Title
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Journal
Comparative Political Studies, 11(1)

Author
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Publication Date
1978

Peer reviewed
PARTIES, COUPS, AND
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Patterns of Political Change
in Tropical Africa

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Cross-national research has devoted considerable attention to the conditions under which democracy emerges and persists. Yet there are relatively few democracies in the world, and the other half of that question, concerning the conditions under which other kinds of regimes emerge and persist, has rarely been treated directly in cross-national analysis. Rather, this issue has been dealt with only in a negative way, in terms of the emergence of "nondemocratic" regimes under the "opposite" conditions. There has been little effort to break down what is generally a residual nondemocratic category or to specify the conditions under which different types of nondemocratic regimes appear.

For example, one of the more intriguing findings of this tradition of research concerns the relationship between the failure or success of the attempt to introduce democracy and the characteristics of the party system at the time when democracy is introduced (Pride, 1970). For those attempts that fail, however, there has been little or no analysis of the impact of different types of party systems on the way in which these democratic institutions are dismantled or of the different types of authoritarian rule that are set up in their place. This study will explore these issues regarding the emergence of authoritarian rule in tropical Africa.
The new states of tropical Africa provide an interesting setting for such a study. These 26 countries went through a period of "tutelary" democracy in the decade and a half following World War II, during a period of decolonization in which Western democratic institutions were introduced. After independence, however, these democratic institutions were dismantled. Democratic regimes were not maintained, but quite the opposite: the regimes moved increasingly in an authoritarian direction. There followed a period of institutional jockeying and regime experimentation which provides a useful laboratory for exploring the conditions under which different types of authoritarian regimes emerge. This study will explore the varied experiences of African countries with the introduction of democratic institutions and the different patterns of change through which they moved to establish distinct types of authoritarian rule in the postindependence period.

The framework employed in this study is derived from the work of Linz. According to Linz (1972: 27), authoritarian regimes commonly arise to control mass participation and to prevent the political expression of social cleavages that can easily emerge in a democracy. In Africa, these issues arose as a consequence of the introduction of democratic institutions in the preindependence period. The introduction of competitive party politics had the effect of politicizing ethnic and regional cleavages, since there was a widespread tendency for these cleavages to coincide with party cleavages (Emerson, 1960: 353-354; Zolberg, 1966: 21-22; Anderson et al., 1974: 68). Party competition thus became an important channel for the political expression (or political stimulation) of societal cleavages. The introduction of Western democratic institutions also brought a new type of mass political participation on the national level, as universal suffrage was introduced in the space of relatively few years and the electorate was mobilized as part of the nationalist drive for independence. Following the emphasis of Linz, party dominance and level of voting in national elections are used as independent variables in this analysis.

Linz's framework for analyzing different types of authoritarian regimes once they emerge involves, in part, an extension of this concern with issues of popular mobilization and mass participation. He suggests that one of the major dimensions in terms of which subtypes of authoritarian rule can be distinguished is the degree and type of popular mobilization, and that controlled and noncompetitive elections are one important indicator at which one should look.

The opportunity for popular participation, even if controlled, channeled, manipulated, and under co-opted leadership, makes
such regimes different. . . . The flow and ebb of single parties . . .
[deserves] special attention in the study of such regimes. The same
is true for plebiscites, referenda, partial elections, etc. which
should be studied as indicators of government policy rather than
as free elections. Rates of registration, participation, void or blank
votes, in this case are more interesting than the choices expressed
and often reflect the attitudes toward the regime in addition to the
intention of the rulers [Linz: 1972: 31].

Following this emphasis, the present analysis will devote particular
attention to the way in which party systems and electoral systems were
transformed or eliminated in the postindependence period as a starting
point for distinguishing subtypes of authoritarian rule in Africa.

The goal of this study is thus to analyze the emergence in tropical
Africa of distinct subtypes of authoritarian rule as an outcome of the
different experiences the countries had with the introduction of demo-
ocratic institutions in the period of decolonization. It is argued that
African countries, starting with different preindependence experiences
with mass political participation and party dominance during the period
in which democratic institutions were introduced, followed different
sequences of events in dismantling these institutions and in setting up
different subtypes of authoritarian rule in the first decade and a half of
independence. The analysis focuses on the relationship between pre-
independence electoral participation and party dominance, and their
effect on type of one-party regime formation, military coups, and
postindependence regimes. The findings of the study are summarized
through the presentation of five modal patterns of political change in
tropical Africa.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN
THE STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICS

At the same time that this analysis addresses certain broad issues
concerning the emergence of authoritarian regimes, it is also relevant
to a more specific issue in recent research on African politics: the
tendency to place what may be an excessive emphasis on the similarities
among the authoritarian patterns of national political change being
followed by African countries. There has been a tendency to view the
predominant as the universal and to overlook or minimize the signif-
cance of differences among countries. While this approach has provided
some valuable insights into certain major political transformations that
have occurred in Africa, it may tend to "overhomogenize" African politics (Bienen, 1970: 110). In methodological terms, it leads to the neglect of one of the most important means of gaining insights into political change: the systematic analysis of differences among countries.\(^3\)

The emphasis on the similarity of developmental patterns throughout Africa has emerged primarily since these countries achieved political independence around 1960. In the first years of the independence period, the one-party regime came to be seen by many American and European analysts as the predominant form of government that was emerging virtually everywhere in Africa (for a discussion of this preoccupation with one-party regimes see Coleman and Rosberg, 1964: 4; Zolberg, 1966: 2-3). This generalization was later superseded by the conclusion that virtually no country was immune to the "rash" of military interventions that began to occur on the continent around 1965.\(^4\)

Implicitly, at least, it was assumed that there was a single pattern that all but a few stray countries were following. The countries that were not yet following this pattern would presumably do so shortly. To the extent that these predominant patterns were perceived as emerging in virtually all African countries, it appeared to be irrelevant to look for different patterns of national regime evolution.

At least two explanations for this tendency to emphasize similarities among countries may be identified. The first is a theoretical perspective that may be called the "constraints on development" thesis. This thesis identifies in African—or more generally Third World—countries common characteristics which account for a similar evolution of national political regimes. It suggests that because of the similar cultural, multiethnic, and historical context of African countries and the particular characteristics imposed by late-comer status, by economic and political dependency, and by the ever-growing gap between developmental aspirations and actual accomplishments, there are few options open to many countries on the continent (examples of this literature are: Lofchie, 1971; Wallerstein, 1971; Zolberg, 1968a, 1968b; O'Connell, 1967; Feit, 1968; Amin, 1973; Harris, 1975). It thus becomes reasonable to expect similar developmental patterns among African countries.

