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Daniel H. McFadden: The Chancellor Mark Christensen Era at UC Santa Cruz, 1974-1976

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Daniel H. McFadden:  
the Chancellor Mark Christensen Era  
at UC Santa Cruz,  
1974-1976  

Interviewed by Randall Jarrell  
Edited by Randall Jarrell and Irene Reti  

Santa Cruz  
2012
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Introduction

UC Santa Cruz’s second chancellor, Mark N. Christensen, served the campus from July 1974 to January 1976. He was forty-five, and had served as vice chancellor at Berkeley before accepting this position at UCSC. A professor of geology and geophysics, Christensen had received UC Berkeley’s Distinguished Teaching Award in 1962.

Christensen arrived at UCSC during a tumultuous point in the campus’s history. Founding Chancellor Dean McHenry had brought to fruition his singular vision for UC Santa Cruz as an innovative institution of higher education which emphasized undergraduate teaching centered in residential colleges, each with a specific intellectual theme and architectural design. McHenry oversaw the planning and building of UCSC from 1961 until his retirement in June 1974. In the early years, UCSC drew high caliber students and earned a reputation as a prestigious and unique university. But by the mid-1970s, enrollments were falling. Internally, the campus was fracturing along faultlines between the colleges and the boards of studies (now called departments), as UCSC experienced the political and economic pressures of trying to establish a decentralized, innovative campus within the traditional University of California.

Christensen’s tenure as chancellor rather tragically ended in controversy after only eighteen months. Although most of the faculty liked Christensen as a
person, they lost confidence in his ability to govern the campus. The Regional History Project never conducted an oral history with Mark Christensen, and he passed away in 2003. But in 1980, former director Randall Jarrell interviewed Christensen’s special assistant, Daniel McFadden, about the Christensen era. McFadden’s oral history is a perceptive and balanced reflection on the political climate of UCSC in 1976, just as what McFadden characterizes as a “Bicentennial Rebellion” was taking place.

The Regional History Project is publishing this transcript in 2012, nearly forty years after the interview was recorded (on May 20, 1976), because McFadden was only able to turn his attention to editing and approving the transcript after his retirement. Dan McFadden holds a BA and MA in intellectual history and a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Pittsburgh. Before coming to UCSC, McFadden served as assistant chancellor for public affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. After leaving UCSC, McFadden held a variety of administrative positions, including deputy city manager for the city of San Jose, California. His private consulting work focused on privatization projects, working with counties, cities and local agencies, or investment groups to develop entertainment, hospitality and recreational facilities. He has returned to live in Santa Cruz.

McFadden arrived in the Regional History office in 2010 with the transcript and a release form in hand. We are grateful to him for making available this thoughtful narrative, which provides much insight into a chaotic and painful chapter of the campus’s history. I entered his corrections and performed final copyediting on the transcript.
Copies of this volume are on deposit in Special Collections and in the circulating stacks at McHenry Library at the University of California, Santa Cruz, as well as in PDF format on the Library’s website. Regional History is supported administratively by Christine Bunting, Head of Special Collections and Archives, and University Librarian, Virginia Steel.

—Irene Reti

Director, Regional History Project

McHenry Library, University of California, Santa Cruz

January 2012
Arrival at UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: When did you come to UCSC?


Jarrell: That was near the end of the [Chancellor Dean] McHenry era?

Mcfadden: Yes. He hired me and told me he expected me to stay around for three years. Then I got here in August and he announced his resignation in October, I think.

Jarrell: You came from the University of Pittsburgh, is that right?

Mcfadden: Yes.

Jarrell: So you didn’t have an academic appointment, but came with an administrative appointment only? Because I see that you have your doctorate?

Mcfadden: Yes. I am a lecturer and usually teach one course in public policy in higher education. As a matter of fact, McHenry was a visitor in my class last night. And I also have some independent studies during the year.

But I came from Pittsburgh, where I’d been for four years, and was assistant vice chancellor for public affairs. I had finished my Ph.D. in public policy while I was there. Then I came out to Gurden Mooser, who was assistant chancellor for university relations, who was going to retire at that time or within a year. So I sort of came here in university relations. But Gurden decided that he wanted to stay on. When [Mark] Christensen was coming down, there was talk then by
McHenry, and I went up to visit Christensen before he did come down about me going over as an assistant to Christensen. Then in the summer of 1974, before Christensen arrived, I went over into the chancellor’s office to work, to write the first draft of an academic plan. I was working primarily with Vice Chancellor [Eugene] Cota-Robles then.

So I spent the 1974 academic year in Christensen’s office. My office was right next to his, as one of his assistants. I was more or less a gadfly, doing academic planning and special kinds of projects. Then in the early fall of 1975, I moved across the building to handle public affairs, primarily just external relations. And that’s what I’m doing now.

**Jarrell:** You’re still listed as special assistant to the chancellor; that’s no longer correct?

**Mcfadden:** I’m still assistant to the chancellor. It’s just a function change. Before, I was working on the academic plan. I did the first draft of that. I redirected or headed up the group of three or four people to rewrite the catalog, go through and sort that all out. Then I was on a task force on enrollment, to write up an enrollment program and to reorganize the enrollment function downstairs. There was a series of those kinds of projects. Now I’m primarily working on external relations, although I still get pretty much involved internally on enrollment questions, planning questions, and I’m doing a paper now on a system of committees for the campus. So I’m still a gadfly.

**Jarrell:** Yes. Like a troubleshooter, you go where you’re needed in terms of special projects and areas of expertise that need to be addressed.
Background: University of Pittsburgh

McFadden: Yes. When I was at Pittsburgh, I worked for the chancellor there as his troubleshooter. The first year I was assistant vice chancellor for student affairs when the student unrest was pretty high. Then I handled the racial problems for a year. We had a lot of racial problems, both with the community and internally, and reorganized their minority programs, special admissions programs. Then I guess most of the next year I spent on an affirmative action plan and with HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] and women’s rights, primarily a woman’s affirmative action program. A good bit of that year I worked also with the legislature on legislative problems. They were very upset at us because of the campus unrest. So I did a lot of the liaison work there. The last year I worked primarily in the community and set up a corporation of university-community groups that gave the community groups essentially a veto over any more expansion of the university. There were four other institutions involved and something like nine community groups.

Jarrell: Was the university there encroaching on residential areas, similar to the UCSF [University of California, San Francisco]?

McFadden: Yes, right, very similar. That’s why I did a lot of work on that. Then I did a lot of consulting work in the east; that’s how I got tied a little bit into UC—the UC people who were responsible for that came to Pittsburgh and the Carnegie Commission people came in and they looked at what we had done and figured it was a model, so we got a lot of traveling around out of that. We had some sixty million dollars worth of construction. The community organized, got
to the mayor and the governor, and stopped it all cold. So it took about six or seven months to get it all back on track again—siting and redesigning it and a lot of meetings, a lot of organization. So what I did at Pittsburgh was primarily to just work with problems. I chaired their University Committee on the Master Plan and their Budget and Administrative Committee.

**Jarrell:** You have a very broad background.

**McFadden:** Well, I worked a couple years as assistant to a city manager in California and—

**Jarrell:** In what city?

**McFadden:** Napa, before I went back to Pittsburgh. Before that, when I got out here I was flying for five years in the air force and spent a lot of that time in Southeast Asia.

**Jarrell:** Are you from California originally?

**McFadden:** No, from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

**Jarrell:** But you spent a lot of time in California?

**McFadden:** Oh, yes. I spent seven years. I was stationed at McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento, but I spent a lot of that in Southeast Asia, about two years of it, I guess. I’ve sort of bounced around. My last year in the service, I was chief of administrative services at McClellan for the adjutant to the base commander. I got some fairly decent experience in the service before I came out.
Appointment at UC Santa Cruz

Mcfadden: Actually, how I got here was I came out to take a job as director of planning at Stanford, and I just came down to see a friend of mine who was assistant city manager down here in Santa Cruz. He was giving a talk up on the campus so I came up on the campus.

Jarrell: Was that David Koester?

