Title
The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t

Author
Mantegna, Agostino

Publication Date
2014

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992

by
Agostino Mantegna

Doctor of Philosophy in Geography
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014
Professor John A. Agnew, Chair

This research investigate the geographical logic of political clientelism. It show how political clientelism works in a macro-comparative perspective using the contrasting cases of Southern Italy and California as examples of two ideal-types in which clientelistic politics operates. The main finding is that the allocation and flow of financial funds related to public and infrastructural spending is influenced by clientelistic political strategies. This means that variations in the territorial distribution of public and infrastructural spending structure and govern electoral outcomes – e.g. exchange of votes in return for allocation of resources (favors). Decreasing expenditures in Southern Italy lead to increase in preference voting, whereas increasing availability of state and federal resources increase incumbent advantage and push for increasing role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California. This contrasting patterns demonstrate how the different forms in which territorial politics is being constructed plays out in in two macro-regions in a global world dominated by incipient processes of decentralization and state restructuring.
The dissertation of Agostino Mantegna is approved.

David L. Rigby
Michael E. Shin
Michael C. Storper

John A. Agnew, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2014
To my parents, Cristina and Mario, for their love and support
Table of Contents

| Introduction                                      | 1 |
| Outline of Chapters                              | 25 |
| Chapter 1: The territorial logic of political clientelism | 29 |
| Chapter 2: Revisiting territorial politics       | 48 |
| Chapter 3: Constructing a macro-analytical approach | 66 |
| Chapter 4: A political history of two sub-state spaces | 89 |
| Chapter 5: Institutional transformations         | 110 |
| Chapter 6: Clientelistic politics regimes at work | 130 |
| Chapter 7: Patterns of distributive politics (I): Public spending | 154 |
| Chapter 8: Patterns of distributive politics (II): Infrastructural spending | 172 |
| Chapter 9: Patterns of distributive politics (III): Voting and lobbying | 191 |
| Conclusion: Unbundling territorial politics      | 214 |
| References                                       | 235 |
List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. California - Southern Pacific Railroad business patronage system: p. 133.
Figure 2. California - Artie Samish political clientelism system: p. 136.
Figure 3. California – The lobbying clientelism system: p. 141.
Figure 4. Southern Italy - Center-periphery clientelistic circuit system: p. 144.
Figure 5. Southern Italy - The infrastructure of the mass clientelistic party: p. 147.
Figure 6. Southern Italy - The factionalist-corrupted clientelistic system: p. 150.
Table 1. Some of the main explanations of Southern Italy clientelism-prone development: p. 14.
Table 2. Main explanations of California political crisis-prone development: p. 18.
Table 3. Sample of political clientelism studies by world regions and countries: p. 30.
Table 4. Territorial typology of political clientelism: p. 37.
Table 5. Multidimensional typology of Southern Italy and California political clientelism: p. 46.
Table 6. Territorial politics typology based on particularistic resources and blocs of votes: p. 54.
Table 7. Institutional macro-contexts compared: p. 58.
Table 8. Effect of decentralization and structure of incentive for politicians: p. 60.
Table 9. Institutional linkages compared: p. 62.
Table 10. Sub-state as units of analysis: p. 74.
Table 11. Encompassing comparisons: p. 78.
Table 12. Analytical compass of ideal types: p. 84.
Table 13. Southern Italy and California political development ‘paths:’ p. 91.
Table 14. The Progressive institutional reforms: p. 112.
Table 15. Clientelistic politics regimes: California: p. 132.
Table 16. Clientelistic politics regimes: Southern Italy: p. 143.
Table 27. Territorial distribution of direct investment by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 177.
Table 28. Territorial distribution of transfers to firms by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 178.
Table 29. Territorial distribution of transfers to public agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): 179.
Table 30. Territorial distribution of transfers to regions and local agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 180.
Table 36. Rate of preference voting by regions - Regional elections, 1970-1990: p. 197.
Table 40. Average (median) expenditures all major party candidates, General Elections - California 1976-1998: p. 205.
Table 41. Total campaign expenditure by Assembly and Senate incumbents and challengers, California, 1976-1996: p. 207.

Acknowledgments

This research is the result of a three-year project, carried over thanks to the generous assistance of John Agnew and the indispensable financial support of the UCLA Department of Geography, which by providing a three full-cycle Teaching Assistant Fellowship has permitted to complete it. Without the intellectual generosity of John Agnew and the financial support of the Department of Geography, this project would have been very difficult to complete. John Agnew demonstrated that mentoring is a craft in which few academic excel. I feel lucky to have the chance to work with him. Special thanks goes to the other members of my Doctoral Dissertation Committee, Michael Storper, Michael Shin and David Rigby for helping me in the initial stages of my research and for providing the final feedback. A special mention goes to Luca Muscara’ who has provided invaluable helps since this project started and has followed it with generous criticism and humorous attitude. I am particularly grateful to Irene L. Clark for her painstakingly proofreading work, her suggestions on how to improve my English style and for her crucial suggestions in sorting out some key linguistic issues. Many members of my ‘transatlantic family’ in both Italy and United States have been supportive over these years of ‘intellectual isolation.’ In Sicily, Cristina, my mom, Patrizia, my sister and her two wonderful gems, Beatrice and Diego, have made through Skype such isolation a fun one from time to time; in San Francisco, Jeanne and Nancy and the entire Bay Area have been my island of escape and relaxation from the hot pressure of the dry Los Angeles weather. In New York, Giusy, my haunt and her family have been my point of reference since I moved into the United States, and her generous moral support never
stopped since. Finally, Kasi McMurray, the Chief Manager of the UCLA Department of Geography, has been more than instrumental in my survival of the academic journey, providing both understanding and reprimand when the occasions demanded it. To all of them go my most appreciative thanks. Finally, this research is dedicated to my parents, Cristina and Mario, for their love and supports.

Los Angeles and San Francisco, November 20, 2014
Biographical Sketch

After studying Philosophy and Economic History at the University of Palermo during the early 1990s, I dropped out of the University to pursue a career as freelance writer and researcher in Rome. Here I took a job as a contract researcher at the EURISPES, where I collaborated on several projects, relating with the restructuring of the Italian labor market, the role of European law in the economy of small firms and the impact of globalization of the geography of Italian industrial districts. In collaboration with Andrea Tiddi I published a small book, titled Reddito di Cittadinanza: Verso la Società’ del Non-Lavoro (Castelvecchi, Rome 2000), which summarizes the main policy argument that tie together the thrust of these years of research in Italy. In 2001 I moved to the United States to pursue my studies. After completing the required English courses, I was accepted and subsequently enrolled at Hunter College (CUNY) in August 2003. I took my Bachelor Degree in Sociology, with Urban Planning and Geography as minor, graduating in June 2007. During these years, I continued to collaborate with Andrea Tiddi, publishing another publicy-oriented report for the Lazio region, titled Reddito Garantito e Nuovi Diritti Sociali: I Sistemi di Protezione del Reddito in Europa a Confronto per una Legge nella Regione Lazio (Assessorato al Lavoro, Pari Opportunita’ e Politiche Giovanili della Regione Lazio, Roma 2006). In the summer of 2007 I moved to Los Angeles, where I was accepted in the Geography Department at UCLA as a PhD Student. Under the supervision of Allen J. Scott I pursued my interest in economic geography, completing my Master Degree in the second half of 2009, with a thesis titled Pattern of Skill Change in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000. My interests moved towards political geography, and since 2010 I pursued my research under the supervision
of John Agnew, who pushed me to work in the field of territorial politics. My PhD
Dissertation is the first installment of long-planned research project dedicated to
reconstruct the historical origins, genesis and development of territorial politics seen from
a macro-analytical perspective and based on historical-comparative analysis. This larger
project aimed at examining the historical trajectories of territorial politics constitute a
cycle of studies titled, *The historical fabrics of territorial politics.*
Introduction

Democracy has only the choice of being run cheaply by the rich who hold honorary office, or of being run expensively by paid professional politicians.

*Max Weber*

The processes by which territorial politics in contemporary sub-state polities is constructed are not well known, or at the best have received only cursory treatment. Even less known is how peculiar forms of political exchanges are at the center of such processes. In short, there is a relationship between distributive politics and corresponding forms of territorial politics that need to be studied in a global world dominated by incipient processes of decentralization and state restructuring. This research will attempt a foray into this complex relationship. It will do by investigating the concept of territorial politics as it exists in two contemporary locations: Southern Italy and the state of California. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, it will argue that in the contemporary world, political clientelism is one of the main drivers by which territorial politics is often constructed. It will also suggest that political clientelism has a geographical logic.

The German writer Bertolt Brecht, in deconstructing the clientelistic nature of the Roman Republic, a well-known model of the past, helps us to trace the links that connect political exchanges and territorial politics. In his novel, *The Affairs of Mr. Julius Caesar* (*Die Geschäfte des Herrn Julius Caesar*), Brecht reveals several fundamental features that structure such links.\(^1\) First of all, he shows how the Roman Republic democratic regime is built around nothing but electoral manipulation and exchange of favors for

---

\(^1\) The novel is an unfinished work. Originally composed in six books, Brecht worked on it from 1938 to 1939 during his Danish exile, and it was only published posthumously in 1957. I have used the Italian edition of the novel, *Gli affari del signor Giulio Cesare*. Turin: Einaudi, 2006. All quotes come from this translation. All translations from Italian used in this research, when not indicated, are mine.
political support. In short such a regime relied on a powerful mechanism: namely, that of clientelism. Second, Brecht demonstrates how such a mechanism is in turn functional to the factional struggle for the distribution of power in the Senate. The clientelistic nature of such power reposed on the ability of the noble families to develop, organize and structure a clientela which is constituted by three hundreds families who controlled the Senate:

“Each of these families has in the City a clientela of thousands of persons” (Brecht, 2006: 83).

Third, in the electoral process, there is at work an exchange of votes in return for promised benefits, and, when necessary, votes were simply bought en mass to win elections (Brecht, 2006: 78). Fourth, in constructing their own clientela politicians/patrons distribute ‘favors’ in return for monetary contribution: favors that involved assignment of official offices, and the distribution of benefits in the form of a ‘carefree handling’ of money raised almost to profligacy. Thus the clientelistic and patronage policy is for these politicians/patrons only a means to finance their debt and especially their lavish lifestyle. Five and finally, there is a territorial logic in the

---

2 The term clientelism originated from the Latin word clientela and it related to the power of Patricians, who “had large number of humble plebeian ‘clients’ (clientes): men bound to them by personal ties involving obligations on both sides which it was considered impious to disregard” (Ste. Croix, 1981: 334). According to Ste. Croix, the clientela and the clientes constituted “the origin and the nucleus” in both the ‘strict and technical sense’ of what he considered the “whole system of patronage.” Such a system had an “enduring importance in Roman history, from the earliest time to the Later Empire” (ibidem). It is noteworthy that Ste. Croix considers the system of clientela (and thus that of the patronage) as a “social institution” (341-343; 364-367; 372). Rouland offer a brief excursus on the philological ambiguities related with the origin of the term cliens and its derivates (1979: 19-22).

3 See the fundamental contribution of Ste. Croix on the inner political evolution of ancient Rome centered on the ‘suffragium’ and its powerful link to the exchange of votes as part of the patronage system (1954: 33-48).

4 In the Roman world, such profligacy was a norm. Its role is the classical locus of the research of Paul Veyne (1976). For a more recent analysis, see Lomas and Cornell (eds.) (2003).

5 See Garnsey and Saller on the function of the Roman emperor as patron, on the structure of patron-clients relationships and on the patronage system (1987: 149-159). For the specific role of the patronage system in the early empire, see Saller (2002). For a general overview regarding patronage in the ancient world, see Wallace-Hadrill (ed.) (1989).
administration, distribution and re-distribution of ‘favors.’ In brief, there is a distributive politic underpinning the political exchange between politicians/patrons and citizens/clients, which is in full evidence in the third book of the novel titled, *Classical administration of a province*, which deals with Caesar’s politics of favors targeting his new ‘provincial’ clientela. Such management relied on the financial support of the powerful business families of the City. They financed his governorship in exchange for secured profit coming in the form of favorable taxation returns from the local exploitation of the main business enterprise (e.g. iron and silver mines) making them even more rich.  

Caesar also received financial and political support (e.g. money and votes) from the local business elite, which he treated as ‘men of affairs’ (Brecht, 2006: 165). The territorial logic relies on the fact that by exchanging political support in return for favors, Caesar manages the relationships between the center (the City) and the periphery (the Province), and he can thus return triumphant to Rome and prepare his candidature to the Consulate. Such a candidature of course involves more exchange of favors, financial support and electoral manipulations.  

Brecht’s fictional novel tells that Julius Caesar’s politics *is a territorial one:* He must distribute ‘favors’ to his various geographical constituencies in exchange for political (and financial) support. It is from this exchange of electoral support in return for favors that his political power is ultimately determined, and it is through political

---

6 On the systematic role of clientelism in structuring the relationships between Roman emperors and the powerful local business elites, see respectively Deniaux (1993), Harmand (1957), and Rouland (1979).

7 The novel abruptly stops with the next political campaign of Caesar’s already under way: the last pages of the diary of Rarus are full of painstaking notes displaying a democratic list of ‘favors’ in need of delivery, of course being necessary to set the stage for Caesar’s electoral run for the Consulate. See, on the pathological and parasitical structure of this system of reciprocal favors, Damon (1997).
clientelism that such power is constructed. This research thus explores the idea that political representatives, their parties of reference and their networks of support develop and structure themselves through a set of exchange mechanisms centered upon the return of electoral votes for channeling flows of financial funds towards their geographical constituencies. Consequently, it is suggested that the nature of the clientelistic politics involved in this exchange process determines ultimately the relationships between the centers and the peripheries of political power and in turn helps to shape the structure of influence, electoral legitimacy, and political linkages in structuring and organizing territorial politics in sub-state political spaces. The logic of such an exchange process is a geographical one: namely, to construct forms of territorial cleavage across different political scales. By constructing forms of territorial cleavage, political clientelism produces the formation of political spaces where political representatives can allocate public funds for personal return (e.g. being re-elected) while at the same time creates the conditions for the construction of political forces which both shape and condition electoral behavior at different scales – e.g. the local, the regional and the national.

Before advancing this argument further, it is important to clarify that not all territorial politics is clientelistic in its nature, even though grasping the inner working logic of political clientelism helps shed some light on the complexity of territorial politics. Consequently, I argue that the analysis of territorial politics must be placed squarely in terms of the current debates about the relational turn in human geography. It is only by scrutinizing the ‘context’ of territorial politics and political clientelism, that the

---

8 The historical figure of Julius Caesar has been portrayed in its full complexity in two celebrated biographies: see respectively, Meier (1995) and Canfora (1999).
geographical project underlying the historical analysis of the various forms of territorial politics can be theoretically, empirically and historically grounded.

*Territorial politics in a relational framework*

By suggesting that the construction of territorial politics can be fruitfully grasped through the analysis of political clientelism, I am not arguing that all *territorial politics is clientelistic politics tout court*. Far from that. Rather, a central claim of this research is that territorial politics indeed takes many different forms in contemporary political spaces, and that political clientelism is just one of them. Indeed, the view exposed in this research aims at counterbalancing those types of analyses that reduce the inherent complexities of territorial politics into polarized dichotomies. Such is the case of the research carried by Robert Putnam and collaborators in their study of the Italian regions’ institutional performances in the early 1990s, which has had so much influence on subsequent research on regional politics. This study made a sharp distinction between regional polities that are programmatic (Northern regions) and others that are clientelistic (Southern regions). The main argument is:

“that political involvement in less civic regions is impelled and constrained by personalistic, patron-client networks, rather than by programmatic commitment on public issues” (Putnam, 1993: 99).

This claim says that regions in Southern Italy are inherently prone to clientelistic and particularistic relationships, whereas regions in Northern Italy are rich in civic life and characterized by programmatic and public goods-oriented politics. In the former, the use of personal preference votes underlies various personalized patronage politics; in the latter, civic politics led to promotion of the general interest and the public goods that
support a virtuous civic life. This dichotomous view about regional polities is structurally reductionist and simplifies the complexities underlying the social processes that shape the contours of territorial politics at different scales and in different places. In order to avoid such reductionism, I shall suggest that the social processes constituting territorial politics are not happening within separate regional or national “containers” as conventional political science and political sociology have tended to regard them. Rather, a more promising way to think about territorial politics is relationally. This is because the social processes that underpin territorial politics,

“are usually and perhaps increasingly in a globalizing world located in a series of extensive economic, political, and cultural networks with varying geographical scope” (Agnew, 2011: 24).

Thinking about territorial politics relationally means placing these social processes within the context of geographical concepts (e.g., region, territory, place, scale) that help reveal how the structural logic of socio-spatial relations works across space and time (Jessop et al., 2008).

From this perspective, the reductionism and reification of the social processes underpinning regional polities are avoided, giving voice to the complexities of territorial politics in the new order emerging from such an increasingly globalizing world. This relational perspective suggested by Ash Amin takes the following form:

“In this emerging new order, spatial configuration and spatial boundaries are no longer purposively territorial or scalar, since the social, economic and political inside and outside are constituted through the topologies of actor networks which are becoming increasingly dynamic and varied in spatial logic” (Amin, 2004: 33).

---

9 This brief discussion offer only a preliminary view; I shall return in more depth to discuss the relational approach to territorial politics in my Conclusions.
Furthermore, thinking about territorial politics relationally involves arguing about new spatial configurations and different forms of socio-spatial relationships that overcome the static view of territorial politics in much of the contemporary research about regional polities. It means understanding that the social processes underlying the construction of territorial politics are open, fluid, dynamic and linked through complex relationships to the major actors that create and re-create them over time and at different scales. *This view implies that territorial politics is itself relationally constructed.*

This is because the socio-spatial relationships that constitute territorial politics are themselves open, fluid, dynamic and territorially constructed through multiple political levels that involve both state and non-state actors, political representatives, administrative jurisdictions, local and central institutions, just to name a few. From this perspective, the logic of territorial politics is inherently a conflictual process, continually open to negotiation, embedded in power relationships and mapped out by political exchanges filtered between center and periphery. This conceptualization of territorial politics as relational supports what Doreen Massey (2011) has suggested in a recent statement about territories. She argues that:

> “Territories are constituted and are to be conceptualized, relationally. Thus, interdependence and identity, difference and connectedness, uneven development and the character of place, are in each pairing two sides of the same coin. They exist in constant tension with each other, each contributing to the formation, and the explanation, of the other” (Massey, 2011: 4).

Territorial politics thus ‘exists in constant tension,’ producing and being the product of conflict and power over the territorial allocation, distribution and redistribution of resources. This conflict involves many subjects and emerges from contentious relationships between collective and particularistic interests. A relational framework
helps us to think about these relationships in a geographical perspective, overcoming the limitation of a static view about the contemporary representation of interests in various regional polities. This also helps us to demolish a myth underpinning much research about territorial politics that paints a ‘democratic canvas’ by the analysis of much collective and particularistic interests, by positing a critical view of such a material basis to representation. From the relational perspective sketched here about territorial politics, contemporary (and past regional politics) are inherently biased towards the particularistic side and what varies is the degree to which such particular interests are structured, organized, promoted, and aggregated at different spatial scales and in different places by a network of political agents linked through parties and supported by administrative institutions spanning between the center and the periphery of political power.

In the context of democratic forms of representation structured around electoral competition, the multidimensional logic of territorial politics emerges as one of the most fruitful ways to deconstruct the logic of such representation. Indeed, as Kevin Morgan has subtly suggested, much of democratic political space is inevitably bounded. This occurs:

“Because politicians are held to account through the territorially defined ballot box, a prosaic but important reason why one should not be so dismissive of territorial politics” (Morgan, 2007: 1248).

How are politicians held to account through territorially bounded forms of electoral competition? How is such competition structured, organized and defined by political representatives? Which strategies are put to work to link the results of the ballot box with geographically constituted constituencies? Answering these questions involves putting territorial politics and political clientelism into a historical-geographical context.
**Context of territorial politics and political clientelism**

The structural logic that engineer current territorial politics is complicated and convoluted because the development of territorial politics and the functioning of political clientelism are strongly affected by their geographical context. In short, such structural logic does not operate in a vacuum: rather it works within distinct and contextual geographies. These geographies in turn became entrenched in what I call institutional spaces. Which institutional ensembles determine and shape the functions of sub-state territories? What historical and geographical mechanisms structure the relationships between governmental centers and their peripheries? How is territorial politics constituted? I propose to answer these questions by arguing that territorial politics encompasses a set of historical-geographic processes that are contingent across time and space.

Here I focus on one of the less studied forms in which territorial politics is geographically and historically constructed: namely, clientelistic politics. This research supports this idea by comparing the set of processes at work within two specific sub-state political spaces, namely that of California and of Southern Italy, that exemplify how territorial politics took radically different shapes in the last several decades. In the context of this goal, I will argue that these two sub-state political spaces represent clearly different models of how one of the peculiar forms of territorial politics, and the comparative analysis I offer will examine the ‘complex logic’ underpinning the

---

10 In the course of this research I will always use the term ‘sub-state’ instead of the most common ‘sub-national,’ following the indication of recent comparative politics as defined by Caciagli (2003/2006 2nd ed.): 18). By sub-state, I conceive territorial units with different degree and level of political functioning and political representation compared to the central state. These units are crucial to the understanding of the mechanism and logic underpinning territorial politics and especially political clientelism, without being trap into the nation-state framework; see, Agnew (1994), Agnew and Corbridge (1995), and the Roundtable on “The territorial trap fifteen years on” in Geopolitics (2010: 752-784). I return to this question in Chapter 4.
construction of contemporary territorial politics. By comparing two different contexts and their underlying historical-geographical processes, I aim to demonstrate three main features of contemporary territorial politics: First, how new sub-political spaces are fabricated through forms of distributive politics, with political clientelism as one of its main territorial engines and one of its most powerful institutional drivers. Second that this process of construction in turn works in order to reproduce local political constituencies and their political representatives. Finally, that this reproduction serves to structure their relations with the center of political power and thus support their re-election, their conquest of political consent and of legitimacy as well. I claim that it is only by inquiring into the historical-geographical process that the territorial logic of political clientelism reveals all its complexity. In order to reveal such complexity, I shall advance my inquiry on three interrelated levels. First, I will dissect the logic of how territorial politics is constructed; second, I will disentangle how such logic then shapes the relationships between the center and the periphery of power; and, finally, I will demonstrate how these relationships then filter across geographical sub-units of the state by a set of institutional ensembles and mechanisms.

This approach will advance an understanding of how territorial politics took its shape in the past few decades in two different sub-state political spaces, suggesting that such an understanding will impact contemporary research on territorial politics (and political geography at large) on three fronts. Theoretically, it will point to the structural logic underpinning the set of processes fabricating contemporary territorial politics. Methodologically, it will offer a macro-analytical comparative perspective to tackle the historical-geographic mechanisms that shape sub-state political spaces. Finally,
empirically, it will present a selective set of data that may show how constructing this
type of macro-analytical perspective can highlight the process and logic on how territorial
politics works across time and space. The following section will summarize this
perspective.

A macro-analytical approach

As discussed above, I claim that the nature of clientelistic politics has a
geographical component, which rarely has been the focus of much of the past and of the
current literature as well. At the same time, there has been and there is a tendency to
focus on cross-country regression analysis, single-nation or local studies. Of course, we
can learn a great deal about political clientelism from national and local-level analyses or
cross-country comparisons; yet such analyses cannot capture important sources of
variation within countries. In this research, I attempt to move away from these
perspectives and instead focus on those variations concerned with sub-units, which can
be captured through the lens of macro-territorial components – e.g. a set of territorial

---

11 The scholarly literature on clientelism and patronage is immense, spanning all social science disciplines
and covering several decades of research in all geographical latitudes. My reading has been thus highly
selective. In navigating the sea of the clientelism literature I have found the extensive reviews by Scott
Roniger (eds.) (1984), Gellner, E. and J. Waterbury (eds.) (1977) and Schmidt, et al. (eds.) (1977) all
contain extended reference to the literature covering the socio-anthropological approach to clientelism as
the dominant paradigm from the 1950s to about the 1970s. For more recent references see, Roniger and
Güneş-Ayata (1990), the Bibliographie Indicative in Briquet and Sawicky (eds.) (1998), pp. 317-325; the
vast bibliographies contained in Piattoni (2001; 2005 and 2007), and in Kitschelt and Wilkinson, (eds.)
(2007). Finally, both Stokes (2007) and Hicken (2011) presents a compendium of the most recent research
in political science. Caciagli (2009) is a wonderful small guide to political clientelism themes and to its
various strands in the literature, while Briquet (2009) offers a critical review of much of the research
focused on covering the “Italian case.”

12 See respectively the collection of essays in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds.) (2007) as representative of the
first approach. Single-nation analyses are the focus of the various studies presented in Briquet and Sawicky
(eds.) (1998), and in Piattoni (2001). Furthermore, see Kettering (1986; 1988) for the case of France;
Hopkin (2001) for the case of Spain; Martz (1997) for the case of Colombia, and Nam (1995) for the case
of South Korea, Birch (1997) for the case of Ukraine. Allum (1973b; 2001; 2003) for the case of Naples,
Caciagli et al. (1977), and Caciagli and Belloni (1981) and Belloni, F. Caciagli, M. and L. Mattina (1979)
for the case of Catania, and Mühlmann and Llaroya (1982) for the case of Sicily are some of the classical
works in the local studies tradition.
contiguous regions and set of territorial contiguous counties. In order to capture these within variations of political clientelism, this research develops what may be called a comparative macro-analytical framework. Such a framework was sketched long time ago by the Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan (Ceri, 1990; Mjøset, 2000). Stein Rokkan indeed, was (and probably still is) one of the few social and political scientists who took very seriously the role of territorial sub-units as macro-comparative metric and macro-unit of analysis, refusing to take the state as the only container of political processes.\textsuperscript{13} In my research, I will develop my own comparative exercise taking a Rokkanian macro-analytic perspective as point of departure. I will then apply it to the development of macro-territorial sub-units as a structural lens to examine variations of political clientelism across macro-political and macro-institutional spaces. In following Rokkan’s methodological, theoretical and empirical incipit, I aim to demonstrate how the form and content of political clientelism has a territorial dimension that has not been addressed in most perspectives on clientelistic politics. Setting the stage for his magnum opus, Citizens, elections, parties: Approaches to the comparative study of the processes of development, Rokkan, wrote:

“Conceptually and empirically much more taxing, but of great potential value in the development of systematic macro-theory is the strategy of paired comparison […]. Such confrontation of pairs of contrasting cases […] may not only offer opportunities for a deepening of insights into the dynamics of each system, but also offer springboard for further model building across a broader range of case” (2009: 52).

\textsuperscript{13} See respectively Rokkan and Urwin (eds.) (1981; 1983); Rokkan, Urwin, Aerebrot, Malaba and Sande (1987) and Rokkan (1996). In Chapter 3, I deal in depth with the construction of such macro-analytical perspective for the study of political clientelism in specific, and of political geography at large.
In this research, I will utilize this strategy of paired comparison centered on two sub-state political spaces in order to sketch the contours of a systematic macro-theory and advance a modest ‘springboard’ proposal for further model building in territorial politics across a large range of its possible subjects. This assumption ultimately resulted in the construction of the macro-comparative framework of the study, and it determined the choice of cases. Below, I briefly sketch the main reasons that these two contrasting cases can advance the development of such a macro-theory of territorial politics. Italy and its Southern corner especially, is generally considered a clientelistic (and degenerating into a quite corrupt) political system - i.e. a political system in which clientelistic politics loom deeply and large.

The conventional explanations point to structural and cultural factors, whether they apply solely to the Italian South (considered as the hotbed of clientelism and the cradle of Mafia-related crime-prone forms of clientelistic politics) or to the entire country (supposedly “infected” from the South or enfeebled by its own distinctive pathogens). All these factors, in one or in combination to each other, appear in the long and never-ending debate on the so-called “Southern Question” (see Table 1 for a summary of these explanations). They emerge in this debate in order to explain why Southern Italian politics involve high degrees of political pathologies that directly and indirectly foster a social, political and institutional development that is clientelistic-prone.

---

14 The methodological foundation of focused-paired comparison is laid out by Tarrow (2010).
15 White (1980) and Chubb (1982) are examples of comparative research for Southern Italy, focusing both on paired and structured analysis: namely, that of two cities and that of two communes respectively. Shefter (1977; 1994) compare patronage and party structures across England, Germany, Italy, France and the United States; Piattoni (1996; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c and 1999) focus on a paired extensive comparison of Abruzzi and Puglia, and then she extends such approach to all the Southern political space. All these works have been important methodological references for building my macro-analytical approach to political clientelism. I sketch the methodological contours of my own macro-analytical perspective in Chapter 3.
Table 1: Some of the main explanations of Southern Italy clientelism-prone development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main cause</th>
<th>Author/Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic marginality</td>
<td>Palloni (1979); Lo Curto (1978); Daniele (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perverse effect of state redistributive policies</td>
<td>Trigilia (1992); La Spina (2003); Cannari, Magnani and Pellegrini (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-regarding values (e.g. ‘amoral familism’)</td>
<td>Banfield (1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>Arlacchi (1983); Catanzaro (1991); Centorrino and Signorino (1997); Gambetta (1992); La Spina (Ed.) (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of civic culture</td>
<td>Putnam (1993)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political implication of this literature is that given the immutability of many of these factors, little follows in terms of progress and emancipation from clientelism (and of course much less from entrenched corruption). Consequently, the debates surrounding the “Southern Question” abandoned the issues of the structural economic underdevelopment of the Southern regions, into a discussion centered very much on the tendency of Southern Italy to be a political space where pathologies of all sorts and nothing else are the rule of the game.\(^{16}\) It is one of the merits of Simona Piattoni to have turned around this tendency with her provocative claim about the possibilities of a ‘virtuous clientelism’ path within Southern Italy (1998a; 1998b). As her comparative research demonstrates at length, political clientelism is anything but immutable: its structure and development is plastic and fluid, it tends to adapt and more importantly, it changes over time. Otherwise, political clientelism would not be able to embed itself in such a variety of regions, political systems and cultural landscapes (see Table 3). Without an understanding of its variability and its tendency to adapt to different institutional structures, all the

\(^{16}\) Agodi (2003) reviews much of the discussion about the so-called Mezzogiorno covering several strands of the debate. Bevilacqua (1993/2005) is now a classic in the historiography of Southern Italy. Dickie (1999), Lumley and Morris (Eds.) (1997) and Schneider (ed.) (1998) offers different interpretations of the so-called ‘Southern Question.’ I shall return to the relationship between the “Southern Question” and the geographical-historical construction of political clientelism in Part II of my research.
consequences emanating from political clientelism remain obscure at best. Therefore, by introducing the variable of territorial variation within a macro-analytical perspective, I shall be able not just to highlight the geographical basis of political clientelism, but perhaps more importantly, to disentangle its own deeper macro-mechanisms, which, I contend, are both institutional and territorial.

In the last few decades, the political science literature has begun to take political institutions very seriously and to investigate factors which are more pliable through human action. In particular, a variant of this literature, known as historical institutionalism is important for the present research into the nature of political clientelism. In brief, the agenda of historical institutionalism is to analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examine just one institution or process at a time.\(^\text{17}\) Accordingly, increasing attention has been paid to the political system and those formal and informal rules which govern the selection of candidates, the running of electoral campaigns, the internal organization of parties, the workings of the Parliament, the formation of coalitions and so on, and the incentives that they create for mobilizing the vote through clientelistic appeals. Such an institutional turn in political and social science has been translated into a recent attempt to study the deep determinant of clientelism in Southern Italy (Fantozzi, 1993; Piattoni, 2005 and 2007) and in the European context at large as well (Piattoni, ed., 2001).

In my research, I aim to build upon this approach by foregrounding the role of territory in structuring the logic and mechanism of political clientelism. I argue that by

\(^{17}\) On the development of historical institutionalism, see the overall review of recent work in this tradition by Thelen (1999). The new agenda of comparative historical analysis appears in its full complexity in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (eds., 2003). Both traditions of research constituted a constant point of reference for my approach, from both a methodological and from a theoretical perspective as well.
injecting a territorial perspective in the study of clientelism, we can appreciate how the geographical logic of clientelistic politics highlights a less pathological understanding of Italian Southern politics when we compare it to an extremely different model. Indeed, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, political clientelism has its own *contextual variations* within the institutional structure of one of the most advanced democracies of contemporary world politics, that of the United States and specifically on of its more important states, California. In building a macro-comparative typology of political clientelism, which reflects extreme contextual variations, one of my purposes is to contribute to the understanding of one of the deeper mechanisms fabricating territorial politics in the contemporary political landscape. As already suggested, the role that clientelistic politics plays out in the political landscape of the United States has been understood quite differently.

Clientelistic politics is not viewed as central to the United States political system compared to that in Italy and its various Southern corners. Indeed, political scientists tend to compare the supposed well-functioning of one democracy with the fragile, fragmented and pathological mechanism of the other. But such an approach is limited, and one of my goals is to critically explore how territorial politics centered upon political clientelism might enable us to uncover the ‘pathologies’ of both systems, and perhaps of others. Accordingly, I will try to demonstrate how political clientelism relies on an institutional structure that produces less than gratifying outcomes to a well and oiled representative

---

18 See for instance Allum (1973a), Bull and Newell (2005; 2009), Newell (2010), Di Palma (1977), Donovan (2003) and Hine (1993). Both La Palombara (1987) and Sabetti (2000) offer a contrarian view to such misplacing translation, attempting to situate the Italian democracy within a more accurate institutional space compared to other political systems, supposedly considered superior and thus representing the model to follow. In a recent review, Mastropaolo (2009) has correctly catechized much of the American research about the Italian political Southern system over the last 30 years.
and presidential democracy. Thus in order to accomplish this paired comparison, I will focus on the social, political and institutional mechanisms that in the United States political landscape can be fruitfully compared to the Italian one. Once I compare this set of institutional mechanisms, I can then claim that there is a type of political clientelism one might refer to as *Made in California*, as well another referred to as *Made in Southern Italy*. In explaining their radical differences, a macro-comparative analysis can teach us something significant in relation to how territorial politics works in a large-scale system of governance.

When I focus on the California case, it is notable that since the mid-1970s, many observers have debated about the conditions causing the frequent waves of ‘political and financial’ crises looming in California. But in contrast to the ‘Southern Question’ the discussion about the rising ‘California Question’ has not involved any reference to the role of political clientelism. As in the case of Southern Italy, in the California case, the territorial dimension of politics is completely absent, and consequently the geographical basis of political clientelism has never been investigated. It is exactly by introducing the variable of territorial variation within a macro-analytical perspective, that I shall be able to disentangle the deeper mechanisms underpinning the “California question” (see Table 2 for a summary of the main factors cited in debating it). Why has political clientelism rarely figured in the explanatory framework to understand American state and sub-state politics? The reason, I would argue, is that scholars (with few notable exclusions as we shall see) of different schools of thought over time have eradicated the study of ‘political patronage’ and ‘machine politics’ from the terrain of political and institutional analysis.19

---

19 See for instance Bearfield (2009), who complained about the fact that the concept of patronage has received scanty attention in the field of public administration. Wolfinger already in the early 1970s was
This outcome has thus obscured the role of clientelism in shaping the contours of American state politics, to which, as I shall argue, the political crisis-prone development of California represents an interesting typology in the contemporary construction of new forms of territorial politics. Comparative analysis will begin with the well-known historical argument that the state of California as a whole has rarely being entrenched with any form of explicit political clientelism. While patronage and machine politics were historically grounded within the United States institutional structure from the early logic of the American political parties, their role has been located mainly in the northeastern states and their large cities. In fact, historical accounts of political development in the western states and in the case of California especially, have all noted their absence. This difference set up an interesting paired comparative analysis. My argument is that the functioning of patronage in California has not been absent: rather it has assumed less visible forms than its northeastern counterpart. Once patronage is revealed and its presumed absence put in the context of the particular political development of California, then we can see its less visible forms as an analogical criticizing the political science literature for assuming, erroneously, that patronage and machine politics were withering away (1972). They both simply changed their forms and their functioning.

### Table 2: Main explanations of California political crisis-prone development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main cause</th>
<th>Author/Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of the California state</td>
<td>Schrag (1998; 2006); Korey (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal effect of state policies</td>
<td>Lustig (Ed.) (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive demographic growth</td>
<td>Douzet, Kousser and Miller (Eds.) (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget constrains</td>
<td>Mathews and Paul (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 13</td>
<td>Cain and Noll (2010); Kogan and McCubbins (2008; 2009); McCubbins and McCubbins (2010); Citrin (2009); Martin (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
component of the peculiar political clientelism that developed across the Atlantic. I can thus construct a quasi-experimental test, based on the fact that one crucial variable (e.g. patronage politics) is present in a completely different form in one of our cases during its crucial early political development. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to demonstrate that political clientelism in Southern Italy can be compared to the different form of patronage politics in the early political development of California. In order to make this claim, I will argue that the Italian and the American cases have a structural similarity and functional parallelism despite their seeming differences.

Support for my claim derives from Sidney Tarrow’s pioneering study - originally published in 1967 - of the role of clientelism in Southern Italy. In discussing the role of the Democratic Christian party in determining the structure of power in Southern Italy, Tarrow wrote:

“The parallel is instructive: the passage of the DC in the Mezzogiorno from clientelism of the notable to clientelism of bureaucracy, and the change from vertical to horizontal clienteles, essentially follows the evolution of the party machine in America” (1967: 341).

Once I examine the peculiar ways in which the party machine was initially absent from the California landscape, I can then develop the structural and functional analogy between the ways in which Southern Italy clientelism and the particular California form of patronage and machine politics were entrenched within their own respective institutional structures over time. Following this approach, I can then look more clearly at the territorial dimension of political clientelism, focusing on the institutionally different macro-political space constituted over time in California and fruitfully compare it to that of Southern Italy. Sidney Tarrow stressed the similarities between the evolution of the party machine in America and Southern Italy form of clientelism. However, Martin
Shefter in order to study the relationship between party and patronage in Germany, England and Italy traced another interesting parallel:

“The American party system provides many parallel cases, and the factional struggle within the Christian Democratic party resemble in substance and outcome nothing so much as the conflict between regular and reform factions within the Democratic parties of Illinois or New York” (1994: 56).

This parallelism can take a geographical turn and transferred regionally to California, where the conflict was not between different factions, but between different electoral bases because of the ‘issue-oriented style of politics’ that is entrenched in state territorial politics. This is a style of politics that produces an individualistic-oriented form of patronage, and a form of machine politics that is not based on a party structure but relies on the financial support of a small circle of interest groups, pressure groups and lobbying, and so forth. Similarly, following the historical parallels traced by Tarrow and Shefter, Simona Piattoni (and other comparative-oriented political scientists) discussed the political significance and structural extension of clientelism in different social, political and institutional settings, arguing that the overall political development of Italy and the United States had indeed a parallel evolution. As she suggested:

“In both political systems the clientelistic exchange has been one of the principal modality of collecting votes, in the periphery and in the center as well, caused by the weak structuration of political parties (basically coalition of local groups of power) and by the limited autonomy of the public administration from the circuit of politics” (2007: 73).

As she suggests, it is thus possible to construct a fruitful comparison between the two countries, based on the role that the clientelistic exchange has played out in both political systems as a peculiar mode of raising votes. As in the case of the analogy sketched by

---

Tarrow and then by Shefter, the parallel traced by Piattoni indicates an interesting and unexplored avenue of analysis. Building on these previous parallels, the main feature of this research is to study the processes underlying current territorial politics in Italy and the United States; but rather than focusing on the State as the container of political processes, I center my analysis on sub-state political spaces. It does so by investigating the *geographical basis of political clientelism in two structurally different sub-political spaces*. In tracing a macro-analytical perspective centered on two different models of how territorial politics is currently at work in the contemporary political sub-state spaces, I shall provide an alternate paradigm to the study of political processes and their geography. This alternate paradigm is built on a macro-analytical perspective that stresses the role of political clientelism as one of the contextual forms in which territorial politics is historically and geographically constructed. The territorial and the spatial matrix in which contextual political processes are entrenched represents one of the many forms in which we see territorial politics working across space and time. 21 This approach relies on a specific methodology, which will be addressed in the next section.

*Research design and methods of analysis*

The study relies on a quasi-experimental design structured around a strategy of paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010). This design strategy aims to answer three underlying hypotheses about how the territorial logic and functioning of political clientelism is one of the forms in which territorial politics is constructed across space and time. In order to explore the idea that political clientelism has a geographical logic, I construct my thesis in terms of a quasi-causal chain argument organized in three interlinked empirical steps.

