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DOING UNJUST THINGS IN A ‘JUST’ SOCIETY: THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

PSYCHOLOGY

by

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Abstract

Doing unjust things in a “just” society: The moral justification of structural violence

Andrew Pilecki

This dissertation examines the relationship between how moral or immoral a group is perceived to be and people’s acceptance of harm towards members of that group. The ways in which political elites and lay people make distinctions between groups along moral basis was examined in a series of studies employing qualitative and survey designs using Internet-based samples. Findings revealed that political elites and lay people utilized an expansive moral domain comprised of the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory when distinguishing members of a target group from others. Participants who perceived members of a target group as typically less moral than most other people were more likely to accept structural violence towards that group. Those perceived to be less moral than others were also perceived to be less human and have more negative emotions directed towards them (e.g., anger, contempt). The findings of this dissertation lay the foundation for a moral psychology of intergroup relations, which seeks to examine the inextricable relationship among morality, social identity, and intergroup violence.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

“Time may in some degree modify our resentment of Japanese treachery and even soften our horror of their nameless cruelties, but we no longer want them to live with us. So let us stay apart—in peace. Regardless of their various shades and degrees of citizenship here, Japan still claims them as citizens—all of them. Let’s send them all back there as soon as possible. And I mean ALL (sic). If we have to have an amendment to our Constitution to effect this—then let’s have the amendment” (A way out, 1943, p. A4)

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the naval forces of Imperial Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. By the next day, the United States found itself at war not only with Imperial Japan but also Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Benjamin Franklin once said “Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety” (Franklin & Franklin, 1818, p. 270). Nevertheless, two months after the Pearl Harbor attacks President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. This order permitted the forced relocation and internment of US citizens of Japanese ancestry along the Pacific Coast for military and security reasons. Although violating the democratic principles upon which this country was founded, the US Supreme Court affirmed the order on December 18, 1944, in Korematsu v. United States. The majority opinion of that decision stated that, “…we could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group” (Korematsu v. United States, 1944, p. 214) The court thus held that the liberty of a
particular group of people, in this case, Japanese-Americans, was worth sacrificing to purchase the safety of the country (see Robinson, 2001).

“A way out” (1943) was the title given to an editorial published in the Los Angeles Times on December 6, 1943. Note the fundamental argument it presents. The author distinguishes the Japanese from others along a moral basis based on their “treachery” and “nameless cruelties.” Japanese-Americans are not exempted from this distinction. Rather, because “Japan still claims them as citizens” they are included in the general category of “enemy” and thus unworthy of the rights and protections provided by US citizenship. This view was common among those living in the Western United States. In December 1942, for example, 97% of respondents in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada and Arizona stated that they supported relocation. Of this number, only 29% supported the return of relocated persons after the end of the war (Feraru, 1950).

How could a nation that was presumably fighting in Europe and the Pacific on behalf of democratic principles against fascism overwhelmingly support the violation of these principles at home? There are seemingly universal moral prohibitions against harming others (i.e., “The Golden Rule,” see Blackburn, 2001). As with any rule, however, there are exceptions that drawn upon moral arguments to justify the harm that has been inflicted (e.g., Just War Theory, Walzer, 2000). In the case of Japanese-American internment, this exception was made justified in the name of security rooted in concerns regarding the potential disloyalty of US citizens of Japanese ancestry (Nagata, 1990). The effective withdrawal of US democratic principles was, in other words, predicated on the perceived immorality of Japanese-Americans versus segments of the US population.

The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two illustrates the social factors that underlie violence towards members of particular groups. Violence directed at a
specific group of people within a society, whether it is in the form of physical harm or the restriction of political rights, occurs within a larger context marked by widespread public acquiescence as well as legal and political sanctioning. Public support for measures that restrict the rights of certain groups are often predicated on the perception that the members of this group are somehow more immoral than other people. This perception can subsequently inform people’s belief that moral standards of treatment do not apply to certain groups.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how people’s perceptions regarding the moral status of other groups correspond with their acceptance of violence towards members of that group as well as other emotional and cognitive factors. It will address the following research questions:

1. How do political elites and lay people distinguish groups along a moral basis?
2. Are people more willing to accept violence towards those groups they perceived as being typically less moral?
3. Are groups perceived as less moral than others more likely to be perceived as less human?
4. Are people more likely to feel negative emotions (e.g., anger, contempt, disgust) towards those groups they perceive as less moral than others?

In addressing these research questions, this dissertation aims to reveal some of the subtle cognitive and emotional processes through which we come to perceive forms of social violence and mass harm as morally acceptable.

This introductory chapter consists of five sections. “The Social Context of Violence” reviews previous definitions of violence and critique the way in which they bias psychological processes occurring on the individual level. An argument for a broader approach to addressing the problem of violence that takes into consideration its social context
as well as its structural manifestations (e.g., restriction of civil rights; see Galtung, 1969) will then be offered. The next section, “Defining Morality,” will examine how morality has been conceptualized within psychology, with emphasis placed on the dimensions of morality specified in Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2002). The sections entitled “Distinguishes Moral Form Immoral Groups” and “The Social Function of Stereotypes” will describe how the perception that certain groups are immoral emerge from comparison people make among groups (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986) on a moral basis and how such stereotypes help legitimize violence, broadly defined. The final section will outline a series of studies rooted from this theoretical framework that systematically address the research questions outlined in the previous paragraph.

**The Social Context of Violence**

On March 17, 1941, the Western Defense Command (WDC) was formed under the command of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt. The WDC was tasked with the defense of the Pacific Coast region from foreign invasion. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General DeWitt advocated for the relocation of Japanese—citizens and non-citizens alike—as well as other “subversive elements” from the Pacific Coast. This urging precipitated President Roosevelt’s subsequent executive order authorizing the internment of Japanese-Americans (Robinson, 2001).

During a congressional hearing held in April 1943, Massachusetts Congressman George J. Bates asked General DeWitt whether his stance that the Japanese should not be allowed to return to the West Coast was based on “experience as a result of sabotage or racial history.” General DeWitt responded with the following:

I have the mission of defending this coast and securing vital installations.

The danger of the Japanese was and is now—if they are permitted to come
back—espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty (Investigation of Congested Areas, 1948, p. 740).

The Japanese, according to DeWitt’s testimony, were more likely to commit acts of sabotage against the United States, regardless of whether they are citizens. A reader echoed this argument in an editorial published in the Los Angeles Times on May 3, 1943:

If there is anything that would make this country a better place to live it would be the total absence of every drop of Japanese blood. They put a knife in our backs once. Don’t let anyone ever forget that for one moment….they will never change as Gen. DeWitt said a few days ago, ‘IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WHETHER THE JAPANESE IS CITIZEN OR NOT, HE IS STILL A JAP AND CAN’T CHANGE’ (sic) (Let’s ship them back, 1943, p. A4).

The treachery exhibited by Imperial Japan in their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (“They put a knife in our backs once.”) is perceived to be a quality inherent to all Japanese (“HE IS STILL A JAP AND CAN’T CHANGE”), thereby making the entire group worthy of suspicion. The immorality attributed to this category of people provided the justification for the violation of their political rights.

General DeWitt’s testimony and its re-emergence within the editorial published in the Los Angeles Times illustrate the mutually constitutive relationship between government authority and public opinion that make acts of violence like the internment of Japanese Americans during World War Two possible. Despite the apparent importance of institutional factors in facilitating social violence, psychologists have tended to define violence primarily
as something occurring among individuals. Anderson and Huesmann (2003), for example, define violence as an extreme form of aggressive behavior by someone with the intent to harm another person. Such a conceptual definition of violence frames it principally as a matter of individual behavior resulting in physical harm. This framing is problematic, however. First, it minimizes the structural factors that permit violence towards particular groups to occur (e.g., government policies). Second, it minimizes non-physical types of harm such as those embodied in the denial of political rights (Galtung, 1969).

Individualistic definitions of violence have nevertheless persisted within social psychology and have shaped how scholars have investigated its origins. Early psychological models, for example, viewed violence as the product of unconscious (Freud, 1930/1961) or innate biological drives (Lorenz, 1966). Dollard and colleagues’ (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis, which argued that aggressive behavior was fundamentally caused by our experience of frustration when seeking a particular goal (see also Berkowitz, 1989; Miller, 1941), greatly informed research in the mid-20th century. This model, along with contemporary socio-cognitive models of aggression (e.g., Anderson & Carnagey, 2004), is nevertheless linked epistemologically to the privileging of cognitive and emotional processes on the individual level. Within these models, factors related to social context, like institutional power or widely held social beliefs, are often relegated to the status of background variables.

Other scholars, most notably those from outside of psychology, have approached the problem of violence from perspectives that better account for the structural conditions that facilitate them. Within such perspectives, racism, for example, is not merely the product of prejudicial beliefs held by individuals in society (cf. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950); rather, it is an ideological discourse employed by those in power to justify
particular political projects. In this vein, Arendt (1976) argued that European imperialism, “...would have necessitated the invention of racism as the only possible ‘explanation’ and excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had ever existed in the civilized world” (pp. 183-184). Likewise, Memmi (1982) argued that racism constituted a form of social organization deployed for the specific purpose of giving advantage to one group over another and justifying hostility towards the latter. Specifically, members of targeted groups are imbued with features that in turn justify racist attitudes towards them. In other words, groups are constructed in such a way as to legitimize their own political domination (Fanon, 1963). Racism is thus an ideological discourse inextricably linked to the social context from which it emerges and is implicated in the power asymmetries and violence enacted within that social context.

Tajfel (1981), critiquing the privilege given to individual psychological processes within the discipline, claimed that much social psychological research was “irrelevant” because it inadequately accounted for the contextual factors that shape behavior. There have nevertheless been social psychological models of conflict that account for such factors. Sherif’s (1958) Realistic Conflict Theory emphasized the intergroup and structural aspects of aggression and violence, namely that it was competition over scarce resources that facilitated violent behavior between groups. Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory (1986) articulated a model of intergroup conflict that conceived of it as the product of an interaction between social structure and social cognition. Violence, according to this model, emerges as a result of the difference in social status that exists between groups along with the perception that this hierarchy lacks legitimacy. Conflict and violence between groups can thus be a means to change this relationship and achieve social change.
Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural violence, in contrast to definitions that privilege individual behavior and physical harm, defines violence in terms of the ways that societal institutions and authorities prevent people from otherwise achieving their realistic potential. Systems of social hierarchy, within this framework, are thus problematized as forms of collective violence (cf. Tolan, 2007) that target specific groups of people (e.g., racial minorities, sexual minorities, women) within society. Structural violence is made possible by a number of factors, namely disparities in access to power as well as differences in social status among social groups. Such hierarchies are justified, moreover, by the presence of dominant cultural beliefs (Galtung, 1990) and other legitimizing myths (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Conceptual definitions of violence that emphasize individual behavior and physical harm may, at worst, fail to frame social phenomena like racism, sexism, and/or political oppression as forms of collective violence or, at best, emphasize explanations that privilege psychological processes on the individual level. Such definitions of violence are, admittedly, more conducive to the experimental-based methods of contemporary social psychologists and the epistemological assumptions contained therein, notably the existence of a “pre-social” individual that can be extracted and studied independently from his or her social context (see Tajfel, 1981). One way to examine the factors that facilitate structural violence is to examine the subtle cognitive processes that make violence towards specific groups possible. Building upon this proposition, this dissertation is rooted in the argument that the perception that members of a certain group are typically immoral serves an influential role in determining whether violence towards that group is acceptable.

Defining Morality
What is the basis upon which we determine the morality of other groups? Interning Japanese-Americans was argued to be necessary because of the apparent threat this segment of the population posed to the war effort (Nagata, 1990; Robinson, 2001). Internment was thus justified on the grounds of self-defense. The moral condemnation of US citizens of Japanese ancestry went beyond the supposed harm they could inflict, however. “Loyal ones? How do you tell a loyal Jap?” a reader asked in an editorial published by the Los Angeles Times on December 6, 1943, “He will smile and bow at you and with one swift move knife you in the back” (The two-faced Japanese, 1943, p. A4). Japanese-Americans, as illustrated in this excerpt, may be harmful, but this harm was incidental to the much more fundamental moral transgression for which they, as a group, were deemed guilty. Namely, they were considered disloyal.

People tend to value loyalty, but does loyalty make someone a morally good person? Morality, in a general sense, refers to a code of conduct against which judgments of right and wrong are made (cf. Gert, 2012). If a person follows that code of conduct, his or her behavior will be judged to be morally right. If that person violates that code of conduct, though, his or her behavior will be judged to morally wrong. The composition of this code of conduct is a matter of debate, however. In examining the cognitive and emotional factors that influence moral judgment, researchers within various fields of psychology have nevertheless shed light on the dimensions that people draw upon to make moral judgments.

The cognitive-developmental model rooted in the work of Jean Piaget (1965) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) has shaped traditional definitions of morality within psychology. This model contends that people form moral judgments as a result of deliberative, conscious moral reasoning. The capacity for moral judgment among adults, according to Piaget (1965) and later Kohlberg (1969), is the product of their development of moral reasoning throughout
childhood. Earlier stages of moral development are characterized by judgments made in accordance with authority figures (e.g., parents), rules and social conventions. Later stages of moral development, however, are marked by appeals to higher-order, abstract moral principles regarding justice (Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) and care (Gilligan, 1982). The cognitive-developmental model thus defines moral judgment as an individual, conscious process that, at its highest level, pertains to issues of fairness (i.e., justice) and harm doing. “Loyalty,” as such, may constitute an aspect of morality, albeit one indicative of a lower stage of development.

Haidt (2001), in contrast, has proposed the social intuitionist model of moral judgment. This model argues that moral judgments are the products of a fast, automatic, and emotion-laden processes through which an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike emerges (see also Haidt, 2007). Moral reasoning, in contrast to the cognitive-developmental model, often reflects a rationalizing process that aims to find support and justification for a moral judgment that we have already made intuitively. Although evolutionary in origin, a person’s moral intuition is shaped by the moral system within which he or she is socialized (Haidt, 2008). Moral systems, according to Haidt (2008), constitute an interlocking set of values, practices, and psychological mechanisms that collectively aim to suppress individual selfishness, thereby making social life possible. Moral systems serve an important social function in that they aim to not only protect the welfare and autonomy of individuals, but also protect larger collectives by regulating the rights, duties and obligations that individuals have to them (see also Graham & Haidt, 2010). Recognizing these dual functions, Haidt and Graham (2009) proposed Moral Foundations Theory.

According to Moral Foundations Theory, there are six foundations upon which all moral systems are based and that ultimately inform our moral judgment (Haidt, 2012; Haidt
& Graham, 2009). First, Care/Harm regards basic concerns for the suffering of others and is reflected in the virtues of caring and compassion. Second, Fairness/Cheating regards concerns about unfair treatment, inequality, and abstract notions of justice. Third, Loyalty/Betrayal regards concerns related to group membership and is reflected in the virtues of loyalty, self-sacrifice and vigilance against betrayal. Fourth, Purity/Degradation regards concerns about physical and spiritual contagion and is reflected in the virtues of chastity, wholesomeness and the control of one’s desires. Fifth, Authority/Subversion regards concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical relationship and is reflected in the virtues of obedience, respect and role fulfillment. Sixth, and last, Liberty/Oppression regards concerns about political equality, dislike of oppression, and a concern for victims.

In contrast to the cognitive-developmental model, Moral Foundations Theory specifies a much broader definition of what constitutes morality. Whereas the former frames adherence to authority and rule following as indicative of early stage moral development, Moral Foundations Theory considers these to be a basis (i.e., Authority/Subversion) for moral judgment on par with principles of justice and care. Research has shown that people’s reliance upon one or multiple moral foundations when making moral judgments differs as a function of socioeconomic status (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993) and political orientation (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Regarding the former, Haidt et al. (1993) found that participants from a low socio-economic background in both Brazil and Chicago made use of both non-harm and harm-based morality in their moral appraisals. In contrast, those from high socioeconomic backgrounds made use of only the latter, regardless of national context.

In terms of political orientation, there is a growing recognition that liberals and conservatives in the United States rely on different moral foundations in their moral
judgments. Namely, while liberals rely primarily on the individualizing foundations (e.g., harm/care, *Fairness/Cheating*), conservatives tend to rely upon all of the moral foundations when making a moral judgment (Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt, et al., 2009; Weber & Federico, 2012). The cultural schisms that typify the polarization between liberals and conservatives in the United States are thus not reflections of a larger debate between moral relativism and moral universalism. Rather, such schisms are maintained by partisans’ adherence to moral values to degrees that vary across the political spectrum; in other words, liberals and conservatives may often speak in a moral language that goes unrecognized by those on the other side of the political divide (Haidt, 2012).

People’s perceptions that a particular group is immoral, it is argued, facilitates their subsequent acceptance of structural violence inflicted upon the members of that group. The determination that a group is immoral is informed by the belief that its members have violated, or fail to adhere to, some aspect of the code of conduct against which people make moral judgments. According to Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2006) this code of conduct is comprised of six moral dimensions: *Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Purity/Degradation, Liberty/Oppression*. What, though, is the fundamental psychological process through which groups come to be deemed as moral or immoral?

**Distinguishing Moral from Immoral Groups**

There was opposition to the prolonged internment of US citizens of Japanese ancestry within the Roosevelt Administration. In late 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and others urged the president to permit “loyal” Japanese-Americans to serve in the Army in order to increase morale within the internment camps as well as undercut the argument that internment was the result of racial
prejudice (Robinson, 2001). On February 1, 1943, President Roosevelt issued a statement acquiescing to these calls and declared that:

No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart;

Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry (as cited in Robinson, 2002, p. 170).

The 442nd Regimental Combat Team, consisting entirely of US citizens of Japanese ancestry, was subsequently created.

The implications of Roosevelt’s statement, along with the formation of the 442nd, did not go unnoticed by supporters of internment. If “loyal” Japanese-Americans could conceivably be separated from “disloyal” ones to the extent that they could be trusted to serve in the military, would it not be possible to use the same process to permit internees to return to their homes on the West Coast? Resistance to such efforts among the public, particularly on the West Coast, was sharp. In an editorial entitled “Stupid and Dangerous” published in the Los Angeles Times on April 22, 1943, the author admonished critics of internment by reminding them that, “the Japanese are among the most clannish people on earth” and that:

As a race, the Japanese have made for themselves a record for conscienceless treachery unsurpassed in history. Whatever small theoretical advantages there might be in releasing those under restraint in this country would be enormously outweighed by the risks involved (p. A4).

Instances of structural violence, such as the internment of Japanese-Americans, present members of the perpetrating group, such as the writer of the editorial, with a fundamental—
and psychologically difficult—question: “how can I be a good person if I am part of a group that brings harm to others?” The perpetuation of structural violence is due, in large measure, to how most people answer this question.

One potential answer, as illustrated in the above excerpt, is to label those affected by structural violence as “bad” (e.g., “clannish,” “treacherous”). Doing so can make it such that those affected by the structural violence are perceived as exempt from the type of moral considerations that would make such treatment objectionable (see Opotow, 1990). In the above case, the determination that the Japanese were inherently “bad” was used to support the argument that whatever civil protections Japanese-Americans were entitled to were subordinate to the larger need of securing the country. What is the specific mechanism through which we determine who is “good” and who is “bad,” though? The author of the editorial provides a clue. Note how the editorialist attributes the traits of “clannish” and treacherous to people of Japanese ethnicity via a comparison made between them and others.

This type of social comparison lies at the heart of Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) Social Identity Theory. The underlying assumption of this theory is simple: people like to feel good about themselves. People are, however, social creatures and their sense of self is not only shaped by those personality characteristics that make them unique but also those characteristics that they hold in common with others and thus form the basis for their membership in social groups. People’s view of themselves—their “self-concept”—is thus comprised of a personal and a social component, both of which people strive to view in a positive light. To maintain a positive image of the groups with which people belong—and by extension themselves—they make favorable comparisons are made between their group and others along an evaluative dimension. Such comparisons nevertheless inform the associations that people make between members of a group—whether their group or another—and
particular qualities. The Japanese thus become “clannish” and “treacherous,” because they exhibit them, supposedly, to a far greater degree than other people. Comparisons such as these form the basis of the stereotypes that people hold for other people (Schneider, 2005).

Tajfel (1981) argued that virtually any evaluative dimension could be used for the purpose of comparing groups (e.g., “clannishness”). Researchers, however, have discovered that some dimensions are utilized more often than others. Fiske, Cuddy, Flick, and Xu (2002) argue, for example, that warmth and competence are the two fundamental dimensions upon which people differentiate groups and form stereotypes (see also Cuddy et al., 2009). These dimensions, their model contends, provides information regarding the intent (e.g., positive or negative) and capabilities of groups other than our own.

There is evidence showing that morality is also an integral dimension upon which groups are differentiated. Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) found in a series of studies that perceiving one’s group as moral was more important in the ultimate evaluation of that group than either its perceived sociability (i.e., warmth) or perceived competence (see also Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto & Leach, 2008). The desire to view one’s group as moral is tied to the enhanced self-esteem that a person gets from being a member of a group that is evaluated positively on such a dimension. As a result, those who are strongly identified with a group are more likely to be invested in maintaining a positive moral image of that group. This positive image is threatened, however, when one’s group is responsible for harm inflicted upon others.

There are some mechanisms that people engage in to preserve the positive moral image of their group under conditions of threat. Moral behavior, according to Bandura (1990), emerges from mechanisms of self-regulation and self-sanctioning. We can “disengage,” however, from these mechanisms by employing various strategies (e.g.,
dehumanizing others, minimizing the suffering of others) with the consequence being that an immoral behavior will be more likely to occur (see Bandura, 1999; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). Believing that one’s group is morally superior to others, a process called ingroup glorification (Castano, 2008), can serve this function as well. Previous research illustrates that ingroup glorification can act as a cognitive buffer against the feelings of shame and/or guilt that would otherwise compel members of a group to admit that their group acted immorally (Bilali, Tropp & Dasgupta, 2012; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2007).

Believing that some groups are exempt from moral consideration is another mechanism through which people can effectively disengage from self-sanctioning. Opotow (1990) proposes that we maintain a psychological boundary demarcating those to whom standards of fairness and justice apply. Morally excluded groups, namely those perceived to be outside the “scope of justice”—be it animals (Opotow, 1993, 1994), people who are poor (Lott, 2002) or Muslim-Americans following the September 11, 2001, attacks (Coryn & Barshuk, 2006)—are not extended such considerations. These groups, in other words, have been effectively excluded from the moral community of groups and the standards of treatment afforded those found within (see also Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Tileaga, 2007). As a result, inflicting harm upon the members of these groups becomes less morally problematic as they are viewed, from the onset, as unworthy of better treatment (see Tileaga, 2005, 2006).

Both ingroup glorification and moral exclusion highlight the fundamental comparative process by which groups—whether our own or others—come to be perceived as either moral or immoral. If people compare groups along a moral dimension to ultimately judge their members as moral or immoral, Moral Foundations Theory suggests that this
criterion would be comprised of six dimensions (e.g., Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Purity/Degradation, Liberty/Oppression; see Haidt, 2012). The determination of how moral another group is this based on how caring or fair they are in relation to others, as the cognitive-developmental model suggests, as well as how loyal, respectful of authority, spiritually pure, and respectful of the rights of others they are perceived to be. It is along these dimensions that stereotypes regarding the morality or immorality of another, in other words, are formed.

The Social Function of Stereotypes

On December 6, 1943, there was little doubt as to who was going to win the war in the Pacific. The US Pacific Fleet had won a decisive battle against the Japanese navy near the island of Midway in June 1942. Japan had lost Guadalcanal and was now fighting losing battles in both the Gilbert and Solomon Island chains in the South Pacific. It was also in the Solomons that Imperial Japan lost Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander-and-chief of the Japanese Fleet who led the initial attack on Pearl Harbor, when a plane carrying him was shot down on April 18, 1943. Even the Emperor of Japan recognized that the tide had turned against his country when he declared to the Japanese diet that the empire’s situation was “truly grave” in October 1943 (Situation “truly grave,” Hirohito warns, 1943).

It was also on this date that the Los Angeles Times published the results of a poll it conducted with its readers concerning US policies towards the Japanese. Although non-scientific, the poll had 11,621 responses. Of these responses, 93.5% favored the deportation of all Japanese from the United States following the war as well as forbidding future immigration from Japan; 82.7% noted further that such a measure would exempt Japanese born in the United States. Lastly, in response to the question, “Would you permanently
exclude all Japanese from the Pacific Coast States, including California?” 90.8% of people responded “Yes” (Here are results of Jap questionnaire, 1943, p. A4).

The *Los Angeles Times* also published a number of comments from readers along with these results. Justifying the position that all Japanese should be deported, regardless of citizenship, one reader argued that:

The Japs, in the Pearl Harbor incident, told the world more forcefully their estimate of the value of truthfulness and honesty than words could have told.

There may be some exceptions to this national standard they have set up, but they are so comparatively few that we are justified in voting to send them all back to Japan at the close of the war (Three reasons, 1943, p. A4).

