Conditional and Concessive Clauses in Modern Greek:
A syntactic and semantic description
by
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Abstract

This dissertation examines a number of types of conditional and con­cessive clauses in Modern Greek, focusing on the individual constructions as well as on their relationship. I argue that although conditionals and concessives are related, they are also distinct constructions with special syntactic and semantic/pragmatic properties.

The conditionals which I look at are those introduced by an and na. I show that na conditionals have a more limited distribution than an conditionals and that the constraint governing their distribution is of a semantic/pragmatic nature. I also show that conditionals should be viewed as bi-clausal constructions whose essential properties refer to both the antecedent and the consequent. The an and na conditional clauses are constituents of the concessive conditionals introduced by na, ke na and akoma ki an. This study looks also at these concessive conditionals with an eye to determining the extent to which their properties are derivable from the properties of their constituent parts. The conclusion here is that although conditionals and concessives are close semantic relatives, they should still be analyzed as distinct constructions with partly unpredictable properties. The concessives are also examined as a class which includes not only concessive conditionals but also factive (an ke type) concessives and as concessives, which, I argue, are neither factive nor conditional.

Issues raised in the course of describing these clauses include the interaction between grammar (conventionalized morpho-syntactic
principles) and general pragmatic principles of interpretation, the distinc-
tion between predictability and motivation and the alleged dichotomy
between semantics and pragmatics.

Eve E. sweeten
To my parents and Christos
Acknowledgements

Infinite thanks are due to my committee members. Eve Sweetser has been a patient and supportive as well as critical and clearminded chair. Charles Fillmore, Paul Kay, George Lakoff and Johanna Nichols all helped with valuable criticism and insights from which this work has greatly profited. They also gave me lots of encouragement at times when it was crucially needed and their humor and support made the whole thing look less impossible. Thanks is also due to Michele Emanatian for comments and to the people of the Wednesday seminar and especially Jane Espenson, Adele Goldberg, Jean-Pierre Koenig, Laura Michaelis, Tony Moy, Eric Pederson and Frederike Van der Leek. Finally, I want to thank Claudia Brugman for having always been a support and an inspiration. I, of course, am solely responsible for the content of this work.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Aims of this study; why are conditionals and concessives worth investigating

This dissertation has two basic goals. First, to give an as full a description as possible of Modern Greek conditionals and concessives. And secondly, to advance our understanding of the interrelationship of syntactic constructions with semantics and pragmatics. These two goals are interrelated, since it will become clear that the complex of relations between the forms and meanings of the different Greek concessive and conditional constructions can only be described in a framework which

1) allows us to express generalizations both at the level of regular semantic compositionality and at the level of unpredictable but motivated form-meaning relationships and,

2) allows us to link both pragmatic and semantic information directly to (classes of) syntactic constructions as well as to lexical items.

Conditionals are a fairly universal construction. They have always been constructions of special interest, judging from the amount of literature which has been devoted to their semantics both from the point of view of the logical tradition and from the point of view of their discourse properties. The analysis of conditionals presented here differs from both those analyses which descend from the logical tradition and those which see conditionals as serving uniformly a discourse function. I will be arguing that although there may be such a universal function associated with conditionality, conditionals should be broken down into distinct constructions
with varying formal and semantic properties. Different languages may vary in the way they express different kinds of conditional meanings and one purpose of this thesis is to discover what kinds of associations between meaning and form Greek makes in its conditional patterns.

Concessive clauses, unlike their "neighbor" the conditionals, have never been studied in their own right as a class. Greek has an extremely rich system of ways to express concessiveness corresponding to distinct constructions with special properties. A study of (at least) the concessive conditionals requires reference to conditionals with which they share many of their properties. Conditionals and concessives can, therefore, be said to form a natural class.

In conditionals and concessives we have a complex but interrelated set of constructions, constituting an excellent test case for a number of issues of theoretical interest. The refined distinctions we need to make in order to give an adequate description of such clauses will demonstrate the need to include semantic and pragmatic factors as an explicit part of the syntactic constructional analysis. This in turn will argue for the need to recognize the construction (i.e. a pairing of meaning and form) as the relevant unit of description. Moreover, the kind of semantic description that we need to give to conditionals and concessives directly addresses the issue of the semantics versus pragmatics distinction and argues in favor of abolishing a strict dichotomy. Finally, conditional and concessive constructions raise the question of exactly how meaning composes and pertain directly to the issue of compositionality. My conclusion in this area will be that a strictly compositional analysis will be very hard to maintain. On

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1 With the exception of König's (1988) paper.
the other hand, we could very profitably talk about compositional meaning with respect to a particular structure as well as about the semantic motivation underlying particular constructions. Construction Grammar, the theoretical framework assumed in this dissertation, allows the expression of both these kinds of generalization. All of these issues will be taken up and discussed more extensively in the following sections.

1.1 Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation is concerned with certain types of conditional and concessive clauses of Modern Greek. The types of conditional sentences to be discussed are exemplified in (1)-(3) below:

(1) na imun onasis θa to ayoraza
   'if' be-IMPF-P-1SG Onassis FUT it buy-IMPF-P-1SG
   "If I were Onassis, I would buy it".

(2) as meletisi ke θa perasi
   'if' study-PERF-NP-3SG and FUT pass-PERF-NP-3SG
   "If he studies, he will pass".

(3) an ixe er0i o janis θa ixe er0i ke i maria
   'if' come-PERFECT-P-3SG the John FUT come-PERFECT-P-3SG and the Mary
   "If John had come, Mary would have come also".

Na, as\(^2\) and an are different conditional markers. Although they were all translated by "if", the adverbial clauses they introduce are each

\(^2\) Na and as have many other functions besides their conditional one and these will be also discussed in the following chapters. The conditional and the concessive uses are, however, the main focus of this study.
characterized by different semantic and pragmatic properties. Part of this study, therefore, will be devoted to describing these properties.

The concessive clauses which will be examined are exemplified in (4)-(8) below:

(4) onasis na imun δen θα borusa na to ayoraso

Onassis "na" be-P-1SG NEG FUT can-IMPF-P-1SG subj. it buy

"Even if I were Onassis, I wouldn’t be able to buy it".

(5) ke onasis na imun δen θα borusa na to ayoraso

and Onassis "na" be-P-1SG NEG FUT can-IMPF-P-1SG subj. it buy

"Even if I were Onassis, I wouldn’t be able to buy it".

(6) akoma ki an erθi o janis emis δen θα pame

"even" and if come-PERF-NP-3SG the John we NEG FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL

"Even if John comes, we won’t go".

(7) as vreksi emis θα pame

"as" rain-PERF-NP-3SG we FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL

"We’ll go even if it rains / although it may rain".

(8) piuje an ke δen ton kalesan

go-PERF-P-3SG ‘if’ ‘and’ NEG him invite-PERF-P-3PL

"He went even though they did not invite him".

Besides discovering and describing the syntactic and semantic / pragmatic properties of these adverbial causes, the purpose of this dissertation will be to investigate the relationship of these clauses to the conditional clauses of (1)-(3). I will be arguing that although concessives and

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conditionals are undoubtedly related constructions (both syntactically and semantically), they are also distinct in ways that cannot be predicted by any general principles. As such, they should be treated as distinct constructions with special properties.

The term "construction" will be used in its intuitive sense to refer to form-meaning pairings, much in the way that it has been used in traditional grammars. "Construction", however, will be also used in its more technical sense with the particular content that it has within the theoretical framework of Construction Grammar. Construction Grammar is a descriptive and theoretical framework currently being developed in the Linguistics Department of the University of California at Berkeley. Within this framework the term "construction" also refers to pairings of particular forms with particular semantics. One of the basic tenets of the theory is that the construction is the basic unit of description and that it encompasses simultaneously syntactic and semantic/pragmatic information.

This dissertation is a case study intended to illustrate this and other tenets of Construction Grammar. On the other hand, it is also intended to argue for some of the theoretical constructs and assumptions of Construction Grammar. That is, I will start by assuming that structures like the ones exemplified in (1)-(8) are constructions, and therefore, that their description will have to include both syntactic and semantic/pragmatic information. But, I will also argue that in some cases we are required to view them as such.

In the remainder of this section, I outline the structure of the dissertation. In the next section, I outline briefly some of the basic assumptions and tools of Construction Grammar. Finally, in the two subsequent sections, I will take up two themes which recur in the course of this study:
the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and the issue of semantic motivation.

In chapter 2, I discuss the syntactic and semantic properties of the constituents which make up the concessive constructions. The importance of describing these independently lies in the fact that this will enable us to decide later on how compositional the concessive constructions are. Some of the constituents are lexical, as, for example, the introductory connective *ke*. Others, however, are clausal, that is they are themselves adverbial clauses. One such clausal constituent is the conditional clause introduced by *na*, which participates in the *na* and the *ke na* concessive constructions. Another clausal constituent is the type of clause introduced by *as* which also serves to introduce concessive clauses. This chapter, therefore, will be mostly concerned with describing the syntactic and semantic/pragmatic properties of these constituents outside the concessive environment.

Chapter 3 examines three types of concessive clauses introduced by *na*, *ke na*3 and *as*. The description here will focus on those aspects of their syntax and semantics which are not derivable and predictable from the properties of their constituent parts and, therefore, must be attributed to the concessive constructions as a whole. We can think of this chapter, therefore, as comprising the constructional level of description. Besides giving an as full a description as possible, this chapter aims also to draw a distinction between degrees of compositionality and required constructional description, as illustrated by the *na* and *ke na* concessives, on the one hand, and the *as* concessives on the other.

3 I will also look briefly at the *akoma ki on* construction, especially as it relates to the other two concessive conditionals.
Chapter 4 addresses some of the theoretical issues which arose in the previous two chapters. In particular, I discuss the issue of the semantic composition of the constituents from the point of view of the dogma of strict compositionality and that of semantic motivation. I first show that the Greek data resist an analysis on a "rule-to-rule" basis. I also discuss the issue of semantic predictability versus motivation with respect to the *as* construction, arguing that in some cases, exploring the semantic motivation for a given construction helps towards a more adequate description of its semantic properties.

Chapter 5 will be concerned with what we may think of as discourse properties of conditionals and concessives. The linguistic context to be systematically examined here will be limited to the immediate embedding environment of these adverbial clauses which is, of course, the main clause that they modify. This chapter, therefore, will be concerned with formal and semantic properties which have to do with both the antecedent and the consequent of conditionals and concessive conditionals and which have to be stated at the cross-clausal level (e.g., dependencies of the verb tense in the antecedent and the consequent). At this level, the constructions include the whole sentence, that is both antecedent and consequent. The discussion will be conducted in terms of the *an* conditionals, the assumption being that the kind of cross-clausal properties discussed here also apply to the other, more restricted in distribution, types of conditional clauses (e.g. ones introduced by *na*).

Chapter 6 will examine the semantics of the concessive clauses as a class. The first section will give a brief description of the syntactic and semantic properties of the factive (*an ke* type) concessives. In the rest of the chapter, I argue that based on the kinds of concessive constructions
discussed in the previous chapters, we should distinguish three types of
ccessive semantics, i.e. three ways in which the "p->(implies)-q" aspect
of conventional meaning may be said to arise from the contributions of
different pragmatic and semantic factors.

Finally, chapter 7, will be the concluding chapter, in which, besides
reviewing briefly my results, I will touch upon unresolved questions and
areas in which the present study could be profitably extended.

A final note is in order here with respect to the data in this thesis. I
have made an effort to use as many attested examples as possible, col­
clected from both oral and written discourse. These are marked in the text
by single quotes. I haven’t been entirely successful in using only attested
examples, but I have tried to use them in cases where judgements of
grammaticality tended to be very fine and controversial.

1.2 Construction Grammar: theoretical background

The theoretical and descriptive framework assumed in this disserta­
tion is that of Construction Grammar. I will be assuming this framework
inasmuch as, for example, I will presume that it is necessary to provide
simultaneously both a syntactic and a semantic description of the adver­
bial clauses that are the topic of this dissertation. But I will also be argu­
ing for the framework by presenting evidence that a full and adequate
description of these clauses requires reference to semantic and pragmatic
conditions.

Construction Grammar is currently being developed at the Depart­
ment of Linguistic of the University of California at Berkeley. Fillmore
and O’ Connor (1988) are important case studies within the Construction
Grammar framework, which also contain explicit discussions of its assumptions and consequences. Much work on specific grammatical topics has been done within the Construction Grammar on specific grammatical areas. Lambrecht (1986a) and (1986b), Brugman (1988), Goldberg (1989), Fried (1990) can be considered representative examples.

I will not attempt to compare Construction Grammar fully and systematically with other, older or current, frameworks of grammatical description. It seems to me, however, that a clear and sharp distinction can be drawn between Construction Grammar and GB in that the latter requires that all grammatical phenomena (or all which are worthy of description) be ultimately reducible to some general universal principles. Construction Grammar, on the other hand, first recognizes all the potential grammatical idiosyncracies that a given language may present without advancing any claims about the universality of the relevant descriptive parameters. Construction Grammar is closer to theoretical frameworks such as LFG (Bresnan 1979, 1982), HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1987) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, forthcoming) than to GB; it shares with all this latter group some assumptions about the necessary association of syntax and semantics. Yet, besides the differences in notation, there are also important differences in some of the fundamental assumptions about language, which each of these theories makes. Cognitive Grammar, for example, does not recognize a formal level of syntax existing in its own right; rather, syntax is an epiphenomenon, the only cognitively real levels being semantics and phonology.

Construction Grammar, on the other hand, recognizes the existence of a syntactic level as such, although this level is necessarily associated with a level of semantic description. Neither level, however, is given
priority. In this respect, Construction Grammar is highly reminiscent of the approach taken by most traditional grammars, where labels including both morpho-syntactic and semantic information, (for example, "genitive of possession" or "ablative of separation"), are common. Construction Grammar, however, sees the pairing of syntactic and semantic information as a theoretical prerequisite, with all its necessary implications. With respect to language acquisition, for example, the claim is that syntactic and semantic aspects are acquired simultaneously by the child and that linguistic information stored in the mind includes syntactic and semantic information at the same site. Syntactic and semantic information are by definition, therefore, included in the description of any grammatical phenomenon and this is what basically differentiates Construction Grammar from any theory which either eliminates the semantic side of the description or treats syntax and semantics as completely separate and autonomous levels of analysis.

What constitutes a semantic description may also be a matter of some controversy. I will have more to say on this subject, in the following section on the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Here, it is sufficient to note that Construction Grammar pays equal attention to the semantic and syntactic aspects of the description. The extensive research on frame semantics as well as more recent developments in semantic theory as, for example, the idea of prototypically structured semantic categories (Rosch 1978, 1981 and others) are taken into account. The literature on the role of prototype structure and semantic frames in the analysis of linguistic meaning has amply demonstrated the inadequacy of the necessary-and-sufficient conditions approach, and Construction Grammar incorporates the results of such enriched semantic analysis in the description of the
semantic pole. In some respects, Construction Grammar can be con­sidered to be an outgrowth of the semantic research on frames. Most importantly for our purposes (since this dissertation is concerned with clausal constructions), frames can be associated with whole constructions, as well as with specific lexical items. Moreover, as both conditional and concessive clauses are themselves constituents of larger bi-clausal (adver­bial + main clause) constructions, semantic description will need to be given for the non compositional aspects of these larger constructions as well; that description makes reference to pragmatic factors and it is hard to conceive how it could be made in terms of semantic features.

An important difference between Construction Grammar and other current theories (especially GB) is that the former puts no restrictions on the permissible range of data for investigation. Indeed, it seems to be a distinctive feature of Construction Grammar that it pays equal attention to the productive and the idiosyncratic aspects of a language; rather than drawing a sharp distinction between the two, Construction Grammar maintains that there is a continuum from the fully productive to the com­pletely idiosyncratic, recognizing that many linguistic phenomena can par­take of both characterizations.

All phenomena of a given language deserve, therefore, some kind of description in the grammar of that language. This should not be read as denying the obvious differences that exist between "core" and "periphery" phenomena or between universal and language-specific ones. It simply means that "periphery" and language-specific phenomena are as important as those which may prove to be universal. The assumption and conviction underlying this choice is that only by paying attention to some complex structures (which in some theories would occupy the periphery) and to
structures which may be considered (semi)idiomatic, can we arrive at an understanding of what a complete account of a grammar of a language might require.

Filmore and Kay (1987) devote part of their discussion to the issue of idiomaticity and propose that we should recognize an idiomaticity cline. At one end of the continuum, we find constructions with no specific lexical information associated with them. At the other end of the continuum, there are constructions which have all their lexical information conventionally specified and whose overall meaning has to be independently stated; we may think of these as the "real" idioms. Between these two extremes we find various possibilities, one of which is constructions containing positions which may be filled by any sort of filler, the overall interpretation being predictably uniform. That is, such a construction does not have all of its lexical content specified; but the construction as a whole must be associated with a particular constructional semantics, which then combines relatively regularly or compositionally with a semantics of any slot-fillers. These examples are central to my analysis, since part of the point to be made with respect to Greek conditional and concessive constructions is that the meaning is often associated with a certain constructional pattern rather than with a specific word or words.

Filmore and Kay further claim that the number of constructions which are purely syntactic is relatively small. Purely syntactic constructions would be constructions which have no specific semantic or pragmatic information associated with them and which do not include any specific lexical items. Such a construction in English, and for that matter in Greek as well, is the subject-predicate construction (this is considered to be a very general construction which underlies both the passive and the active
constructions). While in other languages it may be necessary to provide very specific information as to what kind of things can appear as subjects, both English and Greek are pretty much free in what semantic roles they allow as subjects. No other specific information need be associated with such a construction, which can therefore be considered a purely syntactic one. Such constructions, however, are relatively rare; and this necessarily highlights the importance of other partially filled and/or partially constrained constructional patterns, where semantic/pragmatic restrictions play a central role.

The notion of the construction will figure prominently in the description of the adverbial clauses which are the topic of this thesis, and it will do so at two levels. First, we have to identify constructions (with special syntactic and semantic properties) at the level of the adverbial clause itself. These constructions can be roughly identified by the type of connective by which they are introduced. It is also necessary, however, to recognize larger constructions which comprise both the adverbial and the main clause. These are identified both by the form of the introductory connective and by the verbal morphology (specifically, aspect and tense marking) in the antecedent and the consequent. That is, what identifies these bi-clausal constructions is not the lexical fillers of the verbal slots in the two clauses, but rather the tense and aspect morphology on the verb.

As I noted above, traditional grammars implicitly rely on the idea that grammatical description contains both syntactic and semantic information. In modern linguistics too, the idea that the form-meaning pairing should be taken as the basic unit for the linguistic description is hardly new. Saussure's (1915) definition of the sign is a definition of form-meaning pairing and one might be tempted to say that a construction is
like a morpheme, only bigger. This "extension", however, is new and would go, I believe, contrary to Saussure's implication that the sign is confined to the morpheme level. As noted before, constructions can be recognized at multiple levels and constructions can contain other constructions. As a result of this, the meaning pole of a construction can be either any kind of pragmatic or semantic information ("whole frame" kind of information included) or, as in the case of the subject-predicate construction discussed above, it can be a fairly abstract specification to the effect that the semantics of this construction is to predicate a property or a relation of the subject referent.

Constructions are, therefore, given a prominent place in Construction Grammar. They are abstract units of description, consisting of an association of formal and semantic properties. What in older transformational frameworks was the output of phrase structure and transformational rules, in Construction Grammar can be considered to correspond to descriptions of constructions, which, however, lack associated semantic description (at least under the "interpretive" theoretical model -Jackendoff 1972). At the other pole, Generative Semantics (cf. Lakoff 1963, 1970) took semantic units to be the relevant units of description. Construction Grammar, on the other hand, takes the construction per se to be the central unit of description. It follows, that in contrast to the older transformational frameworks as well as to GB, Construction Grammar is monostatal; a construction comprises all the syntactic information which used to be assigned to two (or more) distinct levels as well as the semantic information which in these theories represented yet another level.

Morphemes and lexical items are themselves "lexically filled" constructions, characterized by "valence descriptions" which comprise
abbreviated descriptions of their combinatorial possibilities. A valence
description of a verb, e.g., "is a characterization of the linguistic entities
whose presence is required (or permitted) when it is used in a particular
meaning ..." (Fillmore 1989:65). Such valence descriptions contain the
number of the 'participants' which accompany a given lexical item and the
grammatical function and the semantic role of each such participant.
They may also contain other specifications of a formal or
semantic/pragmatic nature where necessary. As an illustration, let us con­sider the valence descriptions of the verb *afino* (= "let, allow"), which will
figure in subsequent discussions concerning the origin of the *as* connective.

We must account for the different argument structures of *afino* as they appear in (9)-(11) below:

(9)  o janis afise tin maria
     the-NOM John-NOM let-PERF-P-3SG the-ACC Mary-ACC
     "John let go of/ left Mary".

(10) o janis afise tin maria na fiji
     the-NOM John-NOM let-PERF-P-3SG the-ACC Mary-ACC 'na' leave-
     PERF-NP-3SG
     "John let Mary go".

(11) o janis afise na fiji i maria
     the-NOM John-NOM let-PERF-P-3SG 'na' leave-PERF-NP-3SG the-
     NOM Mary-NOM
     "John let Mary go".

Examples (9)-(11) correspond to three distinct valence descriptions of
the verb, given as (9')-(11') below, in Fillmore's (1989) "box" notation.
(9')

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lexeme &quot;AFINO&quot;</th>
<th>cat V min+</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agt</td>
<td>Pat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_{NOM}</td>
<td>N_{ACC}</td>
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(10')

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<tr>
<th>lexeme &quot;AFINO&quot;</th>
<th>cat V min+</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agt</td>
<td>Cont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_{NOM}</td>
<td>N_{ACC}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V_{na}</td>
<td>2(1)</td>
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(11')

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lexeme &quot;AFINO&quot;</th>
<th>cat V min+</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agt</td>
<td>Cont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N_{NOM}</td>
<td>V_{na}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The top row in (9'), (10') and (11') indicates the "lexeme" (i.e. the abstraction over all the possible morphological realizations of a given verb) with which the particular valence descriptions are associated. The decision to make this homophonous with the first person singular, present tense form of the verb is completely arbitrary, simply following the general trend for Greek to list that as the default form of the verb (e.g. in dictionary entries). The specifications in the second row indicate respectively that the category of the lexeme is verbal and that it is +minimal, that is it represents the major lexical category within the verbal ("V") category.

Below the specification of V, the third row of entries in (9'), (10') and (11') contains information about the grammatical roles (subject, object etc.) served by the complements of asino. "1" stands for the argument which is the subject (note that in Greek, we don't need to have an overt NP realizing that argument), while "2" represents the direct object. Finally, C stands for "other" complement. The next row identifies the semantic role associated with each argument, and any other semantic information which may be relevant to the kinds of entities which can serve as arguments. The semantic role of the subject in all the valences of this verb is that of "Agent", while the direct object in (9') is the Patient. In (10'), the " -- " in the place of the semantic role assignment indicates that the verb in its use as a three-place predicate does not assign a semantic role to its syntactic object. Some evidence for this comes from the possibility of having idiom chunks filling that slot, the argument being the same as that given for the distinction between "raising" and "equi" structures (all the caveats which normally apply to this argument apply here as well; cf. McCawley 1988). Consider for example, (12):
(12) afise ton kombo na ftasi sto xteni

let-PERF-P-3SG the knot ‘na’ reach-PERF-P-3SG to-the comb

"He let his back get to the wall".

Finally, the semantic role of the third complement is to express the "content" of the act of allowing.

The third row in the valence descriptions provides information on the grammatical form which the constituents instantiating the arguments must have. In all valences, the subject will be instantiated by a noun phrase (N being here a sufficient conventional abbreviation for a maximal noun-phrase, since all phrasal constituents that appear as complements are necessarily maximal), and that noun phrase will have case Nominative. The direct object in (10') will also be realized as a noun phrase, which however, will have case Accusative. The third complement in (10') and (11') will be realized as a clause (V=maximal phrase of verbal type) introduced by na. Finally, the 2(1) index in (10') (whose operation is illustrated by example (10)), is a "co-instantiation" or "control" index which tells us that the [the-ACC maria-ACC] represents simultaneously the object complement of afino and the subject complement of fervyo.

The description of these valences contains information which may be thought of as redundant, in that it may be predictable from general principles. We may not need to specify, for example, that the case of the subject will be nominative nor that the semantic role associated with the subject will be that of an agent; if there is an agent argument, we may predict (by the semantic role hierarchy) that it will show up as the subject. These valence descriptions, therefore, can be thought of as representing redundantly the output of such general operations as well. What is important is that by following the (relevant) valence descriptions in
parsing each of these sentences, we can decide whether they satisfy the requirements imposed by the valence, in which case the sentence will be a grammatical sentence of the language, or not, in which case the sentence will be ungrammatical.

The preceding discussion was oversimplified. Much more needs to be said if we are to fully justify the theoretical and notational choices assumed even by this limited presentation of data\(^4\). It should be noted that multiple valence descriptions associated with one lexical item are not a handicap of the theory, nor do they represent inability to capture generalizations, since it is possible to treat certain kinds of valence variability (e.g. the one represented by valences (10') and (11')) by means of lexical rules relating valences to each other in a regular fashion (cf. Fillmore 1989). This possibility will not be explored here for Greek. I simply wish to give an idea of what a valence including both semantic and syntactic information would look like. For more complex constructions such as the ones to be examined in this dissertation, even a minimal specification of the associated semantic/pragmatic information may be much more complex than the simple semantic role specifications given here for a single lexical item's valence.

1.3 The semantics-pragmatics dichotomy

A point which will come up repeatedly in the following chapters is the alleged dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics. The analysis of the Greek data presented here adds to a broad range of data which suggests that we have no reason to believe that such a distinction can be

\(^4\) Fillmore (1989) is the most detailed presentation of the theoretical assumptions and notational devices of Construction Grammar.
profitably maintained.

The semantics/pragmatics dichotomy is manifested in two main areas of semantic research. First, in the description of lexical meaning and specifically in the assumption that the meaning of words could be adequately described in terms of binary and objective semantic features (an assumption shared by a research tradition following Katz and Fodor 1963). And secondly, in the description of sentence semantics where, in line with the logical tradition, it was assumed that truth-conditions exhausted the meaning description at the sentence level.

The assumption that lexical meaning could be described in terms of features has been argued against in all of the extensive literature on frame semantics. Fillmore's (1976) discussion of the meaning of the word "bachelor" shows, for example, that culture-dependent understanding of marriageable age (which is not identical with physical puberty) is part of the frame with respect to which the word "bachelor" acquires its meaning. Examples can easily be multiplied and the literature is too extensive to be exhaustively cited. (Fillmore 1971, 1982, 1985, Sweetser 1987 are representative examples and contain a full list of references on the topic.) Recent work on metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Brugman 1983 and others) has shown that metaphorical understanding of one domain in terms of another is often a necessary part of meaning description; metaphorical mappings, however, are often culture-dependent, as is the structuring of the domains which are mapped.

To the extent that a description of word-meaning must take into account encyclopaedic "world-knowledge", and to the extent that that knowledge is often relativized and culture-dependent, semantics cannot be objectively based and the division between semantics and pragmatics
appears artificial. Staying within the assumptions of the standard feature analysis would require either that the cultural and pragmatic information be incorporated into the semantic feature analysis of a given lexical item, or that it be seen as outside the scope of linguistic description: neither of these options appears satisfactory.

But the data in this dissertation do not argue against the semantics-pragmatics distinction simply by offering support for frame-semantic analyses associated with particular lexical items. Rather, they argue for pragmatic information being directly associated with a given word or a given constructional pattern (cf. Kay 1983, 1990). One might think of this as framing, with the understanding that the frame is of a fairly abstract nature, without any conventional encyclopaedic knowledge about the content. Alternatively, we may think of this pragmatic information as a specification to the effect that a particular word or construction provides certain guidelines for the interpretation of whatever specific material accompanies it or "fills" its slots. In the rest of this section, I will further elaborate on the way pragmatic information is associated with Greek conditional and concessive constructions.

Whole constructional patterns will be associated in each case with a particular meaning, and that meaning is "by definition" pragmatic. With respect to the conditional sentences, for example, I will argue that they should be seen as bi-clausal constructions (composed of an adverbial and a main clause) realized by particular verb forms in the antecedent and the consequent. One of such conditional formal patterns is associated with the meaning "general correlation": roughly, it says something like "wherever the antecedent happens/occurs, then the consequent happens/occurs as well". Whatever the specific lexical content of the two clauses, the bi-
clausal structure should be interpreted along these lines. This approach to conditionality (proposed by Fillmore 1990; cf. also Akatsuka 1986) is very different from the truth-conditional approach to conditional meaning. The latter neutralizes the formal differences between the conditional constructions and associates a material implication semantics (or some other; cf. chapter 5) with the ‘if’ marker. That is all there is to the semantics of a conditional sentence in a truth-conditional framework. Any further differences are relegated to the pragmatic domain.

In the constructional approach adopted here, one kind of meaning difference between conditional constructions, is associated with the different verbal forms: these forms may, for example, mark variation between givenness, hypotheticality and counterfactuality. Another kind of meaning contrast is associated with the choice of conditional marker per se, and to account for that difference we have to refer to pragmatic conditions such as givenness, or use in making suggestions. In both cases, however, this pragmatic significance is conventionally associated with aspects of the constructions, and hence constitutes the actual meaning of a given conditional pattern, unless of course we are willing to reduce meaning to truth-conditions.

Turning next to the concessives, I will argue that there are at least three distinguishable kinds of concessive semantics associated with distinct constructions. All three, however, make reference to pragmatic factors or conditions, and these factors are in each case what I take to be the conventionally conveyed semantics of these constructions. One class of concessive constructions (the na, ke na ones), for example, is associated with scalar semantics, and the pragmatic nature of scales has been noted by many analysts (Fauconnier 1973, Kay 1990 etc.). Taking English even as a
parallel example, we note that proper names (which surely lack lexical semantic scalarity) are pragmatically interpreted as part of a scalar model in examples like "Even John ate three helpings", where "John" is seen as a low point on some scale of food-consumption. The scalar interpretation in these constructions can be either associated with a specific word (corresponding roughly to English "even") or to a whole constructional pattern. As Kay (1990) notes, "even" is characterized as having direct pragmatic interpretation in that the scalar model that is presupposed by the sentence which contains it can be thought of as containing information which is part of the shared background of the speaker and hearer at the time of the utterance. A direct pragmatic interpretation (though not scalar) is also associated with the Greek concessive marker as inasmuch as it codes the speaker's act of "granting" or admitting something previously asserted by the hearer. Finally, a pragmatic interpretation is also associated with the factive (an ke) concessives; I argue that they directly code "opposition" or "adversity" between the content of the adverbial and the main clause.

Describing the meaning of all these connectives and constructional patterns, therefore, requires reference to pragmatics. As Kay (1990) notes with respect to "even", it may be possible to maintain a distinction between semantic (i.e. truth-conditional) meaning and pragmatic meaning by attributing the scalar semantics of "even" to conventional implicature. Presumably, we could do the same for the other concessive and conditional markers discussed here, and still maintain the traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction. Alternatively, we could say that since an adequate semantic description of the constructions marked by such words requires reference to inherently pragmatic (contextually inferred) meaning, we
might as well conclude that the traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction does not apply. In describing the Greek conditionals and concessives, I will take the latter view, it as evident that the semantics of some kinds of words or constructional patterns consists really of "guidelines" on how to interpret a given sentence. As I noted in the preceding section, Construction Grammar, which adopts the findings of the frame semantics research, does not have any theoretical commitment to maintaining the distinction and there is a growing body of literature which argues against it. The present study should be seen as adding a piece of data which also argues in the same direction.

1.4 Prediction and motivation

In describing conditional and concessive clauses, we will find it necessary to refer to the constructional part of their meaning, that is to the part of their semantics which is not predictable from the meaning properties of their constituent parts. As such, this part of the meaning will have to be attributed to the construction as a whole.

The grammar, therefore, will consist of (at least) the description of constructions with their associated and formal properties. At another level, however, we may also want to talk about relations between two or more constructions with an eye to determining the extent to which the formal and semantic properties of one of these may be said to follow from the properties of the other. One way of doing this is by means of a lexical rule, of the sort mentioned in section 1.2. Lexical rules are usually meant to be generalizations over alternations at the lexical level, relating valence descriptions. One such lexical rule for English, e.g., and I believe for Greek
as well\(^5\), is the rule of "Dative movement", relating the two valences associated with the verb "give" (and other verbs) in "He gave the book to John" versus "He gave John the book". Although I haven’t seen any proposals for lexical rules relating constructions at other than the lexical level, it is conceivable that something akin to a lexical rule relates the na conditionals with the na concessives. As I will show in detail in chapter 3, formally na conditionals are distinguished from na concessives by a word-order difference. The "rule" also creates a difference in meaning but, although such rules have been claimed to relate completely synonymous valence descriptions, in reality they often do not (cf. the "causativization" rule). Seen in this light, therefore, and with the provision that lexical rules could be seen as relating units longer than the valence of a single verb, the Greek conditional-concessive relationship could be handled by such a rule.

But lexical rules will not help us to talk about all possible kinds of relationships between constructions. There are cases where the differences are exclusively semantic in nature. Rules of the kind described above are by definition "ill-equipped" to describe these cases, since such rules usually relate "formally" distinguishable constructions. In describing, for instance, the various clauses introduced by as (cf. chapters 2 and 4), we find that in some cases (though not invariably) the difference between the constructions is primarily semantic and there is no way of formally distinguishing two kinds of as clauses. If we decide to treat such uses of as as homonymous, then, of course, there is no need to talk about a relationship. If, on the other hand, we decide to treat them as semantically related, there are (at least) two ways of analyzing the relationship: either

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\(^6\) Consider examples like ἔδωκε τῷ τινι τοῖς Ἰανί, "He gave the book to John", versus ἔδωκε τῷ Ἰανί τῷ τινι, "He gave John the book". For Greek, we would have to further specify that the prepositional "goal" phrase will be in the genitive case when promoted to direct object.
by recognizing multiple distinct but related meanings, or by postulating a single general and/or abstract meaning covering all the meaning distinctions. In chapter 4, I argue that we have good reasons to take as as really polysemous, that is as representing a larger semantic category with related but distinguishable sub-senses.