Mcfadden: Yes, Koester and his assistant, John Levy, were both friends from before, when I’d been out here. I’d been in the service with John Levy. So I came up and looked around and decided I really liked the place. I had been at Harvard for six weeks the summer before, and they had a series of case studies in higher education. One was about UC Santa Cruz. I was fascinated with the structure of UCSC. So that’s how I got here. They didn’t really have a job thought out for me when they hired me; McHenry just sort of hired me.

Jarrell: Just kind of improvised.

Mcfadden: Yes, right. I was being paid out of five different accounts and they didn’t have enough money to carry me the second year. It was that kind of thing. That was all a surprise after I got here. But that was, I guess, typical of the way things were pieced together here.

Jarrell: But you did have a kind of overview before you got here of the rather strong structural relationships of colleges and boards, and that it was rather unusual, even as collegiate systems go?
McFadden: Yes. As far as the structure, I thought it was very interesting and I spent some time just studying the cases that they had at the Harvard Business School. They had three or four and we spent a lot of time on UC Santa Cruz. So I had an understanding of what the structure was. I was fascinated by the concept of undergraduate, liberal arts education. Pittsburgh was about the size of UC Berkeley. It had sixteen graduate schools and five hospitals and they were building up a football team while I was there. I was involved in all that going on and I just wanted to get somewhere where it wasn’t. I was tired after four years there. I wanted to get away from an urban university and I wanted to get someplace that didn’t have a football team. That’s how I got to Santa Cruz.

Jarrell: Well, coming as you did in the last year of McHenry’s tenure, would you like to speak about anything in particular—about what he’d built here, or about your working relationship with him—anything that would throw light on the problems and the structural conflicts that we have here [now].

McFadden: Yes. To give you a sense of my perspective on the problem, I really felt that Mark Christensen wasn’t the problem; he just simply wasn’t the solution. When I got here, I was amazed at the poor morale, the mistrust, and the bitterness of a lot of the people here. I felt that the problems were rather deep-rooted here; it was witnessed by the number of turnovers of deans and provosts, just a constant revolving door. I think that McHenry was not an easy guy to know, even for people who knew him fairly well. I’m not sure—he’s sort of an enigma. Yet it’s strange. I respect Dean very much. I think what he’s accomplished speaks for itself. There’s just no question that it’s spectacular, and it took a lot of energy and a lot of devotion. It took an unusual person to be able
to pull that off. I don’t think there’s any question about that. So I don’t feel particularly constrained about criticizing the man. I feel like what he’s done is going to withstand my criticism. I don’t feel like I have to walk around it. I saw Dean in his last year here. He was tired, obviously. He was disappointed in a lot of things. He’d come through a lot of hard years. A lot of the people he’d brought here because of their academic leadership qualities disagreed with him and rebelled. I think that’s the way he viewed it, too.

**Jarrell:** As rebellion?

**The McHenry Vision**

**Mcfadden:** As rebellion. I think that his drive to build this place was an obsessive kind of drive—which it had to be—[since he] was the founding chancellor. Then he had this vision he was carrying out. But there wasn’t room, in his vision, for many other people. There was also a very strong sense of pioneers here. If you weren’t a pioneer somehow, if you came [here] later, you didn’t have a franchise. You weren’t really allowed to be critical because you weren’t sort of in on the ground floor.

**Jarrell:** Do you mean you hadn’t gone through the blood and sweat?

**Mcfadden:** Yes, you hadn’t been through the hazing, so to speak. I think Dean kept people off balance.

He hired people because of a particular skills, and he really saw them carrying out that particular function. He didn’t, I don’t think, view people as people, completely developed or total personalities, wanting to put their own creativity
in. He looked for them more to add what he saw and to fulfill that. I also think that he had, for probably good reasons, recruited faculty stars. He wanted high visibility here and he wanted to build legitimacy very quickly, which I think is necessary in the UC system. It was a very wise way to go about it. He brought in a lot of outstanding senior people and he brought in a lot of junior people. He was recruiting faculty when faculty were in a seller’s market. I think he got some young faculty here who had good credentials but really hadn’t earned the right to do their own thing, which of course is the mark of distinction in academia, if you’re a faculty member, your ability to do your own thing. So I think the faculty were not terribly pulled together. There wasn’t really a senior-mentor kind of system here, and a lot of the young faculty pulled away and did their own thing. I think the turnover at the top level and the sort of socialization that had taken place with the younger faculty, left this place in a situation where people were groping. They didn’t know who to be angry at. It was just a sea of lanolin here, you know, you just couldn’t get ahold of anything. That was my sense when I first came here and looked around. I also had a sense of a very big division between the faculty and staff. I think the faculty were recruited, as they say, from prestigious institutions. Most of them had the benefit of an expensive eastern education. A lot of them were Berkeley people. The staff were more local and had a different value system, I think.

**Jarrell:** When you say staff, are you talking about the staffs of the colleges?

**McFadden:** I’m talking about staff generally of the campus, all the way through middle management. I think that staff here did come with a different kind of a value system. They looked at this as a job that paid more than other jobs in the
community, but I don’t think they identified deeply with the institution, the kind of identification that you see at more mature institutions, private institutions. There’s more of a civil service kind of mentality here. That’s my opinion anyway.

The senior staff, a number of the key people were from a military background, retired. I think Dean liked those people. One time he said, “Well, they’re good soldiers. You know, they follow instructions.” But there wasn’t a lot of creativity in the senior management, in the administrative staff here. I think that Dean was trying to hold costs down and put his money into faculty, which is understandable. I don’t think he spent a lot of money on administrative talent. I think he got what he paid for. I didn’t feel that the administrative skill here was up to the level of the faculty and student body.

Administrative Effectiveness

You asked about the situation here when I came. It seemed that there was a beautiful physical plant, beautiful setting, a good concept, an outstanding senior faculty, a junior faculty yet unproven, good credentials, but—

Jarrell: Inexperienced?

McFadden: Well, they hadn’t really proven out yet, I don’t think. I thought there was a fairly weak administrative leadership, so that it wasn’t a good institution in that sense. In other words, I think it’s a misconception in higher education that if you’ve got good faculty as determined by their credentials, their publishing record, and Ph.D.’s, and the institutions at which they were educated, and good students as determined by SAT scores and class rank in high school, that you
have a good institution. It’s not true. One and one will equal less than two if they’re not wired together right in a program. I felt that the institution wasn’t wired together. A lot of energy necessarily had to go to getting this place physically here, dealing with those problems, recruiting people, and of course Dean took a very, very close hand in all of this. There’s just only so much time. The man obviously worked tremendously. His talent shows with the physical plant here and with the faculty he recruited. But I think what suffered was the management of the institution.

**Jarrell:** Do you think that the discrepancy in the managerial quality that you found might also be partially explained by Chancellor McHenry’s inability to delegate certain responsibilities?

**Mcfadden:** I think it’s partially there. I think that that’s a lot of it. Part of the reason he couldn’t delegate is I don’t think he could trust that things would be done up to the level or in the fashion that he would like to have them done if he did them himself. That’s a very common kind of trait—people not being able to delegate.

**Jarrell:** Yes.

**Mcfadden:** I think that’s part of it. But I also think that Dean was extremely well versed in government and governmental processes. He was an exceptional planner and he understood planning and numbers very well. He was outstanding in terms of his educational philosophy and approach. But I don’t think he really had administrative experience in the sense of running an organization and having a lot of people report to him, of dealing with those
problems which are maintenance kinds of problems which are not terribly creative but are very necessary to—

**Jarrell:** To keep it all moving.

**McFadden:** Yes. I don’t think that was his strong suit. What I’m saying is I don’t think he backed himself with second-level, strong administration. I think that’s one of the major weaknesses. When Christensen came in, that was to me one of the obvious problems with the campus.

But there was another thing that I think was part of Dean’s character. I sound like an amateur analyst here but I looked at McHenry in the first year and he was fascinating. Two parts of him showed up in the campus, maybe three. I think one quality was he was utopian in his educational thinking. He liked creativity and let things happen and bloom and he hired those kinds of people, creative people. The other part of him is that he’s a very strong Calvinist and he believes very much in control. I think he made moral judgments about people. He had this very strong, Calvinist kind of bent. And these two—the Utopian and the Calvinist—are at counterpoint. But they show up in the place little bit, for example, in the faculty-administrative split—the kind of people he picked for control on the administrative side; the kind of people he picked for creativity on the faculty side—and never the two shall meet, you know. The other part of it is that he believed very strongly in the federalist model of checks and balances. So he set them up here. He’d created this dynamic tension, the kind of tension that builds muscles in Charles Atlas. Well, I don’t see it as very creative. I think there’s only tension.
Jarrell: There’s not the creative outcome.

