Social Science and the Public Agenda: Reflections on the Relation of Knowledge to Policy in the United States and Abroad

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SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA: Reflections on the Relation of Knowledge to Policy in the United States and Abroad

by

Harold L. Wilensky

At the lively 1996 annual meeting at Aspen of Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy Research, many political scientists, sociologists, epidemiologists, and public health experts complained of the insidious influence of health economists on the course of health-care reform or, put another way, the dangers of limited market perspectives in policy analysis. In contrast, Victor Fuchs, a health economist who delivered the 1995 Presidential Address at the American Economics Association (Fuchs, 1996), argues that what was wrong about the health-care debate of 1993-94 was that health economists were ignored.

It helps to put these recurrent American laments in cross-national and cross-disciplinary perspective. As a student of comparative political economy and social policy for 30 years, I have interviewed more than 400 politicians, budget officers, experts in taxing and spending, health and welfare officials, labor and management people in 19 rich democracies for my project on the politics of taxing and spending. I would like to share my observations about the similarities and differences among these nations in the interplay of knowledge and public policy. It is clear that intellectuals, including social scientists, have
typically had tense relationships with men and women of power in all these
countries. But it is also clear that the disjunction between research and policy is
perhaps most extreme in the United States. The similarities are rooted partly in
the universal limitations of social science; the differences are due to the diverse
contexts in which research is applied. I shall develop three themes.

1. We should resist the temptation to oversell the practical value of
   applied research. The idea that applied research in the social sciences
   (as opposed to basic research) is more relevant to the public agenda and
   public policy is a mistake; it tends to divert money, talent and attention
   away from the job of developing cumulative knowledge about culture,
   social structure, and politics.

2. The character of social research and its effects on the public agenda and
   social policy depend upon the structure of the political economy in
   which it is financed and used; hence, American social scientists have
   less influence on policy than their counterparts in several rich
democracies where there is a tighter relation between knowledge and
   power.

3. My final point is that good basic research deals with recurrent problems
   of the human condition and is therefore, in the broadest sense, public-
   policy research. Basic social science makes its way in the long run by
   shaping elite and mass perceptions of social reality.

Overselling the Practical Value of Social Science

It is a common temptation to oversell the practical value of social science.
What, for instance, can a social scientist tell politicians and policy planners about
the causes and effects of the welfare state that might help them grapple with
social problems and fiscal burdens? He or she could tell them plenty; but its
immediate practical relevance is very limited. Regarding causes, we can say that
over the past century economic development and its social and political
correlates have everywhere among rich countries created a strong political
demand for pensions, health insurance, family allowances and childcare,
worker's compensation, unemployment compensation and related labor market
policies, and miscellaneous aid to the poor; that chief among these convergent trends are the changing structure of the family, the aging of the population, increased female labor force participation, family breakup, and a general mass demand for security and equality. And in response to mass demands the governments of all these rich countries sooner or later develop seven or eight similar programs and expand their financing and coverage.

If the social scientist is doing comparative work, he or she could note big differences among countries equally rich, and explain that too. He could say that differences in the timing and rate of industrialization as well as the timing of expansion of the franchise have led to differences in the structure of industry, labor and the professions, in electoral systems and party politics; these differences, in turn, have led to different policy profiles and different levels and types of mass resistance to taxing and social spending—so that Proposition 13 in California has its strong and sustained counterpart only in Britain and Denmark (with some of it in Switzerland and Norway) but not elsewhere (Wilensky, 1976; 1981).

Let's say our social scientist hasn't lost the policymaker by now and he is asked a more practical question: "Tell me the likely fiscal burden of pensions for the next 20 years." If the list of long-term structural changes that created the welfare state—and make it difficult to cut down—are of limited practical use, the short-term forecasts are not all that great either, even though demography is one of the more solid and systematic of the subfields of social science and the costs of pensions are one of the least complicated problems. For to know with any reasonable precision the cost of a national pension scheme 10 or 20 years from now we need to forecast not only the age and sex composition of the eligible population but also the rates of inflation, unemployment, and growth as they shape the size of the tax base and benefit levels; the policies of unions and
employers and the changing character of work as they affect the taste and pressure for retirement, the party composition of the government as it shapes tax policy and pension reform, and more.

In short, if the social scientist is doing his job specifying the social, cultural, economic and political causes and consequences of major institutions he will provide only the vaguest guide to policymakers. This limitation, of course, will not prevent politicians' use of shaky forecasts as political weapons, as in the recent American debates on the balanced budget and the "crisis" of Medicare and Medicaid.

