Not All Martyrs or Saints: The Aragonese-Castilian Crusade Against Granada, 1309-1310

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"Not All Martyrs or Saints": The Aragonese-Castilian Crusade against Granada, 1309–1310

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With the advantage of seven hundred years’ hindsight, one can see that the Aragonese-Castilian crusade of 1309–1310 was doomed to failure before it ever began; but there is plenty of evidence that the crusade’s leaders, particularly Jaume II of Aragon, believed at the time that there was every reason for it to succeed, despite the host of difficulties that they realized lay in their way. Their persistence in the face of these obstacles, both man-made and beyond human control, reveals a good deal about crusading attitudes and motivations in the early part of the fourteenth century. An examination of why this crusade failed despite the leaders’ determination provides both an ironic narrative of human perversity and an example of how both large, impersonal forces and individual personality combine to shape history.

A fair amount of study has been done on Aragonese participation in this crusade, which is logical, since Jaume II of Aragon was the prime mover of the undertaking, and the archives of the Crown of Aragon have provided the bulk of pertinent documentation. In addition, there has been some study of the Castilian participation, though generally in a less systematic manner. But oddly enough, no historian so far has seriously considered the inseparability of their crusading efforts, which consisted of two aspects. The first was that, for political reasons, the Aragonese could not have undertaken the crusade that Jaume II so wanted without joint participation by Castile. The second was that the failure of the Castilian share of the crusade was the main cause of the whole enterprise’s collapse. Although the crusade labored under a number of disadvantages from its inception, as will be shown, it might have been able to achieve at least a measure of success, had it not been for three major factors. The first, which neither the Aragonese nor the Castilians could have helped, was unusually bad weather coinciding with their siege opera-
tions against Almería and Algeciras. The second—caused by an unfortunate conjunction of weather, insufficient funds, and overhasty planning, especially by the Castilians—was serious difficulty resupplying and paying the crusaders. Bad weather and supply problems led inevitably to disease and low morale in the siege camps. The third, and decisive, factor was the desertion of several leading Castilian magnates with their forces, a move that so weakened the Castilian army that they were obliged to negotiate a truce with Granada and raise the siege of Algeciras. Once the Castilians had gone home, the Aragonese at Almería had no choice but to do the same.

There were two major political reasons that Jaume II could not crusade in Granada without Castilian participation. First, the 1244 treaty of Almirra between Aragon and Castile had determined that Granada was virtually entirely in Castile’s sphere of influence, so Aragon could not legally undertake conquests of any sort in Granadan territory. Second, and more immediately, Granada was at least nominally a vassal state of Castile. Aragon explicitly had recognized this relationship as recently as 1304, and had promised to respect Granada’s vassalship. An Aragonese attack on Granada would have been interpreted as aggression against Castilian interests. Jaume II, however, had strong motivations for attacking Granada. Therefore he was determined to involve Castile in a joint crusade, thus legalizing his own aggression. He negotiated a separate agreement with Fernando IV of Castile: in return for Aragonese assistance, Castile would grant a sixth of the territory conquered to the Crown of Aragon. Achieving his goal required persuading Fernando that such a campaign against his own vassal was necessary and desirable.

Jaume’s motives were reasonably clear. One was his conviction, often repeated in his documents, that by crusading he was serving God and his own honor. In his letters he regularly characterizes the Almeria-Algeciras campaign as “the service of God,” a designation expanded in a letter to Fernando IV written from the siege camp at Almeria: “You and we have begun these deeds to serve God and to exalt Christianity and to evict the sect of Muhammad from Spain, so that the name of our Lord Jesus Christ may be praised there.” The presence of Muslims in North Africa apparently was not objectionable, for Jaume aggressively pursued diplomatic and trade relations with Morocco, and he even allied with Morocco against Granada in 1309. He nevertheless presented it as a religious obligation to expel Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. In the same letter to Fernando IV, he also designates their campaign as “a benefit and honor to you and to us.” When the Castilian magnates deserted, Jaume wrote to one of them in righteous anger, rebuking him because “the service of God, and the king of Castile, is diminished.”
urges the magnate to go back, "especially for the sake of the king of Aragon's honor."10 Since at least 1304 or 1305, Jaume had entertained schemes for a crusade, against either Sardinia or Granada, which he lost no time in proposing to Pope Clement V when the latter was elected in 1305.11 Aragon's longstanding friendship with Muslim Morocco, and both Morocco and Aragon's annoyance at Granada's expansionist behavior in the western Mediterranean at the start of the fourteenth century, now gave Jaume a practical motivation for making Granada his target.

Before 1295, Granada had been largely on the defensive in the face of Castilian expansionism, in which Castile often had been joined by Aragon. But at the death of Sancho IV, Castile disintegrated into the chaos of a long minority rule and disputed succession. From 1295 until 1302, Granada raided across the frontier almost at will and recaptured a number of castles from the Castilians. A new king, Muhammad III, came to power in Granada in 1302 and seemed content to maintain generally peaceful relations with Castile. Early in 1303 he agreed to recognize the latter's nominal overlordship and to pay yearly tribute, in exchange for retaining all of the territory that Granada had retaken between 1295 and 1302.12 His goal for expanding Granadan influence lay in North Africa and the western Mediterranean instead.

In this ambition, he inevitably clashed with Morocco and the Crown of Aragon. The most notable episode in Granada's attempt to insinuate itself into North African politics began in 1304, when Granada encouraged local malcontents in Ceuta to declare their city independent of Morocco. Morocco, involved in a war against Tlemcen, was not able to do much about the rebellion; and by 1307 Muhammad III was claiming to be lord of Ceuta. During these years he attempted various other interventions in Moroccan politics as well.13 He also allowed incursions into Valencia, notably the burning of Cocentaina in 1304.14 Within months of this episode, the master of the Aragonese Templars was urging Jaume II to attack Granada, "to exalt the faith of Christianity and to put down and diminish the faith of the Cross's enemies, as your grandfather and your father used to do."15 Since the Granadan intervention, Ceuta had become a base for piracy against shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar, a development that particularly concerned Aragon as well.16 Obviously it was in the interests of both Morocco and Aragon to contain and punish Muhammad III's activities. It is hard to tell who first approached the other to hint at an offensive alliance against Granada, but by 1308 serious negotiations were under way between Jaume II and Morocco, which had extricated itself from its war with Tlemcen in the previous year. In 1309, the negotiations culminated in plans for a joint Aragonese-
Moroccan attack on Ceuta, and promises of Moroccan financial aid to, and sanction of, the projected Aragonese-Castilian attack on Granada.\textsuperscript{17}

Jaume II had brokered a peace agreement in 1304 that settled Castile’s internal struggles, as much as they ever could be settled.\textsuperscript{18} Fernando IV had attained his majority. As Aragon’s troubles with Granada increased and Jaume II became attached to the idea of leading a crusade that also would resolve these practical problems, he began at least as early as 1306 to suggest that Castile join him in making such a crusade possible.\textsuperscript{19} Fernando IV at first hesitated. Castile just had emerged from a long period of unrest and civil war; Granada was his vassal, and relations had been peaceful since 1303. As Jaume obviously knew, however, the young king of Castile was easily led; and apparently Fernando also had dreams of emulating his ancestors’ conquests. By late 1307 or early 1308, after a series of summit meetings between the two kings, Fernando had been convinced. The opportunity to fight a holy war, coupled with the prospect of not only winning back the territory lost in 1295–1302 but conquering more, was too glorious to resist. Moreover, Jaume agreed to obtain the pope’s dispensation, albeit retroactively, for Fernando’s marriage to his own cousin, Constanza of Portugal, and to marry Fernando’s daughter, Leonor, to Jaume’s heir.\textsuperscript{20}

The formal alliance was made in Alcalá de Henares on 19 December 1308, accompanied by Fernando IV’s authorization of Jaume II to negotiate with Morocco on their joint behalf. A separate agreement drawn up the same day promised that Aragon should receive a sixth share of Granada, namely Almería; or, failing that, a sixth of whatever territory was conquered. Castile was to supply its share of the warships that would blockade the Granadan port towns of Almería and Algeciras, their initial objectives.\textsuperscript{21} The Alcalá also shows how thoroughly Fernando IV had absorbed Jaume’s crusading idealism:

> Desiring to serve God and follow the path of our forebears; and so that the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ (who has shown and shows great mercy every day) may be exalted here by us; and in order to remove from Spain the unbelievers in the Catholic faith, who are [here] in dishonor to God and to the great harm and danger of all Christendom; and because we never have found any surety or firmness in what they promised ... we will make war by sea and by land upon the king of Granada and his land.