McFadden: Not unless it’s wired together. Not unless you have good administrative talent and you take the time to establish processes where disagreements can be resolved and people understand how they’re resolved. People need to understand what went into making the decision; it shouldn’t appear arbitrary. I think Dean delayed on many of his decisions until the last moment. He was not, at least in my view, a great decision maker. He would make them, but he would make them without people understanding what went into them.

Jarrell: The “why.”

McFadden: Yes. His decisions could be right, but people didn’t understand why. I think of all the energy consumed building this place and the amount of meetings, just the energy it consumed of the faculty, of Dean’s energy. The millions of details, the amount of pressure. His personality, his strengths and weaknesses—both, I think, were very evident.

There was no Santa Cruz model. There was really a Berkeley-UCLA model and Santa Cruz was to overcome the evils inherent in those institutions—the large autonomous departments and the shift to graduate education, and the fragmentation of education due to the departmentalized kind of thing. The lack of interdisciplinarity, cross-disciplinary faculty work. So it was not that Santa Cruz was envisioned as something that was made out of whole cloth, that was fashioned as a new educational concept. It was really a counterpoint.
Jarrell: A reaction. A negative view.

McFadden: It was a dialectic, really, setting up an antithesis to what Berkeley and UCLA were. So you were always—in working away from those models, you were always accepting them at the same time. So inherently, when you’re working from a model and trying to build something to counteract a UCLA, with which he was intimately acquainted, you necessarily take a lot of what’s there. It’s not something you can sit down and analyze very coldly.

I think a lot of the tensions that developed have led to this tiredness, this low morale, this mistrust, and resentment that was pretty evident on the campus when I came here for McHenry’s last year. I was very amazed at that. At the same time, I really liked what was here and the number of really interesting individuals who were here, the number of really sharp people. You know, this is a long way to answer your question.

Jarrell: It’s important to set the groundwork.

McFadden: Yes. I think what McHenry accomplished here is just fantastic. I think he has assured himself a place in history by doing it. I wasn’t around him in the earlier years, but I saw him in the last year. At that time I think he was very tired and the place was down on its heels. I would hazard the opinion that if Dean would have stayed on for another year or two, the faculty would have been in open rebellion even though Dean was the founding father, and even though many of them knew that if they took him on there was a cost involved in that.
The Need for Institutional Change

Jarrell: I’ve heard it said by several people that at the Asilomar conference quite a number of faculty who’d been here right from the start felt that nothing of a new direction could be more than contemplated and certainly not actualized until McHenry had resigned or retired. Many felt that real change was impossible in terms of some of the conflicts that had emerged after the first decade.

Jarrell: That change was not possible while he was still here because the chancellor took it as personal criticism. How would you respond to that statement?

McFadden: I think there’s a lot of truth to that. Somebody who didn’t believe deeply in what he was doing couldn’t accomplish what he accomplished here. But the danger there is that it becomes an ideology; it becomes a very strong party line and anybody who disagrees is a deviationist. That is a Trotskyite designation. I think there was part of that in his approach. But in a lot of ways I think McHenry felt at times (and this is just off the cuff) but I think he felt he was ankle deep in midgets here. I think he felt that people didn’t share the vision, didn’t have the breadth of understanding, hadn’t been where he had been, didn’t have any experience. There may be some truth in that.

But the fact is that he did hire some terribly talented people and didn’t let them play a significant role. And they got very frustrated. There was a tremendous amount of negative energy here; you could feel it in that first year that I was here. I think that one of the major problems with chance at that point was he was
tied into this very rigid UC system. The pressures to be the same [as the other campuses] were very strong. So to overcome those you almost had to be in rebellion, and Dean was, I think, with the administration. To build the institution, he also crowed quite a bit about the quality of students we had and he rubbed it in. I think a lot of people were just waiting for the place to fail and they weren’t going out of the way to help the place. They were angry at Santa Cruz.

Community relations between the town and the campus after the student protests over the bombings in Cambodia got really bitter. I think he just backed away from it. He just felt he couldn’t do anything with it. Those were really, really tough times. They were really difficult.

**Jarrell:** At a certain time, I’m sure college and university administrators all over the country were tearing their hair out in trying to deal with this phenomenal unrest, manifested in all kinds of ways.

**McFadden:** Right. Yes, I think it was particularly difficult here because of the very conservative nature of the community. So there were all these cross currents. But I think that morale was a major factor. Change was not possible. I’ve mentioned about the UC system here.

**Demographics and UC Santa Cruz’s Growth**

I think McHenry had to keep the enrollment estimates up in order to try to push to get additional facilities, and to try to keep driving them up even though everybody knew, and he knew that they were not realistic. I think he felt he had
to move because demographics were against him and he had to get these things in place right away. So he didn’t want to change those figures at all and everybody knew that they were wrong. All the planning was going on, and he wanted to fulfill this northern loop of the campus which was unrealistic in terms of the mood of the legislature and the political environment. He knew that because he’s a very sharp political person. But he couldn’t give in. He had to try to complete this thing. I think the loss of College Eight was a severe blow to him; I think it really set him back.

**Community Relations**

It’s interesting, when I [first] came out for an interview, we had a discussion up at the house. There was McHenry, and [Vice Chancellor] Hal Hyde, and Gurden Mooser, and we were talking about community relations. I had just done a lot of work on that in Pittsburgh and I said, “Well, you really have to establish roots in the community, because it can hurt you in a lot of different ways and you can’t tell when. People will lay back and if they see you’re vulnerable, if you want something, they can deny it; they’re going to deny it to you.” McHenry said, “We’re a state university. We’re not a community college. We really can’t be involved with the community that much.”

**Jarrell:** McHenry said that?

**Mcfadden:** McHenry, yes. His feeling was—and I think maybe he felt that there was very little to gain now because the situation was so angry on both sides—he felt that it was necessary to keep the community pacified so you could do your own thing, but not really open up the institution, which was a terribly elitist
institution, and change the configuration of the institution to relate better to the community. That was not in his thinking.

I said to him, “Well, I’m sure it’s going to break. You’re going to need something and they’re going to be able to deny it to you because the feelings are so bad.” I knew [Santa Cruz City Manager] David Koester and you could just pick it up from the community people here. Well, then College Eight came up for an appropriations hearing and Assemblyman Frank Murphy appeared and pleaded for it not to go through unless there was housing with it, and that killed College Eight. So I felt there was some prophecy in what I was saying at that point. I think even then there was a possibility that some structures could have been gained—possibly College Eight in the next year, possibly the physical education facilities—if McHenry would have radically revised the original plans for development of the campus, if he would have re-sited the physical facilities and re-sited College Eight.

The End of Growth

Jarrell: Could you be more specific, because I’ve never read about this particular controversy.

Mcfadden: Well, the idea was that the road, the northern loop, was to go up around the top of the campus. College Eight was to be the first step. Then if the physical education facilities went in up there, that would open up that whole area, open up the roadway through there, and that would open the campus up. That would anchor it so you could add the other colleges in. If you terminated that idea, if you didn’t get the road through, then the original Long Range
Development Plan would be frustrated. You couldn’t go ahead with it at all. I think if McHenry had said—now I’m second-guessing without really knowing concretely—but I have a strong feeling that if he had said, “College Eight is the last college here for awhile. Give me this one and I’ll wait and see what happens,” I think if he’d said or acted on that he would have gotten [approval for] College Eight. But we’d already started to form College Nine and we were talking about ten colleges; there might be three additional colleges. That just wasn’t in the cards at all; there was just no way that was going to happen. So in many ways—you know, things change so quickly.

Jarrell: In about a ten-year period there was—

McFadden: Yes, just in the late sixties, early seventies, it just changed so radically that it would have been a lot to expect of somebody to change that radically with it, if they had put all these hours into thinking this thing through and developing it.

Jarrell: In terms of these options here.

