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The political origins of social science: the cultural transformation of the British parliament and the emergence of scientific policymaking, 1803-1857

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2007

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The Political Origins of Social Science:
The Cultural Transformation of the British Parliament
and the Emergence of Scientific Policymaking, 1803-1857

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in
Sociology

by

Nadav Gabay

Committee in Charge:
Professor Gershon Shafir, Chair
Professor Richard Biernacki
Professor Nancy Postero
Professor Akos Rona-Tas
Professor Michael Schudson

2007
The dissertation of Nadav Gabay is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2007
What do we do when we trace social connections? Are we not, in effect, writing down accounts? What is an account? It is typically a text, a small ream of paper … No matter how grandiose the perspective, no matter how scientific the outlook, no matter how tough the requirements … the result of the inquiry – in 99% of the cases – will be a report … And that is excellent because there is no better way […]

Bringing the writing of reports into the foreground might irritate those who claim to know what the social is made of. They would much prefer to be like ‘hard’ scientists and try to understand the existence of a given phenomenon, refusing to consider the written account and relying instead on direct contact with the thing at hand via the transparent medium of clear and unambiguous technical idiom […]

Textual accounts are the social scientist’s laboratory … So, to treat a report of social science as a textual account is not a weakening of its claim to reality, but an extension of the number of precautions that have to be taken onboard and of the skills requested from the enquirers … If the social is something that circulates in a certain way, and not a world beyond to be accessed by the disinterested gaze of some ultra-lucid scientist, then it may be passed along by many devices adapted to the task – including texts, reports, accounts, and tracers. It may or may not. Textual accounts can fail like experiments often do.

(Latour 2005: 123-127)
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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my grateful thanks to my committee members - Richard Biernacki, Nancy Postero, Akos Rona-Tas, Gershon Shafir and Michael Schudson – for their kind and helpful criticisms and suggestions on early versions of these chapters. I am particular indebted to Gershon Shafir, the committee chair and my intellectual mentor, for invaluable feedback, precious advice and practical guidance at important points, and for helping me get through the bureaucratic and financial hoops as an international student at UCSD. Most of all, Gershon has provided me with a model of the ideal adviser. His unwavering support was never stifling. He allowed me to wander where I eventually chose to go, and for that, among many other things, I am grateful. I hope to be able to emulate his intellectual integrity, his generosity for opinions different from his own, and his deep sense of responsibility for his students.

I have also been privileged to have Richard Biernacki and Akos Rona-Tas as close advisers. Both are models for intellectual rigor, acuity and good sense. The scope of their erudition never ceases to amaze me and I came to depend on their advice, keen insights and approval. Other faculty members, whom I met during my studies, and whose teaching, advice and assistance have been particularly valuable are, Isaac Martin, Richard Madsen, Carlos Waisman, Gil Eyal, Jeff Haydu, Eppie Yaar, Andrew Scull and Lisa Catanzarite.

My peers at UCSD proved to be an exciting intellectual environment for developing ideas and trying them out. They include my dear friends, who had to endure and sustain my obsessive writing for quite long enough: Daniela Carpano and Manzur Rahman, who opened their heart and their home to me, and whose sparkling minds were a constant source of intellectual stimulation over wonderful Italian and Indian dinners; Moira Mackinnon who offered close companionship, intense intellectual conversations, and long, reflective, walks on the beach; and Paula Gutterize, whose judgment, always incredibly sensible, has never failed me. I am also grateful to my fellow
cohort survivors: Charlene Bredder, Michael Haedicke, Tanya Karvetz, Miriam Padolsky, David Ribes, and my long-time officemate Caroline Lee. Other friends and colleagues who deserve their own special thanks are: Neilan Barnes, Mariano Bargero, Melody Chiong, Irit Dekel, Michael Evans, Ethan Hollander, Jas He, Rika Yonemura, Katie Marker, Seiko Matszawa, Shezad Nadeem, Martha Poon and Shlomit Stein.

This project could not have been conceived without the guidance and support of Yehouda Shenhav, my intellectual mentor and academic godfather, who first introduced me to the world of historical sociology. His intelligence, enthusiasm and originality, coupled with a strong intellectual veracity, provided an eye-opening experience and an unflagging source of encouragement in my earlier years as a student. Ultimately, it was Yehouda’s intellectual passion that inspired me to pursue an academic career. My interest in governmental commissions has begun with a paper that we co-authored together when I was his research assistant in Tel Aviv University, and this dissertation might be seen as a belated response to his stimulating class on the historical and intellectual origins of the social sciences.

Over the years I have received generous funds from numerous institutions: Tel Aviv University, the Fulbright-Hays/Institute of International Education, International Sepharadic Education Fund (ISEF), UC Regents Fellowship, the University of Californian – San Diego, and the Institute for International, Comparative and Area Studies (IICAS). The support of these funds has helped sustain my studies and research in the Unites States, as well as my archival work in London, and made possible the completion of my project. For their help I am most thankful. I am especially grateful to Nina Weiner, Ofira Yaish and others in the ISEF Foundation, whose enormous dedication and great affection have made the foundation into an invaluable source of moral and material support.

I have also been fortunate to have had the invaluable assistance of IRPS librarians – Stephen Cruz, the public service supervisor and Rui-Hua Zhang the interlibrary loan manager –
who maintained a constant supply of books, manuscripts and documents from libraries and archives all over the United States. I am also obliged to the archivists and librarians at the British Library, the Public Record at Kew, and the University College of London; their good will, excellent skills and superb organization proved extremely helpful to my research. Additional thanks are tendered to Lawrence Goldman and Stephen White of Oxford University for allowing me to use their database and indexes of the *Transaction of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science*, and to Andrew Scull whose endorsement proved immensely helpful in opening doors to archives and special collections in London.

My family in Israel has been a constant source of love and support. I am lucky to have parents who surrounded me with books and instilled in me deep thirst for never-ending learning. My debt to them is too personal and too great for me to expand on here. Finally, I wish to acknowledge my four grandparents – Yosef, Aliza, Moshe and Rivka – who were a nurturing presence throughout my childhood and adolescence. In their own histories, which span old world and new, they all had a great knowledge of sacrifice - bereft of any vocabulary of complaint. To their memory, I dedicate this dissertation.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Political Origins of Social Science:
The Cultural Transformation of the British Parliament
and the Emergence of Scientific Policymaking, 1803-1857

by

Nadav Gabay
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology
University of California, San Diego, 2007
Professor Gershon Shafir, Chair

This study is concerned with explaining why and how – under what practical condition and within what social arrangements – knowledge about society emerged as “social science”: a relatively autonomous domain of expertise with its own distinctive arrangement of working practices, institutional arrangements and technologies. Social Science, I argue, originated not as much with Marx and Weber in Germany, or Comte and Durkheim in France, as with the political institution of governmental investigations in Britain almost half a century before it obtained academic prestige within the disciplinary framework of the universities. Only after social science was well entrenched in the political field, through the work of governmental commissions, and its influence and effects were felt in the public sphere, through legislation and policy, did it migrate into the universities, where it was appropriated by academics in their associations.

I suggest that there is much we can learn about the scientifi city of social knowledge once we forgo the traditional ways in which the history of social science is told and look at political institutions, political practices and political circumstances as the driving force behind the emergence not only of social investigations but indeed of social science more in general. It was
politics, its discourse, its mechanics of parliamentary and governmental work, its legislative practices and bureaucratic routines, its technologies of recording, compiling, archiving, presenting and transporting information, which provided the condition of possibility for the emergence of social science as a domain of expertise, not least by investing social knowledge with importance, authority and relevance, through the work of governmental social investigations.

Social science, I argue, was developed as a creative response to the growing requirement of publicity in the exercise of political authority during the first half of the nineteenth century. I locate the origins of social science within a larger transformation in the organizational culture of the British parliament, which took place at this period, following the increasing publicity of parliamentary debates and proceedings in the national Press. This transformation conditioned specific patterns of investigation and publication that turned social knowledge into a domain of expertise, thus paving the way for the emergence of social science. The first step in this transformation was the disenchantment of politics. With the opening of parliament to the “public gaze,” politics became a domain an application for public reportage – a category of knowledge, that was understood to be worthwhile to observe and interpret, and which was constituted through the monitoring of parliamentary debates. Once politics was constructed as a field of application for the Press and identified with public reportage, contemporary political and social events inside and outside parliament became observational and ‘experimental’ and could now be legitimately monitored, accumulated, archived, combined into chronologies, and then served as a basis for interpretation and commentary.

In the second step, the growing coverage of politics in the press, encouraged government officials to take control of the legislation process from parliament by establishing a new policymaking regime, based on empirical explorations of social problems outside parliament by especially assigned governmental commissions. Serving on these commissions, politicians effectively became social experts, turning their gaze onto the public, carefully inspecting and
monitoring social problems in their localities, thus making social knowledge a legitimate domain of political expertise. With the growing use of governmental investigations, expert knowledge about society was effectively entrenched into the political field, transforming the organizational culture of parliament, its discourse and practices, from “verbal economy” of oratorical performance to the “visual economy” of writing public reports for policymaking purposes. In this new parliamentary regime, visual knowledge gained a cultural comparative advantage, an "epistemic privilege," over verbal knowledge, not merely because of its physicality but, more importantly, because it "fitted" the new circumstances created by the growing power of the press and the formation of political-print-culture. An “elective affinity” was created between political reportage and social reportage.

In the third and final step, government officials attempted to control and manage the variety and partisan and contradictory understandings of politics that were created by the Press and challenged the ability of government to elicit support for its policies inside and outside parliament. They did so by establishing various associations whose goal was to promote an official political discourse through immense public opinion campaigns, accompanied by a massive dissemination of governmental reports about social problems. In these campaigns, expert knowledge about society, produced by governmental investigations, was presented as scientific: useful, relevant, non-partisan, tangible and accessible to others. In this way, expert knowledge about society was grafted onto the practice and discourse of its public consumers, effectively becoming “scientific.”
1. Introduction

In early nineteenth century, social science did not exist, neither as a domain of knowledge nor even as a set of defined practices. There were various activities being done that would eventually be done by social scientists but these activities were not aggregated into systematic sets of tasks. By the end of the nineteenth century all this had changed. ‘Social science’ has become a fairly clear territory of bounded practices, an institutionalized set of “things to do.” If we take the question of the origins of social science seriously we soon find that asking when, why and how ‘social science’ emerged immediately disappears behind the bigger and more ominous question of “what does it mean to say that social science emerged?” Tracing the origins of social science, thus immediately brings into focus a more general problem concerning the connection between the scientificity of social knowledge and its constitution as a relatively autonomous domain of expertise - i.e., the ability to attribute some sort of dominial autonomy to intellectual engagement with the social world (Abbott 2001).

Typical social science historiography has attempted to circumvent this problem by conveniently treating social knowledge as independent variable, thus removing it from the center of its inquiry. As a result, we get no account of what this knowledge is, how it works, and what makes it ‘scientific’. Especially neglected are the more mundane activities that goes into the production of scientific knowledge and to which most resources and labor are devoted, namely, the procedures of observing, recording, classifying, aggregating and disseminating that occupy all components of social research (Biernacki 2005; Knorr-cenita 1997; Latour 1987, 2005).

This study is concerned with explaining why and how (under what practical condition and within what social arrangements) knowledge about society emerged as “social science” – a relatively autonomous domain of expertise with its own “epistemic culture,” its own “distinctive arrangement of working practices, institutional arrangements, and technologies” (Knorr-Cetina
1999: 7). I suggest that there is much we can learn about the *scientificity* of social knowledge once we forgo the traditional ways in which the history of social science is told and allow the performative nature of social knowledge and the phenomenology of its scientific appropriation to stand at the center of our historical inquiry.

Social knowledge, I argue, acquired scientific status almost half a century before it obtained academic prestige within the disciplinary framework of the universities. The current study locates the origins of social science within a larger transformation in the organizational culture of the British Parliament – from oral culture and “verbal economy of sound” to print culture with its slower, more silent and spatialized economy of writing and “visual way of knowing” – which took place in the first half of the nineteenth century. I focus in particular on the development of social reportage, produced by *Governmental Social Investigation* conducted by *Governmental Commissions* (commonly known as “royal commissions”), collecting social data and exploring social problems “in the field”. As the political *modus operandi* was increasingly relying on the writing of public/official reports, this new mode of investigation was embedded in a growing association between politics in general and the printed texts. Only after social science was well entrenched in the political field, through the work of governmental commissions, and its influence and effects were felt in the public sphere, through legislation and policy, did it migrate into the universities, where it was appropriated by academics in their associations.

### 1.1 A Pre-Disciplinary History of Social Science

The success of the university disciplines supported a narrow understanding of the history of social science in which the only unifying concept for the discourses and practices of social science has been the academic discipline. As a result, much of the history of social science
has been written as a retrospective reconstruction of a set of academic disciplines and sub-
disciplines (the ‘social sciences’). This tendency to impose a priori, an external, institutional
boundary between ‘science’ and ‘non-science’, overlooks the fact that the criteria of scientificity
– intellectual or institutional – are products of the same historical development and were
imposed by the very actors whose work they evaluate. Moreover, disciplinary history
delaminates the boundary of a discipline by pertaining to the past only when it bears a direct
relation to the contemporary practice of a particular discipline (Connell 1997). As a result,
struggles to impose new definitions of science in order to gain legitimacy for practices
previously regarded as unscientific, is left unanalyzed (Breslau 1990).

The current study has set out to challenge this disciplinary “boundary work.” Rather
then accepting that the formation of university specialties constitutes the beginning of social
science and its proper boundaries, this study focus on the early, pre-disciplinary, history of
social science. While disciplinary history pertains to the past only when it bears a direct relation
to the contemporary practice of a particular discipline, a focus on the pre-disciplinary period
enables us to overcome the official constructing the past in the service of disciplinary and
professional socialization. It allows us to analyze the many struggles to force scientific
definitions on social investigations outside of academia in order to gain legitimacy for practices
previously regarded as unscientific. This kind of history involves a multitude of non-academic
groups and opens the way to “a wide range of configurations and intricacies that no longer affect
the identity of social science as academic science,” and which from the point of view of
disciplinary history may legitimately be forgotten (Heilbron 1995: 1). It thus enables a careful
examination, free of theologies and anachronistic fallacies, of the critical issue which stands at
the center of my project: the relation between the scientificity of social knowledge and its
institutional autonomy.
1.2 Social Science as Expertise

The mainstream historiography of social science can be divided, roughly, into three main approaches. The first approach treats social science as an evolutionary process of ideas by reducing intellectual activity to a small number of abstract schemes and then providing examples of the permanence of certain schemes that can be found in today’s social science. The problem with reducing social science to abstract schemes, such as ideas and theories, is that it is not only impractical to actually find such ideas in any coherent and stabilized form (Swidler 2001), but that it is quite impossible to show that these ideas actually influence action and how they had worked to construct “social science” as a separate domain of expertise.

The second approach reformulate the development of social science on the institutional level and ask: “what was the order in which certain institutions that we identify with ‘social science’ emerged?” This “sequence-of-institutions” approach (Abbott 2001: 267) is deceitful because the historical narrative is built back to front: we start with what we know emerged and then look for its origins. But history is lived onwards, not backwards. Social science emerged not by projecting itself back from some fixed point in the present, but from local practices and historically contingent processes. It would be false, then, to look for the origins of social science by arbitrarily reasoning back from academic social science, which was institutionalized and departmentalized in modern universities at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, Social science did not principally find its sites of application with its own institutional location – unlike the old profession it had no Church, no court of law and no hospital. In fact, by the time we see major institutional events in social science, we are well past the real moment of structuration, the moment when the very shape of tasks began to become fixed, when various practices start to become bounded as a particular area of activity, a set of “things to do.”
The third approach suggests the social science developed through the process of progressive professionalization whereby a group of experts was able to lay claim to jurisdiction over a certain area of human experience and legitimates this claim by means of some form of rational knowledge. Under this approach, social science emerged as a separate profession by gradually departing from other professions, erecting institutional boundaries and creating an internally referential system. In this process, practitioners of social science slowly became specialists by orienting themselves toward one-another than toward the outside.

‘Professional closure’ is indeed an important institutional mechanism, and as long as we avoid the anachronistic fallacy of approaching its history as a “sequence-of-institutions” it can provide us with some useful tools for observing boundary work practices (Gieryn 1995; Abbott 1988, 2001). But professionalization cannot account for the complex texture of knowledge-in-action. It is problematic to assume a preexisting area of human experience colonized by experts, or that a certain form of rational knowledge existed to provide experts with authority, because this would be to project backwards precisely what was fabricated by discursive practice. We must show, instead, how discourse constitutes its own “domains of application” (Foucault 1962, 1972, 1994). Moreover, as this study will show, the early structuration of social science was not predicated on the ability of social expert to professionalize and restrict access to social knowledge. Rather, its development depended mostly on a complete opposite process, that of publicity: the ability of non-academic social experts – the governmental investigators – “to go public - to intervene - to present their knowledge as useful, relevant, and accessible to others, so that expert knowledge is grafted onto the practices and discourses of its consumers” (Eyal 2002: 658).

In this study I suggest an alternative way of approaching the history of social science: not merely as the development of a body of thought but as the emergence of a new expertise – a certain form of life, a mode of practicing or acting upon the world. Following Nikolas Rose
(1991), I use the term ‘expertise’ to refer to a specific sociological and cultural activity that create warranted knowledge through a habitual *modus operandi*, which exercise a certain diagnostic gaze, characteristically deployed around problems, by which truth is pursued and carries with it a particular kind of social authority.

Most crucially, expert systems, unlike professional or disciplinary systems, which devote most of their energy to keep their knowledge closed so as to prevent its appropriation by others, involves a more ‘generous’ open and cooperative orientation, capable of establishing homologies across different fields. Understanding social science as expertise allows us therefore to enlarge the space of knowledge-in-action, rather than simply observe it as a set of ideas, an institution or a profession. This pragmatic and phenomenological approach combines cultural, sociological and historical understanding of how actors themselves continuously define what belong to social science and what does not; how, in other words, the boundaries of the social scientist’s authority and responsibility are decided in practice, in action, and how these boundaries are changing with time. In this way, the matter of institutional or so called “external” influences upon the development of social science are interesting insofar as the boundary in question is the actors’ boundary and not one imposed or projected arbitrarily onto the past (Shapin 1989 1992).

This approach is especially useful in overcoming the difficulty of trying to predefine the field of social science in order to write its history. It allows us to completely reject any *a priori* definition of “social science,” and to focus, instead, on the social arrangements and the *practical conditions* under which social science was fabricated by actors as they were generating their own conceptual vocabularies with only limited reference to their place in any wider developmental account. Most importantly, an historical study of social science as expertise opens suggestive venues for understanding the role of politics in the early structuration of social science. As I show, social science emerged when various Victorian reformers established
homologies between politics and science, while working together to make new policies and solve social problems by investigating and reporting about “social problems.”

1.3 The Political Origins of Social Science

The study of the relationship between science and politics is often guided by a central dogma, according to which there exists a clear division of labor between two autonomous fields: Science organize our knowledge of the worlds, while politics directs our action in it. Science determines “what is” (facts), whereas politics, working with the ‘finished products’ of science, determines “what ought to be” (Jasanoff 1996b, 2004). Working against this dogmatic view of the relationship between politics and science, Shelia Jasanoff advises that we ask: What is the role of political institutions in producing systematic modes of reasoning and shared beliefs about what counts as factual, credible, truthful and scientific?

We are all too familiar with the explanation that the rise of British social investigations was informed by a number of transformations that allegedly erupt with full force during the early nineteenth century: rapid economic change amounting to an industrial revolution, a political revolution which brought the middle class to power, and a revolution in government that established a modern bureaucratized state. Recent historical accounts, however, have convincingly challenged these macro-structural explanations. We now recognize that British industrialization was more gradual and uneven, that, that political rise and social influence of the middle class was much more restricted than has often been suggested, and that the administrative reforms of the early Victorian period did not amount to a major beureocratic centralization (see, e.g., Hewitt 2006).

Thus, although the early nineteenth century brought with it some significant changes in administrative and public structures, macro socio-economic processes by themselves can no
longer provide an adequate explanation for the sudden political significance of social investigations. Instead we may wish to follow Jasanoff, by reversing the story altogether and looking at political institutions, political practices and political circumstances as the driving force behind the emergence not only of social investigations but indeed of social science more in general. As this study shows, it was politics, its discourse, its mechanics of parliamentary and governmental work, its legislative practices and bureaucratic routines, its technologies of recording, compiling, archiving, presenting and transporting information, which provided the condition of possibility for the emergence of social science as a domain of expertise, not least by investing social knowledge with importance, authority and relevance, through the work of governmental social investigations. This alternative explanation should not be taken as refutation of the relevancy of the process of social-economic change, but rather as an effort to modify complement it. Once we step outside the boundaries of the socio-economic narrative, we can see British social investigations not as a product of the social reality of industrialization and modernization, but rather as an elaborate and often contested argument about it.

1.3.1 The British Parliament as the Cradle of Social Science

The genesis of social science in Britain as a new form of expertise was a product of a new politics of truth, and its development was embedded within British politics and formulated in relation to the legal tradition of the ‘common law’. My historical investigation starts, therefore, in the British Parliament – the House of Commons – which, since the eighteenth century was probably the most important institution responsible for the production of truth in Britain. I am particularly interested in detecting constitutive links between aspects of social scientific knowledge-making and those mundane practices of parliamentary work that are not
commonly considered as having much to do with scientific practice. Such reassessment requires that we broaden our frame of reference to include the cultural dimension of formalized politics.

Most scholars who study the history of the House of Commons tend to concentrate on the political give and take of parliamentary decision-making and coalition building. They are too busy studying how majorities were put together and than maintained to support the government of the day and implement policies that they forget to ask what parliamentary work actually entailed for nineteenth-century contemporaries. What men did when they got into Parliament, apart from acting as lobby-fodders, who voted according to party lines, and how the practices of parliamentary work changed throughout the nineteenth century, have not received much attention. More crucially, the important constitutive role of the British Parliament in the development of social science has been largely neglected. Scholars tend to ignore it because they do not consider the political machinery to be important cultural site of intellectual or scientific activities. There is, therefore, a complex archaeology of nineteenth-century parliamentary cultural production whose dimensions have barely been examined. We still have no accurate conception of the influence of parliamentary intellectual and textual production in the Victorian period on empirical and scientific culture and on public or political culture more in general. We have little understanding, therefore, of the influence of politics on the development of social science.

1.4 The Thesis

The main postulation this dissertation suggests that changes in the organizational culture of the British Parliament in the first decades of the nineteenth century, following the increasing publicity of parliamentary debates and proceedings in the national Press, conditioned specific patterns of investigation and publication, which turned social knowledge into a domain of
expertise, thus paving the way for the emergence of social science. The first step in this transformation was the *disenchantment* of politics. With the opening of Parliament to the “public gaze,” politics became a domain for public reportage – a category of knowledge, that was understood to be worthwhile to observe and interpret, and which was constituted through the monitoring of parliamentary debates. Once Parliament became a *field of application*, represented in various ways in the numerous reports of political reporters, contemporary political and social events inside and outside Parliament could be legitimately monitored, accumulated, archived and served as a basis for interpretation and commentary.

In the second step, the growing coverage of politics in the press, encouraged government officials, in ways I describe below, to take control of the legislation process from Parliament by establishing a new policymaking regime, which was based on empirical explorations of social problems outside Parliament by especially assigned governmental commissions. Serving on these commissions, politicians effectively became social experts, turning their gaze onto the public, carefully inspecting and monitoring social problems in their localities, thus making social knowledge a legitimate domain of political expertise. With the growing use of governmental investigations, expert knowledge about society was effectively entrenched into the political field, transforming the organizational culture of Parliament, its discourse and practices, from “verbal economy” of oratorical performance to the “visual economy” of writing public reports for policymaking purposes. In this new parliamentary regime, visual knowledge gained a cultural comparative advantage, an "epistemic privilege," over verbal knowledge, not merely because of its physicality but, more importantly, because it "fitted" the new circumstances created by the growing power of the press and the formation of political-print-culture. An “elective affinity” was created between political reportage and social reportage.

In the third and final step, government officials attempted to control and manage the variety and partisan and contradictory understandings of politics that were created by the Press,
and challenged the ability of government to elicit support for its policies inside and outside Parliament. They did so by establishing various associations whose goal was to promote an official political discourse through immense public opinion campaigns, accompanied by a massive dissemination of governmental reports about social problems. In these campaigns, expert knowledge about society, produced by governmental investigations, was presented as scientific: useful, relevant, non-partisan, tangible and accessible to others. In this way, expert knowledge about society was grafted onto the practice and discourse of its public consumers, effectively becoming “scientific.”

1.5 The Organization of the Argument: An Overview

Chapter Two introduces a spatio-temporal model of for understanding the relationships between science and politics: the Knowledge-Political Continuum (Pels, 2003). The model offers an integrated solution to some problems with Michel Foucault’s archeological method of discursive analysis and Tom Gieryn’s cartographic model of boundary work. In the model, science and politics are not divided by sharp ruptures but retain their relative autonomy precisely because they are interconnected through broad transition zones across a range of institutional settings with permeable and frail boundaries. While this view suggests various amalgams of scientific and political practices, these boundaries nevertheless succeed – as spatio-temporal filters – in keeping them at arm’s length as relatively autonomous domains of social activity.

These transition zones range from the ideal-typical extreme of science as a disinterested, value-free, search for truth (the idea of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake) to its polar opposite of professional politics. Between the two extremes we find a wide range of practices and institutions that mix and mediate scientific knowledge and politics and through
which social actors have to pass in order to shift their position, either temporarily or permanently. For example, academic intellectuals publishing journalist pieces, gaining high media profiles, serving on governmental commissions or ‘defecting’ to posts in politics or government administration; members of Parliament publishing articles and books, writing policy reports or ‘defecting’ to teaching posts in universities.

In the model, knowledge is performed politically or scientifically by different actors in different institutional settings along the continuum. The continuum covers a range of spatial activities (public, private; personified, disembodied), temporal activities (fast, slow; transitory, permanent) and inscriptive methods ranging between a disembodied semiotic text and embodied voiced utterance. Different configuration of these activities takes place in a variety of institutional settings that mediate between science and politics. Hence, the model is able to articulate, in a relatively simple way, an ethnographically enriched picture of what scientists and politicians (in all their different roles, admixtures and combinations) ‘actually do’. I apply the model to construct a three-part argument about the emergence of social science out of the dynamics of parliamentary politics and its interaction with Print Culture and in particular with practices of public reportage.

1.5.1 Part One – The Ascendancy of Political Reportage and the Disenchantment of Parliamentary Politics

My goal in the first part of the dissertation is to trace the emergence of social science, its moment of structuration, to changes in the organizational culture of Parliament, following the increasing publicity of parliamentary debates and proceedings in the national Press at the end of the eighteenth century. I show how this trend was promoted, encouraged, and largely enabled by
the activities of a small group of parliamentary reformers, who slowly but surely convinced the House of Commons to open its procedures for the Press. This group will play a pivotal role in the governmentalization of legislation (discussed in Part Two) and in the production and dissemination of social reportage (discussed in Part Three).

The often-misunderstood territory of early nineteenth century reportage occupies a unique historical position “between the ancient bards and community story-telling of historical memory, and the mechanically reproducible spoken word of the phonograph” (Kreilkamp 2005: 2). By focusing on political reportage, I wish to explore the interactive nature of parliamentary and Press development, and the ways in which the symbiotic evolvement of these two institutions through conflict, cooperation and reciprocity, was responsible for the early structuration of social science. I focus, particularly, on the mechanics, the material conditions and the politics of parliamentary work and of parliamentary reporting. Reportage, like science, is always caught somewhere between artistic intention and mechanical reproduction (Latour 2005). Moreover, if we keep in mind that the writing of social reports – sociography – was developed in close relationship to journalism (Lepenies 1988), political reportage becomes an important space for exploring not only general questions internal to scientific practices, but more specific questions which pertain to the scientificity of social knowledge. In particular, how does the practice of literal writing (recordation of voice as evidence) affect literary writing about society? How did the interplay between the literal and the literary affect understanding of the relation between verbal and written evidence? And how did it change ideas about authorial agency, composition, attribution and originality?

By answering these questions I illustrate the new norms and practices which shaped the practical epistemology of the newly created field of public reportage. I analyze the disenchanting effect that this public gaze had on parliamentary politics: the creation of new sensibilities that transformed political discourse and practices from oral culture based on a
“verbal economy of sound” to print culture with its slower, more silent and spatialized economy of writing and “visual way of knowing.”\textsuperscript{1} This cultural transformation conditioned specific patterns of investigation and publication, as the modus operandi of parliamentary work was increasingly relying on the writing of public reports for policymaking. The writing of reports gained a cultural comparative advantage, an "epistemic privilege," over verbal knowledge because they "fitted" the new circumstances created by the infiltration of the press into Parliament and the creation of political-print-culture.\textsuperscript{2}

1.5.1.1 National Politics as a ‘Field of Application’

The Press opened the possibility that the public could come to know Parliament on its own terms. This meant, in principle, at least, that politics could be made an object of understanding. It has been disenchanted but not yet intellectualized (i.e., made into an object of scientific calculations). The disenchantment of British parliamentary politics provided the condition of possibility for the emergence of social knowledge as a field of expertise and paved the way for the birth of social science.

For social reportage to appear as a legitimate form of expertise, before it was appropriated by would-be investigators of society, Parliament itself and its verbal economy of knowledge production – what had been said in Parliament, and how it was said – first needed to be broken down and restructured as a field of application “that was no longer confined to that in

\textsuperscript{1} In Politics as a Vocation Weber described the printed press of the nineteenth century as a “a continuous political organization” and saw political reporters as a model for the professionalization of politics (Weber 1946: 77-128).

\textsuperscript{2} The classic formulation of this idea was Weber’s use of the notion of "elective affinity" to explain how certain religious ideas were embraced by certain social groups because those ideas made sense of their lived experience (Weber 1958).
which knowledge was *said*” (Foucault 1962: 74). Once politics was constructed as a field of *application* for the Press and identified with public reportage it became observational and ‘experimental’, “freed for the movement of discovery” (Ibid) -- a category of knowledge that was understood to be worthwhile to observe and interpret, and which was constituted through the monitoring of parliamentary debates. Contemporary political and social events inside and outside Parliament could be legitimately monitored, accumulated, archived, combined into chronologies, and then served as a basis for interpretation and commentary. Print culture, and public reportage more specifically, thus opened the way to granting the public the possibility of *detached* political engagement to evaluate and judge what politicians say and do by reference to the common experience of publicly certified facts, which assume their validity and authority through a universal-public gaze (Ezrachi 1990).

1.5.1.2 Organization of Part One

Part One is organized as follows. Chapter Three analyzes the discourse and practices of the eighteenth century House of Commons, which, I argue, were based on esthetic principles of *patrician orality*. These principles placed a premium on spontaneity of verbal expression, as performative display of sincerity that testified to the credibility of the speaker, and tended to reject the use of reading and writing practices in legislation. Chapter Four describes the gradual infiltration of reporters from the British press into the House of Commons. I show how the penetration of reporters into Parliament was encouraged by a group of parliamentary reformers who sought to exploit this new medium of publicity to promote their own version of truth in the media market to influence public opinion. Chapter Five describes shows how this new *public gaze* on the House of Commons led to a cultural transformation of parliamentary discourse and
practice, and changed the practices of political reportage. In particular, I show how, faced with the problem of verbatim recording of voice in Parliament, new norms and practices of political reportage were developed and institutionalized in a new genre of political reportage before they appeared in the empirical scientific culture of social science. Chapter Six traces the effects of public reporting on the legal-political system of adjudicative government. I first discuss the connection between the oral culture of the British common law tradition to the system of parliamentary select committees of inquiry. I then show the effects of the printed press on the conduct of these inquiries, thus laying the ground for the analysis of “government by commission” in Part Two.

1.5.2 Part Two – A New Political Culture: The Rise of Governmental Investigations

Part One shows how the evolving relationship between the British political system and Public Reportage was associated with some major changes in the organizational culture of the House of Commons. My goal in Part Two is to show how specific norms and practices, which shaped the ongoing practical task of reporting about Parliament in the Press, were translated into the new realm of social investigations, as legislators required solutions to the problem of managing the credibility and effectiveness of the legislative process. More specifically, I describe how these changes created the institutional conditions for the Governmentalization of Legislation: a growing control of the executive over the legislative and policymaking agenda. As the process of legislation was increasingly governmentalized the problem of government gradually came to be thought, reflected and calculated outside the judicial framework and became increasingly depended upon a new form of (social) knowledge produced by innovative methods of investigation and inscription.
As I show, the model of legislation has changed from a process driven by the oral culture (“government by talk”), based on the common law tradition of *adjudicative government*, to a new process of *government by commissions*, driven by print culture, directed by social explorations, and embedded within new communicative standards of public reportage. Thus, a relatively well-working solution to problems of ordering vocal performance and managing its credibility as evidence in the domain of the national printed Press was translated into a new domain of social investigations, where it was “constituted as a solution to problems of order in special scholarly practices” (Shapin 1994: xxviii, chap. 3).

One of the central changes in British political culture during the 1830s and 1840s, with the centralization of legislation in government, was a sharp decline in the power of independent initiative. With the expansion of government created a growing segregation between official business of government and unofficial business of private MPs was created, which dramatically diminished the power and effectiveness of the latter. This did not mean, however, that the members of the house had ceased to affect legislation or that the governmentalization of legislation was a well designed and coordinated effort. Rather, the British government expended its activities as an often unplanned, piecemeal and spasmodic response to the challenges introduced by an ever-expanding publicity of parliamentary activities in the printed media (Cox 1987; Gash 1979; Jupp 1990). The rules and conventions of procedure were changing, accompanied by fundamental changes in the workings of the government: the emergence of an executive structure that sought relentlessly to control both the legislation process and of the management of its communication to the public.

In order to circumvent the confusion inherent in the term *government*, I assign the term only in reference to the British executive branch. It will thus be used interchangeably with such terms as the executive, cabinet or ministry. The term *political system* will be used to refer to the legislative and the executive branch together. I use the term *governmentalization* quite
differently than it is used by Foucault. The *governmentalization of legislation* denotes two distinct but interrelated processes: (1) a cultural-institutional process – *the governmentalization of Parliament*, i.e., the increasing influence of executive practices and norms on the *modus operandi* of the British legislature; and (2) a structural-organizational process – the centralization of legislative work in the executive. Importantly, this process was not based on bureaucratic centralization of the state administrative apparatus but involved the centralization of statistical knowledge about society, which was increasingly collected “in the field” by governmental commissions. I argue that the growing dominance of public reportage during the first half of the nineteenth century was responsible for the early structuration of social science in Britain, in the form of governmental investigations. I use the term *Governmental Commissions* instead of the more commonly used term – royal commissions, which originated in the fifteenth century (Clokie and Robinson 1969: 40) – to indicate a transformation in the *modus operandi* of these commissions in the nineteenth century.\(^3\)

1.5.2.1 A New ‘Evidential Paradigm’

The opening of the Parliament to the printed media and the corresponding expansion of the press led fundamental changes in organizational culture. The presence of the media in the House sharply augmented the number of active MPs, prompting them to demonstrate zeal to their constituents by making more and longer and more frequent speeches and proposing more and more Bills through the machinery of parliamentary select committees of inquiry. Because more and more MPs became active in parliamentary affairs, exercising their rights to express

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\(^3\) Governmental Commissions were composed from commissioners and sub-commissioners or inspectors. I refer to all these three positions together as governmental investigators.
the grievances and opinions of their constituencies, the cumulative effect was disastrous to the ability of the government to pass its own policies, as individual MPs (“backbenchers”) exercised unrestrained power to seize the attention of the House at virtually any time.

Under these circumstances, attacks against “government by talk” by utilitarian and liberal reformers was intensifying and increasingly receiving the support of governmental officials, who sought to circumvent the rights of individual members and control the legislative agenda. Whereas the defenders of parliamentary inquiries were concerned that Parliament will lose its status as a debating society, governmental officials were concerned that Parliament will be conceived only as such. They criticized the parliamentary culture for nurturing endless debates, arguing against the inefficiency of organizing policy making around parliamentary inquiries and oral modes of communication.

Functioning as a public tribunal – witnesses appearing before MPs who as committee members assumed the roles of judges, barristers and juries – the parliamentary inquiry lacked machinery for the externalization of its gaze. It was, therefore, geared to generating a situations of immediacy that simulated the instant, unmediated, face-to face, visibilities of the adjudicative process in the courtroom. The parliamentary inquiry was thus contained in the judicial evidence with its immediate cognition anchored in specific individuals attuned by oaths to their responsibilities and in the insistence that human voice (as delivered in viva voce testimonies) is in itself quite particularly true.

It is in this constellation that we need to understand the emergence of governmental commissions and their radical impact on parliamentary culture. These commissions were designed to take control of the legislative process by taking over legislative initiative and investigative authority over social problems from parliamentary select committees of inquiry, which were the main mechanism for drafting private bills, while keeping the investigation a way
from the watchful eyes of the press. Consequently, they were constructed as an extra-parliamentary machinery of investigations, transferring a large segment of policymaking to exploration “in the field,” far from public scrutiny. In contrast to the parliamentary inquiry, which was guided by the oral culture of Common Law adjudication and predicated on verbal evidence taken *viva voce* in testimonial hearings that were often open to the public, many governmental investigations were based on new standards of facticity, embedded in a visual economy of empirical explorations: the discovery of new evidence through observations of social facts “in the field.”

Under the standard narrative of field exploration and scientific discovery, which governmental investigations and their official reports helped to spread, truth became known once it was *seen*, i.e., experienced directly by the governmental investigation through visual perception. In this new “evidential paradigm” (Ginzburg 1989), truth about society like truth about nature could be scientifically “discovered,” by close observation “on the spot”. It was through the unmediated, authentic experiences of the investigator with the social problems “in the field” that the proper way of knowing society was achieved and then translated into an official authoritative reports, printed and publicized widely, so as to influence opinion inside and outside Parliament and elicit support for government’s proposed policies.

I analyze government reports as a new and unique literary-bureaucratic genre of social reportage and trace its link to political reportage of Parliament. I examine social reportage not merely as a source of knowledge retrieval but mainly as a site of knowledge production, as socio-cultural process and a practical experiment. Historians often “mine” the *content* of commission’s reports, but rarely attend to their peculiar *form*. They search for exemplary documents rather than look for the culture of their knowledge construction and the social and

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4 In fact, some governmental commissions – such as the Poor Law Commissions (1832-4) the Factory Commission (1833) and the Handloom Weavers Commission (1837-41) – were specifically created to modify the conclusion that was charted earlier by select committees.
political condition of their production and circulation. I draw mainly on the experience of governmental commissions that operated during the so called “angry 1830s and hungry 1840s,” and focus especially the work of the Poor Law Commission (1832-4), the Factories Commission (1833), the Children’s Employment Commissions (1840-43) and the Sanitary Commission (1842). These new governmental investigations involved a huge labor to monitor social problems in their locale sites, interpret what one see, hears or reads and report it in writing in an effort to transform observable events into meaningful information through which social reality, rendered as calculable, could be digested and communicated to the public. By means of inscription, reality was not simply “recorded” (as in the stenographic transcripts of the court) but composed and made stable, mobile, comparable, and combinable.

Many of the social problems encountered by governmental investigators in their explorations were not visible from the perspective of adjudicative government, nor from the abstract theoretical categories of political economy. A new type of knowledge had to be constructed – a socio-economic knowledge based on ethnographic and statistical explorations – in an effort to expose the reality of daily life which eventually were relegated to the social domain: bodily health, housing, family life, environmental conditions, criminal tendencies, education, sexual activities, gender relations, parenthood, dietary, hygiene (Procacci 1991; Poovey 1995). The empirical exploration of governmental investigations thus worked to transform “social problems” (poverty, unemployment, industrial relations, public health, etc.) from the abstract categories of political economy to the study of their social reality; social problems were examined as a social-behavioral and cultural phenomena that could be carefully observed, study, monitored and govern.

Individuals were no longer understood merely as juridical subjects whose governance was confined entirely to the adjudicative domain of the common law. Rather, they were seen as existing in a dense field of relations between people and people, people and things, people and
events. To secure the well-being of the population, government had to act upon these relations, using a whole range of strategies and tactics. Abstract legal-political knowledge was replaced with concrete, tangible, social facts, generating not only a new category of knowledge but a new domain of expertise – social economy – with its own “epistemic culture,” its own distinctive arrangement of working practices, institutional arrangements, and technologies (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 7). In Part Two, I trace the cultural and institutional transformation of social economy into social science.

1.5.2.2 Organization of Part Two

Part Two is organized as follows. Chapter Seven describes the governmentalization of legislation in the first half of the nineteenth century. I show how the printed media exacerbated adversarial realities in the House of Commons, leading government officials to establish and use governmental commissions to appropriate legislative initiative from Parliament. I then focus on the case of the poor law investigation to show how the study of pauperism paved the way for the creation of social economy as a new type of knowledge which challenged the paradigm of juridical knowledge produced by parliamentary inquiries and political economy. Chapter Eight offers a detailed description of the modus operandi of field explorations by governmental investigations and their effect on the developing practices of social reportage. Chapter Nine presents a systematic comparison between the legal model of parliamentary committees of inquiry and the explorative model of governmental investigations. So far, despite some studies on specific aspects of governmental commissions or on parliamentary committees, these instruments have not been subjected to any systematic study or comparative analysis regarding their method of operation. In the second part of the chapter I discuss a specific comparative
case: the rivalry between Sadler’s parliamentary inquiry and the Factories Commissions, which were both assigned to investigate into the condition of work in the factories in 1832-3.

1.5.3 Part Three – A New Public Culture: The Public Promotion of Social Science

Part Two explains how the growing presence of the Press in Parliament encouraged government to take cultural and institutional control of the legislation process, thus establishing a new parliamentary regime that conditioned specific patterns of investigation and publication and made social knowledge into legitimate domain of expertise. In Part Three, I describe how the growing power of the Press created an avalanche of information about Parliament in newspapers, which was partisan and contradictory. This dynamic created additional incentives for governmental officials to enter the media market; they did so by producing and disseminating “official knowledge” about politics and society on a massive scale in an attempt to control the diffusion of information as a way of directing public opinion and elicit support for their public policies. The increasing involvement of the British government in the media market, producing was thus conducive to the growing visibility of social knowledge and growing presence of social expertise in the public sphere.

The massive production and dissemination of governmental reports during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, has to be understood as an institutional response to these two challenges: within Parliament they were part of the governmentalization of legislation, outside of Parliament they were part of a larger attempt to control and manage the variety and contradictory political discourses in the public sphere, through a massive dissemination of governmental reports about society. It was the combined response of the British government to these two
interrelated challenges posed by the printed Press, which eventually led to the emergence of social science.\(^5\)

By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the British government emerged as an enterprising publisher, supervising the printing, binding, and mass circulation of printed materials (Frankel 2004 2006). The central mode of activity was not centralization but publication. The so-called “growth of government” or “revolution in government” in the first half of the nineteenth century was not so much a process of bureaucratic centralization but one based on the circulation of official reports and the diffusion of social knowledge (Harling 1996). Politicians were deeply invested in the preparation of these reports, in their content, design and public dissemination. Their publication often involved specific commercial considerations, and many reports were specifically designed to win over the reading public by making them conform to the competence and cultural expectations of the “consumers” whom the government wanted to attract. The cultural repertoires of print culture, offered by official reportage, when intertwined with repertoires of market capitalism offered by parliamentary reformers, generated new modes of sociability, most noticeably the model of politics as “public communication.”

My goal is to explore the connection between the public diffusion of social knowledge and its scientific appropriation. We can think about the scientific appropriation of social knowledge as a series of experiments in governmental incorporation. The ultimate political goal of these experiments is to translate social knowledge into social policy by defining the domain of the social as a knowable entity by generating useful intelligence about social relations and conditions so that these might be governed. Yet such incorporation may not succeed at all. One central condition for its success was publicity – its public diffusion as “useful knowledge.” Without some degree of publicity official knowledge about society was likely to remain the

\(^5\) As Wolf Lepenies reminds us, from the very moment of its inception, social reportage – sociography – came onto an inevitable conflict, as well as cooperation, with the national press over the claim to offer an adequate reproduction of the “prose of social life and everyday circumstances” (1988: 13-4)
personal knowledge of public officials or local notables. The scientificity of social knowledge, I argue, crucially depended on the success of these experiments and as such was inextricably connected to an ideology of publicity through printed texts.

If the production of official governmental reports about social problems made social knowledge a legitimate domain of expertise, its scientific appropriation took place exactly at the moment where governmental reports were circulating to such an extent that a cultural understanding of social knowledge began to emerge as a type of knowledge which belongs to a community that extends beyond the milieu of politicians and officialdom. A successful translation of social knowledge into social science is largely determined, therefore, by opportunities to “go public” – to gain support and recognition outside of the political sphere by creating a network of relations with other civic organizations and social groups so that new knowledge cultures will be “spilled and woven their tissue into society” (Knorr Cenita 1997: 8). According to Paul Feyerabend, the same is true for development natural science. Scientific progress has rarely been the result of an intra-professional development but has always needed an element of public and political persuasion. When Galileo, for example, discovered the moons of Jupiter he did not contact a few colleagues and discuss it with them, nor did he publish his findings in a learned journal. He wrote a pamphlet about them, in Italian, with pictures, got it printed up himself, sold them in the streets and it became a best seller (Feyerabend 1975).

As I show, governmental commissions enabled Victorian political reformers qua social investigators to enter into a kind of double alliance with both officialdom and the lay public and allow them to play a major role in the expansion of government both inside and outside Parliament. Through the production and dissemination of governmental reports theses social investigators were able to wield knowledge as power, claiming legitimacy for their expertise and credibility for the knowledge that they produced because they were, in a real sense, in the know about the objects that they sought to govern. Internally, they allied themselves with
governmental authorities, translating political concerns into a new vocabulary of social problems in official reports, which enabled the executive branch to centralize legislation by blocking and transferring legislative initiative and practice from individual MPs to the cabinet. Externally, these investigators sought to form alliances with the lay public, promoting public communication and shaping public opinion by translating the public’s daily worries into their reports, while publishing short journalistic version of it for easier digest.

By deploying their expertise to translate the interests of politicians, governmental officials and the lay public into their own, Victorian social investigators managed to make their fact-finding model of investigation the *obligatory mode* for the operation of the governmental network as a whole (see Latour 1987). Only after this governmental form of social expertise was well entrenched in British political and administrative systems and proved its relevance and usefulness to lay constituencies in the public sphere, a wide network of association related governmental investigations (I focus on two associations in particular: SDUK and NAPSS), was it able to migrate into the universities, where it was appropriated by academics in their different social science disciplines. At this conjuncture, the model of governmental investigations was also migrating outside of Britain to associations in Europe and the United States making social science an international domain of expertise mobilized by an international group of political reformers.

1.5.3.1 Concluding Remarks on Public Reportage and Reciprocal Inspections

Unlike Weber who argued that disenchantment was *caused* by a process of increasing rationalization driven primarily by science (1946a), I argue the inverse: that the disenchantment of politics preceded its rationalization and served as the condition of possibility for the
emergence of social science.\textsuperscript{6} What I am describing is essentially the structuring of a reciprocal inspection between Parliament and the public, mediated by print. Simply put, the infiltration the Press into Parliament and the disenchancing effect that the public gaze had on its discourses and practices, created incentives for, and conditioned patterns of, governmental gaze into society. This reciprocal process was advanced mostly by means of public reportage, a new genre of fact making, which included both reports about politics in the Press and reports of politicians about society. Public reportage developed as a new form of social and political expertise, which historicized parliamentary speech and procedures, took possession of them and gave them official authority and extra-parliamentary official dimension, first as political and later as social knowledge.

Jeremy Bentham, who at the start of the nineteenth century was the most recognized leader of the political reform movement (a coalition of Liberal Whigs and radical utilitarians), was probably the first British philosopher to connect Print Culture with the inter subjective nature of public reportage, and to formulate an elaborated ideology of print as a method of political reform (Bentham 1791, 1802, 1817, 1824). In Bentham’s scheme, the principle of reciprocal inspection – the possibility of a flexible shifting of the roles between the observer and the observed – is a dominant principle in the modern public sphere “whose vehicle [is] the written word” (Habermas 1989: 51), and implies a more equal distribution of the power through inspection.

\textsuperscript{6} This argument owes a great deal to Gil Eyal (2002, 2006) account of the emergence of expertise in Arab affairs (Orientalism) as an academic profession in Israel. It is important to note that Weber does not provide any clear explanation of how exactly science “disenchant the world,” probably because as a sociologist he was more concerned in answering how is it that people have come to act as if the world is disenchanted. According to Gilbert Germain, “Weber makes it clear … that de facto mastery of the world is not a precondition for disenchantment. Rather, the world is disenchanted when it is perceived as a potential object of mastery, regardless of the actual level of calculative control attained by a particular social order” (1993: 28; my italics).
The modern history of the relationship between science and the state is commonly and falsely associated with an inexorable move toward increasing professionalization, specialization and a proliferation of expert discourses *at the expense* of public discourse. Even Foucault, who developed his conception of visuality as surveillance power of government in the modern state, based on his reading of Bentham’s *Panopticon* (1977: 195-228), fails to acknowledge the interactive and complex character of the visual experience produced by print culture. As I show in Chapter Six, although Bentham did not quite reverse the roles of the governor and prisoners as inspectors and inspected in his depiction of the Panopticon, he certainly did so in his discussion of the role of print in the public sphere. Unlike the total institution of the prison, in the public sphere the citizens – as a reading public – were empowered by the ascendancy of print culture to inspect political authority.

1.5.3.2 Organization of Part Three

Part Three is organized as follows. Chapter Ten explains the important link between reform, the development of social expertise and the political economy of Print. I show how the first “scribal community” of social scientists, emerging in middle decades of the nineteenth century was organized around the production and circulation of governmental reports and was dominated by political reformers who played an imperative role in articulating an ideology of print as a basis for a new public culture. I focus, in particular, on The Society for the Diffusion of Social Knowledge (SDUK 1826-1846), established by governmental investigators to organize digest publish and disseminate information about politics and society in a direct competition against the unreliable information published in the Press. Chapter Eleven describes the intellectual career of Harriet Martineau, who collaborated with the SDUK on
several occasions and whose popular writings, I suggest, played an important role in the scientization of British politics. Martineau’s biography, it is argued, reveals an interesting phenomenological and performative intersection between her deafness, her propensity towards social reportage with strong visual content, the wide public circulation of these reports and the scientificity of social knowledge. Chapter Twelve seals the argument by offering a revised history of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Knowledge (NAPSS 1857-1884). I trace the origins of the NAPSS and its model of operation to the new parliamentary regime that was organized around governmental investigations, and argue that the founding of the Association tells a story about politicians *qua* social investigators becoming the *institutional entrepreneurs* of social science. A content analysis of the NAPSS annual transaction shows that governmental investigations served as the main source for the papers delivered in its conference and provided the model for the research projects that were initiated by the association. With the establishment of the NAPSS in 1857, as a result of the political instability of the 1850s, the domain of social expertise was transferred from its point of origin in government and was institutionalized as “social science” in the public sphere.
2. Methodology: The Analytical Model

The history of social science literature was, until very recently, structured around two general opposing views, leading to a polarized situation with intellectualists with their internalist approach to science and contextualists with their externalist approach to science conducting relatively unconnected studies (Shapin 1992). The internalist approach typically consists of analyzing values and ideas about the social world, mostly using a cognitive-internalist method, based on comparing and interpreting texts. Internalists focus on autonomous abstractions (‘ideas’, ‘theories’, ‘values’), which take place only contingently in particular (and ‘brilliant’) human minds and then articulated in various texts to provide a pattern of human history as a whole. These ideas and values about society are treated as an independent-internal history, often called the “history of ideas.” Often, in this approach, social science is conceived as a set of ideological tradition, each committed to specific set of values (liberal, conservative and others), and it is through these values that social scientists perceive social problems and formulated social theories. With this circular use of ideology or values as both cause and content of social theory, the intellectualist approach effectively mystifies the activities and the scheme of thought that it seeks to uncover.¹

Methodologically, writing the history of sociology as an intellectual “history of ideas” entails the comprehension of texts by discovering the relation they bear with other texts. Relations between texts are then frequently interpreted as influences, usually by “assuming an immanent development whereby text ‘B’ is more or less logically follows from text ‘A’” (Heilbron 1995: 8). At best, such internalist history will let readers understand the overall social

¹ Thus, for example, according to one internalist approach the development of social science in Britain or the United is ultimately attributed to more or less unified Anglo-American liberal values of individualism and empiricism and to the prominence of positivism (Parsons 1937; Annan 1959; Mazlish 1989). These values are said to be the building blocks of both British and American social theory, which structures the way social scientists in these societies perceived social problems and formulated solutions to it.
experience of those authors by clarifying the relations between their analyses and the debates of their time, and make connections between their analyses and those of their predecessors, rivals, and allies.

Most intellectualist history of social science are therefore written as a story about the development of social theory. The main purpose of this intellectualist narrative is to construct institutional coherency and academic legitimacy by appropriating well-chosen predecessors and a sort of Pantheon of their major works whose “scientific” ideas are dealt with as relatively unambiguous units with fairly sharply defined boundaries. In sociology, for example, this internalist history commonly introduced in a three-part narrative: “Foundations” (leading up to Comte and Marx), “Classical Sociology” when the founding fathers (centering on Durkheim, Weber, and Marx), set the framework of sociological theory and “Modern Sociology” (Connell 1997). The familiar canon embodies a story of great men who created sociology in response to dramatic changes in European society: the industrial revolution, class conflict, secularization, alienation, and the modern state. Thus, for Bottomore, sociology “was above all a science of the new industrial society” ([1962] 1987, p. 7), in Nisbet’s (1967) formula it was the result of “the two revolutions,” industrial and democratic, and for Giddens’s (1989) it was the product of industrialization and urbanism. This type of history conveys essential elements of professional academic ideology. Central to this ideology is the conviction that intellectual activity can be reduced to a small number of abstract schemes, which are then treated as the principal element of social science analyses.

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2 For example, in sociology the familiar canon embodies a story of great men who created sociology in response to dramatic changes in European society: the industrial revolution, class conflict, secularization, alienation, and the modern state. Sociologists take this account of their origins seriously. The classical texts are widely cited, and it is not uncommon for research papers, monographs, or treatises to identify themselves as having a Marxist, Durkheimian, or Weberian approach. In fact, as Connell (1997: 1515) observes, among the social sciences, sociology exercise the “most intense interest in the writings of a small group of putative founding fathers” and as such presents the most extreme case of “identity-defining focus on a small group of classical theorists.” Connell’s observation is echoed by Andrew Abbott’s sarcastic reamrk that sociologists, “like tribesmen … get to know one another through long discussions about kinship that serve to establish their common ancestors” (2001b: 11).
In contrast to the intellectualist approach, the externalist method challenges the assumption that abstract ideas, elaborated by texts, has an autonomous existence. Here social processes is presented quite separately from treatment of intellectual development, and the focus shifts from social theory to its external context of production. Contextualist histories of social science typically draw two kinds of correspondences between an “internal” social theory and “external” social influences, motives, and interests, which effectively eliminates the problem of drawing any sort of necessary connection between this social context or setting and the content of works produced there. In Marxist history, for example, texts and ideas have no autonomy, they are merely a resource appropriated by political actors when it is consistent with their interests. Social science is therefore treated only as a reflection a specific class-based ideology and interests.3 From this perspective, social science only gives the appearance of universalism to particularistic intervention that is based above all on the principle of reproducing capitalist relations of production.4

In system theory, researchers are looking for a (functional) correlation between the development of the social system and the (cognitive) development of texts. Many studies of “institutionalization,” or “professionalization,” of social science which the historical sociology of social science focus only on the organizational or administrative aspects of science (funding

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3 For example, In Schwendinger and Schwendinger’s The Sociologists of the Chair, sociology is developed as an intellectual project aimed at satisfying the needs of their patrons for ideological justification, either through functionalism or via a representation of sociologists as cynical political ideologues. The rapid and powerful development of academic sociology in America is therefore explained as providing the necessary ideology for “the corporate-liberal state, social class inequality, the centralization of capital, and modern imperialism” (1974: xxvi). More generally, the development of academic social science in America is commonly depicted as an attempt by New England intellectuals to secure their class interests and reestablish their position in society in a period of rapid industrialization (Furner 1975; Foner 1988; Haskell 2000). On the other hand, Marxist historians explain the relative weakness of academic social science in Britain as a result of a class-based alliance between British middle-class and the aristocratic elite (Anderson 1968; Gouldner 1970: 125-6; Soffer 1982).

4 Habermas’s Towards a Rational Society (1970) provides one of the most penetrating examples of this approach. According to Habermas, because traditional ideologies have long been “disenchanted” by capitalist rationalization, the state appropriates science to convert political questions into soluble technical problems. In this way social science is being used to balance a “legitimation deficit” that results when state’s intervention itself erodes the ideology of "just exchanges" in the market.
sources, departmental organization, informal groupings of faculty) are products of this externalist approach. In these studies, the history of social science is written as a retrospective reconstruction of a set of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines (the ‘social sciences’) that are treated from organizational and logistic perspective. The development of social science thereby becomes the purely logistic problem of organizing the organizational infrastructure of the different disciplines of the social sciences. This approach often lead the rational fallacy of justifying developments in social science as a “correct” (rational) response to particular social interests or to a changing environment (industrialization, modernization, urbanization, etc.), rather than attempting to explain the inner working of its (re)production: how social knowledge is produced organized, disseminated as scientific knowledge through time and space.

One important consequence of this polarized internal/external situation in the history of social science is that analysis of social science as an institutional form is detached from its analysis as an intellectual practice, and the relation between the two is either overlooked or treated as a wholly contingent one. As a result, the history of social science has been mostly written either in the form of accounts of the organizational infrastructure or in the form of accounts of “finished products”: social theories and traditions of thought. This situation effectively eliminates the problem of drawing any sort of necessary connection between institutional settings and the content of the works produced in them (Breslau 1990).

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6 For example, in the institutionalist approach the rise of American social science is explained as an attempt by New England intellectuals to secure their class interests and reestablish their position in society in a period of rapid industrialization (Furner 1975; Haskell 1977; Foner 1988).

7 According to Latour and Woogler, this separation leads to the problem of causal relationship between social and intellectual factors: “does the formation of social groupings (intellectual community) give rise to the pursuit of scientists of certain intellectual lines of inquiry, or does the existence of intellectual problems lead to the creation of social networks of scientists?” (1979: 25)
2.1 Social science and the Question of Relative Autonomy

Another way of presenting the problem with the internal/external historical studies of social science is to say that both assume means-end model of intellectual activity. In effect, much of the debate between intellectualists and contextualists historians of science is due of the fact that both parties are, essentially, engaged in the same type of explanatory project. Both approaches assume that intellectual production is accomplished as a fit between means and ends, and it is therefore considered only in terms of its output and its particular relevance to one's purpose and not as an object of explanation in its own right (Biernacki 2005; Knorr-Cetina 1997).

The only major difference between the internal and external approaches resides in the choice of which elements or factors will be deemed explanatory. In the intellectualist approach, social science is *internally* reduced to the sum of its finished intellectual products (theories, research results, etc.) that are described as the fulfillment of ideals, values and worldviews operating subjectively, in the heads of actors. For contextualists, social science is treated *externally* by tracing the ways by which these intellectual products are being utilized as a resource in accordance with the different economic and political interests that constitute the goals towards which actors, working in different institutions, direct their action.

The key problem with these means-end accounts is that they render knowledge the independent variable. But, in effect, the last thing they do is explain what this knowledge is and how it works (Knorr-Cetina 1997). This tendency to focus on “finished products” underscores the conceptual and analytic virtues of scientific results, while neglecting the more mundane and empirical aspects of the actual work that goes into producing scientific knowledge and to which most resources and labor are devoted: namely, the procedures of observing, recording, classifying, and aggregating that occupy all components of social research (Biernacki 2005; Latour 1987; Pal 1990; Swidler 2001).
What is ignored, in other words, is the role of actual cultural work that went into producing social knowledge – in the constitution of social science as a *particular domain of knowledge*. The paradox is that the internalist focus on social theory and other finished intellectual products as an explication of intellectual engagement with the social world seems supreme and acquires its autonomous status simply because, as a finished product, social scientific knowledge remains abstract, general and empirically un-interrogated (Knorr Cenita 1997). And it is due to the same sort of superficial treatment of intellectual activity that contextualist histories of social science, instead of providing an explanatory account for the ways social knowledge is materialized and reproduced as social science, are often thought to be completed when it can be concluded the “science is not autonomous.”

Clearly, then, both the specific historical question about the emergence of social science and the broader sociological question of relations between intellectuals, knowledge and power pertains to a more general theoretical problem of the connections between scientific practices and the wider society. This question of the “relative autonomy” of social scientific knowledge stands at the center of my inquiry. Both the internalist and externalist approach to “social science” provide reductionist simplification to this complicated problem. It is largely due to their equivocal notion of *relative autonomy* that neither externalism nor internalism can provide a fertile ground for historical research.

As I suggest below, providing an adequate solution to the problem of relative autonomy demands a simultaneous engagement with the two interrelated problems of *reproduction* and *boundary formation*, and involves, therefore, a double move from the conventional means-end approach to the analysis of culture: a discoursive “move-up” from knowledge-as-ideas and an ethnographic “move-down” to how discourse are inscribed in mundane practices of actors (Swidler 2001). It is only through this double move that the historical study of social science can overcome the external/internal epistemological trap.
2.2 Theoretical Models of Intellectual Activity and Scientific Knowledge

Analytically, I look for both the practical conditions and the institutional arrangements within which social science emerged. From this perspective, intellectual activity is at the same time a matter of ‘truth’ and a matter of political strategy and social organization (Jasanoff 1996b). I thus approach the complicated question of “relative autonomy” in terms of two interrelated process: the discursive reproduction of knowledge (Foucault 1973; Latour 1987) and the boundary work which organizes and structures this knowledge as institutional forms of life (Gieryn 1982, 1995 1998), with all the detail and specificity that such project entails.

This dual treatment recognizes that intellectual engagement with the social world always-already refers to two objects simultaneously: its chosen object domain and the social order of the playing field. The aspect of object domain – the “social,” in the case of social science - demands an epistemological “move-up” from knowledge-as-ideas to the way knowledge is (re)produced by discursive practices. It requires an analysis of discourse because we cannot assume that a certain form of rational knowledge existed to provide experts with authority, but must show how this particular form of knowledge was shaped by discursive practice so as to constitute its own “domain of application” (Foucault 1962 1972 1973). The aspects of social order, on the other hand, necessitate an empirical “move down” away from ideas as an “abstract stuff” in the head of actors and into their mundane practices as they are inscribed in the physical and the habitual, configured along social boundaries, and then mobilized and translated by social agents in collaborative efforts or in the course of competition over legitimacy and authority.

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8 For example, in his discursive analysis of the emergence of the “medical gaze”, Foucault shows that the clinical investigation was shaped by the construction of the patient body as a “domain of application”: a category of entities that were understood to be significant, i.e., that it was both possible and worthwhile to observe them, and to interpret what one sees (Foucault 1962).
It is important to note that this “move-down” principle of *mundanity* should not be limited to the realm of ‘lower’ or ordinary life, the lives of so-called common people. Certainly that is how the discipline of social history has tended to interpret matters, but it need not be restricted to such a reference. What the empirical “move down” captures is that *power is ordinary*, not that it is necessarily exercised by ordinary people or lower-level institutions. This study wishes to locate the mundane in high-level institutions of politics, in the daily work of legislators, government officials and state administrators.

This double move requires us to use the same resources in explicating closure, stability and change in people’s *knowledge of the world* as well as in their *organization of life in the world* for each is constitutive of the other (Jasanoff 1996b). It involves, in other words, paying simultaneous attention to how culture (discursively) influence action and to how people (pragmatically) use culture. Under this approach, the story I tell about how scientific order is achieved in social knowledge draws upon the same analytical tools and strategies that I use when I analyze the rules, institutions and culture in the world of politics.

From a Foucauldian perspective, the policymaking process operates as a discursive formation, which generates discursive positions that specify definitions of the relevant objects, questions, and proper techniques for an area of study. At the same time, these discursive practices are utilized and manipulated (inscribed, mobilized and translated) by different actors in their jurisdictional struggles over legitimacy and authority. This boundary work authorizes specific researchers as spokespersons for those objects, by specifying who can legitimately produce authoritative knowledge in the field in question, and under what conditions.
2.2.1 Discoursive Events and Discoursive Formations: Social Knowledge as Archive

Foucault’s use of the term ‘discourse’ may be taken to be tactical, a way to avoid treating knowledge in terms of 'ideas'. Analyzing knowledge as 'ideas', according to Foucault, carries at least three presuppositions that he wishes to discard: (1) that ‘ideas’ are knowledge by virtue of being “finished products,” a resource utilized to achieve specific ends; (2) that 'ideas' are knowledge by virtue of being logical propositions that presents themselves for external validation as ‘truth’; (3) that ‘ideas’ are knowledge by virtue of being an abstract and mental representation inside people’s head and is thus tied to the apparatus of production of thought by a human subject. Put together, these three presuppositions constitute a kind of a logical necessity in historical investigations that apply the means-end model: where ideas as “finished products” being treated as logical propositions (e.g., theories) and at the same time having specific 'authors'.

It is not generally recognized that Foucault developed the conceptual tool of “discoursive formation” (as a “move up” from ideas) to challenge means-end models of knowledge by reformulating the problem of relative autonomy as one of reproduction. Foucault, especially in his earlier writing, was interested in explaining, without recourse to some knowledge of what the "truth" should be (i.e., that theories or ideas are adopted because they are somehow "correct" and "true"), how certain discoursive "events" were replicated, while others disappeared (Foucault 1972: 27; cf. Eyal 2002). This sort of explanation, Foucault argued, requires a “move up” from knowledge-as-ideas to knowledge-as-discoursive-practices. Discoursive practices established a definite set of relations between discoursive events, which worked to preserve them. Such relations (which Foucault termed discoursive formations) carry a certain necessity (positivity), but not because they are taken for granted, not because actors do not think about them, but because they think with them, because they govern how the objects of discourse are formed or what modes of observation and formulation are available.
Foucault called this set of relations between discursive events the *archive*: “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements … which differentiate discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration” (1972: 129-30). The archive is not an institution nor a library of statements but the system that establishes statements as discursive events and things. For Foucault, the archive of a given period is composed of the totality of discursive formations or ensemble of statements which constitute a given field of knowledge. Understood as an archive, “social science” is the result of different discourses that take “society” as its object of study. Foucault developed the concepts of the discursive formation and the archive to directly confront the “history of ideas” and replace the normative concept of “scientific discipline,” which assumes the self-evident unity of such discourses:

By this term [archive] I do not mean the sum of all texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents attesting its own past … nor do I mean institution, which, in a given society, make it possible to record and preserve those discourses that one wishes to remember and keep in circulation. On the contrary … it is rather the reason why so many things, said by so many men, for so long, have not emerged in accordance with the same laws of thought, or the same set of circumstances … but they appeared by virtue of a whole set of relations that are peculiar to the discursive level; why instead of being adventitious figures, grafted, as it were, in rather haphazard way, on to silent processes they are born with specific regularities… The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statement as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass … but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred, in accordance with specific regularities (1972: 129).

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9 The etymology of the term archive best captures Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge. From the Latin *archivum*, “residence of the magistrate,” and from the Greek *arkhe*, to command or govern, archives are forms of governmental administration that order knowledge (e.g., criteria of evidence, proof, testimony, and witnessing) both in the authoritative-imperative and taxonomic-scientific sense (Stoler 2002).

10 As Lois McNay (1994: 66) points out, the *archive* is Foucault’s term of choice to replace the term episteme, which Foucault was never to use again after The Order of Things. In an attempt to respond to critiques that the episteme was an overly idealist, structuralist notion, Foucault emphasized the historical transformations and possibilities of the archive. Like the Episteme, the Archive is defined as a general condition of possibility – the system of discursive regularities – which determines what can and cannot be spoken in a given historical era. Foucault stresses, however, that the archive is composed of multiple and varying discourses; it is not a limiting or contrasting formation but an enabling system of rules which is never entirely complete and which is therefore always open to change. The archive is a regulative rather than a constitutive principle Conceptualized as an archive the episteme is defined in operational terms and turns into a “culture in action.”
According to Foucault, a discursive formation cannot derive its coherence through reference to the same object. We do not get an object by digging deeper into structures and we do not look for intentions. We look for regularities. We want to know the rules by which this discourses operate. By figuring out these rules we can discover how objects are composed and spread, how they (re)produced as unities through time and space.

Foucault’s archeological method should be read, therefore, as an oblique kind of celebration of archival reason. ¹¹ This is partly because Foucault’s world is a chaotic world of discursive events, a world of transient performative utterances, in which knowledge is produced instantaneously out of the endless flow of discursive events. In this world, change and irregularity is the norm. What needs to be explained is stability and coherence (De Certeau 1984: 75).

If the world is a world of instantaneous events, than what distinguishes social entities is their property of replication and repetition, of being events that keep happening in the same way. Accordingly, Foucault asks: what is the unifying principle that enables us to identify a certain group of statement with a specific field of study? Foucault’s archaeologies answer this question by discerning the ways in which various discursive events and practices surrounding them come together in discursive formations, offering positions to subjects who circulated in these formations and among these discourses. Discourse formation, in other words, involves this

¹¹ This point is often missed in recent trends of using Foucault’s discursive approach in “critical studies.” These studies focus their attention on demystification of power/knowledge schemes, and not so much on their condition of possibility. Social science histories are thus written “from the bottom up,” as popular narratives of in a political effort to re-situate those who appeared as objects of the colonized efforts of the state. This sort of critical engagement with texts is devoted to a reading of official documents “against their grain” in order to reveal the language of rule and the biases inherent in statist perceptions (Stoler 2002). Official reports are linked to modern state power and analyzed as a type of colonial documents which perpetuate managerial and technical discourse of subjection and control (see, e.g., Ashforth 1990; Burton and Carlen 1979; Bhabha 1994; Sheriff 1983). But discourse analysis is not a question of whether certain unities are real or false, it is a method of analyzing the way these unities came into existence according to certain condition of possibility for the (re)production of knowledge. Striving to apply Foucauldian analysis critically by deconstructing all sorts of texts, do not seem to take the notion of the archive seriously enough (I develop this critique in the concluding chapter).
meticulous and subtle mechanism: the transformation of utterances into statements. Foucault differentiates utterances and statements, the two representing “a kind of gradation between different types of discourse.” While the first are local and momentary “‘uttered’ in the course of the day and in casual meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it, the latter are units of powerful translocal and lasting discourses “which are reiterated, transformed or discussed” (Foucault 1972: 220). Not every utterance works outside the moments of its emergence. “There is a certain materiality (steadiness) and mediality (circulation) necessary to run an extended discourse” (Scheffer 2007: 4). It is important to realize that Foucault analysis of the “formation of discourse” out of multiple, fleeting, utterances is essentially phenomenological: the transformation of utterances into statements takes place at different sites, in different temporalizations; discursive units vary in accordance to the way they circulate and interrelate; their survival depends on their spatio-temporal expansion.

2.2.2 The Archive/Episteme and the Practical Epistemology of Actors

Under the knowledge retrieval paradigm, archives are treated as a means to an end and documents are invoked piecemeal and selectively to confirm the present-academic practice of social science. This practice often leads to the shared intellectualist conviction that it is in the writing of academic theoreticians that the secrets and treasures of the “social science” are really stored. Foucault archeological method, suggests, in contrast, that we ask what insights about social knowledge might be gained from attending not only, not even primarily, to its archival content, but to the politics of its articulation and reproduction. We are asked, in other words, to attend the practical condition of knowledge reproduction: to study archives not as fully autonomous sites of knowledge retrieval but as relatively autonomous sites of knowledge
production – i.e., to reflect on how the making of documents, their usage, circulation, valorization, attribution, appropriation which vary with each culture, constitute social knowledge as an archive in the first place (Foucault 1988).

Within the framework of knowledge politics, social science is studied not in terms of their “expressive value or formal transformations” but as genres of documentation, cultures of inquiry, and archival conventions – the “modes of existence” and the “conditions of possibility,” which shape what could be written and what warrants repetition. Following Foucault celebrated questions: "What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? (1988: 210), Ann Stoler (2002) recommends that instead of looking at exemplary documents, historians of knowledge should focus their attention on “sociology of copies,” the practice of writing and reporting and the system of classification and the organization of printing copies, in order to figure out the politics of social knowledge.

In other words, what Foucault’s archaeologies push to the fore is the notion that “ideas” or scientific statements only account as knowledge by virtue of their performance. Intellectual activity depends, at least as much, on mundane investigatory practices – i.e., creating and mobilizing technical capacities, associated with instruments, the writing of reports and protocols – as it does of theory construction. This insight opens the possibility to broaden Foucault’s notion of knowledge/power to practical alignments between human agents and material technologies – objects, instruments, skills and various social networks, which, working together, constitute the discursive field of knowledge.

Yet, while Foucault discoursive approach gives us an important tool to explain how culture influence action, it does not show how people use culture. Foucault never really explains the role of social actors in the stabilization and reproduction of knowledge. We get no account of how historical agents produce, manipulate and respond to discourses. Because the archive is not
the content of what anyone says or do, but the system of meanings that allows them to say anything meaningful at all, Foucault’s archaeologies never really resolve the question of whether social action is completely determined by discursive practices. Often in his writings Foucault seem to view individual identity and action, indeed, even originality, as the product of capillary disciplinary structures of power. But historians of science can readily point to examples of individuals who have fashioned their own intellectual identities in ways that cannot be simply explained as a result of hegemonic discursive structures alone.

Foucault understanding of agency is therefore too weak; people are more active than his conceptual framework suggest. Some recognition of the capacity of individuals for autonomous self-expression – outside existing disciplines, at the crossover points between disciplines, or in opposition to the prevailing currents within their discipline – seems to be required. We need to think about agency - performance, doing things. To dismiss the understandings of how human actors are involved in the reproduction of knowledge is to relegate them status of bearers of discourse-as-structure, denying a role for agency. Such an analysis fails to account for both the appeal and success of particular discourses, and the reasons why people are actively involved in sustaining them.

Moreover, this severe lack in agency turns to be especially problematic in Foucault’s politics of knowledge. Discursive formation may generate a political culture with real political effects, but these effects are by no means neutral with respect to competing groups. Knowledge production often occurs in politically charged social and cultural constellations of real people with real agendas working within institutional networks. If we wish to explain the empirical question the emergence of social science as an within the power/knowledge scheme, we cannot focus only on how knowledge shapes action. We must also to explain how actors wield knowledge as power.
Foucault’s archeological method must, therefore, be complemented by an approach which is more sociologically oriented. Foucault’s “move-up” from knowledge-as-ideas needs to be complemented by a sociological “move-down” from ideas. In particular, it needs to be accompanied by a rich and detailed account of how this action is inscribed in the physical and the habitual, and then played out, often as a mundane activity, by actors in the social field (cf. Swidler 2001). Steven Shapin’s history of science (1994 1996 1999), for example, targets the everyday life of intellectual production. Instead of prejudging what noticeable features of everyday scenes might or might not be pertinent to stories about the making and justification of knowledge, his studies develop a rich and detailed stories about truth-making in particular settings. The central question therefore becomes in all cases: How did they do it? And the answer must come to grips with such mundane processes as “conversing, persuading, cajoling, coercing, manipulating, testifying about experience and receiving the testimony of others, making marks on blackboards, inscribing in print and circulating printed objects, gesturing, grimacing, grunting (and witnessing others do so), retrieving routine social knowledge about the standing and identity of those making claims, asserting modified and new identities, and so on and on” (Shapin 1999: 6-7).

“Moving down” from knowledge-as-ideas, we should ask not only who is an author, but also what is a writer, what is writing, how is it different from speaking, etc. The discoursive analysis of “literary authorship” and its relations to “scientific authorship” that admits certain subject while excluding others, must be supplemented by a complementary analysis of how the concept the author is inscribed in habitual practices of writing and then translated by different groups in the social field to acquire autonomy and author-ity. A discoursive analysis has also to take into account, for example, the “syntax of deferral” (the systematic deferment of speech, the

12 According to Shapin “Just as we have well-established genres for writing social histories of the mundane practices of eating, dying, breeding, getting, and spending, so too we can have a social history of the practices of truth-making” (1999: 8)
methodical deceleration of the pace of writing, and the consequent reflexive delay of thought),
and show how it operates in the cultural construction authorship, acknowledged as a specific,
scientific, “temporality and textuality of that space between enunciation and address” (Bhabha
1994: 135), to configure a relative autonomous domain of (social scientific) knowledge.

There are, of course, various ways of integrating Foucault’s discourse analysis with the
“mundaneness postulate” (Shapin 1994, 1999) that underscores practical human activity and
performance. Several sociological frameworks had been suggested to be used in adjunct to the
Foucauldian approach: Erwin Goffman’s symbolic interactionism (Hacking 2004), Bruno
Latour’s actor-network (Bockman and Eyal 2002) and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the field
(Eyal 2002; Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 1998; Mitchell, 1991). In the current study the
complementary “move-down” will focus, with some significant modifications, on Thomas
Gieryn’s boundary work approach to scientific practice, while borrowing freely from some of
Latour’s methodological insights as well as those of other scholars.

I call the new integrated framework of discourse analysis (move up) and boundary work
analysis (move down) – boundary configuration. As I explain below, according to this new
approach, domains of knowledge come into existence as social entities when social actors tie
together (or configure) boundaries in a certain way and within liminal institutional settings (or
boundary organizations). With the new framework of boundary configuration my goal is to
introduce agency into discourse by depicting it as an activity through which social actors
construct knowledge domains, through boundary work, by weaving together networks of
discursive relations through the configuration of social, institutional, conceptual and material
elements in various combination.
2.2.3 Discoursive Formations as Boundary Work: Social Knowledge as a Cultural Space

One of the most basic ontological assumption, implicit in Foucault’s archaeologies, is that there exists a synchronic and logical relation between boundaries and entities: given the constant flux of discoursive events, saying that a set of closed boundaries exists is logically equivalent to saying that a social thing exists. This can be demonstrated by Foucault’s concept of discoursive formation. For Foucault, a ‘discourse’ could be discerned as an ‘entity’ when a group of statements achieves a unity, and could be defined as a single system of formation. A discoursive formation cannot derive its coherence through reference to the same object because an object cannot possess a pre-discoursive identity; it is rather always-already constituted by the discursive framework, by the archive in which it is implicated. The existence of any discoursive formation is conditioned by the archive, operating as regulatory principles (“rules of formations”) that make it possible to distinguish one discoursive formation from another (Foucault 1972). Foucault’s solution to the problem of relative autonomy is therefore based on the (implicit) insight that the archive, being a system of discoursive relations, is not internal to discoursive formations. Rather, it defines its limits, its boundaries. “Discourses,” he emphasizes, “are limited practical domains which have their boundaries” (Foucault 1991a: 61).

Because discoursive formation is defined from without, from its margins, and not from within, from some core or essence, the idea of discoursive formation always-already assumes some type of boundary work which delimitates its territory in time and space; discursive

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13 Foucault identifies four rules of formations: the formation of objects, the formation of enunciative modalities (the rules which determine the positioning of the subject within a discoursive formation), the formation of strategies and the formation of concepts. If in the operation of a group of dispersed statements the operation of any or all of these rules of formation can be discerned, then it can be concluded that a particular discoursive formation has been identified. Foucault explains that the relations between discoursive statements may be organized according to forms of succession, forms of coexistence, and procedures of intervention. Most importantly for our discussion is the Procedures of intervention for conceptual formation which include techniques of rewriting, methods of transcribing, methods of translating, methods of approximating, modes of delimiting, modes of transferring, and methods of systematizing statements (Foucault 1972: 37-9).
formations exist not as “things” but as *boundary configurations*. Against this backdrop, Foucault's failure to address the importance of boundaries as an analytical tool is quite astonishing.

According to Timothy Mitchell, this failure is the main reason for the difficulty in reconciling Foucault’s study of micro-mechanisms of power/knowledge with the larger social structures, which they reproduce or challenge (Mitchell 1991a, 1991b: xi-xii). What Foucault seems to overlook is probably the most important consequence of his power/knowledge project: how is it that at the same time as discursive formation becomes internalized, and by the same methods, it appears to take the form of an external structure? What is ignored, in other words, is the question of relative autonomy of knowledge domains, which Mitchell conceives as the structural effect of discursive relations: how a construct like the “state” (Mitchell 1991a, 1991b) or the “law” (Mitchell 1999) appears to us as having a structural unity, a coherent ‘thing’, when, in reality, each construct is a multiple set of discursive practices?14

To solve this dilemma, Mitchell proposes that we adopt a spatial perspective of discursive action and look at the boundaries between discursive domains such as “state” and “society”. According to Mitchell, however amorphous these boundaries may be, the very image of their existence constitutes a mechanism that generates discursive power. This discursive power enables or constrains people’s concrete range of activity by making them experience what is essentially a set of internalized discursive practices as external reality, which Mitchell calls *structural effect* (1991a; 1999). In his study of the colonization of Egypt (1991b), Mitchell analyzes the emergence of the domain of the Egyptian colonial state not as

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14 According to Mitchell, “the precise specification of space and function that characterize modern institutions, the coordination of these functions into hierarchical arrangements, the organization of supervision and surveillance, the marking out of time into schedules and programs – all contribute to constructing a world that appears to consist not of a complex of social practices but of a binary order.” On the one hand, there are “individuals and their activities,” on the other hand there appears to be “an inert structure that somehow stands apart from individuals, preexists them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives.” Mitchell argues that this binary structure reflects the “peculiar metaphysic of modernity, where the world seems resolved into the two-dimensional form of individual versus apparatus, practice versus institution, social life and its structure – or material reality and its meaning” (1991b: xii).
an actual structure, but as the powerful *structural effect* of discursive practices. Instead of simply collapsing the realms of state and society into a seamless web of relations, where differentiations are no longer legible, where all distinctions between inside and outside become fluid and evaporate, and where the ideas of autonomy and bounded practice therefore lose much of their meaning, Mitchell suggests that we can still maintain a realistic notion of the relative autonomy of the state if we understood it as the ever-precarious outcome of negotiations about flexible and shifting boundaries between state and society (1991a; 1999).

By understanding the discoursive domain of social science as the structural effect of a *boundary work* between science and politics, I wish to follow the insights of Mitchell’s Foucauldian perspective, but give it a more concrete and sociologically satisfactory form by introducing agency into discourse. Although the term “boundary work” is usually associated with Tom Gieryn (1983, 1995, 1999) it is has been used, explicitly or implicitly, as an analytical tool, by various scholars such as Steven Shapin (1989 1992), Sheila Jasanoff (1990 1996a), Bruno Latour (1987, 1993) and Andrew Abbott (1988, 2001), in order to explain the demarcations made between science-and non-science, between different domains of knowledge and between actors and different types of expertise and professions. In the rest of this section, I will focus on Gieryn’s cartographic model of boundary work. Other models will be introduced in the following sections as modifications to Gieryn’s cartographies.

2.2.4 Gieryn’s Model of Boundary Work: Boundary work and Cultural Cartography

Gieryn’s notion of boundary work refers to how actors carve out a domain of cognitive authority for their science. For Gieryn “science is nothing but a space, one that acquires its authority from and through episodic negotiations of its flexible and contextually contingent
borders and territories” (Gieryn 1995: 405). Based on this spatial understanding of science, boundary work is defined as the: “the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e. to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organisation) for purpose of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activity as non-science” (Guer yr 1983: 782).

The virtue of this operational definition of science is that it perceives the relative autonomy of knowledge as an action category: it describes a certain type of work, an activity, something people do. It is not a structural concept, but a concept which focus on strategic action. The definition tells us exactly what it is that we need to do in order to analyze science as a boundary work: (1) analyze how actors define science; find out what they consider to be ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ practices, problems, tools, theories, conceptions, behavior, enunciations, people; (2) analyze how these boundary work strategies relate to cultural cartographies of what is and is not science; (3) analyze outcomes in terms of a territorial (or jurisdictional) struggles between groups that make claims on knowledge.15

Gieryn’s understanding of science is guided by the insight that institutional explanation to the problem of relative autonomy can be effective only insofar as the boundary in question is the actors’ boundary and not one imposed or projected arbitrarily onto the past. Boundary work is therefore an attempt to avoid essentialism, not as a reified content, but as relations of things that are codified, mobilized, translated and classified by living actors within cultural maps. In his studies Gieryn shows that there is not one best way to organize science/policy boundaries, as there is no stable definition of science or politics, nor a fix set of rules about the most desirable division of labor between experts and policy makers (Gieryn 1999). For example, scientists will

15 Gieryn identifies four types of ‘boundary work’: (1) establishing a new boundary; (2) moving a boundary; (3) changing the characteristics of a boundary; and 4) changing the rules that govern agreed intersections (1995: 173). He also distinguishes between types of boundary work according to their utility and thus identifies three ‘genres’ of boundary work: expulsion, expansion and protection of autonomy (Gieryn 1999: 15-17).
tend to draw vague boundaries around science and politics (stress similarity) when they see possibilities for expansion of their role in the political process, but will tend to draw sharp boundaries when they perceive the political process as a threat that could compromise their position. More specifically, social scientists tend to draw very sharp lines between facts and values, science and politics, objectivity and ideology when they fear politicization of their field as a threat to autonomy or academic status at the university. On the other hand, they will tend to play down such differences when they think they can develop a beneficial role by more political/policy involvement.

Gieryn (1999) situates his operational definition of science in a spatial model of *cultural cartography* in order to describe “the actual organization of science-in-society”. In this spatial model, the relative autonomy of intellectual activity is treated as a *demarcation problem*. Domains of knowledge are understood as jurisdictions, spatial locations on a *cultural maps*. In Foucauldian terms, intellectual activity is seen here as the practice of grouping together sets of discursive events and giving them a stable formation. Such ‘maps’ are, for example, categories such as “science is objective (and politics is subjective);” “science is about truth (and politics is about power);” “science is neutral (and politics is partisan).” Social actors may well treat people, ideas, activities and a range of cultural items (e.g., statistic tables, surveys, committee hearings, reports of commissions, newspaper articles, novels, etc.), differently, depending upon what side of their boundary they happen to place them (Shapin 1989 1992). Thus, in context of the cartographic model boundary, Gieryn’s boundary work works like Foucault’s archive, composed of spatial rules of discursive formation that define logical relations among sets of discursive events based on their position in a cultural cartographic field: nested, overlapping, adjacent, separated. As such, it operates as a system of meaning that regulates how the objects of discourse are treated and determines what modes of formulation are available.
2.2.4.1 Problems with Gieryn’s model of Boundary Work

Gieryn’s concept of boundary work project demonstrates that it is simpler, more direct and more efficient to approach the question of relative autonomy as an action category, since that model restricts itself to the evidentiary and publicly accessible schemas that are immediately implicated in the spatial organization of action itself. The cartographic model thus steers us away from either essentializing or reifying domains of knowledge and toward interpreting their agent-centered constructions in terms of culturally mediated action.

There are, however, several problems with Gieryn’s cartographic model. Probably the most basic problem with Gieryn’s model is its exclusive focus on the spatial dimension. I will address this problem in detail in the next section and offer a new spatio-temporal model, which takes into account both the space and the pace of intellectual activity. But first I need to address three other problems in Gieryn’s model closely interrelated and pertain to Gieryn’s particular conceptualization of boundary work. First, the way Gieryn’s method works best in analyzing how an already established scientists further their interest by altering their boundaries about what is it that they actually do in reference to other groups. In fact, Gieryn gives only examples of an already defined groups of scientists working within a defined scientific institutional settings. His aim is thus limited to showing how different types of claim making by scientists are introduced according to changing circumstances. Gieryn’s notion of boundary work seems less adequate in dealing with how non scientific groups become scientific and how non-scientific knowledge and activities become appropriated by science. Moreover, Gieryn’s model does not pay much attention to how conflict between competing groups on boundary building alters the meaning of science. In other words, Gieryn model does not take historically mediated action seriously enough. And it is exactly at that point that Foucault’s archaeologies become particularly useful.
A second and interrelated problem of Gieryn’s cultural cartography is that at any particular moment there are only two possibilities: science or non-science. The boundaries between these binary poles are shifting as actors claim making goes in one direction or the other. This dichotomous structure fails to address the multiplicity and liminality of adjunct spaces residing in between science and non-science. One problematic result is that scientists and non-scientists are often discussed as if they are already two identifiable groups with clearly articulated interests (Engineers, natural scientists, clergy, politicians, social scientists, etc.). Boundary work is not a simple power struggle between “scientists,” on the one hand, and “non-scientists,” on the other. Instead, various different groups with various different interests have engaged at various different boundaries between various knowledge domains. As they mostly operate within liminal zones, the status of these groups as “scientists” or as “non-scientists” is often unclear. For example, Gieryn’s analysis of various strategies of boundary work between science and politics misses the meditative (and translative) role of many groups that are involved in public policymaking. These groups are not easily situated as politicians or scientists but occupy a liminal zone between science and politics.

This brings us to the third, and probably the most basic problem in Gieryn’s cartographic model: namely, his spatial conception of “boundary”. The cartographic metaphor conceives the relations between science and adjacent fields like geographical boundaries between countries. Boundaries are not conceived as real social entities, but rather treated as simple one-dimensional demarcation lines that ultimately define domains of knowledge by enclosing and separating them from other domains. As Michele Lamont and Virag Molnár observe in their review of boundary studies in social science, in Gieryn’s approach, then, boundary work is usually practiced to achieve expand or eliminate professional closure. Studies influenced by Gieryn’s work tend to approach boundary work as an integral part of the professionalization process; as a result, scholars frequently see boundary making as an activity...
that “generally proceeds through exclusion and that boundaries are salient and mostly have to do with demarcation” (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 86). Underlying much of this work is the assumption that boundary work operates ideally as mechanisms that distinguish or separate an inside from an outside by clarifying difference and establish division. Thus conceptualized, boundary work is not done within boundary territories but from enclosed knowledge domains, by actors who are always-already identified as spokespersons of these domains.

2.2.5 From Boundary Work to Boundary Configuration

To overcome the problems in Gieryn’s account, I suggest, that we treat boundaries as a territorial zones, a real and complex social entities, occupied by actors and resources that do not belong to any pre-existing cultural space in particular (e.g., Bhabha 1994: 70-86). From this perspective, boundary work is conceived as a work done not on the margins of already defined domains of knowledge by their actors-spokespersons but within boundary territories.

This conception of boundaries better captures the dual role of boundary work. It underlines that boundaries are not only conditions for purification (restriction, separation and exclusion), but also for hybridization, i.e., the configuration of objects, discourses and practices. Actors in these boundaries engage not only in institutionalizing differences through purification practices (e.g., expulsion and protection of autonomy) but, most importantly, in practices of knowledge expansion through hybrids. For Latour (1987, 1993), the actual process of knowledge production is based on continuous expansions of network of hybrid objects that, in turn, necessitate discourses of purification, which, by camouflaging hybrids practices (e.g., re-distinguishing politics from science) assure their continuous reproduction. As Latour makes clear, the separation between political knowledge and scientific knowledge is entirely productive: the
more knowledge is purified into the rarefied zones of “pure science” and “pure politics” the more does translation of science into politics and politics into science fill the emptied middle ground with their hybrid offspring. Accordingly boundaries assume a dual function: they serve both as both demarcation lines that separates ‘science’ from ‘politics’ and, more importantly, as the place, the territorial zone, in which actors coordinate and weave them together.

I use the term *boundary configuration* to stress that knowledge expansion through boundary work is not primarily result of pushing or moving the boundary further, thus extending an already given knowledge domain to territories previously occupied by other domains, but rather a product of hybridization: the making of new knowledge domains through practices of translation – establishing homologies across different domains of expertise – and the weaving together of elements from various domains of knowledge which share the same boundaries.

