Organizing Communities: Institutions, Networks, Groups

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American Muslims are developing institutions, networks, and groups with social, economic, and political as well as religious power. An overview of the historical and contemporary American Muslim landscape precedes discussion of the many organizational forms. Institutions include mosques, schools, religious organizations, and political organizations in the United States. Networks include diasporic or transnational movements and less formal associations that also tend to be transnational. Groups include voluntary associations and groupings based on ethnicity, national origin, or gender in the United States.

OVERVIEW

Indigenous African American Muslims were arguably the first in the United States to mobilize on the basis of Islam, in the early twentieth century, as they looked for new identities in “Asiatic” origins and Islam. As African Americans moved north in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and tried to establish themselves economically, they sought alternatives to white and Christian domination by founding several religious and political movements based on Islam. Of the two early African American Muslim movements [see the Appendix at the end of the chapter], the Moorish Science Temple of America (1913) and the Nation of Islam (1930), the second, more powerful NOI encouraged the rejection of American citizenship, voting, and service in the military. The MSTA, while providing cards identifying members as Moorish citizens, did not deny U.S. citizenship or reject participation in American politics. Although in both movements contact with Arab Muslim immigrants furnished some impetus and provided some content, little significant interaction occurred between indigenous African American Muslims and Muslim immigrants until the arrival of a few dedicated Ahmadiyya missionaries from British India in the 1920s. The Ahmadis, followers of a charismatic late nineteenth-century teacher in northwestern India
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whose movement sent missionaries abroad, gave these African American movements access to the Ahmadiyya English-language translation of the Qur’an and some of the “Old World” teachings.¹

Arab immigrants were next to mobilize as Muslims in North America. Arab Muslims, along with larger numbers of Arab Christians, came to the United States in the late nineteenth century. These first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants established mosques in Detroit, Michigan, starting in the 1920s,² and, along with newly arrived foreign students, they initiated broader organizations in the 1950s and 1960s.³ The leaders of these – the Federation of Islamic Associations and the Muslim Students Association organizations⁴ – mobilized to maintain and transmit their religion in Canada as well as the United States. Not only was their focus directed toward members of their families and communities; they also sought to change American misconceptions about Islam and influence foreign policies, especially regarding Palestine. As immigrants from South Asia arrived and Arab immigrants continued to arrive, new religious organizations formed, the most recent initiated by American Shi’a Muslims.

After the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act that spurred immigration to the United States by Muslims from all over the world, American Muslims increased their efforts to form political coalitions on the basis of religion. South Asian Muslims, characteristically well-educated professionals from India and Pakistan, constituted a third major group of American Muslims,⁵ and they and other post-1965

³ Arab Muslims mobilized first on the basis of language, culture, and national origin, together with Arab Christians, forming the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). American notions of race initially complicated their citizenship, but early court decisions that Arabs were Asiatic and therefore could not be citizens were reversed, and they were classified as Caucasian and white. Suad Joseph, “Against the Grain of the Nation – the Arab,” in Michael Suleiman, ed., Arabs in America: Building a New Future (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 257–271.
⁴ See the appendix at the end of the chapter for a list of organizations mentioned here.
Muslim immigrants gradually moved to become citizens. Muslim national political coalitions sprang up from the 1980s: the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim Council, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Arab and South Asian leaders engaged some African American Muslims in these coalitions. The Nation of Islam led by Warith Deen Mohammed, son of Elijah Muhammad who died in 1975, was moving closer to mainstream Sunni beliefs and practices. Mohammed participated in some coalition activities, notably as a member of the Islamic Society of North America’s governing council; he was also recognized by leaders in Saudi Arabia as the representative of American Muslims. However, relations between the diverse American Muslim communities remained weak. For example, in 1997 Warith Deen Mohammed renamed his community the Muslim American Society, although an immigrant-based Muslim American Society had been founded in 1992 (Mohammed’s previous names for his community were, successively, World Community of al-Islam in the West, American Muslim Mission, and Ministry of W. D. Mohammed). After 9/11, Mohammed renamed his community yet again, this time as the American Muslim Society, to emphasize its foundation in American history and culture. Before his death in 2008 the community was renamed again and remains The Mosque Cares.