The Uses and Limits of Applied Research, Especially the Evaluation Research Industry

But what about applied research on the gains and costs of particular policies and programs? Because American policy debates since the 1960s are typically framed in cost-benefit terms, increasingly guided by a burgeoning evaluation research industry, we can profit from an evaluation of the evaluations and speculate about their policy impact. (Incidentally, it is clear that sociologists, economists, and political scientists alike have contributed to the growth of the policy-analysis industry and its spinoffs—demonstration projects and social experiments.) In my comparative study of the political economy and performance of rich democracies I have been struck by the contrast between the American penchant for careful evaluation research and the European habit of acting on many fronts without much systematic assessment of outcomes.

In my view, the character of evaluation research and its effects on public policy depend upon the context in which it is financed and used: fragmented and decentralized political economies such as the United States foster isolated, single-issue research, typically focused on short-run effects and used for political ammunition rather than policy planning. In contrast more "corporatist" systems
such as those of Sweden, Norway, Austria, and perhaps Germany foster dialogue between researchers, bureaucrats, and politicians in which a wider range of issues are connected, longer-range effects are more often considered, and research findings are more often used for policy planning and implementation as well as budget justification. Larger contexts for bargaining—especially among labor, management, and government—mean larger contexts for policy analysis, with or without rigorous evaluation research (Wilensky, 1983, pp. 61-68; 1992b).

American evaluation of programs for job training and job creation is a dramatic illustration of Wilensky's law: the more evaluation, the less program development; the more demonstration projects, the less follow-through. In no other policy area in the United States—not even in the Pentagon—has the demand for rigorous evaluation research loomed so large. And nowhere among the rich democracies has such research been so politicized. Three problems are apparent: (1) the research itself is usually quite narrow, politically naïve, and in design and execution often seriously flawed; (2) research focused on a single program obscures the interaction and interdependence of many programs (for example, education in schools, job training programs, and job creation); and (3) evaluated success has had little to do with program funding.

Consider earnings gains as an evaluation criterion for job training. It is a typically narrow efficiency measure that ignores the interdependence of policies. Reflecting on extensive evaluation research in the war on poverty, Henry Aaron observes that research was guided by the "impulse to isolate individual influences; to make complex social economic processes statistically and

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2 The United States has become a specialist in evaluation research. In the month of February 1981 alone the General Accounting Office—which accounts for only a small share of the evaluation research industry—issued 41 evaluation reports. The 1975 Congressional Sourcebook on federal program evaluation cites 1700 evaluation reports issued by 18 executive branch agencies and the GAO during 1973-75 (Nachmias, 1980, p. 1164).
mathematically manageable through abstraction" (1978, p. 156). The interdependence of policies is thereby obscured. Thus, in Aaron's words:

improved education and training may be ineffective in increasing earning capacity unless steps are also taken to change the mix of available jobs, and efforts to change the mix of available jobs may fail if low-wage workers lack training and education. Either taken alone might fail, when both together might succeed. Research and experimentation would detect the failures but have no way to indicate the hypothetical potential for success. A rather vague assumption of such an interrelatedness marked early political rhetoric about the War on Poverty but was wholly absent from the precise, but partial, analyses of its effectiveness performed by social scientists (1978, pp. 156-157).

Similarly, CETA (Civilian Employment and Training Administration) got mixed reviews by evaluation researchers and experimenters (Haveman and Saks, 1985). They found that CETA had a poor benefit-cost ratio for direct job creation measures but better ratios for targeted training measures. Their research suffered not only from the single-issue, short-duration disease but also from the natural distortion resulting from political combat about redistribution of income and power. The more CETA accented its presumably more effective but less popular targeting of the 'employment handicapped', the more vulnerable it became; it was eliminated in 1981.

In the same vein, did the Job Corps, which tried to train and place hardcore unemployed youth, raise the subsequent earnings of Corps members? The Job Corps received mixed marks by this and other limited criteria; the researchers reported that it probably yielded benefits greater than its cost (Aaron, 1978). Yet its critics, noting the costs, called press conferences and delivered such lines as, 'for the huge sums wasted on one Job Corps member we could send a student to Harvard', selectively adding a non-completion or non-placement rate from one of the reports (50 percent, 43 percent, 62 percent, or whatever); the
program was sharply cut back. Conversely, Head Start, a program to provide pre-school education and health care to young children of the poor, was pronounced a failure by the limited criteria of evaluation research yet it remained politically popular.\(^3\) In fact, after sharp cuts in funding of both social and labor-market policies, more recent, more sophisticated evaluation research—taking account of long-term effects and wider range of gains and costs—has shown that both the Job Corps and Head Start were impressively cost effective.

