Judgments of Children and Adolescents
on Exclusion and Inclusion of a Biracial Peer in Korea

by

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Abstract

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This study examined the exclusion and inclusion of biracial peers of Korean children and adolescents in the fourth grade ($n = 37, \text{M}_{\text{age}} = 9.09$), seventh grade ($n = 32, \text{M}_{\text{age}} = 11.92$), and tenth grade ($n = 32, \text{M}_{\text{age}} = 14.90$), focusing on their social and moral reasoning. Participants ($n = 101$) differentiated and coordinated the domains of social reasoning reflecting on the nature and context of a social issue when they made judgments about excluding a biracial peer in both initial and conflict situations. The participants tended to negatively judge the exclusion of a biracial peer in order to protect the welfare and rights of the biracial peer and to enhance the fairness of social interactions and the decision making processes. Nevertheless, judgments of exclusion were sometimes found acceptable. Significant variations were found by context and by age in the initial situations. Excluding a biracial peer from a personal relationship setting (i.e., a birthday party) was viewed as more acceptable than excluding him or her from a group activity (i.e., a boys and girls chorus) or a public facility (i.e., a swimming pool). Older participants were more likely than younger ones to judge exclusion acceptable. These findings are similar to previous findings in the U.S. (Killen, Lee–Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002), confirming exclusion as a multifaceted phenomenon which is associated with the coordination of multiple forms of reasoning of children and adolescents across cultures.

Analyses of justification categories for judgments of exclusion showed that moral reasons (i.e., fairness, welfare, and rights) tended to take priority over personal and conventional reasons. In addition, judgments justified with moral reasons were found to be less changeable in conflict situations than were those justified with personal or conventional reasons. In terms of age differences in social reasoning, an age-related increase of personal reasoning was found in the initial situation of the personal relationship context. In addition, an age-related increase of fairness reasoning was found in the public facility and group activity contexts, whereas an age-related decrease of rights reasoning was found in the personal relationship and public facility contexts. No significant gender differences were found.

In general, the findings and suggestions from this study may contribute to the
development of the scientific understanding of the dynamics and structures of children’s social reasoning on exclusion. They may also provide future studies on peer exclusion, racial prejudice, and peer victimization with some useful theoretical conceptions and empirical examples in social reasoning as well as exclusion.
Introduction

Recent demographic changes in South Korea have brought numerous race-related issues, such as racial discrimination, social exclusion, human rights for migrant workers, and language development challenges for biracial children. Currently, about 2% of the population of South Korea is not ethnically Korean, which is a result of the rapid growth in migrant workers and arranged international marriages since the 1990s. Most of these workers and spouses come from other Asian countries, such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and Pakistan. According to the National Statistical Office (http://www.kosis.kr), the number of international marriages grew from 5,534 in 1992 to 36,204 in 2008. International marriages account for about 11% of the total number of marriages in Korea. The number of children aged 16 or younger from international marriages was 58,007 in 2008, accounting for 6.5% of all children in Korea (“Korea Faces,” 2008). Korean scholars, government officials, and lay people commonly use the term “multicultural family” to refer to a family consisting of a Korean husband, immigrant wife, and biracial children. It is one effort of Koreans to embrace and support immigrants from different cultures. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations in Korea are providing a variety of policies and programs for the social inclusion of immigrant women and biracial children. For instance, the Korean government has established Multicultural Family Support Centers (http://mfsc.familynet.or.kr) to offer Korean language courses for immigrant women and biracial children and Emergency Support Centers for Migrant Women (http://www.wm1366.org) to provide counseling for legal and family issues in various native languages. Despite such efforts, biracial children in Korea face many problems.

A number of scholars and researchers in Korea have examined social and psychological issues regarding the development and welfare of biracial children from the disciplines of sociology, social welfare, clinical psychology, education policy, linguistics, and anthropology (see Bae, 2006; Choi, 2009; Han, 2006; Hwang & Kim, 2008; Jo, Seo, & Kwon, 2008; Jung & Woo, 2007). Nam and Lee (2009) found that the biracial children of multicultural families were highly distressed by economic and physical environments and showed a higher rate of depression as compared to the Korean children of typical Korean families. Jung and Woo (2007) reported problems in the social adjustments of biracial children: 7.6% experienced bullying and marginalization, and 6.9% were distressed by their appearance. They also developed national identity issues: 59.6% of biracial children thought of themselves as foreigners in Korea, and only 9.5% thought of themselves as Korean. In addition to these problems, some biracial children showed delays in language development and many were distressed by low academic achievement. Findings from previous studies are mainly related to the adjustment problems of biracial children and methods of intervention. Few studies have dealt with the judgments of Korean children and adolescents on the inclusion and exclusion of biracial peers, from a developmental psychological perspective. Therefore, along with these approaches, it is necessary to study the social thinking and moral judgments of Korean children about their interactions with biracial peers, in order to understand and resolve issues within the social relationships of biracial children.

In making judgments of peer inclusion and exclusion, children may integrate and apply various concepts and considerations, such as moral notions regarding fairness,
welfare, and rights, as well as systematic ideas about group activity, harmony, and hierarchy (Turiel & Killen, 2010). Decisions to exclude children from gatherings, groups, or public facilities based on race or gender tend to be viewed as violations of human rights and social justice. However, children and adolescents may exclude some peers of different races or gender from group activities when the peers are unable to contribute to the goals of group (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001). It is also true that most personal relationships include some people but exclude others (Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005). Some types of exclusion from group activities and personal relationships are thought to be acceptable or morally irrelevant. Considering the multifaceted nature of the judgments of peer exclusion or inclusion in real life situations, this research needs a perspective and method that may disentangle the complexity of exclusion and present a coherent understanding of Korean children’s judgments of the exclusion and inclusion of peers.

**Social domain approach**

This study uses the social domain perspective to examine the judgments of Korean children and adolescents of the exclusion of biracial peers in various situations. Many empirical studies have demonstrated that “certain types of social interactions constitute coherent systems revolving around a particular social domain” (Turiel, 1983, p. 50; see Nucci, 1981; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Smetana 1983, 2006; Wainryb, 1991). When children encounter different types of regularities in their various interactions with other people and environments in a society, a systematic classification of personal issues, conventions, and morality emerges in a way which constitutes them as distinct organizing components for social thoughts and actions (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). Personal issues consist of the preferences and choices of an individual over one’s privacy, selection of friends, and individual activities in leisure time (Nucci, 1981, 1996; Perkins & Turiel, 2007). Conventions are defined as shared norms and manners that organize and regulate the social interactions of people. They vary by the context of the society or institution in which they are constituted (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). Morality is based on the concept of welfare (harm), justice, fairness, and rights. Morality is neither arbitrary nor dependent on context (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). These three domains are distinct, systematic, and substantial types of social reasoning. Both children and adults frequently coordinate different domains for their decision-making in social situations (Turiel, 2002). This approach is a powerful instrument for systematically delving into complicated social and relational issues, such as children’s judgments of the exclusion of biracial peers within various contexts.

Cognitive structural theories of moral development prior to the social domain approach did not fully acknowledge young children’s abilities for moral reasoning. Piaget (1932) maintained that morality has two qualitatively different forms: one based on constraint and unilateral respect (i.e., heteronomy); the other, on cooperation and mutual respect (i.e., autonomy). Children in the heteronomous stage of development, under eight years of age, may not participate in the process of moral judgment but can receive and follow ready-made moral norms. According to Piaget, children aged eight or older may develop the capabilities of forming autonomous moral judgments and differentiating morality from convention. While sharing Piaget’s idea that children may make judgments from extrinsic reasons (e.g., authority, punishments, rewards, etc.), Kohlberg (1969,
1971) theorized an invariant sequence of moral development stages: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Every child is supposed to develop in this developmental process without omitting any stages. In Kohlberg’s theories and findings, children make judgments to avoid punishments and to receive rewards (i.e., preconventional stage), or to obey the rules and customs of a society (i.e., conventional stage). Adolescents begin to make judgments out of a genuine respect for others or out of principles of justice and equality (i.e., postconventional stage). Neither Piaget nor Kohlberg assumed that young children could perform genuine moral reasoning.

Unlike these approaches, Turiel (1983) suggested that young children across cultures distinguish moral issues from conventional ones and make judgments out of a concern for others’ welfare and rights. Smetana (1981) found that three or four year-olds in the U.S. differentiated between moral and conventional transgressions (e.g., between taking another’s belongings and a failure to put objects in designated places) and thought that moral transgressions deserved a larger punishment than did conventional transgressions. Kim (1998) found that Korean children as young as five or six years of age made the judgment that stealing or inflicting harm was morally wrong, not because of commands from authority figures but because of the nature of the action. Researchers in the social domain approach acknowledge the child’s capacity for moral reasoning by its theory and evidence that children across cultures can differentiate domains of social reasoning, thereby making moral judgments based on welfare, rights, and fairness.

The social domain approach views moral development as a part of the children’s social developmental process, in which children make inferences about their social interactions and construct distinctive categories of social knowledge (Smetana, 2006; Killen, 2007; Turiel, 1983, 1998). In the process of social development, children understand some unique criteria of the moral domain (i.e., non-rule contingency, generalizability, and unalterability) and differentiate moral reasoning from non-moral reasoning (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). They make moral judgments and know that they are correct, even if no rules are present, and believe that they should be accepted in other countries and be consistent in other contexts, without change. The finding of domain distinctions in children’s reasoning sheds light on the moral development of children. As these domains are conceptually separate categories, each domain has its own developmental trajectory. These developmental processes are not regulated by a global sequence of children’s moral development (Helwig, 1995). From the domain approach, it is not assumed that conventional reasoning should precede moral reasoning, or vice versa. Instead, separate developmental processes of three domains of social knowledge and ideas emerge simultaneously (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1998). In order to have a broad picture of moral development, researchers should pay attention to both the developmental trajectory in the moral domain and the developmental pattern in the coordination of the moral domain with non-moral domains.

First, researchers continue to investigate how a child’s reasoning changes with age in the moral domain. Each domain entails distinctive justifications which refer to reasons for judgments (Turiel, 1983, 2007). Justifications in the moral domain are based on concepts of welfare, justice, and rights; justifications in the conventional domain, on tradition, social agreement, and social coordinations; and justifications in the personal domain, on personal preference, choice, and privacy. These justifications are known to change with age in each domain. (See Nucci, 1996; Nucci, Killen, & Smetana, 1996 for
age variations in the personal domain; and, Turiel, 1983 for age variations in the conventional domain.) Researchers in this area have investigated age variations in the use of moral reasons for judgments (i.e., moral justifications). Smetana (1981) found that preschool children make moral judgments with events entailing welfare reasoning (e.g., hitting) more consistently than with those entailing fairness reasoning (e.g., sharing a toy). Davidson, Turiel, and Black (1983) studied age variations in the organization of children’s reasoning in the moral and conventional domain. This study included three age groups: six, eight, and ten year-old children. There were age-related differences in the children’s use of justification categories. They found that fairness reasoning increased with ages for familiar events (e.g., bullying), whereas welfare reasoning increased with ages for unfamiliar events (e.g., physician’s duties). In the group of six years-olds, welfare reasoning was used more than fairness reasoning, regardless of the situation. Except the finding that children aged six or younger may make moral judgments concerned mainly with avoiding physical or psychological harm, straightforward results in age variations in the use of justification categories were not found.

Second, researchers have examined how children’s coordination of moral reasoning with other domains of reasoning changes with age. Many events in real life situations tend to entail concerns about both morality and social or personal issues. For example, seven boys in a basketball club decided not to accept a peer who was short and not athletic because they were concerned about their performance in the upcoming basketball competition, although they felt badly about the excluded peer. The issue of peer exclusion in this situation may entail moral reasoning (i.e., concern for the disappointment of the excluded peer) and conventional reasoning (i.e., group functioning as a sport team). Even though they were aware of moral issues involved, the boys allowed their conventional concerns to take precedence. In children’s coordination of moral reasoning with non-moral reasoning, some age differences have been found. For instance, adolescents are more likely than children to give priority to group functioning over moral reasons in a complex process of inclusion or exclusion of a peer from a group activity (Killen et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001).

Nucci and Turiel (2009) suggested that moral reasoning develops together with the understanding of social conventional norms and concepts and realms of personal decision and choice. They also found that the frequency of moral choice (i.e., giving priority to moral reasons over conventional or personal reasons) is lower among early adolescents (10 to 14 years old) than among children (7 to 8 years old) and older adolescents (16 to 17 years old). Instead of a unidirectional increase of moral choice with age, a U-shape pattern was found in moral development. This developmental pattern was revealed in the reasoning of children and adolescents on conflict situations regarding direct and indirect harm and help. When some features of conflict situations were ambiguous, younger adolescents were more likely than children and older adolescents to select a non-moral, personal choice (i.e., giving priority to personal reasons over moral reasons). Age variations in the development of the personal domain were reported: The arena of personal reasoning increases with age (Nucci et al., 1996). Especially, younger adolescents tend to vigorously expand the zones of personal preference and choice, and to conflate reasoning based on rights with personal reasoning by considering various personal choices as inviolable rights (Smetana, 2006; Nucci & Turiel, 2009).

These results suggest that developmental features in the coordination of domains are significant in theorizing the general patterns of moral development. Researchers may
find that priorities between moral and non-moral reasons that children adopt in their judgments of complex situations vary by age. For instance, older children may be more likely than younger children to subordinate moral concerns to personal reasoning. This study systematically investigates age differences, both in children’s reasoning in the moral domain and in their coordination of moral reasoning with non-moral reasoning in various complex situations.

**Approaches to exclusion**

Scholars and researchers have approached the social phenomenon of exclusion in various ways. The developmental psychologists Buhs, Ladd, and Herald (2006) define peer exclusion as a form of peer maltreatment: The targets of exclusion are restricted in their engagement in peer relationships and activities, as well as in their access to social and instrumental resources. It is associated with a low level of classroom participation and achievement. The social psychologist Miller (2007) views social exclusion as a process of marginalization from the mainstream of society, by which the targets of exclusion experience a lack of wealth, welfare, social relationships and activities. In terms of morality, Opotow (1990, 2006; see Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005) defines exclusion using the notion of the scope of justice (Deutsch, 1985, 1990), which implies that some people or institutions apply the principle of justice to a limited group of people or objects. Those who are morally excluded stay outside the scope of justice and receive unfair treatment. According to these approaches, the implications and effects of exclusion tend to be negative: Exclusion tends to be a pejorative term, considered a moral transgression. Exclusion seriously endangers the basic need of children and adults to be part of social groups and relationships, and may cause many problems, such as depression, anxiety, poverty, discrimination, and antisocial reactions (Asher & Coie, 1990; Hutchison, Abrams, & Christian, 2007). The vast majority of American children judged the exclusion of a peer by gender or race as morally wrong (Killen et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001). It was found that even preschoolers think it is wrong for a group of girls to exclude a boy from playing with dolls, even though they see doll-playing as a typical girl’s activity. Likewise, they judge it wrong that a girl is excluded from a group of boys who are playing with trucks (Theimer, Killen, & Stanger, 2001). In general, exclusion based on gender or race and prejudice or stigma is judged morally wrong and considered to cause harm to the excluded.

It is, however, important to acknowledge that some types of exclusion might be inevitable in a society. Abrams, Hogg, and Marques (2005) suggested that relationships necessarily include people, but they also have boundaries that, by definition, exclude other people. Although the boundaries of some relationships are flexible, it is true that most personal relationships and social groups are not able to include all sorts of people due to the nature of relationships or group activities. For instance, in a personal gathering context, the host may exclude some individuals who do not know each other very well, in order to secure an intimate ambience for the gathering. A social group may exclude individuals who do not meet the criteria for group membership, in order to make the group function according to its goals. For example, slow runners are excluded from a school track team. Killen and Stangor (2001) found that older children are more likely than younger children to condone exclusion on the basis of group membership in cases in which the inclusion of these children might interrupt an effective group functioning. These types of exclusion need to be distinguished from other forms of exclusion that are
based on gender or race and prejudice or stigma. Thus, exclusion in social relationships may not always be morally condemned. In order to have a broader understanding of exclusion, it is important to study how variations of contexts influence the judgment of exclusion.

Leets and SunWolf (2005) studied the rules adolescents employ to exclude peers from social groups in their conceptions and actual social behavior. Adolescents reported that the most common reason for exclusion is a perceived lack of physical or social attractiveness of a peer. They tended to promote positive images of their groups by excluding unattractive peers. Besides unattractiveness, they judged peer exclusion as legitimate behavior to punish past wrongdoings, to prevent dangerous actions of the target of exclusion that may harm insiders, to force group loyalty for all insiders, or to protect the target peer from the anticipated hostile behavior of insiders (i.e., benevolent protection). This study revealed some specific reasons or rules with which adolescents justify and permit peer exclusion.

However, it is problematic that Leets and SunWolf viewed these reasons as moral rules for peer exclusion without carefully classifying them. As the adolescents reasoned about exclusion in the context of a peer group, they might have thought about some reasons from the domain of conventional reasoning, not from the domain of moral reasoning. In many cases, they did not make these decisions according to concerns about the welfare and rights of their own or others (i.e., moral reason), but according to concerns about damaging the group image (i.e., conventional reason) or personal preferences in the selection of a friend (i.e., personal reason). Among the rules, dangerous behavior and benevolent protection may be related to moral reasoning: The former is to keep insiders from harm, and the latter is to protect outsiders from harm. Without classifying various reasons for endorsing peer exclusion, it is difficult to understand the different implications and qualities of the judgments of exclusion.

In addition, it should be noted that judgments of the exclusion of the same peer may vary by context. Adolescents may approve of the exclusion of unattractive peers from their social groups and personal gatherings, whereas they may not endorse the exclusion of the same unattractive peers from public institutions. Adolescents tend to use personal and conventional reasons for a justification of the judgment of exclusion mainly in the friendship and group contexts, while they tend to use moral reasons in the public context (Killen et al., 2002). As moral judgments are not contingent on personal conditions, social consensus, or authority expectations (Turiel, 1983, 2002), the lack of attractiveness of a peer can hardly justify the exclusion from the public context in which most adolescents are concerned with the rights and welfare of a target peer. On the other hand, adolescents may think that they are able to make a judgment of either exclusion or inclusion in the personal and group contexts according to personal preference or consensus among group members (Killen et al., 2002). Thus, some personal conditions such as gender, race, and even unattractiveness, can be an influential factor that justifies the judgments of adolescents on peer exclusion in a personal or group setting in which exclusion may not cause a serious violation of human rights or a severe physical or psychological harm on a target peer, unlike exclusion in a public context. Thus, the general rules of peer exclusion that Leets and SunWolf (2005) found may be applicable mainly in certain social contexts. Despite the lack of classification of different reasons for exclusion and a consideration on contextual variations of judgments in their study, it is
noteworthy that they found that adolescents do not always reject peer exclusion, but often endorse peer exclusion from social groups for various reasons. This finding implies that adolescents do not always view exclusion as a moral transgression.

