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Publication Date
2009

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Sovereignty Will Not Be Funded: Indigenous Citizenship in Hawai‘i’s Non-Profit Industrial Complex

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Ethnic Studies by Maile Renee Arvin

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2009
The Thesis of Maile Renee Arvin is approved and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically.

Co-chair

Co-chair

University of California, San Diego

2009
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project does not explicitly present the bulk of the interview data I was blessed with, but this thesis would not have been possible without the discussions, time, and support given by the eleven "official" interviewees (who remain anonymous here) and several others (including many at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement, and Anne Keala Kelly) who helped me navigate the non-profit industrial complex in less formally cite-able ways. My mother, Wanda Leilani Arvin, was a primary source of practical support in this respect. I thank her for letting me include her in the stories told here, as well as for her endless inspiration and unconditional championing.

Though these stories are not fully told here, some of the toughest lessons I have learned about non-profits, Native Hawaiian subjectivity, and life in general came from my time in San Francisco at the Asian and Pacific Islander Wellness Center. There, Jennifer Drone, Tatiana Kaneholani, Stephanie Goss and Ryan Fuimaono became incomparable co-workers, inciters, and friends. In many ways, this thesis is simply a continuation of conversations I began with them. They each continue to inspire and support me from 730 Polk Street.

At UC San Diego's Department of Ethnic Studies, I have been blessed with a richly intellectual and encouraging family. As is clear in several Voicing Indigeneity podcasts, Miget Lujan Bevacqua, Madel Ngiraingas, and Angie Morrill did more than anyone to make this space, both academically and otherwise, a home. Angie, especially, has shared invaluable advice and friendship, and much accompanying laughter and tears, during the writing of this thesis. Professor Ross Frank has been a wonderful mentor since
my very first day here. Professor Denise Ferreira da Silva, like her work, has consistently made graduate school such a pleasurable challenge.

My cohort, Stevie Ruiz, Susan Chen, Seth San Juan and Trangdai Glassey-Tranguyen, have read more drafts of this thesis than I can count, and their feedback has always been helpful. Professor Roberto Alvarez provided our cohort with much needed encouragement and clarification as the thesis process began in spring 2008, Professor Ross Frank helped us find our own writing processes, and Professor Wayne Yang has inspirationally seen us through to the end. In addition, Professors Denise Ferreira da Silva and Mark Harris, Rashné Limki, Kit Myers, Angie Morrill and Long Bui have been incredible writing group members. Professors Yen Espiritu, Sara Clarke Kaplan, Lisa Yoneyama, and Adria Imada have all offered important assistance with this thesis as well.

The most unexpected blessing I have received in San Diego is the love of Ryan Moran. This work, and many other treasured parts of my life, would not be possible without him.
This thesis investigates the role of Native Hawaiians in contemporary non-profit industry fueled collaborations with state, federal and corporate institutions, using the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s (CNHA) annual convention as a site that illuminates the shaping of an ideal mode of citizenship for Native Hawaiians. At stake in such a study is how indigenous political practice can find other modes of expression beyond achieving legal recognition on terms set by the United States, which are always limited by the settler colonial legacy of the nation state's founding and continuing present.

CNHA, as a key player in Hawai‘i’s non-profit industrial complex in Hawai‘i, importantly shapes not only the discourse surrounding federal recognition legislation for Native Hawaiians through its support of the Akaka Bill, but also broader understandings
of Native Hawaiian subjectivity and sovereignty. Thus this thesis also addresses the interplay between the bureaucratic and middle-class nature of CNHA and the contesting articulations of sovereignty championed by those who protest CNHA. This allows me to address the gendered and racialized logics at play in the multiple processes of Native Hawaiian subject formation, at CNHA and in the other more "radical" sovereignty spaces. The thesis considers how Native Hawaiian political praxis can be regenerated in the face of various legacies of colonial and patriarchal blood quantum policies.
INTRODUCTION

“This is your convention center. We are so glad to welcome you home.” This greeting given by a white, middle-aged male speaker, wearing a patterned aloha shirt and purple lei, opens a panel session at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s 2007 annual Native Hawaiian convention. A representative from the Hawai‘i Tourism Authority (HTA), the man faces a largely Native Hawaiian/Kanaka Maoli\(^1\) audience, many of us also wearing aloha shirt styles and leis. I remember this scenario so well perhaps because it was a scene not unlike those interrogated by Native American scholar Phillip Deloria in his book *Indians in Unexpected Places*.\(^2\) Deloria interrogates how and why American Indians appear strikingly out of place in most “modern” places (e.g. riding in cars, getting a manicure, competing in sporting events). In a similar sense, a largely white-collar convention audience of Native Hawaiians is an anomalous presence in the Convention Center, usually booked by visiting mainland organizations. The unmarked subtext of the HTA representative’s “welcome” is that by many past and present accounts, Native Hawaiians are not supposed to be business managers, executive directors, bankers, or wind energy engineers, as they showed themselves to be at this convention. Colonial and contemporary “neo-colonial” powers have long represented Native Hawaiians as backwards, lazy, and dying out. Kanaka Maoli who did achieve

\(^1\)Kanaka Maoli is the Hawaiian language term for Native Hawaiian. I use both Native Hawaiian and Kanaka Maoli, interchangeably but generally with the former more appropriate to non-profit terminology, and the latter more applicable to radical activism. As Hawaiian scholar and language teacher Noenoe Silva notes, Kanaka means, “Person, people, but also Hawaiian; Kānaka is plural form, Kanaka is singular and the category.” Kanaka Maoli means “Real person or people, i.e., native” (Silva 2004, 238). See also Kauanui (2008, xi-xii, who distinguishes Kānaka as countable plural; Kanaka as categorical, uncountable plural); and Tengan (2008, xi-xiii).

some success within American society disproved little in the face of such racial discourse because it was taken as a sign of assimilation, and therefore a voiding of Native identity.

However, the moment I found even more “unexpected,” in a slight twist of Deloria’s sense, was when the HTA representative, sporting many of the cultural markers of Native Hawaiian-ness, figuratively welcomed Kanaka Maoli to the bounty of modern Hawai‘i. The HTA representative marked his ownership of Hawai‘i, and particularly the wealth of the Waikīkī-located convention center, by feeling the need to welcome Native Hawaiians into it. Read symbolically, this welcome is a subtle admission of damaging colonial power; obliquely referencing the ways Native Hawaiians have been made “homeless” in their own homeland. Yet the speaker’s remarks were a brief plug for the HTA as a sponsor of apparently (in his view) mutually beneficial Native Hawaiian and Hawai‘i state tourism ventures: CNHA’s Native Hawaiian convention and the building it was being held in.

The HTA was in fact established in 1998 in large part to manage and market the newly opened Convention Center, and “attract the kind of business meetings that contribute to revenue growth for the state.”^3^ Thus in a literal sense, the Convention Center is a public, state-owned space. Yet for myself as for many of the participants I attended the convention with, it was their first time inside the imposing Convention Center. At somewhat of a crossroads between the downtown business district of Honolulu and the hotels of Waikīkī, the Center blends in well with the ritzy sheen of both areas. Its façade is framed by palm trees, sheets of glass stretching several stories, and

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giant stone sculptures that make up part of its $2 million art collection. It is precisely this spectacular wealth that makes the Center, for many local residents, a devastating symbol of trickle down economic policies that persist in Hawai‘i today. While the state funded the $200 million construction of the Convention Center, hundreds of other public employees’ jobs were cut and public services scaled back or privatized.⁴

Why, then, would a Native Hawaiian Convention be held at the Convention Center? What are the conditions of possibility for a tourism representative to suggest collaboration with Native Hawaiians in this contemporary moment? This thesis investigates the role of Native Hawaiians in non-profit industry fueled collaborations with state, federal and corporate institutions, using the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s annual convention as a site that illuminates the shaping of an ideal mode of citizenship for Native Hawaiians. For in a significant way, the Native Hawaiian businessmen and women who attend the convention are subjects shaped by the same racialized settler colonial logics that make them seem out of place. HTA invites these white-collar Native Hawaiians to be not only the objects of the colonial-tourism machine’s gaze, but to strategically participate in wielding it upon themselves. Thus the HTA’s remarks implicitly point to an unmarked form of, one of the non-profit industry’s favorite code words, ‘community development’: a project bent on anxiously addressing the Native Hawaiian community’s historic alienation within the state by re-making them into subjects that can be welcomed into it. As the market for tourism buoyed by a system of global capitalism is naturalized as the unshakeable reality of contemporary Hawai‘i,

the state and institutional response to historic calls for Native Hawaiian rights offers only a realm where we are to become the plucky self-reliant agents of selling the Islands.

How this process of native self-entrepreneurship (to use Nan Seuffert’s term, as I will explain later) has gained traction through a certain alignment of the contemporary non-profit industry, native nationalist projects intent on achieving (and/or indebted to historic) forms of legal recognition, and settler colonial nation states seeking to remedy “historic wrong-doings” is the central investigation of this thesis. At stake in such a study is how indigenous political practice can find other modes of expression beyond achieving recognition on the settler colonial state’s terms. Many native activists and scholars are currently engaged in related studies, and thus my introduction begins by laying out a few of the many ways scholars have already formulated responses to the dangers of native nationalism fixed on legal recognition or a nation-state goal. I begin with a further examination of what concepts such as “home” and “nation” may signify for indigenous people in settler colonial societies.

Re-articulating Native Nationalism

Yen Le Espiritu’s *Home Bound* explores what she sees as the tension “between the necessity and inevitability of a desire for ‘home’ and the accompanying dangers of that desire” for Filipino-American immigrants to San Diego. The dangers, Espiritu notes, stem from missing how “identities forged from below are often no less essentialized than the hegemonic identities imposed from above.”5 This thesis charts an analogous tension

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6 Ibid., 15
between an indigenous desire for a self-determined ‘nation’ (distinct from the colonial nation) and the accompanying dangers of that desire for Native Hawaiians. The point of my analogy is simply that “nation” has historically been the most important framework for orienting indigenous people’s politics and lives. “Nation” in the indigenous context carries the same resonance of Espiritu’s “home” but the ways in which indigenous people access their nations are necessarily quite different from transnational immigrants.

Indigenous nations are not always as easily locatable on a standard map of the globe as is, in Espiritu’s case, the Philippines. Nations can exist with and without a recognizable, scientifically locatable state structure. For example, though Native American reservations dot the United States map, these boundaries often reflect more the colonial history of conquest, forced migration, and gradual alienation of land rights than an older historical and broader cultural understanding of national lands held by those who live on the reservation.

Home and nation for indigenous people therefore do not always equate to a similarly geographically locatable nation-state. This does not mean that an indigenous nation is always less tangible than widely recognized nation states like the Philippines and the United States. However, there are multiple approaches, under a range of labels including ‘nation-building’ and sovereignty, to accessing and producing the indigenous nation for those who identify with it. Vince Diaz has noted: “identity is less about rootedness, but more about routedness” (emphasis in original). 7 Espiritu uses this quote in Home Bound to reflect on how diasporic subjects may imagine their homelands as orientation without necessarily intending to return to them. This quote thus also signals a

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7 Espiritu, 99
move towards understanding identity as a future-oriented process rather than static, tradition-bound, and solely past-oriented. Before I return to the way nation is (and is not) invoked at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s annual convention, I begin here with a review of how indigenous nationalism and citizenship have been theorized by a number of native feminist scholars who begin their accounts directly engaging the dangers that may accompany “rootedness” for indigenous nations.

Andrea Smith, a scholar at the heart of a growing contemporary indigenous feminist scholarship, echoes many of Espiritu’s claims as to the simultaneously counter-hegemonic and dangerously essentializing ties to the homeland, though in reference to indigenous nationalism. Smith begins her book Native Americans and the Christian Right from the Foucauldian premise that even the most liberatory “political projects cannot escape reinscribing the power relations they seek to contest or possibly instilling new power relations, which can be oppressive.” Yet Foucault does not suggest that liberation is impossible, only that it is “not a once-and-for-all event but a continual and open-ended process.” Smith accordingly argues for a politics of rearticulation “committed to a revolutionary process that is unfixed and ever changing.” This politics of rearticulation draws on both Foucault and Stuart Hall. Hall asserts: “interests are not given but always have to be politically and ideologically constructed.” Smith argues that the refashioning of common sense required, as Hall notes, in any political project is a process that the Christian Right have grasped with some success, while the liberal Left, to its detriment, has seen it as relatively unimportant. Smith contends that Native peoples often grasp

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9 Ibid., xxi
10 Ibid., xxii
11 Ibid., xvii
importance of creating common ground, rather than assuming alliances are given, because it has been the only way to advance their consistently marginalized political movements. She argues that “all peoples need to realize—we cannot fundamentally ensure the well-being of our ‘communities’ without rethinking who we can ally ourselves with in order to develop mass-based movements for social change.” Thus rearticulation, for Smith, requires a constant questioning of not “what is?” but “what could be?”

The politics of rearticulation she advances means that the commitment to feminism in her work does not mean that Native women’s voices are simply included where they have formerly been silenced nor are they sole focus of either her politics or scholarship. For Smith, and a number of other Native feminist scholars, centering women does help “rethink how we constitute ‘community’ or understand ‘the nation’” against male-driven (if often unmarked as such) narratives of political praxis. However, citing Foucault’s understanding of power, Smith notes that her centering of Native women requires a constant recentering, and an assumption that the “center” is not permanent, stable or monolithic. Rather: “we constantly recenter the discussion to see if this illuminates our understanding of the issues so that we can build a more liberating framework, not just for our communities but for all peoples.”

What, then, do Smith’s politics of rearticulation and Native feminism mean more specifically for native nationalisms? Smith does not purport to have the blueprints to a “perfect” anti-sexist, anti-racist native nationalist movement, but she poses a number of

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12 Ibid., xxii
14 Smith, xiv. Other Native feminist scholars working in conversation with Andrea Smith include Jennifer Denetdale, Mishuana Goeman, Kehaulani Kauanui, Diane Million, and Audra Simpson.
15 Ibid., xiv
critical questions in order to imagine what is possible when Native visions of nationhood and sovereignty do not assume a Native nation-state would the most liberatory outcome:

How do Native women shape a “nationalist” politics from a coalitional framework? Underpinning these “feminist” articulations of sovereignty is a critical interrogation of what a nation is. Who is included in a nation? And how can a political vision of nationhood and sovereignty be disarticulated from a nationalist struggle that seeks a nation-state as its goal? These questions provide the basis for a prolineal genealogy of sovereignty: a history of the future of sovereignty, what sovereignty could mean for Native peoples.¹⁶

As the scare quotes around “nationalist” and “feminist” in this excerpt suggest, Smith is not rooted to the conventional understandings of either of these terms. She is more interested in where such political orientations could lead Native people in the future. In accordance with her concepts of rearticulation and recentering, Smith is suggesting that orienting political organizing and scholarship around these questions could even lead to a possible discontinuation of the use of “nationalist” and “feminist” labels altogether. The content of Smith’s book is therefore a detailed ethnographic study of a number of activist organizations and the coalitional politics they engage, which provides a rich historicization of, as she describes, “the future of sovereignty.” Though this future is not fully realized yet, Smith proves that the possibilities are multiple and constantly being reshaped: this is the unique methodology that she terms a “prolineal genealogy.” This importantly reorients Native American and indigenous studies as not only about the history and present ‘social ills’ of Native peoples, but also about a future, one that indigenous people are continuously writing and re-writing.

¹⁶ Ibid., 257
Audra Simpson, in Smith’s view, is another Native feminist scholar that engages in writing a prolineal genealogy. Smith describes Simpson’s text, *To the Reserve and Back Again: Kahnawake Mohawk Narratives of Self, Home and Nation*, as generating:

a praxis of nation building involving multiple narratives, including those of her interlocutors, herself, and her readers. This text does not simply describe Mohawk nationalism; rather, the narration itself becomes a moment of nation building.¹⁷

I agree with Smith’s assessment that Simpson, trained in anthropology, is methodologically innovative in how she carefully negotiates sharing certain aspects of the stories with her Mohawk interviewees. The unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) questions in her text are recognized as both literal and symbolic refusals: narrative moments that she theorizes as possible resistant “mediating agent[s] of the power of the state.”¹⁸ I have looked to Simpson’s work to shape my own ethnographic methodology, as I will return to later. First, I would like to take more time to probe how Simpson understands and uses the terms nation, state, and citizenship (the socio-legal category encompassing the nation’s political subjects), in order to establish what she and Smith mean by “nation-building,” and to make clear how these terms will be used in my own study.

Simpson argues that her “Kahnawake case study offers an unusual process of people attempting to align, through policy, a grounded form of recognition with a more institutional approach.”¹⁹ She alludes here to a number of juridical and legislative processes in both Canada and the U.S. (as the Kahnawake Mohawk region straddles both

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¹⁷ Ibid., xxviii
¹⁹ Ibid., 34
nation states) which along with the “boundaries and borders of other Mohawk reserves, feed into citizenship-formation within the reserve and also among the larger, tactile and moving Mohawk citizenry.”

Through arrangements that, for example, include the use of Indian “status” cards that function as passports for Mohawks crossing the U.S.-Canadian border, Simpson argues that the relationship of Kahnawake people to the U.S. and Canada (alternately described as “ward of the state,” “partial citizens,” or “citizens plus”) signifies something more than simply a legal status. She writes: “They have the legal status only, it seems, of protected peoples, but it is this status that they use to protect and entrench their semiotic and material resources in light of state encroachment.”

Thus citizenship in an indigenous nation is for Simpson a matter that is, in some ways, aligned with institutional recognition, but not confined to loyalty to those state institutions. Above all, for Simpson, nationhood is produced through members’ narration. For example, some of Simpson’s anecdotes prove that members of the Kahnawake may highly value their status cards, while at the same time understanding the cards may not always afford them the recognition they believe it should: border guards can, and frequently do, choose not to recognize them. Even when grounded in legal definitions, Simpson’s indigenous citizenship is always extending beyond the legal to constitute a “relentless discursive and living practice that takes on different forms in the everyday life of community.” As Smith points out, this is a gesture not only towards the importance of present everyday practices of the Kahnawake, but also how they are not necessarily

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20 Ibid., 14
21 Ibid., 53
22 Ibid., 53
fixed but expect to adapt as future challenges require different “discursive and living practice.” Simpson writes:

I want to say very briefly, and very concisely to my readers, that the people of Kahnawake do not resist, they are. And the ways in which they are can be at times vexing, demanding, resistant, acquiescent and in all ways complex. Their insistence on remaining who they are (with careful attention to who they would like to be) is localized around the issue of membership and their desires for a national configuration; these are demanding propositions considering the efforts that have been made by the state to change who they are for the future.

The point that Simpson makes here is similar, in my view, to the ones I highlighted from Espiritu and Smith above. The people of Kahnawake’s self-recognition is shaped by historic legal and cultural understandings of “who they are” as much as “who they would like to be,” which requires a complex and contradictory existence that is never only “resistant” nor only “acquiescent” to institutional power. Nationhood is thus an orientation but not a fixed horizon, as Espiritu argues the homeland is for Filipino-Americans. As in Smith, native nationhood is never exactly fixed because for native people, “remaining who they are” requires a “relentless” practice of negotiating the often damaging notions of what the state would like them to be.

“Good Citizenship” Versus Alternative Citizenships

It is worth asking at this point: can what Smith and Simpson describe as native “nationalism without nation” still even use the terms nationalism and nation, or in related discussions, sovereignty? Similarly, can citizenship, in reference to native peoples, be a category flexed over and beyond the legal institutions that are generally responsible for

23 Ibid., 54
defining citizens? Simpson imagines a multiplicity of citizenships, stating that her central argument is:

that membership, whether it be imagined as citizenship, substantive citizenship, social citizenship, alternative citizenship, “feeling citizenship,” clan, who your mother is or who your father is— all of this is a state of belonging that is generated from the ground of sociality, experience, and narration. I want to argue that these forms of engagement and recognition are at least as important as recognition from the institutional “top” of governance structure.24

Here Simpson pries open the ways in which political subjectivity can be attributed, broadening it beyond the arena in which the nation-state has sole political subject-forming authority. This is an important intervention, to recognize the many ways political collective identity is formed from “below” in addition to from above. Still, as Simpson and Smith’s analyses so powerfully suggest in the first place, I would argue that the Native feminist political practice they describe ultimately belies and explodes the categories (nation, sovereignty, citizen) they begin with.

Legal scholar Nan Seuffert, drawing on Benedict Anderson’s seminal Imagined Communities, defines nations as:

imagined political communities, which need boundaries, and enemies. Law is integral to the construction and maintenance of these boundaries, and the identification of enemies. Nations are the stories that are told about collective identities, which also shape the stories available for individual identities.25

Though nation in this account is not monolithic, it is strictly defined by the law and images endorsed by institutional state structures and those interested in belonging to them. I do not think that Smith’s politics of rearticulation can fit under this national rubric.