Though the constraints thesis raises an important issue, it can be carried too far. For instance, the argument about the external dependency can be carried to the point of economic determinism that leads to the neglect of important political differences among countries. Cardoso (1977), one of the most prominent analysts of the problem of external dependency, has insisted on the importance of the distinction
between the broad type of economic system that exists in any country (e.g., dependent capitalism) and the particular type of political regime that may serve to maintain that economic system. He argues that any particular type of economic system may coexist with and be maintained by a variety of different types of regime, representing important differences in the political order that evolves in each country.

A second reason for the tendency to deemphasize differences may be a reaction to an earlier tradition of research on African politics that stressed the importance of different types of colonial rule and the different kinds of parties which gained control of the newly independent governments (Hodgkin, 1957; Wallerstein, 1961; Schachter [Morgenstau], 1961; and Coleman and Rosberg, 1964). The distinctions made in this literature have now been largely discredited.

The concern with type of colonial rule has become less widespread, probably for two erroneous reasons. First, following the initial period in which the differing philosophies and goals of direct and indirect rule were emphasized by a number of scholars, field researchers quickly discovered that indirect rule was not always applied in British Africa and that in French Africa it was often found necessary to work through traditional chiefs. Indeed, after 1917, this increasingly became official French policy (Alexandre, 1970). That the differences are not what they appear to be in theory or that they are not as great as expected, however, does not mean that they do not exist or are not important. Second, after the granting of independence, research began to focus on other, more immediate developments in Africa, such as one-party regime formation and military coups, and it appeared that these subsequent developments were occurring in ex-British and ex-French Africa alike. Thus, type of colonial rule dropped out of the analysis of African politics, and colonial legacy, to the extent that it still received attention, was often assumed to be roughly similar for all African countries regardless of former ruler.

The recent failure to distinguish among types of parties in Africa represents, in part, an overreaction to Zolberg's and Bienen's important revisionist interpretations of African party states. Bienen (1967), analyzing TANU in Tanzania, and Zolberg (1966), analyzing the five West African countries that were widely considered to have the strongest "mass" parties, demonstrated that these parties did not in fact have many of the characteristics that the current models attributed to them and that the contrast between these "mass," "mobilizing," or "revolutionary-centralizing" parties and other "patron," "elite," or "pragmatic-pluralist" parties had been greatly overstated. Zolberg further argued
that the party-states that emerged in those five West African countries after independence had to be understood as weak regimes with a limited scope of authority.

Rather than use these findings to refine earlier distinctions, the major scholarly reaction to these analyses was to abandon distinctions. Because it had been shown that the strongest parties were most usefully described as weak, subsequent analyses assumed that all parties in Africa were weak and, therefore, there was little or no difference among them. All regimes were viewed as being equally vulnerable to military intervention. Distinctions were blurred and it was emphasized that the postindependence regimes were more similar than different: they were essentially weak, had emerged from relatively similar colonial situations, and were under similar political, economic, and social constraints.

These trends in African political research are unfortunate. Zolberg's major points are well taken: first, in order to understand the post-independence regimes in the party-states of West Africa, it is indeed useful to understand those parties as relatively weak rather than as strong, well organized, highly articulated, mobilizational parties eliciting overwhelming popular support. Second, and this follows from the first point, the differences between these parties and the others are not as great as had been supposed. The mass/patron, mass/elite, and revolutionary-centralizing/pragmatic-pluralist distinctions did not provide accurate descriptions and did exaggerate the differences between the types of parties. What is incorrect, however, is the implicit inference in subsequent writing on Africa that there are no distinctions to be made.

The thesis of this article is that though the earlier distinctions regarding colonial rule and political parties were misleading, some distinctions can be made. Differences in the experience with colonial rule and in the types of party systems and patterns of electoral participation that appeared in the preindependence period have led to different patterns of political change in African countries and to the emergence of distinct subtypes of authoritarian rule in the postindependence period.5

**PARTY DOMINANCE AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION**

Linz's framework points to the politicization of cleavages and the overall level of mass participation as two important factors in the
emergence of authoritarian regimes in democratic settings. In the context of the transfer of democracy to colonial Africa, two of the most important manifestations of these factors are found in the issues of party dominance and party competition and in the dramatic increase in mass electoral participation. The following analysis focuses on the relationship between these two phenomena and their impact on post-independence regime outcomes.

If one considers all 26 countries, there is no relationship between electoral participation and the ability of a single party to achieve dominance over its competitors ($r = .00$).\(^6\) Within colonial subgroups, however, a different picture emerges. Among the British colonies, the relationship is negative ($r = -.49$). Among the French colonies, by contrast, the relationship is positive. Though there is only a modest positive bivariate correlation between these two variables ($r = .20$), an examination of the scatterplot for this relationship reveals that the relationship is curvilinear and that there is an empty quadrant: there are no countries with a low level of dominance that had a high level of voting.\(^7\) If one calculates a Q statistic on the basis of a dichotomized form of the data, there is thus a perfect positive association ($Q = 1.0$).

The introduction of socioeconomic control variables does not substantially alter this finding.\(^8\)

Three hypotheses concerning the linkages between voting turnout and party dominance are available in the literature that may help to interpret these opposite relationships in the British and French colonies. The first hypothesis posits a negative relationship in which voting affects dominance: higher levels of voting have a fragmenting influence which makes party dominance more difficult to achieve. According to the two other hypotheses, the causation goes in the other direction, from dominance to voting. The second hypothesis posits a positive relationship in which the presence of a dominant party may stimulate a bandwagon effect and/or a certain kind of dominant party may actively mobilize the vote in an effort to broaden its support. In a preindependence context, dominant parties may have found it advantageous to mobilize the vote in order to press for nationalist demands and to consolidate their power, even at the risk of increasing demand-making in other areas. The third hypothesis posits a negative relationship in which a lower level of dominance, i.e., a higher level of party competition, results in greater voting turnout. This corresponds to the pattern reported in the United States, where it has been suggested turnout is greater in close elections and was therefore relatively low in the traditionally one-party dominant South. This nega-
tive relationship between party dominance and voting turnout may be due both to the perception of voters that their vote is potentially more important in a close contest and to the competitive tactics of party leaders who, facing a close election, make a greater effort to mobilize the vote.

Among the French colonies, the relationship between turnout and dominance is positive, and only the second hypothesis posits a positive relationship: voting was greater where there was a more dominant party that attracted or mobilized the vote. More specifically, in light of the curvilinear relationship noted above, it would appear that a high level of dominance may have been a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for a high level of voting among the French colonies.

Among the British colonies, the relationship between dominance and turnout is negative, corresponding to the other two hypotheses. An examination of variations across constituencies within colonies suggests that it is the third hypothesis which applies to British Africa: higher levels of party competition produced higher levels of turnout. The two colonies which were lowest on voting turnout were as low as they were because one party was so dominant that there were many uncontested constituencies where no voting took place. This relationship between party dominance and turnout, however, is not limited to the effect of voting in the extreme case of uncontested constituencies, but rather it is more continuous. In Ghana, for instance, it has been observed that turnout was low in certain areas because the CPP was dominant and the electoral outcome was not in question (Austin, 1966: 340). At the other end of the spectrum, it has been suggested that in Nigeria turnout was higher in given constituencies because of the high level of competition (Post, 1964: 351-354).

