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Testing for Race: Stanford University, Asian Americans,
and Psychometric Testing in California, 1920-1935

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by

David Palter

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Abstract


David Palter

Between 1920 and 1935, researchers at Stanford University administered thousands of eugenic tests of intelligence and personality traits to Chinese-American and Japanese-American children in California’s public schools. The researchers and their funders, a diverse coalition of white supremacists and immigrant advocacy organizations, sought to use these tests to gauge the assimilative possibility and racial worth of Asian immigrants, and to intervene in local, national, and transpacific policy debates over Asian immigration and education. By examining the Stanford testing projects, and exploring the curious partnerships that coalesced around them, this study seeks to expand our understanding of the intersection between race science and politics in early twentieth-century California.

Racial psychometric testing was a key technology of the Progressive-era eugenics movement, and Stanford’s testing projects reflected the assumptions of this movement. Like scores of other race-based testing projects during the era, they adhered to careful, premeditated formulae predicated upon the dual-hinged fallacy that race and intelligence were fixed and quantifiable categories.

Despite the hereditarian and racial essentialist foundations of the tests, however, the researchers and funding institutions affiliated with the Stanford projects approached their work from a wide array of political positions. Lewis Terman, who
directed the balance of the testing, was a prominent eugenicist, and he used his cache as a faculty member at Stanford and President of the American Psychological Association to advance eugenic causes, including race-based immigration restriction. By contrast, Terman’s largest funder, the Japanese Association of America, three of his students, Kwok Tsuen Yeung, Hisakichi Misaki, Reginald Bell, and one of his colleagues, Edward Kellogg Strong, attempted to use testing to augment the social status of Asian immigrants and their children, end racial segregation in the public schools, and stem the tide of California’s nativist movements.

By highlighting the contributions that individuals and organizations affiliated with Stanford University made to eugenic testing during the 1920s and 1930s, this study complicates our understanding of the eugenics movement, and renews our sense of the movement’s broad and lasting influence over American institutions. Many of the Stanford testers had an agenda that was progressive compared to that of Terman’s, but they never escaped the constraints of the eugenic testing paradigm. In part because their tests drew upon and helped to reify false notions of intelligence and racial hierarchies, their projects ultimately failed to change anti-Asian sentiment or public policy. The participation of Asians, Asian Americans, and pro-immigrant progressives in the testing projects, however, reminds us that eugenic technologies were once so pervasive that they compelled the intellectual and material investment of those they were designed to marginalize.
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David Palter
Berkeley, California
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On October 23, 1929, Japanese biologist Yusaburo Noguchi announced to an awestruck New York press corps that he had discovered the secret of race. “Racial characteristics,” he declared, “are the result of glandular secretions and physical environment,” and “by electrical nutrition and glandular control” he could now “at will change an Indian to a darker color, with the physical characteristics of a Negro, or mold a Japanese so that he would have the same appearance as a Caucasian.”

According to Noguchi, this revelation was the result of fifteen years of eugenic research in the jungles of Brazil, where he and his team treated “jungle savages” to interventions that included “sun rays, ultraviolet rays…and glandular treatments.”

Noguchi’s claim captured headlines across the country. In New York, the Times led with “Biologist Asserts He Can Remold Man.” In Washington D.C., the Afro-American announced that “Glands Govern Racial Colors,” followed by the subtitles: “Japanese Says He Can Change Black to White” and “Can Develop Giants or Dwarfs to Order.” The Ogden Standard, in Ogden, Utah, relayed: “Man Soon Able to Change his Color,” and the Bee, in Danville, Virginia, used a similar title, followed by the more provocative: “Man Soon Will Be Able to Change from Black to

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White, and Vice Versa.”5 The editors of the Lehigh College Newspaper, the Brown and White took a more circumspect position, covering Noguchi’s claims but reprinting a New York Post editorial that chafed against his eugenic mission to, as Noguchi put it, “mold the human race closer to perfection:” “Before we can quite believe that Japanese can be turned into Caucasians we shall have to see the experiments performed.” The editorial warned against “tampering with radical attributes,” and imparted to Noguchi that “man…has no desire, thank you, to be remodeled by any human agency.”6 According to the October 23 Los Angeles Times report, Noguchi was to spend only one more day in New York, and then travel to San Francisco, where he would stay for two weeks before returning to Japan.

It is not clear whether Noguchi in fact visited California in the autumn of 1929, but the figure he cut, that of a Japanese scientist assuming divine power over race, would have had particular resonance in the state that for three decades had been the epicenter of the anti-Japanese movement in the U.S. From the earliest stages of Japanese immigration to the West Coast and Hawaii in the 1890s, nativists in California had waged a race-based, anti-Japanese campaign to “keep” the state “white,” and by 1929 they had won many of their legislative battles. 7 In the

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5 “Man Soon Able to Change His Color,” Ogden Standard, December 20, 1929; “Claims Man to Be Able Soon to Change Color,” The Bee, December 13, 1929.
6 New York Post editorial, reprinted in Brown and White, November 1, 1929. News even spread to Singapore, where the editors of the English-language daily Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser repeated Noguchi’s assertion that he “could practically control the growth of an infant, fixing its stature, breadth of shoulders and other characteristics.” Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, December 5, 1929.
7 “Keep California White!” was the slogan of Senator James Phelan’s 1920 U.S. Senate Campaign. It was an effective distillation of anti-Japanese, white-supremacist sentiment, and it underscored the entitlement many white Californians felt toward
California that Noguchi was to visit, Japanese immigrants could not own land, vote, or run for public office. Due in large part to the agitation of California labor leaders and politicians, U.S. borders were closed to Japanese immigrants, and Japanese already residing in the U.S. were barred from naturalizing as citizens.\(^8\)
In 1929, California was also at the center of the American eugenics movement. Present-day perspectives on eugenics—the pseudoscientific effort to improve human stock by selective breeding—generally associate it with the Holocaust, and understandably so. The eugenics movement that began in the South Kensington, London labs of British scientist Francis Galton in the 1880s indeed bolstered German doctrines of racial supremacy, and culminated in Nazi medical experiments, forced sterilization and genocide in Europe. In the United States, however, eugenics manifested itself primarily in two related phenomena, involuntary


9 Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), ix.

sterilization, and what psychologists call “psychometric testing” or “mental testing,” and California was a focal point of both.\(^{11}\) In 1909, California was one of the first states to enact a compulsory eugenic sterilization law, and by 1929 it had sterilized far more of its citizens than any other state. As historians Paul Lombardo and Alexandra Stern have observed, California’s sterilization laws, part of the eugenic campaign for “human betterment” in the U.S., were the most expansive in the country; while several other states only allowed the practice in prisons, California’s laws impacted hospitals and juvenile homes as well. By 1922, of the 3,200 sterilizations of inmates and patients of state-run social welfare institutions, fully eighty percent had been performed in California.\(^{12}\) Overall, between 1910 and 1940, though thirty-three U.S. states adopted eugenic sterilization legislation, California was responsible for more than a quarter of all sterilizations on record.\(^{13}\)


California also provided the backdrop for the most important developments in eugenic psychometric testing. Although other psychologists, such as James McKeen Cattell and Edward Thorndike at Columbia University, employed testing in a limited capacity at the turn of the twentieth century, it was Stanford University psychologist Lewis Terman who popularized both the notion of I.Q. and standardized testing in the U.S. Terman’s 1916 Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test, and his subsequent testing of army recruits during World War I, brought eugenic testing out of laboratories inspired by Galton at American universities and into the American mainstream. Within a decade after the publication of the Stanford-Binet, Terman’s tests had become a standard instrument of evaluation nationwide. Administrators in the corporate world, in prisons, juvenile systems, mental health hospitals and schools put their faith in his


tests to measure the intelligence of prospective employees, patients and students. Even today, intelligence tests and standardized tests of achievement are based on templates Terman established.\textsuperscript{16}

Although several histories of testing have considered Terman’s role in the psychometric testing movement, one critical component of Terman’s contributions has been overlooked: his racial testing of Asian Americans.\textsuperscript{17} Between 1920 and 1935, Terman, Terman’s graduate students and affiliated researchers at Stanford University administered thousands of psychometric tests—tests of memory, of "general intelligence," of personality traits, even of "aesthetic appreciation" and musical ability—to Chinese-American and Japanese-American students throughout California in order to attempt to gauge their assimilative possibility and racial worth.\textsuperscript{18} By examining these testing projects, exploring the motives of the researchers

\textsuperscript{16} Chapman, \textit{Schools as Sorters}; Minton, \textit{Lewis M. Terman}.


and the funders, this dissertation seeks to expand our understanding of the intersection between race science and politics in early-twentieth-century California.

Terman’s testing of Asian Americans, a new and promising development in the eyes of adherents of race science, represented one piece of a nationwide testing phenomenon that aimed to measure the aptitudes of racially-defined groups. But it was not mere coincidence that Stanford’s testing of Asian Americans occurred during the peak years of the anti-Japanese movement. In 1920s California, Asian immigrants found themselves jockeying for position within a constantly evolving, white-dominated racial order. The stakes were high: the right to immigrate, to own land, to vote, to educate their children—all were tied to perceived positions within California’s racial hierarchy. As this study will show, Terman and his Stanford University cohort, as well as nativist organizations, immigrants, and immigrant supporters all utilized psychometric testing and employed the language of applied psychology to augment their social status and further their diverse political objectives.

This study will offer the first in-depth look at the relationship between eugenic testing and Asians and Asian Americans. Despite the thousands of tests conducted on—and in many cases by—Asians and Asian Americans, these populations are largely absent from histories of eugenics and intelligence testing. This absence is a function of two larger trends, one conceptual, one geographical, in the scholarship on Progressive-era race relations. The first is social scientists’ focus on race as a black-

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19 Only one chapter-length study has been written on the intelligence testing of Asian Americans. David Yoo, “Testing Assumptions: IQ, Japanese Americans, and the Model Minority Myth in the 1920s and 1930s,” in Chan, Sucheng, ed. Remapping Asian American History (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2003). Terman’s biographers do not mention his relationship with the JAA, nor his research on Asian Americans.
white phenomenon. As Tomás Almaguer has observed, scholars working on race relations in the United States have traditionally attributed second-tier status to “other racial/ethnic patterns” outside of the black/white binary, treating them as if they “merely reflected extensions of black/white patterns.”20 This conceptualization of race as black and white, what Omi and Winant call “biracial theorizing,” has obscured the ways that public policies with ties to the eugenics movement—such as testing, student tracking and forced sterilization—affected non-white groups differently.21

The second reason for the absence of Asian Americans in studies of eugenics and intelligence testing is that such studies have traditionally concentrated on the East Coast. As Alexandra Stern has observed, the first generation of scholars looking at the history of eugenics focused on Eastern organizations such as the Eugenics Records Office (ERO), and the American Eugenics Society (AES), and figures such as Charles Davenport because the principal archives documenting the eugenics movement were located in eastern-seaboard cities. Stern argues that early studies of eugenics “tacitly enshrined the East Coast as the geographical reference point and then projected that interpretation across the rest of the country, often with only remote interest in regional variations.”22 As a consequence of this focus on the East Coast, eugenic activities in other parts of the U.S., such as those that affected Asian Americans, have not received the attention they merit.

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22 Stern, *Eugenic Nation*, 5.
By highlighting the role that testing figures in California played in debates over public education, immigration, and naturalization during the anti-Japanese movement, this dissertation hopes to contribute to a growing body of literature that repositions eugenics as a nationwide phenomenon.\textsuperscript{23} It also seeks to bridge the considerable gap between the secondary literature on racial intelligence testing, dominated by scholars writing in Psychology, Anthropology and the History of

Education, and the work of historians and sociologists writing on the development of racial thinking on the West Coast.24

Refocusing our lens on the West Coast not only necessitates the inclusion of Asian Americans, it compels a revision of the history of eugenic testing. In my analysis of the relationships between the testers and the tested, I borrow the term “racial formation” from Michael Omi and Howard Winant for its emphasis on race-making as a dialectical process. Indeed, my research suggests that the power dynamics that framed interactions between the largely white-supremacist cadre of psychometric testers and the Asian immigrant community during the 1920s and 1930s were more contested and more nuanced than previously imagined. Asian immigrant organizations such as the Japanese Association of America, Asian psychology graduate students such as Kwok Tsuen Yeung and Hisakichi Misaki, and white advocates for Asian Americans such as Reginald Bell and Edward Strong were pivotal contributors to Stanford’s testing projects. They brought their own ideas about race to the table, and their projects variably supported and challenged the racist presuppositions undergirding racial testing.

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The relationship between Terman and the Japanese Association of America (JAA) between 1920 and 1926 exemplifies this phenomenon. When Terman required funding for his "psychological and anthropological study of California Japanese," he turned not to Stanford University, nor to the Rockefeller Fund, which had sponsored earlier projects, but to the Japanese Association of America.\(^{26}\) Although Terman was a published white supremacist and proponent of race-based immigration restriction, members of the JAA responded to his underwriting request enthusiastically. They provided $10,000 to fund Terman’s project in full, and campaigned for the support of the parents whose children were to be tested. My research suggests that the Japanese Association of America worked with Terman because both parties accepted what we can call the race paradigm—the idea that the world’s population could be defined and hierarchically ordered by race—and adhered to the then widely-held notion that psychological testing promised the true measurement of the intelligence and behavioral characteristics of a racially defined group. As Eiichiro Azuma has pointed out, though JAA members and other elite Japanese in California were victims of anti-immigrant hysteria, they were often unwilling to ally themselves with Chinese immigrants or working-class Japanese, opting instead to forge their own place in the race and class-based social hierarchy of the state.\(^{27}\) Correspondence between Terman and the Japanese Association of America suggests that high-ranking members of the

\(^{26}\) “Suggestions for a Psychological and Anthropological Study of California Japanese,” undated, April 1921, Lewis Madison Terman Papers (hereafter LMT Papers), Box 8, Folder 1.

organization viewed testing as a useful means of improving their position within this hierarchy.

In addition to the Terman-JAA study, testing projects conducted by Kwok Tsuen Yeung and Hisakichi Misaki, both students of Terman, underscore the need to revise our understanding of eugenic testing as solely a white-supremacist exercise. In 1921, Yeung, a visiting scholar from China, administered Terman’s tests to one hundred and nine Chinese-American children, aged five to fourteen, at San Francisco’s segregated Oriental School. Like the members of the JAA that sponsored Terman’s testing of Japanese-American children, Yeung adhered to the race paradigm and was convinced of the efficacy of racial testing. In a chapter of his study devoted to “Racial Mental Differences,” he chastised sociologists such as Franz Boas and William Thomas who by the 1920s were challenging the coupling of race with intelligence, and instead anchored his work squarely within the camp of psychologists such as Terman and William Pyle, whose work suggested innate mental disparities between racial groups.²⁸ Rather than challenge the notion of racial hierarchy or the practice of racial testing, Yeung pit the test results of his subjects against those of other “races”—including “Spanish,” “Portuguese,” “Negro,” and “American”—in order to elevate the position of Chinese Americans along what he perceived to be the contemporary racial hierarchy.²⁹

In 1927, six years after Yeung’s study of Chinese-American children and the joint Stanford University-JAA study of Japanese-American children, Japanese organizations viewed testing as a useful means of improving their position within this hierarchy.

researcher Hisakichi Misaki administered Terman’s tests to eighty-two Japanese-American children, ages six to nine, in the San Francisco Bay area. Compared to the grandiose goals of earlier racial studies that presumed to establish the intelligence of an entire nationality, however, Misaki’s goal was limited: he would give intelligence tests to Japanese-American children in both English and Japanese, compare their scores, and establish the degree to which an English-language handicap affected their performance.30

Ultimately, Misaki achieved the narrow goal he set—he discovered that Japanese Americans scored higher on intelligence tests administered in Japanese—but he was disappointed with the test results. Even accounting for the language handicap, Japanese-American children still lagged behind their white counterparts on Terman’s Sanford Binet test. Misaki’s response to this finding reveals his deep commitment to racial testing. Instead of challenging the notion of racial intelligence, or even simply testing methodology, he doubled down, pointing to inherent mental deficiencies in the subset of Japanese-American children he tested. His subjects scored poorly not because they were Japanese, but because they were, indeed, Japanese American. “Are national groups of immigrants fair representatives of their countrymen in general?” he asked. “The writer does not assume that they are….Immigrants attracted to this country from the Orient are drawn from inferior groups in their own countries.”31 Misaki’s dual allegiance to testing and to “the Japanese” as a racial group placed him in a difficult position: to accept testing as

viable, he had to both elevate the people of Japan and disparage those children of Japanese immigrants whose scores did not live up to that elevated position.

The Japanese Association of America, Kwok Tsuen Yeung, and Hisakichi Misaki were not interested in challenging either the idea of racial hierarchy or the supposition that racial intelligence was a discrete and measurable quantity. Indeed, as this analysis will show, in many ways their works aided in the persistence of troubling racial categories, even as these categories were being called into question by other social scientists. But, just as the findings of their studies called for a subtle reimagining of Asian Americans on the American racial hierarchy, their involvement in a movement designed and led largely by white supremacist eugenicists suggests a broader definition and rethinking of American racial testing.

