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Collective Action in the Chinese Countryside

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The study of popular contention in rural China has become a veritable growth industry. In the last two years alone, a number of articles have explored peasant challenges ranging from tax resistance,¹ to petitions against land expropriation,² to environmental protests,³ to clashes surrounding local elections.⁴ Although this literature does not yet rival the outpouring of work on China's rural political economy, the gap is closing. Collective action in the countryside, a topic that once seemed to be a sideshow to the main event of economic reform, industrialization, and innovations in property rights, is moving closer to center stage.
Now, five books have appeared that demonstrate how far we have come in the study of rural contention. These books roam widely and collective action is only one of many topics they alight upon. Each volume, however, has much to say about what disaffected villagers want, how they pursue it, and what they ultimately get. While the analyses are occasionally at odds and there are different shadings of emphasis among the authors, the points of consensus far exceed the discordant notes. This suggests that it may be an opportune time for some stock-taking. What do we know about the aims, means, and impact of collective action in rural China? How widespread is it? Who is targeted? What forms does rural popular action take? Who leads it and how organized is it? Why is it occurring? What, more broadly, can the study of rural discontent and its consequences contribute to the understanding of state-society relations in China?

Frequency and Scale

It is not mysterious why interest in rural collective action is growing. When Elizabeth Perry’s study (chap. 9) of unrest in the countryside first appeared in 1985, my students were taken aback. Her account of sectarian violence and cadres leading their communities into battle with nearby villages jarred with the stunning economic growth and peaceful decollectivization that other analysts were busy chronicling. Of course we now know that a wave of rural contention was rising in the early 1980s that has yet to crest.

Lucien Bianco wisely cautions that reports of mounting unrest are partly a result of better access to information during the reform era. Still, there is little doubt that rural collective action has increased of late. Bianco himself, in a book that spans the entire twentieth century, concludes: “overall it appears that the Chinese countryside has seen more disturbances during the twenty years of reform than during the previous thirty, that the second half of the 1980s was more agitated than the first half, and that the 1990s
have been more unsettled still" (p. 245). Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü concur, noting reports that show rural violence and protest became more common in the 1990s, with especially large spikes of popular action in 1992-93 and 1996-97. In 1996-97, for instance, parades, demonstrations and petitioning took place in as many as 36 counties in nine provinces, with 230 cases deemed "turmoil, riot, or rebellion".

Jonathan Unger, like Bernstein and Lü, underscores not only the growing number of incidents but also the "increasingly open disgruntlement" (p. 197) in many areas and the bloody conflicts that sometimes erupt. He notes that 3200 collective protests occurred in the first half of 1998 alone, of which more than 420 involved confrontations in which rural government buildings were surrounded, with casualties topping 7400, including more than 1200 officials or police wounded. Like the armed standoff in Daqiu zhuang detailed in Bruce Gilley's book, many of these provocative, overt acts of insurgency go far beyond the "everyday resistance" that scholars of contemporary China have tended to focus upon in the past.⁵

Rural discontent is clearly widespread and chronic. And though most collective challenges remain small in scale, some are not. 380,000 rural residents took part in the 1996-97 protests, and another surge of dissent the following summer drew in about half a million villagers from four provinces. Individual incidents can also be quite large. A 2001 Central Organization Department analysis, cited in Bernstein and Lü, speaks of "frequently hundreds and thousands and even up to 10,000" participants in a single event. Moreover, the top of this range is certainly understated. The Renshou rioters in 1993, for example, turned out well over 10,000 people to contest a special road levy. In 1995, 20,000 villagers rose up in Shanxi to protest taxes that were rising faster than incomes. In Jiangxi in 2000, imposition of a local tax at a time of declining agricultural prices precipitated a riot of up to 20,000 farmers and the ransacking of a township office compound. (The size of large-scale actions cannot help but bring to mind the Falun
Gong sit-in that occurred outside Zhongnanhai in April 1999 -- a demonstration whose massive scale Perry observes was partly responsible for the harsh repression that followed).