For British Africa there is an additional explanation of the variation in electoral turnout: colonial policy with regard to the rate and timing of the introduction of elections. Where elections were introduced later and where fewer preindependence elections were held, electoral participation was lower, as subsequent elections provided an additional opportunity for the parties to develop an organization, penetrate further into the countryside, and mobilize more people. For British Africa the correlations of electoral participation with number of preindependence elections and with the number of preindependence elections with universal suffrage are .48 and .89 respectively. The rate and timing of the introduction of elections does not explain any of the variance in turnout among the French colonies since French colonial policy was the same in all colonies.
It would thus seem that in French Africa, greater participation was at least in part the result of mobilization by an already dominant party, whereas in British Africa greater participation tended to result from colonial electoral policy and higher levels of party competition. For the French colonies, greater electoral participation was, as will be shown later, a consolidating, supportive factor for an already dominant party, whereas for British Africa greater electoral participation was not the result of the strategy of the dominant party and was not within the control of that party.9

PATTERNS OF ONE-PARTY REGIME FORMATION

The distinct patterns of party dominance and electoral participation that emerged in the period of decolonization meant that African leaders had different political resources and faced different political problems as their countries became independent. These differences led to different choices regarding mobilization and control in the new nations. The result has been distinctive sequences of political change in the decade and a half following independence.

The first important consequence of these preindependence processes was for the party system—specifically for whether or not a one-party regime was formed and how it was formed.10 Some analyses of African politics have simply considered whether or not a one-party regime was formed. It is important, however, to consider the different ways in which one-party regimes have been instituted.11 In some cases, they have been established by a broadly popular party with little opposition. In others, they have been formed in a situation of substantially less power and popular support. Within the African context, we may consider three patterns of one-party regime formation. One-party regimes have been formed by the total electoral success of a leading party, by the merger of parties, and by coercion—by the banning or repression of opposition parties. In addition, there are some cases in which one-party regimes were never formed. These four categories may be seen as representing an ordinal scale of the degree to which a one-party regime was formed as a “legitimate” consequence of the results of elections, with the final category reflecting the absence of one-party regime formation.

The type of one-party regime formation that occurred in each country depended in part on the degree of party dominance that emerged in the preindependence period, with the more dominant
parties being more likely to establish a one-party regime by more “legitimate” means, according to the norms of the electoral system during the period of decolonization (rho = .59). While this relationship is hardly surprising, it has not received explicit attention in analysis of postindependence politics in Africa.

Within this overall relationship, however, the countries which formed one-party regimes by coercion cannot be distinguished in terms of degree of party dominance from those which never formed one-party regimes. Rather, the differences between these two groups of countries appears to result primarily from a difference in former colonial ruler. In the ex-French colonies, the leading parties tended to proceed relatively quickly to establish their final dominance either by overtly banning opposition parties or by effectively prohibiting them from contesting elections. Multiparty regimes were not retained in any of the ex-French African countries (see Table 1).

By contrast, among the seven ex-British African countries which had not established a one-party regime by election or merger, there was much greater hesitancy to ban the opposition and a greater tendency to retain a multiparty regime for longer. In five of these countries, multiparty elections continued to be held after independence, though in two of them one-party regimes were eventually formed, six and eight years later respectively, by banning the opposition. This greater hesitancy can also be seen in the fact that the remaining two ex-British colonies which formed a one-party regime by coercion, though they did not continue to hold multiparty elections, also waited a substantial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Merger</th>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>One-Party Regime</th>
<th>Not Formed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 26
interval after independence—seven years—before doing so. This pattern contrasts markedly with the ex-French colonies that did not form a one-party regime by election or merger. Nearly all of these countries had moved to form a one-party regime by coercion within a year or two of independence. It may be noted that the three ex-Belgian African countries likewise did not ban the opposition as a means of initially establishing a one-party regime.

This finding gives new credence to the earlier argument that once had greater currency, that the norms of democracy were somewhat more firmly rooted in British Africa than in French Africa. Post has suggested that in contrast to the British, the French left behind them an institutional pattern which put far less emphasis on the formal balancing of interests through such devices as bicameral legislatures, entrenched positions for chiefs, and official oppositions. Their legacy was rather one of greatly centralized decision-making and administration, and of the supremacy of the executive over all other branches of government [Post, 1968: 193].

Furthermore, the ex-British colonies had in their former colonial ruler a model of great continuity in competitive electoral politics. For the ex-French colonies, by contrast, the model provided by the metropole involved a far more uneven history of competitive elections (Zolberg, 1964: 104-105). Finally, the French Communist Party was linked to the dominant parties in most of the French colonies, so that the one-party ideologies and practice of European Communism may have been more readily diffused to French Africa.

In addition to the effect of preindependence party dominance, there was an independent effect of electoral participation on type of one-party regime formation. The impact of voting turnout is quite different for the British and French colonies, being negative for the former and positive for the latter. It would thus seem that higher levels of voting aided one-party regime formation by legitimate means among the French colonies, while it hindered it among the British colonies.

This difference reflects the different causes of turnout in the two colonial groupings. Among the French colonies, greater participation occurred where there was greater party dominance and seemed to be the result of the mobilization of the electorate by these parties. It served as a source of support for those parties which had already achieved a high level of dominance, enabling them to form a one-party regime by election or merger. Among the British colonies, greater voter turnout
was not the result of the strategy of a dominant party to demonstrate more support and thereby unequivocally eliminate its opponents. Rather, it was the result of colonial policy concerning the evolution and transfer of electoral arrangements to the colonies and also a result of party competition. As such, it was not within the control of the dominant party. Thus, while greater turnout aided the formation of one-party regimes by election or merger among the French colonies, this was far from the case among the British colonies.

**POST-INDEPENDENCE REGIMES**

The type of one-party regime formation that occurred around the time of independence had important consequences for the kinds of regimes that have emerged in the first decade and a half of independence in Africa. First of all, it had important implications for the pattern of military intervention (see Table 2). Where a one-party regime was formed by election or merger, these regimes were based on parties that had fared well under the competitive elections introduced during the period of decolonization. Furthermore, this method of achieving one-party status was more or less within the rules of the political game then being played. Consequently, these regimes had relatively little opposition and greater legitimacy. They have generally not been susceptible to military overthrow, but rather have experienced substantial political continuity in the decade and a half since independence.