In the next section I present a spatio-temporal model of boundary configuration between science and politics to explain the emergence of social science. The model offers as a new formulation of boundary work which takes into account various intellectual activities, which take place between science and politics. The model integrates Foucault’s discursive method (“move-up” from ideas) with the practice boundary work (“move-down” from ideas) and supplement the cartographical imagery of boundary work with a temporal imagery of knowledge-politics time-economy. In the model, *boundary configuration* of science and politics is accomplished through two corresponding spatio-temporal processes: the *politization of science* and the *scientization of politics*. These process, I contend, are only realizable by means of boundary configurations: successive translations and mediations across a *liminal institutional settings* – an extended range of mediating institutions – defined as *boundary organizations* – working as spatio-temporal filters. I argue that within these liminal zones, the spatio-temporal configurations of scientific and political discourses, practices and people not only allow science and politics to expend into each other domains but play an important role in establishing new domains of knowledge.
2.3 Spatio-Temporal Model of Boundary configurations

We are accustomed to think of science and politics as two fundamentally distinct cultures. Indeed, in many ways, politics is seen as the complete antithesis of science. Science is open-ended, impartial search for truth, while legislation is an adversarial process that ultimately seek compromise. The adversarial nature of politics is often blamed for promoting partisanship and for preventing the appropriate resolution of the scientific inquiry by injecting disagreements and charlatanism into the pure process of science. But this is only part of the story. It is equally true that science and politics are mutually supporting systems and deeply connected social institutions heavily invested in each other. Political institutions has been an active partners in the production and maintenance of credible scientific evidence (Jasanoff 1996b 2004).

We are, therefore, faced with the challenge of transcending the dichotomies of science and politics in a way that could retain a notion of their autonomy, while acknowledging hybridity and mixture between them. There are number of ways to frame the sort of challenge I have in mind, but at least one seems obvious: we need to find a new reconciliation between the liberal-modernist ‘art of separation’ (Walzer 1984) and value sphere differentiation (academic freedom, market freedom, political freedom, etc.), on the one hand, and the post-modern and post-foundational emphasize on displacement, indeterminacy and boundary transgression, on the other hand. If domains such as ‘politics’ or ‘science’ are indeed so radically indeterminant, as postmodernists insist, how can we recognize them?

Gieryn’s attempt to solve this problem by applying a cartographic imagery of intellectual activity as boundary work, joins a long-standing tradition in social theory that has conventionally privileged a discourse of cognitive mapping and spatial zoning, in which ontological issues of similarity and differences are dealt in topological terms. This tradition articulates the social universe in terms of fields, spheres, domains, regions, systems, levels,
centers, peripheries, etc. The cartographic model, however, has a particular problem of conceiving the relative autonomy of bounded practices as a product of flexible and fluid process. If autonomy cannot be sustained in absolute terms and if our goal is to capture the seamless web of relations between science and politics while still holding a structural notion of knowledge domain, an exclusive reliance on spatial imagery of boundary work seems too rigid.

To rectify this problem, I suggest that we develop a new model for understanding the relationships between science and politics based on Dick Pels’ Knowledge-Political Continuum (KPC) (Pels 2003). Pels’ KPC can be reconstructed as a new and improved formulation of boundary work. In the model, science and politics are not divided by any sharp ruptures, but retain their relative autonomy, as distinct forms of life, precisely because they are interconnected through broad transition zones across a range of institutional settings with permeable and frail boundaries, which while suggesting various mixtures between scientific and political practices, nevertheless succeed – as a kind of spatio-temporal filters - in keeping them at arm’s length as relatively autonomous domains of social activity, each with its own unique ordering and amalgamation of human norms, practices, discourses, and knowledges. The practice of treating science and politics as distinct forms of life (as opposed to viewing them as ideal forms of activity) can help avoid the trap of imagining that activities taking place in those domains labeled as “scientific” are somehow free of concerns about values, power, and order, while activities taking place in domains labeled as “political” are somehow not involved in the production of knowledge (see, especially, Jasanoff 1990 1996a).

This multitude of boundaries and transition zones range all the way from the scholastic dispositions of value-free science and academic “Ivory Tower” (the idea of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake) to that of professional state-politics. Between the two poles we find all kinds of practices and institutions that mix and mediate scientific knowledge and politics through which actors may pass in order to shift positions, either temporarily or permanently.
In the model, the relative autonomy of science or politics is a complex and graded reality, which is socially performed and pragmatically accomplished by continuous investments in the many boundaries which incrementally separate politics from science, but at the same time provides many opportunities for cooperation. For example, academic intellectuals publishing journalist pieces, gaining high media profiles, serving on governmental commissions or “defecting” to posts in politics or government administration; members of Parliament publishing articles and books, writing policy reports or “defecting” to teaching posts in universities. A simplified (and up-to-date) version of such model is presented in Figure 1; it includes, traveling from science to politics: university-based research, university based policy-oriented research, academic administration, private research organizations, Governmental policy-oriented research (parliamentary committees and governmental commissions), research units attached to political parties (think tank), professional journalism, government bureaucracies, and legislative bodies.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) The KPC simplifies a complex reality. Clearly, the social world is not a simple linear continuum but a complex, multidimensional, quilt which contains a whole system of relations. Nonetheless, situated within the spatio-temporal model it offers a more nuanced theoretical framework for conceptualizing the relative autonomy of knowledge domains. The simplicity of the model in this case should be regarded as an advantage because it offers both a parsimonious and a powerful explanatory framework.
The KPC offers a phenomenological approach to the question of institutional autonomy. The model articulates, in a relatively simple way, a phenomenology of science/politics differences and relationships by offering an ethnographically enriched picture of what scientists and politicians (in all their different roles, mixtures and combinations) ‘actually do’. In the model, knowledge is performed politically or scientifically by different actors in different institutional settings along the continuum. Each institutional setting may be said to posses its own epistemic culture consisting of a distinctive arrangement of discourses, working practices, and technologies such as different forms of textual inscription and translation. Moreover, the phenomenology of social knowledge, as displayed in the scientific-political continuum, demonstrates that the semantic properties that we ascribe to information along the continuum (e.g., the validity, credibility, truthfulness, objectivity, autonomy), are, in fact, conditioned by the way these information is inscribed, by the material properties of its inscription devises, and by the institutions and practices that condition the use of these textual objects and the regularity of their performance (Nunberg 1996).

The KPC demonstrates that the scientization of politics and the politization of science can never be instantaneous, self-sustaining developments, but are only realizable by means of boundary configurations: successive translations and mediations across an extended range of mediating institutions working as spatio-temporal filters. Similarly, separating “scientific” from “political” knowledge is an ongoing and rather precarious achievement. One cannot stop drawing

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17 Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) uses the term epistemic cultures to underscore the diversity of scientific practices and to contrast domain differences in knowledge-making processes. She defines “epistemic culture” as “those amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms … which, in a given field, make up how we know what we know” (1999: 1).

18 According to Geoffrey Nunberg the semantic properties that we ascribe to textual information are “the reflexes of the institutions and practices that surround the use of these documents.” Institutions and artifacts impose a particular form of registration content. Information is an effect that is experienced at the confluence of a routinized form (eg, a page of a newspaper), its recognizable authoring institutions (eg, the New York Times), and other encoded daily practices (eg, buying or subscribing to a newspaper). One aspect in the creation of such informational genres is the suppression of explicit authorship in the document and its replacement with institutional authorship (Nunberg, 1996: 120).
boundaries between them. The very act of drawing the boundary also transgresses it and produces multiple hybrids. There is not only one boundary which separates between them; at a given time there might be a multitude of boundaries, producing multitude of knowledge-political hybrids.

The scientificity of intellectual activities is therefore as much a product of delineation and relatedness as of action and performance. Scientific domain of expertise emerges as a pragmatic outcome of boundary graded distinction and ongoing negotiations about flexible and shifting boundaries: the configuration of slow and fast time dispositions and of spaces of relative privacy and relative publicity. In *Making a Social Body*, Mary Poovey offers a similar conceptualization of the relative autonomy of knowledge domains. Poovey defines a domain as a fictitious or reified aggregate or totality produced “by the drawing of boundaries and the codification of rules so as to create from what had seemed an undifferentiated continuum of practices and ideas, new and more specialized conceptual—or imaginary—entities” (Poovey 1995: 7; my italics).

### 2.3.1 The Time Economy of Politics and Science

Along the KPC, boundaries not only represent topographical entities (space) but are also the markers of differential time frames (pace). By focusing on the science-political time economy, we can analyze how knowledge is *performed* along the continuum; we can ask, for example, how specific deceleration practices of knowledge production gradually distinguishes this knowledge from “faster” practices of knowledge production, and eventually serving as temporal filters that separate science, from journalism, from politics, and so on (Pels 2001; Bourdieu 1998a: 128-29).
Pels identifies the *absence of haste* as “the primary condition for a successful working of the ‘logic of scientific discovery’” (2003: 35). We can think about this deceleration of political practices as part of the *scientization of politics*. In this process, one of the conditions for the emergence of ‘social science’ as a separate domain of intellectual activity is when knowledge production in political institutions is separated from public practices of immediate performance and subjected to systematic deceleration. From this phenomenological perspective, political activities, such as the legislative process, can be said to become more “scientific.” This temporal profile of scientific activity is also recognized by Bourdieu who sees leisure as a ‘scholastic disposition’ and as conditions of existence of all scholarly fields (1998a: 128-9; cf. Bourdieu 1998b). As a scholastic disposition, having ‘free time’ normally inclines its possessors “to suspend the demands of the situation, the constrains of economic and social necessity, and the urgencies it imposes or the ends it proposes” (Bourdieu 2000: 12). As a result of this “suspending of urgency, the pressure of ‘things to do’,” ‘having’ time to think, read and write, become a prerequisite for intellectual work (Ibid: 206). What Bourdieu seems to suggest in his more recent studies is that the scientific field is defined not so much by struggles over recognition but by the particular time-economy of scholastic practices, which regulates the reputational struggles in the intellectual field and gives it its particular form. From a spatio-temporal perspective, scientific activity comprises bounded terrains of ‘long breadth’ practices of textual inscription, translation and of slow-paced circulation of knowledge, which involves long-term cycles of investment in human and material resources.

As I will show in the next chapters, governmental investigations played an important role in the deceleration of Victorian Political activities, setting the process of social policymaking apart form the demands of urgency and immediacy, which are imposed by more ‘speedy’ practices of politics. The systematic deceleration of political activities is conducive to both scientific creativity and innovation, on the one hand, and to negative slowness of
underproduction (literal idleness) and delay, or indeed, irresponsible overproduction (‘publication waste’), on the other hand. It is no wonder, then, that the slow-paced economy of governmental investigations have been blamed for both under- and over- production as well as for tactics of intentional delay of decision-making.

If leisure is a “scholastic disposition,” which defines the scientific field, politics, by contrast, involves accelerated practices of knowledge production and decision-making. Politicians, expect quicker returns within a much shorter time-span and thus communicates mainly through speaking and accelerated forms of writing (Virilo 1986; Kellner 1999; Pels 2003). As suggested by Latour (2004a: 11-16), politicians are defined by the particular characteristic of taking quick decisions under high pressure of time, and thereby rounding off arguments and dived the collective into enemies and friends. This temporality contrast between academic science and state politics could be traced to the Platonic opposition between the slow paced philosophical skhole and the fast-paced askholia (the Greek word for work) which signified the hurried existence of people in the agora (the ancient Greek public square or marketplace) (Bourdieu 1998a: 128-9). If in the askholia, time is money, and speed is power (Virilio 1986), then acceleration needs to be confronted as a political phenomenon. There is an intimate connection between acceleration and power, which can be illustrated by the fact that “very important people”, who ‘cannot waste their time’, are always in a hurry and always arrive late, forcing ‘ordinary people’ to wait for them (Bourdieu 2000: 224, 226; Virilo 1986).

Another difference, which segregates scientists from politicians, concerns the selectivity and the level of attention to issues. While scientists are expected to concentrate on a

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19. Within science, one might similarly distinguish between relatively ‘fast’ disciplines such as biotechnology, engineering, or computer science that are increasingly stressed up by forms of ‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) and ‘slower’ ones such as arts and human sciences.

20. From this time-economy perspective, there is a strong resemblance between executives and politicians. Both stage an oral or verbal world, a world of endless talk which considerably outpaces the slower tempo of exchange between academics. senior managers spend between half and three quarters of their time simply talking to people, whether in face-to-face situations or on the phone (Thrift 1999: 154).
few isolated topics for a long period of time, politicians are ready to switch among topics and issues very rapidly. The epistemic culture of state politics typically favors a broad but necessarily superficial sweep of knowledge about a plethora of subjects, whereas academics reverse this logic in favoring a deep acquaintance with a highly selective and narrow set of discipline-driven questions. From a spatio-temporal perspective, the epistemic culture of academic intellectuals could only exist in a relatively bounded and slow-paced space, within which actors can be rigorously selective about their topics and legitimately ignore the plethora of other issues that might call for immediate attention. This selectivity enables them to take things apart, focus on tiny details, and leisurely ponder about their broader significance; to slow down conversations and conflicts by means of quiet turn-takings and long communicative intervals (e.g. reading and writing rather than talking face-to-face); and more generally, to postpone decisions about what the social world is like and what one should do about it.

At the same time, however, we can think about the acceleration of scientific activities as the politization of science: the speeding of the production, circulation and public dissemination of academic knowledge production. In his *On Television and Journalism* Bourdieu criticizes this very process when he condemns the “fast thinking” and the intellectual “fast food,” which is served up by scholars who are seduced by the swift velocities of the media and its logic of commercialization. This “media intellectuals,” according to Bourdieu becomes “cultural celebrities,” who prefer to speak publicly (and under rigorous time constraints) by writing fast and short pieces for newspapers or appearing on radio and TV talk shows rather than publishing academic articles in journals “who nobody ever reads.” They often encounter the censure and displeasure of colleagues who accuse them of sacrificing their intellectual and scientific integrity to the seductions of publicity (fame, prestige, money) and the demands of the lay public. True scientists, they are told, are not driven by ambition for quick gains; they are not attracted by the glare of the moment, the spotlights and the nervous pace of public life; they are not interested in
persuading audiences as large as the politician’s electorate and are satisfied to communicate smaller circles of professionals in the more quiet retreat of the academy (Bourdieu 1998b).

### 2.3.2 The KPC and Verbal/Print Cultures

In the model, politics is associated with verbal culture and scientific knowledge with print culture. Moving along the continuum towards the politics pole, we witness a gradual increase in noisy activities of talking, disputing and negotiating and a concomitant decrease in the slow and largely silent activities of reading and writing. An important defining characteristic of politics is the higher value given to the spoken word. Because politicians need to talk to large audiences and conduct many face-to-face conversations about multitude rapidly changing topics, they seek to minimize the temporal and spatial distance between themselves, their speech and their listeners to create an image of perfectly self-present meaning where the speaker and listener are both present to the utterance simultaneously. According to Barbara Johnson, “this immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean and know what we have said” (Johnson 1981: viii). Similarly for Ong (1977: 136) voice represents “a world of dynamism, action and being-in-time.” In oral cultures, written texts appear politically and socially meaningless in comparison with spoken language that arises out of the needs of a moment and has an observable effect on identifiable listeners. Much of the politicians’ investment in reading and writing typically remains confined to “illiterate” forms of textuality – written speeches, notes, memos, briefings – that are usually

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21 The current postmodernist emphasize on the historical and subjective dimensions of all celebrates discourse-as-voice as a liberating experience in political identity. It looks to politicized the textual and scientific discourse through the performative aspect of verbal utterance. Mikhail Bakhtin, for example, even while acknowledging that discourse can be analyzed as disembodes language, insists on voice as the central term (e.g., Bakhtin 1986, 1993).
subservient to the production of authoritative speech and face-to-face communication. Politicians use form of “illiterate writing” that is they use writing to speak (Elbow 1994: xxvi).

By contrast, in the print culture of science the primary purpose of talkative encounters is to inform subsequent writing. If politicians write to talk, scientists talk to write (Goody 1987: 299-300). Scientists typically communicate through fewer and far slower conversations and follow a leisurely rhythm of written commentaries (the slow turn-taking exchange of articles and counter-articles, books and counter-books), which are also far removed in time (e.g. quoting long dead precursors) and space. While politicians exercise fast and wide communication (addressing large publics), scientists focus on slower and narrower conversation (usually addressing their own particular professional community).

The KPC can thus be conceived as representing a range of institutional settings between a disembodied semiotic text and embodied voiced utterance (Elbow 1994). According to Walter Ong (1977: 136), the sound heard and the word seen are distinctly different experiences. Spoken language has more semiotic channels than writing. Speech contains more channels for carrying meaning, more room for the play of difference (e.g., volume, pitch, speed, accent, intensity, tone, etc.). Writing has to achieve its subtleties with fewer resources. Unlike vocal utterance, the written text lacks intimacy. Hearing correspond more easily to interiorities and knowledge of persons; writing, by contrast, corresponds to visual knowledge, a knowledge by sight which generates "things-like" knowledge, effective only at distance. The habit of writing thus tends to reify experience and to treat personal encounters as inert and object-like, oriented primarily to surfaces. Things become more material as they depart from the immediacy of speech: “like the drafting of a document (that can not be talked out of existence), the compiling of a report (that

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22 Even at academic conferences, which are the more “politicalized” mode of scientific activity, the official conduct of intellectual engagement is still mostly based on slow-paced communication (reporting of research by reading scholarly papers) and less on casual speech and real-time commentary. The unofficial side of conversation is of course much more political-like. It is, however, important to note that within the academic field, more ‘political’ functionaries such as academic administration or even department chairs talk a lot more, write a lot less, and regularly mingle with many more people than their colleagues.
can not be amended by way of talking), or the trained body (that can not be talked into existence)” (Scheffer 2007: 6 fn. 10). This emphasis on materiality as visibility is associated closely with the nineteenth century transformation in the authorization of novel modes of persuasion which gradually gave prefer the visible operation and “silent force” of the experimental report over the “pomp of words” (Ezrachi 1990: 62).

Scientific practices are ontologically embedded in the materiality of inscription (Latour and Woolger 1979; Latour 1987; Goody 1987). The materiality of writing enforces a degree of precision and apartness, which is not generally experienced in the verbal culture of politics. By giving oral communication a material and stabilized form, the habit of writing forces social actors into a slowed-down pattern that disposes them to delay their reactions to the world rather than being swept along by the hectic immediacy of face-to-face interactions or speaking in front of a crowd. Textual objects can be inspected in much greater detail, they are not tied to an occasion or a spokesperson, and they allow for a wider and more effective circulation and accumulation of knowledge; the wider their circulation, the more textual objects become ‘timeless’, depersonalized, and distanced from lived experience, no longer tied to an occasion or a spokesperson (Goody 1987). In this sense, it may be argued that print culture has a disenchanting effect on the verbal culture of politics that it works to demystify those “magical” qualities associated with the charismatic performance of political speech.

But even if we do not accept the existence of an ontological, constitutive link between writing as a technology of reflective delay and the emergence of modern scientific rationality (cf. Goody 1987; Ong 2002), we must still acknowledge that there exist a strong relationship between ideology of print, modes of sociability and scientific discourse and practices. Writing is a social action; regularized forms of writing are social institutions, interacting with other social institutions and creating habits of social thinking. Practicing science is often a matter of non-verbal, solitary interaction with textual objects and inscription technologies than a matter of
talking to and negotiating with other human subjects. The latter is the daily fare of politician who is expected to be gregarious and ‘personable’ (Goody 1987: 299; Ong 2002: 68, 101). This, in turn, defines a range of differences between politicians and scientists in their social conducts and manners, their habitus: self-presentation, tone, attitude, temper, etc.

2.3.3 The Materiality of Inscription and the Scientificity of Social Knowledge

The KPC offers a fertile dialogue with Latour’s ethnographic study of scientificity: how science inscribes signs onto things and educes things into signs. In particular, the model offers a phenomenological, spatio-temporal, reading of Latour’s perspective on science and politics and especially his depiction of the laboratory as set of activities bounded in time and space. For Latour the specificity and strength of scientific practice are precisely located in their material technologies of “fact-writing”: Inscription devices which solidify subjective and ephemeral ideas and images unto material forms such as scientific reports, charts, maps, pictures, etc. It is within the circulation of these inscriptive devices (“immutable mobiles”) that literary knowledge may become scientific. Science crucially entails therefore “the organization of persuasion through literary inscription” (Latour and Woolger 1979: 88).

Scientific practice is inconceivable without a powerful object-attention, and this pragmatic (rather than epistemological) practice of reification as it emerges from an intense visual interaction between an object and a thinking mind taking shape through a circuit of revisions and fine-tunings. This circuit of objectification is intimately tied to specific materialities: “doing science” is impossible without reading books, holding a pen to paper, typing on a keyboard and looking at a screen, correcting print outs. What Latour reminds us is that, practicing science is still much more a matter of non-verbal interaction with non-human objects (such as books, articles, protocols,
instruments, machines, pen and paper, keyboard and screen), than a matter of talking to and negotiating with other human subjects (Latour, 1983, 1993).

The common understanding is that Latour’s ‘fast and hard’ image of scientific activity favors an ontology that renders science and politics essentially “the same thing.” Focusing almost exclusively on the process of accelerated circulation of already inscribed objects, Latour inevitably concludes that science is “nothing special” and that “science is politics pursued by other means” (Latour 1983: 168). What Latour seems to overlook in equating politics with science is the pragmatic spatio-temporal mediating and performative effect of the inscription process itself. Yet, despite this refusal to separate the interior world of science from the social world ‘outside’, Latour’s discussion of the laboratory does suggest a phenomenological distinction, a spatio-temporal gap, between science and politics. For Latour, it is the fact that scientists use laboratories, which ultimately separates their work from that of politicians (Pels 2003). The specificity of science resides in the special power of laboratories, as centers of calculation, to reverse the scale of phenomena in order to make things readable, and thus allow scientists to “take their time” and make multiply trials and mistakes, in order to record and compare them, sum them up and learn from them. The relative seclusion of the laboratory from the public eye, the dramatic deceleration of laboratory work and the strict selectivity of issues tested in the labs, which allow for repeated experimentation and the systematic registering of mistakes. The politician, by contrast, “works on a full scale, with only one shut at a time, and is constantly in limelight” (Latour 1983: 165).

If science is indeed “politics continued by other means,” then the calm space and easy pace of the laboratory precisely grants the different means by which is singled out as special activity (but not too special). In this reading of Latour, the laboratory, even while blurring the boundaries between science and society, remains incapable of functioning if it is not in some sense removed from the urgency and politics of everyday life. Thus, although the scientific knowledge produced in laboratories is declaredly “public knowledge” that suppose to be valid
universally and available to all, in practice “the laboratory is a place where valuable instruments and materials sequestered, where skilled personal seek to work undisturbed, and where intrusion by outsiders is unwelcome (Golinski 1998: 84).

Recently, Latour has identified the writing of reports about society as the “social scientist’s laboratory.” Bringing “the writing of reports into the foreground,” he wants to explore the cultural implications of writing and print (as opposed to speech) as a medium for producing and disseminating social knowledge (2005: 127). According to Latour, in social science, text production is the goal; the scientificity of the social thus cannot be understood without seeing the centrality of texts. what makes social science as a particular domain of expertise is the writing of textual accounts about society. “No matter how grandiose the perspective, no matter how scientific the outlook, no matter how tough the requirements,” writes Latour, “the result of the inquiry – in 99% of the cases – will be a report … And that is excellent because there is no better way” (Latour 2005: 123). Latour defines the scientificity of social knowledge as the process by which social investigator gain access, through practices of reportage, to new entities that are then put into wider network of circulation. “If the social is something that circulates in a certain way, and not a world beyond to be accessed by the disinterested gaze of some ultra-lucid scientist;” it is within this circulation that social knowledge may become scientific. “It may or may not. Textual accounts can fail like experiments often do.” (Latour 2005: 127; italics in the origin).

In addition to this spatial understanding of the scientific materiality of the technology of reportage, the KPC offers a temporal conceptualization of scientific materiality. The temporal understanding of materiality does not deny the spatial materiality of inscription but it does makes their durability an empirical issue (Scheffer 2007). For Latour, materiality is conceptualized as stable and robust, as being in place like an infrastructure or as being in circulation like documents. It is imagined as taking space, being here and there by means of circulation. Along the KPC, however, the materiality of writing/inscription refers not only to substantial things such as books
documents, files, archives, laboratories, etc. Temporally understood, materialities are ‘material’ to various degrees of discoursivity and therefore provide different degrees of stability and elasticity (Foucault 1972, Scheffer 2007). This concept of materiality refers back to Durkheim’s definition of ‘the social fact’. For Durkheim social facts “possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual … whether he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him” (1895: 51). Like the materiality of “social facts,” I understand materialities of scientific discourse as a structural effect which exceeds the space-time of face-to-face interaction. Thus, for example, the performative utterance of reading a paper is “more material” (has a stronger structural effect) than making an improvised speech or engaging in a spontaneous conversation. A particular knowledge domain can thus materialized and achieve a relative autonomy out of a specific socio-temporal order.

2.3.4 Boundary Configurations, Boundary Objects and Boundary Organizations

The creation of new domains of knowledge and expertise through boundary configurations involves multiplicity of boundary objects that are deployed together and in combination through establishing homologies across different existing domains of expertise along the KPC, within liminal institutional settings composed of boundary organizations. Leigh Star and James Griesemer (1989) coined the term "boundary object" to argue that many objects of scientific investigation inhabit multiple liminal zones of intersecting domains of knowledge. Conceptualized as “objects,” these boundary interfaces could be seen as cultural resources for developing and maintaining coherence across these domains.

Boundary objects are a social construction, yet at the same time they act as a trading zone where diverse groups share information and may be able to arrive at shared meanings. They can be
material objects (artifacts), texts, concepts or procedures, which maintain their disparate identities while at the same time allowing members of different communities to work together around them in a practical manner so as “to get the job done,” although they are often inconsistent and ambiguous. Boundary objects are therefore both “plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constrains of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation” (Star and Griesemer: 393).\(^{23}\)

The contents of a boundary object do not require consensus and this flexibility provides some degree of translation between groups and allows the object to stretch across multiple domains, serving multiple groups. Hence, boundary objects allow diverse actors with conflicting views, missions, and interests to share meanings while maintaining, to a certain extent, their own particular understandings, without necessarily implying a full agreement about the classification of objects and actions. As such, boundary objects underline aspects of collective work, cooperation, coordination of goals and expectations among a host of different partners with different backgrounds and different types of expertise working in diverse and complex institutional settings.

This emphasis on cooperation, led some scholars to argue that the notion of boundary object generally tends to underestimate conflict among users. To become interface for adjustment of controversies, boundary objects have to assume some structural properties. Following this logic, David Guston (2000) introduced the concept of boundary organizations to explain how boundary objects work in the highly contentious and politicized process of policymaking to bridge the social worlds of science and politics. Boundary organizations are built around a particular boundary object or a set of boundary objects to allow collaborations between actors with conflicting and

\(^{23}\) In their study, Leigh Star and James Griesemer use boundary objects to explain how the various interests of scientists, trappers, amateur collectors, university administrators, and others came together in producing shared representations of nature and consequently establishing a natural history museum in California. Boundary objects included specimens, field notes and even California itself.
even contradicting interests. In boundary organizations boundary object are used as bridging devices to connect knowledge with action and research with policy so as to stabilize the tensions which arise from the conflicting demands of politics and scientific investigation. On the one hand, too much reliance on science might result in professional closure and create an intellectual “ivory tower”. On the other hand, too much reliance on politics might result and partisan advocacy that will undermine the credibility of scientific investigation. Neither strategy will result in an expert whose advice and intervention are sought. Boundary organizations enable investigators to balance between the need to maintain trustworthiness and intellectual honesty and the need to assure that the knowledge produced will be practical and useful for decision making; they allow them, moreover, to secure their integrity and credibility as social experts (by not politicizing research) while attaining political legitimacy by making the process public and open to multiple participants, at the same time as they legitimate the creation and use of boundary object (Guston 2000: 109).

The structural properties of boundary organization provide incentives for competing experts to collaborate and overcome their differences and configure together their capacity to present themselves as disinterested observers in search of the truth and their capacity to present themselves as relevant and useful (Eyal 2002). According to Guston, there is a positive correlation between the degree of contention and the number boundary organization and objects manipulated within them. The Scientization of knowledge production in the highly contentious and politicized process of policymaking will tend to induce the production and usage of hybrids through boundary configuration (Guston 2000).
2.3.4.1 Governmental Commissions as Boundary Organizations and the Early Structuration of Social Science

In the next chapters I trace the origins of social science in Britain to the formation of governmental commissions – a network of boundary organizations which occupied a liminal zone between parliamentary politics and scientific knowledge. As boundary organizations, governmental commissions assembled politicians, economists and legal and medical experts inducing them to work together to solve social problems (boundary objects), as they all shared important skills of conducting social investigations, albeit in different forms. The commissions coordinated the interactions and structured the cooperation of these various actors, thus configuring together political, legal and scientific knowledge and expertise, and bridging the gulf between these different practices and epistemic styles of investigation. As governmental commissioners these actors could legitimately present themselves and act as both members of a scientific community of social investigators and as political activists, thus bridging the boundary between politics and science and forming the basis for the emergence of social science as a new intellectual and practical expertise.

Governmental investigations are a good example of a mediating institution between science and politics, which often exhibit a tension between political requirements and systematic research. As a liminal institutional setting, they simultaneously decelerate of the “fast thinking” of politicians (e.g., by writing lengthy and cumbersome reports) and accelerate the slow-paced social research (e.g., through market-based techniques of publication and dissemination). The unique institutional position of governmental investigations, in other words, enables politicians to integrate decelerated forms of intellectual activities into the accelerated settings of political

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24 The creation of governmental commissions is often deliberately design either to accelerate or to slow down legislative action according to circumstances.
communication and public pinion campaigns. On the one hand, the preference given to empirical observations over political speech, which resulted in the execution of lengthy and extra-parliamentary investigation conducted “in the field,” and the production of extensive and bulky reports, worked to considerably decelerate the usually fast-paced political decision-making. On the other hand, to be a governmental investigator demanded the political goal of being persuasive and influential and required that one’s discourse will influence public opinion in order to be taken up and used on the policy market. This open and public orientation dictated wide dissemination of social knowledge through an accelerated circulation of governmental reports.

Moreover, governmental reports are constructed configuration of ephemeral and permanent genres of communication into the hybrid genre of “sociography” (Lepenies 1988). On the one hand, governmental reports give policymaking a semi-permanent form and enable political discourse to stand back from and quietly study a static and rigid ‘thing’ rather than being swept along by the hectic immediacy and the fleeting dynamics of parliamentary culture. Within the political framework, the writing and the reading of governmental reports forces the mind into a slowed-down pattern which favored more reflective and analytic habits of thinking and communication and more permanent storage of information, opening up a wider range of thought for the reading public and increasing the potentiality for cumulative knowledge and collective memorization. On the other hand, like political reportage in the Press, investigatory reports find their home in ephemeral texts because their investigation must be tightly focused and highly disposable. Investigatory findings, like the parliamentary papers (the “blue books”) that house them, are by definition suppose to be temporary and give up their cultural place to new and more useful findings and observations, which are in turn doomed to rapid replacement. As a short-acting texts whose goal is to provide immediate relief for the problem their raises governmental reports are topical, they seek to master problem very close to the surface, they take effect quickly but also wear off quickly. Thus, although the cultural work performed by the
governmental investigations is neither brief nor negligible, the disposability and problem-solving orientation of the “sociographic” report lacked the stuff of “greatness” associated with the “novel” and other classical forms of literature (Lepenies 1988). My main goal in the next chapters is to show how social science emerged as a new domain of expertise, out of the effort of governmental investigators to configure these opposing spatio-temporal orientations into a single, relatively autonomous, intellectual project.
PART ONE
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THE DISENCHANTMENT OF
PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS

The Senate is a scene of Civil Jar,
Chaos of contrarieties at war;
Where sharp and solid, phlegmatic and light,
Discordant atoms meet, ferment, and fight;
Where Obstinacy takes his sturdy stand,
To disconcert what Policy has planned;
Where Policy is busied all night long
In setting right what Faction has set wrong;
Where flails of oratory thresh the floor,
That yields them chaff and dust, and nothing more.
(William Cowper, Expostulation, 1782).

“The age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters,
economists, and calculators, has succeeded”
(Edmund Burke 1790).
3. Government by Talk: The Cultural Organization of the Eighteenth Century House of Commons

The House of Commons enjoyed an astonishing measure of prestige in Britain. Its central position in the organization of the life of the nation was established during the early eighteenth century when King George I came to the throne in 1714 as a result of a parliamentary decision. It was at about that time that the Commons’ responsibility over the public revenue, led it to take increasing responsibility for other aspects of the national life. Henceforward the problem of government became inseparable from the problems of managing the House of Commons (Lambert 1975).

To be a member of the eighteenth century British Parliament was to be a notable, mixing with the great and enjoying the facilities of an old fashion gentlemen club, “the best club in London,” dominated by the temperament and habits of the landed gentleman. A statute introduced in 1711 gave formal expression to the social and economic divisions between MPs and the unpropertied mass of the people by requiring candidates to hold a substantial stake in the land. The law excluded the clergy, government officials, pensioners, contractors, and all those not possessing the substantial property qualifications. The landed aristocrats were therefore the senior members of the eighteenth century House of Commons, exerting immense influence over the membership of the Commons through their electoral privileges and their supervision of local administration.

Moreover, all MPs were required to take an oath of allegiance to the crown while holding a copy of the New Testament. This quasi-legal and sacred ritual was seen as a vocal affirmation of a closed aristocratic allegiance, which guaranteed the structuring of trust and loyalties between the ruling elites. Religious restrictions enshrined in the oath of allegiance effectively barred members of certain suspect religious groups (Roman Catholics, Jews and...
Throughout most of the eighteenth century, parliamentary practices reflected this closed, secluded and aristocratic character of the House. Its members saw themselves as members of an elite group that styled itself as a closed “assembly of gentlemen,” and it was in such terms that the House found and proclaimed its essential unity. Like any prestigious and exclusive club, the eighteenth century House of Commons was comparatively immune to external pressures, particularly those not sponsored by the landed elite. Parliamentary costume, with wigs, variously colored topcoats, decorations, silk breeches, and brightly buttoned shoes reflected this exclusive, hierarchical society of rank. What took place inside the House was seen as a matter belonging to an exclusive clique and was not allowed to be made public. Any attempt to report on parliamentary proceedings to the public was heavily sanctioned as it was considered an assault to the dignity of the House and a breach of its exclusive privilege to conduct its affairs in private.

3.1 Conditions of Performance

The intimate atmosphere of a small and exclusive gentleman club was enhanced by the spatial arrangement of the House of Commons. St. Stephen’s Chapel in the Palace of Westminster, where the Commons met until the great fire of 1834, was small and intimate Chamber, modestly decorated in green, compared to the large, lavishly furnished red Lords Chamber. There were benches on two sides of the Chamber, divided by a centre aisle. The

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1 The oath of allegiances was one of three oaths that MPs were required to take; the other two were the oath of supremacy and of abjuration. The laws which excluded persons on account of religion were abandoned after a series of struggles, those against Roman Catholics in 1829 and those against Jews in 1858. In 1888 the oaths were modified and the general right to solemn affirmation was established for those who chose not to take the oath, which enabled Quakers to sit in the House.
2 Henry VIII enhanced the importance of Parliament by his use of it during the English Reformation. In 1547 the king gave permission for members of the commons to meet at St. Stephen's Chapel, in the Palace
Speaker’s chair was at one end of the Chamber; in front of it was the Table of the House. The Clerks sat at one end of the Table, close to the Speaker so that they could advise him on procedure when necessary. Members of the Government sat on the benches on the Speaker's right, whilst members of the Opposition occupy the benches on the Speaker's left. The gangway separating them (known as the Floor of the House), was designed to be “two sword lengths apart.” Government ministers and important opposition leaders set on the front rows (and were known as “frontbenchers”); other members of Parliament occupied the back rows (and were known as “backbenchers”).

From its initial foothold in St. Stephens Chapel, the Commons had been found inadequate in size to accommodate all of its members. The problem of space increased considerably after the union with Ireland in 1800 which increased the number of MPs from 558 to 658.3 Contemporaries saw the small size of the Chamber as an advantage, as it was thought to facilitate the intimacy of discussion. Hence, even after its restoration in 1852, the House of Commons could only seat 420 members (300 on the floor and 120 in the galleries). In fact, the restoration did not change the size of the chamber; along with its Gothic style, the new chamber retained the same basic structure and architectural sensibility of its predecessor. In the words of a guidebook from the late 1850s, the rebuilt of the House of Commons chamber was kept “as small as possible … for the purposes of speaking and hearing without effort during the average attendance of members, which amounts to about three hundred” (Ruddle 1858: 46). Its architecture signified that the House of Commons was, fundamentally, a space of intimate debates and polite discussions, not of grand oratory.

3 After the Act of Union there were 465 MPs from England, 100 from Ireland, 48 from Wales and 45 from Scotland.
The House normally met in the afternoon, which allowed MPs time to earn a living or to sit on committees during the morning. The first hour of business usually attracted a good attendance, because it was concerned with petitions, questions and the business of the House; but many members rarely appeared in the House until after dinner, and divisions (the parliamentary terminology for ‘votes’) were usually delayed until later in the evening for their benefit. Only great parliamentary occasions were normally staged early in the day, in order to give plenty time for debate and attract full attendance. The total time available was in any case very limited. Following the old agricultural rhythm, parliamentary sessions usually ran from late January or February to July; and business did not begin until about four o’clock in the afternoon.

The political system was under the firm control of the landed elite. “The executive and the legislature were not only dominated by landed gentlemen but were also institutions in which the exercise of political authority was virtually undisturbed by the priorities of any other interest” (Jupp 1990: 6). In general, then, the practices of governance in eighteenth century Britain reflected a world in which landed gentlemen executed the limited responsibilities of the state. The Commons maintained the characteristics of a body whose historic function was to criticize government and obtain redress for grievances rather than assist the ministers of the crown to govern the country (Gash 1979: 49-51).

As a result, parliamentary activities were far from being designed to facilitate public business. Public bills dealing in a positive manner with social and economic problems throughout the country were rare events, and apart from bills there was little to detain the average member beyond the “great days.” The number of parliamentary (select) committees was small, and few touched on matters of general concern. Neither bills nor committee reports were

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2 MPs remained unpaid for their service until 1911 when they were granted of £400 a year (Dixon 1996)
3 According to Lambert, in the eighteenth century “only about half the membership [were] mentioned as active in any way at all, while some ten percent of the members [were] responsible for about half of all the business” (1975: 11, fn. 25).
printed before 1780, which limited knowledge of them out of doors. Petitions as an outside pressure were not frequent enough to seriously disturb the normal routine of business.

Motions by individual MPs took precedence over public business. Miscellaneous debates could be started on the introduction of petitions or as a matter of urgency by private members. As Bentham charged: “The Country Gentleman who has had his Turnips stolen, goes to work and gets a bloody law against stealing Turnips: it exceeds the utmost stretch of his comprehension to conceive that the next year the same catastrophe may happen to his Potatoes. For the two general rules in ... modern British legislation are, never move a finger till your passions are inflamed, nor ever look further than your nose (Leiberman 1989: 2002).

The temporal flow of activities and procedures in the eighteenth century House of Commons militated against public business Repeated motions for adjournment, even when repeatedly defeated, could so consume parliamentary time as to achieve their object in the altogether abandonment of debate. Though ministers were responsible for organizing the work of the House of Commons, they were obliged in practice to give a major share of parliamentary time to the House as a whole. As a result of time constraints - of the six months’ parliamentary session government could count on the equivalent of less than a half - controversial legislation extraneous to the essential work of government was easily obstructed. Thus, Ministers were dependent on the goodwill of the House of Commons to push for controversial legislation and to the dispatch of business, and in time of crisis or party conflict they could find their work intolerably obstructed.

The inefficiency of Parliament in getting things done has been both the cause and the effect of the passivity and pragmatic nature of most MPs. “You know the nature of that assembly,” wrote Bolingbroke in a letter to Windham in 1753; “they grow, like hounds, fond of men who show them game, and by whose loud hallo they are encouraged” (quoted in Silvester 1996: 66). According to Norman Gash, “that the system worked at all was an achievement. That
it did so was mainly because the rows of country gentry on the backbenches were as a rule to leave debating to the acknowledged orators on either side. Bad and boring speakers were summarily and sometimes brutally extinguished” (1979: 50). As I show in the next chapters, with the increasing number of members anxious to communicate with their constituencies and demonstrate their diligence in the national newspapers, which followed the growth of parliamentary reporting in early nineteenth century, even this safeguard disappeared. It was a system that was bound to show strain under the increasing openness of Parliament to publicity and the growing amount of work that fell on the House after 1815.

3.2 Politics as Art

Cultural production in the House of Commons was dominated by the stylistic tradition of classicism, a certain unity of style, a certain “way of doing things,” which was attuned to aristocratic audience and lifestyle. A central ‘rule’ accepted among politicians pertained to the function of politics as art. ‘Art’ was a code word for which a particular stylistic arrangement. A specific “order of things,” which was often was often associated with reasonableness and good common sense. The same functionings of artistic styles were applied to several other aristocratic settings or fields outside of politics: in music, dance, garden design, architecture, painting, and belles lettres, the type of literature advocated by aristocratic men of letters of the “Oxbridge clerisy” (mainly poetry, drama and essays), appreciated for the beauty, artistry, and originality of its style and tone rather than for its ideas and informational content (Heyck 1982; Knights 1978). An emphasis was put on a specific, elegant and harmonious, arrangement of words, notes, dance steps, objects, etc.
The purpose of this harmonious arrangement, which was equated with ‘reason’ and ‘nature’, was to tame the mind and curb the imagination to guard against excessive stimulus of the senses. Reason in Classicism was the intellectual counterpart of good taste, those etiquette (morals and manners), who were mainly transmitted from one aristocratic generation to the next in the privacy of the home. It was, in this sense, a conservative intellectual style of moderation and restraint. To act reasonably was ordinarily meant to keep in check passion and enthusiasm which were seen as leading to unnecessary confusion. It demanded clarity and common sense and rejected obscure designs, complex arguments and out of the ordinary expert knowledge. The latter were considered as bourgeois virtues, useful only in the world of professional activity; in aristocratic generalist circles, specialization was seen as deterioration and decay. Studying and detailed knowledge were viewed as a waste of time; technical expressions and lines of reasoning demonstrating any complexity were seen as pedantic.

For a well-bred gentleman, art had to be comprehensible and recognizable; artistic appreciation was viewed not as a separate activity but as an everyday component of a lifestyle of any reasonable men. The understanding of politics, like the enjoyment of art, was not supposed to require any special knowledge or expertise. Anything beyond the natural and the familiar, which challenged common sense understanding, was not considered as significant. Patient and careful investigation was discouraged in favour of overwhelming flashes of intuition.

This particular combination of elegance, eloquence and good taste, on the one hand, and the rejection of erudition and scholarship on the other, led to the cultivation of a parliamentary culture which can be best describe as patrician orality, a powerful verbal and rhetorical type of intelligence accompanied by a strong emphasis on the naturalness of speech against the artificiality of print culture, the superiority of the “living voice” with its embodied presence and immediacy, against the printed word and the reading of the “dead letter.” As Hugh Blair the chair in Rhetoric of Edinburgh University put it in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters
“The tones of voice, the looks and gestures … which no Writing can convey … are natural interpreters of the sentiments of the mind. They remove ambiguities; they enforce impressions, they operate on us by means of sympathy, which is one of the most powerful instruments of persuasion. Our sympathy is always awakened more, by hearing the Speaker, than by reading his work in our closet” (quoted in Newlyn 2000: 344). The discoursive principles Patrician orality, which organized the eighteenth century parliamentary debates, confirmed the gentle rules of propriety, refined courtesy and good taste; the accuracy of political speech and its details were not as important as its overall and immediate effect.

### 3.3 Government by Talk: Eloquence and Performance

The word Parliament is derived from the Latin ‘parliamentum’ and the French word ‘parler’ and originally meant a talk.\(^6\) The philological meaning of Parliament is therefore ‘government by talk.” Talking was what the eighteenth century British Parliament did most of the time. Oratory was central organizing principle of parliamentary conduct.

Reid (1985: 97) refers to eighteenth century Parliament as a "theatre of oratory." The physical space, Gothic style of the building and small intimate size (57 by 35 feet) of St. Stephen’s Chapel, where the House of Commons assembled had joined forces to create an unusual speaking space which was strongly reminiscent of late eighteenth-century theater. The small size of the chamber made it, often at time of big controversy, a crowded place where MPs literally rubbed shoulders, for there were not enough seats to accommodate them all. Consequently, the atmosphere in the House was at once adversarial and familiar and at times even intimate.

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\(^6\) In pre-revolutionary France the word ‘Parlement’ was applied to courts of justice which were not representative bodies at all.
The rituals of the House, its ordering of discourse and physical movement, and its restrictions on public access, created a unique dynamic between speakers and listeners that lent the House special and even sacred character. Throughout the century there was in theory no audience for its proceedings beyond its own walls. The publication of its debates was technically a breach of privilege, and a standing order of the House provided for the clearing of so-called “Strangers” from its galleries whenever any Member should so demand. In such circumstances, when the same speakers could confront one another session after session, character in its various meanings and appropriations became an inescapable fact of parliamentary life. Those who wished to wield political influence had first to gain a character of weight and consequence in the House, and this could only been done by the action of speech (Reid 2004).

Parliamentary discourse was structured by the cultural convention of patrician orality. As such, it was the territory of generalists who could carry out an entertaining theatrical performance. Verbal virtuosity and a capacity for refined and witty observation were highly esteemed. Aphorisms, maxims witty anecdotes, surprising paradoxes and other stylistic devices were especially popular. Charming anecdotes, clever sayings, entertaining narrative, were widely appreciated in the parliamentary theatre of the eighteenth century. They were considered as an integral and part of the art of politics, and an important element of the House bushiness.

On the Parliament floor, political speeches operate as a powerful theatrical play displayed for an intimate audience. Fewer than half of the House members were likely to be present for each day's session. Of those, fewer than twelve would typically speak in a debate on a relatively unimportant issue; 25 to 30 would speak in an important debate. Thus the scene would have looked very much like a theatrical play, with a group of actors performing for an audience which, while responsive and often vocal, was not thoroughly interactive. In an article for the Monthly Chronicle in April 1838, the playwright and MP Edward Bulwer-Lytton noted that “the man who writes a play for Covent Garden ought to remember that the Theatre is but a
few paces from the Hustings” (146). As the *Times* observed, “[t]hey say that we have lost as a nation our theatrical taste, but the truth is Parliament is our theatre” (February 4, 1859: 2). And as Sara Suleri describes, “for eighteenth-century England . . . the theatricality of the event overshadowed the historical and political questions that it raised, causing the popular imagination to believe that it observed a spectacle with a definite end” (1992: 53).

The division of the House into actors and audience was also partly a function of the vagaries of the speaking order, which was determined solely by the Speaker. The convention dictated that anyone wishing to speak would stand and await recognition from the Speaker, who would then, in theory, call on the members in the order in which they had arisen. In practice, however, the order of speakers was heavily influenced by concern about oratorical skill, and that audience response dictated which speaker was recognized. Another convention governing parliamentary discourse was that the rule allowing members to speak only once on any given issue was virtually never observed. Pitt, for example, who was well recognized for his oratorical skills and who habitually spoke first, frequently got to speak a second time later in the same debate (Thomas 1971: 192-93).

The material conditions of parliamentary speech-making, consistently highlight the importance of performative in midst of terrible noise and somewhat chaotic atmosphere. Visitors to the House of Commons during the eighteenth century often stressed the extremely loud noise coming from the chamber and the disorderly manner of the debates. Carl Moritz, who visited the House in 1782, observed that "if it happens, that a member rises, who is but a bad speaker, or if what he says is generally deemed not sufficiently interesting, so much noise is made; and such bursts of laughter are raised, that the member who is speaking can scarcely distinguish his own words" (Moritz 1795: 54).

Loren Reid provides a few useful anecdotes in this regard. Joseph Addison, for example, began his maiden speech by saying, "Mr. Speaker, I conceive," and then paused as if frightened
by the terrible sound around him and least the sound of his own voice. He again commenced, "I conceive, Mr. Speaker--" and again stopped; then proceeded, "Sir, I conceive." He could go no further; another member gained the floor and said, "Sir, the honourable gentleman has conceived three times, and brought forth nothing." The eldest son of Lord North described his experience: "Having risen and caught the Speaker's eye, I brought out two or three sentences, when a mist seemed to rise before my eyes; I then lost my recollection and could see nothing but the Speaker’s wig, which swelled and swelled, and swelled, till it covered the whole House. I then sank back on my seat” (Reid 1949: 138). Even a successful maiden speech was no guarantee of future confidence. William Gerard Hamilton was so traumatized by the ordeal of his first speech in 1755 that "he did not speak again for a long time, thus acquiring the nickname “Singlespeech Hamilton” (Ibid 139).

Nevertheless, Hamilton who sat in Parliament close to forty years made parliamentary speech a subject of his meticulous study, carefully observing those rhetorical elements which made parliamentary oratory persuasive. In 1808 he published his observation in *Parliamentary Logic*, a cynical oratorical manual for politicians and lawyers, consists of 553 advises on how to construct an effective political speech. In his favorable review of the book, Jeremy Bentham wrote that Hamilton’s book proves the need for urgent and comprehensive parliamentary reform. According to Bentham, Hamilton portrays the British Parliament as a place where Machiavellian language games continuously take place, while rejecting any universal consideration of truth and reason in legislation. In Hamilton’s eyes, Parliament is,

a sort of gaming-House; members on the two sides of each house the players; the property of the people ... the stakes played for. Insincerity in all its shapes, disingenuousness, lying, hypocrisy, fallacy, the instruments employed by the players on both sides for obtaining advantages in the game: on each occasion ... what course will be most for the advantage of universal interest, a question never looked at, never taken into account: on which side is the prospect of personal advantage in its several shapes - this the only question really taken into consideration (1824: 385).
The practical importance of these parliamentary language-games was stressed by Lewis Namier. According to Namier (1957: 7-8), arguments on the House floor needed to be persuasive and not merely formal. Speeches at the house floor were known to significantly influence parliamentary opinions and decision-making. Although the audience inside the House was divided by personal interests and party allegiances, party organization and discipline was considerably weak and a skillful speech could have had a considerable effect on the balance of forces in the, to the extent that it was able to appeal to the binding norms and conventions of Parliament as an assembly of gentlemen, by demonstrating consistency in political principle and character. As Burke, who spent most of his parliamentary career in the opposition, noted in a letter to a friend, “[t]here are many honest well-meaning country gentlemen who are in Parliament only to keep up the consequence of their families. Upon most of these a good speech will have influence” (quoted in Bruyn 1996: 775). With weak party discipline and an underdeveloped print culture constant exposure eloquent oratory could (and did) affect parliamentary decision-making (Thomas, 1971: 200–2).  

3.4 A Culture of Patrician Orality

The house eighteenth century House was composed of roughly five socially distinct groups of MPs according to social status: (1) Irish peers and the sons of English and Scottish noblemen who made up about a fifth of the total of MPs House; (2) untitled “country gentlemen;” (3) capitalists and businessmen with interests in manufactures, banking, and overseas trade; (4) professional men who had legal, military, or naval experience and expertise

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7 Edward Burke’s seminal speeches demonstrate the dominance and efficacy of the eloquent speech in the British Parliament of the eighteenth century. Although Burke spend almost all of his parliamentary career in opposition, and the vast majority of his speeches were delivered at debates which ended in defeat for his party, his speeches had known to exert a strong accumulative effect on opinion in Parliament (Reid 1985).
(5) a group of self-made men (commonly described as “adventurers”) who devoted themselves to politics as a profession and as a means to public fame (Namier and Brooke 1985: 97-176).

This was a diverse audience but to the extent that the speaker could appeal to the shared values that defined its ethos as an assembly of gentlemen - “a set of honourable, and uncorrupt Gentlemen” - it offered grounds for sympathy and identification (Reid 2004: 383)

Patrician orality was the traditional rhetorical culture through which the gentle character of the House was constructed and reaffirmed. Speakers in this tradition appealed directly to his purity of character in order to solicit his audience’s trust by filling their speech with attributes of rhetorical personality: habits of style, local allusions, personal anecdotes (Reid 2004). This ideal type oration exemplified the privileged status that gentle eloquence was granted in British culture of the eighteenth century. It was a characterized by two distinct modes of utterance. On the one hand, hostility to conflict and faction (accompanied by a strong distrust in expert knowledge and erudition); on the other hand, extemporary effusion, an unmediated application of experienced eloquence to the matters brought forward in the course of debate (Reid 2000).

The two speech modes were not seen contradictory because they were seen as situational, performed by politicians like in a theatre or on a stage. Passionate speakers at the Commons were certainly no strangers to the gentler, dispassionate, idiom of polite society, but they separated the speaking style of the politicians from the vocal esthetic of the aristocratic gentleman, whenever they saw their task to persuade by a display of authentic conviction and moral ferocity. In these particular situations, parliamentary performance simulated the adversarial realities of the courtroom.

Other speeches in the House were performed as a set of congenial sermons, a gentler form of utterance which focused on ethical appeal while precluding argumentative expressions of disapproval. Because appeal implicitly elevates the listener to a position of authority and humbles the speaker to that of supplicant, appeal is a rhetorical tactic to avoid unnecessary
confrontation. Unlike argument, appeal calls forth the listener’s moral sympathy and “better judgment” rather than his analytical faculties (Schroeder 2003). In gentle culture, party, faction and partisan opinion, were often seen as inviting unnecessary hostility and dispute and practitioners typically presented a self-image of virtuous independence to the House, and adduced their freedom from political obligations as proof of their sincerity and trustworthiness. Nonetheless, while open disagreements and organized political alignments were often avoided, the consensual atmosphere was at same time a cover for subtle rivalries, which provided a fertile ground for more animated, enthusiastic, speeches.

In his historical study of Truth in early modern England, Steven Shapin identifies the cultural practices by which the English gentleman was recognized as truth-teller. He equates gentleman’s sense of honor with truthfulness. Gentle identity was based on an honor culture which stressed the significance of gentlemanly truthfulness. Shapin defines the gentleman as the “culture’s paradigm of the type of individual one could trust to speak the truth” (1994: xxvi). Character construction of this kind was closely associated with a particular cultural type, the country gentleman, whose values and personality were rooted in the ownership of land. His attachments were primarily to his locality rather than to Westminster; lacking ambitions for office, he regarded attendance at the House as an extension of his local role and duties (Reid 2004). What most qualified the country gentleman for this office of trust, and set him apart from those who served the narrower cause of party, was his capacity for disinterestedness. He could be disinterested because he was a man of property whose landed estate guaranteed his political and material independence.

Because political parties conflicted with character gentle culture, they were seen, at best, as necessary evils. Party was associated with faction, an instrument for the acquisition of power and other ‘external’ interests, employed by the “outs” to displace the “ins”. Thus, members continued to consider themselves above partisan affiliation, or at any rate outside,
party (Brewer 1976). A common charge was that a gentleman who becomes attached to party is “a man who has been bought who betray his internal civic duty dedication to a common cause and the ideal of honorable fellowship forged by like-minded gentlemen” (Reid 2004: 390).

Unlike the comparatively small number of professional politicians who thought it necessary to speak on almost every question of substance, country gentlemen preferred to reserve their eloquence for debates in which either local matters of specific concern to them or great issues of conscience were involved. For the country gentleman a parliamentary debate on great or contentious issues was a matter pertaining to his internal consciousness. He saw speaking on such debates as a psychological need to fulfill a civic duty by giving a free and truthful account of his sentiments, for until he has disburdened himself of those sentiments he cannot return to his accustomed ease (Reid 2004: 387). Hence, he felt induced to speak not so much to persuade or to engage in argument, as to discharge his obligation to account publicly for his vote. Clearly, this convincing denial of any intention to persuade was also used tactically to rhetorically convey a particularly strong ethical appeal. Through appeal, subjective opinions were carefully translated into a form of advocacy for action and justice rather than an invitation to objective argument.

As Shapin (1994: ch.4) shows, gentle identity was used to protect against the damage that attribution of professional special interest might do to the credibility of testimony. The physician, the chemist, the schoolman, the priest were all presumed to be speaking for special interest, while the "country man" reputedly pointed to his gentlemanly status as an argument against imputing any such interest to him. Interestingly, even when country gentlemen took a stand in debates on the land tax, this was hardly an issue about which they could claim to be impartial, it was assumed that their interest in it was the very thing that made them representative and trustworthy, for they were elected to represent property (Reid 2004: 386).

This stance also militated against expert knowledge, especially when applied to politics. The understanding of politics was not supposed to require any special knowledge or expertise.
Patrician orality gave common sense priority over special knowledge. Conversational skills were preferred over literary erudition. Eloquence in spiritual matters took the place of profound argumentation. An atmosphere of refined and elegant entertainment militated against science, erudition and scholarship. Since the main aim was to please, a well-founded argumentation and proof were matters of secondary importance. New political knowledge and insights, profound arguments, were overshadowed by the mastery of stylistic devices and rhetorical decorum. A good play of words had more chance of success than a learned lecture, an amusing story would lead to greater rewards than well-founded argumentation. Lord Macaulay writing in 1859 on the eighteenth century Parliament was critical of what he regarded as a system in which patrician eloquence dominated over professional skills:

Parliamentary government is government by speaking. In such a government, the power of speaking is the most highly prized of all the qualities which a politician can possess; and that power may exist in the highest degree without judgment, without fortitude, without skill in reading the character of men or the signs of the times, without any knowledge of the principles of legislation or of political economy, and without any skill in diplomacy or in the administration of war. Nay, it may well happen that those very intellectual qualities which give a peculiar charm to the speeches of a public man may be incompatible with the qualities which would fit him to meet a pressing emergency with promptitude and firmness (Macaulay 1843).

3.4.1 The “Golden Age” of Parliamentary Oratory

The exercise of patrician orality reached its apex during the second half of the eighteenth century, a period that was consistently described by nineteenth century commentators as Parliament’s oratorical “golden age,” starting with Edmund Burke, the elder William Pitt and his principal political oratorical rival in the House of Commons, Charles James Fox. The era of Pitt and Fox was the standard by which Victorian commentaries measured nineteenth century speech-making in the House of Commons. In particular, they held that the
excellence of this oratorical “golden age” was epitomized by the facility with which late-eighteenth century MPs were able to draw from the well of classical literature in their parliamentary speeches. It was commonly asserted as fact that the MPs of this period routinely employed classical references and quotations, and that Latin served almost as a *lingua franca* among the parliamentary caste.

In his *Eloquence of the British Senate* (1807), Hazlitt credits Robert Walpole, who in 1727 became Britain first prime minister, with the introduction of a partisan discourse in Parliament delineated party difference more sharply so that “the combatants on each side, in this political warfare, were regularly drawn up in opposition to each other, and had their several parts assigned them with the greatest exactitude.” As Hazlitt critically notes, this discursive innovation based on of semi-adjudicative model of deliberation turned the House of Commons into a “regular debating society,” which over time produced the hollow formalism of the “Golden age of Parliament” and in particular that of the Pitt government:

The effect of this system could not be different from what it has turned out. The House of Commons, instead of being the representative and depository of the collective sense of the nation, has become a theatre for wrangling disputants to declaim in the scene of noisy impertinence and pedantic folly. An empty shew of reason, a set of words has been substituted for the silent operation of general feeling and good sense; and the ministers referring every thing to this flimsy standard have been no longer taken up in planning wise measures, but in studying how to defend their blunders (Hazlitt 1902b: 406).

In the eighteenth century Parliament, the credibility of the argument was contingent on the speaker’s spontaneity and in particular on his the theatrical display of emotional sincerity. The speaker’s rhetorical boldness and ardor were viewed as creating a “spectacle of sincerity” (Fliegelman 1993). In his *Parliamentary Logick*, Hamilton, advice parliamentary orators how to stage an effect of spontaneity in their speeches: “Preconsider what you mean should be the finest part of your speech, and in speaking connect it with what has incidentally fallen in debate …
When you come to this premeditated and finest part, hesitate and appear to boggle; - catch at some expression that shall fall short of your idea, and then seem at last to hit upon the true thing. This has always an extraordinary effect, and gives the air of extempore genius to what you say” (1808: 43). Hamilton’s Machiavellian approach to parliamentary discourse, highlight the importance given to the aesthetic performance of sincerity and to the theatrical display of spontaneity, over the actual content of the speech, its details its accuracy and the reasoning of arguments.

Under the condition of Patrician orality, parliamentary speech was not designed to generate any profound argument or new political knowledge. Rather, it was constructed to confirm the gentle rules of propriety, refined courtesy and good taste it was intended to create an immediate effect, specific to time and place; once the debate was terminated the legislation passed, amended or defeated, its utility was lost. Burke proposed, for example, that it was the “business” of rhetoric “to affect rather by sympathy than imitation; to display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker ... than to present a clear idea of the things themselves” (1757: 177). Lord Chancellor, Thomas Erskine, urged this view of political oratory in his introduction to Fox's speeches: “Eloquence ... consists more in the dexterous structures of periods, and in the powers and harmony of delivery, than in the extraordinary vigour of the understanding” (1815: xi).

This immanent tension between erudition and scholarship, on the one side, and parliamentary discourse, on the other, formed one of the main themes in the work of the parliamentary reporter and literary journalist William Hazlitt. Referring back to the “era of Pitt and Fox,” the so called “golden age of parliamentary oratory,” Hazlitt astutely remarked that,

Both Mr Fox and Mr Pitt (though as opposite to each other as possible) were essentially speakers, not authors, in the their mode of oratory. Beyond the moment, beyond the occasion, beyond the immediate power shown, astonishing as that was, there was little remarkable or worth preserving in their speeches. There is no thought in them that implies a habit of deep and refined reflection … Read over the collections of old Debates, twenty, forty, eighty, a hundred years ago; they are the same mutatis mutandis, as those of yesterday. You wonder to see how little has been added; you grieve that so little has been lost (Hazlitt 1820).
According to Hazlitt, the British prime minister, William Pitt, was as a wholly rhetorical creature whose sole talent consisted in his “artefu l use of words” (Hazlitt 1902a: 346). Pitt, Hazlitt observes, “seemed not to have believed that the truth of his statements depended on the reality of the fact, but that the things depended on the order in which he arranged them into words” (1902a: 323-4). Thus, Pitt regarded “every subject presented to him nothing more than a tabula rasa, on which he was at liberty to lay whatever colouring of language he pleased; having no general principles. No comprehensive views of things, no moral habits of thinking, no system of action, there was nothing to hinder him from pursuing any particular purpose, by any means that offered; having never any plan, he could not be convicted of inconsistency, and his own pride and obstinacy were the only rules of his conduct” (Hazlitt 1902a: 346-7).

Likewise, Fox’s “exalted merit as a debater in Parliament,” did not “consist in the length, variety, or roundness of his periods, but in the truth and vigour of his conceptions ... in the exuberant fertility of his invention; which spontaneously brought forth his ideas at the moment.” Instead of forcing his thoughts “by cold, pre-mediated illustrations or by episodes, which, however beautiful, only distract attention,” Fox “was accustomed to repass his subject, not methodically, but in most unforeseen and fascinating review ... binding even his adversaries in a kind of spell for the moment, of involuntary assent” (Erskine 1815: x-xi). According to Erskine, Fox’s oratory demonstrated that “the spring and the fountain of Eloquence” resides not in the cognitive faculties of the mind but “in the heart – a cold-blooded learned man, might, for any thing I know, compose in his closet and eloquent book; but, in public discourse, arising out of sudden occasions, could by no possibility be eloquent” (Ibid: xiii):

[Fox’s] emphases were the unstudied effusions of nature - the vents of a mind, burning intensely with the generous flame of public spirit and benevolence, beyond all controul [sic.] or management when impassioned, and above the rules to which inferior things are properly subjected: his sentences often rapidly succeeded, and almost mixed themselves with one another, as the lava rises in bursts from the mouth of a volcano, when the resistless energies of the subterranean world are at their height (Erskine 1815: xiv).
A similar point can be made about the rhetorical ornamentation of Richard Sheridan, who left a successful life as a playwright in order to become a member of the House of Commons. Like Pitt and Fox, Sheridan’s political speeches relied heavily on repetitive sentence structures, tactical over-statement and other rhetorical schemes, rather than on the tropes of rational argument. The rhythmical repetitions of schemes were meant to impress on the audience values of self-expression, subjectivity and the inner truth, or authenticity, of one's feelings. Richard Sheridan’s father, Thomas Sheridan, a famous Irish orator developed his own theory of language. In his *Lectures on Elocution* (1762), considered one of the most important contribution to elocutionary theory in the eighteenth century, he argued for a complete separation between the spoken and the written language; the former must be seen as natural (“a gift of god”), while the latter is utterly artificial (“the invention of man”). For that reason, Sheridan was adamantly opposed the reading of text in public as a substitute for spontaneous speech. He saw public readings as “the true source of the bad manner” because reading is thought “in a different way, with different tones and cadences, from those which we use in speaking; and this artificial manner, is used instead of the natural one, in all recitals and repetitions at school, as well as reading.” According to Sheridan, unlike the artificiality of reading, the power which words acquire when “forcibly uttered by the living voice,” is a power of good, creating sympathy between human beings through a universal language (quoted in Newlyn 2000: 340).

### 3.4.2 A Culture of Anti-Scribalism

In the House of Commons, until the nineteenth century, the rhetorical overtones of political eloquence set it apart from scribal practices. Written texts appear meaningless in comparison with spoken language that arises out of the needs of a moment and had an immediate,
observable, effect on identifiable listeners. ‘Antiscralism’ or ‘antitextualism’ was, therefore, a central feature of the cultural organization of Parliament, which dominated the House until the nineteenth century and had directed the long-standing antagonism between Parliament and the print culture (Donoghue 2001). Parliamentary discourse was characterized by low-level activities of reading and writing and a concomitant to high-level activities of talking, disputing and negotiating. Politicians spend most of their time in parliamentary debates, where writing (usually brief notes) was basically subservient to the production of more effective and authoritative speech.

Classical oratory emphasized the naturalness of speech against the artificiality of print culture; the superiority of the “living voice” with its clarity and immediacy, against the printed word and the reading of the “dead letter.” Under the norms of patrician orality, spontaneity were given priority over the coherency of a written argument. The primary objective of political oratory was expressive and parliamentary discourse was seen as a dramatic interplay between spontaneous point of views that must not be subjected to the “dead word” of the printed text. As one observer wrote, “the House of Commons dislikes that which is didactic and recoils from that which is dull” (cited in Meisel 2001: 214-5). Great political orators spilled their words like lava, hot with their own thoughts and feelings. Setting this bursting lava of words into a more detached form like the printed text had a necessary cooling effect on the spontaneity of words making them loose their forcefulness and vitality. In his introduction to the 1815 edition of Fox’s speeches, Lord Erskine’s claim that “the great affair of a free government like that of England, could not be usefully discussed in public by men coming forth from their closets with written discourses, however sublime or beautiful” (Erskine 1815: viii). Thomas Sheridan, for example, refused to publish his speeches, understanding that the power of his oratory was based on his parliamentary performance, which he believed could not be captured in print (Morwood 1985: 125).

In eighteenth century parliamentary culture there was therefore a clear and impenetrable boundary between the “bookish” writer and the “lively” speaker: “the most bookish men are
generally remarkable for the worst delivery” (Sheridan 1762: 8). Conversely “the most dashing orator I ever heard is the flattest writer I ever read. In speaking, he was like a volcano vomiting out lava; in writing, he is like a volcano burnt out. Nothing but the dry cinders, the hard shell remains.” Hazlitt 1820a: 27).

It is hardly surprising therefore that even the reading of prepared speeches and an overdependence on the assistance of notes were regarded as unparliamentary practices. Thomas Sheridan, for example, saw the substitute of the “natural” spontaneous speech with “artifical reading in public as “the true source of the bad manner” (quoted in Newlyn 2000: 341). With reading, the delivery of one’s own words become artificial as if he reads someone else’s writing. As a result, many members intending to speak in debates had to memorize their notes beforehand. Members had to ask for specific permission to include the reading of specific documents (such as letters, petitions, etc.) in their speeches and they were usually refused (Thomas 1971: 203–6). When they were allowed to read, politicians tend to speed diagonally through administrative memos, quick reports, oral summaries, or discursively presented decisions. Even today in the modern House of Commons it still forbidden for members to read a speech. MPs may use notes, but if they are obviously reading from them, everyone cries, “reading, reading” and the notes are put away! (Healey, 1991:225).

Another important set of rules of guided by the Commons’ culture of patrician orality prohibited members from indulging in ‘personalities’ (Thomas 1971: 212-213). This had a direct effect on oratorical style and contributed to the wittiness and attractiveness of speech (the famous English understatement). Unable to practice outright character assassination within an adversarial system, members must coat their invective with a veneer of sarcastic humor rather than personal ridicule. If a speaker made an especially offensive or potentially seditious statement or accusation,

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8 As one MP wrote of the parliamentary humor, “the man is not to be envied who thinks he is being funny when the House is sure he is being rude. But when the right note is struck in this style of speaking there is no better audience in the world than the House of Commons” (quoted in Meisel 1999: 279).
the Clerk would, at the behest of another member, write the statement down word for word, so that the offending speaker could withdraw the remarks (Ibid: 214-215). This was the only occasion in which what was said in Parliament was actually recorded in writing. Paradoxically, then, the House turned the practice of writing upside down: using writing as a way of recording only those statements which are to be ritualistically eliminated from the debate.

The oral culture of eighteenth century Commons drew a firm distinction between completed action and *oration*, between things *done* and things being *said*. Print was used only to inscribe what the Commons had decided or enacted. This was recorded was recorded in its *Votes* and, at rather greater length, in its *Journals* which was the central record of the House. Seated at the table in the centre of the House, the clerks scribbled away, taking the minutes of each day’s sitting, recording every item of business transacted. From 1690 a summary version of the minutes was compiled and published daily by the House with the title *Votes of the House of Commons*. The fuller version of the Journal was then compiled, under the direction of the Speaker, from the printed Votes with the aid of any supporting printed-paper presented to the house. But the House retained no memory of what had been uttered by individuals in the course of debate. The Journal contained no record at all of speeches made in the house, except of a certain well-defined formal occasions. It contained no reference to debates or parties and no information about the activities or opinion of members could be obtained from it.

This separation between the memory of what was said in Parliament and the memory of what was done by Parliament is analogues to Thomas Osborne’s distinction between *royal memory* (the memory of “the sovereign and great acts”) and *archival memory*. The latter, according to Osborne, is a modern form of memory, a memory of “everyday detail” that appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was guided by principles of “publicity and mundanity” (Osborne 1999: 58). Moreover, the printing of the eighteenth century Journal (and the eighteenth century reports of select committees), those official materials of the “royal
memory,“ had no real practical purpose. It fulfilled a record-keeping rationale of recording the House of Commons’ decisions. As such it was the exclusive domain of the House clerks – the high priests who understood these arcane matters – and was not aimed at all at the public readings. In fact, the publication of the Journal appeared, at best, six months after the end of a session could have only very limited usefulness for political significance for the larger public or even for the politicians themselves. In 1906 the Clerk of the House described the House of Commons Journal as “an elaborate translation of twentieth century facts into eighteen century fiction” (quoted in Lambert 1975: 10).

According to the Commons eighteenth century operative model, then, the eloquence of the parliamentary orator, though practiced, is wholly contingent and in a strict sense has no history. Print, by contrast, historicized the speech, took possession of it and gave it an extra-parliamentary dimension. Thus, parliamentary proceedings were seen as an unsuitable material for the “formal record of the business of the house” (Lambert 1975: 10). As Burke explained in a letter to his patron, the Marquis of Rockingham, in 1779: “Any thing may be said in a Speech; it is fugitive; and the Liberty of Speech carries along with it the apology for its own defects or errors [sic], but a motion on the records of the house is permanent; and the matter of it being prepared, indiscretion in it is the last thing in the World to be pardond [sic]” (quoted in Reid 2000: 127).

On formal occasions, when the shorthand clerks, responsible for the minutes were asked to record some parliamentary speeches, they were often accused of too mechanical writing which does not capture the spirit of the speech and its performative aspects and affects. Lord Loughborough, speaking in 1794 during the Hastings trial, complained that the shorthand writers are utterly unreliable because “they were in general ignorant, as acting mechanically; and by not considering the antecedent, and catching the sound, and not the sense, they perverted the sense of the speaker, and made him appear as ignorant as themselves” (quoted in Donoghue 2001: 851 fn. 44). This complaint about the “mechanical ignorance” of the clerks marked a divide between
the norms of patrician oratory and the bureaucratic practices and of the House clerks whose clerical duties were summed up in their oath that he shall “make true entries, remembrances, and journals of things done and passed in the House of Commons” (quoted in Williams 1954: 122).

The lack of a register for parliamentary speech carried major implications for the ways debates were carried out. Because the House retained no formal record of speeches, it was considered a breach of privilege for members to refer to what had been said on an earlier occasion. No reference could be made in speeches to anything that had been said in previous debates because members could never remember exactly what had been said due to the lack of verbatim written record of the speeches (Thomas 1971: 214–15). The lack of written records imposed, therefore, a formal restraint on the free play of political argument and affected the quality of the House of Commons’ deliberations. This situation met growing resistance from members and led to a growing practice of adjourning debates so as to create a formal continuation between debates. As I show in chapters five and six, the rule against references to previous debates was abolished only with the entrance of the national press into Parliament, which created a printed records of parliamentary debates to which MPs could now refer.
4. From Oratory to Reportage: Changes in the Organizational Culture of the Nineteenth Century Parliament

In the course of his pioneering study of the public sphere, Habermas identifies the reporting of parliamentary debates as one of that sphere’s key political functions. It is not generally recognized, however, that Habermas considered the wide and rapid circulation of parliamentary reportage as a major factor leading to a change in the organization of Parliament itself, by transforming the mode of publicity of political knowledge (1989: 60–7). Although Habermas theory of the public sphere has been widely discussed and contested, only scant attention has been given to the development in the nineteenth century of a transformative relationship between public communication and the modus operandi of the British Parliament.

The relation between politics and print might seem to the modern reader like a fairly simple and straightforward engagement, but in fact it took a long time to put together. There were two main and interrelated obstacles. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Three, a powerful verbal type of intelligence, which emphasized the naturalness and spontaneity of the “living voice” had militated against the artificiality of the “dead letter.” Secondly, as I show below, Parliament did not consider the audible utterances emitted by its members to be amenable to inscription in writing. These utterances were rather perceived as momentary and fleeting and could not constitute interpretable long standing events, with any form of memory.

For Weber, parliamentary reportage induced the disenchantment of politics, marked by its growing professionalization. In his Politics as Vocation, he described the printed press of the early nineteenth century as a “a continuous political organization” and saw the political reporter as the only real professional politician, who gets paid for doing his job (Weber 1946: 77-128). My intention here is not to provide a sociological account of modern political journalism. Rather, what I seek to show in the rest of this chapter is how with the growing publicity of...
parliamentary procedures, which opened the Parliament to public scrutiny, British Politics became increasingly disenchanted. As legislation no longer rested on direct performance in Parliament but on the mediated form of its publication, a crucial transformation in the cultural organization of Parliament and in the practical epistemology of governance had taken place.

4.1 The Emergence of Public Reporting in Parliament

In the oral world of eighteenth century Parliament there was a pervasive belief that political authority was more likely to be respected and political debate was more effective if no record of political debates was taken or made public. The privilege of discussing politics belonged exclusively to politicians in political institutions, and these discussions were considered confidential. According to a royal proclamation drafted by Francis Bacon in 1620, matters of state were "not themes or subject fit for vulgar persons" (Starr 2004: 24). The publication of debates that took place in Parliament was therefore considered a crime.

Throughout the eighteenth century the House of Commons periodically renewed the standing orders which prohibited the reporting of its proceedings and excluded “strangers” from its galleries (Aspinall 1956; Thomas 1959; Wahrman 1992). It did so against the background of a rapidly expanding printed media which helped to create a market for information and opinion which was further extended by those unofficial assemblies: clubs, coffee-houses, debating societies, etc (Habermas 1989).

During this period publications of parliamentary debates were seen as fundamental breach of privilege, an affront to the dignity of the House and an infringement of its freedom to debate. This fundamentalist view rested on the assumption that the public had no right to information about parliamentary proceedings beyond the barest record of legislative decisions.
and votes. During one attempt to clear the gallery of strangers, Burke asked that David Garrick (a visitor that day) be allowed to stay on the grounds that "he was a man to whom they were all obliged; one who was the great master of eloquence; in whose school they had all imbibed the art of speaking, and been taught the elements of rhetoric (Donoghue 2001: 846). Burke reasoning underscored the central criteria for membership in the closed club of the eighteenth century House of Commons.

The very idea that parliamentarians had external reputations to win, or a sphere of opinion to address – that they were accountable to anyone other than themselves for their deliberations and discourse – remained a matter of controversy in both Houses for much of the eighteenth century. In 1738 adopted a standing order which declared:

That it is a high indignity to, and a notorious breach of privilege of, this House, for any New-Writer, in Letters or other Papers, (as Minutes, or under any other denomination) or for any printer or publisher of any printed Newspaper of any denomination, to presume to insert in the said Letters or Papers, or to give therein any Account of the Debates, or other Proceedings of this House, or any Committee thereof, as well during the Recess, as the sitting of Parliament; and that this House will proceed with utmost severity against such offenders (quoted in Robson 1988: 1-2).

In the debate, which led to the passing of this motion, Thomas Winnington warned of the dangers of having "every word that is spoken here by gentlemen misrepresented by fellows who thrust themselves into our gallery." Sir Robert Walpole, then Prime Minister, expressed the frustration of the House at reading accounts of debates "wherein all the wit, the learning, and the argument has been thrown on one side, and on the other nothing but what was low, mean, and ridiculous". And Sir William Pulteney declared that “no appeals should be made to the public with regard to what is said in this assembly, and to print or publish the Speeches of gentlemen in this House, even though they were not misrepresented, looks very like making them accountable without doors for what they say within” (Cobbett 1806–20, v10: 806). In another
debate surrounding the issue of publication, William Windham predicted that the publication of parliamentary debates would have a transformative effect on Parliament itself. It would change “the present form of government … making it democratic; for it was calling every day on the public to judge of the proceedings of Parliament. By these daily publications the people were taught to look upon themselves as present at the discussion of all the proceedings of Parliament, and sitting in judgment on them (Cobbett 1806–20, v34: 159).

Parliamentary reporters were seen as interlopers, urban meddlers in the aristocratic world of high politics. Worse, they addressed themselves to the populace, thereby not only assisting in the development of a middle-class opinion which threatened the political authority of the landed interest, but encouraging the lower orders who read their parliamentary reports to contemplate matters above their station. The central argument against reports from Parliament was that recording Parliament deliberations in print conflicts with the legislature’s business, which is to consider the pass legislation. The legislative process, it was believed, can be performed properly only if the issues are discussed freely and honestly, without fear of illegitimate pressure and without hope of illegitimate reward. Members of Parliament did not see themselves as delegates, they did not think that their duties are merely to represent or replicate the opinion of their constituents. Consequently, the proper aim of speeches was to persuade only the audience of parliamentary members whose votes will decide the issue. Speech can only be performed “in the moment” for the sole purpose of persuading the members of the House for the immediate purpose of voting on a specific legislation. Using the parliamentary floor to address other audiences outside the House was seen not only as inappropriate and unethical but also as a threat to the entire parliamentary modus operandi.

Periodicals responded to these restrictions by writing parliamentary reports largely out of their imagination, disguising their stories as letters to friends abroad or changing the names of the speakers. The London Magazine, for example, was reporting on the “Proceedings of a
Political Club” whose members were called Cicero (Walpole) and Cato (Pulteney), and *The Gentleman's Magazine* ran a series of parliamentary reports under the heading “Debates in the Senate of Magna Lilliputia,” written by Samuel Johnson (Hoover 1953). At stake, therefore, was not only the question of accountability; no less important was the problem of managing political information and, in particular, controlling political representation. As the number of newspapers multiplied, each eager to offer readers its own account of the business of Parliament, public opinion became more independent and the question of the control of political representations became ever greater.

Between 1738 and 1771, on the orders of the House, printers were summoned to the Bar to apologize and be reprimanded. Many refused, and ensuing confrontations led to riots and the imprisonment of several MPs. The result was a draw: the “breach of privilege” rule stayed, but the Commons gave up for good the idea of punishing those who dared reproduce its proceedings. Thus, although the House was reluctant to abandon the principle that the publication of debates was a breach of privilege, after 1771 it had, in practice, abandoned its attempts to seriously enforce prohibitions on reporting. From 1777 the gallery of the house began to be opened more frequently to reporters. Reports of parliamentary debates and proceedings now featured openly and prominently in most newspapers. Parliamentary reporters made the House of Commons – its conventions, its political players and the balance of its forces – more visible than ever before.

Reporters, however, were far from being privileged spectators and reporting conditions remained difficult. Although reporters were no longer subjected to institutional prosecution or harassment, they were certainly not given any official endorsement and the debate over the presence of reporters in Parliament continued. Reporters had no right of admission and had no seats reserved for them; when they could get in at all, they were restricted to the back rows of the gallery, where the acoustic was poor, and were tolerated only as visitors (“strangers”). There
was no ‘public’ gallery in the Commons before it was destroyed by fire in 1834. The gallery was often a crowded place, usually occupied by MPs, and when an important debate was excepted reporters had to wait with the crowd until the doors were opened at noon, and compete for seats with ordinary members of the public, while forcing their way to the back rows, where they sat in semi-darkness struggling to hear and record what was being said on the Floor of the Commons far below, while continually interrupted by parliamentary members passing and re-passing their seats. Periodically, and especially in debates on the most controversial issues, the House attempted to maintain secrecy by invoking the standing order which excluded strangers from its galleries, thus reducing the sources of accounts of speeches to the members themselves. Even when attendance was low, reporters were not allowed to move from the back to the front raw so as to better listen to the speeches on the floor.

Moreover, it was not until 1783 that reporters were allowed to take notes. When James Stephen reported the debates for the Morning Post in 1781 and 1782, taking notes in Parliament was forbidden. “To use a pen or pencil,” writes Stephen, “was deemed a high contempt, so much so that I once saw a gentleman taken into custody and turned indignantly out, merely for taking down a figure or two with his pencil when Lord North was opening his Budget. We were obliged, therefore, to depend on Memory alone, and had no assistance in the work, one reporter for each House being all that any paper employed” (quoted in Aspinall 1956: 237).

A major change came in 1803 when on May 23, following the failure of negotiations with Bonaparte, Britain was again at war with France, but in the press there was no report of the debate in Parliament on the issue, which took place a day before. As the newspapers explained to their readers, with clear disapproval, they could not provide an account of the parliamentary debate because their reporters failed to enter the gallery. The protest of the press had an immediate effect on the House and led its Speaker to order to give reporters privileged access to the back row of the gallery. Like in the case of the previous concessions in 1771 and 1783, no
official resolution was passed, let alone a new standing order, to enforce it. But in the world of Parliament, this was enough to set a new tradition. The Speaker had ruled. And other Speakers would follow suit. The Press had achieved a permanent foothold in the House.¹

The 1803 order is seen by many as marking the establishment of the Official Public Report. Now that journalist were granted right of admission as privileged spectators, the growing corps of reporters dedicated to covering the Commons gradually established itself as an institution, from its base in the back row of the gallery. The new order shows that the thirty years of parliamentary reporting had worked to transform the relationships between the House and the Press. 1803 also marked the first systematic attempt to record the House proceedings based upon journalists’ reports, when William Cobbett followed his History of Parliament 1066 – 1802 with the printing of parliamentary debates in regular installments as a supplement to his Political Register, which in 1809 was transferred to the ownership of the Hansard family.

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the importance of parliamentary reporters increased and, as a result, they were given more and more privileges in the House. By 1824 reporters were allowed for the first time to enter the gallery after the door had been locked against other ‘strangers’; and they had secured a private entrance to the gallery itself, thus enabling the sixty to seventy newspaper reporters who habitually occupied the gallery to avoid the crowd (Aspinall 1956: 251). In 1828, Macaulay observed in the Edinburgh Review that “[t]he gallery in which the reporters sit has become the fourth estate realm.” Macaulay noticed that “[t]he publication of the debates, a practice which seemed to the most liberal statesman of the old school full of danger to the great safeguards of public liberty, is now regarded by many persons as a safeguard, tantamount, and more than tantamount, to all the rest together” (quoted in Meisel 2001: 1).

¹ During his visit to Westminster in 1812, Charles knight, the famous London Publisher, wrote in his diary about his experience as a visitor in the reporter gallery of the House of Commons: "I observed on the back bench - which by its elevation commands a view of the body of the House - half-a-dozen reporters busily employed with their note books. This back bench is theirs by custom, but not by right" (Knight 1874: 82).
Still, many MPs continued to deeply distrust the press in general and parliamentary reporters in particular. Without aristocratic conception of honor, journalists were seen as lacking self-restraint. The sixth duke of Bedford complained in 1826 that "the proprietors of the daily press have large Capitals in the traffic and not an acre of land." In the 1820s serious attempts were made by Lord Liverpool government who regarded the press as “really the root of the evil,” to repress free speech without great success, as reporters faced an increasing support from a growing number of MPs, many of the utilitarian reformers (Wasson 2006: 94).

As the century progressed, newspapers were able to provide fuller coverage of the House of Commons to a readership that was both increasingly literate and increasingly enfranchised. There was a growing public interest in parliamentary news and information promoted by the growth in the London and provincial press, most of which carried parliamentary intelligence. In London the number of newspapers rose from 19 in 1783 to 52 in 1811, in 1824 there were already 135 papers and in 1856 their number skyrocketed to 420 (Aspinall, 1956: 6; Cox 1987: 13). The growth in the provincial press was equally striking: there were 27 newspapers in England and Wales in 1780, and 153 in 1830 and 375 in 1954 (Jupp 1990: 71; Cox 1987: 13). Circulation rose rapidly as well. In 1835 35 million stamped newspapers were sold; fifteen years later the number was close to 100 million (Wasson 2006: 81). And it has been calculated that by 1830 a single copy of a newspaper was read by between twenty and thirty people (Aspinall, 1956: 9, 23-25). They were often read in the thriving coffeehouses, reading rooms, and mechanics institutes.

Never before or since had so many pages of print been devoted to political speeches. If during most of the eighteenth century newspapers devoted most of their space to commercial interests that concerned their readers, by the end of the eighteenth century, virtually every newspaper and many periodicals, both in London and in the provinces, wishing to have some political relevance, devoted much of their space to detailed reports of parliamentary debates.
(Aspinall 1956: 33), and it would not be a mistake to assume that their readers certainly devoted just as much attention to reading them. Some estimates claim that in the first half of the nineteenth century, between fifty to seventy-five percent of total news columns in the *Times* were devoted to parliamentary reports while Parliament was in session (Bevis 2003: 576). In *The Morning Chronicle*, for example, over half of the space not taken up by advertisements was devoted to parliamentary debates (Wasson 2006: 76).

The increasing demands for parliamentary reporting was also reflected in the increasing number of parliamentary reporters. In 1834, the number of reporters did not exceed 60. By 1871, their number increased to 105 (Meisel 2001: 78). Parliamentary Reporting became more professionalized and more systematized. Each reporter took notes for one or two hours and was then replaced by his successor, to write from his notes the speeches he had heard, enabling newspaper to print reports of the early parts of the debates while it was still proceeding (Aspinall 1956: 251). As parliamentary reporting was enjoyed higher prestige, the job attracted “gentlemen of a literary character”, including Samuel Johnson, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Payne Collier, John Campbell (who became a Lord Chancellor) Allan Cunningham (the poet), William Hazlitt, and William Cobbett, whose Weekly *Political Register* later became *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*. Charles Dickens secured a job as a parliamentary reporter between 1831 and 1836 for the *Mirror of Parliament*, edited by his uncle, which during the 1830s successfully rivaled *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*.

The mounting power of the Press was now acknowledged and appreciated by a growing number of politicians from all parties. At a meeting of the Newspaper Press Benevolent Association, held in London on July 13, 1839, Lord Brougham, Benjamin Disraeli and Lord Lyndhurst paid tribute to those “connected with the literary departments of the Newspaper Press of the United Kingdom.” Particular attention was drawn to “the influence and good effects of the Newspaper Press” on the moral conduct of society, as demonstrated by the educational, civilizing
and calming effects of newspaper reading” (quoted in Jones 1996: ch. 5). These developments brought Thomas Carlyle to comment in 1841 that “Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact,—very momentous to us in these times. Literature is our Parliament too,” declared Carlyle,” writing brings Printing; Brings the Universal every-day extempore Printing” it thus “becomes power a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law making, in all acts of authority (Carlyle 1841: 189-190; my italics).

When the New Palace of Westminster opened for business in 1852, the permanent status of public report was manifested in the new House of Commons by a special writing room and a special gallery with 19 front-row seats, or boxes expressly designed, built, and reserved for parliamentary reports. It was indeed most significant that while the space provided for MPs’ debates did not change in its essentials from in the old camber, the most significant alteration in the physical arrangement of the House was directed towards giving more space for public reporting. In fact, the opening of the new Houses of Parliament was delayed for more than two years while a glass roof was installed in order that those in the reporters’ gallery could hear and write down the speeches.

The new design reflected the changes in the organizational culture of Parliament by mid-nineteenth century: the shift from spoken to written activities. While debates were kept confined to the small, closed and intimate space of a chamber, which was modeled almost exactly on one which existed in the old House, the new design grandly improved the Parliament’s surroundings, such as the press gallery, and the administrative and clerical facilities, where politicians and other officials were busy writing reports. Also improved was the House Library where books and documents were archived and stored. From the mid-eighteenth century the House of Commons obtained possession of an ever-increasing proportion of the Palace of Westminster, for use as committee rooms and for the work of the officials of the house. During the eighteenth
century the place designated for the meeting of every select committee was the Speaker’s Chamber which comprised two rooms, each about 20 feet square. By the end of the eighteenth century such accommodation proved inadequate for the growing volume of Committee work and the house gradually obtained more committee rooms by conversions and additions to the Palace of Westminster. By mid nineteenth century there were more than a dozen Committee rooms.

4.2 The “Silent Revolution”: Public Reportage and the Disenchantment of Parliament

In 1797, Burke observed in a letter to French Laurence, his literary executor, that “it is very unlucky that the reputation of a speaker in the House of Commons depends far less on what he says there, than on the account of it in the newspapers” (quoted in Wahrman 2002: 88). This remark reflects a historically important transformation in the relationship, and balance of power, between Parliament and the ‘public sphere’ with its print culture (Habermas 1989). Burke himself was acutely aware of this transformation, bemoaning seven years earlier, in connection to the French Revolution, that “the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded” (Edmund Burke 1790).

As Parliamentary discourse was projected to the public by means of the printed reports the House could no longer sustain the pretence that it spoke to no one but itself. With this transformation, the work of the legislators became less dependent on face-to-face rhetorical engagements between gentlemen inside the Commons chamber, and much more on their engagement, through print, with the public outside the House, where their reputation was now largely constructed. Print “historicized the speech (or a version of it), took possession of it and gave it an extra-parliamentary dimension” (Reid 2000: 127). What was once perceived as a
threat to the freedom of parliamentary debate would slowly come to be seen as an opportunity for MPs, for if print took possession of their words, it could also allow their words to take possession of the public.

