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Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America

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Authors
Collier, RB
Collier, D

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SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA

Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier

The second printing of Shaping the Political Arena (Notre Dame University Press, 2002) can readily be bought from any bookseller.

Excerpts included in this file are only a small portion of the text, and readers are encouraged to purchase the complete book.

This file includes the Preface to the 2002 edition by Guillermo O'Donnell; Authors' Note; Overview and Introduction; Introductions to Chapters 3 to 7; and Conclusion, Glossary, Bibliography, and Index.
## Contents

*Preface to the 2002 Edition*  
Guillermo O’Donnell  
ix  

*Authors’ Note to the 2002 Edition*  

*Figures and Tables*  

*Acknowledgments*  

### OVERVIEW

I. Introduction  
1. FRAMEWORK: Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies  
2. CONTEXT: The Labor Movement and the State in Latin America  

II. Cleavage  
3. LABOR: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest  
4. STATE: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination  

III. Critical Juncture  
5. INCORPORATION: Recasting State-Labor Relations  
   *Brazil and Chile: Depoliticization and Control*  
   *Mexico and Venezuela: Radical Populism*  
   *Uruguay and Colombia: Electoral Mobilization by a Traditional Party*  
   *Peru and Argentina: Labor Populism*  

IV. Legacy  
6. AFTERMATH: Reaction to Incorporation and Postincorporation Dynamics  
   *Brazil and Chile: Aborted Populism*  
   *Mexico and Venezuela: Transformation of the Majority Coalition*  
   *Uruguay and Colombia: Reinforcing Traditional Two-Party Systems*  
   *Peru and Argentina: “Difficult” and “Impossible” Games*
Preface to the 2002 Edition

Guillermo O'Donnell

The University of Notre Dame Press should be congratulated for its decision to reissue this remarkable book. *Shaping the Political Arena* follows the best Weberian tradition of historical political sociology, in several senses.

In one of these senses, which will be immediately obvious to the reader, this book displays encyclopedic knowledge and the skillful utilization of a huge and varied literature.

In a second sense, the Colliers have a broad—macro—and very important question: What were the patterns, and the consequences, of the incorporation of labor (basically, urban labor) into the national arenas of politics of Latin America? The authors trace these consequences in relation both to labor and, no less importantly, to the overall characteristics of the political regimes and more generally of the societies that emerged during and after (and, as they show, partly as a result of) the political incorporation of labor in Latin America.

In a third sense, as Weber did, this book uses a rather wide array of causal factors without reducing its explanations to any of them. Yet this is not intellectually undisciplined eclecticism: these factors are carefully sorted out and assessed in each case and across cases.

Fourth, and related to the preceding remark, I found it particularly pleasurable, as I did in Weber's *Economy and Society*, to "watch" the authors of *Shaping the Political Arena* move in each step of their analysis with clear—and explicit—self-consciousness of their methodology. In many passages of their book, the Colliers do us the important service of pointing out what they believe are the scope, the possible robustness, and the likely limitations of their findings and arguments. In fact, I have found this methodological self-consciousness extremely useful both for my own work and for my teaching—it is nice, and indeed helpful, to watch very good minds carefully telling us about the rationale of the conceptual and empirical steps they are taking.

Fifth, because the Colliers have a theoretical framework backed by impressive research, they come out with a series of hypotheses and con-

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1 Always mindful of the need to offer clear definitions, the authors consider incorporation as the “first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement” [p. 161].
clusions that add enormously to our knowledge not only of labor but also of political processes—broadly understood—in Latin America.

A book of this scope and complexity invites various uses and readings. Mine, as implied above, is that of the study of a complex collective actor by means of a theoretical framework that moves both through time (tracing the history of the respective labor movements in eight countries) and by means of “horizontal” comparisons. The main comparisons are of cases that are paired by means of similarities in certain factors that the theory indicates as particularly relevant. Some of these pairings are counterintuitive, and certainly they would not have been generated had the questions posed been different from the ones of this book; for example, it took me some time and several discussions with the authors until I fully understood—and agreed with—the pairing of two cases, Brazil and Chile, that in many other respects are very different, as the Colliers themselves emphasize. Here, as usual in these procedures, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: as the reader will notice, these pairings highlight important elusions that add enormously to our knowledge not only of labor but also of political processes—broadly understood—in Latin America.

For the study of these critical junctures, the comparisons, now in terms of paired cases, are very helpful. As the authors persuasively show, in Latin America there were at least four patterns of labor incorporation: [1] the radical populism of Mexico and Venezuela; [2] the labor populism of Argentina and Peru; [3] the electoral mobilization (of labor) by a traditional party of Uruguay and Colombia; and [4] the pattern that at least in the initial period was more exclusionary, involving the depolitization and control effected in Brazil and Chile.2 The Colliers further show, by going back to the history of each case and then returning to the four paired comparisons, that each mode of incorporation generated its own “legacy,” disaggregated into the more or less immediate reactions to labor incorporation (the “aftermath”) and its longer term “inheritage.” As they argue, and highlight in the title of their book, this flow of events has significantly contributed to “shaping the political arena” of these eight countries (which as a set contain a very large proportion of the Latin American population and territory). The incorporation of the working class into the national political arena—however precarious, subordinated, and controlled it was in most cases, and notwithstanding the reactions, sometimes repressive, it provoked—deeply influenced the politics and, indeed, the whole of society in these countries.3 Even with its limitations—closely mapped in this book—this incorporation meant the end of oligarchic domination and of a predominantly agrarian society in these countries.

As this book makes clear in the reflections it includes under the heading of “Heritage,” these events did not lead directly to democracy [rather, in some of these countries, they led to nasty authoritarian reactions]. Consequently, among many other valuable contributions, this book shows that in Latin America the paths to democracy have been quite different from those traversed by the highly developed capitalist countries. The historical specificity of the Latin American paths to democracy is a topic that still needs much research. It is an important topic, both in its own right and because it should be a major explanatory factor of the characteristics—and failings—of contemporary democracy in this region. This is not the main focus of this book. Yet, as Weber did with his work, the present study illuminates and opens up areas of inquiry that are not central to its purpose, furnishes knowledge that is extremely relevant to those

2 I use, in italics, the terms used by the authors.
3 The authors summarize nicely their approach when they point out that their work “builds upon an analysis of the dialectical interplay between labor control and labor mobilization” (p. 745).
Writing this preface in 2002, I cannot avoid an additional note. In Latin America, the social actor this book traces—the working class, especially its urban segment—never achieved full political incorporation, understanding by this a broadly accepted and properly represented location in the circuits of political, economic, and social power. Furthermore, in most of our countries, the ravages of economic and social crises and policies, under both authoritarian and democratic rule, have significantly diminished the absolute and relative weight of the working class. Still, it is very hard to imagine a democratic future (other than a rather perversely updated version of oligarchic rule) without a vigorous presence of the working class in what this book calls "the political arena." Whether this kind of presence is still possible, and in what ways, is a major question for the answer to which this study, beyond its great intrinsic interest, provides indispensable historical, theoretical, and methodological background.

Authors' Note to the 2002 Edition

THE YEARS since the initial publication of Shaping the Political Arena have seen major changes both in the larger scholarly literature in which this study is embedded and also in Latin American politics—the topic of the book.1 Shaping the Political Arena has been part of a lively, expanding research program of comparative-historical analysis. This program builds on evolving conceptions of critical junctures, path dependence, and historical institutionalism. Its methodological tools are, in important measure, those of small-N analysis and controlled comparison. Among the many substantive themes that have been analyzed in this tradition, the study of national political regimes has had a central place.2 In the intervening years, it has also become more evident that Latin American politics is, indeed, experiencing the new critical juncture we discussed at the end of the last chapter. The class coalitions, party systems, and resulting regime dynamics that were our central focus have in important respects been destabilized. In some countries, they have been superseded entirely.

For this new printing of the book, we have not undertaken the Herculean task of updating the text to respond either to the evolving literature in comparative-historical analysis or to recent developments in Latin American politics. In this Authors' Note we would, however, like to offer some brief comments about the book's central claims. This study was conceived and initially written (if not finally published) when political-economic and dependency perspectives were influential in research on Latin America. Our purpose was to offer an alternative approach that put greater weight on social and political factors. Specifically, the book analyzes the critical juncture during which organized labor was initially incorporated into the political and legal system. The goal was to explore the impact of party systems on regime dynamics, where the party system is understood as the political institutionalization of class coalitions. These new coalitions were integrally linked to changes in social structure: the

1 We thank the University of Notre Dame Press for its efforts in reissuing this book, as well as the Kellogg Institute of International Studies at Notre Dame for its support of this initiative.

2 See James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

As the authors properly note, "Obviously, the argument is not that labor politics and state-labor relations can, by themselves, explain broader patterns of change. Rather, the focus on these issues provides an optic through which a larger panorama of change can be assessed and, in part, explained" (p. 745, italics added).
formation of two “new” classes and the move from, schematically, a two­class society of lord and peasant to a four-class society that also included a proletarian working class and the urban middle sectors. Long books often have the disadvantage of provoking simplistic take­home messages with which they become identified. In the case of Shaping the Political Arena, these have included: “labor incorporation matters” and “critical junctures are important.” Indeed, the proposition that the initial incorporation of the labor movement is a critical juncture that matters is central to our argument. But how does it matter? And for what?

Labor incorporation occurs in diverse ways, producing distinctive patterns of reaction and counterreaction. These differences are consequential for subsequent party structure and regime dynamics: for whether, during the period of new opposition movements and political and economic crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, politics was integrative or polarizing; for whether countries established, or failed to establish, political institutions and resources that helped to meet the political and economic challenges of this period; and for whether, in the end, these political systems self-destructed during those decades. The crucial intervening variable is the party system.

Three key steps in the argument are as follows.3

- **Class Coalitions in the Incorporation Period.** The critical juncture of initial labor incorporation centrally involves the construction of new class coalitions that take two basic forms. In some cases an accommodationist alliance produces a modus vivendi among the upper classes and pits them against the lower classes in a sustained effort to control and depoliticize labor organizations (with the peasants initially, though unreliably, attached to agrarian elites through clientelistic ties). In other cases a populist alliance links the organized working class (and sometimes the organized peasantry) with the middle sectors, a pattern accompanied by diverse forms of worker mobilization.

- **Party Heritage.** The incorporation period is followed by intense reactions and counter-reactions that fundamentally transform the balance between political mobilization and control that the state had sought to establish in the prior phase. New coalitional relationships emerge, building on key aspects of coalitional patterns from the incorporation period. These new relationships then crystallize in the party system, through which they are institutionalized in the political arena, creating patterns we call the party heritage of incorporation. We typologize the divergent forms of this heritage in light of the political and coalitional location of the organized working class and labor-based parties, including crucially their relationship to a centrist majority electoral bloc (Figure 7.2, p. 504).

- **Regime Dynamics.** In the final step of the argument, these party systems structure distinctive processes of accommodation and conflict, producing integrative versus conflictual political dynamics. These ultimately influence the political capacity to avoid, rather than succumb to, bureaucratic-authoritarian coups.

Looking beyond these steps in the argument, it merits emphasis that we explicitly viewed the trajectories of change explored in this book—which encompass much of twentieth-century Latin American politics—as a delimited historical episode, centered on the transition to a “modern” social structure and the emergence of mass politics. At the end of the book we speculated about a new critical juncture in the current period. Today it is even clearer that with the rise of neoliberalism in national economic policies, the partial eclipse of union power, and the uncertain emergence of alternative popular sector actors, among many other transformations, Latin America is in the midst of fundamental political change.

As was the case with the previous critical juncture, this new episode involves a basic alteration of the relationships among class structure, party systems, and regime dynamics. Though this process will have common features across a number of countries, it will be variegated in its content and timing and in the trajectories of change that emerge in the political arena. Reactions and counterreactions growing out of the earlier party heritage will contribute to shaping these divergent trajectories in this new era.

This brief commentary is not the proper place to launch an analysis of these processes. However, we would like to conclude by observing that the conceptual and methodological tools of comparative-historical research, noted above, will prove valuable in ongoing efforts to undertake such an analysis. Very crucially, these tools strengthen the analyst’s capacity to evaluate continuity and change in terms of carefully conceptualized variables, as well as to assess short-term and long-term explanations for emerging patterns of change.

Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier
Berkeley, May 2002

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3 The timing of each step in the argument for each country is explained in detail in the main text, and many key terms and distinctions are defined in the glossary.
Overview

In the course of capitalist development in Latin America, one of the fundamental political transitions has been the emergence of worker protest and an organized labor movement, along with the varied responses of the state to this new actor within society. During a relatively well-defined period in most countries, a historic change took place in the relationship between the state and the working class. An earlier pattern—in which repression was generally a far more central feature of the state response to worker organization and protest—gave way to state policies that launched the “initial incorporation” of the labor movement. State control of the working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police or the army but rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and institutionalization of a labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state. In addition, actors within the state began to explore far more extensively the possibility of mobilizing workers as a major political constituency.

The terms on which the labor movement was initially incorporated differed greatly within Latin America. In some countries the policies of the incorporation period aimed primarily at establishing new mechanisms of state control. In other cases the concern with control was combined with a major effort to cultivate labor support, encompassing a central role of a political party—or a political movement that later became a party—and sometimes producing dramatic episodes of worker mobilization. The alternative strategies of control and mobilization produced contrasting reactions and counter-reactions, generating different modes of conflict and accommodation that laid the foundation for contrasting political legacies.

The analysis of these distinct patterns of conflict and accommodation offers new insight into important contrasts among countries such as: whether a cohesive, integrative political center was formed or more polarized politics emerged; whether and how party systems came to channel social conflict; and, more specifically, why in some countries the electoral and trade-union arenas came to be dominated by parties of the center, whereas elsewhere parties of the left came to play a far greater role. The analysis sheds light on alternative patterns of sectoral and class coalitions, distinct modes of centrifugal and centripetal political competition, and contrasting patterns of stability and conflict. It also helps explain whether countries followed a democratic or authoritarian path through the period of new opposition movements and economic and political crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

The emergence of different forms of control and mobilization during the initial incorporation periods, along with their varied legacies, is the focus of this book. The study is based on a comparative-historical analysis of the eight countries with the longest history of urban commercial and industrial
development in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

It bears emphasis that single-country monographs and historical studies focused on each of these eight countries have commonly asserted that the years we identify as the initial incorporation periods were historical watersheds that had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of politics. Yet these analyses, focusing as they do on individual countries, not surprisingly have lacked consistent criteria for identifying and comparing the incorporation periods, as well as for carrying out a comparative assessment of their legacies. The goal of this book is to provide a framework for this comparison and to offer a methodological and analytic basis for assessing the causal impact of the incorporation periods on the national political regime.

In focusing on the state’s role in shaping the labor movement and on the reactions and counterreactions at the level of national politics produced by these state initiatives, we do not intend to suggest that workers and labor leaders did not themselves play a major role in constituting labor movements. Their role has been amply documented, and at various points it plays an important part in the present analysis. However, our primary attention centers at a different level: the repercussions for the larger evolution of national politics of alternative state strategies for dealing with the labor movement. At this level of analysis, one can identify fundamentally contrasting trajectories of change that merit sustained attention in their own right.

In that the book seeks to trace out these contrasting trajectories of national political change, we see this study as part of the ongoing quest in the Latin American field over the past 30 years to explain the different paths of national development found within the region. In this context, our analysis is


2 Chapter 3 focuses on the early history of the labor movement from the perspective of worker organization and worker protest. In the analysis of the incorporation periods in Chapter 4, the discussion of the goals of actors within the state who initiate incorporation—the “project from above”—is juxtaposed with a discussion of the goals of the leading sectors of the labor movement, the “project from below.”


4 The procedure was proposed by George and McKeown (1985:344). It is similar to the procedure of “discerning” earlier advocated by Barton and Lazarsfeld (1969) and of “pattern matching” advocated by Campbell (1975).
The Historical Argument

In the first decades of the 20th century, the relationship between the state and the labor movement changed fundamentally. Prior to that time, state policy commonly involved extensive repression of working class organization and protest, repression that on many occasions resulted in the death of dozens or even hundreds of workers. This earlier era saw occasional ad hoc state cooperation with labor groups in sectors too important economically or politically to permit their continual repression, as well as occasional state efforts to mobilize the support of workers. Nonetheless, the labor movement was dealt with in important measure coercively—by the police or the army.

During a well-defined period in each country, this relationship was altered. In general, some use of repression continued, but control was to a greater degree accomplished through the legalization and institutionalization of certain types of labor organization. Unions became legitimate actors within these societies. In conjunction with the unions' more legitimate role, political leaders also began to pursue far more extensively than before the option of mobilizing workers as a base of political support.

This change to new modes of state-labor relations—from repression to institutionalization, from exclusion to incorporation—generally took place in the context of a larger set of political transformations also occurring in the early decades of this century. These included a decline in the political dominance of older oligarchic groups and the assumption of power by newer elites drawn in part from the "middle sectors," whose social, economic, and political importance was increasing rapidly with the sustained economic expansion and the growing importance of the urban commercial and manufacturing sector during this period. Reformist elements that emerged from the more traditional elite also played a significant role in this period of change. The new political leadership promoted a transition from a laissez-faire state to a more interventionist state, a change signaled by the promulgation of new "social constitutions." The state came increasingly to assume new social, welfare, and economic responsibilities involving above all the modern sector of the economy, but in a few cases also encompassing a restructuring of work and property relations within the traditional rural sector.

The incorporation of the labor movement was typically high on this agenda of change, though its timing varied among countries. In conjunction with the new social and welfare responsibilities, the state introduced new legislation regulating such things as working conditions, minimum wage, and social security. With the new economic responsibilities, the state began to establish a regularized system of labor relations, assuming a role as mediator of class conflict and arbiter of labor-management disputes. Actors within the state established regularized, legal channels of labor relations and made some concessions to correct the worst abuses of the working class, thereby seeking to take the labor question out of the streets and away from the police or army and bring it into the realm of law by providing mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. The goal, in the terms in which it was commonly conceived, was to "harmonize the interests of labor and capital." These changes were accompanied by the introduction of corporatism as a new set of structures for the vertical integration of society. Corporatism in Latin America thus involved the legalization and institutionalization of an organized labor movement, but one that was shaped and controlled by the state.

This, then, is the historical commonality of these countries. In the course of capitalist modernization, two broad new sectors produced by modernization, the working class and the middle sectors, began to be integrated into the polity in more subordinate and more dominant positions, respectively, within the framework of an important redefinition of the role of the state in society.

The argument of this book is that within the framework of this historical commonality, there were fundamental political differences in how this process of labor incorporation occurred. In most cases the result was ultimately the creation of an organized labor movement and system of industrial relations in important measure controlled and regulated by the state. Yet this occurred in very different ways. Correspondingly, the larger political legacy of these earlier periods differs fundamentally among countries. To introduce these differences, it is necessary to discuss further the incorporation periods themselves.

Types of Incorporation Periods. We define the initial incorporation of the labor movement as the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. During the incorporation periods, institutionalized channels for resolving labor conflicts were created in order to supersede the ad hoc use of repression characteristic of earlier periods of state-labor relations, and the state came to assume a major role in institutionalizing a new system of class bargaining.

The analysis of initial incorporation revolves around two arguments. First, this fundamental change in state-labor relations occurred in relatively well-defined policy periods. These periods correspond to historical experiences as chronologically diverse as the Batlle era in the first decade and a half of the 20th century in Uruguay, the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution in the years following the 1917 constitution, the Vargas administration in Brazil beginning in 1930, and the Perón era in Argentina beginning in the 1940s. In most but not all cases, these incorporation periods coincided with the larger period of political reform and expansion of the role of the state discussed.
played a role in both types of incorporation. The key question is whether, in addition, a
opposition to politicization in favor of this party or movement. For a further discussion of
these distinctions, see Chapter 5.

Two sequences of change may initially be identified. In cases of state incorporation, the incorporation project was principally concerned with state control of the labor movement and was implemented under an authoritarian regime. Correspondingly, the initial regime breakdown brought with it a process of democratization. In the cases of party incorporation, the incorporation period promoted progressive social policies and the political mobilization of the working class, and the regime under which incorporation occurred was in most cases more democratic and competitive. Here the incorporation period triggered a strong conservative reaction, which in most cases ultimately led to a coup and a period of authoritarian rule, followed

Legacy of Incorporation. The distinct types of incorporation had a fundamental impact on the subsequent evolution of national politics. In all eight countries the incorporation experience produced a strong political reaction, and in most countries this reaction culminated in the breakdown of the national political regime under which the incorporation policies had been implemented. In the face of this reaction and of the counterreaction it often produced, the ultimate legacy of incorporation commonly entailed outcomes quite divergent from the goals of the leaders of the original incorporation period. To understand these outcomes, one must examine closely these reactions and subsequent counterreactions. We will refer to the period of reactions and counterreactions as the “aftermath” of incorporation, and to the longer-term consequences as the “heritage” of incorporation.

Two sequences of change may initially be identified. In cases of state incorporation, the incorporation project was principally concerned with state control of the labor movement and was implemented under an authoritarian regime. Correspondingly, the initial regime breakdown brought with it a process of democratization. In the cases of party incorporation, the incorporation period promoted progressive social policies and the political mobilization of the working class, and the regime under which incorporation occurred was in most cases more democratic and competitive. Here the incorporation period triggered a strong conservative reaction, which in most cases ultimately led to a coup and a period of authoritarian rule, followed

by the institution of some form of more competitive, civilian electoral regime.

By tracing the movement of the countries through these different sequences of change, we gain new insights into the evolving role of the labor movement in sectoral and class alliances and hence into the character of these alliances, the articulation of these alliances with the party system and the character of the party system, and the way crucial issues concerning the legitimation of the state were resolved—or often, not resolved. Special attention focuses on whether a stable majority bloc emerged roughly at the center of the electoral arena, whether unions were linked to parties of the center or parties of the left, and, relatedly, whether the union movement was generally in the governing coalition or tended to be excluded. On the basis of these dimensions, four broad types of outcomes are identified: integrative party systems, multiparty polarizing systems, systems characterized by electoral stability and social conflict, and stalemated party systems.

The consequences of these distinct patterns were dramatically manifested in the period of social and economic crisis and new opposition movements during the 1960s and 1970s, a period that culminated in the emergence of “the new authoritarianism” in some, but not all, of the most modernized countries of Latin America. The problem of explaining this outcome, as well as the contrasting experience of other relatively modernized countries that retained civilian regimes, has received wide scholarly attention over more than a decade.9 We argue that an important part of the explanation of these contrasting regime outcomes is the structure of contestation and cooperation in the national political arena, which was in important respects the legacy of incorporation and of the reaction to it.

For each country, the analysis extends either to the onset of these authoritarian periods or to approximately 1980. After this point, significant changes in the parameters of politics occurred. Nonetheless, contrasts among countries that are in part the legacy of incorporation remain fundamental to understanding the agenda of political issues faced both by military governments and by the leaders of later democratization efforts. A primary goal of the book is to explore this evolving legacy of incorporation.

Looking at the overall trajectory of the different countries through this sequence of change, one observes a complex relationship between the character of the incorporation period and its legacy. In the intermediate run, the control-oriented approach of state incorporation in some important respects created a greater opportunity for future polarization. This occurred for several reasons, among them that many of the legal controls of unions broke down with the competitive bidding for workers' votes under a subsequent democratic regime, and that state incorporation left unresolved the partisan affiliation of workers and unions, leaving them available for mobilization by other actors in later periods. By contrast the often radical mobilization of party incorporation created political ties and loyalties that in some cases

8 Given the definition of incorporation periods presented above, the state by definition played a role in both types of incorporation. The key question is whether, in addition, a party or movement played a major role and whether a central goal was depoliticization, as opposed to politicization in favor of this party or movement. For a further discussion of these distinctions, see Chapter 5.

later contributed to conservatization of the labor movement and its integration within a centrist political bloc. Thus one potential trajectory of change was from control to polarization, and a second from mobilization to integration. A major goal of the analysis is to probe the factors that led particular countries to follow either of these two trajectories.

A final observation is in order about the normative implications of alternative outcomes such as polarization and integration. Under some circumstances and from some normative perspectives, the “stability” or reduction of conflict that might be associated with the outcome of integration are preferable to instability and conflict. Under other circumstances and from other normative perspectives, stability and reduction of conflict may be seen as blocking needed change, whereas polarization may open new avenues for change. These alternative assessments were actively contested in the eight countries during the periods studied here, and they are explicitly debated by social scientists who study these countries. In this book, our goal is not primarily to evaluate these outcomes but rather to advance the understanding of the political context in which they were fought out.

Relative Autonomy of the Political and the Impact of Socioeconomic Change

The book thus explores the long-term impact of political differences among countries during the incorporation period. By contrast, much of the literature on political change in Latin America has focused on social and economic explanations. Although we do not claim to present a monocausal model—in that we do not pretend to explain all the observed variations or features of regimes on the basis of political factors—the political argument explored here nonetheless does raise the issue of the relative autonomy of the political.

In recent decades in the context of the larger debate—both Marxist and non-Marxist—on the state, much attention was paid to the issue of political autonomy, particularly on a theoretical level. Yet, during the period when dependency theory was ascendant in Latin American studies, political analysis at times seemed to lose its way and politics was often considered epiphenomenal. What really mattered was the underlying pact of domination, which came part and parcel with the economic base.10

Subsequently, concern with the political sphere was revived and reinforced. In part this was due to the particular conjuncture in Latin America. As the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s left the scene, attention turned to the possibility of creating a political arena that safeguarded democratic values, even in a situation where the underlying economic parameters had not changed.11 Thus, there was interest first in political values that were previously disparaged and secondly in institution-building in the political arena for the consolidation of democracy.

It seems clear that some facets of the political process act as powerful and fundamental causal variables in social life and provide the basis for an underlying “political logic” that animates change, which is in a sense analogous to the “capital logic” that is a central concern of the dependency perspective. One component of this political logic is the generation of political projects in order to form coalitions to gain or retain political power.12 It consists of a potentially autonomous realm of conflict over political incumbency and entails a political dynamic that played a central role in shaping the incorporation projects. Another component is the pursuit of legitimation, which is a fundamental imperative of the state and one that may conflict with other imperatives such as the protection and promotion of capital accumulation [Habermas 1975, O’Connor 1973]. In addition to the potentially autonomous dynamic of change that revolves around these imperatives of incumbency and legitimacy, other sources of political autonomy are found in vested interests, sunk costs, and institutional rigidities.

The argument is not that the socioeconomic context of politics is unimportant. Rather it is that the political arena is not simply fluid, constantly responding to socioeconomic change. Instead, because of an autonomous political logic and vested interests, it may be resistant to such change over significant periods of time. Socioeconomic change is important to political outcomes, but the political arena may to some degree follow its own pattern and pace of change, that at times takes a highly discontinuous form.

This pattern of discontinuity contrasts with many forms of economic and social change. Socioeconomic change, such as urbanization or economic growth, is often a continuous process that proceeds at a more-or-less even rate—or an evenly fluctuating rate. It commonly entails the aggregation of innumerable changes or decisions by individual actors over time. A model of this type of incremental change is so fundamental to neoclassical economics that on the title page of his seminal work Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall [1916] placed the maxim natura non facit saltum—nature makes no leaps. Some political change—for instance, that in the “behavioral” or attitudinal realm—may also occur incrementally.

However, other aspects of political change, in the structural, institutional, and policy spheres, may be more discontinuous. This discontinuity consists of macro transformations, deriving from a process of decision making for the collectivity regarding the distribution of political and societal resources and associated issues of conflict and cooperation. This process leads to the founding of new legal orders, state structures, or other institutional arrangements.

10 For a critique of this perspective, see Cardoso [1979].
11 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead [1986] and Goodman [forthcoming] are examples of this focus.
12 See Cavarozzi [1975:33–37]. This focus is related to C. Anderson’s widely noted discussion of the logic of “winning, consolidating, and maintaining power” that is part of his “prudence model” of developmental policy-making in Latin America [1967:87, Chaps. 3–4] and parallels both Anderson [1967:87] and Ames’s [1987] concern with “political survival.” The focus is obviously similar to the larger concern in political analysis with how the goal of gaining and retaining power shapes political action [Downs 1957].
Such episodes of macro change may be followed by periods of minimal change or by more incremental and perhaps more informal change. For instance, smaller incremental changes in policy may be made, laws may not be applied, their implementation may evolve, and institutions and structures may begin to operate or behave in different ways. But these involve relatively minor shifts within a framework in which changes on a large scale are relatively infrequent. Between such major changes, institutions and structural rigidities create a partially autonomous logic of the political arena.

It is within this framework that the uneven impact of social and economic change on politics, of the kind explored in this book, must be understood. This perspective is introduced further in Chapter 1.

**Approach to Comparison**

**Selection of Cases.** The choice of the eight countries analyzed here is based on three criteria. First, along with vast differences in their social and economic makeup, these countries have the longest history of urban commercial and manufacturing development in Latin America. More than other Latin American countries, their modern sectors have for much of this century been sufficiently large to create an active arena of labor politics and state-labor relations. As a result, labor politics has long been a central issue on the national political agenda.\(^1\)

Second, because these countries represent a “comparison set” that provides a useful basis for exploring hypotheses about industrial modernization, they have already received substantial attention in previous research on the political economy of industrialization and regime transformation. The present study therefore can build on an important body of analysis comparing the evolution of these cases. In particular, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (D. Collier 1979), analyzed the same eight countries, focusing on the period of opposition movements, crises, and the rise of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s. The present volume, by contrast, takes the analysis for these eight cases from roughly the beginning of the 20th century up to this period of opposition and crisis. It thus responds to the challenge posed

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\(^1\) In conjunction with this shared experience of economic and industrial growth and the related issue of country size, these eight countries loom large within the overall picture of demographic and economic expansion in Latin America. As of 1980 they contained 84 percent of the population of the 20 countries commonly defined as Latin America—i.e., with a “Latin” (Spanish, Portuguese, or French) colonial history—and as of 1979 they had 92 percent of the gross domestic product (not including Cuba). Although the major role of Cuba within the Latin American and international scene since the 1960s and the importance of the Central American crisis in the 1980s belies any argument that big countries are “more important,” the demographic and economic preponderance of these eight countries merits note. Among the 20 countries, Brazil had 35 percent of the population, Mexico 20 percent, and the other six countries 29 percent. Among the 19 countries, Brazil had 32 percent of the GDP, Mexico 25 percent, and the other six countries 35 percent (Wilkie and Haber 1983:5, 280–81).

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**OVERVIEW**

in the final chapter of *The New Authoritarianism*: that it is essential to view the rise and fall of authoritarianism in Latin America that occurred between the 1960s and the 1980s within the framework of longer cycles of regime change within the region (394–95).

Third, this set of countries is auspicious because for each of these cases there is an extensive body of historical and monographic literature on national politics and trade unions that constitutes an invaluable basis for the type of comparative analysis of secondary sources carried out here.

**Differences and Commonalities among Cases.** A principal challenge of comparative-historical research is to push the systematic comparison of cases as far as possible without pushing it to a point where it does violence to the distinctive attributes of each case. Scholarly debates on comparative research are enlivened by strong disagreements about where that point is located.

It is easy to enumerate prominent features of the national political evolution of each country that are of great relevance for this analysis and which appear conspicuously unique. For instance, in Mexico these would include the revolution and its very nonrevolutionary one-party heritage; in Uruguay the peculiar tradition of two-party politics, the reformist genius of Batlle, and the social welfare state, juxtaposed with the economic and political stagnation of recent decades. In Chile, they would include strong parties of the left located in a national political system also characterized by a strong right and deeply ingrained conservatism; and in Argentina the explosive mobilization of Peronism, its conservativization and fragmentation, and its troubled political legacy.

Any comparative analysis that did not address these distinctive attributes would fail to capture the reality of these countries. Yet it is equally obvious that a meaningful understanding of these cases cannot be gained only by dwelling on their unique traits, but must be achieved in part through a comparative assessment of the larger political issues that are fought out and the commonalities, as well as contrasts, in the political and institutional forms taken by the resolution of these issues.

**Splitters and Lumpers.** The problem of adequately assessing these similarities and contrasts suggests the relevance here of the distinction suggested by J. H. Hexter (1979:241–43) between two types of analysts: “splitters” and “lumpers.”\(^14\) Splitters are quick to see contrasts among cases and to focus on the distinctive attributes of each case. Their contribution is essential, since the close, contextually rich analysis they tend to produce is invaluable for understanding the cases under consideration, for bringing to light new information, for generating new hypotheses and theories, and for providing the basic data on which all comparative analysis depends. Lumpers, by contrast, have an eye for generalizations and commonalities, for fitting particular
cases into broad categories. Their approach is likewise essential, since it plays an important role in synthesizing the details presented in case studies.

One major risk for the lumpers is the methodological problem identified by Eldon Kenworthy (1973) in his article entitled “The Function of the Little Known Case in Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn’t.” Kenworthy, a specialist in Argentine politics, criticized the misuse of the case of Peronist Argentina, which at an earlier point was poorly understood by broad comparativists. These comparativists, according to Kenworthy, distorted the Argentine experience to fit it into their conceptual categories.

A variant of this problem, which has arisen in the comparative analysis of the historical periods of concern in this book, could be referred to as “the misuse of the best known case.” In this instance, a general pattern for a whole region is derived from the best known case (or cases) writ large. For instance, in the analysis of state-labor relations and populism in Latin America, the experiences of two or possibly three leaders have often commanded the attention of analysts: Perón (a relatively well-known case among Latin Americanists), Vargas in Brazil, and perhaps Cárdenas in Mexico. Generalizations have too often presented a single picture for Latin America that combined elements of each of these experiences, forming a composite that ultimately corresponds neither to the original case or cases on which the generalization is based, nor to other cases to which it is applied [R. Collier 1982:98–100].

What is too often missing is an analytic middle ground between splitters and lumpers that encompasses simultaneously a concern with similarities and differences. In carrying out description, such an approach attempts to identify multiple patterns rather than necessarily to “lump” cases into a single type. In testing explanations, this approach employs the systematic examination of similarities and contrasts among cases as a means of assessing hypotheses about patterns of change.

An important concomitant of occupying this middle ground is the recognition of a crucial point: the claim that two countries are similar or different with regard to a particular attribute does not, and is not intended to, assign to them the overall status of being similar or different cases. It is relevant to underline this point because in the fields of comparative analysis and Latin American studies, when scholars engage in a carefully contextualized comparison of “whole countries,” there can be a tendency to depict certain countries as “really” similar or different—to a degree that may paralyze comparative research. For instance, students of the Southern Cone commonly hold that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay share an underlying socioeconomic structure that contrasts markedly with the rest of South America, giving a common “meaning” to the dynamics of their politics. Yet in terms of the structure of its party system, Uruguay has historically had much more in common with Colombia than with its Southern Cone neighbors. Uruguay is not inherently more similar either to Colombia or to other Southern Cone countries. Rather, it shares with each important similarities and differences.

In sum, our methodological stance recognizes the contribution of both splitters and lumpers, but insists on the flexible application of a middle position that acknowledges a diversity of similarities and contrasts among any combination of cases.

**Most Similar and Most Different Systems Designs.** In focusing on the analysis of similarities and differences, we employ two strategies of comparison, a combination of a “most similar” and a “most different” systems design [Przeworski and Teune 1970; Przeworski 1987]. These two designs are “ideal types,” and the matching and contrasting of cases that they posit is never perfectly achieved in any real analysis. Yet they are invaluable points of reference in constructing comparisons.

First, the overall analysis of the eight countries can be considered a most similar systems design. These eight cases are broadly matched, in that among the countries of Latin America, they have overall the longest history of urban, commercial, and industrial development, and in conjunction with this development have experienced the broad transformations in the political sphere discussed above. Further, these changes have occurred within a common regional and cultural context. Against the backdrop of these similarities, this methodological design identifies four broad types of incorporation periods and seeks to discover whether corresponding contrasts emerge in the legacy of incorporation.

Second, the comparison of countries with similar types of incorporation constitutes a most different systems design. Countries with similar incorporation experiences typically exhibited major contrasts in the pattern of socioeconomic development, the characteristics of the labor movement, and other important political attributes. The comparison within these sets of cases therefore constitutes a most different systems strategy, which juxtaposes cases that are fundamentally different in a number of respects. Within the remainder of this book, the case studies are distributed themselves among the seven resulting types of incorporations.

**Types of Incorporation and Country Pairs**

In addition to the distinction between state and party incorporation presented above, we identify three subtypes of party incorporation. The eight countries distributed themselves among the four resulting types of incorporations.

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16 These correspond to J. S. Mill's (1974/1843) methods of difference and agreement, respectively.
ration periods in a way that placed two countries within each type. The book is thus organized around the analysis of four pairs of countries: Brazil and Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, Uruguay and Colombia, and Peru and Argentina. From the perspective of the most different systems design, it is essential to emphasize both the similarities and contrasts within each pair.

**Similarities within Each Pair.** The core similarity in each pair derives from the analysis of the incorporation periods, presented in Chapter 5. The cases of state incorporation, where the state sought primarily to impose new methods of control, are Brazil (1930–45) and Chile (1920–31). Among the cases of party incorporation, where the concern with control was accompanied by a major effort at support mobilization, we distinguish three subtypes. First, in Colombia (1930–45) and Uruguay (1903–16), the mobilization of workers was carried out by traditional parties as an aspect of electoral competition within an established two-party system. Since these parties were founded in the 19th century and had strong ties to the economic elite, not surprisingly this type involved the most limited mobilization of the working class, being restricted largely to electoral mobilization. We refer to this category as electoral mobilization by a traditional party.

The other two types of party incorporation were led by new, explicitly anti-oligarchic parties, and both involved more comprehensive forms of mobilization. In Peru (1939–48) and Argentina (1943–55), the party or movement that led the incorporation period not only engaged in the electoral mobilization of workers, but also systematically and successfully built partisan ties to labor organizations and drove out of the labor movement elements affiliated with other parties, leading us to label these cases labor populism.