Fernando also promised not to make peace with Granada without Jaume’s “will and consent.” He swore to it all on the cross and the gospels, and involved his personal honor by vowing that if he reneged, he should be considered “worth less than that man who breaks a sworn agreement.”\textsuperscript{22}
Subsequent events proved that, although the practical political and material benefits promised by this crusade were major motivations, each king’s sense of religious mission and personal honor was just as important.

It was more difficult to convince the Castilian magnates that a crusade was desirable. Persuading them to attack Granada was not the problem. They preferred the traditional frontier raiding, however, to the prospective expense and difficulty of organized crusading, which involved ships, siege engines, many horses and men, and vast sums of money. These magnates also discerned the prospective benefit to Aragon in Jaume’s plan, and wondered why they should put themselves out for another crown. Domingo García de Echauri, sacristan of Tarazona and Jaume’s personal envoy to Fernando IV—an observer at the Castilian parliament called at Madrid in the spring of 1309 to seek funding for the venture—reported to his master that his informants among the Castilian procurators “have had advice that they should not besiege Algeciras, but instead should ravage the vega of Granada only and come back afterward.” He complained that “they have judged Diego García,” one of the Castilian treaty negotiators, “to death in the parliament, my lord, saying that he has made Castile a tributary to you, in that you are to have a part of their conquest. . . . I am taking care. . . . to undeceive you about what all the magnates here think: thus, it is reasoned that you have placed the king of Castile in this bad position in order to accomplish your own profit, not considering his.” Even more important, several Castilian magnates looked with marked disfavor on any scheme that might bring their king the prestige of a successful crusader. They preferred that Fernando IV remain weak and subject to their influence.

Chief among the latter were the king’s paternal uncle, the infante Juan (1262–1319), and the king’s cousin Juan Manuel (1282–1347). The infante had a dishonorable record of self-seeking disaffection that had extended to outright rebellion against his father Alfonso X, his brother Sancho IV, and Fernando IV himself during the latter’s minority. He seemed unable to make up his mind whether he wanted to be regarded as Castile’s leading magnate and the chief prop of the state—with commensurate income and influence, of course—or to work for the state’s disintegration, in the hope of making himself the petty king of a detached portion. Instead he tried both by turns. Perhaps his most disgraceful moment had come in 1294 when, though only recently pardoned for treason against Sancho IV, he joined the Moroccan emir Abū Ya‘qūb in besieging Tarifa, conquered by Sancho only two years earlier. Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, whose loyal defense of Tarifa in 1294 won him the epithet el Bueno, was to play an important part—and, in contrast to Juan, a heroic one—in the 1309–1310 crusade. So, indirectly,
would the 1294 siege of Tarifa. Juan Manuel, scion of a cadet branch of the Castilian royal family, was likewise the victim of frustrated pride and ambition. With even less hope of a crown than the infante Juan, Juan Manuel comforted himself with attempts at de facto autonomy as governor of a palatinate Murcia, and with an elaborate personal mythology that depicted his cadet line as superior in honor and moral authority to the line that actually wore the crown. He is better known today as the author of moral fables such as Conde Lucanor and theoretical social treatises such as the Libro de los Estados, which are the products of his later life.

Both of these magnates had been involved in the negotiations between Jaume II and Fernando IV from the beginning, at Jaume’s behest. Knowing how important their cooperation was to the success of his plans, Jaume wrote to each of them with some frequency, urging them to attend the negotiations and to join the campaign. Not only did these magnates command considerable military resources, but the fact was that they could not be trusted to stay behind unsupervised with their king away on crusade. Jaume II commanded a healthy respect from both men, as well as genuine admiration and affection from Juan Manuel. The latter was betrothed to Jaume’s daughter Constança and carried on a regular correspondence with his father-in-law, in which he addressed Jaume in such terms as “a father and a lord for whom I desire long life and good health, and whom I have a great wish to serve and to do everything you ask and think good.” But in this instance it transpired that while Jaume could lead the two Juans to the circle, he could not make them dance. Their defection from the Castilian siege camp would lead to the collapse of his crusade.

The infante Juan and Juan Manuel were signatories to the Alcalá treaty in December 1308, swearing on the cross and on the gospels that they would join their king in his undertaking; “nor shall we consent that or advise the said king of Castile to go against it; in testimony of which, we order our wax seals to be affixed here.” But by the time of the 1309 parliament two months later, they were quarreling with Fernando IV again. Juan Manuel was upset because the king did not want to give him the governorship of Murcia, though “he would be even more needed than before, since there was to be a war; and the governorship would not pertain to any magnate of Castile so well as to him, because his own lands bordered on the realm of Murcia.” Following the infante Juan’s example, he threatened to leave the parliament over the matter; but Jaume II intervened on his behalf, and Juan Manuel received the governorship. The infante also had wanted something he was not getting, namely the town of Ponferrada, and it seems he actually did leave the parliament in a huff. Jaume II proved less sympathetic in that case, describing
himself as “very displeased and astonished by this.” He instructed Domingo García de Echauri, “You should speak to the infante Don Juan on our behalf, and you should tell him . . . that it would please us that he not think of making such a request at this time, or any other request that might cause disruption to these plans.” 35 This approach was effective, for later the infante ended up, together with his rival magnate Juan Núñez de Lara, declaring before the king in full parliament that they would go on crusade, because the evils that they had done in this world were numerous and varied; and if they should die now, while they still had these [on their souls], [at least] they had something by which they might be saved. The mercy of God is very great; therefore, they were preparing themselves in heart and will for those deeds, in such a way that they might save their souls, and that if they should die . . . they might be in the presence of God. 36 The sacristan of Tarazona must have been very convincing.

The procurators of the Castilian towns also required some persuading. Once the project had been explained to them properly, however, they were enthusiastic about it, unlike the magnates. A measure of their initial reluctance might have come from the magnates’ opposition, but their main worry was money, since they would have to provide most of it. It is hard to tell if the towns were sincere in their claims of poverty, or if they were merely on the defensive against royal profligacy. Domingo García de Echauri reported to Jaume II: “The poverty is so great here that they cannot rid themselves of it with subsidies or by milking the land, to such an extent that it makes them disheartened.” 37 On the other hand, although the towns were wary of granting subsidies directly to their king, they were able to put their own militias in the field without noticeable difficulty. Seville, for example, fielded fully equipped naval and land forces which achieved the only Castilian success of the crusade, and which remained in the field longer than their contract demanded. This town’s council also guaranteed repayment of a massive loan for which the king had contracted. These do not sound like the actions of an impoverished community. Yet crusading was a vastly expensive undertaking, especially when nobles and their retinues had to be paid to participate. The fact that a portion of the funds would be given to Aragon also gave the towns’ representatives pause. They insisted that Fernando IV explain his entire battle plan to them. There may have been in their insistence a suspicion that, in light of his history of precarious finances, he really did not intend to use the money for the purpose stated. He satisfied them, however, and despite their obligatory grumbles of poverty, they granted the taxes he requested. 38 In the end, the autonomous town militias that accompanied Fernando IV to Algeciras, most notably Seville’s, did not
waver in their loyalty. When the Castilian envoys to the papal curia passed through Barcelona in the late spring, they reported both the fact that their king had had to explain his plans to his parliament and the assertion that “the people of their land are very determined on this deed.”