At the end of the twentieth century, African American Muslims constituted from 30 to 42 percent of the American Muslim community, while Arabs constituted from 12.4 to 33 percent and South Asians from 24.4 to 29 percent. These three major groups of American Muslims were developing converging constructions of race, religion, and the nation as well as converging religious and political trajectories. Moves to citizenship and participation in mainstream politics characterized the major organizations, although issues of race, class, and gender divided the “community.” Muslim immigrants tended to be, as the Pew Research Center survey of 2007 found, “middle class and mostly mainstream,” although this was not true of refugees. African Americans continued to

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differ from immigrant Muslims in many respects, their mosques more often located in poorer downtown areas with segregated congregations, and they stressed ‘asabiyyah or community interest and solidarity more than ummah or the international community of Muslims. Women played prominent roles in the earlier Arab Muslim communities, but many of the newer immigrant groups (post-1965) have imported more patriarchal cultures; African American Muslims generally continued more egalitarian traditions but have also adopted gendered practices, and there are some among them who justify polygyny (multiple wives) as a response to conditions in the African American community.10

For American Muslims, 9/11 changed the political situation dramatically. Major national Muslim organizations had been optimistic about the role of American Muslims both in America and in the Muslim ummah, talking about the three Abrahamic traditions constituting Western civilization. The aftermath of 9/11 put American Muslims on the defensive, despite the vigorous repudiation of the terrorists by national organizations and leading spokespersons.11 Another consequence of 9/11 was increased participation in mainstream politics by American Muslims and more open recognition, by Muslims and others, of the differences among Muslims.12 Leading African American Muslims now stress their Americanness, contrasting themselves to immigrants whose cultural baggage constrains their full citizenship. The immigrants, who earlier talked of being simultaneously American and members of an international Islamic ummah and envisioned American leadership of that ummah, now stress their status as American citizens and emphasize the universal principles of Islamic law and its areas of agreement with generalized American notions of social justice.13 Arab Muslims in particular face challenges to enjoyment of full citizenship rights. Scholars have

11 ISNA’s Fiqh Council of North America condemned the destruction and violence committed against innocent people on 9/11 from 2001 on, calling it contrary to Islam, but the national media only highlighted the fatwa issued in 2005.
written about “disciplinary inclusion” as Muslims try to balance their experiences of inclusion against ones of stigmatizing discipline.\(^{14}\)

**INSTITUTIONS: MOSQUES, SCHOOLS, AND RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The number of mosques has grown steadily over the decades. First among immigrant mosques was one in Highland Park, Michigan, in 1921, although a mosque founded in 1934 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, also claims to be first.\(^{15}\) Mosques and cultural centers have been started by the various strands of Islam in the country, from Sunni, Shi’a, and Sufi (the last a mystical path that can be either Sunni or Shi’a) to groups like the Ahmadiyya and Druze, whose status as Muslims is sometimes questioned (most scholarly treatments of American Muslims include the last two).

Mosques vary a great deal and change over time. Mosques that were Ahmadiyya have seen African American membership decline as Pakistani immigrants arrived, having left Pakistan after its government’s 1974 decision that Ahmadis were not Muslims. Mosques that were affiliated with the Nation of Islam moved toward Sunni Islam through Warith Deen Mohammed’s reforms, and new NOI mosques were founded with Louis Farrakhan’s revival of the movement.\(^{16}\) At least one African American mosque that followed Sunni practices has become more Sufi-oriented as leadership changed, while others remain anti-Sufi or more legalistic.\(^{17}\) Mosques or Islamic spaces have been founded in prisons and on campuses, with African American Muslims mounting the legal battles to secure Islamic worship spaces and halal food in prisons.\(^{18}\) Mosques in Dearborn and Detroit that had adopted American cultural practices (such as holding dances or card games) became more conservative as new immigrants dominated the congregations in the 1970s and

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\(^{15}\) See Sally Howell, Chapter 3 in this volume.

\(^{16}\) Linda Walbridge and Fatimah Haneef, “Inter-ethnic Relations within the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in the United States,” in Carla Petievich, ed., *The Expanding Landscape: South Asians and the Diaspora* (Delhi, 1999), pp. 123–146.