One of the most careful and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis ever done on a social program was published in the early 1980s (Long, Mallar, and Thornton, 1981 and Mallar et al., 1980). It was focused on the Job Corps and illustrates that solid proof of program effectiveness often has no impact on policy or program funding. The Job Corps provides a wide range of services to disadvantaged youth—vocational skills training, basic education, and health care—typically in residential centers. In fiscal 1990-91 it served 62,000 young people; a majority are black, 8 in every 10 are high-school dropouts, 4 in 10 from families on public assistance (New York Times, January 17, 1992). It is the most expensive federally-run training program. Baseline and follow-up data were gathered for about 5,100 youths over two years (including a matched comparison

\(^3\)The research pronouncing failure was seriously flawed. For instance, research concluded that a brief stint in a special school, as one might expect, brought only a small, temporary improvement in reading readiness, which faded after the first grade. A Rand Corporation evaluation of the evaluations, however, noted that research on Head Start and on similar programs for older children did not assign treatment and non-treatment children on a random basis, evaluated unrepresentative projects, were contaminated by "radiation effects" spilling over from project to non-project children, or had other defects (Aaron, 1978, p. 84). In the case of tests of reading achievement of older children, the fading effect after a year (losing ground during the summer) ignored the differences between students in summer school and those whose only compensatory education was administered by street gangs (Heyns, 1978). Thus, although Head Start was at first an evaluated failure, follow-up studies, better designed, suggested more success (Lazar et al., 1979; Schweinhart and Weikert, 1980). But whether evaluation research found failure or success, Head Start remained popular in Congress; the Bush administration joined Congress in support of increased funding in 1990.
group who were never enrolled). The average training period was 5.9 months. Using a social accounting framework, the researchers showed estimated total annual costs to society (including Corpsmembers) of $5,070 in 1977 dollars and the total benefits to society of $7,343—or a net gain to society of $2,271 per Corpsmember.

If we concentrate only on the increased post-program output and earnings, as is typically done, we would miss almost half the societal benefits shown for the Job Corps. For instance, the net social value of reductions in arrests—reductions in criminal justice system costs, personal injury and property damage, and the value of stolen property—amounts to about $2,000 per Corpsmember during the observation period. Apparently, while many matched non-Corps youth were vigorously engaged in robbery, burglary, theft, bar-room brawls, mugging old men in back alleys, peddling drugs, and an occasional murder—all the while collecting an average of $1,357 more on AFDC, General Assistance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, and Workers Compensation than Job Corps members collected—the Corpsmembers were off the street during training and often worked in conventional jobs afterward. Some minor savings came from reduced drug/alcohol use; but the big savings were in the reduced criminal activity accompanying their use.

President Reagan proposed to wipe out the Job Corps (Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1984) and President Bush's 1993 budget proposal while ballyhooing Head Start, cut the Job Corps slightly from the 1992 figure. At the logical and ludicrous extreme, a "neo conservative" cost-benefit analyst could defend its

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4 1992 data peg the current cost to educate, house, and outfit one Job Corps student for one year at $18,831. One year in a juvenile detention center on average costs $29,600 according to the Department of Justice (New York Times, February 17, 1992).
elimination by costing out a number of potential savings: society would benefit from the greater number of murders (lower medical and pension costs for the deceased); then there is the gain to free enterprise (self-employed fences would profit from the increased stealing).

Many social programs and labor-market policies in the United States are funded for such a short period and at such a meager level that the fuss about their alleged failure to solve some huge problem is absurd. Some of these programs were hardly launched before they were shot down in a cloud of complaints about great costs and limited benefits, often reinforced by short-term, single-issue, evaluation research. In the rare case where evaluations were made and evidence was found of some modest success, the results were pronounced as benedictions at the graveside. Political success may have been inversely related to evaluated success. In the absence of effective coalitions of politicians, bureaucrats, and experts, in the absence of a system of aggregating interests, achieving consensus, and integrating social and economic planning, each interest group can interpret research results according to its preconceptions with no accommodation to opposing preconceptions. The voice of research, even scholarly analysis, is drowned out by the noise.