We need some way, therefore, of talking about these semantic constructional differences (or patterns of constructional polysemy) in a way that captures the commonalities between the senses, as well as the fact that are properties unique to a particular sense. One way of doing this is by postulating a 'radially' structured category of the sort proposed by Lakoff (1987) illustrated by his detailed analysis of 'there' constructions6. Lakoff's claim is that radially structured categories exist both in the lexicon, where they relate different senses of a given lexical item (or morpheme), and in the grammar where they represent (semantic and syntactic) relationships between constructions. In both cases, they have the same function, namely to motivate correspondences between form and meaning.

In chapter 4, I propose a skeletal analysis of the different as constructions along these lines. In some cases the variation is only semantic, whereas in others different as clauses are differentiated by both formal and semantic properties. Describing the structure of the category is a way of noting which constructions are more closely related than the others and identifying such properties of a given construction as can be derived from its closest "relative".

As I said in the beginning of this section, the grammar will have to independently specify the constructions of a given language. Why then

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6 Brughman (1988) contains a detailed description of another *lexical network* or category with constructions at the nodes, namely the network of constructions which are headed by the lexeme HAVE.
concern ourselves with motivation at all; especially since, even in the "simplest" case where no formal differences exist between two constructions, we will have to specify whether a given semantic "node" of the category is not only possible (i.e. motivated) but, also, actually existing? I can think of two reasons for doing so. The first refers to the linguist's task of describing the semantics/pragmatics of a given construction as adequately as possible. By noticing the semantic relationship(s) between the construction being described and some other constructions ("marked" by the same lexical/grammatical item), valuable insights may be gained into the semantics of the former. I have found this to be true both with respect to the as concessives (which, I argue, are motivated via a "permission" sense of as) and with respect to the na conditionals, whose "dubitative" semantics can be traced to its non-conditional uses. The second reason has to do with my intuitions as a native speaker of Greek, to the effect that these senses of, e.g., as are indeed related. Somehow that relationship will have to be described. Obviously, in this kind of task there won't be total agreement between speakers as to what is related to what and in describing semantic relationships we need to refer to some "idealized" abstraction, which will be unavoidably affected by the analyst's own intuitions. Despite these difficulties, inasmuch as this kind of analysis tells us something about the speaker's linguistic competence, it is worth doing.

In the discussion of the various constructions, therefore, I intend to consistently address the issue of their motivational semantics. In some cases (for example, for as) I do so in more detail than I do for others. This is because, as I stated above, I believe that identifying the semantic motivation for the particular as construction which is the main concern of this study (namely the concessive) helps considerably in giving an
adequate semantic description of that construction. In yet other cases, I haven't been able to find a straightforward semantic motivation for the overall interpretations of a given construction (cf. especially the discussion of conditionals in chapter 5). Even there, however, I have made an attempt at providing motivation by discussing what I called the "systemic coherence", that is the extent to which a given constructional pattern can be seen as fitting into a broader system of similar phenomena. I can only hope that this kind of work may serve as a step towards the discovery of more substantial motivation.
Chapter 2

The syntax and semantics of lexical and clausal constituents of the concessive constructions

2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the syntactic and semantic properties of the constituents which we find as components of the different types of concessive clauses. Of interest, of course, are those constituents which recur across different constructions; these are both of the lexical and the clausal type. The purpose here is to isolate the syntactic and semantic properties which can be assigned to these constituents (constructions or not) and to distinguish these properties from the properties which can only be attributed to the larger (concessive) construction as a whole.

Several clarifications are in order here. The first has to do with the distinction 'lexical' versus clausal which I referred to above. From the survey of concessive clauses given in the introduction it is clear that the recurring constituents are either of the type exemplified by ke or by the type exemplified by na clauses or as clauses. Within lexical constituents I will examine the semantics of ke outside the concessive context, trying to determine how much of its semantic contribution is attributable to ke itself, in other than the concessive environments, and how much arises only in a concessive context.

For the clausal constituents, we need to address questions of internal order, constituency and basic semantics, again outside the concessive context. As we shall see, some types of clauses mean different things and have different syntax depending on whether or not they are part of a concessive
construction, and, therefore, the difference will have to be specified at the level of the larger (concessive) construction. For yet other types of clause, however, the difference between the concessive and the non-concessive constructions is minimal and a great deal of the formal and semantic properties of the concessive construction are derivable from the properties of the constituent clause. To capture this difference, I shall need to make reference to both the formal and semantic/pragmatic properties of the constituent clause as a whole (i.e., of the 'conditional' or 'as' sentences as constructions themselves), and to individual constituents of these clauses, and in particular to the connectives by which each is introduced.

In particular for na, there have been attempts to provide unified analyses of its semantics which claim that na is polysemous. On this account, all the uses of na listed in 2.2.1 (including those which are radically different from the conditional and concessive ones) are related. However, as I argue in chapter 3 below, there seem to be also strong arguments for setting apart the conditional and the concessive uses of na from all its other uses and to treat them as a separate class of constructions. There are also arguments to the effect that the conditional and concessive constructions themselves, although more closely related than the others, should nevertheless be considered separate and distinct constructions.

However, once we distinguish each of the constructions, there are interesting generalizations which refer, for example, to the na conditionals as a class, regardless of the form in which each na clause is expressed in (e.g., by what particular tense or mood combination and of the special semantics attached to this form). These generalizations may be motivated partly by the semantics of na in other than the conditional and the concessive contexts (i.e., by the other uses of na), but are by no means
predictable or derivable from them. The fact remains, therefore, that a detailed syntactic and semantic analysis of *na* conditionals and concessives is necessary if we are to account fully for their syntactic-semantic and pragmatic behavior as a class of *na* uses which is different from the rest, but also as distinct types of constructions themselves.

2.1 KE

2.1.1 Contextual or lexical "evenness"?

To find out what is the semantics of *ke* when it is found in a conditional environment, that is when it introduces concessive clauses, we need to consider what is the semantics of *ke* in a non-conditional environment. *Ke* (and its regular allomorph before vowels *kt*) is homophonous with the coordinate conjunction "and". The first question, therefore, we need to address, is whether *ke* can be found to express anything akin to concessiveness\(^1\) in other than the conditional, clausal environments. If such a use exists, it may motivate or even allow us to give a fully compositional account of the cases where *ke* is obligatorily construed as "even". Examples (1) and (2) show that *ke* can indeed have such a meaning:

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\(^1\) It is too early at this point to try to define what concessiveness means. In general, there have been two ways of thinking about a sentence containing, for example, the word *even*, regardless of whether the sentence is a conditional or not. One of them makes reference to an (independently existing) counter-to-expectation idea which is evoked by the proposition containing *even* while the other analyses *even* as a scalar term. I review some of the literature on the non-conditional *even* in this section and some on the conditional *even* in the next chapter. In the course of describing the constructions I hope that it will become clearer what concessiveness can and cannot mean with respect to the Greek data and in chapter (5) I will attempt a semantic characterization of concession. For this section, it is enough to distinguish between the "regular", conjunction meaning of *ke* and its concessive use, no matter how we choose to analyze the latter.

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(1) ‘-vriski kanis γνισίο μελι στα χωριά’

find-3SG one pure honey in-the villages

"Can one find pure honey in the villages?"

‘-ke στιν Αθήνα vriski an psakis’

‘and’ in-the Athens find-2SG if look for -2SG

"You can find it even in Athens, if you look for it".

(2) ‘-θα ερθον ολι στο parti nomizis’

FUT come-3PL everybody to-the party think-2SG

"Will everyone come to the party do you think?"

‘-ke i maria θα ερθε an epiminis’

‘and’ the Mary FUT come-3SG if insist-2SG

"Even Mary will come, if you insist".

The speaker of (1) has in mind that it in general unlikely that pure honey can be found in a large city, or, if we think of ke in scalar terms, that it is more unlikely to find it there than, e.g., in a village. Similarly, the speaker of the ke sentence in (2) assumes that Mary is more unlikely to come than some other people who had been invited, or that we may in general not expect Mary to go to parties. An appropriate context can thus trigger an "even" reading of ke. Outside this context, however, the same sentence may have a an additive interpretation. In other words, the "even" reading of ke may be contextually available but it is also cancellable and, therefore, not a conventionalized meaning of ke. If for example, the context sentence in (1) were ‘In Salonica you can find pure honey’, the answer could have been the same with ke having this time an additive (‘also’) interpretation:
'In Athens as well/also you can find it, if you look for it'.

This way of talking about things may be misleading in that it does not take into account the intonation difference between the additive and the "even" interpretation of *ke*. The "even" reading of *ke* requires a rising intonation on "aθīna", for example, which is lacking from the also interpretation. To the extent that this is a grammaticized intonational pattern ("maria" in (2) is also characterized by the same rise), it is an oversimplification to say that the "even" reading is simply contextually controlled.

However, I want to draw a distinction between cases like (1) and (2) on the one hand, where the "even" meaning is not conventionalized, and cases where *ke* is in a conditional environment introducing a concessive clause. When combined with at least one type of conditional clause, *ke* is unambiguously concessive. For the non-clausal uses, therefore, we might still say that *ke* basically means "and" and that the fact that sometimes it gets translated as "even" is a fact about the translation (that is, it is English which requires "even" in such cases) rather than about *ke* (however see also (9), (10)).

2.1.2 Analyses of "even" operators

Supposing that *ke* has an "even" reading, even if only as a conversational implicature, how can we characterize this meaning? In other words, what exactly is the semantics of *ke* in examples like (1) and (2). No systematic study of the semantics and syntax of the Greek *ke* has ever been done. There have been, however, studies of other lexical items with similar semantics in English and French, namely "even" and "meme". My purpose
here is not to review in detail all of the analyses given so far for English and French but rather to see if any of the analyses given for, e.g., the English "even", can adequately account for the non-clausal uses of ke as well as for its use to introduce concessive clauses. The latter use, and the extent to which it can be shown to fall out from the former is the main focus of this study.

Studies of 'even' include Fillmore (1965), Horn (1969), Fraser (1970), Fauconnier (1976), Karttunen and Peters (1979), König (1986) and Kay (1990). All of them (except perhaps Fillmore's) involve to some degree some idea of a scale or gradience and also some idea of a presupposition, since a sentence containing 'even' is taken to depend on some other sentence contextually present either implicitly or explicitly.

Fillmore (1965) employs the notion of "counter-to-expectation" to describe the semantics of "even". He says that a sentence with "even" violates some expectation as in (3),

(3) She even reads Sanskrit,

where the idea conveyed is not only that she reads Sanskrit but also that this is somehow surprising.

The "counter to expectation" idea is also present in the analyses of Horn (1969), Karttunen and Peters (1979) and König (1986). Karttunen and Peters say that the phrase focused by "even" is the "least likely" from a set of other possible candidates of which the predicate is true. Horn, on the other hand, gives a scalar analysis for non-subject "even" (e.g., Muriel even campaigned for Hubert), but proposes a non-scalar semantics of subject "even" (e.g. Even Muriel voted for Hubert), which is based on a parallel analysis for subject and non-subject "only". Finally, König who talks explicitly about "even" in an "even if" clause, uses both the notion
of the scale and that of counter-to-expectation to describe the semantics of concessive clauses: "Even", says König, presupposes (a) that there is an alternative to the focus value which satisfies the open sentence in its scope, and (b) that the value given in the focus is the least likely and therefore most surprising of all values under consideration in a given context².

Kay (1990) contains detailed criticism of the analyses of Fillmore, Karttunen and Peters, Horn and Fauconnier. Kay's proposal is that 'even' (both in subject and non-subject position) can be most adequately analyzed as marking a sentence (the text proposition-tp) which is more informative than an expressed or implied context proposition (cp). 'Greater informativeness', is in turn defined as unilateral entailment (the tp entails the cp, but not the other way around) in a scalar model (whose dimensions may be pragmatically determined). Kay argues convincingly that Fillmore's and Horn's analyses can be recast successfully in his analysis without losing their original insights, and at the same time account for cases which violated the predictions of the original analyses. Thus, he shows that in Fillmore's analysis, the "counter-expectational" notion is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a felicitous "even" sentence, while, arguing against Horn, he shows that subject "even" is also scalar. Finally, in response to Fauconnier, who sees "even" as a necessarily end-of-scale operator, Kay argues that end-of-scaleness is not necessarily involved and should rather be seen as a special case of his "more informative" idea.

² Anscombe and Ducrot (1983) also use the notion of the scale in talking about the semantics of "meme" (=even). They, however, see scales as special "argumentative" dimension of language, which is distinct from the "logical order". I am not in a position to evaluate this analysis, which should be nevertheless mentioned as another example of a scalar analysis for "even".

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The examples with non-clausal *ke* seem also to accommodate a scalar analysis well. Consider for example (4)-(7):

(4) `sto telos simbaθise ke tin marθa`

    to-the end like-PERF-P-3SG even the Martha

  "In the end, he liked even Martha".

(5) `ke stin arxi itan δiskolo`

    even to-the beginning be-P-3SG hard

  "Even in the beginning it was hard".

(6) `xtipisa ke to kuδuni ala kanis δen akuse`

    ring-PERF-P-1SG even the bell but nobody NEG hear-PERF-P-3SG

  "I even rang the bell but nobody heard".

(7) `ke ta xristujena pia filise ke ton petro`

    and the Christmas part. kiss-PERF-P-3SG even the Peter

  "And at Christmas he kissed even Peter".

We can think of all instances of *ke* in (4)-(7) as presupposing some sort of scale against which the constituent focused by *ke* occupies a less likely (or more informative, in Kay’s terms) position than some other understood argument. Clearly, all the scales set up in (4)-(7) are completely pragmatically determined, i.e., the terms evoking the scale do not have a priori scalar semantics.

However, as I argue in chapter 3, there doesn’t seem to be any straightforward way in which the ‘more informative’ *tp* analysis can be applied to the clausal *ke*, that is to the *ke* which, together with a conditional marker, serves to introduce an "even if" type of clause. There are
examples of such sentences to which the "more informative" idea (and, in fact, any analysis which reduces the counter-to-expectation idea to a scalar (end-of-scale or not) phenomenon, e.g. Fauconnier's) does not seem to apply in any obvious way. For such cases, I claim, we seem to be obliged to make reference to some notion of a "counter-to expectation" frame which is evoked by the sentence containing ke. Since the clausal uses of ke to introduce concessive sentences is the main focus of this dissertation, I will discuss this more fully in Chapter (3), where I look at the semantics at a constructional level.

2.1.3 KE and possible focuses

Leaving aside the semantics of non-clausal ke, we now come to its distributional properties. Following McCawley (1988:611), Kay (1989) and others, I will speak of the "focus of ke" as the element which is contrasted with its alternatives, and "scope" the sentence in which the substitution of alternatives is carried out (cf. also Chomsky 1972:99-102 for a related idea of focus and its relation to presupposition). In examples (1) and (2) above, ke picks as its focus an adverbial PP which acts as an adjunct and a NP which is the subject of the sentence respectively. In (8) below, the focus of ke is a NP which is the object (a morphological accusative):

(8) itan toso 0imomenos pu xtipise ke ton jani
be-3SG so angry that hit-3SG 'ke' the John
"He was so angry that he hit even John".

Normally ke precedes its focus. Examples (9) and (10), however, are exceptions to this rule:

(9) 'ir0e ston 0amo ke efere ke 0oro'
come-P-3SG to-the wedding and bring-P-3SG even present

"He came to the wedding and he even brought a present".

(10) 'ekatse ke kapnise ke to tsiyaraki tu'
sit-P-3SG and smoke-P-3SG even the cigarette his

"He stayed and he even smoked his cigarette".

Examples (9) and (10) represent what we may call the double ke construction in which the second ke obligatorily has an "even" reading. In (9) and (10) ke appears in the middle of the verb phrase which is its focus. It is clear that what is being contrasted in (9) and (10) is the whole VP and not just the the last constituents, that is the direct objects. The idea in (9) is that we didn’t expect him/her to come at all, much less to bring a present and in (10) that he/she was not expected to stay at all, much less to make themselves so obviously at home. This is also supported by the fact that the prosodic peak in these sentences is on the verb (here efere and kapnise) and not on the direct objects. In this type of construction, where there is at least one constituent following the verb (it might be an intransitive verb followed by some kind of adverbial phrase), so that in a way there is a position available for ke, this second ke only has an "even" reading.

Where the VP, however, consists only of a verb, it seems clear that the generalization is that whenever the conjunction interpretation is necessary for the structure of the sentence, then the "even" interpretation is simply unavailable. Consider, for example, (11), where ke can only be interpreted as "and":

(11) irθe ke efa-ye
come-P-3SG and eat-P-3SG "He came and he ate". In such cases the "even" interpretation requires the presence of other lexical items which would unambiguously code an "even" meaning. Kiolas is the lexical item required in a positive context, kan in a negative:

(12) ir8e ke efaye kiolas/*ke
    come-P-3SG and eat-P-3SG even
    "He came and he even ate (stayed for dinner)".

(13) ir8e ke δen efaye kan/*ke
    come-P-3SG and NEG eat-P-3SG even
    "He came and he didn't even eat".

Since ke is the only lexical item participating in the adverbial concessive clauses, I will not examine the semantics and distribution of these other items. For ke, we may conclude that although it does not seem to be conventionally associated with an "even" meaning (except perhaps in some environments), it can be used with such a meaning in certain contexts.

The final thing we need to address is the relationship between akoma and ke. The facts about the distribution and semantics of akoma, which some grammarians (c.f. Tzartzanos 1963:131-2) analyze as also meaning "even", can be summarized as follows:

(A) When akoma precedes ke or follows both ke and the focused phrase\(^3\), the meaning becomes unambiguously "even". Thus, while (1), as I said, can have a purely additive/"also" meaning, with the addition of akoma (akoma ke stin aβina...), the interpretation of the focused constituent

\(^3\) Akoma shows floating effects, which I am not going to examine here. The positions I describe in (A) can be considered the neutral ones, while end-of-sentence position is also possible. As expected, there is considerable variation in acceptability from speaker to speaker.
becomes obligatorily scalar. *Akoma ke* can appear in all the same environments that *ke* (in the meaning "even") can.

(B) *akoma* must be accompanied by *ke*, if it is going to have an "even" reading. By itself, it can only have a temporal "yet" or "still" interpretation. We can illustrate this with example (14):

(14) boris akoma (ke) na fijis an 0es
    can-2SG akoma and subj. leave-2SG if want-2SG

a. "You can still go if you want" (without the *ke*)

b. "You can even go if you want" (with the *ke*)

Given these, the question arises as to what exactly is the meaning of *ke* and the meaning of *akoma* and what is the division of labor between them. When I consider issues of composition and compositionality later on, I will take the position that although the function of *ke* to introduce concessive clauses is clearly motivated (given its implicature properties), there is also a distinction to be drawn between this function, where it obligatorily means "even", and the cases discussed in this section. There is a further difference between the kind of "even" meaning that non-conditional *ke* expresses and that expressed by the *ke* which introduces a clause (only the former can be always thought of as scalar). *Akoma ke* expresses "evenness" obligatorily, both in clausal and non-clausal environments. On the one hand, we have *ke*, with a contextually available "even" reading, and, on the other, we have *akoma* which by itself cannot have an "even" reading at all. The two of them together add up to a conventional way of expressing "evenness". Figuring out the semantic processes which led a "still" and an "also" to come to mean "even" may be an interesting question itself, although not a question to be discussed here.
2.2. NA

2.2.1 The non-conditional uses

2.2.1.1 NA in main clause environments

The morpheme *na* is multi-functional in Modern Greek. Its use is so frequent and so varied that there is no one single study which encompasses all the different uses. Mackridge (1985), contains the most complete list of the uses, although, as the author admits, no attempt at a systematic investigation is made. Joseph and Philippaki (1987) and Hesse (1980) also contain lists of the uses as does Tzartzanos (1963). Since this dissertation is mostly concerned with the concessive *na*, I am only going to look in detail at one use of *na*, which, I argue, is the only one directly related to the concessive use. That use is the conditional. However, in view of the fact that some of the properties of the conditional *na* can be traced to its semantics in completely different environments, I will try to address briefly the other uses of *na* as well. I cannot hope to do justice or even list exhaustively all of the other uses (the reader is referred to the works mentioned above). I simply intend to list some of *na*’s basic uses, which will help clarify the range of its distribution and semantics. At this point, I am not making any claims about whether there is a single polysemous *na* or whether we are dealing with complete homonymy. Later, I will make some suggestions in this direction.

The first group of uses is the *na* in a main clause environment. The basic use here is the employment of *na* to express the imperative, obligatorily in the third person and alternating with a monolexemic form in the second:
(15) na fijis / fije amesos

'na' go-2SG / go-2SG-IMP immediately

"Leave immediately!"

(16) na fiji amesos

'na' go-3SG immediately

"I demand that he/she leave immediately".

In the rest of its uses in main clauses, *na* expresses various modalities like an optative ("wish") as in (17) or, as in example (18), a "deliberative question" (Mackridge 1985:283):

(17) na isuna brosta

'na' be-2SG there "I wish you had been there!"

(18) na erθo ki eγo

na' come-1SG and I "Shall / Should I come too?"

From examples (15)-(18), it is obvious that the so-called main-clause uses of *na* are less "main-clause like" than a sentence containing a verb not preceded by *na*. In fact, given that Modern Greek does not have any non-finite complementation, we could make an argument similar to that made for Latin by R. Lakoff (1968) to the effect that in all these examples, there could be a main verb understood to which the *na* clause serves as a complement. This is obvious for the imperative cases, and conveyed by the translation in (17). (18) could be equally well translated as "Do you want me to come too?".

A parenthesis is in order here to talk briefly about the morphology of the Greek verb. We need to differentiate between the different verb forms which follow *na* in the conditional and concessive clauses. For this, I am going to use Mackridge's categorization of the verb forms which captures
the contrasts in the verb morphology. The description here will be oversimplified, not taking into account verbs which lack certain aspectual forms. I will also not address the question of exactly what part of the endings expresses aspect and what tense. The table below is taken from Mackridge (1985:103) and illustrates the forms which contrast, using the verb "to love" in the 1st person singular. (Verb endings are underlined.)

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Imperfective</th>
<th>Perfective</th>
<th>Perfect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tense</td>
<td>a'yaço</td>
<td>a'yaşi</td>
<td>a xo a'yaşi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>a'yaşusa</td>
<td>a'yaşisa</td>
<td>ixa a'yaşi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The perfect, past and non-past, is distinguished from the other aspects by a different ending, but the past/non past distinction is expressed by verb "to have" (in non-past xo and past ixa forms). The perfective non-past, a'yaşi, is the only form which cannot occur by itself but requires the presence of a particle. Na and as (which will be discussed more fully below) are such particles. Œa, the future marker, is another. The perfective non-past form must be preceded by one of these (and that is why it is sometimes called a bound-form), while these markers can also "govern" any of the other forms in table I.

The discussion of whether Modern Greek has a morphologically distinct subjunctive (Joseph and Philippaki 1987:179-180), or whether there is only a semantic distinction between indicative and subjunctive (Mackridge 1985:104 and ch.9), hinges on the analysis that one gives to this fact about the distribution of the perfective non-past. Mackridge's point is that since the particles are an inseparable part of the verb form,
subjunctiveness does not inhere in a particular verb ending, but is a function of the subjunctive markers, and, therefore of the syntactic/semantic context. This, according to him, does not warrant the existence of a morphological distinction between indicative and subjunctive. On the other hand, Joseph and Philippaki (1987:179-180) argue that since there is at least an independent difference in the type of negation, we should recognize a distinction between the subjunctive (marked formally by the particles na and as and the negation) and the indicative. Taking part in this debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. When I address the conditional use of the na-verb form, I will simply assume that the na verb form is indeed primarily characterized by irrealis semantics, although in some cases (cf. (22)) this generalization breaks down.

2.2.1.2 NA as a non-factive subordinator

I now proceed to listing the rest of the uses of na, and in particular its so-called subordinate uses. Na may introduce a clause which acts as the subject of a verb or as a complement of a verb, an adjective, a preposition or a conjunction. Na can also introduce clauses which depend on nouns (forming a sort of "infinitival" relative clause). I will use the term "dependent" in (20) as a cover term to refer to both complement and modifier uses of na. Finally, na serves to introduce adverbial clauses. Below I give one example for each of these categories of usage:

(19) Subject:

---

4 In the examples that follow, PERF stands for perfective, IMPF for imperfective and Perfect will just be perfect. P is past and NP non-past. Finally, where I don't mark the PERF or IMPF, this means that the particular verb does not show this distinction morphologically.
bōri na fiji

can-IMPF-3SG na go-PERF-NP-3SG "It is possible that he
will leave/He may leave".

(20) "Dependent"

(20a) of a verb:

θelo na fiji

want-1SG na go-PERF-NP-3SG "I want him/her to go"

(20b) of a noun:

δen ine anthropos na ton ebistevese

NEG be-3SG person na him trust-IMPF-NP-2SG

"He is not a person to be trusted".

(20c) of an adjective:

panda proimimos na voîsisī

always eager/willing na help-PERF-NP-3SG

"Always eager to help".

(20d) of a preposition:

θa perimename mexri na efevje

FUT wait-1PL until na leave-IMPF-P-3SG

"We would have waited till he/she left".

(20e) of a conjunction:

irfes prin na ksimerosi

come-P-2SG before na dawn-PERF-NP-3SG

"You came before dawn (‘it dawned’)."
(21) Subordinate clause

na se ixe di 0a ekane meyali fasaria
na you-ACC see-PERFECT-P-3SG FUT make-P-3SG big fuss

"If he had seen you, he would have made a big fuss".

The list above is not exhaustive since there are many more constructions in Modern Greek which have the na construction as one of their constituents. All I have tried to do here is give a sample of what I consider to be the main categories of usage for na.

Na is not always in an irrealis environment. In relation to examples like (20a), it is worth pointing out that na most often introduces the complement of a verb of necessity, ability or volition (cf. also Mackridge 1985:285, Tzartzanos 1963:185) and in this sense it does contrast with the complements of factive verbs, usually introduced by oti (cf. 23). However, as (22) shows, this is by no means a necessary condition on the distribution of na.

(22) ton i0a na fevji

him see-P-1SG na leave-IMPF-NP-3SG "I saw him leaving".

(23) sini8itopiisa ksaflnika oti fevji

realize-P-1SG suddenly that leave-IMPF-NP-3SG

"I suddenly realized that he is leaving".

The examples above show also that the verb form which follows na can be any of these illustrated in table I. As we shall see, this is a property of the na construction which is preserved in its subordinate clause use.

Example (21) above exemplifies the use of na to introduce a conditional. Na by itself can introduce a concessive clause as well, and part of
chapter 3 will be devoted to this latter construction and its relationship to the conditional. For the rest of this section, I will investigate the properties of the \textit{na} conditional since this is one of the constituents of the concessive construction.

2.2.2 \textbf{NA as a conditional marker.}

This use of \textit{na} involves a particular construction, different from the others in that \textit{na} this time introduces an adverbial rather than a complement clause. Examples (24)-(26) illustrate further the use of \textit{na} to introduce a conditional clause:

(24) na bi ksañika 0 a jini meyali fasaria
na enter-PERF-NP-3SG suddenly FUT happen-PERF-NP-3SG big fuss
"If he/she enters suddenly, there will be a big fuss".

(25) na imun onasis 0 a to ayoraza
na be-P-1SG Onassis FUT it buy-IMPF-P-1SG
"If I were Onassis, I would buy it".

(26) na xate ltasi δío lefta noritera 0 a tus proftenate
na arrive-PERFECT-P-2PL two minutes earlier FUT them catch-
IMPF-P-2PL
"If you had arrived two minutes earlier, you would have caught them".

Formally, \textit{na} conditionals have the \textit{na} verb form in the beginning of the clause, with the other constituents following. After the verb various orders are possible. Crucially, however, for our purposes, (cf. Chapter 3), the verb form preceded by \textit{na} is always in the beginning of the conditional clause. The only constituents that can come between \textit{na} and the verb are
the negation morpheme and a pronominal object (cf. ex. (21)). After the verb phrase, various orders of constituents are possible, some of which may be considered less marked than others.

Apart from the difference that I'll describe in chapter 3 (which is crucial to the resulting interpretation), every order of constituents which is possible in the conditional is also possible in the concessive. The following word order patterns appear to be the commonest ("subject" refers to a NP subject as opposed to just inflection marked on the verb, and () indicate optionality).

(i) na copula (subject) predicate (cf. (25))

(ii) na verb-intrans. (subject) (adverbial) (cf. (24))

(iii) na verb-transitive (subject) object (adverbial)

The na conditional, however, is more restricted in use than the ordinary conditional marker an (=if). All of the examples above are also possible with an in the place of na). However, alongside (24)-(26), we have (27)-(29) which are ungrammatical (although they are again grammatical with an):

(27)* na meletisis toso sklira 8a perasis
na study-PERF-NP-2SG that/so hard FUT pass-PERF-NP-2SG
"If you study that hard, you will pass".

(28) *na pijenis stin aðina pare 8e meña
na go-IMPF-NP-2SG to-the Athens take-IMP-2SG and me
"If you are going to Athens, take me also / as well".

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On the basis of (27)-(29), (and other examples presented below), I suggest that a general constraint governing the distribution of na conditionals is that they can only be used in cases where the speaker has doubts about the truth of the protasis. We can call na conditionals "dubitative". In the course of the discussion, I will try to qualify this notion further.

Example (27) contains the anaphoric element "toso" (=so, that). In one interpretation, "toso" may be referring back to a previous statement by the interlocutor to the effect that he/she is actually studying hard. In this context and under the reading where the speaker accepts the protasis as true, the na conditional is ungrammatical. "Toso" may also refer back to some previously specified (either by the speaker or by the interlocutor) degree of required studying, which, however, the speaker is not viewing as very likely to be achieved by the addressee ("If you study that hard, which I doubt, you will pass"). Under the latter interpretation, the example with na is considerably improved.

Example (28) is ungrammatical with na against the background of the interlocutor having just said that he is going to Athens. The speaker of (28) accepts this as a given premise in the conversation and on the basis of this makes the suggestion expressed in the apodosis. Example (29), on the other hand, is slightly harder to explain. It is the use of the first person in the protasis which renders the use of na difficult; this is because the use of the first person tends to indicate (though not in any absolute way—cf. the discussion below) that the speaker considers it likely that the case
of his having to send parcels may indeed arise (since, after all, he should know).

In Akatsuka’s (1985:625) terms, *na* conditionals, then, cannot be used to express what she calls "surprise conditionals" (Akatsuka’s data come from English and Japanese). I do not wish to argue with Akatsuka’s claim that this type of conditional represents yet another point on the irrealis continuum, because it takes time for newly learned information to be assimilated into one’s established body of knowledge (Akatsuka 1985:625). My point is simply that in examples like (28) above and (30) below, which Akatsuka calls "surprise/regret" conditionals, the speaker regards the protasis as having been contextually established and for his purposes as being given. These are the cases where *na* conditionals are completely excluded.

(30) - isxirizete oti ine o pio timios

claim-IMPF-NP-3SG that be-3SG the most honest

"He claims that he is the most honest".

- *na/an ine toso timios jati ðen plironi

na/if be-NP-3SG that honest why NEG pay-IMPF-NP-3SG

ta xrei tu

the debts his

"If he is so honest, why isn’t he paying his debts?"

Haiman (1978, 1986) argues that conditional protases are always the topics or givens of their sentences and as such they are neither challenged nor denied by material in the apodosis; rather, they are "(pre)-supposed" to be true and thus constitute the framework or starting point from which the sentence proceeds. Akatsuka (1986) on the other hand, argues that no
conditional protases are givens and if they are topics, they are contrastive topics (i.e. "as for X" topics) rather than thematic topics ("speaking of X"). Even in examples like (29) or (30), where "if" can be paraphrased by "since", Akatsuka argues that there is an epistemological difference between "since" and "if", since the latter may code only indirectly accessible information through external evidence (linguistic communication included). Thus, while (31) is acceptable with "if" in the particular context, it is not acceptable if the speaker has just gone near the window and seen for himself that it is indeed raining:

(31) -It has started raining.
-If it is raining, let's stay in.

Haiman's claim is also argued against in Sweetser (1990:5.3.2), where, however, a distinction is being made between given and non-given conditionals. Sweetser notes that given conditionals in English are all epistemic and speech-act conditionals\(^5\), while it seems impossible to get a "given that/since" reading for a content (if X (cause), then Y (effect)) conditional. If there is indeed a general correlation between "given" protases and epistemic and speech-act readings, then this would explain why speech-act and epistemic conditionals tend to be ungrammatical with na. If the content of the antecedent is contextually established as true, then it cannot really be questioned- be a true hypothetical; rather, it serves as the background for the performance of the speech-act of the consequent or for drawing a conclusion. As we have seen, examples (28), (29) and (30), which do not welcome na (unless they are interpreted as casting doubt),

\(^5\) In Sweetser's terms, an epistemic conditional has the semantic structure of 'If I know that X is true, then I conclude that Y is true'. A speech-act conditional, on the other hand, is of the form 'If X is the case, then I perform the speech-act expressed in the apodosis'.
are speech-act conditionals. Example (32) below is an epistemic, and, as predicted, it is also bad with na (although perfect with an):

(32) --ta fota ine anikta
    the lights be-NP-3PL open "The lights are on".
--*na/an ine anikta ine mesa
    na/an be-NP-3PL open be-NP-3SG in
"If the lights are on, he is in".