1980s but are now beginning to return to earlier practices.\textsuperscript{19} When limited by funds or conversion of existing buildings, earlier mosques were sometimes inconspicuous, but now they often proudly assert Islamic identities in public space.\textsuperscript{20}

The roles of American Muslim women in mosques have changed over time. Women were instrumental in establishing early mosques in Detroit, Michigan; Michigan City, Indiana; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; and Toledo, Ohio.\textsuperscript{21} Segregation of women [by barriers like walls and curtains] in some American mosques has increased in recent years, especially in some immigrant Sunni mosques.\textsuperscript{22} Gender segregation is generally less practiced in African American Muslim mosques, especially those of Warith Deen Mohammed.\textsuperscript{23} Exactly how women should be participating in mosques across America is being taken up locally in mosque after mosque.\textsuperscript{24}

Issues of mosque governance and religious decision making are institutional ones. Muslim immigrants, shaped by the American context, find new ways of governing mosques and new sources of religious authority as shari‘ah or religious law is interpreted by laypeople rather than specialists in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). African American mosques typically are led by one charismatic and powerful imam [historically, Black churches in America were led by one preacher or minister].\textsuperscript{25} Immigrant mosques more often turn to “congregationalism,” to governing models that qualify religious institutions for tax exemption.\textsuperscript{26} This means writing constitutions, making lists of dues-paying members, and electing boards of directors, organizational features new to many

\textsuperscript{20} See Akel Ismail Kahera, Chapter 13 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{22} Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait; A Report from the Mosque Study Project [Washington, D.C., 2001], pp. 9, 11, 56.
\textsuperscript{25} Fredrick C. Harris, Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism [New York, 1999].
\textsuperscript{26} Discussion of Bagby, Perl, and Froehle’s 2000 survey reviews these clear differences among American Muslim mosques; Leonard, Muslims, pp. 76–78.
immigrants. The governing boards are dominated by middle-class professional men (doctors, engineers, lawyers, and IT professionals), while the imams, employees of the governing boards, are generally imported from abroad. The imams lead prayers and teach about Islam but are often hindered by inadequate linguistic or cultural knowledge from playing more important roles in their new settings. As the congregants learn and practice organizing skills, religion becomes a political resource, encouraging Muslims to participate in local and higher levels of politics. A path-breaking Detroit Arab American Study and other recent studies reinforce the point with respect to Arab Americans, a slight majority of whom are Christian.

Women’s services on the governing boards of mosques and as imams are contested issues. Women participate prominently in the institutions and activities of the transnational Nizari Isma‘ili and Ahmadiyya movements. Among the Twelver Shi‘a, allegiance to religious and judicial authorities (maraji’) in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon remains strong, so when closed-circuit television was introduced to allow women seated separately to watch a male religious speaker, opposition in some Shi‘a centers in North America was overcome by the ruling of a marji’.

The exercise of Islamic religious authority in the United States raises institutional questions, because (save for some movements) there is no centralized authority structure in Islam. There are many imams but fewer scholars of fiqh in the United States. Muslim immigrants can continue to turn to authorities in their former homelands, or they can recognize those becoming established in the United States, many of them academics teaching Islamic law in institutions of higher education. Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl at UCLA has argued that “new spokesmen” without traditional legal schooling have stepped forward,
professional doctors and engineers who read the Qur’an and hadith and dispense opinions about religious issues.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, the governing boards and imams of mosques seem to have little respect for the traditional schools of Islamic law: respondents to a 2000 national survey of mosques placed the schools of law at the very bottom of the list of sources of authority for worship and teaching.\textsuperscript{33} This suggests that legal interpretations from former homelands are not determining beliefs and behaviors in the United States and that “new spokesmen” are having an impact. Many of these “new spokesmen” are less feminist, less helpful to the “gender jihad” underway among American Muslim women, than fiqh and Qur’an scholars like Khaled Abou El Fadl, Amina Wadud, and Kecia Ali.\textsuperscript{34}

Increasing American Muslim participation in politics has led to the establishment of organizations above the congregational or local level to further and defend religious and political goals. The appendix to this chapter lists the major religious and political movements, beginning with efforts by African Americans to mobilize on the basis of Islam in the early twentieth century and moving to the religious and then the more political organizations. Arab and South Asian immigrant Muslims currently lead the major Muslim religious and political coalition efforts, although American-born leaders are stepping forward in some organizations.

The earliest national (actually binational) association to organize on the basis of Islam was the Federation of Islamic Associations of the United States and Canada, or FIA, in 1953. Second-generation Lebanese and Syrians and foreign students and new immigrants worked together to educate Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam, connect Muslim Americans to each other and to the global community of Muslims, and seek accommodations from mainstream North American institutions. By the 1970s, internal conflict over political and religious goals drained the FIA’s support; although it functioned into the 1990s, it was eclipsed by other organizations, particularly the Islamic Society of North America.