Smaller, legal and arguably legal acts of contention are also on the rise. As early as 1988, Farmer's Daily received about one thousand letters a day, mostly complaints from farmers about local abuses. Interviews conducted in 1998 by Bernstein and Lü suggest that letter-writing, petitioning and collective visits have only continued to grow. By the turn of the century, provincial authorities received hundreds of thousands of complaints from rural districts every year, and collective petitioning in Hebei alone reached 6047 visits in 1997, with each delegation averaging 22 complainants.6

Claims, Grievances, and Targets
Some years ago, Charles Tilly identified three types of claims made by collective actors. Competitive claims take aim at resources held by rivals in society. Reactive claims involve efforts to defend group rights and privileges, most often against agents of the state. Proactive claims assert rights not previously enjoyed.7 Taken together, the five books under review offer evidence that each sort of aim is at work in the Chinese countryside today.

Unger, Perry, and Bianco draw attention to confrontations rooted in competitive claims. Examples range from trifling quarrels between families, to simmering lineage disputes, to armed vendettas (xiedou) that pit whole communities or even alliances of villages against one another. This type of popular action was a perennial feature of social life prior to 1949, but it became less common during the first decade after the PRC was founded. Competitive conflicts gained a new life, however, by the early 1960s, Perry explains, as socialist agriculture was consolidated and feuds based on membership in teams, brigades and communes (which often mirrored pre-1949
marketing areas, villages, and lineages) were rekindled. During the late 1960s, such tensions often intensified further. Unger attributes this to a lethal brew of traditional and Cultural Revolution notions of uncompromising honor, righteousness, vengeance and intolerance, which engendered a virtual frenzy of communal strife in certain villages.⁸

This upsurge during Mao's final years does not mean that collective action based on competitive claims died out with the Cultural Revolution. In fact, feuds and xiedou remain common, particularly in the southeast. Bianco and Perry identify a number of factors that encourage kinsmen or villages to vie with each other: the growing role of the family under the household responsibility system; a resurgence of clan activity, as seen in renewed temple-building, compilation of genealogies, and ancestor worship; new sources of conflict linked to marketization, such as disputes over forests and village boundaries. Religious rituals often play a large part in these rows and can serve to buttress communal solidarity and deepen rifts. Of the five authors, Perry is most insistent about the prominence of strife that springs from competitive claims. Speaking of the immediate post-Mao period, she sees little proactive contention and a marked decline in reactive, anti-state incidents compared to the 1950s.

Several of the other authors, focusing on the 1990s and collective action directed at local officials, highlight reactive claims. For Bianco, Unger, and Bernstein and Lü, a large portion of rural agitation is conservative and defensive. Villagers rise up to maintain the existing order when it is threatened. Theirs is an effort to undo an outrage that violates popular notions of equity, fairness or justice. Their main aim is to eliminate an encroachment on established practices or principles.

The grievances that inspire this type of collective action are the time-tested ones: first and foremost excessive and irregular taxation, followed by venality, arrogance and arbitrariness of local officials. Deception, beating, bullying, corruption, diversion of funds, and abuses connected with grain procurement can also antagonize villagers and
lead to conflict. The targets of popular ire are mostly local power holders, such as tax collectors and grassroots cadres. Actions taken by township authorities, Unger notes, are a particular irritant at present.

While richer, suburban villages have been the primary site of protests over land requisition for development zones, most reactive contention (e.g. tax and fee resistance discussed by Bernstein and Lü and Unger) occurs in less developed parts of the central grain belt. It is agricultural areas in inland provinces where villagers are squeezed hardest and most openly. These are the localities in which state assistance is low, outside investors are scarce, and development targets remain high. In these districts, thriving township and village enterprises are generally not available to take on the costs of services and development projects, as they can in more industrialized villages along the eastern seaboard. And in middle-income "agricultural China" there is still a surplus to be extracted, unlike much of the truly impoverished far west, which is also buffered by state relief and policies that provide assistance to minorities. It is in the grain-producing heartland where cadre-peasant relations are particularly tense and farmers have reason to feel resentful toward grasping local officials; it is here that the fiscal system and demands for rapid development feed discontent by making predatory and parasitic practices virtually irresistible for local revenue-collectors.

Contention that traces to reactive claims, fierce as it can be, is rarely directed at the regime, nor does it typically involve demands for wider political change. Peasant actions are usually a response to a specific and local aggravation, such as a new user fee. The demands of protesters tend to be limited and remedial, generally abandonment of an unpopular measure and a return to the old order. Once relief is given (and perhaps a few officials are punished), the participants are usually satisfied and protest subsides.

