Title
African History: The Rise and Decline of Academic Tourism

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9c82v5mx

Journal
Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 13(1)

ISSN
0041-5715

Author
Zeleza, Dr. Tiyambe

Publication Date
1983

Peer reviewed
AFRICAN HISTORY: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF ACADEMIC TOURISM

by

Tiyambe Zeleza

In 1976 Terence Ranger noted that there was "a crisis for African history arising out of the collapse of the consensus of the golden age,"¹ a complaint that has been echoed by others since then.² A year later Ranger warned further against the emerging "romanticisation about 'the people'"³ which was prompted by the criticisms of his work particularly made by Isaacman and Depelchin.⁴ Such sad and nostalgic reflections on a supposedly receding 'golden age' in the face of new historiographical trends, betray a crisis in liberal/nationalist historiography, of which Ranger was one of its major and ablest proponents.

In fact, it can be argued that the challenge posed to nationalist historiography by theories of underdevelopment and dependency, and similarly by the Marxist critiques of underdevelopment in recent years do not constitute a crisis in African historical scholarship, but rather they represent healthy and welcome attempts to ask more penetrating questions and to provide more satisfactory answers to problems that are central to a deeper understanding of African history and society.

The Nationalist/liberal tradition

It is beyond the scope of this paper to review in any great detail the complex subject of nationalist historiography, or other 'schools' in the study of African history which sprang from imperialist or anti-colonial traditions.⁵ Suffice it to say that the development of nationalist or Africanist historiography in the sixties was peculiarly fitted to an era marked by euphoria about the achievements of the nationalist movements and full of great expectations about the future. Cultural heroes were reclaimed from the Hegelian world of "natural man in his completely wild and untamed state," and glorious empires were exhumed from the Africa of the "Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit".⁶ It was discovered that Trevor Roper, the eminent Oxford don, had mistaken cultural resilience against colonial onslaught for the "gyrations of barbarous tribes."⁷ The 'native agitators' of colonial rulers and imperial ideologues became the founding fathers of the new nations, the 'modernising elites' in the sanitised vocabulary of the development economists and political scientists who were scurrying across Africa.
with briefcases full of advice.

Chiefs, spirit mediums, and valiant warriors who had resisted the imposition of colonial rule were finally absolved of slanderous charges that they were 'backward looking', inspired by atavistic instincts of their primitive past; they became the precursors, in fact, mentors, of the latter-day nationalists. Terms like 'native' and 'tribe' were finally hurled into the dustbin of imperialist history. The legitimacy of the nationalists was shored up, continuity in African history was re-established, and colonialism became just one other episode in the long history of Africa separating the idyllic and egalitarian past and the post-colonial future of nation-building and unity, development and equality, pride and dignity.

Thus at last anti-colonial writers and critics from Morel, Nevinson, Leys, to Hodgkin and Davidson lost their marginality; nationalist historiographers incorporated their critiques of colonial oppression and exploitation. The wandering prophets of Pan-Africanism finally reached the promised land. The age-old nationalist cry 'Africa for the Africans' no longer echoed in the wilderness but became a clarion call to students of African history and society to resurrect "African activity, African adaptations, African choice, African initiative" from the onerous weight of colonial oppression, overlaid by Eurocentric and sometimes racist imperialist historiography and ideology. It was a big challenge but few historians seemed unduly daunted by it. Their enthusiasm carried them through. National histories appeared. Colonial policies were demythologised as the inherently exploitative and oppressive nature of the 'colonial situation' came to be emphasised. Other subjects such as the study of messianic movements and independent churches, which in a bygone era would have raised the eye-brows of the imperial historian as a confirmation of the barbarism of the 'dark continent', were carefully analysed. Egypt was reclaimed and the Sphinx's negroid nose was finally reconstructed. The 'Hamitic factor' was questioned; the Zimbabwe ruins were after all built by the Rozwi and not Phoenicians. It was also shown that African traders had engaged in long-distance trade long before the introduction of so-called 'legitimate commerce' after the abolition of the European slave trade. And the scrolls of Timbuctu were resurrected from the expanding Sahara; the 'natives' had not, after all, been blissfully cursed with ignorance before Europe magnanimously undertook her 'civilising mission'. The African ancestry of the Pushkins was revealed. And it was proclaimed that Christianity had traversed Africa long before reaching Rome. Vansina brought oral tradition out of the jungle. African history finally achieved institutional respectability.
Ironically, anthropology, which had produced so many detailed studies of African societies long before the study of African history was even recognised, found itself on the defensive. It was charged that its functionalist-positivist paradigms exonerated, if not actually extolled, colonialism. But while the study of African history as a whole continued to thrive, from the early seventies nationalist historiography fell victim to its own enormous success: nobody could any longer seriously contest that Africa had its own history. Cabral’s impassioned call for the ‘inalienable right’ of Africans to have their own history, like other people, had been heed- ed. Students now began to ask new questions for which nationalist historiography, grounded as it was within the terrain of bourgeois social thought with its idealism, empiricism and liberalism, did not have the methodology to provide satisfactory answers.

Criticisms began to flow. It was charged that ‘African voices’, which nationalist historiography had reclaimed, were voices of the leaders, whether the kings of the pre-colonial era, the ‘new men’ of the early colonial period, or the nationalists who later became the rulers of the newly independent states. In short, nationalist historiography narrowly focussed on, and universalised, the activities and interests of traditional and modern ruling classes, and not the ‘people’ themselves, those beloved ‘masses’ of the nationalist demagogues. Nationalist historiography had proved all too susceptible to pressures to provide ‘cultural heroes’ and validation for myths of African classlessness propagated by African ruling classes in order to mask and legitimate their vested privileged interests. Students began to ask: What had happened to all those notorious African slave traders? And how did kings come to be kings, anyway?