Where one-party regimes were established by coercive means or where multiparty systems continued to exist, no party had fared as well under the competitive elections in the period of decolonization. In these cases, the attempt to form a one-party regime involved the elimination of rivals who were viable power contenders. The more coercive methods of forming a one-party regime were rarely successful, and instead of producing a more unified political system, they tended to intensify rivalries and increase opposition. Almost all of these regimes have been overthrown in military coups. Attempts to retain multiparty regimes likewise tended to fail. In fact, one of the direct and immediate causes for military coups in those countries which retained multiparty regimes was the unworkability of elections. In most cases, the outcomes of these elections were disputed. In the power struggle which followed, no acceptable solution could be reached, and the military intervened.
TABLE 2
Coups by Type of One-Party Regime Formation as of 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of One-Party Regime Formation</th>
<th>Coup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election or Merger</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Formed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 26

In addition to whether or not there were coups, certain other differences among postindependence regimes may be noted. It was argued above that it is reasonable to characterize most countries in contemporary Africa as having relatively weak authoritarian regimes. Within this framework, however, distinct subtypes of authoritarian regimes may be identified.

For Linz (1972, 1975), one of the most important aspects of an authoritarian regime is its limited political pluralism. In order to limit pluralism, authoritarian regimes pursue different policies toward political mobilization. Thus, he argues, differing patterns of political mobilization, including plebiscites, referenda, and controlled elections, are a significant dimension to consider in the analysis of subtypes of authoritarian rule.

Though virtually all African countries have undergone "departicipation" (Kasfir, 1976) through the elimination of competitive, multi-party elections since independence, the ways in which elections have been transformed have varied considerably. In the countries in which one-party regimes have persisted, electoral mobilization has been limited and controlled through the mechanism of the one-party election. In the case of the ex-French African colonies with one-party systems, these transformed elections have taken the form of plebiscites. In the ex-British colonies with one-party systems, they have taken the form of one-party competitive elections. Among the countries that have had coups, the policy of military governments has increasingly been to control electoral mobilization by eliminating elections. Preliminary evidence suggests that these alternative approaches to transforming elections imply somewhat different distributions of power, different roles of the party, different degrees or types of popular participation, and different bases for the legitimacy of the regime.
PLEBISCITARY ONE-PARTY REGIMES

In the case of the contemporary one-party regimes of ex-French Africa, the elections are plebiscites quite strictly speaking. No opposition is permitted and the voter can vote only for or against official candidates. However, though there is no doubt about the outcome of these elections, the few available commentaries on them suggest that the governments in these countries take them seriously (Zolberg, 1964: 271-272; Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-1971: B253). The extensive campaign and election coverage in the media also attests to this. It appears that these governments make a major effort to use elections to mobilize popular support, spread party and government propaganda, and manipulate symbols of legitimacy. The elections thus become a ritualistic occasion for the symbolic ratification of government policy and candidates. Official returns for these elections report exceptionally high levels of affirmative voting and turnout: the reported level of affirmative voting is typically either 99.9% or 100%, and turnout ranges between 88.9% and 99.9% of the total number of voters registered. What is important in official returns is not their accuracy, but the fact that they point to the importance of the election as a symbol or myth of the legitimacy of the government. Even allowing for substantial over-reporting in the official figures, it appears that sizable numbers of people are mobilized in a ritual act of voting on election day.

These governments, then, are based on parties that were dominant and mobilizing in the preindependence period, when they mobilized high levels of voter turnout in order to eliminate completely the opposition and form a one-party regime electorally. They continue in the postindependence period to pursue a relatively vigorous policy of electoral mobilization in order to generate support and legitimacy for the regime. This plebiscitary alternative is characterized by the mobilization of a large proportion of the relevant population into the passive role of approving official candidates. Citizens do not mobilize, they are mobilized. This mobilization is thus primarily oriented around elite interests. Furthermore, mobilization is infrequent, coming at four- or five-year intervals, and other kinds of participation are not encouraged. Rather, levels of membership and participation in political and para-political organizations are low. This kind of situation has been called “low subject mobilization,” in which “[c]itizens are mobilized on a temporary basis to ratify the decisions of the authoritarian elite and to demonstrate support for the regime. Much of the time, however, the regime does not encourage participation. As a
result, the level of political participation is low” (Purcell, 1973: 30). The generally low level of participation, even in those countries where electoral mobilization is considerable, can be seen in the nature of the party. Linz has characterized the authoritarian party in terms that sound familiar to analysts of parties in Africa.

First, and foremost, the authoritarian party is not a well organized ideological organization which monopolizes all access to power. . . . A considerable part of the elite has no connection with the party and does not identify with it. Party membership creates few, if any, duties. Ideological indoctrination is often minimal, the conformity and loyalty required may be slight. . . . The party is often ideologically and socially heterogeneous. Far from branching out into many functional organizations, in an effort to control the state apparatus and penetrate other spheres of life . . . it is a skeleton organization of second-rate bureaucrats [Linz, 1964: 314].

Nevertheless, the distinctive thing about these regimes is that they do engage in a periodic and apparently extensive mobilization of the masses through which they attempt to ratify, in the show of mass support, the regime, its office-holders, and its policies.

COMPETITIVE ONE-PARTY REGIMES

A different pattern of electoral mobilization has appeared in the one-party states of ex-British Africa. Three types of competitive one-party elections have emerged in these countries: in one case there is a competitive primary within the party; in another case the party selects more than one official candidate to stand in the election; and in the final case there is competition within the party both in the primary and in the election. In these situations, electoral choice is not eliminated but is restricted to candidates within the single party who are running on the overall platform and program of the party.

Reported levels of electoral participation are considerably lower, ranging from about 43% to 73% of registered voters. This would appear to reflect in part a lower level of concern with mobilizing the electorate and also the absence of a felt need on the part of the government to give the appearance of massive participation by inflating the figures. In addition to a difference in degree, the type of mobilization in one-party competitive regimes is different from that in plebiscitary regimes.
In these cases, what might be called modified subject mobilization has some "participant" qualities (to use Almond and Verba's terminology), in that the citizen does have some limited influence in leadership selection and the threat of non-reelection is a real one (Almond and Verba, 1963: 214). In Tanzania, 45% of the former Members of Parliament who ran in the 1965 elections lost their seats by vote of the electorate, as compared to only 7% in the 1972 elections for U.S. House of Representatives. The one-party competitive regimes thus involve a somewhat different distribution of power from the plebiscitary regimes. This can be seen in available analyses of these elections, which indicate that there is only limited use of campaigns to build support for the national government and its policies and much more of an orientation toward local issues and patronage politics (Hyden and Leys, 1972; Hill, 1974). Compared to the plebiscitary regimes, then, one-party competitive regimes involve less support manipulation and greater participant influence. Legitimacy in these regimes derives more from popular choice, however limited or controlled it may be, than it does from the ritual of mass ratification.