The radical disjunction between knowledge and policy was well illustrated by the lengthy struggle over the complex Clinton health reform proposal of 1993-1994. The level of the debate was set more by the infamous television ads starring Harry and Louise than by the careful research on the costs and benefits of various systems of health care finance and delivery. During the year-long debate on health-care reform, the disjunction between knowledge and policy was matched by the disjunction between political rhetoric in Washington and public opinion, between responses to general slogans and to specific issues. Despite the sharply partisan climate of 1993-94, despite fear-mongering slogans by the small
business lobby and insurance companies (including the Harry-and-Louise commercials that pictured a nice couple over a kitchen table bashing the Clinton plan as a threat to everything they cherish), issue-specific opinion remained friendly to the outlines of national health insurance. Cross-sections of Americans polled about issues remained enthusiastic about (1) universal and government-guaranteed coverage via an employer mandate; (2) portability of all medical insurance; (3) prohibition against insurance companies' refusal to cover pre-existing conditions—in short, the content of the administration bill. But the same respondents, asked whether they supported the "Clinton health-care proposal," gave their TV-driven negative response. Few, of course, knew what the proposals contained (Jamieson and Capella, 1994). The media, especially television but also the prestige press, concentrated on politicians shouting at one another in 20-second sound bites, the style and content of the advertising war, and the details of the political process, accenting extremes (Fallows, 1996, pp. 222-229; Johnson and Broder, 1996, pp. 628-635). Despite this cloud of confusion and hysteria, a majority showed support for the specific ingredients of reform. (Based on the Gallup Poll Monthly and the Roper Center reviews of diverse polls, The Public Perspective.) My favorite example of media-filtered "information" that is fed back to pollsters as public opinion is from a focus group survey on the proper role of government, done at the height of the "balanced budget" debate of 1994-1995. One older citizen on social security who was a heavy user of government-provided Medicare explained that "I want the government off my back... I don't want the government messing around with my Medicare."

In other words, the role of experts and intellectuals in shaping policy and the policy agenda in the United States is severely limited or transformed into that of propagandist. Compared to other countries we are loaded with experts and academicians but their voices are typically cast to the winds. That is why
extreme doctrines can penetrate high policy circles, prompting sudden swings in national policy, unconstrained by sober analysis. For instance, without grasping the erratic relationship of experts and intellectuals to policy in the U.S. we cannot understand how Reaganomics could overnight become public policy, so swiftly replacing a small, serious literature on both monetarism and supply-side economics. By 1992 this doctrine quadrupled the national debt (from $908.5 billion in 1980 to $4,080.3 billion, the OMB estimate for 1992); its successful mass marketing prompted all the surviving candidates in subsequent elections to embrace tax cuts. It was revived in the Dole Presidential campaign of 1996 in proposals for massive tax cuts to balance the budget.

Prominent in publicizing the supply-side component of Reaganomics and persuading the President of its efficacy were such "pop" economists as Jack Kemp, trained as an upstate New York football player, Jude Wanniski, trained as a Wall Street Journal editorial writer, and Arthur Laffer, an economist turned publicist. Herbert Stein, Republican economist and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under Presidents Nixon and Ford, calls it "punk supplysidism," and gives this account of the issues:

I borrow the term 'punk' from Denis Healy, who characterized Mrs. Thatcher's economics as punk monetarism, meaning extreme to the point of being bizarre . . . . Until about 1979 or 1980 we were having a serious, active, professional discussion of the problems on the supply side of the American economy. A marked slowdown of the growth of total output and of productivity had been recognized. Work was going on to discover the causes of that slowdown—work associated with the names Denison, Kendrick, Nosworthy, Jorgensen and others. This work had not yet led to final, agreed conclusions. At the same time it was pointing tentatively to partial solutions. Some policy steps, including limited tax reductions, were being proposed.

Suddenly, all of that was swept to the sidelines—punk supply-side-ism took center stage. It offered a universal explanation for the slowdown: Tax rates (or government
expenditures) were too high. It offered a universal solution: Cut tax rates (or government expenditures). This became the focus of discussion of the supply side of the economy (Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1981).^5

So irrelevant has social-science knowledge become to political discourse that today we see another odd convergence of ideologies from the populist right and the populist left that periodically mark American politics. California's Jerry Brown, Presidential candidate of the left in 1992, and Republican House Majority leader, Dick Armey in 1995, both inspired by the same people whose ideas intoxicated Ronald Reagan, proposed to scrap all taxes and replace them with a flat income tax. The net effect would be to drastically increase the deficit and make the rich richer and the lower three-fifths poorer. It is another simple nostrum alleged to produce economic growth and tax simplicity, another reflection of American political mood swings unanchored in economic or social reality and certainly unanchored in any social-science discipline.