The cultural and political impact of public reports on parliamentary discourse cannot, therefore, be overestimated. Henry Brougham, for example, who had, as we will see, a pivotal role in making the infiltration of the Press into Parliament possible saw the Press as an “engine ... invented for working upon the popular mind, whether to instruct, to persuade, or to please ... of which the powers are not limited in time or in space.” For Weber, the process of disenchantment entailed, first and foremost a breakdown in the unity of meaning, thus indicating “unconvincing cultural practice, failed symbolic performance” (Alexander and Mast 2006: 15).

Brougham understood well the effect the disenchanting effect of print on the culture of patrician orality. The national Press he argued has splintered the oratorical scene in which the orator "was the Parliamentary debater, the speaker at public meetings, the preacher, the newspaper, the published sermon, the pamphlet, the volume, all in one” (1838: 380). Once Parliament became a “field of application” for public reportage, the primal moment of oration with its magical effect of eloquence was closely monitored and differentiated into different functions, different forms of specialization and inscriptions, and into different domains of commentary and expertise.

The public circulation of speech via the printed page led to a change in the nature of parliamentary eloquence itself and brought about a decisive reorientation of parliamentary discourse, as MPs were attempting to develop styles, which could mediate between their political peers and their readers. The Commons increasingly became a platform for addressing the nation. Looking back at the eighteenth century “golden age” of parliamentary rhetoric from the vantage point of mid nineteenth century, Thomas Babington MacAulay considered the influence of parliamentary reporters on the oratorical skills as the appropriate tool for parliamentary leadership:
At present, the best way of giving rapid and wide publicity to a fact or an argument is to introduce that fact or argument into a speech made in Parliament … A speech made in the House of Commons at four in the morning is on thirty thousands tables before ten … The orator, by the help of shorthand writer, has to a great extent superseded the pamphleteer. It was not so in the reign of Anne. The best speech could then produce no effect except on those who heard it. It was only by mean of the press that the opinion of the public without doors could be influenced; and the opinions of the public without doors could not but be of the highest importance in a country governed by parliaments … The pen was therefore a more formidable engine than the tongue (MacAulay 1843).

By implicating the oral culture of the Commons in the medium of print, the new culture of political reportage has significantly altered the way Parliament worked. With the increasing awareness of officialdom that their speech and opinions in Parliament might provide material for the press, Parliament was now more oriented and more attentive to general public concerns (which were not necessarily represented in Parliament). Parliamentary reports not only played an increasing role in setting the terms for how Parliament dealt with public issues; the press also became an increasingly important player in setting the agenda for parliamentary debates, by raising new, and often more general, public concerns of its own. Debates were often initiated by items that members had read in the morning's newspapers and looked to them as expressing issues of general public concern.

In 1853, the Eclectic Magazine observed how the presence of the Press helped the Commons achieve “political maturity.” “From the strangers' gallery,” reported the Magazine, "we cannot omit to observe first how much the press altered the character of the oratory of the House ... It is to the Reporters' Gallery members speak, not to the House. Ordinarily no one listens - no one expect to be convinced - no one seeks to convince.” Parliament, notes the Magazine, seemed to have lost its “enthusiasm,” it “cares little for declamation. It would rather be without it. It considers it a waste of time. Figures of arithmetic are far more popular than figure of speech. The latter are for school-boys and youth in its teens - the former are for men. Business is one thing - rhetoric is another.” In this new political environment, concluded the
Magazine, skilled orators “are quite out of place.”

One of the best reflections of this transformation is presented by the parliamentary reporter in George Henry Francis in the introduction to his book *Orators of the Age* (1847a). Examining the changes in the discourse of the House of Commons during the first half of the nineteenth century, Francis observed that Britain “during the last twenty years, has been undergoing a revolution, silent, slow, and gradual, but still emphatically a revolution ... we are in a state of transition, a condition of things favorable to the development of the wisdom of the statesman and the philosopher, but not to the genius of the poet or the orator” (Francis 1847a: 21). According to Francis, the most important manifestation of this “silent revolution” is the decline in the rhetorical eloquence of parliamentary oratory: “the most biased admirer of the present must admit a deficiency of power and eloquence as compared with the past.” Unlike classical rhetoric, the new parliamentary discourse lacks “the animus that vivified the speeches of the older orators - their concentration of soul - their indifference to all external modifying influences, to all but the full development of the spontaneous creations of their intellects.” “What” asks Francis “have been the causes of the decline of what, in a popular country, must ever be one of the most powerful agencies of change?” He explains that is “the wonderful progress recently made in the art of reporting” that transformed parliamentary rhetoric into a public discourse (Ibid: 16-20):

(T)he House has become the property of the public; and deference is paid to the public, by public men merging their private quarrels in the more important contests of the class interests which they represent ... The commercial calculating spirit of the bourgeoisie ... jeers at fine speaking. It comes to transact business, not to be amused; for that it has the theater or the last new novel ... its time is too precious to be wasted on prepared perorations or magnificent exordiums. It requires something practical; prefers figures of arithmetic to figures of rhetoric ... to poetry (1847a: 20)

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2 Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature Science and Art, October 1853: 237-8
As personal politics of private interest transformed into impersonal and practical politics based on public interest, members of the House of Commons, who used to be the exclusive members of the most prestigious debating club in London, became public men using public discourse. “(T)o be a successful public speaker and to be first rate orator are two very different things,” Francis astutely detects. Unlike classical orators, public speakers "find it necessary to do something more than merely display their own talents.” They “become more business-like … rejecting the beautiful [and] apply themselves to the practical … always ready with facts, with arguments" (Ibid: 30-1).

The publication of debates altered the context of speech and subtly reshaped and transformed parliamentary practices. By exposing MPs to the public gaze it shifted discursive criteria for judging political sincerity, credibility and trustfulness, and required MPs to refashion themselves rhetorically and otherwise. In the course of the 1798 debate misrepresentation of parliamentary debates by newspapers William Wilberforce, a leader of the anti-slave movement, drew the House’s attention to,

a very common practice … which, for its honour and dignity, he wished to be discontinued. Gentlemen were in the habit of speaking of one another in a fulsome style of compliment, in a way that might, perhaps, please some bystanders, but which neither aided the debate, nor had the least tincture of sincerity in it; and the very members themselves, who used that sort of language in the House, treated it every where else as empty sound and flirting nonsense (Cobbett 1806–20, vol. 34: 154–5; my Italics).

In this direct attack on patrician orality, intellectual credibility and emotional honesty are counterpoised to the rhetorical ornament of parliamentary eloquence. It is significant that Wilberforce critique of the culture of eloquence and patrician orality in Parliament took place in the course of a debate on the effect of print culture. Juxtaposing the artificial and insincere discourse of parliamentary eloquence with the extra-parliamentary, public culture, and its ideal of truthfulness, Wilberforce’s comment reveals a rising tension (manifested in the in the conduct
of MPs themselves) between the oral culture inside Parliament and the new emerging public culture with its derived norms and expectations of political action induced by print. Thus, for example, Burke, who fought against what he saw as the “political experimentalism” of political reformers (“the fabricators of government”), rejected any attempt to form a science of society or politics, doubting that such science can “furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of the state” (1796: 332). He insisted, therefore, that “no discoveries are to be made in morality, nor many in the great principles of government” (Burke 1790: 182). “There is not in the physical order,” wrote Burke, “a distinct cause by which any of those fabrics must necessarily grow, flourish, or decay; nor, in my opinion, does the moral world produce any thing more determinate on that subject, than what may serve as an amusement, (liberal indeed, and ingenious, but still only an amusement,) for speculative men ... We are therefore obliged to deliver up that operation [of moral causes] to mere chance” (1796: 332-3).

The primary obligation of the eighteenth century orator was not to communicate thoughts and feelings but to display the experience of them as persuasively and spontaneously as he could (Fliegelman 1993:2). His goal, the organizing logic of his performance, was to make an appeal for action or justice, not to present an argument by using formal reasoning. Appeal, more so than argument, calls forth the listener’s moral sympathy and “better judgment” rather than his analytical faculties. It is a form of a priestly discourse, a ceremonial address which sought to preclude, or at least to reduce to a minimum opposition, which gave the speaker “sublime immunity” from expressions of disapproval. Because appeal implicitly elevates the listener to a position of authority and humbles the speaker to that of a supplicant, a mere petitioner, it connotes qualities of politeness, respect and agreeability.

With the rise of political reportage and the growing circulation of parliamentary debates outside of Parliament, a new political habitus begun to emerge in Parliament with dispositions towards new norms of credibility, pragmatism and utility. As the country gentleman George
Wyndham (Lord Egremont) put it, when reflecting in 1827 on the changes he had noted in the previous forty years: “In parliamentary eloquence the change does not arise from taste but from necessity, for the flights of Demosthenes [Famous Greek orator] are as little suited to sinking funds and paper money, and corn and fir, timber and silk and cotton, as a trumpet would be to a Quaker’s meeting” (quoted in Jupp 1990: 69). The authority of *impersonal utility* “rooted in the discourse of descriptive science,” had gradually come to replace “the authority of sincerity rooted in the discourse of affective experience” (Fliegelman 1993: 129).

Ultimately, the decline of classical oratory in nineteenth century Parliament was held to be one of the most significant index of a more general decline in the quality of parliamentary oratory. The MP and author Edward Bulwar lamented the decline classical tradition of parliamentary oratory, observing in his influential *England and the English* that the British Parliament is “left solely to the uncultivated and the idle, and you seek in vain for those nightly reunions of wits and senators which distinguished the reign of Anne, and still give so noble a charm to the assemblies of Paris” (Bulwar 1833: 92). In 1860, Benjamin Disraeli expressed similar sentiments, while connecting the changes in parliamentary eloquence to the rise of journalism and its contribution to the ‘presentist’ atmosphere and discourse in the House:

> There used to be well understood rules in the House of Commons in the old days, respecting quotations. No English poet to be quoted, who had not completed his Century. Greek & French never under any circumstances; Latin as you like … No quotation is what we are [now] most deficient in. Very few will venture in Latin. But it is not that the House relinquished quotations, but the new elements find their illustration and exponents in illegitimate means … Bright & Cobden & all those sort of people, are always quoting Dickens & Punch, &c. Our quotations are either tawdry or trashy. The privilege of quotation should not be too easy. It should be fenced in” (Swartz, 1975: 97-8).


4.2.1 Taking “the Pulse of the Publick”

The changing relations between the Parliament and the Press were to a large extent promoted by members themselves, and in particular by a group of Whig and liberal reformers, many of whom were influenced by Benthamite utilitarianism. In fact, it was the action of these members who wanted their speeches published, that, in 1783, eventually defeated the attempt to forbid note-taking in the gallery (Aspinall 1956: 245). Once reporters achieved a foothold in Parliament, MPs increasingly turned a blind eye to the official ban on reporting the debates and eventually encouraged it. One of the major supporters of parliamentary reportage among the MPs in early nineteenth century was Lord Henry Brougham, a barrister-reformer who later became Lord Chancellor and the first chair of the world first social science association, the British National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (NAPSS), established in 1857.

During his visit to Parliament in 1812, Charles Knight, the famous publisher-reformer, witnessed a debate in which some distinguished MPs were complaining about the misrepresentation of their speeches by reporters in the Press reports. Brougham, then a young and inexperienced MP, stood in the reporter defense, suggesting that “Gentlemen should consider the disadvantages under which reporters of their debates are taken.” Brougham, Knight observed was immediately silenced by the speaker who “With a mock solemnity … called "Order!" (Knight 1874: 82).

This was Knight’s first encounter with Brougham, one that had left a big impression on this would-be-reformer who devoted his publishing career public education through the dissemination of “useful knowledge”. As he recalled, “it was very daring in Mr. Brougham to hint, on such an occasion in 1812 … to recognize the presence at its debates of the obscure strangers who sat on the back bench of the gallery would have been to compromise the privileges of Parliament. This hypocrisy was a queer relic of those times when the repression of public opinion was held to be the security of the State” (Knight 1874: 82-3). Fifteen years after
this encounter Knight assisted Brougham in creating the *Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*, the very first precursor to the world’s first social science association, established in 1857 – *The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science*, which was also largely the creation of Brougham (see chapters 10 and 12).

Brougham not only publicly defended the tendency among reporters to compose (sketch-write) political speeches instead of recording them verbatim, he was known to actively encourage this practice. Frederick Knight Hunt, for example, tells in his book *The Fourth Estate* (1850) about a Times parliamentary reporter of the 1830s, named Tyas, who in transcribing his notes of a speech by Brougham thought of a passage in Cicero that could neatly illustrate Brougham’s argument, and so inserted about twenty lines from it to the original text of the speech. When Brougham himself prepared the collection of his speeches, he chose to include the passage (Macdonagh 1913: 31).

This tendency to blur the boundaries between parliamentary discourse and scribal or journalistic practices was exhibited by Brougham already in the early stages of his political career. In 1810, on the eve of his parliamentary debut, Brougham assured his friend John Allen that he was so much accustomed to writing, being a regular contributor to the Edinburgh review where he also serve on the editorial board, that in case he will not “look sharp” on the House of Commons floor and fail impress the House with his spontaneous speeches, he could easily, always and “infallibly get into preaching, dissertating, E. Review kind of manner” (quoted in Stuart 1985: 64).

According to Ellis Wasson (2006), Brougham exemplifies the preoccupation of Whig reformers with Print Culture to advance their social ideas. Wasson provides a long list of MPs from early and mid Victorian period, most of them Whig reformers, who by engaging extensively with the press played pivotal role in the growing influence of parliamentary reporters and the Press
on the conduct of Parliament and its organizational culture. These politicians communicated regularly with editors of journals and newspapers and devoted much energy to write articles and correct proofs of their speeches. As prime minister, Lord Grey provided documents used for his speeches in the Parliament to *The Morning Chronicle* and made sure his intermediaries with the press knew “the tone to be taken in the papers.” He also used his influence to urge cabinet ministers to write chapters for the widely circulated “Reform ministry” propaganda pamphlet. John Russell wrote several articles for the Edinburgh Review and in the 1840s he was corresponding regularly with the owner of *The Morning Chronicle* about wide range of policies and press issues and explained government and party positions (Wasson 2006: 79).

As Philip Harling (2001) has recently shown, Brougham, Russell, Grey, and other leading parliamentary reformers, who will come to play a pivotal role in the establishment of governmental social investigations in the 1830s and the 1840s, fought hard to resist the repression of reporters during the 1820s. Many of these reformers were barristers-MPS. They used the revision of the laws of libel enacted by Fox in 1792, which allowed juries and not the government to define what was illegal in reporting practices, to turn prosecutions against individual journalists into forums for radical expression as they believed that the juries ensured that "the pulse of the publick" could be taken and heeded. Addressing the juries, they turned the trials against parliamentary reporters into public forums, which disseminated the journalists opinions more broadly than if they had been let alone, making prosecution of the press difficult and not worthwhile for politicians.

It is clear from correspondence between politicians that many understood that politics was no longer confined to the chamber of the House of Commons, that much could be learned about the state of public opinion from reading newspapers and that paying attention to what the

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most successful ones said was a political duty (Wasson 2006). Long after the removal of the ban on parliamentary reportage, politicians frequently sent corrected reports of their speeches to the newspapers. This was a common practice in the first half of the nineteenth century. All the major editors seem to have invited members to submit notes or corrected reports of their speeches. *The Morning Chronicle*, for example, declared on March 27, 1795 that its report of Fox’s speech had been “carefully revised, enlarged and collated with the notes of several Members of the house” (quoted in Aspinall 1956: 247).

Furthermore, a considerable number of MPs who wished to achieve public notice were now actively pursuing the publication of their parliamentary speeches, their thoughts and their opinions. Many wrote letters to the press on matters of political controversy or as comments on other publications. They frequently revised their speeches for publication as pamphlets and some also saw to it that a handful of their major orations were published independently as highly finished texts, and in fuller versions than any newspaper editor would be willing or indeed able to print. In this way they sought to guard against error and misrepresentation in the press.

MPs tried to control or influence the press by means of subsidy and patronage. An interesting illustration of the anxiety of members to be adequately reported is given by a statement of a reporter employed by the Morning Post in 1810 who claims that he had been offered money by a member in return for a particularly good report of the speech which he was about to make:

To the note I gave no answer, and to the hon. gentleman’s speech I paid precisely the attention to which … it appeared to me to be entitled. The next day the hon. Member enclosed to me a cheque upon his banker. This I instantly returned, accompanied by a few lines in which I observed that he had entirely mistaken my character of all my co-adjustors, if he imagined that we were to be influenced in the performance of … a public duty by any private consideration (Cobbett’s Political Register, Feb 17, 1810).

As Aspinall observes, the habit of member’s paying newspaper printer to have their speeches published was a common practice during late eighteenth century and early nineteenth
century. It is even suggested that the famous parliamentary reporter Woodfall himself “had for many years had £400 a year for giving the speeches of Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan much more at length and better than he did those of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas.” This process, which begun in the 1790s, grew during Grey administration in the 1830s to the point in when it was recognized that some degree of direct ministerial access to the press was an essential part of governing.

Most significantly, legislators contributed actively and enthusiastically to the efforts to systematize and regularize the printed record of parliamentary discourse through more formal parliamentary registers, which were at that time collected and edited by parliamentary reporters. The preface to one of the volumes of William Woodfall’s *Parliamentary Register* noted that “those noble men and gentlemen who favour the reporter with a minute of their speech, are requested to send them to Mr. Stocakdale’s or the Report’s house, as early as possible after they are delivered.” In November 1803, when Woodfall’s *Parliamentary Register* was coming to an end and William Cobbett started his own printing of *Parliamentary debates*, he too saw the success of his project as dependent on the “correctness and amplifications which the speeches of our friends will receive from their own hands” (quoted in Aspinall 1956: 252-6).

### 4.2.2 Politics as paperwork

The changes in the practices and the ethos of the legislature were equally significant. An important aspect of the growing significance of print culture within Parliament, encouraged by parliamentary reportage, was the increase in the number printed papers presented to Parliament. According to Jupp, in 1797-98, for example, 800-1,200 copies of each of the 13 papers designated as of special interest were printed; in 1820, between 1,250 and 3,000 copies were

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4 Gorge Rose, the joint secretary of treasury, to Lord Auckland, Dec24, 1793 (quoted in Aspinall 1956: 245, fn. 4).
printed of the 186 papers in the same category (Jupp 1990: 71). The volume of papers presented to the Commons for information also rose sharply from about 140 per year in the 1770s to about 380 per year in the 1820 (Cox 1987: 53; Jupp 1990: 68). Information about printing expenses indicate a tremendous increase in printing capacities. In 1799 the expense of printing the Journals, Votes and all other Papers was £8,000; in 1827 it was £46,184 exclusive of the Journal and by the 1850s it would more than double to up £100,000 a year (Frankel 2006: 45). This avalanche of printed parliamentary information reflected the effect of public reportage on the enormous growth in parliamentary business which accompanied the House of Commons’ cultural transformation to written practices in early nineteenth century.

In 1852 Benjamin Disraeli, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, maintained during the debate that parliamentary literature attested to the intellectual development of the era, and would be most greatly appreciated in retrospect. The historian, according to Disraeli, would judge the age by the vast production of public knowledge inscribed in parliamentary papers and publications:

If we looked to manners, if we looked to the means of Government not only in this country but its dependencies, and indeed, to all those subjects which ought to afford the materials whence the true history of a country was drawn, we should find that in the Parliamentary literature, which had grown into importance within the last half-century, resources were placed in the hands of the public writers, such as never had been before possessed in any time or country (quoted in Frankel 2006: 41).

Sheila Smith (1962) writes that Disraeli made a systematic use of parliamentary literature (mostly reports of royal commissions or "blue books") in his own fictional writings. She finds remarkable similarities between the content of the report of the Children's Employments Commission and Disraeli famous novel, *Sybil* (1845). Parliamentary reports was thus used not only as evidence for legislation but as a source for other types of literature. As I discuss below, Disraeli was certainly not the only Victorian writer who relied on parliamentary reports to construct the narrative for his novels. Since Martineau’s for illustration novels on Poor Laws and paupers (1834), this became a common method in fictional writing among Victorian novelists. Interestingly, in *Sybil*, Disraeli’s refers to the growing spread and usage of parliamentary literature: When a delegation of chartists enters Charles Egremont's library they notice piles of blue books and other parliamentary papers on a side table (1845: 196).
MPs’ offices had begun to be hopelessly cluttered with all sorts of parliamentary papers and other printed materials and members were constantly complaining about getting lost in a maze of overwhelming quantities of parliamentary papers. In recent years “it had rained blue books,” announced the MP William Ewart in a parliamentary debate. “[I] object to having tons of papers which are never opened sent to my lodgings,” complained V. Scully “[I have] been out of town for a few weeks, and on my return, instead of being able to go to "The Derby" [I] had to wade through a mass of Parliamentary papers put away 11lb and threw away 2 cwt” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 65).

The prospect of publicity proved effective in inducing the government to respond to the challenge of debate by the opposition. The failure to persuade inside the House had pushed parliamentary opposition to win conviction outside it. A widespread petitioning movement began to emerge in the 1780s following the mismanagement of the American war and the increases in taxation which had been levied in order to finance it. The movement made use of print as a vehicle for popular protest against the inefficiency and corruption of the system of government, and in this contentious climate more radical political associations began to take root (Newman 1987: 206; Tilly 1995). Pressure groups proliferated, seeking remedial legislation, through petitions. Individual MPs, and opposition members in particular, took every opportunity to remind the House of the petitioners’ sentiments and demands, making petitions the normal method by which the unenfranchised could make their opinion known. Parliamentary discourse was in this way gradually shaped as a reactive response to external impulses initiated in broader arenas of public discussion.

Petitioning was an inexpensive way for individual MPs and their constituents to have their opinions and grievances not only heard in the House but, even more importantly, to get them printed by the House of Commons and circulated widely to increase its impact. William Cobbett encouraged the readers of his Political Register to send petitions to Parliament so that
their grievances could be freely publicized. “If you would have anything generally known, or any principle generally discussed, you cannot do better than embody it in a petition to Parliament. This is the only effectual way of drawing attention to it. On this ground then ... we would have the people ... eternally pestering Parliament with Petitions” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 49). As the Common’s Librarian explained to a Lords Committee on printing in 1854: “I sometimes have very great doubts whether papers are not moved for in order to get them printed because it is cheaper to buy copies of them than to print a pamphlet. I believe many a correspondence with the Public Department has been moved for with this view … Anybody can write a letter to the Secretary of State or to the Treasury, and then the correspondence may be moved for – and there is a pamphlet” (HL 1854, 119: q. 136, 137).

As a result Petitioning grew on an unprecedented scale in this period, both in the range of issues ventilated and the number of petitions presented. Their number had risen from 880 in 1787 to 4,498 in 1815 and 24,492 in 1831 (Frankel 2006: 49). An average of about ten different issues per year was raised in petitions before 1800; about thirty-seven between 1800 and 1820; about 120 in the 1820s; and 4,568 separate petitions in 1829 (Jupp 1990: 72). A conventional form of reply was to refer petitions to a select committee for further consideration. Consequently, the number of select committees sharply increased at the end of the eighteenth century, rising from an average of ten per year in the period 1715-60 to sixteen per year between 1761 and 1780, and twenty-one per year between 1781 and 1800 (Jupp 1990: 68; Lambert 1975: 45-48). We can also identify a substantial change in the concern of these committees. Throughout most of the eighteenth century, select committees dealt exclusively with internal procedures and issues of administrative routines or crisis problems, beginning in the 1780s we see more and more parliamentary committees that are concerned with social and other long-term problems (Tompson 1979: 49-50).
4.2.3 The decline of Political Oratory

The new print culture, which swept the Parliament in the first half of the nineteenth century, extended both the discursive function of parliamentary oratory and the utility of parliamentary practice and business beyond their original occasion. As parliamentary debates became more attuned to broader arenas of public discussion, the organizational culture of the Commons became more oriented towards public service in full view of the public gaze. Legislation became increasingly focused on public concerns and the Commons’ mode of operation reoriented itself towards finding workable, pragmatic, solution to ‘social problems’. A century after reporters were officially permitted into Parliament, William Matthews describes the House of Commons as follows:

The great Majority of the questions that now come up for decision by our political assemblies turn on masses of facts, antecedents in blue-books, tabulated statistics, which all necessitate not only elaborate inquiries, but differences of opinion after the inquiries. The Demesthenic vehemence is, therefore, out of place. Ingenuity and skill, a happy facility of dealing with tangled and complicated facts ... and, along with these, the calm didactic exposition, the clear, luminous statement ... are more efficacious than the "sound of fury" of the ancient orator. The modern speaker feels that on points of detail it would be ridiculous in a passion, - that on matters of business it would be absurd to be enthusiastic; and hence, except on rare occasions, he deals in facts rather than in fancies, in figures of arithmetic rather than in figures of speech, in pounds, shillings and pence, rather in poetry ... The cold, calculating, commercial spirit of the age jeers at fine speaking, and the shrewd speaker (Mathews 1879: 35-6).

A new kind of politician emerged in the House of Commons. If in the eighteenth century MPs were considered public figures only on a virtual and ex-officio basis, the new relationship between press and Parliament in the nineteenth century, and the massive growth in the number and size of newspapers, made MPs public figures de facto. The increase in business, the change in the substance of business, the attention of public opinion, all gave encouragement and opportunity to ambitious entrepreneurs who were interested in advancing their interests by
cultivating public opinion. By the end of the eighteenth century, access to Parliament was not particularly difficult for anyone with above £300 per year from land and about £1,500 per year to pay for a seat and sessional expenses, amounts well within the reach of the growing professional and commercial classes. As Thorne detects, there was a gradual change in the composition of the House, mostly due to a gradual rise in the number of members best described as self-made men and that the proportion of merchants, bankers, and industrialists reached nearly 19 percent (1986 [1]: 290, 318). In 1830, *The Times* calculated that the proportion of lawyers, merchants, traders, and bankers had grown to 22 percent (*The Times*, October 26, 1830). Aspinall Estimates the proportion of bankers, general traders, and East and West Indian merchants in the 1831 Parliament at 27 percent (1952: xxx).

A striking symbol of this transformation was the change in the public appearance of members. By the 1830s the universal black top hat, black topcoat, trousers, and shoes replaced the traditional aristocratic parliamentary costume, with wigs, and various clothing and decorations reflecting social status, and made the MPs not only indistinguishable from each other but also impossible to differentiate from the bureaucrats, lawyers, and city men. As Jupp (1990: 66) observes, “those who had worn the appearance in public of belonging to an exclusive gentlemen’s club no longer did so.”

With respect to their oratorical standing in the House of Commons, the new politician rarely acquired a reputation for parliamentary eloquence. This was particularly true in the case of barristers-MPs, whose overtly legalistic and dull legal-forensic discourse in the House of Commons best reflected the disenchantment of parliamentary oral culture and the new position that legal experts took within an increasing rationalized administration and governmentalized political system. According to Robert Stuart (1985: 63), “a barrister, accustomed to weigh each argument in detail, to dwell upon technical points of law, and to treat all causes with equal gravity, was certain to bore the House.” An 1847 essay on parliamentary barristers in *Fraser’s*
*Magazine*, by the parliamentary reporter George Henry Francis, observed that the speeches delivered in the Commons by Frederic Thesiger’s, former Attorney General (who became Lord Chancellor in 1858), were the antithesis of the principle of classical oratory: “Take up whatever subject he may – a grave political question, a legal argument, an ex officio explanation, or a railway case – he equally seems to *speak as from a brief*. He carries all the habits, gestures, and mode of treatment of the *nisi prius* jury trial advocate into Parliament” (Francis 1847b: 311-12).6

The declining eloquence of barrister-MPs in Commons resulted from the nature of their parliamentary position and reflected the growing segregation between the cultural organization of Parliament and that of the courts of law. Outside of Parliament, the success of a barrister in the courtroom generally depended on his ability to undo the arguments of opposing counsel and win the sympathies of the jury than on his command of the law.7 In Parliament, however, with the governmentalization of legislation barrister-MPs were more or less constrained to speak on points of law for the government and for specific departments. Legal advancement through Parliament no longer demanded oratorical skills, and although some barrister-MPs did speak in a partisan interest, their speeches tended to adopt legal-forensic discourse with its non-partisan tone of the legal expert. As Coleridge reminded the House, in his capacity as a law officer, the barrister-MP “has to advise the Government and the House itself” for that reason he must have a “great professional position, so he may not be overborne by the weight of greater authority in the House itself when he is called upon to speak on legal subjects; as to which, if he does his duty, he will always remember that it is a real opinion, not a party argument, which the House is entitled to expect at his hands” (HC 1872, 211: col. 256-7). As a result, observed Henry W. Lucy the senior parliamentary reporter for the *Daily News*, the barrister-MPs were living a ‘dual life’:

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6 In the British courtrooms the *brief* was a formal document containing all the facts and points of law pertinent to a specific case and listing main contentions along with supporting evidence and documentation, which was filled by the barrister before arguing the case in court.

7 Jurymen did not belong to the gentlemen aristocracy; they were drawn from various strata of the middle classes. Peers were exempted from jury service, as were legal and medical profession.
“In court, eloquent, brilliant, resourceful, and successful; in the House of Commons, prosy, artificial, tiresome unconvincing” (cited in Meisel 2001: 214-5).

Another barrister-MP who personified the new political culture in Parliament was JS Mill, who joined the Commons in 1865, as an independent MP, representing the city of Westminster constituency from 1865 to 1868. According to William White, Mill’s utter failure as a parliamentary orator was a typical sign of the new parliamentary regime, organized around the new norms and sensibilities of print culture.8 White’s astute observations are worth quoting at length:

Mr. John Stuart Mill has spoken in the House four times, and "is a failure." This big giant, whom we were all so much afraid of, is, after all, no giant at all, but a mere pigmy ... And so we may imagine Squirt saying to Squilibet, as they sipped their wine at Lucas's, or smoked their Havannah below: "Did you hear this great Mill, about whom there has been so much talk?" "Yes." "What did you think of him?" "Well, I should say he was a failure. I could see nothing in him." "Nor I. By the way, what has he done that so much noise was made about him?" "Oh! written some book." "Ah! these writing fellows never show well in the House." Then Mr. Mill is not a failure? we think we hear some reader say; to whom we answer, No; Mr. John Stuart Mill has not failed ... Mr. Mill never thought to startle and dazzle the House by his oratory ... Mr. Mill has no oratorical gifts, and he knows it. Nor can he be called a rhetorician. He is a close reasoner, and addresses himself directly to our reasoning powers; and though he has great command of language, as all his hearers know, he never condescends to deck out his arguments in rhetorical finery to catch applause. His object is to convey his thoughts directly to the hearer's mind, and to do this he uses the clearest medium - not colored glass, but the best polished plate, because through that objects may be best seen. Mr. Mill did not succeed as an orator; but then he did not attempt oratory. He did not excite a furor of cheering; but then he neither expected nor wished for applause. Rapturous cheering ... be an offence to Mr. Mill. He would, perhaps, ask "What foolish thing have I said that these people applaud" And, indeed, we ourselves have, after long experience, come to think that applause in the House of Commons, is often uproarious in proportion to the foolishness of the sentiments which calls it forth ... What Mr. Mill intended to do was to reason calmly with his opponents, and this he succeed in doing” (White 1897: 31-33)

8 William White was well known as a doorkeeper of the House of Commons; he wrote sketches of parliamentary life for the Illustrated Times, his son collected the writings and later released them as The Inner Life of the House of Commons in 1897.
White was well aware that Mill was a typical “bookish” speaker. His speeches, constructed like a demanding text, were unsuited for verbal performance and found the medium of vocal delivery unaccommodating. Mill’s speeches relied on tropes of rational argument; they were not structured to convey the “inner truth” or feelings of the speaker through classical rhetorical devises such as rhythmical repetitions or other such oratorical ornaments, but simulated a delivery of a scientific report and demanded “deep attention” and careful scrutiny. “So close is Mill's reasoning, and so concise his sentences, that if you cannot hear all that he says you might as well hear nothing …. Mr. Mill uses no superfluous words – every word is necessary to make his meaning clear, and to this special end is chosen” (White 1897: 33). By the second half of the nineteenth century, the classical features of early patrician orality with its descriptive sound, vehement tones and gestures, figurative style, and inverted arrangement has, to a large degree, given place to calm pronunciation, plain style, and concise arrangement. Political Language was modernizing: becoming more correct and accurate, less striking and animated.
5. Invisible Hands: The Practical Epistemology of Political Reportage

With the growing publicity of parliamentary procedures, British Politics was increasingly disenchanted as legislation no longer rested on direct performance in Parliament but on the mediated form of its publication. Yet, the relation between parliamentary politics and print was nothing like a straightforward engagement and took a long time to put together. There were two main and interrelated obstacles. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Three, a powerful verbal type of intelligence, which emphasized the naturalness and spontaneity of the “living voice” had militated against the artificiality of the “dead letter.” Secondly, as I show below, Parliament did not consider the audible utterances emitted by its members to be amenable to inscription in writing. These utterances had been rather perceived as momentary and fleeting, and could not have constituted interpretable long-standing events with any form of memory.

So much of the operation and so many of the traditions of the British Parliament had evolved around the spoken word that parliamentary culture and print culture were bound to find themselves at odds. For social reportage to appear as a legitimate form of expertise, before it was appropriated by would-be investigators of society, Parliament itself and its verbal economy of knowledge production – what had been said in Parliament, and how it was said – first needed to be broken down and restructured as a field of application “that was no longer confined to that in which knowledge was said” (Foucault 1962: 74): a category of knowledge that was understood to be worthwhile to observe and interpret and which was constituted through the monitoring of parliamentary debates.

The opening of British politics to the Press and the relentless effort of political reformers to advance print culture and challenge the model of “government by talk” as unproductive for effective legislation, had worked to undermine models of political communication by verbal means. Political speech was no longer automatically seen as a medium of republican virtue but
was increasingly defined as a threat to reason and rational intelligible expression, and an obstacle to progress (Kreilkamp 1995: 37). My goal in this chapter is to show how, with the emergence of parliamentary reporting, certain norms and practices shaped the practical epistemology of parliamentary reports, were institutionalized in a new genre of political reportage before they appeared in the empirical scientific culture of social science. In the next chapters I will show how these practices were transferred and translated into the new realm of social investigations, as politicians required solutions to the problem of managing credibility against the multiple and conflicting public representations, generated by parliamentary reports in the press.

5.1 The Victorian Problematic of Voice

The attempt to translate parliamentary speeches into writing exposed an immanent tension between print and oral culture. In 1771 Alexander Wedderburn, responding to the question of whether a speech attributed to him in a newspaper was correct, captured the ambiguity that was built into that liminal space between political oratory and political reportage: “Why, to be sure, there are in that report a few things which I did say, but many things which I am glad I did not say, and some things which I wish I could have said.” In 1774 Thomas Townshend confessed to the House: “I have sometimes borrowed a paper to hear what I said myself, sometimes very much surprised at it” (quoted in Thomas 1959: 634). Other MPs were more bitter about the practice of parliamentary reporting. Burke, for example, condemned as early as 1770 the habit of “newspapers to publish such monstrous things as they do, for speeches of mine … I never new them in one in one instance, when they have remembered any thing of mine, that they did not totally misconceive the drift of it, and render it utterly ridiculous.
You will excuse me for dwelling long on the subject. I am really vexed by it.” Thomas Pownall complained in 1872 that reporters are not getting even “one half of the real argument.” For Lord Shelburne, writing in 1878, the reporters were “Beasts” who “put together what they can recollect in the most vulgar language for they know no better.” Burke used to caution his friends and colleagues against “giving Credit to the speeches printed in the Newspapers. They are rarely genuine; they are for the most part extremely misrepresented, often through Ignorance, often through design; and very frequently the whole is a mere matter of invention” (quoted in Todd, Langford and Marshall 1981[5]: 35). In 1786 Burke advised Adam Smith in the same spirit to “pay no regard to the Speeches in the Newspapers, which so far as regards me, I am persuaded are often misrepresented wilfully; but almost always are misrepresented from the total ignorance of the Speech makers in the matters treated of” (quoted in Wahrman 1998: 88).¹

The immediate context of this remark was concerns about the misrepresentation, whether accidental or politically motivated, of parliamentary oratory by parliamentary reporters. William Todd and his associates find, for example, that the report of Burk's Speech in the Whig paper *Morning Post* of May 26, 1777 “do not record him as having said anything of comparable interest to what [Burke] had put in his notes” (Todd, Langford and Marshall 1981[5]: 35). Although it is quite possible that Burke decided to abandon the arguments in his notes when he finally came to speak, it seems more likely that the conservative Burke was not given a fair treatment in the Liberal *Morning Chronicle*.

¹ Dror Wahrman provides a long list of MPs who complained about the treatment of their parliamentary speeches in the newspapers. In 1798, for example, William Wilberforce raised the issue in the House of Commons, drawing attention to “a studied design to misrepresent, and even to vilify the members and their proceedings”, with “an evident tendency to prejudice the public mind” against Parliament. Wilberforce often complained of “gross and scandalous misrepresentations;” in 1802, he wrote to Hannah More, “You talk of my speech; whatever it was, the newspapers would have given you no idea of it. Never was any one made to talk such arrant nonsense”. Lord Holland expressed very similar concern in his letter to Grey in 1824: “I hope... you read it [his speech] in the Morning Chronicle or rather not in the Times for the latter made me say half a dozen things that I should particularly dislike saying” (Wahrman 2002: 89 fn. 14).
Misrepresentations of political speeches were also linked to lack of technology and adequate conditions for verbatim recording of voice in the House. As a French observer, who in 1810 sat in the gallery with the reporters noted: “Far from setting down all that is said, they only take notes, to appearance very carelessly, one word in a hundred, to mark the leading points. It is difficult to understand how they can afterwards give the connected speeches we see in the papers, out of such slender materials, and with so little time to prepare them” (quoted in Wahrman 1992: 87). When Charles Knight visited the House of Commons in 1812 he observed on the backbench in the gallery “half-a-dozen reporters busily employed with their note books,” and decided to practice himself in reporting for his “own amusement and instruction.” He soon noticed that although he was “not writing short-hand,” he had “no inferiority to the experienced men around me; for I observe that very few have acquired, or at any rate employed, that useful art” (Knight 1874: 82).

As a result, many politicians were driven to supply reporters and publishers with written copies of their speeches. In 1832 the London Times disclosed to his readers the actual process by which its rival the Mirror of Parliament was prepared. The Times referred to the Mirror as “the authentic record of the speeches which noble lords or hon. Members, after day’s reflection, think they ought to have made,” and related to its readers that if the Mirror, contain passages which the noble or honourable orator repents him of, if which may disagreeable to his constituents, he strikes them out, of course; and if (which after having heard the speeches of others, is not improbable) any good things occur to him as things which he might have said with advantage, it is not to be expected that he will resist this temptation of inserting them, though he never thought of uttering them at the time. Now, it can hardly be necessary to suggest that no reliance is to be placed upon reports of the proceedings in Parliament which are conducted upon such as system as this (quoted in Aspinall 248-49).
The editorial policies of the Mirror of Parliament reveals that emerging genre of political reportage, like any written report of an oral performance, must be understood as the product of complex mediations. In translating speech into public text, political reportage, from their very inception, typically remained almost as much the product of the reporter, the editor and the publisher, as that of the orator. Victorian journalists did not insist on a full and accurate report because they increasingly saw writing as politically and culturally superior to voice and as a way to muster spoken utterance. Thus, if Parliament claimed to incorporate a “virtual representation” of the public, reports of parliamentary debates allowed the public to claim “virtual and multiple representations of Parliament,” in which the middle class practitioners were able to engage in public commentary and to express their own opinions and thoughts, “via the (reconstructed) lips of the MPs” (Wahrman 1992: 111).

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that TC Hansard, the official editor, compiler and publisher of the House of Commons debates, *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*, thought that the work of the reporters in the reshaping of the speeches should be viewed as "literary work" and not as a dishonest act (HC [327] 1878, xvii: 32 [q. 351]). In his testimony before a select committee of the House of Commons, Hansard stated that he sees no “great evil” in the reporters’ tendency to “put into a Member’s mouth what he ought to have said, rather than what he said” (Ibid: 20 [q. 190]). Hansard had no reporters of his own present in the House. He made up his reports by collation of those published in the newspapers to which he added speeches from manuscripts and pamphlets handed to him by politicians. Consequently, the House recordation was entirely depended on the press and its norms and practices of political reportage. The Daily News argued in 1853 that many MPs gave to Hansard “a composition which is no more the speech uttered by them in the House of Commons than it is a Welsh ballad,” warning that "with open eyes we are

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2 Only after 1850 was it indicated, by the use of an asterisk, in the Hansard’s Parliamentary debates if a speech was reprinted from a pamphlet or some official report (Jordan 1931).
sowing the seeds of dissension between historians of another age" (quoted in Jordan 1931: 439).

Hansard’s testimony exemplified the changing attitudes among the early Victorians about the relationship between speaking and writing. Central to this change was a growing conviction that stenographic reports, which are merely representation of evidential speech, are inferior use of writing. Parliamentary reporters had always claimed that their job went far beyond mere stenography. And although many were trained in shorthand writing, shorthand was not their preferred method. Looking back on his long career as a parliamentary reporter for the London Times, where he worked for sixty years, Charles Ross, who had excellent training a shorthand writer recalled that when he wrote up his notes he "liked to take pains instead of giving verbatim reports” (HC [327] 1878, xvii: 583). In 1854 the *Quarterly Review* described the main function of parliamentary reporters as one of “filtering parliamentary speaking of a bad grammar, nonsense and irritation.” The parliamentary reporter, declared Fraser's Magazine in 1830, must “posses a sound judgment and extreme facility of composition to enable him on the moment to fill up the *lacuna* which must necessarily exist in the most perfect note-book” (quoted in Jordan 1931: 445).

“The Victorian problematic of voice,” explains Ivan Kreilkamp, “was such that to draw on the power of utterance without framing that power in writing was to seem to traffic in dangerous forces. What was desired both in politics and in the technology of writing, was moderate, partial incorporation” (Kreilkamp 2005: 87). Part of what seemed at stake, therefore, was the possibility of controlling or owning spoken language. Victorian journalists did not insist on a full and accurate report because they increasingly saw writing as politically and culturally superior to voice and as a way to muster spoken utterance. The practice of political served in transforming the mercurial nature of the spoken word - having the characteristics of eloquence, shrewdness, swiftness, volatility quick and changeable in temperament – into the permanent certitude of the written word.
5.2 Circumventing Political Speech: The Parliamentary Sketch

Verbatim reporting, to be sure, was also constrained by material considerations. For example, constraints on newspapers’ size limited the reports to only a small portion of lengthy debate. Heavy per-sheet taxation of newspapers before 1836 (when the newspaper stamp was reduced to one penny) tended severely to limit both their distribution and their size. A typical London newspaper at the end of the eighteenth century consisted of only a single sheet, about 25 by 19 inch, folded once so as to make four pages with four columns to the page (Aspinall 1956).3

Another structural limitation on verbatim reports was the barring of note taking in Parliament until 1783, which made verbatim reports impossible and led to the development of an alternative reconstructive method of reportage. One such inventive method of reportage was the “parliamentary sketch.” The sketch was developed as a method of political reporting by William “Memory” Woodfall, who was the sole parliamentary reporter of his paper the Morning Chronicle in the second half of the eighteenth century and perhaps the most famous parliamentary reporter of the century. Woodfall, who was regarded by his contemporaries as by far the most proficient parliamentary reporter, wrote his sketches in his house from his own recollection and from notes and verbal information supplied to him by the members themselves. In 1771, Woodfall told his readers that his reports were written up “at midnight and always with the utmost dispatch” (quoted in Todd, Langford and Marshall 1981: 30). After scribbling down a few leading points (“short heads”) about the parliamentary debates which he witnesses at a particular day, he described his next steps: “I sat down the instant I came home, and made

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3 The abolition of the statutory restrictions on the size of a sheet in 1825 led many papers to increase the size of the sheet. Thus, to circumvent the stamp duty, The London Times in 1829 was printed on a single sheet four feet by three, containing 49 columns. It could be folded twice and cut so as to make eight pages of the usual size (Aspinall 1956).
minutes, brief indeed, but enough to arouse my recollection of the whole that passed. I have
been these two days employed in drawing the arguments of the speakers from the short heads
[which he had written immediately after the debate] . . . into the length and circumstantial detail
that belonged to them” (quoted in Aspinall 1956: 234). As Woodfall explained to his readers in
1773, he was not trying to give an exact report; on the contrary, his goal was to compose a
report that will contain his own impressions, thus attempting “to express not only the meaning
of the Speakers, but to give also as near as it is practicable, their manner and expression”
(quoted in Todd, Langford and Marshall 1981 [5]: 30). It is, therefore, significant that Woodfall
was also London’s foremost theater critic. In constructing his sketches, Woodfall implicitly
assumed that theatrical skills can translate directly into reportage about the political arena.

Although the “parliamentary sketch” was originally developed to overcome the House of Commons’ limitations on note-taking, many reporters had described their methods in very
similar terms, long after the restriction were eliminated (MacDonagh 1913). George Bradley, in
his self-help guide to shorthand writing, pointed to the reporting career of Samuel Johnson,
 wrote a series of parliamentary reports under the heading “Debates in the Senate of Magna
Lilliputia” to The Gentleman's Magazine as an example of self-composition disguising as a
reportage: “instead of reporting the speeches of noble lords and honourable members, [Johnson]
composed them, and it is recorded that he made them all speak in the same pompous and
‘grammatical’ style in which he was himself accustomed to write” (Bradley 1843: 11). Johnson,
according to Bradley’s shorthand criteria, did not write reports because he did not accurately
transcribe the speeches he heard but put them into his own words. The varied speeches all
become perfect “grammatical” Johnsonian prose – they are reported in the same form Johnson
was “accustomed to write.” The problem that Bradley identifies with Johnson’s reports is a
slippage from speech to writing that seem to mix them together in a way that makes the writing
of the report superior, not instrumental, to the human speech it claims to transcribe. Johnson”s
claim to “report” on speech without transcribing it, bypass voice, and arrogantly impose his own standard of written English on speech in order to make his political opponents come off badly.

The sketch became a common method of reportage among parliamentary reporters. The growing power of the nineteenth century press to disseminate the words of the Commons influenced the growth of parliamentary sketch-writing reports as a particular mixture of fictional and objective textual forms. In fact, while writing had been allowed informally in the gallery since 1783, the shorthand method was not use before 1812 and verbatim reporting was rare until the 1830s. Lord John Campbell, who started his parliamentary career as a parliamentary reporter for the *Morning Chronicle* (1800-2) during his legal training at Lincoln’s Inn, and later became a MP for Stafford (1830), Attorney General (1834) and Lord Chancellor (1859), noted that he “knew nothing, and did not desire to know anything, of short-hand. Short-hand writers are very useful in taking down evidence as given in a court of justice, but they are wholly incompetent to report a good speech. They attend to words without entering into the thoughts of the speaker” (quoted in Macdonagh 1907: 738; my italics). Campbell’s critique against shorthand inscription echoed those of other MPs who protested against the “mechanical writing” of the Commons’ shorthand clerks, which failed to capture the ‘spirit’ of parliamentary oratory.

The eighteenth century parliamentary measures against the publication of its debates can, therefore, be reformulated as an argument against verbatim reporting of them. Speeches in the House were principally designed to be immediate in effect and specific to time and place; once the occasion had passed, and the debate terminated, their utility was lost. Their accuracy, their details were not as important as their overall and immediate effect. Their contingency thus resisted their inscription in print. The practice of reportage marked a cultural gulf between modes of parliamentary oratory, their image of gentlemanly ease and the image of the laborious parliamentary reporter striving, through his writing “to channel the flow of eloquence into print” so as to translate parliamentary knowledge into public knowledge (Reid 2000: 126).
5.2.1 Charles Dickens and the Realist Sketch

When Dickens began his career as a parliamentary reporter in 1831 the resistance of parliamentary reporters to verbatim reporting persisted. “For a number of important formative years,” Steven Marcus writes of Dickens, “he had worked as a kind of written recording device for the human voice, for speech, for the English language. He had been a writing machine for others, their language flowing through his writing” (Marcus 1965: 138). In 1865 at speech at the second anniversary dinner of the *Newspaper Press Club* (organization founded in London by parliamentary reporters) in Westminster Hall, Dickens remarked: “To this present year of my life, when I sit in this hall, or where not, hearing a dull speech- the phenomenon does occur – I sometimes beguile the tedium of the moment by mentally following the speaker in the old way; and sometimes, if you can believe me, I even find my hand going on the table cloth, taking an imaginary note of it all” (Dickens, 2004: 86). Dickens’s image of himself suggests the power of the reporter habitus: the long lasting influence of his reporting career had on his conception and figuration of writing, triggered by speech.

Dickens’ experience as a parliamentary reporter had given him a valuable vantage point, from which he overviewed the conduct of public affairs as a confluence of both short-time ephemeral claims of politicians and matters intrinsically and supremely enduring. His sketched were experiments in a type of political reportage which tried to go “beyond politics” by negotiating the tensions between timing and timeless considerations. Dickens’ *A Parliamentary Sketch* (1836a), offers insights into the “report” as an hybrid interactive genre, which integrated both the political oratory and literary work. According to Bevis (2001: 172), in the opening of his sketch Dickens asks his readers to prepare themselves for a text that is both “about Parliament” and “whose style is parliamentary.” The interplay between the two meanings of the text enables Dickens to carefully position himself, together with other parliamentary reporters, in
a liminal space between two different epistemic cultures – political and written – and assumes an intermediary position between tedious prosaic writing and parliamentary speech:

We hope our readers will not be alarmed at this rather ominous title. We assure them that we are not about to become political, neither have we slightest intention of being more prosy than usual - if we can help it … have visited [Parliament] quite often enough for our purpose, and a great deal too often for our personal peace and comfort - we have determined to attempt the description. Dismissing from our minds, therefore, all that feeling of awe, which vague ideas of breaches of privilege … are calculated to awaken, we enter at once into the building, and upon our subject (Dickens 1836a: 1).

Dickens attempted to infuse writing with all the immediacy of the moment of oral utterance. In discussing early work, Chittick observes that Dickens's earlier novels were “above all political entities, in their subject matter, in their audience, and in their publishing ephemerality ... What was wanted was news. In particular, parliamentary news” (1990: 40). Dickens’s sketch underscores one particular aspect of parliamentary news as a writer-reporter's art: to bridge between written and spoken temporalities: "Half past four o'clock and at five the mover of the address will be 'on his legs' as the newspapers announce sometimes by way of novelty" (Dickens 1836a: 1). The peculiarity of the writing in this sketch, Bevis observes, is developed by the “vague exactness of Half-past four o'clock, for the setting is specifically anchored in the time of now, yet drifting in a now that knows no bounds because it has no dates” (Bevis 2001: 173). In his later Sketches Dickens turn the gaze of his reports away from Parliament and into the street of London. Using political reportage as an his interface, his extra-parliamentary reports chronicled the life of everyday people, while applying journalistic methods of parliamentary reportage which were developed in Parliament. It was largely through the practices of reportage that Dickens, Harriet Martineau (whom I discuss in chapter Five) and others, who established realism as the dominant mode of fiction, were able to keep their fingers on the pulse of the moment and make use of current events as empirical materials but give them a transcendent, enduring (fictional) form.
It is therefore important to note that the emerging governance-by-print and the new practices of reporting, while transforming oral governance did not replace it. The KPC provides a more useful way to think about parliamentary reportage as a liminal institutions setting, where writing about parliamentary debates was practiced as a hybrid form that enabled readers to feel the pressure of time and the 'glare of the present' (of the political orator), while exerting control over time by revisiting it in narrative that combines the regularity of time with the imaginative vigor of interpretation (of the literary author).\(^4\)

As noted by many, Dickens’ first novel, *The Pickwick Papers* (1836b), depicts the intimate connection between print culture and political reform. The novel, as noted by many was written as a direct satirical commentary on political reformers, their leader Henry Brougham (“Mr. Pickwick”) and their *Society for the Diffusion of Social Knowledge* (“The Pickwick Club”).\(^5\) The novel’s First Chapter - *The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club* - ends with the following statements: “We have no official statement of the facts which the reader will find recorded in the next chapter, but they have been carefully collated from letters and other MS. authorities, so unquestionably genuine as to justify their narration in a connected form” (1836b: 18). This statement concede that verbatim recording of speech is impractical form of reporting and announces that the text will produced the Hansard principles of records "carefully collected" from different sources, and converted into a specific constructed narrative. It is in this sense that Dickens, writing under the pen name *Boz*, presents himself not as the *author* of the book about *The Pickwick Papers* but as a *reporter* and an *editor* of the Pickwickian's papers themselves, a person who collects various facts from various sources, including his own observations, and puts

\(^4\) Dickens own biography step-by-step shift from reporter to author – his graduation from shorthand transcription of parliamentary speeches, to the dashing, competitive world of daily newspaper reportage of public speeches, and then to Dickens’s first parliamentary sketch as “Boz” and finally to his career as an author starting with the *Pickwick Papers* – is a good example of a steady movement of writing practices along the *knowledge-political continuum* from the news report, centered on political speech to the more academic text-driven form of the novel, forming out of the fragments of early nineteenth century speech, fiction and journalism, from techniques of reportage and shorthand.

\(^5\) I discuss the SDUK in Chapter Ten.
them together into “narration in a connected form” (1836b: 19).

The role Dickens had assigned for Boz was that of an investigative reporter, a 'chronicler' of events and people whose everyday life were approached through the discursive practices of reportage. And it was under these terms that The Pickwick Papers first appeared – with incredible success – not in a book format, but as a serial publication of 19 installments over 20 months (between March 1836 and October 1837), with each installment, signed as “edited by Boz,” presenting an elaborated engagement with the interface between speech and written reports (Drew 2004). As argued convincingly argued by Marcus (1965) and Bevis (2001), the enormous success and cultural impact of his Dickens writings, derived in part from Dickens’s having hit upon a way to bring his experience as a parliamentary reporter to bear on fiction writing. In Dickens, “real” human voices are permitted now to speak within print, where they had formerly been merely recorded and represented.

Dickens’s approach to political reportage as careful maneuvering between the immediacy of parliamentary performance and the decelerated temporality of writing, overlaps with some insights from the work of another contemporary parliamentary reporter (and literary journalist), William Hazlitt, who, like Dickens was interested in the relationship between political speech and writing. In his 1820 essay On the Difference between Writing and speaking, Hazlitt observed that for the orator "time presses": there is no getting "beyond the moment, beyond the occasion, beyond the immediate power shown." This “lamentable lack of a beyond” (with its presentists and accelerated pace) is heard specifically within the walls of Parliament: “An orator can hardly get beyond common-places: if he does, he gets beyond his hearers ... The House of Commons, it might be said, hates every thing but a common-place”. According to Hazlitt, in eighteenth century Parliament the “deep and refined reflection,” needed for the creation of new and profound political knowledge and insights, was overshadowed by the mastery of stylistic devices and rhetorical decorum. By giving esthetic priority to unmediated
and extemporary effusion of eloquence, the oral culture in the House of Commons discarded the
“cold” and retrospective nature of print, authorship and verbatim written reports. As Sir Henry
Crabb Robinson declared in 1824, “a senate of orators is a symptom of material decay …
Neither the Habeas Corpus, nor the Bill of Rights, nor Magna Carta originated in eloquence”

In contrast to such temporal and linguistic immobility, the expensiveness of the written
word gives us salutary pause of thought and reflection: “in writing you have the choices of your
own time,” which is beyond pressure of “instantaneous and infallible communication” a
gateway to “profonder views of things, finer observations.” Throughout the text, Hazlitt
carefully constructs a boundary between the “finer observations” of the author-reporter and the
orator as an occasional dispenser of “common places”:

The most successful speakers, even in the House of Commons, have not been
the best scholars or the finest writers -- neither those who took the most
profound views of their subject, nor who adorned it with the most original
fancy, or the richest combinations of language.. In reading, we may go over the
page again, whenever anything new or questionable "gives us pause" … In
hearing, we are (saving the mark!) in the company of fools; and time presses
(Hazlitt 1820).

The verbal intelligence of parliamentary oratory was, no doubt, very clever, charming
and tactful. It was based, however, on a superficial, short-term, effect, which militated against
print culture as a constellation for learning, study and scholarship. In print culture, ideas had a
chance to be read and re-read, thought and re-thought, and it was possible to take several factors
into consideration, revise and make corrections and references. This new paradigm – indeed an
ideology – of social and intellectual improvement through the printed texts, guided many
parliamentary reformers in their quest for the production and dissemination of social
knowledge. Throughout the nineteenth century, political speech was increasingly scrutinized as
invalid, unreliable and superficial method of producing knowledge and must be replaced by the
medium of the printed texts, through a sophisticated apparatus of publicity: the systematic
collection, organization and wide circulation of written facts through printed texts. It was this
system which gave parliamentary knowledge a scientific status as “social science.”

5.3 The “Fallacies” of Political Discourse and Bentham’s Ideology of Print

At the turn of the nineteenth century, parliamentary reformers were increasingly
questioning whether classical oratory with its emphasis on pronunciation and performance was
adequate for legislation. Under the doctrine of eloquence, truth was seen as simply a matter of
conviction and conviction as simply a matter of technical facility: the product of the correct
combination of tones and gestures habitually associated with conviction, "the just and graceful
management of the voice, countenance, and gesture in speaking" (Sheridan 1762: 19). To
reformers, by contrast, legislation was seen a rational-logical process that needs to be directed
by long-term considerations based on real evidence, inscribed in, and communicated through,
written texts, not by the ephemera of spoken words.

One of the leading figures in this effort to change parliamentary discourse was the
utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, whose stress on the “principle of publicity” and the
liberty of the press remained central components of the utilitarian program of political reformers
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Bentham’s *The Book of Fallacies* (1824) is probably
the best example of the deep distrust of the spoken language in politics, which was felt by
political reformers in the first half of the nineteenth century. For Bentham, oral culture based on
principles of eloquence and rhetorical manipulation was the foundation for all other major
fallacies of public reason. Unlike the written text, Bentham believed, spoken words are opened
to all matter of construction after they have been uttered, and it is precisely when language
exceeds its referential function that it becomes ineffective or even dangerous, blurring the distinction between truth and falsehood (Mulvihill 2004): “Alas! How dependent are opinions upon sound! Who shall break the chain which bind them together?” (Bentham 1824: 524) 

Bentham finds the answer in the praxis of writing and the medium of print. His Plan of Parliamentary Reform (1817), for example, identified the visual realm of print and the written word as the ideal medium for the exercise of political power. Parliamentary reform is to be achieved by using print to administer sound – “by the course of writing, on the part of those to be elected, and of reading on the part of the electors” (Bentham 1817: 39):

Yes: - the pen is the true means for administrating sound, dispassionate, and undelusive information: the eye, in the stillness and the leisure of the closet, applied to the silent paper, is the true organ for the reception of the matchless blessing. Lips on the one part, ears on the other part; those are questionable, and delusive is the only information capable of being communicated and received by such organs - the sole and imperfect resource of immature, unlettered, and unenlightened times (Bentham 1817: 39).

For Bentham it was the interiority of the acts of reading and writing, their reliance upon visual perception rather than the economy of voice and the collective experience of political speechifying, exploited by demagogues that guaranteed their essential rationality. “Now,” Bentham asks his readers, “look to speechifying and writing, and the comparative beneficialness and innoxiousness of the sort of information to be expected from the two sources” (Bentham 1817: 39). He lists the advantages of writing over speaking in parliamentary politics as follows:

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6 Jeremy Bentham saw the French Declaration of Rights, published by the French National Assembly in 1791, as a case of anarchical fallacy of political speech: nothing but “words and proposition of the most unbounded signification, turned loose without any of those exceptions of modifications which are so necessary on every occasion to reduce their import within the compass, not only of right reason, but even of the design in hand” (1824: 497). Bentham concludes that the framers of the French Declaration of Rights have failed not simply in their abuse of words “but in undertaking to execute a design which could not be executed at all without this abuse of words” (1824: 522; see also, Mulvihill 2004: 58-9).
By speeches, many an assembly has been driven into precipitate and mischievous resolves; by writings much fewer, not to say one. By speeches, followed on the spot by resolution taken on the spot, falsehood are asserted, and means of detection excluded; in writings, scarce can falsehood be brought forward on one side, but there will be time for detecting and refuting it on the other; by speeches, imagination is fascinated, excessive passion excited, time for comprehensive conception and all judgement denied. By writing, no advantage, in any of these ways, can be gained by one side to the injury of another. When tongues and ears are the organs of converse in an assembly, met under the notion of hearing speeches, by its own clamour (that is, by the clamour of a few impatient tongues on both sides of the question, or, what is much worse, on one side only), may not only all documents, but all argument be excluded; whereas, in so far as pens and eyes are the organs, by no power but that of the tyrant - of a tyrant about the throne, or on a bench, can any be deprived of the knowledge of whatsoever has been said, or can be said, on both sides (Bentham 1817: 39-40).

In *The Book of Fallacies*, Bentham opposes the calming effect of writing on reason “the language of plain strong sense,” to the deceptive excitement triggered by the theatrical performance of speech, “the language of smooth nonsense,” which is “easy and familiar,” because it “requires nothing but to swim with it” (Bentham 1824: 524). Because unlike the medium of print, “the use of a speech is to carry the measures of the moment,” political oratory is better able to bypass critical scrutiny than the written (1824: 465). The immediacy of vocal performance has a deceptive effect on reason. In speech, “the confidence of the tone in which the decision is conveyed, is at once the fruit and the sufficient evidence of the complete command which the glance of the moment sufficed to give him of the subject in all its bearings and dependencies” (1824: 481; my italics). Classical oratory cannot guarantee the validity of truth statements because it promises only affective delivery and not a logical discovery of truth. To overcome these rhetorical fallacies, Bentham proposes a set of strict procedures to control political speech in Parliament. He suggests, for example, to use the written records of the parliamentary debates as a protective device against falsehood; whenever “an instance of imposture” occurs in Parliament, printed reports of debates should “at the bottom of the page, by the help of the usual marks of reference, give intimation of it” (1824: 486).
Speechifying no longer simply plays second fiddle to reason, as for Bacon, but becomes its enemy. For Bentham the threat posed by “the juggleries and charms of words” to reason and order was so fundamental that it must be controlled; Because speech is a form of political language linked closely and instantaneously to the body, it might instantly, at any given moment, cross over into irrational behavior. The path to modernity for Bentham thus seemed to lie in circumventing political speech with “dispassionate” visual knowledge and the “stillness” of writing.

5.3.1 Publicity and the Reciprocal Gaze: Print as Panoptic Technology

Bentham first pinpointed the praxis of publicity, mediated by print, as the ultimate solution against the deception of classical rhetoric and its “abuse of words” in his Essay on Political Tactics (1791). Publicity, according to Bentham, breaks the regressive spell of political rhetoric by opening it up to a sphere wider than the “debating club” of Parliament. It is most crucial, however, that the public gaze will be mediated through the distancing and decelerated medium of the printed text. Submitting that “all the passions touch and enkindle each other reciprocally,” Bentham objected, for example, to admitting large number of visitors to Parliament (and objected to admitting women altogether), suspecting that “the discussion would take a turn more favorable to the excitements of oratory, than to logical proof” (1791: 326). If politicians need to be distanced from rhetorical manipulation by strict procedures, the public, whose very presence may exacerbate these passions, needs to be distanced from the heat of parliamentary activities.

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7 According to Bentham, “females … have been excluded from the House of Commons, after the experiment has been tried, and for weighty reasons. It has been found that their presence gave a particular turn to deliberations - that self-love played too conspicuous a part - that personalities were more lively - and that too much was ascribed to vanity and wit … The seductions of eloquence and ridicule are most dangerous instruments in a political assembly. Admit females - you add new force of these seductions … the direct method of pleasing female sensibility consists in showing a mind susceptible of emotion and enthusiasm. Everything would take an exalted tone … it would be necessary to speak of liberty in lyric strains, and to be poetic with regard to those great events which require the greatest calmness” (1791: 327).
debate by the intervention of print: “The speeches of the orators, which are known to them only through the newspapers, have not the influence of the passionate harangues of seditious demagogue. They do not read them till after they have passed through a medium which cools them” (1791: 313; my italics). It was through the recordation and public circulation of political language in printed texts that truth can be separated from the misleading effects of oratory.

Bentham saw Print as a synopticon technology: a decentralized medium for the regulative operation of inspection, which by disciplining impulses otherwise tending towards “hedonistic anarchy” of thought, enables social reality to be constructed as an object that could be witnessed and discussed through the detached engagement of reason. As is well known, Bentham suggested a central observing tower, which he called panoptic, as a modern technology for controlling prisoners by continuously watching inside their cells, even though the prisoners cannot see that they are being observed. Although Bentham did not quite reverse the roles of the governor and prisoners as inspectors and inspected, he certainly did so in his discussion of the role of print in the public sphere (Ezrachi 1990).8 Foucault, who based his conception of visuality-as-domination on a lengthy discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon as an example of the surveillance power of government in the modern state (1977: 195-228), failed to properly acknowledge the interactive and complex character of visual experience connected the decentralized regulative medium of the public gaze: the many inspecting the few. Unlike the total institution of the prison, in the public sphere the citizens – as a reading public – were empowered by the ascendency of print culture to inspect political authority.

Such reciprocal dynamic Bentham found in the Press by means of which “instruction descends from the government to the people, and remounts from the people to the government; the

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8 Although Bentham depiction of the Panopticon certainly put the stress on the prison’s central observing tower, which allows guards to control the prisoners, Bentham’s concept of the visitors who inspect the inspectors and thus manage to temper tyrannical character of one-sided inspection is a clear indication that Bentham applied the principle of reciprocal inspections even to his discussion of the modern prison (Ezrachi 1990).
more liberty the press enjoys the easier it is to ascertain the current of opinion, so as to act with certainty.” “Experience has proved,” Bentham argued in his Theory of Legislation, “that newspapers are one of the best means of directing opinion, of quieting its feverish movements, and of dissipating those falsehoods and concocted rumours” (Bentham 1802: 443). Bentham saw the “unofficial” reports in the press as essential to the effective operation of the political system, as they function “either to prevent negligence and dishonesty on the part of official reporters, or to prevent suspicion.” Without the certification of the press, Bentham recognized, the state’s official reports “would be regarded as a certificate of falsity.” Moreover, “the authentic publication of the proceedings of the assembly could only be made with the slowness which would not give the public satisfaction, without reckoning the evil which would arise in the interval from false reports, before the authentic publications arrived to destroy them.” The principle of reciprocal inspection could, therefore, be applied not only to authenticate official reports from below but also to combat false reports from above, due to the accelerated nature of printed news. “Non-Official Journals,” Bentham observes, “completely accomplish this object. Their success depends upon the avidity of the public, and their talent consists in satisfying it. This has in England reached such a point of celerity, that debates which have lasted till three or four o'clock in the morning, are printed and distributed in the capital before mid-day” (1791: 315).

For Bentham the political economy print and the dynamic of reciprocal inspection it generates, guaranteed both individual freedom and social order. In his Plan for Parliamentary Reform, Bentham compared the reading of a newspaper to the “absolute and imperturbable secrecy” of the ballot (1817:105), which, according to Philip Connell, “secured the moral and political primacy of the self-interested individual elector as a precondition for the legislative pursuit of the public good” (Connell 2001: 83). “Publicity is [therefore] the very soul of justice … Without publicity, all other checks are fruitless; in comparison to publicity, all other checks are of small account” (Brougham 1791: 316-7). Almost two centuries before Benedict Anderson
wrote his *Imagined Community*, Brougham understood the act of reading a newspaper as situated in a liminal zone between private and public: as a practice that is both privately and publicly performed, which can unite citizens collectively – thus forming a public opinion tribunal of justice - as they simultaneously perform their daily ritual of newspaper reading in private (1791: 310-317).  

9 “The public compose a tribunal, which is more powerful than all the other tribunals together,” wrote Bentham.
6. Adjudicative Government:
The Common Law Tradition and Parliamentary Inquiries

The legislative process in the eighteenth century Parliament relied to a large degree on parliamentary select committees of inquiry whose model of inquiry as knowledge-producing enterprise was based on legal practices of common law adjudication taken from the realm of the trial courts. Common law adjudication provided the central mechanism of ruling in Britain, which is to say that the art of government and the art of legal adjudication were for a long time largely the same thing. What made the Common Law tradition central for social inquiry and for the production of social knowledge was its twofold claim to knowledge of how society should be governed. First it provided a ‘technique’ of rule, a knowledge which both assumed and exemplified the superiority of adjudication as the mode in which the business of government should be conducted.

Second, the common law offered a consistent and credible framework for judgment and decision making by theorized knowledge as the accumulation of historical “precedesnts”. Knowledge of past practice was an important component of successful government. Adjudicative government, “stored information about society in the forms of records of its decision and transactions … in the form of precedents” (Murphy 1997: 58). The past was seen as a container of accumulated wisdom concerning the kinds of governmental decisions deemed best. Adjudicative government did not proceed according to a general plan, but by analogy from prior particulars to processing new particulars. As Bourdieu explains (1977: 16), “customary law always seems to pass from particular case to particular case … never expressly formulating the fundamental principles which ‘rational’ law spells out explicitly.”

As a customary law of government, rooted in the assumption – if not the explicit claim – that adjudication was the best method for conducting the business of government, the common law
was fundamentally a question of adjudication-as-government and government-as-adjudication. The business of government was, therefore, conducted in courts, and the British Parliament was considered the highest court in the country. Thus, for example, under the Old Poor Law administration in England, the key agents who supervised and who were responsible for the schemes for setting the poor for work were often from the judiciary – the local magistrates and justices of the peace (JPs). In this adjudicative model, government consisted essentially in the sending of instructions to local adjudicators like magistrates and JPs. Local government consisted of negotiating the implementation of such instructions, in adjudicative bodies (mostly courts). Social order was guaranteed by judgment in court, at first hand, person to person through testimonial hearing. In this way knowledge of society, and the practical experience of its administration “were woven together in indissoluble manner” (Murphy 1997: 88).

Under the paradigm of adjudicative government ‘society’ was nothing like a set of facts and figures. Rather, it was the manner in which things looked if you sat behind a table, or on a bench, listening to argument before pronouncing judgment. Reality is conceived as something established through the convergence of independent individual testimonies. As Schramm (2000: 7) notes, the characters in eighteenth century novels “were rarely subject of judgment without the reader being offered their personal testimony of guilt or innocence.” Under this adjudicative model, the truth about human behavior represented itself in trial-like proceedings. Social knowledge was understood and characterized through problems and pathologies, through its predicaments. As the product of adjudication, ‘society’ was adversarial in essence; government and adjudication as a form of dispute resolution were barely differentiated; the concept of ‘decision’ had a monolithic character, for which the paradigm was the decision made by a judge. As I show below this adjudicative paradigm provided the basis for the epistemic style and guided the conduct of parliamentary inquiries.
6.1 The Common Law as Oral Culture

Founded on the practices of the British legal profession, the English Common Law emerged out of an oral, not a written tradition. Chief Justice Matthew Hale, for example, in his 1713 *History of the Common Law*, thought oral evidence to be far superior to written evidence due to its articulation through the immediacy of oral performance and the spatial dynamic between the speaker and its audience. According to Hale, because oral evidence is delivered in person, “the very manner Manner of a Witness’s delivering his Testimony will give a probable indication whether he speaks truly or falsely” (quoted in McKenzie 2002: 243). This view was reiterated a century later by the Lord Chancellor, Thomas Erskine, who thought that government “The great affair of a free government like that of England,” he argued, “could not be usefully discussed in public by men coming forth from their closets with written discourses.” Equating the oral culture of the common law with the normative model of adjudicative government, Erskine thought that writing practices are not suitable for the practice of government:

In our Parliaments, it is impossible to anticipate the circumstances or arguments upon which the most vital interests of the country may stand for immediate consideration; and in our courts of justice, whose decisions so often depend upon the oral testimony of witnesses, and which is to be pronounced in the instant, the talent of composition, further than as it gives strength and correctness to unpremediated speaking, would be still more useless” (Erskine 1815: viii).

In many ways, common law adjudication is the art of making the unwritten intelligible. Unlike the Roman law with its abstract, general and universal form of a codified law, embedded in a printed text which is always the same, the legal tradition of common law has not been a uniform system capable of codification but a succession of judicial acts in which the 'common experience' of the legal profession was collected. The common law, is in this sense, “unwritten,” a *lex non scripta* to use Blackstone’s term. It is a form of medieval textuality, where, “a work of
literature was not thought in isolation, as an artifact produced by some person … whose intention we must ‘recover’, but as an ever-rolling stream accumulating and adapting over time as it is ‘collected’ with its multitude of readers. *Collatio* means all these things: bringing together of texts, conversations about texts, and feeding upon texts as one feeds at a community meal” (Carruthers 1990: 217). Because the lack of system could make learning and practice of the common law difficult, lawyers and judges found it convenient to make abridgments of past cases listing them under various headings for easy reference. For Carruthers, the logic behind this kind of scribal practices characterized the expensive nature of legal writing in Britain that offered a “‘common place, which collects subsequent comments, glosses, references, as readers apply, adapt, restate, mediate upon it’” (1990: 214).

In place of a text, the common law offers a sort of a repository and a source which takes a form closer to conversation than to a written text, which emphasizes the independence and the authority of the document. Writing is not intended to produce a text in a modern, positivist sense – a text as something tested, completed, and presentable which is woven and fabricated according to general plan or scheme. The purpose of writing is not to persuade but to displays ‘in time’ a record which is imperfect, not finished, and unstable. serve as a copy, a record inscribed as scrapbook. From the vantage point of the printed manuscript, the common law represents, therefore, not a text but a pre-text and its scribal practices are attributed the character of orality. According to Donald Kelley, “one major characteristic of the English legal tradition was the way in which it preserved oral modes of proof over the ‘dead hand’ of writing, not only in pleading and teaching … but also in judgment.” It was this institutional embeddedness of the common law in oral tradition which was largely responsible for the general view of practitioners that the English law “was ‘found’, not ‘made’: oral, not written, in provenance; judicial, not legislative, in character” (Kelley 1990: 166).
Through this scrapbook form of inscription, the common law functioned as a precedent law, consisting of chronological collections of past cases in the *Yearbooks* and *Register of Writs*, which were then used to extract out (extrapolate) decisions out of the congruity of previous cases. The foundation of the law was considered to reside in the Writs, which were arranged in groups within the Register; and the Yearbooks which were records of past cases said to yield a “continuity of experience” (Ives 1982: 160). This form of scrapbook inscription served as a quarry to work with rather than to study or interpret. Common law practitioners maintained that the *collatitio* was able to yield a greater degree of certainty than a codified system – a certainty based on the fact that common law was not a rigid and closed document but an ongoing experiential enterprise. Sir Edward Coke, the chief justice in early seventeenth century, maintained that Roman law was less certain than common law because it depended upon a "number of interpretations" that gave rise to "so many diversities of opinions, as they do rather increase than resolve doubts and un-certainties." By contrast, common law was based upon “the resolutions of Judges in Courts of Justice . . . reported in our books, or extant in judicial records or in both, and therefore, being collected together, shall (as we perceive) produce certainty” (quoted in Sargent 1989: 24). In a sense, the Yearbook and the writs were analogous to the journal and the votes in the House of Commons, whose main function was to record decisions already made. Both represented forms of enunciation and methods of inscription which justified credibility as recorded experience.

The lack of system in the common law was seen as part of its strength because it was flexible enough to meet new needs and modifications. A codified legal system was seen as more liable to lead to arbitrariness and uncertainty because it was not grounded in the actual problems associated with legal decisions. For Chief Justice Hale, those who make use of pure abstract reasoning are "most commonly the worst judges that can be, because they are transported from the ordinary measures of right and wrong by their overfine speculations, theories and
distinction” (quoted in Sargent 1989: 24). Rather than speculating on abstract, universal, principles, common law practitioners sought practical solutions to actual problems while maintaining a very flexible and localized character. They opposed the use of codified texts and procedures for the purpose of governance and adjudication because they considered universal method of rule as easily subject to political centralization and control.

6.1.1 Common Law, Performance and the Simulation of Immediacy

Because of its lack of system, legal evidence in the common law practice is essentially unmediated; the only mediation between reality and observation is the adjudicative process itself. Common law adjudication simulates immediacy: a concern for immediate knowledge of the world which seek to regulate the appearance of the world and has very little to say other than whatever fell immediately before the senses. This perpetual presentist temporality is based on rules of immediate cognition that resists formalization. As a result, the common law is practiced in public through experience and analogy, contiguity and similarity, and is anchored in specific individuals – judges, juries, witnesses, attuned by oaths to their responsibilities. The individualization of cases and of people as source of knowledge allow the simulated immediacy of (re)presentation.

Simulating immediacy, common law trials are public affairs with witnesses testifying in an open court. The visibilities of the British courtroom are therefore immediate visibilities, based on direct face-to-face interactions that produce direct knowledge: The common law “has to see things – and especially people – close to hand” (Murphy 1997: 156).¹

¹ By contrast, in Roman Law the method of taking evidence consists of questioning witnesses in private and then introducing their depositions as evidence to a closed court, where a judicial bench would determine the facts of the case and pass legal ruling.
In the common law tradition, long experience generated wisdom, and wisdom conferred authority. Accordingly, the judicial procedures of the English common law were ruled by “unwritten” customs which were given the status of a true law and equated with ‘nature’. The judicial records, like the acts of Parliament, were seen only as written confirmations of the more fundamental principle of custom, which represented the ‘spirit’ of the law. As long as legislative practices were only subservient to the foundational idea of ‘custom’, the British political system made the principle of ‘custom’ the unquestioned premise of English social thought over the centuries. The principle of trial by jury, which determined the validity of a custom by inquiry of certain number of “good man,” is an illustration of this perception, as is the methodological premises of common law, which encourage reliance on praxis and experience over logical demonstration. Unlike the Roman Law, the common law courts do not require a complete proof in order for a verdict to be reached by the jury. Proof consists in the balance of persuasion. The final decision was to be based upon the probable merits of the cases put forth by the accused and the accuser, and the case would be decided in favor of the one whose account appeared to them most likely to be true. Thus, in cases where the evidence was incomplete the jury was expected to proceed upon its knowledge of the custom. The jury was therefore considered both as competence to judge issues of fact and as a source of evidence.

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2 Proof in the codified system of the Roman law did not consist in the balance of persuasion. Rather, strict mechanical rules of evidence were followed. Different pieces of evidence carried different numerical values (from 0 to 1), and by a simple arithmetical calculus, complete proof was achieved when the total of these values was 1.

3 In their original form, British Courts of law were anything but agencies of inquiry, but appeared to base judgments on the validity of oaths on humane divine and intuition. Jurors, frequently came from the same neighborhood as the accused, and were chosen on the basis of their past experience with the accused and the witnesses and the knowledge that they had of the case. Until the fourteenth century, juries were considered as source of evidence. Their competence to judge issues of fact was a much later development.
As a customary law, the English common law was seen as the ‘natural’ expression of English society. In this natural jurisprudence, manners and customs could not change by laws, the law was their natural expression. Manners and customs change in themselves and then through experience and learning the laws and the institutions of the nation might be accommodated to them. This is why laws had to be understood in their local and historical context.

The translation, or accommodation the law the changing circumstances of “local customs” demanded as sort of (pre-modern) social expertise. Whenever legal experts and legislators could not limit themselves to a body of laws, they made use of ‘artificial reason’ to detect and determine the ‘spirit’ of the English law, those societal customs which was considered to reflect the common good of the English nation and society, and which, ultimately, determined the conditions and limits of reform (Kelley 1990: 168). A direct link was thus developing between the British social thought and legal expertise. As the Lord Chief Justice Mathew Hale proclaimed already in 1648, the best judges were people of practical experience in social behavior, “men of observation and experience in human affairs and conversation between man and man” (quoted in Postema 1986: 61).

To be qualified, the common law practitioner had to acquire an almost instinctive ability, which could not be formally taught but resulted from a deep and prolonged exposure to the working of the law through the practical training offered in the Inns of Court, and the practice of law in the common law courts. This sort of practical training allowed practitioners to gain the necessary experience to exercise the artificial reasoning of the common law for the discernment of similarities and differences in past cases and for the analogical application of these precedents to new cases. They emphasized case law and precedent, grounding their jurisprudence and their social thinking on their insular experience, even though they often equated this experience with “nature.” In the construction and application of a law, experience
had to guide the use of reason (thus restraining pure reason) and the structure of the judicial gaze was attuned to possibilities of contiguity and resemblance, often by making extensive use of metaphors and analogies (“this is like this …,” “it is as if …”) (Murphy 1997: 114-5).

By ultimately seeking out the spirit of the law, both the judicial and the legislative process demanded a philosophical understanding of society. This judicial-philosophical intellectual activity was often referred to in the eighteenth century as the “science of legislature.” By late eighteenth century, the members of ever-growing legal profession became “the undisputed experts of social thought” (Kelley 1990: 167). According to Pocock “jurisprudence … was the social science of the eighteenth century, the matrix of both the study and the ideology of manners.” Natural jurisprudence engaged in “intensive study of the variations of social behaviour throughout space and time,” in order to “reveal the underlying principles of human nature on which the diversities of conduct were based” (Pocock 1985: 49).

In the eighteenth century, Scottish natural philosophers were developing a science of the legislator according to the principles of natural jurisprudence. Following Montesquieu, they offered an intellectual scheme through which the law was judged not so much by reference to their internal coherence, or intrinsic merits, as in terms of their appropriateness to complex social states. The main figures in this emerging tradition – Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Joan Miller and others (identified as the founders of political economy) – who began to look more and more like social experts, faithfully recording and interpreting social similarities and differences, offered little positive advice for legislators beyond the common law injunction to respect established social mores.4 This naturalistic and deterministic picture was antagonistic

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4 This transposition is most clearly illustrated in the work of Adam Smith whose early lectures on jurisprudence (moral philosophy) which he taught at the university of Edinburgh, anticipated his pioneering work in political economy. In this work Smith exploits his knowledge of jurisprudence to compare the problems of property, contract, and modern commerce in terms of “natural rights” and of particular “stages” of social development. Smith’s Wealth of Nations expends “moral philosophy” into more technical areas of economic thought (Winch 1993).
not merely to the legislator as founder of states but to any developed notion of political agency as means of achieving social goals. As a result, the science of the legislator left the lawmaker “with precious little to do other contemplate ‘natural’ processes and to issue pious warnings about ‘artificial’ impediment and expedients” (Winch 1993: 68).

6.2 The Common Law Tradition and the Ascendancy of Parliamentary Inquiries

Acts of inquiry were an integral and indispensable part of the British judicial system. Royal justice and administration were built upon legal inquiry not only in the formal system of courts but also in the ad hoc agencies of prerogative, and in particular by the extra-juridical parliamentary select committees of inquiry. By the middle of the eighteenth century these parliamentary inquiries extended so extensively that we can speak about the British Parliament ingrained “habit of inquiry” which was evident in all aspect of the British adjudicative government (Tompson 1979).

Select committees were appointed by standing order of Parliament that dealt with some pre-specified subject matter, usually dealing with the conduct of the legislature or the executive. They were often composed of thirty or more members (a quorum was normally eight). All members were MPs and were typically selected by the committee chair, who in most cases initiated the inquiry to advance a particular Bill. Select committees were also attended by clerks, usually trained as solicitors, who were appointed ad hoc and who sometimes held no official position in the house (Lambert 1975: 10). It was not difficult to manipulate the membership of committees, and as Luke Hansard testified before Hume’s committee on printed papers of 1835, member lists were usually window-dressed with the names of “men of ranks and talents, yet it is shrewdly guessed that they will not take any active part in the inquiry” (Hansard 1962: 139-140).
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the parliamentary inquiry became the central tool for legislation. Although select committees have been used for a long time in the House of Commons, their early use often pertained to the internal operation of the Commons itself (matters now taken up by the so-called domestic committees) rather than substantive policy areas. Richard Pares (1953: 203) regards select committees as an old system gaining a new political prominence in the 1770’s following a series of committees into East India affairs which seem to set the fashion. From the 1790s, both the principle and the main provisions of a private Bill were almost invariably heard at the Select Committee stage. In the last four decades of the eighteenth century the House of Commons appointed 580 select committees, but only 353 committees submitted their reports to Parliament, and only 49 dealt with issues of social reform (Lambert 1979; Tompson 1979). During the first half of the nineteenth century select committees continued to be important parliamentary device; their number was increasing and their number was increasing. 543 committees submitted their reports between 1801 and 1834. The average annual number of select committees that submitted their reports before 1832 was 16; in 1834 their total number was 23 and in 1840 the number rose to 27 (Clokie and Robinson 1969: 62). As I show in the next chapters, during the first decades of the nineteenth century there exist a strong link between the presence of the Press in Parliament and the frenzy of private Bill legislation through select committees.

Pressure groups and British social movements also valued parliamentary inquiries and use them as a political platform and a public tool to advance their agitations and claim-makings. To give only a few examples, the anti-slave-trade movement in the late 1780s took great trouble to drum up witnesses for a parliamentary investigation into the evil. The Ten Hours movement cooperated closely with Sadler’s select committee of inquiry in 1832 (see chapter 9). In the 1840s, the Chartists’ leader and the head of the Anti-Corn-Law League, Richard Cobden, demanded a select committee to cross examine the protectionist leaders; as he told Parliament in
March 1844, “there is no tribunal so fair as a Select Committee” (Cobden 1870: 48). Cobden threatened that a refusal to establish such committee would only result in more incitement and agitation among agricultural workers:

What objections there can be to the Committee I cannot understand. Are you afraid that to grant it will increase agitation? I rather think there is a good deal of agitation going on there now. Do you really think that the appointment of a dozen Gentlemen, to sit in a quiet room up-stairs and hear evidence, will add to the excitement out of doors? Why, by granting my Committee you will be withdrawing me from the agitation for one. But I tell you that you will raise excitement still higher than it is, if you allow me to go down to your constituents—your vote against the Committee in my hand—and allow me to say to them, 'I only asked for inquiry; I offered the landlords a majority of their own party; I offered them to go into Committee, not as a Chairman, but as an individual Member; I offered them all possible advantages, and yet they would not—they dared not grant a Committee of inquiry into your condition.' (Cobden 1870: 52).

Some parliamentary inquiries thus served as a public forum to protest official government policies and as a public opinion struggle over these policies. Pressure groups occasionally reprinted parliamentary papers for their own purposes; temperance reformers plundered the report of the select committee on drunkenness of 1834 for ammunition for decades. Nonetheless, most committees were inclined towards a narrow conception of their role, inquiring into the more constricted issues of administrative procedures or to issues pertaining to the work of Parliament itself. Hence, although parliamentary inquiries were instrumental in bringing a good deal of material to a wider public, they impact was usually limited in time and space and they were much less effective in their ability to make novel contribution to policy debates and did not have much impact on the general public discourse.
6.2.1 Inquiry, Judgment and Objectivity

The growing usage of parliamentary inquiry through parliamentary select committees in the eighteenth century represented the supreme law enforcement authority of the House of Commons, being “the Grand Inquest of the Nation.” The ascendancy of parliamentary inquiries to dominant position in the British legislative process, caught the eyes of foreign scholars. Alexis de-Tocqueville, for example, expressed a great interest in “parliamentary enquiries” during his 1833 journey to England, suggesting that there is much one can learn from “their utility, their frequency, their forms” (Tocqueville 1988: 63). In his Politics as a Vocation, Weber advocated the system of British select committees as an effective workshop for the legal training of politicians and a crucial step towards the professionalization of politics and the emergence legal-bureaucratic authority more in general.5 According to Weber:

the highly developed system of committee work in the English Parliament makes it possible and compelling for every politician who counts on a share in leadership to cooperate in committee work. All important ministers of recent decades have this very real and effective work-training as a background. The practice of committee reports and public criticism of these deliberations is a condition for training, for really selecting leaders and eliminating mere demagogues” (Weber 1946: 77-128).

Weber saw the system of parliamentary committees as an effective institution whose inquiries provided a legal and administrative training ground for real leadership and played an important role in the transformation of politicians from mere demagogues to professional legislators. Weber’s insights resonate with Richard Pares’ observation that parliamentary inquiries,

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5 It is very possible that Weber includes British governmental commissions in what he describes as “the highly developed system of committee work in the English Parliament.” Weber was instrumental in securing the adoption of Article 34 in the Weimar Constitution. The article stated that one fifth of the members of Parliament could ask for the institution of a committee of investigation.
brought members of Parliament face to face with the interests and the facts, as
the study of petitions … could not … this work brought them into contact and
even sympathy with the wishes and interest of the public, which was now able to
watch and criticize them … and this awareness of the public … made the career
of the British Politician on the eve of 1830 very unlike what it had been in 1760.
He was a public man … Responsive to the wishes of the public, he need not, he
could not heed the wishes of the Crown, or look to it for leadership as his
predecessors had done (Pares 1953: 203-4).

At the same time, parliamentary committees of inquiry did not constitute any significant
break from the common law tradition and its oral culture. On the contrary, parliamentary inquiries
were integral part of the epistemic style of this tradition and their modus operandi was embedded
on the adjudicative method as it was practiced in the British Common Courts of Law. It is,
therefore, important to pay attention to the close linkage between the method of inquiry and rule of
evidence in parliamentary committees and the norms and sensibilities that characterized the oral
culture of the British judicial system. Importantly, both system were based almost entirely on oral
testimonies. In most cases, parliamentary inquiries did not call for any documentary evidence but
simply summoned witnesses and questioned them. Although the questioning of witnesses in
parliamentary inquires was usually done in a manner that would never be permitted in a court of
law (e.g., much of the evidence produced was the merest hearsay, and thus often unsubstantiated)
their method of operation simulated many of the practices of common law adjudication and
involved legal skills of interrogation and cross-examination of witnesses.

Many of the barristers-MPs (often referred to as ‘Law Officers’) did not use their
oratorical skills on the parliamentary floor because they were too busy working in parliamentary
select committees, advising and drafting legislation (Meisel 2001: 207-21). Robert Cecil, an MP
and future prime minister described his experience with a parliamentary select committee,
comparing it to a public tribunal:
We were lingering about the hallowed precincts of St. Stephens, on the way to the great hall … when we found ourselves in the centre of a stream of human beings hotly careering in one direction. There were counsel in wigs, attorneys dandling huge briefs, oppressed-looking clerks groaning under blue bags, and a nondescript crowd of keen eager-looking faces, panting and steaming as they elbowed each other through the splendid hall … we found ourselves in a huge square room hung round with maps. There was a bar in front of us, and beyond that a horse-shoe table, round which five weary-looking gentlemen were seated. It was the awful tribunal, a Committee of the House of Commons … The argument proceeded. The counsel flung cases at each other, which certainly the Committee, and probably no one else, had ever heard of, and overwhelmed the tribunal with legal terms.  

Similarly, Hippolyte Taine, in his popular Notes on England, described the working of a mid-Victorian parliamentary inquiry into the British Museum as an odd mixture of parliamentary deliberations and conversation among peers with the legal framework of interrogating witnesses: “Seven or eight members sat around a table in a lofty room open to the public … The general tone was even, moderate; there were occasional smiles, it was all rather like an informative private conversation. And that, in fact, is what it was.” Taine concluded that for the public, the parliamentary is “the way to be well informed” (Hippolyte 1872: 185).

This hybrid form of “informal formality” was the way in which most selection committees carried out their inquiries. The examinations of witnesses took place in a clearly defined social setting, where persons termed “witnesses” were questioned by members of Parliament, who were endowed with rights and powers over the investigation. The creation of the setting for the testimonial hearings was meant to ensure the impartial establishment of facts. The examinations followed a precisely determined procedure. First witnesses were put under oath; the phrase “sworn and examined” is explicitly mentioned at the beginning of each protocol. The term was derived from the language of the courts and indicated that the hearings were conducted according to the social pattern of a judicial examination. The placing of informants under oath represented a symbolic act that put them under the Parliament legal authority. This meant that the hearing was

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6 Saturday Review, July 4, 1857 (quoted in Silvester 1996: 139-140)
to serve the process of establishing the truth according to a testimony that was factual, which was not motivated by their own interest. The protocols of select committees often did not contain anything more beyond a verbatim recording of the hearings; above all they did not give any indication of the informal rules that must also have been at play during the examination.