These wranglings over participation and finances had left Fernando IV little time to organize his campaign, another shortcoming that his parliament disliked. The sacristan of Tarazona worriedly reported that, because of these shortages of time and ready funds, the king of Castile would probably be able to produce only half the 8,000 cavalry he had promised Jaume. Later Fernando personally told the sacristan that, counting the military orders’ contingents, Castile eventually expected to field 7,000 cavalry. How many were actually present at peak Castilian strength is unknown. The Castilian naval forces were also to encounter financial shortfalls, ascribable in part to the havoc wreaked on their supply lines by the weather and a lack of ready cash. The queen of Castile pawned her jewels at one point to provide the galleys’ crews with a month’s pay. Fernando IV also borrowed 8,900 gold doblas, worth more than 231,000 maravedis, from Genoese merchants resident in Seville, a loan for which that town’s council consented to stand surety. Financial difficulties were hardly confined to the Castilians. From his siege headquarters in one of the Granadan king’s own palaces outside Almería, Jaume II was to write to his brother-in-law the Portuguese king and to Clement V asking for more funds, with indifferent success. He also pressed the emir of Morocco for the naval funds promised in their agreement, and later for Aragon’s share of the spoils after Ceuta was returned to Moroccan control. He got neither. Seven years later, he was still paying for Aragon’s share of the crusade expenses.

But Fernando IV’s revelation of his plans to the Castilian parliament in March 1309 had unfortunate strategic effects as well. Apparently deciding that if he had let the cat out of the bag, he might as well do so with a vengeance, he unilaterally ordered raids across the frontier into Granada. Domingo García de Echauri wrote, “My lord, I very much regret the publication of the business, and even more the beginning of the war, because it happened before the time that had been set and without your knowing about it. He [Fernando IV] told me . . . that he could not get around it for anything.” Some of these raids were carried out by disaffected Granadan noblemen who had entered Fernando’s service when obliged to leave their homeland. Notable among these were the ra’is of Andarax, who had fallen foul of Muhammad III’s chief minister, and a man called al-Maš. With 300 to 400 light horsemen, they raided the area of Alcaudete with great vigor and success, the ra’is rejoining Fernando before the parliament ended in April. In the meantime Fernando
arrested the escort bringing Granada’s yearly tribute payment, and the master of Calatrava essayed his own frontier raids. Not surprisingly, by mid April Granada was in a state of alarm, and wild rumors were flying that a crusade jointly led by the kings of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal was about to descend on them. These rumors had reached Morocco as well, where the common people were not enchanted by the prospect of a fellow Islamic state’s destruction, whatever their emir Abū ’l-Rabī’ might have thought about it.

A forewarned Granada’s first act of self-defense was to get rid of the ruler whose ambitions had made his country the target of the Aragonese-Castilian-Moroccan alliance, and especially the minister who had advised him in this folly. On 14 March 1309 Muḥammad III was deposed by his half-brother Naṣr, said to be the son of a Christian woman. The chief minister, Ibn al-Ḥakim, was stabbed to death and his body torn apart by a hostile crowd. Naṣr sensibly began conciliatory negotiations with both Abū ’l-Rabī’ and disaffected Granadans such as the raʾīs of Andarax. The emir of Morocco received Naṣr’s sister as a wife, and Granada renounced all claim to Ceuta, which its inhabitants surrendered to Abū ’l-Rabī’ on 20 July 1309. Thus Morocco’s chief justification for allying itself with Aragon and Castile evaporated at about the time that the Christians were taking up their siege positions. Furthermore, Granada ceded the towns of Ronda and Algeciras to Morocco as part of their agreement, which put the Castilians in the ironic and awkward position of besieging a town that belonged to their ally. Abū ’l-Rabī’ never gave Granada any extensive military support against his former Christian allies, but he did permit several hundred horsemen to cross the strait to aid Naṣr. His major contribution to Muslim solidarity in this instance was his effective withdrawal from his coalition with Aragon and Castile and his withholding of funds promised earlier to Jaume II. Nevertheless, the Christian ships blockading Algeciras and Almería now had to keep looking over their shoulders for fear of a Moroccan surprise attack.

A generous share of the responsibility for this reversal must be laid at Fernando IV’s door. Worry was voiced at the Castilian parliament in March “that the king of Granada might make an arrangement with the king of Morocco”; but instead of acting cautiously as a result, Fernando acted with impulsive defiance that precipitated the Granadan reconciliation with Morocco. This misstep not only removed a valuable partner from the alliance, for all practical political purposes turning Morocco into a potential enemy, but also undermined the crusade’s position by transforming the siege of Algeciras into an attack against an ostensible ally. Granada’s rapprochement with Morocco would probably have occurred anyway; but without the spur of Fernando’s misguided bravado it would not have been conducted with
such urgency and with such inopportune timing for the crusaders.\textsuperscript{54}

Of course, when the pope granted the crusading indulgences, he had not known about the Moroccan alliance. Jaume and Fernando’s envoys had been extremely careful not to mention it. When he learned about it after the alliance had crumbled, Clement V had the satisfaction of scolding Jaume for having had faith in any Muslim prince’s promises.\textsuperscript{55} Had he known beforehand, the pope never would have granted the indulgences. He had opposed the Granadan crusade all along, and would have welcomed such an unassailable reason for denying the campaign crusade status. As the first of the Avignon popes, Clement V was very concerned with pleasing the French king, who had in mind rather a grand \textit{passagium generale} to the Holy Land, along the lines of Pierre Dubois’s crusade theory, to be led by his brother Charles of Valois. This prospect became Clement’s preferred crusading project, and he did not welcome competing projects from Spanish kings. Ironically, this French-papal crusade proposal ran into at least as many obstacles as the Granada crusade; and by the time it finally departed in 1310, it had dwindled into a minor campaign against Rhodes.\textsuperscript{56}

In the meantime, Jaume faced an uphill diplomatic battle gaining formal crusade status for his campaign against Granada. The curia expressed suspicions that his crusade was only a sham to intimidate Granada, leaving Jaume and Fernando free to collect the tenths at leisure, to spend how they pleased. Annoyed at English, German, French, and Provençal interest in the Granadan crusade, the pope rejected Jaume’s request that Navarrese, Gascons, Provençals, and Toulousains be allowed to join his crusade.\textsuperscript{57} Clement probably refused for political reasons as well as because the Granadan crusade detracted from his own project: Navarre, Gascony, Provence, and Toulouse were all regions in which his French patrons’ jurisdiction was disputed by the Crown of Aragon, Castile, or England. Whether or not foreign crusaders ever participated in the Granada campaign is not clear. Clement V finally granted crusading indulgences to Aragon and Castile over the period of 21 March–8 May 1309, along with other necessary grants and protections; but the indulgences were not as extensive as those Clement authorized for the French-papal crusade, especially those given to people who merely donated money or gave counsel instead of going themselves or providing substitutes. This disparagement was not removed until the crusade was nearly over. Then, in response to Jaume’s repeated requests for funds, the pope granted the full indulgence in place of ready money.\textsuperscript{58} By that point, in November 1309, it was already too late.

The crusade had been scheduled to begin on 24 June 1309.\textsuperscript{59} It comes as no surprise to learn that both the Aragonese and the Castilians were late.
Jaume II sent some forces ahead, probably in late July or early August, and arrived at Almería himself about 15 August.\textsuperscript{60} The Castilians were actually ahead of him. The infante Juan wrote to Jaume on 8 August, informing him that “King Fernando my nephew and I, and many other good men with him, arrived at Algeciras on the Wednesday now past, which was the 30th day of July.”\textsuperscript{61} Fernando had left his capable mother, María of Molina, as regent of Castile in his absence. Exactly who these “many other good men” were is rather problematical. Fernando IV’s chronicle, written a generation after his death, states that Juan Manuel, the lord of Vizcaya Diego López de Haro, and the king’s own brother Pedro came late, an assertion that seems quite probable.\textsuperscript{62} On the other hand, the civil and ecclesiastical levies of Seville, led respectively by Alonso Pérez de Guzmán and Seville’s warrior archbishop Fernando Gutiérrez Tello, were certainly there on time, as were Juan Núñez de Lara and his following; for these three commanders and their forces were detached soon after arriving to besiege Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{63} Judging from other documents and the chronicle’s account of those who accompanied the infante Juan and Juan Manuel in their desertion, also present at one time or another between August and November were the infante’s elder son Alfonso, Fernán Ruiz de Saldaña, Fernán Pérez Ponce de León, the archbishop of Toledo, the master of Calatrava and his knights, and Gonzalo Sánchez de Troncones. The \textit{Anales de Sevilla} calls the latter man the field commander, \textit{adalid mayor}, of the Sevillian militia; in a document drawn up at the siege itself, Fernando IV refers to him as “the vassal of King Abū ‘l-Rābi’,” and rewards him for “notable services that he did for me, especially at this siege of Algeciras.” He certainly could have been both.\textsuperscript{64} The Castilian naval forces were already in position when Fernando arrived, commanded by Jaspert, viscount of Castellnou. Jaspert was actually Jaume II’s subject and had been the chief Aragonese negotiator with Morocco in 1308–1309; but he was officially named admiral of Castile about the beginning of October 1309.\textsuperscript{65} He remained loyal to Jaume despite the Castilian appointment, for on 22 October he wrote a detailed report for him on the deplorable state of the Castilian forces, in which he wished he might be under Jaume’s command in any battle rather than where he now was.\textsuperscript{66}

