the family, flooding, problems with crop-eating pests, poor rainfall, low yield for other reasons, and a low price for output. Malnourishment might also lower the farmer’s productivity. To proxy for it I use the share of the household’s consumption budget devoted to rice, the staple food, including the value of home-produced rice.

\textsuperscript{13}Given the presence of misallocation, how can I assume a common interest rate and a user cost? Recall my objective is to construct a consistent measure of the value of capital. Reweighting using household-specific interest rates would be equivalent to calling a tractor more valuable because the household renting it pays a higher mortgage. This is not to say farmers do pay the same user cost for capital, only that the productive value of each asset is independent of financial market imperfections. It is a bigger problem if there is variation in the prices farmers actually pay for capital they rent, as I would measure a farmer as having more capital when he only pays more for it. This is a limitation of any study that measures capital with its cost.

\textsuperscript{14}The survey does ask households about “Payments for other rentals,” but the rented goods might not be capital and almost no one reports receiving any (only three do in the latest year when we would expect the best rental markets).
Table 1
Sample Descriptives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from rice</td>
<td>47918.6</td>
<td>(77327.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>74560.7</td>
<td>(93826.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>(15.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>181.6</td>
<td>(191.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Budget Share</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction who report</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death in Family</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop-Eating Pests</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Rainfall</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Yield for Other Reason</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Price</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Households 775 Observations 6230
Villages 69

Note: I construct the sample in two steps: I first restrict it to household-years with positive revenue and positive capital, land, and labor. I further restrict the sample to household with at least two years of positive revenue and factors. All variables are annual. Revenue and capital are in 2005 baht, land in rai, and labor in human-days. The share of the household's consumption budget spent on rice is my measure of hunger.

Jensen and Miller (2010) argue as households become less hungry they substitute away from the staple, so a larger share implies more hunger. All monetary variables are deflated to 2005 Thai baht. I describe all the variables in more detail in Appendix A.7.

Table 1 reports household-year averages of each variable for the sample. I restrict my analysis to the households I observe with positive rice revenue and levels of all factors for at least two years, as I cannot calculate a household fixed-effect for anyone else. At 2005 exchange rates the average annual revenue from rice was roughly 1200 dollars. Farms are small and most farmers plant only 19.4 rai (3.1 acres) of paddy.
5 Estimating the Production Function

I cannot use the expressions for optimal land, labor, and capital derived in Section 2 without an estimate of the production function. Estimating a production function is never easy, and misallocation complicates the task because I cannot assume firms choose their inputs optimally. As I explain, however, misallocation lets me identify the production function using a dynamic panel estimator.

5.1 Estimation with Misallocation

The literature has raised two problems with dynamic panel estimators. First, they assume changes in land, labor, and capital are correlated with their lagged levels. With perfect markets and without adjustment costs, it is not clear why this assumption holds. A firm can choose the optimal level of each factor without regard to the level in the past. Second, dynamic panel estimators assume firms have the same information when they choose labor as when they choose land or capital. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) explain that under perfect markets the assumption creates perfect colinearity between the level of each factor.

Ironically, the imperfect markets that cause misallocation also solve both problems. If a farmer lacks credit he may have to hire fewer workers the year after a bad harvest, but can slowly rebuild his savings and with it his labor force. If one farmer can rent tractors more cheaply than his neighbor they will use land and capital in different proportions.

To test whether markets are perfect, take Expression 1 and substitute
\[ A_{jt} K_{jt}^{−(1−θ)K} T_{jt}^{θT} L_{jt}^{θL} = E\left[ \frac{y_{it}}{K_{it}} \right]. \]

Then

\[ \theta_K E\left[ \frac{y_{it}}{K_{it}} \right] = R_z^t w_i^K \]
\[ \Rightarrow \frac{y_{it}}{K_{it}} = v_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \]

where \( v_{it} \) is a village-year dummy and \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is a rational expectations error. In other words, if markets are perfect the output-capital ratio should not be correlated with anything—for example, the log of land or labor—after controlling for village-year fixed-effects. Table 2 regresses the ratio of output to land, labor, and capital on the log of each factor. I exclude the log of capital from the regression for the ratio of output to capital (and so on) because measurement error in capital might create a correlation even if markets are perfect. I report the p-value on the F-test that none of the regressors are significant. In all three cases I reject no correlation at the 10 percent level, and in two cases I reject at the 1 percent level.\(^{15}\)

The regressions for the marginal product of land and labor suggest farmers who have a lot of labor lack land, and those with land lack labor. This suggests a failure in the labor market—households with large families should be sending their kids to work on the farms of their landed neighbors but instead employ them at home. I ultimately find that such failures cause little misallocation (see Section 6), but they do let me identify the production function.

\(^{15}\text{In Appendix 6.2 I derive a different test using the ratios of factors and again reject perfect factor markets.}\)
Table 2
Test of Imperfect Markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log(Land)</td>
<td>0.118*</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>96.347***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Labor)</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>205.160**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(64.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Capital)</td>
<td>21.752</td>
<td>(62.71)</td>
<td>7.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>6230</td>
<td>6230</td>
<td>6230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pval on F-Test</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Under perfect markets the ratio of output to any factor should not be correlated with the logs of factors after controlling for village-year fixed-effects. I report the results of such regressions. Standard errors are clustered within household. I exclude the log of capital from the output-capital ratio (and so on for the other factors) because measurement error in capital might create a correlation even if markets are perfect.

Imperfect markets do, however, rule out a class of methods Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) call "structural techniques." The econometrician assumes the firm chooses intermediate inputs to match its anticipated productivity. All else equal, more intermediate inputs imply higher anticipated productivity. The assumption yields powerful results when satisfied: the econometrician can non-parametrically estimate productivity. It is also why structural techniques fail when factor markets fail. Take a concrete example and suppose two farmers have the same amount of land, workers, machinery, and productivity. One has a wealthy uncle. She can borrow money to buy fertilizer whereas her clone is constrained. The econometrician wrongly concludes the clone is less productive. The structural techniques fail because they assume the farmer’s choices are only a function of her productivity and not her constraints or privileges.16

16Ackerberg et al. would say the “scalar unobservable” assumption fails. In principle, one can deal with this problem by adding controls for unequal access to factors. But the case described
5.2 Modeling Productivity

What makes one farmer more productive than another? Much of what determines a firm’s revenue productivity in manufacturing or services—a successful marketing campaign, a new product line, the monopoly power born of a competitor’s demise—are absent in agriculture. Many of the most obvious determinants of a farmer’s productivity—rainfall, crop-eating pests, illness, accidental misapplication of fertilizer—either affect everyone in the village or are unanticipated. As I argued in Section 3, Thai farmers have used modern seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers for decades, so nobody has a technological edge. Land quality does not appear to vary much within a village.\textsuperscript{17} Malnourishment might lower the farmer’s productivity, and he certainly knows when he is hungry, so I construct a measure of hunger. What remains is the farmer’s own managerial talent: his knowledge of how to eke the most output from his inputs of land, labor, and capital. Managerial talent is a fixed characteristic of the farmer I can capture in a household fixed-effect. I model anticipated and unanticipated productivity as follow:

\begin{align}
\log A_{it} &= \left[\text{Household Fixed Effect}\right]_{i} + a^H[Hunger]_{it} \\
&+ \sum_{k} a^D_k[District-Year Dummies]_{k,it} \\
\log \phi_{it} &= \sum_{j} a^S_j[Dummy Shocks]_{j,it} \quad (6)
\end{align}

\textit{here is an example where few datasets would contain the necessary variable (having wealthy family members).}

\textsuperscript{17}I took the average price per rai as proxy for land quality and included it in unreported production function estimates. The coefficient was small and insignificant—.029 with standard error .02—which I take to mean quality does not vary much and price reflects location rather than fertility.
\[
+ \sum_{m} a^R_m \{Monthly\ \text{Precipitation}\}_{m,it} + [Overall\ \text{Error}]_{it}
\]

In the dummy shocks I include indicators for illness, death in the family, retirement, flooding, problems with crop-eating pests, poor rainfall, low yield for other reasons, and a low price for output. The overall error includes unanticipated idiosyncratic shocks that are not covered in the dummies and measurement error.\footnote{Self-reports of bad rainfall and prices only add information if there is variation between villages within a district, but I include them anyways to ensure I correctly estimate the production function. Ideally I would also control for the price of the type of rice grown, but I do not observe this in the annual data.}

Two sets of variables—district-year dummies and (district-level) precipitation—are assigned to either anticipated or unanticipated, but actually will not affect my measures of misallocation. Any shock that affects everyone in the village equally will simply divide out of the expressions for optimal allocations in Section 2.3. In the aggregate output decomposition of Section 2.5 I combine both types of productivity into overall productivity, making the distinction unimportant.

The reader may doubt that I can ever know as much about the farmer’s productivity as the farmer himself. In Section 8 I assess how much the main results change when farmers anticipate all productivity.

### 5.3 Dynamic Panel Estimation

If the bulk of a farmer’s anticipated productivity is fixed, it seems natural to estimate

\footnote{Self-reports of bad rainfall and prices only add information if there is variation between villages within a district, but I include them anyways to ensure I correctly estimate the production function. Ideally I would also control for the price of the type of rice grown, but I do not observe this in the annual data.}
\[ \log y_{it} = \log A_{it} + \log \phi_{it} + \theta_K \log K_{it} + \theta_T \log T_{it} + \theta_L \log L_{it} + [\text{Overall Error}]_{it} \]

with the within-household estimator or equivalently OLS with household dummies, where \( \log \phi_{it} = \log \phi_{it} - [\text{Overall Error}]_{it} \). But the key assumption for its consistency—what Wooldridge (2002) calls strict exogeneity—fails. Strict exogeneity requires that unexpectedly high or low output in either the past or future will not affect a farmer's input decisions today. But suppose a credit-constrained farmer suffered a bad harvest last year and spent her savings on food, leaving less money to rent land this year. Aside from potentially causing misallocations the situation also violates strict exogeneity.

The Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, 1982) can estimate the production function under a weaker assumption called sequential exogeneity. Sequential exogeneity assumes a farmer will not base her input decisions on unexpectedly high or low future output, but makes no assumptions about past output. In other words, current and future error terms are unanticipated shocks to productivity. I implement the estimator by taking first-differences to eliminate the fixed-effect and instrumenting the differenced factors with their lagged levels. Lagged levels are uncorrelated with the combined error term by sequential exogeneity, so the instruments are valid. Although other dynamic panel estimators—Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond—make even weaker assumptions, these estimators also have higher variance. I choose Anderson-Hsiao as a compromise between bias and variance.