The hearings themselves were usually carefully planned and prepared; a list of questions that had drawn up in advance provided a line of discourse that was adhered to relatively closely. The list consisted of a catalogue of key words, which, in turn, were defined by questions. A defined number of topics were listed in this way; for example, state of agriculture, rent, permanent improvements, farming population, etc. The questions relating to these topics were early examples of what has since become the common pattern of a questionnaire, with a sequence of questions moving from those with a more general wording to specific questions seeking particular pieces of information. The long list of questions contained not only a sketch the problem under investigation; it also implicitly suggests the core of the answers as a model of the nature of the problem and its causes. The questionnaire, in other words, was not so much empirical or explorative in nature; the questions preempted the result of the investigation, and the inquiry produced an outcome that corresponded to the general and undisputed views of its members. This approach limited the horizons within which select committees carried out its stocktaking as well as their summary of conclusion and recommendations to Parliament.

The epistemic style of the parliamentary, its method for collecting evidence and for establishing facts in the reports inquiry, and the principles of common law jurisprudence with its adjudicative method and rule of evidence represent the same system of meanings and attributions that together convey a symbolic order and a display of objectivity. As Latour astutely observes, the principle of objectivity originated from the micro-procedures invented by judges to produce their ethos of disinterest and only later transported by science as a rhetorical device to boost its legitimacy, even though the method of objective judgment does not coincide with the
way science actually works. The “coldness and rigour of judgment, in short, everything that we associate with objectivity, belongs not to the world of the laboratory or of calculation, but to the judicial bench” (Latour 2004b: 106).

The judicial form of parliamentary inquiry was supplemented by the notion that MPs, conducting an inquiry, can act both as lawyers and as judges. Many MPs serving in select committees conceived their duties in this way. For example, Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, who was appointed in 1854 to investigate the expansion of the Factory Act, commenced his inquiry into bleaching industry with summoning groups of about ten laborers to Bolton. “Since they were, as it were, plaintiffs in the inquiry, I thought it not more than right and proper that I should hear their case first” (HC [151] 1857, XI: 2). In his March 1844 speech, Cobden urged the House to form a select committee to inquire the state of agriculture workers. Cobden, who was a firm believer in free trade, who made a fortune as a calico printer which he later sacrificed to form and lead the Anti-Corn-Law League in order to fight protectionism, asked not to be appointed as Chair of the committee but as a regular member so he could represent (as a plaintiff) the grievances of the framers, while inviting other committee members to represent the side of the landowners (and protectionism) (Cobden 1870: 52). Treating the inquiry as a public tribunal for settling disputes, Cobden was convinced that he could prove, through the adjudicative process of the inquiry, that truth and justice is on his side:

Recollect that hitherto you have never heard the two sides of the question … I do not want a man to be examined who is not a farmer or landowner. I would respectfully ask the Earl of Ducie and Earl Spencer to be examined first; and then hon. Gentlemen could send for the Dukes of Buckingham and Richmond. I should like nothing better than that—nothing better than to submit these four noblemen to a cross-examination. I would take your two witnesses and you would take mine, and the country should decide between us. Nothing would so much tend to diffuse sound views as such an examination. But you have even Members on your own side who will help me to make out my case” (Cobden 1870: 50; my italics).
Because the parliamentary inquiry was subjected to adjudicative judgment between two opposing views to elicit both truth and justice, the selection of well-functioning committees was a very complex and careful task that required political sensibility and shrewdness to achieve the required balance of opinions within the committee. Anthony Trollope described the enormous amount of political calculations that provided the ground for the Limehous Bridge Inquiry:

Mr. Nogo, the member for Mile End, had been allowed to carry his motion for a committee … But of whom was the committee to be made up? That was now the question which to Mr. Nogo, in his hour of temporary greatness, was truly momentous. He of course was to be the chairman, and to him appertained the duty of naming the other members; of naming them indeed—so much he could undoubtedly do by the strength of his own privilege. But of what use to name a string of men to whom Mr. Vigil would not consent? Mr. Nogo, did he do so, would have to divide on every name, and be beaten at every division. There would be no triumph in that. No; Mr. Nogo fully understood that his triumph must be achieved—if he were destined to a triumph—by an astute skill in his selection, not by an open choice of friends. He must obtain a balance on his side, but one in which the scale would lean so slightly to his side that Mr. Vigil’s eyes might be deceived. Those who knew Mr. Vigil best were inclined to surmise that such an arrangement was somewhat beyond Mr. Nogo’s political capacity … Mr. Nogo, at the head of the list, put Mr. Vigil himself … Then he named sundry supporters of the Government, sundry members also of the opposition; and he filled up the list with certain others who could not be regarded as sure supporters of one side or the other … And then the committee met, and a lot of witnesses were in attendance (Trollope 1857 348-50).

Trollope depiction of the decision making stage of the inquiry as a process of forming a judgment, share many similarities with Cobden’s speech: “At the close the members met to prepare their report … It was now their duty to decide on the merits of what they had heard, to form a judgement as to the veracity of the witnesses, and declare, on behalf of the country which they represented, whether or no this bridge should be built at the expense of the nation” (Trollope 1857: 354).
6.2.2 Parliamentary Inquiry, Print and Oral Culture

Parliamentary inquiries sometimes resulted in new legislation but almost always ended in reports appended by massive transcripts of hearings and other documents, known as Command Papers, for they were presented to Parliament at the command of the monarch. During most of the eighteen century very few reports had been printed. This made it easier for government to prevent the official distribution of unfavorable reports. The question of whether a report should be printed was simply a matter of political decision. With the increase of parliamentary reporting in the newspapers, however, some major changes in the practice of the House with regard to printing were taking place, involving a great increase in the quantity of printing of all kinds, and especially of parliamentary reports.

Parliamentary inquiries functioned as a miniature Parliament or a national court and like the Parliament and the court they also open their doors to the national Press by the end of the eighteenth century. Through the use of select committees legislators made intense use of the press, shaping public opinion and advancing their careers and reputation. Journalists were allowed to cover the hearing process and committee members routinely published column bringing new information to the debate, while the investigation was still taking place. The publication of the weekly evidence opened the process to rebuttal, and public reaction was conceived as guaranteeing the completeness of the record.

Thus, with the start of the nineteenth century parliamentary inquiries adopted the principle of transparency as a basic guideline for their operation. There was a growing concern for making the political system more accessible to information retrieval. It was not only the facts but also the process of accumulating facts that was deemed necessary to be visible for observation. As a result, the parliamentary report functioned mainly as a recording of human voice. It sought to represent a verbatim unaltered, unedited and almost unmediated recording of testimonies.
This concern with an immediate, unmediated knowledge of the world guided the material production (editing, copyfitting, binding, etc.) of the committees’ reports and their appearance as tangible objects: their size, their typography, etc. Thus, for example, because the realism of voice was a such a basic principle of the adjudicative procedure of the inquiry, it also guided the practice of publicity: parliamentary reports had to include the entire course of witnesses’ questioning regardless of any factual utility. The realism of voice, as an authentic human expression which stands for immediate cognition, and the insistence that vocal utterance is in itself quite particularly true, so real that it must not be subjected to any alteration and is barely warrant discussion, was a central dimension of the parliamentary report. The publishers, who at the time also served as editors, had to remain absolutely faithful to the manuscript. Reports were printed page after page on wide sheets of paper that had to be folded and printers were not allowed to deviate from the form or even the size of the original manuscript. This resulted in a bulky volumes printed on very large folio pages, which were expensive to print, difficult to utilize, and often obscured any explicit coherent message in the text.

The printing of the parliamentary report was thus considered to be the making a copy in print. The general assumption in preparing reports for publication was that these reports should not be read exhaustively as books, but rather should be used for reference, similar to the use of a dictionary or an encyclopedia. The credibility of the report relied not on the articulacy and persuasiveness of its composition but on its stenographic accuracy and its faithfulness to the verbal evidence in the original script. They were seen as an official database, containing record of evidence and sources to help legislators and executives interested in this information. As a result, the parliamentary report were seen not as act of composition but of recordation, a transcriptase representation of human voice. This aspiration for verbatim reporting indicated a novel concern with the archival quality of evidence and signified a departure from the collatio as the method of inscribing adjudicative records in the courts of law.
In 1791 the first verbatim transcripts of evidence given in Select Committees begun to appear, with the appointment of the shorthand-writer Joseph Gurney to take down the evidence given in House of Commons Private Bill Committees. Gurney was a member of a family firm of shorthand-writers who served both the Houses of Parliament and the Criminal Courts. The Gurneys established the practice of recording testimonial evidence in a clear form of question and answer - a great advance on the earlier method of summarizing evidence (Drew 2004). The question of whether to employ a shorthand writer at any particular Committee was left to its Chairman’s discretion, until 1826, when the Commons passed a resolution that every Committee on a Private Bill should be required to report the Bill to the House together with the evidence and Minutes of proceedings (Cobb 1966).

From 1801 onwards, the reports and evidence of practically all committees were printed in the Sessional Papers or in appendices to the Journals. An official print of Verbatim minutes of evidence was made only when there had been a motion for it in the House in which the bill was pending and this procedure was usually reserved for particularly contentious bills. The Commons evidence between 1835 and 1899 amounts to some 3,500 volumes, each of up to 2,000 pages in length (Cobb 1966: 164). The evidence exists in such quantities because proceedings on contentious bills were often very prolonged, with speeches from Counsel on both sides (which unfortunately are not recorded in the minutes of evidence), followed by examinations and cross examination of expert witnesses.

The increasing emphasis on the production of printed texts in Parliament, uncovered not only the concern of legislators over the archival quality of their published chronicle, but, most importantly, it exposed a rising tensions between the oral tradition of parliamentary inquiry and its printed form. What was revealed, in other words, was a growing conflict between the developing culture of print in Parliament and the epistemic culture of parliamentary inquiry, which was largely based on common law and parliamentary oral practices. In parliamentary
inquiries, investigators were simulating a tribunal of judges who like in a legal procedure retrace only a short referential chain by essentially relying on the immediate and verbatim recordings of testimonial hearings that require only a few referential steps to establish a reasonably solid evidence. By contrast, the production of printed reports, despite efforts to make them into verbatim recording of what was said, always involves a set of practices within a social circuit and thus requires complex mediations. In print culture, therefore, evidence is often established by utilizing many referential steps and transformations.

If meaning is seen to reside in the immediacy of speech (in oral testimonies) then writing must assume an instrumental and subsidiary role as a recording device in order to more faithfully register those vocal meanings. The report of the parliamentary inquiry must therefore depend entirely on its fidelity to spoken utterance. Changing the short-hand transcripts of the examination, distance the report from the immediacy of speech and is therefore seen as a corruption of the self-presence of meaning, “the spirit of a witness’s verbal testimony,” which the presence of speech would have prevented.

The main problem, however, as we saw in the previous chapter, was the absence of any reliable and trustworthy technology of recording human voice, which affected both the recording process of parliamentary speech and of the viva voce mode of parliamentary inquiry. Witnesses constantly complained that their testimonies were misrepresented by the shorthand clerks who recorded their speech and were consequently given the right to revise their transcripts. The usual practice in the early nineteenth century was for the witness to be given the manuscript transcript of his evidence, upon which he might make corrections (subject to the chairman’s approval) before the revised evidence was printed. In 1837 Luke Hansard noted in a detailed analysis of what had happened to some of the evidence taken before the select committee on the Records Commission that one witness, finding it insufficient simply to re-write his replies, also re-wrote the questions he had been asked to suit his new answers (Lambert 1975: 48).
As the daily printing of the minutes of select committees became a common practice, committee members and witnesses were increasingly altering the original minutes before sending them into print. Henry Hansard, Luke Hansard’s son, complained that corrections to the proofs were in many cases extremely heavy, at times “even exceeding 50 percent upon the composition” (quoted in Cobb 1966: 173). The problem of alterations was exacerbated by the fact the committee itself was authorized to make substantial changes in the transcripts whenever they thought it necessary. The committee chairman, with the assent of the committee, had the right to expunge any part of the evidence which appeared “wantonly malicious or even needlessly offensive to the feelings of individual.” But according to Hansard, writing in 1833, the practice was often to go further than this and “to draw a witness into colloquy, and then to omit or insert just so much as answers the views of the leading men [of the committee]” (Hansard 1962: 98). It has been shown, for example, that the “Drunken Committee” of 1834, appointed to investigate the increase of the vice amongst the lower orders, bluntly omitted the evidence of some witnesses (Lambert, 1975: 48). As the Webbs remark “substantial alterations can be and are made by both parties - a practice open to abuse” (1932: 153).

By the 1830’s abuses of this practice were giving rise to some anxiety in the Commons. In 1836, for example, it was alleged in a debate that Henry Warburton, M.P. had added in manuscript some 7,000 words of the evidence which he had given before the Select Committee on Timber Duties (Hansard, 1836, XXXII: 138-55). In 1837 during another debate over the reporting of select committees, Robert Peel challenged in the Commons the discretion that allowed witnesses to go over their testimony after it had been given to a committee and before it was sent to be printed. This privilege, he claimed, undermines the public’s confidence in the fidelity of the parliamentary record. Peel had no objection to “mere verbal alterations’ as long as

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7 “House of Commons Select Committee on the Publication of Printed Papers” (HL, Sessional Papers, 1840, 29: 291).
the sense of the original utterance remained the same in print. He contended, however, that some witnesses enjoyed so much license that “in many cases the answer [as printed] did not correspond with the question, and the person examining, if he were disposed to discharge his duty properly, would indisputably have sought further explanation and added additional questions.” Hence, Peel concluded that, “the undoubted superiority of parole over written evidence in eliciting the truth was destroyed by a system of deliberate alternation, and the spirit of a witness’s verbal testimony, when thus retouched and reconstructed, could be traced no longer” (Hansard 1837, XXXVI: 71-3).

For the defenders of oral culture, the spoken word is given a higher value because the speaker and listener are both present to the utterance simultaneously. There is no temporal or spatial distance between speaker, speech, and listener, since the speaker hears himself speak at the same moment as the listener does. As Barbra Johnson explains, whether or not perfect understanding occurs in fact, “this immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word we know what we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean and know what we have said.” Because, “the writer puts thought on paper, distancing it from the immediacy of speech … this is seen as a corruption of the self-presence of meaning, an opening of meaning to forms of corruption which the presence of speech would have prevented (Johnson 1981: viii-ix).

In the same debate, James Abercromby, the Speaker of the House, referred to the “evils arising from the indulgence given to witnesses in correcting their evidence” and instanced a case in which “the witness not only altered the answers he had given before the committee, but he actually inserted questions to elicit answers illustrative of his views.” Abercromby supported Joseph Hume’s proposal that the evidence should be printed in proof exactly as it had been taken down, and that the witness might then “attend the Committee for the purpose of correcting any verbal mistakes to which, as a rule, corrections ought to be limited. If the witness wishes to
vary and add to his evidence lie ought to be re-examined before the Committee, and subjected to proper examination” (Hansard 1837, XXXVI: 73-4, 144-6).

The same position was taken by Henry Cole, the archivist in the Public Record Office in the 1830s. Cole criticized the custom of “placing the evidence given at viva voce examination in the power of the witness before it is printed,” which always resulted in “subsequent alteration from the witness.” In a pamphlet privately printed and circulated to the House of Commons in 1837, titled *Reform in Printing Evidence taken before House of Commons Committees*, Cole argued that because “there is little or no check on the extent or character of the alterations, [they assume] when printed totally different character, though published as, and ostensibly professed to be, the evidence verbally delivered to the committee.” Cole protested, moreover, that this practice cause a delay in the printing of the evidence and their distribution to the members of the committee "frequently to the serious detriment of the inquiry" (1837: 18).

Another major concern was that in the final sittings for the drafting of the report, the judgment of committee members, who not always attended the hearings of evidence, will tend to rely on the altered printed transcripts. Addressing this problem, a 1854 Lords Committee exposed the tension between the common law legal-adjudicative method of inquiry and the mediated form of print. Its conclusion, which gave priority to the adjudicative method, conferred the committee chairman with a status of a court-of-law judge who determines the admissibility of evidence, while asserting that having an immediate, uncorrected evidence printed and circulated would “convey to the members of the committee an exact statement of the Evidence given, the effect of which might be altered even by changes of words or phrases intended only to improve the style, and this course will tend to lessen the amount of corrections, and thus to diminish the somewhat delicate duty of the Chairman of deciding on their admissibility” (quoted in Cobb 1966: 173).
6.3 Changes in Legal Culture: Trial Reports and Competent Advocacy

The history of trial reports in Britain shares many similarities with the history of parliamentary reports in the Press. As James Sutherland notes, the word ‘reporter’ was originally used for the shorthand writer employed to take down trials and other proceedings; it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that it was used for newspaper reporters, who were earlier referred to as news gatherers (Sutherland 1986: 47). According to Sutherland, throughout most of the eighteenth century, “journalists were not only forbidden to report parliamentary debates, but also severely discourage from reporting important trials in the law courts” (Sutherland 1986: 47). In stark contrast to the nineteenth century newspapers’ regular transcription of court proceedings and detailed coverage of important trials, publishing reports about important trials in earlier periods would have led to immediate trouble.

The big break for the reporting of trials in the newspapers came in 1796 when the publication of trials was declared lawful and the law courts were opened to reporting, along with Parliament (being the high court), three years later. The shift in both cases, though unplanned and gradual, was paradigmatic. Whereas judges had previously been reprimanding anyone who dared to take notes in their court, in early nineteenth century the judges agreed that “it is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings of Courts of Justice should be universally known” (quoted in Grossman 2002: 32). An 1824 article in the Edinburgh Review described the increasing news-papers’ trial reporting as being part of the “spirit of observation, inquiry, and improvement,” in which “all the news-papers abound with reports of trials, and all their readers freely talk over both the merits and the points, the form and the substance, the preparatory process, and the ultimate decision” (Edinburgh Review, 39, March 1824, p. 171).

Trial reporting in the nineteenth century became so extensive that it was described as an essential part of extending the public reach and influence of the justice system. The Solicitors’
Journal summed this up in 1858 article: “As a general rule, it is undoubtedly desirable that correct and impartial reports of proceedings in open courts of justice should be given in the press. As has been well said, the printing of such reports is only an extension of the area of the Court” (quoted in Grossman 2002: 32). The printed press has become a central component of a newly established order of justice. If the publicity parliamentary deliberation became integral part of the legislative practice, the publicity of adjudicative procedures through trial reports in the Press constituted a central principle of the administrating justice. Both legislation and adjudication became increasingly dependent on the reports of their evidence and proceedings.

As in the case of parliamentary reportage, the opening of court trials to the public gaze led to a reworking of the connection between facts and verbal rhetoric, changing the conduct of legal inquiry and the practices of the legal profession. This was especially apparent with the dramatic reduction in public executions in the 1830s, which was associated with the increase emphasis of the trial scene itself in legal and crime reporting. With trial reports, the outdoor public spectacle of the scaffold was replaced by a different sort of “mass ceremony,” as Benedict Anderson (1990) calls the national ritual of newspaper reading. Foucault had exactly this in mind when he noted that once “punishment had gradually ceased to be a spectacle” and “become the most hidden part of the penal process,” it was “the conviction itself that marked the offender with the unequivocally negative sign: the publicity had shifted to the trial and to the sentence” (Foucault 1977: 9).

6.3.1 The Lawyerization of the Criminal Trial and the Rise of Competent Advocacy:

From Objectivity to Competent Advocacy

This shift from punishment to the proceedings of the trial itself, brought into focus the legal practice of advocacy, shifting significant power from the judge to the lawyer. With the ascendancy of trial publicity the meaning and practice of legal advocacy was starting to change.
Most significantly, at about the same time that trial reports became lawful, the prohibition of the medieval Common Law on the assistance of counsel to persons accused of capital crimes was drastically eroded when lawyers were permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses in criminal trials (Cairns 1998). The effort to emphasize cross-examination in adjudicative procedures kept testimony at the forefront of a court's strategies of proof and made the court into a mini-Parliament: a place of adversarial exchanges and deliberations between lawyers and witnesses which newspaper were eager to publish.

Trials began to take on a wholly different complexity – and a slower pace. Under the older form of criminal trials, truth was essentially assumed to reside in the speech of the accused. Once confronted with the accusation and the evidence the accused could clear or hang himself by speaking with no professional help. The assumption was, as Sergeant William Hawkins put it in 1721, that “generally every one of Common Understanding may as properly speak of Matters of Facts, as if he were the best lawyer ... it requires no manner of Skill to make plain honest Defence.” The true meaning of human behavior was believed to emerge by somehow speaking itself out of the simple, raw, singular and unmediated vocal utterance of the unprepared amateur: “the very speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of Defence of those who are guilty, when they speak for themselves,” Hawkins believed, “may often help to disclosure the Truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial Defence of others speaking for them” (quoted in Schramm 2000: 52).

The arrival of the lawyers in the criminal courts challenged this equation of truth with amateurish speech and transformed the adjudicative process by turning it into presentations of conflicting narratives constructed by professional advocates. Instead of merely determining sentences, trials became the orchestrated public assembling of opposing stories. Truth was now skillfully composed and, after 1836, was also ‘officially’ reported by the lawyer to the jury (and to the general public with the help of the trial reporters), rather than just uttered by the accused.
A particularly telling marker of this change was that prisoners could now access the dispositions, which contained the evidence against them. The defense could then prepare its account accordingly. As Foucault observed, the new presence of lawyers did not just mean that professionals would now speak for each party; the whole nature of the inquiry had shifted:

“The question is no longer simply: ‘Has the act been established and is it punishable?’ But also: ‘What is this act, what is the act of violence or this murder? To what level of reality does it belong? Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action?’ It is no longer simply ‘who committed it?’ But: ‘How can we assign the casual process that produced it? Where did it originate in the author himself?’” (Foucault 1977: 19)

Alexander Welsh (1992: 8) sees the lawyerization of the criminal trials as the rise of new forms of representation that “openly distrust direct testimony,” i.e., the idea that testimonies as facts could speak for themselves. The rejection of amateurish rhetoric involved a recognition that uneducated speech cannot bridge the gap between language and the events it seeks to describe. The introduction of the lawyers not only helped to develop the standard rules of evidence, but changed the entire culture of inquiry. As Welsh shows, in early nineteenth century an epistemological shift occurred in which firsthand testimony became increasingly subordinated to its corroboration by narratives, which, more than ever, came to depend on presentations of circumstantial evidence. In court the barrister had to weave material facts and testimony into a story to bear out the “whole truth.” Truth was no longer legible in the words of the accused or the accuser; it could no longer rest on testimonial evidence alone. In this form of narration, human utterance, telling one’s own story in one’s own words, is a less credible procedure than having one’s story reconstructed by an orchestrating third part, namely the barrister as a professional narrator who is, in effect, reporting the evidence to the jury.

With the 1836 Prisoners’ Counsel Act (PCA), which authorized the ‘full defense’ in felony trials by giving the counsel the right to address the jury on behalf of the accused, criminal
trials took the adversarial form familiar today (Cairns 1998: 3). The enactment of the PCA and the debates surrounding it brought to the fore the principle of competent advocacy a form of legal expertise that selectively seeks out evidence most favorable to particular hypothesis so as to present this position as persuasively as possible to a third party, while playing down, or explaining away, unfavorable evidence “without outright concealment or fabrication” (Maccoun 1998: 268).

6.3.1.1 Laying the Ground for Social Science: From Objectivity to Competent Advocacy

Two major debates took place in the House of Commons in 1824 and 1826 on proposals to allow full defense by counsel in criminal trials. The merit of competent advocacy, and particularly its effect on the discovery of truth in criminal trials was a major question in these debates, as legislators were making pertinent points about the nature of fact and the extent to which facts required interpretation and arrangement by a trained expert in order to serve as effective pieces of evidence. The opponents of full defense by counsel, which included the majority of judges, argued that there was no need for speeches from prisoners’ counsel in criminal trials because juries were able to discern the truth from the examination and the cross-examination of witnesses and from the statements that prisoners made in their own defense. Full defense by counsel would only distort the truth with sophistical and emotive arguments. The supporters of reform, by contrast, argued that juries would be assisted by the comments of counsel on the evidence. They saw the competent advocacy of an expert counsel as the best means to ensure that juries were fully informed of all the facts and all possible interpretations of the facts, in reaching their verdicts (Cairns 1998: 4)

In the British common law tradition, advocacy has always been not a learnt but an acquired skill, the reward of experience not study. It is inevitably termed an art not science,
and sometimes seems most to resemble a professional mystery. The preferred term was *tact*. Tactfulness was the skill, commentators agreed, that related to the conduct of the whole cause rather than any particular stage of it, and guided the barrister's inaction (the selection of matters to omit or to be silent about) as much as his action. “Of this” wrote Thomas Noon Talfourd in 1825 “a by-stander sees but little; if the art be consummate, nothing; and he is, with difficulty, made to comprehend its full value” (quoted in Cairns 1998: 9).

If the elusive notion of “tact in the management of a cause” is the essence of lay advocacy, the purpose of *competent advocacy*, by contrast, is an attempt to make a case for the truth of some proposition by presenting it as persuasively as possible through the interpretation of facts: pointing the jury to evidence that favor the proposition in question and or explaining away (or playing down unfavorable evidence. Henry Brougham, who was the Lord Chancellor between 1830 and 1834, divided the skills of the advocate into argument (the proposition), examination (of witnesses) and oratory (addressing the jury). In Brougham’s analytical scheme, legal argument includes the application of principle (or precedence) to a set of facts. The principles of Greek and Roman advocacy were familiar to Brougham as a successful advocator who maintained an interest in the subject throughout his political career (Cairns 1998: 7).

Brougham, who was pushing hard for a major legal reform that will include the PCA, argued that a mere presentation of facts in the courtroom is far from being conclusive evidence for guilt:

> Suppose the counsel [for the prosecution] did confine himself to a dry statement of facts, no case could be harder than for the whole web to be, as it were, united together by the juxtaposition of all the circumstances, so as to make up such a picture of the prisoner's guilt as that a man could not rid his mind of it, and fancied he saw the prisoner committing the fact. To unravel this, would require the acutest observations of a prisoner's counsel; for in such a case nothing could tell more strongly against a prisoner than a simple detail of circumstances (Hansard 1826, XX: 15, col. 628)

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8 The Lord Chancellor is a cabinet minister who is head of the judiciary and Speaker of the House of Lords.
According to Brougham, the involvement of a skilled advocate, an expert who untangle the web of facts presented by the prosecution, was a necessary to ensure that conviction did not result from the erroneous assumption that facts by themselves could not lie. This view was utterly rejected by the Attorney-General John Copley (later Lord Lyndhurst), who forcibly expressed the prevailing legal epistemology of the objective self-evident fact. The jury, Copley argued, should make its judgment based only dry facts as they are being meticulously recorded by the prosecutor, and not by the interpretation given to these fact by a defense attorney. Copley conviction that truth will prevail once enough evidence is recorded, and his distrust of the adversarial practice of arranging evidence into a persuasive narrative by competent advocators, was finally laid to rest in 1836 with the Second Report of the Royal Commissioners on Criminal Law, appointed by Lord Brougham in 1833.9

The commission labored long and hard, producing eight substantial reports between 1833 and 1845. The second report, which led to the enactment of the PCA, concluded that even in a speech which purports to be solely an exposition of the relevant evidence, the presentation of every fact is subject to some arrangement: “The giving order and connexion to mass of facts tends to impress the Jury with their materiality and to impart greater force to the evidence than it would otherwise posses emphasized the power of competent advocacy to cover the truth.” It is “not merely difficult,” wrote the commissioners “but impossible, to distinguish between the effect of a skilful arrangement of facts and of a commentary upon them; an impression is often made upon the minds of the Jury by an able address, before the evidence is given' which is not the less dangerous for the professions of fairness and candour with which it may be accompanied.” Consequently, they recommended that “the power of being heard by Counsel is essential to the attainment of truth” (quoted in Schramm 2000: 107).

9 The Five commissioners were: Thomas Starkie, Henry Bellenden Ker, William Wightman, Andrew Amos, and John Austin. Ker, a member of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful knowledge (chaired by Brougham) persuaded Harriet Martineau to write her seminal How to Observe Morals and Manners, “the first book on the methodology of social research” (Lipset 1968: 7) (see Chapters 10-11)
The idea that a fact could "speak for itself" denied any space for professional representation or spokesmanship not only from lawyers in the courtroom but also from legislators in Parliament, especially from the advocators for reform in the House. The contestation of this idea, and its eventual rejection, had, therefore, far reaching implications, extending well beyond the judicial arena. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, facts were increasingly seen as multi-faceted and open for professional manipulation. Experts could claim the power of representation through professional interpretation, which rested on a combination of rhetorical power and analysis of facts. In a way, competent advocacy co-opted the methods of forensic evidence in the court of law (forensic discourse) with the rhetorical power of parliamentary deliberation (deliberative discourse).

As the idea of “facts speaking for themselves” became increasingly discredited and replaced by the idea of expertise as competent advocacy, evidence was gradually put within an expert narrative and a new, scientific, legitimation to reform politics emerged, laying the ground for a new practice of investigation by governmental commissions. As I show in Part II, the distinction between a preference for plain, self-evident fact, on the one hand, and appreciation that all facts require interpretation, on the other, was recapitulated in a struggle over authoritative social knowledge between the adjudicative paradigm of parliamentary committees of inquiry and the explorative paradigm of governmental commissions of investigations. It was in the course of this struggle that the legal skill of competent advocacy was configured with novel practices of public reportage developed by political reporters and translated into social expertise in governmental investigations during the mid decades of the nineteenth century.
PART TWO

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A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE:
GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSIONS
7. The Ascendancy of Governmental Investigations and the ‘Discovery’ of the Social

During the eighteenth century, the high profile of the crown and the susceptibilities of the country gentlemen militated against the concepts of a Prime Minister and Cabinet Government. Parliamentary procedures were not designed to facilitate policymaking by the Government. General measures of public policy were considered as the concern of the Parliament as a whole, and were normally introduced not by the Government but by private MPs. Since there were no formal limits on debate, any member could filibuster proceeding of which he disapproved and could make motions “on the sudden,” without any previous notice (Cox 1987: ch.6).

Historians usually consider that the eighteen century comes to an end about 1780 when the crown gradually withdrew from any significant contribution to the making of domestic and external policies, and the centers of gravity of ministerial responsibility and accountability, and of its sources of information and inspiration, shifted decisively to the House of Commons. Within this constitutional framework, the gradual opening of the Commons at the end of the eighteenth century and the changes in its organizational culture, described in Part One, were accompanied by fundamental changes in the workings of the executive: The emergence of an executive Government that sought relentlessly to control both the legislation process and of the management of its communication to the public. This transformation in the framework of executive practice – the governmentalization of legislation – Changed the structure of the decision-making and diminished the weight of individual MPs in policy decisions.
7.1 The Governmentalization of Legislation

The governmentalization of legislation denotes both a cultural-institutional process – the governmentalization of Parliament, i.e., the increasing influence of executive practices and norms on the *modus operandi* of the British legislature – and an structural-organizational process – the centralization of legislative work in Government. Importantly, the latter was based not on bureaucratic centralization of the state administrative apparatus but involved the centralization of statistical knowledge about society, most of which was collected “in the field” by Governmental Commissions. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in 1835 during a trip to England: "There is a great deal of centralisation in England; but of what sort? Legislative and not administrative; governmental rather than administrative” (Tocqueville 1958: 109). Tocqueville, who was somewhat skeptic about the ability of the British Government ability to “achieve its object,” was nevertheless very impressed by the governmentalization of the legislative process: the capacity of the British state to centralized, command, filter and deploy information for legislation. Tocqueville’s observations were echoed by John Stuart Mill in 1861 when he noted that, “power may be localized, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralized” (1861: 62).

According to Oliver MacDonagh, between 1825 and 1835 the nature of parliamentary Government was being transformed as responsibility over general measures of social policy transferred from Parliament to Government. “What developed with extraordinary rapidity was a deliberative legislative policy continued from session to session … the lengthening of sessions, the drastic reduction of private members’ time and the constant increase in Government’s all [of these changes] dates from these few years. In a word, legislation became both the business of the ministry, and systematic and continuous” (MacDonagh 1977: 6). It was in this period that the notion of a prime minister - one person who would give direction and cohesion to a ministry - came to be regarded as desirable and constitutionally acceptable. This was also the period when
the cabinet came to be recognized as a useful and constitutionally acceptable body (Jupp 1990: 61). By mid nineteenth century, the British Government became a body with both executive and legislative predominance and increasing authority over public legislation. This “close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers,” was according to Walter Bagehot the “efficient secret of English Constitution” (1867: 48).

The governmentalization of legislation involved an institutional struggle between Government and Parliament for the control of policymaking and legislative agenda. The growing jurisdictional rivalry between the executive and the legislator over the Government of Britain during the mid nineteenth century fed into a general epistemic shift concerning the role of Government, which brought with it significant questioning of methods of inquiry.

To explain this transformation, scholars emphasized the growth in volume and complexity of parliamentary business, especially during the Napoleonic Wars and after the 1832 Reform Act (which increase the electorate by some 80%). But, as Gary Cox and others have suggested, this explanation fails to address the major transformation in parliamentary practices which followed the growing openness of Parliament to newspaper reportage and the effect that this expansion in public communication had on the demand by an increasing number of MPs for more legislative time (time on the floor of the House of Commons) (Cox 1987; Cox and Ingram 1992).^1 Evidently, the opening of the Parliament to public media and the corresponding expansion of the press, which had increased seven-fold in the first half of the nineteenth century, sharply increased the number of active MPs prompting them to publicize causes and demonstrate

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^1 According to Gash (1979) The 1832 Reform Act did not lead to any significant change in parliamentary work. Gash claim that the transformation of Parliament was a was a piecemeal and gradual process that started at the end the eighteenth century and took more than sixty years to be completed. Cox and Ingram (1992) provides empirical support Gash’s emphasis on the continuities between the pre-1832 and the post-1832 periods. To be sure, the 1832 Reform Act did push MPs to be more active, for electoral reasons, but these activities had been a continuation of a trend which started with the promotion of public communication: more speaking in debate, more presenting of petitions, more asking of questions, more moving of amendments on going into Committee of Supply, more moving of amendments to the Orders of the Day, more raising of adjournment debates. There was no increase in the number of bills introduced because these other, more flexible, methods of seizing attention were available.
Whereas in the eighteenth century only a few prominent speakers occupied the floor of the house, in 1820s more than third of the House of Commons were active enough to merit inclusion in the Hansard’s index, and by 1833 60% of all MPs were included. The volume of papers presented to the Commons for information also rose sharply from about 140 per year in the 1770s to about 380 per year in the 1820 (Cox 1987: 53; Jupp 1990: 68).

As more MPs were eager to debate more and to initiate more private legislation so as to get noticed by the press, the frequency of debates increased, and there were more interventions and longer speeches. As Sir Robert Peel put it, “there was a great appetite for legislation, and a strong desire among hon. Members to be distinguished as the introducers of new laws” (quoted in Cox and Ingram 1992: 544). In 1833 CW Wynn complained in the House of Commons that the length of debates was increasing and attributed this to the reporting of parliamentary debates. “In consequence of the publication of the debates,” argued Wynn, “Members were anxious that their constituents should see that they took part in the discussion; and the consequence was, that hon. Gentleman delivered arguments that had been urged by former speakers, not regarding what had been previously stated, provided that they had the opportunity of delivering their sentiments” (Hansard 1833, XV: col. 1013).

Ironically, the rights of private members began to fall away exactly when their appetite for private legislation grew. Because more and more MPs became active in parliamentary affairs, exercising their rights to express the grievances and opinions of their constituencies, and because they had the unrestrained power to seize the attention of the House at virtually any time, the cumulative effect was disastrous to the ability of the House to conduct its business. Sessions took more and more time lasting well into the night, in order to finish the public business, but

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2 This was be done in a variety of ways: “by presenting a petition (until 1839), by moving an amendment to the motion that a particular Order of the Day be taken up (until 1837), by moving an amendment to the motion that the Orders of the Day be read (until 1848), by raising a debate on Friday adjournment (until 1861), by moving an amendment on going into Committee of Supply, and so forth” (Cox and Ingram 1992: 545).
there were so many hours the House could sit in a year and the situation was becoming chaotic. “In order to extricate themselves from this dilemma,” Cox argues, “the House of Commons repeatedly took the most obvious way out and abolished the rights that were being abused” (1987: 57). As the rights of individual members (backbenchers) declined, control of the legislative agenda passed increasingly into the hands of the Government. This did not mean, however, that the members of the house had ceased to affect legislation. What was changing in the 1830s and 1840s was the power of independent initiative. The rules and conventions of procedure were changing and there started to develop a process of segregation between official business of Government and unofficial business of private MPs.

The legislative initiative of individual members, and in particular the vast increase in petitioning, was typically diverted into a formal period devoted to the questioning of ministers (Cox 1987: 59-61). By 1835 questions had become frequent enough that a special “Question Time” was designated in the House schedule and members were asked to giving formal notice of the questions to be asked, by printing them on the notice paper. The institutionalization of questioning largely replaced eloquence and debate on the floor. “If MPs could no longer secure the time necessary to impress their constituency by making speeches on the floor, they could show themselves vigilant in the defense of local interests by asking pointed questions.” The growing use of questions by MPs was an implicit recognition of the centralization of legislative authority in the Cabinet, and indeed it accelerated this process by pressuring ministers to legislate on matters that they might otherwise not have pursued (Cox 1987: 63).

If we follow the line of argument so far – from the transformative effect of public reportage on the organizational culture of Parliament to its subsequent governmentalization – it is clear that, in contrast to those who describe the governmentalization of legislation Parliament as a “revolution in Government” (usually attributed to the 1832 Reform Act), this process was anything but a well designed and coordinated effort by Government to expend. Rather, the
British Government expanded its activities as an often unplanned, piecemeal and spasmodic response to the challenges introduced by an ever-expanding publicity through the printed media. In general, it was a cumbersome process which took a considerable amount of time not least because MPs were reluctant to give up traditional parliamentary practices that had enabled them to limit the power of the executive in earlier ages.

It took, for example, several decades of increasing pressure on parliamentary time, for the Cabinet to tighten its grip on parliamentary timetable, to allow more time for Government and less to the private member and to give Government priority over bills introduced by individual members of Parliament. Government business was first given priority by an order 1811 (Cox 1987: 47). Ministers also had “more resources at their disposal-specialized legislative draftsmen, research staff, etc.” With the increase in Press coverage of Parliament, this initial advantage of ministers over ordinary members tended to grow. Because pushing bills through the old procedure, and thus competing with many others for a small amount of time, became increasing ineffective, MPs preferred to pressure the existing ministers to take up their bills. This pressure to legislate, “gave the ministers an incentive to develop their institutional advantages further, which thus made Government support even more vital to secure for the next piece of legislation.” Thus, in 1837 the Cabinet acquired priority by standing order on two days a week (Mondays and Fridays). This was extended to three days in 1852. In addition, individual members of Parliament were often restricted in their capacity to amend Government bills. Slowly but surely the cabinet, which was generally responsive to these pressures and effective in meeting legislative demands, “became the focal point of all legislative pressures” (Cox and Ingram 1992: 555). Of the 6,898 acts passed by Parliament between 1833 and 1855, only 735 were private bills (Roberts 2002: 396). By mid nineteenth century, Government became an organ of legislation and took control of the business of the House of Commons; the cabinet introduced almost all the laws that were approved in Parliament and the Bills of Government
departments made on average 80 percent of the acts (Drewry 1988).

In the 1830s governmental takeover had reached a new stage, as controversies over the mechanism of printing pitted the executive departments (Treasury, Stationary Office) against the House of Commons. The executive branch was now increasingly its control over the production and dissemination of parliamentary papers at the expense of Parliament. In 1831, for example, the Treasury decided that paper used by the parliamentary printers should be supplied by the Stationary Office. Moreover, Government was now increasingly taking printing and publishing prerogatives from Parliament and transferring them to outside publisher through ad hoc contracts. From 1791 until 1835 Luke Hansard, the House printer, assisted by the Speaker's Office, was responsible for everything except the Votes. After that many of the Command papers, including the reports of the Governmental Commissions (perhaps the most profitable of parliamentary printing), were printed by special contracts under the immediate supervision of the Stationary Office (Alford 1964).

During the 1830s almost every department of state was making a conscious effort to present to the public authoritative facts and figures about its work and parliamentary reformers under the Whig Government were busy transferring the responsibility over production and dissemination of parliamentary information from Parliament to Government. Two new organizations in particular which heralded the formation of the first secular civil administration in Britain, signaled the desire of the executive to create of a centralized archive for the collection of national information by assuming responsibility for the production of comprehensive statistical knowledge: the Statistical Office of the Board of Trade (1832) and the General Register Office (1837). The Statistical Office dealt mainly with economic statistics (mostly commercial trade) whereas the General Register Office, which replaced the Commission of Records, was in charge of social statistics (births, deaths, marriages). The Public Record Act of 1838 made the General Register office into a highly centralized body where local documents
pertaining to the individual records of each citizen were stored, arranged them methodically, protected and, most importantly, rendered easily available for public use with as low a fee as possible, as a service provided by the state. A series of administrative amendments, during the 1840s, widened the scope of the public record legislation to cover all categories of paperwork generated by Government departments. As a result, the term “public record” ceased to relate exclusively to material which was about and belonged to the population at large (individual records or censal material), and instead came to describe documents created and owned by the state. Thus, rather than transferring authority a way from the state, the General Register Office served de facto to enhance governmental centralized control of information, which in turn helped Government to control and centralized legislation away from the Parliament (Vincent 1998: chap. 2).

Government control over statistical information indirectly curbed Individual MPs' initiatives for special returns, thus limiting their opportunities to utilize or exploit such a request to promote various causes. In 1835 reformers were able to formalize the public dissemination of all parliamentary documents in legislation by ordering the sale of the entire printed output of the House of Commons to the public, at the lowest price possible. The main goal of the legislation was to seize the allocation of documents from the hands of individual MPs. By relying on market mechanism, reformers wanted to make sure that information will circulate without the mediation of individual MPs, who under the new legislation also had to purchase the documents they were interested in.

Paradoxically, therefore, it was exactly at the moment “when Parliament began to legislate prolifically [that], it also gave up its attempt to govern [the country]” (e.g., enclosures, maintenance of roads and bridges, appointment of constables, regulating working conditions, etc.). Parliament began to lay down general rules (regulations) about these matters and to entrust their execution to Government officials (secretaries of state, head of departments, boards of
commissioners), who for this purpose were endowed with statutory powers. “Power was passed to the executive, thence to administrators, thence to men of specialized knowledge – all ‘statesmen in disguise’” (Macleod 1988: 2-3; cf. Kitson-Clark 1959, Kingdon 1969). As a result, the British Government gained increasing authority over public legislation.

It is in this context that we need to understand the emergence of investigations by royal commissions. These investigations were developed as an extra-parliamentary practice of field exploration, both institutionally and methodologically, in order to transfer legislative initiative from Parliament to Government and to remove a large segment of policymaking, which now was conducted as exploration “in the field,” far from public scrutiny and the watchful eyes of the media. In contrast to the parliamentary inquiry, which was guided by the oral culture of Common Law adjudication – based on verbal evidence testimonial hearing *viva voce* which were open to the public – the governmental investigation was based on empirical explorations and a visual economy of observations of social facts “in the field,” mediated by the individual authentic, “on the spot,” experiences of the investigators with social problems in their localities. This experience was then translated into an official authoritative reports, printed and publicized widely, with the help of the Press, so as to influence opinion inside and outside Parliament and elicit support for Government’s proposed policy.

This political maneuver, despite allusions to scientific impartiality, was quite transparent at the time. In fact, some royal commissions – such as the Poor Law Commissions (1832-4) the Factory Commission (1833) and the Handloom Weavers Commission (1837-41) – were instituted to modify the conclusions which were charted earlier by select committees. They were constructed as foot soldiers in a political battle between Government reformist and Parliament traditionalist.
7.2 Government by Commissions: The Rise of the Governmental Investigation

Although royal commissions were used under the Tudors and the Stuarts, the rise of royal commissions in the nineteenth century was not a revival of an old tradition; it rather signified the genesis of a novel and modern machinery of governmental investigations controlled by the cabinet. To emphasize this separation in method and operation and underscore the growing power of Government, I will use the term *Governmental Commissions* to refer to the royal commissions of the nineteenth century. The ascendancy of Governmental Commissions in the nineteenth century, as the dominant investigatory practice of the British political system and as a major force of social investigation, was an integral part of the governmentalization of Parliament, and was facilitated by the growing dissatisfaction with the working of parliamentary select committees.3

Governmental Commissions were used by the British cabinet to take control of legislative initiative while weakening parliamentary initiative and institutions. By taking over investigative authority over social problems from Parliamentary select committees and replacing them with an executive policymaking machinery, governmental investigations served as an alternative, extra-parliamentary model of investigation, in both an institutional and a methodological sense, to the semi-judicial and adversarial practice of parliamentary inquiries. Whereas the defenders of

3 The Royal Commissions at the times of the Tudors and the Stuarts were very different from the Governmental Commissions of the nineteenth century in almost every aspect: methods, practices, goals and constitutional status. In the sixteen century they were used mostly “to standardize the nature and the degree of religious reformism in England,” so as to establish the royal supremacy of the King over the Anglican Church (Clokie and Robinson 1969: 40). Moreover, in contrast to the innovative practices of exploration developed by the governmenta investigations of the nineteenth century, the production of truth and knowledge in the royal investigations in of the sixteenth century appeared in the commonplace form of oral interrogations. Oral evidence was the most significant aspect of a commission’s investigative procedure (Landwehr 2003: 223). The 1688 Revolution, which shifted the center of gravity from the Crown to Parliament, removed the foundations upon which the royal commissions of the period were based. The King was forbidden from creating new paid offices outside of Parliament and all commissions, whether for administration or for inquiry, were declared illegal if they were not supported by parliamentary appropriation. (Clokie and Robinson 1969: 46-7). Moreover, by the end of the sixteenth century select committees were firmly established as an alternative machinery of inquiry controlled by Parliament (Ibid: 51). Thus, the seventeenth saw a continuous decline in the use if royal commissions because of their extra-legal status and procedures and they became almost forgotten during most of the eighteenth century (Cartwright 1975: 34).
Parliamentary inquiries were concerned that Parliament will lose its status as a debating society, governmental investigators were concerned that Parliament will be conceived only as such. They criticized the parliamentary culture for nurturing endless debates, arguing against the inefficiency of arranging political representation and policy making around and oral mode of communication.

One of the most important implications of the governmentalization of the British Parliament was the failure of the British legislator to develop a system of standing committees along American or French lines that will protect the legislative rights of individual members. Because of the Cabinet's effectiveness in meeting legislative demands, "schemes for the introduction of powerful standing committees - or any other institutional rival to the cabinet - met with little success" (Cox and Ingram 1992: 556). What was developing instead was a clear separation between public bills that were now seen as the official business of Government, and private bills that were seen as the unofficial business of private MPs.

As a result, the machinery of drafting private Bills was quite distinctive from that employed for public Bills. Private Bills were increasingly channeled through and carried on in mechanisms of ad hoc parliamentary inquiries in select committees where they were “dealt with by way of a distinctive judicial type procedure.” Although select committees were considered parliamentary committees, they were not independent from the cabinet. Ministers and other members of the Government administration were highly suspicious of the encroachment of select committees on the authority of Government. From the 1780s the British governments made a determined effort to exert their influence over the committees and prevent them developing into public tribunals by the opposition and individual MPs. In addition, ministers struggled to limit the committees terms of reference to “matters of fact and not policy” (Jupp 1990: 70-71).

As the Government attained greater control of the time and procedure of the House, it sought to exert its authority over the conduct of select committees in effort to control any suggested alteration in the legislative procedure of the House, to remove contentious issues
from the political agenda, and to incline parliamentary committees towards a narrow conception of their role. Their efforts were successful and by the middle decades of the nineteenth century the committees were very much under the influence of ministers, mostly as a result of changes in the method of selecting members. MPs now had to submit lists of their favored candidates from which the executive made the final lists, a method which played into the hands of ministers. Membership in select committees now reflected more and more the cast of the executive. For example, the most prominent members of all ten of the major select committees on procedures appointed during the nineteenth century were men who had sat or were sitting in Cabinet. These men were unlikely to recommend any measures that might abate the power of the cabinet (Drewry 1988: 33). Moreover, many recommendations of selects committees which did not to resonate with the opinion of Government were simply blocked through the simple expedient of appointing Lords committees who did not make any systematic inquiry into the matter and whose sole purpose was to vindicate ministerial inaction (Eastwood 1989). These governmental tactics strongly diminished the public impact of parliamentary inquiries and their ability to make novel or definite contribution to policy debates. Hence, although parliamentary inquiries were instrumental in bringing a good deal of material to a wider public, they were much less effective in their ability to make novel or definite contribution to policy debates.

Along with exerting more control over parliamentary inquiries, the cabinet developed a system of \textit{ad hoc} Governmental Commissions to promote Government’s own policy initiatives. Membership in a Governmental Commission was in most cases a temporary position, but could become permanent if the commissioners recommendations were accepted and legislated, the

\footnote{A famous clash between Government and parliamentary inquiry was in 1855 when prime minister George Hamilton (Lord Aberdeen) and three members of the Cabinet resigned from office in protest of the passage of a motion for the appointment of a select committee to enquire “into the conduct of to the Carimean war “by those departments of Government whose duty it has been to administer to the wants of that army.” Gladstone, one of the resigned ministers explained: “An inquiry such as is proposed is incompatible with real confidence on the part of Parliament in those who hold executive office, and entirely incompatible with the credit and authority which ought, under all circumstances, to belong to the Ministers of the Crown, whatever party or political creed they may profess ” (quoted in Stamps 1952: 605).}
Government sometimes decided to institutionalize the commission as an administrative Board: a semi-governmental body with high degree of autonomy established to administer and supervise the implementation of the new policy, as recommended by the original governmental investigation. These Boards employed numerous inspectors (usually referred to as “assistant commissioners” in ad hoc governmental investigations), and produced various governmental reports; in fact, they often acted as editorial boards, similar to the editorial boards in Review journals and other journals and other literary and academic periodicals of high journalism, digesting revising and preparing for publication the information gathered by the inspectors and reported back to the Board.

Although the temporary nature of governmental investigations added to the constitutional significance of these institutions for ministerial power, historians have generally been more interested in those inquiries which became permanent. The latter are associated with the notion of “administrative revolution” or the “growth in Government” paradigm. The ad hoc character of governmental investigation, however, must not be seen as less significant: the pragmatic flexible capacity for repeated use of commissions on an unlimited range of subjects made it a powerful investigative tool and. The innovative function of the Governmental Commission was thus not less technological then institutional. It allowed Government to experiment with different forms of social explorations and different methods of governance.

The commissioners’ authority was based on three main aspects. Firstly, commissioners were authorized, by the Government, to conduct investigations on behalf of the Government. Secondly, they were sent to the field to investigate the problem “on spot,” where they could gain experience and claim expertise. Thirdly, commissioners were empowered to speak and write authoritatively on particular subjects by virtue of their recently acquired expertise, which

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5 The most famous Board in the first half of the nineteenth century was the Poor Law Commission Board established to administer the implementation of the New Poor Law from 1834 to 1847.
they often utilized for a wide public dissemination of their reports. As a result, the status of the commissions’ credibility as a laboratory of social knowledge was at once epistemological and ethical. Governmental investigation provided an epistemological credibility to the emergent community of social scientists because they were a site of particular kinds of expert knowledge predicated on exploration and discovery of empirical facts, through close empirical observations and unmediated, authentic experience. Moreover, Governmental Commissions, which were often populated by renowned and accomplished statesmen and other influential figures, were a source of ethical credibility because the knowledge they generated, was a sign of status, of official authority, of a certain right to speak (Osborne 1999).

The British Government devoted a considerable amount of financial resources to that end, which grow as the century proceeded. The average annual cost of maintaining Governmental Commissions between 1807 and 1816 was £34,580, between 1817 and 1826 it rose to £61,190 and between 1820 and 1842 some 53 commissions reported at an annual cost of £88,000. The work of the Poor Law commissioners between 1832 and 1834 alone cost £6,566. Select committees, by contrast, were usually underfinanced and lacked the resources to mount the kind of major investigation which might command general support as an authoritative basis for policy prescription (Eastwood 1989: 286). Whereas the total expense of all select committees appointed in the 1820s came to less than £50,000, the various Governmental Commissions appointed by the Whigs in 1833-1834 alone cost over £23,000 (Harling 1996: 209).

The Whigs’ expensive and seemingly endless inquiries into social questions were seen as a mere jobbery, providing employment for Whig barristers and other political reformers. “The system is daily extending,” cautioned the conservative lawyer, Joshua Toumlin Smith, “and will daily extend till the public voice, or the absolute impossibility of raising the millions of taxation annually wasted in reckless extravagance and jobbing, … compels the entire and uncompromising abandonment of the whole” (1849: 253). Political reformers could not deny
that governmental investigations are great source of Government jobs. Sydney Smith, the former editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, observed in admiration that “the only doubt of seeing a new man among the Whigs,” “is not whether he is a commissioner or not, but whether it is tithe, poor-laws, boundaries of boroughs, church leases, charities, or any of the thousand concerns, which are now worked by commissioners” (quoted in Clokie and Robinson 1937: 93).

Government officials defended the use of Governmental Commissions as a public-minded alternative to the “Tory corruption” in the localities. Edwin Chadwick, one of the “founding fathers” of governmental investigations, explained in connection to the Poor Law investigation: “as most prefer one great tyrant, to a multitude of petty tyrants, so from all I can learn they would prefer on central job-ocracy to the multitude of petty job-oocracies with which they are at present afflicted” (quoted in Harling 1996: 208-9).

Nonetheless, the cost of Governmental Commissions did not increase in proportion to their greater frequency in the 1830s and 1840s. While their numbers increased, fewer commissions were given salaries. Of the fifteen commissions appointed between 1830 and 1841, only four employed salaried commissioners. The other commissioners had to rest content with travel expenses and other modes allowance (Harling 1996). Thus, while the increase in utilization of governmental investigations as a tool for legislation and administration substantially broadened the locus of central responsibilities, this “revolution in Government” did not create a French- or a Prussian-style bureaucratic state, nor did it greatly increase the amount of patronage available to the central Government. Political reformers were very sensitive to public sentiments against “centralization” As the Whig Prime minister and enthusiastic reformer Lord John Russell, told Edwin Chadwick: “We are endeavoring to improve our institutions. We are busy in introducing system, method, science, economy, regularity, and discipline. But we must beware not to lose the cooperation of the country – they will not bear a Prussian minister to regulate their domestic affairs” (quoted in Harling 1996: 210). The central mode of activity was
not centralization but publication. It did not involve so much jobbery and Government central
bureaucracy as the circulation of reports and the diffusion of social knowledge.

It was mainly through a massive effort of producing and disseminating official reports
about social problems that governmental investigations had played a major role in the expansion
of Government both inside and outside Parliament. The House of Commons and its printing
committees had no immediate jurisdiction over the publication of governmental reports in
matters of content, quality of production or number of copies (Frankel 2006: 65). From intra-
parliamentary perspective, the emergence of governmental investigations was part of an
ongoing struggle between Government and Parliament over legislation, as it enabled
Government to centralize legislation by shifting legislative initiative from individual MPs
(backbenchers) to Government. Externally, as I will show in the next chapters, governmental
investigations were a major tool in promoting public communication and shaping public
opinion. Unlike parliamentary committees of inquiries, many Governmental Commissions were
inclined towards an expending conception of their role and were instrumental in bringing a good
deal of material to a wider public, making novel contribution to not only to the process of
policymaking and legislative debates but also to the general public discourse about social issues
and to the methods by which these issues should be scrutinized and dealt with.

7.2.1 The Inception of Governmental Investigations

The first governmental investigation to be established in the eighteen century was the
Public Account Commission which worked from 1780 to 1837. Although this was not a social
investigation, it was the first investigation to treat the economy as a separate system (Torrance
1978). With its establishment Government started generating a good deal of new information
about its own functions and administrative methods which, in turn, gave further impetus to the
movement for economical reform and the rationalization of allegedly corrupt and ineffective methods of administration (Eastwood 1989). More importantly, the Public account investigation introduced one important novelty regarding its composition; it was decided that the investigative commissioners would all be financial experts instead of politicians. The commissioners themselves were well aware of their vanguard condition: “A Commission of Accounts … is not an ordinary institution; and we have been obliged to connect ourselves with the suggestion of our own understanding, unassisted either by the lights of our ancestors or the experience of contemporaries” (quoted in Tompson 1979: 52). This public commission administration paved the way for an increasing reliance on expert investigators (and not only on expert witnesses) in investigating a broad range of social problems during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The thirteen governmental investigations between 1780 and 1818 were more experimental in nature. Their establishments seem to be a venerable prerogative exercise of a special commission where regular jurisdiction failed. It was only with the establishment of the 1818 Charities Commission, which was in operation until 1837, that Royal Commissions went through a considerable change in methods and procedures and became linked to a new movement of governmental social investigations (Tompson 1979). The growth in the number and effectiveness of Governmental Commission as the institutional machinery responsible for the execution of governmental investigation owed more than a little to the Charities Commission. In fact, one finds a significant overlap in the personal acting as assistant commissioners for the charity commission and those enlisted again in the 1830s by commissions investigating factories, the Poor Law system, municipal corporations, rural police and civil administration.

In 1818 Lord Brougham, the chief architect of the Charities Commission, had argued that “it is absolutely necessary, that able and active men of business, chiefly lawyers, should be engaged to devote their whole time to the inquiry.” Castlereagh, the Leader of the House, countered Brougham proposal that the investigations will be conducted primarily by lawyers.
“If the commission were formed of persons not known to the public,” Brougham argued, “it could not be expected that their investigation could be successful, or their report satisfactory.” For Castlereagh the success of the investigations depends not so much on the investigators’ skills but on their public reputation and credibility. “A certain proportion of the commission ought … to be persons of great station, who although they should not go into the labourious part of the investigation, could yet be aiding and assisting by their counsel and authority.” He therefore recommended that Governmental Commissions be composed “partly [of] parsons of rank and station … and partly persons who could give the ministerial labours required” (quoted in Eastwood 1989: 287). The Charities Commission, with its combination of barristers-MPs and the token presence of bishops and elder statesmen among its commissioners, set the model for the composition of governmental investigations and the rational of the division of labor between skill and reputation which guided their operation. This division of labor between dignified and efficient parts of governmental investigations exemplified a compromise between the interest of the landed elite and that of parliamentary reformers.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, 152 governmental investigations submitted their reports, an average of three commissions a year. Of them, 60 commissions were established before the Reform Act of 1832. Public interest in the work of Governmental Commissions grew steadily with the increased attention that their activity and reports got in the Press. There was a corresponding decline in the number of select committees appointed between 1801 and 1834 compared to the last two decades of the eighteenth century, from twenty-one to eighteen appointed committees per year (Clokie and Robinson 1969; Collinge 1984). By 1860 the London Times declared “England is the country, and this is pre-eminently the age, of social inquiries. Probably more men devote themselves without desire of reward to questions connected with the physical and moral improvement of their fellows than are induced by the riches prizes to study other department of knowledge” (quoted in Goldman, 1993: 95).
7.3 From Adjudication to Legislation: Legal Practitioners in Governmental Investigations

The nineteenth century House of Commons became a notable repository of legal talent. By 1800 lawyers came to outnumber and intellectually to outweigh the clergy. According to Martin Weiner in the first half of the nineteenth century there was “an explosion in the number of barristers and attorneys” (Weiner 1990: 50). Law became the second most popular career for Oxbridge graduates, with about 10 percent choosing a legal career, even though only about 2.5

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6 sources: Collinge (1984); Harrison (1995); Clokie and Robinson (1937).
percent had come from families of lawyers (Heyck 1982: 71). Christopher Allen counts 379 practicing barristers in 1775 and 1,835 in 1840 (1997: 149).

Beyond the courtroom stage, many barristers had been elected to Parliament. For many barristers-MPs, serving in the House of Commons promised further advancement in their legal career (Meisel 2001: 210). Their relatively high earnings at the bar, and their connections with members of the landed classes, (at university or at the Inns of Court), made it easier for barristers to become MPs, compared to other professions. Between 1790 and 1820 there were 112 members of the legal profession in Parliament, composing the second largest groups of professional (after military officers) (Harris 2000: 253). In the 1830s the legal profession was already the largest in Parliament proportion and its proportion grow to 20 percent in the 1880s (Meisel 2001: 208). In terms of social background, the majority of lawyer-MPs in the nineteenth century appear to have come from the lower strata of the landed classes and from the professional and commercial classes. Relatively few were sons of peers (Edwards 1964).

Most importantly, in the half of the nineteenth century lawyers became a shaping force in the field of social thought (Kelley 1990). Until late in the eighteenth century, the tasks performed by lawyers in the Inns of Courts or in Parliament were largely related to the land and the needs of landowners and were based mostly on familiarity and less on technical training (Abel-Smith and Stevens 1967: 66ff.). The growing number of barristers who were attracted to projects of governmental investigations and social reform was therefore a significant occupational trend.

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7 The most important position for barristers in the House of Commons, as well as the best stepping-stones for further advancement in the law, were the senior law offices in Government where legal expertise was a precondition for appointment: the Attorney General and his deputy, the Solicitor General. The offices of Attorney and Solicitor General included legal and political responsibilities such as serving as leading counsel for Crown prosecution or providing legal advice to the Government and its ministries (Edwards 1964). The men who filled either or both of the positions of the Attorney and Solicitor General, typically proceeded to the judicial bench, or attained the highest (and most lucrative) legal-political office, the Lord Chancellorship. The Lord Chancellor was effectively the Speaker of the House of Lords, which, theoretically, was also the highest court of appeal for most of the nineteenth century. The offices of Attorney and Solicitor General, in addition to a number of more minor offices, were important and lucrative governmental positions open exclusively to members of the legal profession.
As discussed in Part I, the barristeral, legal-forensic discourse, which was viewed with considerable skepticism in the House of Commons – as overtly legalistic and dull – reflected the disenchantment of politics and the new position that legal experts took within an increasing rationalized administration and governmentalized political system. The centralization of legislation in Government, which took place during the Victorian period, was linked to the increasing a-political status of law officers and barristers-MPs, and played an important role in the professionalization of parliamentary practices and business. The strong impact that Henry Brougham had on jurisprudence in the first half of the nineteenth century, and the affinity between law and administrative reform indicated that law was gradually becoming a chief vehicle of social engineering (Berman 1978: 114). Brougham who was the architect of many Governmental Commissions advocated strongly the participation of lawyers, preferably legal officers in Government or barristers-MPs, in governmental investigations (Eastwood 1989).

The Journalist and reformer Rev. Sydney Smith characterized the intimate connection between barristers and governmental investigations as “the great principle” of Government and “the real secret of life.” Smith complained that barristers became the Government's “favourite human animal,” while observing that “the whole earth is, in fact, in commission, and the human race, saved from the flood, are delivered over to the barristers” (cited in Clokie and Robinson 1969: 93). While Smith had probably overstated his case, there is no denying that nineteenth century barristers were becoming deeply involved in the social legislation generated by the systems of Select Committees and Governmental Commissions; and in the case of the latter barristers were usually appointed to serve on Governmental Commissions because commissioners often had to function as magistrates (or as Justice of Peace) if the ad hoc commission was to transform into a permanent administrative commission after finishing its preliminary investigation. For example, the 1829 Metropolitan Police Commission, which operated for three decades, while gradually extending its powers to a growing apparatus of
inspectors that the commissioners will be practicing barristers and that the inspectors will have knowledge of the law since they were to be magistrates or JPs. In addition to their legal skills inspectors were expected to have investigative skills similar to those of the prison inspectors (established in 1823): the ability to observe, report, and deal tactfully with the local officials in order that a comprehensive report might annually be submitted to Parliament.

Moreover, The realization of governmental objectives has always required a delicate blending of political and legal skills: Government departments simply could not function without ready access to legal expertise. Lawyers acted as secretaries to more than half of the commissions appointed between 1815 and 1870. Many barristers also served as assistant commissioners (inspectors). In the 1830s the majority of inspectors were barristers (Eastwood 1989: 287). According to Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, governmental investigations represent “a system of intellectual collusion, whereby selected, frequently judicial, intelligentsia transmits forms of knowledge into political practices.” Importantly, the effect of this process is the constant “replenishing” of official discourse “with both established and novel modes of knowing and forms of reasoning” (Burton and Carlen 1979: 7). Because governmental investigation departed form the constrains of the common law traditions and the restrictive procedures of legal-adjudicative method of inquiry, their ad hoc structure enabled the commissions to introduce an ongoing process of innovative methods of investigations and new evidential technologies that were configured as legal, political and scientific hybrids.

According to Donald Kelley, once the spirit of the law began to be identified with the spirit of legislation, the science of legislation signaled a transition from traditional jurisprudence to self-conscious science of society. This transition led to the “defections from the old legal tradition to other fields, beginning especially in political economy but including ethnographical investigation as well.” Lawyers thus “played a major role in the emergence of ‘scientific’
ethnology” (1990: 265-6). Examining the connection between British Jurisprudence and the rise of political economy Kelly (1990: 267) writes,

The tendency to turn from the habits and values of the old legal tradition to the inclusive and apparently ‘realistic’ view of political economy became an increasingly common pattern among intellectuals (especially intellectuals who were denied access to power and legislative action) who were dreaming of a modern social science in which they could in other ways legislate and determine ‘laws’ for humanity, as Smith so instructively done … thus the young Marx … dropped out of law school and, with the encouragement of Engels, prepared himself in Anglo-Scottish political economy on the way to his own conceptual … system of social science … thus the young Max Weber embarked on ‘a change in discipline’, from law to political economy, which (or rather, the two in combination) led him to his post-Marxist system of ‘sociology’

An examination of Nassau Senior’s Career path from Legal practice to holding the first professorship in of political economy in Britain, further clarifies the trend observed by Kelley. Nassau Senior, a chancery barrister who headed the famous 1834 Poor-Law Commission became the first professor of political economy at Oxford University in 1825. Senior, who specialized in property law, was called to the Bar in 1819 but decided to end his practice at the Chancery Bar after less than a year and to become a conveyancer. 8 “As I need not go to chambers in the evening,” he explained in one of his letters, “I shall have leisure to acquire other knowledge than that of mere law” (cited in Levy 1970: 47). In 1821 Senior joined the staff of reviewers for the literary and economic journal Quarterly Review. From July 1821 to July 1827 he published three literary pieces relating to Walter Scott’s novels. The other two articles were Senior’s first published political economy papers. One article dealt with the issue of copyrights and called attention to defects in the law regarding literary property. But it was the second article which got the attention of political economists. The article, which was the first that Senior published in the Quarterly Review, was written as a response to the report of a select committee appointed to consider petitions relating to agricultural distress. In it, Senior used his

8 A conveyancer is a solicitor who deals with the legal aspect of buying and selling of immovable property.
knowledge of property law and his practical experience as a conveyancer to discuss prices, rent, profit, wages, taxes and commerce, while making special reference to the Corn Laws.

The article led James Mill to recommend Senior in 1823 as a member of the recently established *Political Economy Club*. In the following year, Senior was also elected as a member of the *London Athenaeum* (a famous club for literary men, scientists and artists), upon the recommendation of the secretary of the admiralty, Wilson Croker, who founded the Club and was a leading writer in the *Quarterly Review*. In view of his membership in the two clubs and his Corn Law publication, Senior was soon considered for the Drummond Chair of Political Economy at Oxford. As the statutory requirements for Oxford degrees and residency disqualified most of the recognized economists at that time, such as Malthus, James Mill, McCulloch and Tooke (the chair of the Factory Commission), senior’s election in 1825 was secured and took place without a contest.9

### 7.3.1 Profiles of Governmental Investigators

Governmental investigations were a legislative tool under ministerial control, as ministers appointed their members.10 It was mainly for this reason that the cabinet relied increasingly on their reports. As the cabinet in the first of the nineteenth century did not reflect party hierarchy, decisions were frequently made by individual ministers working in collaboration with specialists

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9 In the 1820s most political economists were implicated in one way or another with the British East India Company (EIC), whose employees were required to have some legal skills. Between 1790 and 1820, 32 MPs were directors of the EIC (Harris 2000: 253). In 1825 John Ramsey McCulloch was the Chief Examiner of the company and James Mill was the First Assistant Examiner (replacing McCulloch as chief Examiner in 1828). Malthus, was the chair of history and political economy at the East India College in Haileybury, training administrators for the East India Company’s operations (a position which he held from 1805 until 1834). The efforts of the company in administering India emerged as a model for the civil service system in nineteenth century Britain. Croker, Malthus, James Mill, McCulloch and Tooke were the founders of the Political Economy Club.

10 Until 1854 the Home Secretary was the sole secretary of state responsible for the appointment of royal commissions inquiring into English and Welsh subjects (Collinge 1984).
or bodies of specialists from outside the cabinet and often from outside the normal political reserves on which the ministry as a whole depended for its parliamentary majorities.

Because the British civil service in the first half of the nineteenth century was small, and because nothing in their experience prepared it for this type of operation, commissioners often had to be sought from outside the officialdom. Thus, for example, academic scholars served as secretaries to most of the commissions dealing with educational issues. Engineers were used occasionally when technical subjects were being investigated (MacLeod 1988). However, as was discussed above, the most frequently used professional group were lawyers, usually barristers rather than attorneys, because by the nineteenth century they were the professional group most closely associated with the Government, and with political society; many were MPs themselves (Drewry 1988). According to Eastwood (1989: 287), the appointment of lawyers, as well as other experts to governmental social investigations, represented “an important shift away from an older class of gentlemen administrators and amateur investigators towards a more self consciously bureaucratic and bourgeois class of administrator” (see also, Perkin 1969: 308-9).

One implication of this reliance on a relative small number of experts was the greater independent status which was given to Governmental Commissioners in pursuing their investigation. The investigators’ sense of independence was more a product of their allegiance to political mentors rather than to a bureaucratic ethos of civil service (see, e.g., Chadwick, 1846). A famous incident which illustrates this independence was the case of the Factory inspector James Stuart who was so infuriated by the recommendations of the three senior commissioners in the Central Board (especially the proposal of limit child labor to eight hours) that he publicly accused them of ignoring the results of the investigation in Scotland and even of deliberately

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11 Between 1815 and 1870, eight commissions employed outside experts in education: British Museum (1847-50); Oxford University (1850-2); Cambridge University (1850-2); National Gallery Site (1856-7); Popular Education (1858-61); Public School (1861-4); Royal Academy (1863); Schools (1864-7). At the same period, five commissions employed outside experts in engineering: Metropolitan Water Supply (1827-8); Health Of The Metropolis (1847-1850); Railway Charges (1865-7); Pollution Of Rivers (1868-74); Water Supply (1866-9) (Collinge 1984).
omitting evidence that did not concur with their prefabricated conclusions. He then published his accusations and hostile exchange with the Board in the press, and despite the ensuing public embarrassment continued in his position of factory inspector for many years to come (see Wing 1837: 476-494).

Another implication of having a small number of experts was the large overlap in the personals of governmental investigations. Some officials, who became experts in field research, were appointed to different investigations based on their new expertise. It was therefore not unusual for barrister-MPs and other legal or medical practitioners to serve as investigators on several commissions throughout their careers. Many of those who made governmental investigations into a career published their own pamphlets, articles and books about social issues based on their experience as governmental investigators, thus establishing their reputation as social experts.

Thus, although most commissioners were usually not paid for their job, for many, incentive was still high as service on a commission of inquiry frequently brought its investigators to the notice of the public and of the Government, thus increasing opportunities for promotion. Lord Henry Brougham, the Lord Chancellor (1830-4), who founded numerous organizations, such as the Edinbourough Review (1802), the Society for the diffusion of Useful Knwoldge (1827), the Law Amendment Society (1847) and the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1857), served on three commissions (Charities 1831-4; Ordnance Survey 1857-8, and Chancery Evidence 1859-1960) and was the architect of numerous others. The chancery barrister Nassau Senior, who became the first holder of the Drummond professorship of Political Economy at Oxford in 1825 and one of the founders of the Society for the diffusion of Knowledge and the London Statistical Society, chaired the Poor Law
Commission (1832-4) and the Handloom Weavers Commission (1837-41), and served as advisor and an expert witness on numerous other commissions.  

Another founder of the London Statistical Society, John Elliot Drinkwater, a barrister and a legal counsel to the Home Office, served as a factory inspector (1833) and as a commissioner of Municipal Corporations (1833-5) and bestowed his legal expertise on numerous other commissions and committees. Alfred Power, a barrister who served as a factory inspector in the north east district together with Drinkwater, was also a Poor Law inspector who established the workhouse system in the northern industrial counties, a position he held for close to ten years until he was appointed to Poor Law commissioner in Ireland in 1843; in 1849 Power became the chief commissioner of the Irish Poor Law. Godfrey Stephen Lushington, an MP, a Judge of the Consistory (ecclesiastical) Court of London and a founding member of the Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK), served as a commissioner on no less than twelve commissions between 1820 and 1858, and was later appointed to the Dean of the Arches (President of Doctors Commons). His son, Godfrey Lushington, was appointed Legal Adviser to the Home Office after serving as Secretary to two commissions of inquiry.

Another curious mixture of half politician and half a civil servant was the barrister-MP John George Shaw-Lefevre, the younger brother of the speaker of the House of Commons, Charles Shaw-Lefevre. John George Shaw-Lefevre served as the Clerk of Parliaments, as joint

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12 Although Senior aspired for political career, his Jewish background denied him a position in Parliament.
13 Although Drinkwater was a pivotal figure in early Victorian governmental administration and a leading inspector very little information about his life is known to exist. Drinkwater held a degree in mathematics from Cambridge and was called to the Bar in 1827. A close friend of Brougham and a member of the Society for the diffusion of social knowledge, he published in the society's library of the Useful Knowledge, part of the treatise on "algebraical expressions" and scientific biographies of Galileo and Kepler. When Lord Grey came into Office in 1831, he was employed as a counsel to the Home Office a position he held until 1845. In 1830 he co-authored (anonymously) a book together with Lubbock "On Probability", and in 1834 over dinner at Babbage's London home he founded the Statistical Society of London together with Malthus, Jones and Whewell, to which he was elected as secretary, responsible for the publication of the Society's minuets and transactions. In 1848 he sailed to India where he became a member of the Supreme council and president of the Law Commission. Drinkwater died in 1851 in India (De Morgan 1859).
secretary to the Board of Trade and vice Chancellor of the University of London. During his political and administrative career Shaw-Lefevre was an investigator in no less than ten Governmental Commissions, including an important appointment to the Board of the Poor Law Commission (1834-1841), where he was in charge on carrying into effect the New Poor Law Amendment Act.14

George Cornewall Lewis was another barrister-MP who served on the Board of the Poor Law commission after succeeding his father, the barrister MP Thomas Frankland Lewis, who served on the Board between 1834 and 1839. Cornewall Lewis undertook his first public work as one of the commissioners to investigate into the condition of the poor Irish residents in the Britain in 1833, a year after writing a book to “illustrate the various uses of the principle terms belonging to political science” (1832: iii). In 1834 he was appointed by Lord Althorp to investigate into the state of church property and church affairs in Ireland. In 1838 he succeeded his father (whoas one of the principal poor-law commissioners, where he served until 1847. In the 1850s Lewis served as under-secretary to the Home Office (1847-1850), as Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1850-55) and as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1855-59) and Home Secretary (1859-61); During this period he served as Governmental Commissioner, investigating the Management of Meant Markets (1849-50), the studies and revenues of the university of Oxford (1852-3), the state of the Corporation of the City of London (1853-54) and the Concentration Of Law Courts (1859-60); between 1852 and 1855 he was he also accepted the editorship of the Edinburgh Review (1852-55).

14 Shaw Lefevre’s other governmental investigations included Country Rates (1834-6), Charities (1835-1837), Constabulary Force (1836-9), the estates of the Church of England (1849-1851), the British Museum (1847-50), Inns Of Court (1854-5), the Civil Service of the East India Company (1855), Digest Of Law (1866-70), and Standards Of Weights And Measures (1867-70). His Son George John Shaw-Lefevre was also a barrister-MP who served on several governmental posts during the second half of the nineteenth century, participated in a number of governmental investigations, Chaired the Statistical Society of London between 1879-88 and was a long-time member of the NAPSS.
The barristers Edward Tufnell and Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, each partook in four different Governmental Commissions: both served as commissioners in the Children Employment Commission (1862-7; Tremenheere was chair) and the Employment of Women and Children in Agriculture Commission (1867-71); Tufnell was also a factory and poor law inspector in the 1830s and a chief inspector of workhouse schools (a position he held until 1872), and Tremenheere was a commissioner in the Bleaching Work Commission (1854-5) and a mine inspector in the 1840s. The barrister W. D. Fane was appointed Legal Assistant to the Board of Trade after serving the Mercantile Laws Commission.

Probably the most famous barrister-commissioner was Edwin Chadwick, who started his public service career as Bentham’s personal secretary and served on the Factory Commission of 1833, the Poor Law Commission of 1834, the Police Commission of 1839, the Health of Towns Commission of 1844 and many more. Chadwick was a prominent figure on the Poor Law Board (1834-1846) and the founder of the sanitation movement in Britain, which secured him a governmental position as a sanitary commissioner in the Board of health (1848-1854). He was instrumental in developing original practices of social administration and innovative methods of official reportage.

7.4 The Poor Law Investigation: From Political Economy to Social Economy

The Poor Law Commission is probably the governmental investigation which drew the utmost attention from historians. The commission prepared, designed, supervised and maintained what was arguably the most monumental project of social reform in the first half of the nineteenth century to which political reformers devoted most of their resources: the New Poor Law system in Britain. Its report has been interpreted and explained in thousands of
different ways and was described as “one of the classic documents of Western social history” (Checkland and Checkland 1974: 9). The Webbs helped to perpetuate the image of the Poor Law investigation as a major work of social science when they wrote that the commission’s report, who was “by far the most extensive sociological survey that had at that date ever been undertaken” (Webb and Webb 1929: 54). The Poor Law reports served as a major source of information and reference in almost every major study of society in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, figuring in such works as Friedrich Engels’ *The Condition of the English Working Class* (1845), Karl Marx’s *Capital* (1867), Karl Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation* (1944), TH Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), and many others.

Britain’s highly developed nation-wide pre-industrial welfare – known as “Poor Law” – system was unique among European countries. Established at the turn of the sixteenth century, the system required every parish to provide relief to any of its legal residents “who were in need because of sickness, old age, absence of parental support, or unemployment” (Somers and Block 2005: 266). The problematic of the Poor Law system, which led to the establishment of the investigation, was rather simple. British Farmers had to pay their workers enough during the year to keep them from taking jobs elsewhere. They could do this by offering workers annual labor contracts or they could employ labor only when needed, but pay their workers rates that were high enough to sustain them for the entire year. With both of these methods, farmers bore the entire cost required to keep their workers. The Poor Law offered farmers another option. They could hire workers when they needed, and have unneeded workers collect poor relief during off-seasons. Under this option, farm workers’ annual income was made up partly of wage payments and partly of poor relief, which was administered by the parish vestry, elected by the taxpayers. Because labor-hiring farmers controlled most of the vestries in the rural parish, they were able to shift some of their labor costs onto other taxpayers in the parish (Boyer 1990).
The troubles began in 1782 when Parliament sanctioned the granting of outdoor relief to able-bodied males in response to the decline in household income in the rural south. As a result, aid to the poor between 1780 and 1820 more than doubled and “become a standard necessity in the family budget of the greater part of the lower working class” (Somers and Block 2005: 266), and generated a dramatic increase in taxes levied for this purpose. The sharp increase in spending on poor relief, which made welfare expenditures in England the highest in Europe (Boyer 1990), sparked tax revolts in the parishes, and led to major debates on the Poor Laws in and out of Parliament. There was a growing concern especially among political economist and other utilitarians that the Poor Laws “create the poor which they maintain,” as Thomas Malthus put it in his Essay on the Principle of Population first published in 1798.

In 1832, eight Commissioners were appointed “to inquire into the practical operation of the laws for the relief of the poor in England and Wales” and to report what improvements might be made in them or in the manner of administering them. The appointment of a Governmental Commission investigate the Poor Law was by no means the first attempt to reform the Poor Law system. Parliamentary inquiries had addressed the problems of pauperism on many occasions un the 1810s and 1820s, yet these inquiries failed to produce a fixed and general plan that could reform the highly complex and decentralized system of local welfare. What was attempted and

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15 The problem of high expenditures was further exacerbated after 1795 when the Vestry of Berkshire County decided that its poor should be entitled to a specific quantity of assistance depending upon the price of bread and the size of the family. Under this new welfare system which received the name Speenhamland, when the gap between wages and the price of bread widened beyond a certain level the parish used tax-payer moneys to supplement the wages of workers and their families (Polanyi 1944: ch. 7; Webb and Webb 1927: 168-189). As the program spread among England’s parishes, it generated another dramatic increase in poor relief and in the taxes levied for this purpose.

16 The eight Commissioners, appointed March 17, 1832, were: Bishop of London, Bishop of Chester, W. Sturges Bourne, N. Senior, H. Bishop, H. Gawler, W. Coulson, J. Traill. (G. Taylor, J. J. Froude and A. Bissett served as the commission’s Secretaries)

17 Among the important parliamentary inquiries were the Report from the Select Committee on the Poor Laws (1817), Report from the Commitee on the Poor Laws (1819), and Report from the Select Committee on Labourers Wages (1824).
advocated by the Poor Law governmental investigation, in contrast, was a national reform based of universal principles and uniform standardization of relief methods.

There was, moreover, a deep epistemological transformation in the sort of knowledge produced by the Poor Law investigation, which moved the study of poverty into a new phase. Much of the knowledge about the poor had to be created by the commission because very little evidence of the dependent poor was available in 1832. As no single welfare system existed, each Parish or township in Britain, of which there were around 15,000 at the time, was responsible for looking after its own poor and thus kept its own records, which were unpublished, and parliamentary committees collected only limited and sporadic information from local officers after 1800. This information collected was mostly legally oriented and based on common law administration through the adjudicative decisions of justices of peace (JPs), which were codified in handbooks for magistrates. In these handbooks the “right” to relief rested on entitlement, rather than need. This legal knowledge emphasized the correctness of administrative procedures, namely how to react to the poor; the poor themselves were not investigated and appeared only as claimants whose rights had to be adjudicated (Lees 1998). Poverty and dependency emerged as problems of liability and jurisdiction. The knowledge that counted was precise rendering of common law and parliamentary statues, not the effect of public policies.

The main effort of the investigation which took place between 1832 and 1834 was to supplement this legal information with socio-economic knowledge about the poor by contacting local Poor Law administrators directly. The commission opened its investigation by sending questionnaires to parish officials in 15,000 parishes and received 1,500 responses on the basis of which the commission decided to conduct an extensive field investigation of the parishes’ local administration (HC [44] 1834, XXVII: 2, Appendix B; see also, Blaug 1964: 203). In June 1832, the commissioner, H. Bishop, and the assistant commissioner, JW Cowell, conducted a successful trial investigation in Eastern England, and between July 1832 and January 1833 at
least twenty-four additional Assistant Commissioners (Poor Law inspectors) were appointed to
tour the country and collect testimonies in more than 3,000 parishes and towns on behalf of the
commission (see Appendix I). They were empowered to examine parish books to ascertain the
payments given to the poor, and were given specific written instructions to interview
magistrates, overseers of the poor and clergymen.

At the outset, the methods of inspection utilized by the Assistant Commissioners were
exploratory and tentative in nature. Nevertheless, and despite the geographic breadth the
investigations, their investigation was “sociologically limited and intellectually quite narrow”
(Lees 1998: 117). The commissioners regarded rural parishes as largely autonomous labor
markets and residents as either employers or workers. Accordingly, the questions asked by the
commission focused on limited themes, particularly on the operation of local labor markets,
issues of employment, and family incomes. Overseers were asked to estimate workers’ weekly
wages, rents and employment prospects at different times of the year. How many more
agricultural laborers lived in the Parish than could be employed regularly? Were there migrant
Irish and Scots? Did they think that families could subsist on their yearly earnings? Could
thrifty individuals avoid dependence on the parish? How many able-bodied laborers in each
parish were receiving allowance or regular relief? Other questions concerned current relief
practices. Officials had to report the numbers in the workhouse and those getting parish
allowances, as well as the amount spent.

In March 1834, the information gathered by the Poor Law inspectors together with
answers to the commissions’ questions were published in twelve massive folio volumes, which
were presented to Parliament.18 A short and popular version of the commission's report, written
by Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick, was published as a “blue book” in an small (octavo)

18 In 1835, fourteen more volumes were added to the report with different appendixes of compiled
evidence.
and portable format. The report explicitly recognized that the Poor Law was being abused by large farmers, who supported outdoor relief because it "enables them to dismiss and resume their labourers according to their daily or even hourly want of them, and to... throw upon others the payment of a part... of the wages actually received by their labourers” (PLC 1834: 59). The commissioners considered outdoor relief as a shortsighted policy that diminished workers' skill, diligence, and honesty, and in the long run worked to reduce labor productivity and led to a decline in profits. The report included the traditional criticism on the Poor Law system drawn from the political economy textbooks of Smith and Ricardo. It restated Smith’s criticism that poor relief diminished the wages-fund from which the laborer’s subsistence had to be paid, and that the Law of Settlement prevented the mobility of laborers according to the demand for labor. Following Ricardo’s principles, the commissioners held that the poor rates were rapidly escalating, destroying the property of landowners and the capital of the employers of labor.

Chadwick, who was originally one of the Assistant Commissioners and became the commission’s secretary in April 1833, was the author of the second part of the report that detailed the remedial measures proposed by the commission. In his summary, Chadwick identified the problem as one of “maladministration” and called for sweeping reforms of the Poor Law, including three major changes: (1) making a uniform system of relief throughout the country; (2) making those receiving relief “less eligible” than lowest-paid workers; (3) replacing outdoor relief with workhouses for the able-bodied and their families (PLC 1834: 261-3). To put these changes into effect, the commission recommended the forming of a new system of welfare based on new administrative unites (the “parish unions”), a system of workhouses for the able-bodied workers, and the establishment of a central board of Poor Law commissioners in London to test and supervise the implementation of the new Poor Law system. The goal of this

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19 Chadwick was initially appointed (July 1832) to inspect the Poor Laws in North and East London. His report, which suggested some remedial measures, impressed the commissioners, who decided to incorporate his recommendations in the report and to promote Chadwick to the position of the commission’s secretary.
new system was to simplify the old system and to reduce and centralize the channels for the flow of information from London to the localities and back. This was achieved by replacing the large number of part-time and largely unsupervised overseers by a small number of full-time union officials. Union officials were composed of a Board of Guardian clerks who supervised the union magistrates and an army of medical, relieving, and workhouse officers. The clerks were supervised by Poor Law inspectors, who reported back to the Poor Law Board in London (Driver 1993: chap. 8).

This new governmental welfare machinery sought to standardize practices according to new norms, while conducting the biggest social policy experiment that Britain ever saw. Between 1834 and 1871 the Poor Law Board, operating from the Somerset House in London, built and administer a new, comprehensive and uniform welfare system in roughly fifteen thousand parishes. Sixteen Poor Law inspectors, including three who had served as assistant commissioners under the original Poor Law investigation, assisted by an army of Poor Law officers, were engaged in a massive administrative reorganization of the parish system into a smaller number of unions and in the building of workhouses all across Britain. In 1836 the Commissioners reported that they had combined 7,915 parishes into 365 Unions, involving a total population of 6,221,940. This was 43% of the population of England and Wales and accounted for 65% of the total poor rates. By 1839, some 350 workhouses had been built, mostly in the rural south of England (Driver 1993). In 1842 there were 221,787 paupers receiving indoor relief in the workhouses and 1,207,402 poor who were recipient of outdoor relief (Llewellyn 1972: 109).

Although the Poor law Board was not officially established as a quasi-governmental body before 1847, in practice, the poor law commission, which operated from the Somerset House in London between 1834 and 1847, functioned as a governmental board for all intent and purposes and did so with a greater autonomy than the post 1847 Board that was subject to stricter governmental oversight and parliamentary supervision.
Inspectors were instructed “to collect and diffuse information relating to the administration of relief, the state of pauperism, and the condition of the industrious classes” (PLC 1841: 55). They maintained communication with the new Unions, organized the election of the Unions’ Poor Law Guardians and workhouse officials, conducted detailed biannual inspections of the Union in their districts and send back full reports on the effect of the new Poor Law on poor relief in various parishes, with tables of poor rates and their evaluations of contribution of each parish to the Union (Driver 1993). “You will find no part of duties productive of results so obviously and immediately beneficial” read the inspectors’ instructions, “as your transplanting into a Union the arrangements and modes of management which, either of your personal knowledge, or by means of information communicated to you from the Poor Law Commissioners you know to have been introduced into other unions with successful results” (PLC 1841: 61).

A major part of the work of the Poor Law Board became the creation of a new form of knowledge about the dependent poor, mainly through numerous reports composed by an army of field inspectors, who were collecting and diffusing “useful information” on the management of the workhouse, the administration of outdoor relief, the state of pauperism, and the welfare of the working classes in parishes and towns, more in general. The original governmental investigation focused it efforts on the collection of new data through a large scale survey; its report contained mostly anecdotal, un-synthesized, evidence and its evidence, for the most part, treated each parish as a separate world. The commissioners of the Poor law Board at Somerset – George Nichollas, Thomas Frankland Lewis and John George Shaw-Lefevre – along with its secretary, Edwin Chadwick, and nine clerks, sought to reconstruct public knowledge about the poor, who under the old Poor Laws had been treated as separate cases of legal entitlement.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{21} Lewis has resigned his post in 1839 and was succeeded by his son George Cornewall Lewis. In 1841, Shaw-Lefevre resigned as well and was replaced with Francis Head. The new Commissioners opposed to Chadwick’s leadership and eventually led to Chadwick’s resignation in 1846 and to an overall
Their job was to bring this legally oriented specificity under control and disciplined into uniformity. Welfare clients had to lose their individual stories and treated according to fixed standards. To do this they had to device a system that would be able to control local officials. The solution laid in the redefinition of knowledge about the poor through social statistics.

Under Chadwick’s leadership (1834-1846), the Commission was not only an administrative board but functioned also as an editorial board, reviewing and editing the inspectors’ reports and assembling them into official annual reports, which explained to the public the principles of the measure and the progress of its implementation. Chadwick, who as the Commissions’ secretary assumed the role of the editor-in-chief of the annual reports, revolutionized the way official reports were written. Wishing to infuse the report with a detached, official tone, he insisted on editing the inspectors’ dispatches and even returning them to rewrite. Submitting his revised report to Chadwick in 1835, the exasperated inspector Richard Hall commented: “I have availed myself of your suggestion and rewritten my report, carefully abstracting all that was learned and poetical. I am certain it will now be stupid enough, an prosy enough too” (quoted in Brundage 1988: 42). The editorial function of the Board enabled its members to establish a corporate identity through standardized practices of reportage and helped maintain the authority of the Poor Law investigation as an institution.

reorganization of the Board including the appointment of George Nichollas as the new Poor Law Secretary.

