FROM SOFT POWER TO ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY? A Comparison Of The Changing Rationales And Roles Of The U. S. And Canadian Federal Governments In International Education

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Publication Date
2015-02-01
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A Comparison Of The Changing Rationales And Roles Of The U. S. And Canadian Federal Governments In International Education

February 2015

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ABSTRACT
Through a historical and comparative analysis of international education policy development in Canada and the U.S., this paper will map the similarities and differences in the two countries. It will highlight the contributions and challenges of the government’s involvement in international education (IE) in the two federal states and in particular, explore the implications of the changing contexts, rationales and approaches for international education to the federal role in higher education. It will conclude with observations on the differential impact of the federal government’s role in international/higher education on the higher education systems of the two countries and thus contribute to our understanding of how national specificities and characteristics outweigh the commonly stated policy rationales, approaches and outcomes for international education.

Keywords: International Education, Internationalization Of Higher Education, National Policy, Federal Government, Soft Power

As McAllister-Grande (2008) suggests there has been little comparative or cross regional study on the history and policy development of international education (IE). While there has been some comparative research on the higher education systems of the U.S. and Canada¹ the two jurisdictions have rarely been compared when it comes to IE. This is curious given that Canada and the U.S. share a common border and an extensive bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, there are important differences between the two countries; however, there are some striking similarities that make the comparison meaningful. In particular, the federal government’s role in higher education in the two countries is fairly similar. Given this similarity, this paper seeks to understand the causes for the similarities and differences in the role of the federal government in IE² in the two countries, using a historical and comparative analysis.

A. HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Both the U.S. and Canada are federal states where education is the primary responsibility of the state/province. Neither country has a federal ministry of education and although the U.S. has a Department of Education (DoED), the federal role in national higher education policy is highly circumscribed. The federal role in higher education is limited to providing student aid, supporting research and other policy areas of specific national importance (e.g. military and aboriginal issues). Further, the state/provincial role in higher education is highly protected given the value placed on regionalism and regional autonomy in both jurisdictions. University-government relations share in common a high respect for principles of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. When it comes to IE, in both countries it is a policy arena that falls between the cracks of foreign policy, a responsibility of the federal government and higher education, the responsibility of the state/provincial governments, making the federal role in IE nebulous and ill defined.

¹ This ROPS is also a contribution to Center’s Research Universities Going Global (RUGG) Project which is a collaboration between researchers and associates affiliated with the Center for Studies in Higher Education at UC Berkeley and the International Centre for Higher Education Research (INCHER), University of Kassel, Germany.
According to Knight (2014), Nye’s term “soft power”, which he defines as “the ability to get what you want [referring to national interests within an international arena] through attraction rather than coercion or payments” 3, has become the new vogue in IE, with international educators drawn to it “like bees to honey” 4. She questions the attractiveness of a soft power approach and asks, “are the primary goals of international higher education to serve self-interests and gain dominance?” 5

This paper argues that IE has its roots in soft power diplomacy. Soft power, and cultural diplomacy, a form of soft power, provided the rationale for the federal role in IE. Further, to challenge the legitimacy of self-interest in IE, as Knight does, seems somewhat paradoxical, given any government’s inherent interest in preserving its own stability and progress. However, what this paper proposes is that IE as a soft power tool does not always translate into similar national goals of seeking global power and dominance. Rather, as this comparative study illustrates, soft power approaches are highly context specific. What constitutes a soft power approach differs by jurisdiction and changes over the course of time often in response to both domestic and international determinants. In the present context, globalization is considered one such powerful external policy determinant 6 that is “…changing the world of internationalization”.7 However, globalization is assumed to result in policy convergence across different jurisdictions. This comparative study will contribute to the contesting policy discussions on policy convergence as a result of globalization vs. the continuing relevance of national characteristics in determining IE policy, its rationales and approaches. 8

B. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION (IE) IN THE U.S. AND CANADA

It is not surprising that IE has its roots in soft power diplomacy given that it was initiated as a formal government activity post world war II. Thus, in comparing the federal role in IE policy between the U.S. and Canada, this paper will outline developments all the way from the mid 1940’s to the current period, early 2014. Drawing on available literature in the field, it will discuss the cases in an alternating pattern across five decades, 1945-1960’s; 1970’s; 1980’s; 1990’s and 2000’s.

Figure 1: Time Period

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1945-1960’s: The ‘Golden’ Years: Post World War II

This period is fondly cherished as the golden era in both Canada and the U.S. The U.S. federal government initiated its formal role in IE in 1945, almost two decades before the Canadian initiatives.

U.S.A. - Labeled by some as a period of “euphoria,” 9 the post world-war II era, was a time when several major IE initiatives emerged. The “birth” of IE in 194510 is linked to senator, J. William Fulbright’s vision of the “promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture and science”11 using the proceeds from the sales of surplus war property. Under President Truman, the Fulbright program achieved an “unprecedented size and scope”12 and became an envy of other nations and America’s IE flagship initiative. Contrasting Fulbright’s idealism was the new National Defense Act (NDEA) of 1958, which introduced the Title VI programs, perhaps the most influential IE policy development in the U.S. Among other policy directives within the National Defense Act, Title VI provided federal funding to U.S. universities to develop language and area studies centers as well as graduate fellowships for advanced international knowledge and expertise.13
A direct response to the Russian’s launch of the Sputnik, the NDEA proclaimed that, “the security of the nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and technical skills of its young men and women”.14 Other important initiatives developed during this period included the Smith Act in 1948 that resulted in congressional appropriations for international educational exchanges and the creation of the US Information Agency (USIA), an organization established in 1953 to promote America’s image abroad. In 1949, the federal foreign aid agency developed a new role of international technical assistance for the U.S. land grant universities.15

Each of these new initiatives were coordinated by different federal units; for example, title VI programs were administered by the Office of Education (OE) within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), while the Fulbright, was run through the Department of State (DS). McAllister-Grande16 suggests that this structure set the policy context for IE where different federal departments administered programs, often independent and even in contradiction with one another. The academic community welcomed these important initiatives, while also expressing concern over the influence of government’s political agenda on IE. Sensitive to these concerns, the government assured academics that “neither partnership or reciprocity implied government control or any loss of university autonomy”.17 The “euphoria” for IE extended beyond the federal government to include private foundations, e.g. Ford, and Carnegie who worked in partnership or in parallel to the federal government.