McFadden: So you had to hold out hope that maybe something would be changed. I came in where I’d been working with the legislature and fighting with them about appropriations for Pittsburgh. I came in and looked at the thing without any background really, but also without any preconceptions, without any hang-ups.

Jarrell: Without any stakes in an old game or an old way of organizing things.
McFadden: I think that didn’t go with the party line very well. I think College Eight people, under Paul Niebanck as provost—there are a lot of planners there and they looked at College Eight as the last college, and it would be stuck up on the end of that road all by itself. They wanted it re-sited and that delayed the project. Dean didn’t want to give on that. So that controversy raged back and forth. I think we lost a year and lost the facilities there. At least I would say chances were pretty good from where I saw it. Now maybe I don’t have all the info, but it seemed like we could have gotten it through with some kind of action.

Jarrell: You mentioned that this was an elitist institution and that perhaps if the configuration of this place—I don’t know if you were referring to admissions policies or what—but if some aspect of it had been changed, if it had been more open to the community, that this might have made people in town feel a little more sympathetic or amenable to certain plans. Could you amplify this?

McFadden: I think the housing thing put forth by Assemblyman Frank Murphy cost and could have been dealt with. I think that should have been handled. We say this place was built up on the hill and it was buffered from the town; it was moved up. It’s a beautiful campus, but in terms of access to it by the public who are unfamiliar with the campus, there are a lot of designed-in impediments. It simply is not designed for access.

Jarrell: I find in my work with volunteers who come up from town to work in our office in the library, that this situation is true. People coming from town, or
those who want to use our materials, and elderly people find that it’s extremely
difficult for them to use this place.

**McFadden:** Yes, right. It was designed in and that’s part of it. So in a way Dean
was interested in cutting his losses. I think he saw not a whole lot that could be
gained. But it’s a long way of saying, coming back to your question, that things
could not be changed very well. Dean held to the numbers, which were unreal, to
try to force the continued construction of facilities here.

**Academic Planning**

When Mark Christensen came in, he had to deal with an immediate demand that
was coming down from University Hall—to write an academic plan which was
supposed to have been done in Dean’s last year. But Dean couldn’t do it because
he was leaving. He didn’t want to write a plan for his successor and quite
frankly, he didn’t want to write a plan that changed all his original plans and
feelings. So it wasn’t written. But it was due right when Christensen was coming
to the campus. The charge was given about six months before Christensen came.

**Jarrell:** This was McHenry’s charge.

**McFadden:** The charge was given about six months earlier, six months before
Christensen came. Of course, it was after McHenry announced his resignation. I
think Dean was tired and I don’t think he wanted to rewrite his plan here. I think
that’s asking an awful lot of a guy. He left it to Christensen. Christensen was
appointed chancellor and took the summer off. So what happened was the plan
was due in July but nothing was written. The first of July, I was asked to come
over and do the thing. So I got a draft out by the fifteenth of August, what is
called a preliminary document. But the first thing Christensen had to do then
was get a plan together for the campus and to get the campus level, the numbers
scaled down and to curtail the construction, to change the whole concept. The
whole Long Range Development Plan, the enrollment level, everything had to be
restructured. And there were a lot of old pioneer [faculty] who felt that this
shouldn’t be changed.

Christensen’s Appointment

Christensen had a pretty large order then. I think people got up, knowing
Christensen was coming. The search committee was not generally favorable
about Christensen. There were a couple of dissenting members in five faculty
from the campus who were not overly impressed. But Christensen was a hand-
picked person; Dean had a strong hand in it; Albert Bowker, the chancellor at UC
Berkeley had a strong hand in it, and of course Charles Hitch, the president of
the University of California. Christensen was the only real candidate considered.
He was really the only one who was given interviews down here on the campus.
One other person came in but it was really—

Jarrell: I have heard that two or three years ago, President Hitch gave an
address, perhaps before an academic senate meeting, in which he said that since
there was such a turnover in provosts and vice chancellors and similar positions
that University Hall was going to maintain a sort of roster of acceptable
candidates for chancellor and vice chancellorships on the different campus and
kind of groom people to step into these positions. Have you ever heard about that?

**McFadden:** No. It’s very possibly true, but I don’t know. I think in a system like this, where there’s a lot of emphasis on knowing the system and on standardization and conformity, there’s also an emphasis on promoting from within, from people who know the system. In a way, the system’s been good to them. They’ve been allowed to rise to the top. They’re socialized within it so they’re not overly critical of it. They’re good at maintaining. If you bring in new people from the outside, they tend to be critical. Of course, that’s the way to keep things from getting stale, from getting too rigid and out of phase with what’s going on outside the institution. But it seems like it’s the nature of an institution to value people who reinforce what is. So it’s totally conceivable that there is that kind of thinking.

I don’t know what all went into Christensen’s appointment down here. Certainly he had mixed reviews at Berkeley. He was not known for decision-making. But he was known for being interested in experimental education, undergraduate education, and for being a very likable, bright, young, articulate person. I think there were some who felt he was not a good administrator as a vice chancellor at Berkeley. But I think in a lot of people’s minds that was a much bigger and difficult job than being the chancellor of an undergraduate institution of six thousand students. So the idea was, “Well, he could be a good chancellor down there. He’s interested in education. The students will like him; the faculty will like him.” I think they were looking for somebody who would ease things off down here, who could build morale, who would just take the meanness out of
the feeling down here, and who would not press too hard on University Hall. Because McHenry toward the end made statements that were openly critical of the University [of California] policy of favoring the large campuses over the small campuses, he got headlines up and down the state. So I think they were looking for somebody who wouldn’t shake the tree too much. So all these thoughts went into the decision.

Again, that’s off the top of my head, but looking at it, I think that’s why the appointment was made. It was not an open search looking for the best talent in the nation. It was really an in-house kind of appointment, and I think for those reasons.

**Working with the New Chancellor**

**Jarrell:** When you first met and started working with Chancellor Christensen, you were still a gadfly at this point when he came?

**Mcfadden:** I didn’t really have a portfolio. Gurden Mooser was staying on. One of the things about the University Relations operation is that it’s funded out of non-permanent money. They patched this thing together to bring me here so there was really no way I could stay in that area. They got a special allocation from President Hitch, when McHenry requested it before he left, to keep me on another year as a utility player, working with Christensen on problems.

**Jarrell:** As sort of a facilitator?

**Mcfadden:** Yes, just to work as a staff person on particular problems. I should say I was very, very angry about this and it partly colors my feelings maybe
about the way McHenry went about his business. But I was very angry with the fact that I took an $8500 cut in salary to come here from Pittsburgh and I was offered more when I was leaving there—the presidency of one of their branch campuses, or to step in as vice-chancellor for governmental relations.

**Jarrell:** That’s quite a substantial sacrifice, really.

**McFadden:** Well, it wasn’t a sacrifice. It’s what I wanted to do, but it was a cut in pay. But it angered me that I got here and they were doing this mickey-mouse kind of thing. It made me very critical of the kind of practices that went on here, and how they handled personnel, which was very poor. So I should probably say that my initial impressions of the administration here were not overwhelmingly favorable. But anyway, I went over then in the office and worked closely with Christensen for that year and probably was as close as anybody to him.

**Jarrell:** Since you had such a close working relationship with Chancellor Christensen, and were aware early on of the reservations some people held about his abilities, would you discuss your initial impressions of the chancellor’s early tenure, maybe dating from his inaugural address on?

**McFadden:** Well, let’s see, the inaugural address was in the spring. He had already been here since the previous fall.

**Jarrell:** That’s right.

**McFadden:** My awareness came much sooner than that.

**Jarrell:** It took a long time for it to filter out to the public area?
McFadden: Yes. It was his inability to level with people who were close to him. In other words, his ability to let you in on where he was so that you could have some sense that he was fixed in that position, so that you could understand why he was doing things, so that you could, as a staff person, know sort of where he was, from day to day. There are a lot of things that Christensen did well. I think that the faculty response initially was very positive. He had an easy style. He did hit it off very well with students and with faculty. He was just a terribly good person, I think a very nice person. He was ill-suited to be an administrator, for sure. I don’t think there’s any question about that. I think a major problem was that that one didn’t know who he listened to. You gave him advice on something and you gave him the rationale; he would leave saying that’s what he was going to do at a meeting one day, and then we’d have a special meeting the next and it would be 180 degrees different. You had no idea what had happened in the intervening period, or who had talked to him.