22 The OED credits Dickens with the first use of the term ‘prosy’ in *The Pickwick Papers* (1836b) to depict the dry style of writing that sticks to matters of facts which characterized statistical reports, which characterized “the posthumous papers of the Pickwick Club”: “resembling, or having the character of, prose ... but usually with emphasize on the tiresome effect than on the intrinsic qualities: commonplace and tedious.”
The Poor Law investigators did not seek to abolish the Poor Law nor did they look to eliminate poverty. They acknowledged that all civilized societies should provide aid to those unable to obtain the means of subsistence (invalids, the blind, women after birth, etc.): “to refuse relief ... when it cannot be proved that the offender could have obtained subsistence by labour, is repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind” (PLC 1834: 227). The problem with the administration of the Poor Law, in their view, was that it offered relief to able-bodied individuals who could without any help earn a subsistence income.

The Poor Law investigation focused, therefore, not on the general problem of poverty but on the specific reality of pauperism: chronic poverty engendered by the relief which was given to the able-bodied poor. In their analytical framework, poverty resulted primary from unemployment, the maldistribution of labor, and the misuses of wages, whereas pauperism – the real problem – arose from individual immorality encouraged by problematic public policy. The investigators believed that regulating relief and cutting down welfare for poor who are able to work will force them to find their way onto the employment market, and in the long run will lower taxes, raise wages, make laborers marry later and have fewer children (thus slowing the rate of growth of the labor supply), and eventually produce happier, more honest and independent population. One means to make state-administered relief unattractive was to force those able bodied who applied for relief to get it only by going into the workhouse. Chadwick had envisaged workhouses as institutions designed to educate the children of paupers and protect them from evil influences such as drunkenness and prostitution. The workhouse itself separated men, women, and children, preventing families from living together. Chadwick's biographer, Samuel Edward Finer, writes of Chadwick's plans for the workhouse system, "when one compares it with the Panopticon one is struck by many resemblances" (1952: 85).
The investigation into the reality of pauperism forced the commission to confront the more mundane aspects of poverty. Pauperism did not work as an abstract category; its reality confronted the commissioners with the spectacle of people who were a living, breathing proof that adjudicative Government – the legal system of administration by the common law - was insufficient in accommodating independent economic dynamics. In fact, the common law administration failed to resolve the problems of pauperism at the local level because the practices which created the problem, in the first place, were embedded within the legal system, its laws and procedures (Procacci 1998). As the investigators soon realized the legal framework as exhibited by the common law administration of poor relief, was thus part of the problem, not the solution. The solution, they believed laid not in the law but in Government. The report should thus be read as an cognizant effort to separate pauperism (as a social category) from poverty (an economic category), and to mark the former as a space for governmental intervention.

The investigation into the reality of pauperism challenged not only the legal conceptions of poverty but also the abstract and deductive level of political economy, which saw free markets and the invisible hand as universally beneficial and redemptive social forces. For political economists, poverty was a natural category, essential for grounding the theory of wealth. As the political economist and magistrate, Patrick Colquhoun, argued in a much quoted passage: “Without a large proportion of poverty there could be no riches, since riches are the offspring of labour, while labour can result only from a state of poverty … Poverty therefore is a most necessary and indispensable ingredient in society, without which nations and communities could not exist in a state of civilization” (Colquhoun 1806: 7-8).

Compared to political economy’s abstract-deductive notion of poverty as a natural ground for the development of wealth, the social reality of pauperism seemed “unnatural,” a deformity. It was the culture of poverty which impinge on the healthy, productive bodies that
needed to be treated, not poverty itself, which was seen as a natural, unproblematic, and
immanent part of the abstract laws of economics. Unlike poverty, which was hardly recorded
or reported, pauperism thus had to be systematically recognized, described and analyzed as a
social problem. The exploration of pauperism as a social problem thus implied a transformation
of poverty from an abstract economic category to a social-behavioral and cultural phenomenon
that can be carefully observed, studied and governed. The goal of the Poor Law governmental
investigation, therefore, was social and cultural and not purely economical: it sought to govern
not the problem poverty itself but that of the difference between the abstract law and the
concrete observable social fact symbolized by pauperism (Procacci 1991). As a result,
pauperism could be subjected to Government oversight, while poverty, which was relegated to
the economic, was left to the operation of the free market.

By separating pauperism from poverty, the knowledge produced by the Poor Law
investigation contributed to the delineation of a social domain. Given that the problem of
pauperism was not visible from the perspective of adjudicative Government, nor from the
abstract theoretical categories of political economy, a new type of knowledge had to be
constructed – a socio-economic knowledge – in an effort to expose the reality of pauperism.
Pauperism became a moral and physical designation, which encompassed all the components
eventually relegated to the social domain: criminal tendencies, bodily health, environmental
conditions, education (Poovey 1995: 11).

What started as an attempt to generate knowledge for policymaking, which was rooted
in a thoroughly atomistic conception of society, slowly began to discover not the individual but

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21 Pauperism triggered the feeling that something hidden lurking at the background “a magma in which
are fused all the dangers which beset the social order” (Procacci 1991: 159). This is, for example, how
Alexis de-Tocqueville described his experience with pauperism during his Journey to England to a
French audience in 1835: “I traveled through Great Britain in 1833. Others were struck by the imposing
prosperity of the country. I myself pondered the secret unrest which was visibly at work among all its
inhabitants. I thought that great misery must be hidden beneath that mask of prosperity the European
admires. This idea let me to pay particular attention to pauperism, that hideous and enormous sore which
is attached to a healthy and vigorous body” (Drescher 1964: 20-21).
the social: the facticity of socially structured connections. The focus on pauperism, which made the daily reality of the poor an object of expertise, opened the way for governmental investigators to explore the structural conditions of poverty. In such ways the administrative inadequacy of the economists’ abstract conception of poverty and pauperism came to be revealed, and many who had been drawn into Poor Law administration moved on to more empirical investigation of society. Thus, for example, after four years in office, the Poor Law Commissioners in Somerset wrote to the Home Secretary to justify proposed legislation which would enable them to incur expenditure not envisaged by the act of 1834, connecting poverty to public health and the “physical causes” of sanitary conditions:

The most prominent and pressing of the . . . charges for which some provision appears to be required, are for the means of averting the charges on the poor-rates which are caused by nuisances by which contagion is generated and persons are reduced to destitution. In general, all epidemics and all infectious diseases are attended with charges, immediate and ultimate, on the poor-rates. Labourers are suddenly thrown, by infectious disease, into a state of destitution, for which immediate relief must be given. In the case of death, the widow and the children are thrown as paupers on the parish. The amount of burdens thus produced is frequently so great as to render it good economy on the part of the administrators of the poor-laws to incur the charges for preventing the evils, where they are ascribable to physical causes, which there are no other means of removing (PLC 1838: 94).

Governmental investigation were pivotal, therefore, in translating legal-political knowledge into social knowledge, thus generating not only a new category of knowledge but a new “epistemic culture,” a distinctive arrangement of working practices, institutional arrangements, and technologies (Knorr-Cetina 1999: 7), which transformed political economy into social economy and which gave a prominent role to statistics. These theoretical implications of pauperism as a social category were not explicitly articulated by the Poor Law investigators at the time, as they had more obvious practical objectives. Only in the 1850s will social economy be explicitly posed as an alternative to political economy. But the Poor Law Commission, which provided a model for future social investigations, was critical in setting the empirical framework
which enabled the next generation of social investigators to challenge some of the basic premises of political economy and claim social knowledge as a new domain and expertise. Political economy could now be specified as an *economic* method while statistics as *social* method (Procacci 1991; Poovey 1995, 1998).  

In this sense, the Poor Law investigation of 1834 was the nucleus from which grew not merely the idea social policy but the epistemic culture of social science.

From institutional perspective, the Poor Law investigation, and the various governmental investigations which followed in its footsteps, became an important instrument in separating between the social, the economic and the political domains, and formalizing the relationship between these three spheres. With the formation of the Poor Law Board in 1834, the Poor Law investigation was institutionalized as part of Government and became relatively independent, self-sustaining and self-propelling executive body that enjoyed high degree of autonomy, compared even to ministerial departments. This institutional independence, triggered by the governmentalization of the legislative sphere, was an early sign that the social domain was being institutionally separated from the political domain.

The Poor Law Commission initiated the practice of *extra-parliamentary investigation* for gathering evidence, sending an army of inspectors to the field. The type of evidence they collected was, however, still based on formal testimonies, given in writing (answering of questionnaires) or on recorded verbal testimonies. Moreover, the Poor Law inspectors did not record the testimonies from the paupers themselves, the subject of their investigation, but from local officials who were in charge of administrating their relief. As I show in the section below and in the next chapter, because of various practical reasons, the pursuing governmental investigations of the 1830s and 1840s gradually shifted their focus from formal methods of

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24 Many of the practicing statisticians in early Victorian Britain were also working as governmental investigators to design and administrate the new Poor Laws. Both Nassau Senior and E.C. Tufnell, an assistant poor law commissioner, were among the founders of the Statistical Society of London.
collecting testimonies to field methods of “on the spot” empirical investigation based on participant observations and informal conversations.

7.4.1.1 Chadwick’s Sanitary Investigation

Governmental investigations were instrumental in extending the social and cultural explorations from the narrow focus pauperism to all members of the lower classes and beyond. A case in point was Chadwick’s Sanitary investigation. Eight years after the Poor Law investigation, the Poor Law commission, at the initiative of Chadwick, embarked on a nation-wide investigation of public health that included a social survey of the lower classes living in urban conditions. Appalled by the sanitary conditions in the workhouses and horrified by the spread of epidemics in London at the end of the 1830s, Chadwick became convinced that the economic relief of destitution was not in itself sufficient; it was essential, on economic grounds, to take steps for the prevention of disease by removing its physical causes - if the health of the working population could be improved then there would be a drop in the numbers of welfare dependents. Chadwick was especially provoked by the fact that Poor Law auditors had judged illegal the use of funds administered under the Poor Law to remove nuisances, such as refuse and stagnant pools, although they were recognized as breeding places for disease (Litsios 2003). He began to press for public health measures and to research in detail the lives of the lower classes as a whole.

The relatively narrow predicament presented by pauperism was thus extended to become a much larger social problem: the corrupting effects of unsanitary condition in urban areas on the morals and manners of city dwellers. Chadwick used Poor Law medical officers and other doctors on his staff to collect early data on the health of towns, on the basis of which he conducted his own investigation, which culminated in a Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring
Population of Great Britain, which Chadwick wrote and published privately in 1842. In his report, Chadwick did not see sanitation as a medical practice but as an exercise in social engineering. As Finer notes, “throughout the whole Report there was not the slightest concession to the claims of curative medicine. On the contrary, there was a sustained attack upon it” (1952: 217). Predictably, therefore, Chadwick’s principal proposals for public health reform were: “drainage, the removal of all refuse of habitations, streets and roads, and the improvements of supplies of water” (Chadwick 1842a: 370).

The report carried major implications for the entire population of city dwellers was made clear in the review of the report by the medical expert and one of the Sanitary investigators, Thomas Southwood Smith. “We reflect that the air the labouring classes breathe,” wrote Southwood Smith, “is the fluid in which rich and poor are equally immersed -- that it is a commonwealth in which all are born, live, and die equal … a subject in which every member of the community is self-interested” (Smith 1843: 421). Chadwick's Report meticulously demonstrates how many years of productive labour were lost annually to "premature" deaths among working men; He cites, for example, from the calculation which the political economist, John Ramsey McCulloch, made for the town of Dundee, that the loss in the value of labor through sickness and death, exceeded 25,000 pounds per annum (Chadwick 1942a: 274).

In August 1842, JS Mill wrote a favorable review of the report in the Examiner. Mill starts with explaining the importance of sanitation. He notes especially those parts where Chadwick stressed the social costs of bad sanitation: it killed more people than any war; and it resulted in infectious diseases which were a major cause of destitute widowhood and orphanage. Then Mill moves to discuss how the report contribute (and modify) Malthus theory of

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25 In 1837, following a typhus epidemics in London, Chadwick instigated a preliminary investigation into the "physical causes of fever.” He turned to three physicians to undertake the study by collecting evidence on the sanitary conditions in British towns: Neal Arnott, James Kay, and Southwood Smith. All three were deeply involved in the utilitarian movement, and the last two were also prominent members of the Society for the Diffusion of Social Knowledge (SDUK).
population. According to Mill, Chadwick had proved that what Malthus called the “positive checks of population” - misery and vice - did not diminish numbers, but simply kept the population in a younger and more sickly state. The report seem destined “to make impression on the public mind more extensive and permanent even than that recently produced by the applying disclosures of the Children's Employment Commission” (Mill 1963 [II]: 516).

Chadwick’s report is famous for launching the public health movement in Britain, which soon spread across the Western world. In Britain, the report had a tremendous effect on Parliament and the public led to the establishment of a Governmental Commission, which conducted a five years investigation into the Health of Towns (1843-1848) and resulted in the Public Health Act of 1848, whereby a General Board of Health was established with powers to initiate sanitary reform according to the Commissions’ recommendation.26

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26 The executive commissioner of the Board of Health were: Edwin Chadwick, Lord Ashley, Thomas Southwood Smith and Lord Carlisle.
8. The Logic of Exploration:
Governmental Commissioners as Field Investigators

Many of the social problems encountered by governmental investigators in their explorations of social problem “in the field,” were not visible from the perspective of adjudicative government, nor from the abstract theoretical categories of political economy. A new type of knowledge had to be constructed – a socio-economic knowledge based on ethnographic and statistical explorations – in an effort to expose the reality of daily life which eventually were relegated to the social domain: bodily health, housing, family life, environmental conditions, criminal tendencies, education, sexual activities, gender relations, parenthood, dietary, hygiene (Procacci 1991; Poovey 1995). These new governmental investigations involved a huge labor to monitor social problems in their locale sites, interpret what one see, hears or reads and report it in writing in an effort to transform observable events into meaningful information through which social reality, rendered as calculable, could be digested and communicated to the public.

Under the standard narrative of exploration of scientific discovery, which the commissions report helped to spread, truth became known once it was seen. In this new “evidential paradigm” (Ginzburg 1989), truth about society like truth about nature could be arrived at, or scientifically “discovered,” by close observation “on the spot”. It was through the unmediated authentic, experiences of the investigator with the social problems “in the field” that the proper way of knowing society was achieved and then translated into official, authoritative, reports, printed and publicized widely, with the help of the Press, as “finished products,” so as to influence opinion inside and outside Parliament and elicit support for government’s proposed policies.

Historians of social science have paid far less attention to the culture of exploration, and in particular, to the subject of fieldwork than to statistics and social theory, despite the evident
significance of practices of fieldwork to social investigations and to the development of social
science as a whole. If we think about social knowledge as constituted through a range of
embodied practices – traveling, observing, collecting, recording, interviewing, narrating – the
subject of fieldwork becomes difficult to escape. The field in the sense of the “social field” is not
just there; it is always in the process of being constructed and reproduced by the spatial practices
of fieldwork, and discursively through the field reports and other publications. Such an approach
to fieldwork prompts many further questions about the means by which investigatory skills are
transmitted, transposed and reproduced as social expertise and about the association between
field explorations, social reportage, social expertise, authorship, and the printed texts.

8.1 From Adjudication to Social Explorations

The rationale and *modus operandi* of the new regime of governmental investigations was
largely developed by a series of five committees on printing and public documents appointed to
suggest effective ways of collecting, organizing and utilizing “useful knowledge” for legislation.
These committees, appointed by the British government between 1831 and 1835, put at the
centre of their inquiries the issue of trustworthy, “authenticated,” knowledge as a major problem
of government. They criticized the incompetence of the adjudicative model of parliamentary
inquiries to generate adequate data that could be utilized in cases where governmental
intervention is needed to fix social problems. With this emphasis on the need for a new
machinery for the systematic and methodical collection and organization of credible knowledge,
the committees established and formally articulated the *raison d'être* for governmental
investigations method of operation. In 1833 the committee on Printing and Public Documents
concluded its findings as follows:
Owing partly to the investigations made by Parliamentary Committees, and partly to the custom that has long obtained of printing all sorts of accounts respecting the institutions, trade, and finance of the country, and subjecting them to parliamentary discussion and public criticism, a vast mass of materials has been collected respecting many subjects belonging to the statistics of the empire and its colonies ... And yet, notwithstanding all these means and materials ... statistics can hardly be said to exist …

It is the easiest thing possible to pile figures on figures ... and they do this the more easily that they have a scientific air about them … Considering the vast mass of official returns and other papers annually printed by order of the House of Commons and the number of private publications on subjects having relation to this science, by one not pretty familiar with such topics would easily imagined the extraordinary deficiency of our information as to some of the most important particulars respecting British statistics ... Instead of accurate, well authenticated data, we have frequently nothing to trust to, but vague conjectural estimates; and are obliged to choose among conflicting, contradictory, statements, where it may be no easy matter, perhaps to assign any very satisfactory grounds for the preference given to one rather than to another. Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear the most opposite allegations made in Parliament as to matters of great public importance; nor is there in fact a season in which the Legislature does not proceed to legislate in the dark, - interfering when it should do nothing, and doing nothing when its interference might be advantageous.\(^1\)

In its conclusion, the committee put forward what can be seen as the first manifesto of governmental commissions:

It is surely high time that an end were made to this most disgraceful state of things; and that we set about adopting measures and organizing machinery capable of making us reasonably well acquainted with the state of the principal branches of industry carried on in our country, and of those engaged in them. Now we are fully convinced that this cannot be effected otherwise than by the intervention of Government. Private individuals, even if they had the necessary funds, are wholly without the means of making complete and effective enquiries; and of ensuring their being continuously and systematically carried on. Most of the details as to the numbers and classes of the people, with the ratio of births, marriages, and deaths, to the population, might be learned by making improvements in the census; and by enforcing the registration of the occurrences alluded to. But to obtain what is of still more important, an intimate acquaintance with the state of the principal businesses carried on in the country, and of the real condition of the person engaged in them, new machinery must be set in motion.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Ibid, 177 (my italics).
The committee recommends the appointment of “competent statistical” inspectors “whose sole employment, should be to make themselves acquainted with every particular respecting the leading branches of industry carried on in such towns ... with all facts and circumstances that might serve to throw light on the state and mutations of industry, and the condition and habits of the people.” In addition the committee recommends establishing the institutional machinery for the “organizing of means for rendering [the statistical inspectors] efficient, and for turning their reports to the best accounts.”

Importantly, the committee considered in its conclusion the quantitative statistical data of census as less reliable and useful for the purpose of social legislation then the ethnographic form of statistical knowledge, which provides both systematic and “intimate acquaintance” with social problems at hand. For the Victorians, scientific knowledge was practical experience (‘he who does knows’). This belief guided their skepticism towards the more formal quantitative form of information. According to the committee, while quantitative data generate unreliable, unsystematic “conflicting, contradictory, statements” there can be no much debate over a knowledge produced by “statistical inspectors” from their own continuous and intimate experience in the field, and organized efficiently in reports. The credibility of knowledge depends on an efficient and systematic organization of experienced first-hand knowledge; it is not a function “scientific air” of numbers and the compilation of raw figures. It was important for government to diminish the power of individual MPs and to minimize as far as possible the time-consuming debates over legislation, which in early Victorian period, following their extensive coverage in the press, threatened to paralyze the ability of the British political system to govern effectively. Under this condition there was an acute need to establish new machinery which could efficiently and systematically produce and disseminate credible and uncontroversial data for policymaking, in particular in areas of social policy, where political disagreements were most prominent.

3 Ibid, 177, 181.
8.2 The Extra-Parliamentary Investigation and the Genesis of Field Research

According to Sheila Jasanoff (1990), the capacity of legislators to change the rules governing the assessment of facts in law-making likens them to “paradigm transforming pioneers” in science. The emergence of the governmental investigation introduced this kind of a paradigm-shift in policymaking, changing official inquiry from a legal-adjudicative to a new model of extra-parliamentary exploration, whereby the quality of the investigation depends more heavily on the skills, expertise and intentions of the commissioners who serve as investigators. Governmental investigators rely more on their own experience and observations, and has a greater role in the production of knowledge. An examination of the arguments put forward by early nineteenth century commissioners, sheds light on the investigators attempts to justify the superiority of their techniques and procedures, and, in particular, on their epistemological justification of experience in the field as the foundation of a new science based on social expertise and the logic of exploration.

The advantages of field investigation did not escape Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the leading British social scientists of the early twentieth century. In their *Methods of Social Study*, one of the first comprehensive British textbook on social scientific method, they compared governmental investigations and in particular the investigator’s note taking and the new developing practice of field reporting, to the “scientist’s laboratory, blow-pipe, or test-tube” (1932: 90). For the Webbs, it was not the mere extra-parliamentary setting, which gave the practice governmental investigations its scientific character but the fact that these investigations were so immersed in habits of reading and writing, which enabled them to come up with new insights by processing and reshuffling previously collected evidence. As observed by Harrison, the use of oral evidence in royal commissions has gradually decreased with the years to a point where at the start of the twentieth century more than half of governmental investigations relied

In the details of their organization and the methods of their operations, governmental investigations royal commissions functioned as small administrative bureaucracies, moving in space and time, while producing, collecting and digesting massive amounts of textual information. The Poor Law Commission of 1834 had eight commissioners and twenty-four sub-commissioners (inspectors). The Factory Commission of 1833 had fifteen full commissioners but still adopted office/field division. The Employment of Children Commission of 1842 was led by four commissioners who supervised twenty inspectors. The factory commission divided up the country into four districts and sent commissioners to each under the direction of a central board based in London. The Employment of Children Commission organized itself rather similarly.

Field investigators usually involved a great amount of paper work in an effort to aggregate information about society. Their investigations were ordinarily launched with a massive circulation of cumbersome questionnaires to local informants. The Poor Law Commissioners, for example, sent out in 1832 questionnaires, which were written by Senior and Chadwick, to 15,000 parishes and received 1,500 responses (HC [44] 1834, XXVII: 2, Appendix B; Blaug 1964: 203). In 1836, for example, the Irish Poor Law Commission mailed roughly 7,600 forms; only half of these forms were returned (Frankel 2006: 147). When Edwin Chadwick urged Lord John Russell to establish the Constabulary Commission, he invoked the experience of the Poor Law Investigation, which “by sending circulars asking for opinions as well as information,” brought “a great proportion of the public were … to a council and enlisted in support of measures which appeared to be, and in some degree were, the results of their deliberations” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 150).

Informants much sought after were the ostensibly disinterested and educated men such as clergymen, teachers, magistrates, and surgeons, who were in personal and ongoing contact with large segments of the population in their communities. Whenever the Factory
Commissioners arrive to a new town, they encouraged the inhabitants to provide them with written documentation: “all communications addressed to His Majesty’s Commissioners, and left in the post office before [a certain date]” they announce in the local papers “will be met with attention” (HC [450]1833, XX: 78). Factory commissioner Edward Tufnell, reporting from Lancashire, devised a new shorthand method: “Questions relating to the chief points of inquiry were prepared previous to the examination, and numbered. I then formed a list of all such words as were constantly occurring. Such as ‘factory’, ‘children’, ‘machinery’ ‘cotton’, etc., and denoted each by a single stroke of the pen” (Ibid, 749).

When they did conduct formal hearings, governmental investigators took various steps to ensure the credibility of testimonies and to increase their reliability as evidence. In Manchester, for instance, the Factory Commissioners asked employers to give “some public assurance or pledge that [workers] shall in no way be prejudiced by any evidence which they may give,” and commissioners were ordered to use fake names for workers in their report and “endeavor to obtain for them all protection for giving evidence freely, by preventing, where practicable or expedient, their names being made public” (HC [450] 1833 XX: 77). The Children’s Employment commissioners were given the exact same set of instructions, while asked, in addition, to make sure that children were questioned unaccompanied by their employers or parents and every precaution was taken “to diminish the chance of inaccuracy of statement, from timidity, or from confusion to which the children are subject when spoken to by stranger” (HC 1842 [380], XV: 267).

Reliability of evidence was amplified further by a kind of stratified method for sampling witnesses to ensure that the composition of witnesses would reflect a representative sample of the population in the field. The Short Time Committee in Manchester, for example, was asked by the Factory Commission to nominate three witnesses for each branch of manufacture: a
current employee, a former laborer who left for a better job, and another who had quit for ill health (HC [450] 1833 XX: 77).

Another method for increasing reliability guided the selection of the investigators. In the case of parliamentary inquiries, politicians were selected to serve in committees according to their partisan affiliation and/or their position regarding the issue under investigation (usually whether they were for or against the proposed bill) to ensure a fair judgment. By contrast, in governmental investigations members were selected to ensure adequate representation of skills according to the specific requirement of the investigations. A case in point was the composition of the 1836 Irish Poor law commission. Each field team in the Irish Poor Law investigation was comprised of an Englishman and an Irishman. This tandem structure acknowledged that leaving the investigation to foreigners, ignorant of Irish social construction and habits would alienate prospective witnesses (George 1856: chap. 3). In this way, the investigation tried to combine the local knowledge of some commissioners with the assumed impartiality of other commissioners who did not possess such knowledge, in a seeming effort to try to replace the notion of objective judgment with the hope that opposing perspectives would compensate for each other in the final report.

8.2.1 Statistical Methods of Exploration: Classifications and Comparisons

The evidence collected and analyzed in many of governmental reports in the 1830s and 1840s illustrates a strong drive to organize and synthesize social knowledge through classification and comparison. The Constabulary Forces Commissions (1839), for example, was an effort to reconstruct a composite portrait of a criminal compiled from numerous testimonies collected in jail. It depicted a detailed picture of the sub-culture of thieves including a profile of a typical thief, his age, background, chronology of typical offences, typical methods of stealing, typical targets, typical crimes by age groups, the impact of imprisonment on future behavior,
specific jargon, etc. The report described in details the social organization of thieving, specifying and analyzing different groups of thieves, their different methods, their special jargon and habits, their place within the social system of offenders, their internal hierarchies, and in particular a process of status attainment and social mobility within and between these “criminal professions.” Below is a typical passage from the report, discussing the profile of the house-breaking “profession” within the social organization of thieving:

The next species of thieving pursued, is that which entitles a thief to be placed at “the top of the tree” in “his profession,” and to which they all more or less aspire ... Before speaking of the implements made use of in house-breaking, we will say a few words on the character of the house-breaker, who for the most part is of reckless and daring disposition; three-fourths of them are returned transports, the other part are made of servants out of employ. When a thief arrive at this stage in his profession ... he is then "a right" or "good man;" but should his character be in the least blemished by his ever having turned evidence against his confederates ... he is ... obliged to go to “low thieving” … If, on the contrary he has throughout maintained an irreproachable character amongst thieves, never having got another man into trouble, at the same time retaining a determined dislike to all constables and police, he is a man highly respected in that particular and outcast society in which he moves (Constabulary Forces Report 1839: 383, 391).

Practices of classification and comparisons were particularly evident in the reports about works in factory. When Samuel Swain Scriven explored the employment of children in Potteries in ten towns and parishes of the district of Staffordshire in 1842, he noted that he first intended “to report on each [factory] separately.” However, as he soon realized, “there was so great a similarity in their character, that it would have occupied my time uselessly, and been attended with no advantage.” He decided, therefore, “to divide the whole into three distinct classes, not according to their magnitude or extent, but to their merits as to drainage, ventilation, and convenience.” He then constructed a table showing number and rates of each class of factories in each of the ten towns and parishes he inspected (see Appendix II). The comparison thus shifted the focus from working condition in specific factories to an approximation of the average working condition in each district (HC [431] 1843, XIV). Inspectors for the Factory Commission
were instructed to compare young factory laborers to lower class children and adults outside the factory system in what may have been a similar attempt to divert attention from working conditions and labor relations to environmental variables (HC [450] 1833 XX: 75-83).

These practices of classification and comparison became a central occupation of early social statistics and led to a growing use of numbers. The rising faith in numbers during the 1830s and the 1840s was not primarily an ideological device: the consequence of their aura of neutrality which could mask political agenda; the use of numbers had a notable practical characteristic: it could collapse individual variations into categories and allow for more efficient comparison through computation. With numbers the specificity of individual stories, the highlight of the legally based testimonial system of adjudication could be brought under control, standardized and disciplined into uniformity. Thus, for example, the governmental investigations on the State of Large Towns and Populace Districts in 1844 classified deaths in Whitechapel in 1838 by computing the averages ages of deaths and dividing them by occupation and overcrowding in the area (HCC [572] 1844, XVII: q5669-81).

In the 1830s Poor Law investigators use the machinery of the New Poor Law to collect numerical statistics that “reduced the dependent poor to standard categories of their own choosing” (Lees 1998: 124). The slowly evolving numerical profile of the Poor law indicates that paupers were represented only in terms of how much money they cost. Investigators were collecting information comparing the cost of supporting paupers in many of the fifteen thousands parishes under their supervision. Towards the end of the decade this had begun to change and as governmental investigators decided to collect statistical information about the people they aided. In the first national report on the operation of the Poor Laws published in 1840, this data was already used to construct two new categories of the forms of relief for comparison: indoor versus outdoor. This categorization of the method of granting aid became the central unit of analysis, which dominated poor law reporting for the rest of the century.
Furthermore, the dependent poor were classified into three major categories: (1) aged, infirm or disabled; (2) insane, lunatic or idiot; and (3) able bodied. How and where people received help gained more attention than personal characteristics, and the investigators used a few tables cross cut forms of relief in each parish with the three types of dependent poor and with some basic demographic distinctions (adult males, adult females, and children over sixteen). The category of able bodied men on outdoor relief naturally received most of the attention. This category was then further divided into three sub-categories: those who got aid because “of want of work,” “insufficiently earnings,” or “other causes” (PLC, 1840: 10-16).

The use of comparative methods sometimes served to expend the reach of investigative projects beyond the immediate groups under investigation. The Scottish Poor Law Commissioners, for example, remarked that “proper observations” demand that the condition of the poor should always be judged in juxtaposition to the condition of the working classes. “If this is not attended to, the Notes, particularly those of them relating to cases in the Highlands and Islands, will convey an exaggerated impression of the discomfort of the poor” (HC 1844 [557], XX: ii). In 1842 the mine inspector, Dr. Charles Barham, measured levels of education by a dividing approximately 400 miners according to those who could sign their names and those who could not. He then not only arrived to conclusions about the impact of employment on children’s education but also compared different factors connected to employments in the mine to levels of educations (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 758).

In 1833, a year into the poor law investigation began its work in England and Wales, it became clear to the investigators "that much instruction might be derived from the experience of other countries." authorized by Lord Melbourne, the minister of the home office to extend the investigation "as far as might be found productive of useful results," they turned to Lord Palmerston, the foreign minister, to obtain the assistance of the diplomatic machinery. With Palmerston’s help he investigators sent long questioners, similar to the ones that they sent to
thousands of parishes in England and Wales, to British ambassadors for ten European countries and the United States asking them “to produce and transmit, with the least possible delay, a full report of the legal provisions, existing in each country, for the support and maintenance of the poor, of the principle on which such provisions were founded ... and of the practical working and effect of the actual system, upon the comfort, character, and condition of the inhabitants.” A full report, comparing the poor law provisions “and the condition of the labouring classes” in England to the reports from the other countries was compiled, synthesized and arranged in tables as an appendix to the poor law report by Nassau Senior in 1835 (Senior 1835: 1-2).⁴

The explorative and ethnographic framework of the investigations allowed investigators more room to improvise and innovate. Factory Commissioner John Cowell, for example, developed in the course of his investigative work in Lancashire, special weighing instrument that could simultaneously measure the height and weight of children. One commissioners handled the scale, positioning the child with his own hands; a second supervised the clerk who registered data; and a third, the medical commissioner, evaluated special cases (Frankel 2006: 154). This sort of flexibility and creative improvisations was largely lacking in parliamentary inquiries because they were confined to the specific and immediate setting of the hearing room and the more constraining adjudicative procedures.

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⁴ The European countries used for comparison were: Norway, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, Prussia, Holland, Belgium and France Turkey and Greece. Four states in the United States were reported separately: Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York.
8.2.2 Governmental Commissioners as Field Investigators: The Problematic of Voice

The issue of the relations of language to “the real” and the ability of language to mediate reality was a growing concern for governmental investigators who were sent to the field. They knew full well that language was constitutive and that words could just as easily be used to misrepresent. The focus on field observations was a way of mitigating the effects of language, in particular spoken language. As a result governmental investigators were attempting to create an empirical correspondence as close as possible between the world they perceived and the language of their descriptions. In a letter entitled “Memoranda of Instructions for Ascertaining the causes of Pauperism,” Chadwick encouraged poor law inspectors to engage in a form of participant observation, advising them that “incidental remarks, causal and unsought conversations will frequently discover more than twenty formal examinations.” This kind of “on the spot” informal method of investigation, observed Chadwick, can overcome the “habitual suspicion of the lower orders of whatever appears done with design would at once lock up their lips, or induced them to pervert the truth under the notion that their confessions would be turned against them” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 160).

The Webbs have criticized the reliance of parliamentary inquiries on formal hearings, this “interminable question and answers,” which merely accumulated opinions and hearsay rather than facts (1932: 142). Giving examples from governmental investigations, Beatrice Webb argued that investigators should observe and survey social problems personally “by penetrating below the topmost administrative layers” (1938: 362). Beatrice Webb supported the use of interviews but only to the extent that they are conducted informally and only as a route to actual observations and documents that, in her opinion, contained the facts. “The less formal the conditions of the interview the better,” she asserted, and emphasized that although a careful plan of inquiry should be made beforehand, this should not be flourished before the informant, nor
should notes be taken during the discussion.” She sought in the interviewer “a spirit of adventure, a delight in watching human beings quite apart from what you can get out of their minds, and enjoyment of the play of your own personality with that of another.” The informant should neither be interrupted nor argued with; on the contrary, he “must be permitted to pour out his fictitious tales, to develop his preposterous theories, to use the silliest arguments” in the hope that eventually something useful would emerge (1938: 362-3; see also Webb 1907).

The focus on observations and the method of indirect engagement with subjects in the field, advocated by the Webbs’ methodological approach, was developed and adopted by governmental investigators as practical solutions to some of the basic difficulties they encountered in their extra-parliamentary explorations. Because official visits by inspectors, performed in order to obtain evidence, were easy to manipulate, and as Friedrich Engels (1845: 48) pointed out, the conducted tour of the factory led by the employer himself was hardly likely to elicit the whole truth, entering the factory or descending into a mine shaft became essential to investigators’ claims to have penetrated and exposed previously hidden spaces.5 Factory commissioners, for example, developed tactics to ensure that their visits would come as a surprise (Ward 1962). Complaining that the employers who were so ready to supply information “seldom or never descend into the pits,” the mine commissioners of 1842 entered the pits themselves (HC [380] 1842, XV: 43).

Verbal examination became a particular problematic procedure when it came to collecting information from mine workers. When the mine investigator Samuel Scriven was exploring the pits in Yorkshire, he soon found that many of the miners he was trying to interview in an office at West Riding were reluctant to cooperate. Frustrated by the process of collecting and recording verbal testimonies from miners, he soon began to question the

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5 There was ample evidence of the diligence with which employers prepared mills for official inspections, ordering the floors cleaned, removing the sick, sending children to wash and wear their Sunday cloths (Ward 1962).
reliability of verbal examination. May Holmes, who worked in the mines for eight years, assured Scriven, who was suspicious at her failure to complain about her working condition, that nobody has told her what to say. Looking to “emancipate” his investigation from hearsay evidence, Scriven began to look for other sources of information, and was relying increasingly on visual input. He was thus was able to test, for example, the assertions of one boy witness about his ill-treatment by getting him to reveal the scars which had resulted (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 13, 77).

It was not long before Scriven realized that a proper exploration of the working condition of miners cannot rely on formal interviews and that it would be more practical, credible and productive to try and elicit information by observing his miners while they worked and by trying to make informal conversation with them on the spot. He therefore decided to “go native;” and descended into the pits dressed as a miner himself. “I have reason to congratulate myself upon my resolve” wrote Scriven, “because I feel that I have become more familiarized with their habits, practices, wants, and sufferings, can more faithfully describe them, and better stand the test of any future examination that may be considered necessary, than would have been otherwise possible” (HC 1842 [382], XVII: 58; on Scriven’s methods see p. 65 in the same volume).

While touring the Northumberland and North of Durham collieries, the mine inspector John Roby Leifchild had similar experiences with his subjects, which, Like Scriven, led him to adopt the method of “on spot” observations as a practical solution. Leifchild reported that miners treated him as a stranger and reacted with hostility to his attempt to ask questions concerning their work and earnings. “It was in vain that I went in the evenings from house to house, explained the object of my mission, read to them my instructions, and combated their objections; vague suspicion still lurked in their minds” (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 539). He realized that it was impossible to conduct formal interviews with young laborers either inside the pits,
because they were in constant motion, or outside the pits, for they were not inclined to spend
much time answering questions from a stranger.

Leifchild questioned the sincerity of children’s speech; he found in direct field
observation a more reliable method of collecting data and a mean by which he could corroborate
children’s verbal responses. “As the veracity of the pit-boys was impeached by some employers,
all the means within reach were resorted for the purpose of testing the truth of their statement”
(Ibid: 521; my italics). Given that “their habitual vice of lying and deceit is so inveterate, that no
information you may extract from them is to be trusted, then, assuredly, we can scarcely hope to
arrive at correct conclusions, by the enumeration of negatives or affirmatives merely penned
from the mouths of the boys as they pass in rapid review before a registering clerk” (Ibid: 528).

Language itself seemed to pose a particular powerful barrier, an impediment of effective
communication, that could only be crossed by direct observation. First, Leifchild encountered a
basic problem of estrangement generated by class and culture differences between the
investigator and the laborers. The workers’ speech, he observed was loaded with “numerous
mining technicalities, northern provincialism, peculiar intonation and accents, and rapid and
indistinct utterance” (Ibid: 524-5). The strong and rough utterances of the mine workers require
translation if they are to be properly understood by a literate public. Literature that “speaks
dialect” is unintelligible to the proper readership of the report until the speech is translated into
something closer to standard written English. This process of translation was often done through
observation as a mediatory technique to standardize unruly speech.

Second, lack of sufficient vocabulary, Leifchild claimed, distorted the ability of young
workers to translate their harsh experiences into words and compelled them to translate extreme
anguish into homely expressions. Thus "sore tired" would mean extreme fatigue, and a boy
claiming that he was "hurt in his arm" had fractured the limb” (Ibid: 515). Liefchild felt that only
through direct observation in the field could translate this linguistic stoicism, this normalization
of suffering, into more exact terms. For a stranger to read the mind of a pitman,” Liefchild argued, “a circuitous approach and no small tact are requisite” (Ibid: 515). "My sensations during the descent and ascent of the upcast shafts enabled me to appreciate the complaints of the witnesses in reference to them," wrote the mine inspector John Roby Leifchild in his report (Ibid: 519). Leifchild also remarked that the silence of some young miners regarding the excruciating nature of pit labor should be qualified by his observation of the fact that they lived a “sequestered life” and had no standard against which to estimate their toil (Ibid: 266).

It is important to note that although the investigator’s especially mistrusted the verbal statements of children, there is an ample of evidence in the reports to suggest that investigators were suspicious of the verbal testimonies of various informants, including those given by employers, and wished to confirm them with their own observations. The mine inspector H. Jones, for example, reports of an interview he had with Mr. James Jones who was the underground supervisor in the British Iron Company's Collieries at Ruabon in North Wales: “He, in answer to my question whether the boys were fatigued and wearied by their day's work so that they could not enjoy recreation when it was over, replied in his native tongue, ‘No; they bound like young goats from their work to their play.” The inspector, who at the time was observing mine workers only during the working day, thought the supervisors’ answer to be “a little figurative” and decided to observe the children’s activities after their working hours. "As soon as the children came up,” he reports, “I was surprised and pleased to observe the alacrity with which they went to play; they were quite alive to their amusements, and enjoyed themselves with all the vivacity of youth and health, preferring their games to going home to their food.” He therefore concluded to have “found the fact as [the supervisor] stated it (HC [431] 1843, XIV: 25).

This rejection of informants’ verbal utterance involved a growing recognition which pervaded all Victorian governing institutions (courts, Parliament, government) that uneducated
speech cannot bridge the gap between language and the events it seeks to describe. In courts, as we saw, this recognition led to the lawyerization of the adjudicative process which made competent advocacy an integral feature of the legal fact-finding procedure. In governmental investigations, direct, “on spot” field observations were thus designed to discipline “unruly speech” in an attempt to solve the problem of plurality of voices. Governmental investigators attempted to create a domain of expertise for controlling speech through observations and inscribing it into the standard and official language of a “report” that may be read without a reference to locality, at any place within Britain or even beyond: a universal text of maximum probability.

Moreover, by incorporating witnesses’ verbal testimonies with their own observation and translate this integrated account of visual and verbal information into a written report, governmental investigators thought they were better equipped to gauge social problems and human pain than the sufferers themselves and they could therefore speak for them. That the investigators became and expert witnesses and spokespersons for their subjects was best illustrated during the 1842 investigation into the sanitary condition of the working classes, when Chadwick interviewed his own investigators (inspectors) and incorporated these exchanges into his Sanitary Report. Chadwick shrewdly used the proximity of the investigators to their subject to create a rhetorical distance from the scene of investigation by interviewing commissioners as expert witnesses. He was thus able to guarantee both the appearance of expert-objective remoteness and utilize the official investigators with their own experiences and reflective impressions as though they were the authentic ‘field witnesses’ (Chadwick 1842a). We see here a sophisticated configuration of both judicial and field methods, where governmental investigators assume various roles - as observers, as interviewers and as (reflective) expert witnesses – each role generates a different type of evidence and knowledge.
8.3 The Logic of Exploration and the Discovery of Society

Already in ancient times, governmental commissions were a site where the three meanings of ‘Theoria’ - journey, spectacle and thoughtful observation – were fused together (see, Wolin 2001: 202). In antiquity, Theoria was the name given to the practice of Greek commissions designed to investigate rumors. When word came of great events or serious doings that might affect the interests of the city, a group trusted by the community was formed and sent to investigate the truth of the matter. The theoria, as it was called, would report back to the assembled citizens and this official version became truth (Kurke 2000).

Oz Frankel (2006) alerts us to some important similarities between governmental social investigations and geographical natural expeditions. Both governmental investigation and geographical expeditions featured field investigators, commissioned by central governments to travel to exotic, unknown parts of the world, and spectacle worked together in both commissions and expedition reports. Like the reports of geographical investigators, social reportage blended together statistics and scientific measurement with anecdotal, on-the-spot experiences of investigators told in language of spectacle, marvel, terror and disbelief. And like geographical expeditions, traveling to unknown lands, governmental commissions attempted to uncover and penetrate enclosed spaces - the factory, the mine, the asylum, the prison, the poorhouse, etc – in an effort to learn the true situation of the inhabitants. Chadwick expressed this sense of discovery in his famous remark that the findings of the 1842 Sanitary Commission about the condition of the poor in Britain, “have been received with surprise by persons of the wealthier

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6 According to Xavier Zubiri (1981), this interesting relationship between official truth-claims and the intertwining practices of *wandering* and *wondering*, provided Athenian philosophers of the fourth century (BCE), such as Aristotle, the basis for transforming the notion of *theoria* from a conception of wisdom as a practical and political performed activity into to a conception of the wise man as a disinterested *spectator* of truth (i.e., as a theorist “gazing at a spectacle”). Consequently, *Sophia*, which was mostly attributed to individual subjective mental attitude, became associated with the concept of *theoria* and turned into an *episteme*: a kind of intellectual vision directed toward truth for truth's sake (Zubiri 1981).
classes living in the immediate vicinity, to whom the facts were as strange as if they related to

foreigners or natives of an unknown country” (Chadwick 1842a: 342).

Exploration and the empirical experience gained by the process of discovery through empirical observations was an important end in itself and not just a mean of gathering data. Indeed, the scientifcify of social knowledge was thought to reside in the practice of exploration itself, and not so much in the specific methods used to analyze the data which was collected in consequence. The discourse of exploration emphasizes the experience acquired in the field through actual practice and direct factual observation over abstract deductive reasoning or philosophical speculation. It was through actual travel and personal experience that commissioners reported about society, discovering new populations and in the process constructing the “social.” The Journey of the itinerant governmental investigator, starting with a specific investigation and then moving to the mundane world of the fixed inspectorate, participated in the ‘discovery’ of society through the endless repetition of investigative and reporting practices.

8.3.1 Discovering Underground Tribes: Children's Employment Commission (1840-3)

In 1840, four Commissioners - Thomas Tooke, Thomas Southwood Smith, Leonard Horner, and Robert Saunders - were appointed to investigate into “the employment of the children in mines and collieries, and in the various branches of trade and manufacture.” The four commissioners all served as governmental investigators for the Factory Commission of 1833, where they gained important experience in exploring child labor through field investigations.⁷

⁷ The Factory Commission initiated and institutionalized the system of factory inspection. Tooke and Southwood Smith served as factory commissioners (together with Chadwick) and Horner and Saunders, who were employed as factory inspectors, were still on the job during their service as commissioners on
The commissioners were instructed to collect information as to the ages at which they were employed, the number of hours they worked and as to the effect of their employment on their morals and bodily health. To collect this information, the Home Secretary appointed twenty Sub-Commissioners (mine inspectors), who were assigned to specific industrial district (see, Appendix 1).

The mines investigation epitomized the status of the commissioner as a ‘discoverer’, mediating between politics and the social world. The commissioners and their assistants spend more than a year collecting data from the mines, crawling in wet pits deep into the belly of the earth, risking their own health, gathering chilling stories of little children laboring in the abiding darkness of mine shafts, and (literally) unearthing conditions of life and labor in mining communities that had gone unnoticed by the general public. “The earth,” wrote Edwin Chadwick his review of the report for the Quarterly Review “seems … to have heaved from its entrails another race, to astonish and to move us to reflection and to sympathy.” Edwin Chadwick, whose sanitary report, another exemplary account of exploration, appeared in the same year, credited the mines investigator with a social discovery of an unknown human tribes “in our own land and within our own ken … having habits, manners, and almost a language, peculiar to themselves,” and displaying “modes of existence, thoughts, feelings, actions, sufferings, virtues, and vices, which are as strange and as new as the wildest dreams of fiction” (Chadwick 1842: 159).

the Children’s Employment Commissions. Southwood Smith was served a sanitary commissioners (with Chadwick and Arnott) at the time of the investigation.

8 Conversely, the investigator was entrusted with representing government to its provinces, sometimes imparting knowledge rather than collecting information. Inspectors, for instance, were asked to inform miners as to the importance of childhood to the growth and maturity of the human body (HC 1842 [380], XV: 268). Moreover, with the establishment of permanent mines inspectorate, some investigators became involved as speakers for local causes, having acquired the necessary experience and expertise with social problems of their locality. For instance, the mines a inspector for the Glasgow area, Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, made clear that he felt obliged to participate in local debates over the establishment of a police force for Lanarkshire and the alteration of the law on withholding wages from laborers. “The only excuse I have to offer,” Tremenheere explained, “is the anxiety I felt on behalf of the population whose condition I had been engage in investigating” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 155).
This rhetoric of exploration and discovery figured extensively in commission report. The report recreated for his readers the investigators’ terrifying experience below ground, in the darkness of the mineshaft. Going down the pit, “the light diminishing gradually until there is total darkness: when arrive at the bottom … a new world is opened:- there are roads branching out for miles in every direction … exhibiting black, big boned figures, half-naked, working amid the clatter of carriages … the roar of furnace, and the groaning and plunging of steam-engines” (Chadwick 1842: 161-2):

Here we find tens of thousands of our countrymen living apart from the rest of the world … the circumstance surrounding their existence stamping and moulding mind and body with gigantic power … Thus, morally and physically isolated, the collier becomes gregarious and clannish, and is rarely seen by any save those who traffic with him. A stranger, to obtain a view, must go for the express purpose, and at some hour either before they descend or when they emerge from the pit, when he cannot fail to be struck with the gaunt and sinewy form, the black grisly aspect, and peculiar costume of this singular race, who stalk across the fields, clothed in a short jacket and trousers of flannel, with a candle stuck in the hat, and a pipe in the mouth (Chadwick 1842: 159, 161).

Published in April 1842, the commission’s report on the Employment of Children in the Mines of England and Wales was the most widely read government publication of the era. The report, which sold over 10,000 copies, perfected the practice social reportage as a journey of exploration and discovery, featuring shocking depiction of child labor cruelties and dreadful stories about little boys and girls spending most of their time below the earth in hard labor. The strong visual observations in the report were accompanied by sensational illustrations of half-naked women and children pushing trolleys in dark mineshafts, which shocked the British public. The explorative fieldwork of the Mine Commissioners was central to Friedrich Engels’

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9 An interesting indication of the extent to which the Mine investigation had captured the imagination of the British public was a letter sent by Charles Dickens to his friend, the physician and mine inspector Thomas Southwood Smith. Dickens, who read the commission report, sent to him by Smith, asked his friend if he could join him to one of his mine inspections so he could observe the colliers by himself. “Can you tell me of your own knowledge, or through the information of any of the mining subcommissioners, what is the best bleak and barren part? And can you, furthermore, while I am in those regions, help me down a mine?” Smith
decision to write *The Condition of the Working Class in England* in 1844 and inspired him to take to the street of Manchester and devote his “leisure hours almost exclusively to the intercourse with plain working men” (1845: 336). Engels who moved from Germany to Manchester in the midst of the public outcry, triggered by the governmental report, made an extensive use of the commission’s report throughout his book, dedicating a whole chapter to the subject (“The Mine Proletariat”), in which he essentially summarized of the major governmental reports of the time.10

The conditions in some exploration were so rough that it was not unusual for investigators to sacrifice their own health, and sometimes even risk their life, in order to collect the necessary data. As indicated by the report, the conditions in the many of the mines were so taxing “that nearly all of [the inspectors] incurred serious indisposition” (HC 1842 [380], XV: 95). Jelinger Cookson Symons and Samuel Scriven, who were sent to explore the pits in West Riding of Yorkshire, described in a dramatic tone their horrific journey. Symons was slowly descending in one on the pits when “just at the moment of disengaging from the cove [i.e., corf] and chains at the foot of the shaft, all around being dark and dismal enough, a stone, weighing five pounds, fell from near the top, close to [his] feet. Several children have been thus killed.”

The experience led Symons to remark that the colliers “must have strong nerves [descending] a deep shaft, probably much deeper than St. Paul's Cathedral in high” (CEC 1842: 8). Scriven reported on being forced to “creep on my hands and knees the whole distance, the height being

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10 Engels descriptions of the Manchester Slums also used data from Chadwick’s *Sanitary Report* to demonstrate the effects of poor living conditions in industrial cities on death rates. In his introduction to the first German edition of the book, Engels refers to the report as an “authentic source,” noting that “only in England is adequate material available for an extensive enquiry into the condition of the proletariat” (quoted on Goldman 1993: 96). David McLellan, Marx's biographer, writes that Engle's book provided "an empirical basis for several of Marx's later theories. It was the foundation document of what was to become the Marxian socialist tradition" (1993: xix-xx). George Boyer (1998) maintains that the book provided the foundation for the Communist Manifesto as well.
barely *twenty inches*, and then still lower on my breast, and crawled like a turtle to get up to the headings.” He then described a near death experience, being “hurried” through a narrow passage, pushed by a miner, “on a flat board mounted on four wheels” with his “head hanging over the back, and legs over the front of it, in momentary anticipation of getting scalped by the roof, or of meting with the still more serious infliction of a broken head from a depending rock” (CEC 1842: 4; italics in the origin, see also Chadwick 1842: 162).

Captivated by the miners’ unique physical features, investigators set out to explore continuity between workers and nature, observing how miners bodies were hardened and deformed by physical environment and working conditions in the pit. James Mitchell who explored the mines in Leicestershire and south Durham thought that “the colliers, as a race of men, in most districts, and in Durham amongst the rest, are not of large stature, but they always appear strong and vigorous” (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 143). The muscles of the Lancashire children, he observed, were “developed to a degree amounting to deformity ... the muscles of the back and loins stood from the body and appeared almost like a rope passing under the skin.” Smith explained that “the colliers intermarry very much, and some portion of the deterioration in respect to their stature and physical condition is probably congenital” (HC 1842 [382], XVII: 188).

Like Smith, John Leifchild, who investigated the mines of Northumberland and North Durham, thought that the short stature of colliers was “hereditarily transmitted to the children.” Referring to underground working conditions, he noted that “the [coal] hewers ... generally rather stunted and curvilinear, are quite at home. A form like that of a note of interrogation could not be better adapted to these narrow and low passages than the body of a practised hewer.” Leifchild suggested that the colliers’ short stature was an intergenerational phenomenon and that

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11 Serious ailments affected investigators in other commissions as well. In a letter to a friend in 1843 Chadwick described the devastating effect of that the Sanitary investigation have had on the commissioners’ health: “Dr. Playfair has been knocked up by it and has been seriously ill. Mr. Smith has had a little dysentery. Sir Henry de la Bache was obliged in Bristol to stand at the end of alleys and vomit whilst Dr. Playfair was investigating overflowing privies” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 156).
evidence of this “must be looked for and estimated in some of the old collieries where the labour has been the uninterrupted occupation of generations. Conclusions deduced, for example, from the appearance of the work people in the newer collieries ... would be partially fallacious” (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 525).

In 1861, after twenty years' experience of north-eastern mines which made Leifchild an expert in the life of the British “pitmen tribes,” Leifchild explained in an article to the Quarterly Review that, “in the north, where the race has so long continued isolated, the pitman born and bred differs in his configuration from any other operative. His stature is rather diminutive, his figure disproportionate, his legs are more or less bowed, his chest protrudes, and his arms are oddly suspended... In all these particulars we note the hereditary features of a class working in darkness and in constrained positions. Other men could not perform the work, and therefore the descendants of genuine pitmen do not look like other men” (Leifchild 1861: 358-9). However, rather than identifying the selection of a distinct shorter genotype, Leifchild believed that the mining environment exercised a direct physical effect upon heredity in colliery villages. He implicitly accepted the prevailing Lamarckian theory of inheritance which held that environmentally induced effects (e.g., narrow working conditions), or mutilations, could directly influence genetic material, and that that adaptative changes (e.g., shortness), acquired by this means, could be passed to any offspring.

For John Symons, the Colliers’ physical appearance was a source of anxiety generated by gender confusion and sexual abuse. “On descending Messrs Hopwood's pit at Barnsley,” he reports “I found assembled round a fire a group of men, boys, and girls, some of whom were of the age of puberty; the girls as well as the boys stark naked down to the waist, their hair bound up with a tight cap, and trousers supported by their hips ... Their sex was recognizable only by their breasts, and some little difficulty occasionally arose in pointing out to me which were girls and which were boys, and which caused a good deal of laughing and joking.”
In the Flockton and Thornhill pits the system is even more indecent: for though the girls are clothed, at least three-fourths of the men for whom they "hurry" work stark naked ... When it is remembered that these girls hurry chiefly for men who are not their parents; that they go from 15 to 20 times a day into a dark chamber (the bank face), which is often 50 yards apart from any one, to a man working naked, or next to naked, it is not to be supposed but that where opportunity thus prevails sexual vices are of common occurrence. Add to this the free intercourse, and the rendezvous at the shaft or bullstake, where the corves are brought, and consider the language to which the young ear is habituated, the absence of religious instruction, and the early age at which contamination begins, and you will have before you, in the coal-pits where females are employed, the picture of a nursery for juvenile vice which you will go far and we above ground to equal (HC 1842 [381], XVI: 196).

The miners’ “moral nature,” their identity, had been permanently tainted by their wretched conditions of life. Not only did the miners take on the characteristics of their surroundings, those surroundings came to constitute their lived relations to all around them. The influence of material condition of existence on the habits, lifestyles and morals of the lower classes stood at the center of another governmental investigation which took place in 1842: the Sanitary investigations, conducted by the Poor Law Board at the initiative of its secretary, Edwin Chadwick. Like the mine investigation, the Sanitary Investigation was couched in the framework of field exploration and the language discovery. Chadwick’s report indicated that there was a large and almost completely alien urban world that lay just out of sight for many Victorians. His project was to overcome the observational barriers that shield this world from view and to offer it to the public. According to Chadwick, the forcing of the poor into “small rooms and places … that are secluded from superior inspection and from common observation” contributes to the degradation and vices of the lower classes (Chadwick 1942a: 243).

Like the reports of the mine investigator, Chadwick’s Sanitary Report was profoundly visual. His aim was to impress the Sanitary Investigators’ strong and vivid visual experiences on his readers that they cannot doubt his veracity. It is the visual that gives authority. The strong image-like descriptions enabled Chadwick to lead his readers into the visualized scene and to
convince them of its truth. The credibility of the report, in other words, ultimately rested not on its general thesis but on the power of its descriptions.

In the Sanitary report the poor are “inspected” in their dirty neighborhoods, “discovered” and their filthy and crowded homes, and explored through the environmental aspects of their poverty, which exposes the mundane reality of their urban living conditions. The poor who populate Chadwick’s Sanitary report are described in the reality of their unsanitary urban surroundings. They have no individual stories, no essential meaning of their own. They poor their meaning prescribed to them mostly through artifacts which accompanies urban lower class daily life: streets, sewers, privies (outdoor toilets), dungheaps, attire, cottages, cellars, ventilation systems and workshops (Childers 1995: 91). Dirty sewers and cellar, crawling with diseases and pestilence, tarnished cottages, filthy streets are embodied in the individual poor and give them their class identity.

The reports thus depicts an almost symbiotic connection between the poor and their urban environment. “It appears to be a matter of common observation, in the instance of migrant families of workpeople who are obliged to occupy inferior tenements,” writes Chadwick, “that their habits soon become ‘of a piece’ with the dwelling” (1942a: 127; my italics). Their individual identities and their identity as a class both emerged as they are being immersed with multitude of “artifacts of lower class life: “streets, sewers, privies, dungheaps, attire, cottages, and workshops” (Childers 1995: 91). Chadwick describes the case of "a female who had been brought up as a servant in a well-ordered house;" however, after she married, “her personal condition had become of 'a piece' with the wretched stone undrained hovel, with a pigsty before it, in which she had been taken. We found her with rings of dirt about her neck, and turning over with dirty hands Brown's Dictionary, to see whether the newly-elected minister was 'sound' in his doctrine. In this case no moral lapse was apparent, but the children were apparently brought up under great disadvantage” (128-9). In this particular case, the woman’s
education saved her from moral degradation. But in most cases of unsanitary conditions, claims Chadwick, education cannot rescue people from such fate. “That the population so exposed is less susceptible of moral influences, and the effects of education are more transient than with a healthy population” (Chadwick 1942a: 370).

The moral vices and social habits of the lower classes, their “culture of poverty,” both shape and are shaped by unsanitary environmental conditions. On the one hand, unsanitary conditions “are often allowed, from the filthy habits of the inhabitants,” who “throw all kinds of rejected animal and vegetable matters, which then undergo decay and emit the most poisonous exhalations.” These inhabitants “are utterly regardless both of personal and domestic cleanliness, to accumulate to an immense extent, and thus become prolific sources of malaria, rendering the atmosphere an active poison” (Chadwick 1942a: 93). On the other hand, the “defective town cleansing fosters habits of the most abject degradation and tends to the demoralization of large numbers of human beings;” this “adverse circumstances tend to produce an adult population short-lived, improvident, reckless, and intemperate, and with habitual avidity for sensual gratifications” (Chadwick 1942a: 370). Thus, for example, a direct link is drawn between poor ventilation and alcoholism:

In the towns the access of the wind is impeded by the closeness of the surrounding habitations ... The close pent up air in these abodes has, undoubtedly, a depressing effect on the nervous energies and this again, with the uneducated and indeed with many of the educated workpeople has an effect on the moral habits by acting as strong and often irresistible, provocative to the use of fermented liquors and ardent spirits ... it is common facts that the same workpeople indulge more in drink when living in the close courts and lanes of the town than when living in the country (Chadwick 1942a: 129-130).

Some scholars believe that by focusing its attention on the relatively narrow relationship between the agency of the poor - their behavior, habits, lifestyle, and morals - and the small structures of their immediate urban environment, the Sanitary investigation was intentionally ignoring the pollution, wastes and contamination produced by the larger structures of capitalist industrialization: factories, mills, mines or any of the large industry that was changing the face of the urban landscape. The analysis of public health at the level of the urban poor “dwellings, drainage and ventilation” (Chadwick 1942a: 77) is accused of “blaming the victims”: laying the central responsibility for the unsanitary condition in poor neighborhoods on the poor themselves (Childers 1995: chap. 5).
8.4 Governmental Investigators as Authors

As governmental investigations became a common method, social reportage was increasingly connected with the experience of discovery: the exploration of society in remote places, by a few individual investigators, away from public assemblies of witnessing. Within the explorative framework, what made the text seem “true,” were claims based on what the governmental investigator discovered in the field. This emphasis on personal experience, acquired in the field through travel and direct factual observation, sought to recreate the investigators’ experience for the reader as a way of enhancing the credibility and the impact of the reports. And as was often the case, governmental investigator turned to their own impression and feelings. There is little wonder, therefore, that it was not uncommon for governmental investigators to write about themselves, their tasks and performance.

It was the investigator’s own authentic personal experience with social facts, which was primarily responsible for the unfolding of a drama whose moral implications are crucial to the persuasiveness of the report. Because the traveling notebook made the investigator’s own experience and recognition contingent on truth claims, authenticity became a major source of credibility. Governmental investigations participated in framing a category of social knowledge based on authenticity: a mode of persuasion which emerged out of the direct, personal experience of the investigator present in the field and belied by his actual writing activity. The ethos of disinterested, objective judgment in legal proceedings was replaced by a new paradigm of objectivity (Latour 2004b): claim for credibility based on the authenticity generated by a multitude of ‘objects’ (or social facts) – numbers, narratives, diagrams, illustrations, tables, local documents, interviews – taken ‘on the spot’ and then transported from ‘the field’ and transplanted into an official account, in an attempt to recreate for the readers the personal experiences of the investigator in the field.
The degree of independence which the governmental investigator enjoyed “in the field,” was translated into a measure of autonomy in crafting his reports. The process of data collection “in the field” is generally much less “democratic” than access to investigating procedures in parliamentary committees or in the courts of Law. As fieldworkers, the governmental investigators sought to monopolize observational and representational authority. Instead of acting like human stenographs, recording the testimonies of witnesses in remote places, they wanted to exert control and professional credence on their reports by applying different technique of composition and narration. Thus, in addition to using a tabular form to arrange response to written or oral questions, governmental investigators recounted discrete episodes or “case studies” in details. This was often done by breaking witnesses’ responses into short utterances and weaving them as quotations into their own general statements and observations. This way of incorporating voice into a general narrative, integrating verbal and visual information as it were, effectively recreated a sense of realism, which simulated local daily encounters between the investigators and his informants in the proverbial “field” (Roberts 1998). In this process, it was not only the voice of the respondent which was revealed in the text; a second voice was also immediately acknowledge -- that of the reporter-as-author.

Another common practice, which became more and more frequent and habitual as governmental investigations became more established, was to quote from evidence collected in previous governmental or parliamentary reports, or from articles in professional journals, and to combine these secondary sources of evidence with new evidence or with new commentary in light of novel discoveries. Utilizing social reportage as secondary source of evidence helped establish and institutionalized the reports as an archive of social expertise, thus creating a library of social knowledge whose effects, credibility and authority were continuously (re)established through its being a source of reference for new investigations. The following typical excerpt from Chadwick’s sanitary report demonstrates how multiple evidence from numerous sources
were methodically used to compose a persuasive narrative about the sanitary conditions of poor people in Glasgow:

The indiscriminate mixture of people and their children in the immediate vicinity, and often in the same rooms with persons whose character was denoted by the question and answer more than once exchanged, “when were you last washed?” “When I was last in prison,” was only one mark of the entire degradation to which they have been brought … Asking some children in one of the rooms of wynds in which they swarmed in Glasgow what were their names, they hesitated to answer … “The fact is,” observed Captain Miller, the superintended of the police, “they really have no names … or only nicknames like dogs.” There were found amidst the occupants, labourers earning wages undoubtedly sufficient to have paid for comfortable tenements, men and women who were intelligent, and so far as could be ascertained, had received the ordinary education which should have given better tastes and led to better habits. My own observations have been confirmed by the statement of Mr. Sheriff Alison, of Glasgow, that in the great manufacturing towns of Scotland, “in the contest with whiskey, in their crowded population, education has been entirely overthrown.” … The labourers presented to our notice in the condition described, in the crowded districts were almost all Scotch. It is common to ascribe the extreme misery and vice wholly to the Irish portion of the population of the towns in Scotland. A short inspection on the spot would correct this error. Mr. Baird in his report on the sanitary condition of the poor of Glasgow, observed that “the bad name of the poor Irish had been too long attached to them.” Dr. Cowan, of Glasgow, stated that, “From ample opportunities of observation, they appeared to him to exhibit much less of that squalid misery and addiction to the use of ardent spirits than the Scotch of the same grade” (Chadwick 1842a: 131-2).

Note how in the passage above, each observations or hypothesis is immediately followed and corroborated by an external source of evidence. The passage presents a typical usage of various types of evidence produced by a gallery of informants, composed of lay witnesses (children and adults), expert witnesses (medical doctors and police officers) and even a direct quotation from a previous report about the same subject. All were carefully interwoven into Chadwick’s own statements, observations and ad-hoc hypotheses to create a condensed, multilayered and persuasive narrative about the “Effects of Noxious Agencies in depressing Moral Habits” on poor people in Glasgow.13 By injecting into the report the personal experiences of the investigators, Chadwick combined personal narrative and objectified description. This practice of

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13 The reference is to an article by C.R. Baird, C. R., “Observations upon the Poorest Class of Operatives in Glasgow, 1837,” which was published in the Journal of the Statistical Society of London on July 1838.
reportage was very different, for example, from the way travel books of the eighteenth century were written. In these reports personal narrative predominated over description and the two in most cases remained separated (Pratt 1986: 33).

Before publishing his Sanitary Report, Chadwick, who was not especially noted for his writing skills, sent the draft to JS Mill to comment. In April 1842, Mill sent the draft back to Chadwick with his comments and suggestions, advising him how to follow scientific writers such as Comte and to turn his manuscript into a more “effective” report by applying scientific principles of unified authorship:

I have read your report slowly & carefully. I do not find a single erroneous or questionable position in it, while there is the strength & largeness of practical view which are characteristic of all you do. In its present unrevised state it is as you probably aware, utterly ineffective from the want of unity and of an apparent thread running through it and holding it together. I wish you will learn some of the forms of scientific exposition of which my friend Comte makes such superfluous use, & to use without abusing which is one of the principal lessons which practice & reflexion have to teach to people like you & me who have to make new trains of thought intelligible (quoted in Robson 1985: lxxviii).

As Mill implies in the letter, Chadwick was aware that his report was written scientifically enough; he wanted the report to be read like a scientific study and was probably anxious for advice for ways to restructure the arguments and arrange the evidence into a coherent and persuasive narrative. Chadwick certainly believed that his reports made for great reading material. In 1860 he sent Florence Nightingale a copy of his *Rural Constabulary Report* (1839) promising her an interesting read: “Observing from your...attack on the writers of novels that you do read such things, it occurs to me that you want amusing reading occasionally ... Murray, the bookseller, told me that he thought [the Constabulary Report] as interesting as a novel and he proposed to republish it. In it you would find the history of the adventures of young thieves as recounted by themselves” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 56).
Because of the premium placed on exploiting virgin ethnographic fields and the relative privacy of the independently taken field-notes, the observations and interpretations of governmental investigators were less susceptible to scrutiny, validation, or refutation for the simple reason that no one but their ethnographic author commanded the necessary observational and representational authority for the task. But even when the credibility of the investigators was challenged in Parliament, typically by conservative MPs who opposed the proposed reforms of the commissions, the charges frequently worked to reconfirm the new norms of authorial exploration. In May 1843, for example, the conservative M.P. Charles Lennox Cumming Bruce, when introducing an amendment to the Mines and Collieries Act to permit the continued working of women, wished to undermine the credibility of the report, which led to the legislation of the Act.

Cumming Bruce’s chosen strategy was to question the credibility of the governmental investigator as an explorer: the author of one’s own authentic discoveries. What ensued was a parliamentary debate that, in actuality, worked to (re)affirm and to (re)establish the new norms of empirical exploration and discovery through field observations, which were interjected to the political system by governmental investigation. Thus, although the goal of the conservative was to challenge the credibility of the Children’s Employment report, the terms and underlying assumptions, around which the debate was organized, testified to the deep impact that the new norms of governmental investigations were having on parliamentary culture and public culture in general. Voicing a deep concern about what he saw as a new strategy of persuasion by governmental investigation – “communicating information through the eyes” – Cumming Bruce was trying to cast a doubt on the authenticity of the drawings of working women used in the report, questioning whether they were indeed “real pictures” taken on site or rather result of the investigators’ general “impressions:”
For the first time, in any report of evidence presented to the House on a great public question of this sort, the royal road was taken of communicating information through the eye. Engravings were presented for the edification of hon. Members who had no time for reading, or of that still more numerous class who might be frightened by the bulk of two ponderous volumes, exhibiting the women in every possible condition of degradation and suffering. But, surely those who looked at the report, and trusted to it for enabling them to form an accurate judgement, had a right to suppose that those drawings, thus presented in a grave public document, were made from actual observation, and exhibited the result of what the reporter had actually seen; sketches, in short, from nature, taken on the spot. No such thing (Hansard [69] 1843: cols. 440; my italics).

Relying on several letters he received from managers and workers in the mines, which he read to the House, Cumming Bruce continued with the specific example of Robert Franks, who inspected the mines for East Scotland. Franks, claimed the MP, “got all his information by making enquiries above ground.” Franks, he charged, made “his drawings, not of what he had seen,” because “he did not go below ground. He did not see the women at their work. He contented himself with examining such of them as he found accidentally in their houses, or at the pit-mouth” (Hansard [69] 1843: cols. 439; my italics). Franks was blamed for writing his report solely based on conversations and impressions he made “above ground;” his report thus failed to reflect personal, authentic, experience, below ground. Franks was indicted, in other words, for failing to meet the authorial standards of direct observations as criteria for personal authentic experience in the field.

Cumming Bruce’s speech provoked an intense debate in Parliament between conservatives and reformers about the credibility of the Children Employment report. The terms of the debate, however, exposed some important shared assumption about what constitutes a credible visual evidence in field investigations and demonstrated the great extent to which governmental investigations managed to influence parliamentary discourse and reaffirm standards of empirical observations in methods of exploration and discovery. The MPs who participated in the debate all agreed that evidence “from the field” must be “natural;” like a
photo it must be taken “on the spot;” it has to accurately reflect the direct, immediate and unmediated experience of the investigator in the field, it should mediate for the reader what the investigator actually saw in the field; it cannot be based on indirect sources of information, on impressions, on delayed experience, on reflection, on speculation. Under this set of assumptions, there was no substantial difference between natural observations and social observations of workers. Verbal information was therefore redundant; after all, it could not had been translated into a credible visual evidence.

8.4.1 Authorial Representation and Representational Authority

The case of the governmental investigator, translating his personal experience into official text, testifies to the complex condition of authorship under government auspices. The making of the governmental report - its production, publication and dissemination - was ultimately bound up in complex collective procedures, which could obscure agency and exclude individual credit, and which, at the same time, could be used by governmental investigators for personal benefit. As most governmental investigators were not paid for their work, one of their few tangible rewards was to see their report in print; many of them sought to become social experts by using their experience in the field, which was publicly certified by the published report, as a cultural capital. Many of these investigators published their own pamphlets, articles and books about social issues based on their experience as governmental commissioners, thus establishing their reputation as social experts.

In essence, then, the government investigator occupied a dual position, as an official commissioner-reporter and as an individual explorer-author, which indicated both subjugation (reporting to authority) and control (over the text) - two incongruent positions that became
harder to maintain especially when a report was interjected into public discourse. On the one hand, the work of the governmental investigator required that his discourse will influence public opinion in order to be taken up and used on the policy market. It demanded therefore from the governmental investigators the ‘political’ goal of being persuasive and seeking to influence public opinion. This open and public orientation dictated, in turn, the production of highly disposable knowledge production, oriented towards provisional and tightly focused decision-making, which shaped the nature of the investigatory report as an essentially transient text.

On the other hand, government sponsorship of texts could never fully suppress or entirely eliminate personal authorship in official reports nor could it overt subjective language in the text. Many governmental investigators took advantage of their position to become authors and build reputation as social experts. They sought to maintain control over the production, dissemination and circulation of their report so that the investigation will remain identified with them, as their area of specialization, protected from appropriation by their patrons and supervisors (ministers, government) or by powerful political institutions (Parliament, state). The extra-parliamentary nature of the governmental investigation, conducted in the field by individual investigators as self-experienced work of exploration and discovery, enabled the investigators to develop social expertise, exert considerable control over the process of the investigation, and motivated them to increase their production of written account which they later attempted to publish and circulate as their own work. This dynamic tended to encourage the production of long and bulky reports, while working to considerably decelerate the usually fast-paced political decision-making. It was the principle of experiential authority, the methodological norm of authentic unmediated experience of the investigator in the field, which helped investigators to balance between personal and official authority and their opposing requirements, tying them together, as it were into a new framework of scientific authority.
9. From Legal Adjudication to Social Exploration: Governmental Investigations vs. Parliamentary Inquiries

The ascendancy of governmental investigation as an explorative policymaking tool, offered a challenging alternative to the legal adjudicative model of legislation which guided the work of parliamentary committees of inquiry to the parliamentary inquiry. Governmental investigators introduced a new model of social investigation, which challenged parliamentary practices and inspired developments in the phenomenology of evidence. As the process of legislation was increasingly centralized in the executive and communicated to the public, the problem of government gradually came to be thought, reflected and calculated outside the judicial framework; the growing segregation between adjudication and legislation, reflective of the developing division of labor between Parliament and government, facilitated a boundary work between law and society, as the relation between parliamentary inquiries and governmental investigation was increasingly formulated as the relation between legal adjudication and social exploration.

The goal of this chapter is to highlight some crucial differences between these two forms of formal investigations as two contrasting epistemic cultures. So far, despite some studies on specific aspects of governmental commissions or on parliamentary committees, neither of these instruments have been subjected to any systematic analysis regarding their method of operation, nor has it been any serious attempt to compare between these two forms of investigations. As I will show below, the legal model of parliamentary committees of inquiry and the explorative model of governmental commissions of investigations constituted different regime of practices each with its own fact-finding model and conceptions of social knowledge, characterized by specific modes of temporality, visibility and inscriptions.
In the second part of the chapter I will demonstrate these differences by discussing the case of two official investigations – Michael Sadler’s parliamentary inquiry of 1832 and the Factories governmental investigation of 1833. Both dealt with the same “social problem” at almost the same time: the employment of Children and Women in factories and the working condition in the factory system more in general. By examining the ways in which these two bodies conducted their investigations, I wish to highlight some of the basic differences between legal and explorative practices of knowledge production about the social world, and to specify a movement along the political-knowledge continuum from political to a more scientific mode of investigations that occurred in the British political system during the first half of the nineteenth century. In of governmental investigations, problems inspired by common law jurisprudence were translated into empirical framework of statistical explorations. What resulted from this translation was a new positivity of the social, and a gradual discoursive shift from political economy to social economy in relation to which the epistemic properties of the common law tradition became increasingly opaque in the conduct of social investigations.

Before we start, a note of caution is necessary. By underscoring the ascendancy of the governmental investigation on its departure from the legal adjudicative model of the parliamentary inquiry, I do not mean that judicial model of inquiry faded into the background, making way for extra-judicial empirical methods of social explorations. Legal practices of inquiry were not disappearing but rather incorporated, transformed and translated, into a new model of governmental investigations which were constituted as hybrids of political legal and scientific practices.1

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1 According to Foucault, during the nineteenth century, law is becoming more disciplinary and disciplinary power becomes more legalized. Foucault argues that the mechanisms of rule in modern societies are based on this very heterogeneity or hybridity between the legal system based on a concept of sovereignty and a system of disciplinary powers (Foucault 1980a:105-6).
Like select committees of inquiry, governmental commissions, as state-official, policymaking tools, are legally created entities. The law entrusted them with official authority, define their objectives and establish their boundaries. Moreover governmental investigators could not be said to have made a clear break with legal-political epistemology and with some of the main concerns of common law practitioners (e.g., authenticity and close proximity of witnessing). They register continuity and discontinuity, and the struggle of trying to occupy both the position of the legal practitioner and the social practitioner. Thus, before turning to discuss their differences, we should bear in mind that the legal-political process was in no way external to governmental investigations but inherent in them.

One way of conceptualizing governmental investigations is to situate them as liminal institutional settings on the Knowledge-Political Continuum. Functioning as liminal institutional setting between law, politics and science, governmental investigations played an important role in stringing together legal practices of inquiry and disciplinary practices of investigation, juridical with extra-juridical data collection, observational and explorative methods of field investigation with adjudicative procedures of examination. Once it is recognized that the very definition of evidence in governmental investigations was a peculiar hybrid of law and science, it becomes easier to understand how the virtues of authentic witnessing and objective judgment, came to migrate from the legal system to social investigations, translated by governmental commissioners whose new status as social expertise and their reports about social problems had the capacity to bring discussion to an end by delegating the issue to “matters of fact.”
9.1 Representation vs. Exploration

According to Brian Harrison the extra-Parliamentary method of field investigations made “thorough inquiry … easier for royal Commissioners, free as they were to roam about the country and interview informants in less formal situations.” Select committees, by contrast, “could never produce the wealth of information collected by investigators who … engaged in participant observation” (Harrison 1982: 288). The Poor Law governmental investigation, which became a template for most other governmental investigations in the 1830s 1840s, was defended in similar terms by Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In his speech to Parliament on April 1834, Althorp introduced the new measures recommended by the Poor Law Commission, contrasting its report with what was regarded as the manifold shortcomings of earlier parliamentary committees of inquiries on the same subject. The parliamentary inquiry, according to Althorp, lacked both discrimination and breadth of understanding; it was “greatly deficient in facts, while it was abundantly contaminated with opinions,” because the method of inquiry was generally based on collecting information “from gentleman who had come up generally as volunteers to give evidence,” each predisposed towards a particular analysis and a particular program for reform. The governmental investigation, by contrast, with its army of field investigators had provided Parliament with “fifteen volumes of hard facts … indispensably necessary to guide the Legislature to anything a safe and sound system of reformation” (Hansard 1834, XXII: col. 875). This point was frequently articulated by many other Victorian reformers. For example, James Kay, the poor law commissioner, had argued that select committees “are never so minutely accurate as those results obtained from statistical investigation” and consequently “frequently utterly fail … in convincing the public” (Kay 1832: 5).

The parliamentary report and the governmental report entailed two very different modes of reducing events in the world into text. In the case of the parliamentary inquiry, the legal
habitus provided a conceptual framework and *modus operandi* for gaining a direct knowledge of what was true about social reality, of what was what and of how things stood together. For backbenchers such as Richard Cobden, the adjudicative framework of the parliamentary inquiry was “the best tool for promoting legislation,” by which he meant private bills, because it provided a necessary mechanism for settling political disputes fairly and efficiently. “I am of opinion that an inquiry such as I propose would be carried on with more satisfaction and with less loss of time by a Select Committee than by a Commission,” he told the House in March 1844. “There is no tribunal so fair as a Select Committee; Members of both sides are upon it, witnesses are examined and cross-examined, doubts and difficulties are removed, and the real facts are arrived at.” Cobden saw the adversarial process of adjudicative judgment, “where both sides of the story could be heard” as a more reliable method of achieving both truth and justice than governmental investigations. “Before a Select Committee we can obtain as much evidence as we want to show … We may get that evidence in less time and more satisfactorily before a Select Committee than through a Commission” (Cobden 1870: 48).

Moreover, according to Cobden, the immediate and unmediated character of adjudication not only set the condition not for adversarial contestation but also provided an opportunity for true dialogical process of deliberation and of persuasion between conflicting outlooks and opposing parties. Thus, in parliamentary inquiry, landlords may contest the position of farmers about the effect of protectionism on agricultural employment, but they might also be persuaded by the farmers’ “valuable suggestions” and practical experience:

Besides the facts I have stated, if you appoint a Committee, the landlords may obtain evidence which will go far to help them out of their own difficulty—viz. the means of giving employment to the people … You may in a Committee receive valuable suggestions from practical agriculturists—suggestions which may assist you in devising means for providing employment. There may be men examined more capable of giving an opinion, and more competent to help you out of this dilemma (Cobden 1870: 48).
Given the strong influence of partisan politics on the course of the inquiry, Cobden’s enthusiastic depiction of parliamentary inquiries may be seen as naïve or idealistic at best. A very different picture of the working of parliamentary inquiry was drawn by Anthony Trollope in 1857. Trollope’s cynical descriptions of the Limehous Bridge Inquiry portrays parliamentary inquiries as science’s worst epistemological nightmare: a bastion of political calculation, a mode of arbitrariness in which a closed assembly decides, with no other evidence then vocal utterance, and by simple consensus, what should be held as the truth:

And then the committee met, and a lot of witnesses were in attendance. At the close the members met to prepare their report … It was now their duty to decide on the merits of what they had heard, to form a judgement as to the veracity of the witnesses … but not one of them dreamed of being influenced by anything which had been said before them. All the world--that is, all that were in any way concerned in the matter--knew that the witnesses for the bridge were anxious to have it built, and that the witnesses against the bridge were anxious to prevent the building. It would be the worst of ignorance, ignorance of the usage of the world we live in, to suppose that any Member of Parliament could be influenced by such manoeuvres. Besides, was not the mind of each man fully known before the committee met? Various propositions were made by the members among themselves, and various amendments moved. The balance of the different parties had been nearly preserved. A decided victory was not to be expected on either side … A huge blue volume was then published, containing, among other things, all Mr. Nogo's 2,250 questions and their answers; and so the Limehouse and Rotherhithe bridge dropped into oblivion and was forgotten (Trollop 1857: 341-6).

Trollope’s portrayal of the politics of parliamentary committees was shared by many contemporaries who criticized the effectiveness of parliamentary inquiries. As early as 1773, Edmund Burke, noticing the expedition with which the secret committee of 1772-3 reported, cynically remarked that he was “apt to think she was pregnant before wedlock” (quoted in Lambert 1975: 46). Luck Grave Hansard mentioned in his diary that select committees were “so managed that a certain number of members are nominated who engage to act in accordance with the wishes of the mover of the committee” (Hansard 1962: 140). Dickens described their work in *Hard Times* as toil at “the national cinder-heap,” where a member of Parliament could be found
“sifting for the odds and ends he wanted, and ... throwing the dust about into the eyes of other people that wanted other odds and ends” by thus he “in fact resumes his parliamentary duties” (1854: 161). Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1932), saw the legal adjudicative method as an easy way to manipulate evidence and conclusions according to particular political position because it allow the committee to selectively summoning the right witnesses and to guide them in their statements.

Even Marx and Engels, whose work relied heavily on the reports of governmental investigations, had few illusions about the method of inquiry used by parliamentary committees. Referring to the Sadler’s select committee on the factory system from 1832, Engels admitted that its report “emphatically partisan, composed by strong enemies of the factory system, for party ends.” “Sadler,” wrote Engels, “permitted himself to be betrayed by his noble enthusiasm into the most distorted and erroneous statements, drew from his witnesses by the very form of his questions, answers which contained the truth, but truth in a perverted form” (1844: 170). While making extensive use of the 1842 Children’s Employment Commission’s reports, which he praised for their credibility, Marx had nothing good to say about parliamentary inquiries on the same issues. Addressing the 1866 parliamentary report of the select committee on mines Marx wrote:

This Report is the work of a Parliamentary Committee selected from members of the House of Commons, and authorised to summon and examine witnesses. It is a thick folio volume in which the Report itself occupies only five lines to this effect: that the committee has nothing to say, and that more witnesses must be examined! The mode of examining the witnesses reminds one of the cross-examination of witnesses in English courts of justice, where the advocate tries, by means of impudent, unexpected, equivocal and involved questions, put without connection, to intimidate, surprise, and confound the witness, and to give a forced meaning to the answers extorted from him. In this inquiry the members of the committee themselves are the cross-examiners ... the witnesses are mostly working coal-miners. The whole farce is too characteristic of the spirit of capital (1867: 626-7).

By contrast, Marx and Engels praised the reports of governmental commissions, asserting that Britain was the only country in which it possible to locate what they considered to
be authentic, impartial sources for the social study of the proletariat. It is inconceivable that Marx could have written his *Capital* in the form that he took without the reports of British social investigators. In the preface for the first edition, written in 1867, Marx duly expressed his appreciation of “men as competent, as free from partisanship and respect of persons as are England’s factory inspectors, the medical reporters on public health, her commissioners of inquiry into the exploitation of women and children, into the conditions of housing and nourishment and so on.” Recognizing that “the social statistics of Germany and the rest of the Continental Western Europe are, in comparison with those of England, wretchedly compiled,” Marx concluded that Germany’s bad social condition would be exposed only if, “as in England, our governments and parliaments appointed periodically commissions of inquiry” (1867: 91).

Similarly, in his *Conditions of the Working Class in England*, Engels made extensive use of the commissions’ reports, describing them as “authentic sources.” Thus, for example, Engels descriptions of the Manchester Slums used data from Chadwick’s Sanitary Report to demonstrate the effects of poor living conditions in industrial cities on death rates. Engels thought German Socialism suffered from its ignorance of the real world because “only in England is adequate material available for an exhaustive enquiry into the condition of the proletariat” (1845: xxvii). Engels not only depended heavily on the evidence of royal commissions throughout his book (e.g., 1845: 109, 123); the extra parliamentary practices of governmental investigations and their mode of “scientific discovery” influenced Engels’ own choice to study the working class and his preferred method of inquiry: ethnographic method of personal observation in order to write his scholarly report (Magubane 1985).²

² David McLellan, Marx's biographer, writes that Engle's ethnographic study provided “an empirical basis for several of Marx's later theories. It was the foundation document of what was to become the Marxian socialist tradition” (1993: xix-xx). George Boyer (1998) maintains that Engle’s study provided the foundation for the Communist Manifesto as well.
9.2 Verbal vs. Visual Information

Parliamentary committees assembled witnesses collected testimonies on the problem as the committee had defined it, and then wrote a short report about what needed to be done. Their focus was not so much on assuring public confidence in its final report – but in securing the confidence of the public in the inquiry process itself which will then will be hopefully projected to the report as well. The inquiry was thus constructed as an “open court” - they were open to members of all parties as well as to the general public who could witness every piece of evidence, and with the introduction of parliamentary reporters could also be reported in newspapers.

Simulating an adjudicative process, the parliamentary inquiry is geared to generating a situation of immediacy because it lacks external machinery for the externalization of its gaze. This immediacy is contained in the judicial evidence with its immediate cognition (“giving an opinion”) and its insistence that human voice (of the expert) is in itself quite particularly true, and in the adjudicative process with its rules governing what can be seen (known). Functioning as a public tribunal, the visibilities of the parliamentary inquiry simulated the immediate visibilities of the courtroom and its direct knowledge is anchored in specific individuals attuned by oaths to their responsibilities – the witnesses appearing before the committee, and the MPs serving as committee members while assuming the roles of judges, barristers and juries.

The realism of voice and the adjudicative procedures seek to regulate the appearance of the world, not the manner of knowing. Evidence served as much as anything to exclude the world if simulation of immediacy was jeopardized. The inquiry, in other words, is concerned with an immediate knowledge of the world; it does not investigate the world in any positive sense, and propose no world which can be pictured as a result of such investigations. Contrasting the immediacy of legal inquiry with the “long referential chain” of scientific investigations, Latour notes that the “short referential chain,” common to legal adjudication, “would freeze the
blood of a scientist,” whose “objective is always to know more,” by “engaging in research, not judgment.” Thus, unlike the legal practitioner, a scientist “would demand a more direct, richer, and more living, contact with reality! `Let's … go and see what's happening for ourselves, let's do some fieldwork’” (Latour 2004b: 100).

The institution of parliamentary inquiry is therefore located closer to the political pole on our Knowledge-Political Continuum. It functions more as a representative body: a mini-Parliament seeking representational recognition, judgment and justice, rather than a research team whose main goal is to seek the truth by producing new factual information about the world (Cartwright 1975: 226). It was not unusual, therefore, to appoint forty or more MPs to a single committee; the MPs, selected from all parties, served as examiners, official representatives (representing their constituencies and the public at large), and as witnesses to the inquiry, so as to guarantee the widest representation of opinion as possible. Hence, it was almost unavoidable that the conflict between politics and systematic investigations “was perhaps at its most severe with the select committee, which was always liable to be disrupted by political events” (Harrison 1982: 301).

As a result, the parliamentary report functioned mainly as a recording of human voice. Its central goal was to represent a verbatim unaltered, unedited and almost unmediated recording of testimonies. The writing of the report assumed an instrumental and subsidiary role was a mere representation of evidential speech, and it was implied that the representation of evidence was to attain a standard of unbiased mimetic accuracy, on which the credibility of the report was predicated. The problem, however, was the absence of any trustworthy stenographic technology that could accurately record human voice. As we saw in the previous chapters, because there was no reliable way of knowing whether the short-hand transcripts accurately faithfully recorded the inquiry, all those involved in the examination process – witnesses and investigators alike – were given a free hand to make any changes to the questions and answers in the draft transcript as they saw fit. The process of preparing the report thus involved a long chain of mediation which
militated against the supposed immediacy and transparency that characterized the verbal inquiry
of parliamentary committees. Because “there is little or no check on the extent or character of
the alterations,” complained Henry Cole, parliamentary reports assume “when printed, totally
different character, though published as, and ostensibly professed to be, the evidence verbally
delivered to the committee” (1837: 18).

Cole, who as the cataloguer of the Records Commission was the major driving force
behind the establishment of newly created Public Record Office, in which he served as an
archivist, understood well the potential problems engendered by the incompatibility between
verbal examination and its mediation through print.³ Cole insisted that certain types of inquiries,
such as “inquiries into a witness’ conduct, his character, state of intelligence, competency,” can
only be effective “by personal examination and verbal reply:”

The essential worth of such [i.e., verbal] evidence consists in the mode which it
is given. Allow a witness the unbounded and uncontrolled license of making
changes, which the present system allows, and there is no fact ever so clearly
stated at the time of examination that cannot afterwards be mystified; no conduct
undefended before the committee which cannot glossed over and palliated; no
ignorance so gross that it cannot be made to assume the semblance of profound
wisdom; and no stuttering hesitation that may not be metamorphosed into
flippant readiness of speech” (1837: 19).

For Cole the production of the parliamentary report reveals an inevitable conflict between
the verbal mode of the parliamentary inquiry and the evidentiary norms of print culture. In his
conclusion, Cole offers to separate between print and oral cultures of inquiry or evidentiary
paradigms. He asks the members of Parliament to reconsider "whether this viva voce mode of
taking evidence might not for some inquiries be exchanged for a better.” He suggests that
“investigations of character” would be conducted verbally, whereas “scientific investigations”
would be conducted in writing. According to Cole, “in matters of science,” which involve “long

³ In the 1840s Cole was the an advisor for Prince Albert who appointed him as the chief executive of the
Great Exhibition of 1851. In 1853 Cole became the secretary of the Science and Art Department (a position
he shared with Leon Playfer) and was later appointed to the head of the South Kensington Museum.
trains of reasoning and logical deduction, written questions and written answers would be more efficacious than the present mode; and if the facts on which the opinions proceeded appeared disputable, a viva voce examination might be superinduced. Under all circumstances, both modes should retain their distinctive features. At present the professed viva voce examination is a mongrel of both, besides being subject to the disadvantages before spoken of” (1837: 23)

Drawing a clear distinction between speaking and writing as different modes of persuasion, Cole argues for an irreconcilable discrepancy between parliamentary inquiries and governmental investigations. In verbal examinations there is no temporal or spatial distance between speaker, speech, and listener, since the speaker hears himself speak at the same moment as the listener does. The value of parliamentary inquiries stems exactly from the fact that that both speakers and listener are present to the utterance simultaneously. Whether or not perfect understanding always occurs in fact, the immediacy of the verbal adjudication seems to guarantee the notion that all those involved in the inquiry, mean what they say, say what they mean and know what they have said (Johnson 1981).

