THE DIVISIONS OF THE POPE:

The Catholic Revival and Europe's Transition to Democracy*

"Democratic societies are populated not by freely acting individuals, but by collective organizations that are capable of coercing those whose interests they represent."
Adam Przeworski (1991)

For many years students of politics have shared two assumptions. 1) By the nineteenth century, "organized religion" had been displaced in Europe as the most vital source of identity and meaning. 2) And where it did still remain strong, especially in Catholic countries, these residues were antithetical to the real theme of the nineteenth century: the rise of democracy.¹

The first generalization did not go without contradiction from contemporaries. The young Harold Laski, writing in 1917, argued that "the Catholic Revival and the growth of nationalism are perhaps the two most fundamental facts in the history of the

*My thanks to Chad Bryant, James Bjork, Marcus Kreuzer, John Kulczyncki, Thomas Laqueur, and James Sheehan for information and bibliographical help.

¹This view is found especially among those who accept the mutual exclusion of "modernization" and religious belief. The assumption can be found in the distinguished works of Eugen Weber (France), Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Germany), and Stuart Woolf (Italy). It is argued, with greater nuance, by Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge and London, 1975).
nineteenth century." And historians of religion, even when they accepted the secularization thesis, have done much to qualify it (although the degree to which their work has been assimilated into the more general historical literature is open to question). The second generalization, however, is still widely shared, particularly as concerns the ultramontane church of the infallible Pius IX: superstitious, centralized, hierarchical, absolute—in short everything but democratic.

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4 The second assumption has been prominent among political scientists: e.g., Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), 137-76; esp. 163. Although Sartori claims that the relationship between Catholicism and democracy is an "open question," since he considers "all Catholic democracies" to be among those that "have not yet solved their problems" (!), he effectively forecloses the question. Moreover, he cites in support: A. Hauriou, "La Democratie Parlamentaire Peut-elle Reussir dans les Pays a Comportement Majoritaire Catholique?" in L'Evolution du Droit Public (Paris, 1956), 321-29. More recently, Robert D. Putnam, in his argument for the importance of associations in building social capital for democracy, excludes those connected with the Catholic Church, which he hypothesizes are "negatively associated with good government" Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 1993), 175-76. Also S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1960), 83-84. Anna Zarnowska, "Religion and politics: Polish workers c. 1900," Social History vol. 16 no. 3 (Oct. 1991): 299-316 argues (309) that the use of the Church (the only legal, organized sphere of public life in pre-war Upper Silesia and Russian Poland) as a substitute public sphere brought the diffusion of norms of public behavior that "conformed to the undemocratic character of society." A provocatively opposite view was early expressed by Daniel O'Connell (the Catholic Church has ever been on the side of democracy), cited by Laski, Studies, 139. Cf. also the (unpersuasive) title of Karl Buchheim's book on the Catholic organizations, Ultramontanismus und Demokratie. Der Weg der Deutschen Katholiken im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1963).
The following essay does not quarrel with this characterization of the nineteenth century Catholic Church. But I shall propose that in an age of the birth of mass politics, Catholicism—and perhaps especially this kind of Catholicism—has been constitutive of what political scientists call the "Transition to Democracy." In the first part, I shall lay out some of the common features of the international Catholic Revival in the nineteenth century. In the second, I shall draw on recent discussions among political scientists on the transition to democracy. These newer perspectives, which encourage us to think about the genesis of democratic politics in a non-normative way, suggest that we need to bring the Church into the story.

I. The Revival.

Historians differ as to whether, and to what degree, religious feeling was declining during the Enlightenment. But no one doubts that ecclesiastic authority, within the Catholic Church, was moving to national centers—and increasingly to the state. The landmarks are well known: the Holy See's caving in to the French crown and issuing the bull Unigenitus in 1713; its dissolution in 1773 of its own strongest supporters, the Jesuits; its haplessness in the face of Portugal's Plombal, on the one hand, and the Habsburg's Joseph II, on the other. More

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and more it looked as if the future of Catholicism lay in some kind of loose federation of national churches, with each firmly under the control of its respective state. And then came the French Revolution, with all of its military and other consequences. By the early nineteenth century, the Church's institutional strongholds on the continent had been leveled.

Although not all countries ran on Paris time (Poland's disaster began with the partitions—thus earlier; Spain's came later), the wreckage took the same form everywhere: lands confiscated, educational institutions closed, orders dissolved, nuns and priests expelled, diocesan sees and parishes left vacant. In the German lands, the ecclesiastical states disappeared with the Holy Roman Empire—a greater break with Germany's past, it has been argued, than 1848, 1870, 1918, or 1945. Confessional homogeneity, which had been the rule since the Peace of Westfalia, suddenly ended, as large populations, especially although not exclusively Catholic populations, were brought under the rule of sovereigns committed to a rival

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6 Suggested by Ellen L. Evans in the introduction to her new book, *The Cross and the Ballot: Catholic Political Parties in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 1785-1985* (Humanities Press, forthcoming), which she was kind enough to let me see.

7 For an excellent collection of articles on the old regime church in all its (national) variety: William J. Callahan and David Higgs, ed., *Church and Society in Catholic Europe of the eighteenth century* (Cambridge, 1979).

8 By Gerhard Benecke in his stimulating essay "The German Reichskirche," in Callahan/Higgs, *Church and Society*, 77-87; quote on 83.
version of Christianity. In France, the de-christianization campaign, in the words of John McManners, "formulated and compacted anticlericalism as an 'interest' in French life, bound up with the destiny of the Revolution...." 9

The revival began slowly; it was visible to Macaulay as early as 1840; to Germans, by the time of the Trier pilgrimage of 1844, a public gathering larger than any in living memory; to the world at large, with the bunching of religious vocations in the fifties and sixties. In what did the revival consist? In Ireland it meant the introduction of respectability and Tridentine church disciplines. In Silesia and Poland, it meant renewed pilgrimages, a temperance movement inspired by the Irish example, and Easter communion rates of ninety-seven percent of the population— even in areas of heavy industrialization and considerable anti-clericalism. 10 Everywhere, but at different times, it meant the return and renewal of the clergy, the founding of new orders, most of them devoted to the active life, and a rise in vocations—in unprecedented numbers for women. 11

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10 I owe this information to James Bjork, of the University of Chicago.