There is no narrative account of the siege of Algeciras. Some idea of how the Castilians might have conducted the siege can be gained from the account of an earlier, and just as disastrous, Castilian siege of the same town in 1278–1279. The best description is in Alfonso X’s chronicle, written in the mid fourteenth century, but based on an earlier written source. Although a Muslim account also exists, in the fourteenth-century \textit{Rawd al-Qirās} of Ibn Abī Zar‘, it is more an exercise in literary topoi than a recounting of events.\textsuperscript{67}
In this earlier siege also, the Castilians suffered from a lack of funds and resultant supply problems, which led to unspecified disease in their camp, as well as to scurvy and low morale aboard the blockade fleet. When a Moroccan naval force arrived to relieve Algeciras, the Castilians were unable to resist it. The Castilians either burned or scuttled their own fleet to keep it out of enemy hands, and the Moroccans massacred or took captive all of its survivors.

There are, however, accounts of the Aragonese siege of Almería. Ramon Muntaner’s *Crònica*, written about fifteen years after this crusade, devotes two of its briefer chapters to it, in an episodic and selectively edited fashion. A Muslim account, Ahmad Ibn al-Qādi’s *Durra't al-Hijāl*, gives a lively version of events from the point of view of the besieged. The major event in the siege was the battle on St. Bartholomew’s eve, 23 August, when a superior force of Granadan cavalry attacked the Aragonese camp in an attempt to break the siege, but were driven off. Jaume II viewed this success as a sign of God’s favor and fired off exultant letters the next day to Fernando IV, the kings of Portugal and France, the pope, and many other notables. He was to make much of this battle after his crusade had failed, replying to the pope’s criticisms: “All the power of the king of Granada, which was from five thousand to six thousand horsemen, was defeated on the field... by people who were not half their number.” He claimed that, as a consequence, Muslims would be afraid to meet Christian armies in open battle in the future. There were several more skirmishes, one only a week after this battle, but they were essentially inconclusive. Jaume’s military concerns mostly were taken up with siege engines, attempts to undermine Almería’s walls, and writing begging letters in his quest for improved finances. Every so often the Aragonese would try to storm the walls, and the defenders would drive them away, either with the traditional boiling oil or by setting fire to their siege engines. In a skirmish in late September or early October, the Almerians discouraged one such attempt by emptying the contents of the town’s cesspits on the attackers. Ibn al-Qādi comments on this episode, “This was a great success because it brought together two things of the same sort... This device proved more effective than combat, and Allah by this means brought a respite to the Muslims.” The Aragonese did manage to breach a section of wall on 6 December, but they were beaten back. By then it was too late, anyway, for the Castilians already were negotiating their withdrawal.

Despite all of their disadvantages, the Castilians too enjoyed a success in August. The Sevillians besieged Gibraltar by sea and land for most of the month, until the town agreed to surrender under treaty on 12 September. Fernando IV traveled there in early October to make his first and only
triumphal entry and to give his new town an official charter. The archbishop of Seville consecrated Gibraltar’s mosque as a Christian church. Seville later received several royal grants of privilege as rewards for this success. Each grant document praised the town’s loyal service:

For the many good services that we have received from the council of the very noble city of Seville . . . in defending and protecting our land from our enemies, both against Muslims and against Christians, as much as they could; and notably in this siege that we were in just now at Algeciras, and in the conquest of Gibraltar, in which we received many services from them: both with their bodies and with their belongings, with which all of them as one, and each by himself, relieved us when we had great need; and because they did not want to leave our service, even though they had done their time.  

It was not to last. Just a week after Gibraltar’s formal surrender, Alonso Pérez de Guzmán was killed in a Muslim ambush in the Sierra Gaučín while trying to keep Castilian supply routes open to Gibraltar. If his later biographers are correct, he fell victim to an old Granadan battle ruse, a feigned retreat called by the Castilians the tornafluhe. Juan Manuel describes this technique in his Libro de los Estados, with repeated warnings about how fatal it could be to be taken in by this ruse. Losing so valuable a commander, to an old trick that a man with his long experience of fighting for and against Muslims should have seen through, must have been a severe blow to Castilian confidence.

But more damaging than the loss of a single leader, no matter how famous, were the adverse weather conditions and their disruption of both Castilian and Aragonese supply lines. Fernando IV’s chronicle claims that, beginning some time that autumn, “for a good three months it never stopped raining.” While this claim is no doubt exaggerated, it is a fact that the crusade was hampered by extremely bad weather. It is possible to piece together from disparate sources a general chronology and description of the crusade’s meteorological misfortunes and their results. Several sources remark on the strength of the wind. Early in his account of the siege of Almería, Ibn al-Qāḍi details how well-stocked the town was with provisions, whereas the besiegers suffered from a lack of supplies. No doubt Fernando IV’s premature opening of hostilities had given them ample warning to prepare for a siege. Their predicament occurred because “Allah caused a wind to blow from the west for two months, which prevented Christian merchant ships from sailing, cutting off supplies to such an extent that they all went hungry.” In his report to Jaume II on 22 October, Jaspert also speaks of wind: “My lord . . . since I left you at the siege of Almería, until the next
Monday in Algeciras, there has been a great wind and also the levanter, which lasted until the day after St. Luke’s, in such a fashion that I could send no word to you.”

At first glance, these accounts appear to contradict each other. Ibn al-Qādī speaks of a strong wind from the west that did not allow merchant ships to approach the shore from the sea, which was east of the besieged towns. Jaspert speaks of a levanter, a wind from the east. In fact, there is not necessarily a contradiction. Ibn al-Qādī refers to the first part of the siege, which effectively began in August. Jaspert, on the other hand, is writing about the weather in October. His most recent departure from Jaume’s presence, to which he refers, was shortly after his appointment as admiral of Castile. In a letter dated 6 October, Jaume commends Fernando IV for having made this appointment, adding, “we have kept him for a few days now because we needed some things done that we could not avoid.” Therefore the departure Jaspert mentions, and the beginning of the levanter, occurred not long after 6 October. Jaspert says that he reached his new post at Algeciras on a Monday. The sixth was in fact a Monday, but context indicates that he probably meant the following Monday, 13 October. This levanter lasted until the day after St. Luke’s, 19 October. This would indicate a Mediterranean storm of approximately a week’s duration. The picture that emerges is of two months of fairly steady, strong westerly winds beginning about the time that the crusade arrived, and continuing well into October; then Jaspert’s week-long levantar picked up where Ibn al-Qādī’s westerlies had left off.

Jaspert’s report confirms Ibn al-Qādī’s assertion about the effects of the two-month westerlies on Christian naval supply lines. Describing the state of the Castilian fleet he now commanded off Algeciras, he laments,

Also, I let you know, my lord, that the galleys have no private or official word about their bread or their pay. Instead, my lord, there is a great danger and great suspicion among all the fleet of disarming. There could be enough bread for the fleet for all this month of October. Eight hundred rovas of flour are supposed to be coming from En Aimerich, according to what he says. You see, my lord, all the provisions that we have. I believe I can stretch out the men’s pay until 15 November; but may it please you, my lord, see to it that they send bread all this time. Furthermore, I don’t believe I can stretch out the pay one day more.

He also requests that Jaume send him “two or three hundred lengths of heavy cloth,” since some of his men were virtually naked. The land forces probably were not in much better shape.