MILITARY REGIMES

The final type of authoritarian regime in Africa is the military regime. Military regimes actually represent quite a wide range of styles of rule, from very personalistic, such as Idi Amin's Uganda, to quite bureaucratic, such as Acheampong's Ghana (Decalo, 1976: 240-254). In comparison with the two types of one-party rule, however, they have certain characteristics in common which set them off as a group. These regimes are dominated by coalitions of bureaucrats and army officers, and the usual pattern is for all parties to be banned, though a single official party is sometimes established. Though there have been some cases in which the military has held either competitive or controlled elections, the more general policy of the military has been to stay in power and to rule without holding elections. An interesting exception to this is Zaire where General Mobutu set up and legalized a single party, which he controls and which he apparently would like to use to move toward a more plebiscitary pattern of rule. In the more general pattern, however, military regimes do not make any use of the controlled or manipulated electoral mobilization present in the other two types of authoritarian rule. The decline in popular participation
therefore is the greatest in these cases, since there are no electoral channels and often no party left at all. Finally, there is a difference in the basis of legitimacy of a military regime, since there is no use of elections of either type to provide the basis for apparent support, ratification, or representation. As a result, military regimes must put greater reliance on force as well as on the popularity of their policies in order to maintain themselves in power.

The findings of the above analysis may be summarized as follows. In those countries with leading parties which fared particularly well in the multiparty competitive elections introduced in the period of decolonization, these parties managed to eliminate the opposition and form one-party regimes in the course of these elections—either through complete electoral victory or through the merger of a weaker party into a clearly dominant one. Two different kinds of one-party regimes were formed, however, and this difference appeared to result from differences in former colonial ruler as well as differences in degree to which the parties mobilized the population electorally. In the first kind, primarily found in ex-French Africa, all electoral competition was eliminated, and plebiscitary regimes based on continued support mobilization were established. In the second, primarily found in ex-British Africa, electoral competition was retained within the framework of a one-party system. In those countries where the major party had not fared as well in the multiparty elections of the preindependence period, the final result has been military rule, though it is possible to distinguish alternative intermediate steps. In the ex-French African colonies, coercive means were used to establish a one-party regime; whereas in the ex-British and ex-Belgian colonies, a multiparty regime was initially retained. Neither of these subpatterns produced a viable solution to the problem of a lack of consolidation of power, however; and the regimes tended to be overthrown and military regimes ultimately established.

MODAL PATTERNS OF POLITICAL CHANGE

In the foregoing analysis, it was argued that three initial, interrelated conditions have had important effects on postindependence politics in tropical Africa: the degree of party dominance and the level of electoral participation which emerged in the preindependence period, and colonial ruler. In order to summarize these effects, it is convenient
to dichotomize preindependence party dominance and electoral participation in order to assign countries to high and low categories on these variables.\textsuperscript{16} Since there is a positive curvilinear relationship between these two variables among the French colonies, the cases of ex-French Africa fall predominantly in the low dominance/low participation, high dominance/low participation, and high dominance/high participation cells of the resulting fourfold table. Since the correlation is negative for British Africa, those cases fall predominantly in the low dominance/high participation and the high dominance/low participation cells. As a result, five different sets of initial conditions can be distinguished.

On the basis of these five subgroups, five modal patterns of change in Africa from the period of decolonization through the first decade and a half of independence may be identified, involving distinct sequences in the relationship among preindependence electoral patterns, the type of one-party regime formation, and postindependence political patterns. These patterns are summarized in Figure 1. It must be emphasized that these patterns are derived from the analysis presented above. They thus summarize probabilistic relationships, and it is obviously not the case that all the countries come out "correctly" at each step in the pattern. Some follow the pattern perfectly and may be considered to be representative countries which exemplify the pattern. Others follow a sequence perfectly except for one deviation, whereas a few others either switch from one pattern to another or cannot be described in terms of these patterns.

Pattern I includes those ex-French African countries in which dominant parties in the preindependence period mobilized the population to build sufficient electoral support to enable the party either to eliminate opposition parties through total electoral victory or to absorb the opposition through mergers. One-party regimes in these countries were thus formed well before independence. After independence, this policy of support mobilization has been continued in the plebiscitary regimes that have been established. Though this analysis is concerned with the politics of the first decade and a half of independence, it might be mentioned that more recently, one country seems to be in a process of modifying the plebiscitary regime. In 1976, Senegal allowed the formation of two additional official parties: one to the political right and one to the political left of the ruling party which occupies the political center. The first national election in which these parties will be allowed to participate is scheduled for 1978.

Pattern II represents an intermediate sequence for ex-French Africa. The major party in each country achieved a high level of dominance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern I: French Africa</th>
<th>Pre-Independence Electoral Patterns</th>
<th>Transformation of Party System Around Independence</th>
<th>Post-Independence Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast, Mauretania, Senegal, Guinea (2)</td>
<td>High Party Dominance → High Electoral Participation</td>
<td>One-Party Regime by Election or Merger</td>
<td>One-Party Plebiscitary Regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern II: French Africa</th>
<th>Pre-Independence Electoral Patterns</th>
<th>Transformation of Party System Around Independence</th>
<th>Post-Independence Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Mali (3)</td>
<td>High Party Dominance → Low Electoral Participation</td>
<td>One-Party Regime by Banning Plebiscitary One-Party Regime</td>
<td>Military Coup: &quot;Stable&quot; Rule, Relative Regime Continuity</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Ghana, Togo, Chad (4), Congo (2), Gabon (2,4)</td>
<td>Low Party Dominance → Low Electoral Participation</td>
<td>One-Party Regime by Ratification Election</td>
<td>Military Coup: Regime Experimentation, Greater Instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern IV: British Africa</th>
<th>Pre-Independence Electoral Patterns</th>
<th>Transformation of Party System Around Independence</th>
<th>Post-Independence Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya (1), Malawi (4)</td>
<td>High Party Dominance → Low Electoral Participation</td>
<td>One-Party Regime Formed</td>
<td>One-Party Competitive Regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern V: British/Belgian Africa</th>
<th>Pre-Independence Electoral Patterns</th>
<th>Transformation of Party System Around Independence</th>
<th>Post-Independence Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Zaire, Burundi (1), Burundi (4), Uganda (3)</td>
<td>Low Party Dominance → High Electoral Participation</td>
<td>Multi-Party, Competitive Elections Continued</td>
<td>Military Coup: Regime Experimentation, Greater Instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The numbers in parentheses refer to the steps in the sequence at which the country deviates from the indicated pattern.
b. One country in ex-British Africa, Ghana, also follows this pattern.