Regardless of the fact that the United States was winning the war and the West Coast was no longer under threat of attack, the stereotype that Japanese people were “treacherous” was still prevalent and still being used to justify, among other proposed policies, internment. For many, such as the writer of the above editorial, this stereotype was impervious to disconfirming information (cf., Allport, 1954). Examples of loyalty on behalf of Japanese-Americans, such as the formation of the 442nd Infantry Regiment, are considered mere exceptions to the “rule” regarding the true nature of the Japanese exemplified in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Stereotypes represent one of the most studied concepts in the history of social psychology (see Schneider, 2005). There are, as a result, many different theories regarding their origin and their effect on how the world is perceived. The various definitions proposed by these theories share one common element, however: a stereotype is fundamentally an association perceived to exist among a group (or social category) and some quality (e.g., trait, behavior, etc.; Schneider, 2005). Stereotypes, in other words, refer to the qualities that are
attached to other people as a function of their perceived membership in a group. Stereotypic associations are often depicted as reflections of a biased, simplistic and erroneous perception of reality (Lippman, 1922; Katz & Braly, 1933, 1935). Despite their negative connotation, the capacity to form stereotypes is rooted in people’s innate cognitive ability to categorize stimuli—especially social stimuli (Hirschfeld, 2001; Mahalingam, 2007)—encountered in our environment (Allport, 1954).

Rather than define stereotypes in terms of an exaggerated or biased perception of reality, some researchers have instead focused on the social functions that they serve. The conflict between groups, according to Sherif (1958), arises as a result of competition over scarce resources. This state of conflict, in turn, leads to the emergence of negative stereotypes that help maintain antagonism between groups. If the conflict gets resolved, and relations become cooperative, the stereotypes that the groups has of one another will likewise change and become more positive. Sherif’s (1958) framework thus emphasizes the relationship between stereotypes and the structural relations that exist among groups.

As described above, Tajfel and Turner (1986) argued that stereotypes are the products of comparisons that we make between groups along an evaluative dimension. This explanation for the origin of stereotypes has two important implications. First, in contrast to Sherif (1958), it explains how stereotypes emerge in the absence of conflict. Second, it illustrates that the tone and content of stereotypes can be dictated by factors independent of the actions or qualities of those who are being stereotyped.

The attributes and qualities associated with particular groups are shaped by the psychological and social functions that they serve, of which Tajfel (1981) identified three. First, stereotypes help people maintain a positive view of their group about others. Second, stereotypes provide explanations for stressful, large-scale social events. Third, and last,
stereotypes serve the function of providing justification for actions undertaken by one’s group. In fulfilling these functions, stereotypes can inform what Sidanius and Pratto (1999) refer to as the legitimizing myths that justify group-based social hierarchies and intergroup violence.

Although stereotypes are the products of comparisons made among groups, this comparison is not made in a vacuum. The ways in which people categorize their social world, namely the process through which they place themselves and others into discrete social groups (e.g., American, psychology student, criminal), may not correspond to divisions that actually exist in reality. When confronted with a series of objects, for example, a person engages in two opposed cognitive processes: categorization and particularization (Billig, 1996). In the former, the person looks for common features among objects to justify their placement within a particular category. Objects that have four legs, a flat horizontal surface, a curved vertical surface and can be used for sitting would be placed in the category of “chair.” People can make adjustments to the criteria for inclusion in a particular category—for example, by making certain features more important than others—and for that reason a “stool” could be justifiably included in the category of “chair.”

Particularization, in contrast, reflects the process by which a person decides that certain objects do not belong in a particular category (Billig, 1985, 1996). Although it has four legs, a flat surface and can be used for sitting, most would exclude “table” from the category of “chair.” People also employ these cognitive processes to categorize people into different social groups, using qualities (e.g., physical, trait, cultural, etc.) associated with particular groups to guide the categorizations that we make. These criteria, however, are negotiable and, as argued by Billig (1985, 1996), ultimately determined via argumentation. It
is for this reason that one could have a lively debate about whether or not a “stool” should be considered a type of “chair” or a separate category entirely.

When applied to people, the inherent, negotiable nature of social categories lends itself to ideologies that provide a ready-made framework for how people ought to be organized into categories and subsequently evaluated (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b; Van Dijk, 2006). The categorical distinctions among social groups existing within political discourse thus often reflect those intended to persuade, blame, and/or justify (Edwards, 1991; Finlay, 2007; Reicher, 2004) in a manner consistent with the ideology from which they are derived. By depicting the traits attributed to social categories as fixed and immutable, political leaders and other “entrepreneurs of identity” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b, p. 75) can effectively reify the relations among groups. Doing so can help mobilize support for specific political projects (Hopkins & Reicher, 1997; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) or reify status inequalities that may exist among social groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a).

Political controversies thus often reflect a disagreement over the content and meaning of a social category (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001b). Just as one, for example, could argue about whether a “stool” is a “chair,” one could argue whether US citizens of Japanese ancestry should be included in the category of “enemy” or “friend,” with the social consequences differing depending on which categorization ultimately becomes codified politically, legally and socially (see Edelman, 1988; Pilecki, Muro, Hammad & Clemons, 2014; Reicher, 2004). Japanese-Americans were categorized in the latter category in General DeWitt’s testimony to Congress due to the treacherousness that members of the Japanese “race” supposedly possess. Such distinctions subsequently inform the public’s perception of relevant social groups (see Elcheroth & Reicher, 2014; Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Verkuyten, 2005), as
evidenced in the editorial that appeared in the Los Angeles Times days after DeWitt’s testimony. The emergence and widespread acceptance of the stereotype that the members of a group are immoral may thus originate from political discourse seeking to legitimate violence and inequality among groups. Such stereotypes not only serve this function, but they also help permit those who inflict or benefit from structural violence to maintain a positive moral image of themselves.

**Doing Unjust Things in a “Just” Society**

Stereotypes often function as legitimizing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) that provide justification for structural violence inflicted upon specific groups. The moral content of these stereotypes is especially crucial in fulfilling this function. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two, as evidenced in the examples provided above, was often justified in the name of security. This argument was informed by a more fundamental distinction proffered by political elites regarding the Japanese that found resonance with the US public at the time, namely that they were typically disloyal and thus automatically worthy of suspicion. The attribution of this trait to the Japanese reflects a moral stereotype, namely one that highlights the supposed immorality of this group of people. The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the extent to which stereotypes such as these facilitate people’s acceptance of structural violence.

What makes the moral content of stereotypes so important is that they can inform beliefs regarding the moral considerations that are extended to certain groups and not others. That is, if someone is part of a group deemed immoral, then he or she may not be viewed as part of the moral community of those considered worthy of moral and just treatment (see Opotow, 1990). Harm experience by this person may be considered more acceptable as a result. This dynamic exists in a context of other cognitive and emotional factors. Perceiving
others as less than human (Bandura et al., 1975; Louis et al., 2013; Staub, 1988) or feeling anger or hatred towards them (Halperin, 2008, 2011; Halperin et al., 2012) can likewise facilitate the restriction of moral consideration towards others. It is therefore crucial to not only examine the relationship between how we perceived the moral status of other groups and what forms of structural violence are considered acceptable in light of these other factors, but also the extent to which they enhance this relationship.

This dissertation consists of four studies that will address in different ways the research questions specified at the beginning of this chapter, which were the following:

1. How do political elites and lay people distinguish groups along a moral basis?
2. Are people more willing to accept violence towards those groups they perceived as being typically less moral?
3. Are groups perceived as less moral than others more likely to be perceived as less human?
4. Are people more likely to feel negative emotions (e.g., anger, contempt, disgust) towards those groups they perceive as less moral than others?

Chapters 2 and 3 address the research question, “How do political elites and lay people groups distinguish along a moral basis?”. Chapter 2 consists of a descriptive study analyzing how political leaders use moral claims to distinguish groups. Political discourse regarding the War on Terrorism was selected as a case study due its explicit moral character (e.g., Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Pilecki et al., 2014). A thematic content analysis of speeches made by Presidents Bush and Obama on the topic of terrorism was conducted. Statements describing terrorism or terrorist actors were coded on the extent to which they reflect the dimensions specified in Haidt’s (2012) Moral Foundations Theory (harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity and liberty). The findings of this study illustrate how a particular social
group, namely “terrorists,” was morally distinguished from other political actors along a wide-range of moral dimensions.

Chapter 3 builds on this finding by demonstrating how lay people, rather than political leaders, distinguish groups along a moral basis. Two national, non-probability samples recruited through posts made on social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) and ads placed in online classifieds (e.g., Craigslist; see also Cohen, Wolf, Panter & Insko, 2011) were used for both studies. Participants were administered items asking them to indicate how likely members of a previously selected group are to engage in moral/immoral behaviors (e.g., kill), adhere to moral/immoral values (e.g., equal rights) and exhibit moral/immoral traits (e.g., corrupt) relative to other people. Analysis intended to determine the extent to which participants distinguished groups responses along the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Reflecting the findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 demonstrated that people morally distinguish using an expansive moral criteria, namely the six dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory.

Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the remaining research questions. Historical precedent as well as previous psychological research demonstrates that perceiving a group of people as less than human (i.e., dehumanization) facilitates the infliction of harm upon that group. In this vein, the second study featured in Chapter 3 explored the relationship between moral stereotyping and people’s acceptance of structural violence. It also examined how people’s perception that the members of a group are immoral corresponds both with how “human” they consider them to be as well as how it corresponds to both positive and negative (e.g., anger) emotions. The results demonstrated how the belief that others are immoral related to participants’ acceptance of structural violence towards them and how human they are
perceived to be. Chapter 4 also found that participants were more likely to report feeling emotions such as anger and fear towards those whom they stereotyped as immoral.

As illustrated in the case of Japanese-American Internment, structural violence is often carried out through government policies that enjoy widespread public support. Whereas Chapter 3 examined the research question, “What cognitive and emotional processes correspond to people’s perceptions that a group is immoral?” as it pertained to the relationship between moral stereotypes, dehumanization and general attitudes towards structural violence, Chapter 4 instead examined this question as it pertained to the relationship between moral stereotypes, group-based emotions, and public policy attitudes. This study featured a large-scale survey study using an online sample. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four policy conditions (immigration, gun rights, sexual minority right, and welfare). The findings of this study illustrated how perceiving a group to be immoral facilitates our acceptance of structural violence, in this case in the form of support for harsher policy measures that entail political repression and/or direct harm towards others. This study also explores the role of emotions—specifically contempt, disgust, and anger—serves in this relationship.

The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light on the subtle cognitive and emotional processes that underlie the widespread public acceptance of structural violence. The studies comprising this dissertation specifically examine how the stereotypes that people have concerning the morality of other groups correspond with what forms of treatment they view as acceptable towards others. This dissertation also explores how these stereotypes correspond to how people view the humanity of certain groups as well as the emotions directed towards its members. This dissertation, therefore, lays the foundation for a moral
psychology of intergroup relations incorporating Moral Foundations Theory and Social Identity Theory to examine the problem of violence in an expansive manner.

This paradigm has the potential to make a major theoretical and methodological contribution to the intergroup relations literature. Regarding the former, attempts to apply Moral Foundations Theory to study the relations among groups has been lacking. By employing it as a framework to explore how people distinguish groups both rhetorically and cognitively (i.e., stereotypic perception) along a moral basis, this dissertation highlights the value of Moral Foundations Theory as a means of understanding the psychological mechanisms making intergroup violence more palatable to the general public. In terms of its methodological contribution, these studies illustrate the value of a mixed-methods approach in studying intergroup violence. To properly account for the social context of violence, it is important to not only examine how political leaders—as well as lay people—talk about groups in moralizing ways, but also the societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1989; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003) that facilitate public acquiescence to violence. A moral psychology of intergroup relations paradigm could thus inform measures that monitor public opinion of certain social groups and provide indicators of the threat posed to its members.
Chapter 2

Distinguishing the “Good Guys” from the “Bad Guys”:

Identifying the Moral Dimensions Used By Political Leaders To Describe Terrorists

“Political language...is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.” George Orwell (1946/2005)

George Orwell’s essay, “Politics and the English Language,” from which the above quote is taken, is a critique of modern English rooted in the recognition of the inherent relationship between language, thought and power. Vague, imprecise language, Orwell argued, was indicative of vague, imprecise thought. It was within these abstract, poorly defined spaces that political language could obfuscate the true intentions of political actors and the destructiveness of particular political projects. Villages, for example, are not so much destroyed, Orwell pointed out, as much as they are “pacified.”

These euphemisms allow acts of political violence to be framed in a manner that overcomes two fundamental tendencies. First, people have an inherent need to view themselves, and by extension those with whom they associate, as morally good people (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto & Leach, 2008; Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). Second, people have an inherent need to feel compassion towards those who are suffering. This tendency, in particular, has evolutionary origins and is reflected cross-culturally to such an extent that it is seemingly universal (Cameron & Payne, 2012; Geotz, Keltner & Simon-Thomas, 2010).
One way to circumvent these tendencies is to divide groups on a moral basis (see Graumann, 1998) such that the intended targets of violence are perceived as “bad” or “immoral.” With this designation, the victims of violence can be effectively exempted from the standards of moral treatment (Opotow, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). Threats to the positive moral image of one’s group is no longer at issue nor is the need to feel compassion in the face of suffering, as the victims of harm are exempt from the standards of moral treatment normally afforded others. Investigating this process, the purpose of this study is to investigate the following research question: how do political elites distinguish groups along a moral basis for the purposes of legitimizing political projects? This study specifically examines how such distinctions emerge with respect to the category of “terrorist” within speeches given by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and their function in legitimizing US counterterrorism strategy.

Social Categories and Language

Where do our perceptions of other groups come from? In answering this question, social psychologists have focused primarily on social cognitive processes (e.g., Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1967; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Recognizing the apparent fluidity of social categories, some scholars have assumed a more constructivist approach. They argue, instead, that social categories are constructed rhetorically (Billig, 1996) and are thus intimately connected to the ideological context from which they emerge (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Van Dijk, 2006).

Although researchers have shown that we may have a natural predisposition to divide our social world into distinct categories (Allport, 1954; Hirschfeld, 2001) and to view these categories in essentialist terms (Mahalingam, 2007), the boundaries between these categories are, according to the rhetorical approach, arbitrary. Categories emerge as a result of tension
between two opposed cognitive processes: categorization and particularization (Billig, 1985). Categorization refers to the process through which the particularities of a case (e.g., stool) are minimized to include it as an instance of a general category (e.g., chair). Particularization, in contrast, refers to the process through which particularities are emphasized (e.g., a stool’s height) in order to distinguish it as a special case and thus a separate category (e.g., a stool is categorically distinct from a chair). The preference for one type of categorization over another is a rhetorical matter.

Categorization and particularization thus lie at the heart of political controversies as people can debate the classifications or labels given to different social groups and the attributes informing such designations (see Condor, Tileaga & Billig, 2013). Establishing the boundaries of a social category constitutes a form of social action with the attributes and qualities used to distinguish groups serving the purpose of justifying, blaming (Edwards, 1991) or otherwise presenting the groups with which one belongs in a favorable light (Van Dijk, 2006; cf., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For this reason, political elites and other “entrepreneurs of identity” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 75) often seek to construct social categories discursively to mobilize support for specific political projects, marginalize opponents (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) as well as identify enemies liable for violent action (Edelman, 1988). Social category construction is thus the fundamental means through which political discourse translates to political action (Reicher, 2004).

**Why Categories Matter: The Case of the War on Terrorism**

Researchers employing a discourse analysis approach have shown the various ways in which the excesses perpetrated in the War on Terrorism (e.g., enhanced interrogation, drone strikes) were legitimized by the political discourse proffered by the Bush and Obama Administrations. This discourse, Jackson (2005) argues, was deliberately created:
to make people who would otherwise be circumscribed by normal social
codes of non-violence, tolerance and human rights, complicit or even willing
participants in a massive project of counterterrorist violence (p. 181; see also
Jackson, 2007).

A categorical distinction, often made in moral terms, between the United States and its allies,
on the one hand, and the figure of the terrorist, on the other, existed at the center of this
discourse. Scholars have noted how President Bush framed terrorists as “barbarians”
threatening the civilized world (Esch, 2010; Kinsella, 2005) or as morally repugnant political
actors existing outside the political order (Lazar & Lazar, 2004). Recent inquiry has found
that aspects of the War on Terrorism discourse have persisted into the Obama
administration’s efforts to justify US counterterrorism operations as well (McCrisken, 2011;
Pilecki, Muro, Hammack & Clemons, 2014).

Correlational and experimental studies further illustrate the power of political
rhetoric in shaping people’s perceptions of terrorism. Dunn, Moore, and Nosek (2005)
analyzed a sample of newspapers in the United States and found that more benign language
(e.g., forces, strategy, reaction) was used to describe actions undertaken by US and allied
forces. Hostile language, namely words implying destruction (e.g., explosion) or malicious
intent (e.g., hostile), was more likely to be used about the actions of Iraqi or non-allied
groups. These minor linguistic differences influenced people’s interpretations of ambiguous
events. In a subsequent experiment consisting of college and community-based samples,
Dunn et al., (2005) found that participants exposed to benign language used to describe the
destruction of a building were more likely to attribute the act to US forces as well as believe
that it was both legitimate and necessary. Participants given the hostile account, in contrast,
were more likely to perceive the incident as an act of terrorism that was both unnecessary and cowardly.

Employing a martial or juridical framing (cf., Crawford, 2003) can influence what approach to counterterrorism is preferred. Golec de Zavala and Kossowska (2011) found a relationship among a sample of Polish participants between the attribution of soldier-like characteristics and support for a military counterterrorism strategy. Administering a mock newspaper article containing either a terrorist-as-soldier or terrorist-as-criminal framing to a sample in the United Kingdom, Golec de Zavala and Kossowska (2011) found that those in the terrorism-as-soldier condition were more likely to prefer a military counterterrorism strategy in comparison to those in the terrorist-as-criminal condition, especially among those high in social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Those in the terrorist-as-criminal condition, in contrast, were more likely to endorse a counterterrorism strategy based on control and containment.

In conclusion, words matter. The categories we use to organize and make sense of our social world are not givens. They are, rather, constructed through language. The criterion through which a group is placed in one category or another is established rhetorically (Billig, 1996), often by political elites seeking to mobilize support for particular political projects (Reicher, 2004). As evidenced by Golec de Zavala and Kossowska (2011), for example, political leaders wishing to pursue a military counterterrorism strategy could depict those who engage in acts of terrorism as soldiers. The category of “terrorists” itself implies illegitimacy and a dubious moral character (Dunn et al., 2005). This dubious moral character is often the basis upon which harsh and potentially controversial counterterrorism measures are legitimized (Kinsella, 2005; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Pilecki et al., 2014). It is, therefore,
crucial to examine the rhetorical means through which categories such as “terrorist” are constructed and subsequently distinguished along a moral dimension.

**Defining Morality**

The purpose of this study was to analyze how moral content was used to construct and distinguish the category of “terrorist” within speeches made by Presidents Bush and Obama. Moral content, in this case, is defined as statements reflecting the dimensions identified in Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009). According to this theory, there are six foundations upon which all moral systems are based (see Table 1). The universality of these moral foundations is due to the societal functions they serve. Hence, all societies have the capacity to cultivate virtues based on these foundations, although there is variation in how they are manifested in terms of content and which moral foundations are emphasized (Haidt & Graham, 2009). Research has shown, moreover, the reliance on one or multiple foundations when making a moral judgment can differ as a function of political orientation (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007) and socio-economic status (Haidt, 2001).

There have been few studies examining how people articulate the moral dimensions identified in Moral Foundations Theory. Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009; Study 4) analyzed sermons given in traditionally liberal (e.g., Unitarian Universalist) and traditionally conservative (e.g., Southern Baptist) churches for the presence of words reflecting the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., safe, crush for the Care/Harm dimension). Results revealed that liberal sermons were more likely to feature words reflecting the dimensions of Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating in relation to conservative sermons. Words reflecting the dimensions of Authority/Subversion and Purity/Degradation were more likely to emerge within conservative sermons. This finding is in line with previous studies
finding that political liberals tend to rely on the Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating dimensions when making moral judgments while political conservatives tend to rely on all the moral foundations to an equivalent extent.

Clifford and Jerit (2013) propose that political elites can reinforce through their rhetoric the connections perceived to exist between particular moral foundations and specific public policy stances. To explore this relationship, they conducted a content analysis of articles from The New York Times regarding the debate over stem cell research across a 12-year period. Articles were coded for the presence of words reflecting the moral foundations of Care/Harm and Purity/Degradation, among others. Results revealed that statements supporting the use of embryonic stem cells for medical research—a position typically held by political liberals during the time—were more likely to feature words reflecting the Care/Harm dimension in comparison to statements made by opponents of stem cell research—a position typically held by political conservatives during the time. Opponents of stem-cell research were, in contrast, more likely to feature Purity/Degradation words along with words reflecting other dimensions.

Studies investigating the ways in which people articulate the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory have typically employed coding schemes emphasizing the presence of keywords associated with each moral foundation. Although such a strategy is useful for aggregation and making comparisons between groups, it comes at the cost of the thematic and rhetorical context from which moral content—as defined by Moral Foundations Theory—emerges. As such, it remains unclear how these moral dimensions are used rhetorically for political purposes. US counterterrorism policies following the September 11, 2001 attacks, previous research shows, were often rooted in a categorical distinction made between terrorists and other political actors in moral terms (Esch, 2010; Kinsella, 2005; Lazar
& Lazar, 2004; Pilecki et al., 2014). The political rhetoric that emerged from this period represents an ideal subject of inquiry for examining how the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory are articulated to construct and position social categories.

Present Study

The purpose of this study is to analyze how terrorist actors are distinguished (i.e., particularized) from other political categories along a moral dimension. To achieve this aim, speeches made by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama on the topic of terrorism were analyzed through the theoretical lens of Moral Foundations Theory using thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Rather than aggregation for the purpose of comparing across ideological groups, this study sought to provide a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) of the deployment of moral content—as it is defined by Moral Foundations Theory—by political elites when speaking about terrorism. This study was, therefore, descriptive in scope as it sought to identify the dominant moral themes emerging from political speeches on the topic of terrorism.

Method

Data Corpus

The initial corpus of data consisted of speeches cultivated from the White House’s official website as well as other sources (e.g., The New York Times; The Miller Center). The author, along with an undergraduate research assistant, analyzed the initial corpus of speeches for mentions of the words “terror” or “terrorism.” Speeches in which terrorism was mentioned but not a major topic (e.g., many Barack Obama’s State of the Union Addresses) were not retained for further analysis. The final corpus of data consisted of 20 speeches, 11 from George W. Bush and nine from Barack Obama (see Table 2).

Analytical Framework
Morality was considered to assume the role of cultural model (Gee, 1999) or “background knowledge” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 28) within which situated meanings of political categories (e.g., terrorist) arise. To be as encompassing as possible, a deductive approach was employed. That is, analysis consisted of an examination of speeches through the lens of an existing theoretical framework, namely Moral Foundations Theory. This strategy contrasts with the inductive, grounded theory (e.g., Charmaz, 2006) approach emphasizing themes and concepts derived directly from the data. It also comes in response to the fact that acknowledging the interaction between the interpreter and the text is integral to interpretive analysis (Tappan, 1997). As such, the expansive definition of morality provided by Moral Foundations Theory draws attention to aspects of morality that may not feature prominently in the author’s moral worldview.

**Analytical Procedure**

The analysis focused on the latent and semantic content of political speeches (see Braun & Clarke, 2006). Previous studies examining the articulation of moral foundations through text and talk have focused on the presence of particular words (e.g., “kill”). This study, in contrast, was interested in the underlying ideas and assumptions informing the semantic content (i.e., specific words) of presidential speeches. As such, the analysis focused more attention to the rhetorical and thematic context from which moral content emerged. The analytical process followed the procedures for thematic content analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) as well as the iterative approach used by Sani and Reicher (1998, 1999, 2000).

First, the author and an undergraduate research assistant reviewed the initial corpus of data to become more familiar with it in a general way. Second, the author and an undergraduate research assistant identified and coded statements made by George W. Bush or
Barack Obama regarding terrorism in relation to the moral dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Statements, in this case, were defined as “phrases, assertions, comments, and attributions that retained a sense of completeness and had a homogeneous object” (Sani & Reicher, 1998, p. 629). The data was coded the data and validity was established via consensus (Tappan, 1997). Third, the author reviewed the corpus again, focusing on the thematic and rhetorical context from which coded statements emerged.

This step, specifically, meant moving beyond the question of “Does this statement reflect a particular moral dimension?” to questions like, “How is this moral dimension being expressed to distinguish the terrorist from other social categories?” and “How does this expression relate to others both within and across texts?”. The unit of analysis thus shifted from the statement to the argument (e.g., “a statement or interconnected set of statements which characterize either an aspect of the entity or else its general nature”, Sani & Reicher, 2000, p. 103). The analytical process at this stage involved multiple readings of the text to examine the political discourse on terrorism as it emerged within the argumentative context following the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to Billig (1996):

…the meaning of discourse used in an argumentative context must be examined in terms of the contest between criticism and justification.

Therefore, to understand the meaning of a sentence or whole discourse in an argumentative context, one should not examine merely the words within that discourse or the images in the speaker’s mind at the moment of utterance.