Of the five authors, Bianco is most emphatic in stating that Chinese peasants almost never rise up to gain new rights or better their position. For him, "reactive
movements remain predominant” (p. 250) and rural contention is fundamentally
defensive, sometimes competitive, but rarely proactive.

This brings us to Gilley, the only author who stresses proactive claims. Bernstein
and Lü, it is true, mention on their first page "the increased assertiveness of society,
including demands for accountability, the rule of law, and a voice in policy-making."
They also locate, amid a host of defensive claims, occasional calls for democracy and
slogans that challenge the status quo and seek greater autonomy. But it is Gilley who
makes the case for reactive aims broadening into proactive ones. In his telling, what
began as a limited effort to safeguard the prosperity of China’s richest village evolved
into a “quest for . . . political, social, and economic equality for China’s peasants” (p. 52).
Daqiuzhuang’s extraordinary Party secretary, Yu Zuomin, had a vision of China in which
country folk were no longer second-class citizens and villages ran themselves as they
pleased. To usher in these changes, the Party would be pushed to the sidelines and a
new moneyed class would take its place. Political reforms would also be necessary,
such as eliminating the Organization Department and giving constitutional status to rural
enterprises.

Through conferences and exchanges with other villages (including several
Maoist models) Yu circulated his views widely. Yu’s bottom-line goal of ending
discrimination was national rather than parochial, long-term rather than immediate.
Although his antagonists were at first local leaders, by the time the rebellion that made
Daqiuzhuang famous was put down, the uprising was “verging on a genuine social
movement” (p. 157) whose target was Party ideology, leftist ideologues, and senior
officials.

Unlike contention rooted in reactive claims, popular action with proactive aims is
most often found in better-off localities with flourishing township and village enterprises.
Contrary to profiles of industrialized villages that emphasize political passivity, Gilley
argues that "examples of wealthy villages rising up to defend their interests are now legion" (p. 160). He cites Chinese sources from the mid- and late 1990s that evince concern about fortified villages and village chieftains (zhuangzhu) who use economic means to build political capital. I interviewed just such a chieftain a few miles down the road from Daqiuzhuang in July 1998. In an industrialized village where every household owned an automobile and homes averaged 200 square meters, the Party secretary had defied his superiors for years (with villagers united behind him), while county leaders were awaiting an opportunity (i.e. a misstep) to take down this "small Yu Zuomin" and corral his wayward village.

Gilley reminds us to be alert for proactive claims growing out of reactive ones. Proactive demands may also come garbed in reactive robes. Efforts to gain entry into the local polity can arrive disguised as requests to honor an existing right. Consider a 1995 wall poster that criticized cadre corruption with these words: "We're citizens. Give us back our citizen rights." In one sense, the graffiti artist was making a reactive claim against local leaders who refused to recognize his right to inspect the village accounts. In another sense, he was cloaking a daring proactive claim in reactive terms, demanding citizenship rights he had never enjoyed while making it appear he had just been deprived of them.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Forms of Action}

Many of today's protests hark back to pre-1949 practices. Popular action, now as then, often takes the form of collective petitioning, demonstrations, besieging government compounds, sacking offices and homes of local bureaucrats, destroying official vehicles, and rioting. Bianco notes that obstructing roads and bridges has become more common, while confronting the army has declined and killing tax collectors has inched downwards. Still, the overall picture is clear: contemporary protests, in Perry's words,
“share a remarkable resemblance to patterns of unrest so familiar to students of imperial and Republican China” (p. x).

Certain forms of collective action have become especially prominent as villagers hone their resistance routines and innovate at the edge of the repertoire of contention. \(^{13}\) Rural agitators have always been rules conscious and adept at seizing on official rhetoric to press their claims. In late imperial China, tenants sometimes used government rulings as a pretext to refuse payment of rent, and villagers also objected to taxes when they felt local authorities had ignored proper collection procedures and would back off when faced with complaints. Such challenges, Bernstein and Lü explain, typically rested on appeals to equity and fairness, focusing on how the tax burden was apportioned, on adjustments for harvest conditions, and on the use of biased measures and conversion ratios. \(^{14}\)

The books under review document a similar, perhaps heightened, sensitivity to government discourses in the countryside today. Resourceful villagers often couch their resistance in the language of loyal intentions while professing little more than a desire to make the system live up to what it is supposed to be. They object to official misbehavior in the name of unimpeachable ideals and tender impeccably respectable demands. “As they become better informed and more inclined to think of their relations with the state and its representatives in contractual terms” (Bianco, p. 251), these plucky villagers exploit a yawning gap between rights promised and rights delivered. In particular, they seek to trip up local officials who refuse to acknowledge rights that central authorities have recognized, and they demand that protections they have been guaranteed are honored.