The governments of Presidents Kennedy (1961-63) and Johnson (1963-69) were part of this golden era. Kennedy endorsed the broader rationales for international exchange through the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act or the Fulbright Hays Act in 1961. He introduced a Bureau of International Cultural Relations in 1959, subsequently renamed the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in 1960 within the DOS.18 One of his major legacies was the creation of USAID through the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 and the introduction of the influential Peace Corps program. The Peace Corps, designed to send young Americans abroad to promote friendship and world peace, was highly successful by 1966 in sending the highest number of U.S. volunteers abroad.19 A new NGO Education in World Affairs (EWA) was formed to strengthen the role of U.S. higher educational institutions in international issues. Unfortunately the organization dissolved.20

President Johnson was committed to building America as a “great society” and he believed that “ideas not armaments, will shape our last prospects for peace; that the conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms; that the knowledge of our citizens is the one treasure which grows only when it is shared”.21 Johnson appointed a task force on IE and introduced the International Education Act (IEA) in 1966, which recommended a wide range of initiatives 22 including the set up of a new Center for International Educational Cooperation (to be housed in the department of HEW). Unfortunately, the IEA although enacted into law, was never funded. The IEA would have likely shaped the IE policy landscape in the U.S. significantly and, Vestal contends, that even if it was not funded, it “remains an important landmark of federal intentions in this policy arena”.23

Initiatives during 1945-1960, established the U.S. federal role in IE. This role was multipronged in approach; it included academic exchanges, technical and development assistance and curriculum (area studies and language) development. It was rationalized in context of the federal government’s responsibility for foreign policy, which during the post world war II period,
focused on a dual intent of promoting mutual understanding and world peace as well as ensuring national security in wake of the cold war. Kennedy and Johnson were recognized as leaders who “understood and valued soft power gained through the exchange of ideas”. The failure in funding IEA towards the end of this era, however, signaled a shift away from these golden years.

Canada - The establishment of its first external aid office, under the Department of External Affairs (DEA), during Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s leadership (57-63), marked the beginnings of the Canadian federal government’s role in IE. Overseas development assistance (ODA) became an important component of Canada’s foreign policy as an expression of what Pratt has called, “humane internationalism” - “an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty.” ODA consolidated the role of Canadian universities in internationalization with the educational sector deploying among the largest number of technical assistance personnel including faculty and students to developing countries and hosting students from developing countries on Canadian campuses. Under Prime Minister Pearson (63-68), ODA further strengthened with the creation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), “making Canada one of the more generous donors among industrialized countries.” Prime Minister Pearson is credited for building a strong reputation for Canada in world affairs as a middle power, committed to peace building.

Unlike the U.S., there was an absence in Canada of private foundations supporting IE. However, several non-governmental organizations (NGO) linked to post secondary institutions formed in response to the federal government’s ODA policies (two of the most prominent being Canadian Universities Service Overseas (CUSO) and the World University Services of Canada (WUSC)). These NGO’s were instrumental in supporting IE and sending Canadian students abroad. The Pearsonian era, like the Kennedy and Johnson era in the U.S., symbolized a high level of commitment to internationalism and development/humanitarian assistance, an era that several lament has never returned to Canada. The Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship program (CSFP) initiated during this period marked a shift in Canada’s foreign policy. Bergfalk argues that is was indicative of an evolution of the growing interest of the federal government in “cultural diplomacy and a recognition that education could serve as a Canadian foreign policy tool.”

Unlike the U.S., Canada did not have a DoED but in 1967, the government introduced a new Academic Relations Section within the DEA. Its purpose was to build better relationships with the Canadian academic community. It is interesting to note that in its policy and program development, officials looked to the approaches of the US DS and while it adapted a few of its programs, the general consensus was that the US DS’s approach was too direct in terms of a federal government role in IE and therefore inappropriate for the Canadian context. The DEA expressed interest in supporting the study of foreign relations, regional studies and languages at Canadian universities, similar to the Title VI program approaches. It rationalized its role in these proposed programs given their “direct and immediate interest” in meeting “national need[s]” however such support from the federal government raised ethical issues of academic freedom as well as constitutional problems and were subsequently never implemented.

1970’s: New directions: Shifting policy priorities

U. S. A – The end of the period of euphoria in IE came as a direct result of several events, including Kennedy’s assassination, the fall out from the Vietnam War, a faltering U.S. economy, and the oil crisis and the Watergate scandal --events that did not bode well for IE. This was a time of severe budget cuts. Ruther states that the funding for Title VI centers was cut by almost half with the program representing less than 1% of the OE program funding from its original 8% in 1958. Aid funding was also substantially reduced, although not to the same levels as the Title VI programs and exchanges. In 1970, the report of an Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs indicated that “expenditures for educational exchanges [were] lowest of any time in recent history” causing disappointment and serious doubts about the government’s interest in IE. Funding cuts were indicative of a shift in thinking about IE. The broader goals of mutual understanding, peace and humanitarian assistance “failed to garner [the same] major support” within the federal government. This is why Ruther describes the Nixon (69-74) and Ford (74-77) IE period as one “from boon to bane” a time when, “the nation was in no mood to assume global leadership if it meant more Vietnams”.