24 Ibid., 34
precisely because it abhors boundaries, is more interested in identifying potential allies rather than enemies, and is open to changing the collective identity in relation to the identities and needs of individuals who constitute it. Seuffert goes on to say: “National and individual identities participate in the Eurocentric logic of identity; nationality, race and gender are meaningful within a system of differences, in opposition to what they are not.”

Again, Smith and Simpson continuously argue that the way Native people deploy nation, race and gender do not fit the common modes of Eurocentric identity. Simpson’s point that Kahnawake do not resist but are (at times resistant, acquiescent, and more) is made to highlight that Kahnawake do not know themselves merely through opposition to non-Kahnawake or the superstructures U.S. or Canada. Rather, they produce their sense of collective identity through both resistance and alignment with institutional modes of governance.

The main argument I wish to establish from the preceding literature review is that Smith and Simpson’s versions of “nationalism” are so different from much of what is called nationalism that it deserves to be carefully distinguished from other types of Native nation-building that do have a nation-state or recognition from a settler colonial nation-state as a goal. I do not offer a different name for it here yet, because, in keeping with Smith’s prolineal genealogy, I do not necessarily know that we understand it fully enough, across multiple indigenous contexts, to name it beyond specific occurrences. Still, it is important to recognize that not all Native people agree with Smith and Simpson’s rearticulations of nation and sovereignty, because they do not assume their “nationalism” fits every Native version of nationalism, and those who use their theories

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26 Ibid., 3
cannot either. Some Native people do choose to articulate their identities as solely resistant or solely acquiescent; Smith and Simpson’s work is meant to be as critical of these practices as they are hopeful that Native politics on the whole is always more than the sum of these most visible one-dimensional stances. As the site under question in this thesis, the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement, is an example of what I will argue is a U.S. state-determined form of corporate indigenous citizenship, I will largely use “nation” and “citizenship” in the conventional understanding as articulated by Seuffert above. However, Smith and Simpson’s analyses will be important, especially in Chapter Two, as I question what possibilities there are for imagining and practicing a different form of political collective identity.

The distinction between alternative modes of citizenship as described by Simpson above and citizenship as the legal category of a nation state is also important because this latter category of citizenship has been such an important tool of colonialism. Seuffert notes that the making of Maori as enemies was an essential process to the foundation of New Zealand as a nation. A Maori could become a “good citizen” of New Zealand, but this required a performance that rarely allowed simultaneous actions performed in pursuit of Maori interests—such as consenting to British sovereignty. She describes how the translation of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the document that essentially founded New Zealand as a British colonial state, was necessarily deceptive, suggesting in the Maori-language version that British would be governors of British subjects but Maori governing structures would remain in place for Maori people.

Seuffert argues that the missionary Henry Williams, responsible for the Treaty’s translation, personally stood to gain in clarifying his right to land rights (as did most of
the other British people living in New Zealand at that time) after the treaty passed.

However, she also argues that his deceptive translation was “not an isolated incident” but a performance of good citizenship, that is, “the fulfillment of dual individual and national interests, sometimes overlapping.”

She goes on to note:

The fulfillment of national and individual interests simultaneously is also reflected in the nineteenth century ideology of ‘manliness’ that provided ‘the essence of civic virtue… [as well as] a guide for the little man’…. Williams’ actions [the deceptive translation] mapped his own identity on to a white masculine ideal of the good citizen/subject…, a forward-gazing (white, male) citizen…, an agent of free trade imperialism acting simultaneously in his own interests and in the interests of nation-building. His act is also the performance … and fulfillment of that ideal, and for that moment he closed the gap between his own identity and the ideal….

Seuffert shows how the “good citizen” was not a permanently held subject state in this example but an ideal that had to be performed, with the use of certain racial and gendered identities, in order to be fulfilled. Seuffert argues that in the colonial period as much as in the contemporary period, Maori men were and are assimilated to a similar “good citizen” status under government programs “encouraging self-entrepreneurship among colonised men” and thereby “assimilating some Maori men to a new strand of national identity as global entrepreneurs.”

As Chapter One will show, the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement (CNHA) and its support of the Akaka Bill, U.S. Congressional legislation to “federally recognize” Native Hawaiians, operates on very similar assumptions about citizenship to the ones Seuffert describes. Native Hawaiians have been “good Americans” and thus deserve to better themselves through self-entrepreneurship, modeled after the Alaska

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27 Ibid., 16-17
28 Ibid., 16. Note that Seuffert uses in-text citations in this quote that I have not included here.
29 Ibid., 6
Native Claims Settlement Act, as I will discuss in depth later. Though there are many women involved in CNHA, their involvement requires a performance of good citizenship, which as Seuffert persuasively argues, depends on a white masculine entrepreneurial ideal. “The ideal citizen,” Seuffert concludes, “not only acts in both his own and the nation’s interests simultaneously, he is also forward gazing, without a history; he is always able to shed his history.” Though many Native people find their histories important orientations for the future, under the domain of good citizenship, Native political projects fixed on ‘transparent’ inclusion into the colonial nation-state require that Native history (especially the legacies of colonial violence) be performatively shed, whether through legislative recognition, official apologies, or the like. Native “tradition” and “culture” are allowed to remain, but largely as they are useful in the advancement of self-entrepreneurship. This is the same scene, described at the beginning of this thesis, enacted by the Hawai‘i Tourism Authority “welcoming home” Native Hawaiians at the Hawai‘i Convention Center.

It is this mode of indigenous citizenship, the overlay of concurrent political subjectivities, both Native and American, which are deployed to reinforce rather than resist each other, that is the main site of investigation in this study. The next section considers the ethnic nationalist movements that became popular in the 1960s and 70s as a partial history of the nationalist movements that shaped the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement. This history presents an ideal of native nationalism that contrasts sharply to CNHA’s indigenous citizenship model, with a genealogy to contemporary Hawaiian nationalist movements that offer both resistance to and complicity with CNHA.
“There is No American Dilemma”: Post-Civil Rights Nationalisms

Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue in Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s To the 1990s that the appeal of racial nationalism in the contemporary U.S. “appears to be limited” to the exceptions of Native Americans and Puerto Ricans, and that these and others have failed to successfully “demonstrate the existence of internal colonized ‘nations.’”

Broad-based nationalist movements begun in the 1960s and 70s, such as the Black Power movement and the Chicano/a Brown Berets organized around the occupied homeland of Aztlán, have thus come to seem passé even to seminal Ethnic Studies scholars. Still, for native and many other nationalist movements, which still exist today, what Omi and Winant have thrown out with the bathwater is worth much more examination. For example, Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton’s book Black Power (1967) is a hauntingly relevant critique of the civil rights movement and the resulting rise of multicultural projects of inclusion. Critiquing the assumption that “political coalitions are or can be sustained on a moral, friendly, sentimental basis; by appeals to conscience,” Carmichael and Hamilton wrote:

We view this as a myth because we believe that political relations are based on self-interest: benefits to be gained and losses to be avoided. For the most part, man’s politics is determined by his evaluation of material good and evil. Politics results from a conflict of interests, not of consciences.

The source of conflict Carmichael and Hamilton reference here is in part the question of what place white liberals could have in the Black Power movement. Their point was not that white people could do nothing to change either individual or institutional racism, or

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that the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) opposed coalitions outright, but that white liberals could have a significant impact through organizing their own communities to oppose white privilege. Most white-dominated liberal organizations “could only perpetuate a paternalistic, colonial relationship—doing for the blacks.”

These and other white “allying” forces did not have black people in their interest and many in fact entered alliances to impede long-term progress for blacks. Carmichael and Hamilton emphasized, to white and black people, several times through Black Power that, as in the quote above, it must be realized that there is no “American dilemma” or “conflict between the so-called American Creed and American practices.” Rather, values such as equality, liberty and justice “are simply words which were not even originally intended to have applicability to black people.”

Carmichael and Hamilton’s words are important to this study because they both diagnosed and prefigured what would be an ongoing process of alliances that did little for black people (and other people of color in other contexts) beyond superficially and paternalistically recognizing their struggle. Their critique in Black Power was accordingly leveled even more forcefully at black people who cooperated in the white establishment. This followed similar postcolonial theorizing and actions going on in Africa at the same time, especially Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1963) and his critique of the nationalist bourgeoisie who came to replicate colonial power structures.

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32 Ibid., 65
33 Ibid., 72
34 Ibid., 77
instead of substantially changing them. Carmichael and Hamilton described the situation in the United States thus:

Colonial politics causes the subject to muffle his voice while participating in the councils of the white power structure…. Thus, when one talks of a “Negro Establishment” in most places in this country, one is talking of an Establishment resting on a white power base; of hand-picked blacks whom that base projects as showpieces out front. These black “leaders” are, then, only as powerful as their white kingmakers will permit them to be. This is no less true of the North than the South.

This “entire class of ‘captive leaders,’” as the authors go on to describe them, became advocates for helping individual black people but, by doing so, actually hurt efforts at group liberation. I argue in the rest of this thesis that the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement have similarly become an example of the class of Native Hawaiian “captive leaders” who insist, as the black leaders described by Carmichael and Hamilton did, that “you must ‘play ball’ with the party in order to exact maximum benefits.”

There is a similar and Black Power-informed critique of “captive leaders” that can be drawn from the history of the 1960s and 1970s nationalist movements in Hawai‘i as well. Haunani-Kay Trask cites the formation of the Kōkua Kalama Committee (KKC) in 1970 as “Hawaiian history… being made…. By 1980, activists would look back and see in Kalama Valley the first land struggle of modern Hawaiian resistance.” KKC was directly formed in protest to the development of high-cost subdivisions in Kalama Valley, for which developers evicted and bulldozed the farm houses of many Native Hawaiian (and non-Native) residents. While the protests were ultimately not successful in stopping

36 Carmichael and Hamilton, 10-11
37 Ibid., 13, 54
38 Ibid., 12
the development of Kalama Valley, KKC had succeeded in drawing much support and attention to their cause. This spurred them to reorganize into a broader structure named Kōkua Hawai‘i in 1971. With the goal of becoming capable in leading anti-eviction and other land rights struggles across the state, Kōkua Hawai‘i was inspired by and modeled after the political strategies used by the Black Panthers in the mainland United States.

Fighting institutional racism even among Native Hawaiian organizations was a key component of Kōkua Hawai‘i’s plan, as Bishop Estate (a wealthy non-profit “charitable trust” founded on the assets of Native Hawaiian Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop) officially owned the land that Native Hawaiians were being evicted from. Though Black Panther-inspired, the particular manifestation of institutional racism and colonial legacies in Hawai‘i centered on issues of land and environmental rights. Kōkua Hawai‘i published a full-page ad detailing their plan of action in the Honolulu Advertiser in 1971:

1. We must save our farm lands to grow food. We must stop the developers who want to pour concrete over everything.

2. We must stop people from moving here until we can first take care of our own local people’s needs.

3. We must take care of our air, land, and water. If we kill water, nature will kill us.

4. We must get back our land from the few big landholders that have almost all of it. It was stolen from us in the first place.

5. We must use our land to house and feed our people and learn to rely on ourselves to do it- not on the mainland.

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41 Trask, “The Birth of the Modern Hawaiian Movement.”
6. As a start, we demand that Kalama Valley be saved for the local people and that the tourist and high-income development planned by Bishop Estate and Kaiser-Aetna be stopped.\textsuperscript{42}

There is no vagueness or possible overture of compromise in the demands Kōkua Hawaiʻi states here: land must be returned; land must be used to feed and house our people; local communities must become self-sustaining. Also, the emphasis on environmental issues and local people’s needs are not limited to the good of Native Hawaiians. Rather, it is clear in the positioning of their manifesto in the Honolulu Advertiser that forwarding the cause of Native Hawaiian land rights is best for the entire Hawaiʻi community. The use of “locals,” encompassing both Native Hawaiians and non-Native long-time residents of Hawaiʻi, as a collective identity in organizing like this changed slowly later in the 1970s. Trask notes that under this shift: “The rights of ‘locals’ were not thereby opposed. But Hawaiians’ historic and cultural claims to the land as the first and original claimants were increasingly seen, at least by Hawaiians as primary.”\textsuperscript{43}

This ethos of pushing Native Hawaiian demands to the forefront of political organizing, also modeled after the native and ethnic nationalist movements in the mainland United States, would come to shape other seminal Native Hawaiian political actions, such as the 1976 occupation of Kahoʻolawe, the smallest of the eight major islands in the Hawaiian chain.\textsuperscript{44} The U.S. military had used Kahoʻolawe as a site for bombing target practice since 1941, against the religious and cultural significance of the land to Native Hawaiians. In 1990, the military finally responded to the continued protests by ending bombing. Nonetheless, protests of military presence and their

\textsuperscript{42} Trask, “The Birth of the Modern Hawaiian Movement,” 149
\textsuperscript{43} Trask, From A Native Daughter, 67
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 68
desecration of land continue today. As brief as the history sketched above is, it is important to know, before further examination of the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement, that Kanaka Maoli have long participated in nationalist political organizing that has consistently produced collective identity through sustained relationships with the Hawaiian nation, as both remembered and currently lived. However, in part in response to the strong visibility and support Kanaka Maoli activism has sometimes garnered over the years, the state and federal governments have continually attempted to respond (and lessen the visibility of protests) by offering special welfare programs and state-sponsored forms of recognition. The leaders of the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement, as I will elaborate below, constitute some of the “captive leaders” who are also some of the main beneficiaries of these state programs, though their annual Native Hawaiian convention attempts to include all of the Native Hawaiian “community” in their vision.

“Community Development” at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement

For many years, I worked as a volunteer and employee for various Native Hawaiian non-profits; I went to college on a scholarship for Native Hawaiians administered by (a now-defunct, that is: de-funded) non-profit; and many of my family members and friends have and continue to do the same paid and unpaid work. As was the case for many of these colleagues, it was precisely through such community work that I came to know the Native Hawaiian Convention, which since 2001 has been held each year by the non-profit Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement (CNHA). My first introduction to the convention was as a volunteer for ‘Ōiwi: A Native Hawaiian Journal
(itself a product of a non-profit publisher Kuleana ‘Ōiwi Press). I staffed a table for ʻŌiwi at the Convention’s Marketplace—a large, open area filled with tables where information and products are on display for convention participants. Leaflets and swag are passed out, and items from books and T-shirts to expensive Ni‘ihau shell jewelry are sold. That year I often peeked in through the doorways of the panel sessions, interested in the potential of so many Native Hawaiian organizations and local leaders gathering together.

The convention materials and brochures I glanced over were familiar to me from other non-profit materials I had seen and even helped write. Accordingly, the mission statement of CNHA hardly seemed controversial: “Our mission is to enhance the cultural, economic and community development of Native Hawaiians and to support the capacity of community-based organizations that contribute to the well-being of the Hawaiian islands and its people.”45 The repetition of the word community seems nothing but natural here. Yet, in stark contrast to the manifesto of Kōkua Hawaiʻi’s demands for land and environmental rights noted above, the message is not transparent, even (or especially) to those who are Native Hawaiian. Exactly which Native Hawaiians are being referred to here? Which are in need of development, and why do some of us (or them?) need CNHA’s help to ‘develop’?

Following these questions, and others they have generated, this thesis pursues an investigation and critique of CNHA and the Akaka Bill, of which it is a primary supporter, by using the 2008 7th Annual Native Hawaiian Convention sponsored by CNHA as the primary site of analysis. CNHA and its annual convention are important not

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45 This specific phrasing of the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement mission statement comes from their website as accessed in 2008 (www.hawaiiancouncil.org). CNHA includes variations on this statement in nearly all the materials they produce and disseminate.
only because CNHA’s convention is a non-profit site productive of ‘community’ but also because CNHA has come to exert an increasing amount of influence over all Native Hawaiian non-profits in Hawai‘i. The definitions of community appropriated and produced by CNHA echo far beyond its own offices. As one person I interviewed put it, “Once they [CNHA] came along [in 2001], the money dried up. All the grants started going through them.” This influence is perhaps most evident in the names of the convention’s corporate sponsors, whose logos are peppered throughout the convention’s materials and speeches: Bank of Hawai‘i, Lockheed Martin, American Savings Bank, and Freddie Mac, among others. The list of panelists and speakers are also usually impressive in the sense of mainstream recognition. In 2008, the CNHA convention included presentations from all national representatives for Hawai‘i: Senators Daniel Inouye and Daniel Akaka, and Representatives Neil Abercrombie and Mazie Hirono.

I want to make it clear, however, that using CNHA as the primary site of my analysis does not stem from a desire to de-legitimize all non-profit organizations working for Native Hawaiian communities. I approach this investigation following many of the definitions and questions laid out in The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, a collection of essays edited by the scholars and activists of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, who themselves continue to struggle for transformative justice within the non-profit structure.46 Dylan Rodríguez, in this collection, defines the non-profit industrial complex as a type of shadow state: “a set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class control with surveillance over public political

ideology, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements."\(^{47}\)

I see CNHA as a metonym for the non-profit industrial complex that has seen exponential growth globally since the 1980s. I am not interested solely in the macro economic and political processes described here, however, for as Rodríguez also states, “this new industry grounds an epistemology—literally, a *way of knowing* social change and resistance praxis—that is difficult to escape or rupture.”\(^{48}\) How this neoliberal, non-profit epistemology impacts, changes, and/or entrenches contemporary indigenous epistemologies and ontologies (ways of being and becoming) have received far too little scholarly attention.

At its broadest level, then, this thesis asks: What is an effective response to appropriation of grassroots activism into state and corporate modes of maintaining the colonial status quo? How are members of “radical” sovereignty movements constructed as improper citizens in distinction to CNHA’s “good citizens? How can a critique of the Native Hawaiian push for federal recognition also become a productive critique for the “grassroots” and “radical” movements to help foster a more transformative political change? Can the models of indigenous citizenship being advanced within the non-profit industrial complex be re-articulated to achieve something more meaningful for indigenous people? This question has required me to first understand, using the CNHA convention as a sample, how native membership is negotiated both structurally and in the daily experiences of those who live with those structures by accepting, excusing, resisting, and denying those structural definitions. How does the work occurring in the

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 8  
non-profit industrial complex explicitly and implicitly define Native subjectivity and community? And which of these definitions are possible and urgent to undo?

Re-articulating Native Hawaiian Subjectivity

Any indigenous studies project interested in definitions of Native subjectivity and community inevitably raises the specter of authenticity—both racial and cultural. As the orientations this project draws from Yen Espiritu, Andrea Smith, and Audra Simpson should make clear, it is crucial to understand that this project is not concerned with unraveling the ‘truths’ of who is Native Hawaiian. I agree here with Judy Rohrer who argues, along with Kēhaulani Kauanui’s succinct labeling of blood quantum standards as a “bloody mess,” that: “Precontact Kānaka Maoli did not think in terms of race and certainly never asked to be ‘raced.’”49 The more radical implication of such a statement is that Native Hawaiians may have to give up “race” as the basis of their claims to sovereignty. How this can be done, in a variety of Native contexts, has spurred much of the work of contemporary indigenous scholars.50 The heft of this work can be seen as following what Rohrer sees as “a primary goal of decolonization… (re)discovering community-based definitions of one's group and trying to make a place for them in neo-or post-colonial societies.”51

51 Rohrer, 10
I use a variety of terms to refer to indigenous people in my work—including in my own context Native Hawaiian and Kanaka Maoli—and I see self-identification as an essential consideration in labeling any group. Nonetheless, I emphasize indigenous in my project’s framework in order to make it clear that I do not see the Native Hawaiian case as existing in isolation. The term indigenous helps me highlight the comparative nature of Native Hawaiian nation-building. This comparative work is evident both in how the Native Hawaiian case is relationally shaped at the American national and international levels in relation to other native and ethnic-minority cases, and in how Native Hawaiians have very consciously drawn on other native contexts in shaping their own political practices. Nevertheless, it should remain clear that indigenous, like most other terms used for and by native peoples (including Native, Indian, First Nations, Aborigines, “tribes,” ‘Oiwi, and hundreds more) have enormous discursive power to both oppress and empower the people they designate. In using these circumscribed terms, however, neither oppression nor revolutionary empowerment is inevitable but constantly strategically shaped and re-shaped by the specific contexts and methods of their employment.

Though individual subject formation and collective identity may seem to be abstract and at times utopian processes of re-discovery, there is much material at stake here. A recent example of the concrete value of Native Hawaiian claims is the contested settlement of ‘ceded’ lands formerly owned by the Hawaiian monarchy (overthrown by a U.S.-government backed cadre of American businessmen in 1893). Now being appealed as far as the US Supreme Court, this January 2008 settlement between the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the Hawai‘i State government would negotiate the exchange of 209 acres on Maui and the Big Island, valued at $200 million (this is only a small portion of
the 1.8 million acres of ‘ceded’ lands statewide). Many Native Hawaiians, who feel neither organization is properly accountable to the community, contest both the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the state government as legitimate arbitrators of this legacy. Considering the material stakes of Native Hawaiian claims to sovereignty, of which this ceded lands case is just one example, begins to explain the list of CNHA convention sponsors (Lockheed Martin, Bank of Hawai‘i, Freddie Mac) who may otherwise seem out of place, or acting out of purely humanitarian interests, in funding Native Hawaiian causes.