21 This analysis follow the work of Nicos Poulantzas (1978/2000: 99-107) on the territorial aspect of political process as representing one of the most important institutional materiality of the state.
The first step is that the allocation and flow of financial funds related to general public spending and infrastructural spending is channeled by political clientelism; the second step is that variations in the distribution of general public spending and infrastructural spending govern electoral outcomes – e.g. exchange of votes in return for allocation of resources (favors). Finally, the third step is that these different electoral outcomes produce a territorially uneven political development – e.g. different forms of fabricating territorial politics. The first two hypotheses are tested using comparative quantitative data, the third comparing qualitative data. Specifically, the first two hypotheses are tested comparing the territorial and institutional allocation of public and infrastructural spending over time. The temporal variations in the territorial distribution of public and infrastructural spending demonstrates that the decreasing expenditures in Southern Italy led to an increase in preference voting (e.g. votes of exchange), whereas the increasing availability of state and federal resources increased incumbent advantage (through massive increased in the amount of money necessary to support skyrocketing financial campaign to get elected) and increased the role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California (by channeling financial support to Assembly and Senate candidates). The third hypothesis is tested through a focused comparative narrative fashioned in terms of a historical-geography analysis of political clientelism and its multiple geographies based on a set of structural and institutional changes occurring in the two sub-state political spaces over time - from the 1860s to the 1990s.

The research follows a macro-analytic approach as it is found in the research tradition of Stein Rokkan and Max Weber, as well as how it emerged in contemporary historical institutionalism. In order to develop such an approach, I will construct a set of
territorially based aggregate data (used to test the first two hypotheses) that then can be historicized and thus linked to the comparative narrative of institutional changes (developed to test the third part of the hypothesis). This methodological procedure will demonstrate that different forms of political clientelism construct contemporary territorial politics, of which California and Southern Italy are two contemporary but extreme different ideal-types. This research, in short, attempts to demonstrate how territorial politics works in a macro-analytical comparative perspective using the contrasting cases of clientelistic political development in Southern Italy and in California as examples of two ideal-types by which territorial politics tend to operate.

Coda

As suggested by the Max Weber quote at the beginning of this Introduction, democracy seems not to have many choices, and I would add that both choices, regardless of the mechanisms by which they are eventually put at work, involve some version of political clientelism. A survey of the current development in contemporary territorial politics across different regions of the world suggests that democracy is a very expensive enterprise and that professional politicians have found in political clientelism their most powerful engineering tool. Rather than disappearing as a primitive form of organizing consent and building legitimacy characteristic of economically and politically backward regions, political clientelism has emerged as a viable and effective system. The overall purpose of this research is to demonstrate how such a tool has constructed, in two vast and different sub-state political spaces of the contemporary polity, new forms of territorial politics, whose existence and foundation may have something crucial to say about what democracy has become and perhaps where it is going. In order to do that, I
attempt to recast the *geography* that in much of the debate about the contours of territorial politics has been omitted from the analysis.
Outline of Chapters

Following the introductory chapter, the dissertation has nine chapters, which correspond roughly to the three-partite (e.g. theoretical, historical/institutional and empirical) components of my research. Accordingly, part one offers in three chapters the theoretical and methodological framework underpinning the overall dissertation. Chapter 1 lays out the conceptualization of political clientelism from a geographical perspective, maintaining the idea that this particularistic form of exchange has a territorial logic. It offers a critical evaluation of different perspectives in the political literature over the nature of clientelism, and it suggests how a territorial approach may enrich our understanding of the logic and functioning of clientelistic politics. The concept of territorial politics is at the center of critical examination and re-evaluation in Chapter 2. Based on this reinterpretation, the chapter then links this concept to that of political clientelism by developing a typological classification of territorial politics structured around the exchange of particularistic resources and blocs of votes. This typology is in turn applied in order to capture the institutional contexts of my macro-comparative analysis: namely, Southern Italy and California. The analysis of this context points out the radically different forms in which territorial politics is entrenched in these two sub-state political spaces, according to the relationships between institutional models and pattern of change determined by their decentralized reforms, the structure of incentive underpinning politicians’ strategies and the distributive outcomes emerging from them. Finally, Chapter 3 concludes part one, by presenting the contours of the macro-analytical perspective that underpins the overall comparative analysis. The main thrust of this methodological chapter is centered on the presentation of the three epistemological
yardsticks that support this research: namely, sub-state space as the unit of analysis, encompassing comparisons as the main research strategy and the ideal-types as the theoretical tools that flesh out my approach in developing a critical approach to territorial politics in general and to distributive and clientelistic politics in particular.

Part two, which is also structured in three chapters, presents the historical-institutional contexts for Southern Italy and California sub-state spaces in a focused comparative perspective. Chapter 4 offers a stylized historical survey of the political history of the two sub-state spaces, focusing on their respective political development path from the 1860s to the 1990s. The analysis traces out the major turning points and shifts from one historical period to another, and then highlights the role of political parties and their major representatives figure in shaping the contours of such political history. The chapter is an exercise in what may be labeled macro-structural history. Chapter 5 then addresses their institutional structures in order to grasp the historical and institutional environment where clientelism politics takes its deep shapes and ever-changing forms. The analysis focuses specifically on those administrative and institutional changes that in both sub-state spaces contributed to the transformation of their political structures. Specifically, it highlights the different set of conditions that favored or constrained political representatives in seeking enactment of particularistic forms of representation in exchange for electoral benefits: in short, the chapter’s main point is to establish how their respective institutional paths led to contrasting forms of clientelistic politics. Finally, Chapter 6 unites the historical and institutional materials assembled in the previous two chapters and recapitulates the main thrust of the analysis in a more formal way. The central argument revolves around the idea of ‘clientelistic
politics regimes,’ which is an attempt at providing a structural schema or template by which to consider the dominant forms that particularistic-oriented political exchange took their form and content historically in both sub-state political spaces. The analysis suggests that such form and content have their own specific logic, a logic that was contingent on a set of given historical conditions peculiar to Southern Italy and California respectively.

The three chapters forming part three then focuses on the empirical analysis, comparing how the two sub-state political spaces developed the exchange mechanism that led to political clientelism in the context of a dynamics centers-peripheries. The main thrust of the analysis is to give empirical substance to the main hypotheses of this dissertation and it does so by a comparison of three indices of the pattern of distributive politics that underpin contrasting forms of political clientelism. Accordingly, Chapter 7 studies the territorial and institutional allocation of public spending from 1960 to 1990, while Chapter 8 does the same for infrastructural spending, and finally Chapter 9 compares the trend in political exchange, measured respectively by the increase in preference voting in Southern Italy, and the circuit that links increase spending for financial campaign by candidates, extension of their financially-driven incumbent advantage and corresponding increase of lobbying expenditures to target candidates who, once in power, will return ‘favors’ in the state legislature. The empirical analysis attempt to demonstrate how the decreasing trends in public and infrastructural expenditures in Southern Italy led to an increase in votes of exchange; in contrast, in the state of California, the increasing trends of state and federal resources results first in the exponential increase of resources available to candidates to be distributed to their
constituencies and secondly, to an increase in the dependency on lobbying and special-interests politics, who are the only political groups who could provide financial support to the Assembly and Senate candidates in a context where financing electoral campaigns and running for offices has become extremely expensive since the mid-1970s.

The concluding chapter brings together all the main findings and articulates a new agenda of research for the analysis of the various aspects of territorial politics. The key argument is that territorial politics is about, ‘Who gets What, When, How and more importantly Where.’ As such, territorial politics has a complex historical pattern that needs to be reconstructed from a practical standpoint, with an emphasis on its junctures, turning points and changes seen through the lens of their concrete and detailed effects and outcomes over specific territories. This involves thinking about territory analytically, building a macro-analytical approach, and forging different methodological yardsticks that work across space and time in a comparative fashion. The research agenda had to be executed from a historical and geographical perspective and based on a relational approach. It thus attempts to intervene critically in contemporary political geography, situating it within debates about ‘new regionalism,’ the ‘resurgence of territory,’ and ‘place and politics.’
1. The territorial logic of political clientelism

Dans le monde cloisonné de la géographie, l’unité politique, c’est le territoire.

Jean Gottmann

We capture more of what the member has in mind when conjuring up “my district,” however, if we think of it as the geographical constituency.

Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

Many political systems - in the politically ‘developed’ as well as ‘not-yet-politically-developed’ world - have tendencies toward entrenched political clientelism (see Table 3). Political clientelism, broadly considered as the exchange of votes for selective material benefits, can assume various forms. For the present purpose, I conceptualize political clientelism as one of the modes of political mobilization and political representation having a demand and supply side (Piattoni, 2005: 62-69). That said, the latter is the focus of my analysis. Following this specification, I posit that political clientelism is a form of managing power and organizing consent by distributing favors in exchange for political support. This political support takes expression mainly in the form of electoral mobilization: that is, in terms of votes. Votes are thus the crucial measure of this form of particularistic exchange that in this research I identify with political clientelism. Even though votes are not the only object of exchange in political clientelism, I shall focus principally on them because the structure of voting and its patterns immediately qualify for an understanding of that territorial dimension that much of the research on clientelism tend to leave out from the analysis. In what follows, I will argue that what I call the territorial dimension of clientelism (and its main components) plays a crucial role towards an understanding of its logic and process.

22 Such a panoramic view about the geographical extension of this phenomenon around different regions of the world, suggest that political clientelism tend to be present in all political systems while at the same time seems to be able to adapt to any particular institutional context.
Table 3: Sample of political clientelism studies by world regions and countries\textsuperscript{23}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Lyrintzis, 1984; Mavrogordatos, 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Birch, 1997; D’Anieri, 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Hopkin, 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Farello Lopes, 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Goldston, 1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Meyer-Sahling, 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Mueller, 1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Szczepskiak, 2006; Gwiazda, 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Willerton, 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Allum, 1973b; Caciagli et al, 1977; Graziano, 1980; White, 1980; Piattoni, 1996; Zinn, 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Kettering, 1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Fatton, 1986; Beck, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Wantchekon, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Liddell, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Mason, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Remmer, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Fox, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Martz, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Cheng, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Wang and Kurzman, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Nam, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Chandra, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Mushkat, 1971; Myers, 1971; Bridges, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Gosnell, 1977; Guterbock, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>Stone, 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>McCaffery, 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the United States, studies focused mainly at the scale of cities.

One of the goals of my research is thus not only to redress this shortcoming in the literature, but to advance a new geographical framework capable of capturing the territorial complexity of political clientelism. In this chapter, I thus study political

\textsuperscript{23} In addition to those cited in Table 3, several other studies focus on the complex relationships between clientelism and party politics. See Hopkin (2006), Katz and Mair (1995) and Warner (1997). Comparative analyses of the French and Italian Christian Democratic parties in Warner (1998), of party and patronage in Germany, England and Italy in Shefter (1977), and the macro-analysis of party clientelism in southern Europe found in the research by Papadopoulos (1997) offered insights for my own-paired cases. Furthermore, the partisan determinants of patronage in Latin America studied by Gordin (2002) offered an interesting historical reconstruction and so a model of the long-term trajectory of political clientelism. Finally, studies of party patronage in American politics found in the research of Sorauf (1959), Gump (1971), Johnston (1979), and Scott (2006) functioned as a meter of comparison for my own model.
clientelism from a geographical perspective. A central claim in what follows, is that political clientelism has a territorial logic. I argue that political representatives think and operate through a territorial lens and it is through such a lens that they enter into structural relationships with their constituencies. By developing and structuring these relationships, political representatives tend to construct a set of exchange mechanisms centered upon the return of electoral votes for channeling flows of financial funds towards what they perceive as their geographical constituencies. Furthermore, their parties of reference and their network of support, assume a geographical form in terms of a symbiotic relationship with the political personnel that represent them in the places of power. This exchange process between votes and benefits tends to assume a particularistic form over time. This form in turn determines the character of the clientelistic politics involved in such exchange. In order to understand the mechanisms that underpin the character of clientelism politics, I shall scrutinize more generally how the territorial dimension of such politics structure the relationships between the center and the periphery of political power.

I proceed in the following order. First, I shall address briefly the role of territory in shaping center-periphery relationships; I will argue that its role is crucial to understanding the territorial dimension of political clientelism. Then I will present an analysis of different territorial forms of political clientelism by a critical evaluation of the literature that deals with the concepts of ‘patronage,’ ‘machine politics,’ ‘personal vote’ and ‘constituency service.’ I will then argue that I can characterize political representatives as clientelistic/territorial-seekers, which modus operandi attempt to influence and shape those political linkages that are crucial in structuring and fabricating
territorial politics in sub-state political spaces. Finally, I will put together these lines of inquiry by presenting two ideal-types of political clientelism that underlie my research, two ideal-types that combine the macro-territorial units of analysis (e.g. the two sub-political spaces) with a typology of their clientelistic politics. These ideal-types will highlights the main differences between the Southern Italy and California forms of territorial politics.

*Center-periphery relationships*

By comparing two territorial sub-units, I aim to uncover the logic of territorial politics underpinning two different political systems, which differences, I shall argue, are the outcomes of different forms of political clientelism. My assumption here is that political clientelism is a territorial strategy of linking the center of political power to its periphery. Such an approach to clientelism has been addressed in the work of political scientist Sydney Tarrow, who in a series of publications in the 1970s, attempted to elucidate the functioning of territorial politics from a comparative perspective (Tarrow, 1967; 1977; (Ed.), 1978). In comparing France and Italy, Tarrow argued that the relationships between center and periphery in the two countries assumed their forms through the linkages between the elite ideology of administration, the construction of coalitional strategies and the assembling of the appropriate institutional bounding to govern these relationships. Based on his comparative analysis, Tarrow demonstrates that the French were following a *dirigiste*, where in contrast Italy developed a clientelistic form of political integration. Accordingly, in his reconstruction of the different logic of territorial politics at work in France and Italy, Tarrow assigned an important role to clientelism. In his analysis, he suggested that in developing its form of political
integration between the periphery and the center, the local elite in Italy will actively participate in the construction of a clientelistic system. In this process, the local leaderships will function mainly by structuring a set of brokerage-oriented strategies.

Tarrow’s portrait of local politician in Italy is as follows:

“In a clientelist system, he is more likely to become a political entrepreneur, seeking benefits through the bureaucracy, the party system, and personal contacts in the capital” (Tarrow, 1977: 45).

In Tarrow’s center-periphery approach, political clientelism thus plays a crucial role in structuring these linkages. I shall suggest that in seeking benefits, local politicians operate through a territorial lens, and that the territory constituted their fundamental political resource; it is through the territory that these linkages became operative. I shall thus argue that the logic underpinning these linkages has a geographic component: namely, that of the territory. In fact, it is through the territory that the model of clientelistic integration highlighted by Tarrow allows the linkage between center and periphery. If the set of mechanisms underpinning political clientelism develop around the goal of developing strong ties between the center and the periphery of political and institutional power, then I shall assign to the territory a strong role in structuring these mechanisms. What might these mechanisms be? These mechanisms are nothing but political processes embedded both historically and institutionally onto territories. How then does territory emerge as a central tenant of this assumption? I shall support it by following the conceptualization of territory as developed in the work of French geographer Jean Gottmann, who suggested that:

---

24 The origin of the center-periphery framework to study clientelism is in Graziano (1973; 1976 and 1978), which research anticipate and it is close to that of Tarrow in spirit.
“Territory is a political as well as a geographical concept because geographical space is both partitioned and organized through political processes. A political theory that ignores the characteristics and differentiation of geographical space operates in a vacuum” (Gottmann, 1975: 31).

Clientelist politics, I shall posit (and following Gottmann), is fundamentally a set of political processes that organize and partition geographical space. The territorial dimension of political clientelism is nothing but that process of differentiation of geographical space that any theory of clientelism cannot avoid confronting. If this territorial dimension of political clientelism disappears from the analysis, there is the risk of conceiving it as operating into an empty political space. Indeed, political clientelism does not operate in such a vacuum, and I argue that its main logic is a territorial one.

Such logic is territorial because political clientelism operated through a set of principles all structured around the allocation of resources over geographical constituencies.

Accordingly, by underling the territorial dimension of political clientelism, I aim to uncover how its deep determinant tend to structure mainly as a set of historical-geographical processes. It is only by tracing its foundation in such historical-geographic processes that I shall understand how territorial politics takes its own peculiar form in two different macro-political spaces. In this way, I shall appreciate how clientelist politics has functioned in both macro-political spaces as a strategy to structuring the ties between the center and the periphery of political power. In turn, this strategy, which is a geographical one, has structured the functioning of territorial politics in the two sub-state spaces that are the center of the present research – e.g. California and Southern Italy. The

---

25 Following the work of Gottman (1973, 1975 and 1980), I posit that political clientelism can be thought as a very important aspect of the process that the French geographer identify with the spatial variation of politics. In our case, the variation has to do principally with territorial politics.
center-periphery approach thus embraces an idea of political clientelism as a form of territorial strategy that dynamically links the actions of political representatives in structural relationship with that of their constituencies. This suggests that the center-periphery model underpinning political clientelism is a form of organizing and partitioning space. I thus argue that political clientelism is one of the most important features influencing variations in territorial politics. This assumption found is support in the analysis of Gottmann, who argued that:

“In the spatial domain the political process consist of frequent shifts in the centre-periphery relationships” (Gottmann, 1980: 216).

I shall thus suggest that political clientelism, as a territorial strategy, is one of these political processes that shift the relationships between the center and the periphery. The idea that the territorial dimension of political clientelism structures the process of differentiation through, within and across geographical space thus indicates that political representatives cannot but confront it. They have to confront it because their own entire political career depends on, and demands it. Without a territorial dimension of their politics, their own geographical constituencies could not simply exist. Allocating resources to their constituencies is not an option. These constituencies are a geographical entity and it is because of this territorial logic that political clientelism structure itself around the exchange of votes for selective and material benefits. For representatives, then, the real political unit is the ‘territory,’ and it is because of such a spatial domain that their own ‘district’ must be constituted as a geographical constituency. In inquiring upon the center-periphery relationships, I established one of the cornerstones of the territorial

[^26]: See Wellhofer (1988 and 1989) for a review of much of the literature centered on the center-periphery framework.
dimension of political clientelism. In the next section, I will turn the attention to engaging with the literature on clientelism, patronage, personal vote and constituency in order to build another pillar of my analysis upon the territorial logic of political clientelism: namely, *its territorial forms*.

_Territorial forms of political clientelism_

Which territorial forms underpin the logic of political clientelism? I argue in what follows, that political clientelism, considered as the exchange of votes for selective and material benefits, can assume different territorial forms. Based on the geographical space in which political clientelism tends to concentrate its targets and the scope underpinning the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources targeting narrow or broad clientele I identify four ideal types: 1) patronage; 2) machine politics; 3) constituency service, and 4) pork-barreling. The first two operate at the city-level, whereas the latter two operate mainly at the district-level. I then further distinguish between narrow and broad type of particularistic goods or benefits. In the former, the scope of the allocation of resources would target narrow needs and interests. In return, the clientele would be offering their votes in exchange for selective material benefits. Political representatives, on the other side, may allocate resources targeting a broad clientele, and offer to them their representation in return of electoral support. Towards these broad but still selected groups of clients, political representation will take clientelistic exchange at different geographical levels. Accordingly, by combining the type of territory and its geographical targets with the types of political clientelism based on the scope (narrow and broad) structuring the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources, I arrive at the territory typology presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Territorial typology of political clientelism

In this conceptualization, the territorial dimension of clientelism departs from those theoretical perspectives that have been predominantly considering this form of exchange as a predominantly “demand-oriented” phenomenon. In sharp contrast, my typological construction is sympathetic to the ‘supply-oriented’ framework, in which political representative targets (territorially) specific ‘clientele.’ Due the assumptions guiding our analysis on the geographical logic of political clientelism, I am specifically interested in the other two territorial forms. That is, those that rely on district-level distribution of particularistic benefits: respectively, a) constituency service and b) pork-

---

27 This ‘demand side’ formulation has its theoretical origin in the work of ‘exchange-oriented micro-sociology; see Blau (1964), one of the classical work in this tradition of research. The main consequences of the micro-sociological view of clientelism, is that the origin and existence to the demand for this type of exchange come from the economically and culturally backward segments of society. While this analysis is functional to the study of clientelism in more traditional societies, it is less so for advanced one, where the mechanisms underpinning political processes are more complex.

28 The supply-based account stresses, “Those institutional circumstances that may induce party leaders to adopt clientelism or patronage as a strategy for attracting voters, supporters, and activists to their side” (Piattoni, 2001: 17).
barreling. According to the definition of its first proponents, constituency service is an important aspect of contemporary forms of political representation, the aim of which is to gain personalized electoral support from political constituencies. The main idea, as expressed by the authors who first highlighted it, is as follows:

“Constituency service constitute an important means by which representatives earn personalized electoral support – votes based not on party membership or association with a particular government but on the individual identities and activities of the candidates (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987: 3).

The constituency service is thus the political linkage that politicians and representatives establish between voters and policymaking in order to receive electoral support from their constituencies. As such, this political linkage relies on the allocation of resources on a narrower basis. This overarching concern induces politicians to build personal reputations and followings during their active life as representatives; in short, to cultivate a ‘personal vote;’ and to seek a secure retirement position in some branch of the state or the para-state. The personal vote does not relate to the personal qualities of the candidate, but rather to his/her past record or programmatic commitments. The range of the personal vote can vary from a more narrow conception emphasizing the support a politician gains through personal efforts (Kitschelt, 2000) to a broader understanding, which encompass all support, attracted through either efforts or reputation (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Marsh, 2007). There is no implication in Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina’s work that the party vote should be more objective and rational and the personal vote less so. In both

---

29 Such political linkage received support by the political research on the determinants of electoral politics; see for example, Brooks (2006), Cox (1990; 2006) and Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007).
30 Kitschelt definition is the following: “The personal vote is the effect of a candidate’s personal initiatives on his or her electoral success, net of aggregate partisan trends that affect partisans as members of their parties” (2000: 852). Carey and Shugart (1995) provide empirical measurement of this ‘effect,’ which is different from the way ‘constituency service’ is assessed in the related literature.
cases, the motivations behind the vote can be entirely objective and rational - material or programmatic - and there is no implication that the personal vote has anything to do with qualities and considerations which are difficult to operationalize and measure (such as charismatic qualities of a representative). As such, the personal vote can be operationalized and measured by indicators such as: a) the politician’s personal roll call vote record on specific policy options; b) the time and effort they devote to “constituency service;” and c) whether in his/her statements they take stands in contrast with the party line. The idea behind the cultivation of the personal vote is that part of the vote that political representatives attempt to secure are likely to be the candidate’s district, and thus that the allocation of resources is of a narrow scope. The assumption that the district-level is the appropriate geographical target of this particularistic form of the distribution of benefits, may suggest that the personal vote is a territorial strategy to build an ‘incumbent advantage’ and in turn to develop such a long career in office (Swindle, 2002).

Accordingly, I shall argue that this territorial form represents a viable strategy to capture “personal” votes in hopes of securing support from the local constituency, and in turn reinforces the constituency service procedures. Even though the “personal vote” literature typically focuses on how politicians provide constituency service in order to gain individual recognition from voters, I argue that when interpreted from a geographical perspective, the constituency service and the personal vote both constitute a peculiar form of clientelistic politics. The personalization of politics that it follows from both strategies, tends to create incentives to target the district-level in order to allocate specific resources. Namely, resources that have an extremely narrow geographical scope – e.g. targeting local interests and locally-targeted public goods, such as local infrastructure,
roads, hospitals, schools, etc. The constituency service, then, creates grounds for casting a personal vote that may be entirely programmatic or based on a positive assessment of the candidate’s past or future performance. However, in both alternatives, it will constitute a linkage between representatives and their constituency, and I argue that such a linkage is fundamentally organized territorially. This assumption corroborates Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina analysis, when they wrote:

“A territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making process. A representative elected with the votes, efforts and resources of the people of a specific geographic area naturally attaches special importance to their views and requests, out of a sense of obligation as well as self-interest. The exact level of particularism varies with many factors, especially the strengths of the party system, but the potential basis for local interest advocacy always exists” (1987: 19).

In summary, constituency service is nothing but one of the geographical expressions of what I called territorial forms of political clientelism. Lastly, among the territorial forms that rely on district-level distribution of particularistic benefits we identify in order to build a geographical analysis of political clientelism is pork barreling. Broadly defined pork barrel politics is the practice of targeting expenditure towards particular districts based on political considerations. As such, ‘pork barreling’ takes the form of

---

31 In the U.S., some localized federal spending is transparent while other is less so – e.g. through the rather opaque procedure of “earmarking,” in which provisions for locally targeted resources are inserted into bills.

32 In future research, I shall attempt to demonstrate that the personal vote as measured in terms of incumbent advantage, roll call voting pattern and earmarks appropriations record on specific infrastructural-related project, constitutes a direct linkage to the channeling of financial funds targeting the geographical constituency related with political representatives. Such linkage then it can be interpreted as a strategy of clientelist politics that allow us to compare such strategy across several political spaces across past and contemporary regional polities.

33 This interpretation found support in the analysis of Piattoni, who considers constituency service and personal vote as variation of clientelism, since both are modality of distribution of particularistic benefits (2005: 100-104).

34 This definition is more strict and narrow in scope, since pork barreling can also target states or regions.
geographically targeted collective goods towards specific constituencies. Pork barreling is thus oriented towards extremely localized benefits provided to individuals on a selective basis within a restricted geographic scope (Stein and Bickers, 1994; 1995; Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman and Sigelman, 2002; Frisch, 1998). A long tradition of American political science has focused on pork barreling within the U.S. Congress (Ferejohn, 1974; Fiorina and Noll, 1978; Fiorina 1977; 1983; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). These studies focus on how individual politicians claim credit for providing locally targeted collective goods to their districts, despite the cost to other districts or for national policy.

From the theoretical point of view, the literature point to two main findings. On the one hand, in the process to allocate funds, political representative may favor narrow geographical areas governed by their allies and discriminate against other areas governed by opposition parties in order to win re-election (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Thus, pork barreling has both an incentive to target ‘marginal districts’, that is congressional districts which are not firmly in one political camp or the other (Fiorina, 1989: 9), but also to target safe districts to enhance an incumbent advantage and reinforce the personal vote in order to increase the electoral return from constituency service. On the other hand, political representatives may channel more resources to swing districts to diminish the uncertainty of the electoral outcome in both their congressional districts in those of their congressional allies (Dixit and Lodregan, 1995, 1996). I shall thus argue that the

35 Wilson (1986), Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Levitt and Poterba (1999) sketched a number of theoretical conjectures that might explain why legislators have a political preference for the pork barrel politics in the process of allocating funds favoring narrow geographical areas. They found empirical evidence supporting the fact that parties play a significant role in determining the geographic distribution of federal expenditure. Levitt and Snyder (1997) developed and subsequently estimated a theoretical model, finding similar results.

36 This practice lead to what in US Congress distributive politics literature is called ‘log-rolling’ – e.g. the strategy, deployed by legislative member, of trading favors (usually vote) to obtain passage of actions of
commitment of political representatives to pork barrel politics represents another type of territorial strategy, this time focusing at the district-level as the appropriate geographical target of this particularistic form for the distribution of benefits. It is based on the geographical space in which political clientelism tends to concentrate its targets and the scope underpinning the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources targeting narrow or broad clientele.

When interpreted geographically, I claim that the four ideal types I identify - e.g. 1) patronage; 2) machine politics; 3) constituency service, and 4) pork-barreling - represent a structural equivalent of political clientelism as it take territorial forms in both Italy and US. I can thus compare their working logic in both countries, and then focus on the way this logic is constructed at the sub-state political space, both historically and geographically. Having addressed the various territorial forms that clientelistic politics take, I now turn the attention to the agents that channel particularistic benefits towards their geographical constituencies: namely, political representatives.

**Political representative as clientelistic/territorial-seekers**

Which conditions structure politicians’ search for electoral advantage? Following political scientists, I focus on the institutional circumstances under which politicians supply selective goods in return for votes.\(^{37}\) I suggest that the ultimate goal of politicians

---

\(^{37}\) Such an exchange mechanism is of course not the only possible one in the context of political clientelism. Various examples might be used to document other mechanisms at work – e.g. USA relationship with Mafia in Sicily during the 1940s, the use of ‘clans’ in Somalia by USA in the last 20
who build loyal clienteles is to secure their own re-election: that is, to occupy stable seats and, from that position of power, influence policy-making (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1989). Re-election is not the only means politicians have to secure their stability in office and their influence over policy-making. Nevertheless, it is one of the most important political strategies that representatives need in order to achieve such a position of power. It is at this key juncture that political clientelism takes its ‘pure’ forms: namely, that of building their ‘electoral connection’ and developing their own ‘home style.’ Since the 1970s, more than in the past, politicians have been primarily concerned with building long and fruitful political careers to cover the periods of apprenticeship, of service as representatives of possible lapses in elective office, and of retirement from active politics.

Both Italy and US political systems have been over their political history a tendency for a great increase in the long-term career of professional politician whom, as Max Weber suggested, lives ‘off’ politics rather than ‘for’ politics. The professionalization of the politics has in both countries become entrenched with the state apparatus and its administrative or bureaucratic structures, even with important structural difference both in terms of timing and political development. From my perspective, I shall argue that in the search for electoral advantage, *political representatives cast themselves in the form of clientelistic/territorial-seekers*. By looking at the different institutional contexts in which political representatives operate, I can thus characterize their different *modus operandi*. In fact, in Italy and in the United States, structural difference in their respective institutional apparatus creates a set of constraints in the

---

years, or the role of oligarchy in the ex-Soviet Union to master the transition from a command to a market economy. These examples illustrate forms of what I shall call ‘indirect political clientelism’ not all of which are centered around on the exchange of votes for channeling financial funds within specific territorial constituencies. I am grateful to Luca Muscara for suggesting this point.
attempt of politicians to influence and shape the territorial linkages that stretch from the center to the periphery, and from their geographical constituencies to their place of power. What is crucial in my comparative research is that the structuring and fabricating of territorial politics in sub-state political spaces is strongly constrained by a set of institutions that push the clientelistic/territorial seeking process in one direction rather than in another. Such a process calls for a different set of strategies by political representatives in the attempt to link center and periphery, and even more importantly in their political maneuvering to create linkages between geographical constituencies and the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources that they can channel towards them.

When studied from a comparative perspective, the differences emerging from the two institutional contexts in which political representatives operate, lead to important clues about the logic underpinning political clientelism and in turn help us to uncover one of the forms in which territorial politics take shape over time - and not just in the two sub-state spaces that are under scrutiny here. When I characterize political representatives’ different modus operandi in such a different institutional context, my research should help to point out some of structural elements in the way territorial politics work in sub-state political spaces. By suggesting that political representatives cast themselves in the form of clientelistic/territorial-seekers, I shall highlight the institutional context in which different forms of territorial strategy may be at work in the distribution, allocation and redistribution of particularistic benefits. Thus, the comparative exercise should help my analysis in highlighting that two different models of territorial politics are at work in these two sub-state political spaces, models in which political representatives
seek different territorial strategies to navigate their own respective institutional context. Having established the various territorial forms that clientelistic political strategies can take, and having inquired about the agents that operate strategically within the different institutional contexts, in the final section, I attempt to recapture the main thrust of my analysis by developing a more precise formalization of the contrasting types of political clientelism that distinguish these two different macro-territorial units.

**Conclusion: Ideal-types of political clientelism**

In addressing the role of territory, first in shaping center-periphery relationships, second in laying out the different territorial forms of political clientelism and third in highlighting the types of political agents that tend to operate strategically within its different institutional context, I have set up the overarching framework to study the logic of territorial politics from a comparative perspective. As the above rather abstract analysis suggests, I contend that both in the California and in the Southern Italy cases, territorial politics is at work in terms of the geographic distribution of particularistic benefits. Now, I shall synthesize these previous lines of inquiry by presenting two ideal-types of political clientelism that underlie my research. These ideal-types attempt to lay out the main structural differences between Southern Italy and California form of political clientelism, which in turn underlie the different logic structuring their respective form of fabricating territorial politics. This multidimensional typology combines the macro-territorial units of analysis (e.g. the two sub-state political spaces) with the analytical features embedded in their corresponding clientelistic politics. This results in the construction of two analytical categories. The first attempts to capture the two different *modus operandi*, whereas the second seeks to define the set of different
mechanisms that underpin the construction of clientelist politics in the two sub-state political spaces. Table 5 presents the multidimensional typology I constructed in my macro-comparative analysis.

Table 5: Multidimensional typology of Southern Italy and California political clientelism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of political clientelism</th>
<th>Ideal-type</th>
<th>Modus operandi</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constituency service</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Statutory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predatory</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Factionalist</td>
<td>Corruptive-prone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first ideal-type I shall call *constituency service clientelism* for the macro-territory of California; the second ideal-type I shall call *predatory clientelism* for the macro-territory of Southern Italy. The first has an efficient and bureaucratic *modus operandi*, supported by a set of transparent and statutory mechanisms. The second type has a ‘coercive and factionalist’ *modus operandi*, coupled with a set of crime or corruptive-prone mechanisms. The term ‘factionalism’ is my peculiar adaptation from a research on the ‘politics of factions’ that lay at the organizational core of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, and especially in the key (from the political and the electoral perspective as well) regions of Southern Italy; see, Zuckerman (1979; 1997).
territory. This apparatus relies respectively a) on the linkage between center and periphery, and b) on the linkages between geographical constituencies and political representatives as determined by the allocation of resources in terms of narrow and broad scope. In the macro-analytical comparative framework that underlies this study, I attempt to elucidate and then to demonstrate that different forms of political clientelism fabricate contemporary territorial politics. In explaining why and how the territorial logic of political clientelism is a crucial structural variable to understanding the logic of current forms of territorial politics, I shall stress the set of institutional mechanisms that political representatives use to capture electoral advantages. As suggested, such an advantage has a territorial logic. Accordingly, before developing the methodological foundation of my macro-analytical approach, I need to revisit the concept of territorial politics.
2. Revisiting territorial politics

Territory is the fruit of partitioning and of organization.

*Jean Gottmann*

You cannot study power and conflict without considering territory.

*Stein Rokkan*

In chapter 1, I argued that in order to understand how political clientelism operates in different territorial-cum-political formations, it is necessary to study spatial variations in politics (Gottmann, 1980) and suggested that political constituencies develop and structure themselves through a set of exchange mechanisms in which electoral votes channel flows of financial funds in their local territory. I made the case that political clientelism is a territorial strategy for managing power relationships between the center and the periphery, and that this strategy over time is articulated according to how the allocation of resources is geographically distributed. In this chapter, I will advance this idea a bit further, arguing that political clientelism in turn constructs a form of territorial cleavage across localities.

My argument revolves around the idea that such cleavages shape the structure of influence, impact the processes underpinning electoral legitimacy, and have a crucial role in determining how those political linkages ultimately articulate the structuring and fabricating of territorial politics in sub-state political spaces. The construction of these cleavages guarantees the formation of a political space where these political representatives can allocate public funds for personal or party return - e.g. being re-elected - while at the same time creating the condition for the construction of political forces which both shape and condition electoral behavior at the local, regional and national level. Accordingly, in this sense, we can argue that political clientelism is a form
of distributing ‘favors’ in exchange for political support; it is a territorial strategy
intended to manage the relationship between center and periphery, while at the same time
attaining political legitimacy and consent. One of the central tenets of this research is that
the form and content of political clientelism has a geographical logic.

Having explored this idea in the previous chapter, I now focus on the idea that this
logic is what ultimately shapes the contours and logic of territorial politics. In what
follows, I thus examine how territorial politics, as it is currently manifested in sub-state
spaces, is structured, organized, managed and determined by clientelist politics. In short,
I argue that any inquiry into the logic of political clientelism must be rooted in a theory of
territorial politics. This is a very important question because we know little about how the
outcomes of those political processes underpinning the fabrication of territorial politics
have an impact across, through and within a given territory. By centering our
comparative analysis upon one of the less studied forms in which territorial politics is
imbued, namely, political clientelism, we hope to gain an understanding of these multi-
faced political processes. I will first revisit the concept of territorial politics, clarifying
the specific framework that informs my analysis. Then, I will demonstrate how the
concept of territorial politics, as defined here, became extremely relevant to
understanding the institutional macro-context that relates to the two macro-regions under
scrutiny. This analysis will then prepare the terrain for the following chapter, which
tackles the issues related to the construction of a macro-analytical perspective on
territorial politics, offering the main methodological foundation of the entire research.
Such a macro-analytical foundation rests on the idea that in order to understand territorial

49
politics, we need to shift our attention to the macro-regional level of political processes. Before doing this we need to define the concept of territorial politics.

_Disentangling territorial politics_

There is no commonly accepted definition of territorial politics in the scholarly literature. The reason is that ‘territorial politics’ is an interdisciplinary field rooted in comparative politics, and therefore the concept is dispersed along several venues, which possess different theoretical, methodological and empirical concerns. That said, historically, territorial politics has a common beginning: namely, that the field became highly critical of ‘whole nation’ political economy studies of the 1970s and 1980s.\(^\text{39}\) One of the first comparative works that signaled the shift from the ‘whole nation’ approach to a more ‘territorial-oriented one’ was the research undertaken by Stein Rokkan and various collaborators. In this line of research, the analytical framework suggested that a major concern of territorial politics should be on the relations between the center and their peripheries as encapsulated in a structure of ever-changing territorial cleavages. Starting from this assumption, Rokkan and Urwin attempted to develop a typological construction of such territorial cleavages. In their typology, the center-periphery polarity produces a combination of four possible territorial structures, centered upon the degree of historical source of strain and strategies of unification (1982: 9). These structures formed a classification schema that revolved around the predominant role of two forms of spaces: a) territorial space and 2) membership space. These spaces were less congruent in comparison to others as they pertain to the process of nation-building or state-building.

\(^{39}\) Notable works, which shaped this turning point, include, Rose and Urwin (1975), Rokkan and Urwin (eds.) (1982), and Rokkan and Urwin (1983).
respectively. Following this schema, Rokkan and Rose classified European territorial structures. In their analysis, they placed only a scanty attention to the conceptualization of territorial politics, but suggested that in their classification, according to two-dimensional axes of nation-building or state-building, there was “the potential for varying kinds of territorial politics (1982: 13).

Following this line of inquiry, subsequently, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) pursued the theme of territorial structuration in a macro-comparative context. Their effort aimed at displaying how states responded to different sets of territorial pressures coming from peripheral mobilization. These territorial pressures produced three different channels of contestation, creating a set of cleavages structured along, respectively 1) party political responses, 2) economic policy responses, and 3) institutional concessions. Again, these set of cleavages opened up to different kinds of variations in territorial politics. In this line of inquiry, thus, territorial politics emerged in the conflict among the processes underlying nation-building and state-building, and the correspondent set of cleavages centered upon the conflict center-periphery. As such, territorial politics is the study of territorial structures and their variations, namely, that of territorial cleavages.\(^{40}\) In the same arch of time, a British scholar, Jim Bulpitt published *Territory and power in the United Kingdom* in 1983. This research focused on the center-periphery relationships in England over a long period but it framed the discussion in terms of concepts and theories employed in the analysis of the territorial logic, intergovernmental relations, political

\(^{40}\)This framework had both an empirical application as developed in Rokkan, Urwin, Aerebrot, Malaba and Sande (1987) and a more theoretically focused discussion as assemble in Rokkan, S. (1996, edited by P. Flora with S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin). In this posthumous work, the role of territorial politics become submersed in the text along different sections, making the reconstruction of the last phases of Rokkan’s research on territorial structuration a task that cannot be pursued here.
nationalism and state change. In developing his own approach, Bulpitt conceptualized territorial politics as a type of territorial management strategy that local elites use to bind the periphery to the center. In his analysis of the United Kingdom case, Bulpitt defined ‘territorial politics’ as:

“That arena of political activity concerned with the relations between the central political institutions in the capital city and those interests, communities, political organizations and governmental bodies outside the central institutional complex, but within the accepted boundaries of the state, which possess, or are commonly perceived to possess, a significant geographical or local/regional character” (1983: 52, original emphasis).

In focusing on those administrative and intergovernmental relations, coupled with the analysis of political nationalism and state change, Bulpitt constructed a theory of territorial politics centered upon what we may call the territorial logic of center-periphery relationships. This relationship relies on the political search for strategies of ‘territorial management’ pursued by various local elites. The main territorial outcome was to avoid putting in jeopardy the integrity of the state while avoiding entrenchment in local politics.41

While the theories of territorial politics of both Rokkan, Rose and Bulpitt focus upon the conflictual relationships between center and periphery, the conceptualization of the form of conflict remains in the background of their analysis. Since the purpose of this research is to understand the role of clientelistic politics in fostering conflicts due to the particularistic forms of distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources in exchange of electoral support, we need a different theory one that involves a more precise concept

41 For a detailed review of Bulpitt book, see Bradbury (2006); for the possible extension of Bulpitt framework to the case of the United States, see Savitch and Osgood Jr. (2010). The most extensive comparative application of territorial politics as strategy of ‘territorial management’ found its crucial role in the research carried by Keating (1988).
of territorial. My contention, therefore, is that a crucial theoretical step is to conceptualize the properly territorial component of ‘territorial politics.’ Such an analytical perspective accrues from the classical analysis done by Sidney Tarrow in the mid-1970s. According to Sidney Tarrow, the term territorial politics should take a specific meaning:

“We do not intend to analyze politics about territory, but rather politics about other issues that are fought out across territory” (Tarrow, Introduction,” in Tarrow, Katzenstein, and Graziano [Eds.], 1978: 1).