One should also consider the positions which are being criticized, or against which a justification is being mounted. (p. 121)

Justification, Billig (1996) adds, often involves the particularizing a category away from others by shifting the “essence” of that category from one set of social values to another.
In terms of this study, distinguishing the terrorist category from others would be accomplished through the attribution of immoral traits to members of the terrorist category, accusations that members of the terrorist category engage in immoral behaviors, and/or contentions that members of the terrorist category adhere to immoral values. Attributions of positive moral qualities to the United States or its allies, and the subsequent juxtaposition of these against the figure of the terrorist, would, likewise, be a means of distinguishing the terrorist category. This study considered these rhetorical structures as indicators of category constructions, patterns of which are noted and compared within and across texts.

**Results**

The analysis revealed that Presidents Bush and Obama differentiated the category of terrorist from other categories along a broad moral basis. Namely, content reflecting each of the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory were present within presidential discourse. Noteworthy, also, was how both Presidents utilized these moral dimensions to frame the problem of terrorism such that US counterterrorism efforts seemed logical, necessary, and therefore legitimate. To illustrate these findings, the Results section will be divided into six sub-sections. Each section will feature a dominant theme extracted from the data pertaining to a particular moral foundation. The themes described in these sections do not constitute an exhaustive list. Rather, for the sake of space, only major ones emerging with respect to each moral dimension are described in detail. These sections also include excerpts from both President Bush and President Obama illustrating each theme. This step was taken to highlight the similarities in how President Bush and President Obama differentiated terrorists on a moral basis, even though the analysis did find some differences between the two leaders. This finding builds upon previous work (e.g., McCrisken, 2011; Pilecki et al, 2014), illustrating the hegemonic status of the War on Terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2005) despite its apparent
repudiation by the Obama Administration (e.g., Wilson & Kamen, 2009) as well as other work documenting differences in moral worldview as a function of political orientation (Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 2002).

**Care/Harm: Terrorist-as-murderer**

A dominant theme reflecting the foundation of Care/Harm emerged among presidential speeches featuring the description of terrorists as “murderers.” This label is important as it immediately casts terrorist violence in a morally dubious light. Murder, rather than the more ambiguous “kill,” implies that the victim was innocent, thereby highlighting the unjustified nature of the act. Terms like “radical” and “slaughter” used by President Bush and President Obama enhance the apparent egregiousness of terrorist violence. This description distinguishes the category of terrorist from other political actors who engage in violence, such as soldiers (see Bhatia, 2005; Golec de Zavala & Kossowska, 2011).

President Bush articulated the terrorist-as-murderer in the State of the Union Address he gave on January 23, 2007:

> In the mind of the terrorists, this war began well before September 11 and will not end until their radical vision is fulfilled. And these past five years have given us a much clearer view of the nature of this enemy. Al Qaeda and its followers are Sunni extremists possessed by hatred and commanded by a harsh and narrow ideology. Take almost any principle of civilization, and their goal is the complete opposite. They preach with threats, instruct with bullets and bombs and promise paradise for the murder of the innocent.

(Miller Center, 2013d)

The type of harm presented by terrorists, as described by President Bush, is unique in terms of its scope and motivation. Words such as “harsh,” “bullets,” and “bombs” highlight the
magnitude of terrorist violence. The motivation behind this violence, described with words like as “extremist,” “radical,” and “narrow ideology,” further highlight its unjustified nature. This description serves the purpose of positioning terrorists outside the bounds of “civilization” (see Kinsella, 2005).

The terrorist-as-murderer theme emerged in the rhetoric of President Obama as well. In a speech given on May 19, 2011, which was in weeks following the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama declared:

Bin Laden and his murderous vision won some adherents. But even before his death, al Qaeda was losing its struggle for relevance, as the overwhelming majority of people saw that the slaughter of innocents did not answer their cries for a better life. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011)

Like Bush, President Obama construed terrorist violence as a form of murder, the magnitude of which is enhanced by the use of word “slaughter,” and the emphasis placed on the innocence of its victims. The framing of terrorist violence as “murder” removes it from the realm of politics and war, a basis upon which its legitimacy could presumably be found (see Walzer, 2000), and instead places it within the realm of criminality (see next section) and cruelty towards others.

Terrorists are those who threaten innocent life; the United States and its allies, according to President Bush and President Obama, protect it. This juxtaposition helped establish the necessity, and thus legitimacy, of controversial aspects of the US counterterrorism response. Justifying the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques on terror suspects, Bush stated on September 6, 2006:
“I can say that questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks, here in the United States and across the world.”

Bush reiterated this point later in the speech by declaring, “We are getting vital information necessary to do our jobs, and that’s to protect the American people and our allies” (The New York Times, 2006). These claims put the United States in the role of “protector” against the threat posed by terrorism. It thus has a duty to employ whatever means are necessary to safeguard innocent life (see Harré, R., Moghaddam, F., Cairnie, T., Rothbart, D., & Sabat, S. 2009).

This argument was also present in a speech given by President Bush on March 19, 2008. Expressing the need for a continued military presence in Iraq, Bush stated:

We watched in horror as Al Qaida beheaded innocent captives and sent suicide bombers to blow up mosques and markets. These actions show the brutal nature of the enemy in Iraq, and they serve as a grim reminder. The terrorists who murder the innocent in the streets of Baghdad want to murder the innocent in the streets of America. Defeating this enemy in Iraq will make it less likely that we will face the enemy here at home. (Miller Center, 2008)

Here, Bush invoked the brutality indicative of the terrorist-as-murderer theme by mentioning beheadings as well as acts of destruction against mosques and markets. “Innocent” is used in both its adjective (“innocent captives”) and noun forms (“the innocent”) to describe the victims of terrorist violence. The military presence in Iraq, in this case, is justified on the basis that it safeguards innocent lives both in Iraq and the United States.
President Obama’s speech on May 23, 2013, provided a similar argument when justifying the use of drone strikes on terrorism suspects. Although stressing the threat posed by members of the terrorist category, President Obama, in contrast to President Bush, highlighted the proportionality of terrorist versus US violence:

To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties—not just in our cities at home and facilities abroad, but also in the very places—like Sana’a and Kabul and Mogadishu—where terrorists seek a foothold. Let us remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013)

Obama later reiterated this point by highlighting that the United States, in contrast to members of the terrorist category, seek to protect innocent life as much as possible:

But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us, and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013)

Violence coming as a result of US counterterrorism operations is thus different in moral terms. Whereas terrorist actors target makes no such distinction between legitimate target and civilian, US counterterrorism tactics, such as drone strikes, discriminate between those deserving of the violence and those “they hide among.” The loss of innocent life due to the latter is, therefore, an unfortunate byproduct of violence that is otherwise necessary and morally justifiable.

**Fairness/Cheating: Terrorist-as-unjust**
The theme of terrorist-as-unjust emerged within speeches given by Presidents Bush and Obama. Content reflecting the Fairness/Cheating foundation, which regards issues of equality, justice, and proportionality (Haidt, 2012), comprised this theme. There were two inter-related components to the terrorist-as-unjust theme. Both Presidents described terrorists either as those who must be “brought to justice” or as those who embody the antithesis of justice. The terrorist-as-unjust theme was often coupled with the terrorist-as-murderer theme described in the previous section. Because terrorist violence is unjustified due to its targeting of innocent people, it requires a proportional response (i.e., punishment).

The examples below illustrate this theme. Regarding counterterrorism efforts abroad, President George W. Bush described in his 2004 State of the Union address that:

Thousands of very skilled and determined military personnel are on a manhunt, going after the remaining killers who hide in cities and caves and one by one, we will bring those terrorists to justice. (Miller Center, 2004)

President Bush’s words feature both a juridical and a martial discourse regarding counterterrorism (see Crawford, 2003; Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post & Victoroff, 2007). Because of the violence they inflict, a “manhunt” is underway to “bring those terrorists to justice,” thus identifying terrorists as fugitives within a juridical framework.

Military, rather than law enforcement, personnel carry out this mission. Bush noted later in his 2004 State of the Union address that:

After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got. (Miller Center, 2004)

Bush construes those placed in the terrorist category as individuals who must be brought to “justice,” but in a manner entailing a military response given the nature of their violence (e.g.,
“the chaos and carnage of September the 11th”). President Obama provided a similar narrative of the September 11, 2001 attacks and its aftermath in his May 2, 2011, speech announcing the death of Osama bin Laden:

We were also united in our resolve to protect our nation and to bring those who committed this vicious attack to justice. We quickly learned that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda—an organization headed by Osama bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and was committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe. And so we went to war against al Qaeda to protect our citizens, our friends, and our allies. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2011a)

President Obama invoked both the terrorist-as-murder and terrorist-as-unjust themes in this excerpt. Terrorists were not only committed to “killing innocents,” but they also “openly declared war on the United States.” This narrative is preceded, and thus contextualized, by Obama’s statement that the United States is committed to bringing those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks to justice. President Obama therefore elides the juridical and martial discourses to frame US military actions as a means of achieving justice.

Presidents Obama also distinguished the terrorist category from those categories considered to be on the side of “justice,” which included both the United States and, more generally, Muslims. “[T]hat’s why we must communicate clearly to Muslims around the world,” President Obama declared in a January 7, 2010, speech, “that al Qaeda offers nothing except a bankrupt vision of misery and death—including the murder of fellow Muslims—while the United States stands with those who seek justice and progress” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). By declaring that the United States “stands with those who seek justice and progress,” President Obama implied that terrorists represent the
opposite. This position is due—drawing upon the terrorist-as-murderer theme—to the nature of the violence they inflict, particularly upon fellow Muslims. President Obama thus distinguished the terrorist category from the superordinate category of those seeking “justice and progress,” generally, as well as the category of Muslim, specifically (see Purity/Degradation: Terrorist-as-contagion section below).

**Liberty/Oppression: Terrorist-as-tyrant**

The theme of terrorist-as-tyrant featured content reflective of the Liberty/Oppression foundation. President Bush’s farewell address, given on January 15, 2009, illustrated this theme:

> The battles waged by our troops are part of a broader struggle between two diametrically different systems. Under one, a small band of fanatics demands total obedience to an oppressive ideology, condemns women to subservience and marks unbelievers for murder. The other system is based on the conviction that freedom is the universal gift of Almighty God and that liberty and justice light the path to peace. (The Miller Center, 2009)

President Bush, in this excerpt, positioned the terrorist category in opposition to the “universal gift” of freedom, the moral basis of which is rooted in “Almighty God.” The claims that terrorists desire to oppress others and eliminate dissent made by President Bush inform this characterization (see also Leudar, Marsland, & Nekvapil, 2004).

Like the terrorist-as-unjust theme described above, the terrorist-as-tyrant was also employed to distinguish the category of terrorist from a superordinate one consisting of the United States and its allies. President George W. Bush articulates this moral community (see Opotow, 1990) of freedom in the following excerpt from his State of the Union Address delivered on January 29, 2002:
Together with friends and allies from everywhere to Asia, from Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom. (Miller Center, 2002)

President Bush constructs the moral community of freedom by listing different parts of the world bound to the “momentum of freedom.” The “forces of terror” are positioned outside this group of “friends and allies” as those who wish to stop or disrupt this momentum. US counterterrorism efforts can thus be framed as a way to defend all the members of the moral community, not just the United States.

The terrorist-as-tyrant theme was not as prominent within President Obama’s speeches. It did, however, emerge in a speech on US foreign policy in the Middle East on May 23, 2013, when President Obama declared that:

> We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013)

The phrase “tyranny of terrorism” reiterates the link between terrorism and tyranny established in President Bush’s farewell address. This tyranny, moreover, is distinguished from the type exhibited typically exhibited by a head of state.

**Loyalty/Betrayal: Terrorist-as-divisive**

Loyalty towards one’s group is a virtue according to the *Loyalty/Betrayal* foundation. Anything that threatens this virtue can, therefore, be considered immoral. The analysis revealed content coalescing around the theme of *terrorist-as-divisive*, which emphasized the terrorists’ goal of dividing the societies they target. For example, in remarks following the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009, President Obama stated:
As a nation we will do everything in our power to protect our country, as Americans we will never give into fear or division, we will be guided by our hopes, our unity, and our deeply held values. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009c)

These excerpts featured the assumption that terrorists seek to not only instill fear into the populations they target but also that this fear is a means of sowing discord (e.g., “we would splinter in fear and selfishness”; “we will never give into fear or division”).

Highlighting the fact that the desire to sow discord among target population is a defining characteristic of the terrorist category, President Bush and President Obama noted how terrorist actors threatened the unity of societies outside of the United States. In a speech on sectarian violence in Iraq given on August 24, 2007, President Bush stated:

[T]hese al Qaeda attacks are designed to accelerate sectarian violence, by attacking Shia in hopes of sparking reprisal attacks that inspire Sunnis to join al Qaeda’s cause. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2007)

As in the US context, the terrorist aim is identified as the desire to sow discord to further their goals. President Bush elaborated upon this goal in a speech given on March 19, 2008, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq:

A little over a year ago, the fight in Iraq was faltering. Extremist elements were succeeding in their efforts to plunge Iraq into chaos. They had established safe havens in many parts of the country. They were creating divisions among the Iraqis along sectarian lines. And their strategy of using violence in Iraq to cause divisions in America was working as pressures built here in Washington for withdrawal before the job was done. (Miller Center, 2008)
As described in this excerpt, terrorist violence in Iraq aims to not only divide Iraqi society but US society as well. This frame links those who disagree with the Bush Administration’s policy at the time with the ultimate goal of terrorist actors, namely the withdrawal of US military personnel from Iraq. The terrorist-as-divisive theme thus also serves as a potential means of rallying support for US counterterrorism efforts as well as marginalizing domestic opposition.

**Authority/Subversion: Terrorist-as-chaos**

Statements made by President Bush and President Obama emphasizing the intention of terrorist actors to disrupt structures of authority and foster disorder comprise the theme of terrorist-as-chaos. Within this theme, terrorists were presented as a threat to the social order, specifically the legitimacy of government authority. The terrorist-as-chaos theme emerged in President Bush’s January 23, 2007 State of the Union Address:

> For America, this is a nightmare scenario; for the enemy this is the objective.
> Chaos is the greatest ally—their greatest ally in this struggle. And out of chaos in Iraq would emerge an emboldened enemy with new safe havens, new recruits, new resources, and an even greater determination to harm America. (Miller Center, 2007)

President Bush’s claim that chaos is the “greatest ally” of terrorism exemplified the terrorist-as-chaos trope. Terrorists thrive in such contexts as they, paradoxically, represent a “safe haven” from which they can launch attacks against others.

Within the terrorist-as-chaos theme, counterterrorism strategies promoting stability such as the continued presence of US military personnel in Afghanistan can be framed as legitimate and necessary responses to the terrorist threat. Illustrating this reasoning, President Obama stated in a December 1, 2009, speech on US foreign in Afghanistan and Pakistan that:
In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009b)

“Stability”, defined as the ability of the Afghan and Pakistani governments to provide security, and the ability of al Qaeda to operate in this region and abroad is framed in zero-sum terms. If stability declines (“…if the region slides backwards…”), al Qaeda is strengthened, thereby increasing the likelihood of an attack (“…al Qaeda can operate with impunity.”). When framed as such, US intervention becomes a proper response in the attempt to limit the contexts from which terrorism can emerge.

Terrorist actors are also agents of chaos. “We have learned through hard experience what happens when we pull our forces back too fast,” Bush remarked on March 18, 2008 speech that again stressed the need for a continued US military presence in Iraq, “The terrorist and extremists step in, they fill vacuums, establish safe havens and use them to spread chaos and carnage” (Miller Center, 2008). President Obama echoed such claims a year later in a speech given on May 21, 2009:

[W]here terrorists offer only the injustice of disorder and destruction, America must demonstrate that our values and our institutions are more resilient than a hateful ideology (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009a).
Both of these excerpts highlight that beyond harm (e.g., “carnage”; “destruction”) and injustice, terrorists also aim to spread “chaos” and “disorder.” The terrorist category is thus not only defined by the type of violence associated with it (see terrorist-as-murderer) but also by the unique threats it poses for society. Terrorists aim not only to turn members of society against one another (see terrorist-as-divisive) but also break the moral bonds that hold it together.

**Purity/Degradation: Terrorist-as-contagion**

President Bush and President Obama’s use of metaphors describing terrorist actors as “parasites” or a “cancer” typified the terrorist-as-contagion theme. The assumption that terrorists constitute a foreign contaminant within our global society that must be stopped lest it spread to unaffected areas underlies this theme. “My hope,” President Bush said in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union Address, “is that all nations will heed our call and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries as well as our own” (Miller Center, 2002). The use of the “parasite” imagery emphasizes the foreign—in the manner that a parasite exists externally from its host—and damaging nature of terrorist actors. The term “parasite” also serves as a means of distinguishing terrorists from the community of potential “host” countries that they could potentially infest.

President Obama’s speeches featured elements of the terrorist-as-contagion theme, albeit less so in comparison to his predecessor. Most notably, in his December 1, 2009, speech on US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama stated:

> We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That’s why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009b)
Terrorists, here, assume a different form of social contaminant. Members of the terrorist category now constitute a “cancer” embedded within a clinical discourse. Although it is in remission in one area (i.e., Afghanistan), the “disease” of terrorism has spread elsewhere, namely to the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. US counterterrorism strategy, as a result, must be broadened to deal with this newly infected area.

Both presidents described terrorist actors as contagions affecting Islam in particular. In his State of the Union Address on January 31, 2006, President Bush stated:

No one can deny the success of freedom, but some men rage and fight against it. And one of the main sources of reaction and opposition is radical Islam—the perversion by a few of a noble faith into an ideology of terror and death. (Miller Center, 2006)

After the distinction made between terrorist actors and “freedom” (see terrorist-as-tyrant), President Obama draws a distinction between the “radical Islam” of the terrorist and “noble faith” of Islam. Likewise, President Obama—in the same December 1, 2009, speech noted above—notes in his narrative of the September 11 attacks that:

As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda—a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions. (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009b)

Statements framing the category of terrorist as a contaminant of Islam (i.e., “one of the world’s great religions”) thus comprise part of the terrorist-as-contagion theme. Such statements serve as a means of undercutting the alternative framing of the “War on Terrorism” as a “War on Islam” (see Leudar et al., 2004) by placing members of the terrorist category outside the category of “Muslim” (cf. Mamdani, 2004).

Discussion
Previous research has shown how US counterterrorism strategies following the September 11, 2001, attacks were often legitimized on a moral basis (e.g., Lazar & Lazar, 2004). These studies have focused primarily on how terrorist actors were positioned discursively outside the community of groups considered worthy of moral treatment (see Pilecki et al., 2014). The distinguishing of terrorists from other political actors along a moral dimension is thus well documented; however, the moral dimensions upon which this distinction occurs within political discourse has not been adequately explicated. To address this gap in the literature, a thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of speeches made by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama was conducted through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012). The purpose of this analysis was to reveal the extent to which the category of the "terrorist" was distinguished rhetorically along the moral dimensions identified within this framework.

The analysis revealed that speeches made by President Bush and President Obama featured, to varying degrees, six major themes corresponding to the six dimensions outlined in Moral Foundations Theory. These themes were the following: terrorist-as-murderer, terrorist-as-unjust, terrorist-as-tyrant, terrorist-as-divisive, terrorist-as-chaos, and terrorist-as-contagion. These themes, collectively, constructed a multi-faceted, morally abject terrorist category distinct from those categories encompassing morally “acceptable” groups (see Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). Terrorists, in other words, are not only morally transgressive due to the unjust nature of the violence they inflict (i.e., terrorist-as-murderer, terrorist-as-unjust), but also because of their political objectives (i.e., terrorist-as-tyrant) and their desire to undermine (i.e., terrorist-as-divisive, terrorist-as-chaos) or infect (i.e., terrorist-as-contagion) society.
The implications of this study are two-fold. First, by identifying the specific moral dimensions through which terrorist category was distinguished from others, this study provides a nuanced account of how the “complex discursive accomplishment” (Tileaga, 2007) of moral exclusion is achieved by political rhetoric. It also reveals how US counterterrorism efforts could be framed as a rational response to the complex threat that members of the terrorist category pose. Second, despite the proliferation of research on Moral Foundations Theory, there have been few studies employing qualitative methods in this area. This study thus illustrates the potential of this approach to expanding the scope of Moral Foundations Theory research beyond the realm of moral judgment on the individual level to investigate how political leaders articulate moral foundations and employs them to legitimize political projects.

The Dimensions of Moral Exclusion and its Consequences

This study adds to previous research investigating how people construct morally excluded categories (see also Tileaga, 2007). Expanding upon Pilecki et al. (2014), this study shows that the terrorist category can be morally excluded via claims going beyond those emphasizing the threat of physical harm. Terrorists, in other words, exist separately from morally “acceptable” categories (see Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990) because they not only unjustly harm innocent people, but also because they represent an oppressive, insidious, and infectious category of people whose threat will spread if left unchecked. These findings, ultimately, point to the broad, multidimensional basis upon which the categorical distinction between morally excluded and morally included groups is made (see Graumann, 1998).

The analysis also revealed the role that problem definition serves in legitimizing policies towards morally excluded groups. “As political discourse,” Rochefort and Cobb (1994) argue, “the function of problem definition is at once to explain, to describe, to
recommend and above all, to persuade” (p. 15). The manner in which a social problem is
defined by political elites is inextricably tied to the types of solutions seen as both rational
and justifiable by the general public. The identification and definition of a problem within
political discourse is thus not value-neutral. Rather, it is an ideologically informed strategy
for gaining legitimacy and popular support (Edelman, 1988).

The themes emerging from President Bush and President Obama’s speeches not only
rendered the terrorist into a morally excluded category but also described the “problem” of
terrorism such that the “solutions” put forward in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001,
attacks could be framed as both logical and necessary (see also Jackson 2005, 2007). The
terrorist-as-murderer and terrorist-as-unjust themes helped to depict terrorists as fugitives.
Efforts to capture, detain, prosecute and even kill (e.g., drone strikes; see The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, 2013) members of the terrorist category could subsequently be
labeled as legitimate ways of bringing them to justice. The terrorist-as-tyrant theme,
meanwhile, highlighted the mutually exclusive relationship between terrorists and political
freedom. Efforts to “spread” freedom and democracy, as a result, become potential solutions
to the terrorist threat, thereby legitimizing US strategies aiming for “regime change” and
nation-building projects in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Regarding the latter, the terrorist-as-chaos theme notably emerged within President
Bush’s rhetoric in the context of an increasingly deteriorating situation in Iraq following the
2003 US-led invasion. The “problem” of terrorism was elided with the problems facing
coalition forces occupying the country. Further US commitment to stabilizing the country
was consequently framed as a rational response to the apparent aims of terrorist actors to
destabilize the country. Lastly, when he compared al-Qaeda to “cancer,” President Obama
employed the terrorist-as-contagion theme as a rationale for an expanded US counterterrorism
strategy encompassing both Afghanistan as well as border regions in Pakistan. Just as cancer can spread from one organ to another, the “cancer” of terrorism can spread from one country (i.e., Afghanistan) to another (i.e., Pakistan). A broad, aggressive response—akin to chemotherapy—therefore, becomes necessary to prevent this outcome. The terrorist-as-divisive theme was distinct insofar as it was used as a basis to minimize dissent rather than justify counterterrorism strategy. In other words, if the “problem” of terrorism includes efforts by terrorist actors to divide and weaken society, public dissension can be delegitimized as a form of aid to those who want to harm the US.

These aspects of the “problem” of terrorism cohere around the morally abject character of the terrorist figure emerging from the speeches of Presidents Bush and Obama. US counterterrorism efforts, moreover, became normalized as rational and logical responses to the terrorist threat (Jackson, 2005, 2007). It is through this rhetorical construct that, in the spirit of the quote from George Orwell that began this chapter, “drone strikes” can be construed as a means of bringing terrorists to “justice” (Obama, 2013) while pre-emptive wars and prolonged military occupation can be placed under the banner of spreading freedom and democracy (White House, 2006). Defining the morally excluded category as a problem requiring a particular solution is, therefore, an important rhetorical mechanism through which violence towards excluded groups is legitimized.

Articulating Moral Foundations Theory

Moral Foundations Theory has spurred a great deal of research in recent years. Despite its theoretical richness (Haidt, 2007, 2008, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2009), this body of work has been focused primarily on investigating moral judgment on the individual level (e.g., Graham et al., 2011), specifically judgment tendencies that differ as a function of political orientation (e.g., Federico, Weber, Ergun & Hunt, 2013; Graham et al., 2009; Weber
& Federico, 2012). There have been a few studies employing a qualitative framework, however these have mainly focused on people’s use of particular words associated with specific moral foundations (e.g., Clifford & Jerit, 2013; Graham et al., 2009). To date, there has not been a study conducted that has a Moral Foundations Theory framework to analyze political rhetoric from a purely rhetorical/discursive psychological perspective.

This study reveals the functions that moral content, as defined by Moral Foundations Theory, serve within political rhetoric. Moral Foundations Theory, to the extent that it attempts to legitimize a broad, commonly shared moral domain, may be therefore useful for researchers wishing to examine how moral content is employed in the rhetorical construction of social categories (e.g., Billig, 1996; Edwards, 1991; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). The findings of this study make a theoretical contribution to the Moral Foundations Theory literature as well. Although absent from earlier theoretical and empirical work, Haidt (2012) argued that Liberty/Oppression, which regards people’s sensitivities to domination and their willingness to resist it, represented a distinct moral foundation. There have been few studies, however, conducted to corroborate this claim (see Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto & Haidt, 2012). The emergence of a terrorist-as-tyrant theme among the speeches analyzed in this study reveals that this foundation can be employed as a means of morally distinguishing and condemning others.