Governmental investigations challenge the security of the parliamentary inquiry’s immediate link to reality. By relying on written testimonies and written field observations the governmental reports deliberately distanced the evidence from the immediacy of speech. Governmental investigations thus constructed a new epistemic style of exploration which generated a ‘positive’ knowledge about the world as it is, and constituted a new way of thinking about writing and its relationship to human utterance. Instead of serving as “voice recorder,” the commission report was a work of composition through exploration. The governmental report affords a way of avoiding or displacing problem of personal judgment. It is no longer a matter of individuals judging other individuals face-to-face but of social observations “taking the shape of a flat surface of paper.” As Latour points out, “many things could be done with this paper world that cannot be done with the world” (Latour 1987: 226, 227).
There are, therefore, considerable differences between governmental investigations and parliamentary inquiries in their approaches to fact-making. The construction of facts in parliamentary inquiries proceeds through a formal ritualized courtroom to establish facts correctly but only as an adjunct to their more general objective of settling disputes fairly and efficiently. Truth must be connected to judgment and justice. What the parliamentary inquiry “knows” is a function of what the witnesses in its proceedings choose to relate in the answer to questions posed by the members (simulating the role of lawyers and judges), and that evidence is a sworn testimony. Evidence in the legal epistemology of the parliamentary inquiry is simply the composite of testimony presented in and around adjudicatory proceeding.

The facts constructed in parliamentary inquiries are thus necessarily different from the facts that the extra-parliamentary form of governmental investigation can construct as a persuasion tool in their own procedurally distinct surrounding. The constitutional status of governmental investigations, which neither subordinates them to any other body nor constrains theirs procedure, makes them a more flexible instrument than the parliamentary inquiry. This constitutional advantage is expressed first and foremost in the fact that unlike parliamentary inquiry, governmental investigations were not confined to Westminster and the parliamentary session. The extra-parliamentary form of governmental investigations bring distant objects close to hand through their reports making the world simultaneously knowable and known.

The extra-parliamentary principle structured not only the format of governmental investigation but also the preparation of the governmental report for publication. In parliamentary report-writing is infused with orality and print is a mere representation of vocal articulation evidential speech. If in parliamentary inquiries meaning is seen to reside in speech (in testimonial evidence), then the writing and printing of parliamentary reports must assume an instrumental and subsidiary role as a recording device in order to more faithfully register those vocal meanings. Printers of parliamentary reports toiled hard to provide facsimile in print of the
original transcripts, so as to simulate the authentic recordation of voice in the printed page; they were not allowed to deviate from the form or even the size of the original manuscript. Published in the standard folio format, most of the parliamentary documents therefore were not offered for mass distribution (Frankel 2006). Governmental report transformed this publication process of official documents, playing a central role in displacing of the state archive outside of Parliament. If parliamentary reports were published mostly “for the record” and mainly as a reference, governmental reports were published mainly to influence public opinion and their publication process was therefore much more attuned to their prospective usage as reading material.

The appearance of governmental reports indicated a shift in the practices of official publications from print as copy-making (mimetic accuracy) to print as a claim for a corporate, commanding authorship. Part of this shift flew directly from the organization of their production and distribution. In an effort to make their reports more marketable but at the same time more authoritative, governmental commissioners needed a different materiality and epistemology of representation. They found it in the material format of the octavo-sized books, or ‘blue book’, which at the time were used mostly for publishing fiction (novels) and other works of popular literature. Using a private publisher instead of official parliamentary printer, the governmental commissions functioned as an autonomous publishing unit, making most of the typographical decisions regarding the size of type, margins, and division of page. Unlike the condensed page and small font of the parliamentary report and other parliamentary documents, which were printed on large folio sheets, governmental report were prepared so that the letters were large and the page elegant and printed in small portable book format to increase their public appeal and make their reading as easy and fluent as possible. This typographical design of the governmental report, which emphasized readability over recordation and reference, took its queue from novels as well as from the periodical reviews and literary magazines such as the
*Economist* or the *Spectator* that were both literary and informational (Frankel 2006). There seemed to be a correspondence between the desire to make governmental reports more portable and the idea that movement was inherent not only to the phenomenology of *reporting* (through travels of exploration) but to the materiality of the *report* itself.

Once devised, printed and disseminated as books there was an expectation that governmental reports would be similarly consumed. Such market appropriation of official publications was encouraged by government for it was argued that these documents were initially printed for the sake of their diffusion. Parliamentary reports were distributed to a small number of people, mostly politicians and administrators and were read whenever one found the time to read the latest report or when one sees that article or report. Governmental reports arrived in quite different way. From 1835 they were distributed through the system of bookstores. The key gate-keeping was thus performed by booksellers who are attentive to commercial concerns. Because of their book format governmental reports were reviewed in a wide range of journals, newspapers and magazines; they were advertised in trade as well as scholarly journals as well as catalogs. They were displayed at professional meetings. Thus citations and word to mouth complement a well-organized system for drawing attention to books. Because they were often mentioned in parliamentary debates which were reported constantly through the regular distribution of newspapers, governmental reports also enjoyed the status of regular visibility which ordinary books rarely did. Compared to the blue books the discussion of parliamentary paper is a relatively a rare event. This cross cutting consideration in the publication of blue books affects their visibility.

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4 From the folio to smaller formats, a hierarchy existed that linked the material format of the text, its genre and the way it was consumed (the moment and mode of its reading). In the eighteenth century, Lord Chesterfield bore witness to this fact: “Solid folios are the people of business with whom I converse in the morning. Quartos are the easier mixed company with whom I sit after dinner; and I pass my evenings in the light, and often frivolous chitchat of small octavos and duodecimos” (quoted in Chartier 1998: 167). This hierarchy distinguished the book that had to be laid flat in order to be read; the humanist book, which was more manageable in its medium format and suitable for both classic and newer texts; and the portable book with multiple uses and more numerous readers.
9.3 Stenography vs. Authorship

Until the appearance of governmental investigations, most social policy issues either were raised as part of a parliamentary debate or were testified before the assembled body of parliamentary select committees, where both parliamentary reporters and MPs could witness the debate or testimony. The Parliamentary report was little more than a stenographic recordation that such an event took place and was witnessed by an assembled body of gentleman-politicians. It contained a verbatim recordation of the verbal exchanges which was appended to it, titled “evidence.”

Parliamentary committees did not know quite what to do with this data they had recorded. They did not attempt to synthesize the information they gathered and often tended to merely summarize the content all their questions and testimonies, witness by witness, county by county, for hundreds of pages (Poovey 1998). Because meaning was seen to reside in the testimonial evidence itself, the writing of the report naturally assumed an instrumental and subsidiary role as a recording device in order to more faithfully register those vocal meanings. The main goal of the committee’s report was not so much to persuade its readers about the credibility of the committee’s policy decisions, but to record that a ritual of public persuasion had already taken place during the hearing of witnesses by the parliamentary committee.

The credibility of the parliamentary inquiry rested heavily on the communal witnessing of its adjudicative procedure by official representatives and prestigious figures, and not so much on the dissemination of its final reports, or on the reputation of its expert witness. The large number of parliamentary members from all parties who were selected to serve on each committee was aimed at guaranteeing the principle of representation - witnessing and by acting as political representatives of their constituencies and of the public at large official representatives - often at the expense of efficiency. Witnesses no matter how esteemed, could
always be opposed by equally impressive witnesses who attest to the contrary. In parliamentary inquiries, it was the performative display of the verbal examination, its visibility and transparency that was responsible for organizing the procedures of marshaling evidence, and which played the most essential part of truth-making, as it assured that persuasion occurred in the course of the inquiry itself, and thus conferred credibility its results. The immediacy of the investigation demanded the public visibility of its actual procedures and modus operandi both as a mode of persuasion and as a source of legitimacy.

No longer performed in public, governmental investigations increasingly became a private affair, and their reports were composed as an assemblage of explorative journeys of several itinerant investigators working for the same commission. Consequently, the credibility of the investigations shifted from the public visibility of its procedures and methods of operations to its final product: the written account in the official report. In this new economy of trust, the governmental report became the central persuasive mechanism of the investigations and its major source of credibility and public legitimacy. Since neither the reader nor any official representatives on his behalf, except for the field investigators themselves, have witnessed the series of social explorations which compose the official account, it is the governmental report itself which stood in place of the witness. The report mediated between the readers and the experience of the investigator in the field, and the reading public became (virtual) witness to this experience only through the written account. In order to earn the trust of the reader, the story of the experiments must be told (composed) persuasively because the written account became the main source of persuasion.

As more governmental investigations were conducted in the field for the purpose of discovering “new facts” about social problems, social reportage was increasingly connected with the investigator’s own authentic personal experience of social exploration, and sought to recreate this authentic experience for the reader as a way of enhancing the credibility and the
impact of the reports. *Authenticity* thus became a major source of credibility, replacing the ethos of disinterested, *objective* judgment in the semi-legal proceedings of parliamentary committees.

An experiential “I was there” element, implicit in the report, established the investigator’s unique position as an author and conferred his observations with scientific authority. In assembling and translating his personal experience as a field investigator into an official account, the reporter assumed a role of an author, offering his reader the illusion of full and direct access to the field of investigation. The effort to construct the governmental report as a persuasive device, as part of the commission’s policy campaign, demanded, in other words, a strong sense of *authorial representation*: a stable narrator who enters the field, gathers and analyzes the data, and then reports the findings.

In this sense, governmental investigations were performances which served to authorize a form of social discourse (Ashforth 1990). For governmental commissioners, the field investigations represent both a form of truth and knowledge and a certain ethical authority, a certain right to speak. The status of the commissions’ credibility is at once epistemological and ethical (cf. Osborne 1999). Their credibility is *epistemological* because they are a site of particular kinds of knowledge, particular styles of reasoning that are associated with it; their credibility is *ethical* because knowledge generated through personal experiences in the field is a sign of authenticity, of authority, of a certain right to speak, a certain kind of author-function.

9.4 A case Study: Sandler’s Committee vs. the Factory Commission

During 1831, workers in most of the major industrial towns started forming *Short Time Committees*. These committees held public meetings and signed workers on petitions to Parliament in an effort to promote a bill restricting child labor in what became known as the
Ten-hours movement. On March 16, 1832 Michael Sadler, an MP for Newark who became the main spokesman for the movement, introduced legislation that proposed limiting the hours of all workers under the age of eighteen to ten hours a day. In April 1832, Sadler was made chairman of a parliamentary inquiry and for the next three months his select committee interviewed 89 witnesses and published a report in favor of Sadler’s Bill. 5 The report, which got enormous public attention, drew a dreary picture of cruelty, misery, disease and deformity among the factory children.

On 14 March 1833 Lord Ashley, who replaced Sadler as the spokesmen for the Ten-hours movement in Parliament after Sadler lost his seat in general elections of December 1832, presented a Bill to regulate the labor of children in factories. The Ten Hours Bills proposed the same regulation recommended by the Sadler's committee: no child should be employed under the age of nine, no person between the ages of nine and eighteen was to be employed for more than ten hours a day and eight hours on Saturday, and there was to be no night work (from 7pm to 6 am) for anyone under the age of twenty-one.

In response, the parliamentary opposition to the Bill, arguing from the dangers of foreign competition and the desirability of child labor as the lesser evil to starvation, demanded the governmental commission will be appointed before voting such bill on the ground that the Sadler's committee had not taken evidence from the manufacturers and thus been biased in its findings. Speaking on behalf of the manufacturing interest-groups, MP Wilson Paterson Patter claimed that it was necessary to ensure that the matter was “better understood” by submitting it to governmental investigation, and that it is essential to clear the reputation and characters of the employers “from these imputations, which seemed to be cast on them by the friend of this measure, but which further evidence could be proved to be utterly unjustifiable” (HC 1833 XVI: 640-1).

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5 Select Committee on Labour of Children in Factories, HC 1831-2 XV (hereafter “Sadler's Committee”).
Paterson’s motion prevailed by one vote (74 to 73). The appointment of the Factory Commission considerably altered the situation in the House, enabled government to take the initiative away from the Ten Hours Movement and take control of the factory legislation in Parliament while short-circuiting the balance of parliamentary opinion. Anxious that the proposed commission will serve as a political tool to bury the bill, Lord Ashley, urged the House to place on it “medical men of the highest skill and eminence” (HC 1833 XVII: 114-5). The appointment of the Factory Commission on April 19, 1833 was met with strong disapproval by the Ten Hours Movement. MP Richard Oastler, the leader of the Ten Hours Movement, condemned the investigations as “a trick of the government,” intended to serve “their dear friends the capitalists” and denounce the commissioners as “a set of Briefless barristers and of Feeless doctors” (quoted in Ward 1962: 97).

There was, however, another, more principal, objection to establishment of the factory commission which relied on the adjudicative epistemology of the common law tradition. The Fraser’s Magazine, for example, published a provocative article against the Factory Commission under the heading The Commission for Perpetuating Factory Infanticide. The article argued that Sadler’s evidence should be regarded as conclusive and final proof because witnesses had testified before a “competent and orderly court” and any retrial, especial under the unprecedent forms of a royal commission, would be inappropriate. Under this legal conception of enquiry, a case once subjected to judgment and decided upon cannot be re-opened to allow for new evidence to be introduced. Legal adjudication is not an ongoing process of inquiry; once judgment was passed, there is nothing more to discuss.

On the other side, employers’ representatives in Parliament have emphasized the biased questioning of witnesses in Sadler’s committee, and the anecdotal and impressionistic nature of many of its statements. They charged that the recruitment of witnesses was carefully organized

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by the short-time committees and much of the questioning draw on a stock of distinctly leading questions. Robert Greg, the author of *The Factory Question* accused Sadler of giving to the world "such a mass of ex-parte statements and of gross falsehoods and calumnies as probably never before found their way into any public document" (1837: 7). Even Engels criticized Sadler’s committee of being “emphatically partisan … composed of strong enemies of the factory system,” and concluded that Sadler was led astray by his “enthusiasm into [making] the most distorted and erroneous statements, drew from witnesses by the very form of his questions.” Sadler, according to Engels, asked witnesses questions in such a way that manipulated them to give answers in accordance with the committees anti-factory agenda (1898: 192). In response, supporters of the bill argued that the representation of structured partisan interests was a normal feature of the parliamentary inquiry’s *modus operandi* and although the committee was certainly loaded with Sadler’s allies, it did also include, for example, Poulett Thomson, Robert Peel and Thomas Gisborne, all committed, in varying ways, to political economy and manufacturing interests.

The contested nature of social knowledge formed a recurring sub-text to he conflict between Sadler’s committee and the proposed governmental commission. This conflict underscored the Parliamentary inquiries and governmental investigations as competing models for truth-making, representing alternative ways of seeing the factory and its problems.

The analysis below is concerned with ways in which these alternative conceptions of social investigations, were formulated and negotiated as politicians were seeking to appropriate social issues and use them as platforms for their political agenda.
9.4.1 Investigating Conditions at the Factories: Exploration vs. Adjudication

The legal overtones of the Sadler’s Committee, its references to trials, witnesses, and testimony, are hard to ignore. In essence, the committee saw its central role in staging a *public enunciation*, for the benefit of the legislature, of what was already known in the localities. It was organized as a public tribunal, providing a platform for popular agitation of the unheard voices of the working class, organized and led by the ten-hour movement, ranging from factory operatives to medical men, clergy and propertied philanthropists, each presenting its prepared case to the committee according to the adjudicative model of legal examinations. Witnesses, most of them adult-male factory workers, were recruited by the *Short-Time Committees* network, which prepares them for the proceedings at Westminster and paid their travel expenses. This operation was directed the orchestrated by Sadler’s, according to specific guidelines. The *Short-Time Committees* were asked to select the most recognized, and in some sense elected, representatives of their trades and communities: “Overlookers Operatives, and others who work, or have worked in Factories of various descriptions affected by the Bill.” As a confidential memorandum, on the selection and briefing of witnesses “in preparation for evidence for the parliamentary select committee,” advised: “it is desirable that this class of witnesses should be of various ages, and as far as can be, persons who themselves, or by their children, have been considerable sufferers by the system. They will have to give evidence from their own knowledge” (Driver, 1946: appendix B).

In the committee’s testimonial hearings at Westminster, these witnesses were routinely asked to comment on general opinion in their localities. The testimony of James Hanson, a plumber and a brazier from Yorksheir, exemplifies a typical exchange: “Having had very

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7 Confidential memorandum “in preparation for evidence for the parliamentary select committee, 1832, 552: guidelines to short-time committees on selection and briefing of witnesses."
extensive intercourse with them, do you believe that their views and feelings upon this subject have been taken up suddenly, or that hey are likely … to be laid down again? – I think they so well understand the situation in which they are placed, that they are fully convinced that ten hours are quite sufficient, and will ultimately give them all the benefits of their labour, rather than any longer hours” (HC 1831-1832, XV: q. 9123).

The justification for the public tribunal as a model for truth-making, were testimonial hearings are taken in public and subjected to attestive judgment was based on a “common sense” epistemology which militated against the notion of expertise. As the Manchester Short-Time committee declared in one of its pamphlets “the simple proposition, whether young persons during the period of growth, should be requiered to labour more than Ten Hours a day … requiered nothing but common sense, and a disposition to do justly, and to love mercy.”

The Factory commission, by contrast, was based on a model of social exploration. The three Commissioners - Thomas Tooke, Edwin Chadwick and Thomas Southwood Smith - and the twelve Factory inspectors who comprised the Factory commission, presented themselves as “disinterested men, cool, analytical, and unsentimental” (quoted in Ward 1962: 94). The commissioners’ task was to prepare a general report and to frame instructions for the twelve factory inspectors, who were assigned to inspect hundreds of factories in four district covering the entire territory of England and Wales, to collect information in groups of three, in each group there was one inspector with medical training.

As the Commission’s report indicates, the Factory investigation was driven by larger ambitions than to allow the employers to present their case. The Factory commission were not uncritical of the factory conditions and their report did not amount to whitewashing of the

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8 Manchester Short-Time Committee. 1833. “Protest against the Parliamentary Commission, to collect further evidence on the factory system” (signed: George Higginbottom, chirman). [Br. 558 (12)] The Oastler collection, Item # 28202.
manufacturers, as the Ten Hours Movement had feared. With an implied contrast to Sadler’s committee, the commissioners presented their first report as “a full exposition of the condition of factories in the different districts of the kingdom” (HC [450] 1833 XX: 7; my italics). The report claimed that working condition do indeed deserve criticism but this was on grounds that bad conditions led to an unavoidable wastage of human resources rather than to moral or spiritual degradation. From this socio-economic perspective, factory children were categorized as waged workers and forced into unequal exchanges of increased effort and productivity for inadequate payment, rather than simply victims of random cruelty.

The central thrust of the investigation was to identify problems requiring intervention, but to dissociate this from radical critiques of the “factory system” as such. As the famous poor law and sanitary investigator James Kay, argued in the preface to his well-known 1832 study of *The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes Employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester*, most of the ‘evils’ that can be identified are “so far from being necessary consequence of the manufacturing system,” but “have a remote or accidental origin, and might, by *judicious management* be entirely removed” (Kay 1833: 15; italics in the origin). The failure of parliamentary committees to provide accurate depiction of social condition in the factories “as they really were,” prompted Kay to attack their general method of inquiry:

> When any emergency demands a special inquiry, information is obtained by means of committees of the Commons, whose labours are so multifarious, as to afford them time for little else than the investigation of general conclusions derived from the experience of those supposed to be most conversant with the subject. An approximation of truth may thus be made, but the results are never so minutely accurate as those obtained from statistical investigations; and as they are generally deduced from a comparison of opposing testimonies, and sometimes from partial evidence, they frequently fail in the most important respect, namely - in convincing the public of the facts which they proclaim (Kay 1832: 19).

In effect, the report gave, for the first time in British history, an official seal of approval to an organized working class opinion and interest by recognizing the network of short-time committees - “that class of men who entitle themselves, unfortunately with some truth, the delegates of the workpeople” - as a movement representing factory workers’ agitations and claim-making (Factory Commission 1833: 44).
For Kay, at its best, parliamentary inquiry is only capable of little more than general conclusion and approximation of truth because of the natural limitations of their adjudicative method of inquiry. By contrast, his study of workers in the factory districts of Manchester and Lancashire, “have avoided alluding to evidence which is founded on general opinion, or depends merely on matters of perception (1832: 72). Kay started his career as a social investigator in 1827 as a medical officer affiliated with dispensaries in a poor, overcrowded district of the city, where he gained an extensive and direct experience of the lives of the urban poor. During the Cholera epidemic of 1832 he served as secretary of the local Board of Health and took part in its survey of the extent and spread of the disease. The survey enabled Kay to gain access to reliable and verifiable statistical data (“vital statistics”), while providing him with a valuable ethnographic experience with “social problem.” He was thus better able to appreciate the connection between methods of collecting and assessing statistical information and the experience of using this information to solve social problems. Kay, therefore, insisted on corroboration by statistical verification; one observer’s perception is not enough: the evidence must be observable, recordable and recurring. Proper Social investigation must therefore include a systematic compilation of various different observations in different locations by different investigators, to establish a trend or a tendency and thus discursively solidify a representation of the reality of the social problem under investigation.10

This model of social investigation guided the factory commissioners; their report can be read as an elaboration of Kay’s propositions. One strategy used by the commission to identify problems for intervention was to compare factory with other employments, and compare working conditions in larger and smaller factories. Foreshadowing the agenda of subsequent

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10 The experience which Kay thus gained of the conditions of the poor in the Lancashire factory districts, together with his interest in economic science, led to his appointment in 1835 as poor law inspector in Norfolk and Suffolk and later in the London districts. Kay served as a sanitary commissioner in 1838 and in 1839 he was appointed first secretary of the committee formed by the Privy Council to administer the Government grant for the public education in Britain.
investigations the commissioners compared between factory work and other employments of children, such as mining, domestic weaving, framework knitting, and lace-running, concluding that factory work was “amongst the least laborious … and the least unwholesome,” and thus helping to establish a more favorable view of the factory. The commissioners further concluded that factory conditions work to the advantage of the large, technically rational factory, observing that “where the harshest treatment of children has taken place, the greatest number of bad cases occurred in the small obscure mills belonging to the smallest proprietors” (HC [450] 1833 XX: 16-18, 20). Through the “statistical” use of this comparative framework, the identification of problems for intervention dissociated from any systematic critique of industrial capitalism, and helped establish the superiority of the large and well-regulated factory as the site of social and moral improvement, as well as the symbol of economic progress.

The Investigation of the Factory Commission not only shaped the political and discourse about the factory question but also set the pattern for future practices of social exploration by governmental investigation, sending investigators “to the field” to collect empirical data through empirical observations of social problems in their local sites. It was the first to introduce a strategic use of ethnographic field methods, guided by a utilitarian approach to social problems, which militated against the adjudicative methods and legal principle of public hearings used in parliamentary inquiries. The public tribunals as a model of inquiry was replaced with “on the spot” filed observation mediated by the self experience of a considerable number of investigators who was touring the country and closely inspecting the working condition in factories and recording them in writing. Edwin Chadwick who was responsible for formulating a set of official instructions for the factory inspector – an innovative procedure which was quickly adopted by future commissions – ordered the investigators “to take their evidence in their own handwriting, behind close doors, and on no account to make it public” (Finer 1951: 54). The final report was constructed as a compilation of the individual reports of governmental
investigators which were collected in the field and sent back to the commissioners in London. As such, the factory reports were composed as “authentic” accounts, mediating reality for the reader through the investigators’ self-experiences, which were at the same time internally referential, verifying themselves with repetitions of similar accounts by the different investigators reporting from different localities (Childers 1995: 82).

Another investigative strategy used by commissioners was an innovative use of medical expertise within the utilitarian framework of social economy. Sadler’s parliamentary committee made many interviews with medical experts and used them extensively in its evidence but experts’ opinions were used only as a symbolic endorsement to views about the destructive effect of long working hours which were already considered by the committee to be ‘common sense’. In the factory commissions, medical expertise was incorporated, for the first time, with the organizing principles of social economy, and used, to generate climate of concerns in which moral order, improved health and productive efficiency went together and pointed out the need for ameliorative intervention. The factory investigation strung together laws of capital accumulation, medical data, demographic data, physical geography, climate and other environmental factors in the topography of the town. Childhood, female puberty and reproduction were often presented as “vital economy” to oppose and to set limits to political economy (Gray 1996: 83).

As the Factory commission soon realized, the practicality of medical expertise is bound to find itself at odds with the abstract rules of political economy. If medical expertise could convincingly assess the adverse effects work in unsanitary on workers’ health, the optimal length of working day was out of the scope of medical opinion. The Factory commission insisted testing the empirical connection between hours of work and health, rejecting the

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11 Sandler’s medical witnesses included five practitioners from manufacturing towns, and no less than sixteen from London. Experts were normally asked a standard question “what your opinion will be, appealing to the general principles of your profession.” (e.g., Sadler’s committee 1832: q. 10898).
“commonsensical” approach of Sadler’s committee for establishing such a connection. As James Williamson argued in his statement for the Factory Commission, “as a physician I cannot assert that any uniform limitation of hours is essential to the physical health of children” (HC [519] 1833, XXI). It became obvious that the urging question of whether a child should labour twelve hours a-day and be sufficiently fed, or ten hours a-day and be insufficiently fed could not be answered on medical grounds, as Sadler’s committee supposed. The question needed a new model of analysis, where medical data was only one factors interacting with other social and economic variables (Gray 1996: 83). It quickly became obvious to the commissioners that such a model is not readily available to be imported form outside but needed to be developed in the course of the investigation. In 1833 the factory investigators Chadwick, Power and Tuffanel were facing a similar problem in their investigations into pauperism for the poor law commission. It was the commitment of these investigators and others to finding practical solution to the pauperism and child labor through empirical social exploration which eventually led to the structuration of social economy as a new file of expertise. Obviously, the structuration of this new domain of knowledge was not explicitly articulated as governmental investigators were focused on practical objectives.

In their first report, the Commission recommended that the ten-hours work day should not extended beyond the age of thirteen. Until they reached that age (‘young persons’), children were not free agents and in fact required according to the commission more protection than Ashley's bill had given them. The commissioners thus favored an eight-hour day between the ages of nine and thirteen; after that age protection should cease and contracts should be freely negotiated. The report was especially critical of the failure of Ashley's bill to ensure that legislation should be enforced. There was, the report argued, little point in leaving enforcement in the hands of parents and employers who had interest in evading the requirements, rather, enforcement through state intervention should be put in the hands of disinterested parties. The report therefore recommended
the appointment of inspectors and the introduction of various registration and certification procedures to see that the legislation was implemented. The mechanism of inspection galvanized the *ad hoc* investigative work of the governmental commission within a permanent administrative structure of the state; it thus made social investigations an ongoing monitoring effort of knowledge production, organization and dissemination.

With the publication of the Commission’s First Report in June 28 1833, a new bill was introduce by Lord Althorp, the Whig Chancellor, and was quickly passed. The Act stipulated a maximum of eight hours and compulsory schooling for children (age 9-12), together with a twelve-hour day for “young persons” (age 13-17); it required that factory children should be educated for two hours every day and that four factory inspectors were appointed to enforce the Act. The Act was applied to all textile production using powered machinery, but excluding lacemaking, bleaching, and dyeing and with modifications in silk.

### 9.4.2 The Contest over Authoritative Social Knowledge

A wide-spread popular protest campaign, organized by the *Ten Hours Movement*, which included enunciations and even threats of violence, welcomed the Factory Commissioners. The Short Time Committees called for demonstration whenever governmental investigators appeared and a broadsheet warned commissioners: “Have you made your wills?” (Ward 1962: 92). At a subsequent Huddesfield meeting organized by the local Short-Time committee, doll figures of two commissioners were burnt. The parish minister and economist, Thomas Chalmers who was witnessing the scene from his hotel window noted: “The spectacle, I am sure, is a depraving one, and fitted to prepare the actors for burning the originals” (Driver 1946: 236). Such local
confrontations, linking attempts to renegotiate working practices to popular politics and demands for legislation, recurred during the following two decades.

In Leeds, commissioners Drinkwater and Power were engaged in a pamphlet-war with Sadler who accused the governmental investigators of deviating from the accepted rules of adjudicative parliamentary examination in their refusal to stenograph the entire exchange between them and their witnesses (see Sadler 1833a, 1833b). Sadler accused the commissioners of holding their proceedings in secret and contended that the method of their investigation is a direct assault against “our most ancient and venerated institutions, our courts of justice” (Sadler 1833a: 6). “I would also remark, that your method, independently of other consideration, is most objectionable as being different to that of the select committee of the House of Commons. The minuteness with which the evidence of the operatives was taken down and published [by the select committee], has exposed them to the most rigorous scrutinies” (Ibid: 8). Insisting on the superiority of the method of common law adjudication for social inquiry, Sadler added:

I confess that I have heard no judges who follow the course which you prescribe, but those, perhaps, of the Inquisition. The notes taken of judicial evidence are often short, because they are principally for the purpose of assisting the memory of the judge, or for occasional reference afterwards; but, different to yours, their correctness is guaranteed by both the press and the public. But the reports of your proceedings should have been made in full, as their object ought to have been the satisfaction of Parliament and the people at large. And it was essential that the interrogatories should have been also given verbatim, so as to have shown the nature and animus of the whole inquiry (Ibid: 7; my italics).

I confess that you argued little, but dealt copiously in persuasives (sic) grounded upon your avowed candour and personal respectability in order to induce us to accede to your scheme of proceeding … but private respectability and public confidence are held to be very distinct things in this, and, I believe, in most other countries … Our confidence in the Judges of the land, and of the juries who assist in the administration of justice, is all but unbounded, but it would be instantly withdrawn, nor could it be restored, were they determined to conduct their proceedings as you do, in secret. (Ibid: 9-10)

Indeed if I understand (and a mistake on a point of jurisprudence, would in me be venal,) that in a Chancery Commission to inquire, it has been declared a misdemeanor, to go apart in another room with either the parties to consult; and I can hardly think it legal … that this Commission should examine witnesses … in private; much less call upon certain of them to answer a second and third time, upon fresh interrogatories (Ibid: 13)
In the Commons, Lord Ashley raised similar criticism against the methods used by the Factory Commission. Ashley protested the carelessness and the disrespect that the commissioners have shown in their treatment of verbal evidence. He objected that testimonies were taken in private and not recorded by verbatim by a sort-hand writer. Members of Parliament had the right, Ashley argued, to expect that the whole testimonies should be laid on the table of the House (Hansard 1833, XVIII: 305-6; 914-15). It appears that workers were “judged in secret,” he wrote in The Standard, “and nothing of their testimony will be reported except the 'substance'!” This, he felt, clearly opened up the possibility that the evidence might be “transformed in passing through the minds of selfish and partial and perhaps interested political Economists!” (quoted in Finlayson 1981: 79).

Referring to the case of Joseph Habergam, one of sadler’s witnesses repeatedly reexamined by factory commissioner Drinkwater, Oastler demanded an ‘open court’: “Let us have the people to hear the cause between Addison [Habergam’s former employer] and Habergam,” he demanded at a public meeting Huddersfield”(Sadler 1833: 8). Oalster argued that the appointment of a commission was a governmental scheme to “cross examine” laborers who testified in front of his parliamentary committee and to exempt employers from similar scrutiny. Sadler and Ashley, on their part, rejected a compromise offered by the commissioners according to which two representatives from both sides would sit in the hearings provided that they would not publish their notes before the commission’s work was completed (Gray 1996: chap. 3). In making such appeal for public judgment and transparency of evidence Oastler, Sadler and Ashley were responding the pressures from the Ten Hours movement. The Short-Time committee in Manchester, for example, charged the method used by the factory commission “whose Evidence will be a secret kept to themselves, and whose Report only will be public” as “unprecedented in all Parliamentary inquiries.” The governmental investigators
“have questioned the accuracy of our Evidence which is in print, but how can we expose any falsehood in theirs, when it is all private and given as well as kept in the dark?”

In his pamphlets Sadler also ridiculed the principle of “on the spot” practices of the commissions’ social explorations. The real “field experts”, Sadler asserted are the workers, those with longest “on the spot” experience with factory labor. The commissioners, “leaving London for a spring tour,” thus wasted their time attempting to collect information through direct observation; all they really needed to do was to record the testimonies of workers – the real experts of the factory system (Sadler 1833a: 12).

Your central secretary, I think, dwells upon the advantage of your inquiry being pursued upon the spot. – but I will venture to assert that your observations, however conducted, can produce nothing at all equal in correctness, copiousness or value, to those made also upon ‘the spot’ by men whose talents for such investigations are not likely to be soon surpassed … who practiced in the very focus of the factory system, with which they were personally and professionally conversant, for a greater number of years than, probably, (I mean no offence by adverting to the fact) the oldest of you gentlemen have lived … The Commission, had they intended to take the best evidence on the subject, or at least know how to have done it, needed not to have traveled far, or separated. (pp. 11-12)

Similar sentiments were raised in a public meeting organized by the Short-Time Committee in Halifax. Accusing the government of “appointing a number of men … to traverse the country at an enormous expense,” the organizers questioned the necessity and credibility of evidence “collected in crimson-lined traveling post chaise” or “by a single stroll through a mill prepared for their reception,” compared to the “great mass of evidence” that had been “brought before the select committee” by the operative themselves, those experienced with the “days and nights and years of toil and fatigue which have emaciated thousands of constitutions and consigned hundreds to premature graves.” The speakers in the meeting were convinced that the

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12 Manchester Short-Time Committee. 1833. Protest against the Parliamentary Commission, to collect further evidence on the factory system (signed: George Higginbottom, chairman) [Br. 558 (12)] The Oastler copy, Item # 28202.
operatives are the only people equipped the necessary experience, knowledge and the moral right to speak about the condition of the factories and the labor of children, and asking them to present their case before a public tribunal is therefore the only way to collect credible evidence.\(^{13}\) Parliamentary inquiries and their method of common law adjudication were seen as serving local practices and institutions by giving expression to local interests and a voice to local institutions. The demand to conform to traditional, judicial, means of parliamentary inquiry was thus motivated by a great suspicion that government, by its attempt to collect new information, was vying to control information and eliminate local government and institutions.

In another pamphlet against the factory commissioners, Sadler (1833b) devoted a considerable amount of effort to contrast between the (legitimate) judicial form of parliamentary inquiry and the (illegitimate) inquisitorial methods which in his opinion guided the evolving new project of governmental investigations (giving the example of the poor law commissions). In the epistemic culture of legal adjudication, the index for the robustness of evidence is its ability to publicly and openly withstand hostile cross-examination. This emphasis on adjudication makes public cross-examination both the independently acknowledge principles of justice and the truth by which the evidence must be judged. Under the inquisitorial logic, on the other hand, although the authority of the investigation still rests in its evidence, the investigator composes his report by selecting and arranging the evidence into a convincing narrative – the unfolding of a drama whose moral implications are crucial to the persuasiveness and influence of the investigation. Sadler, who was concerned that the new function of the investigator as a storyteller, responsible for the moral interpretation of the findings, does not follow a judicial procedure of marshaling evidence, was well aware of the persuasive power that narrative structure that organizes the findings in governmental reports posses:

\(^{13}\) Public Meeting in Halifax on The Ten Hour Bill, held on Saturday, July 13th, 1833, pp. 11-12.
[You] may recollect that, among other reasons which you gave against a full
record of the evidence and proceedings was, that they would be far too
voluminous to publish in full ... I understood you to argue from this the
necessity of selecting and abridging your evidence as your predecessor, the Poor
Law Commission, has taken the liberty of doing. Now this also is a power to
which, when unchecked, I most particularly object; it leaves too much to the bias
of a man’s mind, however fairly disposed ... that you should also have the power
of abridging and selecting the evidence for publication, is really monstrous. It is
not, gentlemen, for nothing that the law of evidence demands the “whole truth,”
as well as the “truth.” Otherwise the purpose of deception might be, and often
are, quite as well secured by imperfect and garbled statements as by downright
falsehood. Besides, I have been told ... that you occasionally prefer to put down
the evidence of the operatives and others in your own words ... I have utmost
objection to this percolation of evidence ... as the public and yourselves might
possibly differ as to what which ought to be regarded as the refuse of the
inquiry.” (pp. 6-7; italics in origin)
You (Mr. Power,) ... have, I understand, been a Poor Law Commissioner
also; and, without at all impeaching your motives, the unfair mode of arbitrarily
extracting and of fraudulently indexing the evidence upon that inquiry, as now
given to the public, however satisfactory to yourself, very much indispose me to
trust the evidence upon [the] question.” (p. 7)

Sadler’s protest against the “inquisitorial” methods used by the factory investigators
(and against Alfred Power in particular), may have taken their que from another commission-
bashing pamphlet written a few days earlier by William Rider, the secretary of the Radical
Political Union in Leeds. “Mr. Power”, Rider sarcastically remarked, “is not unacquainted with,
nor hostile to the ways and doing of the Holy Inquisition, he seems to delight so much in
SECRECY and DUNGEONS; he may have come from Spain for anything I know, for I cannot
hear of any one who knows from whence he was sprung. Some think they are three Hottentots
[referring to the three commissioners in the North East district], but I think they are of the
devout, holy, and merciful order of Inquisitors” (Rider 1833: 10).
Governmental investigations exploded on the Victorian scene at time when authoritative and trustworthy knowledge was seen as based on the consensus of popular opinion and common experience, rather than on field investigation based on individualized observations and social expertise. In the epistemic culture of the common law tradition, credible knowledge about “social problems” was often seen as mirroring the ‘common sense’ of the working community and its customs. Inquiry was seen as the public enunciation of common law jurisprudence and its “straightforward” norms of natural justice and artificial reason. Anyone endowed with normal reasoning and moral faculties, must acknowledge the case for the Ten Hours factory regulation.

Conceptions of natural balance and order, as they are manifested in the “spirit of the laws,” had a strategic place in this form of argument. When asked whether the operatives had considered the possible effect of shorter hours on wages, Stephens Binns, a worker at a flax mill in Leeds, declared before the Sadler’s committee, in what sounded as a well prepared statement: “the labouring class are straightforward people; they are not political economists; they are determined to support the Ten Hours’ Bill upon the score of humanity” (HC 1831-1832, XV: q. 4912).

According to one pamphlet, prepared by the Ten Hours Movement, the “ordering economy of nature” dictated some limitations of hours; twelve hours was evidently too long for children, and to require further proof of this “implies the lack of Common Sense or Honesty.”

In a pamphlet addressed to Lord Althorp and titled *Factory Commission: The Legality of Its Appointment Questioned and the Illegality of Its Proceedings Proved*, the barrister Geoffrey Crabtree attacked the extra-judicial and extra-parliamentary framework of the governmental inquiry. In a chapter titled ‘Why not Quash the Commission’ Crabtree writes:

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14 The Commission for Perpetuating Factory Infanticide, Fraser Magazine, June 1833, pp. 7-8
Your Lordship will excuse the prejudices of an old man in favour of laws of England … Among the tendencies to error, to devious and uncomfortable courses in the paths of government, I have selected the rage evinced by the ministry of which your lordship is a member, for working out demonstrations in domestic policy by the false rule of Commissions, appointed without any other symbol of public credit than the great seal … Without circumlocution, I am nearly certain that the Factory Commission is an appointment against the law, and I am quite certain that if the law of England is to prevail, the proceedings must be quashed for their illegality … the violence done in the case of the factory commission to humanity, by contempt of the boundaries of legal authority, is the most grievous. (1833: 3-5; my italics)

Crabtree’s major concern was that governmental investigations are not bound by the traditional rule of evidence but are guided by “unknown modes of procedure, and a course of examination arbitrarily set up by the examiner, altogether strange to the law, and as to which the parties most interested have been kept in darkness” (Ibid: 9). For him, “the gravest charge of all is, that of having actually grabbed evidence on their books, taken in a manner not only unknown to the law, but in many instances most pointedly forbidden by the law. Not only they adopted a secret, separate, and “unconfronted” mode of examination, for which there is literally no precedent in any law except that of the inquisition”(Ibid: 15). As he explains:

One of the first acts [of the Commissioners] is to show the defendants the plaintiff’s case, receive their answer, call back the witnesses, and examine them in the dark to refute their own testimony … All the world knows that this could not be done in a Court of Law … The superiority of examination viva voce, in open Court, is esteemed one of the greatest excellence of our law, not only from the awe and the reverence which the solemnity of the manner is supposed to produce in the witness, and the regard which from thence he must have for truth, but also from the benefit of cross-examining; as also the air and manner of giving evidence often carry such convictions with them, as will induce the Court and Jury to believe or reject what the witness has sworn … The most disastrous incident in all the encroachments made on the Common Law by the towering usurpation of the Chancery, is the changing of the examinations, which were originally oral, into written, and, of course, unconfronted depositions" (1833: 16; my italics).

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15 When applied to the examination of witnesses, the term viva voce means oral testimony taken in acto as opposed to written testimony contained in depositions or affidavits.
“We behold,” writes Crabtree, “the power of examination before a Committee of the House of Commons abdicated by that body in favour of a court of the newest form and impression” (Ibid: 13). In common law adjudication, Crabtree explains, “one of the rule is: ‘That the affair must be performed as far as it is possible uno acto, that there may be as little opportunity as possible to divulge the depositions, that neither side may better their proof’” (Ibid: 16). The Factory commission, “by impeaching the force of the evidence taken before a competent court, and ordering a re-examination to cure the presumed defect,” charges Crabtree, “have done that which the Common Law has always considered a gross misdemeanor; unless, in their new-fangled jurisprudence, a court so constituted and regulated by their own whims, is of superior authority to the House of House of Commons” (Ibid: 14). Under the epistemic culture of common law jurisprudence, a case, once subjected to judgment and decided upon, cannot be re-opened to allow for new evidence to be introduced. While the explorative model of governmental investigations sought to establish a two-way path between the investigations and the facts in order to know more and allow knowledge to be continually produced and improved, the adjudicative model of inquiry demanded closure, seeking definite and legally binding judgment. “What was to prevent the Commissioners from framing their proceedings by this [adjudicative] model?” Asks Crabtree; “has ‘the march of intellect’ so far outstrip ‘the wisdom of ages’, that the veriest tyro in Miss Martineau's philosophy can strike out a rule for the guidance of public justice at a moment's notice, which shall satisfactory replace the experience of the law?” (1833: 17).\footnote{The author journalist Harriet Martineau was a famous journalist and social reformer in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. I discuss her contribution to the popularization and scientization of governmental investigation in Chapter Eleven. Crabtree is referring here specifically to Martineau’s Illustrations of Political Economy, which was a series of twenty-four didactic short tales published between 1832 and 1834, whose tremendous success brought Martineau instant public notoriety as a writer and reformer.}
Crabtree’s pamphlet is probably first scholarly critique on the cultural implications of governmental commissions. This critique was further developed and given deeper theoretical dimension in a popular book written fifteen years later by Joshua Toumlin Smith, a barrister from Birmingham and a leading mid-Victorian constitutional theorist of local government. As suggested by its title, *Government by Commissions - Illegal and Pernicious*, Smith’s book was written as a ruthless attack against the ascendancy of governmental investigations in mid-Victorian period. Like Crabtree, Smith saw common law adjudication as the only credible model of inquiry. “It has already been shown,” Smith wrote, “that for inquiry into every possible subject which it can be of interest of the public should be inquired into and thoroughly investigated, simple and most efficient means are provided by the fundamental laws and institutions of this country.” Parliament, “the grand inquest of the whole nation, which … represents, not one local interest merely, but the interests of all localities throughout the country has, by ancient custom, always been in the habit of arraying, out of its own body, committees, or juries of inquest, for any matter needing special investigation.” The appointment of governmental commissions is therefore “an open contempt of this ancient and sound principle and practical of the law of the land; an attempt to do by a new instrument, entirely under the control of government, that which has, from the earliest times, been provided for being done apart from any partial interested control whatever, and therefore far better and alone trustworthy done” (Smith 1849: 180-1; see also Smith 1851).

From the historical perspective of a mid-Victorian writer, Smith was able to look back and assess the changes in British political culture, which took place during the first half of the nineteenth century. Trying to explain what made governmental investigation so influential by the 1840s, he identified the emergence of a new political culture – government by commission –
which was gradually replacing the epistemic culture of common law tradition with an ideology of persuasion “by authority” (competent advocacy). This new political culture, Smith realized, was embedded in print culture with its strong emphasis on the publicity of easy to read, digestible, reports as a means of persuasion. Moreover, Smith noticed that this new form of publicity is creating its own growing readership.

Smith was particularly troubled by the wide dissemination of the governmental reports and their extensive influence on public opinion and culture, as a result. According to Smith, governmental investigations had not only infringed upon old freedoms by substituting local government with a centralized one, but their reports, by departing from the traditional type of the legal transcript, which emphasized verbatim recordation of verbal evidence, were deviously crafted to be consumed “only in part.” The access of commissioners to the printing press was therefore particularly worrisome since “there is no presentment by adjudication. What evidence [the commissioners] please is taken and no more. All evidence is taken in secret; and so much published as, and when they like; and with such an accompanying gloss as they please to give it” (Smith 1849: 168). Commissions’ reports are intentionally devised to be consumed only as a partial and a one sided narrative: “it is not the evidence but the reports of Commissions, as disseminated through the newspapers and in other ways well known to the initiated, which are read” (Ibid: 174).

Under this new culture of persuasion, publicity takes place only at the end of the investigation; it ceases to guide the process of investigation itself and now is implicated in the massive effort to disseminate the finished report as widely as possible. “Those reports” Smiths contends, “are foisted on the public, with the object of creating false and factitious subservience to ‘authority’” (174). Thus, “the pictures of horror artfully put together in the pages of blue books are greedily devoured, and serve as food for the sentimental philanthropy of the reader; while the reports themselves are accepted as infallible gospel … The same disposition, so
lambently prevalent at the present day, always leads to a worshiping of “authority” (172-3). As we will see in the next chapters, Smith not only identifies here a growing (middle class) constituency as the major consumers of these reports; he is also able to construct a dialectical relationship between this emerging new readership and the new public culture of government by commissions created by governmental investigations. This culture promotes new norms of centralized government through a new ideology of persuasion: “There will always, then, be a large class to which these Commissions may safely look for support and to be quoted as admirable contrivances … The class must increase the wider the system [of government by commissions] spreads; and the two mutually re-act to increase and spread each other” (174-5). As I argue, this new public culture was essential to the emergence of social science as a new domain of expertise.
PART THREE

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A NEW PUBLIC CULTURE:  
THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the British government emerged as a major cultural force; it became an enterprising publisher, dispensing and deploying knowledge, supervising the printing, binding, and mass circulation of countless documents, central among them was a new genre of governmental reports of social investigations which were often labeled books, as in "blue books," marked by their blue paper cover. Politicians were deeply invested in the preparation of these reports, in their content, design and public dissemination.

The avalanche of governmental reports and the attentiveness they displayed to the reading habits of the public were part of a sophisticated public opinion campaign by political reformers who sought both to elicit public support for their policies and to exercise control over the dissemination of political discourse against the growing power of the national press. Governmental reports such as those issued annually by the Poor Law Commissioners from 1834 to 1847, reports of the Factory Commission (1833), Chadwick’s Sanitary report (1842), the Children’s Employment’s commissions (1842-3) or the Commission on the Health of Towns in 1845, were accompanied by massive public campaigns, disseminated through variety of textual outlets in huge amounts, and were fully publicized in the newspapers.

The publication of governmental reports often involved specific commercial considerations, especially after the Parliament ordered in 1835 that all official publication will be available to the public to purchase in bookstores at the lowest price possible. Governmental reports were specifically designed to win over the reading public by making them conform to the competence and cultural expectations of the buyers whom the government wanted to attract. A new readability was created by printing the reports in a “blue book” layout: paperbound books, covered generally with blue paper with octavo format composed of printer’s sheets folded into eight leaves (page size of 5 by 8 inches), which gave the governmental report the materiality
of a book made it easier to carry, and cheaper to produce. Commercially, even if the length of
the reports varied, their prices always remained much lower than most books at the time
(Frankel 2004 2006). As I show below, there existed a powerful, inexorable, connection between
the public diffusion of social knowledge and its scientific appropriation.

The central mode of operation was not centralization but publication. As I have argued
earlier, the so called “growth of government” or “revolution in government” in the first half of
the nineteenth century was not so much a process of bureaucratic centralization but one based on
the circulation of official printed materials. It did not involve so much jobbery and government
central bureaucracy as an extensive production and dissemination of reports and other textual
ephemera. As Weber recognized, the clerk with a pen in his hand stood at the centre of modern
bureaucracy. In modern government, Weber observed, “administrative acts, decisions, and rules
are formulated and recoded in writing, even in cases where oral discussions is the rule.” For
Weber, “the combination of written documents and continuous organization of civil functions,
constitutes the ‘office’ which is the central focus of all types of modern corporate action”
(Weber 1978: 219). In his study of South Africa’s Native Affairs Commission, Andrew Ashforth
demonstrates the absolute centrality of writing for modern government. Ashforth’s observation
that “the real seat of power” in modern states is “the bureau, the locus of writing” (1990: 5), may
be overstated but it is definitely not too far off the mark when the nineteenth century British
government is concerned.

The sharp increase in the production and circulation of official reports by the British
government in the middle decades of the nineteenth century cannot be viewed only as a
response to a growing number of “public concerns.” More profoundly, it has to be understood
as an ongoing effort to organize information and influence public opinion by Parliament whose
members were facing a growing problem of managing credibility. The presence of the printed
media in the Commons created variety of information about Parliament in newspapers which
was partisan and contradictory and threatened to undermine official authority. Faced with the challenge of securing their official authority and maintaining their credibility in public discourse, governmental officials sought to control the flow of information and restore the coherency and credibility of political knowledge (and the policymaking process) by “going public” and establishing a process through which official knowledge about society was produced, published, presented as “useful knowledge,” and “diffused” through massive circulation of official reports. As a result, “Useful knowledge” was increasingly valued in proportion to its durability and to the patterns of its consumption (the reading habits it encourages). Other kinds of knowledge, speculative, ephemeral, partisan, receded in prestige. Scientific facts imply solidity and durability which in turn conferred respectability.

Below I focus, in particular, on the diffusion of social reports: on the mechanics of their production, on the politics of their circulation and their strategic utilization by the British government. Here, and in the next chapters, I explore the connection between the public diffusion of social knowledge and its scientific appropriation. If the production of official governmental reports about social problems made social knowledge a legitimate domain of expertise (as discussed in Part Two), its scientific appropriation took place exactly at the moment where governmental reports were produced and disseminated to such extent that a cultural understanding of social knowledge began to emerge as a type of knowledge which belonged to a community that extended beyond the milieu of politicians and officialdom. A successful translation of social knowledge into social science is largely determined, therefore, by opportunities to “go public” – to gain support and recognition outside of the political sphere by creating a network of relations with other civic organizations and social groups so that new knowledge cultures will be “spilled and woven their tissue into society” (Knorr Cenita 1997: 8).

The appearance of governmental reports at the start of the nineteenth century, and their massive production and dissemination, have to be understood as an institutional response to
these two challenges. Within Parliament they were part of the centralization of legislation in government (as discussed in chapter 7). Outside of Parliament, as I discuss below, they were part of a larger attempt to control and manage the variety and contradictory political discourses in the public sphere, through a massive dissemination of governmental reports about society.

My goal in this chapter is to show how the government’s effort to appropriate political knowledge helped to shape the first community of social scientists by structuring the means of communication and its regularized channels and by setting the standard of social investigations for political reformers. I wish to illustrate how the struggle between government and the press created imperatives for investigative reporting and defined social problems with preferred remedies done in certain ways. With the increasing circulation of facts about society in the public sphere, the “useful knowledge” produced by governmental reports claimed (and acquired) the cognitive status of science, not only because it was instrumental in implementing social policy (i.e., knowing civil society as an administrative domain) but primarily because, through political reportage, it became a knowledge which was grafted onto the practices and discourses of the of its consumers – the literate populace – and endowed political reformers with the credentials to generate trustworthy truth-claims.

The political economy of print and the popularization of knowledge about society thus played a major role in the early structuration of social science as they were central to the ability of political reformers to wield knowledge as power. In a way, then, social science was developed as a creative response to the growing requirement of publicity in the exercise of political authority in the first half of the nineteenth century.

My main argument is that the social science community in the first half of the nineteenth century was organized around the production and circulation of governmental reports. It was formed as a “scribal community” (Love 1993: 177) whose writing not only comprised their
principal work, but also one of the central foundations of government. Social knowledge as a legitimate domain of expertise emerged exactly at the moment where governmental reports are disseminated to such extent that a cultural understanding of social knowledge begin to emerge as a type of knowledge which belongs to a community that extends beyond the milieu of politicians and officialdom.

10.1 Reform Politics and Struggles to Control the “Diffusion of Political Knowledge”

With new technological innovations in print during the first two decades of the nineteenth century the production and dissemination of printed text of all kinds became possible much cheaper. The first hand-operated iron frame printing press (steam press), the mechanically produced paper (the Fourdrinier papermaking machine), stereotype printing, and the development of railway transportation, which facilitated the circulation of printed material allowing more people to read than ever before contributed to a shift from a literature written for an elite audience to one written for the public at large promoted a rapidly expanding publishing industry in which the British state played an increasing role. Walter Ong identifies this shift as the pivotal period in Britain’s transition from “verbal economy of sound” to print culture, to a “visual way of knowing” with a more silent and spatialized economy of writing (2002: 109-158). This development in public communication is a central component in Habermas’ model of the transformation of the eighteenth century “public sphere” through the advent of the mass circulation press and mass politics into a “sphere whose decisive mark was the written word” (1989: 16).

1 Harold Love defines “scribal communities” as “groups of like-minded individuals [bound] into a community, sect or political faction, with the exchange of texts in manuscript serving to nourish a shared set of values and to enrich personal allegiances” (Love 1993: 177).
An explosion of essays, magazines, newspapers, anthologies, abridgments and miscellanies confirmed that readings of all kind were in the ascendancy. The Retrospective Review declared in 1820 the coming of the printing age: “a spectacle of what, perhaps, we never before seen in any age … that of a whole nation, employing nearly all its leisure hours from the highest to the lowest rank in reading - we have been truly called a READING PUBLIC.” The Retrospective went on to suggest that this seemingly universal commitment to reading compared rather poorly with “the lively Greeks,” who “were not a reading nation - they were a hearing and talking people” (quoted in Keen 2004: xvi).²

The uncontrolled avalanche of printed information was seen as having the power to annihilate human capacities of retention and organization, and have led to a growing awareness of “information overload” – of an incommensurability between the amount of data received and the ability to process it. As early as 1795, The British author, Isaac Disraeli, the father of Benjamin Disraeli, wrote that every time he considers “that every literary journal consist of 50 or 60 publications, and that of theses, 5 or 6 at least are capital performances, and the greater part not compatible,” and when he takes his pen and attempts “to calculate, by these given sums, the number of volumes that the next century must infallibly produce, [his] feeble faculties wander in perplexed series,” he finds himself lost “within billions, trillions, and quartillions,” and feels “obliged to lay down my pen, and stop at infinity” (quoted in Newlyn 2000: 40). Three years later, Thomas Malthus published his famous Essay on Population. Harold Bloom (1995) has recently claimed that the “Malthusian repletion”, the fear from proliferation and overpopulation, which characterizes Malthus’ laws of population, reflects general canonical

² In 1809 Samuel Taylor Coleridge saw the “fortuitous redoubling” of Britain’s economic energies as intimately linked to the interconnective power of the nation’s expending communications network. “Newspapers, their Advertisements, Speeches in Parliament, Law-Courts, and Public Meetings, Reviews, Magazines … the diffusion of uniform opinion, of Behaviour and Appearance, of Fashions in things external and internal, have combined to diminish, and often render evanescent, the distinction between the enlightened inhabitants of the great city, and the scattered Hamlet” (quoted in Connell 2001: 153).
anxiety with the opening of the nineteenth century, regarding the “unmanageable excess” of printed information and a consequential effort to domesticate the market of information, to underwrite it with the status of science.

Moreover, the abundance of reading materials led to a concern that readers are reading excessively which, in turn, led to general anxiety that readers were reading *incorrectly*, that they read “too much and too little.” Readers were seen as being in a constant race against the speed of printing production, and this “hurried careless, method of reading,” the way readers were carelessly and rapidly were turning from book to book represented a danger (Mays 1995). “In rapid reading [the mind] is nearly in the same state as yours is when you are whirled through a country in a railway-carriage or post-chaise,” explained William Chauncey Fowler, a professor of English literature at Amherst, in a piece titled “Reading as a Means of Culture” (Fowler 1867: 239). According to Fowler, many readers were attracted “to the column of a newspaper just as they are to a garden of flowers, or to a winding river. They have no purpose in view; they have no object to be accomplished. The act of reading terminates in itself, so far as any end is concerned. It is just a matter of present gratification, of present amusement” (Ibid: 235). Fowler saw purposeless, uncontrolled reading lead to “mental gluttony,” “a great appetite and poor digestion;” readers “may read much and think little,” because what they read “[is] not going through the process of assimilation, instead of invigorating, burdens the mind” (Ibid: 238). Like Fowler, political reformers in the first half of the nineteenth century were concerned with “those ephemeral productions that requires as little labor to read them as it did to write them.” (Ibid: 241) and sought to slow down process of reading by trying to shape and control the reading habits of the populace, directing them towards utilitarian aims.
10.1.1 The Capitalist Organization of Print and the Representational Crisis of Political Knowledge

The expansion of the Press coincided with the dramatic growth of trade and industry, which multiplied the numbers and wealth of the entrepreneurial class. City businessmen, who now owned most newspapers, were able to individually raise the capital needed to start a newspaper. With this growing trend towards individual ownership, disputes of the past between multiple proprietors over the policy of the papers could be avoided. With a single individual able to determine policies and the quality of a paper, and often acting as his own editor, newspapers began to hold a vastly different editorial outlook on national political matters according to the independent position of their owners (Wasson 2006).

This tendency of reportage to become partisan according to the guideline of the newspaper’s corporate authorship, as dictated by its owner, was facilitated the model of authorial secrecy which dominated Victorian journalism. British newspapers in the first half of the nineteenth century operated a policy of anonymity in the publication of articles and reviews, which emphasized a collective, impersonal, rather than individualized, effort of knowledge production. The ideology of corporate authorship in reportage held that the principle of publicity was important in and of itself and must not be regarded as a personal endeavor. Just as lawyers and doctors were defining their calling against mere trade by imposing restrictions on personal advertisements, so too journalists distinguished themselves, by their distaste for self-publicity. And much like civil servants, whose status was invested in the importance of official publication, the journalists’ individual aspiration were subordinated to the larger ethical goal and intellectual presence of their publication (Vincent 1998: 66). Like the civil servant this

3 There were, of course, instrumental consideration as well. Anonymity concealed the widespread practice of journalists working for several newspapers at once, and the fact that many of the contributors to the press were otherwise building their careers in law, medicine, or civil service, and were cautious not to
anonymity separated the political reporter from the politician who based himself on his personal reputation.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the majority of national newspapers dedicated most of their space to political reportage. Virtually every newspaper and many periodicals, both in London and in the provinces, wishing to have some political relevance, devoted much of their space to detailed reports of parliamentary debates (Aspinall 1956: 33). And their readers certainly devoted just as much attention to reading them. The spectacle of so many people reading and writing about politics, and the sense that, for better or worse, these dynamics had enormous political implications made the task of understanding more about these developments an undeniable priority. At stake were the problems of control over information and the representation of politics. As the number of newspapers multiplied, each eager to offer readers its own account of the business of Parliament, public opinion became more independent and the question of the control of political representations became ever greater.

Editorial policies actively militated against verbatim reporting. As discussed in chapter Two, reporters and editors modified parliamentary speeches according to the political line of their newspaper, by omitting some parts or adding to the speech itself commentaries on the speaker’s opinions and performance. As Dror Wahrman (1992) shows, the representations of the proceedings of the British Parliament in the press were in fact distinct reconstructions, mediated through editorial practices specific to each newspaper. The written record of what any member actually said depended on the newspaper and its habitual readers to whom it provided political information. Therefore, “as far as the public in Britain was concerned, there was no single image
of Parliament available to and shared by everyone. Instead the public was confronted with a plurality of representations, in which diverging political languages were employed to address differently formulated concerns” (Wahrman 1992: 86).

As a result, readers of the oppositional newspapers, the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Star* had a completely different representation of Parliament debates than the readers of the pro-ministerial press, the *True Briton, The Times* and the *Evening Mail*. The pro-ministerial paper, *St. James’s Chronicle*, for example, explicated its editorial policy in the following way: “desirous as we are to insert every fair Argument brought forward, on both sides, we consider it as a duty to omit those sallies of imagination, which, however they may delight in the Theatre, seem very ill adapted to the gravity of a British Senate”. The *Morning Chronicle* clarified that although inaccuracies may arise “[t]he House possesses also, from the present establishment of the periodical press, the best security against misrepresentation, in the number, and rivalry of the prints” (quoted in Wahrman 1992: 88). In this interesting postulation, the accurate representation of parliamentary debates rests on the cumulative effect of a large number of reports.

Moreover, the increasing demand for written accounts of parliamentary debates pushed publishers and booksellers to collect series of debates which they offered to sale in bound volumes. The editors of such compilation did not rely primarily on newspaper reports as their sources; instead, they invited MPs to supply them with their own versions of their speeches. The most famous of such collection was the Parliamentary Register, which was first compiled in 1774 by John Almon and was taken over by John Debrett in 1781. The Political Register invited MPs from the opposition who were either completely ignored or were not given a fair treatment in the ministerial Newspapers to supply its volumes not only with their own versions of speeches but to correct, as they see fit, the reports of their speeches in the ministerial papers (Todd, Langford and Marshall 1981[5]: 31).
Early nineteenth century Journalism thus opened multiple zones between parliamentary politics and public representations. The unstoppable flow of printed commodities in the market was seen as a kind of infinite semiosis, pulling value into a constant and unfixed motion, the condition that Roland Barthes (1977) calls "metonymic confusion." With the spread of the market infrastructures, commodities as signifiers of value were circulating ever faster without transience to any principle of signification, thus eroding any connection between signifiers of value and attributes of worth (Bigelow 2000). Authority over the representation of political knowledge was not any longer entirely at the hand by the officialdom of the British state. Rather, parliamentary reportage opened the way for multiple authorities competing for rights to be the representatives of political information, including lawyers, philanthropists, philosophers, priests, critics, and political radicals. Thus, almost from its inception, political reportage became a battle ground between the Parliament and the public press over the content of political information and the meaning and conceptualization of parliamentary politics more in general.

At stake, then, was something much bigger than the mere misrepresentation of the parliamentary speech of one member or another. With the emerging new culture of political reportage, the central concern was the undermining of the credibility and consistency of the British political system as a result of the multiple and often contradicting images of parliamentary politics in the Press. With opinion increasingly being made and exchanged outside Westminster, government came under growing pressure to stabilize the representation of political information by regaining its control over the production and circulation of political knowledge and its ability to manage and shape public opinion, which was under the increasing influence of the independent press. While gradually allowing open access to political information and supporting its free circulation, politicians were troubled that “there is not much demand on the part of the general public for what may be called political science, and a great demand for party politics and
personality” (HC [750] 1852-53, XXXIV: 163). In response, political reformers sought to control political discourse by making it more *scientific* (i.e., official, credible, disinterested) so as to maintain their influence over public opinion whose value for policymaking became increasingly important. “In a culture marked by the ‘struggle against indeterminacy’ … misperception remained a fear, but as a danger to be defeated rather than an inevitable fate” (Hewitt 2006: 417).

### 10.1.2 Reform and the Political Economy of Print

For British political reformers - a coalition of Liberal Whigs and radical utilitarians – governmental organization of print provided a solution to at least two key problems inherent in Victorian political order: how to present official action as being in the public interest, and how to reconcile individual freedom with social order. The nexus of commerce, morals and the diffusion of knowledge, inherent in the political economy of print, was thus seen not only as a problem but also as an enlightened solution to social disorder, provided that “speculative” information would be replaced by a massive dissemination of “useful knowledge,” authorized by the representative of the state. For early Victorian reformers, the difference between “reform” and “revolution” resided precisely in the distinction between “useful” (scientific) knowledge and a “speculative” (partisan-political) knowledge.

The struggle against speculative knowledge was part of a coordinated effort to transform Victorian political culture by making politics more scientific through an ideology of print, which associated “speculative” knowledge with partisan demagoguery, that “falsehood and impulsiveness” of verbal political rhetoric. “Useful knowledge” about politics and society, by contrast, was associated with scientific rationality and connected to the print culture, with its

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4 Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary Papers.
material and visible qualities and its norms of physicality, instrumentality, impersonality and transparency. For reformers, the scientificity of useful knowledge rested on three main principles: (1) the materiality of reading and writing, their decelerating, impersonal, yet self-contemplative effects; (2) the public visibility of politics as an empirical, transparent and tangible object for observation, or “domain of application;” (3) the utility of political economy for social policy. As governmental investigator, political reformers were to play a major part in consolidating these principles into one coherent framework.

In their struggle to control “speculative” print, by flooding the literary market with “useful” texts, political reformers took their cue from Bentham, who laid the philosophical foundations for the political economy of print (Bentham 1791, 1802, 1817, 1824). Bentham believed that the remedy to the risks of publicity lies not in restriction on it, but in even more determined and comprehensive publicity and free flow of information, about all matters of public concern. Bentham believed, moreover, that the exercise of political power through publicity is legitimate and beneficial only if it seeks to direct behavior through rational persuasion (Postema 1986: Chap. 11). Essential conditions for securing public reason and rational discourse, could only be secured, he thought, by the growing reliance upon visual perception through print technology, unlike the economy of voice and the collective experience of political speechifying, which could be easily exploited by demagogues. Bentham put a special stress, therefore, on the interiority of the acts of reading and writing, done individually and in private, which like the absolute and imperturbable secrecy of the ballot, “secured the moral and political primacy of the self-interested individual elector as a preconditioned for the legislative pursuit of the public good” (Connell 2001: 83).

As the political economy of print guaranteed both individual freedom and social order, the utility of “publicity” and the liberty of the press were both essential to good government and an ideal medium for the exercise of political power through pastoral practices of popular education.
Following this Benthamian spirit, political reformers sought to control the effects of sensational press not by censorship but by even more publicity – by intensifying, systematizing and standardizing, as it were, the production and circulation of ever increasing “useful” texts, while using a variety of media outlets for popular instruction.

Part of the motivation to control political information clearly carried an anti-Jacobin flavor. It is important to note, however, that for the majority of British political reformers the real long-term threat to Britain posed by the French Revolution was not so much the mobilization of a radical labor movement, but rather, as men like Edmund Burke had always feared, the proliferation of “English philosophes,” and in particular radical journalism which knew how “to make the pen mightier than the sword” (Davis 2000). The political turbulence that spilled over from the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century appeared to the majority of British observers (Conservatives as well as Liberals) as the violent political consequence of the diffusion of “speculative” knowledge and opinion, mainly by means of irresponsible News Press with a restless and politically ambitious commercial interest. Counter-revolutionary arguments expressed an anxiety about the deterioration of reason, sensibility and moderation, which was believed to occur under the repeated and addictive impact of fast-paced sensational news spreading delusion, infantilism, trickery and violence. The effects of “uncontrolled,” rapid, fast circulating, printed materials, figured as a public extension the immediacy of political speech and verbal demagoguery, and intensified awareness of the pressing need to define literature in ways that reinforced the need to control the habits of readings and the quality of knowledge.

It was no coincidence that when a group of Whiggish political reformers establish their first literary and political journal, The Edinburgh Review, in 1802 the lead article to appear in its very first volume dealt with the refutation of the influence of speculative knowledge of French “philosophers” in fomenting the French revolution (see Francis 1802). The founders of the Edinburgh Review - Francis Jeffrey, Francis Horner and Henry Brougham - all belonged to a
group of Scottish Whig liberals, all had started their public careers as lawyers, and all eventually became Whig MPs. The *Review* was published by Archibald Constable in quarterly issues until 1929. Under its first editor, Francis Jeffrey, the magazine was a major outlet for political economists who regularly called for social and political reforms.5

The Edinburgh Review was, in fact, the first literary home of those political reformers who were responsible for the early structuration of British social science. Its mandate was pedagogical: It served as the major vehicle for the popularization of the doctrines of political economy, and “the most fertile and influential workshop for their application to the political and social problems of the time” (Fontana 1985: 2-3). In championing a standard of inductive reasoning, the *Edinburgh Review* both modeled and promoted a particular kind of intellectual consumption, that of critical reading. In teaching the British public how to read in a particular way, the *Edinburgh Review* was concerned with ways of controlling the spread of information. Its editors were interested in the relationship between politics, economic knowledge, and print culture and especially in the possibility of rescuing politics from partisanship by the diffusion of economic knowledge as “useful information” and practices of critical reading (Klancher 1987: 69-72).

These issues became central to the second edition of Malthus’ *Essay on Population*, published in 1803. In this revised edition, Malthus, who frequently figured in the *Edinburgh Review*, added a strong pedagogical element to its population principle, suggesting that the only effective means of encouraging “preventive” checks to population, such as moral restraint, was to “infuse” into “the lower classes of society … a portion of that knowledge and foresight which so much facilitates the attainment of this object in the educated part of the community.” The manners and intellect of the lower orders, according to Malthus, had to be raised through the instruction of the “simplest principles of political economy” to a point at which they could

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5 The main rival of *The Edinburgh Review* was the *Quarterly Review* which supported the Tories.
exercise moral circumspection and rational foresight, “and approximate them in some degree to the middle classes of society, whose habits, generally speaking, are certainly superior” (1803 [2]: 151-5). Malthus added that he agrees “with Adam Smith in thinking that an instructed and well-informed people would be much less likely to be led away by inflammatory writings, and much better able to detect the false declamation of interested and ambitious demagogues, than an ignorant people” (1803 [2]: 122; my italics).

The political economist, James Mill, who was an occasional contributor to the *Edinburgh Review*, shared with Bentham, Malthus and other political reformers an ideology which saw the social organization of print as isomorphic with the capitalist free market and with the principle of political economy. Like them, he was both troubled and fascinated by the profound political consequence of the emergence of print culture, arguing that such a cultural transformation required a complete reorientation of existing political and educational structures. “The art of printing exists,” wrote Mill, “and the irresistible progress of the information, which it diffuses necessitates, not a change merely, but a perfect revolution, in the art of governing mankind” (Mill 1830: 2). This identification of a transparent public culture of print as a precondition and guarantor of enlightened government was derived in part by the reformers’ understanding of the efficacy of the press in facilitating the operation of “publicity” and “opinion.”

In his *Essay on Government* (1823), Mill drew on Bentham’s concern with publicity and popular education in conjunction with his own particular interest in popular political economy. According to Mill, the goal of government was to secure “the greatest happiness of society,” by insuring to every man the greatest possible quantity of the produce of his labor. Since political economy envisioned society as unified through the interrelation and mutual reliance of productive processes - “like a different parts of a well constructed engine” (McCulloch 1825: 97) - this, in turn, could best be achieved by securing for every individual an accurate knowledge of his best interest, as revealed by the science of political economy (Mill 1823: 5).
Johan Ramsey McCulloch, the first Chair of Political Economy at University College London, concurred with Mill’s position when he described the strategy necessary for the popularization of economic knowledge. "The economist who confines himself to the mere enunciation of general principles, or abstract truths," wrote McCulloch, "may as well address himself to the Pump in Aldgate, as to the British public. If he wished to be anything better than a declaimer, or to confer any real advantage on any class of his countrymen, he must leave general reasoning, and show the extent of injury entailed on the community by the neglect of his principles; how their application may be best affected; and the advantages of which it will be productive." The economist, McCulloch concluded, “will abdicate his principal functions if he does not call the public attention to every institution or regulation, which appears, on a careful enquiry, to be adverse to the increase of public health and happiness. Unless he do this, he can be little else than a mere ideologist, about whose speculation most people will, very properly, care little or nothing” (quoted in O'Brien 2004: 85).

In 1821, Mill founded The Political Economy Club together with Malthus, McCulloch and a circle of political reformers. During its first three decades, the Club had 108 members, 58 of them were members of Parliament (Whitson 1975: 1051). As the Minutes and proceedings of the Political Economy Club reveals, the Club, which is often described as Britain’s first “professional associations” or “academic society” where economist could debate ideas, and provide peer review for their work, was in fact a way of establishing a forum of public educators in the belief that the press was “the grand instrument for the diffusion of knowledge, or error,” and members were therefore enjoined “to study the means of obtaining access to the public mind through as many as

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6 Founding members included Ricardo, Malthus, James Mill, Torrens, Tooke, and Norman. J. S. Mill, J. R. McCulloch, Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick were also members. Most members, however, were not political economists but important politicians and businessmen. They include, J.G.S. Lefevre, John Abel Smith, Lord Althorp, William Whittmore, J. D. Hume, William Clay, Robert Lowe, G. C. Lewis, Rowland Hill, W. E. Gladstone, W. E. Forster and very many others (O'Brien 2004: 13).
possible of the periodicals publications of the day and to influence as far as possible the tone of such publications in favour of just principles of Political Economy” (quoted in Connell 2001: 83).

10.1.3 John Stuart Mill as a Theorist of (Print) Culture

Like his father James, John Stuart Mill thought literature should be useful and practical. He condemned the love of the British authors for ornamentation. Writers, he argued, should write not to “show off their eloquence” but because “they have something to say … as if they were conscious that the reader expect something more valuable from them than mere amusement” (1826: 63). To be useful, literature must be striped of its decoration and patrician style of rhetoric and made into strictly functional and communicative vehicle for the expression of arguments and ideas in print.

In 1823, the Mills co-founded with Jeremy Bentham and other Utilitarian reformers the Westminster Review as a journal for philosophical radicals.7 In 1824 the Westminster Review announced approvingly that “We are advancing from a reading to a scientific population” (quoted in Connell 2001: 79). In the same year JS Mill was secured a position as a clerk in the in the East India Company (EIC) by his father who was the First Assistant Examiner in the company at the time.8 The EIC, provided employment for most of the notable British economists in during the first half of the nineteenth century. JS Mill was in charge of the governance of India through correspondence between the Court of Directors in London and the Governors on the subcontinent.

The main channel of the EIC administration was established through handwritten communication, and during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Mills spent most of

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7 James Mill's position at the EIC prevented him from appearing on the Westminster Review editorial board.
8 In 1830 James Mill replaced John Ramsey McCulloch as the Chief Examiner of the company. In 1856 JS Mill became Chief Examiner succeeding Thomas Love Peacock, who had succeed James Mill.
their time writing reports and reading those sent to them. Problems were initiated by incoming correspondence, considered by consulting past reports and solved by composing new dispatch reports. The labor of opening, reading, docketing, drafting, writing, copying, filing, and posting letters and reports thus occupied most of the Mills’ working days in the EIC. In a testimony before a House of Lords Select Committee on India in 1852, JS Mill described the practices of his organization, which in many respects provided the template of domestic administrative innovations, by arguing for the absolute centrality of writing to the conduct of good government. According to Mill, not only is "the whole government of India is carried on in writing,” but “there is not a single act done in India, the whole of the reasons for which are not placed on record.” Mill saw the disciplines of writing and recording as a central instrument for assuring a "greater security for good government than exists in almost any other government in the world, because no other has a system of recordation so complete” (quoted in Aguirre 2004: 289). Mills’ conception of “useful knowledge” versus “speculative information” was largely developed as a result of his long service in the EIC. In his Autobiography, JS Mill portrays an intimate link between his administrative, public-work as a clerk for the EIC, and his scientific approach to political reform and legislation:

[T]he opportunity which my official position gave me of learning by personal observation the necessary conditions of the practical conduct of public affairs, has been of considerable value to me as a theoretical reformer of the opinions and institutions of my time … the occupation accustomed me to see and hear the difficulties of every course, and the means of obviating them, stated and discussed deliberately with a view to execution; it gave me opportunities to perceiving when public measures, and other political facts, did not produce the effects which had been expected of them, and from what causes; above all, it was valuable to me by making me, in this portion of my activity, merely one wheel in a machine, the whole of which had to work together. As a speculative writer, I should have had no one to consult but myself, and should have encountered in my speculations none of the obstacles which would have started up whenever they came to be applied in practice. But as a Secretary conducting political correspondence, I could not issue an order, or express an opinion, without satisfying various persons very unlike myself, that the thing was fit to be done. … while I became practically conversant with the difficulties of moving bodies of men, the necessities of compromise, the art of sacrificing the non-essential to preserve the essential. (Mill 1873: 58-60).
In his years of service at the EIC, Mill not only acquired a superior knowledge of economics and politics, but he also learned how to apply that knowledge to current problems and then to communicate his ideas in writing to senior managers in London, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. His experience in the company thought him, in other words, how to analyze policymaking as a scientific experiment – “perceiving when public measures, and other political facts, did not produce the effects which had been expected of them, and from what causes” – and how to report his finding in a persuasive way to people “very unlike myself”. This heightened sensitivity to the public reception of his reports was amplified moreover by Mill’s recognition of the importance of teamwork in making the enterprise as a whole to be effective. It was, therefore, the principles of publicity and teamwork, as connected to the practices of official reportage, which in Mill’s reflective account, turned him from a mere “theoretical reformer” and a “speculative writer” into a responsible reporter and a full-fledged reformer - the earliest model of a responsible social scientist.

JS Mill was preoccupied, throughout his career, with questions of publicity and, in particular, with the practice of reading and the character of the public reception of written texts (Johns 2000). He was especially concerned with the power of the reading public to subordinate creative individuality to the interests and consuming powers of the mass. “This is a reading age,” Mill observed in 1827, “and precisely because it is so reading an age, any book which is

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9 Mill attributed enormous importance to reading and writing, both as mental and as physical practices. In his *Principles of Political Economy*, Mill observes that “there is some bodily ingredient in the labour most purely mental, when it generates any external result. Newton could not have produced the Principia without the bodily exertion either of penmanship or of dictation” (Mill 1848: 41). This “bodily ingredient,” Mills believed, makes “the production of texts” assimilable to material production by factory workers. Moreover, as Adrian Johns (2000) Observes, that for JS Mill, methodical and carefully managed reading was no less a therapeutic practice than an intellectual pursuit. During the second half of the 1820s Mill used reading to recover from his depression and recommended it as a remedy for his friends. He constructed a detailed and specific list of works to be read, divided into four “courses,” each of which was to be approached with different levels of intensity and at different times of the day. In his private correspondence, Mill proscribed reading courses as a way to generate a “habit” of reading every day. This involved “working” over a set number of pages - 20, 50 or 100 – as early in the morning as possible, and then supplementing this with further reading that would not “fatigue the mind” (Johns 2000: 309).
the result of profound mediation is, perhaps, less likely to be duly and profitably read than at any former period.” Such a book produced no more “durable impression” on reader’s mind than an ephemeral newspaper article:

The world reads too much and too quickly to read well. When books were few, to get through one was a work of time and labour: what was written with thought was read with thought, and with a desire to extract from it as much of the materials of knowledge as possible. But when almost every person who can spell, can and will write, what is to be done? it is difficult to know what to read, except by reading every thing; and so much of the world business in now transacted through the press, that it is necessary to know what is printed, if we desire to know what is going on … And the public is in the predicament of an indolent man, who cannot bring himself to apply his mind vigorously to his own affairs, and over whom, therefore, not he who speaks most wisely, but he who speaks most frequently, obtains the influence (Mill 1827: 409).

Mill believed that he was witnessing the collapse of the public sphere under the pressures of excessive heterogeneity induced by the steam press. He thought that the growing proliferation of printed materials signified a shift in the “imagined community” of readers, as the public “gorges itself with intellectual food, and in order to swallow the more, bolts it” (Mill 1827: 409-417). “Before the press existed,” Mill contended in 1831, “the leading mind of a nation could bring themselves into contact with the national mind only by means of speech. The forum, the theatre, the pulpit, the school, where then the sources of illumination and mental culture.” However, “since the discovery of printing, books are the medium by which the ideas, the mental habits, and the feelings, of the most exalted and enlarged minds are propagated among the inert, unobserving, unmediative masses” (Mills 1831: 324). In his essay Civilization published in 1836, Mill returned to the problematic ramification of the fast production and hasty consumption of knowledge. He quotes at length from his 1827 article, commenting that as result of this massive public dissemination of printed material, and especially with the rise of the press, “nothing is now read slowly or twice over … literature is becoming more and more ephemeral,” as the attention of the reading public “cannot sustain itself on any serious subject” (1836: 185-6):
Is there, then, no remedy? Are ... the growth of charlatanerie, and the diminished efficacy of public opinion as a restraining power,--are these the price we necessarily pay for the benefits of civilization; and can they only be avoided by checking the diffusion of knowledge ...? Assuredly not. All that we are in danger of losing we may preserve, all that we have lost we may regain, and bring to a perfection hitherto unknown; but not by slumbering, and leaving things to themselves, no more than by ridiculously trying our strength against their irresistible tendencies: only by establishing counter-tendencies, which may combine with those tendencies, and modify them. (1836: 187; my italics)

Truth will not emerge by itself from a spontaneous "struggle of opinion" unless the circulation of knowledge will be somehow regulated to ensure the quality of knowledge (Mill 1836: 185). Mill’s “counter tendencies” were to be established through the scientization of politics and take a regulative form through the formation an elite intellectual domain in which experts could educate the public and control public discourse. The Scientization of Politics, Mill hoped, will secure good government by creating “skilled democracy” (1861: 236). He believed that representative institutions were superior to other forms of political organization, but he also recognized that “the natural tendency of representative government, as a modern civilization, is towards collective mediocrity”(1861: 259). In Representative Government Mill praised “the acquired knowledge and practiced intelligence of a specifically trained and experienced few” (1861: 228). Such qualities in his opinion was totally lacking in Parliament which he termed a “tribunal of ignorance” (1861: 221). Democracy, in his mind, threatened “a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which control it” (1861: 247). In his 1840 review of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Mill suggested to limit the role of Parliament to discussion and giving the task of framing and altering laws to “skilled senate, or council of Legislation,” to perform the function of parliamentary draftsmanship (1859: 82-3).

A “skilled democracy” thus demanded both the scientization of Parliament and the scientization of the “public sphere” to achieve better-informed public opinion through the diffusion of expert knowledge. The scientization of Parliament, Mill believed, could be achieved
by the governmentalization of legislation – the use of governmental commission, composed of experts, in all matters concerning legislation: investigating social problems and drafting Bills based on their recommended solutions) (1861: 221-6). At the same time, the scientization of the public opinion was to be based on the diffusion and careful regulation of expert knowledge produced by governmental investigations and other scientific inquiries (1861: 247-9). In the literary marketplace of ideas, Mill determines, “the system of individual competition has fairly worked itself out, and things can hardly continue much longer as they are.” Hence, only through “co-operation … among the intellectual classes and professions” a change in “the habits of society itself” could be achieved.

For this there is no remedy, while the public have no guidance beyond booksellers’ advertisements, and the ill-considered and hasty criticisms of newspapers and small periodicals, to direct them in distinguishing what is not worth reading from what is. The resource must in time be, some organized co-operation among, the leading intellects of the age, whereby works of first-rate merit, of whatever class, and of whatever tendency in point of opinion, might come forth with the stamp on them, from the first, of the approval of those whose names would carry authority … the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge was as considerable a step towards it, as could be expected in the present state of men's minds, and in a first attempt (1836: 188; my italics).

It is not generally recognized that JS Mill was motivated not so much by a normative conception of the freedom of opinions but by a concern for the quality of opinion in the modern marketplace, defined by print culture. This concern was a major preoccupation for the service middle class in government and in particular for government administrators, such as Chadwick. In other words, it was Mill’s experience as government administrator, which made him a theorist of culture and not merely of limited government. The basis for Mill's case for liberty is not at all a complacent faith in the marketplace of ideas or in the ideal of free conversations and

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10 As the drafting of legislation demanded skill and knowledge, it should be left to a governmental commission, “not exceeding in number the members of a Cabinet.” (1861: 223). Mill suggested that once the commission draft a Bill, Parliament would have the power to either pass or reject it, but it would not have the authority to make any changes to it but only to suggest amendments to the commission. Parliament would thus “watch and control the government” but it would not take the role in expert executive tasks for which it was unsuitable due to the MPs lack of expert knowledge (1861: 226).
discussion. For Mill, and arguably for most political reformers as well, the public sphere had already been corrupted by an atmosphere in which attention spans are cut short and no one risk taking any idea thoughtfully or seriously in relation with the truth. He therefore sought to regulate opinions which the free and accelerated circulation of press sets out of control (Waldron 2003). Mill saw this form of regulation as underwriting any educational practice and as an essential component of creating good citizens and making a civil society (Johns 2000: 305-311).

In the 1870s Mill advocated the creation of a Ministry of Education to offset local control precisely for this purpose. In 1870 he participated in a session on the reform of elementary education organized by the Education Department of the National Association for the Promotion of Science, in it he claimed that “What constituted the government a free and popular one was not that the initiative was left to the general mass, but that statesmen and thinkers were obliged to carry the mind and will of the mass along with them” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 288)

Importantly, Mill’s educational thoughts suggested the necessity of a new and larger discoursive medium than political economy, as a creative response to the growing requirement of publicity in the exercise of political authority. He saw the Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge, as a harbinger of such a newly created medium although “with enormous defects, both in plan and in execution.” In his System of Logic (1843), Mill called this new discoursive medium for the regulation of information, the science of ethology, which he perceived as an embryonic social science. Ethology was an “exact science of human nature,” which “corresponds to the art of education, in the widest sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective character as well as individual” (1843/1858: 543). It was through the science of ethology, Mill believed, that the scientization of politics could be applied to the public sphere.

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11 This false notion of Mill usually rests on some quotes from Chapter 2 "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion" in On Liberty. See in particular Homi Bhabha’s opening argument in The Location of Culture (1994) where he distinguishes between free democratic government by speech and public discussion in the British Island and the oppressive government by print in its colonies. Bhabha’s argument is based on what I consider to be a false association of JS Mill’s arguments with the democratic ideal of free discussion.
10.2 The SDUK and the Temporalities of Reform

In early 1827 a group of Whig politicians in collaboration with other political reformers established the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK) for “imparting useful knowledge to all classes of the community” (SDUK 1829) by acting as an intermediary between political reformers (qua authors) and publishers. A General Committee of 40-60 members served as an editorial board, selecting authors, commissioning and reviewing manuscripts, fixing their form and their selling-price, the frequency of publication and the payment to authors; the publisher made arrangements with the printer, and organized the distribution and sell of publication. Prominent among the members of the SDUK publishing committee were many politicians and members of the Political Economy Club, such as James Mill, Nassau Senior, John Russell, Lord Althorp, Joseph Hume, Zachary Macaulay, and others.

The most prominent member and the major driving force of the SDUK was Henry Brougham, a Whig Politician and a notable Edinburgh lawyer with a clear dedicated

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12 As noted by many, Dickens’s *Pickwick Papers* was written in direct reference to the SDUK and in particular to its founder, Lord Brougham. We learn from the first page of the novel that the Pickwick meeting takes place on May 12 1827, and that Pickwick speech is said to help “the advancement of knowledge, and the diffusion of learning” (1836: 12). The Society was responsible for many series of publications including: *Library of Useful Knowledge; British Almanac; Library of Entertaining Knowledge; Farmer’s series; Maps; Working Man’s Companion; Quarterly Journal of Education; Penny Magazine; Penny Cyclopedia; Gallery of Portraits; Library for the Young; Biographical Dictionary.*

appreciation for the written word, whose extensive parliamentary experience was characterized by hard fought battles for reform against what he saw as ill-informed opponents too poorly educated to recognize the issues that he was trying to promote.¹⁴ In his inaugural speech as the president of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Brougham described in detail the SDUK’s *modus operandi*, recommending it as a model for the promotion of social science: “Regular meeting were held to receive the reports of sub-committees, charged with preparing the various works composed either by their own members or by authors who were employed. Every matter was discussed by the general committee, both on the writing submitted and on the new works to be undertaken. The most severe examination had been applied by the sub-committees, but the proof-sheets were further submitted to whole of the members, who had to consider both the substance and the manner of treating it” (NAPSS 1858: 17). According to Brougham, the most important service provided by the SDUK was “teaching professional authors and publishers that there is a market for true and substantial knowledge among the people at large, which, even if they had before suspected its existence, they never had felt confident enough to prepare books for it” (NAPSS 1858: 18).

Brougham’s 1825 pamphlet *Practical Observations Upon the Education of the People*, which drew a close link between political reform, the diffusion of useful knowledge, and the regulation of the reading habits among the populace, provided a theoretical and practical blueprint for the various activities of the society. Brougham thought that with the growing diffusion of instructive reading and useful knowledge, the public’s desire for formal instruction would also increase. He therefore wanted to give social and political knowledge a pluralistic and educational function to encourage reading and learning habits. In his pamphlet, Brougham urged the creation of public libraries, book clubs and reading societies, the repeal of the paper tax and

¹⁴ According to Zachary Macaulay, in the early 1830s Brougham was, next to the king, the most popular man in England, constantly featured in the press as an advocate of law reform, the abolition of slavery, the extension of education, New Poor Laws, and the Reform Bill (Stewart 1986).
the subsequent reduction of printing costs to allow for the diffusion of cheap printed material with useful information as a strategy for increasing the practical demand for books of an “instructivist cast” (1825: 4-5, 7).

The publication of affordable books, Brougham asserted, would encourage "useful" reading and promote popular interest in intellectual issues such as the complexities of government and the "commercial prosperity of the country" (1825: 5). “Why” he asks “may not every topic of politics, party, as well as general, be treated of in cheap publications?” According to Brougham, “it was highly useful to the community that the true principles of the constitution, ecclesiical and civil, should be well understood by every man who live under it,” because “the peace of the country and the stability of government, could not be more effectively secured than by the universal diffusion of this kind of knowledge.” (1825: 3-4). The kind of knowledge Brougham is referring to is useful knowledge about politics and society, and its public dissemination suppose to achieve the political goal of social order and good government through public education for good citizenship. Brougham explains why:

A country which tolerates every kind, even the most unmeasured of daily and weekly discussion in the newspapers, can have nothing to dread from the diffusion of political doctrines in a form less desultory, and more likely to make them be both well weighted at the time, and reserved for repeated perusal. It cannot be denied, that the habit of cursory reading, engendered by finding all subjects discussed in publications, which how great soever [sic] their merit may be, no one looks at a second time, is unfavourable to the acquisition of solid and permanent information (Brougham 1825: 5; my italics).

The remedy for the accelerated circulation of the ephemeral press, and the consequential overloading of the public sphere with “incomplete” knowledge, was reform, and reform was to be achieved by the scientization of politics: with the “extensive diffusion” of “useful political knowledge” the public will learn to appreciate the “enlarged view” of perfect, “solid and permanent” knowledge. Thus, the scientization of politics becomes a precondition for good government and good citizenships. If the populace would not be politicized in this particular
way, Brougham feared, then the threat of revolution would become even more real. "Imperfect knowledge" of politics and a "superficial acquaintance" with current and historical events, writes Brougham in his book on *Political Philosophy* (1842), may expose the public “to be misled by designing men, or to becomes the dupes of their own irregular desires and groundless fancies.” Nevertheless, claims Brougham, such errors are inseparable from all learning, because they are the consequences of imperfect information with which learners must begin; they overshadow the dawn of all intellectual improvement ... The risk ... is admitted; the guarantee is certain and it is easy. An imperfect light is dangerous ... Then let in more light! This is the cure for the evil ... be the hazards arising from the circulation of free opinions and the diffusion of political knowledge among the people a thousand times more imminent than they have ever been painted by alarmed and short-sighted men; we cannot prevent the evil, be it ever so appalling, and are left to apply the only remedy - "let there be more light" ... To oppose the progress of truth - to suppress the communication of opinion - to obstruct the diffusion of knowledge ... is quite as ineffectual an exercise of the persecuting power. It remains to mark the most salutary effects of an extensive diffusion of Political Knowledge ... An enlarged view of their own best interests must give the people sound and enlightened feelings respecting the merits of human conduct (1842: 28-9; my italics).