The Greek data argue strongly for a "dubitative/non-dubitative", "given/non-given" distinction since na conditionals are excluded from "given", "non-dubitative" contexts. Furthermore, evidence against Haiman's claim comes from the observation that judgements of grammaticality change depending on whether specific contextual knowledge favors a dubitative or non-dubitative, a likely or non-likely interpretation. Consider, for example, (33):

(33) 'na erθi stin ora tu θa prolavume'
    na come-PERF-NP-3SG to-the time his FUT make it-PERF-NP-1PL
"If he comes on time, we'll make it".

For this example to be grammatical at all, it has to be the case that the speaker has no way of knowing if the person referred to will be on time or not and furthermore he has reason to believe that it is unlikely that he will show up on time; the more unlikely, the better it gets. In fact, the

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6 Van der Auwera (1986) also discusses this type of conditionals. His claim, however, is that we should not distinguish between conditional speech acts and speech acts about conditionals. The description here does not hinge on that, since I am only making reference to given vs. non-given conditionals which may or may not be speech acts.
shared knowledge between speaker and hearer in this case happens to be
that the person in question is hardly ever on time. Example (33), however,
is completely inappropriate in a context where the speaker knows that the
person is already on his way and has no reason to believe that there will
be anything to detain him (in which case we could paraphrase (33) with
"Since he'll be here on time, we'll make it"). Similarly example (29) above
improves considerably if what the speaker had in mind is something like
(34):

(34) If the remote and unlikely possibility arises in which I'll have to send
parcels, then he can mail them for me.

This semantic/pragmatic condition regarding na conditionals has to
be stated in terms of the "dubitative" vs. "non-dubitative" distinction
rather than in terms of the "given/non-given" one. As we have seen, with
respect to (27), (part of) the protasis may be "given" and yet the sentence
with na may be good if it is read as casting doubt on the content of the
anteceendent. We could say, therefore, that na conditionals are
dubitative/counterfactual in a broad sense, covering English examples like
(35) and (36):

(35) Had he been late, we would have missed the show.

(36) Were/should he be late, we would miss the show.

The counterfactual interpretation can be easily seen as the one end of the
dubitative continuum, with the "given" and accepted as true (e.g. (28))
seen as the other. Na is allowed under the dubitative and the countefe-
tual (cf. (26)) interpretations but ruled out in the cases where the speaker
has no doubt whatsoever about the truth of the protasis.

These interpretations are speaker (or hearer) imposed rather than
irrevocably evoked by particular examples. Examples (27) and (29), as I
said above, get better under a dubitative interpretation, although the ana-
phoric element in the former and the first person singular in the latter
tend to rule them out out of context. Similarly, (37) and (38), regular
speech-act conditionals, are ungrammatical if the speaker is simply repeat-
ing the content of the antecedent as established background. The asterisks
in the na version refer to this reading. If, however, the intended reading is
something like "If, by any chance, you are the last one to leave..." (for
(37)), and "If, by any chance, you get hungry..." (for (38)), then the use of
na becomes acceptable:

(37) *na/an ise o telefteos pu θα fiji
    na/an be-NP-2SG the last that FUT leave-PERF-NP-3SG
    klise ta fota
    turn off-IMP the lights

"If you are the last one to leave, turn off the lights".

(38) *na/an pinasis exi fai sto psijio
    na/an get hungry-PERF-NP-2SG have-NP-3SG food in-the fridge

"If you get hungry, there is food in the fridge".

Should an example like (30) be considered counterevidence to the
generalization proposed for na conditionals? The na conditional in the con-
text of (30) is starred despite the fact that the overall interpretation seems
to be that the speaker does not believe that the person referred to is
indeed honest. If this is the case, then examples like (30) would be excep-
tions to the generalization that na likes dubitative/counterfactual con-
texts. However, I would like to argue that (30) (and examples like it) are
not really an exception to the rule. The speaker of the conditional in (30)
is still accepting the content of the protasis as established and uses it as
the background for performing the speech-act of the apodosis. It is this aspect of the meaning which rules out the use of na. The "I don't really believe p" part of the meaning is derivative and should be seen as an implicature arising from such examples in cases where real-world knowledge points to a conflict between the content of the antecedent and that of the consequent. As an implicature, it can be cancelled without any oddity and the question in the consequent can be read as a genuine request for information rather than a challenge: "If he is so honest, which I have no reason to doubt, why isn't he paying his debts"?. Such examples do not, therefore, constitute counterevidence to the generalization proposed for na nor do they warrant the existence of a special construction to account for such cases. In other words, I see no reason to distinguish (30) and the like from an example like (39):

(39) -- pijeno stin aòina

   go-IMPF-NP-1SG to-the Athens "I'm going to Athens".

   --*na/an pijenis stin aòina jati na min eròs mazi su

   na/an go-IMPF-NP-2SG to-the Athens why subj. NEG come-PERF-NP-1SG with you

   "If you are going to Athens, why don't I come with you?"

An interesting issue arising in the context of this discussion is the interaction between the tense of the verb and the dubitative constraint. It is clear that the constraint on the distribution of na conditionals cannot be stated in terms of the tense of the verb in the conditional clause, since the same example can improve or get worse depending on the speaker's intentions or knowledge and the degree to which he considers something to be likely or true. However, since the tense patterns themselves in a conditional environment have conventional interpretations associated with
them, we may expect these meanings to interact with the general meaning of a *na* conditional. So, for example, the pluperfect (=PERFECT PAST) in the antecedent is normally associated with a counterfactual interpretation (cf.chapter 5); the protasis of such a conditional is taken to presuppose as fact its content with reversed polarity in the past tense (in the terms used here in the PERFECTIVE PAST). Na clauses with the PERFECT PAST in the antecedent are normally always acceptable:

(40) na ixan er0i stin oratas 0a tus ixes 8i
    na come-PERFECT-P-3PL to-the time their FUT them see-
PERFECT-P-2SG

"If they had come on time, you would have seen them".

This is because certainty about their not coming can be seen as the negative end point of a likely continuum, which sanctions the use of *na*. Predictably, however, when the pluperfect is embedded in a "given" context which cancels counterfactuality (the protasis of (41) does not convey that they didn’t come on time), the use of a *na* conditional is ruled out:

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7 Comrie (1986) argues against the pluperfect being conventionally associated with counterfactuality, at least for English and suggests that alleged counterfactuals in other languages should be also reexamined. He cites examples like (i), where the possibility of whether the butler did it or not is at the very least left open:

(i) If the butler had done it, we would have found just the clues that we did in fact find.

Based on such cases, Comrie suggests that counterfactuality is an implicature rather than the meaning of the conditional pluperfect. However, he goes on to say that it is interesting to speculate on why counterfactuals should be a stronger implicature with conditionals that have past time reference.

Comrie’s is certainly a valid point. However, until chapter 5 where I actually argue that the pluperfect has a conventional interpretation in certain conditional contexts, I am simply going to assume that like English, Greek has at least a strongly preferred counterfactual interpretation associated with the pluperfect form, leaving as an open question the issue of what status exactly we should attribute to this meaning (cf. also Fillmore 1989 for a treatment of the pluperfect conditional as a distinct construction with counterfactual meaning).
"They had come on time".

"If they had come on time, how come I didn’t see them?"

Things are even less clear with other verb forms. The IMPERFECTIVE PAST for example, may be associated with both hypothetical and counterfactual meaning as in (42), (43) respectively (cf. chapter (5)). (43) can also be read as a hypothetical:

(42) an s  evlepe  o pateras su θa se skotone
    an you see-IMPF-P-3SG the father your FUT you kill-IMPF-P-3SG
    "If your father saw you, he would kill you".

(43) 'an ton ipostirizan stis ekloyes θa evjene’
    an him support-IMPF-P-3PL to-the elections FUT get elected-IMPF-P-3SG
    "If they supported him in the elections, he would be elected".
    "If they had supported him in the elections, he would have been elected".

Both (42) and (43) are also possible with na since hypothetical and counterfactual meanings are, as we have seen, compatible with it. Consider, for example, (44):

(44) na s  evlepe  o pateras su θa se skotone
"If your father saw you, he would kill you".

Example (44) is, however, more appropriate in a context where the speaker knows that the father is nowhere near and therefore it is highly unlikely that he will show up. On the other hand, it is highly inappropriate in a context where the father is standing in full view of the speaker ready to intervene in that case, if the speaker wished to admonish a last warning to the child (to stop doing whatever she is doing), he/she would have to use an an conditional with the same verb form.

Finally, and in relation to (44), consider an example like (45):

(45)'na se δi o pateras su θa se skotosi'

"If your father sees you, he'll kill you".

Example (45) features the PERFECTIVE NON-PAST in the antecedent, a verb form which, if anything, is not associated with counterfactuality. Depending on the verb form in the consequent, the perfective non-past in the antecedent may mean different things and in this respect it may be more difficult to describe what such a tense can mean in some conditional environment than simply to identify the non-occurring meanings. The point is that in view of the non-occurring meanings, this is the verb form

8 Both the perfective, non-past and the imperfective, past express hypotheticality. As is the case, however, in many languages, the past forms are more hypothetical in that a past antecedent is seen as less likely to occur than a non-past one, even if the content of both refers to present or future situations (cf. also Mackridge 1985). The fact remains, however, that unlike the past forms, the non-past ones are never associated with counterfactuality.
that, when in a *na* conditional, we should expect the greater variation in judgements. As I pointed out with respect to (33) and (27), (29) above, these are the cases where a speaker has to have in mind (or the hearer imagine) some special contextual conditions.

Such examples bring home a point forcefully made by Fillmore (1989:ch.3 and elsewhere). A *na* conditional with a non-past verb form is only good if there are special contextual conditions holding which exclude a possible given, likely or certain reading for the protasis; on the other hand, the hearer of such sentences will be forced to imagine that such conditions do indeed hold, even if he/she doesn’t have direct access to what the speaker has in mind. One way of describing this is by recognizing that constructional meaning (in this case, confinement to dubitative/counterfactual contexts which characterizes the *na* construction) may be superimposed on the meaning of the non-past verb form in a conditional context. Even if the meaning of the verb-form itself might lead us to a preferred "likely" or "very possibly" meaning, the semantics of *na* overrules this interpretation.

### 2.2.3 Summary and Conclusions

I have argued in the preceding section, that the use of *na* conditionals in Modern Greek is governed by a constraint which limits their distribution to dubitative and counterfactual environments. The significance of this constraint lies in the fact that a full description of *na* conditionals requires reference to pragmatic factors; these factors are sometimes verifiable by both speaker and hearer (that is they both know by the preceding context that the protasis is given), while at other times the speaker uses a *na* conditional to present the protasis as highly unlikely
and the hearer is forced to conclude that this is indeed the case.

Describing *na* conditionals, therefore, requires a unit of description which at the same time encompasses grammatical/syntactic information and semantic/pragmatic information. This unit is the construction. Notice that in the case of *na* conditionals we may have to recognize two levels of description: one at which all *na* constructions are unified by this constraint, i.e. by this semantic/pragmatic feature against "certainty". And another one at which, they each represent distinct constructions with particular semantic and pragmatic properties. A *na* conditional with the pluperfect in the protasis (and always an appropriate verb form in the apodosis- cf. chapter 5) is counterfactual, while a *na* protasis with a non-past verb form isn't (the protasis is presented as unlikely but not necessarily as non-true).

This type of work is in the tradition of a growing body of work which pays attention to the semantic/pragmatic information attached to a particular form and considers it a proper part of linguistic description. This tendency is evidenced in Fillmore's (1983, and 1989) work on grammatical constructions containing syntactic/semantic descriptions of particular conditional patterns in English), in the Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1989) analysis of the "let alone" construction and Kay's (1990) study of "even". It is also evidenced in Lakoff's (1987:462-585) detailed analysis of the English constructions introduced by "here" and "there" and in his recasting of the coordinate structure constraint (Lakoff 1986) in frame-semantic terms. Lambrecht 1986a and 1986b studies the pragmatic motivation for particular clause types in colloquial French and in German binomial expressions respectively. Brugman (1988) is an exhaustive syntactic and semantic/pragmatic description of the English constructions headed by
'have'. Finally, Sweetser (in preparation) argues that change predicate constructions are associated with two distinct interpretations which correspond to role and individual readings (in the sense of Fauconnier 1985). This list is by no means exhaustive. I have already mentioned work on conditionals in which the discourse environment plays a crucial role (cf. Akatsuka and Comrie). The position that I am advocating though and which is represented by the works listed above, departs somewhat from the discourse tradition (as this is, for example, represented in Hopper 1985) by paying simultaneous attention to form and meaning and by recognizing that particular constructions may be conventionally associated with a certain meaning.

Finally, to what extent is the semantics of na in a conditional environment motivated by its semantics in other environments? Since, I have only done a systematic study of na as a conditional, any observation here is speculative. It seems worth pointing out, however, that in its use to introduce a verb complement (cf. (20a), na usually introduces the complement of verbs of necessity, ability or volition, but, crucially, never the complement of a factive verb. Moreover, in its use in a main clause environment, na is used to express modalities like the optative, questions or imperatives (cf. (15)-(18)) but never a declarative statement. The use of na, therefore, to introduce a conditional and, further, a conditional which is governed by a specific constraint against "givenness" does appear to be a motivated extension.

This is not meant to imply that a description of the conditional construction as such is redundant; from the discussion above, it is clear that at the very least we need to make reference to the special use (and meaning) of the tenses in a conditional clause and to the way that these
interact with the semantic/pragmatic function of a *na* conditional. On the other hand, it is useful to recognize that the choice of *na* (as opposed to any other from the available complementizers, e.g., *oti* or *pos*) to express this kind of conditional is not totally unmotivated and arbitrary. In the course of this dissertation, I hope to show that at least some of our choices of connectives for introducing a concessive clause are motivated to a lesser or greater extent by the meanings that a connective (or subordinator) may have in other contexts. Moreover, the kind of meaning that a connective has in these other contexts may motivate the kind of concession that it expresses. This is what I suggest is true of *na* in its conditional use and, as I argue in chapter (3), of *as* in its use to introduce a concessive.

2.3 AS

2.3.1 Syntactic properties

The preverbal particle *as* also serves to introduce a clause. The general consensus among traditional grammars and analysts is that the clauses introduced by *as* are more like main clauses than clauses introduced by *na*. Whereas both *na* and *as* serve to introduce imperative type clauses, *as*, unlike *na*, cannot be used as a subordinator to introduce the complement of verbs, nouns etc. (cf. 2.2.1). Examples of *as* sentences are listed in (46) to (50) below:

(46) *as mi fame* tora
    as NEG eat-PERF-NP-1PL now "Let's not eat now".

(47) ‘*as erθun* oti ora θelun’
- 63 -

as come-PERF-NP-3PL what time want-NP-3PL

"Let them come whenever they want".

(48) 'as exi vreksi θe μu oso lipame'

as rain-PERFECT-NP-3SG god my while be away-IMPF-P-1PL

"If only it has rained, God, while we were away".

(49) 'as mu γrapsi ena γrama ke θa ta kanoniso'

as I-GEN write one letter and FUT them arrange-PERF-NP-1SG

"Let him write me a letter, and I'll arrange things".

(50) θelo na ton γnoriso ki as ine vlakas

want-NP-1SG subj. him meet-PERF-NP-1SG and as be-NP-3SG stupid

"I want to meet him even if he is stupid".

As far as the morphological/syntactic facts go, na and as are indistinguishable. As, like na, can govern any of the verb forms listed in table I, and like na clauses, clauses with as are negated by mi(n) (cf. (46)). This last feature according to Joseph and Philippaki (1987:179) is one of the formal ways of characterizing the subjunctive.

In 2.2.2 I noted that besides the negative morpheme and an object pronoun, there is no other constituent which can come between na and the following verb form. This is true of as as well; example (51) with a pronoun is grammatical but (52) with another constituent between as and the verb is not:

(51) as (min) ton δo
as NEG him see-PERF-NP-1SG
"I shouldn't see him".

(52) *as avrio δο τιν maria
as tomorrow see-PERF-NP-1SG the Mary
"I could see Mary tomorrow".

Finally, with respect to the possible word order patterns (i.e. order of constituents following the verb), *as* has all the possibilities available to it that *na* has (cf. 2.2.2).

2.3.2 Semantic/pragmatic functions

Mackridge (1985:298-299) claims that *as* serves to introduce clauses which may have two main functions: the hortative or permissive on the one hand and the concessive on the other (Since he says that there are only two main functions, presumably the hortative and the permissive are more closely related to each other and belong to the same class). These are exemplified in (53)-(55) below:

(53) as pame ki emis
as go-PERF-NP-1PL and we "Let's go too".

(54) as min erθun afu δεν θελun
as NEG come-PERF-NP-3PL since NEG want-NP-3PL
"Let them not come since they don't want to".

(55) ela sto parti mas ki as feris ton andra su
come-IMP to-the party our and as bring-NP-2SG the husband your
"Come to our party even if you bring your husband".
Example (53) exemplifies, according to Mackridge, the hortative use, (54) the permissive and (55) the concessive. In its hortative sense, Mackridge suggests, *as* expresses an "injunction" on the part of the speaker which is rather more a wish or a desire than if *na* were used in the same context. This observation disagrees with the Joseph and Philippaki treatment of *as*, who claim that this particle is the main periphrastic suppletive form of the imperative (which has monolexemic forms only for the second person singular and second person plural). If by imperative they refer to the prototypical meaning associated with imperatives, namely "giving an order", then the form with *na* (cf. examples (15), (16)) is certainly more imperative than the form with *as*, which, as Mackridge suggests, tends to be milder. *As* clauses are primarily suggestions which in context may be interpreted as mild or indirect orders. Compare for example (56) (with a monolexemic imperative), (57) with the *na* form and (58) with *as*:

(56) ela amesos
    come-IMP immediately "Come immediately!"

(57) na erθi amesos
    na come-PERF-NP-3SG immediately "(I demand that) he come immediately".

(58) as erθi amesos
    as come-PERF-NP-3SG immediately "Why doesn't he come right now?"

I'll suggest below that *as* has at least two more distinct functions than those proposed by Mackridge, namely the conditional and its use to express a wish. With respect to Mackridge's remarks, however, it is worth stressing that *as* does seem to have a distinct permissive sense.
synchronically, although this is in general disputed and most grammars do not list such a meaning (cf. Tzartzanos 1963). As is historically derived from the singular imperative form of the verb *afino* "let, allow" (Imperative *ase* > *as* - cf. Tzartzanos 1963, Kriaras 1973). However, as the syntactic difference between (59) and (60) (with the lexical verb in the imperative) shows, as is completely grammaticized:

(59) as fiji o janis
as leave-PERF-NP-3SG the John
"John should/may go".

(60) as(e) ton jani na fiji
let the John subj. leave-PERF-NP-3SG
"Let (allow) John to go".

In (60), as(e) is still a three-place predicate, case-marking its object "John*. The *as* of (59), on the other hand, is governing the whole clause and is necessarily followed by the verb. I agree with Mackridge that we need to recognize a distinct permission sense for *as* synchronically as well, rather than subsuming both meanings under a single one. The latter analysis appears to be problematic in several respects. If such a meaning exists, what is its nature? Is it an abstraction over suggestion and permission and, if so, what kind of common features are there between suggestion and permission?. If, on the other hand, we identify it with either suggestion or permission, we would have to derive the other interpretation in some sort of principled way, which would allow suggestion to be interpreted as permission in some contexts but not, e.g., as an order. Example (54), for instance, could be read both as a suggestion and as granting permission (if, for example, the speaker is a father talking about his children).
It cannot, however, be interpreted as an order. Furthermore, I suggest in chapter 4 that the conditional and the concessive uses make much more sense and some of their properties fall out, if they are each taken as being motivated from distinct permissive and suggestion uses.

Contextually, an *as* clause may be also interpreted as a wish, as for example in (61) (cf. also (48) above). Since this kind of meaning is not always relatable to a suggestion, we may need to recognize it as a distinct function:

(61) *as vreksi 0e mu*

*as rain-PERF-NP-3SG god my "If only it would rain, god!"

Finally, *as* clauses can participate in structures like these illustrated in (62)-(65):

(62) *'as kani tin δulia tu ke 0a pai kala'*

*as do-NP-3SG the job his and FUT go-PERF-NP-3SG well

"If he does his job, he'll be fine".

(63) *'as eyrafe ena γrama ti 9īoma9a*

*as write-IMPF-P-3SG one letter the week
ke δen 0a ton ksexnayan’

and NEG FUT him forget-IMPF-NP-3PL

"If he had been writing one letter a week, they wouldn't have forgotten him".

(64) *as er0is ke 0a ta pume*

*as come-PERF-NP-2SG and FUT them say-PERF-NP-1PL

"If you come, we'll talk./ If you come, you'll regret it".
(65) 'as ixe xtipisi to kušuni ke θa to metanione'

as ring-PERFECT-P-3SG the bell and FUT it regret-IMPF-P-3SG

"If he had rung the bell, he would have regretted it".

Sentences (62)-(65) are conditionals. The as clause in such cases expresses a condition for the second clause in (62), a counterfactual situation in (63) and (65) while, (64) depending on whether or not we choose the idiomatic interpretation of the phrase "θa ta pume", can either express a simple contingency or a conditional threat (the idea being that the speaker does not in fact want the hearer to come). The two interpretations are formally indistinguishable but only in the case where the intended meaning is a threat or a negative suggestion can we have polarity items. Compare, for instance, (66) to (67):

(66) as pis tipota/*kati ke θa to metaniosis

as say-PERF-NP-2SG anything/something and FUT it regret-PERF-NP-2SG

"If you say anything, you will regret it".

(67) as pis kati/*tipota ke θa se sinxoresun

as say-PERF-NP-2SG something/anything and FUT you forgive-PERF-NP-3PL

"If you say something, they’ll forgive you".

That (62)-(65) form conditional patterns is also evidenced by the fact that as we may expect, there are tense dependencies between the antecedent and the consequent. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. For now, I can just give one example to illustrate this. Compare (65) above with (68):
Example (68) illustrates simply that a PAST verb form in the antecedent, constrains the verb form in the consequent, requiring a past verb form there as well.

A lot more may be said about as as a conditional. For one thing, a full study would have to specify what types of conditional meanings may be expressed by this kind of antecedent. In general, we may expect that the possibilities of as as a conditional marker will be somehow constrained by its general meaning of expressing a suggestion in non-conditional environments (cf. also chapter 4). So, for example, whereas (69) is acceptable, (70) under the reading which expresses the speaker's doubt as to the place where the hearer lives, is not. Both (69) and (70) are of course fine with a regular an conditional (cf. 2.2.2):

(69) as eyrafes esi to miso ke tha eyrana
    as write-IMPF-P-2SG you the half and FUT write-IMPF-NP-1SG
    ki eyo to ipolipo
    and I the rest

"If you had written half (of it), I'd have written the rest".

(70) *as emenes eso ke tha ikseres afti tin taverna
    as live-IMPF-P-2SG here and FUT know-P-2SG this the tavern

"If you lived here you would know this tavern".

So (62)-(65), in addition to the conditionality, may be seen as preserving parts of the semantics of suggestion as well. In (64) and (66) we have what we may call negative suggestions, that is things that the speaker does not
(or did not) want the hearer to do (or have done). Still, it seems possible to trace this kind of meaning back to a suggestion one, via a Searlean type of account of indirect speech acts (Searle 1981: chapter 2). The point is simply that some motivational semantics is easily imagined for the conditional uses of *as*.

To summarize, therefore, we have seen that clauses introduced by *as* are primarily associated with expressing a suggestion about what should/can/may etc. be done (or could have been done in the case of past verb tenses) and also permission. They may be also interpreted as wishes and finally they may serve as the antecedents of conditional sentences whose two parts are "conjoined" by *ke*. This may not be a complete or fully detailed description of all the uses of an *as* clause, but for the purpose of describing the concessive use, it should be enough. In chapter 3, I will discuss the concessive use of the *as* clauses (cf. example (50) above), arguing that although we need to recognize a separate *as* concessive construction, the use of *as* to introduce a concessive clause is highly motivated, if we recognize that one of its non-concessive uses is to express permission.
Chapter 3

The NA and AS concessive constructions

3.0 Introduction

In chapter 2, I examined some of the properties of the lexical and clausal constituents of concessive clauses. In particular, I discussed the properties of \textit{ke} in a non-clausal environment and the properties of two types of clauses, those introduced by \textit{na} and \textit{as}. Undoubtedly, there is a great deal more to say about these constituents. All I can hope to have done here is to have pointed out some of their syntactic and semantic/pragmatic properties which will necessarily figure in the description of concessive constructions.

In this Chapter, I will examine the constructional properties of the concessive clause and also look at the properties of their internal constituents in a larger context. The issue of compositionality, will be taken up in Chapter 4, but as I have already noted in the preceding chapter, we should expect that not all properties of the concessive clauses will fall out from the properties of their internal constituents. This fact is easily accommodated by a descriptive and theoretical framework like that of Construction Grammar, since description of the constructions at every level is the basic tenant of the theory. The limiting case in which all of the properties of the larger constructions follow from the properties of its constituents is also accommodated naturally. Importantly, however, full compositionality in Construction Grammar is not a theoretical but an empirical matter, judged on a case-by-case basis. The description of these properties, therefore, will be done with an eye to determining the extent to
which they follow or don't follow from the properties of the constituent parts.

I will look at both the syntactic and the semantic properties of these concessive clauses. On the syntactic side, I will take up questions of constituency, which in the preceding chapter I just presupposed without justification. I will also consider questions of internal order at the constructional level. On the semantic side, I will look at the general semantic and pragmatic properties of the constructions. The chapter will be organized by construction: that is, I will first examine the clauses introduced by na, then the clauses introduced by ke na and finally the clauses introduced by as. The description in this chapter will concentrate on the clausal level. Cross-clausal relationships and dependencies (that is, dependencies between the concessive and the main clause) will be taken up in Chapter 5. Also, in this chapter, the question of what exactly we mean by concessiveness will be left at an intuitive level and also be taken up in a later chapter.

3.1 NA concessives

3.1.1 The "pragmatics only" account

I will begin this section by outlining an approach to the relationship between conditionals and concessives which is presented in König 1986 and Bennett 1982. The König and Bennett analyses are based on a truth-conditional approach to conditionals and a purely pragmatic view of the conditional-concessive conditional relationship and that is why I will be referring to these accounts as the pragmatic accounts.
Konig's general point is that concessives introduced by connectives like the English "even if" should be considered a specific type of conditional. Based on the Greek data, I am going to argue that although concessives of the "even if" type share certain properties with a regular conditional sentence, they nevertheless have properties which must be attributed to the "even if" construction as such.

Konig's arguments can be summarized as follows: First, evidence for the concessive as a conditional subtype is adduced by the fact that in many languages, connectives of the "even if" type are derived from conditional connectives. Even in languages like German, where the concessive conditional and the conditional are introduced by different connectives, it used to be the case that the concessive frequently had a conditional use in earlier periods. Greek is no exception in this respect; both the na and the an markers have conditional and concessive uses and to the extent that such polysemy is suggestive, it is indeed an argument that conditionals and concessive (conditional) are indeed related.

Secondly, Konig claims, the classification of "even if" constructions as a particular type of conditional is supported by semantic facts as well: "All semantic properties that differentiate "even if" conditionals from ordinary conditionals can be shown to be due to the contribution that "even" makes to the meaning of such constructions" (Konig, 1986:232). As I will show, the Greek data constitute direct counterevidence to this claim.

The following summarizes Konig's account of the contribution of "even" and the derivation of concessives from conditionals: Truth

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1 No study has been done to determine which use was historically prior but there is no reason not to assume that in accordance with the historical developments in other languages, these markers had first a (purely) conditional meaning. In any case, the argument about the relationship of conditionals and concessives is not affected by our lack of knowledge of the historical facts.
conditionally, examples (1) and (2) below are the same, their meaning
difference being of a purely pragmatic nature:

(1) If Peter comes, I will not stay.

(2) Even if Peter comes, I will not stay.

The difference is due to an interpretive principle which Geis and
Zwicky (1971:562) have called "conditional perfection" and formulated as
in (3) (cf. also Fauconnier 1985:114 for a description of the same
phenomenon):

(3) A sentence of the form X --> Z invites an inference of the form
-X --> -Z.

König claims that this inference is like a Gricean generalized implica-
ture and that despite claims to the contrary (mainly by Levinson
1983:145ff), it can be given a straightforward Gricean account. This debate
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is of interest is how this
inference relates to the semantics of the concessives. A sentence of the
form "if p, q" , König says, and its more categorical counterpart "q (any-
way)" can be assumed to form a scale: < q (anyway), if p,q > . By the
maxim of quantity, the assertion of the weaker statement "if p, q" will
implicate "-q (anyway)" and thus to the inference that p is a necessary as
well as sufficient condition for q. (This account is also found in Cornulier
1983).

Concessive conditionals, on the other hand, exclude "conditional per-
fection" from the set of admissible inferences by entailing or presupposing
that the conditional relationship holds for a whole series of antecedents.
Wherever, therefore, the protasis of a given conditional contains an
expression that marks an extreme point on a scale - which licenses the
inference that the conditional relationship holds for all other values on the
same scale, and thus for a series of antecedents - conditional perfection is cancelled and the conditional can be interpreted as a concessive.

According to König, expressions which can have this cancelling effect include the following:

(i) all focus particles (e.g. just) which evaluate their focus value as ranking low on a scale.

(ii) all expressions specifying extreme values in a particular propositional schema (e.g. not drink a drop, drink a whole bottle).

(iii) all superlatives and pseudo-superlatives.

(iv) free-choice quantifiers like "any".

The view that the difference in meaning between conditionals and concessives is not truth-conditional, but it is instead due to the presence of such words, and in particular of "even", is also held by Bennett (1982): "So far as truth-conditions are concerned, there is no class of "even if" conditionals". Bennett’s paper is also explicitly concerned with unifying the meaning of "even" in non-conditional environments with the meaning of "even" in an "even if" environment.

3.1.2 NA Concessives

Let us now turn to the Greek data. The prediction made by the König and Bennett analyses would be that the addition of "even" or of any word or expression from the list above (in the König account) would be sufficient for producing concessive meaning. In this context, "concessive" and "concessiveness" will be used to refer to the cases where the content of the antecedent and that of the consequent are seen to be in some
sort of opposition or adversity relationship. This interpretation may arise in more than one way; this discussion, however, will be deferred until chapter (6), where I will investigate more thoroughly the different ways in which \( p \) may be said to imply \( q \). The (non truth-conditional) difference between conditionals and concessives lies in the cancellation by these expressions of the "conditional perfection" implicature which would otherwise arise in most contexts. The Greek concessive clauses defy these predictions in at least two ways: first, they make a distinction between the "even" word and the other classes of "end-of-scale" words by showing that for the latter mere addition to a conditional clause is not a sufficient condition for giving rise to concessiveness. Secondly, they show that the addition of all such expressions (including "even") is not a necessary condition in order for the clause to have concessive meaning.

In 2.2.2, I examined the use of \( na \) conditionals in Modern Greek. Consider for example, (4) (example (25) in 2.2.2):

(4) \( na \) imun onasis \( \theta a \) to ayoraza

\( na \) be-P-1SG Onassis FUT it buy-IMPF-P-1SG

"If I were Onassis, I would buy it".

According to the König story, since "Onassis" is a pseudosuperlative contained in the protasis of a conditional, sentence (4) should also have a concessive reading available as well. Consider, for example, (5) where the negation in the consequent creates an appropriate "incompatibility" context for the protasis and the apodosis (if one is Onassis, one is normally expected to be able to buy anything):

(5) ?? \( na \) imun onasis \( \delta en \) \( \theta a \) to ayoraza
na be-NP-1SG Onassis NEG FUT it buy-IMPF-P-1SG

"If I were Onassis, I wouldn't (be able to) buy it".

The ?? indicate that (5) is pragmatically odd because it is still obligatorily (purely) conditional. The mere presence of the pseudosuperlative is not enough to make it compatible with the negative consequent.

On the other hand, the English example (6), König claims, is a perfect concessive (König 1986:ex. (23)):

(6) If I were Rockefeller, I would not be able to pay for this.

However, even in (6), in order to get the concessive interpretation, the sentence has to be read with special emphasis (rising intonation) on "Rockefeller" (what Haiman (1986:223) calls "squeal" intonation. "Squeal", Haiman claims, is a special diacritic). Intonation, in turn, is not something that can be taken into account when composing the meaning of the clause and, therefore, in this respect the König and Bennett accounts may be insufficient even for English.

Turning again to Greek, reading example (5) with emphasis on "Onassis", certainly improves it. However, only two of my fifteen informants reported that they might actually say it this way. For the rest, the natural way to get a concessive reading involves preposing the crucial word, as in (7).

(7) onasis na imun ðen ða borusa na to ayoraso

"Even if I were Onassis, I wouldn't be able to buy it".

We obtain similar judgements if we try to get a concessive from a conditional by adding other appropriate words from König's list, except for ke (= even). Consider, (8) to (10) where again ?? stands for pragmatically odd:
(8) (a) "If he drinks a drop, he'll get drunk".

(b) "Even if he drinks one drop, he'll get drunk".

(9) (a) "If he were the fattest person in the world, he wouldn't need such a diet".

(b) "Even if he were the fattest person in the world, he wouldn't need such a diet".

(10) (a) "If just John had come, we wouldn't have fit".

(b) "Even if just John had come, we wouldn't have fit".

In (8), we have "an expression specifying an extreme value", in (9) a real (i.e. marked as such) superlative and in (10) "just" which marks its focus as being low on a scale. In none of these examples, however, does the
concessive reading arise automatically.

Now consider examples (11)-(13):

(11) 'stin aðīna na pas δεν vriskis δulia'
    to-the Athens na go-PERF-NP-2SG NEG find-IMPF-NP-2SG job

"Even if you go to ATHENS, you won't get a job".

(12) tin Eleni na silavun δεν θα maðun tipota
    the Helen na arrest-PERF-NP-3PL NEG FUT learn-PERF-NP-3PL nothing

"Even if they arrest HELEN, they won't learn anything".