These days, one of the more common protections cited is the Center’s 5% limit on peasant burdens. Unger, Gilley, and Bernstein and Lü explain how rural activists often invoke the authority of the national government to contest illegal local levies.
These expert faultfinders rally their neighbors with slogans like “resolutely unite around the Center” and say they are merely seeking faithful implementation of Party policy. They know about the 5% maximum and often possess written materials that spell it out. "Armed with such information," Unger observes, "by far the greatest number of farmers' protests today are entirely within the letter of the law. These include signature petitions, appeals to law courts, approaches to national newspapers and magazines, and delegations of peasants traveling to seek out high-level officials to lodge direct complaints" (p. 214).15

Sometimes, however, peaceful protests turn violent. The 1993 Sichuan riots and the 2000 Jiangxi riots both trace to the arrest of activists who dared to inform other villagers about the 5% rule. Farmers in Daolin, Hunan, who called themselves Volunteers for the Publicity of Policies and Regulations, also clashed with local officials over provincial and central directives that capped taxation and opposed corruption. These "burden reduction heroes" used tape recorders and a loudspeaker truck to tell their neighbors about their rights. Their efforts culminated with a demonstration in January 1999 that turned into a battle between thousands of villagers and 1000 police officers and 500 soldiers.

In all these incidents, protesters used the regime's own words as a weapon and combined legal tactics with collective action (or the threat of it) to defend their "lawful rights and interests" (hefa quanyi).16 They ceded the high ground to official values and shrewdly launched attacks in a rhetoric that even unresponsive elites had to recognize. Their tactics included petitions, civil disobedience, and out-and-out violence, used singly, together, or in sequence. Bernstein and Lü point out that disruptive acts, such as sit-ins or blocking rail lines, are often the most effective way to communicate grievances to higher levels. And, when as often happens, angry villagers are brushed off, given empty promises, or fobbed off on others, the level of violence can escalate rapidly.
Leadership and Organization

Leadership involves skills and action. Effective rabble-rousers motivate followers, build coalitions, and frame issues in a way that resonates. They also size up opponents, seize opportunities, and force mistakes. In rural China, as elsewhere, the catalysts of collective action (like Yu Zuomin) tend to have forceful personalities and more than a dash of charisma. They are seldom, the authors stress, ordinary farmers.

Village cadres sometimes initiate popular action, especially the larger, more organized episodes. According to Bianco, Gilley, and Perry, this is the case for many xiedou and also for contention orchestrated by managers of village conglomerates. Grassroots leaders may also incite "everyday resistance", such as illegal lumbering and looting of bricks and coal. Scattered evidence gathered by Bernstein and Lü indicates that heads of former production teams, now called group leaders, may be more likely than full-time village cadres to side with peasants and spearhead contention.

When basic-level leaders themselves are targeted, Bianco and Bernstein and Lü note, the instigators often are better-educated villagers and respected elites not in office. These include teachers (who can build networks based on ties with parents) and former soldiers (who often have organizational and communication skills derived from their stint in the PLA). Peasants with schooling can compose effective petitions and are more likely to know about beneficial laws and policies. Demobilized soldiers typically feel that they are more worldly and capable than current office holders and are often frustrated that they have been shut out of the village power structure. Most recently, elected cadres have also taken to coordinating attacks on appointed village or township officials who impose excessive fees or try to implement other unlawful “local policies” (tu zhengce). In Shandong, in fact, liberalizing nomination procedures in 1999 produced so many "leaders of collective visits" (shangfang touzi), that provincial authorities
complained that contention directed at township officials, organized by elected cadres, was causing widespread chaos.19

Leadership, important as it is, is often short-lived. Bernstein and Lü argue that most rural tax protests are spontaneous flare-ups that lack sustained leadership and coordination. Bianco goes even further, writing of "peasant furies" and "deficient" or "nonexistent" organization (p. 251). Secret societies and clans do provide grounds for mobilization, but they also divide the population and undermine unified opposition to outside pressure. Bernstein and Lü conclude that while tax protests sometimes spread to neighboring townships, and school and business ties may one day inspire township- or county-wide action, so far there are few signs of the solidarity, coordination, and reach of a true social movement.