Psychologists in the area of social identity mention the tendency of people to pursue positive images of their groups by maintaining a distinction between their groups and those of others, by favoring their groups, and by excluding deviant or undesirable members from their groups (Hutchison et al., 2007; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Leets and SunWolf (2005) also suggested that the peer exclusion phenomenon reflects adolescents’ need to belong and that they include or exclude peers by assigning them to different social identities. The issue of identity goes beyond the realm of conventional reasoning, such as group functioning or image, according to some scholars. Giddens (1986; see Kasperson, 2000) proposed that moral status is associated with social identities. When a person is identified by one’s country of citizenship, his or her basic rights are secured by the nation. Unfortunately, it is not unusual for undocumented migrant workers in some countries not to have the same rights or protections as native or documented people. Furthermore, Opotow and Brook (2003) applied concepts of identity and exclusion to issues of environmental conservation. When people do not have a positive shared knowledge about the relationship between people and the environment and, thus, identify animals and plants in nature with them, they can exploit the animals and plants by thinking them as morally irrelevant. Extending this argument, it is plausible that some Korean children believe that biracial peers have different social identities and so exclude them from peer groups.

It has not been found that Korean biracial children form their own groups or that they have defined themselves as a stereotypic social or personal identity in Korea. As a small minority, they tend to scatter within a large pool of Korean children, especially in urban schools. It might be premature to examine the general relationship between the social identity of biracial children and peer exclusion in Korea. Nevertheless, it is possible that children use some concepts of identities, such as Korean, biracial, or child to justify their decisions of exclusion or inclusion. For instance, in the public facility context in which biracial children are excluded from public swimming pools without an explanation of specific causes, some may argue that biracial children are also Koreans and, therefore, have the right to use the pools. The issue of how they define the identity of the biracial peer may be part of their justification for the judgments of exclusion or inclusion.

In order to study the relationship between identity and exclusion, it is important to view identity as a multifaceted concept. According to Tajfel et al. (1971), each individual has a repertoire of identities: He or she has several types of social and personal identities. Social contexts and other factors may relate to which of one’s multiple identities becomes salient to a person or group. The relationships between identities and judgments of exclusion are not straightforward but rather context-dependent. Thus, it may not be the right step to study whether specific identities of biracial children regulate the judgments of children on exclusion. This study treats the relationship between identity and exclusion as an open question, without developing a specific hypothesis.
Previous studies on racial exclusion

Studies on racial exclusion from the social domain perspective have been conducted in the U.S. (Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002; Killen & Stanger, 2001). Killen and Stangor (2001) found that the vast majority of children negatively judged race and gender exclusion in straightforward conditions such as a math club from which a black child was excluded due to his or her race. They also devised complex situations in which children were asked to select one of two children to join a club when only one of them fits the stereotype of the club activity (e.g., a girl for ballet and a boy for baseball). In those situations, children were expected to consider social conventional reasons, such as group functioning, as well as moral reasons, such as fairness and rights. Unlike straightforward situations, the judgments of children varied by age and gender in complex situations. Older children made more stereotypical decisions, such as the selection of a boy for the baseball club, than did younger children. More girls used fairness as a reason to justify the decision of exclusion than did boys. These findings suggest that children use different ways of social reasoning according to the context and complexity of issues.

Killen et al. (2002) also conducted a comprehensive study on the social reasoning of children on race and gender exclusion in various contexts such as friendship, club activity, and school. Contextual variations were found in the judgments of children regarding exclusion. They judged that it was more acceptable to exclude a peer in a friendship context than from a peer group or at school. In terms of racial exclusion, the majority of children in the fourth, seventh, and tenth grades thought it unacceptable to exclude a black peer. It was also found that children tended to judge peer exclusion by race as less acceptable than peer exclusion by gender. In terms of justifications for judgments, personal and conventional reasons were mainly used in the friendship and peer group contexts, respectively, whereas moral reasons were used in all the contexts. When individuals are confronted with multifaceted issues (e.g., issues involving both moral and non-moral dimensions), judgments and reasoning vary according to individuals’ evaluations on the salience and weight of various considerations from the different domains and different ways of coordinating those considerations (Helwig, 1995; Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 1983, 1995; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Turiel et al., 1987).

In the studies of Killen and colleagues (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2002)), contextual variations were found in the judgments of children. Their judgments were often modified when some new features were introduced. However, situational changes are not the only sources for individual variations in the judgments of children, as in the same context, age differences were found. For example, younger children were more likely to make a moral choice by including an atypical peer to a club with a consideration of the welfare or equality of the peer, while older ones, a conventional choice by excluding the peer to uphold the tradition or harmony of the club (Killen & Stangor, 2001). Older and younger children may differ in ways in which the domains of some thoughts are identified and coordinated. Different levels of social reasoning among children are related to individual variation in judgments. In order to explain girls’ more frequent use of fairness reasoning than that of boys, Killen and Stangor suggested that “girls may be more sensitive to exclusion than boys on the basis of their experience of being excluded from gender specific activities such as sports” (Killen & Stangor, 2001,
of happy victimizers). It is plausible that one’s experience affects one’s judgment because children develop social reasoning through their interactions with other people and environments. It may be one of the factors that explain why the salience of moral or conventional considerations differed among children in the same situation, grade, and gender. However, they did not test and study how one’s experience affects one’s judgments. This study also does not investigate the relationship between experience and reasoning because it is first necessary to test whether some findings in contextual, age, and gender differences are consistent, and to accumulate some evidence that helps understand in-depth the developmental trajectories in the moral domain of social reasoning. Compared to findings in the personal and conventional domains, empirical findings are not sufficient to comprehend developmental changes in the moral domain (see Nucci, 1996; Turiel, 1983).

In addition to the studies of Killen and her colleagues (Killen et al., 2002; Killen & Stanger, 2001), there have been various studies of peer interactions, such as peer rejection and victimization (Asher, & Coie, 1990; Caravita, Paola, & Salmivalli, 2009; Gazelle, & Ladd, 2003; Graham, 2006; Kochenderfer, & Ladd, 1997; Olweus, 1993; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006; Smith, & Brain, 2000). Many studies on peer victimization have focused on the personal and psychological characteristics of victims and bullies. For example, Olweus (1993) suggested two general types of victims: The passive or submissive and anxious provocative victims. He also found that aggressiveness was a distinctive characteristic of bullies. Kochenderfer and Ladd (1997) studied how victimized children’s responses to peer aggression were associated with a reduction in the continuation of victimization. Some studies have analyzed the relational and interpersonal aspects of bullying as a social or group process in which the bully, victim, defenders, and bystanders interact (Gini, 2006; Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Bjorkqvist, Osterman, & Kaukiainen, 1996). Unlike Killen et al. (2002), these researchers, however, have not analyzed the social reasoning of individual children and adolescents in depth, with regard to bullying or victimization. The development of the understanding of children’s social reasoning about exclusion may help peer victimization research gain a broader base for a deeper analysis of peer relationships.

In the area of peer victimization, Arsenio and his colleagues (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006; Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001; Arsenio & Love, 1995) have brought up some important issues about children’s understandings of peer victimizers. They suggest that children’s understandings of the link between event and affect in different contexts enhance children’s adaptive functioning in peer relationships. They found that preschoolers tend to have a different link between the event of bullying and the emotion of the bully from older children. In assessments where children were asked to predict the emotions of victimizers, the younger children were more likely to predict positive emotions such as happiness, whereas the older ones, negative emotions such as pain and sadness. Children’s understandings of others’ emotions, as well as their other-oriented emotional responses, may predict protective behaviors against peer victimization (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Thus, researchers in this area need to examine and interpret carefully the finding that a younger child tends to positively associate the negative event of bullying with the positive emotion of happiness (i.e., the phenomenon of happy victimizers).
Reflecting on children’s positive attributions to the bully’s emotional state, some
may raise questions such as: “Are the younger children blind to the negative aspects of
peer victimization? Are they immoral?” Despite the phenomenon of the happy victimizer,
evidence shows that young children both understand the negative emotions of the bully
and conduct moral reasoning. Keller, Lourenco, Malti, and Saalbach (2003) suggest
that children are able to judge peer victimization as wrong while they assume the positive
feelings of the victimizer. Thus, the phenomenon of the happy victimizer does not
undermine the children’s capacity for moral reasoning. In addition, the younger children
answered that the bully also feels some pain and sorrow as a consequence of his or her
actions, when they were asked in the probing process whether the bully may have
different emotions than happiness, (Arsenio et al., 2006; Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001;
Arsenio & Love, 1995). From this result, it is assumed that the younger children may
make an initial judgment reflecting the salience of a concrete outcome of the event, not
broadly thinking about other unspecified moral or non-moral aspects. When other aspects
of the event were directly presented to them, the children were capable of incorporating
those aspects into their reasoning.

In sum, Killen and her colleagues (Killen, 2007; Killen et al., 2002; Killen &
Stanger, 2001) found that children and adolescents use multiple forms of reasoning in
various contexts of exclusion, and explained how they differentiate contexts in judgments
of exclusion. Children tend to view peer exclusion as one form of peer maltreatment and
judge it morally wrong, while they endorse exclusion in some contexts mainly with
conventional and personal reasons. Studies on peer relationships with a focus on the
children’s reasoning process may help research on peer victimization gain a
comprehensive view regarding the causes, processes, and results of bullying by
classifying moral and non-moral aspects associated with bullying, as well as by
examining developmental features in the relationship between children’s understanding
of others’ emotional states and moral judgments.

Cultural differences in racial exclusion

Few empirical studies have been conducted on children’s judgments of racial
exclusion in Asian countries. Most previous studies in this area were conducted in North
America. It is an intriguing question of how the judgment patterns of Korean children
regarding peer exclusion by race may be similar to or different from those of American
children. Over the past few decades, theorists such as Hofstede (1980), Markus and
Kitayama (1991), and Triandis (1995) have maintained a sharp distinction between
Western cultures (e.g., the U.S. and Canada) and non-Western cultures (e.g., China,
Korea, and Japan) by characterizing the former as individualistic and the latter as
collectivistic. According to these perspectives, Koreans, as people in collectivistic
cultures, have an unbounded, flexible concept of self so that they act interdependently
and value the goals of their communities over personal goals; whereas Americans, as
people in individualistic cultures, have a bounded, unitary concept of self so that they act
independently and autonomously to achieve their own personal goals (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Collectivistic cultures value good social relationships and ingroup
harmony more than do individualistic cultures. According to Suh (1994, cited in Triandis,
1995), Koreans and Chinese show more positive emotions when they are with friends
than when they are with strangers, whereas Americans do not show a difference in the
expression of positive emotions between the two situations. From this point of view, East Asians tend to make clearer distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members than do Northern Americans (Triandis, 1995). If this perspective accurately reflected realities of different cultures, then certain differences in children’s judgments of exclusion could be expected between Asians and Americans. However, many criticisms have been raised against the generalizations of collectivism for Asian populations and individualism for Western ones (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Turiel, 1998, 2002; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Wainryb, & Turiel, 1994). In addition, cross-cultural studies on peer exclusion have not support the sharp distinction between Western and non-Western cultures, but have produced complex results that show cultural differences among Asian countries (Park, Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2003).

Killen, Crystal, and Watanabe (2002) compared Japanese and American children in their judgments of peer exclusion, and Park et al. (2003) examined the judgments of children on the same issue with samples from Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Both studies surveyed how children and adolescents (i.e., fourth, seventh, and tenth graders) evaluated the exclusion of atypical peers (e.g., aggressive behaviors, cross-gender behaviors) from a group. While no overall differences were found between Japanese and American samples in both studies, Korean children were much less willing to exclude a child from a peer group than were Japanese and American children. Interestingly, no gender differences were found in the Korean samples. As gender inequality seems to be more salient in Korea than the U.S., this finding is somewhat counterintuitive and difficult to explain. In addition, older children in Korea demand less conformity and grant more autonomy than do younger children, whereas no age differences regarding this issue were found in the samples of the U.S. and Japan. Regarding the causes of some unique results among Korean children, Park et al. (2003) explained that peer exclusion might be related to peer victimization in Korea and the recent promotion of gender equality in Korea might be related to the lack of gender difference. These suggestions, however, remain to be tested in the future. In sum, these two studies reveal that Korean, Japanese, and American children cannot be categorized into such two cultural groups as collectivist and individualist. A simple categorization of cultural phenomena should be avoided in order to explain a multifaceted social phenomenon such as peer exclusion.

Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) found that Western and non-Western cultures cannot simply be classified as individualist and collectivist, respectively. By a meta-analysis of cross-cultural differences in studies regarding individualism and collectivism from 1980 to 1999, they found that Koreans and Japanese were not more collectivistic than European Americans. While they used the conceptual frameworks of individualism and collectivism, they came to the conclusion that it was inadequate to evaluate the whole Korean culture as collectivistic in comparison with European American culture. Researchers from the domain perspective found evidence against a sharp distinction between Western and non-Western cultures and, further, argued against the conceptual frameworks of collectivism and individualism (Turiel, 1998, 2002; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Wainryb, & Turiel, 1994).

Various cultural orientations coexist in a country. Regardless of Western and non-Western societies, it is not realistic to characterize the culture of a country as a generally homogeneous culture (Turiel, 2002; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Rights and democracy, which are characteristics of individualism, are present and valid beyond
Western cultures, while also possibly being restricted in Western cultures. Wainryb and Turiel (1994) suggested that some typical individualistic concepts such as personal agency and rights are embedded in the societal structure of Druze, a religious community in Israel based on the Koran and with a strong patriarchal tradition. According to the individualism and collectivism dichotomy, the Druze are a duty-based society which restricts autonomous activities. But in that community, it was found that people in both dominant and subordinate positions of the community have concepts of rights and fairness: Males hold a strong sense of rights and personal entitlements and females protest and reject some unfair practices, not accepting all duties (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). On the other hand, some basic rights, such as the freedom of speech, can be restricted even in a rights-based individualistic society. Helwig (1995) found that about half of the participants from the U.S. do not endorse a freedom of speech which may cause psychological harm to others. For instance, more than half the children restrict speech that contains remarks promoting racial discrimination. From these results, it is suggested that both Western and non-Western societies have concepts of rights and use them according to individual judgments, based on the reasoning of various dimensions of contexts and issues. Thus, instead of generalizing the orientations of different cultures, researchers using social domain methodologies have found that individuals apply and coordinate various sets of contrasting concepts—such as duties, rights, autonomy, and cooperation—to varying social contexts across cultures and within cultures (see Helwig, 2006).

This study does not follow the assumption that peer exclusion in Korea is more or less prevalent than in the U.S. merely because Korean culture is collectivistic or individualistic. Regardless of cultural backgrounds, most children would reject the exclusion of a peer from peer groups or public facilities based on his or her race or gender if no other competing moral, conventional, or personal considerations were introduced (see Killen & Stangor, 2001). However, children and adolescents would differentiate the judgments of exclusion if they were presented with complex issues that entailed various moral and non-moral considerations. By examining the judgments of children in the exclusion of a biracial peer in several contexts with varying levels of complexity, this study may allow some direct or indirect comparisons of the social reasoning of children and adolescents between different cultures and within cultures.

**Contexts and social reasoning**

Contexts influence ways in which children and adolescents judge exclusion. They may judge exclusion of a peer from a public institution as a moral transgression, whereas they may judge it from a friendly gathering as a matter of personal decision (See Killen et al., 2002). Helwig (1995) studied how children and adults apply moral concepts, such as freedom of speech and religion in three situations: family, school, and society. An age-related increase in the affirmation of freedom was found: Older participants were more likely than younger ones to grant children as well as adults freedom of religion and speech in general. However, this trend alone was not able to explain some results. For example, the first graders (81%) were more likely than college students (50%) to endorse religious freedom for children in the family context. Even though college students tended to allow the freedom of religion more than did first graders, this age related increase was not applicable in the family context. In order to figure out the complex and systematic
nature of social reasoning on exclusion, the influence of contexts on the social reasoning of children should be examined, together with developmental changes in reasoning with age.

Domain perspective on contextual variations in the judgments of children is different from a relativistic view on cultural contexts, which tends to make context the sole regulating force for development by considering the person and the situation as an indissociable unit, without a systematic explanation of the interaction between them, and by assigning unique developmental trajectories to different cultural contexts (see Rogoff, 2003). From the domain approach, neither cultural contexts nor individual capacities solely determine the social judgments and developmental patterns of children. Instead, children construct and develop distinctive systems of thought through their interactions with the environment (Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 2006). As contexts, as well as age, interactively affect the thoughts of children, both contextual variations and age related changes in social reasoning are expected to be found in the study of the judgments of children on exclusion.

In this study, participants were asked to assess the exclusion of biracial peer in various situations that included one of three events: an invitation to a birthday party, joining a chorus, and admission to a public pool. First, the invitation to a birthday party represented an activity in the personal domain. This situation involved a main character who was debating whether to invite a biracial peer to his or her birthday party. This is considered personal since a child’s reasoning regarding this activity is based on his or her preferences and choices: A child thinks that he or she can invite his or her peers that he or she likes. Second, the selection of a chorus member represented a social issue in the conventional domain. In this situation, a main character was debating whether to allow a biracial peer to join a traditional Korean boys and girls chorus. This is considered conventional since a child’s reasoning regarding this event is based on traditions or shared norms of a group: A child thinks that his or her groups should follow some rules about the selection of new members to maintain traditions or to function properly. Third, the admission of a biracial child to a public pool represented an issue in the moral domain. This situation involved an official decision of the town council to not allow the biracial peer to use any public pools in town. This is considered moral since a child’s reasoning regarding this event is based on the protection or enhancement of the welfare and rights of people and the fairness of social rules and interactions: A child may think that it is wrong to hurt the feeling of his or her peer or to discriminate by race. The classification of activities by domain was based on the previous empirical and theoretical research of the social domain theory (Killen et al., 2002, Killen & Stanger, 2001; Nucci, 1981; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Smetana 2006; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2008).

Killen et al. (2002) examined children’s social reasoning in three contexts: friendship, peer group, and school. The situations of the birthday party and chorus of this present project were related to the contexts of friendship and peer group, respectively. They chose the school context as a setting in which social reasoning about exclusion was expected to be evaluated in moral terms. The exclusion of a child from school may have entailed some prudential issues such as concerns about academic progress because an exclusion from school can be considered not only morally wrong, but also a serious hindrance for one’s future (see Perkins & Turiel, 2007). Thus, this study chose exclusion from a public swimming pool – which is not as detrimental to a child’s basic capabilities
for living as the exclusion from a school – so that children could evaluate the exclusion mainly with moral reasons.

In this study, each of the three events has three variations: one initial and two conflict situations. These nine situations are categorized by three contexts: Exclusion in the personal relationship context (e.g., an invitation to a birthday party), exclusion in the group activity context (e.g., joining a chorus), and exclusion in the public facility context (e.g., admission to a public pool). The term context refers to the three main settings in which the three prototypical events are situated, whereas the term situation indicates a particular condition in which children make a judgment of peer exclusion. On the other hand, the term domain is not directly associated with the term context or situation, but with the classifications of prototypical events and social reasoning. Children may use domains of social reasoning other than the domain of a prototypical event when the event is embedded in a certain condition which stimulates multifaceted considerations. For example, a child may use moral reasoning regarding an invitation to a birthday party (i.e., personal domain) if he or she is introduced to the information that an unfamiliar peer in his or her town is lonely and thereby become concerned about the difficulties of the peer. The basic structure of this study regarding the formation of contexts and situations are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Basic Structure of Research Design (domain)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Personal relationship</th>
<th>Group activity</th>
<th>Public facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main event of initial situation</td>
<td>Invitation to a birthday party</td>
<td>Selection of a chorus member</td>
<td>Admission to a public pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(personal)</td>
<td>(conventional)</td>
<td>(moral)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social pressure and</td>
<td>tradition</td>
<td>Personal choice and preference</td>
<td>Personal choice and preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict</td>
<td>(conventional)</td>
<td>(personal)</td>
<td>(personal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasoning</td>
<td>Fairness and rights</td>
<td>Fairness and rights</td>
<td>Tradition and authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(moral)</td>
<td>(moral)</td>
<td>(conventional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* See the section on Method and Appendix A for the details of various situations.