(13) 'o iðravlikos na min ixe erθi θa
    the plumber na NEG come-PERF-P-3SG FUT
    ta katafername'
    them manage-IMPF-P-IPL

"Even if the PLUMBER hadn't come, we would have managed".

In (11) what is preposed 2 is a prepositional complement, in (12) the direct object, in (13) the subject. Crucially, however, in none of these examples is the preposed phrase an out-of-context scalar word, i.e. a word that could in some imaginable sense fit in König's list (cf. Nikiforidou 1988). Nevertheless, placing these constituents in first position results in their becoming scalar terms and acquiring extreme values on the given scales (e.g. "Athens" in (11) ranks high on a scale of likely places to get a job, i.e. the meaning is something like "even if you go as far as Athens...").

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2 It should be clear that I am not using the terms "preposed" or "preposing" in a transformational sense. All they serve is to contrast this type of sentence with the sentence where na and the verb form appear in the beginning.
"Helen" in (12) ranks high on the scale of people who if arrested, are likely to let the police know what happened- "even if they go so far as to arrest Helen..."etc.). Whether these constituents have end-of-scale meanings or whether they simply denote some extreme (towards an end-of-scale) value does not seem to be important. In fact, we could treat the meanings that these terms acquire as relative, in the way that Kay (1990) analyzes "even" - see 2.1.2. We could say, that is, that this type of concessive clause in Greek, with the "crucial" constituent preceding the verb marks its content as being more informative than an implied (series of) other propositions. The overall semantic impact of sentences like (7)-(10) and (11)-(13) is that since the consequent will hold for the more informative (and often least likely) of the antecedents, it will also hold for any other antecedent "less informative" (or more likely). (In 3.2, however, I am going to suggest that Kay's account runs into problems with another type of concessive construction). In the na concessives featuring a preposed constituent, the series of antecedents which are set up by the protasis, consist in propositions whose only changing part is the part corresponding to the focused constituent. In other words, what is in focus is not the whole VP but only the constituent in the beginning of the clause. This is indicated in the English translation by the capital letters which mark the focus.

With respect to this construction, it might be argued that preposing the constituent is nothing but another pragmatic device which Greek employs in order to get the concessive reading. Even if this is the case, I am going to argue below that this does not make the Greek na concessives any less problematic for the truth-conditional/pragmatic story. For now, I just want to point out that there has not been any systematic correlation recognized in Greek between the first position in a sentence and a focused
constituent. Joseph and Philippaki (1987:98-99) note that, if anything, the clearest correlation between position and focus holds for the sentence-final position of direct objects and case-marked indirect objects: if these constituents are "moved" to final position, they have to be interpreted as emphatic focus. Mackridge (1985:234-239) also notes that the focus, if any, tends to be placed at the end.

A final thing we need to clarify is what exactly counts as preposing. I mentioned in 2.2.2, that the only element, besides negation, which can come between na and the following verb form is an object personal pronoun. This, however, does not count as preposing, so, for example, (14) can only be interpreted as a conditional (and, therefore, with this particular apodosis it is pragmatically odd):

(14)? na tu eleyes kalimera 0a se evrise
  na he-GEN say-IMPF-P-2SG good morning FUT you swear-IMPF-P

"If you said good morning to him, he would swear at you".

I have also encountered examples where more than one constituent is preposed. In this case, the resulting interpretation is again scalar. Consider, for example, (15) and (16):

(15) 'kalimera me ton kalitero tropo na tis pis
  good-morning with the best way na she-GEN say-PERF-NP-2SG
  0a se vrisi'
  FUT you swear-PERF-NP-3SG

"Even if you say good morning to her in the nicest way, she will swear at you".
Regardless of whether we take the constituent structure in (15) to be
[V NP] PP or [V NP PP] it is obvious that the direct object and the
prepositional adjunct do not make up a constituent. The same is true for
(16) where the preposed constituents are this time the subject and a
prepositional adjunct. In any sort of transformational or movement
account, trying to relate the two types of structures, this fact would
present a serious problem.

The interpretation in these constructions, with two constituents
appearing before the verb, is analogous to the cases where only one consti-
tuent is at the beginning. Both constituents acquire a scalar (or more
informative) meaning. In (16), for example, the speaker is saying that even
if JOHN comes (who in this context has to be interpreted as contrasting
with e.g. a heavier person) and even if he brings the Golf (as opposed to,
e.g., the Mini), we would not fit. This is similar to the cases which
Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988) call multiple foci sentences with
English "let alone" as in (17) (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor ex.75):

(17) You couldn't get a poor man to wash your car for $2 let alone a rich
man to wax your truck for $1.

---

3 Example (18) could have a reading where there is only one focus, under which "John" and the
"Golf" would make up one constituent. This is the "complex NP" reading in which "John with the Golf"
serves to distinguish "John" from other individuals without, e.g., cars and which would be identical to
the cases with only one focused constituents. The problematic case for the transformational analysis is
the double focus reading.

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The *na* clause with two constituents in the beginning corresponds to the first part (i.e. the pre-"let alone" part) of (17), showing this "piling effect" in the interpretation. Evidence that what is actually in focus in this type of *na* clause is (are) the preposed constituent(s) (which, in each case, are setting up a relevant scale), can be found in examples like (18) and (19) where the focus (or foci) are made explicit by the presence of another contrasting focus (foci):

(18) uiski na pji $\delta$en $\theta$a me$\theta$isi

    whiskey na drink-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT get drunk-PERF-NP-3SG

    poli ligotero bira

    much less beer

"Even if he drinks WHISKEY, he won't get drunk, much less (if he drinks) beer".

(19) uiski to proi na pji $\delta$en $\theta$a me$\theta$isi

    whiskey the morning na drink-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT get drunk-PERF-NP

    poli ligotero bira to vra$\delta$i

    much less beer the evening

"Even if he drinks WHISKEY in the MORNING, he won't get drunk, much less beer in the evening".

One final case it may be useful to look at is the case where the protasis of the *na* conditional contains only an intransitive verb with no overt subject phrase present (person and number will always of course be marked on the verb). Consider for example (20):

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Example (20) has a conditional interpretation. Also, however, (and it seems to me predictably so), with the right (squeal) intonation, it can also have a concessive reading, as for example in (21):

(21)  

"Even if he had screamed, we wouldn't have heard him".

In such cases, granted the intonation difference, the transfer between a conditional and a concessive interpretation is relatively free, because, I submit, in such cases there is no other "preposeable" constituent; the focused (by the intonation) constituent is the VP itself and its the verb which sets up a scale. Examples (22) and (23) also illustrate the same point:

(22)  

"If she had cried, she would have moved him".

(23)  

"Even if she had cried, she wouldn't have moved him".

(I am changing the polarity of the main clause in order to give to the sentence the pragmatically most plausible interpretation. The point is that
even if I hadn’t, the sentence with this kind of intonation would have to be interpreted as evoking incompatibility between the antecedent and the consequent)

In the na concessive construction, therefore, it is the constructional pattern associated with a particular word order which picks the focus (or foci) and forces an "even" reading despite the fact that no "even" is present. Schematically, we could represent the construction as in (24):

(24) \[ X \text{ na } V(Y) , Z \]

X is the variable standing for the fronted constituent(s), V is the verb form which follows na, Y is the variable standing for whatever constituents follow (which may be 0) and Z is the variable standing for the consequent. On the semantic side, we will have to specify at least that X must be interpreted as scalar. In unificational terms, this means that if X is a priori scalar, then this feature unifies with the general meaning of the construction. If X is not scalar, then scalarity is inherited from the construction.

This particular semantic property can only be attributed to the specific form in (24). It is not a fact about the semantics of the individual parts that X should have this particular meaning, since, as we have seen, it is often the case that X becomes scalar only by virtue of its appearing in this particular position, in this particular construction. Even if (granted the intonation difference) we take a na clause with no constituent other than the verb in the beginning to be ambiguous between an "even" and a conditional reading, the fact remains that (24) with the fronted constituent can only have an "even" reading. This is NOT a general fact about conditionals, it is a fact about na conditionals. Consider (25)-(27) which
feature the "regular" conditional marker an (cf. also 2.2.2):

(25) onasis an imun θa to ayoraza
    onassis if be-P-1SG FUT it buy-IMPF-P-1SG
    "If I were Onassis, I would buy it".

??onasis an imun δen θa to ayoraza
    "If I were Onassis, I wouldn't buy it".

(26) kalimera an tis pis ola θa pane
    good-morning if she-GEN say-PERF-NP-2SG everything FUT go-PERF-NP-3PL.LP
    kala
    well
    "If you say good morning to her, everything will be fine".

??kalimera an tis pis θa se vrisi
    good morning if she-GEN say-PERF-NP-2SG FUT you swear-PERF-NP-3SG
    "If you say good morning to her, she'll swear at you".

(27) to poSilato an pari (*δen) θa
    the bicycle if take-PERF-NP-3SG (NEG) FUT
    ftasi stin ora tu
    arrive-PERF-NP-3SG to-the time his
    "If he takes the bicycle, he'll (*won't) arrive in time".

Examples (25) and (26) demonstrate that to the extent that only a concessive interpretation is notionally available, the sentence is at best very odd. Things get even clearer when, as in (27), the preposed phase is not an a priori scalar term, in which case the "even" reading is impossible.
to get (this is indicated by the star in the negation morpheme. The impossible reading to get is the one in which the background understanding is that taking the bicycle would help one arrive in time).

Examples (25)-(27) show that word order is not enough to produce an "even if" reading. Example (28) below shows that emphatic stress on the focus alone cannot give rise to concessiveness either:

(28) ?? an imun ONASIS δen θa to ayoraza

"Even if I were Onassis, I wouldn’t buy it".

Finally, concessives containing the an conditional differ from na concessives in that ke is unambiguously concessive in the latter but not in the former. To get a concessive-only reading out of an an conditional, the clause has to be introduced by akoma ke/ki (cf.2.1.3). Compare, for example, (29) to (30):

(29) ki an erθun δen θa pame

ke if come-PERF-NP-3PL NEG FUT go-PERF-NP-IPL

(a) "And if they come, we won’t go".

(b)"Even if they come, we won’t go".

(30) akoma ki an erθun δen θa pame

"Even if they come, we won’t go".

There is an intonation difference corresponding to the two different interpretations of (29) (major stress on an for the "and" reading, major stress on erθun for the "even" reading). The fact remains, however, that the ke of the ke...na concessives can only mean "even" and is, therefore, "constructionalized" in a way that the ke/ki of an an concessive is not. The latter, as we have seen, has both "and" and "even" readings still. Again, contrary to König’s predictions, no obvious generalizations seem to
be available regarding the relationship of conditionals and concessives and a description is required on a construction basis. This conclusion is further enhanced by the different focus strategies employed in the two types of concessive clauses. As we have seen, in the *ke...na* construction *ke* and its focus must be adjacent and in the beginning of the clause. In contrast, in the *akoma ki an* concessive, the connective is always immediately followed by the verb phrase and focus differences are simply marked by intonation, as in (31):

(31) *akoma ke an ferun to fortiyo ən xorame*

  *akoma ke if bring-PERF-NP-3PL the truck NEG fit-IMPF-NP-1PL*

"Even if they bring the truck, we won't fit".

(32)*akoma ke to fortiyo an ferun ən xorame*

Depending on whether the stress is on *ferun* or on *fortiyo*, two different scales are set up corresponding to the two different focuses (bring vs., e.g., not bring, truck vs. car). As (32), however, shows, the option of "moving" the focus next to *akoma ke* is not available, although (cf. (25)-(27)) there is no general restriction against moving any constituent before the *an* conditional marker.

### 3.1.3 The relationship between concessives and conditionals

In Chapter (2), I looked at the semantics of *na* as a conditional. In the section above, I examined *na* clauses with an "even if" reading, what for the time being I call concessives. In this section, I will look at the relation of the conditional and the concessive construction, outside and beyond the truth-conditional predictions.
In the preceding section, I argued that one of the inevitable conclusions we must draw is that *na* conditionals and *na* concessives must be considered to be two distinct constructions. What I want to discuss now is why the question of conflating them would have arisen in the first place.

It seems clear that both *na* conditionals and *na* concessives are related "uses" of a *na* clause, and both very distinct from the other uses of *na* listed in 2.2.1. In terms of distribution, they are the only uses of *na* where this form is not governed by a lexical governor (as we have seen, *na* can be governed by a verb, a noun, an adjective, a preposition and a conjunction). In its conditional and concessive environments, *na* is again subordinate, but this time the governor is a main clause. Moreover, in chapter (5), I will show that certain types of cross-clausal dependencies (between the antecedent and the consequent) obtain both in the conditional and the concessive constructions. This again goes to show that conditional and concessive (conditionals) are closely related constructions.

Semantically, both conditionals and concessive conditionals involve an antecedent and a consequent and a relation between the two. Beyond this general description, however, we also need to describe this relation in each case (cf. chapter (5)). Finally, historical evidence of the sort addressed by König (1986) and Haiman (1986), which shows that conditional connectives in several languages develop into concessive (i.e. "even" type) connectives, also argues for a close semantic relationship between conditionals and concessive conditionals of this sort.

In Chapter (2), I showed that the use of the *na* conditional is restricted to dubitative/counterfactual contexts. It follows that in cases where the protasis is contextually given and its truth is established *na* conditionals are ruled out. So (33) with a *na* (but not with an *an*) conditional
is ungrammatical:

(33) - erxete o janis avrio
    come-IMPF-NP-3SG the John tomorrow
    "John is coming tomorrow".

- an /* na erxete pes tu na se voιθisi
  an /*na come-IMPF-NP-3SG tell-IMP him subj.you help-PERF-NP-3SG
  "If he's coming, tell him to help you".

In the preceding section I pointed out some of the formal and seman-
tic characteristics of the na concessives, arguing that in some respects they
cannot but be considered a different construction from the na conditional.
Now I want to discuss one aspect in which the semantics of na concessives
may be (at least) motivated.

As I said in 3.1.3., the semantic effect of the construction in (24) is to
force a scalar interpretation of the constituent which fills the first slot in
the antecedent clause. It is clear that in many cases the scale which is set
up is completely context-dependent, and in this sense we might more
appropriately talk about the semantic-pragmatic effect of the construction
or rather, of the pragmatics being part of the semantics of the construc-
tion. The first constituent, by virtue of being in the position where it is,
acquires a scalar reading and this sets up a whole series of antecedent pos-
sibilities of which the antecedent which contains it is interpreted as the
the least likely of all the others.4

4 Kay 1990 derives this counter-to-expectation idea that characterizes many sentences containing
"even" from the fact that, normally, asserting something which is further along (or more informative) on
a scale violates a (quantity) conversational implicature arising from the assertion of a lower (or less
informative) point on the same scale. Asserting that "she reads Latin", for example, conversationally
implicates that *she doesn't read Sanskrit* (if the background assumption is that Sanskrit is harder than
Latin and therefore further along the more informative scale). Asserting that *she (even) reads Sanscrit*
This semantic/pragmatic function of the na concessive construction, whereby one is asserting that the consequent will hold for any of the antecedents whose focused constituents are lower on the relevant scale than the focused constituent which actually appears in the antecedent, is, I claim, incompatible with "givenness" (Alternatively, we may think of this as scalar semantics correlating with "non-givenness"). If "given" along the lines of (33) above is taken to refer to something which is entirely established or accepted as true in context, then it is obvious why a na concessive cannot be interpreted as "given". The pragmatic force of this construction is exactly to make a novel contribution to the conversation by offering at least one piece of information (i.e. the one represented by the focused constituent) which is new (regardless of whether we analyze this contribution as more informative, less likely, more extreme, etc.). Consider, for example (34)-(37):

(34)a. -o janis əen akui poli kala
   the John NEG hear-3SG very well
   "John cannot hear very well".
   b. -kufos na ine prepi na akusi
   deaf na be-NP-3SG must-IMP subj. hear-PERF-NP-3SG
   "Even if he is DEAF, he should hear (the way we are shouting)."

(35)a. -o janis ine kufos
   the John be-3SG deaf
   "John is deaf".

violates this implicature. For the purposes of the present discussion, the point is not how this interpretation arises but simply that it is available.
b.-*kufos na ine prepi na akusi
"Even if he is DEAF, he should be able to hear".

(36)a. -0a er0i o antiproesros
FUT come-3SG the vice-president
"The vice-president will come".

b.-o proesros na er0i den sozomaste
the president na come-PERF-NP-3SG NEG save-MD-IMPF-NP-1PL
"Even if the PRESIDENT (himself) comes, it won't save us".

(37)a. -0a er0i o proesros
FUT come-3SG the president
"The president will come".

b.-*o proesros na er0i den sozomaste
"Even if the president comes, it won't save us."

The point of examples (34)-(37) is simply that the sentences with the
fronted constituents are bad (or inappropriate) as replies to statements
which establish as true or given the content of the protasis. So for example
(34b)(=35b), the na concessive construction, is not a good answer to (35a)
but it is a good answer to (34a) where its protasis can be seen as providing
new information. This constraint is due to the pragmatic force associated
with this construction which in turn arises from the interpretation that
the construction is forcing on its first constituent.

"Non-givenness" in the case of na concessives is, as I said, a corrolary
of scalarity. Na conditionals, on the other hand, are also excluded from
cases where the content of the protasis is completely given (cf. chapter 2,
example 39), even if, in the case of na conditionals, non-givenness is a by-product of the general constraint in terms of the dubitative/counterfactual contexts. In any case, na conditionals are perfectly compatible with na concessives in that they both correlate with non-givenness, and in exactly this respect, it may be said that this semantic/pragmatic aspect of na concessives is doubly motivated.

3.2. KE NA concessives

This section will examine the type of dependent concessive clause introduced by ke na. The description will focus mainly on two issues: the syntax (and especially the constituent structure) of these constructions and some of the semantic/pragmatic properties of the ke na concessives in relation to the na concessive construction described in the previous section. The obvious difference between the na and the ke na clauses is that in the latter we have what we may call an explicit, lexical "even" (i.e. ke). Part of the point in this section will be to show that not all the differences between the two constructions can be attributed to the presence of ke, at least not in any obvious way.

Examples of ke na concessives are listed in (38)-(40) below:

(38) ke na erθi i maria δen θa erθi o janis

even na come-PERF-NP-3SG the Mary NEG FUT come-PERF-NP-3SG the John

"Even if Mary comes, John won't (come)."

(39) 'ke noritera na erxotan δen θa prolavename'

even earlier na come-IMPF-P-3SG NEG FUT be in time-IMPF-P-1PL
"Even if he had come earlier, we wouldn’t have made it."

(40) ‘ke na min ixate xtipisi   to kuðuni θa  sas akuyame’

   even na NEG ring-PERFECT-P-2PL the bell    FUT you hear-
IMPF-P-1PL

"Even if you hadn’t rung the bell, we would have heard you."

3.2.1 Word-order and constituency considerations

Examples (41)-(44) illustrate the various possibilities in word-order
(and focus) patterns in the ke na concessives:

(41) ke i maria na erθi   δεν imaste  arketi

   even the Mary na come-PERF-NP-3SG NEG be-NP-IPL enough

"Even if MARY comes, we are not enough".

(42) ke to kalitero tis forema na foresi   fenete  apesia

   even the best her dress na wear-PERF-NP-3SG look-IMPF-NP-
3SG terrible

"Even if she wears her BEST dress, she looks terrible".5

---

5 We may note here an interesting distinction first observed by Brugman (1986). Consider an example
like (i): (i) ke tin jineka sto kokino aftokinio na ixe 8i

   even the woman in-the red car na see-PERFECT-P-3SG

δεν θα  boruse na tin anaynoriasi

   NEG FUT can-IMPF-P-3SG subj. she-ACC recognize

   "Even if he had seen the woman in the RED car, he wouldn’t have been
able to identify her*.

In (i) the prosodic focus is "red"; however, what is actually being contrasted here are entities (namely
"women in cars") and that is what Brugman calls the "contrast focus". Note that in the Greek examples
the only possible way of rendering the reading where the contrasted elements are women, is like in
example (i). Example (ii) can only mean that what is being contrasted is cars:

(ii) ke sto kokino aftokinio na ixe 8i tin jineka δεν θα  boruse

na tin anaynoriasi

The generalization for Greek, therefore, should be that in cases where the contrast and the prosodic
focus are not identical, ke should be immediately next to the contrast focus.
The first question we need to address is what is the structure in this type of clause (i.e. in the antecedent clause). The *ke* word has a fixed position in the clause (that is, it cannot appear in any other than the first position in the sentence), so that, for example, (43') is ungrammatical:

(43') *na tis ferōis ke askima δεν θα θίμοσι

If an interpretation is available for such non-initial *ke*, it has to be an "also/and" interpretation, cf. (45):

(45) na erōi ke o janis δεν θα xoresume

"If John comes also, we won't fit".

We may ask, therefore, whether *ke* and its focus make up a constituent. There is really no conclusive test that may be applied here but some indications may come from the observation that alongside (41)-(44) we have also sentences like (46) (see also (15), (16)) with double foci which obviously do not make up a single constituent:
"Even if he eats a WHOLE steak in the MIDDLE of the day, he'll (still) be hungry".

The point here is simply that since the direct object and the time adverbial do not represent one constituent, and since they are both in focus, even if we assumed that ke and its focus(es) made up a constituent, it would be hard to know what to call such a node.\(^6\)

Finally, with respect to example (44) we may ask whether ke and na make up a single constituent. This is the way that ke na is treated in most traditional grammars (cf. for example Tzartzanos 1963), the idea being that it represents a complex concessive connective without necessarily analyzable parts. However, if we take (41)-(43) on the one hand, and (44) on the other, to be instances of the same construction, there is no reason to suppose that we have a ke na constituent. Semantically, all ke is doing in (44) is picking as its focus the whole VP or the whole clause and, therefore, as is the general rule with this construction it has to be immediately

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\(^6\) This situation (see also (15) and (16) with the *ke-less* construction) is similar to that presented by other focus constructions. For example, Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988) in their description of the *let alone* construction note that the things that can be conjoined by *let alone* need not be syntactic constituents. Consider, for example (i):

(i) A poor man wouldn't wash, let alone a rich man wax, your car
    for $2, let alone your truck for $1.

Given that *let alone* is also a focus construction, this may not be so surprising. On the other hand, not all focus constructions can feature more than one focus, unless these foci make up a constituent (cf. for example Prince 1981 for a description of topicalization and Yiddish movement as other focus constructions). The it-cleft, for instance, cannot focus more than one constituent (*It was Yoshiko on Tuesday that I saw*—cf. also McCawley (1988 58-60). It was Yoshiko in the car that I saw, is grammatical, I think, only if *in the car* is a modifier of *Yoshiko*).
to the left of its focus. In fact, the very existence of examples like (41)-(43), where there is an intervening constituent between *ke* and *na*, argues against their being one constituent. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that *na* and the following verb phrase do not make up a constituent (which would be the consequent of having a structure like [[ke *na*] [VP...]]); the only constituent that can come between *na* and the following VP is the negation and an object personal pronoun, and these, as we have seen in 2.2.2, are exactly the same constituents which can come between *na* and the rest of the VP in the cases where *na* acts as a complementizer and where, therefore, there is every reason to believe that *na* introduces a constituent (e.g., *θelo na fiyo* "I want to go").

### 3.2.2 KE NA: some semantic/pragmatic properties

The difference between a *na* and a *ke* *na* concessive is that the latter contains *ke*. The examples so far show that there are no unpredictable differences between the two constructions. What the *na* concessive does by word order, the *ke* *na* construction does by having *ke* mark a focus as well as by requiring initial *ke* and focus order; grammar, in other words, plays a role here also. Both constructions serve to put one constituent into focus setting up a series of possible antecedents (which may of course be just two). In what follows, I will discuss two properties of the *ke* *na* concessive which, at first glance, differentiate it from the *na* clauses and cannot be attributed in any obvious way to the presence of *ke*. Consider examples (47), (48):

(47) -avrio erxete o petros

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tomorrow come-IMPF-NP-3SG the Peter
"Peter is coming tomorrow".

-ke na erxete (pali) exume na kanume
even na come-IMPF-NP-3SG (still) have-NP-1PL subj. do-NP-1PL
tin pio poli ūlia moni mas
the most work alone we-GEN
"Even if he is coming, we still have to do most of the work ourselves".

(48) 'tin ixe xtipisi i zesti'
    she-ACC hit-PERFECT-P-3SG the heat
"She had suffered a heat stroke".

-'ke na tin ixe xtipisi i zesti eprepe
even na she-ACC hit-PERFECT-P-3SG the heat must-P-3SG
na prospatðisi na erði'
subj. try-PERF-NP-3SG subj. come-PERF-NP-3SG
"Even if she had suffered a heat stroke, she should have tried to come".

If we take ke to have the semantics of other scalar terms along the
lines of the analyses given for "even" in chapter (2), then the use of the ke
na sentences in (47), (48) is a little bit surprising. In all the other examples
(cf. (41)-(44)), ke can be analyzed as focusing a constituent and thus as
marking a proposition which is more informative (in Kay's terms) or less
likely than some other assumed or expressed statement in the context. In
these cases, however, the speaker of the ke na concessive is only repeating
information which is already given in the context. The
semantics/pragmatics of such clauses is to convey to the addressee that
the speaker is willing to grant the truth or the correctness of the
addressee's statement for the purpose of being able to assert the consequent. We may call this use "speech-act" use (cf. also the discussion on as in the next section).

With respect to the semantic motivation, it is clear that "givenness" is not part of the ordinary semantics of *ke* in its use to mean "even". It is also not part of the semantics of a *na* conditional (cf. 2.2.2) or a *na* concessive. In chapter (4), when I consider the issue of motivation, I argue that although this use of *ke na* is certainly distinct from the clearly scalar cases, it is also relatable to or motivated by the scalar semantics of *ke na* in its "regular" use. However, the scalarity which is involved in examples like (47) and (48) is of a different nature, involving the speaker's degree of commitment to the content of the consequent. We may think of this as scalarity at the level of the illocutionary force (or speech-act level), rather than scalarity in the subject matter. (47), (48) and the like are, therefore, not scalar in the same way that (41)-(44) are, although they still share this general feature of incompatibility between the content of the protasis and that of the apodosis. We may paraphrase what the speaker of (47) says, for example, with the following: "although the fact that Peter is coming may lead one to expect that the work will be divided, this is not actually so". Note that as we might actually expect with such examples, there is no difference in meaning correlating with the difference in focus (i.e. there are no different scales set up because there are no scales or, rather, no scales of the same kind). So, for example, (50) and (51) in the context of

7 If we take the speech-act use of *ke na* to involve no scalarity whatsoever, one way of "reconciling" the two functions of *ke na* might be to think of this in terms of what Traugott (1988, 1989) calls "pragmatic strengthening", i.e. the process by which a previously contextually triggered meaning of a word is "promoted" to the status of an independently available (conventional?) meaning. For *ke* (or *even*), for example, we would want to say that the counter-to-expectation or unlikely frame which is often arising from the violation of the implicature of the scalar semantics (cf. footnote 3), in these examples functions as the meaning proper itself. This, however, is little more than a description of the data and not a real argument as to which analysis is correct.
(49) are synonymous and both are appropriate answers to (44):

(49) ine pamblutos
    be-NP-3SG very rich

"He is very rich".

(50) ke pamblutos na ine prepi na sevete tus alus
    even very rich na be-NP-3SG must-IMP-NP subj. respect-IMPF-NP-3SG the others

"Even if he is very rich, he should show some respect for the others".

(51) ke na ine pamblutos prepi na sevete tus alus

Examples (52), (53) below exemplify further the difference between the na and the ke na concessive constructions and the fact that the former but not the latter is restricted to "non-given" contexts:

(52) liyo apo afto na ixe pji 0a ixe peθani
    little from this na drink-PERFECT-P-3SG FUT die-PERFECT-P-3SG

"Even if he had drunk a little of this he would have died".

(53) ke liyo apo afto na ixe pji 0a ixe peθani
    even little from this na drink-PERFECT-P-3SG FUT die-PERFECT-P-3SG

One might suppose sentences (52) and (53) were completely synonymous, both having the two readings which the English translation has: (a) He didn’t drink any of the stuff, (b) He drank a lot or all of it. If we turn the counterfactual into the corresponding negative statement, then, in the terms of Horn (1985), reading (a) would correspond to the
metalinguistic reading of the negation: "He didn't drink a little, in fact he didn’t drink any". However, whereas (53) does have both readings, (52) is only appropriate in a context where "he didn’t drink any". The difference in the two readings cannot be attributed to a difference in focus and in fact Paul Kay (p.c.) has convinced me that the assumed contrasted proposition is the same for both interpretations, namely that he drank a lot. The difference can be described as follows: For the "he drank a lot" interpretation this assumed contrasted proposition (i.e. the context proposition) is set in the actual world, which is the world normally contrasting to the world of a counterfactual antecedent. For this interpretation, the context proposition can be something like what we have in (i) below (*cp* marks the context proposition, *tp* the text proposition):

(i) –peθane jati ipje olokliiri tin botilja (cp)  
"He died because he drank that whole bottle".  
--ke liyo apo afto na ixe pji 0a ixe peθani (tp)  
"Even if he had drunk a little of it, he would have died".

For the "he didn’t drink any" interpretation, however, the context proposition is not set in the actual world but in another hypothetical world:

(ii) --θoksa to 0eo 0en ipje kaθolu  
"Thank God, he didn’t drink any".  
an to ixe pji 0a ixe peθani (cp)  
"If he had drunk it, he would have died".  
--ke liyo apo afto na ixe pji 0a ixe peθani (tp)  
"Even if he had drunk a little, he would have died".

In (ii), the cp is neither set in the actual world (in which he didn’t drink any) nor in the hypothetical world of the counterfactual antecedent of the
tp (in which he drank a little). Rather, it is set in yet another hypothetical world in which he drank it all.

According to the above, therefore, (52) cannot be an appropriate answer to (54):

(54) peθane jati ipje olokli ri tin botilja
die-PERF-P-3SG because drink-PERF-P-3SG whole the bottle
"He died because he drank the whole bottle".

This difference derives, I claim, from the "given-non-given" distinction which was discussed above and which distinguishes the \textit{na} from the \textit{ke na} concessive construction. I argued above that simple \textit{na} concessives are non-givens. It follows that (52) cannot be used in a context where "he actually drank a little":

(52') -- ipje liyo eftiξos
drink-PERF-P-3SG a little fortunately
"He drank a little bit, fortunately".

---* liyo apo afto na ixe pji θa ixe peθani
a little from this na drink-PERFECT-P-3SG FUT die-
PERFECT-P-3SG

"Even if he had drunk a little, he could have died".

On the other hand, (54) entails that "he drank a little" and this is what rules out (52) as an appropriate answer to (54). The "explanation", in other words, is the same one which accounts for (52'), except that in this case what counts as "given" is an entailment rather than the "surface" sentence itself.
The \textit{ke} of the \textit{ke na} concessive is undoubtedly related to the non-conditional \textit{ke}. Syntactically, they can both attach to the same kind of constituents. Semantically, except for the cases where this special speech-act reading seems to be the only one available for the conditional \textit{ke} (cf. (47), (48)), conditional and non-conditional \textit{ke} can straightforwardly receive the same kind of analysis. However, with the non-conditional \textit{ke}, the concessive reading was contextually triggered (and therefore, contextually cancellable as well), whereas for the \textit{ke} in the conditional environment the only possible reading is a concessive one. That is, when appearing in the construction in (55), \textit{ke} can only be concessive:

\begin{equation}
\text{(55) } \text{ke (X) na V (Y), Z (consequent)}
\end{equation}

In the \textit{na} and \textit{ke na} types of concessive clauses, we have what Lakoff (1987:507-509) calls minimally different constructions. Both are focus constructions with very similar semantic and pragmatic functions. However, there are also differences which must be explicitly specified in the description of each of these separately, if we want these descriptions to be an adequate guide to the use of each\footnote{Yamaguchi (1989) comes to a similar conclusion with respect to certain types of Japanese concessive clauses.}.

3.3 AS concessives

3.3.1 AS or KI AS?

The issue I will examine in this section is whether the concessive clauses in question are introduced by \textit{as} or by \textit{ki as}. The question arises with respect to alternations like the ones exemplified in (56)-(57):

\begin{equation}
\text{(56)-(57) }
\end{equation}
Mackridge (1985:298) claims that in its concessive use \textit{as} is always immediately preceded by \textit{ki} (the allomorph of \textit{ke} before vowels). However, his examples are all like (56), where the concessive clause follows the main clause. He fails to notice, therefore, that in cases where the clause introduced by \textit{as} precedes, introducing the clause with \textit{ki as} is distinctly odd, if not ungrammatical. Tzartzanos (1963) also notes that in its concessive use \textit{as} is often preceded by \textit{ki} (without specifying the environments) but is also careful to note that \textit{as} and \textit{ki as} are synonymous.

The question, therefore, is whether \textit{as} or \textit{ki as} is the conventional way of introducing this type of concessive clause. In view of examples like (56), where both \textit{ki as} and \textit{as} are possible introducers, and of (57) where \textit{ki as} is not appropriate, Mackridge's claim is obviously wrong. Whether the concessive is introduced by \textit{as} or by \textit{ki as}, the resulting meaning is the same. The difference is that if \textit{as} (as opposed to \textit{ki as}) introduces the clause, then the \textit{as} clause appears to be standing on its own as a sentence (much like the non-concessive clauses introduced by \textit{as}), and example (56), for
instance, is read with a break in the middle. Consider also (58)-(59):

(58) as vreksi \vbar\ 0a pame
    as rain-PERF-NP-3SG  FUT  go-PERF-NP-1PL
    "Even if it rains, we'll (still) go".

(59) 0a pame \vbar\ as vreksi
    "We'll go even if it rains".

