Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing

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Aquinas and Later Scholastics on Willful Wrongdoing

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Philosophy

by

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DEDICATION

To Matt

For your boundless support and unconditional love.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Aquinas

In Iob  Expositio super Iob ad Litteram (Commentary on Job)
In NE  Sententiae libri Ethicorum (Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics)
In Sent.  Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Commentary on the Sentences)
QDV  Quaestiones de veritate (Disputed Questions on the Truth)
QDVC  Quaestiones de virtutibus in communi (Disputed Questions on Virtue)
QDM  Quaestiones disputatae de malo (Disputed Questions on Evil)
ST  Summa Theologiae

Works by Suárez

DA  De Angelis (On the Angels)
DFH  De Fine Hominis (On the Human End)
DM  Disputationes Metaphysicae (Metaphysical Disputations)
DS  De Spe (On Hope)
DVP  De Vitiis et Peccatis (On Vices and Sins)

Works by Other Authors

EN  Nichomachean Ethics
DDT  Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis (Capreolus)
CST  Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae (Cajetan)
General Abbreviations

a. article
ad. reply to an objection
arg. argument
c. around
disp. disputation
dist. distinction
lib. book
obj. objection
q. question
sect. section

Citation Style

References to Aquinas’s works cite the abbreviation for the work (ST, for instance, for the Summa), the part of the work in which the reference is found (I-II, for example, refers to Aquinas’s *Prima Secundae*), then the relevant question within that part of the work. Finally, if applicable, these references cite the numbers of both the relevant article within that question and reply to an objection within that article.

References to Capreolus’s *Defensiones* follow a similar schema, citing the abbreviation for the work (DDT), the book under consideration, distinction number, and then the numbers corresponding to the relevant question and article. Since an article can be rather lengthy, citations also indicate the section within the article under consideration and, if applicable, a particular argument. Finally, I have included reference to the place each citation can be found in the Paban and Pègues edition of the text. The format for these citations is volume number, page number, then column (a or b).

References to Cajetan’s work cite the abbreviation for the work (CST), the location of the reference within the *Summa*, and a Roman numeral indicating the section of Cajetan’s commentary as it appears in the Leonine edition.

Finally, references to Suárez’s work cite the abbreviation for the work, as well as the relevant book, then chapter, then paragraph number within that work as noted in the Vivés edition. This citation is followed by reference to the place each citation can be found in the Vivés edition of Suárez’s *Opera Omnia*: volume, page number, and then column.
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Thank you to my parents, Brian and Karen Comstock, who have always trusted me enough to encourage me to succeed doing what I love.

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Aquinas holds that all people desire what they desire sub ratione boni, or, as J. David Velleman puts it, “under the guise of the good”. While this thesis has had many advocates from antiquity to the present, critics often accuse its proponents of failing to account for familiar phenomena, including willful wrongdoing. The willful wrongdoer calmly and deliberately does what she knows is bad.

Aquinas argues that both the guise of the good thesis, and what I call the Socratic thesis — the notion that all wrongdoing involves ignorance — are compatible with willful wrongdoing. Here, I assess the merits and shortcomings of Aquinas’s account, and explore how later scholastic philosophers, John Capreolus, Thomas Cajetan, and Francisco Suárez, interpreted and altered it.

In the first chapter, I examine Aquinas’s view of vice. I show that Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, holds that vicious actions are instances of willful wrongdoing. He believes that vices distort the agent’s perception of her ultimate end, leaving her capable of clear-eyed evil in the pursuit of an apparent good.
In the second chapter, I consider Aquinas’s account of several states, including despair. Aquinas holds that these states are both instances and sources of willful wrongdoing. His account of them and their origin suggests that, contrary to popular belief, Aquinas believes some wrongdoing originates without a prior error in reason.

In the third chapter, I examine how influential fifteenth and sixteenth century thinkers John Capreolus and Thomas Cajetan interpret Aquinas's account of willful wrongdoing. I argue that while each successfully resolves several of the original account's weaknesses, each also overlooks the primary role Aquinas accords to the will in such wrongdoing.

In the final chapter, I turn to the prolific early modern Spanish philosopher Francisco Suárez. Suárez, like Aquinas, adheres to both the guise of the good thesis and the Socratic thesis. I examine his understanding of the Socratic thesis in light of the distinction he draws between moral and metaphysical necessity.
INTRODUCTION

The topic of this study is a very ordinary phenomenon: willful wrongdoing. The willful wrongdoer does what is morally bad knowingly, without the mitigating influence of ignorance or unruly emotions. She is not weak-willed or akratic, and neither is she unaware of the fact that what she does is morally wrong. The willful wrongdoer is someone who does what she knows is morally bad, and does it calmly and on purpose.

Such actions, I venture, are exceedingly common. While medieval Christian philosophers, like Aquinas, deem willful wrongdoing especially grave, this is because of the involvement of the agent’s will in such acts. It is not because such acts need to be extraordinary. The willful wrongdoer need not, for instance, act for the sake of doing what is bad, or out of a desire to rebel against the constraints of the moral law. As I argue below, willful wrongdoing is compatible with a wide variety of motives. The willful wrongdoer can act for pleasure, for wealth, for love, or for any other good, as well as from attitudes like presumption and despair.

When we think of willful wrongdoing, then, our paradigmatic case should not be Satan or the psychopath, but rather the tax evader, the casual liar, the plagiarizer, or the businessman who charges his personal expenses to the company credit card. Willful wrongdoing is not some particular set of especially grave actions, but one way of performing any morally bad action. It is performing a morally bad action calmly and knowingly.

Here, I look to the way this topic was treated in Aquinas’s work and the work of several of his most influential later scholastic allies. All of the figures I treat here share at
least two commitments: (1) a commitment to the view that every person acts for the sake of some perceived good, and (2) a commitment to the view that every morally bad act is performed with some kind of ignorance or intellectual failing. Many scholastic thinkers did not share both of these commitments, and a few may not have shared either of them. This study, then, is a limited one. I focus on thinkers who share commitments which have seemed to some to restrict the range of morally bad actions a thinker can account for. The first, which J. David Velleman has dubbed the “guise of the good thesis”, has come under especially serious scrutiny for appearing to suggest that phenomena like willful wrongdoing and weakness of will are impossible. Here, I work to show that these commitments are compatible with the acknowledgement of a wide variety of forms of truly clear-eyed wrongdoing.

In the first chapter, I examine Aquinas’s view of vice. I show that Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, holds that vicious actions are instances of willful wrongdoing. He believes that vices distort the agent’s perception of her ultimate end, leaving her capable of clear-eyed evil in the pursuit of an apparent good.

In the second chapter, I consider Aquinas’s account of several states, including despair. Aquinas holds that these states are both instances and sources of willful wrongdoing. His account of them and their origin suggests that, contrary to popular belief, Aquinas believes some wrongdoing originates from the will itself without prior intellectual determinism.

In the third chapter, I examine how influential fifteenth and sixteenth century thinkers John Capreolus and Thomas Cajetan interpret Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing. I argue that while each successfully resolves several of the original account’s
weaknesses, each also overlooks the primary role Aquinas accords to the will in such wrongdoing.

In the final chapter, I turn to the prolific early modern Spanish philosopher Francisco Suárez. Suárez, like Aquinas, believes that agents always act for a good. He also, like Aquinas, argues that all wrongdoing involves some sort of intellectual failing. I examine his understanding of the latter claim in light of his employment of the concept of moral necessity. I argue that while his understanding of the claim is much weaker than Aquinas's own, he still believes that there are certain sorts of judgments agents never act against.

Over the course of the work I give labels to several claims. Here are the three most important ones:

1) The guise of the good thesis: the claim that all of an agent's desires aim at some perceived good,

2) The guise of the greater good thesis: the claim that given a choice among goods, an agent desires and chooses the good deemed best,

3) The Socratic thesis: the claim that all wrongdoing involves some kind of intellectual failing, be it ignorance, a lack of consideration, or an error.
Chapter 1: Willful Wrongdoing and Aquinas's Account of Vice

First, a truism: it is perfectly possible for a person to do what she judges bad in some respect. People commonly act in ways they judge bad for their bodies, bad for others, bad for their careers, bad for the environment, bad in the eyes of the law, and so forth. What is contentious is not this claim, but rather related claims like: (1) a person can feel motivated to do what she knows is morally bad, (2) a person can feel motivated to do what she judges all things considered bad for herself, and (3) a person can do what is bad because it is bad. Such claims have inspired centuries of debate and are under renewed scrutiny in contemporary action theory and moral psychology. Aquinas affirms the first of these claims but denies the second and third: he holds that a person can desire to do what she knows is morally bad, but denies that a person can desire to do what she knows is all things considered bad for herself, and denies that anyone does what is bad for the sake of doing what is bad.

Admittedly, the claim Aquinas affirms may not appear all that contentious. After all, people routinely break promises, lie, gamble, cheat, abuse, and plagiarize, even when they claim to know such actions are morally bad. Some even say they enjoy acting immorally. A teenager, for instance, might steal a candy bar or lie to her parents just for the thrill she claims to get from doing what she knows she should not. Or consider the psychopathic serial killer. The trouble with psychopaths, Gary Watson and others claim, is precisely that they are unfazed by judgments about the morality of their actions. A psychopath might judge that some action is morally bad and yet continue to perform it with calm, cool, calculation — even joy.¹ Finally, there is a mountainous body of recent work on the

¹ Watson (2011). For more on whether psychopaths can make moral judgments, see Piers Benn (1999), Ish
phenomenon of moral weakness, also called incontinence, weakness of will, or akrasia, which suggests that it is possible - even common - for nearly any person to succumb to temptation to do what she in some sense knows is wrong.\(^2\) What, then, is controversial about the claim that people can do what they know is morally bad?

Today, much controversy over this claim arises from debate over the consequences of what J. David Velleman has dubbed the "guise of the good" thesis: the notion, popular from Plato to present, that all of our desires aim at a good (Velleman 1992). If the good in question is some one good — the moral good, or perhaps Goodness itself — or if all goods are commensurable, then the notion that all of our desires aim at a good may conflict with the notion that people can be motivated to do what is bad on purpose.\(^3\)

Aquinas adheres to a version of the guise of the good thesis, holding that all of our desires aim at our own good: happiness (beatitudo). However, this position, on its own, does not pose a threat to the position that people can do what they know is morally bad. Some people may aim at happiness when they do what they realize is morally bad. Think of the teenager above, for instance, who does what is bad to get a thrill. Or, to take a more classic example, consider the joy youthful Augustine claims to have taken in his infamous pear theft.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Controversy has also arisen from a related debate over what is entailed in judging an action morally bad. Motivational internalists, for instance, claim that moral judgments necessarily produce in agents some, at least weak, desire to act in accordance with them. Consequently, internalists often hold that there are certain situations in which it would be impossible for a person to deliberately wish to do what she knows is morally bad. This leads many to reject or re-describe the actions of purported amoralists, like psychopathic serial killers, who appear entirely unmoved by moral judgments. On motivational internalism, see, for instance: Björklund, Björnsson, Eriksson, Ölander, and Strandberg (2012), Nichols, (2002), and Svavarsdóttir (1999) and (2009). Aquinas, as we will see, believes that at least moral knowledge produces in agents some motivation to act in accordance with it.

\(^4\) See Confessions, lib. 2, cap. 4-9.
What does create tension for the position that people can knowingly do what is morally bad is Aquinas's intellectualist claim that *all morally bad actions involve ignorance.* I call this claim the 'Socratic thesis', as it has its origins in remarks Socrates makes in Plato's dialogues. While the Socratic thesis has fallen out of favor in recent centuries, it was widely accepted from Plato's time through the beginning of the early modern period. One classic challenge for advocates of the Socratic thesis is the reality of moral weakness, mentioned above. The morally weak person knows that what she does is morally bad. She even knows that moral goodness should be chosen over other goods, like pleasure or wealth. Assuming, as Aquinas does, that moral goodness *should* be chosen over other goods, the morally weak person's wrongful actions do not appear to involve ignorance, or at least not ignorance of a sort that would explain those actions. Plato's commitment to the Socratic thesis is often thought to lead him to deny the possibility of moral weakness. Aquinas explicitly works to account for its reality, suggesting that the person who acts from weakness is ignorant because she fails to consider what she knows when she acts. Her mind clouded by some passion, she focuses all of her attention on whatever immediate good her action involves (pleasure, wealth, prestige, etc.). After her passion subsides, she once again attends to her knowledge that the action is morally bad, and feels regret.

Here, however, I set the already rich academic conversation about moral weakness aside in favor of contributing to a new conversation: one about willful wrongdoing. The willful wrongdoer does what she knows is morally bad. Unlike the morally weak person, however, the willful wrongdoer does not regret yielding to some temptation to act against

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5 See, for instance, ST I-II q. 77, a.2 or q.78, a.1, obj. 1 and ad. 1.
6 See Protagoras 358c-d.
7 I take this up in greater detail in chapters three and four.
her better judgment, and her mind is not clouded by a passion. Rather, she follows her better judgment, believing the good she pursues is more conducive to her happiness than moral goodness. The willful wrongdoer calmly and remorselessly chooses, in some instance, to do what she knows is bad.

It is crucial to distinguish the willful wrongdoer from the person who calmly and remorselessly does what she knows is taken to be morally bad. To see why, compare the following cases. Case 1: Brynn knows full well that many of her fellow countrymen believe it is morally bad to form a polygamous union. She disagrees with them, and so she calmly and remorselessly forms one anyhow. Case 2: Greer knows full well that many of her fellow countrymen believe it is morally bad to form a polygamous union. Unlike Brynn, Greer agrees with her fellow countrymen. Despite this, she calmly and remorselessly decides to form such a union anyhow. Greer, and not Brynn, is a willful wrongdoer. The willful wrongdoer makes a considered choice to do something she herself judges morally bad.

Despite his commitment to both the Socratic thesis and the guise of the good thesis, I argue that Aquinas makes room in his moral psychology for truly willful wrongdoing. In this chapter, I make a preliminary attempt at characterizing Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing. I suggest that his general account of willful wrongdoing is perfectly consistent with his versions of the guise of the good thesis and the Socratic thesis. I then examine Aquinas’s account of vice, one of the two sources of willful wrongdoing he identifies in the Summa. While Aquinas’s account of vice is broadly Aristotelian, I argue that in associating vice with willful wrongdoing, Aquinas deliberately deviates from Aristotle in ways that have gone under-appreciated in the secondary literature.

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8 I develop this characterization further in Chapter Two.
I. The Pursuit of Happiness and the Guise of the Good

It is helpful, first, to understand why Aquinas commits himself to the Socratic thesis and what his commitment to that thesis entails. Aquinas’s endorsement of the Socratic thesis is grounded in his understanding of the relationship between each person’s moral life and what is to that person’s advantage. Aquinas believes that all people, whether they realize it or not, naturally and constantly strive toward an ultimate end. A person will not choose to perform an action she believes will move her away from her end (ST I.II q.1, a.6).

Aquinas believes that every person’s ultimate end is happiness (*beatitudo*). While he acknowledges that different people seek their happiness in different things, he holds that every person’s *true* ultimate end is a sort of happiness she can only experience in the beatific vision of God in the afterlife.⁹ People, he argues, have a natural desire to understand the causes of the effects they see in the world. They cannot be truly happy so long as this desire remains unsatisfied, and this desire will remain unsatisfied so long as they do not understand the First Cause. This is understanding people can only gain through the beatific vision, the only true satisfaction of all of our desires (ST I-II q.3, a.8).

Aquinas believes doing what is (objectively speaking) morally wrong always moves a person away from God and so away from true happiness. Fortunately, reason, when used properly, always leads the reasoner toward God and so toward her end. Any person who does what is morally bad, then, does not reason properly.

Hence, the deep connection Aquinas sees between each person’s moral life and her happiness explains his endorsement of the Socratic thesis. Every person acts for her own happiness, but each morally bad action moves that person away from true happiness. Since

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⁹ Aquinas says, “nothing is able to lull a person’s will, except the universal good...God alone can satisfy the human will” (ST I-II, q.2, a.8).
no person would move away from true happiness knowingly, any person’s choice to do
what is morally bad must involve some ignorance.

Aquinas’s belief that every person acts for her own happiness grounds his
adherence to a version of the guise of the good thesis. He says, “A person must, of necessity,
desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end....And if that person desire it, not as his
perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect
good” (ST I.II q.1, a.6). In order for a person to choose to act, she must see her action as
moving her toward happiness, her ultimate end and perfect good. As we will see, even the
willful wrongdoer believes that what she does moves her toward (or at least not away
from) happiness.

II. Sinning from malitia

Aquinas calls instances of willful wrongdoing sins from malitia. Malitia is the source
of wrongdoing on the part of the agent’s will; the resulting actions are entirely voluntary
and supremely culpable. While English translators often call such acts sins from ‘malice’,
this translation does more to confuse than to clarify.\(^\text{10}\) Though truly malicious actions, like
torture, can be sins from malitia, more mundane actions, like lying, overeating, and
extramarital sex can be sins from malitia as well. Regrettably, other plausible translations,
such as sins ‘from evil’ or ‘from wickedness,’ have a different drawback. Both can lead one
to think that the person who acts in this way has a disposition to do what is morally bad —
that he is a generally evil or wicked person — and, as will become clear in the next chapter,
this might not be the case. To sin from malitia (as to sin from weakness) is not to do a

\(^{10}\) Despite reasons to resist this translation, sins from malitia are called sins from malice in a wide number of
places including the English Dominican’s translation of the *Summa Theologiae* and both Jean Oesterle’s and
Richard Regan’s translations of *De Malo*. 
particular sort of morally bad thing, but rather to do a morally bad thing in an especially willful way.

It is worth noting too that the Latin word translated 'sin', *peccatum*, is not a special religious term. Aquinas considers all morally bad actions sins. In fact, it is not even a special moral term, though Aquinas nearly always uses it to denote only morally bad actions. In his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo (Disputed Questions On Evil)*, he explains that this is the common way theologians use the term (QDM q.2, a.2). Generally speaking, *peccatum* is a term used by both medieval Christian thinkers and by pre-Christian Roman ones like Cicero to denote any imperfect action. Incorrectly solving a math problem and even limping are sins in this sense because each is an imperfect action; perfect walking, after all, would not involve limping. Morally bad actions are sins because Aquinas considers them imperfect actions.

Aquinas holds that there are three possible explanations for any person's sin: ignorance, passion, and *malitia*.11 "Sin occurs in human acts" according to Aquinas, "sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensory appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will" (ST I.II q.78, a.1). Those sins that occur on account of a disorder in the will are sins from *malitia*.

Though all morally bad actions, even sins from *malitia*, involve ignorance, not all people sin *from* (or through) ignorance. Aquinas holds that when a person sins *from* ignorance, her ignorance leads to her desire to act immorally. We might, for example,

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11 By "passion" Aquinas means a feeling - lust, anger, fear, etc. - accompanied by a physical change ("passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation" ST I-II, q.23, a.3). Most passions are what we would more ordinarily call "emotions."
imagine someone who has never come to realize (though she could have and should have) that taking hotel towels is an instance of theft. She believes that, like the toiletries, hotel towels are complimentary. She is aware that she should not steal. In fact, if someone informed her that she was stealing, she would stop taking the towels. But since she does not realize that taking hotel towels is stealing, she continues to do so whenever she desires without feeling regret. Even though, in this instance, the person has a desire to take the hotel towels, her ignorance of the nature of her action, not her desire for the towels, is the cause of the theft. Properly speaking, the source of her sin is her ignorance.

Alternatively, the person who sins from passion knows that what she desires to do is something she ought not do, but sins because some passion momentarily arises and clouds her judgment. Perhaps she feels slighted by a colleague and a sudden rush of anger drives her to start a vicious rumor about him. When a person sins from passion, a passion causes the person to judge (falsely) that an action that is ordinarily morally bad is, in this particular case and at this particular moment, good. While seething with anger, starting a rumor seemed the appropriate response to her slight. However, after her anger subsides, she realizes that she ought not have reacted as she did. In fact, she regrets having done so. Passion only momentarily clouds a person’s judgment; once it subsides, the person realizes that she has acted badly and feels regret (ST I.II, q.77, a.2-3; I.II, q.78, a.4).

The person who sins from malitia, the willful wrongdoer, still makes a mistaken judgment. However, she does not do so on account of the influence of some momentary passion or ignorance, but on account of a disordered will.

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12 This is Aquinas’s account of the oft-discussed weak-willed or akratic person. For more on Aquinas on sinning from passion, see Kent (1989) and (2007).
Aquinas holds that the will is an appetite that inclines a person toward her good as understood by reason. A person's will is her constant appetite for her ultimate end.\textsuperscript{13} Aquinas often contrasts the will with the sensory appetite, which inclines the person toward goods connected with the well-being of her body, like food, drink, or sex. Further, the will is the very source of voluntary action. Aquinas believes that all embodied beings have sensory appetites, whereas only creatures with reason — human beings, angels, and God — have wills. When a person’s will is well ordered, it inclines her toward her true good, the happiness she would find in union with God in heaven. When the will is disordered, it inclines the person away from God and this union and toward some other good as though that good were her end.

In his \textit{Summa Theologiae}, Aquinas describes a disordered will and its impact on the agent:

The will is disordered when it loves a lesser good more. The consequence is that the person chooses to suffer a detriment to the good that is loved less, in order to obtain the good that is loved more, as when a person wills, even knowingly (\textit{scienter}) to suffer cutting off a limb in order to conserve his life, which that person loves more. And in this way, when a disordered will loves some temporal good, like riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason, or divine law, or the charity of God, or some such thing, it follows that the person is willing to suffer a cost to some spiritual good in order that it may obtain some temporal good. Moreover, evil is nothing other than the privation of some good. Accordingly, when a person wills knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil without qualification, whereby he is deprived (\textit{privatur}) of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good, he is said to sin from certain \textit{malitia} (\textit{ex certa malitia}) or on purpose (\textit{ex industria}), choosing the bad, as it were, knowingly (\textit{quasi scienter}) (ST I-II, q.78, a.1).\textsuperscript{14}

In what follows, I refer to the passage above as 'the focal passage'. According to the focal passage, the person who sins from \textit{malitia} chooses a temporal good, like pleasure, over a spiritual good, like obedience to God’s law or virtue (Aquinas often uses the terms “order of

\textsuperscript{13} See, for example, ST I-II, q.9, a.1.

\textsuperscript{14} All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
reason” and “order of virtue” interchangeably). She does so because she loves the temporal good she chooses more than the spiritual one she forsakes. In De Malo, Aquinas puts this point in slightly different terms. There, he says that the person whose will is disordered, “desire[s] some changeable good so much that he does not flee being alienated from the unchangeable good” (DM q.3, a.12). However, the general sense of both passages is the same; temporal goods just are changeable, while spiritual goods are unchangeable. In both works, Aquinas’s point is that a person’s will is disordered when she loves a changeable, temporal good so much that she does not avoid the knowing loss of an unchangeable spiritual good. The knowing choice to give up some spiritual good for a temporal one, then, is what Aquinas calls sinning from malitia.

Ordinarily speaking, a person should not feel inclined to forsake a spiritual good for a temporal one; every person’s will is naturally inclined to choose spiritual goods over temporal ones where the two conflict. This is because each person’s will is naturally inclined toward her true happiness and each person’s true happiness, recall, is the sort of happiness that person would experience basking in the vision of God in the afterlife. The attainment of this happiness, Aquinas believes, requires that one value spiritual goods, which move one toward God, more than temporal ones. A disordered will is disordered in that it pursues some temporal good, even at the expense of a spiritual one.

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15 For the interchangeability of these terms, see ST I.II q.95, a.3 and ST I.II q.100, a.2.
16 Colleen McCluskey notes this as well (2005, 10-11).
17 It should be noted that we need not take from this that only Christians, or those who have had contact with the Christian tradition, can sin from malitia. Since the order of virtue is a spiritual good, someone who knowingly does what is not virtuous, knowingly gives up a spiritual good even if she does realize that the good she gives up is spiritual. What is required is only that (1) the agent in question knows that she gives up a good when she acts, and (2) that the good given up is, objectively speaking, spiritual.
18 Aquinas believes that this natural inclination can be significantly diminished in postlapsarian human beings, but it remains in all human beings nonetheless. See, for instance, ST I.II, q.63, a.1 and q.85, a.2.
III. Clear-eyed Evil

I take from the focal passage that the person who sins from *malitia* knowingly gives up some spiritual good for a temporal one. Further, I take it that the knowledge involved is *occurrent* knowledge: the willful wrongdoer realizes, at the very moment she acts, that what she does involves giving up this good. Since Aquinas holds that evil is the absence of a good, to knowingly give up a good is to knowingly incur an evil. In this sense, the willful wrongdoer knows that her action involves some evil, and so the evil in her action is clear-eyed.

This is an important point to defend, because Aquinas does not believe that all people who sin with knowledge sin with *occurrent* knowledge. The person who sins from passion, for instance, is said to know that what she does is morally bad: this is why she feels subsequent regret. However, Aquinas believes that at the moment she acts, this knowledge is non-occurrent (in scholastic terms, she has mere 'dispositional' rather than 'actual' knowledge of the nature of her action). Passion, when strong enough, prevents a person from attending to her knowledge that what she does is morally bad, though the person who sins from passion still retains that knowledge when she acts. She retains the knowledge that her action is morally bad in the way that a person retains the knowledge that her mother's eyes are green, even while sleeping, discussing politics, or working to solve a math problem. I argue that the willful wrongdoer, by contrast, *does* attend to her knowledge when she acts.

While I have good company in reading Aquinas's account of willful wrongdoing in this way — in fact, this is one thing most scholars seem able to agree on — this reading is
still an important one to spend some space defending.¹⁹ This is the case for two reasons. First, the notion that sins from *malitia* are clear-eyed will raise questions about how we ought to understand Aquinas’s account of acting from vice. I show below that Aquinas believes actions from vice are sins from *malitia*. However, it is often thought that the vicious person does what is bad (or at least often does what is bad) unwittingly. Hence, Aquinas’s suggestion that actions from vice are sins from *malitia* may appear to tell against a clear-eyed evil account of willful wrongdoing. Second, a clear-eyed evil account of willful wrongdoing may seem incompatible with Aquinas’s commitment to the Socratic thesis, though I hope to demonstrate otherwise.

Despite these difficulties, Aquinas says at least three things that provide support for the reading I am advancing. First, in the focal passage, he compares the person who sins from *malitia* to a person who allows a limb to be amputated because that amputation will save his life. While choosing amputation is itself bad — it is choosing to give up one’s limb, a good — choosing to suffer the loss of one’s life would be much worse. Faced with the choice between limb and life, the willing amputee chooses life. This example implies that the wrongdoer Aquinas has in mind realizes, when she acts, that her action involves giving up a good. Despite this, she knowingly gives up that good in pursuit of another good she cares about more.

In his *De Malo*, we find a number of similar comparisons. There, Aquinas says that the person who sins from *malitia*, “does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin which he understands (*percipit*) to be conjoined to what he wills” (DM q.3, a.12). In

¹⁹ For others who read Aquinas’s account of sinning from *malitia* in this way, see Gregory Reichberg’s “Beyond Privation: Moral Evil in Aquinas’s *De Malo*”, Carlos Steel’s “Does Evil Have A Cause?: Augustine’s Perplexity and Thomas’s Answer”, and Colleen McCluskey’s “Willful Wrongdoing: Thomas Aquinas on *certa malitia*”, though McCluskey, unlike Reichberg, Steel, or I, suggests that the sort of knowledge the person has at the moment she sins is knowledge that the good she pursues is less valuable than the good she sacrifices.
attempting to explain what it is the willful wrongdoer "understands", Aquinas compares
the wrongdoer to three characters: (1) a man who commits himself to harsh servitude in
order to be with a woman he loves, (2) a ship captain who jettison's his cargo to save his
ship, and (3) someone who takes bitter tasting medicine to preserve his health. Aquinas
frequently uses all of the analogies above as examples of per se undesirable actions,
voluntarily and knowingly performed for the sake of desired ends.20 Like the willing
amputee, all of these people choose to suffer something they know, at the moment they act,
is bad (the loss of freedom, the loss of cargo, and the unpleasant taste of medicine
respectively) in pursuit of a perceived greater good.