While this project is a critique of the type of indigenous citizenship produced at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s annual convention, this project’s goal is to continuously ask what a different kind of indigenous citizenship (which I have argued above deserves a different name entirely) could look like. I argue that, following the lead of native feminist scholars, and particularly the questions laid out by Andrea Smith and Audra Simpson in the beginning of this introduction, we can pursue a re-articulation of native nationalism and indigenous citizenship. I, too, have more questions than blueprints as to how this can be done. Could a different mode of political collective identity be seen and felt in the same ways that we often cannot escape seeing and feeling American citizenship? To what extent is realizing a different mode of seeing, feeling, and being, a goal of ours here? Is this “nationalism without a nation” already being practiced in less than overtly visible ways?

People unfamiliar with the Native Hawaiian context often ask me: “What is the motivating factor behind the sovereignty movement?” Ultimately, there is no soft way to

explain that there is nearly nothing about Native Hawaiian lives, constantly faced with statistics that put us at the bottom of every socioeconomic scale, and cultural practices that are constantly devalued (but appropriated) by the American mainstream culture industry, that is not a motivating factor. The material and metaphorical stakes are very high for the many indigenous people (radical and moderate alike) who are too often written off as angry, deluded, ungrateful Americans. Overall, both my critique and my questioning towards what else is possible, is an attempt at a different politics of seeing and speaking that dignifies, rather than dismisses, all indigenous people and indigenous social-political praxis.

Methodology

This study would not be possible without data that understands the non-profit industrial complex as lived experience, as a site where power is generated and performed in both expected and creative ways. Accordingly, my methodology is interdisciplinary, following many Ethnic Studies scholars in drawing on both ethnography (interviews and field notes from participant observation primarily sited at and around the CNHA convention of October 2008) and discourse analysis as is heavily used in cultural studies. Here, I reflect on these intertwined methodological approaches in order to present an account of how I have conceptually and practically conducted my study.

Ethnography is not a method that can be pursued lightly in any community, but especially in indigenous communities today, due to a long history of exploitation by anthropology and other social science disciplines. This history was often on my mind while pursuing this project, as my position as both insider and outsider in various spaces
in the community was often uncomfortable. Yet speaking to people in the community seemed nonetheless urgent to me in other ways. Andrea Smith looks to her own participant observation as a potential source of personal accountability and I felt a similar need for accountability, especially in order to understand if my questions were deemed relevant and important within the communities I spoke with.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, some questions were overwhelmingly important to respondents, and those interactions shaped the overall direction of my project. Additionally, my interviews and observations kept certain faces vividly in my mind as I turned over two questions that Audra Simpson persuasively argues “should guide the work of anyone doing research in their own community… 1) can this knowledge be used to hurt anyone? 2) can I go home after this?”\textsuperscript{54}

Indeed, Simpson’s work was a key source of inspiration in how to conduct and analyze my study. Asking, “How do you live within your community in a dignified manner while simultaneously living within Empire (which can be a very undignified affair)?” Simpson pursues an understanding of her interlocutors “within the multiplicity of frames that shape their lives” (emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{55} Yet Simpson does not explain every detail of these multiplicities precisely because she is after a methodology that allows native lives to be unfixed. This approach, described as ethnographic refusal, highlights the aporetic nature of all scholarship as well as the oft-overlooked significance of what is \textit{not}, in a positive textual sense, there.\textsuperscript{56} Following Simpson, the stories that I re-present from my research refuse, to a certain extent, straightforward descriptions of the CNHA convention or the people I interviewed.

\textsuperscript{53} Smith, xxx
\textsuperscript{54} Simpson, 150
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 31, 40
\textsuperscript{56} Smith, xxvi
This approach of “ethnographic refusal” was not easily arrived at, as I began my study with a solid, rather conventional, sociological model of the research I would complete. After an analysis of how, and with what possibilities and costs, ideas about Native Hawaiian communities and their needs circulate around the CNHA convention, I planned to conduct a certain “respectable” number of interviews, transcribe them along with my field notes, and code this raw data into a few categories. There is nothing inherently wrong with such a plan, and my ultimate veering away from this track was due partially the constraints of time and resources. I imagined a third chapter to this project which would focus tightly on the content of the eleven interviews I did conduct with participants in the Native Hawaiian non-profit world in the summer of 2008. However, in the process of writing the project, certain analyses claimed importance as essential groundings in understanding such in-depth ethnographic data: namely, a discursive analysis of the Akaka Bill and a global-historical reading of CNHA within the global non-profit industrial complex in Chapter One, and a native feminist-oriented analysis of discourses around self-representation and blood quantum in Chapter Two. In valuing these analyses, the majority of the ethnographic data I overtly use in this thesis comes from my own views of my participant-observation at the CNHA convention, not my interview data. While that interview data could be a future resource, I want to explain further how I do treat my remaining ethnographic data (which retains pertinent ethical issues around examining this data are no less complicated than those pertaining to interviews), and why I do not ultimately think this project is incomplete without presenting interview data in a third chapter.
This thesis has come to be a series of discourse analyses of Hawai‘i’s historical context, the Akaka Bill’s legal text and the debates it has generated, awkward moments of the CNHA convention and heavily gendered jokes about blood quantum. In *The Discourse on Language*, Foucault asserts that the production of discourse is a kind of “will to knowledge” that “in every society… is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.” In short, discourse analysis as influenced by Foucault and other post-modernist, post-structuralist theorists, treats words, texts, and other “evidence” not as absolute truths but as products of societal discourse as much as the invention of an individual author or agent. While such a methodology has most commonly been applied to textual sources, I extend discourse analysis to apply to ethnographic data. I follow scholars like Latin American feminist scholar Sonia Alvarez in understanding both CNHA’s political practice and what I repeated refer to, in contrast, as the more radical sovereignty movements in Hawai‘i, as discourses themselves. Reading political movements as discourse allows me to read both CNHA and other Kanaka Maoli political groups as (to paraphrase feminist scholar Jane Mansbridge) sets of changing aspirations and goals that are structured by institutions and individuals, which though diametrically opposed on some issues implicitly support the same racialized and gendered definitions of Native Hawaiian identity in other arenas.


Reading ethnographic data as discourse raises its own particular set of ethical questions. Namely, does understanding my observations of people’s words and lives as discourse reinscribe a potentially violent (post)modern notion that there is no “reality” that each individual or society can inhabit? Many have pointed out how conveniently (for the white Western world) postmodernism and poststructuralism debunked the notions of identity, authenticity, and culture at the very same moment (in the 1960s and 70s) that a number of social and political movements by people of color around the world gained power through reclaiming identity and cultural authenticity in colonial and postcolonial situations. I do not claim in this work that there are no real lived experiences that Native Hawaiian people (in stark contrast to people of other races and histories) have access to—quite the opposite, a fact that I hope the rest of this work will show. Rather, I question how these lived experiences are best used, and how they can matter to my study without me taking on an academic, anthropological voice of authoritative “knowing” in representing them. Simpson reminds us that “anthropology has imagined itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” and accordingly, fulfilled the colonial “imperatives of Empire… [providing] specific technologies of rule that sought to obtain space and resources, to define and know the difference that it constructed in those spaces and to then govern those within.”

difference, but as tools to deconstruct the spaces and technologies colonial states erected
to govern us?

Pursuit of that question has left me with many discontinuous and unruly parts
rather than the solid whole I imagined my original research plan would yield me. Worries
about whether leaving out the content of my interviews would leave me with not
“enough” data followed me into the late stages of thesis writing. Yet, again, I took my
direction from Simpson’s understandings of “enough”:

Rather than stops, or impediments to knowing, [anthropological] limits
may be expansive in what they do not tell us. I reached my own limit
when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the
deply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other
Indigenous peoples that they have been mired within anthropologically.60

This limit references a situation Simpson describes in which an interviewee repeatedly
said “No one seems to know” in answer to questions she posed about a divisive topic, the
legacy of Bill C-31 (an amendment seeking to redress the patrilineal definitions of
membership in Canada’s Indian Act), which Simpson understood as “let’s just not say.”
Simpson writes: “So I did not say, and so I did not ‘get into it’ with him, and I won’t get
into it with my readers… his predicament and my predicament and the actual stuff (the
math, the clans, the mess, the misrecognitions, the confusion and the clarity)—the
calculus of our predicaments.”61 For Simpson this calculus does not contribute or
complicate either claims to sovereignty or one-dimensional representations of
Kahnawake people.

60 Ibid., 78.
61 Ibid., 77.
In my own study, I have had to decide which pieces of the “calculus of our predicaments” does contribute to and complicate Kanaka Maoli concerns, and which do not. In something of a contrast to Simpson, my second chapter does present some of the actual stuff, the math and the mess, of blood quantum legacies in the Native Hawaiian context. Here, jokes and odd parts not included in the proper space of interviews or convention presentations are my main evidence—not because I am eager to catch my interlocutors at their worst or most unmediated moments, but largely because it was these exchanges that I found most interesting in contrast to some of my less interesting initial interviews (due almost entirely to my amateur interviewing skills). I argue that some engagement with the math and mess, but not a straightforward, explicated genealogical alternative, does further Kanaka Maoli political practices of sovereignty. Thus Simpson’s concerns (augmented in my account by Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?”) remain important orientations though they differ in terms of content. Overall, the ethnographic portions of this thesis should be understood as starting places and stepping stones to future work which will continually return to these and future interviews as crucially important sources. Some of my interviewees (who remain, unsatisfyingly, anonymous here) may be rightly disappointed that their views do not obviously appear in this work, but the high value of their generative interviews, as much as discussions I have had with my Kanaka Maoli family and community for my entire life, I hope readers will recognize throughout.

At times, the data drawn from my interviews and field notes are framed by sources drawn from national and local media as well as government documents. I particularly rely on newspaper articles and legislative records in Chapter One to approach
the many possible readings of the Akaka Bill and CNHA’s support of it. I also use newspaper articles and editorial cartoons published in local and national news media chiefly to index how the legacies of a colonial imaginary are continually refreshed under the guise of multiculturalism, which has rooted with a vengeance in Hawai‘i. Racist representations of Native Hawaiians in editorial cartoons such as Daryl Cagle’s (from the Kāne‘ōhe-based weekly circular Midweek) demonstrate not only the threat Native Hawaiian political organizing, even in its most moderate forms, present to a majority of Hawai‘i’s ‘possessive investment in whiteness.’ Cagle’s cartoon also clearly indicates some of the racialized logics that Native Hawaiians have long internalized, ignored, subtly resisted, and overtly fought in Hawai‘i, despite the gross number of news articles that for years have continually expressed their surprise at the very existence of racial struggle in Hawai‘i through such clichéd headlines as “Trouble in Paradise.”

While both sources are used in these pages, especially in Chapter Two, this study privileges ethnographic data over reading such mainstream media against the grain not because interview and field notes data holds more ‘truth.’ I see both media representation and personal agency at work in discursively shaping definitions of self and community. Indeed Hawai‘i has a long and unavoidable history of imbrication in “economies of looks and looking,” to borrow Performance Studies scholar Diana Taylor’s definition of

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spectacle. Taking this as a given, I am most interested in how Native Hawaiians themselves work to position their individuals and communities in and out of these mainstream representations. Specifically, I see CNHA’s annual convention as a particular locus of certain ‘economies of looks and looking’ that remains this study’s central concern throughout.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter One begins this project by situating the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement within a reading of the Akaka Bill. Because Native political status within the U.S. has long been determined relationally, this chapter continues by examining the relationships between competing models of indigenous citizenship in Hawaiʻi as well as with certain Native American models within the United States. The Alaskan Federation of Natives (AFN) is of particular interest because of strong metaphorical and material ties between CNHA and the AFN. Several speakers at the CNHA convention came from Alaska, including Willie Hensley, former president of AFN who was instrumental in the federal Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971. ANCSA transferred land titles to Native Alaskans by establishing twelve Native Alaskan regional corporations and over 200 village corporations, thereby extinguishing any further Native Alaskan claims. As this chapter will show, the corporative model of ANCSA is clearly one that CNHA favors for the Native Hawaiian context. This shapes CNHA’s support of the Akaka Bill, and thus what the Akaka Bill could mean for Native Hawaiians, in a very

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specific way that I argue has generally gone unrecognized in the face of a common understanding of the Akaka Bill as providing an “open” process to self-governance.

Chapter Two takes a more in-depth look at the space of CNHA’s annual convention and how different types of Native Hawaiian citizen-subjects are produced and managed at the convention site and beyond it. This requires a particular attention to the gendered production of indigenous citizenships, and the Native Hawaiian communities’ various notions of genealogy that operate through specific lenses on both the past and the future. Drawing on Epeli Hau‘ofa’s notions of an ever-expanding Pacific world, Kēhaulani Kauanui writes, “genealogy is a Hawaiian form of world enlargement that makes nonsense of … fractions and percentage signs.” Yet as Kauanui also recognizes, many Kanaka Maoli continue to invest heavily in the neo-colonial standard of “50 percent” as proof of Native Hawaiian identity. CNHA furthers this investment in authentic “fractions and percentage signs” in overt and subtle ways, such as valorizing speakers who live on Hawaiian Homestead lands and those who graduated from Kamehameha Schools. The traces of these investments in authenticity do not exist in a CNHA vacuum, however, but can be found in equal measure in individuals and groups that are stridently anti-CNHA. This chapter asks how Native Hawaiian women in particular are leveraged (by themselves and others) in producing and sustaining various versions of a Native Hawaiian citizen-subject.

Accordingly, in Chapter Two, I center some of the excess ‘stuff’ that happens outside of, on the way to, and after an ethnographic interview proper, that stuff so easily (and often necessarily) brushed aside. I argue that when genealogies come into conflict,

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65 Kauanui, 12
whether subtly or overtly, there is both the danger of exclusionary violence (metaphorical and material) and the potential for genealogy (and its connection to political praxis) to be re-articulated in radically different but regenerative ways.

Overall, this study engages in, and exposes, internal critique of Native Hawaiian political praxis and in doing so offers something akin to Foucault’s “pessimistic activism.” Foucault described it this way:

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same thing as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.\footnote{Viego, 13}

It is my contention that indigenous political praxis is itself an intensely hyper- and pessimistic activism, having had to recognize for centuries that “everything is dangerous.” Thus, while acutely aware of the ethical (and potentially de-moralizing) issues involved in such a study, I agree with Avery Gordon that the utopian is inextricably tied to most banal realities: “We need to know where we live in order to imagine living elsewhere. We need to imagine living elsewhere before we can live there.”\footnote{Avery Gordon, \textit{Ghostly matters: haunting and the sociological imagination} Minneapolis, MN; University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 5.}

Noenoe Silva has asked of her own documentation of Kanaka Maoli resistance at the time of annexation: “Why does it matter that this… is documented and analyzed? We might just as well ask: How do a people come to know who they are?”\footnote{N. Silva, 3} This work does not attempt to answer, to describe to its readers, who Native Hawaiians are, but rather shows Kanaka Maoli engaged in \textit{becoming}, in writing the history of their futures.
CHAPTER ONE

Advancing Indigenous Citizenship:
CNHA and the Akaka Bill

*Why should we care if this is an election that is for the United States and not Hawaiian nationals?* 69

—Professor Jonathan Osorio, Director of Kamakakūokalani Hawaiian Studies Center, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa

*My message is simple. Native Hawaiians are Native Americans.* 70

—U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye (HI-D)

Native Hawaiian definitions and practices of community have been gradually overlaid with American structures of race and governance (both formal and informal) since the 1800s. However, distinctions between Native Hawaiian and American identity and practice have always been salient. Native Hawaiians have continuously responded to the material and ideological influence of the U.S. in Hawai‘i in a variety of ways, whether through resistance, strategic adoption, or internalization. The above quotes showcase two divergent views on the relation between Native Hawaiians and the U.S., which inform various contemporary strategies of defining Native Hawaiian political identity. The first quote is framed within the context of the 2008 U.S. presidential primaries and its heavy media coverage. Upon being asked for a comment on the debate about Barack Obama’s eligibility to be president, 71 Kanaka Maoli professor Jonathan

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71 Adding to the racially charged perceptions of Obama as black and mixed race man, and as a Muslim because of his name, opponents charged that Obama was possibly not “natural born” and thus ineligible to be president; arguments varied from questioning Hawai‘i as legally ‘natural’ U.S. territory to citing Obama’s early childhood education in Indonesia as proof he was not really born in Hawai‘i.
Osorio dismisses the importance of the election entirely by re-centering his (and implicitly all Native Hawaiians’) relationship to the U.S. nation. Asking instead, “Why should we care?” Osorio attempts to use interest in Obama’s potential foreign-born status to draw attention to the rarely visible Hawaiian sovereignty movement, with a sense of politics distinct and even divorced from the U.S. nation state. In contrast, the second quote from U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye claims that “Native Hawaiians are Native Americans,” thereby conflating rather than separating ‘Hawaiian national’ politics from U.S. national politics. The indigenous comparison between Native Americans and Native Hawaiians is not an uncommon one, and has often been the basis for productive strategic alliances. However, Inouye’s invocation of the comparison at the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s annual convention purposefully emphasizes not just comparative similarities but unwavering equation. This is in service of Inouye’s advocacy for the Akaka Bill, U.S. federal legislation that would set up a ‘Native Hawaiian governing entity.’ Inouye’s speech also implicitly takes CNHA as the audience and future constitution of this ‘governing entity.’ As the Akaka Bill returns to a Democratic-majority Congress in 2009, an environment in which it is more likely to pass than it has been for in the last nine years of attempts, an investigation of, and intervention in, CNHA’s model of indigenous citizenship is especially urgent.

Indeed, while Senator Inouye’s remarks were not, on the surface, directly related to the U.S. presidential election, Obama’s stated support (widely publicized within Hawai’i media outlets) of the Akaka Bill added a particular sense of timeliness to his

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72 In relation to Professor Osorio’s quote, Senator Inouye’s stakes are positioned somewhat differently as a Japanese-American local to Hawai’i. However, Inouye has been a strong ally to U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka, who is Native Hawaiian, and the Akaka Bill’s namesake. Inouye and Akaka make the same claims in support of the Akaka Bill’s recognition that Native Hawaiians are Native Americans.
speech at CNHA. In my interviews, conducted shortly after Obama had won the Democratic party nomination, the presidential election often came up organically in the course of talking about the future of Native Hawaiian communities. The interviews lent evidence to my sense that Native Hawaiians’ lived relationships with the U.S. are much less clear-cut than the dichotomies staged by Osorio and Inouye of a Hawaiian nation equaling or opposing the U.S. nation. This chapter seeks to understand some of these complicated routes of citizenship that indigenous nationalisms follow, through a particular focus on notions of citizenship and indigeneity at CNHA. What constitutes the agenda of CNHA and how is it advanced? What models from other international and native contexts does CNHA draw on, contest, incorporate and ignore? And how do individual Native Hawaiian people, whether they attend the CNHA convention or not, respond to CNHA’s citizenship model? This chapter answers these questions by situating CNHA’s model of indigenous citizenship within the global-historical context of Hawai‘i’s annexation and statehood within the U.S., as well as within the neoliberal forces that re-shaped community of color organizing into corporative structures since the late 1970’s. This history and continuing present is indexed throughout by quotes from my interview participants who draw on these contexts in a variety of complex identifications and orientations that provide snapshots of how Native Hawaiian models of citizenship are constantly being questioned and re-made.

73 Indeed, shortly prior to President Obama’s inauguration, CNHA presented his office with policy documents presented at the 2008 CNHA convention and a document entitled, “Federal Legislative & Executive Priorities in the First 100 Days & Stimulus and Economic Recovery Recommendations” (Dec 23 2008). Additionally, on February 4, 2009, the Akaka Bill was re-introduced into both the House and Senate.
Deciphering The Akaka Bill

There are a number of different stories I could tell about CNHA through its outspoken support of the Akaka Bill, which is the lynchpin in CNHA’s proposed model of indigenous citizenship. The Akaka Bill itself is a notoriously vexing Congressional legislative text that has become interwoven with many narratives about what it means to be Native Hawaiian, while also helping to generate a number of new discourses. To a number of white (and others who participate in whiteness) conservative pundits and Congressional Republicans, the Akaka Bill signals anti-white “racial apartheid,” and portends Hawai‘i’s complete secession from the U.S. nation, a particularly ungrateful move after over a hundred years of Hawai‘i benefiting from America’s First World political, economic and cultural bounty.74 It is precisely these Republicans who have stalled the legislation in Congress since its introduction in 2000. In an unlikely convergence of directly counter-arguments, at the opposite end of the rhetorical and political spectrum, many Kanaka Maoli sovereignty leaders find the Akaka Bill equally dangerous and unacceptable. However, these leaders find the bill to be a total settlement and extinguishment of Native Hawaiian sovereignty claims for a “paper government” that offers very few substantial rights, especially rights crucially related to land. Alternatively, many Native Hawaiians find the conservative, racist responses to the Akaka Bill a common cause to unite against while remaining divided, undecided or ambivalent about the Akaka Bill’s passage. As it has gone under many revisions since its’ introduction to Congress in 2000, common responses to the Akaka Bill in my interviews were distanced

(“I don’t really know what it says anymore, I don’t know what it would really do for us”) and/or apathetic (“I can’t really believe that they [the U.S. government] would really do anything to help us now”).