Like JS Mill, Brougham’s typification of “useful political knowledge” is closely linked to specific habits of reading. The effort to regulate the quality of knowledge circulating in the public sphere entails a change in the nature of reading itself. To ensure the diffusion of official political knowledge, the leisurely habits of “cursory reading” – the random and brief examination of ephemeral information, induced by the growing influence of the Press - has to be replaced by the practice of instrumental reading: the slow, purposeful, systematic and careful examination of “solid and permanent” knowledge, the socio-temporal profile of scientific knowledge and activity. The scientificity of knowledge about politics and society is increasingly tied to its usability and consequently increasingly valued in proportion to its durability and to the patterns of its consumption (the reading habits it encourages). Scientific facts imply solidity and
durability which in turn conferred respectability; other kind of knowledge, speculative, ephemeral, partisan recede in prestige.

The sort of works supported by the Society were predicated, therefore, on the assumption that inappropriate ‘readings’ of news reports might be averted if influence could be brought to bear on the intellectual context in which the act of newspaper reading occurred. Hence, one of the stated goals of the SDUK was to control socio-political information and to shape the political discourse by reorganizing and reordering parliamentary reports and other political information in the Press.

In 1832, for instance, the barrister-MP and SDUK member George Cornewall Lewis, who served on numerous governmental investigations, published his Remarks on the Use and Abuse of Some Political Terms under the auspices of the SDUK. The purpose of the book, according to Lewis was to "illustrate the various uses of the principle terms belonging to political science" (1832: iii), because "the number of political arguments now sent forth into the world by means of newspapers, magazines, reviews, and other periodical publications is so great, that errors arising from the indistinctness of words are embodied in a thousand forms, and multiplied in a constantly increasing progression” (1832: x). "Such verbal ambiguities,” complained Lewis, “generate confusion of thought in those who sincerely seek after truth” (1832: viii). “For this reason,” Lewis concluded, “it is the more desirable that where all people talk on the same subject, they should be agreed about the vocabulary with which they discuss it” (1832: x).

A more ambitious attempt to regulate and political discourse was the SDUK’s “newspapers’ digest”: The Companion of the Newspaper and published monthly from 1833 to 1837. The Companion, which was subtitled “Journal of Facts in Politics, Statistics and Public Economy,” sought to help readers understand what they read in newspapers by organizing useful social and political information from the press and guiding their attention to those titles that were deemed to be the greatest utility to them. The ninety-five page issues of Companion
were published monthly, primarily as a way of avoiding stamp duty (required for publications published more frequently than 28 days). In this way, cost could be reduced and the Companion could be sold for the trifling price of fourpence and expand its market into the working class population. The monthly format of the Companion brought, however, other unexpected but important advantages. The long press cycles allowed the Companion to provide a more extended discussion of news events than the daily and weekly press had space or time to allow, and that a daily or weekly reader would not have had time to consider. Published monthly, the Companion signaled itself as something that was meant to be read and digested slowly over a 30-day cycle, rather than the more accelerated pace a 1-day or 7-day cycle, as most current events periodicals were: “There are a number of scattered materials necessary for the proper understanding of any political question, which are apt to be overlooked in the unavoidable hurry of newspaper controversy; and many details of the highest importance to Commercial Interests, are in the same way neglected … it will be the duty of this publication to collect and simplify them, so that they may be easily referred to” (1833 [1]: 1).

The logic of the Companion was clear: while the creation and circulation of news is all about speed, the understanding of the news requires a pause and time-perspective which allows for reflective seriousness. An article about newspapers in the very first issue of the Companion reminds the readers of the accelerated process of knowledge production in the developing news media and its ever growing appetite for new information: “the rapidity which begins in the very first process of writing, is continued through the editing, printing, and publishing; and is followed with equal rapidity in every stage of its circulation” (1833 [1]: 15). The Companion, by contrast, saw it as its mission to translate the political information from the press, which was recorded and prepared at great haste and which both reporters and their readers had not always leisure to consult, into a general and lasting public knowledge through a decelerated mode of careful examination and (re)interpretation.
Aspiring to become an assistant to all newspaper readers, whatever their particular opinions, the Companion collected, reorganized, edited, and reframed articles from the press into matters of universal and lasting interest. Its editors saw political events of the moment as an indexical part of other times and insisted that both the public and the legislature should strive to look beyond the present. Through this process translation, the SDUK sought to exert some control over the growing multiplication of narratives about politics and parliamentary proceedings by submitting political knowledge to a singular organizing principle of practical utility, by which every transitory political question or event must eventually be tried. In its prospectus, the Companion asserted that rather than taking a specific party political line, it will, “in great part, be a storehouse of FACTS applied to practical uses.” Theses useful and practical facts, as the extended title of the Companion suggested, were evidence pertaining the principles of “politics, statistics and public economy,” principles which corresponded with the all encompassing ideology of reform (1833 [1]: 1). In its first year the Companion even published two additional supplements, each organized around a specific principled subject: one about the East India Company (1833 [3]) and the other on the Poor Laws (1833 [7]), and there were annual news round-ups.

Most interestingly, from August 1834, the phrase “useful knowledge” was replaced with “political knowledge” in the statement that appeared above the journal’s title on the masthead, which now read “under the superintendence of the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge.” This was a new society comprising those members of the SDUK who wanted the society to focus its effort mainly on the publication of political topics that will be organized and discussed scientifically.\(^{15}\) The Prospectus for the Society in the September issue of the Companion explained: “Upon subjects of Political Science it has now become necessary that

\(^{15}\) In actuality the SDPK did not formed a separate society but worked as a section within the SDUK. Its members included: Lord Brougham, Edwin Chadwick, James Mill, George Grite, George Long, G.C. Lewis, H.B. Ker and others (see Companion 1834 [8]: 167-8)
the people, without distinction, should be educated. Their want of political knowledge places
them under the influence of leaders, - in most cases uninformed, - often imprudent, - and
sometimes corrupt” (1834 [9]: 2; my italics; see also Companion 1834 [8] 167-8).

Created by Charles Knight, the printer of the SDUK together with a circle of
parliamentary reformers, the Companion, was thus, in effect, collecting information about
parliamentary proceedings from the Press, and then, after editing, reorganizing and reframing
this information, presented the information to its readers as “political science” whose purpose is
to serve as an objective factual knowledge with which they could resist the manipulation of
political leaders and parties. Put differently, with its Companion the SDUK was trying to
expunge the transitory, contingent and performative affects political rhetoric from newspaper
report in order to give political knowledge a more factual, objective and transcendent format
that could resist manipulation based on temporary political interest. It is important to note that
this goal was made explicit by Knight who at the same time of serving as the chief editor for the
Companion was also the official publisher of the biggest social policy experiment in Britain: the
Poor Law investigation report (1834) and the many annual reports of the Poor Law Board and
the Board of Health which followed the New Poor Law scheme.

Knight was also the creator editor and publisher of The Penny Magazine (1832-45), the
SDUK’s most successful project, which was also its most extreme attempt to scientize the format
of the cheap and popular periodical press. Knight believed that the Magazine would encourage
"less hasty and less violent" opinions (Penny Magazine, 18 Dec. 1832 [1]: 1). He offered his
readers the opportunity to rise above the cheap thrills of politics: “no excitement for the lovers
of the marvellous - no battle or abuse for the gratification of a diseased taste for personality -
and, above all, no party politics.” The Penny Magazine, he claimed, provided a "General
Education" such as the "facts of political economy" free of the “"violence of party discussion”
or the "stimulating details of crime and suffering" (Penny Magazine, 18 Dec. 1832 [1]: iii).
When the Penny Magazine was launched in 1832, no less than five cabinet ministers served on its management committee, including Brougham as the chairman and John Russell as vice-chairmen. Averaging eight pages an issue, much of the Penny Magazine's contents were encyclopedic in nature, both to justify escaping the stamp tax and because the market demanded it. Topics covered included technology, agriculture, language, literature, archeology, history, statistics, architecture and more. Its didactic nature avoided partisan politics, but the Magazine often praised the New Poor Law and commended industrialization, technological innovation and the march of intellect. In fact, often one seems to be reading a watered down version of The Edinburgh Review designed for the masses.

Priced one penny and published every Saturday, the Penny Magazine was an immediate and an extraordinary success, playing a critical role in the development of the first consumer mass market in literature. In 1832 it sold 200,000 issues, and in 1833 it was already purchased ten million times. At a minimum the journal was seen by a million readers, and if copies were passed around in the same way that daily papers were shared, many millions must have seen some issues. Some of its readers were shopekeepers, clerks and even gentry, but there is evidence of a wide and faithful working class following (Wasson 2006). “The Penny Magazine” observed the publisher William Chambers, was set to “curtail ... the circulation of a class of cheap publications offensive to moral, and even to common decency” by “introducing, and stimulating the introduction by others, into quarters where books had hardly penetrated, of both literature and art” (Chambers 1832: unpaginated).

Knights portrayed The Penny Magazine as “rational, honest and temperate newspaper, in preference to a declamatory insidious, and violent newspapers.” He accused the “scavengers” of the “brutal and vulgar press,” who "sneer" at a "real and practical improvement of our social condition," of encouraging “false hope of extravagant expectations to the great mass of the working classes, or seek[ing] to array the rich against the poor, and the poor against the rich.”
The way to fight this type of publications, Knight believed, was to maintain “the principle of a cheap diffusion of wholesome knowledge” (quoted in Haywood 2004: 191; my italics).

By “wholesome knowledge,” Knight had in mind a “universal knowledge” which can transcend class and partisan interest, associated with the popular press and the politics of the moment, and acquire a position of inevitability and disinterestedness in the public mind. The principle of universality played no small part in the considerable efforts of the SDUK to appeal the working class. The underlying motive of the SDUK circle was not to pacify the increasingly politicized laboring class with depoliticized literature; their effort to scientize politics was not a technocratic attempt to depoliticize everything; rather, their main strategy was to present their knowledge as transcending particular party or class, and this had to be done by demonstrating that their knowledge appeals equally to all classes. Useful knowledge, in other words, was not used to censure the politicizing “tendencies” of the popular press but to counterpoise them with “scientific” literature, “which may combine with those tendencies, and modify them” (Mill 1836: 137).

The scientization of politics was thus used not as an absolute replacement for the increasing politization of society but as a balancing force between short- and long-term considerations, between the passing and the permanent, the urgent and the enduring. By erecting a boundary between partisan-particular (short-term) and universal-objective (long-term) issues, reform could be constructed not as a mere issue of ‘politics’ but a one which pertains to universal and objective interests: the interest of all humanity. Through this socio-temporal organization, reform could become political practice and a form of political knowledge which transcends politics itself. As long as this distinction between “the politics of the day” and “the

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16 The main consumers of “useful knowledge,” nonetheless were middle class readers. Unlike the enormous success of its Penny Magazine most other projects of the SDUK’s failed to attract any significant amount of working class readership.
interest of humanity” remained in the public mind, intervention of the state to secure specific social reforms was largely welcomed and perceived not as a narrow based political interest.

10.2.1 A Nation of Political Observers: The Reading Public and the Scientifcitiy of “Useful Knowledge”

Brougham’s Political Philosophy was published by the SDUK as an introductory volume to a Political Series that was intended to extend the study of political economy into a general examination of society and will serve as the first textbook for the comprehensive study of civil society (1842: 31-2). Unfortunately the SDUK folded shortly after Political Philosophy was published, so the anticipated treatise never materialized. Nonetheless, Brougham’s book presents an interesting attempt to transform political economy into political science by extending its discipline to all issues of government. “Political economy,” writes Brougham, is the study of “the accumulation and distribution of wealth,” but it should also treats “the religious and civil education of the people, - the provisions necessary for securing the due administration of justice, civil and criminal, and as subservient to these, the maintenance of police ... and generally all institutions, whether supported by private exertions or by the state, the object of which are a public nature” (1842: 7-8).

According to Brougham, print culture created the conditions for the emergence of social science by making the literate populace into political observers. While only very few people practice moral philosophy, i.e., acquire “the habit of turning the observation inwards, and making the mind subject of its own contemplations ... the bulk of mankind are political observers.”

17 Brougham’s Political Philosophy can be considered as the constitutive text for the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1857-1884), whose the annual transactions (1857-1884), discussed in the next chapter, could be regarded as an attempt by Brougham and his circle of reformers to revive the Political Series project, on a much larger intellectual and administrative scale.
How different are those facts with which the political observer is concerned! The mere history of national affairs - the narrative of those public events which take place - the changes in the condition and fortunes of whole communities - their relations with each other, whether in peace or war - the rise and decay of great institutions affecting the welfare of millions - the progress of a policy upon which the happiness, nay, the very existence of whole nations depends - the verities in the governments under which they live - the influence of those Governments upon the condition of the people ... all these are subjects of most interesting contemplation in themselves, as mere facts (1842: 5)

Their objectives were political. Political reform according to Brougham is not to be
achieved by individual moral improvement but through the attective gaze of the public as political observers, mediated by print. The “moral habits of men as individuals” Brougham contended, “form a small and not an extremely interesting chapter in the history of man,” compared to “facts with which the political observer is concerned” (1842: 5). With the growing circulation of the press and the ascendancy of political reportage, “the operations of government, the habits and proceedings of the people, the conduct of communities, their fortunes and their fate, form the daily subject of reflection with all persons even of an ordinary degree of intelligence in every civilized country.” As a result, claims Brougham “the appetite for knowledge of this description is far more generally diffused than for either moral or ethical knowledge, that numberless bodies of men in every country conceive themselves interested in political subjects, who would regard metaphysical speculations as wholly foreign to their concerns” (1842: 4-5).

For Brougham, political reportage, by making politics into a visible and tangible object readily available for public gaze, plays a crucial role in transforming the “imagined community” of readers. Because of its public nature, popular reading no longer serve primarily the purpose of individual, inward, moral contemplation but that of collective, outward, empirical observations of civil and political institutions (i.e., social facts), which, unlike moral concerns, “are more obvious; they are perceptible in most cases to the senses; they are reducible to number and measure” (1842: 5). Political reforms, therefore, can no longer be satisfied with
moral philosophy or political economy that “treat of man in his individual capacity.” Reformers need a new science who treats “man as a member of society” (1842: 2), and whose facts “are more plain, manifest, and tangible, than those which form the subject of Moral Philosophy” (1842: 5). The accent on the materiality and visibility of political and social knowledge was closely associated with the evolution and authorization of novel modes of public persuasion through political reportage: a persuasion based on visible operations, as distinct from and superior to the rhetoric of speech. Underlying this empirical orientation was also the assumption that the reality to which “useful knowledge” refers is the same as the political and social reality with which laypeople are familiar in their ordinary experience (Ezrachi 1990).

The construction of “useful knowledge” about politics as a social science was thus accompanied by a highly self-conscious public-relations campaign. Reformers sought not only to mediate and regulate governmental administrative intervention in the public sphere, through the principles political economy, but strove to mediate and regulate the multiplying and intensifying public gaze on politics. This reciprocal mediation – of both the state’s gaze and public’s gaze – engendered new criteria for what counted as "objective knowledge" about politics and society - an underlying belief in the basic continuities between objective knowledge and ordinary experience.

The scientificity of useful knowledge resides not so much in its administrative instrumentalism as a tool for public policy, but in its association with publicly observed facts. The circle of SDUK reformers were therefore intimately involved in the cultural industry of governmental reports during the first half of the nineteenth century: in their preparation, their publication, their dissemination and commercial distribution. A large proportion of governmental investigators, commissioners and inspectors, were member of the SDUK who brought into the making of governmental reports their knowledge of publicity, their sensitivity to public opinion and their experience with the diffusion of useful facts through organized printing campaigns. Brougham, Senior, Chadwick and other prominent SDUK members, initiated and
chaired numerous investigations. The factory commissioners, for example, all served at the time of their investigation on the SDUK’s publishing board, and so were many of the factory inspectors in the 1830s. Charles Knight, the main publisher of the SDUK was also the official publisher for the Poor Law Commission, the Poor Law Board, the Sanitary Commission and the Board of Health. And Joseph Hume played a major role in the commercialization of governmental investigation by convincing Parliament to sell them as book in the literary market.

With the increasing circulation of facts about society in the public sphere, useful knowledge claimed (and acquired) the cognitive status of science, not only because it was instrumental in implementing social policy (i.e., knowing civil society as an administrative domain) but primarily because, through political reportage, it became a knowledge which was grafted onto the practices and discoursed of its consumers – the literate populace – and endowed political reformers with the credentials to generate trustworthy truth-claims. The political economy of print and the popularization of useful knowledge played therefore a major role in the early structuration of social science as they were central to the ability of political reformers to wield knowledge as power.

10.2.2 ‘Pictorial Commissioners’: The SDUK and the Children’s Employment Commission

When the report on the Employment of Children in the Mines of England and Wales was Published in April 1842, it caused a public sensation and soon became the most widely read government publication of the era. Its exposure of the degradation and hardship undergone by children working underground, certainly drew public attention, but what was especially shocking was the decision of the commissioners to enhance the realism of the already strong visual descriptions of the report, by using sensational sketches (by the standard of the time) to
illustrate the evidence. In addition to various illustrations maps of mines and diagrams of modes of ventilation the commissioners decided to depict child labor cruelties by including in the report close-up sketches of half-naked boys, girls, and women in various working situations, laboring in dark mineshafts.

Circulated in public, the drawings functioned like “real” pictures taken on site. They were made by four of the inspectors reporting from the field: John Kennedy, Samuel Scriven, Robert Franks, and Elijah Waring, at the instigation of the commissioner Dr. Thomas Southwood Smith (Fox 1977). Southwood Smith first witnessed the worthy employment of illustration as one of the original members of the SDUK editorial committee (Roberts 2002: 167). The SDUK’s *Penny Magazine* (1832-45) was one of the first journals to take full advantage the development in the 1830s of wood-engraving, a technology which allowed drawings to be printed by machine quickly, cheaply and in large quantities. In 1835 the *Penny Magazine* had already illustrated its own articles on mining with topographical and diagrammatic representations of a colliery (Fox 1977). As a practicing physician trained at Edinburgh, Smith wrote the Society *Treatise on Animal Physiology* (1829) and contributed to its *Penny Cyclopaedia* (1833-43) the chief articles on anatomy, medicine and physiology, to which he added illustrations.

It was not only his familiarity with medical textbooks which made Smith particularly receptive to the use of sketches as a way of illustrating evidence, but his general approach to the science of medicine. Smith was in a minority in the medical profession and his medical career was entirely atypical in that he was trained as a Baconian inductivist and believed medicine should be an inductive. He advocated a careful collection of evidence through direct observations as the only reliable basis for inference and complained that lack of inductive training make medical men particularly susceptible to false inference (Webb 1993).

Smith decision to illustrate the evidence discussed in the report proved extremely affective in affecting public opinion. If seeing meant believing, now, and for the first time, the
public was truly able “see,” through the eyes of the investigators, the social reality which took place underground. The Sketches drew the attention of newspapers whose eagerness to reproduce them on their own pages increased the circulation of these visual evidence, thus increasing the public exposure of the report. On 15 May Bell’s Penny Dispatch, published several pages of the more sensational illustrations from the reports under the headline “Wholesale Murder of the Working Classes”, stressing the “revolting indecency” of the conditions; on 22 May the Weekly Chronicle attacked “The Degrading and Disgusting Practices on Women and Children in the British Collieries”. The Westminster Review re-engraved and embellished many of Scriven’s schematic engravings which, it believed, gave “a better idea of the circumstances than a volume could convey without them.” The London Times described the sketches as unquestionable evidence “illustrative of the horrible and degrading labours to which too many of the unfortunate children employed in the coal-mines, &c. appear to be subjected.”

One of these woodcuts represents a child dragging a small waggon full of coal on all-fours, just like a beast of burden, and in a state of nudity … Other woodcuts represent children pushing the waggons forward, and apparently using the severest exertions to accomplish their task. Almost all are more than half-naked; and it appears, that in the district of Halifax these wretched beings work perfectly naked, in low, dark, heated, and dismal chambers (quoted in Fox 1977: 95)

The reliance on visual effects, the attempt to see facts and display them to the public was an integral feature of the report’s mode of theorizing. The visualization of under covered facts about the condition of mine labor, attached outmost importance to them and elevated them to the central role of the theory. Visual facts became means of displaying the theoretical meaning of child labor rather than just serving as supporting evidence for theoretical statements.

Celina Fox (1977) argues that the report on the employment of children in mines had a long term impact on the press, transforming the ways in which newspapers treated visual evidence in general, and in particular in cases of social and political news reports. Before the sensationalist governmental report exploded on the public scene, most newspapers, with the
notable exception of the SDUK’s *Penny Magazine*, conceived of wood engraved sketches and other type of drawing. Art form and therefore adhere to patrician principles of esthetic moderation and harmony; they were careful to avoid what they regarded as sensationalism and did not use visual evidence to illustrate political or controversial matters.

Less than a month after the publication of the commission report, the first edition of *The Illustrated London News*, the world’s first fully illustrated newspaper, was published. Its publisher and chief editor, Herbert Ingram, who became an MP in 1856 for the Whig party, used his magazine to advance the cause of social reform. With an obvious allusion to the commission’s report, Ingram, announced in the June addition that his magazine’s concern would be “with the English poor” and that the “three essential elements of discussion with us will be the poor laws, the factory laws, and the working of the mining system in those districts of our soil which nature has caverned with her treasures, and the cruelty disfigures with its crime” (quoted in Fox-Bourne 1887: 119-20).

Sketches very similar to those which were drawn by governmental investigator figured regularly on the pages of the *Illustrated*. In January 1846, for example, the *Illustrated* was the first to sketch detailed drawings of the horrible impact of famine of the Irish Poor In the second half of 1845. The drawings were instigated by a series of report in *The London Times* on the Irish famine in the *Times*’ special correspondent, T. C. Foster. Questioning the credibility of these reports, the *Illustrated London News*, announced that “the great interest excited by the ‘proven’ account … by ‘the Times Commissioner’ has induced us to dispatch an Artist to the spot, to sketch the principal localities so vividly described in the above communications. Our Artist’s report is almost exclusively graphic; but, he had appended to his sketches a few pencil notes, of which we avail ourselves” (quoted in Fox 1977: 99). Two weeks after the *Illustrated London News* published the drawings, its chief rival, *The Pictorial Times*, responded:
The graphic reports of “The Times Commissioner” … strengthened and determined an intention we had long entertained to send a PICTORIAL COMMISSIONER to IRELAND … Mr. Frederick N. Sheppard … and the first fruits of his pencil (with many valuable facts) are now placed before our readers. That justice may be done to Ireland - Ireland must be known as she really is in 1846. Let us make an offering in her behalf of PICTORIAL FACTS (quoted in Fox 1977: 100; my italics).

Explaining the intent behind publishing engravings that showed the effects of tenants oppression and famine in Ireland in 1846, the Pictorial Times stated: “We wish, so far as possible, to annihilate distance, to bring our readers into contact with the peasantry of the sister isle, and to contribute our part to the urging of appropriate means for the amelioration of their wretched condition” (quoted in Brown 2002: 17). There followed no less than a dozen pages devoted to detailed illustration of villages, houses and families, often explicitly named and constantly reinforced with accounts stressing their authenticity: “It should be kept in mind that the sketches from which our engravings are executed, have just been transmitted by our artist, who made them on the spot, and they may therefore be received as faithful transcripts of the objects he beheld. Our aim from the first has been truth, nor shall anything induce us to swerve from it: truth alone can prove satisfactory; truth alone can do good” (quoted in Fox 1977: 101; my italics).

The Press was clearly adopting both the rationale of social reportage and the empirical model of field explorations, as instigated by governmental commissions and their fact-making discourse and visual practices of social investigations: identifying a social problem, sending commissioners to the field to observe social events on the spot, experience them personally, and report back to the public the evidence of what they saw as “it really is,” for the purpose of social reform. To be sure, amelioration was not their only purpose; commercial consideration played a central role in the decision of the Press to use drawing in social reportage. By reproducing the discourse and practices of governmental investigations they could legitimized the selling of “sensationalist pictures” by depicting it as evidence essential the credibility of their report.
10.2.3 The SDUK and the Poor Law Investigation

The Poor Law Commission launched a new model of public persuasion, using governmental investigation as a vehicle for a massive propaganda campaign based on a mass circulation of officially sanctioned social reports. This was mostly achieved through the commissioners’ close relationship with the SDUK circle and its publication machinery, which enabled the commission to function as an autonomous publishing unit, independent of the official parliamentary printers. Long before the investigation was completed, the commissioners were already disseminating to the public a collection of excerpts from the notebooks of the twenty four poor law inspectors, many of them were members of the SDUK, which tour the country collecting information about pauperism in the parishes. With the help of Charles Knight, the SDUK printer, the commissioners packaged some of the more thrilling excerpts into various abridgments, reviews and pamphlets for public circulation.

Although not named first in the commission, Nassau Senior, another prominent member of the SDUK, took the leading role and conducted all correspondence with Brougham, the Lord Chancellor, and with the Home Office. Senior explained the overall strategy in a letter which he wrote to Brougham in March 1833 “We should make a gradual attack in public opinion. First, [publish] our instructions and queries. Then, the specimens of our evidence. Then, 6 weeks after, the full evidence. Then, two months after, the report, and then, measures could be prepared during the vacation and brought in at the beginning of next session” (quoted in Frankel 2006: 39). All throughout the investigation, Chadwick was bombarding Thomas Barnes, the chief editor of The London Times, with carefully chosen extracts he was assembling for the final reports from the notebooks of the poor law inspectors and have even send him a print of the secret and confidential Notes of the Heads of a Bill (Finer 1951: 97). In 1833 Chadwick and Senior even managed to convince Francis Place to finance the circulation in tens of thousands of a pamphlet they wrote on
the “evils of the labour rate, with special reference to the manner in which that system destroyed the distinction between pauperism and independence” (Webb and Webb 1929: 95).

In March 1834 the information from the inspectors’ local reports together with answers to the commissions’ questions were published in twelve massive folio volumes, which were presented to Parliament. The report had great appeal in both in Cabinet, which solidly endorsed it, and in Parliament, where all parts of the political spectrum supported the New Poor Law bill and rejected major amendments to it. Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick composed a relatively short summary of the report that got wide circulation. This short and popular version of the report was not only written by central members of the SDUK but it was also published by Charles Knight, the publisher of the SDUK. Knight, who was appointed “publisher by Authority” for the Poor Law Commission in 1834, continued to work as the publisher of the Poor Law Board over thirty years. As part of his job for the board, Knight was responsible for the publication of its annual reports and was in charge of designing and producing all the books and forms necessary for the new system of local welfare accounting (Gray 2006: 77).

At the advice of Chadwick, Knight published the summary report in an octavo portable format, which contributed significantly to its popularity. Unlike the previous poor law reports, prepared by parliamentary committees, which emphasized recordation, the typography of the governmental report focused was on persuasion and readability (Frankel 2004 2006). Unlike the condensed page and small font which characterized parliamentary documents, Knight designed the pages of the report to be elegant and airy, with large letters and margins. Moreover, while the parliamentary reports proceeded chronologically according to the progression of the protocols of testimonial hearings conducted in Parliament, the report the poor law governmental report was organized thematically, mimicking, as it were, the sort of scientific publication that the SDUK was interested in marketing to the public.
The aggressive public opinion campaign of the poor law investigators caught the attention of the parliamentary reporter William Cobbett. “We have never before heard of a public board turning authors … and selling its books,” he observed in his Political Register in 1833. Governmental investigators, Cobbett asserted, have become the authors of books under the auspices of the state, exploiting their official position to give authority to their personal reports:

These Commissioners sit in London, it seems and sends forth roving deputy-commissioners to collect information about the country. This rover give in written accounts of the result of their inquiries. A parcel of extracts from these accounts have been collected together, printed in the form of an octavo book, and sold at price of four shillings, “PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY”; and, the members of the House of Commons have each them been furnished with a copy of this book. This is a new way of doing the nation’s business (quoted in Frankel 2006: 44).

The SDUK also played an important role in the massive public relation camping in support of the New Poor Law, which accompanied the Poor Law investigation and the dissemination of its controversial report. It did so mainly through the production and dissemination of vast amount of literature – books pamphlets and article in magazines and newspapers – in support of the investigation supported the reform. Moreover, When the SDUK evaluated the New Poor Law for the readers of its Penny Cyclopedia in 1840 it proclaimed it a “success.” By conducting detailed inquiries throughout the country, the “actual condition of the labouring class in every parish was ascertained with the view of showing the evils of the existing practice.” And the editors felt confident that “upon a careful review of all the facts which have been ascertained before and since its enactment, [the statue] may be said to have answered the end proposed … It has been found adapted to nearly every emergency that has occurred” (Penny Cyclopedia 1840, 17: 328-9).

The successful campaign of the Poor Law Commission to distribute its report by selling it at the price of two pens, led the way to expanding a custom formerly used mainly for dispersion of the Parliamentary Votes - selling parliamentary documents to the general public. Following an
initiative of MP Joseph Hume from the SDUK, the House formalized in legislation in 1836 the marketing for sale of its entire printed output to the general public, through booksellers, “at the lowest price they can be furnished.” The House printer, Luke Graves Hansard observed with great concern that “there seems too much of the 'Diffusion of Knowledge' new scheme in this” (Hansard 1962: 146). Hansard suspected that Hume, together with the “strong party” of “the Diffusion of Knowledge men and Mr. Knight their great Minster,” were aiming to monopolize the production and dissemination of parliamentary papers (Hansard 1962: 161).

During the 1830s, Hume was chairing four different committees on printing in an attempt to advance political reform by revolutionize the practices of official publications. Hume’s printing committees had two general goals: (1) to transfer the responsibility over the production of and control over social knowledge from Parliament (and especially from individual MPs) to government; and (2) to open this knowledge to the public by making it available for purchase. As avid supporters of the freedom of the press and the repeal of the tax on newspapers Hume and the SDUK circle envisioned an information-saturated, censure-free public sphere of individuals purchasing documents for their own self interest and therefore paying for them as they would be paying for a newspaper for example. The legislation introduced into both the realm of official knowledge what were seemingly free market principles, creating a public sphere of voters-readers in which official reports were competing against newspapers journals novels and other printed materials for public attention in the literary consumer market. Government could now circulate its own reports utilizing the capitalist organization of print and the mechanisms of free market.

There was an educational element in selling documents behind informing the people. It "taught" the public the value of useful knowledge (Frankel 2006). But the main goal of the legislation was to seize the allocation of documents from the hands of individual MPs. By relying on market mechanism, reformers wanted to make sure that those who were in need of
specific information, indeed received it directly, without the mediation of individual MPs, who under the new legislation also had to purchase the documents they were interested in. Individual MPs were seen as incompetent in making decision about how to distribute parliamentary papers. Now that social knowledge was increasingly produced by government, reformers sought to effectively abolish the role of as mediators between official information and the general public.
11. Harriet Martineau:
From the Popularization of Social Knowledge to Social Science

The conflict between print and speech, visuality and voice, tangibility and ephemerality, truth and fiction was not confined to the institutional spheres of science and politics but also set its stamp on the lives of individual actors considered in this work. In this chapter I suggest a phenomenological reading of Harriet Martineau’s work to show the important role played by Martineau in the *scientization* of British politics and consequently in the development of Victorian Social Science.

The last two decades have seen the rediscovery of Harriet Martineau, “the first woman sociologist,” (Rossi 1973: 118-24) by numerous scholars in various fields who have been writing about Martineau’s sociological work in a growing number of books and articles. Still, only scant attention has been paid, so far, to the interesting relationship between Martineau’s severe hearing impairment, her career as a social investigator and reporter, and her reflections about the practice of social science. As I show below, the life of Martineau reveals an interesting phenomenological and performative intersection between deafness, propensity toward visual knowledge, the materiality of writing reports about society (as opposed to the non-materiality of speaking), the wide public circulation of these reports, and the scientificity of social knowledge.

1 A review of recent literature on Martineau is offered in Hill and Hoecker-Drysdale’s 2001.
11.1 Martineau and the Poor Law Investigation

In 1833, Brougham, and Charles Knight commissioned Harriet Martineau to write four didactic novels on the operation of the old poor so as to acquaint the public with the abuses and the corrupting effects of parish relief and urge a reform of the Poor Law according to the guidelines of the commission’s official report. Each tale corresponded to one of the four main questions that guided the poor law investigation and displayed a distinct environment, which corresponded to the various types of field investigations conducted by the Poor Law commissioners: town, rural community, mining district, and fishing village.

At the time, Martineau was still working on her *Illustrations of Political Economy*. This series of twenty-seven fictional tales, dramatized for a popular audience the academic doctrines of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and James Mill. Martineau structured the tales into four broad units, dealing with production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, according to the organization of James Mill’s *Elements of Political Economy* (1821). The work, published between 1832 and 1834, was an instant and spectacular success, propelling a virtually unknown young woman from Norwich to instant fame.2

Following the successes of her *Illustrations*, Martineau became acquainted with many important and powerful politicians and was increasingly involved with the political issues of her time. She moved to London where she was approached by legislators and ministers asking for her advice and writing services to help promote their bills in Parliament by influencing public opinion. Lord Althorp, for example, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, sent his secretary Thomas Drummond to supply Martineau with information to enable her to prepare the public for the Budget of 1833 (Martineau 1877 [1]: 260-5). During 1834, she worked closely with the

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2 The 1500 copies of the first story, *Life in the Wilds*, sold out in ten days, to the astonishment of Martineau's publisher Charles Fox, who later estimated monthly sales of the tales at 10,000 copies reaching 144,000 immediate readers (Huzel 2006: 55).
Royal Commission on Excise of Taxes, appointed to inquire into the grounds of Tax exemptions, writing *Illustration of Taxation*. In these five taxation tales, Martineau took up issues familiar from her *Illustrations of Political Economy* but focused on the operation and disadvantages of specific tax systems in Britain, based on the evidence and findings of the Tax Commissions’ report (see, Martineau 1834a).

Martineau was asked by the Poor Law Commission to model each of her four novels according to the successful formulation of her *Illustrations of Political Economy*. She crafted her literary narratives in accordance with the ‘scientific’ evidence the Poor Law governmental investigations taken in the field and modeled the sequence of the topics she intended to discuss on the mode of inquiry used by the commissioners (Orazem 1999: 149). Before writing her tales, she was given advance copies of some of the materials being prepared for the first official report by the Poor Law Commission. “Lord Brougham,” writes Martineau, “sent me all the evidence as it was delivered in by the commissioners of Inquiry into the operation of the Poor-laws” (Martineau 1877: 221). She was given “the manuscript of the evidence taken, and the draft of the report of the commission before they were formally presented to the Ministers of the Crown (a thing without precedent!), in order that she might use the facts to pave the way for the reception of the report in the House and by the people” (Fenwick 1885: 112). To ensure the correspondence between Martineau’s literary narrative, the poor law ‘scientific’ report and the educational aims of the SDUK, the four novels were reviewed prior to their publication by a committee of political economists that included, among others, Nassau Senior and James Mill.

The novels were published between 1833 and 1834 in four volumes - The Parish, The Hamlet, The Town, The Land's End - under the title *Poor Laws and Paupers Illustrated*. The tales clearly represented the findings of the Commission’s report and advocated the commission’s main recommendations for the enactment of the New Poor Law: the elimination of outdoor relief in favor of the workhouse, the principle of less eligibility (people in the
workhouse should live at a standard below that of the independent laborer), and the creation of a central board to ensure the uniformity of administration. Martineau's influence on popularizing New Poor Law was so great that Cobbett was cited in his *Political Register* as referring to the New Poor Law Bill as "the mother Martineau bill" (cited in Huzel 2006: 72).

11.1.1 “Salesmanship in Print”: Martineau as a Popularizer of Social Knowledge

Although often criticized for their radical politics, Martineau's *Illustrations* were well received by contemporaries. Her mixture of fiction, reportage, and scientific reasoning was generally viewed as notable intellectual accomplishment and a useful contribution to the dissemination of economic knowledge. “If political economy be a science at all,” claimed a reviewer in the *Monthly Repository*, “it ought to be a popular science. It should be understood by those whose interests are to be promoted, and their conduct guided by the application of its principles.” *Illustration of Political Economy*, declared *The Spectator*, “is unparalleled in the history of literature … the union of science and entertainments, the creative and descriptive powers, the close observation of life … combined with the wonderful cheapness of the ‘little books’, are as unique as astonishing” (quoted. in Orazem 1999: 139). A review of Martineau's *Poor Law and Paupers illustrated* in *The New Monthly Review* concluded that Martineau "has arrived at the point of excellence where we begin to estimate the value and adjudge the station of a writer. The greatest and most consummate order of perfect intellect, is that in which the imaginative and the reasoning faculties are combined, - each carried to its height: - the one inspired, the other regulated by its companion" (quoted in Huzel 2006: 71).

In *Illustrations*, Martineau developed a literary technique involving a fictional narrative based on “statistical facts” to illustrate theoretical principles. She referred to her tales as “pictures of what those [political economic] principles are doing in communities” (1832a: xii)
and as “pictures of selected social action” (1877 [1]: 461). Michael Hill argues that Martineau’s literary technique was an early example of case method: “Her method was not unlike the modern case study, except that it was fictitious. To illustrate each principle she wrote a tale in which the actual operation of the principle was made evident in real life, and then, at the end, lest the reader have missed a point, the political economy which had previously been illustrated was briefly summarized” (Hill 1988: xxvi).

Blurring the boundaries between reportage and a novel, Martineau’s illustrations did not construct a fully fictive world. Unlike the fiction novel, which generally portrays particular people who, in the fictive universe they occupy, exist in a set of relations with other fictional characters, the actors in Martineau’s narratives remain theoretically abstract; they do not play a particular person but a social type or a demographic category. Martineau’s biographer R. K. Webb thought that “her characters are for the most part wooden,” and that their “emotion is synthetic” (1960: 120). Martineau described, in retrospect, the writing of Illustrations as a process in which she had ‘embodied each leading principle [of political economy] in a character: and the mutual operation of these embodied principles supplied the action of the story. It was necessary to have some accessories, some out-works to the scientific erection: but I omitted these as much as possible; and I believe that in every instance, they were really rendered subordinate’ (Martineau 1877 [1]: 193).

In a way, Martineau was casting her characters according to abstract principles and demographic groupings, similar to the typification used today for market research. Indeed, if the main purpose of the novel was to advertise the poor law report, a high degree of abstraction was essential to the aesthetic of advertising. As a “salesmanship in print,” Martineau’s novels function similarly to the flat, abstract world of advertisement which, as Michael Schudson observed, “does not represent reality nor does it build a fully fictive world” (Schudson 1984: 214). Martineau’s illustrations exist, instead, in a liminal space, mediating between reality and
fiction. They function on their own plane of reality, a hyper ritualized and intensively edited form of actual life, a reality that Ervin Goffman (1976: 15) labels “commercial realism” and Schudson terms “capitalist realism” (1984: 214): a form of publicity that put into work this hyper ritualized life in order to sell ideas as goods.

Martineau herself did not regard her *Illustrations* as a work of fiction; she saw herself primarily as a social reporter, not as an author of fiction. When criticized by some of the SDUK members for the explicit nature of a murder scene in one of her tales, Martineau used the official report as a shield. "It is singular that the incidents and expressions which [are] marked by my critics as questionable," she observed, “are precisely those which are taken without alteration from the Poor Law Evidence, & from real life” (cited in Frankel 2006: 40). In a way, then, Martineau conceived of her work as a popular illustration of the evidence collected and depicted in governmental reports. In her preface to *Poor Laws and Paupers Illustrated*, Martineau reiterated this line of defense, while emphasizing her “unquestionable authority in the reports of the poor law commissioners”:

> As any utility which may be contemplated from the following tale must be impaired by the supposition that the woes and the vices it displays are the offspring of an uncontrollable imagination, I beg to state that all that is most melancholy in my story is strictly true. I have unquestionable authority in the reports of the poor law commissioners, and the testimony of others who are occupied in the administration of parish affairs, for every parochial abuse and every pauper encroachment here exhibited (Martineau 1833).

Although the narratives of Martineau’s tales were artificial and fictional, the readers were expected to experience them as ‘real’. Their reality was constructed as an artificial representation of the “authentic” factual reports. In fact, the tales were intended to make the commission’s protocol-based report seem *more real* by simulating the effect of poor policy as ‘real’. Each tale represented a hyper-reality of poor law policies based on their representations in governmental reports. As such they functioned like a site location where filmmakers search for
places that “look real” on film, that is, consistent with what a stereotypical place should look like on film. Paradoxically, then, the artificial and fictional structure of Martineau’s narratives works, in a way, as a ‘better’ format than the social report. In the preface to *Forest and Game-Law Tales* (1845) Martineau wrote:

> I am deeply indebted to many, both friends and strangers, who have supplied me with the materials necessary to my object, from the oldest lore obtainable to the evidence of the Parliamentary Committee of last session. This aid had enabled me to prosecute and present my work with the courage justified by the fact that my tales are all, though bearing the form of fictions, essentially true. What invention there is, is merely exposition of facts. I trust there will be found in the whole no important representation of any effect of the system which may not be substantiated from the history of the past or present time (cited in Hill 1988: xxvii).

Martineau reflected on the complex relationship between her dual position as a reporter of facts and as an author of fiction in many of her works. In her Autobiography, Martineau recalls, for example her refusal to have publishers pay for her trip in return for the promise to write a book based on her journals in America: “I am sure that no traveller seeing things through author’s spectacles, can see them as they are” (Martineau, 1877 [2]: 3). In the preface to the tale *Ireland* she admits that the plot is not dramatic enough to qualify as good fiction. “As for the incidents of the tale,” she explained, “my choice was influenced by the consideration, not what would best suit the purposes of fiction, but of what would most serve the cause of the Irish poor. A much more thrilling and moving story might have been made of conspiracy, and slaughter by weapon and by gibbet; but these scenes want no further development than may be found in our daily newspapers (1832b: ii ). The reform of the Irish poor, Martineau is suggesting, is served more by the social reporter who sticks to the facts, then by the novelist who seeks to dramatize events into “a much more thrilling and moving story.” Yet, according to Martineau, as a realistic account, just reporting on facts is not enough because it registers only what is seen on the surface; fiction, on the other hand, can reveal the inner causes of human behavior but only if it
forfeits some of the esthetic qualities and the dramatic scenery that makes for good novel. A
good social reportage in the service of reform thus entails a more complex and careful balancing
between the aesthetics of facts and that of fiction.

11.2 From Illustrations to Observations

Michael Hill may have overstated the case when commenting that Martineau’s
*Illustrations* “are fundamentally works of theoretical and empirical social science” (1988: xxviii), but he may not have been too far off the mark. In her preface to *The Parish*, the opening
tale of her *Poor Laws and Paupers Illustrated*, Martineau lays down the sociological principles
which guide her work:

The pleasantest office of philanthropy is, doubtless, to set forth persuasively
whatever is pure in human nature, and lofty in social character; but there is a
satisfaction admits the pain of exhibiting the reverse of the picture, when vice
and misery can be indisputably referred to *the errors of a system rather than to
the depravity of individuals*. All *social systems* being remediable, the task of
exposing the unhappy results of any involves a definite hope of the
amelioration which must, sooner or later, follow the exposure. The more
clearly evils can be *referred to an institution*, the more cheering, and the
expectations of what may be effected by its amendment. Let these rational
hopes console the readers as they have supported the writer of this tale
(Martineau 1833; my italics).

In this passage, Martineau seems to depart from the individualistic discourse of political
economy, which she implicitly characterizes as a form of scientific charity. Instead, she offers a
socio-economic perspective of institutional problems, or “errors,” in the “social system,” as an
alternative to the focus on the “depravity of individuals,” or abstract laws regarding “human
nature.” By conceptualizing poverty not as the some of individual deprivation but as a social
reality (i.e., as pauperism), a consequence of social system, Martineau formulates a public and
scientific agenda for governmental investigations, which translates the technocratic, moralistic
and often individualistic discourse of reform into a sociological framework. It was, however, in *How to Observe Morals and Manners* — the text that Martineau had started writing immediately after the completion of her *Illustrations* — that she came the closest to formulating a theoretical framework for empirical social science.

### 11.2.1 “How to Observe Morals and Manners”: A Manual for Social Investigators

Shortly after finishing writing her tales for the SDUK, Martineau undertook another commission with the Society to write a systematic account of observational techniques. Martineau was originally asked to write her account as a chapter for a multiple-author book on “observation” in a variety of scientific fields, edited by Henry Bellenden Ker, a Law commissioner and an active member of the SDUK. Martineau wrote her chapter in August of 1834 on board a ship on her way to the United States where she conducted two years of field research, which resulted in two reports: *Society in America* (1837) and *Retrospect of American Travel* (1838b). These travel reports helped established Martineau among the middle class audiences of her time as a model of observational precision and reliable reporting. When the book project on “observations” collapsed, Charles Knight decided to plan instead a series of volumes under the title *How to Observe*. In 1838 Knight asked Martineau to extend her chapter on observations and write a full blown methodological textbook on observing *Morals and Manners*. If the initial paper was guided by Martineau’s experience with governmental reports which she used extensively in her illustrations, the eventual expansion and refinement of *How to Observe Morals and Manners* benefited from the direct experience with observational techniques she acquired as a social investigator in the field during her the two year of travel in America.
Martineau’s task in *How to Observe* was to direct the social observation of the field investigator in a manner useful for science: in a sense, to define his field of vision. Working on *Illustrations*, Martineau became closely familiar with governmental investigators (royal commissioners and their assistants or inspectors) and with the content, style and practices of governmental investigations and reportage. Like her *Illustrations*, *How to Observe* was initiated by a group of parliamentary reformers, many of whom served as governmental investigators at one time or another, and was partly based on Martineau’s unsettling experience with analyzing governmental reports and other official materials, in an effort to make them more persuasive to the public. Because, the commissions’ credibility of claims to empirical knowledge was said to depend on accurate observation ‘in the field’ above all else, *How to Observe* can be read as an attempt to resolve some fundamental dilemmas encountered by governmental investigators: What constitutes a valid observations? How was field observation to be trusted?

While visual knowledge through observation was a key term in the lexicon of governmental investigators, how and what to observe were far from self-evident. In *How to Observe*, visual knowledge is more than just a matter of looking: in order to see properly, one had to observe methodically, to follow a rule. Although, instruction manuals for travelers were not in themselves new, Martineau’s *How to Observe* might be seen as the first explicit attempt to transform the lay traveler into a full-fledged social investigator and not just into a scientific observer. The book was the first English field method manual attempting to promote an authoritative “way of seeing” in the social field. As Seymour Martin Lipset writes in the introduction to *How to Observe* that Martineau’s manual “is perhaps, the first book on the methodology of social research in the then still unborn disciplines of sociology and anthropology. Martineau realized that the study of social systems was a separate scientific discipline, and called it the “science of morals and manners” (Lipset 1968: 7).
In fact, Martineau preferred the more contemporary terms ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ to the terms ‘morals’ and ‘manners’ to describe her social scientific method. As she writes in her autobiography, *Society in America* was intended by her to have been called “Theory and Practice of Society in America” but her publishers objected to the title (Martineau 1877: 405). Martineau’s original title reveals more closely her methodological principles in *How to Observe* and in particular her deep understanding of the reciprocal relationships between theoretical presuppositions, empirical data collection and the process of making generalizations.

Most crucially in this respect, by studying the relationships between social theory (universal moral principles) and social practices (particular social manners), Martineau proposes an elaborate framework for comparative research. For Martineau, social theory is equivalent to the universal principle of morals. Human happiness is one example of a universal moral good, which can be achieved in a variety of ways (i.e., *manners*) in various societies. It is the comparative study of this variation in “national character” that should stand at the focus of social investigations. The social investigator "must bear in mind that there are a few universal interests which everywhere stand for, and that it is the modification of these by local influence which he has to observe" (Martineau 1838a: 225). In her sociological study *Society in America*, Martineau repudiates legislative reformers who, based on universal theoretical principles of morality, advocate one set of laws, a universal model of social policy, which can be implemented anywhere and everywhere, and who, like Bentham, “offer to codify for countries where they have not set their foot.” “It is absurd,” claims Martineau, “to suppose that communities, where wide differences of customs, prejudices, and manners still exist, can be, or ought to be, brought into a state of exact conformity of institutions” (1837: 76).
11.3 Harriet Martineau’s Deafness and the Scientificity of Social Knowledge

For Martineau, assessing the moral state of societies depended crucially on the collection of empirically-driven social facts (i.e., manners). In *How to observe* she conceptualized manners as a set of tangible things and practices, the observable traces of institutional activity. Morals – the inner workings of the human heart – are unobservable *theoretical* entities. Martineau believed that manners are merely surface, manifestations of the deeper morals of society. “Manners cease to have meaning when separated [from morals]” A social investigator who treats manners without connecting them to morals, thus treating social practice separately from social theory, “does not merit the name of an observer” (1838a: 222) because he is “like one who, without hearing the music, sees a roomful of people begin to dance” (1838a: 55). Music in this metaphor stands for moral regulations. Morals constitute the rhythm of life, the ideas which patterns human behavior and their motivation for action.

With this metaphor Martineau draws a sensual contrast between morals and manners: manners are exteriors/sights, morals are interiors/insights; you *hear* morals; you *see* manners. The investigator who focuses only on manners thus imitates a deaf person. However, and most crucially, deafness is in a way a precondition for “true” hearing. According to Martineau the act of *seeing* (observing manners) has an analytical priority over *hearing* (i.e., reflecting about morals). The “music of morals” cannot be directly observes or sensed, it can only be deduced or and reflected upon from observations of social manners; it must, therefore, involve a process of discovery and an economy of explanation, the quintessential *modus operandi* of modern science. Much like a deaf person in a ballroom, then, the investigator cannot “hear the music” of society’s morals until he first carefully observe the “dancing patterns” of its typical manners. Overcoming deafness thus depends on the scientific ability to induce morals from manners, demonstrating their intimate connection.
Dominated by a strong visual modus operandi, How to Observe sets forth the principles for disciplined observation of society: a systematic and impartial collection and organization of social before the social investigators could be said to possess “the requisites for understanding what he contemplates” (Martineau 1838a: 1). Analytically, then, (objectively) understanding of society is different then (subjectively) contemplating about it. For the investigator to be able to connect these two levels of analysis, she first must be able to analytically and methodologically separate between them to assure their reliability. To corroborate and separate as far as possible one’s subjective response from objective observation, Martineau advocates the use of three separate means for cross-checking information: (1) a diary in which to record one’s personal, subjective reactions to events; (2) a journal in which to record facts and impressions, interesting anecdotes, sayings, epitaphs, and the like; and (3) a notebook in which to draw or record facts of daily life as observed for comparative and systematic study. The purpose of these inscription devices is to help the social investigator make sure that her explication of morals is indeed derived from objectively observed facts and not from subjective impressions (which can only serve as commentary upon such explications). In this respect, Martineau’s economy of explanation – the scientific process of forcible externalization of an otherwise hidden interiors of “making the inside the outside” by deriving morals from observable facts - is closely tied to the economy of writing: “to lay down flat on the surface, to open up and make evident what is obscured and hidden” (Goody 1977: 118).

When Martineau was writing How to Observe, the dominant paradigm of social inquiry was that of common-law adjudication. Under this model of legal inquiry, in which verbal utterance was the primary source of evidence, ‘society’ was nothing like a set of tangible facts. Rather, it was a manner of listening to testimonies or speeches in the courtroom or in Parliament before pronouncing judgment. The scientificity of social knowledge in Martineau’s writing is achieved in a direct contrast to this adjudicative model of inquiry and its reliance on audible utterance. Social investigation becomes scientific through the engagement of the investigator
with a tangible social world, a social world of hard facts observed “in the field”. According to Martineau social researchers should relinquish the ephemerality of voice and focus their investigation instead on social facts, on ‘things’ – physical artifacts, official records, work of literature, and other observable patterns of institutional behavior and social organization.

Interviews, testimonies, conversation, and informants have secondary importance at best:

To arrive at the facts of the condition of the people through the discourse of individuals, is a hopeless enterprise. The plain truth is – it is beginning at the wrong end. The grand secret of wise inquiry into Morals and Manners is to begin with the study of THINGS, using the DISCOURSE OF PERSONS as a commentary upon them. Though the facts sought by travelers relate to Persons, they may most readily be learned from Things. *The eloquence of Institutions and Records*, in which the action of the nation is embodied and perpetuated, is more comprehensive and more faithful than that of any variety of individual voices. The voice of a whole people goes up in the silence workings of an institution; the condition of the masses is reflected from the surface of the record. The institution of a nation, - political, religious, or social, - put evidence into the observer's hands as to its capabilities and wants which the study of individuals could not yield in the course of a lifetime. The Records of any society, be they what they may ... afford more information on Morals in a day than converse with individuals in a year (1838a: 63-4; my italics).

Martineau is extremely distrustful of social investigations based primarily on speech and testimonial evidence. What people say is secondary to how they behave, to their institutions and to the tangible things they create. The eloquence of speech is replaced in Martineau’s social analysis with the “eloquence of institutions and records.” Relying on ideas and thoughts expressed by human voice as a main pool of evidence is a poor way of deriving morals. “The chief reason why the discourse of individuals … is almost purely deceptive as to morals,” is that the investigator “has no security that those he meets are a sample of the whole” (1838a: 192):

To begin the work of observation with registering ... private discourse is ... useless, from the diversity there is in man's minds ... The testimony of no two would be found to agree; and, if the traveller depended upon them for his general facts, he could never furnish a record which could be trusted. But, the facts being once obtained by stronger evidence than individual testimony ... the discourse of individuals assumes its proper value, and become illustrative where before it would have been only bewildering (1838a: 188).
Morals must derive, therefore, from manners and other social facts (i.e., tangible and concrete things), not from voice. Oral evidence can serve only as commentary on social facts recorded by meticulous observations. The truth of an observation made by a field investigator, according to Martineau, consisted less in precise verbatim description of what was said, i.e., in the recording of human voice, than in the careful and meticulous recording of manners as hard social facts. Only after manners are recoded the investigator can creatively structure his different recordings of audible utterance within a general narrative so as to derive morals for manners. The questioning of witnesses or conversation with inhabitants serve only to confirm, substantiate, explicate or interpret the information that was already gathered through direct observations of things.

It is the collection and recording of social facts which constitutes the most important phase of social investigations. In order to assess the moral state of society, each observer must therefore attend carefully to empirical instances of manners. Sixty years later Emile Durkheim reiterated this point when he wrote in The Rules of Sociological Method: “Instead of observing, describing, and comparing things, we are content to … proceed … from ideas to things, not from things to ideas … It is clear that this method cannot give objective results.” According to Durkheim, “the first and most fundamental rule” is to “consider social facts as things” (1895: 14-15; italics in the original).

Martineau is looking for the eloquence of ideas not in the ephemeralities of “individual voices” but in tangible artifacts: the printed words (records) and observable patterns of behavior and collective institutions; she is searching, in other words in voices inscribed in institutions artifacts and records. “It is clear,” Martineau admits, “that we cannot know the mind of a nation any more of an individual, by merely looking at it, without hearing any speech.” But Martineau

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3 In fact, Martineau advises the investigator not to take notes “on the spot, as evidence, what a companion might be saying to him,” but to allow “the conversation to flow on naturally, without checking it by the production of the pencil and tablets” (1838a: 196).
locates this speech not in the human voice but in official records and institution. She pays particular attention to the inscription of ideas (or morals) in books; for her, “national literature is national speech.” In addition to national literature, Martineau recommends reading the books of legislation as a supplementary method open for the investigator who wants to inquire into “the popular mind” of “self governing people” (1837: 323). The hearing of voice is exchanged for the reading of text.

Morals, according to Martineau, are best represented in books of literature and legislation not in voice. Wherever national literature is available to “the careful observer,” he “may almost frame himself a scale of popular morals and manners” (1838a: 144). The scientificity of social investigations depends on the ability of the investigator to read society like a text. To readers, knowledge comes “not through the ear but through the eye alone, not from the exchange of views with others viva voce but by scanning and interpreting fixed rows of silent signs, not in a noisy community of other persons but in the silence of the library and isolated consciousness” (Kernan 1987: 220-1).

The basic predicament facing the study of morals and manners is that of undisciplined observation, which results in unscientific and unprofessional induction. She associates this problem with haste: “No books are so little to be trusted as travels,” because travelers “generalise too rapidly. Most, if not all, take a fact for a principle, or the exception for the rule, more or less; and the quickest minds, which love to reason and explain more than to observe with patience, go most astray” (1838a: 21). Immediacy, quick commentary and reliance on human voice are all characteristic of oral culture which favored flashes of intuition over careful

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4 In regarding “national literature as national speech” Martineau was clearly influenced by Thomas Carlyle’s article State of German Literature, which appeared in the Edinburgh Review in 1827. Lengthy quotes from the Carlyle’s article appears both in How to observe and in Society in America. The introduction to Society in America is opened with a quotation from the article and so is the chapter on Utterance which starts with Carlyle assertion that “there is but one method by which most nations can express the general mind: by their literature” (1837: chap. 8; the same quote appears in How to Observe, 1838: 123).
and patient investigation. The reason why unlike observations of nature, social observations are not considered a science, Martineau contends, is that unlike the natural scientist, the typical social observer thinks “that he can understand men at glance; he supposes that it is enough to be among [people] to know that they are doing” (Martineau 1838a: 3). “Natural philosophers,” however, “do not dream of generalizing with any such speed as that used by the observers of men ... The geologist and chemist make a large collection of particular appearances, before they commit themselves to profound a principle drawn from them, though their subject matter is far less diversified than the human subject” (1838a: 17).

11.3.1 “More Than Meets the Eyes”: Deafness and the Phenomenology of Scientific Social Observations

To remedy the problem of hastily induction, Martineau believed, it is not enough to engage in meticulous and systematic collection of evidence; the social investigator has to practice a reflective delay before arriving to any tangible conclusions; he “must deny himself all indulgence of peremptory decision, not only in public on his return, but in his journal, and in his most superficial thoughts” (1838a: 18):

In order to ‘judge through judgment’s eyes’, those eyes must be made strong and clear; and a traveller may gain more without the bodily organ than with an unstrained understanding. The case of the Deaf Traveler [John Kitto], leads us to say the same about the other great avenue of knowledge. His writings prove, to all who are acquainted with them, that, though to a great degree deprived of that inestimable commentary upon perceived facts – human discourse – the Deaf Traveler is able to furnish us with more knowledge of foreign people than Fine-Ear himself could have done without the accompaniments of analytical power and concentrative thought (1838a: 27)
The significance of Martineau’s reference to John Kitto’s traveling reports cannot be overstates, when we realize that Martineau was almost completely deaf herself. As Mary Jo Deegan asserts, "Martineau cannot be understood as a person or sociologist unless her deafness is included as part of her autobiography, knowledge and methodology.” According to Deegan Martineau’s “choice in career, methodology, and topic selection” were all influenced by her deafness (Deegan 2001: 56, 46-47). As I shall argue below, the reality of Martineau’s hearing loss may well have led her to stress the epistemological priority of observation over discourse, of seeing over hearing.

The intellectual aspirations of both Martineau and Kitto developed in their youth in parallel and as a reaction to their hearing impairment. Both found the solitude enforced by their deafness and an opportunity to enhance their literary skills of reading and writing. Kitto, who was born to a poor family who leaved in an almshouse, became deaf in 1817 when he was twelve after falling from a ladder. As he intimates in his autobiography Lost Senses, it was this sudden state of deafness which increased his thirst for knowledge, made him spend most of his time reading in the Plymouth public library and induced him to pursue a literary career as a writer and a traveler-reporter. Well aware of the connection between deafness and textuality, Kitto chooses to include in the opening chapter of his autobiography a recount of the history of his reading (Davis 1995: 61-2). Utilizing his literary skills, Kitto became a journalist and an author of numerous traveling books. “My pen” writes Kitto, “became the instrument of redressing [my deafness], and of ameliorating the more afflictive part of my condition … the pure love of knowledge, for its own sake … have carried me on … I had, in fact, learned the secret, that knowledge is power” (1848: 80-1).

Like Kitto, Martineau’s self-education resulted from her exposure to a wide array of texts. As Susan Bohrer points out “Books, articles, periodicals, primary sources such as records of parliamentary proceeding,” were Martineau’s “guardians against the evils of isolation” (2003: 27;
see also Martineau 1834b: 41). Like Kitto, Martineau seemed to acquire the habit of silently observing social behavior, reading it like a text, and writing down their observation on paper, as this scrutinizing and soundless activities, were accepted for the deaf. Martineau, it needs to be remembered was one of the very few women in Victorian England who made a living out of writing. In a letter to Francis place in 1832 she claims: “I want to be doing something with the pen, since no other means of action in politics are in woman's power” (cited in Webb 1960: 114).

After writing several traveling books Kitto was encouraged by Charles Knight and John Russell to write a column for the SDUK’s *Penny Magazine* under the title *The Deaf Traveler*. As Kitto explains, his deafness enhanced his visual abilities and qualified him with the necessary observational skills for his traveling reports; he claimed to possess a panoramic observational ability and able to register visual input in great detail and be sensitive to visual nuances:

> My mind retains a most distinct and minute impressions of everyday circumstance ... and of every scene upon which, during frequent and long-continued change of place, I bestowed more than the most cursory notice. It is something to say this, under the immense variety of new objects which, during a long period of time, were constantly passing before my eyes, like the moving panorama of some London exhibitions. And it should be understood that what I mean by "cursory observation" is the seeing of a thing without looking at it; and therefore that I retain a clear impression or image of every thing at which I ever looked ... I am not exactly aware of the extent in which this faculty may be common or not to others: but from a few opportunities I have had of comparing my own impressions with those of others, I think that where ordinary observation is limited to one or two prominent point in a set of circumstances, mine embraced the whole of the circumstances in which these prominent points were involved (Kitto 1848: 67-8; italics in the origin).

Deafness became a way for Martineau and Kitto to wield knowledge as power. Both found their powers of observation and understanding enhanced by their disability and isolation; both treated their deafness as a kind of experiential laboratory for the pursuit of knowledge. As Alison Winter have shown, the fact that Martineau was frank about her deafness and wrote about it in such a forthright was legitimated if not encouraged by the fact that her invalidity was a ticket to enter the very exclusive club of Victorian intellectual women. Like Kitto who had used his
deafness to pull himself from a miserable life of poverty in the almshouse and pursue a public career as a renowned intellectual, Martineau drew on her disability to augment her authoritative status and to “self consciously [construct] a career for herself as Britain's exemplary invalid.” In Victorian times, "one fundamental characteristic that intellectual women shared was their very oddity - the fact that they were not like other women,” and this oddity was “often registered in terms that stressed particular confirmations of their bodies” (Winter 1998: 204, 211).

For Martineau and Kitto, the process of truth-discovery could not be extricated from their deafness which became the process of ascertaining the physiological basis of making that discovery. Martineau’s Autobiography, for example, can be read as an attempt to reconstruct herself as a natural-born political economist through her deftness. She recounts how, at age fifteen, “I was all the while becoming a political economist without knowing it” (1877 [1]: 55). And she finds “that I had been teaching [political economy] unawares, in my stories about Machinery and Wages” (1877 [1]: 105).

Martineau and Kitto lived in a period where the English polite society with its “verbal economy of sound” was going through a massive transformation with the spread a print culture with its impersonal and “visual way of knowing,” based on a more silent economy of written observations (Ong 2002: 109-158). In polite society the credibility and authority of the speaker and her good morals were contingent not on her ability to communicate thoughts but rather on a display emotional sincerity through rhetorical ornament and eloquent use of words in conversation (Fliegelman 1993: 129). Because, as deaf reporters, Kitto and Martineau were more comfortable writing, reading and observing than speaking and listening, their skills did not only ‘fitted’ well with this transformation but they played a significant role in promoting this cultural change. Being deaf, they were allowed to challenge the polite society's mistrust of solitude and aloneness and publicly advocate the authority of impersonal utility rooted visual practices of the scientific observer.
Both Kitto and Martineau’s traveling reports were criticized on account of their deafness. Contemporaries alleged that their deafness prevented the from being able to give an accurate account of the societies they observed. Their inability to hear people’s conversation, especially those that were not specifically meant for them, made them miss out on the subtleties of verbal exchanges that took place around them (Bohrer 2003). Henry Richardson, for example, wrote in the Contemporary Review that Martineau “heard specific remarks and formal conversation; but she missed a thousand moral nuances which a person who can hear well is easily conscious of … it may also be said that Harriet Martineau missed, through her deafness, many a lesson in manners” (Richardson 1877: 1121).

Kitto’s claim to posses a panoramic observation was clearly an effort to compensate for this specific predicament by claiming to posses an enhance ability to observe the wide scope of social interactions and “the whole of the circumstances” in which they take place. But Kitto was also acutely aware that his deafness skewed his reports. Dominated by visual knowledge, he felt that his empirical accounts were keyed primarily to exteriors, and thus lacked personal intimacy. Kitto often writes about his experience as a deaf reporter in this spirit:

> In general, when you see the company visibly amused or interested, and ask to know the cause, the chances are that the person to whom you apply thinks it *not worth* repeating on his fingers... This is one of the great annoyance in the state of the deaf. He is confined to the solid bones, the dry bread, the hard wood, the substantial fibre of life; and gets but little of the grace, the unction, the gilding and the flowers, which are to be found precisely in those small things which are “not worth” reporting on the fingers (Kitto 1848: 147).

Martineau was well aware that her deafness might be used to question the reliability of her investigations. In her *Autobiography*, Martineau writes about Sydney Smith, an American slave owner who made the sarcastic remark that "she is writing a book … to prove that the only travellers who are fit to write books must be both blind and deaf." In a revealing passage, Martineau attributes Smith’s reference to her deafness to a passage she wrote in the preface to her *Society in America*: “In that preface I explained the extent to which my deafness was a disqualification for travel, and for reporting of it: and I did it because I knew that, if I did not, the slaveholders would make my deafness a pretext for setting aside any part of my testimony which they did not like (1877: 186)."
11.3.2 “With the Practiced Eye of a Deaf Person”: Deafness as Social Expertise

In *How to Observe*, as well as in many of her other writings, Martineau’s goal is to turn this “great annoyance in the state of the deaf” into the advantage for the social investigator who is interested in the scientific study of society. By examining her own deafness and the intellectual powers it facilitated, Martineau was in actuality reflecting on the conditions for mental work in general. First, she gives an analytical and methodological priority to seeing over hearing. The investigator, imitating a situation of deafness, induces morals (thoughts, ideas) from her observations of hard social facts, instead of depending on their unreliable verbal transmission. Deducing Moral observation thus involved a process of discovery and an economy of explanation - “to open what we examine, making inside the outside, destroying its interiority as such” (Goody 1977: 118) – which, according to Martineau, is more reliable than reliance on the ephemerality of human voice.

During he travels in the East, the difficulty to communicate verbally with the Arabs provided Martineau with an opportunity to display her non-verbal expertise as an observer of human behavior. In the absence of an interpreter, Martineau writes in *Eastern Life*, her fellow travelers “were much given to pantomime” to communicate with the Arabs. “It was amusing to me to see, with the practiced eye of a deaf person, how invariably they were misunderstood; and often, when they had no suspicion of this themselves.” Unlike her hearing companions, Martineau understood that the pantomimic display of manners and gestures, like any spoken language, works as culturally and socially produced sign system with its own internal logic which the practiced eye of the experienced observer might be able decode. Pantomime, she explained to her travel companions, is not a universal mean of communication. Their non verbal gestures is a European Pantomime; it “may be a good way with any people in Europe, from a general affinity of ideas, and of their signs, which prevails over a continent where there is a
nearly uniform civilization. But is avails nothing, and is even misleading, between Europeans and the natives of Oriental countries” (1848: 71).

Second, the state of deafness, according to Martineau can help the investigator to regulate his observations by filtering out trivial, insignificant or unsubstantial information, and focusing instead on “the substantial fibre of life.” Moreover, the situation of deafness makes the investigator not only a better, more precise observer, but, paradoxically, it also turns him into improved and more attentive listener, as his interactions with informants demand special effort and attention. Martineau notes the increase willingness of informants to share confidence with her when she used an ear trumpet as a hearing aid. Her hearing impairment created a situation of intimate privacy between her and the informants, minimizing distractions as people gave her full attention while conversing with her in public:

I labored under only one peculiar disadvantage that I am aware of, but that one is incalculable. I mean my deafness. This does not endanger the accuracy of my information, I believe, as far as it goes, because I carry a trumpet of remarkable fidelity; and instrument, moreover, which seems to exert some winning power, by which I gain more in tête-à-têtes than is given to people who hear general conversation. Probably its charm consists in the new feeling of ease and privacy in conversing with a deaf person (Martineau 1837: 54).

Third, Martineau argues that the situation of detachment and silent observation, conditioned by deafness, the removal from the immediacy of human conversations, lent authority to the deaf, who could see whole truths which were distorted or fragmented by the view from a vantage point within the bustle of life. Moreover social seclusion and detachment from everyday experience and immediate interactions is essential for the process of scientific writing, as it imitates a state of mediation which is necessary for reflective delay and increases the ability to think abstractly (1834b: 264). In her Autobiography, Martineau describes her trip to the East as a silent travel filled with experiences of solitude. She emphasizes the importance
of “opportunities for quiet mediation” not in the safe seclusion of one own home but out in the open through “on the spot” observations:

My deafness which would, in the opposite case, have imposed a most disabling fatigue, was thus rather advantage ... there were many hours of every day when I was virtually as much alone as I could have been in my own house ... during the ten weeks that we were on the Nile, I could sit on the deck and think for hours of every morning; and while we were in the desert, or traversing the great scenery of Palestine ... I rode alone … without a word spoken … I cannot attempt to give an idea what I learned during those quiet seasons. All the historical hints I had gained from my school days onward now rose up amidst a wholly new light. It is impossible for even erudite home-stayers to conceive what is gained by seeing for one's self the scenes of history, after any considerable preparation of philosophical thought. When, after my return, the Chevalier Bunsen told me that he would not go to Egypt, if he had the leisure, because he already knew every thing that could be learned about it, I could not but feel that this was a matter which could be judged of nowhere but on the spot (Martineau 1877: 536-7; my italics)

In her Letter to the Deaf, Martineau writes that the central predicament of deafness is loosing the ability to understand what is going on in social interaction, which makes the deaf extremely conscious to the social world. A dialectical response develops as a result: On the one hand, the deaf is forced into social isolation, retreats from society, and find comfort in solitude. On the other hand, and at the same time, the deaf tend to become inquisitive and “unscrupulous about truth” (1834b: 250), out of a desire to understand social interaction and as a way of gaining control of them. An intellectual model of social investigation emerges out of the ability to carefully regulate and balance these two conflicting societal dispositions. Martineau's advise the deaf to "never to ask what is going on forward" (1834b: 255) always wanting to know what was said, what is happening, and so on, because this may irritate to hearing people. Instead, the deaf should delay her immediate desire to understand what is going on around her, and “take advantage” of her hearing lost: her understanding will go deeper by quietly and leisurely reflecting about the content of social interaction from systematic observations. In her methodological

6 It is interesting to note that Martineau’s is preaching for independence and self-reliance for the deaf, the same moral principle which guides her treatment of the pauper in Illustrations: Martineau was known for
writing, Martineau was able to turn this dialectical disposition into a prerequisite for the professional social investigator. Truth seeking, encouraged by the strong and conscious desire to understand the social worlds, and combined with an innate ability to withdraw from the immediacy of daily life, its hectic interactions and noisy chitchatting into a quite space of solitude and "temporary misanthropy" (1834b: 251) become a scientific approach to the study of society.

By examining her own deafness and the intellectual powers it facilitated, Martineau was in actuality reflecting on the conditions for mental work in general. In a way, she presents her deafness as a solution to the problem of value-free science: how to develop an objective science of society whilst investigators are inextricably bound up with the subject matter. The “deaf investigator,” or for that matter any investigator who adopts a “modality of deafness” in his research, is better able to withdrew herself, in disciplined fashion, from social world and switch focus from being immersed in the world of conversation to observing it from outside. In this way, the deaf investigator can distance herself from the status and position of a normal, hearing, persons and thereby “naturally” worked to “bracket out” those attitudes which the investigator shares in common with everyone else.

In his Problems of Involvement and Detachment, Norbert Elias (1956) argued that the analytical ability to achieve scientific detachment is a societal accomplishment. Elias suggested that only under specific societal conditions do people develop the capacity to manage their emotions in their relations with other, as to make scientific detachment possible. As the case of Harriet Martineau demonstrates, the intellectual model of the social investigator as a “deaf traveler” provides the necessary societal condition for scientific investigation, as it is able to produce and utilize a set of specific phenomenological conditions to simulate detached observation while still engaged in the situation.

advocating the use of hearing aids like the ear trumpet, which she uses herself, as part of this struggle for social independence.
12. The Social Science Association and the Scientific Appropriation of Social Knowledge

On October 12, 1857 thousands of people filled Birmingham Town Hall to witness the opening of the first congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (NAPSS) and listen to the inaugural address delivered by its president – Lord Henry Brougham. The platform was crowded with politicians and other important political and social reformers such as John Russell, formerly prime minister, William Cowper, president of the Board of Health, Anthony Ashley-Cooper (Lord Ashley), the leader of the factory reform movement, Edwin Chadwick, James Kay-Shuttleworth, Thomas Southwood Smith and many others. “So numerous were the papers to be read, and so lively and prolonged the discussion,” reported The London Times, that the sessions overran and required an extra day (quoted in Goldman 2002: 27).

The NAPSS was founded less than three months before on July 29 1857 at a meeting of forty-three professionals and reformers, at the London home of Henry Brougham. Of the people present, most were lawyers and politicians, mostly members of the Law amendment society, which was founded by Barrister-MPs in 1844 and whose president was Brougham, and fifteen were women, representatives of the first organized feminist movement in Britain, which had been campaigning for the legal protection of a wife’s property since 1854 and had sought assistance from the Law Amendment Society (Goldman 2002). The Association made Brougham its president and appointed a young lawyer and aspiring politician, George Woodyatt Hastings, who was instrumental in initiating the meeting at Brougham’s house, as its general secretary.\(^1\)

\(^1\) George Hastings was a young barrister, the son of the founder of the British Medical Association, Sir Charles Hastings. His position as the secretary of the Law Amendment Society, Hastings was in a position to draw together the organization and patronage required to fund the NAPSS. In 1852 he became the secretary of the Medical Reform Committee of the British Medical Association, a position he held until 1858. In 1880 he was elected to Parliament as a liberal MP for East Worcestershire.
The NAPSS, reported *The London Times*, was “a centre for the communication and interchange of ideas on current topics of political and social interest.” According to JS Mill, who sat on its governing Council, the Association brought together “persons of all opinions consistent with the profession of a desire for social improvement.” Its main goal, according to Brougham was “to aid legislation by preparing measures, by explaining them, by recommending them to the community, or, it may be, by stimulating the legislature to adopt them” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 1-2) Hastig similarly thought the central mission of the NAPSS was to encourage social reformers “to collect facts, to diffuse knowledge, to stimulate inquiry … and [to make] suggestions in aid of social improvement” (NAPSS 1858: xxviii).

The Association commanded an influential membership. The inaugural General Committee included eighteen peers, twenty-eight MPs, and a distinguished group of public administrators and intellectuals including JS Mill, Edwin Chadwick, William Farr, James Kay-Shuttleworth and many others. Two of its presidents were former prime minister (Russell in 1858 and Archibald Primrose, Earl of Rosebery, in 1874). Many cabinet ministers and notable MPs delivered papers in the NAPSS annual meetings. They were joined by public servants such as Edwin Chadwick, John Simon and William Farr, three of the great sanitary reformers of the nineteenth century and economists including Henry Fawcett and W. S. Jevons.

The NAPSS had a fairly constant membership of about 1200 persons, who paid annual fees (Goldman 2002). London members formed the majority of NAPSS members and came mainly from mid-nineteenth century professions. A check of the background profile of members in 1866, 1869, 1872, and 1880, indicates that on average active members of Parliament about 10% of the members, a ratio that remained relatively constant (Yeo 1996: 153). This is a staggering Figure, which shows that about one of every five members of the House of

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2 Gladstone was present for its 1863 congress in Edinburgh and, in 1868, chaired a notable meeting of its Committee on Labour and Capital a few weeks before he became prime minister (Goldman 2002). The NAPSS had twenty-two different presidents between 1857 and 1884. All of them were politicians who started their political career either as members of the House of Commons or as governmental official.
Commons was also NAPSS members at any given time. Legal experts composed 30 percent of the members, city businessmen 10 percent falling to 6.6 percent, doctors and civil servants 12 percent and women 7 percent (Ibid).

The intention of the founder was to model the NAPSS on the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS). Hastings and a group of social reformers had tried in 1856 to establish an embryonic Social Science Association within the framework of the BAAS by extending its statistical section to include “subjects of jurisprudence, political economy, education, and others closely connected to statistical research.” But the scheme was rejected on grounds that “only the exact sciences were deserving the name of science; [only] that ... which can be demonstrated by mathematical formula to be true may be called scientific.” In response, Hastings persuaded Brougham to establish a separate “society for the discussion of social questions” (NAPSS 1879: 151-2). “There is every prospect,” wrote Hastings to Brougham at the beginning of May 1857, “that you may if you choose to do so preside over this autumn over a meeting embracing the whole range of a moral and social science – Law Amendment – Reformatories – Education – Statistics – to be held at Birmingham” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 53). Brougham approved and the social scientists “quitted the orthodox believers and proceeded to found a pugnacious and prosperous sect of their own” (NAPSS 1879: 151-2). When Brougham wrote to Russell to invite him to the first congress of the NAPSS, he assured him he has “every reason to expect the same benefit will accrue to Social and generally to Moral subjects” as “Mathematical and Physical Science has received from the annual Meetings of the British Association [BAAS]” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 52).

The Birmingham congress, set the pattern of the five-days annual meetings, held in all the major British cities each fall until 1884. Each congress was attended by thousands and attracted hundreds of participants, many from the worlds of national politics and administration,

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3 Of the 658 Mps in the House of Commons, about 120 were NAPSS members at any given time.
who read papers in a mixture of plenary and specialist sessions. Paper submission simulated the procedures of an academic conference. Contributors were advised to send papers to the General Secretary who sent them to the department committees for approval (NAPSS 1860: xxvi). In addition, from 1863 each of the NAPSS five Department assigned five or six specific themes into specific sessions, of three or four speakers each, and approached leading figures to write papers on them to be delivered at the NAPSS congress. Many of these papers together with the discussions which accompanied some of them were published in voluminous *Transactions* where they were classified according to the Department and Section to which they were presented. The Congress’ proceedings were also extensively reported in the local press which often published fuller accounts than can be found in the *Transactions*.

The NAPSS divided its deliberations into five ‘departments’ on legal reform (“Department of Jurisprudence and Amendment of the Law”), penal policy (“Department of Punishment and Reformation”), education, public health and social economy. In 1861 a Department for Trade and International Law was added to the original five.\(^4\) The Association maintained a central organization in London to coordinate the lobbying of Parliament and the administration where its five departments held regular bi-weekly meetings during the parliamentary session (from January to July). In these meetings members of the Association mixed with representatives of the political and administrative classes to discuss specific issues regarding the passage of parliamentary legislation. The papers delivered in those meetings were recorded, assembled, and published in a series of NAPSS *Sessional Proceedings*.

The NAPSS inspired the establishment of at least two professional and independent journals of social science. In 1865, Hastings created a monthly *Journal of Social Science*, which contained original papers, reviews of books as well as the full texts of some of the papers.

\(^4\) In 1863 the Department of Social Economy changed its name to “Economy and Trade” and the Department of Punishment and Reformation was absorbed into Jurisprudence as a section on Crime and Punishment. In 1876 the Association formed a Department of Art to consider matters of culture, taste, design and public education.
delivered at the annual Congress but only summarized or noticed in the Transactions. The Journal survived only for a year until it was merged into the record of the NAPSS Sessional meetings and renamed the Sessional Proceedings, carrying only papers and items connected with the NAPSS. In 1862 the Sanitarian Benjamin Richardson created and funded the Social Science Review, which was “based on the principle of the National Association,” and carried relevant articles and paper until 1866. “With journals for publications, regular meetings, a place in the public eye, a publicly recognized function, and a place in a wider international community of scholars and practitioners” the British social science met the basic standards of a mature intellectual discipline (Goldman 1993: 103).

12.1 The NAPSS as a Parliament of Social Reporters

The Founding of the NAPSS is a story about politicians qua social investigators becoming the institutional entrepreneurs of social science.\(^5\) The decade in which the NAPSS was established was a period of great political instability, which led to a growing neglect of social issues and long term reform. The 1850s witnessed six different governments of varying ideological compositions. Constructive legislation which needed time to develop and demanded constant attention once implemented, was impossible. It was too large and too difficult a commitment for a short-lived ministries who dependent on insecure majority (Cromwell 1966: 254).\(^6\) As Sir Joseph Napier told the Law Amendment Society in 1860, “during the eleven years

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\(^5\) Paul Dimaggio defined “institutional entrepreneurs” as “organized actors with sufficient resources” who see in the creation of new institutions “an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly.” They therefore create “a whole new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together” (DiMaggio 1988: 14).

\(^6\) Historians commonly refer to this period as the “age of equipoise.” Beginning with the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846 and ending with the Second Reform Act of 1867, the period was characterized by a strange mixture of an economic boom and of great political instability (see, e.g., Burn 1964).
he had the honour of sitting in Parliament, there had been, he believed, either five or six changes of administration. When one Government went out, everything they had in progress became stopped, and there came in a new set of workmen, with a new set of tools and new ideas”. In June 1856, Hastings complained to Brougham about the political confusion in Parliament: “the scramble now going on in the House of Commons is almost beyond belief. Bills shelved or shoved through, not merely without proper consideration, but without the smallest reference to their value in the country” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 117, 56).

On September 1856, William Gladstone, “the Association’s favorite politician,” (Goldman 1986: 118), published an lengthy article in the *Quarterly Review* on the “Declining Efficiency of Parliament.” According to Gladstone “Parliament has of late years increasingly lost its capacity to make provision for the legislative wants of the country” (1856: 561). Reviewing for his readers the 1855 parliamentary session, Gladstone blamed Parliament “for blunders, scandals, failures and disgraces, official, political, constitutional, executive and above all legislative,” He found the House of Commons to be increasingly paralytic, reminding him of the "tossing of a ship at anchor" where there was “motion but no progress” (1856: 535). He condemned the “scandalous inaction” of the government, blaming it for “legislative wreck and ruin” (1856: 545, 546). What was needed most, claimed Gladstone, was a political maturity based on *executive politics*: “We want, most of all, that a character of seriousness and earnestness should be once more impressed upon the proceedings of Parliament” (1856: 568). Gladstone believed in the model of the “executive politician” brought him into an active cooperation with the NAPSS, although he was not particularly supportive of many of its proposed reforms (Goldman 1986: 123ff.).

The haphazard political situation, during and after the Crimean War (1854-6) clashed with the long-term project of social scientific investigation. “The House of Commons,” observed the *Edinburgh Review*, “has been fickle, pliable and uncertain, extending its ephemeral favour to
every possible combination of parties ... and terminating its captious existence by a sudden revolt,” which resulted in “the declining efficiency of Parliament ... Men treat Parliament more as a debating club, and less as a deliberative assembly ... it has left on record very few sharply defined and clearly expressed opinions of its own.” According to the Review, Parliament displays a frantic woman-like behavior, “a vacillation and inconstancy, a waywardness and petulance, which remind us of nothing so forcibly as the frailest members of that sex which is excluded from its deliberations.” The Review attributed this political frenzy to “the vastly increased influence of public opinion upon Parliamentary parties and their leaders ... No sooner is a question distinctly raised in Parliament, than it is thoroughly ventilated and discussed by the press; opinion is formed, and against that opinion no party leader in the House of Commons is bold enough to make a resolute stand” (1857 [105]: 554-8).

Frustrated by the inability of the political system to legislate and implement long term social reforms, political reformers looked for new schemes to reorder and redirect the state. They found it in the NAPSS, which was created largely as an alternative, unofficial Parliament of social experts, many of whom establish their expertise while working as governmental investigators in the 1830s and the 1840s. Despite political instability, and largely because of it, governmental commissions reached their peak in the 1850s, with an annual average of eight newly appointed royal commissions, as experts inside and outside government carried on with social investigation. However, in the political chaos of the 1850s and 1860s pursuing long-term policies became almost impossible and the increasing reliance on governmental investigation was thus no longer enough to mobilize and secure the major project of social reform envisioned by political reformers. The vulnerability of relying solely on the ad hoc system of governmental investigation and administration to overcome became all too obvious.

In a way, it was the very limitation of the ad hoc system of governmental investigations gave rise to the NAPSS. In the absence of resources for policy-making within government, the
NAPSS was created in an attempt to refocus the political system on long-term and knowledge-intensive reform projects by institutionalizing the practices of governmental investigations within an extra-parliamentary organization of social expertise. Rather than undertaking dispersed investigations on single issues under the auspices of government, social reformers in the 1850s came to believe that the pooling of resources and ideas in a large and multi-faceted forum would best assist their various interests and the cause of reform in general. The Association thus both adopted and extended the policymaking role of governmental investigation in forming, formulating, investigating, and presenting social policy to Parliament and the public in order to influence legislation and pressure ministers for action.

The NAPSS’ executive structure included a governing council and five executive sections, which in contrast to other scientific associations at the time were designated as “departments,” each headed by a department “minister” or (president) emulated a cabinet of ministers, and functioned like a government in charge of setting new projects for social investigation. With its particular executive structure, the Association was designed as an umbrella organization for the different social projects pursued by governmental investigations during the mid nineteenth century. The NAPSS executive structure provided a platform where various social investigators - politicians, bureaucrats, professors and local elites – could meet in public, exchange information, engage in long-term policymaking and gain public legitimacy, while offering the *modus operandi* of governmental investigation as a shred framework of collaboration and as a standard model for professional social investigations.

The NAPSS also served as an important public forum for national debate, which played a mediatory role between Parliament and the public, filling a gap between state and local politics and providing a “scientific” alternative, as it were, to the debates in the House of Commons. Like the debates in Parliament the NAPSS Congresses received massive press coverage. The *Glasgow Daily Herald* reported that, at the conclusion of the 1860 congress,
Hastings “could not help referring to the advantages that had arise to the Association from the publication of the proceedings in the newspapers … It was absolutely astonishing to find that they should have each morning been able to read in penny papers the proceedings of the previous day” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 73).

The members of the NAPSS were keen to exploit its immense publicity. According to the London Times “self seeking men” found social science “the surest road to personal reputation” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 67). As politicians, social investigators used the Association as a platform to reaching new audiences and develop a public image to enhance their political authority, while using their new-found popularity for political advantage at Westminster. As experts, social investigators used the platform to enhance their power and legitimacy, hoping that a broad constituency that appreciated their work would establish their credibility and social authority, and hence, to increase their influence over the political system.

In its heterogeneous composition and in the extent of its interests the NAPSS imitated the British Parliament in the age of popular politics. The NAPSS’ raison d’être was to constitute itself as an “alternative Parliament,” explained The British Almanac of the Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge in 1858, a Parliament of social reformers which takes “action not subsidiary to parliamentary action, but going before it, prompting it, teaching it, cramming it” (SDUK 1858: 11). The NAPSS was acknowledged by contemporaries as “alternative Parliament and was variously referred to as an “outdoor Parliament,” a “supplementary Parliament,” and “unofficial Parliament,” staffed, according to The Spectator by the “volunteer legislators of Great Britain” (Goldman 2002: 1). Its founders believed that crucial public issues were better debated and better understood in the NAPSS than in the House of Commons. They envisioned the Association as an open forum for the exchange of expert knowledge on social questions and for the discussion of all aspects of social policy, which were either ignored or misunderstood by the mid-nineteenth century Parliament. "We summon those who honestly differ in opinions, because they regard the
same subject from different points of view, to look at both sides, when possibly they may be found to agree,” announced Brougham in the NAPSS inaugural address to a mixed crowd of peers, baronets, members of Parliament, industrialists, administrators, professors, medical doctors, clergymen, laborers, women, and tradesmen. In Parliament, Brougham told its diverse audience, “there is less diversity of opinion than might be supposed” (NAPSS 1857: 15-16).

While diversity of opinion and differences in perspectives was explicitly encouraged, party, religious and class differences were characterized as impediments to open discussion and freedom of exchange. In his address to a meeting of working-class men at the Glasgow meeting of 1860, Brougham reiterated the Association’s founding principle: “We are of no party in the State; we are of no sect in the Church; we open our rooms to all parties from the highest Tory down to the purest Radical. (Laughter and cheers). Without distinction of persons, from the High Churchman to the Low Churchman, from the Catholic to the Protestant, from the Jew to the Gentile (laughter and cheers) – we open our doors to all sects, all classes, all parties, and all conditions of men (Cheers)” (quoted in Schroeder 2003: 102-3).

The NAPSS “scientific” commitment to non-partisan, dispassionate discourse as a social good in itself was enshrined in its policy from the beginning. In 1859 Vice Chancellor W. Page Wood, the president of the department for Jurisprudence and Law Amendment, warned:

we should render [our Association], as far as possible, a scientific Association, that we should avoid all those subjects, the discussion of which might introduce any perturbation in our deliberations . . . on which party feeling can be brought to bear, or upon which there is a fair balance of party opinion . . . If we do not take that course, the Society will be shipwrecked, and its deliberations will be brought to an end. We ought to endeavour to form an opinion calmly, dispassionately, and deliberately: and we cannot do that . . . if we introduce subjects upon which any strong party feeling exists (NAPSS 1860: 61)

The distinction which reformers drew between party politics in House of Commons and the NAPSS as an alternative Parliament of social science social was based on the temporal configuration of these institutions and their time-economies. Reform demanded patient
investigation and patient investigation required political stability, as the barrister-MP JS Pakington told the first NAPSS congress, “Parliament, overwhelmed with work is partly unable and partly unwilling to undertake the settlement of these social questions. The legislature has no time to bestow upon matters which are not put before them in some practical shape as pressing for immediate action” (NAPSS 1858: 37). “Read or listen (if you can) to the debates in Parliament,” suggested the Scottish judge, Lord Adam Gifford to the audience at the NAPSS Congress of 1877. “[h]ow seldom can you detect the presence or the power of a truly scientific spirit? How seldom is there a commanding reference to principle or truth at all? How seldom is there a calm consideration of the experience of the past or of the possibilities of the future? ... The orator confines his appeal to partial or local circumstances. He tells of the public meetings of his constituencies or of others. He points to the monster petition ... He abuses or taunts his opponents ... and with brazen inanity talks against time ... And so, the houses of legislation become the arena of faction and of party, if not personal fight, where nothing but unworthy or low and insufficient motives reign” (NAPSS 1878: 40-1).