11 The clergy of France, which had the largest Catholic population in Europe, was growing at a dramatically faster rate than the rest of the population. In Spain the revival of orders began around the turn of the century, their numbers nearly doubling within the next thirty years. Francis Lannon, Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy. The Catholic Church in Spain 1875-1975 (Oxford, 1987), 59, 61.
Given the sometimes quite strict financial limits to expansion, the results were remarkable.  

And of course the revival meant a more prominent role for the pope, especially conspicuous against the background of the eighteenth century, when the Holy See had seemed so weak—or at least, so obliging. The enhanced authority of Rome expressed itself in little ways as well as important ones: in the spread of the "Italian" clerical title "Monseigneur," in the fact that more and more of the most talented younger clergy went to the colleges in Rome to finish their education, and that more bishops made _ad limina_ visits. We see it in the introduction (300 years after the Council of Trent!) of the Roman Breviary and the Roman Missal into Ireland, into holdout dioceses in France, and into the Rhineland: the latter, the result of a long, twilight struggle not completed until 1887. The change was visible also in the adoption of "Roman" clerical garb in places where it had not been seen in a very long time, if at all. Since priests continued—amid much discussion about the issue—to be clean-shaven, even after mid-century, at a time when the beard was regarded as a badge of masculinity (and in Germany, of "democracy!"), the adoption of the cassock sometimes made for trouble. When John Henry Newman walked the streets of Birmingham

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12 Clearly described for Spain in William J. Callahan, "An Organizational and Pastoral Failure. Urbanization, industrialization, and religion in Spain, 1850-1930)" in Hugh McLeod, ed., European Religion, 43-60, esp. 49. Spain presents the apparent paradox of a Church was both ultramontane and under the thumb of the state. See Callahan's illuminating "Regalism, Liberalism, and General Franco," Catholic Historical Review, LXXXIII/2, Apr. 1997: 201-216.
in his Oratorian habit, an angry crowd—unhappy, perhaps, at this apparent genderbending—doused him with a sack of flour.\textsuperscript{13}

Most important, perhaps: the clergy appealed to the authority of Rome in every kind of fight and at every level. Prussian bishops invoked it in their disputes with the Crown; French curés, in conflicts with their bishops. The Kapellmeister in Trier, in his campaign for a reform of the hymnal, invoked it in his struggle with the chapter's organist, who preferred the old, local ways, and did not go gently into that good (ultramontane) night.\textsuperscript{14} Although it is difficult to point to a single general rule covering all cases,\textsuperscript{15} and even more difficult


\textsuperscript{15}Contrast the assessment of the effect of Revolution and 1801 Concordat on the relative power of bishop and pope given by McManners, Revolution, 149 and Owen Chadwick, The Popes and the European Revolution (Oxford, 1981), 609 (both of whom emphasize the elevation of the pope as a consequence of the decline of his episcopal peers), with those of Ralph Gibson, A Social History of French Catholicism 1789-1914 (London and New York, 1989) and Jacques-Olivier Boudon, L'épiscopat français à l'époque concordataire (1802-1905): Origines, formation, nomination (Paris, 1996). Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, in Catholic Historical Review LXXXIV/1 (Jan. 1998): 127-29, concludes that "the episcopate represented an elite all the more powerful as under the regime of the Concordat of 1801 the bishops exercised a more effective authority over their clergy than their predecessors could enjoy under the Ancien Régime."
to explain the change in a thoroughly satisfactory manner,\textsuperscript{16} there is no doubt that the first eight decades of the nineteenth century saw a reconfiguration of authority relationships: within the parish, within the dioceses, and between the dioceses and the Vatican. It was easy for opponents to argue that the changes were all aimed at enhancing the pope's personal power. And two extraordinarily long pontificates (Pius IX's record-setting reign from 1846-1878, and Leo XIII's, from 1878-1903) made it unusually difficult for contemporaries to distinguish the institution from the office-holder. But the main purpose of this "Romanization" was to combat the danger--so real in the eighteenth century--of national churches.\textsuperscript{17} More positively, it aimed at strengthening the identity of clergy and laity to a church that, if not yet universal, was at least international. In this project, Rome largely succeeded. And in succeeding, it became increasingly visible, providing both Catholics and anticlericals across Europe with a single conspicuous symbol of their respective causes.

The first sign of a Catholic revival was the conversion of some celebrity intellectuals. Many of their names are familiar: 

\textsuperscript{16} Though the revival was certainly more than the reflex consequence of "de-criminalization," and shared some of the same aspects as Anglo-American evangelicalism, Christoph Weber rightly warns against unconsciously taking over the conceptualization of ultramontanes themselves: their own dichotomy of life versus death, and their vocabulary of rebirth, awakening, Neubeleben, resurrection, which may quite distort the picture both of the eighteenth century and of what was happening in the nineteenth. \textit{Aufklärung}, 58.

\textsuperscript{17} On the 18th century danger, see Karl Otmar von Aretin, \textit{The Papacy and the Modern World} (London, 1970), although he would probably not agree with my assessment on 19th century consequences.
in France, Chateaubriand; in Germany, Friedrich Schlegel and his wife, Dorothea--the brilliant daughter of the Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelsohn; in England, and somewhat later, John Henry Newman, Henry Edward Manning, Augustus Welby Pugin--whose neo-gothic churches reflected the new sensibility--and Gerard Manley Hopkins, to name only the most lustrous. But there were numbers of other converts, now largely forgotten, who were luminaries in their own day. Such a one was Philipp Veit, Dorothea's son, the founder of the Nazarine School of paintings. Veit's canvasses, significantly, include "Triumph of Religion," "Two Marys at the Sepulcher," and "Immaculate Conception."

Intellectuals are, of course, ever a tiny minority, and conspicuous Catholic intellectuals, a minority within a minority. But they are, for a culture, what the canary is at the pit of the mineshaft. Their chirps are a sign of habitability. And in their search for authenticity, it was precisely the "unreasonable" aspects of Catholicism the intellectuals embraced.

The converts contributed three elements to our story.

1) As a group, they gave Catholicism that high-profile, pugilistic, In-Your-Face tone, that experimental, "let's-try-it-on-for-size"-willingness to defend the indefensible, that was

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18The cross-over from Anglicanism to Rome, said Lecky, "'was quite unparalleled in magnitude since that which had taken place under the Stuarts.'" History of Rationalism I: 159, quoted in Laski, Sovereignty, 141.