CNHA is the most visible, if not the only, ‘civil’ group (that is, beyond the bill’s state and federal government sponsors such as U.S. Senator Daniel Akaka, the bill’s namesake, or the quasi-state Office of Hawaiian Affairs) that takes a wholly positive view of the Akaka Bill. This mutual support (CNHA to this legislation, and in return governmental support of CNHA) has been obvious from the beginning of both the Akaka Bill and CNHA (officially founded in 2001). In the first U.S. Congressional joint hearing on the bill in 2000, soon-to-become CNHA president Robin Danner and her sister Jade Danner were among the only Native Hawaiians who testified in support of the legislation. What can be made of this support is somewhat difficult to discern at first, and especially through a sole focus on the text of the Bill itself. Nevertheless, it is important to see what the Bill says, and just as importantly does not say, to understand how it has become an unavoidable referent in the contemporary Native Hawaiian political sphere today and to elucidate CNHA’s vision of Native Hawaiians’ future.

First introduced to Congress in 2000 by Senator Daniel Akaka, the legislation was officially labeled as a process determining “Native Hawaiian Federal Recognition” and claimed “To Express the Policy of the United States Regarding the United States’ Relationship With Native Hawaiians.” The background and purpose of the bill is framed by an overview of Hawaiian history before and after Euro-American colonial

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76 Ibid.
contact, with particular reference to the 1993 Apology Resolution.\(^{77}\) This resolution, which also passed through Congress and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton, acknowledged and apologized for the 1893 overthrow.\(^{78}\) The Apology includes an important disclaimer: “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.”\(^{79}\) This acknowledgment without an immediate attempt at rectification was nonetheless something of a victory for Native Hawaiians, coming on the heels of many rallies in 1993 commemorating and reinvigorating the resistance that never died out during the 100 years since Hawai‘i’s overthrow. Many Kanaka Maoli scholars and activists recognized it as a starting point towards justice.\(^{80}\) Although the Akaka Bill also includes the disclaimer that “Nothing in this Act is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States,” (amended in the 2009 version to add, “or to affect the rights of the Native Hawaiian people under international law”) the Akaka Bill does ostensibly pick up where the Apology Resolution left off. It is precisely the terms on which the Akaka Bill seems to be a settlement of claims that make the legislation unacceptable to many, and require a closer examination.

The content of the Akaka Bill is largely an outline of bureaucratic offices that the legislation would establish. These include an “Office of Special Trustee for Native Hawaiian Affairs” in the Department of the Interior, a “Native Hawaiian Interagency


\(^{78}\) *To Acknowledge the 100\(^{th}\) Anniversary of the Jan. 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii…*, Public Law 103-150, 103\(^{rd}\) Cong., 2\(^{nd}\) sess. (23 Nov. 1993).

\(^{79}\) Ibid.

\(^{80}\) Trask, *From a Native Daughter*. 
Task Force” composed primarily of officials from “each Federal agency that establishes or implements policies that affect Native Hawaiians,” and a “Native Hawaiian Interim Governing Council, for the organization of a Native Hawaiian Governing Body.” The major task of the Native Hawaiian Interim Governing Council would be to establish a roll delineating the “adult members of the Native Hawaiian community who wish to participate in the reorganization of a Native Hawaiian governing body.” While the legislation is careful to state that the proposed Governing Body will eventually be granted the rights to establishing their own criteria for Native Hawaiian membership—the most radical provision of the bill—the initial roll includes those who can prove they are:

(A) the adult members of the Native Hawaiian community who wish to become members of a Native Hawaiian governing body and who are the lineal descendents of the aboriginal, indigenous, native people who resided in the islands that now comprise the State of Hawaii on January, 1, 1893, and who exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian archipelago, including the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii, as evidenced by (but not limited to)—

i. genealogical records;
   ii. Native Hawaiian kupuna (elders) verification or affidavits;
   iii. church or census records; or
   iv. government birth or death certificates or other vital statistics records; and

(B) the children of the adult members listed on the roll prepared under this subsection.

What is notable here is that the Akaka Bill attempts to sidestep issues of blood quantum that the federal government itself helped to sediment through previous acts, especially through the Hawaiian Homestead Commission Act of 1920 which limited leases to

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82 Ibid., 21-22
Native Hawaiians with verifiable 50% or more Native Hawaiian blood. Legacies from blood quantum policies have produced contentious racialized and gendered divides, the subject of battles within and without courts (an important topic that I return to in Chapter 2). The Akaka Bill thus does not specify a minimum ‘fraction’ of belonging but it does require some verifiable, genealogical link. It limits initial membership in the Native Hawaiian governing body to “the lineal descendents of the aboriginal, indigenous, native people” residing in Hawai‘i at the time of the 1893 overthrow. However, simply because it remains linked to definitions of “aboriginal, indigenous, native,” (no matter how loosely defined in contrast to blood quantum restrictions) the Akaka Bill has drawn consistent attacks from the Republican right, alleging that the creation of “race-based” governments in the U.S. is fundamentally unconstitutional. The Bill’s supporters point opponents to the existence of Native American governments as precedent.

The other main conservative argument against the Akaka Bill is the possibility of casino development by Native Hawaiians in Hawai‘i, under the same federal laws that allow gaming for Native American tribes. The concern over casino rights is a conservative attack borrowed from similar attacks on Native American tribes with gaming rights in the mainland United States, a strategy used, for example, by politicians like Arnold Schwarzenegger, who boosted his election campaign to become California governor by proclaiming he would not pander to “Indian casino tribes play[ing] money politics in Sacramento.” This scare was raised locally along two fronts—first, gambling is illegal in Hawai‘i and there was fear that the Akaka Bill would change this state law

83 Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood.
but limit gambling rights to Native Hawaiians; and secondly, this new casino market would compete with established tourism venues in Hawai‘i. This line of opposition led the legislation to be revised in 2006 with a clause pointedly outlawing casinos:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Native Hawaiian governing entity to conduct gaming activities under the authority of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.).

This change did little to quell Republican opposition. However, likely because of the drastically changed power dynamics in Congress after the 2008 election, this clause has been dropped in the early February 2009 version of the Bill. An editorial in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin suggested that dropping the clause was key to Native Hawaiians achieving justice. Tellingly, however, the Star-Bulletin’s support of gaming rights for Native Hawaiians locates the exercise of those rights outside of the state:

Tribes received nearly $30 billion in casino revenue in 2006, according to the National Indian Gaming Association. The Akaka Bill could provide a lucrative source of revenue to Hawaiians by opening casinos in mainland states that allow gambling. The federal regulatory act does not allow such activity by tribes in states, including Hawaii, where gambling is illegal and should remain that way.

Justice for Native Hawaiians here curiously requires fueling, rather than making efforts to reverse, the Native Hawaiian diaspora to the mainland United States by positing establishment of casinos in the states where it is legal as Hawaiians’ best opportunity. This vision for Native Hawaiians’ future contrasts seriously with most Kanaka Maoli epistemologies that rely on a connection with (not necessarily ownership of) the land of the Hawaiian Islands, an epistemology that Noenoe Silva, among many others, refers to as aloha ‘āina (literally, ‘love of/care for the land’). The vision of outsourcing Native

Hawaiian casinos also requires Kanaka Maoli to further participate in the American settler state project by quite directly settling in Native American lands and competing with Native American casinos. The back-and-forth nature of the gambling issue was revealed again when the Bill’s reintroduction to Congress in March 2009 included the text of the 2006 ban, thus making the issue of casinos in Hawai‘i or the U.S. mainland moot once again.\(^\text{87}\)

A key point on which the Akaka Bill remains silent is, in fact, the issue of land rights in Hawai‘i, which could possibly provide, like Native American reservations or the land rights given to Alaska Native corporations, a more meaningful base for sustaining Native Hawaiian communities. Haunani-Kay Trask addressed this oversight, which she saw replicated even in pro/con debates around the bill, and not reflective of the concerns of a broad Native Hawaiian community:

Hawaiians need to be included in the federal policy on recognized native nations on our own terms….

What Hawaiians need is power: the power to reclaim ceded lands,\(^\text{88}\) all entitlements that accompany them, and substantive recognition as a self-governing nation.

In other words, Hawaiians need sovereignty on our own land base in our own country run by our own elected representatives. We do not need the latest version of a paper nation railroaded by the congressional delegation and their hand-picked Hawaiian collaborators. Hawaiians must oppose the current Akaka bill. If passed, it will be the death knell of any native claim to land and self-government.\(^\text{89}\)


\(^{88}\) As mentioned in the introduction, ‘ceded’ lands (which many prefer to refer to as ‘seized’ lands) are those 1.8 million acres in Hawai‘i formerly owned by the Hawaiian monarchy and since the overthrow held in trust by the U.S. and state governments.

\(^{89}\) Haunani-Kay Trask, “Pro, con articles on Akaka Bill fail to address land issues.” *Honolulu Advertiser*. 2 May 2004.
Haunani-Kay Trask thus represents one of the many radical Kanaka Maoli sovereignty leaders who advocate rejecting not just the Akaka Bill as proposed but the very terms upon which the Akaka Bill rests. She argues instead for “recognized native nations on our own terms,” which can be addressed by federal policy but not as a tokenized “paper nation” that enacts no substantive changes to Native Hawaiian communities. As I will discuss more in depth later, Trask and one of the groups she is associated with, Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i, argue that the proper venue for Native Hawaiian recognition is at the international, not the U.S. national, level.

To many Kanaka Maoli then, like Trask, CNHA leaders are the minority of “hand-picked Hawaiian collaborators” that the government has chosen to negotiate with. Mohawk scholar and activist Taiakake Alfred sees what he terms “self-government” projects, such as the Akaka Bill, being advanced by settler state governments and a privileged segment of indigenous communities, as a systemic problem plaguing Mohawk communities and beyond:

In most cases, these agreements create new bureaucracies and put in place new levels and forms of government based on the colonial model, or new capitalist relationships with non-indigenous business partners. These new arrangements benefit a few people, mainly elected officials, entrepreneurs, lawyers, consultants, and, to a much lesser extent, the people who staff the various structures. … This is not to begrudge the fact that some of us have gained the education and skills needed to secure jobs or create businesses…. But in the midst of all the apparent progress, there is a nagging sense among many people that something is wrong even with these supposed solutions…. It is the sinking feeling that political power and money, the things we’ve worked so hard to achieve, are still not going to be enough to liberate us from our present reality.90

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Alfred’s book, *Wasáse*, quoted here, is a powerful manifesto urging Onkwehonwe (the Mohawk word for original people) to resist collaborating with “Settlers” in these “new bureaucracies.” While he acknowledges the benefits such new forms of government may hold for those who lead and staff such structures, he also urges indigenous people to confront the fact that these are “paths of least resistance,” which continue to ignore the damages still being perpetuated upon native communities.\(^91\) The redemption Alfred offers is in cultivating courageous indigenous pathways. Particularly, he champions the warrior ethos and practice he calls *Wasáse*, which will ideally support “an indigenous cultural foundation… and intellectual base upon which to build a challenge to the empire.”\(^92\)

*Wasáse* brings up a very gendered referent for the native subject (which Alfred also acknowledges) that I will turn to analyzing in the next chapter. Here it is important to note that I find Alfred’s particular conception of warrior-ness less compelling than his forceful repudiation of “new bureaucracies” and his ability to link these contemporary “self-government” initiatives sponsored by settler states as a new wave of colonization. While the Akaka Bill has been tailored to the specific historical and contemporary context of Native Hawaiians, the processes fueling the Akaka Bill are drawn much more broadly from global contexts. While this foregoing section has laid out an overview of the Akaka Bill and the many types of discourse and action it has spurred, many questions remain. Many aspects of both the Akaka Bill and CNHA’s agenda remain vague. Would the Akaka Bill really be nothing more than, as Haunani-Kay Trask terms it, a “paper nation”? For if, as Alfred quite convincingly writes, new bureaucracies will do little to

\(^91\) Ibid., 40
\(^92\) Ibid., 56
decolonize the worlds indigenous people inhabit, how then do these bureaucracies and their native proponents persist in advancing such programs? Knowing how to undo such shifts first requires tracking how empire in the contemporary moment has developed new technologies, and if colonialism has not exactly changed, how it has been repackaged. Such tracking necessitates a larger frame of analysis than those generally applied to Hawai‘i. In the next sections, I begin to relate the issues of race, citizenship and indigeneity at play in the Akaka Bill, CNHA, and Native Hawaiian sovereignty more generally to Hawai‘i’s position in a global-historical frame.

Situating Native Hawaiians Globally and Historically

Hawai‘i has been over-determined by a history and ongoing presence of U.S. settler colonialism to the extent that, as the quotes I began this chapter with and the overview of the intricacies of the Akaka Bill explained above demonstrate, Native Hawaiian political and cultural subjectivities are constantly shaped in relation to, or in distinction from, American ones. A central problem in analyzing these subject formations emerges from this same over-determination. In paying quite necessary attention to the extensive history of violent epistemological and material shifts enacted variously by business interests, culturally driven ideologies, and governmental policies, all shaped in and by the U.S., the U.S. remains a seemingly unshakeable referent. This creates U.S.-determined temporal and geographical boundaries that make it difficult to assess the situation of Native Hawaiians within the inter-related processes of global capitalism that continue to shape Hawai‘i and the U.S. in drastically uneven ways. As Cedric Robinson writes, limiting a study’s perspective to national boundaries of time and space is to
mistake the “ordering of things,” chronologically or spatially, for the autonomous “order of things.” How can these bounded frames be unlearned and, in a meaningful and lasting sense, undisciplined?

The answer in Robinson’s case, as he tracked the aggregation of a global Black radical tradition, was to understand that the “institution of American slave labor could not be effectively conceptualized as a thing in and of itself.” Instead, he situated slavery as “a particular historical development for world capitalism.” For him, this approach not only reflected macro-processes at the level of finance capital or international political battles, but the “lived legacies” of Black people. More recently, Denise da Silva has formulated a broader critical intervention into all studies of race, nation, and culture by positing a framework of global-historical analysis:

Throughout the twentieth century, under the rule of the principle of nationality, I contend, both former European colonial powers and the others of Europe (on the American continent, in the colonies of Asia and Africa, and in other areas never under official colonial subjection) deployed the historical signifier (the nation) and the global signifiers (the racial and the cultural) to write their particular version of the subject of transcendent poesis. Neither the citizen, the “individual,” … nor the national subject… can describe them because the political things inhabiting the contemporary global configuration are global/historical subjects.

Crucially, Silva emphasizes that the impact of such a global-historical approach beyond only national or universal ‘human’ frames is not to produce and celebrate “better historicity” but to use historical materialism towards a “critique of modern thought, a

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94 Ibid., 200
95 Ibid., 200
delineation of a social ontology that more productively challenges both the *scene of regulation* … and the *scene of representation*.”

In relation to my own study, CNHA’s support for the Akaka Bill is styled upon the scene of regulation in the sense that CNHA is arguing for regulatory adjustments: formal, legal and bureaucratic justice (its own “self-government” and thus its own national-historic signifier). This is a call for better historicity (that is, in this case, recognition and redress of past injustice), which is not unique to CNHA, though other Native Hawaiian claims have radically different conceptions of just what “better historicity” would require. However, CNHA’s project also heavily depends on logics developed on the scene of representation—CNHA’s proclaimed need for “Fourth World”

Native Hawaiian culture and race to find a place at the First World table. Thus, CNHA’s ultimate goal of gaining a national-historic signifier (a Native Hawaiian self-government) is inextricable from a goal of reformatting Native Hawaiian racial and cultural signifiers so they can finally inhabit the transcendental, transparent subjectivity which has been wielded against them for so long.

To take seriously Silva’s critique requires, then, more than attention only to the pitfalls of the formal, macro-political and economic processes in which CNHA is a participant and agent. It requires also tracking the ways in which racialized and multicultural projects are used, in ways both obvious and subtle, and by white and Asian settlers as much as Native Hawaiians themselves. The next section begins, therefore, with an account of neoliberalism developed in the late twentieth century. Neoliberalism has

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97 Ibid., 187
98 Indigenous scholars such as Jace Weaver have theorized the position of Native Americans as inhabiting a “Fourth World”—that is an overlooked “Third World” which inhabits the same space as the “First World.” (Weaver 2005).
created and substantially structured the projects of NGOs like CNHA through the employment of global/historical signifiers including racial, cultural and gendered signifiers in addition to the national ones. From there I move towards placing CNHA more specifically within the history of indigenous activism and settler state policies, which as I will show, is now inextricable from this same rise of transnational neoliberalism. I argue that the impacts of CNHA policies, illumined by this comparative global frame, are poised to re-configure not only Native Hawaiian lives and identities, but also broader understandings of both citizenship and indigeneity.

Neoliberalism’s Expedient Culture

While neoliberalism has become a label sometimes indiscriminately used in a variety of contexts, the formulation of ‘third way’ neoliberalism that this study finds most salient was first and most openly described by Anthony Giddens, in reference to Tony Blair and the New Labour Party, in 1998. Giddens in fact distinguishes the ‘third way’ from both the social democratic, leftist tradition of the ‘old’ Labour Party and the neoliberal, conservative politics of Margaret Thatcher (and Ronald Reagan in the U.S.). To Giddens at the end of the twentieth century, following what he sees as “the dissolution of the ‘welfare consensus’ that dominated in the industrial countries up to the late 1970s,” the essential political project of the time for Western-styled democracies is to show how “political idealism” can be revived through creating collaboration between the left and right.99 The key agent in this ‘third way’ solution is civil society. Domestically, civil

society is hailed as the arena in which the excesses of welfare are better managed through a “social investment state.” Internationally, Giddens argues for the concurrent development of a global civil society in place of the ruling system of often-warring nation states. To check the “self-interest” of states dominating the world market, “global laissez-faire” must be curbed and regulated through the expansion of “cosmopolitan democracy …[as] a condition for effectively regulating the world economy, attacking global economic inequalities and controlling ecological risks.”

Lisa Duggan aptly describes this third way approach as attempting to represent “a kind of nonpolitics—a way of being reasonable.”

Many scholars and activists have observed that the impact of the ‘third way’ ideology found in the policies of leaders like Tony Blair and Bill Clinton have realigned forces not only in the political sphere but in the so-called cultural sphere, and in these spheres’ relation, as well. George Yúdice argues powerfully that “the role of culture has expanded in an unprecedented way into the political and economic at the same time that conventional notions of culture largely have been emptied out.” Yúdice thus tracks, with a much more critical eye, the consequences of Giddens’ new global civil society through a particular look at the proliferation of funding, advocacy and other newly institutionalized support of ‘culture.’ Yúdice sees this new utility of culture as resource or expedient epitomizes the emergence of a new episteme in which culture:

is called on to resolve a range of problems for community, which seems only to be able to recognize itself in culture, which in turn has lost its specificity. Consequently, culture and community are caught in a circular,
tautological reasoning…. In our era, representations of and claims to cultural difference are expedient insofar as they multiply commodities and empower communities.  

Yúdice thus points out that contrary to what may be expected of the ‘shrinking state,’ in many ways, third way neoliberalism has created more funding opportunities for cultural organizations. Yet distinctly, this “notion of culture as a resource entails its management, a view that was not characteristic of either high culture or everyday culture in the anthropological sense.”

The specific managing agents of what Yúdice terms expedient culture are commonly recognized as the internationally prevalent NGO (non-governmental organization; more commonly referred to as the non-profit in the U.S.). While NGOs have many critics, Yúdice critiques “absolutist” stances like those taken by Hardt and Negri declaring all NGOs the “mendicant orders of Empire,” emphasizing the existence of NGOs who strategically work within this new ‘global’ civil society, “to take the money and run.”  

Sonia Alvarez makes a similarly complicated critique of the international NGO boom, through an embedded and implicated perspective having participated in a variety of work done with feminist NGOs, and funding agencies such as the Ford Foundation, in Latin America. Alvarez highlights the central role NGOs have played in articulating “social movement webs—the capillary connections among feminists and their sympathizers who now occupy a wide variety of social and political locations.” The danger in her eyes is not the multifaceted NGO boom in and of itself,

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103 Ibid., 25  
104 Ibid., 4  
but the increasing demand for NGOs’ to act as technical advisors to inter-governmental organizations (state and international bodies like the United Nations). Accordingly:

the more professionalized, technically adept NGOs seem to have become privileged interlocutors of States and IGOs on gender policy matters. In pronouncing them intermediaries, neoliberal governments effectively have circumvented the need to establish public forums or other democratic mechanisms through which those most affected by gender policies might directly voice their needs and concerns…. NGOs and other women’s movement organizations openly critical of government incumbents are seldom among the States’ designated ‘partners’ in the implementation of gender and social welfare programs.¹⁰⁷

The force of these developments, Alvarez argues, is to “de-hybridize” NGOs into specialized functions that have little direct dialogue with the communities they purport to serve.