\textsuperscript{33} Respondents to the 2000 national mosque survey who deemphasized the traditional schools of Islamic law included imams but even larger numbers of mosque presidents and members of governing boards: Bagby, “A Profile of African-American Masjids,” p. 28.
ISNA developed out of the Muslim Students Association (MSA), inaugurated by Arabic-speaking foreign students in the United States in 1963. As these students grew older, they established ISNA in 1982, headquartered in Plainfield, Indiana. ISNA’s goal was primarily religious: to further education about Islam and to maintain commitment to the faith. In the twenty-first century, ISNA has taken on political goals as well, bringing together Muslims across lines of affiliation, race, and gender and participating in interfaith events. It established the Fiqh Council of North America, which issues *fatawa*, or legal opinions on issues: for example ISNA and the Fiqh Council issued a fatwa against terrorism in 2005.

National organizations with similar religious goals were founded later by new South Asian and newer Arab immigrants. The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) was founded in North America in 1971 by Pakistani members of a political party in Pakistan, the Jamaat-i Islami. In 1992 chiefly Arab immigrants founded the Muslim American Society (MAS), and in 2002 Shī’as of the (largest) Twelver branch founded the Universal Muslim Association of America (UMAA).

In the late 1980s and 1990s, American Muslim organizations formed to engage in mainstream politics. Officially first was the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), founded in 1988 by leaders of the Islamic Center of Southern California in Los Angeles; this organization works to “enrich America” through education and political outreach activities. Next was the American Muslim Council (AMC), started by Eritrean-American Abdurahman Alamoudi in Washington, D.C., in 1990; this organization ended in 2009. The American Muslim Alliance (AMA) was developed by Pakistani American educator Agha Saeed in northern California from the late 1980s and was officially incorporated in 1994. Saeed went on to organize two national Muslim coalitions aimed at mobilizing bloc votes for the 2000 and 2004 elections, the American Muslim Political Coordinating Committee (AMPCC) and the American Muslim Taskforce.
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(AMT); the latter continues as the American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections. Finally, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was founded in Washington, D.C., in 1994 by chiefly Arab American leaders and has become the largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization in North America. Like AMPCC, CAIR is a lobbying organization. All of these organizations enthusiastically engage in democratic politics, using skills partially learned in American-styled mosques and sometimes interfaith politics as well. Muslims increasingly contend for political offices all across the country, although 9/11 set back such efforts significantly.

Several organizations have worked to further knowledge production by and about American Muslims. The African American Institute for Islamic Research, founded in 1990 in Newark, New Jersey, by Amir Al Islam and Zain Abdullah, convened two national conferences, and The Conference on Islam in America (in 2011) (TCOIA) brought together scholars, community and civic leaders, and members of the media for educational goals. The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a post-9/11 organization founded in Detroit but now headquartered in Washington, D.C., brings together scholars conducting empirical research and offering policy analysis on issues relating to American Muslims and Muslims around the world.

Islamic schools, pioneered by the Nation of Islam as alternatives to the segregated and inferior schools available to African Americans, are being established by middle- and upper-class immigrant Muslims. Many started out as part-time or weekend classes at mosques, but full-time Islamic schools, most accredited by the relevant regional and national educational associations, attract some Muslim parents throughout the country. Early ambitions to establish higher educational institutions of Islamic learning have not succeeded. In Herndon, Virginia, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) was founded in 1981 and has offices and branches in the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Its “Islamization of Knowledge” project aimed to apply a reformed version of Islamic thought to global problems. In the 1990s it established the Graduate School of Islamic Social Sciences, which trained imams and Muslim chaplains (many were employed in

41 See the AMT Web site, www.americanmuslimtaskforce.net/contactus.html.
44 See the organization’s Web site www.ispu.org/portal/7/WhoWeAre.aspx.
the American military and in prisons); this was reorganized after 2001 and renamed the Fairfax Institute. Also after 2001, an FBI investigation and public scrutiny led to more outreach and education programs for non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{45} In Chicago, the American Islamic College established in 1981 experienced financial difficulties by 1986 and never achieved accreditation. After a court case over control of the property, it was reconstituted in 2006 and was still operational in 2010.\textsuperscript{46} There are scattered reports of seminaries training students to be American imams: Darul Uloom al-Madania in Buffalo, New York, Darul Uloom in Chicago, the American Islamic University in Detroit, the Islamic Association of North Texas in Dallas, and Hartford Seminary in Connecticut. An Imam Ali Seminary reportedly trains women as well in Medina, New York. The Zaytuna Institute in San Francisco, founded in 1996 by the charismatic white Islamic scholar Hamza Yusuf, has started Zaytuna College, which enrolled a freshman class in the fall of 2010.\textsuperscript{47}