19For a famous (and polemical) alternative interpretation of the conversions as instances of "subjective occasionalism:" Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (Munich, 1919).
the hallmark of the nineteenth century ultramontane. Thus we hear William George Ward, the founder of the Dublin Review, announce that he for one would like to see a new papal bull awaiting him every morning on the breakfast table, alongside his Times. Here was a new form of épater les bourgeois. This sort of intellectual gave to a much broader range of Catholics "below"--from school teachers and labor organizers to professionals and politicians--that cultural self-confidence, that nerve, that not only inspires sacrifice, but is also necessary--particularly in countries where Catholics had neither majority nor hegemony--for self-respect.21

2) Second, through their willed belief in the outrageous, the converts closed the gap between popular and learned religion. To convert to a Church in which a Bishop of Poitiers could promote--as late as the 1860s--the cult of "the only part of Christ's body left behind when He ascended into heaven" was quite a feat.22 The official church, although stopping short of

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21 The "Renaissance of Polish Catholicism," it has been argued, occurred only after the turn of the 20th century, and largely among an intelligentsia that turned away from the extremes of nationalism and socialism.

22 Gibson, History, 151. A Protestant lexikon, in discussing "superstition" (Aberglaube) wrote that "one can even say, "It is essential for Catholicism to produce superstition, which on the one hand does not belong to official religion, and therefore can be denied, [but] on the other hand has grown up with it, and creates a tough support in the sensuous being of the common people." Hermann Gunkel and Otto Scheel et. al., eds., Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch in gemeinverständlicher Darstellung (Tübingen, 1909) I: 95-96.
sponsoring outright fideism, met this kind of heroic faith half way by "rationalizing" its miracle-working machinery: concentrating its wonders in fewer and fewer, but better and better sites.\(^{23}\) By closing the gap between popular and learned religion, the ultramontane intellectuals made possible a new solidarity between the Catholic elite and the Catholic masses, a solidarity that the eighteenth century had begun to dissolve. This was a development with potentially momentous political consequences.

3) Closing the cultural gap between learned and popular religion meant, however, that the cultural gap between Catholics and the non-Catholic population yawned ever wider—perhaps wider than at any time since the Reformation. This is the third element that the converts contributed to our story. I don't mean to suggest that they alone were responsible for the cultural divide. But the fact of their being converts made it especially easy for non-Catholics and Liberals to think there was something "funny," something exaggerated, something extravagant—not about Catholic beliefs (that already went without saying!), but about the legal, political, and social arrangements that Catholics

\(^{23}\) On this process: Thomas A. Kselman, Miracles and Prophecies in Nineteenth-Century France (New Brunswick, 1983). Eugen Weber points out that "the great Marian apparitions...and the publicity they received" overwhelmed local cults, "transferring piety from the parish level to a transcendant object, just when patriotism too was being transferred from the petite patrie to the grande." Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (London, 1977), 423. The Church put a brake on fideism by rejecting locally-revered saints (see Heinz, "Im Banne") and locally-sponsored miracles (David Blackbourn, Marpingen. Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Bismarckian Germany [Oxford, 1992]), when proof was insufficient.
were now saying their religion absolutely required. This mistrust would play its role in the culture wars that lasted intermittently from the 1830s through the first decade of the twentieth century--culture wars which are also (I will later argue) part of the story of the transition to democracy.

A second feature of the Catholic Revival were the missions. This was, of course, a missionary century. And ultramontane Catholicism shared the same premise as that other international religious movement--evangelical Protestantism: that the world had yet to be Christianized. "De-christianization" was paradigmatically the situation in much of France after 1796. But de-christianization was becoming a reality everywhere that population explosion and urbanization brought new generations of Europeans into a dark inner continent that, if not heathen, could no longer be considered Christian. As Western Christianity made greater and greater efforts to encompass the world beyond Europe's shores, at home Christians--including Catholics--were moving to convert Christendom itself. Mission was the sunny twin of secularization.  

24 e.g., in Josef Görres's Athenasius (1838).

Catholics already had a model for missionizing at hand: the Society of Jesus, which had spearheaded, particularly in Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland, the Counter-Reformation's reconquista of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Jesuits had continued to conduct missions in the countryside, especially in Eastern Europe, until their dissolution in 1773. In 1814, they were formally re-constituted and began again the work of conversion—not of Protestants this time, but of Catholics: the unchurched, the heterodox, the fallen-away, the lukewarm. Always controversial, their lot was not an easy one: and their successes—and pertinacity—were crowned with expulsion, over and over again. Ten expulsions in seven countries over more than fifty years—and the furious demands that they be returned—guaranteed that the Jesuits (and those missionary orders associated with them) would always be in the news. In an era in which the universal word "Catholic" was increasingly preceded by the adjective "Roman," the Jesuits were Roman—in the sense of championing the prerogatives of the Holy See—without being Italian. The generals of their order, in the

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26 The Jesuits in Poland conducted from 800 to 1,000 missions annually. By mid-18th century, one of every four parishes in the diocese of Cracow had had a mission, usually by Jesuits or Lazarists. The situation was similar in the diocese of Warsaw and Vilna. Thus virtually the whole of the Polish population was "missionized." Jerzy Kloczowski, "The Polish Church," in Callahan/Higgs, ed., Church and Society, 122-37; 133.

27 In Holland, in 1815; in the Russian Empire, in 1820; in Portugal, in 1834; in Spain, in 1820 and again in 1835; in Switzerland, in 1847-48; in France, in 1830, 1880, and 1901; in the German Empire, in 1872— from which they were not allowed to return until 1917.
course of that troubled century, came from seven different
countries.  