This definition of territorial politics, thus involves the idea that political processes contain an element of conflict that is manifested in and structurally located across territory, and we may add, through and within territory. In this sense, when analyzing the political processes underpinning the fabrication of territorial politics, I aim to stress the determinate condensation of political forces and political conflict that emerge around (and surround) the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources over specific territories.

This determinate condensation take its own historical expression ‘across, through and within’ territory. The proper ‘territorial’ component of ‘territorial politics’ is thus one imbued with conflict, power and struggle around the control of particularistic benefits, which in turn are distributed, allocated and redistributed over those geographical constituencies that allow political representatives to build their own ‘electoral advantage.’ Paraphrasing the old dictum, my crucial assumption is that territorial politics is about, “Who gets What, When, How” and more importantly ‘Where.’ If the ‘Who,’ the ‘What,’ the ‘When,’ have received lots of attention from political scientists and from historians of political development, the ‘Where’ has rarely being systematically explored, and it is thus the ‘Where’ that I attempt to tackle in this research. By stressing the allocation,
distribution and redistribution of resources (resources that as we demonstrate in the previous chapter are particularistic in nature), as the centerpiece of the determinate condensation of political forces and political conflict, a different theoretical idea of territorial politics thus emerges. The conflict and power relationships emerging from the allocation, distribution and redistribution of resources tends to structure itself in a hierarchy of territorial formations with various degrees of political effects. How is this hierarchy formed? How are these political effects organized historically over various territorial formations? We are now in the position to answer these questions from the perspective of how they affect the construction of the “Where” in territorial politics. I do this with the aid of Table 6, where I sketch a possible abstract way in which the concept of “Where” can be fruitfully captured.

Table 6: Territorial politics typology based on particularistic resources and blocs of votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of territorial politics</th>
<th>Divisible benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical districts</td>
<td>Constituency service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork-barreling</td>
<td>Patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine politics</td>
<td>Fragmented by individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Southern Italy)</td>
<td>(California)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can distinguish different territorial formations using our previously developed classification of territorial forms of clientelistic politics. In enriching our framework, I construct a schema in which the type of resource being distributed is in the form of so-called ‘divisible benefits,’ that is, benefits that can be allocated to individual or collective
constituencies over specific territory in a piecemeal fashion, in exchange for delivering a bloc of votes. The continuum of such allocation may follow from both large areas to geographical district systems, which ultimately will be entrenched in different forms of clientelistic politics. It is through such a process that, we argue, territorial politics becomes entangled across space. Territorial politics thus may take its specific form along a continuum that may stretch from patronage and machine politics (lower quadrant) to pork-barreling and constituency service (higher quadrant). The resulting typology of territorial politics forms, based on the combination of the distribution of particularistic resources in exchange for a bloc of votes, exemplifies the historical differences between the Southern Italy and California models of clientelistic politics.

This typology produces two radically different forms (models) of territorial politics that I label as follows: I call, the territorial politics relating to Southern Italy as ‘fragmented by factionalism.’ In those relating to California, I identify a form of territorial politics that I call ‘fragmented by individualism.’ Both forms of territorial politics can take different variations or even overlapping combinations accordingly to the extent by which any of the four forms of clientelistic politics may prevails in a given territorial formation over time. Therefore, the allocation, distribution and redistribution of divisible benefits in exchange for delivering a bloc of votes affects differently each given territory. The territorial politics typology I construct is, of course, an abstraction, but one that can fruitfully guide the historical and geographical analysis in the rest of this research. In the context of Max Weber’s ideal types (see next Chapter), this typology corresponds to a plane of reference in which a generic concept is developed in order to

---

42 For the distinction between ‘indivisible’ and ‘divisible’ benefits, see respectively Dahl (1961: 52) and Wolfinger (1974: 63).
isolate causal and essential characteristics of a given phenomenon. As such, the resulting form is abstract and pure. Our scope here is indeed that of isolating some of the essential characteristics of territorial and clientelistic politics for the two macro-regions under scrutiny. Having established in a preliminary way such a generic concept, I will now focus attention on what I call the macro-context of territorial politics.

**Macro-context dimensions of territorial politics**

How did the ‘fragmented by factionalism’ (in relationships to Southern Italy), and the ‘fragmented by individualism’ (in relationships to California) type of territorial politics became entrenched in these two sub-state political spaces? In which ways do any of the four forms (models) of clientelistic politics tend to prevail in a given territorial formation over time? In order to answer these questions we need to look at the institutional macro-context in which territorial politics operates. In the last 30 years, many changes have emerged as central government institutions have decentralized various functions to the regional level and as new demands have emerged, focused on regional-scale collective goals. The full implications of these changes have not been fully explored in territorial politics, as many approaches remain trapped by a methodological nationalism focused on central government institutions and policy processes. In this research, I address the macro-territorial level in its own right, rather than a scaled-down version of national politics, in order to demonstrate how political clientelism, by partitioning and organizing territory, fabricates contrasting forms (models) of territorial politics.

43 Such an approach ties different perspectives; for some examples, see respectively Keating (2008), Jeffery (2008) and Jeffery and Wincott (2010), whom address the issue of ‘methodological nationalism.’ Recent works in territorial politics, follow similar avenues; among, many, see Anderson (1992), Snyder (2001a), Eaton (2004), Herbst (2000), Boone (2003) and Caramani (2004).
politics. In doing this, my aim is to analyze the *macro contexts* of territorial politics. Rather than examining just one institution or process at a time, my plan is to examine the combined effects of institutions and processes, which may help to understand the fabric of contemporary territorial politics from a historical/geographical perspective. This assumption requires developing a macro-analytical approach in regard to two very different political systems, as represented respectively by Italy and the United States, and then narrowing my explanatory framework towards the two macro-regions selected for the study – e.g. Southern Italy and California. In suggesting how clientelistic politics does not operate in an institutional vacuum and why territorial politics must be understood in political geography terms, I offer an institutional analysis of the two *macro-contexts* of territorial politics on which my research is focused.

This analysis is, again, constructed in an ideal-typical fashion by classifying some of the key institutional changes and related processes that were likely to affect the rise of the two different models of territorial politics. I focus here briefly on the macro-institutional difference since they help set up an interesting and revealing comparative exercise. With the aid of Table 7, I illustrate the contrasting features underpinning the two-macro regions by developing a classificatory system for the United States and Italy and then rescaling it for California and Southern Italy. This classification system has two dimensions: a) institutional models and b) patterns of change (e.g. decentralization). With the help of two variables, form of government and reforms, we can highlight how the major difference in the two political systems set up a contrasting institutional macro-context from which territorial politics and its logic are historically entrenched. The federal structure of the United States Logic produced a decentralized form of
government. Italy, in contrast, due to its Napoleonic heritage, developed a Republican and centralistic form. When we translated these differences within the political space of the two macro-regions, we noticed a more revealing difference in terms of the institutional context.

Table 7: Institutional macro-contexts compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of change (decentralization)</th>
<th>Institutional models</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of state</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms</td>
<td>Southern Italy</td>
<td>Regions (1968)</td>
<td>Proposition 13 (1978)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern of change in both macro-contexts has been the driving force toward decentralization, but this occurred in radically different forms. The institutional reforms, in fact, played out in Southern Italy through the creation of Regions followed by the
Regional Councils. California, in contrast, witnessed decentralization through tax-centered reforms. With the passage of Proposition 13, a new central feature of California government was established: namely, the requirement of the two-thirds vote rule in the legislature to raise revenue – the so-called supermajority rule. How did these reforms affect the strategies of political representatives in the two macro-regions? When such reforms are compared from a strictly institutional perspective, the decentralization’s outcomes set up a similar scenario but with an intriguing different logic. At the outset, the reforms in California produced a reduction in the authority of local governments and an increased dependency of the State of California on the federal government. In Southern Italy, in contrast, decentralization reinforced the linkages between local/regional and central power, since the central government retained fiscal and political control over the devolution of administrative functions. And what structure of incentives did these reforms produce for politicians?

With the aid of Table 8, I illustrate the contrasting structure of incentives that emerged from the decentralization outcomes as they took shape in California and in Southern Italy since the 1970s. For the political representatives of Southern Italy, the decentralization of functions and the still strong centrally-dependent allocation of resources (while public spending was progressively shrinking over time) gave politicians a structure of incentives characterized by the following goals: a) to become increasingly involved in factional conflict; b) to become regularly involved in intra-party competition; c) to search for preference votes; d) to become increasingly dependent on their own party political leaders; and e) to collude with organized crime. This structure of incentives thus helps explain the reasons for the shrinking availability of public resources in Southern
Italy since the mid-1970s, degenerating into a full-fledged corruption-prone form of clientelistic politics. In the contrasting case of the Golden State’s politicians, the reduction in the authority of local governments and an increased dependency of the State of California on the federal government (in a context of increasing availability of state and federal resources) gave them a completely different set of incentives.

Table 8: Effect of decentralization and structure of incentive for politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decentralization outcomes</th>
<th>Southern Italy</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factional conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Personal vote</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-party competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Constituent service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preference vote</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Incumbent advantage</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control from party political leaders</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Dependency from interest groups financial support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collusion with organized crime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Strategic alliances with lobbyists</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order: a) to cultivate the ‘personal vote;’ b) to promote their own constituent service; c) to develop and maintain their own incumbent advantage; d) to become increasingly dependent upon interest groups providing them with financial support; and e) to investigate strategic alliances with lobbyists who will support their political career, legislature and public policy agenda. This radically different structure of incentives helps demonstrate how the California political system became entrenched in the bureaucratic and constituency service form of clientelistic politics.

This institutional analysis of the macro-contexts I have attempted, demonstrates one of the crucial variables in explaining the fabrication of contemporary territorial politics: namely, that decentralization of government opens many possibilities for clientelistic politics because local constituencies became more dependent on central government rather than becoming more autonomous. In turn, this suggests that institutional decentralization tends to put political representatives in the position of determining the shape and form of territorially constituted polities. How do political representatives seek electoral support in exchange for personal benefits, rather than for public interest? Which institutional linkages support this strategy? These questions can be addressed with the aid of Table 8, which compares the institutional linkage that political representatives build based on the resources they seek to control and on which their re-election strategies depend. In the case of Southern Italy, in a macro-context where state-controlled resources over time were shrinking quite dramatically, the Southern local political representatives were seeking to control the key financial resource: that is, public spending expenditures. Their California counterpart, in contrast,

44 In Chapter 5, I shall attempt to build an historical-geographical analysis of the institutional changes that over time have shaped such outcome for Southern Italy and California respectively.
was seeking to control intergovernmental transfers. But the institutional linkage was radically different. In the former, the party organization and the party factions were the filter for appropriating parts of the financial funds; in the latter, the public administration and the state and local bureaucracy were the key filters in controlling governmental funds.

Table 9: Institutional linkages compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key resources</th>
<th>Southern Italy</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public spending expenditures</td>
<td>Party organization</td>
<td>Intergovernmental transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party factions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State and local bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distributive effects</th>
<th>Southern Italy</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td>Efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorially fragmented</td>
<td></td>
<td>Territorially compacted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Southern Italy</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factionalist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These different institutional linkages, in turn, created a radically opposite distributive effect: inefficient and fragmented by territories in the case of Southern Italy, efficient and targeting compacted territories in the case of California. In short, the different institutional linkages were at work with radically opposite logic: in the case of California, the increased availability of intergovernmental transfers led local political representatives to develop a strong ‘bureaucratic and efficient’ approach to appropriate financial resources, and once controlled to distribute them in a partitioned and extremely geographically targeted way. This led to a compacted territorial form as a result of such a distributive strategy. In the California context, where party structure has been historically weak, ‘individualistic’ territorial politics tended to dominate without being contested. In contrast, in the case of Southern Italy, the decreasing availability of centrally-controlled financial sources led Southern political representatives to literally ‘fight’ for the remaining state funds, through their party and their internal structures, and once appropriated, to distribute them in an inefficient and extremely geographically dispersed way. As a result of such a distributive strategy, the Southern Italy political space has been dominated by historically strong party structures producing ultimately a ‘factionalist’ form of territorial politics.

Both the individualistic and factionalist forms of territorial politics produce increasing challenges to democratic systems of representations. Territorial political spaces where these forms of politics are entrenched define rules of the game in which increasingly political support is exchanged for particularistic benefits. This exchange, which involves politically-mediated resources, results in increasingly hierarchical relationships between the agents caught in the processes, a hierarchy that radically
transforms the allocative, distributive and redistributive role of the state, and with it, the entire functioning of political representation and its democratic variation. The study of territorial politics helps us face, in a critical and geographical way, this incipient transformation.

Conclusion

The allocative, distributive and redistributive effects of particularistic benefits for personal or party return, tends to condition not just the electoral behavior at the local, regional and national level, but more importantly for our purpose, to strongly influence the path of territorial politics and of patterns of governance as well, especially in an era of increasing decentralization of governmental functions. In understanding the institutional macro-context in which clientelistic politics operates in these two macro-regions, I aim to show how they represent clear alternative cases of territorial politics. I argue that the territorial basis of politics has to figure as one of the key tenets of current research, and the scaffolding of it should have a macro-comparative breath and a macro-analytical depth. Furthermore, developing a macro-comparative analysis of these two sub-state spaces can highlight some intriguing aspects of the overall socio-structural trajectories of contemporary territorial politics. What structural factors may explain their differences? There is, I argue, an emerging territorial politics at work in several macro-regional spaces around an increasing globalized and an increasingly decentralized world. I posit that we should begin to tackle these questions by focusing, from a macro-analytical perspective, on the role that allocative, distributive and redistributive effects of particularistic benefits play in many of the emerging sub-state territories. These are important questions because, as I have argued in this chapter, territorial politics tend to produce uneven processes. In
order to flesh out a set of methodological yardsticks that can help us to unpack the ways territorial politics work across space and time, we need to proceed more like an engineer that an architect. As Walter Benjamin commented in reference to Bertolt Brecht’s *Versuche*:

“Like an engineer who starts drilling for oil in the desert, he starts operations in carefully calculated sites in the desert” (Benjamin, 1999: 366)

It is to these points of ‘carefully calculate sites’ that the scaffolding of macro-analytical perspectives must inevitably begin its operations. These ‘chosen points’ of theoretical applications are by their nature constructed with the intent to operationalize the complex logic of a macro-analytical perspective. However, this is done without mapping out all the possible sites where drilling may be possible. It is to the presentation of these *chosen points* that the next chapter is dedicated.
3. Constructing a macro-analytical approach

Comparative analysis will remain sterile as long as it is not rooted in detailed research on the historical developments and the structural peculiarities of each system.

Stein Rokkan

At the macro-historical level, we seek to account for particular big structures and large processes and to chart their alternative forms.

Charles Tilly

The construction of abstract ideal types can only be considered a tool, never an end [in itself].

Max Weber

By revisiting the concept of territorial politics, I demonstrated in the previous chapter how such a concept can help us to untangle the complex logic that underpins the forms that political clientelism may take. Furthermore, an inquiry upon the institutional macro-context leads us to appreciate the subtle difference that becomes apparent when comparing California and Southern Italy. However useful may such an analysis may be, it still does not clarify what methodological foundation I need to build in order to produce a meaningful comparison between the two macro-regions. If territorial politics may actually address the types of questions that are central to our inquiry here, I need to develop a methodological framework capable of producing a substantive analytical approach within our comparative analysis.

Thus, in order to understand territorial politics, I should try to avoid the “territorial trap” and the “methodological nationalism” that underlies it. This means in turn to shift our focus to a different level of analysis: namely, that of the macro-regional level of political processes. Such level calls for a different analytical framework, one that requires the development of an adequate methodology of analysis and a different set of
theoretical tools. The understanding of territorial politics, I argue, should then be constructed in terms of what I call a *macro-analytical perspective*. The analysis sketched in the previous chapters suggests that a macro-analysis of territorial politics is thus in order and suggests the following questions: On what foundations does a macro-analytical perspective may rely? Which methodological approach do I need to develop in order to uncover the differences in the way territorial politics, through forms of political clientelism, shape two sub-state political spaces? Which units of analysis may I use in order to sketch the macro-regional level of political processes? What theoretical tools do I need in order to unpack the differences I aim to highlight in our macro-territorial comparisons?

In this chapter, I argue that in order to disentangle the differences that are at work in California counties and in Southern Italy, it is necessary to develop an adequate method of analysis. If the set of political processes that underpin the different forms of political clientelism in Southern Italy and California constitute a crucial factor, it is because a focus on their macro-regions reveal fundamental clues about the political geography of sub-state spaces. In what follows I proceed, first, by showing how the idea of encompassing comparisons can work as a grounding historical-geographical principle for our inquiry. Second, I will demonstrate how sub-state spaces are the fundamental unit of analysis for our empirical reconstruction of territorial politics in the two macro-regions. Third, and finally, I will present the analytical construct of the ideal-type as the appropriate theoretical level of analysis for our macro-analytical perspective. By developing these three methodological yardsticks, this chapter will contribute to an understanding of territorial politics from a macro-analytical perspective.
**Sub-states spaces as unit of analysis**

In constructing a macro-analytical perspective, a primary goal is to avoid two issues that in my view have limited attempts to grasp the complexity of territorial politics: namely, the “territorial trap” and “methodological nationalism.” In short, a change of perspective is in order. More specifically, this involves a shift in focus to a different unit of analysis: that is, from the state to that of the sub-state level, a perspective that requires a different conceptualization. As I already explained, our approach focused on what I refer as the macro-context of territorial politics. In contrast to those approaches that attempt to explain political clientelism at the individual level, I concentrate on aggregate patterns. In this, I follow Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, who in their seminal work published over 40 years ago, concentrating on how conflicts arising from the structure of a society shape and polarize political competition, made a case for shifting territorial units as an explanatory factor. In pondering the factors that might influence electoral results, their approach addressed the methodological issue of the unit of analysis right from the start. They pointed out that in order to attain a comprehensive understanding of how social relations affect electoral outcomes, it would be necessary to study aggregate patterns underpinning territorial cleavages. In their original contribution, Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the need to study, not only the “differences and similarities across nations but also within nations” [original emphasis] (1967: 53).

Accordingly, I strongly emphasize that the study of political clientelism as a significant influence on creating differences and similarities across territories must center on ‘within

---

45 On the issues, see respectively Agnew, op. cit., and Jeffery and Wincott, op. cit. The main reason to escape this type of approach is to avoid settling for a reductionist explanation of political processes. Our analytical perspective does not to reduce ‘territorial politics’ outcomes to simple expression of political clientelism, neither reduces ‘variations in clientelistic politics’ to voting patterns or party strategies.
nations.’ Thus, sub-state political space, which I identify primarily with the idea of ‘within nations’ aggregate patterns, becomes an important unit of analysis. It is important because I am seeking a complex historical explanation of the differences and similarities on how clientelistic politics work out in two sub-state political spaces. As such, the shift towards sub-state aggregate patterns has resulted in the use of a strategy using paired comparisons. How does such a strategy work? According to Tarrow:

“...It is a distinct analytical strategy for working through complex empirical and historical materials using the leverage afforded by the differences and similarities of comparable cases” (Tarrow, 2010: 243)

Thus, the analytical strategy based on paired comparisons is well-suited for the complex historical explanation our study demands. Furthermore, again following Stein Rokkan, I argue that at the theoretical level, there is no a priori reason to assume that the state is a monolithic entity, operating at equal levels of effectiveness, or efficiency throughout its sovereign territory. Indeed, in one of the most celebrated works in comparative politics of the last decades, the notion of sub-state variation in institutional effectiveness was precisely the motivation behind the study of Italy’s regional governments (Putnam, Nanetti and Leonardi, 1985; Putnam, 1993). In addition to the substantive reasons for examining territorial performance at the sub-state level, there are also methodological reasons for doing so. Below I offer some notes to clarify the methodological assumptions behind my argument. Political scientist Richard Snyder (2001) argues that the sub-state

---

46 See respectively, Merritt and Rokkan (eds., 1966), and especially Rokkan (1970/2009). On the necessity that the state re-equilibrates the differences within its territory, insist also Gottmann (1973), who in his works emphasize that the state has not aprioristic place in the study of political geography. I am grateful to Luca Muscara’ for directing my attention to this point.

47 There has been a resurgent wave of studies centered upon the ‘region’ as unit of analysis in international relations; see respective, Acharya (2008), and Katzenstein (ed., 2005); in the contexts of comparative areas studies, see the review by Ahram (2011), who argues about regions as a grounding principle and not as geographical entity. See note 79 for reference to the geography literature on the concept of region.
comparative method offers distinct advantages in three areas of the research process, namely: 1) research design, 2) measurement, and 3) theory construction. With respect to research design, the sub-state comparative method is a useful way of counteracting the often cited “many variables, small-N” problem in social science (Lieberson, 1992; 1994). A single case study transforms into a large number of observations when the individual variables of regions, cities, towns, etc., are developed as units of analysis. Furthermore, a focus on the sub-state level enhances the ability to control for a variety of potential explanatory variables. Second, a sub-state analysis avoids the problem of incorrectly coding cases based on national-level attributes, including taking national averages. Finally, the sub-state comparative method offers benefits for theory building because it allows scholars to disaggregate countries, thereby illuminating the ways in which constituent units of a political system interact (Snyder 2001; Applegate, 1999).

Accordingly, comparing similar sub-state units across distinct national units may be a more powerful strategy for making valid causal inferences than comparing national units. For example, Linz and de Miguel long ago (1966: 269) argued that a comparison between “advanced and backward sections” of Spain and Italy with similar cultural and socioeconomic features is an especially effective way to explore how the different political institutions of the two countries influence membership in voluntary associations. In my case, this strategy applies in terms of the analytical framework of the paired comparisons, where I am interested in exploring how the two sub-state different political systems, institutional structure and electoral system influence clientelistic politics and then construct different territorial politics. By analyzing contiguous sub-state units as the

---

48 As already mentioned, I refer to sub-state and not sub-nation as frame of reference for my macro-analytical comparisons of the two macro-regions. Snyder’s analysis, however, differ from the use I do of his argument, and I translate it within my ‘sub-state’ macro-comparative method.
macro-territorial context of reference, then I am able to design between-nation and especially ‘within-nation’ comparisons that achieve an especially strong degree of control over cultural, historical, and ecological conditions such as electoral voting patterns, intra-party competition, factionalism, and so forth. This strong degree of control matches with the distinctiveness of the paired comparisons analytical strategy. As Tarrow suggests, paired comparisons have an analogy with experimental design in the following sense:

“It is similar to experimentation in its ability to compare the impact of a single variable or mechanism on outcomes of interest” (2010: 244)

Using sub-states as units of analysis allows the research to test the impact of our variable of interest and the mechanism I am seeking to explain in a more controlled and focused comparative environment. Although these various strategies of sub-state analysis serve as powerful tools for making controlled paired comparisons, they share a limitation: the potential for diffusion and borrowing among sub-state units in a single country and among contiguous sub-state units in neighboring countries can make it difficult to achieve independent observations and tests.49 One technique for mitigating the trade-off between (1) the ability to establish control over potential explanatory factors and (2) the ability to achieve independence among the cases is to combine within-nation comparisons and between-nation comparisons of non-contiguous sub-state units. This

49 Tarrow, op. cit. mentions (and then addresses) four pitfall of paired comparisons: 1) Insufficient degrees of freedom (e.g. “the absence of enough degrees of freedom to reliably choose among alternative explanations for outcomes of interest”), 2) Non representativeness (e.g. when “cases were often chosen because of their familiarity or geographic proximity to one another, ignoring potential comparisons of cases that are either unfamiliar or geographically ‘outside of one’s area’”). 3) A-theoretical case selection (e.g. when ‘case are chosen because of structural similarities, such as case “that have gone through similar experiences” or because they “go through similar phases at the same time […] or are simply in the same part of the world are obvious subjects for paired comparison”). 4) Ignoring scope conditions (e.g. when in “the social sciences often produce efforts to expand the scope conditions of a theory” but “it can easily produce the extension of theories beyond their feasible range” (246-249). I attempt to avoid such pitfalls, and then follow Tarrow suggestions on how to get around them.
approach is intended to reduce the potential effects of diffusion along the lines of comparing ‘advanced and backward’ sections of different countries.\textsuperscript{50} Such a dual strategy could help maximize both control over potential explanatory factors and independence among the cases.\textsuperscript{51} A final advantage of the sub-state comparative method concerns how it can help us build theories that explain the dynamic interconnections among the levels and regions of a political system. Disaggregating countries along territorial lines that follow different political, administrative and institutional levels makes it easier to see how the constituent parts of a political system interact. This enables the research to explore the causal connections among territorial units that experience divergent patterns of change - e.g., why specific Southern regions exhibit such divergent patterns in terms of infrastructure-related spending and socio-economic trajectories, and why different counties of California exhibit such different patterns in terms of electoral return and constituent services. Analyzing these connections helps us gain a stronger understanding both of national politics and of major processes of political and economic transformation at the sub-state level. Focusing on the dynamic linkages among the levels and regions of a political system provides a new way of looking at the relationship between contrasting political phenomena observed at the “center” (i.e., the state level) and at the “periphery” (i.e., the sub-state level). More importantly, it helps in deciphering the big structure and the large process that emerge from this dynamic linkage. In synthesis, such a macro-analytical methodology allows us to decipher the relationship

\textsuperscript{50} This is the case as proposed for instance in their comparative study of Spain and Italy by Linz and de Miguel, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{51} It bears emphasis that the problem of achieving independence among cases is by no means limited to sub-state comparative analysis; cross-national and within-nation electoral geography research is thus a key methodological tool for controlling the effect of many independent observations that emerge when looking at variations over contiguous territorial units. In Part III voting and lobbying variables will play an important analysis in achieving such ‘control.’
between the ‘center’ and the ‘periphery’ using political clientelism as a double-faced mechanism: both as a bonding and as a territorial cleavage producing factor. At the same time, the possibilities for generalizing from sub-state cases improves our ability to make valid inferences from sub-state to state levels of analysis. Recent work on quantitative methods provides new ways to manage the problems that arise in making cross-level inferences although there are still controversial issues.\(^52\) Adapting such insights to qualitative small-N research should provide better techniques for generalizing from sub-state units, thus giving new insights about the logic of territorial (and clientelistic) politics in terms of their different macro-context. In providing a paired comparison as testing cases, a macro-analytical perspective can expand the potential of using sub-states as units of analysis capable of testing theories of territorial politics.\(^53\)

As the above discussion indicates, my focus here is on sub-state spaces. However, there is no generally accepted definition in the literature that will produce homogenous units for the study of within-national structure and process in terms of paired comparisons. Since sub-state variations are multiple and extremely different in many political systems, and because, accordingly, different territorial units are even more prone to such problems, I need to develop classification criteria for capturing the scope and extension of those units in order to decipher aggregate patterns. The immediate task then is to conceptualize the sub-state political spaces in a way that meets, as far as possible, normal linguistic usage, while providing us with a meaningful and unambiguous unit of analysis.


\(^{53}\) I plan to demonstrate that a macro-analytical perspective is also extremely useful in the field of political geography. However, I cannot pursue this goal here, where I restrict myself to the scope of this specific research. The methodological foundation that I lay out here will function as first-step theorization about such possible expansion.
For my purpose, the concept of sub-state spaces refers to larger territorial (as distinct from non-territorial) units or sub-systems, between the local level and the state system level. I define, then, sub-state political space as a set of *coherent macro-territorial entities situated between the local and national levels with a capacity for nested decision-making*. Table 10 highlights the main components of my definition.

**Table 10: Sub-state as units of analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key characteristic of sub-state spaces</th>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Intermediate between local and national governments</td>
<td>Set of legislative and executive institutions responsible for nested decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intersecting boundary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010: 4)*

The territorial, administrative and political dimensions of sub-states are thus those units by which I attempt to disentangle the ‘big structures, the large processes and then to chart the alternative forms’ that territorial (and clientelistic) politics take in two macro-areas. I seek to account for their difference at the macro-historical level, searching for explanations about the outcomes and processes of concrete macro-context phenomena in the midst of specific social and historical moments. The analytical perspective sketched here attempts to capture those macro-territorial phenomena, like the territorial allocation, distribution and redistribution of financial funds, the erection of different administrative institutions, the adoption of different electoral systems, or the enactment of parties’

---

54 The macro-region has been the most common object of analysis in world politics, while micro-regions are more common in the realm of the study of domestic politics and economics. In contrast, geography tends to be more flexible, moving up and down according to different conceptualization of region, territory and scale.

55 In reviewing the work of Rokkan, both Ceri (1990), and Mjøset (2000) make the case for such an approach.
strategies in relationship to clientelistic politics. My perspective thus resolutely *enacts a macro-territorial logic seeking analytical grounding in terms of paired comparisons constructed along the macro-historical plane.*

**Encompassing comparisons**

As suggested in the previous section, my scope in working methodologically with macro-territorial units does not necessarily mean eliminating the possibility that the empirical analysis may require some sort of scaling-down approach. Indeed, the level of analysis requested when looking at variation in public or infrastructural spending and electoral voting stability or instability over time for different incumbents, candidates and parties in California and Southern Italy invokes a different approach to our macro-comparative analysis. As suggested previously, my methodological assumption is not to produce a set of homogenous units for within-national comparison, but to develop macro-territorial units that help in discerning and unpacking causal mechanisms underpinning variation in territorial politics across California and Southern Italy. This approach will not involve forcing both sub-state political spaces into exact replication: rather, I am looking for variations and differences in outcomes and processes.

Pivotal in this enterprise is an approach on comparison that reflects what Skocpol and Somers labeled as ‘comparative history as macro-causal analysis.’ According to their typology, the explicit goal of this approach is of making causal inferences about macro-level structures and processes (Skocpol and Somers, 1980: 181-187). In similar terms, very much concerned about cause and effect, this typology related with what Charles

---

56 See respectively, Mayntz (2004: 254) and Kittel (2006: 667) for the analysis of social macro-phenomena and their mechanisms. I inject a ‘territorial frame’ in such mechanism-oriented approach.
Tilly (1984) called encompassing comparisons. It is within this specific typology that I focus here. Tilly describes them as follow:

“Encompassing comparisons begin with a large structure or process. Then select locations within the structure or process and explain similarities or differences those locations as consequences of their relationships to the whole” (1984: 125)

At the macro-historical level, I seek to account for particular “big structures and large processes and to chart their alternative forms.” Thus in order to establish the macro-causal analysis that links clientelistic politics and territorial politics, I need to select the appropriate ‘locations’ and from here explain similarities and (especially) differences in terms of their structures and processes. Accordingly, a first and immediate task then, is to translate my conceptualization of the sub-states in a way that provides, as far as possible, a meaningful but still flexible unit of analysis for the scope of such an encompassing comparative approach.

The methodological goal is to use such sub-state as encompassing units of analysis that can grasp the macro-structures at work within the context of the mechanisms that underline clientelistic politics and then influence territorial politics. The second task is to study the relationship between the set of processes occurring within each large structure in terms of differences or similarities. In using such encompassing units of analysis, I aim at understanding how different territorial politics fabricates within sub-state spaces and what structural factors explain their political forms - e.g. “constituency service” and “predatory” political clientelism. Furthermore, encompassing units of analysis attempt to capture and grasp the set of mechanisms generating political clientelism within each respective macro-historical context in terms of past and future directions. Accordingly, the logic underpinning encompassing comparison allows us to
proceed as follows: Based on the construction of our territorial, administrative and political units, I restrict our inquiry on the sub-state level analysis, both historically and geographically. I proceed in this way, in order to decipher the patterns of variation of our variables of interest at the macro-aggregate level. I locate in these units their territorial referents and then I aggregate the data pertaining to all variables of interest at the macro-level - e.g. infrastructural spending, preference voting, etc. Our principal scope is in fact that of explaining the underlying causes for these patterns at the macro-aggregate ecological level (Rokkan and Dogan, 1969). I do not seek to account for individual behavior, even though I may draw on individual level research for the generation and then the testing of our hypotheses.

Thus, in general, the sub-state political space will be my main units of territorial reference. However, since my focus is establishing causal impact of how clientelistic politics affect territorial politics, when necessary I aim at discerning temporal as well geographical variation on sub-state territorial units. The study of aggregated patterns (at the macro-regional level) may then shift towards more a disaggregated one, thus tracing outcomes within small territorial units (counties, provinces, etc.). I may refer to these types of territorial units as micro-regional level of analysis. When I talk about a macro sub-state and micro sub-state level of analysis in the context of encompassing comparisons, I simply refer to the multiplicity of meanings that I attached to the concept of sub-state political spaces; namely, the idea that it denotes a spatial dimension, which might also be territorial, political, of social interaction, economic, or even functional. Macro sub-state and micro sub-state units of reference are nested entities, even though they invoke the same concept: that of sub-state political space. That is, an encompassing
comparison entails the study of a multiplicity of nested territorial entities within an
existing state. I summarize this complex issue with the aid of Table 11, where the
partition of our nested sub-state political spaces offers the empirical plane that covers our
conceptualization of encompassing comparisons.

Table 11: Encompassing comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units of encompassing comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial unit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-state (SI and CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Legenda*: SI = Southern Italy; CA = California

First, recall that a sub-state political space refers to a given territory having
multiple, but still continuous and intersecting boundaries with respect to the boundaries
of the correspondent political space of interest. For my purpose, the empirical translation
underpinning the encompassing comparison means that the state of California functions
as a macro-territorial unit. For Southern Italy, the eight regions forming the so-called
Mezzogiorno function in this research as the other encompassing macro-territorial unit.
Both these macro-territorial units emerge as an aggregation of administrative and
political units. Second, such a macro-region forms a multiple macro political space,
defying a set of administrative and political units that, for the object of our analysis,
presents a distinct variation in clientelistic politics (provinces, counties and incorporate
cities); a variation that I study by the analysis of the relationship between
allocation/distribution of spending and electoral outcomes (e.g. incumbent advantages,
Third, these sub-state political spaces are located within the periphery but outside national governments, thus helping to distinguish those institutions responsible for binding decision-making and thus useful as a measure of territorial politics. In this way, with the aid of an encompassing comparison, I can analyze the different institutional structures forming the Southern Italy and California environments (e.g. administrative and political units), and then unpack the impact of such structures on the logic and mechanism underpinning territorial politics. For my purposes, then, the use of an encompassing comparison became a crucial methodological strategy to study sub-state political spaces as a coherent territorial entity possessing a set of institutions that may help to explain variations in the macro-contexts in which territorial (and clientelistic) politics operates.

This definition of encompassing comparisons and of its main components is intentionally minimal. My methodological assumption is simply to define a particular set of discrete geographical objects to be used in the empirical evaluation, while in a second step evaluating their influence on the overall territorial (and clientelistic) politics. This includes the extent to which a sub-state political space exercises pressure toward political clientelism through its own set of institutions (e.g. electoral systems, forms of governance, party systems, etc.). It also involves the extent through which the agents that mediate between center and periphery (e.g. political representatives) navigates among the various territorial units (e.g. province, communes, counties, geographical districts, etc.) in order to strongly influence the central government for channeling financial resources.

57 Wolfinger and Greenstein (1969) offered one of the few attempts to think about California as a macro-regional unit; for the case of Southern Italy important to develop a macro-territorial vision that can be adapted to my purpose has been the work of political geographer Francesco Compagna (1964). Even though their conceptualization does not relate directly to political or electoral behavior both authors indirectly offered a possible model to be adapted to my own scope.
crucial to their re-election. These elements are crucial since I deal with two radically different political systems. Accordingly, I built an encompassing comparison that centers on California as a sub-state political form of governance decentrated, due to the federal structure of the USA government. On the other hand, I developed a different form of encompassing comparison for the case of Southern Italy, a sub-state form of governance that shifted from centralization to a complicated form of devolution. To the extent that both sub-state political spaces exert an independent influence over binding decisions that relate to the channeling of resources to their nested administrative and political units, I describe them as autonomous in terms of the mechanisms that underlie territorial politics. The reason to focus on such autonomy is that as is well known, the concept of sub-state space is slippery, stretching above and below the national state, and thus I aim to be flexible in my empirical analysis. In fact, historically, the concept of sub-state space, similar to its progenitor ‘region’, has evolved primarily as a space between the national and the local.

This space, that I may call a ‘meso-space’ had been playing a distinguishing role in the field of territorial politics and specifically as a unit of analysis within a particular state. However, empirical work on territorial politics has not been methodologically appreciative of its constituent elements. This is well stated in the research of Michael Keating, who argues that:

“A region is the result of the meeting of various concepts of space. It is also an institutional system, either in the form of a regional government or as a group of institutions operating on a territory” (1998b: 11).

---

58 See respectively, Muscarà (2001) and Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010: 4-11). Jonas (2012) and Agnew (2013) provide analytical reviews of the literature on the concept of ‘region’ in the field of geography.
The territorial, administrative and political dimensions of a sub-state political space that I defined previously in tracing the contours of a sub-state as unit of analysis, encompasses the ‘institutional system’ operating on a macro-territory. These dimensions thus work out as our macro-territorial units by which I aim at disentangling the ‘big structures and the large processes’ that lead from clientelistic politics to territorial politics. Furthermore, encompassing comparisons help us to trace more deeply the macro-historical and macro-geographical sequences by which the two sub-state spaces evolved over a long span of time (see Chapter 4, 5 and 6). According to Tilly, there are inherent advantages in proceeding along the methodological path signed by encompassing comparisons:

“Encompassing comparisons have twin advantages: directly taking account of the interconnectedness of ostensibly separate experiences and providing a strong incentive to ground analyses explicitly in the historical contexts of the structures and processes they include” (Tilly, 1984: 147)

Our choice to follow such a methodological path attempts to exploit both of those ‘twin advantages.’ On one side, I trace the interconnectedness of territorial and clientelistic politics; on the other, I ground our analyses in the macro-historical and macro-geographical contexts on which territorial (and clientelistic) politics are based.

Encompassing comparisons is thus our methodological strategy to unpack the ways territorial (and clientelistic politics) work across space and time.

Ideal-types

Having defined the unit of analysis (e.g. macro-regions), and illustrated the way I chart the big structures and the large processes (e.g. encompassing comparisons), I now turn the attention to our final theoretical yardstick: namely, that of ideal types. Ideal types
are the basis of logic procedures deployed in a vast range of topics by German social scientist, Max Weber. They figure prominently in his entire scientific production, spanning several fields and covering immense fields of research. My interest here is not to deal with the overarching architecture of Weber’s theoretical works, but more modestly to extrapolate from his methodological writing and his substantial empirical analysis, a viable and productive use of this peculiar logical and methodological concept.\(^5\) My point of departure is that Weber’s form of comparative analysis rests upon the utilization of ideal types. One of his main concerns was that ideal types never strive to provide an exhaustive description of empirical reality, but only precise even if partial construction of such reality. As such, Weber does not introduce general laws or theories in his historical-comparative research and rarely defines overarching processes. In this sense, the scope of ideal types is quite modest. There is indeed a strict relationship between ideal types and the methodological assumptions that, according to Weber, should guide forms of comparison, and a form of macro-comparison as well.\(^6\) According to Weber:

“A genuinely critical comparison...should be concerned with the distinctiveness of each […] two developments that [are] finally so different, and the purpose of the comparison must be the casual explanation of the difference” (Weber, 1976: 385; emphasis in the original)

Ideal types thus help to construct the ‘distinctiveness’ of two or multiple paths of development in order to stress their differences, and only when this is done can causal

---

\(^5\) For a general introduction to Max Weber’s work and life see Käsler (2004); Bruun (1972/2012), Burger (1976) and Albrow (1990) are three of the most penetrating analysis of Weber’s methodology; recently, a clear reconstruction of Weber’s complex methodologies and their epistemological background is in Eliaeson (2002).