Nationalist historiography had been too preoccupied with showing that Africa had produced organised polities, monarchs and cities just like Europe, to probe deeper into the historical realities of African material and social life before the advent of colonialism. As for the colonial period nationalism was made so ‘overdetermining’ that only faint efforts were made to provide systematic, comprehensive and penetrating analyses of imperialism, its changing forms, and their impact, not to mention the processes of local class formation and class struggles. By ignoring these themes nationalist historiography over-stated its case: the overall framework in which the ‘heroic’ African ‘initiatives’ were taken was lost, and, in addition, African societies were homogenised into classless utopias.

Thus nationalist historiography had failed to provide its own ‘problematic’, or at any rate, it took over questions as
they were posed by imperialist historiography; to the latter's postulation of African backwardness and passivity, nationalist historiography counterposed with notions of African genius and initiative. In all this 'politics' was emphasised at the expense of economic struggles for survival through the centuries. As the euphoria of independence disappeared into thin air with the failure of the much-vaunted 'political kingdom' to deliver much in terms of material and social progress, apart from flags and national anthems, students began to ask why Africa remained desperately poor despite its enormous wealth. Decolonisation was re-examined. It was pronounced 'false'. The 'radical pessimism' of Fanon, which in 1971 Ranger had correctly predicted would become the main adversary of the 'Africanist historian', and not the "discarded colonial school", was vindicated. Nationalism began losing some of its glitter. Conspiracy theories gained currency; the colonial powers had made 'deals' with the nationalist leaders to perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the 'masses'. Neo-colonialism became the new catchword. Nkrumah was praised for his foresight.

This 'wind of change' in African historical circles soon crossed the Zambezi and liberal historians in the so-called 'White' South fell from their cocoons of 'splendid isolation'. From the 1920s when liberal historiography became increasingly dominant in English-speaking universities in South Africa the country was seen through the prism of race and culture, and its history was interpreted as a series of racial and cultural interaction between the Afrikaners, Africans and the British in the context of a changing and modernising economy.

Liberal historiography elevated racial stereotyping and moralising into a doctrine. Afrikaners became the eternal villains, the collective 'evil genius' behind the development of the vicious racial system of apartheid. In contrast, the British peeped from the pages of South African history as an enlightened people blessed with racial tolerance. That the British settlers developed similar racist attitudes towards Africans was conveniently forgotten. Africans, on the other hand, appeared generally innocent, in fact, they were reduced to passive lumps of human clay. Their herculean struggles against the settlers and their expanding colonial frontiers were left unacknowledged.

This idealistic approach of liberal historiography to social relations and the racial system was partly based on the assumption that capitalism is inherently rational, efficient and non-ascriptive (i.e., 'colour blind') so that over time the development of capitalism in South Africa would marginalise the prevailing archaic and irrational racial attitudes. In short, liberal historiography preached that the relations be-
tween economic development and the system of white supremacy were essentially antagonistic and contradictory because of the liberalising and integrative nature of capitalism, industrial capitalism in particular. The liberal historians simply failed to see that South Africa's immense and rapid economic growth was not accompanied by any relaxation in the racial system. On the contrary, rapid economic growth, for instance after the Second World War, has gone hand in hand with a more rigid application of Apartheid and a widening social gulf between the races. The thesis that apartheid and capitalism are incompatible led to the illusion that apartheid would die a natural, if slow, death by the operation of economic forces. In short, it bred reformism.

By the turn of the seventies, liberal historiography had come under severe attack. Radical historians began arguing that not only was apartheid compatible with, but "has actually been an integral, functional component of South African capitalism and economic growth". Hence, revolution and not reform, would destroy apartheid. These historians started looking more systematically at the unsung heroes and hidden processes behind the history of South Africa. Africans lost their invisibility and their resistance to colonial conquest, and adaptation to an expanding capitalism, was acknowledged; the formation, expansion, impoverishment and exploitation of the peasantry and working classes began to be analysed; the pivotal role of the mining revolution in the late 19th century in the transformation of the political economies of Southern Africa was underlined; and political struggles among the various white groups and between them and Africans began to be seen in their bewildering complexity. Thus at last, South African history moved away from magic political dates, like the so-called 'great-watershed' of 1948. Settler colonialist perspectives, values and myths were exploded; 'lusotropicalism' in the Portuguese colony of Angola, for example, was exposed as a cruel hoax that it was. Class analysis was no longer shunned like a deadly virus. Themes of 'interaction' went out of the window and in came analyses of the concrete realities of racial, national and class struggles over land, labour and political power. Apartheid and capitalism were integrated and liberal historiography gave way to the history of South Africa's "racially structured capitalism."

Liberal historiography in Southern Africa, therefore, was very much like nationalist or Africanist historiography to the 'black north' in that both tended to be highly empiricist, were idealistic in their preoccupations, and suffered from bourgeois or petty-bourgeois biases in various degrees of adulteration. It is significant that both began feeling the winds of discontent at the turn of the seventies. By then theoretical questions, practical concerns and the vagaries of time were coal-
escing into a profound critique of nationalist/liberal historiography. Its practitioners mournfully declared that there was a general crisis in the study of African history as a whole. There was never any crisis (Editorial emphasis). Nationalist/liberal historiography had simply lost its 'hegemony' over African historical scholarship. Africa had now been subsumed into the 'Third World'. Gunder Frank was being discovered and imported into Africa. The continent's enduring poverty had finally become underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment and Modes of Production

Notions of underdevelopment and dependency developed out of dissatisfaction with prevailing bourgeois descriptions, analyses and prescriptions for Latin America, as well as Marxist ideas about 'backward' countries. Orthodox development theory saw underdevelopment as an original or traditional state. Consequently, the underdeveloped countries could only wrest themselves out of this state by passing through a number of Rostovian stages, acquiring Parsonian value systems, and keeping their doors open to 'free' trade, and the diffusion of Western investment and technology. Meanwhile, Marxists still clung tenaciously to Marx's optimistic prognosis that the expansion of capitalism through trade and investment would eventually break down all pre-capitalist modes of production and bring about capitalist economic development in the image of Western Europe. Contrary to the 'progressist' projections of both theories, however, the 'Third World' failed to break out of underdevelopment.

Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which was formed in 1948, led the challenge against conventional theories of international trade and economic development. The ECLA showed how the international division of labour was not a natural outcome of world trade, and that it brought greater benefits to the centre than the periphery. The commission advocated the use of a structuralist and historical perspective in order to understand underdevelopment and devise solutions for its eradication. But the failure of the import-substitution industrialisation model of the ECLA encouraged writers on Latin American underdevelopment, like Gunder Frank, to seek for more radical analyses and solutions. The reformulation of ECLA analyses and strategies almost occurred simultaneously with attempts by the Latin American left to reconceptualise obstacles facing capitalist development, particularly industrialisation, in the periphery as a result of pervasive 'feudal-imperialist' alliances. It was left to Baran to provide the first systematic analysis of underdevelopment from a Marxist perspective. He insisted that Western development had historically taken place at the
expense of underdeveloped countries, and that the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries were profoundly inimical to economic development in the periphery. All these critiques were united by a common pessimism regarding the possibility of capitalist development in the periphery. Socialism, broadly and variously defined, was seen as the only real alternative to perpetual underdevelopment and dependency.

Fanon’s radical pessimism no longer seemed so radical or strange anymore; it assumed axiomatic familiarity. The dependency school found ready and eager students of poor old Africa, impoverished by centuries of imperialist exploitation. Frank’s grand reconstruction and periodisation of Latin American history was repeated for Africa by Amin, Wallerstein and Rodney. It was demonstrated that from the time of the Atlantic slave trade, to the era of formal colonisation, and, finally, the post-independent period, the history of Africa, like that of Latin America, was characterised by a constant siphoning off of ‘social surplus’ from Africa to the West through numerous mechanisms, principally the operation of unequal exchange, which was a product of an asymmetrical international division of labour. In short, the underdevelopment of the periphery and development of the centre was constantly being reproduced through an interminable satellite—metropolis chain, in which the surplus generated at each stage is successively drawn to the centre. African or Third World underdevelopment was, therefore, simply one side of the same coin of Western development. The dualist models of modernisation theory were buried; the world had become a single integrated unit. Capitalism attained universal omnipresence, and the ‘development of underdevelopment’ assumed a Sisyphean inevitability.

For Samir Amin accumulation on a world scale involves a continuous process of primitive accumulation in the periphery for the benefit of the centre. He argues that, unlike expanded normal reproduction, the mechanism of primitive accumulation is unequal exchange, that is the exchange of products of unequal value, or rather whose prices of production are unequal. The dynamic of unequal exchange is rooted in the very structure of linkages between socio-economic formations of peripheral capitalism and of capitalism at the centre. Unlike the latter, capitalist formations on the periphery are characterised by unevenness of productivity between sectors, disarticulation and extraversion of the economic system, and domination from outside. The combined and cumulative effects of these factors create the conditions for the drainage of surplus to the centre, thereby reinforcing and reproducing the commercial, financial, and technological dependence of underdeveloped countries on the centre. Arghiri Emmanuel, on the other hand, narrows unequal exchange to ‘an unequal rewarding of factors’, notably the ‘labour factor’, between ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ countries. In
other words, wage disparities, even for the same productivity between poor and rich countries are at the root of unequal exchange. Thus the periphery is drained of much of the social value of its labour. International working class solidarity thereby undermined. Henceforth, the proletariat of the periphery takes over from their privileged metropolitan brethren the role of a vanguard in the global socialist revolution. Underdevelopment finds its historic mission. It is the grave digger of capitalism.

Wallerstein tries to systematise dependency notions of 'incorporation', 'transfer of surplus', 'specialisation' into a 'metatheoretical' construct with which to explain the origin of capitalist development and underdevelopment and to locate the mainspring of their subsequent evolutions. He sees capitalism as a trade-based world division of labour in which a unique pattern of labour usage characterises the core (free, skilled labour), and the periphery (coerced, unskilled labour). 'When labour is everywhere free', he contends, 'we shall have socialism'. According to Wallerstein, therefore, the development of capitalist production, which facilitated the growing division of labour, was itself made possible by the regional specialisation of methods of labour control. Capitalism is depicted as a system of labour rationalisation and of unequal exchange. In short, Wallerstein's world system is a global Parsonian monster in which the peripheries are assigned specific economic roles, and all they can do is jockey either for semi-peripheral or core-status, until the system self-destruct sometime in the 'twenty-first or twenty-second century.' Consequently, in Wallerstein's world system social struggles are spectacularly trivial, and historical processes are reduced to a series of ahistorical functionalist games of system maintenance. Pessimism finally matures into fatalism. Fanon is turned on his head.

Marxist critics charge that Wallerstein, Amin, Emmanuel Frank, and others who construct grand teleologies of development and underdevelopment mislocate the dynamic of capital accumulation by concentrating on exchange relations and not production relations (class structure, class struggle). The 'external' determination of dependency is so overemphasised that the role of 'internal' structures in reproducing dependency is obscured. Thus set against the 'unequal exchange of the underdevelopmentalists, is the 'comparative advantage' of the development economists, so ferociously attacked by the former; both dwell on trade at the expense of production itself, disregard classes which emerge from the productive process, the ensuing class struggles, and the complex and contradictory effects of those struggles on the social formations of the so-called peripheral capitalist societies. This is partly because, despite appearances to the contrary, underde-
development analysis was focussed almost exclusively on the economic terrain. In short, underdevelopment writers miserably failed to delineate the specificity of the political in the reproduction of the economic conditions of underdevelopment.