However, according to Snow the Cold war paradigm continued to provide the rationale for what little federal investment continued for Title VI and exchange programs. The threat from the Soviet Union resulted in a push towards exchanges and in hosting international students, “who in turn [would] represent a more accurate picture of America to [their] compatriots upon return”. IE programs that justified a pragmatic and national defense rationale survived, however the credit for not having all IE

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programs closed during this period is also attributed to the growing sophistication of IE advocacy groups. Their efforts resulted in the integration of some of the failed IEA legislative intent into the NDEA Title VI programs and a permanent place in the federal portfolio of the existing network of languages and area studies centers as “a valuable national resource for the indefinite future.”

With President Carter’s election (1977-81) there was new hope for IE. He created a separate Department of Education (DoED); USIA was changed to the US International Communication Agency (USICA) absorbing the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs from the DS, the purpose being to enable the government to fulfill its “public diplomacy” role. In performing its functions, USICA at times overlapped and at times conflicted with the DoED. By 1978, a Presidential commission was created to attempt to improve U.S. attention to international concerns and foreign language and international studies. A Coalition for the Advancement of Foreign Languages and International Studies (CAFLIS) was formed under three supportive legislators, Paul Simon, Dante Fascell and John Buchanan, however Ruther suggests that they were ineffective in fulfilling the commission’s mandate. It was the strong and continuous lobbying efforts of the disciplinary associations in area studies and the Directors of Title VI programs once again that “helped preserve th[is] policy arena”.

**Canada:** This era marked a radical shift in Canada’s foreign policy. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-79; 1980-84), Canada’s national interest was considered paramount and foreign policy re-defined as “the extension abroad of national policies.” An increased emphasis on defining Canadian culture as distinct from American led to an expression of pride in the promotion of Canadian culture with cultural diplomacy, for the very first time, becoming a priority for its foreign policy.

In 1974, the Academic Relations Section within DEA, originally set up to improve relations with Canadian academics, shifted its mandate entirely, “to develop an informed awareness and a more balanced understanding of Canada... and to facilitate the development of more productive contacts and cross fertilization between Canadian and foreign scholars.” As part of this mandate, the Canadian Studies Program Abroad (CSPA), referred to by few as the “crown jewel” of Canada’s international academic relations, became the primary program focus of this section. Reflecting this change in purpose, the section became a full division under the Bureau of International Cultural Relations. Canadian studies came to be defined as a subject that “promotes knowledge about Canada by dealing with some aspect of Canada’s culture, social conditions, physical setting or place in the world” through a single subject or interdisciplinary thematic study. This period was one of “Canadianization” of higher education and the creation of Canadian studies as a legitimate area of academic studies in the achievement of both national and foreign policy objectives.

The CSPA included a wide range of program initiatives ranging from establishing Chairs of Canadian Studies, to assistance to foreign universities to develop further programs, courses, research or events in the field. The CSPA in many ways represented a unique partnership approach to academic exchanges and while it became the raison d’etre of the academic relations division, it also highlighted the dismal investments of the Canadian federal government in international cultural relations (ICR). While Canada’s ICR budget was $7 million/year in 1983, France was investing $340 million/year, Britain, $127 million/year, and Germany, $200 million/year.

**1980’s: From politics to economics? - The growing economic imperative**

**U.S.A.** - The Iranian revolution and the resulting hostage crisis shifted the perspective on IE within the federal government, in spite of the overall support for IE under the Carter administration (77-81). Difficulties in tracking Iranian foreign students, led to the government taking a series of measures that made visa regulations more complex and burdensome. The government considered introducing a formal immigration tracking system and proposed the Simpson–Mazzoli bills in the mid 1980’s to impose a 2-year foreign residence requirement for all foreign students after graduation. Strong advocacy from the IE lobby groups prevented the implementation of these strict measures. This time, joining in their efforts were members of the U.S. industry who argued that restricting the entry and stay of international (graduate) students would eventually weaken America’s global competition and future prosperity. Foreign graduate students contributed to research and development in the STEM fields, closing U.S. borders would mean losing these students to other countries who would benefit tremendously from their talents.

With Reagan elected (81-89), the early 1980’s were initially not an optimal time for IE. Enormous budget cuts were made to HEA Title VI and Fulbright programs and there were talks of DoED closure and shift in programs from the federal to state levels. Similarly funding for AID/international research and technical assistance declined and Peace Corps was slashed in size. The

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1 The terms foreign students and international students are used interchangeably in this paper.
shift in international assistance policy also meant less engagement of university faculty/students. Aid was re-directed to countries that were clearly strategic for the U.S. from a geopolitical perspective. Reagan's foreign policy was focused on specific "geopolitical hot spots".52 Ironically in spite of this initial lack of support, it was Reagan's conservative foreign policy perspective that changed the tides for IE. The IE lobby, cognizant of Reagan's policy priorities, emphasized the importance of national security goals achieved through IE. Either in response to their arguments and/or its own policy priorities, quite unexpectedly, the Reagan administration provided a fairly large boost to IE. A new title VI was created in the HEA, with NDEA Title VI and the IEA repealed. "There was a need to strengthen course offerings and requirements in foreign languages studies and international studies in the nation's schools, colleges and universities"53 and international exchanges were seen as an explicit foreign policy tool to combat the influence of the, "so called Evil empire".54 Reagan's aggressive anti communist foreign policy provided the ideological basis to support international educational exchanges, with the "era of sending and receiving young scholars to build mutual understanding ... now a quaint artifact of a bygone era."55