\(^6\) Among sociologists, Kalberg (1994 and 2012) offers the most complete discussion of the nested structure of Weber’s comparative and macro-comparative analysis and the ideal type level of inquiry that support and guide it.
assessments of such difference be explained. In this sense ideal types are just ‘heuristic aids’ (Kalberg, 2012: 122). As Weber wrote in “The ‘objectivity’ of knowledge in social science and policy” (1904), ideal types have a distinctive character, in that they help to construct and reconstruct the set of abstract interrelations and events that historical life contains. These set of interrelations clarify the internal consistency of a given phenomenon, and thus through the “theoretical accentuation of certain elements of reality” the complex rendering of reality is excavated. The idea of ideal types thus opens this possibility for socio-historical research, because, as Weber argues:

“This possibility can be important, and even essential, both for heuristic purpose and as an aid to exposition. In research, the ideal type seeks to render the scholar’s judgment concerning causal imputation more acute: it is not a ‘hypothesis,’ but it seeks to guide the formulation of hypothesis. It is not a depiction of reality, but it seeks to provide [the scientific] account of unambiguous means of expression” (Weber, 1904/2012: 125; emphasis in the original)

In contrast with many schools of historical, sociological and political thoughts, idea types are the distinguishing level of analysis that Weber deploys in his own empirical and historical research. Their role is to develop quasi-models of analysis, in order to assist 1) the understanding of an ever-changing and ever-flowing reality, and to facilitate 2) a clear conceptualization of the particular case or development under investigation (Kalberg, 1994: 84-87). Ideal types are analytically oriented tools for all multiple forms of historical comparisons. I suggest that this should also be extended to geographical comparison as well. Their scope is neither to introduce general laws in causal explanation nor to provide an exhaustive description of empirical reality. Rather, ideal types play a double role. Weber assigns this role in the following way:

“[The ideal types […] has the status of a purely ideal limiting concept against which reality is measured – with which it is compared – in order to bring out certain significant part of the
empirical substance of [that reality]. Such concepts are construction…” (Weber, 1904/2012: 127; emphasis in the original)

Thus ideal types as ‘purely limiting concepts’ help a) to measure reality, and then 2) to compare it. As Weber emphasizes repeatedly, the ideal type is a ‘theoretical construction’, and its operative structure assumes the form of a genetic concept deployed in the course of socio-historical comparative analysis. Such a construction provides the genetic content by which ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘causal explanation’ emerges from and through comparisons. In doing this, ideal types help to uncover and disentangle the multiple layered structure of historical life and the events that organized it. Ideal types aim at capturing the uniqueness of socio-historical events, and what is typical or distinctive about them. By the accentuation of the ‘one-side’ or ‘point of view’, rather than providing general schema to subsume reality, ideal types serve to define the scope of “discrete empirical cases” (Kalberg, 1994: 87).

Table 12: Analytical compass of ideal types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plane of reference</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genetic concept</td>
<td>Isolating causal and essential</td>
<td>Abstract and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>characteristic</td>
<td>pure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis-forming</td>
<td>Indicating the direction in the</td>
<td>Generative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>formation of a hypothesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heuristic means</td>
<td>Formulating possible point of view for empirical research</td>
<td>Regulative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematization</td>
<td>Measuring interpretatively the historical-empirical reality</td>
<td>Constructive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results/Outcomes</td>
<td>Processing interpretation of new possible connections</td>
<td>Open-ended/Innovative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Based on Weber (2012: 124-137); Kasler (2004: 242)
In this sense, an ideal type is a yardstick by which to anchor empirical comparative analysis: as tools, they have a prominent constructive incipit. In Table 12, I extrapolated what in my view are the structuring principles of Weber’s construction of ideal types that are suitable for my purpose. I can distinguish Weber’s ideal types’ formation and construction by five major categories, classified according to three sets of criteria: first, their plane of reference; second, their scope, and finally, their form. The first category that of ideal type as a genetic concept, has the primary function of isolating causal and essential characteristic of territorial (and clientelistic) politics. In their more abstract and pure form I identify the constituency service and the predatory character of how political clientelistic elements differ between California and Southern Italy. The second category, the ideal type conceived as a hypothesis-forming device, helps to indicate the direction in the formation of my hypothesis. First, that the allocation and flow of financial funds related to infrastructural and developmental aid is channeled by political clientelism; and second, that the variations in the territorial/spatial distribution of such aid structure and govern electoral outcomes (e.g. exchange of bloc of votes in return for allocation of resources). This is my generative form. The third category, that of the ideal type as a heuristic means, structure the formulation of my possible point of view in my empirical research: namely, that the distinctive character of political clientelism depends on its territorial strategies and its underlying mechanisms. This regulative function allows us to study the territorial linkages established from the different patterns of correlation that I found between the channeling of resources over localities and electoral advantages and incentives by political representatives. The fourth category, that of the ideal type as a systematization tool, functions to measure by means of a focused
paired comparison, the historical and geographical empirical reality underpinning the construction of clientelistic politics in the two sub-state political spaces and its own different regimes over time. This version should allow us to compare, as in an experimental design, the impact of our variable of interests (proportions of public and infrastructural spending by different territorial, administrative and political units, incumbent advantage by senator and local electives, preference voting, etc.) on the fabrication through different form of clientelistic strategies of radically opposite forms of territorial politics. This is my more properly constructive form, where I am seeking to disentangle the ‘big structures and the large processes’ that from clientelistic politics have led to territorial politics by means of our encompassing comparative approach. Finally, the last and fifth category that of the ideal type as a procedure for capturing the results or outcomes of our research, should help us in eventually processing the interpretation of new possible connections. These connections can emerge between the various modus operandi I assign to political clientelism (e.g. efficient and bureaucratic in the case of California, coercive and factionalist in the case of Southern Italy) and their underlying mechanisms (e.g. transparent and statutory in the case of California, crime and corruptive-prone in the case of Southern Italy). This final form is open ended and it is oriented toward an innovative formulation about our overarching theme, namely the role of clientelistic politics in fabricating different form of territorial politics in two sub-state political spaces.

Conclusion

In searching for a methodological foundation to what I designed as a macro-analytical perspective, I argue that it is necessary to shift the analysis of territorial politics
and political clientelism towards a different level of analysis. I indicate this as the sub-state level. This level, which I unpack according to different territorial, administrative and political units, is fundamental to our perspective in revealing crucial clues about the political geography of the two sub-state spaces that are under scrutiny here. Accordingly, I demonstrate how the idea of encompassing comparisons works out as a grounding historical-geographical principle. This principle set up a group of units that are capable of capturing the nested structures in which different patterns of clientelistic politics are at work. Thus I project a territorial frame in the macro-context in which the two sub-state spaces are organized, not just in purely territorial forms, but also, and this is crucial for our reconstruction, from the institutional framework that underlie the administrative and political formation of territorial (and clientelistic) politics. By tracing the changing forms, studying the big structures and the large processes, underlying the historical-geographical variations of political clientelism, I aim to demonstrate that territorial politics is strongly affected by the macro-contexts that interact with the two sub-states over time and especially over space. My methodological foundation then assumes its final form with the aid of Weber’s analytical constructs which stand under the rubric of “ideal types.” In this chapter, I delineated the most important features of my methodological tools, and argued that they represent the most appropriate theoretical level of analysis for my macro-analytical perspective. These three set of methodological yardsticks (e.g. sub-states as units of analysis, encompassing comparison as an analytic procedure, and ideal types as a theoretical compass of analysis) flesh out the scaffolding that supports my macro-analytical perspective. In Part II and Part III, my goal is to give substance to this perspective by examining, first the political history of the two sub-state political spaces,
then their key institutional transformation, and finally, the major regimes of clientelistic politics over time. It is to this task that I now turn my attention.
4. A political history of two sub-state spaces

Money is the mother’s milk of politics.
*Jesse M. Unruh*

Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come e’, bisogna che tutto cambi.
*Tomasi Di Lampedusa*

In this chapter I offer a historical survey of the political history of the two sub-state spaces. I focus specifically on the respective political development paths of Southern Italy and California, with an emphasis on the major turning points and shifts from one historical period to another. I will trace the role of political parties and discuss how their major representatives figure in shaping the contours of such a history. In following my own methodological assumption, this is not a conventional political history; rather it is a by-product of an ideal-type approach, a form of what Max Weber called ‘structural history.’ Following Weber, I chart large blocks of time and their internal development giving only slight attention to the historical events surrounding or being part of such blocks. Within these blocks, I then extract those political historical junctures that lead to a fruitful macro-comparative exercise in highlighting the difference between the political development path of Southern Italy and California. In order to do that, I will first set up a periodization that traces the temporal dimension of it. Subsequently based on such a temporal skeleton, I highlight their major differences in order to capture the main historical roots of their contrasting patterns as they pertain to the structural conditions that from the early 1970s influenced their respective forms of political clientelism. It is a form that, as I argue, has its own peculiar historical trajectory in the macro-context of their respective political development.
Periodization of political development paths

The political development of California and Southern Italy can be understood in terms of a comparative analysis that is based on their historical trajectory. In what follows, the parallelism that I sketch originated in the contrasting modalities in which the overall political landscape in both spaces was constructed over time. Accordingly, my first task is to develop an appropriate periodization, from which the political history of California and Southern Italy can then be fruitfully compared. This parallelism, however, does not necessarily have to be viewed as the mechanical duplication of their political experience. Rather, this exercise should be interpreted as an attempt to compare their political development paths in order to highlight the major macro-level structures and process unfolding over a long period of time in the two sub-state political spaces. If my hypothesis is that since the 1970s, the political systems of California and Southern Italy have moved along a different trajectory in terms of their clientelistic system, then their contrasting political history should help situate that trajectory on a more solid ground.

What macro-level structures influenced their political history? Which macro-processes constituted their political landscape over time? Which agents were the sources of their political trajectory? Through the periodization, I aim to answer these questions, giving historical substance to my comparative analysis. This periodization, a glimpse of the major historical shifts within their respective political histories, thus helps to chart historically their key ‘big’ structural differences and their underlying ‘large’ processes. In short, this encompassing comparative exercise should help trace the ways in which the political structures and political processes formed a developmental path that can

---

61 In what follow I have been influenced by the comparison traced by Simona Piattoni between Italy and United States (2007: 71-115); there of course, the comparative exercise has the nation state as its unit of analysis. In my case, I deal with sub-state political spaces.
disentangle the complex historical trajectory of clientelistic politics in the two macro-regions. Table 13 presents the temporal scansion that characterizes the political development path of California and Southern Italy over time. This table focuses on those critical junctures that punctuated the political development of both sub-state spaces and contributes to the focus of this chapter by capturing the key turning points in those political processes that underpin the construction of their contrasting clientelist politics. It is to discuss these critical junctures that I now turn my attention.

**Table 13: Southern Italy and California political development ‘paths’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Southern Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political junctures</td>
<td>1849-1900</td>
<td>1850-1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900-1923</td>
<td>1860-1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1924-1941</td>
<td>1876-1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1942-1954</td>
<td>1901-1921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The first juncture: Early business patronage (1849-1900) and the roots of notable’s clientelism (1850-1860).* In its first state elections held in 1849, Democratic candidates received the most support, and in September 1850, California was admitted to
the Union. At the time, Democrats controlled both houses of the legislature, and the California Democratic Party was officially constituted in March 1851. Slavery weakened and factionalized the Democratic Party, leading to the growth of the Republican Party which gained strength forming coalitions supported by the big business interests in the state (e.g. mining, railroad building and banking). However, weak party organization in both the Republican and the Democratic camps was the norm. The elections of 1860 split the Democratic Party into several factions, and the Republican Party became affiliated with the business-controlled patronage emerging in 1861 with the establishment of the Southern Pacific Railroad. This weakness in both parties led outside forces (e.g. business elites and bureaucratic representatives) to organize patronage around a different set of exchange procedures. From the ‘spoil system’ of the Jacksonian democracy, California politics transited to a ‘business patronage system.’

Indeed, the structure of the State politics during this period became dominated by the Southern Pacific Railroad. Martin Shefter summarized this period in the political history of California as follows:

“Politics in California during this period was ridden with patronage, but the state’s party organizations was weak. The most powerful force in state politics during this period was not party organization, but rather the Southern Pacific Railroad. The most influential political figure in California was not a party boss, but rather the head of the railroad’s Political Bureau” (Shefter, 1994: 179)

The Southern Pacific Railroad through lobbyists in Washington obtained subsidies in federal bonds and was granted ten million acres in public land. In a decade, the Southern Pacific Railroad established a virtual monopoly in the state’s railway system and in all forms of land transportation. In 1861, the railroad magnate Leland Stanford, running on a

---

62 A brief overview on the role that federal patronage played during this period in California political history is presented by Williams (1973: 57-81).
Republic ticket, was elected governor leading to control over state legislation and congressional representation, local politics and influence over newspapers. In California, local politics was influenced by one of the chief lobbyists of the Pacific, William Parker, who connected local elites to the railroad interests. In contrast, the social construction of Southern Italy, a decade before the unification, was still centered on agrarian relationships. Even though feudalism was abolished in 1806, the Southern regions were under control of an agrarian aristocracy, consisting of notables, who retained political power from control over land. This type of political relationship was personalistic and the role of local politics was totally subordinated to the circles of people being close to the local notables through the mediation of familial ties. The local notables profited from the redistribution of land exercised by the Napoleonic state, extending their political power in large areas co-extensively to their enlarged land properties. Furthermore, the notables administered the local commune and as ‘galantuomini’ concentrated their control over the entire political sphere. The sovereignty over latifundia was the source of economic and political power as well.

The second juncture: The Progressive era (1900-1923) and the Unification period (1860-1876). Around 1900, the Republican Party controlled politics in California and the Southern Pacific Railroad controlled the Republican Party. The party through political patronage weakened the local government and the extensive maladministration did the same for the state government, where the spoils system dominated, especially in the harbor and highway-related projects, which were of crucial importance for the Political

---

63 Williams (op. cit.: 206-232) argue that the power of the Southern Pacific Railroad has been overestimated by previous scholarships, and one of his goals is to present a more balanced appraisal of its role within California politics from 1880 to 1896.
Bureau of the Southern Pacific. But the inflow of new immigrants, the rise of a modern urban economy and the establishment of a maturing manufacturing production created the condition for the rise of a new class of politicians united around the goal of undermining the patronage power of the Political Bureau of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and their allied interests. First with the establishment of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League in 1907, then with the rise of the Progressive movement, the California political landscape changed forever. The political credo of the Progressives can be summarized as follow:

“Destroy the railroad machine; destroy the machine by taking nominations away from the parties; destroy the power of privilege and corruptions by returning politics to the people” (Owens, Constantini and Weschler, 1970: 35).

This credo was executed through a set of reforms that ran deeply within the California political and institutional landscape from 1910 to today. The initiative, the referendum, the recall, the institution of cross-filing and of the direct primary system changed the form and content of political competition in California, giving to the Progressives a new set of rules from which to gather an electoral stronghold. The introduction of nonpartisan offices (especially at the local level), the establishment of primary elections to replace closed party conventions and that of the three pillars of ‘direct democracy’ produced a crucial shift in the constitution of the political space. This space was now structured according to: a) the weakening of party organization; and b) the decline in competition in general elections. As a result, the Progressive’s reforms destroyed both the business patronage of the Southern Pacific Railroad and that of the administrative spoils system.

---

64 My understanding of the development of progressivism in California has been greatly influenced by the classical research of Mowry (1951) and Olin Jr. (1968). More recently, Deverell and Sitton (1994), attempt at revisiting the Progressive movement in its complex and often contradictory internal trajectory.
that flourished around the monopolistic control by the Political Bureau (and its allied interests) over the California economy. With the passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act in 1883, which established a merit-based public service system in the federal government and soon extended at all other governmental levels, the decline of state patronage was slowly assured. However, if state patronage declined, the rise of the ‘New Deal’ and the rise to the power first by the Lincoln-Roosevelt League and then of the Progressives engineered a new form of territorial politics, that shifted its focus from local politics to the Federal. The linkages established by Hiram Johnson and President Roosevelt during his many years of presidential power, created the conditions for the translation of federal power into ‘federal patronage.’ Rather than Sacramento, the dispenser of ‘political favors’ was re-centered in Washington, where the federal distribution of patronage involved the new bureaucratic and administrative apparatus built by the “New Deal” legislation, and its millions of dollars channeled over California to retain its electoral politics under close scrutiny and more significantly close control. With the ‘New Deal,’ California territorial politics shifted from the periphery toward the ‘center’ with Washington becoming the ‘capital of favors.’

Similarly, with the Unification, Southern Italy became part of a new administrative state, with an institutional skeleton that reflected the past Napoleonic framework: namely, an extremely high level of centralization.\textsuperscript{65} The aristocracy and the rising local bourgeois class responded by maneuvering through a process of mediation that progressively infiltrated the new Italian parliament. Universal suffrage was restricted to only a few segments of the population and the structure of the electoral body was so

\textsuperscript{65} The historical pre-unitary period in the Mezzogiorno is covered in compact form by Bevilacqua (op. cit.: 25-59)
small that the local notables had few constraints on their becoming the political representatives for the Southern dominant class in the nascent unitary state. The alliance between the Northern capitalists and the Southern agrarians established the new political system based on the exchange between political support and electoral return. The constitution of the parliament and the centralized administrative structure of the state (established in 1865) created the conditions for a politically-mediated relationship between center and periphery. This relationship linked the parliament, the ministers, the prefect and the deputy, and at the end of the chain was the ‘great elector,’ usually the local notable able to mobilize and collect votes for his own parliamentary candidate. As a result, the local notable was the command-chief of the peripheral ‘clientele.’ During this decade, in the Southern regions, we witness the transition from the agrarian to the lawyer’s notables, which became the transmission belt between the nascent unitary state and the rising administrative structure in the periphery of it.

The third juncture: The conservative republicanism era (1924-1941) and the rise of the Left to power (1876-1900). The structural transformations put in motion by the Progressives were slowly accommodated within the Republican Party, which came to control the state legislature and pushed the political agenda further to the right. The political style that underpinned this agenda stressed the issue of nonpartisanship, which had its roots in the Progressive’s agenda. This assumption was based on two criteria: a) that political parties and politicians in general should not be trusted; and b) that democratic government should be based on the principles of efficient business administration at all levels. From Friend Richardson (1923-1927) to C. C. Young (1927-1931) and from James Ralph (1931-1934) to Frank Merriam (1934-1939), all Republican
governors followed these two principles, usually painting themselves as ‘business managers.’ With the Democratic Party being a national force but a non-factor in California politics (due to the disarray produced by the “Sinclair Affair”) during these two decades, the competition became a game between progressive and conservative Republicans. The common thread among the Republican governors was that their nonpartisanship translated into an unfettered individualism, coupled with a pragmatic approach to public policy, a doctrinaire adherence to liberal laissez faire and an open conservative ideology. In the state, politics became a functional expression of its massive population size with its great demands for governmental services and its consequently larger budget. With the reapportionment of 1931, California was given its fair share of congressional and state assembly seats, which constituted the prime factor in the dominance of Republicans, even though the rural-dominated Republican stronghold still reigned in the State senate due to the Federal Plan adopted in 1926. In addition, the era of conservative republicanism was further reinforced thanks to the establishment of the CRA (California Republican Assembly founded in 1934,) which became a sort of political machine ably orchestrated by Earl Warren.

Similarly, with the elections of 1876, which brought the left into power, a new class of politicians emerged in Southern Italy. With Depretis, the politics of transformismo became entrenched in all relationships and the closed circuit that from the center ascended to the periphery was reinforced from the electoral return, in which deputies elected in the South (plus islands –e.g. Sicily and Sardinia) amounted to over 63% of the total.66 Mainly consisting of lawyers and public servants, this new class of

66 The development of transformismo and its nuances is well covered by Musella (2003) and Sabbatucci (2003).
politicians became the transmission belt of the politics of *transformismo*, making the South the major reservoir of votes for the emerging left government. The politics of *transformismo* created a system of representation for the Southern regions controlled by a small body of professional politicians that functioned more as political brokers rather than as party men. This resulted in the development of a set of mutually depending linkages that from the control of local public administration, especially of the Commune Council, and from the control by the local prefect of the composition of electoral and administrative lists, lead directly to the ministers, deputy and up to the Parliament. This resulting linkage has been aptly described as following:

“The Prefects assumed such an important role in the political system of the new state that the system has been described as being a ‘prefectocracy’” (Fried, 1963: 120).\(^{67}\)

Accordingly, in the Southern regions, the political system centered on *transformismo* became constructed through stable coalitions based on the manipulations of elections and the capillary distribution of government patronage. The prefects, the local professional politicians, and the court of notables and their clientele became the supporting pillar of an electoral machine that linked the center and the periphery for the years to come.\(^{68}\) In 1882 there was a slight enlargement of universal suffrage, and the electoral system was changed from uninominal to plurinominal, where each collegium could elect from two to five deputies. Used until 1890, this electoral system attempted to consolidate the party system in the Parliament, but in 1892 it returned to the uninominal system (with few changed in the quorum now lowered). The opposition of the Southern notables and their politicians delayed the extension of universal suffrage, and the political system in the

\(^{67}\) The term ‘prefectocracy’ was coined by Gaetano Salvemini in 1954.

\(^{68}\) A glance at the circuit linking, in the Southern Italy between 1860 and 1914, prefects, the local professional politicians, and the court of notables and their clientele through personal relationships and political exchange is offered with detailed historical material by Musella (1994).
South remained personalistic and patronage-based, with the construction of restricted electoral clientele being the pillar of the exchange of political support in return for votes.

*The fourth juncture: The Warren era (1942-1954) and the consolidation of the Left to power (1901-1921).* The Republican dominance in a state that has a democratic majority was based on four factors: a) incumbency; b) cross-filing; c) gerrymandering; and d) widespread newspaper support. The Earl Warren governorship from 1943 to 1953, stamped with the slogan of ‘nonpartisanship,’ was one of key contributors to such dominance. As the main founder of the CRA (California Republican Assembly), Warren created a shadow party organization that formally gave Republicans a political structure to coordinate, organize and run political campaigns, thereby getting around the legal restrictions established by the Progressives. Furthermore, Warren fully exploited the cross-filing system, which gave an advantage to incumbents who cross-filed on Democratic tickets in order to defeat Democrats in the primaries.

Warren’s liberal standing and political support produced a very activist governorship that used financial outlays to subsidize social services of all kinds, and directed public spending to upgrade material infrastructures (e.g. roads) as well social infrastructures (e.g. education, state institutions and state services, such as public hospitals, health system, etc.). Particularly important was the establishment of an ‘individualistic pattern’ of political visibility. Warren stressed a personalistic style of campaigning, characterized by a search for independent forms of funds and the formations of his own political organization separated from the party’s organization. Warren attempted at the same time to a) restrict lobbying activities (with the passage of more stringent lobbying legislation in 1949 and 1950 in order to contrast the main
lobbyist organization, controlled by Artie Samish) and b) control the influence of special interests, which his Democrats predecessor, Culbert Olson, cultivated through appointment of civil servants in the administration.  

In contrast in Italy, the left consolidated its control over the Parliament under the government of Crispi, who promoted the reform of the administrative system, inaugurating the so-called ‘meridionalization’ of the public system. More and more public offices were used by the left to expand their electoral based in the Southern regions, by creating a model of patronage politics around the public administration: the administrative system functioned as a form of social mediation. With the first Giolitti government (1902) the role of the peripheral prefects became even more crucial in gathering electoral votes in the South. The Parliament became an articulation of territorial clientele structured along the continuum center-periphery with the ‘prefectocracy’ playing an increasing role as transmission belt especially in the South. 

The political system under Giolitti deeply degenerated. First of all, the electoral process and the vote became a ‘commodity’ to be exchanged; second, corruption increased; and third, the manipulations of local elections were guaranteed by intimidation and even use of force. The “Giolitti system” attracted much criticism, but none more vehemently denounced it than the Southern leftist intellectual Gaetano Salvemini.  

In his most famous publication, Salvemini showed in detail the gross and openly manipulative nature of local elections in the small communes of Southern Italy, calling

---

69 I shall return with a more detailed treatment of the role of Artie Samish within California politics between late 1930s and 1950s in Chapter 6.

70 Salvemini (1910, reedited in 1919) illustrated the manipulative and corrupted feature of elections under Giolitti, demonstrating with a wealth of direct sources the extent, scope and depth of the nature of political exchange between the Italian Parliament and the local notables in various localities of the Mezzogiorno.
the Italian premier ‘Ministro della mala vita.’ The nature of these elections was dependent upon the role of the prefect, whose principal goal was:

“to mobilize the government’s standing electoral machine in the constituencies” […] especially “local notable” who were “susceptible to bribery and other forms of inducement, such as decorations and senatorial appointments. In the existing small constituencies, it was not difficult for the prefect to strike bargains with the dominant cliques for support of the ministeriali in exchange for government favors, such as schools, contracts, and railway concessions”(Fried, 1963: 123).

In this way national and local politics were inherently intertwined: the Italian Parliament during this period became a confederation of local clientele. The approval of extended universal suffrage in 1919 and the change of the electoral law (e.g. the adoption of a proportional system with scrutiny of the list) created the condition for the emergence of an important party, structured around a different political exchange system. But the abrupt rise of the Fascist regime in 1924 postponed the rise of the new system, and froze the Southern regions into a one-party dictatorship until 1945. That said, Fascism engineered a new form of territorial politics, in which the vertical centralization of power completely undermined the role of the peripheries – in which the ‘prefects’ were now under the complete and direct control of the Fascist party apparatus – and re-centered the political landscape towards the ‘center.’ This arguably became the most important pre-requisite for the development of the new form of political clientelism: a clientelism that looked toward Rome as the ‘capital of favors.’

*The fifth juncture: The Knight and ‘Pat’ Brown era (1955-1969) and the rise of mass party clientelism (1946-1968).* Under Governor Goodwin J. Knight (1953-1959) California government turned a bit more conservative, stressing moderation and using
public spending to expand a liberal program through a host of initiatives aimed at targeting pensions, worker’s compensation, and various types of insurance policies (especially unemployment and disability). Knight however, turning for political support to organized labor, fell in line with the right wing faction of the Republican Party. On the other side, since the early 1950s, the Democrats began to re-organize the party, creating a number of Democratic Clubs which then constituted the foundation for the establishment of the CDC (the California Democratic Council) starting in 1953. Both the clubs and the CDC functioned as the organizational structure at the grass roots level to revitalize the party, producing the election as Attorney General Edmund Brown, showing that they could be united behind the party slate of candidates.

This was the outcome of the amended cross-filing law (first in 1952, then definitely repealed in 1959). An initiative required cross-filing candidates to show their party affiliations on the ballot, thereby increasing the power of parties to select their candidates and put together their slates in both the primaries as well in all other state elections. Taking advantage of missteps within the Republican camp involved in an increasingly factionalized politics, the Democrats obtained a landslide victory in the elections of 1958 electing the only Democratic incumbent holding statewide office as the new Governor of California: Edmund ‘Pat’ Brown. As soon his office was inaugurated, Brown reconstituted the administrative and bureaucratic structures by replacing all previous employees. As Rarick argues,

“By comparison to the sparse patronage opportunities offered by the attorney general’s office, the governor’s chair was fertile ground from which to reward supporters. He told all of Knight’s political appointees – those not protected by civil service – to submit their resignation” (Rarick, 2005: 114).
During his governorship from 1959 to 1966 Brown expanded enormously the state budget, which doubled under his tenure by pushing public spending towards all sort of social services. Moreover, perhaps more importantly, Brown undertook massive infrastructural projects: at one side the implementation of the California Water Project, thanks to the Burns-Porter water bonds legislation; on the other, the restructuring of the higher education system through the Donahoe Act and the establishment of the Master Plan. Crucial for the realization of such massive projects was Brown’s reorganization of the state government in 1961, which restructured the administrative and bureaucratic branches of California’s government.

Similarly, retaining some of the conservative traits of Fascism, Southern Italy’s political system too used public spending to enhance a more liberal set of policies. This system was reborn once the Fascist regime and the one-party dictatorship collapsed in 1945. From 1922 to 1943 there were no ‘formal elections’ but thanks to the peculiar institutional re-organization of the state administration under Fascism, the Southern regions became a stronghold of a new form of ‘prefectocracy.’ The Prefects were directly under the control of the Fascist Party and the establishment of the dictatorship simply reinforced the centralistic tendency of the old Napoleonic state, making the periphery just an appendage to the control from the center. Indeed, at the referendum to choose the new form of government, Southern Italy voted en mass for the monarchy. Italy as a whole voted 45.7% for the monarchy, whereas the South (plus the two islands, Sicily and Sardinia) voted respective 67.4% and 64.0%. When seen through the lens of regional distribution, all regions voted higher on the Monarchy, from a lower 56.9% in Abruzzi e Molise to the higher 76.5% of Campania. All Southern communities with a population
above 100,000.00 inhabitants voted higher than the median for Italy, with Taranto a lower 51.4% compared to the Sicilian ones, which were well above 81%. All Southern provincial capitals voted lower than the Italian median, with the higher being Enna at 39.9% compared to the lower being Messina (both towns located in Sicily) at 14.6%: without question, the old notables did not appreciate the Republican form, and found in the Christian Democratic Party their own ‘transformistic avenue.’ In both the elections for the Constituent in 1946 and in the first election for the Deputy Chamber in 1948, all of the Southern region channeled their majority of votes towards this party. The Christian Democrats received 35.2% of the vote in Italy, and the Southern regions voted close to it, with Sardinia being the higher at 41.1% in comparison to Basilicata being the lower at 31.3%. In 1948 this trend was reinforced: as a whole the Christian Democratic Party received 48.5% of the vote in Italy; in the Southern regions, it received from the lower 47.9% in Sicily to the higher 56.1% in Molise, beginning that ‘meridionalization’ of the voting pattern that will mark the Republican period of Italian history.

How did this ‘meridionalization’ trend come about? Various explanations have been offered; however, in the context of this research, I will focus on the role of the Christian Democratic Party in gathering electoral support through the ‘continuation in new forms’ of the old pattern of clientelistic politics. This continuation resulted in a new structural platform: the mass political party. Once universal suffrage was extended to the entire population (above the 21 years old age), the political party transformed itself: from the ‘party of notables’ it became the ‘mass clientelistic party.’ In the Southern regions, this transformation channeled notables within the mass structure of the Christian Democratic Party. With the retirement of Alcide De Gasperi in 1953, the re-organization
of the party by his newly elected secretariat Amintore Fanfani in 1954 gave the Christian Democrats a new structure to coopt the Southern notables. By penetrating into all the wheels of the State administrations, thereby creating a strategic alliance with lateral organizations (like the Coldiretti in the agriculture), and by organizing the party into ‘factions’ that competed for the supremacy within the party and from there for the control of the major public sources of the state, the transformation of the Christian Democrats into a modern mass party received a formidable push. A new cohort of Southern urban professionals attached to the administrative structure of the state slowly emerged as the stronghold of the new mass party for the Christian Democrats. Thus the party became the centralized site of political exchanges, the filter of new political demand for the deprived masses of the South, and the channels of ‘favors’ from the periphery to the center. This new structure of the mass party received Fanfani’s support during the center-left experiment in the mid-1960 (1963-1968), when the Socialist Party became effectively the new partner in the South for the distribution of public resources and for the accumulation of electoral support.

The sixth juncture: The Reagan, “Jerry” Brown and Deukmejian era (1970-1992) and the degeneration of mass party clientelism (1968-1992). The axis of power formed by ‘Pat’ Brown and Jesse Unruh was not sustained during the meteoric rise of Ronald Reagan and the tax-related revolt that pushed it. Reagan was elected governor in 1966 and was then reelected in 1970, extending his power until 1975. The Republican Party cemented around Reagan, ideologically protesting the mammoth distribution of public resource, although, in reality, their policies followed the same pattern. Budgetary expenditure continued to growth, public campaigning and the cost for running for office
continued to rise, and soon the state was on the edge of a fiscal peril. The main reason for this was the unforeseen effect of the passage of Proposition 13, brought to the political landscape by the Jarvis and Gann’s initiative. Proposition 13 on June 1978 passed by an almost two-to-one margin, and the immediate effect of the initiative was to slash property taxes from 2.6% to 1%. Both property owner and business (whose tax saving rose to 63%) received their pay back for supporting the initiative, but it was a different story for the local governments. In one night they lost about 22% of their revenue coming from local taxes and their budgeted expenditures was now on a shrinking path. The only possible outcome was to run to Sacramento in search of extra financial funds. The empowering of Sacramento is aptly described as follow:

“By slashing local property taxes revenue, putting up higher barriers for local passage of taxes and bonds, and giving the legislature the authority to divvy up remaining property tax dollars, Prop 13 was the Great Centralizer” (Mathews and Paul, 2010: 49-50).

The power of the ‘Great Centralizer’ was reinforced by the passage in 1990 of an initiative that limited the assembly members to three two-year terms and senators to two four-year terms. This reinforcing effect channeled its energy towards what Artie Samish called in his dazzling memoir the ‘short cut man.’ Whereas Proposition 13 shifted power from local government to Sacramento, the imposition of term limits turned politicians into a body of short-timers seeking fund-raising supporters and financial benevolent alliances. This powerful combination elevated the power of special-interest groups and of lobbyists to an unprecedented level.

In contrast, in Southern Italy there was no equivalent of ‘Proposition 13’ type of measure. Rather, the distribution of public resources and the politically-mediated structuration of the administrative institutions had a dual impact on key engine of the
political system: namely, the mass party clientelism. The rise of Bettino Craxi and the Socialist Party transformed the rule of the game for political competition, pushing the Christian Democratic Party into a degenerative path. In 1970, the Regions and then the Regional Councils were instituted. As result, the institutional structure of the Italian state began a contradictory decentralization path. In fact, this shift of power from the center to the periphery was short-sided, since the central state controlled much of the fiscal and financial funds. This mechanism was in play with the mediating role of the parties, which in the Southern regions still controlled much of the necessary vote to remain in power.

However, the increasing public debt, the shrinking of public funding, the decreasing distribution of politically-mediated resources strained the mass party structure, and the shrinking pie increased factional politics within parties thus contributing to the rise of new class of Southern politicians now structurally dependent on the power of party leaders who could dictate and control the channeling of a shrinking fund from the Parliament.

As result, the Christian Democratic Party, historically organized by factions, fragmented itself into more and more factions, increasing intra-party competition to control key positions in those public and private sites where sources could be first controlled, then divided and finally distributed at a the high return. The allocation, distribution and redistribution of public resources shifted from mass-oriented to portfolio-oriented, where the return was higher for their investment: namely, a higher bloc of votes. Political exchange, accordingly, took a sharp turn towards all types of corruption, where political representatives (and their closed circle of servants) became the ‘collector of dirty money’ more than anything else. Competition for the shrinking pie eventually
degenerated into collusion with organized crime in several regions of the South. Mafia in Sicily, Camorra in Campania, Sacra Corona Unita in Calabria, and other local forms of organized crime became crucial components of this deep-seated corruption, where political exchange translated into favors of any type as long as the local structure could return a higher bloc of votes that could then be used to control a faction, rise to power within the party, and move up to the chain of clientelistic politics that from Rome shadowed down all over the regions of Southern Italy. In 1982 the principal public resource pipeline, the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, was abolished. The only financial transfers came from the centrally controlled European government in Bruxelles and the rising debt ceiling put even more strain to the already draining political exchange system. Once operation ‘Clean Hands’ revealed the depth and extent of politically-mediated corruption in Italy (and in many Southern regions as well), the degeneration of the mass party clientelism took its toll: under its roof only a massive stash of bills was the real medium of exchange. It was a medium that the judiciary system used to break the party system of the ‘First Republic,’ and transition it into the so-called ‘Second Republic.’

Conclusion

The political history of Southern Italy and California shows their contrasting developmental path. While in the latter, the role of political parties was constrained by the set of reforms created during the Progressive Era, in the former the dominance for over 40 years of one single party (e.g. the Christian Democratic Party) during the so-called Republican Era, structured its role as the fundamental agent of mediation between the center and the periphery. The internal development and the historical junctures helps trace the crucial differences between the two sub-states spaces, which can be summarized
as following. On one hand, Southern Italy started as an agrarian-oriented form of
clientelism with the local landlord and its small circle functioning as their main agents of
representation, whereas due to the dominance of the Southern Pacific Railroad, in
California, we witness from the early star a predominant form of business-oriented form
of patronage politics.

This initial, and decisive contrasting pattern then set a historical trajectory that
shows a divergent set of structural constraints and options with which the respective class
of politicians had to deal. The emergent local notables in Southern Italy, while
transforming themselves from agrarian to professional politicians, still maintained a
central role in the functioning of the political system, withstanding the dark period of
Fascism. Their mediating role increased, and found in the Christian Democratic Party a
main filter from which to structure political exchange. In contrast, in California, the
weakening - due to the Progressive’s style of reforms - of the party system, and then the
rise of a covert ‘political machine’ run by Artie Amish, left the state political system open
to the influence and penetration of outside forces: namely, special-interests and lobbying.
At the beginning of the 1970s, these two sub-state political spaces arrived with a very
different set of conditions leading then to a significantly different form of political
clientelism. It is a form that at one side led to a candidate-centered style of representation,
whereas on the other side led to a mass party-centered one. These two styles presuppose a
different set of institutional arrangements, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
5. Institutional transformations

Interests, not people, are represented in Sacramento.

*Carey McWilliams*

E’ quale e’ la forma organizzativa di questa corruzione, di questo generale personalismo della vita politica meridionale? E’ il nascere di quella catena per la quale i deputati servono i ministri alla Camera, e questi, a mezzo di organi governativi asserviscono ai deputati le amministrazioni locali.

*Luigi Sturzo*

The contrasting patterns of political development between Southern Italy and California did not happen in a vacuum. Accordingly, in this chapter I focus on the institutional structures that constitute the macro-context in which clientelistic politics display its working power. At the center of the analysis are those administrative and institutional changes that in both sub-state spaces influenced the transformation of their political structures. In particular, my purpose is to concentrate selectively on those changes that highlight the different set of conditions that favored or constrained political representatives in seeking the enactment of particularistic forms of representation in exchange for electoral benefits. These benefits depend very much on where the monopoly of resources (to be allocated, distributed and redistributed) is located. From an institutional perspective, whereas in Southern Italy, through the mediation of the mass party the government had that monopoly, in contrast in California, the set of institutional reforms proposed and actuated during and after the Progressive Era, located it within the state legislature, which is composed of ‘individuals’ seeking reelection, not party members as in the case of Southern Italy. In the latter, the party constitutes the political link between the center and the periphery and in this way establishes a reciprocal dependency between local and central power. In the former, the weak form of party
organization led to the rise of powerful external agents represented by special-interests and lobbying activities, which became the major context of operation in controlling the state legislature. Martin Shefter captured this process in a synthetic formula:

“The destruction of party organizations in the state also left California’s political system vulnerable to penetration by outside forces” (Shefter, 1994: 184)

Accordingly, I trace out in what follows the institutional conditions that set up this ‘penetration of outside forces’ in the political system of California, and compare it to the different institutional patterns as a product of universal suffrage, the role of the mass (clientelistic) party in Southern Italy, and the creation of the new administrative structure starting in the 1970’s. I will first examine the California case and will then discuss that of Southern Italy.

*California: The Progressives’ institutional reforms and the rise of the “Lobby State”*

In order to grasp the entrenchment of ‘outside forces’ within the California political system, we need, first of all, to re-read the institutional path as it was set up during the Progressive Era. This institutional path centered on the weakening of party organization, which is the crucial distinct variable that distinguishes the form of clientelistic politics rooted in California from that of Southern Italy. How did such a weakening come about? Which lasting effect did it have it over the function of political exchange in California? My claim is that the institutional transformations instituted by the Progressives between 1911 and 1926 undermined the role of political parties as the key mechanism of political representation, and thus served as the pillar of political exchange (see Table 14 for the list of major reforms instituted during the Progressive Era). The key Progressives reforms all concentrated in making the political party the less
viable agent of such an exchange until the late 1950s. The initiative, the referendum, and the recall were sponsored by Republican governor Hiram Johnson beginning in 1911 and adopted in both state and local government. Through the initiative procedure, the people themselves originate and passed statutory laws and constitutional amendments. Referendum by petition was used to prevent laws that had already been passed from going into effect. Finally, by means of the recall, voters in California could remove from office any elected state official before the expiration of his terms.

Table 14: The Progressive institutional reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The initiative, the referendum and the recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The cross-filing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extension of civil service throughout the state government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The creation of direct primary system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The direct election of United State Senators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1909, a law establishing the direct primary system allowed only supporters of a party to receive the party’s nomination. This system created elections preceding the general elections. In the primaries, a candidate was nominated to be a contestant for each party in the general election. In this way, the average voter was given a voice in the nomination process, which otherwise took place within the party structure. The direct primary thus gave to the man in the street a direct opportunity to express his choice of a candidate. With the institution of the cross-filing law in 1913, partisan requirements were eliminated thereby permitting an individual candidate to file for the nomination of more than one party. Furthermore, the introduction of nonpartisan offices (especially at the
local level), the establishment of primary elections to replace closed party conventions, and the push for ‘direct democracy’ produced a crucial shift in the constitution of the political space. This space became structured around a nonpartisan election game that severed linkages between political parties and possible clientele. The fundamental outcome of this game was to considerably weaken the party organization, because these reforms undermined the tendency to benefit incumbents in the elections, and disrupted party unity and party discipline. Thus, seen from an institutional perspective, these reforms did not only change the form and content of political competition in California, it also gave to the Progressives a new set of rules from which to develop an electoral stronghold. More importantly, it reduced political parties to a mere appendix of electoral exchange between political representatives and their voters.