Figure 1: Modal Patterns of Political Change in Africa, 1945 to 1975
on the dichotomized variable, but in fact party dominance was lower than for the parties in Pattern I (with the exception of Guinea, which like the cases in Pattern II also had low participation—Guinea might alternatively be characterized as having switched from Pattern II to I). These parties did not mobilize the vote and attract additional support with which they could establish one-party regimes by election or merger. Instead, like the Pattern III countries, they did so by coercion. The tactic adopted was the simple banning of the opposition parties, either before or within a couple of months of independence. When it was time for the next scheduled election, an attempt was made to set up a plebiscitary regime similar to those in the countries that followed Pattern I. These plebiscitary regimes remained in power for varying lengths of time, but eventually all have been overthrown by the military, again like the Pattern III countries. Nevertheless, the first decade and a half of independence was a period of relative “stability” as these military governments were still in power as of 1976. Throughout the postindependence period, therefore, these countries have had only two heads of state—one civilian and one military.

The countries in Pattern III are primarily the former French colonies which had low levels of party dominance and generally low levels of participation. None of these countries had one-party regimes at the time of independence, but all moved to form one through coercion within the next few years. The tactic employed differed somewhat from that employed by the Pattern II countries. In all cases some form of “rati-fication” election was used to establish a one-party regime. These elections took three forms: either one-party or one-list elections; competitive elections involving list voting in which the whole country was redefined as a single constituency, thus assuring the total victory of the dominant party; or, in the case of Ghana, the one non-French African country in this pattern, a referendum on the issue of the formation of a one-party regime. This attempt to legitimate the formation of a one-party regime through an election was generally not successful, and in all cases except Chad, the military ousted the government within a year or two. With the exception of the 1960 coup in Zaire, the first coups in tropical Africa are to be found among these countries. Unlike the case of Pattern II countries, however, the military leaders in these countries have not established stable or continuous rule. Rather, postindependence history has been one of greater regime experimentation and instability. In general, the first military intervention, which came relatively early, was followed by the installation of a new civilian government, only to be followed by a second coup and
usually the establishment of longer-term military rule. These changes have been accompanied on the whole by a higher incidence of unsuccessful coup attempts than is the case for Pattern II countries. Benin is the extreme example of this pattern, with 6 coups from 1963 to 1972 and a variety of different civilian arrangements alternating with military governments, producing 5 different constitutions and 10 different presidents in the decade and a half after independence (Decalo, 1976: 39). The deviations from this general pattern occurred in Gabon and Chad. In Gabon, the French intervened after the first coup and restored the ousted civilian government to power. The government has managed to retain power and set up a plebiscitary regime. In Chad the first coup did not follow the initial formation of a one-party regime, but came 13 years later, though the intervening years were a period of rebellion and civil war which might be traced to the formation of a one-party regime and the banning of the Muslim PNA (Morrison et al., 1972: 209; Africa Research Bulletin, 1975: 3594).

Before moving on to the ex-British and ex-Belgian colonies, it should be mentioned that the one ex-French African country which has not been mentioned, Cameroun, does not fit any single pattern of political change. Starting out at independence with low dominance and low participation (Pattern III), it has switched into the first pattern in that it formed a one-party regime by merger and has continued to have a plebiscitary pattern.

Pattern IV includes the ex-British African colonies that had a significant European settler population. Because of this special factor, the introduction of elections and the extension of the suffrage was generally delayed by the British government in order to protect the European settler interests. Furthermore, there was a tendency in these colonies for party differences to coincide with racial cleavages, so that there was, compared with other colonies in Africa, relatively little competition among Black African parties, the more general pattern being a dominant African party opposing a party representing European settlers. Electoral participation remained relatively low, first because there were fewer elections in these “late” decolonizers and hence fewer opportunities for the dominant party to build an extensive organization and mobilize the vote, and second because with relatively little intra-African party competition, a high proportion of constituencies were not contested and, following the British practice, no voting took place in such constituencies. (It might be added that this practice stands in sharp contrast to the French tradition, and indeed in French Africa turnout was often greater in uncontested constitu-
encies.) By independence, the special arrangements for the representation of European settlers had been dropped and the dominant African parties moved to establish a one-party regime.

Whereas among the ex-French African countries there is an important difference between those which formed a one-party regime by coercion and those which did so by noncoercive, more legitimate means, among the ex-British African countries the major difference is between those which formed a one-party regime by any means and those which did not. In Tanzania and Malawi, a one-party regime was formed by the electoral victory of the respective parties which had no effective African opposition at all. In Zambia, an attempt was made over eight years of multiparty politics to eliminate the opposition in elections, but as this goal continued to elude party leaders, a one-party regime was finally established by banning the opposition. In Kenya, a one-party regime was initially formed by the merger of the second largest party into the most dominant, and a one-party regime existed for a year and a half before a splinter group established an opposition party. Three years later that party was banned. All of these countries are presently one-party competitive regimes, with the exception of Malawi, which continues to follow the British practice of simply declaring the electoral victory of the sole candidate in uncontested constituencies throughout the country.

Pattern V includes the countries of nonsettler British Africa as well as two former Belgian colonies, Burundi and Zaire. These countries had low party dominance in the period before independence, and as a result of party competition, electoral participation was relatively high. Though Zaire and Nigeria had low turnout compared to the other countries in this group, this difference is in good measure due to the fact that universal suffrage was not introduced in these countries before independence, as it was elsewhere in Africa. Zaire had only manhood suffrage, but nonetheless came within three percentage points of the cut-off point—a very high rate of participation among those eligible to vote. In Nigeria there was only manhood suffrage in the North, which has about half the total population. If it were not for this restricted franchise, the rate of participation would obviously have been considerably greater. In all of these countries, multiparty regimes were initially retained in the postindependence period and competitive elections were held. In each case, however, the election became a focus for intense political conflict, resulting in military takeovers. The two major deviations from this pattern are Gambia and Uganda. Gambia, the smallest country among the 26 considered here and one
which lacks an army, has never had a military coup. It continues to have the only multiparty regime in tropical Africa. In Uganda, multi-party elections were never held in the postindependence period. Rather, the opposition was banned and an attempt was underway to switch into the pattern of one-party competitive regimes being followed by Uganda's neighbors. The military coup of Idi Amin interrupted this process, however. Like the countries in Pattern III, the postindependence history of these countries has generally been marked by greater regime change and experimentation.

CONCLUSION

This study has viewed the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes in tropical Africa as outcomes of different patterns of political change rooted in the experience each country had with the introduction of competitive party politics. Specifically, it was found that the two independent factors suggested by Linz, the political expression of societal cleavages and mass participation, along with colonial legacy, had an impact on the emergence of different subtypes of postindependence authoritarian rule. Party dominance, an important aspect of the political expression of societal cleavages, had a strong effect on the types of postindependence rule which emerged. Continuous civilian rule has occurred only in those countries where the major party emerged as overwhelmingly dominant during the period of competitive party politics. Where party dominance was low, the civilian regimes did not endure either in the countries where a multiparty regime was retained, or where there was an attempt to create a single-party regime by coercion. In these countries the military has intervened.