Finally, in Mexico (1917–40) and Venezuela (1935–48), the mobilization of the incorporation period took its most comprehensive form. In the other six countries the transformations of the incorporation period were almost entirely restricted to the labor movement in the modern sector of the economy and did not encompass peasants in the traditional rural sector. However, in Mexico and Venezuela the incorporation project was extended to this part of the rural sector, accompanied by agrarian reform, and therefore represented the most comprehensive assault on rural property relations and on the existing oligarchy. Given the comprehensive character of the transformations launched by these incorporation periods, we refer to them as radical populism.

17 We treat workers in modernized rural enclaves as being in the modern sector. A discussion of these terms is found in the glossary.

18 As is clear in Chapter 4 and 5, in the other four cases of party incorporation, the incorporation of the peasantry and the corresponding reorganization of rural property relations were not a central feature of this period for two very different reasons. In Peru and Colombia, the oligarchy was sufficiently strong to make this an unlikely outcome, whereas in Argentina and Uruguay and extensive traditional peasantry did not exist. Hence, although within both pairs of cases [Peru–Argentina and Uruguay–Colombia] this outcome had different causes, its consequences were partially similar, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6. Although in Argentina important reforms occurred in the rural sector, they did not encompass a restructuring of rural property relations of the kind found in Mexico and Venezuela.

Two further observations may be made about this grouping of cases. First, although these pairs are derived from a comparison of the incorporation periods, this grouping of cases had deep roots in the periods prior to incorporation and extends well beyond them. Second, it is essential to think of these types of incorporation periods as analytic categories, not as perfect descriptions of each country. Obviously, the two countries within each category are not identical in terms of the defining dimensions, but they are far more similar to one another in terms of these dimensions than they are to the countries identified with the other categories.

**Differences within Each Pair.** In the framework of the most different systems design, we are centrally concerned with fundamental economic, social, and political differences within each pair. These differences represent the contrasting contexts within which the analysis focuses on the similarity in the incorporation period and on the hypothesized similarity in the legacy within each pair. In three of the four pairs [excluding Mexico and Venezuela], this most different systems design juxtaposes within each pair: (1) a more socially homogeneous, relatively urban, far more European society of the Southern Cone, which is relatively modernized in terms of per capita indicators of education, literacy, and urbanization—Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina—with (2) a more socially heterogeneous, less urban society, which has a substantial population of Indian or African extraction and which is considerably less modernized in per capita terms—Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (see Table 0.1).

Marked contrasts are also found between Mexico and Venezuela, though these contrasts have changed during the decades covered in this study. In the

| TABLE 0.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Countries: Similarities and Differences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic Differences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Incorporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More socially homogeneous, higher on per capita modernization indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less socially homogeneous, lower on per capita modernization indicators</td>
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</tbody>
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* This ordering of Venezuela and Mexico refers roughly to the period of the 1950s to the 1970s. In the late 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, the ordering of these two countries on several of these variables was the opposite from that reflected here (see Chapter 3), and in the 1970s and 1980s, they more nearly converged.
19th century and into the first decades of the 20th century, Venezuela was among the least developed of the eight countries. However, with the rise of the petroleum sector, by roughly the 1950s Venezuela corresponded more nearly to the first row in Table 0.1, with high levels of per capita income; whereas in important respects Mexico lagged behind. However, with Mexico's oil boom in the 1970s, it gained again on some indicators. Depending on the particular period under consideration, different contrasts therefore come into play in the comparison of Mexico and Venezuela.

Political differences within the pairs are also of great importance to the analysis. Some political differences vary consistently with the socioeconomic contrasts noted above, and others do not. For instance, given the link between patterns of socioeconomic development and the emergence of strong labor movements (see Chapter 3), the countries in the upper row of Table 0.1 generally have stronger labor movements, and those in the lower row, with greater surplus labor, generally have weaker labor movements. On the other hand, differences in type of party system are of great importance to the analysis, but do not vary consistently among the pairs. The strong parties of Chile and the weak parties of Brazil present a major contrast that is crucial for our analysis, though we will argue that in the 1960s these two countries were distinctive among the eight in the degree to which they were characterized by polarizing, multiparty politics. Similarly, it is important to distinguish the two-party system of Venezuela from the one-party dominant system of Mexico, though we label both integrative party systems.

Major parts of the book are organized around the discussion of these pairs. We juxtapose the two cases in each pair in order to explore their parallel (though certainly not identical) experiences with the incorporation periods and their legacies. At the same time, we explore contrasts within each pair.

Alternative Explanations

To assess the explanatory value of a focus on incorporation periods and their legacies, it is helpful to probe the relationship between this perspective and other explanatory approaches. Some of the most relevant of these approaches may be noted briefly here.

Many studies have explored the impact of social and economic change on the evolution of national politics in Latin America, focusing on such interrelated dimensions as differing levels of socioeconomic modernization, distinct patterns of economic development and social change, and contrasting modes of articulation with the international economy. Such explanations receive substantial attention in this book. Chapter 3 examines their impact on the initial emergence of different types of labor movements, and Chapter 4 assesses their role in the emergence of reform movements that challenged the “oligarchic state” and that in most cases launched the incorporation period. We address other aspects of the impact of socioeconomic change as well, though we hypothesize that once the incorporation periods occurred, distinctive political dynamics were set in motion that must be analyzed in their own right and not simply as a reflection of economic and social forces.

In addition to the impact of social and economic change, transnational political developments must be considered. For instance, the diffusion of ideologies and modes of political organization had an important impact. This includes the demonstration effect of the revolutionary ideologies and models derived from the Russian and Cuban revolutions, as well as the organizational and ideological alternatives presented to the labor movement in each country by the different types of trade unionism emerging in Europe and in other parts of Latin America. The policies of foreign governments were also of great importance, particularly those of the United States. Other international actors played a role as well, such as the international communist movement, whose evolving policy had a major impact on the coalitional position not only of national communist parties but also of national labor movements, thereby strongly influencing domestic coalitional patterns. Both world wars had major ramifications in Latin America.

Piecing together these various external influences, one can picture a kind of transnational historical “grid” through which these countries passed. The grid consisted of a series of historical episodes that occurred at the international level, and the episodes within the grid can collectively be thought of as phases in what is sometimes referred to as “world historical time.” Considering these episodes in chronological order, and recognizing that some may overlap, they would include (1) the decline of anarchism and the rise of alternative approaches to worker organization, including socialism, communism, and national populism; (2) the Russian Revolution and its immediate aftermath, along with the internal wage-price squeeze triggered in part by the economic impact of World War I, which precipitated in most of Latin America and in much of the Western world a dramatic wave of worker protest; (3) the international depression of the 1930s; (4) the Comintern’s coalitional strategy before and during World War II of “popular frontism” and class collaboration in support of the Allied war effort that was adopted as part of the struggle against fascism; (5) the onset of the cold war after 1945, which brought a dramatic change in coalitional patterns in a number of countries; (6) the internationalization of important sectors of the economy in these countries beginning as early as the 1950s in response to new external opportunities and pressures; (7) the Cuban Revolution and the broader international climate of social protest and radicalization of the 1960s and early 1970s; and (8) the international dimensions of the reaction that sought to limit the impact of this protest and radicalization, involving the very important role of the U.S. government.

One of the fascinating issues posed by this study is the uneven relationship between these phases of world historic time and the analytic phases that are the focus of this book—that is, the periods of the oligarchic state, initial incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. We thus confront the interaction between a longitudinal and a cross-sectional perspective: between the unfolding over time within each country of phases of political change, and a
sequence of international developments that influenced all the countries at roughly the same chronological time, but often at a different point in relation to these internal political phases.

In this framework, timing is important. Depending on timing, an incorporation period may have been cut short by the impact of the depression; or, if it began later, its leaders may have had the "advantage" of appearing to offer a solution to the problems of the depression. Similarly, the conflicts of the aftermath period may have been worked out in the atmosphere of more conciliatory class relations of the later 1930s or early 1940s or in the more conflictual atmosphere of the late 1940s. Such differences had a significant impact on the patterns we analyze, and throughout the study we seek to be sensitive to this impact.

A final observation should be made about the problem of assessing rival explanations in a work of comparative-historical analysis such as this book. Research in this tradition draws great strength from its close focus on relatively few countries and from the rich treatment of cases often entailed in the construction of the complex categorical variables that are commonly employed. Yet this tradition is weaker in its capacity to address two issues that can be handled routinely with statistical analysis. Comparative-historical analysis lacks the capacity to state precisely the degree to which a given factor is a partial explanation of some important outcome, and it lacks a precise means of summarizing relationships in terms that are probabilistic rather than deterministic.

The practitioner of this approach must therefore rely on historical analysis and common sense both in weighing alternative explanations and in recognizing that the relationships under analysis are probabilistic and partial. It is in this spirit that we explore the impact of the incorporation periods: as explanatory factors that must be looked at in conjunction with other explanations and as important explanations that make certain outcomes more likely, but not inevitable.

The idea of partial explanation is crucial in the analysis of the pairs of countries. Simply because two countries had parallel experiences in the incorporation period, we would not expect that they will come out exactly the same on the relevant variables in the heritage period. Rather—as is particularly evident in the case of Chile and Brazil, where enormous differences might lead one to predict sharply contrasting trajectories of change—the hypothesized finding is that the two countries will prove to be more similar than one might otherwise expect. Our goal is to develop this kind of multivariate perspective in assessing our argument.

Organization of the Book

Following this Overview, Chapter 1 explicates the underlying analytic framework, drawing on Lipset and Rokkan's [1967] model of discontinuous political change that focuses on "critical junctures" and their legacies. The reader more concerned with the discussion of Latin America than with these generic issues of discontinuous change may wish to turn directly to Chapter 2, which examines the context within which the analysis is situated by exploring basic issues of state-labor relations within the region.

Chapter 3 begins the historical analysis, assessing the events that set our story into motion: the dramatic emergence of worker organization and protest at the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, during the era of what is commonly referred to in Latin America as the "oligarchic state." Chapter 4 then traces the emergence of the reformist challenges to oligarchic domination. This challenge was led by elements of the middle sectors and dissident members of the traditional elite, who in all eight countries eventually launched a reform period that inaugurated the transformation of the oligarchic state. To orient the reader, Figure 0.1 provides a chronological overview of these reform periods [R], as well as of the subsequent periods discussed below: incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. The definitions and assumptions that underlie the identification of these periods are presented in Chapters 1, 4 and 5, and in the glossary.

Chapter 5 analyzes the incorporation periods, exploring the distinctive dynamics of state incorporation and of the three types of party incorporation. As can be seen in Figure 0.1, in five of the countries, the onset of incorporation and the reform period discussed above coincided, whereas in three others there was a delay before the onset of incorporation [indicated by an arrow following the "R"]). The circumstances of this delay are analyzed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 6 explores what we define as the aftermath period, constituted by the initial political reaction and counterreaction to the incorporation experience. Chapter 7 then analyzes the larger heritage, focusing on the institutional arrangements forged during the period of incorporation and its aftermath. The concluding chapter, in addition to synthesizing the argument, poses the question of whether the legacy of incorporation still persists or has been superseded in each of the eight countries. This question arises both in the countries that had military governments in the 1960s and 1970s and in those that experienced continuous civilian rule.

Following the concluding chapter, the glossary defines a number of terms used in this book and presents an extended discussion of the concept of the initial incorporation of the labor movement. Readers interested in the issues of method and comparison that arise in applying this concept should refer to the glossary, as well as to the analysis of critical junctures in Chapter 1.

Within each of the historical chapters—that is, Chapters 3 to 7—the order of presentation is intended to highlight the contrasts among the pairs of countries. Thus, each of these chapters begins with Brazil and Chile, thereby establishing one pole of comparison involving the traits associated with state incorporation (or its antecedents or legacy, according to the chapter). We then examine Mexico and Venezuela, the two cases that exhibited all the key traits of party incorporation and that thereby represent the other pole of the...
Figure 0.1 Chronological Overview: Onset of Reform Period, Incorporation, Aftermath, and Heritage

Aftermath, and Heritage

CHI

MEX

VEN

URU

COL

PER

ARG

of politics that reemerged after this period of military rule reflected a continuation of the heritage of incorporation. Chapter 8 asks whether the pattern immediately with the onset of the reform period. R with dashes and an arrow indicates a conservative authoritarian rule that followed incorporation in five of the cases of party incorporation.

Comparison:

Finally, we analyze the other two pairs, which in some important respects are intermediate cases.

To encourage systematic comparison, we have presented the analysis of the eight countries in a standardized format that lends itself to the close examination of similarities and contrasts among cases. To this end, we have introduced variations as needed to capture distinctive features of specific cases. These variations are particularly evident for Brazil and Chile, which, as cases of state incorporation, follow a contrasting trajectory of change.

The analysis proceeds in the following manner. In examining the emergence of working-class organization and protest in Chapter 3, we present for each country first an analysis of the socioeconomic context and then of the labor movement itself. The analysis of the reformist challenge in Chapter 4 focuses on the period of the oligarchic state, the emergence of the reform alliance, the initial transition and change of government, and the role of labor in the transition. The assessment of the incorporation periods in Chapter 5, for the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the “project from above”—that is, the goals and strategies of the leaders of the incorporation period, the “project from below”—that is, the goals and strategies of the labor movement, the political exchange on which the incorporation period was founded, the role of the party, and the emergence of opposition and polarization. For the cases of state incorporation, where there is little or no exchange, party role, or polarization, these latter three sections are replaced by a general analysis of labor policy. The analysis of the aftermath of incorporation in Chapter 6, in the cases of party incorporation, focuses on the conservative reaction, the formation of a new governing coalition in counterreaction to this conservative period, and the transformation of the party that accompanies the emergence of this new coalition. Finally, in analyzing the heritage of incorporation in Chapter 7, we first provide an overview of the party system and then systematically review for each country the reaction to the new opposition movements and crises of the late 1950s to the 1970s.

The organization of the book is intended to facilitate different approaches to reading it. Readers who wish to focus on a particular analytic period in a number of countries can follow the headings for each country that correspond to the standardized subsections noted above. For readers interested in an overview of the analysis, each chapter begins with an introduction to the relevant step in the argument and provides a summary of the country patterns in that step. The write-up of each pair of countries in Chapters 5 to 7 begins with a further introduction to the pair, and Chapter 8 provides an overall summary of the argument. Finally, readers who wish to focus on a specific country should read the chapter introductions and the introductions to the relevant pair of countries as well as the appropriate country sections. For any of these approaches, readers will be aided by the Index of Countries by Analytic Period.
Framework: Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost, "The Road Not Taken"

The idea of crucial choices and their legacies, of which Robert Frost wrote, has long intrigued students of political change. Numerous scholars have focused on major watersheds in political life, arguing that these transitions establish certain directions of change and foreclose others in a way that shapes politics for years to come. Such transitions can, following Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, be called "critical junctures."\(^1\)

The character of critical junctures and the perspective from which they are analyzed vary greatly. Some critical junctures, as in the choice of Robert Frost's wanderer, may entail considerable discretion, whereas with others the presumed choice appears deeply embedded in antecedent conditions. The critical juncture may involve a relatively brief period in which one direction or another is taken or an extended period of reorientation. Some analyses stress underlying societal cleavages or crises that lead up to the critical juncture, whereas others focus primarily on the critical juncture itself. Finally, some critical junctures may be seen as coming close to making "all the difference," as Frost boldly asserts in his poem. More commonly, the effect of the critical juncture is intertwined with other processes of change.

Yet underlying this diversity is a common understanding of change that is a cornerstone of comparative-historical research on development. It suggests what Paul A. David (1985:332) has called a "path dependent" pattern of change, in that outcomes during a crucial transition establish distinct trajectories within which, as he has engagingly put it, "one damn thing follows another." James Gleick (1987:8), in summarizing the version of this perspective known as "chaos" theory, captures a related feature of critical junctures in stressing the idea of "sensitive dependence on initial conditions."

To those who study revolutionary change, it comes as no surprise to suggest that political life exhibits the kind of discontinuities posited in analyses of critical junctures. What should be underlined is the extent to which this focus is widely employed in a diverse spectrum of research not concerned

exclusively, or even primarily, with revolutionary change. It plays a central role in Max Weber's analysis of the cyclical interplay between periods of continuity and sharp disjunctures—inspired by charismatic leadership—that reshape established social relations.\(^1\) In major works of comparative-historical analysis of the 1960s, it is found in Barrington Moore's argument that within the process of modernization, different patterns of commercialization of agriculture were a historic watershed that set countries on different paths to the modern world; in Louis Hartz's comparisons of the founding of "fragment societies"; and in Alexander Gerschenkron's work on the "great spurt" in the industrialization process.\(^2\) This perspective is central to research on the crises, sequence, and timing of development,\(^3\) to recent studies of continuity and change in international and domestic political economy,\(^4\) to older work on "institutionalization,"\(^5\) to more recent work on the political economy,\(^6\) to recent studies of electoral realignment\(^7\) and to research on technological change.\(^8\) Though the importance of this perspective is particularly evident in studies based on cross-national comparisons, it also plays a role in research on long-term patterns of change within individual countries and in studies of electoral realignment in the United States.\(^9\) In rational-choice theory, a variant of this perspective is found in "threshold" models of collective behavior.\(^10\)

Arguments about critical junctures have played an important role in research on labor politics. In their classic *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Clark Kerr and his coauthors emphasize the long-term stability of the industrial relations system that was "crystallized by the leading elite at a relatively early stage" (1960:235). In Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) analysis, and to an even greater degree in the subsequent work of Carlos Waisman (1982, 1987), Gregory Luebbert (1986, 1987), and John Stephens (1986), the resolution of the working class cleavage has a profound effect in shaping national politics. Other studies have focused on critical junctures within the labor movement. Samuel Valenzuela (1979:esp. chap. 4) shows how the filling of "organizational space" during crucial phases of labor movement development "freezes" organizational alternatives within the labor sector; and Lipset (1983:1) analyzes how the "historic conditions under which the proletariat entered the political arena" shaped the subsequent emergence of reformist as opposed to revolutionary labor movements.

Following this tradition, the present study applies the idea of critical junctures and their legacies to the evolution of 20th century politics in Latin America, focusing on a period of fundamental change in the relationship between the state and the labor movement. This change responded to two sets of cleavages: that between workers and owners and that between workers and the state, expressed in the emergence of worker organization and protest beginning in the late 19th century; and that between the middle sectors and the oligarchy, expressed in the emergence of major reform movements in the first decades of the 20th century. Growing out of this new worker activation and these reform periods, there eventually emerged in each country the policy period we refer to as the "initial incorporation of the labor movement."\(^11\) This book argues that the incorporation periods constituted a critical juncture that occurred in distinct ways in different countries, and that these differences played a central role in shaping the national political arena in the following decades.

Historical studies of the eight countries analyzed in this book have routinely argued that the years corresponding to the incorporation periods were of great historical importance and had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of politics.\(^12\) Yet this literature has lacked consistent criteria for identifying and comparing these periods, and the specific claims concerning their legacies vary greatly—since these studies obviously were not conducted within a common analytic framework. To date, no analysis has systematically compared these incorporation periods across a number of cases or pieced together the complex interactions among the characteristics of the antecedent political system, the incorporation period itself, and the legacy of incorporation.

This chapter establishes a common framework for analyzing critical junctures. The need for such a framework derives from the surprising lack of attention to the problems that arise in assessing arguments about critical junctures and their legacies, given how widely used this perspective is in the development literature.\(^13\) It is easy to initially hypothesize that a set of countries passed through a crucial period of transition and that the transition occurred in distinct ways that had a profound impact on subsequent patterns of change. Yet many pitfalls are encountered in assessing the descriptive and explanatory claims contained in such an hypothesis. This chapter provides a framework for dealing with these pitfalls.

**Building Blocks of the Critical Juncture Framework**

A critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis)\(^14\) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.

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1. See note 1 in the Overview.
2. Exceptions to the lack of attention to these methodological problems are found in the writing of Harsanyi (1960), Gerschenkron (1968), Verba (1971), and Krasner (1984).
3. As noted above, this kind of framework is also used in the analysis of single countries, as in the literature on realigning elections in the United States. In single-country analyses, systematic comparisons are sometimes made, or less systematic (or implicit) comparisons...
The elements in this definition may be illustrated with an example. In Barrington Moore's *Lord and Peasant*, the period of basic change is the commercialization of agriculture; the contrasts involve the varied role of different class and sectoral groups in this transition, particularly lord and peasant; and the legacy consists of different "routes to the modern world": bourgeois revolution and Western democracy, revolution from above, and fascism and peasant revolution and communism (1966:xvii, chaps. 7-9, e.g., pp. 413-14).

Thus, the concept of a critical juncture contains three components: the claim that a significant change occurred within each case, the claim that this change took place in distinct ways in different cases, and the explanatory hypothesis about its consequences. If the explanatory hypothesis proves to be false—that is, the hypothesized critical juncture did not produce the legacy—then one would assert that it was not, in fact, a critical juncture.

In addition to the three components contained in the definition, a number of further elements must be considered (see Figure 1.1).

1. The antecedent conditions that represent a "base line" against which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed. In Figure 1.1, the arrow from the antecedent conditions to the legacy is intended to suggest the potential rival hypothesis that important attributes of the legacy may in fact involve considerable continuity and/or direct causal links with the preexisting system that are not mediated by the critical juncture.

2. The cleavage (or crisis) that emerges out of the antecedent conditions and in turn triggers the critical juncture.

3. Three components of the legacy: a. Mechanisms of production of the...
of the timing of industrialization. More broadly, the challenge is to establish a definition that effectively demonstrates that potentially major differences among cases in the critical juncture, in its timing or in other characteristics, in fact occurred in an analytically equivalent period—that is, that they represent different values on the same variable.

This dilemma arose in the research for this book, since some of the presumed incorporation periods were sufficiently different from one another that we were led to examine them carefully before concluding that they should all be viewed as analytically equivalent transitions. Relevant contrasts included the difference between the corporatist incorporation periods of most countries as opposed to the pluralistic incorporation period in Uruguay. We also encountered differences in the international and historical context of the incorporation periods due to major contrasts in timing, in that the onset of these periods varied over four decades, from 1904 to 1943. Our questioning led to the extended discussion of the definition of incorporation presented in the glossary and to the close attention in the analysis of individual countries to the issue of identifying the appropriate period.

2. How Long Do Critical Junctures Last? Critical junctures may range from relatively quick transitions—for example, “moments of significant structural change”—to an extended period that might correspond to one or more presidential administrations, a long “policy period,” or a prolonged “regime period.” Such variations in duration depend in part on the immediate causal mechanisms involved, which may produce a type of change that crystallizes rapidly or gradually. A dramatic political upheaval may produce rapid change. On the other hand, some changes may be the result of the sustained application of a government policy, involving an extended period of time.

The issue of wide variations in duration is important in the present analysis. Not surprisingly, in focusing on the historical episode in which a given set of public policies is actively applied for the first time, it turns out due to the differing political dynamics of particular countries—that the government or a series of linked governments that first sustain these policies may in some cases be in power for only a few years and in others for much longer. In the countries considered here, the duration of the incorporation period ranges from nine years in Peru to 23 years in Mexico. As long as this policy period fits the definition of the particular critical juncture—in this case, the initial incorporation period—this poses no problem for the analysis, but the issue of this fit must be examined closely.

3. Cleaveage or Crisis. An important part of the literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of cleavages or crises, thereby placing particular emphasis on the tensions that lead up to the critical juncture. Since these cleavages are seen as producing or generating the critical juncture, Valenzuelza and Valenzuela (1981:15) refer to them as “generative” cleavages. The argument of this book is that the working class mobilization and conflicts between the middle sectors and the oligarchy in the first decades of the 20th century represented generative cleavages.

If a cleavage is a central concern of the analysis, a careful examination of the cleavage itself is essential. Before testing hypotheses about the links among the cleavage, the critical juncture, and the legacy, it is useful to contextualize the analysis by exploring the meaning of the cleavage within the particular setting, raising the question of why it should be so important. In this spirit, Chapter 2 explores the social and political meaning of worker-owner and worker-state conflicts in Latin America, probing the question of why they tend to reverberate so deeply within the larger polity.

4. Specifying the Historical Legacy. The importance or lack of importance of a critical juncture cannot be established in general, but only with reference to a specific historical legacy. It is hardly novel to assert that one should not debate the importance of a hypothesized explanation without first identifying the outcome to be explained, yet it merits emphasis that inconsistencies in the identification of the outcome can lead to divergent assessments of the importance of the critical juncture. In the present analysis, the incorporation periods are intended to explain the specific set of contrasts explored in Chapter 7 concerning party systems, associated constellations of political coalitions, and related issues of regime dynamics. In the framework of the discussion of similarities and differences among countries presented in the Overview, the fact that the countries with a similar heritage of incorporation in this specific sense differ profoundly on many other characteristics should not be taken as evidence that the incorporation periods were not highly consequential.

5. Duration of the Legacy. In analyzing the legacy of the critical juncture, it is important to recognize that no legacy lasts forever. One must have ex-

16 Cardoso and Falletto 1979:xiv.
17 These variations in duration can raise the issue of appropriate labeling. With regard to the overall label, we retain the expression critical juncture as a reasonable compromise between alternatives such as founding moments or choice points, on the one hand, and period of transition, on the other.

18 Two alternative relationships between the cleavage and the critical juncture should be noted. First, the cleavage may be important because the activation or exacerbation of the cleavage creates new actors or groups and the critical juncture consists of their emergence. An example would be the emergence of the urban class and the organization of labor unions within the working class. Second, the cleavage may be important not because it leads to the emergence of new organized actors, but because it raises political issues so compelling as to trigger some kind of larger reorganization of political relationships. Both outcomes can, of course, occur, as in the analysis presented in this book, where the appearance of an organized working class played a central role in precipitating the critical juncture, but the critical juncture itself is identified with the state response, consisting of the initial incorporation of the labor movement.

19 An example can be found in analyses of the critical juncture associated with the worker-owner cleavage in Europe in the first decades of the 20th century. Luebbert and Stephens place great emphasis on this cleavage, whereas Lipset and Rokkan deemphasize it and give greater causal importance to a series of prior cleavages. This discrepancy appears to be due in part to the fact that Lipset and Rokkan are explaining the emergence of modern party systems, whereas Luebbert and Stephens are concerned with explaining different trajectories of national regime evolution. The explanation of a somewhat distinct legacy leads to a contrasting assessment of this critical juncture.
explicit criteria for determining when it ends but must also be open to ambiguities about the end points. For instance, in assessing the heritage of incorporation in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, we took as an end point for the analysis their military coups of the 1960s and 1970s. These coups unquestionably represent a major discontinuity in national politics in all five countries. Yet in the postmilitary periods in the 1980s, important elements of the heritage of incorporation persisted. The choice about the end point is best viewed as a matter for ongoing analysis, a theme which we address in the final chapter.

The challenge of explaining the varied duration of the legacy is also a central concern. The legacies of some critical junctures are stable, institutionalized regimes, whereas others produce a political dynamic that prevents or mitigates against stable patterns. In these cases, the “self-destruction” of the legacy may be predictable from the critical juncture, though the length of time before this occurs may vary greatly and is influenced by other factors as well. The issues raised in the Overview concerning choices between control and support mobilization in the incorporation periods, and their implications for different patterns of radicalization or co-optation in the heritage periods are basic to the stability of the legacy and represent a central concern of the analysis.

6. Comparing the Legacy with the Antecedent System: Assessing Continuity and Change. In addition to carefully identifying the legacy, it is essential to compare it explicitly with the antecedent system. Even in revolutions, political systems are never completely transformed, and in the study of revolution debates about continuity and change can be of great importance. The discontinuities that accompany the less drastic critical junctures of concern here are at least as ambiguous, and there is the risk that the enthusiast of the critical juncture framework may be too readily disposed to find such discontinuities. The analysis of Uruguay and Colombia well illustrates the need to consider these issues of continuity.

In some instances, one may be dealing with apparent continuities that conceal significant changes. For example, before the incorporation period Uruguay and Colombia were characterized by two-party systems with deep roots in the 19th century, in which class divisions tended to be blurred and each party had relatively stable patterns of regional and sectoral support. In the legacy of incorporation, one finds the same party system with similar characteristics. The argument is obviously not that the incorporation period created this party system. Rather, it focuses on how the existence of this type of party system shaped the incorporation period and on the specific ways in which the incorporation experience in part perpetuated, and in part modified, the party system.

Alternatively, one may find apparent differences that conceal continuities. For instance, beginning in the 1940s the Argentine labor movement was overwhelmingly Peronist, whereas previously it was predominantly socialist and communist, a major change that was the immediate consequence of the incorporation period. Yet for many decades after the 1940s, Peronism had an ephemeral existence as a political party and consisted basically of a grouping of unions and federations that were perhaps the strongest in Latin America, but that were poorly articulated with the party system. Interestingly, this specific characterization of the post-1940s period could in fact also be applied to the pre-1940s period, when precisely these attributes were present. What is crucial about the latter period is that this outcome followed the incorporation period and hence reflected the failure, in contrast to the postincorporation experience of some other countries, to establish a stable political role for the labor movement.

These two examples underline the importance, throughout the analysis, of the careful assessment of continuity and change.

7. Type of Explanation: Constant Causes versus Historical Causes. The distinctive contribution of the critical juncture framework is its approach to explanation. It focuses on what, following Stinchcombe (1968:101–29), may be called “historical causes.” Arthur Stinchcombe explains this approach by comparing two types of explanations of continuity or stability in social life: “constant causes” and “historical causes.”

A constant cause operates year after year, with the result that one may observe relative continuity in the outcome produced by this cause. For instance, it has been observed that Latin American workers employed in isolated export “enclaves” commonly have a high propensity to strike, due to certain attributes of the enclave (Di Tella 1968). To the degree that there is continuity in this propensity to strike, it may be hypothesized that it is in important measure due to the continuing influence on workers’ strike behavior of these same attributes. This is not the pattern of causation posited by the critical juncture framework.

By contrast, Stinchcombe’s depiction of an historical cause corresponds to the intuitive understanding of critical junctures. In this case, a given set of causes shapes a particular outcome or legacy at one point or period, and subsequently the pattern that is established reproduces itself without the recurrence of the original cause. Stinchcombe refers to the type of explanation that accounts for such a pattern of persistence as “historicism,” and uses the expression “historical cause” to refer to the event or transition that sets this pattern into motion (1968:103, 118).

In addition to distinguishing between constant and historical causes, Stinchcombe emphasizes the importance of the processes that reproduce the legacy of the historical cause. These mechanisms of reproduction involve in part the fact that, once founded, a given set of institutions creates vested interests, and power holders within these institutions seek to perpetuate their own position (Stinchcombe 1968:108–18, Verba 1971:308). Stinchcombe also emphasizes the role of “sunk costs” that make the continuation of an established institutional pattern a less “expensive” option than creat-
ing new patterns [1968:120-21]. As Stephen Krasner puts it, "once a given set of institutional structures is in place, it embodies capital stock that cannot be recovered. This [capital] stock takes primarily the form of information trust and shared expectations" whose availability and familiarity reinforce the vested interests noted above (1984:235). In fact, these mechanisms of reproduction become a type of constant cause—but one that is distinctively a legacy of the critical juncture.21

For the purpose of our analysis, four issues concerning these mechanisms of reproduction should be underlined. First, to the extent that the outcome or legacy involves political institutions, this emphasis on mechanisms of reproduction raises issues central to current discussions of the "new institutionalism" (March and Olsen 1984, 1989) and to debates on the relative autonomy of politics. In fact, as Krasner emphasizes (1982, 1984), political autonomy is an important theme in the analysis of critical junctures.

Second, the existence of these mechanisms of reproduction and the possibility of the relative autonomy of politics—or of specific political institutions—underscores why it is appropriate to construct a critical juncture framework to begin with. This framework is concerned with a type of discontinuous political change in which critical junctures "dislodge" older institutional patterns. If these processes of reproduction and autonomy did not make institutions resistant to change, models of incremental change would be adequate. It is precisely because political structures often tenaciously resist change that we turn to the analysis of critical junctures.

21 In addition to explicating the relationship between historical causes and constant causes, it is also appropriate to note the place of historical causes in broader typologies of different approaches to explanation, such as the distinction between deductive, probabilistic, functional, and historical or "genetic" explanation proposed by Nagel (1979:chap. 2).

An historical cause, in the sense intended here, is a particular type of genetic explanation that has a relatively "law-like" probabilistic character. Nagel defines a genetic explanation as one which "sets out the sequence of major events through which some earlier system has been transformed into a later one" (1979:25). In assessing genetic explanations, he rejects the idea of viewing them primarily as idiographic (concerned with unique events), as opposed to nomothetic (concerned with general laws) [25, 547-48]. He observes that in genetic explanations, "not every past event in the career of the system will be mentioned," and that "those events that are mentioned are selected on the basis of assumptions ... as to what sorts of events are causally relevant to the development of the system." At times these may be "tacit" assumptions, as in the more idiographic tradition of historical writing. Alternatively, in a more nomothetic tradition, they may involve "fairly precise developmental laws" (25). Genetic explanations may thus encompass a spectrum from more idiographic to more nomothetic approaches.

The models we are concerned with here often contain a fairly self-conscious and conceptually elaborate specification of the nature of the transition involved in the critical juncture that is open to extension to other countries or contexts. These models seek thereby to establish a pattern of explanation that, loosely speaking, may be called "law-like." Hence, the analysis of critical junctures involves a type of genetic explanation that falls more toward the nomothetic end of this spectrum. Since the laws or patterns they identify involve statements about conditions under which given outcomes are more likely, rather than the conditions under which they are necessary consequences, this involves probabilistic explanation [26].

Third, in applying the critical juncture framework to a particular domain of analysis, it is useful to specify distinctive features of these mechanisms of reproduction in that domain. For instance, the traditional understanding of trade union politics and state-union relations suggests it is an area where a given constellation of political relationships, once institutionalized, has a strong tendency to persist. This tendency is directly discussed or strongly implied by a wide range of analyses. Familiar examples are Michels's [1959/1915] classic observations on the co-optation of labor-based socialist parties and the iron law of oligarchy; Olson's [1968] analysis of the collective action problems involved in union formation, which make coercion and state sanctions an important element in the creation and viability of trade unions; and the widely observed tendency of corporatist structures to perpetuate given patterns of union organization and of state-union relationships. These examples suggest how powerful, vested, self-perpetuating interests, embedded in sunk costs, can crystallize around prevailing patterns of union organization and state-union relations. The great importance of such elements suggests that a critical juncture framework is particularly appropriate in the analysis of trade-union politics.

Fourth, it is useful to distinguish between the mechanisms of the reproduction and the production of the legacy. There often occurs a significant interval between the critical juncture and the period of continuity that is explained by these mechanisms of reproduction. To the extent that the critical juncture is a polarizing event that produces intense political reactions and counterreactions, the crystallization of the legacy does not necessarily occur immediately, but rather may consist of a sequence of intervening steps that respond to these reactions and counterreactions. Because these intervening steps occur within the political sphere and because they follow the critical juncture, which is the point of differentiation among the cases, we consider them part of the legacy.

We therefore find it useful to refer to the dual processes of (1) the production of the legacy—involving its crystallization, often through such a sequence of reaction and counterreaction; and (2) the reproduction of the legacy, involving the process analyzed by Stinchcombe. This distinction corresponds to the contrast between the aftermath of incorporation discussed in Chapter 6 and the heritage of incorporation analyzed in Chapter 7.

8. Rival Explanations: Constant Causes. The core hypothesis is that critical junctures occur in different ways in different contexts and that these differences produce distinct legacies. Obviously, the assessment of this hypothesis must be attentive to rival explanations. One of the most important types of rival explanations consists of the "constant causes" discussed above, that is, attributes of the system that may contribute to the presumed stability of the legacy, but that are not the product of the critical juncture.22 This issue arises in the present book in assessing the legacy of incorporation, an

22 Thus, within the framework of the discussion of constant versus historical causes above, they do not include the constant causes that are part of the legacy itself.
important example being found in the explanation of the political stalemate in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s. It is common to argue that this stalemate was a legacy of the convulsive rise of Peronism in the 1940s—that is, of the incorporation period. Alternatively, it may be due to underlying structural attributes of Argentine society and economy that both before and after the incorporation period were an ongoing, “constant cause” of the stalemate, and hence represented a rival explanation to the incorporation hypothesis. Thus, O’Donnell (1978) has argued that the particular type of primary products that Argentina exports are conducive to zero-sum policy conflicts between the rural and urban sectors, which in turn can contribute to political stalemate. Though it is difficult in any one study to evaluate a broad range of such rival explanations, this book attempts to address them when they seem particularly important.

9. The Problem of Partial Explanations. Some problems in the study of critical junctures are relatively standard issues in the field of comparative-historical analysis yet are of such importance in the present assessment of incorporation periods as to merit attention here. One of these concerns the issue of assessing partial explanations. This, indeed, is all that one normally expects to find in social research.

Compared to scholars who engage in multivariate analysis based on quantitative data, researchers who do multivariate analysis based on the systematic yet qualitative comparison of historical events face an interesting problem in assessing partial explanations and in making the assessment convincing. In quantitative analysis, there is no expectation that a given explanation will entirely account for a given set of outcomes, and quantitative techniques offer straightforward procedures for assessing what portion of the “variance” in the outcome is explained. Even if this is a quarter, or a fifth, or even a tenth, it is often considered a meaningful finding.