This established a candidate-centered political system that was to run its course even after the cross-filing law was repealed in 1959 by a bill passed in the California legislature by a predominant Democratic majority. Concomitantly, the Progressives reformed the governmental hiring practices in 1913, replacing the ‘spoil system’ (which allowed appointments on the basis of political and personal loyalty to a party) with a civil service system providing for many jobs to be filled by a competitive examination.\textsuperscript{71} The creation of such merit-based civil service throughout all the levels of state government undermined the ‘old patronage system.’ Thus the weakening of the party organization and the removing of patronage opportunities strongly reduced the role of political representatives as a mediator of clientele, creating a vacuum which ‘outside forces’ could fill.

\textsuperscript{71} This trend was reinforced in 1934 when the state employees themselves successfully sponsored a constitutional amendment that extended civil service coverage, provided for promotions on the basis of merit, and established an independent state Personnel Board.
If the Progressive Era produced a candidate-centered political system, it was reinforced in 1966 with the reform that professionalized the legislature structure. With the passage of Proposition A-1, the California legislature was re-organized as a professional and full-time job. This re-organization process was the result of the cooperation between Governor ‘Pat” Brown (as mediator among different political interests) and the Assembly speaker Jesse Unruh (through commanding legislative support). Such cooperation had reciprocal benefits:

“By expanding and professionalizing legislative staffs, establishing annual year-around sessions, increasing legislative salaries, and assisting in reapportioning the state Senate according to the one-man, one-vote formula, Unruh helped to upgrade the legislature to number-one status in the nation and gained reputation for himself” (Putnam, 1994: 263).

’Even though Brown and Unruh held different political views, they developed a legislative alliance that translated plans and project into actual bills. Brown mediated between business interests and Unruh manipulated the California Assembly and the Senate’s political representatives, succeeding in getting majorities in voting legislation that satisfied multiple clients. The power of Unruh became as extended as the money he was distributing through bills and the legislatures with the pressure from lobbying groups. Proposition A-1, which was strongly and capably pushed by Unruh through the California legislative maze, had a crucial institutional unforeseen effect on the relationship between politicians and ‘outside forces: namely, it increased enormously the cost of running for office. Unruh remarked in his late memories:

“The overwhelming change which took place between then and now happened outside the legislature and overtook the legislature – the enormous cost of running for office. In a way, you could say the reforms of the ‘60s could have been entirely successful but the entire ship of state was swamped by the rising tide of campaign costs. Raising money for election campaigns has
become the number one priority. Everything else has become subservient to that single goal. The remark, ‘Money is the mother’s milk of politics,’ which I quoted but did not invent, could be restated in terms that it is the mother’s milk, the meat and potatoes and the dessert and frosting of politics now. Whatever changes we would have made in the operation of the legislature in the ‘60s would have been overtaken by this single phenomenon” (Boyarsky, 2008: 170).

The cadre of professional politicians competed for an extremely valuable position, since becoming part of the legislature meant to get a high return in power over legislation, power that would subordinate multiple interests to the actions that an elected politician would make within the California legislature. As result, Unruh and the new professional corps of politicians became the centralizing point of millions of dollars in state funds and bonds that affected special-interest groups, who in turn returned favorable passing legislation in Sacramento with crucial financial support for re-elections. An astute observer of California politics has summarized Unruh’s role in such a centralizing process:

“A master of the techniques of pressuring special-interests groups to donate campaign money, which he dubbed ‘the mother’s milk of politics,’ he soon became unbeatable in his assembly district and thereby in a position to deflect funding from such groups to the election campaigns of fellow legislators who did him the service of voting ‘right’” (Putnam, 1984: 52).

In short, after Proposition A-1 was approved, special-interest politics and lobbying flourished. The enormous increase in the cost of running for office and the parallel increase in the overall campaign cost, resulted in the cadre of professional politicians being financially dependent on special-interest groups and lobbyists. Indeed, special

---

72 This parallel rise of special-interest politics and lobbying is somewhat slightly different from the type of lobbying activities put forward by Artie Samish from late 1930s to mid-1940. I shall return to such difference in Chapter 6.
interest politics and lobbying ‘overtook’ the California legislatures from the mid-1960s and at an increasing pace.

The third and final important institutional transformation affecting California’s political system was the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. If the Progressive Era reforms effected the mechanism linking political representative to their voters, and if the professionalization of the California legislature changed the relationship between politicians and their financial brokers, Proposition 13 shifted the terms of governance between different levels of the political system. This political system was born decentralized, due to the federal structure of the United States Constitution. However, the passage of Proposition 13 radically affected California’s decentralization, a process that took deep shape through the tax-revolution wave and that continued through other state-centered propositions. Approved by California voters in 1978, the Jarvis-Gann initiative limited property taxes to 1 percent of property valuation (minimally adjusted each year) until the property was sold.73 Since property taxes constitute the major revenue source for local governments, their budgeted expenditures were now significantly reduced. Cuts in budgets decreased the availability of funds and this resulted in the empowering of Sacramento, which became the central nerve of finance, and with that, of political power.

Thus when seen from an institutional perspective, Proposition 13 had two major effects on California governance. It reduced the revenues of local governments (immediately after the passage a massive $4.85 billion bailout bill has to be approved for saving many local governments and reached nearly $70 billion in 2010) and, perhaps more fundamentally, it removed the authority of cities, counties, and districts to

---

73 For the institutional side of the story surrounding the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, see Citrin (2009) and Martin (2009) respectively.
determine the size of their own budgets. Before 1978, local agencies could set property
tax rates to raise the revenue they needed to provide a locally determined level of public
services. After 1978, one large side effect of tax and expenditure limitations directly
following from Proposition 13 was to cause the activities of government, including
infrastructure financing, to devolve from local to state governments. Thus, rather than
fostering independence from federal finance, Proposition 13 actually produced the
opposite effect: namely, an increasing dependency of local government on federal power.
Indeed, recent research shows how per capita state and local capital outlays expenditure
in California have increased correspondingly with those of the United States (both local
and total) after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Thus from a strict institutional
perspective, perhaps the most important outcome of Proposition 13 was the synchronic
reduction in the authority of local governments and the shift of power from local
government to Sacramento.

How did such a synchronic process, which resulted in the increased dependence
of the State of California on the federal government affect political representatives? In a
context where the cost of running for office and campaign costs increased exponentially,
the window of opportunity to capture a federal funds created conditions for a significant
political exchange between candidates and special-interest groups and between both
groups and lobbyists. Special interest groups and lobbyists channeled financial resources
towards candidates that would in turn capture such financial resources towards the

---

74 This is, for instance, the argument supported by Cain and Noll (2010), and by Kogan and McCubbins
(2008, 2009). On the impact of Proposition 13 over the entire spectrum of California political machinery,
see especially, McCubbins and McCubbins (2010).
75 See de Alth, S. and K. Rueben (2005: 5) for the data being discussed here.
76 See Schrag (1998, 2006), who is the strongest proponent of the role of Proposition 13 in shaping the
institutional (and financial) pattern in California since its passage.
legislature that would positively affect their respective clientele. In exchange, candidates would increase their chances of re-election. The latter would structure their political career around the construction of a more personal vote strategy and in turn increase their ‘constituency service’ approach to elections. The former would arrange their strategies around the channeling of resources towards those candidates that would have legislative power to exercise centralizing control over the millions of dollars in federal funds and state bonds that affected special-interest groups and lobbyists. The political exchange between passing favorable legislation in Sacramento and receiving crucial financial support for re-elections created, since the passage of Proposition 13, a strong causal linkage that flowed from the rising dependency of local government to federal and state power, resulting ultimately in the rise of an incumbency advantage in the overall California political system. The weakening of party organization, the professionalization of the California legislature and shifts in the terms of governance between different levels of the political system coordinate, thereby making California a special-interests prone political landscape and ultimately a peculiar ‘Lobby State.’

Southern Italy: The shift in institutional patterns and the rise of the “Corrupted State”

In contrast to California, Southern Italy’s institutional trajectory and its shift all revolved around the role of the mass party. If party organization was the weakest link in the function of the California political system, it represented the strongest one in Southern Italy. It is by focusing on such a crucial difference that I shall try to explain their radically divergent paths in the form of clientelistic politics that shaped their respective sub-state political spaces. Accordingly, I shall focus on three sets of transformations that highlight such contrasting paths: a) the establishment of universal
suffrage (between 1912 and 1919) and of the new electoral system based on proportional representation; b) the role of the mass (clientelistic) party (1950-1970) and the creation of the new administrative structure (1970). As I shall show in what follows, this powerful combination resulted in a very different form of state and supported a very different set of interests.

The first crucial institutional transformation in Southern Italy was the passage of quasi-universal suffrage by Giolitti in 1912 and then the extension to the entire male population in 1918 through the law produced by the Vittorio Orlando. Finally in 1919, with the law passed on August 15, the electoral system abandoned the majoritarian to become a proportional one. The enfranchisement of the entire adult population (above the age of 21 years) was the pre-condition for establishing the mass party in its modern form. Before universal suffrage was extended to the entire population the electoral system was based on restricted enfranchisement and a uninominal system that advantaged the Southern class of local notables. They transformed the electoral districts into ‘personal feuds’, directing the votes of their local network towards their favorite candidate. From the parliament, notables obtained resources and political capital to reinforce their role as mediator between centers and peripheries. The uninominal electoral system elevated the notables as the center pillar of an informal mechanism that guaranteed the political exchange between local interests and central power. Thus the rise and progressive entrenchment of the so-called ‘transformismo’ was the territorial counterpart of the system of political exchange centered upon the ‘party of notables.’ As Michael Keating aptly noted:

77 This political interpretation of the relationship between centers and peripheries in the Mezzogiorno is largely inspired by the masterful reconstruction of historian Paolo Macry (2012: 106-133). I am grateful to Luca Muscara’ for drawing my attention to such magnificent piece of historical research.
“The territorial expression of TRANSFORMISMO was a clientelistic system. By delivering a solid block of parliamentary votes to the government of the day which might change its complexion from time to time but was never supplanted, southern deputies were able to secure prominent positions in government and were allowed control over patronage within their constituencies” (Keating, 1988: 55).

This ‘territorial expression’ coalesced in what we might call the ‘old clientelism’, the clientelism of the ‘notables.’ This has been described as following:

“The ‘old’ clientelism, was the clientelism of the true ‘notables’, characterized by great inequalities between patron and client. The deference enjoyed by such notables derived from their status as aristocrats, or large landowners or professionals (judges, lawyers, university professors). Their status as notables – together with the deference they received – was taken from granted by them, and accepted by their followers, as an established and more or less permanent fact, unrelated to economic resources, had little to do with the exercise of public power, but flowed instead from their personal wealth, social standing, and prestige – all highly permanent resources which could be utilized in an autonomous and discretionary fashion. Finally the old clientelism of notable could flourish even where organizations was lacking or very weak” (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 36-37).

Accordingly, during the Liberal era (1876-1922), Southern Italy developed an instrumental use of the state, a particularistic conception of political representation and a clientelistic structuring of public institutions and of their respective resources. It created a political paradigm in which the distribution of particularistic benefits over territories was functional to the gathering of electoral consent to be returned to the government and its parliamentary deputies as a means of exchange. The expansion of universal suffrage and of an electoral system based on proportional representation constituted the pre-requisite for the rise of a modern mass party. This is the second institutional transformation to which I now turn my discussion. The ‘old’ clientelistic system survived the Fascist period
and was reconstituted under new conditions by the Christian Democratic Party starting in the early 1950. It is under the dominant role of the Christian Democrats that the state started to expand its bureaucratic and administrative apparatus, and co-extensive to it is the transformation of the political party system from the ‘party of notables’ to the ‘mass clientelistic party.’ Under the leadership of Amintore Fanfani, the Christian Democrats developed a capillary territorial organization, with a subtle penetration of the state and of all bureaucratic and administrative structures by its various party structures, establishing a true monopolistic power through the allocation, distribution and redistribution of public resources in exchange for electoral support: a veritable ‘monopoly of granting favors.’ The shift from ‘granting favors’ to individuals and their ‘feuds’, based on a personalized targeting, toward extended social groups based now on a collective one, created the condition for the establishment of the modern ‘mass clientelistic party’ to which the Christian Democrats in Southern Italy was the most representative prototype. This shift constructed a different form of clientelism, a form that is described accurately as follows:

“The new clientelism is inherently tied to the modern, conservative, mass-based party. It is clientelism derived from, and resting upon, the judicious use of the party organization and public resources. The new clientelistic form was necessary because the resources the old notables were insufficient for the needs of a mass society: the society of the towns and cities experiencing rapid, sometime explosive, urbanization within the space of a few years. The new clientelism is connected, therefore, to the steady enlargement of the scope of state activities, which has occurred in response to the increase in volume and character of demands which have accompanied major societal changes. And the principal instrument through which public resources may be obtained is the apparatus of the Christian Democratic Party. The DC is the dominant force in the central government. As such, it enjoys control over public agencies and state resources. The distribution of these resources, however, have been largely a function of the dynamics of internal party
politics: public resources are distributed throughout the country in accordance with the competitive positions of subnational units of the DC” (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 37-38).

The ‘mass clientelistic party’ was thus a constellation of factions competing for capturing public resources, for controlling the state, for manipulating the bureaucratic and administrative apparatus of the central government. The creation of the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno along the general agencies set up after the war contributed to the massive extension of such constellations, creating a network of clientele controlled by the Christian Democratic Party. During the 1950s and 1960s, this network was built on a new set of strategies which were centered upon allocating jobs in municipal and private services, and on providing social benefits and mass housing in many Southern areas.78 These intricate and convoluted networks constituted the gravitational force forming the Christian Democratic Party constellations; constellations that worked relentlessly on establishing a true system of governance between centers and peripheries until the 1970s. Likewise its predecessor, the expanding entrenchment of the ‘factionalism’ was the territorial counterpart of the system of political exchange centered upon the ‘mass clientelistic party.’

The third and final important institutional transformation affecting Southern Italy’s political system was the creation of Regions in 1968 (which became operative in 1970) and the establishment of the Regional Councils in 1970 (which became operative two years after). The institutional difference between the California federal structure and the Southern Italy transition towards a decentralized system constitutes not just an interesting macro-comparative exercise; rather, it helps to substantiate my claims about

---

78 See respectively, Allum (1973b) and Chubb (1982) who document in details the expansion of municipal employment in Naples and Palermo during this period.
the contrasting institutional path as a pre-condition for the entrenchment of a different form of clientelistic politics over time. Accordingly, I shall attempt in what follows to briefly highlight its major role in the development of a new political space in Southern Italy since decentralization processes took off.

The process of decentralization in Southern Italy has been characterized by what I shall define as a ‘partisan logic.’ By this I mean that the logic of decentralization should be understood in terms of the role that political parties played in determining its outcomes.79 The Republican constitution was the product of mediation between the major parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PC). From such mediation emerged a peculiar territorial design. It was designed as a regional state, with a very little power over the peripheries. Such a territorial design retained strong unitary polity and never invoked a possible transformation into a composite federal state. Accordingly, regionalization was a top-down process, largely guided and controlled by central institutions. Indeed, neither territorial representation (including participation in constitutional amendments) nor fiscal autonomy, were granted to the regions. Furthermore, the constitution has two more peculiarities: the first was that it preserved the architecture of local government,80 the second was that the Italian regionalism was set up as an asymmetrical system, which also contributed to institutional weakness. In fact, the 1948 constitution considered ‘five special regions,’ three located on national borders (Val d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and two islands (Sicily and Sardinia). These regions were granted two institutional features: 1)

79 I follow in this the research of Martino Mazzoleni (2009; 2010: 21-66). I am grateful to Michael Shin for pointing out to me the importance of the analysis on the ‘partisan logic’ in the overall Italian decentralization processes and its implications for my own perspective.80 Such architecture was still ruled by the frame legislation of 1934 directly controlled by central government.
self-rule powers, and 2) the immediate creation of elective regional assemblies. In contrast, the remaining fifteen ‘ordinary regions’ were promised a more limited set of competences and left to wait for state legislation in order to elect their governing bodies.\textsuperscript{81} This asymmetrical system emerged from different political calculations and partisan logics. The large majority of the center that approved this weak form of regionalization wanted to control the autonomist push from the two islands, and preserve its large voting basis. At the same time, it wanted to preserve the territorial articulation of the Catholic vote in the other three regions. In contrast, the left opposed it because it assumed that decentralization would favor the landlord interests in the Southern Italian regions. However, this asymmetric system switched the partisan logic once the Constitution of 1948 was approved and in the following years, the DC became entrenched into the state apparatus. Thus, the DC, which previously was an advocate of regionalization, opposed and subtly delayed as long as possible any form of decentralization.

An important reason for this delay in decentralization was that in Southern Italy, the rising mass party could respectively: 1) profit very much from preserving the traditional alliance between localism and centralism; 2) reinforce its key role as the principal political broker in patron-client relations; and 3) strengthen the relationship between party supporters and the block of votes they could now deliver to it. Indeed, this partisan logic contributed significantly to the electoral outcome in the various Southern regions, where the votes to the Christian Democratic Party did indeed became increasingly concentrated. In contrast, the left and especially the PC became a strong supporter of regionalization, mainly to oppose the partisan logic emerging from the

\textsuperscript{81} This was possible only with the advent of the 1970 regional reforms.
conservative spectrum, while at the same time attempting to penetrate the periphery, where a rising working class constituted the new electoral basis for the hegemonic mass party. As a result of its progressive entrenchment within the status apparatus, since the mid-1940s, the DC commanded at the center, negotiating between national and local politicians mainly via financial transfers and through a newly founded special state agency (Cassa Del Mezzogiorno). In this way, the historical alliance between centralism and localism was deepened to a new level in Southern Italy, becoming a key factor in preserving political support for the DC and her coalition partners (Hine, 1996). This development of a coalition between the DC, PSI (Italian Socialist Party), Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) and Italian Republican Party (PRI) in the 1960s, the first center-left government, was thus functional to the technocratic administration of such political support to the DC in order to weaken the PC in many Southern Regions: an administration that still depended heavily on the voting support coming from the Mezzogiorno.

In the 1970s, partisan logic pushed towards a set of institutional reforms that created a different model of the state: namely, from a highly centralized to a decentralized one. The law to create ‘ordinary regions’ passed in 1968 and the first regional councils was subsequently elected in June 1970. Two years were required for the central government to issue decrees transferring powers, funds and personnel to regions, so that only in 1972 were regional governments operative. Ordinary regions were

---


83 See among many recent research on this topic, Catanzaro, Piselli, Ramella and Trigilia (2002) Cerulli Irelli and Pinelli (eds., 2004). Chiaramonte and Tali Barbieri (eds., 2007) and Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte (2000) cover in detail the relationships between electoral and institutional changes at the regional level.
only given the means to become operational in 1977 (DPR n. 616). However, and this is
the real effect of partisan logic, much of the control over fiscal matters remained strongly
centralized in the Italian government. Consequently, due to the increasing administrative
decentralization to local governments throughout the post WWII period, the progressive
rise in sub-state shares in public spending (which moved from 18.0% in 1951 to 26.8% in
1980) was strictly commanded by the DC and its various coalitional alliances. The
increase in public spending channeled financial funds in the Southern regions in return
for electoral support. However, since regional finance would completely depend on state
transfers, after the fiscal reform started in 1971 sub-state revenues dramatically dropped
from 14.7% in 1950 to 3.2% in 1980, shrinking the amount of money that the DC and its
electoral alliances could use for developing clientelistic politics at the local level. The
partisan logic was reinforced at the legislative level, because the Italian parliament kept
on legislating in matters devolved to regions: much of this legislative production was in
the form of leggine given out to solidify particularistic exchange through the mediation of
the various factions progressively forming within and around the DC.

As result, regions were never given power, and the decentralization process was
piloted by the various party factions, which became the crucial transmission belt in
shaping center-periphery relations since the mid-1970s. Thus through decentralization,
party factions rather than the newly created regions became important in representing
territorially-based interests. These interests in turn became increasing dependent on
factional politics and the various party mechanisms that constructed an alliance between
centralism and localism. The rise of factional politics thus reinforced the existing patterns
of clientelist intermediation in the southern regions of Italy, where clientelist politics
became the dominant mode of political exchange for governing parties. Partisan logic, increasingly structured around factional politics since the mid-1970’s, did not just weaken the regionalist challenge to centralism, where regions rather than autonomous polities operated as agencies of central government, but perhaps more importantly, created the condition for transforming factions into full-fledged corrupted agents of intermediation. The decreasing availability of financial transfer at the local level pushed factions toward a corrupted *modus operandi* in the gathering of electoral support. The increasing factional practices completely obliterated the boundaries between patronage, clientelism and corruption, which in several Southern Italy regions and localities became practically indistinguishable (Musella, 2000: 101-137; Allum and Allum, 2008).

Accordingly, this extreme form of factional politics underpinned a mode of territorial politics that entrenched the local political classes as the essential intermediaries between centers and peripheries, thereby creating a financial era for the Mezzogiorno as a whole, where resources to be channeled over territories in return to political and electoral support were inexorably shrinking. The factional politics from the periphery was carried deeply in the center, where the entire administrative and bureaucratic system became functional to its expansion and penetration giving rise to a new form of State: the ‘Corrupted State.’

*Conclusion*

This comparative historical analysis of administrative and the institutional changes suggests that different sets of conditions have deeply affected both sub-state political spaces. As I argued, these conditions and their powerful combination supported

---

84 See respectively Baldi and Baldini, 2008 and Romanelli, 1995, for the historical reconstruction about how since the formation of Italian state autonomous polities operated as agencies of central government.
a very different set of interests, which in turn led to a very different form of state. Such a combination also marks different forms of clientelistic politics and affects the way they operate. In both sub-state political spaces, political representatives in seeking enactment of particularistic forms of representation in exchange for electoral benefits, faced a different set of institutional options and constraints. In Southern Italy, the monopoly of resources (to be allocated, distributed and redistributed) was channeled over territories through the mediation of the party structure, which historically transformed itself from ‘mass-based clientelistic’ to ‘factional.’ In contrast, in California, the set of institutional reforms concentrate such monopoly within the state legislature. Party members and their respective ‘factions’ in the case of Southern Italy, and ‘individuals’ seeking reelection in the case of California were the key agents involved in controlling, channeling and distributing the resources on a territorial basis. In the institutional context of California, special-interests and lobbying activities became the major filter of operation set up to achieve control of the state legislature. In contrast, in the institutional context of Southern Italy, the party structure and its faction became the Archimedean point from which powerful linkages were politically established between centers and peripheries. This Archimedean point was the outcome of a long history of partisan logic that in Southern Italy led to a clientelistic and factional-prone political landscape, which ultimately produced a ‘Corrupted State.’ In California, the Archimedean point clustered within the state legislature, as a result of the historical weakening of the party organization, the professionalization of its legislature and the shifts in the terms of governance between different levels of the political system. These factors led to a special-interests prone political landscape, which ultimately produced a ‘Lobby State.’ Having reconstructed the
institutional path in which clientelistic politics operated, it is now time to probe more deeply into its various manifestations as they have developed historically in both sub-state spaces, a topic that will be discussed in the next chapter.
6. Clientelistic politics regimes at work

Where there are many interests to be served, there is always competition for favors.

*Carey McWilliams*

Alle clientele, il governo sempre assicura il suo appoggio.

*Ettore Ciccotti*

The chapter reconstructs the different regimes of clientelistic politics in both sub-state political spaces over a long period of time. Previously, I established that their political history and their respective institutional paths led to contrasting forms of clientelistic politics. We are now in the position to reconstruct these different forms in a more formal way. My argument is that clientelistic politics operates over time according to various regimes and that these different regimes have developed historically in both sub-state spaces following to their own specific logic: a logic that was contingent to a set of given historical conditions. However, before such logic can be explored, it is important to establish a definition of clientelistic political regimes, which in this context can be understood as the dominant set of particular institutional configurations relative to a given historical period that form a general and relatively coherent form of political exchange among the agents involved.

Thus the idea of regimes characterized by clientelistic politics is an attempt to provide a structural schema or template by which to consider the dominant forms that particularistic-oriented political exchange takes historically. I attempt to accomplish this task by relying on the fourth category of ideal type presented in our methodological chapter. Recall that by this category I refer to an ideal type as a systematization tool. Its main function is to measure by means of a focused paired comparison, the historical and
institutional reality underpinning the construction of clientelistic politics. The analysis of these various regimes of clientelistic politics is done in the more constructionist version of our ideal type analytical compass. Here I am seeking to disentangle the ‘big structures and the large processes’ that preside to the construction of the different regimes of clientelistic politics and their transition from one regime to another. As such the ideal type constructed here are different from their pure form previously presented. What is different here is that this construction is presented in a more formal and analytical compact form, aiming at capturing the logic of these different regimes over time. Accordingly, the main goal of this chapter is to put the previous analysis into a more formal (even if qualitatively oriented one) way. Following the same template of the previous chapters, I examine first the California case, then I turn the attention to the Southern Italy one.

Clientelistic politics regimes in California, 1849-1992

The construction of clientelistic politics regimes implies the idea that by tracing out a set of structural similarities in the distribution of favors in return of political (and eventually electoral) support, I can then point out the form and type of political clientelism that crystallized over time in the two sub-state political spaces. In short, this typological exercise aims at identifying from such similarities a corresponding set of structural differences so that their respective logical outcome can be reconstructed. Which type of political clientelism emerged from such differences? How were such different clientelistic politics regimes formed? How can this set of structural similarities and differences be identified? I shall answer these questions by isolating in an abstract form the principal structural components underpinning the various forms in which
clientelistic politics regimes took shape over time. With the aid of Table 15 I now shall look at those components in detail.

**Table 15: Clientelistic politics regimes: California**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>System of political representation</th>
<th>Representation of interests</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of clientelism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849-1900</td>
<td>Amateur</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>Business groups</td>
<td>Privates</td>
<td>Business patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1969</td>
<td>Amateur</td>
<td>Party candidates</td>
<td>Special-interest groups</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Special-interest clientelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1992</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Lobbyist organizations</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Lobbying clientelism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I shall isolate three major clientelistic politics regimes in California. They covered about 150 years of its history. Each regime is constituted by a set of structural variables, namely: a) the type of politicians; b) the system of political representation; c) the type of interests that are represented; d) the type of resources that are available and that can be used; and finally e) the type of clientelism that emerge from the combinations of these variables. For each variable, I can then identify its correspondent key category as it emerges in a specific time frame. In their combination, structural variables and their key correspondent component or category form a building block that produces a conceptual matrix of the different clientelistic politics regimes as they evolve over time. However, it should be clarified preliminarily, that the temporal frame is not continuous. Indeed, between the first and the second regimes, there is the interruption caused by the Progressive’s reform, which, as I argued previously, changed the entire political landscape in the State of California. However, even this interruption found an analogy with Southern Italy, where the same occurred during the rise of Fascism. As documented

---

85 The same will be done for the case of Southern Italy.
in the previous two chapters, these different political regimes – e.g. Progressivism and Fascism – created the conditions for the establishment of a similar form of territorial politics: a form that looked at the ‘center’ as its proper political reference as expressed through increasing centralization of power. With this preamble in mind, I offer a more concrete analysis with the aid of a series of flow charts. In California, the first regime was all organized and structured around the Southern Pacific Railroad businesses.

Figure 1: California - Southern Pacific Railroad business patronage system
Figure 1 charts the logic of the first regime in its all structural linkages. It covered especially the years 1861-1900: that is, the period from which the Southern Pacific Railroad exercised a dominant power over California politics until its demise by Progressive’s reforms. During these years, politicians were mainly amateurs, and the Pacific Southern Railroad had easy control over them. This control was strongly exercised at that time through the dominant Republican Party, which, with the mediating role of the Pacific Southern Railroad lobbyists, had complete hegemony over the California legislature and strongly influenced the choice of the State Congressional representation. The form of political exchange was organized by the Southern Pacific Bureau through financial support to State representatives and Congressional delegates, and turned into complete corruption towards local politicians who were initially opposed to the power of the monopolistic railroad colossus. In this way the control of the Republican Party was translated in the control of State politics and its politicians at all levels of the government.

The system of representation was thus a monopoly of the Southern Pacific Bureau, and such monopoly represented the interests of the various business groups linked to the expanding railroad and transportation systems. The key resource, finance, was thus a private one. The various business groups used their own money to monopolize politics in exchange for political favors that guaranteed them monopoly of the various business resources from which their profit emerged: namely, monopoly over a) railroad’s California system; b) harbors; c) highways; and finally probably the most important of all, d) the State’s land. The form of political exchange and its main mechanism – financial support to amateur politicians - guaranteed to the Southern Pacific Railroad the
construction of what I define as a “business patronage” system. Monopoly over key resources was constructed politically, using financial support in return to politicians and the dominant Republican Party to exercise control over the system of representation, which in turn was a pre-condition of the monopolistic power of the Southern Pacific Railroad over California politics and its key economic sectors. This ‘business patronage’ system was broken by the rise of Progressivism, which institutional reforms, as I argue previously, first undermined this system and then created a more democratic political landscape. However, the demise of this ‘business patronage’ system did not last too long. It was resurrected from the early 1930s, and perfected between 1940s and 1950s, by “The Guy Who Get Things Done:” that is, Artie Samish. Figure 2 illustrates the ‘logic’ of the new system put at work by Samish from 1931 to 1950.

In order to dominate the California legislature, this system under Samish assumed a peculiar form, a form that transformed political exchange into a formidable apparatus to protect and push special-interest politics over everything else. This new system created by Artie Samish, and which constitutes the second clientelistic politics regime has not attracted the attention of historians, with the exception of Carey McWilliams. Based on McWilliams’s research, I shall attempt to highlight briefly the main structural components of what I shall call “Artie Samish political clientelism system.” How did this system come about? McWilliams offer a clear answer in the following passage:

86 This is the title of Carey McWilliams’s famous piece in The Nation, published on July 9, 1949, which for the first time called attention to the role played by Samish in California politics. McWilliams had already done that in his main publication, California: The Great Exception, published in 1949 as well. But it was his piece in The Nation, and the publication of two articles by Lester Velie in Collier’s – “The Secret Boss of California” – on August 13 and 20, of the same year, that put Samish on the radar of the large public.
87 The only historical research was done by Rusco (1961) in his PhD Dissertation, which meanly deal with Samish’s relationship with the brewer and beverage industries.
“With party discipline at a minimum, a vacuum has been created in Sacramento which had to be filled; if neither the governor nor the political party chieftains could boss the legislature, someone has to undertake this function and that someone was Artie Samish who has referred to himself, quite accurately, as ‘the guy who gets things done’” (McWilliams, 1949/1999: 200).

Figure 2: California - Artie Samish political clientelism system

The Progressive’s reform weakened the political party to the point that the legislature became the real object of control. Artie Samish’s political clientelism system thus set up the organizational structure to exercise such control. As in the previous years, politicians were still in a large sense amateur, and the weak party organization by both Republicans and Democrats reinforced this status. Since Samish’s organization had the goal of controlling the legislature, for him neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party
constituted a vehicle for channeling the organization’s interests. In fact, in his autobiographical notes, Samish was clear about that:

“I didn’t care whether a man was a Republican or a Democrat or a Prohibitionist […] All I cared about was how he voted on legislation affecting my clients” (Samish and Thomas, 1971: 34-35).

Accordingly, the form of political exchange organized by Samish’s organization was completely functional to his ‘clients.’ Who were these clients?

In Figure 2 (see on the bottom the rectangular) I identify them with the special-interest groups, such as trade associations (wholesale and liquor associations, gambling and horse-racing associations, motor carrier associations, brewers associations, etc.) and professional organizations. These were the building blocks of Samish’s interest groups clientele, which was organized by Samish as follows:

“When asked to represent a special interest group, his first step is to organize a trade association, if one is not already in existence, and to secure a contract as its ‘public relations counsellor.’ […] Once he has a contract with the trade association, he will secure the legislation in which the association is interested, or repeal or amend ‘unfavorable’ legislation” (McWilliams, 1949/1999: 201-202).

Following the organization of his clientele and having established its main ‘interests,’ Samish’s organization targeted legislators who would be ‘friendly’ to those interests. This system was labeled by Samish himself as “Select and Elect:”

“Determine which assembly district and senate seats that were up for election; establish a fund for campaign contributions’ spread the money (in cash) where it would contribute more to elect candidate for assembly and state seat; set campaign contributing ranging from $250 to $1,000 – from $10,000 to $20,000 for close elections; lay out the money for specific cost (e.g. printing bills, headquarters rental, rally or radio announcement, etc.; political propaganda using ‘billboards […] free of charges, courtesy of the brewers and liquor dealers” (Samish and Thomas, 1971: 120).
The exchange system worked through targeted financial support to legislators who would return the ‘favor’ of being elected – that is, they would get votes bypassing favorable legislation to Samish’s clients. In this way, by directly controlling legislators, Samish had control over California with the support cast of lobbying that exercised pressure to favor special-interest groups. The system of representation was thus organized around parties’ candidates with complete indifference to their affiliation to the Republican or the Democratic Party. In summary, the interests represented were strictly those of the various special-interest groups linked to Samish’s clientele. The key resource, money, was public, and was legally dispensed by the special-interest groups through specific funds controlled by Samish. Samish then used this public money to put at work his “Select and Elect’ system.

The form of political exchange and its main mechanism – financial campaign in return for votes for passing favorable legislation - guaranteed to Samish’s organization the construction of what I define as a “political clientelism system.” This system was built around the control of large bloc of votes in the key place in California’s political power: the state legislature. McWilliams summarizes as follows the logic of Samish’s system:

“From 1931 to the present time Samish has controlled a large bloc of votes in the state legislature. Control of this bloc is tantamount to control of the legislature, as this bloc usually elects the speaker of the Assembly, who appoints committees. Majority control of two or three key committees carries with it, of course, the power to kill in the committee or send out a ‘do-pass’ recommendation most important piece of legislation” (McWilliams, 1949/1999: 203).

The control over the state legislature translated into control of California politics. Since this ‘political clientelism system’ as McWilliams astutely noticed, ‘could not be
challenged at the polls,’ it was partially demolished through a federal investigation that pushed Samish out of the California legislature. But his system did not disappear altogether. This is because Samish’s political clientelism system established the role of lobbying and its organizations at the center of the state legislature, and from there to playing a significant role in California politics. Lobbying in connection to special-interest groups thus pervasively penetrated the political landscape: the ‘outside forces’ now took advantage of the institutional weakness of parties and the increasing state intervention in the overall machinery of both the government and the economy. It is thus around this role that the third clientelistic politics regime has been built since the late 1960s. The purpose of lobbying is to influence government policy in a way that protects and benefits the lobbyists’ clients and their special interest. During the period from 1970 until 1992, the expansion of government machinery and its regulatory bureaucracy created new layers of administrative steps that enriched the business for lobbyists’ organizations.

With the 1966 reform engineered by Jesse Unruh, the California legislature was fitted with professional politicians, whose career increasingly depended on their legislative performance. Party affiliation and ideological positions were not relevant to produce and pass bills that would eventually satisfy special-interest groups, especially when these bills involved millions of dollars. Accordingly, the individuals became the new class of aspirant legislators, men that lobbyists’ organizations and their clients (e.g. special-interest groups) could easily ‘select and elect.’ Thus the system of representation became organized around candidates regardless of their political standing. The escalating costs to run for office create a market for channeling campaign finance to control both party nominations and from there control ‘special candidates’, who, once elected, would
vote favorable legislation for the lobbyists’ clientele. Accordingly, lobbyist organizations became the real interests being represented in California politics. The California legislature, its legislators and the control of committee assignment under the close supervision of the centralized Assembly speaker (from Unruh to Willie Brown) functioned as a transmission pipe for those special-interests clientele. The resulting clientelistic politics regime is sketched with the aid of Figure 3, which offers a glance at its main structural components.

The distribution of resources linked at once the California State and the US Federal State, with the California Senators extracting federal funds and money to finance massive infrastructural projects and distribute patronage in the administrative and bureaucratic machinery of the now multiplied layers of the California government. The rise in available resources coming from the federal government in conjunction with the California state government enhanced the possibility of exchanging favorable legislation in return for the financial support necessary for getting elected. Votes were traded to get to Sacramento and from there to protect the interests of those lobbying organizations that financed candidates’ expensive political campaigns.

The regimes that I shall refer to as ‘lobbying clientelism’ revolved around the power of the so-called ‘Third House.’ The ‘Third House’ operated functionally in a political landscape where the party organization was weak, where a new professional California legislature was engineered and where the expansion of the administrative and bureaucratic form of governance multiplied the interests at stake. Even more, it worked efficiently when and where re-election and a political career became dependent on huge campaign contributions.

---

88 See Michael and Walters (2001).
Figure 3: California – The lobbying clientelism system

Lobbying organizations

\[ \rightarrow \]

Special-interest groups

\[ \rightarrow \]

Campaign finance

\[ \rightarrow \]

Control over party nominations

\[ \rightarrow \]

Control over candidates

\[ \rightarrow \]

California legislature

Legislators

Committees

Distribution of resources

\[ \rightarrow \]

Administrative and bureaucratic patronage

State infrastructural projects

Federal funds

Exchange mechanism:
Both were now prominently linked to financial support for political campaigns to interest
groups and their strong lobbying support (Masket, 2007). In return, California political
representatives were under pressure to deliver ‘bills’ that reflected the special interests of
lobbying organizations’ clients. This lobbying clientelism system had in the California
legislature its own centralizing operative core, where the control of millions of dollars
and bonds was distributed according to political return: a return that involved the
protection and enhancement of benefits for the ever-expanding special-interest groups.
The competition for legislative favors thus multiplied in accord with the expansion of the
many interests that the California legislature needed to be served; and this had to be done
in a consistently efficient manner and without devolving into bribery or corruption. The
huge California regulatory state apparatus thus made the ‘Third House’ business stamped
by a clientelistic mark.

*Clientelistic politics regimes in Southern Italy, 1860-1992*

In contrast to California, the case Southern Italy clientelistic politics regimes offer
a radically different perspective on their historical entrenchment. These regimes
proliferated in a political context where clients were at the same time seeking return in
terms of personal and collective benefits in exchange for broad particularistic goods as a
form of social advancement in a society with scarce resources. Southern Italy’s historical
underdevelopment created different conditions for the rise and expansion of these
regimes, and as was the case of California, we can isolate three of them since 1860,
covering about 150 years of political and institutional history. Table 16 displays each

---

89 This path took a new turn in 1990 with the approval of Proposition 140, which established term limits of
three two-year terms for assembly members and two-four years terms for state senators.
regime as constituted by the same set of structural variables and their combinations previously identified for the case of California.

Table 16: Clientelistic politics regimes: Southern Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>System of political representation</th>
<th>Representation of interests</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Type of clientelism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860-1921</td>
<td>Notables</td>
<td>Elite party</td>
<td>Local notables</td>
<td>Privates</td>
<td>Elite patronage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resulting conceptual matrix of the different clientelistic politics regimes as they evolved over time in Southern Italy offer a clear meter of comparison. As done for the case of California, with the aid of a series of corresponding flow charts, I chart the logic and its major structural linkages that from the center span to the periphery. The first regime covers the years 1860-1921: that is, the period from the Italian unification to the rise of the Giolitti system. That period is presented in Figure 4.

What I shall call the center-periphery clientelist circuit system was not organized in a unidirectional but in a two-way direction. That is, it as a circuit because it functioned as a reciprocal political exchange. The exchange mechanism was structured around votes. The Southern class of local notables - supervised closely by the prefects who controlled the local electorate – organized their own clientele, directing the votes towards their candidate, thus presiding over the election of Southern deputies. Once elected, these deputies controlled government patronage, thus distributing favors to the local notables and their clientele. From the Ministers, who supervised and controlled state patronage, the Southern deputies then extracted public resources that moved them directly to the
Italian parliament, where they could accumulate the political capital necessary to reinforce their role as mediator between centers and peripheries.