In recent years, however, a new trend has emerged. A 2001 Central Committee analysis advised that popular contention was becoming "visibly" more organized. Supporting this assessment, a 2002 report by Sichuan's Organization Department claimed that over 95 percent of relatively large collective events were directed by leadership groups that employed a division of labor, fashioned tactics, and masterminded unrest.20 Bernstein and Lü themselves acknowledge that increased "staying power" became a notable feature of rural resistance in the late 1990s.

The likeliest organized threat remains heterodox religious sects, which operated throughout the 1980s and 1990s (well before Falun Gong grabbed the world's attention). Some boasted followers in ten or more provinces and the six largest had between 100,000 and 600,000 members. As Perry and Bernstein and Lü point out, Falun Gong and the underground Christian movement have also displayed an impressive ability to assemble people outside approved channels.

Outcomes
Gauging the impact of collective action is notoriously difficult. Questions about causality and definition dog even the most careful attempts to link an episode or cycle of contention to an outcome. Popular action is always but one factor in a long chain of events, and showing how reformist elites and protesters come together to produce change is always complicated. Given these impediments, it's no wonder that studies of contentious politics (including the books under review) have traditionally paid more attention to the origins and dynamics of contention than to its consequences. It is also not surprising that research on outcomes often has a defensive tone, as attention falls on whether contention has an impact rather than how it has an impact.

In China, where popular input in policy making is limited and organized movements are crushed or pushed underground, locating effects entails looking beyond quick policy or procedural victories and eschewing simple notions of "success" and "failure," while scanning for a range of outcomes. These results may be long-term and indirect, and they may be associated with policy implementation and value change rather than institutional breakthroughs or anything approaching regime collapse.

Although the odds are against it, collective action can sometimes help curb misimplementation of popular policies. On occasion, illegal levies are rescinded, rigged elections are overturned, and corrupt or avaricious cadres are reined in. In fact, in one Hebei county, lodging collective complaints was so effective that the county organization department censured township officials for caving in too readily. In the words of a frustrated county official: "some township leaders have developed a collective complaints syndrome: they scratch their head whenever they see the masses come . . . and appease them by recalling a village party secretary as soon as a complaint is lodged".

When the stakes are higher and violence is involved, Bianco, Perry, and Bernstein and Lü find that a more common outcome is detention of the ringleaders
followed by concessions on the very subject of the protesters' demands. After the 1997 riots in Jiangxi and Hubei, for example, Li Peng dispatched a work team, which ordered payment of all IOUs and abolished 21 taxes and fees. The highway taxes that provoked the Renshou riots were also rescinded after the unrest ended, though several of the organizers were imprisoned. Rural provocateurs usually pay a high price for their deeds, but not always. When leaders of protests or petition drives manage to escape arrest, they are sometimes drawn into officialdom, as yesterday's "peasant hero" becomes today's elected village cadre.

Rural unrest may not pose an imminent danger to the regime, as Unger and Bernstein and Lü suggest. And it may be less threatening than urban upheaval and factional infighting, as Bianco suggests. But it can play a part in fending off extraction, deflecting predatory behavior, and sending grasping and high-handed cadres packing.

Participating in collective action may also bring about what Bianco calls "a positive change in the peasants themselves" (p. 251). While Bianco sees accession to full citizenship as "very remote", Bernstein and Lü argue that rural folk have become much more rights conscious, especially in middle-income, agricultural China. It is quite possible that the greatest impact of contention has been on popular identities and aspirations. Organizers, in particular, undergo a learning experience, become aware of new possibilities, and often end up inclined to participate in larger struggles. The recent emergence of "peasant leaders" attests to the presence of a corps of frustrated, assertive, risk-takers whose actions reflect heightened expectations and a deep engagement with official "rights talk".

Opportunities, Allies, and the Media

Collective action is often associated with openings in the political opportunity structure: protest is more likely when institutional access improves, when rifts among elites appear, when influential allies become available, and when the state's capacity or will to repress
declines. In rural China, the books under review suggest, the recent upturn in contention is in large part a product of political easing, undertaken at a time when officialdom is increasingly divided and some elites (including journalists) are disposed to champion popular demands.