The second thing that provides support for the reading I am advancing is the way
Aquinas responds to an objector in the Summa. A few lines before the focal passage, one of
Aquinas's objectors contends that if all sins involve ignorance, sinning from malitia is
impossible. Aquinas responds that sinning from malitia involves a type of ignorance that
does not exclude “the simple knowledge that [a particular action] is an evil” (ST q.78, a.1,
ad.1).21 He contrasts the type of ignorance involved in sinning from malitia with both the
ignorance involved in sinning from passion (ignorance “that a particular action is evil at
this particular moment, as when he sins through passion”) and the ignorance involved in
sinning through ignorance (ignorance “that a particular action is evil”). In so doing,
Aquinas implies that the person who sins from malitia realizes that her particular action, at
the moment she chooses it, is bad in some respect.

Third, in his response to another objector, who contends, on the basis of the guise of
the good thesis, that evil cannot be intended, Aquinas explains that while no one intends

20 See SCG lib. 3, cap. 5-6; In Job cap. 1; STII.II q.64, a.3.
21 I explore this in further detail below.
evil *primarily*, one can intend evil “for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good” (ST q.78, a.1, ad.2). He then provides yet another illustrative example: a lustful man who is unable to pursue his lust without offending God. Aquinas says that this man “would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the pleasure” (ST q.78, a.1, ad.2). Since the lustful man would prefer to avoid offending God altogether, it is clear that he recognizes that incurring God’s anger is a bad thing. Yet, comparing pleasure with God’s favor, he chooses pleasure. He does so, not because he has decided that incurring God’s anger is, itself, a good thing and not because he has lost sight of the fact that God’s anger is a consequence of his action. Rather, he chooses to incur God’s anger because he prefers pleasure to God’s favor. He, like the willing amputee, knowingly gives up one good for the sake of another good he perceives to be greater.

On account of such passages, I conclude that Aquinas believes the willful wrongdoer acts with occurrent knowledge that her action involves giving up a spiritual good (that her action is not virtuous, is against Divine Law, or some such thing). Consequently, the willful wrongdoer acts with occurrent knowledge that her action involves some evil. In this sense, the evil in her action is clear-eyed.

**IV. Clear-eyed Evil and the Socratic Thesis**

As mentioned, this conclusion may appear incompatible with the Socratic thesis. After all, if the willful wrongdoer realizes, when she acts, that she gives up a spiritual good, it does not seem that her action involves ignorance.
Despite the apparent problem, Aquinas maintains that sins from *malitia* involve ignorance. As mentioned above, he explains his position in a response to an objection on this ground. There, he says that those who sin from *malitia* lack the knowledge “that this bad thing is not to be sustained for the achievement of that good, but the person knows plainly (*scit...simpliciter*) that this thing he does is bad” (ST I.II q.78, a.1, ad.1). In other words, those who sin from *malitia* know that they give up a good, but do not know that they give up the good they ought to pursue. Like the willing amputee, then, the willful wrongdoer knowingly gives up some good (incurs an evil) in pursuit of a perceived greater good. But unlike the willing amputee, the willful wrongdoer unwittingly gives up the good she ought to pursue in order to pursue the good she should sacrifice. The willful wrongdoer values the wrong goods too highly.

While this explanation may save Aquinas from the charge that his account of willful wrongdoing is incompatible with the Socratic thesis, it also may appear to collapse any meaningful distinction between sins from *malitia* (instances of willful wrongdoing) and sins from ignorance. If the willful wrongdoer pursues a less valuable temporal good, like physical pleasure, over more valuable spiritual one, like virtue, only because she mistakenly believes the temporal good is the greater good, isn’t the source of her sin her ignorance rather than her disordered will?

Colleen McCluskey finds this puzzle so worrisome that she claims that Aquinas’s willful wrongdoer must know, not only that she sacrifices a spiritual good for a temporal one, but also that she sacrifices a greater good for a lesser one.\(^{22}\) McCluskey still admits that the willful wrongdoer’s action involves ignorance, but she does not believe it involves

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\(^{22}\) McCluskey (2005); pp. 38-40.
ignorance of the fact that a greater good is given up for the sake of a lesser one. Rather, the willful wrongdoer, McCluskey claims, is ignorant of the fact that a known lesser good should not be chosen over a known greater one. When Aquinas says, then, that the willful wrongdoer is ignorant of the fact “that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good”, McCluskey must take him to mean something like: “the willful wrongdoer is ignorant of the fact that a particular known-to-be-greater good should not be sacrificed for the sake of a particular known-to-be-lesser good”.

There are certainly ways we may be able to make sense of such a mindset. It need not even be puzzling. The matter depends largely on the scale on which the goods at hand are compared. To appropriate Ruth Chang’s notion of comparability, two items are comparable when it is possible for one to be better or worse than the other in some respect (Chang 2013). Comparing two acts, one of which is morally good and the other is morally bad, I may deem the morally good action better in terms of its ability to bring me closer to rational perfection. I may deem the morally bad action better in terms of its ability to provide immediate pleasure. In both cases, I compare the two acts and make a judgment on that basis. At the moment I choose to do what is morally bad, I may even hold both judgments in mind. If so, there is a sense in which I choose the good that is better for me knowingly (better in terms of pleasure), and there is also a sense in which I choose the good that is worse for me knowingly (worse in terms of its relation to rational perfection). My action only becomes puzzling if I choose a morally bad act despite making a further judgment: a second-order judgment that rational perfection, or moral rectitude, is all things considered better for me than pleasure.

23 Ibid. pp. 18-19.
However, this more puzzling position is the one McCluskey seems to attribute to Aquinas. Recall that Aquinas holds that every desire (and thereby every voluntary action) aims at not just any good, but at the agent’s own ultimate good: happiness. Spiritual goods are greater goods for human beings than temporal ones because spiritual goods and not temporal ones are needed for true happiness. To know that a spiritual good is greater, then, is not to know that it is greater on some minor or impersonal scale, but to know that it is greater for oneself overall. Consequently, on McCluskey’s account, the willful wrongdoer chooses a good known to be all things considered better for herself over a good known to be all things considered worse for herself. Perhaps most puzzlingly, she does so because she is ignorant of the fact that a good that is all things considered worse for herself should not be chosen over a good that is all things considered better for herself. Given that, on Aquinas’s account, an agent’s pursuit of happiness drives all of her desires and actions, this would be a bizarre consequence.24

It is also a position that is unsupported by the texts. There is no direct evidence Aquinas even acknowledges the type of ignorance this position introduces: ignorance of the fact that less valuable goods should not be pursued at the expense of more valuable ones. And though a lack of evidence for this reading would not tell against it decisively, I believe that the illustrative examples Aquinas provides militate against it. The willing amputee, the ship captain, the voluntarily enslaved lover and the sick person all know that greater goods

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24 This is not to say that agents always consciously pursue happiness. In the Prima Secundae, Aquinas explains that “one need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something...thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step” (q.1, a.6, ad.3). However, an agent’s desires and preferences are shaped by her pursuit of happiness, in the way that the steps the traveler takes are shaped by her destination. Even when she is not thinking of happiness occurrently, then, every person desires and chooses to act as she does for the sake of happiness. Consequently, it would be difficult for Aquinas to explain an agent who consciously chooses to do what she believes is worse for herself, overall.
should be chosen over lesser ones. If the willful wrongdoer is like them, she is not ignorant of this fact, but rather of which goods are, in fact, greater. I explore this further below.

I also argue below that Aquinas believes that willful wrongdoing results from either vices or from attitudes like despair. Both lead people to think those temporal goods they pursue are greater goods than the spiritual ones they give up. Neither makes one ignorant of the fact that more valuable goods should be pursued, but they do lead to mistakes regarding which goods are more valuable.

But if I am correct and the ignorance involved in sinning from malitia is ignorance of the fact that one pursues a less valuable good at the expense of a more valuable one, how can we save Aquinas from the charge that sins from malitia are simply sins from ignorance? As mentioned above, while Aquinas believes that every sin involves ignorance, only some sins are committed from ignorance. The person who sins from ignorance does what is morally bad only because she does not know (but could and should) that the action she performs is morally bad. He frequently implies that if this person were to know that her action is morally bad, she would not perform it. While a person who sins from malitia is also ignorant — she is, on my reading, ignorant of what good she ought to value most highly — her ignorance is not ignorance of the fact that the action she performs is morally bad. She knows that she does what is bad when she acts, but she does not know that, in acting, she sabotages her own ability to achieve true happiness.

This sort of ignorance is, crucially, the direct result of her will’s disorder. Aquinas believes it is the movement of her will that leads her to mistakenly believe that the pursuit of a particular temporal good, in the way she wishes to pursue it, is consistent with her pursuit of her ultimate end. Thus, even though the person would not act badly without
some ignorance, the cause of the ignorance itself is disordered willing, not an intellectual failing.

Later in the *Summa*, Aquinas explains how the will becomes disordered. He holds that it can happen in one of two ways: (1) through the acquisition of a corrupt state, like a vice, or (2) through giving up a disposition that had deterred morally bad action. In each case, I argue, disordered willing gives rise to the sort of ignorance I have identified: ignorance of the fact that some temporal good is less valuable than some spiritual good. For the remainder of this chapter, I focus on Aquinas's account of corrupt states, delving deeply into his account of one specific sort of corrupt state: vice. In the next chapter, I turn to Aquinas's account of the ways one gives up those dispositions which ordinarily deter wrongdoing.

**V. Corrupt States**

In the *Summa*, Aquinas describes a corrupt state as follows:

According to that state, some evil becomes, as it were, suitable and similar to a person; and to this thing, because of its suitableness, the will tends, as to the good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover, this corrupt state (*dispositio*) is either a disposition (*habitus*) acquired through habituation, which is turned into a nature, or a sickly disposition (*aegritudinalis habitudo*) on the part of the body, as in the case of a person who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption (ST I.II q.78, a.3).

A person can be in a corrupt state either because she has acquired a vicious disposition, or because she has an inborn physical inclination toward certain sorts of sins. The former person might be inclined to cheat on her spouse because she has gradually become accustomed to behaving unfaithfully. The latter might be inclined cheat on her spouse because she has, physically, a greater propensity to feel lust than other people, and so a stronger inborn inclination toward sexual wrongdoing.
Aquinas has very little to say about sinning from inborn physical dispositions. In fact, he does not take up the topic again in any discussion of willful wrongdoing throughout his works. I believe that it is fair to conclude, then, that he does not consider such dispositions paradigmatic sources of willful wrongdoing. For this reason I treat them only briefly here.

We learn in the Summa that Aquinas believes the body gives people their individual natures (as opposed to their nature ‘rational animal’, which they have on account of their species). Each person’s body is different, and the powers of each person’s soul, “are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts” by her body (ST I.II q.63, a.1). And while Aquinas maintains that people do not have any robust natural appetitive dispositions (the sorts of dispositions that might incline the person toward sin or goodness with the strength and consistency of an acquired vice or virtue), he explains that, “on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive dispositions by way of natural beginnings; for some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness, or such like” (ST I.II q.51, a.1). There can be at least the beginnings of virtue or vice in the natural dispositions of our bodies.

Later in the Summa, discussing virtue, he appears to confirm this suggestion, saying that “by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues...In this way one person has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude” (ST I.II q.63, a.1). On account of their different bodies, individuals can have different natural aptitudes or bodily temperaments which predispose them to particular types of virtuous or vicious actions. While an individual’s bodily temperaments
do not make her virtuous or vicious, they make it easier for her to act in accord with that
temperament. Someone naturally prone to feel anger at the slightest frustration of her
goals, for instance, might become viciously vengeful more readily than someone who is
naturally calm and cool in the face of disappointment.

I take it, then, that what Aquinas means when he suggests that someone might sin
from *malitia* on account of a “sickly disposition” on the part of the body, is that someone
might sin from *malitia* on account of some pre-vicious bodily temperament. Though the
rational soul is naturally inclined toward virtue, Aquinas appears to believe that the body
can be naturally directed toward either virtue or vice.25

As I mention again in the third chapter, Thomas Cajetan, one of Aquinas’s most
widely read scholastic commentators, raises worries that this suggestion collapses
Aquinas’s distinction between sins from passion, which occur on account of a disordered
sensory (bodily) appetite, and sins from *malitia* which are supposed to occur on account of
a disordered will.26 He spends the entirety of his commentary on this article attempting to
resolve those worries. Since Aquinas says so little about sickly bodily dispositions,
however, and particularly little about the way they relate to willful wrongdoing, I set
further discussion of them aside. Here I focus on Aquinas’s suggestion that vices lead to
willful wrongdoing. This is a claim he makes consistently throughout his works. In fact, at
times, Aquinas even identifies actions from vice with sins from *malitia*.

At least one motive Aquinas has for suggesting that vices lead to willful wrongdoing
comes from the Latin translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Recall that Aquinas

25 This is, I should note, only the case for post-lapsarian human beings. Prior to the fall, the body was naturally
directed toward virtue alone.
26 See Cajetan’s commentary on ST 1II q.78, a.3.
calls instances of willful wrongdoing sins from *malitia*. As it happens, *malitia* is the term Robert Grosseteste uses in his translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (the version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* familiar to Aquinas) to translate the Greek term *kakia*. Though this is a perfectly reasonable literal translation of the Greek — both *kakia* and *malitia* are general terms that can mean something like “badness” — in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle often uses the term *kakia* to mean vice (in Latin, *vitium*). Hence, Aquinas, reading Grosseteste’s Aristotle, finds in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the three sources of sin he and others in the Christian tradition recognized: ignorance, passion, and *malitia*. Further, he sees in Aristotle that sins from *malitia* are sins from vice. This gives him reason, as someone working to synthesize Aristotle’s insights with those of the Christian tradition, to try to explain how vices might lead to willful wrongdoing.

However, while Aristotle has an account of vice, he does not have an account of clear-eyed evil, or, at very least, he does not have one in connection with acting from vice. In connecting vices to sins from *malitia*, then, Aquinas deviates significantly from Aristotle’s own understanding of vicious action.

Aquinas’s general account of vicious dispositions is broadly Aristotelian. Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that a disposition (*habitus* in Aquinas and *hexis* in Aristotle), a virtue or vice, is a quality whereby a person is inclined well or ill toward some sort of action (ST I-II, q.49, a.2). A person’s disposition is a sort of second nature and it impacts her understanding of her end (ST I-II, q.78, a.2 ; QDV a.8, ad.16). Acting in accordance with a disposition seems natural to the agent, while acting against it is difficult and unpleasant.

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28 For the suggestion that Aristotle acknowledges sins from *malitia*, see q.78, a.1, ad. 3.
Because of this, even though acting from vice is objectively bad for an agent, doing so feels fitting to her.

Also following Aristotle, Aquinas thinks a single morally bad action does not make a person vicious: vices are acquired gradually over time. A person who feels lust on occasion, or even sometimes acts from lust, need not have the vice of lust. A lustful person, on the other hand - someone who has the vice of lust — is someone who has acted lustfully so many times that she has come to aim at pleasure as her end. In the *Summa*, Aquinas suggests that vices arise gradually from sins from passion. The person who sins from passion, recall, does what she knows is morally bad and she feels regret after she acts. She feels regret because she is not confused about her true end. When such a person is not influenced by passion, she desires to do what is right and thereby aims at true happiness. The vicious person, by contrast, has gradually come to aim at the wrong end and so she acts badly without subsequent regret.²⁹

In *De Malo*, Aquinas explains that the will of a person who has acquired a vicious disposition tends toward evil “as a heavy object moves downward” (QDM q.3, a.14). Though every person’s true nature is to tend toward God (toward true happiness), a vicious disposition makes some morally bad action feel natural, pulling the will, the appetite for happiness, toward some other good instead. This does not mean that vice prevents the will from pursuing happiness. Rather, vice leads a person to seek her happiness in some temporal good, like physical pleasure. And since the will is a person’s appetite for happiness, vices disorder the will.

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²⁹ This suggests a sort of continuum in the level of regret felt by those who sin from passion. As they inch closer to vice, it is likely Aquinas believes people feel less and less regret when they act badly.
Note, however, that the analogy Aquinas draws between a person’s will tending toward morally bad action and a heavy object tending toward the earth is not meant to indicate that, as a heavy object cannot help but move toward the earth, this person cannot help but move toward wrongdoing. A heavy object can be moved away from the earth if acted on by another power. Likewise, Aquinas holds that a person can resist the force of her vicious disposition through the use of her reason, though she cannot do so easily (QDM q.6, a.24; ST I.II q.78, a.2, ad.3).

This represents one important point of departure from Aristotle. Aristotle says of the vicious person that, “it does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust and will be just...to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are such voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so” (EN III 5 1114a12-1114a21). On Aristotle’s account, once a person is vicious, she cannot become virtuous, at least not by her own unaided efforts. Aquinas, by contrast, believes that even the worst people are morally malleable. In the Summa, he defines a disposition as something one uses when she wills. He is explicit that any person can fail to use her dispositions, or even act contrary to those dispositions (ST I-II, q.50, a.5; ST I-II q.71, a.4). As we will see in the next chapter, Aquinas believes a virtuous person can sin. Likewise, though doing so may be difficult, a vicious person can act contrary to her vice. In fact, Aquinas’s vicious person can even do what is morally good for the right reasons. Vices and virtues, then, incline, but do not determine, a person’s will.

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30 For more on this, and on Aquinas’s endorsement of this claim as a reading of Aristotle, see Kent (2013).
In some places, Aquinas seems to suggest that the vicious person is capable of doing what is good for the right reasons entirely on her own, without help or incitation from others. This seems to be his considered view, for instance, in the *Prima Secundae*. There, Aquinas holds that in a moment of clarity, a vicious person may regret her morally bad actions. Since she “is able not to use the disposition, and to think of something else, by means of reason which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the disposition, the person is sorry for what he has done through the disposition” (*ST I-II* q.78, a.3, ad.3). Later in the work, he argues that all people, even the most vicious, have access to certain first principles of reason as well as first principles of natural law (which direct moral action) (*ST I-II*, q.95, a.6). If reasoned from properly, the first principles of natural law allow a person to figure out how she ought to act in most particular situations. Aquinas believes that a person’s reason can never be entirely corrupted and her inclination toward virtue can never be entirely suppressed. Hence, he appears to hold in the *Prima Secundae* that it is always open to a vicious agent to choose to use her reason properly and act well.

Elsewhere, in his *Disputed Questions on Truth*, Aquinas suggests that a vicious person can do what is morally good, not because she can act resist her vice entirely on her own, but because she can be led away from her vice by persuasion. There, he says: “a disposition does not wholly corrupt the soul; and reason does not cling so stubbornly to what is false that it cannot be led away from it by a contrary argument” (*QDV* q.24, a.11). What is important for my purposes, however, is that in both places, Aquinas argues that the vicious person need not remain vicious. Either on her own or with help from others, she can reason properly and act well.
To summarize, a vice makes some type of morally bad action seem natural and thereby easy, while it makes resisting that type of action unpleasant and difficult. A vice thereby causes a person to feel a strong inclination toward a particular sort of wrongdoing. This strong inclination leads the will, the person's appetite for happiness, to aim at the wrong good. Consequently, the vicious person tends toward some good other than her true good as though that good were her end, but she can, nevertheless, with significant effort and deliberation, or with outside aid, resist her vice and act as she ought. While vices disorder the will, they do not disorder the will in a way that renders the vicious person unable to act otherwise than she actually acts.

VI. Vices and Clear-eyed Evil

Because vices disorder the will, they lead to willful wrongdoing. Recall that the will is a person's appetite for her happiness and that those who sin from malitia choose certain temporal goods over spiritual ones. On my account, they do so because their disordered wills prompt them to mistakenly believe that the goods they pursue are more conducive to their happiness than those they choose to give up. Since a vice inclines a person to pursue some good other than God as her ultimate end, a vice inclines a person to value some temporal good (like pleasure) more than any other good, including spiritual goods like virtue. Lust, for example, inclines a person to pursue sexual pleasure as though that pleasure were her end. Recall the lustful man from the Summa, who chooses to pursue pleasure even when doing so involves incurring God's anger. The lustful man understands that the pursuit of pleasure involves giving up God's favor, but believes, falsely, that sexual pleasure is worth the evil incurred through disobedience. Vice, then, leads precisely the sort of ignorance I suggest is characteristic of willful wrongdoing.
In fact, Aquinas not only believes that vices can lead to willful wrongdoing; he claims explicitly that “whenever someone sins from a [vicious] disposition, that person sins from certain malitia.” He explains that this is because “that which is fitting to someone who has a vicious disposition is that which excludes a spiritual good, from which it follows that the person chooses a spiritual evil in order to obtain a good which is fitting to that person according to his disposition” (ST I-II, q.78, a.2). All actions from vice involve the prioritization of a temporal good over a spiritual one, and so all actions from vice are sins from malitia.

However, recall that I have argued that the person who sins from malitia has occurrent knowledge that what she does involves giving up a good and thereby incurring an evil. Her ignorance is not ignorance of the fact that what she does is both morally bad and bad for her, but rather ignorance of the fact that she chooses to give up a more valuable good for a less valuable one. If all vicious actions are sins from malitia, and all sins from malitia involve this sort of occurrent knowledge, then all vicious actions are clear-eyed. If this is correct, this claim is striking for at least two reasons.

First, it represents a major deviation from Aristotle's account of vice. While there is some debate over how to understand Aristotle’s account of vice, it is relatively clear that Aristotle does not hold anything like the clear-eyed evil account of vicious action that I believe should be attributed to Aquinas. On the clear-eyed evil account, the vicious person realizes that her vicious actions involve an evil and yet she acts anyway, with ease and without regret. And recall that Aquinas thinks the willful wrongdoer recognizes that her actions involve a personal evil: she recognizes that her actions require she give up some good, like God’s favor.
While several remarks Aristotle makes in Book Nine of the *Nicomachean Ethics* suggest that he thinks the vicious person realizes that what she does is bad for her, these same remarks also suggest that such a realization makes the vicious person discontent. Her soul, he says, is “at odds” (στασιάζει) with itself, as she feels pain at the very pleasure she takes in her own wrongful actions (EN 1166b2 — 1166b24). Aquinas’s vicious person, on the other hand, is content and decisive when she acts viciously — she finds her actions pleasurable and does them without inner turmoil or regret. In this, Aquinas follows another characterization of the vicious person we find earlier in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book Seven, Aristotle’s vicious person appears to act decisively and remorselessly, content with her choices. Crucially, in Book Seven of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle also appears to hold some version of what I will call an ‘unwitting evil’ account of vice, on which the vicious person is unaware that her vicious actions are bad.\(^\text{31}\) He says, for example, that the vicious person is “by necessity without regrets, and therefore incurable” because “vice is unconscious of itself” (EN 1150a16-20; 1150b29-1151a5). Aristotle does not appear to have in either place, then, a clear-eyed evil account of vice, at least not one of the sort I attribute to Aquinas.

The second reason that finding a clear-eyed evil account of vice in Aquinas’s works is striking is because on the surface, such an account entails two implausible claims: (1) every vicious person — every greedy person, every envious person, etc. - knows that acting in accordance with her vice is bad for her in some way, and (2) every time a vicious person acts viciously — every time the greedy person is greedy, for example — she knows that her

\(^{31}\) Even those who do not take Aristotle to hold a strict unwitting account overall do not, to my knowledge, take Aristotle to hold anything like the clear-eyed account I will attribute to Aquinas here (see, for example, Brickhouse (2003), McConnell (1975), and Roochnik (2007)).
particular vicious action is bad for her in some way. Below, I suggest that the clear-eyed evil account of vice does, in fact, entail both of these claims. However, I argue that if Aquinas has a sufficiently narrow conception of what it means to act from vice, these claims become more plausible.

I believe there to be evidence that Aquinas does hold a clear-eyed evil account of vice. The passage from the *Summa* cited above (in which Aquinas claims that all vicious actions are sins from *malitia*) is not itself decisive. It is one article removed from the claims in the focal passage and is ambiguous enough to remain open to interpretation. When he explains that all sins from vice are sins from *malitia* because all sins from vice involve the choice of a temporal good over a spiritual one, Aquinas may be broadening the account of willful wrongdoing found in the focal passage to include any (even unwitting) choice of a temporal good over a spiritual one. He may also be intentionally eliding the distinction between sins from *malitia* and sins from vice in order to accommodate the notion of sinning from *malitia* he finds in Grosseteste's Aristotle. However, Aquinas's description of the relationship between vice and willful wrongdoing in *De Malo* suggests otherwise. There, in one and the same article, Aquinas: (1) identifies sins from *malitia* with sins from vice, and (2) suggests that the person who sins from *malitia* sins in a way that is clear-eyed.

At question 3 article 12, Aquinas identifies sins from *malitia* with sins from vice. He explains that the willful wrongdoer's will comes to aim at the wrong good on account of a disposition (*habitus*). He says that when a person has a disposition toward a sinful good, "then the will by its own movement without some passion is inclined to that good, and this is what it is to sin from choice, either on purpose, or from certain knowledge or likewise
from *malitia*(QDM 3.12). The suggestion in article 12, then, is that a disposition toward some sinful good — a vice — is a source of willful wrongdoing.

Furthermore, in this article Aquinas does not indicate that anything other than vice can lead to willful wrongdoing. In fact, in his reply to an objector, Aquinas again identifies instances of willful wrongdoing with actions from vice. He says that “in the one who sins from *malitia*, the willing of evil is the first principle of sin because from itself and through the person's own disposition the will is inclined to will evil” (QDM q.3, a.12, ad.5). Likewise, in the following article, Aquinas defends the position that, other things being equal, the willful wrongdoer sins more gravely than the person who sins from passion: “when someone sins from a disposition, which is to sin from *malitia*, then the will through itself tends to the sinful act” (QDM q.3, a.13). Later in that same article, Aquinas argues that, “in the one who sins from *malitia*, the will is inclined to an act of sin from an enduring disposition”. In both cases, Aquinas identifies sins from *malitia* — instances of willful wrongdoing - with sins from vice.

It is noteworthy that in presenting the three sources of sin - ignorance, passion, and *malitia* - in both the *Summa* and in *De Malo*, Aquinas never suggests that sins from passion or ignorance can be sins from vice. Recall that Aquinas believes all of a person’s sins are sins from either ignorance, passion, or *malitia*. Thus, if vices do not give rise to either sins from passion or sins from ignorance, then, by process of elimination, they must give rise to sins from *malitia* alone. When discussing willful wrongdoing, Aquinas confirms this repeatedly. Consequently, understanding what Aquinas believes all sins from *malitia* entail should provide a key to understanding what is involved in sins from vice.
For this reason, it is significant that in the same De Malo articles in which Aquinas identifies sins from vice with sins from malitia, he suggests, yet again, that sins from malitia involve clear-eyed evil. He uses the examples (mentioned previously) of a sick person who takes bitter medicine, a ship-captain who jettison's cargo, and a man who willingly submits himself to harsh servitude for the woman he loves, to illustrate of the sort of person he has in mind (QDM q.3, a.12). Each of the people in these examples, as mentioned, realizes that what she does is bad, but acts for the sake of a perceived greater good. Here Aquinas explains that these examples present the sort of person who “should wish so much to enjoy some pleasure...that that person does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin, which he perceives (percipit) to be connected to that which he wills” (QDM q.3, a.12). The willful wrongdoer does what is morally bad, not because she does not realize that she is sinning, but because she values some other good more than moral rectitude.