**Figure 4: Southern Italy - Center-periphery clientelistic circuit system**

The local class of notables in this way became part of the exchange mechanism that guaranteed the structural linkage between local interests and the central power. This
linkage created a pattern for the first regime of clientelistic politics regime structured around three features: 1) a particularistic structuring of political representation; 2) an instrumental use of the state and of its public resources; and 3) a clientelistic conception of public institutions and its various administrative apparatus. Accordingly, the clientelistic circuit system functioned in a *modus operandi* where the gathering of electoral consent to be returned to the government and its parliamentary deputies served, as a means of exchange for the distribution of particularistic benefits over territories. The system of political exchange centered upon the notables, who represented the small ‘elite party’ associated with local interests. This small party then gathered private resources in order to elect their candidates. This exchange created a circuit that from the prefects transmitted its input to the parliament, with patronage serving to oil the wheels: a form of patronage that was restricted and elitist in nature.

This circuit became even more centralized during Fascism, and after its collapse and the formation of the Italian Republic, the relationships between centers and peripheries took a different shape. The formation of the second clientelistic politics regime is co-extensive to the transformation of the political party system from the elitist ‘party of notables’ to the ‘mass clientelistic party.’ This transformation happened under the dominant role of the Christian Democrats and especially under the leadership of Amintore Fanfani. In Southern Italy, the rising mass party functioned as an apparatus for capturing those votes where they became increasingly concentrated in the Christian Democratic Party. The capture of these votes was thus crucial to the mass party expansion in the Southern regions, and may be attributed to three reason: 1) it reinforced the role of the Christian Democratic Party as the exclusive political broker in the newly
reconstituted patron-client relations; 2) it solidified the linkages between party supporters and the block of votes they could now deliver to it; and 3) by combining both, it thus preserved the political alliance between localism and centralism that was so crucial to the hegemonic role of the Southern interests in regard to their political survival. In contrast to the first regime, now the main resources were public since the state from the 1940s on started to expand its administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. The mass party thus developed in parallel to this expanding apparatus, by enhancing its capillary territorial organization in the Southern regions and by establishing a ‘monopoly of granting favors in exchange for electoral support. This monopolistic power in the allocation, distribution and redistribution of public resources towards Southern expanding social groups established a new infrastructure for political exchange. The resulting regime is presented in Figure 5, which charts what I shall call the ‘infrastructure’ of the mass clientelistic party.

This infrastructure rotated around the filtering role of the Christian Democratic Party, which had a monopolistic control over the flow of public money. Such flow was then distributed in forms of particularistic benefits to the mass, forming the local clientele network, which in return delivered a substantial bloc of votes to the party. Accordingly, electoral support to the party was the exchange mechanism in return for favors. The Christian Democratic Party assumed the form of a centralized allocative agency, distributing these favors in the form of: a) public works; b) aid to local agencies; c) regulations and favorable contracts for the private construction industry; and finally d) special financial transfers to the local banking system. In turn, this first layer of the distributive mechanism provided the lower substratum, by parceling out these benefits to
respectively: e) local bureaucratic agencies; f) entrepreneurial construction groups; and g) real estate speculators.

Figure 5: Southern Italy - The infrastructure of the mass clientelistic party

Local clientele network

Flow of public money

Christian Democratic Party

Electoral support

Distribution of public resources

Public works
Aid to local agencies
Private construction industry
Local banks

Local bureaucratic agencies
Construction entrepreneur groups
Real estate speculators
These benefits were distributed citywide, and the large metropolitan areas in the Southern Italy (e.g. Naples, Palermo and Catania) and their urban-rural continuum were the main geographical targets.\textsuperscript{90} From 1946 to 1968, a new cadres of professional politicians formed the supporting core of the infrastructure on which the power of the new system of representation was based: namely, that of the Christian Democratic Party. The interests represented were consequently those of the mass party and its members, to whom resource appropriations, allocation and distribution were coming from the rising public system – e.g. the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno being its most proto-typical expression.

This type of clientelism assumed the form of ‘mass clientelism’ from which a group of professional politicians received electoral support that catapulted them to the top echelon of Italian politics. The old notables were now replaced by a new class of Southern politicians who envisioned in the Christian Democratic Party a likely avenue to reach the center of political power and from there solidify their own brokering role as the mediators between local demands and central supply. Eventually the mass clientelistic transited to a more developed form, once the public resources became really controlled by the state, to which the parties sitting in Parliament were just another expression. It is in this new context that in the case of Southern Italy, the history of political clientelism since the mid-1970 devolved into a full-fledged corrupt-prone form. The collusion between clientelism and corruption had its roots in the progressive shrinking of public resources and in the aggressive penetration of political parties within the state structure. As the state became fully occupied by parties, public resources were depleted at an

\textsuperscript{90} There is a substantial body of research documenting the city-centered expression of the allocative function related with the mass clientelistic party; see respectively, Allum (1973b; 1997; 2001); Chubb (1982); Graziano (1973; 1976; 1980); La Palombara (1964; 1987); Mühlmann and Llaroya (1982) and White (1980).
increasing rate. As the research conducted in Southern Italy over the last decade demonstrates, political demands became ‘public commodities’, giving rise to political markets where votes were exchanged in return to monetary deposits. Accordingly, a tangent system was structured around electoral support, taking the form of personal votes to party members. As such, since the mid-1980s, a corrupt form of clientelism slowly emerged and then solidified. In Southern Italy, political party representatives worked on capturing control of the shrinking state resources through the tangent system. The peculiar mode of capture was through what I shall terms ‘factional competition.’ This regime is presented in Figure 6, which charts the main components of what I shall call the factionalist-corruped clientelistic system and offer a glance at the interpenetration between factions and state resources.

This system emerged in the early 1970s and lasted until the early 1990s. In this system, factions rather than the party structure, became the principal avenue for transforming clientelistic exchange into straightforward corruption, where money was exchanged for political decisions. This money guaranteed the accumulation of factional power within parties, and in turn expanded the degree of electoral support that was functional to the construction and financial support of factions. Factions were nothing but a form of exercising control over state resources. The leading factions were those emerging with the two parties that in the 1970s were controlling much of these resources: namely, the Christian Democratic Party and the rising Socialist Party under the leadership of Bettino Craxi. Such control is a crucial intervening variable between the scope for particularism that lead to clientelism and the diffusion of corruption (Wallack, Gaviria, Panizza, and Stein, 2003).
Figure 6: Southern Italy - The factionalist-corrupted clientelistic system

- State resources
- Christian Democratic Party
- Socialist Party

- Faction A
- Faction B
- Faction C
- Faction D
- Faction E
- Faction F
- Faction G
- Faction H
- Faction I

- Public infrastructural projects
- Regional Councils positions
- Provincial Councils positions
- Public works and related public positions
- Local administrative positions
- Presidency of local public agencies
- Communal agencies positions

Exchange: Personal vote

Distribution of public and infrastructural spending
This increasing collusion between political clientelism and corruption found empirical support in the research carried by Miriam Golden in her collaborative effort to disentangle the institutional deepening of distributive politics and especially of corruption (Golden, 2003; Golden and Chang, 2001; Golden and Picci, 2005; 2006; 2008). This research demonstrated how the widespread political corruption might emerge out of a patronage and clientelistic-prone system. According to Golden and collaborators, this can occur only when some exogenous factor causes a change in the payoff affecting at least one of the following. Three factors emerge from their analysis: First, the extent to which businesses are willing to pay bribes as part of the cost of doing business with the public sector. Second, the extent to which politicians have an incentive to seek additional illegal financial resources. Third, and finally, the extent to which politicians enjoy a large collective incumbency advantage and do not fear exposure by a credible political rival.

When I apply this framework to Southern Italy, it seems clear that all three prerequisites were at work since the mid-1970s. Factions were thus the main channel toward the distribution of public and infrastructural spending in the Southern regions, which in return was exchanged for a vote that became heavily personalized. The clientelistic politics regimes from 1968 to 1992 was run by professional politicians who were representing the interests of the clientele that belonged to the Christian Democratic Party and its new political alliances, especially the Socialist Party. The interests being represented became exclusively those of the various parties’ factions who aggressively

91 The crucial difference between political clientelism and corruption is that in the case of the latter, as defined by Treisman (2000; 2007), there is the misuse of public office for private monetary gains, whereas in the former this monetary element might not be present as crucial component of electoral support towards a given candidate or political representative. There is a vast literature dealing with corruption, which in many studies tend to overlap with clientelist politics; I have taken into account the following: Cazzola (1988), and Kawata (ed.), (2006). General treatment of corruption I have consulted includes Rose-Ackerman (1999), (ed.) (2006), and Lambsdorff (2007).
competed to appropriate, control and then distribute resources coming from the State, where factions were now a symbiotic element. The parties became the ‘state’ and the state became transformed into an appendage to the party-government. Its factions were aggressively pursuing power and votes became a veritable commodity to be exchanged for particularistic goods. Each party’s factions constructed its own power by allocating and distributing favors to its respective electoral market: infrastructural project, control over Regional, Provincial and local councils, administrative, presidential and communal positions became the object of market exchange, where tangents bought favors and blocs of votes. In Southern Italy, political exchange became thus imbued into fully corrupted clientelism, in which intra-party competition transformed factions into a veritable corrupted machinery for the accumulation of votes.

Conclusion

By comparing the cases of Southern Italy and that of California, I argue that their respective regimes of clientelistic politics developed around dominant forms of particularistic-oriented political exchange that historically produced structurally different systems. In Southern Italy, the hegemonic role of the Christian Democratic Party has structured a fragmented territorial politics due to its factional-prone mechanism in the allocation of public-extracted resources. This process, while factional, still operated in term of party mass clientelism (since at least the collapse of the First Republic in the 1990s). This institutional difference, between Southern Italy and California tends to suggest that a particular form of political clientelism is at work in structuring a political representative’s respective territorial strategies. Specifically, I argue that this different institutional context, in which political representatives operate, characterizes their
different *modus operandi*. The weak party system in California produced a strong tendency towards a form of individualistic clientelism, whereas in contrast, in Southern Italy the strong factional structuring of the dominant party, the Christian Democrats, led to a form of *party mass clientelism*. The degeneration of clientelism into corruption in Southern Italy led to an electoral politics turning into a full-fledged tangent system, which in many cases became co-extensive with the political entrepreneurship of new organized crime (e.g. Mafia, Camorra, etc.). In contrast, in California, the shift in the balance of power from local to the federal state and the increasing dependency on financial support to seek re-election turned into narrowing the scope of the particularistic exchange. Accordingly, the different clientelistic politics regime that emerged in California resulted in a conflict that is not between different factions, but between different electoral bases that was due to the ‘issue-oriented style of politics’ that was entrenched into the state territorial politics. This is a style of politics, I argue, that produces an individualistically-oriented form of patronage, and a form of machine politics that is not based on a party structure but relies on the financial support of small circle of special-interest groups, and increasingly from the mediating role of lobbying organizations. However, the similarities in the distribution of favors in return for political and electoral support produces differences in their logical outcome: namely, taking a ‘parasitical form’ in the Southern corner of Italy compared to the ‘constituencies service form’ developed in California.
7. Patterns of distributive politics (I): Public spending

L’ampliamento delle basi di massa dello Stato nel Mezzogiorno è avvenuto nel segno del corporativismo assistenziale più che nella direzione dello sviluppo produttivo; ha determinate la constituzione di un sistema di potere redistributive e clientelare piuttosto che un rafforzamento e un’espansione reale dei livelli di democrazia.

Francesco Barbagallo

Distributive policies are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. ‘Patronage’ in the fullest meaning of the word can be taken as a synonym for ‘distributive.’

Theodore J. Lowi

In this chapter I offers an aggregate analysis of the patterns of distributive politics in Southern Italy and California across different time frames. The use of different time frames is on one side functional to the availability of macro-aggregate data, and on the other it attempts to capture the contrasting time patterns among the two cases. These data can be distinguished by their temporal patterns: a) a long term one, which for the case of Southern Italy, covers respectively the period 1950-1993 and the period 1980-2006; b) a short term one, covering the sub-periods 1971/1972-1988/1989 and 1971-1998. In the case of Southern California data were assembled for the following time patterns: a) the long term period covering 1971-2006; and b) a short term period, covering 1974-1988/1989. The level of the analysis is in line with our methodological procedures, resolutely macro. By looking at the trend in general public spending and in the level of expenditures, this chapter aims to reconstruct over a long period of time the macro-structure and development of one of the most crucial variables that affects the relationship between the allocation and flow of financial funds related to spending and
the deep determinants of clientelistic political strategies. In fact, it is assumed that the availability of public resources can reduce or increase its distribution over targeted constituencies and as such influences the way in which political exchange between spending (e.g. financial resources) and votes is shaped over time.

From this point of view, the distributive politics of public spending, that is at the center of this chapter can be considered as the first index of an underlying pattern of distribution, one that reflects: a) the structure of political exchange between political representatives and their respective constituencies; and 2) the linkages between territorial politics and political clientelism. It should be noted initially, that the data presented in this (and the following two chapters), do not offer a definitive proof, but rather suggest more modestly, a qualitative argument about the relationships between votes and spending. The fragmentary nature of the data itself prevents a fully quantitative analysis of this relationship. Furthermore, the data were assembled from different sources, in order precisely to overcome such difficulties. That said, it is hoped, that the combination of different sets of data may still offer a coherent and stylized story about the underlying factors of clientelistic politics when seen from a territorial point of view. With this caveat in mind, I now proceed by looking first at the historical trend in public spending in Southern Italy, followed by a replica of the case of California using a comparable set of aggregate data over a similar time frame.

**Pattern of public spending in Southern Italy: A decreasing trend**

In one of the few attempts to uncover the role of public spending in Southern Italy over time, Carlo Trigilia (1992/1994: 55-61), lamented the incomplete availability of reliable data pertaining to the forms of public investment being directed to the regions of
Mezzogiorno. In the following years, a new wave of historical research partially redressed this remarkable deficiency, which clearly constituted one of the most profound ‘black holes’ in the vast literature dealing with the structure and development of Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{92} Using this new research as my starting point, my aim is quite modest: first, to extract and second, to clearly isolate the general historical trends associated with the amount of financial drainage being channeled in Southern Italy since about the mid-1970s. In Italy, ordinary public spending is traced through different accounting systems (e.g.\textit{ Sistema Informativo Della Ragioneria dello Stato} for the territorial distribution of public spending,\textit{ ISTAT} for the territorial distribution of spending according to regions, provinces, communes, etc., and more recently from the\textit{ Conti Pubblici Territoriali} (CPT).\textsuperscript{93} It is then divided between spending in capital and the current spending account. The current spending account component represents the most consistent share of the overall public spending (about 90\% of the total) and covers transfers (to firms and families), purchasing and stipends for the public administrations (another voice is that of the public debt that is computed apart). The remaining share (about 10\%) – the spending in capital – is the one related to public investment (of which infrastructure spending is the most important item for our scope), and as such will be the focus of this and the next chapter. In contrast, extraordinary public spending, is traced from the budget estimate related with the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno. As Trigilia correctly pointed out in his pioneering analysis, what emerges from the scattering aggregate data is the pervasive role

\textsuperscript{92} This work can be divided in two waves. An early one coming from the SVIMEZ: see respectively, Cafiero and Marciani (1991); Marciani (1993); Moro (1993); SVIMEZ (1993); and second one that has a more historiographical imprinting: See for instance, Barone (1994) and the more recent quantitative-oriented history carried out by, Lepore (2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2013), Felice and Lepore (2013).

\textsuperscript{93} This new system was instituted in 1998 as part of the “Dipartimento per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione economica” (former Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo e di Coesione).
of the ‘politically intermediation of public resources’ within Southern Italy. In fact, about 50% of GDP produced in the Mezzogiorno is attached to the public finance (about 53% in Southern Italy, compared to 33% in Northern Italy in 1988). A large component of public spending is in the Mezzogiorno, which is completely subordinate to the support of family income, especially pension and spending for social and sanitary items. Thus, according to Trigilia, when computed in relationship to the GDP, public spending assumed a form of ‘political intervention’ within the Southern economy. This was the case in the late 1980s. But what about a longer time frame?

Table 17: Aggregate public spending in the Mezzogiorno as percentage of Italy, 1980-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Mezzogiorno over Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).
To answer this question, data reported in Table 17 shows the aggregate public spending in capital from 1980 to 2006 in Southern Italy as a percentage of spending pertaining to all of Italy. It should be noted that on aggregate, public spending in capital, increased from about 4.1 billion Euro (in 1980) to about 22.2 (in 2006). However, what is important to notice is that this increasing trend is contrasted with the decreasing one when compared to the rest of Italy. As the percentage indicates, aggregate public spending in capital from 1980 to 2006 decreased by 8.5% (from 45.2% to 36.7%). Thus, in Southern Italy, public spending in capital has been decreasing since 1980, not substantially but nevertheless a figure worth noting. This trend can be see also from a territorial perspective and disaggregated by regions. Table 18 shows data compiled from the Svimez in regard to the distribution of public spending from 1972 to 1988 in percentage terms.

### Table 18: Public spending distribution in the Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1972-1988 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Median by years Total spending</th>
<th>Median by years Total spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Svimez (1993).*

Data are presented by regions in two blocks of time and computed in terms of a median within 4/5 year intervals: 1972 to 1981 and 1985 to 1988 respectively. The data
displayed indicated that the distribution of public spending has decreased in the Mezzogiorno by a minimum of 0.2%. All regions displayed a stable or minimum change over time. Interesting from our perspective is the fact that some regions (e.g. Campania, Sicilia and Puglia, with 8.6%, 8.5% and 6.3%) were able to receive a larger share of total public spending in the first period compared with other regions, followed by a slight decline from 1985 to 1988 (-0.2% for Campania and Sicilia, and no change for Puglia). These three regions were also the ones where the factional competition in the Christian Democratic Party was stronger and where the structure of the regional and local organization of the party was more dependent on public resources to build their power in relation to the center of politics. The changes between 1972-1981 and 1985-1988 indicated that this competition was happening in the context of the availability of decreasing public resources. It also suggest that the territorial distribution of public spending is not uniform across Southern regions, and in order to explain these difference we need to call into focus the role of the territorial structure of how votes are collected in terms of consent and legitimacy. If the trend in the aggregate public spending shows a slightly but clearly decreasing pattern, what about the role of the principal channel of distribution of resources in the Mezzogiorno, namely, the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno?94

Table 19 displays the long term pattern of extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno from 1971 to 1989 (based on the data assembled by Cafiero and Marciani, 1991: 272-273). Articulated by four-interval periods, the data clearly show that since the 1970s, the amount of extraordinary expenditure directed to the Mezzogiorno has steadily

94 A general overview of the role of the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno within the context of public policy interventions in Southern Italy is offered by La Spina (2003). The entire historical parable of the ‘extraordinary intervention’ for the Mezzogiorno is reconstructed with precision by Cafiero (2000).
declined. As measured by 1989, extraordinary expenditure was reduced by 1.700 in millions of lire.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>6.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>7.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1986</td>
<td>6.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1989</td>
<td>5.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Cafiero and Marciani (1991).*

In contrast to the usual assumptions, this trend indicated that the financing funds coming from the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno and channeled to the Southern regions from 1971 to 1989 decreased rather than increased over time. Again, this confirms our initial argument, that Southern politicians structured their political strategies in a context where public resources were steadily but nevertheless irremediably, shrinking. An ulterior confirmation comes from data displayed in Table 20, which shows the long-term pattern of the amount of extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno from 1971 to 1998 as a percentage of Italy’s GDP. First of all, it should be noted that again, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, the amount of extraordinary expenditure always accounted for a very small share of the Italian GDP (never higher than 1.23% - in 1975). Second, it should be noticed how the trend showed a different pattern: that is, from 1971 to about 1977 there is an increase in extraordinary expenditure directed to the Mezzogiorno (from 0.71% in 1971 to just over 1% in 1977). Since the late 1970s the trend shows a constant decline, and in about 20 years we witness a structural pattern that from the peak of 1978 (0.96%) declined to 0.38% in 1998. Overall, the data shows that from 1971 to 1998,
extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno decreased by 0.33%, confirming that the amount of public resources channeled to Southern Italy – both by the State and by its major public agency, the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno – has been steadily decreasing.95

### Table 20: Extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno, 1971-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>% of Italy GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).

95 A very similar trend is offered in the early research carried by Marciani, op. cit. A somewhat more precise picture can be gathered by referring to the data presented later on by Anna Spadavecchia (2007: 28 - graph 4). Based on data coming from the Budget Account of the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, she presents the long historical trend in expenditure by the agency from 1951 to 1993. The data show the total expenditure and the share related to subsidizing firms. Here we focus only on total expenditure. These data show a three-period trend: from 1951 until 1965 a gradual increase; beginning in 1966 a strong increasing pattern in total expenditures that reach their peak around 1975, where over 3,700 billion of lire were invested; finally, after 1976, the Cassa expenditure on subsidies as well as its overall expenditure started a declining trend, reaching a lower level that put the amount of public investment back to the one available in the early 1950s. This confirm the overall trend: namely, a constant shrinking share of public investment towards Southern Italy beginning in the mid-1970s.
Seen in combination, these data clearly indicate that the pattern of distributive politics from the 1970s to the 2000s in the Mezzogiorno, both as a whole and territorially partitioned, exhibit a clear structure: namely, that of a shrinking share of public resources distributed according to an uneven territorial trend. Some regions did better than others, but, as a whole, Southern Italy’s political landscape was dominated by a constantly decreasing availability of public resources (the partial exception occurring during the spike in the decade between 1965 and 1975, the short increase between 1983 and 1985, and between 1987 and 1991 - just before the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno was abolished). It is therefore reasonable to conclude, that from this perspective, distributive politics in the Mezzogiorno from 1970s onwards was a game where the strategies of the different actors involved in clientelistic politics were structured around the necessity to deal with a decreasing share of public resources coming from the State and its major ‘distributive agency.’ Ultimately, this shrinking availability of public spending created the conditions not just for increasing competition between territory-based factions of the two major parties that controlled the wheels of ‘distributive politics (e.g. Christian Democratic and Socialist parties) but perhaps more importantly partitioned the political landscape according to the different territorial availability of public resources: Campania, Puglia, Sicilia and Calabria – that is, the regions in which ‘factional politics’ was dominant – received larger share of public investment compared to the others. In conclusion, after 1976, factional competition coupled with a shrinking trend in public resources shifted the logic of the mass clientelistic party towards its corrupted and degenerated form. This analysis will then be established when the role of infrastructural spending in the general economy of clientelistic politics shifts within the Mezzogiorno is considered.
Pattern of public spending in California: An institutional diversified but increasing trend

As showed in Part II, the institutional architecture of the State of California, structured around a strong decentralization policy and shaped through an even stronger tax-revolution wave (e.g. the passage in 1978 of Proposition 13), offers a contrasting case when compared to the centralistic and party-government structure dominating Southern Italy since the early 1960s. As I demonstrated at length, one significant side effect of tax and expenditure limitations was to cause the activities of government to devolve from local governments to the state. In the course of the last two decades, a host of different scholars have grappled with the impact of Proposition 13 on the structure and development of California (Silva and Barbour, 1999; Barbour, 2007). One of the key insights emerging from this research is that Proposition 13 actually increased the dependency of local governments on the state of California, and - I would suggest - indirectly on the federal government - a phenomenon that will be discussed in the following section. Building upon this research my goal is two-fold: first to reconstruct the chronological pattern of public spending, and second, to capture the historical evolution on the aggregate level of the institutional structure of California since the passage of Proposition 13. By looking at this impact coupled with the decreasing and increasing role of federal transfers at different institutional levels (e.g. state, counties, and local government) I aim to show how a different distributive politics was at work in the Golden State. To begin with, Table 21 shows the aggregate public spending in California from 1974 to 1988. The data are organized by different institutional levels: namely, federal, state and local.

Recall that in Southern Italy decentralization policy were slowly and almost ineffectual, and taxation was still a central state affair with limited regional autonomy, even in lights of the change starting in the 1970s.
Table 21: Aggregate public spending in California by institutional levels, 1974-1988 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The pattern demonstrates that while federal and local government spending decreased by 2% and 6% respectively, state spending increased substantially in these 14 years: that is, by 9%. This decline in the portion of federal and local government expenditure, and the substantial increase in the fraction of expenditures funded by the state, indicates the effect of Proposition 13: namely, the shift of power from the local to the state level. This centralization effect can be seen not only in terms of expenditure, but also in terms of revenue. California revenue has a complex structure, with different fiscal relationships linking state to local, state to cities, state to counties, and the state to the federal power. For our purpose here, it should be noted how almost half of county revenues has come from the state and federal governments (over 20% and 15%, respectively since the 1970s). A large fraction of this revenue has been delivered by so-called federal grants. Since the ‘Reagan revolution’ in 1980s targeting fiscal federalism, the federal support for the state of California has gradually declined. This decline can be seen from Table 22 which displays the aggregate revenue for California State Government from 1974 to 1988. The data show that the federal grants decreased in importance from 22% to 18%: that is, a slight decline by 4% over this period of time. This pattern suggests that the state government in the state of California became more
autonomous from federal support, even though this decline is not as sharp as that experienced by the local government.

Table 22: Aggregate revenue for California State Government, 1974-1989 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Federal Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A different picture emerges when we look at the aggregate revenue for California County Government from 1974 to 1988. Table 23 compares the percentage of federal and state grants revenue being allocated over 14 years.

Table 23: Aggregate revenue for California County Government, 1974-1989 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Federal Grants</th>
<th>State Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures demonstrate a significant contrast between the different institutional levels: namely, the reduction in grants allocation from 22% to 16% by the federal level, and the increase in grants distribution from 24% to 33% by the state level. The reduction by 6% in federal grants and the corresponding increase by 9% in state grants allocated to the California County Government between 1974 and 1988 indicates quite clearly again
the structural shift in political (and economic power) from the local to the state level. It is important to recall at this point of our analysis, that about 35% of all state and local government workers in California (excluding those involved in education) are employed by counties. The increasing share of state grants channeled to county government clearly reflects a distributive politics centered upon what we have indicated previously—that is, as a component of the administrative and bureaucratic patronage characteristic of the peculiar lobbying clientelism system at work since the mid-1970s in the state of California. This administrative and bureaucratic patronage, which functions as an exchange system between state and counties, is based on the fact that the state delegate to the counties three primary responsibilities: 1) Counties serve as agents of the state in administering statewide health and social services programs; 2) Counties carry out other designated countywide functions, including public safety, public works and more importantly elections; finally, 3) counties in unincorporated areas deliver local services that would otherwise be provided by cities (for example, policing, parks and garbage collection). From these delegations of functions, a massive administrative and bureaucratic patronage is put at work. In brief, California County Government is a central pillar of the distributive politics as exemplified by the allocation of grants.

If counties are crucial in such allocation schema, the same cannot be said for the local government, which, as I argued in Part II, is the real victim of Proposition 13. Table 24 shows aggregate revenue for California Local Government from 1974 to 1988, using again federal grants as an index of distributive politics. In contrast to the pattern we traced out for the California State government (e.g. reduction by 4% in federal grants
allocation), the distribution of federal grants to the local government display a substantial decrease: that is, in 14 years there has been a reduction of 10%.

Table 24: Aggregate revenue for California Local Government, 1974 to 1989 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Federal Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rubinfield (1995).*

Such a sharp decrease confirms that Proposition 13 had its major negative impact on local government. In fact, it reduced the revenues of local governments (by nearly $70 billion, for example, in 2010) and, perhaps more fundamentally, removed the authority of local governments to determine the size of their own budgets. After 1978, the passage of Proposition 13 stripped the power from local agencies to set property tax rates in order to raise needed revenue. This resulted in a dramatic reduction in the authority of local governments and a consequential shift of power towards the state government. The sharp decrease in the allocation of federal grants to the local government suggests that the pattern of distributive politics shifted as well: namely, it became centralized in Sacramento and in the state government wheels. It is from these wheels that the complex lobbying clientelism system takes its own centripetal energy, an energy that in the counties has its territorial structure, and in the state government its own distributive mechanism. Such a mechanism involves a different relationship with the federal power. A glance at such a relationship is displayed in the data assembled in Table 25, which shows the magnitude of federal revenue and expenditures being channeled in California
for the fiscal years spanning 1971 to 2006. Both federal revenue and federal expenditure witnessed a massive increase since 1970.

### Table 25: Federal revenue and expenditures in California, 1971-2006 (In millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>17,630</td>
<td>23,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>18,963</td>
<td>25,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>21,386</td>
<td>28,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>24,959</td>
<td>31,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>28,510</td>
<td>36,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>28,092</td>
<td>41,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>37,997</td>
<td>47,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>42,773</td>
<td>49,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>49,558</td>
<td>52,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>58,873</td>
<td>61,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>67,150</td>
<td>69,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>71,542</td>
<td>77,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>70,893</td>
<td>86,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>76,624</td>
<td>91,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>85,348</td>
<td>97,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>89,604</td>
<td>100,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>101,445</td>
<td>100,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>108,332</td>
<td>102,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>118,854</td>
<td>108,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>127,796</td>
<td>115,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>128,585</td>
<td>127,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>128,889</td>
<td>139,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>129,532</td>
<td>147,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>136,166</td>
<td>155,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>149,185</td>
<td>152,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>164,752</td>
<td>157,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>174,863</td>
<td>160,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>199,106</td>
<td>161,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>216,811</td>
<td>166,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>258,601</td>
<td>175,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>264,873</td>
<td>188,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>232,302</td>
<td>206,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>227,611</td>
<td>219,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>237,931</td>
<td>232,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>265,784</td>
<td>242,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>299,521</td>
<td>253,906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* California Department of Finance (2009).

As is indicated in this table federal revenue increased from $17,630 to $299,251 million, whereas federal expenditures increased from $23,453 to $253,906 million over
36 years. If federal spending decreased from 1974 to 1988 by only 2%, and federal grants as part of distributive politics were reduced over time at the state, at the county and especially at the local government level, the channeling of federal revenue and especially federal expenditure continued unabated. This is because the axis of power between lobbying organizations and special-interest groups has placed in Sacramento a host of politicians whose job has been to attract federal funds, to administrate federal aid for infrastructural projects, and to allocate administrative and bureaucratic patronage as a parcel of the exchange mechanism that put them in the California legislature, and sent them to Capitol Hill to secure the public resources to then be distributed and allocated in their own respective districts. This complex exchange mechanism has a logic that works at different institutional levels: namely, privileging counties to the detriment of local government. The pattern of distributive politics as the index of federal revenue and federal expenditure centered on those territorial units – e.g. the counties – where the large returns were localized: shows namely, 1) distribution of administrative and bureaucratic patronage; 2) allocation of federal grants; and 3) centralization of political capital. In return for the distribution/allocation of resources (favors), California politicians gained a seat in Sacramento, where their work in the legislature and especially in the various crucial committees linked state and federal power. The increasing availability of state and federal resources resulted in an increase of incumbent advantage and in a corresponding increase in the role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California.

**Conclusion**

By comparing the pattern of distributive politics centered on public spending between Southern Italy and the state of California since the 1970s, I have reconstructed
the macro-financial context in which their respective forms of particularistic-oriented political exchange is entrenched. To highlight their structural difference, I used public spending data as an index of their peculiar distributive politics. The analysis of this index demonstrated that in Southern Italy, a decreasing share of public resources was being channeled from the State and its major ‘distributive agency’ towards the Mezzogiorno, both as a whole and in terms of its regions as well. The shrinking availability of public spending – especially after 1976 - shifted the logic of the ‘old’ mass clientelistic party towards its ‘new’ form: that is, a corrupted and degenerated one. The monopolistic role of the Christian Democratic Party in the distribution of public resources was challenged in the Southern region on its left side by the rise of the Socialist Party as a new avenue to gather consent and legitimacy across the Mezzogiorno. The wheels of ‘distributive politics were now structured around fierce competition between different ‘factional groups’ within these two parties, and a larger share of public investment was channeled toward Campania, Puglia, Sicilia and Calabria as compared to the others. Thus, the combination of an increasing factional competition coupled with a shrinking trend in the distribution and allocation of public resources opened the room for full-fledged corruption and the development of the ‘tangent-exchange model’ of clientelistic politics that was revealed in 1992 with the “Clean Hands’ operation.

In contrast, in the state of California, in a political context dominated by a weak party system and a candidate-centered form of consent and legitimacy, the analysis of the index of distributive politics indicated that a different institutional logic was at work since the 1970s. On one hand, federal grants shrunk over time at the state, at the county and especially at the local government level. On the other hand, the channeling of federal
revenue and especially federal expenditure shows an increasing concentration towards the county governmental level. After the passage of Proposition 13, the resulting shift in the balance of power from local to the state government ‘centralized’ political capital in Sacramento and especially in its legislature mechanism (e.g. committees). A two-way street linked power in Sacramento and power in Washington, DC. Attracting federal funds, administrating federal aid, and allocating administrative and bureaucratic patronage towards counties became part of the exchange mechanism between the California legislature and Capitol Hill. By securing public resources and distributing them towards their own respective counties, politicians in turn secured the support of the lobbying organization and special-interest groups that financed their ever-increasing financial campaigns. This two-way street exchange mechanism (at once directed toward the federal power and towards the lobbying and special-interests group power) worked at different institutional levels: that is, being detrimental to local government while favoring counties. Counties then became the crucial territorial level where the distribution of administrative and bureaucratic patronage and the allocation of federal grants guaranteed the highest returns in terms of political capital investment. From such investment, politicians seeking ‘expensive’ election and re-election – thanks to the increasing availability of state and federal resources – gained a formidable incumbent advantage. Lobbying organizations and special-interests politics in turn increased their role as ‘controllers and centralizers’ of the new Golden State politics.
8. Patterns of distributive politics (II): Infrastructural spending

A lobbyist is one who ably and properly qualifies to represent industry or any other organization before a legislative body. He is a short-cut man.

Arthur H. Samish

In the previous chapter, I offered a first view on the patterns of distributive politics by comparing general public spending and the level of expenditures for Southern Italy and California respectively. I now extend my analysis by looking at my second index of distributive politics: namely, infrastructural spending.97 An important distinction should be made between infrastructural spending as opposed to the general transfer of public spending scrutinized in Chapter 7. In the case of Southern Italy, while infrastructural spending is included in the former, there is a component of such spending, the so-called ‘extra-ordinary expenditures’ that is not included in general public spending. Accordingly, since the large portion of both infrastructural spending and ‘extra-ordinary expenditures’ related both to spending for public investment, of which infrastructural quota and related services are the most important sector of distributive politics, I compiled data for them separately and they will constitute the main data structure for the following analysis. In contrast, in the case of California, infrastructural

97 There is an extremely technical literature on how to define and classify ‘infrastructure’ and even more specialized on how to ‘measure’ it. See respectively, Buhr (2003), Picci (2002) and Torrisi (2009) as general references on both issues.
expenditures are included in the general public spending, even though the complicated financial structure of the state of California tends to relate with both. However, it was possible to separate the infrastructural spending from the general one, and the amount of expenditures for infrastructural investment at different institutional levels constitutes the main data structure for my analysis of the case of California.

As for general public spending, I use different time frames to build my macro-aggregate data analysis, and the data presented in what follows can be distinguished again by their temporal patterns: a) a long term one, which for the case of Southern Italy, covers respectively the period 1950-1993 and the period 1951 to 1993; b) a short term one, covering the sub-period 1985 to 1993. For the case of Southern California I assembled data for the following time patterns: a) the long term period covering 1960 to 2003; and b) a short term period, covering 1972 to 1992, 1970 to 1995 and 1977 to 1995 respectively. Infrastructural spending, due to its nature, is usually considered a major source of economic development for a given territory, and it could be interpreted as an index of the territorial distribution of transfers that are subject to ‘political interventions.’ This is because infrastructural spending constitutes for political representatives and their respective constituencies a form of ‘retribution’ for their good policy strategies (Crain and Oakley, 1995). Furthermore, a host of economic interests tend to solidify around infrastructural spending, thus favoring the development of lobbying and special-interest politics (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). These interests assume a different form in Southern Italy, where the ‘government parties’ are the main channel of distribution, whereas in California different level of government (e.g. federal, state, county and local) intervene in the distributive process. Regarding the different distributive channels – more
centralized versus a decentralized one - the linkages between territorial politics and political clientelism can be studied using infrastructural spending as a component of the distributive politics at work in specific territories. By comparing infrastructural spending in Southern Italy and in California over a long span of time, this chapter will explain how their contrasting patterns of distributive politics responded to different territorial incentives.

Infrastructural spending in Southern Italy: An uneven territorial trend

In Italy, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the spending in capital - the one related with public investment – constitutes about 10% of the total public spending. While this share may appear tiny compared to the rest, it plays a fundamental role in Southern Italy. Such a share of the spending in capital is the one channeled in the Mezzogiorno to public investment and as such has always been considered central to its economic development. This spending is then divided into two major categories: spending for public investment (infrastructural activities and related services) and a smaller quota of transfers (resources transferred to firms, especially credits and subsidies). Plus, there is the share of extraordinary investment being historically channeled through the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, which constitutes a larger share of targeted ‘infrastructures.’

---

98 This is of course the main trust of the research carried in the United States around the issue of ‘pork-barrel’ distributive politics, from the classical work of Ferejohn (1974) to the more recent research by Bickers and Stein (1996; 2000) and Levitt and Poterba (1999; 1995).

99 A recent report by the Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni criminali, anche straniere - Relazione sui costi economici della criminalità organizzata nelle regioni dell’Italia meridionale (2011: 31- Figure 14b) shows the aggregate public investment in the Mezzogiorno from 1950 to 2000 disaggregated by regions. Excluding the instable cycle for Basilicata (e.g. peak in 1958, with a collapse immediate following in 1960 and new upswing cycle around the 1970s) and for Campania (upsing from 1965 to 1968), the graph lines shows a clear decreasing trend from 1970s onwards for all Southern regions. This trend show a collapse of public investment in the Mezzogiorno from the 1980s to the 1990s, when the share became almost flat until the 2000s.
Table 26: Infrastructural expenditures by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, 1971-1992 (millions of lire, current)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>289.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>331.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>354.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>606.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>973.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.4930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1.6470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1.5660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.8630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2.2350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2.4010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4.1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3.8720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3.3460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3.3030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2.6200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2.8040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.6990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3.4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.8470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).

My focus here is on this last component: namely, that of infrastructure spending, since it is the most important item for our scope. The long term trend in the share of infrastructural expenditures being channeled by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno from 1971 to 1992 in the Mezzogiorno as a whole is presented in Table 26. From 1971 to 1992 (the year the agency was officially abolished) the amount of infrastructural expenditures shows a consistently increasing trend. From $289.3 (calculate in 2011 currency) in 1971, infrastructural expenditures rose to $2.8470 million of lire in 1992, an increase of $286.453 million of lire in about 21 year (a ratio of about $13.6 million by each year). This data suggest that while on aggregate, public investment was sharply decreasing from the 1970s, the share of infrastructural expenditures was moving in the exact opposite
direction: namely, a substantial increase.\textsuperscript{100} I interpret this dynamic by suggesting that the Southern Italy political class – and its party’s factions – switched their ‘clientelistic politics’ from the State to the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, as soon as the level of public investment coming directly from the Italian State started to reduce its clientelistic channels. More and more ‘public money’ was now being channeled towards the Mezzogiorno using ‘infrastructures’ as the main platform from where to build political and electoral power. As such, infrastructural expenditures became the main source of political exchange between politicians, their respective factions, and the State. The ‘switching’ from the State to the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, signaled a ‘switch’ in the distributive politics, of which infrastructural expenditures were now the main driver for building political careers – and thus political capital – in the Southern regions. But as for the case of general public spending, the construction of consent, legitimacy and especially political power had an uneven territorial expression.

Using data disaggregated by ‘functions’, it is possible to take a deeper look at such territorial discrepancies in the allocation of resources by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno since the mid-1980s, a period during which what I called ‘factional competition’ reached its climax. I will begin my analysis from the data that display that territorial distribution of direct investment channeled by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno during the period covering 1985 to 1993. The data presented in Table 27 are displayed by Regions, which help us to uncover the proper ‘territorial’ dimension of the type of distributive politics attached to the Cassa during the 1980s and the 1990s. Scrutiny of the data reveals a clear pattern: first of all, in terms of direct investment, the decreasing trend in the availability of

\textsuperscript{100} The data aggregated by the Svimez displays a very contrasting pattern when compared to the share of public investment that all regions of Southern Italy received from 1950 to 2000 presented by the cited report of the \textit{Commissione parlamentare}. 

176
resources is confirmed one more time, with the Mezzogiorno as a whole losing about 10% of direct investment.

Table 27: Territorial distribution of direct investment by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>26.34</td>
<td>28.49</td>
<td>35.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>16.78</td>
<td>19.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>16.43</td>
<td>22.24</td>
<td>18.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>14.54</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>96.47</td>
<td>95.72</td>
<td>86.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).