Indigenous social movements, just as Alvarez traces with international feminist organizing, have been heavily impacted since at least the 1990s by the same third way state policies and the resulting NGO boom that Giddens, Yúdice and Alvarez trace. Ronald Niezen historicizes the international indigenous movement, noting the particular importance of NGOs in the push for indigenous rights at the level of the U.N. and similar international organizations. He notes that:

the rise of an indigenous “middle class” as an epiphenomenon of assimilation policies would have had little effect if indigenous leaders had continued to be institutionally marginalized, working within compliant or controlled tribal governments or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, radicalized but often suppressible protest groups. The postwar era has, however, seen the florescence of another kind of entity almost tailor-made for international indigenous politics. In recent decades nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increased in numbers almost exponentially….¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 194
Niezen’s assessment of NGOs as “almost tailor-made for international indigenous politics” is an important one, as it fits well with Yúdice’s analysis of NGOs managing culture as political expedient. Indigenous people are still to many the pure embodiment of “culture,” and their historic management by settler colonial states (the classic “ward of the state” relation) positions many indigenous people precisely as cultural commodities to be preserved for state ends. However, due to the varied and creative ways that indigenous people shape international politics, the NGO boom, as Alvarez argues in her own case study, is not simply a re-instantiation of the colonization of the world’s indigenous people. While international indigenous politics is, as Niezen argues, largely a very recent and top-down formula for political alliances, UN meetings and other venues like it, “nevertheless provide mundane venues for the expression of extravagant hope.”109

The impact of these global reconfigurations of relations between states and civil society, the role of the proliferating NGO, culture as resource rather than “for itself,” and the internationalization of identities like feminist and indigenous fall unevenly across nations and communities. There is much work left to do in understanding these uneven impacts in a variety of contexts, and this thesis focuses on understanding how these neoliberal forces have shaped contemporary Native Hawaiian political and cultural fields. A key question that arises for this study, then, is how does this ‘new’ third way neoliberalism reformulate relations of indigenous-settler citizenship? Are policies aimed at, in Giddens’ terms, fostering “cosmopolitan democracy” and greater global governance, for example, imagining a different kind of (inter)national sovereignty and subjects? If so, to what ends, and to what extent have such visions been successfully

109 Ibid., 25
realized? Yúdice suggests that though third way rhetoric has spurred a wave of cultural rights movements, “cultural rights are the ‘Cinderellas of the human rights family’ because their definition is still ambiguous… Moreover, even though cultural rights refer to collectivities, the individual rights of members of such collectivities have priority.” The push to make cultural rights ‘justiciable,’ as Yúdice terms it, on par with firmly institutionalized economic rights requires a reconfiguration of culture. Culture is recognized legally only when translated into an economic, self-determined, empowered (away from welfare) version. Thus Yúdice is able to speak to notions of consumer citizenship in which ‘multiculturalists’ find “it is possible to play the game of citizenship through the medium of consumption, not only of commodities but, more important, of representations.” In the next section, I return to CNHA as a particular example of a managerial NGO which has, rather successfully, attempted to translate Native Hawaiian cultural rights into economic ones. CNHA’s success in the game of consumer citizenship, however, has not gone uncontested and is only one part of the picture in how neoliberalism and internationalization of indigenous and cultural rights have impacted Native Hawaiians.

CNHA Amidst the Indigenous NGO Boom

While the global NGO boom described by Alvarez and the international indigenous movement described by Niezen above both have clearly shaped the fields of the Native Hawaiian social movement, how CNHA fits in these contexts is not self-
evident and requires some careful consideration. While undeniably part of the globalized third way neoliberal ideology that continues to shape the contemporary moment, CNHA very consciously styles itself to a U.S. national, not an international, audience. This contrasts sharply with other segments of the organized Kanaka Maoli community. How then are we to understand and analyze both the possibilities and pitfalls enabled by neoliberalism across the Native Hawaiian political spectrum? Alvarez helpfully analyzes the feminist movement in Latin America drawing on Mansbridge’s understanding that:

the feminist movement… is neither an aggregation of organizations nor an aggregation of individual members but a discourse. It is a set of changing, contested aspirations and understandings that provide conscious goals, cognitive backing, and emotional support for each individual’s evolving feminist identity.\footnote{Jane Mansbridge “What is the Feminist Movement?” (Feminist Organizations, Myra Marx Ferree and Patricia Yancey Martin, eds., 1995) quoted in Sonia Alvarez, “The Latin American Feminist NGO ‘Boom,’” International Feminist Journal of Politics 1.2 (1999) 185.}

It is first important to realize that CNHA does not, as it nonetheless claims, represent a democratic sampling of the “changing, contested aspirations and understandings” that constitute the contemporary Native Hawaiian political movement. However, CNHA is coming to resignify the field of Native Hawaiian political discourse, just as Alvarez suggests of other NGOs in her own context, emptying it of the dialectically changing and contested goals and identities, into a narrow discourse about American citizenship. How does CNHA manage to do this, and what other models of Native Hawaiian organizing are being eclipsed?

While many non-profits have no choice but to strategically learn the neoliberal “non-politics” language of government and foundation grantors, “third way” rhetoric is deeply integrated into CNHA’s political agenda, showcased at its annual convention and
in its constant political advocacy at state and federal levels. One unfamiliar with the more contentious aspects of CNHA’s agenda may find nothing particularly objectionable, for example, in its stated philosophy:

At CNHA our mission is to focus on the needs of our member organizations and community organizations all across the state and country that tap into and lift up Hawaiian culture as a strength and solution to the community development challenges of our people.\footnote{Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement’s 7th Annual Native Hawaiian Convention program booklet (2008), 72.}

Even when forced to be less vague about the actual practices it engages in, CNHA seeks to present all of its claims as neutral, for the uncontested good of the ‘community.’ For example, at the top of every policy recommendation page in its Policy Roundtable and Town Hall booklet, distributed at a session of the same name at the 2008 Native Hawaiian convention, is the bold title: “Working Together.” However, the agents in this working relationship are described more specifically in the content of the policy recommendations as primarily: the Hawai‘i state and U.S. federal governments, the Department of Hawaiian Homelands, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, financial institution sponsors like Freddie Mac, and Native Hawaiian small businesses.\footnote{“2008 Policy Roundtable & Town Hall” booklet, 3-6.} The entire rest of the Native Hawaiian population is apparently represented by CNHA itself. Thus while helping ‘our community’ is continuously invoked, the specifics of CNHA’s plans are either de-emphasized or staged as the only, most ‘reasonable’ way. It is, as Duggan puts it, to challenge potential detractors with the question: “Who could be against greater wealth and more democracy?”\footnote{Duggan, 10}
Duggan persuasively argues for an understanding of this brand of neoliberalism as not only a style of “economic and trade policy” but also crucially a cultural politics. While contradictory and contested, the key cultural terms of neoliberalism, privatization and personal responsibility, have often been successful in gaining support for neoliberal economic visions. Duggan cites welfare “reform” as one of the most striking examples wherein legislative policies such as the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA):

… emerged from decades of efforts to erode New Deal welfare state programs, especially AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children], through the deployment of images of sexually promiscuous, lazy welfare queens breeding for the profit of an ever-enlarging welfare check. The specific neoliberal spin on this cultural project was the removal of explicitly racist, misogynist language and images, and the substitution of the language and values of privatization and personal responsibility.\(^{117}\)

CNHA’s version of this neoliberal culture may differ slightly in the sense that it officially emphasizes ‘group’ responsibility: Native Hawaiians ‘working together.’ While CNHA admits that Native Hawaiians suffer many socioeconomic disadvantages in Hawai‘i, they use such statistics to further partnerships with corporations and government programs that will give Hawaiians a ‘place at the table.’ Sessions at the CNHA convention emphasized, however, that Native Hawaiians must work to earn this place—for example, Christopher Dawson, president of the Native Hawaiian Organizations Association (NHOA),\(^{118}\) told the audience at the Business Leaders Roundtable: “You’re not going to get a contract just because you’re Native Hawaiian.” The rest of the session was geared

\(^{117}\) Duggan, 16

\(^{118}\) NHOA represents Native Hawaiian small businesses that operate under the federal Small Business Administration 8(a) program, a provision that allows for-profit businesses to operate under non-profit ones to promote minority economic development. The 8(a) program has focused on the “special needs and obligations of federally recognized American Indian Tribes and Alaska Native Corporations (ANC)” since the 1980s, and was amended in Congress to include “Native Hawaiian Organizations” in 2002.
towards learning how to talk to contractors without using such entitled language. To 
return to Yúdice’s understanding of culture as expedient in neoliberal civil society, while 
there is more of a market available to fund ‘cultural rights’ projects, these must still be 
translated into justiciable language of individualized economic rights. The emphasis on 
personal responsibility within collective empowerment is part of this translation.

CNHA’s “third way” approach does resonate with many Native Hawaiians, even 
those who are otherwise opposed to the CNHA agenda. For example, Andrew 
Yamamoto, a Native Hawaiian who works at a Native Hawaiian non-profit and regularly 
attends the CNHA convention, told me in an interview:

I think that in the kind of culture we live in, and economy and society we 
live in, we do need to make money somehow. And you know, that’s why 
I’m kind of torn…. I feel for Hawaiians who say they want to kick all the 
haoles out and create a traditional Hawaiian society, but at the same time, 
I realize that one, I never want to live under a monarchy [laughs], and two, 
we’d be completely screwed if we didn’t actually have a First World 
economy…. we need the money. It’s kind of this grey area where I think 
we need it, but on the other hand, I don’t think that’s enough reason to 
settle on it as the best option. CNHA just seemed like a giant talking head, 
just spouting that. 119

Yamamoto’s ambivalence about CNHA and its annual convention was chiefly in its lack 
of space for debate and discussion than in what he nevertheless identified as a site over-
full with corporate sponsors and political ties. He emphasized many times that “we do 
need to make money,” and identified CNHA as one of the only Native Hawaiian 
organizations that recognized that, in contrast to more “traditional Hawaiians” who only 
“say they want to kick all the haoles out.” While he does not reference it specifically 
here, we spoke only a few months after a sovereignty group had occupied ‘Iolani Palace,

119 Andrew Yamamoto is a pseudonym, used to protect his identity and emphasize the mediation of my 
reading of his views rather than the totality of his own. For more on my methodological approach, please 
see the Introduction.
the site of the Hawaiian monarchy’s overthrow and Queen Lili‘uokalani’s imprisonment in 1893, proclaiming their right to be recognized by state and federal governments as an operating Native Hawaiian government.\textsuperscript{120} In contrast to this occupation and others like it, which are consistently ridiculed in local media, CNHA successfully represents itself as a more reasonable alternative, even to those like Yamamoto who worry about how undemocratic their political agenda may be.

It is important not to overstate, however, what may seem like CNHA’s ability to complete a totalizing defamation of other parts of the Native Hawaiian political movement. While there are many contesting and varied groups that make up the Kanaka Maoli social and political sphere, I want to focus here on contrasting CNHA to one of the other most recognized Native Hawaiian political organizations, Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i (literally ‘The Hawaiian Nation’). Founded in 1987 by a large group of Kanaka Maoli including activist-scholars such as Mililani Trask (one of the first leaders), Ka Lāhui became well known in the early 1990s, as part of several events that energized the sovereignty movement around 1993, the year marking the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Hawai‘i’s overthrow by American businessmen. Ka Lāhui enrolled 18,000 Kānaka Maoli into a governmental structure “generally based on the American democratic model with four branches: executive, legislative, judicial, and \textit{Ali‘i Nui} (High Chiefs). The latter have no voting power, but merely advise on matters of traditional protocol.”\textsuperscript{121} Proposing a “Nation within a Nation” relationship that consciously draws parallels with many Native

American nations with the U.S., Ka Lāhui thus sees itself as seating a government in exile and on this basis attends U.N. meetings to advocate for Native Hawaiians.

Like CNHA, the institutional conditions of possibility for Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i’s emergence can be located within the same neoliberal and internationalizing structures I have described above. Yet Ka Lāhui is positioned quite differently, and links more directly to the international indigenous movement described by Niezen. To Niezen, the emergent international indigenous movement is a process in which: “Indigenism involves reinvigoration of the comfort and color of local traditions with the safety-in-numbers effect of a global movement.”¹²² He goes on to note that:

> The most common goals of indigenous peoples are not so much individual-oriented racial equality and liberation within a national framework as the affirmation of their collective rights, recognition of their sovereignty, and emancipation through the exercise of power.¹²³

This framework of international indigenous solidarity and the strategic leveraging of international coalitions to critique nation state policies that damage indigenous rights is precisely what Ka Lāhui Hawai‘i adopted in the 1990s to increase their visibility. For example, in 1993, Ka Lāhui was instrumental in convening an International People’s Tribunal (Ka Ho‘okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli). The Tribunal operated in the tradition of the Russell Tribunal, organized in 1966 to investigate American war crimes in Vietnam by philosophers Bertrand Russell and John-Paul Sartre. The findings by the Kanaka Maoli Tribunal Komike (Committee), for whom the judges were drawn internationally

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¹²² Niezen, 13
¹²³ Ibid., 18
and represented a variety of indigenous activists and scholars, indicted the U.S. on several counts including acts of genocide and ethnocide against the Kanaka Maoli.\textsuperscript{124}

While CNHA strategically highlights alliances and comparisons between Native Hawaiians, Native Americans and Alaskan Natives, CNHA does not position itself among the same international indigenous movement that Ka Lāhui does because its interests lie in fostering a relationship directly with the U.S. state. Where Ka Lāhui has become something analogous to what would in Alvarez’s terms be a technical-expert NGO in relation to international bodies like the U.N., Alvarez’s analysis does not entirely fit Ka Lāhui because its members, and some outsiders, understand the organization as a government with enrolled citizens, not just a NGO. By contrast, CNHA does not currently operate as a government (though this picture becomes more complicated as CNHA’s involvement with the Akaka Bill is examined) and openly embraces its role as a technical-expert NGO in its relation with corporate sponsors and the Hawai‘i state and U.S. federal governments. The final section continues to question in what ways citizenship is being reformulated through both CNHA’s and Ka Lāhui’s national and international positioning, specifically through a look at how CNHA imagines Native citizenship as enabled by the Akaka Bill.

\textbf{CNHA and the Alaska Federation of Natives}

Anne Keala Kelly, a Kanaka Maoli journalist and documentary filmmaker, is one of the few to attempt to critically and thoroughly interrogate CNHA’s agenda and

\textsuperscript{124} Churchill and Venne, eds., \textit{Islands in Captivity: The International Tribunal on the Rights of Indigenous Hawaiians}. 
practices in Hawai‘i’s local media and the U.S. national media. While widely known and remarked upon that CNHA leaders Robin and Jade Danner lived for many years in Alaska, Kelly was the first to publicly question the institutional and business ties CNHA cultivated with the Alaskan Federation of Natives and related Alaskan businesses. In 2003, she published an article titled, “The Alaska–Hawaii Connection: How Inupiat, Gwich’in, and Native Hawaiian Power Bases Impact Both ANWR and Native Hawaiian Federal Recognition” in *Native Americas* journal. She writes:

This story is … a peak behind the curtain of how the Alaska oil industry's efforts have secretly stepped into the Hawaiian community to secure Senator Akaka's support for drilling in the Refuge. And it's about how a multi-national Alaska Native corporation, flush with oil money and tied to Senator Akaka, has tried to convince the Hawaiian people to simultaneously oppose the Gwich’in people, who are fighting to keep drilling out of the Refuge, and accept the Akaka Bill. That bill could ultimately leave the Hawaiians as politically powerless as the Gwich’in….  

Kelly’s article is a call-to-attention urging readers to recognize and oppose the Congressional political deals she sees being sedimented between oil-drilling on Alaskan Native lands and the Akaka Bill legislation. While her critique is a much needed one since CNHA is often taken uncritically as the representative voice of all Native Hawaiians, her work has also been taken up by some towards fueling a critique of CNHA as a top-down conspiracy. For example, a website entitled, “CNHA Exposed! What is the CNHA Secret Agenda?” has republished Kelly works and asks:

- Why is CNHA plotting to engineer a Native Hawaiian governing entity?

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126 With her permission, though with the disclaimer: “Authors of articles on this site have no connection to the website itself other than having given permission to reproduce their work.”
• Do you honestly think Native Alaskan Corporations are helping to pay for this just because they like you?

• Why does the CNHA want you to be a ward of the US government as are federal prisoners and “recognized” Native Americans?¹²⁷

This heightened ‘conspiracy’ rhetoric makes sense when we consider, as the discussion about CNHA’s “third way” rhetoric showed above, how effectively CNHA has represented itself in public media, to the unwavering support of Hawai‘i’s politicians, as the ‘reasonable’ voice of Native Hawaiians. Some Native Hawaiians feel that there is little recourse to changing CNHA’s image in the face of how powerful they have become through political and corporate sponsors. Another interview participant described to me a protest they mounted against one of CNHA’s annual conventions, which was quickly shut down by CNHA calling the police.

These critiques citing secret conspiracies formulated between CNHA, the Akaka Bill, and all the other indigenous and Congressional politics to which each is tied, tend to represent CNHA, members of the U.S. Congress, and oil companies intent on drilling in Alaska as a monolithic, undefeatable force gathering against Native Hawaiians. However, these alliances are contingent, not self-evident, and deeper critique is needed. To return to the context of neoliberal re-structuring of politics and culture described above, we must recognize that it was only recently that such alliances have been forged this way. State and corporate institutions began discovering in the 1970s that indigenous people could be organized in NGOs and funded as cultural expedients towards “progress,” whether that progress is deemed oil drilling in Alaska or the now increasing use of the technical and cultural expertise of Native Hawaiians in tourism and other business interests in Hawai‘i.

These neoliberal policies flared up somewhat earlier in Alaska than in Hawai‘i, and thus it is worth briefly looking at the history of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) before considering further how and why CNHA models itself after AFN. Established in 1966, the AFN began as a group of over 400 Alaska Natives from 17 separate Alaska Native organizations that worked to achieve a land settlement with the U.S. government. The urgency of the land settlement was spurred by the discovery of oil in Alaska in 1968. AFN achieved their goal in 1971 with the federal passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which formally extinguished all Alaska Native land claims upon the U.S. government by transferring titles formerly owned by the federal government to 12 concurrently organized Alaska Native regional corporations and around 200 smaller village corporations. These corporations collectively received title to 44 million acres and a settlement of approximately $962,500,000. This was a remarkable political event, representing one of the largest U.S.-native settlements ever made.

However, like the conferral of casino gambling rights to many Native American tribes around the U.S., ANCSA has impacted different Native Alaskan tribes unevenly. Today, AFN is the statewide institution, governed by a 37-member elected board, which manages all Alaska Native corporations as members in the federation. AFN’s states its mission thus:

Alaska Native people began as members of full sovereign nations and continue to enjoy a unique political relationship with the federal government. We will survive and prosper as distinct ethnic and cultural groups and will participate fully as members of the overall society. The mission of AFN is to enhance and promote the cultural, economic and political voice of the entire Alaska Native community. AFN’s major goals are to:
• Advocate for Alaska Native people, their governments and organizations, with respect to federal, state and local laws;
• Foster and encourage preservation of Alaska Native cultures;
• Promote understanding of the economic needs of Alaska Natives and encourage development consistent with those needs;
• Protect, retain and enhance all lands owned by Alaska Natives and their organizations; and
• Promote and advocate for programs and systems which instill pride and confidence in individual Alaska Natives.  

This mission statement closely mirrors CNHA’s mission (as described above). Though CNHA does not have the formal, legal status of the AFN, they clearly speak the same neoliberal and “community development” language that emphasizes “economic needs,” cultural preservation and advocacy at the federal and state levels. Also noticeable is how the discourse of indigenous sovereignty is invoked but only as part of the Alaska Native past: “Alaska Native people began as members of full sovereign nations…” The extinguishment of Alaska Native claims through ANSCA undoubtedly benefited many Alaska Natives, but the price was effectively a termination of indigenous sovereignty, along similar lines to federal termination policies the U.S. pursued in the 1960s and 70s with other Native American tribes like the Klamath.  

It is precisely the threat of termination through a similar settlement of claims, though it is paradoxically labeled “federal recognition” and refuses to directly address land in the Native Hawaiian case, that cause many Kanaka Maoli to oppose the Akaka Bill. Nonetheless, CNHA actively pursues the passage of the Akaka Bill, with the equally active support of AFN, who is an official partner and sponsors CNHA’s annual convention. At the 2008 convention, several AFN leaders, including AFN president Julie

Kitka, were invited to speak at the Business Leaders Roundtable, an optional ‘break-out’ session that ran concurrently with an alternate ‘culture’ session in which participants practiced arts such as ti leaf basket-weaving (expert practitioners of business and culture apparently being mutually exclusive if interdependent). A featured Alaska Native speaker was Willie Iggiagruk Hensley, who was, in the dominant entrepreneurial ethos of the CNHA convention, promoting his newly published memoir, *Fifty Miles from Tomorrow: A Memoir of Alaska and the Real People*. Hensley was active in getting ANSCA passed, served for 20 years as the president of NANA Regional Corporation (one of the 12 main Alaska Native regional corporations), and is currently “Manager of the Federal Government Relations for Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, the organization that operates and maintains the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).” Along with his inspirational speech, urging the CNHA audience to keep up the fight (implicitly for the Akaka Bill), CNHA included with its handouts an article from *Indian Country Today*, proclaiming, “Sealaska infuses millions into southeast Alaska economy.”