Despite differences in extent, the fact that the terrorist-as-tyrant theme, as well as others, emerged with the speeches of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama, presidents from different ends of the ideological spectrum, highlights the second theoretical contribution of this study. What factors facilitate similarities in the use of different moral foundations regardless of political orientation? A great deal of research has been dedicated to revealing the differences between how Conservatives and Liberals in the United States make moral
judgments (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 2002). The findings of this study illustrate that such cleavages may become less pronounced as a function of topic (e.g., foreign policy) or role of speaker (e.g., President of the United States; see Pilecki et al., 2014). Future research, therefore, should examine these and other factors and how they shape the moral content of political rhetoric.

**Limitations and Conclusion**

This study was limited in some ways. First, a deductive approach was employed to analyze speeches; specifically, they were examined through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory. Although expansive, this theory is by no means a final, definitive account of human morality. There is thus a chance that dimensions of morality not identified by this theory, which would otherwise be acknowledged had an inductive, grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006) approach been used, may have been overlooked during analysis. In light of the previous theoretical and empirical work on Moral Foundations Theory, as well as the overall dominance of themes extracted from the analysis, the likelihood of this oversight affecting the conclusions reached in this study appears to be minimal.

Second, although analysis revealed that members of the terrorist category were distinguished along a broad moral basis, which was subsequently used to define the “problem” of terrorism such that the US counterterrorism responses seemed both logical and necessary, it is not clear whether this rhetoric had a discernible effect on public opinion. Views towards the use of torture on suspected terrorists, for example, have changed little in the past decade. Fifty-one percent of respondents in a January 2015 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (2015) considered torture to be “often” or “sometimes” necessary to gain information from suspected terrorists. This figure was 48% in February 2008 and 43% in July 2004. There is, moreover, widespread support for the use of drone strikes to target
terrorism suspects in countries like Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia (61% approve versus 30% disapprove; Pew Research Center, 2013). The themes emerging from the presidential speeches examined in this study could be interpreted as an attempt by political elites to reflect the general opinion of their constituents rather than an attempt to mobilize support for a specific political project. Further research, particularly those employing mixed-method designs (e.g., Verkuyten, 2005), should be conducted to clarify this relationship.

Despite these limitations, this study found evidence that the moral content of speeches made by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama on terrorism was comprised of themes reflective of the moral dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012). This finding illustrates a means of distinguishing (i.e., particularizing; Billig, 1985) members of the terrorist category from along a moral basis. The analysis also revealed that these different moral dimensions were employed to define the “problem” of terrorism in a manner that normalized aspects of the US counterterrorism response. President Obama’s reference to terrorism as a form of “cancer”—that is, an impurity existing within society—provides the rationale for an aggressive, expansive US counterterrorism response, akin to chemotherapy, that aims to stop the “spread” of terrorism. This study, therefore, contributes to the intergroup relations literature, particularly research on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990) by illustrating the rhetorical functions that moral foundations-related content serves making harm towards particular groups morally acceptable.
Chapter 3

How People Distinguish the “Good Guys” from the “Bad Guys”:
The Dimensions of Moral Stereotyping and Its Consequences

“Every society and religion has rules, for both have moral laws. And the essence of morality consists, as in art, of drawing the line somewhere.”
Huston Smith (Snell, 1997)

“Morality is simply the attitude we adopt towards people whom we personally dislike.” Oscar Wilde (1895/2001, p. 41)

The problem of violence has been defined within social psychology largely in individualistic terms. Anderson and Huesmann (2003, p. 298), for example, defined violence as a particularly extreme form of aggression “directed toward another individual carried out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm.” This bias towards the individual as the unit of analysis has persisted throughout much of the research on violence throughout the previous century. Early psychological models of violence viewed it as the product of the unconscious (Freud, 1961), innate biological drives (Lorenz, 1966), or frustration due to impeded goal-seeking behavior (Miller, 1941). Contemporary socio-cognitive models of aggression (Anderson & Carnagey, 2004) retain this epistemological link towards conceiving violence in terms of individual-level processes, with the relegation of social context to the status of background variables.

Tajfel (1981) critiqued this bias, arguing that much social psychological research was “irrelevant” because it inadequately accounted for the social context when trying to explain
behavior. Privileging the interpersonal dimensions of violence also helps to ignore non-
physical, albeit extremely harmful, acts of collective violence like the systematic violation of
people’s civil, political and economic rights. The internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War Two, for example, was an act of violence perpetrated against a segment of the US
population and facilitated by political and military institutions acting under the authority of
the political establishment (e.g., the President of the United States, the Supreme Court)—
often with the acquiescence of large segments of the general population (Robinson, 2001).
Peace psychology, on the other hand, has introduced a more expansive definition of violence
termed structural violence, which refers to ways in which societal institutions and authorities
prevent people from otherwise achieving their realistic potential (Galtung, 1969).

The strength of this conception is that it problematizes a number of important social
processes (e.g., racism, sexual, poverty) by framing the harm they produce as forms of
violence inflicting upon specific groups of people (e.g., people of color, women, the working
class). To adequately address the problem of violence from this perspective, social
psychological research must go beyond individual levels of analysis and examine the context
from which it emerges. This approach entails, among other things, examining the societal
beliefs (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003) that facilitate the perception that
violence, whether it be in the form of physical harm or political repression, is acceptable
towards certain groups. In this vein, this chapter examines the relationship between moral
stereotyping—namely, the perception of certain groups as being typically “moral” or
“immoral”—and people’s acceptance of structural violence (e.g., barring members of certain
groups from holding public office).

**Moral Stereotyping**
The present emphasis on moral stereotyping requires further exploration of what stereotypes “are” and what they “do” in terms of intergroup relations. Regarding the former, Schneider (2005) defines stereotypes as “qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people” (p. 24). Moral stereotyping, then, regards the moral qualities—either positive or negative—attributed to members of particular groups. In terms of what stereotypes “do”, this chapter is rooted in the socio-motivational tradition emphasizing the social nature of stereotypes, particularly the functions they serve within the context of intergroup relations (Ellemers & Van Kippenberg, 1997). This conception approach contrasts with the early view of stereotypes as erroneous generalizations that people have of other groups (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1933, 1935).

The socio-motivational approach emerged from Tajfel’s (1981) early work employing the “minimal group” paradigm, which found that stereotypes were not cognitive errors nor the products of conflict over scarce resources (c.f., Sherif, 1958). From this body of research, Tajfel and Turner (1986) proposed Social Identity Theory, which held that people fundamentally want to maintain a positive social identity, namely that part of a person’s self-concept derived from his or her membership in a group. A positive social identity is achieved when one’s group compares favorably to another along an evaluative dimension. A negative social identity of social identity, by contrast, comes as a result of unfavorable comparisons between one’s group and another. Stereotypes emerged as the products of such comparisons.

Potentially any characteristic can be employed to compare and evaluate groups (Tajfel, 1981), however research has identified some the most commonly used ones. The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), for example, contends that the content of stereotypes are comprised of two fundamental dimensions: sociability (i.e., warmth) and competence (see Cuddy et al., 2009). There is further research demonstrating
the primacy of morality in intergroup perception. Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) found in a series of studies that perceiving the in-group as moral was more important in the ultimate evaluation of one’s group than either of the dimensions specified in the Stereotype Content Model. Notably, Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto and Leach (2008) found that participants were more likely to opt for improving group status—as opposed to improving individual status—when such actions were evaluated as moral by the in-group, regardless of whether it was evaluated as competent.

What comprises this moral dimension, though? Influenced by the cognitive-developmental model (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965), morality has often been defined in terms of judgments of right and wrong pertaining to issues of justice (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Kohlberg, 1969) and care (Gilligan, 1982). Emerging from a socio-evolutionary paradigm, Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt, 2012) outlined an expansive moral dimension comprised of six “foundations” upon which all moral systems are based. The foundations of Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating regard basic concerns for the suffering and unfair treatment of others, respectively. The foundations of Loyalty/Betrayal and Authority/Subversion pertain to people’s moral obligations towards their group and hierarchical systems (e.g., respect for leaders). Moral judgments made by Purity/Degradation foundation emanate from concerns about physical and spiritual contagion. Lastly, the foundation of Liberty/Oppression regards issues of political equality and oppression.

Integrating Social Identity Theory and Moral Foundations Theory, this chapter examines the extent to which moral stereotypes are products of comparisons people make between groups along a moral dimension comprised of these six foundations. A social group could be perceived as being typically immoral if, for example, they are seen as less spiritually pure (e.g., Dalits in India) or more disruptive of legitimate structures of authority (e.g.,
anarchists) in comparison to others. Immoral qualities (e.g., impure, subversive) may be attributed to the members of such groups. These attributions may also have the potential to condition what standards of certain treatment groups are afforded, thereby by making violence—physical and/or structural—between groups more acceptable.

**Moral Stereotyping and Violence**

The need to view the in-group as inherently moral is tied to the enhanced self-esteem that one derives by identifying with a group that is evaluated positively. As such, people who are strongly identified with a group are more likely to view their groups as having high moral status (Leach et al., 2007). What happens when the in-group acts immorally, however? One way of making ingroup harm morally acceptable, and thus preserving the moral status of the ingroup, is to frame the target of ingroup harm as being unworthy of moral treatment. That is, the victims of ingroup harm are perceived a priori as not worthy of moral standards of treatment.

Bandura’s (1990) work on moral disengagement illustrates this concept. Moral behavior, according to Bandura (1990), emerges from mechanisms of self-regulation and self-sanctioning. However, a person can “disengage” these mechanisms by employing various cognitive strategies (e.g., framing act as morally justified) with the consequence being that morally transgressive behavior will be more likely to occur (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; see Bandura, 1990). Moral exclusion represents one disengagement strategy by which certain groups are perceived as unworthy of moral and just treatment.

A person’s scope of justice, according to Opotow (1990), is the psychological boundary distinguishing those to whom standards of moral and just treatment apply. Those perceived to exist outside of this boundary are not afforded such consideration, and, as a result, are more likely to be viewed as acceptable targets of both physical (Martín-Peña &
Moral exclusion and delegitimization reflect psychological processes ultimately resulting in a categorical distinction made between groups considered either worthy or unworthy of moral treatment (see Opotow, 1995). This distinction represents a form of moral judgment (Graumann, 1998) at which point groups are stereotyped as being either “good” or “bad.” Those placed in the latter category are more likely to be perceived as more legitimate targets of violence. These moral stereotypes, moreover, are results of the comparison made along a moral dimension between the target group and those groups found within the scope of justice. In other words, moral stereotypes may emerge via comparisons that do not necessarily implicate the groups with which a person identifies.

**Moral Stereotyping, Dehumanization and Group-Based Emotions**

Moral stereotyping exists with other cognitive and emotional processes that facilitate the acceptance of intergroup violence. These include perceiving others as less human (e.g., Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013; Staub, 1989) or emotions such as anger or disgust (Halperin, Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012). It is unclear, however,
how stereotypes regarding the morality of other groups relate to these other variables. The purpose of this section is to review previous research on dehumanization and group-based emotions to examine the potential relationship between these variables and moral stereotyping.

Research has found that people’s perception that members of a group lack either naturally human or uniquely human traits is related to how moral they are perceived to be and what forms of treatment they deserve. Haslam (2006) has identified two, humanity-defining trait dimensions. The first dimension represents uniquely human traits, which define the boundary that separates humans from animals (e.g., civility, morality, higher cognition). The second dimension encompasses naturally human traits, which consist of features distinguishing humans from non-living things (e.g., cognitive flexibility, emotionality, warmth). Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam and Koval (2011) found that groups seen as lacking naturally human traits—for instance, as emotionally cold and rigid—were more likely to be viewed as deserving rehabilitation (e.g., education) following a moral transgression. Those perceived as lacking uniquely human traits—as immature, irrational, and/or backward, for example—were, in contrast, perceived as more blameworthy for their moral transgressions and thus seen as more deserving of punishment (e.g., negative consequences) rather than rehabilitation.

Infrahumanization is a type of dehumanization occurring along an emotional dimension. Social psychologists have identified two types of emotions: primary and secondary. Primary emotions represent those that are typically experienced by both humans and animals, like happiness, sadness, anger and fear. Secondary emotions, in contrast, are those that are unique to humans, like affection, admiration and pride (Leyens et al., 2000). Research has shown that people have a tendency to believe that those outside of their group
are less likely to feel secondary emotions; we do not make such distinctions when it comes to primary emotions, however (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Outgroup infrahumanization has been found to occur both as a result of being reminded of historical ingroup violence towards an outgroup (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009) as well as a result of exposure to generic human violence in which the ingroup is not implicated (Delgado, Rodriguez-Perez, Vaes, Leyens, & Betancor, 2009).

Beyond the emotions that people attribute to others, there is an emerging body of research on the relationship between group-based emotions, namely those emotions that emerge as a result of one’s identification with a group (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), and attitudes towards other groups. Matthews and Levin (2012), for example, found that the belief that Muslims represented a threat to Western values and traditions predicted feelings of disgust towards Muslims. Additional research has identified the powerful role of hatred in shaping social and political attitudes (see Halperin et al., 2012). Group-based hatred towards others has been linked to decreases in people’s support for compromise (Halperin, 2011; Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, 2014) and increases in people’s support for violent measures (Halperin, 2011). Hatred, moreover, is associated with the belief that harm inflicted by another group is intentional and a reflection of their evil nature (Halperin, 2008).

In conclusion, previous research indicates that stereotyping members of another group as immoral may correlate with the belief that they also lack traits considered to be uniquely human (Bastian et al., 2011) and the belief that they are less likely to experience secondary emotions (e.g., affection, admiration and pride; Leyens, 2009). It is unclear, however, how these variables relate to one another when predicting people’s acceptance of violence. Regarding group-based emotions, previous research on delegitimization has found a strong relationship between delegitimization and higher levels of fear and lower levels of
hope on both the collective and personal levels (Halperin et al., 2008). Research has also shown that moral threat is associated with higher levels of group-based disgust (Matthews & Levin, 2012). These findings indicate that perceiving a group as typically less moral than others should correspond with greater negative affect (e.g., fear, disgust) and lower positive affect felt towards the members that group.

The Present Study

The purpose of this chapter is to examine across two studies the dimensions upon which moral stereotypes are based as well as their relationship with the perceived acceptance of violence towards other groups. Acknowledging the role of other factors—like dehumanization and group-based emotions—in shaping people’s views towards violence, this chapter will also explore this relationship within the context of these other variables. It is hypothesized that stereotypes regarding a group’s morality originates from comparisons made between it and other people on a moral basis comprised of the moral dimensions outlined in Moral Foundations Theory. Those stereotyped as immoral are more likely to be dehumanized, and elicit negative emotions as well as be perceived as more acceptable targets of violence. This chapter, also, hypothesizes that moral stereotyping remains a significant predictor of participants’ acceptance of violence even after accounting for demographic variables, emotions, and dehumanization.

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to identify the dimensions that people use to distinguish groups on a moral basis. This process, according to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), underlies the formation of "moral stereotypes." Morality, as proposed by Haidt (2012), is comprised of the six moral foundations. The moral basis upon which groups are distinguished, therefore, should be comprised of these dimensions. Study 1 examined the
validity of this proposition by examining the extent to which people employ the six moral foundations identified by Haidt (2012) and others to differentiate social groups. It also tested the hypothesis that perceiving a group to be typically less moral than others is correlated with greater acceptance of violence towards that group.

Method

Participants. Study 1 employed an Internet-based sample consisting of 517 participants (Age\text{Median} = 33). Demographic information is provided in Table 3. Internet-based surveys and questionnaires have been shown to be a suitable alternative to the traditional paper-and-pencil measures (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2000; Riva, Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003). They can also provide access to a more demographically and geographically diverse sample in comparison to undergraduate samples (Birnbaum, 2004). Information about the study and a link to the survey materials was posted on social media sites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), online classifieds (e.g., Craigslist, Backpage.com) and online advertisements (e.g., Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). The final sample constituted 67% of participants who at least started the online survey. Cases with missing data or erratic responses (e.g., writing in the same group for all three evaluative conditions in the group selection protocol) were omitted from further analysis. As compensation, participants were given the opportunity to enter into a monthly drawing for a Visa gift card.

Procedure. Using a protocol adapted from Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1979), participants were presented a list of polarizing social, political and religious groups. To elicit strong reactions among participants, this list consisted of groups that were inherently polarizing (e.g., Conservatives; Liberals), perceived negatively by the general population (e.g., Tea Partiers; Atheists; Putnam & Campbell, 2012) and/or generally condemned by most
people (e.g., Neo-Nazis)\(^1\). Participants were then asked to complete a series of steps that resulted in the selection of three groups: one group that they liked the least, one group that they liked the least but not as much as the first group, and a group that they liked the most. Participants were then randomly assigned to complete items assessing the moral stereotyping using either of their disliked groups or their liked group\(^2\).

**Measures.** Thirty-two items were initially administered to measure the degree to which a person perceived members of their assigned group as being more or less moral in comparison to “most other people.” Items featured comparisons in terms of adherence to moral values (e.g., “In comparison to most other groups, how much do Conservatives value fairness?”), engagement in moral behavior (e.g., “In comparison to most other groups, how likely are Liberals to betray others?”) and possession of moral traits (e.g., “In comparison to most other groups, to what extent are Feminists compassionate?). Participants responded using a seven-point (-3 = “much less”; +3: “much more”) scale. Item content was guided by previous empirical work on Moral Foundations Theory conducted by Graham and colleagues (Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Responses were scored such that positive values reflected the perception that members of the evaluated group were typically *more* moral than most other people while negative values reflected the perception that members of the evaluated group were typically *less* moral than most other people.

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1 This list presented to participants consisted of the following groups: Atheists, Conservatives, Evangelicals, Feminists, Liberals, Mormons, Muslims, Neo-Nazis, Socialists, Tea Partiers, and Other (Write-in).
2 The advantage of this group selection protocol is that it allows for the selection of groups that will elicit—either through the selection of Neo-Nazis or through a group that a participant has identified—extremely negative responses (e.g., Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). However, given that participants will be randomly assigned to one of three conditions (least liked group, second least liked group, or liked group), participants will not always be evaluating Neo-Nazis—the group that would be selected presumably by the most people to be the least liked. Thus, responses towards a variety of different groups could be gathered.
Demographic items (e.g., sex, political orientation, religiosity) were also administered. Political orientation was measured along a seven-point (0 = “strongly liberal”; 1 = “strongly conservative”) scale.

**Results**

The objective of Study 1 was to determine the moral dimensions upon which people distinguish and thus stereotype, social groups. Responses to the moral stereotyping items were analyzed using exploratory factor analysis (EFA). The absence of multicollinearity is an assumption for EFA (Garson, 2012a); the intercorrelations among moral stereotyping items were therefore examined as a preliminary measure. Pearson correlations greater than .80 between items were subjected to further scrutiny; as a result, five items were omitted from subsequent analyzes. As displayed in Figure 1, Scree plots revealed that four factors were common across evaluative conditions. Guided by this finding, an exploratory factor analysis using oblique rotation with Kaiser normalization (Graham et al., 2011) was employed with each evaluative condition. A factor-loading criterion of .40 was used to determine the retention of items onto factors (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). Initial findings revealed a common pattern of item loadings between the two dislike conditions, which were subsequently combined to form a single dislike condition (N = 328).

The results of the EFA for the combined Dislike condition and the Like condition, respectively, revealed that the factor structure of the former conformed, in part, to the moral dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. This result, however, was not the case for items in the Like condition (see Table 4). Regarding the combined-Dislike condition, the first factor consisted of 11 items (α = .86) reflecting the foundations of Care/Harm (e.g., “kill”), Fairness/Cheating (e.g., “betray others”) and Liberty/Oppression (e.g., “equal rights”). This configuration of items onto a single factor represent, collectively, what Haidt and Graham
(2009) term the individualizing foundations that pertain to individual rights and protections. The remaining three factors, in contrast, reflected the binding foundations of “Loyalty/Betrayal” (5 items, $\alpha = .66$; e.g., “loyal”), Authority/Subversion, (3 items, $\alpha = .69$; e.g., “Rebel against authority”) and Purity/Degradation (3 items, $\alpha = .72$; e.g., “Chastity”).

Discussion

Study 1 sought to explore the moral dimensions upon which people differentiate groups, specifically the extent to which these dimensions map onto those outlined in Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012). Participants from an online sample were randomly assigned to evaluate either a liked or disliked group they previously identified using items derived from previous Moral Foundations Theory research (e.g., Graham et al., 2011). Exploratory factor analysis revealed a similar factor structure among participant responses across evaluative conditions. Only the responses within the two dislike conditions, however, mapped onto the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Results revealed that participants made use of the individualizing foundations (Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression), collectively, as well as the binding foundations of Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Purity/Degradation, respectively, when differentiating members of disliked groups from other people. Responses within the Like condition did not reflect this configuration, however.

This difference among evaluative conditions was not anticipated. People have a tendency to perceive out-group members as being more homogeneous in comparison to in-group members (Linville & Jones, 1980). As a consequence, outgroups are often evaluated in less complex ways, which can facilitate more extreme perceptions of them (Linville & Jones, 1980; Linville, 1982). Participants in Study 1 were not asked to select a group with which they identified; rather, they were asked to select a group they liked. Participants assigned to
the Like condition in Study 1 may have nevertheless selected, and subsequently evaluated, a group with which they identified, leading to a more nuanced, less stereotypic evaluation. This difference among evaluative conditions was not anticipated. People have a tendency to perceive out-group members as being more homogeneous in comparison to in-group members (Linville & Jones, 1980). As a consequence, outgroups are often evaluated in less complex ways, which can facilitate more extreme perceptions of them (Linville & Jones, 1980; Linville, 1982). Participants in Study 1 were not asked to select a group with which they identified; rather, they were asked to select a group they liked. Participants assigned to the Like condition in Study 1 may have nevertheless selected, and subsequently evaluated, a group with which they identified, leading to a more nuanced, less stereotypic evaluation.

**Study 2**

The purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the results of Study 1, namely the finding that the moral basis upon which people form moral stereotypes of others is comprised of the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Study 2 also sought to explore the extent to which perceiving other groups as less moral than others correlates with dehumanization, negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear), and acceptance of violence. Based on the findings of Study 1, the following hypothesis was tested:

H1: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with greater acceptance of violence towards members of that group.

Regarding dehumanization, Study 2 examined the relationship between moral stereotyping and both trait- and emotion-based dehumanization (i.e., infrahumanization). Bar-Tal (1990) notes the general relationship between delegitimizing and dehumanizing perceptions of other groups. Regarding the relationship between moral stereotyping and specific, humanity-defining trait dimensions (Haslam, 2006), Bastian and colleagues (2011)
found a relationship between the attribution of uniquely human traits (e.g., backwardness), perceived deservingness of punishment, and beliefs concerning whether members of the target group contribute positively to the moral community following a moral transgression. Based on this finding, perceiving another group as immoral may correlate with the denial of uniquely human traits to the members of that group. It is, however, unclear whether such a relationship is exclusive to the denial of traits perceived to be uniquely human. For this reason, Study 2 tested the following hypothesis:

H₂: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with the denial of both human-defining trait dimensions (uniquely human and naturally human) outlined by Haslam (2006).

Previous research on infrahumanization has found a relationship between the perception that others are less likely to experience secondary emotions and exposure to violence (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic et al., 2009; Delgado et al., 2009). Leyens (2009), moreover, has speculated, based on previous research, that symbolic threat is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of infrahumanization. The perception that members of a particular group are typically less moral than most others may constitute such a threat as it draws attention to the distinguishing customs, values and standards of behavior typified by members of the target group. Moral stereotyping may therefore be a facilitating factor in the infrahumanization of other groups; as such, it was hypothesized that:

H₃: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with the denial of secondary emotions to members of that group.

Because infrahumanization does not entail the denial of primary emotions to others, there was no correlation predicted between moral stereotyping and the perception that others experience primary emotions.
Study 2 also examined the relationship between moral stereotyping and group-based emotions. Previous research has found a strong relationship between the delegitimization of an outgroup and higher levels of fear and lower levels of hope on both the collective and personal levels (Halperin et al., 2008). Research has also shown that perceived moral threat elicits other negative emotions, such as disgust (Matthews & Levin, 2012). Based on these findings, the following hypotheses were tested:

H₄ The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with higher levels of disgust, fear and hatred, as well as lower levels of positive affect, felt towards the members of that group.

The relationship between moral stereotyping and participants’ acceptance of violence; namely, was also explored in Study 2 in relation to dehumanization and group-based emotions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that:

H₅ The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will significantly predict participants’ acceptance of violence even after accounting for demographics, dehumanization and group-based emotions.

Method

Participants. As in Study 1, participants for Study 2 were recruited via online advertisements on social media (e.g., Facebook, Reddit, Twitter) and posting on online classifieds (e.g., Craigslist, Backpage.com). The final sample consisted of 994 participants (AgeMedian = 32), which represented 59% of people who at least started the online study (see Table 3 for demographic information). As compensation, participants were offered the chance of entering into a drawing for a $25, $50 or $100 Visa Gift Card³.