^5Benjamin Friedman (1989, pp. 109-133, 209-270) presents a careful, balanced review of the assumptions of Reagan's budgets and evaluates empirical evidence of their economic effects. He shows that the primary cause of the accelerating debt was revenue shortfalls, not spending that exceeded Reagan's proposals. In fact, the Democratic Congresses tended to give Reagan less spending than he asked for, especially in 1984 and 1985. The centerpiece of supplysidism, the release of a flood of savings (hence capital investment) and hard work (hence increased labor supply) hitherto stifled by taxes was, to say the least, an illusion. In Reagan's seven years the personal savings rate fell from 8.2 percent of disposable income in 1982 to 4.8 percent in 1989; the growth in the labor supply averaged 1.6 percent, about the same as the previous four years. In my own study of 19 rich democracies I encountered the same paradox: Left governments in Europe in recent decades have on average evidenced more fiscal discipline than the newer rightwing governments, mainly because social democrats have educated their publics in the idea that there is no free lunch. In contrast to their American counterparts, the social democrats of Europe long ago understood that you could tax in moderately regressive ways, spend progressively, and thereby reduce inequality; they paid their way via politically-acceptable consumption taxes and social-security payroll taxes, while lowering corporation taxes and/or capital gains taxes. In office, the left is less doctrinaire than the right. President Clinton by his 1993 budget and the cooperation of the Federal Reserve Board, similarly accomplished an unprecedented four consecutive years of deficit reduction while his "conservative" opponents, whose record has been "spend and borrow," attacked him as a "tax-and-spend liberal."
We can view economics as an extreme case for understanding the great distance between social science and policy for two reasons: it is the only social science institutionalized in the White House (the Council of Economic Advisers); and it can claim higher levels of consensus about theory and method than the other social sciences. That is why health economists using an economizing model have for better or worse dominated the intellectual component of health-care reform (cf. Fox, 1990, pp. 484, 489-491, 496-497). Because of their ideological bias toward market solutions and their insulation from research on the organization, financing, and performance of health-care delivery systems in other countries, one group of American health economists have made exaggerated claims regarding the benefits of "medical savings accounts" reminiscent of the claims of the supply-side ideologues of the 1980s and 1990s. If this advocacy research shapes health-care reform the likely outcome would be a two-tier system, further cost shifting on a grand scale, and a further polarization of American politics, without the benefits of either cost control or equality of access (White, 1995).

If mainstream economics is regularly overcome by forensic economics, if it has so little effect in shaping the public agenda, how can we expect sociology or political science to have more effect? In fact, even where sociology and political science provide a consensus of the competent on major issues of public policy, the record is not encouraging. Again we see the inverse and perverse relation of solid knowledge of a problem and the public policies adopted. Let me use two issues to illustrate—poverty prevention and crime prevention. As our knowledge of the structural and cultural roots of poverty mounted from the early social surveys of living conditions in 19th century France (Frédéric Le Play's studies of the European working man's household budgets 1829-1855) and England (Charles Booth's studies of the London poor in the 1890s) to the urban
ethnography of the 1920s to the 1960s (Park, 1925; Burgess, 1926; Wirth, 1928; Thrasher, 1936; Whyte, 1943; Gans, 1962; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1970) to its recent revival (Howell, 1973; Sullivan, 1989) to the current more systematic work of William Wilson and his Chicago colleagues (Wilson, 1987; 1991; and Wacquant and Wilson, 1989); the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics study (1968 on), Peter Rossi's and Christopher Jencks' surveys of homelessness (1989 and 1994), the Wisconsin poverty mafia (scores of books and reports from the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty)—all this had little effect on national public policies since the mid-1970s. In fact, although sociological perspectives on poverty, an implicit social causation theory, may have guided some parts of President Johnson's War on Poverty, it quickly passed, as a remarkable consensus emerged that the War on Poverty was a total failure.

Radicals who never did believe that reform measures by "ideologically bankrupt liberals" could do anything to change "the basic structures of domination," self-flagellating liberals who read reports alleging the ineffectiveness of one or another anti-poverty program, fiscal conservatives who say you cannot solve problems by throwing money at them, and old-fashioned reactionaries who believe that poor should be punished for their lack of virtue, all agree that the only winner of the War on Poverty was poverty. This consensus was remarkable because, as Aaron (1978) shows, neither the initial enthusiasm nor subsequent disenchantment were based on reliable information or scholarly analysis regarding the actual success or failure of the programs themselves. Along with the Vietnam War and the Nixon conspiracies, the negative consensus was part of the ideological climate for the passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 and the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980. That negative consensus continues to guide current debate on
welfare reform.

