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ETHNICITY AND THE POLITICS OF GROWTH

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Los Angeles: Number One in Growth and Slow Growth Movements

The media continually assure Angelinos that they no longer live in a provincial outpost. Los Angeles is the place, today second to Tokyo as the world's fastest growing urban area; tomorrow possibly the number one city in the Western Hemisphere. According to The Atlantic's special issue on "the big orange": "Los Angeles rivals New York in attracting ambitious people who want to make it, in almost every professional endeavor and field of business" (Lockwood and Leinberger 1988, p. 31). The attraction is apparently international. The increased immigration of Latinos, Asians, and others has made Los Angeles the first "Third World" city in the U.S.

However, media hype about being number one underplays the social consequences of growth. The Los Angeles miracle has in fact depended on a kind of "Third World" pattern of chaotic and unequal development fueled by foreign capital and low-waged immigrant labor, and accompanied by inadequate investment in a sagging infrastructure, and minimal regional planning for a fundamental economic, demographic, and spatial restructuring of the region (cf. Soja, Heskin, Cenzatti 1985; Davis 1987).

Thus, Los Angeles may be the place for growth, but it is also the place for growth problems and, increasingly, slow-growth movements. In the absence of social planning, newcomers to the city and old residents representing a kaleidoscope of ethnic and class experiences are individually and collectively through grassroots movements improvising their own solutions to the major problems of immigration and rapid economic change.

THE CASE OF MONTEREY PARK

This paper offers one small but dramatic example of grassroots responses to urban restructuring. It is a case study of the politics of ethnicity and growth in Monterey Park, North America's first suburban Chinatown. Evolving after World War II from a predominantly white, middle class suburb into a multi-ethnic city, today Monterey Park has the highest concentration of Asians of any city in the United States.

Our research addresses two issues: (1) the development of the politics of growth and ethnicity in a multi-ethnic, middle class suburb undergoing rapid demographic and economic change as a result of the rapid influx of Asian people and capital; (2) the role and stands taken by new Asian immigrants and established residents -- Latinos, Asian-Americans, and Anglos -- in the struggle for ethnic representation and local control over land use, space, language, and the very definition of community.

This paper focuses specifically on the ethnic actors and political currents surrounding the City Council election of April 1988. We used a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative methods appropriate to a community study: demographic analysis, ethnographic observation of the City Council and political campaigns, content analysis of English and Chinese newspapers, interviews with candidates and community leaders, interviews conducted during precinct walking with the leading candidates, and finally,
participation in an exit poll and statistical analysis of results. Our research team was multi-lingual (English, Chinese, Spanish) and multi-ethnic (Asian, Latino, and Anglo).* (In our analysis, we use the local terminology for ethnic groups and consider “Anglos,” as the name implies, an ethnic group.)

Our report will begin with a brief description of the changing ethnic population of Monterey Park. This will be followed by an analysis of the development of the slow-growth movement and the positions taken by the major ethnic groups in the city.

**THE PEOPLE OF MONTEREY PARK**

Only minutes East of downtown Los Angeles, well served on three sides by the Long Beach, Pomona, and San Bernardino freeways, Monterey Park has historically been a step on the ladder of mobility out of the poorer urban centers to the middle class suburbs of the San Gabriel Valley. In 1960, it was an Anglo town (85% Anglo, 12% Latino, and 3% Asian) reluctantly giving way to the suburban dreams of Latinos and Japanese-Americans.

By 1980, the accelerated immigration of second and third generation Chicanos (Americans of Mexican descent) and Nisei (second generation Japanese-Americans) had changed the ethnic map of the city to 48% Anglo, 39% Latino, and 33% Asian. There was also a small, 1% but fast-growing population of Blacks.

In the last decade, the ethnic proportions changed dramatically in response to Chinese immigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere in Asia. The new Chinese immigration into California was sparked generally by more lenient U.S. immigration laws, political instability in Asia, and the dream of a prosperous and peaceful life in the expanding Pacific Rim economy. Encouraged by developers and realtors selling Monterey Park in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States as "The Chinese Beverly Hills," the number of Asian residents in the city increased by 70.6% to become a majority of 51% compared to 15.8% Anglo, 30.5% Latino, and 1.9% Black (see Table 1).