However, within this decreasing trend, a counter directional one in all the three time periods (e.g. 1985, 1989 and 1993) seems to clearly emerge: namely, Campania, Calabria and Sicily, who received a disproportional share of direct investment from the Cassa - +9%, +8.3% and +1.6% between 1985 and 1993 respectively. How we can explain such regional differences? Based on my argument, I argue that this territorial unevenness reflects the ‘power’ of different factions within the parties that dominate Southern Italy politics during the 1980s and 1990s – e.g. the Christian Democratic and the Socialist Party. The territorial distribution of direct investment assumed in the most ‘factional-prone’ are the result of a major struggle to control vital resources to be ‘politically distributed’ and thus were used to develop a powerful exchange mechanism in return for electoral and political support. This is, indeed, the period in Southern Italy history where a veritable new model of corruption-prone clientelistic politics was erected.
by the like of Antonio Gava, Cirino Pomicino, Antonio De Lorenzo, Salvo Lima, Giacomo Mancini in Campania, Sicily and Calabria respectively (just to name the most prominent one among a long list of corrupted politicians). A slightly different picture emerges when we look at the data that is presented in Table 28, which display the territorial distribution of transfers to firms by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno during the period 1985-1993.

Table 28: Territorial distribution of transfers to firms by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>12.22</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td>17.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>18.56</td>
<td>24.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>14.51</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>79.64</td>
<td>67.88</td>
<td>76.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As previously indicated, the data are aggregate at the level of regions. As a whole, the Mezzogiorno shows a negative trend, with a decline by 3.1% over the period. More interestingly, it is the Abruzzi who rank first in the amount of transfers to firms among the Southern regions, confirming the role of this region as a place of ‘virtuous clientelism.’ Indeed, transfers to firms indicate clearly the prevalence of a distributive politics oriented towards ‘productive’ activities, and the increase of 5.4% between 1985 and 1993, suggest how the pattern of clientelistic politics is really affected by the local political class. All the other regions, excluding Molise, Campania and Basilicata, which
have a minimum positive trend, display a decreasing amount of resources devolved to ‘productive’ activities, suggesting that the territorial distribution of transfers to firms by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno was really channeled away for this type of investment a type of investment that clearly has a lower return in terms of distributive politics in many Southern regions. This pattern is confirmed when we look at Table 29, which presents the data that display the territorial distribution of transfers towards public agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno during the period 1985-1993 and aggregated by regions.

Table 29: Territorial distribution of transfers to public agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>24.92</td>
<td>24.52</td>
<td>33.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>21.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>23.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>24.14</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>93.83</td>
<td>99.98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).

Public agencies, and their administrative positions, were indeed one of the marks of the clientelistic politics as it emerged in the era of ‘factional competition’ after the 1970s. On the whole, the Mezzogiorno registered an increase by 6.2% in transfers to public agency by the Cassa. At the same time, when we look closely at the territorial distribution, the data suggest an interesting ranking among Southern regions, with Calabria, Puglia and Campania dominating in these ‘distributive functions’ with an increase by 20.2%, 16.8% and 8.4 respectively between 1985 and 1993. In contrast, in
this function, Sicily registers negative trends, decreasing these transfers by a very substantial 20.3%. This can be explained by the ‘dissolution’ of the DC faction after the killing by Mafia of Salvo Lima, the powerful chief of Andreotti’s faction in Sicily. Puglia’s ranking was the effect of the powerful factions built around the charismatic leader Aldo Moro since the mid-1970s, one of the powerful politicians within the Christian Democratic Party’s factions. Finally, when we look at the data in Table 30, which displays the territorial distribution of transfers to regions and local agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno during the period 1985-1993, we notice that Campania is disproportionately the highest in attracting this type of distributive function compared to all other Southern regions.

Table 30: Territorial distribution of transfers to regions and local agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>17.35</td>
<td>20.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>14.03</td>
<td>11.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>11.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>23.68</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>21.55</td>
<td>12.27</td>
<td>15.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>83.76</td>
<td>95.74</td>
<td>94.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Svimez (2011).

As for the transfers to public agencies, the transfers to regions and local agencies by the Cassa, indicate quite clearly that the Mezzogiorno as a whole, from 1985 to 1993, received an increasing amount of transfers (10.3%), confirming that the distributive politics has been less oriented towards ‘productive’ activities, and more channeled...
towards ‘politically motivated’ ones. However, the distributive pattern from a territorial stand point displays again an uneven trend, with virtuous clientelistic regions showing a positive net (Abruzzi with a +6.8, and Molise with a +6.2), whereas, excluding the dominant role of Campania already mentioned, all the remaining regions display a negative one – Calabria with a decrease by 12.4%, Sicily by 5.5% and so forth. This pattern can be again interpreted by referring to our previous argument, that distributive politics was territorially biased with a disproportional amount of resources being channeled towards some specific regions to the exclusion of others, but in a context of shrinking availability of public transfers that increased the factional politics in the Southern regions.

This general interpretation is strongly confirmed by the quantitative data recently assembled by historian Amedeo Lepore (2012: 101). The data displayed in his Graph 3, present the long-term trend in the amount of expenditure channeled by both the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno and the ‘Agenzia for the Mezzogiorno’ from 1951 to 1993. The data are aggregate by typology of interventions: namely, a) infrastructures; b) contribution to productive sectors; c) intervention and contribution to credits and participations, and d) others. The data demonstrate quite clearly, that among expenditures, both agencies channeled the large majority into infrastructural functions, with a rapid and increasing trend starting in 1973. Between 1972 and 1977, expenditures increase from about 2.000.0 to over 5.000.0 million euro, declining a bit until 1982 and reaching their peak in the following years close to 6.000.0 million euro. After 1983 infrastructural expenditures declined precipitously. This confirms once again that resources in the Mezzogiorno were distributed according to: a) a general clientelistic politics; and b) within a context of a
cyclical but inexorably shrinking long-term trend. The consequences, as already mentioned, were clearly: first, an increase in ‘factional competition’ to grab the shrinking resources available; second, an increasing territorial bias in the modality of distribution; and third, a shift from a distributive politics oriented towards mass clientele, to another one channeled by personal ‘clans.’ The personalization of political exchange thus pushed to the extreme the constitution of the party’s factions, leaning toward a full-fledged mechanism of corruption in order to gather consent and legitimacy. The distributive politics structured around the allocation of infrastructural expenditure and its main derivative pillars (e.g. direct investment, public agencies, and regions and local agencies) assumed a corruption-prone form, a form that parallels the crucial 1975-1985 decades, when it was originally instituted. It is indeed, during this decade that a ‘new bloc of power’ was constituted, involving infrastructural spending and its distributive channels. Thus emerged a different form of power and a different type of clientelism, a clientelism organized by the exchange of personal votes in return to redistribution of ‘favors.’

**Infrastructural spending in California: Federal, counties and cities trend compared**

During the so-called “California Golden Age Era” (e.g. 1950s and 1960s), under Governor Pat Brown, massive infrastructural projects were financed in order to meet the needs of a growing state. Freeways, the State Water Project, and the university system were some of the most celebrated accomplishment of the non-partisan Governor. This was a period when tax and expenditures were not subject to fiscal and institutional limitations. However, according to many scholars, Proposition 13 changed everything (Alth and Rueben, 2005; Dowall and Whittington, 2003; Hanak and Barbour, 2005; Hanak and Rueben, 2006). My previous analysis on the pattern of public spending
suggested that the changes brought by the passage of Proposition 13 have indeed been significant. Following such analysis, I now take a detailed look at the pattern of infrastructural spending with the intent to show how distributive politics had an impact in the Golden State at different institutional levels (e.g. state, counties, and local government). In a state as big as California, infrastructural spending is likely to touch on many interests, both directly and indirectly, and as such, it can help us to uncover how these interests are affected by the financing of infrastructure.

In one of the few comprehensive quantitative studies, Alth and Rueben (2005: 5) assembled data that shows the long term pattern of infrastructural spending in the state of California. In Figure 1, these authors show the per capita state and local capital outlay expenditure from 1957 to 2002. The data compare the amount of expenditures for infrastructural at both the state and the local level (the authors compares the US as well, but this component is omitted from my discussion). From this data we can identify two cycles: the first one, running from about 1957 to 1967, shows a clear increase. This is the ‘era’ of Pat Brown, and during this era state outpaced local expenditures. The second cycles, starting in 1977 show the effect of Proposition 13. After a few years of decline, coinciding with the end of Pat Brown’s governorship, followed by a period of stagnation, per capita state and local capital outlay began an expansionary trend that continued unabated in the 2000s. However, the state capital outlay share in expenditures outpaced again the local one, confirming again that the general tendency is for the state to assume a predominant role in expenditures. Such a role is even more pronounced when we take a look at the state revenue sources for infrastructure financing covering the period 1960 to 2003. As data assembled in Table 31 indicates, we can see respectively that from 1960 to
2003, the sources coming from federal funds decreased in California by 12.5%, whereas the amount per capita actually increased by $40 million.

Table 31: State Revenue Sources for Infrastructure Financing in California, 1960-2003 (2003 $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: de Alth and Rueben (2005).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount per capita</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This suggest that the state became more autonomous from federal funding related to infrastructure financing, while the amount of spending increased substantially between 1960 and 2003. The state thus controlled more revenue sources and was able to increase spending. This shows how distributive politics related to infrastructures took a special form in the state of California: namely, increasing availability of revenue sources allowed political representatives to ‘redistribute’ more ‘public goods’ to their constituencies on a per capita basis. But how does infrastructural spending revenue affect different territorial units in the state of California? We can answer this question by looking at Table 32, which displays the per capita city and county general revenue by different sources for the period covering 1972 to 1992. In regard to cities, the data show that both federal and state subventions declined significantly over these 20 years, with the former decreasing by $26 million, and the latter by $9 million respectively. In brief, cities retained less revenue and thus the local politicians had a difficult time ‘redistributing’ public goods. The opposite occurred for political representatives attached to the county government. Here we notice that between 1972 and 1992, counties received an increasing

---

101 The point that the state of California should invest more in ‘public goods’ is a common them in both Lustig (ed.) (2010), and in Mathews and Paul (2010) as well.
share of federal subventions, with an increase by $14 million, whereas from state
subventions, counties received a massive share of revenue, totaling a $188 million
increase during this period.

Table 32: Per Capita City and County General Revenue by Source, California 1972-1992
(2002 $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Subventions</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Subventions*</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Subventions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Subventions*</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bourbon (2007).

Thus at the level of counties, both the federal and the state role were crucial in the
transfer of an increasing amount of revenue. Accordingly, political representatives at the
county government level had materially more infrastructural goods to distribute to their
respective constituencies. Such increasing share of infrastructural goods to be
redistributed thus enhanced their re-election possibilities. Having highlighted the
differences between cities and counties, we can now assess the role of the federal
government in delivering investment associated with infrastructures.

Table 33, shows respectively the per capita capital grants and the percent capital
grants in terms of the federal grants related to major physical capital investment in the
state of California from 1970 to 1995. First of all, real per capita grants increased over
this period by $23.70 million, but the percentage of total federal grants allocated for
physical capital investment declined by 11% during this period. Thus, a shrinking share
of federal grants were channeled to the state of California during these 25 years, even though real per capita capital grants actually increased. Second, such federal grants were allocated differently in terms of specific areas of physical investment.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real per capita capital grants</td>
<td>$139.20</td>
<td>$129.10</td>
<td>$167.60</td>
<td>$149.80</td>
<td>$136.60</td>
<td>$162.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent capital grants for:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban mass transport</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community development</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real per capita total grants to state and local governments</td>
<td>$474.70</td>
<td>$590.60</td>
<td>$678.60</td>
<td>$636.90</td>
<td>$679.80</td>
<td>$925.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total federal grants allocated for capital</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: de Alth and Rueben (2005).

That is, while highways and community development investment decreased by 12% and 10% respectively, physical investment for urban mass transport and airports increased by 7% and 4% respectively. Finally, the real per capita total grants to state and local governments increased quite substantially from 1970 to 1995 by $450.70 million. Accordingly, the federal role in channeling towards the state of California grants became more pronounced since 1970. More money for physical investment was available for redistribution, even though the pattern of distributive politics associated with infrastructures was uneven - favoring urban mass transportation and airports at the expense of highways and community development. When seen from the perspective of
the linkages between center and periphery, these data suggest that many of California’s politicians had at their disposal an increasing amount of public goods to re-distribute over their constituencies. That is, infrastructural and physical capital investment became the major avenue of distributive politics since the 1970s, an avenue paved with the grants coming from the federal government. We can take a detailed look at how this avenue was developed over time by scrutinizing Table 34 which displays federal funding expenditures disaggregated by functions for California from 1977 to 1995.

Table 34: Federal Funding Expenditures by Character, California 1977-1995 (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>State operations</th>
<th>Local assistance</th>
<th>Capital outlay</th>
<th>Not classified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>3,552.00</td>
<td>4,096.30</td>
<td>343.40</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,991.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>3,317.00</td>
<td>3,569.50</td>
<td>352.60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,239.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>3,262.50</td>
<td>3,775.20</td>
<td>414.90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,452.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>3,731.20</td>
<td>4,240.80</td>
<td>188.20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8,160.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>4,668.80</td>
<td>5,237.10</td>
<td>341.70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10,247.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>5,066.40</td>
<td>5,518.50</td>
<td>278.30</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10,863.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>6,369.30</td>
<td>5,511.50</td>
<td>373.90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12,254.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>5,791.00</td>
<td>6,123.10</td>
<td>540.20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12,454.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>3,917.60</td>
<td>8,692.80</td>
<td>761.20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13,371.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>4,177.60</td>
<td>9,345.00</td>
<td>757.70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14,280.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>4,384.60</td>
<td>9,744.20</td>
<td>615.90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14,744.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>4,475.40</td>
<td>9,738.30</td>
<td>736.50</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14,950.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>4,998.80</td>
<td>10,546.10</td>
<td>1,081.30</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16,626.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>5,034.90</td>
<td>12,018.40</td>
<td>1,296.70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18,340.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>5,336.80</td>
<td>14,884.00</td>
<td>943.60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21,483.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>5,655.40</td>
<td>19,701.90</td>
<td>955.70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26,723.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>6,003.00</td>
<td>21,990.60</td>
<td>1,221.90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29,115.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>6,088.60</td>
<td>24,796.80</td>
<td>1,281.80</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>32,553.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>6,217.30</td>
<td>23,351.30</td>
<td>1,534.90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31,497.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>6,149.40</td>
<td>22,663.20</td>
<td>1,147.80</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30,339.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>6,847.70</td>
<td>23,205.70</td>
<td>933.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31,385.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>6,701.60</td>
<td>23,513.00</td>
<td>1,061.70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31,644.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>7,172.80</td>
<td>25,591.40</td>
<td>1,194.60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>34,473.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>7,650.30</td>
<td>28,121.70</td>
<td>1,099.10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>37,303.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>8,262.10</td>
<td>30,613.00</td>
<td>1,948.10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>41,272.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>9,177.10</td>
<td>35,553.50</td>
<td>1,448.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>46,622.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>10,288.20</td>
<td>42,333.50</td>
<td>1,497.80</td>
<td>613.10</td>
<td>54,732.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: California Department of Finance (2014).

The data compiled by the California State Controller’s Office, and available from the California Department of Finance show quite clearly the long-term trend of federal
funding towards the state of California. In all three functions, namely, state operations, local assistance and capital outlay, federal funding has been increasing massively between 1977 and 1995. Specifically: expenditures related to state operations increased by about $7 million; those related to local assistance increased by over $40 million, and finally, expenditures related with capital outlay increased by over $1 billion. Overall, federal funding expenditures increased by $46 million between 1997 and 1995. As a result of such a massive increase in federal funding, California’s political representatives did not just grab more money to re-distribute from ‘public goods’ to their constituencies, but perhaps more importantly, they had more public resources to reinforce their political status over time, providing them with a formidable advantage. The increasing availability of federal funding thus created the condition for a form of distributive politics that we may label ‘expansive.’ It is ‘expansive’ because such distributive politics deepened the role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California, toward whom financial funds were directed to support politicians who were able to smoothly grab an increasing share of federal resources.

Conclusion

The comparison between their respective patterns of distributive politics centered on infrastructural spending demonstrated that whereas in Southern Italy there were shrinking resources available, the opposite occurred in California: namely, an increasing share of infrastructural funding, federal grants and federal expenditures became available.

---

102 That this is not exactly a novelty in California emerges from one of the few historical research that attempt to capture the relationships between the state’s massive infrastructural development and the political intermediation favoring special-interests groups, lobbying organization and their political representatives; see Erie (2004: 40) where the hypothesis of a peculiar Southern California’s clientelism is briefly explored.
since the 1970s. The outcome of such a contrasting pattern was clear: the availability of reduced state resources associated with infrastructural spending resulted in an increasing ‘factional competition’ within the parties that dominated Southern politics since 1970s (e.g. Christian Democrats and Socialists). In contrast, in the California legislature, the increasing share of infrastructural funding, federal grants and federal expenditures over time reinforced the advantages of political representatives. As a consequence, while in Southern Italy, we witnessed a shift from a distributive politics oriented towards mass clientele, to another one channeled by personal ‘factions and clans,’ in the state of California we noted a form of distributive politics structured around the re-distribution of ‘public goods (in the form of infrastructural and major physical investments) towards counties, but also through federal funding to state and local government. In a context dominated by a candidate-centered style of politics and in the presence of a weak party system, California distributive politics, centered upon the increasing availability of federal funding, grants and expenditures over time, cemented and reinforced on one hand, the center-periphery linkages between California legislature and Washington, DC., and on the other between politicians and lobbying organizations and special-interest groups that financed their skyrocketing financial campaigns. Both actors gained from the increasing role of the federal government in financing infrastructures: politicians built around them their incumbent advantage; lobbying organizations and special-interests politics built around them the availability of an increasing share of ‘public good,’ enhancing their role as ‘dispensers’ of a massive distributive politics in the ever-expanding state of California. In California, the long-terms effect of Proposition 13 were to produce an ‘expansive’ form of political clientelism, which underpins the recurrent
political crisis, complaints and political struggles concerning budget constraints, and the backlash resulting from the institutional lock-in due to political polarization in the legislatures. In contrast, Southern Italy developed a form of political clientelism that I would define as ‘regressive,’ in which the decreasing inflows of infrastructural investment and spending reinforced the ‘political redistributive role’ of the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, and in turn cemented the powerful ‘mediating’ functions of those party’s factions that channeled the agency’s resources in a territorially biased way. Paradoxically, in both Southern Italy and California, infrastructural investment and expenditures had an ‘intensive’ outcome: in the former, it structured and cemented a new bloc of power constituted around the political distribution of a shrinking share of resources; in the latter, it organized and compacted politicians, lobbying organizations and special-interest groups, who shared their gains from the allocation and redistribution of ‘public goods’ financed with federal money. But their respective clientelistic politics took a different form from such an outcome: namely, it took a regressive path in Southern Italy, where politics and personal affairs became indistinguishable; it took an ‘expansive’ path in California, where politics and money allied and solidified their long-term ties: ties, that practically realized and politically translated, the sense of Arthur H. Samish’s “short-cut man.”
9. Patterns of distributive politics (III): Voting and lobbying

The more effective a legislator is, the more valuable he is to interest groups who are able to obtain his support for their legislative ideas, and the more willing they are to provide campaign support in order to obtain access to him.

Michael J. BeVier

In chapter 7 and 8, I attempted to give empirical substance to the political exchange linking political representatives, their different territorial constituencies and the various institutions that support such exchange. I used public and infrastructural spending to carve out a macro-financial context in which the re-distribution of public resources take its shape. Public and infrastructural spending were considered as indices of distributive politics, and more specifically they were viewed as indices that measure the political exchange in an indirect way. In this chapter, I will construct a more direct measure of the pattern of distributive politics developing historically from the 1970s onwards in Southern Italy and California. Accordingly, my third index of distributive politics is a more detailed measure of clientelistic politics. In what follows, electoral and financial expenditure data are assembled to capture the long-term pattern of the political exchange. The chapter’s central purpose is to demonstrate from a macro-empirical perspective the type of exchange that occurred in these two sub-state political spaces. In particular, it will advance the main thesis of this research by showing respectively: a) the continuing rise of preference voting over time in Southern Italy, a rise that captured the
magnitude of the vote exchange entrenched in the Mezzogiorno; and b) the rising cost of political campaigns, the disproportionate financial advantage of incumbents over challengers, and the increasing spending of lobbying to influence the re-election of California’s political representatives and through them California legislatures. Electoral and financial expenditures thus show the different type of exchange mechanisms at work in these two very different political spaces, a mechanism that captures the different modus operandi of distributive politics and as such that of clientelistic politics in Southern Italy and California. I will first discuss the case of Southern Italy, and I will then move to the case of California.

Preference voting in Southern Italy: A continuing rise in the vote of exchange

As I demonstrated in the two previous chapters, both public and infrastructural spending were allocated with an eye to their ‘electoral return.’ Indeed, elections in Southern Italy have always exhibited a peculiar pattern, a pattern dominated by what scholars have defined as the ‘vote of exchange.’ This vote has been utilized by the parties who controlled the ‘political distribution’ of resources in order to gain consent and legitimacy, thus increasing their presence in the entire political life of the Mezzogiorno. That said, the territorial approach to distributive politics in postwar Southern Italy has been rare, the exceptions being research conducted by Marzotto and Schachter (1983) and, partially, by Golden and Picci (2008). Marzotto and Schachter’s research was one of the few attempts to link the allocation of investments in the Italian South to electoral behavior. Using a modified random sample of 534 southern Italian communes, they studied whether electoral competition (between the two dominant parties in Southern Italy - Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party) influenced the distribution
of investments by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno between 1950 and 1970. Marzotto and Schachter attempted to examine whether the Christian Democrats received a higher electoral result caused by political payoffs towards the party elected members for channeling investment in their territorial constituencies and thus reinforcing the primacy of the party in the Southern regions over time. Their result suggested that this primacy was not directly linked to the distribution of investment in the Mezzogiorno. Golden and Picci instead studied the geographic distribution of resources to electoral districts in Italy over four decades, 1953-1994. In their empirical analysis, they showed that when districts elect politically more powerful deputies from the governing parties, they receive a large share of infrastructural investment in terms of public works located in those electoral districts. They interpreted this as indicating that legislators with substantial political resources reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. In their analysis, they demonstrate that when districts elect powerful candidates (off the lists of governing parties) they secure more infrastructure investments. However, despite these important differences research by both Marzotto and Schachter and Golden and Picci suggest that there is a link between electoral behavior and allocation of resources.\(^{103}\)

This link is however very hard to formalize in terms of statistical modeling. Accordingly, and following my previous analysis, I now turn my attention to my last index of distributive politics, namely, preference voting in an attempt to cast light on the mechanism of political exchange at work in Southern Italy since the 1970s. To summarize the definition offered in previous chapters, clientelistic politics indicated that

\(^{103}\) This link found more empirical confirmation in the collaborative research of Golden and Picci (2005; 2006; 2008), Crain and Oakley (1995), and Cadot et al. (2006). These analysis found that political factors influence the allocation of infrastructure investment across states or regions in the US, France, Germany and Italy as well.
the political exchange mechanism centered both directly and indirectly in the reward of electoral votes for channeling financial funds towards specific regions and localities. Both the macro-financial analysis of public and infrastructural spending towards the Mezzogiorno demonstrated that the channeling of public resources has, indeed, been ‘politically’ oriented. By looking at the pattern of the vote of exchange over time I will now highlight the clientelistic modalities of the return of electoral support toward those candidates and parties who, as we have seen, were those in control of the public resources being allocated in Southern Italy. The vote of exchange (\textit{voto di scambio}) is one of the modalities of casting a ballot in the elections (the other two are, the vote of opinion, and the vote of belonging – \textit{voto di opinione} and \textit{voto di appartenenza}).\footnote{On these distinctions, see respectively, Parisi and Pasquino (1977), and Katz (1985).} Such modality capture the idea that the vote is cast to support candidates who eventually will return a ‘favor’ once elected. As such, the vote of exchange indicates a personal relationship between voters and candidates, a relationship that characterizes the clientelistic nature of politics in the Mezzogiorno. Indeed, in Southern Italy, historically, the use of this type of vote has always been higher than in the rest of Italy.

A measure of the vote of exchange is what has been referred to as ‘preference voting;’ that is, the ratio of the number of preferences expressed over those that are expressible. This ratio captures three features of this type of vote: a) the territorial distribution of preference voting is coextensive with the spread of clientelistic politics; b) preference voting is considered an incentive to corruption and thus indicates a degeneration in the relationships between voters and candidates; c) preference voting is a measure of the extension and deepening of the vote of exchange (Cartocci, 1990: 106). Furthermore, preference voting is an index of intra-party competition and thus a measure
of ‘factional’ cleavages within a given party (Cazzola, 1975). Following these indications my scope is somewhat more modest. I am using preference voting mainly as a complementary index of distributive politics (public and infrastructural spending were the previous), and as such as a direct measure of the degree of clientelistic politics at work in the Mezzogiorno. Considered together, these three indices offer a coherent story that provides empirical substance to my thesis. After these introductory remarks, I will focus on to the empirical analysis. Table 35 displays the index of preference voting for the elections of the Chamber of Deputy covering 20 years period from 1972 to 1992.105

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mezzogiorno</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mellissari (2012).

The index is showed by comparing the aggregate percentage for Southern Italy versus Italy as a whole. Scrutiny of the data immediately suggests the following: first, in both the South and in Italy as a whole, the index displays a substantial increase in these 20 years, increasing by 23.2% for the former, and by 23% for the latter; second, it is very clear that the index is for every point in time (e.g. 1970, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992) higher in Southern Italy compared to Italy as a whole – on the average higher by about 15%. Third, the index is constantly above 40% in Southern Italy, meaning that almost half of the voters indicated on the proportional list their ‘preferences’ for specific

105 The data were collected for this period because the Italian electoral law was based on a nearly pure proportional representation system that remained unchanged. With such system while voters were able to list their preferences for candidates on a party list, in Southern Italy due to the powerful role played by ‘factions,’ parties’ member were able to manipulate these preferences and channel them towards those members who were loyal to one faction within a party.
candidates. Finally, the index shows an abrupt drop from 1972 to 1976 by 8.2%, but from 1976 its increase is constant and literally explodes in the electoral turn of 1992, that is, the year that witnessed the ‘collapse’ of the party system and the last electoral competition fight with the proportional representation system. The index of preference voting clearly shows that many party’s faction candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputy, thus confirming that on the aggregate, a vote of ‘exchange’ was at work, and in turn the relationships between political elites and the Southern voters were therefore decisively clientelistic in nature. The change after 1976 fit quite smoothly our previous analysis which indicated that around this year both public and infrastructural spending underwent a clear ‘clientelistic’ transformation. Furthermore, the index confirms empirically that the relationships between Southern voter behavior and party candidates, in general, became a contest as to which party could secure more ‘politically-oriented type investments for a specific region. The massive increase of the index of preference voting in 1992 signals quite unequivocally that from the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the intra-party competition between the Christian Democrat and Socialist’s factions did become indeed undistinguishable from full-fledged corruption. Overall, the magnitude of preference voting in the Mezzogiorno seems to confirm that the political exchange between party’s candidates, their factions and the Southern votes between 1972 and the 1990s closely resembles the stylized model of political clientelism (see Figure 6) presented in this thesis.

I will now focus on the territorial dimension of the preference voting’s index. Table 36 displays the rate of preference voting by regions for the round of regional elections covering again the period from 1970 to 1990. Data refer to the ordinary regions,
excluding Sicily and Sardinia, for which elections timing is different due to their different institutional structure.

**Table 36: Rate of preference voting by regions - Regional elections, 1970-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data refers to Ordinary Regions, Sicily and Sardinia are excluded; Source: Mellissari (2012).*

Scrutiny of the aggregate data for these six regions reveals a rate of preference voting for over 20 years. In ranking order: Basilicata rates increased by 15.3%; Calabria by 12.8%; Campania by 12.7%; Puglia by 5.5% and Abruzzi by 3.9%. In all Southern regions, clearly preference voting clearly is a strong indicator of the deepening of the vote of ‘exchange’ from 1970 to 1990 for the regional elections. The average rate, which is constantly above 45% (with Basilicata and Calabria over 50%), reconfirms that about half of the Southern voters gave ‘preferences’ to candidates of parties who commanded ‘exchange” (e.g. electoral support) in return for ‘favors’ (e.g. channeling public resources towards their regions).

However, this pattern of exchange is territorial differentiated with Campania, Calabria and Basilicata topping the list, and Puglia and Abruzzi on the bottom. Still, it is quite remarkable to see how extensive and deep is the rate of preference voting across all Southern regions during the 20 years under scrutiny here. Similarly, when we look at the average rate for the five time periods, we see a clearly increasing pattern that starts in 1975 and continues unabated until 1990. During these four rounds of regional elections,
the rate of preference voting climbs from 48.2% to 51.4% in 1985 and jumps to 54% in 1990, suggesting that again the return of electoral support was somewhat linked to the distribution of public resources towards candidates’ regions, and this on an increasing basis after 1975. This matches our previous analysis on the distributive politics in the Mezzogiorno as indicated by the pattern of public and infrastructural spending, demonstrating that around the crucial two-year period of 1975-1976 the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno turned into a veritable ‘clientelistic pipeline’ for many party’s candidates and their respective factions. The index and the rate of preference voting, when viewed through the territorial lens clearly captures the pattern of a distributive politics manifested in a fully displayed political and electoral exchange. Of course, both patterns of exchange reveal quite clearly the idea that the dynamic of clientelist politics in Southern Italy was ‘factionalist’ in nature, mediated by infra-party competition and dominated by the two rising “parties of government” in the late 1970s and early 1990s: namely, the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party.

I will now analyze the electoral pattern by parties that, displayed in Table 37, shows the percentage return in the regional elections in Southern Italy by parties for the period covering 1970 to 1990. As previously noted, the data refer to ordinary regions, and therefore Sicily and Sardinia are excluded from the analysis. The return of votes in these five regional elections, clearly indicates that two parties the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, dominate politics in the Mezzogiorno during these 20 years. Respectively, the Christian Democrats received on average over 40% and 13% respectively, forming the axis of command and control over Southern Italian politics. The Communist Party, while receiving on average of over 23% of votes, where clearly in
opposition and rarely were involved in the mechanism underpinning the vote of exchange.

Table 37: Regional elections in Southern Italy by Parties, 1970-1990 (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI*</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDI**</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDU***</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liste Verdi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altri</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1990 PDS;
** In 1970 PSU;
*** In 1970 PSIUP;
(*) Data refers to Ordinary Regions, Sicily and Sardinia are excluded;
Source: Fantozzi and Greco (2009).

Indeed, mainly, the electoral support was based on the vote of belonging in the Mezzogiorno and from a territorial point of view, such a vote was coming from the rural areas, formally excluded from the pattern of distributive politics that so aptly characterizes the Mezzogiorno during these 20 years. From 1970 to 1990, the vote for the Christian Democratic Party only increased by 0.3%, thus remaining stable, even though one may note that the big increase happened between the electoral rounds of 1975 and 1980, when the DC increased its percentage by 3%. In contrast, the increase by the Socialist Party has been substantial, which during these 20 years increased its percentage by 7.8%, going from 11.2% in 1970 to the impressive 19% in 1990, when it surpassed the Communist Party as the second ranking party in the Mezzogiorno. Such escalation can be linked to the rise of the Craxi leadership, and with the Socialist Party entry into the
commanding and controlling functions of the Italian State and its Parliament. From there, the various ‘Socialist’s factions’ were able to secure public resources, and then redistribute them politically towards the Southern regions. By assuming a role in many regional, provincial and local councils, assuming many regional, provincial and local administrative positions, controlling many key positions in local public agencies, and establishing top ranking position in communal agencies, this faction was easily able to extend a veritable distributive politics that even challenged the historical role of the DC in the Mezzogiorno. Socialist’s factions, indeed carried the evolution from clientelistic to corrupted politics, innovating the ‘political exchange’ system: namely, that now in the Southern regions, electoral support in return for ‘favors’ (e.g. channeling of public resources) was more than anything a veritable ‘monetary affair.’

Christian Democrats in the Mezzogiorno accepted the challenge and upgraded as well their own ‘gathering system.’ Accordingly, a bloc of votes were now bought directly through political intermediaries, which in turn channeled such money to reinforce the power of a given factions in the two government’s parties. This transformed clientelistic politics into a full-fledged corruption system, a system that was inherent in the logic of intra-party competition. The index and the rate of change of preference voting, and the increasing support of these two parties from 1970 to 1990 confirms this trend. Only the judiciary operation of “Clean Hands’ will reveal how deep this transformation has gone, and not just in the usually ‘clientelistic-prone’ Mezzogiorno.106

106 The analysis of the transformation from the ‘mass clientelistic party’ into the ‘corrupted party’ in the so-called ‘end’ of First Republic political system remain to be done. Much analysis of the corruption system revealed by ‘Clean Hands’ has focused too much on the issue of corruption per se, rather than looking at how the previous ‘clientelistic politics’ has actually degenerated so easily into full-fledged system where votes were actually bought en masse by functionaries of the dominant parties (especially DC and PSI) who acted as ‘financial intermediaries’ between the party’s factions and their geographical constituencies. For the beginning of such analysis, see Guzzini (1995).
As I argued in chapter five, one of the unforeseen outcomes of the passage of Proposition A-1 in 1966 enormously increased the costs of running for office in California. Overall, campaign costs skyrocketed, and the main consequence was that candidates became, willing or not, dependent on the financial support of special-interest groups and of lobbyists. Special-interest politics and lobbying had the political goal of influencing the California legislature, where all the main decisions affecting their ‘client’ interests were made. The so-called ‘Third House’ thus engineered the collection, allocation and distribution of the huge campaign contributions needed by any candidate to get elected. Such financial support for political campaigns thus linked interest groups and their strong lobbying support with candidates: neither one could not function without the other. Special-interests groups and lobbying organization needed ‘bills’ to be passed in the California legislature; candidates needed special-interests groups and lobbying organization to finance their political career in Sacramento.

Since the passage of Proposition A-1, the competition for legislative favors has multiplied as the many interests that the California legislature served expanded enormously. As a consequence, a peculiar clientelistic imprinting marks the relationship between the financial operations engineered by the ‘Third House’ and the electoral game underpinning the winning of office in both the Senate and the Assembly. Moreover, this hypothesis is supported by the empirical data. In fact, it is possible to demonstrate empirically that there is indeed a link between rising campaign costs, increasing incumbent advantage and the increased influence of lobbying and special-interest groups.
in the context of the California political system since the 1970s. To begin to address these issues, I will begin by looking at the data presented in Table 38, which display the total campaign expenditure by candidates for the state of California from 1976 to 1996.

**Table 38: Total campaign expenditure by candidates, California 1976-1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Primary Election (18-Month Period)</th>
<th>Primary Election (Six-Month Period)</th>
<th>Combined Total (Two-Year Period)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>7,063,351</td>
<td>7,668,970</td>
<td>14,732,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>9,662,289</td>
<td>10,572,177</td>
<td>20,234,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>16,732,984</td>
<td>17,541,448</td>
<td>34,274,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>19,690,487</td>
<td>24,153,938</td>
<td>43,844,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>20,560,337</td>
<td>24,194,516</td>
<td>44,754,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>29,911,624</td>
<td>30,073,294</td>
<td>59,984,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>38,715,616</td>
<td>40,146,460</td>
<td>78,862,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>30,520,665</td>
<td>23,949,856</td>
<td>54,470,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>43,434,387</td>
<td>35,417,713</td>
<td>78,852,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>40,989,311</td>
<td>45,169,531</td>
<td>86,158,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>50,034,254</td>
<td>55,643,715</td>
<td>105,677,969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: California Secretary of State (1996).*

This data, collected by the California Secretary of the State, present an almost complete picture of the campaign financing for California state candidates and officeholders. The data are computed using two-time frames: a) by an 18-month period and b) by a 6-month period; then the two-year combined period presents the total campaign expenditure by candidates. A scrutiny of this data reveals quite clearly that in these 20 years, total campaign expenditures for primary elections has been constantly rising. In the period 1975-1976, 18-month period expenditures totaled $7,063,351, totaling $7,668,970 for the 6-month period. As a result, expenditure for running for office in a two-year period totaled a combined cost of over $14,000.00. Twenty years later, the total campaign expenditure increased by seven-fold. Accordingly, running for office and supporting a primary elections campaign has become a very expensive enterprise. In
1995-1996 it now costs over $100,000.00 to finance an election campaign. This confirm empirically that indeed, costs for an election campaign have been rising since the 1970s.

We can now take a more detailed look at this trend by scrutinizing the data presented in Table 39, which shows the expenditures by candidates for the California State legislature for the general elections.

### Table 39: Expenditures by candidates for the State Legislature, General Elections - California, 1976-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Total Legislature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,102,673</td>
<td>2,598,091</td>
<td>7,668,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,485,837</td>
<td>3,134,451</td>
<td>10,572,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(172)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13,717,415</td>
<td>3,882,895</td>
<td>17,541,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(219)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>17,382,585</td>
<td>6,916,512</td>
<td>24,153,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16,220,869</td>
<td>8,039,948</td>
<td>24,194,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(144)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>18,330,538</td>
<td>12,095,060</td>
<td>30,073,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>30,322,449</td>
<td>9,878,303</td>
<td>40,146,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>16,896,588</td>
<td>7,053,268</td>
<td>23,949,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(148)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>29,404,887</td>
<td>6,012,826</td>
<td>35,417,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28,398,356</td>
<td>16,771,175</td>
<td>45,169,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(156)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36,106,830</td>
<td>19,650,385</td>
<td>55,643,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(154)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>37,417,674</td>
<td>19,360,338</td>
<td>56,666,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(191)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The number in parenthesis indicates actual candidates who run for the general elections; **Source:** California Secretary of State (1998).

The time period covered in the data goes from 1976 to 1998, and reports the sum of general election campaign receipts, expenditures, cash on hand and debts for state candidates and officeholders. Expenditure by candidates is reported for both the
Assembly and the Senate, and the third column displays the total legislature expenditures. As noted previously, the expenditure by candidates have been increasing by seven-fold between 1976 and 1998 – from the original $7,668,970 to over $56,000,000.

Interestingly, as the number in parenthesis under the sum indicates, which shows the number of actual candidates who run for these general elections, it is clear that the degree of completion has gotten harder and harsher: that is, 226 candidates ran for office in 1976, while 191 did so in 1998, a 84.5% decrease. We find the same pattern for both Assembly and Senate: namely, in the former, candidate expenditures in 1976 were just above the $5,000.00 mark, while in 1998 they reached over $37,000.00; in the latter, while it required just only $2,600.00 to run for the state legislature, it increased to over $19,000.00. Thus in both the Assembly and the Senate, expenditures for candidates to run for office increased by more than seven-fold. That the degree of completion has also gotten harder is confirmed for both Assembly and Senate numbers of candidates, which decreased by about 83.6% and by about 88.4% respectively. It is also worth noting that running for the Assembly is in general significantly more expensive compared to running for the Senate: it costs about as much as twice to run for the former compared to the latter.

This trend seems to contrast with the pattern displayed in Table 40, which shows the average expenditures by all major party candidates, in the general elections, for the period of 1976-1998. This suggest, that coupled with the increasing competition, it is the seat at the Senate that is most ‘valued’ by both Democrats and Republicans. It may be argued that both party candidates see the Senate as the political seat with the highest return. Such a return is probably based in the power to redistribute resources, the power
of influencing bills, and the power of commanding the attention of special-interest groups and lobbying organizations.

**Table 40: Average (median) expenditures all major party candidates, General Elections - California 1976-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>22,064</td>
<td>53,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>42,861</td>
<td>51,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>68,996</td>
<td>77,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>78,766</td>
<td>159,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>87,048</td>
<td>108,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(144)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>84,656</td>
<td>187,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>104,674</td>
<td>132,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>82,454</td>
<td>156,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(148)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>122,165</td>
<td>77,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>95,573</td>
<td>229,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(156)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>154,883</td>
<td>173,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(154)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>143,519</td>
<td>248,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The number in parenthesis indicates actual candidates who run for the general elections; Source: California Secretary of State (1998).*

From 1976 to 1998 the average expenditures for the Assembly increased by more than six-fold, whereas during the same period, the average expenditures for the Senate increased by about four-and-half-fold. Excluding the general election of 1992, when expenditures were more costly for the Assembly than for the Senate, in all the other elections years, party candidates had to invest twice the amount of money to succeed in winning a Senate seat. It should be noted that in contrast to the previous data, the number
of party candidates competing for Assembly and Senate seats have remained constant over time, signaling that the degree of competition has been rather constant since 1976. This probably resides in the power of both the Democratic and the Republican Party to control nominations and allocate party’s budget to the financing of political campaigns during general elections, a control which does not seem to be at work when we looked at the overall expenditures by all candidates. This suggests that indeed party control of the general elections, although not completely absent, are clearly weaker compared to the amount of money that all candidates are able to collect: a difference that is measured in millions of dollars compared to the hundred thousand that we find in the average expenditures from all major party candidates. Such a discrepancy is accountable in term of the different roles played by special-interest groups and lobbying organizations compared to both parties in the California political system.