Further evidence for the clear-eyed evil account is found in Aquinas’s reply to a number of his objectors in that same article. One objector, for example, argues that when a person sins from malitia, the sin itself is willed only incidentally in the way that when a person loves the sweetness of wine his love of wine is only incidental. In other words, the objector argues that the person who sins from malitia wills some good, like pleasure, not the evil that happens to be attached to that pleasure. Aquinas disagrees, responding that “what is connected with a good principally desired, if unforeseen and unknown, is not willed unless accidentally....But if the person should know that it is evil, the person consequently now wills the evil, as I have said, and not only accidentally” (QDM q.3, a.12, ad. 4). Aquinas’s response suggests that the willful wrongdoer both foresees and knows that what she does is bad in some way: it is in this sense that she can be said to will the evil
involved in her action. If this is correct, then in *De Malo*, at least, Aquinas commits himself to the view that sins from *malitia* are clear-eyed. If, as I have suggested, he also commits himself to the view that all sins from vice are sins from *malitia*, then he commits himself to the view that all sins from vice are clear-eyed as well.

Finally, there is evidence in both the *Summa* and *De Malo* that Aquinas deliberately moves away from the unwitting evil account of vice he himself attributes to Aristotle in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas asserts that Aristotle gives three reasons why sins from vice are graver than sins from passion: 1) the vicious person remorselessly sins in accordance with her choice; 2) vice is a longer lasting condition than passion; and 3) “real vice is hidden from the one having it and his deception consists in thinking that what he does is good...hidden evil is more dangerous than overt evil” (St. Et., lib. 7, l.8, n). By contrast, in both the *Summa* and *De Malo*, Aquinas presents his own three reasons why sins from vice are graver than sins from passion: these are the same three reasons he believes sins from *malitia* are graver than sins from passion. Aquinas’s three reasons are: (1) sins from vice are more voluntary than sins from passion as they are more in the will; (2) vice is a longer lasting condition than passion; and (3) the person who sins from vice has a fixed intention of sinning because that person has a wrong estimate of the end (ST I.II q. 78, a.4; QDM q.3, a.13).

While Aquinas’s three reasons are very similar to Aristotle’s, note that he emphasizes the role the will plays in such actions. This makes sense, since both of the times he presents his three reasons most explicitly, he does so in the context of distinguishing sins from *malitia* from sins from passion. Also, more importantly, Aquinas does not say that vice is hidden from the one having it. While he consistently holds that the vicious person is
ignorant of her end, he also consistently holds that this ignorance is a deliberate sort of ignorance that is the result of the strength of the person's desire to do what is morally bad. He never says that, as a result of this ignorance, the vicious person fails to know that her action is in some way evil.

I suggest, then, that we should not take the ambiguity in the *Summa* passage (ST I-II, q.78, a. 2) to indicate that Aquinas believes that actions from vice are only sins from *malitia* in a qualified sense. In both the *Summa* and *De Malo*, Aquinas is clear that vice is a primary source of willful wrongdoing. Further, in both works, he ties vice to sinning from *malitia* alone, not to sinning from ignorance or passion. Finally, he explicitly claims in the *Summa* (and implies in *De Malo*) that all sins from vice are sins from *malitia*. Without evidence to the contrary, I suggest that we have strong reason to conclude that Aquinas believes all sins from vice are sins from *malitia*, and are thereby clear-eyed.

**VII. Challenges for the Clear-eyed Evil Account of Vice**

There remain a few at least *prima facie* problems for this conclusion. There are, for instance, several passages in Aquinas’s corpus that appear inconsistent with a clear-eyed evil account of vice. In *De Malo*, for example, Aquinas uses a pair of practical syllogisms to characterize the difference between the morally weak person, who sins from passion, and the intemperate person, who acts from vice. Aquinas’s practical syllogisms illustrate the way these wrongdoers deliberate when acting. Aquinas explains that, initially, the morally weak person is moved in two directions - her reason tells her to avoid some pleasure while her passions incline her to pursue it. She weighs her options, turning “over and over in her mind that everything pleasurable is to be pursued” (QDM q.3, a.9, ad.7). In the end, it is this judgment which prevails: she caves into temptation and follows the promptings of passion
rather than reason. The intemperate person, by contrast, “yields entirely to the movement of desire for pleasure” and so reasons confidently as follows: “everything pleasurable is to be enjoyed, this act is pleasurable, therefore this act is to be done” (QDM q.3, a.9, ad.7).

If this is how the intemperate person reasons when acting, then at least this particular type of vicious person seems to act with a sort of tunnel vision. She does not consider whether her action is morally bad, and indeed, she makes no comparative judgment of the sort involved in sinning from malitia. Rather, she focuses only on the pleasure involved in her action. She is the sort of person who pursues pleasure single-mindedly, doing what is morally bad unwittingly.

Despite appearances, I argue that it is perfectly possible to interpret Aquinas’s description of the intemperate person’s reasoning in a way which is consistent with a clear-eyed evil account of vice. Aquinas consistently holds that the morally weak person is unlike the vicious person because she feels regret after she acts. The morally weak person feels regret because she knows that the action she performs moves her away from her end; she simply loses sight of this fact for a moment when some passion clouds her judgment. This is also why, initially, the morally weak person is torn between the judgment of her reason and the inclination of her passions. She feels genuinely conflicted because her morally bad actions conflict with her perception of her end.

The vicious person’s actions, by contrast, cohere with her perception of her end. For this reason the vicious person never feels conflicted and acts decisively, without subsequent regret. It may be, then, that Aquinas, by means of his syllogisms, intends to contrast a person who experiences internal conflict when deciding to act with a person who acts decisively. Reflect, for example, on the willing amputee. The amputee realizes that
amputation involves an evil: the loss of his limb. He probably wishes that he could save his life without suffering this loss. This fact, however, need not cause the willing amputee to feel genuinely conflicted when deciding whether to act. We need not think, in other words, that the amputee is genuinely torn at any point between a judgment that he ought to save his life and the strong desire to save his limb.\textsuperscript{32} The amputee may, instead, realize that it is bad to lose his limb, but realize that saving his life is worth the loss. He may, then, firmly, decisively, and without genuine internal conflict or regret, choose amputation for the sake of his life.

In his commentary on Job, Aquinas confirms that he believes this sort of thing is possible. There, he explains that a person can rejoice even over taking bitter medicine because of her hope for health.\textsuperscript{33} In other words, the person who desires her health strongly enough can still take her medicine decisively and gladly, despite realizing it is bitter and wishing it were not bitter. This is what I suggest Aquinas believes happens in the case of vice. The vicious person, one type of willful wrongdoer, comes to desire some good, like pleasure, so strongly that she sins decisively, confidently, and gladly despite realizing that doing so requires she give up a good.\textsuperscript{34}

In this way, Aquinas’s depiction of the intemperate person’s seeming tunnel-vision may be his way of depicting the intemperate person’s single-minded focus on the pursuit of pleasure. What differentiates the intemperate person from the morally weak person is not that she fails to realize that the pursuit of pleasure involves giving something up, but that

\textsuperscript{32} This is not to say that the amputee cannot feel torn in this way; I suggest only that he need not.

\textsuperscript{33} In Job cap. 1.

\textsuperscript{34} It is worth noting, of course, that Aquinas does have a place in his moral psychology for those who sin decisively, gladly, and fail to even realize their actions require they give up a good. That place is just in his account of sins from ignorance, not his account of willful wrongdoing.
she consistently and decisively chooses to pursue pleasure because she believes pleasure is her end. The intemperate person's action, then, may well remain clear-eyed.

Similarly, other passages in Aquinas's corpus are only *prima facie* inconsistent with a clear-eyed evil account of vice. For example, in the *Summa* and elsewhere, Aquinas claims that the intemperate person suffers from lengthy, stubborn, and particularly serious ignorance. Vice is a longer lasting condition than passion precisely because a person who sins from passion suffers from only intermittent and comparatively momentary ignorance (ST II-II q.156, a.3, ad.1). For this reason Aquinas sometimes calls incontinence (moral weakness which renders the agent prone to sin from passion) a transitory vice. One might take the analogies that Aquinas draws between the effect of passions and the effect of vices, then, to suggest that both involve the same sort of ignorance. Vices simply cause stronger and lengthier ignorance of that sort. And since Aquinas believes that passions cause the person to be momentarily ignorant of the fact that her action is bad, this would mean that he thinks vices cause stronger and longer lasting ignorance of the fact that one's action is bad. If this is what Aquinas means for us to take away from the passages in question, then he cannot hold a clear-eyed evil account of vice.

As with Aquinas's syllogisms, however, these passages can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with a clear-eyed evil account of vice. Aquinas's analogies suggest only that the person who acts from a vice suffers from an ignorance that is more serious and stable than that suffered by the morally weak person who sins from passion. Moreover, recall that Aquinas believes that the ignorance involved in sinning from *malitia* is different from the sort of ignorance involved in sinning from passion. The person who sins from passion is ignorant of the fact that her particular action, at the moment she acts, is bad.
because her passion momentarily clouds her judgment. The person who sins from *malitia*, in contrast, is ignorant of the comparative value of the goods to which she attends. The person who sins from *malitia* pursues an objectively lesser good over an objectively greater one, and does so because she is mistaken about her ultimate end. A vice enables this sort of ignorance, since a vice leads a person to mistakenly see some temporal good as her end instead of God.

Both vices and passions, then, *do* leave a person ignorant. Also, as Aquinas suggests, the ignorance caused by a vice is more intractable than the ignorance caused by a passion. However, this is precisely because vices and passions lead to different types of ignorance. Passions lead the person to lose sight of the fact that some particular action is not conducive to her pursuit of her end. Vices lead the person to lose sight of her end itself. Hence, the vicious person’s ignorance is particularly difficult to remove. However, the vicious person's ignorance need not prevent her from recognizing that her particular action is morally bad and even bad for her in some way. So long as she believes that some morally bad action is necessary to her pursuit of her end, the evil in her actions can be clear-eyed.

A more serious challenge to the clear-eyed evil account of vice is that it still appears to entail two implausible claims: (1) that every vicious person knows that acting viciously is bad for her in some way, and (2) that every time a vicious person acts viciously she knows that her particular vicious action is bad for her in some way. The first claim is implausible because it seems a person can be greedy, prideful, etc. without ever coming to believe that her greed or pride is bad. Think of someone who has been told from a young age to look out for his own welfare above all else. Imagine this person adopts this value, and as an adult, becomes a committed Randian objectivist, focusing much of his life’s efforts
on the accumulation of wealth for the sake of his rational self-interest. Such a person, we might think, could be quite viciously greedy and yet never become aware of this. If so, such a person would be unwittingly wicked.

The second claim is implausible because it is conceivable that a vicious person could, at least on occasion, unwittingly act in accordance with her vice. Think of an established and greedy Wall Street tycoon, even one who recognizes that greed is morally bad (since she places her end in the accumulation of wealth, the immorality of her greed hardly fazes her — this is, recall, the state of the vicious person according to Aquinas). While such a person may, of course, realize that certain of her greedy actions require that she give up a spiritual good, one might think that we need not believe that every time such a person acts greedily, she realizes this is a consequence of her actions. Recall that according to both Aquinas and Aristotle (at least Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII), a vice is a disposition that makes some morally bad action easy, pleasurable, and natural to the vicious person. If greed is easy, pleasurable and natural to the Wall Street tycoon, we might imagine that sometimes she acts greedily without even thinking about it. Perhaps, over time, she even convinces herself that she was initially mistaken about the nature of greed and that she need not forfeit a good in order to act greedily. If she does this, will her greedy actions cease to be vicious?

The problems associated with the second implausible claim are easier to defuse, so I will begin there. First, it is important to note that Aquinas does have a place in his moral psychology for the unwittingly evil actions of a vicious person. This is because Aquinas believes that a vicious person need not act from her vice. Not only can she act well (as noted above), but she can act badly on account of a passion, or even on account of
ignorance, rather than on account of her vicious disposition (ST I.II q.78, a.2). The greedy person who unthinkingly acts greedily, or who ceases to believe that greedy actions are wrong, then, may be said to act greedily from ignorance rather than from vice.

While this would make some of the greedy person’s wrongful actions less voluntary and so more excusable than actions that are, properly speaking, vicious, I suggest that this is consistent with common sense. On this view, as, I believe, on a common sense view, a person is more culpable when she performs a morally bad action knowingly and without regret than when she performs it unwittingly and without regret. Aquinas believes that morally bad actions done from ignorance can still be seriously culpable and gravely wrong, but that they are not as culpable as those same actions done from malitia. On this reading, then, a morally bad action is only “from vice” when the person’s vice, which causes her to pursue the wrong good as her end, explains her action; and a person’s vice explains her action only when she remorselessly acts despite knowing, occurrently, that what she does involves a spiritual evil. It is only in this limited sort of case that it is clear that the vicious person acts badly because she is vicious and not because she is ignorant or morally weak. In other words, Aquinas does have a place in his moral psychology for unwittingly wicked actions; that place is simply in his account of sins from ignorance, rather than in his account of sins from vice.

There is a lingering problem with this response, however, because someone like the Wall Street tycoon seems to unwittingly act badly precisely because of the strength of her vice. At least counterfactually, this person may well act in the same way even if he were to realize that his action involves some evil. If the person would act in the same way even with occurrent knowledge, he would be very different from the person whom Aquinas says sins
from ignorance. The person who sins from ignorance, recall, acts as she does because she is ignorant: the cause of her sin is a disordered intellect, not a disordered will. This would seem to imply that were she not ignorant, she would not sin. In fact, in the Summa, Aquinas says explicitly that “not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone that removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act” (ST I.II q.76, a.1). In considering an act of unwitting patricide, Aquinas explains that “if a man’s will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of patricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin” (ST I.II q.76, a.1). Consequently, if the Wall Street tycoon’s will is disordered in such a way that knowledge about the nature of his actions would not restrain him from wrongdoing, his ignorance cannot be the cause of his unwitting wrongdoing.

Therefore I propose a refinement to the clear-eyed evil account of vice I have attributed to Aquinas. I suggest that although Aquinas often suggests that all instances of willful wrongdoing, and thereby all vicious actions, involve clear-eyed evil, his considered view is likely that some unwitting actions can be sins from vice, as long as the person committing the actions would still commit them were she clear-eyed. While this refinement does, admittedly, make room for instances of willful wrongdoing that do not themselves involve clear-eyed evil, Aquinas’s account of vice is still a clear-eyed evil account in the relevant sense. Unwitting vicious actions, on this reading, are only considered vicious actions because they would still be committed were the person clear-eyed. Aquinas’s account of unwitting malitia, then, is dependent on the possibility, in each unwitting action, of clear-eyed evil. Even the refined version of Aquinas’s account of vice remains very different from Aristotle’s account of vice in Ethics VII. On Aristotle’s account, the unwitting
nature of a vicious person’s action appears to explain why she acts decisively and with pleasure. On Aquinas’s account, by contrast, the unwitting nature of an individual vicious action is merely accidental to nature of that action and has no bearing on the decisiveness of the wrongdoer in acting.

Now, I return to the first implausible claim: the claim that every vicious person knows that acting viciously is bad for her in some way. This claim is more difficult to defuse because it is, in fact, true that Aquinas does not appear to be able to give an account of the entirely unwittingly vicious person. Because of Aquinas’s account of the nature of vice, as well as his account of nature of the acquisition of vice, someone who has never come to know that a particular type of action is morally bad would act from ignorance, not from vice, no matter how inclined she has become toward that action. In fact, Aquinas suggests several times in his corpus that an unbeliever’s actions (though not her unbelief itself) are all partially excusable because those actions proceed from ignorance.\textsuperscript{35} Despite this — and this is crucial — because Aquinas believes that we all have access to basic moral knowledge, it is very unlikely, perhaps even impossible, on his understanding of human psychology, that a person could acquire any character trait resembling a vice without knowing, at some point, that her actions are morally bad. For this reason Aquinas holds that even states like unbelief, ignorance, and despair, states that we may consider to be quite passive, are often themselves directly and knowingly willed. In the next chapter I explore this notion further, examining, for instance, the way in which despair can be an instance of willful wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{35} See, for instance, ST I.II q.89, a.5; ST II.II q.10, a.3, ad.2; QDM q.3, a.8, ad.1; and QDM q.3, a.13, ad. 1.
Aquinas's refusal to acknowledge that someone could be unwittingly vicious might be more palatable if we consider again that Aquinas believes all sins from vice are sins from *malitia*. Sins from *malitia*, recall, are supposed to be entirely voluntary and supremely culpable. Since it is at least reasonable to hold that clear-eyed evil is more voluntary than unwitting evil, I suggest it is likewise reasonable to hold that a genuinely unwittingly evil person would not be able to sin from *malitia*.

**Conclusion**

In taking all sins from vice to be instances of willful wrongdoing, Aquinas makes not only a place, but a primary place, in his moral psychology for clear-eyed, remorseless, wrongdoing. He does so in the face of his commitment to the Socratic thesis and despite his belief that all actions aim at some good. While Aquinas does not believe that any agents do what is evil for evil's sake, he does acknowledge that some do what is evil in pursuit of a good.

The vicious agent pursues some good she ought not as though that good were her ultimate end. Her vice enables her to do what she realizes is bad in the mistaken pursuit of a perceived greater good. As examples like that of the willing amputee illustrate, people regularly give up certain goods in the pursuit of others they value more highly. The vicious person simply puts high value on the wrong goods. Aquinas's insight into the nature of vice is that confusion over one's end best explains, not the thoughtless actions of the unwittingly wicked, but the calculated crimes of those who do evil in pursuit of their ends.

Vice, however, is only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for willful wrongdoing. In the next chapter, I show that Aquinas believes some willful wrongdoers are not vicious. In fact, just prior to acting, they may even be virtuous.
Chapter 2: Aquinas on Willful Wrongdoing in the Absence of Vice

Vice provides only one explanation for clear-eyed evil. Aquinas believes there are other explanations as well. A person need not seek her end in the wrong good to sin from *malitia*. Aquinas thinks any person, even the virtuous person, can engage in willful wrongdoing. As the vicious person can sometimes will to do what is morally good, Aquinas believes the virtuous person might, under certain circumstances, will to do what is morally bad.

This does not mean that Aquinas thinks virtuous people do what is morally bad easily, often, or without a reason. Like Aristotle, Aquinas believes virtues, particularly acquired virtues, make morally good actions easy and pleasurable. The virtuous person seeks her end in the right good and has all that she needs to reliably act well. However, unlike Aristotle, Aquinas believes that the virtues do not entirely prevent wrongdoing. In this life, there is no person so perfect that she is immune to temptation to do what is morally bad. While the virtuous person need not succumb to temptations she experiences — Aquinas believes that at least the person who has both the acquired cardinal virtues (temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence) and also certain God-given dispositions he calls ‘infused virtues’ has all that she needs to resist the desire to do what is bad — she can. Virtues, Aquinas thinks, facilitate morally good action without making morally bad action impossible. A person’s dispositions, recall, are things that she uses when she wills.36

36 See ST I-II, q.50, a.5 and q.71, a.4, as well as Chapter One.
Here, I focus on two of the ways Aquinas thinks a virtuous person might sin from *malitia*: through despair and through presumption. Though Aquinas believes despair and presumption can be passions, he also believes they can be willful acts. When they are, they are both instances and sources of willful wrongdoing.

I. **Hope of Heaven and Fear of Hell**

Aquinas’s account of the way attitudes like despair and presumption give rise to willful wrongdoing is more straightforward than his account of the way such attitudes serve as instances of willful wrongdoing. For this reason I treat these attitudes as sources of sin from *malitia* first.

After discussing the role vice plays in willful wrongdoing, Aquinas says in the *Summa*:

In another way it may happen that the will, *per se*, tends to an evil through the removal of some restraint (*prohibentis*): for instance, if someone be deterred from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to that person, but because of hope for eternal life, or fear of hell. If hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, the person will end in sinning from certain *malitia*, being freed from the bridle, as it were. Thus, it is clear that sin which is from certain *malitia* always presupposes some disorder in the person, which, however, is not always a disposition (*ST* I-II, q.78, a.3).

A person can engage in clear-eyed wrongdoing, then, even when she does not have a vice. She does so because she gives up some restraint on wrongdoing, like hope for eternal life or fear of hell. Initially, such a person refrains from doing what is morally bad because a disposition, like hope or fear, helps her to keep her will in line with her true end. These dispositions serve to deter moral wrongdoing in general, and willful wrongdoing in

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37 Aquinas actually believes there are six ways a virtuous person might sin from *malitia*: through presumption, despair, obstinacy, impenitence, envy of a brother’s grace, and rejection of the known truth. See In Sent. lib 2, dist. 43, q.1, a.3 and ST II.II, q.14, a.2. I choose to focus on despair and presumption because what Aquinas has to say about these attitudes in his major works is both lengthier and clearer than the scattered remarks we find about other states, like obstinacy.
particular. Aquinas believes the loss of a relevant restraint on sin, like hope or fear, disorders a person's will and leaves her more capable of clear-eyed wrongdoing.

In the passage quoted, Aquinas refers to the “removal” (remotio) of dispositions like hope or fear, which makes the person’s role in the matter sound passive. In most places, by contrast, including in passages in the *Summa*, Aquinas uses more active language to describe this person’s role. Aquinas claims elsewhere, for instance, that this person “casts aside” (abiicit) or “rejects” (reiicit) dispositions like hope and fear, or the restraint the person associates with such dispositions.38

In such passages, Aquinas is almost certainly describing the person’s actions from a third-person perspective: it is unlikely a person who despairs would describe herself as casting hope aside. Rather, she would describe herself as pursuing some good or avoiding some evil. I explore this further below. However, Aquinas’s relatively consistent use of active terms like those noted, highlights his conviction that the person’s role in the removal of dispositions like hope or fear is a willful and active one. Going forward, I will describe the person as someone who “gives up” dispositions like hope or fear. I intend this locution to capture the active, blameworthy, nature of the agent’s involvement in the removal of such dispositions, while avoiding the misleading connotation of conscious contempt involved in terms like “rejects” or “casts aside”.

Because Aquinas describes the person who gives up hope or fear as someone who had been restrained from sin, it may sound as though the person he has in mind is already strongly inclined toward wrongdoing before she rejects a disposition like hope or fear. One

38 See, for example, ST II.II q.14, a.1, where Aquinas says: “per contemptum abiicitur et removetur id quod electionem peccati poterat impedire, sicut spes per desperationem, et timor per praesumptionem, et quaedam alia huiusmodi, ut infra dicetur.” See also: In Sent. lib. 2, d. 43, q.1, a.2 and QDM q.3, a.14.
might then worry that she subsequently sins from *malitia*, not because she gives up whatever disposition had restrained her, but rather because of some prior inclination toward wrongdoing. But the talk of restraint does not itself imply that the agent Aquinas has in mind is especially eager to leap into a life of unbridled evil. Aquinas believes that *all* human beings need hope, fear, and several other such dispositions, to consistently avoid wrongdoing.

Hope of eternal life, the sort of hope Aquinas has in mind here, is a disposition he thinks all people need in order to attain their true end. This hope is a virtue of the will, to be contrasted with the passion of hope, a state of a person’s sensory appetite.\(^\text{39}\) Anyone can experience the passion of hope, and that passion can be directed at the pursuit of any temporal good deemed difficult to attain. One can hope, then, to find true love, to earn a promotion, or to win a marathon. The virtue of hope, by contrast, has a very specific function: it leads the agent to believe, though only to the degree that she ought to, that God will forgive her immoral actions and reward her good deeds with eternal life (*ST II-II*, q.17, a.2). Hope of this kind inclines a person’s will toward God, and thus, toward her true end (*ST II-II* q.18, a.1). By directing the will toward God, hope directs the person away from morally bad action.

Fear of hell, by contrast, makes a person aware that if she sins against God and fails to repent, she will be punished eternally for doing so. Aquinas tells us that fear of hell is “incompatible with the will to sin” (*ST II-II* q.19 a.9). There is a sense, of course, in which he exaggerates here. After all, the very wrongdoer we are concerned with gives up fear of hell,

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\(^{39}\) Aquinas also acknowledges an inchoate version of the virtue of hope, whereby a person hopes for happiness in heaven, but on account of merits she does not yet possess. The person with the full-blown virtue of hope hopes for happiness in heaven on account of merits she does already possess (*ST I-II*, q.65, a.4).
and so wills to do what is morally bad in spite of the fact that she possesses this disposition. There is also a sense, however, in which what Aquinas says is true. God-given fear is “incompatible with the will to sin” because Aquinas, recall, believes that agents strive toward their own ultimate ends. He takes for granted that any agent who believes that the penalty for moral wrongdoing is eternal suffering will think it in her best interest to avoid even the most pleasurable morally bad action. So long as she does, she will avoid wrongdoing. Once she does not, it is a sign her fear has been lost. Thus, this sort of fear, like hope of eternal life, helps the agent to keep her will in line with her true end.

While we may agree that fear of punishment provides effective motivation to avoid wrongdoing, we may wonder about the character of the sort of person who does what is morally good out of such fear. Fear of punishment may seem a poor motive for morally good action, suitable for children, perhaps, but not for the virtuous. In the Summa, Aquinas contrasts servile fear, the fear of being punished eternally by God, with two other types of fear: (1) the passion of fear, which anticipates some future evil connected to a sensory good (e.g. bodily injury, rejection, the loss of a loved one, or imprisonment) and (2) what Aquinas calls ‘filial fear’, the fear of succumbing to temptation to do what is morally bad (ST I.II q.41; ST II.II q.19 aa. 2-5).

Each of these three types of fear, Aquinas thinks, anticipates a future evil that surpasses the agent’s power. If a future evil is one an agent thinks she can avoid, she will not fear it. Consider, for instance, a young professional with a secure job and substantial investments. Such a person is far less likely than, say, a freelance painter, to fear destitution upon retirement. The more control a person feels she can exercise over future evils, the less she fears them.
Neither of the latter two types of fear are passions. As the virtue of hope regards a spiritual good, both servile and filial fear regard spiritual evils, the proper objects of the intellectual rather than the sensory appetite. Both types of fear, then, are states of the will.

Filial fear of God, Aquinas thinks, is always good. It is the sort of fear a person has of disappointing someone she loves and respects. Only a person who loves God can have filial fear, and so such fear is found only in the virtuous. Servile fear, by contrast, the sort of fear Aquinas focuses on here, is found both in those who are virtuous and in some who are not (ST II.II q. 19, a.4). This does not, however, mean that it is found in those who are vicious: fear of hell, as mentioned, is particularly persuasive, and Aquinas takes for granted that a person who believes the penalty for moral wrongdoing is eternal suffering will think it in her best interest to avoid bad actions. However, a person with servile fear but no filial fear is motivated to avoid wrongdoing for the wrong reason, and so cannot be entirely virtuous. When she avoids wrongdoing out of fear, she avoids wrongdoing only because she wants to avoid punishment, not because she loves God. A virtuous person, Aquinas thinks, fears both doing what is morally bad and punishment, but is motivated in both fears by love for God.

In the passage from the *Summa* above, Aquinas focuses on servile fear. Whether the person he has in mind has only servile fear, and so is not virtuous, is unclear and relatively unimportant for my purposes. Even if the person he has in mind in this passage is not virtuous, this does not suggest she could not be. I show below that in other places, Aquinas claims that even people who have never done anything morally bad may give up hope or fear.

Also, as mentioned, servile fear is found in the virtuous. Hope for heaven and fear of hell, then, are not dispositions vital only to those who, itching to act badly, find themselves
particularly persuaded by fear of punishment or the promise of reward. Aquinas believes every person needs these dispositions to avoid moral wrongdoing. Acquired virtues only serve to deter people from morally bad actions connected to worldly pursuits. They would be sufficient for moral goodness if some sort of worldly happiness were our ultimate end, but since Aquinas believes people have a supernatural ultimate end, they need an array of supernaturally oriented dispositions to prevent serious morally bad actions entirely. These dispositions include hope for heaven and fear of hell.