Another IE policy shift occurred as the U.S. economy came to be viewed as core to the long-range security of the Nation. New Title VI programs now included business schools and there was a focus on the research and instructional needs of business students in the area of international affairs and languages. With these new priorities, the policy mandate for IE expanded considerably. Recognizing this broader scope, the set up of a federal agency, similar to the National Science Foundation (NSF), was recommended to expand international studies. While such an agency was never set up, IE resources thinned out as they were now split over many more initiatives than before. With the growing complexity of the sector, there was also increasing need expressed for policy leadership and coordination.56

### Canada

The Canadian Studies program (CSPA) continued to be the major federal focus with funding increased to outreach a larger number of countries. By the mid 1980's, the budget for academic relations reached its highest peak, with approximately $20 million as operational funds. These were important years for Canada's ICR. The CSPA appealed to senior officials as a useful and effective tool to project Canada's image abroad and raise its profile among international decision makers. The program was also perceived as a less direct and intrusive IE approach, as it did not challenge provincial jurisdictional authority nor institutional autonomy or academic freedom. In its efforts to stimulate the work of foreign academics on the teaching of Canada by avoiding 'Canadian cultural imperialism' and the 'straight export of Canadian content' through pre-packaged teaching materials from Canada '57 the CSPA approach resulted in less support to Canadians in favor of support to foreign faculty, drawing heavy criticism from the Canadian academic community as an approach that was "wrong headed".58 "They were appalled that foreign scholars were supported by Canadian tax dollars, while there was an absence of support for Canadian scholars and students wishing to study abroad"59 particularly at a time when Canadian universities were facing severe funding cuts and the country needed to become more internationally focused and globally competitive.

Over time, the CSPA, as other federal programs, began to experience a slow but steady shift in policy priorities. The geographic expansion of the program came to be dictated by Canada's trade and economic interests. The government's cultural diplomacy goals became synonymous with its trade goals. The 'trade creep' in foreign policy was evident and made visible through the newly amalgamated Department of External Affairs and International Trade (later became Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DFAIT). Even Canada's development assistance program, formerly known as one of the largest with an emphasis on humanitarian assistance, shifted with Canada's bilateral aid increasingly tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services.60

The link with trade heightened IE policy interest in foreign student recruitment. One additional staff person was added to the academic division for the exclusive purposes of the “marketing of educational services”.61 There was growing sentiment that foreign students should not be educated at the expense of the Canadian tax payers62 and by 1986, Canadian provinces had begun charging international student differential fees. The federal government rationalized its role in recruitment as foreign student policy it said was an area of international not educational policy and hence well within its policy domain. A committee was struck to develop a national strategy, however none of its recommendations were implemented.

A new Conservative government under Mulroney (84-93) brought in a 'back to basics approach' and while some senior department officials managed to protect a few of the academic and cultural relations core functions, a proposal was initiated to shift all cultural and academic related activities out of the Department and into a proposed new organization. While this new organizational structure did not eventually materialize, this proposal fundamentally challenged the importance of ICR and the role of the DFAIT in this foreign policy area.

**1990s: Divergent pathways: post cold war**
U. S. A. - The end of the cold war left a policy vacuum as national security had provided a consistently important rationale for the federal government’s interests in IE. There was growing concern for lowered commitment to IE and increased U.S. isolationism. However, once again, reminiscent of the Reagan era, under the Bush (Sr.) administration, the National Security Education Act (NSEA) in 1991 reinstated the national security agenda as a predominant policy rationale for IE. Re-educating the newly independent countries of the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe provided a new impetus for US engagement in IE and resulted in substantial funding for educational and cultural exchange programs. Given this new enthusiasm for IE, Vestal concluded that the “logjam of federal funding had indeed been broken and expressed enthusiasm that indeed IE was in a new age perhaps a golden one”.

Clinton’s election (93-2001) signaled a much anticipated return to the traditional values of IE, however the IE community was disappointed when his administration did not move in this direction. They felt “betrayed by the internationalist” President who instead adopted as his doctrine “economic expansion and enlarging markets for US goods and services”. IE programs that were supported had to meet objectives that fit the new rationale for global competitiveness. Under the Clinton administration, the USIA programs were initially reduced by 23-25% and eventually in 1998 the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act led to the merger of USIA with the DS, its responsibilities assigned to a new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy. This was reflective of a time when “mutual understanding had no resonance on Capital Hill”.

The focus on global economic competitiveness led to a heightened interest in developing the global competence of Americans. There was concern that for every 8 or 9 international students coming to study in the U.S., 1 American student was going abroad, and that of the 100,000 American students studying abroad, three quarters ended up going to western Europe. Study abroad for American students was important as, “[g]lobalization requires a cadre of workers in business, academics and the NGO community who are well educated in the history, politics and culture of other nations”. The government was concerned with “reinventing diplomacy in the information age” and with engaging higher education with this “new challenge” to strengthen the place of the US in the post cold war world.

The outward looking policy of sending American students abroad was antithetical to the proposed set of new immigration regulations restricting international student entry and stay in the U.S. The 1994 world trade center bombings had raised fear about openly welcoming international students. The government introduced the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 amending the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It proposed a pilot computer based system to track international students, a system, which eventually would become the predecessor of the SEVIS program introduced post 9/11. This proposed pilot project along with the other INS restrictions caused grave concern within the IE community. The IE lobby spoke forcefully about the gradual decline in the U.S. share of the international student market, a problem, particularly since other competitor countries moved strategically in the exact opposite direction, making their immigration regulations less restrictive and more international student friendly. NAFSA initiated an advocacy campaign for a national IE policy.