Today, like other areas in Los Angeles, Monterey Park is a town in transition from a middle-American, racially mixed suburban bedroom community to a financial and service center for local and regional Chinese and Asian populations. Chinese signs and Asian businesses line the major commercial streets, and condos have begun to invade the domain of cozy single-family dwellings. The sights and sounds of the 1960's and 1980's clash. Old-timers flee or stay to hold the line, and newcomers go about the difficult business of surviving in a foreign land.

**THE POLITICS OF SLOW GROWTH AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION**

On the positive side, the immigration of Asians and Asian capital has meant economic revitalization and a sense of pride and excitement in building a model multi-racial community. In 1985, Monterey Park was honored nationally by the Citizen's Forum on Self-Government as an "all-American" city for its...
innovation in developing cross-cultural interaction of all ethnic groups and, in particular, newly arrived immigrants. Moreover, ethnic minorities were the majority on the five-member City Council, with two Latinos, David Almada and Rudy Peralta, and a Chinese-born, longtime resident, Lily Chen, who recently and unsuccessfully ran for Congress.

But the appearance of harmony was deceiving. A year later, in 1986, all three minorities were swept out of office after a successful campaign on the part of RAMP, the Residents' Association of Monterey Park. Their sin was being soft on development and granting too many variances to developers. The defeat of the minorities on the City Council signaled the collision of two political movements -- the politics of slow-growth and the politics of ethnic representation. A complex mixture of progressive and conservative currents, these movements sometimes clash and sometimes mesh in the turbulent course of local politics.

The first, the slow-growth movement, tends to be a defensive, populist, and sometimes, a nativist response on the part of established residents who have formed their lives and expectations in an earlier cycle of suburban growth. The second movement is a defense against racism and an offensive struggle for empowerment on the part of the underrepresented minorities (cf. Frank and Fuentes 1987). These movements are complexly interrelated in the thinking of local citizens.

The most visible and powerful movement is that of slow-growth as represented by RAMP. Its success in passing propositions limiting growth and in electing friends to the City Council is a local expression of a strong regional slow-growth movement. Rampant in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, and elsewhere in California, these movements are nightmares to developers who have long been accustomed to having their way in getting the prime commodity controlled by cities -- land use (cf. Logan and Molotch 1987).

In Monterey Park as elsewhere the goal of the slow-growth movement is control over land use in order to curb the problems of development. Every old resident can recite the same litany of complaints about the effects of growth.

For instance, there are tax problems. High tax-producing businesses like J.C. Penney's, car dealerships, and big-name supermarkets fled the city. They were replaced by low tax producers -- new offices, banks, and mini-mall businesses -- which did not provide the revenue needed for expanding city expenses.

There are also quality of life problems: heavy traffic on once quiet streets, inadequate parking in commercial areas, ugly condos and oversize offices encroaching on R1 territory, few shopping facilities catering to non-Asians, and above all, the feeling of being an alien in one's own hometown.

Thus, growth is a number one issue in Monterey Park. But growth has two contradictory sides. One is populist, the support of the little guy defending his community against the big developer. The other side is nativist. Some old residents blame growth problems on the Chinese and have extended their fight for control over land to control over language and, ultimately, over the very definition of what constitutes an American community.

In 1985, the City Council adopted an ordinance requiring businesses (Chinese businesses) to include English translations in their signs. A year later at 1:30 a.m. after the watchful public had retired, the Council's slow-growth majority pushed through a resolution supporting English as the official language of Monterey Park. One of the more "patriotic" Council
members even proposed that the local police cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in carrying out its American duties.

These actions clearly linked nativism (racism) and slow growth. But in protest against this equation and the English Only resolution, a new political force entered the local arena. CHAMP, Citizens for Harmony in Monterey Park, formed as a coalition including anti-racist developers and an as-yet undefined group of progressives. Heavily supported by Latino and Asian residents, CHAMP collected over 4,000 signatures on a petition that killed the City's English Only ordinance. (Of course, English Only was later overwhelmingly supported in a statewide election.)