The Jesuits were not the only Catholic missionaries, but
missionary work did depend upon the Catholic orders, which were
thus both a cause and a consequence of the revival. In France,
the numbers of male religious increased sixfold between 1851 and
1861—perhaps not accidently a decade in which the Holy See
seemed especially endangered. Female religious, although not
formally missionaries, were no less important to the education
and socialization of the female population. The bonne soeur, the
non-cloistered nun, of which there were more at the beginning of
the Third Republic than at any time in history, before or since,
was as much a fixture in most French parishes as the curé
himself. The image of the religious orders had undergone a
reversal since the Old Regime: from worldly loafers, parasitic
on the rest of the community, to selfless martyrs to the
Catholic people, unchurched and churched alike. The fact that

28 In the nineteenth century: German, Pole, Veronese, Dutch, Belgian,
Swiss, Spanish, German.

29 Ralph Gibson, "Female Religious Orders in Nineteenth-Century France," in Frank Tallett and Nicholas Atkin, eds., Catholicism in Britain and
France since 1789 (London and Rio Grande, Ohio, 1996), 105. In Ireland
too, the growth of female religious outstripped the growth of
population. An excellent feminist account: Caitriona Clear, Nuns in
Nineteenth-Century Ireland (Dublin and Washington, D.C. 1987); and for
England: Susan O’Brien, "Terra Incognita: The Nun in Nineteenth-
Century England," Past and Present 121 (Nov. 1988): 111-140, and idem,
"French Nuns in Nineteenth-Century England," Past and Present 154

30 Gerard Connolly, "The Transubstantiation of Myth: towards a New
Popular History of Nineteenth-Century Catholicism in England," Journal
of Ecclesiastical History vol. 35, no. 1 (Jan. 1984): 78-104; Otto
anticlerical regimes targetted them for expulsion further internationalized the church, as these sisters, brothers, and missionary fathers went from country to country, and then to the United States and Latin America.

The most important of the missionary communities were those that ministered to children. In the Netherlands, five congregations were founded to care for the children of the poor in industrializing cities in the generation after the French Revolution. In the British Isles, between a third and a half of the Redemptorists' missions were aimed at children. Over a five year period, at mid-century, Father John Joseph Furniss conducted eleven missions in Ireland and seventy-three in the north of England. The missions, which lasted on average about three weeks, attracted children in the thousands. Furniss set his sites on the poorest classes, those least likely to be churched. And parish priests reported that attendance at mass after Father Furniss's departure increased spectacularly, sometimes as much as seven-fold, an effect that was measurable for several years. It has been suggested that these missions reflected the characteristically nineteenth century "discovery of childhood" as a special stage in life, one calling for

The most telling sign of this reversal of image is the birth of Protestant religious orders: first within Anglicanism, in the 1830s, then within German Lutheranism. Owen Chadwick, The Christian Church in the Cold War (London, 1992), 170.

special techniques (e.g., competition between boys and girls; prizes for bringing a friend) but also offering special promise.\textsuperscript{32} If so, in exploiting this discovery, ultramontane Catholicism was similar to Methodism in its entrepreneurial spirit. The children's missions were also, however, part of a conscious and growing movement, encouraged especially by the Jesuits, to induct the Catholic into the full life of the church at earlier and earlier ages: first communions beginning in England no longer at fourteen but at ten; on the continent, not at ten, but at seven.\textsuperscript{33} The child, as the historian Bernard Aspinwall has put it, was to be the father of the Ultramontane.

If missions were designed to \textit{spark} a commitment to the faith, Catholic schooling was thought necessary to anchor it. Not only would religious subjects and devotions take up to a third of the curriculum, mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation were made a school activity, which pupils would attend \textit{in corpora}. The emphasis, in sermons and in school, on lurid penalties that awaited the unredeemed, was joined to the sweet savor of moral superiority enjoyed by those who accepted the offer of the Church—\textit{a superiority demonstrated}, so they were taught, by the various miracles vouchsafed it during the course of the century. It should not surprise us that when their


\textsuperscript{33}However, not everywhere was early first communion the rule: it was usually delayed in France until 10 or 12, only after 1910 was it done at seven. Gibson, \textit{History}, 258. Throughout most of the 19th c. the French clergy were hostile to frequent communion.
meetings let out, throngs of Glasgow children might crowd over to the house of some Protestant, join hands, and chant "Daily, daily, sing to Mary." On the other side of the channel, the target might be Jews. Mission and school inculcated what we now call "self-esteem"—but a good deal of self-righteousness as well.

As the school replaced the village as the main means of socialization, it was inevitable that the question of school authority would turn into one of the fundamental controversies of the nineteenth century. As Ernst Gellner argued, modifying Max Weber, "The monopoly on legitimate education is now more important, more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence." If, like Gellner, one posits that in modern society real power is bound up with education as tightly as with military and police, then it was predictable that the state coveted, and had to covet, a monopoly on education just as much as a monopoly on force, and that the church viewed, and would have to view, its claim to the socialization of the faithful not only as its traditional, but as its natural, right. And in fact, the struggle over schooling was the issue of the nineteenth


35 Aspinwall, "The Child," 428; and 432, 437-38.

36 Gellner did not see this claim to a monopoly on education as something universally valid, but rather tied it explicitly to "modern' relationship: the dissolution of "segmentary society," developments in communication, democratization, etc. Moreover he did not discuss this claim, as do I, in connection with conflicts between church and state but rather in relation to the conflict between various language groups within society. Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell, 1983).
century. Everywhere Catholics fought for control over their schools, either by obtaining political influence in the state or through voluntary bodies.\footnote{Errors 45, 46, 47, 48 of the Syllabus of Errors of 1864 concern the schools.} It was the issue over which Dutch Catholics broke with Dutch Liberals in the 1860s. It was the issue which brought Catholic families—\textit{not just} clerics—\textit{into} conflict with the state. It was the issue which gave Catholics a stake in the political process, which they demonstrated, first by petition campaigns, then by voting. In England, the establishment of a separate Catholic school system was the crowning achievement of nineteenth century Catholics. Marjorie Lamberti has argued that it was Bismarck’s fear that German Catholics were about to do the same that led him finally to seek an end to the Kulturkampf.\footnote{State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany (New York, 1989), 215-217.}

Located somewhere between the liminal moment of the mission, and the routine socialization of the school were the voluntary societies, beginning with purely devotional and charitable parish guilds and sodalities in the early decades of the century, but, as the complexities of industrial society increased, developing into more practical organizations, and proliferating in many places—Germany, Belgium, Holland, Britain, Prussian Poland, even (after the turn of the century)
in France--into a whole culture of sociability and social services.\(^{39}\)