Canada - Mulroney’s (84-93) conservative government had been unsympathetic to IE, but what was surprising was that under Chretien’s liberal regime (93-2003), although it was among the first Canadian government’s to formally recognize ICR as a third pillar in Canada’s foreign policy objectives there was no firm commitment to translate policy into any concrete IE funding or programs. Instead, the early 1990’s were marked by a period of austerity and severe budget cuts as Chretien had inherited a huge national budget deficit. During this period, the academic relation division experienced an 8%, 10% and 5% reduction each year beginning 1991. The shrinkage in exchange programs caused embarrassment for Canada as other countries offered many more scholarships to Canadians then Canada could offer these same countries. Overall this was a period of policy inconsistency and a lack of clarity on the relative importance of ICR within the Department, with “the cultural and academic budgets ... always seen as easy targets by senior DFAIT management, who still regarded these as peripheral to Canadian foreign policy objectives”.

International development assistance remained relatively stable with the highest number of university projects, approximately 200 recorded in 1989/1990. New CIDA programs included, the University Partnership Cooperation and Development (UPCD) program and the International Youth Internships Program (IYIP). The IYIP was part of the government’s youth employment strategy in response to the competitive global economy. This indicated a shift in government priority and in 1991 two policy papers released by the Government of Canada on national prosperity used the terms ‘international dimension’ and ‘internationalization of higher education’ for the very first time. In recognition of the growing importance of IE as a policy area, DFAIT released a paper titled, ‘The International Dimension of Higher Education in Canada: Collaborative Policy Framework’. The paper highlighted the need for better policy communication and coordination but perhaps most importantly signaled a shift in thinking from IE as a component of international cultural relations (ICR) to higher education as a commodity within the context of
an “international market place”. The paper argued that IE as trade was an important mechanism to secure Canada’s national prosperity because Canada as a country was highly dependent on its export earnings for its GNP (almost a third).

There was now a direct policy link between international student recruitment, IE and international trade. Jim Fox, the President of the Canadian Bureau of International Education (CBIE) proclaimed that Education should be viewed as tradable product. “For Canada, educational trade amounted to 1.5 billion in 1994. This relates to international students alone… Education, in fact, ranks as an export that is next to wheat in its importance to this country”. In 1992, Canadian universities hosted 37,000 foreign students, the focus now became a substantial increase in these IS numbers. Chrétien’s ‘bullish’ focus on enhancing Canada’s international trade led to Team Canada missions which often included university presidents. In 1995, the first eight Canada Education Centers (CEC’s) were established to market Canadian higher education. In 1998, the Minister of International Trade, Marchi, created a new Educational Marketing Unit within DFAIT and assigned it a task of brand development and coordinating Education Centers (CEC’s) were established to market Canadian higher education. In 1998, the Minister of International Trade, Marchi, created a new Educational Marketing Unit within DFAIT and assigned it a task of brand development and coordinating Canadian education abroad. In support of these new initiatives, Axworthy as Foreign Minister initiated a new ‘high powered’ Academic Relations Advisory Committee and restored $2 million to DFAIT.

In response to the new global economy, Canadian academics expressed interest in increasing the number of Canadian students studying abroad. In 1992, there were only 23,000 Canadian students studying abroad, a majority studying in the U.S. In response to requests from foreign governments, the federal government signed onto the North American Mobility Program and the Canada-European Union Program thus supporting international exchanges for Canadian faculty and students. What is interestingly to note is that the responsibilities for the new programs was given to the Department of Human Resources and Development Canada (HRSDC) and not DFAIT. This new development meant further fragmentation of responsibility for IE within the federal government.

2000’s: Immigration Reform: IE as a global talent acquisition strategy

U.S.A. - Clinton (93-2001) eventually rekindled his image as an internationalist president in the eyes of the IE community through his first- ever 2000 Presidential memorandum on an IE policy. The memorandum called for a “coherent and coordinated international education strategy [that] will help us meet the twin challenges of preparing our citizen for a global environment while continuing to attract and educate future leaders from abroad”. It made specific reference to international students as contributors of “$9 million to the [U.S] economy”, while also serving as facilitators of cultural exchange and “our greatest foreign policy assets”.

This presidential level support for IE, even if mostly rhetorical, was dramatically challenged with the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001. With 9/11, IE posed a risk to the nation’s security. Recoiling back to restrictive immigration policy processes initiated as a response to the Iranian crisis and the world trade center bombings, a new tracking system for international students was introduced by the Bush (Jr.) administration (2001-9). The passage of the US Patriot Act, the Enhance Border Security Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Visa Entry Reform Act facilitated the federal government’s restrictive immigration policies and the implementation in 2003 of the controversial Student and Exchange Visitors Information System (SEVIS), administered by the new Department of Homeland Security (operations were still DS responsibility). As Witt states, “the entire landscape of international education in the US shifted dramatically from a posture of recruitment to one of determent, from receptive to suspicious, from hospitable to hostile”. “The global war on terrorism replaced the cold war as the national security meta narrative”. This was a time of crisis in IE with the U.S. experiencing its first substantial drop in foreign students for the first time in over 30 years. Such a drop was not experienced even during the cold war.

This drop severely impacted U.S. universities who were both dependent on foreign graduate students for advanced research in the STEM fields as well as on revenues from international student fees. The advocacy groups urged the government “to strike an appropriate balance between the conflicting demands of strengthening homeland security and maintaining openness to the world”. International programs, they suggested were an investment in the nation’s security. Powerful industrialists/business figures like Bill Gates supported the need for America to welcome foreign students to strengthen its innovation capacity and global competitiveness. Both national security and global economic competition were identified as important rationales and the “secure borders, open doors” campaign came to dominate the IE policy discourse.