Table 3 reports the Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the production function. As expected, rice farming is relatively labor- and land-intensive, and each shock to
Table 3  
Production Function Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Elasticities</th>
<th>Productivity Modifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Hunger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Share ($\theta_K$)</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1st Stage F-Stat</td>
<td>111.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Share ($\theta_T$)</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1st Stage F-Stat</td>
<td>128.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Bad Rain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Share ($\theta_L$)</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1st Stage F-Stat</td>
<td>133.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to Scale:</td>
<td>Low Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Estimate ($\sigma$)</td>
<td>0.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Households: 734  Observations: 4856
R-Squared: 0.760  Cragg-Donald Stat.: 204.435

Note: The table reports the Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the production elasticities and the effects of each component of productivity (see Section 5.3 for details). The variable “Death” refers to a death in the (extended) family. I cluster standard errors by household.

productivity has the expected sign. The first-stage regressions of factor changes on their lags easily satisfy the usual standards for strength (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). The production function has decreasing returns, justifying the span-of-control assumption I make in Section 2. Rice farming in Thailand still requires the farmer to manage many workers and animals—if Thailand adopted the heavy machinery used in the U.S. it might raise these returns.
Table 4
Sample Sizes and Productivity in Rice-Farming Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmers Per Village</th>
<th>Productivity Dispersion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th Pctl.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th Pctl.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Pctl.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Sample Characteristics

Table 4 reports sample sizes and the median dispersion of anticipated productivity $\hat{A}$ among the villages of my sample. The median 90/10 ratio for productivity within a village is 3.09, a number close to the range of 1 to 3 that Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2011) find for the gross production functions of several manufacturing industries in Colombia and Chile. Productivity in a rice-farming village is distributed much like in a typical manufacturing industry. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find much larger 90/10 ratios in their sample, possibly because they use value-added rather than gross production functions. Gandhi et al. show that value-added representations require strong assumptions about gross production functions and tend to inflate the dispersion of productivity.

6 Results

I plug the estimates of production elasticities and anticipated productivity into the expressions for fully perfect and perfect factor market allocations: (3) and (4) for capital and similar expressions for land and labor. I drop all observations from village-years with only a single farmer because they by construction have no within-village misallocation.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)The sample loses 13 households, 8 villages, and 47 observations.
Table 5 reports the effect of several predictors on the probability of being under-allocated in 1996. I call a farmer under-allocated if he produces more after reallocation than before. I predict under-allocation with the farmer's age and years farming rice, whether he rents land, whether illness lowered his income, his cash savings, and whether he chose the most risk-averse options in two questions that measure risk preferences.\(^{20}\) Ten more years of age or experience reduce by 6 and 5 percentage points the chance of being under-allocated, suggesting farmers accumulate factors as they age. As expected, a risk-averse farmer is 11.2 percentage points more likely to be under-allocated. A farmer who fears risk is less likely to gamble on a large farm even if he is more talented than his neighbors. Savings do not predict under-allocation, perhaps because they may equally be a sign of wealth or unwillingness to invest.

I then estimate the misallocation in each village using the expression for \(G_I\) in Section 2.4 and plot the distribution in Figure 2.A. Even in the earliest year of my sample (1996) the total cost of factor and financial market failures was less than 15 percent in most villages. Over time the distribution shifts down-
ward, and misallocation falls below 8 percent for most villages by 2008. Many villages appear to have negative misallocation because estimated misallocation is a random variable. When true misallocation is low the probability a normally distributed estimator falls below zero is high.\footnote{The estimates are random for two reasons: sampling error, as arises with any estimate made with a finite sample, and the unanticipated shocks. The optimal allocations I compute are ex ante perfect, but their ex post efficiency will depend on the realization of shocks. If the most efficient farmers get unlucky draws the optimal allocation will look less efficient.}

To reduce the noise and represent the whole rice sector, Figure 2.B depicts misallocation across all villages from the original four provinces surveyed at baseline.\footnote{I restrict the sample to households from the original four provinces surveyed at baseline to avoid the artificial jump that comes from adding a new province partway through.} I estimate the gains in sample-wide output from reallocating factors within each village after weighting by population (see Section 2.5). Sample-wide misallocation is never more than 17 percent and falls to below 4 percent by 2008. The results suggest factor and financial market failures do not produce much costly misallocation, and what little they do produce falls over time.

Figure 2.B also separates the misallocation caused by imperfect factor markets from that caused by imperfect financial markets. I calculate $G_i^{FACT}$ and $G_i^{FIN}$ as defined in Section 2.5 and reweight them to the sample-level. Both types of misallocation fall from 1996 to 2008. Since the factor market measure is a lower bound while the financial market measure is an upper bound, neither market unambiguously causes more misallocation until 2006 when financial market misallocation drops to nearly zero. Policymakers and donors often blame the financial markets for underdevelopment, but the graph suggests factor markets cause as much or even more misallocation. Like in Figure 2.A, the apparently negative financial market misallocation in 2008 is an artifact of sampling error. If true financial market misallocation is almost zero the probability
Figure 2

**Panel A:** Density of Within-Village Misallocation; **Panel B:** Sample-Level Overall, Factor, and Financial Market Misallocation

---

Note: Panel A plots the shifting distribution of misallocation within each village. I report misallocation as the fraction of observed output foregone because factors are misallocated. Panel B calculates the overall cost to the rice sector from misallocation within villages for every year of my sample. It also splits overall misallocation into misallocation from factor versus financial markets, where my measures bound the gains from perfecting first the factor markets and then the financial markets.

of estimating it to be negative is large. The estimator for financial market misallocation is also more volatile than the estimator for factor market misallocation, so the apparent contrast between the slow march of factor markets versus the drunken stumble of financial markets may be another artifact.

Figure 3 decomposes growth in the four provinces into changes in aggregate factor stocks $F(\cdot)$, revenue productivity $Z$, and the efficiency of factor allocations $E$. Each line shows how log output would have grown since 1996 if some parts of growth had been shut down. The solid line shows output if productivity and efficiency were fixed at their 1996 level and only aggregate factor stocks changed. Without growth in productivity and efficiency, rice output would have fallen since 1996 as factors flowed out of rice farming. Since Thailand has rapidly industrialized over the past two decades, agriculture’s decline
Figure 3
Decomposition of Growth in Aggregate Rice Output in the Sample

Note: I decompose aggregate output and compute changes in the log of the aggregate factor stocks $F(\cdot)$, revenue productivity $Z$, and the efficiency of factor allocations $E$. Each line plots the counterfactual change in output holding all components except the indicated component fixed (so the lowest line holds average productivity and allocative efficiency fixed while letting aggregate factor stocks change).

is not surprising. The middle dashed line shows growth if changes in productivity are turned back on, and comparing it to the solid line shows the contribution of productivity to growth. Rising productivity since 1998 overwhelmed the outflow of factors and produced net gains in rice revenue. It rose for two reasons: better yields and higher prices. Average yields might have improved as less productive farmers left farming and those who stayed became more skilled, but the spike in productivity after 2006 comes entirely from rising food prices. The final line in Figure 3 shows output when changes in efficiency are turned back on, and comparing it to the middle dashed line shows the contribution of improving efficiency to output growth. It is trivial. Compared to the other two sources of growth, efficiency barely changed the trajectory of rice output.

Why do I find so much less misallocation than earlier work (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)? One possibility is that markets in agriculture really are more
efficient than in manufacturing. But Karaivanov and Townsend (2013) compare households in rural Thailand to their urban counterparts and find that the rural households appear more constrained.\textsuperscript{23}

Another possibility is that equally bad markets cause more misallocation in manufacturing than in farming because some feature of manufacturing makes market failures more costly. One possibility is that productivity is more dispersed in manufacturing, but I show in Section 5.4 that productivity is no less dispersed in a Thai village than a typical manufacturing industry. More generally, the distribution of village-level misallocation in Figure 2 shows that some villages have lots of misallocation (nearly 60 percent), demonstrating that costly misallocation is possible in my context; it simply does not happen often.

Given how important the returns-to-scale are to the level of misallocation, the reader may wonder if decreasing returns in rice production explain why I find so little misallocation. But if I map parameters from my competitive framework to those of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the closest equivalent in their model is what they call $\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}$, a function of the degree of product differentiation $\sigma$. Since they assume $\sigma = 3$, the value of this function comes out to two-thirds—very close to my estimate of .664 for the revenue returns-to-scale.

Perhaps I find less misallocation because many earlier studies assume the firm knows its entire productivity when choosing inputs whereas I assume it knows only a fraction.\textsuperscript{24} Both approaches are flawed; firms lack perfect foresight, but it is unlikely my estimates of anticipated productivity are complete. But I show in Section 8 that the difference does not explain why I find less mis-

\textsuperscript{23}Some earlier work—Townsend (1994) and Benjamin (1992), for example—does find surprising efficiency in rural insurance and labor markets.

\textsuperscript{24}See Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) for an example of a study that similarly assumes the firm knows only part of its productivity.
allocation than Hsieh and Klenow—assuming all productivity is known raises misallocation but not by enough to match what they find.

The results are not driven by my assumption that the aggregate supply of land, labor, and capital stays fixed. Hsieh and Klenow make the same assumption for their headline numbers; when they allow the capital stock to rise in response to reallocation, they find even larger gains from reallocation. Moreover, I show in Section 8 that allowing factors to flow between villages within a subdistrict does not much increase my estimates. Though letting farmers import tractors would further raise output, the inflow of capital would rise with aggregate productivity. Since I find less within-sector misallocation than Hsieh and Klenow, I would also find smaller capital inflows.

Finally, it may be that earlier studies measured misallocation from sources other than factor and financial market failures. Though Hsieh and Klenow show that their measures improve when distortionary policies are repealed, they never claim all of the misallocation comes from imperfect markets. A recent paper by Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker (2014) finds that much of measured misallocation across countries and sectors may be explained by adjustment costs, which are relatively small in a rice-farming village.

7 The Effect of Credit on Misallocation: The Million Baht Program

Between May 2001 and May 2002 the Thai government gave every village's public lending fund one million baht. The aptly named Million Baht Program in effect gave smaller villages more credit per-household. Kaboski and Townsend
(2011) explain that village boundaries have little economic meaning and come from a bureaucratic tangle with statistically random outcomes. Since village sizes are random the per-household rise in credit is also random, and Kaboski and Townsend verify there are no differential trends between the villages that received more or less credit (see Table I on p. 1369 of their paper).