Testing projects conducted by Stanford researchers Edward Strong and Reginald Bell also expand our conceptions of eugenic testing. Strong and Bell, like Yeung and Misaki, were psychologists who trained in Terman’s shadow. They embraced eugenic testing and the racial paradigm. However, as white supporters of Japanese immigrants, they attempted to use testing for progressive causes. In 1932, Bell administered hundreds of Stanford-Binet tests to Japanese-American children in Sacramento as part of a “Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools.” Bell’s work set Japanese-American educational segregation in the context of California’s long anti-Asian movement and
attempted to employ testing to demonstrate the adverse effects of segregating Japanese-American students by race. 32


Expanding upon Bell’s 1932 study of segregation, each of these works attempted to use racial testing to challenge prevailing anti-Japanese prejudices in education and hiring, but they did so with mixed results. Like Yeung and Misaki, Strong and Bell were confined by the methodologies they employed and by the racist presumptions of their field. For those that adhered to the racial paradigm, race was a zero-sum game. Thus, in order to elevate Japanese Americans Bell and Strong frequently compared them to other racially-defined groups. Whereas they described Japanese and Japanese Americans in their studies as “remarkably self-sufficient,” “intelligent, law-abiding, and desirable,” they characterized Mexicans, and Filipinos

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and Chinese, respectively, as “filthy” and “pleasure-seeking.” Their studies sought to change the position of Japanese Americans along California’s racial hierarchy not by dismissing racial thinking, but instead by embracing essentialist racial discourse and simply lowering Chinese-, Filipino-, Mexican-, and African Americans on the racial ladder.

By focusing on the individuals and institutions that put together the Stanford University racial testing projects of the 1920s and 1930s, this study hopes to complicate our understanding of the ways eugenics actually functioned in the U.S. when the movement was at its zenith. If the efforts of Yeung, Misaki, Bell and Strong demonstrate the limits of testing, the Terman-JAA relationship reminds us that eugenic technologies were once so pervasive that they compelled the intellectual and material investment of those they were designed to marginalize.

In addition to expanding the ways we conceptualize eugenic testing, highlighting the role of Asian immigrants in the testing phenomenon broadens our understanding of Asian immigrant resistance during the 1920s and 30s. Members of the JAA, Yeung, and Misaki all conceived of their studies not simply as intellectual projects, but as political endeavors, responses to anti-Asian sentiment and public policy in California. This dissertation adds to a large body of work on Asian and Asian-American struggles for citizenship, and for equal rights in public education and

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the workplace by scholars such as Sucheng Chan, Gary Okihiro, Erika Lee, Yuji Ichioka, Judy Young, Gordon Chang, Him Mark Lai, and Victor Low.35

Due to the ambivalent nature of the testing projects, however, this dissertation also looks to studies that complicate the narrative of resistance. Eiichiro Azuma’s work on Japanese immigrants in San Francisco during the early-twentieth century is particularly useful in this regard because it underscores the role class played in Japanese immigrant reactions to American racism. Azuma points out that elite Japanese in 1920s San Francisco denounced immigration policies that discriminated against Japan as a whole, but accepted as appropriate restrictions directed at Japanese immigrants they labeled “inferior.”36 Azuma notes that elite Japanese “drew a distinction between themselves and their compatriots from rural Japan, whom the former despised as a ‘degenerated class,’ ‘dirt peasants,’ and ‘ignorant fools.’”37 The testing projects of the JAA, Yeung, Misaki, Strong and Bell followed a similar pattern. Whatever their progressive intentions, the Stanford researchers were limited by positions on racial discrimination that were narrow and class-specific.

Although all of the Stanford testing projects were conducted by California-based researchers on children in California schools, this dissertation approaches the project from a transnational and specifically transpacific perspective. I have adopted

36 Azuma, Between Two Empires, 37.
37 Azuma, Between Two Empires, 38.
this approach for two reasons. First, in order to understand the shape of the testing project, it is useful to see it as a confluence of ideas on race, eugenics, and mental measurement that flowed across borders. As we will explore in greater depth in Chapters One and Two, Terman’s racial worldview was the outcome of a centuries-long Euro-American discourse on race, and his testing methodology was born of specific relationships between European and American psychologists that began in the 1880s.

Beyond Terman, however, it is necessary to recognize that the JAA members who supported his testing and the Chinese and Japanese graduate students who worked with his tests did not come to California as blank slates. The worldview that framed their own assumptions about race and intelligence—a worldview that led them alternately to accept or reject the conclusions of Terman and other predominantly white, male Protestant testers—was the product of a complex amalgam of formal and informal transpacific educational experiences. To better understand this phenomenon, this dissertation is informed by scholars that have recognized the importance of transnational perspectives on Asian-American history such as Arif Dirlik, Yong Chen, Dorothy Fujita-Rony, Sucheng Chan, Eichiro Azuma, and Shelly Lee, the work of Gail Hershatter and Frank Dikotter, who have written on regional and racial identification in modern China, and studies of the development of race and racial science in Meiji and Taisho-Era Japan (1868-1926) by
Kenneth Pyle, Alan Christy, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Eiji Oguma, Jennifer Robertson, Michael Weiner, and Noriko Aso.38

This dissertation also adopts a transnational perspective in part because the individuals and organizations at the center of this story, the Stanford funders and researchers, positioned their own work within this frame. Terman, the JAA, Yeung, Misaki, and board members of the Carnegie Corporation who funded Strong and Bell’s research hoped to use testing to influence local and state politics, but they also expressed their intention to affect change at the international level. They frequently

considered how their findings might impact transpacific diplomatic relationships, and, in the case of the Terman-JAA project, even solicited Japanese funders to support their venture.

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The claims by biologist Yusaburo Noguchi with which we opened speak to the transnational nature of early-twentieth-century eugenics, even as they represent a *reductio ad absurdum* of that movement’s preoccupation with race. Although the relationship between science and race began in 1735, when Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus first divided humans into separate “species” based on geography and perceived skin color, during the eugenics movement of the late-19th and early-20th century, scientists came to believe they should, in the words of British scientist Francis Galton, actually “modify” and “influence race.” In 1883, Galton coined the term “eugenics,” from the Greek *eugenes*, or well-born, to denote the “science” of improving human biology. As he articulated in his *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development* that year, his mission was to develop a set of practices that would give “the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing

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speedily over the less suitable.”

Forty years after Inquiries, Galton’s eugenic philosophy guided the experiments of scientists in every corner of the globe, including those of Noguchi, a Japanese government-sponsored biologist laboring in the jungles of Brazil. By 1929, eugenics had become so embedded within the grammar of mainstream science in Europe, the United States, and Asia that Noguchi felt comfortable defining his profession by it; when prompted to explain his experiments, Noguchi told reporters that it was scientists’ “job to add to the store of

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41 Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, 25.
knowledge until we can at will mold the human race closer to perfection physically, mentally and spiritually.”

Yet how would scientists divine the shape of the mold? If “perfection” were attainable, what, or more precisely who, would it look like? Like his fellow eugenicists, Noguchi conflated race with innumerable physical, mental, and moral characteristics. He confided to a New York correspondent for the *Afro American* that he was “now able to change a black man into a white man, an Indian into a Japanese, a dwarf into a giant and a potential criminal into an upstanding member of society.”

As the reporter explained, pigment was not Noguchi’s only concern. The *Afro American* reported that Noguchi was “more than six feet tall and weighs 195 pounds, and he wants to change all Japanese men and women into persons of his own physical stature.” However, it was more than “stature” that drove Noguchi’s experiments. His

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43 “Alchemy of Races Aired,” *Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 24, 1929. I borrow the term “grammar of science” from the British mathematician and Galton biographer Karl Pearson, who published a popular book of the same name, to illustrate the degree to which race and science were entangled at the turn of the twentieth century. Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (London: Walter Scott, 1892). *The Grammar of Science* was a wide-ranging synthesis and explanation of modern scientific theory and practice, covering topics as diverse as “the nature of thought” to “matter as non-matter in motion” to “the infinite divisibility of space.” An avid eugenicist and white supremacist, however, Pearson also saw fit to weave among these concerns his thoughts on social order. Under the subsection “Life,” Pearson argued that “there is cause for human satisfaction in the replacement of the aborigines throughout America and Australia by white races of far higher civilization.” Like Galton, Pearson was convinced that human progress depended on the advancement of “white men:” “It is a false view of human solidarity,” he wrote, “which regrets that a capable and stalwart race of white men should replace a dark-skinned tribe which can neither utilize its land for the full benefit of mankind, nor contribute its quota to the common stock of human knowledge.” Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 438.
final claim to the *Afro American* correspondent was that “Given time, I could change the Japanese into a race of tall blue-eyed blondes.”

Noguchi did not explain how exactly he would determine which races should be transformed into which, but by the 1920s, many of his fellow eugenicists were looking to the eugenic “science” of psychometric testing to evaluate the worth of supposed racial characteristics. In 1884, Galton had invented a series of psychometric tests to discover the relative “fitness” of individuals and then of groups. James McKeen Cattell and Edward Thorndike, both psychologists at Columbia University who admired Galton, developed and promoted his techniques over the next two decades, but it was Lewis Terman who was most responsible for advancing psychometric testing first in the U.S., and then worldwide.

Terman was a eugenicist and a white supremacist, and developed psychometric testing in the service of these concomitant ideologies. A member of

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several eugenics organizations, including the American Eugenics Society, the Eugenics Record Office, and the Human Betterment Foundation, Terman believed, first, that human intelligence was a fixed, measurable, heritable genetic trait; second, that “whites” possessed a higher intelligence than other racially-defined groups; and third, as Galton had first set forth in 1870, that “the improvement of the natural gifts of future generations of the human race is largely, though indirectly, under our”—the scientist’s—“control.” The testing methodology that Terman devised, and the conclusions he drew from his data, depended on this eugenic triptych.

Terman was not alone in these beliefs. In 1916, when Terman published his Stanford-Binet Test, an adaptation of French psychologist Alfred Binet’s intelligence scale, like-minded power brokers in the fields of education and psychology lauded it as a panacea for any number of social problems. That year, the dean of Stanford’s School of Education, Ellwood Cubberley, estimated that Terman’s Binet revision would soon be called upon to address questions relating to “choice of studies, vocational guidance, schoolroom procedure, the grading of pupils, promotional schemes, the study of retardation in the schools” and “juvenile delinquency.” Three years later, the editor of the Journal of Education, A.E. Winship, joined in the praise, writing to Terman’s publisher that “Terman has given us the most epoch making


book in American education in my day. He has taken Binet and his own previous book and has revealed a clear course for the recreation of the Public Schools of America, the first time anyone has made this way clear.”

In the early 1920s, with Terman at the lead, psychometric testing and the eugenic politics it supported moved from the margins of psychology to the center. As scholars such as Henry Minton and Paul Chapman have shown, by 1923, Terman had become president of the American Psychological Association (APA), and his tests—the Stanford-Binet revision, National Intelligence test, Terman Group Test, and Stanford Achievement test—sold in the millions. During the same period, Terman parlayed his professional status into political influence for eugenic causes, writing on the necessity of restrictive immigration legislation and lending expert advice both to fellow eugenicists at the Eugenics Records Office and U.S. policymakers. Even while President of the APA, Terman published on the supposed dangers what he called “dysgenic” immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and Asia presented to the American “germ plasm,” and he sat with U.S. Senator Albert Johnson—for whom the racially restrictive 1924 Immigration Act is named—on the Eugenics Committee of the USA. By the eve of World War II, professional psychology had become synonymous with mental testing, as the testing faction assuming several of the

49 A.E. Winship to Hoyt, August 2, 1919, LMT Papers, Box 1.  
profession’s department chairs, American Psychological Association presidencies, and major journal editorships.52

Much of the literature on testing approaches the field with a wide-angle lens, connecting it to scientific racism more broadly, or to the politics of the eugenics movement in the U.S., which affected policies in education, social services, and immigration.53 This study will build on that literature, setting Stanford University


studies within the dual context of scientific racism and American nativism. In addition to demographic shifts and psychologists’ ability to attach their practices to more established, respected professions, eugenic testing gained currency primarily because it confirmed the prevailing worldview of a pre-World War II academic and professional class. From Terman’s initial Stanford-Binet testing of children in public schools (1916), which concluded that “Spanish-Indian and Mexican families of the Southwest,” and “negroes,” had low levels of intelligence, to Stanford University psychologist Edward Strong’s sex-type testing (1936), which found that men and women had innately different interests, early psychometric tests reinforced the racist, classist, and sexist assumptions of those who administered them. 54 As Mark Nathan Cohen has argued, the tests became pervasive because they built upon “a culturally defined cognitive pattern (a model describing how the world works) that doesn’t have to be right, only widely shared, to have important cultural results.”55

This dissertation will draw connections between the Stanford testing projects and larger trends in American race science, but it will spend the balance of its efforts tracing how individuals and organizations with conflicting perspectives brought the projects together. We know that race science during the interwar period was shaped by the broad political currents that surrounded it. The Stanford projects in particular evolved out of anti-immigrant discourse at the national level, and anti-Japanese politics at the local level. Focusing on the uneasy associations behind these projects

reveals, however, that even this relationship was not as deterministic as we might assume. Testers such as Terman, Reginald Bell, Kwok Tsuen Yeung, Edward Strong and Hisakichi Misaki, and funding institutions such as the Japanese Association of America and the Carnegie Corporation approached testing from complicated, often contradictory positions. Some of the actors involved opposed immigration, while others welcomed it. Some had long ties to eugenics and eugenics organizations, while others were new to the field, and hoped to operate only on its outskirts. Whatever their histories, and whatever their motives, however, the Stanford testers’ shared commitment to the racial paradigm upon which testing was predicated ultimately guided their projects in directions that reified race.

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My research is in conversation with an extensive, contentious literature on psychometric testing—a half century of scholarship from the History of Education, Psychology and Anthropology. It should be noted that despite the early objections of Walter Lippman, a minority of psychologists, and numerous sociologists and anthropologists, psychometric testing enjoyed widespread public and academic acceptance for decades, from the 1910s to the 1960s. It was not until the late-1960s

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that scholars writing on Terman’s cohort began en masse to critically reevaluate its contribution. Revisionist educational historians, economists and psychologists questioned the political and ideological commitments of the testers and pointed out basic flaws in the tests’ designs.\textsuperscript{57} In \textit{Roots of Crisis} (1973), a broad critique of Progressive-era school reform movements, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring and Paul Violas positioned testing as a pivotal tool in an educational agenda designed to police the lower class and indoctrinate youth with the values of the corporate order.\textsuperscript{58} Writing on Mexican and Mexican-American students in Los Angeles, Gilbert Gonzalez (1974) and James Cameron (1976) charged that white educators used testing to track Chicano students into vocational classes as part of a larger effort to maintain a racially-segmented hierarchal class structure in the city.\textsuperscript{59} And arguing

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from a Marxian perspective, economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1976) found that that school reform in general, and testing in particular, consistently failed to produce positive results because the ostensible goals of education reform—promoting social equality, developing and supporting young peoples’ capacities—operated at cross currents with the exigencies of an economic system that bred inequity and stifled the capacity of the majority. 60

Princeton psychologist Leon Kamin echoed revisionists’ criticism of Terman’s cohort and added to it an in-depth critique of the design of the intelligence tests themselves. In *The Science and Politics of I.Q.* (1974), Kamin argued that the American psychologists who took up and popularized Alfred Binet’s test, namely Terman at Stanford, Robert Yerkes at Harvard, Edward Thorndike at Columbia, and Henry Goddard at the Vineland Training School in New Jersey, fundamentally misunderstood and misused the French scientist’s original work. 61 Binet’s test, he argued, was designed as a practical diagnostic tool to “identify students whose academic aptitudes were so low as to necessitate their placement in ‘special schools.’” 62 Skeptical of Social Darwinist arguments and Francis Galton’s growing eugenics movement across the channel, Binet had taken pains to explain that the test could not, and should not be used to support the contention that an individual’s intelligence is a fixed quantity. According to Kamin, however, the American testers ignored Binet’s warning, misinterpreted his findings, and misused his methods for their own professional and political advantage. Kamin contended that these pioneers

of applied psychology—all members of various eugenic, white-supremacist
organizations—saw in Binet’s test a salable scientific model to support their
convictions regarding heredity and racial superiority.63

Over the past three decades, several studies have framed intelligence testing
within broader investigations of racial science.64 The best known of these, Stephen
Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1981) looked at the methods American
scientists have employed in support of biological determinism. Focusing primarily on
the history of craniometry and psychometric testing, Gould argued that these
techniques were fundamentally flawed because they were based on false assumptions
about the nature of human evolution and intelligence. Racial science as a whole, he
argued, suffered from “two deep fallacies:” reification, which he defined as “the
tendency to convert abstract concepts into entities,” and ranking, “our propensity for
ordering complex variation as a gradual ascending scale.”65 These fallacies, Gould
concluded, rendered “sciences” such as craniometry and psychometric testing
valueless.