In contrast, when the concessive is introduced by *ki as*, the sentence is read as a complex sentence containing a regular subordinate (but cf. next paragraph) clause. The generalization on the distribution of *as* and *ki as* is that they are interchangeable when the concessive clause which they introduce follows but *ki as* is odd when the concessive comes first. Consider (57) above and also (60), (61):

(60) 'i sakorafa piye poli kala stus ayones
    the Sakorafa go-PERF-P-3SG very well to-the  games
    "and" as/as min pire to xriso'

"Sakorafa did very well in the games, even if she didn't get the gold (medal)".

(61) ??ki as/as min pire to xriso i sakorafa piye poli kala stus ayones
    "Even if she didn't get the gold, Sakorafa did very well in the games".

This in turn suggests that *ke* still retains some of its conjunction status. One way of looking at this, is to say that *ki as* may be on its way to becoming a grammaticized concessive connective (like, and perhaps under the influence of, *ke na*) but it hasn't yet generalized its use to all
environments. We may speculate that this preference for the environment where the concessive clause follows has, as I said, something to do with "and" coming from "and" and/or with the observation that in general (not just in Greek- cf. König 1986), this position seems to favor or even force a concessive reading (so if a concessive is doubly marked anywhere, we would expect it to be in this position). Consider, for example, (62), (63), with the "regular" conditional an:

(62) θα pame an xionisi
FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL if snow-PERF-NP-3SG
"We'll go (even) if it snows".

(63) an xionisi θα pame
"If it snows, we'll go".

In (62), the speaker may be expressing either a real commitment to going ("We'll go anyway, even if it snows"), or a regular ("if and only if") conditional. (63) on the other hand, seems to have only a purely conditional reading (cf.also English "I will go if it rains" vs. "If it rains, I will go"). Finally, consider examples (64)-(67):

(64) δυλεβί ολι τίν ιμέρα (κι) ασ ινε αροστος
work-IMPF-NP-3SG whole the day (ke) as be-NP-3SG sick
"He works all day even if/although he is sick".

(65) 'δυλεβί ολι τίν ιμέρα (κι) ασ ινε ke αροστος'

(66) δεν κιμιθικα καθολυ το vraδι
NEG sleep-PERF-P-1SG at all the evening
(ki) as pira farmako
(ki) as take-PERF-NP-1SG medicine

"I didn't sleep at all at night even if/although I took medicine".

(67) 'sen kimiiika to vra8i (ki) as pira ke farmako'

Compared to the ke na concessives where ke occupies a fixed (first) position in the sentence, and, as I showed in the preceding sections, is unambiguously concessive, the (second) ke in (65), (67) is not part of the as construction. For one thing, the "even" reading of ke in these cases can be cancelled. In an example like δen kimiiika kaθolu to vra8i (ki) as pira ke farmako ke xapia "I didn't sleep at all at night although I took (both) medicine and pills", ke (in bold face) functions as "and" in the context of the two ke construction (="both...and"). As I suggest in the following section, there is a difference in meaning between the as or ki as clause without this (second) ke and with it, a difference which is predictable given the meaning of ke and the meaning I propose for the as concessives. The point here is simply that this second ke should not be confused with the ke in ki as.

3.3.2 The AS semantics

In this section, I will investigate the semantic/pragmatic properties of the as concessives, arguing that at least in one respect, as concessives are different from both ke na (i.e. even if concessives) and an ke (even though) concessive clauses. Consider, for example, (68), (69):

(68) ke na fiji o janis eyo θa mino

even na leave-PERF-NP-3SG the John I FUT stay-PERF-NP-1SG
"Even if John leaves, I'll stay".

In (68) we have the *ke na* construction, in (69) an "even though" type of concessive introduced by *an ke*. In the next chapter, I will talk more about this kind of concessive and the problems it poses for a compositional analysis of these structures (notice that "and if" comes to mean "even if" but "if and" comes to mean "even though").

What is relevant to the present discussion is that from (68) we can draw no entailments as to the truth of the antecedent. Example (68), as is also the case with the corresponding conditionals of this form, does not convey anything as to whether John will or will not leave. In contrast to the conditional, however, (68) does entail the consequent, in other words, the speaker conveys that in either case he/she will stay. On the other hand, (69) clearly entails or presupposes the truth of the antecedent. Entailment seems to be the right notion here since, for one thing, that "John will leave" is not preserved under negation. This has been the basis of a traditional division between the so-called concessive conditionals and the "pure" or factual concessives (cf. König 1986) and an argument for the former being just another (pragmatic) variety of conditionals. I have partially addressed this question in 3.2. The point of the following discussion is to see if and how as concessives fit into this binary (factual vs. non-factual) distinction.

Consider (70)-(72):

(70) 'as exi kali foni 8en borume na tin

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as have-NP-3SG good voice  NEG can-PERF-NP-1PL subj. her
afisume na trayuðisi’
let-PERF-NP-1PL subj. sing-PERF-NP-3SG
"We cannot let her sing even if she HAS a good voice".

(71) ‘as exane tin psixremia tu ðen eprepe
    as lose-IMPF-P-3SG the cool his NEG must-IMPF-P-3SG
    na ton voiðisis’
subj. him help-PERF-NP-2SG
"You shouldn’t have helped him even if he DID KEEP losing his
    calm".

(72) ‘as min ixe erði sto parti mu eyo ða pao
    as NEG come-PERFECT-P-3SG to-the party my I FUT go-
    PERF-NP-1SG
    sto ðiko tu’
    to-the his
"I will go to his party even if he DIDN’T come to mine".

What the speaker is doing in (70)-(72), by using an as clause, is saying
something like the following: "I will grant (you) (the truth of) what was
just said; nevertheless I am still going to say/think/do what I was going to
anyway". Notice that in the English translations of (70)-(72), "even if" is
ambiguous between a "true" (i.e. scalar) interpretation of "even" and a
speech-act interpretation (as in examples (47), (48) above). That is we
may interpret the translation of (70), for example, as contributing by the
use of the "even" clause a contrasting focus (in this case "good voice"),
"higher up" or more informative on the relevant scale than some other
focus in an assumed proposition. Or, alternatively, we may interpret (70) in the way we interpreted (47), (48), as not making any novel contribution by the use of the "even if" clause, but simply as accepting as the basis for a further assertion something which has already been contextually established.

On the other hand, Greek as clauses can only have the latter interpretation, i.e. what in 3.2.2 I called the speech-act use. This is what an as concessive codes and therefore a more appropriate translation of all the as concessives so far might be to replace the whole concessive clause by "even so".

There are a few things to note here. If we take the as clauses to mean something roughly like "I'll grant you what you said, nevertheless I still maintain X", then we may expect that an as concessive is inappropriate in a context where the speaker wants to present the content of the main clause as following anyway by virtue of asserting that it holds for an extreme value. So, for example, (70) is an appropriate response to (73) but not to (74):

(73) exi kali foni nomizo
have-NP-3SG good voice think-IMPF-NP-1SG
"She has a good voice, I think".

(74) exi metria foni nomizo
have-NP-3SG mediocre voice think-IMPF-NP-1SG
"She has a mediocre voice, I think".

On the other hand, an "as...ke" clause combines the as and the ke meanings in a predictable sort of way. We could paraphrase example (75) for instance as "I'll grant you what you said and I'll grant you even more
than that":

(75) as exi ke kali foni δen borume na tin
   as have-NP-3SG even good voice NEG can-IMPF-NP-1PL subj.
   her
   afìsume na trayuðisi
   let-PERF-NP-1PL subj. sing-PERF-NP-3SG

"I’ll grant you that she even has a good voice. We still
can’t let her sing".

Predictably, (75) is a good response to (74) but not to (73).

In all (70)-(72), however, as well as in (75), the "I’ll grant" or the
"let’s say or agree" part of the meaning is there. There is a difference in
meaning, in other words, between (75) and (76), a difference which may be
best described in terms of a different framing. In (76), with ke na, the
speaker is framing the concessive as a conditional, saying among other
things that he/she does not in fact know whether the person in question
has a good voice. In (75), with as, on the other hand, the framing of the
concessive is done via the speech act force associated with as. One of the
implications of this framing is the conveyance by the speaker of the idea
that whether the content of the as clause is true or not does not matter.
What matters is that for the purposes of the conversation the speaker will
accept it as true.

(76) ke kali foni na exi δen borume na tin afìsume na
   trayuðisi

This difference is partially reflected in the fact that ke... na conces-
sives but not as concessives exhibit tense dependencies between antecedent
and consequent. Compare for example (72) above (with a PERFECT,
PAST form in the as clause and a future in the main clause) with (77):

(77) ke na ixe erǒi i maria 8en
    even na come-PERFECT-P-3SG the Mary NEG FUT come-PERFECT-P-3SG

θa ixe erǒi/ *θa erǒi o janis
    FUT come-PERFECT-P-3SG FUT come-PERF-NP-3SG the John

"Even if Mary had come, John wouldn’t have/*won’t come*.

In (77), the perfect past form in the antecedent requires a past verb form in the consequent (the perfect past as in this example, or the imperfective past). Interestingly, the only case where (77) is grammatical with a non-past verb in the consequent is when we give it what I’ve been calling a speech-act reading; that is (77) with the future in the apodosis is acceptable as an answer to (78):

(78) i maria ixe erǒi sto parti tu omos
    the Mary come-PERFECT-P-3SG to-the party his nevertheless

"Mary had come to his party, nevertheless".

If, as I suggested, the as clauses have this special kind of concessive semantics associated with them, then it seems clear that the distinction between factual and non-factual concessives does not apply. The speaker of an as concessive does not say either that "I don’t know if p" or that "I know that p"; he simply states that for the purposes of the conversation, we may accept or agree that it is true.

This particular pragmatic function which is really the semantics of the as concessives, may be traced to its non-concessive meaning; In 2.3.2, I noted that one function of the non-concessive as is to introduce a clause
which expresses permission. Depending on the tense of the as clause, this may be interpreted as direct granting of permission on the part of the speaker or as a statement to the effect that there was nothing preventing the person(s) referred to from doing something. Consider, for instance, (79), (80):

(79) as erëi
    as come-PERF-NP_3SG    "He may come".

(80) as erxotan
    as come-IMPF-P-3SG
    "He could have come (there was nothing preventing him)".

In all the examples with the non-concessive as the permission expressed by the speaker has to do with the "real-world". The speech-act (of permission) conveyed by such examples is a speech-act whose intended effect is to influence the real world developments, or, in the case of a past verb form, to express what could have been done or happened. Following Sweetser (1990:49-75), we may call this meaning the content meaning of as and we may paraphrase it in general with "I allow (you) to do X". There may a lot more to say about the semantics of permission, if we wanted to determine what is it that such a frame includes. Searle’s (1984:14-15) discussion of directives, for example, may be relevant to determining the presuppositions (sincerity conditions), propositional content and general illocutionary force in these cases. But, for my purposes, what is important is simply that in such cases the speech act is operating in (or affecting) the world, or, as Searle puts it, the direction of fit is "from world to words" (i.e. the purpose of the speaker is to get the real world situation to match his words).
On the other hand, one way to think of the concessive meaning of *as* is to view it as a performance of an act of permission, but this time in the speech act world. The speaker of an *as* concessive is no longer saying "I allow you to do X" but simply "I allow you to say X or I grant you X" for the purposes of the conversation and specifically for the purpose of performing the assertion (or whatever speech act) which is expressed by the other clause. The content of the *as* clause, in other words, is no longer applying to the real/content world but to the speech-act world or the world of our conversation. It is a speech-act of permission performed or operating in the speech-act world.

The non-applicability of truth and falsity judgements to the *as* part of the concessive construction stems, I suggest, from their operating in the speech-act world. So, for example, it is weird to follow up the utterance of an *as* concessive (e.g. (81)) with a statement like (82):

(81) as vreksi θa pame
    as rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL
    "We'll go even if it rains".

(82) δεν ένε αλήθια ότι θα vreksi
    NEG be-NP-3SG truth  that  FUT rain-PERF-NP-3SG
    "It's not true that it will rain".

Granting permission presupposes that permission has been asked for. It is this aspect of the meaning of content *as* which is preserved in its use in the world of the conversation and accounts for the fact that the content of an *as* concessive is already on the table and under discussion. *As* concessives are offered as background to the assertion of the main clause, and at least in this respect their semantics is motivated in being directly relatable
to their non-concessive use. What does not follow from their content semantics, is that speech act as also codes concession; that is the speech act meaning of as also includes a counter-to-expectation frame, a requirement which has to be satisfied by the content of the two clauses. Consider for example (83)-(85):

(83)  
\[\text{vreksi avrio} \]
FUT rain-PERF-NP-3SG tomorrow "It will rain tomorrow".

(84)  
\[\text{as vreksi piknik } \theta a \text{ pame} \]
as rain-PERF-NP-3SG picnic FUT go-PERF-NP-IPL

"Even if it rains, we'll go on the picnic".

(85)  
\[\text{??as vreksi piknik } \delta \text{en } \theta a \text{ pame} \]
"Even if it rains, we won't go on the picnic".

Example (85) shows that we cannot have the speech act use of as followed by a context which under normal assumptions would violate the counter-to-expectation requirement.

As is not unique in having both content and speech act meanings. As Sweetser (1990) argues, many lexical and grammatical items show this polysemy between content and speech act meanings. The modal verbs, conjunctions like "and" and "because" and conditional markers are among such items. Consider, for example the different meanings of "may", exemplified in (86), (87) (Sweetser 1990:70):

(86) He may go.

(87) He may be a university professor but he sure is dumb.

(86) exemplifies the root/content meaning of "may" (I allow him to go) while (87) exemplifies the speech-act meaning (I allow into our conversational world the statement that he is a university professor). Predictably,
(87) presupposes that the statement that he is a university professor has been already made or is somehow contextually given.

In chapter 4, I will pursue such parallelisms between as and other lexical items a bit further, suggesting that this polysemy is more systematic than just looking at the semantics of as would lead us to believe.
Chapter 4

Composition, Compositionality and Motivation.

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will investigate the degree to which the semantic properties of the concessive clauses discussed in the previous chapter fall out of the semantic properties of their constituent parts. I will not introduce any new data but simply consider the data already discussed with respect to the three notions appearing in the title of this chapter.

Already in the previous chapter, I have hinted at some of the difficulties that an analysis adhering to strict compositionality would run into. Here, I would like to expand on that and also address the question of composition from a constructional point of view which recognizes the construction as the relevant unit of description. The component parts of a given construction will be constructions themselves with particular semantic and pragmatic properties to begin with.

The Greek data argue against the doctrine of strict compositionality and, in particular, against the idea of semantic composition that relies on the "rule-to-rule" hypothesis. Two aspects of this view of the interaction between syntax and semantics do not seem to be easily accommodated by the Greek concessives. One of them is the idea that the semantic composition of a syntactically complex expression is accomplished by iterating local operations in specific subparts of the construction. The other refers to the belief that semantically interpreted constituents are first situated in context and then acquire their contextualized interpretation. The Greek concessive clauses resist this kind of analysis in two respects. First, because
the relevant meaning of the constituent parts is often not available unless these parts are in a particular grammatical environment. And, secondly, because there are semantic properties of the constructions which are not derivable from the semantic properties of their parts. Strict compositionality, as assumed in the rule-to-rule hypothesis, denies the existence of expressions/constructions/idioms which can be both compositional and arbitrary at the same time and thus misses the fact that there may be generalizations to be extracted even from partially compositional expressions. Since it is possible that technically there may be a way of describing such facts while maintaining the compositional dogma, or even, as I suspect is more likely, claim that this range of data is outside the scope of linguistic analysis proper, it may be more accurate to say that they argue against the spirit if not the letter of such an approach to semantic analysis.

Partial compositionality also pertains to the distinction made by Lakoff (1987: 147-48 and elsewhere) between prediction and motivation. Langacker (1987: chapter 12) draws what I take to be a parallel distinction between (full) compositionality and analyzability. Langacker wants to distinguish further two kinds of analyzability. One kind refers to a composite structure [C] including the content of structures [A] and [B]; the other, refers to a person specifically ascribing to [C] the contents of [A] and [B]. This, according to Langacker, corresponds roughly to a difference between conscious and unconscious processing (Langacker 1987:457). However, in talking about the semantics of a particular construction as being motivated, I won’t take into account this distinction, assuming that speakers in general recognize the presence of particular components in a composite structure (without implying that they systematically analyze the
contribution of each), despite of the fact that the meaning of the whole is, more often than not, more than the sum of the meanings of the components.

There is another aspect to the compositionality dogma as represented by the school of Montague semantics (cf. Dowty, Wall and Peters 1981), Ladusaw (1979)). According to this notion of semantic composition, given the meanings of the constituent parts, the meaning of the whole can be derived via a fixed mathematical function. Although there may be such a function on the basis of which composite meaning is calculated, it cannot but suffer on intuitiveness, due to the kind of units which participate in the meaning-composing function. Practitioners of this kind of analysis characteristically assume an overall theory of meaning which excludes all kinds of cognitive structures and relationships. For conditionals, this translates into truth-conditional meaning exhausting the meaning description, whereas I would like to argue that reference to semantic frames (which by definition include knowledge structure) seems to be a necessary part of the description of the constraints on the distribution of such sentences.

4.1 The NA and AN conditionals and concessives: semantics depending on form

I will start by considering the na concessives, which as I have shown in chapter 3, come in two varieties, exemplified in (1) and (2) below:

(1) δεκα χρόνια να περασύν δεν θα το κσεξασί
ten years na pass-PERF-NP-3PL NEG FUT it forget-PERF-NP-3SG
"Even if ten years go by, he won't forget it".

(2) ke δέκα χρονιά na perasun δεν θα to ksexasi

"Even if ten years go by, he won't forget it".

Example (1) features the na concessive, example (2) has the ke na type of clause. Examples (1) and (2) are concessive conditionals and according to the truth conditional analyses I outlined in the previous chapter (König 1986, Bennett 1982), they are semantically indistinguishable from "regular" conditionals, since meaning is equated with truth conditions. The difference in meaning between (1) and (2) and the corresponding conditionals is relegated to the realm of pragmatics, arising from the cancellation of "conditional perfection" (cf. chapter 3) due to the presence of a word such as ke or any other end-of-scale term in the conditional clause.

However, as we have seen, in the type of the concessive clauses exemplified in (1) and (2) concessiveness does not arise automatically. The concessive reading requires that the relevant phrase or word appears in a fixed position in the sentence, namely the first position. So, for example, (3) is primarily a conditional while (4) is a concessive:

(3) na ixe kafsona avrio δεν θα pijename

na have-P-3SG heat wave tomorrow NEG FUT go-IMPF-P-1PL

"If there was going to be a heat wave tomorrow, we wouldn't go".

(4) kafsona na ixe avrio θα pijename

heat wave na have-P-3SG tomorrow FUT go-IMPF-P-1PL

"Even if there was going to be a heat wave tomorrow, we would (still) go".

Granted the variation in judgements with respect to (3) (some subjects reported that with exaggerated stress the relevant phrase, examples like
(3) might be read also as concessives), the fact remains that (4), even without *ke*, can only have a concessive reading. Moreover, the word or phrase which appears in first position in such structures does not have to have an a priori end-of-scale or simply scalar word. Any word in this position will require the construction of a pragmatic scale as, for example, (5):

(5) to vivlio na διαβασμένη πάλι δεν θα καταλάβει τίποτα

the book na read-PERF-NP-1PL still NEG FUT understand-PERF-NP-1PL anything

"Even if we read the BOOK, we still won't understand anything".

The point with such examples is that the use of the word "book" does not normally evoke a scalar model in the interpretation of the sentence on which reading the book" would represent a point. Yet in this construction "book" evokes a scalar interpretation. We cannot equate this with some sort of topicalization or any other focus construction since the preposed phrase is not simply in focus or topicalized, but requires a scalar (as opposed to any other) interpretation. This is a case, therefore, where we have a particular meaning associated with a construction. Once the pattern is recognized as such it can be claimed to have general and productive properties. As I said in chapter 3, we can simply represent the preposed phrase with a variable and know that the filler of this slot will be given a scalar interpretation regardless of its inherent semantics.

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1 Fillmore (1989) makes the same point with respect to the English ditransitive construction (*V N N*), which can be superimposed on certain verbs increasing their valence and forcing particular interpretations which cannot but be associated with the construction. Goldberg (1989) explores in detail the semantics of this argument structure, arguing that specific semantic constraints should be directly associated with the ditransitive structure rather than with the individual verbs which participate in the construction.
Within the constructional pattern, meaning can be considered to be fully compositional. Any term in that first position will unify with the semantics of the construction, unless it has some semantic feature or specification which clashes with the constructional semantics. (However, I haven't been able to think of such a word in order to test this). Notice that this is very different from saying that there are two words "book" or two meanings of the word "book", one with non-scalar and the other with scalar semantics; instead, the claim is that scalarity is a property of the construction. What is required is that the relevant constituent(s) are found within the configuration in I:

I. [(ke) X na V''] [ V'']

Yet, not all conditionals associate scalar semantics with word order. Conditionals introduced by an require explicit marking with akoma ke. Example (6) cannot be read as a concessive and is thus pragmatically odd, whereas (7) is a regular concessive:

(6) ?? plusii an itan Sen 0a to ayorazan
rich if be-P-3PL NEG FUT it buy-IMPF-P-3PL
"If they were rich, they wouldn't be able to buy it".

(7) akoma ke an itan plusii Sen 0a to ayorazan
"Even if they were rich, they wouldn't be able to buy it".

Moreover, as (7) shows, different conditionals employ different focusing strategies. While in the na and ke na concessives the focused constituent always comes first, in the akoma ki an concessive conditionals the verb directly follows the akoma ke connective and focused constituents are simply marked by intonation as in (8) vs. (9):
(8) 'akoma ki an yrapsis oli tin διατριβι
still and if write-PERF-NP-2SG whole the dissertation
prepi na minis na teliosis ke ta tipika'
must-IMP subj. stay-PERF-NP-2SG subj. finish and the formalities
"Even if you write the whole dissertation, you have to stay
and finish up with the formalities also".

(9) *akoma ke oli tin διατριβι an yrapsis prepi na minis na teliosis ke ta
     tipika

Such facts suggest strongly that conditionals and concessive conditionals have to be treated as distinct constructions. The claim that the difference can be attributed solely to pragmatics and that it is the purely compositional product of a word like "even" or other end-of-scale terms is not easily maintained. Concessiveness seems to be associated with particular patterns which differ from conditional to conditional and as such they are an inherent part of the grammar of such clauses.

Leaving aside the word-order differences, I now come to the semantics of *ke* and the other concessive connectives considering them from a compositional point of view. In chapter (2) I suggested that *ke* may occasionally be interpreted as "even" in a non-conditional environment although this meaning should be rather treated as an implicature than as a conventional interpretation. In the preceding chapter, I showed that *ke* in the *ke na* construction is unambiguously concessive, while in combination with the *an* conditional it is not. The relevant contrasts are exemplified in (10)-(12) below:
(10) ke na fijis tora δen prolavenis to leoforio

and na leave-PERF-NP-2SG NEG catch-IMPF-NP-2SG the bus

"Even if you leave now, you won't catch the bus".

(11) ki an fijis tora δen prolavenis to leoforio

"And if you leave now, you won't catch the bus".

"Even if you leave now, you won't catch the bus".

(12) akoma ki an fijis tora δen prolavenis to leoforio

"Even if you leave now, you won't catch the bus".

The crucial example is (11) which, although introduced by ke, can have both an "and" and an "even" interpretation. Unless we take the ke’s in (10) and (11) to be homonymous (which goes against all intuition), it seems inevitable that some reference must be made to the constructional environment. We need to know that it is not just ke composing with a conditional but that it is ke composing with an an or a na conditional in order to know which are the available semantic interpretations. These observations, coupled with the behavior of ke in other concessive constructions make a straightforward compositional analysis very problematic. I haven’t yet discussed the factive concessives (cf. next chapter), but the point about compositionality can be made here. Consider, for example (13):

(13) an ke δen ton kalesan ir0e

if and NEG him invite-PERF-P-3PL come-PERF-P-3SG

"Even though they did not invite him, he came".

As (13) illustrates, ke and an, depending on conventionalized order (since we cannot make this order systematically produce the meaning difference), produce radically different meaning. In (11) and (12) we have an "even if"
clause while in (13) the truth of the protasis is entailed. These facts sug-
gest that although the participation of *ke* in such sentences may be
motivated, it is also conventionalized with respect to the construction in
which it is found; simply saying that *ke* means "even" will not necessarily
predict the overall meaning of a given concessive clause.

The only generalization which seems to be extractable is that *ke* in
these biclausal structures is marking concessiveness, although its exact
contribution may differ from construction to construction. Thus besides
the *ke na, akoma ki an* and *an ke* constructions, we have *ke* appearing in
the type of concessive clause exemplified in (14). The concessive clause in
(14) is also a distinct construction with special properties. The point here
is simply that it is also marked by *ke*:

(14) *ke pu xtipise kanis ðen jirise na ton kitaksi*

*ke that hit-PERF-P-3SG nobody NEG turn-PERF-P-3SG subj. him
look-P-3SG*

"What if he was injured! Nobody turned to look".

In chapter 2, I argued that describing the constraint on the distribu-
tion of *na* conditionals requires reference to a "non-given" condition which
is contextually determined and which can be relaxed or tightened depend-
ing on the speaker's intended meaning and the addressee's imposed
interpretation. *Na* conditionals, like *an* conditionals, can express various
different meanings depending on the verb form in the antecedent and the
consequent, but in all cases this general restriction to
dubitative/counterfactual contexts is superimposed on any other interpre-
tation. We may think of this as a frame (in the sense of Fillmore 1976,
1982, 1985) evoked by *na* conditionals. The nature of this frame is a little
bit different from the ones described by Fillmore in that doubt about the truth of a certain situation is not knowledge generally shared and constantly evoked by use of a word or a construction, but rather it is knowledge determined by the immediate context and/or a set of limited assumptions shared by the speaker and the addressee. In this sense, it may be more accurate to say that a na clause tells you how to frame a situation\(^2\). Nevertheless, it is knowledge of a pragmatic nature, not analyzable in terms of semantic features, and since it is evoked every time a na conditional is used, this is yet another case where the pragmatics are part of the semantics of a given expression (in our case, construction).

On the basis of the word order differences, I argued that na conditionals and na concessives are distinct constructions. The word order difference is not in any way compositional, since it cannot be taken into account in a mathematical, meaning-composing function. It can be argued to be at best motivated, if it is taken as highlighting a particular constituent and, therefore, as producing focus contrast. On the other hand, as I said above, there is no way of predicting that this particular focusing will result in a scalar interpretation for the preposed constituent. I have also argued, however, that the scalar interpretation associated with such structures correlates with and motivates "non- givenness" insofar as the protasis in these constructions specifies some point which is further along on some scale than a point specified in some other, contextually given or assumed proposition. In this respect, the speaker is making a novel (non-

\(^2\) The same distinction is made in Kay (1987), who discusses the interaction between inferences warranted by the grammar of the text and the "parsimony principle" (which characterizes the ideal reader). Roughly speaking, Kay expresses this as follows: By choosing a scenario which fits the relevant frame (here the dubitative schema), we achieve a matching at the semantic level of something which is already required by the (grammar of) the text.

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given) contribution. We could say, therefore, that the pragmatics of a na conditional, that is the pragmatic constraint conventionally associated with it, composes. I think of this as pragmatic compositionality in the sense that it is the pragmatics of a na conditional which determines what things it likes to go with or participate in. This way of talking about things, however, requires that we take seriously the idea that the composing parts are constructions which may bring with them some special semantics and pragmatics and that pragmatics may also motivate partly the kinds of meanings that will arise or the kinds of meanings a given construction will unify with.

The question of motivational semantics arises also with respect to what I called the speech-act use of ke...na, exemplified here in (16):

(16)— o janis erxete avrio

the John come-IMPF-NP-3SG tomorrow

"John is coming tomorrow".

-- ke na erxete pali exume na kanume oli tin 8ulia

ke na come-IMPF-NP-3SG still have-NP-lPL subj. do-NP-1PL whole
the work

"Even if he is coming, we still have to do all the work".

In discussing such examples in the previous chapter, I suggested that they do not involve scalarity in the same way that the "regular", non-speech-act uses do. Here, I would like to elaborate on that further. The scalar model evoked by the non-speech-act uses is the same in this case as well, except that it is now in the background. Consider (16) as part of the dialogue in (17):
(17) — exume na kanume oli tin δulia ja to parti
"We have to do all this work for the party".
-- ma erxete o janis avrio
"But John is coming tomorrow".
-- ke na erxete pali exume na kanume oli tin δulia
"Even if he is coming, we still have to do all the work".

The background understanding in this conversation involves a scalar model very much like the one evoked by the content use of the same κε sentence: having someone else around entails having to do less work than if no one is around to help. This model is not, however, directly evoked by the sentence containing κε but is rather part of the background reasoning. What the sentence with κε expresses in this case is that despite the conclusions that the scalar model would lead one to draw in this case, the speaker still committed to the validity of the proposition expressed in the apodosis. In this case, the speech act is an assertion but it could also be an order as in (18), or anything else:

(18) -- 'ine mono ja mia mera mata'
be-NP-3sG only for one day mom
"Mom, it is only for one day".
-- 'ke ja mia mera na ine pijene na rotisis ton patera su'
and for one day na be-NP-3SG go-IMPER subj.ask-PERF-NP-2SG the father your
"Even if it is for one day, go ask your father".

Insofar as the sentence with κε (including the consequent) is more enlightening for the addressee as to the commitment or the degree of insistence of the speaker towards the speech act of the consequent, we might still say
that *ke* still marks a more informative proposition in the sense of Kay (1990). Technically, however, I don't see any straightforward way of applying Kay's analysis to this type of example. Since "even" in this analysis always takes wide scope, both the text proposition and the context proposition in this kind of construction would have to be in a conditional form. In the non-speech-act use of the sentence, this would not present any problem since the context (less informative) proposition could be something like "If John is not coming, we'll have to do all the work ourselves". Yet, in the case of the speech-act use, the context proposition is not a conditional.

We may argue, therefore, that the use of *ke...na* in this speech-act context is motivated with respect to the scalar semantics of this construction in other contexts: the content use involves scalarity in the subject matter as opposed to the speech-act use which involves scalarity at the level of the cognitive/conversational reasoning. Still, we have to distinguish between *na* and *ke...na* concessives, since only the latter allow this kind of speech-act use. Yet, nothing in the semantic description of these constructions, would predict this difference and, therefore, the difference would have to be specified. Having said that, however, we may also argue that the fact that it is *ke...na* which may have either interpretation is less arbitrary than if it were *na*. The *na* concessives rely on word order to signal the scalar interpretation, whereas the *ke...na* clauses have also an explicit marking, namely *ke*. We might expect, therefore, that it would be harder for a construction which uses a fixed order to give rise to scalar meaning at first place to be also used in cases where scalarity, depending on how one thinks about it, is either cancelled or put on a different basis. *Ke...na*'s, on the other hand, are characterized by both a word order
pattern and an explicit lexical item to which the ambiguity can be attributed.

4.2 The AS clauses: motivation as part of the semantic structure

In the preceding chapters, I looked at clauses introduced by *as* which again have more than one function. In (19)-(22) I list the types of *as* clauses which will figure in this discussion:

(19) as fame tøra oxi aryoterà
    as eat-PERF-NP-1PL not later
    "Let's eat now, not later".

(20) as erëi tøra an ñeli
    as come-PERF-NP-3SG now if want-NP-3SG
    "He may come now, if he wants".

(21) as kanis ta mëthimata su ke ña se afiso
    as do-NP-2SG the lessons your and FUT you let-PERF-NP-1SG
    na vjis ekso
    subj. go-PERF-NP-2SG out
    "If you do your homework, I'll let you go out (=How about
doing your homework and I'll let you out)".

(22) as fonazì eyo ñeñ pao
    as scream-IMPF-NP-3SG I NEG go-PERF-NP-1SG
    "I am not going, even if/though he is screaming".

In (19) *as* is introducing a suggestion, in (20) *as* is expressing permission ((20) can be also read as a suggestion), while (21) and (22) exemplify the
conditional and the concessive uses of *as* respectively.

In chapter 3, I suggested that it is the permission sense which is directly related to the concessive. I have also suggested that the conditional use is related to and partly constrained by the use of *as* to introduce a suggestion.

The claim I want to advance is that in the case of *as*, relating the conditional to the non-conditional use and the concessive to the non-concessive provides considerable insights to the kind of conditional and concessive meanings expressed by *as* and goes some way towards predicting their semantic/pragmatic properties. I will first look briefly at the conditional uses and then go on with the concessives.

*As* conditionals are more constrained than *an* conditionals. Good and bad examples of *as* sentences are listed in (23)-(27):

(23) ??*as* emenes eðo ke θa äkseres afti tin tavern

*as* live-IMPF-P-2SG here and FUT know-IMPF-P-2SG this the tavern

"*If you would only live here, you would know this tavern*.

(24) ??*as* ixes pio polla lefta ke θa erxosun mazi mu

*as* have-P-2SG more money and FUT come-IMPF-P-2SG with me

"*If you would just have more money, you could come with me*.

(25) *as* ixame epenðisi stin IBM ke θa imastan

*as* invest-PERFECT-P-1PL to-the IBM and FUT be-P-1PL

plusii tora

rich now

"*If we had invested in IBM, we would be rich now*."
(26) *as kseris γαλικα κε θα se proslavun
    as know-NP-2SG French and FUT you hire-PERF-NP-3PL
    "If you know French, they'll hire you".

(27) as maθis γαλικα κε θα se proslavun
    as learn-PERF-NP-2SG French and FUT you hire-PERF-NP-3PL
    "If you learn French, they'll hire you".

A precondition for as conditionals is that these structures have to be coordinated, that is the presence of ke is necessary. This condition characterizes the as conditional construction and has to be specified.