CHAMP was a coalition of different political forces struggling against racism for greater ethnic representation and harmony. But like the slow growth movement, the politics of ethnicity has two faces. One looks toward the developers; the other, toward the victims of imposed and unplanned development.

Not surprisingly, the two sides formed an unstable alliance. CHAMP split along class lines. Several powerful developers of dominant Chinese and Anglo interests formed their own organization, ABC (Americans for Better Cityhood) to mount their own campaigns equating slow-growth with racism and the cause of development and profit with anti-racism.

Their first campaign against Anglo slow-growthers was a failure. ABC used its financial resources to collect enough signatures to hold a special election to recall the two Anglo Council members who had openly advocated the English Only ordinance.

The growth forces lost. In the largest local election turnout in the City's history, the voters defeated the recall move by 62% This was a victory for the slow-growth forces who denied the charges of racism and managed to keep their supporters in office. Defeat can also be attributed to the tactics of the developers who hired Spanish speakers to persuade middle class, assimilated, and English speaking Latino residents that the City Council was out to deport them to Mexico. The growth forces continued their battle for control in the April 1988 City Council race.

The progressive forces in CHAMP and the movement for ethnic representation formed in the April 1988 City Council elections around the candidacy of Judy Chu, a Chinese-American educator who was serving on a local school board and who had been associated with causes of social justice. Running without RAMP or developer support, she put together a new political force which captured the progressive elements of both the politics of slow-growth and ethnic representation -- a positive concern for both community-controlled growth and greater ethnic diversity. The commitment to these goals was demonstrated in her practice. She ran a strong grassroots campaign which involved Asian, Latino, and Anglo organizers and volunteers in citywide, door-to-door and person-to-person contacts.

THE CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

After the defeat of the recall movement in 1987, the stage seemed to be set for a slow-growth victory in the April 1988 elections when two developer candidates would be up for re-election. Given the recent history of city politics, the overt campaign issue would be economic growth and land use. The unspoken issue, however, would be racism and the under-representation of old resident Latino and Asian minorities as well as Asian immigrants.

On the "slow-growth side, the Anglo-led RAMP forces, confident of a sweeping victory," sponsored two Anglo candidates: Betty Couch and George Ristic. They ran on a clear-cut controlled growth and citizen's
participation platform. Ristic was a newcomer to city politics. As a founding member of RAMP and a leader in the controlled growth fight, Betty Couch was the stronger candidate. Moreover, she ran a vigorous grassroots campaign.

The development forces behind the old ABC coalition supported the incumbent, Cam Briglio. Although viewed by slow-growthers as a disruptive and unprincipled candidate, in the eyes of development forces, at least Briglio was pro-development and pro-Chinese. Interestingly, perhaps out of fear that an Asian could not win, the developers did not run an Asian candidate for City Council. Their man, Monty Manibog, a Filipino-American, who was also up for re-election, decided to run instead for City Treasurer. But true to their multi-ethnic image and in a play for the Latino vote, they added a local Latino businessman, Fred Balderrama, to their ticket. A longtime resident, Balderrama was a political newcomer who had been active in the Chamber of Commerce and civic organizations. His enemies pointed out a possible conflict of interest: his towing business had a contract with the Monterey Park.

The candidates on the multi-ethnic pro-business ticket stressed the need for city revenues and quality development. They depended largely on signs and frequent mailings and did not run a strong door-to-door grassroots campaign. This was probably a mistake in a community where the voters have to be reached personally since no single civic group can call the vote.

As an alternative to the Anglo-identified slow-growth movement and growth-identified sector of the anti-racist movement, Judy Chu ran on the platform of controlled growth and ethnic harmony. There were also three minor independent candidates for the Council election: Frank Arcuri, a vocal fighter for English Only and Americanism on the right wing of the slow-growth movement; Marie Purvis, a local businesswoman active in civic associations; and Victoria Wu, a rather eccentric Hong Kong born acupuncturist. None of these candidates had strong institutional support or funds to mount an effective grassroots or mailing campaign.