From the late 1960s to the present, these revisionist critiques of racial
intelligence testing have been met by a small but devoted cast of hereditarian
psychologists led by University of California, Berkeley psychologist Arthur Jensen.
Jensen’s 1969 Harvard Educational Review article, “How Much Can We Boost IQ

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64 See Gould, The Mismeasure of Man; Mensh and Mensh, The IQ Mythology;
Tucker, The Science and Politics of Racial Research; Richards, Race, Racism and
Psychology; Fish, ed., Race and Intelligence; Alexander Alland, Race in Mind: Race,
IQ, and Other Racisms (New York: Macmillan, 2002); Stephen Murdoch, IQ.
65 Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 24. Gould situates this latter “fallacy” within the
context of a modern western discourse fascinated with the notion of progress.
and Scholastic Achievement?” chastised the “zeitgeist of environmental
egalitarianism” that “stifled” and “ignored…the possible importance of genetic
factors in racial and behavioral differences.” 66 Convinced that races differed
physiologically and biologically, Jensen concluded that it made sense for mental
aptitudes to differ as well. Over the next three decades, Jensen and psychologists such
as Hans Eysenck and Phillip Rushton published dozens of books and articles laying
out the parameters of this argument. 67

66 Arthur Jensen, “How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?
Eugenics, 270.
67 A sampling of Jensen, Rushton, and Eysenck’s work includes: Arthur Jensen,
Educability and Group Differences (London: Methuen, 1973); “Cumulative Deficit:
“Cumulative Deficit in IQ of Blacks in the Rural South,” Developmental Psychology,
v. 13 (1977): 184–191; Bias in Mental Testing (New York: Free Press, 1980); Jensen,
and C. R. Reynolds, “Race, Social Class and Ability Patterns on the WISC–R,”
Personality and Individual Differences, v. 3 (1982): 423–438; “Psychometric g
Related to Differences in Head Size,” Personality and Individual Differences, v. 17
Long-term Memory: A Comparison of Chinese-American and Anglo-American
Dilemma of Group Differences,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, v. 6 (2000):
121–127; J. Phillip Rushton, “Japanese Inbreeding Depression Scores: Predictors of
“Mongoloid–Caucasoid Differences in Brain Size from Military Samples,”
Intelligence, v. 15 (1991): 351–359; “Cranial Capacity Related to Sex, Rank, and
Race in a Stratified Random Sample of 6,325 U.S. Military Personnel,” Intelligence,
v. 16 (1992): 401–413; “Cranial Size and IQ in Asian Americans from Birth to Age
Seven,” Intelligence, v. 25 (1997): 7–20; Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life
History Perspective (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995); Rushton and Arthur
Jensen, “African–White IQ Differences from Zimbabwe on the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children—Revised are Mainly on the g Factor,” Personality and Individual
Differences, v. 34 (2003): 177–183; Hans Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and Education
(London: Temple Smith, 1971); The IQ Argument (New York: The Library Press,
1971); The Inequality of Man (London: Temple Smith, 1973); The Structure and
Measurement of Intelligence (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1979); “The Effect of Race on
Human Abilities and Mental Test Scores,” in C. R. Reynolds and R. T. Brown, eds.,
In 1994 the latest outcropping of hereditarianism, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s *The Bell Curve*, became a best seller. Herrnstein and Murray argued that intelligence was for the most part innate, that it was largely fixed, and that it was a predictive factor in the social and economic outcomes of individuals and groups.\(^{68}\) The overwhelming popular response to *The Bell Curve* compelled six members of Berkeley’s Sociology department to write a rejoinder. Their 1996 response, *Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth*, was particularly concerned with the argument that intelligence was predictive of social outcomes. Setting aside debates over the heritability of intelligence, they wrote that “‘nature’ determines neither the level of inequality in America nor which Americans in particular will be privileged or disprivileged; social conditions and national policies do. Inequality is in that sense designed.”\(^{69}\)

In 2005 Alexandra Stern entered the fray with *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America*, a field-changing book that shifted the usual chronological, geographical, and topical foci of the history of eugenics. Whereas earlier studies of the eugenics movement, focusing on East-Coast eugenicists like Madison Grant and Charles Benedict, had dated the fall of the eugenics movement to the revelations of the Holocaust in the 1940s, Stern’s approach centered on California revealed that the movement lasted well into the 1960s. According to Stern, eugenicists after the Second World War simply “repackaged”


\(^{69}\) Fischer, et. al., *Inequality by Design*, xi.
their ideas, shifting the scope of their research and influence to the world of family planning. As Stern notes, this “disarticulation and transposition of ‘race’ onto gender and sexuality was an integral component of the mid-century shift” that allowed eugenic thought to survive in academic and popular discourses on marriage and femininity into the 1960s, and in government-sponsored sterilization campaigns aimed at poor women in the U.S. and the third world. 

As part of her research, Stern looked at Terman’s contributions to the California Bureau of Juvenile Research, the West Coast wing of Charles Davenport’s Eugenics Records Agency. Stern discovered that between 1910 and 1920 Terman and his protégés tested hundreds of what Terman called “‘backward and mentally defective children’” for the Board, and the findings of these tests were advertised and generally accepted as proof of the correlation between delinquency and defective heredity.

This study uses Stanford University as a pivot point for Asian-American eugenic testing partially because, taking a cue from Stern’s work, doing so allows us to revisit the motives and methodologies of Terman, and to re-center his contributions to the eugenics movement writ large. To date, the most extensive treatments of Terman are Paul Chapman’s *Schools as Sorters: Lewis M. Terman, Applied Psychology, and the Intelligence Testing Movement, 1890-1930*, and Henry Minton’s *Lewis M. Terman: Pioneer in Psychological Testing*. Both published in 1988, these were balanced appraisals of Terman’s contributions to the fields of Education and

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71 Ibid., 9.
72 Ibid., 92-95.
Psychology. Responding to the polarizing claims of Terman’s early supporters and more recent revisionist detractors, Chapman and Minton underscored the importance of understanding Terman within the context of his times. They moved away from the revisionist characterization of Terman as a racist xenophobe bent on social control, opting instead to depict him as a flawed progressive idealist. Invoking Foucault, Minton in particular felt that Terman simply “failed to understand the intricate way in which scientific knowledge interacts with social power” and “the way in which science could become subservient to vested interests.” These portrayals of Terman as a product of his times are useful, but they run the risk of subtly eliding Terman’s formative role in the promulgation of white-supremacist educational and immigration policies. Additionally, while Chapman and Minton covered Terman’s professional career thoroughly, neither addressed his relationship with the Japanese Association of America or his and his students’ work with Chinese and Japanese immigrant children. This dissertation reconsiders Terman’s controversial contributions in light of these relationships.

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Chapter One introduces the joint testing project between Terman and the Japanese Association of America. Analyzing the puzzling coalition between a white-supremacist eugenicist and an organization advocating for Japanese immigrants, it looks first at Terman's academic and political genealogy and second at the anti-Japanese hysteria to which JAA officials hoped the study would respond. Finally, it

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73 Minton, *Lewis M. Terman*, 266.
looks closely at the study itself, examining the racial assumptions of both the testers and the funders.

Chapters Two and Three take a step back and set racial intelligence testing in a historical context that helps to explain Stanford’s research on Asian Americans. Chapter Two chronicles the history of scientific approaches to race from the first attempts to classify people according to race in the 18th century to debates over nature versus nurture in the 20th, highlighting along the way race scientists’ particular fascination with the Orient. The chapter ends with what I term the Galton-Boas divergence. While early 20th century sociologists and anthropologists, led by Franz Boas, began to distance themselves from hereditarian conceptions of race, American psychologists, swayed by Galton's eugenic arguments, held fast. They adopted both the political ideology of Galton and his laboratory techniques to the American context, with immediate and lasting results.

Chapter Three builds on the idea of the Galton-Boas divergence on race, setting the testing projects of American psychologists against the approaches of their contemporaries in the social sciences. The chapter concentrates on the Survey of Race Relations on the West Coast (1923-1925), sociologist Robert E. Park’s attempt to investigate and explain the dynamics of race relations between whites and Asian Americans in California and neighboring states. The chapter argues that although sociologists like Park adopted non-hereditarian conceptions of race, often criticizing the techniques and the politics of psychologists, their work was nonetheless affected by the testing movement. Despite their criticisms, Park and his colleagues adopted its pseudo-scientific language and reliance upon statistical presentation.
Racial testing was conceived and promoted in the U.S. by white-supremacist eugenicists determined to reshape the nation according to their racial ideology. During the immigration debates of the early 1920s they acted in dual roles as mouthpieces for nativist groups and purportedly objective scientific advisors to government. With the passage of the restrictive 1924 Immigration Act, which drastically reduced immigration of southern and eastern European immigrants to the U.S., and cut off immigration from Asia, their politics of exclusion carried the day. The testers were equally successful in the field of public education, where biased testing regimes tracked working-class and minority students away from college preparatory courses and into ones designed to prepare them specifically for lower-paying employment.

Despite the intentions of those who originally conceived of the tests, however, some testers attempted to employ testing methodology for socially progressive causes as well. Chapters Four and Five examine two Stanford University projects that attempted to combat anti-Japanese politics in California between 1928 and 1935. Chapter Four focuses on Reginald Bell’s 1932 “Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” the first study to use psychometric testing to challenge school segregation. The chapter explores the motives and influences that put the study into motion. Bell was trained by a generation of psychologists whose racial views he did not share, but he entered his project with the notion that testing offered a viable solution to racial problems. His study is remarkable because it reflects the tensions created by using racist methodologies for antiracist purposes. Ultimately, as the chapter demonstrates, Bell’s
anti-racism trumped his “scientific” training; by the end of the study, when his Stanford-Binet testing of Japanese-American children did not yield the results for which he had hoped, he questioned the biased methodologies that he himself had employed, siding in crucial ways with critics of the Stanford-Binet test, and opening it up to further challenges.74

The final chapter looks at the history of Stanford’s 1929-1935 study of second-generation Japanese in California, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Tracing the history of the study illuminates the ways personal and institutional relationships, as well as transnational, national, and state politics shaped interwar racial projects. Carnegie Corporation of New York archives reveal that the Stanford study actually began in the spring of 1926, when U.S. historian Charles Beard brought a funding proposal to his long-time friend, Carnegie Corporation president Fredrick Keppel. Beard, who had established strong relationships with several Japanese politicians and bureaucrats while working in Japan in 1922 and 1923, was concerned about the employment difficulties faced by Japanese Americans, and he suggested to Keppel that Carnegie fund a vocational training and job placement program through the Japanese YMCA of Los Angeles. Keppel was enthusiastic about the idea. As the chapter shows, he and other Carnegie administrators, including former U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, conceived of the project in transpacific terms. They hoped that aiding Japanese Americans would help to alleviate diplomatic tensions brought on by the 1924 Immigration Act, which had excluded Japanese immigrants from the U.S. and sparked indignation in Japan. Given

the intransigence of anti-Japanese politics in California, however, Keppel was worried about the domestic response direct Carnegie funding to a Japanese YMCA might elicit, so, over Beard’s objections, he chose to funnel the project instead through Stanford University. This decision transformed the project entirely. By 1930, within one year of Stanford’s involvement, what had begun as a proposal to fund Japanese-American vocational education and employment opportunities had become a series of tests and surveys of Japanese-American vocational aptitudes, interests, and employment opportunities. Ultimately, though transpacific concerns had initially prompted Keppel into action, California’s anti-Japanese politics and Stanford University’s investment in psychometric approaches to race shaped the end product of the project.

Concentrating on Stanford’s racial testing projects of the 1920s and 1930s, and setting those projects in the context of larger scientific and political trends allows us to reconsider Terman’s contributions to racial testing, and to bring to light early links between testing and Asian Americans. Focusing on the ways the Stanford projects came together, however, also reveals complex connections between individuals and organizations of varying and often contradictory outlooks. By pulling at the strands of these connections this dissertation seeks to complicate our understanding of the ways eugenics functioned in the U.S. before World War Two.
Chapter One:
Strange Bedfellows: Lewis Terman and the Japanese Association of America, 1921-1926

If our nation is to live its people must be of the best, and their blood must not be contaminated by that of the unfit….The failure of a race to produce enough children to successfully maintain itself is known as race suicide. How do the statistics on births and deaths in your city compare?

- William Atwood, *Civic and Economic Biology* textbook, used in California public high schools, 1922

On April 19, 2010 the Arizona State Senate passed Senate Bill 1070, the “Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” which granted police broad authority to ascertain the immigration status of any legally-detained individual they suspected of being “unlawfully present” in the United States. The law required that all immigrants carry proof of immigration status at all times, and made it illegal for an “unauthorized alien” to solicit work in the state. It also sought to punish those who aided illegal immigrants, making it unlawful for any person to “conceal, harbor or shield an alien from detection” and stipulating misdemeanor penalties for those who “encouraged or induced” an immigrant to come to Arizona illegally.

Two years after the Arizona Senate passed S.B. 1070, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled several provisions of the bill unconstitutional. However, the most controversial section of the bill, requiring police to determine the immigration status of individuals they suspected might be illegal, remained in place. In September of 2012, the

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American Civil Liberties Union, the National Immigration Law Center, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund requested a new injunction on the law in U.S. District Court, arguing that it “encouraged the detention of people with a Latino phenotype,” but the district court judge refused to issue the injunction.\(^3\)

On April 24, 2012, the author of S.B. 1070, Michael Hethmon, explained to the *Washington Post* his reasoning behind the bill. Immigration, he argued, is on track to change the demographic makeup of the entire country. You know, what they call ‘minority-majority. How many countries have gone through a transition like that—peacefully, carefully? It’s theoretically possible, but we don’t have any examples.\(^4\)

To those familiar with U.S. immigration history, the strain of racial thinking in the contemporary breed of restrictive immigration legislation appears anachronistic, but not new. Hethmon’s invocation of the threat posed by shifting “minority-majority” racial demographics harkens back to an era when immigration law was designed explicitly to deal with the problem of “race suicide,” when members of congress lauded bestsellers like Madison Grant’s *The Passing of a Great Race*, and groups


such as the Asiatic Exclusion League and the American Eugenics Society had real influence over congressional debates. In the long history of U.S. immigration and naturalization law, which before the passing of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act had generally been delimited by race, Hethmon’s reasoning is more typical than aberrant.5

Those who are surprised that eugenic thinking still has such formative resonance at the highest levels of U.S. policymaking in the twenty-first century, however, underestimate the extent of its power in the twentieth. To understand the depth of its influence, this chapter will look at the relationship between a eugenicist, Stanford University psychologist Lewis Terman, and an immigrant advocacy organization, the Japanese Association of America (JAA) during the 1920s, the period in which eugenic thought and immigration policymaking were most closely aligned. In that decade, as eugenics reached its apogee in the United States, it became the lingua franca of debates over immigration and citizenship. As the relationship between Terman and the JAA will illustrate, eugenics was so ubiquitous that even immigrants and their supporters spoke in its tongue, applied its reasoning, and employed its technologies to advance their political objectives.

Although eugenics took many forms in the U.S., it interfaced with the American public most pervasively through intelligence testing. Developed first by French psychologist Alfred Binet in 1905 as a limited, practical tool to gauge the educational progress of children, intelligence testing became in the 1920s a focal point of the American eugenics movement. While Binet, skeptical of contemporary

eugenic and Social Darwinist arguments, had underscored that the test could not be used to support the contention that an individual’s intelligence was a fixed quantity, leading eugenicists in the U.S. used the tests to reinforce and propagate their convictions regarding mental heredity and white racial superiority.6

At the forefront of American intelligence testing was Stanford professor Lewis Madison Terman. In 1916, Terman adapted Binet’s intelligence scale for use in American schools, selling his test not only as an instrument teachers might use to address the educational needs of their students, but as a “true” quantifier of each student’s fixed level of intelligence, or intelligence quotient (I.Q.). The test vaulted Terman into the national spotlight. By 1923, he had become president of the American Psychological Association, and his intelligence tests were the most widely used standardized tests in education; his Stanford-Binet revision, National Intelligence test, Terman Group Test, and Stanford Achievement test sold in the millions, and provide the template for most standardized tests today.7

To Terman and his fellow eugenicist psychologists, the ramifications of the Binet revision were enormous. If testing could measure the innate intelligence capacity of individuals it could do the same for groups. As I will discuss in more depth in Chapter Two, although racial intelligence testing predated Terman’s Binet revision, Terman’s work as a psychologist and public proponent of testing fundamentally changed the field, expanding it exponentially while at the same time giving it a level of legitimacy it had never previously enjoyed. Indeed, it was in large


part this legitimacy that created the preconditions for the relationship between Terman and the Japanese Association of America.

Between 1921 and 1926, with funding and support from the JAA, researchers under Terman’s direction administered thousands of intelligence tests to Japanese-American children in California’s public schools. The resulting study, entitled “The Mental Capacity of American-Born Japanese Children,” published in 1926, is not altogether singular in its methodology or its findings. One of the scores of race-based intelligence testing projects precipitated by Terman’s Binet revision, it adheres to careful, premeditated formulae predicated upon the double-hinged fallacy that both race and intelligence are fixed and quantifiable categories. What is remarkable about the study is that it represents the product of a relationship between a prominent white-supremacist eugenicist and an immigrants’ rights organization. To understand two seemingly unlikely developments—Terman’s application to the Japanese Association of America for funding, and the JAA’s enthusiastic support for the project—we need to look closer at the histories of Terman and the JAA.

Lewis Madison Terman

In an autobiographical sketch Terman wrote for Carl Murchison’s *History of Psychology in Autobiography* in 1961, Terman self-consciously mused over the improbability of his own success. Born the twelfth of fourteen children to a farming family in rural Johnson County Indiana in 1877, he was, by his own estimation, more likely to become a farmer than a psychologist. He attended a one-room schoolhouse

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until the age of 13, and his was the first generation in his family to graduate from high school.9

After farming for two years and studying with his older brother John part time, Terman began at age 15 to look for a path that would take him away from the family business. Supportive of his decision, Terman’s parents sent him to the Central Normal College in nearby Danville, Indiana to prepare for a career in teaching.10 There, Terman studied for the next six years, taking Pedagogy, Classical, and Scientific courses, and apprentice teaching in nearby country schools. In 1898, at the age of 21, he became principal of 40-student high school in his home county. Then, the following year, he married Anna B. Minton, a fellow Danville teacher, and settled down in a small farmhouse near his school.11

By 1901 Terman had become unsatisfied with his position. Though happy in his marriage and blessed by the birth of his first child, Fredrick, he began to consider the possibility of earning a bachelor’s or even a master’s degree so that he could teach at a private normal school or college. If it didn’t work out he could always fall back on his high-school principalship. Following the advice of former teachers and classmates at Danville, he looked to Indiana University to advance his education and career. To support a two-year degree, his father and brother loaned him $1,200, and his wife agreed to take in lodgers.12 While at Danville, Terman had developed an interest in psychology, so at the university he took every psychology class offered, as

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12Seagoe, Terman and the Gifted, 16.
well as year of neurology, philosophy, sociology, economics, and three years’ worth of German and French.  

During his two years in Bloomington, Terman worked closely with psychologists Ernest Lindley, William Lowe Bryan, and John Bergstrom. All three had earned their Ph.D. degrees under G. Stanley Hall at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, and Lindley had just returned from a post-doctoral year with Wilhelm Wundt, considered to be the founder of modern psychology, at Leipzig University in Germany. According to Terman, it was the work he did for Lindley’s classes, particularly two papers prepared on “Degeneracy,” and “The Great Man Theory” that influenced his later work more than any other instruction at the university.