In comparative-historical analysis that deals with “whole countries,” this kind of assessment runs into some of the same problems of assessing similarities and differences among cases discussed in the Overview. If two countries “look” similar in the incorporation period, the expectation in assessing the legacy of incorporation is that they should also “look” similar in the heritage period. Yet this expectation may pose an unrealistic standard that interferes with the adequate assessment of the hypothesis. If the incorporation period explains a quarter of the variation in the legacy—a substantial finding by many standards of analysis—the cases would in fact look quite different in the heritage period, and there could be risk of an erroneous rejection of the hypothesis. Thus, the criterion must be that they look sufficiently similar to suggest that the hypothesis has partial explanatory power. Employing this criterion is particularly important in the context of the most different systems design discussed in the Overview, which is based on the delib-

39 For a comment on what it means to compare “whole countries,” see footnote 15 in the Overview.

Conclusion

Our goal has been to identify issues commonly encountered in the analysis of critical junctures. Though it makes sense intuitively that societies go through periods of basic reorientation that shape their subsequent development, too little attention has been devoted to the problems that arise in assessing claims about the scope and nature of this impact. To make this assessment more adequate, one must devote careful attention to the identification of the critical juncture and the legacy, the comparison with the antecedent system, the distinction between constant and historical causes, the mechanisms of production and reproduction of the legacy, various kinds of rival explanations, and special problems of assessing the impact of critical junctures in the context of comparative-historical analysis.

Finally, a basic point should be reiterated. In an analytic framework that contains many elements, it is essential that these elements be examined with care. At the same time, it is also crucial that the main idea not slip from view. The goal of presenting these several criteria of assessment is to strengthen the test of the core hypothesis: that the critical juncture occurred in different ways and that these differences were highly consequential. In the present book, this hypothesis concerns the long-term impact of different types of incorporation periods. The goal of providing this framework for the analysis of critical junctures is to better assess this core argument about the transformation of Latin American politics.
Context: The Labor Movement and the State in Latin America

We have hypothesized that the emergence of the labor movement in Latin America, along with the forging of new patterns of state-union relations during the incorporation periods, had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of national politics. Why should this transition be so important? Why should the emergence of and response to working-class conflict have a major impact? Analysts of many different actors both within society and within the state are often adept at interpreting and explaining larger patterns of political change from the “angle” of the particular actor they study. Indeed, any larger picture of change can usefully be viewed from many different angles. Why, then, should the labor movement be of particular significance?

We argue that in crucial phases of Latin American development, labor politics has been a kind of coalitional “fulcrum.” In different countries and at different historical periods, organized labor has been a pivotal actor, and the choices made by other actors in positioning themselves vis-à-vis organized labor have had a crucial impact on national politics.

This idea is expressed subtly but pointedly in Alexander Wilde’s analysis of the breakdown of Colombian democracy in the 1940s, an instance that nicely illustrates our argument as a kind of “crucial case” because it is one with a labor movement that was conspicuously weak. Wilde suggests that despite their weakness, the unions in Colombia contributed to democratic breakdown because their presence in coalition politics of this period was “constantly unsettling.” They could force the political party with which they were then mainly identified, the Liberals, to “support or repudiate them,” and in the process seriously strained the Liberals’ commitment to the basic rules of the political game [Wilde 1978:45]. Obviously, if the coalitional presence of unions can be constantly unsettling in a country where they are weak, they potentially play an even more central role in countries that have stronger labor movements.

Why should the coalitional presence of unions in crucial periods of change be “constantly unsettling”? Why should the labor movement be a coalitional fulcrum or a pivotal actor? What understanding do we have of labor politics in Latin America that allows us to build on the answers to these questions and to construct an argument about the larger political impact of the labor movement?

This chapter addresses these questions. We first examine general arguments about the political significance of the labor movement in Latin America, focusing on its strategic importance in the economic and political sphere and its potential role in legitimating or delegitimizing the state. We then explore further the theme raised in the Overview concerning the choices of actors within the state regarding strategies of labor control and labor mobilization, along with the complementary choices on the side of actors within the labor movement regarding strategies of cooperation or noncooperation [the traditional anarchist position] with the state. In discussing these strategies, we introduce the idea of a “dual dilemma” that underlies the interaction between these two sets of choices. This interaction is explored further in the context of a discussion of corporatism, the concept commonly used to describe many of the principal institutions of state-labor relations in Latin America.

Political Importance of Labor Movement

The political importance of the labor movement may be looked at both from the perspective of its capacity for collective action and in terms of the special significance of this capacity in bestowing political support and mobilizing opposition.

Capacity for Collective Action. The location of many unionized workers in spatially concentrated, large-scale centers of production and/or their strategic position at critical points in the economy or the polity gives them an unusual capacity to disrupt the economic and political system and hence provides incentives for sustained collective action. This capacity is fundamental to organized labor’s political importance.

The contexts of work conducive to collective action are analyzed in the next chapter. They include: (1) isolated “enclaves” of export production, along with related networks of transportation and communication, that are crucial to the prosperity of the export sector in a number of countries and that can easily be paralyzed by strikes; (2) large-scale urban factory production located in close proximity to the centers of national political power in what are in many cases highly centralized polities, where strikes can have a dramatic impact on the political system; and (3) the most dynamic sectors of the urban industrial economy, which may employ fewer workers due to their more capital-intensive form of production, but where labor stability and rapid growth are commonly viewed by economic and political leaders as crucial to economic development. The paralysis of this latter sector through strikes is therefore an important economic and political event, and the use of repression to control strikes may be especially problematic because of its effect on the skilled labor force in this sector and the greater difficulty of replacing skilled workers. If the workplace is owned by a foreign enterprise, sentiments of nationalism can provide strong ideological support for collective worker action. In both foreign-owned and public sector enterprises, the potential negative political ramifications of the extensive use of repression may be greater than in nationally owned firms in the private sector. In sum, many workers are situated at points in the process of production that give
them opportunities for collective action that may potentially have a considerable impact.

**Political Significance of Worker Organization and Protest.** Many authors argue that the collective action of workers has special political significance in the Latin American context. James L. Payne's [1965] widely noted thesis on "political bargaining" in Latin American labor relations suggests that in labor surplus economies such as those in many Latin American countries, unions' often weak position in the sphere of collective bargaining pushes them into the political arena. Further, in the relatively centralized political systems characteristic in much of Latin America, the national executive often quickly becomes involved in labor disputes, and key actors may commonly believe that the executive can and should "do something" about these disputes. Given this expectation, the failure to contain worker protest can threaten the stability of the national executive.

Other discussions view the political significance of workers' collective action in terms of its importance for the legitimation of the state (Waisman 1982:ix). The specific form of these arguments varies, but the recurring theme is the implicit or explicit comparative thesis that basic elements central to the legitimation of the state in some earlier-developing European countries are absent or incomplete in Latin America and that unions play a central role in efforts to compensate for this deficiency.

Part of the argument about incomplete legitimation revolves around the hypothesis that in the 20th-century world of nation states, the fundamental dependency of Latin American countries on the international economic system, the cycles of denationalization of their economies that occur as an aspect of this dependency, and the prominent role of foreign enterprises in economic development make the legitimation of capitalism and of the capitalist state more problematic than in contexts where development is nationally controlled to a greater degree (Hirschman 1979:90–93). As Corradi (1978) put it, due to their external dependency, Latin American societies are chronically "decentered" in the economic sphere.

Alternative perspectives that provide a link between incomplete legitimation and issues of worker politics appear in O'Donnell's analysis of the "mediations" between state and society and Corradi's discussion of the political consequences of this decentering. O'Donnell [1977, 1979, 1982] suggests that given the uneven record of free elections and the problematic status of civil liberties in many Latin American countries, the mediation of citizenship has had a troubled history in the region, and two other mediations have played a larger role: nationalism and "populism." Corradi makes a parallel argument in analyzing the consequences of economic "decentering." In reaction to this decentering, the political sphere is "the domain in which a society that has no control over its own destiny tries to repair the ravages of foreign domination." Thus, "culture and politics seek to integrate, from inside dependent societies, what economic power operating essentially from abroad, tends to disintegrate. This attempt at integration is what gives Latin American culture and politics their peculiar flavor. It is expressed most distinctively in 'populist' movements" (1978:41). Corradi also notes that in contrast to the postulated dependence of the economic sphere, these expressions of populism in the cultural and political sphere can exhibit an important degree of autonomy from economic forces. His argument about autonomy is consistent with the perspective we adopt in stressing the distinctive dynamic surrounding the political dilemmas of state-labor relations.

A further variant of this perspective on incomplete legitimation is found in the thesis that labor's importance is greater because Latin American development has not produced a strong national capitalist class. An early version of this argument was presented by Leon Trotsky in the late 1930s while he was living in exile in Mexico. Reflecting on the coalitional dilemmas of the political systems found in dependent, "semi-colonial" economies, Trotsky observed that "inasmuch as the chief role in backward countries is not played by national but by foreign capitalism, the national bourgeoisie occupies . . . a much more minor position." He argued that, as a consequence:

The national proletariat soon begins playing the most important role in the life of the country. In these conditions the national government, to the extent that it tries to show resistance to foreign capital, is compelled to a greater or lesser degree to lean on the proletariat. On the other hand, the governments of those backward countries which consider it inescapable or more profitable for themselves to march shoulder to shoulder with foreign capital, destroy the labour organizations and institute a more or less totalitarian regime. (Trotsky 1968:10)

Though coalitional alternatives in Latin America are certainly more complex than this, Trotsky's observations usefully suggest that the tension in labor policy between a concern with the mobilization of labor support and with labor control can take a particularly acute, politically charged, form.

The crucial point for present purposes is that the organized working class is one of the most important "bearers" of the mediations and political symbols relevant to the problem of legitimacy. In O'Donnell's terms, the segment of the population that is by definition the bearer of the mediation of lo popular and also an important bearer of the mediation of nationalism is commonly referred to as the "popular sector." With obvious variations across pressed classes, but as victims of poverty and governmental indifference, who, moreover, embodied what was most authentically national" (1982, chap. 1).

1 O'Donnell refers to this third mediation in Spanish as the *pueblo* or *lo popular*. These terms are difficult to translate, since the most nearly equivalent terms in English—people and popular—have different connotations. Hence, we have used the term *populism*. In O'Donnell's analysis, these Spanish terms refer to a form of collective identity of previously marginalized sectors of the population "whose recognition as members of the nation came about through their demands for substantive justice, which they posed not as op-

2 The popular sector may be defined as the urban and rural lower class and lower middle class. This is obviously not a traditional Marxist class category. For an exploration of some of these issues, see Laclau [1977].
countries and over time, the two most important actors within this sector are the organized labor movement—due to its special capacity for collective action discussed above—and, in some very important cases, an organized and politically mobilized peasantry. Populist appeals have of course been made to other segments of the popular sector, and beginning in the 1970s new forms of popular social movements based in the informal sector appeared to assume a larger role in Latin American politics. Yet over a number of decades in the 20th century, though obviously with major contrasts in their relative importance in different countries, these two principal segments of the urban and rural popular sectors—the labor movement and the peasantry—have produced the most important organized expressions of these mediations.

By securing the visible cooperation of the organized labor movement, the state can take an important step toward addressing problems of legitimacy. Alternatively, the labor movement can be a principal vehicle for protest against state policy and such protest can hurt the legitimacy of the state. With reference to the policies that raise issues of nationalism and antinationalism, unions can be either an invaluable resource for governments that wish to take nationalistic initiatives, or an important adversary of governments that reject such policies.

In sum, the collective action perspective calls attention to unions’ concrete capacity to bestow support or generate opposition. The perspective that focuses on nationalism, populism, and legitimacy suggests why the collective action of workers becomes a potent force in Latin American politics, and why state responses to worker protest likewise become a pivotal domain of policy. These two perspectives offer a clearer basis for understanding why the coalitional role of labor can be “constantly unsettling,” as Wilde put it. It can be constantly unsettling because labor not only has this substantial capacity for collective action, but because its collective action touches on larger, underlying issues of Latin American politics.

Putting State-Labor Relations in Perspective

At the same time that we emphasize political importance of the labor movement, we also wish to place labor politics in a realistic perspective by raising four points concerning the relation of the “formal” to the “informal” sector of the economy, the issue of the homogeneity versus heterogeneity of the labor force in the formal sector, the relationship between state-labor and capital-labor relations, and a recent challenge to arguments, such as that presented above, that focus on legitimacy.

**Formal and Informal Sector.** Studies of the urban working class quite properly see the labor movement and unions as just one part of a complex world of work, and these studies at times express concern over an excessive focus on the organized labor movement. As one explores claims about the political importance of the labor movement, it is essential to be clear about what sector one is considering.

**Labor and the State**

Spalding (1972:214) urges caution in not overstating the importance of organized labor in Latin America, noting that “despite the existence of huge confederations, sometimes grouping more than a million members on paper, only about 15% of the economically active population belongs to a union. . . . The industrial sector, usually the focus of militant labor organization, represents only approximately 30% of the salaried population.” Sofer (1980:175) presents similar arguments, suggesting that “studies of political parties and trade unions . . . focus attention on a minority of workers and give short shrift to the unorganized.”

Obviously, it is not productive to base an argument about the political importance of unions on a simplified notion that they include most of the labor force or are in some sense “representative” of the larger urban working class, encompassing unorganized workers and the informal as well as the formal sector. It is also essential to recognize the large contribution of studies reflecting the concerns of the “new labor history” in shedding light on this larger world of work in Latin America and its impact on societal change.

Far from maintaining that the labor movement represents this larger world of work, we adopt the perspective of Portes and Walton (1975:103–4), who differentiate sharply between the formal and informal sectors, treating them as different classes with distinct interests and distinct relationships to other classes within society. This “class differentiation” within the broader “working class” resulted in important measure from the special capacity for collective action of specific segments of the working population. The formal sector emerged as the product of the political demands of these segments of the working class and of state policies that responded to, or sought to preempt, these demands, leading to the creation of a formal, regulated, “high-wage” sector of the labor force that became differentiated from the more “traditional” informal sector (Portes 1983). Thus, the formal sector was created by politics and public policy, and its existence is in part an expression of the political importance of the labor movement. In addition, one of the major policy periods in which these policy initiatives occurred was, of course, what we call the incorporation period. Thus, the present study can be understood as an analysis of an important aspect of the genesis of the formal sector of the economy and of the ramifications of this genesis for the larger evolution of politics.

**Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity.** A second point of caution regarding the political importance of the labor movement concerns the relationship between the labor movement and the larger context of work within the formal sector. Jelin observes that studies of the working class that focus at the level of unions and union politics tend to see the working class as a more homogeneous actor, whereas studies focused on the labor force within the workplace tend to see the working class as more heterogeneous. In research

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3 This thesis was explored in depth in a public lecture given by Jelin at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, in 1981.
on union politics, there is a risk of misrepresenting the diversity and complexity of the unionized sector of the work force.

This tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity raises issues that are both methodological and substantive. They are methodological in the sense that the level of analysis influences what is observed. A macro study of national trade union politics is indeed more likely to focus on the overall characteristics of the "forest," whereas a micro study of one or a few specific contexts of work tends to focus on the characteristics of individual "trees." From the first perspective, the forest looks more homogeneous; from the second, much less so. Both perspectives are needed to advance the understanding of Latin American labor, as they are in the analysis of any topic.

In addition, a substantive issue is involved, in that union formation and state-labor relations have an impact on these realities of homogeneity and heterogeneity. It is certainly the case that there is a high degree of heterogeneity within even the organized sector of the labor movement. However, it is worth noting that both in the course of initial union formation and subsequently, labor leaders and labor organizations seek to homogenize the labor movement as they attempt to bring it under their own leadership (S. Valenzuela 1983), trying to standardize conditions of work, units of collective bargaining, and often the political orientation of unionists. This homogenization is also pursued by actors within the state. Both the initial incorporation projects and subsequent state policy toward labor represent in part a systematic effort to standardize and homogenize the labor movement and relationships of work. Thus, a process of aggregation and homogenization is integral to the evolution of labor leadership, of union organization, and of state-union relations. At the same time, changes in the nature of work, changes in the labor movement, and many other factors may disaggregate, make more heterogeneous, or even destroy existing patterns of labor leadership, labor organization, and state-union relations.

In attempting to adopt an interactive approach to the relationship between the labor movement and political structures, we seek to be sensitive to both the methodological and substantive side of this issue. Thus, in analyzing union politics, we recognize that: [1] we are focusing only on one segment of the labor force, the formal sector; [2] this sector was created by politics and public policy in response to labor activation; [3] although there is always a risk that a focus on union politics can lead the analyst to see the labor movement as more homogeneous than it really is, such homogenization is inherent to the functioning of unions and state-labor relations and indeed is central to the topic of this book; and [4] at the same time that those who benefit from this homogenization will seek to defend the institutions that support it, others who benefit less may seek to modify or undermine these institutions. It is in part because of recurrent attempts to undermine these institutions that the legacy of episodes of labor policy such as the initial incorporation periods are often sharply contested.

**State-Labor versus Capital-Labor Relations.** A third issue is the relative significance of state-labor relations, the central focus of this analysis, as opposed to capital-labor relations. One perspective suggests that in Latin American state-labor relations may in fact be more important than employer-labor relations. This thesis is central to J. Payne's (1968) argument about political bargaining. Payne maintains that due to labor's weak position in the labor market and greater leverage in the political arena, a pattern of industrial relations emerges in which political bargaining is more important than collective bargaining as a means of pursuing labor gains. The implication is that to a greater degree than in the advanced industrial economies, state-labor relations are the crucial arena of interaction, rather than employer-labor relations. Goodman [1973:21] likewise underlined the paramount importance of the state in shaping labor relations in Latin America, though he stresses that in distinct historical periods and different countries, the form taken by state-labor-manager relations is diverse.

However, as Roxborough (1981:84–85) has pointed out, the degree to which the state plays a larger role in labor relations in Latin America than in the advanced industrial countries can easily be exaggerated. Further, with reference to Payne's argument about political bargaining, it is possible to suggest that instead of positing a tradeoff between the strength of labor organizations in the workplace and their strength in the political arena, one should think in terms of a complementarity between these two dimensions. By virtue of being a weak economic actor, labor may also be a weak political actor; or at the very least, a political actor deprived of the clout that comes from economic strength.5

The argument we wish to present does not depend on the thesis that state-labor relations are more important than state-capital relations. Rather, it makes more sense to argue that state-labor relations revolve in part around the distinctive political dynamics of support and legitimation discussed above, and that they therefore merit substantial attention in their own right. Bendix (1964:72–73) makes a parallel point in analyzing the earlier history of advanced industrial countries, suggesting that the initial emergence of labor movements and labor protest was fully as much a political issue as an economic issue. This political issue is our central concern.

**Legitimacy.** Part of the argument about the political importance of the labor movement has focused on its role in contributing to, or undermining, legitimacy. Before embracing this perspective, it is appropriate to consider Przeworski's (1986:50–53) important challenge to analyses of regime change which focus on legitimacy. Przeworski argues that "the entire problem of legitimacy is . . . incorrectly posed. What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives" [51–52].

5 In countries and historical periods where a large public sector is unionized and the state is the owner of enterprises, these categories obviously overlap. But in many decades earlier in this century that are of central concern to this analysis, public ownership of enterprises was more limited and public sector unions were considerably less important within the labor movement.

5 Albert Fishlow, personal communication, suggested this observation.
Przeworski has thus presented an invaluable challenge, which points to the need to analyze regime change at a more concrete level. The key question that must be addressed in responding to this challenge is the following: what are the attributes of given political “alternatives” that lead key actors to view them as “preferable”? It is evident that in the Latin American context, the identification [or conspicuous lack of identification] of the symbols of nationalism and populism with given regime alternatives can play a crucial role in defining these alternatives as desirable or undesirable. In addition, labor politics plays an important role in this process of definition. Therefore, even accepting Przeworski’s framework, these symbolic dimensions of labor politics can be seen as closely linked to regime dynamics.

To conclude, arguments about the labor movement’s political importance are complex and need to be made in light of the issues and challenges just discussed. However, within that framework there is substantial ground for viewing the labor movement as a powerful political actor in Latin America and for using the analysis of labor politics as a perspective from which to explore broader issues of political change.

**Control, Support, and the Dual Dilemma**

In light of the labor movement’s political importance, it becomes clearer why, in distinguishing among types of initial incorporation, we have focused on the varying degree of emphasis on control and support mobilization. Having the capacity to control the labor movement is a major political asset, as is the capacity to mobilize labor’s political support. Similarly, the lack of either of these capacities can be a major political liability.

In the analysis of such assets and liabilities, it must be recognized that the relationship between control and support mobilization is complex, even if the matter is looked at only from the side of the state. If one’s perspective also encompasses the strategies adopted by the labor movement, the matter becomes even more complex.

This complexity may usefully be viewed in the framework of a “dual dilemma” in the relationship between the state and organized labor. From the standpoint of leaders who shape state policy, the dilemma concerns this choice between the option of controlling labor and seeking to mobilize labor support. On the side of the labor movement, the dilemma concerns the choice between cooperating with the state or resisting such cooperation, as well as the related choice between entering or not entering into the sphere of partisan politics.

**Dilemma from the Standpoint of the Labor**. From the perspective of political leaders who shape state policy, the emergence of the working class raises explosive issues of how to control this powerful new force within society, but it also presents the opportunity to mobilize new bases of political support. Both of these options can be compelling.

The state in Latin America has been and continues to be centrally con-

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L A B O R A N D T H E S T A T E

cerned with controlling organized labor and limiting its political and economic strength. This control is a central issue in capitalist development and ultimately involves what O’Donnell has referred to as the issue of maintaining “cellular domination” in society, that is, the basic capacity of capital and the state to regulate the functioning of the economy in the workplace [1982:chap. 1]. Historically, the growth of the state’s concern with the control of labor was closely connected with the long-term erosion of more traditional systems of private, clientelistic control of workers in the course of modernization. In the context of this erosion, the emergence of an organized working class poses a basic challenge to the existing distribution of economic and political power, a challenge that we explore in some detail in the next chapter.

At the same time, the option of cultivating labor support can be compelling. Political divisions even within a relatively narrow political elite may encourage a more progressively oriented faction to increase its power through building labor support, following a pattern of mobilization as an opposition strategy (Schattschneider 1960). Governments that adopt nationalistic economic policies commonly find labor support highly compatible with this policy orientation.

However, such efforts at support mobilization characteristically involve sharp disjunctures in political coalitions that may produce intense conflict, making them potentially risky to initiate and difficult to sustain. To use Wilde’s phrase, the constantly unsettling character of this dilemma is reflected in the fact that the reaction to “pro-labor” policies and to the mobilization of workers as a support base has been a central issue triggering many of the most dramatic regime changes in 20th-century Latin America. The dilemma centers around whether unions should play a broader political role, either by establishing labor parties as political arms or by forming coalitions with other sectors.

One aspect of the dilemma for labor is the issue of cooperation with the state. From its early anarchist tradition, the labor movement has been aware of the risk of co-optation and control that can result from such collaboration. However, the failure to collaborate can leave labor without allies, influence, and access to policymakers and public agencies. It entails foregoing the opportunity to establish an exchange relationship that can yield important benefits. The attraction of these benefits is particularly great in situations like those in early 20th-century Latin America, when the conditions of work left labor in a weak position and when the alternative was often repression.

6 Obviously, clientelistic forms of control and other forms of clientelistic relationships persist, yet they are supplemented by new forms of control and political articulation. See Kaufman (1977a).
A variant of the dilemma concerns the link not just to the state, but to political activity and political parties more broadly—the issue of whether or not to enter the political arena and seek political office. Again, the dilemma derives from the influence that can be gained by winning public office—if only in a minority and opposition status—versus the risk of subordination of the union movement to the political logic of party politics and elections.

In fact, within Latin America the apolitical alternative has seldom been viable. This is due in part to labor's often weak position in the workplace, to the ability of the state to influence labor with both carrots and sticks, and to Comintern policy, which at important moments mandated cooperation with the state for the communist sector of the labor movement. Nevertheless, both in theory and in practice, the dilemma between autonomy and the advantages that can be gained through political participation, including at times state protection, is a real one.

**Relative Impact of the State's Choices and Labor's Choices.** How important are the state's choices, as opposed to labor's choices, as they resolve their respective sides of this dual dilemma? The answer depends on what specific outcome is to be explained—that is, important for what?

If one wishes to explain why the incorporation periods occurred to begin with, it was obviously because a working class emerged, constituted itself as a labor movement, and often decided to challenge, rather than cooperate with, the state. On the other hand, if one wishes to explain why the incorporation periods took the specific form they did in each country, the answer will focus more centrally on the dynamics of intraelite politics and choices by actors within the state, although at various points choices made within the labor movement were also important.

In the countries identified in the Overview as cases of state incorporation, characterized by a sustained attempt to control and depoliticize the labor movement, the incorporation period was imposed on labor, with repression when necessary. Hence, the strategies of the labor movement toward cooperation or noncooperation with the state were of marginal relevance to the form of incorporation. On the other hand, labor's reaction became very important in the aftermath of incorporation.

In the cases of party incorporation, the political logic from the standpoint of leaders acting within the state was again crucial, but the strategy of labor was more central, and the incorporation period must be seen as the outcome of the interaction between the two sides of the dilemma. To address the labor movement's demands and overcome its reluctance to cooperate, actors in the state seeking to mobilize labor support at times had to pursue prolabor policies more aggressively than they otherwise would have, as the price of securing cooperation and support.

To capture this interaction in our analysis of the incorporation period in Chapter 5, we begin the discussion of each country by examining the goals of actors within the state (i.e., the project from above) and then explore the goals of leaders of the labor movement (i.e., the project from below). The discussion then proceeds to explore the interplay between these two projects.

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**An Interactive Perspective on Corporatism**

Given the utility of an interactive perspective on state-labor relations, it is useful to go one step further and show how the social science concept—and the political practice—of corporatism can be understood from this perspective. State-labor relations in Latin America have been widely interpreted as corporative. In most of the countries considered in this study, the dual dilemma unfolds within this corporative context, and the policy instruments employed by the state as it addresses the dual dilemma are in part the instruments of corporatism. This is especially true in the initial incorporation periods, one of the most important historical episodes in which corporative structures were introduced.

**Components of Corporatism.** We have elsewhere defined state-group relations as corporative to the degree that there is (1) state structuring of groups that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive, compulsory interest associations; (2) state subsidy of these groups; and (3) state-imposed constraints on demand-making, leadership, and internal governance. Corporatism is thus a nonpluralist system of group representation. In contrast to the pattern of interest politics based on autonomous, competing groups, in the case of corporatism the state encourages the formation of a limited number of officially recognized, noncompeting, state-supervised groups.

Though at times it may be useful to view corporatism as a single syndrome of political relationships, to pursue these issues of control and support mobilization it is helpful to disaggregate the concept. The creation of corporative frameworks for shaping labor movements occurs in the context of very different relationships of economic and political power—as was already suggested in the typology of incorporation periods in the Overview—and this diversity suggests that there may be variations and subtypes of corporatism. In fact, some corporative provisions bestow advantages upon the labor organizations that receive them, whereas others do not. Important organizational benefits are bestowed both by provisions for the structuring of unions [such as official recognition, monopoly of representation, and compulsory membership] and also by the subsidy of unions. These provisions are quite distinct...

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8 This generalization does not apply to Uruguay, where the incorporation period was pluralistic rather than corporative. At the level of corporative labor legislation, it likewise does not apply to Peru. Due to the legislative paralysis at the height of the incorporation period in Peru, little labor legislation was passed. However, in other respects a corporative pattern was followed in Peru, and in both Peru and Uruguay the larger ideas about political exchange developed below are relevant (see Chapter 5).

9 The following discussion draws on Collier and Collier (1979).

10 We deliberately use the expression "constraints" to refer to these specific provisions, employing the term "control" more broadly, as in the above discussion.
from the constraints, which directly control labor organizations and labor leaders.

The idea that structuring and subsidy are benefits is supported by more general research on political organizations, which suggests that these provisions do in fact address basic organizational needs of labor unions. These include the need to compete successfully with rival groups that seek to represent the same constituency, the need to be recognized as the legitimate representative of their constituency in dealings with other sectors of society, the need to recruit and retain members, and the need for stable sources of income. Because structuring and subsidy help meet these needs, they confer significant advantages to the unions that receive them.

Although these provisions may be of value to any interest association, two of them meet special organizational needs of unions. Provisions for compulsory membership have long been seen as crucial to the formation of unions, and their importance becomes clear in the problems of collective action that arise when strikes are conducted by individuals associated with two basic factors of production: capital and labor. Individual capitalists can protest the direction of economic or political change simply by failing to invest. They do not require collective organization to carry out what might be thought of as a “capital strike,” and hence to have a major political and economic impact. Labor is far more dependent on collective action if it is to influence the economy and the polity. Further, whereas capitalists can consume rather than invest, the immediate economic hardship to individual workers who withdraw their labor is necessarily much greater, reducing the incentive to make such a decision on an individual basis and further increasing the need to aggregate individual decisions in order to undertake such a withdrawal (see Offe 1985). Hence, corporative provisions for compulsory membership that enforce participation in certain forms of collective behavior have a special value for unions.

Second, because unions bring together individuals of low income, the problem of financial resources is far greater than it is for the interest associations of capitalists or many other groups. Hence, provisions for the subsidy and financing of unions are particularly important.

**Inducements and Constraints.** Though structuring and subsidy thus provide important organizational benefits to unions, one must understand the political context in which these provisions appear in order to interpret their significance. As we have emphasized, corporative policies toward organized labor in Latin America have been introduced from above by political leaders acting through the state who have used these policies to help them pursue various goals, including the effort to control the behavior of the labor movement and/or to win its political support. It therefore seems appropriate, at least within the Latin American setting, to view structuring and subsidy not simply as benefits but as inducements through which the state attempts to persuade organized labor to support the state, to cooperate with its goals, and to accept the constraints it imposes. In this context, corporatism may thus be viewed as an exchange based on an interplay between inducements and constraints.

However, though one can distinguish between inducements and constraints, they are not diametrically opposed phenomena. This point brings us back to the theme raised above: the idea that state efforts at imposing control and mobilizing support can be, in their ultimate consequences, interconnected in complex ways. Analysts of power and influence such as Laswell and Kaplan (1950:97–98) and Gamson (1968) distinguish between inducements and constraints but view both as mechanisms that serve to influence behavior. Constraints are seen as producing compliance by the application, or threat of application, of negative sanctions or “disadvantages.” Inducements, by contrast, are offered to produce compliance by the application of “advantages” (Gamson 1968:74–77). In this literature, inducements are viewed as mechanisms of co-optation. As such, though they involve “advantages,” they can also lead to social control.

The dual character of inducements is evident in the specific mechanisms of structuring and subsidy discussed above. These inducements may, like the constraints, ultimately lead to state penetration and domination of labor organizations, for at least three reasons. First, an inducement such as monopoly of representation by its nature is offered to some labor organizations and withheld from others. This provision has commonly been used in Latin America to undermine radical unions and promote those favored by the state. Second, unions receiving inducements must commonly meet various formal requirements to receive them. Finally, the granting of official recognition, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, or subsidy by the state may make the leadership dependent on the state, rather than on union members, for the union’s legitimacy and viability. This dependency may encourage the tendency for labor leadership to become an oligarchy less responsive to workers than to the concerns of state agencies or political lead-

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12 This is true especially in the early phase of the labor movement before the emergence of middle-class unions. Obviously, the working-class unions may include a “high wage” sector, but relative to capitalists, members’ incomes are low.
ers with which the leaders interact. The dual nature of the inducements explains why high levels of inducements, as well as constraints, are often instituted by governments that are indifferent to cultivating labor support and whose goal is to produce a docile, controlled labor movement, as occurred in the cases of state incorporation analyzed in Chapter 5.

**Labor Movement Responses.** If both inducements and constraints can ultimately lead to control, it remains to be demonstrated that labor organizations really desire to receive the inducements—that these provisions in fact induce labor organizations to cooperate with the state and to accept the constraints. A preliminary examination of the evidence suggests this is often the case.

A useful opportunity to observe labor leaders’ assessments of different corporative provisions is in the debate that often arises during the incorporation period, at the time of enactment of the first major legislation that provides a basis for legalizing unions and that commonly includes a number of inducements and constraints for the unions that become legally incorporated under the terms of the law. An important example is found in Argentina. The dominant sector of the Argentine labor movement initially rejected the labor policies of the military government that came to power in Argentina in June of 1943. Only when Perón began to adopt the program of this sector of the movement—that is, to support the organizational goals of labor as well as its substantive demands on bread and butter issues, in part through a labor law that placed heavy emphasis on inducements—did major sectors of the labor movement begin to accept his offer of cooperation (Silverman 1967:134–35).

In Mexico the reaction of the labor movement to the first national labor law in 1931 again reflected the dual nature of the law, encompassing both inducements and constraints. Labor leaders objected to certain constraints—the provisions for federal supervision of their records, finances, and membership lists—whereas they accepted the provisions for the recognition of unions, defined above as an inducement. Furthermore, they were dissatisfied over the absence of compulsory membership, a provision that we have identified as an inducement (Clark 1934:215; Harker 1937:95).

The debate within the labor movement over the passage of the 1924 labor law in Chile reflects this same pattern. The dominant Marxist sector of the movement generally accepted the new system, arguing that it had to “use all the social legislation of the capitalist state to fight capitalism itself” (quoted in Morris 1966:246). The debate within the labor movement showed that although this sector opposed the constraints contained in the law, it was attracted by the law’s provisions that would help it extend its organization to new economic sectors and allow it to receive a state-administered financial subsidy derived from profit-sharing. The inducements contained in the law were thus initially sufficient to motivate the dominant sector of the labor movement to cooperate with the state.

The 1924 Chilean law illustrates another point as well. Though the inducements offered by the state have often been sufficient to win the cooperation of labor, this has not always been the case. Historically, the anarchists were acutely aware not only of the costs of the constraints that accompany the inducements, but also of the tendency of the inducements to lead to control. Thus, following the traditional anarchist position regarding the risks of co-optation arising from cooperation with the state, the anarchist sector of the Chilean labor movement rejected the 1924 law completely. Another example is the 1943 law in Argentina, which was widely opposed by organized labor. At that point the state was not willing to extend sufficient inducements to win the cooperation of the labor movement, which rejected the constraints. It is noteworthy that the Peronist law of 1945 provided the necessary level of inducements and was accepted by the labor movement, despite its similarly high level of constraints.

These examples suggest that although some labor groups will resist these inducements, the inducements have in fact served to win their cooperation and to persuade them to accept the constraints. Furthermore, the distinction between inducements and constraints is not merely an analytic point of concern to social scientists. It is, rather, a vital political issue in the history of state-union relations in Latin America, one which we will observe being played out at various points in the historical analysis below.

In conclusion, two observations may be underlined. First, this interaction among the components of corporatism, along with the closely related theme of the dual dilemma in state-labor relations, plays a central role in framing the analysis of both the incorporation periods and the legacy of corporatism. Second, the picture that emerges is not static, but highly dynamic. Thus, the introduction of corporative provisions of state-labor relations, often during the incorporation periods, should not be understood as producing structures or institutions that are unchanging. The literature on corporatism has repeatedly noted a major divergence between the goals of actors in the state who introduce corporatism, the initial reality of the corporative structures, and the ultimate consequences of these structures. The question of how this divergence occurs is a central theme of this study.

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Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest

Beginning in the latter decades of the 19th century, older patterns of worker association oriented toward mutual aid societies began to give way to new forms of collective action. By the end of the second decade of the 20th century, most of the eight countries had seen the emergence of substantial labor movements and dramatic episodes of worker protest. Although the middle sectors would ultimately play a far more central role in initiating the change in government that brought the major challenge to oligarchic hegemony, it was the working class that was in a position at an earlier point to make its demands felt through the vehicle of mass protest and to pose what came to be known as the “social question.”

The emergence of worker organization and protest grew out of the expansion of Latin American economies that occurred in response to a remarkable 25-fold increase in world trade between approximately the middle of the 19th century and the beginning of World War I (Furtado 1976:45). During this period, the primary product export sector within Latin America exhibited extraordinary growth. Though political factors played a role, the emergence of the labor movement cannot be understood without central reference to the economic, social, and demographic transformations of this era.

The character of these economic transformations varied greatly from country to country. According to their contrasting endowments of location, climate, and natural and human resources, these countries developed distinct combinations of extensive agriculture, intensive agriculture, and extraction of minerals and petroleum; contrasting patterns of urban-commercial development and incipient manufacturing for the domestic market; and vastly different degrees of reliance on European immigration to expand the modern labor force.

This chapter explores the impact of distinct constellations of growth on the emergence of national labor movements. The remainder of the book is, in effect, an analysis of the reactions and counterreactions to these initial developments. For each country, this chapter summarizes the contrasting patterns of economic and social change and then presents a brief account of the emerging labor movement. For all the countries, the account covers the period at least to 1920, thus providing a basis for comparing the rhythm of labor movement development in the last decade of the 19th century and in the first two decades of the 20th.

This part of the analysis has an important place in the larger design of the book. We argued in Chapter 1 that critical junctures such as the initial in-
corporation period can lay the foundation for political institutions that may come to have significant autonomy. By contrast, the present chapter explores a contrasting pattern in which the initial eruption of worker politicization appears to be strongly and directly linked to economic and social change.

A related goal of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the labor movement up to reform periods analyzed in the following chapter: that is, the periods inaugurated by the changes in government in 1920 in Chile, 1930 in Brazil, 1935 in Venezuela, 1911 in Mexico, 1903 in Uruguay, 1930 in Colombia, 1919 in Peru, and 1916 in Argentina. This analysis provides a “baseline” against which the subsequent interaction between the labor movement and state initiatives toward labor can be assessed. For the countries where the beginning of the incorporation period was delayed beyond these changes in government, we briefly extend this assessment to the onset of incorporation.

To help orient the reader, Figure 3.1 provides a chronological overview of the emergence of labor protest and its timing in relation to the reform period and to major international events.