Also, he had a particular problem with his wife, Helen. She was very much determined not to be overshadowed. She was a professional and she had her own life. She was heavily into that model and she started out very strongly to make sure that Chris did an equal share in taking care of their two kids. She was very determined that things would be shared. That would have been all well and good, I think, as a professor, but it didn’t work out in his role here. He was gone a lot of the time in the summer. He went on vacation. Then all through that early fall he was taking care of the kids, responding to Helen. It was just evident that there was going to be a major problem if they didn’t work out a good way of—

Jarrell: What about child care?
McFadden: They did some of that but I don’t know a whole lot about it. They had a number of housekeepers. They didn’t seem to work out very well. But anyway, that was something that was never really handled, and Christensen was spread both ways.

Right from the beginning, he didn’t read his mail. He couldn’t really work; he was a nitpicker as far as grammar, prose, style; he couldn’t really work from drafts that were prepared for him. So everything was just bottle-necked almost from the beginning.

Jarrell: Did he write his own copy?

McFadden: Yes and no, yes and no. If I would write something he would usually go “Okay” because I would go in and sit down with him then and say, “We’ve got to get this out.” I pushed him very, very hard on a lot of things. That’s my style. I’m at time abrasive. But I pushed him on the things I wanted done. Barbara Sherriff [assistant to the chancellor] handled his correspondence, and his normal mail, and all that, and she simply couldn’t move the stuff through. She couldn’t get him to focus on it very well. But a lot of that was just time.

If this campus had been a mature campus with good administrative people at the second level, with processes worked out, traditions established, a common view established, if it hadn’t been truncated in enrollment—all of these things that would make it a peaceful place—Chris, in spite of his administrative failings, would have, I think, maintained. He would have done some good things. He still would have had to work the thing out with his wife. It just wasn’t a good situation. That was apparent.
The mail wasn’t moving. He couldn’t make decisions, or would make them and turn them around. He couldn’t work from other people’s copy to keep things moving. On the other hand, I really think he loved the place a lot and really believed in the education. I liked him a lot but he made a number of moves early on as far as I was concerned, that turned me off.

One is that we did this preliminary academic plan. The fact that he never got the plan going was one of his major downfalls. He was criticized for it. He hired Pat Sullivan as assistant planner. Pat had been an intern at Berkeley. He came to the campus and necessarily felt that he was the planner. I was doing the staff work on the planning and so was Eugene Cota-Robles, so the planning was over there. Pat derailed the process we had set up. We had worked on it all summer. We had a lot of faculty working and things were moving along. Essentially Pat shot down what we were doing. That was okay but he didn’t put anything in its place. There was no substitute. So nothing happened on the plan. There’s still nothing happening.

Following that was this move on faculty aggregation. We got something started there, but as soon as there was opposition, which necessarily there always is, when you make change, he wavered. He would change back and forth on it. He made a lot of statements to the faculty about change, about reform, when he clearly didn’t understand what was involved in it, initially. So people’s expectations were very high. They had been down in the dumps before. When he came and made these statements, they immediately got all excited.

**Jarrell:** They got euphoric.
McFadden: Yes. Primarily it was the provosts. So then, when nothing happened, they got very down and angry.

But it was evident in the planning and in this reaggregation thing, where he kept changing the signals, that nothing was happening. I was handling that at first and I got out of both of them. I got out of the academic plan after the first month in the fall. I stayed with reaggregation for about two months. I got out of that just because it was obvious that whoever [was part] of these things was just going to get chewed up. There was just no way to make much progress or at least to do something in a rational fashion.

Admissions and Financial Aid

Jarrell: What about enrollment policies and changes in the admissions office? Were you involved in that?

McFadden: I was involved in that. I was asked to study the enrollment, admissions, financial aid areas. There were gross problems there. It was really not run well at all. The admissions office [was] evaluating a superabundance of applications. They took their time responding to people. There was no real outreach or recruitment or information emphasis. Our applications had fallen off significantly and a lot of that was due just to the admissions operation not being up to par. Also, there were financial aid problems.

Jarrell: Admissions and financial aid have to work hand in hand.

McFadden: Very much so, because you’ve got to respond to the student about what aid they’re getting before they actually say they’re coming, even if you
admit them. But also your relations with schools, your relations with counselors, all of this is very important.

The other facet of that was that there was no good information on our students here. We had information on students coming in, but this was an experimental enterprise here and we had no real information on the impact we were having on these kids, except how many got fellowships, data which Dean McHenry prized very much. But this really didn’t tell about what was happening to the students: why were they leaving the campus?

**Jarrell:** The rank and file students?

**McFadden:** Yes. Were we really having an impact on them? We weren’t getting any feedback. So we wanted to tie together relations with schools, admissions, and financial aid, and tie these under one professional who could coordinate them. Their peak periods were different times of the year so you could use staff to handle it; you could flip-flop staff to handle the paper. The admissions peak was before the awarding of aid, which is later in the summer, and you could coordinate them. If your relations with school people were helping with the admissions and helping with the financial aid, they actually had better current information to give people in the field. I did this at Pittsburgh and it worked very well. So we set this thing up. We had six weeks and we had this enrollment task force group. I chaired it. We interviewed everybody working in these offices. We wrote it up and the idea was to go outside and get a professional, get somebody from a private school who actually had to work to get applicants. In the private school the admissions director is probably the key job, second to the president. In
terms of whole relationships, external relationships, and, well, almost all facets, it’s a very key job.

**Jarrell:** Here it seems to have been given sort of short shrift.

**McFadden:** Well, yes, it was a processing job because there were so many applications. It’s part of UC but we were set up differently here. We are a liberal arts undergraduate college. We are an elitist college. We’re more like small, private, liberal colleges—like Reed and Oberlin. I felt we really needed somebody like that.

**The Inaugural Speech**

I helped Christensen draft that speech a little. I drafted some of his earlier talks and I tried to keep them short because he had a way of leaving the script and just going on and on. He wanted to make a statement on educational philosophy. He showed the speech to me the day before and I told him it was twice as long as it had to be. He had to cut it down. But he had so much in there that he had thought about and wanted to say. And then I don’t think he worked on it as hard as he should have the night before. He had not given many formal speeches and he didn’t understand that it would take so long, and that it would ramble. But by that time the tide was already pretty well going out. The fact that the speech did wander and he was nervous about it, lost his moorings in the middle of it a little bit—I think that became again, another incident or symbolic kind of thing.

He gave that speech again at a geological conference and I think it was many, many times improved because he cut it. It wasn’t bad. He worked on it. It just
rambled, was too long. He had all this imagery in there and he got very identified with it and wouldn’t cut it. That’s where I think the major problem was.

Jarrell: One more major thing I’d like you to discuss is the divisional reorganizational plan. Did you do any work on that?

McFadden: Yes. Well, let me back into it a little bit. We’d gone through the reaggregation thing; people were fighting over FTE again and everybody was tired. All the fatigue that had been there in McHenry’s last year was coming again. People were really laying down. You could see it. In the late summer I talked with Christensen. I said, “I really think unless you make some clear statements and make a decision, make some decisions here, that you’re going to see a lot of debate in the fall in the faculty senate, and you’re going to get a vote of no confidence by the winter term.” And he said, “Do you really think it’s that serious?” I said, “Yes, I really do think it is.” Well, he didn’t take it completely to heart. I had pushed him very hard; a lot of times I’d pushed him hard. I could say we were friends, in the sense that he would let me push him and he didn’t get angry about that. But the other part of it is he wouldn’t really follow through on it. Or he would do it sporadically, as he did on the enrollment thing. Then at the last minute I feel like he just picked the wrong horse. Then I felt identified with the whole thing, so that was discouraging. That occurred right in that summer. So, beginning that summer, I just started getting a lot of space away from there. I went on vacation that summer and I said to Christensen before going, “Well, when I come back I expect my office will be gone.” I had moved
into the office and there was considerable resentment about that by Barbara Sheriff.