Near the end of his tenure in Bloomington, Lindley, who had become both Terman’s mentor and friend, recommended Terman to G. Stanley Hall at Clark University. Hall granted Terman a fellowship for thesis study, and in the fall of 1903 Terman, Anna, and their two children, 3-year-old Fredrick and his newborn sister Helen, set off for Worcester.

Although Terman credits his studies with Lindley as the catalyst for his future work, it is clear that Hall was a major influence as well. “Like many other students who went to Clark in those days,” he later wrote, “I was drawn there by the inspiring effect of Hall’s writings. I remained under his hypnotic sway during the first half

13 Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 310.
14 Minton, Lewis M. Terman, 18; Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 310.
15 Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 311.
year.” 16 Hall directed Terman in his early studies on gifted children, and pointed him to the work of Francis Galton, the inventor of eugenics, and to Alfred Binet. Hall was Terman’s first thesis advisor, and the first to caution Terman about mental testing and what he called the “quasi-exactness of quantitative methods.” 17

According to his 1961 autobiography, Terman the graduate student shared Hall’s concern over the false certainty of quantitative psychology. Of his initial reading in 1904 of Charles Spearman, the statistician and psychologist who introduced to psychology the notion of general intelligence, or g, Terman remembered being taken aback by the “dogmatic tone…and his one-hundred-per-cent faith in the verdict of his mathematical formulae.” The “absoluteness” of Spearman’s claim, noted Terman, “seemed to me as absurd then as it does now.” 18

Given the history of psychological testing, this memory seems at best ironic, and at worst revisionist. As we will discuss further in Chapter Two, the lynchpin of Terman’s career, his IQ tests, depended on the false certainty of numbers in two fundamental ways. First, the IQ became popular precisely because it promised to define in the clearest of terms that which had been undefinable; it could reduce

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16 Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 318.
17 Terman transitioned to Edmund Sanford after his first year, though he writes little about Sanford in his autobiography; Ibid.
18 Although he was critical of Spearman’s inflexible delivery, Terman’s IQ relied on an understanding of intelligence similar to Spearman’s g. In both cases intelligence was a fixed, innate, and measurable quantity. Spearman’s definition of g: “G is dominant in such operations as reasoning, or learning Latin; whereas it plays a very small part indeed in such operation [sic] as distinguishing one tone from another…G tends to dominate according as the performance involves the perceiving of relations, or as it requires that relations seen in one situation should be transferred to another….G is in the normal course of events determined innately; a person can no more be trained to have it in higher degree than he can be trained to be taller.” Quoted in Paul Monroe, ed. Conference on Examinations (New York: Columbia University, 1931): 156-157. Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 319.
intelligence—an illusory, and variable phenomenon—to a single number. Second, statistical analytics that were indecipherable to most non-statisticians created a smokescreen behind which eugenic psychologists like Terman hid unscientific procedures and faulty conclusions. By the end of his long career Terman had withdrawn his absolutist arguments regarding mental heredity, and in characterizing his early intellectual inclinations, perhaps the Terman of 1961 created a version of himself consistent with his current attitudes. It is also possible that Terman never perceived himself as representing his conclusions as uncompromisingly as had Spearman. There is no question, however, that during his career he took full advantage of quantitative presentation to sell his tests.

If Terman never truly took to heart Hall’s distrust of quantitative psychology, he did absorb his mentor’s racial and eugenic worldview. A decade before Terman warned in 1922 that Mexican, Eastern European and Asian immigration contaminated the American gene pool, Hall was concerned with “race suicide,” the notion, shared by several of his contemporaries in the social sciences, that whites would die out if they did not increase their rates of procreation. Hall seldom used the word “eugenics” in his early works, but he wrote incessantly about the relative birth rates of what he called “higher” and “lower” races, and, like Galton, was anxious over the

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birth rates of the white “educated class.” In his 1905 book, *Adolescence: its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education*, Hall invoked the founder of eugenics: “Galton has shown us that if a woman is not married before the age of twenty eight and the man a few years later, even the most fertile races are doomed to extinction….The proportion of fertile marriages is becoming very gradually less in most civilized lands.” Hall wrote *Adolescence*, his most famous contribution to child psychology, while Terman was at Clark, and although Terman would eventually abandon many of Hall’s suppositions linking adolescence and racial development, the influence of Hall’s preoccupation with supposed racial health is evident in all of his student’s work.

In the summer of 1904, having just completed his first year at Clark, Terman suffered a pulmonary hemorrhage. Convinced that the cold weather had played a part in his ill health, he began to look for a teaching position in California. Between 1905 and 1910, which Terman calls “the fallow period,” he worked in San Bernadino, California as a high school principal, and taught Child Study and Pedagogy at the Los Angeles State Normal School.

Owing to his connections at Indiana University, however, in 1910 the “fallow period” came to an end. Two years earlier, Stanford University President David Starr  

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22 Terman, “Trails to Psychology,” 309.
Jordan, formerly president of Indiana University, had created a professorship in educational psychology in the Department of Education for his colleague from Bloomington, John Bergstrom. Unfortunately, Bergstrom died within a year and post was left vacant. Upon the advice of another Hoosier, Education Department Chair Ellwood P. Cubberley, Jordan turned to Indiana psychologist, Edmund Huey to fill the position. Huey, preoccupied with clinical research at Indiana, declined, but he recommended to Jordan a former student of Bergstrom’s: Lewis Terman.23

Stanford proved a perfect fit for Terman. He spent his next 32 years there, first as an assistant professor in Education, and then, for two decades, as chair of the Department of Psychology. Within a few years a symbiosis developed. Stanford’s caché helped Terman secure early funding for his experiments, and sell the idea of mental testing to the American public; in turn, Terman’s fame provided the university’s fledgling psychology department with national exposure.24

While in his later years Terman retreated from his most strident white supremacist and hereditarian claims, early on Terman the psychologist was inseparable from Terman the racist eugenicist. Remarkably, this is particularly true of the period leading up to and during his relationship with the Japanese Association of


America, 1915-1925. Terman’s first major publication, *The Measurement of Intelligence: an Explanation of and Complete Guide for the Use of the Stanford Revision and Extension of the Binet-Simon Scale* (1916), evidenced his racial worldview. Terman’s conclusions were remarkable enough, having supposed the limited capacity of these two children, made an estimation of their future course, and questioned
backhandedly the foolhardiness of the United State’s democratic experiment.

However, he continued:

> It is interesting to note that M.P. and C.P. represent the level of intelligence which is very, very common among Spanish-Indian and Mexican families of the Southwest and also among negroes. Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in the family stocks to from which they come. The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods.  

Terman predicted that when mental testing was done on a grand scale, observers would discover “enormously significant racial differences in general intelligence, differences which cannot be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture.” Children like M.P and C.P., Terman argued, should be segregated,” tracked into “special classes” and be made into “efficient workers.” Showing his hand, he continued:

> “There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding.”

Terman was even more forceful with his eugenic message in popular publications. In a 1922 article for the journal *The World’s Work*, Terman echoed G. Stanley Hall’s concern for “birth rate differential.” “For centuries,” he wrote, “the average mental endowment of the European and American peoples had held its own. But within the last fifty years a change of sinister portent has taken place. Intellectually superior families are no longer reproducing as rapidly as formerly.”

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27 Ibid.
29 Terman, "Were We Born that Way?" 658.
Compounding the issue in the U.S., Terman reasoned, was the influx of immigrants of “inferior extraction,” Mexicans, and Southern and Eastern Europeans, who were “distinctly inferior mentally to the Nordic and Alpine strains.” His answer to this quandary: “set a minimal mental standard for our immigrants from every source.” “No nation,” he cautioned, “can afford to overlook the danger that the average quality of its germ plasm may gradually deteriorate as a result of unrestricted immigration.”

Terman’s particular use of the phrase “germ plasm” further signaled his eugenic politics. German biologist August Weismann coined the phrase in the late-nineteenth century to describe, very specifically, “the first ontogenetic stage of the idioplasm of an animal or a plant…the hereditary substance of a germ cell capable of development.” Today, we recognize this “hereditary substance” as genes. In the early twentieth century, American eugenicists such as Terman and Charles Davenport associated “germ plasm” with traits they assumed were hereditary, such as intelligence, and they worried about the possibility, in Davenport’s words, of “good germ plasm,” being overtaken by “bad germ plasm” in the U.S.

This Terman, the “germ plasm” Terman, was the man who asked the Japanese Association of America to fund his “psychological and anthropological study of California Japanese” in the spring of 1921. Why did the JAA accept his proposal? The answer to this is found in the contentious history of the anti-Japanese movement on the West Coast.

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30 Lewis Terman, "Were We Born that Way?" 660.
The Japanese Association of America, formerly the Japanese Deliberative Council (JDC), was founded by elite Japanese in San Francisco in May, 1900. According to its charter, the formal mission of the council was to “expand the rights of Imperial subjects in America and to maintain the Japanese national image.”33 One of four central bodies under the jurisdictions of Japanese consulates in Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles and San Francisco, the council changed its name to the Japanese Association of America in 1908, but its essential function remained unchanged. The Japanese Association operated as an umbrella organization to which dozens of local bodies in California affiliated. It collected annual dues from members of the Japanese immigrant community in return for a broad range of activities, including educational programs, financial assistance, the processing of immigration papers, and political advocacy.34

In his first letter to the Japanese Association of American in April of 1921, Terman argued that a thorough study of Japanese-American children in California’s schools would shed light on what he termed the “prejudiced and unscientific discussion of the racial problem” informing contemporary debates over Japanese

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immigration and naturalization. The timing of Terman’s funding request could not have been better. In the spring of 1921 the JAA was fighting a losing battle against California’s anti-Japanese movement. Despite the Association’s best efforts, the California legislature had the year before passed the California Alien Land Law, which extended and strengthened earlier legislation prohibiting non-citizens from owning land in the state. Although the law did not specifically name the Japanese, anti-Japanese agricultural interests and politicians had pushed it through the state legislature. In April of 1921 JAA leaders were also worried about the ways West Coast anti-Japanese arguments were playing out in Washington D.C., and they had reason for concern. In May, as they considered Terman’s offer, Congress passed the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921, which effectively cut off immigration from Japan by setting a 3% quota on immigration based on the 1910 U.S. census. The author of the law was Washington State Senator Albert Johnson, a long-time opponent of Japanese immigration, and a member—alongside Terman—of the Eugenics Committee of the USA.

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35 “Suggestions for a Psychological and Anthropological Study of California Japanese,” April 12, 1921, Lewis Madison Terman Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (hereafter LMT Papers), Box 8, Folder 1.
37 LMT Papers, Box 2, Folder 4.
The JAA decided to fund Terman’s project in this immediate embattled context, but the officials of the association also understood the possibilities of Terman’s study within a longer history. 38 The “prejudiced and unscientific discussion of the racial problem” against which Terman positioned himself in his correspondence with the JAA had taken many forms over the past half century. Racially-motivated anti-Japanese arguments, well-known to Terman and the JAA, derived from California’s anti-Chinese movement, which California politicians and white labor unions and newspapers led from the 1850s through the turn of the century. In order to understand the depth of the opposition the JAA faced, it is necessary to examine this longer history.

When wealthy Japanese immigrants and members of Japanese trading firms established the Japanese Deliberative Council in San Francisco in 1900, they did so in the city that had been the hub of the anti-Chinese movement. 39 In the 1870s, “anti-coolie” clubs could be found in every section of the city. Populated for the most part by white working men, the clubs harangued against the peril of “Mongolian” labor and staged torch-lit parades calling for an end to Chinese immigration. 40

From the 1870s to the early 1900s, the leaders of the anti-Chinese movement in San Francisco were in fact heads of local unions, recent European immigrants who

38 LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1; Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ichioka, *The Issei*.
fought for control over municipal contracts but banded together on the question of Chinese immigration.\textsuperscript{41} The relationship between leaders of San Francisco’s Labor Council and Building Trades Council during the 1890s illustrates this phenomenon. The Building Trades Council and its president, Irish immigrant Patrick Henry McCarthy, wielded substantial power in city government. Building Trades Council members oversaw municipal fire and sanitary inspection, street paving, and building construction projects, and were recognized by City Council leaders as representative of skilled white workingmen throughout the city. San Francisco’s Labor Council, on the other hand, enjoyed a far less prominent position on the local political scene. Composed of workers from highly skilled and semi-skilled industries alike, it was less stable, less tied to the everyday functions of city government, and less powerful. The labor council’s most vocal members, however, Andrew Furuseth and Walter Macarthur of the Sailor’s Union—both recent immigrants—worked side by side as equals with Patrick McCarthy on Chinese exclusion.\textsuperscript{42}

At the end of the nineteenth century, the mouthpieces of the Building Trades Council and the Sailor’s Union, \textit{Organized Labor} and the \textit{Coast Seaman’s Journal}, respectively, issued similar pronouncements against Chinese and Japanese immigrants. As early as July 25, 1888, the \textit{Journal} warned its readers about Japanese sailors being employed on American ships; \textit{Journal} editor Walter Macarthur termed the problem “a recently developed phase of the Mongolian issue.”\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Organized Labor} came on to the scene a decade later, but its caustic tone more than made up for that.

\textsuperscript{41} Saxton, \textit{The Indispensable Enemy}, 243-253.
\textsuperscript{42} Saxton, \textit{The Indispensable Enemy}, 243.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Coast Seamen’s Journal} (July 25, 1888), quoted in Daniels, \textit{Politics of Prejudice}, 19.
Asserting that Chinese immigrants were carriers of bubonic plague, on March 10, 1900 it cautioned that “the almond-eyed Mongolian is watching for his opportunity, waiting to assassinate you and your children with one of his many maladies.”

Patrick McCarthy, Andrew Furuseth and Walter Macarthur were well-known figures in both the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese exclusion movements, but the most influential anti-Asian agitator was undoubtedly Denis Kearney. A recent Irish immigrant and leader of the California Workingmen’s party, Kearney helped propel the anti-Chinese cause onto the national stage during the 1870s, ultimately forcing Congress to enact legislation banning Chinese immigration in 1882.

After 1882, Kearney and other exclusionist leaders turned the principal elements of the anti-Chinese argument against what they saw as a new impending threat from the East. In Sacramento, during the summer of 1892, Kearney voiced his vehement disapproval of:

> the foreign Shylocks [who] are rushing another breed of Asiatic slaves to fill up the gap made vacant by the Chinese…Japs…are being brought here now in countless numbers to demoralize and discourage our domestic labor market and to be educated …at our expense…We are paying out money [to allow] fully developed men who know no morals but vice to sit beside our…daughters [and] to debauch [and] demoralize them.

Containing essential elements common to both the arguments against Chinese and Japanese immigrants, Kearney’s tirade represented a moment of transition from the...
former exclusion movement to the latter. Leaders of both movements framed their arguments in economic terms. In this way they attempted to appeal directly to unemployed or underemployed white laborers and simultaneously deflect criticism from opponents who depicted theirs as a purely racist position. Exclusionist leaders also appealed to the gendered race fears of their audience. If, in other parts of the United States, reactionary whites depicted African-American men as a threat to white womanhood—and indeed to whiteness more generally—in California, exclusionists depicted white womanhood as under siege by Asian men.

Gender took center stage particularly in the arguments of the Asiatic Exclusion League, the first organization of considerable size dedicated primarily to the cause of Japanese exclusion. Formed by AFL-affiliated white labor leaders on May 14, 1905, the Asiatic Exclusion League lobbied the federal government to

expand anti-Chinese restrictions to all other Asians.\textsuperscript{49} Building Trades Council President Patrick McCarthy, as well as Andrew Furuseth and Walter Macarthur of the Sailor’s Union attended its first meeting, and Olaf Tvetmoe, also of the BTC, was named president. When the league convened on January 5, 1908, in Council Hall, 316 14th Street, San Francisco, it met to discuss not only what it called “the Japanese invasion,” and its “menace to American labor,” but the apparently pressing issue of “Japanese [men] and white women.”\textsuperscript{50} Referring to a report issued by the California State Labor commissioner in 1907 asserting that “5000 white girls have been robbed of their employment as waitresses and domestic servants by the Japanese,” council members observed that “the elimination of our young women from domestic service” was, in fact “the most dangerous phase of the Japanese question.” “If a white girl is not afforded the opportunity of acquainting herself with the problems of domestic economy,” they asked, “how can she fit herself to become the companion and helpmeet of the American wage-earner?”\textsuperscript{51} The league’s foray into the question of Japanese men and white women reflected a larger fear about the changing role of

\textsuperscript{49} Daniels points out that the League was largely a paper organization, important in that it was the first joint body formed specifically to exclude the Japanese, but relatively benign in its political influence. None of the measures it supported ever made it through the state legislature. Daniels argues, however, that the League—perhaps because it had so many prominent members, because its tentacles reached so far (according to Tveitmoe, the league enjoyed some 231 affiliates, 195 of which were labor unions) did help shape the rhetoric of the exclusion movement. Daniels, \textit{The Politics of Prejudice}, 28.