I exploit the program to test my measures of efficiency. By increasing the supply of credit the program improved financial markets and should decrease misallocation from financial market imperfections.\(^{25}\) I regress a village’s misallocation in each year on year dummies, village fixed-effects, the log of the per-household credit injection (one million divided by the number of households), and the interaction between the log credit injection and 2001, the year of implementation, and 2002, the year after. The coefficients on the interactions measure the semi-elasticities of misallocation with respect to credit.

Table 6 reports the results, which are rescaled to show the change in the dependent variable due to a one percent increase in per household credit. A one percent increase in credit decreases misallocation by .1 percent of observed output, nearly all of which comes from decreases in financial market misallocation. Since a credit intervention should affect financial markets, the results suggest my measures of factor versus financial market misallocation pick up what they should. The program had no significant effect on aggregate land, labor, or capital, confirming Townsend and Kaboski’s (2009; 2011) finding that the program did not affect average investment. If the average did not change but misallocation fell, most households must have cut back their scale while the

\(^{25}\)The program might increase misallocation if the village funds lent out credit unfairly. But as Kaboski and Townsend (2011) explain, villagers elected panels of managers to administer the funds. The decisions were transparent and the main criterion was whether the managers thought the borrower could repay the loan.
### Table 6

**Effects of the Million Baht Credit Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>b/se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Credit</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>9.766</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(494.52)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 X Credit</td>
<td>-0.095**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.093**</td>
<td>-396.228</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(432.99)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 X Credit</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-221.249</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(583.20)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FEs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village FEs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>65.000</td>
<td>65.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>735.000</td>
<td>735.000</td>
<td>735.000</td>
<td>735.000</td>
<td>735.000</td>
<td>735.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All standard errors clustered by village

*Note:* The table captures the causal effects of the credit intervention on misallocation. Log of Credit is the log of the per-household credit injection (one million), and the program was implemented in 2001 and 2002. The coefficient on the interactions gives the percentage point decrease in misallocation caused by a 1 percent increase in per household credit availability. A 1 percent increase in credit reduces overall misallocation by .09 percentage points, and almost all of the effect came from a reduction in misallocation from financial market failures (third column) rather than factor market failures (second column). The program had no effect on (per household) aggregate factor stocks.
most productive farmers scaled up. Kaboski and Townsend’s structural model similarly showed the program did not affect all households equally.

Though statistically significant, the effect is small. Even a fifty percent increase in credit would only reduce misallocation by five percentage points. With so little misallocation at baseline the result is not surprising. Improving financial markets that do not cause much misallocation will not produce spectacular results. But whatever the program’s effects, they seem to have faded by its second year. The interaction of average credit injected and the year after implementation (2002) is a third the size and insignificant. One possibility is that households changed how they used their credit in the second year of the program. But recall that measured misallocation is noisy, making the estimated program effect noisy. The impact could be identical in both years, but the variance of the estimators might make it seem different.

8 Robustness and Alternative Specifications

8.1 Perfect Foresight

To avoid blaming factor and financial markets for random events I make assumptions about how much productivity the farmer anticipates. But if I underestimate how much the farmer knows I will underestimate the amount of misallocation. I can bound the bias by recalculating misallocation assuming, as is common in the literature, that farmers anticipate all productivity. The allocation I calculate by subbing \( A_{it}\phi_{it} \) in for \( A_{it} \) in expression (3) is unrealistically perfect—farmers do not have perfect foresight—so it puts an upper-bound on true misallocation.
Figure 4

**Panel A:** Sample-Wide Misallocation When All Productivity is Anticipated;  
**Panel B:** Sample-Wide Misallocation with Reallocation Within Sub-districts

![Graph A](image1)

![Graph B](image2)

**Note:** Panel A plots misallocation using the breakdown between anticipated and unanticipated productivity in the main text next to misallocation assuming all productivity is anticipated. Panel B plots misallocation assuming reallocation within villages (as in the main text) next to misallocation with reallocation within sub-districts (tambons), most of which contain four villages.

Figure 4.A, which compares the upper bound to my preferred specification, suggests I still find less misallocation than Hsieh and Klenow. Misallocation is higher, but in all years after 1996 it still falls short of the 40 to 60 percent Hsieh and Klenow report India could gain from reallocating to U.S. efficiency (much less the 100 percent India could get with perfect efficiency). By the end of the sample misallocation costs less than 20 percent of observed output—half of what Hsieh and Klenow find for the U.S.

### 8.2 Small Samples and Between-Village Misallocation

Misallocation often happens because the most talented producers do not get enough factors. If very talented farmers are rare they might not appear in my small per-village samples and I might underestimate misallocation. Even if the
Table 7
Correlation Between Village Misallocation and Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/se</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: I regress efficiency and gains from reallocation with the village on the number of farmers in the village in my sample. I exclude villages with only one farmer (they have zero misallocation by construction). I find no evidence that small samples bias me towards finding too little misallocation. I cluster standard errors at the village-level.

social planner favors reallocating everything to a small productive elite, I show in Section 5.4 that the dispersion of productivity in most villages is similar to what Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2011) find in manufacturing industries. Table 7 reports regressions of efficiency on sample size. Estimated efficiency is no lower in villages with larger samples, and equivalently the gains from reallocation are no higher in villages with larger samples (if anything, they are lower). The results give no reason to fear I would find more misallocation if my sample were larger. In Figure 4.B I recalculate sample-wide misallocation assuming I can reallocate factors between villages within a sub-district. The procedure does not differ much from within-village reallocation except I must account for the sample design (see Appendix A.2). Since sub-districts contain several villages they have larger samples of farmers. Reallocating within sub-district also increases the potential gains because the social planner can reallocate between as well as within villages. Figure 4.B shows the combined effect of both forces is small. Reallocating between villages does not much increase misallocation. Sample size is not a problem, and between-village misallocation is small rela-
tive even to within-village misallocation.

9 Conclusion

My results do not mean misallocation never matters or market failures have no costs. The assumptions behind my method might hold for other sectors and other countries, but that does not mean applying it to India or Africa would reveal as little misallocation as I find in Thailand. It is also possible, as discussed in Section 6, that imperfect markets cause more misallocation outside agriculture. Finding little misallocation within rice farming is not the same as finding little misallocation between farming and industry. Jeong and Townsend (2007), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), and Midrigan and Xu (2013) all find that between-sector misallocation does matter. Even among Thai farmers I find in Shenoy (2014) that risk causes under-specialization, a misallocation of time. Finally, this paper and those I cite assume the technology used by farmers stays fixed. If improved markets let farmers switch to a better technology—if Thai farmers could abandon the low returns-to-scale of their method for the mechanized agriculture of U.S. farmers—the gains could be enormous.

What the results do suggest is that evidence of a market failure is not always evidence of costly misallocation. Only by measuring the costs of each type of misallocation caused by each market failure can we know when and where misallocation really matters.

References

Shenoy, Ajay. 2014. “Risky Income or Lumpy Investments? Testing Two Theories of Under-Specialization.”
A.1 Proof of the Bounding Condition

I prove that my measure of factor market misallocation is a lower bound on the truth. Call the land-capital and labor-capital ratios derived with the endowment assumption \( \tau = \frac{T}{K_i}, \Lambda = \frac{L}{K_i} \), and define the ratios without the assumption \( \tilde{\tau}, \tilde{\Lambda} \) similarly. According to (2) they must be identical for all farmers. Consider the market-clearing condition for land with the endowment assumption:

\[
\sum T_i^+ = T_I \\
\Rightarrow \sum K_i^+ \tau = T_I \\
\Rightarrow \tau K_I = T_I \\
\Rightarrow \tau = \frac{T_I}{K_I}
\]

Identical reasoning shows \( \tilde{\tau} = \frac{T_I}{K_I} \) as well, so \( \tau = \tilde{\tau} \) and similarly \( \Lambda = \tilde{\Lambda} \)

The difference between aggregate output with and without the endowment condition is

\[
\tilde{Y}_I^+ - Y_I^+ = \sum A_i \phi_i (\tilde{K}_i^+)^{\theta_k} (\tilde{T}_i^+)^{\theta_T} (\tilde{L}_i^+)^{\theta_L} - \sum A_i \phi_i (K_i^+)^{\theta_k} (T_i^+)^{\theta_T} (L_i^+)^{\theta_L} \\
= \sum A_i \phi_i (\tilde{K}_i^+)^{\sigma} \tau^{\theta_T} \Lambda^{\theta_L} - \sum A_i \phi_i (K_i^+)^{\sigma} \tilde{\tau}^{\theta_T} \tilde{\Lambda}^{\theta_L} \\
= \tau^{\theta_T} \Lambda^{\theta_L} \sum A_i \phi_i \left[ (\tilde{K}_i^+)^{\sigma} - (K_i^+)^{\sigma} \right]
\]
\[\Rightarrow \frac{1}{Y_I} \left[ (\tilde{Y}_I^+ - Y_I) - (Y_I^+ - Y_I) \right] = \frac{1}{Y_I} \tau^T \Lambda \theta_i \sum A_i \phi_i \left[ (K_i^+)^\sigma - (K_i^+)^\sigma \right] \]

\[\Rightarrow \tilde{G}_I^{FACT} - G_I^{FACT} = \frac{\tau^T \Lambda \theta_i |I|}{Y_I} \sum A_i \phi_i \left[ (K_i^+)^\sigma - (K_i^+)^\sigma \right] \]

\[\Rightarrow E_i \left[ E \phi \left[ \tilde{G}_I^{FACT} - G_I^{FACT} \right] \right] = \frac{\tau^T \Lambda \theta_i |I|}{Y_I} E_i \left( A_i \left[ (K_i^+)^\sigma - (K_i^+)^\sigma \right] \right) \]

where the last step follows because unanticipated productivity \( \phi \) is independent and mean 1, and the size of village \( I \) is \(|I|\). Since \( \tau^T \Lambda \theta_i |I| > 0 \), \( E_i \left[ E \phi \left[ \tilde{G}_I^{FACT} - G_I^{FACT} \right] \right] > 0 \) if and only if \( E_i \left( A_i \left[ (K_i^+)^\sigma - (K_i^+)^\sigma \right] \right) > 0 \). In words, \( G_I^{FACT} \) underestimates the gains from perfect factor markets. Since \( G_I = G_I^{FACT} + G_I^{FIN} \) it must be that \( G_I^{FIN} \) overestimates the subsequent gains from financial market perfection. ■