**NETWORKS: ALUMNI ASSOCIATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS**

Networks include less formally established groupings, such as voluntary associations for the graduates of predominantly Muslim schools and universities, political parties based overseas with networks in the United States, and Sufi or other movements based overseas with members in the United States. In the first alumni category one finds the Old Boys and Girls of India’s Aligarh Muslim University and Pakistan’s Karachi University.\textsuperscript{48} While there are analogous networks from other Muslim-majority countries like Yemen (the Yemeni Students Association Abroad or YSAA), Arab immigrants have tended to form secular associations with both Christian and Muslim members. Some hometown or place-of-origin associations, such as Hyderabad associations for people from Hyderabad, India, or the Beit Hanina Social Club for Palestinians, showcase languages and cultures that can be called Muslim (in terms

\textsuperscript{45} See Juliane Hammer’s article in Curtis, *Encyclopedia I*, p. 269.

\textsuperscript{46} See Zareena Grewal and R. David Coolidge, Chapter 14 in this volume, also Marcia Hermansen’s article in Curtis, *Encyclopedia I*, pp. 51–52.

\textsuperscript{47} See al-Husein N. Madhany’s article on Zaytuna in Cesari, *Encyclopedia I*, pp. 646–647.

\textsuperscript{48} My major finding in a study of emigrants from Hyderabad, India, in seven new settings (Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the United States, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates), was that the old school tie was most meaningful for them: Karen Isaksen Leonard, *Locating Home: India’s Hyderabidis Abroad* (Palo Alto, 2007).
of civilizational heritage) if not Islamic (religious). The Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America and the Islamic Medical Association of North America both developed from the MSA and are clearly identified as Muslim. Other associations based on occupation or national origin, like the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America (AAPNA), the Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC), or the American Association of Yemeni Scientists and Professionals (AAYSP) are often thought of as Muslim organizations.

Diasporic religious movements and political parties, like the Tablighi Jamat from South Asia and the Jama'at-i-Islami party from Pakistan, focus on reviving and maintaining faith abroad. Possibly more political would be the Ikhwan or Muslim Brotherhood, based in Egypt, and Deobandis, comprising graduates of the Dar ul Ulum Deoband seminary in northern India. These last two movements have triggered interest from American intelligence agencies. The Muslim Brotherhood has attracted more attention because of its history of political opposition to the regimes in Egypt and Syria and because some of its factions abroad have justified the use of violence against the state and citizens. However, while many Arab foreign students coming to the United States from the 1960s were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, no American branch of the organization has ever been established. Some of the students who established the MSA and then ISNA, as well as some of the scholars from Arab countries and Malaysia who founded the International Institute of Islamic Thought in 1981, were inspired by the Brotherhood. But by helping to establish these American Muslim organizations and institutions, Muslims with ties to the Brotherhood differentiated themselves from followers of Wahhabism in America, choosing instead to relate to the non-Muslim majority and mainstream politics. Muslim American political organizations such as the AMC, MAS, and CAIR have also been allegedly influenced by the Brotherhood. Lorenzo Vidino tries to make a case for what he terms “the new Muslim Brotherhood in the West” as a transnational Islamist organization supportive of terrorism, while admitting that this “network” has relatively few members and no clear indication of significant support among American Muslims. Also, he finds those with ties to the Brotherhood disagreeing with each

49 The encyclopedias edited by Cesari and Curtis have entries for the Tablighi Jamat and the Jama'at-i-Islami party, and one has an entry for the Muslim Brotherhood, but neither had an entry for Deoband or Deobandis (or for the Hizb-ul-Tahrir, which opposes democracy and advocates establishment of an Islamic system of government and reinstatement of the Caliphate).