Sealaska, another Alaska Native corporation, is heralded in the article for being “one of the largest for-profit, private-sector employers in the region [of southeast Alaska]” through both its timber corporation and its heritage institute. The message CNHA was sending was obviously that Native Hawaiians should follow the AFN model and thereby reap financial success. The very different historical, cultural and geographic contexts of Hawai‘i and Alaska were never addressed, however. At the same time as the convention, it was announced that the ‘ceded lands’ court case was being appealed to the Supreme

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130 “2008 Business Leaders Roundtable” booklet, CNHA.
Court—apparently Kanaka Maoli land claims are juridically settled rather than legislatively.

Where the Alaska claims were founded on and carried out through a division of oil rights, again, the crucial differences in context make the Akaka Bill and CNHA’s vision difficult to parse. What would CNHA have settled with the government for Native Hawaiians in place of oil rights which Hawai‘i does not have, and the land right claims made by the more radical sovereignty groups CNHA is careful to distance themselves from? The answer is unclear, perhaps because it is answerable in many different ways, such as the argument about casino rights made by the editorial staff at the Hawai‘i Star-Bulletin.

CNHA’s vision, I would argue, depends on the scene with which I opened this thesis, of the Hawaiian Tourism Authority agent welcoming the Native Hawaiian crowd home. Tourism is the most lucrative industry in Hawai‘i today, and though its revenues are too prized by the state and businesses that operate it to share with Native Hawaiians, CNHA imagines creating more savvy Native Hawaiian businessmen that will break into that sphere. Thus, the Akaka Bill and the racist opposition it attracts creates a diversion, a distracting measure that directs the field of discourse about the Akaka Bill away from both issues of land rights and military presence in Hawai‘i. This diversion serves not only the conservative Republicans who oppose land rights for Native Hawaiians, but moderate organizations like CNHA as well. For once the racist arguments against Native Hawaiians are rebutted, organizations like CNHA do little to interrogate the processes of militarization and capitalism that the Akaka Bill allows to continue. In fact, CNHA sees
the legislation as a chance for certain Native Hawaiians (namely, themselves) to better participate in that militarized and capitalist structure.

As Hakim Adi writes, this is another manifestation of the neoliberal “third way” claiming to mediate between ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ groups while “the reality has not been a radical break with the past but, rather, an adoption of all that is most backward at home and abroad.”¹³² The Akaka Bill participates in a notion of Native Hawaiian nationalism producing what Adi refers to, in other global contexts, as a ‘failed and failing state’—that is, indigenous nations could never be an equal member among the domination of First World nation states. The ‘solution’ to these failed states becomes another justification for intervention, just as the Akaka Bill is justified on the grounds of U.S. humanitarian and moral obligation to support indigenous self-determination but reinstates the power of the federal government to grant and limit these rights.

CNHA would have Native Hawaiians achieve economic self-determination, modeled after the corporative structure used by the Alaska Federation of Natives. Reading CNHA and the Akaka Bill as a key component of a new “imperial formation” that extends American empire through discourses of personal responsibility and empowerment is a starting point in understanding how to resist this “new imperialism.”¹³³ The fitting conclusion that Adi makes, “Monopoly capitalism remains alive, even if it is moribund,”¹³⁴ is an important reminder in deciding where more meaningful formations of indigenous sovereignty can intervene for Kanaka Maoli, rather than simply becoming new grounds on which the settler state intervenes. The next chapter takes a closer look at

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¹³⁴ Adi, 114
the micrological elements of power that instantiate imperialism in the very formation of Native Hawaiian subjects, through a look at the biopolitical splits spurred by the non-profit industrial complex and its colonial legacies, and particularly the roles of Native Hawaiian women.
CHAPTER TWO

Native Hawaiian Subjectivities:
Representation and Re-generation at CNHA and Beyond

Many speakers who can speak or, even more impressively, chant in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i (Hawaiian language) open their remarks by doing just that. “I went to Kam Schools before they had Hawaiian, so this is hard for me,” other speakers will note self-consciously, making the audience laugh, before they also attempt an introduction in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i. Still, participants generally identify themselves as Hawaiian not Kanaka Maoli. Literally meaning, ‘the real people,’ Kanaka Maoli has become increasingly used as a self-identification, along with the revitalization of ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i and the sovereignty movement over the past few decades. The first person I hear use it at the CNHA convention is a haole (white, literally, “foreigner”) university professor, who also argues that no matter the imperfect fit of such language, Kanaka Maoli are Native American, for the strategic purposes of survival in the U.S. legislative and justice system.

Some seemingly expert ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i speakers argue that popular notions of some Hawaiian catch phrases must be corrected. For example, one kumu (elder and teacher) tells us that “Kū mau mau” (a phrase popularly and powerfully chanted at protests and sovereignty rallies as a cry to fight against state power) has been “misused and abused.” She cites the phrase as originating in a chant that workers used as they labored to fell huge koa trees. The lesson is not to fight each other but to work together. She guides the audience through a rehearsal of a few chants printed in the conference booklets.

—from convention field notes, Sept. 30 2008

This chapter begins with some echoes, and a slight shift in vision. The foregoing excerpt from my field notes at the CNHA convention repeats some scenarios I have already questioned. Again, there is a white middle-aged man, dressed in an aloha shirt, addressing an audience of Native Hawaiians: an appropriative and pedagogical “Hawaiian at heart” offering what he sees as the best path for Native Hawaiian political
and social justice. Again, there is the insistence that Native Hawaiians are Native Americans, at least for the strategic translation of our identities into something the U.S. government can understand. The first chapter of this work placed these vexed social formations within a global-historical context in which the corporatized indigenous citizenship model of the Council for Native Hawaiian Advancement (CNHA) emerges at the intersection of Hawai‘i’s tourism, military, and non-profit industrial complexes. This chapter tracks how CNHA’s citizenship model, along with other Kanaka Maoli sovereignty models, produces model subject-citizens. This shift in analysis is important in understanding how Native Hawaiian subject formation is achieved (both formally and informally) in contemporary Hawai‘i.

My guiding questions in this chapter are: how does the ‘same’ history and collected memory of Native Hawaiians so easily fracture into political practices that directly conflict even within the supposedly united perspective of those at the CNHA convention? How do these conflicts continually re-shape Native Hawaiian claims (that is, both who can claim to be Native Hawaiian and what a Native Hawaiian political claim can be)? And most urgently: how could these limiting notions of community politics and membership be re-articulated towards more generative actions to continue addressing Native Hawaiian needs? As I contemplated these questions, and spoke to a variety of Native Hawaiian interviewees, I was also forced to consider over and over again how Native Hawaiians are very rarely the ‘same’—and thus what I was to make of the

disjunctures, splits, and holes in my supposedly cohesive topic became its own substantial theoretical grounding I had to reckon with.

Accordingly, I pursue these questions through my own retelling of the traces that have haunted me in the course of researching my thesis project. That is, I center a few examples of what has often seemed to me anecdotal (rather than academic) evidence—the stuff that happens outside of, on the way to, and after an ethnographic interview proper, that stuff so easily (and sometimes necessarily) brushed aside—in order to consider how they substantially constitute yet appear so unaccountable to the ‘larger’ issues indigenous scholarship and activism generally recognize. This excess of ethnographic data, approached through discourse analysis and indexed by critical scholarship about memory, gender, and native feminisms, provides a rich look at what is too often understood as the ‘excessive’ sovereignty claims and the ‘hopelessly diverse’ number of Kanaka Maoli leaders, queens, CEOs, and other citizens who advance them. I begin with a meditation on tracing power in subaltern spaces and ask, following native scholar Andrea Smith, how to form a political praxis of meaningful resistance to such power. Using these analytics, I then look at how the heavily racialized and gendered history of blood quantum policies for Native Hawaiians underlie scenes of power and subject formation at the CNHA convention as well as in more radical Kanaka Maoli spaces.

Subjectivity and Sovereignty: Approaches to Representation and Resistance

Avery Gordon has analyzed the elusive multiplicity of power, writing: “Power can be invisible, it can be fantastic, it can be dull and routine… it can speak the language
of your thoughts and desires. It is systematic and it is particularistic and it is often both at
the same time.”

This chapter takes to heart Gordon’s Foucauldian insistence that power can be systematic and particularistic at the same time by asking what heterogeneous modalities of power are at work in some of the “dull and routine” tenets of Kanaka Maoli subjectivity that, while familiar to most Kanaka Maoli, are significant in ways that are anything but obvious. Gordon’s work is exemplary in that it insists on examining what haunts the scene of power, rather than take the hegemonic nature of power for granted. Following Gordon’s lead, it is worth further defining from the outset how I see power (and indeed, “sovereignty,” as the ubiquitous corollary to power especially as invoked in the indigenous context) at work in the subject forming scenarios I examine. There are three primary formulas that I engage in this chapter. Michel Foucault’s biopower and Gayatri Spivak’s assertion that the subaltern cannot speak each sketch out an outline of the fields hemming Native Hawaiian subjects in, even when the scenes they inhabit purport to allow self-representation and self-determination. Foucault and Spivak’s formulas point to a number of disjunctures in these modes of power that Andrea Smith’s politics of re-articulation and unlikely alliances seize on, along with complementary formulas by Cherrie Moraga, to suggest equally heterogeneous modes of resistance. I follow these theorists lead in order to imagine a productive intervention into both CNHA and other Kanaka Maoli modes of subject formation that does not follow what Spivak calls “the absurdity of the nonrepresenting intellectual making space for her [the female subaltern, doubly Other] to speak.”

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Foucault’s biopower is in many ways a fitting and rich description of the power embedded in the non-profit industrial complex, as described in the last chapter. For Foucault, this supplementary power has a much older genealogy than the one I have sketched in terms of the rise of neoliberal capital: biopower became compounded with political sovereignty in the nineteenth-century, along with the rise of the importance of the nation state. Whereas the techniques of power prior to this time were disciplinary and centered on the individual body, another power, at a different scale, becomes embedded within these: “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.”

No longer solely an “anatomopolitics of the human body,” Foucault sees this new power as a “biopolitics of the human race.” Biopower’s domain is therefore not addressed to the individual body but rather to:

a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness and so on… not individualizing, but if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species.

Thus the methods of biopolitical control are not solely the prison, panopticon, and confessional but the manipulation of “ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on” to achieve “overall states of equilibration.” Foucault notes that these mechanisms regulating the production of life require in place of rather indiscriminate charitable organizations such as the church, “much more subtle

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139 Ibid., 243
140 Ibid., 242-3
141 Ibid., 243, 246
mechanisms that were much more economically rational… [such as] insurance, individual and collective savings, safety measures, and so on. \(^{142}\)

I would venture to add to this list of subtler and more rational mechanisms the non-profit industrial complex, under which “Native Hawaiian” has become a rational category, a type of “man-as-species.” In the last chapter, I sketched the global-historical context that has made Native Hawaiians a target population in the contemporary indigenous NGO boom, and more specifically, how CNHA has placed itself as an authority at the forefront of this new scene. The mechanisms seen in desperate need of control here, as formulated by the health and education policy driven non-profits in addition to CNHA’s community development projects, are precisely Native Hawaiians’ birth and death rates, rate of reproduction, economic viability, and so on. While the Native Hawaiian non-profit world thus exists to intervene to make Native Hawaiians live, it is also necessary to ask, as Foucault does: how can this biopower, with the objective to make live, also let die? Why are Native Hawaiians’ rates of reproduction, diabetes, homelessness, and more apparently so direly different than the rest of the United States’ population?

Here we have to recognize that the non-profit industry is founded within the larger mechanisms of a racist and colonial modern State, i.e., the state and federal governments that passed legislation to appropriate funds to Native Hawaiian health and education programs. Foucault writes that racism is “the break between what must live and what must die” and “the first function of racism [is] to fragment, to create caesuras within

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 244
the biological continuum addressed by biopower.” The second, related, function of racism he notes is also important: “If you want to live, the other must die.” This second function announces itself, in contrast to previous formulas of power, through implementing not “a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship…. the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race.” This relationship has clearly been implemented in Hawai‘i since the British and American colonial eras—Native Hawaiians had to be removed from land, murdered, or, as the rest of this chapter will show, bureaucratically and culturally defined out of existence through systems of blood quantum in order to make way for white colonial administrators, missionaries, and businessmen. Thus the biopower of the U.S. nation state today operates in a circular fashion: it creates the conditions of death for Native Hawaiians and then institutes a non-profit industry to make a modicum of Native Hawaiians live. The implications resulting from how Native Hawaiian reproduction is a particular target in the task of preserving this State-sponsored Native Hawaiian “species” are the focus of this chapter.

Reading Native Hawaiian reproduction as a biopolitical target requires a move towards understanding more particularized processes of subject formation, particularly how discourse and practices around reproduction impact Native Hawaiian women, in contrast to the institutional structures of indigenous citizen-making examined in the first chapter. It is also a fraught project that is in some ways foreclosed by the biopolitical as Foucault describes it. In biopower, there is no question of the individual, only man-as-

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143 Ibid., 255
144 Ibid., 255-6
species, the global mass divided by races. However, what I am after in this chapter is something that works even more unevenly, the self-representing Native Hawaiian subjectivities wrought under multiple layers of racialized, gendered and sexualized cultural formations. It is the process rather than the subject at the heart of projects like CNHA and radical sovereignty groups that I am interested in investigating—as it is not possible to determine the proper, authentic Native Hawaiian subject, nor would I want such a role. I turn to Gayatri Spivak’s canonical “Can the Subaltern Speak?” to understand some of the pitfalls of such a project.

“Can the Subaltern Speak?” is from the beginning a critique of a recorded discussion between Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. Tracking the ideology in what Spivak calls “the unguarded practice of conversation,” she reveals in these two theorists known for critiquing the sovereign subject, “an unquestioned valorization of the subject, the ‘object being,’ as Deleuze admiringly remarks, ‘to establish conditions where the prisoners [and other subaltern figures of the Third World] themselves would be able to speak.’” Spivak is clear that not only do these philosophers fail to admit that the Other is as heterogeneous as the Other’s transparent foil, but that this homogenizing writes the subaltern Subject as undivided, and thus easily (assuming, implicitly, proper First World conditions) representable. To Spivak, this carelessly ignores the latent critique of collective agency found, somewhat surprisingly because of how class consciousness has been championed, in Marx. She quotes his work The Eighteenth Brumaire:

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life... they form a class. In so far as

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145 Spivak, 66, 69
… the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community…
they do not form a class.\textsuperscript{146}

For Spivak, this is the heart of what is conflated in Foucault and Deleuze’s conversation:
the use of representation as \textit{Vertretung}, political representation as in an individual agent
who is descriptively “speaking for,” and representation as \textit{Darstellung}, economic
representation as in a transformative “re-presenting” conditions in terms of class agency,
that is, “a contestory replacement as well as an \textit{appropriation (a supplementation)} of
something that is ‘artificial’ to begin with—‘economic conditions of existence that
separate their mode of life.’”\textsuperscript{147}

Spivak’s article is notoriously quoted, but without, I think, a full understanding of
her intervention into representation (which impacts subaltern women in a particular way,
but is not limited to women per se). Later, I will engage her more infamous analysis of
the Hindu tradition of sati and the two dialectically legitimized sentences, “White men
are saving brown women from brown men” and “The women actually wanted to die,”
which plays out in a different, but related, way in the Native Hawaiian context. From the
outset, however, it is more fundamental to understand that collective agency is not
foreclosed only for subaltern women, but that it is an inherently artificial project. Native
Hawaiian interests, as the rest of this chapter shows, do not form a class—not only
because class conditions are varied across the Native Hawaiian population, but also
because “the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community.” Both
CNHA and the more radical sovereignty movements each argue differently—they are
each heavily invested in calling, and thus transforming, the Native Hawaiian community

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 72
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
into being. This is not an inherently damaging project, on either side, but it does ignore a fundamental recognition that the heterogeneous individual interests of Native Hawaiians are not fully representable in either movement.

More contemporary scholar-activists have suggested that radical political praxis can recognize such heterogeneity. Andrea Smith’s politics of rearticulation and prolineal genealogy offers one kind of political and spatial praxis that chips away at monolithic representations of both the Christian right and Native Americans. Smith critiques both religious and indigenous nationalist projects that depend on territorial and heteropatriarchal practices, calling for recognition that our own heterogeneous communities are often our most unlikely allies. She also centers Native women, but does so in a way that is consistently self-reflective and open to constant recentering. This recentering is based on Foucault’s understanding of power that “does not assume a permanent center.”

Smith’s text may offer more idyllic (and, to some of us, illegible) possibilities than concrete blueprints to an alternative social and spatial praxis. However, I would argue that Smith, as Mary Pat Brady argues in terms of Cherrie Moraga’s Queer Aztlán, is engaged in “an immolation, a revolution of space and language” that seeks to disarticulate Native visions of nationhood and sovereignty from a solid nation-state goal.

This prolineal genealogy does not attempt to write the blueprints to a new revolutionary practice because it admits that “sovereignty entails a vision that is beyond

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149 Smith, xiv
what we can see now, it is not necessarily something that can be clearly articulated.”\textsuperscript{151}

Still, to begin with, rather than disregard or despair at the opacity of this “substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” is a way of writing a radically different text. Smith’s book, to put it in the words of Hortense Spillers, functions as an academic text to write Native American Studies “\textit{out} of the traditional symbolic order” (where Native American Studies has long been dedicated to statically describing Native American people).\textsuperscript{152}

I see Smith’s unlikely alliances as doing some of the work that Spivak tends to doubt can be done, in Spivak’s instance that:

the assumption and construction of a consciousness or subject sustains such [anti-sexist organizing among/for women of color] work and will, in the long run, cohere with the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the advancement of learning and civilization. And the subaltern woman will be as mute as ever.\textsuperscript{153}

Smith does not assume a proper Native woman subject or consciousness—it is a referent that is constantly re-centered. I am not arguing that Smith has offered us a way to absolutely reverse the muting of the subaltern woman, but that she shows us one way that hegemonic interpellation can be challenged. Spivak does this as well. Though the overall tone of her essay suggests a damning picture of the impossibility of subaltern speech, she ends with a counterhegemonic reading of a woman who hung herself while she was menstruating to demonstrate that it was not an illicit pregnancy that caused her suicide, but a political cause. The subaltern woman can and does speak—the question is always rather, can she be heard? That Spivak, in spite of contrary readings of this event, could

\textsuperscript{151} Smith, 269
\textsuperscript{153} Spivak, 90
and did hear signals something, a trace of a productive possibility that is more significant than Spivak fully credits.

As Mary Pat Brady describes, memory can also be a key force in making interpellation incomplete. Brady sees in Cherríe Moraga’s work (a Chicana writer and activist deeply engaged in formulating an alternative, queer Chicana nationalism) the insistence that “dominating systems cannot force people to forget entirely that they are dominated.”154 The next section considers how memory can function for both hegemonic and resistant purposes, in a performance of Native Hawaiian subjectivity as both whole (and thus, sovereign) and split (as all subjectivities are). I consider the interplay between filmmaker Puhipau and CNHA president Robin Danner in order not to imagine a whole, fully self-representable Native Hawaiian subject but to imagine a political practice built on the recognition of such heterogeneity and splits in subject formation.

What CNHA Re-members

Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues, “[I]t is the very act of historical commemoration that calls group identity into being. As Jos Perry puts it, ‘We recollect, therefore we are.’”155 Indeed, the annual nature of CNHA’s convention was key in establishing it as a stable, reliable Native Hawaiian political organization. Founded in 2001, history was exactly what CNHA needed, and an annual convention became a public and increasingly recognized site of ‘historical’ commemoration. That is, the convention and CNHA itself has come to be commemorated annually, though specific Hawaiian historical events were

154 Brady, 138
not. This is in marked contrast to the practices of many Native Hawaiian groups who organize protests and rallies on key historical dates such as Queen Lili‘uokalani’s overthrow on January 17, 1893. Thus CNHA’s convention calendar plays into the routine schedule of its main audience, comprised of staff from Native Hawaiian-focused non-profit organizations, local and state politicians, and other public leaders who are accustomed to attending professional conferences. Accordingly, in the convention space, a group identity is shaped at the hands of an elite portion of the non-profit industrial complex—funders, executives, state and federal senators. These distinctly middle-class groups are generally the only ones who can afford to attend the convention. Although scholarships are available, daily costs for the convention ranged from $140-180 for registration and lunch alone (travel costs even for those on-island could be considerable for gas and parking in pricey downtown Honolulu).