### A.2 Robustness: Subdistrict-Level Reallocation

This appendix explains how to calculate misallocation at the sub-district level. The firm’s problem is the same as before, and its optimal capital choice is \( K^*_i = \eta A_i^\frac{1}{1-\sigma} \) where \( \eta = \left[ \left( \frac{\theta_T}{\theta_T - \theta_L} \right)^{1-\theta_T - \theta_L} \left( \frac{\theta_T}{\theta_T - \theta_L} \right)^{\theta_T} \left( \frac{\theta_L}{\theta_T - \theta_L} \right)^{\theta_L} \right]^{-\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \). Replace the village-level market-clearing condition with village and subdistrict-level conditions:

\[\sum_{i \in I} K^*_i = K^*_I \quad \forall I\]

\[\sum_I w_I K^*_I = \sum_I w_I \bar{K}_I\]

where \( K^*_I \) is the amount of capital the village is optimally allocated, \( \bar{K}_I \) is the village’s initial allocation, and \( w_I \) is an inverse-probability weight (total number of households in the village divided by the number of households sampled). Then

\[\eta \sum_I w_I \sum_{i \in I} A_i^\frac{1}{1-\sigma} = \sum_I w_I \bar{K}_I\]
\[ \eta = \frac{\sum_I w_I \sum_I w_I \bar{K}_I}{\sum_I w_I \sum_{i \in I} A_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \]

Sub this back into the individual demand:

\[ K_i^* = \frac{A_i^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}{\sum_I w_I \sum_{i \in I} A_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \sum_I w_I \bar{K}_I \]

Let \( y_i^* \) be output with the optimal capital, land, and labor. Optimal aggregate output is

\[ Y^* = \sum_I w_I \sum_{i \in I} y_i^* \]
A.3 Unequal Information about Village-Level Shocks (For Online Publication)

This appendix shows that under additional assumptions the method still works when farmers have more information about aggregate productivity when choosing some inputs than others. Consider the choice of labor and capital. There is an aggregate shock $\phi_A^t$ with mean 1 that is uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity $\phi_{it}$ and is unknown when the farmer chooses capital but known when the farmer chooses labor. Then the conditions for an optimal choice under perfect factor markets are

$$E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}\phi_A^t] E[y_{it}] = \frac{1}{\theta_K} (R_{it}^z(T_{it}^y)E[\lambda_{it}] - \omega_{it}) w_t^K$$

$$E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}] \phi_A^t E[y_{it}] L_{it} = \frac{1}{\theta_L} (R_{it}^z(T_{it}^y)E[\lambda_{it}] - \omega_{it}) w_t^L.$$

Suppose first that the variance of $\phi_A^t$ is small. Then

$$E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}\phi_A^t] \approx E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}].$$

Alternatively, assume the variance of $\phi_A^t$ is arbitrarily large, but the farmer is risk neutral. Then $\lambda_{it} = u'(C_t; \gamma_t) = 1$, and

$$E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}\phi_A^t] = E[\phi_{it}\phi_A^t] = 1.$$

$$E[\lambda_{it}\phi_{it}] \phi_A^t E[\phi_{it}] = E[\phi_{it}] \phi_A^t = \phi_A^t.$$

In either case, divide the condition for optimal land by the condition for optimal labor:

$$\frac{L_{it}}{K_{it}} = \frac{\theta_L w_t^K}{\theta_K \phi_A^t w_t^L} = \frac{\theta_L w_t^K}{\theta_K \tilde{w}_t^L}.$$
where $\tilde{w}_i^L$ is a normalized price. Since $\phi^*_t$ does not vary within the village farmers still have equal capital-labor ratios. The effect of a positive aggregate shock is to proportionally raise or lower every farmer's demand for labor. The effect is absorbed into the price ratio; the relative price of labor rises such that the optimal capital-labor ratio is the same regardless of the shock. By a similar argument the optimal scale of each farmer also remains unchanged.

### A.4 General Model (For Online Publication)

This appendix presents a more general form of the model I use in Section 2 to derive my measures of misallocation, and also derives their asymptotic behavior. Suppose households are the sole economic actors, and as ever they live to maximize their lifetime utility from consumption. They earn income by selling or renting out the factors they own (including labor) and by operating firms. Aside from the usual budget constraint, they face potentially binding constraints on their choices of factors. For example, if no labor market exists they are constrained to use exactly their labor endowment. They may also be constrained in their period-to-period liquidity. They save and borrow at interest rates that need not be common across households, and may also have to pay an external finance premium to borrow. A household’s access to insurance may be imperfect, which means its consumption depends on the profits of its firm. Finally, households differ in their preferences (notably their risk tolerance) and the productivity of the firms they operate.

Suppose household $i$ owns and operates firm $i \in I_t$, where $I_t$ is some group of firms (a village or a sector). The household maximizes present discounted utility from consumption over an infinite horizon:

$$\max_{(c_{i,t+j}, x_{i,t+j}, I_{i,t+j})} \mathbb{E}\left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j u_i(c_{i,t+j}) \mid I_{it} \right].$$
Subject to:

\[ c_{it} + b_{i,t+1} = y_{it} + [1 + r_{it} + \zeta(z_{it} - b_{it}; b_{it}, X^o_{i,t-1})](z_{it} - b_{it}) \]  
\( \text{(Budget Const.)} \)

\[ y_{it} = f(A_{it}, \phi_{it}, X_{it}; \theta_i) \]  
\( \text{(Production)} \)

\[ z_{it} = w^T_{it}(X_{it} - X^o_{it}) + p^T_{it}I_{it} \]  
\( \text{(Expenditure)} \)

\[ X^o_{k,i,t} = (1 - \delta^k)X^o_{k,i,t-1} + I_{k,it} \quad \forall k = 1, \ldots, K \]

\[ z_{it} - b_{it} \leq \omega_{it}(b_{it}, X^o_{i,t-1}) \]  
\( \text{(Liquidity Const.)} \)

\[ \underline{X}_{it} \leq X_{it}(X_{it} - X^o_{it}, I_{it}) \leq \overline{X}_{it} \]  
\( \text{(Factor Choice Const.)} \)

where \( \mathcal{I} \) is the information set, \( f \) a strictly concave decreasing returns revenue production function, \( A \) anticipated revenue productivity, \( \phi \) unanticipated revenue productivity, \( \theta \) a vector of production parameters, \( X \) factor levels used in production, \( c \) is consumption, \( b \) borrowing, \( r \) the borrowing rate, \( \zeta(\cdot) \) an external finance premium, \( y_{it} \) revenue, \( X^o \) owned factors, \( I \) purchase of factors, \( p \) a vector of factor purchase prices, \( z \) input expenditure, and \( \omega(\cdot) \) a liquidity constraint. \( X_{it} \) is a continuously twice-differentiable factor choice transformation function, and \( \underline{X}_{it}, \overline{X}_{it} \) upper and lower bounds on (transformed) factor choice; they bound a household’s access to factors beyond those it owns (rented factors). Assume all past and currently dated variables are elements of \( \mathcal{I} \) except \( \phi \). Rental prices \( w \) and all other prices can vary by household/firm \( i \).

For notational simplicity I model insurance markets implicitly as the correlation between a household’s unanticipated productivity and its consumption (perfect insurance ensures zero correlation). I have assumed away output and asset taxes because they are not important in the empirical application; accounting for them is straightforward if the tax schedule is known.\(^{26}\)

Let \( X_{k,I} \) be the aggregate stock of factor \( k \) among the unit measure of firms in \( I_t \). Define an allocation vector as a set of \( K \)-dimensional vectors \( \{X'_{it}\}_{i \in I_t} \) such that \( \int_{i \in I_t} X'_{k,it} \, di = X_{k,I} \forall k \).

Varying factor prices and savings rates, external finance premiums, liquidity constraints, and factor choice constraints can all distort realized allocations.

\(^{26}\)For output taxes, for example, one would simply modify the budget constraint to be \( c_{it} + b_{i,t+1} = (1 - \tau_{it})y_{it} + \cdots \) and then perform all subsequent operations conditional on the presence of the taxes to account for the fact that they will continue to distort even the counterfactual optimal scenarios where market failures are eliminated.
away from the frictionless benchmark. Eliminating them separates the household problem from the firm problem and produces the production allocations of the frictionless neoclassical world. Denote outcomes in the world with no constraints or market imperfections by asterisks, and characterize it with these conditions:

(Law of One Price) \( w_{it} = w_{I_t}, p_{it} = p_{I_t}, \forall i \in I_t, m_k \forall k \)

(Unconstrained Factor Choices) \( X_{it} = X(-X^*_{o,t}, -X^*_{o,t-1}), \overline{X}_{it} = X(\infty, \infty) \forall i \in I_t \)

(Perfect Credit Markets) \( \omega_{it} = \infty, \zeta_{it}(\cdot) = 0, r_{it} = r_{I_t} \forall i \in I_t \)

(Perfect Insurance Markets) \( c_{it} \perp \phi_{it} \forall i \in I_t. \)

Under these assumptions the firm maximizes per-period expected profit independently of the household’s dynamic consumption problem:

\[
\max_{X_{it}} \mathbb{E}[f(A_{it}, \phi_{it}, X_{it}; \theta_i)] - w_{it}^T X_{it} \mid I_{it}\]

Then the following first-order conditions and market-clearing conditions characterize the unique general equilibrium outcome:

\[
\mathbb{E}[f_{X_{k,it}}(A_{it}, \phi_{it}, X^*_{it}; \theta_i)] = w_{k,I_t} \forall k \tag{8}
\]

\[
\int_{i \in I_t} X^*_{k,it}(w_{k,I_t}, A_{it}, X^*_{k-it}; \theta_i) \, di = X_{k,I_t} \forall k \tag{9}
\]

Solving these equations solves for the optimal allocation vector \( \{X^*_{it}\} \). The optimal allocations solve a system of equations that contain only observables and production parameters estimable from observables. This makes calculating the counterfactual scenario with production and factor data possible.