50 Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York, 2010), p. 16.
other as they and other Muslim activists develop American Muslim political organizations.\textsuperscript{51} Finally, Vidino states that “a new generation of American-born activists is slowly replacing the foreign-born founders of the network and their views cannot be exactly the same as their predecessors.”\textsuperscript{52}

The term “Deobandi” seems to have no political resonance in the United States, although there is probably an “old boys’ network” of graduates from India’s Dar ul Ulum Deoband. Web sites feature competing Islamic messages and networks that claim “orthodoxy” in various ways, Deobandi ways among them, and various Tablighi Jamat or Deobandi Sufi spinoffs can be located in Chicago and elsewhere. But does online communication equal a “virtual community,” and, further, does a “virtual community” equal an offline community in any meaningful way? Research remains to be done on this question.\textsuperscript{53} Deobandi movements have pragmatically adapted to the countries in which they find themselves.\textsuperscript{54} Internet articles on Deobandis in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan do not provide insight into Deobandis in the United States (or in India).\textsuperscript{55} In any case, recent activities and pronouncements by the Dar ul Ulum Deoband in India disassociate Islam and Muslims from terrorism and exhort Muslims to abide by the laws of the states in which they reside.\textsuperscript{56}

Transnational Islamic charitable organizations like the Holy Land Foundation were major recipients of American Muslim \textit{zakat}, charitable donations, before 9/11, and such funds were sent primarily abroad. However, as the FBI and the Department of Justice began to investigate

\textsuperscript{51} Vidino, \textit{New Muslim Brotherhood}, pp. 168, 176–177.
\textsuperscript{52} Vidino, \textit{New Muslim Brotherhood}, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{55} Most Deobandis in the United Kingdom are working-class immigrants from Pakistan and loom large partly because South Asians (and splits among them) dominate the Muslim population there (as in Canada and South Africa). In the United States, African Americans, South Asians, and Arabs produce a very different sociopolitical constellation.
\textsuperscript{56} In February 2008, ‘ulama of various schools of thought convened for an All-India Anti-Terrorism Conference in Deoband to declare that terrorism was un-Islamic. In June in New Delhi, some 200,000 Muslims gathered to hear and cheer a fatwa signed by the grand Mufti of Deoband, Maulana Habibur Rahman, stating that Islam was against terrorism.
and indict Islamic charities as possible supporters of foreign terrorist organizations, American Muslims have looked more to charities based in the United States like the Life for Relief and Development in Michigan, now the largest Muslim-led charity headquartered in the United States.\textsuperscript{57}

The final category of transnational networks among American Muslims includes minority religious movements within Islam like the Twelver Shi’as, Isma’ili Shi’as [Nizaris and Bohras], the Ahmadiyyas, the Druze, and Sufi movements. Very diverse, these movements look to specific recognized leaders who are often abroad (maraji’ or religious scholars, the Aga Khan, a da’i or head, and other authoritative designations).\textsuperscript{58} They are not always recognized as part of the American Muslim community: surveys taken by American Muslim immigrant leaders to define and describe Muslims in the United States have omitted some of these organizations, as well as the Nation of Islam and the Moorish Science Temple of America.\textsuperscript{59} Twelver Shi’as\textsuperscript{60} are now usually included, as American Muslims try to work together.

The Sufi orders headed by pirs and shaykhs teach mystical and meditative techniques and often invoke poetry, music, and dance to achieve higher levels of spiritual awareness. These movements are not always specifically Islamic, and some have been labeled “pop” Sufism.\textsuperscript{61} Both Sunni and Shi’a, Sufi movements have produced many offshoots and recombinations in the United States, and women are arguably more prominent in Sufism.\textsuperscript{62} The charismatic leaders of early movements came from both immigrant and Euro-American backgrounds, and most early followers were white; the tomb of Samuel Lewis in New Mexico may be America’s first Sufi shrine.\textsuperscript{63} Most notable among Sufi orders in the United States are the Chishtis, the Bektashis, the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship, the


\textsuperscript{60} Linda S. Walbridge, \textit{Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shi’ism in an American Community} (Detroit, 1997).


Halveti-Jerrahi Order of Dervishes, the Mevlevis, the Nimatullahis, and the Naqshbandi-Haqqanis. The Chishti musician and pir Inayat Khan came from India in 1910, and he and his son Vilayat Inayat Khan built a following featuring qawwali, the singing of religious songs as dhikr. 64 The Bektashi pir Baba Rezheb came from Albania to Michigan in the early 1950s. 65 The Sri Lankan teacher Bawa Muhaiyaddeen founded a fellowship in 1971 in Philadelphia. 66 Muzaffer Özak, sheikh of the Halveti-Jerrahi Order of Dervishes, came from Turkey in 1977; his order is headquartered in New York. 67 The Mevlevis, who trace their founding to the poet Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi in thirteenth-century Anatolia, have three branches in the United States. 68 Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani moved from Lebanon to the United States in 1991 and links the American branch of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi order to its head in Cyprus. 69 West African orders, the Tijaniyyah and the Murids, arrived with immigrants at the end of the twentieth century, and Cheikh Amadou Bamba (of the Murids) Day is celebrated in New York City annually. 70