The most obvious contradiction in solidifying a middle-class Native Hawaiian identity in this space is not simply that the majority of the Native Hawaiian community is working-class and, especially in recent years, has been disproportionately represented in the state’s growing homeless population. While many scholars and activists have pointed out the undeniably capitalist nature of non-profits, ostensibly, the non-profit industry is meant to serve our most marginalized people. The history of the non-profit industry centered on Native Hawaiian communities is particularly rooted in concessions forced from state and local governments by Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements of the

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156 This annual reliability was also something that CNHA’s president, Robin Danner, needed to gradually establish her own personal accountability to the local Native Hawaiian community in Hawai‘i as well. Danner, while Native Hawaiian, grew up in Alaska and moved to the state around the same time as CNHA’s founding. Danner’s Alaskan background is constantly evoked by critics; see Anne Keala Kelly, “The Alaska-Hawaii connection (Part One),” Indian Country Today 12/19/03 2003.
1970s and 1980s. Yet how does a non-profit organization that hosts an annual convention costing upwards of $500 per person to attend maintain its legibility as an agency that “serves the community”?

One example of the pains CNHA does go to in order to stress these ‘community’ connections is their annual Native Hawaiian Community Advocate awards. Here the word ‘community’ becomes a curious code word for Native Hawaiians ‘out there,’ those who do not regularly attend the convention but engage more directly in grassroots organizing (rather than, the implicit contrast is, to the more bureaucratic non-profits that are the CNHA audience). At the 2008 convention, the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation presented the award (consisting of a plaque and a $5000 grant) to Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina (“The Eyes of the Land”), a documentary film company that focuses on “documenting traditional and contemporary Hawaiian culture, history, language, environment and the politics of independence and sovereignty.”

Many of Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina’s films are filled with scenes of Native Hawaiian protests and other political actions, which are hardly the topic of most films made in Hawai‘i. Their most well known film is *Act of War: The Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom* (1993), which features many prominent Native Hawaiian scholars, such as Haunani-Kay Trask and Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa, narrating what they purposefully emphasize as an American *coup d'etat* of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893.

Before presenting the award, a short video presentation that drew clips from a variety of Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina’s films was shown to the convention audience. Images

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157 Source: Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina website.
158 *Act of War* was made during the overthrow’s centennial and screened as part of the People’s International Tribunal also held in Hawai‘i that year. Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina also has a documentary of footage from the People’s Tribunal.
flashed by: crowds of Native Hawaiians wearing red shirts in solidarity gathered in front of ‘Iolani Palace; hula dancers performing; groups of Native Hawaiian children in Hawaiian language immersion schools; a heiau (sacred burial site) on ‘Oahu’s North Shore that has been in danger of being removed by real estate developers. The clips went by too quickly to get a full sense of the events they documented—indeed, if I had not already seen some of Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina’s films, I would not have been able to recognize as much as I did. Still, the images were familiar enough to evoke a sense of pride in our Native Hawaiian community and the audience applauded loudly when the video ended. This relationship this award and video reel instituted between Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina and CNHA is much like the one Spivak describes in her critique of Foucault and Deleuze’s valorization of the subaltern they are anxious to see self-represented:

The limits of this representationalist realism are reached with Deleuze: ‘Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in barracks, in a prison, in a police station’ (FD, p. 212). This foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism—the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism—to define its own arena as ‘concrete experience’, ‘what actually happens.’ Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme.159

CNHA’s community awards similarly valorize the “concrete experience” of the Native Hawaiian Others who labor in the dirtiest arenas of “advanced capitalist neocolonialism”: the factory, school, barracks, prison, police station. For the Hawaiian context, CNHA adds the heiau, the protests in front of Iolani Palace, the kalo patch. Although Spivak critiques here the erasure of the First World intellectual’s concrete

159 Spivak, 69
experience in consolidating the international division of labor, it is remarkably applicable
to the First World non-profit bureaucrat consolidating the Fourth World division within
her own community.

Morris-Suzuki writes, “Images like photographs or newsreel footage often possess
great power to convey the terror, elation or confusion of particular historical events; but
without accompanying scripts or narration they seldom tell us much about causes or
effects.”

In this case, then, the irony is that though Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina is respected
for their attention to historical and cultural details, and to a radically transformative
political agenda, CNHA could buy into the group identity and emotions evoked by their
films (such as pride in preserving culture, and anger at past and continuing injustices)
without similarly committing to a radical political practice. In fact, CNHA was able to re-
purpose and re-articulate these images as part of their moderate political practice. To
return to Spivak’s terms, “concrete experience” of the protest, Hawaiian culture, and
grassroots organizing is fetishized and consumed as if it represents the experience of all
Native Hawaiians, and more importantly, is the narrative that is most in need of being
(self) represented. In the process, the experiences of the CNHA crowd are written as
transparent, able to participate in the ‘concrete,’ but through using that grounding as a
reason to ‘advance’ the concrete needs of the community ‘out there,’ not their own
particular economic interests.

When Puhipau, the founder of Nā Maka O Ka ‘Āina, took the stage to receive the
award and give a short speech, he attempted to address the conflicts between his political
commitments and those of CNHA. “The work is not finished,” he said. “Our nation

160 Morris-Suzuki, 23
exists, our kingdom exists. If we keep looking to the federal government, we’ll get tired. To make changes, we must go to the children.” Puhipau criticizing CNHA’s mission, even indirectly here, was a strong departure from any of the other speakers or panel presentations at the convention. Where many speakers identified themselves as graduates of Kamehameha Schools (a private K-12 school system for Native Hawaiian children, and a sponsor of CNHA), and told anecdotes of their high school days to connect with other Kamehameha graduates in the crowd, Puhipau also went against this script. While he identified himself as a Kamehameha Schools graduate, he went on to relate the school’s historic role in assimilating Native Hawaiians into American society, which for men was particularly tied to the U.S. military through institutions such as JROTC.161 “We were taught to be gunners, to do the dirty work for multinational corporations,” Puhipau said in place of a light high school anecdote. “Thank goodness some of us didn’t feel comfortable with the military situation…. It is time we said, Yankee, beat it, go home!”

While Puhipau’s speech, like his video clips, elicited applause from the convention audience, it was a tense, unexpected moment in the normally placid convention room. Puhipau’s presence and speech, clearly articulating his political commitments, were not as easily re-purposed and submerged into the narrative of Native Hawaiian-ness as told by CNHA as his film clips were. Robin Danner, the CNHA president, nonetheless stepped up to hug and honi (kiss on the cheek) Puhipau. When she addressed the audience again, she said, “Thank you, Puhipau. It takes all kinds to advance our movement.” To me, this was a gut-wrenching example of how inclusion and

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161 JROTC stands for Junior Reserve Officer’s Training Corps, chapters of which exist across the United States and in extra-territorial sites such as Guam, Puerto Rico, and other countries. For a partial history of JROTC at Kamehameha Schools, see Ty Kāwika Tengan, “Re-membering Panalā’au: Masculinities, Nation, and Empire in Hawai‘i and the Pacific,” The Contemporary Pacific 20.1 (2008): 27-53.
recognition, as informed by contemporary discourses of civil rights and multiculturalism, is so effective in neutralizing (if not exactly silencing) those who struggle to call attention to oppressive conditions. Elizabeth Povinelli has described this as a dangerous mode of achieving “social difference without social consequence,” which she theorizes as particularly effective in razing over radical indigenous claims in settler colonial societies like the U.S. and Australia.\(^\text{162}\) Robin Danner meant to take both Puhipau and his films as cultural adornment, without real political dissention, to further CNHA as an all-inclusive Native Hawaiian space.

However, Puhipau’s speech was a disruption, no matter how brief, that allows us to read CNHA’s convention against the grain. Here, I turn to Agamben’s notions of memory, testimony and the witness in his text *Remnants of Auschwitz* to flesh out some of the unexpectedly symbiotic connections between Puhipau’s and CNHA’s ideas of community.\(^\text{163}\) CNHA’s ethos distinctly emphasizes self-help and a kind of “pulling yourself up by the bootstraps” advancement. This stance is a direct response to a long history and continuing present of mainstream representations of Native Hawaiians as lazy, incompetent, welfare queens who have willfully and wrongly refused to complete their assimilation into American life.\(^\text{164}\) Local cartoonists like Daryl Cagle consistently draw on racialized stereotypes to make this point, drawing Native Hawaiians as dirty,


\(^{164}\) Exemplary of this commentary is Bruce Fein, writing against the Akaka Bill: “American civilization has been a boon, not an incubus, for the Native Hawaiians living today…Native Hawaiians’ nagging resistance to complete assimilation seems to explain their suboptimal demographics” (“A Race-Based Drift?” *The Washington Times* 10/04/2004).
gaping-mouthed children. Political arguments against the Akaka bill are caricatured as complaints on par with a dog barking. Senator Daniel Akaka is represented as the only Native Hawaiian in suit and tie, a striking contrast to his ungrateful community.

Agamben defines shame as:

nothing less than the fundamental sentiment of being a subject, in the two apparently opposed sense of this phrase: to be subjected and to be sovereign. Shame is what is produced in the absolute concomitance of subjectification and desubjectification, self-loss and self-possession, servitude and sovereignty.

The awarding of Nā Maka O Ka ʻĀina and the near-absented presence of Puhipau in the voiding of his political commitments in Robin Danner’s response (“It takes all kinds”) can be read as a scene of (generally unmarked or at least not officially remarked upon) shame. While it may initially be surprising that Puhipau was invited to speak and receive an award at CNHA at all, Agamben’s take on subjectivity suggests that Native Hawaiian identity is only made coherent in this convention space by reifying the two senses of being a subject: to be subjected and to be sovereign. Danner’s insistence on advancement, like the ethos of much non-profit work, requires a split in Native Hawaiian group identity between those who have ‘advanced’ and those who still need ‘advancement.’ This is a re-enactment of Cagle’s cartoon, with the civilized Native Hawaiian Senator trying to help his irredeemably uncivilized people. Ironically, though “sovereignty” has long been a useful rallying term for more radically political Native Hawaiians, in Agamben’s terms, it is CNHA who insists on being sovereign—in maintaining self-possession (Danner’s

165 See Daryl Cagle’s cartoon (unavailable to be reproduced here) in: United States. Senate. Committee on Indian Affairs. Policy of the.... S. Hrg. 108-27. 2003. P. 130 (figure untitled). This document is a compendium of arguments for and against the Akaka Bill, and this cartoon, originally printed in the local Kaneohe-based paper Midweek, is included positively as a critique of Native Hawaiians’ unwillingness to assimilate in a statement titled, “Killing Aloha.”

166 Agamben, 107
short, apparently ‘respectful’ quip) against what seems in contrast to be an unprovoked sense of self-loss (Puhipau’s final outburst: “Yankee, beat it! Go home!”). Puhipau (while I do not intend to suggest that his own discourse is completely unproblematic) is able to more directly acknowledge his own subjectivity as split, encompassing the indignity of being forced to be part of the U.S. military machine and yet continuing to find that ‘our nation exists.’ While Danner maintains a respectful demeanor, her refusal to engage Puhipau’s politics, and the relegation to activists like Puhipau to the singular community award slot, betrays a desire to, if not change, sweep such divergent views under the rug.

In my reading of this scene, through Agamben, the significance of Puhipau bearing witness at the CNHA convention is less the content of his own experiences than how his speech allows, however briefly, a rupture in the otherwise homogeneous setting. His speech points out the costs of rendering a Native Hawaiian identity fixed on a certain kind of advancement, as it is formulated by CNHA. For the directors and supporters of CNHA, Native Hawaiian advancement, self-determination and justice are achieved through, as I argue in Chapter One and as illustrated in Cagle’s drawing, the entrance of Native Hawaiians into a regulated, civilized citizenship ala Senator Akaka. Puhipau’s rupture points to Agamben’s insistence that Auschwitz’s ultimate lesson was, “The human being is the one who can survive the human being.” And yet: “it is not truly possible to destroy the human… something always remains. The witness is this remnant.”

167 Ibid., 133
Lisa Kahaleole Hall argues that, in Hawaiian metaphorical terms, the past does not lie behind us, but instead orients forward-looking visions of Kanaka Maoli future. In describing Puhipau’s role at CNHA as both witness and remnant, I am acutely aware of the ways such a reading is at risk of converging with colonial expectations that have long written indigenous people as backwards and nearly extinct “remnants” of primordial humanity—and therefore, not really part of humanity at all. However, Agamben’s theorizing of witness as remnant is fundamentally driven by a desire to encode critical memory practices with transformative political praxis in the face of “remembering” Auschwitz in ways that produce other dangerous aporias. “Remnant” signals in Agamben’s account not a trace of that which is about to vanish, but the indestructible traces that always escape even the most apparently solid hegemonic orders. These remnants invoke a rich set of practices for the future, not just the past.

Hortense Spillers offers some potentially useful ways to build on the critiques of media and language Morris-Suzuki and Agamben have raised here, by adding a deeper critical awareness of what she calls an “American grammar”:

[that] dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and valuation, [which] remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is “murdered” over and over again.

Spillers deconstructs this grammar to unveil the hidden processes behind making African American kinship and gender formations illegible. She also suggests that transformative political praxis lies not in making these formations legible (explicated and included in

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169 Spillers, 68
American grammar) but in writing a radically different text, in making a place for the African-American female “out of the traditional symbolics of female gender” (emphasis original). 170 This seems to echo Agamben’s point that “Testimony takes place in the non-place of articulation.” 171 Both Spillers and Agamben write towards an understanding that it is only through the production of improper and illegible subjects (in my example, Puhipau) that other subjects are made whole and completely disconnected from the conditions of their own making (in my example, Danner and others involved in CNHA leadership). The following section builds on this theorizing of split subjectivities and illegible uses of Native Hawaiian past and future by focusing on heavily gendered and raced discourses of genealogy that circulate in and outside of CNHA.

That Bloody Mess: Legacies of the Hawaiian Homestead Commission Act

Another anecdotal example, drawn from the proceedings of CNHA’s 2008 Convention, foregrounds some of the particularly gendered history of Native Hawaiian subject formation that has been not yet been substantially addressed. During one of the sessions, when one young Native Hawaiian man (in his twenties or thirties) got up to speak, CNHA President Robin Danner spent a longer than usual time introducing him. “Are you single?” she asked him, as they both spoke into their microphones on the stage. “Ladies, are you paying attention?” she asked the audience. “Handsome, Hawaiian and a lawyer!” Danner was performing at once the role of an exuberant MC and yenta matchmaker. This appears to be a relatively harmless type of discourse: a joke, for the

170 Ibid., 80
171 Agamben, 130
pleasure of the speakers and the audience, indicating pride in talented Native Hawaiian men. Still, this joke is worth further consideration, I believe, precisely because of its innocuous nature. Matchmaking, a joke that may seem quite improperly placed in other convention settings, implicitly fit quite seamlessly in with several days of speakers identifying themselves, or being identified by Danner and other CNHA staff, as “homesteaders.”

Homesteaders are those Native Hawaiians who have qualified (with a 50% or higher blood quantum) and survived the often 30+ years waitlist for a Department of Hawaiian Homelands lease, on designated sections of land that once belonged to the Hawaiian monarchy.¹⁷² Homesteading was thus represented, implicitly and explicitly, as both a source of pride for those who had already attained it and a desired status for those who could prove they have a 50% quantum, and especially those who could prove their children would also have at least a 50% quantum (thus retaining the homestead within their immediate families). The history of this 50%, and its arbitrary but no less “real” legacy, requires a bit more historical grounding, in order to understand how it undergirds not only subject formation at the hands of CNHA staff but Hawaiian subjectivity under the direction of more radical Kanaka Maoli projects as well. Neither homesteading nor blood quantum policies are unique to Native Hawaiians, but appear, in a dizzying array of different fractions of land and blood, in many indigenous contexts.

Though the Lockean philosophy behind the homestead (land cultivated as the basis of civil freedom) is much older, in the United States, the history of officially

¹⁷² There are a few exceptions for which a homesteader could have less than 50% blood quantum (see Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood). Nonetheless, representations of homesteaders invoke the strict adherence to 50%, as I will discuss further later in this chapter.
designated homestead policies can be traced back to at least the Homestead Act of 1862. For American Studies scholar Henry Nash Smith, the homestead ideal of 1862 was a particular re-writing of the “agrarian ideal” that began much earlier in, for example, Crevecoeur’s poetic writings of virgin land waiting to plowed: not the “picturesque Wild West beyond the agricultural frontier” but the vast transformation of the “great interior Valley” into the garden of the world.\textsuperscript{173} However, the Homestead Act had a particular audience and imagined ideal homesteader: the Northeastern common man, who could be either a New England farmer or a city-dweller looking for better opportunity.\textsuperscript{174} This relied on a theory of the West as simultaneously a frontier of endless opportunity for every man and as a particular safety valve for unemployed and impoverished workmen, namely European immigrants to the Northeast. This imagined subject of the homestead, however, rarely came to fruition because Northeastern workmen largely did not have the resources needed to move themselves and their families out West, set up a farm and survive until a crop was harvested and paid for.\textsuperscript{175} Nonetheless, the ideal of the safety valve held “an almost universal acceptance” throughout the nineteenth century because, as Smith argues, the free West was for the North an essential rhetorical counterpart to the slave-driven plantation agrarianism of the South. Distracting the public from the poverty and unemployment in Northern cities fueled by the Great Panic of 1837, Northern politicians and the Northwestern farmers who became homesteaders aligned with abolitionist groups to better compete with Southern agricultural business. Thus “free soil” in contrast to Southern plantations was a distinction made not for “humanitarian regard

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 199
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 239
for the oppressed black man” but in order to isolate and keep the Southern market from expanding by keeping “Negroes, whether slave or free, out of the territories altogether.”

What happened when Western notions of homesteading, private land ownership and individual self-making were exported to Hawai‘i? While many scholars have addressed how U.S. colonial power came to be exerted over Native Hawaiians in Hawai‘i’s eighteenth and nineteenth century history, in her book *Hawaiian Blood* (2008), Kēhūlani Kauanui is one of the first scholars to address imperialism in the era directly leading up to statehood, when America’s exceptional 1890’s period of empire was supposedly over. Kauanui importantly relates the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) and its version of homesteading to the Dawes Act (also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887), which sought to break up large tracts of Native American reservations into much smaller, privatized tracts belonging to specific tribal members. Allotment also further opened reservation lands up to purchase by non-native settlers, leading to “checkerboarded” tribal territories in which Native American sovereignty is further undercut by the scattered presence of non-native landholders not subject to Native tribal laws. Where we can see in Henry Nash Smith’s analysis of the American West’s homesteading policies a subtle triangulation of white-Indian-black, Kauanui argues Hawai‘i had its own contingent configuration: “Race, law, and citizenship in Hawai‘i were structured and sustained along a racial triangulation of haole-Hawaiian-Asian

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176 Ibid., 393
devised as white-Native-alien.”

According to the logics of this racial triangulation, Chinese and Japanese laborers were interpellated as unassimilable and perpetually foreign threats to the U.S., while Native Hawaiians were seen as salvageable, domestic racialized figures that could be “rehabilitated” from the brink of colonial extinction into American citizenship.

Into this white-Native-alien triangulation, the HHCA reversed the logic of both homesteading as formulated for white settlers on the continent and Native American reservations (in a logic related to the Dawes Act’s breaking up of these lands). Instead of granting Native Hawaiians land for their individual freedom and/or exercise of indigenous sovereign rights, the HHCA “returned” Native Hawaiians who were increasingly making up the burgeoning population of Honolulu’s slums to “remote lands with poor soil and with little water or infrastructure for homesteading by Kanaka Maoli.”

These lands were leased to individual Kānaka Maoli for ninety-nine years at a time—then, as today, there was no way to ever officially “own” a Hawaiian homestead. Instead, an effect of the de facto “ward of the state” relationship Native Hawaiians came to hold with the U.S., the land is continually held in trust by the state and federal governments.

Homesteading for Hawaiians thus became a discursive practice of rehabilitation, which in actuality did little to provide Kanaka Maoli substantial means towards broad socio-economic equality with white settlers. As Kauanui argues, HHCA instead “institutionalized a form of racial segregation for ‘native Hawaiian’ lessees who occupied

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179 Kauanui, 75
180 Ibid., 119
the allotted territories that make up Hawaiian Home Lands on the margins of society.”

Kauanui highlights here that the HHCA established a violent legacy of blood quantum
through limiting leases to Hawaiians of 50% blood quantum or more. Kauanui
powerfully demonstrates, through historicized close readings of the hearings leading up
to the HHCA’s passage, that both the general approach towards rehabilitation and the
particular 50% blood quantum fraction requirement were not obviously decided notions
before the HHCA’s passage but rather the conflicted resolution of disagreements about
the U.S.’ obligation to Kanaka Maoli. The legal rights of the U.S. over “ceded lands” of
the former Hawaiian monarchy were left somewhat deadlocked (and may only just be on
the brink of formal resolution, after a Supreme Court hearing in February 2009) over
“whether the lands were part of the public domain or a Hawaiian inheritance.” In the
meantime, Hawaiians involved in the HHCA hearings resorted to connecting Kanaka
Maoli land rights to the U.S.’ moral obligation to aid Hawaiians—“hence, their focus on
rehabilitation.”