\textsuperscript{50} See Minutes from January 1908, in Gerald N. Grob, Ray A. Billington, Nathan Glazer, Irving L. Horowitz, eds., \textit{Proceedings of the Asiatic Exclusion League: 1907-1913} (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 18. “Japanese and White Women” is a section header for the league minutes taken that day. I bracket \textit{men} in the quote only to indicate that the league was not here speaking to the issue of Japanese women. The league’s language often normalized \textit{Japanese} as male.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
women in Progressive Era U.S. According to league members, if women were not trained for their role as “companion and helpmeet,” they would be left virtually without purpose. No thought was given to the notion that women might well operate outside of the private sphere, or in some capacity independent of the “American”—normalized as male—“wage earner.” What exclusionists called “The Japanese invasion” was odious not simply because of the threat it posed to race-obsessed white labor leaders, but because it threatened to upset a delicately balanced patriarchy.52

In minutes from May 10, 1908, under the headline: “Young Women Lose Employment,” the league addressed the issue again. This time, along with an ostensible concern over the “loss of employment for white girls,” is the notion that white American women and Japanese immigrants are separated by essential differences:

Returning to the loss of employment by white girls it is learned from agencies making a specialty of furnishing female help that the situation is nothing short of terrible, that hundreds of girls are out of employment who would be glad of any position by which their needs could be provided for. One lady manager said: “people have become so accustomed to Orientals that they forget an American girl cannot live like an Asiatic.”53

That “an American girl cannot live like an Asiatic” is represented as a given, a reality somehow temporarily overlooked by erring employers.

If we look further at this notion of white womanhood, the exclusion

52 The term “the Japanese invasion” may have come into popular use after it headlined a San Francisco Chronicle article in 1905 which argued that Japanese immigrants “were no more assimilable than the Chinese.” “The Japanese Invasion, The Problem of the Hour,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 23, 1905.
movement appears both more fearful and more violent than previous literature has suggested. League minutes from January 5, 1908 noted an apparent increase in Japanese prostitution in certain sections of San Francisco and stated that it would “soon be necessary for white women” in those locations “to arm themselves for protection against the insults of the Japanese.”  

Frustrated with President Roosevelt’s reluctance to pass a comprehensive law against Japanese immigration, delegates from the Asiatic Exclusion League then posed a rhetorical question: “shall we obtain the necessary relief from such conditions or shall we become compelled in defense of our womankind to adopt the measures of the Black Belt of our Southern States?”

Here an important connection becomes apparent: not only were California labor leaders in 1908 well aware of the methods used to maintain order by whites in the South, they looked to the region as a model.

Advocates of Japanese exclusion, though, did not reserve their condemnation

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for Japanese men alone. As the league minutes quoted above confirm, part and parcel of the exclusionist argument was the characterization of Japanese immigrant women as prostitutes. One forum in which this was done was the debate over the practice of “picture brides.” Between 1900 and 1910, once the first small wave of mostly male Japanese immigrants had found suitable occupation, many of those men sent home for their wives or girlfriends. In cases where they had not established prior relationships, their families in Japan sometimes arranged long distance marriages by photograph, sending newlywed wives across the ocean to meet their husbands, often for the first time.57

Exclusionists chastised these “picture bride” marriages in labor periodicals and in the mainstream press, but it was the Asiatic Exclusion League that offered the most heinous coloring of the practice. Reasoning that their presence was inimical to the American idea of marriage, delegates at the league’s January 1908 convention insinuated that “picture brides” had other, “unclean motives”: “every few days we read of ‘Marriages by Photograph,’ and of the arrival in San Francisco of women who claim to have been so married. This is, of course, the beginning of her career. Its extension may well be a matter of apprehension.”58 Although the number of Japanese prostitutes working in America at the time was miniscule (the U.S. census for 1900


records only 985 Japanese women in total), league delegates, working within the context of Progressive era reform, played up the specter of prostitution whenever possible.\textsuperscript{59}

Four years later, in April of 1912, “picture brides” again played a central part in Exclusion League proceedings. This time, however, Japanese immigrant women figured not only as prostitutes, but as threats to white labor:

It would appear from an observation of the immigration records that substantial numbers of Japanese, are, in fact, coming to the United States on every ship in the guise of so-called “picture brides” of Japanese already here. These brides in every respect are just as much laborers as are their husbands, who work in the restaurants, in the laundries and in the field, competing with American labor.\textsuperscript{60}

As Evelyn Nakano Glenn and others have observed, this characterization of Japanese immigrant women is not wholly inappropriate. At home and in the workplace, the labor that women provided was indeed essential to the economic development and upward mobility of the first generation of Japanese immigrants, or Issei. League delegates also correctly surmised that a good portion of recent Japanese immigrants were female. Between 1909 and 1923, two-fifths of the Japanese admitted in to the U.S. were in fact women.\textsuperscript{61} However, the twin allegations that this immigration was “substantial,” and that it competed with “American” labor are both unfounded. As Roger Daniels argues, despite exclusionist claims to the contrary, Japanese immigrants never represented an economic threat to white organized labor. Indeed, at no point in the early twentieth century did the Japanese population of California ever

\textsuperscript{59} Ichioka, \textit{The Issei}, 28.
\textsuperscript{60} Grob, et al., Minutes from April, 1912, \textit{Proceedings of the Asiatic Exclusion League}, 216.
\textsuperscript{61} Glenn, \textit{Issei, Nisei, War Bride}, 22.
account for more than two and one-tenth percent (.021) of the state’s total population.  

Foreshadowing later eugenic arguments, the Asiatic Exclusion League also contested the idea of intermarriage between Americans of European and Japanese descent. Minutes from its July, 1911 meeting tied the act to the practice of sexual slavery, noted the “physical, mental, and moral differences,” between Americans and Asians, and labeled the idea “preposterous and revolting.” Exclusionist Valentine S. McClatchy, son of Sacramento Bee founder James McClatchy and former director of the Associated Press, spoke of intermarriage in stark, if less malicious terms. Armed with a controlling interest in the Bee, and numerous political and organized labor connections—he counted among his close friends California Governor Hiram Johnson and State Federation of Labor Secretary Paul Scharrenberg—V.S. McClatchy was the most prominent private citizen in the exclusion movement from the end of World War I until the mid-1930s. Addressing the Honolulu Rotary Club in 1921, McClatchy cited “the biological law which declares that races of widely different characteristics perpetuate through intermarriage, not their good, but their less desirable qualities,” and conveyed the “fact” that “Eurasian children of such intermarriages have no social standing on either side of the Pacific.” McClatchy vehemently opposed intermarriage on racial as well as “social” grounds. According to

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his argument, not only immigration, but assimilation, indeed, sex, had to be regulated.

When the Japanese Association of America was founded in 1908, its stated mission was to support the interests of Japan and Japanese immigrants in the U.S., but it quickly found itself buried under the immense weight of these myriad arguments. In addition to providing proper immigration papers to its members (for a fee), and publishing pamphlets that taught American customs to newly-arrived Japanese, from 1908 through the 1920s the JAA published English-language pamphlets, articles, and even full-length monographs devoted to refuting the claims of exclusionists. In early 1913, faced with the impending passage of California’s first Alien Land Law, the Association published a 20-page pamphlet outlining popular and legal arguments against the legislation. As if wearied into whimsy by the absurdity of their opponents’ arguments, the JAA began its pamphlet with a short introduction that read:

Total acreage owned by the Japanese in 1912, according to the State Statistics of Labor, 12,726, or 20 square miles, the result of the Japanese labor within the last 50 years.

Total square miles of California, 158,360. Total square miles owned by the Japanese, 20. It will take the Japanese, therefore, 395,900 years to own California.66

The pamphlet included a section of support from non-Japanese individuals and organizations. One of these, a single-paragraph appeal written by vineyardists in Florin, California, addressed the exclusionists’ gendered argument head on. After

noting that the land owned by Japanese in Florin was “largely too poor for whites” and that “Japanese industry makes it productive and profitable,” the Florin group relayed that the “Japanese are conceded by all fair minded residents here as peaceable, law abiding, moral, temperate, grateful and generous. Among so large a population of Japanese in some fourteen years, there has never been a white woman molested.”67

In addition to the Florin group, the Japanese Association of America in the 1910s counted among its supporters one of California’s most prominent intellectuals: Stanford University President David Starr Jordan. Considering Jordan’s relationship to the JAA and the Japanese immigrant community helps us understand both Stanford's role in the history of Japanese immigrant exclusion, and the peculiar—and very specific—ways in which Stanford figures helped to shape the intellectual project of race in this country. Like Terman, Jordan was an early and devout eugenicist. He was chairman of the American Breeders’ Association Committee on Eugenics, the first eugenics organization in the United States, which tasked itself in 1908 with demonstrating “the value of superior blood and the menace to society of inferior blood.”68 Jordan, however, was also fascinated with Japan. An ichthyologist by training, a list of his publications in the few years before hiring Terman at Stanford includes the following titles: *Ichthyology of Japan* (1902), *A Review of the Cottidae or Sculpins Found in the Waters of Japan* (1904), *A Review of the Flounders and Soles of Japan* (1906), *The Giant Bass of Japan* (1906), *The Blood of the Nation: A

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Study of the Decay of Races through the Survival of the Unfit (1906), and once again, *Fishes* (1907). Jordan traveled to Japan frequently for work and pleasure, became an expert on Japanese-American relations, and had several Japanese friends in academics and business.

To reconcile his positive experiences in Japan with his white supremacist worldview, Jordan attached himself to an idea expounded by a minority of eugenicists in the U.S and Japan at the turn of the century—that the Japanese had “white blood.”

—The earliest records, bits of statuary and the like in Japan” he wrote in May 1907.

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71 The most prominent exponent of this theory in Japan was historian and economist Taguchi Ukichi. As Eiji Oguma, *A Geneology of ‘Japanese’ Self-images*, trans. David Askew (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002) has observed, Taguchi’s racial theory was a moving target; between 1895 and 1905 Taguchi claimed alternately that the Japanese were nearly Aryan, Aryan, and more Aryan than Europeans. In 1895, spurred by Japan’s recent victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War, he argued that Japanese should not be grouped together with Chinese in a “yellow” racial category because their languages were different, and because “the intellect of the Japanese race is far superior to that of the Chinese race.” According to Taguchi, certain Japanese had a “coarse appearance and an inferior intellect,” only because of racial intermarriage with indigenous groups. Those who had not intermarried, in fact, had “skin even smoother than…that of the Aryan race.” Taguchi Ukichi, “Nippon Jinshiron,” (On the Japanese Race) quoted in Oguma, *A Geneology*, 145. Taguchi argued that linguistic links between Sanskrit (widely held at the time to be root of Aryan languages) and Japanese meant that Japan was the “true descendent of the
of 1913, “represent a white people…called in Japanese, Yamato, which I suppose means mountaineer. They were characterized by light complexion, long faces, slender and wiry build.…Thought by many [to have been] derived from the races of the Euphrates…this type is now represented largely among the upper classes and the student class of Japan.”

The Japanese, Jordan, argued, were “colored,” but unlike Aryan race,” and that Europeans with German-based languages were actually the imposters. As he told a Japanese audience in 1901, for Europeans to claim Aryan identity for themselves was “to steal our ancestors, and demote us to the status of a branch family of the Aryan race.” Taguchi, “Kokugo jo yori kansatstu shitaru jinshu no shodai,” (A Linguistic Approach to Identifying the Founder of Ethnic Groups)” in Oguma, A Geneology, 145. In 1904, responding to Western fears of a “Yellow Peril,” Taguchi published Destroy the Theory of the Yellow Race: The Truth of the Japanese Race. In it, he argued that “pure” Japanese were Caucasian, and that if they dressed in Western clothing and maintained Western standards of health and sanitation, “this would be enough to banish the ill repute of the Japanese as a yellow race.” Taguchi, Ha oka ron: Nippon jinshu no shinso (Destroy the Theory of the Yellow Race: The Truth of the Japanese Race) in Oguma, A Geneology, 146. Historian Noriko Aso has noted that Taguchi’s theories were never widely accepted in Japan, not least because their “reaffirmation of a link between whiteness and superiority…ultimately represented a dead-end for Japanese national pride.” Noriko Aso, “Greece of the East: Philhellenism in Imperial Japan,” in Karen Bassi and J. Peter Euben, eds., When Worlds Elide: Classics, Politics Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 30. This does not mean, however, that Japanese intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century abandoned Taguchi’s effort to place Japan within the geneology of the West. Instead, as Aso writes, “narratives of Caucasian racial origins gave way in mainstream discourse to arguments that Japan and Greece were culturally, rather than biologically, connected.” Ibid. Prominent figures such as philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro and central banker Shibusawa Keizo, (grandson of Eiichi Shibusawa, a major contributor to the JAA-Terman testing project fund), articulated artistic, literary and philosophical connections between ancient Greece and Japan, even, Aso observes, going so far as to “challenge the West’s proprietary claim to its own ‘origin’….According to Watsuji, the West, beginning with the Romans, got the ancient Greeks wrong. The Western aesthetic tradition,” in particular, “had mistakenly labored to develop Greek ‘realism’ to a somewhat vulgar technical perfection. The ‘Japanese’ of Nara, however, were able to grasp the spiritual dimensions of Greek realism.” Aso, “Greece of the East,” 35.

David Starr Jordan to Editor, San Diego Union, May 13, 1913, Box 89, Folder 791, David Starr Jordan Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, also quoted in Gordon Chang, Morning Glory Evening Shadow: Yamato Ichihashi and His Internment Writings (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 20.
their “Mongolian” Chinese and Korean neighbors, they were descended of “white stock.” Although Jordan was critical of immigrants from Ireland and Southern and Eastern Europe, he always refrained from disparaging the Japanese, and the JAA could count on the Stanford University president for his support against anti-Japanese land ordinances and immigration restriction.\footnote{Burns, \textit{David Starr Jordan}; Chang, \textit{Morning Glory Evening Shadow}.}

In addition to rhetorical support, Jordan’s proclivity for Japan translated into concrete gains for Japanese and Japanese-American scholars. During his two-decade tenure (1891-1913), Jordan recruited dozens of Japanese students to Stanford, and he took a personal interest in their academic development. The connections he forged lasted well into the twentieth century: between 1891 and 1931, Stanford University graduated 142 students from Japan, a total which equaled all European alumni over the same period. In an era marked by anti-Asian sentiment in California, it is noteworthy that Stanford’s total alumni from Asia during that period, 276, exceeded that of any other American University.\footnote{Stanford University, \textit{Stanford Alumni Directory, 1891-1931}, v. 4 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932)} In 1913, his last year as president, Jordan hired Stanford’s first non-white professor, Japanese historian Yamato Ichihashi. Jordan had mentored Ichihashi throughout his undergraduate career, written his recommendations for graduate school, and assisted in the publication of his writing. Now, he set Ichihashi on a path to be the first tenured Japanese professor in the U.S.\footnote{Yamato Ichihashi Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University, Box 2, Folder 1; Chang, \textit{Morning Glory Evening Shadow}.}

Jordan’s role in establishing Stanford University as an institution friendly to Japan also had lasting impact on the history of racial intelligence testing, as several of

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\footnote{Burns, \textit{David Starr Jordan}; Chang, \textit{Morning Glory Evening Shadow}.}
\footnote{Yamato Ichihashi Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University, Box 2, Folder 1; Chang, \textit{Morning Glory Evening Shadow}.}
Jordan’s recruits went on to train in psychology with either Terman or G.S. Hall and conduct tests of their own in the U.S. and Japan. In the short term, Stanford’s status with Japanese businessmen and academics was crucial to Terman’s successful bid for JAA funding.

The esteem with which JAA officials held David Starr Jordan and Stanford University, however, does not wholly account for the enthusiasm with which the JAA received Terman’s proposal. Letters exchanged between representatives of Stanford and the JAA during the course of their joint eugenic venture reveal not only the character and talents of individuals working for both institutions, and the vital interplay between individual and institutional interests; they attest to a mutual, if nuanced, acceptance of what we might call the race paradigm—the idea that the world’s population could be defined and hierarchically ordered by race—and an adherence to the notion that psychological testing promised a true measurement of the intelligence and behavioral characteristics of a racially defined group.

In *Between Two Empires: Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese America*, Eiichiro Azuma observes that early-twentieth century Japanese immigrants to the United States “generally accepted the legitimacy of the meanings and categories upheld by the dominant ideologies of both the United States and Japan.”

Looking at the Stanford-JAA joint testing project, we may safely take Azuma’s assertion one step further. Though Terman developed the testing plan, it was the JAA that ultimately ensured its implementation, providing $10,000 to fund the project in full, and campaigning for the support of the parents whose children were to be tested.

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76 Azuma, *Between Two Empires*, 5.
Here, elite Japanese not only “accepted the legitimacy of these meanings and categories,” they played an integral part in legitimizing them.

The Test

In April of 1921, Lewis Terman wrote to K. Kanzaki, General Secretary of the Japanese Association of America, to gauge the association’s interest in funding a “psychological and anthropological study of California Japanese.” “The purpose of the study,” Terman wrote, “would be to make a thoroughly scientific investigation of the important mental, moral, and physical characteristics of representative Japanese residents in California.” The research would provide “unprejudiced and authoritative data concerning the Japanese with respect to:

1) Intellectual ability, as shown by standard mental tests.  
2) The extent to which mental deficiency and degeneracy are prevalent among them.  
3) Moral characteristics and the extent to which these are being influenced by American ideas.  
4) Social characteristics and the extent to which these are being influenced by American ideals.  
6) Health and physical traits.  

In order to obtain this information, Terman proposed that his researchers would study “American-born Japanese children” between ages 12 and 14—children, Terman noted, who at the age of 21 would become full American citizens between 1929 and 1931—in several counties, including Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, Los Angeles, Monterey, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara. “Whatever was

77 “Suggestions for a Psychological and Anthropological Study of California Japanese,” April 12, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
found to hold true of this cross section sampling,” Terman suggested, “could be regarded as true of our future Japanese citizenry in general.”

Since Terman’s proposed budget was $10,000, he made sure in his April 1921 letter to note that the project would be not only of scientific, but practical value to Japanese in California. In no uncertain terms, he argued that his research would “help truth prevail over race prejudice in the solution of Japanese-American relationships.” In a revised proposal later that summer, Terman expanded on this point: “As a result of the investigation, we should be able to substitute for the present vague, prejudiced and unscientific discussion of the racial problem involved, a body of real evidence, scientifically acquired and interpreted.”