Similarly, extensive and solid sociological contributions to the understanding of changing rates of crime over time and place have had virtually no effect on American policy in the past 25 years; the better the research the smaller the audience. From my own recent review of American data on violent crime and from cross-national studies, including my own of 19 rich democracies (Wilensky, forthcoming, ch.13), I infer a broad scholarly consensus about the roots of violent crime: across time and geographical areas and under modern conditions, the combination of poverty and inequality (i.e., great absolute and/or relative economic deprivation) and family breakup in the context of crowded urban living powerfully and consistently explain homicide rates, which are correlated with less reliable data on other violent crimes. (Allan and Steffensmeier, 1989; Archer and Gartner, 1984; Baron and Straus, 1989; Blau and Blau, 1982; Currie, 1985; Gartner, 1990; Greenberg and others, 1987; Hirschi, 1983; Land, McCall, and Cohen, 1990; Messner, 1980; West and Farrington, 1977; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972.) Further, the crackdowns on crime—the prison boom since the early 1970s, the repeated declarations of war on drugs and crime from Nixon through Bush, tough talk and tough laws—have given us the highest known incarceration rate in the world and an increasing share of state budgets going to courts and prisons (for the first time in recent California history the 1991 budget for prisons exceeded the budget for the nine campuses of the University of California), and a poisonous politics, Willie Horton style. But the crackdowns do not deter crime. Scholars of very different ideological persuasion, dovish like Elliott Currie (Currie, 1985) and hawkish, like James Q. Wilson (Wilson and Hernstein, 1985) range between the view that increasing the

6The University of California takes $2.1 billion (fiscal ‘92-93); corrections takes $3.3 billion. Source: General Fund Expenditures, Figure-A, Governor’s Budget.
severity, frequency, and certainty of punishment is only marginally effective in
deterring crime (Wilson and Hernstein, 1985, pp. 390, 392, 400, 403) or are
counterproductive (Currie, 1985, pp. 7, 11, 28, 61-63, 70-71). Increasing the
number of law enforcement personnel and increasing police efficiency has only a
very small or no effect in reducing violent crime, unless vast resources are put
into community-oriented policing where the results are very modest and are nil
where there is no "community." (As Durkheim would say, you can't have
community-oriented policing when you don't have community.) Again, as in
the case of poverty research the scholarly consensus regarding crime prevention
is segregated from the action.

In sum, policy segmentation is extreme in the United States and the
disjunction between social science and social policy is equally extreme. At the
other end are more centralized, more corporatist democracies with more
consensual politics, and tighter integration of knowledge and policy—Japan as
well as such smaller European democracies as Norway, Sweden, Austria and to a
lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands (with Germany a middle case
between the extremes). In these countries either American style evaluation
research is not done at all, or if done it is more closely tied to policy deliberations
and is used not to kill off your political enemies but to foster consensus and
implement policy (Wilensky, 1983, pp. 57-68; Levine et al., 1981, pp. 36-57; and
Richardson, 1982). In other words, national differences in structures for
bargaining shape the intellectual channels for influence. It is not the modest
supply of social-science knowledge that blocks its influence in the United States,
although it is modest; it is not our limited supply of experts and intellectuals (as
Schumpeter suggested long ago, all rich countries develop an abundance of
intellectuals and social critics); it is not even the limitations of applied social
research (American research has been more rigorous than others); it is instead
the location of our experts and intellectuals. If they were located in an interacting array of centralized labor federations, centralized employer federations, strong political parties, and at least moderately centralized governments with the capacity to implement policy, American social scientists would have as much influence as their counterparts abroad.

Basic Social Science Deals with the Human Condition and Shapes Policy in the Long Run

Despite its limitations, social science does make its way into the public agenda in the long run even where social and political structures are unfavorable for the easy interplay of politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals. For good basic research is policy-oriented in the broad sense that it deals with persistent problems of the human condition—hierarchy and equality, consensus and conflict, security and efficiency, participation and political legitimacy, the causes and consequences of the wealth of nations. It also addresses recurrent problems of modern society: the breakdown and regeneration of community and democracy, social rights and individual liberties, public interests and private troubles. To develop knowledge of these universal problems and dilemmas and their resolution is to provide a framework for shaping the public agenda.

That our knowledge of these issues makes its way in the long run is evident from the intellectual history of the past century or so. Consider these examples drawn from sociology and economics:

• The theories of John M. Keynes penetrated high policy in every modern country from the 1930s until now. Fiscal policy was greatly shaped by this basic research. Although FDR, elected on a budget balancing platform, did not pay attention to Keynes and failed to extricate himself from the recession of 1937-38, subsequent presidents
benefited from the institutionalization of academic economics in the Council of Economic Advisers and on average did better. And comparable advisory institutions in other modern democracies provided a channel for steady professional economic advice, thereby improving economic performance (Wilensky, 1967, ch. 7 and pp. 105-106).