Also of interest in the election, were the hotly debated City Clerk and Treasurer races. The strongest candidate for City Clerk was David Barron, a longtime Latino resident active in the network of parent and children organizations. The more controversial contest was the Treasurer race between an old-guard Anglo resident, former council person, Louise Davis, and Monty Manibog. Davis had strong old-resident support and did long hours of precinct walking with Betty Couch. Manibog relied on his council and business reputation and his contacts with the pro-developer candidates.

Thus, on April 12, 1988, the voters faced distinct choices within growth/slow-growth and ethnic representation movements: slow-growth (Couch and Ristic); pro-business/growth and ethnic diversity (Balderrama and Briglio); controlled growth and ethnic harmony (Judy Chu).

ELECTION RESULTS

The two winners of the City Council election were Judy Chu with 24.5% of the vote and Betty Couch with 19.8% George Ristic, the second slow-growth candidate, received 17% the developers' Latino candidate Fred Balderrama 14.5% and the developers' incumbent candidate, Cam Briglio, 10% Other candidates received less than 10% of the vote Whites 3).
David Barron, a Latino candidate for City Clerk, easily won over three other candidates with 53% of the vote. In the closer race for City Treasurer, Louise Davis, who did her precinct-walking with Betty Couch, got 57% of the vote as compared to 43% for the developer's candidate, Monty Manibog.

The election of Chu, Couch, and Davis meant a decisive defeat for the developers. Their victory also symbolizes the growing role of women in grassroots movements, an important topic which will be taken up in a later report. Here the task is to describe and attempt to explain how the different ethnic communities voted.

Our analysis draws on our community research and the results of an exit poll sponsored by the Southwest Voter Research Institute and the Asian Pacific Voter Registration Project (APVRP). Some twenty students from Alhambra High School and UCLA and the principal investigator conducted the poll during the peak morning and evening hours in all twenty of the Monterey Park Precincts. We were predominantly Asian, except for several Anglos and Chicanos, a fact duly noted by the voters. The self-administered questionnaire consisted of fifteen items including candidate choice, sex, ethnicity, age, income, education, place of birth, and length of residence. There were no questions of opinion.

Asians were deliberately oversampled in order to tap and compare the diversity of that population. In the end, we collected 1,390 usable questionnaires or 17% out of the 8,148 residents who voted. The voter turnout was high for a city election: 36.3% of the 22,436 registered voters.

Before beginning our analysis, a word about the registered voters and how they compared with the overall population in Monterey Park. Although Asians are a numerical majority (51% as compared to 31% Latino and 16% Anglo), because of non-citizen status and low involvement in the political process, they constitute only 36% of the registered voters, according to APVRP. Fifty-eight percent of these are Chinese, mainly newer and foreign born residents, and 37% are Japanese, mainly American born old residents. We estimate that today Chinese, Anglos, and Latinos constitute about one-third each of the registered voters.

Historically, Latinos as well as Asians have been underrepresented in the political process as officials and voters. By contrast, Anglos, although the clear numerical minority, have tended to dominate city politics as elected officials, leaders in the slow-growth movement, poll workers, "high registration and turnout" voters. However, the patterns are changing. In the April 1988 City Council election, the Chinese turnout was high, 35% and almost on a par with their registration. We lack the precise figures for other voters, but according to poll observations, we suspect that the Anglo turnout was high and the Latino turnout moderate at best. The major news is that Asians are participating much more in the electoral process, and the results show the effects of their vote.

ETHNICITY AND GROWTH POLITICS

In our analysis of voting, we will concentrate on the politics of growth and ethnicity as reflected in the behavior of four ethnic groups: Chinese, Japanese-Americans, Latinos, and Anglos. We selected this method of presentation not because ethnic interests dominate every other concern. Rather, the major issues of growth, representation, and immigration carry different meanings and weights within ethnic communities. We have found it
useful, therefore, to take ethnicity as an organizing principle in interpreting the vote and city politics generally.