To solve for the outcome where factor markets are perfect I must assume unanticipated shocks are Hicks-Neutral. That is, \( y_{it} = \phi_{it} f(A_{it}, X_{it}; \theta_i) \). Since all factors are equally risky in production, imperfect insurance only affects overall expenditure and not expenditure on capital versus labor. Consider the following hypothetical: Firm \( i \in I_t \), which uses \( \bar{X}_{it} \) in production, now has those factors as “endowments.” Each firm can then trade factors with \(-i \in I \) subject to its expenditures being equal to the value of its endowment until its factor mix is optimal.
Since firms cannot change their total expenditure for a period, they again optimize period-by-period:

$$\max_{X_{it}} \mathbb{E}[\phi_{it}f(A_{it}, X_{it}; \theta_i) - w^T_{it}X_{it}]$$

Subject to:

$$w^T_{it}(X_{it} - \bar{X}_{it}) = 0$$

Essentially, I have dropped the firms into an Edgeworth economy where their profit function plays the role of a utility function. The following equations characterize the unique outcome:

$$\mathbb{E}[f_{X_k}(A_{it}, X^+_{it}; \theta_i)] = \frac{w_{k, it}}{w_{j, it}} \quad \forall k, j \quad \forall i$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

$$w^T_{it}(X_{it} - \bar{X}_{it}) = 0 \quad \forall i$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

$$\int_{i \in I_t} X^+_{k, it}(w_{k, it}, A_{it}, X^+_{-k, it}; \theta_i) \, di = X_{k, it} \quad \forall k$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Define efficiency and the gains from reallocation as in the main text. Assume anticipated productivity is also Hicks-Neutral, the production function is homogeneous, and common production parameters. I can prove this theorem about my measure of the costs of factor versus financial market failures:

**Proposition 2 (Bounding)** Assume $$y_{it} = A_{it}\phi_{it}f(X_{it}; \theta_i)$$, $$f$$ is homogeneous of degree $$\sigma$$, $$\theta_i = \theta_{it} \quad \forall i \in I_t$$, and $$\mathbb{E}[A_{it}((\tilde{X}^+_{1, it})^\sigma - (X^+_{1, it})^\sigma)] > 0$$, where $$\tilde{X}^+_{1, it}$$ is the quantity of the first factor $$i$$ would choose at time $$t$$ under Unconstrained Factor Choices and the Law of One Price without being constrained by endowments. Then $$G^{FACT}_F$$ is a lower-bound on the true gains from moving to Unconstrained Factor Choices and the Law of One Price. Likewise, $$G^{FIN}_F$$ is an upper-bound on the true gains from subsequently creating Perfect Credit and Insurance Markets.

**Proof:** Consider the (unobservable and incalculable) outcome where the Law of One Price and Unconstrained Factor Choices hold without the extra restriction of endowment conditionality. Call this the True Perfect Factor Market outcome. Denote with superscript + a variable specific with perfect factor markets and the endowment condition: the Endowment-Conditional Perfect Factor Market (ECPFDM) outcome. Let overset tilde and superscript + variables
MARKET FAILURES AND MISALLOCATION

come from the True Perfect Factor Market (TPFM) outcome. An over-bar denotes variables from to the observed/realized outcome. For notational ease, suppress the common production parameter $\theta_I$. I first prove two lemmas useful to the main result.

**Lemma 1** For any level or vector of factor choices $X_{it}$, let $\tilde{X}_{it} = X_{it}/X_{1,it}$. Then $\tilde{X}_{it}^+ = \tilde{X}_I^+$ and $\tilde{X}_{it}^- = \tilde{X}_I^-$ for all $i \in I$ (that is, all firms in both outcomes will employ factors in exactly the same proportions).

The optimality condition for ECPFM is

$$f_{X_k}(X_{it}^+) / f_{X_1}(X_{it}^+) = \frac{w_k^+}{w_1^+}.$$ 

By homogeneity,

$$\frac{X_{it}^+ f_{X_k}(X_{it}^+/X_{1,it})}{X_{it}^+ f_{X_1}(X_{it}^+/X_{1,it})} = \frac{w_k^+}{w_1^+} \forall k$$

$$\Rightarrow f_{X_k}(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) / f_{X_1}(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) = \frac{w_k^+}{w_1^+} \forall k$$

Since $f$ satisfies strictly decreasing returns, $X_{it}$ is unique and thus the $\tilde{X}_{it}$ that satisfies the above conditions is also unique for each $i,t$. But the above conditions are not functions of any variables unique to $i$ (e.g. $A_{it}$), and thus $\tilde{X}_{it} = \tilde{X}_I$ for all $i \in I_t$. A similar argument shows that $\tilde{X}_{it} = \tilde{X}_I$ for all $i \in I_t$. ■

**Lemma 2** $\tilde{X}_{it}^+ = \tilde{X}_{it}^+$ for all $i \in I_t$, that is the mixes of factors will be identical with TPFM and ECPFM.

Since $\{X_{it}^+\}$ and $\{\tilde{X}_{it}^+\}$ are both allocation vectors, each factor must aggregate to the total observed stock. For the latter, for example, for all $k$

$$\int_{i \in I_t} X_{k,it}^+ di = X_{k,It}$$

$$\Rightarrow \int_{i \in I_t} X_{1,it} \tilde{X}_{k,It}^+ di = X_{k,It}$$

$$\Rightarrow \tilde{X}_{k,It} \int_{i \in I_t} X_{1,it} di = X_{k,It}$$
\[ \Rightarrow \quad \tilde{X}_{k,It} = X_{k,It} \]
\[ \Rightarrow \quad \hat{X}_{k,It} = \frac{X_{k,It}}{X_{1,It}}\]

where the second line follows from Lemma 1. Parallel arguments show that
\[ \hat{X}_{k,It} = \frac{X_{k,It}}{X_{1,It}}. \]
Then
\[ \hat{X}_{k,It} = \tilde{X}_{k,It} \quad \forall k \]

implying \[ \hat{X}_{It} = \tilde{X}_{It}. \]

To prove the main result, write the difference between the TPFM and ECPFM outcome as

\[ \tilde{Y}_{It}^+ - Y_{It}^+ = \int_{i \in I_t} A_{it} \phi_{it} f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) \, di - \int_{i \in I_t} A_{it} \phi_{it} f(X_{it}^+) \, di \]
\[ = \mathbb{E}[A_{it} \phi_{it} f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+)] - \mathbb{E}[A_{it} \phi_{it} f(X_{it}^+)] \]
\[ = \mathbb{E}[A_{it} \phi_{it} f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) - f(X_{it}^+)] \]
\[ = \mathbb{E}[\phi_{it} \mathbb{E}[A_{it} \{ f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) - f(X_{it}^+) \}]] \]
\[ = \mathbb{E}[A_{it} \{ f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) - f(X_{it}^+) \}] \]

where the second equality comes from the measure 1 normalization, the fourth the independence of anticipated and unanticipated variables, and the fifth the unit mean normalization of \( \phi_{it} \).

By the homogeneity of \( f \) and Lemma 1,

\[ f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) = (\tilde{X}_{1,it}^+)^a f(\tilde{X}_{1,it}^+) \]
\[ f(X_{it}^+) = (X_{1,it}^+)^a f(X_{1,it}^+) \]

and by Lemma 2 \( f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) = f(\tilde{X}_{it}^+) = a \). Applying these results to the above expressions, we have that
\[ \bar{Y}_{ti}^+ - Y_{t_i}^+ = \mathbb{E}[A_{it}\{f(\bar{X}_{it}^+ - f(X_{it}^+))\}] = \mathbb{E}[A_{it}\{(\bar{X}_{1, it}^+)^\sigma a - (X_{1, it}^+)^\sigma a\}] = a\mathbb{E}[A_{it}\{(\bar{X}_{1, it}^+)^\sigma - (X_{1, it}^+)^\sigma\}] \]

Since \( a > 0 \) and \( \mathbb{E}[A_{it}\{(\bar{X}_{1, it}^+)^\sigma - (X_{1, it}^+)^\sigma\}] > 0 \) by assumption, TPFM output is greater than in the ECPF result, and so the calculated gains will be as well.

QED

Now suppose that consistent estimators of \( \{A_{it}, \phi_{it}, \theta_{ti}\} \) are available. Then it is a numerical exercise to solve the sample analogs of (8) and (9) for estimates of the CCM allocations and (10), (11), and (12) for sample analogs of the PFM allocations. Plug the computed allocations into the expressions for efficiency and the gains. The following proposition summarizes the asymptotic properties of these estimators:

**Proposition 3** Suppose \( \hat{I} \) is a random sample of \( I \), and define \( \hat{E}_i, \hat{E}_i^{FACT}, \hat{E}_i^{FIN} \), and the estimators of the other components as described above. Finally, assume the expectations and variances of \( A_{it}, \phi_{it}, \theta_{ti}, y_{it}, X_{it} \) are finite. Then the estimators are all consistent and asymptotically normal.

**Proof:**

**Consistency:** I will prove the consistency of \( \hat{E}_i \); demonstrating the consistency of the other estimators is similar. Suppress time subscripts for notational simplicity. I will first identify the population parameters in terms of their moments, and then demonstrate that the sample analogs are consistent estimators.

Recall that (8) characterizes any interior solution to the population optimization - in other words, if an interior solution exists, the function \( X^*(A_i, \theta_i, w_I) \) characterizes firm \( i \)'s optimal allocation as a function of \( i \)-specific parameters and the prices. Since \( f \) is concave and satisfies DRS, the solution is not only interior but also unique. Moreover, the Maximum Theorem Under Convexity (see Sundaram, 1996, p. 237) guarantees that \( X^* \) is a continuous function of the population prices \( w_I \) (see the Lemma below). Inspection demonstrates that the optimality conditions are identical for the sample optimization, and thus the
derived $X^*$ is as well.

Applying the measure-one normalization, (9) in population reduces to

$$E[X^*(A_i, \theta_i, w_I)] = E[X_i].$$

Note that the sample analog of (9) in random sample $\hat{I}$ reduces to the sample analog of this moment condition trivially:

$$\sum_{i \in \hat{I}} X^*(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{w}_I) = \sum_{i \in \hat{I}} X_i$$

Since \{\hat{A}_i\}, \{\hat{\theta}_i\} are consistent estimators for the population technology parameters, then together with the Lemma below this implies that $\hat{w}_I$ is a consistent GMM estimator for $w_I$.