Bianco, in particular, argues that the authorities play a bigger role than villagers in determining the amount of resistance. For him, the key change of late is a regime that has become more tolerant of small-scale actions that do not target the Center. He observes that there has never been a one-to-one relationship between grievances and mobilization, and that during the collective era (when rural discontent was greatest), protest was at a low ebb. In his view, which is shared by most students of contentious politics, a demonstrated willingness to crush resistance usually deters popular action and it is the loosening of controls that stimulates people to pour into the streets. The single most important impetus for collective action, noted both by Bianco and Bernstein and Lü, has thus been a decline in the swiftness, certainty, and harshness of repression, even compared with the early reform period studied by Perry.

The recent surge in contention can also be linked to specific reforms and policies that have cut the costs of certain kinds of dissent and opened the polity a crack. Bernstein and Lü list a number of institutional departures -- the end of collective farming, communes, mass campaigns, class labeling, and class struggle -- that have left villagers’ less fearful, reduced their dependence, and expanded their room for maneuver. At the same time, a series of freshly-minted restrictions on cadre discretion have given rural people more violations to protest: in this regard, the authors highlight the 5% limit on fees; a stipulation in the Agriculture Law that allows villagers to reject illegal impositions; a clause in the Villagers’ Committee Law that authorizes voters to challenge election chicanery by lodging reports (jubao); and measures that grant rural residents the right to appeal to higher levels if cadres refuse to open village accounts. A 1998 State Council
regulation, cited by Bernstein and Lü, also signaled a conciliatory approach to some types of contention. It concluded that most rallies, demonstrations, and parades arose from "contradictions among the people" rather than "contradictions with the enemy," and took local cadres to task for impinging on the masses' lawful rights and interests.

The presence of elite allies and muckraking reporters has also altered the risk-reward ratio for rural activists. Yu Zuomin had backers as highly-placed as Bo Yibo and Li Ruihuan to protect him when others called him a "mountain rebel." On lower-profile disputes, villagers have proven adept at ferreting out advocates in various bureaucracies who have a stake in seeing their appeals addressed. They skillfully "venue shop" and press their claims wherever they have the best chance of success. In one place, it might be a civil affairs bureau; in another it might be a people's congress; in a third it could be a discipline inspection committee or a procurator's anti-corruption office. These villagers have recognized that state power is both fragmented and divided against itself, and they know if they search diligently, they can sometimes locate pressure points where elite unity crumbles. Official allies, for their part, typically make themselves available when they believe that offering redress will reduce the likelihood of further unrest while improving policy implementation and cadre oversight.

Journalists can also be crucial allies, often indirectly. Increased editorial freedom and competitive pressures have given rise to a more market-oriented media, and exposés of official wrongdoing can generate a huge audience. In the course of uncovering corruption and other misconduct, television stations and newspapers have, as Gilley remarks, become more willing to report the point of view of protesting peasants. Bernstein and Lü note that Farmer's Daily has emerged as an advocate of rural interests, and that in the midst of the 1999 Daolin demonstrations, several organizers traveled to Beijing to contact the producers of Focus -- China's most popular TV program devoted to investigative journalism. Quite a few villagers know by now
that bad publicity can affect a local cadre’s performance evaluation and career prospects, and may even precipitate an immediate investigation. In one village where Lianjiang Li and I have done research, a group of complainants have been trying for years to lure (or hire!) a reporter to come and expose several corrupt cadres.

Of course, any gains in political space should not be exaggerated. As Yu Zuomin discovered, elite allies can be fleeting and journalists can be used to delegitimize protest and heap calumny on people they once praised. Adventurous newspapers (such as Southern Weekend) can come under pressure and be subject to editorial reshuffles for reporting aspects of the rural situation that the leadership wishes to keep quiet. The 5% limit is often flouted and the statute that empowers villagers to reject illegal fees does not specify remedial steps. Rural residents may challenge dishonest elections, but the Villagers’ Committee Law does not spell out any punishment for abridging voters’ rights. Even as collective visits continue, Bernstein and Lü point out that a 1995 directive limited and regulated them, decreeing that no more than five complainants be sent and instructing villagers to pursue their charges level-by-level.