Another key factor in this particular formula of rehabilitation for only those
Native Hawaiians who met the 50% blood quantum was the powerful business interests
of the Big Five, a consortium of sugarcane corporations operating in the islands since the
early 1800’s. The Big Five and their associates were the beneficiaries of leases from
earlier arrangements with the Hawaiian monarchy, and they lobbied to make the target
population of the rehabilitation policies as exclusive as possible in order to protect their

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181 Ibid., 87
182 Blood quantum policies, Kauanui argues, first entered Native American land rights in the 1906 Burke
Act, an amendment to the Dawes Act. (Kauanui, 89).
183 Kauanui, 80
184 Ibid.
plantation lands from being turned over.\textsuperscript{185} U.S. congressional members at the time were not particularly bothered by an inclusive definition of ‘native Hawaiian’ extending beyond the 50\% rule, but revised the HHCA to include a blood quantum minimum in order to appease the Big Five.\textsuperscript{186} To its opponents, the HHCA walked a fine line between rehabilitation and entitlement, as “real Hawaiians” (for whom the U.S. could have a moral obligation to help) were quickly dying out and supporting part-Hawaiians who were through intermarriage “‘to all intents and purposes’ white people” gave them an unfair advantage.\textsuperscript{187}

How does this somewhat arcane policy history relate to Native Hawaiian subjectivity today? It is a thorny, and in some respects, an unexpected question, because as Kauanui also recounts, Native Hawaiian understandings of membership have not traditionally nor commonly in recent practice depended on fractions, but instead an extremely inclusive genealogical model.\textsuperscript{188} Many Native Hawaiians do not qualify for a Hawaiian Homestead but still consider themselves Native Hawaiian. HHCA is the primary legislation (and to my knowledge, the only state/federal program) for which the 50\% blood quantum applies, whereas other programs (including the Akaka Bill, as discussed in Chapter One) more commonly rely on genealogical evidence of any fraction. This does not hold true, however, for everyone. During the same 2008 summer that I did the bulk of this project’s research, a lawsuit was settled in court, brought by five Native Hawaiian men seeking to limit the services of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Native

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 116, 122-124
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 111
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 147, 155
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 12
Hawaiians of 50% blood quantum or more.\textsuperscript{189} The disenfranchisement of certain longstanding members of a native community by others in that community is not uncommon, as we have seen most recently with the disenrollment of those of black Freedmen descent from the Cherokee.\textsuperscript{190} The lawsuit against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) seeking to instantiate the 50% rule for all OHA administered programs beyond just the Department of Hawaiian Homelands, was ultimately dismissed. Nonetheless unofficial understandings of Native Hawaiian membership, within our own community, are predicated if not precisely on the 50% standard, then on the sense that Hawaiian blood is fractioned and becoming harder and harder to come by.

Thus, the matchmaking jokes of Robin Danner, along with her frequent identification as a Kapa'a homesteader, while not specifically advocating or defending the 50% blood quantum, define the desired Native Hawaiian subject under such terms. This desire for, if not exactly wholeness then at least a fifty-percent-ness, is not unique to Robin Danner or CNHA, but pervades much of Native Hawaiian cultural and political discourse in more radical spaces. The next section turns to one last anecdotal example of how this logic figures outside of CNHA, and to consider, along with Smith and Spivak, how these logics can be contested.

\textbf{Genealogies of the Future}

At a recent Native American and Indigenous Studies conference, a respected Kanaka Maoli scholar shared a story about an even more venerated Kanaka Maoli man

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 264
\textsuperscript{190} Circe Sturm, \textit{Blood politics: race, culture, and identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma} (University of California Press, 2002).
active in the sovereignty movement who consistently “acknowledges” queer women and women in interracial relationships in the community by saying, “Love whoever you want but make sure you have Native Hawaiian babies.” When I had the genuine honor of meeting this leader in the course of my own research, we had a long and engaging talk about the history and future of the sovereignty movement before we reached a moment similar to the one recounted at the conference. He is well known for protesting the actions of CNHA and their convention, as well as the Akaka Bill, and thus represents one of the many radical sovereignty groups for whom federal recognition is the extinguishment of native rights rather than a first step to their full exercise.

While saying our thank-yous and goodbyes, this sovereignty leader turned to my mother (who had set up the meeting) and said: “You should have more.” (More Native Hawaiian children, that is.) It was said good-naturedly, as an apparent compliment to both of us. Still, I expect that you can estimate my mother’s age without me needing to reveal it. I similarly expect that you also have trouble imagining a situation in which it is considered appropriate for a male acquaintance to urge your mother to have more babies. The joke does, however, echo Robin Danner’s matchmaking emceeing. The question I am left with is therefore not about how Robin Danner or this sovereignty leader came to enjoy telling jokes like this—the foregoing section on blood quantum in Hawai‘i has shown the historical significance of “preserving” Hawaiian blood. Thus, whether or not the individuals telling these jokes are sexist or racist is quite beside the point. The discourse they each participate in circulates independent of them.

Yet how do we critically interrogate this brief, almost throwaway line? “You should have more”: made us all laugh, but that laughter was more uncomfortable for
those it was directed at than he who spoke it. However, this little line had an intimate history—not just in the repetition from the scholar’s story, but in dozens of more and less menacing iterations both my mother (herself, one of those Native Hawaiian women in an interracial relationship) and I (as a light-skinned, mainland-raised Native Hawaiian woman who is thus often unintelligible as one) had heard many times before. “You should have more” is also precisely the kind of thing white feminists seize upon to “save” brown women from brown men, and supposedly constraining native cultures rather than the “free” West. Thus this scenario is an echo of the ban on sati, and the stalemate addressed in Spivak’s dialectally legitimizing sentences: “White men are saving brown women from brown men” and “The women actually wanted to die.” In this case, I might have been caught between the Western feminist sentence “Brown men should not tell brown women to have more babies” and the defensive Native response “Brown women actually want to have more babies.” As in Spivak’s case, these sentences would work together to produce a subject—a female subaltern—that could make no other response, outside the feminist and traditionalist ones, heard.

Yet, we brown (and maybe-brown) women, mother and daughter, instead laughed. It was an uncomfortable laughter but it also did not produce a sense of crisis. We did not need to further engage the joke, nor attack he who told it. I would argue that we are no less concerned than the sovereignty leader about the future of the Native Hawaiian community, or about perpetuating our identities as Native Hawaiian women. So, do we have a different sense of genealogy than he? And what does it mean if our senses of genealogy are unintelligible to each other despite our apparently cohesive identity of Native Hawaiian? For somehow, we all identified as Native Hawaiian and
were intelligible to each other as Native Hawaiian—yet how we got that way (how exactly does one have a Native Hawaiian baby?) was less clear. Certainly, in other scenarios this tenuous legibility would have been challenged instead of laughed over—in ones, for example, where my mother, long acknowledged as part of the same Native Hawaiian circles that this sovereignty leader frequents, was not around to put my own identity in context. “You should have more,” our male leaders say. To take such a suggestion seriously begs the questions—“With whom? Who still has more than 50%?” The answer to that leads circuitously, of course, back to the Kanaka Maoli men who have raised the question or to ancestors who have died before we were born.

This grossly heterosexist, patrilineal, and incestuous discourse of kinship frames this section’s urgency: a feminist reading that, as Andrea Smith reminds us, many Native, not just white, women do have. Yet I believe this anecdote is instructive because it opened up a productive possibility that was not entirely visible to us until the moment of the joke, and my mother’s and my response. The heterosexist and racist discourse used to justify the need for more blood quantum babies is not always, or even often, successful (and therefore, perhaps, the reason why it is so often brought up and then dismissed as a joke). Therefore, in this case, the joke illuminated this discourse’s many moments of slippage—the many instances in which Native Hawaiian babies made of 50% blood quantum or more cannot be and are not produced. Thus “You should have more,” was received as something of an inside joke, where we all laughed. Perhaps we could read this as an instance of, as Mary Pat Brady describes, memory making interpellation incomplete. Perhaps in taking our oppressive modes of genealogy as a dark joke is an instance of not being able to forget that within our own communities, certain members
among us also actively participate in this dominating. Ultimately, my (and my mother’s) alternative notions of Native Hawaiian genealogy allowed us to subtly resist (through reading it humorously) the symbolic colonial order embedded in that sovereignty leader’s offhand comment. Our subtle resistance did not, of course, entirely overturn the legacies of blood quantum in Native Hawaiian communities.¹⁹¹ Is there a political praxis that could? Given Spivak’s cautions against the subjectivities created with both moves towards saving women and defending tradition, is such a project even desirable?

My answer to these questions follows Andrea Smith in insisting that such a political praxis is both possible and desirable; though this thesis cannot fully answer what such a politics, barely glimpsed in the uncomfortable but unshaken laughter of my mother and I, would substantially look like. Nonetheless, I want to end this section by foregrounding an unlikely alliance that Native and queer people (along with other racialized groups) share, since each has long been represented as a population that cannot reproduce. I have argued that genealogies can be strengthened through allowing them to be illegible rather than scientifically fractioned; in short, that they can be queered (as they are in the work of Cherríe Moraga and Andrea Smith). However, making new claims on alternative genealogies is not automatically in itself transformative or without the risk of becoming oppressive in its own right. Jasbir Puar writes:

[I]f race and sex are to be increasingly thought outside the parameters of identity… as assemblages, as events, what is at stake in terms of biopolitical capacity is therefore not the ability to reproduce, but the

¹⁹¹ I share many scholars’ unease with finding and naming modes of ‘resistance’ everywhere—as James Scott writes, “the hidden transcript [revealed in much of this recent work on resistance] is a condition of practical resistance rather than a substitute for it” (A. Smith, 112).
capacity to *regenerate*, the terms of which are found in all sorts of registers beyond heteronormative reproduction.\(^{192}\)

In this respect, Smith’s accounting of unlikely alliances can be seen as offering a way for Native women to redefine the terms of how they want their political practice regenerated. This acknowledges that, like Puar writes, the child is only one figure of reproduction “in a spectrum of statistical chances that suggest health, vitality, capacity, fertility, “market virility,” and so on.”\(^{193}\) To think of the native or queer body/identity this way is in Moraga’s terms, to see the body as a “temporal geography,” or in Smith’s terms, to see Native as a generative performance. The critical edge of both of these projects is in how they each map possibilities for Native and Queer Chicana bodies, communities, and nations to grow rather than vanish; to pass on political praxis and its urgency rather than always already assuming its demise.


\(^{193}\) Puar, 211
CONCLUSION

I am left, at the end of this thesis, wondering if I have cheated my readers; if I have irresponsibly led them on. The extent of the productive possibilities for undoing even some small part of the many damaging structures of Hawai‘i’s non-profit industrial complex, and all its attendant colonial legacies, that I offer at the end is an anecdote about how my mother and I negotiated a joke about having Hawaiian babies by, in fact, doing very little. I argued that an un-representative, and happily un-represented (in contrast to the subaltern women concretely “represented” and fixed in Spivak), sense of genealogy was crucial to not being caught in a dialect of white feminism and native heteropatriarchal tradition. I would argue that many Kanaka Maoli women negotiate jokes, as well as a range of practices from romantic love (and sometimes reproduction), with “handsome Native Hawaiian lawyers” or white outsiders alike, to potential and actual assaults from both strangers and familiar “community” members, with similar un-representative and un-representable strategies. However, the proof of these negotiations, reminiscent of what Audra Simpson terms an indigenous “relentless discursive and living practice,” would require much more ethnographic work than I have been able to do thus far.

The future work this points me to would be less about the straightforward uncovering of all these “hidden transcripts” than an investigation of the potential implications such alternative genealogies and political practices may have in shaping new and different versions of the women-centered native nationalism without nation that
Andrea Smith has pointed us to.\textsuperscript{194} This could require reading, in a way, Andrea Smith against herself. Her book \textit{Native Americans and the Christian Right} focuses on political practice as seen in a number of formally organized activist and religious groups. Though she points to unlikely alliances that are not in existence yet, the alliances are largely imagined to be different iterations of formal activist organizations. Such a focus could be read as limited, as she seems to point out herself in her collaborative \textit{Incite! Women of Color} collection \textit{The Revolution Will Not Be Funded}, in which the pitfalls of formal organizations are enumerated and critiqued. This is not to say that formal activist organizations are automatically limiting but that they are not the only places where politics takes place and that perhaps taking into account both the organized and un-organized activism could yield a different view of both.

The above thus points to some possible directions for my dissertation. Yet, even while gesturing towards what could be more redemptive work in the future, it is important, I think, to recognize that this thesis does not, in large part, tell a redemptive story. I asked in my introduction if the models of indigenous citizenship being advanced within the non-profit industrial complex could be re-articulated (in Andrea Smith’s sense) to achieve something more meaningful for indigenous people. The overwhelming answer I come away with from my study is no: CNHA’s model of indigenous citizenship offers very little to anyone besides the leaders of CNHA. Smith’s unlikely alliances, in my view, could find creative strategies to combat CNHA’s policies but would similarly heed Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton’s warning about political coalitions that

replicate rather than fight paternalistic and colonial relationships. My account of CNHA and its annual convention, with leaders deeply tied to extracting benefits on par with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act from the U.S. government and, in very material senses, becoming colonial administrators and entrepreneurs themselves, has offered very little hope for re-articulation.

Indeed, the Akaka Bill, with President Obama’s stated support and a Democratic-majority Congress, is better poised to pass than at any other time in its Republican-embattled history. Other legal decisions whittle away at Kanaka Maoli political hope as well. In the later stages of writing this thesis, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (within a month of the hearing) on the “ceded lands” case referenced briefly throughout this study as an example of a battle for substantive land rights. The Supreme Court’s decision was that the federal Apology Resolution passed by Congress in 1993 had no legal standing, and thus an earlier decision made by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court arguing that the state had no right to sell lands formerly belonging to the Hawaiian monarchy until Native Hawaiian claims to those lands are “put to rest” was overturned.195 Outrage among Kanaka Maoli who viewed the “ceded lands” as a last vestige of hope for future land rights conflicted with more moderate voices who argued it was “much ado about nothing” and at least no Native Hawaiian programs were challenged for being racially-exclusive.196

Yet as this thesis has shown, I believe that there are many reasons why land rights are still so crucial, both materially and symbolically, to Kanaka Maoli communities and that any political agenda that places self-entrepreneurship as a more important goal has little hope of advancing any form of political collective identity beyond that of good American citizenship. Implicitly, this has been a critique not only of CNHA and comparative models of indigenous citizenship like that of the Alaska Federation of Natives, but also of the ways native and other ethnic nationalisms have been dismissed as idyllic or insubstantial by the academy. As I referenced in my introduction, Omi and Winant’s assertion that “the appeal of nationalism in the contemporary U.S. appears to be limited,” is indicative of the erasures of native and other ethnic nationalist practices continuing in the contemporary moment that are common within Ethnic Studies as much any traditional discipline in the U.S. Omi and Winant seem to suggest that only “successful” ethnic movements are worthy of further contemplation in an account of racial formation. Colonialism in the U.S. is no longer important except to Native Americans and Puerto Ricans; thereby, indigeneity and nationalism so easily falls out of the frame of critical race and ethnic studies at its very founding. My point in raising such a brief critique of Omi and Winant again is to suggest that redemptive (“successful”) narratives are not a certain “good” for either political or academic projects. Ultimately, this is why I am not apologetic for finding less than a wealth of productive possibilities. Indeed, what I am urging both indigenous political actors and scholars is to further pursue the un-redempive and the exceptions.

197 Omi and Winant, 47
This returns us to the example I ended Chapter Two with—the point that both indigenous people and queer people have both long been represented as groups that cannot reproduce. Both indigenous and queer people are exceptional by this account, but juxtaposing them in this unlikely alliance foregrounds how unexceptional their ‘exceptions’ really are. By extension, queer and indigenous people are simply at one end of a racialized and gendered spectrum in which blacks, Latino/as, poor whites, and others are consistently represented as reproducing in excess, thus taxing the welfare system. My contention, following Denise Ferreira da Silva’s global-historical, is simply that Ethnic Studies scholarship as much as political organizing must recognize and critique not only “the nation” or the racial and cultural but the scenes of regulation and representation that, in modern thought, are crucial in the interlocked social production of all people, not just an exceptional few.

Of course, we know that both indigenous and queer people can and do reproduce; as much as blacks, Latino/as, poor whites and others do not necessarily ever have children. Yet in my account, I have argued that babies, Native Hawaiian or otherwise, are less important than the creative regeneration of any other number of practices and ontologies. Certainly, it is regeneration rather than the simple reversal and replacement of colonial norms that this study pointed to as necessary in both the politics of CNHA and Kanaka Maoli who are rooted to that bloody 50%. For me, like Smith’s notion of sovereignty, this regeneration is more the “substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” I do not know if the concept of regeneration holds the promise of political transformation, but I do believe it could be, like Espiritu’s notion of homeland, an orientation if not a fixed horizon.
Foucault’s notion of genealogy could offer another way to understand regeneration for Native Hawaiians negotiating the colonial binds of blood quantum, the non-profit industrial complex, and more. Foucault described genealogy as “gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”

Indeed, the meditation on the difficulties and dangers of self-representation Chapter Two ended on points to the ways that racialization for Native Hawaiians draws on a long and twisted history of homesteading passed down from Locke, to the American “frontier” and the checker-boarding of Native American reservations, to an appeasement of the Big Five sugar corporations. The documents (Hawai‘i’s annexation, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, statehood, the Apology Resolution) have been scratched over and recopied many times, with palpable effects upon Kanaka Maoli individuals and families. As Foucault also argues, “the body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration.” The last anecdote I examined, asking how women might respond to being jokingly asked to have a Native Hawaiian baby, was an example of (specifically female-gendered) bodies being inscribed with certain expectations, in order that a Native Hawaiian collectivity might not dissociate and dissolve. I have suggested that recognizing the illusion of unity does not necessarily have to dissolve Native Hawaiian collectivity; in fact, insisting on the

199 Ibid., 148
heteropatriarchal re-inscription on Kanaka Maoli women’s bodies further dissociates this collective.

I bring back Foucault here at the end not only because his work has explicitly and implicitly oriented much of this study, but also because I find his notions of genealogy illuminating not only of how to view the past but also the future. He claims:

The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us. 200

This echoes many of the scholars who have oriented this study, especially Vince Diaz’s insistence that “identity is less about rootedness but more about routedness.” Rather than relying on an authentically rooted Native Hawaiian subject with which to critique the co-opted “good citizens” who lead CNHA, this thesis has attempted to show that all Native Hawaiians are indeed crossed by discontinuities. Yet Kanaka Maoli political practice cannot depend on fixing those discontinuities either through representing every “subaltern” class of subject within Kanaka Maoli communities nor through violent claims towards creating more (50% or more) whole subjects. Rather, I have agreed with Foucault that “effective” genealogies and histories will have to engage in disrupting both “traditional” and more contemporary understandings of how Native Hawaiians come into being.

Foucault argues that this “‘effective’ history will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made

200 Ibid., 162
for understanding; it is made for cutting” (emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{201} I see this thesis as the beginning of more work that engages the historical and the contemporary sphere for Native Hawaiians and indigenous people more generally not in order to provide, as Silva writes, “better historicity,” but in order to use such knowledge “for cutting.” This cutting entails for Foucault the proliferation of counter-memories, “a transformation of history into a totally different form of time”; “ceaselessly multiplying risks”; and “dissolving the unity of the subject.”\textsuperscript{202} My own work will similarly require further Foucauldian genealogies of not only Native Hawaiian ontologies but the very old notions of sovereignty, citizenship and its relationship to land, and the legal and discursive underpinnings of racial formation in Hawai‘i that not even the “new/old” epistemologies heralded by Lisa Kahaleole Hall’s “facing forward toward the past” may be able to shake.\textsuperscript{203} Overall, this future work—as much as this thesis—pursues such dangerous territory not in order to deny Native Hawaiians the “sense of being a people” – which is, in fact, what Smith argues the goal of colonialism is—but to articulate a more flexible, more un-representable and un-fixed sense that is set to both withstand the endless imperial formations launched at Kanaka Maoli in the neo-colonial present but also to be more in keeping with how complicated Kanaka Maoli actually are.\textsuperscript{204} Like Audra Simpson’s insistence that her Kahnawake “do not resist, they are. And the ways that they are can be at times vexing, demanding, resistant, acquiescent and in all ways complex,”

\begin{flushleft}
201 Ibid., 154 \\
202 Ibid., 160, 163 \\
203 Hall, 279 \\
204 Smith, “American Studies Without America: Native Feminisms and the Nation-State,” American Quarterly 60.2 (June 2008) 312.
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Kanaka Maoli deserve both political practices and scholarship that reflect the multiple contradictions that they are.\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{205} Simpson, 54
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