Applying the measure 1 normalization to the definition of $E$, we have

$$E[I] = \frac{\mathbb{E}[y_i]}{\mathbb{E}[f(A_i, \phi_i, X^*(A_i, \theta_i, w_I); \theta_i)]}$$

while the estimator of $E$ is

$$\hat{E}_I = \frac{\sum_{i \in I} y_i}{\sum_{i \in I} f(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\phi}_i, X^*(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{w}_I); \hat{\theta}_i)} = \frac{\sum_{i \in I} y_i}{|I|} \frac{\sum_{i \in I} f(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\phi}_i, X^*(\hat{A}_i, \hat{\theta}_i, \hat{w}_I); \hat{\theta}_i)}{|I|}.$$
population ratio. Thus, $\hat{E}_I$ is consistent for $E_I$.

**Lemma (Price Estimator and GMM Consistency):** Consider each of the requirements for consistency in turn.

**Consistent Weighting Matrix:** There are exactly as many market-clearing conditions as prices, implying the estimator is just-identified and thus the weighting matrix irrelevant.

**Global Identification:** Recall that the optimal outcome will be identical to the solution to the planner’s problem. By the assumption that $f$ satisfies decreasing returns, this will be a strictly concave optimization with a unique maximizer $\{X_i\}$. By (8), the condition $f_X(X^*_i) = w$ is satisfied for all $i$. Since $f_X$ is a function, the uniqueness of $X^*_i$ implies the uniqueness of $w$. Thus, $w$ uniquely satisfies the market-clearing conditions.

**$X^*(w)$ Is Continuous at all $w$:** Observe that $X^*$ is the solution to $i$’s optimization problem, and thus it suffices to show the conditions of the Maximum Theorem hold (see Sundaram, 1996, p. 237). Observe that since $f$ is assumed continuous in $X_i$, the continuity condition is satisfied, so one need only show that the constraint set is a compact-valued continuous function of $w$. The firm is implicitly constrained to choose positive values of all factors, so 0 is a lower bound. Meanwhile, since $f$ satisfies decreasing returns, for each $w_k$ there exists some $\bar{X}_k(w_k)$ such that $f(0, \ldots, \bar{X}_k(w_k), \ldots, 0) - w_k\bar{X}_k(w_k) = -100$. Define $W(w) = \sum_k w_k\bar{X}_k(w_k)$. Since the firm always can choose zero of all factors and earn profit zero, we can impose that $w^T X_i \leq W(w)$ and the outcome will be identical to that of the unconstrained problem. This “budget constraint” is like any other from consumer theory and thus continuous, and is closed and bounded (thus compact) for all $w$. Thus, $X^*$ is continuous by the Maximum Theorem.

**$w \in \Theta$, Which Is Compact:** Since $f_X > 0$ by assumption, $w >> 0$. Then some $\varepsilon > 0$ exists such that $w >> (\varepsilon, \ldots, \varepsilon)$. Meanwhile, aggregate demand $E[X^*_k(A_i, \theta_i, w_I)]$ for any factor $k$ is continuous and strictly decreasing in $w_k$. Then some $\bar{w}$ exists such that $E[X^*(A_i, \theta_i, \bar{w}_I)] = E[X_i]/2$, and $\bar{w}_k > w_k$ for all $k$. Then $w \in [\varepsilon, w_1] \times \cdots \times [\varepsilon, w_K]$, a closed and bounded subset of $\mathbb{R}^K$, which is thus compact.

$E[\sup_{w \in \Theta} ||X^*(w)||] < \infty$ : Note that $X^*$ is determined by the satisfaction
of (8) (and the non-negativity constraint). Since $f_{X_k}$ is strictly decreasing (by strict concavity) and strictly positive (by assumption), for any finite $w$, either the condition will be satisfied by some finite positive $X^*$ or the non-negativity constraint will bind and $X^*$ will have one or more zero elements. Observe that $\Theta$ as defined above is closed and bounded, so any $w \in \Theta$ is finite.

**Asymptotic Normality:** I again prove the result only for $\hat{E}_I$; similar algebra and applications of limiting statistics prove the result for the other estimators.\(^{27}\) Suppress time subscripts for notational simplicity.

$$
\sqrt{I}(\hat{E}_I - E_I) = \sqrt{I} \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in I} y_i}{\sum_{i \in I} y_i^*} - \frac{\mathbb{E}[y_i]}{\mathbb{E}[y_i^*]} \right) \\
= \sqrt{I} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \sum_{i \in I} y_i - \mathbb{E}[y_i] \sum_{i \in I} y_i^*}{\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \sum_{i \in I} y_i^*} \right) \\
= \sqrt{I} \left( \frac{\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \bar{y}_i - \mathbb{E}[y_i] \bar{y}_i^*}{\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \bar{y}_i^*} \right) \\
= \sqrt{I} \left( \mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \bar{y}_i - \mathbb{E}[y_i] \bar{y}_i^* \right) \\
= \left[ \mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \cdot \sqrt{I} \left( \bar{y}_i - \mathbb{E}[y_i] \right) - \mathbb{E}[y_i] \cdot \sqrt{I} \left( \bar{y}_i^* - \mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \right) \right] (\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] \bar{y}_i^*)^{-1}
$$

By Kolmogorov’s Law of Large Numbers and the Continuous mapping theorem, $C \xrightarrow{p} \mathbb{E}[y_i^*]^{-2}$. By the Lindeberg-Lévy Central Limit Theorem, $A \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \sigma_y)$ and $B \xrightarrow{d} N(0, \sigma_{y^*})$ for some finite $\sigma_y, \sigma_{y^*}$. Then by the Mann-Wald Continuous Mapping Theorem and the replication property of the normal distribution, $(\mathbb{E}[y_i^*] A - \mathbb{E}[y_i] B)$ is asymptotically normal. Finally, by the Slutsky Transformation Theorem, the product of this term and $C$ is also asymptotically normal.

---

\(^{27}\)For example, the gains from reallocation are actually a continuous function of $E$: $\hat{G}_{\hat{I}} = \frac{1}{\hat{E}_I} - 1$. Simply apply the Delta method to prove the asymptotic normality of $\hat{G}_{\hat{I}}$. 

A.5 More Details on Estimating the Production Function (For Online Publication)

This appendix explains why I use the Anderson-Hsiao estimator instead of fixed-effects and shows measurement error in the factors of production might not bias my estimates of the production function too badly under plausible assumptions.

5.1 Fixed-Effects Versus Anderson-Hsiao

Farmers have individual invariant productivity terms, so the standard approach is to estimate the production function

\[ y_{it} = A_{it} \phi_{it} K_{it}^\alpha T_{it}^\beta L_{it}^\lambda \]

in logs using fixed-effects (the within estimator). In other words, sub (6) and (7) into the logged production function, and estimate by OLS

\[
\log y_{it} = [\text{Household Fixed Effect]}_i + a^H [\text{Hunger]}_{it} + \sum_j a^S_j [\text{Dummy Shocks}]_{j,it} \\
+ \sum_k a^D_k [\text{District - Year Dummies}]_{k,it} + \sum_m a^R_m [\text{Monthly Precipitation}]_{m,it} \\
+ \theta_K \log K_{it} + \theta_T \log T_{it} + \theta_L \log L_{it} + [\text{Overall Error}]_{it}.
\] (13)

However, the consistency of the estimates requires what Wooldridge (2002) calls the strict exogeneity assumption:

\[ \mathbb{E}[[\text{Overall Error}]_{is} \mid K_{it}, T_{it}, L_{it}] = 0 \quad \forall s, t = 1, \ldots, T \]

The unexplained productivity component [\text{Overall Error}]_{it} must be completely cross-temporally uncorrelated with the regressors of interest, in particular the productive factors.

To see why this might be problematic, consider a farmer who gets a bad unobserved shock because he accidentally used too much fertilizer. Then al-
though the accident will not affect contemporaneous or past factor input choices (because it is unpredictable), it might affect future input choices if the resulting low yield drives him to sell land or capital for food. A drop in the possession of these factors would be informative about an earlier bad productivity shock. If the unobserved shock is big relative to household income then OLS will estimate production shares inconsistently.

Instead I make a weaker assumption of sequential exogeneity Wooldridge (2002). Sequential exogeneity only requires that factor levels be uncorrelated with future values of unexplained productivity:

$$E[(\text{Overall Error})_{is} | K_{it}, T_{it}, L_{it}] = 0 \quad \forall t = 1, \ldots, T \text{ and } s \leq t$$

A bad shock last year can affect capital stock this year as in the previous example without damaging consistency. Problems only arise if farmers anticipate some part of the error term, like a technological innovation they acquire but I do not observe. If farmers buy more land or capital to exploit the innovation the estimator will not be consistent. Large technological innovations are unlikely in Thailand and affect everyone, so the time and time-district dummies should capture them. Assuming sequential exogeneity is the same as assuming $\hat{A}_{it}$ completely captures the anticipated component of TFP. I must assume as much, anyways, for the optimal allocation I compute to be accurate.

To implement the assumption I first-difference away the fixed component and instrument the differenced factors with their lagged levels. The first stage of the regression for capital is

$$\Delta \log K_{it} = +b^H \Delta [\text{Hunger}]_{it} + \sum_j b_j^S \Delta [\text{Dummy Shocks}]_{j,it}$$
$$+ \sum_k b_k^P \Delta [\text{District - Year Dummies}]_{k,it} + \sum_m b_m^R \Delta [\text{Monthly Precipitation}]_{m,it}$$
$$+ \nu_K \log K_{it} + \nu_T \log T_{it} + \nu_L \log L_{it} + \Delta [\text{Overall Error}]_{it}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

and the second stage is
\[
\Delta \log y_{it} = a^H \Delta [Hunger]_{it} + \sum_j a^S_j \Delta [Dummy Shocks]_{j,it} \\
+ \sum_k a^D_k [District - Year Dummies]_{k,it} + \sum_m a^R_m \Delta [Monthly Precipitation]_{m,it} \\
+ \theta_K \Delta \log K_{it} + \theta_T \Delta \log T_{it} + \theta_L \Delta \log L_{it} + \Delta [Overall Error]_{it}.
\] (15)

The identification assumption is

\[
\mathbb{E}[(\log K_{i,t-1})[Overall Error]_{i,t-1}] = \mathbb{E}[(\log K_{i,t-1})[Overall Error]_{i,t}] = 0
\]

and so on for land and labor, as well.

### 5.2 Measurement Error in Factor Choices

Given how I construct the measures of capital and labor, measurement error is likely. In this appendix I show that if the measurement error is persistent it will not bias the estimates of the production elasticities. The error is most likely to be persistent in capital because I construct it using the asset ownership table.