Procedure. Participants in Study 2 were presented with the same target group

³ As in Study 1, cases with missing data or erratic responses were omitted from further analysis.
selection procedure as those in Study 1; they were then randomly assigned to one of three evaluative conditions (Dislike 1, Dislike 2 or Like). Participants then completed items with their assigned group.

**Measures.** The moral stereotyping items derived from Study 1, along with four additional items (see Appendix I), were presented by the Qualtrics in randomized order with the following measures.

*Infrahumanization.* Participants were administered a series of 18 primary emotions (e.g., “rage”; $\alpha = .73$) and 18 secondary emotions (e.g., “anguish”; $\alpha = .88$) derived from previous infrahumanization research (e.g., Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Demoulin et al., 2004, 2009) and asked to indicate how likely members of the target group are to experience the specified emotion in comparison to most other people using a seven-point (-3 = “Much less likely”; +3 = “Much more likely”) scale.

*Dehumanization.* Twenty traits, ten associated with human nature (HN; e.g., “friendly”; $\alpha = .87$) and ten considered to be uniquely human (UH; e.g., “rude”; $\alpha = .86$), derived from Loughnan, Haslam and Kashima (2009) were shown to participants (Haslam, 2006). As in previous dehumanization research (e.g., Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009), participants were asked to evaluate members of the target group on HN and UH traits by comparing them to members of another group, which, to be consisted with our other scales, was “most other people.” Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which members of the target group exhibit the specified trait in comparison to most other people using a seven-point (-3 = “Much less”; +3 = “Much more”) scale.

*Emotion.* Items reflecting anger, fear (“worried,” “anxious,” “afraid”; $\alpha = .89$), hatred (“hatred,” “hostile,” “contempt”; $\alpha = .90$), disgust and positive affect (“empathy,” “hope,”
“compassion,” “optimism”; \( \alpha = .93 \), derived from previous research on intergroup emotions (Halperin & Gross, 2011; Halperin, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000) were administered.

Participants were specifically asked to indicate the extent to which members of the target group made them feel the emotions listed using a six-point scale (0 = “not at all”; 5 = “very much”). Participants were also asked to evaluate the disliked and liked groups they identified along a 100-point continuum ranging from 0 (“Extremely dislike”) to 100 (“Extremely like”).

Acceptance of violence. Nine-items were administered to measure the perceived acceptability of violence. To encompass an expansive definition of violence, these items reflected both structural (…should be allowed to run for political office) and direct/physical (…deserve to suffer) forms of violence (see Galtung, 1969). Items regarding the former were derived, in part, from previous research on political intolerance (e.g., Halperin et al., 2008). These items thus measured the participant’s acceptance of both direct and structural violence towards others, thereby reflecting the broad definition of violence informing this chapter (Galtung, 1969). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they believed members of their target group were more less deserving of direct or physical violence in relation to most other people along a seven-point scale (-3 = “much less”; +3 = “much more”). Responses were scored such that positive values reflecting greater acceptance of violence towards members of the target group in relation to others.

Results.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis. The first objective of Study 1 was to replicate the results of Study 1 with a new sample. As such, confirmatory factor analysis using Mplus

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4 This item also was used to check whether the group selection protocol was completed correctly. Participants who provided higher “Like” values for groups they previously as identified as having disliked in comparisons to those they identified as having liked were omitted from further analysis.
(Muthén & Muthén, 2012) was used to examine responses from participants in the two dislike conditions only ($N = 655$). Analysis was limited to these groups in light of the results of the exploratory factor analysis conducted in Study 1, namely that responses loaded onto factors in a manner that reflected the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory among those evaluating members of a Disliked group. Although the exploratory analysis in Study 1 revealed a four-factor structure among responses, a six-factor model that directly corresponded to the six moral foundations outlined in Haidt (2012) was tested initially. Specifically, the 11 items representing, collectively, the individualizing foundations and that loaded onto a single factor in Study 1 were divided along theoretical lines among the foundations of Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating and Liberty/Oppression, respectively.

Initial tests of the six-factor theoretical model showed poor fit. Modification indices were thus used to trim it. Items that correlated highly with multiple factors were subjected to further scrutiny and possible omission. The final six-factor model is presented in Figure 2. Goodness-of-fit indices [$\chi^2(120, N = 655) = 604.48, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .08; \text{CFI} = .89; \text{SRMR} = .06]$ suggested adequate fit of the data for the model (see Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005). The fit of the six-factor model to the data was subsequently compared to the following alternatives: a single-factor model encompassing all items; a two-factor model consisting of one factor combining all the individualizing foundations (Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Liberty/Oppression) and another factor consisting of all the binding foundations (Purity/Degradation, Authority/Subversion, Loyalty/Betrayal); a four-factor model conforming to the factor structure derived from the results of Study 1; and a five-factor model remaining an adequate fit of the data even when responses among the Like condition were included [$\chi^2(120, N = 994) = 1193.50, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .10; \text{CFI} = .90; \text{SRMR} = .07]$. 

\footnote{The six-factor model remained an adequate fit of the data even when responses among the Like condition were included [$\chi^2(120, N = 994) = 1193.50, p < .001; \text{RMSEA} = .10; \text{CFI} = .90; \text{SRMR} = .07]$.}
model in which the foundations of Fairness/Cheating and Liberty/Oppression were combined (Graham et al., 2011). As revealed in Table 5, significant chi-square difference statistics as well as lower Akaike information criterion (AIC) values indicated that the six-factor model was a superior fit to these theoretical alternatives.

Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the internal consistency of the 18 moral stereotyping items as well as for each of the six dimensions identified previously. Alphas were generated for items within each evaluative condition, respectively, and then averaged to form a composite reliability coefficient. Analysis revealed the internal consistency of the entire moral stereotyping scale, as a whole, to be high ($\alpha = .92$).

**Descriptive Statistics.** Responses to the 18 moral stereotyping items derived from the confirmatory factor analysis were averaged, as in Study 1, to form a single moral stereotyping (MS) score. Descriptive statistics revealed that the mean MS score was negative in the combined-Dislike condition ($M = -.80, SD = .88$) while the mean MS score was positive in the Like condition ($M = .89, SD = .82$). Overall, groups selected by participants in each of the Dislike evaluative conditions were perceived as being typically less moral than most other people; groups selected by participants in the Like condition, however, were perceived as being typically more moral in comparison to most other people.

**Correlational Analysis.** Pearson correlations were used to explore relationships among demographic variables (i.e., age, sex, political orientation, and religiosity), MS scores, dehumanization, group-based emotions and acceptance of violence within each condition. Correlations among measured variables (i.e., moral stereotyping, dehumanization, group-based emotions, acceptance of violence) are provided in Table 6.

**Acceptance of Violence.** Responses to acceptance of violence items were averaged to form an AV score ($\alpha = .90$). The hypothesis (H$_1$) that perceiving a group as typically less
moral than others will be associated with greater acceptance of violence towards members of that group was confirmed. There was a significant, negative correlation between MS and AV scores in both conditions. Within the combined-Dislike condition, lower MS scores were associated with greater acceptance of violence, $r(549) = -0.47, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.53; -0.40]$; within the Like condition, higher MS scores were associated with less acceptance of violence $r(289) = -0.45, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.54; -0.36]$.

**Dehumanization.** Analysis revealed that MS scores were significantly correlated with both measures of trait-based dehumanization in both conditions. With the combined-Dislike condition, lower MS scores were associated with less attribution of naturally, $r(549) = 0.57, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.51; 0.62]$, and uniquely, $r(549) = 0.56, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.51; 0.62]$ human traits in relation to others while higher MS scores were correlated with greater attribution of traits in both of these dimensions, $r(289) = 0.67, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.60; 0.73]$, and, $r(289) = 0.63, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.55; 0.69]$, respectively) within the Like condition. These findings supported the initial hypothesis (H$_2$) that perceiving a group as typically less moral than others will be associated with the denial—in relation to most other people—of both uniquely human and naturally human traits to the members of that group.

Regarding emotion-based dehumanization (i.e., infrahumanization), analysis largely supported the hypothesis (H$_3$) that the perception that a group is typically less moral than others would be correlated with the denial of secondary emotions—but not primary emotions—to members of that group. There were significant, positive correlations between MS scores and the attribution of secondary emotions in both the combined-Dislike, $r(549) = 0.50, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.43; 0.56]$, and the Like, $r(289) = 0.36, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.25; 0.45]$, conditions. Perceiving that a group was less moral than others was therefore associated with the denial of secondary emotions. As predicted, there was no significant correlation between
MS scores and the attribution of primary emotions in either the combined-Dislike, $r(549) = .06$, 95% CI [-.02; .15], $p = .13$, and Like, $r(289) = .10$, $p = .08$, 95% CI [-.01; .21] evaluative conditions. These results suggest a relationship between moral stereotyping and infrahumanization.

**Group-Based Emotions.** A similar pattern of results emerged within both conditions. Disgust (combined-Dislike: $r(549) = -.48$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.54; -.42]; Like: $r(289) = -.22$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.33; -.11]), fear (combined-Dislike: $r(549) = -.33$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.40; -.25]; Like: $r(289) = -.21$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.32; -.10]), and hatred (combined-Dislike: $r(549) = -.39$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.45; -.31]; Like: $r(289) = -.20$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.31; -.09]) were negatively correlated with MS scores; likewise, there was a positive correlation between MS scores and positive affect (combined-Dislike: $r(549) = -.21$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.12; .28]; Like: $r(289) = .44$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.35; .53]) and overall outgroup like/dislike (combined-Dislike: $r(549) = .52$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.45; .58]; Like: $r(289) = .44$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.34; .53]) in the combined-Dislike and Like conditions, respectively. These results supported $H_4$, namely that the perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with higher levels of disgust, fear and hatred, as well as lower levels of positive affect.

**Hierarchical Linear Regression.** Hierarchical linear regression was used to determine the unique variance accounted for by moral stereotyping items among responses to the acceptance of harm items (i.e., AV score). Demographic variables (age, sex, political orientation, religiosity), group-based emotions (disgust, fear, positive affect, and overall like/dislike), measures of dehumanization (uniquely human traits, naturally human traits, primary emotions, secondary emotions) were entered as the first step. MS scores were entered as the second step in the regression to determine the unique variance accounted for by moral
stereotyping among AV scores. Standardized coefficients of all variables within each model are provided in Table 7.

MS score remained a significant predictor of acceptance of AV scores even after accounting for demographic, group-based emotions and dehumanization within the combined-Dislike and Like conditions. In the former, the final model revealed that age ($\beta = -0.11, p < .01$), hatred ($\beta = 0.20, p < .001$), overall like/dislike ($\beta = -0.11, p = .02$), attribution of naturally human traits ($\beta = -0.11, p = .04$), attribution of secondary emotions ($\beta = -0.19, p = .01$) and MS scores ($\beta = -0.19, p < .001$) were statistically significant predictors of AV scores. The addition of MS scores in the final step of the regression, moreover, accounted for a significant—albeit small—amount of additional variance among AV scores. With the Like condition, MS scores was the lone significant predictor of AV scores in the final model ($\beta = -0.23, p < .001$).

**Commonality Analysis.** MS scores, as revealed by the results of the regression analysis described in the previous section, were a statistically significant predictor of AV scores even after accounting for the variance due to other variables (i.e., demographics, dehumanization, emotion) in both evaluative conditions, thereby providing support for $H_4$. MS scores also accounted for a statistically significant, albeit small, amount of unique variance in AV scores in both the combined-Dislike ($\Delta r^2 = .01, p < .01$) and the Like ($\Delta r^2 = .02, p < .01$) conditions. Given recent criticism within the social psychological literature of the over-reliance on null-hypothesis significance testing procedure (NHSTP) when interpreting the results of statistical analyses (e.g., Trafimow & Marks, 2015), it is important to explore these results further. To do so, Commonality Analysis was performed among the predictors.

Commonality Analysis (Nimon, 2010; Nimon, Lewis, Kane & Haynes, 2008)
provides a means of identifying the unique, non-overlapping regression effect of a predictor variable within a linear model. As such, the unique variance due to a specific predictor variable can be compared and interpreted in relation to the other predictors in the model. Commonality Analysis also aids in the interpretation of regression models consisting of predictors that are highly correlated with one another (see Table 6). Although often listed as an issue needing to be resolved before regression analysis can proceed (see Stevens, 2002), multicollinearity is viewed as an inherent and essential feature of the present study given how much the variables of interest (e.g., dehumanization, moral stereotyping, emotions) are conceptually related to each other (e.g., Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal et al., 2007).

A commonality coefficient ($\gamma$) for each predictor variable was generated using the procedure outlined by Nimon et al. (2008) and is included in Table 7. The unique variance due to MS scores among AV scores was large in comparison to the other predictor variables within the models generated for both the combined-dislike and like conditions. Within the former, MS scores ($\gamma = .016$) and hatred ($\gamma = .016$) accounted for the largest proportions of variance explained in the model (4.42% and 4.55%, respectively). MS scores, in other words, not only accounted for as much unique variance as hatred, a powerful predictor of political attitudes (see Halperin et al., 2009; Halperin et al., 2012), but also accounted for 1.7 to 3.0 times more of the total explained variance than variables like dehumanization (i.e., denial of naturally human traits; $\gamma = .005$, 1.47%), overall like/dislike of the target group ($\gamma = .006$; 1.71%) and infrahumanization (i.e., denial of secondary emotions; $\gamma = .009$; 2.53%). MS scores, in addition, accounted for more variance than the only demographic predictor of note, namely age ($\gamma = .011$; 3.19%). Within the like condition, MS scores—the only statistically significant predictor in the regression model—accounted for far more of the explained variance in Acceptance of Violence score ($\gamma = .019$, 6.04%) than any other variable, with
dehumanization (i.e., denial of uniquely human traits) contributing the second largest amount of unique variance ($\gamma = .009; 2.98\%$).

**Discussion**

Study 2 had three objectives. The first was to replicate the results of Study 1, namely the extent to which the moral dimensions upon which participants compared groups conformed to those specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that Study 2 achieved this objective; participants’ responses to moral stereotyping items conformed to a six-factor structure, each of which reflected a distinct moral foundation (Haidt, 2012). This finding indicates that participants employed a broad moral basis comprised of considerations of care, fairness, liberty, authority, loyalty, and purity to compare, and therefore stereotype, groups.

The second objective was to test a series of hypothesized relationships between moral stereotyping, on the one hand, and group-based emotions, dehumanization, and acceptance of violence, on the other. Correlational analysis supported these hypotheses. Groups perceived as typically less moral than others were viewed as more acceptable targets of violence. Conversely, groups perceived as *more* moral than others were perceived as less acceptable targets of violence. Participants were less likely to attribute both naturally (e.g., “friendly”) and uniquely (e.g., “rude”) human traits (Haslam, 2006), as well as secondary emotions (e.g., “anguish”; see Leyens, 2009), to those groups they stereotyped as immoral. Lastly, participants were more likely to feel disgust, fear and hatred towards groups they perceived as typically less moral than others. Likewise, participants reported that they felt fewer positive emotions and reported greater overall dislike towards those they stereotyped as immoral.

The third aim of Study 2 was to examine the extent to which moral stereotyping predicted participants’ acceptance of violence after accounting for other variables (e.g.,
demographics, group-based emotions, dehumanization). Hierarchical linear regression revealed responses to moral stereotyping items accounted for a small, albeit statistically significant amount of variance in participants’ acceptance of violence after accounting for other factors. Moral stereotyping, more importantly, remained a significant predictor of acceptance of violence in the final regression model derived in both the combined-Dislike and Like conditions with it being the sole significant predictor within the latter. Moral stereotyping may thus not only be a means of withdrawing moral consideration to facilitate violence but also a means of strengthening moral consideration to prevent it. That is, participants were less willing to accept violence towards those they perceived as more moral than others.

**General Discussion**

This chapter sought to examine the components of moral stereotypes and their relationship with other variables, principally people’s acceptance of violence towards other groups. Stereotypes, in line with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), were conceived as the products of comparisons made between groups along an evaluative dimension. Moral stereotypes, therefore, emerge from comparisons made along a moral basis, which, as was argued, is comprised of the six dimensions identified in Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2009; Haidt, 2012). Stereotypes regarding the morality of a group, in other words, are determined on the basis of how harmful, just, oppressive, respectful of authority, disloyal and spiritually pure it is perceived to be in comparison to others. It was hypothesized that those stereotyped as typically immoral along these dimensions would be perceived as more acceptable targets of violence, as less human and engender more negative emotions, such as anger or disgust.
Two studies employing online-based samples (Birnbaum, 2004; Gosling et al., 2000; Riva et al., 2003) were conducted. Using exploratory factor analysis, Study 1 provided initial support for the claim that the moral basis upon which people compare groups is comprised of the dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Study 2 elaborated upon these initial findings. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that participants employed the six, distinct moral dimensions specified in the Moral Foundations Theory when comparing groups along a moral basis.

Subsequent analysis revealed a negative correlation among moral stereotypes and group-based emotions; that is, the less moral a group was perceived to be, the more likely participants were to feel disgust, hatred and anger—and the less likely they were to feel positively—towards members of that group. These findings align with previous research illustrating the relationship between perceived moral transgressions and negative emotions (Halperin et al., 2008; Halperin, 2008; Matthews & Levin, 2012). Group stereotyped as immoral were more likely to be dehumanized (see Bar-Tal, 1990) specifically they were perceived as lacking human-defining traits (Haslam, 2006) and less likely to experience human-defining emotions (i.e., infrahumanization). Regarding the latter, Leyens (2009) has speculated that symbolic threat is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of infrahumanization. The perception that members of a particular group are typically less moral than most others may constitute such a threat as it draws attention to the distinguishing customs, values and standards of behavior typified by members of the target group. Moral stereotyping may therefore be a facilitating factor in the infrahumanization of other groups.

Lastly, regression analysis revealed that moral stereotyping was a significant predictor of participants’ acceptance of violence even after accounting for the influence of demographics, group-based emotions, and dehumanization. This finding reinforces previous
research on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990) and delegitimization (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012), namely that groups distinguished from most other people—be it those considered to be within one’s scope of justice or part of the community of “acceptable” groups—along a moral basis are seen as legitimate targets of harm. This finding implicates the role of moral status vis-a-vis others, embodied in the form of moral stereotypes, as a primary mechanism in the maintenance of direct and structural forms of intergroup violence (Galtung, 1969). Responses to moral stereotyping items, notably, was the only significant predictor of acceptance of violence among participants assigned to evaluate members of groups they previously identified as liking. Thus, moral stereotyping may not only be implicated in the withdrawal of moral consideration but also serve as a protective factor for those groups perceived as more moral than others.

**Moral Stereotyping, Dehumanization and Emotions**

This study is rooted theoretically in the assumption that violence is made possible, or at least facilitated, by the withdrawal of moral consideration to others (e.g., Opotow, 1990). Acting non-violently, according to this framework, is the "default" condition maintained by psychological mechanisms of self-regulation and self-sanctioning (Bandura, 1990). Critics, however, point out such assumptions reflect a moral framework imposed by researchers that ultimately ignores the moral outlook of perpetrators—and victims—of violence. Fiske and Rai (2015) argue that most violence represent moral acts undertaken in the name of establishing or maintaining an important social relationship. Initiation rites (e.g., hazing) for membership in certain groups may be harmful, but may be perceived as morally good by its members given that it strengthens intra-group bonds as well as legitimizes group hierarchies and conventions. The acceptance of violence as a means of upholding a moral value (Ginges
& Atran, 2011) or conviction (Skitka & Mullen, 2002) indicates that violence may emerge from the presence, rather than absence, of moral consideration.

The results of this study complement, rather than contradict, this claim. Moral disengagement and dehumanization, as Fiske and Rai (2015) note, may be more relevant among third-party "bystanders" to violence than among perpetrators. Structural violence is made possible by socio-political contexts shaped by legitimizing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and cultural narratives (Galting, 1990; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012) that foment its widespread acceptance among the public. Moral stereotypes construing specific groups as being less moral than most, and thus unworthy of the types moral treatment afforded others, function in this manner. Perceiving members of the Tea Party to be typically immoral may not lead one to engage actively in violence towards them, rather it may result in greater acceptance towards violence whether it be direct or structural, when carried out by others (e.g., public policy). Conversely, believing that members of particular groups are typically more moral than others may serve a protection function making violence especially unpalatable.

The fact that moral stereotyping accounted for as much violence as hatred and more than either trait- or emotion-based dehumanization in participants' acceptance of violence indicates that moral stereotypes may serve a particularly powerful role in maintaining the socio-political context conducive to structural violence. Although previous research has shown that dehumanization is related to less collective guilt (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006) following instances of intergroup violence, and less willingness to help those who are suffering (Cuddy et al., 2007), the link between dehumanization and the condoning of violence, Fiske and Rai (2015) note, is less clear (see Esses et al., 2008). Moral stereotyping has the potential to clarify this relationship, as it may exist as an intermediate variable.
between dehumanization and the acceptance of violence. People may not automatically accept violence towards those they view as being less than human; they may, in fact, believe they are less morally culpable for their actions and thus less deserving of punishment (see Bastian et al., 2011). The perception that members of a group are both inhuman and immoral, in contrast, may be needed to facilitate greater acceptance of violence. Further research is needed to explore this relationship.

The relationship between hatred and moral stereotyping revealed in this study is worth further exploration as well. Both variables were strong predictors of acceptance of violence. Halperin (2014) proposed that group-based emotions are preceded by cognitive construal of events or groups (see also Van Bavel, Packer, Haas, & Cunningham, 2012). Moral stereotyping may reflect the construal of a group as either "good" or "bad," informing a subsequent emotional reaction (e.g., hatred) and, ultimately, a behavioral response (e.g., acceptance/endorsement of violent measures). It may be through this mechanism that moral stereotypes come to shape people's views on violence towards others.

Towards a Moral Psychology of Intergroup Relations

This chapter’s findings reveal the potential mechanisms through which public acquiescence to violence—broadly defined—is engendered. Scholars have identified common societal beliefs (e.g., victimization) that facilitate and maintain states of conflict between groups (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1998; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). This chapter illustrates, though, that perceiving certain groups as less moral than others was strongly associated with the acceptance of violence of direct and structural forms of violence (Galtung, 1969) towards its members. Such perceptions, results revealed, are the products of subtle comparisons made along a broad moral domain. If widely-held, such stereotypes could assume the role of "legitimizing myths" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or comprise master narrative (Galtung, 1990;
Hammack & Pilecki, 2012) making violence towards certain groups not only seem justifiable, but also a moral necessity (Finlay, 2007; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). This chapter thus lays the groundwork for a moral psychology of intergroup relations focusing on the moral distinction people make, how they make them, and what are the consequences for those who are distinguished either negatively or positively.

Such a paradigm, as illustrated by the studies comprising this chapter, would be rooted a definition of the moral domain informed by Moral Foundations Theory, which has been primarily employed by researchers to examine moral judgment at the individual level. Studies have revealed, most notably, that Liberals and Conservatives in the United States tend to rely upon different moral foundations when making moral judgments. Whereas Liberals tend to reply on the foundations of Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating, Conservatives are likely to utilize all of the moral foundations—namely, Authority/Subversion, Loyalty/Betrayal, Purity/Degradation in addition to those relied upon by Liberals—to a more similar extent (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt, 2012). Additional studies have elaborated upon this finding (e.g., Weber & Federico, 2012), particularly the reliance among Libertarians on the Liberty/Oppression foundation (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).

Despite the apparent relationship between moral judgment style and political orientation, this chapter shows that people may make use of all foundations when judging others. Political Liberals were over-represented in the samples used in Study 1 and Study 2 (see Table 3). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses nevertheless revealed that participants made use of all six, distinct moral dimensions when comparing groups along a moral basis. The insufficient number of Conservatives and Libertarians within the samples used in these studies precluded further analysis of the difference in moral stereotyping
patterns across political orientations, however. Future research should, therefore, investigate whether Liberal, Conservative, and Libertarian-identified persons emphasize different moral dimensions when stereotyping others using more politically representative samples.

There is nevertheless a growing amount of research illustrating the utility of Moral Foundations Theory in the study of intergroup relations, more broadly. Graham et al. (2010) found a relationship between the importance that participants placed on a particular moral foundation and their judgment of groups associated either positively or negatively with that foundation. Participants who scored highly on the Loyalty/Betrayal foundation, for example, were more likely to judge harshly those groups perceived as inherently disloyal, like flag-burners. Federico, Weber, Ergun and Hunt (2013), moreover, found that people who scored high in Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)—and were therefore more likely to legitimize social hierarchy—were less concerned with moral issues pertaining to the dimensions of Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating. Those who scored highly on Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981)—and were therefore more likely to endorse authority, social conventions and norms—were, in contrast, more concerned with matters pertaining to the dimensions of Authority/Subversion, Loyalty/Betrayal, and Purity/Degradation.