How would the major ethnic groups line up on the candidates and issues? (1) Would they vote in ethnic blocs: Anglos for Couch/Ristic, Asians for Chu, Latinos for Balderrama? (2) Or, in a town seemingly divided between new and old residents, did it even make sense to assume that ethnicity was a major political force? Would the movement for controlled growth cut across ethnic lines: old resident Japanese-American and Latino residents strongly favoring the anti-growth candidates? Under these conditions, could a Chinese-American candidate be elected in face of a strong slow-growth movement which at its nativistic extreme equated Chinese with development? Or would Chu’s campaign cut across the ethnic spectrum? (3) Or, would class interests prevail as high income citizens no matter what their ethnicity went for business, and lower income citizens for control over land use? (4) Or, would the pattern be more complex with the concerns about growth and diversity expressing themselves in different and complex ways within each ethnic community. Our answers tend to support the last choice.

All candidates claim that they represent issues which cut across ethnic lines. Did the City Council vote support this claim? When we examine the pattern in four distinct ethnic groups -- Chinese, constituting 31.4% of our total; Japanese, 19.2%; Anglos, 24.4% and Latinos, 18.6% -- the first impression is that each group did indeed cast an ethnic vote. The majority of Anglos voted for the Anglo, slow-growth candidates; Japanese and Chinese went for Chu; and Latinos for Balderrama (See Table 3).

However, what our analysis really supports is a complex picture of ethnic and crossover voting. For example, Chu drew between 30-35% of the votes in our Latino and Anglo samples. Couch did particularly well, 28% among Japanese-Americans. In Monterey Park, where no one ethnic group has a majority of voters, crossover votes are needed to win an election. The complexity of voting patterns emerges when we analyze comparatively the relative weight and probable causes of ethnic and growth voting within each of the major ethnic groups.

The Chinese: The Primacy of Ethnic Representation

Chu did not specifically target or cater to the Chinese vote. She rejected all developer financial support, including that of the Chinese. Nevertheless, she got a wide cross-section of the Chinese vote, 89% in our sample. Why? We suspect that the desire for ethnic representation overrode all other major political concerns.

One indicator of an ethnic vote was the strong interest in Chu shown by the wider Chinese community outside of Monterey Park. Chu was invited to their functions. They attended her fund raisers and contributed even though she was not running in their districts. Also, the two major regional Chinese language newspapers -- the conservative, pro-Taiwanese Chinese Daily News/World Journal and the more liberal Central Daily News -- gave her favorable coverage. In spite of their differences on international issues, they united on the need for local representation. While both papers reported the developers’ fears that Chu was not loyal to their cause, their editorial consensus was positive. She had a good professional image which could serve the Chinese community as a whole. The Chinese voters agreed.

The results of the exit poll confirm a Chinese ethnic vote. One indication was “bullet-voting.” Twenty-four percent of her Chinese supporters voted for Chu only. This may have been a clever strategy to increase her chances of winning in a two-vote race. Or maybe it meant a
lack of interest in other voters and issues. In either case, the Chinese seemed single-minded about a Chu victory.

As for the Chu supporters who cast two votes, 35% selected the second Chinese candidate, Wu, who had practically no support in other ethnic groups. Another 39% voted for the Chinese-friendly but anti-Chu developer candidates, Balderrama and Briglio. Only 21% of the second vote of Chu supporters went for the slow-growthers, Couch or Ristic. These results do not suggest overwhelming support or interest in the controlled growth aspect of Chu's platform.

Who were the 11% of the Chinese in our sample who voted against Chu? Here we see opposition from Chu coming from the developers on one side and the slow-growthers on the other. Of the anti-Chu Chinese, 49% voted pro-development; the next largest group, 34% voted slow-growth. But at this point in our analysis, we cannot find any significant differences between the social backgrounds of the various Chu and anti-Chu Chinese voters. We do know that the social-economic profile of the Chinese as a whole was high: 49% in our sample of voters reported incomes over $55,000, and 79.3% held college or post-graduate degrees (See Table 4).

These results from the exit poll, from observations, and from interviews lead us to conclude that the Chinese were voting for ethnic representation. Also, the Chinese did not have a defined political profile on other local issues. The pattern is not surprising in an immigrant community which lacks political representation and is just taking form in the political arena. What is clear is that there is racism in the "free market," and that in the future the Chinese, like every other minority, will need political clout to achieve their collective goals. However, the current trend of ethnic voting tells us nothing about the Chinese vote in the future when there may be a choice between a Chinese Republican or a Democrat, a Chinese slow-growther or a developer.