**Jarrell:** That you had moved in there?

**McFadden:** Yes, that I had moved into the office at all. They were working on space plans in Central Services. This is sort of an annual kind of ritual that they go through and everybody moves around; some lose, some gain. So when I came back they had a plan that moved my office across the building. I was sort of angry about it at first, but then I thought, well, it’s my opportunity to get out of the office because that’s where I was going. So I jumped on it and that’s how I had to option to stay or leave. I said, “No, I’d like to leave and get out of there.” So I was pretty disgusted.

**Critical Voices on Campus**

The faculty didn’t have a lot of communication until Martin Kanes made a speech in the academic senate. That was a minor speech but it was like the avalanche had backed up and the speech was the shot that started it to roll. There was a meeting with Elizabeth Penaat and Eugene Cota-Robles and Leo Laporte and myself. That was right after Martin’s speech or maybe right before. They called a meeting and said, “Well now, how do we help Chris out? All we’ve got to do is sort of smooth this thing over.” And I said, “No, I think there are really significant problems.” Everybody was trying to get to Chris. I didn’t quite understand what was going on then, but they felt he was in trouble in some ways. They wanted to help him out and yet they wanted to protect their own ass and not get identified with him. A number of people in the building were
stretched so far that they were in agony. And that went on through the next three or four months. People jumped on one side and then the other. The only way I felt I could keep any consistency at all was just get back from it. So I did get back. I felt there were really serious problems and that Christensen had to do something. Christensen called me up and said, “I want to talk to you.” So we took a walk around the campus. I said, “Well, what do you want to do? What’s your interest here? Do you want to stay around here and hang on (because this was in the fall), or do you want to straighten out some of the problems here and if you fail, just leave, go back to Berkeley?” I said, “You can either let this thing become a very personal kind of nagging fight between you and some of the faculty, which will hurt the place a lot. It will drag everything through the newspapers and we will get a lot of bad publicity, or you can give it your best shot. Get up there and say whatever you think the problem is and give it your solution. If they accept it, then you’ll have gained some momentum and you’ll be able to show that you’re decisive. You administer the place and carry it out. If they reject it, if you don’t have the support, that tells you where you are. Then you resign.

I didn’t want to see him get subjected to a vote of no confidence. I don’t think anybody else did. Well, there were some who did. There were a lot of agendas at that time. Some people were very sincere, but some people among the faculty were on their own little power trips.

But, at any rate, he said, “No, I really do care about this place and I don’t want to get into a long, nasty fight and just run the place down. I’d rather give it my best shot.”
Reflections on Tensions at UCSC

I said, “The tensions are so built up between the colleges and the boards that you’ve got to do something to break the tie here. You’ve got to come down on one side or the other. You’ve either got to roll it back toward a divisional, departmental kind of structure and put your resources around programs, or you’ve got to go with the collegiate setup and reinforce your provosts. But this stalemate is wearing everybody out.”

That was his thinking, too. He asked me, “Well, which do you think?” I said, “I don’t know. I think that’s got to be whatever you feel. You’ve got a better sense of that.”

He said, “Well, I want to go spend a few days by myself and I want to write out whatever I’m going to say by myself. I’d like to talk to you and Leo Laporte after I write this thing and see what your sense is.”

So he did. He called us to the house the night before he delivered it and he was very angry because somebody on the faculty had gone to the media in San Francisco before the meeting. He was angry about that so he added a paragraph at the front pointing saying he was angry.

Two of my closest friends on the campus, John Marcum and Paul Niebanck, were taking a very strong role from the other side. They’d given up on Christensen and wanted him out. It was very intense.

Anyways, you asked whether I was involved with the speech. I didn’t change anything in it. I took a little bit of stuff out of it. I remember that he had the word
“paradigm” in there three or four times, which is a no-no word and I went through and struck that. Then he had something about the divisions. The problem was that the natural sciences had been set up very differently than the social sciences and the humanities and you had to recognize that in order to come up with some change or some solution. So he did, but he’d said that essentially there was no need for graduate work in the social sciences or the humanities. I remember striking that and changing it. I said, “That’s really going to involve a lot of anger. The humanities and social sciences feel like poor cousins anyway [in comparison] to the sciences. I think what you should say is that this place is developed and this is recognizing what is, in terms of configuration, rather than putting down the other.”

So those were the two changes. He had one other session with Cota-Robles, Tom Clifton, Leo Laporte, and myself at the house the night before he gave the speech. But it was done then. There were no changes. So it was his work. In some ways there was a lot of it that was of value. There was a nagging kind of debate around the issues Martin Kanes raised that were not really the issue either, about somebody having to borrow a dime to make a long-distance phone call or to use the Xerox machines, privileges, that kind of stuff.

Jarrell: Real petty stuff.

Mcfadden: Rather than getting into all that petty stuff, the speech was an attempt to elevate the discussion and it was a test of Christensen’s strength to carry through, whether there was any confidence. So rather than inviting a vote of confidence in a formal way, he was in essence asking for a vote of confidence
from the faculty in terms of this reorganization proposal. When it was dismissed out of hand, essentially that was the vote of no confidence.

To my understanding, he was going to then announce his resignation and leave that July. That was clearly what I thought was going to happen and clearly what we had discussed. Well, the faculty did reverse it. We were coming down from Berkeley a few days later, about a week later or something like that, and Liz Penaat and I were in the backseat of the car. Christensen was driving. He said, “Well, I’ve talked to a number of people here and I feel strongly now that it would be better for the campus if I continued.” I guess President David Saxon was asking him to continue also. That just absolutely blew me. I said to him, “A lot of people justify their self-interest in terms of institutional goals or whatever. Is that what you really think?” He said, “Yes.” I said, “Well, okay.” We remained friends and I still consider him a very good friend. I think he’s a very good person. But I got a lot of distance from him then because I did feel he was, in a sense, really in over his head.

Jarrell: It was a whole new game.

McFadden: Yes. People were running various agendas and he was caught in University Hall politics and campus politics in the sense that he had to contend with such things as what pulling a chancellor at one campus would mean in terms of another campus; what was Saxon’s view, and how a couple of key people here on the campus who were Christensen’s appointments felt that they would be under the knife. They were encouraging him to hang in there. So exactly what I was hoping wouldn’t happen did happen. It got nasty. It got in the
papers and it really got drawn out and lousy. He couldn’t build any support. He just didn’t have any faculty support.

**Jarrell:** Do you think he’s a politically astute man?

**McFadden:** Oh, no. He’s not even apolitical. He’s non-political in the sense that he doesn’t operate that way.

**Jarrell:** He’s not motivated by those kinds of considerations.

**McFadden:** No. He’s a very good person. There’s just no doubt about it. I mean, he’s not calculating in that way and if he had that kind of political awareness he would not have let himself get as far behind the power curve as he did. He could feel the tides pulling very strongly in the early spring. A few of the faculty, a few of the provosts and other senior faculty that I respect a lot were pulling back and getting very disgusted and down.

One of the most counterproductive things that Chris did was hold meetings. He would just hold meetings and meetings and meetings and he had an aversion to closure. When things would be about to close he’d say, “Now, on the other hand,” and he’d open it back up again. Tom Clifton, who he brought down from Berkeley, pressed him pretty strongly about this. I used to say, “You know, it’s not important to be right. It’s important to be certain, just you, the chancellor. Just make a decision. It’s the timeliness of the decision. If you make it, people will come in behind it. But if you don’t make it—“ But he didn’t make the decisions and he made a lot of statements initially that he didn’t understand.
exactly what the ramifications would be, which is forgivable in terms of the complexity of this place, but—

**Jarrell:** It seems remarkable, though, that somebody from University Hall who had been in the bureaucracy, who’d been nurtured over there, would be so inept in terms of procedure.

**McFadden:** Well, that’s one of the misconceptions, I think. Christensen, as many administrators in the UC system, rose through the academic senate. He was beautiful on his feet, I’m sure. He got along very well with people. He was bright, very interested in the institution. But he was brought in by Chancellor Bowker to be the liaison with the faculty as the vice chancellor, which is a staff position at Berkeley and they turn it over every so often.

He dealt with the Library Committee, the Computer Committee, and faculty things. He didn’t have any staff. He just had a part-time staff assistant. He didn’t have any budget control. He didn’t have any administrative experience. You know what I’m saying to you? He had almost none.

