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Authors
Waldinger, Roger D
Fitzgerald, David

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by

Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald

Department of Sociology, UCLA

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At the turn of the 21st century, “globalization” is the order of the day. With international migration bringing the alien “other” from third world to first, and worldwide trade and communications amplifying the feedbacks traveling in the opposite direction, the view that nation-state and society normally converge has waned. Instead, social scientists are looking for new ways to think about the connections between “here” and “there,” as evidenced by the interest in the many things called “transnational”. Those studying international migration evince particular excitement. Observing that migration produces a plethora of connections spanning “home” and “host” societies, these scholars proclaim the emergence of “transnational communities”.

Connectivity between source and destination points is an inherent aspect of the migration phenomenon – no surprise given the social networks that channel the process. However, those networks generate, not one, but a multiplicity of “imagined communities,” organized along different, often conflicting principles, whether related to the scale of aggregation (local v. national) or opposing visions of the “community” in question. On occasion, these “imagined communities” conform to the root meaning of transnational – extending beyond loyalties that connect to any specific place of origin or ethnic or national “group”. Yet what immigration scholars describe as “transnationalism” is usually its opposite: highly particularistic attachments antithetical to those by-products of globalization denoted by the concept of “transnational civil society” and its related manifestations (Florini, 2000).

Moreover, migrants do not make their communities alone. Intellectual fashions notwithstanding, states and the politics conducted within their borders fundamentally shape the options for migrant and ethnic trans-state social action.
First, states seek to control movement across territorial boundaries – exit as well as entry. Therefore, defining “transnationalism” in terms of the “regular and sustained” cross-border activities of individuals, as do Portes and his associates (Portes, et. al, 1999), takes for granted what needs to be explained; doing so also makes freedom of movement the point of departure, as if this were not a world divided by states, many of them expelling their undesirable residents or closing their doors to foreigners.

Second, state controls operate at internal as well as external levels, seeking to regulate membership in the national collectivity as well as movement across territorial borders. That both boundaries prove leaky is the rule, not the exception (Krasner, 1995). More relevant is the variability in the degree to which internal and external boundaries are institutionalized, and the means and intensity by which states police them. Together, these factors condition the ability of migrants living “here” to act in ways that yield leverage “there.”

Third, civil society actors in both host and destination countries raise questions regarding the allegiance and political bona fides of persons whose social identities are largely framed by their connections to two states. The terms of national belonging are almost always the subject of conflict; variations in political culture ensure that they also differ from one nation-state to the other.

Fourth, the relationship among states affects the scope for multiple versus exclusive national loyalties. The security/solidarity nexus waxes and wanes with the degree of inter-state tension. “Dual loyalty” becomes a particularly intense issue when belligerency develops between host and sending countries. Thus, while international migrants and their descendants recurrently engage in concerted action across state
boundaries, the use, form, and mobilization of the connections linking “here” and “there” are contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints.

We develop this argument in the pages to follow. Engaging the existing literature, we argue that conventional social science overlaps with folk understandings that nation-states normally contain societies (as implied by the concept of “American society”), which is why the appearance of foreigners and their foreign attachments are viewed as anomalies expected to disappear. Our point of departure is utterly different. Networks of people, information, and goods regularly span the boundaries of the state, leading international migration to consistently recur. Since a container model of society enjoys widespread legitimacy, the arrival of foreigners persistently sparks both state efforts to bound the societies they enclose and civil society attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community that international migration threatens to disrupt. Consequently, the standard depiction of “assimilation” and “transnationalism” as competing theoretical perspectives or analytic concepts misleads. While the sociological dictionary defines “assimilation” as the decline of an ethnic difference (Alba and Nee, 2003), assimilation is also the making of difference between national ‘peoples’. As ideology of the nation-state society, the sociology of assimilation necessarily obscures coercive efforts to build a nation-state society by excluding outsiders – via control of external borders – and to distinguish between members and unacceptable residents of the territory – through regulation of the internal boundaries leading to citizenship and legal residence. Likewise for “transnationalism,” the relevant forms of social action do not transcend difference, but rather are directed entirely toward specific places or groups. In the end, “assimilation”
and “transnationalism” are each as particularistic as the other. The collision between these processes defines the phenomenon of interest to us here.