Brougham underscored in many of his presidential speeches the temporal discrepancy between the short-term practices of parliamentary politics and the long-term projects of social reform, contrasting the speculative and unreflective hastiness of party politics to the measured and responsible pragmatism of the NAPSS. In his inaugural address, for example, he maintained that most of parliamentary debates are characterized by “ignorance and misinformation, or inattentive, and therefore inaccurate, observation or careless reflection and hasty declaration,” (NAPSS 1858: 15-16; my italics). “He is no friend to the advance of Social Science in any of its branches,” declared Brougham in 1861, “who hastens forward with heedless unreflecting speed, despising all that is gained, because it is less than all that he desires, and looking down in contempt upon those whom he passes in his impatient course. The spirit, so inimical to real, solid improvement, sometimes is the fruit of zeal without knowledge” (NAPSS 1862: 4; my italics).
In 1860, Brougham made a similar point, contrasting the impulsiveness and divisiveness of party politics in the House with the cohesiveness promoted by the slow and careful practice of the NAPSS and its a-political method of policymaking: “gradual and slow has been the course by which we have arrived at Social Science, unconnected with faction and class interest … at length came the age of principles and opinions wholly apart from party schemes and personal interest” (NAPSS 1861: 25). As he explained later in his speech,

The conduct of government and of the Legislature becomes a most important subject of consideration; but we are by the constitution of our body obliged to confine this discussion within somewhat narrow limit, most especially avoiding all personal or party topics. It is, however, both permitted and required that we direct our attention to those parts of the political system which prove destructive to the progress of social improvements … to be undertaken respectfully as to the manner, cautiously as to the subject-matter, and temperately and considerately as to the interests involved (NAPSS 1861: 26-7).

The intellectual limitations of the NAPSS as a scholarly society, its slow moving pragmatism and adherence to stability, were thus celebrated as the ultimate guarantee of its usefulness: It was the very devotion to detail, slow inquiry, and gradual progress, that promoted political maturity. The very term “social science” was itself an expression of the NAPSS desire to encourage “political maturity” by creating an open forum based on strong political consensus: an anti-partisan and a-political pluralism and diversity, where each group could contribute from its own perspective to an accepted common good: the progressive pursuit of happiness. In 1861, Brougham explained that "the term ‘Social Science’ seemed preferable to Political … because it appears to exclude the subject of party controversy, and to describe those sciences which all parties are agreed to promote, or at least candidly to discuss” (NAPSS 1862: 3).

Brougham dedicated most of his 1860 opening address to an attack on government by talk: “this excessive speaking – the speaking of members whose talents, information, or personal

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7 The term “sociology,” was also offered and immediately rejected as it was “constantly repudiated by [the Association’s] members, as a barbarous mixture of languages” (NAPSS 1862: 3).
importance, gives them no claim to be heard,” which he connected to the unreflective haste of partisan politics and its adverse effect on effective legislation. “The greatest obstruction to the conduct of business in the two Houses of Parliament, particularly in the House of Commons, arises from the reluctance to fetter discussion, either by rules binding upon the members, or by restraining the speakers in their addresses.” Brougham identified four central “obstructions to social progress” caused by the continuous reliance of legislation on verbal discussions in Parliament: (1) “The mere prolixity of speech;” (2) “the inveterate habit to introduce any subject on which any speaker desires to be heard, however foreign to the question of adjourning;” (3) the ever increasing “number of speakers;” and (4) the problem of the self-interest of individual MPs: “many members .. wholly unknown, except to their constituencies … desire to speak, first, because they would court those constituencies, or impress them with a notion of their importance; next, because they consider that they gain reputation by their speeches.” Brougham concluded that the “combination of small parties [and their] determination to resist whatever proceeds from certain quarters, especially the Government … and the countless member of endless speeches, without any merit,” had turned the House of Commons into “a byword as a place of talk and not of work, the caricature of a popular assembly” (NAPSS 1861: 26-7).

By drawing a boundary between partisan-particular (short term) and universal (long term) issues, reform could present itself as politically neutral: “a neutral ground, where,” in the words of the Daily News “men can talk over great questions without thinking about the two front benches in the House of Commons” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 62). As long as this distinction between “the politics of the day” and “the interest of humanity” remained in the public mind, the intervention of the NAPSS to secure specific social reform was largely welcomed and perceived not as a narrow

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8 To illustrate his point, Brougham cited a few lines from the poem Expostulation by William Cowper (1782): “Where policy is busied all night long/ In setting right what faction has set wrong,/ Where flails of oratory thresh the floor/ That Yields them chaff and dust – and nothing more” (NAPSS 1862: 27).
based political interest. Through this temporal organization, social science was supposed to answer the most important political questions in a way which transcends politics itself.

In 1858, during its second Congress, The London Times described the NAPSS as “a sort of chapel of ease for the House of Parliament, taking up and discussing with minuteness hardly there attainable questions scarcely within the domain of politics – questions … [which] bear far more than merely political controversies on the moral and social well-being of the people” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 83; my italics). The expression “chapel of ease” nicely captured the NAPSS pastoral ambitions to provide an open public forum, where social question will be pursued not through the “lower” considerations of day to day “political controversies” in Parliament, but through the “higher” calling and pastoral practices of improving “moral and social well being,” according to the universal interest of humanity.

In 1862, as part of its London Congress, the NAPSS was allowed by “the graceful courtesy of the Government” to hold a gathering of some 8,000 people in the Palace of Westminster, where “Westminster hall and its accessories,” were placed “at the service of the Social Science Association (Guy 1870: 447). This unique and highly symbolic permission, reported the Daily Telegraph, was granted “with the proviso that no other society is to use it as a precedent.” As the London Times explained, “such a privilege is wholly without precedent and the Association may justly feel that in the reception halls which the nation placed at its disposal they exhibited, in marked manner, their admiration and sympathy for the work in which it is engaged.” The Spectator described with enthusiasm how the “House of Commons … [was] crammed to suffocation, the green benches being filled with an enthusiastic multitude

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9 Behind the rhetoric of neutrality, however, was an organization with many links to mid-Victorian liberalism. Of the 250 members in its governing council, approximately one-third were MPs and of these more than seventy-five percent were Liberals. On the parallelism between the NAPSS and the Liberal party in the 1860s, see Goldman 2002.

10 “chapel of ease” is a church building other than the main church of a parish which provides easier accesses to some parishioners than the main church. Such a chapel may exist, for example, to accommodate parishioners who live at a distance from the principal church.
form the floor to the ceiling.” The symbolism of the occasion was not missed. According to the Spectator, “for the first time the volunteer legislators of Great Britain assembled in the halls consecrated to regular legislative business and boldly took possession of the House of Commons.” In this symbolic occasion, social science, which was launched by political reformers from within Parliament in the first decades of the nineteenth century, came a full circle: “King Brougham and his trusty ministers” – had finally conquered the Parliament (quoted in Goldman 2002: 75; my italics).

12.1.1 Performing Social Science

The organization of the NAPSS congresses resembled the present form of the academic conference. Individual papers on related issues were organized into panels, with chairs presiding at each session and discussion time following the papers; “plenary” addresses were given by the presidents of each of Association’s five departments; an opening sermon functioned like a keynote address to inaugurate each congress; organized socializing was built into the structure of the week in the form of breakfasts, banquets, and site-seeing tours; and administrative policy was discussed at the last day of the meeting in an “annual general meeting” (Schroeder 2003). The meetings were primarily about meeting people, establishing and renewing contacts, negotiating and striking deals and building up networks and scientific reputation.

In the congresses reformers were reading papers on which they have bestowed weeks or perhaps months of thoughtful preparation and the ensuing conversation adapted either a general discussion in the form of general commentary or a question-and-answer patterns. From this spatio-temporal economy perspective, these presentations were much more like the readings of scientific papers then the improvised talk followed by the noisy and haphazard pattern of public
political debate, which is often associated with parliamentary culture.

The NAPSS had no shortage of gifted and exciting orators; indeed, many of its members were politicians with an aptitude for public speech. It was, therefore, quite remarkable that one of the Associations’ most identified trademarks was its extremely dull sessions, characterized by the monotonic reading of tedious and long papers with a low almost inaudible voice and a serious and dispassionate voice. Indeed, there was no lack of press reports by both critics and defenders of the Association on the reigning boredom of its meetings. In 1862, for example, the writer for the Saturday Review noted that, in the absence of a clear definition of the category social science, “we should say that reading dull papers in an inaudible voice is one department of Social Science, and that sitting still on a hard bench in front of the reader and going to sleep is another department of it” (quoted in Schroeder 2003: 104).

To be sure, it was precisely the tedium of the NAPSS’ meetings, which was actively promoted by their organizers in an explicit attempt to discourage as “unscientific” the passionate, any emotional display of (partisan) feeling that might have enlivened its meetings. Dullness was a good sign of the Association commitment to a climate of reasoned and polite debate, and its overall “orientation to consensus” (Abrams 1968: 47). To achieve such climate presenters were asked to read their papers and engage rather than make spontaneous or stylized speeches, and the organizers made sure that the reading of the papers was followed by reasoned and disciplined discussion, rather than careless impetuous oration, or heated debate. In this sense, the NAPSS congresses could be seen as a near-ideal instantiation of a liberal bourgeois public.

What made the meetings unspeakably dull for the listener was exactly what made the space both vital and suitable for its women participants. The NAPSS was the first public forum in Britain, if not in the world, to include women both as organizers and as officers in its governing council and as public speakers. In the Victorian period, “feminine” voice was considered a distraction to public speaking. Middle-class feminists took extreme care to frame their
contributions to public discussion within culturally acceptable modes of address. On the one hand, woman’s speaking voice, its low volume and high pitch, was thought to be “naturally” unfitted for public delivery; on the other hand, women were discouraged from speaking lifting up or deepening their voice because speaking loudly was consider impolite and unwomanly. Moreover, there was a strong cultural injunction against “heated exchange” between men and women in public forums. Women were therefore forced to express themselves almost entirely through writing. The BAAS, for example, limited women to the purely social rather than scientific meeting and prevented them from speaking in public from its inception in 1831 until 1860 and even then most contributions by women were still read by men and women were not allowed to take part in the Associations’ governing council (Morrell and Thackray 1981: 149).

The NAPSS, which took extreme care to discipline political debate in an effort to make politics more scientific, created a safe space for women’s presence and utterance, a cultural space in which and from which women were able to speak their mind publicly. Thus, in an interesting way, what began as an attack on “government by talk” in Parliament, led to the creation of a civic platform with culturally acceptable modes of address through which women could speak publicly for the first time. As one contributor to the feminist English Woman’s Journal remarked in 1858, “the Association has assumed the right of woman to sit in an assembly deliberating on social affairs – nay, to express her opinion in that assembly if she chooses” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 115). For women unaccustomed to having their voices heard in an assembly, the SSA was far from boring; they regarded and discussion for its own sake far from a waste of time. On the contrary, Victorian women reformers regarded the opportunity to talk publicly as an exciting form of political action, enacting a new public identity and space that women could inhabit collectively. Bessie Parkes’s private account of her reading at the Bradford congress in 1859, is a good expression of the sheer feeling of exhilaration which accompanied the prospect of this new public identity:
I had a *most* successful week at Leeds and Bradford. I read our paper to a crowded section; 200 people listening, at the very least; Mrs. [Anna] Jameson and Miss [Louisa] Twining on the platform beside me—Section B of Social Economy was occupied all day with female interests, and Lord Brougham came and sat with us for ten minutes. . . . We staid on the platform all day, receiving the gentlemen. Did you ever hear of such a thing! It really was an extraordinary scene; *equivalent to women in Parliament*, and a great deal more impressive than anything I ever heard of in America, because of the social weight of the male portion of hearers and speakers. People all told me I read excellently; and I tell you, not from conceit, but because I know it will please you. In the morning I had read it all over to the bed post! (quoted in Schroeder 2003: 106; my italics).

In the first meetings of the NAPSS, the sheer novelty of women addressing a public assembly was an object of curiously, which drew large audiences and caught the attention of the press. Reporting in 1861 for the *Blackwood’s Magazine* on the NAPSS Congress in Dublin, Joseph Beavington Atkinson described the “astounding effect and “the spectacle … of a woman’s speaking,” noting that “crowds came as if to witness a phenomenon transcending the limits of ordinary nature” (quoted Schroeder 2003: 108). As Bessie Parke recalled “When [Mary] Carpenter spoke … hearers poured in from other sections and sat, not only in every available corner, but on steps, or on anything they could find on the floor.” Emily Faithful’s address in 1863 attracted “upwards of 1000 members,” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 115-16), and another notable event was registered when the suffragist, Millicent Garret Fawcett read the address of her blind husband, the political economy professor Henry Fawcett, at the 1868 Congress. Overall, 126 women contributed about 269 papers at the NAPSS meetings. Only about half of these papers concerned women's specific issues. (Goldman 2002: 115-18).

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11 Bessie Parke was the daughter of the MP and political reformer Joseph Parkes who was a friend of both Brougham and Hastings.

12 Florence Nightingale, for example, contributed seven papers. Other leading women who addressed the NAPSS on several occasions were: Barbara Bodichon, the cousin of Florence Nightingale; Emillia Jessie Boucherett, a suffragist who founded the Society for the Employment of Women; Sara Emily Davies, founder of Girton College in Cambridge; Emily Faithful, a feminist printer and publishers who established the *Victoria Magazine*; Elizabeth Garret, the first English woman doctor; Octavia Hill, the founder of the Charity Organization Society (1869); Louisa Twining, founder of the Workhouse Visiting Society (1858).
12.1.2 Martineau, the NAPSS, and the Scientization of Social Knowledge

Because of her illness, Martineau could not attend the first Congress of the NAPSS in Birmingham or the inaugural meeting of the association at Brougham’s house (July 29, 1857); she sent her young niece, Jane Martineau who was nursing her at the time (Goldman 2002: 380). Martineau did attend the second Congress in Liverpool as a reporter for the *Daily News*. She opened her report by criticizing the “fragmentary” character of the NAPSS which resulted from its attempt to promote “social science” before such a science was in effect created. It is not enough, wrote Martineau, that “everybody wondering at the same phenomenon … on some of the most prominent questions, and not the least on those which are regarded as their specialties,” there seemed to be “no scheme of general facts,” that will tie all these different questions and topics together; the “authors should have expressed their conception of the term “Science,” that the public might know what to look for, and the members might come to some sort of agreement what to attempt” (Martineau 1858a: 93-4).

Nevertheless, Martineau was very optimistic and pragmatic in explaining how, in her opinion, the scientization of social knowledge should be achieved institutionally. Two days earlier, on October 23 1858, she wrote in *The Spectator* under the titled “What is Social Science?” that one should not do not “disparage the attempt by any presumption that [social science] must at once jump to completeness. No science is complete … A science may be fragmentary, and still be a science; it all depends upon the method and ascertained principles” (Martineau 1858b: 1120). In her *Daily News* article, Martineau took a similar pragmatic approach, asserting that “the heights” of the science of society “can be attained only by ways yet unexplored.” The scientization of social knowledge, she believed, is not a linear process, a unidirectional progress. It can travel on many roads. It develops out of pragmatics of trial and

13 “Johan Stuart Mill,” wrote Martineau, “has promised us a new work on “Sociology”; the first attempt towards placing ‘social science’ upon something like a scientific basis” (Martineau 1858b:1120).
error. In a passage worth citing at length, she drew an analogy between the establishment of the NAPSS and the setting up of a geographical expedition, which she used to join at a younger age:

A large party have agreed to begin to scale the heights, and off they set … hoping to do great things. At present they have got no further than a broad glacier. People on the watch at a distance wonder why they do not march straight on and up, instead of going zigzag, stopping very often and turning back always. People at a distance do not perceive the crevasses which open in all directions, and can have no conception what it is to look down into those dim abysses, nor how unsatisfactory it is to find them bridged in a way which will not bear any but the lightest tread. A guide here and there may show how to head them around; but in most cases there is nothing for it but to turn back, and try some other way … If their day is over before they have accomplished this, why blame them? Who is there that could have done better? Let them try again and again, if they do not reach the summit — even any true peak of the whole range — they are exploring the way, and perhaps making something like a road. In plain language, the best hope seems to be that the members will work on at practical objects, improving in scope, in order, and in enlightened zeal as they are now doing from year to year. They will be brought, some day, into a position which will compel them to determine whether to go on into science, properly so called, or to break off. It will be given them in that hour what to speak, and resolve, and do. Till that hour arrives, we have only to desiderate what is practicable, and not to be dissatisfied with what is achieved, merely because it has been mistakenly ticketed with the description of a higher class than that to which it belongs (Martineau 1858a: 95-6).

12.2 The NAPSS as a Boundary Organization

As discussed in the introduction and theoretical chapters, the NAPSS can be conceptualized as a classic case of *boundary organization*, where social questions, concepts, and investigative discourse, practices and procedures taken from the world of governmental investigation were configured with newly created ones and used as *boundary objects* — a bridging device between politicians, administrators, legal experts, academics, medical experts, and other groups of social investigators (Guston 2000; Star and Griesemer 1989). As a boundary organization, the NAPSS provide incentives for these competing groups to collaborate and overcome many of their differences, thus enabling the scientization of knowledge production in
the highly contentious and politicized process of policymaking by linking knowledge with action, social investigation with policy. This configuration enabled social reformers to balance the need to secure maintain trustworthiness and intellectual honesty and secure their integrity and credibility as social experts (by not politicizing research) with the need to assure that the knowledge produced will be practical and useful for decision making and to secure political legitimacy by making the process public and open to multiple participants. In this respect the Association reproduced the mission, modus operandi and structural properties of governmental commissions in a more systematic fashion and on a bigger scale.

There are important differences between the NAPSS, as a boundary organization, and professional (disciplinary) organizations must be kept in mind. The NAPSS tended to exhibit considerably more organizational and epistemological variability than the legal or medical professional organizations. In these professional organizations the production of knowledge often led to increasing specialization. By contrast, the social knowledge produced in the NAPSS was interdisciplinary in nature and was often guided by a collective interest in problem solving that encourages the cross-fertilization of methods, concepts, and theories. These differences entailed different type of boundary work. For professional disciplinary organizations, boundary work centered on professional closure and monopoly control through the creation and maintenance of solid boundaries and involves mostly purification practices. In contrast, the NAPSS depended fundamentally on the continuous flow-through of ideas, people, skills, practices, and resources grounded in other preexisting fields; boundary work entailed therefore practices of translation and configurations of hybrids. Given these basic differences, the NAPSS tended to be less stable and less powerful relative to the pre-existing professional organizations. It controlled fewer resources and enjoy less status or credibility because it was oriented toward integrating established knowledge domains.
12.3 From Political Economy to the Social Economics of Labor and Capital

Social economy sought to replace the anonymities of general laws with a philosophy of everyday, ordinary life. Social science emerged with this willingness to pursue the empirical reality of social life and its most mundane aspects which make up the ordinary, common life. In 1836 JS Mil made one of the first public and official references in English to the term “social science” in an article in the Westminster Review. In the article Mill referred to social science as “the science of social economy,” which explains “by what principles of his nature man is induced to enter into a state of society. . .what are the various relations which establish themselves among men as the ordinary consequences of social union.” According to Mill, this willingness of social economy to “[embrace] every part of man's nature, in so far as influencing the conduct or condition of man in society,” is what makes it “the scientific foundation of practical politics, or the art of government, of which the art of legislation is a part.” Political economy, explained Mill, is only as one “branch” of social science, because it “does not treat of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth ….It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive” (1844: 137; my italics).

In the last presidential address at the last Congress in 1884, George John Shaw-Lefevre, the former chair of the London Statistical Society and one of the NAPSS long-standing members, reaffirmed Mill’s position that “the object of social science” was “not merely to discover the laws of production and distribution of wealth”, but to go “far beyond the scope of political economy” and deal “with all the conditions of the people in reference to the environment.” According to Shaw Lefevre, “what experiment is to physical research an act of legislation is to social inquiry.

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14 JS Mill used the term “social science” privately in correspondence as early as 1829 (Goldman 1983).
for we are able to compare the state of things before and after the change; and we conclude that
the difference is due to the legislation [social investigators as legislators]” (NAPSS 1884: 2).15

But the distinction between political and of social economy was already made explicit
in the very first introduction to the NAPSS’ transactions. In the introduction, Hastings
contended that the central goal of the Association was to rely upon the “actual experience” of
“social reformers,” and unite them in “a common investigations of various branches of social
economics.” According to Hastings, “social problems” were not isolated evils, but rather a
manifestation of a general structural problem, striking “its roots into the substance of the nation,
ramifying through a hundred secret crevices into classes apparently the most removed from its
influence.” This interconnected system of nuisance, could only be confronted by the deploying
a unified framework of “social knowledge” about “social subjects” gathered through “social
inquiry”. Hastings used the term “social economics” to describe the collective activity of the
Association aimed at achieving this unified framework (NAPSS 1858: xxi-xxiii).

The NAPSS is probably best known to historians today for the pioneering research of its
social economy department into trade unionism that resulted in the famous 1860 report - *Trades’
Societies and Strikes* - and for its subsequent discussions of the legal and social position of trade
unions that manifestly helped to change middle-class attitudes towards organized labor and push
for the trades union legislation of the 1870s. The important question of organized labor
presented the NAPSS an exceptional opportunity to demonstrate their usefulness as social
scientists in preventing strikes. The Association’s investigation into trade unionism, the ensuing
discussion, and the public discourse it helped to foster, were crucial in institutionalizing social
economics as a real alternative to political economy. As I show below, the scientific
appropriation of social knowledge was achieved, to a large degree, through a “boundary work”

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15 Gorge John Shaw-Lefevre was the only son of John George Shaw-Lefevre who served as a Poor Law
Commissioner as well as on numerous governmental investigations.
between social economy and political economy. The antagonism of politicians to political
economy and its abstract laws, played an important role in curving a space for social science as a
pragmatic enterprise, occupied with the empirical reality of social life: the tangible, the concrete
and the mundane. Thus, what begun as a model for governmental investigation became under
the auspices of the NAPSS an explicit scientific discourse and public agenda.

12.3.1 Investigating Trades’ Societies and Strikes

One of the major issues confronting the new emerging community of social scientists
was the impending danger of labor unrest. This issue, which threatened to disrupt production,
was instrumental to the scientific appropriation of social knowledge by the NAPSS. The
tumultuous labor-capital relations enabled the NAPSS to translate those random parliamentary
inquiries and governmental investigations which dealt with industrial relations into a single field
of significations: social economy (Latour 1987). As the growing labor unrest became pressing
problems, social scientists sought to gain power by using their skill to regularize industrial
relations (cf. Shenhav 1999).

On February 1859, following a special conference on “Trades’ Societies” which took
place in Liverpool in 1858, the council of the NAPSS appointed a commission of thirty-two
members, chaired by the poor law and Sanitary investigator and the president of the social
economy department in 1859, James Kay-Shuttleworth, to investigate into “the objects and
constitution of Trades’ Societies, with their effect upon wages and upon the industry and
commerce of this country” (NAPSS 1860: 657). The investigative committee into Trades’
Societies and Strikes included many lawyers, state administrators (“statesmen in disguise”) as
well as ten past, present and future members of Parliament, most of them were barristers and
many served as governmental investigator during the 1860s.\textsuperscript{16}

In preparing its report, the committee adopted the basic procedures and practice of
governmental investigation: some members were conducting field investigations, collecting data
about unions and strikes in different localities, while other were reviewing and analyzing
records of parliamentary inquiries and other documents. In addition, during the course of their
investigations, as they were confronted by the challenges of a complex and unpredictable reality
presented by the daily, mundane, problems of workers and employers, some investigators began
to use their experience and negotiation skills outside Parliament by placing themselves as
mediators, a middle group between labor and capital (cf. Carroll-Burk 2002). Against the
abstract and dismal commodification discourse of political economists, which saw labor unrest
as the unavoidable result of the natural laws of the market, the new community of social
scientists sought to pacify employer-employee relationship and harmonize industrial relations
by confronting the \textit{reality} of these relations. It was this pragmatic, commonplace, approach to
social problems that formed the basis for social economics.

The committee was supposed to present its report on October 1859, at the annual
meting of the NAPSS held in Bradford, but the report was not ready for the meeting. Instead,
the department of social economy devoted a section of its business (under the heading "Labour

\textsuperscript{16} The MPs serving in the committee were: George Shaw-Lefevre, Thomas Dyke Acland, Edward Akroyd,
George Woodyatt Hastings, Johan Ball, Thomas Hughes (who serves as the committee’s secretary and
was later appointed as a commissioner in a governmental investigator on Trade Unions, 1867-9), Charles
Buxton (served as commissioner in three governmental investigation during the 1860s on topics related to
religion and sanitation), William Edward Forster (a wool manufacturer, who served as a commissioner in
four governmental investigation during the 1860s on subjects of law and education), and Henry Fawcett (a
Cambridge Political Economy professor). Other members included popular civil servants, such as William
Farr (a statistician who was first compiler of General Register Offices), as well as many barristers and
journalists including Andrew Edgar (barrister and founder of NAPSS); John Malcolm Ludlow (barrister,
journalist and a social activist who later became the secretary of the governmental investigations into
Friendly society 1870-1); Godfrey Lushington (a barrister who became the Permanent Secretary at the
Home Office and the draftsman of the 1871 trade union legislation), and Frank Harrison Hill (a barrister
and a journalist who became the editor of the \textit{The Daily New} between 1870 and 1887).
and Capital—Strikes”) to “facts concerning the antagonisms between capital and labor” with a particular focus on trade unions and strikes. Eight papers were read about the subject, including a preliminary report of the investigative Committee on Trades’ Societies, and the entire day was spent discussing the papers and the issue (NAPSS 1860: 635-664, 712 -723).

While two papers argued against strikes on orthodox political economic grounds, all other presenters supported the right of workers to organize and strike organized labor. After a detailed accounting of “Facts and Inferences relating to the West Yorkshire Coal Strike, from February to December, 1858,” John Holmes concluded, for example, that “the men did not originate the strike”, and that “the masters caused the whole contention.” Indeed, the workers “did all they could by proposing arbitration, and by deputations, to reason and arrange terms”, but the “masters uniformly rejected all and every proposition to reason, arrange, or modify” (NAPSS 1860: 644). John Plummer argued that strikes were “occasioned by coldness, tyranny, or misbehaviour on the part of employers.” John Watts suggested that unions could “furnish workmen with a remedy against the injustice of employers,” and “[fill] a sphere of great usefulness” by “[standing] as barriers between the workmen and pauperism” (Ibid: 713). Noah Forrest a chain maker, who was asked to provide an account of the conflicts between workers and employers in his trade from the point of view of the workers, described unions and strikes as “a standing army or as a vaccination to prevent smallpox - i.e., a less evil adapted to prevent a greater. He thought trade unions represent “the steadiest, honest, most industrious men,” and protested the representation of non-unionists in the Press as “persecuted paragons of goodness, and unionists in general as idlers, vagabonds, revolutionists, &c.”(Ibid: 655-656).

Henry Fawcett, the Cambridge political economist, who presented a paper on "The Theory and Tendency of Strikes," advocated a deductive approach to the study of industrial relations. "Because social science requires the same investigation as physical science ... It therefore becomes necessary to consider the political economy of strikes.” Fawcett and his
fellow political economists, believed strikes are unavoidable because he saw them as integral and inevitable component of the economic laws of the market affecting the “natural rate of wage.” “There are those,” explained Fawcett, “who cherish the traditions of the past, and hope to revive the feelings of dependence between employers and employed; but this cannot be;” clashes between employers and employed are unavoidable and so are the strikes whose central function is to “[equalize] the rate of wage,” and “secure to the labourer the certainty of being benefited by any disturbing cause which should temporarily raise the profits of an employment above the ordinary rate.” Because workers were seen as commodities, something one could buy, utilize, or sell, Strikes were viewed as no more and no less than a mechanism for resorting ”the natural rate of wage” to equilibrium, and as such, all events of labor unrest “might have been foreseen” (Ibid: 638-9). Labor unrest was not framed as a political issue, but was naturalized by political economists who sought after a theoretical system that could offer greater predictability and control over the workforce.

In the ensuing discussion, the tension between political and social economy was fully exposed: the social economists’ attempts to scientifically explore the social reality of the conflict between labor and capital and to provide an empirical account of strikes based on the concrete relations between employers and workers, became a test-case for the validity of political economy as a social science, and a way of establishing its differences from social economy. The MP and member of the investigative committee, Edward Akroyd, suggested that the reports read in the section describe nothing less than a “social war” that is raging between “masters and workmen,” and confirm that political economy is not only unhelpful in avoiding strikes but in fact exacerbate the conflict between labor and capital. By looking at strikes in a cold and abstract way, as an appropriate response to a necessary conflict between capital and labor, protested Akroyd, Fawcett fails to understand the meaning of a “true social science,” whose goal is
Pragmatic and ameliorative: to facilitate "personal intercourse" and "promote conciliation" in all relations (NAPSS 1860: 720-1):

Political economy will not help us to avoid strikes and their attendant evils. Nay, the danger is aggravated by the rigid application of this science, and Mr. Fawcett … considers strikes as a natural sequence of the effort of the masters, on the one hand, to purchase labour on the lowest possible terms, and of the workmen, on the other, to obtain for their commodity, labour, the highest possible price. If I understand Mr. Fawcett correctly, he considers a strike as the best solution of the difficulty, and as appropriate test of the market price of labour. Precisely at this point of our difficulty, when the hard maxims of political economy afford no relief, social science steps in, and light our path to a peaceful adjustment of the question (NAPSS 1860: 720).

Akroyd’s social economics perspective on organized labor and strikes was echoed in an important account of the Trades’ Societies and Strikes report, written by the barrister John Ludlow for the MacMillan’s Magazine. Ludlow, who assisted in composing the report as the investigator of “West Yorkshire Coal Strike and Lock-Out of 1858” (NAPSS 1860b: 11-51), devoted a large portion of the article to an attack on political economy understanding of social reality and human agency. “Political economists,” protested Ludlow, are “never tired of teaching the working man that wages depend on demand and supply, and therefore, that trade societies cannot affect them.” Yet, “it is precisely because they depend upon demand and supply - the demand of living men’s capital, and supply of living men’s labour - that trade societies can affect them. Wages do not fluctuate according to some abstract natural law.” Economic behavior, explained Ludlow, does not follow a set of abstract law; it is embedded in real social relations involving real living and breathing human beings. Economic laws, such as the law of supply and demand, are therefore social construct that depend on the reality of industrial relations and in the agency of workers, in what they do and how they behave. “A leading defect in the science of political economy … is its frequent … forgetfulness of the human will, as an economic force. It is generally strives to drag man and his actions from the sphere of
spontaneousness down into fatality; to treat him as a blind creature led by fixed instinct, and not
as one endowed with free-will” (Ludlow 1860: 321-2; my italics):

In the daily experience of life, we know perfectly that we can get a given article at a lower price in one place than we can in another ... We know perfectly that the reason of such difference is simply, that the one man chooses to sell lower than another; it is only when one comes to speak of wages that ‘the inexorable laws of supply and demand’ are treated as some almighty power whose fiats alone rule the world of labour. Now, the working man in combining does not mean in the least to deny that there are such laws; he simply claims to master and use them ... On the demand for labour he cannot much operate, but he can operate upon its supply (Ludlow 1860: 322)

When the Trades’ Societies and Strikes report was finally presented at the NAPSS congress of 1860 in Glasgow it drew massive public attention. Twenty-thousand applications for admission from Glasgow’s working-class population were received that year, although only 3,500 tickets were available for distribution (Goldman 2002: 95). The introduction to the meeting’s transactions noted with pride that “the representatives of capital and labour met face to face and on equal terms, to debate questions involving the most cherished interests of both. Yet here again a feeling of moderation and fairness characterized the discussion, and the aim of the Association to furnish an impartial arena for social inquiry was fully realized” (NAPSS 1861: xxiv). The 652 page report was published in a separate volume. The report was an exemplary exercise in social economics, presenting a diverse, partly digested, empirical data (interviews, field investigations, statistics, and archival research) on various trade groups, strikes, regulations, and the history of combination in Britain. It was recognized by contemporaries as “the best collection of Trade Union Material and the most important account of Trade Union action that has ever been issue” which is “far superior [to any] Blue Book” published in the nineteenth century on the subject (Webbs 1896: 209). Fredric Harrison, a member of the 1867 royal commission on Trade Unions, which followed the NPASS investigations, described the report in his autobiography as “the best book you [can] read …
[the] best collection of materials for obtaining a knowledge of the actual ways and wants of the industrial classes” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 229; my italics). It contained ten different case studies of strikes and lockouts, three accounts of trade unions in particular towns, two reviews of parliamentary reports about unions, as well as other documents. The case studies conformed to a single style which simulated the “blue book” reports of governmental commissions: meticulous descriptions of evidence about disputes set in the context of an economic examination of the state of trade, including a social analysis of the history of industrial relations pertaining to the trade, the level of technology, working conditions, wages, etc.

The discussion which followed the presentation of the report in 1860 at the NAPSS meeting in Glasgow, exposed again the growing rift between political and social economy. It began when Edmund Potter, an MP and owner of a large calico-printing firm, presented the orthodox conception of political economy according to which labor is “a mere purchasable article like all other commodities, and ought to be bought and sold, and weighed and measured accordingly,” and that employers “could not treat labor in any other way” (NAPSS 1860b: 595-6, 599-603). In response, MP Thomas Huges, condemned the habits of employers to “treat the labour of their men, which was in fact the lives of their men, on the same principles as those on which they treated a dead commodity” (NAPSS 1860b: 595). Hughes, who participated in the Trades’ Societies Committee as an investigator into “the lock-out of engineers in 1851-2” (NAPSS 1860b: 169-206), noted that many committee members changed their mind in favor of trade unions following their investigation. “The committee,” Hughes asserted, “was certainly a remarkable instance of the change which came over persons when they inquire into facts” (NAPSS 1860b: 599).

One such person was Gorge Shaw-Lefevre, who was a particular active investigator in Trades’ Societies Committee, reporting on "the strikes and lock-out of the building trades in London in 1859-60,” and composing an overview of "trades' societies rules" (NAPSS 1860b: 52-
76, 114-146). “It was necessary,” Shaw-Lefevre argued “that there should be some minimum rate of wage, and a fixed time for working.” The report “[proves] that without combination men were unable to arrive at fair data for the settlement of their wages” (NAPS 1860b: 610).

Archibald Alison, a barrister and the rector of the University of Glasgow, concurred. He thought that “trades’ union in themselves are not only proper, but are a necessary balance in the fabric of society .. without them capital would become far too powerful, and workmen would be much beaten down.” Alison thought social science has an important role in supporting trade unions while managing and pacifying industrial relations to reduce the possibility of strikes and labor unrest, so unions could "gain their legitimate objects without incurring the terrible hazards of inducing evils to society” (NAPSS 1860b: 602).

Similar debates took place in the NAPSS all throughout the 1860s and brought into light important questions concerning the commodification of labor and the agency of workers in that process. In 1867, for example, the merchant and president of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Philip Henry Rathbone argued that “labour is only a dead commodity: the employer and employed stand in relation to each other merely as buyer and seller of that commodity” (NAPSS 1868: 693). In 1868 a special session of the Department of Social Economy (now called “Economy and Trade”), Ludlow described political economy as “a mere plutonomy ... a mere science of the distribution of wealth,” that has no business investigating the “rule of society and mutual relations between man and man.” Political economy could therefore find no place in its theory for trades unions - those “unnatural” interventions in the labor market, which social economy saw as one of its main object of investigation, and the NAPSS began the movement for their acceptance (quoted in Goldman 2002: 227).

In 1873 William Edward Forster, the minister of Education in Gladstone’s government and the president of the Economic Science and Statistics section (section F) of the BAAS, addressed the section at the annual meeting of the BAAS held at Bradford. In a provocative
speech, Forster, who participated in four governmental investigations during the 1860s and whose investigative-political career was launched by the Trade’s Societies investigation, suggested that the scientific treatment of political questions (the “scientization of politics”) requires the injection of political pragmatism and realism (realpolitics) into scientific practice. Forster began his speech by situating himself as a politician, not a scientist. He apologized for not following "the usual course, and brought forward a prepared written address," because his "time and thought" were "so occupied with other pressing matters," and asked the audience permission to let him "make a speech instead of reading a paper," thus clearly breaking the rules of a scientific performance. He then dedicated the first half of his speech to making the argument that "In this section we deal, and we must deal, with politics" (1873: 486). Political subject, he urged his audience, should not "be left to the ... Social Science Association," as some members of the section think (1873: 487). Social science, to be effective and properly exercised must become a meeting place between the scientists and the practical politician, who have to deal with daily issues:

There is undoubtedly an advantage in subjecting political questions to the condition of scientific debate. It is well that they should sometimes be treated and debated in the temper, and with the simple desire of the discovery of truth which ought characterise all scientific discussion. Then, again, as regards this special Section, there is an advantage in the political theorist or thinker being brought into contact with the practical politicians, for when they come together I think the theorist would perhaps learn to appreciate and estimate more fairly than he sometimes does the immense friction, if I may use the term, with which the practical politician has to deal, and which he finds to clog and interfere with his efforts. It is not sufficient to announce and explain the law of economic science. In outward nature you have to deal with dead facts. In economic science, affecting the political and social condition of men, you have to deal with persons who have free will, and the power of exercising it, and of refusing to obey the laws which you explain ... it is not enough for a State to declare the laws of economic science, of political economy for example ... We must take into account the existence of this friction, and we must be prepared for this result - a very disappointing result, and a result of which I am sure experimental philosophers would greatly complain if they were beset with it in physical science (1873: 488)
Service on the *Trade’ Societies and Strike* investigative committee had boosted the political careers of many NAPSS members who were active in the investigation and took part in the NAPSS public meetings on the subject. Shaw Lefevre, who contributed two reports in 1860 to *Trade’s Societies and Strikes*, was able to get elected as Member of Parliament for Reading in 1863, after serving as a governmental investigator for the Sea Fisheries Commission in 1862. He was a Member of Parliament for 32 years and presided at the NAPSS last congress of 1884. Before becoming a social investigator he failed to get elected to Parliament candidate for Winchester in 1859. Henry Fawcett, professor of political economy at Cambridge lunched his political career as an MP in 1865 and later as Postmaster General, following a successful performance in the NAPSS. Through his involvement with the *Trade’s Societies and Strikes*, Fawcett developed a reputation as an expert on industrial relations; he attended most congresses in the 1860s, delivered four papers, was the president of the Department of Economy and Trade, and served on important NAPSS investigations. Godfrey Lunshington was appointed Secretary for two governmental commissions after his excellent performance in the Trades’ Societies investigation. As a young barrister he wrote four reports for the Trades’ Societies and Strike report, the largest individual contribution, including two detailed studies of recent labor disputes in the glass and chain making industries, a general analysis of documentation sent to the committee by a wide variety of unions, and a review of parliamentary reports on unions. With his record as a social investigator and his legal skills, he was appointed as the legal council to the Home Office and the draftsman of the 1871 trade union legislation. Following his position as the secretary for the Trades’ Societies, Thomas Hughes decided to stand for Parliament as a representative of the Working Class and was elected MP for Lambeth in 1865, and was later appointed a governmental investigator for the Trade Unions Commission (1867-9). Hastings’ political career was delayed for many years because he had neither the station nor funds for election to the House of Commons. Without connection or aristocratic patronage, Hasting saw
the NAPSS as vehicle through which to make political contacts. His strategy to win political favour by getting noticed through active work in the public interest and in the public eye, eventually was successful when he became a member of Parliament in 1870.

12.4 The NAPSS and Governmental Investigations

In his address at the NAPSS 1871 meeting in Leeds, William Newmarch, the president of the department of Social Economy, commended the NAPSS for “leaving behind, as far as possible” the old principles of political economy, “its former, a priori, abstract, and deductive character,” and developing instead, “a science of observation, experience, fact, and induction.” Political economy, according to Newmarch, was a “presumptuous and dogmatic” consequence of intellectual laziness: “deductive reasoning, from plausible premises, is so much easier for both writers and readers than labourious, dry, and patient collection of details, that there must ever be, in all branches of knowledge, a powerful tendency towards mere a priori and abstract speculation; and, as almost a necessary consequence, a disposition to be presumptuous and dogmatic” (NAPSS 1872: 109).

It cannot be denied that for the greater part of the present century, Political Economy, both in this country and elsewhere, has been followed too much in the metaphysical, deductive, and geometric form. The premises have been sought in the ingenuity and fancy of the writers; and hard fact and patient observation have been left to what was considered the very inferior function of the mere statistician. Truth, however, is not to be conquered by false Methods; and there soon a flagrant, if not a dangerous, discrepancy between deductive predictions and real events (Ibid: 109-10).

17 William Newmarch was a banker and the secretary of the Globe Insurance Company, who throughout his career contributed many articles on finance to various magazines and newspapers including the Economist, and the Times. His extensive knowledge of banking earned him a reputation as a first rate economist. He was the secretary of the London Statistical Society, the editor of its journal, and its president between 1869-1871.

18 According to Newmarch, “[t]he ‘Wealth of Nations’ is not a deductive treatise. On the contrary, it holds its place in public estimation, precisely because, as the result of the patient labour of ten years spent upon
Newmarch concluded his argument against political economy by adding an historical dimension to it. The origins of social science – as “the inductive science of real events” – must be traced back, he claimed, not to the “ingenuity and fancy” of individual writers (i.e., the philosophers and political economists) but to the system, “the practical habit,” of governmental investigations:

Let us remember however that the inductive or Baconian method has never been without its cultivators, at least in this country ... it was cultivated ... thirty years ago by Edwin Chadwick to the subject of Factory and Infantile labour, and Sanitary and Poor Law Legislation. It may be said, indeed, with no small truth, that it is to the practical habit of the British Parliament of requiring all new proposals of extensive change to be preceded by exhaustive investigation of the fact of the case ... that we owe the gradual establishment, or rather reestablishment of the superiority of the Inductive over the Deductive methods of Political and Social Economy (Ibid: 110)

Newmarch’s understanding of the origins of social science, made explicit the important role played by the tradition of British governmental investigations in providing the intellectual framework and modus operandi for the NAPSS. Taken seriously, it offers a new outlook on the institutional operation and historical significance of the NAPSS, as a crucial link between the scientization of politics and the creation of social science. From this perspective, the NAPSS is characterized by a range of attempts to organize an already existing domain of experience – governmental investigations – and give it a wider institutionalized form as social science. In fact, the power of the NAPSS was derived, in large part, from its capacity to organize domains of governmental investigations that emerged in the course of institutional projects of sanitation, legal reform, punishment, management, education and the like.

Exploiting its many links in government, and in fact operating as an as an unofficial external government agency, the NAPSS executive structure, which included a governing council and five executive sections, emulated a cabinet of ministers and functioned like a

it … it combines, so completely and happily, a philosophical insight, with knowledge of practical life, and the application of appropriate facts” (NAPSS 1872: 110).
government in charge of setting new projects for social investigation. These investigations had largely followed in the tradition of governmental commissions, both in their composition, methods of investigations and practices of reporting. The influential investigation in trade unions organized by the NAPSS Department of Social Economy is a case in point. Similarly, the Department of Public Health established in 1858 an investigation into the British regulation, practices and procedures of Quarantine in comparison with those other nations (NAPSS 1862: xxxix, 11, 582-698).\(^19\) The Quarantine Committee had its reports and recommendations communicated to the Board of Trade and they were finally published as an official parliamentary returns in recognition of the services of an eminent group of investigators on an important subject (HC [600] 1860: 155-385). In 1864 the Department of Education sent a delegation to Prime Minister Parmurerston to put the case for a governmental investigation into the provision and funding of secondary education. As a direct consequence the Taunton commission was established and was stuffed mostly with NAPSS members.\(^20\)

The NAPSS and governmental commissions shared similar structural properties in that they were both *boundary organizations*, situated in a liminal space between political and scientific knowledge and practices. Both organizations assembled together politicians, legal experts, economists and medical experts inducing them to work together to solve social problems. As boundary organizations, they both coordinated the interactions and structured the cooperation of these various actors, who in the process of working together, assumed a collective identity as “reformers.” As reformers they could legitimately present themselves and act as both members of a scientific community and as political activists, thus bridging the

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\(^{19}\) The Quarantine Committee included a number of physicians in government administration (including William Farr and Soutwood Smith) as well as three MPs.

\(^{20}\) Nine of the thirteen education commissioners were NAPSS members: Stafford Henry Northcote (NAPSS president in 1869) George William Lyttelton (president of the Education Department in 1868), Edward Baines (president of the Education Department in 1871), Edward John Stanley (one of the founder of the NAPSS); Thomas Acland and William Edward Forster (both served as investigators of Trades’ Societies and Strikes), Walter Farquhar Hook and James Edwin Thorold.
boundary between politics and science. Much of the NAPSS’ modus operandi was developed out of the practices of governmental investigations, their methods of data collection, field exploration and reporting.

The more unified and consistent organizational structure of the NAPSS accorded the _ad hoc_ and heterogeneous activities of governmental investigations a coherence and a wider institutional form, locating them within a single field of explanation and deliberation: they were no longer _ad hoc_ activities, directly connected to politics and governance, but claimed to be grounded in a positive knowledge of society. Thus, previously distinct reform projects became related, "translated" into a single unified field.

One way in which the NAPSS sought to achieve this translation was by rendering governmental investigations publicly through polemic and debate. In this sense, the NAPSS annual meetings functioned as public talking shops, where real-time conversations were struck up against the background of the slow-paced findings of governmental investigation. Many of the NAPSS members – which now belonged to a new community (indeed, a new profession) of social scientists – served at one time as social investigators in governmental commissions and had experience in writing governmental reports. Of those who had written papers for the NAPSS annual congresses, 126 had served as governmental investigators beforehand. Of the 77 MPs who presented papers at the annual congresses, 33 (43 percent) had previous experience as governmental investigators, while the estimated average rate of governmental investigators among all serving MPs in mid nineteenth century was around 5 percent.²¹ Even more astounding

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is the proportion of NAPSS presidents who served on governmental commissions. Of the twenty-one presidents, only one did not serve as governmental investigator: fifteen presidents had previous experience as governmental investigators and five served as governmental commissions only after their presidency.

Even those members who did not serve as governmental investigators often based their papers on facts collected in governmental reports. As illustrated in figure-4, more than half of the papers presented at the NAPSS congresses between 1857 and 1884 had made some reference to governmental commissions, and more than 40% of the papers have cited governmental reports as their a source of evidence. Both of these figures remained remarkably stable throughout the twenty-eight years in which the Association was active. Moreover, the pattern shows that most of the scholarly reference to governmental investigation used them as evidential source; only about 20% of the papers that referred to governmental investigation did not use them as a source. By contrast, as shown in Figure-5, the reference to parliamentary inquiries and the use of parliamentary reports as evidence was much less prevalent in the NAPSS congresses. On average, less than 30 percent of the papers had made some reference to parliamentary inquiries and only 14 percent had used parliamentary reports as evidence. Moreover, reference to parliamentary inquiry was not necessarily associated with their usage as a source for evidence; only half of the papers who referred to parliamentary inquiries used them as evidence. Importantly, the graph shows an obvious decrease (from 1874) in the proportion of

22 Of the 21 NAPSS presidents 17 were politicians and 4 had served as state administrators.
23 This was Charles Gordon (11th Marquess of Huntly) who presided over the 1876 congress in Liverpool.
25 These were: Henry Howard Herbert, Algernon Percy, Francis Napier, Donald James Mackay, and Richard Temple.
26 These figures were calculated by comparing records from the NAPSS Transactions to lists of officials in royal commissions. The number of MPs refers only to those members who served as members of Parliament at the time they were presenting their papers; the total number of NAPSS members who served as MPs at anytime is almost twice as high.
papers who referred to parliamentary inquiry, and even clearer and more consistent decline (from 1865) in the proportion of papers that used parliamentary reports as evidence. It is clear therefore that social scientists showed more interest in governmental investigations, that their interest in parliamentary inquiries was relatively low and rapidly declining and that their willingness to use parliamentary reports as evidence was declining even faster.27

The status of the commissions’ credibility as an archive of social knowledge was at once epistemological and ethical. As sites of particular kinds of knowledge and of particular styles of reasoning, governmental investigation provided an epistemological credibility to the emergent community of social scientist. Moreover, Governmental commissions, which were often populated by renowned and accomplished statesmen and other influential figures, also provided ethical credibility because the knowledge they generated, was a sign of status, of authority, of a certain right kind of author-function that conferred social experts a certain kind of providential seriousness. Ethical credibility was also generated by the type of social investigation practiced in governmental commissions.

27 The average and median for reference to governmental investigations is 52 percent and the standard deviation is 6.3 percent; the average use of governmental reports as evidence is 43 percent, the median is 45 percent and the standard deviation is 6.5 percent. Of the 1,363 papers that referred to governmental investigation, 1,095 papers (80%) used governmental reports as evidence. More than two thirds of the papers presented in the 1865 Congress at Sheffield had made some reference to governmental investigations and more than half of the papers had used governmental reports as evidence. The average for reference to parliamentary inquiries is 29 percent, the median is 31 percent and the standard deviation is 9 percent; the average usage of parliamentary reports as evidence is 14 percent, the median is 13.5 percent and the standard deviation is 7.5 percent. Of the 798 papers that referred to parliamentary inquiries, 394 papers (49%) used parliamentary reports as evidence.
Figure 3: Proportion of NAPSS Papers
Referring to Governmental Investigations or Using them as a Source

Figure 4: Proportion of NAPSS Papers
Referring to Parliamentary Inquiries or Using them as a Source
12.4.1 Promoting Governmental Investigation as a Model for Legislation

In their effort to create convergences and homologies between its own operation and the operation of the British government, the NAPSS leadership had used the model of governmental investigation not only to enhance its own credibility, in its effort establish social science as a new field of expertise, it also actively and openly promoted governmental investigations as an operational model for the British government. In addition to his effort to secure more positions for social experts in government, the NAPSS’ main concern was to eschew partisan politics from policymaking by institutionalizing social investigations, on the model of governmental commission, as an integral part of the legislative process.

Thus, for example, during a special Joint meeting of the NAPSS’ Department of Jurisprudence and the Amendment of the Law which took place in London in 1859, Chadwick presented a programmatic paper which offered radical changes in the “chief methods of preparation for legislation.” Chadwick, who after the collapse of the Board of Health in 1854 had much time on his hand, decided to devote most of it to campaign for the reform of institutions of British government according to the principles of “social science” (Finer 1952: 475). Chadwick mentioned in his paper three main advantages of the governmental investigation which, in his opinion, made the model of governmental commissions the most effective devise for the scientization of legislation: (1) “it admits to complete investigation as to the state of information and opinion in even the most obscure nook and cranny;” (2) it prepares and informs a public opinion while disarming opponents by its cogency of information, and (3) it divests legislation from any party complexion (quoted in Finer 1952: 480).

Chadwick recommended that the Privy Council would oversee all social investigations, and that to each commission there would be attached a body of assistant commissioners to carry out the actual investigations. Based on such investigations, the commission would then draft
legislation for debate by Parliament. The ad hoc procedures of social investigations were thus to be given a permanent place in British political system and parliamentary machinery. Only upon the commissions’ report, would the parliamentary debate take place. The presumption was that a reliance on governmental investigations would eschew popular sinister interests from both parliament and public opinion thus allowing the final piece of legislation to become “scientific.”

JS Mill, who most likely was present at the meeting, further developed Chadwick’s scheme in his Considerations on Representative Government (1861). Mill’s conception of a Legislative Commission, staffed by unelected experts - “experienced and exercised minds … not exceeding in number the members of a Cabinet” - who were to investigate social issues and then draft the bills that Parliament would debate, and his suggestion of ministerial cabinets - councils of "able and experienced professional men" to guide ministers - were close in spirit to Chadwick’s aims (1861: 265). The role of Parliament (the “tribunal of ignorance,” according to Mill), would be limited to “watch and control the government”; it might serve as “the nation’s Committee of Grievances and its Congress of opinions,” but it should not be allowed a role in expert executive tasks for which its size, competition and proven incompetence made it unsuitable” (1861: 221, 226).28

Chadwick and Mill, expressed one of the most widespread and fundamental believed amongst the members of the NAPSS: Partisan Politics is getting in the way of expertise and bringing social reform and policymaking to a halt, “because the House of Commons will not forgo the precious privilege of tinkering it with their clumsy hand” (Mill 1861: 222). What was offered then was to separate social knowledge from parliamentary politics not by delegating the former into civil society but by institutionalizing social science within government. Governmental investigations were thus offered not only as a pivotal method for centralizing legislation in the

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28 Parliament would retain “the power of passing or rejecting the bill when drawn up, but not of altering it otherwise than by sending proposed amendments to be dealt with by the commission” (Mill 1861: 226).
executive and for embedding social science in government (thus securing constitutional positions for non-elective social experts), but as the underlying institutional framework for separating social knowledge from politics, while making the social scientist, \textit{de facto}, into a legislator.

\textbf{12.5 The NAPSS’ Domestic and International Impact}

In its twenty-eight years of operation, the NAPSS influence on legislation and social policy was considerable. There was hardly a social question excluded from the Association debates, and it played a part in the resolution of many of them. The NAPSS’ department of jurisprudence was principally responsible for the 1870 \textit{Married Women’s Property Act} which was instrumental in establishing legal equality for women and promoting of feminist reform; its Education Department secured the Taunton Commission – from which followed the \textit{Endowed Schools Act} – and influenced the reform of secondary education; the department of Public Health prompted establishing the governmental investigation on the Sanitary Acts 1869-71. The extensive research into trade unionism in the Department of Social Economy strongly impacted public opinion in favor of organized labor and influenced the trade union legislation of 1871. And the remedies offered by Punishment and Reformation Department for the control of crime (published as ‘reformatory principles’) were integrated into the \textit{Habitual Criminals Act} of 1869 and had dictated the terms of the \textit{Prevention of Crimes Act} of 1871. In most of these cases the Association was also successful in securing positions for social experts to control public bodies, commissions, and department of state charged with the oversight of these policies. Similarly, the NAPSS played an important role in paving the way for the professionalization of public service (in the 1870s) and advocating efficient and systematic public administration (Abrams 1968: Chap. 4; Goldman 2002, Yeo 1996: chap. 6).

In April 1886, a few days after the NAPSS suspended its operations, \textit{The London Times
remarked on the process of institutional specialization that had weakened the NAPSS: “For a long period the floaters of theories had no other medium for advertisement than its annual tournaments, or those of the British Association. Gradually the vast field which the two monopolized has been partitioned among a multitude of offshoots.” *The Times* recognized the Associations’ greatest successes in “propagating a thirst for social amelioration … With a Parliament of a new type occupied for half the year the visions of general legislative meddlesomeness, the convocation of a Social Science Congress for a week’s session in September appears a work of supererogation” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 366). When Parliament finally took the role of social reform, under the influence of the NAPSS, the Association role became redundant. According to *The Times* it was the NAPSS’ considerable achievements which eventually made it superfluous, because it had made social reform an object of national politics and integral part of public culture. Having played its role in making politics more “social” and making social questions “political” – in demonstrating the responsibility of government to address them and the process that might resolve them – the NAPSS was no longer required.

### 12.5.1 International Influences

The NAPSS was a benchmark of a larger international movement of institutions and ideas. This movement was mobilized across national borders by cosmopolitan clerisy of intellectual liberal reformers who wished to follow the British success in bringing together all the experts on social questions into a single organization and constructing strong relationship between social investigations and politics based on the promotion of this new synthesize of “social science.” They therefore turned to the NAPSS and to the British experience with governmental investigations, looking for guidance and expertise (Bulmer 1987; Goldman 1998, 2002). As one contemporary
German-American former observed, the NAPSS influence “has not been confined to Great Britain. It soon became a general centre of social information, commended the sympathies and secured the cooperation of many leading minds on the continent. Its printed transactions, now grown into an imposing array of volumes, justly ranked among the most valuable publications of our times, and have been so regarded by thinkers and reformers in all civilized countries” (Villard 1869: 7). 29

The NAPSS intellectual and organizational model for conducting social investigation, far from being peculiar, was in fact widely envied and emulated in a variety of countries who grappled with similar social questions, culminating in the establishment of the International Social Science Association in Brussels (ISSA) in 1862 and the American Social Science Association (ASSA) in Boston 1865. Both in Europe and in America, it was not only British ideas that were admired and replicated but the British ways of organizing and harmonizing social knowledge, expertise and politics, the entire institutional modus operandi of the British reform model, the British method and procedure of getting things done in the task of governance.

The origins of the International Social Science Association (Association Internationale pour le Progrès des Sciences Sociales) could be traced back to the fifth annual meeting of the NAPSS in Dublin in 1861, which brought together the founders of the ISSA: Michel Chevalier, Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, and Ernest Desmarest from Paris and Michel Corr-Vander Maeren from Brussels (Goldman 2002: 323-6). 30 These four distinguished French economists and lawyers “were so much struck by the proceedings that they conceived the idea of starting an international organization, by which the truths of social science might be propagated throughout

29 According to Henry Villard, “efforts have been making in France for some time, to organize a Social Science Association according to the British prototype, and have failed so far, only in consequence of obstacles interposed by the Government” (1869: 11).

30 Chevalier, a Saint-Simonian political economist who taught at the College de France, and was a member of the Senate under the Second Empire where he negotiated the Anglo-French free-trade treaty of 1860, presided over the NAPSS’ Department of Trade and International Law, where he presented a paper on the internationalization of free trade (NAPSS 1861: 116-32). Garnier-Pagès was named mayor of Paris and had served as minister of finance in the provisional government of 1848. Ernest Desmarest was a leading French lawyer and the president of the Paris bar in 1864-5. Michel Corr-Vander Maeren was a judge of the Court of Commerce at Brussels.
the other countries in Europe.” The task of initiating the new organization was entrusted to Maeren, whose former experience as the founder of several economic associations, especially qualified him for the work. On his return to Brussels, Maeren set up a local organizing local committee “of the most eminent men of the kingdom.” The committee "prepared a constitution and by laws, similar to those of the British Association, and in May, 1862, issued a circular to persons throughout the continent, asking their cooperation, and inviting them to attend the first international congress for the promotion of social science” in September 1862 in Brussels. “In order to insure the success of the first meeting, three members of the Committee were chosen as delegates to attend the sixth annual meeting of the British Association, and familiarize themselves more thoroughly with the work of that body” (Villard 1869: 7-8).

The organizational structure of the ISSA was accordingly modeled on the NAPSS with five departments of comparative law, education, art and literature, public health and political economy. And like the NAPSS the ISSA membership of about a thousand, drawn preponderantly from Belgium, Holland and France, was dominated by a mixture of middle class politicians, lawyers doctors and businessmen. Yet, unlike the NAPSS, the International Association took no part in the formulation of policy: as an international forum it had no leverage on national governments and saw itself, instead, as an international forum for the exchange of information in which different national experiences on any particular social issue could be compared. “The International Association was intended to be a channel of exchange of thought and experience, rather than an instrument of direct action, and this useful action it has fulfilled to a great extent” (Villard 1869: 10).

The first ISSA Congress met on September 22, 1862 under the presidency of the Mayor of Brussels and remained in session for four days. It was attended by around eight hundred representatives from Belgium, Holland, France, Britain, Italy, the German states, Russia, Switzerland and the United States, and was followed by subsequent meetings in Ghent (1863),
Amsterdam (1864) and Berne (1865) which extended over a whole week. These meetings were regularly attended by delegates from the NAPSS. “As in Great Britain, public meetings and the publication of the transactions were adopted as the practical means of pursuing the objects of the Association” However, unlike the NAPSS, only a few papers were read "and most of the time was devoted to the discussion of a number of questions in each of the departments, proposed by the Organizing Committee.” According to Villard, this focus on verbal exchanges over written reports made the ISSA sessions “less fruitful of substantial results, than [they] would have been, had the example of the British Association been more closely followed” (Villard 1869: 9-10). The ISSA meetings came to a halt after the 1866 Congress planned for Turin was cancelled following Austria’s war with Prussia and Italy.

Although the ISSA was short lived, it was nevertheless a powerful expression of European admiration to British social science. The NAPSS had an even bigger impact and lend a deeper resonance in the United States. The creation of the American Social Science Association (ASSA) owed much to the translation of the NAPSS’ methods of collecting, organizing and disseminating social knowledge by New England reformers who thought that by emulating the NAPSS they could enhance their influence and power in the United States (Goldman 1998). As the general secretary of the Association and one of its founders, Franklin Sanborn recalled in 1897, “it was at the close of our great Civil War, when the minds of men … were ready to unite in whatever promised benefit to the restored nation, that a few of us in Massachusetts conceived the thought of an Association similar in purpose to that which Lord Brougham and his friends had inaugurated in England eight years before” (Sanborn 1897: 21).

Two of the seven members of the Committee of Arrangements, which organized the ASSA – Dr. Edward Jarvis, its chairman, and Caroline Healey Dall – had been in direct personal contact with the founders and leaders of NAPSS. Jarvis was an eminent physician and sanitarian with broad social interests and engagements, including the promotion of public
health, vital statistics and social investigation. A respected authority in nineteenth century America on the treatment of the insane, he was well known to the statistical and sanitary communities in Britain. As President between 1852 and 1884 of the American Statistical Association, founded in 1839 in imitation of the Statistical Society of London he began corresponding with two of the most notable public administrators in Victorian Britain, William Farr and Edwin Chadwick. Jarvis became enthusiastic about the idea of Social Science Association following a five months trip to Britain, where he made new intellectual contacts while visiting the Offices of the General Register, the Poor Law Commission, the commission of Lunacy and the statistical Society of London, and met with Chadwick, Farr, Brougham and Hastings. Jarvis returned home (Goldman 1993, 1998).

The feminist scholar and activist Caroline Healey Dall was intrigued by the possibility of replicating the NAPSS in the United States. “If England was ready for such an Association, so are we,” she declared in 1860, “If England could organise it, so can we ... We are in haste to relieve social evils, but we neither accumulate information, nor hold practical consultation concerning them. We shall never do any better till we adopt this English plan.” Dall saw in the NAPSS public model of social science a particular opportunity of developing a public forum for the American women’s movement. She thought that “nothing has ever promised so much noble usefulness for woman, nothing has ever occurred to change the popular estimate of her character in the same degree as the formation of that out-of-door-Parliament – the Association for the Advancement of Social Science.” Dall explained that the NAPSS model “offers a position of entire equality to woman. It encourages her to express herself in the presence and with the sympathy of the wisest men, and gives her an opportunity to speak to the actual Parliament through her own influences exerted on its best members.” In the late 1850s, she was corresponding with two of the leading British women’s activists who had helped found the NAPSS, Barbara Bodichon and Bessie Rayner Parkes. She carefully noted the number of
contributions in the Transactions from women – ten at Liverpool in 1858, seven at Bradford in 1859 and was proud that “Mary Carpenter did not blush to speak in the presence of Russell and Stanley and Brougham” (quoted in Goldman 1998: 10-11). Dall played a central role in the creation of the ASSA; she wrote the Association’s “Statement of Purposes,” drew up its original constitution, and collaborated in framing the American Association’s by-laws and served as an officer of the Association for two decades.

The ASSA held its first meeting on October 4, 1865, in Boston, which was attended by about three hundred New England reformers, and continued its operation until 1909. The Association transactions were published in its Journal of Social Science between 1869 and 1909. In all, some eleven papers written by British contributors from the NAPSS were published in the Journal of Social Science. ASSA members, on their part, also delivered papers at the NAPSS congresses. The ASSA member and highly successful New York lawyer David Dudley Field was deeply involved in the projects of the NAPSS Department of Jurisprudence and International Law section. Field, who came to the attention of English legal reformers through his efforts to codify the state law of New York, based on the English common law, attended four NAPSS congresses (1866, 1867, 1873 and 1881) and gained the Association Support for even more ambitious project of composing a code of international law.31 Francis Wayland, the President of the ASSA and the Dean of the Yale Law School, gave a paper in 1862 at the NAPSS annual meeting in Dublin. In 1874, for example, the NAPSS invited presentation of “papers on American subjects” for its Annual meeting at Glasgow. Fredrik Sanborn’s paper on “American Poor Laws” and the Secretary of the American Public Health Association, Elisha Harris’ paper on the “Health of American Cities” were subsequently published in the Transactions. And in 1883, Daniel Coit Gilman, a founder of the ASSA, its President in 1879-

31 Field delivered four papers to the NAPSS on “Project for an International Code” (1866), “Project for an International Code” (1866 and 1873) and “The Community of Nations” (1867). He also delivered two papers at the meeting ASSA in New York and Boston respectively in 1869 and 1870.
80, and an important influence on the academic institutionalization of the social sciences in America as President of the new Johns Hopkins University, presented a paper at the NAPSS “Conference on the Administration of Hospitals” (Goldman 1998). The connection between the two Social Science Associations was formally recognized in May 1870 with the reception of Samuel Eliot, then President of the ASSA, at a “special meeting” of the NAPSS’ Council which drew an impressive and appreciative audience to welcome him “as the representative of the kindred Association of a kindred nation” (quoted in Goldman 1998: 14).

The ASSA shared a comparable conception of social science with the NAPSS: “To learn patiently what *is* - to promote diligently what *should* be - that is the double duty of all the social sciences” (Sanborn 1886: 6; italics in the original). The ASSA was a resource of social knowledge and expertise, and at least some of its members, attained positions of social authority and had a considerable influence on different areas of national life. The American Association addressed similar issues, adopted the same departmental structure as its British counterpart (for Education, Public Health, Jurisprudence, and Economy, Trade and Finance), and like the NAPSS, the ASSA was designed as a centralized union of reform organizations bringing them together in an effort to promote legislative reform by developing itself as an arena of expertise with the scientific authority to educate public opinion on the one hand and coax the politicians on the other.

Yet, the ASSA had proven much less successful compared to the NAPSS. Unlike its British counterpart, the ASSA did not have a broad political base and government support and it relied solely on the support of genteel New England intellectuals and reformers predominantly from New York and Massachusetts (Haskell 2000). Its lack of political connections, its relative geographical isolation, and its small scale and recurrent financial difficulties made the ASSA much less influential and severely limited its ability to influence social policy and public

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32 For example, Francis Amasa Walker, perhaps the best known of American economists in late-nineteenth century, directed the ninth and tenth federal censuses in 1870 and 1880; Carroll D. Wright, president of the ASSA in 1886, was the first Commissioner of the US Bureau of Labor for twenty years after 1885.
opinion. As Edward Jarvis explained in a letter to the NAPSS in 1869, “We have an Association on the plan of yours, and we are making some progress, but we fall far short of your success. We have not, as you have, enlisted the best minds of our men of *power and influence* to cooperate with us.” Similarly, in 1867 Caroline Dall met an English journalist the Association in England” and who “was disgusted with our ‘nobility and gentry’ because they did not offer us the same gracious hospitalities he had been accustomed to see offered there” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 328-9).

Unlike the NAPSS, which had a fairly constant membership of about 1200 persons, who paid annual fees, the ASSA membership constantly fluctuated and rarely rose above 400. As Sanborn reported in 1880, the ASSA “began in October 1865 with about 150; these increased to nearly 600, then fell away in 1872-3 to less than 200, and now number between three and four hundred” (Sanborn 1880: vi). In Britain, meetings attracted thousands from all over the country year after year. In comparison, as Edward Jarvis observed, the meetings of the ASSA “were small – forty, fifty or sixty persons; once they had over a hundred; but never a church full, nor yet a hall full” (quoted in Goldman 1998: 20). In 1873 Jarvis told the ASSA meeting that the reform projects that the Association was trying to promote “have not attracted the attention of the American people as they do that of the people of Britain. Although a few of the best minds have joined in the enterprise, the great world of such have kept aloof” (quoted in Goldman 2002: 328). While British reformers largely succeeded in marrying social research and reform politics, their American counterparts failed to interest and involve the local and national political elites in the United States, and without their “power and influence” substantive reform through legislation proved impossible.
12.5.2 Some Hypotheses for Future Research

The ASSA failed to centralize national debate and shape federal policy and never came to exercise the same degree of political influence. The marginalized New England reformers were seeking in vain to establish their moral and political leadership in a federalized system and a social matrix which did not support their program, let alone recognized their right to govern. We may reasonably conjecture that it was this failure of American intellectuals to influence policymaking and participate in the task of government, according to the British model, which eventually led them to focus on a new sphere of influence – the emerging research universities and colleges of the 1880s where the professoriate shared the outlook of the gentry reformers and were often numbered among them – and to establish social science as academic disciplines (the “social sciences”). In his resignation speech Sanborn pointed to this tendency towards academic professional closure that had been developing in the ASSA as early as the 1880s following its public and political marginalization; the ASSA he argued “might be charged, and possibly has been, with being a close corporation, proceeding in its selections of subjects and writers from personal and restricted views and not opening to the great public that opportunity for discussion which is the best guarantee that truth will be elicited and recognized in our debates” (Sanborn 1897: 26).

In contrast to the British pattern, social science in America in the last decades of the nineteenth century, was on its way of becoming a respected academic discipline, gaining its social “authority” from its place within higher education and its association with the values of academe, rather than from its direct relationship with politics and social administration (Goldman 1987, 1998; Schweber 1996). Under this postulation, experts choose to create a professional academic safe-haven for scientific inquiry, one that rejects any immediate interventionist goals in their encounter with their objects of study, only when they fail to
influence the world of affairs as reformers. This non-interventionist agenda is often justified by the idea that knowledge produced by academic scientists is of a higher order than research findings of non-academics (Breslau 1990).

Why were British intellectuals more successful in influencing public policy compared to the Americans? One might reasonably speculate that social science in Britain emerged as an adjunct to government largely because of the institutional presence of governmental commissions. The tradition of extra-parliamentary governmental investigations explains the unique responsiveness of British government to the practice of social investigations as a policymaking tool for reform purposes. Governmental investigations enabled British intellectuals not only to develop social expertise oriented towards the amelioration of social problems, but, even more significantly, had made it peculiarly easy for these British social experts to get close to the machinery of government, to shape public opinion, and to exert their influence upon public policy. As such, the governmental commissions functioned as a *liminal institutional setting*, mediating between social science and politics, serving as a *boundary organization* which assembled together all those various groups that were engaged in various forms of investigation concerning social matters – politicians, legal and medical professionals, administrators, and educators – into network of collaboration based on a common form of social expertise.

This particular form of social investigation – extra-parliamentary governmental investigation – did not exist in America during the nineteen century. Three attempts to establish presidential commissions in the nineteen century by President Van Buren, President Jackson and President Taylor led congress to question the authority of the president to appoint commissions and in 1842 an act was passed that sought to prevent public spending on commissions. It was only in the early twentieth century, under President Roosevelt that presidential commissions were first institutionalized as a legitimate form of inquiry (Flitner 1986; Lacey and Furner 1993;
Contrary to their American colleagues, participation in governmental commissions allowed the British intellectuals to develop a particular form of social expertise by striking a balance between their capacity to present themselves as disinterested observers in search of the truth and their capacity to present themselves as relevant and useful to different non-academic constituencies. It follows that, in the process of becoming a social expert, neither purely open social relations (e.g., of politicians) nor strict closure (e.g., of the academic expert) helped support the status of the NAPSS’ social experts, but rather a liminal institutional setting provided by the governmental investigation.

33 The form of inquiry conducted by Congressional and Senate committees follow the adjudicative model of British parliamentary committees of inquiry (select committees). As discussed in Chapter Nine, this model of inquiry stands in contrast to the scientific-explorative model of extra parliamentary social investigation presented by governmental investigation.
13. Conclusion

The current study has offered an historical investigation into the birth of modern social science as we practice it. This practice, I argue, originated not as much with Marx and Weber in Germany, or Comte and Durkheim in France, as with the political institution of governmental investigations in Britain. Breaking the routines of disciplinary research, I have tried to free the historiography of social science from its academic disciplinary bias and to treat it *sui generis*. There is much we can learn about the *scientificity* of social knowledge, I suggested, once we forgo the traditional ways in which the history of social science is told, which is often teleological and tautological, and allow the performative nature of social knowledge and the phenomenology of its scientific appropriation to stand at the center of our historical inquiry.

Accordingly, this research has started from the methodological premise that understanding the relationship between the institutional and intellectual aspects of knowledge production requires, first and foremost, a historical analysis of the conditions under which social science was established as a new domain of discourse and practice before it started to crystallize as a distinct academic and occupational *practice*, with the emergence of university disciplines and professional organizations. Under what practical condition and within what institutional arrangements, I asked, did intellectual engagement with the social world emerge as a relatively autonomous domain of expertise?

To answer this question, I have constructed a new analytical framework – a spatio-temporal model of knowledge-political boundary configurations – that can help "contextualize" the relationship between the cultural organization of various institutions and the knowledge produced in them. The purpose of the model was to rectify the lack of a satisfactory theory of knowledge formation that would allow us to account simultaneously for the substance of knowledge and for the social institutions within which this knowledge is formulated. In all parts of the
dissertation I have tried to approach the emergence of social science on these two levels concurrently by analyzing it in terms of two interrelated process: the discursive reproduction of knowledge and the *boundary work* that organizes and structures this knowledge as institutional forms of life, with all the detail and specificity that such project entails. This double move requires us to pay simultaneous attention to how culture (discursively) influences action and to how people (pragmatically) use culture in their struggles over legitimation and authority.

Under this approach, the story I have told about how scientific order is achieved in social knowledge, drew upon the same analytical tools and strategies that I have used to analyze the changes in the organizational culture politics. Within this framework, I have shown how British political institutions have shaped the development of social knowledge and provided the conditions for its scientization. In their struggle to and take control over legislation and legitimate their authority as policymakers, governmental officials (*qua* social investigators) constructed social knowledge as a new domain of expertise by formulating claims about the *intellectual distinctiveness* of their enterprise, about the relevance of empirical social knowledge collected through direct observations “in the field” for *policy*, about its advantage over traditional forms of legal inquiry and about its usefulness for *practical governance*.

### 13.1 Implications for the Field of Cultural Politics

One of my goals in writing this dissertation was to locate mundane aspects of the actual work that goes into producing knowledge in high-level institutions of politics, in the daily work of legislators, government official and state administrators. This goal was motivated by the understanding that the principle of mundanity should not be limited to the realm of ‘lower’ or ordinary life, the lives and experiences of so-called common people. Certainly that is how the
discipline of social history has tended to interpret matters, but it need not be restricted to such a reference. What the principle of mundanity captures is that power is ordinary, not that it is necessarily exercised by ordinary people or lower-level institutions. The problematic association of mundanity with ordinary people and low-level institutions does not stop, however, with social history. It has characterized recent trends in the field of cultural politics and in particular in the Marxists treatment of Foucault power/knowledge which has pervaded the domains of critical studies and popular culture, as well as recent debates on the nature of “public sociology” (see, e.g., Burawoy 2005; Burawoy et al. 2005). I therefore wish to spend the rest of this concluding section to explicate some of the lessons that the current study carries with it for the field of cultural politics.

13.1.1 Don’t Throw the King’s Head Out with the Bath Water

As it is well recognized, one of the most significant contributions of Foucault’s understanding of government as the mobile, changing and contingent assemblages of regimes of practices, has been its innovative exploration of the ways in which governmental politics extend beyond state agencies to make use of practices of individual self-government and of diverse elements of civil society. Foucault’s analytics of government assumes that discourses on government are integral part of the workings of government rather then simply a means of its legitimation; government in this sort of analysis is accomplished not by a centralized set of state apparatuses but through numerous assemblages with multiple actors and agencies (Foucault 1991b). The analysis of government require us, therefore, to attend to what is put together in these assemblages: “the routines of bureaucracy; the technologies of notation, recording, compiling, representing and transporting of information; the theories, programmes, knowledge and expertise
that compose a field to be governed and invest it with purpose and objectives; the ways of seeing and representing embedded in practices of government; and the different agencies with various capacities that the practices of government require, elicit, form and reform” (Dean 1999: 26-7).

However, in its eagerness to “cut off the King’s head” and challenge the centralizing images of power and the state, Foucault’s analytics of government excludes altogether from the analysis the specific political and state-level institutional mechanisms and developments, whose central role in bringing about the governmentalization of the state in Britain cannot be ignored. As the current study has shown, in order to trace the origins of social science in Britain we need to better understand how the transformation of the legal inquiry as a toll for legislation came about in this country and the role that British Politicians played in it. But Foucault tells us nothing about the institutional changes in the operation of Parliament and government through which the epistemic displacement of law was underpinned. One obvious result of this predicament is that we remain in the dark regarding the significant role played by politicians in this general transformation, and, in particular, in the development of social science.

Nonetheless, although Foucault was, admittedly, less interested in applying his power/knowledge approach to ruling elites and dominant political institutions, his analytics of government provides a useful framework for the study of political elites as well (see Foucault 1981: 96-98), allowing to pose new ways of looking at their role in the construction of social science. One promising way of connecting my project with that of Foucault is to approach the early history of social science in Britain as the history of government as a problematizing activity. Government, according to Rose and Miller (1992: 181), “poses the obligations for rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address,” it is therefore “intrinsically linked to the problems around which it circulates.” This sort of history attends to the ways in which Victorian authorities wielded knowledge as power by posing themselves with this question: "how can we know what we need to know, and do what we need to do in order to govern?” (Ibid: 177).
From such a perspective, each formulation of the art of governing embodies, explicitly or implicitly, an answer to the set questions that can be answered through empirical inquiry: Who or what is to be governed? Why should they be governed? How should they be governed? According to what logic? With what techniques? Toward what ends? It is in answering this question, and around these problems, that a institution of governmental investigations have been developed and elaborated as programmes of government, a discoursive devise which lay claims to a certain knowledge of the problem to be addressed that has promised to make government possible. This social knowledge was first and foremost a knowledge of 'know how' embedded in regime of practices: an assemblage of people, theories, projects, texts skills and techniques for conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling (Gordon 1980).

The current study has traced the early structuration of social science to a change in the regime of practices in Parliament (a process which I described as the “governmentalization of Parliament”). I have shown how the emerging explorative model of governmental investigations constituted a different regime of practices a different art of governing from the legal model of parliamentary committees of inquiry with its own style of thought, fact-finding practices and conceptions of social knowledge, characterized by specific modes of temporality, visibility and inscriptions.

13.1.2 The Purpose of Historical Investigation: Condition of Formation vs. Demystification

This study urges that we treat at Foucault’s analytics of government from the perspective of his archeology of knowledge. From such a perspective, governmentality is far from a theory of power or even of governance. It is rather an analytical method of power/knowledge, which asks particular questions of the phenomena it seeks to understand;
questions that can be answered through empirical inquiry. As such, it provides us with some important tools for historical analysis of social knowledge. The problem is the growing tendency among scholars to use Foucault’s power/knowledge and methods without taking this notion of his archeological approach seriously enough. In their studies, these scholars extend the range of available sites for the study of social knowledge by applying Foucauldian analysis critically to deconstruct all sorts of texts in order to demystify their content.

This commitment to reading texts “against their grain,” is very common in postcolonial studies, for example, which offers emancipation through critique. In this field histories are written as popular histories “from the bottom up,” as narratives of resistance that might locate human agency in small gestures of refusal and silence among the colonized. The main focus is on the tactics of inversion and recuperation employed by those who appeared as objects of colonial discipline. This sort of critical engagement with texts is devoted to a reading of elite sources “upside down” in order to reveal the language of rule and the biases inherent in statist perceptions (Stoler 2002). Postcolonial studies “mine” the content of all sorts of documents such as the reports generated by government commissions and parliamentary committees, but they rarely attend to their peculiar form or to the and cultural and sociological process of their production. Instead, governmental investigations are connected to modern state power through knowledge deemed as ‘true’, and analyzed as a type of colonial documents which perpetuate managerial and technical discourse of subjection and control for maintaining “hegemonic domination” through the manufacturing and regularizing of consent (see, e.g., Ashforth 1990; Burton and Carlen 1979; Bhabha 1994; Sheriff 1983).

In contrast to this Marxist treatment of Foucault, which prevails in critical and postcolonial studies, the current study has argued that to take Foucault’s archaeologies seriously, we must focus our attention not on the demystification of power/knowledge schemes but on their condition of possibility. In other words, the insight that all knowledge are
knowledge “for,” arising in historically contingent discursive settings to be wielded as power, should be seen as the opening of our inquiry not its ending point (see, Schudson 1997). Discourse analysis is not a question of whether certain unities are real or false; it is rather a method of analyzing the way discursive unities come into existence according to certain condition of possibility for the (re)production of knowledge. Even if they are right in connecting governmental commissions to modern forms of state power, this connection do not explain at all how forms of power/knowledge are (re)produced; it merely signals the problem - to treat it as an explanation often results in a teleological and one-dimensional understanding of social science as embedded in the symbolic power of the state. This tendency to see culture as the discursive shaping and serving of power, reducing it “to emanations of preconstituted power positions, trivializes culture and fails to recognize politics” (Ibid: 393). Historians of social science should focus, therefore, on the ethnographies of knowledge production, while brushing along, not against, its received categories. After all, if these categories are interesting at all, it is because they were the actors’ categories, decided upon in practice, in action, and not some categories imposed or projected by the historian onto the past.
Appendix I

Officials of Governmental Commissions

Poor Law Commission (1832-1834)

Eight Commissioners were appointed on March 17, 1832: Bishop of London, Bishop of Chester, W. Sturges Bourne, N. Senior, H. Bishop, H. Gawler, W. Coulson, J. Traill. In June 1832, the commissioner, H. Bishop, and the assistant commissioner, JW Cowell, conducted a successful trial investigation in Eastern England, and between July 1832 and January 1833 at least twenty-four additional Assistant Commissioners were appointed to tour the country and collect testimonies in more than 3,000 parishes and towns on behalf of the commission. They were: J. W. Cowell, H. G. Codd, E. Chadwick, W. Wylde, J. W. Pringle, E. C. Tufnell, J. J. Chapman, G. Henderson, A. Majendie D. O. P. Okeden, J. D. Tweedy, C. H. Maclean, C. P. illiers, S. Walcott, H. Stuart, A. J. Lewis, P. F. Johnston, H. Everett, D. C. Moylan, J. Wilson, R. W. Pilkington, H. Pilkington, W. Carmalt, A. Power, J. J. Richardson, J. Revans. Three secretaries were appointed to the commission: G. Taylor (first secretary), J. J. Froude and A. Bissett (assistant secretaries). Only the secretaries received salaries; the commissioners were unsalaried and their assistants were awarded only subsistence allowances of £1 a day in addition to their traveling expenses.

The final report was completed in March 1834 and presented to the House of Commons with the reports of the Assistant Commissioners and all other appendices in twelve massive folio volumes (Report from His Majesty’s Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws; HC [44] 1834, XXVII-XXXIX). Answers of local officials to the commission’s questionnaires were printed in Appendix B1, parts I-V (HC [44] 1834, XXX-XXXIV). In 1835, fourteen more volumes were added to the report with different

1 Source: Collinge, 1984.
appendixes of compiled evidence. A popular and relatively short summary of the report, containing 360 pages, was written by Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick and published in March 1834: *Royal Commission to Investigate the Poor Laws, Report on the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws* (See, PLC 1834).

**Factory Commission (1833)**

Three Commissioners were appointed in April 19, 1833 – Thomas Tooke, Edwin Chadwick and Thomas Southwood Smith – to investigate into the employment of Children in Factories in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain. They were assisted by twelve Factory inspectors, who were assigned to four districts to collect information in groups of three, each group composed of one commissioner with medical training (M) and two lay commissioners. Barry, D. (M), Mackintosh, R. J., and Stuart, j. investigated Scotland and North Ireland (called the Northern District); Loudon, C. (M) Drinkwater, J. E. and Power, A. investigated the North-Eastern District, which included Yorkshire, Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire; Hawkins, F. B. (M), Cowell, J. W. and Tufnell, E. C. investigated Lancashire; Spencer, J. (M) Horner, L., and Woolriche S. investigated a Western District, which included Birmingham, the Potteries and the West Midlands. Wilson, J. was appointed as secretary. Wilson, J. was appointed as secretary. The Commissioners, their assistance and the commission secretary were all awarded allowances of £200 for their services, in addition to their actual traveling expenses.

The Commission’s first report was presented to parliament on 25 June 1833 and issued with the evidence gathered from the four districts (HC [450] 1833, XX). A second report, accompanied by the reports of three of the 'medical' Commissioners, Hawkins, Barry and Loudon, followed on 13 July 1833 (HC [519] 1833, XXI). Statistical information and the replies to printed
queries issued by the commission were gathered together in a supplementary report dated 15 February 1834 (HC [167] 1834, XIX; HC [259] 1834, XX) (Collinge 1984).

**Constabulary Force Commission (1836-9)**

Three Commissioners – Charles Shaw Lefevre, Charles Rowan and Edwin Chadwick – were appointed in 1836 to inquire as to the best means of establishing an efficient constabulary force in the counties of England and Wales. They issued a first report on 27 March 1839 (HC [169] 1839, XIX), which dealt with “the evidence as to the state of crime . . . the case for the organisation of a police force and the principles of its organisation” (Ibid: 1). The report was also published as a Blue Book for public consumption by W. Clowes and Sons for Her Majesty's Stationery Office (see, Constabulary Force Report 1839). Evidence had been collected for a second report which was to treat of “the action of a police when organized,” but the second report was never completed. The Commissioners were unsalaried. Their Secretary, Samuel Redgrave, a Home Office Clerk, was awarded one payment of £300 in 1838.

**Children’s Employment Commission (1840-3)**

Four Commissioners were appointed on October 20, 1840 – Thomas Tooke, Robert Saunders, Thomas Southwood Smith, and Leonard Horner – to investigate into the “employment of the children of the poorer classes in mines and collieries, and in the various branches of trade and manufacture.” Horner and Saunders were also active factory inspectors at the time of their appointment. The four commissioners were assisted by twenty sub-commissioners (inspectors) who were assigned to specific districts in order to collect infraction and report back. Collinge
(1984) provides a list of the sub-commissioners, their date of appointment and their assigned districts: J. Mitchell, (appointed Nov. 19, 1840; send to South Staffordshire, Shropshire, Warwickshire, Leicestershire and South Durham); L. Stewart. (Nov. 19, 1840; Dorset, Devon, Somerset and Norwich); S. S. Scriven (19 Nov. 1840; North Staffordshire, Worcestershire and West Riding); J. C. Symons (19 Nov. 1840; West Riding and Cumberland); J. L. Kennedy (Nov. 19, 1840; South East Lancashire and North Cheshire); R. D. Grainger (Nov. 19, 1840; Birmingham, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and London); F. Roper, (Dec. 7, 1840; South Ireland ibid.); T. Tancred (Jan. 6, 1841; West Scotland), R. H. Franks (9 Jan. 1841; East Scotland and South Wales); A. Austin (Jan. 22, 1841; West and North Lancashire); J. R. Leifchild (Jan. 22, 1841; North Durham and Northumberland); W. R. Wood (Jan. 22, 1841; Bradford and Leeds); J. R. Martin (Feb. 12, 1841; North Ireland and Cumberland); R. H. Horne (Feb. 12, 1841; South Staffordshire) J. G. Burns, (Feb. 17, 1841; South East England). E. Waring (Feb. 20, 1841; Forest of Dean and South Gloucestershire). J. M. Fellows (Feb. 25, 1841; Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire); C. Barham (March 3, 1841; Devon and Cornwall); R. W. Jones (March 12, 1841; South Wales). H. H. Jones (March 13, 1841; North Wales)

Investigations were also conducted by the Commission Secretary, J. Fletcher (appointed Oct. 20, 1840) in Lancashire, Scotland and South England. Fletcher had previously served as a secretary for the Municipal Corporation Commission and for the Handloom Weavers Commission. Fletcher and two of the four commissioners who were not already recipient of salaries as factory inspectors were awarded allowances of £500; their assistances received a yearly salary of £300 and were awarded allowances of £100.

The Commissioners reported on the employment of children in mines and collieries on 21 April 1842 (HC [380] 1842, XV). The official report was accompanied by a popular short summary, containing 90 pages: The condition and treatment of the children employed in the mines and collieries of the United Kingdom (See, CEC 1842). The report, written by the commissioners for public consumption, was “Carefully Compiled From the Appendix of the First Report of the
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire Into this subject.” On 30 January 1843 the commissioners reported on the employment of children in trade and manufacture (HC [430] 1843, XIII). The reports of the Sub Commissioners were published as appendixes to the main reports (HC [381-2] 1842, XVI, XVII; HC [431-2] 1843, XIV, XV).

**Health of Towns Commission (1843-8)**

Thirteen Commissioners, appointed on May 1843, were commissioned to investigate the state of large towns and populous districts in England and Wales with reference to the causes of disease among the inhabitants, and into the best means of promoting and securing public health. The Commissioners were allocated into six districts and miscellaneous towns not included within the districts allotted to individual Commissioners: Duke of Buccleuch (Chair), D. B. Reid and Earl of Lincoln (North East district), R. A. Slaney (Wales), G. Graham and H. T. de la Beche (Bristol and Bath), Leon Playfair and Robert Owen (Lancaster); William T. Denison (Woolwich and Salisbury), J. R. Martin (Portsmouth and Norwich), J. Smith (Yorkshire), R. Stephenson and W. Cubitt (North Midlands). Although not a Commissioner or an official, Edwin Chadwick, the Secretary of the Poor Law Commission, was active at all stages of the investigation (Finer 1952: 231-7).

The commission issued its first report on 27 June 1844 (HC [572] 1844, XVII) and its second report, to which were appended the district reports, on 3 February 1845 (HC [602, 610] 1845 XVIII: 1, 299). The commission was kept in being until April 1848 so that salaries could be paid to its Secretary and a clerk, who were seconded to the office of the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests, the government official with responsibility for the introduction of public health legislation. Of the Commissioners, Buccleuch, the Lord Privy Seal, Lincoln, the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests, Slaney, a former Member of Parliament, and Graham, the Registrar-General, were offered no remuneration. Cubitt, whose professional commitments had
prevented his devoting many days to the work of the commission, declined to take any payment. The remaining eight Commissioners were remunerated at the rate of 3 guineas a day whilst actually employed on the business of the commission in London or in the country, and with the exception of Stephenson, were awarded an additional payment of 50 guineas for “special services”. The Secretary, Henry Hobhouse, received a salary of £600 payable until 1 April 1848. Chadwick was denied any remuneration, but was grudgingly allowed a sum of £180 for “expenses out of pocket.”
Appendix II

Table 1: Samuel Scriven’s Three-Class Classification of Factories by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>class 1</th>
<th>class 2</th>
<th>class 3</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fenton &amp; Lane Delph</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longton &amp; Lane End</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke-upon-Trent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanley</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longport</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burslem</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corbridge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longport</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>50.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: HC [431] 1843, XIV
**Appendix III**

**Table 2: Locations, Dates and Presidents of the NAPSS Annual Meetings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>12-17 Oct.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>11-16 Oct.</td>
<td>Lord John Russell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>10-15 Oct.</td>
<td>Anthony Ashley-Cooper (7th Earl of Lord Shaftesbury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>24-27 Sept.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>15-22 Aug.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>5-14 Jun.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>7-14 Oct.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>York</td>
<td>23-29 Sept.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>4-11 Oct.</td>
<td>Lord Henry Brougham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>3-10 Oct.</td>
<td>Anthony Ashley-Cooper (7th Earl of Lord Shaftesbury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Belfast</td>
<td>18-25 Sept.</td>
<td>Frederick Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood (Lord Dufferin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>29 Sept.-5 Oct.</td>
<td>Stafford Henry Northcote (1st Earl of Iddesleigh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>21-28 Sept.</td>
<td>Algernon Percy (Duke of Northumberland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>4-11 Oct.</td>
<td>John Pakington (Lord Hampton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>11-18 Sept.</td>
<td>Francis Napier (10th Lord Napier and 1st Lord Etrick)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>3-8 Oct.</td>
<td>Richard Monckton Milnes (Lord Houghton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>30 Sept.-7 Oct.</td>
<td>Archibald Primrose (Earl of Rosebery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Brighton</td>
<td>6-13 Oct.</td>
<td>Henry Austin Bruce (Lord Aberdare)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>11-18 Oct.</td>
<td>Charles Gordon (11th Marquess of Huntly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>19-26 Sept.</td>
<td>John Hamilton-Gordon (7th Earl of Aberdeen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>1-8 Oct.</td>
<td>James Fraser (Bishop of Manchester)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>6-13 Oct.</td>
<td>Donald James Mackay (11th Lord Reay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>3-8 Oct.</td>
<td>Thomas O'Hagan (Lord Chancellor of Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Huddersfield</td>
<td>3-10 Oct.</td>
<td>Richard Temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>17-24 Sept.</td>
<td>George Johan Shaw-Lefevre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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