Terman assured Kanzaki that if the JAA entrusted him with this research, its conduct, interpretation, and publication would be unaffected by the partisan politics endemic to the issue of Japanese in California. “The carrying out of research under the auspices of Stanford University,” he assured them “would be sufficient guarantee of its scientific accuracy and freedom from bias, as this university is privately endowed and entirely independent of political influences.”

To seal the deal, Terman appended a list of his credentials. This list included his memberships on the Council of the American Psychological Association, the Division of Anthropology and Psychology, National Research Council, and the National Research Council Committee on Race Psychology; his past and current

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 “An Outline of the Proposed Study of the Mental Traits of Japanese Children in California,” undated, Summer 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
81 “Suggestions for a Psychological and Anthropological Study of California Japanese,” April 12, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
funding, which numbered in the thousands of dollars; and a selected list of publications. Although he included in this last section *The Measurement of Intelligence*, Terman saw fit to exclude several other publications in which his notions of Anglo-Saxon supremacy were more explicit.82

On April 19, Kanzaki notified Terman that his proposition had found favor with the JAA Board of Directors, and that they would meet on May 6 to consider supporting it. Kanzaki, who would be stepping down from his position on April 20, expressed his “appreciations for the cooperations shown to us by the thoughtful American in the Japanese problem” [sic], and directed Terman to address all future correspondence to Tanezo Takimoto, his successor.83

Terman’s letter to Takimoto on May 5, one day before the JAA Board was set to meet, demonstrates not only his confidence in mental testing, but also his sales acumen. The letter was dual-purposed: on the one hand, it reminded the JAA of his standing in the scientific community; on the other, it reiterated explicitly the political usefulness of the proposed investigations. Noting that he had only just received Kanzaki’s positive April 19th letter due to an “extended trip in the East,” Terman wrote that during the trip he had spoken about the project “with many of the leading psychologists in the eastern universities…all of whom…expressed the view that such a study is extremely desirable and that it would help in no small degree to put the Japanese in the right light before the people of America.”84

Over the next few weeks, Terman received encouraging news from Takimoto.

82 Ibid.
83 Kanzaki to Terman, April 19, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
84 Terman to Takimoto, May 5, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
According to a letter from the latter dated May 10, the JAA Board of Directors had met on May 6, and had instructed Takimoto to begin securing funds for the study.85 By early June, the directors expressed interest in expanding the scope of the study to include mental tests in Japan under Terman’s direction. Takimoto inquired whether “anthropological and ethnological investigations,” as well as “statistics of criminality and etc. in Japan” might also be useful.86

Buoyed by the JAA’s obvious interest—and its promise of financial support—Terman nonetheless was careful not to overextend the parameters of the proposed research. Undertaking mental testing in Japan, he surmised, would bring the project over budget. Moreover, it was outside the scope of his direct concerns. As with statistics of criminology in Japan, he asserted, “such data would be of less value for our present purpose than similar data on Japanese in California. It is specially desired to know how Japanese and American children compare with one another when subjected to the same environment.” Further attempting to endear himself to his would-be funders, Terman then added, “In this connection, I was interested the other day to hear Dr. Harold Williams, director of the California Bureau of Juvenile Research, say that no Japanese child had ever been committed to a California institution for juvenile delinquents.”87

85 Takimoto to Terman, May 10, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1. Takimoto was never explicit about the Board’s motives in his letters to Terman, but the Board’s rapid decision to fund the project, and its subsequent sustained interest in its findings, suggests that JAA members reasoned such a study—stamped with the imprimatur of Stanford University and buttressed by the moral authority of science—might aid its beleaguered campaigns for land ownership, educational access, naturalization and citizenship rights.
86 Takimoto to Terman, June 4, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
87 Terman to Takimoto, June 7, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
By early June of 1921, Terman had convinced Takimoto and the directors of the Japanese Association of America of the proposed study’s worth, but funding was going to be an issue. In 1921, $10,000 would have accounted for between a third and a half of the JAA annual budget.\(^{88}\) It was clear that Takimoto would have to seek outside funding from Japanese business interests if that figure was going to be met. A series of exchanges between Takimoto, Terman, and Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur during June and July suggest that the newly-minted JAA General Secretary was reticent to bring the matter to possible funders without the explicit institutional backing of Stanford University.

Although Terman had outlined the study and submitted two proposals to the JAA, the project required the explicit support of Wilbur to proceed. “Personally, I have thoroughly understood the matter,” Takimoto wrote to Terman on July 11, “but to convince the parties interested”—would-be funders in Japan—“the President’s answer will be the most effective.”\(^{89}\) After some gentle prodding from both Terman and Takimoto—the former even drafted a letter to the JAA that Wilbur might simply sign—on July 27 the Stanford President satisfied Takimoto in writing, assuring him that his university would see the JAA funds “efficiently administered” and the research “carried on with the greatest of scientific care.”\(^{90}\)

Institutional assurances in hand, Takimoto began his search for funders. In


\(^{89}\) Takimoto to Terman, July 11, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.

\(^{90}\) Terman to Wilbur, June 9, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1; Wilbur to Takimoto, July 27, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
early August, he was aided by the renowned Masaharu Anesaki, Professor of the Science of Religion at Japan’s Tokyo Imperial University.\(^91\) Although principally a scholar of Japanese Nichiren Buddhism, Anesaki had long been interested in racial research. After earning a degree in Philosophy from Tokyo University in 1900, Anesaki had studied in Europe under Albrecht Weber and Thomas William Rhys Davids, indologists concerned with the development of the “Aryan” ethnicity, and he himself was interested in the concept of “race memory.”\(^92\) From the outset, Anesaki lent his credibility and connections to the project. He had in fact proposed a similar research idea that very summer to the Pan Pacific Educational Conference in Hawaii, and to the Committee on Japanese-American Relations in Tokyo, and he was confident that the latter—or at least influential businessmen connected to the latter—would support Terman’s investigations.\(^93\)

In the fall of 1921, while Takimoto and Anesaki searched for funding, Terman put together a research team headed by Marvin Darsie, a Stanford Education Ph.D. candidate teaching at the University of California’s Southern Branch (later to become UCLA). Under Terman’s guidance, it was in fact Darsie who originally envisioned the study as his dissertation, although Terman does not mention this in his letters to

\(^91\) Anesaki to Takimoto, August 31, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
\(^93\) Anesaki to Takimoto, August 31, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
the JAA.94 At 34, Darsie was already an experienced educator. Previous to his appointment in Los Angeles, Darsie had taught science at Glendale High School and Lincoln High School in Los Angeles, so he had experience with the very public school administrators, teachers, and students he would need to work with for the project.95 From November 1921 to December of 1922, Darsie and field workers Ruth Quire, Kathryn Donald, Mary Taylor and Petra Johnson conducted the actual tests.96

Before moving to Los Angeles, Darsie had worked closely with Terman at Stanford, and this closeness was reflected in the casual language which colored their exchanges, and in the trust Terman accorded his student at each stage of the project. Thus it was that the tests Darsie proposed be included in the study early on—the Stanford Binet, Army Beta, Trabue Completion, Stone Reasoning Test in Arithmetic, and Thorndike McCall Silent Reading—were with few exceptions there at the end. Terman approved of Darsie’s general methodology, which as planned employed a regimen of both linguistic and non-linguistic tests, as well as tests and questionnaires to measure school achievement, “school attitude,” “volitional makeup,” “aesthetic appreciation” and “constructive ability.”97

With Terman’s guidance, Darsie decided which tests to include in the study, but he was not entirely sure of their efficacy. In early November 1921, he was

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94 In the final, published version of the study, Darsie writes that he “projected” the research in 1920, before the Terman-JAA correspondence began. Marvin Darsie, The Mental Capacity of American-Born Japanese Children (1926; repr., New York: Kraus, 1967).
95 Berkeley Daily Gazette, January 23, 1940.
96 Darsie to Terman, October 28 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1; Marvin Darsie, “The Mental Capacity of American-Born Japanese Children” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1924); The Mental Capacity of American-Born Japanese Children.
97 Darsie to Terman, October 28, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
particularly concerned with the study’s non-linguistic tests: the Army Beta Test and Kelley’s Constructive Ability Test. Developed in 1917 by Terman and six other prominent psychologists (in conjunction with the Army Alpha Test) to measure the cognitive abilities of WWI recruits who used English as a second language, the Army Beta Test was certainly the most famous and most-used non-linguistic intelligence test. Between 1917 and 1918, the army administered Army Alpha and Beta to 1.7 million soldiers. However, Darsie was not entirely convinced that it would provide satisfactory results for this study. He was similarly concerned about Truman Kelley’s Constructive Ability Test, a building block test that Kelley designed in 1916 to measure children’s spatial reasoning, problem solving, and manipulative abilities.98

Terman, too, expressed reservations about the non-linguistic tests. Although he himself created it, his endorsement of the Army Beta for the Japanese study was at best lukewarm: “The Army Beta is far from perfect, but I think it is the best thing available of its kind.” Next to his estimation of Kelley’s test, however, which he thought was “miserably slow to give” and lacking in its ability to “draw on the higher intellectual processes,” the Army Beta fared relatively well.99

By late December 1921, Darsie and his field workers had completed preliminary testing and were ready to report on their findings. Before delving into what he found, it is important to underscore that spending undue time on the findings of the Terman-Darsie test risks reinforcing its misguided methods and conclusions. I

98 Darsie to Terman, November 9, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1; Terman’s role in the development of the Army Alpha and Beta tests is treated extensively by Terman’s biographers: Minton, Lewis M. Terman; Seagoe, Terman and the Gifted; and Chapman, Schools as Sorters; Truman Kelley, “A Constructive Ability Test,” Journal of Educational Psychology, v. 7, n. 1 (Jan 1916): 1-16.
99 Terman to Darsie, November 15, 1921, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
am far less interested in the test results, biased as they were, than in the factors which
gave birth to the project. It is useful, however, to take a brief look at some of the test
criteria, assumptions, and conclusions. They provide a glimpse, after all, into the type
of concerns that fueled racial testing, and they illustrate why the JAA was so intent
upon carrying the project out to its conclusion.100

As Darsie had expected, the Japanese children were “markedly inferior to
American in those tests in which language plays an important part.” However, “in
tests of reasoning power, apart from language, the Japanese children were equal to
Americans, and in tests of rapid learning markedly superior to Americans.”101 The
preliminary results Darsie sent to the JAA were based upon tests given to 568
children, 292 boys, and 276 girls, from age 10 to 15 in nine California localities. Like
other testing projects of the day, Darsie interpreted the results by age, grade, sex,
locality (urban vs. rural), and “distribution according to occupation of fathers.” Once
broken down into these sets, Darsie compared the Japanese American children to
“Americans,” sometimes labeled “native Americans,” and to children of other
immigrant groups, in this case “Northern Europeans, Finns, Slovaks, Southern
Italians, Portuguese, and Spanish.”102

In addition to the tests, Darsie surveyed more than 400 teachers regarding
their Japanese-American students’ “traits” and abilities, and, as with the tests, both
the categories in play and the teachers’ answers revealed more about the evaluators

100 Darsie to Terman, January 2, 1922, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
101 Darsie, “A Preliminary Report on the Mental Capacity of the Japanese Children of
California,” undated, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
102 Darsie used the term “Native Americans” to refer to white children with non-
imigrant parents.
than the evaluated. In the category of “school achievement,” Darsie found that “there were no important differences between boys and girls…except in [science and history], in which the boys were superior to girls.” He added: “it is worth noting that in knowledge of American history and literature, Japanese boys and girls in San Francisco are superior to American children.” Additionally, according to the “teacher’s ratings,” the children were “slightly superior in the following traits: appreciation of beauty, permanence of moods, desire to excel, freedom from vanity, and conscientiousness.”

Given the anti-Japanese sentiment against which the JAA hoped to position the tests, and their request for 250 copies of the study in its final form, it is safe to suggest that JAA members were buoyed by Darsie’s three preliminary conclusions:

1) The Japanese in California are as a group, somewhat inferior in intelligence to Northern Europeans, but markedly superior to Southern Europeans.

2) In application and capacity to learn, they are probably superior to any European race in America, as well as superior to native Americans.

3) In social-moral traits, they are fully equal, and in many respects probably superior to the average child of other races in California, as judged by their teachers, this being true with respect to native American children as well.

Darsie’s study in its final form included analyses of each data set, and its conclusions regarding Japanese-American abilities did not differ substantially from

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103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.; four years after the initial testing was complete, Takimoto contributed another $243 (in addition to the $10,000 raised for the testing) for the purchase of these 250 copies. See Darsie to Terman, April 12, 1926; and Takimoto to Stanford University, April 28, 1926, LMT Papers, Box 8, Folder 1.
the preliminary report; importantly—and surprisingly, given his training—however, it offered a strong critique of intelligence testing, and particularly the Stanford-Binet. Published in *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, a journal edited by Walter Hunter, the G. Stanley Hall Professor of Genetic Psychology at Clark University, in January 1926, it included an additional 90 children, and gave greater consideration to the divergent results attained by the use of linguistic versus non-linguistic tests. Although Darsie had attempted to control for language handicap by selecting only American-born Japanese children, he found that Japanese-American students fared far worse on the former than the latter. The extraordinary degree of divergence between the composite scores—Japanese-American children were in fact superior to their white counterparts on the beta tests, but inferior to them on alpha tests, particularly Terman’s Stanford-Binet—provoked Darsie to challenge existing testing methodology. He ended his study with a warning: it was “plain…that with groups or individuals having had widely different opportunity and stimuli to master the language, Binet’s I.Q.’s must be accepted with extreme caution as indices of innate differences in mental capacity.”106

To gain a fuller understanding of why Darsie’s mentor, and the psychology profession more generally, never heeded this advice, opting instead to push full bore ahead with bold claims regarding IQ and heredity, we can look at the other studies alongside which *Comparative Psychological Monographs* published Darsie’s test. In 1926 the journal published Darsie’s study of Japanese-American children, two similarly biased tests of Mexican-American and African-American children, and one

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test of “mentally retarded children.” The three short volumes that included these works, however, interposed between them the following studies: “A Behavioristic Study of the Activity of the Rat;” The Thyroid Influence on the Behavior of the White Rat;” “The Relative effectiveness of Certain Incentives in Animal Learning;” and, to draw everything together, “Studies of the Reliability of the Problem Box and the Maze with Human and Animal Subjects.” The juxtaposition of these studies speaks to the confidence of an emergent field in its ability to attack wide-ranging problems, and throws into relief the conceit that psychologists might expertly measure the mental, physical, and social characteristics of human and animal life and speak about them in a similar fashion. As I will discuss in the following chapter, this conceit, which underscores deep connections between eugenics and professional psychology, helped usher nineteenth-century scientific racism into the twentieth century.

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Stanford University's racial intelligence testing studies of the 1920s and 1930s operated at the juncture of multiple personal, community, and institutional histories. In this chapter, we tracked the intellectual influences that guided Stanford Psychologist Lewis Terman toward racial testing. Terman not only employed the methodologies of his teachers—psychologists Ernest Lindley at the University of Indiana and G. Stanley Hall at Clark University—he emulated their eugenic world view.

107 Comparative Psychology Monographs, v. 1-3 (January 1925-October 1926).
This chapter also expanded our understanding of the motives for Terman’s 1921-1926 Stanford University-Japanese Association of America (JAA) joint testing project by framing it as a response by the Japanese immigrant community to California’s anti-Asian movement. Though Terman and much of his nativist cohort conceived of intelligence testing as an exclusionary mechanism, JAA board members, Japanese intellectuals, and the elite Japanese businessmen who sponsored the Stanford-JAA testing project looked to it to prove the assimilative possibility and racial worth of Japanese immigrants. Key to the Stanford-JAA relationship was that both sides shared a similar understanding of race as a discrete, inherited trait, and intelligence as a measurable quantity. In that context, the notion of racial intelligence became a valuable commodity.

Finally, this chapter began a critical exploration of Stanford University’s approach to understanding race during the interwar period. Two factors, Stanford administrator and faculty ties to the eugenics movement and eugenic testing, and a sustained interest in Japan and the Japanese, coalesced to shape the direction of the Stanford approach. In the proceeding chapters, we will look closer at these factors and the types of studies and conclusions they prompted.
Chapter 2:
The Science of Race

Stanford University became a center of eugenic testing of Asian Americans during the 1920s through a relationship of strange bedfellows between Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman and the Japanese Association of America (JAA). As we saw in Chapter One, this relationship was the product of several moving parts: Stanford President David Starr Jordan’s fascination with Japan, Terman’s prominent role in developing eugenic testing, and the JAA’s desire to use testing—and the prestige of Stanford University—to combat anti-Japanese sentiment in California.

In this chapter, we place Stanford’s intelligence testing of Asian Americans within the longer history of scientific approaches to race, exploring the development of race science from its European origins in the eighteenth century to the American eugenics movement of the 1920s and 1930s. A considerable body of research has laid out the broad contours of that history, but this chapter provides an ordering of it that is specific to the topic of Asian-American intelligence testing. It does this first by emphasizing two interrelated ways of understanding the world that were evolving in concert at the turn of the twentieth century: Orientalism and racial essentialism, and then by highlighting the particular branches of race science in which this testing was embedded.