Rejecting the conventional views, we outline an alternative approach emphasizing the interactions of migrants with states and civil society actors in both sending and receiving countries. We apply that approach to show how sustained comparisons across time and place illuminate the sources of variation in migrant trans-state politics, a matter obscured by the current literature, preoccupied with the single case of the United States and a dehistoricized fixation on the “contemporary” period.

The Career of a Concept

The concept of “immigrant transnationalism” entered the literature through the work of anthropologists Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, who argued that the emergence of “transnational” social fields linking particular sending and destination countries represented a break with the past. Contrary to historical patterns and received social science notions, neither settlement nor the severing of home country ties was inevitable. In the contemporary age of migration, rather, “transmigrants …maintain, build, and reinforce multiple linkages with their countries of origins (Glick Schiller, et al, 1995:52),” thereby expanding the range of “home” to encompass both “here” and “there.”

So fundamental a change required entirely new concepts: “transnationalism” identified the social connections between receiving and sending countries; “transmigrants” denoted the people who forged and kept those ties alive (Glick Schiller, et al. 1992).

Though the new idea quickly caught on, conceptual disagreements soon emerged. One view emphasized transnationalism, a complex but fundamentally closed set of
relationships, so encompassing as to virtually erase the distinction between “here” and “there.” The influential formulation developed by Portes and his associates exemplifies this stance: for them, the “concept of transnationalism” is delimited “to occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contact over time across national borders for their implementation (Portes et al, 1999).” A different approach, emphasizing transnational *practices*, as opposed to a transnational condition of being, replaces the fine lines associated with “transnationalism” with a continuum: here, the regular, sustained trans-state practices underscored by Portes and his associates shade off into something more erratic and less intense (Levitt, 2001b).

Further difficulties arose in conceptualizing the cross-border activities that interact with migrants’ transnational engagements. One formulation contrasts the “transnationalism from above” of corporations and states with the “transnationalism from below” of international migrants (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). The severing of enterprise from its original, national base exemplifies the core of the transnational concept. Describing the actions of states as “transnational,” however, deprives the concept of analytic leverage, as it is meant to distinguish cross-border, non-state actors *from* states and show how the two constrain and shape one another. An alternative, identifying the linkage between sending states and their members on foreign soil as exemplifying the “deterriorialized nation-state,” stretches the definition of the state beyond meaning. States only legitimately possess the power of coercion within their own borders, and consular activities abroad depend on the acquiescence of hosts.

Additional conceptual permutations will surely arise. However, no disagreement exists regarding the relationship between “immigrant transnationalism” and receiving
states, largely because the matter has not been raised. Aware that immigrant dual
loyalties may produce allergic reactions among their “hosts,” scholars have sought to
calm such fears, noting that home country allegiances rarely persist to the second
generation, in which event “transnational activities” should be accepted as they “can
actually facilitate successful adaptation” (Portes, 1999: 472). While the advice may be
sensible, the absence of any concerted effort to analyze the relationship between
“immigrant transnationalism” and receiving states and civil society actors is a
fundamental omission.

**The politics of “here” and “there”:**

**Beyond nationalism – or particularism in long-distance form?**

With sympathizers, if not adherents, of the transnationalist view at the helm of
three scholarly journals (*Diaspora, Identities*, and *Global Networks*); an international
center on “transnational communities” based at Oxford University; and a legion of
supportive books, articles, and dissertations pouring out across the social sciences, the
transnationalist moment would seem to be now. One hesitates to be left standing in the
station when the train is so obviously departing. Still, perhaps there is time for a spirited
warning before everyone gets on board.

We agree that this new literature has drawn scholars’ attention to a salient aspect
of international migration. Alas, it has not delivered on its promise. *International*
phenomena *can* be distinguished from those that are *trans*national. As argued by
international relations scholars since the 1960s, the former pertains to relations *between*
states, the latter to institutions extending beyond and even encompassing states. But one simply has to invoke any of the many transnational institutions – whether the market, the Catholic Church, or the more recent networks of human rights activists – to see that transnational phenomena, properly speaking, have at best variable relevance to the migration cases at hand. It would be otherwise, were we talking about the last great age of migration, when no small proportion of the international movers understood themselves to be “workers of the world.” But at the turn of the 21st century, the best approximation of transnationalism of this sort is to be found among the “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair, 2001), still bound to its country of origin, but increasingly oriented toward the elimination of economic nationalism. By contrast, the political behavior described by scholars of contemporary immigrant “transnationalism” is altogether different, involving long-distance, trans-state affiliations of a particularist sort – a form of social action entirely distinguishable from trans-nationalism in any of its incarnations.