Grievances, Demonstration Effect, and Opportunity for Collective Action

The emergence of labor organizing and protest derived from an interaction among (1) the collective grievances created by dismal conditions of work typical of the early history of industrialization and commercial development in many countries, (2) the demonstration effect of European labor movements, especially the anarcho-syndicalist tradition of Spain and Italy and later the Russian Revolution and the international Communist movement; and (3) workers’ opportunity to pursue new forms of collective action that was created by the rapid growth of the working class and by special forms of concentration of workers in new contexts of work, such as export enclaves.

With regard to grievances concerning conditions of employment, it is true that wages were sufficiently high in certain periods in some countries to attract large numbers of European immigrants into working-class employment, and indeed in various occupational categories, wages in Buenos Aires around 1914 were higher than those in Paris and Marseilles (Díaz-Alejandro 1970:41). However, wages were generally low, and even in the best of cases their purchasing power was subject to sharp fluctuations and tended to fall rapidly with inflation, as occurred during World War I in many countries. Workers’ loss of purchasing power at this time was one of the factors contributing to the dramatic, continent-wide wave of worker protest in the late 1910s [Skidmore 1979:97].

Hours of employment were typically long, days of rest few. Employers had

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**Figure 3.1 Emergence of Labor Protest: Timing in Relation to Onset of Reform Period and Major International Events**

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
little concern with occupational safety, work injury tended to be the responsibility of the employee. Regulations concerning working conditions of women and children did not yet exist, and, more broadly, terms of employment were defined with an informality that provided little protection for workers. Worker organizing, demands for collective bargaining, and strikes were commonly met with violence from the police, the army, private security forces, and strikebreakers. Correspondingly, early concerns of the labor movement included higher wages, the eight-hour day, days of rest, occupational safety, indemnification for work injury, regulation of the working conditions of women and children, the right to collective organization and collective bargaining, and the right to strike.

Obviously, these conditions of work varied both over time and among countries, and at certain points such variations will be considered in the analysis. An example is the impact on worker protest of the wage-price squeeze during World War I. For the purpose of the analysis in this chapter, however, we will in general treat these conditions of work as a common problem of all the countries, rather than as a principal source of variation among them.

The second major factor shaping labor movements was the demonstration effect of developments in Europe. Especially prior to the emergence of distinctively Latin American populist movements beginning in the 1930s, the basic political alternatives within the Latin American labor movement—architect, anarcho-syndicalist, socialist, and communist—as well as the timing of their emergence were all derived from the European experience. The demonstration effect of the Russian Revolution, which was seen as a model of successful seizure of power by a working-class movement, contributed to the dramatic surge of worker protest throughout the Western world after 1917, when workers “from Berlin to Turin, from Chicago to Lima, from São Paulo to Buenos Aires, rose in general strikes against their employers and the state” (Skidmore 1979a:97). The Russian Revolution and the emerging communist parties also presented a model of labor organization oriented toward strong links between unions and political parties, a model whose growing importance contributed to the decline of anarchism [Spalding 1977:54]. In subsequent decades the changing policy of the Communist International toward class collaboration interacted in crucial ways with other features of each country’s labor history. Finally, the United States government and the United States labor movement played a role during this period, particularly in Mexico, though their role would become even greater after the second World War.

These international influences contributed to a common rhythm of labor movement development shared by a number of countries. Within that framework, major variations among countries in the scope of worker organizing and protest can best be understood in light of internal economic, demographic, and social dynamics within countries that created the opportunity for workers to organize and protest. The literature on the emergence of labor movements in Latin America1 exhibits a broad consensus on the socioeconomic conditions of special relevance to creating this opportunity: (1) urban-commercial development, (2) industrial growth, (3) the emergence of isolated enclaves of export production, (4) conditions of labor shortage [or labor surplus], and (5) European immigration. Obviously, the comparative discussion of a limited set of factors such as these cannot possibly do justice to all the forces that create opportunities for labor movement formation. However, it can take an important step toward explaining the emergence of labor movements and can serve as a point of reference in the larger analysis of links between this socioeconomic context and the broader political transformations that are the focus of this book.2

Urban-Commercial Development. The growth of large cities and urban commerce created an important part of the demographic base for labor movements in Latin America, and the earliest instances of worker organization and protest were commonly found in the national capital—or, in the case of Brazil, also in São Paulo—among typographers, bakers, and workers in urban transportation and services. As a first approximation, one may compare countries on this dimension by assessing the overall growth of the largest city or cities. In comparing cities, it is useful to consider both the absolute size of the largest urban centers, which provides a measure of the magnitude of urban-commercial activity, and also their relative size—that is, their proportional importance within the national context.3 This latter variable captures such basic contrasts as that between a country where the largest city represented 2.5 percent of the national population [Mexico City in 1900] as opposed to nearly 27 percent [Montevideo in 1920; see Table 3.1 below]. The sharply contrasting development of multiple urban centers in different countries also makes it appropriate to consider an indicator such as the proportion of national population in urban centers over 20,000, which, when juxtaposed

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2 In discussing arguments about links between socioeconomic conditions and the emergence of labor movements, it is important to note the risk of a reductionist view that sees labor movement development as arising directly out of socioeconomic change. We agree with the criticism made, for instance, by Katznelson and Zolberg (1986:introduction) of the analytic perspective from which working-class consciousness, activation, and organizing is conflated with the process of proletarianization itself. Indeed, the focus of this book, with its emphasis on the incorporation period, is precisely on how political factors mediate the relationship between the creation of a working class in the context of socioeconomic change and the emergence of its political role. Nevertheless, it is also useful to explore the direct links between socioeconomic change and the emergence of the labor movement, since these links obviously are also of substantial importance.
3 For an insightful assessment of the use of per capita versus absolute indicators in research on Latin American development, see O’Donnell (1973:chap. 1).
with the proportion in the capital, permits an assessment of the importance of secondary urban centers [see Table 3.2 below].

**Industrial Growth.** The growth of manufacturing and factory employment also created new contexts of work conducive to labor movements. The expansion of manufacturing in Latin America is often seen as associated with a later era of economic development, involving the period of “import-substituting industrialization” in the 1930s and after. Yet in many countries a manufacturing sector began to grow in the latter part of the 19th century, though the size of manufacturing establishments tended to be small during this earlier period. By the first decades of the 20th century, and in some cases earlier, workers in an incipient manufacturing sector, especially textile workers, played an important role in the labor movement. It is again useful to view this development both in terms of the absolute number of workers, which suggests the degree to which a critical mass of workers may have emerged, and the relative weight of these workers within the national labor force, which points to such marked contrasts by 1925 as that between countries where the factory work force was roughly 1 percent of the economically active population (Peru and Venezuela), and those where it was roughly 8 percent [Argentina and Uruguay; see Table 3.3 below].

**Isolated Enclaves.** Isolated enclaves of economic activity such as mining, petroleum extraction, and spatially concentrated, modernized agriculture created contexts of work in which class antagonisms and class conflict become sharply focused [Di Tella 1968:386–87], and strong labor organizations were commonly found in these settings. Where such forms of production were foreign owned and played a crucial role in the export economy, this effect is even more pronounced, since worker protest often fused with sentiments of nationalism directed against the foreign enterprise, and the economic and political impact of strikes was enhanced due to the importance of the exported product for national revenues. Transportation workers who brought the products of the enclaves to national markets and international ports were also likely to sustain strong labor organizations, in part for the same reasons.

**Labor Shortages and Labor Surplus.** Labor surplus economies are commonly seen as depressing wages, inhibiting labor organization, and in other ways weakening workers’ bargaining position. Correspondingly, labor shortage economies are seen as conducive to the development of stronger labor movements. However, because the mechanisms through which these effects operate are complex and measurement of the relevant variables is difficult, the discussion will be limited to two aspects of this issue: the significance of a heavy inflow of European migrants into the urban labor market as an indicator of a labor shortage, and the onset of heavy internal rural-urban migration, which is commonly seen as increasing the urban labor surplus. In addition, labor shortages and labor surpluses associated with different phases of the business cycle and the resulting impact on the labor movement will at various points be noted.

**European Immigration.** The massive influx of European immigrants around the turn of the century had a major impact on the emergence of national labor movements. These immigrants made up a large portion of the working class populations of Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil in this early period, and the direct experience of many immigrants with labor movements in Europe played a central role in shaping labor movement development in these three countries. Through these immigrants, the demonstration effect of developments in European labor movements was conveyed in a far more direct fashion. These five factors certainly do not exhaust the variables that account for different patterns of labor movement development. We do not pretend to compare other factors systematically, but one that will be noted below on an ad hoc basis—a distinctive dynamic of political leadership—appears so important for the development of the Peruvian labor movement that it seems essential to introduce it.

### Approach to Comparison

In the discussion of each country, we sketch the economic and social context of labor movement development and the rise of the labor movement itself. Quantitative data available for these comparisons not surprisingly suffer from problems of reliability. In addition, appropriate comparative data are not always available for crucial time periods in certain countries. However, the goal of the present discussion is to establish a rough sense of orders of magnitude and an approximate ordering of the countries on the relevant variables. For this purpose, available comparative data are adequate. In fact, a close comparison of the data presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 with that in country monographs (see discussion of individual countries below) suggests that the comparative data are reasonably reliable.

Tables 3.1 to 3.3 present data, principally for the period around 1920–25, for some of the variables discussed above: the size of the national capitals plus São Paulo, presented in both absolute and per capita terms; the proportion of the labor surplus economy that makes collective bargaining ineffective and political bargaining essential from the standpoint of workers. In contexts of labor surplus, one might thus expect the interest of the labor movement in collective bargaining to be deflected to political action, so that there might be a stronger, rather than weaker, development of cer-
TABLE 3.1
Population of National Capitals Plus São Paulo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City Population</th>
<th>City Pop. as Percent of Nat. Pop.</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santiago</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>507,000</td>
<td>13.4 (3)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chile)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>713,000</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>811,443</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Brazil)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,157,843 (2)</td>
<td>4.2 (6)</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>239,820</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Brazil)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>579,033</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>344,721</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mexico)</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>471,066</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>615,000 (3)</td>
<td>4.3 (5)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>92,000 (8)</td>
<td>3.3 (7)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Venezuela)</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>393,000 (5)</td>
<td>26.9 (1)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Uruguay)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>482,000</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>144,000 (7)</td>
<td>2.5 (8)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Colombia)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima-Callao</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>170,417</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>A, B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Peru)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>255,000 (6)</td>
<td>5.3 (4)</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>663,854</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Argentina)</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1,575,814 (1)</td>
<td>20.0 (2)</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Order of countries corresponds to order of presentation in text and thereby juxtaposes the pairs of cases analyzed in later chapters. Numbers in parentheses reflect rankings of the eight capitals as of 1920, except for Buenos Aires (1914) and Bogotá (1918). Source A: Boyer and Davies 1973. Source B: Eakin 1978:400. Figure for Lima-Callao for 1903 combines data for Lima for 1903 from source A and data for Callao for 1905 from source B. All national population data are from Wilkie (1974: chap. 8) except for the 1895 figure for Argentina, which is from source A.

TABLE 3.2
Population in Urban Centers over 20,000 in 1920 as a Percent of National Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life Ch 27.6 (3)</th>
<th>Mex 12.6 (5)</th>
<th>Uru 27.8 (2)</th>
<th>Per 5.0 (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bra 13.0 (4)</td>
<td>Ven 11.7 (6)</td>
<td>Col 8.9 (7)</td>
<td>Arg 37.0 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers in parentheses reflect ranking among the eight countries. Data are from Wilkie and Haber 1983:86. Slight discrepancies vis-à-vis Table 3.1—such as that concerning the urban population of Peru in 1920—result from the use of different primary data sources.

The outcome to be explained is the rhythm and scope of worker organizing and protest, which may roughly be referred to as the initial "strength" of the labor movement, encompassing organizational strength both within and outside the workplace (S. Valenzuela 1983) and the capacity to use this organization in pursuit of collective goals. One important indicator of this capacity is the extent of collective protest.

Of the many conceptual issues that arise in the study of labor movements,
two of particular relevance to this analysis may be noted here. First, especially in later historical periods, when institutionalized labor movements develop stable relationships with governments and are able to extract policy concessions in exchange for limiting the scope of protest, protest by itself is a poor indicator of labor strength. However, in this earlier period, such relationships were far less common. Hence, scope of collective protest may be a more direct and useful indicator of labor movement strength.

Second, we can distinguish between an overall conception of the scope and strength of the labor movement and the particular form that the action of the labor movement may assume. Many hypotheses in the literature cited above are concerned with understanding this overall dimension, though some are concerned with explaining particular facets of labor movement development. An example of the latter is the hypothesis that the decline of anarchism and the growing concern in the labor movement with institutionalizing work relationships and developing stable ties with the national political system was in part a product of new concerns of workers that resulted from the decline of artisan production and the growing predominance of larger scale factory production [Alexander 1983]. Another example is Bergquist’s (1986) analysis of the conditions under which workers in the export sector contribute specifically to revolutionary forms of labor action. In the following discussion, attention will focus principally on the overall scope of organization and protest, at the same time that, as appropriate, distinct forms of worker activation such as these will be explored.

This text skips from the last page of the Introduction to Chapter 3 (p. 68) to the first page of the Conclusion to Chapter 3 (p. 93).

Conclusion

The emergence of labor movements, which sets our story into motion, had roots in the rapid economic growth that took place beginning in the second...
half of the 19th century in much of Latin America. The region saw the massive expansion of primary product exports, which in some cases occurred in conjunction with enclave development and which in general stimulated urban, commercial, and industrial growth. Part and parcel of this economic expansion was the emergence of a working class in the export, transportation, commercial, and manufacturing sectors. In relation to poor conditions of work and to European models of labor movement development, workers began to organize and protest, thereby opening up a new political agenda centered on the social question. They posed the issue of how the state and economic elites should respond to worker protest and new working-class demands. These demands appeared to many as a major assault on established order, even when they focused on such relatively modest issues as the eight-hour day or the regulation of worker safety. When they took the form of the revolutionary program of anarchism or communism, they were indeed threatening.

The strength of the labor movement and the scope of protest varied with a number of factors: the size of the emerging working class (in absolute and relative terms), its degree of concentration in urban and enclave areas, the conditions of labor shortage or surplus in the labor market, and the ideological and organizational models and experiences brought with European immigrants. This chapter has explored these factors and the resulting characteristics of labor organization and protest for each of the countries. At this point, it is appropriate to provide a more explicitly comparative summary that focuses on three dimensions: (1) a comparison of the economic and social contexts out of which labor movements emerged; (2) cross-sectional comparisons of labor movements during the roughly three decades covered in this chapter, and (3) a comparison of labor movement development by the onset of the reform period.

**Economic and Social Context.** Table 3.4 summarizes the socioeconomic development of the eight countries in terms of the factors conducive to the development of a strong labor movement. As can be seen in the table, while there is broad variation among countries, no country has a favorable score on all the variables, nor does any country have an unfavorable score on all of them. Thus, although Colombia probably had the conditions least favorable to a strong labor movement, it had at least some enclave production, was not at the very bottom on some of the socioeconomic indicators, and had at least some evidence of influence of European migrants. At the other end of the spectrum, Argentina probably had the most favorable conditions, yet lacked enclaves and did not have as pronounced a primate city pattern of development as some countries.

It is possible to sum the scores on the different variables, though doing so obviously involves arbitrary assumptions about relative weighting. Proceeding either with such an arithmetic sum or on a more impressionistic basis, a more-or-less clear ranking of countries emerges. Argentina appears to have had the most favorable conditions for labor movement development, followed by Chile and then Uruguay. For the earlier part of this period, Uruguay was tied with Mexico, if we presume that heavy rural-urban migration had not yet had a major impact on the urban labor market in Mexico, but was one position ahead of Mexico once this situation of Mexico changed in the first decades of the 20th century. The next ranked case would be Brazil, followed by Peru. In last place were Colombia and Venezuela, with the latter moving somewhat ahead after the development of the oil enclaves.

**Cross-Sectional Comparisons of Labor Movement Development.** An examination of the scope of the labor movement in a series of specific periods—the 1890s, the first decade of the 20th century, the first half of the 1910s, and the latter half of the 1910s—reveals a relatively clear ordering of countries (see Figure 3.1). Major episodes of labor protest occurred during the decade of the 1890s in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. In Mexico, in contrast to the other two countries, significant protest had begun a decade or so earlier. Some protest occurred in the 1890s in Brazil, and also in Uruguay and Peru, though on an even more limited scale. There is little or no evidence of an emerging labor movement either at this time or in the following decade in Colombia and Venezuela.

Roughly the same picture continues in the first decade of the 20th century. By this time the scope of protest in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, in that order of decreasing magnitude, had reached even greater proportions, including important worker insurrections, and Brazil likewise experienced major labor protest during this period. Uruguay and Peru also had a number of strikes, though in Uruguay most of this decade came after the onset of the reform period. The effect of the early reform period on labor activation may

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**Table 3.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions Supportive of Early Labor Movement Development</th>
<th>Ch</th>
<th>Br</th>
<th>Ve</th>
<th>Me</th>
<th>Uru</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>Pe</th>
<th>Ag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High on Absolute Size</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High on Per Capita Indicators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primate City Pattern</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclaves</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4/</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Immigrants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Surplus Economy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 4—Very Favorable; 3—Favorable; 2—Neutral; 1—Unfavorable; 0—Very Unfavorable. A slash indicates change within this early period. The last variable, labor surplus economy, is the only one for which more of the variable is less supportive of labor movement development. Hence, more labor surplus receives a lower score in this table.
help to explain why Uruguay was ahead of Peru at this time in terms of sustained labor organization.

The first half of the 1910s—prior to the major, continent-wide increase in labor protest during and after World War I—saw a relative lull in militancy in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. On the other hand, at this point the scope of strikes in Uruguay was substantial, though again this may be accounted for in part by the government’s support of strikes under the second Batlle administration. During these years Peru began to experience widespread strikes both in the urban and enclave sectors, though in part because of the far more repressive atmosphere in Peru the emergence of sustained labor organizations continued to be less common. At this point Venezuela and Colombia had at most sporadic labor protest and limited worker organization.

Finally, the years 1916–20 saw a major crescendo of labor protest, which took its more dramatic form in Argentina and then Chile, followed by Mexico, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil. In Argentina and Uruguay, again, this protest must be seen in light of the fact that it came after the onset of the reform period. This was the period of the first strikes in Colombia, which had a substantial impact on national consciousness, and in Venezuela it was still a period of limited, incipient protest.

On the basis of these cross-sectional comparisons, one might thus view Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, in that order, as having the most extensive early labor movements. Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil constitute an intermediate group of countries that had labor movements that were quite substantial, but significantly behind those in the first group. Colombia and finally Venezuela had the least developed labor movements.

Given the qualitative nature of the comparisons made here and the small number of cases, it is impossible to provide a strong test of individual hypotheses about the impact of the economic and social context presented at the beginning of the chapter, much less about their relative weight in explaining the emergence of the labor movements. However, juxtaposing the comparison of labor movement development just presented with the summary of the socioeconomic factors presented above, it is evident that the two orderings are similar. Further, the qualitative description of individual country patterns presented in the main body of this chapter is supportive of the general thrust of these hypotheses. Hence, though our evidence is not precise, the picture that emerges is one of strong links between socioeconomic change and the scope of labor organizing and protest.

**Labor Movement Development at Onset of Reform Period.** An important concern of this study is with the evolution of the labor movement up to the change in government that marks the onset of the reform period analyzed in the next chapter. It is therefore useful to compare the labor movements at the analytically equivalent point that corresponds to the onset of that period, in addition to comparing them in chronologically equivalent decades, as has just been done [Table 3.5]. In the three countries where the incorporation period was delayed beyond the onset of the reform period (Mexico, Peru, and Argentina), the character of the labor movement at that subsequent point will also be noted.

Two clusters of factors appear to account for the scope of labor organizing and protest at these specific points in time. First, within the framework of the analysis presented above, the scope of labor movement development is in part the result of the level and pattern of socioeconomic development that had been achieved by that time in each country. Second, it also depended on the timing in relation to certain international developments in labor movements that cut across a number of countries: two major international episodes of strikes [the strike waves of 1906–10 and of the immediate post-World War I period]; and the regional evolution from anarchist, to syndicalist, and then to communist and in some cases socialist predominance in the labor movement.

In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico by the onset of the reform period, substantial evolution of the labor movement had already occurred in the context of extensive urban-manufacturing development. However, in other ways these countries differed considerably. At the onset of the reform period in 1916 in Argentina, the Argentine labor movement was certainly the strongest in the region. This movement had important anarcho-syndicalist and syndicalist currents, with socialists, as we shall see, coming to play a significant electoral role vis-à-vis workers. The continent-wide eruption of worker protest at the end of the 1910s came shortly after Irigoyen’s rise to power in Argentina, posing a major challenge to his initial labor policies. By 1930 in Brazil, by contrast, the labor movement had a substantial measure of com-

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**TABLE 3.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reform Period</th>
<th>Incorporation Period (if different)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1930)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1920)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1911)</td>
<td>(1917)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1911)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1903)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1930)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1919)</td>
<td>(1939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Very extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1916)</td>
<td>(1943)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From a socialist to communist orientation, the other ultimately emerging was hastened by vigorous repression in the first year of the new government. On the other hand, the Mexican labor movement was still substantially mutualist and anarchist by 1911, and the major wave of strikes of 1906–10 preceded the revolution and represented part of the context out of which it emerged. Though the Mexican Casa del Obrero Mundial cooperated with the Constitutionals briefly during the revolution, this alliance quickly fell apart once the fighting was over and the dominant part of the labor movement returned to its prior anarchist orientation of the pre-1911 period.

By 1919 the Peruvian labor movement had already undergone substantial development, though the erosion of anarcho-syndical dominance had just begun, to be superseded shortly by two currents of leadership, one evolving from a socialist to communist orientation, the other ultimately emerging as APRA. The major eruption of strikes in the immediate postwar period was an important part of the context in which the reform government of Leguía came to power, though as we shall see the continuation of the strikes and protests in the following years, obviously with the support of these new elements of leadership, posed serious difficulties for Leguía's initially more favorable labor policies.

In Colombia, although the onset of the reform period came late, the prior development of the labor movement was less impressive. Colombia not only ranked far behind Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, but also behind Peru. The labor protest of the late 1910s and the 1920s in Colombia, though substantial compared with its minimal level during previous years in that country, was on a smaller scale than that in Peru in the first half of the 1910s. The scope of labor movement development in Colombia in the 1920s was probably more extensive than in Uruguay prior to 1903 in terms of episodes of worker protest that had a major national impact, though possibly more limited in terms of the development of sustained worker organization. Given the late timing in Colombia, a significant feature of labor politics in the 1920s was a substantial current of communist orientation, which would later play an important role during the Liberal period in the 1930s.

1920s was a substantial current of communist orientation, which would later play an important role during the Liberal period in the 1930s.

Finally, the countries with the least developed labor movements by the reform period were Uruguay and Venezuela. Because Batlle's rise to power came exceptionally early, the labor movement by that time was just entering a period of rapid expansion. At that early point, the movement that did exist was anarchist and to a lesser degree socialist. In Venezuela, by 1935 the labor movement was even less developed. However, in the context of rapid urban growth and the consolidation of major export enclaves, the potential for a more important movement was growing and was quickly realized once Gómez's system of tight control of worker organizing collapsed.

Since our analysis is concerned with a comparison of labor movements at the onset both of the reform period and of the incorporation period, we should briefly note the experience of the three countries where the onset of incorporation was delayed beyond the beginning of the reform period (see Table 3.5). In Mexico the labor movement did not significantly change over the short interval between 1911 and 1917. On the other hand, in Peru the interval between 1919 and 1939 brought substantial growth of the labor movement and the emergence of APRA and the communists as the dominant currents. Yet the scope of the movement remained far more modest than in several other countries. In Argentina the long interval between 1916 and 1943 saw extensive growth of the labor movement and a shift toward the political predominance of socialist and communist unions. In the context of this growth, the Argentine union movement certainly remained one of the largest and strongest in the region.

Hence, although these delays brought substantial growth in the union movements in Argentina and Peru, they probably did not significantly change the relative ranking of the countries as of the onset of incorporation.
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination

In response to the growing strength of labor organization and the dramatic scope of worker protest in the first decades of the 20th century, political leaders became increasingly concerned about the “social question.” They debated the appropriate role of the newly emerging working classes within the economic and political system and the problem of mitigating the exploitative conditions of work that appeared to encourage this new social protest. The debate on the social question was intertwined with a broader debate on social and political reform, and by the 1930s an important period of reform had emerged in all eight countries. In conjunction with these reforms, the state ultimately initiated what we refer to as the initial incorporation of the labor movement.

The evolution of this period of reform occurred at a different rhythm and in a different way in each country. Important contrasts include the nature of the reform project itself, the scope of opposition to reform from elements of the established political order, the timing of the incorporation period, the degree to which reformers were able to carry out their programs, and the degree to which they cultivated the support of the labor movement in conjunction with their challenge to the oligarchy.

This chapter first introduces the historical setting of this period of reform. The eight cases are then analyzed, with a focus on [1] the political system prior to the reforms, [2] the emergence of the reform alliances, [3] the immediate political transition and change of government that brought the reformers to power, and [4] the role of the labor movement in this transition.

In five of the countries—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela—the incorporation period, which is analyzed in the next chapter, began with this change in government. However, in Mexico, Peru, and Argentina, a substantial delay occurred between this change of government and the onset of incorporation. For these three countries, the present chapter explores the causes of this delay and brings the analysis up to the eve of the incorporation period, thereby covering the period from 1910 to 1917 in Mexico, from 1919 to 1939 in Peru, and from 1916 to 1943 in Argentina.

Historical Setting

The national political framework within which labor movements initially emerged in these countries is commonly referred to in Latin American polit-
some South American countries the exceptional scope of urban labor protest toward the end of the 1910s in Argentina.

In most of the countries these reform movements emerged and evolved in a gradual fashion. Yet in all eight cases a well-defined change in government serves as a benchmark in the inauguration of this period of reform and of the transformation of the oligarchic state: in Chile the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920; in Brazil the Revolution of 1930 and the assumption of power by Getulio Vargas; in Uruguay the election of José Batlle y Ordóñez in 1903; in Colombia the beginning of the Liberal period and the election of Enrique Olaya Herrera in 1930; in Venezuela the death of Juan Vicente Gómez in 1935; in Mexico the 1910 Revolution and the fall of Porfirio Díaz in 1911; in Peru the second presidency of Augusto Leguía, beginning in 1919; and in Argentina the beginning of the Radical period with the election of Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1916.

To provide an overview of these transitions, Table 4.1 presents these dates, along with (1) the date of the new constitution associated with each reform period; (2) the date that the initial incorporation period was launched; and (3) the degree of labor movement development on the eve of the incorporation period.

These events spanned four decades of Latin American history and involved very different kinds of transitions: the death of one dictator (Venezuela) and the collapse of the rule of another (Mexico); disputes surrounding a presidential succession resolved on the battlefield (Brazil, Uruguay, and again Mexico) or resolved under the pressure of intense urban social protest (Chile and Peru); and also conventional elections (Colombia and Argentina). These transitions also differed in the degree to which they led to a fundamental reorientation in political coalitions and to broad political and economic reform, as opposed to mild reform within the framework of the continuing dominance of established oligarchies. Even in the cases of drastic political disjunctures, the intermixing of continuity and change was complex. As Rodney Anderson (1976:299) has said for revolutionary Mexico: "The resignation of Porfirio Díaz . . . does not mark the death of one era and the birth of another, . . . the old regime lived on in institutions and ways with roots too deep and influences too pervasive to fall with the old Caudillo who had so long kept them secure . . . Yet the events of the years that follow the maderista triumph belong to another history."

These reform periods all mark an important step in a broader transition from the laissez-faire state, more characteristic of the earlier oligarchic period, to a conception of a more activist state. This new conception still asserted liberal notions of the primacy of property rights and at most a moderate role of the state in the ownership of productive enterprises. Yet it assigned to the state new social, welfare, and economic responsibilities that prominently embraced a changed relationship between the state and the new urban sectors, including the working class. This conception of the state's role was commonly spelled out in constitutions promulgated in the period following the initial change of government [Table 4.1]. Mexico's 1917 constitution was the world's first example of "social constitutionalism," predating both the Russian and the Weimar constitutions, and along with them it became an important international model. New constitutions also appeared in Uruguay in 1917, in Peru in 1920, in Chile in 1925, and in Brazil in 1934. A constitutional revision was adopted in Colombia in 1936, and in Venezuela, following a modest revision in 1936, a fundamentally new constitution was adopted in 1947. Argentina's "social constitution" was adopted in 1949, only two years after the new constitution in Venezuela but extremely late in relation to the earlier reform period of Yrigoyen. This long delay will emerge as an important feature of the Argentine case.

### TABLE 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change of Government that Inaugurated Reform Period</th>
<th>New Constitution</th>
<th>Onset of Incorporation Period</th>
<th>Labor Movement Development at the Onset of Incorporation Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1930 (Vargas)</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1920 (Alessandri)</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 1911 (Madero)</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela 1935 (López Contreras)</td>
<td>1936, 1947</td>
<td>1935, 1947</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1903 (Batlle)</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia 1930 (Olaya)</td>
<td>1936 (Const. revision)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1919 (Leguía)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 1916 (Yrigoyen)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Very extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See definition in glossary and analysis in Chapter 5.
* Based on the analysis presented in Chapter 3.

**Focus of Analysis**

This chapter explores the development of this period of reform, and hence the political context out of which the incorporation period emerged. Four themes are highlighted.

**Political Position of the Oligarchy.** The initial reform period did not deci-

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2 I.e., the victory of the Madero forces in 1911.
sively bring to power the opponents of the old order. Indeed, in a number of countries a major political crisis accompanied the immediate succession to the presidency of the leader of the reform movement. Once this succession had occurred, to varying degrees the reformers faced opposition from groups identified with the old order. Differences in the degree and form of subordination of the reformers to the oligarchy are crucial to the interpretation of these periods.

These differences depended in important measure on what we will refer to as the political “strength” of the oligarchy and the way its position was articulated through the political system. Oligarchic strength is obviously a complex, multidimensional phenomenon (Payne 1968) not easy to compare across countries. Yet the literature (cited below) on these countries points to differences so profound that some discussion of contrasts among cases is possible. To help guide the reader through the analysis, certain preliminary observations about the position of the oligarchy in different countries are made in Table 4.2.

In Brazil and Chile the oligarchy is commonly seen as having had an unusual capacity for the direct exercise of power in the political sphere. During periods of electoral politics, it had significant capacity to sustain its position due to the electoral support it maintained through the clientelistic control of major portions of the rural sector. In Uruguay and Colombia, the political position of the oligarchy was likewise strong, in that these oligarchies also enjoyed electoral support in the rural sector, rooted in traditional systems of

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### TABLE 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Position of Oligarchy</th>
<th>Articulation through Political System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Position</strong></td>
<td><strong>Position in</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>of Oligarchy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Often viewed as unusually strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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104  **SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA**

105  **REFORMIST CHALLENGE**

clientelistic control. However, Uruguay and Colombia had the distinctive attribute that the oligarchy's political position was mediated through both parties in well-institutionalized two-party systems. 3 Mexico and Venezuela, by contrast, fall at the opposite end of the spectrum. Here the period of the oligarchic state saw an erosion of the oligarchy’s economic, social, and political position, which had no counterpart in the other cases.

Finally, Peru and Argentina in many respects differed greatly in the position of their oligarchies, both from one another and in relation to the other six countries. Peru might be seen as having an oligarchy that was in many respects strong but whose power was flawed due to extreme heterogeneity within the elite, a factor that contributed to severe political divisions and important political crises. Argentina is commonly seen as having an unusually strong, unified oligarchy, yet in periods of electoral politics this strength was flawed by the lack of a substantial peasant electoral base. These contrasting patterns of power, combined with these important flaws and certain conjunctural issues of timing, contributed to interesting parallels in the evolution of Peru and Argentina.

**Worker Mobilization in Support of Reform Movement.** In the face of oligarchic resistance to the reform movements, new political leaders adopted distinct approaches to attaining and consolidating power. Some leaders viewed the working class as a political resource that could be mobilized in the struggles among sectors of the elite, whereas elsewhere this form of mobilization was not employed, and leaders’ concern focused more on the control of the working class. Though these differences are of particular concern during the incorporation periods considered in the next chapter, important contrasts among cases already emerge in the period considered here.

Drawing together the issues addressed under this and the previous heading, we may anticipate the distinction between two alternative coalitions that will be important throughout the analysis: a populist alliance, in which working class mobilization and in some instances peasant mobilization become an element in the struggles between the reformers and more traditional groups; and an accommodationist alliance, in which the reformers maintain at least the acquiescence, if not the support, of major elements of the oligarchy.

**Timing of Incorporation in Relation to Change of Government that Inaugurated Reform Period.** These contrasting relationships among the reformers, the labor movement, and the oligarchy contributed to important differences among countries in the timing of the initial incorporation period in relation to the onset of the reform period (see Table 4.1), with a significant delay in Mexico and long delays in Peru and Argentina. In Mexico the onset of the incorporation period was delayed in part by the civil war. In Peru and

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3 In discussing the Colombian oligarchy, Pécaut (1987:106, 108) underlines its strength in the sphere of social domination, but the fragmentation of the power it exercised through the state. However, the indirect control of the state provided by the dynamics of the two-party system probably gave the oligarchy more power within the state than was found in several other countries.
Argentina during the 1910s, the government launched what could have become an incorporation period, however, this initiative was aborted and incorporation was postponed for two decades.

This pattern of false starts and delays in the incorporation period in Peru and Argentina reflects the difficulty of initiating this major change in labor policy. The transition was difficult because of potential opposition from both the oligarchy and the labor movement. Important sectors of the oligarchy often strongly opposed policies that suggested any form of state-sanctioned institutionalization of the labor movement, as well as other policies favorable to the labor movement or to workers. A shift to such policies therefore commonly involved a sharp disjunction in political coalitions that was difficult to initiate and to sustain. In addition, it was often difficult to secure labor’s cooperation with these state initiatives, even when the initiatives included provisions “favorable” to labor. In some countries the labor movement had by this time achieved considerable strength and autonomy, giving it considerable capacity to resist cooperation with the state. Important sectors of the movement were anarchist and revolutionary and strongly opposed such cooperation.

**Timing of Incorporation in Relation to Emergence of Labor Movement.** A fourth theme is the timing of the onset of incorporation in relation to the emergence of the labor movement [Table 4.1]. Though the debate on the social question and the initiation of incorporation were in part intertwined with a larger set of reform issues, the incorporation periods were obviously also a direct response to the emergence of the labor movement. However, this response varied greatly in the degree to which it was preemptive, in the sense of occurring at an early point in relation to the emergence of the labor movement, as opposed to emerging long after the initial emergence of labor organizing. An examination of this aspect of timing provides another perspective for analyzing how these political systems responded to this period of dramatic economic and social change.
Incorporation: Recasting State-Labor Relations

The period of initial incorporation of the labor movement is defined as the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. During this period, the state played an innovative role in constructing new institutions of state-labor and labor-capital relations and new approaches to articulating the labor movement with the party system.

The incorporation period emerged out of the experience of working class activation and elite debate on the social question discussed in the previous two chapters. This first major attempt to incorporate labor was important for a number of reasons: it addressed a fundamental crisis or potential crisis in these societies; it represented one of the most significant periods in Latin American history in which the state was challenged to address a fundamental reform agenda; and it constituted an opportunity to shape national political institutions for years to come, an opportunity that was seized—or in some instances aborted, initially postponed, and later reinitiated—in different ways in different countries.

Our basic thesis is that the incorporation periods were a crucial transition, in the course of which the eight countries followed different strategies of control and mobilization of the popular sectors. These differences had a long-term impact on the evolution of national politics. We do not intend to suggest that once the initial incorporation period had occurred, the patterns established remained unchanged. Quite the contrary, these periods set into motion a complex sequence of reactions and counterreactions, and the legacy of incorporation is to be found in the working out of this sequence. These reactions often led to consequences quite different from those intended either by the actors within the state who initiated incorporation or by the labor leaders who may have cooperated with them. Correspondingly, with regard to labels, when we assert that a country is an instance of a particular type of incorporation, we are referring to this earlier historical transition and not to the subsequent trajectory of change.

The analysis of incorporation is based on a number of choices concerning the appropriate identification of these periods and the treatment of subperiods within the overall incorporation experience. These issues may be of great interest to some readers and of little interest to others. We have therefore discussed them primarily in the glossary and have also treated them to some degree in Chapter 1. Questions concerning the beginning and end points of the incorporation periods are also addressed within the historical analysis in the present chapter, as well as in Chapter 4.
Figure 5.1 gives a chronological overview of the incorporation periods in the eight countries, identifying for each country both an initial, more cautious phase of incorporation, led by "conservative modernizers," and characterized to varying degrees by modernization, tentativeness, stalemate, and failure, and a second phase during which state initiatives generally assumed a more vigorous form.

Figure 5.1 Chronological Overview of Incorporation Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 = onset of first phase of "conservative modernizers"; 2 = onset of second phase of incorporation period.

Table 5.1 provides a more detailed overview of these two phases of incorporation, including the event (coup, assassination, election, or worker demonstration) that marked the transition between the phases. The table also shows the relation between the onset of the reform periods analyzed in the last chapter and the incorporation periods. In Mexico, Peru, and Argentina, the onset of reform brought an unsuccessful attempt to launch an incorporation project, followed by delays of varying lengths prior to the onset of the incorporation period.

Types of Incorporation Periods

The classification of these incorporation experiences is derived from the answers to a series of questions concerning the overall goals of the political leaders who initiated incorporation, the principal political agency involved in the incorporation period, two dimensions of the mode of incorporation, and the scope of incorporation.