The initial situations represented main events in ways which people may encounter in social interactions. A conflict situation was based on the judgment made in the initial situation. The conflict was introduced by presenting participants with an opposing judgment with reasons from domains other than the domain of the main event in the initial situation. A pair of conflict situations between the domains of social reasoning is presented in each context. In the personal context, conventional (i.e., social
pressure and tradition) and moral (i.e., fairness and moral norms) reasons were introduced, respectively, to generate conflict situations. When a child decided to invite or not invite a biracial peer to his or her birthday party, two conflicts were posed, respectively, by (1) introducing the preferences of his or her friends (i.e., conventional issue), and (2) introducing the statement that the birthday boy or girl came to be concerned about fairness and rights (i.e., moral issue).

In the group context, personal (i.e., personal choice and preference) and moral (i.e., fairness and rights) reasons were introduced, respectively, to generate conflict situations. When a child decided to admit or not admit a biracial peer to a chorus, two conflicts were posed, respectively, by (1) introducing the affection or hatred of the peer by the chorus leader (i.e., personal issue), and (2) introducing the moral concerns of the chorus leader that the selection was fair or unfair (i.e., moral issue). In the public context, personal (i.e., personal choice and preference) and conventional (i.e., tradition and authority) reasons were introduced, respectively, to generate conflict situations. When a child thought it right or wrong that a town council had decided to exclude a biracial child from public pools, two conflicts were posed, respectively, by (1) introducing the information of the biracial child’s enthusiasm for swimming or the neighbors’ feelings toward the biracial child (i.e., personal issue), and (2) introducing the statement that a tradition or past practice was different from his or her initial judgment (i.e., conventional issue).

Everyone encounters various kinds and levels of conflicts in diverse social contexts. According to Turiel (2002), conflicts in social life “stem from the different types of social judgments individuals make, as well as from different types of moral judgments to existing arrangements” (p. 285). Much empirical evidence is needed to contribute to a clear understanding of the dynamic nature of social reasoning upon conflicts in social relationships introduced by opposing ideas of different domains. It is necessary to conduct more studies of social reasoning in conflict situations. Therefore, this study investigated how children and adolescents make judgments of racial exclusion and justify them when conflicting opinions or assumptions were presented from different domains.

It was expected that these complex situations would contribute to the examination of age differences in social reasoning. Killen and Stangor (2001) found age differences in social reasoning upon racial exclusion in complex situations, not in straightforward situations which did not include conflicts or critical choices. In this study, both initial and conflict situations were presented in a complex manner, since age differences in contextual variations of social reasoning tend to be found when children are dealing with complex issues. Complex qualities for initial situations were provided by presenting details of characters and situations. For example, when a birthday boy was debating whether to invite his biracial peer, it was made known that he did not desire to be close friends with the biracial peer. The complexity of conflict situations were provided by directly suggesting contradicting opinions, judgments, and facts from different domains. For example, when a birthday girl decided to invite her biracial peer, she knew that her friends did not want the biracial peer at the party. These complex situations were expected to contribute to the in-depth investigation of children’s coordination of different aspects of a domain and different domains of social reasoning, as well as age difference in social reasoning.
Goals and Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to investigate how children and adolescents use and coordinate distinct forms of social reasoning to evaluate racial exclusion in various situations. For this purpose, this study has four specific research goals: First, how do children and adolescents make judgments about exclusion in different contexts? Second, how are the contexts and types of judgments associated with justifications? Third, do participants change their initial judgments in conflict situations? Fourth, are there age differences in the differentiation of contexts as well as in the justification categories in social reasoning?

My first hypothesis was that participants are more likely to judge the exclusion of biracial peers on the basis of race as wrong in all three contexts: a personal relationship (i.e., invitation to a birthday party), group activity (i.e., selection of a chorus member), and public facility (i.e., admission to a public pool). Research in North American populations has shown that children recognize the negative consequences of social exclusion such as psychological harm (see Buhs, Ladd, & Herald, 2006; Millar, 2007; Opotow, 1990, 2006; Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005). I predict that most Korean children, like American children, would judge that a biracial peer should be included in these contexts.

In conjunction with the general tendency to negatively evaluate peer exclusion, contextual variations may emerge in children’s judgments of exclusion. Killen et al. (2002) found that American children and adolescents tend to think of exclusion in the context of friendship or group activity as more acceptable than exclusion from an opportunity to attend school. I hypothesized that participants are more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal relationship context than in group activity and public relationship contexts, and more in the group activity context than in the public relationship context. In the context of personal relationship, a child might judge that it is acceptable to exclude children who are not close friends from a personal gathering, such as a birthday party. In the context of a group activity, children would judge certain selective criteria as acceptable. For example, they would not choose a peer who is not athletic to be a member of a football team. However, the vast majority of children and adolescents are likely to reject the exclusion of a peer from public facilities on the basis of the racial background of a peer from public facilities on moral grounds.

Second, I examined contextual variations in justifications as well as the relationship between the types of judgments and justifications for those judgments. As social exclusion is a multifaceted phenomenon which is presented in various situations, it was expected that children would use a range of reasons to justify their judgments: Moral justifications (i.e., fairness, welfare, rights), conventional justifications (i.e., group functioning, authority, tradition, social influence), and personal justifications (i.e., personal choice) (see Table 2 for the details of justification categories). Killen et al. (2002) found that children and adolescents reasoned differently on exclusion according to context. They tended to use moral and personal reasons in the friendship context, moral and conventional reasons in the group context, and moral reasons in the school context. In this study, I predicted that children’s justifications would vary in accord with context. They are more likely to use personal justifications in the personal relationship context than in other contexts, conventional justifications in the group activity context than in
other contexts, and moral justifications in the public facility context than in other contexts.

In addition, I hypothesized that participants using moral reasoning are more likely than those using personal or conventional reasoning to judge the exclusion of the biracial peer as wrong. Children tend to think that the exclusion of a peer due to his or her race is unfair, violates rights, and causes the peer psychological harm (Killen et al., 2002; Killen & Stanger, 2001; Killen & Turiel, 2010). Thus, I predicted that participants would not justify the exclusion of a biracial peer from any activities or facilities, given their concern for the welfare, fairness, or rights of the peer. I expected that those who used a personal reason would be more likely than those using moral or conventional reasons to judge the exclusion of a biracial peer as acceptable in the personal relationship context. Participants might think that an invitation to a personal gathering was a matter of personal choice. They would use conventional reasons such as group functioning and social influence for both the endorsement and rejection of exclusion.

Third, I examined whether participants changed their initial judgments in subsequent conflict situations. After their initial judgments, they were presented with conflicting opinions from other domains different from the domain of the main event of a context. For example, after a participant gives a judgment about inviting the biracial peer to his or her birthday party, which is a prototypical event of the personal domain, he or she is asked to make another judgment if his or her friends do not want the peer to be present at the party, which is a type of social pressure that is related to the conventional domain. I hypothesized that the participants who justified their judgments with moral reasons are less likely to change their judgments than are those who justified their judgments with personal and conventional reasons. Participants would more easily change their decisions based on personal reasoning than moral reasoning in conflicts with their peer group or with authority, since moral judgments, unlike judgments in the personal or conventional domain, are not heavily influenced by variations in locations, contexts, and external influences (see Turiel, 1983).

In addition, I examined whether the proportions of changes of judgment vary by direction: positive (i.e., from exclusion to inclusion) and negative (i.e., from inclusion to exclusion). I predicted that participants would be more likely to change from exclusion to inclusion (i.e., positive) than from inclusion to exclusion (i.e., negative). Basically, judgments with personal and conventional reasons are more likely than those with moral reasons to change in conflict situations. Thus, the initial judgments of exclusion are likely to change to inclusion (i.e., positive direction) since they are expected to be justified by personal or conventional reasons, whereas the initial judgments of inclusion are unlikely to change to exclusion (i.e., negative direction) since they are expected to be justified by moral reasons.

Fourth, I examined whether there are age differences in the differentiation of contexts as well as the justification categories in social reasoning. This study includes participants from the fourth, seventh, and tenth grades. Helwig (1998) suggested that a majority of Canadian ten year-olds understand the universality and non-rule contingency of rights. As this study deals with children’s reasoning about rights, fourth graders (Mage = 9.09) are an age group with which to adequately study developmental changes regarding their understanding of the key moral concept of rights. In terms of contextual variations in children’s judgments, Helwig (1995) found that children in the third grade
or older differentiate children’s rights to freedom of speech in different societal contexts (i.e., society, school, and family): The third graders thought that the prohibition of the freedom of speech by an authority is more acceptable in the family context than in society or school contexts. Furthermore, the three age groups of this study are the same as those of Killen et al.’s 2002 study of exclusion in the U.S., which may facilitate comparisons between Korean and American populations. Previous studies found that fourth graders were less likely than seventh or tenth graders to differentiate various contexts (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2002).

I hypothesized that older participants are more likely to judge exclusion as acceptable in the personal and group contexts, but not in the public context, than are younger ones. This hypothesis also implies that older participants tend to use personal and conventional reasons in the personal and group contexts since those reasons are expected to be closely related to the endorsement of exclusion. Older children and adolescents tend to hold a broader sense of personal domain than that of younger children (Nucci et al., 1996). In the selection of a member for club activities, older children tend to consider the importance of group functioning more than do younger children (Killen & Stanger, 2001). Due to the expansion of the realm of personal choice and the consideration of group function with age, older participants may differentiate various contexts more clearly than do younger ones. However, age differences were not predicted in the judgment of exclusion in the public context; I expected that the vast majority in each of the three age groups would view exclusion from public facilities due to one’s race as morally wrong.

In addition, I examined age related differences in justification categories in moral reasoning. Previous studies show mixed results. For example, the use of fairness increases with age only in familiar situations (Turiel, 1983); whereas it decreases with age in the judgment of exclusion regarding friendship and peer group membership for European American students between the seventh and tenth grades (Killen et al., 2002). It is also premature, due to the lack of previous findings, to make specific hypotheses regarding age differences in the change of judgments. I still examined age differences in the change of judgments in conflict situations to assess whether there is a developmental trend regarding situational variations in children’s evaluations of peer exclusion.

Finally, I do not hypothesize any gender differences in this study. Some studies show that girls tend to use fairness for justification more than do boys (Killen et al., 2002; Killen, & Stanger, 2001), whereas an exclusion study with Korean children does not show any gender differences (Park et al., 2003). I examined gender differences in the judgments and justifications of exclusion in various situations in order to lay a foundation for an in-depth discussion from the social domain perspective. I also do not predict any cross-cultural findings in this study because all the participants are Korean. It is not adequate to directly compare the results of this study with those of previous studies on exclusion (see Killen et al., 2002, Park et al., 2003) because the contexts and stories of exclusion in this study are not the same as those in the previous ones.

In summary, I first hypothesized that participants are more likely to judge exclusion as wrong in all situations. Second, they are more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal context than in group and public contexts, and more in the group context than in the public context. Third, older participants are more likely to judge exclusion as acceptable in the personal and group contexts, but not in the public context, than are
younger ones. Fourth, participants are more likely to use personal justifications in the personal relationship context than in other contexts, conventional justifications in the group activity context than in other contexts, and moral justifications in the public facility context than in other contexts. Fifth, participants using moral reasoning are less likely than those using personal or conventional reasoning to judge the exclusion of the biracial peer as acceptable and to change their judgments in conflict situations.
Methods

Participants
The sample consisted of 56 girls and 55 boys from urban schools in Seoul, Korea. There were 19 female and 18 male fourth graders ($M = 9.09$ years, $SD = .37$, range 8.33 to 10.17 years), 16 female and 16 male seventh graders ($M = 11.92$ years, $SD = .31$, range 11.33 to 12.5 years), and 16 female and 16 male tenth graders ($M = 14.90$ years, $SD = .34$, range 13.83 to 15.42 years), respectively. Teachers at those schools recruited volunteers for this study. In Seoul, the neighborhoods of high or upper middle class tended to be located separately from those of middle or lower class. The former groups were located in the southeast part of Seoul. As the schools that I visited for interviews were located in the northern or southwest part of Seoul, the majority of the students were expected to be from middle or working class families. All participants were Korean; none of them were biracial. Their racial backgrounds were verified by their teachers. Parental permission and participant assent were received prior to interviews.

Procedure and Design
The research assessed judgments of racial exclusion in hypothetical situations through 20-25 minute interviews. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis at school. I conducted all of the interviews in Korean. Participants were informed that their interview data was confidential and anonymous. The interviewer then read scripted stories to the participant and asked the participants questions about each story. All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed.

Each interview included three sets of stories consisting of one initial and two conflict situations in three contexts (i.e., personal relationship, group activity, public facility). In all stories, the biracial peer was the target of exclusion. The main character (i.e., pure Korean) and the target of exclusion (i.e., biracial) in the stories were assumed to be peers of the same gender and grade as the participant. Gender appropriate names were used for interviews.

The stories depicted the biracial child as half-Filipino and half-Korean, thereby implying that he or she probably had darker skin and was shorter than Korean peers. The Philippines is one of the major Asian countries from which women emigrate for international marriages in Korea. It has not been studied whether Korean children differentiate biracial children according to non-Korean parent’s racial background in peer interactions. In order to make the story realistic in the public facility context where a biracial child is not admitted to a public swimming pool, this study chose a half-Filipino child who tends to be distinguishable from other Korean children by his or her appearance. The Korean-Chinese and Korean-Japanese biracial children differ little from mainstream Korean children in appearance, while Korean-Filipino and Korean-Indonesian children differ in appearance from most Korean children. (See Appendix A for a complete version of the interview protocol of this study.)

In the personal relationship context, the initial situation involved a “pure” Korean child who was thinking about whether to invite a biracial peer to his or her birthday party (see Figure 1 for the interview procedure of the personal relationship context). In the story, the birthday child did not like the biracial peer although he or she knew that the peer wanted to be friends with him or her. The participant was asked if it was all right for
the Korean child not to invite the biracial peer (judgment). Then, the participant was asked to explain why he or she thought that it was all right or not all right to exclude the biracial peer (justification). After the initial judgment, two conflict situations were presented to the participant.

The first conflict situation in the personal context entailed the introduction of information from the conventional domain that opposed the initial judgment of the participant. If the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the birthday party as not all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation that was introduced by the friends of the birthday child: They said that they did not want him to join the party because he was not part of their group. Conversely, if the participant had judged exclusion of the biracial peer from the birthday party as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the friends of the birthday child: They said that they wanted the biracial peer to join the party because the peer was part of their group. In this conflict situation, the personal issue, an invitation to a birthday party, was confronted by conventional issues such as social pressure and tradition.

The second conflict situation in the personal context entailed the introduction of information from the moral domain which contradicted the initial judgment of the participant. If the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the birthday party as not all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the moral conviction of the birthday child: He or she came to believe that it was fair to not invite the biracial peer to the party because the peer was not a “pure” Korean. Conversely, if the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the birthday party as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the moral conviction of the birthday child: He or she came to believe that it was unfair to not invite the peer to the party because the peer was a “mixed-blood.” In this situation, a personal preference regarding an invitation to a birthday party was conflicted with the moral issue of fairness.
In the group activity context, the initial situation involved a “pure” Korean child leader of a boys and girls chorus who was thinking about whether to allow a biracial peer with musical talent to join a chorus that had never had a “mixed-blood” as a member (see Figure 2 for the interview procedure of the group activity context). The participant was asked if it was all right for Min (Korean) to not invite Po (biracial) to his birthday party? The participant was asked to explain why he or she thought that it was all right or not all right to exclude the biracial peer (justification). After the initial judgment, two conflict situations were presented.

The first conflict situation in the group context entailed the introduction of information from the personal domain which contradicted the initial judgment of the participant. If the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the chorus as not all right, he or she was asked to explain why he or she thought that it was all right or not all right to exclude the biracial peer (justification). After the initial judgment, two conflict situations were presented.
chorus as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the leader of the chorus: He or she liked the biracial peer very much. In this conflict situation, the social and conventional issue, an admission of a biracial peer to a traditional Korean boys and girls chorus, conflicted with a personal preference such as one’s affection or dislike of a peer.

The second conflict situation in the group context entailed the introduction of information from the moral domain that contradicted the initial judgment of the participant. If the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the chorus as not all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the moral conviction of the leader: He or she came to believe that it was fair to not invite the biracial peer to the chorus because the peer was not a mainstream Korean. Conversely, if the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the chorus as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the moral conviction of the leader: He or she came to believe that it was unfair to not invite the biracial peer to the chorus because the peer was a mixed-blood. In this situation, a social and conventional issue, an admission of a biracial peer to a traditional Korean boys and girls chorus, conflicted with the moral issue of fairness.
In the public facility context, the initial situation involved the decision of the town council to forbid all biracial children from using public swimming pools in the town (see Figure 3 for the interview procedure of the public facility context). The participant was asked if it was all right for the biracial child to be banned from the swimming pool (judgment). Then, the participant was asked to explain why he or she thought that it was all right or not all right to exclude the biracial peer (justification). After the initial judgment of the exclusion, two conflict situations were presented to the participant.

The first conflict situation in the public context entailed the introduction of information from the personal domain which contradicted the initial judgment of the participant. If the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial child from the public pools as not all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the personal preference of neighbors: Nobody liked to swim together with the biracial child. Conversely, if the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the public pools as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the personal preference of the biracial child: He or she liked...
swimming very much. In this situation, the moral issue, a right to use a public facility such as a swimming pool regardless of race, was conflicted by a personal preference such as one’s desire for a sport or dislike toward the biracial child.

The second conflict situation in the public context entailed the introduction of information from the conventional domain which contradicted the initial judgment of the participant. For example, if the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the public pools as not all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the tradition of the town: Only “pure” Koreans could swim together. Conversely, if the participant had judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from the public pools as all right, he or she was asked to evaluate the conflict situation introduced by the history of the town: All swimming pools in the town have admitted biracial children. In this conflict situation, the moral issue, a right to use a public facility such as a swimming pool, was conflicted by a conventional issue such as tradition.

Figure 3 Interview Procedures in Public Facility Context

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In the interview, the order of contexts (personal, group, and public) varied to counterbalance any order effects. In each context, the initial situation was presented first, and two conflict situations followed. The order of the two conflict situations was
counterbalanced. For example, the conflict with conventional issue and that with the moral issue were counterbalanced in the personal context.

**Domains and categories of justifications**

Based on Killen et al.’s (2002) and my previous pilot study with 30 samples (2009), eight justification categories were selected. They are presented in Table 2. They are grouped into three domains of social reasoning; moral, conventional, and personal. The domain of moral justifications includes rationales about fairness, welfare, and rights. The domain of conventional categories includes rationales about group function, tradition, authority, and social influence. The personal domain includes a rationale about personal choice.