A further general condition, however, seems to be traceable to their function to introduce a suggestion. Suggestions and orders are distinct speech acts; an order is necessarily addressed to an individual distinct from the speaker, while a suggestion can include the speaker in the set of people the suggestion is addressed to. What suggestions and orders share is that among the felicity conditions for the performance of such speech acts is the belief of the speaker that the person(s) to whom an order or a suggestion is addressed or is referring to is(are) in a position to carry out what is suggested/ordered. If I suggest that you go, I am presupposing that you are able to do it, and so on. It is this part of the semantics of as which is preserved in its use to introduce a conditional. Consider (26) and (27) as a minimal pair; (26) containing the verb "know" is ruled out for the same reason that "Know French!" or "I suggest that you know French" (in its directive, not in the assertion reading) are ruled out. (27), on the other hand, with the verb "learn" is fine. The difference in (23)-(25) can be also accounted for in the same way: (25) is acceptable since investing in IBM is something that we could have done if we chose to. Examples
(23) and (24), on the other hand, are odd with an as conditional, unless they are interpreted as attributing responsibility to the addressee for living where he/she does and for not having enough money respectively.

If the conditional use of as is related to the suggestion meaning, the concessive use can be directly motivated through the permission sense (cf. example (20)). The claim is that an example like (29) is related to (28):

(28) as fiji
    as leave-PERF-NP-3SG
    "He may leave (=I allow him to leave)"

(29) as fiji eyo tha mino
    as leave-PERF-NP-3SG I FUT stay-PERF-NP-1SG
    "I'll stay even if he leaves (=I grant you that he may leave. Still, I will stay)"

In chapter 3, I suggested that an accurate paraphrase for (29) would have to be something like "I grant that what you said— in this case that he may leave—may be true. Nevertheless, I still maintain what I did, despite what you think are adverse circumstances". I have also suggested that this meaning may be taken as a direct extension of the permissive sense in the speech act world: "I allow you to do X" is parallel to "I allow you to say X" or "I allow X as a premise to our conversation".

The fact that truth conditional judgements are not relevant when faced with as clauses is precisely because they operate at the speech-act level. The same is of course true of the speech-act use of ke...na (cf. chapter 3). The fact that the as clause in these examples is always "given" or on the table also falls out from this kind of special speech-act semantics; I can only grant or allow into the conversation something which
has been already said or suggested, as permission in the real world is normally preceded by a request for permission. This kind of semantics is built into an *as* clause in a way that it is not built into a *ke...na* clause. Out of context, the *ke...na* clause of (17) is ambiguous between a content and a speech-act reading, that is the scalar model can be either in the subject matter of the sentence itself or it can be part of the conversational background. An *as* concessive, on the other hand, lexicalizes the speech act reading.

The kind of polysemy that *as* shows is not unique. Content/permission senses and speech-act senses are also manifested by the verb *boro* "may, can". Unlike "may", however, which is also characterized by the same kind of polysemy (cf. Sweetser 1990), *boro* grammaticizes the speech-act and the epistemic readings, since under these interpretations it can only be an impersonal, third person singular. Consider (30)-(35):

(30) He may go.
(31) He may be a university professor but I am not sure.
(32) He may be a university professor but he sure is dumb.
(33) bori na fijis may-IMPF-NP-2SG subj. leave-PERF-NP-2SG "You may leave".
(34) bori na ise kaθijitis aกา δen ime siyuri may-IMPERS subj. be-NP-2SG professor but NEG be-NP-1SG sure "You may be a professor but I am not sure".
(35) bori na ise kaθijitis aกา δen su fenete may-IMPERS subj. be-NP-2SG professor but NEG you look-M-NP-3SG

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"You may be a professor but you don’t look it".

In the case of "may", content, epistemic and speech-act readings are not distinguished by grammatical differences. In the case of boro(i), however, epistemic and speech-act readings are marked by different syntax; bori in these cases is an impersonal verb and it can only appear in the third person singular with the subjunctive clause acting as the subject. Following Horn’s (1985) argument concerning the ambiguity of negation, we may say that such facts support a lexical polysemy analysis for bori rather than one which treats this verb as pragmatically ambiguous between content and non-content readings. They also support a lexical polysemy analysis for "may", and by analogy for the other modals also, as Sweetser (1986, 1990) proposes. If a language has a distinct form (or a formal difference) for a particular meaning, then we may take this as an argument for lexical polysemy in languages which do not make the formal distinction. The metalinguistic reading of the negation is not formally marked in any language, the speech-act and epistemic meanings of such verbs are.

Things get a bit hairy when one starts considering what counts as a formal difference or a different form. Thus Horn’s argument refers to the observation that no language seems to have a distinct morpheme or word for the metalinguistic negation, although the metalinguistic reading imposes special requirements on the syntax of the sentence in which it is contained. One of these, for example, is that it cannot be followed by "but":

(36) *It is not a rare phenomena but it is a rare phenomenon.

I take bori (of the epistemic and speech-act readings) as being relevant to Horn’s kind of argument because I consider that it instantiates both a distinct lexical item (inasmuch as it is no longer declensible) and a different
construction. The former assumption, however, may be a matter of some dispute.

The clearest argument for distinguishing between lexical polysemy and pragmatic ambiguity is of course that the latter but not the former should be completely predictable. Thus, we may expect that any language with a negation morpheme will be able to use it with a metalinguistic reading. The polysemy of *may*, *bori* etc., on the other hand, is not predictable in the same way and neither is the polysemy of *as*. Given the permission sense, for example, we cannot predict that concession will also be there as an available meaning nor that the extension will take place in all domains; *may* and *bori* have epistemic readings but it is not clear that *as* has too (at least, I haven’t been able to find any clearly epistemic examples). The semantic extensions characterizing these items are motivated but not predictable.

*As* is more like "may* in not making any formal distinction between content and speech-act readings. Yet, as I suggested, it could be argued to belong to this broader system of systematic lexical polysemy. This could make its semantics motivated in a more general way too, insofar as it belongs to a system of similar polysemies. Note that both *bori* and "may", like *as*, have also suggestion meanings also, which would make the parallelism even more striking. *As* is also derived from a verb meaning "let, allow" and we may argue that permission is still the central meaning of the category, both as the one historically prior and as the one through which we can motivate both suggestion and concession.

In setting up the semantic category of *as*, we need to recognize at least four distinct meanings. Of these four, permission and concession, on the one hand, and suggestion and conditionality on the other, are directly
related to each other. The kind of relationship may differ in each case too; the permission-concession relationship involves transfer of domains (content to speech-act) and Sweetser (1990) argues that this kind of relation is metaphorical, whereas the as in its conditional use is partly constrained by the suggestion semantics but conditionality itself may come from the kind of construction that as is found in (as p ke q). Finally, the permission to suggestion relationship can be described in the following way: given that as is derived from the imperative form of afino "let, allow", we can talk about the meaning change as involving sentences like the following:

(37) as ton jani na fiji

    as the John subj. leave-PERF-NP-3SG

    "Let John go".

(38) as fiji o janis

    as leave-PERF-NP-3SG the John

    "(I suggest that) John leaves".

In (37) the speaker is making a request for letting a person go. In (38) on the other hand, the request is towards "allowing" something to happen; in both cases the hearer can be thought of as the one giving permission, in the case of the suggestion reading, however, the request for permission concerns an action rather than a person. In other words, from the point of view of the speaker, one way to render the suggestion felicitous would be the permission/agreement of the hearer. Diagrammatically, we can represent the semantic structure of as as follows (leaving aside the "wish" meaning). The arrows in the diagram represent the semantic motivation links between the different senses.
The AS category of constructions
Ideally, postulating this kind of semantic relationships should be accompanied by a historical study of the order of development of each meaning, confirming the proposed semantic relationships. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study. All I can argue for here is that recognizing some structure to the as category renders the various functions of as much less arbitrary.

There is no way of predicting that as should have a concessive meaning as well and, therefore, the existence of an as concessive construction has to be independently specified. However, the non-concessive semantics of as makes the concessive meaning highly motivated. Saying this, however, requires a theory of meaning which recognizes polysemy relationships and domains of meaning with special properties, like the speech-act domain.

It seems useful to distinguish between this kind of minimal reference that has to be made to the concessive use of as from cases like the na construction where concessiveness is attached to a word order pattern and motivation is not so easily discernible. Even if we motivate the preposing as a focusing strategy, no obvious explanation suggests itself as to why the focused constituent should acquire a scalar reading.

In short, with respect to these types of Greek concessives, we need to talk about both facts which, lacking a systematic explanation, should be considered partly idiomatic, and facts which, although analyzable and clearly motivated, are not strictly compositional in the sense discussed in the introduction. We need, in other words, to recognize a continuum of compositionality which is not possible within a theoretical model of semantics where the only two poles are strict compositionality and complete idiomaticity.
Chapter 5

Conditionals and concessives as bi-clausal constructions

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will examine what we may think of as discourse properties of conditionals and concessives or, alternatively, conditional and concessive constructions as a whole. So far, in discussing *na* and *as* conditionals and concessives, I have been essentially discussing properties which concerned and could be stated in terms of the antecedent. These properties characterized all *na* and *as* clauses, regardless of the embedding context.

The immediate embedding context for an adverbial subordinate clause is the main clause that it depends on. The focus of this chapter, therefore, will be the description of properties which have to do with both antecedent and consequent and as such have to be stated at the cross-clausal level.

The discussion of conditionals will be centered on the *an* conditionals, which are the "regular", "garden-variety" conditionals of Modern Greek. Unlike *na* and *as* conditionals, the *an* conditional marker is not characterized by any special constraints and its distribution is broader than that of the other two; every conditional clause introduced by *na* or *as* can be also introduced by *an*, but the reverse, as we have seen, is not true. The kind of facts to be discussed in this chapter is relevant to all conditional clauses and, therefore, the discussion will be held in terms of one type of conditional clause which can be considered representative of these properties and which, as I said, will be the *an* conditional. The cross-clausal
dependencies and associated meaning structures can be assumed to hold for the other kinds of conditional clauses as well, unless they are preempted by the general constraints governing na and as which I have already discussed.

In dealing with conditionals, there have generally been two main approaches. One of them treats the conditional and the main clause separately, assuming that their semantic contribution can be separately assessed and evaluated. The other approach maintains that the meaning of a conditional lies in the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent and that separate assessment not only does not make much sense but is often impossible. This is an oversimplified statement and there are many differences among analyses which subscribe to one or the other of these traditions. The common denominator can, however, be found in the distinction noted above.

The analysis of Greek conditionals that I will present here recognizes that the meaning of a conditional sentence lies in the relationship between the two clauses and, furthermore, that a particular conditional meaning is attached to a particular formal pattern, represented by the verb forms in the antecedent and the consequent. What I will be arguing is that certain Greek conditional sentences support strongly the idea that conditionals should be viewed as bi-clausal constructions with special formal and semantic properties.

The second part of this chapter will look more systematically at the conditional-concessive conditional relationship. In the preceding chapters, I showed that there is more than one way of forming a concessive out of a conditional, and that we have to take into account the type of conditional clause which is participating in a concessive construction. Certain formal
and semantic properties are inseparably linked to the concessive clauses as such and have to be considered as part of the grammar proper of this type of adverbial clause. In this chapter, I will try to describe some of the properties which characterize the concessive conditionals as a class. These properties concern the semantics/pragmatics of all concessive conditionals and require reference to the consequent as well. Constructional differences of the sort observed in the previous chapters will be neutralized in this context and the discussion will again be made in terms of one type of concessive clause, since the properties described here are common to all concessive conditionals. The general question that I will be trying to answer in this section is the following: Given a certain conditional sentence—in our terms, a certain verbal pattern with associated meaning—what is the effect of adding a word like "even" to the conditional clause? Can we abstract any commonalities among the different concessive conditional patterns which arise?

As in all the preceding chapters, I will also try to address the issue of motivation. Some of the conditional sentences I will be describing have properties which are clearly constructional in that they are not in any way predictable from the properties of their component parts. On the other hand, a closer look at the semantics of these components (in this case, at the semantics of the aspect and tense forms involved) makes the overall picture less arbitrary than it would have otherwise seemed, showing that the association of particular forms with particular meaning, although not completely predictable, is highly constrained.
5.1 Conditional constructions: problems of analysis

5.1.1 Some approaches to conditionals

In the logical tradition, it is generally believed that the connection between the p and the q of a conditional sentence is not part of the meaning. Conditionals1 like (1) below have been the kind of example used to demonstrate the correctness of this position:

(1) If this is Athens, then I am the Pope.

Still, logicians have also noted that in any formula of the form "if p, then q", there is some kind of connection between p and q, although, due partly to the difficulty of describing the exact nature of this connection, the question has been relegated to pragmatics; the relationship between the p and the q is not, in other words, part of the meaning proper of a conditional sentence.

As far as I can tell, this conclusion holds regardless of the analysis that one gives to "if". Thus Grice (1975) gives a material implication analysis to an "if p, then q" statement and maintains that the oddity of this analysis in cases where the truth or probability of q clearly depends on that of p is due to the violation of the maxim of quality. Stalnaker (1975) proposes a possible worlds solution to the problem of conditionality, addressing some of the counterintuitive implications of the truth-functional approach; in his approach, which is based on Kripke's (1963)

1 Conditionals of the kind exemplified in (1) have sometimes been called counterfactuals. Since I want to reserve this term for conditional patterns with specific formal properties, I will not call them that. As Fillmore (p.c.) points out, counterfactuality in these cases is not associated with the verbal forms in the antecedent and the consequent, since the same verb forms could have a non-counterfactual meaning. Rather, in the specific example, counterfactuality is pragmatically triggered, arising from the "blatant falsehood" of the consequent (cf. Akatsuka 1988).
modal logic, "if p, then q" is true in this world if q is true in the nearest world to this one in which p is true. Yet, the problem of the connection between p and q is still a pragmatic one, according to Stalnaker: "The second issue--the one that has dominated recent discussions of contrary-to-fact conditionals--is the pragmatic problem of counterfactuals. This problem derives from the belief, which I share with most philosophers writing about this topic, that the formal properties of the conditional function, together with all the facts, may not be sufficient for determining the truth value of a counterfactual; that is, different truth valuations of conditional statements may be consistent with a single valuation of all non-conditional statements. The task set by the problem is to find and defend criteria for choosing among these different valuations.... These criteria are pragmatic and not semantic". (Stalnaker 1975:165-166).²

This position has been inherited by linguists with otherwise widely different stands. Thus Geis and Zwicky's (1971) "conditional perfection" (cf. chapter 3) is also a pragmatic inference. McCawley (1981) maintains that the p,q relation is pragmatic in nature and so does Haiman (1978) and Gazdar (1979) (who subscribes to Stalnaker's analysis of "if"). Finally, Dudman (1984, 1984a) claims that the p and the q of a conditional clause are separately generated and independently parsed and that this is the only way of explaining the choice of the verb forms in a conditional like "If you called the police right away, the children are safe now". In all these analyses, the semantics of a conditional does not include the

² Adams (1990) has yet another approach to the problem of the p, q connection, according to which a conditional inference is valid if, roughly, it is impossible for its premises to be probable while its conclusion is improbable (or, if the improbability of the conclusion does not exceed the sum of the improbabilities of the premises). Finally, Lewis (1976) holds that a variant of Stalnaker's approach applies to counterfactuals.
description of the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent.

Akatsuka (1986) is explicitly in disagreement with this position. According to her, the connection between p and q is an integral part of the "if p, then q" construction's linguistic meaning. That is, each conditional sentence shares an abstract, grammatical meaning similar to "correlation/correspondence between p and q". What is contextually determined is the specific nature of the "correlation/correspondence" in each conditional sentence.

According to Akatsuka, even the indicative conditionals of the type exemplified in (1) manifest a connection between the p and the q parts of the sentence, which has to do with the evaluative judgement of the speaker: the degree of absurdity in p correlates with/ corresponds to the degree of absurdity in q. So, for example, in (1) the speaker is asserting something like "Your claim that this city is Athens is just as absurd as saying that I am the Pope". Akatsuka claims that her analysis fits well with the observation that the q of indicative counterfactuals must be a clear falsehood.

The analysis of the Greek conditional patterns in the next section agrees with Akatsuka's position in that it takes the antecedent-consequent connection to be part of the meaning of a conditional sentence. However, there is also a difference in that the description of the Greek conditionals will be making reference to the specific verbal forms which appear in the protasis and the apodosis, claiming that the meaning of a conditional pattern is inalienably linked to its form. To a construction grammarian this is hardly surprising, although it may be surprising to analysts trying to unify conditionals under a truth-conditional or other meaning. The analysis of conditionals given here, will be, therefore, in the spirit of Fillmore's (1983,
1989:chapter 20) analysis of the English conditional patterns, always connecting a given conditional pattern with one or more meaning structures. Although I will be disagreeing with the specific form-meaning mappings that they postulate, it should be pointed out that the same approach to conditional sentences is also taken by most traditional grammars. Tzartzanos (1963) can be again considered representative in this respect, containing as it does the most detailed discussion of conditional patterns.

I have no objection to Akatsuka's claim that there is a general meaning, abstract enough to cover all conditional sentences. I also agree with her claim that the prototypical meaning of "if p" is to express the speaker's "uncertainty towards/uncontrollability of p", which seems to be a further elucidation of the common characterization of conditionals as "hypothetical". I believe, however, that there is a lot more to be said about the conditional patterns. In particular, the Greek conditionals argue strongly for more specific form-meaning pairings, since it is the case that the choice of the verb form of p, for example, may depend on the specific meaning associated with the conditional pattern as a whole.

5.1.2 Modern Greek conditional constructions

The organization of this section will be as follows: first, I will discuss a particular conditional pattern, arguing that at least in this case we have to make reference to constructional meaning, taking into account both antecedent and consequent. Then, I will describe some other conditional patterns which I will also take as representing form-meaning pairs. The structure of the argument here is that since for at least one case we need to refer to constructional meaning and the antecedent-consequent relationship, we may have reason to believe that other conditionals are also
characterized by this kind of constructional meaning, even in the cases where the evidence, although by no means contradictory, may allow other analyses as well. The conditional patterns that I will discuss do not by any means exhaust the conditional constructions of Greek and should, therefore, be seen as only a part of what a full description of conditionals should ultimately include.

As in the other cases, however, I am also going to address the issue of motivation, which in the context of the present discussion translates into deciding which of the linguistic choices of verbal forms can be considered to be motivated (by the semantics of these forms in other environments) and to what extent. The hope is that this discussion will further clarify the meaning structure of such sentences and help pinpoint the boundaries between constructional and compositional meaning.

The first conditional pattern to be discussed is exemplified in (2)-(4) below:

(2) 'an pjo koka kola revome'
   if drink-PERF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG
   "If (whenever) I drink coke, I burp".

(3) an vrekxi vrexi ja ta kala
   if rain-PERF-NP-3SG rain-IMPF-NP-3SG for the good
   "If (whenever) it rains, it pours".

(4) 'an er0i stin aθina meni mazi mas'
   if come-PERF-NP-3SG to-the Athens stay-IMPF-NP-3SG with us
   "If (whenever) he comes to Athens, he stays with us".
The semantic relationship between the antecedent and the consequent in examples (2)-(4) can be thought of as one of "general correlation" (as is also indicated by the translation): whenever p happens/holds, q happens/holds as well. Fillmore (1989) describes a similar conditional pattern for English, as in (5):

(5) If he wakes up early, she wakes up early.

The Greek conditional sentences above employ all the PERFECTIVE, NON-PAST form of the verb in the antecedent and the IMPERFECTIVE, NON-PAST in the consequent. The overall meaning associated with this pattern is that of general correlation.

The crucial thing here is the choice of the verb form in the antecedent, that is, the use of the Perfective non-past. I will argue that at least this choice is to some degree constructional, that is, it cannot but be attributed to the whole conditional pattern with its associated meaning. The argument refers crucially to a distinction manifested by an and otan clauses when they are used to express a particular meaning. Consider (2)-(4) above alongside (6)-(14):

(6) *an pino koka kola revome
    if drink-IMPF-NP-1SG coke burp-EMPF-NP-1SG
    "If I drink coke, I burp*.

(7) *an vrexi vrexi ja ta kala
    if rain-IMPF-NP-3SG rain-IMPF-NP-3SG for the good
    "If it rains, it pours*.

(8)*an erxete stin aθina meni mazi mas
    if come-IMPF-NP-3SG to-the Athens stay-IMPF-NP-3SG with us
"If he comes to Athens, he stays with us".

(9) otan vreksi vrexi ja ta kala
when rain-PERF-NP-3SG rain-IMPF-NP-3SG for the good

"When it rains, it pours".

(10) otan vrexi vrexi ja ta kala
when rain-IMPF-NP-3SG rain-IMPF-NP-3SG for the good

"When it rains, it pours".

(11) otan pjo koka kola revome
when drink-PERF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG

"When I drink coke, I burp".

(12) otan pino koka kola revome
when drink-IMPF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG

"When I drink coke, I burp".

(13) an pinis koka kola doe mu ke mena
if drink-IMPF-NP-2SG coke give-IMPER I-GEN and me

"If you are drinking coke, give me some too".

(14) otan eroi o janis 0a pame
when come-PERF-NP-3SG the John FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL

"When John comes, we'll go".

Examples (6)-(8) show that the Imperfective, non-past is ungrammatical in the protasis under the general correlation reading. As (13) shows, this is not a general constraint against this form in a conditional protasis, but rather, a constraint in the case where the consequent contains an Imperfective, non-past as well and the resulting meaning is that of general correlation.
These judgements are reversed when the adverbial clause is intro­duced by *otan* "when". As the contrast between (9) and (10), and (11) and (12) shows, the *otan* clauses require the Imperfective, non-past in the antecedent in the reading "whenever p, then q". Example (14) shows that, once again, the restriction is not a general one against the perfective forms in the *otan* antecedent. When the apodosis has a future verb form and the overall meaning changes, a perfective is grammatical. For some examples, as for instance (12), the version with the perfective is less bad than the corresponding *an* clause with an imperfective. I don't know why this should be so. The fact remains, however, that between the *otan* perfective and the *otan* imperfective clauses (always under the relevant reading) there is a clear preference for the latter.

In the next section, I will discuss which of these linguistic choices of verb forms for the expression of the "general correlation" meaning is more motivated and why. Here, I just want to point out that the *an* vs. *otan* distinction argues for a constructional analysis, that is for an analysis which makes reference to the formal properties of the antecedent and the consequent (and to the associated meaning). Given that the overall interpretation is very similar in the *an* and the *otan* clauses and that *an*’s and *otan*’s behave very similarly in other respects, the different verb forms appearing in the protasis under the general correlation reading will have to be described by reference to the presence of *an* vs. *otan* and by reference to the relevant interpretation. This interpretation, in turn, is uniquely associated with the verbal forms of both antecedent and consequent. *An*’s and *otan*’s are both appropriate supporting environments

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3 Yu (1983) claims that tense patterns are always the same in conditional and temporal clauses (and some other types of adverbial clauses as well). In view of the facts presented here, we are obviously in disagreement.
for the perfective, non-past. As I noted in chapter (2) (2.2.1), this verbal form is called bound because it cannot occur without one of the supporting particles (na, θa, as). In an clauses and οtan clauses (and certain other types of adverbial clauses to be discussed in the next section), the perfective non-past is also acceptable. So compare (4) and (14) above to (15), (16) below:

(15) θα γραψι/*γραψι τα μαθήματα του ντο οδοματιο
    FUT write-PERF-NP-3SG the lessons his to-the other room
    "He will do his homework in the other room".

(16) επιθε θα παρι/*παρι φαρμάκο να μην φαι
    because FUT take-PERF-NP-3SG medicine na NEG eat-PERF-NP-3SG
    "Because/since he will take medicine, he shouldn't eat".

Tzartzanos (1963:65) is one of the traditional grammars which recognizes the existence of this conditional pattern and describes it by reference to both the tense forms in the antecedent and the consequent (the conditional of the "indefinite repetition"). He fails, however, to notice the contrast with the corresponding οtan pattern. Mackridge (1985:302) also gives such an example but subsumes it under his "factual" conditionals category without noting any special constructional requirements.

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4 οtan is derived from οτέ "when" + an. This morphological and historical relatedness is not of course unique to Greek. Many languages manifest such synchronic and diachronic relations between their "if" and their "when" markers (cf. Traugott 1985) and in some languages (e.g. German) there is not even a distinct lexical item. The fact that in other languages, e.g. English, "if" and "when" clauses are very similar with respect to their formal properties as well (cf. Fillmore 1989 for a description of these parallel constructions), makes the Greek data appear even more strange.
General correlations can be also situated in the past. In this case, both the antecedent and the consequent require the Imperfective past, as in (17), (18):

(17) an ixe stin tsepi tu mia ḍraṃt tin ešine
if have-IMPF-P-3SG to-the pocket his one drachma it give-IMPF-P-3SG
"If (whenever) he had a drachma in his pocket, he gave it away".

(18) 'an ekleje i ašelfi tu ekleje ki aftos'
if cry-IMPF-P-3SG the sister his cry-IMPF-P-3SG and him
"If (whenever) his sister cried, he cried too".

The next conditional pattern that I will discuss is exemplified in (19)-(21) below:

(19) an o janis pniyotan ḍen θa ixe zisi ke i išia5
if the John drown-IMPF-P-3SG NEG FUT live-PERFECT-P-3SG and the herself
"If John had drowned, she wouldn't have lived herself".

(20) an o janis ixe pni ji ḍen θa ixe zisi ke i išia
if the John drown-PERFECT-P-3SG NEG FUT live-PERFECT-P-3SG and the herself

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5 In all the conditional examples in the preceding chapters, I have glossed θa with FUT (=Future marker) and I will continue to do so in this chapter. It should be obvious that depending on the following verb form, θa can express anything from future to past time reference and various modalities. So FUT is nothing but a glossing convenience and the description of the verb forms in the antecedent and the consequent will be making reference to the whole verb complex, including the θa particle.
"If John had drowned, she wouldn't have lived herself".

(21) an o janis ixe pniji δεν θα zuse ke i ιδια

If the John drown-PERFECT-P-3SG NEG FUT live-IMPF-P-3SG and the herself.

"If John had drowned, she wouldn't have lived herself".

What the conditionals in (19)-(21) have in common is that they are all past counterfactuals, that is they presuppose as true the content of the antecedent clause with reverse polarity in the past tense. There are several more things, however, to be said with respect to such patterns.

The conditional patterns of (20) and (21), with the PERFECT PAST in the antecedent, are past counterfactuals in the sense described above, regardless of the verb form in the consequent which can be either the FUT+Imperfective Past or FUT+Perfect Past. The conditional pattern in (19), with the Imperfective Past in the antecedent clause, is also a counterfactual. Depending on whether the verb phrase of the antecedent is stative or not, there may be some different entailments, yet, in both cases the sentence can be argued to be a counterfactual. Compare, for example, (19) above with (22):

(22) an o janis itan orθοδοξos θα ixe jini proeδros

If the John be-P-3SG orthodox FUT become-PERFECT-P-3SG president

"If John were/had been an orthodox, he would have become president".

Since the verb phrase in the antecedent of (22) denotes a state rather than a point event, we can expect that this state will be either construed as having its relevance ended in the past or as having it continued up to the
present. Thus (22) may have two possible readings: (i) John was not an orthodox at the time of the election but he now is, or (ii) John was not an orthodox then and still isn't. Both of these readings, however, qualify as past counterfactual in the sense outlined above and these differences are rather due to the semantic character of states than to a constructional difference. Example (23), on the other hand, illustrates the fact that when the order of the relevant tenses is reversed, that is when the Perfect past is in the antecedent and the Imperfective Past in the consequent (compare with (19) and (22)), past interpretation is no longer imposed on the verb of the apodosis. This is again indicated by the two translations of (23):

(23) an ixe ερθω ο η ιονις  θα πιμέναμε κι εμισ

if come-PERFECT-P-3SG the John FUT go-IMPF-P-IPL and we

"If John had come, we would have gone/would go also".

This is in disagreement with what Tzartzanos (1963:64) reports. He claims that in an example like (24), the time reference of the consequent is obligatorily in the past. Yet, since both the (a) and the (b) continuations are possible, this is clearly not true:

(24) an ixe λαβω ενεργος το τελεγραφιμα

if receive-PERFECT-P-3SG in time the telegram

θα πιμένε FUT go-IMPF-P-3SG

"If he had received the telegram in time, he would go/would have gone".

(a) αλα δεν το πιει κε δεν πιε

but NEG it take-PERF-P-3SG and NEG go-PERF-P-3SG
"But he didn't receive it and he didn't go".

As I noted before, a non-past interpretation is not available to the Imperfective past of (19) and (22).

Counterfactuality in the past appears, therefore, to be inalienably linked to the PERFECT PAST form. If there is a perfect past in the consequent (as in (19)), then a protasis with an Imperfective past expresses past counterfactuality. Counterfactuality in the past is not, however, a necessary concomitant of the Imperfective Past. So alongside (19) and (22) consider (25)-(26):

(25) an ton ipostirizan stis eklojes 0a evjene

"If they had supported him in the elections, he would have been elected".

"If they supported (were to support) him in the elections he would be elected".

(26) an ton ayapuse 0a tin pandrevotan

"If she loved him, he would marry her".

"If she had loved him, he would have married her".
Examples (25) and (26) have the Imperfective Past in the antecedent and the FUT+Imperfective Past form in the consequent. Yet the stative vs. non-stative distinction forces us to make a distinction here as well. Example (26), with a stative verb, has two possible interpretations as is indicated by the translation: One as a present counterfactual ("she doesn't love him") and one as a past counterfactual ("she didn't love love him"). In the latter reading, (26) is synonymous with the corresponding past counterfactual patterns with the Perfect Past. The conditional in (25) on the other hand, may be said to be three ways ambiguous, depending on the speaker's location in time with respect to the time reference of the antecedent and the consequent. It can refer to past or present situations, like (26), but it can also be interpreted as referring to a situation in which the time of the utterance precedes the time of the events described in the antecedent.

It is possible to have a stative verb in the Imperfective past and still have the overall interpretation be one that refers to future events. For this, however, to be the case the verb has to be interpreted as expressing a change of state rather than a continuing state and not all stative verbs will allow this interpretation. "Love", e.g., in (26) cannot be interpreted as "come to love" and this rules out the future reading. (27), on the other hand, can be interpreted as referring to the future, if "live" is interpreted as "move" or "come to stay":

(27) an emene e5o konda əa tin proslamvanan

if live-IMPF-P-3SG here near FUT her hire-IMPF-P-3PL

"If she lived (came to live) somewhere near, they would hire her".

What kind of semantics should we attribute then to the Imperfective Past, FUT+Imperfective Past pattern? I suggest that it is sufficient to say
that the only constraint on this pattern (the stative/non-stative distinction having to be independently stated) can be expressed by saying that the "epistemic stance" of the speaker has to be one in which they associate themself with the world in which the protasis does not hold. The term "epistemic stance" is taken from Fillmore (1990) and refers to the speaker's assumptions about the actuality of the content of the protasis. No relation needs, however, to be specified between the temporal positions of the p and the q on the one hand, and of the speaker on the other, since, as we have seen, in the Imperfective past pattern the speaker's temporal location can all precede, be simultaneous or follow the temporal position of the p and the q.

In the (strictly) counterfactual readings, it is immediately obvious why the speaker associates him/herself with the world of -p, since both the present and the past counterfactual readings of (25), for example, assert that p did not happen or does not hold. In what sense is the "future" reading also a counterfactual? The future reading of (25) can be said to be counterfactual in that the speaker, in using an Imperfective past, is taking a particular perspective with respect to the content of p; that perspective is one which implies that as the world stands currently what p expresses is not going to happen and that it would require some change to make it happen. In other words, bringing about p would somehow go against the normal course of events. Compare, for example (28) to (29):

(28) an erxotan o janis 0a pijename ki emis
    if come-IMPF-P-3SG the John FUT go-IMPF-P-IPL and we

"If John came, we would also go".

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If John comes, we'll also go.

We might translate (28) even more accurately as "If John were to come..." which implies that as things stand now, it is less likely that he will come than that he won't. The speaker of (28) on the other hand, with the Perfective non-past (a pattern to be discussed below), although also referring to a future situation, does not make the same assumptions about the epistemic status of the antecedent; rather, (29) is clearly hypothetical in that the speaker is equally disposed towards p and -p.

From a constructional point of view, we could say that the relevant readings of the Imperfective past are picked within the context of the verbal form in the other clause. Which interpretation we choose is of course constrained by general requirements of coherence and the general meaning of a conditional construction ("There is some sort of connection, causal or not, between the p and the q"). In an example like (19), given that the consequent imposes a past time reference, then the content of the antecedent, if it is to be somehow interpreted as causing the events in the consequent, will have to be interpreted with past time reference as well. In (23) on the other hand, where the tenses are reversed, the antecedent imposes past time reference (it is an event done and finished in the past) but the verb form of the consequent can be interpreted in two ways because an event completed in the past could have effect on some other past event or on events to take place in the future. The permissible combinations, however, as well as their range of meanings appear to be part of the grammar of every language. We have seen that Greek, for example, has a past counterfactual reading for its Imperfective past,
FUT+Imperfective past construction, whereas English does not extend its pattern with the corresponding semantics in that direction. In other words, (30) cannot be interpreted as a past counterfactual:

(30) If she loved him, he would marry her.

Another conditional pattern is exemplified in (31)-(33):

(31) an vreksi ðen ða pao
if rain-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT go-PERF-NP-1SG
"If it rains, I won't go".

(32) 'an erðis ða perasume kala'
if come-PERF-NP-2SG FUT pass-PERF-NP-1PL well
"If you come, we'll have a good time".

(33) an xtipisi to kuduni ða aniksun afti
if ring-PERF-NP-3SG the bell FUT open-PERF-NP-3PL they
"If the bell rings, they'll answer".