This chapter adds to this body of work by showing how people employ moral foundations to stereotype others and its potential consequences. What is unclear, however, is the extent to which the moral dimensions operate in conjunction with—or in opposition to—one another in the formation of people’s moral stereotypes of others. Flag-burners may be compared especially unfavorably to others on the Authority/Subversion dimension (c.f., Graham et al., 2011), but to what extent is this potentially counteracted by other factors, such as the importance people place on the Liberty/Oppression foundation? The extent to which certain moral dimensions are more influential than others in conditioning people’s acceptance
of violence is unclear as well. Are people who score highly Right Wing Authoritarianism more likely to draw upon the foundations of Authority/Subversion, Loyalty/Betrayal, and Purity/Degradation when stereotyping others unfavorably? These questions represent further avenues of research that could potentially reveal the mechanisms through which violence is rendered morally unproblematic.

**Limitations and Conclusion**

This study was limited by the use of an Internet-based sample in both studies. Although they are becoming increasingly common in social psychological research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2012) and provide advantages (see Birnbaum, 2004; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2000; Riva, Teruzzi & Anolli, 2003) over the undergraduate-based samples traditionally used in research, the generalizability of this chapter’s findings is nevertheless limited. Future research should thus examine the relationship between moral stereotyping and acceptance of harm with more nationally representative samples. This study, moreover, was limited to the socio-political context of the United States. The list of social, religious and political groups that participants were presented with and from which they selected their least- and most-liked groups were those that previous research (see Putnam & Campbell, 2012) have shown were especially polarizing within the United States. This study should, therefore, be replicated in other socio-political contexts, particularly contexts of intractable conflict (e.g., Israel-Palestine). Lastly, given the correlational nature of the studies comprising this chapter, it is difficult to ascertain whether moral stereotyping causes greater acceptance of violence or that it emerges as a posthoc rationalization of violence that has already taken place. It could also be possible that a third variable may be influencing both as well. Experimental research is therefore needed to illuminate this relationship.
This chapter, despite these limitations, found strong evidence that people compare groups along the moral dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory, that groups perceived as less moral than others on these dimensions were also perceived as less human, elicited more negative feelings (e.g., disgust) and were viewed as more acceptable targets of violence. Moral stereotyping accounted for a statistically significant and large amount—in relation to demographic, emotion and social cognitive (i.e., dehumanization) variables—of the unique variance in participants’ acceptance of violence towards members of target groups. In light of this chapter’s interest in factors leading to the ultimate withdrawal of moral consideration, it was interesting to note the relationship between moral stereotyping and the acceptance of violence in terms of groups participants previously identified as having liked. That is, participants were less willing to accept violence towards those whom they perceived to be stereotypically more moral than others. Beyond facilitating violence via the withdrawal of moral consideration, moral stereotypes may also act as a protective factor for some groups.
Chapter 4

“Somebody Should Really do Something About Them…”:
The Interaction of Moral Stereotypes and Emotions in Shaping Attitudes Towards Public Policy

"We must say that the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory." Max Weber (1919/2004; p. 33).

"Let us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power over us. The ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and senators and congressmen and government officials, but the voters of this country." Franklin D. Roosevelt (1938)

Weber's (1919/2004) definition of what constitutes "the state" emphasizes the presumed legitimacy that state-sanctioned violence possesses. If someone gets into a physical struggle and happens to strike another person with a club, he or she might be charged with assault and subsequently wind up in jail. If that someone is a police officer, though, that same action will likely result in no consequences given that the police, as agents of the state, are generally accepted as the legitimate arbiters of state-sanctioned violence when enforcing the law. Legitimacy, according to Weber (1919/2004), can emerge from the widespread belief in the validity of legal statutes based on "rational rules" (p. 34). State-sanctioned violence inflicted by the police, who enforce the law, thus exists within a larger legitimizing framework consisting of courts, who interpret the law, and legislative bodies consisting of elected representatives, who make the law.
There is a dark side to the legitimacy extended to state-sanctioned violence. The wave of protests in 2014 and 2015 in response to a number of high-profile deaths of unarmed African-Americans (e.g., Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Walter Scott, among others) at the hands of the police—and the subsequent lack of accountability demonstrated by those responsible for these deaths—illustrate the limits of legitimate state violence (Frankovic, 2015). What if, instead of protest, state violence is met with widespread public support? What if, moreover, state violence takes the form of repression, such as the systematic violation of a person's political or civil rights, rather than the physical violence featured in Weber's definition? Historical examples such as the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II highlight what can occur when public opinion and the legitimizing mechanisms of the state coincide to target a specific group of people. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which paved the way for the displacement of Japanese resident aliens and US citizens of Japanese descent from the West Coast of the United States (Robinson, 2001). Despite it being a violation of the rights of Japanese-Americans living in these areas, this measure enjoyed widespread public support (Feraru, 1950), and the Supreme Court eventually upheld its constitutionality in Korematsu v. United States (1944).

Public policy, as illustrated in the case of internment, can be an instrument of state violence, be it in the form of physical harm or political repression. Within a democratic system, as pointed out—ironically—in the above quote by President Roosevelt, "the state" is comprised of the "people" and its actions are in accordance with its will. Though this conception reflects the ideal rather than what occurs in reality (see Grossman, 2014), the underlying point is that a relationship should exist between public opinion and public policy. As such, policies such as internment (or segregation, or restrictions placed on the rights of
sexual minorities, etc.) cannot exist without widespread public support or acquiescence. This study, based on this assumption examined the moral stereotypes and emotions corresponding with people's support for harsh or restrictive policy measures targeting specific groups of people within the United States.

**Moral Stereotyping and Its Consequences**

Schneider (2005) defines stereotypes as “qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people” (p. 24). This relatively straightforward definition belies a history of social psychological research replete with competing theories attempting to explain their origin and development. Personality factors (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), fundamental cognitive processes (Allport, 1954) and structural causes (i.e., competition for scarce resources; Sherif, 1958) have all been identified as underlying causes for how and why people form stereotypes of others. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) stereotypes emerge as a result of comparisons people make along an evaluative dimension. Stereotypes are therefore functional as the comparisons that underlie them can ultimately serve as a means of maintaining status differentials between groups as well as explaining and justifying intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1981).

Although virtually any dimension could be used to compare groups (Tajfel, 1981), research has revealed that certain ones are relied upon more than others when differentiating groups and forming impressions of them. The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), notably, identify "warmth" and "competence" as the two fundamental dimensions upon which stereotypes are formed (see also Cuddy et al., 2009). A number of studies have found, however, that morality may be more fundamental than either of these dimensions when evaluating groups (Brambilla, Saachi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt,
Goodwin (2015), summarizing this body of research, declared that "...moral character is one of the most, if not the most, important sources of social information used by people to form global impressions of others" (p. 41).

The present study's focus on the moral content of stereotypes is due to its primacy as a dimension in the evaluation and judgment of other groups. What makes the content of a stereotype "moral," however? Morality within psychology has been traditionally defined in terms of issues related to harm and fairness (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). In contrast to this framework, Haidt's (2012) Moral Foundations Theory proposes a more expansive definition of the moral domain, which includes considerations of loyalty, authority, spiritual and physical purity as well as personal liberty (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2009; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Beyond informing individual moral judgment, these dimensions are utilized when differentiating and stereotyping social categories. Specifically, Chapter 3 found that respondents in an online sample made use of a broad moral domain when distinguishing members of previously identified liked and disliked groups from most other people.

There are a number of consequences for groups stereotyped as immoral. Moral stereotypes constitute a moral construal of social relations. Moral, versus non-moral, construals of events are associated with faster, more extreme and more universally prescriptive evaluations (Van Bavel, Packer, Haas, & Cunningham, 2012). Groups perceived as immoral are more likely to be viewed as threats to the in-group (Brambilla, Saachi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013) as well as unworthy of moral consideration (Bar-Tal, 1990; Opotow, 1990), which, in turn, increases the likelihood they become targets of harm (see Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). Moral transgressions committed by those considered
unworthy of moral consideration are judged more harshly as well (Singer, 1998). As such, people may be more likely to endorse violence towards such groups as a means of affirming a moral value or standard (Fiske & Rai, 2015; Ginges & Atran, 2011; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). It is through these various mechanisms that people can come to accept violence towards those they perceive as being stereotypically immoral (see Chapter 3).

**Structural Violence**

Violence has been traditionally defined within the social psychological literature in terms of physical harm enacted by one person upon another (e.g., Anderson & Huesmann, 2003). *Structural violence*, alternatively, broadens the scope of what constitutes violence to encompass any constraint on human agency making the fulfillment of basic human needs unattainable (Galtung, 1969; Ho, 2007). The value of this definition is that it considers racism, systemic poverty, political oppression and the like, which may not necessarily entail physical harm, as forms of violence inflicted upon particular groups of people (Ho, 2007; Pilisuk, 1998; Schwebel, 2011). "These structural patterns," Pilisuk (1998) notes, "are not the acts of nature but products of social arrangements, created by people and sanctioned by normative beliefs and practices of culture" (p. 198; see also Galtung, 1990). A structural violence framework thus entails an approach to the study of violence incorporating both social context and structures of power.

Public policy is a critical means through which structural violence is enacted and legitimized. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two came about as a result of an executive order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, under the advisement of military commanders in the Western United States, the constitutionality of which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (Robinson, 2001). In the wake of the Board v. Board of Education decision in 1954, five southern states—Alabama,
Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia—passed at least 46 pro-segregation measures in opposition to the Supreme Court Decision (Woodward, 1966). Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered probate judges to cease issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples despite a Federal court decision finding the state's law prohibiting same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional (Robertson, 2015). As these historical and contemporary examples illustrate, public policy—be it in the form of legislation, executive action, or court decisions—is a common means of inflicting structural violence on a specific groups of people (e.g., Japanese-Americans, African-Americans, sexual minorities).

A core assumption of this study is that these measures, enacted by a democratic system government, emerge within a larger context of widespread public support or acquiescence. This assumption does not take a simplistic perspective on this relationship, however. Political elites, corporate interests, and other sources of political influence can work to downplay or galvanize public support in order to achieve certain political objectives (see Edelman, 1988; Lasswell, 1950). This assumption also recognizes that "public support" is often difficult measure (see Gibson, 2013; Mehrtens, 2004). Public opinion may be favorable towards goals framed in a generalized manner, but be ultimately against specific measures needed to achieve that goal. As noted by Bar-Tal, Halperin and Oren (2010), there is a general support for peace with Palestinians within the Israeli public. This support, however, is undercut by the widespread rejection of specific compromising measures (e.g., the division of Jerusalem). Analogously, within the United States a majority (70%; Pew Research Center, 2014a) support a path to legal status for undocumented immigrants, but there is also general support for harsh anti-illegal immigration measures (see Jones, 2010).

It is important, despite these caveats, to examine the psychological mechanisms facilitating people's support for harsh policy measures. Widespread beliefs concerning the
moral character of particular social groups may not necessarily increase demand for policies that are potentially harmful towards those groups, but they could provide a socio-political context that is less willing to oppose such measures should the government enact them. If the perception that welfare recipients are typically less moral than most other people becomes widespread, would the public be less willing to oppose candidates advocating the abolition of welfare benefits? In this vein, this study explored the relationship between moral stereotyping and the acceptance of structural violence. Specifically, it examined the extent to which support for harsh or restrictive measures was predicted by the perception that groups affected by them were stereotypically immoral.

**Morality, Emotions, and Public Policy Preference**

This study examined the relationship between moral stereotypes and support for harmful or restrictive policy measures in four policy areas: gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights and welfare. These specific policy areas were chosen for two reasons. First, public opinion within each area is highly polarized (Pew Research Center, 2014b). Second, despite their differences in terms of populations affected, previous research has shown that people’s public policy preferences in these areas are often rooted in moral concerns over perceived value violations.

The belief that the poor violate fundamental social values (e.g., hard work), for example, is correlated with decreased support for welfare policies (Henry & Reyna, 2007; Likki & Staerkle, 2015) and healthcare reform (Wetherell, Reyna, & Sadler, 2013). Likewise, Reyna, Wetherell, Yantis and Brandt (2014) found that participants who believe that gays and lesbians violate traditional family values were less likely to support same-sex marriage and gay adoption (see also Henry & Reyna, 2007). Attitudes toward immigration policies are often rooted in concerns that immigrant values threaten those of the host country (see
Verkuyten, 2013). Increasing the perceived moral character of immigrants, however, can diminish this sense of threat (López-Rodríguez & Zagefka (2015). Lastly, though sparse, research on people’s stereotypes regarding gun owners reveals that perceived value violations may factor in their support or opposition to gun control measures. Notably, Kleck, Gertz, and Bratton (2009) found that respondents in a national telephone sample of US adults who endorsed negative stereotypes of gun owners (e.g., they are racially prejudiced, uneducated, and rural) were more likely to favor bans on the private possession of firearms.

This study also examined the extent to which emotions correspond with people’s moral stereotypes and their support for harsh or restrictive public policies preferences. Although it is less clear how emotions factor in people’s attitudes towards policies in the specific areas of gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare, research focusing on other areas provides clues. Hatred directed towards rival groups within contexts of intractable conflict has been linked to decreased support for compromise and reconciliation (Halperin, 2011; Kahn, Liberman, Halperin & Ross, 2014) and increased support for violent measures (Halperin, 2011). Certain emotions emerge as a result of moral transgressions committed by the self or others. Regarding the latter, Haidt (2003) identifies anger, disgust, and contempt as the “other-condemning” family of moral emotions that ultimately compel people to change their relationship with those who committed the moral transgression.

Halperin (2014) proposes an appraisal-based framework outline the cognitive and emotional processes influencing people’s political attitudes and behavior. An emotional reaction, according to this model, is the product of a person’s cognitive appraisal of an event, and this emotional reaction leads to particular political attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. This original appraisal does not occur in a vacuum, however, but is rather influenced by elements residing both within the individual (e.g., long-term sentiments, pre-existing ideologies) and
outside the individual (e.g., mass media, political leaders). Emotions such as anger, disgust, and contempt may thus emerge in response to groups construed as morally transgressive—and thus stereotyped as immoral—which in turn may lead to greater support for restrictive or harsh policy measures affecting the members of these groups.

**Purpose of Study**

Perceived value violations underlie people's attitudes towards public policy measures across various domains. The present study builds upon this research in two ways. First, moral stereotypes consist of moral qualities attributed to others. They thus pertain to what groups are rather than what they do. If a person believes that members of a particular group are typically less moral than other people, that person would be more likely to accept harsh or restrictive policy measures that affect these groups. Second, this study explored the extent to which emotional reactions towards these groups explain this hypothesized relationship.

Halperin's (2014) appraisal-based framework contends that cognitive appraisal precedes emotional reactions towards other groups, which in turn influence people's political attitudes and behavior (see Halperin, 2011; Kahn et al., 2014). Moral emotions such as anger, disgust and contempt (Haidt, 2003) emerge in response to a perceived moral transgression. As such, these "other-condemning" emotions would likely correspond with negative moral stereotypes concerning others and may also serve as a mechanism through which moral stereotypes influence attitudes towards public policies. This study thus aimed to reveal the cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying people's acquiescence to structural violence executed through public policy. To accomplish this aim, a pilot study was conducted to create measures of public policy preference in the areas of gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights and welfare to be used in the main study.

**Pilot Study**
The pilot study’s objective was to construct a series of Mokken Scales (Mokken, 1971) measuring people’s support for severe policy measures in the policy domains of gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare for eventual use in the main study. Guttman Scales have been used in the past to measure people's public policy preferences (e.g., Starr, 1985; Teske & Hazlitt, 1985, Williams, Nunn & St. Peter, 1976). Mokken Scales are similar to Guttman Scales in that they consist of items of increasing difficulty or severity, but are probabilistic rather than deterministic. That is, while an affirmative response on a more difficult item on a Mokken scale indicates the higher probability of an affirmative response on a less difficult item, such a response is required for a perfect Guttman scale (Garson, 2012b).

There are both theoretical and practical reasons for using a Mokken scale to measure support for public policy measures. Theoretically, this study assumes that public policies within a particular domain (e.g., illegal immigration) exist on a single, latent continuum anchored by contrasting—perhaps even mutually exclusive—measures on how to deal with a particular social problem (e.g., amnesty/path to legal status versus deportation and imprisonment), with successive gradations in between (e.g., deportation/imprisonment only for those who have immigrated illegally and committed an additional crime). A Mokken scale is a non-parametric type of measurement scale based on Item Response Theory (IRT). IRT scoring incorporates both the different levels of difficulty reflecting in the items comprising the measure as well as the items ability to distinguish those who are likely to respond to less difficult items from those likely to respond to more difficult items (i.e., discrimination; DeMars, 2010). If the assumption regarding public policy measures is correct—which is determined via Mokken Scale Analysis (e.g., Jacoby, 1995; Van Schuur, 2003)—then a Mokken Scale represents an ideal way to capture people’s policy preferences.
in a parsimonious manner that is also able to differentiate between those who tend to support extreme measures from those who do not.

Practically, the dichotomous response format of Mokken Scales (e.g., yes/no) better reflects people's real life experience with public policy support or disapproval. Voting, for instance, represents a choice between a series of discrete categories, namely Candidate A, B, C and so forth, which presumably represent different policy positions. Moreover, in certain states (e.g., California) voters are also able to indicate their support for a specific ballot measures by voting either "Yes" or "No." Though people's attitudes towards a particular candidate or ballot measure may exist on a continuum and contain nuance, these ultimately collapse into discrete, stark, and often dichotomous choices. A Mokken scale, in this regard, is ideally suited to capture this choice.

Method

Participants. An online sample consisting of 809 participants (527 females; 264 males; 3 "other"; and 18 "decline to state") was recruited by posting links to survey materials on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and online classifieds (e.g., Craigslist, Backpage.com). The mean age of the sample was 37.8 years (Median = 35). This sample consisted of 54% of people who clicked on the link that started the study. All materials were administered using PsychSurveys.org. Participants were eligible to enter into a monthly drawing for a $25, $50, or $100 Visa Gift Card as compensation. The sample skewed liberal, as the mean political orientation score among participants on a 100-point "thermometer"-type scale (0 = very liberal; 100 = very conservative) was 38.9 (SD = 24.9).

Procedure. To construct these measures of support for harsh policy measures, a pool of items reflecting policy measures of varying "severity" in the domains of gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare policies were generated. For the purposes of
In this study, the increasing "severity" of policy measures is defined in terms of both their increasing distance from the status quo (e.g., ending all welfare policies) as well their capacity to inflict physical harm (e.g., execution of all people who immigrate to the United States illegally) or violate the rights of their intended target (e.g., prohibiting the ownership of weapons by private persons). Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study designed to construct measures of policy preference for use in future research. After agreeing to participate, they were randomly assigned to a policy domain (i.e., gun ownership, illegal immigration, sexual minority rights and welfare). Participants were asked to review a series of hypothetical policy measures and indicate whether they would support the measure if the US government enacted it. Specifically, beneath the prompt, "The government enacts a policy that...", participants were displayed a list of 12 to 15 policy measures of varying severity (e.g., "...bans people who engage in homosexual behavior from donating blood and/or organs"). Items were presented in randomized order. Participants were given the option of responding with either "yes" to indicate their support of the measure or "no" to indicate their disapproval.

Critically, polarizing labels for the groups in question within these policy domains were avoided whenever possible in order to avoid priming the participants. For example, the target group in the immigration policy area was referred to as "people who have immigrated to the US illegally" rather than "illegal" or "undocumented" immigrants. The generation of the initial pool of items was informed by media coverage of the policy domains examined in this study as well as previous research on policy preferences related to gun ownership (Teske & Hazlitt, 1985), illegal immigration (Van der Veer et al., 2004), sexual minority rights (Pearl & Galupo, 2008) and welfare policy (Bullock, 1999). Demographic information (e.g., age, sex, political orientation) was also collected.
Results/Discussion

Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA; Mokken, 1972) using the "mokken" package (Van der Ark, 2015) for R was used to analyze the data in accordance with the steps outlined in Van der Ark (2007, 2012). It is worth noting that a separate analysis was conducted on items within each policy domain. Items (i.e., policy measures) failing to meet either the minimum scalability coefficient \(H = .3\) or to scale onto the model emerging from the automatic item selection algorithm (default value \(c = .03\)) were omitted from further analysis. This process resulted in the four scales presented in Appendix II.

MSA, in essence, determines whether the items comprising a measure represent indicators of a single, latent variable and whether these can be arranged in order of difficulty (i.e., severity). Results indicated that the items comprising the scales presented in Appendix I were structured in this manner. The scalability coefficients \(H\) for the gun ownership (.63), sexual minority rights (.59), immigration (.58) and welfare (.49) scales were within the "strong" range according to the standards put forward by Mokken (1971; see also Garson, 2012b; Van der Ark, 2007). The invariant item ordering (IIO) coefficients, which assess the degree to which items ordering remains the same at all levels of the variable measured by the scale (Van der Ark, 2007), were within the "strong" range stipulated by Ligtvoet, Van der Ark, Te Marvelde and Sijtsma (2010) for the gun ownership, (.73), illegal immigration (.64) and welfare (.58) policy scales. The items within the sexual minority scale had a "weak" IIO coefficient (.37), although it was still within the acceptable range (Ligtvoet et al., 2010). Lastly, latent class reliability coefficients for the gun ownership (.63), illegal immigration (.88), sexual minority rights (.87), and welfare (.75) policy scales indicated strong reliability. These results, collectively, point to the suitability of the scales constructed in this study for use as measures of people's support for severe policy measures in the main study.
Main Study

The purpose of the main study was to examine the relationship between moral stereotypes and people's acceptance of structural violence toward certain groups in the form of harsh or restrictive policy measures across four policy areas: gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare. Believing that a group violates an important social value, previous research shows, predicts diminished support for measures benefiting the members of that group (e.g., Henry & Reyna, 2007; López-Rodríguez & Zagefka, 2015; Reyna et al., 2014). Moral stereotypes similarly represent a moral construal of groups. This study, therefore, tested the hypothesis that:

H1: Moral stereotypes will be negatively correlated with support for harsh or restrictive policy measures in that the less moral a group (e.g., those immigrate to the United States illegally) is perceived to be, the more likely people are to support harsher measures that negatively impact the members of this group (e.g., indefinite detention).

People often experience "condemning" emotions such as anger, disgust, and contempt towards those who have committed a moral transgression (Haidt, 2003). As such, the second hypothesis this study tested was:

H2: Moral stereotypes will be negatively correlated with "other-condemning" emotions in that the less moral a group is perceived to be, the more anger, disgust, and contempt will be felt towards its members.

Lastly, this study explored the relationship among moral stereotypes, other-condemning emotions, and public policy preference, in accordance with Halperin's (2014) appraisal-based model. As such, the third and final hypothesis tested in this study was:
H₃: Other-condemning emotions (anger, disgust, and contempt) mediates the relationship between moral stereotypes and support for harsh or restrictive policy measures.

**Method**

**Participants.** This study consisted of 651 participants. Demographic information is provided in Table 8. As in the pilot study, this sample was recruited by posting links to the study, which was administered using Qualtrics, on social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and online classifieds (e.g., Craigslist, Backpage.com). The final sample represented 73% of those who at least clicked on this link. The use of online samples is becoming more common in social psychological research (e.g., Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011) as it offers access to a more representative population in comparison to the undergraduate population utilized in traditional research (Birnbaum, 2004; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2000; Riva, Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003). Participants were given the opportunity to enter into a later drawing for a $25, $50 or $100 Visa Gift Card as compensation.

**Procedure.** After clicking on the link to the study, which was administered using Qualtrics, participants were informed that the purpose of the study was "to understand the emotional and mental factors underlying people's policy preferences." This description was also used, when possible, on recruitment materials. After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were asked to provide their age and to indicate whether they spent the majority of their lives in the United States. The latter item was included given the US-centric nature of the policy areas dealt with in the study. Participants who were under the age of 18 or who indicated that they have not spent a majority of their lives in the United States were not permitted to continue with the study. After being randomly assigned to a policy domain,
participants completed the measures described in the next section, which were presented in randomized order. At the close of the study, participants were directed to another website, in order to preserve their anonymity, for the opportunity to enter the drawing for the Visa Gift Card.

**Measures.** The following measures were administered in addition to the policy scales (see Appendix II) generated in the pilot study.

*Moral Stereotyping.* Eighteen items derived from Chapter 3 (see Appendix I) were used to measure moral stereotyping. These items have participants compare members of a target group to most other people in terms of values, behaviors and traits reflecting the six moral dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012); for example, "Compared to most other people, how likely are people receive welfare benefits to cheat?". Responses were given along a seven-point (-3 = "much less likely"; +3 = "much more likely") scale with responses reversed scored such that negative values indicated that members of a target group were perceived as being typically less moral than most other people (i.e., negative moral stereotyping).

*Other-Condemning Emotions.* Participants were asked to indicate how much members of the target group (e.g., people who own guns) made them feel anger, disgust and contempt, respectively. Responses were given along a five-point (0 = "not at all"; 4 = "extremely"). These items were embedded along with filler items (e.g., awe; embarrassed), all of which were presented in randomized order by the survey program.

Demographic items, namely age, sex (0 = “male”; 1 = “female”), religiosity and political orientation, were also administered. In terms of political orientation, participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they identified as either “liberal” or “conservative” in two areas: economic issues and social issues. Responses were given along a
108-point, “thermometer”-type scale (0 = “very liberal”; 100 = “very conservative”). Religiosity was measured along a four-point scale (0 = “Not at all religious”; 3 = “Very religious”).