By ‘blaming’ the metropoles and international capital for poverty, backwardness and stagnation in the periphery, the local ruling classes are absolved, thereby misdirecting political struggle. Indeed, the tendency to portray the local bourgeoisie as 'lumpen', 'comprador', or 'auxiliary', incapable of rational accumulation and rational political activity, forces political activists to choose between immediate socialist revolution or permanent state of capitalist underdevelopment. One leads to adventurism, the other to complacent pessimism. Moreover, dependency notions of unequal exchange and international specialisation undermine international working class solidarity and encourage 'third worldist' ideology.

Yet the kaleidoscopic reality of the Third World strains any attempt to homogenise that world into a 'periphery', to see their history unfolding according to the lockstep of a predetermined Rostovian-like pattern. For Warren, the chances of successful capitalist development, that is, industrialisation, are quite good for a number of major underdeveloped countries. In fact, "substantial progress in capitalist industrialisation has already been achieved" in these countries. Imperialism is actually declining as capitalism in the periphery grows. Reversing his earlier position Leys is moved to say that the core-periphery framework is nothing but a 'polemical inversion' of well-known "simplistic pairings." Swainson asserts that the much-abused national bourgeoisie is not merely an "important class of intermediaries for international capital." Independence does matter. wonders whether the characteristics of dependent economies are not characteristics of capitalism in general since they are not exclusive to the former. Is it not, Palma asks, confusing a socialist critique of capitalism with the analysis of the obstacles of capitalism in the Third World to talk of "growth without development?" Kay provocatively remarks that "capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough." And Cooper admonishes: "dissecting complex problems with concepts like underdevelopment, incorporation, unequal exchange, and core-periphery relations is rather like performing brain surgery with an ax: the concepts cut, but messily." Nabudere simply concludes that underdevelopment theorists are propagating petty-bourgeois ideology.

By the late seventies, therefore, dependency theory was beginning to lose its novelty. Like nationalist historiography before it, it had 'proved' its case: development and underde-
velopment are interconnected. Africa or the Third World had been integrated into the capitalist world system and in the process her poverty had lost some of its exoticism.

Notions of dependent capitalist development began to be heard of. Writers like Cardoso tried to marry some of the dependency perspectives on unequal exchange, the changing international division of labour, and uneven development, with Marxist concerns with accumulation within the sphere of production, the processes of class formation and class struggle. The construction of a mechanical - formal theory of Third World underdevelopment in which the dependent character of these economies is the hub on which the whole analysis of underdevelopment turns was being replaced by dialectical analyses of historical processes; the latter being conceived of as the result of struggles between classes and groups that define their interests and values in the process of the expansion of a mode of production with all its contradictions and disjunctions.

An increasing number of writers have therefore tried to advance beyond the ubiquitous and homogeneous capitalism of dependency theory by positing the concept of 'articulation of modes of production', whereby pre-capitalist modes of production are articulated in their diverse relations with the capitalist mode. Thus according to this paradigm the introduction of capitalism does not eliminate pre-capitalist modes, but re-shapes them. In other words, pre-capitalist modes of production continue to exist, but are progressively subordinated to capital through a contradictory process of destruction, preservation and transformation. The treacherous marshland of dualist theories and dependency's universal capitalism is thereby carefully skirted.

But to talk of articulation of modes of production, presupposes a general conception of a mode of production and theories of particular modes of production, which is by no means an easy task. Hindess and Hirst see a mode of production as "an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production," with 'relations of production' here referring to the mode of the appropriation of the surplus product. Bernstein and Depelchin correctly insist, however, that:

the categories of social relations (economic, political, ideological) and the relations between these categories cannot be theorised generally in the concept of mode of production itself, but vary according to each mode of production. . . . The determinations linking the categories of social relations with each
other and with the productive forces, hence giving them their unity in the mode of production as a structured whole, are expressed dynamically through the concept of the laws of motion of the mode. 45

A mode of production, they continue, is only concretised through the social formation in which the mode is manifested. The term 'social formation' may be used, according to Balibar, either as "an empirical concept designating the object of a concrete analysis, i.e., an existence: England in 1860, France in 1870, Russia in 1917, etc., or an abstract concept replacing the ideological notion of 'society' and designating the object of the science of history insofar as it is a totality of instances articulated on the basis of a determinate mode of production". 46

While the capitalist mode of production can be specified without difficulty, the same cannot be done with pre-capitalist modes of production, particularly in Africa. Presently, virtually nobody talks of the stage of 'primitive communism', or sees 'feudalism' and the 'Asiatic mode of production' behind the rise of states in precolonial Africa. 47 Coquery - Vidrovitch's attempt to define an 'African mode of production', based on control of long-distance trade by a patriarchal ruling class, has also been called into question. Why should relations of distribution be dominant over the more basic relations of production? 48 Attempts to construct the 'lineage', 'tributary', or even 'slave' mode of production also tend to suffer from their own problems. For instance, in the 'lineage' mode kinship units play a key role so that the term 'kinship' is taken as a given, while it actually needs to be explained, or rather problematised. 49 The 'tributary' mode, on the other hand, has a pronounced bias towards exchange relations and not the productive system. Lastly, it would be difficult to point to many societies, if any, in Africa where other modes of production were subordinated to the requirements of reproducing the slave mode. 50 Part of the problem lies in trying to construct a single mode or few distinctive modes of production for the diverse and complex historical reality that is Africa. However, the solution does not lie in chasing modes of production behind every tree in Africa's so-called jungles.

But difficulties in labelling pre-capitalist modes of production do not warrant Kitching's hasty conclusion that it is futile, for example, to see Kenya as a social formation of articulated modes of production, rather than "a satellite of the world capitalist mode of production." 51 That is the ghost of Frank stalking us. Equally unpersuasive are attempts to talk of the colonial capitalist mode of production (CCMP). The CCMP was advanced in order to capture the specificity of
imperialism during the colonial era. However, the unanswered question is: can one then talk of a post-colonial mode of production? Or is the CCMP a transitional mode from pre-capitalist modes to capitalism?