1 If one were providing a generalized description of the incorporation periods, in contrast to the present concern with establishing a scheme for differentiating among them, a third dimension of the mode of incorporation should also be emphasized: i.e., bureaucratic linkage, involving the systematic effort to establish bureaucratic ties between the state and the labor movement. This is obviously a basic feature of corporatism and is an important part of the incorporation experience in all of the countries except Uruguay. In Uruguay, in the pluralistic setting of the two presidential terms of José Batlle y Ordóñez at the beginning of the century, labor control tended to take the more "traditional" form of police surveillance of union activities rather than bureaucratic-corporative forms of control.

Goals: Control and Support. Was the major goal of the political leaders who initiated incorporation primarily to control the working class, with at most marginal concern with mobilizing its support, or was the mobilization of support part of a political strategy to gain and maintain power of at least equal importance?

Agency: State versus Party or Movement. Was the incorporation project principally concerned with linking the labor movement to the state, or was it, in addition, centrally concerned with linking labor to a political party or political movement that later became a party?

Mode: Electoral Mobilization. Did the leaders of the incorporation project seek the support of workers in the electoral arena?

Mode: Union-Party/Movement Linkage. Were strong organizational links established between labor organizations and the political party or movement through which support was organized?

Scope: Inclusion of Peasantry. In addition to encompassing modern sector workers in urban areas and modernized enclaves, was there a parallel mobilization and incorporation of peasants in the traditional rural sector?

These questions led us to distinguish four basic types of incorporation periods, delineated in Figure 5.2. We should reiterate that these are analytic types, not comprehensive descriptions of each case, and in fact not every country fits each category perfectly, as can be seen in the footnotes to the figure. However, the countries identified with each type are far more similar to one another in terms of the defining dimensions than they are to the other countries, and we believe this typology captures fundamental differences among the incorporation experiences.

State Incorporation. On the basis of the first two questions, we initially distinguish cases of state incorporation where the principal agency involved in the incorporation project was the state and the principal goal was to create a legalized and institutionalized labor movement that was depoliticized, controlled, and penetrated by the state. Among the countries considered here, the high point of state incorporation occurred under authoritarian rule, and the mobilization of the electoral support of workers was at most a marginal concern, though such mobilization did become important after these periods. Union-party links were prohibited, and preexisting political currents in the labor movement were repressed. A basic premise that helped sustain the governing coalition was that social relations in the traditional rural sector would remain unchanged. The two cases of state incorporation are Chile (1920–31) and Brazil (1930–45).

Party Incorporation. Given our definition of the incorporation period, the state played a role in all cases, and as can be seen in Figure 5.2 the control of
### Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Onset of Reform Period</th>
<th>Aborted Incorporation Initiatives</th>
<th>First Phase: Conservative Modernizer</th>
<th>Second Phase: Full-Blown Incorporation Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Vargas 1930–37</td>
<td>Coup of 1937; Estado Novo, 1937–45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Madero 1911–13</td>
<td>Assassination of Carranza in 1920, Sonoran Dynasty of 1920s, incorporation culminated in 1930s under Cardenas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Batlle 1903–7; Williman 1907–11</td>
<td>Batlle consolidated his position by onset of second term in 1911; Second Batlle presidency 1911–15, incorp. period extends to 1916.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Olaya 1930–34</td>
<td>López wins presidency in 1934; incorp. period extends to 1945.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Leguía 1919–20</td>
<td>In 1945, move beyond toleration of APRA to electoral alliance with APRA, Bustamante govt., 1945–48.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Chile, the period 1924–27 saw crisis and instability as Ibáñez sought to consolidate his power.

1 Immediately after the 1943 coup, these military leaders adopted highly restrictive policies toward the labor movement. The policy alternative represented by Perón’s initiatives was already well-defined by late 1943, but Perón was strongly opposed by important sectors of military leadership until the second part of 1945. He formally became president in June 1946.

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The labor movement was always a goal of the incorporation project. However, in six of the countries, a crucial additional agency was a political party or political movement that later became a party, and a central goal was the mobilization of labor support. These countries were distinguished as cases of party incorporation.

1. **Electoral Mobilization by Traditional Party.** Colombia (1930–45) and Uruguay (1903–16) experienced active electoral mobilization of labor support, but the effort to link unions to the party was either limited or nonexistent, and the incorporation project did not encompass the peasantry. The political context was the expansion of the scope of electoral competition as an aspect of the competition between two traditional parties, both of which had existed since the 19th century. This was the most limited form of party mobilization, where new groups were added to the old party coalitions, where the addition of unions as a major element in these coalitions tended to be problematic, and where the economic elite maintained close ties to both parties.

2. **Labor Populism.** Peru (1939–48) and Argentina (1943–55) experienced active electoral mobilization of labor support and a major effort to link unions to a party or political movement, but the incorporation project did not encompass a peasantry. Because the more extensive mobilization of this type remained restricted to labor in the modern sector, we refer to it as labor populism. The political context was the emergence or consolidation of a populist party or movement that displaced traditional parties and/or the traditional political class. The incorporation period was strongly antioligarchic, but not to the point of fundamentally altering property relations in the rural sector.

3. **Radical Populism.** Mexico (1917–40) and Venezuela (1935–48) experienced broad electoral mobilization of labor support, a major effort to link unions to the party, and, along with the modern sector working class, a parallel incorporation of the peasantry. Because the agrarian reform that accompanied peasant mobilization represented a more comprehensive assault on the oligarchy and on preexisting property relations, we refer to this as radical populism.

Two caveats may be introduced regarding the label party incorporation. First, we use this designation for the sake of convenience, yet as the definition makes clear, the category includes cases involving a “party or a political movement that later became a party.” This is crucial because in Mexico and

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2 Since the state also played a central role in these cases, they could be called “party/state incorporation.” However, this is a clumsy label, and we feel that in light of the above discussion the meaning of the label “party incorporation” is clear.

3 Obviously, whereas in Peru this latter outcome was not plausible due to the strength of the oligarchy, in Argentina it was not plausible due to the lack of a major peasant population. It should be noted that both APRA and Perón did have rural electoral support, but not the support of an organized peasantry equivalent to that found in Venezuela and Mexico.
**Figure 5.2** Types of Incorporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals and Agency of Incorporation</th>
<th>State Incorporation</th>
<th>Party Incorporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil (1930-45)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile (1920-31)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay (1903-16)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia (1930-45)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru (1939-48)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina (1943-55)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico (1917-40)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela (1935-48)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of unions exercised by the state</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor support mobilized by a party (or movement that becomes a party)</th>
<th>No&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>No&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Figure 5.2 (cont.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral mobilization</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union linkage to party or movement</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Weak&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peasantry included</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Parties were introduced in Brazil shortly before the collapse of the Vargas government in 1945.

<sup>b</sup> A government-sponsored party played a marginal role under Ibáñez in Chile.

<sup>c</sup> Batle's effort to mobilize workers' electoral support can best be thought of as a successful investment in future support, in that during the incorporation period itself, workers were still strongly anarchist and tended not to vote.

<sup>d</sup> The important role of the Communist Party within the main labor confederation and the ability of the Conservative Party to inhibit union formation by the Liberal labor confederation within certain regions seriously limited the development of links between the Liberal Party and the labor movement in comparison with the cases further to the right in the chart.

<sup>e</sup> The presence of the Communist Party within the main confederation initially diluted the tie between the PRM and the labor movement.

<sup>f</sup> Important benefits were extended to rural wage workers who could be considered part of the modern sector, as well as to some peasant groups. However, in the absence of a substantial peasantry, there was no project of peasant incorporation that was politically equivalent to those in Mexico and Venezuela.
Argentina the relevant organization at the onset of the incorporation period was a movement, not a party. 4

Second, though the role of political parties is a crucial element in this classification, it must be emphasized that neither this typology nor the related typologies developed for subsequent analytic periods are intended as a substitute for more conventional classifications of parties. Indeed, such classifications may cut across the categories employed here. For instance, the two cases of state incorporation, Brazil and Chile, which both experienced an antiparty, depoliticizing incorporation period, had very different types of parties: those in Chile had deeper roots in society and were far better institutionalized, whereas those in Brazil were shallowly rooted in society and poorly institutionalized. In the two cases of labor populism, Peru and Argentina, the respective labor-based parties—that is, APRA and Peronism—likewise differed profoundly in their degree of institutionalization, both in the incorporation period and subsequently. These other patterns of variation among the parties are recognized in the present analysis and are occasionally introduced as factors that help account for differences between the cases within the country pairs. But it is important to insist that they are different dimensions of differentiation among the countries than those we seek to capture with the analysis of the incorporation periods and their legacies.

The analysis in this chapter is organized around the two well-defined poles evident in Figure 5.2. The cases of state incorporation—Brazil and Chile—exhibited none of the dimensions of mobilization, and the cases of radical populism—Mexico and Venezuela—exhibited all of them. As in the previous chapter, we first examine these two pairs of extreme cases and then turn to the two intermediate pairs.

In the treatment of each country, we first explore the “project from above” (i.e., the basic goals and strategies of the political leaders who initiated the incorporation period) and the “project from below” (i.e., the goals and strategies of the labor movement). For the cases of state incorporation, where labor policies were basically imposed on the labor movement, we then present an overview of the evolution of labor policy. For the cases of party incorporation, where labor policy was not simply imposed, but to a greater extent represented a bargain between the state and the organized labor, we present a more differentiated analysis that focuses on the political exchange with the labor movement, around which the mobilization of labor support was organized; the role of the political party or movement in mediating political support; and finally the conservative opposition that emerged in reaction to the mobilization and progressive policies of the incorporation period.

4 As we emphasize in this and the following chapters, in Argentina Peronism continued to have an ephemeral existence as a party, yet by the definition of that term in the glossary, it unquestionably continued to function as a party.
Aftermath: Reaction to Incorporation and Postincorporation Dynamics

In all eight countries, the incorporation periods produced strong political reactions, and in most cases the regimes under which incorporation had been inaugurated eventually broke down in the face of rising opposition. This chapter analyzes the aftermath of incorporation, focusing on this regime change and the reshaping of state-union-party relations that accompanied and followed it.

The two broad types of incorporation periods—state and party incorporation—triggered distinct political reactions. In Brazil and Chile, state incorporation had been antidemocratic and antimobilizational. It had been carried out under authoritarian regimes, and this authoritarianism generated substantial opposition that culminated in the restoration of competitive, electoral regimes. Under these new regimes, the question of the political role of the working class, postponed rather than answered in the incorporation period, had to be addressed anew. The repoliticization of the working class, and of the parties and other channels through which labor would participate in the new competitive regime, emerged as major political issues.

The countries that experienced party incorporation followed a contrasting pattern. Party incorporation had been reformist and mobilizational and had occurred under regimes that were in most cases more democratic. The opposition movements that emerged were conservative and oriented toward political demobilization. In Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, the incorporation period was brought to an end by a military coup that ousted the reformist governments and inaugurated a period of counterreformist military rule. In Uruguay and Colombia, the incorporation period ended with a relatively mild conservative reaction under the existing civilian regime, followed later by a coup that pushed the conservative reaction even further. In Mexico alone the incorporating party managed to stay in power, and under its own leadership the reformism of the incorporation period was brought to a halt.

In sum, except for Mexico, the aftermath of party incorporation can be traced out in two steps: (1) a conservative reaction in which the party or leadership that led the incorporation period fell from power and (2) an initial

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1 As we saw in Chapter 5, in Mexico, Uruguay, and Colombia, the incorporation periods occurred under more-or-less competitive regimes. In Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru, the incorporation periods were initiated under authoritarian regimes or regimes whose electoral credentials were dubious. Yet the leaders of these incorporation projects later consolidated their power in relatively free elections. Among these latter three cases, only in Argentina did the regime subsequently become authoritarian during the incorporation period.
period of a restored, competitive regime, during which a number of measures were initiated to ensure that the polarization of the incorporation period would not recur. Though in Mexico the incorporating party remained in power, that country experienced the same political changes as the other countries in this last period.

The analysis of the aftermath period covers the following years (see Figure 6.1): in Brazil, from the fall of Vargas in 1945 to 1960; in Chile, from the fall of Ibáñez in 1931 to 1952; in Mexico, from 1940 to 1952; a period which saw a self-transformation of the governing party in a conservative direction; in Venezuela, from the 1948 coup, through the restoration of a competitive regime in 1958, to the early 1960s; in Uruguay, from the halt in the reform effort in 1916, through the coup of 1933, through the restoration of a competitive regime in 1942, to the mid-1940s; in Colombia, from the resignation of López in 1945, through the coup of 1953 and the restoration of a semicompetitive, civilian regime in 1958, to roughly 1960; in Peru, from the 1948 coup, through the restoration of a semicompetitive regime in 1956, to roughly 1960; and in Argentina, from the coup of 1955, through the restoration of a semicompetitive regime in 1958, to roughly 1960.

Aftermath of State Incorporation

For the cases of state incorporation, the analysis begins with this restoration of competitive regimes in 1945 in Brazil and 1931 in Chile. In these cases, a crucial item of “unfinished business” from the earlier incorporation period was the political role of the working class. The depoliticization of the incorporation periods had provided only a temporary resolution of this issue. From the point of view of the labor movement, the political opening represented a new opportunity for political participation and influence, and in this new context the repoliticization of the working class occurred quickly. As a concomitant of the prior depoliticization of the incorporation period in Brazil and Chile, the incorporation experiences had not left a legacy of deeply ingrained political ties between the union movement and a multiclass party or party bloc that was capable of holding power. Hence, in the aftermath of state incorporation, workers’ political affiliations were less well-defined, and in that specific sense the labor movement had a greater degree of political independence. In this context, the repoliticization and radicalization of the working class occurred quickly. In both countries during this period, the Communist Party achieved substantial success in attracting worker support, and a significant challenge to state-controlled unions was mounted, though the pace at which this took place and the degree of success were not as great in Brazil, at least in part because of the reimposition of state controls.

From the point of view of reformist elements within the political elite, one of the problems in the aftermath of state incorporation was the absence of the type of political party—commonly referred to as populist—that had been created or reinforced in many cases of party incorporation: a multiclass party with strong ties to the working class that could potentially be a vehicle to generate support for reform. To address this problem, reformers who had previously been leaders during the earlier periods of state incorporation—that is, Vargas in Brazil and Marmaduque Grove in Chile—now established such parties, which successfully gained influence within the working class. However, unlike most of the parties that had led party incorporation, these postincorporation parties in the cases of state incorporation—specifically the PTB in Brazil and the Socialist Party in Chile—never achieved a majority position. Rather, they became junior partners in political coalitions headed by other, center or center-right parties. Characteristically, during elections these coalitions had a populist character, but once the government was in power the actual practice of policy-making shifted toward the orientation of the accommodationist alliance that had been worked out during the incorporation period. Eventually, these experiments in “populism” failed with the discrediting of the coalitions and the radicalization of the populist parties. Here again, this process went further in Chile.

We define the aftermath period for Brazil and Chile as corresponding to this aborted experiment with coalitional populism, which ended in 1960 in Brazil and in 1952 in Chile. Two features mark this failure. First, the populist party [or important factions within it], and especially its working-class base, was insufficiently rewarded for its electoral support and began to reject the collaborative, coalitional strategy in favor of more radical orientations. Second, the center or center-right party that held the predominant position in these coalition governments could no longer hold on to power. With the collapse
of these attempts, a process of polarization, set in motion during the aftermath period, subsequently became a central feature of political life.

Aftermath of Party Incorporation

For the cases of party incorporation, two issues were pivotal in the aftermath period. The first was the conservative reaction, with its counterreformist policies that in most cases included the marginalization or repression of the party and unions that had earlier played a key role in the incorporation period. The second was the terms under which these parties would subsequently be readmitted to the political game—or, in the case of Mexico, would be capable of continuing in power. The conservative reaction to incorporation made clear the limits to reformism and also the inability of the political system to deal with the opposition and polarization engendered by it. This situation gave rise to various attempts to avoid future polarization by constituting a broad centrist coalition that could consolidate civilian rule. Accordingly, party leaders oversaw a number of changes in the parties that had led the incorporation periods. We will focus on three dimensions of party evolution, which occurred to varying degrees among the cases: (1) a programmatic shift toward the center; (2) the expulsion or departure of the left; and (3) the success of the party, despite its conservatization and loss of leftist support, in retaining its mass constituencies, specifically its ties to the working class, and where relevant the peasantry, encompassing both electoral support and party-union organizational ties.

Another aspect of the attempts to ensure that a return to, or consolidation of, civilian rule would not lead to a repetition of polarization was the adoption of conflict-limiting mechanisms. One such mechanism, used by the military in Peru and Argentina, was the ongoing ban on the incorporating party, even after civilian rule was restored. Another, adopted by the political parties in Venezuela and Colombia, was a pact or accord through which they agreed to limit political conflict among themselves. A third, found only in Mexico, where alone the incorporating party remained in power, was the strengthening of a one-party dominant system. These differences among the countries point to another: the role of the party in overseeing the political transitions of the aftermath period. This was weakest in Argentina and Peru, strongest in Mexico, and intermediate in Venezuela, Uruguay, and Colombia.

The different experiences in the aftermath of party incorporation are summarized in Table 6.1. In Mexico and Venezuela, the party that had earlier led the incorporation period maintained at least a relatively dominant position in this transition. These parties gave up important parts of their earlier reform programs in exchange for retention of, or renewed access to, power, and they successfully used state resources to retain much of their mass worker and peasant base. A contrasting pattern is found in Peru and Argentina, where the incorporating party played a far more subordinate role in the transition, in the context of some form of ongoing ban of this party. Uruguay and

Colombia are in a sense intermediate cases, with the party that led the incorporation period playing a more nearly "coequal" role in the transition with the other traditional party in these two-party systems (or, in the case of Uruguay, a faction of that party).

An Antiflunion Variant of Populism

In introducing the cases of party incorporation, we wish to call attention to an additional theme that emerged in the aftermath period. We have noted that the military presidents who led this period of conservative reaction in part carried out a "negative" political project, attempting to undo the reforms, popular mobilization, and populist coalition that derived from the incorporation period. In addition, in the late 1940s and early 1950s Rojas in Colombia, Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, and Odría in Peru had a "positive" political project, through which they sought to build their own base of working-class support.

The nature of these three projects merits particular attention here because they were shaped by an important international conjuncture in a way that represents an interesting cross-fertilization between the incorporation period in Argentina and the aftermath period in the other three countries. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Peronism posed a dramatic model of the methods that could be used by a military leader to generate working-class support, and Peronism's salience for Pérez Jiménez, Rojas Pinilla, and Odría was reinforced to some degree by Perón's deliberate efforts to export the model. However, what was absolutely essential to the original was missing in the copies: the underlying political logic and the method of achieving power in the first place.

Perón had come to power in Argentina on the basis of the vigorous mobilization of working-class and trade-union support in exchange for major policy concessions. By contrast, the military-leaders-turned-president who imitated Perón had come to power on the basis of precisely the opposite relationship to the popular sector: the demobilization of the organized working class and the systematic destruction of its trade-union organizations. Thus, within the framework of our larger study, Peronism enjoyed the historical advantage of constituting the initial incorporation period in Argentina. By contrast, these imitators adopted elements of Peronism in the context of the conservative reaction to incorporation, and by and large they failed. However, some variation appears among the three cases in the success of these efforts, with Odría in Peru being somewhat more successful.

2 An even briefer experiment along these lines was undertaken in Chile by Carlos Ibáñez when he returned to power in 1952 [see Chapter 7].
**TABLE 6.1**

Aftermath of Party Incorporation: Transformation of Party that Led Incorporation Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party that led incorporation period</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Role of party in transition to new regime</td>
<td>PRM/PRI</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>Peronist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pact, accord, or other conflict-limiting mechanisms</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Coequal</td>
<td>Subordinate</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening of one-party dominant system</td>
<td>Punto Fijo and other pacts</td>
<td>Effort to prevent loss of Colorado support to the left</td>
<td>Pact of Sitges and National Front, 1957–58</td>
<td>Partial electoral exclusion of APRA, Pact of Monterrico, and conviven-cia, 1956</td>
<td>Electoral exclusion of Peronism, aborted pact with Frondizi, 1957–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Programmatic shift toward the center</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expulsion or departure of left</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. Retention of workers' electoral support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. Retention of union-party link</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Greatly weakened</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Retention of electoral support of peasants and links to peasant organizations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Defections in some areas</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* In collaboration with President Baldomir and the Independent Nationalists.
* In collaboration with Conservatives.
* Reform renewed in 1940s and 1950s.
* Move to center-right.
* Fact of being out of power reduced pressure for programmatic homogenization of Peronism and helps explain its relative heterogeneity.
* Occurred after failure of APRA insurrection in 1948, then subsequently in 1959.
* Transferred to National Front.
* With some erosion in the 1960s.
* Never existed.
* But with significant challenges beginning in the 1960s.
* Within framework of poorly institutionalized party. The main organizational locus of Peronism was the CGT.
* Rural workers voted mainly for Blancos.
* Mainly in vicinity of modern enclaves.
* Absence of large peasant sector. Perón had support of rural workers.
* Vote largely transferred to National Front.
Heritage: Between Hegemony and Crisis

The incorporation period and its aftermath helped shape the type of political coalitions that crystallized in the eight countries and the way these coalitions were institutionalized in different party systems. These outcomes in turn influenced the forms of regimes that would emerge, their internal dynamics, and the evolution of national politics in the following years. This chapter analyzes these outcomes as the heritage of incorporation.

The analysis proceeds in two parts. The first presents an overall assessment of the party system, and the second sets this party system in motion by exploring its dynamics when confronted by the period of new opposition movements and political crisis faced by countries throughout Latin America from the late 1950s to the 1970s. We argue that the varying scope of this opposition and crisis in each country can be explained in part by characteristics of the party system and its political or hegemonic resources. Some countries experienced severe polarization, whereas in others the polarization was more mild and to one degree or another was effectively contained by established political actors. In this part of the analysis we explore both the economic challenges reflected in the politics of stabilization policy and the political challenges that derived from the emergence of new opposition movements in the party arena and in labor and peasant organizations.

In some countries the polarization and crisis culminated in military coups, followed by extended periods of military rule, whereas elsewhere the civilian regimes had a greater capacity to deal with these conflicts. We argue that each country's prior experience in the incorporation and aftermath periods played an important role in shaping these alternative outcomes—though the explanatory power of this earlier experience must be looked at in a context in which many other causal factors also had an impact.

It is important to recognize the considerable overlap between the aftermath and heritage periods. Some traits we identify as features of the heritage were direct outcomes of the incorporation experience and hence can be observed during the aftermath period as soon as the incorporation experience was over. By contrast, other features of the heritage emerged only later, in the course of the aftermath. Given this dual genesis of heritage traits, in the sections that follow we will at various points have occasion to consider some of the same chronological periods we analyzed in the last chapter, but now from a somewhat different point of view. For most of the countries, however, the emphasis will be on the post-aftermath period, when all the traits of the heritage were in place.

The interval discussed in this chapter therefore begins with the civilian regimes of the aftermath period. That is, for the cases of party incorporation,

we treat the heritage period as beginning immediately following the restoration of civilian rule, where it had been suspended. \(^1\) For the cases of state incorporation, it begins with the restoration of a competitive regime within a year of the end of the incorporation period.

With regard to the end of the heritage period, we view the problem of identifying its erosion or termination as a complex issue, which we address in an exploratory manner in the final chapter. For five of the countries, within the present chapter, we extend the discussion up to the date of the military coup of the 1960s or 1970s that brought an abrupt end to the civilian regime and the existing party system. The earliest of these coups occurred in Brazil in 1964, the latest in Chile in 1973. These coups are seen not only as the endpoint of our study, but also as an outcome of the political dynamics that we attribute ultimately to the type of incorporation. In other countries, where no coup interrupted the political patterns we describe as the heritage of incorporation, the analysis is carried to the conclusion of the presidential term ending roughly around 1980.

We thus focus on the following intervals (see Figure 7.1): in Brazil, from 1946 to the coup of 1964; in Chile, from 1932 to the coup of 1973; in Mexico, from 1940 to 1982 (the end of the López Portillo presidency); in Venezuela, from 1958 to 1978 (the end of the first Carlos Andrés Pérez presidency); in Uruguay, from 1942 to the coup of 1973; in Colombia, from 1958 to 1986 (the end of the Betancur presidency); in Peru, from 1956 to the coup of 1968; and in Argentina, from 1957\(^2\) to the coup of 1966.

Overview of the Party System

The period analyzed in this chapter is by and large one of civilian, electoral regimes in all eight countries. The only exceptions are the brief military interventions that occurred in Argentina, Peru, and Brazil, interventions of the "moderating" type that were limited both in duration and in that they did not introduce military rule, but rather oversaw the transfer of power among civilian groups (Stepan 1971:63).

The analysis of each country begins with an overview of the party system, focusing especially on three dimensions. The first is the degree to which the party system was characterized by cohesion or fragmentation; that is, the degree to which one or two parties dominated the electoral arena or, conversely, the degree to which electoral competition dispersed political power. The second is the presence of centrifugal or centripetal political dynamics. Some regimes were characterized by a strong polarizing dynamic whereas others were characterized by a strong, stable centrist coalition expressed or...
In addition to providing an overview of different types of party systems, the goal of this chapter is to explore the reaction of each type to the regional experience of new opposition movements and political and economic crises of the late 1950s through the 1970s. During this period, the eight countries exhibited very different patterns of change, some undergoing severe crises that culminated in military coups and others experiencing much greater regime continuity. While many factors contributed to these contrasting outcomes, our principal concern is to explore the argument that the different political structures that were a legacy of incorporation played a central role.

The economic and political factors that shaped this period of crisis may be sketched briefly. With regard to economic factors, this was a period of important change in the Latin American economies and their links with the international economic system. It is widely argued that this period saw a fundamental realignment, beginning in the 1950s, toward the "internationalization" of Latin American economic development that brought major changes in the ownership and financing of key sectors of the economy. The rapid increase in foreign direct investment, especially following the Korean War, was widely perceived as a loss of national control of economic development that, within the framework explored in Chapter 2, posed important problems for the legitimation of the state. This was also a period of growing difficulties with balance of payments and inflation in a number of countries, and economic stabilization programs and the politics of stabilization became major issues. In the context of the denationalization and problems of legitimation just noted, the enforcement of conventional approaches to economic stabilization became considerably more difficult.

With regard to political factors, the period of the late 1950s to the 1970s saw the emergence of new international models of opposition politics that sharply redefined the spectrum of plausible political alternatives within Latin America. In this sense these years had much in common with the period of the late 1910s analyzed in Chapter 3. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Cuban Revolution dramatically posed the possibility that a socialist experiment could survive in the Western Hemisphere, producing an immediate impact on the political goals of the left in many Latin American countries. Perceptions of Cuba also had a strong impact on the right and the military within each country, as well as on the U.S. government and its support of counterinsurgency and of a spectrum of nonrevolutionary political alternatives within the region. Although the U.S. role receives little direct attention in the analysis below, it is an important feature of the larger context.

The combination of new political hopes on the left and new political fears in other parts of the political spectrum set the stage for a major polarization within the region. Amid these hopes and fears, political dynamics revolved in part around the "objective" potential for radicalization in each country, but also around the "perception of threat" (O'Donnell 1975) on the part of the military and other more conservative sectors within each country. As the 1960s wore on, other developments in the international arena fur-

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**Notes:** The complex question of when the heritage ends as an analytical period is addressed in Chapter 8. The analysis in this chapter brings the discussion up to the major coups of the 1960s and 1970s for Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina, and for the other three countries to cutoff dates around 1980—1982 for Mexico, 1986 for Colombia, and 1978 for Venezuela.

1. AFT in parentheses refers to the portion of the aftermath period covered in the previous chapter, which is also treated here as the first part of the heritage period. See explanation in footnote 1 in the accompanying text.

embodied in dominant parties or party alignments that inhibited political polarization. The third aspect of the party system is the nature of the linkage between organized labor and political parties. Of particular concern is whether the union movement was linked to a leftist or labor party or to a multiclass/centrist party, and whether the party to which labor had organizational ties was usually in the governing coalition, or rather excluded from it.

We view the contrasting outcomes on these three dimensions as deriving in part from the types of incorporation and aftermath periods experienced in each country. Specifically, they were shaped by the nature of links forged (or not forged) with the labor movement during the incorporation period, which presented a unique opportunity for establishing union-party ties; by the consequent formation (or lack thereof) of a multiclass centrist party with labor support; and by the types of conflict-limiting mechanisms worked out (or, as in the cases of state incorporation, not worked out) in the aftermath period.

**Opposition and Crisis**

In addition to providing an overview of different types of party systems, the goal of this chapter is to explore the reaction of each type to the regional experience of new opposition movements and political and economic crises of the late 1950s through the 1970s. During this period, the eight countries exhibited very different patterns of change, some undergoing severe crises that culminated in military coups and others experiencing much greater regime continuity. While many factors contributed to these contrasting outcomes, our principal concern is to explore the argument that the different political structures that were a legacy of incorporation played a central role.

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As the 1960s wore on, other developments in the international arena fur-

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**Figure 7.1 Chronological Overview of Heritage Periods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BRA</th>
<th>CHI</th>
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**Notes:** The complex question of when the heritage ends as an analytical period is addressed in Chapter 8. The analysis in this chapter brings the discussion up to the major coups of the 1960s and 1970s for Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina, and for the other three countries to cutoff dates around 1980—1982 for Mexico, 1986 for Colombia, and 1978 for Venezuela.

1. AFT in parentheses refers to the portion of the aftermath period covered in the previous chapter, which is also treated here as the first part of the heritage period. See explanation in footnote 1 in the accompanying text.

embodied in dominant parties or party alignments that inhibited political polarization. The third aspect of the party system is the nature of the linkage between organized labor and political parties. Of particular concern is whether the union movement was linked to a leftist or labor party or to a multiclass/centrist party, and whether the party to which labor had organizational ties was usually in the governing coalition, or rather excluded from it.

We view the contrasting outcomes on these three dimensions as deriving in part from the types of incorporation and aftermath periods experienced in each country. Specifically, they were shaped by the nature of links forged (or not forged) with the labor movement during the incorporation period, which presented a unique opportunity for establishing union-party ties; by the consequent formation (or lack thereof) of a multiclass centrist party with labor support; and by the types of conflict-limiting mechanisms worked out (or, as in the cases of state incorporation, not worked out) in the aftermath period.

**Opposition and Crisis**

In addition to providing an overview of different types of party systems, the goal of this chapter is to explore the reaction of each type to the regional experience of new opposition movements and political and economic crises of the late 1950s through the 1970s. During this period, the eight countries exhibited very different patterns of change, some undergoing severe crises that culminated in military coups and others experiencing much greater regime continuity. While many factors contributed to these contrasting outcomes, our principal concern is to explore the argument that the different political structures that were a legacy of incorporation played a central role.

The economic and political factors that shaped this period of crisis may be sketched briefly. With regard to economic factors, this was a period of important change in the Latin American economies and their links with the international economic system. It is widely argued that this period saw a fundamental realignment, beginning in the 1950s, toward the "internationalization" of Latin American economic development that brought major changes in the ownership and financing of key sectors of the economy. The rapid increase in foreign direct investment, especially following the Korean War, was widely perceived as a loss of national control of economic development that, within the framework explored in Chapter 2, posed important problems for the legitimation of the state. This was also a period of growing difficulties with balance of payments and inflation in a number of countries, and economic stabilization programs and the politics of stabilization became major issues. In the context of the denationalization and problems of legitimation just noted, the enforcement of conventional approaches to economic stabilization became considerably more difficult.

With regard to political factors, the period of the late 1950s to the 1970s saw the emergence of new international models of opposition politics that sharply redefined the spectrum of plausible political alternatives within Latin America. In this sense these years had much in common with the period of the late 1910s analyzed in Chapter 3. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Cuban Revolution dramatically posed the possibility that a socialist experiment could survive in the Western Hemisphere, producing an immediate impact on the political goals of the left in many Latin American countries. Perceptions of Cuba also had a strong impact on the right and the military within each country, as well as on the U.S. government and its support of counterinsurgency and of a spectrum of nonrevolutionary political alternatives within the region. Although the U.S. role receives little direct attention in the analysis below, it is an important feature of the larger context.

The combination of new political hopes on the left and new political fears in other parts of the political spectrum set the stage for a major polarization within the region. Amid these hopes and fears, political dynamics revolved in part around the "objective" potential for radicalization in each country, but also around the "perception of threat" (O'Donnell 1975) on the part of the military and other more conservative sectors within each country.

As the 1960s wore on, other developments in the international arena fur-
ther contributed to this climate of radicalization and polarization: the intensification of the Vietnam War, the antiwar movement in the United States, the worldwide wave of urban social movements and social protest of the late 1960s that encompassed the First World, the Second World (Czechoslovakia), and the Third World; the Chinese Cultural Revolution; and later the growing imminence of the United States’ defeat in Vietnam.

It may be argued that this period of new opposition movements and crisis can be divided at a point somewhat before the end of the late 1960s, when this further set of developments greatly intensified both the sense of opportunity, from the point of view of the left, and the sense of crisis, from the point of view of established political sectors within Latin America. Brazil and Peru had crises and coups before or around the time of this shift, whereas Chile and Uruguay had crises and coups after the shift. Argentina had coups in both phases, though the coup on which we focus was in the first of these, in 1966. Hence, in a sense we are looking at the experience of these countries in two somewhat different phases of a larger period of crisis. In comparing these cases, the characteristically greater severity of the crises in the later period must be kept in mind.

**Party Heritage: A Typology**

This analysis of opposition and crisis and the dimensions that underlie the comparison of party systems can be synthesized on the basis of a typology that provides an overall summary of the party heritage. The following discussion elaborates on the three dimensions on which the typology is based and suggests the specific types of outcomes that emerge from the interaction among the dimensions.

1. **Presence of a majority bloc in the electoral arena located near the political center.** Such a bloc might involve either the electoral dominance of a single party, as in Mexico, or of two parties linked through stable ties of cooperation, as in Venezuela and Colombia in the initial phase of the heritage period, or of two parties that compete actively in the electoral arena, but in a context of centripetal competition, as in Venezuela and Colombia later in the heritage period; or of two parties that compete in a setting in which the competition is mitigated both by intermittent cooperation and by special electoral rules, as in Uruguay. The other countries lacked such a bloc in Peru and Argentina, due in part to an electoral ban, despite repeated efforts to form one. It is a crucial attribute of these countries that wherever such a majority bloc existed, the electoral support of workers played an important role in sustaining it. Whether such a bloc emerged depended on the early history of the party system (especially relative to unions) and suggests the specific types of outcomes that emerge from the interaction among the dimensions.

2. **Organizational links between the union movement and a party or parties of the center.** As we have seen, the organizational ties of unions to political parties is quite a different issue from the electoral orientation of workers. Again dividing the countries into two broad groups, in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina, the union movement was linked to parties located broadly speaking at the center. By contrast, in Uruguay and Chile it was linked to parties unambiguously on the left, and in Colombia and Brazil the unions’ ties with the left played an increasingly important role. The character of these organizational ties derived in part from the political links between parties and unions established (or not established) during the incorporation period and in part from subsequent processes of compromise and consensualization (following party incorporation) or opening and radicalization (following state incorporation) in the aftermath period.

3. **Presence of the union movement in the governing coalition.** Though this factor might seem to overlap with No. 2, it produces a contrasting differentiation of cases. Only in Mexico and Venezuela was the union movement consistently linked to the governing coalition through the heritage period. In all other countries it was in an oppositional role for much if not all of this period. These outcomes again derive from the patterns earlier forged in the incorporation and aftermath periods.

Figure 7.2 presents the cube defined by these three dimensions. The figure locates on the corners of the cube the four overall regime types that are the outcomes of the incorporation experience and its aftermath:

1. **Integrative Party System** [(Mexico and Venezuela)]. These cases had a stable centrist majority bloc in the electoral arena, and the labor movement was organizationally tied to the political center and thus linked to the governing coalition. These regimes generally preempted or defeated leftist and opposition movements, contained social conflict and polarization, and were stable and hegemonic.

2. **Multiparty Polarizing System** [(Brazil and Chile)]. Here, no centrist majority bloc existed, and the labor movement was tied to the center either ineffectively (Brazil) or marginally (Chile) and was generally in a role of opposition. The result was polarization, though this process went much further in Chile, and both cases experienced a coup that ushered in a long period of military rule.

3. **Electoral Stability and Social Conflict** [(Uruguay and Colombia)]. These regimes had a stable centrist majority bloc in the electoral arena, but unions were not organizationally linked to it. In Uruguay the unions were consistently oriented to parties of the left and hence generally played an oppositional role, and in Colombia they were increasingly oriented in a similar way. The result

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4. The term “center” is intended to be quite relative (see glossary) and also rather broad. Here we have in mind political alternatives that reflect neither the extreme conservative reaction to incorporation found in several countries nor a Marxist or leftist political alternative. The term would encompass both the more reformist post-1958 period in Venezuela and the considerably more conservative post-1956 government in Peru.

5. Among the countries analyzed here, to the extent that such a majority bloc was formed, it was in all cases located roughly in the middle of the political spectrum, for reasons explored in the previous chapter. In other historical or geographic contexts, it is obviously possible that such a majority bloc might be located at a different place in the political spectrum.
was relative continuity in the electoral sphere, combined with rising social conflict, including major episodes of labor protest and a gradual militarization of politics in order to confront a growing insurgency. This ultimately led to military rule in Uruguay but stopped short of it in Colombia.

4. Stalemated Party System [Peru and Argentina]. Here the ban on APRA and Peronism often frustrated the formation of a centrist majority electoral bloc. The labor movement was largely at the center rather than on the left, yet the ongoing ban meant that the labor movement was not linked to the governing coalition during a major part of [Peru] or throughout [Argentina] the heritage period. This had the consequence of undermining the formation of a stable electoral majority bloc in both countries and of producing instead political stalemate, which ultimately culminated in military rule.