IE faced “a uniquely challenging and paradoxical environment” because there was bipartisan political support for IE and in spite of the federal perspective of IE as a risk to national security, in May 2002, the Bush administration announced legislation to significantly increase funding for exchange programs. The Cultural Bridges Act of 2002 authorized $95 million/year from 2003-7 for new and expanded IE programs with the Islamic world. As Campbell cogently states, “mutual understanding had come back into the [federal] frame but with a harder edge, lined primarily with the notion of global competence and Americas’ need to
communicate and relate in a multi-cultural globalized, political and economic environment”. Capitalizing on the “why do they hate us?” sentiment, a spotlight was created on the need and role of public diplomacy in fighting terrorism. Karen Hughes as the new Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy became one of the most “visible advocate[s] for exchanges” supporting a budget of $430 million (from $74 million) in 2006 for the DS public diplomacy initiatives. Described as a period of “public diplomacy renaissance” it was reminiscent of the Reagan administration support for exchanges. Powerful dignitaries such as Secretary of States, Colin Powell and Condoleza Rice spoke of IE as the government’s soft power tool.

Several new initiatives and policy priorities developed during this current era; public diplomacy, an investment in academic exchanges, particularly with the Islamic world, investment in study abroad for American students (2005 Commission on Abraham Lincoln Study Abroad Fellowship Program and the Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act) and concern with improving the market share of international students (2009, government accountability office (GAO) study on challenges and best practices in attracting IS to the US). Perhaps, most importantly, the critical need for a national IE strategy was supported by the joint policy document issued by the Alliance for International Education and Cultural Exchange and NAFSA.

In November 2012, the U.S. DoED established its first ever IE strategy, “Succeeding Globally Through International Education and Engagement” that addresses several components of IE, including the objectives for increasing global competencies of U.S. students and establishing best IE practices. While the strategy is recognized as being a step in the right direction, it is criticized by IE professionals as lacking details and firm policy commitments. It is also criticized for not addressing the most relevant of current policy issues, massive budget cuts in IE programs and the need for immigration reform.

IE as a global talent acquisition strategy is now strongly advocated; as NAFSA’s Marlene Johnson has said, “the number of international students in the U.S. – and whether it is going up or down – matters because it is a surrogate for competitiveness”. Phrases such as “America’s loss is the world’s gain” and “Rising above the gathering storm” speak to the urgency with which the IE community calls on the federal government to liberalize immigration policies, so as to attract and retain students and scholars, especially in the STEM fields/professions. The government is urged to do away with antiquated and “outmoded” policies such as requiring international students to speak of their intent to return home before they even start their studies. It is reminded that, “educated [international] students are exactly the kinds of immigrants we should encourage to stay in the US”. While the IE policy community is lobbying for immigration reform, since 2011, the U.S. Department of Commerce is growing increasingly interested in international students as “big business”. As per 2009-2010 estimates, the U.S. economy earned $19-billion from international students, a promising figure that has prompted the Department’s first overseas trade mission on higher education, setting the stage for its future role in IE in terms of promoting American education abroad.

Canada - The release of Canada’s Innovation Strategy in 2002 shifted the Canadian federal government’s exclusive focus on recruiting international students to attracting them as future immigrants. A new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) was introduced making Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) another federal department with high stakes in IE. The IRPA established a separate category of temporary residents for international students, a promising figure that has prompted the Department’s first overseas trade mission on higher education.

A new policy orientation was introduced when Prime Minister, Paul Martin (2003-6) got elected. Martin came in with a different school of thought on Canada’s foreign policy. He separated the department into foreign affairs and international trade, prioritizing Canada’s foreign policy in an attempt to revive Canada’s role in the world, reminiscent of the Pearsonian era. He increased allocations for development assistance introducing new IE programs such as the Canada Corps University Partnership Program, later known as Students for Development program that was built on “our idealism [put] to work by helping young Canadians bring their enthusiasm and energy to the world”. Martin attempted to revive Canada’s commitment to development assistance while also committing to “global citizenship”. During his tenure, IE policy shifted from an exclusive focus on recruiting international students to sending Canadian students abroad. His budget announced, perhaps the most ambitious of all federal IE allocations, a commitment of $150 million for IE with a focus on sending Canadian students abroad. At the same time as these new initiatives, Martin also continued the tradition of IE as linked to economic development. IE was explicitly stated as a policy objective under the 2005 government’s international commerce policy priority, but Martin’s focus on recruiting international students was different. His government encouraged Canada’s research granting councils to offer competitive opportunities to better attract foreign talent as part of a broader innovation strategy. Unfortunately Martin’s government fell in 2006 and with it most of his IE initiatives.

A Conservative government took power under the leadership of Prime Minister Harper (2006-present). Harper immediately re-amalgamated the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, reinstating the predominant view of the central
importance of international trade to Canada’s foreign policy. He introduced highly controversial policy changes such as the cancellation of all federally funded international academic exchange programs. His government’s rationale was that such educational programs fall under provincial jurisdiction and therefore federal government wanted to stay clear of them. Given the forceful pushback from academics and successful program alumni, the Harper government ultimately did restore some of these programs, but with modifications.

Under the Harper government, IE became synonymous with bringing students in, not sending Canadian students out. Study abroad, just like academic exchange programs, was considered to be a provincial responsibility. However, the recruitment of international students was seen as part of the government’s competitiveness agenda to meet Canada’s labour market needs. Advantage Canada, released in 2006 as Canada’s economic action plan, explicitly stated that Canada’s knowledge advantage was to be achieved through marketing Canadian higher education abroad and attracting the “best” foreign students to Canada. DFAIT’s educational marketing unit was renamed Edu-Canada and provided new funding to strengthen its mandate and establish a Canadian international education brand. Rather than continue support to the Canadian Education Centers (CEC’s), his government decided to coordinate marketing efforts from within the Department.