The wind shift in mid October seems to have brought the rain. Jaspert
writes, "It has been raining a good eight days now." He might have meant either exactly eight days, or else approximately a week; but either way it is clear that the rains started about 14 October, at the same time the levanter arrived. Unfortunately, no such documents as this one are available for the period following 22 October, so it is not possible to check how accurately Fernando IV’s chronicle reports the magnitude and duration of the rains. Its general description implies that Jaspert’s mid-October levanter was only the first in a series of storms that poured in off the Mediterranean: "Provisions could not be had, by sea or by land, on account of the great storminess at sea and the great abundance of water that made it impossible for anyone to travel by land." It may not have rained unceasingly for three months, as the chronicle claims, but even a series of storms spread out over that period would have been devastating, especially in an area as unused to heavy rainfall as the southern tip of the peninsula.

In addition to the serious supply problems it caused, the rain contributed to disease in the siege camps, which were at best none too sanitary. None of the sources gives details on this, though Fernando IV’s chronicle says that one of the Castilian magnates, Diego López de Haro, was taken fatally ill during this rainy period. It is not clear exactly when he fell ill, but he died in late January, well after the infante Juan and Juan Manuel had deserted. Fernando already was negotiating with Granada; and when the doctors informed him that the lord of Vizcaya was dying, the king knew that the loss of this magnate as well spelled the end of his hopes of conquest, so he agreed to the Granadans’ terms. What the chronicle does not explain directly is that the heir to Vizcaya was Diego’s niece Maria, who was the infante Juan’s wife. Not only was Fernando losing the magnate, but control of Vizcaya would pass to the deserter infante, increasing his potential to create unrest. Diego was not a particularly old man at the time of his death, so it is not unlikely that he died as the result of disease endemic to a rain-soaked siege camp.

The supply problems undoubtedly were the gravest effect of the autumn storms. Juan Manuel was to write in his Libro de los Estados that "If [the Christians] are going to undertake to besiege some place [of the Muslims] ... after they shall have besieged it, [they should] do battle with siege engines as well as with the army’s guard and with all of the other things that are necessary. ... But the most certain thing is that the lord or captain of the army must watch out that, when the place is to be besieged, he arrange that neither provisions nor money be lacking; for should he lack any of these things, he would have to leave the siege—if no profound miracle should occur—with less benefit and less honor than he should merit." There would be no
at Algeciras and Almería, though not for want of praying. The chronicle says that "in the time that these floods occurred, the very noble queen [mother] Maria, who was governing the realms in Castile and León for the king, understanding that there was great inconvenience to the king and to the people who were there at that siege because of the abundance of water that the rain caused, ordered that all of the religious orders hold processions and pray to God to take away those floods."\textsuperscript{50} This order to hold processions is the only hint that anyone involved with this crusade ever admitted to doubts that the series of disasters dogging it from its inception, and especially the freakish weather, might be signs of divine disapproval.\textsuperscript{91} Even then, it originated with someone not actually present at either siege. If any of the crusade’s leaders entertained doubts of this nature, they did not express them publicly. To the end, Jaume insisted that he was serving God. Even after the Castilian magnates’ desertion, and in the midst of rain and disease and supply shortages, he exhorted Fernando IV to persevere in the “good intent that you have to continue and to carry on in the future these deeds that you and we have begun to the service of God. Certainly, O king, the greater part of your honor and your well-being is tied up in these undertakings. We beg and advise you not to alter any part of that intent.”\textsuperscript{92} Even when the crusade had definitively collapsed, both kings petitioned the pope to extend the grant of crusading tenths, so that they could attempt another crusade. Several months later, so did the archbishop of Seville. Clement V, not unexpectedly, refused.\textsuperscript{93} Instead of invoking the excuse of divine opposition, which would have been tantamount to an admission that their cause was unworthy, the crusaders blamed human agents for their failure. So did later chroniclers.

Everyone had a favorite target. Aragonese and Catalan chroniclers unequivocally blamed Fernando IV in particular and Castilians in general. Ramon Muntaner declares it was Fernando’s fault because he raised the siege of Algeciras without first telling Jaume II. Muntaner then expands this theme, referring to Castilians as “a people in whom [Jaume] should find no worth,” noting “the great ingratitude that the Castilians had shown him.”\textsuperscript{94} The \textit{Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña} (ca. 1370) presents Fernando IV as bought off by the Muslims, with the mediation of “certain barons of Castile,” and comments, “A transgression of this sort was not a new thing with the Castilians, for treating oaths in this fashion is almost hereditary with them.”\textsuperscript{95} Fernando IV’s chronicler, confronted by the situation of Castilian magnates’ desertions leading to a Castilian withdrawal that wrecked the crusade, falls back on that favorite medieval excuse: “some men . . . went around sowing discord” between the king and the magnates.\textsuperscript{96} No one blamed the Granadans, however, for that would mean admitting a defeat at Muslim hands.
Nevertheless, an analysis of contemporary documents makes it clear that, along with the problems caused by foul weather and insufficient supplies, the Castilian magnates' desertion was what really ended the crusade. The infante Juan and Juan Manuel were not alone in their desertion; but they were the crucial deserters, and their contemporaries knew it. If Fernando IV's chronicle is correct, they took five hundred horsemen with them, or roughly half the Castilian cavalry. Fernando's brother Felipe and the archbishop of Santiago were able to bring in four hundred replacements, but with the added complications caused by the lord of Vizcaya's death, this number proved insufficient. But if their desertions' results are known, their exact timing and motivations are harder to establish.

Early in October, Juan Manuel was still in the Castilian camp, publicly avowing his enthusiasm for the campaign. Jaume II's letter to Fernando IV on 6 October says that Jaspert had informed him "that the noble Don Juan, son of the infante Don Manuel, is thinking about how much more he might serve you; and that pleased us very much because we have sent to beg him to continue to serve you." But by the time of Jaspert's report on 22 October, the infante Juan was eager to leave, and Juan Manuel with him. Apparently the only thing making them hesitate was fear of Jaume's reaction, but the infante was already working on a face-saving measure. By 22 November, both were long gone. Before that date, Fernando IV had sent his messenger to alert Jaume to the desertions; and Juan Manuel—undoubtedly from a safe distance—had sent his own messenger to his father-in-law with a letter explaining his and the infante's actions, to which Jaume replied with cold anger on 22 November. The most that can be said is that they departed at the end of October or the beginning of November. It was not long after the rains began, and the timing was probably not coincidental.

It is difficult to determine what caused these magnates to desert, not least because they kept changing their stories in attempts to exculpate themselves and appease Jaume's anger. Jaspert's report of his conversation with them in mid October is the closest thing to an objective source, and it indicates that one of their chief motivations was financial. Another cause, considering the magnates' histories of animosity to recent kings of Castile, was a welter of personal emotions including hurt pride, fear, and sheer dislike. This is harder to untangle than the financial motive, and the shifts in the magnates' self-justifications obscure the issue further; but it is evident that neither king nor magnates needed any third party to sow discord between them.

Jaspert reports that Fernando IV had promised Juan Manuel 100,000 morabatins as his salary for going on crusade; but as of 22 October, payment was twenty days in arrears, and the king owed 26,000 morabatins. Further-
more, the infante Juan’s salary, (total unspecified) was five days in arrears. Both men said that they could not endure this situation any longer: “The infante Juan especially said this.” Jaspert’s emphasis is interesting, for while Juan Manuel had gone without his pay much longer than the infante, it was the latter who expressed the greater resentment. Jaspert’s report depicts the infante as the leader of the pair, especially when it came to doing the talking.  

This seems to have been Jaume’s impression as well. When he sums up the magnates’ side of the story in September 1310, in a letter to Domingo García de Echauri, the bulk of it consists of the infante’s complaints of his treatment by Fernando IV.  

The same pattern had manifested itself earlier, at the Castilian parliament in the spring of 1309, when Juan Manuel had offered to imitate the infante’s example of leaving the assembly when he did not get what he wanted.  

Years later, Juan Manuel delicately alluded to the entire episode as “a dispute that King Fernando and his uncle the infante Juan had between them,” in which Juan Manuel himself “came to the aid of the infante Juan, since he was his cousin.” He describes his relationship with the infante revealingly: “They loved each other more than any other men in the world.”  

This personal loyalty to the infante Juan helps to explain how Juan Manuel could have been expressing his enthusiasm at the month’s beginning, only to plan desertion by mid month.