Aquinas also believes that human beings need these dispositions because he believes all human beings, even the most virtuous, struggle against desires to do what is morally bad. He has a theological explanation for this struggle: human souls are damaged by original sin. Prior to Adam's sin, Aquinas teaches, human beings had original justice, a virtue of the will that subjected the sensory appetite to the intellect, helping human souls to remain perfectly ordered to their true good. People recognized God as their good, desired Him with their wills, and could easily keep their bodily desires in check. Adam's first sin caused human nature to fall away from God. This fall away from God resulted in human beings' loss of original justice and an increase in disordered desire. Without original justice, the need to struggle against our bodies' desires can distract human beings from our natural inclination toward our true end. Postlapsarian human beings, Aquinas believes, are inordinately attracted to temporal goods, like pleasure.

Aquinas is clear that the effects of original sin do not entirely disorder any person's will: human beings retain a natural inclination to do what is virtuous. This inclination, he

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40 At least, this is the case of the cardinal virtues in their acquirable forms. Aquinas also believes there are divinely infused versions of each of these four virtues which are connected with our pursuit of our supernatural end (ST I.II q.63 aa.3-4).
thinks, explains why even the damned, who cannot do what is virtuous, experience remorse (ST I-II q. 85, a. 2, ad. 3). Everyone retains some natural inclination to value spiritual goods, like virtue and obedience to God, more than objectively less valuable temporal goods, like pleasure, where the two conflict, but this natural inclination has been diminished by the loss of original justice. The loss of original justice places an obstacle between human beings and the attainment of their end. Without original justice, all people, even the best people, need God-given dispositions like hope for eternal life and fear of hell to avoid wrongdoing. If a person gives up such dispositions, then, she will be prone to do more frequently what is morally bad.

That said, the person we are currently considering not only acts badly once she gives up hope or fear; she sins from *malitia*. The person who sins from *malitia*, as I have argued, engages in clear-eyed wrongdoing: she realizes, when she acts, that what she does is bad. Why would giving up a disposition like hope or fear dispose an agent to do what is wrong willfully?

**II. Despair, Presumption, and Clear-eyed Wrongdoing**

The loss of hope or fear, Aquinas thinks, is not only a loss, but is a movement into an incompatible, sinful, state. A person gives up hope through despair and fear of hell through presumption (see, for example, ST I-II, q.78, a.3; ST II-II, q. 14; QDM q. 3, a. 14). These attitudes impact the agent’s will and thereby facilitate clear-eyed wrongdoing.

Despair of the sort Aquinas refers to here is not a passive psychological state, nor is it a type of depression. Rather, despair is an act whereby one gives up hope. This sort of

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41 There is a propensity among modern thinkers to use the terms “depression” and “despair” interchangeably. See, for instance, Stocker (1979). The propensity to equate despair with a state of sluggish sorrow like depression is one which already had a long and rich history at the time Aquinas was writing, and leads
despair is an attitude one adopts, not an emotion one experiences. Hope of eternal life, recall, directs the person’s will toward God (and hence toward her true end) because it helps the agent to believe that eternal life is attainable. The person who gives up this hope, adopting an attitude of despair, comes to think that eternal life is unattainable (ST II-II, q.20, a.3). Despair, then, leads an agent to stop believing that her actions can impact her pursuit of her end: whether she acts well or badly, her end is out of reach.

Presumption, by contrast, is an attitude opposed to fear. The presumptuous person, like the despairing person, stops believing that her actions can impact her attainment of her ultimate end. The presumptuous person does so, not because she becomes convinced she will never attain her end, but because she becomes convinced that she will certainly attain her end. The particular sort of presumption Aquinas has in mind gives up fear of hell. The presumptuous person adopts the attitude that she will attain eternal life (and so attain her ultimate end) whether or not she acts badly (ST II.II, q. 21, a.1).

Note that despair and presumption are not states that incline a person toward particular morally bad acts. This distinguishes them from vices. Aquinas explains this distinction, claiming that states like despair:

Consist principally in aversion from the unchangeable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a changeable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a changeable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the unchangeable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God. (ST II.II, q.20, a.1, ad.1)

Aquinas, at times, to explicitly link despair to the spiritual apathy often called “sloth”. For more on the history of these connections, see Snyder 1965, pp. 43-50.
Despair and presumption, first and foremost, move the agent away from God, and so away from her ultimate end. On account of her movement away from her end, the agent who adopts one of these attitudes will necessarily turn to less valuable, changeable (temporal) goods and do what is morally bad. However, unlike the person who pursues temporal goods on account of a vice, the particular temporal goods the despairing or presumptuous person turns to are in no way determined by her presumption or despair.

Attitudes like despair and presumption make it easier for a person not only to act badly, but to sin from \textit{malitia}. Recall that the person who sins from \textit{malitia} pursues an objectively less valuable, temporal good over some objectively more valuable, spiritual one. Further, she does what is morally bad knowingly. Despair and presumption make this possible, not only because they remove a crucial part of an agent’s motivation for avoiding wrongdoing (either hope of heaven or fear of hell), but because they do so by leading the agent to falsely believe that her morally bad actions will have no impact on her attainment of her end. The despairing agent holds that no matter what she does, she will never make it into heaven. The presumptuous agent, by contrast, holds that no matter what she does, she will never be sent to hell. Thus, neither considers doing what is morally good important to the attainment of her ultimate end. The person who adopts one of these attitudes is fully capable of clear-eyed wrongdoing.

In fact, she is perhaps more capable of clear-eyed wrongdoing than the vicious person. Presumption and despair remove a general motivation the person has for avoiding morally bad actions. They do not make any particular type of wrongdoing easy or pleasurable in the way that vices do because they do not lead the person to seek the wrong end. For this reason, in the \textit{Summa} Aquinas says that “to [act morally badly] with pleasure,
and without any notable resistance on the part of reason...occurs only in one who has a [vicious] disposition” (ST I.II, q.78, a.3, ad.1). Unlike the vicious person, acting badly is not second nature to the person who acts on account of presumption or despair. However, because of this, the person who acts from despair or presumption can know full well that what she does is morally bad, and even that what she does is out of line with her true end.

This is not to say that the person who gives up hope of heaven or fear of hell will have no remaining motivation to avoid moral wrongdoing. Aquinas believes even people who give up God-given dispositions like hope of heaven and fear of hell can still have acquired virtues, which direct a person toward happiness in this life. Someone who gives up God-given dispositions does not immediately lose her acquired virtues as well. Likewise, even the agent who has none of the virtues may have some independent motivation to do what is morally good (social benefit, love for another person, etc.). Hence, even without hope of heaven, a person may have motive to do what is morally right. Despair and presumption do not incline an agent toward any particular sorts of morally bad actions, or make morally good action impossible. Despite this, in moving the agent away from her end, despair and presumption do make it inevitable that she occasionally sin (Aquinas, recall, believes all people need hope of heaven and fear of hell to avoid grave wrongdoing). They especially facilitate willful wrongdoing.

Though they especially facilitate willful wrongdoing, not every morally bad action that results from presumption or despair must be clear-eyed. The claim that such states are sources of sin from *malitia*, then, does not run into the plausibility problems Aquinas’s claims about vice have to face (see Chapter One, Section VI). A person who despairs or presumes could just as easily subsequently sin from ignorance or passion as from *malitia*. It
only means that there is reason to think those sins from *malitia* that result from presumption or despair can be especially clear-eyed.

Despair and presumption, I have argued, incline a person to do what is morally bad knowingly. As discussed in Chapter One, this is one critical feature of sins from *malitia*. The most critical feature, however, is that sins from *malitia* result from disordered willing. Aquinas believes the sins that result from despair and presumption can share this feature as well. Aquinas believes despair and presumption, of the sort he is concerned with here, disorder the will rather than the sensitive appetite or intellect. Hope and fear are dispositions that keep the will in line with the agent’s true end, and so when an agent gives them up, this leaves her will disordered.

In *De Malo*, Aquinas explicitly contrasts the way in which such a person’s will is disordered with the way in which the will is disordered when a person acts from vice. There, he says that the loss of a disposition like hope or fear causes a person’s will to tend toward evil the way that water pours out from a broken vase (DM q.3, a.14). Recall from Chapter One that in the same work, he compares the will of the vicious person to a heavy object that tends toward the earth. The heavy object tends toward the earth because that is its nature. Likewise, a person whose will is disordered on account of a vice has a will that tends toward wrongdoing as though morally bad actions were natural to her. The water, by contrast, tends toward the earth because it falls away from the vase that contained it. The loss of a disposition, like hope or fear, destroys the relationship an agent has to a God who, through those dispositions, contains and restrains her will. Her will’s fall away from God, and so from her ultimate end, is, by necessity, a fall toward wrongdoing, just as the water’s
fall away from the vase is, by necessity, a fall toward the ground. Despair and presumption, like vice, involve disordered willing.

III. Despair, Presumption, and the Socratic Thesis

The willful wrongdoing that results from attitudes like presumption or despair still involves ignorance. Recall that Aquinas adheres to a version of what I have called the Socratic thesis. He believes that every wrongdoer, even the willful wrongdoer, lacks some knowledge when she acts. In the Summa, he explains that willful wrongdoing involves ignorance of the fact that a certain spiritual evil is not to be suffered for the sake of a particular temporal good.

This description of the willful wrongdoer’s ignorance makes good sense when the wrongdoer we consider is the vicious person. The vicious person is ignorant in this way because a vice disposes a person to value some temporal good more than any other good she considers. From the vicious person’s perspective, the pursuit of that temporal good seems most in line with her end. However, the person who despairs or presumes does not have a disposition toward a particular temporal good. For this reason one might worry that Aquinas cannot consistently and plausibly maintain that both people who act from vice and those who act from states like presumption and despair are ignorant in the same way.

First, it should be noted that despair and presumption do involve a sort of ignorance. Recall that the person who despairs falsely judges that her morally bad acts are unforgivable. As Aquinas puts it in the Summa, she is ignorant, not of the universal premise that God pardon’s sinners, but of the particular premise that even she could be pardoned (ST II.2 q.20, a.2). The person who presumes, by contrast, falsely judges that God will
forgive her no matter what she does. She is ignorant of the extent to which she will receive punishment.

Further, in each case, this ignorance plays a pivotal role in the person’s choice to do what is morally bad. The person who despairs or presumes is fit to engage in clear-eyed wrongdoing, not because she so loves a particular type of morally bad action, but rather because she makes the false judgment that morally good action is inconsequential to her attainment of her end. She makes this judgment because of the ignorance just described. Hence, Aquinas consistently maintains his adherence to the Socratic thesis.

The ignorance just described, however, is not the sort Aquinas claims is involved in willful wrongdoing: ignorance of the fact that a particular evil should not be suffered for the sake of a particular good. What are we to make of this?

Aquinas does not explicitly explain the connection between the sort of ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing and that involved in states like presumption and despair. However, there is reason to think that the ignorance involved in those states, the sort of ignorance just described, leads to ignorance of the fact that certain particular evils should not be suffered for the sake of certain particular goods. The person in a state of presumption or despair falsely believes that, in general, morally good actions are inconsequential to her pursuit of her ultimate end. Thus, when she is tempted by some good she knows she cannot pursue without acting badly, she may choose to pursue that good anyhow. In the moment she makes her choice, she may well fail to realize that a certain spiritual evil is not to be suffered for the sake of a particular temporal good.

Think, for instance, of a person who considers stealing money from a wallet she finds on a park bench. Imagine that she knows that doing so would be morally bad, and that
this knowledge figures into her calculation when she is deciding how to act. If she is presumptuous, or despairing, this knowledge may play only a very small role in her calculation. The fact that an act is morally bad may still weigh against it in her mind, but not because she believes morally good action is necessary for her attainment of her ultimate end. Suppose the person in our example badly needs extra money to pay off a debt. If she is in a state of despair, the good of paying off her debt may look better to her than trying to return the money she has found to its rightful owner. After all, even if she does what is morally good, she will never attain true happiness, her ultimate end. At least if she pockets the cash, she may increase her earthly happiness. Hence, such a person may choose to take the money. If she does, her act indicates that she values the good of being able to pay off her debt more than any good she thinks she might gain from doing what is morally good. In valuing her ability to pay off her debt more than doing what is morally good, she further indicates that she does not realize that doing the morally good thing is all things considered better for her than even freedom from debt. She fails to realize this precisely because she fails to realize that morally good actions are important to her attainment of her ultimate end. The former sort of mistake relies on the latter, then, and mirrors the sort of ignorance Aquinas claims is involved in willful wrongdoing.

Of course, even if this is true, the willful wrongdoing that proceeds from states like presumption and despair remains importantly different from the sort Aquinas first describes in the *Summa*. There, he says that “the will is disordered when it loves a lesser good more. The consequence is that it chooses to suffer a detriment to the good that is loved less, in order to obtain the good that is loved more” (ST I-II q.78, a.1). In this passage,
the willful wrongdoer is motivated by her strong love for some temporal good. This love is
the source of the ignorance involved in her clear-eyed wrongdoing, not vice versa.

States like presumption and despair, by contrast, involve disordered willing but do not
seem to result from a strong love for a temporal good. Certainly, as discussed above, a
person in either of these states thinks moral rectitude is inconsequential to her attainment
of her ultimate end. She might consequently engage in knowing wrongdoing, valuing, in
that moment, whatever she stands gain from acting badly more than any good she still sees
in doing what is morally right. In the moment she acts, she loves some gain more than
virtue. However, this state of inordinate love seems to be a direct result of the ignorance
involved in despair or presumption, not the source of that ignorance. Clear-eyed morally
bad acts performed from despair and presumption seem to have all of the features Aquinas
attributes to sins from malitia, but not in the right order.

This, however, is to misunderstand the disordered willing such attitudes involve.
Disordered willing always involves desire for some good. As will become evident in the
next section, Aquinas believes even attitudes like presumption and despair are triggered by
inordinate desire for goods (either particular temporal goods, or the avoidance of some
perceived evil). The difference between vice and attitudes like despair, then, is not that
vice, but not despair, is triggered by disordered love. It is that vice, but not despair, involves
a continuing inclination toward particular temporal goods.

To summarize thus far: Aquinas believes giving up a disposition that deters morally
bad action can lead to willful wrongdoing. Both those who hope for eternal life and those
who fear hell see that morally bad actions move them away from their true ends. When
these dispositions are replaced by presumption or despair, the agent ceases to believe that
her morally good actions have an impact on her ability to attain her ultimate end. Neither despair nor presumption inclines the person toward any specific morally bad actions, and these states do not impair the person’s ability to distinguish between what is morally good or bad. However, because they entail the belief that moral rectitude is inconsequential to the person’s pursuit of her end, despair and presumption pave the way for clear-eyed wrongdoing.

IV. Despair as an Instance of Willful Wrongdoing

Aquinas claims that attitudes like presumption and despair can be not only sources, but instances of willful wrongdoing (ST II. II q.14, aa. 1-2; QDM q.3, a.14). We may find this claim surprising. Despair, in particular, may seem more pitiable than culpable. For this reason, I focus my attention on Aquinas’s account of despair below.

As mentioned in the preceding section, the vicious person’s inordinate love for some temporal good precedes, and leads to, the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing. This person’s ignorance of the fact that a particular evil should not be suffered for the sake of a particular good is a consequence, not a cause, of her disordered will. Because such a person’s ignorance is a consequence of disordered willing, Aquinas can argue that such a person’s will, not her ignorance, is the true source of her sin. This allows him to respond to objectors who worry that even his sins from malitia are really sins from ignorance.

In an attitude like despair, ignorance may seem to precede disordered willing. Despair, after all, only facilitates willful wrongdoing because the person who despairs falsely believes she can never attain her ultimate end. If her despair is a mere passive reaction to that judgment, then even if despair entails disordered willing, that disordered willing seems to be, itself, a consequence rather than a cause of the agent’s false judgment.
While despair may render such a person more capable of clear-eyed wrongdoing, then, the primary source of that wrongdoing seems to be ignorance, not a disordered will. This should mitigate, not aggravate, the wrongfulness of her clear-eyed actions.

To describe the despairing person in this way, however, is to misunderstand Aquinas’s account of the attitude. While Aquinas does make a place in his moral psychology for passive, sometimes pitiable, despair (in his account of the passions), he thinks despair of the sort at hand — despair that is opposed to hope in the afterlife — is willful. The passion of despair can be a good thing: there are times a person should give up hope. Hope, recall, aims at a good deemed difficult but possible to attain. If a person who hopes for some good realizes that the good she hopes for is truly unattainable, despair is the appropriate response. A man who hopes to marry his childhood sweetheart, for instance, should despair if she repeatedly rejects his advances, or even marries someone else. If he continues to hope to marry her, we think him deluded and foolish.

Despair of eternal life, Aquinas thinks, is never an appropriate response to one’s situation. The ignorance such despair involves is not to be thought passive and pitiable, but rather a blameworthy consequence of the inclination of the agent’s will. As we will see, Aquinas connects this despair to a growing distaste for the constraints associated with the virtuous life and/or the growing desire for temporal goods. Ignorance of the relationship between the moral good and the agent’s own good is a consequence of disordered willing, not of ignorance.

Despair of eternal life, the specific sort of despair at issue here, disorders the will because it gives up hope for eternal life, a disposition that helps order the agent toward her true end. Aquinas believes a person who despairs of the afterlife may be sinless, even
virtuous, when she acts. This is because hope, of the sort Aquinas thinks despair of eternal life displaces, is an infused theological virtue.

Aquinas contrasts infused virtues with acquired virtues. Infused virtues cannot be acquired, but are rather given directly to people by God (ST I-II, q.63, aa.3-4). Aquinas believes that people have a supernatural ultimate end and so need divinely-given virtues to reach that end. There are three infused theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. There are also infused versions of the acquirable cardinal virtues: temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence.

One may wonder why Aquinas multiplies the virtues. Why would a person need both an acquired and an infused version of temperance, for instance, or prudence? Aquinas’s response is that the infused virtues and the acquired virtues have different functions, as well as different effects on the agent. The infused virtues direct the agent to her supernatural ultimate end; the acquired virtues are only able to direct the person to natural ends (QDV a.10). While both the acquired and the infused virtues subdue a person’s inordinate passions, only the acquired virtues cause the person to experience those passions less intensely. The infused virtues, by contrast, subdue a person’s passions by giving the person the strength to resist them. Someone with the infused virtues can resist temptations despite experiencing them intensely.

The infused theological virtues are connected, not only to one another, but also to the other infused virtues (for example, to the infused versions of the cardinal virtues). Aquinas says:

God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature...[and so] all the moral virtues must be infused together with charity, since it is through them that people perform each different kind of good work (ST I.II q.65 a.3).
Consequently, if a person has the virtue of hope, she has all of the other infused virtues as well. While a person who has all of the infused virtues may or may not have the acquired versions of these virtues, Aquinas thinks she possesses all that she needs to act entirely virtuously (ST I.II q.65, a.2).

Since the infused virtues are connected, the person who has the theological virtue of hope and gives up such hope through despair is virtuous when she first acts. Though she is able to resist despair, she does not.

We might reasonably wonder why she does not. In the Summa, Aquinas explains that there are two reasons a person might despair. Since the object of any sort of hope is a good that the agent thinks it is possible but difficult for her to attain, despair is the result of a person who either: (1) stops considering the object of hope a valuable good, or (2) deems that valuable good too difficult to attain (ST II.II q. 20, a. 4). The first, Aquinas thinks, happens when a person becomes unduly attracted to certain temporal (especially bodily) goods. He explains that “love of [bodily] pleasures leads a person to have a distaste for spiritual things” (Ibid.). The second happens when a person becomes averse to the formidable nature of a life of virtue. The object of the theological virtue of hope is the eternal afterlife. However, attainment of that eternal afterlife is quite difficult. It requires obedience to God’s law, which, in this life, is not always easy or enjoyable. If the life required for eternal happiness seems sufficiently difficult, this can lead her to despair.

42 In this passage, Aquinas also follows a long Christian tradition, beginning in Gregory, in linking despair of the afterlife to both spiritual apathy (often called “sloth”) and to lust. However, as Aquinas believes both sloth and lust are, properly speaking, vices, and he thinks the person who despairs of eternal life despairs (or at least can despair) when she is virtuous, he cannot mean that, strictly speaking, despair of eternal life must arise from these vices. More likely, he means to draw a parallel between the sorts of states involved in these vices and the states involved in despair.
In both his *Sentences* commentary and the *Summa*, Aquinas suggests that such despair is not only a grave sin, but that it is possible, though unlikely, for someone to despair in her *very first* act of sin. In the *Sentences* commentary he illustrates, explaining that someone who has not yet sinned might give up hope after observing different human conditions and noticing the pleasurable lives lead by those who do not hope in God (In Sent. lib. 2, dist. 43, q. 1, a.5). Note that here, the person’s motive for her despair is the first of the two listed above. She despairs because she is unduly attracted to the prospect of a more pleasurable life. What leads her to despair, then, is not an erroneous judgment about her ability to attain an eternal afterlife, but rather attraction to the pleasures she associates with a life free from the constraints of virtue.

In the *Summa*, Aquinas argues explicitly that the person who gives up hope of eternal life does not adopt the position she does because she makes a simple erroneous judgment about her relationship to God and the afterlife. While despair ultimately involves an erroneous judgment, that judgment is driven by either her desire to pursue a temporal good or her desire to avoid the evil she associates with the difficulty involved in obedience to God. For that reason, despair of eternal life, Aquinas argues, consists “not in disbelieving in God’s justice...but in having contempt for it” (ST II.II q.14, a.2, ad. 1).43

In the *Sentences* commentary, he puts his point in slightly greater detail. There, he says that the Christian who despairs of the afterlife believes that sins can be pardoned, but “of his own accord, casts the remission of sins, which he believes to be done, away from himself in order to more freely devote himself to sin” (In Sent. lib.2, d.43, a.3, ad.1).44

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43 See also *QDM* q.3, a.14, ad. 6.
44 “Desperatio, secundum quod est species peccati in spiritum sanctum, non provenit ex hoc quod aliquis neget remissionem peccatorum; sed quia remissionem peccatorum, quam fieri credit, ut liberius vacet
virtuous person who despairs of eternal life, then, does not passively lose hope in response to a judgment she makes. Rather, she willfully gives up hope so that she can more easily do what is morally bad. Aquinas repeatedly refers to despair of the afterlife as something contemptuous, an act that involves the “rebellion” of the will, rather than a passive response to ignorance (In Sent. lib. 3, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad. 4).

This may not sound like a very plausible description of a person who despairs. At the very least, if the person Aquinas has in mind actually experiences her despair as a rebellion from God, or a contemptuous rejection of hope, such wrongdoing must be exceedingly rare. Also, recall, despair involves an agent adopting the belief that she will not attain eternal life. This false belief is the basis for the ignorance involved in her subsequent wrongdoing. The notion that despair of eternal life is contemptuous and deliberate, however, makes it sound as though the person who despairs forms this false belief at will. If so, Aquinas seems committed to a questionably strong sort of doxastic voluntarism. A critic might argue that someone can no more despair at will than she can willfully decide to believe that she is the Sultan of Brunai.

It is far more likely that when Aquinas mentions the contemptuous rejection of hope involved in despair, he is speaking from a third-person perspective. From the outside, it is clear to the believing Christian that the person who despairs of eternal life casts herself away from God. Her act seems especially contemptuous, and is especially culpable, because at the time she despairs, she is virtuous. She has the dispositions she needs to act well and yet acts badly anyhow.

peccatis, sponte a se abiicit, dum non vult tendere in hoc quod remissionem peccatorum consequatur.”
From the inside this despair likely looks quite different. If asked why she no longer hopes for eternal life, the person who despairs may cite distaste for the effort she associated with obedience to God, or she may cite some good she wished to pursue that was incompatible with continued obedience. It is unlikely she would cite aversion to God or to hope per se.

This does not mean that there is not a sense in which this despair is genuinely deliberate. It may not involve conscious contempt for God, but Aquinas still believes the despair that gives up hope of eternal life is an instance of willful wrongdoing. Despair of eternal life, recall, is an act of the will, not a passion. It is an attitude a person adopts, and not a passive psychological state.

The notion that a person can adopt an attitude like despair need not seem puzzling. Consider a fairly ordinary case: Atticus hopes to win a marathon, but after days of grueling training, he is tired and frustrated. In the face of the difficulty involved in his training, he can hardly even remember why he decided to run a marathon in the first place. Focusing on the agonizing days ahead, he may give up hope. If he does, we need not think that his despair was a state he was unable to resist or avoid. People frequently tell their friends and loved ones not to give up hope precisely because they believe that, in at least certain circumstances, it is possible to resist despair. Atticus may, after all, choose to shift his focus instead, thinking about the pride that he will feel if he wins. If he does this, he may continue to hope. Hence, while we may think that the way Atticus thinks about his situation when he focuses on the grueling training is not entirely under his control, we may think that whether or not he focuses on the grueling training instead of some other consideration, is.
On Aquinas’s model, of course, Atticus’s despair is a passion, not a state of the will, even if there is something willful about it. This is because both Atticus’s hope and his despair aim at temporal goods. When a Christian with hope of heaven despairs, by contrast, her despair is a state of the will. Despair of eternal life gives up a disposition that helped the agent to aim at her true end. In giving such a disposition up, a person moves away from her true end, and this disorders her will.

Like Atticus, the Christian with hope of eternal life may focus on the grueling nature the task ahead of her. A life of obedience to God, after all, requires that she limit or forgo certain worldly goods: extramarital sex, excessive wealth, indulgent eating, idle gossip, etc. Alternatively, she may focus on her desire for one of those goods rather than the grueling nature of a life of virtue. Either way, she may despair. What is important, however, is that she need not. The fact that she has the virtue of hope means that she can also focus on the promise of eternal life. As a virtue, hope is a disposition that inclines the agent toward her true end. A person with the virtues, or at least a person with the infused virtues, is capable of resisting all wrongdoing. A person like Atticus, who experiences a passion like despair, may not always be able to resist that despair. Likewise, Atticus’s despair may, in at least some instances, be appropriate. A Christian who has hope of eternal life, by contrast, can always resist despair of eternal life if she so wills. She need not: Aquinas, as noted in Chapter One, believes our dispositions are things we use when we will. A person who has God-given hope of eternal life can fail to use that hope (or perhaps, in some cases, even will not to use it) and so give up a disposition she has. However, she can resist despair if she wills to use her hope.
In arguing that despair can be willful, then, Aquinas need not be committed to some questionable form of doxastic voluntarism. The person who despairs does not simply choose to believe that God will not grant her eternal life, but her despair is willful. It is a result of her failure to use a disposition she should have and could have used to keep her will in line with her end. She should have and could have focused on God’s goodness, or eternal happiness, rather than on some temporal pleasure or the difficulty involved in the Christian life. She does not, and so she engages in willful wrongdoing.

We may press Aquinas on this, however. Why would one virtuous person fail to use hope of eternal life while another does not? If the answer lies in ignorance or in some other preceding and determining factor, we may doubt that it was truly within that person’s control to resist despair.

Aquinas admits that it is very unlikely that a virtuous person will give up hope, or other infused dispositions that help keep her will in line with her end, without any prior inclination to do what is morally bad (ST II-II q.14, a.4). While the infused virtues enable an agent to resist all grave morally bad actions by inclining the agent toward her true end, they are not incompatible, Aquinas thinks, with the experience of temptation (this, recall, is a part of our postlapsarian condition) and with some, at least inchoate, inclinations to do what is morally bad.