Table 2 *Justification Coding Categories*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Domain</th>
<th>includes the justifications that are based on the protection or enhancement of the welfare and rights of people and the fairness of their social interactions and relationships. (In the examples of justifications, Min is pure Korean, whereas Po is biracial.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Fairness</em>: Appeals to upholding fairness in the decision making process of exclusion (e.g., “I think Po should be allowed in the chorus because it is fair that anybody who sings well should be able to sing in the chorus”), or the equal treatment of persons (e.g., “It is fair to treat every person equally without discrimination”).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Welfare</em>: Appeals to the psychological harm of the biracial peer (e.g., “Po will be lonely (or sad) if he cannot swim together”), or taking care of the biracial peer by exclusion or inclusion (e.g., “Po might be hurt if Min’s friends do not like his presence at Min’s birthday party”).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <em>Rights</em>: Appeals to the individual right for opportunities to make friends, participate in group activities, and use public facilities (e.g., “Po should have an opportunity to become Min’s friend”), or to the possession of certain rights according the status of the biracial peer (e.g., “Po should be included since he is Korean (or a friend) too.”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued) Justification Coding Categories

**Conventional Domain** includes the justifications that are associated with the shared norms and manners of a group or society for the facilitation and regulation of social activities and relationships.

4. *Group functioning*: Appeals to the enhancement of group capacity (e.g., "As Po sings well, the chorus will benefit by accepting Po"), or group harmony or teamwork, (e.g., "They cannot get along or work well together if they have an unfamiliar member").

5. *Social tradition*: Appeals to traditions of a group or society (e.g., "It is not good to destroy that tradition since it has some values").

6. *Authority*: Appeals to the authority of a group leader (e.g., "Min can make the decision to include Po since he is the leader"), and the jurisdiction of the local council or government (e.g., "If the council made the rule, then they have to follow it").

7. *Social influence*: Appeals to the influence of others on decisions (e.g., "Min should invite Po if his friends want him to be there").

**Personal Domain** includes the justifications that are based on the preferences and choices of an individual over one’s private and individual activities and relationships.

8. *Personal choice*: Appeals to personal freedom or individual preferences (e.g., “Min can invite Po to his birthday party if he wants to. He does not need to ask for others’ opinions,” “Since it is his birthday party, it is fine for Min to invite only close friends of his,” or “If Po likes swimming very much, the town council should allow him to use the public pool").
Coding and Reliability

The data included two types of responses, judgments and justifications, for the three initial situations and three pairs of conflict situations in the three contexts. Participant’s judgments of *all right to not invite, admit, or allow* were classified as “the endorsement of exclusion” or simply “exclusion,” whereas those of *not all right to not invite, admit, or allow*, as “the rejection of exclusion” or simply “inclusion.” The endorsement of exclusion (i.e., *all right*) is coded as 0, whereas the rejection of exclusion (i.e., *not all right*) is coded as 1.

The classification system of justification categories in Table 2 was used for the coding of the reasons for judgments. The eight justification codes consist of three moral (fairness, welfare, and rights), four conventional (group functioning, tradition, authority, and social influence), and one personal code(s) (personal choice). First, the responses that are classified as the category fairness is coded as 1; welfare, 2; right, 3; group function, 4; social tradition, 5; authority, 6; social influence, 7; and personal choice, 8. One main reason per judgment is coded as long as a participant clearly explains why he or she is making that judgment. Second, the responses for categories 1, 2, and 3 of the moral domain are coded as 1; categories 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the conventional domain, as 2; and category 8 of the personal domain, as 3.

It is necessary to code the change of judgments between initial and conflict situations and the direction of the change to analyze the relationship between evaluations and directions of judgments. If participants do not change their initial judgment in a conflict situation, they receive a 0. If they change their judgment, they receive a 1. Then, if their judgments change from inclusion to exclusion, they are classified as a negative direction and coded as 0. If their judgments change from exclusion to inclusion, they are classified as a positive direction and coded as 1.

Reliability coding examined the data of judgments and justifications using 36% of the interviews. An independent rater was trained to use the coding system of this study and scored 36 samples without knowing the goals of this study. The samples were chosen evenly from the three age groups: Six boys and six girls were randomly selected from each group. Using Cohen’s kappa, agreement between the two raters on judgment was 99%, and inter-rater agreement on justifications was 91%.
Results

Plan for analysis

I present analyses of children and adolescents’ evaluations (i.e., judgments and justifications) of the exclusion and inclusion of a biracial peer in two sections: initial situations (i.e., Question 1 in Appendix A) and conflict situations (i.e., Questions 2 & 3 in Appendix A). Both sections include a description of the proportions of judgments and justifications by gender and grade; the effects of context, age, and gender on judgments and justifications; and, relationships between types of judgments and domains of justifications. In the section on conflict situations, I also present the relationships and transitions between initial and conflict situations.

In the section on initial situations, I first examined whether participants were more likely to judge exclusion as wrong. In order to examine significant differences between judgments of exclusion and inclusion, I used a chi-square goodness of fit test. Second, I examined the overall effects of context, age, and gender on judgments using a repeated measures ANOVA (Analysis of variance). This analysis tested whether participants were more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal relationship than in the group activity and public facility contexts, and more in the group activity context than in the public facility context. I also examined whether older participants were more likely to judge exclusion as acceptable in the personal and group contexts than were younger ones.

Third, I examined whether domains of justifications and types of judgments were related, using a chi square and regression tests. These analyses tested the hypothesis that those who judged exclusion as wrong were more likely to use moral justification categories than personal and conventional ones, whereas those who judged exclusion as acceptable were more likely to use personal or conventional justification categories than moral ones.

Fourth, I examined the overall effects of three contexts, age, and gender on justifications using a repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis tested whether participants were more likely to use domains and categories of justifications in one context than in others. I also examined whether older participants were more or less likely than younger participants to use some categories and domains.

The second section presents analyses of the data on conflict situations and the relationships between initial and conflict situations. Analyses of the conflict situations include significant differences between positive and negative judgments of exclusion, the effects of context, age, and gender on judgments and justifications, and relationships between categories of justifications and types of judgments. Analyses of the relationships and transitions between initial and conflict situations include the effects of context, age, and gender on the change of judgment (i.e., a repeated measures ANOVA), the effects of the domains of justifications on the change of judgment (i.e., one-way ANOVA), and the relationship between the directions and proportions of change (i.e., chi-square and regressions tests). They revealed whether (1) participants were more likely to change their judgments in the personal context than in the group activity and public facility contexts; (2) those using moral reasons in the initial situation were less likely to change their judgments in the conflict situations than were those using personal and conventional reasons; and (3) the proportions of change of judgment varied by direction.
Lastly, I compared judgments and justifications of the initial and conflict situations in each of the three contexts, using a repeated measures ANOVA.

**Initial situations**

**General tendency in the judgments of exclusion.**

The proportions of judgments that rejected the exclusion of a biracial peer in the initial situations of the personal relationship context, group activity context, and public facility context are presented in Table 3.

**Table 3** Proportions of Negative Judgments of Exclusion in Initial Situations (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>GA</th>
<th>PF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Female (n = 19)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (n = 18)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (n = 37)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Female (n = 16)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (n = 16)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (n = 32)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>Female (n =16)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male (n =16)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (n = 32)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (n = 101)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* PR: personal relationship context; GA: group activity context; PF: public facility context.

Fifty-nine percent of the participants judged the exclusion of the biracial peer as wrong (i.e., not all right) in the personal relationship context (i.e., “Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min (i.e., Korean) to not invite Po (i.e., biracial) to his (or her) birthday party?”), whereas 83% rejected it in the group activity context (i.e., “Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus?”) and 92% rejected it in the public facility context (i.e., “Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed to go to swimming pool?”). Chi-square goodness of fit tests examined whether these results were statistically significant when they were compared to 50% chance. The results in the group context, $\chi^2 (1) = 41.83, p < .001$, and public context, $\chi^2 (1) = 71.53, p < .001$, were significant, whereas the result in the personal context, $\chi^2 (1)$
= 3.57, \( p = .059 \), was not significant. Further, 78% and 69% of fourth and seventh graders rejected exclusion in the personal context, whereas only 28% of the tenth graders did. The majority of fourth graders, \( \chi^2 (1) = 11.93, p < .001 \), and seventh graders, \( \chi^2 (1) = 4.50, p < .05 \), judged exclusion as wrong, whereas the majority of tenth graders, \( \chi^2 (1) = 6.13, p < .05 \), judged exclusion as acceptable in the personal context. In sum, the majority of the participants across gender and grade, except the tenth graders in the personal context, did not judge the exclusion of the biracial peer as legitimate across different contexts.

**Contextual variations in the judgments of exclusion.**

It was hypothesized that participants were more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal relationship context than in the group activity and public facility contexts, and more in the group activity context than in the public facility context. I examined the overall effects of the three contexts on judgments using a 3 x 3 x 2 (Context of exclusion: personal relationship, group activity, public facility x Grade: fourth, seventh, tenth x Gender: female, male) ANOVA (Analysis of variance) with repeated measures. This analysis showed a main effect for context, \( F(2, 190) = 22.50, p < .001, \eta^2 = .44 \). It was found that the proportions of negative judgments about exclusion differed significantly by context. Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparisons revealed that children and adolescents were less likely to judge exclusion as wrong in the personal relationship context (59%) than in the group activity context (83%) and public facility context (92%). The differences in the proportion of exclusion between the group activity context and public facility context were not statistically significant. The hypothesis was proved to be partially true.

**Age and gender differences in the judgments of exclusion.**

I hypothesized that older participants were more likely than younger participants to judge exclusion as acceptable in the personal relationship context and group activity context, not in the public facility context. In order to test this hypothesis, I examined age differences in the judgments of exclusion across contexts, interactions between age and context, and age differences in each context. The repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main grade (age) effect, \( F(2, 95) = 8.68, p < .001, \eta^2 = .44 \). It was found that the proportions of negative judgments about exclusion differed significantly by age. Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparisons revealed that tenth graders (65%) were less likely than fourth graders (85%) and seventh graders (84%) to judge exclusion as wrong. In addition, no significant gender differences were found.

**Interaction between age and context in the judgments of exclusion.**

A significant interaction effect between context and grade was found, \( F(4, 190) = 4.68, p < .01, \eta^2 = .44 \). Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparisons revealed contextual variations in seventh and tenth grades and age differences only in the personal context. Tenth graders were more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal context than in the group context and the public context, and seventh graders, more in the personal context than in the public context. Fourth graders showed no significant differences between the contexts. In terms of age differences, tenth graders were more likely to endorse the exclusion of the biracial peer than were the fourth and seventh graders in the
personal context. As expected, the proportion of tenth graders who endorsed exclusion in the personal context (28%) was significantly smaller than those of fourth (78%) and seventh (69%) graders. The vast majority of participants (92%) judged exclusions as wrong in the public context, regardless of grade. However, the results of the group context were similar to those of the public context, rather than those of the personal context – which was against the prediction. The majority of participants negatively judged exclusion in the group context without significant variations by grade: 86% of fourth graders, 88% of seventh graders, and 83% of tenth graders judged exclusion as wrong. The hypothesis was proved to be partially true.

**General tendency in justifications for judgments of exclusion.**

An examination of how the contexts of evaluation and the grade and gender of participants affected the domains and categories of justifications used repeated measures ANOVAs. These tests assessed whether a statistically significant differences in the use of justifications by context, age, and gender were found across contexts and in each context. Participants were expected to use moral reasons (i.e., fairness, welfare, and rights) more in the public facility context than other contexts, conventional reasons (i.e., group functioning, tradition, authority, and social influence) more in the group activity context than other contexts, and a personal reason (i.e., personal choice) more in the personal relationship context than other contexts. The proportions of the domains and categories of justifications are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 Proportions of Justifications in Initial Situations (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Grade 4 (n = 37)</th>
<th>Grade 7 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Grade 10 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Total (n = 101)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>GA</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PR: personal relationship context; GA: group activity context; PF: public facility context. Each domain represents the total of its categories. In each context, the sums of three domains and eight categories are 100, respectively.
In the use of justification categories in the moral domain (i.e., fairness, welfare, rights) for the judgments of exclusion, a 3 x 3 x 2 (Context of exclusion: personal relationship, group activity, public facility x Grade: fourth, seventh, tenth x Gender: female, male) ANOVA with repeated measures revealed a main effect for context, \( F(2, 190) = 41.47, p < .001, \eta^2 = .52 \). Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD showed that there were significant differences between public (91%), personal (60%), and group (38%) contexts. As expected, participants used moral reasons more in the public context than in the personal context and group context, and more in the personal context than in the group context.

The repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for grade, \( F(2, 95) = 5.98, p < .001, \eta^2 = .52 \). The proportions of moral reasons in justifications significantly differed between the three grades. Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparisons revealed that tenth graders (51%) were less likely than fourth graders (68%) and seventh graders (70%) to use moral reasons for justifications. A significant difference was not found between fourth and seventh graders. In addition, no significant gender differences were found.

A significant interaction effect between context and grade was found, \( F(4, 190) = 4.68, p < .01, \eta^2 = .44 \). Post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD pairwise comparisons revealed contextual variations in all grades and age differences only in the personal context. In terms of contextual variations, fourth graders use moral reasons more in the personal context (78%) and the public context (86%) than in the group context (38%); seventh graders, more in the public context (97%) than in the personal context (72%) and the group context (41%), and more in the personal context than in the group context; and, tenth graders, more in the public context (91%) than in the personal context (28%) and the group context (34%). In terms of age differences, fourth graders (78%) and seventh graders (72%) were more likely than tenth graders (28%) to use moral reasons in the personal context.

In the use of justification categories in the conventional domain (i.e., group functioning, tradition, authority, social influence), a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, \( F(2, 190) = 85.36, p < .001, \eta^2 = .61 \). As expected, post-hoc analyses showed that participants used conventional reasons more in the group context (61%) than in the personal context (6%) and public context (8%). A significant difference was not found between the personal context and public context. This tendency was consistent in all grades and genders.

In the use of justification category in the personal domain (i.e., personal choice), a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, \( F(2, 190) = 48.81, p < .001, \eta^2 = .54 \). As expected, post-hoc analyses showed that participants used personal reasons more in the personal context (34%) than in the group context (1%) and public context (1%). This tendency was consistent in all grades and genders. A significant interaction effect between context and grade was found, \( F(4, 190) = 4.60, p < .01, \eta^2 = .54 \). Post-hoc analyses revealed age differences in the personal context. Tenth graders (53%) were more likely than fourth graders (22%) and seventh graders (28%) to use personal reasoning.

In sum, Korean children and adolescents tended to use personal reasons more in the personal context than in the two other contexts, conventional reasons more in the group context than in the two other contexts, and moral reasons more in the public
facility context than in the two other contexts. It was found that the fourth and seventh graders used moral reasons more in both the personal context and public context than in the group context. In terms of age differences, it was found that tenth graders used a personal reason more and moral reasons less than fourth and seventh graders did in the personal context.

**Relations between judgments and justifications.**

I examined whether types of judgments (i.e., exclusion, inclusion) and domains of justifications (i.e., moral, conventional, personal) were related, using Fisher’s exact tests. The domains of justifications and types of judgments were significantly associated at the .001 level in the personal relationship context and public facility context, and at the .01 level in the group activity context. In general, moral reasons tended to be associated with the judgments of inclusion, whereas personal reasons, with the judgments of exclusion. The proportions of the judgments of exclusion and inclusion by the domains of justifications and contexts are presented in Figure 4 and Table 5.
### Table 5 Proportions of Judgments by Domains of Justifications in Initial Situations (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade 4 $(n = 37)$</th>
<th>Grade 7 $(n = 32)$</th>
<th>Grade 10 $(n = 32)$</th>
<th>Total $(n = 100)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. M: moral domain; C: conventional domain; P: personal domain. Numbers in parentheses are frequencies.*
It was hypothesized that those who used moral reasons were more likely to judge exclusion of the biracial peer as not acceptable than as acceptable, whereas those who used a personal reason were more likely to judge it as acceptable than as not acceptable. Using simple logistic regressions, I assessed whether moral reasons predicted the rejection of exclusion and whether a personal reason predicted the endorsement of exclusion. In the personal context, the results indicated that moral reasons for justifications were a statistically significant predictor of the rejection of exclusion (i.e., inclusion), \( z = 5.68, p < .001 \). Ninety-eight percent of the 61 participants who used moral reasons negatively judged the exclusion of the biracial peer. The personal reason perfectly predicted the endorsement of exclusion. All 34 participants who used personal reasons positively judged the exclusion. No participants justified inclusion with a personal reason. This may reflect the fact that they knew that the birthday child did not have a desire to get along with the biracial peer from the story of this context.

In the personal context, moral reasons were rarely used to justify the judgment of the exclusion of the biracial peer. However, there were two participants who used welfare reasoning to endorse exclusion. One of them, a tenth grade male student, said, “It is better not to invite him. He will be hurt during the party because the birthday boy does not like him.” This justification emerged out of his concern for the psychological harm that the biracial peer might experience at the party. Thus, the judgment of exclusion was found to be compatible with welfare reasoning when the judgment was made for the protection of the biracial peer. This type of evaluation was also found in other contexts with low frequencies. Besides these examples, those who used welfare reasoning were mainly concerned about the loneliness or sadness of the biracial peer due to the exclusion.

In the group context, results indicated that moral reasons for justifications were a statistically significant predictor of the rejection of exclusion, \( z = 2.49, p < .05 \). Conventional reasons were also a significant predictor of the rejection of exclusion, \( z = -2.53, p < .05 \). Thirty-seven of the 38 participants who used moral reasons (97%) negatively judged the exclusion of the biracial peer. Forty-five of the 62 participants who used conventional reasons (73%) positively judged the exclusion. In the public context, moral reasons perfectly predicted the rejection of exclusion. Ninety-two participants used moral reasons and 100% of them negatively judged the exclusion of the biracial peer.

In sum, Korean children and adolescents tended to use moral reasons in order to justify the rejection of exclusion across contexts. A few of them used welfare reasoning for the exclusion of the biracial peer to protect him or her from possible harm in the contexts of personal gathering or group activity. On the other hand, they used personal reasoning to justify the endorsement of exclusion in the personal context. Unlike moral reasoning and personal reasoning which were positively associated with inclusion and exclusion, respectively, conventional reasons were used for both inclusion and exclusion, mainly in the group context.

Analysis of justification categories.
Participants used justification categories (i.e., fairness, welfare, rights, group functioning, tradition, authority, social influence, personal choice) to ground their judgments about the exclusion of a biracial peer in the personal relationship, group activity, and public facility contexts. Analyses of all eight categories employing 3 x 3 x 2 (Context of exclusion: personal relationship, group activity, public facility x Grade:
fourth, seventh, tenth x Gender: female, male) ANOVAs with repeated measures examined how context, age, and gender independently and interactively affect the social reasoning of children for the judgments of exclusion. (See Table 4 for the proportions of the categories of justifications.)

In examining the fairness category for the judgments of exclusion, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, \(F(2, 190) = 51.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .58\). Post-hoc analyses by Tukey HSD comparisons showed that participants used fairness reason more in the public context (42%) than in the group context (11%) and personal context (0%). This tendency was consistent in all grades and genders. A main effect for grade was found, \(F(2, 95) = 12.58, p < .001, \eta^2 = .58\). Post-hoc analyses revealed that tenth graders (30%) used it more frequently than did fourth graders (7%) and seventh graders (7%). In addition, a significant interaction effect between context and grade was found, \(F(4, 190) = 5.64, p < .001, \eta^2 = .58\). In the public context, tenth graders (69%) were more likely than seventh graders (41%) and fourth graders (19%) to use fairness reasoning; and, seventh graders used it more than did fourth graders. In the group activity context, tenth graders (22%) used it more than did fourth graders (3%).