In 1978, literary theorist Edward Said developed the notion of Orientalism as a framework for understanding Europe’s relationship with the cultures and peoples of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Said described Orientalism as “the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it,
authorizing views of it, describing it, settling it, ruling over it: in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”¹ Said, and scholars building on his work, have focused on the ways that Western art and literature from the eighteenth-century to the present have imagined “the Orient” in opposition to the West, setting up a dichotomous relationship of self and other, modern and backward, dynamic and stagnant.²

We begin a chapter on race science with Orientalism for two reasons: first, because Orientalism was an integral component of the anti-Asian immigrant

movement to which the Stanford-JAA intelligence testing project was responding; and second, because Orientalism and race science have always been mutually constitutive. The eighteenth-century European scientists who invented “race” relied upon the Orientalist accounts of European explorers for their racial systems, and the explorers in turn employed the “science of race” to substantiate their own claims, and to create and maintain their own visions of the “Orient.” Indeed, many scientists responsible for developing Western racial systems never traveled outside of Europe. German naturalist Johann Blumenbach, who established hierarchy in racial classification, for example, relied exclusively on museum exhibits, travelers’ accounts, and specimens brought to him. Still others, like Francis Galton, the founder of the nineteenth century eugenics movement, were Orientalist writers themselves, venturing outside of Europe only to reproduce Orientalist caricatures of the people and places they visited. In presenting a history that underscores the relationship between race science and Orientalism, we will get a sense not only of Terman’s intellectual foundations, but a further explanation of the motives that led both to the testing of Asians and Asian Americans and the language that colored test questions and results.

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American Orientalism and Racial Essentialism

In April 1896 the San Francisco Saturday Evening Bulletin sent a young reporter named Cora M. Older to observe classes at the city’s only publicly-funded school for students of Chinese heritage, the Chinese Primary School. The principal of the school, Rose Thayer, was less than accommodating. As Older related, Thayer objects to having articles written about her pupils, for she says they do not like it, and then she dislikes having them put on a footing with the inhabitants of a museum. She was so vigorous in her protests that we considered ourselves especially fortunate in getting a peep at the little yellow men, for she declares that this afternoon she shall see that the Board of Education decrees that writers, artists and tourists are not to be allowed to visit the school.5

In Older’s article, entitled “Teaching English to the Little Yellow Men,” Thayer’s fears were realized. Despite Thayer’s remonstrations, Older indeed introduced the students to Bulletin readers as museum pieces: “The principal’s room is very pleasant and contains three grades of pupils, and the torrid sun was shining in through the windows, making more picturesque the boys with large, dark, moist eyes, clothed in graceful gowns of green, blue and black.” Older wrote that the students were “struggling with the intricacies of the stubborn Anglo-Saxon language. It is not easy work for these lads descended from ancestors who for 6000 years have clung obstinately to Chinese.” Yet, as she opined, “they succeed amazingly, and their

English, when mastered is of so perfect a kind that it will perhaps some day put to
shame that of many Americans.”6

Older’s ostensible praise of these diligent students veiled a deeper critique of
their background. In her formulation, they struggled in their new American world—a
world marked by progress, modernity—against heredity itself, against the workings
of an ancestral line that “clung obstinately” to one unchanging tradition for millennia.
Their “dark, moist eyes,” their language, their dress, “graceful” and “picturesque,”
spoke to an aesthetic that was not of this place. Even Principal Thayer played a role in
this drama, included not as one whose practical warnings were to be heeded, but as a
gatekeeper to the school and the promised secret world within. In this characterization
of the students, Older was writing into an Orientalist tradition that made sense to
herself and to her readers. Her visit to the school was a “sensemaking” exercise, a
piece of a larger project of representation that would have to be continually re-made
and re-affirmed by articles like hers for it to maintain its foothold.7

In 1903, seven years after Older introduced Bulletin readers to the Chinese
Primary School, as the San Francisco Board of Education was considering expanding
the school or moving it to another location, residents of the North End, a largely

6 Older, “Teaching English to the Little Yellow Men.”
7 I borrow the notion of “sensemaking” from Said, Orientalism, 102, and from Ali
Behdad, Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1994). Behdad writes that European travelers to the “orient”
are “endowed with the desire for and power of representation…the orientalist is a
sensemaker, a creator of meaning; to discover and represent the Other he must negate
the experience of lack and his sense of disorientation” (71). Behdad’s critique focuses
on European travelogues, and he is speaking here to Flaubert’s account of his travel
to Egypt. Older’s story of her visit to the Chinese School, however, follows this
pattern of representation.
European immigrant community which bordered Chinatown, formed a protectionist league to keep the school and Chinese businesses out of their neighborhood. On the night of February 19, 1903 community leader Reverend Terence Caraher of Saint Francis’ Church of the North End gave voice to their concerns:

The Chinese are obnoxious, and we have a right to protest their forcing their way into this beautiful section of the city. The landlords renting property to these aliens say that they will not sleep or eat in their stores. That means, when they come among us in the morning, they will be reeking with the vice of Chinatown. There were no more revolting vices in the early days of civilization than are to be found today in the Chinese quarter. The arguments against their coming to the North End are many; they undersell our merchants; they live on rats and rice.  

Caraher’s characterization of the Chinese was in line with the anti-Chinese political rhetoric of the day. Like Older’s article in the Saturday Evening Bulletin, it built upon a tradition of Orientalist discourse which treated Chinese people and cultural forms as “alien.” The singular intensity of its rancor, however, can be attributed to a paradigm of racial essentialism—bolstered by scientists, educators, journalists and policymakers in Europe and the U.S.—that separated humans into discrete groups with distinct characteristics and impermeable borders. This paradigm shaped anti-Asian movements in California from the mid-nineteenth century through World War II. The racial-essentialist arguments of Dennis Kearney in the 1870s, Father Caraher at the turn of the century, Japanese exclusionist V.S. McClatchy in the 1920s, and Lieutenant General John Dewitt, who with the quintessential essentialist line “a Jap’s a Jap” recommended to Congress the removal of all Japanese Americans to

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8 San Francisco Examiner, February 19, 1903.
internment centers in 1942, relied upon popular understandings of this paradigm for their authority.⁹

Racial essentialism survived the twentieth century divide without major revision, testifying not only to its utility, but to the agility of the “scientific” systems tasked with reproducing it. While strong analyses of race science by scholars such as Steven J. Gould and William Tucker have looked at the deep historical roots of twentieth-century racial testing, this chapter will add to that discussion, pushing further on the notion that racial testing was the key to maintaining racial essentialism.¹⁰ I argue that in the 1910s and 20s, as older forms of race science receded, the science of intelligence testing provided a bridge to cross the nineteenth-century Euro-American racial paradigm into the twentieth century, allowing the specific racisms and racial orderings of the pre-industrial age to survive and dictate


policy into the post-industrial. Had racial essentialist ideas not been lent credence by this new science, they might have been cast aside as antiquated, irrational concepts, products of a bygone era. But with the new science of applied psychology, and the engineering and medical language that buoyed it, nineteenth century notions of race were incorporated into the next century’s scientific and political discourse.

The intelligence testing movement that propelled racial essentialism into the twentieth century should be seen as an outgrowth of a longer relationship between science and race. This relationship began during the Enlightenment, when scientists and philosophers first devised systems of classification to order and interpret the plant and animal worlds. In the nineteenth century, anthropologists, first in Europe and then in the new United States, added to these systems a vast body of work on anthropometry—the measurement of humans. (In fact, until intelligence testing came into fashion in the early twentieth century, for over one hundred years craniometry, or skull measurement, was de rigueur.) Although its techniques constantly evolved, from the Enlightenment to the era of intelligence testing the scientific profession described a clear lineament: holding fast to a particular brand of racial essentialism it decreed that the human species could be separated into “races,” measured, ordered, and assigned physical, mental, and moral characteristics.

**Inventing Race**

The science of race originated in the eighteenth century with the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus, whose widely-read *Systema Naturae* (1735) introduced taxonomy to Western science. Linnaeus classified flora and fauna and coined a new
term, *Homo Sapiens*, to distinguish humans as the only animals which “know themselves” in the animal kingdom. He divided the *Homo* category into four further “species,” each linked to a geographical region and skin color: “Europaeus albesc.,” “Americanus rubesc.,” “Asiaticus fuscus.,” “Africanus nigr.,” or, as Michael Keevak has translated, “whitish” Europeans, “reddish” Americans, “dark” or “swarthy” Asians, and “black” Africans.¹¹ In the first edition of *Systema Naturae*, Linnaeus did not tie race to a set of behavioral characteristics, nor did he set up a hierarchy of races. Over the decades, however, as Linnaeus’ botanical taxonomies evolved, so too did his thinking on race. Relying on travelers’ accounts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas for his descriptions, in the 1758 edition of *Systema*, Linnaeus defined Americans as “choleric, rectus” (aggressive or easily angered, upright), Europeans as “sanguineus, torosus” (sanguine, muscular), Asians as “melancholicus, rigidus” (melancholy, stiff), and Africans as “phlegmaticus, laxus” (phlegmatic, lazy).¹² He


expressed no explicit hierarchy here, but in connecting the physical to the behavioral
Linnaeus took the first steps toward establishing a basis for racial essentialism.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1795, Johann Blumenbach, naturalist, anthropologist, Professor of Medicine at Gottingen University and student of Linnaeus, expanded and refined his mentor’s system in the third edition of his \textit{On the Natural Variety of Mankind}. To the Linnaen system Blumenbach substituted a term of his own invention, “Caucasian,” for “European,” added “Malay,” and indicated by these revisions two new principles: first, that because of their facial and cranial symmetry, Caucasians, those with ancestry from the Caucasus mountain range, must be the primeval, representative human types from which all others derived, or, in his word, “degenerated;” and second, that “races” are in transition (Malay being “between” Caucasian and Ethiopian). According to Blumenbach, because the Caucasian race was initial, and the others degenerative, it stood to reason that it was the most beautiful race of man, and that God had endowed it with the more positive aspects of man’s nature.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} There is still some debate over whether Linnaeus’ system was hierarchical. In his \textit{The Mismeasure of Man: Revised Edition} (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996) Gould argued that “Linnaeus’ primary ordering principle is cartographic; if he had wished to push hierarchy as the essential picture of human variety, he would surely have listed Europeans first and Africans last, but he started with native Americans instead” (67). James Larson, \textit{Reason and Experience: The Representation of Natural Order in the Work of Carl Von Linne} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), and C. Loring Brace, \textit{Evolution in an Anthropological View} (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000) disagree. They contend that since Linnaeus, like most of his contemporaries, drew inspiration for his system from the “Great Chain of Being,” the Aristotelian chart which ordered the natural world hierarchically from God down to minerals, he must have intended it to be hierarchical. Intended or not, Linnaeus’ separation of humans into races with defined traits was the essential precondition for racial hierarchy.

\textsuperscript{14} Johann Blumenbach, \textit{The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach} trans. Thomas Bendyshe (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865), 264.
The circular logic of Blumenbach’s argument was lost on his admiring contemporaries, as well as on the next century of naturalists, anthropologists, philosophers and politicians. Thomas Jefferson, although he preferred Linneaus’ system for its relative simplicity, looked to Blumenbach to formulate his own ideas on natural history and race, as did Marx and Engels; the elder Emmanuel Kant praised Blumenbach’s epigenetic theory of development in his later writings; and Samuel Coleridge traveled to Gottingen to attend Blumenbach’s lectures and view the pioneering craniometrist’s famous collection of skulls. 15 When Thomas Bendyshe

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15 Harold Hellenbrand, The Unfinished Revolution: Education and Politics in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1990); Bruce Dain, A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). Because he popularized race-based physical anthropology, twentieth and twenty-first century social scientists generally credit Blumenbach with creating modern scientific racism. In the nineteenth century, however, no one would have foreseen this. As several scholars have observed, Blumenbach was more egalitarian than many of his contemporaries. See Arthur Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, ed. Bentley Glass, Owsei Temkin, and William L. Straus Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1996); Milford Wolpoff and Rachel Caspari, Race and Human Evolution: a Fatal Attraction (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); in fact, in 1840 Marx published a biography of Blumenbach which focused on the democratic possibilities of the latter’s research: “At a time when the negroes and the savages were still considered as half animals, and no one had yet conceived the idea of the emancipation of the slaves,” Marx reminded readers, “Blumenbach raised his voice, and showed that their physical qualities were not inferior to those of the European, that even amongst the latter themselves the greatest possible differences existed, and that opportunity alone was wanting for the development of their higher faculties” in Karl Marx, “Life of Blumenbach” in The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 9. Timothy Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," ISIS 71, n. 256 (1980): 77-108; Patrick J. Keane, Coleridge’s Submerged Politics: The Ancient Mariner and Robinson Crusoe (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1994), 58. Blumenbach’s epigenetic theory of development centered on the concept of Bildungstrieb, or “formative drive.” In contrast to preformationist theory, which held that a living organism contained within it the literal pre-formed building blocks, or “germs,” of its later development—thus a chicken egg had organs—Blumenbach argued that there was “no such thing in
translated Blumenbach’s work for the British Anthropological Society in 1865, he noted that On the Natural Variety of Mankind “still [held] its ground in the latest elementary textbooks of ethnology.” And indeed, European and North American geography and biology textbooks used Blumenbach’s five-tiered model and degeneration theory to explain what they generally termed “the races of man” into the 1930s.

Blumenbach did not venture outside of Europe, so his conception of “the races of man” evolved out of his readings of Kant and Hume, the accounts of slave traders and missionaries, working with museum collections, and most importantly, skull nature as pre-existing germs: but that the unorganized matter of generation…takes on a particular action, or nisus, which nisus continues to act throughout the whole life of the animal” in “Ueber den Bildungstrieb (Nisus formativus) und seinen Einfluss auf die Generation und Reproduktion,” Göttingisches Magazin der Wissenschaften und Literatur, 1 (1780): 247-266, reprinted in Nicholas Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry: On the Reality of Questions in the Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 25.

16 Blumenbach, The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, ix.
17 John Burgess Calkin, School Geography, New Brunswick School Series (London: T. Nelson and Sons; St. John, NB: J. and A. McMillan, 1888); Ralph S. Tarr, New Physical Geography (New York: MacMillan, 1910); Dominion School Geography (Toronto: Educational Book Company, 1910); Teachers College Columbia University Biology Professor and eugenicist Maurice Bigelow employed the system in his widely-used Applied Biology: an Elementary Textbook and Laboratory Guide, first published in 1911 (New York: MacMillan); George William Hunter, A Civic Biology: Presented in Problems (New York: American Book Co., 1914) includes the following section in a chapter entitled “The Division of Labor. The Various Forms of Plants and Animals”: “The Races of Man. At the present time there exist upon the earth five races or varieties of man, each very different from the other in instincts, social customs, and, to an extent, in structure. These are the Ethiopian or negro type, originating in Africa; the Malay or brown race, from the islands of the Pacific; The American Indian; the Mongolian or yellow race, including the natives of China, Japan, and the Eskimos; and finally, the highest type of all, the caucasians, represented by the civilized white inhabitants of Europe and America” (196). This section is repeated in the second edition of this text, though to “the caucasians,” the qualifier “the highest type of all” is expunged and “the Hindus and Arabs of Asia” are added. See Hunter, New Civic Biology, 251.
specimens sent to him by colleagues from around the world. Subtly presaging a modern critique of craniometry, the skeptical but fascinated Coleridge noted in 1811 that Blumenbach had “collected 70 or 80 skulls, each of a different race or nation, before he settled on the central one, and by the time he had a 110 (he has now, I believe, a 120) he had altered his arrangement a score of times at least.” It was this collection, this purported physical evidence that provided the grist for Blumenbach’s mill, and gave rise to a century of race science dominated by craniometrics.

Taking their cue from Blumenbach were the renowned and prolific nineteenth century craniometrists Samuel George Morton and Paul Broca. Like Blumenbach, Morton and Broca believed skull measurement to be the most objective and effective way to classify humans. They assumed a correlation between skull size, intelligence, and temperament, and argued for the superiority of larger-skulled “races.” Morton, a Philadelphia physician, amassed a collection of 1000 skulls and published three major works (1839, 1844, 1849) in service of the dual hypotheses that “Caucasian, 

18 Karl Marx, “Life of Blumenbach” in The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach; Blumenbach came to his theory of degeneration in part by wrestling with the arguments of Kant and Hume, who articulated the most widely-known monogenist and polygenist positions. Monogenists, like Kant, and later Blumenbach, held that all humans descended from a common ancestor, whereas polygenists, like Hume, believed that “the races” had different ancestors, and were thus different species. In 1742, Hume wrote: “I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them in their valour, form of government, or some other particular.” Hume contended that such cultural differences would not be so pronounced “if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.” See David Hume, The Philosophical Works of David Hume (London: Adam Black, William and Charles Tait, 1826), 236.
19 Keane, Coleridge's Submerged Politics, 58.
Mongolian, Malay, American, and Ethiopian’ “races” were descended of distinct ancestry, and that their intelligences could be so ranked. Reexamining Morton’s findings in his 1981 book *The Mismeasure of Man*, Harvard Paleontologist Stephen J. Gould accused Morton of unconsciously manipulating the data to fit his preconceptions. Gould found that Morton had skewed his results by simultaneously excluding small skulls from his Caucasian samples, and large skulls from his American and Ethiopian samples. Thus when Morton presented his findings on the mean cranial capacities (and thus intelligences) of “the races” they lined up perfectly with the prejudices of the day, with Caucasians at 87 inches cubed, Mongolians at 83, Malay 81, American 82, and Ethiopian 78.

Gould’s assessment of Morton has recently come under fire from anthropologists who claim that the former misrepresented the latter’s work. In their 2011 article for *Plos Biology*, “The Mismeasure of Science: Stephen Jay Gould versus Samuel George Morton on Skulls and Bias,” J.E. Lewis, D. DeGusta, M.R. Meyer, J.M. Monge, A.E. Mann, and others challenged Gould’s critique, claiming

that his own biases marred his analysis of Morton.\textsuperscript{23} The authors remeasured nearly half of Morton’s skulls, came to the same results as Morton, and found no evidence that Morton excluded any subsets in his experiments. Some of their criticisms of Gould, however, merit further consideration. In particular, they fault Gould for claiming that Morton included more female skulls, which are generally smaller, in his subsets of populations he considered inferior. They reason that “Morton did not collect the skulls himself, and there is no evidence that he excluded any skulls from measurement based on sex.”\textsuperscript{24} Whether Morton collected the skulls himself or had them delivered from colleagues, however, is immaterial. The mode of collection does not invalidate Gould’s claim that Morton’s sample of Caucasian skulls included more male skulls than his sample of Ethiopian skulls, thus skewing the overall results.