The 2008 Global Commerce Strategy provided an invested of $2 million for educational marketing and the government commissioned reports to assess the economic value of international students and identify best global international student recruitment and retention practices. Under the Harper government there was, “really strong recognition...that international students are actually golden, because they are the ones who will go in, get a Canadian education, and be ready for a Canadian workforce experience”. New scholarship programs to attract the best international graduate students and researchers especially in the fields of sciences and engineering were created. This situation where Harper’s policy strategies have translated into greater government support for IE than several previous liberal governments is described as being ironic.

In 2011, the Harper government took an unprecedented step. It appointed a 6 member advisory committee to assist in developing a national IE strategy for Canada. Canada’s Economic Action Plan, 2011 allocated funding for the development of this strategy and the Global Markets Action Plan 1, 2013, identified IE as one of the 22 priority sectors for Canada’s economy. In 2014 The Minister of International Trade, announced Canada’s first-ever international education strategy, Canada’s International Education Strategy: Harnessing Our Knowledge Advantage to Drive Innovation and Prosperity. Its very first paragraph, reads, “international education is critical to Canada’s success..... international education is at the very heart of our current and future prosperity”. The strategy targets the doubling of international student numbers in Canada by 2022 from its 2011 levels and estimates that international students contribute $8.4 billion to local economies and help create 86, 000 jobs for Canadians. Perhaps most importantly, among other priorities, it identifies as its goal “increasing the number of international students choosing to remain in Canada as Permanent Residents after graduation”.

Just like in the U.S., there is concern among critics of the success of the IE policy. In the Canadian context, this concern is expressed in context of the challenges for cooperation and coordination between the two levels of government and various non-governmental stakeholder groups. Noting these precise challenges, the 2012 Advisory Panel Report had recommended the creation of a formal senior policy coordinating structure, The Council of International Education and Research (CIER) (DFAIT, 2012b). In its strategy announcement, however, the federal government has chosen to overlook this recommendation and with it leave unaddressed one of the most challenging policy issues within the Canadian context.

C. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE FEDERAL ROLE
As discussed in the two case studies of IE in the US and Canada, there is ambiguity in the exact role of the federal government. Since education is deemed a state/provincial responsibility and institutional autonomy and academic freedom highly valued, there is constant discussion and debate in both countries about the ‘appropriate role’ of the federal government in IE. This is not to say that in Canada, as is the case in the U.S., the federal government has not played a role in higher education. In fact in both jurisdictions the role of the federal government expanded considerably post World War II. However, to date the federal role has not been clearly defined; it remains ambiguous, contested and negotiated. As a result, in Canada for example, the federal government, as noted earlier, has consciously avoided investing in initiatives that could be interpreted as ‘educational’ and therefore a provincial responsibility. Study abroad, is one such example, which has been associated as being a domestic education issue and therefore a provincial responsibility, as per the current federal government. In the Canadian context, the federal government has for the most part consciously avoided investing in IE programs within Canadian institutions concentrating instead on IE programs abroad as a way to avoid jurisdictional conflict with the provinces and avoid infringement of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. This does not seem to be the case in the U.S.
In referring to the U.S., de Wit argues, “the fact that by constitution the government's role is limited in educational policy but extensive in foreign affairs, defense, trade and commerce suggests the federal policy on international education will be more linked to these areas than to education itself.”\textsuperscript{108} De Wit’s argument holds merit in both countries as it is within each of their respective foreign policy priorities that the federal government has carved out its engagement in IE. What is different however is that in the U.S. its foreign policy has resulted in a strong political rationale for IE, best captured by the term, ‘national security’. In Canada on the other hand, it has been the government’s international trade agenda and hence an economic rationale, what the government has dubbed, “economic diplomacy” that has trumped all other policy rationales.

What is similar within the IE policy context of both countries is the blending of policy arenas that might have been traditionally considered ‘domestic’ or ‘international’, a phenomenon directly linked to forces of globalization.\textsuperscript{109} A case in point is the entry of HRSDC in Canada in this policy arena. HRSDC is a ministry with a primary domestic mandate that was given responsibility to coordinate international mobility programs for Canadians in the early 1990’s. The rationale for HRSDC’s involvement had to do with the federal government’s perception that IE was important for the skill development and training of Canadians given the need to strengthen Canada’s role in a global knowledge economy. This blending of policy arenas in both jurisdictions has meant that a multiple of federal departments are engaged in IE resulting in a policy environment, which is highly complex, particularly when it comes to resource efficiency and policy consistency and coordination.

Another Canadian example of how globalization has merged traditional distinct policy arenas is the policy shift from a strictly recruitment focus on international students to a skilled migration approach, with the needs of the Canadian (domestic) economy/labour market serving as the policy rationale. In the U.S., while there has not been the same overt policy rationale, there is strong advocacy for the federal government to move in a similar direction, with an emphasis on skill development and a skilled migration approach. Could this suggest policy convergence in IE as the globalization discourse purports? In Canada, I would argue that its current IE policy is a result of this domestic impetus.

It is Canada’s domestic labour market needs in light of it’s aging population and increasing dependence on immigration that has served as a prominent policy lever for the new IE strategy. New immigrants to Canada have faced many challenges with
credential recognition and therefore entry into the job market. It is within this context that IE are seen as ideal immigrants as they have Canadian credentials and are assumed to have language and cultural proficiency. Thus within Canada the IE discourse continues to be focused on the recruitment of international students; however the major difference is that they are also now positioned as a value proposition as future permanent residents to meet Canada’s requirements of a skilled Canadian labour force.