Were it just a matter of nomenclature, the matter could be resolved easily. Unfortunately, the literature conflates aspects of the phenomena intrinsically related to migration across nation-states with those that emerge under internal and international migration. Many of the most influential studies of “immigrant transnationalism” (Rouse, 1995; R. Smith, 2002; Levitt 2001a) actually examine the trans-state connections between particular places here and there -- localistic ties reappearing in similar form just about everywhere that long-distance migration occurs. For example, Midwestern migrants to California in the 1920s created state-based associations that picnicked, through the 1960s, in the same Los Angeles public parks where Guatemalan and Mexican
associations gather today. Similarly, the governors of Iowa made the trek to California to campaign among their “paisanos” long before the governors of the Mexican states of Zacatecas and Jalisco thought to do the same (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2003). Such affiliations and organizations based on distant hometowns result from the interaction between natives and strangers, and not necessarily the encounter between nationals and foreigners. Thus, discovering connections between “villages” or “communities” here and there hardly qualifies as transnational, as the same relationship reoccurs within almost any domestic or international migration.

To the extent that migrant bi-localism is a product of the migration experience, it represents a break with the experience of the stay-at-homes. Therefore, it also serves as a vehicle for innovation in the interaction between the migrants and their connections still at home making the use of holistic metaphors – like transnational community or village – inappropriate. Bi-localism can be a stage in the development of a broader set of identities, but not necessarily; often it works in the opposite direction, as the hometown association competes with other forms of organization that emphasize politics or ideology over affective ties. To survive, hometown associations have to unite right and left, believers and secularists, proletarians and entrepreneurs – which is why their anti-political bias is often so strong. Those conflicts also highlight a history of consistent contention over the precise nature of the homeland “community” to which loyalty is owed, suggesting that the literature’s conceptualization of “transnationalism” is largely reification.

Trans-state migrant social action: conditions, constraints, consequences
If the concept of transnationalism cannot cover the many discrete, opposing phenomena to which its scholarly advocates would have it refer, the proliferation of ties extending beyond the territory that states seek to enclose does merit close attention. These connections only violate those tenets of nationalist ideology that define normality as the conditions under which a nation is separate and distinct from the world found on its edges (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). While nationalist ideology and social science “theory” on the topic overlap – as unintentionally implied by Guarnizo et al. (2003: 6), who position themselves against a “theoretical perspective” that “expects immigrants to have a single identity, national allegiance, and representation in one national polity” - the analyst’s job is to take critical distance from the native theory of the world, not use it as the point of departure.

As noted, networks of information, goods, and services regularly extend beyond the limits of state institutions. The mass international migrations of the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries have entailed one-time return migration, repeat migration, and circular migration, as well as migration for settlement. Such flows leave large numbers of persons moving back and forth, not certain where to settle, let alone how much importance to place on the connections “here” versus “there”. Gradually, the networks that breach the nation-state society pull migrants away from home environments, encouraging settlement. The short- to medium-term horizons, however, may look different. As long as migration increases, so does the prevalence of cross-border ties, a factor affecting the dispositions of veteran migrants as well as the opportunities they confront.

Since our interests lie in the constitutive aspects of movement across borders, we emphasize that states make migrations international by bounding territories and defining
the nations they seek to enfold (Zolberg, 1999). Population movement across state
boundaries is inherently a political matter: it threatens to sever the alignment of territory,
political institutions, and society that states try so hard to create. From the standpoint of
the receiving states, international migrants are aliens, not just strangers. Their arrival
makes the relationship between nationals and foreigners a matter of domestic as well as
foreign policy. A similar situation holds on the sending side, as international migration
represents a two-fold threat to the sending state’s power. Exit weakens the “home” state’s
ability to cage and penetrate its population. Access to another territory and its greater
economic and ideological resources gives migrants newfound leverage to effect change at
home.