Undoubtedly the concept of articulation is better equipped than concepts of colonial capitalist modes of production to analyse African societies during the era of colonialism and after, despite some of the aforementioned difficulties. Concretely, articulation involved, according to Berman and Lonsdale,

extracting surplus product from and/or forcing labour into capitalist or quasi-capitalist formations . . . . The form of articulation varied according to the particular character of capitalist penetration, the nature of indigenous modes of production, and the local ecology and resource endowment. The resulting variations in the subjugation and transformation of local societies and the degree to which capitalist forms of production were introduced also determined the differing patterns of class formation within and between colonies.

The process of articulation is accompanied by violence, certainly during the phase of 'primitive colonial accumulation', when the capitalist mode of production is being introduced.

All too often, however, articulation is conceived solely as a continuous process of interaction through which pre-capitalist modes pay the costs of reproduction of the labour force. "Yet in recent years," Mafeje pointedly tells us, "we have witnessed in South Africa the dumping of unwanted labour in the reserves, not to reproduce their labour-power but to perish." This is a sobering reminder that at one stage in the process of articulation, precapitalist modes of production can be used to 'subsidise' capital accumulation, while at another to provide dumping grounds for the 'rejects' of capitalism, especially the unemployed.

We are back to stages. Rey distinguishes three stages of Articulation, namely:

1. an initial link in the sphere of exchange, where interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist mode;
2. capitalism 'takes root', subordinating the pre-capitalist mode but still making use of it;
3. (not yet reached in the Third World) the total disappearance of the pre-capitalist mode, even in agriculture.\textsuperscript{57}

In essence, Rey's "periodisation of stages of articulation is rooted in capitalism's increasing (and eventually total) ability to look after itself."\textsuperscript{58} Articulation assumes unilinear progression. In reaction to this, others insist that it is crucial to emphasise that different capitals at various times require different things from pre-capitalist societies, so that there should be no "bland talk of 'capitalism' doing or being this and that, in relation to other modes of production."\textsuperscript{59} But focus can also be shifted so much to these fractions of capital that we lose sight of the articulation of the capitalist modes as a whole with pre-capitalist modes.

The point to bear in mind when discussing articulation is that it is a process in which the capitalist mode establishes its domination over the non-capitalist modes. But the process of articulation is too complex to be interpreted mechanically as referring to sharply defined and sequentially structured stages. Moreover, lest modes of production become actors in themselves endowed with their own inexorable logic, it should be underlined that this process essentially involves a struggle between classes these modes define. The concept of articulation of modes of production, therefore, provides us with a framework for analysing the historical specificity of different social formations according to their pre-capitalist nature, the forms of capitalist penetration, their dynamic and degree, and the resulting articulation.

Class Analysis and Social Classes

In those heady days immediately after independence African politicians, bureaucrats and academics declared that Africa was classless. Consequently, for them class analysis represented slavish importation of 'foreign ideology', if not something actually worse. They gloried in Africa's uniqueness, her nationalist achievements, and her natural genius for 'socialist harmony'. Western intellectual tourists (Editorial emphasis), on the other hand, brought up on a fulsome diet of bourgeois social science, refused to see Africa in class terms either. They ranged from those who simply contended that, unlike Europe, African societies have not 'developed' enough to generate distinctive and antagonistic social classes, or that the 'elites' and the workers are numerically so small that neither can constitute a coherent stratum, to those who asserted that 'tribalism' or ethnic particularism undermines the growth of class consciousness and class-based action, and that since the great majority of Africans reside as an undifferentiated mass
in the rural areas, it is meaningless to take class stratification as the overall basis of such societies. Under such circumstances, some argued, it is better to use the theory of cultural or social pluralism. Others proposed that developments and problems in Africa could only be meaningfully discussed in terms of modernisation, nation-building and integration.

But denying the existence of social classes in Africa because they do not exhibit the same subjective characteristic as those in Europe is "to place concepts in a historical deep freeze, embalmed around a particular historical conjuncture, conditioned by an image of an ideal or pure form of the social object." That is not history. The fixation with numbers in the 'elite - mass' dichotomy is also unhistorical and betrays a static conception of social reality.

As for the cultural determinism of pluralism it simply obfuscates the underlying complex forces behind so many seemingly 'tribal' conflicts in Africa. As those writers, who tend to reject the term of 'tribe' in favour of the less evocative 'ethnicity'-have shown, judging by the generally acceptable characteristics of a tribal society, such societies have been extinct for a very long time indeed. Certainly the impact of the colonial political economy in reshaping African societies cannot be ignored. Some argue that, in fact, colonialism not only created certain 'tribes' out of the blue, but it also politicised ethnicity because people from different ethnic groups had to compete with each other on a national plane for work, land, education and opportunities that would give them security. After independence ethnic consciousness or 'tribalism' was further promoted by the leaders as a mask of class privilege and exploitation. Thus tribalism is 'unreal', it merely serves an ideological function. 'Tribalism' cannot, then, be used as an analytic unit, for it needs to be explained itself. In short, it has been argued that 'tribalism' does not represent a primordial political force in Africa, rather it developed in response to imperialism in the context of articulated modes of production, in which certain aspects of pre-capitalist modes of production are reinforced and perpetuated, and that it is an integral part of the class struggle in the ideological sphere. Far from being Africa's 'natural condition', therefore, the ethnic 'interpellation' (together with the national 'interpellation'), as Saul puts it, is spawned by internal class contradictions as well as the centre-periphery contradiction.

Thus by the 1970s the aura of nationalist unity had faded, 'African socialism' had sunken deeper into the morass of confusion and ignoble failure, and dependency and Marxist perspectives were breaking the barricades of liberal - bour-
geois scholarship in African and Africanist intellectual circles, so that class analysis of African societies was no longer contemptuously dismissed or dreaded.