The Gülen movement from Turkey focuses on education, religious piety, and philanthropy. Influenced by Sufism and Anatolian culture, it was founded in the late 1970s by followers of preacher and teacher Fethullah Gülen. This mission, now global, emphasizes education and interfaith dialogue, and Gülen himself moved to the United States in 1999. 71

GROUPS

Under this imprecise heading, one finds national-origin groups, such as South Asian Muslims, Palestinian Muslims, and African American

65 See Natalia Slain’s article in Curtis, Encyclopedia I, pp. 82–83.
66 See Natalia Slain’s article in Curtis, Encyclopedia I, pp. 81–82.
68 The Mevlana Foundation was established in 1976 by a shaykh from London who studied under Vilayat Khan; the Mevlevi Order of America was established in 1978 by the son of the shaykh of the order in Turkey; the Threshold Society was established by an appointee of Dr. Celalettin Celebi, descended from Rumi and the late head of the international Mevlevi order. See Natalia Slain’s article in Curtis, Encyclopedia II, pp. 369–370.
Muslims. There are voluntary associations, like the Muslim Boy Scouts and Muslim Girl Scouts, with all-Muslim chapters established officially in the 1970s for Boy Scouts and in the 1980s for Girl Scouts (although Muslims participate in other chapters). American Muslims have formed local, regional, and national associations for specific purposes, for example, the Latin American Dawa Organization (LADO) founded in New York in 1997 for Spanish-speaking converts. Certainly the Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA) with its strong focus on African American Sunni Muslims (those not associated with W. D. Mohammed) and other American-born Muslims (Euro-American converts and the children of immigrants) has become increasingly relevant and sees itself as supplementing ISNA (if not eventually replacing that immigrant-dominated organization). MANA's first elected leader, Siraj Wahhaj and others, like Hamza Yusuf, appeal to younger American-born Muslims.

The Progressive Muslim Union (PMU), though short-lived, was founded in 2004, and formulated as its goal the development of an independent, spiritually and intellectually sophisticated Islamic discourse that was distinctly North American, while remaining true to the teachings and values of Islam, but internal dissension (much of it centered on the war in Iraq) led to resignations of leaders like Omid Safi, Hussein Ibish, Laury Silvers, and Sarah Eltantawi, and eventually to its demise in 2006. Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) headed by Zuriani ‘Ani’ Zonneveld and Pamela Taylor, constitutes a continuation of PMU’s goals and promotes a progressive American Islam.

American Muslim women are increasingly influential. *Islamic Horizons*, ISNA’s major publication, started a series on its own history by focusing on the Muslim women who nurtured the MSA and helped develop ISNA. In 2007 young Muslim women swept the polls in the MSA national elections, resulting in a female president heading an all-women executive board. Muslim women are being appointed to national leadership positions. Most significant was Dr. Ingrid Mattson’s

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72 See entries from the two encyclopedias already extensively cited.
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election in 2006 to head ISNA, the largest Islamic organization in the United States and one generally viewed as conservative rather than progressive by both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Muslim women’s groups are prominent locally and regionally, such as American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (AMILA) founded in San Francisco in 1992 and the Muslim Women’s League or MWL established in 1992 in Los Angeles. Readers of the glossy magazine Azizah, with its stylish contents and hijab-wearing models on the cover, or of the (short-lived) Muslim Girl Magazine aimed at teenagers started in 2007, may constitute groups, like the followers of the many Islamic or Muslim hip hop groups or of the many Web sites and blogs on the Internet.

American Muslim women scholars are establishing themselves in the field of Qur’anic studies and jurisprudence, and their work has ranged from attacks on the very foundations of Islamic marriage and family law to more limited attempts to reinterpret Islamic law. These Muslim feminists include indigenous and immigrant Muslim women, with academics Leila Ahmed, Amina Wadud, and Kecia Ali (an Egyptian American, an African American convert, and a white convert, respectively) leading the way. They call for a rethinking of the Qur’an and hadith, asserting that much now considered divine and immutable is the result of a long, male-dominated intellectual process. Amina Wadud, an Islamic studies professor, published Qur’an and Woman in the 1990s in several countries and languages, evidence of the global reach of the U.S.-based “gender jihad.”