Migration represents both threat and opportunity for sending and receiving states
that negotiate bilateral agreements like the bracero program, which imported Mexicans
for work in the United States, or post-war European “guestworker” programs. Wanting
labor control and temporary migration without settlement, both sides collude to stifle
independent migrant action, which is why sending states can extend surveillance and
policing to the territory of the receiving state with the latter’s assent. However, even
officially invited “guests” come to stay. The same naturally applies to migrations that
take a more autonomous form. Once embedded, and at least partially freed from state
control, migrant networks create the potential for forms of trans-state social action, to
which others in host and home contexts then respond.

As states are membership organizations, with formal citizenship rules
conditioning the potential for participation in “host” and “home” contexts (Brubaker,
1992), migrant membership becomes an object of contestation on both ends of the chain.
Ethnic or migrant cross-border social action is therefore a “matter of state,” but societal influences invariably come into play, especially since the spheres of ethnocultural and formal membership only rarely coincide. National identity is relational, defined in contrast to alien and external states and people. However, international migrations take aliens from outside the state’s territory and bring them inside, either directly, as in the receiving states, or indirectly, via the networks that link persons in the home territory to associates in foreign places, as in the sending states. Alien persons or persons with alien connections are subject to suspicion. Their affiliations with foreign people and places put questions of belonging on the political agenda, leaving the legitimacy of migrant or ethnic trans-state social action under threat.

Loyalty to more than one state has historically elicited negative public reaction. In receiving countries, foreign origins or attachments impede acceptance and generate persistent perceptions of disloyalty. Even in the United States, where a civic conception of nationhood prevails, dominant group members view African-, Asian-, Hispanic- and Jewish-Americans as “open to divided loyalties and therefore less patriotic than ‘unhyphenated’ Americans” (Smith, 1994: 9). Though circumscribing, not preventing, homeland-oriented activities, such suspicions show that cross-state migrant or ethnic membership is not an individual attribute, but rather an accomplishment effected through interaction with a myriad of actors.

While the social organization of international migration variably sustains involvements both “here” and “there,” neither membership nor the means of maintaining ties on both sides are matters for migrants to decide on their own. International migrants may “see themselves as transnational, as persons with two homelands,” as noted
approvingly by Glick Schiller and Fouron (1990: 341). That view, however, is hardly binding on anyone else, as evidenced by the past century’s record of producing refugees without home or host, let alone persons without a state. States not only confer a migrant’s rights to life in the territory; they regulate contacts across borders. In totalitarian states, where emigration is tantamount to betrayal, the “regular and sustained” contacts between source and destination societies that supposedly distinguish “transnationals” from immigrants are not just out of the question, but imperil sending country residents whom the “transnationals” try to contact or help. Even liberal states control the travel of those over whom they have authority, limiting the scope for travel by immigrants whose “home” country stands in hostile relations to their “host.”

The relationship among states also affects the conditions under which international migrants and their descendants can pursue “homeland” interests. In general, a peaceful world encourages states to relax the security/solidarity nexus. International tension, let alone belligerence, provides the motivation to tighten up on those whose loyalties extend abroad (Armstrong, 1976). The specifics of the relationship between particular sending and receiving states matter even more. Homeland loyalties extending to allies or neutrals can be tolerated easily; those that link to less friendly, possibly hostile states are more likely to be suspect. Likewise, power differentials between sending and receiving states count. Migrant origins in a more powerful source raise questions about bona fides on both sides, as receiving and sending states have an interest in transforming migrant trans-state social actors into their agents.

While states have often wrongly suspected international migrants of “dual loyalty,” they have not always erred: immigrants have occasionally served as instruments
of some other authority “here” or “there”. That migrant cross-border social actors are
more likely to be opponents than servants of the home state does not necessarily please
receiving states concerned with international stability, the undermining of which is
precisely what migrant long-distance nationalism can sometimes entail (Weiner, 1993).
Moreover, migratory and ethnic connections crossing state borders also provide the
vehicle for diffusing conflicts from home country to host, adding international tensions to
social antagonisms of mainly domestic origin. And alongside the benign activities
emphasized by the literature, one has to note the more noxious record of those long-
distance migrant and ethnic nationalists who have repeatedly used the most unsavory
means.