New lines of battle were drawn. One group borrowed from bourgeois social categories and talked of 'social stratification', in which class is determined by behavioural patterns; indeed, it becomes trivialised as one aspect, and a descriptive category, of social stratification subject to empirical observation. No wonder that after using this framework, some could make such banal conclusions as "most contemporary African societies are 'one-class-societies'," or divide African societies into 'elite' or 'middle' and 'lower' classes on the basis of their status and acquisition of 'civilised', i.e., 'European', privileges and values. The second group consisted of those who see class in a materialist sense which poses class in terms of the social relations of production. Unfortunately, some of them took Marxian categories of advanced capitalist formations and mechanically transposed them to African societies thereby turning these societies into crude caricatures of themselves.

In particular, one began to hear debates about 'peasantisation' and 'proletarianisation'. What is a peasantry or a working class? Can one even realistically talk of 'peasants' or 'workers' in Africa? Who are more reactionary or progressive - peasants or workers? Is there a peasant mode of production? Are African workers 'labour aristocrats'?

For a long time many writers had resisted calling Africa's rural masses 'peasants' and preferred to stick to terms like 'husbandsmen', 'rural capitalists', or even 'protopeasants'. As for those who dared to call them peasants they tended to define peasant in cultural and sociological terms, so that they saw peasants essentially as 'primitive' cultivators living in self-sufficient, kin-based communities which had been made dependent in various ways upon external structures and forces. Their critics insisted on drawing a distinction between 'peasant' and 'subsistence' economies on the basis that peasants produce primarily for the market and not subsistence. But this distinction was found to be overdrawn; peasants, some argued, produce partly for an external market and partly for their own consumption, so that they are subject to both external incentives and controls and local requirements and sanctions.

Saul and Woods tried to provide a more systematic conception of African peasants and carry the debate further. They argued that a peasantry, which consists of people who enjoy access to a portion of land and use the family household or homestead as a production - consumption unit, can only be
understood within a wider political economy and in the context of historical change. They also stressed that in the process of their development peasants become internally differentiated. For this reason, and the fact that the circumstances and degree of incorporation of African societies into the world capital system differed, one can talk of African peasantry, which include pastoralists. Subsequent writers elaborated further distinctions between 'poor', 'middle' and 'rich' peasants, culminating in Bundy's important study of the South African peasantry. Peasants had come a long way; they were now not only internally differentiated, they were also structurally distinguished from pre-colonial agriculturalists, capitalist farmers, and the rural proletariat. And in the case of South Africa, they had risen and fallen.

Debate now centred on how to conceptualise relations between peasants and capital. On the one hand, there are those who, like Bernstein, argue that the production and reproduction of peasants is determined by the predominance of the world market, capital and the state. Consequently, "peasants have been located . . . within capitalist relations of production mediated through forms of household production . . . in this way peasants are posed as 'wage labour equivalents'." In other words, peasants are 'semi-proletarians' producing surplus value for capital, but located outside the direct labour process. It is therefore fallacious, according to this view, to talk of a 'peasant economy' or a 'peasant mode of production' articulating with a dominant capitalist mode. But these controls Bernstein discusses "circle around the point of production rather than enter it directly." Moreover, to 'proletarianise' a peasant who is not divorced from his means of production, land, and does not sell his labour power as a commodity for a wage, is to fly in the face of Marxist theory and assume automatic worker-peasant class unity instead of possibilities of popular class alliances.

Other writers, therefore, contend that "the contradiction between peasants and capital is a contradiction between different modes of production, and between classes within different modes of production, not between antagonistic classes within one mode of production." In short, as Boesen puts it, peasant agriculture is "theoretically . . . a pre-capitalist mode of production, while historically it exists within capitalist formations." That is almost constipated articulation smelling of dualism. Hyden has, indeed, gone so far as to claim that African peasants, unlike those in Latin America and Asia, have not been sufficiently made dependent on the market and the dominant social classes. They have the power to abandon commodity production and return to subsistence and self-reproduction. While this might be a useful corrective against those who overemphasise the 'rule of the market' in
shaping peasant economic choices, Hyden's notion of an 'uncaptured peasantry' looks like modernisation theory in a new dress. The ability of peasants to resist, including partial withdrawal from commodity relations, is fundamentally a manifestation of the perennial struggle between direct producers and capital over conditions of labour in the sphere of production and over the expropriation and distribution of the product, and therefore does not imply an assertion of peasant 'autonomy' from the dominant capitalist mode of production.

According to Cooper these seemingly endless debates have partly been caused by the fact that the concept of a peasantry is rather ambiguous. Unlike concepts of capitalist and lineage production, for example, the concept of a peasantry does not "explain how work is controlled, how surplus is appropriated, and how a system reproduces itself." Be that as it may, the fact still remains that furious debates have also raged on how to characterise other social classes in Africa, so that ultimately it is the whole domain of African studies which is in search of new directions, just as the continent itself is convulsed by deepening political and social struggles out of which a new future will be born.

Before the sixties when serious research interest in African labour began, the field was dominated by reports of colonial governments, and visiting ILO and ICFTU missions, and movements sympathetic to colonial peoples, like the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Their publications were concerned with either providing colonial governments with data on the supply, control, cost and productivity of labour, or, as in the case of the latter, they sought to effect policy and practical changes in colonial labour policies and conditions.

It would be misleading, of course, to assume that the subject of African labour was confined to institutional studies. One only has to recall those beleaguered humanitarian critics of forced labour, who tried to analyse the fate of people moving from the 'traditional' African world into the 'modern' Western one. Despite their obvious sensitivity to the gross abuses of colonialism, they offered no more than a liberal critique of capitalism, without questioning the underlying exploitative and greedy property relations inherent in capitalism.

As research interest in African labour blossomed after decolonisation a number of approaches became apparent. There were those who donned anthropological glasses to interpret social change, included the labour process, so that they tended to have a truncated vision of such processes. Instead of understanding the system of labour migration as an outcome of articulated modes of production, they often saw it as a product
of the economic 'irrationality' of Africans, or put more politely, the resistance of traditional culture to 'modernity'. Many concluded, therefore, that Africans in wage employment were better described as 'target-workers', 'lumpen-proletarians', 'worker-peasants', or simply 'migrants', but not as workers. Not surprisingly, these writers were preoccupied with showing the importance, or lack of it, of 'tribalism' in African trade unionism.