Bianco is on firm ground when he writes that although peasants have more room to express their grievances, we should not misjudge the power relations between popular forces and the authorities. Officials at higher levels may present themselves as protectors who are doing their best to control errant cadres, but this is often a pose (Unger, p. 215) or an example of good intentions not backed up by a capacity to halt abuses. Even contention that appears to be tolerated operates within an “extremely unequal triangle of forces linking the central leadership, the local authorities, and the peasants” (Bianco, p. 253).

The idea that contention is shaped by a distinctly Chinese interplay of state and society appears in several of the books, and is especially prominent in Perry’s volume. In her words, societal initiatives “reflect the heavy hand of statist influences” and
protesters are “unusually attentive to signals from the state”. Allies are commonly sought “among the bureaucratic elite rather than among society at large”, and instigators often receive “at least implicit high-level encouragement”. The result is a “state-centric” style of contention in which protesters, unlike their counterparts in Eastern Europe, have not turned away from the regime by refusing to take it seriously, but instead continue to crave official recognition (pp. x, xi, xxi, xxiii, xxix, 315, 324).

A propensity to remonstrate rather than to defy inevitably limits most popular claims to those that the Center finds palatable. But it can also help bring villagers the modest victories they achieve. Collective action in rural China has little to do with a new revolution and much to do with changing some things that matter in the village. It is above all a way for people with few other resources to work the system for local benefits. Peasants adapt their strategies to the contours of a reforming regime as they discover which openings can be exploited and where their best opportunities lie. Although contention takes the shape that the state gives it, dependence is not solely a liability for protesters creative and skillful enough to turn it to their advantage.

Berkeley

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Notes

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1 Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, "Taxation without Representation: Peasants, the Central and the Local States in Reform China", China Quarterly, No. 163 (September 2000), pp. 742-763.


3 Jun Jing, "Environmental Protests in Rural China", in Perry and Selden (eds), Chinese Society, pp. 143-60.


6 A 1993 analysis of 170 incidents in Henan found that the number of villagers seeking an audience ranged from seven to 145, with an average of 20 to 30, while larger delegations often had 60 to 70 members. See Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural


11 This position has a long tradition in the study of rural collective action. Tilly, for one, argues that “the rural population of Europe has mounted a substantial amount of proactive collective action, but the actors have typically been nonpeasants.” Hobsbawm, in the volume that launched contemporary studies of rural political action, was also unimpressed by peasant capabilities to imagine a new future -- until a revolutionary party came along. See, Charles Tilly, ”Rural Collective Action in Modern Europe”, in Joseph Spielberg and Scott Whiteford (eds), *Forging Nations*


18 On the role of group leaders, see Grinspoon, "Socialist Wasteland Auctions", chap. 4.

19 Lianjiang Li, "Elections and Popular Resistance".


22 This issue lies near the heart of the debate over Daniel Kelliher's *Peasant Power in China* and Kate Xiao Zhou's, *How the Farmers Changed China* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). On the interplay of elite and mass initiative during decollectivization, see Unger and Bianco, as well as David Zweig, "Rural People, the Politicians, and Power", *The China Journal*, No. 38 (July 1997), pp. 153-68. These authors show that either-or questions about the impetus behind change spring from an unrealistic vision of what popular action can accomplish directly (how often are consequences unmediated by the powers-that-be?) and thereby impoverish our understanding of outcomes.


24 Zhonggong Cixian Xianwei Zuzhibu, "You zhuanggao zhibu shuji yinchu de sikao" (Thoughts on lodging complaints against Party secretaries), Ganbu yu Rencai (Cadres and Talent), No. 12 (December 1993), p. 36.


26 Tan Wen, "'Nongmin yulun lingxiu' shi yingxiong haishi diaomin?' (Are "peasant public opinion leaders" heroes or diaomin?), Zhongguo Shehui Daokan (Guide to Chinese Society), No. 4 (April 2000), pp. 6-9.


29 For an analysis of the stories covered by Focus in 1999, see Alex Chan, "From Propaganda to Hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China's Media Policy"; also Li Xiaoping, "Focus (Jiaodian Fangtan) and the Changes in the Chinese Television Industry", both in Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 11, No. 30 (February 2002).


31 For more on these regulations and the "letters and visits" system, see Laura M. Luehrmann, "Officials Face the Masses: Citizen Contacting in Modern China", Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2000, pp. 76-81, 84.