An example of what this "milieu," as it is called in Germany, might offer was the Catholic "Volksbureau" set up in the Essen of the Protestant "canon king," Alfred Krupp. Established as a "friendly society of a popular sort," it expanded to become one of the official dispensaries of the certificates needed to obtain medical care from the local poor funds. But in addition to acting as an agent of the state, between 1896 and 1901 alone, the clerics and their helpers in this steel town answered 133,850 queries, filled out forms and wrote letters for more than 51,000 working class clients, and supplied aid to people asking for help on everything from getting a son out of the army to getting a mineowner to pay the pension he owed, to finding an apprenticeship for a needy boy, to helping a woman whose husband beat her, to appearing in court on behalf of a worker arrested for fighting.\(^{40}\) The Volksbureau offered something for everyone. It was not the only face of


\(^{40}\) Frank Bajohr, Zwischen Krupp und Kommune. Sozialdemokratie, Arbeiterchaft und Stadtverwaltung in Essen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Essen, 1988), 33-34. Bajohr contrasts Catholics' Vereinsfreudigkeit with the Social Democrats' reluctance to get involved at the sub-political level: 35-36.
Catholicism in Germany, and its like certainly did not exist in every Catholic town. What was more or less universal, however, was the concerted attempt by the Church and its supporters to construct a counter-world within secular society; a world in which Catholics would remain together, depend upon each other—and keep apart from those with different commitments. This too was an authentic result of the revival.\footnote{Although not, apparently, in Ireland, perhaps because of preoccupation with nationalist and land issues. Clear, Nuns, 159-62.}

Finally, the Catholic revival began a move towards frequent communions (ever a part of the Jesuit project), and more generally towards making the mass central to the life of every Catholic. This was a potentially important development, politically, in three ways.\footnote{There was one exception: throughout most of the 19th century the French clergy were hostile to frequent communion. This only changed among those who grew up under the Third Republic.} 1) the mass is corporate. It brings together Catholics of all estates in a single act, makes the Church visible to itself, and provides the basis, not of equality but of disciplined solidarity. 2) The mass marks out difference. With its veneration of Christ's real presence in the host, it sets Catholics apart from all other Western Christians. It also draws the sharpest possible line between the Church and the religion of humanity and other ethical and spiritual movements claiming to share the same "Christian" values. 3) The mass is clerical. It depends upon the priest—as does the confession that must precede it. In sum: for all the sociability and spectacle provided by pilgrimages; for all the refined
interiority provided by the rosary and devotions to the sacred heart; for all accomplishment provided by the myriad organizations developed to better the life of Catholics and society: the centrality of the mass in the Catholic hierarchy of values was bound to increase the faithful's contact with the clergy, and--some said--the clergy's control over them. And the Roman rite, which thanks to concerted papal pressure backed by local ultramontane ginger groups had replaced regional variants almost universally by 1870, was an outward and visible sign of Catholic solidarity with each other and their distance from other Christians.\footnote{To summarize: intellectuals, missions, school, milieu, and sacrament--all of these aspects of the religious revival worked together. They inculcated in nineteenth century Catholics not only a faith, but an identity. What did this identity have to do with politics? For that, let us turn to political science.}

To summarize: intellectuals, missions, school, milieu, and sacrament--all of these aspects of the religious revival worked together. They inculcated in nineteenth century Catholics not only a faith, but an identity. What did this identity have to do with politics? For that, let us turn to political science.

**II. Political Science.**

Political scientists are helpful to historians because they remind us of things we might otherwise take for granted. They do this by giving them special names. The names I want to invoke here are "interest aggregation," "mobilization" and "structuring conflict."

1) Let's look first at "interest aggregation." My thoughts here have been stimulated by the work of Steven Fish, whose book on post-Soviet Russia, *Democracy From Scratch*, addressed the following puzzle: the existence of large numbers of people believing in democratic values, of laws permitting free association, and of democratic elections have proved insufficient to establish effective representative government.

Millions of individuals, Fish points out, however democratic their sentiments and however free their ballots, cannot exercise control over a state. Without effective parties to provide continuity from one election to another and to serve as agents of intermediation, and without identifiable constituencies, elections produce amorphous legislatures with no security that those doing the talking actually speak for anyone outside the room.\(^4\) Such bodies--be they Dumas, Chambers of Deputies, Cortez's, Reichstags--are incapable of disciplined action, no more able to define and carry out an agenda than your average faculty senate. For an individual's choice to have an impact, it must go into the funnel of an organization capable of aggregating interests and giving them the kind of stable embodiment that would make it worthwhile for the state (Crown, bureaucracy, army), or for other groups, to cooperate with them. There must be an organization, and it must be able to "deliver."

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(And, of course, to withhold.) Such organizations presuppose the presence of "civil society," but it takes more than civil society to produce them.

Not every group that calls itself a party, however, can act like one. How does an organization acquire the ability to "aggregate interests?" It can't, if people do not really accept its leaders as, in some sense, "theirs;" and if they do not strongly believe that they share an identity or interest, with the group's other members. Whence comes the glue that accomplishes the miracle of e pluribus unum? Whence comes that sense of mutual obligation, vertically and horizontally ("solidarity norms," in Claus Offe's phrase), that enable parties to demand sacrifices from their constituents (such as risking their job when they vote against the boss), that enable them to acquire resources of time and money, and even to bind their supporters to positions on issues often unrelated to their concrete personal concerns?

At one time, it was fairly common to assume that such solidarities emerged "naturally" out of a person's life situation. Thus workers naturally voted their class interests; the ethnic minority, its national identity. But as Giovanni Sartori has pointed out, after analyzing the electoral geography of postwar France: political identities are not the automatic reflection of structural cleavages. Rather, the cleavages

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45 "Partyless society cannot cope with politicized society." Giovanni Sartori, quoted in Fish, Democracy, 78.

46 Offe cited in Fish, Democracy, 54.
themselves, at least insofar as they become relevant politically, are products of conscious organizers, and especially those who happen to arrive on the scene first. Large collectivities "become class structured only if they are class persuaded," he argues. What is true for class is true, ceterus paribus, for nationality. And for religious affiliation. Ultramontane Catholicism—thanks to its intellectuals, to its missions, to its liturgical centralization, to its parish-centered sociability—was extraordinarily successful in persuading people that they shared the kind of identity across class, across region, sometimes across ethnicity—that can make a genuine party—and thus representative democracy—possible.