A Note on the Strength of the Labor Movement

Although the present argument focuses on the impact of parties and of party-union relations on the intensity of polarization and crisis, other factors are important as well. For the moment, we will underscore one additional explanation: the strength of the labor movement. We earlier noted that the concept of labor movement strength is complex, and overly facile comparisons among countries should be avoided. Nonetheless, certain contrasts within the pairs of cases are so great that they can be presented with reasonable confidence.

A ranking of the eight countries in terms of the scope of worker organization and protest in the first decades of the 20th century was presented in Chapter 3. As noted there, important shifts in factors that influence levels of worker protest took place in the following decades, calling for a reassessment of the ranking if it is to be applied to a later period. For instance, the onset of massive rural-urban migration in Brazil and Mexico in the intervening years was seen in the literature on those two countries as weakening their labor movements, and the emergence of export enclaves in Venezuela altered its initial position in the first two decades of the century as one of the countries with a particularly weak labor movement.

In light of the rankings for the earlier period and these subsequent changes, the following comparisons within the pairs of countries seem plausible. The Venezuelan labor movement had at least caught up with that in Mexico, so there was not a major contrast between them as of this later period. For the other pairs, by contrast, the differences were greater: Chile had a stronger labor movement than Brazil, Argentina a stronger labor movement than Peru, and Uruguay a stronger labor movement than Colombia. These contrasts in labor movement development played an important part in explaining key differences between the countries in each pair. For example, they help account for the higher level of polarization and social conflict in Chile compared to Brazil, and in Uruguay compared to Colombia. Also, with re-
spect to this latter pair, this contrast in labor strength helps to explain the occurrence of a coup in Uruguay and the absence of one in Colombia. Finally, the vast difference in the scope of union organizing and protest between Argentina and Peru was central to the contrasting level and character of the perception of threat in the two countries in the 1960s.
Conclusion: Shaping the Political Arena

The observer even casually acquainted with 20th-century Latin American history will not be surprised by the suggestion that the labor movement and state-labor relations have played an important role in the region's development. Likewise, it is a familiar observation that the evolution of state-labor relations has seen both major episodes of state domination of the labor movement and also dramatic instances of labor mobilization by actors within the state, and that these experiences have had important ramifications for the larger evolution of national politics. It is more novel to construct a model of political change and regime dynamics in Latin America that builds upon an analysis of the dialectical interplay between labor control and labor mobilization. This book has developed such a model. Obviously, the argument is not that labor politics and state-labor relations can, by themselves, explain broader patterns of change. Rather, the focus on these issues provides an optic through which a larger panorama of change can be assessed and, in part, explained.

The book has examined a crucial historical transition, referred to as the initial incorporation period, which brought the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. These initiatives were accompanied by a broader set of social and economic reforms and an important period of state-building. Labor policy during this period placed varying degrees of emphasis on the control of the labor movement and the mobilization of labor support, and these variations had a profound impact on the subsequent evolution of politics, playing a central role in shaping the national political arena in later decades.

The incorporation periods and their impact have been analyzed within what was called the critical juncture framework, which suggests that political change cannot be seen only as an incremental process. Rather, it also entails periods of dramatic reorientation—such as the incorporation periods—that commonly occur in distinct ways in different countries, leaving contrasting historical legacies.

The Historical Argument

The book explores a series of analytically comparable, but chronologically divergent, periods that emerged sequentially in each country: the period of the "oligarchic state," the incorporation period, and the aftermath and heri-
tage of incorporation. The centerpiece of the historical argument is the comparison of incorporation periods. We first distinguish between cases of state incorporation and party incorporation. In state incorporation, which characterized Brazil and Chile, the principal agency of the incorporation project was the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and the primary concern was with depoliticizing the working class and exercising control over its sectoral organizations. In the authoritarian context within which state incorporation occurred, few channels of labor expression or political bargaining existed. Some benefits to labor were paternalistically extended through a new state-controlled union structure, which, particularly in Brazil, became an agency for the distribution of state social welfare programs. At the same time, preexisting independent and leftist unions were repressed. In party incorporation, by contrast, along with the state’s role, a political party or political movement which later became a party was also crucial. Major concessions were extended to labor in the attempt to win its political support, and typically, though not always, the left within the labor movement was tolerated or co-opted, rather than repressed. Three subtypes of party incorporation were distinguished, based on the distinct forms of party-led mobilization, thus yielding four types of incorporation periods (see Figure 8.1).

In Uruguay and Colombia, party incorporation entailed the electoral mobilization of workers in the framework of two-party competition between traditional parties that dated from the 19th century. With the concern of the incorporating party to attract electoral support of the working class, substantial policy concessions were made. However, in contrast to other types of party incorporation, the construction of union-party links was either a marginal aspect of the incorporation project (Colombia) or did not occur at all (Uruguay). The labor populism of Peru and Argentina saw extensive electoral mobilization of labor by a newer, populist party that also constructed union-party links as a central feature of the incorporation project. Major concessions were granted to labor in exchange for its more extensive electoral support and organizational affiliation. Finally, the radical populism of Mexico and Venezuela was similar, except that the electoral and organizational incorporation of the working class in the modern sector was accompanied by a parallel incorporation of the peasantry. Therefore, in addition to the concessions granted to labor, the incorporating government also made concessions to the peasantry, particularly a commitment to agrarian reform, which raised the possibility of a more comprehensive restructuring of property relations.

Explaining Different Types of Incorporation. The earlier part of the analysis sought to show how, after the turn of the century, different types of incorporation emerged out of the period of the oligarchic state. The project of labor incorporation arose from two goals on the part of elites acting through the state. The first, which responded to rising worker protest, was to regularize and institutionalize channels for the resolution of labor-capital conflict and to control the radicalization of the working class. Labor issues and demands had become too disruptive and the inefficiency and unworkability of the coercive approach of repression was increasingly recognized by leaders.
within both the oligarchy and the middle sectors. The second goal was to transform the laissez-faire oligarchic state, in which the middle sectors were politically subordinate, and to create a more activist state that would assume new social responsibilities. The character of the accommodation or confrontation between the reform project and the oligarchic state helped shape the politics of incorporation. In cases of confrontation, reformers tended to promote labor mobilization as a political resource in the conflict.

The scope of labor mobilization and hence the type of incorporation project that emerged can therefore be understood in part in terms of an inverse relationship between the political strength of the oligarchy toward the end of this prior period and the degree to which this option of mobilization was pursued in the incorporation period. This relationship captures the dynamics of six of the cases and brings into sharp focus the factors that led the other two countries, Peru and Argentina, to deviate from the pattern.

The inverse relationship is most evident in the contrast between Brazil and Chile, on the one hand, and Mexico and Venezuela, on the other. In Brazil and Chile, the strong political position of the oligarchy provided the framework for accommodationist relations between it and the rising middle sectors and hence for a control-oriented incorporation period. In Mexico and Venezuela, a disruption of clientelistic relations in the countryside meant a relative erosion of oligarchic strength, which created an opportunity for the wide-ranging urban and rural mobilization that accompanied incorporation.

Colombia and Uruguay may in certain respects be seen as intermediate cases within this inverse relationship, to be understood in light of the special character of their well-institutionalized, two-party systems. In both countries the oligarchy was not united in a single political bloc. Rather, it was split between the two parties, which in many periods confronted each other not only in intense electoral competition, but in armed conflict. The dynamic of deeply ingrained two-party competition created a major incentive for the electoral mobilization of workers, thus disposing these countries toward more mobilizational incorporation periods. At the same time, a long tradition of interparty alliances created the potential for building a strong, bipartisan, antireformist coalition that could reunite elements of the oligarchy and limit the scope of incorporation. Thus, although an important electoral mobilization occurred in the incorporation periods, this antireform alliance blocked more elaborate efforts at support mobilization such as the creation of strong organizational links between unions and the party. In sum, the political split in the elite—which represented a greater degree of oligarchic weakness than was found in Brazil and Chile—made mobilization more likely, yet the tradition of interparty alliances provided a basis for limiting this mobilization.

Peru and Argentina deviate from this inverse relationship. In both cases the oligarchy was in many spheres powerful on the eve of the reform period, yet its power suffered from a crucial "flaw." In Argentina, the oligarchy's lack of a major electoral base in a peasantry placed it in a difficult position in periods of free electoral competition. In Peru, an interaction between di-

visions within the elite and a level of labor protest that was unusually intense, given Peru's relatively low level of development, resulted in two episodes of dramatic loss of control of the political system by the oligarchy, in 1912-13 and 1918-20. Both episodes were followed by the repression of labor protest, and control of the political system was restored.

In this context of flawed political strength of the oligarchy, reform movements emerged in the 1910s in both Argentina (the Radicals) and Peru (Leguía) that undertook important policy initiatives, but that also suffered from what was ultimately a decisive subordination to oligarchic interests. As a result, in both cases a labor incorporation project was contemplated, but due in part to oligarchic opposition, it was aborted and postponed. The reform projects ultimately failed, and overt oligarchic domination was reestablished in the 1930s.

When the incorporation period finally did occur in Peru and Argentina in the 1940s, it took a highly mobilizational form, due in part to the ongoing political frustrations resulting from the long delay and to an international political climate in the 1940s supportive of popular mobilization. Yet as of that decade, these two countries were still characterized by the persistence of an oligarchy that remained a powerful political, economic, and social force. The political "collision" between this oligarchy and the goals of the incorporation project would have important consequences for the subsequent legacy of incorporation.

It is noteworthy that this account of the emergence of different types of incorporation seems to go further toward explaining the degree and form of mobilization initiated from above during the incorporation project than another obvious factor: the prior scope of worker organization and protest, which we will again refer to for the sake of convenience as the "strength" of the labor movement. A relevant hypothesis might be that strong labor movements would "push" the leaders of the incorporation project to initiate more extensive mobilization.

Yet arraying the cases in terms of the scope of mobilization initiated from above during the incorporation period—from Brazil and Chile with little or no mobilization, to Uruguay and Colombia, to Peru and Argentina, to Mexico and Venezuela (see Table 5.1)—one finds no clear pattern. Of the two cases with the lowest levels of mobilization by the state, Chile had a strong labor movement, whereas the strength of the Brazilian labor movement was substantial but much more limited. Of the two cases with the highest levels of mobilization by the state, Mexico had one of the strongest labor move-

1 In contrast to Uruguay and Colombia, where the divisions were more predominantly political, these divisions in Peru involved deep social and economic cleavages.

2 See discussion in Chapter 3.

3 It could be pointed out that the final two pairs—Peru and Argentina, and Mexico and Venezuela—are similar in the scope of mobilization in the modern sector (see Table 5.1) and should therefore be viewed as "tied" on this variable for the purpose of the present discussion. However, in this case as well there seems to be no consistent patterning in relation to early labor movement strength.
ments, whereas Venezuela had one of the weakest as of the start of incorporation. With regard to the third pair, Argentina had the strongest labor movement in the region, whereas the scope of early labor movement development in Peru was far more modest. One interesting regularity that does stand out is the early emergence of the incorporation periods in Uruguay and Colombia in relation to the development of their labor movements. Yet we argued in Chapter 4 that this was not due to the characteristics of the labor movement, so much as to the way the dynamics of intra-elite and interparty competition pushed party leaders at an earlier point to make a political overture to labor. Hence, no systematic relationship between labor movement strength and type of incorporation period emerges, although at many points the strength of the labor movement was an important issue in the analysis.

The Legacy of Incorporation. Against the backdrop of the emergence of different types of incorporation projects, the central concern of the book has been with tracing their consequences through subsequent periods (see Figure 8.2). To understand the heritage of state incorporation, it is useful to consider the generalization that in Latin America, labor movements tend to become politicized, and if, as under state incorporation, this politicization is not promoted by the state during the incorporation period, it tends to occur later from within society in a way that may readily escape state control. This occurred dramatically in the 1930s in Chile and began to occur in Brazil after 1945. This radicalization was a principal legacy of the failure to fill political space that was a basic characteristic of state incorporation.

In the cases of party incorporation, the heritage derived in important measure from the playing out, during the aftermath period, of the opposition and polarization generated by incorporation. The events of the aftermath constituted, in the language of Chapter 1, the “mechanisms of production” of the legacy. One can summarize these events in terms of a “modal” pattern of change followed by most of the countries. The conservative reaction to incorporation generally culminated in a coup which instituted an authoritarian period that brought a more intense form of the conservative reaction. Later, when a more competitive regime was eventually restored, in most cases the party that had led the incorporation period underwent a process of conservatization in its program and policy goals. This conservatization reflected the terms under which it was believed that the party could either retain power [Mexico], maintain a newly constructed civilian regime [Venezuela and Colombia], or be readmitted to the political game (Peru, and to a much lesser extent Argentina).6

This conservatization had several components. One involved the imposi-

4 Mexico had a strong conservative reaction but avoided a coup.
5 In Uruguay this transition was carried out in a way intended to channel the electorate into the two traditional parties and away from the left, but a conservatization of the Colorado Party did not occur at this time.
6 In Argentina, conservatization under these terms might be said to have occurred in the period of Vanden's leadership in the mid-1960s, but it was not an overall characteristic of the aftermath or heritage period.

7 Again, Uruguay is an exception.

tion of a substantial limitation on working-class demand-making,7 though the party made a systematic effort to retain its political ties with the working class and/or the labor movement. Another was the introduction of mechanisms to limit political conflict and ensure that the polarization earlier triggered by incorporation would not be repeated. In Mexico, this mechanism took the form of strengthening the one-party dominant system; in Venezuela and Colombia, it took the form of the party pact. In Peru and Argentina, where the oligarchy remained strong and labor mobilization had been so extensive, the residue of antagonisms from the incorporation period was intense, inhibiting the regulation of conflict through the cooperation of the political parties. Under these conditions the military attempted to limit conflict through the veto of the full participation of the populist party—enforced by coups if necessary. Among the cases of party incorporation, only in Uruguay did no conservatization take place at this point.

The party heritage of incorporation was summarized in terms of three dimensions: whether there was a majority bloc in the electoral arena located roughly at the center of the political spectrum, whether the union movement was organizationally linked to parties of the center, and whether the union movement was usually in the governing coalition. These three outcomes were in important measure a result of the dynamics of the incorporation and aftermath periods. The incorporation period was the critical juncture in which the working class was or was not electorally mobilized by and organizationally linked to a reformist party, which thereby gained the potential capacity to form a majority bloc. Where neither of these occurred (the cases of state incorporation), attempts to form a majority bloc based on labor mobilization during the aftermath period failed. Where one or both of these occurred (the cases of party incorporation), the important question was whether in the aftermath period the polarization and opposition that resulted from the labor mobilization was worked out in a way that the potential to form an effective centrist majority bloc was realized. Different combinations of these three dimensions led to distinct regime dynamics, with Brazil and Chile emerging as what we characterized as multiparty, polarizing systems; Mexico and Venezuela as hegemonic, integrative party systems; Uruguay and Colombia as cases of electoral stability and social conflict; and Peru and Argentina as instances of political stalemate.

Thus, in Brazil and Chile, in the context of state incorporation, the absence of labor mobilization through a multiclass, populist party during the incorporation period contributed to a legacy of a highly fractionalized party system and the affiliation of labor to parties that were either out of power or were formally “in,” but were junior partners in governing coalitions. With the government having few or no political ties to the labor movement, and hence lacking means of hegemonic control, the labor movement, assigned to a position of virtually permanent opposition, underwent a process of radicalization, as did the non-communist parties with which it was affiliated. In
Figure 8.2 Incorporation and Its Legacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chile and Brazil</th>
<th>Uruguay and Colombia</th>
<th>Peru and Argentina</th>
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| **Incorporation** |
| **Depoliticization and Control** |
| Depoliticization. Paternalistic benefits. Left repressed. |

| **Electoral Mobilization by Traditional Party** |
| Electoral mobilization only. Substantial or major concessions to labor. Left tolerated. |
| 1932–73 | 1948–60 | 1940–63 |
| **Labor Populism** |
| 1948–60 | 1955–60 |
| **Radical Populism** |
| 1940–52 |

| **Aftermath** |
| 1931–52 | 1931–52 | 1931–52 |
| **Aborted Populism** |
| Failure of “belated” populist attempt to create a multi-class center. Labor affiliated with radical or radicalizing opposition parties. |
| 1931–52 | 1931–52 |
| 1916–45 | 1916–45 |
| 1945–60 | 1945–60 |
| **Reinforcing traditional Two-Party Systems** |
| Regime transition reinforces electoral role of traditional parties. Workers vote for these parties, but unions either completely or increasingly affiliated with left. |
| 1916–45 | 1945–60 |
| 1948–60 | 1948–60 |
| 1955–60 | 1955–60 |
| **“Difficult” and “Impossible” Games** |
| Populist party banned. Labor either in opposition or forced into subordinate role in coalitions. |
| 1948–60 | 1955–60 |
| 1940–52 | 1940–52 |
| 1948–63 | 1948–63 |

| **Heritage** |
| **Multiparty Polarizing System** |
| Political polarization and policy immobilism. National executive moves to the left. |
| 1932–73 | 1942–73 | 1940–62 |
| **Electoral Stability and Social Conflict** |
| Pacts among traditional parties. Growth of left in syndical arena and in Uruguay in electoral arena. |
| 1942–73 | 1958–86 |
| 1956–68 | 1957–66 |
| **Political Stalemate** |
| Military interventions block electoral victories of populist parties. |
| 1956–68 | 1957–66 |
| 1940–62 | 1958–78 |
| **Integrative Party System** |
| Mexico: one-party system; Venezuela: electoral competition among two cooperating parties. |
| 1940–82 | 1958–78 |

| **Regime Outcome in 1960s and 1970s** |
| 1973 Coup | 1973 Coup |
| Broad coup coalition, military intervention. |
| 1973 Coup | 1968 Coup |
| Increasing militarization of state in context where traditional parties retain power. Coup in Uruguay, not in Colombia |
| 1968 Coup | 1966 Coup |
| Military coup. |
| 1966 Coup |

As noted in Chapter 7, the heritage period overlaps with the aftermath period.
addition to these parties, the labor movement also had close ties to the communist parties. During the 1960s and 1970s, when new opposition movements, polarization, and political crisis were experienced throughout Latin America, this legacy played a central role in the process of radicalization that occurred in both countries, though the radicalization in Brazil took place on a more limited scale. The growing strength of the left culminated in its actual or apparent victory: in Chile, an electoral front of Marxist parties won the presidential election in 1970, and in a different way the turn of events in Brazil also moved the presidency to the left after 1961. As polarization and decisional paralysis proceeded in both countries, a broad coup coalition formed and the military intervened, establishing an extended period of military rule and attempting to eliminate the political system that was the heritage of incorporation.

If Brazil and Chile were “negative” on all three dimensions, Mexico and Venezuela were just the opposite, “positive” on all three. In those countries, the party that led the incorporation period mobilized both labor and peasant support and was able to establish electoral dominance. By the end of the aftermath, a conservatization of the populist party allowed for the formation of broad coalitions based on the incorporating party, either alone (Mexico) or in cooperation with other parties (Venezuela). Maintaining close ties with the labor movement, this party provided the state with legitimacy and offered the government important political resources with which to respond to the opposition movements and crises of the 1960s and 1970s.

Colombia and Uruguay were intermediate cases, differing from Mexico and Venezuela largely due to the absence of strong organizational links between the labor movement and the incorporating party. In the heritage periods in both countries, the vote of the working class in important measure remained tied to the traditional parties, but labor confederations were much less closely linked to these parties, and both countries experienced a significant increase in labor militancy. In the face of worker and guerrilla challenges during the period of polarization and crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, Uruguay and Colombia experienced social conflict and substantial militarization of the state, even though the traditional parties did not lose control of the electoral arena, although the left did grow significantly in Uruguay. In Uruguay this militarization of the state went further, to the point that it culminated in the coup of 1973. Factors that help account for this divergence between the two countries, within the framework of many commonalities, include the greater labor radicalization in Uruguay, the more dramatic impact of the guerrilla insurgency on national institutions; the unsettling effect of the left’s growing electoral strength, the long-term decline of the export sector, which undermined the economic base for the Uruguayan state’s heavy commitment to welfare spending; and the much greater difficulty of the Uruguayan government in shifting economic models to address the economic decline.

Finally, Peru and Argentina were similar to Mexico and Venezuela on the three dimensions with one exception: the labor movement was not in the governing coalition. A central feature of the heritage of incorporation was the ban on an electorally strong populist party that was thereby relegated to an opposition role for much [Peru] or all [Argentina] of the later 1950s and 1960s. This ban reflected a legacy of antipathy between populist and antipopulist forces that had no counterpart in the other six countries. Anti-Peronismo and anti-Aprismo were fundamental points of reference in political life, and populist/antipopulist antagonisms encompassed not only a political dimension, but also reflected profound cultural antagonisms. These antagonisms and this ban played a central role in the distinctive pattern of political stalemate in the 1950s and 1960s. This stalemate was one of the principal conditions that led to the coups of 1968 [Peru] and 1966 [Argentina], coups that—unlike the “veto” coups of the early 1960s in these two countries—inherited long-term military rule through which the military sought to supersede the stalemated party system.

To conclude, if one considers the implications of the failure to fill political space in the state incorporation experiences of Chile and Brazil, the scope of mobilization in the different types of party incorporation, and the contrasting ways in which the conservative reaction to party incorporation was accommodated, one can order a large body of information concerning the political history of these countries.

Erosion of the Heritage?

The analysis has traced out the heritage of incorporation to one of two end points. In five of the countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina), the political dynamic that derived from incorporation inhibited the establishment of stable patterns and ultimately resulted in a military coup that appeared to bring this political dynamic to an abrupt end. In the other countries (Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia), the legacy was a more stable pattern that endured, with no dramatic end point. For the first five cases the analysis extended to this coup, whereas for the other three it extended to approximately 1980. The question of what happened beyond these periods then arises: how long did the heritage of incorporation persist? Though no clear answer could be given as of the late 1980s, a few comments can be made.

Among the five countries where coups overturned the civilian regimes and interrupted established patterns of party politics, Brazil and Chile experienced the longest periods of military rule and elaborate attempts by the military to impose new political structures. In both countries, the political project of the military was to purge the left, rid the country of the prior political system, and establish new institutions that would prevent the recurrence of the old political dynamics of radicalization, polarization, and decisional paralysis. In both cases, the military oversaw a long and complex period of constitution-mongering and electoral engineering in an attempt to create a new
civilian political arena restricted to actors it considered acceptable. In both cases, too, this effort failed.

In Brazil, by the end of the 1980s the transition from a military to a democratic regime was completed, with the new constitution and direct presidential elections at the end of 1989 capping a long process that included the earlier introduction of elections at other levels and, in 1985, the restoration of civilian rule with the inauguration of President Sarney. The Brazilian military had gone through contortions of institutional experimentation, attempting to find a solution first in a two-party system and then in a multiparty system. Yet what immediately emerged, as the military stepped down and a strong bandwagon effect produced tremendous support for the opposition, was on the surface a one-party dominant system based on the PMDB, which won about 70 percent of the presidential vote in the electoral college in late 1984, combined with splintering and fractionalization in the rest of the party system. However, just as in the 1946–64 Republic, when one could conclude little about regime dynamics from the formal existence of a three-party system, so in the post-military period after 1985 the image of a single large party was deceiving. Indeed, after the long interruption by military rule and the great effort of the military government to design and control the new political regime, what was striking was the apparent reappearance of some of the old dynamics.

Hidden under the dominant-party facade was an emerging pattern of fractionalization that became more marked as the Sarney government wore on. Internally, the PMDB could not hold its diverse factions together, as witnessed for example by the defection from the party of what became the PSDB. Even more striking was the level of fractionalization that became explicit in the 1989 elections: no fewer than 24 presidential candidates initially threw their hats into the ring and the two who made it to the final runoff election represented parties that jointly held less than 5 percent of the congressional seats.8

As this pattern indicates, parties in Brazil continued to be fragmented and weak. Indeed, unlike the case of Chile, the post-military parties in Brazil were largely new. Nevertheless, the potential for a restoration of a polarizing dynamic seemed evident. Interparty or interfactional groupings along more ideological or programmatic lines reappeared. This pattern was especially evident in the blocs that formed in the Constituent Assembly of 1987–88 (Bruneau 1989). In addition, on the right the private sector resumed an active role in political and electoral affairs through its organization, FIESP. At the same time the labor movement seemed to be in a similar coalitional position to that in the pre-1964 period, that is to say, in a position of substantial political autonomy. As in the pre-1964 period, unions had some connection with the PMDB and other center-left parties, but these links did not provide the kinds of mechanisms for labor conciliation and class compromise found in cases such as Mexico and Venezuela. A new element, however, was the PT (Workers' Party), which was founded on the basis of the workers' movement that erupted in the late 1970s. The PT achieved unanticipated electoral success in municipal elections at the end of 1988, and it emerged as the second-place winner in the initial round of the 1989 presidential contest.9 The potential for renewed polarization could be seen in the collapse of the PMDB as a broad centrist coalition representing a viable electoral force and its replacement by forces more clearly identified with the right and left. Indeed, the runoff elections pitted a free market candidate Fernando Collor de Mello, the ultimate victor, against Luiz Inácio da Silva [Lula], leader of the strike movement of the late 1970s and founder of the PT.

A further word might be added about the reactivation of the Brazilian labor movement, which began with the São Paulo strikes of the late 1970s and continued through the civilian regime with the formation of two new labor centrals, the CUT and the CGT, and with protest against economic stabilization policies. To many analysts—who focused on the high level of state control over the union movement introduced during the Vargas government of the 1930s and early 1940s and on the subsequent retention of that legal framework through the military period—labor reactivation in the 1970s strike movement came as a surprise. The socioeconomic change Brazil had experienced during the military period was typically invoked as an explanation. That is, with the economic "miracle" and sustained high rates of growth, the military regime oversaw a process of industrial expansion and the formation of a larger, more skilled labor force, working and living in concentrated areas of industrial production. This "new" working class was often seen as providing the basis for the labor activation that began in the late 1970s.

Although these socioeconomic changes were undeniably part of the explanation, the labor activism of the 1970s and 1980s was no surprise from the standpoint of the present analysis, which places more emphasis on the dynamics set in motion by the incorporation experience, particularly on two aspects of its evolving legacy: the relative political autonomy of the labor movement from governing centrist parties and the consequent polarizing dynamic, which was most apparent whenever controls were relaxed—that is, in the mid-1940s and in the last years before the 1964 coup. The reemergence of these tendencies with the return to an open regime is an outcome that might be anticipated from the perspective of the present analysis.

Finally, immobilism in important areas of policy seemed to be reemerging, most dramatically in sharp vacillations of economic policy, suggesting yet another aspect of continuity with the heritage of incorporation in Brazil. Even the military regime, as it was preparing its exit, was unable to implement a stabilization policy over any sustained period, in part because of the political pressure that accompanied the regime opening. The vacillation of

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9 The third runner-up, with nearly the same level of electoral support as Lula, was a familiar figure on the populist left, Leonel Brizola.
the civilian government beginning in 1985 in confronting the stabilization and debt issues was reminiscent of post-1950 Brazil.

In Chile, the transition to a democratic regime was just occurring with the December 1989 elections, the first since the coup of 1973. Having been masterful in his capacity to dominate the political arena during 15 years of military rule, General Pinochet miscalculated on the last step of his carefully laid out plans and, at the end of 1988, lost the plebiscite that would have paved the way for introducing a civilian regime under his own presidential tutelage. With this defeat, support for the proregime forces began to hemorrhage. The ability of opposition groups to work together for the “No” campaign in the plebiscite provided the basis for ongoing cooperation and the formation of a single opposition list for the 1989 elections. Thus, as in Brazil, a strong electoral pole of opposition was created. The Christian Democratic Party was the anchor of the new 17-party Concertation of Parties for Democracy (CPD) and provided its presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, who decisively won the election.

Yet, despite the emergence of a majority electoral bloc, the reappearance of a polarizing dynamic could certainly not be ruled out. The unity within the CPD could well be fragile. As Pinochet’s power dissipated, constitutional amendments, ratified in a July 1989 plebiscite, were forced upon him, and these included a provision backing off from the ban on Marxist parties. Because of the short interval to the December elections, this change did not have much of an impact on those elections, but it had clear implications for the future. Also, on the right, some consolidation had been achieved with the cooperation of forces representing the political (RN) and economic (UDI) right, though a host of pro-Pinochet parties were not included in this major challenge to the CPD. In short, by the end of 1989 a great multiplicity of parties continued to exist in Chile—and often the same pre-1973 parties. For the moment, they had solidified around two major electoral fronts, though it was impossible to predict that these political blocs would endure, rather than fractionalize, as occurred in Brazil. In addition, the prospect of renewed political polarization could certainly not be discounted. The CPD was committed to an economic policy that would not represent a major departure from that of the final years of the Pinochet period, raising the possibility of a perpetuation of economic hardships that could produce a strong resurgence of new forms of opposition politics.

Mexico and Venezuela did not undergo the sharp regime discontinuities introduced in Brazil and Chile by military coup. Yet behind the relative continuity of regimes in Mexico and Venezuela, one must inquire about underlying changes. Rapid urbanization and social change had important consequences for both of the parties that earlier led the incorporation project. In the context of urbanization, the declining demographic and political importance of peasants cut into a major pillar of support for both the PRI and AD, at the same time that these parties, traditionally dependent on mobilization through sectoral organizations, were unable to win much support within the swelling urban informal sector. With the economic crisis of the 1980s, the government was constrained in its ability to offer material payoffs to sustain the coalition. Indeed, the austerity and stabilization policies prompted by the debt crisis, as well as a more general turn to economic restructuring, took a heavy toll on growth, employment, and real wages. In both countries, land reform virtually ground to a halt, and there was some evidence of the emergence of a new, incipient, more combative unionism, though this remained difficult to assess.

Venezuela seemed in a better position than Mexico to absorb these pressures for change, since during the postincorporation period Venezuela made the transition to an electoral basis of legitimacy and moved to a competitive system, thereby opening a channel for expressing opposition and discontent by “throwing the bums out.” Somewhat paradoxically, however, in the 1980s, the regular alternation of the two parties in the presidency was interrupted. In 1984 AD’s Carlos Andrés Pérez was succeeded in the presidency by fellow party member Jaime Lusinchi, and five years later Pérez returned to the presidency. Nevertheless, cooperation between AD and COPEI remained a significant feature of the Venezuelan regime, and the ongoing need for this cooperation was evident in the failure of AD to win a majority in either house of Congress in the 1988 election.

In Mexico, the PRI’s capacity to cope initially seemed impressive. Following the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, the government instituted an orthodox economic shock treatment and began to reorient the economy along liberal lines. Furthermore, with some variations, it sustained these policies and particularly the economic restructuring during the entire presidency of de la Madrid, from 1982 to 1988. The result was the first presidential term since the revolution showing no economic growth, a general drop in the standard of living, and a dramatic decline in real wages. Moreover, this occurred with relatively little protest or mobilization of popular sector opposition; and though the conservative PAN was able to present a greater challenge in the midterm elections of 1985, the parties of the left were not very successful in capitalizing on this situation. As 1988 opened, the government engineered a social pact between labor and capital that once again seemed to confirm the capacity of the PRI to negotiate and bargain with major social groups.

In the July 1988 elections, however, discontent burst forth in the dramatic success of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the former president, who broke with the PRI to stand as an opposition candidate on a reformist platform of democratization, nationalism, and a policy reorientation that would address the forgotten issues of social justice and equitable development. Even if one accepts the official results, rather than Cárdenas’s claim of victory in the three-way race with the PRI and the PAN, the PRI was reduced to just half of the votes, an outcome that seemed to mark the initiation of a new era.

At a time when past patterns of negotiation and conciliation in Mexico were limited by the constraints of economic policy and when symbolic assurances were wearing thin as policy moved to the right, a potential opposition victory appeared to undermine the hegemonic regime in a way that did not seem to be the case for Venezuela. Strong pressures emerged within
Mexico to hold genuinely competitive elections. Social sectors and opposition groups on both the right and the left, which had not been centrally included in the PRI's system of negotiations, demanded political liberalization and democratization with increasing vehemence. Reformist factions within the PRI had earlier wanted to democratize the party internally, and Cárdenas represented only the most recent, though certainly the most important, of these. Even the PRI faction associated with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari sensed that a transition from negotiation and clientelism to electoral support would be more consonant with a liberalization of the economy in which the market was left free to impose hardship. Yet the transition was difficult, being opposed by groups that benefited from the old system, and it was not clear to what extent the Salinas forces could politically afford to let go of the traditional patterns of support, particularly with the continuing vitality of the Cardenista opposition.

Though the future was unpredictable, at the end of 1989 it was possible to contemplate perhaps three scenarios, which differed with respect to the success of Cárdenas's PRI. The first focused on the capacity of the PRI, using a variety of political and coercive resources including blatant electoral fraud along with repressive measures that targeted PRD activists, to defeat the Cárdenas challenge and remain a majority party, if no longer a dominant party in the same sense. In this scenario, the PAN would be the major but limited opposition force, substantially cooperating with the PRI over largely shared economic policy. This strategy seemed to be that of the new Salinas government inaugurated at the end of 1988 (R. Collier forthcoming). In the second, the PRI would not be successful in this strategy in the medium to long run. Instead, the newly formed PRD of the Cárdenas forces would remain a viable and more institutionalized challenger, and the PRI and PRD would compete openly as two more evenly matched parties, with the PAN in a more secondary role. In this case, broader cooperation between the PRI and the PAN to meet the PRD challenge seemed a strong possibility. Indeed, such cooperation was evident in the politics of the new electoral law. In this two-and-a-half party system, a dynamic of convergence would likely come into play. It would seem probable that the PRI, in order to compete with the PRD, would have no choice but to moderate its economic policy in order to attract the support of its traditional mass constituencies. For its part, the PRD in many ways, aside from its commitment to competitive democracy, represented the same nationalist, reformist rhetorical/ideological space historically occupied by the PRI, though abandoned by it in the 1980s. Aside from its rhetoric, its program was moderate and pragmatic, explicitly recognizing economic constraints and the new economic realities, to which the PRI program was responding. However, for the PRD, the new realities meant that a simple return to old formulae was not possible. In the third and least likely scenario for Mexico, a massive defection from the PRI would accrue to the PRD. The result, in some sense, would be the replacement of the PRI with the PRD as a kind of resurrected and renamed PRM (the populist party of the 1930s incorporation period), a dominant, progressive party, but proba-

CONCLUSION

bly without the same kind of formal linkages to the labor movement, though with its support.

Among the four pairs of countries, Uruguay and Colombia constituted the only pair in which one country had a coup and the other did not. In Uruguay, despite the efforts of the military during more than a decade of harsh authoritarian rule to eliminate or subdue actors they deemed responsible for the earlier crisis, with the transition to democracy in the mid-1980s the earlier characteristics of the party system were quickly restored: the strong electoral position of the Colorado and the Nationals, a significant role for the electoral left, and a pluralistic labor movement affiliated with the left.

Indeed, as of the 1980s, the electoral left in Uruguay became more important. The left coalition, the Frente Amplio, increased its vote between the 1971 and 1984 elections from 18 to 21 percent. Subsequently in 1989, despite the defection of a cluster of small parties from the Frente, it gained roughly 20 percent of the seats in both chambers of the legislature, and, together with the parties that had split from the coalition, won around 30 percent of the seats in the lower chamber. The Frente also won the municipal election in Montevideo with 34 percent of the vote. This was a significant outcome, because Montevideo contained roughly half the country's population and because this victory gave the Frente the post of mayor in the capital city.

This showing might be taken to suggest a potential process of polarization, yet such an assessment should be evaluated with caution. It could be argued that even in the polarized context of the early 1970s, the Uruguayan electoral left had been more moderate than that, for instance, in Chile. Relatedly, with regard to the electoral outcome of 1984, it is noteworthy that the title of Rial's [1986] analysis of the 1984 election referred to it as a "Triumph of the Center." These considerations, plus the deflation of developmental expectations in the profoundly changed political climate of the 1980s, made the immediate potential for polarization limited. Further, given Uruguay's reasonable economic performance, some of the gravest aspects of the earlier economic crisis seemed to have been superseded. Nonetheless, with an important left in the electoral arena and a labor movement strongly linked to the left, the possibility of a renewed political crisis could be substantial in a context that presented an opportunity for polarization.

As of the late 1980s, Colombia had experienced four decades of regime continuity. The two traditional parties continued to perpetuate their strong electoral dominance, though with a modest change in interparty relations in the fact that, after 1986, President Virgilio Barco of the Liberal Party ended the tradition of coparticipation with the Conservatives, opening the possibility of more vigorous two-party competition.

However, notwithstanding this step, which could potentially lead to greater competitiveness, a central issue remained unaddressed: the stability of the two-party system was so extreme as to produce a strong delegitimation of the regime, with low voting rates, extensive violence on the right, the continuing guerrilla insurgency on the left, and widespread frustration with the existing order. In the early to mid-1980s President Betancur had launched
a democratic opening, introducing the election of mayors at the municipal level for the first time and providing a channel through which the insurrectional left could enter the electoral arena. As of the end of the 1980s, the consequences of this new sphere of electoral competition were still hard to assess. Yet it was clear that the initiative had not created significant new space for political opposition. The electoral incorporation of the left was unsuccessful, due both to the failure to sustain a ceasefire with important insurgent groups and to the systematic assassination of leftist politicians by right-wing death squads. These assassinations were part of a larger pattern of harassment and killing of leaders of virtually any progressive political group that sought to mount serious opposition to the government, with the result that the political space for a legitimate opposition was very limited indeed. This harassment and killing seriously debilitated the labor movement, whose weakness at this point was dramatically reflected in the failed general strike of late 1988.