North American Muslim women from many national and sectarian backgrounds are increasing women’s roles in Islam, with early twenty-first century groups supporting mosque participation and mixed-gender congregational prayers led by women imams. Patriarchal practices in mosques have been challenged: a “walk-in” in Morgantown, West Virginia, in 2004 involved six Muslim women (African American, South Asian, and Arab American) who entered by the front door and seated themselves in the main area. In a widely reported event, Dr. Amina Wadud gave the sermon and led men and women in Islamic prayer in New York in 2005.

80 See Andrew O’Brien’s article in Curtis, Encyclopedia I, pp. 53–54.
81 See Emily Tucker’s article in Cesari, Encyclopedia I, pp. 455–456.
82 See Jamillah Karim’s article in Curtis, Encyclopedia I, pp. 75–76.
83 See Juliane Hammer, Chapter 19 in this volume.
Trying to generalize about all American Muslims at this time, one turns to Andrew Shryock. He writes that for Arab and Muslim Americans a “structure of feeling” is firmly in place, characterized by “the sense of marginality, the ambivalence about inclusion in (or exclusion from) the cultural mainstream, desires for greater political influence in the United States, the fear of being scrutinized, spied on, and judged a threat to security.”\(^{85}\) Leading American Muslims have not hesitated to express dissatisfaction with American foreign and domestic policies that affect them: MPAC, AMA, and CAIR have been especially strong critics, before and after 9/11. The Detroit Arab American Survey shows that church and mosque attendance have provided members with skills, confidence, a sense of civic culture, and a desire to work for change, leading to the development of an “oppositional” culture or “engaged resistance” based on a perceived lack of respect by other Americans.\(^{86}\) Such oppositional or engaged resistance is historically justified and a legitimate, productive way to engage in politics. The British Muslim sociologist, Tariq Modood, defines political mobilization in a way that legitimates a vigorous American Muslim oppositional culture: “interaction and participation in the political system to register protest, win or support allies, defeat opponents, influence political processes, initiate, modify, or prevent policies, win public resources, or seek to achieve some other political goal, including the basic goals of gaining legitimacy for one’s presence in the country and for one’s existence as a collective presence of a certain sort.”\(^{87}\) Many immigrant American Muslims are clearly developing an oppositional culture or a culture of engaged resistance, similar to that of African American Muslims in the past and present, of Black Protestant churches and Arab American churches, and of contemporary American Muslim feminists. American Muslims may feel marginalized and disrespected, yet their engagement with mainstream politics has become deep and ongoing.


## Appendix: Muslim American Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Founding Date and Information</th>
<th>Initial Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. African American Islam</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moorish Science Temple of America [MSTA]</td>
<td>1913, Noble Drew Ali</td>
<td>East Coast, Midwest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nation of Islam [NOI]</td>
<td>1930, Wallace Fard Muhammad, Elijah Muhammad 1975, leadership assumed by Elijah Muhammad’s son Warith Deen; renamed many times, ultimately as The Mosque Cares 1977, Louis Farrakhan split off, reclaimed NOI name in 1978</td>
<td>Detroit, Chicago</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Islam in America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federation of Islamic Associations [FIA]</td>
<td>1953, Lebanese immigrants</td>
<td>Midwest, Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Students Association [MSA]</td>
<td>1963, Arabic-speaking foreign students in the United States</td>
<td>Plainfield, Indiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Circle of North America [ICNA]</td>
<td>1971, Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim American Society [MAS]</td>
<td>1992, Arab Americans</td>
<td>Falls Church, Virginia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universal Muslim Association of America [UMAA]</td>
<td>2002, Twelver Shi’a</td>
<td>East Coast</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. American Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Public Affairs Council [MPAC]</td>
<td>1988, Islamic Center of Southern California</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Muslim Alliance [AMA]</td>
<td>1994, South Asians</td>
<td>Fremont, California</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Muslim Political Coordinating Council [AMPCC]</td>
<td>1998, AMA, AMC, MPAC, CAIR</td>
<td>Youngstown, Ohio</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Muslim Taskforce [AMTF]</td>
<td>2004, 11 organizations</td>
<td>Fremont, California</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further Reading

Abraham, Nabeel, Sally Howell, and Andrew Shryock, eds., *Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade* (Detroit, 2010).

Abraham, Nabeel, and Andrew Shyrock, eds., *Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream* (Detroit, 2000).