The unpaid salaries also help clarify the situation. Juan Manuel’s eagerness to serve coincided roughly with the period just before his pay ceased. Once his salary arrangements altered, so did his attitude. It did not take long after his own salary fell into arrears for the infante Juan to decide to leave, although he probably had other considerations as well. Why they were not paid is not stated, but it is likely that shipping difficulties caused by the weather were to blame, as Fernando IV’s chronicle says.  

Or perhaps the Castilian king’s overall financial problems were to blame. Either way, their wages went unpaid, and the arrears could only have grown worse by the time the two magnates deserted. This supply and payment problem was at the root of other defections as well. Jaspert mentions, as a preamble to lamenting his supply shortages, that some people already had jumped ship.

Jaspert notes one other problem that the infante Juan claimed was making his position untenable, though the admiral voices a certain skepticism about its authenticity. In a private meeting between Jaspert and the two Juans, the infante told him, “En Jaspert, you have ordered us to stay, as the king of Aragon has ordered us to stay; but I am sure that the king of Castile wishes to kill me.” The infante proceeded to present all his reasons for thinking this, but unfortunately Jaspert was too discreet to put them in his report. He also might not have believed this assertion, for he comments, “He said all the
reasons for such a thing, my lord, so that he might be able to go, and that none of them might be able to tell lies about him." These are the only reasons Jaspert gives for the two magnates’ desire to flee, an important point because later, when they were trying to excuse themselves to Jaume II, they never mentioned money or an assassination threat. Instead, they pleaded that Fernando IV had dishonored them, so that they had had no choice but to leave.

They were plausible enough that Jaume gave them the benefit of the doubt and instructed his messenger to Fernando to “advise the said king of Castile that he should apologize for giving them and their friends cause to have been stirred up to his disservice.” On the other hand, Jaume gave these instructions on the same day, 22 November, that he wrote his chastising letter to Juan Manuel, accusing the deserters of having done disservice to God and to the king of Castile, and of having made all Christendom murmur. The letter to Juan Manuel contains some harsh reproaches for the infante as well, referring with irony both to the infante’s crusading enthusiasm voiced at the 1309 parliament, and to the numerous times he had sought refuge in Aragon—an allusion to how often Juan had had to flee Castile as a traitor. Jaume wrote both letters after he had heard the deserters’ version of events from their messenger. He evidently did not know whom to believe, and was angry at both Fernando IV and the deserters for endangering his crusade. At this point, he was also displeased with Fernando for having entered into negotiations with Granada, an event to which he alluded in his envoy’s instructions. Jaume still had not decided who was telling the truth by September 1310, when he sent Domingo García de Echauri instructions to inquire into the matter. In his letter of instruction, Jaume sums up the magnates’ story for his envoy’s reference, and cautions him strictly not to show the letter to Fernando or to any other person.

Because Jaume remained in the dark for so long, and both Fernando and the two Juans tailored their testimonies to fit their needs, it is hard to say what the deserters’ true motives were, apart from money. They might not have known themselves. In his summation, Jaume cites the infante Juan’s claims that Fernando had dishonored him and Juan Manuel by not associating with them and by taking their rivals’ advice over theirs, which made them appear untrustworthy. The king had also allowed them to be criticized in his presence. Although he had not criticized them himself, he had not put a stop to it either, which had seemed tacit endorsement. Most interesting, however, is the assertion that Fernando had initially promised that when Algeciras should be taken, the infante should hold both that town and Tarifa. When Juan Núñez de Lara and Diego López de Haro had learned of this plan, they informed the king that they would renounce their allegiance if he did any such
thing, so he revoked his promise. This conflict had led to the open criticism and mockery.\textsuperscript{111}

In view of the infante’s past associations with Tarifa and treachery, and with Alonso Pérez de Guzmán’s death fresh in everyone’s mind, Juan Núñez’s and Diego López’s reaction would have been understandable. One can only wonder what desperation would have led Fernando to make such a promise, if indeed the king—and not the infante’s opinion of what was due him—was the one to make it. Had the king offered Tarifa to his uncle, it would have been surprising if there had not been open criticism and mocking allusions to the 1294 siege, directed at the villain of the piece and anyone associated with him. The infante’s discomfiture over the withdrawal of the offer would only have added to his opponents’ scorn. As for the other charges, there certainly was a good deal of rivalry between the king’s barons. Those who had arrived on time and served faithfully, such as Juan Núñez, would have been more favored advisers than the king’s untrustworthy uncle or Juan Manuel. They would have lost no opportunity to emphasise their own loyalty to the infante’s and his protege’s disadvantage. The king might not have actually threatened to have his uncle assassinated, but the infante’s record of risking execution every time he rebelled had probably made him very sensitive to royal dislike, especially when he knew he was contemplating disloyalty. One of his uncles had been executed for treason by Alfonso X; and Juan had come perilously close himself in 1288, when his brother Sancho IV personally came after him with a sword. He was saved only by María of Molina’s intervention.\textsuperscript{112} Bare mention of the fate traitors deserved might have been enough to convince the infante that his nephew really was planning to kill him.

Whatever its true causes, the magnates’ desertion and Diego López de Haro’s death finished the process that the weather and supply problems had begun. By the latter part of November, Fernando IV was negotiating with Nasr of Granada; by December they reached an accord that both parties could temporarily accept. Castile was to lift the siege and go home. This meant that the Aragonese would of course have to do the same. In exchange, Fernando IV would get back most of the major castles seized by Granada between 1295 and 1302, while Granada would acknowledge itself Castile’s vassal and pay tribute. Castile also got to keep Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{113} As Jaume II’s letter of 22 November shows, the king of Aragon did know about Fernando’s capitulation, though he was not pleased by it. But he could do nothing if Castile unilaterally, and in contravention of the treaty of Alcalá, decided to pack up and go home. Eventually he had no choice but to negotiate with Nasr himself, which he did at the end of December.\textsuperscript{114} On 25 January 1310 Jaume
wrote to various notables, announcing the truce that Fernando had declared for both of them; he himself left the next day for Valencia. Aragon, which had been the crusade’s initiator all along, essentially got nothing for its efforts. Castile at least got some territory and several years’ tribute from Granada, which no doubt accounts for the Aragonese chronicler’s resentment.

Fittingly, the crusade that had begun and proceeded in disaster, ended that way too. There were not enough ships to carry all of the Aragonese home at once, so many men had to stay at Almería under Granadan protection. According to a letter Naṣr sent to Jaume on 9 March 1310, they destroyed all the trees in the area where they were kept, and even burned down a number of buildings, including the palace that Jaume had used as a headquarters. They would have starved if Naṣr had not ordered that they be fed. The Aragonese grew tired of waiting and set out to march to Valencia, a journey of six to ten days through Granadan territory. Not surprisingly, few of them made it home, and Naṣr disclaimed all responsibility for them. The Aragonese siege engines also encountered transportation problems. Some, put into Jasper’s care, arrived in Aragon safely. But Jaume had entrusted others to Fernando IV, to be taken to Gibraltar and transshipped. In March, Jaume received an apologetic letter from Fernando, informing him that the Castilian agent entrusted with shipping the siege engines had turned traitor and sold them to the Algeciras, along with every Castilian siege engine in Tarifa. As Juan Manuel wrote in later life, those Christians who go to fight in the land of the Muslims “are not all martyrs or saints.”

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NOTES

1. In this paper, persons clearly identifiable as Castilian have their names spelled in the Castilian manner, as do ethnic Aragonese. Catalan names have a Catalan spelling. Muslim names have been rendered according to standard modern English transliteration. The names of popes and saints have been given in English, as have place-names more familiar to an English-speaking reader in their English spellings, such as Seville. Although Jaume II was king of Aragon and Valencia, but court of Barcelona, etc., he was commonly referred to in the documents used in this study as simply the king of Aragon. This paper does the same, for simplicity's sake; likewise for Fernando IV, here called the king of Castile. The documents refer to a "king" of Granada, so for convenience this paper does also. They sometimes call the ruler of Morocco "emir," so that is the title used here.


5. Benavides, Memorias 2, docs. 416–419.

6. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 479: "Vos et nos por servir á Dios habemos estos fechos comenzados et por exaltar xisptiandat et quitar la secta de Mahomat de Espanya quel nombre de nuestro senyor Jhesu Xrispto y sea loado." See also Andrés Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel: biografía y estudio crítico (Saragossa: La Académica, F. Martínez-Audiencia, 1932), docs. 198–199.