Examples (31)-(33) have the PERFECTIVE NON-PAST in the antecedent and the future marker with the PERFECTIVE NON-PAST in the consequent. The meaning associated with this pattern is the expression of a prediction which is somehow dependent or contingent on the fulfillment of the content of the antecedent. The perfective form in the antecedent has future meaning (although no ða occurs in that clause) and again it seems reasonable to assume that this interpretation is contextually triggered by the verb form of the consequent. In the "general correlation" pattern which was discussed first, the same Perfective non-past form expressed a regularly recurring event and what triggered that interpretation was the Imperfective non-past of the consequent. Unlike the "general correlation"
pattern, however, where the "if" and the "when" clauses behave differently, in the futurate prediction pattern "if" and "when" clauses (like the corresponding English ones—cf. Fillmore 1989) feature the same verb form. So compare (34) to (32):

(34) otan erðis θa perasume kala
    when come-PERF-NP-2SG FUT pass-PERF-NP-1PL well

"When you come, we'll have a good time".

Finally, consider (35)-(38):

(35) an irðan stin ora tus θa iðan tin eleni
    if come-PERF-P-3PL to-the time their FUT see-PERF-P-3PL the Helen

"If they came on time, they saw Helen".

(36) an evrekse sta nisia θa fíyan i turistes
    if rain-PERF-P-3SG to-the islands FUT leave-PERF-P-3PL the tourists

"If it rained in the islands, the tourists left".

(37) an eftase stin ora tu pire taksi
    if arrive-PERF-P-3SG to-the time his take-PERF-P-3SG taxi

"If he arrived on time, he took a taxi".

(38) 'an i ava ayorase kenurjia γuna
    if the Ava buy-PERF-P-3SG new fur
    kerðise to laxio'

    win-PERF-P-3SG the lottery

"If Ava bought a new fur, she won the lottery".
Examples (35)-(38) all have the PERFECTIVE PAST form in the protasis. (35) and (36) with the FUT+Perfective past in the consequent express a causal relationship between the p and the q which denote events that took place in the past. These examples can be also read as epistemics (in the sense of Sweetser 1990) inasmuch as they can be interpreted as meaning something like "If p took place then we may conclude that q took place as well", although content and epistemic readings are hard to tease out. In (37) and (38), however, where the causal relationship is reversed (if anything, it is the content of the consequent which temporally and logically precedes that of the antecedent), the epistemic reading is the only available one.

What has to be accounted for is the difference in the verbal form of the consequent. In all (35)-(38) the time of the utterance is later than the time of the events in the antecedent and the consequent. In (35) and (36), however, p temporally and logically precedes q and this configuration is expressed by the Perfective past in the antecedent, followed by the FUT marker and another Perfective Past in the consequent. In (37) and (38) on the other hand, it is the q which precedes and is the cause of p and this situation is expressed by the perfective past followed by a (simple) perfective past in the consequent. These patterns are not interchangeable as (39) and (40) show:

(39)*an irθan stin ora tus iθan tin eleni  
*If they came on time, they saw Helen*.

(40) *an eftase stin ora tu θa pire taksi  
If arrive-PERF-P-3SG to-the time his FUT take-PERF-P-3SG taxi
"If he arrived on time, he took a taxi".

Greek, therefore, chooses to grammaticize a difference between past epistemic and non-epistemic conditionals which English, (as has been already indicated by the translations) doesn't. Again, this seems to suggest that every such pattern has to be taken in its own right and the associated meaning stipulated on a case-by-case basis.

There are many more conditional patterns which won't be discussed here. A full study of conditionals should determine, among other things, the occurring combinations of verbal forms out of all the potential ones which arise given the morphological distinctions that Greek makes in the verbal system. Fillmore (1990) proposes that a general constraint governing the compatibility of verbal forms in the antecedent and the consequent in English is that the "epistemic stance" of p has to be the same as the "epistemic stance" of q. Although, as we have seen, Greek and English differ in the way they may grammaticize different conditional meanings, I haven't seen the "epistemic stance" condition being violated by any of the Greek examples. So, for example, the reason why (41) is ruled out is because the Perfect Past in the antecedent requires a counterfactual stance, while the future in the apodosis requires a hypothetical one (cf. (31)-(33)):

(41) *an ixe aniksi to γrama θα skotoθi

if open-PERFECT-P-3SG the letter FUT be killed-PERF-NP-3SG

The main purpose of this section has been to argue that conditionals should be viewed as bi-clausal constructions with associated meaning. As I said before, this is the approach taken by most traditional grammars, even if implicitly. However, the categories of conditional sentences that these grammars recognize are much broader than the ones I proposed.
here, lumping together many patterns which, I have argued, are distinct. Thus Tzartzanos (1963) recognizes four types of conditionals: (i) the "factual" ones, (ii) the "counterfactuals", (iii) those which express "a simple thought of the speaker", and (iv) examples corresponding to what I called "futurate prediction" and "general correlation" (which are grouped together under another, nameless category). Given the "an" vs. the "otan" discrepancy discussed in the beginning of this section, we have strong reason to believe that these are distinct patterns. Similarly, there is no obvious reason as to why (42) and (43) below should be in separate categories. According to Tzartzanos (1963:63-64), (42) is an instance of the "simple thought of the speaker" category while (43) belongs to the counterfactuals:

(42) θα πλήρεσες τα πείσματα στο Παρίσι
FUT get-rich-IMPF-P-2SG if go-IMPF-P-2SG to-the Paris
"You would/could become rich if you went to Paris".

(43) θα πήρα άλλη σύζυγο θα πήρα και την δεσποινίδα
if take-IMPF-P-1SG other wife FUT take-IMPF-P-1SG and dowry
"If I took another wife, I would take dowry as well".

This pattern has both past counterfactual and non-past readings (cf. the discussion above) which are equally available to (42) and (43). Mackridge (1985) claims also that "as far as verb forms are concerned, conditional sentences may be divided loosely into "factual" and "counterfactual". Within each group, further subdivision is based on time reference, e.g. factuals are subdivided into present, past, future factuals etc..

The analysis of the conditional patterns I presented here suggests that time reference of the antecedent and/or the consequent is one of the categorizing factors but it is not the only one. The temporal sequence of
the p and the q (cf. (35)-(38)), the temporal location of the speaker with respect to that of the p and the q (with lack of a deictic center, as in the general correlation pattern, being also a possibility), and hypotheticality vs. counterfactuality are other crucial parameters. A full study of conditional patterns may reveal some more. A factor which I haven't discussed yet, but intend to mention in the next section, is the speech-act status of the consequent.

5.1.3 The conditional patterns

In this section, I summarize the conditional constructions that were identified so far. Once again, it should be pointed out that this study is not complete. Some more patterns will emerge from the discussion in the next section as well. What I want to do here is simply give an idea of what a condensed description of these patterns might look like from a Construction Grammar perspective which looks at these sentences as bi-clausal structures with particular semantics. The meaning labels should be thought of as mnemonic indexes rather than as an accurate description of the semantics. For this I will use the kind of "box" notation used in Fillmore (1989) in his description of the English conditional patterns, which pairs the formal bi-clausal pattern with a semantic formula. To make cross-reference a little easier, in table I, I list the constructions by the name they are given here together with the number of the examples in the previous section which are instantiations of these constructions. The

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6 Tzartzanos and Mackridge use the term "factual" conditionals to refer to what I think of as hypotheticals. I want to reserve the term "factual" for a special category of conditionals with "peculiar" properties (cf. section 5.1.4).
name on the left of the arrow is the (mnemonic) name of the construction, the numbers on the right are the numbers of the examples illustrating it.

Table I

1. "General Correlation"--- > (2), (3), (4)
2. "Future Prediction"--- > (31), (32), (33)
3. "Past Counterfactual"--- > (19), (22)
4. "Past Counterfactual"--- > (20), (21), (24)
5. "Past, Present Counterfactual"--- > (26), (27)
6. "Past, Present, Future Counterfactual"--- > (25), (28)
7. "Past Contingency"--- > (35), (36)
8. "Past Epistemic"--- > (37), (38)
1. "General Correlation"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfective Non-Past</td>
<td>Imperfective Non-Past</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. "Future Prediction"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfective Non-Past</td>
<td>FUT+Perfective Non-Past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. "Past Counterfactual"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective Past</td>
<td>FUT+Perfect Past</td>
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</table>
4. "Past Counterfactual"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfect Past</td>
<td>FUT + Perfect Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imperfective Past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. "Past, Present Counterfactual"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective Past</td>
<td>FUT + Imperfective Past</td>
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<tr>
<td>(stative)</td>
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6. "Past, Present, Future Counterfactual"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antecedent</th>
<th>Consequent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective Past</td>
<td>FUT + Imperfective Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-stative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. "Past Contingency"

- Antecedent
- Perfective Past

- Consequent
- FUT+Perfective Past

8. "Past Epistemic"

- Antecedent
- Perfective Past

- Consequent
- Perfective Past
5.1.4 Conditional patterns and systemic coherence

This section will be devoted to looking in more detail at the conditional patterns already discussed. The purpose of the discussion here is to place the observed patterns in a broader context and determine to what extent their semantics is motivated by the semantics of their component parts and specifically by the semantics of the verb forms with which they are associated.

The first pattern I discussed was that of the "general correlation", as exemplified in (44) below:

(44) an klapsi o janakis klei ke i aðelfula tu
    if cry-PERF-NP-3SG the little John cry-IMPF-NP-3SG and the sister his
    "If (whenever) little John cries, his sister cries also".

In contrast, the "equivalent" otan (=when) clauses employ the Imperfective (as opposed to the Perfective) non-past for the expression of the general correlation meaning:

(45) otan klei o janakis klei ke i aðelfula tu
    when cry-IMPF-NP-3SG the little John cry-IMPF-NP-3SG and the sister his
    "When little John cries, his sister cries also".

The first thing to observe is that the an ("if") clauses seem to follow a more general pattern for adverbial clauses which do allow the Perfective non-past. As I noted in chapter (2) and in section 5.1.2 above, this form is necessarily "bound" in that it has to be preceded by one of the verbal particles na, ða or ñs. The only other environments in which it can appear by itself are the types of adverbial clauses listed in (46) and (47). These
clauses, like the an and the otan ones, can "support" a Perfective non-past:

(46) afu pjo koka kola revome
    after drink-PERF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG
    "After I drink coke, I burp".

(47) prin pjo koka kola revome
    before drink-PERF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG
    "Before I drink coke, I burp".

Example (47) is perhaps pragmatically odd in that it suggests some sort of psychological conditioning, but that is beside the point. In both (46) and (47) the meaning which is expressed can again be described as one of "general correlation" between the content of the adverbial and the main clause: every time, before/after I drink coke, I burp. Like the an clauses, the afu and the prin clauses express this meaning with a Perfective form. The same sentences with the Imperfective are ungrammatical:

(48) *afu pino koka kola revome
    after drink-IMPF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG

(49) *prin pino koka kola revome
    before drink-IMPF-NP-1SG coke burp-IMPF-NP-1SG

Unlike the an and the otan clauses, however, where both the Perfective non-past and the Imperfective non-past are possible verb forms in the antecedent (with different resulting readings), the Imperfective non-past is completely excluded from the prin clauses:

(50) prin *erxete/er0i

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Before he comes/came, we clean/will clean/had cleaned up.

Depending on the verb form in the main clause, (50) can be read as a "general correlation" (with the Imperfective non-past), as a future promise (with the FUT+Perfective non-past) or as a description of past events (with the Perfect past). In every case, however, the Imperfective non-past is excluded from the subordinate clause.

The Imperfective non-past is acceptable in the a\fu clauses but it forces a "since" reading of the adverbial clause. Thus (51) with the Imperfective non-past can only be read as a "since" clause, (52) with the Perfective non-past (cf. also (46) above) can only be interpreted as "after", while (53) and (54) with the Imperfective past and the Perfective past respectively, can have both readings:

(51) \afu er\xette\ 0a ksekinisum\e ki emis
    since come-IMPF-NP-3SG FUT start-PERF-NP-1PL and we
    "Since he is on his way, we'll start also".

(52) \afu er\thetai 0a ksekinisum\e ki emis
    after come-PERF-NP-3SG FUT start-PERF-NP-1PL and we
    "After he comes, we'll start too".

(53) \afu erxotan pijene ke tin evlepe
    "afu" come-IMPF-P-3SG go-IMPF-P-3SG and her see-IMPF-P-3SG
"Since he was coming (anyway), he used to go and see her".

"After he came, he would go and see her".

(54) afu ire pije ke tin i6e

"afu" come-PERF-P-3SG go-PERF-P-3SG and her see-PERF-P-3SG

"Since he came, he went to see her".

"After he came, he went to see her".

One tentative generalization we may extract, therefore, is that the Imperfective non-past seems to correlate with factivity. This is clear for the afu sentences where the use of this verbal form forces a factual interpretation. If this generalization is true, it would also explain the incompatibility of this verbal form with the prin clauses, since the situation depicted by a prin ("before") clause is by definition not realized7.

Things are less clear when we consider the an clauses with an Imperfective non-past. Yet, here as well there appears to be a correlation between Imperfective non-pasts and factual or "given" readings of the protasis. Consider, for example, (55) and (56):

(55) an ksekinai o janis as fr Lyme ki emis

if start-IMPF-NP-3SG the John as leave-PERF-NP-1PL and we

"If (since) John is 'arting out now, let us leave also".

(56) an feyume tora jati den vazis to palto su

if leave-IMPF-NP-1PL now why NEG put on-IMPF-NP-2SG the coat your

7 There are languages, as e.g. Chagga (Bantu family), where the "before" clauses contain an actual negative morpheme. The literal translation of a clause like "before he drank", for example, would be "before he didn't drink".
"If (since) we are about to leave, why don’t you put on your coat?"

As is indicated by the translation, there is a strong factual, "given" flavor associated with (55) and (56). Out of context, they both suggest that the content of the protasis has already been "on the floor", discussed and accepted as the premise for further conversation; both (55) and (56) would be inappropriate discourse opening statements. To the extent that na conditionals constitute a test for factivity (cf. chapter 2), we may note that, as expected, the Imperfective non-past cannot appear in a na conditional antecedent:

(57) *na erxete as frýume ki emis
            na come-IMPF-NP-3SG as leave-PERF-NP-IPL and we

(58) *na vrexi δen θa pame
            na rain-IMPF-NP-3SG   NEG FUT go-PERF-NP-IPL

We may also note that if Imperfective non-pasts correlate with factual readings, it should follow that they also correlate with epistemic and speech-act conditionals. Protases with this verbal form tend to be the antecedents of speech-act and epistemic conditionals (I haven't been able to find any conditional with an Imperfective non-past which is neither epistemic nor speech-act). Again, this would be a predictable correlation to the extent that, as said above, such conditionals tend also to be "given" (by virtue of their semantics/pragmatics). Thus (55) and (56) above are speech-act conditionals. Example (59) below is an epistemic:

(59) an vrexi eðo pera vrexi ke sta nisia
            if rain-IMPF-NP-3SG here    rain-IMPF-NP-3SG and to-the islands

"If it is raining here, it is raining (=it must be raining) in the islands as well".
By way of conclusion, we may say that the an clauses side with the majority of the other adverbial clauses in the choice of the Perfective non-past to express a general correlation. In all the other types of adverbial clauses discussed here (and which are the clauses that can support this verbal form) the Imperfective non-past is either ungrammatical or forces a factual reading.

This is still not a full explanation in semantic terms of the formal properties of these clauses. The preceding discussion, however, serves to embed the an clauses in a larger context, seeing to what extent they can be considered regular or irregular. What I wanted to show is that, within the paradigm of the relevant clauses, the otan clauses are the ones which behave strangely. The point once again is that stating this kind of discrepancy between the an and the otan clauses requires reference to the relevant reading associated with the bi-clusal structure.

A complete semantic explanation would have to include, among other things, an account of the semantics of imperfectivity and an account of exactly what aspect of this semantics it is which forces a factual or "given" interpretation in these otherwise (roughly) irrealis contexts. It would also have to explain the interaction between the otan semantics and the semantics of an imperfective form which makes it possible for this form to appear in the antecedent of a "general correlation" otan clause without giving rise to any factual implications.

Speculating a bit further on this contrast, we may say the following. A general characterization of the imperfective semantics proposed by Comrie (1976) is that imperfectivity marks "explicit reference to the internal temporal structure of a situation, viewing a situation from within". Imperfectivity is further subdivided into a number of distinct categories.
one of which is "habitual" aspect. Different languages have of course different ways of lexicalizing the distinctions. I won't attempt to justify Comrie's definition but simply assume that it is correct at least in its essentials. Modern Greek does not lexicalize imperfective aspect differently from habitual aspect; I take the latter to be the relevant aspectual characterization of the "general correlation" meaning: every time that X also Y.

Where does this leave us then with respect to the an vs. otan contrast? We may say that for the an clauses, habituality comes from the formal (imperfective) marking of the main clause (the consequent) and the perfective/imperfective opposition is "saved" for the expression of factuality or "givenness" vs. non-factuality/"non-givenness". Between the perfective and the imperfective, the imperfective seems to be a more motivated choice for the expression of "givenness", if the speaker, in taking something as given or true, can be seen as taking an inside perspective on (and thus in a way "adopting") the situation. On the other hand, the otan clauses, already further along on the "factuality" continuum, do not seem to make a factual/non-factual distinction. Whatever the distinction between (60) and (61), it is not one of factuality:

(60) otan ksekinane iðopiise mas
when start-IMPF-NP-3PL notify-IMPER us
"When they start out, let us know".

(61) otan ksekinisun iðopiise mas
when start-PERF-NP-3PL notify-IMPER us

It should be made clear that nothing I said mitigates the need of describing the an and the otan clauses at the constructional level, since nothing of what I said here is general enough to have predictive power.
Yet, embedding any constructional properties into a larger context serves to make these properties look less arbitrary than they would otherwise do.

The next issue I want to address arises in connection to examples like (62), (63):

(62) an ton ixe δί i maria
     if him see-PERFECT-P-3SG the Mary

(63) 'an ixe pai i aðelfi su sto parti
     if go-PERFECT-P-3SG the sister your to-the party

"If Mary had seen him, John would have seen him also".

"If your sister had gone to the party, her boyfriend would have gone also".

Sentences (62) and (63) are instances of the past counterfactual construction discussed in the previous section, with both the antecedent and the consequent containing the Perfect past. The issue arises when we observe that these examples, besides having the expected past counterfactual interpretation, have also a reading in which the Perfect past is not counterfactual. That is both (62) and (63) may be read as expressing some sort of reasoning about past events (I will elaborate some more on that below). I believe that the English translations could be ambiguous in the same way. The question we have to address, therefore, is whether this constitutes counterevidence to the claim that the PERFECT PAST,
FUT+PERFECT PAST construction is associated with counterfactuality.

What I suggest is that it does not constitute counterevidence inasmuch as we can show that the Perfect past of the non-counterfactual reading is a "real" Perfect past (pluperfect) and, therefore, distinct from the Perfect past of the counterfactual construction. It is in fact the case that the non-counterfactual reading of (62) and (63) requires that the Perfect past be interpreted as a true (non-conditional) pluperfect with appropriate temporal and deictic properties. If the hearer of (62) and (63) is able to go through the relevant context and find that such conditions are satisfied, then (62) and (63) will be interpreted as non-counterfactuals. Such a context is the one given in (64), where the Perfect past is not only interpreted as "past" but as a true "perfect" as well, due to the presence of the "before" clause:

(64) δεν κοινούμε αν ο Τάνες πήγε Φιτι

   NEG know-NP-1PL if the John leave-PERFECT-P-3SG

   πριν έρθει τα άλλα

   before come-PERF-NP-3PL the others

"We don't know if John had left before the others came".

αλά αν πήγε δεν θα έμεινε ικε/ικε δι

but if leave-PERFECT-P-3SG NEG FUT them see-IMPF-P-3SG/see-PERFECT-P-3SG

"But if he had left, he couldn't have seen them".

Some evidence for there actually being two distinct Perfect pasts (or, perhaps, two distinct meanings of the Perfect Past) comes from the observation that the counterfactual meaning appears to be restricted to the conditional-main clause environment. That is (65) below cannot be
interpreted as "I wonder if he didn't come to the party":

(65) anarotieme an ixe erθi sto parti
wonder-IMPF-NP-1SG if come-PERFECT-P-3SG to-the party

"I wonder if he didn't come to the party".

Related to the above, is the issue of the "given" conditionals which, as we said above, tend to have epistemic or speech-act meanings (Sweetser 1990). As I showed in chapter 3, it is exactly when a conditional is "given" that normal tense dependencies between the antecedent and and the consequent tend to break down. So (67) is grammatical only in a "given" context such as that of (66):

(66) o janis ixe erθi sto parti su
the John come-PERFECT-P-3SG to-the party your

"John had come to your party".

(67) an ixe erθi sto parti mu θa pao ki eyo sto δiko tu
if come-PERFECT-P-3SG to-the party my FUT go-PERF-NP-1SG and I to-the his

"If he had come to my party, then I will go to his".

It may be that we have to consider such conditionals as a class of their own, since the "given" (=since) reading of the protasis in a way cancels the conditionality, thus making the "if" clause independent of the main. We may also observe, however, that Fillmore's (1990) general constraint on the well-formedness of conditionals, seems to hold in these cases as well. The "epistemic stance" of the p and the q in such examples is still the same, except that now it is an "actual" epistemic stance. The speaker in this case is associating him/herself with the world of p and the world of q.
In the case of (64), where the context provided the appropriate conditions for the interpretation of the Perfect past as a real pluperfect, the resulting interpretation became of "hypothetical stance" and the overall meaning was epistemic. In (66) and (67), where the protasis was established by the context and the interpretation could be argued to be that of a speech-act conditional (although not exclusively so, since "his coming to my party" is both the cause for my going to his and the "cause" of my asserting so), the "normal" incompatibility between a Perfect past and a future was overridden. In chapter (3), all the ke na examples which exhibited such freedom of choice with regard to the tense forms in the antecedent and the consequent were "given", speech-act examples (inasmuch as (67) is). It would be interesting if it turned out that in every case where the conventionalized meaning associated with a conditional pattern changes or normal tense dependencies break down, the resulting interpretation is either epistemic or speech-act. Further, it is interesting to consider whether the relevant condition for the relaxing of tense requirements should be stated in terms of "givenness" or in terms of the speech-act and epistemic meanings, if in fact these two options are empirically distinguishable.

5.2 The concessive conditionals

In this section, I will look briefly at the concessive conditionals as biclausal constructions. The general question I want to address is the effect that a word like "even", or in Greek ke, has on a conditional construction if it is added to the protasis. What we are interested in here is the interaction between a concessive conditional protasis and the semantics of the whole construction, rather than formal and semantic differences which
have to do with the different concessive clauses.

In the previous sections, I identified several distinct conditional patterns. In relation to these, consider the next set of examples:

(68) akoma ki an pjo nero revome
"akoma" and if drink-PERF-NP-1SG water burp-IMPF-NP-1SG
"Even if I drink water, I burp".

(69) akoma ki an pji nero θa refi
"akoma" and if drink-PERF-NP-3SG water FUT burp-PERF-NP-3SG
"Even if he drinks water, he will burp".

(70) akoma ki an ton ipostirizan stis eklojes δen θa evjene
"akoma" and if him support-IMPF-P-3PL to-the elections NEG FUT be elected-IMPF-P-3SG
"Even if they had supported/supported him in the elections, he wouldn't have been/wouldn't be elected".

(71) akoma ki an ixe afisi ksekliðota
akoma and if let-PERFECT-P-3SG unlocked
δen θa ikan bi i kleftes
NEG FUT enter-PERFECT-P-3PL the thieves
"Even if he had left (the house) unlocked, the thieves wouldn't have entered".

Example (68) contains the verbal forms which instantiate the "general correlation" conditional pattern, (69) contains those associated with the "future prediction" one. The temporal relationship between the antecedent and the consequent in (68) and (69) is still the same as in the
corresponding conditional patterns: the p and the q are still temporally unanchored (with respect to the speaker) in (68) (with p temporally preceding q), while (69) is still referring to future events with respect to the time of the utterance. However, (68) and (69) are no longer conditionals in that the relationship between the p and the q no longer holds. Example (68) can no longer be described as expressing a general correlation, nor (69) as expressing a prediction which is contingent on the fulfilment of the content of the protasis. Rather, what they both assert is that q holds in any case.

The interpretation is similar in (70) and 71). In both cases, the relative positions of the p and the q and the time of the utterance remain unchanged from the corresponding conditional patterns, yet the conditional relationship is no longer present. (70) asserts that "he wouldn't have been elected or wouldn't be elected anyway" while (71) asserts that "the thieves couldn't have entered no matter what".

I will not go through all the patterns since the effect of the concessive environment appears to be consistent throughout in just the respect described above. In contrast to the conditionals, the concessive conditionals ascribe a special status to the consequent. From a truth-conditional point of view, in which conditionality is not part of the meaning of a conditional, the effect of the "even" word can be described as cancelling the pragmatic implicature that q is actually conditional on p (cf. the Geis and Zwicky description of conditional perfection in chapter 3). From a constructional point of view, we would have to say that the concessive word or constructional pattern overrides the conditional aspect of meaning.8

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8 I am not sure exactly how this would work in terms of unification. The simplistic view would be to say that since "even" may be described as coding a relationship between scalarly arranged propositions, with "even" coding the most unlikely/informative one,
There is more to the semantics of the concessive clauses than the assertion of the consequent. Some suggestions in that direction will be made in the next chapter where I will attempt a more complete characterization of the concessive semantics. The final question I want to address in this section is how we should describe this particular aspect of the concessive semantics, namely the assertion of q.

König (1986) draws a distinction between sentences where the focus of "even" (and other words like it) is the whole "if" clause and sentences where "even" focuses only one constituent. In the case where "even" focuses the whole clause, the consequent is entailed, otherwise not. Compare, for example, (72) to (73):

(72) Even if it rains, we'll go on a picnic.

(73) Even if he paid me a million dollars, I wouldn't do it.

In (73), intonation can disambiguate between the reading where the whole VP is in focus and the reading where what is in focus is "a million dollars". The claim is that only under the former reading the consequent is entailed.

I agree with König that there is a difference between (72) and (73) but it is not clear to me that entailment vs. implicature is the right way of describing this difference. In the case where the whole clause (VP) is in focus, the contrasting alternative under the most common interpretation is the hypothetical world of -p; p and -p "exhaust" the possibilities in the relevant universe of discourse and this certainly reinforces the

there should be a conflict between that meaning and conditionality (since "even" can be thought of as adding more than one antecedent possibilities). However, given that so many languages resolve this conflict successfully (by having concessive conditionals), it seems that it should be resolved in a unificational description as well.
interpretation that the consequent necessarily holds. When only one constituent is in focus, the scalar model evoked is usually one that has more than two values (although not necessarily). The focused constituent is interpreted as expressing a relatively extreme, unlikely or more informative point on that scalar model but it leaves open the possibility that there may be another more extreme point, for which, if true, the consequent wouldn't necessarily follow.

It seems to me, however, that the semantic force of these concessive conditionals is really to assert the consequent (Sweetser (1990) and Fillmore (1990) make the same point with respect to English concessive conditionals). It may be possible to follow up a concessive clause with a context like that of (74), but in that case the overall effect in the interpretation is that of "playful" language:

(74) akoma ki an mu ešinan ena ekatamirio
   "akoma" and if me give-IMPF-P-3PL one million
   ʒen əa to ekana
   NEG FUT it do-IMPF-P-1SG
   "Even if they gave me one million, I wouldn't do it".

ala an mu ešinan ʒio əa to skeftomun
but if me give-IMPF-P-3PL two FUT it think-IMPF-P-1SG
"But if they gave me two, I would consider it".

Following the distinction above, example (75) with the whole VP in focus is even more awkward:

(75) akoma ki an vreksi əa pame
   "akoma" and if rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL
"Even if it rains, we'll go".

ala an xionisi  δεν  θα  παμε

but if snow-PERF-NP-3SG  NEG  FUT  go-PERF-NP-1PL

"But if it snows, we won't go".

The whole question of whether the consequent is entailed in this type of clause hinges on whether examples like (74) and (75) express some sort of contradiction. I won't pursue this question further. What is important is that the overall semantics of a concessive conditional includes the assertion of the consequent. Whether this assertion is an entailment or not remains an open question. And perhaps, from the point of view of Construction Grammar, where there is no sharp line between semantics and pragmatics, the answer to that question may not be all that important.
Chapter 6

The semantics of concessives

6.0 Introduction

This chapter will look in some more detail at the semantics of the concessive clauses which have been examined in the previous chapters. The focus here will be on the semantics/pragmatics per se and once again, constructional differences between distinct types of concessive clauses will be neutralized if these clauses can be shown to belong to the same semantic class.

In section 1 of this chapter, I will look briefly at the constructional properties of factive concessives, which, so far, have only been mentioned in passing. The term "factive" or "factual" concessive refers to the type of adverbial clause introduced by connectives like "although" and "even though" in which the truth of the protasis is presupposed. Within this class as well, Greek has more types of connectives than English and more distinct types of clauses. The discussion here will focus on the commonalities of these adverbial constructions rather than the differences, centering on the kind of clause introduced by an ke which is morphologically related to the connectives introducing concessive conditionals.

In the rest of the chapter, I will address the issue of the semantics of the concessive clauses in general, including both factual and non-factual concessives. What I will argue is that from the survey of concessive clauses which were examined in the previous chapters, we need to recognize at least three types of concessive semantics. The distinctive common feature between factual and non-factual concessives (and yet a third category
represented by the speech-act concessives) is that somehow the content of the adverbial clause is taken to be in opposition to the content of the main clause. What I suggest is that depending on the type of the concessive construction, this shared semantic feature is "arrived at" in different ways or comes from different underlying semantics. Examining the different kinds of underlying semantics allows us to qualify in more detail the notion of "opposition" which seems to characterize concessives as a class.

6.1 The factive concessives

The type of clause to be discussed here is exemplified in (1) and (2) below:

(1) 'an ke itan ke i peθera tu
if and be-P-3SG and the mother-in-law his
to parti pije kala’
the party go-PERF-P-3SG well
"Even though his mother-in-law was there, the party went well".

(2) parolo pu efiyan noris eftasan
although leave-PERF-P-3PL early arrive-PERF-P-3PL
pio arγa apo olus
more late than everybody
"Although they left early, they arrived later than everybody else".

I will postpone the discussion of the semantics of these clauses till the next section. Here, we can note roughly that the content of the clause introduced by an ke in (1) and parolo pu in (2) is perceived as being in some sort of opposition or as being incompatible with the content of the
main clause: "You might expect that if his mother in law were there the party would be a failure but, nevertheless, it went well". The adverbal clause in (1) is introduced by an ke (lit. "if and/even") and, as I argued in chapter 4, this is a completely grammaticized way of expressing "even though" (as opposed to the opposite order ki an). In (2), we have a different factive connective, parolo pu (lit. "for-all-that"). In view of the fact that English "although" also contains "all", there may be an interesting semantic regularity to be observed with respect to the semantic development of these connectives. This, however, is beyond the scope of the discussion here. As I said in chapter 4, it would be harder to find motivation for the semantics of an ke, whose meaning appears to depend on grammaticized order.

The semantic aspect of these clauses which differentiates them from concessive conditionals (cf. chapter 3), is that the content of the adverbal clause is presupposed to be true. Unlike concessive conditionals, factive concessives assert both the p and the q. In this respect, factive concessives resemble other types of adverbial clauses such as preposed "because" clauses and afu clauses:

(3) epiSi efiye noris  δεν  prolave

because leave-PERF-P-3SG early NEG have time-PERF-P-3SG

na  τις  δι

subj them see-PERF-NP-3SG

"Because he left early, he didn't have time to see them".

(4) afu ise eδo  as  piasume δulia

since be-NP-2SG here 'let' 'get'-PERF-NP-1PL work
"Since you are here, let's get to work".

Factive concessives, like the clauses above, are negated by δεn. This, however, does not distinguish them from the an conditionals which also use the δεn negation. (As I noted in chapter 2, the distribution of negation is conditioned by the na and as particles which trigger the mi(n) negation, everything else being negated by δεn). Finally, as expected, unlike concessive conditionals (the "speech-act" ones not included), there are no tense dependencies¹ of the sort discussed in the previous chapter, between the adverbial and the main clause. Consider, for example, (5) and (6):

(5) an ke ixa nil sto pari mu eγo
    if and come-PERFECT-P-3PL to-the party my I
δεn θa pao sto δiκo τus
    NEG FUT go-PERF-NP to-the their
"Even though they had come to my party, I won't go to theirs".

(6) 'an ke θa pane ekδromi δεn ayorasan sleeping bag'
    if and FUT go-PERF-NP-3PL excursion NEG buy-PERF-P-3PL sleeping bag
"Even though they will go on an excursion, they didn't buy a sleeping bag".

One interesting fact about factive concessives, and in particular about the an ke ones, is exemplified in (7) and (8) below:

¹ Following the discussion of conditionals in the previous chapter, it should be clear that the term "tense dependencies" refers to the conventional interpretations associated with a given conditional pattern (antecedent + consequent), which may differ from the "normal" meaning of a particular verb form outside the conditional environment.
(7) an ke xoris tilus δεν stenoxoriete kaθolu

if and without friends NEG be sad-IMPF-NP-3SG at all

"Even though (he is) without friends, he is not worried at all".

(8) an ke mikrulis ta kataferni mia xara

if and 'little' them manage-IMPF-NP-3SG "perfectly"

"Even though (he is) young, he manages perfectly".

What is "exceptional" about (7) and (8) is that the adverbial clause does not contain an overt copula or other verb. This is interesting since Greek as a rule does not allow predication without verbal support, except in cases where special constructions are involved, as, e.g., (9):

(9) kalos o keros simera

good the weather today

"The weather is good today".