2) The second element I want to draw to your attention is "mobilization." "Identity," however strongly felt, does not win

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49 In some places, it was more successful than the apostles of class and nation. Bajohr, Krupp, and esp. Karl Rohe, Wahlen und Wählertraditionen in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M., 1992). Sartori himself, however, would not agree with my argument here. See "European Political Parties," esp. 143-45, 163, and 169-71, on the deleterious effects of the clerical cleavage in dis-aggregating Italian interests—an argument I find unpersuasive. Contrast John Vincent, Pollbooks. How Victorians Voted (Cambridge, 1968), 20: "It is ...agreeable to find that the Roman Catholic clergy, in the age of Newman and Pio Nono, swallowed their principles and voted almost solidly Liberal. Here, as with the publicans, calculation quite overlaid feeling, showing the successful function of parties in creating agreement on immediate action, between fundamentally irreconciliable groups—and the Catholics and the Nonconformists in the Liberal rank and file were never far from coming to blows."
elections. As Samuel H. Barnes once said, "No idea has ever made much headway without an organization behind it."\textsuperscript{50} But when franchises were introduced in the nineteenth century, the Catholic "interest" already possessed an organizational infrastructure in the diocese as in the parish. In candidate selection, parish priests proved indispensable brokers between farmers and consumers, bosses and trade unionists. They also distributed the flyers and ballots. They also got out the vote. "Clericalism proved a great initiator to democratic politics," a historian of France has argued, "and the opportunities for mass control intrinsic to democratic politics made the fortune of clericalism."\textsuperscript{51} The priests mobilized voters.

In Germany, voter turnouts in Catholic areas averaged seventy percent in 1874, rates the rest of the Empire did not attain until 1903.\textsuperscript{52} They allowed the Catholic minority, only


\textsuperscript{52}In analogous Protestant districts (i.e., Protestants dominant but with less than 75%) turnouts averaged only 50.3%. These are my calculations, derived from statistics on confession and turnout in Gerhard A. Ritter with Merith Niehuss, Arbeitsbuch (1980), 99-100. I was unable to find a simple figure for Catholic turnout in 1874 among the refined analyses in Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser's Voters. Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, 1997), although 92 Table 2.5a, gives an average of 79% of Catholics voting in constituencies that had Centrum candidates, and he notes, on p. 80, that as a proportion of eligible (Catholic and Protestant) voters, the Centrum rose 80% from 1871 to 1874. Earlier Sperber had noted that in selected north-western constituencies in 1874 the Centrum captured as much as 97% of all Catholics voting. Popular Catholicism in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Princeton, 1984), 256. I am aware of the "ecological fallacy" of deducing the voting behavior of individuals
thirty-six percent of Germany's population, to control, via the Centrum and Polish Parties, the largest bloc of seats in the Reichstag from 1881 until 1912. Even more remarkable was the party discipline that allowed Centrum leaders, in districts where their own party stood no chance of winning, to "deliver" constituencies unanimously in the run-off elections to parties that had viciously attacked them in the first balloting—in return for promises of similar help in more promising constituencies.53

Yet if Germany provided the most spectacular example, the phenomenon was remarkably similar across national boundaries.54

53 Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill, 1985), 92-93.

It triggered charges of "gross clerical intimidation, servile obedience to the priests on the part of the illiterate voters, clergymen canvassing...in their parishes or acting as ...agents in the polling booths." These complaints were lodged by United Ireland in 1892, but they could just as easily have come from the procurator-general of Besançon in 1869, or the Norddeutsche Allgemeine at the height of the Kulturkampf.  

The charge of clerical intimidation was useful for denying legitimacy to Catholic victories. But the belief that clerical pressures were part of Catholic electioneering was not off the mark. The clergy were never shy about offering political instruction. In Brittany, a candidate held rallies in church and bestowed benedictions on his assembled supporters. In 1892 the Bishop of Meath himself placed the name of Michael Davitt into nomination, urged his congregation to come to a Davitt rally armed with sticks, and had a pastoral letter read out at all


masses in the diocese predicting divine retribution for "the dying Parnellite."  
(Davitt's election was overturned.)

Here is not the place to go into the question of the boundaries of legitimate clerical election influence. I want instead to stress that in four countries a successful Catholic party was formed: Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands. The significant exception is France—the country with the largest number of Catholics in Europe. Although considerable "mobilization" there did take place, nineteenth century French Catholics never founded a party capable of aggregating their interests. This is important for—as Stathis Kalyvas has argued—a religious cleavage with a confessional party is bound to

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57 Irish priests also participated fully in the most common secular election crimes: treating, bribery, inciting to riot, instigating multiple voting. Woods, "Election," 300, 247, 306; K. Theodore Hoppen, Elections, Politics, and Society in Ireland 1832-1885 (Oxford, 1984), 245, 245 n5, 246. Clerical influence accounted for 6 invalidations between 1852 and 1881. An exception seems to be (surprisingly) Austria where Boyer describes the clergy as becoming active only well after the turn of the century. Austria's Christian Socials were unlike the Z, not least in being (contrary to their image) not dependent on the clergy for their organizational clout. John W. Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna. Christian Socialism in Power, 1897-1918 (Chicago, 1995), 300, 302-03, 310-12, 328.


59 Austria is usually included in the list; but Boyer's work shows the Austrian episcopate hostile to the party, and suggests that the "clerical" aspect of the Christian Social Party became prominent very late, after it left Vienna and spread to the provinces, towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. It appears to me that Social Democracy was more important for structuring cleavages.
produce a significantly different political environment than a religious cleavage without one. For one thing, conservative "confessional parties (but not conservative parties supported by religious voters, as in France) were forced to absorb Catholic workers' organizations, formed by the church." As a result, Catholic trade unions prospered only in countries where such confessional parties emerged. But even without a confessional party, I would maintain, the religious cleavage in France was powerful enough to help bring coherence into elections, to "discharge what Leon D. Epstein calls the party's 'minimum function,' namely, structuring the vote."61

Now it may be objected that Catholic mobilization, including its high turnouts, represented mere clientelism, and therefore had little to do with genuine participation, and therefore with the transition to democracy.62 If the voters had not felt they had a fundamental stake in what was at play and cast their ballots merely to please their parish priest, that objection would be valid. That stake, however, was produced by the identity Catholics felt with their Church--especially as it

60Kalvas, Rise, 116. John Boyer is writing an article that will also deal with the French exception in detail. The fact that the Republican chamber of deputies was willing to invalidate "clerical" victories wholesale may have played a part. Germaine A[ntoin] Lefèvre-Pontalis, Les Élections en Europe à la Fin du XIX Siècle (Paris, 1902), 13.

61Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick, 1980), 77, quoted in Fish, Democracy, 72-73, writing--significantly--about parties in recent "founding elections" in Spain in the mid-seventies, and Latin America in the eighties.

62This is roughly the position of Blaschke, "Kolonisierung."
came increasingly under siege—and with their clergy, their culture, and with each other. 63 These identities were very much the product of the Catholic revival, and they brought the pressures of the "milieu" to bear on the voter, pressures that were at least as effective as any of the alleged terrors of the confessional. 64 It was precisely the element of genuine "horizontal" re-inforcement that reveals the essential and characteristic difference between the voting legions of Germany's clerically staffed Centrum, Ireland's Home Rule Party, Belgium's Christian Democrats, and those of the vertically-


64 Analyses of Irish elections show that the priest acted more as a necessary conduit and facilitator, and was not able to produce elections against the will of the electorate. Whyte, "Influence," 247 (it was "on the whole true that the Irish clergy could lead their people only in the direction that they wanted to go"); Hoppen, "Priests," 117-138. And here too, unlike Germany, the bishops were by no means happy about the partisanship of their priests. At the same time, Rome's efforts—most notably in 1840 and 1880, to set strict limits to the clergy's politicking—did not have much effect. Ibid., 20. Whyte thinks clerical influence declined between 1870 and 1890. It seems that in Ireland the development of party organizations made the priest's leadership, communications, and brokerage function less indespensible; while in Germany the priest often provided both the organized organization (in the party era)—as well as, in the pre-party era, the de facto (non-organized) organization.
organized, "clientelist" structures in so many districts in Iberia, Latin America, and Africa.\textsuperscript{65}

These horizontal and vertical solidarities were re-inforced by the nineteenth century's Catholic-Liberal conflicts. Some emerged from the agenda of the modernizing state: as in Portugal of the 1830s, when public health laws interfered with traditional Catholic burial practices and triggered riots that fueled a revolution.\textsuperscript{66} Others arose when a greater attention to canon law on the part of church authorities (a product of the new ultramontanist rigor) led them to reneg on an existing modus vivendi which the church had previously silently tolerated. This happened in 1837, when the new Archbishop of Cologne took a hard line on the question of mixed marriages, and resulted in his arrest!\textsuperscript{67} But for all their outward variety, these conflicts were everywhere, at bottom, the same. Ultimately all of them were over sovereignty: that is, over the question of who, in matters of dispute, will decide.\textsuperscript{68} And when no other issue appeared, the

\textsuperscript{65}These ideas were stimulated by the excellent discussion of clientelism in Alain Rouquié, "Clientelist Controls and Authoritarian Contexts," in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié, eds., Elections Without Choice (New York, 1978), 19-35, esp. 22-27, which emphasizes the absence of "secondary" (horizontal) associations in regions with clientelist politics.

\textsuperscript{66}I owe this information to my colleague, Thomas Laqueur.

\textsuperscript{67}Rudolf Lill, Die Beilegung der Köner Wirren 1840-1842 (Düsseldorf, 1962).

\textsuperscript{68}It may come as a surprise that Harold Laski's 1917 Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty is devoted almost exclusively to issues of Church and State.
question of schools was always there, waiting to explode—which it often did. So it is to conflict per se that I now turn.

III. Felix Culpa: The Uses of Conflict.

For a long time, conflict was held in ill repute among democratic theorists. Many considered a consensus on fundamental values a prerequisite for democracy. In 1970, however, Dankwart Rustow argued that a "consensus on fundamentals is an implausible precondition. A people who were not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters would have little need to devise democracy's elaborate rules for conflict resolution. And the acceptance of those rules is logically a part of the transition process rather than its prerequisite." 69

Instead of prerequisites, Rustow offered what he called "a dynamic model" to describe the "Transition to Democracy" in regimes that have begun to enfranchise its people. 70 The only "prerequisite" that he considered relevant was that the state have generally accepted boundaries. A successful transition required neither an egalitarian social structure, nor democratic attitudes (tolerance, civility, agreement on procedures, a


70 Manhood Suffrage: France, 1848, Germany, 1871 (North German Confederation, 1867) Spain, 1890; Norway, 1906; Austria and Finland, 1907; Sweden, 1909; Italy, 1912; Denmark, 1915; Iceland, 1916; the Netherlands, 1918. Rustow's schema has much less relevance where the electorate is too small (Italy, initially) or where political parties agree not to compete (as in Restoration Spain's Turno Rigoroso).
consensus on fundamentals), since a civic culture, he argued, was an effect, rather than a cause of democracy.

The details need not concern us here. But Rustow's central point was that the engine that pushes a country down a path that may lead to democracy is a "hot family feud:" "a protracted, inconclusive conflict between ... well-entrenched forces, neither of whom is able to defeat the other, over an issue that has profound meaning" to both. It is no hindrance that one (and maybe both) of these sides are no friends of democracy, nor that the struggle gets stalemated. Indeed, stalemate is more conducive to democratic development than resolution—or even the victory of the more democratic side of the quarrel. For it is the persistence of the conflict that promotes the tactical compromises, the deals, the reluctantly tolerated procedural expedients that eventually "institutionalize uncertainty." 71

These procedural norms were not sought by the contenders, he stressed, who would have much preferred to win outright. Neither did it matter that the struggle continues after such compromises and procedural decisions are made. In democracies, procedures are designed to regulate, not to end, differences. As long as the "hot family feud" persists, and neither side triumphs, the

71"Transitions" (1970), 355. "Institutionalizing uncertainty" is from Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore and London, 1986), 47-63, esp. 58, 60. I owe insights on Rustow to Fish, "Russia's Crisis" (1996), 141-45, 160. My education in political science, such as it is, is owed to Marcus Kreuter, whose own work, Democratisation and Innovation (University of Michigan Press, forthcoming), is an excellent introduction to these debates.
campaigning, voting, and horsetrading—that is the all-important habituation to open politics—can continue. People grudgingly accept their leaders' hard-won compromises, in hopes of better next time. And competition, in a benign form of Darwinism, rewards those who pay lip service to the procedures that make competition possible.\textsuperscript{72} For Rustow, it is "democracy"—conflict reflected in election contests—that produces democrats, not the other way around.\textsuperscript{73}

If Rustow is right, it helps explain why the Age of the Catholic Revival (roughly 1830-1930) is the golden age of electoral participation. For the church-state conflicts that were repeated all across Europe were indeed a "hot family feud": a protracted, inconclusive conflict between...well-intrenched forces, neither of whom" was "able to defeat the over, over an issue that had profound meaning for both."