Preindependence electoral participation, an important aspect of mass political participation, also had an impact on the type of postindependence regime, though the effect of this participation depended on its cause. Where greater participation was the result of mobilization by a dominant party, it took the form of support mobilization. The regimes in these countries have continued to mobilize electoral support in the postindependence period through one-party plebiscitary elections, which have thus become part of the legitimacy formula for maintaining authoritarian rule. Where greater electoral participation was the result of competition among parties, it had a "destabilizing" effect, inhibiting the consolidation of power by a single party and the
creation of a one-party regime by more legitimate means. The result in these countries has been military intervention.

Though the thesis that African politics is heavily constrained in a way that sharply limits options and choices may in substantial measure be correct, this analysis has thus shown that at the level of national regime different patterns of political change have been followed in Africa. In this connection four points may be reiterated. The first is that colonial legacy has had an impact on patterns of political change in Africa and that this legacy was different for the French and British colonies. The neglect of former colonial ruler as an explanatory variable in much recent literature may have gone too far.

Second, one-party regime formation has not been a universal or uniform process in Africa, as was implied or anticipated in one phase of writing on African politics. Those countries where one-party regimes were not formed represent an identifiable subgroup which is distinctive in terms of colonial ruler and preindependence patterns of party dominance and electoral participation. Furthermore, one-party regime formation has occurred in a variety of different ways, reflecting differences in legitimacy and in the degree of dominance of the leading party. These differences have been important for the types of regimes which one can now observe in Africa.

Third, military coups have similarly not—at least to date—been a universal occurrence in Africa, as has likewise been implied or anticipated in a subsequent phase of writing on African politics. Even if those countries which so far have not had coups have them in the future, it will still be the case that some countries will have fewer coups or will at least have been more resistant to military intervention for longer periods. Again, the incidence of coups is not random but follows a fairly regular and predictable pattern.

Fourth, the strongest parties in Africa may indeed have been weak and may still be weak—relative to their on-paper organization, their intended level of activity as set out in ideological statements, other strong parties elsewhere in the world, and the "model" of organization which they may have adopted or which social scientists may have applied to them. Nevertheless, there have been differences among African parties and some parties have indeed been strong relative to other African parties. These differences have had important consequences for the political patterns which have emerged.

In conclusion, I would like to raise two sets of speculative questions about the way in which the sequence of events described in this paper
could be extended to include both additional "background" variables and additional consequences of the patterns that have been identified. With regard to the origins of these patterns, it is evident that the groups of countries identified with the five patterns of political change—patterns which were derived by grouping countries in terms of their scores on three variables—correspond closely to geographical zones within colonial groupings. The first pattern includes those ex-French African countries along the upper Guinea coast, the coast of the western "hump" of Africa. The second includes noncoastal ex-French Africa, with the exception of Chad. The third includes those countries of ex-French Africa, as well as Ghana, which lie along the Gulf Coast. The fourth includes ex-British east and central Africa; while the fifth includes ex-British west and ex-Belgian Africa.

In the terms of Przeworski and Teune (1970), one may ask what variables can be substituted for these geographic and colonial terms? What further explanatory factors do these groupings suggest? One possibility is diffusion among neighbors, especially within the colonial subgroups, and also, of course, simultaneous diffusion from metropole to a number of colonies. In addition, there may be other distinct factors associated with these geographical groupings that act as internal causes for each country within the group. For instance, geographical grouping corresponds to the historical conditions of European penetration. In the coastal countries, particularly of West Africa, penetration was early, relatively great, and very uneven, producing a coastal-interior split with respect to many aspects of westernization (urbanization, religion, education, economy). The interior countries, on the other hand, had less European penetration, are very poor with limited possibilities for economic development, and are generally sparsely settled with much of the land often desert. Though Pattern IV countries are all in East or Central Africa, it is clear that for this geographical definition we can more accurately substitute other variables and define the grouping, as we have above, as including colonies with settler politics. Though this analytical definition is more accurate than the geographical definition, which would also have included Uganda, the use of the geographical definition helps account for the diffusion, aborted by the Amin coup, of a one-party competitive system to Uganda. Pattern V corresponds least well to a geographic definition and may more accurately be described as the areas of nonsettler politics and indirect colonial rule.

This discussion is obviously preliminary. Work needs to be done to understand what prior conditions these geographical and colonial
groupings really correspond to and to disentangle the logic or mechanisms which relate such prior conditions to the political patterns that have been described.19

Finally, what, if any, effects will these different patterns of political change and these different regime types have on future developments in Africa? There are, of course, important similarities among African countries, and the differences noted in the postindependence period may be eroded over a longer time span. There is another possibility, however. In his broadly comparative analysis, Pride (1970) suggests that patterns of party dominance, party penetration, and societal cleavages in the early period of modernization combine to have abiding effects on the evolution of national regimes. The present study suggests that so far this seems to be the case for Africa as well, and it will be interesting to see how the differences identified evolve over time.

It would also be interesting to explore the impact of differences in regime on policy outcomes such as the successful pursuit of development strategies. This topic has not yet been carefully analyzed by scholars concerned with Africa. Though it does not appear that one kind of regime tends to be either more radical or more conservative than another, the capacity of different governments to pursue development goals successfully (whether more capitalist or more socialist) may depend in part on the type of regime involved. It would be interesting to explore the different kinds of organizational, symbolic, and coercive resources that military regimes and the two types of one-party regimes bring to the task of building and executing long-term development policies. Evidence from Latin America, where the interplay between regime characteristics and policy performance has been more extensively studied, points to the particular importance of certain resources that may be available to African one-party regimes: the continuity of political institutions that may be provided even by an organizationally weak one-party system; the use of symbolic resources that may play a critical role in contexts in which payoffs based on material resources are in short supply; and the possibly greater political flexibility and cooptive capacity of party structures, as opposed to administrative structures directed by military elites, in responding to opposition and crisis (Kaufman, 1976; O'Donnell, 1975; Davis, 1976; Stevens, 1974). It may be the case for Africa as well that there is an important relationship between the differing structural characteristics and political resources of these regimes and their effectiveness in important areas of public policy. Such a relationship is suggested in the African setting by Schumacher's (1975: 226) analysis of Senegal, which points to the
importance of the symbolic, ceremonial, and legitimating role of the party in Senegalese political life, as well as to the somewhat different distribution of power and the influence on policy that results from the presence of the party.