- The labor economists and labor historians at the "Wisconsin School" of the first third of this century mightily shaped American social security laws and the NLRA (Wagner Act and related labor legislation). Again, the ideas emerged long before they were embodied in legislation. For instance, the early impetus for the Social Security Act of 1935 came from social scientists—economists, political scientists and others—who were the original founders and leaders of the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), established in 1906 as a section of the International Association for Labor Legislation. Among the most active scholars who were in or around this association who shaped the public agenda of the 1930s were John R. Commons, labor economist of Wisconsin who wrote 11 volumes on "Industrial Society" and advised Senator La Follette on progressive social legislation before World War I; his student and collaborator John B. Andrews, AALL's Executive Secretary from 1908 until his death in 1943; Edwin E. Witte, who was chief of Wisconsin's Legislative Reference Library while he taught economics at the University in the 1920s and Arthur J. Altmeyer, former student and research assistant of Commons. Both Witte and Altmeyer helped Commons move the issue of unemployment insurance to state debates in the 1920s. (Lubove, 1968,
During the three decades before the New Deal these scholarly advocates did research on collective bargaining, labor law, industrial regulation, income maintenance, worker’s compensation, unemployment insurance, and health insurance; they crafted laws some of which were debated in the legislatures of Wisconsin, Ohio, and New York; later they directly shaped New Deal social legislation.\(^7\) The persistence of the influence of these intellectuals on social legislation of the 1930s is symbolized by Wilbur Cohen’s appointment as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the Johnson administration 30 years later. He got his Ph.D. at Wisconsin in 1934, fully exposed to the lively academic debates about labor and social legislation. From 1935 to 1969 he rose from research positions in the Social Security Administration to Secretary of HEW in 1968-69.

\(^{7}\) Altmeyer and Witte played key roles in formulating the Social Security Act of 1935. In 1934 President Roosevelt created the Committee on Economic Security (CES) to make recommendations that would a year later form the core of OASDI. Altmeyer, Assistant Secretary of Labor at the time, was named chairman of the technical board of the CES. Witte, who by then had become chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin, was named Executive Director of the CES (Altmeyer, 1968, p. 7). Other scholarly voices calling for social insurance in the three decades before the New Deal included Isaac Max Rubinow, an M.D. who took political science courses at Columbia and became a leading comparative analyst of social insurance, especially job injury insurance, who drafted AALL’s standard health insurance bill; Paul Douglas, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago whose studies of wages, living standards, and working conditions led him to advocate family allowances and unemployment compensation and the elimination of demeaning welfare systems; and Abraham Epstein. All three published influential books on unemployment and social security (Douglas, 1931; Epstein, 1933; Rubinow, 1913, 1916, 1934).
Chicago) was straight and expansive during the 1920s through the 1950s. Both sociologists and psychologists played a major role in moving American industry toward more enlightened personnel practices. Although management motives at times were to resist unions, the practices spread throughout industry, union and non-union alike. And the students of labor and industrial relations, some of them institutional economists who were exposed to political science and sociology like Fred Harbison of Chicago, Charles Myers of MIT, Clark Kerr and Arthur Ross of UC Berkeley and John Dunlop of Harvard (who became secretary of labor under President Ford)—these scholars supplied the intellectual rationale for management's increasing acceptance of unions in the 1940s and 1950s and more accommodative labor relations.

- Morris Janowitz' work on the military (e.g., 1961)—unusual in the context of a discipline that was dominated by a vague pacifism and therefore ignored the serious study of the military—and the related work of Charles Moskos (1988) had considerable influence in the reorganization of the military. Moskos' (and Janowitz's) ideas of a national youth service corps of the 1960s have directly shaped the political debate of the 1990s with Senator Nunn and Governor Clinton embracing the idea—again about a 30-year time lag from sociological analysis to national public policy debate.

Similarly it is likely that when political and economic conditions are favorable for the adoption of national health insurance, many a Congressional staffer and White House domestic adviser will dig out old memos and position
papers based not only on the work of medical economists but also on research in the sociology of medicine and the professions, and on comparative studies of the organization and delivery of medical services.

Perhaps a less benign example of the impact of sociological theory many decades after its formulation is Ronald Reagan's social policies: they were inspired not by painstaking sociological research on the roots of poverty but by the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer. Sometimes sociology takes a very long time, indeed, to penetrate the higher circles of power—from Spencer to Reagan in 100 years.

Summary and Conclusion

What I infer from this tour through examples of the public policy impact of social science in various times and places is this.

1. First, while the immediate practical relevance of social research, both applied and basic, is limited, it does shape both mass and elite perceptions of social and political reality in the long run. Along with novelists and philosophers, social scientists shape the verbal environment of leaders and rank-and-file alike. Think of the adoption of sociological images of social class in recent political campaigns—from Richard Nixon's "middle majority" 1968-74 to Gary Hart's yuppies or yumpies (young upwardly mobile professionals), now FRUMPIES (formerly upwardly mobile professionals) to everyone's favorite stratum today, the "middle class" (with as much vagueness in the political debate as it had in the sociological debate).