As an example of fairness reasoning in the group activity context, a tenth grade female said, “It is fair to allow the biracial peer to join the choir. It is not fair to keep the outdated tradition. It is not fair to accept only Koreans. Now our society and world are changing. It is wrong to follow that kind of tradition.” Participants who used fairness reasoning tended to reject customary practices that stood against ideas of equality and justice and accepted authority only when leaders make fair and reasonable judgments.

In the use of the welfare category for the judgments of exclusion, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, \(F(2, 190) = 5.55, p < .01, \eta^2 = .41\). Post-hoc analyses showed that participants used welfare reason more in the personal context (18%) than in the group context (5%) and public context (8%). This tendency was true only for seventh graders. No contextual variations found among both fourth and tenth graders. No significant age and gender differences were found.

As an example of welfare reasoning in the personal relationship context, a seventh grade male said, “It is not all right not to invite Po (i.e., a biracial peer) to Min’s birthday party . . . if he is not invited, he will be disappointed. Negative emotions such as hatred will bother him. Min should respect Po’s desire to become friends with him.” Many participants who used welfare reasoning were concerned about the psychological difficulties that a biracial peer would experience due to exclusion.

In the use of the rights category for the judgments of exclusion, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, \(F(2, 190) = 6.63, p < .01, \eta^2 = .45\). Post-hoc analyses showed that participants used rights reasoning more in the personal context (42%) and public context (43%) than in the group context (22%). Especially, fourth graders used it more in the personal context (59%) than in the group context (27%). A main effect for grade was found, \(F(2, 95) = 11.97, p < .001, \eta^2 = .45\). According to post-hoc analyses, fourth graders (46%) and seventh graders (43%) used it more than did tenth graders (16%). This tendency was consistent in the personal and public contexts. No age differences were found in the group context. Overall, no gender differences were found.

As an example of rights reasoning in the personal relationship context, a fourth grade female said, “Po (i.e., a biracial peer) should be invited, because she is also one of
her friends . . . Min (i.e., a Korean child) should not disregard her because her parent is Filipino.” It is intriguing that many fourth graders viewed the biracial peer as a friend of the Korean child in the story because they were peers and/or living in the same town or in Korea. The commonalities of age and living place were good enough conditions for them to become friends. Because of these commonalities, the biracial peer was considered to have a right to be invited to the birthday party. This kind of rights reasoning appeared less in the justifications of tenth graders.

In sum, fairness was used more in the public context than in other contexts; and welfare, more in the personal context than in other contexts. Moral reasons were generally less used in the group context than in the other contexts. In terms of age differences, older participants tended to use fairness more than did younger ones, whereas younger ones did rights more than did older ones. This contrast was evident especially in the public context: Tenth graders were more likely to use fairness than were fourth and seventh graders, whereas tenth graders were less likely to use rights than were fourth and seventh graders. As an example of fairness reasoning in the public facility context, a fourth grade male said, “. . . Koreans can travel other countries and eat foreign food there. Likewise, he should be allowed to do what he wants to do. It is fair to let him use the swimming pool.” As an example of rights reasoning in the public facility context, a seventh grade girl said, “Biracial people are the same humans like other Koreans. There should be no discrimination.” Fairness reasoning tended to focus on the wrongfulness of the decision of discrimination between humans, whereas rights reasoning tended to focus on common qualities of people.

In the use of the group functioning category for the judgments of exclusion, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, $F(2, 190) = 67.40, p < .001, \eta^2 = .56$. Post-hoc analyses by Tukey HSD comparisons showed that participants used the group functioning reason more in the group context (48%) than in the personal context (5%) and public context (0%). This tendency was consistent across all grades and genders. No age and gender differences were found.

Group functioning was the most common reason for both endorsement and rejection of exclusion in the group activity context. As an example of group functioning reasoning in the group activity context, a seventh grade female said, “She should be allowed to join the chorus. Even though there is the tradition that all members should be Koreans, it is better to include her because she is talented in music. She will make the chorus better.” Those who used the group functioning reasoning to include the biracial peer emphasized his or her musical talent as contributing to the development of the chorus. Some participants mentioned the musical talent of the biracial peer using moral reasons such as fairness and rights. They showed a tendency to say that it was unfair to exclude someone with talent or that the biracial peer had the right to be a member of the chorus because of musical talent.

As an example of group functioning reasoning to justify the judgment of exclusion, a seventh grade female said, “We should sing a song when we are pleasant and cheerful. Unless we sing joyfully, we are not happy. Then, the audience would not be satisfied. So it is not necessary to accept someone who can cause trouble in the group.” She thought the group harmony among the members of a chorus was more important for the achievement of the goals of that specific group activity than were individual talents. These variations with the same group functioning reasoning may be related to the
children’s understanding of the goals of boys and girls choirs. Those who mentioned the musical excellence of the chorus as a goal of the chorus tended to focus on the musical talent of the biracial peer, whereas those who thought the chorus as a sort of friendly and harmonious club activity tended to emphasize the maintenance of close relationships among the members of the chorus.

On the other hand, the tradition reason was used only in the group context (13%), whereas authority was used only in the public context (6%). Social influence was seldom used in the initial contexts. In general, conventional reasons tended to be mainly used in some relevant situations. For example, some participants used tradition reasoning in the group context where the information that a chorus used to accept only Koreans was specifically introduced.

Results regarding the personal choice category were the same as those regarding the personal domain since this domain has only one category. As an example of personal choice reasoning in the personal relationship context, a tenth grade male said, “It is better not to invite him (i.e., a biracial peer). Min (i.e., a Korean child) does not like him. There is no reason to invite anybody he does not like to his birthday party. It would be the same even if he (i.e., Po) was not biracial, but Korean.” Older participants tended to value more personal preferences in the birthday party situation than did younger ones. Many of them tried to make it clear that they condoned the exclusion of the biracial peer not because of his or her racial background, but because of the personal preference of the birthday person.

Conflict situations

Independence of conflict situations from initial situations.

The participants were presented with conflict situations after making their evaluations of three initial situations. Each context had two conflict situations. A participant’s judgment in the initial situation became a base for the two following conflict situations. Against the initial judgment, two opposing judgments with reasons were respectively presented to the participants in order to create two conflicts situations. If the initial judgment was inclusion, the opposing judgments were exclusion, and vice versa. The two opposing judgments came from different domains than the domain of the main event of a context. Conventional (i.e., social pressure and tradition) and moral (i.e., fairness and moral norms) reasons were introduced, respectively, in the personal relationship context; personal (i.e., personal choice and preference) and moral (i.e., fairness and rights) reasons, in the group activity context; and, personal (i.e., personal choice and preference) and conventional (i.e., tradition and authority) reasons, in the public facility context.

Before testing the main hypotheses, it was necessary to examine whether the judgments of conflict situations were statistically significantly associated with those of initial situations. If there were significant associations between them, the judgments of conflict situations should be analyzed considering the influence of the initial judgments. As an example of a conclusion from this sort of analysis, those who rejected the exclusion of the biracial peer tended to repeat the same judgments in subsequent conflict situations without much reasoning. If there was no association, conflict situations should be analyzed independently from the results of the initial situations.
Chi-square tests revealed that the judgments of initial situations were separate from those of conflict situations: No significant associations were found between the judgments of initial situations and those of the conventional conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = 0.03, p = .86 \), and moral conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = .19, p = .66 \), in the personal relationship context; the personal conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = .14, p = .71 \), and moral conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = .07, p = .78 \), in the group activity context; and the personal conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = .00, p = .99 \), and conventional conflict situation, \( \chi^2 (1) = .01, p = .93 \), in the group activity context. In short, the judgments of conflict situations were statistically independent from those of initial situations in all three contexts. The evaluations of participants in conflict situations entailed independent judgments and justifications regarding new aspects and configurations of the situations.

**Classification of the proportions of judgments.**

For the analysis of the judgments of the exclusion of a biracial peer, the proportions of the judgment of inclusion and exclusion were classified into three levels. First, proportions were classified in six pairs since participants were divided into two groups according to their responses (i.e., exclusion or inclusion) in six conflict situations (i.e., 3 contexts x 2 conflict situations). In this classification, each context has two pairs of evaluations. For example, a pair of evaluations in the personal context consists of the two judgments in conventional and moral conflicts of the participants who endorsed exclusion (i.e. PR-C/E & PR-M/E; see Table 6), and another pair of the participants who rejected exclusion (i.e. PR-C/I & PR-M/I; see Table 6). As this classification was the basic unit of evaluation, I examined the effects of situation, age, and gender for the judgments of exclusion using these six pairs of evaluations. These pairs varied in terms of the number of members due to varying proportions in the initial judgments of exclusion and inclusion. For instance, two sub-groups in the conventional conflict of the public relationship context had eight and 93 participants, respectively.

Second, the proportions of judgments were presented in six conflict situations. Each context has two conflict situations: the conventional and moral conflicts in the personal relationship context (i.e., PR-C, PR-M), the personal and moral conflicts in the group activity context (i.e., GA-P, GA-M), and the personal and conventional conflicts in the public relationship context (i.e., PR-C, PR-M). This classification was used for analyses of proportions and directions of changes between initial and conflict judgments. Since an analysis for the proportions of changes was mainly about how many people changed their initial judgments in subsequent conflict judgments regardless of types of initial judgments, it was performed in six conflict situations without separating them by initial judgments. An analysis for the directions of changes examined how directions of change (i.e., positive: from the judgment of exclusion in an initial situation to the judgment of inclusion in a subsequent conflict situation, negative: from the judgment of inclusion in an initial situation to the judgment of exclusion in a subsequent conflict) were associated with initial judgments and domains of justifications.

Third, the proportions of judgments were also presented by three contexts (i.e., personal relationship, group activity, public facility). This classification was necessary to directly compare overall tendencies of judgments and justifications between initial and conflict situations, since these three contexts were consistent between them.
The proportions of the rejection of exclusion in conflict situations with three levels of classification are presented in Table 6. (See Figures 1, 2, and 3 and Appendix A for interview procedures.)

Table 6 Proportions of Negative Judgments of Exclusion in Conflict Situations (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grade 4 (n = 37)</th>
<th>Grade 7 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Grade 10 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Total (n = 101)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR-C/E</td>
<td>88 (n = 8)</td>
<td>80 (n = 10)</td>
<td>57 (n = 23)</td>
<td>68 (n = 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-C/I</td>
<td>72 (n = 29)</td>
<td>55 (n = 22)</td>
<td>78 (n = 9)</td>
<td>67 (n = 60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-C</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-M/E</td>
<td>88 (n = 8)</td>
<td>80 (n = 10)</td>
<td>70 (n = 23)</td>
<td>76 (n = 41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-M/I</td>
<td>66 (n = 29)</td>
<td>77 (n = 22)</td>
<td>78 (n = 9)</td>
<td>72 (n = 60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-M</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-P/E</td>
<td>100 (n = 5)</td>
<td>75 (n = 4)</td>
<td>50 (n = 8)</td>
<td>71 (n = 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-P/I</td>
<td>69 (n = 32)</td>
<td>79 (n = 28)</td>
<td>63 (n = 24)</td>
<td>70 (n = 84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-P</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-M/E</td>
<td>100 (n = 5)</td>
<td>100 (n = 4)</td>
<td>63 (n = 8)</td>
<td>82 (n = 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-M/I</td>
<td>78 (n = 32)</td>
<td>82 (n = 28)</td>
<td>83 (n = 24)</td>
<td>81 (n = 84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-M</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-P/E</td>
<td>75 (n = 4)</td>
<td>100 (n = 1)</td>
<td>33 (n = 3)</td>
<td>63 (n = 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-P/I</td>
<td>67 (n = 33)</td>
<td>68 (n = 31)</td>
<td>52 (n = 29)</td>
<td>62 (n = 93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-P</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 (Continued) Proportions of Negative Judgments of Exclusion in Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situations (%)</th>
<th>Grade 4 (n = 37)</th>
<th>Grade 7 (n = 32 )</th>
<th>Grade 10 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Total (n =101)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PF-C/E</td>
<td>100 (n = 4)</td>
<td>100 (n = 1)</td>
<td>33 (n = 3)</td>
<td>75 (n = 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-C/I</td>
<td>75 (n = 33)</td>
<td>76 (n =31)</td>
<td>75 (n = 29)</td>
<td>75 (n = 93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-C</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PR: personal relationship context, GA: group activity context, PF: public facility context, C: conventional conflict; M: moral conflict; P: personal conflict, E: exclusion, judgment of initial situation. I: inclusion, judgments of initial situation. n: number of participants.

**A general tendency and effects of situation, age, and gender in judgments.**

In the conflict situations, the range of the proportion of negative judgment of exclusion was from 62% (i.e., PF-P/I: the personal conflict situation of the public facility context following an initial judgment of inclusion) to 82% (i.e., GA-M/I: the moral conflict situation of the group activity context following an initial judgment of exclusion). It was hypothesized that participants were more likely to judge the exclusion of a biracial peer as wrong. I assessed whether all these results were statistically significant when they were compared to 50% chance using Chi-square goodness of fit tests. The result of the lowest proportion in PF-P/I was statistically significantly larger than 50% chance, $\chi^2 (1) = 6.19$, $p < .05$. As expected, participants tended to think that it was not acceptable to exclude the biracial peer in any conflict situations.

I examined how situations, grades, and gender affected independently and interactively the proportions of judgments between two conflicts situations in each par (i.e., PR-C/E & PR-M/E, PR-C/I & PR-M/I, GA-P/E & GA-M/E, GA-P/I & GA-M/I, PF-P/E & PF-C/E, PF-P/I & PF-C/I), employing six 2x3x2 (situations x grades x gender) repeated measures ANOVAs. No main and interaction effects of situation, grade, and gender were found. Seemingly, there were some differences in the proportions of the judgment of exclusion in some conflict situations such as in the PF-C/E where only 33% of three tenth graders rejected exclusion while 100% of four fourth and one seventh graders did it. However, there were no statistically significant differences, $F(2, 4) = 4.57$, $p = .09$, mainly due to the small numbers of the samples. In sum, both female and male participants in all three graders were more likely to reject the judgment of exclusion across conflict situations.

**Change in judgments.**

After their initial judgments, participants were presented with conflicting opinions from other domains which did not correspond with the domain of the main event of the context. In these conflict situations, they made judgments of exclusion and inclusion.
First, I examined how many participants changed their initial judgments in subsequent conflict situations. Second, I investigated whether the domains of justifications for initial judgments were associated with the change of judgment. The proportions of the change of judgments between initial and conflict situations are presented along with the domains of justifications for the initial judgments in Table 7.

### Table 7 Proportions of Change in Conflict Situation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR-C</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21/61)</td>
<td>(4/6)</td>
<td>(23/34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(48/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18/61)</td>
<td>(3/6)</td>
<td>(27/34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(48/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-P</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9/38)</td>
<td>(27/62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(36/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-M</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9/38)</td>
<td>(22/62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(31/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-P</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35/92)</td>
<td>(5/8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-C</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22/92)</td>
<td>(6/8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(28/101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(114/372)</td>
<td>(71/152)</td>
<td>(50/68)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(231/606)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** PR-C: conventional conflict in the personal relationship context, PR-M: moral conflict in the personal relationship context, GA-P: personal conflict in the group activity context, GA-M: moral conflict in the group activity context, PF-P: personal conflict in the public facility context, PF-C: conventional conflict in the public facility context. (a/b): a= the frequency of change; b: the frequency of initial judgments. Moral, Conventional, Personal: the domain of the justification from an initial situation.

Overall, 38% of the initial judgments were changed in conflict situations. Forty-eight percent of the participants changed their judgments in both conventional and moral conflicts in the personal relationship context; 36% and 31% of the participants did so in
the personal and moral conflicts in the group activity context, respectively; and 40% and 28% did so in the personal and conventional conflicts in the public facility context, respectively. I examined whether there were situational variations in the proportions of change with a repeated measures ANOVA. The main effect of situation was found, $F(5, 500) = 3.77, p < .001, \eta^2 = .35$. The proportions of the change differed by the conflict situation. According to post-hoc comparisons with Tukey’s HSD, participants were more likely to change their judgments in the conventional conflict situation (48%) and moral conflict situation (48%) of the personal relationship context than in the conventional conflict situation of the public facility context (28%).

It was hypothesized that the participants who justified the initial judgment with moral reasons would be less likely than those with conventional or personal reasons to change their judgments. Using one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, I examined how the domains of justifications influenced the change of judgment. In the personal relationship context, the differences between the three domains of justifications were statistically significant in the change of judgment for both conventional and moral conflicts, $F(2, 98) = 5.74, p < .01, \eta^2 = .06$, and $F(2, 98) = 13.50, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$. According to the post-hoc comparisons, judgments justified with moral reasons were less likely to change in conflict situations than were those with the personal reasons in both situations. Thirty four percent (PR-C) and 30 % (PR-M) of the participants who used moral reasons in the initial situations changed their judgments, whereas 68% (PR-C) and 78% (PR-M) of the participants who used personal reasons changed their judgments. However, no significant differences between the judgments justified with moral reasons and those with conventional reasons were found in the personal relationship context.

As an example of those who did not change the judgments, a fourth grade male said in the initial situation of the personal relationship context, “Po (i.e., biracial) will be hurt if he is not invited. It is not acceptable not to invite Po even if he does not like him.” He rejected exclusion with welfare reasoning (i.e., moral). When he was presented with the information that the friends of the birthday boy did not want Po to be there (i.e., the conventional conflict situation of the personal relationship context), he did not change his judgment, saying, “It is still better to invite Po to the party . . . they will come to know Po better and become friends as they get along together.” He continued to reject exclusion by appealing to the rights of the biracial peer to have an opportunity to get along with peers.

In the conventional conflict situation of the public facility context, the difference between the moral domain and conventional domain of justifications were statistically significant in the change of judgment, $F(2, 98) = 5.37, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$. Post-hoc comparisons showed that judgments justified with moral reasons (24%) were less likely to change in conflict situations than were those with conventional reasons (75%).

As an example of change, a fourth grade female rejected exclusion with group function justification in the initial situation of the group activity context, saying, “Although she is biracial, it is all right to accept her to the chorus. Since she sings well, she will make the chorus better and the members of the chorus sing joyfully.” When she was challenged by the opposing judgment that the leader of the chorus came to believe that it was unfair to accept the biracial peer to the chorus (i.e., the moral conflict situation of the group activity context), she changed her judgment. She said, “It is all right not to accept her to the chorus. If she joined it despite the opposition of the leader, other
members would be bothered by this tension. It is better to acknowledge the idea of the leader.” She accepted the power of an authority figure and endorsed the judgment of exclusion that she had rejected in the initial situation.

**Directions of Change.**

I examined whether the proportions of change of judgment varied by direction: positive (i.e., from exclusion to inclusion) and negative (i.e., from inclusion to exclusion). I predicted that participants were more likely to change in a positive direction than in a negative direction. The proportions of change by direction are presented in Table 8.