Apart from the question of effectiveness, the Latin American experience also suggests that the existence of different regimes may lead countries that have relatively similar economic development strategies to pursue them with quite different human costs. For instance, contemporary Mexico is pursuing economic policies that reflect a type of class domination in many ways similar to that found in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. Yet Mexico has avoided the type of harshly repressive military regime that has clearly facilitated the pursuit of these policies in the other four countries. This may have occurred because of the existence of a highly developed, incorporating, integrative party in Mexico. This relationship between regime type and differences in human costs suggests another line of inquiry that could usefully be pursued within the African setting.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, Lipset (1959); Cutright (1963); Neubauer (1967); Pride (1970); Dahl (1971); and Flanigan and Fogelman (1971).

2. The countries included in the analysis are the former colonies and trust territories of France, Belgium, and Great Britain that are located south of the Sahara and north of the Zambezi.

3. It should be noted that these problems are not present in the growing cross-national literature on African politics, which is explicitly oriented around the examination of differences among countries. See, for instance, Morrison and Stevenson (1972), Duvall and Welfling (1973), Welfling (1973), and Hakes (1973).

4. This idea is explicit or implicit in many studies of military intervention in Africa. See, for example, Decalo (1976), First (1972), Lee (1969), Lemarchand (1972), Welch (1970), and Zolberg (1968a).

5. In its substantive focus, this study may be viewed as an extension of Zolberg's (1966) analysis of five West African countries. The difference lies in the fact that whereas Zolberg's analysis sought to provide insights regarding one type of regime in Africa, the party-state, the present analysis seeks to explore the emergence of different types of regimes.

6. Except for social and economic background variables that were taken from Morrison et al. (1972), the data employed in this analysis were gathered by the author from a wide variety of monographic and periodical sources. A composite measure of party dominance was used which was based on ten variables: percent of the vote for the leading party in the last preindependence election; number of parties with legislative representation at independence; percent of legislative seats won by leading party in the
last preindependence election and the percent held at independence; legislative fractional-
ization following last preindependence election and at independence; pattern of
dominance of leading party over the preindependence period (low throughout the period,
higher but declining, increasing throughout to fairly high level, high throughout); and
three variables derived from Hodgkin (1961); number of important parties in prein-
dependence period; number of important opposition parties; and number of parties in ruling
coalition at independence. Factor analysis was used as a data reduction technique to
derive a single indicator from these ten component variables.

Electoral participation is operationalized as the percent of the population voting
in the last national election before independence, except in Sierra Leone where the
"independence" election in fact followed independence. In Sierra Leone, the last pre-
independence election was held four years before independence under a restricted
franchise, whereas the comparable elections used for other countries were held not more
than one or two years prior to independence, and almost all on the basis of universal
suffrage. The first election with universal suffrage in Sierra Leone was in fact set up
under colonial rule, but did not actually take place until a year after independence, and it
is that election which was used for calculating electoral participation.

A word might be added about the reliability of the data used in this analysis. Many of
the variables involve event data and present few problems because of the nature of the
events. Scoring the occurrence of successful coups, how a one-party regime is formed,
or whether an election is competitive, poses few of the problems encountered in deter-
mining the incidence of other types of events such as strikes, riots, and political arrests.
The data on the distribution of seats in preindependence legislatures were more difficult
to find. For this I have relied heavily on Welfling (1971), as well as on the standard political
histories of each country, African news periodicals, and international yearbooks. The
indicator of electoral participation as a percentage of population may pose somewhat
greater problems because of issues regarding both parts of this ratio. In some countries
there may have been some inflation of voting figures, though I have generally employed
figures that have been used, and thereby implicitly treated as reliable, by country
specialists. The population data is drawn from Morrison et al. (1972).

7. In Figure 1 in the final section of this article, two French colonies are represented
as having low dominance and high participation. The discrepancy results from the fact
that the above relationship is based on a dichotomous form of the variables which divides
the cases at the middle of the range for French Africa, whereas the dichotomy used below
divides the cases at the mean value for all 26 countries.

8. In light of the small case base within these subgroups, partial correlations based
on the introduction of even one control variable must, of course, be treated with caution.
It might be noted, however, that the introduction of indicators of socioeconomic moderni-
zation as controls does not alter the relationship between participation and dominance
among the British colonies, while in a few instances it tends to strengthen it among the
French colonies.

9. These interpretations are based on an examination of the monographic literature
on African politics. For a more extended discussion of these relationships and the causes
of the differences in the patterns between French and British Africa, see Collier (1974).

10. For present purposes, a one-party regime will be defined as involving cases in
which only one party holds seats in the national legislature.

11. Bienen (1970) and Finer (1967) have both suggested that the concept of one-
party regime should be broken down and that distinctions should be made among
them. However, to my knowledge, no systematic analysis of different types of one-party
regimes has been undertaken, except for the distinctions made by Huntington (1970),
which continue to group virtually all the African single-party regimes within the same category. Even Finer, in the analysis which follows his criticism of a blanket single-party concept, analyzes all one-party regimes on the African continent as a single group without making distinctions among them. His analysis is particularly important for present purposes because he finds that one-party states and multiparty states are equally likely to experience military intervention, an assertion about which more will be said below.

12. It may be noted that in one of these countries, Kenya, a short-lived one-party regime had been formed by merger five years earlier.

13. See Zolberg (1966: 78-79) for a similar argument made with reference to the party-states of West Africa.

14. A computer program that permitted calculating partial coefficients for rho, thus making it possible to control this relationship for party dominance, was unfortunately not conveniently available. However, the analysis was redone with a product-moment correlation substituted for the original rho (the values are similar). It was found that in a three-variable path analysis, the polarity of the relationship remained unchanged and its strength was likewise relatively stable.

15. Welfling (1973) also reported a finding which related coups to a party variable. Though her party variable, institutionalization, is very different from mine, it clearly does rank African countries in a similar way. Hence, though the two studies employ different analytic frameworks and seek to explain different things, they do tap the same underlying relationship between characteristics of the party system and military coups.

16. The decision was initially made to dichotomize these two variables at the mean of the distribution of all 26 cases. In both cases, however, the mean did not represent a natural break point in the distribution. As a result, the break point used was that nearest the mean which would divide the cases at a natural break. In fact, the break point used for electoral participation changed only one case, while that used for party dominance changed only two cases, in comparison with the results obtained when dichotomizing at the mean.

17. The only other country (aside from Sierra Leone—see note 6) which did not have universal suffrage before independence was Tanzania, but this fact does not distort the low score on participation for that country. In the first election with universal suffrage, turnout in Tanzania did not even approach the 23% cut-off point.

18. This corresponds to the distinction between “contagious” and “constant source” diffusion discussed in Coleman (1964: ch. 17).

19. The sorting out of these factors obviously goes far beyond the mere introduction of social and economic modernization variables as controls, which has already been done in this analysis. It might involve, rather, some further elaboration of the suggestive groupings of countries according to differences in the nature of European penetration, economic domination, and integration into the world capitalist system proposed by Samir Amin (1972).

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