**Results**

The Results section consists of two sections. The first section describes the results of the correlational analysis conducted to test H₁ and H₂. The second section describes the mediation analysis conducted to test H₃. All analyses were conducted separately for each policy area.

**Correlational Analysis.** Responses on the moral stereotyping and other-condemning items (anger, disgust, and contempt) were averaged to form a Moral Stereotyping (MS) and a Condemning Score, respectively, for each participant. Responses to moral stereotyping items were scored such that negative values reflected the perception that members of the target group (e.g., people who receive welfare benefits) are typically less moral than most other people. Cronbach’s alphas were generated to evaluate the internal reliability of both the MS (\(\alpha_M = .89, \alpha_{SD} = .03\)) and Condemning (\(\alpha_M = .85, \alpha_{SD} = .03\)) items. "Yes" responses to policy preference scales constructed in the pilot study within each policy area were aggregated to form a Policy Score, with higher scores indicating greater support for harsh or restrictive policy measures (see Figure 3a-d).

Pearson correlations were calculated within each policy area among MS, Condemning, and Policy Scores as well as demographic items (age, sex, religiosity, and political orientation; see Tables 9-12). No hypotheses were made regarding the relationships between demographic variables and those of interest to this study. It is worth noting, however, that no demographic variable was significantly correlated with MS, Condemning, or Policy Scores consistently across all policy areas. For this
reason, statistically significant correlations pertaining to demographic items are not addressed in this section. Demographic items were, however, included in the models generated as part of the mediation analysis described in the next section.

Analysis revealed support for both H₁ and H₂ across all policy areas. In terms of the former, moderate⁶, negative correlations were found between MS and Policy Scores. The less moral gun owners, \( r(165) = -.49, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.60, -.36] \), people who immigrate to the United States illegally, \( r(159) = -.47, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.58, -.34] \), sexual minorities, \( r(152) = -.42, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.54; -.28] \), or welfare recipients, \( r(156) = -.48, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.60; -.36] \) were perceived to be, the more likely were participants to support harsh or restrictive policy measures affecting the members of these groups. Moderate-to-large, negative correlations were observed between MS and Condemning Scores, providing support for H₂. The less moral gun owners, \( r(165) = -.49, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.60, -.37] \), people who immigrate to the United States illegally, \( r(159) = -.56, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.65, -.44] \), sexual minorities, \( r(152) = -.46, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.57; -.32] \), or welfare recipients, \( r(156) = -.59, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.69; -.48] \) were perceived to be, the more participants reported feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt directed towards the members of these groups.

**Mediation Analysis.** Mediation analysis, using the "lavaan" package (Rosseel, 2012) for R, was conducted to test H₃, namely the prediction that the relationship between moral stereotyping and policy preference is partially mediated by feelings of other-condemning emotions. The models generated for analysis included demographic items as predictors of both the outcome (Policy Score) and mediating (Condemning Score) variables. Results provided support for H₃ across all policy areas (see Figure 4a-d). Variance in support for harsh or restrictive policy measures towards groups perceived as stereotypically immoral is

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⁶ Based on Cohen’s (1988) criteria.
accounted for, in part, to the experience of anger, disgust, and contempt. These emotions were particularly powerful in this regard within the sexual minority rights policy area. Results of the mediation analysis indicated that anger, disgust, and contempt fully mediated the relationship between moral stereotyping and policy preference, which became weaker once Condemning Scores were included in the model (see Figure 4c).

**Discussion**

Morality is a fundamental dimension people use to differentiate, and thus stereotype, groups (see Goodwin, 2015). The consequences for those imbued with immoral qualities can be severe. Violence may not only be perceived as more acceptable when inflicted upon those stereotyped as immoral (Chapter 3) but a moral action in itself (Fiske & Rai, 2015). The history of the United States is replete with examples of public policy as a means of inflicting state-sanctioned violence, whether it is direct or structural (Galtung, 1969), upon specific groups of people (e.g., Japanese-Americans, African-Americans, sexual minorities). Such policies emerge within socio-political contexts characterized by widespread public acquiescence, if not widespread public support. Examining this dynamic, the purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which support for harsh or restrictive policy measures correlate with negative moral stereotypes, namely the perception that the groups directly affected by these measures are typically less moral than most other people. This study also explored the role that moral emotions (Haidt, 2003) serve in this relationship.

Three hypotheses were tested in this study regarding people's views in four separate policy areas: gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare. Previous research on attitudes towards public policy in these areas has noted that the belief that members of a group violate fundamental social values predicts diminished support for policies benefiting that group (e.g., Henry & Reyna, 2007; Reyna et al., 2014; Verkuyten,
The first hypothesis was, therefore, that the less moral gun owners, people who immigrate to the United States illegally, sexual minorities, and welfare recipients were perceived to be, the more likely participants would be to support harsh or restrictive policy measures affecting these groups. The second hypothesis concerned the relationship between moral stereotypes and moral emotions. Regarding the latter, Haidt (2003) proposed that people are more likely to respond to the moral transgressions of others with anger, disgust, and contempt, which comprise the "other-condemning" family of moral emotions. It was thus predicted that the less moral gun owners, people who immigrate to the US illegally, sexual minorities, and welfare recipients were perceived to be, the more likely participants would be to feel anger, disgust, and contempt towards these groups. The last hypothesis, based on Halperin's (2014) appraisal-based model, proposed that anger, disgust, and contempt mediate the hypothesized relationship between moral stereotypes and support for harsh or restrictive policy measures.

The analysis revealed support for all three hypotheses in each policy areas examined in this study. Participants who perceived members of the target group (e.g., gun owners) as less moral than most other people were more likely to support harsher policy measures (e.g., Using public funds to confiscate and destroy existing handguns on an involuntary basis as well as imprisons those who own guns) as well as feel more anger, disgust, and contempt towards the target group. These "other-condemning" emotions also mediated the proposed relationship between moral stereotypes and policy preference, with evidence of full mediation within the sexual minority rights policy areas. These findings, collectively, add further evidence to the primacy of morality in shaping people's political attitudes. They also highlight the cognitive and affective mechanisms facilitating people's support—or
disapproval—of particular policy measures, which could be utilized by both scholars and practitioners interested in matters of policy and justice.

**The Moral is the Political**

A great deal has been made recently regarding the apparent difference in moral worldview between liberals and conservatives to explain the apparent political polarization that currently characterizes the US electorate. Lakoff (2002), for example, has argued that liberal and conservative morality is rooted in divergent conceptions of the ideal family. Haidt (2012), more recently, proposed that liberals and conservatives tend to rely on different moral dimensions when making moral judgments. Whereas those oriented with the former tend to base their moral judgments on considerations of harm and fairness, those with conservative orientation reply upon these as well as considerations of authority, loyalty and purity (see also Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).

Both of these frameworks approach the study of political thought and behavior from a moral standpoint. They also privilege political ideology, as it is contemporarily defined along the liberal-conservative dimension within the United States (cf. Iyer et al., 2012). Haidt (2012) does acknowledge the a priori, evolutionary nature of moral judgment as it is defined in his social intuitionist model (see Haidt, 2001). People are thus endowed with the capacity to make use of different moral dimensions; it is just that the tendency to rely on certain dimensions over others corresponds with particular political categories (e.g., "liberal," "conservative," "libertarian"). The inherent problem with using morality as a framework for exploring political differences is that it often reifies political categories, which are otherwise fluid, historically situated, and ultimately subjected to the influence of self-categorization processes (see Reicher, 2004; Reynolds & Turner, 2006) that may exert influence on a
person's moral worldview independently of political ideology (cf., Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Graham & Haidt, 2010).

Political attitudes and behavior may be better understood as functions of the moralizing of intergroup relations. Moral standards tend to be viewed as being more objectively true than cultural conventions (Goodwin & Darley, 2008). Moral construals of events, moreover, tend to elicit more extreme responses (Van Bavel et al., 2012) and attitudes rooted in a moral conviction are particularly strong (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Although identification with a political category such as "liberal" or "conservative" is important, and, as a result, correlate strongly with particular types of moral worldviews (Haidt, 2012), the more important question for researchers may be the extent to which a person perceives certain groups through a moral lens. This "lens" is comprised of moral stereotypes (see Chapter 3), moral emotions (Haidt, 2003), conceptions of to whom moral consideration should be extended (Opotow, 1990), as well as notions regarding the treatment of moral transgressors (Fiske & Rai, 2015).

This study illustrates the potential value of this approach. Political orientation was measured along two dimensions: orientation regarding economic issues and orientation regarding social issues. Although a non-representative sample was used, participant responses along these two dimensions were near the midpoint, especially for the economic dimension (see Table 8). Political orientation on either dimension did not consistently predict moral stereotyping, moral emotions or policy preference across the policy areas addressed in this study (see Tables 9-12). Moral stereotyping and moral emotions—namely anger, disgust, and contempt—did consistently and strongly predict policy preference, however. The moral "lens," in this case the perception that the group directly affected by a policy measure is less moral than most other people as well as feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt—namely,
those emotions typically elicited by perceived moral transgressions by others—was thus a better predictor of participants' policy stances than political orientation (see also Wetherell et al., 2013).

**Implications for Public Policy**

The relationship between public opinion and public policy is complex (Mehrtens, 2004). The former represents a single factor among many, including the interests of political, economic, social elites (Edelman, 1988; Lasswell, 1950). The results of this study nevertheless point to the potential value of monitoring public perceptions of particular groups. Widespread endorsement of negative moral stereotypes of a group should raise a red flag for scholars interested in structural violence and justice. Conversely, this study also illustrates the potential of positive moral frames in mobilizing support—or at least acquiescence—towards policy measures benefiting those groups (e.g., López-Rodríguez & Zagefka, 2015).

Defining the moral character of a group in a negative way has the potential of increasing people's acceptance of structural violence (Chapter 3) or, in extreme circumstances, mass violence (Finlay, 2007; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). The apparent threat posed by groups supposedly possessing an immoral character is decoupled from the behavior of its members; in other words, emphasis shifts from what this group does to what they are (Edelman, 1988). Construals such as these can subsequently influence the types of emotions directed towards the members of these groups (Halperin, 2014). As demonstrated in this study, these feelings—particularly anger, disgust, and contempt—function as a mechanism through which violence towards groups stereotyped as immoral becomes viewed as acceptable.
Strategies to counteract the prevalence of these stereotypes may thus be useful. Fujiwara (2005) illustrates how pro-immigrant groups employed this strategy by morally reframed the issues of immigration and welfare policy as matters of human rights. Positive moral frames disseminated to the public could provide the necessary stereotype disconfirming information that can challenge, and ultimately change, widely held negative moral stereotypes (cf., Allport, 1954). Positive moral stereotypes could also provide an "inoculating" function by making it such that violence towards certain groups is especially unacceptable (see Chapter 3). They could also re-establish the extension of moral consideration to previously excluded groups (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005).

The correlational nature of this study precludes any claims regarding the potential effect of such moral frames on public policy preference. It is possible that negative moral stereotypes emerge as a result of a person's support for harmful policies that is derived elsewhere (e.g., economic factors, see Diaz, Saenz, & Kwan, 2011). In this way, negative moral stereotypes would function as a post hoc rationalization of questionable intergroup behavior (see Tajfel, 1981). Previous research nevertheless points to the effectiveness of efforts to change people's construals of events and groups to change both their emotional reactions (see Halperin, 2014) and political attitudes (see López-Rodríguez & Zagefka, 2015). Future research should thus explore how moral frames can be utilized to change people's negative moral stereotypes of other groups and their public policy preferences.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study was limited in a number of ways. First, an Internet-based, non-probability sample was used, thereby limiting the generalizability of this study's findings. There is a growing recognition of the value of Internet-based samples, though, especially in relation to the undergraduate samples that have been traditionally used in social psychological research.
(e.g., Birnbaum, 2004; Gosling et al., 2000; Riva et al., 2003). This study's results point to a strong relationship between moral stereotyping and policy preference, at least in the areas of gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare. Future research should explore this relationship, as well as the role emotions serve in it, with a more representative sample and in additional policy areas, such as abortion and counterterrorism.

Aside from the correlational nature of this study, which was noted in the previous section, this study was also limited by the fact that political behavior was not measured. Believing that welfare recipients are less moral than most other people, for example, may make it more likely that a person would endorse the elimination of all welfare programs, but does that mean he or she would also be more likely to engage in any political action to bring that outcome about? This study was based on the assumption that widespread public acquiescence is sufficient for structural violence towards certain groups to occur. Active engagement, like voting, joining a political advocacy group or participating in a protest, can also contribute to the emergence of structural violence. Subsequent research should, therefore, examine the extent to which moral stereotypes predict political behavior, especially whether the magnitude of the stereotype—perceiving a particular group as being extremely immoral versus only slightly immoral in comparison to others—is related to the levels of political engagement directed against that group.

Despite these limitations, this study revealed the correlation between moral stereotypes and the acceptance of structural violence in the form of harsh or restrictive policy measures. Participants were more likely to support harsher measures affecting those groups they perceived as being stereotypically immoral. This relationship, moreover, was due partly to feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt directed towards the members of these groups. In identifying the cognitive and affective factors associated with public policy preference, this
study illustrates some of the moral components comprising beliefs that make state sanctioned structural violence towards particular groups possible.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation examined the relationship between how moral a group is perceived to be and the extent to which violence towards members of that group is viewed as acceptable. Violence was defined in a broad manner, encompassing both physical harm and, as illustrated in the case of Japanese Internment described in Chapter 1, violations of civil and/or political rights (see Galtung, 1969). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the qualities that people attribute to their groups and others are derived from a comparison made along an evaluative dimension. Virtually any trait can be used for this purpose (Tajfel, 1982). A group’s moral status, would, therefore, be derived via comparisons made between that group and others along a moral dimension.

"Morality" within psychology has been traditionally defined in terms of concerns related to harm and fairness (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012), in contrast, proposes a more expansive definition of the moral domain comprised of not only of matters of harm and fairness, but also authority, loyalty, purity, and liberty. Integrating these two theoretical frameworks, namely Social Identity Theory and Moral Foundations Theory, this dissertation explored the extent to which moral qualities attributed to other groups (i.e., moral stereotypes) are derived from comparisons made between members of that group and others along these six moral dimensions. Groups perceived as being typically less moral than other people could engender some cognitive and emotional reactions, most notably the view that members of that group are legitimate targets of harm. The studies comprising this dissertation sought to investigate this process.
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section reviews the research questions posed in this dissertation and the studies conducted to address them. The results of each study are then summarized. Building upon these findings, the second section elaborates further the proposed moral psychology of intergroup relations described in previous chapters. The social nature of morality is specifically outlined, namely how people’s identification with a group and the need to defend the moral status of this group can underlie their subsequent acceptance of intergroup violence. This section closes with a brief overview of the potential avenues of research emerging from this analytical framework.

**Summary of Findings**

Four research questions guided this dissertation. The first research question addressed in this dissertation was:

RQ1: How do political elites and lay people distinguish groups along a moral basis?

Regarding the former, Chapter 2 consisted of a thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) on speeches made by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama on the topic of terrorism. The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which content reflecting the moral dimensions identified in Moral Foundations Theory emerged in reference to the category of "terrorist" as it was described in the speeches. Analysis found that content distinguishing members of the "terrorist" category from other social categories reflected each of the six dimensions specified in Moral Foundations Theory. Members of the terrorist category were not just framed as immoral because on the unjust nature of the violence they inflict, but also because of the ways in which they threaten legitimate structures of authority, social unity, and individual liberty. Terrorists were also described as an “impurity” (see
Purity/Degradation moral foundation) requiring removal lest they spread and “contaminate” other areas.

Chapter 3 consisted of two studies exploring how lay people perceived distinctions among groups along a moral basis. Online samples were asked to compare the members of a previously identified liked or disliked group to "most other people" using items—specifically traits, values, and behaviors—reflecting the moral dimensions described in Moral Foundations Theory, as well as complete a number of other items (see below). Confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses revealed that participants made use of all six, distinct dimensions when distinguishing members of disliked groups from most other people. This result, coupled with those from Chapter 2, demonstrates that people make use of an expansive moral domain when distinguishing—and hence morally stereotyping—groups.

The objective of the second research question was to examine the relationship between moral stereotyping and the perceived acceptability of violence, namely:

RQ2: Are people more willing to accept violence towards groups they perceive as being typically less moral?

Chapter 2 illustrated how rhetorically framing certain groups—in this case, "terrorists"—as immoral can be used to legitimize violence (i.e., US counterterrorism efforts). This finding, along with previous theoretical and empirical work on moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990) and delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990), led to the following hypothesis:

H_{RQ2}: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with greater acceptance of violence towards members of that group.

Chapters 3 and 4 provided support for this hypothesis. Chapter 3 found evidence that negative moral stereotypes of another group—i.e., the perception that its members are typically less
moral than most other people—were significantly correlated with the belief that the members of these groups are more acceptable targets of violence. This relationship remained strong even after accounting for the variance due to other variables (e.g., demographics, dehumanization, emotions). Chapter 4 elaborated upon this finding by investigating the relationship between moral stereotypes and support for harsh policy measures across four policy areas: gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare. Analysis revealed that across each domain, negative stereotypes of a group (e.g., people who immigrate to the United States illegally) were correlated with support for harsher policy measures (e.g., indefinite detention). The findings from Chapters 3 and 4, collectively, reveal that people are willing to accept violence—either in a general sense or in the form of harsh policy measures—inflicted on groups they perceived as being typically less moral than most other people.

The third and fourth research questions addressed sought to explore the psychological mechanisms related to moral stereotyping, specifically the relationship among moral stereotypes, dehumanization, and emotions (e.g., anger and fear). Regarding the relationship between moral stereotypes and dehumanization, the third research question posed in this dissertation was:

RQ3: Are groups perceived as less moral than others more likely to be perceived as less human?

Dehumanization was assessed along two dimensions: traits (Haslam, 2006) and emotions (i.e., infrahumanization, see Leyens et al., 2000). The following hypotheses, based on previous work (e.g., Bastian et al., 2011; Leyens, 2009), were tested:
Hₚ₃a: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with the denial of both human-defining trait dimensions (uniquely human and naturally human) outlined by Haslam (2006).

Hₚ₃b: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with the denial of secondary emotions (i.e., human-defining emotions; see Leyens et al., 2000) to members of that group.

Chapter 3 found support for these hypotheses. Groups perceived as being typically less moral than other people were also more likely to be denied traits considered uniquely (e.g., civility, morality, higher cognition) or naturally human (e.g., cognitive flexibility, emotionality, warmth). They were also more viewed as less likely to experience human-defining emotions (e.g., affective, admiration, pride).

Emotions have a moral component, too. Anger, disgust, and contempt, for example, are emotions that are commonly elicited by moral transgressions committed by others (Haidt, 2003). There is also a growing recognition of the role that emotions serve in shaping people’s social and political attitudes (e.g., Halperin, Canetti, & Shaul, 2012; Halperin & Gross, 2011). Given this theoretical and empirical foundation, the fourth research question explored the relationship between moral stereotypes and emotions, specifically:

RQ₄: Are people more likely to feel negative emotions (e.g., hatred, anger, disgust, etc.) towards those groups they perceive as less moral?

Based on previous research on group-based emotions such as disgust, fear, and hatred (e.g., Halperin et al., 2008; Matthews & Levin, 2012) Chapters 3 tested the hypothesis that:

Hₚ₄a: The perception that a group is typically less moral than others will be correlated with higher levels of disgust, fear and hatred, as well as lower levels of positive affect, felt towards the members of that group.
Chapter 3 found support for this hypothesis as analysis revealed that negative moral stereotypes of a target group were correlated with greater disgust, fear, and hatred as well as less positive affect directed towards its members.

Building upon these findings, Chapter 4 focused on the relationship between moral stereotypes and “other-condemning” (anger, disgust, hatred; Haidt, 2008) emotions, which typically emerge in response to a perceived moral transgression, within the context of four policy areas: gun ownership, immigration, sexual minority rights, and welfare.

**Hypothesis 4b:** Moral stereotypes will be negatively correlated with "other-condemning" emotions in that the less moral a group is perceived to be, the more anger, disgust, and contempt will be felt towards its members.

Chapter 4 found that people were more likely to feel anger, disgust, and contempt towards gun owners, people who immigrate to the United States illegally, sexual minorities, or welfare recipients if they also viewed those groups as being typically less moral than most other people. These emotions, moreover, partially accounted for—or, in the case of sexual minority rights, fully accounted for (i.e., mediated)—the aforementioned relationship between negative moral stereotypes and support for harsh policy measures. Chapters 3 and 4, collectively, demonstrated that both dehumanization and negative emotions correspond strongly with negative moral stereotypes. Chapter 4, moreover, identified that feeling "other-condemning" emotions, namely those emerging as a result of a perceived moral transgression, is one mechanism through which negative moral stereotypes may predict increases in the perceived acceptability of violence—in this case, harsh policy measures.

The limitations of each study comprising this dissertation have been addressed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. This dissertation, however, was limited in two broad ways. First, studies featured either a qualitative (Chapter 2) or correlational design (Chapters 3 and 4). Regarding
the latter, although a strong relationship was observed among negative moral stereotypes and people’s acceptance of violence towards others, the direction of this relationship remains unknown. A negative moral stereotype of another group may facilitate the later acceptance of violence inflicted upon its members, but it could also, presumably, emerge as a post-hoc rationalization of violence that was already committed. Additional research employing experimental designs is therefore required to resolve this issue. Second, the survey studies conducted in Chapter 3 and 4 made use of non-probabilistic, Internet-based samples. Although these have advantages over studies using undergraduate samples, such samples are not nationally representative, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings of this dissertation. To address this limitation, future research should replicate the studies comprising this dissertation using more representative samples as well as with samples from outside the United States.

Despite these limitations, the results of the studies comprising this dissertation point to the need for a moral psychology of intergroup relations. Previous research has shown how morality is the primary dimension upon which social categories are differentiated and evaluated (see Goodwin, 2015). Adding to this body of work, this dissertation points to the potential highly influential role that moral stereotypes serve in engendering and maintaining people's acceptance of violence as well as future avenues of research illustrating the moral basis of intergroup violence. The findings of this dissertation thus illustrate the potential value of a moral psychology of intergroup relations.

**Towards a Moral Psychology of Intergroup Relations**

War, violence, social inequality, and oppression continue to plague the global community. In response, social psychology has proffered a variety of explanations that are united by the fundamental desire to uncover the cause of these phenomena. There has been an
increasing recognition within the social psychological literature that individuals in settings of war, conflict, or ethnocentrism are often acting within a particular moral framework or worldview provided in their cultural context (see Fiske & Rai, 2015). As illustrated by the results of this dissertation, moral discourse (Chapter 2), moral stereotypes and moral emotions (Chapters 3 and 4) can facilitate the acceptance of violence towards other groups. That is, attitudes, behaviors, and personality traits oriented toward out-group animosity can be linked to normative ideas about good and evil, right and wrong that circulate in social contexts.

Despite its apparent biological and evolutionary roots (see Haidt, 2008; Greene 2013), morality is greatly conditioned by social context (Haidt, 2001), specifically group membership. Thus, any examination of the role of morality in intergroup relations must take the group as the primary focal point of analysis while also recognizing the larger structural and political context. Although Freud (1930/1961) emphasized the role of cultural context in the formation of one’s moral conscience, the link between individual moral worldview and group membership has not received adequate attention in the literature. Research has tended to focus instead on the cognitive (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) and developmental processes (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965) underlying moral judgment existing independently of group membership.

To account for both individual and social levels of analysis, the proposed moral psychology of intergroup relations is rooted in the social identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Two propositions follow from this assertion. First, group membership has a determinative influence on the narrative content of one’s moral worldview. This influence is a product of one’s perception that he or she is a member of a social category and its effect on personal identity. In other words, self-categorization invokes a particular moral pathway with regard to personal narrative development—the desire to link one’s personal narrative with a
larger “master” narrative that provides a sense of affiliation and security (e.g., Hammack, 2010a, 2010b). The second proposition is that the relationship between moral worldview and group membership is solidified by the fundamental need that people have to view their in-groups as morally good. This need is often fulfilled in favorable comparisons made with relevant out-groups along moral dimensions. In other words, social identities exist as part of a larger matrix of evaluation, and moral discourse provides the mechanism by which individuals come to value their social identities.

**Groups, Morality, and “Acts of Meaning”**

The aim of the remaining sections of this chapter is to integrate theoretical perspectives with social psychology that have proliferated but have been too infrequently integrated. The proposed moral psychology of intergroup relations calls upon the social identity tradition, narrative theory, and moral foundations theory to explain why acts seemingly unjustifiable, such as violence, become accepted and condoned by large segments of a population. Theoretical integration on this topic in light of the findings of this dissertation, it is anticipated, will stimulate new areas of empirical research that may reveal the psychological and structural mechanisms facilitating violence and/or oppression across the globe.

**Group-Based Morality**

Recent scholarship has focused on the non-conscious processes that underlie moral judgment. According to Haidt’s (2001, 2007) social intuitionist model, moral judgment is a product of fast, automatic and affect-laden processes largely outside of conscious awareness. Moral reasoning, by contrast, constitutes a slower, more deliberative and conscious mental process. Within the social intuitionist model, moral reasoning often constitutes a rationalizing process for moral judgments that were made intuitively. As a social process, however, moral
reasoning has a determinative influence on moral judgment. Haidt (2001) contends that the mere fact that friends, allies and fellow group members have made a particular moral judgment can influence one’s moral judgment. Most moral change, therefore, occurs as a result of social interaction (Haidt, 2007).