In Canada, historically, domestic priorities have more often than not superseded international priorities110; however what is important to note here is that while the dominant rationale for IE for the Canadian federal government remains economic, the impetus has shifted from strictly promoting international trade to fulfilling the needs of its domestic labour market. Thus, one might suggest that the overarching theme in Canada’s foreign policy and thereby its IE policy has been fulfilling its economic priorities, increasingly in context of its domestic agenda (inward looking).111 This is not the case for the U.S., which has a foreign policy highly dictated by its geopolitical global orientation (outward looking). It also does not share the same demographic challenges in terms of population growth and therefore labour market needs, as Canada. Figure 3 provides a summary of the similarities and differences in the rational of international strategies employed by the two case study countries.

D. CONCLUSION
A historical and comparative examination of the federal role in IE in the U.S. and Canada suggests the following:

1). In neither country is IE a high policy priority of the federal government. In both cases funding for IE initiatives is fairly modest, in Canada it is much lower than in the U.S. Ruther describes the federal role in the U.S as, “barely there but powerfully present” 112 given its low but solid investments. This may be the case in the U.S. because of the powerful political rationale and the direct link between IE and foreign policy. The same cannot be said about Canada whose interest in academic and cultural policy has been described as an “after business hours (initiative) not as part of an overall policy (direction)”.113 In spite of the strong economic rationale, the Canadian federal investment is marginal; in fact, few individual Canadian institutions invest larger amounts for their own institution specific recruitment initiatives than the federal government.114

2). The federal government’s role in IE in the U.S. has enabled far greater government-university interactions than in Canada. The U.S. academic community is far more engaged with federal IE programs given the very nature of these programs, for e.g. curriculum development efforts and set up international research centers but also because of their size and scope. However, the level and scope of these federal initiatives has also meant a greater dependence of U.S. institutions on federal funds for their international activities. In Canada, on the other hand, the federal government has steered away from directly funding Canadian higher educational institutions and has minimal direct relations with the academic community. With low investments, Canadian universities have had to rely on their own resources vs. being dependent on the federal government for their international activities.

3). IE does not necessarily seem to be affiliated with a specific federal government policy ideology or platform. This is curious as typically Democrats/Liberals are known to support educational (social) programs and their respective statements/policy rhetoric would confirm such a perspective. In both countries the initial federal programs were developed under democratic/liberal leadership, subsequently however in the U.S. it was under the Republicans (Reagan and then both Bush, Sr. and Jr.) that new and larger funding investments were made in educational exchanges. In Canada, IE as trade as a policy framework was developed under a Liberal government and further strengthened under the subsequent Conservative government. It is curious that in Canada, like the U.S. it is the Conservatives that have made larger investments in this policy arena, and in the case for Canada, the first government to have developed its first- ever national IS strategy.

4). While both governments have announced national strategies, there is skepticism in both countries about the acceptance of these strategies across the different stakeholder groups and the government’s ability to actually coordinate the strategy. Therefore, their likely impact is suspect. De Wit suggests that a lack of an active national policy for post secondary education and the more autonomous character of American higher education are the two main reasons why in the U.S. one observes a much more active advocacy culture. In Canada, even though those same two conditions exist, there is nothing like the effective lobby groups in the U.S. 115 Comparatively, the Canadian IE lobby group is much smaller and does not exhibit the same level of sophistication, strength and power as in the U.S. This could also be a reflection of the relative size of the post secondary educational sectors in the two countries.

5). And finally, Knight defines internationalization of higher education as “the process of integrating an international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service elements of an institution”. 116 By this definition, the U.S. federal government initiatives have more directly impacted the internationalization of U.S. higher education. Investing in the type of programs the
U.S. government chose has resulted in its contributing to what is commonly understood as “Internationalization at home” (IaH) initiatives. The same cannot be said about the impact on Canadian institutions of the Canadian federal government IE initiatives.

When and how do federal governments engage in IE policy? Typically research indicates there is strong inertia in government policy-making 117 and that more often than not, when governments engage in policy-making, it is often in response to crisis. We also know that for policy-making, champions are needed both within the government, individuals Ruther refers to as “legislative angels” 118 but also outside, by way of strong lobby and advocacy groups. Meek, et al. remind us that, “policy’ itself should not be treated not merely as an officially accepted government directive, but as a resultant of the interplay between key actors involved on issues relating to the structure, function and character of higher education systems” and the, “. . . articulation of interests of various groups affects policies and their ability (or inability) to shape the future direction of higher education systems” 119

In considering the federal government’s role in IE in countries such as the U.S. and Canada where higher education is a state/provincial responsibility and there is no federal ministry of education, IE policy will always be shaped by other federal policy arenas. In such contexts, simply lobbying for more federal engagement in IE can prove to have adverse effects on higher education systems. Lobbying the Canadian federal government for increasing investment in IE has meant an enhanced recruitment and retention strategy for IS; a strategy that has proven risky in other jurisdictions such as Australia in rationalizing lower governmental investments in public higher education and de-emphasizing broader academic rationales for IE. As academics and university administrators, it is imperative that we invest in understanding government policy-making structures and processes, what motivates governments, the political pressures that influence their decisions and their priorities if we are to constructively and convincingly influence government policy to more closely align with the goals and purposes of higher education. This is because as Weingarten astutely observes, “Students, the public, and society are best served when governments adopt a sensible, purposeful and effective set of higher education policies and when they maintain harmonious, respectful and mutually informed relationship with universities”. 120

END NOTES


2 International education and internationalization of higher education are used interchangeably to refer to government policies and programs developed with an aim to link people and educational institutions across national borders.


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