For instance, Aquinas thinks that the person may be influenced by the lingering traces of former vicious dispositions. Aquinas explains that when a person with a vice, like intemperance, receives the infused virtues, her vice is destroyed and “no longer remains as a disposition in the one who had it... but [it remains] in the process of corruption as a sort of state” (QDV a.10 ad.16). The infused virtues are incompatible with vices, but they are
compatible with some lingering inclinations toward sin in formerly vicious people. While any person with the infused virtues, even one with lingering inclinations to sin, can act virtuously, doing so will be more difficult for her than it will be for those without these inclinations (for instance, for those with both the infused and the acquired virtues). The infused virtues, unlike the acquired virtues, enable a person to control her inordinate passions without causing her to feel those passions less intensely. It is possible, then, that a virtuous person with lingering inclinations to do what is morally bad may allow herself to be unduly influenced by a passion.

Likewise, a person may allow herself to despair under the influence of a passion because of previous venial sins: minor infractions, like speaking an idle word or telling a joking lie, that Aquinas thinks are unavoidable in this life and are compatible with the possession of the virtues. While no number of venial sins could cause a virtuous person to lose her infused virtues, and hence, no number of venial sins could cause a virtuous person to despair, Aquinas suggests that venial sins may, in some cases, dispose people to do what is gravely bad more easily. He says, for example, that:

A sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because the person who commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming the will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject the will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus (ST I.11 q.88, a.3).

Thus, like the virtuous person with lingering inclinations to sin, a virtuous person who has frequently sinned venially may, if she experiences a passion like lust, be more inclined than another person to despair.

However, it is crucial to note that Aquinas does not believe either of these conditions is necessary for a person to give up hope and despair. A person can fail to use, or
perhaps even choose not to use, a disposition like hope even if she has all the virtues and has never sinned. In fact, in his *Sentences* commentary, Aquinas argues that Adam, a figure who was both sinless and whose original state enabled him to quite easily keep his will in check, could have engaged in willful wrongdoing though he did not (In Sent. lib 2, dist. 43, q. 1, a.6). Likewise, he suggests that even the angels could have done so. The only explanation for despair in such circumstances would be the agent’s will.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that even in the more ordinary cases, in which a person who despairs has some prior inclination to sin on account of previous vices or venial sins, Aquinas does not believe these prior inclinations are enough to fully explain or determine her action. Any person with the infused virtues can will to use those virtues and so resist the temptation to despair. Even under the influence of the passions that come with the consideration of the difficulty of a life of virtue, Aquinas argues that a person is capable of fleeing or resisting temptation by directing her attention away from that which tempts her or toward spiritual goods (ST II-II q.35, a.1, ad.3).\(^{45}\) It is always, then, within a virtuous person’s power to keep hoping in eternal life and avoid despair.

This account of despair of eternal life is at least broadly in keeping with Aquinas’s description of acts of willful wrongdoing. Instances of willful wrongdoing, recall, share at least the following three features: (1) disordered willing, (2) occurrent knowledge that what one does is morally bad, and (3) ignorance of some kind. Further, the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing is, Aquinas claims, the result of the agent’s disordered willing, not vice versa. Despair of eternal life, as we have seen, does involve disordered willing.

\(^{45}\) See also: “That error that is in reason, according to which the person estimates something good that is not good, is ignorance of choice...the will is in a way the cause of this ignorance when the person does not restrain the passions which absorb reason in this estimate. This restraint is in the power of the will, and therefore sin is rightly attributed to the will” (*In Sent.* lib. 2, d. 39, q.1, a.1, ad.4).
willing. Not only does this despair give up a disposition that orders the will, but it does so because the agent wills not to use that disposition when she ought. The person who despairs of eternal life does so in pursuit of some good: either release from the constraints associated with a life of obedience to God, or some specific good or goods she cannot pursue while remaining obedient. She thereby chooses a temporal good, whichever one attracts her, over a spiritual good, like virtue or obedience to God.

Likewise, despair involves ignorance. The person who despairs is ignorant of the fact that eternal life is attainable, and so of the fact that her morally bad acts have an impact on her fate. However, this ignorance is a consequence, not a cause, of her disordered willing.

Does the person who despairs know that her despair is morally bad? The person who acts from a vice, recall, does what she knows is morally bad, thinking that performing some morally bad act is all things considered good at the time. A person who despairs, we might think, may be able to avoid her despair, but this does not mean that she realizes her despair is morally bad when she acts. I think that this must be conceded. While there is a sense in which the person knows that she no longer aims at eternal life when she gives up hope (it is not as though a person who stops hoping that she will attain eternal life is unaware of this fact, or even of the fact that eternal life is her true ultimate end), it is unlikely that she sees her despair as a sin in the moment that she acts, or even considers her act the choice of a temporal good over a spiritual one. While Aquinas can argue that her act expresses an implicit preference for some temporal good over some spiritual good, the person who despairs likely does not see it this way. Instead, she is focused on the good she wishes to gain or the difficult life she wishes to avoid.
This need not suggest that Aquinas thinks despair and other such attitudes are not true instances of willful wrongdoing. Rather, it suggests that what links all types of willful wrongdoing is the fact that such acts have their source in disordered willing and not in ignorance or passion. This also does not change the fact that in the *Prima Secundae*, Aquinas appears to commit himself to the position that all actions from vice, and even acts properly said to be performed *from* presumption and despair, involve clear-eyed evil.

There, he treats despair and presumption as only sources, rather than instances, of willful wrongdoing. As sources of willful wrongdoing, they, like vices, are perfectly capable of facilitating clear-eyed wrongdoing. This is a point he seems to want to emphasize in that article in the *Summa*. This simply broadens the notion of willful wrongdoing to include the very adoption of attitudes like despair and presumption, even when the adoption of those attitudes does not involve the agent’s clear perception of the fact that what she does is morally bad. They are willful wrongful acts, and that is enough.

**V. What Has Jerusalem to do with Athens?**

While Aquinas's account of presumption and despair is embedded in a rich theological framework, his core insights can be divorced from that framework. First, concerning despair and presumption as *sources* of willful wrongdoing, the broad point is this: when a person loses the motivation she has for doing what is morally good, this makes it easier for her to do what is morally bad knowingly. Attitudes like the excessive confidence that comes from presumption or the pessimism associated with despair facilitate clear-eyed wrongdoing. Consider someone who does what is morally good, not because she hopes for heaven, but because she hopes for something in this life. Perhaps she hopes for tranquility, or a sort of rational perfection, or something comparatively modest,
like friendship, the respect of her colleagues, or a date with a cute classmate. If such a person decides the object of her hope is unattainable — she decides the moral life is tumultuous, that rational perfection is impossible, or that nice girls finish last — her motivation for doing what is morally good may vanish, or at least diminish.

Likewise, a person who has becomes overly confident that she will attain a goal may do what is morally bad knowingly. Think of someone who does what is morally good only because he thinks it will help him earn tenure (via the respect and friendship of his colleagues). After a few wildly successful publications, he decides he no longer needs his colleagues’ friendship and respect. If such a person harbors no other opposition to certain types of wrongdoing (perhaps lying, plagiarism, or slander), he may well start to engage in such wrongdoing knowingly.

What Aquinas says about despair as an instance of willful wrongdoing is, perhaps, impossible to secularize. However, that does not mean that there is nothing to be gained from considering the possibility that despair, and in particular, despair over something we ought to continue to hope for, can be a morally blameworthy, willful, act. Aquinas suggests that there are certain sorts of hope that we can and should maintain, and so certain types of despair that we can and should resist. This, I venture, is true. The new father, attending to the difficulty of caring for a newborn or the pleasures of his previous life, should resist the urge to give up hope that he will be a successful father. Despair can be both a dangerous attitude, and a blameworthy one.

**Conclusion**

In presenting several types of willful wrongdoing, Aquinas works to connect the gravest actions according to Aristotle, actions from vice, with the gravest actions according
to the Christian tradition. In doing so, he shows that what links all instances of willful wrongdoing is not the fact that they are entirely clear-eyed, but rather the fact that they proceed from disordered willing. There are two ways, Aquinas suggests, in which the will can be disordered. Both vices and attitudes like presumption and despair proceed from the will inclining away from the agent’s true end. However, the person who sins from vice has a will that moves primarily toward some temporal good. The person who presumes or despairs moves toward temporal goods as well, but not toward any one dispositionally and in particular. Rather, she has a will that moves primarily away from the constraints and the effort she associates with a life of moral goodness.
Chapter 3: Error in the Intellect and Evil in the Will: Capreolus and Cajetan on Willful Wrongdoing

Aquinas, I have argued, works to render the claim that all wrongdoing involves ignorance compatible with the claim that only some wrongdoing is from ignorance. Disordered willing, he thinks, precedes and leads to the ignorance involved in all sins from *malitia*. Vices lead a person to value the wrong goods too highly, while attitudes like despair and presumption lead a person to judge that morally good actions are inconsequential to her pursuit of her end. It is the will, not the intellect, which is the source of such sins.

Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing, however, would not prevent his critics, in later centuries, from accusing him of a commitment to intellectual determinism. Aquinas frequently describes the will as a passive power, and this led many to believe he was committed full-stop to the position that the intellect’s judgments determine the will, and so the position that a person cannot act against, or even willfully alter, her judgments.46 Aquinas’s commitment to a version of the Socratic thesis did not help matters. The notion that all wrongdoing involves ignorance may seem to imply that all wrongdoing results from ignorance. This position was deemed a serious threat to moral responsibility. After all, if all wrongdoing results from ignorance, it hardly seems right to deem agents culpable for their morally bad actions.

Aquinas’s works attracted not only avid critics, but ardent followers. Those followers often worked to defend him against the charge that his moral psychology renders agents blameless for their morally bad actions. I turn to the work of two of those followers here:

46 See ST I q.80, a.2; q.82, a.3, ad2; or ST I-II q.6, a.4, ad3. This impression remains. See, for instance, Penner (2013), as well as Eardley (2003) and (2006).
John Capreolus and Thomas Cajetan. Both were highly influential Thomists in later centuries and both treat Aquinas's account of willful wrongdoing.

Here, I argue that while both Capreolus and Cajetan develop Aquinas's own account of willful wrongdoing in useful ways, in working to uphold Aquinas's commitment to a version of the Socratic thesis, these thinkers both under-emphasize the causal role Aquinas believes the will plays in willful wrongdoing. In so doing, both thinkers seem to commit Aquinas to the deterministic view that ignorance, or at least some lack of consideration, is the ultimate source of all sin.

I. 1277

Let me turn first to an event that helped kindle later scholastic debate over the relationship between the will and the intellect: the Condemnation of 1277. This event forms a crucial part of the background against which Capreolus and Cajetan write centuries later.

On March 7, 1277, exactly three years after Aquinas's death, Bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier, issued a wide-ranging condemnation targeting either 219 or 220 positions he claimed to find circulating among Paris's faculty of arts.\footnote{While the earliest edited versions of the text, as well as several early manuscripts, list 219 condemned positions, David Piché, responsible for the most recent Latin edition of the text, finds four manuscripts containing 220 condemned positions (Piché 1999, p. 24). It is uncontroversial that the condemned positions I focus on below were included in the original condemnation, and so the precise number of original condemned positions is inconsequential to this chapter.} He deemed those who would even listen to these heterodox positions worthy of excommunication.\footnote{"Ea totaliter condempnamus, excommunicantes omnes illos, qui dictos errores vel aliquem ex illis dogmatizaverint, aut defendere seu sustinere presumperint quoquomodo, necnon et auditores, nisi infra vii dies nobis vel cancellario Parisiensi duxerint revelandum": "we totally condemn these [things], excommunicating all those who have taught the said errors or any of them, or have presumed in any way to defend or uphold them, and even those listening to them, unless they choose to reveal themselves to us or to the chancery of Paris within seven days." (Denifle and Chatelain, 1889, 473; vol. 1, p. 543).} A number of the condemned positions could be traced to Aristotle, Averroes, and their influence, and so the
event is often seen as an attempt to quell the growing influence of strands of Graeco-Arabic
thought in the medieval universities.\footnote{While it is clear that certain positions associated with what we might call radical Aristotelianism and with
Averroës’s teachings were certainly condemned in 1277, there is debate over the extent to which the
Condemnation can be seen as a more general reaction against Greek and Arabic philosophy. See Wippel

Aquinas was not an explicit target of the condemnation, but even some of his earliest
followers noticed that he held several of the positions condemned. For this reason the event
put Thomists on the defensive.\footnote{For more on the early Thomists’ reactions to the condemnations, see Cessario 2005, pp. 41-45 and Eardley
(2006), pp. 168-171. Godfrey of Fontaines noted that the condemnation of positions like 129 and 130 (I
discuss these shortly) served to turn students away from some of Aquinas’s teachings (\textit{Quodlibet XII}, q.5).} One condemned position is particularly relevant to this
project: position 130, which reads "if reason is right, the will is right".\footnote{“Quod si ratio recta, et voluntas recta.” Here, I follow the original numbering schema, as found in both the H.
Denifle and A. Chatelin’s edition of the text, \textit{Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis}, vol 1, first printed in
1889, and D. Piché’s recent edition of the text: \textit{La condamnation parisienne de 1277: Texte latin, traduction et
commentaire} (1999).} Aquinas, as we have seen, holds that all wrongdoing involves ignorance. While this position is not the same as the
position condemned, it seemed to some to imply that position. Aquinas’s version of the
Socratic thesis, after all, commits himself to the position that when the will is wrong, reason
is also wrong: both disordered willing and ignorance of some sort are involved in every sin.
\textit{Mutatis mutandis}, one might think that this implies position 130.

Tempier explains that he condemns this particular position because it suggests that
only knowledge, not grace, is necessary for rectitude of the will. He thinks the one holding
the position commits the "error of Pelagius": the error whereby someone thinks she can earn salvation without the aid of God.\footnote{“Error, quia contra glossam augustini super illud psalmi: ‘Concupiuit anima mea desiderare,’ etc., et quia
secundum hoc, ad rectitudinem voluntatis non esset necessaria gratia, set solum scientia, quod fuit error
pelagii”(Denifle and Chatelain, 1889, 473; vol. 1, p. 551).} One might think, then, that we need only clear
Aquinas of the charge of Pelagianism in order to clear him of the charge that he holds the
condemned position. This is not terribly difficult to do. As we saw in Chapter Two, Aquinas

\footnote{“Error, quia contra glossam augustini super illud psalmi: ‘Concupiuit anima mea desiderare,’ etc., et quia
secundum hoc, ad rectitudinem voluntatis non esset necessaria gratia, set solum scientia, quod fuit error
pelagii”(Denifle and Chatelain, 1889, 473; vol. 1, p. 551).}
believes that human beings need grace in the form of dispositions like hope for heaven and fear of hell for both salvation and rectitude of the will. Without grace, human beings are unable to avoid mortal sin. Hence, while Aquinas does believe that there is a correlation between right reason and right willing, he is certainly not a Pelagian: both right reason and right willing require the aid of God.

However, the condemnation was often taken to apply to the position "if reason is right, the will is right", separate from the charge of Pelagianism. As noted, on its own, the Socratic thesis may seem to imply this position. Consequently, the condemnation could have brought a swift end to the popularity of the Socratic thesis.

One reason it did not was the surprising subsequent concession of a version of the thesis put forward by the prolific Augustinian Hermit, Giles of Rome, in the late thirteenth century. In 1285, Tempier appointed an assembly of masters of theology to investigate Giles's work. The masters ultimately conceded Giles's position that, "there is no evil in the will unless there is error or some nescience in reason", a position very similar to position 130 above.53 This position came to be known as the 'propositio magistralis': the proposition conceded by the masters.54

Eminent philosopher and theologian Henry of Ghent, who had been involved in both the original 1277 Condemnation and the subsequent concession of Giles's thesis, explicitly defends the compatibility of the propositio magistralis with position 130. Henry argues that the condemnation applies only to a reading of position 130 that implies intellectual determinism: the view that an agent's rational judgments determine her will. Henry

53 "Non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel aliqua nescientia in ratione." Wielockx finds the sentence in Giles's commentary on the Sentences at both: In. Sent., d.17, p. 1, princ. 1 and d. 47, princ. 2, q.1.
considers condemned, in other words, the position that right reason deterministically causes right willing.\textsuperscript{55} If an agent's rational judgments determine her will, then they determine her voluntary actions. Many thinkers, including Henry, considered such a position a threat to moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{56} This position seems to reduce all wrongdoing to the result of mistaken judgments (and these judgments, to the influence of ignorance), thereby diminishing or perhaps even demolishing the agent's culpability.

Henry argues that, by contrast, the \textit{propositio magistralis} can be interpreted without a commitment to intellectual determinism. "There is no evil in the will unless there is error in reason", Henry claims, could mean that evil in the will always precedes error in reason (where 'error in reason' includes ignorance as well as nescience, a non-culpable absence of knowledge) and not vice versa, or even that evil in the will and error in reason always occur simultaneously.\textsuperscript{57}

Giles himself argues that some ignorance, or at least nescience, \textit{precedes} each morally bad action, and yet, in at least his later works, he works to render this position compatible with the denial of intellectual determinism. Giles argues that the will non-deterministically causes the ignorance or nescience that precedes each morally bad action, thus leaving the will, not the intellect, the proper cause of wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{55} For more on this, see Eardley 2006.
\textsuperscript{56} Safeguarding the will's freedom from intellectual determinism was certainly one goal of the condemnation, as evidenced in a number of the positions condemned. These include the two I treat in this chapter, as well as position 158, "that after a conclusion has been made about something to be done, the will does not remain free; and that punishments are provided by the law only for the rebuke of ignorance and in order that the rebuke be a source of knowledge for others", 163, "that the will necessarily pursues what is firmly believed by reason and cannot abstain from that which reason dictates. This necessitation, however, is not compulsion but the nature of the will", and others (Denifle and Chatelain, 1889, 473; vol 1, p. 552).
\textsuperscript{57} He defends a version of this latter position, as well as the voluntarist position that the will always causes any error in reason. To deal with the apparent tension between these two positions, Henry divides each temporal instant into two "signs" (\textit{signa}), a prior sign in which there is evil in the will, and a posterior sign in which there is error in reason. For more on this, see Eardley 2006.
P.S. Eardley considers Giles’s position on the relationship between disordered willing and error in reason an innovation, one that develops in a voluntarist direction the intellectual determinism Giles found in Aquinas’s moral psychology.⁵⁸ As should be evident from his account of willful wrongdoing, however, even Aquinas made a place in his moral psychology for morally bad actions that have their primary source in disordered willing.⁵⁹

II. John Capreolus: The Prince of the Thomists

Unfortunately, even in working to defend him against the charges of his critics, certain of Aquinas’s later allies, including French Dominican theologian John Capreolus, tend to contribute to the impression that Aquinas was an intellectual determinist. Capreolus chooses to emphasize the importance Aquinas accords to the intellectual failing involved in morally bad action, overlooking the primary role the will plays in his account of acting from malitia.

In the early fifteenth century, Capreolus wrote his influential Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, a work that earned him the accolade “Prince of Thomists”. On its surface, the Defensiones is a commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Nearly every great medieval thinker spent his early scholarly career writing a commentary on Lombard’s textbook - Albert the Great wrote one, as did Aquinas, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Peter Auriol, Durandus of St. Pourçain, and countless others. The Sentences itself was not a philosophical masterpiece, but rather a carefully organized and meticulous compilation of the Church Fathers’ views on dozens of issues critical to Christian thought.

⁵⁸ See Eardley 2003.
⁵⁹ As there is not space for full analysis of the relationship between Aquinas’s positions and Giles’s here, this project will have to await another day.
Most commentaries on the work, including Aquinas’s, use Lombard’s structure and subject matter primarily as a platform on which to espouse their own views.

Capreolus’s own commentary is unique to the genre because he chooses to use the format as the foundation for a systematic defense of Aquinas’s works against the powerful challenges Thomism had faced at the hands of critics like Scotus, Durandus, and Auriol. Capreolus uses Aquinas’s own words to craft his responses to these challenges wherever possible, and so nearly a third of the Defensiones is devoted to lengthy, direct quotations from Aquinas’s works. This feature of the work would help it to become a standard text for those working to understand Aquinas’s views for centuries to come.60

The Defensiones is lengthy and thorough, so we should find it striking that Capreolus scarcely mentions Aquinas’s views on willful wrongdoing in this work. Aquinas devotes less space to willful wrongdoing in his own works than he does to acting from ignorance or passion, but this cannot entirely explain Capreolus’s near-omission of the topic. After all, Aquinas devotes six articles in his own Sentences commentary to sins against the Holy Spirit, those instances of willful wrongdoing that include presumption and despair. Capreolus follows the Sentences commentary format and even draws on Aquinas’s Sentences commentary liberally throughout the Defensiones. If for this reason alone, one would expect him to say something about Aquinas’s most detailed account of these especially willful acts. On the contrary, Capreolus does not even treat sins against the Holy Spirit in the work, and hardly mentions specific sins of this sort, like despair and presumption. He inserts in the space one would ordinarily devote to discussion of sins against the Holy Spirit (Book II,
Distinction 43), a discussion of the question: "is every sin mortal?". This is a question commentators tended to treat in a preceding article.

This is peculiar: while it was not uncommon to omit or alter certain of Lombard’s topics in creating a Sentences commentary, all of the most prominent authors Capreolus engages in the work, including Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, Bonaventure, and Auriol, treat sins against the Holy Spirit in their own Sentences commentaries. So do nearly all prominent authors in the decades that follow, including Gabriel Biel, Denis the Carthusian, and John Mair. These thinkers often take the opportunity afforded by the topic to spell out their own views on the relationship between disordered willing and intellectual failing. In fact, to my knowledge, those prominent authors who did not treat the topic in their commentaries, like Hervaeus Natalis, did so only because they did not create complete commentaries on the work. The reason for Capreolus’s own omission of the topic is unclear, but its consequence is an omission of Aquinas’s clearest and most detailed discussion of the gravest instances of willful wrongdoing. Capreolus explicitly draws on Aquinas’s account of acting from malitia only two times in his work. In each case, he relies on one and the same article from the Summa, the article that provides Aquinas’s general description of such acts.

Despite how little Capreolus says about Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing, what he does say is worth analyzing. While he says nothing about the relationship between willful wrongdoing and attitudes like despair, his brief comments on the relationship between Aquinas’s general account of willful wrongdoing and the Socratic thesis helpfully develop Aquinas’s account of the knowledge and ignorance that accompany willful wrongdoing.
i. Ultimate Particular Conscience

Capreolus first draws on Aquinas's account of willful wrongdoing in treating the question "can there be sin in the intellect?" Here, Capreolus works to defend Aquinas against a challenge posed by late thirteenth/early fourteenth century French Dominican philosopher Durandus of St. Poucain concerning the nature of conscience (conscientia). "Conscience", here, is not a subtle, ever-present, inner voice inciting a person to do what is right. Aquinas, with many other medieval thinkers, believed conscience could incite someone to do what is right or wrong. He distinguishes conscience from what was called "synderesis". Aquinas thinks synderesis is a disposition that enables us to understand first principles of practical reason, like "good is to be done and evil is to be avoided". Synderesis is found in every person and is a bare, ever-present, prompting to do what is good (ST I q.79, a.12; ST I-II q.94, a.2). This bare prompting, however, is very general. It tells a person neither what is good, nor how to attain what is good.

Aquinas takes conscience, by contrast, to be an act: the application of our knowledge to action (QDV q.17, a.1; ST I q.79, a.13). Conscience presupposes synderesis and is experienced as a judgment telling the agent that some act should be pursued or avoided (ST I-II, q.19, aa. 5-6). As such, our conscience can err: we can think we know what we do not know, for instance, or we can misapply our genuine knowledge, judging that a bad action should be pursued or a good one avoided (QDV q.17, a.2). A struggling student may know, for instance, that doing well in school will increase her opportunities. She may judge on this

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61 Here, Capreolus deviates subtly but significantly from the subject matter ordinarily treated at this same place — Distinction 39, Book 2 — in most Sentences commentaries. Most such works, especially those written prior to Capreolus's own, devote this same section to sin or evil in the will, not the intellect. A few of Capreolus's predecessors did devote the section more broadly to the relationship between the intellect and the will or on occasion, exclusively to topics related to conscience, which he treats here. Even granting this, it was unusual to emphasize error in reason in the section over evil in the will. I suggest that this focus reflects Capreolus's consistent intellectualist reading of Aquinas's works.
basis that she should cheat on a final exam. Consequently, acting with one’s conscience is compatible with performing the entire spectrum of morally bad actions (QDV q.17, a. 4; ST I-II q.19, aa.5-6).

Durandus claims that people can act against their consciences. He argues that because of this, conscience must be a disposition (habitus), not an act, as Aquinas claims. If conscience were an act, Durandus argues, it would be impossible to act against it because the will cannot “be brought to opposites in the same act” (DDT lib. 2, d.39, q.1, a.2, sect. 2, arg. 7; IV 446a). In other words, the will cannot simultaneously move the agent to both pursue and to avoid some act. If it is possible to act against one’s conscience at all, one’s conscience must be a disposition.

Against Durandus, Capreolus argues that conscience is an act, though it is an act of the practical intellect, not an act of the will (DDT lib 2, d.39, q.1, a.3, sect. 2, ad. 7; IV 450a - 451a). Capreolus accepts Durandus’s claim that, in at least some qualified sense, people can act against their consciences. Capreolus takes Durandus’s claim to be synonymous with the claim that people are able to act against at least certain of the judgments they make about what is to be done. He thinks Aquinas agrees that this is possible and he takes acting from passion to be a prime example of this phenomenon. The person who does what she knows is morally bad because she is angry, sad, or wildly in love does what is morally bad despite judging that what she does is, all things considered, not to be done. Consequently, Capreolus spends much of his response working to describe the sorts of judgments an agent can act against. He draws on a brief discussion of the Socratic thesis embedded in Aquinas’s account of sinning from passion. There, Aquinas works to explain how an agent can have genuine

62 Here, I intend to relay only Capreolus’s account of Durandus’s view.
63 He argues that this is the case because: “Impossibile est voluntatem simul actu ferri in opposita.”
knowledge about what is to be done, even though some ignorance precedes every morally bad action. Aquinas explains that:

Since a person is directed to right action by two kinds of knowledge: universal and particular, a defect in either suffices to impede rightness of action and will. It may happen, then, that someone who has knowledge in the universal...does not know in particular that this act...must not be done. This suffices for the will not to follow the reason's universal knowledge. And again...nothing prevents a thing that is known dispositionally from not being considered actually, so it is possible for a person to have correct knowledge not only in the universal but also in particular, and yet not to consider that knowledge actually (ST I.II, q.77, a. 2).

Here, Aquinas employs the distinction, discussed in Chapter One, between universal and particular knowledge, to argue that the ignorance involved in sinning from passion is a failure to consider one's particular knowledge.

While this *Summa* passage is embedded in Aquinas's discussion of acting from passion, Capreolus takes the passage to present the range of ways Aquinas thinks a person can act against her practical judgments. Consequently, Capreolus draws three conclusions from the passage. First, he concludes that a person can act against what he will call her "universal conscience" - the universal judgments she makes about what is and is not to be done, or what is and is not good. Someone can, for instance, steal though she judges, in the universal, that theft is wrong. Even if such a person does not consider her universal knowledge when she acts, there is a sense in which she acts against her considered judgment: she acts, albeit unwittingly, against her own judgment that theft is wrong. If conscience is simply a judgment about what is or is not to be done, then this universal judgment about theft can be considered a type of conscience.

Second, Capreolus concludes that a person can act against her "particular conscience", so long as that conscience is non-occurrent. By this, he means that a person can act against the particular judgments she makes about her actions, so long as she does not
attend to those particular judgments when acting. Such a person makes both a universal judgment (for instance, "needlessly hurting another human being is bad") and a particular judgment ("sharing this piece of gossip now would needlessly hurt another human being"). She then acts against her particular judgment, and does so because she fails to attend to that judgment at the time. Perhaps she is too focused on the joy that accompanies the attention she gets when she shares some juicy piece of gossip, or perhaps she is consumed by anger at the person the gossip will harm.