7. Andrés Giménez Soler, El sitio de Almería en 1309 (Barcelona: Casa Provincial de Caridad, 1904), doc. 11.

8. Ibid.

9. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 479: "Pro et honra de vos et de nos."

10. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 198: "Senyaladamente por honra del Rey de Aragon."


16. Ladero Quesada, Granada, 116-17.
18. This was the peace of Agreda, 9 August 1304. See Benavides, Memorias 2, docs. 281–283.
19. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 162.
22. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 416: “Cobdiçando servir á Dios et seguir la carrera de nuestros anteçessores, et que la fé de nuestro senor Jhesu Xispto sea ensalçada por nos aqui el mucha merced á fecho et face cada dia et per sacar de España los descreyentes de la fé catholica qui estan en deshonrra de Dios et a grand daño et peligro de toda la Xristiandat, et porque ninguna seguridad ni firmeza en lo que prometian nunca avemos fallado... que nos faremos guerra por mar et por tierra contra el rey de Granada et su tierra.” “Valamos menos así como aquell qui quebranta jura pleito.”

23. This sacristan of Tarazona was an Aragonese, to judge from his name and the language in which he wrote his reports to Jaume II. Echauri is a form of a name borne by several towns in the area of Jaca, and is a variant of the Basque name Javier.
24. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (17 March 1309): “Avian avido conseio de no cercar a Aljazira sino tan solament talar la vega de Granada et tornarse luego.” “A Diego Garcia cuydaron sennor adozir a muert en la Cort diziendole quel abia fecho Castiella tributaria de vos en aver parte en la conquista lur... Cuyo... tener manera de como seades desengannado que aca todos los grandes homnes entiende/n/ e así se razona que vos avedes puesto al Rey de Castiella en est mal por fazer vuestro pro no catando lo suyo.” In his book, Giménez Soler combines several documents under the heading “X.” For clarity’s sake, each will be designated henceforth by both his number and the document’s actual date.


26. Ballesteros Beretta, Alfonso X 1006, 1016, 1023, 1053-1054; Gaibrois de Ballesteros, Sancho IV 2: 206–210, 214, n. 2; Benavides Memorias 1, 294, 297.

27. The traditional story is that Juan held Alonso’s twelve-year-old son hostage, threatening to kill the boy if Alonso did not surrender Tarifa. When Alonso continued steadfast, Juan stabbed the boy to death before his father’s eyes (Gaibrois de Ballesteros, Alfonso X 2, 326–327, 332, 335–338). Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 102, prints a document, dated 13 October 1297, that supports this version of events. Another story is told about Juan’s having used this bargaining technique, albeit successfully, against the chatelaine of Zamora in 1282 (Benavides, Memorias 1, 292. Ballesteros Beretta, Alfonso X, 958. Gaibrois de Ballesteros, Sancho IV 2, 332).

29. Ibid., docs. 181, 187–188.
30. Ibid., doc. 192.
31. They were betrothed in 1306, when Constança was six and Juan Manuel 24.
She was placed in his custody, and the marriage consummated, in 1312.

32. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 188: “A padre e a sennor para quien codicio mucha vida e mucha salut a quien he muy grand voluntad de seruir e faser todas cosas que manderdes e por bien tovierdes.”

33. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 416: “Et non consintamos nin conseiamos que el dicho rey de Castilla y venga contra et en testimoio mandamos y poner nuestros seillos de cera colgados.”

34. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 192: “Mas obs seria ara que anch no fo pus que la guerra ere et que a nyuell richom de Castella no pertanya tan be ladelantament com a ell perque la sua terra marcaua ab terra de Murcia.” See also doc.193; Gimenez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (17 March 1309).

35. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 193: “Desplogonos muyto e nos ende maravellamos.” “Fabledes de part nuestra con el dicho infante don Johan e quel digades . . . que nos plazera que a este tiempo non deue el catar de faser tal demanda ni otra que turbamiento alguno dar pueda a estos fechos.”

36. Ibid., doc. 192: “Molts e diuerses eren los mals que ells auies feit en est segle e que si aras murien que ja tenien quies poguesen salir jas fos e sie que la merce de Deu es molt gran e aixi que eren de cor e de voltentat de menarse en aquests fets de tal guisa que ells saluarien lurs animes e que sis murien que...axi liso lexas Deus complir.”

37. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (14 April 1309): “La pobreza es tanta daca que no la pueden con servicios ni con destragamiento de la tierra tirar dessi de manera que los faze descorazonar.”


39. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 195: “Los de la su tierra eran de este fetcho muy volunterosos.” This document is undated, but internal evidence suggests a date ca. May 1309.

40. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (14 April 1309). See also Benavides, Memorias, 2, doc. 532. Fernando IV’s chronicle hints that there may have been only about 1000 cavalry in the Castilian camp by November (Crónica del reinado del rey D. Fernando Cuarto, in Biblioteca de Autores Españoles 66, ed. Cayetano Rosell [Madrid: Atlas, 1953], 163–164.) See also n. 96 below.

41. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 203.

42. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 532.

43. Ibid., docs. 461, 466, 486.

44. Ibid., docs. 446, 476.


46. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (17 March 1309): “Et yo senyor calonyel mucho el publicar del fecho e mas el commençar de la guerra porque se fizo ante del tiempo que era puesto e sin que vos no lo supieste e dixome ... que por al non pudo passar.”

47. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (14 April 1309); Juan Manuel, doc. 192. The name al-Maš is a tentative reconstruction of Catalan “Elmaex.” It may have some
connection to a Berber tribe, the Massa. My thanks are due to Robert I. Burns, S.J., for his expert help in reconstructing this name.

48. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (14 April 1309); Juan Manuel, doc. 192.

49. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 192.

50. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (10 April 1309).

51. Ibid., (14 April and 10 April 1309). See also ibid., 48–49. Harvey, Islamic Spain, 169-170.

52. Giménez Soler, Sitio, docs. 9–10; pp. 49–56; 63. Harvey, Islamic Spain, 172; Cristobal Torres Delgado, El antiguo reino nazarí de Granada (1232–1340) (Granada: Anel, 1974), 242. It is not clear if the ra'is of Andarax returned to Granada. He refused Naṣr’s first offer of reconciliation. (Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 [14 April 1309])

53. Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 (17 March 1309): “Quel Rey de Granada faga adobo con el Rey de Marruecos.”

54. He may have thought that, with these border raids and diplomatic insults, he was diverting Granada’s attention from the crusade’s real objectives. A request from Granada for a brief truce after the raids had begun might have confirmed him in such an opinion. (Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 [14 April 1309]) This request more likely was a Granadan ruse to buy time for defensive preparations. As shown by the report of Artal d’Açlòr, Jaume II’s man in Cartagena, the Granadans already knew by April that a crusade (gran croada de crestians) was coming, even if they were confused about its exact makeup. (Giménez Soler, Sitio, doc. 10 [10 April 1309])


56. Not least of the French-papal crusade plan’s troubles were financial shortfalls and the abrupt removal of the Templars and their resources by their extended heresy trial that began, at the French king’s behest, late in 1307. The project was scaled back until it became an expedition to aid Christian Armenia against the Turks, and it was entrusted almost completely to the Hospitalers. Jaume II warned the pope that the Hospitalers would divert the crusade to help their conquest of Rhodes. His warnings were dismissed, but when the Hospitaler crusade departed in early 1310, they proved accurate. See Finke ed., Acta Aragonensis 3, docs. 88, 91; Housley, “Pope Clement V,” 30–33.


59. Benavides, Memorias 2, doc. 416.

60. Giménez Soler, Sitio, 103.

61. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, doc. 196: “El Rey don Fernando mio sobrino e yo e otros muchos omnes bonos con el llegamos a Algesira miercoles que agora
paso que fueron treynta dias deste mes de julio." Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernandó*, 163, gives the date of arrival as 27 July. Most modern historians repeat unquestioningly.

63. Diego Ortiz de Zúñiga, *Anales eclesiásticos y seculares de la muy noble y muy leal ciudad de Sevilla* [1677], ed. Antonio María Espinosa y Carzel, 3 vols. (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1795), vol. 2, 36–37, has an extensive list of the town's leading men who participated in this siege, including most of the town council; Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernandó*, 163.