Japanese-Americans: A Vote for Asian Ethnicity and Slow-growth

Seventy-five percent of the Japanese-Americans in our sample gave their support to Chu. This may seem more surprising than the Chinese vote. Why should Japanese-Americans support a Chinese candidate? In Monterey Park, the Japanese seem to have more in common with old-resident Anglos and Latinos than with Chinese immigrants. Ninety-three percent of our Japanese respondents were American born, compared to 27% of the Chinese (See Table 4). Japanese-Americans are in fact certified old-residents who well understand the slow-growthers' dislike of the changes brought by Chinese newcomers.

What the apparent anomaly of old residents supporting a Chinese candidate indicates is the existence of two major and, at this time, contradictory political currents within the Japanese-American community. The majority current supported a vote for Asian-American representation. However, there was also a strong slow-growth/old-resident and, probably, anti-Chinese current. Fifty percent of our respondents gave their support to Couch and Ristic, second only to the Anglo support for Couch. Put more strongly, sixty percent of those Japanese-Americans who did not support Chu cast their vote for Couch. By contrast, only 23% of the Chu supporters cast their second vote for Couch.

Our analysis of the exit poll data suggests that these crosscurrents reflect different populations with different concerns. For example, those Japanese-American voters who did not support Chu tended to fit the social profile of an old resident. They were significantly (at the .05 level of
Ethnicity and the Politics of Growth

Statistical significance) more likely to be older and less educated than the Chu supporters. Based on our observations and interviews in Monterey Park, we would hypothesize that lower education and older age may be related to a conservative, old-resident view of the community, to an attachment to the way things were before the Chinese immigrants arrived.

These crosscurrents are also built into the contradictory status which Japanese-Americans have in Monterey Park as old residents and Asians. They speak English, have assimilated, and are welcomed by their Anglo neighbors as "good, quiet, neighbors." But assimilation and residential proximity have not erased their separateness. The two groups stay pretty much to themselves socially. In political life, the Japanese maintain a low profile and are underrepresented, while the Anglos have put their distinctive stamp on local issues.

Today, the rapid Chinese immigration may have changed earlier, Nisei modes of survival and adaptation and tipped the balance in favor of greater ethnic political consciousness on the part of Japanese. Before, Japanese-Americans had to adapt to an Anglo-defined community. Now all the rules are changing as Asian minorities become a numerical majority. In any case, for the underrepresented Japanese-American, Judy Chu was a good Asian-American choice. As one resident commented, "She is not Japanese, but at least she is not a just-off-the-boat Chinese immigrant." Some influential Japanese-American leaders gave their support to Chu, and the majority of voters followed suit. The result was probably a vote for an Asian-American rather than a Chinese. Time will tell whether it was also a vote for Chu's politics.

Latinos: A Strong Ethnic and Chu Vote

And what about the vote of old-resident Latinos who, like the Japanese-Americans, probably moved out of the central city for a quiet and comfortable existence in a racially mixed, middle-class suburb? The second largest ethnic group in Monterey Park, they seem to get lost in the Anglo-Asian dialogue.

According to the exit poll, the majority, 63% of the Latino voters, went for the Latino candidate, Balderrama. However, this ethnic vote was weaker and more ambivalent than among the Chinese and Japanese. The second political current was for Chu. Thirty-five percent cast their vote for her, followed by 19% for Couch, and 19% for Balderrama's running mate, Briglio. Also, the Chu and Balderrama currents were inter-related. Her support was strong among both Balderrama and non-Balderrama voters. Forty-six percent of the Balderrama voters gave Chu their second vote, as compared to 21% for Briglio, and 12% for Couch. Non-Balderrama and presumably, slow-growth supporters, voted 35% for Chu, followed closely by 26% for Couch, and 12% for Briglio.