Note that in both cases, Capreolus extends the notion of conscience in ways Aquinas does not. While Aquinas believes that people can act against certain of their universal and particular judgments, it is not clear that he believes people act against their consciences. This suggests that Aquinas may see one’s conscience as a sort of final practical judgment. The hotel towel thief, for instance, may make a universal judgment that theft is wrong, but when she acts, she makes a final (occurrent particular) practical judgment that she should, here and now, take the towels. Likewise, the jaded friend who shares a juicy piece of gossip may judge, when she is calm and cool, that she should not share the piece of gossip she does. However, while her particular judgment is clouded by anger, sharing the gossip seems the thing to do. This is why she acts. Here, Capreolus should be seen, not as misreading Aquinas’s account of conscience, but as working to harmonize Durandus’s claim that people sometimes act against their moral judgments — a claim Aquinas would accept — with Aquinas’s view that one’s conscience is a sort of judgment about what is or is not to be done.

This is consonant with Capreolus’s third conclusion: that no one is able to act against her occurrent particular judgment about what is to be done. Aquinas does not say this explicitly in the passage above. Since the passage from the Summa is embedded in Aquinas’s
discussion of acting from passion, in that passage Aquinas only describes the ways a person's moral knowledge can remain during acts from ignorance and passion. Hence, it is unclear whether this third claim can be said to follow from the passage at hand. If Aquinas’s passage is meant to suggest that there are only two ways a person can do what is morally bad: (1) with universal but not particular knowledge, or (2) with particular non-occurrent knowledge, then a claim parallel to Capreolus’s third claim — that no one is able to act against occurrent particular knowledge — is implied. However, the position that a person cannot act against her occurrent particular judgments about what is to be done is an even stronger position than the position that a person cannot act against her occurrent particular knowledge. Further, willful wrongdoing seems to be a counterexample to both the former and the latter positions. The willful wrongdoer, after all, judges correctly, occurrently, and in the particular that her action is morally bad.

Capreolus recognizes that some may consider willful wrongdoing a counterexample, but argues that it is not. He clarifies the claim in a way that serves to develop Aquinas’s own description of the sort of ignorance involved in acting from malitia. Coining the term "ultimate particular conscience" to describe the precise sort of judgment he has in mind, Capreolus explains: "I call ultimate particular conscience that which dictates finally that something is in no way to be done, but totally the opposite" (DDT lib 2, d.39, q.1, a.3, sect. 2, ad. 7; ed. IV 450b). Ultimate particular conscience is a judgment whereby a person determines that some act, here and now, should be done or avoided.

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64 “Et hoc intelligo loquendo de conscientia particulari ultimata; et voco conscientiam particularem ultimatam, illam qua dictatur finaliter aliquid nullo modo esse fiendum sed totum oppositum; contra talem enim conscientiam nullus potest agere, ipsa manente.”
Capreolus thinks that even the willful wrongdoer follows her ultimate particular conscience, though she acts against some sort of occurring particular judgment that what she does is bad. He explains:

It is possible for some particular conscience to remain, although not ultimate particular conscience...it is possible for someone to act against such a conscience with that [judgment] standing, as is clear in the one who sins from the choice of evil; a.k.a. from malitia. For such a one may judge that the act that he carries out is a sin, prohibited by God’s law. Nevertheless, he continues, because that person’s conscience is not ultimate. Rather, the person’s ultimate conscience is that, although such an act is a sin, nevertheless it should be done rather than abstained from because of the great pleasure joined to the act (Ibid).65

Capreolus concludes by quoting at length from initial description of willful wrongdoing we find in the Summa, and includes Aquinas’s assertion that the willful wrongdoer, like all wrongdoers, is ignorant in some way. She is ignorant of the fact, recall, that some particular evil should not be suffered for the sake of some particular good. Hence, Capreolus acknowledges that Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing is an account of clear-eyed evil, but works to render this fact compatible with the notion that all wrongdoing involves at least an error in one’s particular judgment.

Capreolus’s addition of the notion of ultimate particular conscience usefully develops Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing. Aquinas, recall, asserts that the willful wrongdoer is ignorant, not of the fact that her particular action is evil but of the fact that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of a particular good. This description of the sort of ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing is not entirely unambiguous. As seen in Chapter One, I take from this that the willful wrongdoer mistakenly judges that her morally bad

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65 “Potest tamen esse aliqua conscientia particularis, licet non ultimata...Sed tamen contra talem conscientiam potest aliquid agere, illa stante; sicut patet in eo qui peccat ex electione mali, vel ex malitia. Talis enim, licet judicet actum quem exercet esse peccatum, et lege Dei prohibitum, nihilominus continuat eum: quia illa conscientia non est ultimata; sed potius haec est sua conscientia ultimata, quod talis actus, licet sit peccatum, tamen potius est fiendus quam abstineatur a tali et tanta delectatione quae est illi conjuncta”.

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action is all things considered good. McCluskey, by contrast, concludes that the willful wrongdoer is ignorant of the fact that a more valuable good should not be sacrificed for the sake of a less valuable good. Capreolus’s addition of the concept of an ultimate particular conscience, a sort of particular judgment no one can act against, enables him to make clear what is only implicit in Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing: that no person, not even the willful wrongdoer, ever does what she judges at the moment is all things considered bad.

ii. Ignorance, Inconsiderationis, and Disordered Willing

In the passage above, Capreolus’s focus is on the sorts of judgments wrongdoers make prior to action. In another place in his Defensiones, Capreolus treats the relationship between the error in those judgments and disordered willing. There, he responds to an argument Scotus makes against the position, “if reason is right, the will is right” (recall that this position was condemned in 1277). Scotus makes a common accusation: that the position implies all morally bad action has its source in intellectual error (DDT lib. 3, d.33, q.1, a.2, sect. 1, arg. 5; V 393b - 394a). This, in turn, seems to him to imply that what scholastics called a ‘punishment’ (poena) — an evil an agent suffers against her will — is the ultimate source of all wrongdoing.

Scholastic thinkers contrast punishment, or ‘penalty’, with fault (culpa). Fault is any evil that occurs in accordance with an agent’s will; all morally bad actions are faults, and a fault is culpable. Punishment is any evil an agent suffers against her will; most evils like pain, suffering, and deformity are punishments. On account of God’s goodness, any evil an agent suffers against her will — all punishment — must be the result of some fault, though it need

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66 For one of Aquinas’s clearest expositions of this distinction, see QDM q.1, a.4.
not be a result the agent’s own fault. No one experiences evil that is not, in the first instance, the result of some blameworthy act. In claiming that adherence to the Socratic thesis commits one to the position that all moral wrongdoing results from punishment, then, Scotus is not only suggesting that the Socratic thesis threatens moral responsibility, reducing all wrongdoing to acting from a sort of non-culpable ignorance, but also that the Socratic thesis leads to the heterodox conclusion that there can be some punishment that is not preceded by a fault.

Capreolus replies first that ignorance or error need not precede wrongdoing; it is enough if wrongdoing is preceded by inconsiderationis (DDT lib. 3, d.33, q.1, a.3, sect. 1 ad. arg. Scoti 5; V 400a). A note should be made on the term inconsiderationis. Aquinas employs this term infrequently, and ordinarily uses it in a narrow way. Sometimes translated “thoughtlessness”, in Aquinas’s works inconsiderationis designates a specific sin whereby a person fails to consider what she must in order to make a correct judgment. It is a sin opposed to judging well. As such, inconsiderationis can be contrasted with ignorance. A person can have knowledge and yet thoughtlessly fail, in a particular instance, to consider what she must to make a correct judgment. Inconsiderationis can also be distinguished from nescience (nescientia). Nescience is a non-culpable absence of knowledge, while inconsiderationis is a sin.

In later centuries, inconsiderationis takes on a broader meaning. As we will see, thinkers like Capreolus, Cajetan, and Suárez apply the term to any lack of consideration, culpable or non-culpable, including nescience and the lack of consideration Aquinas claims was involved in Adam’s first sin and the sin of the angels. At least one of Aquinas’s own

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67 Many evils we suffer against our wills, for instance, are deemed the result of Original Sin.  
68 ST II-II q. 53, a.4.
passages from the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa* is taken as justification for this broader understanding of the term. In that passage, Aquinas claims that the angels’ sin did not presuppose ignorance “but merely absence of consideration ([*absentiam solum considerationis*] of the things that ought to be considered)” ([ST I, q.63, a.1, ad. 4](#)). Aquinas does not actually use the term *inconsiderationis* here, but he does suggest that the angels’ sin was the result of a failure to consider something that would have kept them from wrongdoing. In keeping with the broader usage of the term found in later scholastic works, then, for the remainder of this work, I translate the term *inconsiderationis* ‘lack of consideration’, rather than ‘thoughtlessness’.

Aquinas argues that the angels’ sin involved an absence of consideration rather than ignorance because he believes that the angels are not subject to ignorance. Unlike Adam, the angels have no bodies, only intellects and wills. Aquinas believes that the body is necessary for the discursive reasoning human beings use to acquire knowledge, and so angels cannot reason discursively.69 Instead, they naturally have instant and perfect knowledge of everything they can know.70 Those angels who sinned, Aquinas argues, sinned not because they were ignorant, but because they did not properly consider what they knew: that God’s grace is necessary for their happiness.71

The fact that Aquinas believes even Satan and Adam’s sins involved a prior absence of consideration, however, may just seem to prove the broader point Capreolus believes Scotus is making: that adherence to the Socratic thesis renders agents blameless for their morally bad actions. On Aquinas’s account, Satan and Adam only did what is morally bad

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69 ST I q.58, a.3; QDM q.16, a.2, ad.5.
70 QDM q.16, a.6.
71 QDM q.16, a.2, ads. 4-6; q.16, a.3.
because they did not consider something that would have prevented their wrongdoing. The absence of consideration their acts involve, then, seems to be a punishment — an evil they suffer against their wills. If so, it is true that commitment to the Socratic thesis commits a person to the view that the ultimate source of all moral wrongdoing is some bad state that the agent had no control over. The Socratic thesis threatens moral responsibility.

Capreolus, however, points out that the lack of consideration that preceded Satan and Adam’s sins is not a bad state at all, and so is neither a fault nor a punishment. Each agent’s disordered willing, then, is the first evil involved in her action and that morally bad action is a fault. Hence, Capreolus believes Adam’s sin was fully culpable, as are any morally bad acts following on Adam’s since they are preceded by a blameworthy act.

Capreolus’s argument avoids the theological mine-field associated with claiming that all fault proceeds from some punishment. However, one may still object that a genuine threat to moral responsibility remains. After all, the lack of consideration involved in Satan and Adam’s wrongdoing still seems to play a causal role in that wrongdoing even if it is not in itself bad. If this lack of consideration is not under the control of the agent’s will, it may not be an evil, but we might worry that it still determines the agent to do what is morally bad.

While much of Capreolus’s argument follows straightforwardly from Aquinas’s account of Satan and Adam’s sins, Capreolus neglects to mention that Aquinas believes the sort of lack of consideration involved in morally bad acts like those of the angels and Adam has its source in the will. Their morally bad acts can be considered culpable, then, not only because the lack of consideration that precedes them is not evil, but because the lack of consideration that precedes them is voluntary. Capreolus is silent on the will’s involvement

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72 See QDM q.1, a.3.
at this prior level. His concern is not to defend the possibility that the will can be the primary source of even the lack of consideration involved in some morally bad action, but rather to defend the position that even if all morally bad action results from either ignorance or a lack of consideration, this does not mean that all morally bad action results from non-culpable evil. Consequently, he addresses a crucial theological worry, but leaves open the possibility that the ignorance or lack of consideration involved in an agent’s wrongdoing determines her will.

iii. Prudence and malitia

Later on, Capreolus again defends Aquinas’s commitment to a version of the Socratic thesis. He argues that a person never chooses badly while attending to a dictate of practical reason that has "counseled, judged, and prescribed rightly" concerning both the universal and the particular in some instance (DDT lib. 3, dist. 36, a. 3, ad. 4 Scoto; V, 434b).73 Capreolus thinks practical reason that counsels, judges, and prescribes rightly in the universal and the particular is prudence. Consequently, he argues that the will never chooses badly in the face of complete prudence: if reason is right, the will is right.74

Further, he states, albeit very briefly, that disordered willing need not cause the error, ignorance, or lack of consideration involved in moral wrongdoing.75 In other words, he explicitly defends at least the position that culpable moral wrongdoing can be intellectually determined. Capreolus notes that the notion that morally bad actions require some prior ignorance, or at least lack of consideration, does not mean that all morally bad actions

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73 "Stante recto dictamine rationis practicae consiliativo, judicativo, praeceptivo, in universali et particulari actualiter, voluntas nunquam malo eligit, sicut saepe dictum est."

74 Prudence should be distinguished from a person’s ultimate particular judgment. Though Capreolus argues that a person cannot act against either, the two concepts are not reducible to one another. This is first and foremost because, by definition, prudence always prescribes the right act. Conscience, recall, does not.

75 “Nec oportet quod talis error aut ignorantia sequatur aliquod malum velle, nec quod causetur ex malitia voluntatis” (DDT lib. 3, dist. 36, a. 3, ad. 4 Scoto; V, 434b).
involve an error concerning the person's universal judgment. As noted above, bad action can involve an error in a person's particular judgment. Here, Capreolus turns again to what Aquinas says about willful wrongdoing in the *Summa* to demonstrate. He takes Aquinas's initial description of this sort of wrongdoing, and of the willful wrongdoer's ignorance, to indicate that in even the worst morally bad actions, a person's reason must err in some way. To appropriate the terminology Capreolus used previously, when a person does what is morally bad, at least her ultimate particular conscience, her judgment concerning whether some action is, all things considered good, is in error. Again, Capreolus's goal is to defend the Socratic thesis. His emphasis is not on the will's involvement in willful wrongdoing, and so not on the notion that the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing does not cause, but rather results from, disordered willing. It is not clear whether Capreolus was aware of the concession of Giles's thesis after the condemnations, but it is clear that he takes Aquinas to hold that ignorance, error, or lack of consideration not only accompanies, but precedes and leads to each morally bad action.

Capreolus does not worry that this interferes with our ability to be blamed for our morally bad actions. Lack of consideration, at least, does nothing to interfere with an action's culpability. So long as Adam's first sin was the result of lack of consideration, all postlapsarian wrongdoing can be considered blameworthy as well (DDT lib. 3, dist. 33, q.1, a.3; V 399b-401b). What is important is that the source of a morally bad action be a blameworthy evil — a fault. While he does not explicitly refer to the condemnations, the position he takes works to diffuse the sort of concern reflected in the condemnation of position 130 and in arguments he attributes to Franciscans like Scotus, while embracing the Socratic thesis.
Capreolus is correct to think that Aquinas believed that ignorance, or at least lack of consideration, precedes each morally bad action, that lack of consideration preceded Adam's first morally bad act, and that all of our morally bad actions are nevertheless blameworthy. I have argued that Aquinas also does imply, in his description of willful wrongdoing, something Capreolus makes explicit: that no one can do what she judges all things considered bad. However, Capreolus under-emphasizes the causal role Aquinas thinks the will can play in wrongdoing, and particularly in willful wrongdoing.

**IV. Thomas Cajetan**

After Capreolus’s death in 1444, several decades would pass before another work on Aquinas’s thought would surpass the popularity of the *Defensiones*. That work, written in the early sixteenth century, was the product of another Dominican Thomist: Thomas Cajetan. Cajetan wrote an article-by-article commentary on the *Summa*, contributing to the revival of Thomism in Europe in the face of the growing influence of both humanism and Protestantism. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Cajetan’s commentary was frequently printed and bound with editions of the Summa, and the work had such an enduring influence that it was printed alongside Aquinas’s text in the standard critical edition, the Leonine edition, published in the late nineteenth century.\(^{76}\)

Cajetan’s work comments on each article of the *Summa*, and so he says significantly more about Aquinas’s account of willful wrongdoing than Capreolus does. What we find in Cajetan is, as we might expect, a slightly more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between disordered willing and intellectual failing than the one we find in Capreolus. Like Capreolus, Cajetan carefully defends the Socratic thesis, arguing that some ignorance, error,

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\(^{76}\) For more on Cajetan’s influence, see Cessario 2003, 68-69 or Ashley cap. 5.
or lack of consideration precedes each morally bad action. He also gives less emphasis than
one might expect to the relationship between willful wrongdoing and attitudes like
presumption and despair. Unlike Capreolus, however, Cajetan gives some emphasis to the
causal role the will plays in the ignorance involved in such wrongdoing. Further, he explicitly
suggests that the will is free, in certain circumstances, from intellectual determinism. It does
not appear to be free from determinism, however, in cases of moral wrongdoing.

i. Willful Wrongdoing and Comparative Particular Judgments

Like Capreolus, Cajetan works to fit the following two of Aquinas’s views together:
(1) the willful wrongdoer knows, occurrently, that what she does is morally bad, and (2) all
wrongdoing involves ignorance. I turn first to Cajetan’s commentary on Prima Secundae,
question 77, article 2. This is an article, recall, embedded in Aquinas’s account of acting from
passion that contains both a brief endorsement of the Socratic thesis and a discussion of the
sorts of knowledge one can have while sinning. Like Capreolus, Cajetan uses this article as an
opportunity to clarify Aquinas’s views on the relationship between morally bad actions and
ignorance. Since Aquinas approves a qualified version of the Socratic thesis in this article,
Cajetan raises challenges there for one holding the thesis. He draws most of these challenges
from Scotus, who in turn leans on the authority of Augustine, Aristotle, and the 1277
Condemnation. Here, I focus on a challenge stemming from the Condemnation.

According to Cajetan, Scotus argues that approval of the Socratic thesis contradicts
the Parisian condemnation of the following position: "while universal and particular
knowledge remain, the will is not able [to move] into the opposing error".77 Cajetan’s citation
likely betrays a common gloss on the condemnation of position 129: "when passion (passio)

77 “Stante scientia in universali et particuliari, voluntatem non posse in oppositum errorem” (CST I-II q.77, a.2
n.1; VII 64).
and particular actual knowledge remain, the will is not able to act against them". However, note that condemned position 129 says nothing explicit about universal knowledge, and it does mention passion. Though we can perhaps deduce that a person with actual (occurrent) particular knowledge about a matter has universal knowledge as well, Scotus’s gloss touches more closely on positions Aquinas held than the actual position condemned.

To respond to Scotus’s challenge, Cajetan first points out that when Aquinas approves the position that every morally bad action involves ignorance, he uses the term "ignorance" broadly, intending it to cover lack of consideration (culpable or not) as well the actual lack of some knowledge. Like Capreolus, then, Cajetan recognizes that Aquinas thinks a person needs only an absence of consideration to do what is morally bad. He argues that when Augustinian authorities say that it is possible for a person to do what is morally bad with knowledge, they mean either with non-occurrent knowledge, occurrent universal knowledge, or certain sorts of occurrent particular knowledge. Aquinas, he thinks, agrees on all these counts. The condemnation of the position that the will cannot oppose occurrent universal and particular knowledge, Cajetan argues, establishes only that someone can do what is morally bad despite both occurrent universal and occurrent particular knowledge that her action is bad. He considers this position compatible with the position that all wrongdoing involves at least ignorance of what he calls the "particularis in comparatione": the particular in a comparison. Cajetan believes this is the sort of ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing.

78 For example, see ST I q.63, a.1.
Ignorance of the particular in a comparison is ignorance of the correct comparative value of two goods or evils. Note that Cajetan does not employ Capreolus’s notion of an ultimate particular conscience here, whereby a person judges that some particular morally bad act is, all things considered, to be done. Cajetan’s concern is with the nature of the ignorance, not the positive judgment, involved in willful wrongdoing. Like Capreolus, he hopes to preserve the notion that the willful wrongdoer knows that what she does is morally bad while also preserving the Socratic thesis.

His description of the nature of the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing, of course, does imply something about the nature of the positive judgment involved. It implies that the willful wrongdoer, at very least, judges that the morally bad action she performs is on the whole better than the morally good action she forgoes. As I argued in Chapter One, Aquinas’s clear-eyed wrongdoer judges that the good she associates with some morally bad action is all things considered better than the good she gives up in acting badly because her disordered will leads her to consider it more conducive to her pursuit of happiness.

Does Cajetan’s view that willful wrongdoing involves an erroneous comparative judgment mean, as Capreolus argues, that even the willful wrongdoer must judge that her action is, in the final analysis, to be done? Not necessarily. The two notions are certainly compatible, but can come apart. There is no reason to think that a comparative judgment, even a correct comparative judgment, always leads to an ultimate particular judgment about what is to be done. This becomes clearer in the work of prolific Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez a century later. For now, we can recall Ruth Chang’s notion of

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79 Cajetan also suggests that it is possible to say that someone can act against her correct occurrent particular judgment so long as she has not also made a correct particular prescriptive judgment. The notion that someone cannot act against her prescriptive judgments echoes Capreolus’s view that no one can act against ultimate particular conscience.
comparability. Two items, recall, are comparable when one can be judged better than the other on some scale. The fact that I can judge one good better than another on some scale, however, need not imply that I judge that good better than the other all things considered, or even that I make an all things considered judgment at all.

In his commentary on Aquinas’s initial account of willful wrongdoing, Cajetan, like Capreolus, gives primary focus to the sort of intellectual failing involved in acting from malitia, not to the sense in which these morally bad acts proceed from a disordered will. He explains that the willful wrongdoer is ignorant of the fact that a certain evil is worse than another evil.° Such a person thereby “prefers the wickedly unjust good of gain joined with the evil of injustice, to the good of justice joined with the absence of gain” (Ibid.). Like Capreolus (and me), Cajetan takes Aquinas to hold that the willful wrongdoer retains occurrent knowledge that her action is morally bad. She simply fails to realize that the action she performs is worse for her than doing what is morally good. She engages in clear-eyed wrongdoing, but that wrongdoing still involves ignorance.

In the following article, Cajetan explicitly argues that clear-eyed wrongdoing is involved in the willful wrongdoing that proceeds from vice. Cajetan recognizes that given his general account of willful wrongdoing, Aquinas’s assertion that all actions from vice are actions from malitia commits him to the position that all actions from vice involve clear-eyed evil. Removing any ambiguity about the matter found in the passage itself (discussed in Chapter One), Cajetan embraces this consequence and develops Aquinas’s account of vice to make this conclusion clearer and more plausible. In a reply to an objection in the article

° The person is ignorant of the fact that "hoc nunc malum relatum ad illud aliud, esse sibi peius" (CST I-II q.78, a.1, n.1; VII 72).

°° "Praeponit enim malitiose iniustus bonum lucri iunctum malo iniustitiae, bono iustitiae iuncto absentiae lucre.”
under consideration, Aquinas suggests that repeated actions from passion lead one to acquire a vicious disposition (ST I-II, q.78, a.2, ad. 2). Cajetan uses this genetic story to explain why those who act from vice, and not those who act from passion, act with occurrent particular knowledge that their actions are morally bad. In so doing, he goes beyond anything Aquinas says in this passage or elsewhere.

As Cajetan sees it, the person Aquinas has in mind initially acts from passion (CST I-II, q.78, a.2, ad. 2, n.1; VII 73). The effect of passion is to render the person perturbed (perturbatus) in such a way that she is unable to occurrently judge that the action she performs is morally bad. In sinning from passion repeatedly, such a person gradually forms a disposition to act badly. Once the disposition is formed, Cajetan thinks, the person acts without the sort of disturbance that would impede her occurrent judgment that her action is morally bad. The vicious person is deprived only of a correct particular comparative judgment, the sort of judgment that would accurately compare the good she desires to goods like charity or the divine law. Hence, Cajetan concludes that "such people speak the truth when they say that they understand that they act badly and that they will to do so anyway" (Ibid.).

The vicious person, unperturbed by passion, engages in clear-eyed wrongdoing. She is ignorant only of the comparative value of the goods she considers, failing to recognize that the action she performs is all things considered bad.

Cajetan’s genetic story removes the ambiguity over the relationship between vice and clear-eyed evil that we find in this passage from the Summa, and does so in a way that is clearer and more robust than anything we find on the topic in Aquinas’s own works. Cajetan takes Aquinas’s considered position to be that all instances of willful wrongdoing involve

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82 "Unde tales habituate verum aient, dicentes se cognoscere quod male faciunt, et quod volunt nihilominus facere: sciunt enim actualiter hoc esse nunc malum."
ignorance of the comparative value of two goods or evils, and yet that all instances of willful wrongdoing, including actions from vice, involve clear-eyed evil.

**ii. Evil in the Will**

While Cajetan thinks that willful wrongdoing involves ignorance of the comparative value of two goods or evils, and not ignorance of the fact that one's action is morally bad, he does still think all wrongdoing involves ignorance. If he thinks in turn that this ignorance, or ignorance of some kind, is a prerequisite for disordered willing, then he, like Capreolus, will seem to commit Aquinas to strict intellectualism. Cajetan recognizes, however, that the view that all wrongdoing, even willful wrongdoing, involves ignorance (or at least lack of consideration) does not imply that all wrongdoing requires a prior error in reason and he grapples with the temporal relationship between disordered willing and ignorance.\(^{83}\) Cajetan admits that it is difficult to determine whether wrongdoing requires a prior error in reason or not. On the one hand, he thinks, it seems that an erroneous judgment must precede the will's desire to do something morally bad. On the other, it seems that the will can determine the intellect to one of two opposites, like stealing or not stealing.\(^{84}\) He works to render these intuitions compatible.

In responding to the challenge these competing intuitions present, Cajetan appears to grant the will some freedom from intellectual determinism, though not in instances of moral wrongdoing. Though he explains that when a person chooses between two things, neither of which is morally bad, "the will, from itself alone, bends judgment to what it wills", he concludes that when it comes to choosing between two things, one of which is morally bad,

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\(^{83}\) Henry of Ghent, recall, holds that all wrongdoing involves ignorance as well, but thinks evil in the will and error in the intellect occur simultaneously.

\(^{84}\) "Arguo...stat quod ratio ostendat utrumque oppositum seccundum quod est puta furari et non furari (est enim oppositorum); et quod voluntas determinet se ad unum quia vult...Non igitur oportet intellectum errare vel ignorare ad hoc quod voluntas male velit" (CST I-II, q.77, a.2 n. 4; VII 64b).
"the will itself bends judgments, but not unless concurring to this bending by some other defect in the intellect, or at least some lack of consideration" (CST I-II, q.77, a.2 n. 4; VII 64b).\textsuperscript{85} This, of course, does not immediately imply that some error in reason precedes any evil in the will. While Cajetan does say that the will bends the judgment "by some other defect in the intellect," the passage may remain open to a reading of the Socratic thesis like Henry of Ghent's, on which evil in the will and error in reason occur simultaneously. Cajetan's talk of concurrence may appear particularly suggestive of this.

Cajetan rules this possibility out when he clarifies. In an attempt to render the Socratic thesis compatible with the voluntarist challenges raised against it, he explains that there are these three things involved in each morally bad act: (1) a judgment that some morally bad thing should be done or desired, (2) an intellectual defect, and (3) the passive acceptance of the judgment that some morally bad thing should be done or desired on the part of a bad will.\textsuperscript{86} The proposed judgment that some morally bad thing should be done or desired, he thinks, acts as the will's object. In this sense, it is prior to bad willing. Likewise, an intellectual defect occurs prior to bad willing. Cajetan thinks an intellectual defect of some kind is a prior condition for the will's acceptance of the judgment that some morally bad act should be done or desired. Without it, a morally bad action would not seem good to the agent. The disordered will, Cajetan contends, then passively accepts the proposed judgment. In this sense, the person's erroneous judgment is the effect of disordered willing. Cajetan's point in this passage is that while in a sense, error in reason precedes evil in the will — both a proposed judgment and a defect in the intellect precede the will's acceptance of the

\textsuperscript{85} "Quia cum neutrum oppositorum habet rationem mali moraliter, voluntas ex se sola flectit iudicium quo vult ad alterum vero oppositorum moraliter malum, voluntas ipsa flectit iudicium, sed non nisi concurrente ad hanc flexionem aliquo alio defectu intellectus, saltem non-consideratione omnium considerandorum" (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{86} "Resolvendum est in tria: in ipsum iudicatum...quod acceptatur; et in defectum intellectus, unde quodammodo acceptatur; et ipsam passive affectionem a mala voluntate illatam" (Ibid.).
judgment that some morally bad action should be performed - there is also a sense in which disordered willing precedes some intellectual failing. After all, disordered willing effects the passive acceptance of the judgment that some morally bad action should be done or desired. Without this disordered willing the person would not judge that she should do something morally bad. This explanation of the relationship between disordered willing and ignorance, or intellectual failing, Cajetan thinks, renders the competing intuitions on the priority of intellectual failing in morally bad action harmonious.