That this difference is indeed crucial is confirmed by examining the data displayed in Table 41, which compares the total campaign expenditure between assembly and senate incumbents and their challengers for the period 1976-1996. In this 20 year time-frame, total campaign expenditures are disproportionally skewed to the advantage of incumbents – for both Assembly and Senate – compared to challengers. Indeed, from 1976 to 1996, while the amount of campaign expenditures increased by more than ten-fold for incumbents running for the Assembly, and while it increased by about four-and-half-fold for incumbents running for the Senate, the exact opposite occurred for their challengers: namely, for both the Assembly and the Senate the total campaign expenditures did not show significant increases in 20 years; actually, for the Senate they indicated a decreasing trend.
Table 41: Total campaign expenditure by Assembly and Senate incumbents and challengers, California, 1976-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Assembly Incumbents</th>
<th>Assembly Challengers</th>
<th>Senate Incumbents*</th>
<th>Senate Challengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$25,135</td>
<td>$9,421</td>
<td>$86,275</td>
<td>$25,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>$47,379</td>
<td>$10,359</td>
<td>$59,367</td>
<td>$18,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$84,956</td>
<td>$10,108</td>
<td>$109,205</td>
<td>$12,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$94,122</td>
<td>$10,705</td>
<td>$208,105</td>
<td>$35,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$115,410</td>
<td>$8,475</td>
<td>$241,622</td>
<td>$3,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$119,310</td>
<td>$4,105</td>
<td>$248,105</td>
<td>$9,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$185,177</td>
<td>$9,375</td>
<td>$296,330</td>
<td>$57,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$147,806</td>
<td>$10,252</td>
<td>$235,894</td>
<td>$2,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$175,411</td>
<td>$15,003</td>
<td>$210,033</td>
<td>$16,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$149,602</td>
<td>$6,179</td>
<td>$660,070</td>
<td>$10,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td><strong>268,085</strong></td>
<td>14,943</td>
<td>393,767</td>
<td>9,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Senate incumbents include Assembly incumbents running for Senate seats; **Includes one Senate incumbent running for an Assembly seat; Note: The number in parenthesis indicates actual candidates who run for the general elections; Source: California Secretary of State (1996).

It seems that for a challenger, running for office in the state legislature is a ‘no-game’ competition. Indeed, the disproportionate difference in campaign expenditures among incumbents and challengers tells a simple story: in the state of California there is no real competition in the elections. This ‘incumbent advantage’ indicate quite clearly that the amount of money that candidates are able to collect affects decisively the chances of winning a seat in the state legislature. It is again interesting to notice how total campaign expenditures are much higher for incumbents running for the Senate compared to the Assembly; clearly, the competition for a Senate seat is quite strong, as it is confirmed by the fact that between 1976 and 1996 the number of candidates running has
not changed at all, remaining close to about 20 people competing. Even more significant is the fact that during these 20 years, the number of candidates running for the Assembly seat has actually shrunk, passing from 64 to 51 - a decrease by 79%. This again confirms the idea that the competition has become very tight, resulting in fewer candidates being able to raise the enormous amount of money necessary to run a winning election campaign for the Assembly, while it is even harder to enter into the small circle of candidates who are able to raise the money to run for the Senate seat. The empirical analysis thus tends to confirm what I suggested in the previous chapters: namely, that the ‘incumbent advantage’ is the primary consequence of the escalating costs to run for office in the state of California since the 1970s.

The disproportionate amount of money being channeled in favor of incumbents creates an electoral market that is not a competitive one. Incumbents are completely dependent on special-interest groups and lobbying organizations for financing their political campaigns. Both have assumed control of the ‘money’ necessary to win office, and in a context where party candidates are not awarded a large sum of money (actually there are getting less over time), the channeling of campaign funds toward incumbents allows special-interest groups and lobbying organization to control both party nominations. Over time, incumbents acquire an advantage – primarily a financial one – of such magnitude that their election and re-election is almost guaranteed. This incumbent advantage thus resides fundamentally in the amount of financial contributions that only special-interest groups and lobbying organization are able to procure. Indeed, lobbying organizations and special-interest groups are the real arbiter of election results: results that first and foremost make clear why the old dictum of Carey McWilliams is still at
work. ‘Interests’ are being represented in California politics, and the data about the financial advantage of incumbents from 1976 to 1996 are the clearest confirmation of it.\footnote{For reason of space I decided to focus my empirical analysis on the financial side of the so-called incumbent advantage, rather than to the electoral one. Thus I gathered data on total campaign expenditure and lobbying expenditures, rather than on elections. It is hoped that the aggregate data presented in this chapter still fit the overall schema of analysis, even in the absence of data regarding elections. Such project will be pursued in the time to come.}

In order to complete the analysis, I will now focus on another very important financial indicator: namely, lobbying expenditures. Recall that in our historical reconstruction we labeled California a ‘lobby State.’ Lobbying, or the so-called ‘Third House’ indeed plays a crucial role in the construction of the peculiar form of clientelistic politics at work in the California legislatures. Even though all observers are in agreement about the fundamental role played by lobbyists and lobbying organization in California politics gathering data is not an easy enterprise. That said, from the California Secretary of State, I extracted some data that allow my analysis to be complemented on the lobbying side of the equation forming the schemata of political exchange and thus of clientelistic politics in California for the last few decades. Table 42 displays data on total lobbying expenditures for California’s legislative sessions covering the decade from 1990 to 2000. While 10 years are not enough to capture the long-term trends of the financial role played by lobbying in California politics, still they tell a remarkable story. The aggregate data displaying lobbying expenditures for ten years of legislative sessions in California quite clearly indicates that such expenditures have been constantly increasing over time by a magnitude of two-fold. In 1990 lobbying expenditures totaled over $193,000,000, climbing to over $340,000,000 ten year later. This matches quite closely
the escalating costs to run for office in the state of California, suggesting at the same time that the role of lobbying as ‘financial intermediaries’ has been deepening as well.

Table 42: Total lobbying expenditures legislative sessions, California 1990-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>193,575,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>233,872,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>250,119,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>266,939,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>292,615,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>344,318,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: California Secretary of State (2000).

More and more money is injected by lobbying in the legislative sessions since 1990: indeed, the ratio expenditure over legislators (there are 120 in the California legislature, divided between 80 in the Assembly and 40 in the Senate), indicated that in 1990 more than $1 million and half was spent for each California legislator, whereas it climbed close to the $3 million in the span of just 10 years. Clearly, the financial package provided by lobbying in the California legislature is a fundamental one. The “Third House” in California represents the interests of several hundred groups, and these special-interest groups, in strictly alliance with the lobbying organization that is concerned with these interests, are the principal source of such financial package. According to data collected by the California Secretary of State in 2005, California’s ‘Third House’ had 2,176 officially registered lobbyists in 2000, and 2,639 in 2005: an increase of 121% in just five years. The ratio of lobbying expenditures in relation to the number of lobbyists suggests that each lobbyist managed close to $160,000 in the 1990-2000 legislative year: a financial capital of significant magnitude. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State data on lobbying expenditures does not go back to previous years, nor is there information about
the total number of lobbyists officially registered with the California state system. Still, these data indicated quite clearly that indeed, both lobbying expenditures and lobbyists are on a constant increase, and with it, a deepening of their ‘influence’ first, over California legislatures, and second, over California politics. These data about lobbying expenditures, when seen in close relationship with expenditures by candidates overall and for the state legislature during general elections, and especially when related to the disproportionate difference in the amount of campaign expenditures favoring incumbents over challengers, confirm if anything, that the lobbying clientelistic system in the state of California maintains influence over a financial platform of remarkable magnitude and scope.

Inextricably linked to financial support for political campaigns to interest groups and lobbyists, California political representatives are thus under enormous pressure to deliver ‘favors.’ These ‘favors’ have in the California legislature their own operative system, where the ‘distribution’ of benefits are marked by “political return:” a return, from which election and especially re-election is in turn attached. The competition for legislative ‘favors’ has thus multiplied over the years, resulting in the exponential increase in lobbying expenditures and in the number of lobbyists as well. Without recourse to bribery and other forms of corruption, a veritably efficient manner of exchanging ‘favors’ in return for financial support has been put at work in the state of California since the 1970s. Supported by a set of transparent and statutory mechanisms (embedded in the California legislature, the lobbying regulation about financial disclosure, and through the candidates’ reports on campaign expenditures), and based on modus operandi stamped with an efficient and bureaucratic style, the lobbying system in
California is considered just another aspect of ordinary business affairs. Candidates and legislators run their political career under a form of *constituency service* towards their elective constituencies; special-interest groups run their business under a form of ‘protection of legitimate interests;’ lobbyists run their ones under a form of ‘legislative affairs.’ Regardless of their form, the content of these practices are clientelistic in nature, a clientelism that has in the ‘Third House’ both its engineering system and its financial driver.

*Conclusion*

In this chapter I attempted to show the contrasting pattern of distributive politics in Southern Italy and California by demonstrating that in the latter, a) the rising cost of political campaigns, b) the enormous financial advantage of incumbents over challengers, and c) the extraordinary increase in spending by lobbying exercise a great degree of influence on the re-election of California’s political representatives (and through them the entire California’s legislature). In contrast, in Southern Italy, the magnitude of the vote exchange entrenched in the Mezzogiorno s fully on display by the continuing rise of preference voting over time. Preference voting for Southern Italy and a set of electoral and financial expenditure data concerned with political campaigning in California demonstrated the difference by which distributive politics took shape in these two sub-state political space over the last few decades. The analysis shows that in California, lobbying expenditure, when seen in close relationship to the disproportionate difference in the amount of campaign expenditures favoring incumbents over challengers, and with expenditures by candidates overall and for the state legislature during general elections, indicates that the lobbying clientelistic system maintains financial advantages that make
political competition close to a monopolistic game. In essence, ‘incumbent advantage’ is really nothing but this form of monopolistic control over the outcome of elections and thus of California politics. In contrast, in Southern Italy, the analysis of preference voting, as a measure of the vote of exchange, indicates that rather than decreasing over time, the political system witnessed a remarkable increase in the use of this type of vote option by Southern voters. When linked to the pattern of distributive politics related to the political allocation of public and infrastructural spending, the substantial increase of preference voting clearly suggest how the ‘exchange of favors’ has deepened over time in the Mezzogiorno since the mid-1970s.

These different outcomes register a fundamental contrast in the functioning of clientelistic politics when seen through the lens of a territorial prism. While individualist candidates dominate California’s political landscape, personal ‘feuds’ reign unrestrained in Southern Italy. In the latter, the political landscape assumed a skewed territorial politics because public resources were resolutely manipulated to favor their localities; in the former, the political landscape assumed a fragmented form of territorial politics because public resources were allocated towards those geographic constituencies (e.g. counties) where the highest return of electoral support could be gathered. Regardless of their contrasting pattern of distributive and/or clientelistic politics, the cases of Southern Italy and suggest that territorial politics is historically and institutionally constructed, that its mechanisms are strongly dependent on the local conditions, and that its outcomes are shaped by a multiplicity of factors. In short, territorial politics needs to be unbundled to reveal its inherent complexity. This issue will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
Conclusion: Unbundling territorial politics

Everyone knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State Legislators proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside.

*James Madison*

I began this study suggesting that the construction of territorial politics can be fruitfully grasped through the analysis of political clientelism. I pursued this line of inquiry in order to demonstrate that clientelistic politics has a territorial logic, a logic that derives from the simple fact that politicians are accountable through the territorially defined ballot box. From this, a long chain of effects follows, many of which have been historically, institutionally and empirically reconstructed using the contrasting cases of Southern Italy and California as an illustration of the different contours that territorial politics may take. The main thrust of these cases can be summarized as follows:

- An investigation of the concept of territorial politics as it exists in two contemporary locations, Southern Italy and the state of California, suggests that political clientelism is one of the main drivers by which territorial politics is often constructed;
- Political clientelism ultimately has a *geographical logic*;
- Political representatives, their parties and associated participants (e.g. special-interests groups and lobbying organization) and their networks of support, disseminated between the state, its administrative and bureaucratic structures, and filtered among its different institutional levels, develop and structure themselves through an exchange between electoral
votes and financial funds channeled towards their geographical constituencies;

- Clientelistic politics shape the relationships between the centers and the peripheries of political power;
- The structure of influence, electoral legitimacy, and political linkages in structuring and organizing territorial politics in sub-state political spaces involves an exchange process that is primarily organized on a geographical basis;
- The genesis and formation of contemporary sub-political spaces is thus driven by political representatives who can allocate public funds for personal return (e.g. being re-elected) which in turn shape and condition electoral behavior at different territorial scales – e.g. the local, the regional and the national.

From a theoretical perspective, I argued that territorial politic should be seen through the lens of a relational perspective, this in order to avoid any form of reductionism. This perspective is extremely important in order to reveal how the structural logic of socio-spatial relations works across space and time. I pointed out how the complex territorial logic of clientelistic politics could help us to unpack the complicated social processes underpinning the construction of territorial politics in the contemporary world. The macro-comparative analysis revealed how the social processes underlying the construction of territorial politics are historically open, institutionally fluid, and empirically dynamic. Furthermore, these same social processes are linked through complex relationships to the major actors that create and re-create them over time. I
showed how politicians, their parties, their financial supporters are caught in a set of relations that constrain or smooth out their strategies. These strategies in turn are both influenced and determined by the multiple political levels in which politicians tend to operate. I argued that both state and non-state actors, administrative jurisdictions, local and central institutions are all involved directly and indirectly in the political exchange that is at work in Southern Italy and California. What emerges from the contours of such a political exchange is that the social processes underpinning territorial politics are characterized inherently by conflict: conflict between center and periphery, conflict between different strand of party’s factions, and conflict between the different interests that are represented in the various institutions where power is located and administrated. From the lengthy analysis conducted in the previous chapters, it emerges that territorial politics is the product of conflict and power over the territorial allocation, distribution and redistribution of resources. This conflict involves many subjects, many different actors, span different levels of the institutions and emerges from the always contentious relationships that stand between collective and particularistic interests.

The relational framework and the geographical perspective that I presented in this study aims at examining in greater detail the representation of interests in various regional polities that much of current research simply overlooks. By showing how particularistic interests are structured, organized, promoted, and aggregated in the case of Southern Italy and California, I attempted to reveal the multidimensional layers underpinning the construction of territorial politics. This study thus fosters understanding of why and how territorial politics can be an extremely fruitful way to analyze the trajectories of many regional polities, and thus to illuminate their institutional, historical
and political landscape, both across time and especially across space. From this emphasis upon the geographical dimension of clientelistic politics, my main purpose has been to clarify the way in which territorial politics is itself relationally constructed. In order to specify how the inherent complexity of territorial politics can be sketched from a fully relational perspective, I would like to situate my discussion within three areas of current research in or close to political geography. In what follows, by critically placing the perspective developed in this study in the context of contemporary debates in (or in close relationships to) political geography, my task is thus to unbundle territorial politics.

Before engaging in this examination, I will summarize and critically examine the perspective that informs my vision of territorial politics.

Territorial politics in the context of contemporary political geography: A reconstruction

Political scientist Harold D. Lasswell in a famous book published in 1935, made the case that politics is about ‘Who Gets What, When, How.’ Thirty-four years later another influential political scientist, Theodore J. Lowi, in a ground-breaking work, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (1969; 2nd edition in 1979) argued that the liberal state became an immense ‘distributive Behemoth.’ Lowi identified its engine of growth in ‘delegation.’ Delegation in turn, worked through a process of accommodation, a process in which the several state’s agencies became captives of the interest groups. Lowi described such tendency as ‘clientelism.’ In summary, the government expanded according to three main features: first, by responding to the demands of all major organized interests; second, by assuming responsibility for programs sought by those interests; and finally, by assigning that responsibility to administrative agencies. This combination, in turn led to the formulation of new policies.
which tightened the grip of interest groups on the machinery of government. Lowi saw in clientelism a powerful force in the constitution of public policy, which in previous works he identified in terms of a four-fold typology: namely, distributive, constituent, regulative and redistributive policy (1964; 1970; 1972). Thus if politics is about ‘who gets what, when, and how,’ then the study of distributive politics is the study of politics writ large.

Correspondingly, I would propose that the study of territorial politics is the study of the ‘Where’ distributive politics occurs and thus of ‘politics’ writ large. Three fundamental dimensions could thus be identified as determining the ‘Where’ of distributive politics: a) power; b) conflict and c) resources. As such territorial politics should be conceived of as the study of the territorial allocation, distribution and redistribution of resources - both private but especially public. In this research I demonstrated how the ‘Where’ can be historically and institutionally reconstructed from a concrete standpoint, detailing its effects and outcomes over specific territories. In the course of my analysis I have suggested how a relational theory of territorial politics can be fruitfully deployed in order to disentangle the relationships between power and conflict when political agents fight about public resources. In brief, by appropriating ideas from Nicos Poulantzas, I attempted to demonstrate that territorial politics is a determinate condensation of political forces and political conflict around the distribution, allocation and redistribution of resources over specific partition of territorial space. It is from this tensional relationship between political forces and political conflict, involving many subjects, mediated by different institutions and influenced by many actors (e.g. parties, special-interest groups, lobbying, etc.), that territorial politics emerges. In showing the multidimensional logic of territorial politics
and its various working mechanisms, I argued that in the context of a global world
dominated by a process of decentralization and state restructuring, a world where many
democratic forms of representation are structured around electoral competition, territorial
politics can be one of the most fruitful ways to deconstruct the logic of such processes.
This is because, much of the processes underpinning decentralization, state restructuring
and forms of democratic representation are inevitably territorially bounded. Politicians
cannot help being held to account through territorially bounded forms of electoral
competition; political competition is structured, organized and defined by political
representatives who are themselves territorially bounded to their ‘geographically
constituted’ constituencies. In summary, by focusing on the ‘Where,’ a relational
territorial politics illuminates those political processes that are bound to geographical
space. A territorial politics thus conceived assign to itself the scope of studying the
partitioning and organizing of such a space, and ultimately those political processes that
are bound to it. Having sketched the perspective that informs this reconstruction of
territorial politics, I now briefly engage in a debate with three areas of research in
contemporary political geography that help to situate this reconstruction within current
research.

The rise of a ‘new regionalism.’ In responding to a view of spaces and regions that
emphasizes hierarchies and fixed territorialities, a new regionalism emerged in the last
decade based on a relational approach (Ward and Jonas, 2004; Harrison, 2006; Jessop,
Brenner and Jones, 2008; Jones, 2009). This approach is founded on the idea that what
counts are the relationships and forms of interdependencies that stem from spaces and
regions. This new regionalism argues that spaces and regions are constituted through a set
of multilayered interactions; they must be understood as being formed by multiple and overlapping social worlds; they need to be recognized as being constantly under construction. The relational perspective informing this new regionalism, thus sees spaces and regions as discontinuous objects, fluid and open to internal and external influences (Harrison, 2008b). Consequently, spaces and regions emerge as a set of territorially stretched articulations and networks. Furthermore, such a perspective opposes the view that spaces and regions are a territorially fixed and discrete entity, forever bounded and unable to be influenced from the outside (MacLeod and Jones 2001; 2007; Harrison, 2010). One theme which is central to relational thinking is the idea that the region represents a contingent ‘coming togetherness’ or assemblage of proximate and distant social, economic and political relationships, the scale and scope of which do not necessarily converge neatly around territories and jurisdictions formally administered or governed by the nation state (Allen and Cochrane, 2007).

Behind this static view of spaces and regions lies the view of the state as a nested hierarchy of scales. The new regionalism oppose a more dynamic view of the state, conceived as an ever-changing spatial configuration. Such configuration creates novel and emergent state spaces, which are formed by a new institutional hierarchy that is taking shape in an international context where national state territoriality has been systematically restructured. This occurred in two forms: first, from below, by the devolution and decentralization of decision-making powers to subnational institutions, and then, from above, by the growth of supranational institutions.¹⁰⁸ What emerges from the different strands of the new regionalism is a view of the contemporary global space as

¹⁰⁸ Much of this research originate from the work of Neil Brenner on the formation of new state spaces and the rescaling of statehood (2004; 2009); for a debate on state rescaling and politics of scale see the contribution of Cox (2009; 2010)
a ‘regional world’ (Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998), where regions are the fundamental building blocks of a globally interconnected capitalist economy. This economy is ultimately conceived of as a global mosaic of city-regions (Scott, ed. 2001), or alternatively as an assemblage of territorially interconnected global-cities (Sassen, 2006), or as combination of blocs of regional economies (Ohmae, 1993; 1995). Both these perspectives, regardless of their conceptual and semantic differences, view the rising role of regions as the fundamental building blocks for a globally interconnected capitalist state. In chapter 3 from a methodological point of view, and then in chapters 4 and 5 from a historical/institutional perspective, I argued that sub-state territorial units may constitute more viable units of analysis for such a globally interconnected capitalist economy.

This idea is based on at least three reasons: first (and following Stein Rokkan), because such units help investigate complex rather than mono-causal historical explanations; second (and following Sidney Tarrow), because such units can be fruitfully deployed using paired comparisons, thus unpacking the differences and similarities of comparable cases rather than using applied research strategies based on a single-case study; third (and following both Stein Rokkan and contextual theory in contemporary political geography) because such units work to extend and expand (by scaling up or down accordingly to the cases at hand) the territorial frame of analysis, rather than assuming that the state and its sovereign territory is the only entity shaping and containing political processes. I shall argue that these are some of the reasons that may help explain why debates about the new regionalist approaches and interventions have been in general not very attentive to the ‘political’ side of the equation, relying more on an ‘economic’ and/or administrative conception of regions as strategic scalar anchor
points of the restructured global capitalism. Indeed, the very notion of regional space underpinning this strand of the new regionalism has been challenged by those who advocate a ‘relational’ approach to understanding and conceptualizing regions. From the relational perspective, the regional spaces should be seen in the context of the increasingly complex multi-level, multi-scaled and multi-tiered system of contemporary global capitalism (Macleod and Jones, 2007; Harrison, 2012; 2013; Jonas, 2013b; Varró and Lagendijk, 2013). Accordingly, in this study I showed how using the contrasting cases of Southern Italy and California in such an increasingly complex multi-level, multi-scaled and multi-tiered system can be fruitfully disaggregated into viable territorial units and I then studied its internal logic, both from a historical and an institutional perspective.

More attentive to the ‘political’ side of the debate has been the work of political geographers and political scientists, who at one side argued that regions must be conceptualized as “central rather than merely derivative of non-spatial processes” (Agnew, 2000: 101; 2013), and on the other suggested that regions should be seen in the context of territorial forms of state restructuring (Keating, 1998). Both this conceptions suggest that globalization reinforces the ‘political’ role of regions, which far from disappearing in the magma of regional economic and political differences seem, if anything, to be strengthening (Harrison, 2008a). An empirical study of the ‘new regionalism’ in California by Jonas and Pincetl (2006) shows how this political conception of the regions can foster understanding of the contemporary process of state and governance rescaling.109 According to the authors, this process should not be conceived of in a unilateral fashion, but rather in a contextual way. In fact, forms of new regionalism around regions could be as much a strategic ‘bottom-up’ outcome of

109 For an extensive review of the new metropolitan regionalism in the United States, see Brenner (2002).
organized business interests as it is a solution which is pursued in a unidirectional ‘top-down’ fashion by (central) state interests. In this political approach to the new regionalism, an increasing role is assigned to a better appreciation of the role that territorial politics play in contemporary regionalism. In this study, I demonstrated how such an appreciation can be solidified by showing in chapter 6 how territorial politics operates over time according to various regimes of clientelistic politics and that these different regimes have developed historically in two sub-state spaces following to their own specific logic: a logic that was contingent on a set of given historical conditions. Accordingly, I shall suggest that the agenda of contemporary regionalism can be fruitfully expanded by seriously considering the extent to which territorial politics is historically and institutionally constituted.

In a recent series of interventions, Andrew E.G. Jonas argued that a closer attention to territorial politics in general could benefit the analysis of regionalism (2012a; 2012b; 2013a). In his second and third report Jonas illustrated how geographers, starting from the vantage point of struggles around governance and distribution, are exploring the political side of city-regionalism and starting to address the distributional dilemmas underpinning the politics of city-regionalism and its development. The perspective sketched in my study suggests indeed that territorial politics seen through the lens of a relational framework may push those studying the new regionalism to think more ‘politically’ about these distributional dilemmas. In doing this, it should overcome at least two serious limitation of this new strand of research about city-regionalism: first, to challenge the static view about the contemporary representation of interests in various regional polities that seems to lurk behind much of current research. My research
demonstrates how regional polities are strongly influenced by both parties and others who are involved in the political scene (e.g. special-groups interests and lobbying). Second, a relational territorial politics may help to unpack the set of collective and particularistic interests that always determine the material basis of representation, its public policy and its regional programs. My research clearly showed that contemporary regional polities may be biased towards the particularistic side of such representation. Specifically in the empirical analysis offered in chapter 7, 8 and 9, I attempted to demonstrate how the decreasing trends in public and infrastructural expenditures in Southern Italy led to an increase in votes of exchange; in contrast, in the state of California, the increasing trends of state and federal resources led to two different sets of processes: a) to the exponential increase of resources available to candidates to be distributed to their constituencies; b) to an increase - in a context where financing electoral campaigns and running for offices has become extremely expensive since mid-1970s - in dependency from lobbying and special-interests politics who are the only groups who can provide financial support to the Assembly and Senate candidates.

Consequently, by focusing analysis on the various political processes that shape regional interests, future research may promote the agenda of the new regionalism. Particular importance should be assigned to: 1) the degree to which such collective and particularistic interests are structured, organized, promoted, and aggregated at different

110 In future research I shall attempt to study representation of interests that inform also past regional politics. I plan to compare four agencies-driven process of regional growth and development, that between the 1930s and the 1960s attempted to guide this growth – e.g. the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno in Southern Italy; the Délégation interministérielle à l'Aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR) in the great Parisian regions; the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the southern corner of the United States, and Regional Planning Association (RPA) in the great New York City metropolitan region. These four models represent alternative path to regional growth based on public spending programs and reforms, and their comparative analysis should be able to demonstrate in detail how the interaction between the state, private interests, and regional public policy can take different form according to the different philosophies about distributive politics at the regional scale.
spatial scales and in different places; 2) the extent to which a network of political agents linked through parties, state agencies and supported by administrative institutions determine the trajectories of regional development; and 3) the magnitude and form of political linkages that spanning between the center and the periphery of political powers together different regional polities to the central state. In this way a relational territorial politics should be able to show that many of the distributional dilemmas underpinning the politics of city-regionalism and its development are not new, and that the models of the past can shed light on the current ones.

_The resurgence of ‘territory.’_ In this research I argued that most of the research on territorial politics has given only cursory attention to the ‘territorial component’—Michael Keating being the exception. From a methodological standpoint, I suggest that if this component needs to be examined in detail, one possible path involves the idea of thinking about territory _analytically_. Informed by the macro-analytical approach forged in the late 1970s by Stein Rokkan, I argued that such an approach can offer a set of different methodological yardsticks that in a comparative fashion can unpack the role of the territory not just across space and time, but perhaps more importantly highlight the idea that the territory is itself constructed and reconstructed by ‘politics.’ From this idea, I argued that a return to the work of political geographer Jean Gottmann should be in order (Gottmann, 1951; 1973; 1975). In fact, Gottmann provides a concept of territory well suited to tackle the political issues that surround its construction and reconstruction.

---

111 I plan to give substance to this suggestions by inquiring on how the interaction of particularistic interests, political linkages between center and periphery and the role of the federal state worked together to push certain American states at the forefront of regional politics. I shall attempt to study the territorial politics of state/federal defense spending in the crucial decade of 1950-1960 in three states, namely, Massachusetts, California and Texas in which the connection between federal defense spending and state politics produced three different political geography models of military spending.
Politics, according to Gottmann, is fundamentally a set of processes that organize and partition geographical space. From this it follows that the concept of territory is central to study what Gottmann identifies as the ‘spatial variation of politics.’ In this research, especially in chapter 2, I attempted to show how fruitfully this avenue can be, demonstrating that political clientelism, when conceived through a territorial lens, can capture the spatial variation that underpins territorial politics. Since Gottmann conveys the idea that territory is both “a political as well as a geographical concept,” this perspective constitutes a powerful paradigm to study how territorial politics is fundamentally about partitioning and organizing geographical space through political processes. Thus by focusing on the proper ‘territorial component’ of territorial politics, emphasis is placed upon the “characteristics and differentiation of geographical space” thus avoiding the risk of conceiving political space as an empty one. This approach that, for a better term I called ‘analytical,’ may be helpful in redressing some shortcomings currently resulting from the resurgence of the concept of territory (Painter, 2010).

Much of this should be linked to the work of Stuart Elden who in a series of articles and in two full-length books has attempted to reconstruct the conceptual genealogy of the ‘word’ territory (Elden, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2013a; 2013b). In summary, Elden argues that first of all, territory and territoriality should be distinguished from the ideas of state and especially of sovereignty. Second, he suggests that often territory is conflated with semantically close terms likes ‘land’ or ‘terrain’ – which Elden argues, have a ‘political-economic and political-strategic relations’ with the concept of territory but which is ‘ultimately insufficient.’ Third, he argues that territory should ‘be understood in an expanded sense of political-legal and political-technical issues’ and
accordingly to ‘be interrogated in relation to state and space.’ Finally, Elden proposes a
definition that involves the idea that ‘territory can be understood as a political
technology.’ In short, that territory is ‘a political and legal term’ concerning the
relationship between state and space. Thus Elden attempts to recast the concept of
territory as a political category: stemming from connections between the state and space,
territory is a political technology because it is ‘owned, distributed, mapped, calculated,
bordered and controlled.’ This definition, which combines in a strange mix of Heidegger,
Foucault and Lefebvre, while valuable, leaves much to be desired. First of all, Elden
seems to be committed to a transcendental idea of space, which ultimately informs that of
territory. In his historical research, this perspective is fully at work: the genealogical
approach derived from Foucault is very much applied exclusively to the history of
political thought, where Elden engages political philosophers in order to disentangle the
concept of territory from that of land, terrain, sovereignty and state. Secondly, his idea of
the territory as a political technology neglects the materiality of the construction of
territory as a practical device, a device that indeed Jean Gottmann put at the forefront of
his historical analysis by pointing out how the significance of territory transcend the
political sphere. Territory is a spatial domain because it is produced by the perpetual
interaction of cloisonnement and circulation (Muscara, 2000), and as such it is a property
of geographical space writ at large, not just that of political space. It seems as if Elden
commitment to a transcendental genealogical history a la Foucault trap him into what he
claim to escape. Third, the will to interrogate the concept of territory in ‘its historical,
geographical and conceptual specificity,’ and the claim that the concept of territory ‘must
be approached politically’ in reality ends up in superimposing the history of an idea, that
of the territory, into the history of Western political thought, while neglecting those that he claim to elucidate (especially the geographical ones). In this research I demonstrated how taking Gottmann’s concept of territory seriously can highlight the multiple and complicated way in which politics work on partitioning the geographical space, not just the political one. The complex institutional path that I reconstructed for Southern Italy and the state of California in chapters 4, 5 and 6 gave some empirical content to Gottmann’s ideas, demonstrating that both geographical spaces were constructed and reconstructed through the interactions between institutions, rules of laws, political parties and a plethora of individual and collective choices. Accordingly, debates over the resurgence of territory should benefit from thinking about territory not just politically and historically, but also analytically.  

*Places, spaces and politics.* Finally, this research, by embracing the ‘relational turn’ in human geography and developing a contextual analysis of territorial politics, attempted to distance itself from those bounded, static and ahistorical representations of space and place. I offered an analysis of territorial politics that points to the rise of new spatial configurations and different forms of socio-spatial relationships at work at the sub-state level of political spaces. This view wanted to overcomes the static view of territorial politics that seems to inform much of the contemporary research about regional polities.

---

112 I plan to reconstruct in future research the history of the ideas related to territorial politics by pointing out the analytical role played practical interpretation of the concept of territory in the work of Rokkan, Gottmann and Tarrow in the 1970s, of several strands of research on localities in England and Italy in the 1980s and finally in several disciplines (political history, comparative politics, regional studies, etc. etc.) in the 1990s and 2000s as the incipient process of globalization, devolution, state restructuring and re-scaling pushed the agenda of research towards an appreciation or re-appreciation of the territorial component of political processes.

113 In a review article, Ethington and McDaniel (2007) showed the fruitful interaction between new institutionalism and political geography. In my research I attempted to translate their indication in a more historically-oriented perspective. I am grateful to John Agnew to pointing my attention to this piece.
In my macro-comparative analysis, I proposed an understanding of the social processes underlying the construction of territorial politics as being open, fluid, dynamic and linked through complex relationships to the major actors that create and re-create them over time and in different degrees. This view, by implying that territorial politics is itself relationally constructed, builds a bridge with current research on places, spaces and politics. It does so because the relational analysis of territorial politics that I proposed in this research focuses on the construction of places through social practices. In short, it does not present an understanding of spaces and places as static containers of social processes, but as a dynamic one. One of the insights of contemporary political geography is that several Western social sciences neglected the role and function of physical space as a category of analysis.

Current research in political geography instead, points out how space, rather than being just a neutral plane of human existence, a sort of empty container for important social, political, and natural processes, is instead politically produced, often controlled and subjected to the effect of power and therefore forms the structural basis of political outcomes. In the course of this research, I have emphasized the fluidity and dynamic character of the social and political process that affected and occurred in specific places, noting that such processes responded to interconnections with other places – for example, in terms of center-periphery relationships. Consequently, I offered an understanding of places which, rather than being conceived as having fixed boundaries and being structurally homogenous, in contrast tend to have permeable boundaries and are internally diverse with respect to their social and other attributes. In a nutshell, my

---

114 This perspective has been influenced by the research on place and politics by John Agnew; see respectively his treatment in two full-length books (1987; 2002).
research on Southern Italy and California political spaces and political places has been strongly process-oriented. In contrast to perspectives from other social sciences, the idea of space that territorial politics embraces may be compared to a plane on which events take place at particular locations. Moreover, rather than opposing the generality of abstract space with the particularity of place, my research showed how territorial politics is constructed and reconstructed in a dynamic relationship with both. In this sense, territorial politics may help to highlight an idea of space as a political plane that is subjected to ‘command and control’ functions. At the same time, it shows how place is not just the context of life and experience, but a fundamental political one. Rather than just a “frame” for the investigation of parties, political representatives, political exchange, etc., places in this research represent the complex and dynamic cross-germination of these categories and the activities to which they referred in the historical and institutional contexts in which they occurred (Agnew, 2011).

In the course of my historical, institutional and empirical analysis, I attempted to show how the various political configurations became open to contextual changes - for example, the introduction of Proposition A-1 in 1966 redefined the interests of the politicians who were elected in the California legislatures and more importantly completely shifted the logic and functioning of political campaign, upsetting the established political affiliations between candidates, special-interest groups and lobbying organizations. My relational approach to territorial politics thus contributes to promoting the research agenda on space and place, by giving additional emphasis on the institutional and historical premises of contextual shifts and changes in specific locations and within peculiar locales or social settings. Place and space are thus crucial categories for the
study of territorial politics, since they encompass those particular and unique instances of political experience, human social interaction and their relationships to institutions. In chapter 4 and 5 I emphasized how ‘particular places’ (e.g. Sacramento for the case of California, and the various regions for the case of Southern Italy) carried those unique instances – e.g. a specific form of political attitude towards legislatures and its administrative and bureaucratic functioning in the former, and for the latter specific forms of political culture towards public resources, the state and the central government, and especially towards its peripheral bureaucratic and administrative apparatus.

Research on the multifaceted and complex construction of territorial politics thus forwards research on the version of contextual theory, as developed by John Agnew. This theory, which emphasizes a place-context perspective provides different questions and answers to the relationships between places, spaces and politics. Instead of looking for universal patterns of political behavior (e.g., the rational self-interested agent who maximizes his political calculation and lives in an asocial, a-historical and self-serving world – an agent that underpins the dominance of rational choice theory in much of political and economic research), the place-context perspective emphasizes the ‘geographical situatedness of voters, candidates, issues, and information’ (Shin and Agnew, 2008). In studying the pattern of distributive politics that underpin their contrasting forms of political clientelism through the comparison of three indices – e.g. general public spending, infrastructural spending and preference voting and lobbying – I showed the geographical, or in essence, the territorial situatedness of public resources. In chapter 7 I highlighted how the allocation of public spending had a territorial dimension in both Southern Italy and in California. In chapter 8 I showed the same in relation to the
distribution of infrastructural spending and especially its territorial targeting towards specific regions in Southern Italy, and toward specific institutional levels - e.g. counties – in the state of California. Finally, in chapter 9, I compared the territorial situatedness in the political exchange, showing respectively a) how the increase in preference voting in Southern Italy has a regional variation, and b) how the circuit that links increased spending for financial campaigns by candidates and extends their financially-driven incumbent advantage and corresponding increase of lobbying expenditures to target candidates who once in power will return ‘favors’ in the state legislature, has a county variation. In short, such territorial situatedness constituted the main geographical space of clientelistic politics in both sub-state political domains.

The place-context perspective criticizes all forms of ontological individualism and presents an alternative paradigm for examining and understanding politics in all its complexity. In other words, politics is conceived of as being inherently and territorially situated. In both the historical/institutional analysis presented in chapter 4, 5 and 6, and in the empirical one offered in chapter 7, 8 and 9, I attempted to show how the complex processes underlying the development of political clientelism and the corresponding construction of territorial politics were always spatially and thus contextually situated. By studying and comparing their respective political history, and their institutional variations, this research revealed the extent to which political exchanges involving the channeling of public resources in return of electoral and financial support has been territorially situated in both Southern Italy and California. Consequently, the study of territorial politics helps to unpack the social, political and institutional processes that are always intertwined within various spatial systems. This occurs because the territorial
politics is structured by forces and processes operating at various geographical degrees. The study of territorial politics thus supports the idea that place and space are essential components of political and social relations and that these relations are dynamically conceived. As such, territorial politics may contribute to the advancement of research in contextual theory.

Coda

Max Weber and James Madison looked at democracy from very different perspectives, but both seem to agree on one aspect: namely, that of political clientelism. For Weber the paradox of democracy resides in the fact that professional politicians live from politics, and that the more expensive it is to run for office, the higher the incentive to embrace a form of clientelistic politics. For Madison the paradox of democracy instead is linked to the ‘particularistic’ vision of politics, so that the higher the interests to be served in their counties or districts, the higher the probability of becoming a servant of local clientele. In this study I attempted to demonstrate how territorial politics can help us understand the historical genesis and formation of the ways in which the increasing cost of running for office in the state of California and the increasing dependence of local politicians from financial funds coming from the center in Southern Italy, created structural conditions for creating different forms of territorial politics. Indeed, there is no

---

115 In a future project I plan to give substance to these remarks by studying the geographical logic of machine politics in the early stages of US political history. The study take as its starting point the analysis of Moisey Ostrogorsky on the United States political parties and their territorial map: “If on the map of the United State all the parts of the country where the Machine has developed were colored red…” (1902). Accordingly, I plan to demonstrate the territorial logic in the constitution of political machines in the United States focusing on the period 1890-1920. The comparative analysis involve the analysis of the main geographical axis of what I call the ‘Red America’, namely: New York, Chicago, San Francisco Atlanta, Philadelphia, Buffalo, New Haven and others cities. This study, by focusing on the territorial logic of machines city politics, aim at demonstrative the early formation of territorial politics at its small geographical scale: that of the city/local governance system.
doubt that in the contemporary world, democracy is a very expensive political business and that professional politicians are in direct or indirect ways servant of ‘particularistic interests.’ In today’s global world, transformative processes of decentralization and state restructuring places the representation of interests at the forefront of the agenda of research in political geography. The macro-comparative analysis of two very different sub-state political spaces demonstrates how different forms of political exchanges underlie the construction of these interests. The historical, institutional and empirical analysis of the relationships between the different agents involved in the development of distributive politics shows how corresponding forms of territorial politics emerged, developed and crystallized over time and localized over specific territories. I certainly agree with both Madison and Weber about the paradoxical nature of democracy. Indeed, this study attempted to interrogate the territorial logic of clientelistic politics, or perhaps, to examine the geographical basis of political clientelism. Therefore, through this research I hope to have demonstrated the centrality of analyzing territorial politics, not just for democracy, but for an understanding of politics overall.
References