The ethnic vote, relatively strong support for Chu, weaker support for Couch and slow-growth politics can be understood in terms of the social characteristics and historical experience of Latinos in Monterey Park. A strong ethnic vote made sense simply because Latinos, like the Chinese and Japanese, lack political representation, political organization, and clout. But a less than enthusiastic endorsement of Balderrama was also understandable. His pro-development politics had little to offer to old-resident, strongly democratic Latinos without significant business interests in the community.
But why did the Latinos voters support Chu more strongly than Couch? One might have expected them to support a slow-growth candidate and an Anglo over a Chinese. Typically assimilated, English speaking, and middle class, Latinos, like Japanese-Americans, tend to be old-residents. As such, they often complain about the effects of growth and immigration on the quality of community life. Moreover, as the "first" residents of California (Americans of Mexican descent), they may have a special prejudice against the Chinese, whose presence and apparent success as a "model minority" threatens them with yet another historical demotion on their own territory.

However, after years of Anglo discrimination, Latinos also have reason to band together with Asians to reclaim their majority status. Like the Japanese-Americans and Chinese, some Latinos in Monterey Park have perceived a link between the current slow-growth movement and the continuing saga of Anglo domination. Locally, the Chinese have not been the only victims of slow-growth politics. In 1986, the Anglo-led growth movement worked hard to defeat two Chicano members of the City Council. Moreover, the concern of some slow-growthers with defending the dominance of English threatens the language and culture of Spanish as well as Chinese speakers.

In this historical context of Latino-Anglo conflict, we can understand the appeal of Chu over the slow-growth movement. Moreover, her campaign had strong Latino organizers and volunteers who went door to door in Latino districts. Chu’s victory no doubt depended on the success of this Latino/Chinese dialogue.

Anglos: The Slow-growth Stronghold

The slow-growth movement got its strongest support from Anglo voters. Forty-five percent cast their votes for Couch, and 59% of these Couch supporters gave their second vote to her running mate, Ristic, and 14% to Chu. Within the Anglo community can this support for slow-growth be interpreted as an Anglo ethnic vote against the changes associated with the immigration of Asian capital and people?

A positive case could be made for the slow-growth movement being basically an Anglo movement. To be sure, old residents, regardless of their ethnicity, have given some support to that movement. But among the old residents, it is the Anglo old-guard who have most visibly led and emotionally taken up the fight. The slow-growth movement has a special Anglo connection, because to be Anglo in the United States is to have an edge over everyone else in defining the standards of growth. This ethnic connection becomes even more visible in Monterey Park and Los Angeles where the Anglo "majority" are discovering their own ethnicity and minority status. Under these conditions, their vote for slow-growth may also be a vote for an Anglo dream of what an American community was and should be.

While Anglos in changing ethnic communities may acquire the habit of ethnic voting, in Monterey Park the fact is that many Anglos did not identify with the slow-growth movement. Like other ethnic groups, they cross-voted. Fifty-five percent did not vote for Couch, the major slow-growth candidate. Her opponents gave their votes to Chu (44%) or to the developer candidates, Balderrama (21%) and Briglio (12%). Altogether 30% of the Anglo voters supported Chu. Jesse Jackson should be so lucky in his quest for the Anglo vote.

Who were the Chu supporters? We know that they were not Couch supporters who tended to support other slow-growth candidates. Our exit poll data indicate that Anglos who voted for Chu were more likely (at the .05 level
of statistical significance) than non-Chu supporters to be democrats, have
higher education, and speak a foreign language at home. In other words,
they tended to have a progressive and cosmopolitan rather than an old-
resident profile. Like other "ethnics," they cross voted enough to affect
the overall election results.

CONCLUSION

The objectives of this paper were twofold. First, we have tried to describe
the emergence of slow-growth politics (the struggle to wrest control of
land use from the grip of the developers), and ethnic politics (the
struggle for ethnic representation) in a middle class, ethnically mixed
community which has under-gone rapid demographic and economic change as a
result of the influx of Asian capital and immigrants. This is a story of
the intersection of class and ethnic issues in local grassroots movements.
Slow-growth movements set up a struggle on the part of local residents
against big developer capital. But because capital in Monterey Park has an
Asian face, the movement takes on a racist dimension which sets old
resident Americans against Asian immigrants. Moreover, because it is led
and strongly supported by Anglos who fear their own minoritization and
ethnicization in a Third World America, the slow-growth movement also sets
up opposition between Anglos and everybody else. Thus, the populist and
anti-capital thrust of slow-growth is continually attenuated and
transformed by racism into the politics of ethnicity.