64. Benavides, *Memorias* 2, doc. 477: "Gonzalo Sanches de Troncones, vasallo del rey Aboarrabe, por servicios señalados que me fiso señaladamente sobre esta cerca de Algesira." Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernandó*, 163. Ortiz de Zúñiga, *Anales de Sevilla* 2, 37. Benavides, *Memorias* 2, docs. 487, 490. Gonzalo Sánchez de Troncones had been a companion of Alonso Pérez de Guzmán and other Castilian knights who had entered the service of the Moroccan emir Abū Yūsuf in 1276. Most of these men returned to Castile in 1288–1291, but evidently he maintained a foot on either shore, or else went back later.


70. Giménez Soler, *Sitio*, doc. 13: "Tot lo poder del Rey de Granada qui eren de V. a VI. mille homens a cavall foren vençuts en camp ... per gens que no eren la meytat dells."


73. Ibid., 176–77.

74. Benavides, *Memorias* 2, docs. 502–503: "Por muchos servicios buenos que nos avemos rescebidos del concejo de la muy noble cibdat de Sevilla ... detender et amparar la nuestra tierra de nuestros enemigos tambien contra moros como contra Xpianos quanto ellos podieron et señaladamente en esta cerca do estebiemos agora sobre Algeciras et en la conquista de Gibraltar en que resciemios dellos muchos servicios tambien por sus cuerpos como por sus haberes con que nos acorrieron todos en una et cada uno por si a tiempo que nos era mucho menester et que se non quisieron partir de nos servir maguer que su tiempo habian complido." See also Benavides, *Memorias* 1, 220. n.3; 2, doc. 495; Torres Delgado, *El antiguo reino*, 237.
75. Ortiz de Zúñiga, *Anales de Sevilla* 2, 37–38; Benavides, *Memorias* 1, 220–221, n. 3; 2, doc. 482; Pedro de Medina, *Crónica de los duques de Medina Sidonia* [1561], in *Colección de documentos ineditos para la historia de España*, vol. 39 (Madrid: La Viuda de Calero, 1861), 130–131.


77. Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernando*, 164: “Que duro bien tres meses que nunca ceso de llover.” The chronicle is rather vague about exactly when the rains began.


79. Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, doc. 197: “Senyor... can yo parti de vos del setge dalмерía fin en Algehira lo dillums vinent ab mout de vent e levant qui dura entro lendema de sent luch entalment senyor que nuyl ardit a vos no pusqui trametre.”

80. Benavides, *Memorias* 2, doc. 479: “Nos retuviemos lo algunos dias porque lo avjamos menester a alguns fechos que no lo podiamos escusar.”


82. Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, doc. 197: “Enquarauas fas saber senyor que les galeres no an dam ni conseyl de pa ni de paga ans senyor esta a gran perly e a gran dupte tot lestol de desarmar. Pan pot haver en lestoll per tot aquest mes de vuytbri. Empero senyor a Neymerich deuen venir DCCC rovas de farina segons que diu. E veus senyor tot lo recapte que nos avem. Als homes cresch que alongare la paga entro a XXV dias de Novembre e plassia a vos senyor queus donetz cura que al demig nos alian trames pan. Enquara la paga que no cresech que I jorn pogens mes algun.” And later on, “CC ho CCC pessas de drap gros.” The word “dam” is obscure and may even be a mistranscription by Giménez Soler. From its context, it should indicate some sort of naval supply. A new transcription of this and other documents concerning Aragonese relations with North Africa, Angels Masía i De Ros’s *Jaume II: Aragó. Granada i Marroc. Aportació documental* (Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1989), reached me too late to be fully incorporated in this study. Masía’s transcription of Jaspert’s report renders this problematic word as *clam* (372). Ordinarily the term *clam* means a legal claim or accusation against another party, which makes about as much sense in this context as *dam. Clam ni conseyl*, does, however, have the ring of a legal formula about it, like the English “to have and to hold,” so it is just possible that a phrase reminiscent of Roman law is what Jaspert has in mind. Since *clam* in Latin means secretly, privately, without another’s knowledge, the sense of Jaspert’s statement may be that his ships have had no private or official news about their food supplies or their pay. My translation reflects this transcription, rather than Soler’s *dam*.

The Catalan rova, which held 26 pounds of 12 ounces each, was the equivalent of 10 to 12 kilograms. See Claudi Alsina, Gaspar Feliu and Lluís Marquet, *Pesos, mides i mesures dels països catalans* (Barcelona: Curial, 1990), 227–229. I am grateful to Father Burns for these references. See also Benavides, *Memorias* 2, doc. 419. His supplier, En Aimerich de Bellvei, was the Aragonese admiral.

83. Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, doc. 197: “Pluyas que ya ha fetas ara ben VIII dies.” The rest of this sentence is garbled in Giménez Soler’s transcription.
84. Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernando*, 164: “Non podian aver viandas por mar nin por tierra é por grand tormenta que facia en la mar é las grandes aguas, que farien que ninguno non podia andar por la tierra.”


87. The *Crónica Fernando*, 164, does mention María, but mistakenly calls her Diego’s daughter. It does not mention that she was the infante Juan’s wife. For details concerning the inheritance of Vizcaya, see Salvador de Moxó, “De la nobleza vieja a la nobleza nueva, La transformación nobiliaria castellana en la Baja Edad Media,” *Cuadernos de Historia* 3 (1969): 47, 50–51. See also *Crónica Fernando*, 93, 133–134, 137–142, 147–154.


89. Juan Manuel, *Estados*, 153: “Et si entraren por cercar algún lugar... de que el lugar cercaren, también al combate como en los engendros como en la guarda de la hueste como en to das las otras cosas que son mester. ... Pero la cosa más cierta que el senor o el caballero de la hueste deve catar quando el lugar cercare es que guixe quel non mengüe vianda nin aver; que por cualquier destas cosas quel menguase, se avría de partir de la cerca—si muy grave maravilla non fuese—con menos pro et menos onra de quantol sería mester.”

90. Rosell, ed., *Crónica Fernando*, 164: “En el tiempo que estas aguas tan grandes facian, la muy noble reina doña María, que era en Castilla é en Leon gobernando por el Rey, teniendo que era muy grand estorbo para el Rey é para las gentes que allí estavan en aquella cerca, por las grandes aguas que facia, fizo que todos los de las ordenes andudiesen en procesion é rogasen a Dios que tirase aquellas aguas.”


92. Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, doc. 199: “Buen entendimiento en que vos sodes de mantener e levar adelante estos fechos que comenzados avemos vos e nos a servicio de Dios que ciertamente Rey en estos fechos va la mayor partida de vuestra honra e de vuestro bien. E rogamos e consellamos vos que ninguno daquest entendimiento non vos pueda mover.”


94. Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica*. 888: “Tal gent ço què feia en que ell no trobaria nenguna bondat.” “La gran desconeixença que els castellans le havien feta.”

95. *Chronicle of San Juan*, 97.

97. *Crónica Fernando*, 163–164. See also Giménez Soler, *Juan Manuel*, doc. 192, for a contemporary estimate of at least some of the numbers that the infante was expected to bring. How many he actually had is unknown.

98. Benavides, *Memorias* 2, doc. 479: “Quel noble don Johan fijo del infante don Manuel punya en quanto el mas puede de vos servir et plogo nos mucho porque nos ahuin le embiamos rogar que el continue en vos servir.”


100. Ibid., docs. 198–199.


103. Ibid., doc. 193.

104. Juan Manuel, *Estados*, 170: “Contienda que ovieran entre el rey don Fernando et el infante don Johan su tío.” “Vino en ayuda del infante don Johan, que era su primo.” “Se amavan más que omnes en el mundo.”


107. Ibid.: “En Jaçpert com manatz romandre que com manaria romandre el rey darago siy a era que yo son sert quel rey de Castellam vol matar.” “Totas aquestas rahons senyor dix el per tal que sen posques anar e que nons en posquessen metre sobre el.”

108. Ibid., doc. 200: “Consella que el se escuse de dar occasio a ellos e a sus amigos ond ellos se oviesen a mover a se deservicio.” See also doc. 198.


110. Ibid., doc. 213.

111. Ibid.


117. Juan Manuel, *Estados*, 147: “Non... todos... son martires nin sanctos.”