Without the religious revival, however, which taught ordinary Catholics to value those absolute claims made by the Church to jurisdiction, socialization, and control over its own affairs, it is hard to believe that the feud would have had profound meaning for the masses of the Catholic electorate. Or that Catholic forces would have been entrenched enough to have

\textsuperscript{72}This aspect is emphasized especially in the work of another influential Rustowian: Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (1991).

\textsuperscript{73}Rustow, "Transition," 363. These two elements do not, note bene, necessitate democracy: the fight may go on until the issues fade without any democratic solution; or one side may find a way to crush its opponent. Ibid., 355.
prevented a fairly quick victory for liberals or the state. (One of the Church's strengths, after all, lay in its ability to deploy the pope's divisions—the Jesuits, the teaching orders—from one field of combat, as soon as they were defeated and expelled, to another.) Perhaps we should not be surprised that the decline of the kind of competitive political environment that once produced fierce party loyalties, reflected in high election turnouts, has accompanied the decline of militanm religious identity in the late twentieth century. Secularization and political apathy may go together.

IV. Conclusion: Good News, Bad News.

Some may be skeptical of the Rustowian political theodicy—where good comes out of evil, and democracy out of irresolvable conflict—given what we know that some of these cultural conflicts have produced. And I wish here to register three preemptive caveats myself.

Caveat Number 1:

The Rustowian argument, which is about establishing procedures, says nothing about the affective consequences of a Hot Family Feud. The nineteenth century's culture wars produced hateful examples of anti-Catholicism. In England, church windows

74 Strikwerda, "Resurgent Religion," 65.

75 This conclusion parallels that of the relationship between national identity and conflict (especially religious conflict) Linda Colley, in Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven and London, 1992), 5-7. Her conclusion about the present is that when conflict declines, so does national identity.
were vulnerable to vandals every Guy Fawkes day. In France, conspiracy theories took root. And in countries all over Europe, dedicated religious were expelled from their communities. At the same time these conflicts encouraged among Catholics an access self-righteousness at best, and all too frequently, bigoted disdain, sometimes hatred, for those outside the faith—in the British Isles, for Protestants, and on the continent, for Jews. "Interest aggregation," after all, depends on "cleavage;" they are part of the same story. Or, as David Martin put it recently: "Whatever brings people together also separates them." 76

**Caveat Number 2:** There is nothing automatic (as Rustow himself concedes) about conflict leading to the habits of compromise. Spain in the 1930's: now that's a Hot Family Feud! If Rustowian is not to become simply another word for panglossian, we must insist that not all feuds are conducive to democracy. 77

Why did religious conflict—which was the same sort of conflict everywhere, in Europe and in Latin America—produce, over time, deals, and compromises, and rules in some societies, and such terrible outcomes in others? The answer depends, I

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77 This is a contingency that Rustow himself, who tries to avoid determinisms of all sorts, admits. In fact, he concedes that conflict has proved more productive in societies where it has centered around socio-economic issues than where it has centered on culture. In the former, you can "always split the difference;" while between Catholicism and Secularism as principles of education, as between Flemish and French as official languages, there is no middle ground. "Transition," 359-60.
think, not on the political values of the church, which varied little according to region, but on the strength of the state.

One weakness of Rustow's schema for democratic transition is that he makes his only pre-condition for the potential fruitfulness of conflict that the state have acknowledged boundaries. Obviously a feud involving a session movement is no longer within the "family." But just as important, I would argue, as boundaries, is the strength of the state itself. The state must be actually functioning. It must be able to enforce its own rules (even against itself!), to keep the electoral count minimally honest in most places, and especially to preserve public order.

For conflict is beneficially self-reinforcing (that is, selecting in a Darwinian fashion those who favor democratic norms), only when violence is kept under control. Once violence enters, it too becomes self-reinforcing, creating its own set of expectations that destroy public life. And the willingness to engage in violence is not, I think, a product of culture, but of the failures of the state. When the state is not strong enough to enforce its own rules, neither side feels its existence

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78 For "Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may freely change, the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry be continuous." Rustow, "Transition," 350-51. This exception may cover the Northern Ireland case, where conflict has been destructive of democratic practices and values.
secure. Each becomes maximalist—in its grasp for privilege, in its unwillingness to bend.79

**Caveat Number 3:** I've sketched out an argument for the general political benefits that the religious revival offered in terms of structuring cleavages, of encouraging interest aggregation, of stimulating participation (mobilization), and for producing lengthy and significant conflict. I should add that in self-consciously adopting an international set of norms—cultural, institutional, liturgical, moral—the revival, in some places, offered a useful counter-weight to the nationalism that was increasingly claiming primary allegiance (although in the end Catholicism proved no more effective than Social Democracy in inoculating European society against war.)

But even if we emphasize the positive features of the revival, it remains very much a good news/bad news story. The good news is that in some regions where the revival was strong (Germany, Belgium, England, Ireland) the Church helped develop civil society and the public sphere, while Catholic factions quickly came to support universal suffrage, equal rights for religious minorities, universal suffrage, labor unions, early steps towards welfare state.

I'm sure our conference's other participants will be able to remind us of plenty of bad news that will qualify, if not refute, the optimistic picture presented here. It is a familiar

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79 Is my "strong state" just a dummy variable for "democratic structures" or "liberal mentality"? I think not not: since Germany had much of the first and little of the second.
story that nineteenth century Catholicism was the handmaiden of reaction (France), of privilege (Spain), of antisemitism (Austria), and of apathy (Italy). I have wracked my brain for a covering law (ratio of Jesuits to population? arable acreage to clergy?) that would explain these differences. In vain. All happy religious revivals are alike, but \emph{every} unhappy revival is unhappy after its own fashion.

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\footnote{A stimulating attempt is to be found in Kalyvas, \textit{Rise}.}