Cajetan's explanation, of course, will not satisfy a thorough-going voluntarist. While his reading of Aquinas is one on which disordered, or 'bad' willing precedes the erroneous judgment required for morally bad action, that disordered willing occurs as a passive response to a prior defect in the intellect. The voluntarist's project is to show that the will can act independently of the intellect in at least some instances. She believes that intellectual determination threatens moral responsibility. While Cajetan does acknowledge that some choices are not intellectually determined (namely, choices between two goods, neither of which is morally bad), here, he implies that all morally bad choices are. Cajetan's commentary on question 77, article 2, then, gives him the means to defend Aquinas's consistent suggestion that the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing follows disordered willing. This is something Capreolus cannot do. Despite this, it does not give him the means to defend Aquinas against the charge that commitment to the Socratic thesis renders all morally bad actions intellectually determined.

For this reason, we should not take Cajetan's acknowledgement of the fact that the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing results from affection for the wrong good as acknowledgement of the fact that Aquinas seems to think some disordered willing can
precede intellectual failing. For instance, in his commentary on Prima Secundae question 78, article 4, which treats the question “does the one who sins from certain *malitia* commit a graver sin than the one who sins from passion?”, Cajetan acknowledges that the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing occurs only after a person has a desire to pursue some good that would involve acting badly. There, he says of the willful wrongdoer:

> From an excessive affection for a lesser good, the person errs concerning the end that should be preferred, which is the reason for sinning. For from this, that the person has an affection that is more to gain than to the good of justice, it is judged that the good of gain is more to be followed (CST I-II q.78, a.4 n.2; VII 75a).87

In other words, some excessive affection for the wrong good leads a person to judge that gain should be preferred to justice. This appears to reflect Aquinas’s point, in the same article, that willful wrongdoing is graver than acting from passion, other things being equal, because in cases of willful wrongdoing, the will moves to morally bad action of its own accord. If Cajetan’s point in this article is that the will’s appetite for a lesser good is the ultimate source of the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing, this would appear to contradict the point he makes at question 77, article 2 above.

Even if, by “excessive affection for a lesser good”, Cajetan means to identify disordered willing, this passage can easily be rendered consistent with his commentary on question 77, article 2. After all, Cajetan argues in his commentary on question 77 that the acceptance of the judgment that some morally bad thing should be done is an effect of the will. He thinks that this is compatible with the claim that that acceptance is passive and follows some preceding defect of the intellect.

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87 “Ex affect nimio ad minus bonum errat circa finem praeponendum, quod est ratio peccandi. Ex hoc namque quod affectus quis est plus ad luctrum ad bonum iustitiae, iudicatur bonum lucre magis sectandum.”
Further, while what Cajetan says here remains open to interpretation, what he does not say may be more telling. For instance, in this particular article, Aquinas explicitly emphasizes the importance of the involvement of the will in acting from malitia. Cajetan is not so explicit. He does choose to talk about the impact an excessive ‘affection’ has on the error involved in willful wrongdoing, and the term ‘affection’ can describe an act or state of the will. For this reason, Aquinas claims that the angels have affections, though they do not have passions.\(^8\) Passions require bodies and corresponding sensory appetites, which angels do not have. However, the term can also be used neutrally to describe both passions and acts of the will.\(^9\) Cajetan’s use of this term is as close as we get, in this article, to an explicit acknowledgment of role Aquinas accords to the will in acts from malitia.

In his commentary on the preceding article, Cajetan does explicitly acknowledge that Aquinas thinks the will can move, of its own accord, to evil. There he explains that the will is said to be moved, from itself, to evil, if it is moved to evil because it has become conditioned, or disposed (disposita) by a vice or a sickly condition on the part of the body (CST I-II, q.78, a.3, n.2; VII 74b).\(^9\) While this does accurately reflect Aquinas’s view that vices and sickly bodily conditions can lead to willful wrongdoing, it does not reflect Aquinas’s view that even those who are not vicious and who do not have sickly bodily conditions can engage in willful wrongdoing. Cajetan, conspicuously, does not mention Aquinas’s claim that attitudes like presumption and despair also lead to willful wrongdoing (found in that same article). It is possible that Cajetan does not discuss presumption, despair, and the like because, in this article, Aquinas treats them as sources, rather than as instances, of willful wrongdoing.

\(^8\) ST I q.82, a.5, ad.1  
\(^9\) ST I-II, q.59, a.2; q.102, a.6, ad. 8; II-II q.118, a.6  

"Si voluntas ipsa secundum se non sit aliter disposita, quia tamen secundum suum suppositum est aliter disposita habitu vel plus quam habitu, naturali scilicet aegritudine, dicitur ex seipsa moveri in malum."
Consequently, they may seem to Cajetan rather similar to preceding bodily sickness or vice: in each case, we have a preceding condition that explains the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing, and leads the will to move toward some morally bad action. Either way, he chooses not to mention them or their mode of acquisition and so describes disordered willing in a way that renders the will passive.

Later, commenting on the *Secunda Secundae*, Cajetan does discuss Aquinas’s account of sins against the Holy Spirit, like presumption and despair. In that portion of the *Summa*, Aquinas writes four articles on the topic, the first of which explicitly addresses the relationship between sins against the Holy Spirit and willful wrongdoing. There, Aquinas affirms that sins against the Holy Spirit are all instances of willful wrongdoing, that they should be distinguished from actions from vice, and that they result from contempt for some gift of the Holy Spirit that had restrained the person from bad action.

In commenting on this article, Cajetan makes a claim that does indeed seem to imply that he thinks Aquinas holds that disordered willing can precede intellectual failing. Cajetan spends the majority of his commentary on this article responding to arguments he attributes to Scotus’s own discussion of sins against the Holy Spirit in his *Sentences* commentary. Cajetan claims that Scotus argues for (but does not affirm) the position that a person can will an evil even without viewing it under the guise of some good. In other words, he believes Scotus entertains a rejection of the guise of the good thesis. According to Cajetan, Scotus argues that if an act must appear good before a person can will it, then either that person is unable to will what is bad, or it is necessary for her reason to be blinded (excaecetam) naturally before she acts. By blinded “naturally”, Scotus presumably means blinded in a way that cannot be attributed to a prior free act of the will. This consequence,
Scotus notes, seems against the 1277 condemnations. Again, this reference is to the condemnation of positions 129 and/or 130, discussed above.

Cajetan argues that the position that the will always chooses an apparent good is compatible with the notion that the intellect need not err prior to bad willing. “Sometimes” Cajetan argues, “the error is sometimes that the one willing does not use the intellect to regulate the act of willing that he exercises” (CST II-II, q.14, a.1, n. 4; VIII 114b).\(^9\) In support of this point, he points the reader to *Prima Pars* question 63, article 1, reply 4 and *Prima Secundae* question 77, article 2.

Cajetan’s reply appears to suggest, and quite clearly, that disordered willing can precede any error in reason. A person can will not to use her intellect to regulate her actions, and pursue an only apparent good. If this is what Cajetan means to argue, the position he takes is reminiscent of the suggestion I find in Aquinas’s account of sins against the Holy Spirit that the will can choose whether to restrain a person’s passions, and so cause the sort of ignorance required for willful wrongdoing. This would suggest that the will, rather than a defect on the part of the intellect, can be the ultimate source of some morally bad actions.

However, the passages Cajetan points to in support of his position should give us pause. Cajetan’s commentary on *Prima Secundae* question 77, article 2, for instance, treated at length above, argues that at least lack of consideration precedes any disordered willing. It also argues, recall, that the bad willing involved in morally bad action precedes error in reason only because the will must passively accept the intellect’s erroneous judgment for morally bad action to occur.

\(^9\) “Stat quod intellectum non oportet prius naturaliter errare; sed ex hoc ipso defectus intellectus error est quandoque quod volens non utitur intellectu ad regulandum actum volendi quem exercet.”
Further, *Prima Pars* question 63, article 1, reply 4, which treats the sin of the angels, argues that morally bad actions need not involve ignorance or error, properly speaking. Rather, they occur when something is chosen that:

Is good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect that induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen (ST I, q.63, a.1, ad.4).

Though this seems very close to the point Cajetan makes in the article on sins against the Holy Spirit above — that someone can will not to use their intellect to regulate their actions — what is crucial is that in question 63, Aquinas goes on to argue that this lack of proper regulation itself presupposes lack of consideration. Hence neither of the articles Cajetan directs our attention to makes a clear case for the point that disordered willing, rather than some issue with the intellect (be it ignorance, properly speaking, or at least lack of consideration), can lead to a person’s wrongdoing.

It may be that Cajetan works here to expand the points Aquinas makes in these articles, and even the points he makes in his commentary on these articles, in a voluntarist direction. It is also possible that in claiming that the intellect does not need to err before the will is moved to an only apparent good, Cajetan exploits the notion that prior “blindness” in reason suggests prior evil. Both of the articles he refers to affirm that lack of consideration, rather than ignorance, can be the source of a morally bad action. Lack of consideration, recall, need not be evil. For this reason, Capreolus argues (above) that adherence to the Socratic thesis does not imply that a punishment must precede a fault. A non-culpable lack of consideration can precede a fault as well. If Cajetan draws our attention to the two articles he does because they discuss lack of consideration, then it is likely he is making only Capreolus’s point: that ignorance or error need not precede disordered willing. This would
not imply the stronger point that disordered willing can precede even lack of consideration in the intellect.

One possible bit of evidence for this more conservative reading of Cajetan’s passage can be gleaned from his commentary on ST II-II, question 14, article 4, in which Aquinas argues that even someone who has never acted badly can sin against the Holy Spirit. There, Cajetan goes out of his way to argue that Aquinas does not mean by this that a person can sin against the Holy Spirit without having performed any morally bad actions in the past. He thinks the person Aquinas has in mind must at least have some prior inclination to do what is morally bad. His reading of this passage suggests that Cajetan does not wish to attribute to Aquinas the view that the willful wrongdoer can act without the influence of prior intellectual failing.

While Cajetan, then, says a number of things that suggest at least a limited commitment to the view that the will can sometimes determine the intellect, in the final analysis, he, like Capreolus, appears to overlook the causal role Aquinas believes the will plays in willful wrongdoing.

Conclusion

Both Capreolus and Cajetan work to make Aquinas’s treatment of willful wrongdoing clearer and more consistent, defending Aquinas’s account in light of the events at Paris and subsequent challenges raised against him. In so doing, both alter or augment Aquinas’s account. Capreolus and Cajetan also both, wittingly or unwittingly, shift attention away from what Aquinas has to say about attitudes like presumption and despair. In so doing, they create what is perhaps a more consistent account of willful wrongdoing than the one we find in Aquinas. There is no question on their accounts, for instance, that all acts of willful
wrongdoing are clear-eyed. Unfortunately, this more consistent account is also one that glosses over the primary role Aquinas gives to the will in his account of the gravest morally bad actions. Though Cajetan, unlike Capreolus, does appear to grant the will some freedom from intellectual determinism, he does not do so in instances of moral wrongdoing. He also acknowledges that Aquinas thinks the willful wrongdoer's ignorance is the result of disordered willing, but defends this position in a way that is consistent with the position that some defect in the intellect precedes and determines all disordered willing involved in wrongdoing. In so doing, he commits Aquinas to a (albeit nuanced) version of intellectual determinism with respect to wrongdoing.
Chapter 4: Suárez on the Moral Necessity of Ignorance in Evil

Aquinas’s willful wrongdoer does what is morally bad because it seems all things considered good to her at the time: on account of disordered willing, some morally bad action seems better to her than doing what is morally good. Like the ship-captain who jettisons cargo, or the willing amputee, the willful wrongdoer knows that she gives up a good when she acts. She does not know, in the moment she acts, that the good she gives up is the good it would be best to pursue. This feature of willful wrongdoing may lead some to doubt that Aquinas’s moral psychology is adequate. In accounting for clear-eyed evil, Aquinas’s moral psychology may be more satisfying than Aristotle’s, but surely, some think, people sometimes do what is morally bad even knowing that doing so is all things considered worse than doing what is morally good.

Aquinas acknowledges that sometimes wrongdoers knowingly pursue an all things considered less valuable good, but he attributes such cases to the influence of the person’s passions. The passions, recall, prevent a person from occurrently considering that some action she performs is all things considered bad. On Aquinas’s account, no one calmly and deliberately chooses to do what is morally bad while judging that it would be better to do what is morally good.

According to Sydney Penner, those unsatisfied with this aspect of Aquinas’s moral psychology may prefer the work of prolific Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez (Penner 2013). Penner argues that though Suárez, like Aquinas, accepts the guise of the good thesis, Suárez deems the will free to act against the intellect’s occurrent judgments about what it is all things considered best to do. In other words, Penner argues that Suárez accepts the guise of the good thesis while rejecting what I will call the ‘guise of the greater
good thesis': the claim that when people choose between goods, they always choose those good they deem best.

The guise of the good thesis is compatible with the notion that people sometimes calmly, knowingly act for the sake of all things considered lesser goods. After all, lesser goods can still be judged good in some way: adulterous sex, for instance, can be judged pleasurable, even if a person engages in it knowing it would be better to refrain from doing so. The guise of the greater good thesis is not compatible with this type of action. In resisting the guise of the greater good thesis, Penner argues, Suárez successfully defends a view on which the will, though rational, is free. The will is rational because it must choose between those things the intellect judges good, but it is free because it can to choose against the intellect’s considered judgments about what is best.

If Penner is right, we would expect to find particularly clear evidence of this in Suárez’s treatment of willful wrongdoing. The willful wrongdoer, Suárez argues, is distinct from the person who acts from ignorance or passion, not only because the willful wrongdoer does what is bad in way that is especially grave, but because the willful wrongdoer does what is morally bad in a way that is plainly free (DVP lib. 7, cap. 5, 10-11; IV, 552a-b). Suárez’s account of willful wrongdoing is his account of the freest wrongdoing, and so a place we would expect to find evidence that Suárez believes people can calmly, deliberately, choose to act against their considered judgments. Instead, I argue that we find evidence that, like Aquinas, Suárez thinks there are certain sorts of judgments, including occurrent, particular, comparative judgments, which agents, de facto, do not act against.

Throughout his works, Suárez consistently affirms a version of the Socratic thesis, claiming that some sort of ignorance, or at least lack of consideration (inconsiderationis),
precedes each morally bad action. As noted in the third chapter, affirming the Socratic thesis, and even this version of the Socratic thesis, does not prevent a thinker from arguing that the will, rather than the intellect, is the ultimate source of wrongdoing. Henry of Ghent concedes Giles’s version of the Socratic thesis on this ground. Even Aquinas argues that the will is the source of the ignorance involved in willful wrongdoing. There is, in fact, little question that Suárez deems the will the ultimate source of all morally bad actions. He argues explicitly that: “though a defect of the intellect is always conjoined with an act of sin, that is not the first origin of sinning, but rather that [defect] is brought back to a defect in the will” (DVP disp. 5, sect. 1, 13; IV 556a). Suárez’s adherence to a version of the Socratic thesis does not threaten his view that the will, rather than the intellect, is the ultimate source of sin.

What is at issue, though, is not whether Suárez believes the will rather than the intellect is the ultimate source of wrongdoing, but whether Suárez can consistently affirm his particular version of the Socratic thesis while holding that the will is free to act against the intellect’s occurrent judgments about what it is best to do, here and now. Aquinas’s own adherence to the Socratic thesis seems closely tied to his adherence to a version of the guise of the greater good thesis. Aquinas, recall, believes that all people desire happiness as their ultimate end and that all morally bad actions move people away from true happiness. Consequently, he thinks, no one does what she knows is morally bad realizing, occurrently, that her action moves her away from her end. All wrongdoers, even willful wrongdoers, prefer and pursue those goods that seem best.92 The question is whether Suárez’s own

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92 Note that one could concede most of this and yet resist the position that people, when they calmly choose a good, always choose the good judged best. What if, one may ask, two goods (e.g., virtue and the thrill one would get from pulling off a heist) simultaneously appear to an agent to be conducive to her happiness? If an agent thinks both goods would contribute to her happiness, she could plausibly calmly, deliberately, choose the thrill over virtue, even thinking that virtue would make her even happier in the long run. In other words, if what is important to Aquinas is merely that the agent judges that her action moves her
adherence to the Socratic thesis entails a version of the guise of the greater good thesis, or any similar position on which the intellect's occurrent particular judgments can determine what she wills.

Crucial to discerning the answer is not only determining how Suárez understands the Socratic thesis, but determining how Suárez understands the concept of moral necessity. Suárez, I show, repeatedly calls the Socratic thesis 'morally necessary' (moralis necessitas).

Though, by the late seventeenth century, it will become fairly common to distinguish moral necessity from metaphysical and physical necessity, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when Suárez is writing, the concept of moral necessity is nascent. Indeed, the fact that Suárez even makes a distinction between moral and metaphysical necessity will come as a surprise to most. Penner, for instance, entertains the idea that Suárez may implicitly work with a concept of moral necessity, but finds no direct evidence that Suárez explicitly employs the notion. Likewise, both Michael Murray and Sven Knebel, who have attempted recent genealogies of the concept, trace its origins back to the Spanish Jesuits, but not quite as far back as Suárez. Suárez's use of the concept, then, marks a very early one, perhaps the earliest.

I argue that Suárez uses the concept to designate what he believes always occurs. The claim that a state of affairs is morally necessary is not the strong claim that the state of affairs follows on certain principles, or from the nature of human faculties like the will, but it tow

94 See Knebel (2003) and Murray (2004). Murray explicitly traces the concept back to Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego Granado, contemporaries of Suárez's but both more than a decade his junior. See Sleigh (2010) for details on this concept as it is employed in Leibniz's works.
is a strong claim nonetheless. On account of that claim, it will turn out that Suárez believes people never knowingly and freely act for the sake of all things considered lesser goods.

I. The State of the Texts

First, a brief note on the state of Suárez’s texts: despite the arguable breadth and depth of their influence in the seventeenth century, most of Suárez’s works have suffered recent neglect. The attention Suárez has received in the past few decades has often gone to his influential *Metaphysical Disputations*. Even within his own lifetime, the *Metaphysical Disputations* was Suárez’s most popular work, reprinted more than ten times before his death in 1617 and more than twenty within a few decades thereafter. The work was widely read in not only Jesuit schools across Europe, but also in Protestant-run German universities. In Holland, it earned Suárez the commendation “pope and prince of metaphysicians”.

The popularity of this work is surprising given its length. The *Disputations* take up nearly two thousand pages in the Vivés edition of Suárez’s *Opera Omnia*. Even these two thousand pages, however, represent only a small part of Suárez’s corpus. They fill only two of the twenty-eight volumes of the Vivés collection. Here, I choose to give more attention to some of Suárez’s lesser-known works, especially *On the Angels* and *On Vice and Sin*. While I draw on the *Disputations* throughout, I emphasize these lesser-known works because they contain Suárez’s most detailed descriptions of the interaction between the will and the intellect in wrongdoing.

Suárez’s works are not yet available in a critical edition, and even the *Metaphysical Disputations* is not available, in its entirety, in English translation. The most complete edition

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95 Relatively significant attention has also been paid to the natural law theory found in Suárez’s *De Legibus*. For fairly recent work, see Baciero Ruiz (2007), Gordley (2012), Pink (2009), and Schneewind (1998) pp.58-81

96 For brief accounts of the history and importance of the work, see Freddoso’s Introduction to his translation of *Metaphysical Disputations* 17-19, xiii-xvi (1994) and Penner (2011) Preface xx-xxv.
of Suárez’s works remains the Vivés edition, which was published in the nineteenth century. I rely almost exclusively on this edition of his works.

II. Suárez on Willful Wrongdoing

Suárez repeatedly purports to defend Aquinas’s true views. He claims, for instance, that his treatise on vice and sin “embraces the traditional doctrine of St. Thomas found in ST I-II qq.71-89” (DVP Proem.; IV 514). Likewise, in a much-discussed passage from a work on grace, Suárez calls Aquinas his “first guide and teacher”, writing:

I hope...that I will not depart from his true mind and view in any matter that is important and of some significance, drawing out his view not from my own head but from his classic expositors and defenders and, where they fail him, from the various passages collected among them themselves (DG, Proleg. VI, cap.6, n.28; VII 322).97

The "classic expositors and defenders" Suárez has in mind are often Capreolus and Cajetan, and he does not hesitate to openly disagree with either of them. He does hesitate, however, to disagree with Aquinas. Only occasionally does he outright reject some position he attributes to Aquinas, and even then, he often rejects the position in a qualified way.

Given Suárez’s frequent professed fidelity to Aquinas, we should find it striking that he all but explicitly dismisses Aquinas’s division of morally bad acts into acts from ignorance, passion, and malitia. He devotes only one brief section to the topic in his work On Vice and Sin.98 This is not because Suárez thinks the division is insufficient. In fact, while Aquinas holds that this division is a consequence of our postlapsarian condition — neither the angels’ sins nor Adam’s fall under it — Suárez argues that the division is sufficient to

97 “D. thomam semper tanquam primarium ducem et magistrum habuerimus eiusque doctrinam proviribus intelligere defendere ac sequi conati fuerimus in praesenti opera multo majori studio et affect id praestare curabimus; speramusque cum divino auxilio consecuturos esse, ut a vera eius mente atque sentential, in nulla re gravi aut alcius momenti discedamus; non ex nostro capite, sed ex antiquis eius expositoris ac sectatoribus, et ubi ili defuerint, ex variis eiusdem locis inter se collatis eam eliciendō” (DG, Proleg. VI, cap. 6, n.28; VII, 322). This translation is from Penner (2013). For discussions of this passage, see Rommen, 1926 4f.; Gemmeke, 1965 18f; and Penner, 2013 pp.6-8.

98 DVP disp. 4, sect. 1; IV 550a-553a.
account for all wrongdoing (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1, 13; IV 552b-553a). Suárez holds that Adam’s sin and those sins of the fallen angels were sins from malitia. He explicitly rejects Aquinas’s suggestion that all sins from malitia are either sins like despair, acts proceeding from such sins, or acts proceeding from a corrupt state like a vice. Suárez argues that any morally bad action that does not proceed from ignorance or passion is an instance of willful wrongdoing. He deems acts from malitia “frequent” or “common” (frequens) (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1 9-10; IV, 552a). Suárez thinks the division of wrongdoing into acts from ignorance, passion, and malitia, then, accounts for the full spectrum of morally bad acts.

Suárez resists the classic tripartite division, not because it is insufficient, but because he considers ignorance, passion, and malitia circumstances, rather than causes, of wrongdoing (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1, 1; IV 550a). The division, he thinks, tells us something about the respective gravity of morally bad actions performed under particular circumstances, but not about the true source of morally bad actions. Circumstances like ignorance, passion, vice, and despair merely diminish or augment the extent to which a particular morally bad action is voluntary and free (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1, 14; IV 550a). The true source of any kind of wrongdoing is the will (DVP disp. 5, sect. 1, 2; IV 553b).

While Suárez does not spend much time explicitly discussing the distinction between acts from ignorance, passion, and malitia, this does not mean that we are unable to glean from his works what he thinks willful wrongdoing involves; and indeed, we must, in order to answer the question at hand. That question, recall, is: does Suárez believe a wrongdoer can freely act against her intellect’s judgment that the some course of action is all things

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99 For a particularly clear statement of Aquinas’s position, see In Sent. lib. 2, dist. 43, q.1, a.6.
100 “Unum est de fide certum, nempe in voluntate esse vere et proprie peccatum, et solum eius consensum sufficere ad peccandum.”
considered best? To determine the answer to this question, we need to determine whether there are certain types of judgments Suárez thinks the freest wrongdoing involves. According to Suárez, sinning from *malitia* is simply a way of describing doing what is morally bad in a way that is plainly free, and so we can best begin to answer our question by considering the brief remarks he makes about such sins.

Suárez holds that the person who sins from *malitia* judges her action good in some respect. He explicitly rejects the position, which he attributes to Scotus, that the willful wrongdoer loves evil for evil’s sake (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1, 7; IV 551b). Suárez does, then, adhere to a version of the guise of the good thesis.

The fact that Suárez adheres to a version of the guise of the good thesis, as I noted above, is not tantamount to his holding that the willful wrongdoer judges her act best when she chooses it. The guise of the good thesis does not entail the guise of the greater good thesis, nor does it entail the position that an agent always acts for the moral good. Suárez is, in fact, explicit that a person need not desire the moral good (*honestum bonum*) when she acts.¹⁰¹ He explains that:

> The one who sins may not desire the moral good (*honestum bonum*), but may desire the pleasurable good, or natural convenience...the will, although it is rational, is the universal appetite of a human being, and therefore all that is suitable for a human being is able to be desired under some such aspect of suitability (DVP disp 5, sect. 1, 8; IV 555).¹⁰²

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¹⁰¹ Translations for the term ‘*honestum*’ abound. For example, we find: ‘moral rightness’ (Irwin 2008, p. 614), ‘honorable’ (Garcia and Davis, 1989), ‘righteous’ (Schneewind, 1998, p. 65); even, on occasion, ‘noble’ or ‘universal good’. Thomas Williams notes the trouble with this term in his “Translation and Transmission” (2003, p.16). I choose to translate the term ‘moral’ and ‘moral good’ here because Suárez explicitly contrasts the *honestum bonum*, with not only goods like pleasure and wealth, but also with what he calls the “absolute and abstract good under which various aspects of good are comprehended” (*bonum absolute et abstracte sub quo variae rationes bonorum comprehenduntur*) (DA lib. 7, cap. 6, 20; II 832b). It is clear that, at least in the works I treat here, he ordinarily intends the term *honestum* to designate a particular kind of good: the kind of good involved in doing what is morally right.

¹⁰² “Licet qui peccat non appetat honestum bonum, tamen appetite bonum delectabile, seu naturae commodum...voluntas licet sit rationalis, tamen est universalis appetitus hominis, et ideo quidquid homini est conveniens appetere potest sub quacumque ratione convenientis.”
Since many sorts of goods, not only the moral good, can seem suitable to people, people are not bound to desire what they deem morally good. This fact suggests that a person could engage in clear-eyed wrongdoing, so long as she considers her action good in some way.¹⁰³

Does Suárez believe the person who sins from malitia engages in clear-eyed wrongdoing? He claims that she need not. Here, he deviates from Aquinas, though it is unclear whether he does so deliberately. Suárez argues that while all morally bad actions that result from a habit (consuetudo) of the will (a phrase he appears to be using as an umbrella term for vicious dispositions and other corrupt states), are sins from malitia, not all such acts involve occurring consideration of one’s knowledge (DVP disp. 4, sect. 1, 8; IV 551b-552a). Hence, acts from dispositions like vices are instances of willful wrongdoing, but they need not involve clear-eyed evil. Since Suárez deems willful wrongdoing the freest kind of wrongdoing, this suggests that Suárez believes wrongdoing can be entirely free even if the agent does not consider the fact that her act is morally bad when she acts.