Suppose the error \( \varsigma \) follows an autoregressive process, relates the true value to the observed value multiplicatively, and is independent of the true value. For simplicity, focus on capital and ignore TFP modifiers as well as labor and land; this simplification should not qualitatively affect the argument. Formally, let \( K^o_{it} \) be the observed value of capital and suppose

\[
\log y_{it} = c_i + \alpha \log K_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \\
K_{it} = \exp(\varsigma_{it})K^o_{it} \\
\varsigma_{it} = \rho \varsigma_{i,t-1} + \xi_{it}
\]

Assume that \( \rho \) is close to 1 and \( \xi_{it} \) is small; that is, the error is highly persistent over time. This assumption is plausible because of the way I calculate factor stocks. A household’s level of capital, for example, is computed by back-
ward depreciating the most recent purchase of each asset type and aggregating. Any error introduced by associating latest purchase price with productive value would be carried through to previous years.

The primary regression equation is then

\[
\Delta \log y_{it} = \alpha \Delta \log K_{it} + \Delta \varepsilon_{it}
\]

\[= \alpha \Delta \log K_{o, it} + \Delta \varepsilon_{it} - \alpha(1 - \rho)\zeta_{i,t-1} + \xi_{it}.
\]

The first-stage regression is

\[
\Delta \log K_{it} = \pi K \log K_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

\[\Rightarrow \Delta \log K_{o, it} = \pi K \log K_{o, i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it} + \pi k \zeta_{i,t-1}.
\]

The estimate of \(\pi_k\) will be attenuated because of the correlation between \(K_{o, i,t-1}\) and the lagged measurement error terms. But this will not matter as long as the first-stage remains strong, and the results suggest it is.

More important is that the lagged level of capital is correlated with \(-\alpha(1 - \rho)\zeta_{i,t-1} + \xi_{it}\). But under the assumptions, this lagged error term is small (because \(1 - \rho\) and \(\xi\) are small), so the bias of the IV estimator will be small as long as the first-stage is strong.

The intuition is simple: when the measurement error is persistent, it is captured by the fixed-effect so the parameter estimates are unbiased. What then happens to the estimates of efficiency when these fixed-effects make up some portion of anticipated TFP? Assuming the measurement error is independent of the true fixed component of anticipated TFP, it will almost certainly bias estimated misallocation upwards. To see why, assume the extreme case where markets are complete and contingent, so the observed outcome is perfectly efficient. My noisy estimates of TFP will produce a noisy computation of the efficient outcome; this will differ from the realized outcome, so the measure will erroneously mark the perfectly efficient allocation as inefficient. The true mis-allocation in rural Thailand may be even lower than I find.

Although measurement error in capital probably will be very persistent, that
need not hold for labor. I observe family labor only on the extensive margin. If a household member changes how much time he works in the fields each year the error in measured labor will not be persistent. This error is admittedly a limitation of my data.

A.6 Specification Tests (For Online Publication)

This appendix runs simple tests of whether the production function is approximately isoelastic (Cobb-Douglas) and whether my measure of anticipated productivity actually captures the farmer’s ability to farm.

6.1 Is the Production Function Isoelastic?

The Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of the class of constant-elasticity production functions where the elasticity of substitution $\epsilon$ between factors is 1 (hence alternative label “isoelastic”). I follow the procedure in Udry (1996) and suppose

$$y_{it} = A_{it} \phi_{it} \left[ \alpha K_{it}^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} + \beta T_{it}^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} + (1 - \alpha - \beta)L_{it}^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}}$$

(16)

where $\sigma$ denotes the returns to scale. For computational simplicity I assume $A_{it} = A_{i} e^{\vartheta t}$, the product of a fixed effect and a time trend. Take logs of both sides and subtract away the within household mean to eliminate the fixed-effect.

Column 1 of Table A.I reports the results of estimating the transformed equation with nonlinear least squares. The test of interest is whether $\epsilon$ differs substantially from 1. As (1) of Table A.I indicates, this null is actually rejected. However, the point estimate is almost identical to one ($\hat{\epsilon} = 1.013$) and rejection occurs mainly because the variance of these estimates is very small. The envelope theorem guarantees misallocation does not change much with small changes in the elasticity of substitution, so a tiny deviation from Cobb-Douglas production should not change the results much.

Of course, the ideal estimator is not fixed-effects but the nonlinear equivalent of Anderson-Hsiao: applying GMM to the first-differenced form of (16) using legged factors as instruments. Unfortunately this estimator does not con-
**Table A.I**

CES Production Function Estimates

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<tr>
<td>NLS</td>
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<td>$\epsilon$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\vartheta$</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
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| N        | 775.000   |
| NT       | 6230.000  |
| Pval: $\epsilon = 1$ | 0.061 |

*Note: Estimated using fixed-effects nonlinear least-squares. Standard errors are bootstrapped with resampling at the household-level.*
verge, which may itself be a sign that the data reject the extra parameters. To make a comparison easier I report in Table A.II fixed-effects estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The main difference with the dynamic panel estimates is that the coefficient on land is larger and that on labor is smaller. It is not surprising that these two estimates would be different, as they are precisely the sorts of factors for which strict exogeneity fails. A farmer might sell land and take his kids out of school after a bad shock. Nevertheless, the returns-to-scale is nearly identical, and this is the parameter that governs how much overall misallocation I find. The CES estimate is within two standard errors of the fixed-effects and dynamic panel estimates.

### 6.2 Are Factor Markets Perfect?

I derive a second test for whether markets are perfect, this one using the mixes of factors. Take Expression 2 and add a term for measurement error:

\[
\frac{T_{it}}{K_{it}} = \frac{\theta_T w^K_{it}}{\theta_K w^T_{it}} + \varepsilon_{it} = v_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} 
\]

The land-capital ratio is a function of invariant parameters, noise, and prices that do not vary within a village with perfect factor markets. If markets are perfect it should not be correlated with anything—in particular, the levels of any factor—after controlling for village-year fixed-effects. Table A.III shows that the capital-labor, capital-land, and land-labor ratios are each strongly correlated with the level of at least one factor. I reject the null in five of nine coefficients, which means I can reject perfect markets. Although the markets cause little

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>Returns to scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.III
Test of Imperfect Markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>-5.504***</td>
<td>-299.477***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(45.94)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>-1.411**</td>
<td>-1.080</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 6230 6230 6230
Households 775 775 775

Note: Under perfect markets the ratios of factor choices should not be correlated with anything after controlling for village-year fixed-effects. I report the results of such regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.

6.3 Is $A_{it}$ Really a Valid Measure of Productivity?

Anticipated productivity $A_{it}$ almost wholly determines a farmer’s allocation with perfect markets. If $A_{it}$ is a bad measure of true productivity, the optimal allocations I compute could be completely wrong. If $A_{it}$ actually measures a farmer’s productivity it should be correlated with individual and village characteristics that make a farmer more productive.

For example, if $A_{it}$ is capturing actual productivity it should be higher in areas with climate and soil better suited to growing rice. And if years spent in school raise productivity, it should also be higher for more educated farmers. Table A.IV shows a regression of anticipated TFP $\hat{A}_{it}$ on province dummies and two proxies: an index of agro-climactic suitability for rice and the farmer’s schooling. For schooling I focus on primary education, as basic skills like literacy matter most in farming. The results indicate that TFP is indeed strongly positively correlated with climactic suitability, and also correlated with the farmer’s education.
Table A.IV
Partial Correlations of Anticipated TFP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>log ( \hat{A} )</td>
<td>b/se</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schooling (years)</td>
<td>0.058***</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond Primary</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Suitability</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>775,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( NT )</td>
<td>6216,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The regression shows the correlation between predictors of productivity and my estimates of anticipated productivity. I cluster standard errors by household and include province dummies. Primary Schooling (years) represents the number of grades of primary school the household head has completed, where someone who has completed any grades in secondary school (Matthayom) is assumed to have completed six years of primary school (Prathom). Beyond Primary is a dummy for additional schooling, and Rice Suitability a district-level agro-climactic index.

6.4 Does Dropping the Assumption of Labor Substitutability Change the Results?

Suppose some imperfection makes hired labor less productive than family labor. For example, hired farm hands might shirk when the farmer is not watching. We can treat this monitoring problem as a factor market imperfection that would not exist with perfect factor markets. To be precise, suppose the production elasticity \( \theta_L \) is the elasticity of family labor, meaning labor with no monitoring problem. Each unit of hired labor \( L^H \) is worth only \( f(L^H) \leq 1 \) units of family labor. I choose these functional forms to be concrete; they are not crucial to the argument. Then observed output is

\[
y_{it} = K_{it}^{\theta_K} T_{it}^{\theta_T} [L_{it}^{F} + f(L_{it}^{H})]^{\theta_L}.
\]

Perfecting the market would raise output through two channels: the gains from making hired workers more productive, and the gains from reallocation. Since this paper aims to measure misallocation I need to isolate the second
channel. I define the gains from reallocation as

\[ G = \frac{Y^* - Y^H}{Y^H} \]

where \( Y^H \) is output with the original allocations but all workers are as productive as family workers. Then \( Y^* \) is output with both perfect allocations and fully productive workers.

With perfect markets labor substitutability holds and the optimal allocations derived in Section 2.3 are still valid. But since I assume hired labor is as productive as family labor—\( f(L^H) = L^H \)—I have created measurement error that will bias the production elasticity of labor downward. Rather than estimating the gains from effective family labor \( \theta_L \) I estimate some combination of the gains from family labor and hired labor. If I knew the true elasticity I could define

\[
Y^H_t = \sum_i A_{it} \phi_{it} \bar{K}_{it}^{\theta_K} \bar{T}_{it}^{\theta_T} \bar{L}_{it}^{\theta_L}
\]

\[
Y^* = \sum_i A_{it} \phi_{it} (K^*_{it})^{\theta_K} (T^*_{it})^{\theta_T} (L^*_{it})^{\theta_L}
\]

where factor choices with bars are those I observe the farmer choose and factor choices with stars are the optimal allocations. Since I do not know the true elasticity I assume my biased estimate of the elasticity \( \tilde{\theta}_L = (1 + \gamma)\theta_L \) for some multiplier \( \gamma \). I then recalculate \( G \) for different values of \((1 + \gamma)\) and graph the results in Figure A.I.