That migrant and ethnic social action should take benevolent and malignant forms
is no accident. They both inherently derive from the stateness of the receiving
environment, which constrains the tentacles of the sending state, creating degrees of
freedom unknown before migration. Unfortunately, the scholars of immigrant
transnationalism have been too fond of the phenomenon they study to notice these
unpleasant aspects. Were it otherwise, they would surely not have veered so far toward
celebrating the phenomenon they purported to analyze, depicting “transnationalism” as
“subversive” and “transnationals” as grassroots actors challenging the hegemony of states
and global capitalism “from below” (Rogers et al, 2001). Alas, reality bites back, since
not all readers conclude that multiple, national loyalties are a good thing. The purported
prevalence of transnationalism give those already thinking that the national community is
under threat additional reason to worry and insist that boundaries get rolled back
(Huntington, 1997). Understandably, advocates of ethnic trans-state social action find
such allergic responses displeasing. However, those reactions fully belong to the phenomenon, to be ignored only at the price of implicating oneself in a subject of which one should uniquely be a student. By limiting the ‘transnational’ field of study to the generally pacific activities of groups whose cause may appear noble or innocuous, scholars obscure the conditions that foster or limit the full range of long distance nationalisms in both receiving and sending contexts.

**Beyond the “here” and “now:” the case for comparison**

To reprise, we are not rejecting “transnationalism” to revert to the so-called orthodox “theories” with which this literature is actually twinned. On the contrary, the phenomenon deserves serious scholarly attention, but only when redefined as the collision of the social organization of migration, and its state-spanning results, with reactive efforts by state and civil actors to produce state-society alignment. These interactions involve a multiplicity of actors coming together in a broad range of combinations and variety of circumstances.

However, the very limited sample of cases thus far considered, not the nature of the data collected, makes it hard to assess the range of possibilities. In theory, the literature’s reliance on case studies is irrelevant. The investigator can draw on such strategies as the negative, deviant, or critical case study to build in information from a much larger sample and thereby draw reliable inferences based on intensive study of just one case. Similarly, results from sample surveys are generalizable to the populations from which the surveys are drawn, but no further, unless the unstudied populations are instances of the same or similar case. The paper by Guarnizo et al. (2003) surely
represents an advance in its systematic comparison of a set of cross-border political activities among three immigrant populations. Yet contemporary international migrations to the United States from small, weak countries on the U.S. periphery capture but a limited portion of the phenomenon in question. To illuminate its full range and gain purchase on the broader set of variables in play, one needs to extend the range of cases. This is the task we now pursue, though in purely illustrative fashion, given this paper’s limited scope.³

**Temporal comparisons:**

From the outset, the literature on “immigrant transnationalism” insisted that the contemporary experience represented a decisive break with the past. Historians immediately dissented, but the argument for discontinuity proved hard to abandon. For example, Portes and his associates first argued that the case for studying transnationalism rested on the very novelty of the phenomenon itself (1999), but later, noting the historical precedents, sought to rescue the concept by invoking the “fallacy of adumbration.” Conceding that the phenomenon was not new, they found that transnationalism illuminated previously unnoticed parallels linking “contemporary events with similar ones in the past (Portes, 2002: 184),” and therefore concluded that the concept yielded significant added value.

While agreeing that the phenomenon can be old hat, even as the concept does “new analytical work (R. Smith, forthcoming: 1),” scholars of immigrant transnationalism (Levitt, 2001a; Guarnizo, 2001; R. Smith, 2002; Foner, 2000; Glick Schiller, 1999) still insist that the present significantly diverges from the past:
• technological change has reduced the costs and time entailed in communication and travel;
• the shift from melting pot to multiculturalism has legitimated the expression of and organization around home country loyalties;
• the nationalization of home country societies has increased the salience of the national identities with which immigrants arrived;
• the advent of a new international human rights regime (labeled “post-nationalism”) has diminished the difference between “nationals” and “foreigners” by circumscribing the power of receiving states.

Few have taken issue with these conclusions, with Morawska’s the most notable dissent. Noting that nothing is ever quite the same, she argued that the “lifeworlds and diaspora politics of turn-of-the-century immigrants share many of the supposedly novel features of present-day transnationalism (2001: 178).”

These well-taken criticisms still leave fundamental difficulties unsaid, beginning with the insistence on a qualitative distinction between an ill-defined and unperiodized “now” and “then”. Claiming discontinuity, the students of immigrant transnationalism have effectively dehistoricized the present. They have also reproduced the familiar antinomies of social science, most notably that of a “closed” past and “open” present (Amselle, 2002), which is why the students of globalization, immigrant “transnationalism,” and “transnational relations” all end up with the same “discovery” – that it happened before and in surprisingly similar ways.