**Jarrell:** Well, at the beginning of our interview you mentioned that at Berkeley they thought that sending him down here would be like gravy since Santa Cruz was just a small institution of six thousand people. But do you actually mean that at Berkeley—in terms of budgets, administering people, having the paper flow—he really only had a staff of one or two people and no true responsibility?

**McFadden:** Yes. No responsibility.

**Jarrell:** Well, this would be an immense task, I would think, for him.
**McFadden:** Yes. It wasn’t really thought about up there. They didn’t really think. I don’t think they purposely moved him out of the way or fed him into this thing. One of the things, as I said, he had a very strong interest in undergraduate education. He did some creative things there at Berkeley and I think they felt—

**Jarrell:** He got a teaching award for undergraduate teaching.

**McFadden:** Yes. But he also instituted some undergraduate reforms there in the college. So that was part of it. And he was very well liked by the regents.

But what I’m saying to you is that one of the major misconceptions here is that a vice chancellor has some administrative responsibility. Even here the vice chancellor now has a little more responsibility, but has no real administrative responsibility. The vice chancellor for academic affairs is really a planning, a faculty coordination kind of job, with faculty personnel, but has really very little line administrative responsibility. Christensen had almost none of that at Berkeley, almost no budget experience at all. Some of the things that he got at loggerheads with the faculty about on academic personnel matters and whatnot were things that he should have understood better, but he really didn’t. I mean, he really didn’t have much experience with those things.

But he was culpable in that he didn’t take the time to read and study, to do his homework on things. He just didn’t put time into those kinds of things. The other thing I mentioned was that he didn’t really have a good second-level staff. He didn’t really have that layer below him of real experience. They were new people. Cota-Robles was new and so were Pat Sullivan and Liz Penaat. They all had more or less limited administrative experience.
Jarrell: So he didn’t have a margin of safety in terms of a buffer of experienced people who could keep reality afar until he got his act together and studied up.

McFadden: Yes. Well, part of it was—I’m not saying he didn’t let things alone. In other words, he didn’t really delegate and leave it. He didn’t delegate either. I did an allegory on this called *The Longest Afternoon*. It showed that the difference between McHenry and Christensen as quarterbacks of the team was the multiple huddle, the many meetings. Christensen didn’t delegate; he didn’t hand the ball off. He had a tendency to get back into details and never to let you complete anything, to get back in. So I’m not faulting his second-level people. I’m just saying there wasn’t much experience. If they had been experienced they would have got him and said, “Now, look, you just can’t get into this.” There wasn’t that kind of pressure against him. They weren’t that confident themselves. They were new in their jobs. So it was allowed to get too far along. But Chris didn’t delegate. He just didn’t delegate things at all. The difference between them was that McHenry would take a briefcase of stuff home and work on it and do it. McHenry didn’t delegate either, but he did a lot of the things, he completed them. Chris wouldn’t. He’d take a briefcase home but he’d bring it back unopened.

Being a chancellor is looked upon from the outside as some kind of really super thing, you know? Quite an honor. I’ve worked close enough to it for a number of years now that there’s just no way you could pay me enough money to do it. It’s a lousy job. All you do is deal with the problems that no one else lower than you wants to deal with. They send these problems up and you have to attend receptions and shake the hands of a lot of people. You really wouldn’t care to do
it if you didn’t have to. At least here as chancellor you don’t have a big fundraising responsibility as you do at a private place, which is dog work. But generally, it’s the lousiest job on the campus. Christensen was not suited for the dog work. He looked at it as an honorific kind of position. There was a feeling also, that was not expressed, but it was real, that he was sort of an Eagle Scout. People wanted to come up and run their fingers through his hair, that sort of thing, rather than the respect and the distance and fear that goes along with respect in order to make people move and to do things in an institution.

**Jarrell:** That kind of force of personality?

**McFadden:** Yes. And he didn’t understand that it was dog work. A lot of faculty who come out of the classroom, as he did, never can adjust to the grind of administration. It’s a grind. It’s not something that they’re conditioned for. They’re used to keeping their own hours and working when they feel up and not working when they don’t feel up. It’s a whole different thing and a lot of people don’t take to it well. The things was, Christensen was not tested at Berkeley.

**Jarrell:** So that does say something about the whole process of going through the system and also the process by which he was selected to be chancellor?

**McFadden:** Yes. The process was lousy, the selection for chancellor. But also, let me just say it again, one of the major things is he just didn’t have any experience. If he had been a very experienced administrator, his staff could have had the year to come along and he would probably have been okay. Or if he had a very experienced administrative staff under him, some really sharp people, experienced people, he would have been okay.
**Jarrell:** Would you please comment on how you viewed President David Saxon’s role? Would you interpret his position?

**McFadden:** I don’t know much about Saxon’s role except it presented a real problem for him. There were other rumblings on other campuses at the time, and if Saxon let the faculty, or as somebody said, let the inmates run the asylum, it was all over. So clearly there was resistance to pulling Christensen and initially he was telling Christensen to stay in there, to hang in there.

**Jarrell:** From researching this event, it seems that there is no neat, explicit process for getting rid of a chancellor or some other high echelon person for incompetence or inadequacies. Yet apparently there’s quite a turnover in the UC system.

**McFadden:** Yes. Well, this happens in industry and every form of management. Usually you have a lateral displacement. You give somebody a title and office and a secretary and an increase in salary. If they screw up, you move them out of the way. But there’s no convenient spot to which you can move a chancellor. I thought possibly they’d create a spot for him at University Hall, a staff position up there, you know, when it was getting tight down here. I mean, that certainly has been done before in the UC system, there’s just no doubt about it. I don’t think that Saxon had any comprehension of how intense things were down here and how fast they were moving.

**Jarrell:** So Saxon’s natural response was to just hang in there.
McFadden: Yes. Just as an aside, we had a staff meeting in the early fall and Christensen said to me, “What are we going to do for the Bicentennial? What is the campus going to do for the Bicentennial?” I said, “Well, we’re going to have a rebellion.” Everybody laughed. But you could just feel it. It was alive. You could feel it build. But for somebody like Saxon looking from the outside and dealing with his problems, what this meant in terms of the system—I think he wanted Christensen to hang in until the very last. It wasn’t easy. I think Dave liked Chris a lot.

Chancellor Angus Taylor

Jarrell: What do you think UCSC has to do now? We have Angus Taylor here and from all reports he’s doing marvelously. How do you feel about what he’s doing?

McFadden: Let me say first of all, you have to figure where he’s coming in the sequence here. He’s following two situations, two personalities. He’s got a certain charm and ease and thoroughness that I think a lot of people really like and feel good about. He works very hard. He does all his homework and he turns stuff around very quickly. So he’s very much appreciated in terms of stabilizing. It’s a bad situation but it’s gotten better. [But] Taylor at this point is untested in terms of major, nasty decisions.

Jarrell: This is an interim arrangement?

McFadden: Yes. He’s acting chancellor, so people are not going to run after him that hard. I feel he deliberates and confers at length with people. They feel like they participate in the decision. I don’t watch him. I don’t agree with all his decisions, but I respect him and I like him a lot. I think he is very good for the place and I like him a lot. He’s quieted things very much and that’s very helpful. But his perspective reflects University Hall. He’s worked there for a lot of years. One of the blessings he has, I think so far, is that he’s not tried to solve the real problems here. He’s not got into the complex problems.

Jarrell: They’re in abeyance.

McFadden: Yes. It’s a quiet period. He’s just what the doctor ordered right now.

Jarrell: He doesn’t have to deal with the real substantial issues at the moment. He’s just dealing with the more immediate needs.

If you were writing out an agenda for what has to be dealt with once the new chancellor is appointed, what would be the two, three, or four things of most significance that you think have to be dealt with for maintaining UCSC and enhancing its tarnished reputation?