2. The second inference I draw is that the work of political scientists and sociologists raises the consciousness of policymakers in two ways:
a. **It helps to specify what areas are most open to choice and maneuver and what forces are beyond the control of policy makers**—strong social forces that cannot be reversed by public policy such as the aging of the population, the decline of fertility, the emergence of gender equality.

b. **It brings to view new policy options and a wider range of possibilities.** Consider health insurance: Although mass and elite opinion for a long time, at least since Harry Truman, has been in favor of national health insurance, never before have so many Americans understood the broad options that other modern democracies have adopted. Many folks in both congressional and executive branches have learned something about European and Canadian systems of finance and delivery—again knowledge rooted in long term study by sociologists, political scientists, economists, and public policy analysts. In other words social science serves the good function of rational enlightenment. (Cf. Wilensky, 1967; Weiss, 1988; Brown, 1991; Peterson, 1995.)

Similarly, studies of comparative public policy and comparative political economy show that while all modern democracies confront similar problems of structural unemployment and the same problem of family breakup, some of them have developed effective and active labor-market policies and family policies that have reduced social deprivation and increased productivity. If social science can produce cross-national studies that show what is truly exceptional about American social structure, culture, and politics and what are shared characteristics of modern society, it will be in a position to specify which of the policy innovations of other
rich democracies could be readily transferred to the United States. For instance, of all the policy clusters that we find abroad, active labor-market policy (training and retraining, job creation, placement and job counseling, mobility incentives) and family policy (child care, parental leave, flexible retirement, family allowances) are the two that generate the broadest supporting coalitions and are therefore likely candidates for the American public agenda (Wilensky, 1992b; 1990). That national health insurance has been successful in achieving a reasonable balance between equity and universal coverage, cost control, innovation, and quality in rich democracies as diverse in culture and politics as Britain, Canada, Germany, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, casts doubt on the idea that "American individualism" makes national health insurance impossible for the United States.8

3. On occasion the weight of social science evidence shapes a specific policy direction. The occasion is when a political leader with a preference for that direction comes to power, is able to build coalitions to support it, and hires advisers already in touch with those ideas through social and political networks that reach into university campuses (cf. Wilensky, 1967; Heclo, 1978; Polsby, 1984). Even in the absence of major political change, there are rare cases where research

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8 For a discussion of contradictions and ambivalence in values and beliefs in all modern societies and findings that show that economic individualism is not peculiarly American, and that issue-specific opinion about the core programs of the welfare state is similar across rich democracies, see Wilensky, 1975, pp. 28-49; Coughlin, 1979; Zaller, 1992; Haller, Hollinger, and Raubal, 1990, pp. 55-57; T.W. Smith, 1990, p. 24; Kohli, 1993, pp. 7-10; and Ferrera, 1993. For the kind of cross-national research that has policy implications for health care reform in the United States, see Hollingsworth, Hage, and Hanneman, 1990; Maxwell, 1981; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1990; Glaser, 1991; Marmor, 1994; and Mechanic and Rochefort, 1996.
shapes short-run policy. Explaining the adoption of intrusive regulations of hospital and physician payments—rate setting, prospective payment plans based on diagnostic-related groups, and resource-based relative value scales—by the anti-regulation Reagan and Bush administrations, Lawrence Brown (1991) mentions three conditions favorable to research-informed policy shifts: (1) documentation of a crisis so that action is viewed as unavoidable—a call to arms; (2) authoritative discrediting of non-governmental solutions such as voluntary restraint by medical-providers; (3) the wide appeal of a strategic model—e.g. rate setting—already tested by the states and evaluated as a success. But as this essay suggests and as Brown recognizes, all of the above conditions are typically present across a great range of issues where nothing happens or action is delayed for decades. Finally, as every student of culture knows, in modern society the social definition of a social problem or a "crisis" (of crime, of disease, of the environment, of the welfare state) has little to do with the nature and incidence of the problem. The arts of politics, media management, and publicity are what define a high risk or an urgent social problem. And it is critical elections that create the opportunity for major reforms: FDR ranged between a two-to-one and a four-to-one margin in the U.S. Senate when he signed New Deal legislation; Lyndon Johnson had a two-to-one margin when he launched Medicare.

4. Therefore the best way we can prepare for the moment of choice is to stick to our disciplinary knitting—continue to study the recurrent problems of the human condition that have intrigued social scientists
throughout their history. For there to be applications to policy there must be something to apply.
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