Table 8 *Proportion of Change by Direction (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PR-C</th>
<th>PR-M</th>
<th>GA-P</th>
<th>GA-M</th>
<th>PF-P</th>
<th>PF-M</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>68 (28/41)</td>
<td>76 (31/41)</td>
<td>67 (12/18)</td>
<td>83 (15/18)</td>
<td>62 (5/8)</td>
<td>75 (6/8)</td>
<td>72 (97/134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>33 (20/60)</td>
<td>28 (17/60)</td>
<td>29 (24/83)</td>
<td>19 (16/83)</td>
<td>37 (35/93)</td>
<td>23 (22/93)</td>
<td>28 (134/472)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
Z = 3.45^{***} \quad 4.67^{***} \quad 3.03^{**} \quad 5.34^{***} \quad 1.38 \quad 3.11^{**} \quad 9.26^{***}
\]

*Note.* (a/b): a = the frequency of change, b = the frequency of positive or negative judgment in the initial situation. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Overall, 72% of the participants who had endorsed exclusion in initial situations made judgments of inclusion in conflict situations (i.e., positive direction), whereas 28% of the participants who had endorsed inclusion in initial situations made judgments of exclusion in conflict situations (i.e., negative direction). According to two sample comparison of proportion tests, the differences between the two directions were statistically significant in all conflict situations except in the personal conflict situation of the public facility context, at the .01 or .001 level (see Table 8). In general, children and adolescents were less likely to change their judgments of inclusion than those of exclusion. No age and gender differences were present in the directions of change.

**Comparisons of judgments between initial and conflict situations.**

I first examined whether their judgments in conflict situations would differ by context as they varied by context in initial situations (see Table 6). The effects of contexts on judgments were assessed with a repeated measures ANOVA. No significant differences were found between the total proportions of the rejection of exclusion between the three contexts (i.e., 70% in the personal gathering context, 76% in the group activity context, and 69% in the public facility context). Unlike initial situations, children and participants did not distinguish between contexts when they made judgments of exclusion in conflict situations. Thus, contextual variations on judgments found in initial
situations did not exist in conflict situations. In addition, no age differences were found in any of the three contexts of conflict situations.

Then, I compared the proportions of judgments between initial and conflict situations in the three contexts, employing repeated measure ANOVAs (see Tables 3 and 7 for the proportions of judgments). In the personal relationship context, the difference in the proportion of inclusion judgments between the initial situation (59%) and conflict situation (70%) was not statistically significant, $F(1,100) = 3.7, p = .07$. However, post-hoc analyses by Tukey HSD comparisons found a significant difference in tenth graders. The tenth graders judged exclusion as wrong significantly more in the conflict situation (67%) than in the initial situation (28%). In the group activity context, no significant differences were found in the proportions of judgments between initial and conflict situations.

In the personal relationship context, the participants rejected exclusion significantly less in the conflict situation (69%) than in the initial situation (92%), $F(1,100) = 24.63, p < .001, \eta^2 = .56$. Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests found significant differences in all three grades and both genders. Fourth, seventh, and tenth graders showed a significant decrease in the judgments of inclusion from the initial situation to the conflict situation: For fourth graders, the proportion changed from 89% to 72%; for seventh graders, from 97% to 73%; and, for tenth graders, from 91% to 61%. Both female and male participants showed the same tendency: For the females, the proportion significantly decreased from 96% to 71%; for the males, from 88% to 68%.

Unlike in initial situations, no age differences were found in the conflict situations of the personal relationship context mainly because of the change of the judgments of tenth graders. Thirty-three percent of tenth graders endorsed exclusion in the conflict situations of the personal context, whereas 72% of them did so in the initial situation of the same context. When they encountered opposing judgments from the moral domain or conventional domain in the personal relationship context, they showed a tendency to change their judgments from exclusion to inclusion.

**General tendency in justifications for the judgments of exclusion.**

I investigated the relationships between domains of justifications (i.e., moral, conventional, personal) and contexts of evaluations (i.e., personal gathering, group activity, public facility). I presented the proportions of justifications in the three contexts for an overview of justifications and comparisons between initial and conflict situation. The proportions of justifications by domain and category are presented in Table 9.
Table 9 Proportions of Justifications in Conflict Situations (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Grade 4 (n = 37)</th>
<th>Grade 7 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Grade 10 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Total (n = 101)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>GA</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Domain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal choice</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PR: personal relationship context; GA: group activity context; PF: public facility context. Each domain represents the total of its categories. In each context, the sums of three domains and eight categories are 100, respectively.
I examined how context, age, and gender affected the moral, conventional, and personal domains of justifications, respectively, using 3 x 3 x 2 (Context of exclusion: personal relationship, group activity, public facility x Grade: fourth, seventh, tenth x Gender: female, male) ANOVAs with repeated measures. All three domains revealed a main effect for context: in the moral domain, \(F(2, 190) = 13.12, p < .001, \eta^2 = .51\); in the conventional domain, \(F(2, 190) = 16.36, p < .001, \eta^2 = .48\); and in the personal domain, \(F(2, 190) = 29.52, p < .001, \eta^2 = .54\). According to post-hoc analyses by Tukey’s HSD, moral reasons were used in more in the public context (73%) than in the personal context (59%) and group context (50%); conventional reasons, more in the group context (45%) than in the personal context (20%) and public context (26%); and, personal reasons, more in the personal context (21%) than in the group context (5%) and public context (1%). Contextual variations in the use of the domains of justifications in the initial situations were represented in the same manner in the conflict situations. In addition, a main grade effect, \(F(2, 95) = 3.67, p < .05, \eta^2 = .54\), and a significant interaction effect between context and grade, \(F(4, 190) = 2.54, p < .05, \eta^2 = .54\), were found in the personal domain of justifications. According to post-hoc analyses, seventh graders showed no contextual variations unlike fourth and tenth graders. Tenth graders (31%) used personal reasoning more than seventh graders (11%) did only in the personal context. No age difference between fourth graders (20%) and tenth graders (31%) were found unlike the initial situations. No gender differences were found like the initial situations.

**Comparisons between initial and conflict situations.**

I examined how children and adolescents differentiate their use of the domains of justifications between the initial and conflict situations in the three contexts, employing repeated measures ANOVAs. (See Tables 4 and 9 for the proportions of the domains of justifications)

In the personal relationship context, there were no overall differences in the use of moral reasons between the initial situation (60%) and conflict situation (59%), \(F(1,100) = 4.4, p = .83\). However, post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests found significant differences between fourth and tenth graders. Fourth graders used moral reasons significantly more in the initial situation (78%) than in the conflict situation (58%), whereas tenth graders used moral reasons significantly less in the initial situation (28%) than in the conflict situation (48%).

In the group activity context, there was an overall difference in the use of moral reasons between the initial and conflict situations, \(F(1,100) = 4.7, p < .05, \eta^2 = .57\). The participants used moral reasons significantly more in the conflict situation (58%) than in the initial situation (38%). Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests revealed a significant difference in the male participants. They used moral reasons significantly more in the conflict situation (53%) than in the initial situation (36%).

In the public facility context, there was an overall difference in the use of moral reasons between the initial and conflict situations, \(F(1,100) = 22.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .69\). The participants used moral reasons significantly more in the initial situation (91%) than in the conflict situation (73%) in the public facility context. Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests found significant differences in all three grades and both genders. Fourth, seventh, and tenth graders showed a significant decrease in the use of moral reasons from the initial situation to the conflict situations: For fourth graders, the
proportion of moral reasons changed from 86% to 68%; for seventh graders, from 97% to 80%; and, for tenth graders, from 90% to 73%. Both female and male participants showed the same tendency: For the females, the proportion of moral reasons significantly decreased from 96% to 73%; for the males, from 86% to 72%.

In the use of conventional reasons, there was an overall difference between the initial and conflict situations in the group activity context, $F(1,100) = 8.90, p < .01, \eta^2 = .59$. The participants used conventional reasons significantly less in the conflict situation (45%) than in the initial situation (61%) in the group activity context. Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests revealed significant differences in the tenth graders and male participants, respectively. The tenth graders used conventional reasons significantly more in the initial situation (66%) than in the conflict situation (42%) in the group activity context. The male participants showed a significant decrease in the use of conventional reasons from the initial situation (62%) to the conflict situation (43%) in the group activity context.

In the use of personal reasoning, there was an overall difference between the initial and conflict situations in the personal relationship context, $F(1,100) = 8.90, p < .05, \eta^2 = .59$. The participants used personal reasoning significantly less in the conflict situation (21%) than in the initial situation (34%) in the personal relationship context. Post-hoc comparisons with Tukey HSD tests found significant differences in tenth graders. The tenth graders used personal reasoning significantly more in the initial situation (53%) than in the conflict situation (31%) in the personal relationship context.

From these results, it appears that a tendency to dominantly use a specific domain of social reasoning decreased in conflict situations as compared to the tendency in initial situations. The use of moral reasons became less dominant in the personal and public context; the use of conventional reasons, in the group context; and the use of personal reason, in the personal context. In the group context, moral and conventional reasons were used more equally in the conflict situation (i.e., 50% and 45%, respectively) than in the initial situation (i.e., 38% and 61%, respectively) by a significant increase of moral reasoning and a significant decrease of conventional reasoning from the initial situation to the conflict situations. Children and adolescents may use the domains of social reasoning in a more balanced way as the situations of judgments become more complex by including conflicts between the domains of social reasoning.

**Relations between judgments and justifications.**

I examined the relationship between the types of judgments and the domains of justifications in conflict situations. The proportions of exclusion and inclusion and the domains of social reasoning by conflict situations are presented in Figure 5. The proportions of the domains of social reasoning by types of judgments are presented in Table 10.
I examined whether the types of judgments (i.e., exclusion, inclusion) and the domains of justifications (i.e., moral, conventional, personal) were related, using Fisher’s exact tests. The domains of justifications and the types of judgments were significantly associated at the .001 level in all situations except in the personal conflict situation of the group activity context in which it was significant at the .01 level. In general, moral reasons tended to be associated with the judgments of exclusion, whereas personal reasons, with the judgments of inclusion. These results are the same as those from initial situations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Judgment</th>
<th>Grade 4 (n = 37)</th>
<th>Grade 7 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Grade 10 (n = 32)</th>
<th>Total (n = 101)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-C</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR-M</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-P</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA-M</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-P</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-C</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** PG: personal gathering; GA: group activity; PF: public facility context. C: conventional; M: moral; P: personal domain/conflict.
Using simple logistic regression, I assessed whether moral reasons predicted the judgment of inclusion and whether conventional reasons predicted the judgment of exclusion. The results from all six conflict situations indicated that moral reasons for justifications were a statistically significant predictor of the endorsement of exclusion; $z = 3.85, p < .001$ in the conventional conflict situation of the personal context; $z = 6.13, p < .001$ in the moral conflict situation of the personal context; $z = 2.47, p < .05$ in the personal conflict situation of the group context; $z = 3.52, p < .001$ in the moral conflict situation of the group context; $z = 4.90, p < .001$ in the personal conflict situation of the public context; and, $z = 5.07, p < .001$ in the conventional conflict situation of the public context.

In the group activity context, the results indicated that conventional reasons were a statistically significant predictor of the endorsement of exclusion; $z = -2.81, p < .01$ in the personal conflict situation; $z = -2.77, p < .01$ in the moral conflict situation. In the personal activity context, the results indicated that personal reason was a statistically significant predictor of the endorsement of exclusion; $z = -3.35, p < .001$ in the conventional conflict situation; $z = -6.03, p < .001$ in the moral conflict situation.

In sum, moral reasons tend to be used to justify the rejection of exclusion in all contexts, whereas conventional reasons and personal reason, to justify the endorsement of exclusion mainly in the group activity context and in the personal relationship context, respectively.

**Justification categories.**

For analyses of justification categories, I employed 3 x 3 x 2 (Context of exclusion: personal relationship, group activity, public facility x Grade: fourth, seventh, tenth x Gender: female, male) ANOVAs with repeated measures to examine how context, age, and gender independently and interactively affect the social reasoning of children for the judgments of exclusion. I also examined whether initial and conflict situations revealed some significant differences in the use of justification categories. (See Tables 4 and 9 for the proportions of the categories of justifications.)

In the use of the fairness category, no main effects for context and grade were found unlike initial situations. In the public facility context, the use of fairness reasoning showed a significant difference between initial and conflict situations, $F(1,100) = 7.45, p < .01, \eta^2 = .65$. The participants used it more for justifications in the initial situation (42%) than in the conflict situation (28%). Further analyses revealed significant decreases in the use of fairness reasoning in tenth graders (i.e., from 69% in the initial situation to 41% in the conflict situation). Nevertheless, post-hoc analyses in the conflict situations showed age differences like the initial situations: Tenth graders (42%) and seventh graders (36%) used fairness reason more than did fourth graders (9%) in the public context; and, tenth graders (36%), more than fourth graders (18%) in the group context.

In the use of the welfare category, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, $F(2, 190) = 14.14, p < .001, \eta^2 = .41$, and an interaction effect between context and grade, $F(4, 190) = 2.60, p < .05, \eta^2 = .41$. Post-hoc analyses showed that participants used welfare reason more in the public context (26%) than in the group context (10%) and personal context (8%). In the public context, fourth graders (35%) used it more than did tenth graders (20%) and seventh graders (20%).
In the use of the rights category, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for context, $F(2, 190) = 11.59, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .46$ and grade, $F(2, 95) = 6.65, p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .45$. Post-hoc analysis showed that participants used rights reasoning more in the personal context (33%) than in the group context (13%) and public context (20%). Fourth graders (42%) and seventh graders (36%) used it more than did tenth graders (19%) in the personal context. In the personal relationship context was a significant difference between initial and conflict situations found, $F(1,100) = 4.95, p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .73$. The participants used it more for justifications in the initial situation (43%) than in the conflict situation (33%). Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant decrease in the use of rights reasoning in fourth graders: from 59% in the initial situation to 42% in the conflict situation. In terms of age differences, both initial and conflict situations showed the same pattern in some contexts: An age-related increase of fairness reasoning was found in the public facility context, whereas an age-related decrease of rights reasoning was found in the personal relationship context.

Regarding conventional reasons, repeated measures ANOVAs revealed main effects for context in the use of the group functioning category, $F(2, 190) = 36.70, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .47$, tradition category, $F(2, 190) = 16.91, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .46$, authority category, $F(2, 190) = 10.70, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .42$, and social influence category, $F(2, 190) = 6.26, p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .43$. According to post-hoc analyses, group functioning reasoning was used more in the group context (26%) than in the personal context (5%) and public context (1%) in all grades; tradition, more in the public context (12%) than in the personal context (0%) in all grades; authority, more in the group context (16%) than in the public context (1%) and personal context (1%) by fourth graders; and, social influence, more in the personal context (16%) than in the group context (3%) by fourth graders.

In terms of differences between initial and conflict situations, tradition, authority, and social influence categories were used in the public, group, and personal contexts, respectively, unlike the initial situation. No significant age and gender differences were found in both initial and conflict situations. However, contextual variations in the use of authority and social influence categories were found only in the justifications of fourth graders. Thus, the responses of fourth graders revealed contextual variations in the use of all four conventional reasons unlike those of seventh and tenth graders. Fourth graders tended to use group functioning and authority reasons more frequently in the group context than the other contexts, tradition in the public context more frequently than the other contexts, and social influence in the personal context more frequently than the other contexts. In addition, results regarding personal choice category were the same as those for personal domain since this domain had only one reason in conflict situations.
Discussion

Children and adolescents in Korea face new social issues - such as racial exclusion, discrimination, and cross-race friendships - due to an increase in the number of biracial children in Korea. In order to understand the nature of racial problems, it is necessary to know how Korean children and adolescents view and judge social issues in various relationships with their biracial peers. This study examines the judgments of Korean children and adolescents on the inclusion and exclusion of a biracial peer in initial and conflict situations in the personal relationship context, group activity context, and public facility context. By presenting various hypothetical situations with different degrees of complexity, it was possible to examine how they used and coordinated various forms of social reasoning and considerations. In addition, some cross-cultural implications can be drawn by comparing the results of this study in Korea, where racial issues are relatively new, with those of previous studies on racial exclusion in the U.S., where racial issues have been salient for decades.

The key findings in this study showed that Korean children and adolescents differentiated and coordinated the domains of social reasoning reflecting on the nature and context of a social issue when they made judgments about excluding a biracial peer. In general, participants tended to negatively judge the exclusion of a biracial peer. However, older participants tended to judge exclusion as acceptable in the initial situation of the personal relationship context. This study also deepened the understanding of the relationship between changes in judgments and domains of justifications for judgments. From comparative analyses on patterns of social reasoning between initial and conflict situations, judgments justified with moral reasons in initial situations were found to be less changeable in conflict situations than were those with personal or conventional reasons. As for developmental changes in moral reasoning, an age-related increase of fairness reasoning was found in the public facility and group activity contexts, whereas an age-related decrease of rights reasoning was found in the personal relationship and public facility contexts. These major and other findings need to be discussed to enhance the scientific understanding of the dynamics and structures of children’s social reasoning on exclusion.

Judgments of exclusion

The findings from this study suggest that the social reasoning of children and adolescents on the exclusion of a biracial peer is complex, systematic, and multifaceted. Children and adolescents viewed exclusion as a moral transgression in certain situations, but in others, they viewed exclusion as a matter of personal choice or group functioning. In the public facility context, the vast majority of the participants negatively judged the exclusion of the biracial peer from a public swimming pool with concerns about the welfare and rights of the biracial peer and in order to enhance the fairness of social interactions and decision making processes. Research has shown how exclusion on the basis of race (see Opotow 1990, 2006; Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 05) or social marginalization (see Asher & Coie, 1990; Hutchison, Abrams, & Christian, 2007) can cause serious problems in children including psychological disorders, poor school performance, and antisocial reactions. On the other hand, exclusion was not always judged as morally wrong. In the personal relationship context, some relationships
necessarily include some and exclude others (Abrams, Hogg, and Marques, 2005). In addition, the endorsement of exclusion in some relationships does not necessarily produce or guarantee the same result in other situations. Most of the participants who endorsed exclusion in the personal relationship context did not judge the exclusion of the peer as acceptable in the public facility context. Thus, exclusion needs to be viewed as a multifaceted social phenomenon which results in various forms of reasons and judgments (Killen, 2007; Killen et al., 2002; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Turiel & Killen, 2010).

In terms of contextual variations in the judgments of exclusion, Korean children and adolescents are more likely to endorse exclusion in the personal relationship context than in the group activity context or the public facility context. Especially, adolescents tend to think that the personal relationship context may more legitimately permit the exclusion of some peers due to the nature of the personal gathering or relationship and the different conceptualization of exclusion from racial exclusion or moral exclusion. It is important to distinguish the judgments of exclusion in the personal context from the peer exclusion by race. The initial situation of the personal relationship context includes the information that a birthday boy or girl does not like a certain biracial peer. Many participants, especially tenth graders, endorsed exclusion in this context, evaluating the choice of guests at a birthday party as a personal prerogative. Previous studies have also found that children also consider choosing friends as a personal matter (see Nucci, 1981; Killen et al., 2002). Their judgments should not be considered racial exclusion or moral exclusion since the tenth graders neither intended to harm the biracial peer and violate his or her basic rights, nor made the decision based on racial prejudice or negative stereotypes (see Buhs et al., 2006; Miller, 2007; Opotow, 1990, 2006).