The drug trade, though it may have given the economy a considerable boost, posed an enormous political problem, as the government tried unsuccessfully to deal with the drug lords, who fought back with impressive resources. The already-high level of violence and killing that derived from drug trafficking escalated into a sustained assault on the system of justice through the assassination of judges, police officers, and a minister of justice, and also through attacks on journalists and newspapers that reported news on drug issues or supported the government's campaign against the drug lords. In 1989, the crisis further escalated with the spectacular confrontation between the government and the narcotics cartel, following the cartel's assassination of the leading presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán. This confrontation threatened the authority of the state and raised questions about the ability of the government to maintain basic policies, such as effectively prosecuting criminals, that were essential to dealing with the narcotics trade.

Thus, although the established two-party system did not seem immediately threatened, Colombia faced multiple crises, including especially the political and legal crisis posed by the drug trade and the crisis of legitimacy due to the relentless assaults on the normal functioning of virtually any form of political opposition. Yet, despite the depth of these crises, it was not clear that drastic change was imminent. Hartlyn (1988:235) argues that “the Colombian political process has confounded pessimists and disappointed optimists. If the recent past is the best indicator of the immediate future, then the process of ... political re-accommodation will be drawn-out, resisted, and uneven.”

In Peru and Argentina the obvious point to make was that the “centerpiece” of the analysis of the heritage period—the ban on APRA and Peronism—no longer existed. In Argentina, the post-1966 military government, which had self-confidently launched its project to eliminate the pre-1966 political system, collapsed in the face of massive social protest, and in 1973, after a decisive electoral victory, Perón was allowed to assume the presidency. An evaluation of the experiment in Peronist rule from 1973 to 1976 could potentially be used as a comparison case to explore the “counterfactual” question of what a Peronist government would have been like, had it been allowed in the 1950s or 1960s. Yet three complications during the 1973 to 1976 period made the situation so distinctive that such an exercise is dubious: Juan Perón’s death in 1974; the political incompetence of his wife Isabel Martinez de Perón, who succeeded him in the presidency, and the extreme polarization of Argentine politics at that time, including a major urban insurgency and exceptionally high levels of violence and killing on both the left and the right. This insurgency and violence occurred in the second phase of regional radicalization discussed in Chapter 7. It therefore posed a far greater challenge than in most of the other countries or in Argentina in the 1960s.

Following this failed experiment in re-integrating Peronism into the political system, the military government, which ousted the Peronists in 1976, launched its infamous “dirty war” against the “subversives” and initiated a neoconservative economic project that—in conjunction with the heavily overvalued exchange rate and the emerging debt crisis—produced an economic disaster. Discredited by the scope of repression and by the economic difficulties, the armed forces made things worse through military adventurism in the debacle of the Falklands/Malvinas war with Great Britain, which they lost dramatically.

In the 1983 election that followed the precipitous collapse of the military regime, the Radicals10 won with the help of various factors, including their candidate’s close identification with the human rights movement that had emerged out of the military repression and also a poor choice of candidates by the Peronists. However, the Peronists became well established as the second party in a competitive two-party system, and in 1989 they won the presidency with the election of Carlos Saúl Menem. As noted above, following the period of the ban on Peronism, the Peronists had previously assumed the presidency in 1973. However, at that point their assumption of power was permitted as a desperate attempt to find a solution to the extraordinary crisis of Argentine politics. In 1989, the Peronists’ succession to the presidency was, by comparison, a routine transfer of power. In fact, remarkably, 1989 was the first time in Argentine history that a president who came to office through a fully free election was replaced by a president of a different party who also came to office through a fully free election.

Notwithstanding these important steps toward institutionalizing a competitive regime, among the four countries with newly established civilian regimes in place by 1989, Argentina was the most actively threatened by military rebellions, with repeated crises revolving around the prosecution of officers in connection with their role in the earlier military repression. Later in his term, President Alfonsín sought to mitigate these crises by limiting the scope of prosecutions, and shortly after coming to office in 1989, President Menem granted a broader amnesty that played an important role in al-

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10 After the decline of the UCRI in the 1960s, the UCRP adopted the old party name.
leviating military tension. The severe economic crisis and the emergence of new forms of social protest over food prices posed ongoing threats, but by the standard of 20th-century Argentine history the country had entered a period of at least some stability at the level of regime and of governmental transitions, having achieved a competitive two-party system.

In Peru, the post-1968 military government had assumed power with an ambitious agenda for restructuring the political system. To a greater extent than in the other cases of military rule, the military’s efforts not only failed, but backfired. Seeking to undermine APRA, the military government first supported the Communist Party within the labor movement and later created its own labor federation and also an organization for social mobilization called SINAMOS, which decisively raised, and then dramatically frustrated, expectations in the popular sector. These initiatives had the effect of pushing much further the process of labor radicalization that had begun in the late 1960s. By the end of the 1970s, APRA largely lost its ties with organized labor, which came to be affiliated primarily with the left. Peru also developed an important electoral left, which, as in Uruguay, was a significant force above all in the national capital, where a leftist mayor was also elected. In comparing APRA’s loss of the labor movement and of popular sector support with Peronism’s ongoing strength in that sector, one sees a further legacy of APRA’s conservatization in the 1950s and 1960s.

During the transition in Peru to a civilian regime in the late 1970s, the ban on APRA was superseded and the party was allowed to play a full role in the Constituent Assembly of 1979 and in the general elections of 1980. Haya de la Torre died in 1979, exactly 60 years after he launched his political career in the worker-student protests of the late 1910s, yet without ever achieving his dream of becoming president of Peru. Belaúnde regained the presidency in 1980, in part due to a poor choice of candidates by APRA. However, in the next presidential election APRA finally won under the leadership of Alan García. This might seem to be a major step toward establishing a competitive two-party system, as in Argentina. Yet Belaúnde and his party, AP, were so discredited in 1985 after his presidential term that the party’s vote plummeted in the election of that year. What seemed instead to be emerging was a multiparty system with a substantial left, APRA, whose policies and political posture range from the center-left to the center-right, and a variety of smaller center-right to conservative parties.

One of the major questions about Alan García’s presidency beginning in 1985 was whether he would use APRA’s renewed access to state resources in an effort to win back party control of the labor movement. Interestingly, he did not. Whereas APRA’s historic appeal to the working class had been to the labor movement in the formal sector, García deemphasized this traditional tie and focused on a broader appeal oriented more centrally toward Peru’s massive informal sector.

At the beginning of his presidential term, García was perceived by many to have gotten his administration off to a good start. Yet throughout his years in office, he was bedeviled by grave problems: Peru’s severe economic difficulties; the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, which departed from the tradition of Latin American guerrilla movements in its extreme use of terror and which, as of 1989, was proving to be increasingly powerful; the distortion of social and economic relations through the growing prevalence of drug trafficking, the growing corruption of the police and the ineffectiveness of the legal system and the prison system, and dramatically rising levels of social violence. García also committed a series of policy blunders including a poorly executed nationalization of Peruvian banks, which produced a confrontation with the banking sector that the president dramatically lost. At the end of his term, García was fully as discredited as Belaúnde had been in 1985.

Thus, the changes in Peru had three crucial components. First, as in Argentina, the ban on the populist party was no longer a fact of politics. Second, as in Uruguay, a substantial new electoral left had emerged. Third, in contrast to Peronism’s ongoing dominant role in the Argentine labor movement, APRA largely lost its position in the Peruvian labor movement, and in a new socioeconomic context, in which the formal sector was declining and the informal sector appeared to be of rising importance, APRA did not seek to regain this old constituency. Finally, among the eight countries, Peru—along with Colombia—was experiencing the most grave social and economic crisis, accompanied by severe delegitimation of the state and deterioration of the functioning of state institutions. With these transformations, Peruvian politics was probably the most changed in relation to earlier periods of all the eight cases.

The overall patterns of continuity and change among the full set of countries are summarized in Figure 8.3. This figure replicates Figure 7.2 from the heritage chapter, locating the countries in terms of three dimensions: whether there was a centrist majority bloc in the electoral arena, whether the union movement was organizationally linked to a party or parties of the center, and whether the union movement was usually in the governing coalition. In Figure 8.3, the corners of the cube, which represent alternative “poles” in terms of different combinations of the three variables, are numbered to facilitate identification of different trajectories of change.

As the 1980s closed, it seemed possible that both Brazil and Chile would remain at (or return to) Pole 7. In both, the antigovernment forces at the end of the military regime initially came together in impressive unity. In Brazil, that unity fell apart and a fractionalized and potentially polarizing regime...
CONCLUSION

were lost. In addition, relations between labor and the government grew increasingly tense, as wages dropped by 50 percent during 1989, according to CTV calculations. Nevertheless, despite a potential tendency toward a more combative labor movement, one could find no clear indication of a loosening of AD-labor ties. In the case of such a change in the labor sector, movement would be toward Pole 8, with greater social conflict and perhaps a strengthening of AD-COPEI cooperation.

The direction of change in Mexico was harder to discern. The growing importance of PAN and the dramatic appearance of the Cardenista movement pointed to the end of the one-party hegemonic system, a fundamental change, the significance of which should not be underestimated. Yet, none of the three scenarios sketched above represented a movement away from Pole 1. One way or another, it seemed likely that if a greater degree of competitiveness was introduced into the regime, movement would be toward a pattern more similar to that in Venezuela. That is, to the extent one-party dominance was undermined, what might emerge was a “one-and-a-half” or “two-and-a-half” party system with centrifugal dynamics, a more open regime with greater electoral competition among parties that tended toward programmatic convergence.

In Uruguay, the regime transition of 1985 largely restored the prior political system, with the two traditional parties still in a strong role and, as of 1989, in control of the presidency. The left sustained, and even strengthened substantially, its position in relation to the early 1970s in a pattern that might be approaching that of a three-party system. Uruguay thus showed potential for movement toward Pole 7, though as noted above, in the political climate of the late 1980s, and given the political moderation of the Uruguayan electoral left, even before the 1973 coup, polarization hardly seemed imminent. In Colombia the overwhelming dominance of the two traditional parties had persisted without interruption since 1958, and the electoral arena remained largely closed to the left. Thus Colombia seemed more likely to stay at Pole 8, although as of the end of the 1980s the severity of the confrontation with the drug lords raised many questions about the future of the Colombian political system.

The major innovation in the post-military regimes of Peru and Argentina was the end of the ban on the populist party. In the first election in the 1980s in both countries, the populist party (APRA and Peronism) lost, so these parties did not immediately assume power. Nevertheless, the populist party remained a strong electoral contender, as witnessed by its subsequent victory in both countries. In the framework of this commonality, the two countries were changing in different directions. In Peru, APRA lost its close ties to the labor movement. Subsequently, a strong electoral left emerged in the 1970s, drawing major support from labor. The possibility thus emerged

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13 This ban had been briefly removed in 1973 in Argentina but then reimposed by the 1976 coup.
that Peru might be moving toward Pole 7. In Argentina, on the other hand, Peronism maintained its close ties to the labor movement and no strong electoral force emerged on the left. Argentina therefore had the potential for movement toward Pole 1 and some form of integrative two-party system. It was this possibility that gave efforts at concetration and social pact formation in Argentina a special analytic importance from the standpoint of this study. It is noteworthy that Peru and Argentina were the only pair in which both countries were moving in new directions. In this sense, the heritage of incorporation was least stable in these two cases. Indeed, this makes sense, since a principal feature of the heritage was the ban in APRA and Peronism. With this ban eliminated, politics changed.

**The Role of Social and Economic Explanations**

This book has presented an argument centered on the long-term legacy of political contrasts among the incorporation periods. It has explored the political dynamics through which this legacy was perpetuated, and, in the previous section, the political dynamics that would be entailed in the potential erosion of the legacy. Despite this emphasis on political dynamics, it is not our position that socioeconomic factors are unimportant as determinants of politics, but rather that for outcomes of broad regime type and regime dynamics, which are of interest here, their impact is not continuous, but rather occurs in crucial episodes of reorientation and institutional founding.

Given this model, it is worth returning to the question: what is the impact of socioeconomic change and which socioeconomic changes triggered the critical juncture of the incorporation periods on which we have focused? The literature on Latin American development has presented numerous arguments about the varied ways in which socioeconomic change has shaped the political sphere, focusing on such transformations as the emergence of the new export economies beginning in the latter half of the 19th century, the economic disruption that occurred in the context both of the world depression and the two world wars, the internationalization of these economies beginning in the 1950s, and the distinct phases of import-substituting industrialization that have accompanied these other transformations. Many scholars have pointed to the links between the phases of import substitution commonly seen as linked with the depression, on the one hand, and the emergence of such political phenomena as the incorporation periods and populism, on the other.14

A basic conclusion of the analysis is that the connection between many of these economic changes and the specific political transitions and regime outcomes we analyze is not as direct as some of the literature would seem to suggest. With reference to the relative timing of the initial incorporation period and the phases of import substitution that began with the depression, it

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14 For an overview of some of this literature, see D. Collier (1979: chap. 1).

**Conclusion**

is evident that the incorporation period sometimes came earlier, sometimes coincided with these economic transitions, and sometimes came later. There was no regular pattern. These major economic changes were a significant part of the context in which such political transformations occurred and at certain points played a conjunctural role in influencing the incorporation periods, but their causal importance has at times been overstated.

If one wished to single out a major economic and social transformation that did appear crucial in setting into motion the processes of political change that are the focus of this book, it would be the earlier period of export expansion, which began in the latter part of the 19th century and extended into the first decades of the 20th century. As we saw, this period of growth stimulated not only massive urban and commercial development, but also significant expansion in manufacturing that occurred well before the industrialization often identified in the literature with the period during and after the depression.15 This earlier era of growth brought into being the actors and processes of change that were central to the political transformations analyzed here. These included the export oligarchies themselves and the middle sectors which, at times in alliance with dissident elements of the oligarchy, initiated the major reform efforts of the first decades of the century. This earlier period of growth also created the economic and demographic base in the commercial, manufacturing, enclave, and transportation sectors for the emergence of new labor movements, whose increasing capacity for collective organization and intense social protest was a principal stimulus for the reform periods and the incorporation projects that began to emerge in country after country.

This is not to say that an event such as the depression was not extremely important. Indeed, our analysis revealed that it did have a significant impact. The crisis of the depression contributed to the fall of Ibáñez in Chile and cut short his state incorporation project, with the result that the opportunity to implement his policies was far more limited than that enjoyed by Vargas in Brazil. The crisis of the depression contributed to discrediting the Conservative government in Colombia and facilitated the Liberals' rise to power in 1930, which launched the incorporation period. In Uruguay, the shock of the depression helped stimulate the polarization that led to the coup of 1933. In Peru and Argentina, the economic crisis contributed to the fall of the Leguía and Yrigoyen governments in 1930—both of which had earlier made an unsuccessful attempt to launch an incorporation project. Thus, the depression did have an impact. Yet it appears to have been a marginal factor rather than a central factor in explaining the key outcome in this analysis: why different countries were set onto distinct trajectories of change during the incorporation periods.

These observations about the depression may be applied more generally to the impact of a series of other external events, political as well as economic,

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15 With reference to the early employment effects of this manufacturing growth, see Table 3.3.
that successively influenced these cases. In the Overview, we referred to these events, such as World War I, the Russian Revolution, the depression, World War II, the onset of the cold war, economic internationalization, and the Cuban Revolution, as a kind of transnational historical grid through which these countries passed and which was the source of a sequence of cross-sectional influences that cut across the longitudinal trajectory within each case encompassing the incorporation, aftermath, and heritage periods. As with the depression, these other influences also had an important impact, at times reinforcing the patterns associated with internal dynamics of change and at times producing variations but not, within the decades considered here, superseding these internal patterns.

We have just argued, however, that the transnational development that did have a fundamental, founding influence was the enormous expansion of world trade beginning in the second half of the 19th century, which triggered the export growth that in turn set in motion the processes of change that have been the focus of this book. In addition to this highly visible impact of economic change, the other area in which we found a clear relationship between socioeconomic and political change was in the emergence of the labor movements analyzed in Chapter 3. We observed a close connection between the political outcome—the scope of worker organization and protest—and social and economic change, which had created the economic and demographic base for labor movements. However, as noted earlier in the present chapter, the scope of organization and protest did not, in turn, seem to have a systematic impact on the type of incorporation period that emerged in each country. Once again, to explain the different types of incorporation it appears more fruitful to go back to the broader transformations in social and political structure that derived from the period of export-led growth—as well as to political institutions with roots further back in the 19th century.

Thus, the impact of socioeconomic change on politics is sometimes unambiguous, direct, and relatively unmediated, sometimes unambiguous, yet indirect and mediated through other variables, and sometimes ambiguous and at most indirect. The task is to distinguish which of these alternatives pertains for the particular political outcomes one wishes to explain.

The pattern of links between socioeconomic change and politics that best summarizes our analysis is one in which a major economic and social transformation (such as this earlier period of export-led growth) sets into motion processes of political change (such as the incorporation period and its legacy), which later achieve a certain margin of autonomy in relation to the socioeconomic context. Thus, though the emergence of distinct types of incorporation reflected prior socioeconomic and political differences among countries, the subsequent dynamics derived to a significant extent from the political logic of incorporation itself.

Figure 8.4, adapted from Figure 1.1 in the first chapter, diagrammatically highlights the socioeconomic context of the critical juncture of the incorporation period, which in turn produced the partially autonomous legacy that has been the focus of this book. Against this base line, we may now return
to the question of the erosion of the legacy and ask whether or not, in the context of changes such as the internationalization of production, the debt crisis, and economic liberalization, the period of the late 1980s was possibly producing a new critical juncture.

**A New Critical Juncture?**

In discussing the possibility that the heritage of incorporation may erode, we noted elements of political continuity and change. However, a broader question must be posed. The critical juncture of the incorporation periods emerged under specific historical conditions of economic and social change, and these conditions made certain political coalitions possible. As of the 1980s, when many of these conditions seemed to be changing, one might ask whether these changes would trigger a new critical juncture, based on the founding of quite different coalitional patterns and regime dynamics.

Evidence of economic transformations that might constitute the basis for a new critical juncture was not hard to find. It could be observed in many areas, both international and domestic. Indeed, the international factors by themselves seemed important enough to suggest the possibility of fundamental change. At the most general level, the period of the 1970s and 1980s was one of a major reorganization of capital on a global scale. Several elements were involved, and these suggested the emergence of a post-postwar order. Central among these were the decline of U.S. hegemony and the final reconstruction of Japan and Europe as economic competitors; the growing importance of world trade and the closer integration of national economies with the global economy; the rise of the NICs as low-cost producers and suppliers of industrial goods; and the adoption of new kinds of global production and marketing strategies by multinational corporations. Accompanying the new internationalization of production and economic interdependence was a strong downward pressure on wages throughout the world and a retreat from Keynesian economics and class compromise between capital and labor.

Keynesianism was replaced by a new hegemony of economic orthodoxy, liberalism, and free market ideologies, the effects of which were seen in countries as diverse as the laissez-faire United States, the welfare state of Great Britain, and, most dramatically, the command economies of the communist world, as well as Latin America.

In addition to these global trends, other, often related factors specifically affected Latin American countries. Most obvious was the staggering debt burden that erupted into a full-fledged crisis in 1982. Subsequently, policies to confront the debt crisis, influenced by IMF conditionality, produced low or at times even negative economic growth, net capital outflows, unemployment, and plummeting real wages. Equally familiar were changing patterns of industrialization and the introduction of new models of accumulation, specifically the shift from inward-oriented growth to new industrial production for export. In addition, within Latin American countries over the several decades since the incorporation period, social structure had been transformed. The most obvious changes were the growth of the middle class, the strengthening of the private sector, and rapid urbanization, involving a declining peasantry and a growing urban informal sector.

Indeed, some of these same socioeconomic factors were advanced as principal explanations of the coups of the 1960s and 1970s and of the more subtle regime changes in countries that did not have coups. Specifically, O'Donnell (1973, 1979, 1982) sought an explanation for those coups and the new forms of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes they instituted in factors such as the internationalization of the Latin American economies, changing patterns of industrialization, and the impact of a newly emerging technocratic class. Likewise, it has been suggested (McCoy 1985) that in Venezuela, a country with no coup, a similar change in the model of accumulation led to more subtle changes in state-labor relations. The 1989 riots in reaction to the debt-induced austerity package were illustrative of the potential acceleration of social protest. With reference to Mexico, even before the dramatic results of the 1988 election, many of the changes listed above were evoked in explaining the PRI's declining hegemony and the possible unraveling of the one-party system. In Peru, APRA's efforts at support mobilization under Alan García, that focused more on the informal sector and unorganized workers than on the organized labor movement, suggested that the stagnation of the formal sector and the dynamism of the informal sector could produce important changes in politics.16

By the end of the 1980s, it was not possible to establish unambiguously either the erosion of the prior legacy or the presence of a new critical juncture. Nevertheless, some initial observations can be made.

First, many of the changes noted above seemed to undermine populist coalitions and put pressure on labor and wages—especially the relatively protected wages of unionized workers—in a way that could contribute to the erosion of past patterns. Furthermore, in the conjuncture of the late 1980s, change seemed so widespread and thorough-going on a global scale and so multifaceted within Latin America that it appeared likely that a new critical juncture might be imminent. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the causal impact even of convulsive changes such as the world depression of the 1930s may have been less important than is sometimes supposed for the specific kinds of political alignments or regime outcomes considered here. Thus, caution was necessary in proclaiming the emergence of a new critical juncture that would produce a major regime reorientation.

Second, even if a new critical juncture was emerging, the timing of the political reorientation would not necessarily be concurrent in all countries. The incorporation periods earlier in this century were strung out over nearly 16 As indicated in Chapter 6, in the 1940s and 1950s President Odria of Peru also made a major appeal to an important part of the informal sector—the squatter settlements. However, because he was at the time repressing APRA and the APRA-dominated labor movement, he was in a less good position to cultivate organized labor. In the 1980s, by contrast, APRA might reasonably have tried to regain control of organized labor.
five decades, and the timing of a new critical juncture might similarly vary, although increasing economic integration and the growing impact of international factors as well as the acceleration of technological change might condense the timing.

Third, even if a similar crisis or cleavage produced the critical juncture in each country, a similar political outcome could not be assumed. The argument about the earlier periods of initial incorporation is that different countries confronted the given cleavages in a variety of ways, in part depending on antecedent conditions. The new conditions represented by a new critical juncture in the 1980s and beyond could well produce a common set of constraints or parameters limiting the political structures that appeared, but different countries would confront the situation differently.

Finally, it follows that if a new critical juncture was emerging, the political structures and dynamics described in the course of this book would doubtless continue to be important antecedent causal factors, conditioning the distinctive response of each country.
Glossary

ACCOMMODATIONIST ALLIANCE. An alliance between middle-sector political leadership and more traditional, agrarian elites. This term is used in analyzing the incorporation and aftermath periods and is contrasted with the coalitional alternative of a populist alliance.

AFTERMATH. The period immediately following initial incorporation. Within the framework in which the incorporation period is viewed as a critical juncture, the aftermath is the first phase of the legacy of incorporation. See also heritage.

ANTECEDENT POLITICAL SYSTEM. In the discussion of critical junctures, this is the prior political period that is the "base line" against which the [presumably different] legacy of the critical juncture is compared.

BOURGEOISIE. Owners and high-level managers of enterprises in the urban commercial, financial, and industrial sector, as well as in the modern enclave sector. The relation between the terms bourgeoisie and oligarchy is discussed under oligarchy below.

CENTER, POLITICAL. A middle position between fundamental political alternatives. This may involve a middle position with reference to a left-right ideological spectrum, to alternative choices about political regimes, or to other basic political issues. The "center" is a relative term that must be understood in relation to the spectrum of alternatives within a given national context. Very crucially, during the aftermath period in the cases of party incorporation, the center represents a compromise between the often-radical reforms of the incorporation period and the policies of the conservative reaction to incorporation.

COMPETITIVE REGIME. Applied to civilian regimes under which there is at least substantial electoral competition, although they may not be fully democratic. This term covers a range of cases from post-1958 Venezuela to pre-1973 Chile. See also democratic regime and semicompetitive regime.

CONSTRAINTS. See corporatism.

CORPORATISM. A pattern of relationships between the state and interest groups based on state structuring of representation that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive, compulsory interest associations; state subsidy of these associations; and state imposed constraints on leadership, demand-making, and internal governance. In this book, the discussion of corporatism focuses specifically on unions. Structuring and subsidy together constitute inducements. While both inducements and constraints are viewed as instruments of control, inducements are double edged as they bestow certain advantages. Crucial periods in the evolution of state-labor are viewed in terms of a strategic interaction involving the varied application and consequences of inducements and constraints in the context of the dual dilemma. While the Latin American cases considered here predominantly involve vari-
ants of "state corporatism," this definition could also be applied in contexts of societal corporatism [see Chapter 2], in which case the constraints would be limited, and state structuring and subsidy would in important measure serve to ratify patterns of interest politics that had initially been forged outside the state (Collier and Collier 1979:978-79).

CRITICAL JUNCTURE. A period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis), and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies. Criteria for identifying a critical juncture are discussed in Chapter 1.

DEMOCRATIC REGIME. Used in the sense of Dahl's term "polyarchy," which he defines as a regime that allows extensive political participation and is broadly open to public contestation [1971:7-8]. Our usage is thus restricted to political democracy. Questions of economic and social democracy are discussed in terms of such themes and labels as equity and welfare. See also competitive regime and semicompetitive regime.

DUAL DILEMMA. The choices on the part of both the state and labor about the type of state-labor relations to pursue. Each alternative presents both advantages and pitfalls. On the side of the state, this choice is between the option of controlling the labor movement and seeking to mobilize labor support, on the side of the labor movement it is between cooperating with the state and resisting such cooperation in order to maintain greater autonomy, as well as the choice between entering or abstaining from the sphere of partisan politics.

ELITE. Relatively small groups or strata that exert great influence, authority, and power of decision. We refer to owners and managers of large enterprises as the "economic elite," and to the leaders of the initial incorporation period as the "incorporating elite." We also refer to the "state elite," in the sense of leaders of the state, and to the "political elite," in the sense of the principal political leaders. There is a long debate over the merits of the term "elite," as opposed to an expression such as the "dominant class" (or classes), which is common in Latin American political analysis. We have generally opted for the expression "elite," although the term "dominant classes" is also sometimes used. In some cases, union leaders have reached positions of substantial power over economic policy and resources. However, we do not include them when we employ this term.

ENCLAVE. An isolated area of modernized production or extraction in the agricultural, mining, or petroleum sector.

GOVERNMENT. The head of state and the immediate political leadership that surrounds the head of state. In this sense one speaks of the "Peron government" with the same meaning as the Peron administration. This usage contrasts with that in some fields of political analysis, including the field of American politics (see Sartori 1984:20), where the term is used in a way more similar to our usage of state.

HEGEMONY. The capacity to rule through consent and mediation, rather than coercion. "Hegemonic resources" refers to the political resources—organizational, ideological, and symbolic—that facilitate this type of rule. This usage derives from Gramsci.

GLOSSARY

HERITAGE. The political system and political dynamics that are the legacy of the incorporation period. The heritage encompasses most of what we refer to as the aftermath, with the exception of the periods of conservative military rule that follow party incorporation in some countries [see introduction to Chapter 7]. The issue of the end of the heritage is addressed in Chapter 8.

INCORPORATION. See initial incorporation.

INDUCEMENTS. See corporatism.

INITIAL INCORPORATION OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT. The first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. For the sake of brevity, we often refer to the "incorporation period" and to the "legacy of incorporation." The components of the definition of initial incorporation are understood as follows:

1. "First sustained and at least partially successful" means that these state policies are maintained for more than a brief period, such as just a few months, that they actually affect a substantial portion of the labor movement, and not just a few unions, and that this is the first such policy episode in the particular country.

2. The definition refers to the "state" in the sense of the bureaucratic and legal institutions of the public sector and the incumbents of those institutions rather than the government in the sense of the head of state and the immediate political leadership that surrounds the head of state. Though in general the incorporation periods were initiated by the government in this sense, the important commonality that we focus on is the way and degree to which, as a result of these policies, the state more broadly comes to regulate or oversee unions and industrial relations.

3. "Legitimate and shape" refers to state support and approval of the existence of unions as organizations, along with an effort to influence the role of the labor movement either in the economic system, involving an attempt to institutionalize a system of labor and industrial relations, and/or in the political system, involving alternatively an attempt to depoliticize the labor movement or to win its loyalty to a political party or political movement. Often, though not always, these two dimensions of incorporation occur simultaneously, and the different combinations in which they occur is one of the central concerns of this study.

A central argument of the book is that initial incorporation occurs in relatively well defined policy periods, which we frequently refer to as the "incorporation period." These periods emerge as part of a larger program of political and economic reform, and in five of the eight countries, the onset of the incorporation period coincides with the onset of what we call the "reform period," whereas in the other three there is at least a moderate delay in the incorporation period [see Table 0.1 in the Overview].

Four important issues that arise in analyzing the incorporation period may be noted here.

1. Incremental Change. Most countries experience long-term, incremental growth of the state role in labor relations and the labor movement, constituting an ongoing "ratchet effect" in spheres such as that of labor legislation [Webb...
on the co-optation and control of labor, typically within a corporative frame-
usual is intended to mean that organized labor is
ble, well-institutionalized manner to the political system.
albeit in a subordinate position, or is at least a serious contender among claim­
2. Phases of the incorporation period. Not surprisingly, the overall policy
period that fits the above definition may fall into two or more phases. Most
countries had a first phase of the incorporation period—led by what we call
"conservative modernizers"—characterized by cautious or ambivalent initia-
tives toward the labor movement and/or attempts at reform that were initially
This is followed by a more extensive and ambitious phase of incor-
poration. These phases are discussed extensively in Chapter 5 and are sum-
marized in Figure 5.1.
In some countries the incorporation period is interrupted by a hiatus of sev-
eral years, yet given the larger political context it seems reasonable to treat the
period both before and after the hiatus as part of the incorporation period. For
instance, in Colombia the incorporation period includes not only the main
phase of López’s Revolución en Marcha [i.e., his first administration, 1934–38],
but also his second administration (1942–45), which was an important period
of progressive labor policy. While the Santos administration (1938–42) clearly
represented a pause in terms of labor reforms, it seems reasonable to treat it as
one step within the larger incorporation period. In Mexico, the relationship
between the 1920s, the “Maximato” (1928–34), and the Cárdenas period was
interpreted in the same manner.
3. Transition versus Outcome. The incorporation periods, as analyzed here,
are viewed primarily as transitions, rather than as outcomes, and the attributes
in terms of which any one country is classified in the typology of incorporation
periods may not characterize that country in the heritage period. For instance,
the type of transition referred to as party incorporation may or may not result
in the long run in a labor movement strongly tied to the party or movement
that launched the incorporation period. Correspondingly, when we refer to a
country as a case of party—or state—incorporation, we are referring to this ear-
ier transition, and not to the longer-term legacy.
4. Relation to other definitions of “incorporated,” “incorporating,” and “in-
corporation.” The definition of the initial incorporation period is thus
grounded in specific issues of this particular historical transition and is distinct
from at least three equally valid usages of related forms of this term: [a] The
term incorporated is sometimes used in the analysis of subsequent historical
periods to describe situations in which a major part of the union movement
(and/or the working class or the lower classes more broadly) is linked in a sta-
ble, well-institutionalized manner to the political system. In some cases this
usage is intended to mean that organized labor is “in” the governing coalition,
albeit in a subordinate position, or is at least a serious contender among claim-
ants for the benefits of state policy. Examples of this usage are found in Purcell
(1975:chap. 1) and Davis and Coleman (1986). Alternatively, the stress may be
on the co-option and control of labor, typically within a corporative frame-
work. The relationship between the different types of initial incorporation pe-
riods analyzed in this book and the outcome of a union movement that is in-
corporated in this sense is complex, as we show in Chapters 7 and 8. [b] The
term incorporating is sometimes used in the sense of O’Donnell’s definition of
an “incorporating political system” which “purposely seeks to activate the
popular sector and to allow it some voice in national politics—or that, without
deliberate efforts at either exclusion or incorporation, adapts itself to the exist-
ing levels of political activation and the given set of political actors” (1973:55).
Such a definition could apply both to the historical period analyzed here and
to some subsequent periods. [c] Subsequent incorporation periods that also in-
volve a major new attempt to legitimate and shape the labor movement obvi-
ously occur in some countries, as in the post-1968 period in Peru. These epi-
isodes, while very important, are not the initial incorporation period, involving
the first such attempt, and hence do not fit the present definition.
INTEGRATIVE PARTY SYSTEM. A party system in which there is a majority
bloc in the electoral arena located roughly at the center of the political spec-
trum, and in which the labor movement is organizationally linked to this ma-
Jority bloc and is usually part of the governing coalition. The majority bloc may
involve the electoral dominance of a single party; or of two centrist parties that
are either linked by stable ties of cooperation, or that compete actively, but in
a context of centrifugal competition. The analysis of the heritage of incorpo-
ration in Chapter 7 contrasts the integrative party system with three other
types: stalemated party systems, systems characterized by electoral stability
and social conflict, and multiparty polarizing systems [see the introduction to
Chapter 7]. In addition to serving as a description of two cases (Mexico and
Venezuela), the concept of an integrative party system is used in the analysis
as a “polar type,” with which the other kinds of party systems are compared.
LABOR MOVEMENT. The organizations and collective action of wage earners
in the modern sector, which have the purpose of promoting shared occupa-
tional goals. Also referred to as labor or the union movement.
LABOR POPULISM. A subtype of party incorporation, found in Peru and Argen-
tina, involving the extensive mobilization of labor in the modern sector by a
political party or movement that in the Latin American usage is convention-
ally called populist. See also populism, populist party, radical populism.
LEGACY. The sequence of political events, relationships, and dynamics of
change hypothesized to be the outcome of a critical juncture. In this book the
legacy is divided into two periods, the aftermath and the heritage.
MIDDLE SECTOR. Members of a broad range of occupational groups that stand
between the working class and the economic elite. This expression was in-
vented by John J. Johnson (1958) to avoid what seemed to be the overly restric-
tive implications of speaking of the middle “class.” In the text, the expression
“middle class” is also on occasion used in this narrower sense.
MODERN SECTOR. The economy of the urban sector, as well as of rural agri-
cultural production and mineral or oil extraction, that is characterized by the
application of technology that yields relatively high levels of productivity.
O’Donnell (1973:Chap. 1) discusses the problem of identifying a threshold in
OLIGARCHY. This term is used here primarily with reference to the late 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century to refer to national and regional (i.e., subnational) economic elites, primarily the landed elite and the elites in the mineral/extractive sector. The relative importance of these different sectors within the oligarchy varies greatly among countries. To the extent that enterprises in these sectors are foreign owned, the foreign corporations themselves as they exist abroad are not part of the oligarchy, but the leading managers of these firms who are actors within the national context are. The oligarchy is identified both in terms of its control of these sectors of the economy and in terms of its attributes as an elite social and cultural network identified with the leading “40 families” (the number varies), membership in a leading club or clubs, and so on. For a sophisticated effort to identify members of an oligarchy or “aristocracy” in Argentina, see Smith (1974a:appendix A).

In the literature on this earlier period, the assessment of whether the emerging elites of the commercial, financial, industrial, and enclave sectors are viewed as part of this oligarchy, as opposed to representing a bourgeoisie, depends on the degree to which these new elites differentiate themselves from the established oligarchy in economic, political, and cultural terms. Particularly to the extent that the same individuals or families are involved in both “oligarchic” and “bourgeois” pursuits, such differentiation is a matter of degree, and it is difficult to establish precise criteria of demarcation. Although a full empirical assessment of the degree of differentiation for all eight cases over the period covered in this book would be an enormous task, we make some tentative observations about this differentiation at specific points in time.

In discussions of certain later points, such as the post-1930 period in Peru and Argentina, the return to political power of elements of the same political leadership that had earlier been described as oligarchic is often referred to as a restoration of oligarchic rule, and we follow this usage. In discussions of still more recent periods, the literature sometimes uses the term oligarchic to refer more loosely to governments that are not responsive to popular demands and are oriented toward elite economic interests. This final usage is not adopted in terms of relevant indicators that could serve as a point of demarcation between the modern and traditional sector. See also traditional sector.

OLIGARCHY STATE. A characterization of the state during roughly the late 19th and early 20th century, when in most of these countries the state imposed relative political stability that greatly facilitated massive export growth and the emergence of key, more dynamic sectors of the “oligarchy,” or export elite. With reference to economic and social policy, these were characterized as laissez-faire states that made significant use of the concession of important spheres of economic activity to the private sector (often to foreign capital) as a means of creating basic infrastructure that helped promote economic growth.

The adjective “oligarchic” also refers to the tight control over the political process reflected in such practices as a narrow franchise, widespread electoral fraud, or in certain cases dictatorial rule, which were a common characteristic of politics in this period. These attributes could therefore be seen as aspects of an “oligarchic regime,” and a broader label such as “oligarchic political system” might appropriately be applied to this period. However, following common usage in the literature (e.g., Ianni 1975), the expression “oligarchic state” is retained here.

ORGANIZED LABOR. The collectivity of occupational associations (alternatively called interest associations, representative associations, or, adapting from Schmitter [1977], “intermediative” associations) of wage earners of the working class and middle sector within the modern sector, thus including the modernized agricultural and extractive sector as well as the urban sector. The scope of this definition corresponds to the common pattern of aggregation of workers associations in these countries, in that agricultural workers in modern enclaves or the modern rural sector typically belong to the national organized labor movement. With this last exception, unions of rural workers are not included. The expression organized labor is used interchangeably with organized labor movement, trade union movement, and union movement. The choice to restrict ourselves to one of these expressions would have been preferable in terms of consistency, but was stylistically unappealing, since the expression thus chosen would have been used with such frequency in the text. The alternative of using an abbreviation throughout—as in O'Donnell's use of “BA” for the “bureaucratic-authoritarian state” (1975, 1979, 1982)—did not seem appropriate. We hope that this glossary will establish adequate criteria of consistency.

ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT. See organized labor. Used interchangeably with organized labor, trade union movement, and union movement.

ORGANIZED PEASANCY. The collectivity of occupational associations of peasants.

PARTY. See political party.

PARTY INCORPORATION. A type of initial incorporation in which the incorporating elite seeks to mobilize labor support for a political party—or a political movement that later becomes a party—as a fundamental aspect of the incorporation project. A more complete though less convenient label for this set of cases would thus be party/movement incorporation. Within the framework of our definition of initial incorporation, the state is by definition involved in the incorporation project, but the political dynamics are so different where a party also played a strong role as to justify this distinct label. See also state incorporation.

PEASANTS. Small-scale cultivators, who may have any one of a number of alternative relationships to the land they till, including private or collective ownership, tenancy, sharecropping, or a feudal relationship of exchange.

POLITICAL PARTY. A political group that presents candidates in elections to public office, or a political group that would do so but is unable to, either because it is proscribed or because elections are not held. This is an adaptation of Sartori's (1976:64) "minimal definition." Since the banning of parties and the failure to hold elections are recurring events in Latin America, the second component of the definition is essential.
**POPULAR SECTOR.** The urban and rural lower classes, including the lower middle class. From the perspective of the present analysis, the inclusion of segments of the lower middle class in this category is crucial because it is often part of the organized labor movement.

**POPULISM.** A political movement characterized by mass support from the urban working class and/or peasantry; a strong element of mobilization from above; a central role of leadership from the middle sector or elite, typically of a personalistic and/or charismatic character, and an anti-status-quo, nationalist ideology and program. This definition draws heavily on the widely cited discussion of di Tella, and also on Drake (1978:chap. 1). Whereas analysts of some other parts of the world use the term populism to refer to movements with a strong agrarian and grassroots character, the Latin American literature has placed central emphasis on the working class in the modern sector and on mobilization from above. In the present book, it is essential to note that the initial incorporation periods do not necessarily involve populism. In Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina they do. In Uruguay and Colombia, the role of a traditional political party in leading the incorporation period, along with other factors, makes them at most marginally populist. In Brazil and Chile, the control-oriented incorporation periods are not populist, though in the aftermath of incorporation leaders associated with the incorporation periods subsequently seek to form populist parties. See also labor populism, radical populism, and populist party.

**POPULIST ALLIANCE.** An alliance between middle-sector political leadership and important elements of the popular sector. This term is used in analyzing the initial incorporation period and the aftermath period and is contrasted with the coalitional alternative of an accommodationist alliance.

**POPULIST PARTY.** A political party that possesses attributes associated with populism as defined above, including mass support from the urban working class and/or peasantry, a strong element of mobilization from above; a central role of leadership from the middle sector or elite, commonly of a personalistic and/or charismatic character, and an anti-status-quo, nationalist ideology and program. Important populist parties considered in this study are the Acción Democratica in Venezuela, APRA in Peru, Peronism in Argentina, the PTB in Brazil, and as Drake (1978) insists the Socialist Party in Chile, at least up to the 1950s. The term populist would typically not be applied to communist parties, which to a greater degree are characterized by more impersonal, institutionalized norms of hierarchy that include an important international dimension.

**RADICAL POPULISM.** A subtype of party incorporation, found in Mexico and Venezuela, in which the extensive mobilization of labor in the modern sector is accompanied by agrarian reform and peasant mobilization. This mobilization is carried out by a party or movement that in the Latin American literature is conventionally called populism. The adjective radical is intended to refer to the more comprehensive assault on preexisting property relations entailed in this type of incorporation period. See also populism, labor populism.

**REFORM PERIOD.** This expression is used at a number of points as an abbreviated way of referring to the period of reform in the first decades of this century that we call the transformation of the oligarchic state. In five of the eight countries, the onset of the reform period coincides with the onset of the incorporation period [see Figure 0.1 in the Overview].

**REGIME.** The formal and informal structure of state and governmental roles and processes. The regime includes the method of selection of the government and of representative assemblies (election, coup, decision within the military, etc.), formal and informal mechanisms of representation, and patterns of repression. The regime is typically distinguished from the particular incumbents who occupy state and governmental roles, the political coalition that supports these incumbents, and the public policies they adopt [except of course policies that define or transform the regime itself].

**SEMICOMPETITIVE REGIME.** Applied to civilian regimes under which severe restrictions on electoral competition make the label competitive or democratic regime inappropriate, as in Colombia during the post-1958 National Front period, Peru after 1956, and Argentina after 1958. See also competitive regime and democratic regime.

**STATE.** This concept is used in the Latin American literature both to refer more concretely to the bureaucratic and legal institutions of the public sector and the incumbents of those institutions, and more analytically to refer to a larger set of political relationships or a larger "pact of domination." This book adopts the former usage, which is understood to encompass the government, in the narrow sense of the head of state and the immediate political leadership that surrounds the head of state, as well as the public bureaucracy, legislature, judiciary, public and semipublic corporations, legal system, armed forces, and the incumbents of these institutions.

**STATE ELITE.** The cluster of top political leaders at the pinnacle of the state. Commonly, this term has the same meaning as the government. This expression is extensively used by Stepan (1978b), and is occasionally employed here.

**STATE INCORPORATION.** An initial incorporation period in which the incorporating elite was at most marginally concerned with cultivating labor support and for whom the principal concern was with controlling the labor movement through a system of bureaucratic and legal restrictions imposed by the state. See also party incorporation.

**STATE-LABOR RELATIONS.** As a means of avoiding excessive repetition of a long phrase, this expression is sometimes used to refer to the relationship between the state and the organized labor movement. To avoid confusion, in the text we use the labels workers or the working class, rather than labor, when we wish to refer to individual workers, to workers as an occupational category, or to unorganized as well as organized workers.

**STRENGTH OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT.** The capacity of the labor movement to achieve its goals through collective action. As noted in Chapter 3, in the earlier period considered in this analysis, before the emergence of institutionalized patterns of state-labor relations, the initial scope of labor organizing and protest can be taken as a partial basis for assessing the strength of the labor movement. In later periods, when labor movements more routinely extract
concessions from employers and/or the state in exchange for restraining labor protest, such an indicator is less satisfactory.

TRADE UNION. See union.

TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. See organized labor. Used interchangeably with organized labor and organized labor movement, and union movement.

TRADITIONAL SECTOR. That portion of the rural sector not characterized by the application of technology that yields relatively high levels of productivity. See also modern sector.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE OLIGARCHIC STATE. The period of political reform and state-building that occurred in the first decades of the 20th century. This expression is used to encompass both cases of dramatic political reorientation, such as the Mexican Revolution, and cases of more modest reform that occurred in the context of the continuing political strength of elements of the oligarchy, as in Argentina. See reform period.

UNION. An occupational association of wage-earners in the modern sector, encompassing members of the working class and middle class in both the urban sector and the modernized rural sector. Used interchangeably with trade union. See also organized labor.

UNION MOVEMENT. See organized labor. Used interchangeably with organized labor, organized labor movement, and trade union movement.

WORKERS. Organized and unorganized manual wage laborers in the modern sector, including both the urban sector and the modernized rural sector. See also peasants.

WORKING CLASS. Organized and unorganized manual wage labor in the modern sector, including both the urban sector and the enclave sector. See also peasants.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


ARGENTINA

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest (Ch. 3)
Economic and Social Context, 91–92
Labor Movement, 92–93.
See also 59–68, 93–99
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination (Ch. 4)
Introduction, 129–30. See also 100–106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 131–32
Emergence of the Reform Alliance, 134–35
Initial Transition and Change of Government (1916), 137–38
Role of Labor in the Transition, 138
Orientation of New Government, 140–41
Labor Policy under Yrigoyen, 141, 145–49
From 1930 to Incorporation Period, 149, 153–55
Conclusion, 155–57
Incorporation: Labor Populism (1943–55) (Ch. 5)
Introduction, 314–15. See also 15–18, 161–68, 746–49, 752
Project from Above, 331–35
Project from Below, 336–37
The Exchange
Introduction, 337
Coming to Power (1943–46), 337–40
Perón’s First Administration (1946–52), 340–43
Final Years of Perón’s Presidency, 343–44
The Party, 344–47
Opposition and Polarization, 347–49
Conclusion, 349–50
Aftermath: “Impossible” Game (1955–60) (Ch. 6)
Introduction, 469. See also 353–54, 356–59
Conservative Reaction (1955–58), 484–86
Attempt to Form New Governing Coalition (1958–60)
**BRAZIL**

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest (Ch. 3)
- Economic and Social Context, 68–70
- Labor Movement, 70–72.
  See also 59–68, 93–99

State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination (Ch. 4)
- Introduction to chap., 100–106
- Period of the Oligarchic State, 106–8
- Emergence of Reform Alliance, 108–10
- Initial Transition and Change of Government (1930), 110–11
- Role of Labor in the Transition, 111–13
- Conclusion, 113

Incorporation: Depoliticization and Control (1930–45) (Ch. 5)
- Introduction, 169–72. See also 15–18, 161–68, 746–48
- Project from Above, 172, 172–76
- Project from Below, 178–79, 182–84
- Labor Policy, 184–89, 194–95
- Aftermath: Aborted Populism (1945–60) (Ch. 6)
  - Introduction, 360–67. See also 353–56, 752
  - Labor Reactivation under Conservative Governments (1946–51), 367–74
  - Populism Accommodationist Style (1951–54), 377–83

Shaping the Political Arena

- Coalition Governments (1956–61), 384–89, 391–92
- Distribution of Benefits
  - Introduction, 392–93
  - Industrial Promotion, 393–94
  - Middle Sector Gains, 394–95
  - Traditional Oligarchy, 395–96
  - Labor Movement, 396–402

Heritage: Multiparty Polarizing Politics (1946–64) (Ch. 7)
- Introduction, 507–12. See also 498–506, 751–54

**CHILE**

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest (Ch. 3)
- Economic and Social Context, 72–73
- Labor Movement, 73–75.
  See also 59–68, 93–99

State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination (Ch. 4)
- Introduction to chap., 100–106
- Period of the Oligarchic State, 106–8
- Emergence of Reform Alliance, 108–10
- Initial Transition and Change of Government (1920), 110–11
- Role of Labor in the Transition, 111–13
- Conclusion, 113

Incorporation: Depoliticization and Control (1920–31) (Ch. 5)
- Introduction, 169–72. See also 15–18, 161–68, 746–48
- Project from Above, 172, 172–76
- Project from Below, 178–79, 182–84
- Labor Policy, 184–89, 194–95
- Aftermath: Aborted Populism (1931–52) (Ch. 6)
  - Introduction, 360–67. See also 353–56, 752
  - Labor Reactivation Under Conservative Governments (1932–38), 367–69, 374–77
  - Populism Accommodationist Style (1938–41), 377–80, 383–84

COUNTRY INDEX

- Coalition Governments (1942–52), 384–86, 389–92
- Distribution of Benefits
  - Introduction, 392–93
  - Industrial Promotion, 393–94
  - Middle Sector Gains, 394–95
  - Traditional Oligarchy, 395–96
- Labor Movement, 396–402

Heritage: Multiparty Polarizing Politics (1932–73) (Ch. 7)
- Introduction, 507–12. See also 498–506, 751–54

Overview of the Party System
- Introduction, 507–12
- Party Fractionalization, 512–13
- Polarization, 514–16
- Opposition and Crises of the 1950s to 1970s
  - Introduction, 526–27
  - Political Parties: Centrist Failure and Policy Immobilism
    - Introduction, 527–28
    - New Experiments in the Center (1952–70), 528–30, 532–36
  - The Presidency Shifts to the Left (1961–73), 536–41
  - The Politics of Stabilization, 541, 543–45
- Labor Movement, 545–46, 555–65
- Peasant Mobilization, 565–70

Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage (Ch. 8), 753–56, 758, 765–66
COLOMBIA

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest [Ch. 3]
Economic and Social Context, 85–86
See also 59–68, 93–99
State: Reformist challenge to Oligarchic Domination [Ch. 4]
Intro. to chap., 100–106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 124–26
Emergence of Reform Alliance, 126–27
Initial Transition and Change of Government (1930), 127–28
Role of Labor in the Transition, 128
Conclusion, 128–29
Incorporation: Electoral Mobilization by a Traditional Party (1930–45) [Ch. 5]
Introduction, 271–72, 289.
See also 15–18, 161–68, 746–48
Project from Above, 289–95
Project from Below, 295–99
The Exchange, 299–303
The Party, 303–8
Opposition and Polarization, 309–13
Aftermath: Reinforcing a Traditional Two-Party System (1945–60) [Ch. 6]
Introduction, 438–39. See also 353–54, 356–59, 752
Conservative Reaction (1945–57), 457–61
Formation of New Governing Coalition (1957–60)
Introduction, 461–62
Conflict-Limiting Mechanisms, 462–63
Technocratic Orientation of the Front, 463–64
Programmatic Shift to the Center, 464–65
Retention of Labor Vote, 465–67
Weakening of Party Ties with Labor Movement, 467–68
Heritage: Electoral Stability and Social Conflict [1958–86] [Ch. 7]
Introduction, 639. See also 498–506, 751–54
Overview of the Party System
Introduction, 667
Maintaining Electoral Majorities, 668–70
Voter Apathy and Successive Attempts to Reengage the Electorate, 670–73
Union-Party Links, 673–76
Assessment, 676–77
Opposition and Crises of the Late 1950s to 1980s
Introduction, 677–78
Party System, 678–80
Labor Movement, 680–81
Economic Policy, 681–83
Peasant Mobilization, 683–85
Guerrilla Movements, 685–87
Military Role, 687–90
Capacity for Conflict Regulation, 690–91
Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage [Ch. 8], 761–62, 766–67

MEXICO

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest [Ch. 3]
Economic and Social Context, 75–77
Labor Movement, 77–79.
See also 59–68, 93–99
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination [Ch. 4]
Intro. to chap., 100–106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 113–15
Emergence of Reform Alliance, 115–17
Initial Transition and Change of Government (1911), 117–18
Role of Labor in the Transition, 118–19
From Initial Change of Government to Incorporation Period, 119–23
Conclusion, 123–24
Incorporation: Radical Populism (1917–40) [Ch. 5]
See also 15–18, 161–68, 746–48
Peasant Incorporation, 198–200, 201
The 1920s
Project from Above, 203–11
Project from Below, 211–13
The Exchange, 214–19
Opposition to Populism, 219–24
The Maximato (1928–34), 225–32
The Cárdenas Period (1934–40)
Project from Above, 232–36
Project from Below, 236–39
The Exchange, 239–42
The Party, 242–47
Opposition and Polarization, 247–50
Aftermath: Transformation of the Majority Coalition [1940–52] [Ch. 6]
Introduction, 403–7. See also 353–54, 356–59, 752
Programmatic Shift toward the Right, 407–8
Exclusion of Left and Retention of State-Labor Alliance, 408–16
Conflict-Limiting Mechanisms, 416–20
Heritage: Integrative Party System (1940–82) [Ch. 7]
Introduction, 571–74. See also 498–506, 751–54
Overview of the Party System
Introduction, 574–75
The Dominant-Party System, 575–79
Hegemonic Resources, 579–87
Opposition and Crises of the late 1950s to 1982
Introduction, 587–90
The Politics of Stabilization, 590–92
Political Parties, 592–96
Labor Movement, 596–604
Peasant Mobilization, 604–6
Guerrilla Movements, 606–8
Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage [Ch. 8], 758–61, 767
PERU

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest (Ch. 3)
Economic and Social Context, 88-89
Labor Movement, 89-91.
See also 59-68, 93-99
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination (Ch. 4)
Introduction, 129-30. See also 100-106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 130-31
Emergence of the Reform Alliance, 132-34
Initial Transition and Change of Government (1919), 135-37
Role of Labor in the Transition, 138
Orientation of New Government, 138-40
Labor Policy under Leguía, 141-45
From 1930 to Incorporation Period, 149-53
Conclusion, 155-57
Incorporation: Labor Populism (1939-48) (Ch. 5)
Introduction, 314-16. See also 15-18,
161-68, 746-49
Initial Phase of Incorporation: The Prado
Government, 316-19
Project from Above, 319-22
Project from Below, 322-23
The Exchange, 323-25
The Party, 325-28
Opposition and Polarization, 328-30
Conclusion, 330
Aftermath: "Difficult" Game (1948-60) (Ch. 6)
Introduction, 469. See also 353-54, 356-59, 752
Conservative Reaction (1948-56), 470-73
Formation of New Governing Coalition
(1956-60)
Introduction, 473-74
Pact of Monterrico and the Convivencia,
474-77
Programmatic Shift Toward the Center/Right, 477-78
Consequences for APRA: Short-Term
Gains, Long-Term Erosion, 478-83
Heritage: Political Stalemate (1956-68)
(Ch. 7)
Introduction, 692-93. See also 498-506, 751-55
Overview of the Party System
Introduction, 694
The Ban on APRA, 694-96
APRA's Alliances with the Oligarchy
(1956-62), 696-701
APRA's Alliances with Odria (1962-67), 701-4
APRA's Alliance with Acción Popular
(1967-68), 704-6
Assessment, 706-9
Opposition and Crises of the Late 1950s
and 1960s
Introduction, 710
Party System, 710-12
Labor Movement, 712-14
The Politics of Stabilization, 714-15
Peasant Mobilization, 715-17
Guerrilla Movements, 717
Military Role, 717-18
The Coup of 3 October 1968, 718-19
Capacity for Conflict Regulation, 719-20
Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage (Ch.
8), 762, 764-65, 767-68

SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

URUGUAY

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest (Ch. 3)
Economic and Social Context, 82-84
Labor Movement, 84-85.
See also 59-68, 93-99
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic
Domination (Ch. 4)
Intro. to chap., 100-106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 124-26
Emergence of Reform Alliance, 126-27
Initial Transition and Change of Govern-
ment (1903), 127-28
Role of Labor in the Transition, 128
Conclusion, 128-29
Incorporation: Electoral Mobilization by a
Traditional Party (1903-16) (Ch. 5)
Introduction, 271-72, 273. See also 15-18,
161-68, 746-48
Project from Above, 273-77
Project from Below, 277-78
The Exchange, 278-84
The Party, 284-86
Opposition and Polarization, 286-88
Aftermath: Reinforcing a Traditional Two-
party System (1916-45) (Ch. 6)
Introduction, 438-39. See also 353-54,
356-59, 752
Conservation Reaction (1916-38)
Introduction, 440
Impasse and Growing Political Ten-
sions, 440-43
Coup of 1933 and the New Regime,
443-48

COUNTRY INDEX

Conflicts within the Governing Coalition,
448-50
Formation of New Governing Coalition,
450-53
Absence of Pacts and Coparticipation,
453
Absence of Transformation of the Party,
453-56
Heritage: Electoral Stability and Social
Conflict (1942-73) (Ch. 7)
Introduction, 639. See also 498-506, 751-54
Overview of the Party System
Introduction, 640-41
New Batlle Project (1942-52), 641-43
New Colegiado, Erosion of Reform,
and Stagnation (1952-66), 643-46
Paralysis and Polarization (1966-73),
646-48
Opposition and Crises of the 1950s to
1970s
Introduction, 648
Party System, 648-52
Labor Movement, 652-56
The Politics of Stabilization, 657-59
Guerrilla Movement, 659-61
Military Role, 661-64
Capacity for Conflict Regulation, 664-66
Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage (Ch. 8), 761, 767
VENEZUELA

Labor: Emergence of Worker Organization and Protest [Ch. 3].
Economic and Social Context, 79–80
Labor Movement, 80–82.
See also, 59–68, 93–99
State: Reformist Challenge to Oligarchic Domination [Ch. 4].
Intro. to chap., 100–106
Period of the Oligarchic State, 113–15
Emergence of Reform Alliance, 115–17
Initial Transition and Change of Government [1935], 117–18
Role of Labor in the Transition, 118–19
From Initial Change of Government to Incorporation Period, 119
Conclusion, 123–24
Incorporation: Radical Populism (1935–48), 403–6, 421
Introduction, 403–6, 421
Coalition (1948–63) (Ch. 6)
Opposition and
Project
Segmentation
Introduction, 196–98, 252, 255–70
Emergence of Reform Alliance 115–17
Intro. to chap., 119
Domination (Ch. 4)
Economic and
Social
Context, 79–80
Overview of the Party System
Evolution of the Pact of Punto Fijo, 610–15
Multiclass Integrative Party System, 615–19
Hegemonic Resources, 619–27
Opposition and Crises of the 1960s and 1970s
Introduction, 627
The Politics of Stabilization, 628–30
Guerrilla Movement, 630–32
Labor Movement, 632–35
Peasant Mobilization, 635–36
Political Parties, 636–38
Conclusion: Erosion of the Heritage (Ch. 8), 758–59, 766–67

General Index

Note: The names of political parties are filed in the index alphabetically by their acronym as they appear in the list on pages 791–796. In selected cases there is a cross reference from the full name to the acronym.

Acción Cívica [Colombia], 249, 687–88
Acción Democrática. See AD [Acción Democrática]
Acción Popular. See AP [Acción Popular]
Accommodationist alliance: in Brazil and Chile, 105, 171, 184, 194, 455, 361–68, 377–84, 392, 394, 401, 402, 529, 566, 748; in Mexico, 205, in Peru, 142, 156; in Venezuela, 251, 254–55
Acevedo, Eduardo, 449–50, 452
ACNR [Mexico], 606
AD [Acción Democrática] [Venezuela], 200–201, 252, 255–70, 404, 421–37, 571–72, 609–36, 695, 758–59
ADP [Ação Democrático Legislative] [Brazil], 109, 524–25, 550–52
AFL-CIO (formerly AFL, 77, 214, 217,
Ampuero, Raul, 588
AP [Acción Popular] [Chile], 179
APRA [Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana] [Peru], 91, 98, 500–503, 567
Anarcho-sindicalism, in Argentina, 97; in Brazil, 179, 376; in Mexico, 205, in Peru, 142, 156; in Venezuela, 259–60
Antecedent political system, critical juncture, 140–41

Arturo: first presidency, 169, 402, 410, 432
Alessandri, Miguel, 590–91, 593, 599
Ampuero, Raul, 588
ANUC (Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos), 683, 686–87
ANUC (Eden), 677, 678
AOAN (Asamblea Obrera de Alimentación Nacional) [Chile], 179
APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) [Peru], 91, 98, 150–53, 167–
Critical junctures, 27-39, 751, 754-82; an

crisis and, 35-38, 39; social change and, 37-38, duration of, 32, erosion of the heritage, 755-68;

heritage of incorporation and, 751, 754, legacy of, 30-31, 33-35, 785; new critical juncture, 772-74; problem of partial explanations, 38-39, socioeconomic change and, 768-72; suppressor variables and, 39

CROC (Confederación Revolucionaria de

Obreros y Campesinos) [Mexico], 591, 598-99

CRON [Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana] [Mexico], 206-32, 237-38, 244, 411, 591, 597-99

CRUS (Comité Relacionador de Unidad Sindical) [Chile], 556

CST (Consejo Sindical de Trabajadores) [Brazil], 551

CSTC (Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia), 673-77, 680-81

CT (Congreso del Trabajo) [Mexico], 599, 601-3, 404

CTAL (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina), 262, 317-18, 415

CTB (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia), 374

CTC (Central de Trabajadores de Colom­


CTCh (Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile), 376-77, 383-84, 556-57

CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colom­


CTF (Confederación de Trabajadores Peru­

anos), 317n.69, 318, 323-25, 327-28, 470, 476, 480-81, 706-7, 713-15

CTV (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela), 261-68, 422-23, 433-34, 614, 616, 619-20, 623-25, 628, 632-35

Cuba, 12n.3, 495, 501-2, 612, 686

Cuban Revolution, 19-20, 432, 465-66, 508, 556, and Argentina, 736, 739-40, and Brazil, 552, 555, 567, and Chile, 521, 560, and Colombia, 677, and Mexico, 588, 593, and Peru, 710-13, and Uruguay, 560, 659-61, and Venezuela, 630, 636-67

CUT (Central Unica dos Trabajadores) [Brazil], 575

CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores) [Ur­

uguay], 654-56

CUT (Confederación Unificada de Trabaja­

dores) [Chile], 529, 534-35, 544-45, 555

CUT [Mexico], 414, 598

CUTV (Central Unica de Trabajadores de Venezuela), 619, 632

Dáger, Jorge, 612
de la Huerta, Adolfo, 199, 202n.12, 205-8, 214, 222-23, 226
Delgado Chalbaud, Carlos, 421, 423
Delgado de Odría, María, 472
Democratic Party [Brazil], 109
Democratic Party [Chile], 74
Democratic Reform Party [Peru], 140
Depression era, 19-20, 769-70
Descamisados [Argentina], 338-39
Diaz, Porfirio, 102-3, 115-18
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 599
Drug trade (Colombia), 762
Dual dilemma, 48-50, 218-19
Duhaldie Alfredo, Vasquez, 389
Echandia, Dario, 293-94, 298, 301-4, 311, 457
Echeverria, Luis, 589-92, 594-95, 603, 605-6
Economic growth. See Socioeconomic change
EGP (Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo) [Arg­

entina], 739
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 710
El Comercio [Peru], 139, 252, 319, 328
El Dia (Uruguay), 273, 280-81, 443, 642
Electoral mobilization. See Index of Coun­

tries: Project from Above (Ch. 5); Overview of the Party System (Ch. 7); Opposition and Crises (Ch. 7)
Elite(s). See Index of Countries: Period of Oligarchic State (Ch. 4); Project from Above (Ch. 5)
ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) [Co­

lobmia], 679, 685-86
Enclave sectors and early labor movement deve­

lopment, 59, 64, in Argentina, 92; in Brazil, 68, 70, in Chile, 72-74; in Colombia, 85-87, in Mexico, 76-79; in Peru, 88-91; in Uruguay, 83; in Venezuela, 79-82
Erro, Enrico, 650-51, 663
Escañuela, Diógenes, 255
Escobar Rebellion of 1929 [Mexico], 226
Espéjo, José, 342-43
European immigration: in Argentina, 92, 131; in Brazil, 69, in Chile, 73; in Colombia, 86; in Latin America, 65, 95; in Mexico, 77; in Uruguay, 277-78; in Venezuela, 79
Eva Perón Foundation, 345, 460
Export sector. See Enclave sectors: Socioeconomic change
Factory employment by country (in 1925), 67
Falange [Spain], 247
Falange Nacional [Chile], 512
Falkland/Malvinas, 673
FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Na­

cional) [Venezuela], 433, 630-31
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), 679, 685
Farrell, Edelmiro (Gen.), 332
Fascism, 183, 247, 260, 316, 360, 448-50
FAT [Frente Auténtico del Trabajo] [Mex­

ico], 603
FCV (Federación Campesina de Venezuela), 435, 625, 635-36
FDN (Frente Democrático Nacional) [Peru], 317-22, 325-26, 328, 474-75
FDP [Frente Democrático Popular] [Vene­

zuela], 612-13, 619
February Program [Venezuela], 252
FEDECAMARAS [Federación Venezolana de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción] [Venezuela], 425, 427, 431, 618
FEDENAL (Federación Nacional del Trans­

tporte) [Colombia], 301-3, 309
Federal League of Rural Action (Liga Fed­

eral de Acción Rurista), 644
Federation of Bank Workers [FEB] [Peru], 713
Federation of Metalurgical Workers [FETIMP] [Peru], 713
Federation of Peruvian Students, 90-91
Federation of Textile Workers of Peru, 91
FEI (Frente Electoral Independiente) [Vene­

zuela], 423-24
FENCAP (Federación Nacional de Campe­

sinos del Peru), 492n.62, 716-17
FEP [Frente Electoral Popular] [Mexico], 593, 605
Ferrari, Fernando, 524
Ferreira, Wilson, 647
Fetrametal [Venezuela], 635
FIDEL [Frente Izquierda de Liberación] [Ur­

uguay], 647, 649-52
"Fidelista" groups, 540
FIESP [Federação das Indústrias do Estado de Sao Paulo] [Brazil], 756
Figueróa, Rubén, 177, 518, 607
“Generation of 1928” [Venezuela], 82, 116, 252–55
German-Soviet Pact, 250, 306, 383
Gestido, Oscar, 646, 649–50, 657–58
Getulismo [Brazil], 378, 547
Gómez, Juan Vincente, 80–82, 99, 102, 114–18, 196, 251, 269, 421
Gómez Castro, Laureano, 290–91, 310, 312, 439, 457–59, 461, 668
Gompers, Samuel, 77, 214
González, Enrique (Col.), 332
González Prada, Manuel, 89
GOU [Grupo de Oficiales Unidos] [Argentina], 331–32
Government, 782
Granada Garland, Francisco, 325–26
Gran Cuerpo Central de Trabajadores (Mexico), 212
Gran Liga de Empleados de Ferrocarril (Mexico), 79
Graneau, Julio César, 445–46
Greator Labor Council [GCC] (Colombia), 460
Guadalajara, Declaration of, 602
Guadalupe Zuno, José, 607
Guevara, Che, 717, 736
Guzmán Blanco, Antonio, 114, 421
Heremieny: Mexican heritage period and, 579–87; Venezuelan heritage period and, 617–27
Henríquez Guzman, Miguel, 575–76
Heritage of incorporation: chronological overview, 22, 500; erosion of, 755–68; historical context of, 745–46; identification period, 498–99; other summary charts, 504, 752–53; typology, 502–5. See also Index of Countries
Heros, Jesus Reyes, 959
Herrera, Benjamin, 304
Herrera Campins, Luis, 614, 629
Herrera, Luis Alberto de, 286–87, 442–48, 450, 455, 644–45, 657
Heterogeneity of labor movement, 45–46
Huge Ralli-Stalin Pact. See German-Soviet Pact
Huerta, Victoriano, 121–24
Huerta Grande program (Argentina), 740 “Hypermobilization” in Chile, 569
IAPI [Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio], 334
IBAD [Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática], 525, 552
Ibáñez, Bernardo, 389, 391
Illia, Arturo, 730–34, 736–38
IMF [International Monetary Fund], 531, 542–43, 644–47, 657–58, 738, 772–73, 766
Ignacio da Silva, Luis (Lula), 757
Incorporation. See Aftermath of incorporation; Heritage of incorporation; Initial incorporation, Party incorporation, State incorporation
Incumbency, political autonomy and, 11
Independent Nationalists [Uruguay], 136
Independent Socialist League (Brazil), 549
Indians: in Argentina, 130–31; in Brazil, 69; in Mexico, 223; in Peru, 130, 143–44, 152–53, 321, 327
Inducements and constraints: corporatism and, 52–54, labor movement response to, 54–55
Initial incorporation of the labor movement, 783–85; chronological overview, 22, 162; identification period, 161–62, summary diagrams, 22, 97, 162, 164, 167–68, 747, 752–53; summary discussions in text, 7–8, 15–18, 161–68, 745–50; typology of, 15–18, 163–68. See also Index of Countries
Integralismo movement [Brazil], 183–84
International Heritage Company [IPC] [Peru], 703–4, 710, 718–19
IPES [Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais] [Brazil], 525
IPFN [Independientes para un Frente Nacional] [Venezuela], 612
Iquique massacre [1907], 74
IWW [Industrial Workers of the World], 78, 181
JAC [Junta de Acción Comunal] (Colombia), 683–87
Juárez, Benito, 114
Julio, Francisco, 567
JUNEC [Junta Nacional de Empleados de Chile], 556
Junta de Gobierno [Uruguay], 443–50
Junta Militar [Chile], 110
Junta Patriótica [Venezuela], 427–29, 431
Justicialist Party [Argentina], 487, 726–27, 731
Klein-Saks Mission, 530, 544, 559
Knights of Labor, 77–78
Kubitschek de Oliveira, Juscelino, 378, 385–89, 393, 395–96, 398, 401, 515, 531, 542, 549, 552
Labor movement. See Unionization
Labor Party [Argentina], 340, 343–45
Labor Party [Mexico]. See PLM
Labor populism: in Argentine incorporation period, 314–15, 331–50, defined, 16, 165; in Peruvian incorporation period, 314–15; see also Radical populism
Lacerda, Carlos, 531–32
Land consolidation, Mexican-Venezuelan comparisons, 114–15. See also Agrarian reform
Land Reform Institute (INICORA), 676
La Prensa [Argentina], 484
La Prensa [Peru], 139, 320, 328, 473, 696
La Violencia (Colombia), 312, 438–39, 458–59, 670–72
La Prensa [Argentina], 487, 726–27
Lavalle, Hernando de, 473–74
Law for the Defense of Democracy [LDD] [Chile], 390, 560
Legitimation, 42–43, 47–48
Leguizamo, Augusto B., 98, 102, 129n.16, 132–50
Leoni, Raúl, 265
León Valencia, Guillermo, 683, 687
Liberal Alliance [Brazil], 109–13
Liberal Alliance [Chile], 109, 112, 176–78, 190
Liberal Party [Brazil], 108
Liberal Party [Chile], 368, 518, 530, 532–36
Liberal Party [Uruguay], 278
Liga Militar (Brazil), 109–10
Methodology: alternative explanations, treatment of, 10–12, 18–20, 37–39, 749–50, 768–72, analytic periods, approach to comparison of, 20–23. [See also Index of Countries]; analytic types or analytic categories, use of, 17, 163; case-oriented vs. variable-oriented approach, 14n.15; constant causes, 35–39; cross-sectional vs. longitudinal perspective, 19–20; critical juncture framework, 21–39; early labor history, approach to comparison of, 20–23; historical causes, 35–36; homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of labor movement, 45–46; incorporation periods, identification and comparison of, 3–4 (esp. 4n.1), 6–8, 28–29, 31–32, 161–68, 746–55; “lumpers” and “splitters,” 13–14; “misuse of the best known case,” 14; most similar and most different systems designs, 15; pairing of countries: differences within pairs, 17–18; similarities within pairs, 16–17, types of incorporation and, 16–18; partial explanations, 38; path dependent pattern of change, 27–28; process tracing, 5–6; selection of cases, 12–13; “sensitivity dependent on initial conditions,” 27; strength of labor movement, comparison of, 67–68, 505–6; strength of oligarchy, comparison of, 103–5; suppressor variables, 39; typologies of incorporation period, 15–18, 162–68; typologies of heritage period, 502–5. [See also Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2]
Mexican Revolution (1910), 76–79, 101–2, 119–24, 144, 146
Mexico. See Index of Countries
Michelini, Zelmar, 648, 651–52
Middle sector role of, in coalitions, 6–7
UDN (Unión Democrática Nacional) [Brazil], 362, 368, 379, 381-82, 385, 391, 514-16, 523-26, 533-32, 543

UECH (Unión de Empleados de Chile), 181-82, 192, 376

UGOCM (Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), 236-37, 415, 591, 598, 604-5

UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) [Uruguay], 451-52, 653-65

UIA (Unión Industrial Argentina), 333-34

Ulloa, Manuel, 705-6, 715, 718-19, 734

ULTAB (Unión de Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolos do Brasil), 567-68

UNACH (Unión Nacional de Asalariados de Chile), 558

UNF [Brazil], 525

Unión Civica Radical. See Radical Party [Argentina]

Unión de Empleados [Chile]. See UECH

Unionization: in Argentina, 92-93; in Brazil, 70-72; in Chile, 73-75; in Colombia, 86-88; comparative analysis of, 65-68, 93-96; early development of, 59-68, 93-96; historical context of, 59-60; in Mexico, 77-79; in Peru, 89-91; in Uruguay, 84-85; in Venezuela, 80-82

Unions. See unionization and individual confederations and unions

UNIR (Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria) [Colombia], 291-96, 301-3, 305-6, 309

United Fruit Company, 85-87, 127-28

United States: Mexican relations with, 206-7, 216-17, 220, 223, 412; Peruvian relations with, 139, 317, 321, 710; Venezuelan relations with, 264-65

United Syndical Front, 228

UNO [Unión Obrera Cristiana] [Peru], 694, 695, 703-4

UNR [Unión Nacional Republicana] [Venezuela], 252-55

UNT [Unión Nacional de Trabajadores] [Chile], 558

UOI (Unión Obrero Independiente) [Mexico], 603

UP (Unidad Popular) [Chile], 519-20, 522, 535-36, 538, 545, 563-65, 569-70

Urban centers, population concentration in, 65-67, 76

Urban-commercial development, 63-64


URD (Unión Republica Democrática) [Venezuela], 256, 261-62, 269, 423-24, 427, 429-32, 434-35, 610-13, 630-32, 634

SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA

Ureta, Eloy G., 319

Urriburu, José Félix, 154

Uruguay. See Index of Countries

Uruguayan Industrial Union, 280

Uruguay Union Confederation (CSU), 654-55

USP (Unión Socialista Popular) [Chile], 519, 521-22

USRACH (Unión Social Republicana de Asalariados) [Chile], 182

UST [Unión Sindical dos Trabajadores] [Brazil], 553-54

UTC (Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia), 296-99, 297n.49, 307-8, 457-60, 466-68, 673-77, 680-81

UTRACH (Unión de Trabajadores de Chile), 561

Uturuncos [Argentinian guerrilla movement], 799

Valladares, Héctor (Col.), 148

Valle, Juan José, 485, 495

Valparaíso dock strike [1903], 73

Vandor, Augusto, 495, 726-27, 729-34, 740

Vanguardia Nacional de Obreros y Empleados [Chile], 192


Velasco, Alfredo, 290-91

Velázquez, Fidel, 204, 580

Venezuela. See Index of Countries

Venezuelan Development Corporation, 256

Venezuelan Revolutionary Party, 638

Villalba, Jovito, 319

Villar, Rubén, 204, 580

Villalba, José, 290-91

Villanueva, Alfonso, 319

Vivo, Juan, 204, 580

Vivas, Antonio, 290-91

Wage Councils [Uruguay], 641-42, 658