detail is given to some of the outstanding personalities and major issues that dominated the political scene. Delpar effectively shows that Liberals lacked cohesion and a unified program. Especially after 1875 the party suffered frequent infighting which resulted in the development of splinter groups. By 1885 these disputes led to the defeat of the Liberals and the introduction of the Conservative-dominated government which lasted until the end of the century. The author offers an extended analysis of Liberal activity during this period focusing on the party's attempt to regain power. Unhappiness over their exclusion from public life, in addition to their displeasure over existing economic conditions, compelled many Liberals to resort to violence as a way of removing their enemies from power. The resulting War of the Thousand Days plunged Colombia into its most destructive period during the nineteenth century.

Delpar provides a well-researched account of Liberal activity during the past century. Yet her book has some weaknesses. The title of the book is somewhat misleading since the author concentrates essentially on the Liberal Party rather than on the struggles between Liberals and Conservatives. Her examination of Liberals within the political process discusses little the policies supported and instituted by the party. Also lacking is an investigation of politics at the local level and how and in what ways local and national political organizations were integrated.

Much of Delpar's narrative is a rejection of the thesis posited by Charles W. Bergquist in *Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910* (1978) that socio-economic factors played the major role in shaping politics during this period. While not disregarding these factors, Delpar is on solid ground in stressing the importance of regionalism and the diversity within political groups. Since she views regionalism as so significant, she might have presented a more in-depth analysis of important regional conflicts.

In the preface Delpar makes a provocative statement speculating that the persistence into recent times of a form of liberal democracy in twentieth century Colombia can be traced to the evolution of the party system in the nineteenth century. Inasmuch as this was not the central theme of the present study, perhaps in future investigations she can expand more on this subject. Despite its shortcomings, this book is a useful contribution to the political history of nineteenth century Latin America.

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It is common to compare historical events in Japan and other non-Western countries to European "models." Unusual
(perhaps even heretical) as it may seem, Thomas Huber has reversed the roles in this study. Japan's Meiji Restoration, he suggests, may provide a new theoretical model against which both European and non-European revolutions can be fruitfully analyzed. The Restoration, Huber argues, provides the "essential contours" of a paradigm he calls a "service revolution." This revolution was impelled not by the rising proletariat, the bourgeoisie, or any of the social configurations we normally associate with the forefront of revolutionary action, but rather by an institutionalized service nobility.

To make his case Huber traverses the ground originally explored in Albert Craig's Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration (1961). He emerges from the thicket of Chōshū bakumatsu politics, however, with a very different view of the terrain than that presented by Craig. Gone are the notions of vertical alliance, "han nationalism," and revolution in the name of traditional values. In their place is the view that the Restoration was instigated and led by a new "modern social class" of "service intelligentsia." This class cut across domainal lines, had legitimate shared class grievances, and acted in the name of utopian social values which, while derived from traditional sources, aimed at the transformation of traditional value systems and society.

The book is made up of three slightly overlapping "political biographies" of Yoshida Shōin (Chapters 2-4), Kusaka Genzui (Chapters 5 and 6), and Takasugi Shinsaku (Chapters 7 and 8). These men were successive heads of Yoshida's private academy, the Shōka Sonjuku, the leaders and students of which, Huber contends, typified the broad "service intelligentsia" that took the lead in the Restoration movement.

To Huber the Tokugawa "service intelligentsia" was a distinct social group whose members were well educated and highly literate but distinguished by "minimal social enfranchisement" (p. 189). Among its number were "lower samurai" (below two hundred koku stipend), physicians, priests, and village administrators (shōya). As a class, the "service intelligentsia" enjoyed minor aristocratic perquisites, but they were forced to endure an anachronistic social grading system which fairly rewarded neither their ability nor their efforts—either in material or status compensation—but which lavished wealth and leisure on a less able and less deserving "inner" elite. The steeply hierarchical world of the Bakuhan system, Huber argues, failed to adequately reward talent and merit and as a result invited the hostility of the bureaucratized "service class" which had emerged over the centuries of the Pax Tokugawa.

This "service class" was not motivated to act against the Bakufu on the basis of material interests alone. They acted instead in the name of clearly delineated reformist values derived from traditional sources. The Chōshū restorationists built an iconoclastic reform program around the Confucian notion that the duty of government was to provide for the people's welfare (ammin). They believed that this task could not be fulfilled by a government and social system which failed to reward ability. Only the able could provide and manage a system which could successfully look after the people and the nation.
The reform program advocated by the revolutionary "service intelligentsia" constituted, Huber says, a "first draft" of the transforming programs initiated after the Restoration. He portrays the changes advocated by Yoshida Shōin and expanded by Kusaka Genzui as "strong evidence that the Chōshū activists had a clear idea of what they wanted, and that what they wanted was something very much akin to the Meiji reforms that they later implemented" (p. 116).

Huber's argument for the existence of a newly emergent social class of "service intelligentsia" is a well-presented new view of the social character of the late Tokugawa period. The material grievances of this class are unfortunately somewhat overstated. Was the "service intelligentsia" really so "materially deprived and spiritually tormented?" (p. 3). Were their "psychological and physical burdens" (p. 214) really so heavy? It would have been difficult to convince the bulk of their countrymen of these grievances. More plausible is Huber's claim that they perceived themselves to be unfairly victimized by a political and social system that failed to recognize and reward their abilities. This is a theme suggested in seminal essays by Thomas Smith and Harry Harootunian nearly two decades ago. Huber has finally given it the fuller treatment it deserves.

Less successful is the notion that the reformist programs outlined by Sonjuku leaders constituted a kind of rough draft of the Meiji transformation. The evidence presented for this is thin and inconclusive at best. While it is an extremely provocative idea that deserves more study, it is not convincing here.

Huber has nonetheless raised important new questions to ask of the Restoration and of its relationship to the momentous period which followed. It is a major addition to the literature on the Meiji Restoration. For non-Japan scholars, Huber's use of the Weberian idea of bureaucratization as a source of revolutionary dynamism and the creation of a paradigm for a "service revolution" provide conceptual tools with considerable potential for analyzing periods of revolutionary change. The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan is an important book that deserves a wide audience.

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American newspapers in the 1920s broadcast the name "Borodin" as a synonym for international communism. As the Comintern adviser to the Kuomintang government from 1923 to 1927, Borodin was branded the Mephistophelean eminence grise behind the Chinese Revolution. Borodin added to this media distortion by cultivating a personal revolutionary mystique. When Vincent Sheean asked Borodin about his life, Borodin responded, "I was born in the snow and I live in the sun--