That (9) represents a predication rather than a modification structure is evidenced by the fact that kalos does not appear in between the article o and the noun keros. On the other hand, omission of the copula requires that the constituents appear in the order that they do in (9) (and that some other conditions of pragmatic nature, which I won't discuss here, are also satisfied). Example (10), for instance, is ungrammatical even though it would be a good order if there were an intervening copula verb:

(10) * o keros kalos simera

It is possible that the concessive clauses are a separate kind of phenomenon, and are probably motivated by a different reason from the main-clause instances of non-verbal predication. The constituents that can appear without verbal support with an ke do not have to be what Fillmore (1989) calls non-verbal predicates; non-verbal predicates are
defined as those phrasal types which can combine with the copula to form a predication structure and may be any of nominal, adjectival, prepositional or participial type. Thus, besides (7) and (8) which contain an adjectival and a prepositional non-verbal predicate respectively, consider (11) (with a nominal) and (12) (with a participle):

(11) 'an ke musikos δεν αγάπας τις αλες τεχνές'

if and musician NEG love-IMPF-NP-2SG the other arts

"Even though (you are) a musician, you don't love the other arts".

(12) an ke αγαπιμενι ημικα exun ke ta provlimata tu

if and love-PART-NOM-PL generally have-NP-3PL and the problem theirs

"Even though they are on good terms in general, they have their problems too".

I take the structures in (7), (8) and (11), (12) to represent "reduced" factive concessive clauses, where the understood verb is the copula. As (11) shows, the entity of which the non-verbal predicate is predicated may be co-referential with the addressee and as such it would have been expressed by a second person grammatical form. In this respect at least, the reduced concessive clauses differ from their main-clause counterparts, where the deleted copula seems to be restricted to third person singular, present tense. Constructions exemplified in (13), on the other hand, may be an instance of yet another phenomenon:

(13) 'δινετε ορεα an ke καποσ ξηπιτα'

dress-IMPF-NP-3SG nicely if and somewhat "loudly"

"She dresses nicely, if somewhat loudly".
The "deleted" verb in this case has to be an identical copy of the overt verb of the clause, and such constructions have the feeling of a coordinate rather than a subordinate structure.

In the English translation, I used the "if" construction which does not contain a full clause but rather a sentence fragment. That this is a somewhat weird use of "if" is evidenced by the fact that Greek uses a factive concessive in the same case (omission of the verb is impossible with any of the conditional or concessive conditional markers), and indeed the meaning appears to be factual. That we may need a special construction for English is also evidenced by the fact that, unlike the Greek construction, the sentence fragment cannot be replaced by a full clause (which is not true if "if" is replaced by "even if"). Thus, compare (13) above to English (14) and Greek (15) below:

(14) * She dresses nicely, if she dresses loudly".

(15) dinete orea an ke dinete kapos xtipita
dress-IMPF-NP-3SG nicely if and dress-IMPF-NP-3SG somewhat "loudly"

"She dresses nicely, even if/even though she dresses somewhat loudly".

I take the Greek non-verbal an ke constructions to be essentially synonymous to their full-fleshed counterparts, since I cannot think of a context where we can use one but not the other. Sweetser (1990), on the other hand, seems to suggest that these fragment constructions are devoted to expressing concessiveness in the speech-act domain. I will not argue one way or the other about the English data, since I haven't done any systematic investigation. For the Greek an ke clauses, however, both full and fragmental, I suggest that although they can be put to speech-act uses ("I insist that Y, even if I admit X"), their primary function is to
code direct opposition between the content of the adverbial and the main clause or between the sentence fragment and the rest of the clause. Example (13), for instance, can be used as an answer to the question "How does she dress?", without any feeling of "granting" or "admitting" towards the content of the sentence fragment or of "insisting" towards the content of the main assertion.

6.2 Three types of concessives

In this section, I will look in more detail at the semantics of the concessive clauses which were examined in previous chapters. I have been using the term "concessive clause" as a cover term for adverbial clauses whose content is somehow perceived as being in opposition with the content of the main clause. This semantic/pragmatic property which appears to define the concessive class of clauses has been noted by many analysts. König (1986) formulates it as $p \rightarrow \neg q$ (that is the content of the adverbial clause normally implies the negation of the main clause), and so does Fillmore (1990) who describes concessive conditionals as counter-to-expectation.

What I argue for in this section is that, although the "$p \rightarrow \neg q$" feature is undoubtedly present in all kinds of concessives that I discussed here, we should distinguish three kinds of concessive semantics which in Greek are associated with distinct constructions. I will try to show that while the content of $p$ "going against" or being adverse to that of $q$ is always part of the interpretation, this aspect of the semantics is differently motivated in different concessive constructions. The mapping is not one-to-one since more than one construction may share a particular semantics. What I suggest is that we need to recognize three kinds of
"concessiveness", i.e. three ways in which p may be said to imply \(-q\): (i) concessiveness via scalarity, (ii) "true" concessiveness and (iii) direct concessiveness. The following sections explain and contrast these three categories.

6.2.1 Concessiveness via scalarity

The first kind of concessive semantics to be discussed is associated with the concessive conditional constructions of (16)-(18):

(16) o janis na erθi δen θa ta kataferume

the John na come-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT them manage-PERF-NP-1PL

"Even if JOHN comes, we won't manage".

(17) ke o janis na erθi δen θa ta kataferume

and the John na come-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT them manage-PERF-NP-1PL

"Even if JOHN comes, we won't manage".

(18) ke na erθi o janis δen θa ta kataferume

and na come-PERF-NP-3SG the John NEG FUT them manage-PERF-NP-1PL

"Even if John COMES, we won't manage".

Both the na (of (16)) and the ke na (of (17),(18)) constructions have been discussed in detail in chapter (3), where I pointed out the differences and the similarities between the two. The akoma ki an concessive conditional in (19) was also discussed in relation with the na and ke na constructions:
(19) akoma ki an er0i δεν θα τα καταφέρουμε

‘akoma’ and if come-PERF-NP-3SG NEG FUT them manage-PERF-NP-1PL

"Even if John comes, we won't manage".

All the constructions in (16)-(19) are associated with scalar semantics. Even if the focused constituent would not otherwise presuppose for its interpretation some sort of pragmatic scale, such a scale is imposed by the construction. What I suggest here is that the counter-to-expectation feature in this case is inalienably linked to the scalar property. In what follows, I will try to make the connection more explicit.

The na concessive construction in (16) serves, as I showed in chapter 3, to put one or more constituents into focus (by assigning them to first position) and, furthermore, to force a scalar interpretation of the preposed constituent(s). This meaning is associated with the constructional pattern itself (cf. chapter 4) and is superimposed on the relevant phrase regardless of its inherent semantics (e.g., a proper name like "John" in (16)). What we mean by scalar interpretation is that there is at least one more assumed proposition set up or imagined, with respect to which the na clause is interpreted as "further advanced" or in Kay's (1990) terms more informative. There may be more than one such propositions (i.e. more than one contrasting points on that pragmatic scale) but this is beside the point. As I said in the previous chapter (5.2), there tends to be a correlation between two-point scalar models and focused VP's and between "more than two points" scales and other types of focused constituents, although this is by no means an absolute correlation. That is, a focused VP can be (but need not be) taken as focusing on the truth-value of the clause as a whole, and there being only two truth-values, while other
constituents don't have this possibility. Thus, "John" in (16) represents a more informative point on a scale of, e.g., competent people, than other individuals. The proposition about "John" and the propositions about the other individuals are part of the assumed background knowledge required for the interpretation of this sentence. One difference between the na and the ke na constructions is that the latter allows the VP to be the focused constituent (e.g. (18)), i.e. the constituent which is changing value in these other contrasting worlds. Finally, the akoma ki an concessive conditional allows either the VP or any other constituent to be in focus, but it does so by intonation, since the only possible word-order pattern is the one exemplified in (19).

What (16) - (19) have in common, therefore, is that they all require at least one background proposition against which the concessive conditional clause is evaluated and interpreted\(^2\). For (16), one such alternative world might be the one represented by the antecedent of (20); in that world, the content of the main clause may be said to hold:

(20) If Mary comes (who is much less competent than John), we won't make it.

(20), on the other hand, implicates by quantity that if "John" or any other more competent person comes our chances of making it may improve. (16) contravenes this implicature and thus gives rise to the counter-to-expectation meaning associated with the construction\(^3\).

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\(^2\) To be precise, the scalar model in such cases is set up by the whole conditional sentence and the points on its two axes represent alternative values of some constituent of the antecedent and the consequent.

\(^3\) Sweetser (1990) analyzes English "even if" conditionals as involving "an inherent feeling of scale" as well as coding a "despite" relationship. Here, I suggest an analysis which makes the second of these properties derivative from the first.
The most plausible alternative world set up by the protasis of (18) is the world of -p. In context utterance of a sentence like (21),

(21) If John doesn't come, we won't manage,

can be said to implicate that "if he comes, we will manage" (cf. the description of conditional perfection in chapter (3)). Once again, (18) directly contravenes this implicature. A very similar semantic analysis can be given to the akoma ki an construction exemplified in (19). As we saw in chapter (3), the akoma ki an concessives do not allow preposing of the focused phrase, but distinguish what is in focus by intonation. Depending on the focused constituent, different scalar models (with different numbers of possible values) may appear as the presupposed background.

As Kay (1990) notes in his analysis of non-conditional "even", differences in polarity, modality and mood often have to be neutralized in the process of constructing a presupposed context proposition from a given (explicit) utterance. We can observe that the same thing is true for cases where English "even" or Greek ke introduce a concessive conditional. Thus alongside (16)-(19), consider an example like (22):

(22) ke na ton dis min anaferis tipota

and na him see-PERF-NP-2SG NEG mention-PERF-NP-2SG anything

"Even if you see him, don't mention anything".

In an intuitive way, the antecedent of (22) represents a precondition for the felicitous utterance of the consequent, in the same way that it does in the corresponding "pure" conditional. What does the scalar model and the propositions that it generates look like in this case? Obviously they cannot be expressed in the same form that the actual sentence is in, since
in the world of -p, the reason for uttering the consequent is no longer present. However, scalarity is involved in such examples as well, and the presence of *ke* requires that some scalar model is built for the interpretation of the sentence. The form of these propositions is distinct from the form of the sentence itself. For (22), an assumed background proposition could be something like (23),

(23) If you don’t run into someone, you don’t have the chance to say anything.

which in turn implicates (24) (the knowledge involved here is generally shared world-knowledge rather than specific knowledge shared by the speaker and the addressee):

(24) If you run into them, you do have the chance to say something.

What (22) says then (and in this sense, is more informative), is that "even if you do run into him, you should ignore your chance and not say anything".

In summary, therefore, we can say that the "p->q" property for these concessive conditionals is bound to the scalar property. These particular constructional patterns (with or without an explicit *ke*) set up scalar backgrounds for the interpretation of these sentences, and scales, as shown by various analysts, have certain implicational properties. The contravention of an implicature gives rise to the counter-to-expectation semantics and we can say, therefore, that what *ke* does in this case is very similar to its semantic/pragmatic function in a non-conditional environment (cf. chapter 2). In the next type of concessive semantics to be discussed, it can be argued that the scalar property plays a role there as well (at least for one construction), although that second aspect of concessiveness is clearly distinct from the straightforward scalar cases discussed
above.

6.2.2. "True" concession

The second type of concessive semantics is associated with examples like (25) and (26):

(25) (a) mama ine mono jia ena vraði
    mom be-NP-3SG only for one night
    "Mom, it is only for one night"

(b) ke ja ena vraði na ine prepi na rotisis
    and for one night 'na' be-NP-3SG must-IMPERS subj. ask-
    PERF-NP-2SG
    ton patera su
    the father your
    "Even if (even though) it is only for one night, you (still) have
    to ask your father".

(26) (a) 0a vreksi malon avrio
    FUT rain-PERF-NP-3SG probably tomorrow
    "It will probably rain tomorrow".

(b) as vreksi piknik 0a pame
    'as' rain-PERF-NP-3SG picnic FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL
    "Even if it rains, we'll (still) go on a picnic".

Examples (25) and (26) are instances of two distinct constructions discussed in detail in the previous chapters. The sentence in (25b) is an instance of the \textit{ke na} construction, whereas (26b) is an instance of the \textit{as} construction. Formally, as shown in the previous chapters, they are very
distinct. Semantically, however, they share a particular type of concessive meaning which differentiates them from the scalar constructions of the previous section and from the factive constructions of the following one. I refer to this type of concessive semantics as "true" concession, because it is closer to the real meaning of the words "concede" and "concession". The semantic force of these constructions is to convey that the speaker is "conceding" or granting the content of the adverbial clause, nevertheless maintaining the consequent.

As I argued in Chapter 4, the constructions in (25) and (26) arrive at the common interpretation via distinct motivations or distinct semantic paths. The ke na construction can be seen as extending its basic scalar semantics to the domain of speech-acts (note that only ke na can be used with this semantics, as opposed to the na concessive construction which cannot - cf. ch.(3)). A scalar model can be said to be set up or presupposed by (26a), which is, however, not the actual concessive clause but part of the background context: "If the going away is only for one night", may be said to entail that "nobody would say/insist that one should tell one's father" (p→¬q). This is presupposing an assumed conditional along the lines of "If it is for more than one night, then it would be normal to insist that the father will have to know" (¬p→¬q). The speaker of the ke na clause, is contravening the first of these conditional statements by conceding p and nevertheless insisting that -q. One way to think of that is as a metalinguistic use of ke na. The use of a ke na clause in such contexts serves (in a way) to "correct" the addressee's scalar model and the speech-acts which are based and depend on that model, and replace it by the speaker's one.
This type of concessive semantics is distinct from the straightforwardly scalar one of *ke na*, in that the concessive clause is not coding directly a "more informative" distinct proposition. The *ke na* clause in the context of (25) is repeating something already "given" by the preceding discourse, and it can only be said to be more informative in that it is taken as the background for the speaker's asserting that his/her commitment to *q* is greater than the interlocutor might have reason to assume it was. The speaker's commitment to *q* despite his conceding *p* is what semantically "unites" the *ke na* with the *as* construction.

The *as* concessive, however, is different from the *ke na* one in that it directly codes this speech-act of conceding in the semantics. In the *ke na* example discussed above, the context made it clear that the *p* was already "given" or established and that, therefore, the interpretation we attribute to *ke na* had to be slightly modified to accommodate the contextual influence. The *as* clause of (26), on the other hand, codes directly and as part of its meaning the fact that *p* is given and that the speaker concedes it for the purpose of asserting *q*. The "*p* \(\rightarrow\) *q*" implication in this case, comes, I suggest, from the "granting" semantics of the *as* clause, since "granting" gives positive (if possibly reluctant) support to *p*; you might expect that if I grant you *p* it is because I intend to denounce *q* (the preceding discourse having established that *q* is somehow adverse to *p*). Yet, I go on to assert *q* despite my granting *p* and that is where concessiveness comes from.

An *as* concessive, therefore, derived from a lexical *afino* "let, allow", has the "grant, allow (into the conversation)" semantics associated with it directly in a way that the *ke na* concessives don't; out of context, a *ke na* clause may be ambiguous between a real scalar reading and a speech-act
There is one final point to be clarified with respect to these "truly conceding" constructions. In describing the examples above, I have said repeatedly that the speaker is conceding the content of the adverbial clause in order to reaffirm his commitment to q. Q, however, does not need to be identical to the speaker's commitment, as this is established by context. Thus, alongside, (25) and (26) where the speaker of the concessives has presumably already demanded that the father be asked (in (25)) and asserted that a picnic is about to take place (in (26)), consider (27):

\[(27)\quad \theta \text{a pame volta e}
\]
\[
\text{FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL walk excl.}
\]
\"We're going for a walk, aren't we?\"

\[-\theta \text{a vreksi omos malon}
\]
\[
\text{FUT rain-PERF-NP-3SG but probably}
\]
\"But, it is probably going to rain\".

\-- \as / ke na vreksi \theta \text{a parume ombreles}
\[
\text{'as'/even if rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT take-PERF-NP-1PL}
\]
\"umbrellas\"

\"Even if it rains, we can take umbrellas\".

What (27) illustrates is that the speaker's commitment is towards "going for a walk"; q, in this case, is taken as representing a statement consistent with and "supportive" of the speaker's ultimate commitment, although it is not directly expressing the commitment proper. This is a
feature on which the conceding constructions discussed herein differ from
the "whether or not" construction of (28). In the context of (27), (28)
below is ungrammatical (although it can, of course, be used to mean sim­
ply that "we'll take umbrellas even if it doesn't rain", with no implica­
tions about a walk) whereas (29) is fine:

(28) * vreksi ̵̵ sen vreksi ̵̵ parume ombreles
rain-PERF-NP-3SG NEG rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT take-PERF-NP-1PL umbrellas

"Whether it rains or not, we'll take umbrellas".

(29) vreksi ̵̵ sen vreksi ̵̵ pame volta
rain-PERF-NP-3SG NEG rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT go-PERF-NP-1PL picnic

"Whether it rains or not, we'll go for a walk".

Similarly, the factive concessives which will be discussed next, if put
into this kind of context, put some special requirements on what the main
clause can or cannot be (cf. the discussion in the next section). Thus (30),
in the context of (27), is also odd:

(30) * an ke ̵̵ θa vreksi ̵̵ parume ombreles
if and FUT rain-PERF-NP-3SG FUT take-PERF-NP-1PL umbrellas

"Even though it will rain, we'll take umbrellas".

---

4 This construction deserves special description which, however, will not be done here.
It is interesting to note that it looks as though it conjoins two main clauses (note the use of the ̵̵ "main clause" negation) without any overt conjunction. The verb forms themselves are also interesting since the construction features the "bound" perfective non-past form with no supportive particle.
As I argued in chapter 3, the "truly conceding" clauses differ from both the factive and the conditional ones in that they operate at a non-truth-conditional level, serving solely the purposes of illocutionary force or conversation structure. The fact that Greek has a distinct construction (as) to express only this kind of meaning and the fact that the *ke na* but not the *na* concessives can be extended to express it, argues strongly for recognizing the distinctness of this concessive semantics. In the next section, I will discuss yet another type of concessiveness, associated mainly with the factive constructions.

6.2.3 "Direct" concessiveness

The last type of concessive semantics which I will discuss is associated with structures like (31) and (32) below:

(31) an ke evrekse ta fita mu peθanan

if and rain-PERF-P-3SG the plants my die-PERF-P-3PL

"Even though it rained, my plants died".

(32) irθe parolo pu δen ton ikan kalesi

come-PERF-P-3SG although 'that' NEG him invite-PERFECT-P-3PL

"He came although they had not invited him".

The sentences in (31) and (32) contain factive concessives introduced by *an ke* and *parolo pu*. In the beginning of this chapter, I talked briefly about some of the semantic and the syntactic properties of these factive clauses and especially of those introduced by *an ke*. Of interest here is one semantic property they have in common, namely the fact that they presuppose that the content of the adverbial clause is true.
What factive concessives share with the other concessive constructions is that once again the content of the adverbial clause is seen as being in some sort of opposition to that of the main clause. The claim that I want to advance, however, is that unlike the scalar concessives discussed first and the speech-act concessives of the previous section, the "p-->-q" feature in these factive concessives is directly evoked and constitutes the primary semantics.

With respect to the na, ke na and akoma ki an constructions (6.2.1), we said that the content of the concessive clause was interpreted against the background of a scalar model (different constructions achieving this by different formal means) and that concessiveness was a property derivative of the scalar property. Similarly, for the speech-act concessives of the previous section we said that concessiveness derived from the insistence on q at the speech-act level. In the as concessives, "conceding" is directly evoked but opposition is not. In the na, ke na concessives, conditionality and scalarity are directly evoked and opposition follows from that. For the factive concessives, though, the "p-->-q" semantics appears to be the semantics proper of the an ke and the parolo pu constructions; use of these constructions is a way of coding directly that the content of the adverbial clause would normally imply the negation of the main clause.

We need to qualify this a bit further by saying that p need not contravene q directly, in which case the "p-->-q" feature may be said to apply between implicatures of the actual p and/or q. In general, and as is the case with other coordinate structures (e.g. and and but) as well as with subordinating ones, there is a requirement that somehow the content of the adverbial clause must be interpreted as somehow relevant to that of the main clause. Compare, for example, (33) and (34) (assumed to have
been uttered as answers to the same question, "Did she catch her train?"):

\[
(33) \text{an ke etrekse } \delta\text{en prolave to treno}
\]

if and run-PERF-P-3SG NEG catch-PERF-P-3SG the train

"Even though she ran, she didn't catch the train".

\[
(34) \text{an ke etrekse espase to takuni tis}
\]

if and run-PERF-P-3SG NEG break-PERF-P-3SG the heel her

"Even though she ran, her heel broke".

In (33), \( p \) may be said to directly imply \(-q\). In (34), on the other hand, the hearer may have to go through a more complex reasoning process: If one's heel breaks, then this is likely to slow one down which, in turn, may cause one to miss their train. It is this last step in the reasoning process which is interpreted as directly relevant (and in opposition) to \( p \).

This is not meant to deny that factive concessives can be put to scalar uses, where by "scalar" we mean that the interpretation requires that at least one other proposition, against which the concessive clause is evaluated, is contextually available. However, whereas for the concessive conditionals, scalarity was an inalienable part of the meaning, for the factive concessives, the scalar interpretation requires some sort of special diacritic. For Greek, this could be realized as emphatic stress on one constituent, namely the one which will be seen as changing "value" in the relevant scalar model. Compare, for example, (31) along with (35):

\[
(35) \text{an ke } \text{EVREKSE } \text{ta fita mu pe\do\'anan}
\]

if and rain-PERF-P-3SG the plants my die-PERF-P-3PL

"Even though it rained, my plants died".
The stress on "rained" serves exactly to indicate that the sentence should be interpreted as expressing a "more informative" (in Kay's terms) proposition than some other assumed one (e.g. "You are telling me that my plants died or would have died in dry weather and I am telling you that they died even though it rained"). Without the stress, however, this interpretation is not necessarily evoked. Everything we need in order to interpret the sentence is coded directly in the sentence itself and that meaning is simply that the adverbial expresses some circumstances "adverse" to the event expressed in the main clause5.

Some evidence for the claim that the factive concessives code directly the opposition between the p and the q and as such, they differ from the speech-act "true" concessives, comes from examples like (30) above. In the same line, consider also (36):

((36) A: vijke ekso ja volta

go out-PERF-P-3SG out for walk
"She went out for a walk".

B: ma ekane toso krio

but do-P-3SG so cold
"But it was so cold".

A: as / *an ke ekane krio pire palto

'as' / if and do-P-3SG cold take-PERF-P-3SG coat

5 Michaelis (1989) suggests that English factive concessives are also scalar and thus, like the conditional ones, they can be hosts to the word "still" (in the consequent). However, to the extent that the intonational observations noted here for Greek apply also to the English "even though" construction, we may want to consider whether scalarity is an inherent semantic property of the "even though" constructions or whether it is bound to and brought in by the word "still" itself.
"So what if it was cold; she took a coat". / "Even though it was cold, she took a coat".

According to the *as* analysis in the preceding section, an *as* clause codes the granting on the part of the speaker of the addressee's previous "objection". The speaker can then go on to reassert his original statement or, as I showed, with respect to (27), to assert another proposition which is interpreted as arguing in the same general direction that the original statement does. The counter-to-expectation semantics in that case stems from the speaker's granting p which builds up to the expectation that he/she will change their belief about their initial statement as well. On the other hand, an *ke* codes directly that the content of the adverbial clause is somehow adverse to that of the main clause. In cases like (36), where real-world knowledge strongly contravenes this, use of an *ke* is distinctly odd, since an *ke* cannot extend its semantics to coding opposition inferable from the context when this contravenes the opposition coded directly in the adverbial and the main clause. In cases, however, where the content of the main clause does not violate this constraint and the content of the two clauses can be interpreted as independently adverse, an *ke* can be used instead of *as*, in this sort of "granting" context:

(37) A: pije kala stis eksetasis
    go-PERF-P-3SG well to-the exams
    "She did well on the exams".

    B: ma 8en ixe 8iavasi tipota
    but NEG study-PERFECT-P-3SG anything
    "But she hadn't studied at all".

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"Even though she hadn't studied, her experience helped her."

In summary, I have argued that we need to recognize three different kinds of concessive semantics. Traditional grammars and analysts have called "concessive" both the conditional and the factive constructions. What I tried to show is that although factual and conditional concessives share the "opposition" feature, this feature is associated with distinct semantics corresponding to distinct constructions. I have also argued that we need to recognize yet another type of concessiveness, not previously mentioned in the literature, and that is what I called "true" concession. In Greek, this is also associated with distinct constructions.
Chapter 7

Conclusions and areas for further research

In this final chapter, I summarize the findings of the previous chapters and outline directions for future research which are suggested by this work. Doing that will hopefully help place the results of this study in a larger context and allow us to draw more meaningful conclusions as to what has yet to be done.

This dissertation provided a description of the concessive constructions and of some of the conditional ones at a level of detail which renders that description an adequate guide to the use of these constructions. To do that, it was necessary to make reference to both syntactic and semantic/pragmatic properties of these constructions, thus showing that a description which aims at completeness needs to make reference to both kinds of information. To the extent that intonational facts were also involved in the course of describing these constructions, phonological considerations may also be a necessary part of the description.

I have, therefore, provided evidence for the idea that the construction should be taken as the relevant unit of description. That evidence took three forms. First, I have shown that the distribution of certain forms (specifically of the na conditional marker) is pragmatically conditioned. Secondly, I have demonstrated that the meaning in the na and the ke na concessives is inalienably linked to the formal pattern. And third, I have shown that the distribution of verbal forms in conditional sentences is triggered by the overall meaning of a conditional pattern.

These three arguments taken together provide evidence to the effect that the description of grammatical phenomena needs to make reference
to a unit, simultaneously comprising semantic and syntactic informations. That unit is the construction.

The discussion of the relationship between the *na* conditionals and the *na* and *ke na* concessives demonstrated clearly that compositionality can only be maintained in relation to a specific constructional pattern. These results directly address, therefore, the theoretical issue of meaning composition and the various factors that may enter into it. What the discussion here has clearly demonstrated is that constructional meaning superimposed on constituent meaning is one of such factors.

In the introduction I stated that, among other things, this dissertation would provide evidence for the claim that the semantics-pragmatics dichotomy is to a large extent artificial. That evidence was provided by showing that the meaning of concessives relied on scalar properties for some constructions (the *na*, *ke na*, *akoma ki an* ones), and for others (the *as* concessives), on their speech-act function. Such functions are conventionally associated with these constructions, constituting their meaning proper, and they make direct reference to pragmatic information. This, I take to be an argument to the effect that a sharp distinction between semantics and pragmatics may be often meaningless. Finally, another goal of this thesis was to demonstrate the usefulness of investigating semantic motivation and category structure. I did this with respect to the *as* construction, by showing how the concessive semantics of *as* were directly motivated by its non-concessive uses. And I also illustrated it in the discussion of the relationship between the *na* conditional and the *na* concessive, with respect to their "non-givenness" property.

Chapter by chapter, the results can be summarized as follows.
Chapter 2 examined the syntax and the semantics of the constituents of a number of concessive constructions. Primarily, I looked at the distributional and semantic properties of *ke* which introduces the *ke na* concessive clauses and is a constituent part of the *akoma ki an* concessive connective. The main question asked and partially answered concerned the extent to which *ke*, the same word as the "and" conjunction, can be shown to have concessive (i.e. "even") semantics in other than the concessive clause environment. The tentative conclusion there was that although *ke* appears to have an "even" meaning in some environments, that meaning was contextually triggered rather than a conventionalized part of its semantics. That chapter also looked at the semantics/pragmatics of the conditional clauses introduced by *na*, which represent the clausal constituent of the concessive clauses. One significant generalization there was that *na* conditionals are associated with dubitative/counterfactual semantics and that that predicts their distribution and their infelicity in certain contexts. "Dubitative" semantics are sometimes part of the shared background knowledge between speaker and hearer and sometimes imposed by use of the construction itself. Finally, I looked at the range of clauses introduced by *as* and isolated those constructions which, I argue, have properties relevant to the *as* concessives.

In chapter 3, I gave a detailed description of the concessive clauses introduced by *na*, *ke na* and *akoma ki an*, which made reference to both their formal and their semantic/pragmatic properties. Given the results of the previous chapter, we were able to isolate those properties of the concessive clauses which were not a function of their constituent parts and as such had to be attributed to the concessive construction. A detailed comparison of *na* conditionals, *na* concessives and *ke na* concessives showed
that although they share lots of formal and semantic properties, they also exhibit properties which are not predictable by any general pragmatic principles and which, therefore, have to be taken as part of the grammar of these structures. In the last part of chapter 3, I examined the syntax and semantics of the concessive clauses introduced by as, arguing that as clauses are associated with a special kind of concessive semantics, distinct from both the concessive conditionals and factive concessives; that semantics is a direct coding of the speech-act of "granting" on the part of the speaker.

Chapter 4 reviewed the results in chapter 3 with respect to the idea of compositionality, suggesting that the concessive constructions resist a strict "rule-to-rule" analysis. Within a given constructional pattern, composition of meaning can be said to proceed in a fairly regular and uniform way, but recognition of the relevant constructional pattern is crucial to predicting the overall interpretation of na and ke na clauses. In contrast, all of the formal properties and to a large extent the semantic properties of the as concessives are "derivable" from other more basic uses (constructions marked by) of as. In this chapter, therefore, I look at the category of as constructions as a whole, presenting a skeletal analysis of the network of as constructions, with an eye to making explicit the location of each construction within the network and the effect that it has on its properties. The "permission" sense of as is directly linked to its concessive use, while its "suggestion" meaning motivates the conditional construction.

In chapter 5, conditionals and concessives were examined as bi-clausal constructions, that is as constructions whose description requires reference to both antecedent and consequent. The kind of properties described in this chapter concerns all conditional and concessive conditional
constructions regardless of the way they are introduced. I argued that the meaning of a given conditional pattern lies really in the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent and often the choice of the verb form of the antecedent and/or the consequent may depend on the meaning of the conditional constructions. In this chapter, I presented an analysis of some Greek conditional formal patterns (i.e. patterns of verbal forms in the antecedent and the consequent) with their associated meaning and suggested that a full description of Greek conditionals should proceed along these lines.

Finally, in chapter 6 I looked at the semantics of the concessive clauses as a whole. Traditional grammars and many analysts in grouping such clauses together (by giving them a common name) were essentially recognizing the fact that in every case the content of the adverbial clause is seen as being in some sort of opposition to that of the main clause. What I argued is that we need to recognize at least three ways in which this common property can be motivated. These three distinct concessive semantics correspond to distinct types of constructions in Greek: the concessive conditionals, associated with scalar concessiveness, the *as* concessives, associated with a conceding speech-act meaning, and the factive concessives coding directly opposition between the adverbial and the main clause.

I can see many areas in which this study could be extended, yielding substantial results. The description of the conditional constructions in chapter 5 is, as I said, only a first step towards a complete analysis of Greek conditionals. What I did was to provide an argument as to why conditionals should be analyzed as bi-clausal constructions with associated meaning and give an analysis of some conditional patterns along these
lines. What remains to be done is a complete investigation of all the existing conditional patterns in Greek. This would allow us to have a full picture of the grammaticized choices that Greek makes in its conditional sentences. If such a data collection were available, we could make systematic comparisons between Greek and other languages, of the sort that I have briefly made between Greek and English. The next step would be to see whether different grammatical choices made by different languages could be seen as motivated by the overall system of that language. I have made some preliminary investigations in that direction as well (cf. chapter 5), but a lot more needs to be said before we have a complete picture. Finally, a complete survey of conditional constructions would allow us to see whether they are subject to any general constraints of the sort proposed by Fillmore for the compatibility of forms of the English conditionals. Based on the data I analyzed here, I suggested that the constraint appears to hold for the Greek conditionals as well. We need a full study, however, before deciding whether it holds in general and whether cases where cross-clausal dependencies are relaxed can be handled by a separate sub-regularity (cf. the discussion on the "givenness" feature in chapters 3 and 5).

The examination of the concessives was complete in that the description encompassed all the different kinds of concessive constructions: concessive conditionals, speech-act concessives and factive concessives. This enabled us to look at both the constructional differences and the overall semantics of concessives as a class of adverbial clauses. More work needs to be done on factive concessives where some constructions (e.g. ke pu) were left undescribed. Finally, research should be extended to what I think of as related constructions, that is constructions which although not
explicitly marked as such (e.g. by an identifiable connective) have similar semantics. These include the *V δen V, V,* ("whether or not") construction mentioned in passing in the previous chapter and the *oso/opio/opu ke na* ("no matter how/who etc.") construction. Having all such descriptions available may enable us to arrive at a more refined understanding of the semantic distinctions involved and the ways the language divides the labor between the various constructions.

Finally, interesting results may be obtained by a systematic comparison of concessives and conditionals to other kinds of adverbial clauses, of the sort I outlined in chapter 5. It is possible that such a study will allow us to attribute some of the properties (e.g. the choice of some verbal forms) associated with distinct constructions to some more general principles which will either have direct semantic motivation, or, at least, can be seen as dictated by the language system as a whole.

Studying a group of constructions at such a level of detail is justified if this detailed study gives us insights to the overall structure of the syntactic and semantic system. Under the assumption that this system reflects cognitive structure, it gives us insights to that structure as well. It would be fascinating if this kind of study were accompanied by a historical study, telling us, e.g., the order that the *as* meanings developed. This would either confirm or contradict the semantic structure postulated for *as* here, and would complement cross-linguistic polysemy comparisons of the sort made in the previous chapters between Greek and English. And there would be a lot to be learnt from a study of how children acquire conditional patterns and the kinds of mistakes and overgeneralizations that they make; there are specific predictions made by the analysis given here about the association of syntax and semantic, predictions waiting to be
confirmed or disproved. One would like to have access to a general picture where all synchronic, diachronic and child language considerations would complement each other. I can only hope that by giving a detailed analysis of a small part of that picture, I have taken a step towards understanding better the more distant goal.
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