On the other hand, there were no significant differences in judgments of exclusion between the group activity context and public facility context. Eight-three percent and 92% of the participants rejected the judgments of exclusion in the group and public contexts, respectively. Although there were no significant differences in the judgments of exclusion between the group activity and public facility contexts, the qualities of their evaluations in these contexts were different. They used more conventional reasons, especially group functioning, to justify the judgments of exclusion in the group activity context than in the public facility context, whereas they used more moral reasons in the public facility context than in the group activity context. This contrast implies that many participants viewed the exclusion from a chorus in the group activity context as an issue in the realm of conventional reasoning, while they view exclusion from a public facility as a moral issue that is relevant to the welfare and rights of the biracial peer and the justice and fairness of social interactions. When they evaluated the exclusion of a biracial peer, children and adolescents differentiated the forms of reasoning and types of judgments by reflecting on various features of exclusion in different situations (see Helwig, 1995; Killen et al, 2002).

It was found that their initial judgments were not associated with their judgments of exclusion in conflict situations. In conflict situations, a significant proportion (38%) of participants changed their initial judgments. Contextual variations were found in the change of judgments. The participants were more likely to change their judgments in the moral and conventional conflict situations of the personal relationship context than in the conventional conflict situations of the public facility context. About half of the participants changed their judgments when their initial judgments regarding the invitation
of a biracial peer to a birthday were set in conflict with an opposing judgment, either from a group of friends or due to a change in the moral conviction of the birthday child. When situations were made more complex by conflicts between the personal choice of the birthday person and different concepts such as his or her moral conviction and the social influence of his or her friends, a significant proportion considered non-personal reasons to be more important than personal choice and altered their judgments. On the other hand, only 28% of the participants changed their judgments regarding the admission of the peer to public swimming pools when a new element was added: a traditional practice that does not allow Koreans to swim together with foreigners. Their judgments of exclusion were affected by the changes in contexts and additional information. These results imply that children do not have a fixed attitude or disposition toward exclusion that determines their judgments (see Turiel, 2006).

Across contexts, a positive direction (i.e., from exclusion to inclusion) was more common than was a negative direction (i.e., from inclusion to exclusion) in the change of judgments between the initial and conflict situations. Seventy-two percent of the participants with the judgment of exclusion changed their judgments to inclusion (i.e., positive direction), whereas 28% of the participants with the judgment of inclusion, to exclusion (i.e., negative direction). These changes in the judgments of children and adolescents due to situational variations reflect the ways in which children and adolescents reason about varying degrees of salience, or the importance of original and additional considerations in complex situations, and subordinate considerations in one domain to other considerations in the same or another domain (see Smetana, 2006).

Both contextual variations and the high rate of positive direction in the change of judgments were associated with the justifications that they used for the initial judgments. In other words, these findings are better explained when the patterns of children’s reasoning on exclusion as well as the influence of certain decisive situational factors are examined. Specifically, those who justified their judgments with moral reasons (i.e., fairness, welfare, and rights) were less likely to change in conflict situations than those with personal reasons (i.e., personal choice) in the personal relations context, and those with conventional reasons (i.e., group function, authority, tradition, and social influence) in the conventional conflict situation of the public facility context. In moral reasoning, children and adolescents seriously considered the consequences of their judgments, independent of the influence of local customs or non-moral authority dictates (see Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 2006). In the evaluation of exclusion, moral justifications, unlike personal or conventional ones, are not influenced much by variations in situational contexts and other external conditions. Thus, the low rate of negative direction (i.e., from inclusion to exclusion) across contexts was related to the fact that the initial judgments of inclusion tended to be justified by moral reasons.

In addition, the frequency of judgments with moral justifications, which were used more in the public context than in the personal context, was positively related to the high rates of change in the conflict situations in the personal context as well as the low rate of change in the conventional conflict situation of the public context. The judgments in the public context were less likely to be changed than in the personal context, because the judgments of inclusion with moral reasons were less likely to be changed in the conflict situations and were used more frequently in the public context than in the personal context. While these results confirmed that contextual variations in judgments
and changes of judgment reflect how children differentiate, weigh, coordinate, and prioritize between moral, conventional, and personal reasons (see Helwig, 1995; Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 1983, 1995, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 2006; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Turiel et al., 1987), they also revealed that moral justifications tend to take priority over other justifications in various situations in a consistent manner.

**Diverse reasoning**

From the analyses of the justifications used by participants for judgments, it was apparent that Korean children and adolescents used various forms of reasoning when they were evaluating the inclusion and exclusion of a biracial peer. The children’s use of diverse reasoning corresponds with the characteristics of the social exclusion of a biracial peer as a multifaceted phenomenon (see Killen et al., 2002). The participants in this study used diverse reasons to justify their judgments and construct different priorities, among various considerations reflecting the nature of an event and the characteristics of a context.

For an example, a tenth grade female endorsed the exclusion of a biracial peer in the personal relationship context with personal reasoning (i.e., personal choice), in the group activity context with conventional reasoning (i.e., tradition), and rejected the decision of exclusion in the public facility context with moral reasoning (i.e., fairness). She said, in the personal context, “It is all right not to invite the biracial peer since this kind of invitation depends on what the birthday girl wants. If she does not like the peer, she does not need to ask her to join the party. She is not inviting the peer not because she is a mixed-blood, but because she is not close to her.” In the group activity context, “If the members of the chorus accept and follow that practice as tradition, it is all right not to allow the biracial peer to join the chorus . . . I believe that there are probably some values in that tradition. I guess that they practiced it as tradition since they have the same idea about it. In that case, it is all right to keep it.” In the public facility context, “It is wrong to exclude Po (i.e., biracial) from public facilities because she is a mixed-blood. It is unfair to exclude her without giving any explanations about the decision. I cannot accept it.” She used different reasons to justify her judgments of exclusion and inclusion in three different situations. The patterns of her reasoning in different situations confirm that children’s multifaceted reasoning for various features of situations and events determines their judgments of exclusion and inclusion (see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006).

Contextual variations in the social reasoning of children and adolescents are manifest in the justifications for judgments of the exclusion of a biracial peer (see Killen et al., 2002). It was found that domains of justifications were closely associated with contexts of judgments. Moral reasons were used in all three contexts, unlike personal and conventional reasons. In the initial situations, justifications in the moral domain (i.e., fairness, welfare, rights) were used significantly more in the personal relationship context and public facility context than in the group activity context. Those in the conventional domain (i.e., group functioning, authority, tradition, social influence) were mainly used in the group activity context, whereas the personal reason (i.e., personal choice), in the personal relationship context.

The fact that moral reasons were used in all three contexts does not imply that there were no variations in the use of moral reasons. For an example, a seventh grade boy mainly used rights reasoning, appealing a right to have an opportunity to have friends, in
the personal relationship context; and welfare reasoning, concerning the psychological harm of a biracial peer, in the public facility context. In the personal relationship context, he said, “It is not all right not to invite him . . . he wants to be closer to Min (i.e., birthday boy). He should have an opportunity to get along with him.” In the public facility context, he said, “Public swimming pools are there for everybody. If he is the only one who cannot use it, he will be disappointed and depressed. He should use the pool.” He did not use a moral reason to justify his decision in the group activity context. He used group functioning reasoning to justify his judgment of inclusion, saying, “His talent in music will make the chorus perform better.” Children and adolescents tended to use various justifications for the judgment of exclusion and inclusion, reflecting on salient features of different contexts and events.

Children and adolescents are able to weigh and coordinate different domains of social reasoning as well as various types of justifications for different events and contexts (Helwig, 1995; Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 1983; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991; Turiel, 1983, 2007). In the personal relationship context, the participants coordinated knowledge of the personal domain with that of the moral domain and/or the conventional domain. For instance, those who were concerned about the loneliness of a biracial peer and so thought that he or she should be invited to the birthday party gave priority to moral reasoning over personal preference. In the group activity context, some put priority on moral concerns for the biracial children over conventional concerns such as tradition or group harmony. In the initial situation, about 37% of participants decided to include the peer out of concern for the welfare and rights of the peer or the fairness of the decision process, despite the tradition that excluded biracial peers. Others discerned whether the chorus would function well by accepting a biracial peer with musical talent, despite the tradition of a Korean chorus. They mainly weighed two conventional reasons: group functioning and tradition. Those who thought the betterment of group functioning by accepting a talented peer more important than the observance of tradition judged in favor of including the peer, whereas those who valued tradition more than other concerns judged in favor of excluding the peer. In the public facility context, participants were highly likely to give priority to moral reasons over the conventional reason that the authority of the town council had made the decision to exclude biracial children from public swimming pools. In general, these findings confirm that moral concerns tended to take priority over non-moral concerns in the reasoning of children and adolescents on exclusion.

Although both children and adolescents in this study tended to give priority to moral reasons over personal and conventional concerns, a fixed hierarchy between moral reasons and conventional or personal reasons was not found. For instance, more than 35% of those who had rejected the exclusion of the biracial peer from public swimming pools with moral reasons endorsed the exclusion when they were presented with the information that nobody wanted to swim with the biracial peer. In this situation, the priority between moral and non-moral reasons was often modified when some new features were introduced. When the participants viewed opposing judgments from the personal or conventional domain more salient than the initial moral reason, they did not prioritize moral reasons over other reasons. While acknowledging a tendency that moral reasons were prioritized over non-moral reasons, it is necessary to emphasize that children and adolescents do not apply a fixed hierarchy between moral and non-moral
reasons to automatically judge the inclusion or exclusion of peers in different contexts. An individual child or adolescent is cognizant of the salience and importance of different features of a situation and coordinate, weigh, and prioritize domains of social reasoning to make a judgment (see Turiel, 1983, 2008).

Age differences

It was predicted that the complexities of situations would allow for to the examination of age differences in social reasoning (see Helwig, 1995; Killen & Stangor, 2001). In previous research, the vast majority of both older and younger children negatively evaluated exclusion when they judged it in straightforward situations (e.g., “Is it all right to exclude a black boy from a math club?”), whereas older children or adolescents tended to reveal different patterns of reasoning from those of younger children in complex situations which included implicit and explicit conflicts and/or critical choices (Killen & Stangor, 2001). With an expectation to find diverse patterns as well as age differences in the social reasoning of children and adolescents, all the situations of exclusion in the study were presented in a complex manner. This research found a few age differences in the participants’ judgments regarding the exclusion of a biracial peer.

Significant age differences in the judgment of exclusion were limited in the initial situation of the personal relationship context (i.e., an invitation to a birthday party). Tenth graders were more likely than the fourth and seventh graders to think that it was acceptable to not invite a biracial peer to a birthday party. However, this age difference of judgments in the personal context was not evident in the conflict situations of the same context. This change was mainly brought on by the increase of judgments of inclusion among the tenth graders: 28% of them rejected exclusion in the initial situation, whereas 67% of them did so in subsequent conflict situations. The judgments of the fourth and seventh graders did not differ between these situations, whereas those of the tenth graders did. When an opposing conventional judgment (i.e., social pressure from friends) or moral judgment (i.e., a change in moral conviction regarding the fairness of the initial decision) were introduced, respectively, to generate conflict situations, the tenth graders were more likely than the fourth and seventh graders to change their judgments from exclusion to inclusion. Thus, an age difference was also found in the proportions of change in judgments between the initial and conflict situations.

These age differences reflect the advanced social reasoning of adolescents. Adolescents have a more differentiated knowledge of social reasoning and a larger realm of personal reasoning than children (Nucci et al., 1996). Killen et al. (2002) found that older participants endorsed exclusion in the friendship context with the justification of personal choice more often than did younger participants. Adolescents thought that the friendship context was more legitimate than the school context to exclude some peers, but children did not distinguish between those contexts. Across cultures, it was found that adolescents have and use a wider range of reasons and perspectives to understand and judge complex social interactions such as peer exclusion than do children (see Smetana, 1988; Turiel, 1983). This developmental trend in social reasoning also explains the age differences in the change of judgments in the personal relationship context: The older changed judgments more frequently than did the younger. This difference suggests that adolescents may have a larger variability of judgments on personal relationships due to
their capacity to use more diverse reasons and construct hierarchies among them which are more responsive to the modifications of situational features than children’s capacities.

Further, the age difference in the personal relationship context may reflect that children have different knowledge about the formation of friendship from that of adolescents. Many younger participants maintained that Korean and biracial children would become friends if they had a chance to play together, whereas older participants seldom mentioned the possibility of becoming friends by inviting him or her to the birthday party. Developmental researchers suggest that children value friendship, begin to understand its exclusive nature at early ages, and reveal different features in their relationships with friends with age (Sharabany, Gershoni, & Hofman, 1981; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006; Youniss & Smollar, 1985). Younger children become friends spontaneously by participating in specific activities together but their friendship does not tend to extend beyond certain activities or locations. As children grow older and reach adolescence, they tend to have friends that are fewer in number but stronger in intimacy for long periods. Reflecting on these differences in the experience and understanding of friendship between adolescents and children, it makes sense that children think it more positive to become friends with a biracial peer through the occasion of the birthday party than do adolescents.

These age differences in the personal relationship context, as well as conceptions of friendship, do not imply that children view selecting friends as a moral issue while adolescents see it as a personal business, or that children do not develop a clear realm of personal reasoning like adolescents do. As Nucci (1981) found, both children and adolescents view an interaction with friends, even forbidden friends, as a personal matter. However, it may be that children tend to give priority to moral reasons over personal preference more frequently and easily than do adolescents. Compared to the relative ease in becoming friends, the loneliness and disappointment of the excluded peer was perceived to be quite serious for younger participants. On the other hand, as older participants were aware of the difficulty in becoming friends with the biracial peer, they were likely to weigh possible personal difficulties of the biracial peer less important than the good atmosphere at the birthday party or the personal preference of the birthday person. Some of them mentioned that it would be better to find another occasion, not the birthday party, to develop a friendship. Thus, differentiated developmental features regarding concepts of friendships between children and adolescents are compatible with common characteristics of their social reasoning such as domain distinction and coordination and contextual variations in the judgment of exclusion.

Nucci and Turiel (2009) suggested that moral reasoning develops together with understanding about social conventional norms and concepts and realms of personal decision and choice. While confirming that young children use moral reasoning, as Turiel and many other researchers have supported (Helwig, 1995; Killen, 2007; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 1998, 2006), this study found that children tended to prioritize the domain of moral reasoning over the personal domain or the conventional domain of social reasoning in the judgments of exclusion across various complex situations. This tendency was not found in the judgments of adolescents in the personal relationship context, while it was found in other contexts. In the personal relationship context, there was an age-related increasing tendency to endorse exclusion by prioritizing personal choice over moral reasons. In this study, adolescents made moral choices less than did children.
regarding complex issues in personal relationships. Nucci and Turiel (2009) found that the frequency of moral choice (i.e., giving priority to moral reasons over conventional or personal reasons) is lower among early adolescents (10 to 14 years old) than among children (7 to 8 years old) and older adolescents (16 to 17 years old). Instead of a unidirectional increase or decrease of moral choice with age, a U-shape pattern was found in moral development. The decrease of moral choice between the fourth graders ($M = 9.09$) and the tenth graders ($M = 14.90$) in the initial situation of the personal relationship context in this study is similar to the lower part of the U-shape pattern that Nucci and Turiel found. Since this study does not include participants of 17 or 18 years of age, it is not able to further examine the presence of a U-shape pattern in moral development. Therefore, studies on exclusion in the future need to include older age groups, such as twelfth graders or college students, in order to further examine age-related differences and to see whether the upper part of the U-shape pattern can be found in the judgments on exclusion.

**Cultural differences**

Contextual variations in the judgments of exclusion between the personal relationship context and group activity context may result in some significant implications regarding differences between Western and non-Western cultures. It was shown that Korean children and adolescents are more likely to exclude the biracial peer in the personal relationship context than in the group activity context. This result may contradict the idea that non-Westerners do not have a clear and stable boundary of the self as Westerners do (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). If Koreans, as non-Westerners, did not have a clear boundary of the self but only that of the community, the participants could not have demonstrated a distinction between the invitation to the birthday party of an individual and the admission to a peer group activity such as a chorus. This finding does not support the idea that Asians do not have a clear sense of a personal realm or a distinction between a group and individual, but confirms a universal claim of the domain approach that children and adolescents distinguish the realm of social reasoning regarding personal preference and choice (i.e., an invitation to a birthday party) from reasoning about social norms, traditions, and group functions and goals (i.e., admission to a traditional chorus) (see Nucci, 1981, 1996; Nucci et al., 1996; Smetana, 2006).

Park, Killen, Crystal, and Watanabe (2003) compared the judgments of children on peer exclusion in three countries: Korea, Japan, and the U.S. They found gender differences among the Japanese and American participants, but not among the Korean ones. While cultural differences were found between the two non-Western cultures, Korea and Japan, no differences were found between the Western and non-Western countries of the U.S. and Japan. In this sense, their finding may challenge the sharp distinction between Western and non-Western cultures. As in the Park et al. (2003) study, no gender differences were found in this study. However, it is not easy to grasp the reason for this result. In order to explain a finding of gender difference in fairness reasoning, Killen et al. (2002) suggested that girls are more likely than boys to use fairness reasoning because of their experience of gender inequality. According to this logic, Korean children and adolescents may rarely experience gender inequality. However, sufficient empirical evidence has not been provided regarding the association between gender inequality and gender difference in reasoning. Thus, it is premature to
assume that the promotion of gender equality in Korea has influenced the absence of gender difference in judgments on exclusion (see Park et al., 2003).

As Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) suggested, it is inadequate to view the Korean culture as more collectivistic when compared to American culture. In this study, some values thought important to a collectivistic society - tradition and authority - had only a weak influence on the judgments of children and adolescents. Above all, the results from the initial situation for the conventional context revealed information about how Korean children and adolescent think about tradition. Eighty-three percent of the participants negatively evaluated the exclusion of a biracial peer from the chorus due to the tradition that all members should be Koreans, while 13% of the participants maintained that it was acceptable to exclude the biracial peer since it was invaluable to keep the tradition. Beside this situation, the lowest rate of change from initial to conflict situation was found in the conventional conflict of the public facility context where a traditional practice (i.e., only mainstream Koreans swim together) was in conflict with the initial judgments with moral reasons to admit a biracial peer to a public swimming pool. These findings challenge the proposition that Asians such as Korean, Japanese, and Chinese tend to highly value tradition (Bond, 1996; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995).

Korean children and adolescents consider multiple forms of reasoning such as moral, conventional, and personal reasoning, and use various forms of conventional reasoning to make a judgment regarding group activity such as group function, goals, harmony, and tradition. Their idea of tradition is one of many considerations which may or may not considerably affect the judgment of exclusion. In other words, Korean children and adolescents do not view tradition as an absolute value. Thus, this study indicates that a classification of cultures by collectivism and individualism may not be an effective conceptual frame to explain and integrate the complexity and diversity of local and global cultures (see Turiel, 1998, 2002; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; Wainryb, & Turiel, 1994).