Raising the elasticity raises the gains from reallocation. This does not mean the original estimates were wrong. The gains would rise even if the original estimates were right because changing the estimates makes marginal products look unequal and thus gives the illusion of misallocation. But changing the estimates does bound how much bias might be caused by falsely assuming hired labor is as efficient as household labor.

Figure A.I shows that even if the true \( \theta_L \) is 25 percent higher than my estimate, misallocation in 1996 only rises from 15 percent to 20 percent. Misallocation in 2008 changes even less, from about 4 percent to about 4.5 percent. In short, although dropping the assumption of labor substitutability does cause me to find more misallocation the difference is relatively small.
A.7 Data Appendix (For Online Publication)

7.1 Village (or higher) Level Variables

International Rice Prices From the IMF’s commodity price data. I took the yearly average.

Village Wage Rates From Section V of the annual household survey.

For 1996: For each household, find any worker in the ”other” category who lists their occupation as related to "labor" or "labour" and compute their daily wage. Construct medians by village, subdistrict, etc.

For 1997-2008: For each household, find any worker listed as general agricultural laborer of any sort or in the ”other” category reporting an occupation related to “labor” or “labour” and compute their daily wage. Construct medians by village, subdistrict, etc.

Village Population From Section iii of the annual key informant survey. Survey records both number of households and population of the village.
Precipitation I obtained gridded monthly rainfall estimates to cover Thailand from 1996 through 2008. The estimates for 1996 and 1997 were .5 x .5 lat-long degree grids from the University of Delaware Climate Project’s Terrestrial Precipitation Gridded Monthly Time Series. Those for the rest of the year were .25 x .25 lat-long degree grids from NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (Product 3B-43). I used ArcGIS’s Topo-to-Raster tool to create an interpolated raster for the rainfall data. I then used district-level boundaries from the Global Administrative Areas Project (GADM) to construct district-level monthly averages. I converted the levels to fractional deviations from the mean for each month (where the monthly mean was computed over the sample period). The rainfall shocks relevant for a particular year match the survey response period (so rainfall in 1996 is rainfall from May 1996 through April 1997).

Rice Suitability Index I obtained the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Agro-Ecological Zone (GAEZ) data for the climactic suitability of rice and maize. The data for rice suitability came from Plate 38: Suitability for rain-fed and irrigated Rice (high input). The data for maize suitability came from Plate 30: Suitability for rain-fed Grain Maize (intermediate inputs). I computed a zonal mean for each district: an average value indexing the climate suitability of the district for each crop. I inverted the index so higher values correspond to greater suitability.

7.2 Household-Level Variables
7.2.1 Factors of Production

Land I use the land cultivation data from Section XIV (Landholdings) of the Annual Household Survey. Households report the quantity and value of land they cultivate (regardless of ownership) by use; that is, they separately report land for rice, field crops, orchards, and vegetables. I total the area of the plots for each use and mark this as the land cultivated for each crop. I also deflate the reported value of the plots and total for each crop to form the value of the land owned.

Capital Owned Mechanical Capital: I use Section XII (Agricultural Assets) of
the Annual Household Survey. The survey reports the number of assets of each type, where I group the following assets into broad categories by depreciation rates: tractors (walking tractors, large and small four-wheel tractors), machines (sets, sprinklers, and threshing machines) and structures (crop storage buildings). I depreciate tractors like vehicles, so the depreciation rates I use are 2 percent for structures, 10 percent for machines, and 20 percent for tractors. I correct clear errors in the series of asset classes where an asset disappears and reappears without any record of a sale or appears and disappears without any record of a purchase. I then construct the value of assets owned at the beginning of the first survey round by deflating and depreciating the purchase price by the year of purchase. I then attempt to follow each asset over time, where I label a piece of equipment a separate asset if the quantity of a certain type of equipment rises from zero to some positive number. I unfortunately must treat the addition of new pieces of equipment to an existing stock as identical to the existing assets of that class; but it is fairly rare that a household has more than one piece of equipment of a certain class. I then assign a "price" to each asset with the sale value at the very latest transaction date I can find for it (where the initial value in the first survey round is also considered a transaction). I adjust that price for depreciation in preceding and following years and compute the asset value in a given year by multiplying the price by the quantity held. [Recall the quantity is almost always one if the household owns any.] If I cannot identify a price, I am forced to drop the asset from my calculations. [In rare cases where I can identify a year of acquisition but not a price, I use the intertemporal median of village, sub-district, or district medians for the equipment type.] I then aggregate the value of all assets for each household in each year to construct the value of owned mechanical capital.

**Buffalos:** I assume buffalo are the only animal used to harvest rice and compute the value of buffalo using the appropriate responses from Section XII (Agricultural Assets) of the Annual Household Survey. The household reports the total current value of all buffalos owned, which I deflate. Missing values for this variable generally mean the question does not apply (e.g. the household owns no buffalo), so I treat missing values as zero.
Capital Expenses: For rented capital, maintenance expenses, and intermediate inputs (which I treat as capital) I use the portion on farm expenses in Section XVI (Income) of the Annual Household Survey. After deflating all currency, I compute intermediate inputs as the sum of expenses on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides/herbicides, and fuel. I then rescale the value of rented capital by a user cost: the depreciation rate plus an interest rate, which I set as 4 percent in line with the literature. It may seem strange to assume a common interest rate given the possibility of financial market failures; but recall my objective is to create a consistent measure of the productive value of the capital owned. Allowing the productive value of a tractor to vary based on the household’s borrowing cost makes no sense. I do not know how much of the rental cost goes to machines versus vehicles, so I take the depreciation rate as the average of the rates for each type of asset. Finally, I add the value of maintenance expenses, which is investment (recall I assume investment is immediately productive).

Total capital is the sum of the value of owned mechanical capital, buffalos, and capital expenses.

Labor Family Labor: I first construct the quantity of family labor using Section V (Occupation) of the Annual Household Survey. In each year I count the number of household members who report being unpaid family laborers in their primary occupation and report farming of any sort as their primary or secondary occupation (or report working in the "FIELDS" if their occupation is not categorized). (Some farmers grow several types of crops, but the survey only allows two responses for occupation. To deal with this problem, I reason that a household growing rice will use its working family members on all of its fields, so any family member who works in the fields necessarily works in rice.) I define the number of family workers as the number of household members who satisfy this criterion. I have no intensive margin information on how much the household works, so I assume all members work sixty days of the year in the fields (the median number of days worked from the two years of the Monthly Household Survey available at the time of writing). I aggregate the per-member days worked for each household-year to compute the quantity of family labor. (In other
words, I multiply the number of family workers by the median days an individual works on their fields conditional on working at all.)

**Hired Labor:** The only measure of hired labor is the expenditure on wages recorded among the farm expenses in Section XVI (Income) of the Annual Household Survey. I divide the total expenses on wages by the village-level median daily wage (see above) to construct a measure of days worked by hired labor. Total labor is simply the sum of family and hired labor.

### 7.2.2 Productivity Modifiers

**Catastrophes/Bad Income Shocks** I use the questions about bad income years from Section II (Risk Response) of the Annual Household Survey. The household reports the worst of the last several years for income (including the response year), and the reason for it being atypically bad. If a household chooses the response year as the worst, I mark it as suffering one of the following catastrophes based on the reason it gives:

- Reports bad income this year due to illness
- Reports bad income this year due to death in family
- Reports bad income this year due to retirement
- Reports bad income this year due to flooding
- Reports bad income this year due to crop-eating pests
- Reports bad income this year due to poor rainfall
- Reports bad income this year due to low yield for other reasons
- Reports bad income this year due to low price for output

**Hunger/Undernourishment** I have no direct measure of calories and instead adapt the notion of the staple budget share (SBS) introduced by Jensen and Miller (2010). I use consumption expenditure data from Section XV (Expenditure) to compute the fraction of the household’s budget spent on the staple food in Thailand: rice. This measure includes the value of rice the household grew itself. The intuition behind this measure is that as a household becomes wealthier (and less hungry) it substitutes away
from the staple crop towards other foods (which are superior goods). The higher the SBS, the more likely it is the household is hungry.

### 7.2.3 Other Variables

**Revenue** I use the questions about gross income from Section XVI (Income) of the Annual Household Survey. Households report their revenue from each of several sources, including rice farming and other agricultural activities. Enumerators explicitly reminded households to include the value of crops they produced and then consumed. I deflated and constructed income variables for each of the following sources: Rice Farming, Corn Farming, Vegetable Farming, Orchard Farming, Other Farming.

**Education** I use the questions about age and education from Section IV (Household Composition) of the Annual Household Survey. I keep information about the age, highest grade completed, and school system of the household head. I defined separate variables for number of years spent in primary school (generally from 1-6 for P1-P6), number of years spent in secondary school (generally 1-6 for M1-M6, unless the individual chose the vocational rather than academic track, in which case I set years of secondary school to 3), years of vocational school (from 1-3 for PWC1-PWC3, PWS1-PWS3, or PWT1-PWT3), and years of university (from 1-4).

**Rice Farming Experience** Households report the number of years spent at their primary occupation in Section V (Occupation) of the Annual Household Survey. I record the years spent for individuals who report rice farming as their primary occupation and categorize themselves as ”owners” of the business. I take this as a measure of the rice-farming experience of the household (head). In the rare cases where multiple household members claim to be the owner of a rice-farming business, I take the median as the household-level experience.

**Constraints** I use the questions on farm expansion from Section XII (Agricultural Assets) of the Annual Household Survey. A household is labeled as ”constrained” if it reports there is room for profitable expansion in its business. I label it credit-constrained if it reports insufficient money for
labor, land, or equipment among the reasons for not expanding. I label it factor-constrained if it reports not enough land or labor (a distinct response from insufficient money) among the reasons for not expanding. A household can be both credit- and factor-constrained. I further label households as exclusively credit- or factor-constrained if they report a constraint in one but not the other.

**Risk-Aversion** In 2003 the survey started posing to households a hypothetical choice between staying at their current income forever and taking a job that with 50-50 chance pays either double or two-thirds their current income. If they choose their current job the interviewer gives them the same choice except the alternate job now has a 50-50 chance of paying either double or 80 percent of their current income. If the respondent chose his current job for both questions I marked it as having “high risk aversion.” Since the question was not asked in 1996, I use the 2003 question in Section 6.

**Savings** I use Section XIX (Savings) of the annual household survey. I take the total savings each household has deposited with commercial banks, agricultural cooperatives, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, PCG village funds, and a rice bank.