McFadden: Let me go back on the Taylor thing and then I can answer. You know, they say the body heals itself and the physician gets the credit. We’ve got a period of quiet now and the place is healing itself slowly by a lot of little compromises, people burying the hatchet, and that kind of thing. Certainly Taylor is getting the credit right now. It will change with the new permanent chancellor. There’ll be expectations and people will have their agendas again.
One thing that Christensen did and one thing his period as chancellor here did, it did transition. It was a very nasty, bloody transition. But it lowered the expectations of many of the faculty. It brought to the foreground the reality that if they didn’t cooperate they were going to tear this place apart. It transferred a lot of the power to the senate and faculty that McHenry had held very tightly by himself in the front office. They took it. You know, they almost had to rebel like adolescents and in many ways that similarity holds. There’s a very strong need for paternalism, too. That’s why Angus is welcomed. Working for Christensen, the paternal needs were not answered very well. McHenry was a very paternalistic figure and there was a lot of groping for a father figure that went on. The senate had to finally stand up and do something. The faculty as a group had to wrench the power from Central Services out into various areas. So that was a necessary part of improving the campus—in other words, having real participation. The enrollment picture is much more clear now. We’re not going to get any new buildings. We’re not going to be caught up in this tremendous drain of establishing a college each year, that kind of linear progression that just eats everybody up. It gives time to breathe and to rest, and to sort of assess things.

Any trauma has opportunity and has crisis; they’re both side by side. The Christensen thing in many ways allows for some opportunity here. The Taylor period allows people to get relaxed, get some energy, and it reduces the bitterness and the antagonism that’s been here, was here before Christensen. So a new guy, person, woman—I think they may even appoint a woman here—

Jarrell: Really?
**McFadden:** I think that they may get around to that. But a new person will not have the same kinds of problems that Christensen faced at all. If Taylor in his year mends some of the administrative problems, integrates things, and wires them together, gets some processes going, I think the new person is going to have as number one on the agenda the instilling of some pride in the institution, in the campus. Everybody says it’s a pretty place but they don’t necessarily feel confident about what happens here. He has to get that across to the students, the staff, and the faculty, especially the staff who don’t identify closely with the institution, who are just sort of here.

**Jarrell:** The new chancellor will have to emphasize the validity of UCSC as an institution?

**McFadden:** The fact that it’s a success. It’s no longer an experiment. It’s a success. Words like “innovative” are bad words now. They were in vogue awhile back.

**Jarrell:** This is a substantial intellectual center of a certain kind.

**McFadden:** Yes. We need to say what we do and that we do it well, to build that sense of pride, because that has been taken away. We need to instill it, to get that back to the institution. Then of course he’s got to tighten up some of the programs and some of the practices here. We’re losing too many students who come and leave. We’re not retaining our students. It’s not that the applications are down so badly that bothers, although that’s an indicator. I think the reason they’re down is that many students leave the campus who don’t get fellowships and awards. We don’t see the invisible students disgruntled with the place. They go back to tell their brothers, sisters, friends, and neighbors, “It’s not the place for
you.” That’s what I think has been cutting us. We’ve got to clean up the act here a little bit and get people more responsive about the institution, more invested in it. That’s more a leadership thing than it is a management thing.

**Jarrell:** It’s setting a tone.

**McFadden:** Yes. I think Angus in his year here can deal with the management aspects of it. People are more amenable to change because we’ve come through this trauma. He can write the budget and some of the processes together a little bit. People will allow it to happen now. But the next person has to deal with the leadership aspects, with the problems of morale, spirit, and pride in the institution. He’s got to build it somehow. Otherwise I think that the place is destined to be a second-rate institution, even as beautiful as it is.

**Jarrell:** Do you think that’s a rather general point, just to build a certain confidence or a feeling about this place? Do you think that these structural elements, for instance the college and board conflict, are fundamental and must be dealt with, or do you think that creative tension could come out of that after all that we’ve been through?

**McFadden:** Well, there are degrees of tension. McHenry wanted that tension maintained. If somebody wanted to reduce it they could. The fact that we’re not hiring a lot more faculty means there won’t be as many fights between the board and the college over each faculty member hired here, and that people’s nerves won’t be frayed by that. We’re not growing.

**Jarrell:** Competition will be lessened?
McFadden: Yes. That situation is not going to occur anymore, so that reduces the tensions significantly. The program is essentially in place; we’re not starting a whole lot of new programs. That reduces tension. So I don’t think there’s any major overhaul that needs to be done. I think that they do need some fine tuning for sure on the budget and need to use the budget as a planning and management instrument. It has not been used in that way at all.

Jarrell: If you have a lot of resources, there is less conflict.

McFadden: Yes. But if we get a chancellor who is a management type essentially interested in the routine of the institution, who spends a lot of time looking at his shoes, then the place is not going to prosper at all. Matter of fact, I think we’ll be in a lot of trouble. If we get somebody who is a leader, who can turn people on, excite them a little bit, leave the internal management to a second in command but really deals with the advancement of the campus—not so much the fundraising, but just the good feeling.

Jarrell: Someone who has the stature?

McFadden: Yes. And has a little presence, can project, and has a philosophical and educational sense, then I think the place can move again. I thought Christensen would be an outside chancellor, and only spend fifty percent or less inside [the campus] and that was what the reorganization was about. He was good meeting people. He was good on the fundraising one-to-one part. People really liked him. He was just not good at all on internal stuff.
Jarrell: I remember reading that he wanted to be traveling around, meeting people. He was an extrovert of a certain kind. He wanted to leave a lot of the details of the day-to-day stuff to—

Mcfadden: He had to, in terms of trying to advance this place, because the campus is in a precarious position. And UCSC is too good to be in that kind of position. It really is.

Jarrell: How do you mean precarious? In what sense?

Mcfadden: Well, just in terms of the demographics that we face in the next five years. The fact that it’s considered a dubious enterprise by many at University Hall. It’s an experiment that didn’t make it.

Jarrell: But isn’t it a rather expensive $67 million dollar experiment to just drop?

Mcfadden: Oh yes, it is. But do you want my doomsday model?

Jarrell: Yes.

The Future of UC Santa Cruz

Mcfadden: Okay. My doomsday model is that the state comes down along the coast—there’s been a couple of state and federal purchases of property in there—to tie that into a park, come up through the campus and down into [Henry] Cowell State park and tie that all together. They change the sign at the entrance to the campus to KOA and make this [another] Asilomar. You know they’ve tried to make Yosemite Valley into a convention center. We’ve got the dorms and we’ve got the theater. They could keep the science labs as a research institute and
open up the top of the campus and put trailer spaces up there so people could lug their trailers up there and camp overnight and you’ve got a super, super, super state park conference site.

**Jarrell:** A facility for all kinds of things.

**McFadden:** Yes. That’s my doomsday model. But I think we are in problems. People keep saying we’re not in a UC Riverside situation because they’re in trouble in the south. But we are competing in this region up here, with UC Berkeley and Davis. Right now the eligibility pool for people coming into UC is quite high. It runs over fifteen percent of the twelfth-grade graduates in the state, those eligible. If they change the policy to bring it in conformance with the California Master Plan for Education, to reduce it to twelve and a half percent, there’re going to be a lot fewer students. We’re going to feel the bit on that.

**Jarrell:** But if they do that, now we come to the question—I think it starts here—of affirmative action, of letting students in with less proven backgrounds in order to keep your numbers. I’ve heard from several people that we are already admitting students who don’t have the admissions requirements. They are let in through various channels. I guess affirmative action is a good umbrella for that.

**McFadden:** I don’t think you’re going to get a good figure on that. People here seem to be very vague on that.

**Jarrell:** Do you see the question I’m getting at? If they keep it to twelve and a half percent, this place is going to shrink.
McFadden: No. It would still be twelve and a half percent plus four percent of your total enrollments can be special admits, can be EOP [students]. But the changing of those standards could affect us. I’m digressing here a little bit.

But we could be in serious problems if we don’t have somebody who can really carry the institution, speak well of it, exude confidence in it, and can really get faculty and staff to feel very prideful about this place. That’s what I think the new chancellor needs skill in, not internal management. I don’t think we have time enough for that. That can be delegated.

Jarrell: I see what you mean. You’re talking about something that’s a little less material.

McFadden: Well, this is what any chancellor at a private institution has to do. You can buy technical talent. You can buy management skill. It’s everywhere. We haven’t bought real good skill here, but you can buy it. But the leadership quality, presence, that’s something you have to really be careful and select about. There are not many of those people running around who can build, will put the time in, who have a sense of style, and who can turn people on.
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