Although rooted in evolutionary adaption, moral intuitions are ultimately shaped by the cultural context within which they emerge. For Haidt (2008), moral systems constitute an interlocking set of values, practices, and psychological mechanisms that collectively aim to suppress individual selfishness, thereby making social life possible. Common adherence to particular moral foundations forms the basis upon which moral communities are formed (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Haidt, 2007). Given that appeals made by similar others can influence moral judgment (Haidt, 2001, 2008), identification with a particular moral community can be a determinative factor in which moral foundations are emphasized within one’s moral worldview and how they function in moral judgment. It is through the categorization of the self within a social category associated with this moral community that group membership comes to influence individual moral judgment.

Categorization and depersonalization, namely the perception that one is an undifferentiated member of a group, are prerequisites for intergroup behavior (Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). When viewing oneself as a member of a group, one is more likely to act according to group expectations, values and norms (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg. & Turner, 1990; Giannakakis & Fritsche, 2011; S. A. Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). The norms, values and beliefs that come to define the in-group social category in turn shape how social identity is experienced on the individual level.

According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), variations in social identity facilitate variations in how the self is understood. Individual identity is embedded
within one’s various group memberships and the social and political ideologies that frame collective understandings of those group realities (Reynolds & Turner, 2006). Research adopting a narrative perspective has illustrated the constitutive role that cultural context, specifically ideological frameworks and master narratives, serves in identity development. According to Bruner (1990), a narrative is a vehicle through which cultural structures of meaning are incorporated with individual identity development. Specifically, it mediates between the “canonical world of culture and the more idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires, and hopes” of the individual (p. 52).

The primary function of one’s personal narrative is to integrate aspects of the larger discursive and ideological setting into a unified, coherent and meaningful whole (McAdams, 1996; Schachter, 2004, 2005). It is through the individual’s engagement and adaptation to the larger socio-cultural context within which he or she exists that identity comes into being (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996). Through this process of engagement, discourse, narrative and ideology assume a constitutive role (Hammack, 2008; Sampson, 1993). As the medium through which the larger social context is engaged and reproduced, identity represents the fundamental link between society and the self (Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012).

Identity may also serve as the fundamental mechanism through which people’s moral judgments are ultimately shaped. Although the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001, 2007) emphasizes the role of intuition in moral judgment, it notes that appeals made by similar others can overturn these intuition-based judgments. It has also been shown that people can form moral communities based on their common belief in a particular moral system and the moral foundations found therein (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Haidt, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2009). Both of these statements point to the inherent link between individual moral worldview and group membership. Specifying the process through which the latter influences
the contents of the former, the interdependent relationship that exists between personal and social identity (Reynolds & Turner, 2006; Turner et al., 1987) was emphasized. Group-based moral values thus permeate all levels of the self-concept and shape moral judgment through the process of narrative and ideological engagement (Haidt et al., 2009; Hammack, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). As such, group membership can have a determinative influence on the development of one’s moral worldview, which can ultimately influence the development of moral stereotypes regarding other groups and the moral emotions (Haidt, 2008) directed towards its members (see Halperin, 2014).

Moral Threat and Moral Violence

When direct (e.g., physical) and/or structural (e.g., exploitation) violence (Galtung, 1969, 1990) is perpetrated against members of other groups it represent an inherent threat to the moral status of the ingroup. How can a group be moral, but do seemingly immoral things? Research has shown that the moral dimension is the most important basis upon which the ingroup is evaluated (Goodwin, 2015; Leach et al., 2007). To address this question, destructive actions undertaken by the in-group must be construed as normative and morally justified (e.g., Finlay, 2007).

Processes of moral disengagement or moral engagement can be engaged in to morally justify violence and preserve the moral status of one’s group. The former process influences the extent to which the target of violence is perceived as being worthy of moral treatment. Theoretical constructs like moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990, 1999) and delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012) describe aspects of this mechanism. The studies comprising this dissertation investigate this process as well, namely the extent to which members of a target group can be distinguished from others along a moral basis either rhetorically (Chapter 2) or cognitively.
(Chapters 3 and 4). The second mechanism, which was not addressed in the dissertation, focuses on the act of violence itself and the extent to which it is viewed as reinforcing a moral value or principle. This strategy aims to frame violence as a moral imperative or, in other words, as a moral end in itself (Fiske & Rai, 2015).

**Violence as a Product of Moral Disengagement.** Theories within social psychology have typically viewed violence as a product of one’s disengagement from normal, moral consideration or the perception that moral treatment does not apply to certain groups. Within this framework, construing violence as morally justified constitutes one of many potential strategies through which moral consideration is withdrawn or disengaged. For example, Bandura (1990) contends that moral behavior emerges from mechanisms of self-regulation and self-sanctioning. However, through various strategies (e.g., framing act as morally justified) these mechanisms can be disengaged, thereby making a morally transgressive behavior more likely to occur (see also Bandura, 1999). Illustrating this process, Bandura and colleagues (1996) found that construing injurious behavior as serving righteous purposes, disowning responsibility for harmful effects, and devaluing those who were mistreated were the most widely used disengagement strategies employed within a sample consisting of children and adolescents.

The assumption that the withdrawal of moral consideration lies at the heart of intergroup violence also underlies research on moral exclusion. According to Opotow (1990), moral exclusion refers to the perception that particular groups or individuals exist outside one’s scope of justice, which refers to the psychological boundary of one’s moral community. Those found within this moral community are afforded treatment that is reflective of the in-group’s moral values. In contrast, moral obligations are not extended to those perceived as existing outside this community. As a result, violence towards members of excluded groups is
more likely to be perceived as morally permissible (Opotow, 1993, 1994; see also Chapters 3 & 4).

Delegitimization refers to an extreme form of moral exclusion based on the perception that a target group has violated a basic moral order and is therefore no longer a part of the community of “acceptable” groups and the treatment afforded those found therein (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012). Conceptualizing delegitimization as an ideology of extreme difference rooted in an understanding of place, Tileaga (2007) contends that to delegitimize a group is to construct it as “out-of-place” due to their behavior and/or due to an inherent that is viewed as transgressive with respect to “normative place-appropriate conduct” (p. 277). Delegitimization thus represents an extreme form of negative stereotyping informed by beliefs regarding universal moral standards and made manifest in the moralizing of intergroup relations (Pilecki & Hammack, 2011). Excluded from the moral community of acceptable groups, delegitimized groups become targets of hatred and fear (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008), prejudice (Tileaga, 2005, 2006b; Volpato, Durante, Gabbiadini, Andrighetto, & Mari, 2010) and violence (Hammack, Pilecki, Caspi, & Strauss, 2011; Oren, Rothbart, & Korostelina, 2009).

Hafer and Olson (2003) have nevertheless criticized moral exclusion research on some grounds. Notably, they contend that the literature on moral exclusion has not adequately defined the scope of justice, has not specified the mediating mechanisms in moral exclusion, and has not adequately addressed alternative explanations of findings. In terms of this last criticism, Hafer and Olson (2003) contend that results of moral exclusion studies may be better interpreted in terms of perceived “deservingness.” That is, from the perpetrator’s point of view an act may be fair or just in relation to the perceived deservingness of the target. In
such a case, justice concerns are not so much withdrawn, as described by (Opotow, 1990), but rather altered based on the perceived nature of the target.

**Violence as a Product of Moral Engagement.** Addressing this criticism, there is a growing recognition that intergroup violence is viewed principally as a moral imperative by its perpetrators rather than a product of the withdrawal of moral consideration (see Fiske & Rai, 2015). Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, and Medin (2011) contend that political violence emerges from the moral commitment one has with the in-group and the values associated with group membership. When grounded in sacred group values, the decision to employ violence is not based on instrumental reasoning (i.e., whether the benefits outweigh the costs). Rather, as demonstrated in a series of studies by Ginges and Atran (2011), support for military action—as opposed to diplomatic action—is guided by deontological reasoning, namely the consideration whether an act conforms to a moral value or not. The decision to employ violence is thus largely immune to concerns regarding material gains or losses when it is framed in terms of group values (Ginges et al., 2011).

The use of deontological reasoning in instances of intergroup violence is due to the inherent characteristics of moral belief. Goodwin and Darley (2008) have found that individuals tend to view moral beliefs more objectively than other social conventions, particularly when they are grounded in either religious or pragmatic ideologies. Moral conviction, which refers to the strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral (Skitka & Mullen, 2002), are often viewed by individuals as both universal and objective (Skitka, 2010). Due to these factors, Skitka and Mullen (2002) contend that moral mandates, namely attitudes rooted in one’s moral convictions, represent a distinct class of strongly held attitudes.
Previous research has shown the effects of attitudes that are rooted in moral convictions. Skitka and Houston (2001) presented participants with a news article about a hypothetical murder trial. The known guilt or innocence of the defendant along with the conduct of the judicial process (proper or improper) was manipulated. It was found that the fairness of the trial outcome was judged almost exclusively on the basis of whether the moral mandate was achieved, namely that the innocent go free and the guilty are punished, and not whether the trial was conducted properly or not. Skitka and Houston (2001) concluded that this result showed that assessments of justice are shaped more by whether a desired moral standard has been achieved rather than the manner in which it was achieved, even if it requires extra-legal methods (i.e., vigilantism).

Moreover, Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) conducted a series of studies and found that the more individual attitudes were associated with moral convictions, the more did interpersonal distance increase from those holding conflicting attitudes. In other words, high moral conviction is associated with the rejection of those who do not agree, a finding that Skitka and colleagues (2005) contend is rooted in the perceived universality of moral convictions (see also Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). In addition, it was that found that within small group settings, dissimilarity on attitudes associated with moral convictions led to greater intragroup tension and decreased cooperation.

Moral mandates are more than just moral standards that are used to evaluate outcomes and the procedures that yield them. Given their perceived universality and grounding in objective “facts” (see Goodwin & Darley, 2008), moral mandates form the psychological foundation upon which events and actions can be legitimized (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). When couched in moral terms, actions are judged in terms of whether a specific moral end has been reached largely independent of the means employed (e.g., Skitka
& Houston, 2001). Violence is judged using a similar deontological logic when placed within a moral framework (Ginges & Atran, 2011; Ginges et al., 2011). Namely, violence is judged more on the basis of whether it affirms a particular moral value rather than its anticipated outcome.

In summary, violent actions undertaken by an in-group are often couched in moral terms that allow for the moral image of the group to be maintained among its members. Research has revealed two general strategies through which the moral status of the group is preserved. The first mechanism results in the withdrawal of moral consideration from the target group. The moral status of the in-group is thus preserved because recipients of in-group violence are not considered worthy of moral treatment a priori. The second mechanism results in the view that violence is a moral act that reaffirms a particular moral value or standard. Because violence is viewed as a moral act, and engaging in violence is perceived as acting morally, the moral status of the in-group is preserved.

**Conclusion**

The moral psychology of intergroup relations outlined above is grounded in two theoretical assumptions related to social identity development. First, the contents of one’s moral worldview are derived from one’s self-categorization in, and one’s identification with, a group (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Giannakakis & Fritsche, 2011; S. A. Haslam et al., 1999). Second, there is a fundamental need to view the in-group as morally good (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2007). Given the need to preserve the moral status of the in-group, a number of mechanisms are used to circumvent the threat that immoral actions undertaken by the in-group inevitably poses to social identity. The first mechanism, rooted in moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990) is marked by the perception that moral consideration does not apply to the target group (e.g., Bandura, 1990, 1999; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Bar-Tal &
Hammack, 2012; Opotow, 1990). The studies comprising this dissertation investigated the rhetorical (Chapter 2), cognitive and emotional processes (Chapters 3 and 4) related to this mechanism. The second mechanism, rooted in moral engagement, is marked by the perception that acts of violence reaffirm a moral standard and thus constitute forms of moral action (Ginges & Atran, 2011; Ginges et al., 2011).

Future research needs to investigate the factors influencing which mechanism, either moral disengagement or moral engagement is used to justify intergroup violence or counter threats to the moral status of the ingroup. The role of ingroup identification was also not addressed in this dissertation. Would negative moral stereotyping, namely perceiving the members of a target group as typically less moral than others, increase if a person’s social, rather than personal, identity is made salient? Would this increase likewise correspond with greater acceptance of violence inflicted on members of the target group? Lastly, this dissertation did not shed light on whether processes of moral disengagement—or moral engagement, for that matter—need to be present to facilitate an act of violence to occur in the future or whether they emerge as a post hoc rationalization of violence that has already happened. Structural violence enduring for generations (e.g., racism in the United States) points to the latter pattern whereas direct violence or acts of structural violence of a discrete duration (e.g., internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II) may point to former pattern. The moral psychology of intergroup relations outlined above, employing both qualitative and quantitative means, aims to address these questions in the future.
Table 1

**Definitions of Moral Foundations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Foundation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority/Subversion</td>
<td>Concerns related to obligations of hierarchical relationship, such as obedience, respect and proper role fulfillment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness/Cheating</td>
<td>Concerns about justice and proportionality; “it is about making sure that people get what they deserve, and do not get things they do not deserve” (Haidt, 2012, p. 183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care/Harm</td>
<td>Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty/Betrayal</td>
<td>Concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice and vigilance against betrayal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purity/Degradation</td>
<td>Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness and control of desires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty/Oppression</td>
<td>Concerns about political equality, dislike of oppression, and a concern for victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Descriptions derived from Haidt, Graham and Joseph (2009) and Haidt (2012).
Table 2

*Data Corpus*

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<td>Address to the Nation: 9/11 Terrorist Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>State of the Union (SOTU)</td>
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<td>SOTU</td>
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<td>5571</td>
<td>SOTU</td>
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<td>08/24/07</td>
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<td>5712</td>
<td>SOTU</td>
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<tr>
<td>03/19/08</td>
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<td>Remarks on the War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1858</td>
<td>Farewell Address to the Nation</td>
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<td>3278</td>
<td>Remarks on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/21/09</td>
<td>6451</td>
<td>Remarks on National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/01/09</td>
<td>4595</td>
<td>Remarks on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1087</td>
<td>Statement on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>Remarks on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security</td>
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<td>05/02/11</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>Remarks on Osama Bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/11/12</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>Remarks at the Pentagon Memorial Service in Remembrance of 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/12/12</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>Remarks on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/23/13</td>
<td>7040</td>
<td>Remarks at the National Defense University</td>
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<td>Study 2 Winter 2013</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely conservative</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately conservative</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slightly conservative</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither conservative nor liberal</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slightly liberal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately liberal</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremely liberal</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing/Decline to State</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not religious</td>
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<tr>
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<td>131</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
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<td>Very religious</td>
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<td>Missing/Decline to State</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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*This option was not given during Study 1; *b*This option was not given during Study 2, participants were instead given the option of selecting "Other". Participants who selected Other were not included in this analysis.
Figure 1. Scree plots across evaluative conditions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Disliked-Combined&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Liked&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>.74  -.18  -.27  -.06</td>
<td>.64  -.20  .12  -.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oppress others</td>
<td>.74  -.08  .05   .09</td>
<td>.57  -.44  .24  -.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compassionate</td>
<td>.69  .24   -.06  .20</td>
<td>.14  -.07  .83  .13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbaric</td>
<td>.68  -.11  -.22  -.03</td>
<td>.70  -.08  .18  -.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betray others</td>
<td>.63  .04   -.20  -.14</td>
<td>.82  .01   .06  -.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrade the human body</td>
<td>.60  -.11  -.21  -.20</td>
<td>.64  -.18  -.06  -.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal rights</td>
<td>.59  .09   .20  .18</td>
<td>.07  -.63  .22  -.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheat</td>
<td>.54  .17   -.16  -.18</td>
<td>.87  .07   .09  .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>.47  .03   .29   -.36</td>
<td>.18  -.23  .03  -.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>.45  -.25  .25   .12</td>
<td>.38  -.41  -.04  -.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>.42  .16   .08   -.35</td>
<td>-.01  .14  .28  -.55</td>
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<td>Virtuous</td>
<td>.37  .20   .02   -.20</td>
<td>.12  .20  .38  -.29</td>
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<td>Loyal</td>
<td>-.12  .71  -.04  -.11</td>
<td>.10  .36  .28  -.20</td>
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<td>Obedient</td>
<td>-.18  .53  -.48   .02</td>
<td>-.01  .67  .28  .01</td>
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<td>Hard-working</td>
<td>-.03  .50  -.12  -.18</td>
<td>.12  .27  .20  -.46</td>
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<td>Unity</td>
<td>-.02  .47   .07   -.10</td>
<td>-.03  .06  .38  -.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make sacrifices for others</td>
<td>.27  .41   .07   .08</td>
<td>.03  -.02  .58  -.10</td>
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<td>Rebel against authority</td>
<td>.10  .02  -.70   .02</td>
<td>.39  .48  -.18  .02</td>
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<td>Unruly</td>
<td>.25  .12  -.46   -.05</td>
<td>.69  .29  .01  .01</td>
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<td>-.26  .18  -.08  -.72</td>
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<td>Chastity</td>
<td>-.02  -.04  -.23  -.67</td>
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<td>Personal Responsibility</td>
<td>.15  .19  .13  -.55</td>
<td>&lt;.01  .03  -.06  -.87</td>
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</table>

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

<sup>a</sup>Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

<sup>b</sup>Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Figure 2. Six factor model of moral stereotyping items.
Table 5

Comparison of Alternative Models

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<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta df$</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>RSMEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
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<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1633.85</td>
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<td>1029.37</td>
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<td>42632.78</td>
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<td>Two</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>675.35</td>
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<td>42284.76</td>
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<td>305.41</td>
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<td>.82</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>193.76</td>
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<td>41821.18</td>
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<td>.85</td>
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<td>120</td>
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<td>41637.42</td>
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Table 6

Interactions among Arousal and Intensity
Table 7
Standardized Coefficients, Commonality Coefficients and Percentage of Unique Variance Explained of Predictor Variables on Acceptance of Violence Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>Combined-Dislike&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Like&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tr>
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<td>b</td>
<td>g</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>.011</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<td>.003</td>
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<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<td>Hatred</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Affect</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Target Group&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.006</td>
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<td>Human Nature (Dehumanization)</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.005</td>
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<td>Uniquely Human (Dehumanization)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Emotions (Infrahumanization)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<td>Secondary Emotions (Infrahumanization)</td>
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<td>.009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral Stereotyping Score</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td>.016</td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup>N = 551; <sup>b</sup>N = 333; <sup>c</sup>Δr<sup>2</sup> = .01, p < .01; <sup>d</sup>Δr<sup>2</sup> = .02, p < .01

Total variance explained by linear model: Combined Dislike, r<sup>2</sup> = .36; Like: r<sup>2</sup> = .31

Note: Cases with missing data were excluded from analysis
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Table 8

Demographic Information of Participants in Each Policy Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gun Ownership(^a)</th>
<th>Immigration(^b)</th>
<th>Sexual Minority Rights(^c)</th>
<th>Welfare(^d)</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>12.83</td>
<td>36.50</td>
<td>13.95</td>
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<td>Econ. Issues</td>
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<td>-3.4</td>
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<td>1.60</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.49</td>
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</table>

\(^a\)N = 167 (F = 123, M = 43, Other = 1); \(^b\)N = 161 (F = 112; M = 49); \(^c\)N = 154 (F = 109, M = 45); \(^d\)N = 158 (F = 105, M = 52, Other = 1)
Figure 3. Frequency of Policy Scores across policy areas. Higher Policy Scores reflects greater support for harsh or restrictive policy measures.
Table 9

*Correlations Among Measured and Demographic Variables in Gun Ownership Policy Area*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. MS Score</td>
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<td>.49***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.19*</td>
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<td>2. Condemning Score</td>
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<td>.39***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.14</td>
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<td>.19*</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<td>5. Sex</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>7. Pol. Orientation (SI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Religiosity</td>
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</table>

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 10

*Correlations Among Measured and Demographic Variables in Immigration Policy Area*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MS Score</td>
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<td>.56***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
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<td>2. Condemning Score</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>3. Policy Score</td>
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<td>-.07</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<td>4. Age</td>
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<td>.30***</td>
<td>.22**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Sex</td>
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* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001
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* *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Table 12

*Correlations Among Measured and Demographic Variables in Welfare Policy Area*

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* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Figure 4. Model coefficients and standard errors generated by mediation analysis. Standard errors were generated via a bootstrapping procedure consisting of 1000 simulations. Demographic variables (age, sex, political orientation, and religiosity) were included as predictors (not shown) of both MS Score and Condemning Score in the model. Analysis revealed that other-condemning emotions mediated the relationship between moral stereotyping and support for harsh or restrictive policy measures in all areas; note, however,
that other-condemning emotions fully mediated this relationship with the sexual minority rights policy area (see c.).
Appendix I

Moral Stereotyping (MS) Scale

The MS scale assess the extent to which a group is perceived to be generally more or less moral in comparison to others. The scale is scored so that positive values indicate positive moral distinction, namely the perception that members of a specific group are typically more moral than most other people. Negative values, in contrast, indicate negative moral distinction, which reflects the perception that members of a specific group are typically less moral than most other people.

* = Reverse-scored

Internal reliability: Cronbach’s α = .92

Section A

In comparison to most other groups, how much do <members of target group> value:
(-3 = “value much less; +3 = “value much more”)

A1. equal rights
A2. unity
A3. anarchy*
A4. chastity
A5. the rule of law

Section B

In comparison to most other group, how likely are <members of target group> to:
(-3 = “much less likely”; +3 = “much more likely”)

B1. kill*
B2. degrade the human body*
B3. betray others*
B4. cheat*
B5. oppress others*
B6. make sacrifices for others
B7. rebel against authority*
B8. start a riot*

Section C

In comparison to most other groups, to what extent are <members of target group>:
(-3 = “much less”; +3 = “much more”)

C1. barbaric*
C2. corrupt*
C3. authoritarian*
C4. loyal
C5. spiritual
Appendix II

Please read the policy measures related to gun ownership below and indicate whether or not you would support them if they were put into place by the US government. [Note: response given as “yes” or “no.”]

Would you support a government policy that...

1. ...institutes a waiting period before a handgun can be purchased, to allow for criminal records check.
2. ...requires a license for all persons carrying a handgun outside their homes or place of business (except for law enforcement agents).
3. ...requires a mandatory fine for all persons carrying a handgun outside their homes or places of business without a license.
4. ...requires all persons to obtain a police permit before being allowed to purchase a handgun.
5. ...requires a mandatory jail term for all persons carrying a handgun outside their homes or places of business without a license.
6. ...bans the future manufacturing and sale of non-sporting-type handguns.
7. ...uses public funds to confiscate and destroy existing handguns on an involuntary basis.
8. ...bans the future manufacture and sale of all handguns.
9. ...uses public funds to confiscate and destroy existing handguns on an involuntary basis as well as imprisons those who own guns.

Please read the policy measures related to illegal immigration below and indicate whether or not you would support them if they were put into place by the US government.

Would you support a government policy that...

1. ...deports all of those who have immigrated here illegally and committed a serious crime (i.e., a felony).
2. ...deports all of those who have immigrated here illegally and committed any crime while in the US, regardless of severity.
3. ...deports all of those who have immigrated to the US illegally and do not have steady employment.
4. ...deports all who have immigrated to the US illegally except for those who can show that they cannot return to their country of origin because their lives would be in danger (i.e., asylum seekers).
5. ...deports everyone who has immigrated to the US illegally back to their country of origin.
6. ...deports all who have immigrated here illegally except for those who have children born in US.
7. ...imprisons anyone who has immigrated to the US illegally for a period of time before deporting them to their country of origin.
8. ...imprisons anyone who has immigrated to the US illegally for an indefinite period of time.
9. ...issues the death penalty to anyone who has immigrated to the US illegally.

Please read the policy measures related to sexual minorities below and indicate whether or not you would support them if they were put into place by the US government.

Would you support a government policy that...

1. ...allows private organizations, including religious congregations, to ban people who engage in homosexual behavior from joining them.
2. ...prevents people who engage in homosexual behavior from adopting or having children.
3. ...allows employers to not hire or fire people who engage in homosexual behavior.
4. ...prevents people who engage in homosexual behavior from getting married or having any kind of legally recognized partnership.
5. ...bans people who engage in homosexual behavior from having certain jobs, like those involving children.
6. ...bans people who engage in homosexual behavior from donating blood and/or organs.
7. ...makes homosexual behavior illegal and imprisons those who engage in it.
8. ...makes homosexual behavior illegal and gives the death penalty to anybody who engages in it.

Please read the policy measures related to welfare below and indicate whether or not you would support them if they were put into place by the US government.

Would you support a government policy that...

1. ...allows only US citizens to receive welfare benefits.
2. ...makes people have to perform social or governmental service to receive welfare benefits.
3. ...allows only those who are physically unable to work and/or to care for themselves to receive welfare benefits.
4. ...allows only those who have worked for a certain number for years to receive welfare benefits.
5. ...allows only the parents of small children to receive welfare benefits.
6. ...ends all welfare programs.
Reference


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