Another school saw African trade unions largely as 'ali institutions encouraged by misguided colonial officials, or founded by political agitators and manipulated by trade unions'. In such studies industrial relations were reduced to a set of formal relationships between unions, employers, and the governments, with little reference to the social and economic context in which they operated. Thus these formal-descriptive studies, which were written from Eu centric perspectives and underlined by conservative biases, were long on factual descriptions and short on analysis of structural determinants of the labour process.

Finally, there were those who turned their sights to the institutional links between trade unions and political parties. Some emphasised the role of trade unions in mediating between urban 'elite nationalism' and rural 'mass nationalism'. Others saw trade unions as mere appendages of nationalist parties. Berg and Butler noted the failure of the labour movements "to become politically involved during the colonial period, their limited political impact when they did become involved and their restricted role after independence." Workers' struggles were declared 'economistic', devoid of political content.

Out of this bleak horizon, the outlines of radical labour scholarship began to emerge. Students questioned whether colonial labour policy drawn by officials supposedly walking a thin line between economic policy objectives and morality was the primary source of change in the labour system. What about the 'grass roots', the role of the workers themselves in fashioning the terrain within which capital and class struggles operated? Few saw the need anymore to attribute strikes and other forms of labour militancy to cultural and psychological dysfunctions resulting from 'detribalisation', or to outside influences. Now labour history was analysed in terms of under-development, and working class formation was periodised in the context of the changing conditions of peripheral capitalism.

But no sooner had these advances been made than the 'labour aristocracy' thesis reared its ugly head and threatened to rob African workers of their newly found progressive role.
Fanon's categorical dismissal of the African working class as a privileged segment of the colonial population and therefore abysmally lacking in revolutionary potential, 94 was taken up and popularised by Saul and Arrighi, 95 who argued that this 'labour aristocracy' of skilled workers, mostly groomed by relatively high-paying multinational corporations, is divorced from the rest of the working class and develops economic and political interests essentially congruent with those of the national bourgeoisie.

The obscene disparities in the living standards of workers and the national bourgeoisie are too obvious for there to be any congruence of interests between them. But even if the upper echelons of the working class had "one foot in the steeply rising embourgeoisement ladder," political attitudes cannot simply be reduced mechanically to standards of living. It is important to emphasise that the workers and the national bourgeoisie occupy essentially antagonistic positions in the production process. Moreover, it has to be recognised that neither the colonial nor the neo-colonial economic system can deliver payoffs to the working class as much as is sometimes assumed by the advocates of this rather absurd thesis.

The notion that workers constitute a privileged group in relation to the urban unemployed and the rural peasantry is "a classic example of the 'displacement' of the 'primary contradiction' between interests of the exploiting and exploited categories on to a 'derived' contradiction between exploited classes." 97 It is not helpful to concentrate on the expropriation of surplus from the peasant sector by the urban-based industrial sector and, therefore, to envisage the exploitation of the peasantry by all social classes engaged in the latter sector. That is a simplistic juxtaposition of two modes of production when in fact there are articulated modes in which the capitalist one is dominant. The simple fact of the matter is that workers do not receive crumbs from the exploitation of the peasantry. They are themselves exploited. Moreover, there are numerous mechanisms through which income is transferred from workers to the so-called 'informal' sector and the rural peasantry.

In an age of imperialism when skilled workers in the periphery, as argued by Amin and Emmanuel, receive rewards that are lower than those paid at the centre for the same productivity, serious questions are raised as to the analytical and descriptive validity of the term labour aristocracy used for workers under dependent capitalism. 98 Certainly no state, whether colonial or post-colonial, would feel threatened by a thesis that provides a rationale for holding down wages. Saul himself later came to the view that "the African working class should not be prematurely labelled . . . [because] the role
of this class is far from being frozen by history or by any internal logic of the current African socio-economic structure."

However, it does not follow that we should regard a working class as homogeneous and ignore its internal structure or differentiation as the editors of African Labour History urge us to do, for that would be portraying an imaginary and ahistorical working class, and we would fail to understand all the determinations of working class consciousness and action. And this consciousness should not be viewed as lying at the end of a tunnel of proletarianisation as has been the tendency in much writing on African labour history, both 'conventional' and 'radical'. In order to understand the full political significance of labour action we need to focus on both overt and covert forms of working class protest, manifestations of militancy and the weight of historic defeats, and no less important, the character of the state.

Sandbrook's attempt to analyse the relationship between labour and the post-colonial state by using the concept of 'clientelist politics' is unsatisfactory. It cannot be overemphasised that "contemporary patron-client relationships are themselves contingent upon the established hierarchies of a neo-colonial economy [so that] to propose a description based on clientelism as an alternative to class analysis... is patent nonsense as soon as one moves from the most limited micro-analysis to ask questions about the system as a whole and in whose interest it works." There is need to conceptualise the state more rigorously because of its centrality in the political struggle, the arena in which a social class is transformed from an almost theoretical category of class-in-itself, to a living and self-conscious class-for-itself.

The capitalist state acts as a 'factor of cohesion' for capital's diverse and competing fractions in order to protect capitalist relations of production as a whole. In other words, the state tends to have 'relative autonomy' from the dominant class forces, at least at the level of political practice, so as to secure reproduction of conditions of capitalist production and to ensure the system's legitimation and hegemony over the dominated classes. Thus, the contradictions of capitalist production, that is accumulation and class struggle, are reproduced or 'condensed' within the state, thereby necessitating the existence of the 'relative autonomy' of the state at the structural or institutional level. It also follows that the state constitutes the point where the transformation of structures takes place.