Secondly, we have tried to describe how the politics of growth and
ethnicity are played out within different ethnic communities. Here again,
the comparisons tell a complex story of how the economic issues of growth
are transformed into the politics of ethnicity by each group's historical
experience of domination, oppression, and competition. Thus, for the Anglo
minority, slow-growth movement shades into nativism for Asians, into
racism. Meanwhile, left behind in the Anglo/Asian dialogue, the Latinos
have yet to find their candidate who can speak for their particular
economic and ethnic concerns.

But in spite of all the charges and counter-charges of racism, the fact
remains that the ethnic groups of Monterey Park have enough unity to defeat
large developer interests. The victory of Judy Chu could strengthen that
unity. Her campaign, by combining the issues of slow growth and ethnic
harmony, undercuts ethnic polarization, and creates a common ground for
community opposition against developers.

However, for the Chu coalition to succeed in uniting the progressive
components of the politics of ethnicity and growth, changes and
realignments must occur. First, a segment of the new Asian majority will
have to move beyond a single-minded focus on representation to take a stand
against their own developers for more community-controlled planning.
Secondly, old residents, and most particularly, the Anglo leaders of the
slow-growth movement, will have to move beyond the narrow defense of ethnic
and class privilege against the inevitable ethnic and economic
restructuring of their communities toward a positive recognition of ethnic
diversity and wider ethnic representation in the grassroots resolution of
community problems. None of these outcomes can be assured without political
struggle.

Finally, in addition to these political implications, the case study of
Monterey Park raises important issues about the nature of ethnicity and the
meaning of comparative ethnicity. (1) Ethnicity is an historical process,
not a static thing. We cannot assume that it is based on stable traditions
which ultimately disappear or are modified in the process of assimilation. In the volatile climate of Monterey Park, ethnicity and the politics of ethnicity had to be analyzed as historical processes wherein "traditions" are reinforced, destroyed, or created (Wallerstein 1983; Horton 1984). (2) The study of ethnicity and ethnic politics is inevitably comparative. In Monterey Park, an ethnic identity is formed in interaction with other ethnic groups through a continually negotiated process of competition, cooperation, and conflict. (3) The local formation of ethnic political identities must be placed in a global context. The micropolitics of Monterey Park can be understood only as the creative outcome of people caught up in the rapid political and economic restructuring of an interconnected world-system.

REFERENCES

TABLE 1
Ethnic Composition of the Monterey Park Population
Selected Years, 1960 to 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>32,306</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>24,476</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>13,552</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>9,665</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>4,391</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16,477</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>21,079</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>18,693</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7,441</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19,046</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>31,467</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,821</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>49,166</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>54,338</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>61,246</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2

Asian and Others Ethnicity Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>118*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guamanian</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,128</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Included under Unidentified

Data compiled from the 1980 U.S. Census and the 1986 Test Census of Los Angeles County, California.
### TABLE 3
Candidate Preference by Ethnicity
City Council Elections
Monterey Park, April 12, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Results of Exit Polls</th>
<th>Actual Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couch</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ristic</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Developer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balderrama</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briglio</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(397)</td>
<td>(247)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Turnout rate is 33.6% out of 22,436 eligible voters.
**53 Other Asian, 10 Pacific Islanders, and 7 Black respondents are not included in the above table.
### TABLE 4

**Characteristics of Voters by Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Anglo/White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(392)</td>
<td>(294)</td>
<td>(227)</td>
<td>(301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 or older</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Born</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over $50,000 annually</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate or above</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for Tables 3 and 4 were compiled from an exit poll for the Monterey Park, California City Council Elections of April 12, 1986. The poll was conducted by the Southwest Voters Research Institute and the Asian Pacific Voters Registration Project, Monterey Park, California.