More importantly, the students of immigrant transnationalism have not confronted the alternative hypothesis advanced by Arendt (1951) a half century ago. Due to the
global spread of the state system and the nation-state society, the condition of having no home – not two homes – is what distinguishes “now” from “then”. Since World War I, states would rather “lose…citizens than harbor people with different views (278).” As the world has been completely organized into states, persons who lose a polity find “themselves thrown out of the family of nations altogether (294).” The Arendtian and turn of the 21st century worlds may not be identical. However, the presence of 20 million refugees worldwide, large populations of illegal immigrants with limited rights even in liberal democracies, and continued resistance to claims for asylum (UNHCR, 2000), suggests far greater resemblance than scholars of immigrant transnationalism maintain. In the long view, the rise of massive state apparatuses controlling population movements between states represents the most striking development.

Moreover, contingency should be put back into the flow of history, implying that the current state of affairs is not inevitable, but rather is subject to unpredictable pressures of the sort that burst earlier eras of global interconnection asunder. The technological determinism asserted by the proponents of immigrant “transnationalism” deserves second thought. Earlier, the simple letter knitted together trans-oceanic migration networks with remarkable effectiveness. Moreover, a political environment supportive of immigrant and ethnic long-distance nationalism should hardly be taken for granted. If responsibility for modestly relaxing the distinction between nationals and foreigners lies with domestic political actors, and not new international norms or an international human rights regime (Joppke, 1998), then domestic actors can also produce movement in the other direction. Likewise, the legitimacy currently accorded expression of homeland loyalties is better understood as a product of the moment, not a permanent feature of advanced
democracies. Given that migrants’ trans-state particularism may conflict with the liberal universalism of groups supporting immigrant rights, and migrants remain susceptible to dual loyalty claims associated with restrictive conceptions of the national community, a scaling back is always possible.

Consequently, the analytic task can proceed neither through the construction of categorical oppositions, nor the search for parallels between “now” and “then”. Rather, one should focus on temporal variation in the political constellations shaping the environment for trans-state ethnic and migrant social action, and the sources of that change. We identify two axes of variation around which structured historical comparisons can be pursued, one relating to a characteristic of the migrants, the second to characteristics of the inter-state system.

The migrants:

The trans-state particularism described as “immigrant transnationalism” presumes migrants, coming from nationalized societies where identity is defined by contrast to alien peoples and lands. However, the presence of trans-state social connections may not imply “long-distance nationalism.” The peasant migrants of the turn of the 20th century engaged in circular or recurrent migration and clustered in jobs and neighborhoods alongside their fellow homeowners, whom they joined in more formal associations. But as they also came from a set of folk societies not yet nationalized, they lacked the common traits and corporate sense that nation-building processes impart. Consequently, the literature (e.g., Foner, 2000: 173) engages in anachronism, when insisting that
persons not yet knowing that they were Italians or Poles, but intensely loyal to this hometown and not its neighbor, were nonetheless the “quintessential transnational(s).”

Abandoning the game of determining who is really what, we find utility in emphasizing the relationship between the prior experience of nationalization and the forms of trans-state social action that migrants pursue in the new setting. Compared to their turn of the 20th century counterparts, the migrants of the turn of the 21st century are generally more likely to come from nationalized societies in which internal differences have been diminished. Consequently, they arrive with loyalties extending considerably beyond the local level, making the national the more likely basis for mobilization and aggregation.

However, some contemporary migrants come from weakly or only partially nationalized societies, yielding greater similarity to the newcomers of the last era of mass migration than usually acknowledged. The closest parallel involves migratory trade diasporas from Africa implanted throughout Europe and North America (Stoller 2002. They fully comply with Portes’ strictures that transnationalism entail regular and recurrent trans-state contacts. Among these groupings, however, the national impulse has yet to take root; regional or religious attachments override those of nationality. On the other hand, because many post-colonial states are often arbitrarily-assembled collections of multi-ethnic peoples, the state-seeking nationalisms that powerfully affected the migrants of the turn of the 20th century remain important today.