Colonial and post-colonial states are variants or subtypes of the state in the advanced capitalist formations, but they
have an even more complex task as the 'factor of cohesion' in social formations based on articulated modes of production. As Berman and Lonsdale put it:

The colonial state indeed straddled not one but two levels of contradiction: between the metropole and the colony as a whole as well as within the colony itself. It therefore bore a dual character: it was at once a subordinate agent in its restructuring of local production to meet metropolitan demand, yet also the local factor of cohesion over the heterogeneous, fragmented and contradictory forces jostling within. This very Dual Mandate defined the dilemmas of the colonial state.\textsuperscript{105}

Hence, the 'centrality' of the state in colonial societies in the organisation of the economy and its authoritarian tendencies compared to states in advanced capitalist formations. Needless to say, the state took different forms in different colonial formations, say in settler colonies like South Africa and non-settler colonies like Nigeria.\textsuperscript{106}

The post-colonial state inherits the functions of the colonial state with little alterations, one school argues. But whether to characterise the post-colonial state as 'overdeveloped' or not is a moot point. However, the question of the class character of the post-colonial state is important.\textsuperscript{107} It has been argued that this state is controlled by indigenous social classes. Others contend that the post-colonial state is still dominated by the metropolitan bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{108} Finally, there are those who, following-Sunkel, talk of 'transnational integration' "by which an emerging domestic bourgeoisie is integrated intimately into the transnational capitalist economy".\textsuperscript{109}

By focussing on the secondary class antagonisms between local and foreign capitalist classes, this debate neglects the crucial dimension that the state is "an instrument made necessary by the irreconcilability of class antagonisms . . . . In Africa . . . . the state, while mediating between these latter sections of capital [local and foreign], is an instrument furthering the exploitation of the working class and the peasantry."\textsuperscript{110}

The state is a complex historical process. What is important is not to freeze processes into static definitional schemes. The state and social classes can best be understood within the contexts of the production process itself and the social relations of production. Their configuration depend on conjunctural circumstances in specific settings. As this paper
has tried to show, the class structure in Africa is extremely complex because of the very complexities of her social formations. Certainly, it is futile to abstract the 'revolutionary potential' of peasants and workers into formulations expressing either blind optimism or smug scepticism. Studies of the peasantry, working class and the state must be closely integrated so that we can examine not only the relations of peasants and workers with the dominant classes, but also with one another, in order to identify the conditions under which the struggles of the exploited classes may converge in opposition to the entire system of dependent capitalist exploitation.

Footnotes


7. The works of these writers are too many to mention here. For a brief survey, see P.T. Zeleza, Dependent Capitalism and the Making of the Kenyan Working Class During the Colonial Period, Ph.D. Dissertation, Dalhousie, 1982, pp. 5.

8. See the writings of intellectuals and activists like W.E.B. Dubois and William Leo Hansberry, George Padmore and C.L.R. James, Edward Blyden and Cheik Anta Diop, ibid.


27. Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1956. That Marx himself changed his optimistic prognosis of opportunities for capitalist development in backward or colonised countries is shown by his later views on Ireland. See H.B. Davis, "Capital and Imperialism: A Landmark in Marxist Theory," Monthly Review, September, 1967; and his Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labour Theories of Nationalism to 1917, New York, 1967; Also see Kenzo Mohri, "Marx and Underdevelopment," Monthly Review, April 1979. It has to be sufficiently recognised that 'classical' Marxist writers like Bukharin, Luxemburg, and, of course, Lenin, were keenly aware of the destructive and distorting effects of imper-
ialism or capitalism on backward countries.


36. Nicola Swainson, "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya," Review of African Political Economy, 8, p. 40. Anne Philips poignantly notes, however, that "the discovery that there is a national bourgeoisie... that it is capable of accumulation... could after all mean no more than that Africa will be able to achieve the same form of 'underdevelopment' as Latin America": "The Concept of Development," idem, p. 8.


42. F.H. Cardoso, "The consumption of dependency theory in the U.S.," Latin America Research Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 1977; "Dependency and Development in Latin America," New Left Review, 74, 1972; and with E. Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979. It cannot be overemphasised, however, that Frank, Amin, and Rodney did not entirely ignore class analysis as is so often asserted. Certainly their later writings have few equals in their analysis of the class structures of dependent capitalist formations.


44. B. and P.Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Producti-


49. See H. Bernstein and J. Depelchin, op. cit., p. 34.


More recently, Lonsdale has tried to distinguish four different forms of articulation, namely, transitive, intransitive, tributary, and syncretic: "The State and Social Processes in Africa," African Studies Association, Bloomington, October, 1981, Mimeo. It is tempting to see this as an exercise in reification.


58. ibid., p. 61.

59. ibid., p. 69. This position is mainly associated with B. Bradby, "The Destruction of Natural Economy," Economy and Society, vol. 4, no. 2, 1975.


64. C. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 199.


76. H. Bernstein, "Notes on Capital and Peasantry," p. 73.

77. F. Cooper, "Peasants, Capitalists, and Historians," p. 309.


79. ibid, p. 159.


83. See footnote 8 above.


93. See Sharon Stichter, Migrant Labour in Kenya, Capitalism
94. Fanon, op. cit.


98. For Brief analyses on the way Engels and later Lenin used the term 'labour aristocracy' with reference to the English trade union movement and workers in imperialist countries see, Martin Nicolaus, "The Theory of the Labour Aristocracy," Monthly Review, April 1970; and Eric Hobsbawm "Lenin and the 'Aristocracy of Labour',' idem.


100. Gutkind, Cohen, and Copans, eds., op. cit., pp. 16 - 17.


108. For example, C. Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation," Review of African Political Economy, no. 5, 1976. M. von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version," idem, no. 8, 1977, makes the Poulantsian distinction between 'ruling' and 'governing' class and sees the former as having always been the metropolitan bourgeoisie, while the latter is now composed of Nizers, i.e., Africanizers.