Further, Suárez resists the claim that the willful wrongdoer sins with perfect knowledge (perfecta scientia), practical and speculative, dispositional and occurring, claiming that sinning with this sort of knowledge “either never happens or is rare”. In fact, he suggests that if someone were to perform an act with such knowledge, she would not act from malitia, but from a passion (Ibid).¹⁰⁴ Since acts from passion are performed with

¹⁰³ Note that when Suárez contrasts acting for the honestum with acting for other goods like pleasure, he does not mean to reject the guise of the good thesis, as Schneewind argues, nor does he take up a dualistic position concerning motivation like that attributable to Anselm or Scotus (Schneewind 1998, p.65). Suárez is not positing that a person acts either for the sake of righteousness or for the sake of a good, like one’s advantage. Honestum is, for Suárez, just one of many ways in which a thing can seem good to an agent.
¹⁰⁴ “Secunda sententia dicit peccare ex malitia esse peccare ex perfecta scientia intellectus speculativa et practica, habituative et actual...certum tam expecece non esse necessarium ad peccatum ex malitia, ex ratione facta, quia peccatum ex malitia frequens est: ille autem modus vel nunquam, vel raro contingit. Item quia peccatum ex consuetudine voluntarium...est peccatum ex malitia, et tamen non semper fit cum illa
diminished freedom, Suárez seems to hold that, at least *de facto*, no wrongdoer sins with perfect, occurrent, speculative and practical knowledge in a way that is entirely free.

What Suárez means when he says that people either never, or rarely, do what is morally bad with perfect practical and speculative knowledge, then, is crucial. If he means a person never, or rarely, acts with the occurrent particular knowledge that her act is morally bad, then this claim is quite striking. It leaves Suárez with a view on which no one (or very nearly no one) engages in clear-eyed wrongdoing. Further, it leaves him with a view on which any clear-eyed wrongdoing would most likely be attributed to passion, not *malitia*.

This position, however, would hardly be consistent with Suárez’s argument, noted above, that there is nothing puzzling about an agent who desires a good that is not the moral good. It also would not be consistent with other claims Suárez makes about sinning from *malitia*. In *On the Angels*, for instance, Suárez argues that sinning from *malitia* can involve clear-eyed wrongdoing. He claims that the bad angels provide an example of this. In their current condition, Suárez thinks, they sin from *malitia* (they cannot sin, after all, from ignorance or passion) and yet they experience remorse. This remorse indicates that they know that what they do is bad (DA lib. 7, cap. 5, 32-33; II 824b-825a). When Suárez says a person never, or rarely, sins with perfect speculative and practical knowledge, then, he cannot mean that no one ever calmly does what she realizes is morally bad.

Suárez does not say much more about this claim in his section on the tripartite division of sins, but he indicates that he will take the matter up further in the following section. There, what we find is not an explicit explanation of what perfect knowledge would amount to, but rather a highly qualified endorsement of a version of the Socratic thesis.

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consideratione actuali...maxime operabitur quis contra illam totam scientiam ex passion aliqua, et sic erit peccatum ex passione.”
There, Suárez claims that though a person who sins can make both correct speculative and practical judgments of certain types, “always, in every sin, there occurs some practical lack of consideration” (*inconsiderationis*) (DVP disp. 5, sect. 1, 12; IV 556a).

### III. Suárez on the Socratic Thesis

What does this practical lack of consideration amount to? And does it entail an implicit acceptance of the guise of the greater good thesis? Suárez makes an effort in a number of his works to explain the sense in which he thinks the Socratic thesis holds. These explanations are often rather vague, but in comparing them to one another, I suggest we can at least begin to glean answers to these questions. For much of the remainder of this chapter, then, I consider two of Suárez’s most detailed passages on this topic, one from *On the Angels* and a second, from Suárez’s *Metaphysical Disputations*.105

In *On the Angels*, in his concluding response to the question: “does the will’s sin presuppose some defect in the practical intellect?”, Suárez says:

That axiom, ‘all who sin are ignorant’, whether understood concerning antecedent or concerning consequent ignorance, is to be understood morally, and according to the ordinary human way of acting. It is not true metaphysically and concerning absolute necessity. For in reality, such necessity is not able to be gathered from any certain principles, as is proven. Morally speaking, however, the best argument (*ratio*) shows it...this moral necessity extends to antecedent ignorance, either lack of consideration or at least feeble consideration...the person who sins necessarily thinks about the object of sin and the benefits of it, and thus either doesn’t consider the moral goodness, or thinks less of it than necessary. It may also be the case that the person no less carefully thinks about the deformity than the pleasure (this also morally and frequently can happen) but absolutely speaking the person does not consider the gravity of the moral badness, nor all the reasons that can avert the will from such an object, as much as possible, and in such an event as the person ought (DA lib. 7, cap. 6, 36; II 838b).106

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105 Additional passages concerning the Socratic thesis include DVP disp. 5, sect. 1, 12; IV 556a and DFH disp.10, sect. 1, 7; IV 117b-118a.

106 “Axioma illud, ’omnis peccans est ignorans’, sive de antecedente, sive de consequente ignorantia intelligatur, moraliter intelligendum esse, et secundum ordinarium operandi modum humanum, non metaphysice, ac de absoluta necessitate. Nam revera tanta necessitas ex nullis certis principiis colligi potest, ut probatum est. Moraliter autem optima ratio illud ostendit....haec moralis necessitas etiam ad antecedentem ignorancem,
We should note first that Suárez makes a distinction in this passage between what is metaphysically, or absolutely, necessary and what is morally necessary. He deems the Socratic thesis morally, but not metaphysically, necessary. This distinction may appear to imply that Suárez has only a *prima facie* commitment to even the relatively weak version of the Socratic thesis he proposes here. In a way, he does. It is easier to analyze the distinction Suárez draws between moral and metaphysical necessity, however, once both of the relevant passages have been considered. For this reason, I momentarily set the distinction aside.

I work first to determine what Suárez’s version of the Socratic thesis entails. In this passage, Suárez concedes that it is morally necessary that every morally bad act involve either some lack of consideration or "feeble" (*tenuem*) consideration. In the preceding chapter, Suárez contrasts feeble consideration with forceful (*vehemens*), or intense (*intensa*), consideration, arguing that people *need not* choose the good they consider more forcefully (DA lib. 7, cap. 5, 10; II 817b). In that chapter, Suárez is not as clear as we might hope about what forceful and feeble consideration amount to. It is clear that consideration need not be comparative to be forceful or feeble. Suárez thinks it is possible for someone to forcefully consider a good, for instance, even when that good is the only good she considers (DA lib 7, cap. 5, 16; II 820a). Likewise, forceful consideration does not seem to require a judgment to the effect that: “this is to be done” or “this is to be avoided”, the sort of judgment Capreolus thinks is involved in a person’s ultimate particular conscience. In fact, Suárez does not say that either type of consideration involves making a judgment at all. At very least, forceful

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*vel inconsiderationism, vel saltem tenuem considerationem extenditur...autem peccat necessario cogitare de objecto peccati, et de commoditatibus eius. Unde moraliter loquendo, vel non considerat honestatem contrarii objecti, vel remissius quam oportet. Tum etiam quia licet fortasse non minus attente cogitetur de turpitudine objecti, quam de eiusmodi delectabilitate (hoc enim etiam moraliter ac frequenter contingere potest) nihilominus absolute loquendo, non tantum considerat gravitatem malitiae moralis, nec rationes omnes, quae a tali objecto possent voluntatem avertere, quantum posset, et in tali eventu deberet.”*
consideration seems to require that the agent give a particular good a great deal of her attention. Suárez sometimes describes the position that an agent must choose the good considered more forcefully as the position that an agent must choose the good considered more attentively (attentius consideratum) (Ibid. 1; II 815a). Hence, to act with feeble consideration would be to act with only slight attention to some matter.

In his chapter on forceful consideration, Suárez argues explicitly that a person can sin even if she considers, or thinks about, (he uses considerare and cogitare interchangeably several times in the chapter) the moral good more forcefully than another good, like pleasure (DA lib. 7, cap. 5, 10; II 818). As partial evidence for this claim, he offers the fact that we know from experience that it is possible to do what is morally good even in the face of intense consideration of some temptation. This, he thinks, gives us one reason to think that we can pursue a good, like pleasure, instead of the moral good when the two conflict, even while considering the moral good more attentively.

That claim may seem in conflict with the claim Suárez makes concerning the Socratic thesis in the passage at hand. After all, above, he claims that all wrongdoing involves either a lack of consideration or feeble consideration. If a person can do what is morally bad in the face of forceful consideration of the moral good, however, feeble consideration seems unnecessary for sin. Below, I argue that the solution to this apparent conflict rests in Suárez’s distinction between moral and metaphysical necessity.

What sort of feeble consideration, or lack of consideration, does Suárez intend to argue that all wrongdoing involves? The passage we are considering gives us some, if vague, idea. There, Suárez suggests that in any given morally bad act, one of three conditions obtains: (1) the wrongdoer does not consider moral goodness at all when she acts, (2) the
wrongdoer considers moral goodness when she acts, but not as much as she should, or (3) the wrongdoer considers both moral goodness and the good she pursues carefully, but does not give sufficient consideration to something relevant, like how grave the moral badness involved in her action is, or certain arguments that could avert her will.

I will focus on the third condition, since it involves the weakest sort of intellectual failing. This person recognizes, or at least may recognize, that her action is morally bad but fails to give enough thought to some feature of that morally bad act. Here, we have a case of clear-eyed wrongdoing that nevertheless involves a kind of preceding intellectual failing.

One thing to note: even this very weak condition implies that Suárez believes an agent’s will is responsive to certain types of reasons or considerations. If, prior to acting, every wrongdoer fails to sufficiently consider certain reasons or considerations that could avert her will, this suggests there are, in fact, considerations that could avert an agent’s will in any given instance of wrongdoing. This certainly does not imply that Suárez believes a person’s judgments, or even her knowledge, determine her will. It also does not mean that Suárez is committed to a version of the guise of the greater good thesis. The notion that there are considerations that can avert the will from any given morally bad action is compatible with the claim that wrongdoers can choose perceived lesser goods.

It does, however, suggest that Suárez considers the guise of the good thesis only part of the story about the will’s rationality. After all, if the will is rational merely because it must choose between objects the intellect judges good, then the will could conceivably remain firm in wrongdoing no matter what reasons are marshaled. So long as the wrongdoer continues to consider her act good in some way, she will be able to choose it. Her will may still respond to additional arguments or considerations, of course, but it certainly would not need to. If even
this weak version of the Socratic thesis holds, it suggests that Suárez believes the will is responsive to more than just the intellect’s judgments that particular acts are good in some respect.

I turn now to a second passage, this one from the *Metaphysical Disputations*. There, Suárez says of the Socratic thesis:

...morally speaking, the will never lapses without some defect that precedes in the intellect — at least a lack of consideration of some of the many reasons or motives that are able to hold the will back from the affect in which it sins. This is sufficiently proven from experience...However, I do not understand that it is also morally necessary, and according to what regularly happens, that this judgment is either (1) a formally comparative judgment, namely, that this is to be chosen in comparison with another, or (2) a judgment that is formally about the object as something that is absolutely to be loved or done...I understand that morally and regularly a judgment intervenes by which someone judges absolutely that this object or this deed is suitable here and now because of pleasure or honor or some other similar reason and that the object is worthy or sufficient to be sought here and now (DM disp. 19, sect. 7, 11; XXV 726a).107

Here, Suárez provides a much clearer, more detailed, explanation of the sort of intellectual failings he thinks wrongdoing involves. Again, Suárez claims that the agent does not consider certain reasons that could have averted her will from wrongdoing. In this passage, however, he adds several crucial claims. I start by noting the significance of the two negative claims he makes.

In this passage, Suárez argues that a wrongdoer need not make an explicit erroneous comparative judgment when she acts. Cajetan, recall, argues that all wrongdoing involves at

107 "Moraliter loquendo, nunquam voluntatem labi, quin praecedat in intellectu aliquis defectus, saltem inconsideration aliqua plurium rationum vel motivorum, quae possunt voluntatem continere ab eo affect in quo peccat. Hoc satis probat experientia...quia judicium de agendis vel appetendis absolute prolatum cum tali inconsiderationis quidam error practicus est; nam est actus imprudens, et de se difformis appetiti recto...Non intelligo autem esse necessarium etiam moraliter, et secundum id quod regulariter accidit, ut judicium hoc sit vel formaliter comparativum, scilicet, hoc esse eligendum prae alio; vel ut formaliter sit de object ut omnino diligendo vel faciendo in aliquo sensu ex supra positis...sed intelligo moraliter ac regulariter intervenire judicium, quo absolute judicatur hoc objectum, vel hoc opus hic et nunc esse conveniens ob delectionem vel honorem, vel aliam simile rationem, et dignum vel sufficiens ut hic et nunc expetatur. Hoc enim judicium sufficit ut voluntas moveri possit ut late probatum est, et infra dicam in disputatione de causa finali."
least a sort of ignorance of the correct comparative value of two goods. Here, Suárez resists the notion that a wrongdoer must erroneously compare goods when she acts, or at least that she must do so explicitly. This may seem to suggest that he thinks it is possible for a person to act against a correct comparative judgment. However, Suárez’s point in this place is a broader one. It is the point that a person need not make a comparative judgment at all when she chooses a good. Later on in this same section, this becomes clear. There, he argues that people not only need not make explicit comparative judgments when they act, but that they ordinarily do not make explicit comparative judgments when they act (Ibid.). He reiterates this in On the Angels. There, he adds the claim that when a person does explicitly compare goods, she need not judge one all things considered better than the other. He explains that the good chosen in a comparison “is loved and elected not because it is simply better, but because it is more pleasurable to the senses, or because it is more useful for wealth, or procuring a position, or for some similar end” (DA lib. 7, cap.6, 26; II 834a). In this passage from On the Angels, a person who does compare two goods, deems the good she chooses better than the other in some respect. She simply does not deem the good she chooses all things considered better than the other.

Again, recall Chang’s notion of comparability (Chapter One). Two items are comparable when it is possible for one to be better or worse than the other in some respect. Comparing two acts, one of which is morally good and the other is morally bad, I may deem the morally good action better in terms of its ability to bring me closer to rational perfection. I may deem the morally bad action better in terms of its ability to

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108 Note that we need not think that Cajetan was committed to the view that people always explicitly compare goods when they do what is morally bad, either.

109 “Diligatur vel eligitur non quia melius simpliciter, sed quia delectabilius secundum sensum, vel quia utilius ad divitias, vel honores comparandos, vel ad alios fines similes.”
provide immediate pleasure. In both cases, I make a comparative judgment, but not a second-order judgment that the morally good act or the morally bad one is better on the whole. Likewise, Suárez seems to think that in most cases, when we make a comparative judgment, we make the first-order sort of judgment and choose on that basis. Often, we do not even do this.

Suárez also claims wrongdoers need not make an explicit judgment that the thing they choose to do is absolutely to be done or loved in order to act. In other words, Suárez rejects the notion that we always act on something like what Capreolus calls an ‘ultimate particular conscience’ — our final practical judgment about what is to be done here and now. Again, we need to be careful in reading this claim. Suárez’s claim here is not that people can act against final practical judgments of this type, but rather that they need not make them at all in order to act badly. In fact, in the preceding section, Suárez argues that a particular sort of final practical judgment, a judgment that, all things considered, here and now, some action is necessary, would be incompatible with freedom (disp. 19, sect. 6, n. 10; XXV 772b). In making these two negative claims, Suárez rejects the notion that wrongdoers always make some sort of final judgment about the value or overall appropriateness of their actions before they do what is morally bad.

Now let us turn to Suárez’s two positive claims. He claims that it is morally necessary that the agent judge that: (1) the object she chooses is appropriate here and now because of something good about it, and (2) the object is worthy or sufficient for pursuit here and now. What do these conditions entail? They entail, at very least, that the agent judge her act good in some way. However, they must entail more than this if they are to involve some sort of genuine defect or lack of consideration. After all, a morally bad act can be genuinely good in
certain respects. For this reason, Suárez argues at various places throughout his corpus that the person who judges a pleasurable but morally bad act good in terms of pleasure does not make an erroneous practical judgment.\textsuperscript{110} This helps him to resist certain forms of the Socratic thesis.

In the paragraph that follows, we find an explanation. There, Suárez suggests that when a wrongdoer makes a judgment about what is appropriate and sufficient here and now, she either does not compare the good that she chooses to other goods, does not make an all things considered comparative judgment, or:

Even if a comparison of this sort does occur antecedently, at the very moment a person freely wills a perverse object, that person regularly averts the mind’s eye from other aspects of good and attends [only] to that aspect that moves the will toward the act in question; and it is in this way that the person conceives a judgment of the sort mentioned above. This is sufficient for that judgment to be considered erroneous from a practical point of view. For the judgment virtually contains a comparison of, and preference for, that object in relation to others (DM disp. 19, sect. 7, 11; XXVI 726a).\textsuperscript{111}

While the person Suárez has in mind, then, need not explicitly compare goods, let alone make an all things considered comparative judgment, if she \textit{does} make an all things considered comparison, she will not act against it without first averting her mind. If she deems the moral good all things considered best, she will only do what is morally bad attending to the good she sees in that morally bad act. When she acts, she averts her mind from the moral good and focuses on the good that she pursues. She may make a judgment, then, that a particular morally good act is all things considered best before she acts, and she may even act against that judgment and sin, but she will not act against that judgment while holding it in mind.

\textsuperscript{110} See, for instance, DA lib. 7, cap. 6, 20; II 832.
\textsuperscript{111} “\textit{In eo momento quo homo libere vult objectum pravum, regulariter avertit oculos mentis ad alios rationibus, et ad illam attendit, quae moveat voluntatem ad talem actum, et ita concipit praedictum judicium. Et hoc satis est ut illud censeatur practice erroneum; nam virtute includit comparationem et praelationem illius objecti ad alia, et consequenter includit differentiam ad appetitum rectum.”
Further, her choice implies ("virtually contains") a preference for the good that she chooses. Her act can be seen as the result of a sort of implicit comparative judgment, on which the good she chooses comes out on top. This is why the agent averts her mind from the moral good before acting. This passage suggests both that Suárez thinks people do not choose against their occurrent judgments about what is all things considered best, and further, that a person's choices reflect her preferences.

Given that this person's action reflects an implicit preference for the good she chooses, we might press on the claim that she really makes an all things considered judgment that the moral good is best at all. What scale, we might wonder, does this person use to make her judgment? Aquinas, recall, believes that we make all things considered judgments of this sort on the basis of our perception of what will make us happy. For this reason, these judgments can be influenced by the inclinations of a person's will. If Suárez's claim is simply that a person can act against some kind of abstract all things considered judgment about goodness and yet choose against that judgment with her preferences, Aquinas would almost certainly agree. What is crucial is that both thinkers appear to believe that the wrongdoer ultimately chooses the good she prefers. Suárez seems to think, as Aquinas does, that we see an agent’s values expressed in her acts.

On the basis of these passages, we can draw the tentative conclusion that while there is a sense in which Suárez believes that wrongdoers sometimes act against their all things considered judgments about what is good, that sense is a qualified one. An agent might reject the received judgments of her intellect, but when she does there is still a sense in which she acts in accordance with her preferences, or values. Furthermore, she does not act against the good judged best with that judgment firmly in mind. Suárez does not offer an
account here according to which a wrongdoer sometimes makes the clear-eyed choice of an all things considered lesser good. Rather, he offers an account according to which a wrongdoer sometimes averts her mind from her all things considered judgments in order to do what she knows is bad.

IV. Moral Necessity

Of course, Suárez explicitly says that the claims he makes in these passages are only morally, not metaphysically (or absolutely) necessary. Hence, we may wonder whether there is any reason to think these claims should be taken to hold in all cases. What is crucial now is to unpack the concept of moral necessity.

At least one thing is immediately entirely clear: Suárez does not mean a morally necessary state of affairs is one that is obligatory. When Suárez claims that something is morally necessary, in other words, he is not claiming that we have a duty to do that thing, or that doing that thing is necessary if we are to be morally good. This deontological use of the term will become popular, especially in legal contexts, in the eighteenth century. Here, however, such a reading would hardly make sense. It would be absurd for Suárez to claim that it is obligatory that some lack of consideration precede every morally bad action.

Suárez’s claim appears to be a claim about what actually happens in human affairs. This is the force of his use of the term “morally” (moraliter), exploiting the word’s root (mos/moris) which means something like “what is customary” rather than “what is required”. It is not a claim, then, about what follows from the moral law. Nor is it a claim about what follows from certain principles. Suárez associates acting from certain principles with metaphysical, but not moral necessity (DA lib. 7, cap. 6, 36; II 838b). It is not even a claim about what is necessary given the nature of human faculties. In On Vice and Sin, Suárez
claims that while the Socratic thesis is morally necessary, it is not necessary "if we consider the absolute power of the will...for if for if we consider the nature and power of our free will, it is in its power to be moved by that which it wills, if the object is sufficient, whatever the intellect tries on the contrary" (DVP disp. 5, sect. 1, 12; IV 556a). Suárez’s claim that the Socratic thesis is morally necessary, then, amounts to either the claim that: (1) the Socratic thesis always, actually, obtains, although it does not obtain on account of either certain principles or the nature of the will, or (2) the Socratic thesis ordinarily obtains, although it does not obtain on account of either certain principles or the nature of the will. In other words, he is either making a claim about the way people always actually act, or a claim about the way people ordinarily act.

If he is making the latter claim, then his point is fairly unimpressive. We might reasonably wonder why Suárez would even use the misleading term “necessity” to describe such a state of affairs. If what is morally necessary is merely what people usually do, a great many things will be morally necessary, including most, if not all of our social norms. Taken in this sense, it is morally necessary that people fall in love or pay their taxes. There are, of course, plenty of counter examples in the world: there are tax-evaders, psychopaths, and cynics. However, these counter examples do not matter, because something is morally necessary when it describes the way people ordinarily act.

If he is making the former claim, then his point is significant. It would not be a point about the nature of the human faculties themselves, or about what follows from certain principles, but it would be a strong claim about actual human action. Someone dissatisfied with Aquinas’s moral psychology because she thinks people sometimes make the knowing choice of a lesser good is unlikely to be much more satisfied with Suárez’s, if Suárez’s
considered view is that such actions never occur. If Suárez believes such actions never occur, this suggests that he would likely re-describe purported counter-examples.

The language that Suárez uses to describe moral necessity often suggests the weaker reading of the concept. After all, in the passages treated above, he calls what is morally necessary what happens “according to the ordinary human way of acting”, what “regularly happens”, and what “regularly speaking” happens. These locutions may seem to decide the matter. If so, there is no conflict between Suárez’s adherence to the Socratic thesis and the proposal that people not only can, but sometimes actually do, calmly, deliberately, choose perceived lesser goods.

I suggest, however, that Suárez’s claim amounts to more than this. The weak language just noted should be considered against the stronger language Suárez uses in these passages as well. He not only uses the term “necessity” to describe this concept, but he also makes claims like “morally speaking, always in every sin” there is some lack of consideration, and “morally and regularly speaking it never happens” that the will slides without an intellectual failing. Such language is misleading if what he means is only that something often, or even usually, happens.

Suárez does not employ this concept frequently. To my knowledge, he uses the term ‘moral necessity’ exclusively, or nearly exclusively, in connection with the Socratic thesis. Hence, one way to determine whether we should accept the stronger or weaker reading of the concept is to try to determine whether he thinks there are any actual exceptions to the Socratic thesis.

We do not find any examples of exceptions when we consider his passages on the Socratic thesis itself. While Suárez regularly qualifies the Socratic thesis, ensuring that his
readers know that the thesis is only morally necessary, he does not provide examples that suggest we may have actual experience to the contrary.

Likewise, when we consider other passages on the sorts of actions a commitment to the Socratic thesis would seem to exclude, we do not find examples of exceptions either. Consider his chapter on forceful and feeble consideration in On the Angels, for instance (mentioned above). In that chapter, Suárez argues that a person can sin even if she considers the moral good more forcefully than another good, like pleasure (DA lib. 7, cap. 5, 10; II 818). He even marshals evidence for this claim from experience. However, crucially, he does not marshal any evidence from our experience with wrongdoing of this type. Instead, he offers as evidence the fact that we know from experience that it is possible to do what is morally good in the face of intense consideration of some temptation. While he argues that the converse is possible as well, he does not suggest that we have experience with the converse.

Later in that work, he considers whether a wrongdoer can act against her all things considered judgment that some morally good act is best. There, he says that she can. However, again, he does not draw on experience to support his claim. Instead, he points to the nature of the will. Our experience, he thinks, does not teach that it is possible to make all things considered comparative judgments at all. He says, “although the intellect makes a comparison and prefers the morally bad act (turpe) to the morally good one (honesto), it will not make such a comparison in relation to a common aspect of good bringing together under it those specific aspects of good and preferring the inferior to the excellent. For such a comparison either never, or very rarely, happens, as experience teaches” (DA lib. 7, cap.6,
The implication of this passage is that when people actually choose one good over the other, they choose that good thinking it better than the other in some respect. They do not think it better than the other overall. While Suárez does leave open the possibility that, on very rare occasion, we make all things considered comparative judgments, this claim does not suggest that he thinks we have any experience with the phenomenon. It certainly does not suggest that we have experience with the related phenomenon of choosing an all things considered lesser good over an all things considered greater one.

Finally, recall that when he discusses sinning from malitia, Suárez claims that it either never, or rarely, happens that someone acts against perfect speculative and practical knowledge. There, we find not only an implicit commitment to the Socratic thesis, but also, recall, the claim that if such acts occur, they are the result of the passions. Since sins from malitia, not sins from passion, are plainly free, this serves as further evidence that Suárez does not think people actually freely act against all things considered judgments about what is best.

One may object, of course, that here, again, Suárez makes explicit room for the possibility that there are acts of this sort in the world. He says, after all, that they happen either never or rarely. I concede that this is true. However, it still seems to be his considered view that we do not encounter such acts. At most, if we do encounter them, such acts are exceedingly rare. This is a significant claim. It does not say anything about the metaphysical relationship between the will and intellect, but it does say something about actual human

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112 “Secundo quia licet comparationem faciat intellectus, et turpe honesto praeferat, non faciet talen comparationem in ordine ad commune rationem boni conferendo sub illa specificas rationes boni: et praeferendo inferiorem excellentiori, talis enim comparatio et nunquam, vel rarissime fit, quantum experiential docet, et nulla ratione ostenditur necessaria, ut voluntas inalteram partem feratur.”
action.

On the basis of such passages, I believe we should tentatively conclude that Suárez’s claim that the Socratic thesis is morally necessary is the strong claim that we do not encounter exceptions to the thesis in the world. Given his understanding of what the Socratic thesis entails, this suggests that Suárez believes wrongdoers never actually make the free and clear-eyed choice of an all things considered lesser good.

**Conclusion**

This need not be cause for mourning. Instead, it may present an occasion to reconsider what we mean when we talk about all things considered judgments of this sort. Aquinas thinks the implicit scale on which we measure goods is happiness. To judge a good all things considered greater than some other is to judge that good all things considered greater in relation to one’s own pursuit of happiness, one’s end. A person will not calmly and knowingly choose to do what she deems all things considered bad on this scale because, he thinks, a person always pursues her perceived end.

Suarez appears to believe the scale is a more abstract one, separable from the agent’s considered preferences and perhaps desires. While I have argued that it is Suarez’s view that, *de facto*, we do not act against such abstract all things considered judgments, his broader insight, I venture, is that people rarely, if ever, make such judgments at all. Instead, when choosing to pursue one good over another, we often consider that good on its own, or compared to another on some scale that is not so terribly grand, like pleasure or convenience, or perhaps on multiple scales at the same time. Suarez suggests that we will not act against our all things considered judgments about what is best, but this is only
because we do not make all things considered judgments about what is best. The claim renders us no less free.
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