Moral reasoning

The justification categories in the moral domain are based on the protection or enhancement of fairness, welfare (harm), and rights in the social interactions and relationships among people (see Table 2 for characteristics of moral reasons). Both children and adolescents use the principles of justice and fairness, and concern for others’ needs and rights when they evaluate the exclusion of a biracial peer across various situations (see Smetana, 1981, 2006; Killen & Stangor, 2001; Killen et al., 2002; Turiel, 1983, 1998). The vast majority of the fourth graders, the youngest participants of this study, thought the exclusion from public facilities or institutions was wrong using moral reasons. They made a decision against the authority of the town council. This trend contradicts Kohlberg’s idea that judgments by moral principles emerge in adolescence. According to the findings of Kohlberg (1969), less than 10% of 10, 13, and 16 year olds in Mexico, Taiwan, and the U.S. were found to reach the post-conventional stage of moral reasoning, at which they would make a judgment out of concern and respect for others and universal moral principles, whereas the others made judgments from a concern for punishment/reward, disapproval/dishonor by others, or observance of rules. Unlike these findings, this study showed that the majority of the participants made a judgment to include the biracial peer, not because they were afraid of punishment and blame, desired
to gain some benefit and recognition, or thought that they must observe certain explicit rules, but because they were concerned about the welfare of the biracial peer and/or the fairness and equality in social interactions. Even children are able to put priority on moral principles over authority dictates, social pressure, or traditions that support the exclusion of the biracial peer.

In terms of age differences in moral reasons, the results of this study revealed that older participants were more likely than younger ones to use fairness reasoning, whereas younger participants were more likely than older ones to use rights reasoning. The contrast in the use of fairness and rights between old and young participants needs to be discussed. In the initial situation of the public context, tenth graders were likely to point to the wrong or unfair decision making process of the town council which excluded biracial children from swimming pools, whereas fourth graders were likely to argue that a biracial child possessed the same rights as him or her because the biracial child was a peer of the same age or town and/or a person with the same humanity or nationality.

The relationship between fairness reasoning and age was not found to be consistent in the previous studies (see Davidson et al., 1983; Killen et al., 2002). According to Killen et al., fairness reasoning increased with age in the school context. However, they also found that seventh graders used fairness more than tenth graders in other contexts. Unlike these results, the findings on the relationship between fairness and age are relatively consistent in this study. The two contexts in this study (i.e., group activity context and public facility context) revealed an age-related increase of fairness reasoning, whereas no situations showed an age-related decrease of fairness reasoning. However, the increase of fairness reasoning with age should be interpreted in a limited way since this association was not found in all the situations of this study.

Justifications entailing references to rights were used in all initial and conflict situations. The fourth graders in this study commonly used rights reasoning. Many participants rejected the exclusion of a biracial peer, maintaining that the peer had an individual right to have the opportunity to make friends at a birthday party, participate in a chorus, and use a public swimming pool. In the initial and conflict situations of the personal relationship context and the initial situation of the public facility context, an age-related decrease of rights reasoning was found. For younger participants, some commonalities between Korean and biracial children in Korea such as age, talent, nationality, and humanity, become sufficient conditions for becoming friends by attending a birthday party, singing together by joining a chorus, and using public swimming pools.

The justifications of the fourth graders tended to be a universal claim for the human rights of biracial children across situations. Because of the rights of biracial children, they should be treated equally. According to Dworkin (1993), “individual rights offer the only possibility of genuine community in which all individuals participate as equals” (p. 61). Therefore, it is crucial for children to first acknowledge the possession of rights to construct systematic reasoning for equal opportunities of biracial peers. Tenth graders were probably aware of the rights of biracial peers for equal opportunity. However, they tended to view the fairness of a decision or the decision making process as more salient than other reasons in order to provide a specific justification relevant to the case of the town council’s regulation of the admission of biracial peers to public swimming pools. Basically, this result reflects the age difference of social reasoning that
adolescents have a broader spectrum of social reasons as well as a higher ability to adapt a finely classified reason to a specific situation than do children (see Killen et al., 2002; Smetana, 1988; Turiel, 1983).

Many participants identified the biracial peer as Korean, whereas few explicitly regarded him or her as foreign. As Giddens (1986) suggested that social identities are associated with normative rights, they acknowledged both Korean identity and the rights of the biracial peer. Opotow and Brook (2003) investigated the relationship between identity and exclusion. When people consider other groups of people, animals, or plants as sharing the same identities as human beings, neighbors, or creatures, they do not become the targets of moral exclusion. In a similar manner, it is plausible that some Korean children may think that biracial peers are also Koreans who share the same rights and ought to be socially included. Thus, identifying a biracial peer as Korean may imply a legal or ethnic categorization of the peer as well as a confirmation of the human dignity that the Korean and biracial children share.

Nevertheless, it may not be adequate to make a general statement that one’s national identity regulates or defines one’s human rights. The participants might not support the exclusion of the biracial peer even if they thought that he or she was a foreigner. A fourth grade boy said, “It is not all right to exclude the biracial peer . . . we Koreans would feel bad, if we are treated that way in foreign countries.” Although it is not clear whether he thought the peer as a Korean or a foreigner, it is assumed that his moral judgment about this issue would not change regardless of whether the target of exclusion was Korean or biracial, or whether the place of judgment was Korea or abroad. Even if they think that biracial children are not Korean, they may value other identities of the biracial peer as a child, neighbor, human, etc. Thus, it may not be adequate to state that children’s recognition of a single specific identity of the biracial peer makes a difference in the judgment of exclusion (see Sen, 2006; Turiel, 2007). As this study did not examine children’s implicit and explicit ideas of Korean identity, the relationship between identity and rights cannot be discussed in-depth.

Welfare reasoning was used to justify exclusion as well as inclusion, unlike other moral reasons of fairness and rights, which were seldom used for exclusion. Some participants who judged exclusion as acceptable with the welfare reason tended to consider the possible danger or harm that the biracial peer would experience from some unfriendly peers or people at the party, chorus, or public pool, more seriously than the disadvantages that he or she would receive from the judgments of exclusion by peers, group leaders, and local authority. On the other hand, others who judged exclusions as wrong using a rationale of welfare tended to think of the psychological harm of the biracial peer such as loneliness and sadness due to exclusion. Although the judgments were opposite, the moral intentions to justify them with welfare turned out to be the same – the protection of the biracial peer from harm. The differences in the judgments came mainly from different beliefs and assumptions about the consequence of the interaction between the biracial peer and others, not from different moral principles (see Turiel & Wainryb, 1994; Wainryb, 1991).

Leets and SunWolf (2005) suggested that adolescents judge the exclusion of a peer as fair in some conditions. Those conditions were mainly negative qualities of the peer such as a lack of attractiveness, dangerous behavior, and a lack of group loyalty. They also included cases of so-called benevolent protection. If a peer was expected to get
hurt in a group, it was fair that other group members excluded her or him for protection. Even though the number of adolescents who endorsed the exclusion of a peer for protection was not large, it was one of the common ways of reasoning regarding exclusion. In addition, the dynamic between fairness and welfare must be examined. In the case of benevolent protection, it was judged fair to exclude some peers for protection. Fairness was compatible with exclusion in this case. From the moral conceptions of this study, that decision can be interpreted as that some children and adolescents may make a judgment of exclusion due to their concern for the welfare of the biracial peer, even though they know that it is not fair to exclude the peer. For instance, a tenth grade male participant judged that it was not fair to exclude the biracial peer from the chorus due to his racial background in the initial situation. However, he judged that it was acceptable to exclude the peer when he came to know that the leader of the chorus disliked the peer in the conventional conflict situation. The participant was aware of the unfairness of racial exclusion although he judged in favor of excluding the peer for protection because he was concerned that the biracial peer would get hurt during the activity. In this case, fairness reasoning and welfare reasoning show a different relationship from the case of the benevolent exclusion in which fairness and exclusion were compatible. The relationships between fairness and welfare seem to be complicated. This contrast and complication may suggest the presence of different connotations for fairness reasoning according to contexts. A fairness rationale regarding a decision process might not have the same implications as the argument of fairness about equal treatments. In the future, it might be worthwhile to examine what aspects of welfare reasoning make the endorsement of exclusion and moral reasoning compatible unlike rights and fairness reasoning, and how welfare reason interacts with the other moral considerations such as fairness in different contexts of the social reasoning of children and adolescents.

**Conventional reasoning and judgments of exclusion and inclusion**

This study found some characteristics of conventional reasoning in the judgments of exclusion and inclusion. In the group activity context, it was frequently used for both the judgments of exclusion and inclusion, unlike personal and moral reasoning. More than 60% of the participants used group functioning for justifications in the group activity context: 27% of them made a judgment of exclusion, whereas 73% did inclusion. Among the conventional reasons, group functioning was used to include the biracial peer with an expectation that the musical talent of the biracial peer would advance the quality of the chorus and to exclude the peer with a concern that the harmony among the members might be negatively affected by him or her.

These variations in the same group functioning reasoning may be related to children’s understandings of the goals of the boys and girls chorus. In this study, those who mentioned the musical excellence as a goal of the chorus tended to focus on the musical talent of the biracial peer, whereas those who thought of the chorus as a sort of friendly and harmonious club activity tended to emphasize the maintenance of the close relationships among the members of the chorus. This finding is analogous to the results of Wainryb’s (1991) study on the judgment of corporal punishment. She found that those who believed there were positive effects of corporal punishment for learning thought some parental punishment more permissible than did others who did not believe corporal punishment had positive aspects. In this study, the differences in judgments came mainly
from different beliefs and assumptions about the nature or goals of the chorus, despite their use of the same domain of reasoning.

In this study, participants were more likely to judge in favor of including a biracial peer with group functioning reasoning than in favor of excluding him or her. They tended to view the shared musical talents among the members of the chorus as a more relevant factor than the different racial backgrounds of the members. It is related to the finding of McGlothlin, Killen, and Edmonds (2005) that children pay more attention to shared interests of activities, such as sports, than to racial differences. Across cultures, children may focus on the goal and nature of the specific group activity more than variations of racial backgrounds in the reasoning on the membership of a peer group activity.

Like the effect of group functioning reasoning in group activities, social influence was found to be a powerful factor that influences the judgments of children and adolescents in personal relationship context (see Killen et al., 2002). In the conventional conflict situation of the personal relationship context, the opposing judgments of the friends of the birthday person (i.e., social influence) made about half of the participants change their judgments. The change was prevalent among those who used personal reasoning in the initial situation. About 68% of them changed their judgments by giving priority to social influence over personal choice. Thus, social influences tend to be viewed as salient in the judgments of children and adolescents on exclusion in certain personal relationships.

In terms of the relationship between conventional and personal reasoning, this study also found that personal preference can elicit the conventional reasoning of children, according to situational factors. In the personal conflict situations of the group activity context and the public facility context, the participants were presented with opposing judgments based on personal preference. When they decided to include the biracial peer, they were informed that the leader of the chorus did not like the biracial peer in the group context and that nobody liked to swim with the biracial peer in the public context, respectively. These judgments were initially constructed as personal reasoning. They, however, elicited the conventional reasoning of the participants more often than personal reasoning. In the group context, some participants used authority or group functioning reasoning since the person who did not like the peer was the leader of the chorus. In the public facility context, some participants used social influence as a justification since those who do not like to swim with the biracial peer were not just several people but all the neighbors. It seems quite common that judgments from one domain of social reasoning elicit thoughts of domains other than the original domain. In another instance, although the moral conviction of the birthday person was presented as an opposing judgment against the initial judgment regarding the invitation to a birthday party, many participants interpreted his or her moral conviction as personal preference more than as moral reasoning, especially when they did not agree with the conviction of the birthday person. These findings suggest that children and adolescents do not simply accept external inputs as they are, but interpret them in a way that makes sense for other considerations about the events and contexts of judgments.
Moral reasoning and personal reasoning

Two main findings regarding developmental changes in social reasoning are the increased use of the fairness category in the public facility context and that of the personal choice category in the personal relationship context. The older participants were more likely than younger ones to endorse the exclusion of a biracial peer in the personal context, using personal choice reasoning, and to reject it in the public context, using fairness reasoning. These results may point to some relationships between moral reasoning and personal reasoning in the development of children. For instance, the age difference in the use of the personal choice reason can be a sign of the growth of the idea of personal freedom, which is related to a mature way of moral reasoning such as the frequent use of fairness reasoning (see Killen et al., 2002).

Nucci (1996) suggested that moral reasoning and personal claims to freedom and choice develop in an interdependent manner. The development of a concept of self or agency with personal freedom is based on the formation of a child’s understanding of the rights of liberty, while the development of the personal domain affects the moral development of a child by helping him or her to understand others as free agents and to respect them. Likewise, the association between personal choice and fairness may be a general pattern in the development of children’s social reasoning regarding morally relevant issues. For instance, it is known that adolescents develop and expand the realm of personal reasoning through their negotiations with parents regarding the boundary of autonomy, something which often entails adolescent-parent conflicts (Nucci, Killen, & Smetana, 1996). This kind of negotiation would include various domains and justifications of social reasoning, including the concept of fairness as well as the rationale of personal choice and autonomy. As this study was not designed to examine a specific interaction between fairness and personal choice, it confirms only the association between them. In the future, it would be worthwhile to examine the reciprocal roles of fairness and personal choice in adult-child social exchanges about peer exclusion or other contexts.

Suggestions for future research based on limitations of the present study

A future study on racial exclusion may consider several suggestions based on the limitations of this study. First, future studies on exclusion in Korea may recruit participants among biracial children. Some relevant patterns and implications of the judgments of Korean children and adolescents on the exclusion of a biracial peer from this study are limited in the reasoning of mainstream Korean children. This study may suggest some ways to examine differences between Korean and biracial children. On the one hand, it is worthwhile to investigate differences between them regarding judgments on the same hypothetical situations. On the other hand, it is necessary to study how biracial children view the judgments of exclusion by Korean children. In this study, some children and adolescents allowed the exclusion of a biracial peer by using some non-moral reasons such as personal choice, social influence, and group functioning. They made the judgment of exclusion without an intention to harm the biracial peer. However, it is not clear whether biracial children would view these sorts of exclusion as harmless and/or necessary. These issues must be studied in order to draw a bigger picture of the complex peer relationships between biracial and mainstream Korean children and adolescents.
Second, future research needs a larger sample size than the present study as well as an additional age group - college students. This study had 101 participants from fourth, seventh, and tenth grades. This sample size was large enough to examine the contextual variations and patterns of changes in judgments. However, it was too small to reveal statistically significant differences in judgments and justifications in some conflict situations such as the conventional conflict of the public context. Samples of about 200 would be adequate for the examination of those situations. In terms of age groups, it would be better to include first year college students. This study was able to confirm the lower part of the U-shaped pattern that Nucci and Turiel (2009) found in moral development – an age-related decrease of moral choice between childhood and adolescence. By including college students, future studies may investigate the upper part of the U-shaped pattern – an age-related increase of moral choice between early or mid-adolescence and late adolescence and young adulthood.

Third, theoretical and empirical studies on the relationships between moral reasons (i.e., fairness, welfare, and rights) are needed. This study found some developmental patterns and characteristics of different moral justifications. As examples, welfare reason was used for both exclusion and inclusion, unlike other moral reasons. Fairness reason was used more by older participants than by younger ones in some contexts. Children tended to use rights reason for various situations by focusing on commonalities between Korean and biracial peers. These findings would be more conducive to understanding the developmental patterns of moral reasoning if a substantial theoretical framework for the relationships between fairness, welfare, and rights were available. It would be beneficial to know when these reasons were compatible or incompatible and how children and adolescents prioritized them.

Fourth, I conducted over 70 tests of significance in the course of this investigation, excluding post-hoc comparisons. Given the large number of tests, it is possible that some of my findings occurred simply by chance. In addition, some of the analyses involved questions for which I did not have a direct hypothesis, and thus deserve to be treated with caution. In particular, these analyses involved some of the justification categories and judgments in conflict situations. These tests yielded some interesting and potentially important findings, such as an age-related decrease in the use of rights reasoning in the personal relationship context and the lack of contextual variations and age differences in the conflict situations, and clearly deserve further study.

Fifth, future research could systematically examine how a child’s own negative experiences - such as being bullied - or positive experiences - such as cross-racial friendships - affect his or her judgments of exclusion. Some participants in the present study explained the rationale for judgments with their reflections on experiences with biracial children and of peer rejection or victimization. Some judgments that a biracial peer should be included were based on their positive personal experience with biracial peers. Others rejected exclusion, regardless of the target of exclusion, based on their indirect or direct experience of peer rejection or victimization. It is also important to study the relationship between exclusion and peer victimization. As research in the area of peer victimization classifies bullying as overt abuse (i.e., physical and verbal harassment) and relational abuse (i.e., marginalization, gossip, and demanding compliance) (see Arsenio, & Lemerise, 2001; Bauman, 2008; Buhs et al., 2006), studies on exclusion may specifically examine the relationship between peer exclusion and
relational bullying. From this study, most children and adolescents did not make any judgments of exclusion to harm or discriminate the biracial peer. In real situations, however, some children and adolescents make decisions to avoid, exclude, or reject biracial children with the understanding that their judgments may distress the biracial peers. By studying exclusion in connection with bullying, future research may present a systematic understanding of the conditions or structures of thoughts that result in or accompany harmful actions of children and adolescents in peer relationships.
References


Appendix A

Interview protocol: stories and questions

Personal Relationship Context
Min lives in Manse-dong. Po, who is half-Korean and half-Filipino, lives next door. Min is going to celebrate his birthday with his friends. Min knows that Po wants to get along with him. However, Min does not like Po.
Q1: Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not invite Po to his birthday party? (Judgment) Why do you think it is all right/not all right? (Justification)

For a Judgment of All Right.
Q2O: Conflict with conventional domain: What if Min’s friends say that they want Po to join the party because he has been part of their group? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not invite Po, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3O: Conflict with moral domain: What if Min comes to believe that it is unfair not to invite Po to the party because he is a mixed-blood? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not invite Po, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)

For a Judgment of Not All Right.
Q2N: Conflict with conventional domain: What if Min’s friends say that they don’t want Po to join the party because he has not been part of their group? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not invite Po, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3O: Conflict with moral domain: What if Min comes to believe that it is fair to not invite Po to the party because he is not a pure Korean? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not invite Po, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)

Group Activity Context
Min is the head of a boys and girls chorus, which is the oldest in his town. Po, who is half-Korean and half-Filipino, sings very well and wants to join the chorus. This chorus has never had a mixed-blood as a member. Most members think this is a tradition.
Q1: Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus? (Judgment) Why do you think it is all right/not all right? (Justification)

For a Judgment of All Right.
Q2O: Conflict with personal domain: What if Min likes Po very much? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3O: Conflict with moral domain: What if Min comes to believe that it is unfair not to allow Po because he is a mixed-blood? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)

For a Judgment of Not All Right.
Q2N: Conflict with personal domain: What if Min dislikes Po very much? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3N: Conflict with moral domain: What if Min comes to believe that it is fair to not allow Po because he is not a pure Korean? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Min to not allow Po to join the chorus, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Public Facility Context
Po is half-Korean and half-Filipino. He lives in Manse-dong. The town council makes a decision that all children of mixed–blood cannot use public swimming pools in the town.
Q1: Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed to go to swimming pool? (Judgment) Why do you think it is all right/not all right? (Justification)

For a Judgment of All Right.
Q2O: Conflict with personal domain: What if Po likes swimming a lot? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3O: What if all swimming pools in the town have admitted children of mixed blood before? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)

For a Judgment of Not All Right.
Q2N: Conflict with personal domain: What if nobody likes to swim together with Po? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)
Q3N: Conflict with conventional domain: What if it has been a tradition of the town that only pure Koreans can swim together? Do you think it is all right/not all right for Po to not be allowed, then? (Judgment) Why? (Justification)