*Inter-state relations:*
The condition of inter-state relations affects the ability to maintain national loyalties of a dualistic type. Advantage flows to state-seeking nationalists in the diaspora when their goals overlap with those of host country social actors or authorities. The bounds of acceptable, trans-state social action are easily crossed, however. Diaspora-induced conflict between host and home country authorities is often unwelcome, yielding host country decisions to curtail migrants’ political activities oriented towards the homeland.

Though relational -- defining whom we are by contrast to those whom we are not -- the constraints of national identity are variable. In peacetime, immigrants (and their descendants) can maintain identities that might seem mutually exclusive. The advent of war often forecloses those options. One can try to profess allegiance to two mutually belligerent states, but with difficulty, as no one is more threatening than the detested and feared Other located within the boundaries of one's own state. Moreover, the popular nature of modern wars threatens to transform immigrants from enemy foreign countries into internal foreign enemies.

Consideration of the experience in the United States shows that that war does not yield a single, deterministic effect. World War I prompted the forced assimilation and destruction of German-America. As the total war of the 1941-5 era demanded the mobilization of all Americans, its ideological goals conflicted with the reality of ethnic discrimination, accelerating the integration of the southern and eastern European origin groups. In somewhat similar, though paradoxical fashion, the same international constellation that spelled disaster for the Japanese Americans benefited Chinese Americans, who not only saw the (admittedly symbolic) lifting of the Chinese Exclusion
Act, but also were allowed to mobilize on behalf of precisely the homeland that America
had previously despised. Nonetheless, solidarity with co-ethnics abroad caused constant
suspicion in official circles. When push came to shove, the demands for U.S. national
solidarity over-rode concerns for ethnic solidarity, as indicated by the behavior of
American Jews, whose beleaguered co-ethnics in Europe begged that their American
cousins shake “the earth...to its foundations [so that]...the world be aroused (Karski:
1944: 327-8),” but to no avail.

The ideological nature of international relations rendered immigrants vulnerable
on grounds not just of alien origins, but also alien, “un-American” ideas. With the Cold
War, adherence to communism barred one from naturalization, and deportation was
employed to help destroy the left. Though virtually no one’s loyalty was then beyond
suspicion, groups with a vouchsafed status as enemies of the United States’ enemies had
a green light to openly express old world ties and allegiances, as in the case of the so-
called “captive nations” behind the Iron Curtain. However, one had to be careful about
one’s choice of enemies, since former foes sometimes became friends. In the 1950s,
American Jews were unhappy about American aid to Germany, not to speak of its
rearming and the return of countless ex-Nazis to positions of prominence, but they knew
enough to keep quiet. In the late 1960s, by contrast, because the campaign to “release”
Jews from the Soviet Union positioned American Jews as the enemies of their country’s
enemy, they could ignore opposition from the highest U.S. political levels without
running the risk of raising the dual loyalty flag.

The contemporary era of mass migration belongs to a different world, or so it
appeared until just recently. While new technologies may facilitate trans-state ties, they
were seen as embedded in a more pacific world order, in which national allegiances have once again been allowed to overlap, as opposed to the mutual exclusivity expected for most of the short 20th century. Not all groups are equally lucky in this respect. Immigrants from countries with unfriendly relationships to the United States run the risk of falling into the “enemy alien” trap. That long-distance nationalism in all of its forms (including that of the time-honored ethnic lobby) does not come so easily to Arab Americans shows that the exception proves the rule: when loyalty is in question, long-distance nationalism is a hazardous game.

Just how the sudden inflection of international tension in the early 21st century will affect the pursuit of immigrant and ethnic homeland loyalties is anyone’s guess. But the lessons of history indicate that perception of external threat builds support for a more restrictive view of the national community. Past experience also shows that the American state has the capacity to monitor, control, and restrict the trans-state social action of international migrants and their descendants; whether and to what extent that capacity will be activated is a matter to which scholars of immigrant “transnationalism” will surely want to attend.

**International comparisons:**

The international dimension of migration is under-appreciated by U.S. scholars. Allowing national borders to define the field of study, they have obscured the nation-building/maintaining aspect of responses to international migration by focusing their
interest on the variation within their sample of one. Just a modest expansion of the sample highlights dynamics one would otherwise not see.

Extending the focus cross-nationally lets one examine the possible effects of variations in political culture – in this case, national membership rules – and assess whether and how they affect the options for maintaining allegiances “here” as well as “there.” The best vehicle for analysis entails within group comparisons across different national incorporation systems. As an example, consider the options for maintaining dual loyalties among migrants and their descendants under two sets of ethnocultural systems – namely, the Jews who moved to the pluralistic system of the United States versus those who settled in the unitary system of France.

Cross-border social action was a salient aspect of the ethnic experience on both sides of the Atlantic, but took very different forms. The strong form of assimilation à la française made Zionism taboo in official, organized circles up through World War II. However, that same system proved perfectly compatible with a less politicized form of Jewish cross-border ethnic action – the Alliance Israélite Universelle – which transmitted French cultural ideals as well as schools and related services under strictly Jewish auspices to a strictly Jewish clientele. In contrast, organized American Jewry as well as rank and file Jews proved highly responsive to Zionism’s appeal, before and after the establishment of the state of Israel. While American Jews have since come to comprise the classic ethnic lobby, in France the ethnic lobby appears as a foreign import from the United States, making similar activities by their French cousins far more constrained.

Further insight is gained by assessing the implications of differences in political structure, loosely controlling for political culture. Focusing on ethnoculturally plural
systems -- the United States, Canada, and Australia -- highlights the relevance of the former’s political fragmentation. The loose coupling of U.S. politics at federal, state, and local levels often contains the politics of long-distance nationalism to local or state levels, without ramifying nationally. Consequently, fragmentation averts the outcome most likely to increase the possibility of a negative ethnocultural reaction based on the premise that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” On the other hand, the relatively fragmented nature of U.S. federal politics motivates ethnic lobbying, as it does all other forms of interest group politics, none of which would be as potent were the national polity organized as a unitary regime. Thus, even within similarly pluralistic ethnocultural systems, the greater pluralism of the United States’ political structure facilitates the legitimate mobilization of immigrant and ethnic trans-state social action.

**Conclusion**

International migrants usually have good reason to leave home, but once abroad, they are often motivated to sustain a connection to the town, region, or “nation” left behind. Members of the nation-state societies to which the migrants have moved, however, frequently find these displays of concern and affection disconcerting. It is not simply that the migrants are failing to detach themselves from their old worlds – as social science wisdom and popular belief prescribe. In a world of mutually exclusive nation-states, rather, persons with foreign attachments are open to question, and all the more so when the relevant nation-states co-exist on less than friendly terms.

Historically-oriented scholars will remind us that there is no news here, though no one wants to fall into the trap of saying *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.* The
problem is that the professional students of international migration and ethnicity have not broken with the everyday assumptions of the world in which they live, agreeing that the bounds of “society” and the “nation-state” normally converge. Conceptualizing the process as “immigration” – one in which people move for the purposes of settlement – they contend that attachments to the home left behind are imports that inevitably fade, as immigrants and their descendants gradually assimilate into a “mainstream” whose social ties are bounded at the water’s edge.

To the students of immigrant transnationalism goes the great credit of seeing that connections between “here” and “there” are an inherent and enduring component of the long-distance migrations of the modern world. While implicitly rejecting the view that social relations should be contained within the boundaries of a state, however, the students of immigrant transnationalism have unfortunately forgotten about the processes that produce a container society – whether driven by states’ efforts to bound the societies they enclose, or more informal, ethnocultural membership practices that aspire to the same goal. Therefore, the better view lies beyond the simplistic dichotomy of assimilation versus transnationalism, as these are not theories but rather social processes, inextricably intertwined. It is just such a perspective, emphasizing the *regularity* of international migration and its inevitable collision with the mechanisms by which nation-states attempt to keep themselves apart from the world, that we have tried to develop in these pages.
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1 Smith and Guarnizo provide the exception that proves the rule. While noting that “agents of ‘receiving states’ remain relevant actors (1998:9),” they only devote a paragraph to the matter. We have found only one scholar who pursues the matter further (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001a, 2001b) and none who focuses on the United States, otherwise the main topic of attention.

2 For the Oxford program, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council from 1997-2003, see [http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk](http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk), including a list of 62 working papers and a Routledge book series, with eleven titles, as of this writing.

3 For full referencing of the historical and comparative material, as well as extended discussion, see Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2003.