Whether or not his measurements were accurate in retrospect, Morton’s experiments had an immediate effect on the racial arguments of his day. Cloaked in the purported objectivity of science, they emboldened advocates of slavery in the Antebellum South. Thomas Cobb, secessionist, Confederate Congressmember, Confederate Army Brigadier General and founder of the University of Georgia School of Law, for example, looked to Morton’s study in his 1858 slavery apologetic \textit{An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America}. “The intelligent, unprejudiced writers of the non-slaveholding States of America,” he remarked, “are constrained to admit the inferiority of the Negro mind….Dr. Morton, impartial and scientific as he is acknowledged to be, says, ‘It makes little difference

\textsuperscript{24} J.E. Lewis et. al., “The Mismeasure of Science, 5.
whether the mental inferiority of the negro...is natural or acquired; for if they ever possessed equal intelligence with the Caucasian, they have lost it, and if they never had it, they have nothing to lose.” 25 Upon Morton’s death in 1851, the Charleston Medical Journal exclaimed: “We of the South should consider him as our true benefactor, for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true position as an inferior race.” 26

Equally significant was the work of craniometrist Paul Broca, a founder of French Anthropology, who maintained in 1861 that “there is a remarkable relationship between the development of intelligence and the volume of the brain.” 27 Broca was personally opposed to slavery, but he empowered slaveholders by arguing that Europeans were generally endowed with larger brains than individuals of other races, and he had little patience for scientists who, by his estimation, let their egalitarian or abolitionist sentiments obscure their objectivity. “The intervention of political and social considerations,” he wrote in 1855, “has not been less injurious to anthropology than the religious element.” 28 Though distinct from many of his contemporaries in that he did not believe in ideal racial types—he allowed for great

variability within racial groups and changes over time—Broca was particularly concerned with the spectre of racial mixing. Broca believed that Africans and Europeans were descended of separate species, and that sex between them would be “frequently non-productive,” though he did note (paradoxically, but in keeping with the prejudices of his set) that “the union of the Negro with a white woman is frequently sterile, whilst that of a white man with a negress is perfectly fecund.” 29

Broca’s measurement techniques, instruments, and findings figured prominently in the work of physical anthropologists and anatomists into the twentieth century. In 1906, Robert Bennett Bean, instructor of Anatomy at the University of Michigan, reviewed dozens of nineteenth century attempts to distinguish differences between “the Caucasian and the Negro brain,” and concluded that Broca’s measurements were the most accurate. 30 Working from Broca’s measurements, as well as the confirming studies of Paul Flechsig and Barnard Davis, who also cited Broca, he concluded not only that “Caucasians” were endowed with larger brains, but that “the white and the black races are evidently opposites in cardinal points…the one frontal, the other occipital or parietal; the one a great reasoner, the other emotional; the one domineering, but having great self-control, the other meek and submissive, but violent and lacking self-control, especially when the passions are aroused.” 31

31 Bean, “Some Peculiarities of the Negro Brain,” 380. Bean referenced several studies in this work, but relied primarily upon Paul Broca, Memoirs d’Anthropologie, v. 1, v. 2; Revue d’Anthropologie, 1872-75; Bull. Soc. d’Anthropologie, 1860-75; “Sur la Topographie Craniocerebrale,” Revue d’Anthropologie, v. 5; Joseph Barnard Davis, Thesaurus Craniorum; or Catalogue of Skulls of Various Races of Men in the
Bean and fellow anatomists were indebted to Broca for inventing the instruments and indices of their science—including the craniograph (used to outline a skull), the goniometer (used to measure facial angle), the occipital goniometer (used to measure the angle of the back, lower part of the cranium) and the cephalic index (a measure of cranial width to length used by late nineteenth and early twentieth century scientists to divide humans into racial subsets and now employed, without regards to race, in obstetrics)—but it was Broca’s misguided conclusions regarding the correlation between brain size and intelligence that fueled and established the pattern of their research.32

Collection of Joseph Barnard Davis (London, Printed for the Subscribers, 1867); Crania Britannica: Delineations and Descriptions of the Skulls of Aboriginal and Early Inhabitants of the British Islands: With Notices of their Remains (London, 1865); and “Contributions Toward Determining the Weight of the Brain in Different Races of Man,” Philosophical Transactions, n. 158, (1868) for his conclusion; In his next contribution to Anatomy, Bean lent his expertise to the United States’ colonial project in the Philippines. Racial Anatomy of the Philippine Islanders: Introducing New Methods of Anthropology and Showing the Application to the Filipinos with a Classification of Human Ears and a Scheme for the Heredity of Anatomical Characters of Man (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1910) published while Bean was an Associate Professor of Anatomy at Tulane, was the result of three years study “taking every student available” at the Philippine Normal School and the School of Arts and Trades in Manila (25). To what degree “every student” had the choice to participate in Bean’s battery of physical tests, he does not speak, but at least his readers are apprised of the fact that “interbreeding” between different “types” in the Philippines (his labels include “Austaloid,” “Primitive,” “Iberian,” and “Blends”) yields predictably Mendalian results: “When the types of Manila students are compared with the polyhybrids resulting from the crossing of two unlike tomato plants, great similarity is found between the number of student types and the number of polyhybrids...” (37-45).

In the waning decades of the nineteenth century, polymath British scientist Francis Galton shifted the focus of race science from anthropometrics to mental testing. Francis Galton was a meteorologist, a statistician, a craniometrist, an ethnographer, a geographer, and an African expeditionist and writer of travel guides, but his most enduring legacy is that of founder of the eugenics movement, the masthead of twentieth century biological determinism and racial essentialism. Galton first made his mark in 1869, with the publication *Hereditary Genius: an Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences*. His work was prompted by the findings of his first cousin, Charles Darwin, whose 1859 *On the Origin of Species* posited a theory of natural selection by evolution. Whereas his cousin limited his study to physical traits in animals, however, Galton suggested that human psychological characteristics might be inheritable as well. Presenting as his evidence the abridged family trees of 300 eminent families, as well as anecdotes regarding the limited abilities of children adopted into “well-born” families, Galton argued that nature and not nurture was the greater predictor of cross-generational success in any given field. As Raymond Fancher has written, by combining Darwin’s theories with his own, Galton sparked a sea change in scientific racial thinking. “Psychological

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33 Between 1850 and 1852 Galton explored Southwest Africa, produced a map of the region, and was welcomed into the prestigious Royal Geographical Society. He published two popular accounts of his travels: *The Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa* (London: John Murray, 1853); and the guide book *The Art of Travel; or, Shifts and Contrivances Available in Wild Countries* (London: John Murray, 1855).

differences among individuals and ethnic groups,” Galton and a growing body of like-minded scientists realized, “could potentially be explained on hereditary grounds, and even more important, such variations could be recognized as the basis from which the human race will evolve in the future.” 35

In *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development* (1883) Galton suggested eugenics as a method of intervening in this process of evolution. Derived from the Greek *eugenēs*, meaning “well born” Galton envisioned eugenics as both a science and a set of practices that would give “the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.”36 The eugenic approach, then, was to be both external and internal: it would strive to ensure the triumph of the “suitable races” while at the same time “improving” those races through the development of “superior strains” within them.37

A typical Victorian ethnocentrist, Galton was sure that “Caucasians” were “more suitable” than “Negroes.” In an 1892 edition of *Hereditary Genius* he contrasted “the Negro race with the Anglo-Saxon,” and found the former wanting in “those qualities alone which are capable of producing judges, statesmen, commanders, men of literature and science, poets, artists, and divines.” Referencing his time in Africa, he added that “the mistakes the Negroes made in their matters were

37 Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*, 305-308.
so childish, stupid, and simpleton-like, as frequently to make me ashamed of my own species…and the Australian type is at least one grade below the African negro.”

Like Blumenbach before him and scores of anthropologists and psychologists after him, Galton was steeped in Orientalist literature and fascinated by the various peoples it described; perhaps owing to this, they occupied an unsteady position on his racial hierarchy. In a letter to the editor of The Times of London, June 5 1873, Galton demonstrated his ambivalence toward the people of Asia, India and North Africa. First, he proposed that Great Britain make the encouragement of Chinese settlement in Africa “a national policy, in the belief that the Chinese would not only maintain their position, but that they would multiply and their descendants supplant the inferior Negro race.” In contrast to “the Negro,” Galton described the Chinese as “industrious,” “order loving,” and “endowed with a remarkable aptitude for a high material civilization.” Moreover, he blamed the Chinese classical education system, not racial heredity, for arresting “the genius of the race…by treat[ing] originality as a social crime.” “All the bad parts of his character,” Galton argued, “his lying and his servility, spring from a timidity due to an education that has cowed him, and no


39 Galton was particularly fond of works by French missionary and travel writer Abbé Huc, British explorer Richard Francis Burton, and American naval officer Mathew Perry. David Wrobel, Global West, American Frontier: Travel, Empire, and Exceptionalism from Manifest Destiny to the Great Depression (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 49. In Hereditary Genius (1870; repr., New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1891), Galton profiles a number of other “orientalist” scholars whose works provided the foundation for his racial views. In addition to Francis Galton, “Letter to the Editor,” The Times, June 5, 1873, see Chapter Twenty of this 1891 edition of Hereditary Genius for Galton’s characterization of the Chinese.
treatment is better calculated to remedy that evil than location in a free settlement.”

It speaks to the rigidity of the nineteenth century European racial mindset—and particularly its investment in the white-black dyad—that Galton, despite his trips to Africa, never offered comparable non-hereditarian explanations in his assessments of the people living there.

Galton concluded his letter by turning to the peoples of India and North Africa, finishing his abridged Oriental ethnography with a flourish: “The Hindoo cannot fulfill the required conditions nearly as well as the Chinaman, for he is inferior to him in strength, industry, aptitude for saving, business habits, and prolific power. The Arab is little more than an eater of other men’s produce; he is a destroyer rather than a creator, and he is unprolific.” It makes sense that Galton felt it necessary to offer these characterizations—characterizations which now seem at once exceptionally broad and oddly specific—given Britain’s contemporary presence in China, India and North Africa. If Great Britain’s colonial project was to be successful, the world would have to be known, and men like Galton felt a patriotic duty to know it.

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40 Galton, “Letter to the Editor.”


42 Francis Galton, “Letter to the Editor.”

43 First explored in Galton, *Hereditary Genius* (1870), Galton considers race and empire in all his subsequent works; though this might not be said of the American eugenics movement, Galton’s eugenics were inextricably linked to imperialism.
From Galton’s perspective, by the mid-nineteenth century the superiority and inferiority of what he called the “races of man” was largely a settled question, but the more difficult task of identifying supposedly superior “strains” within a race remained. Here Galton made the shift from anthropometrics to psychometrics, or physical to mental measurement, a logical-enough transition which at the time appeared only a ripple in the water. Galton reasoned that it would be best to devise tests that could identify natural ability and thus predict future contributions. Those who scored well on these tests would be encouraged to marry. Those who did not would not be. According to Galton, proper marriage planning carried with it the added benefit of addressing the external concern of eugenics as well, for “if the races best fitted to occupy the land are encouraged to marry early, they will breed down the others in a very few generations.”

44 Daniel N. Robinson, ed., *Darwinism: Critical Reviews from Dublin Review, Edinburgh Review, Quarterly Review. Significant Contributions to the History of Psychology* 1750-1920 (Washington: University Publications of America, 1977), 80. In effect, Galton’s racial hierarchy differed little from Blumenbach’s, with “Caucasians” at the top, “Negroes” at the bottom, and “Americans,” “Japanese,” “Chinese,” “Hindoos” and “Arabs,” in between. By the turn of the century, however, Galton did express some concern that the British might not be physically equal to their “Imperial responsibilities.” In “Our National Physique—Prospects of the British Race—Are We Degenerating?” an article he published in *The Daily Chronicle* July 29, 1903, he induced readers to “watch the conditions and doing of our race… As regards the physique of Britons, I think we brag or have bragged more than is right. Moreover we are not as well formed as we might be. It is difficult to get opportunities of studying the nude figures of our counymen in mass, (sic.) but I have often watched crowds bathe, as in the Serpentine”—here a lower-case “s” seems equally appropriate—“with a critical eye, and have always come to the conclusion that they were less shapely than many of the dark-coloured people whom I have seen.”

45 Galton’s transition from anthropometrics to psychometrics is chronicled by his colleague Karl Pearson in *The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton* v. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1924).

46 Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*, 323.
In 1884 Galton set up an “Anthropometric Laboratory” in London’s South Kensington Museum to test the public’s natural abilities, but the tests did not quite yield the results he had anticipated. For three pence apiece curious visitors could have their physical strength, reaction time and sensory acuities measured. With the expectation that he could identify neurological efficiency, Galton accumulated these data and evaluated the associations between them. To do this, he transformed the data into standard scores (distributions with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) and plotted them in a scatter diagram. However, he found no correlation between the scores and the markers of intelligence to which he subscribed—namely talent or eminence. Though the tests did not produce the results for which Galton had hoped, they did introduce the concept of mental testing, and they established a statistical language that would serve his eugenic cause.

At the turn of the twentieth century Galton’s experiments became the basis for pivotal collaboration between psychologists in the United States and Great Britain. After visiting Galton at South Kensington in 1886, early American psychologist James McKeen Cattell, who like Terman’s mentor Ernest Lindley earned his degree in Germany under Wilhelm Wundt, built Galtonian psychological laboratories at the University of Pennsylvania in 1887 and Columbia College (now Columbia

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At Columbia, Cattell tested one hundred students, looking for correlations between the mental tests he devised and academic achievement.

Cattell’s tests proved unsuccessful, but two of his students, Clark Wissler and Edward Lee Thorndike, advanced his research to the point where British psychologist Charles Spearman took an interest in their findings. Like Cattell, Wissler and Thorndike had found only weak correlations between sensory acuity tests and academic performance, but Spearman argued that these results were the function of statistical rather than conceptual error: if Cattell, Wissler and Thorndike had employed different correlation coefficients, laboratory tests and academic scores would have lined up. 49 Spearman was a long-time admirer of Galton, and was intrigued with the latter’s supposition that individuals possessed a heritable “general mental ability.”50 The key was to prove, by way of improving upon Galton’s and Cattell’s tests, that “the common and essential element in the Intelligences coincides with the common and essential element in the Sensory Functions [sic].”51

Building on Galton and Cattell’s work, in 1902 Spearman began a study that would transform the field of psychology. He conducted sensory tests on 123 individuals (97 children, 26 adults) in Berkshire, England employing procedures that resembled those of Cattell. However, Spearman employed different formula to calculate for correlations. In his publication of the experiment’s results in 1904, 49 Richardson, Howard Knox, 51.


Spearman claimed to have found a “common and essential element,” a “general factor of intelligence,” or “g,” which could be measured accurately either by laboratory tests or public examinations.52 With “g,” Spearman felt he had finally hit upon a way to determine “Intelligence in a definite objective manner.” Alluding to Galton’s original intention—to use psychometric testing as a means of eugenic screening—Spearman claimed that the success of his experiments would supply Experimental Psychology with “the missing link in its theoretical justification,” and “produce a practical fruit of almost illimitable promise.”53

The next 40 years of professional psychology in the United States would prove Spearman correct. His “general factor of intelligence,” combined with testing methods introduced in 1905 by French psychologist Alfred Binet, laid the groundwork for an American mental testing movement that by World War II had permeated most public institutions. Between 1905 and 1941, professional psychology became synonymous with mental testing, as test developers and proponents assumed a majority of the profession’s department chairs, American Psychological Association presidencies, and major journal editorships. Psychologists sold the tests as the most effective tool to track students in the public schools, screen immigrants at Ellis Island, identify patient and prisoner pathologies in mental health institutions, juvenile detention centers and prisons, and sort draftees for the armed forces.54

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52 Spearman, “‘General Intelligence.’”
53 Spearman, “‘General Intelligence,’” 206.
As historians of these institutions have observed, the testing movement was successful because it offered professionals in each of these fields a mechanism to cope with the increasing numbers of people coming under their administration. By 1916, when Terman devised his Stanford-Binet revision for use in American schools, successful turn-of-the-century movements for compulsory public schooling and increased government involvement and expenditure on health care, prisons, and border control had combined with major demographic changes to create a perfect storm of administrative inadequacy. Between 1890 and 1924, the US population grew from 62,979,766 to 114,109,000, an 80 percent increase, with most of the immigrants settling in large urban centers. In 1910, three fourths of the children in New York, Boston, Chicago, Detroit and Cleveland had foreign-born parents, and in 1916 an equal percentage of San Franciscans spoke another language in addition to English. Administrators in these cities, often overwhelmed and unfamiliar with the languages and customs of those they were tasked to serve, looked to standardized mental testing to separate their charges into manageable categories.

Historian JoAnne Brown has written that the nascent testing movement of the early twentieth century was also successful because psychologists drew upon the language of engineering and medicine, two more established, respected professions, to give their enterprise authority and shield it from criticism. In selling their tests to

UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) set the army project within the broader context of American Psychology.


schools, prisons, and the Army, psychologists used medical terms like “diagnostics,” “diagnosis and treatment,” “differential diagnostics,” and “educational hospital”; and they took advantage of the “scientific management” craze of the era (popularized in 1911 by Fredrick Winslow Taylor) and spoke of “efficiency,” “raw materials,” “processing,” and “production.” 57 In his introduction to Lewis Terman’s Measurement of Intelligence (1916), Stanford University professor Ellwood P. Cubberley tied psychology to medicine explicitly, stating that “before long, intelligence testing will become as much a matter of necessary routine in school room procedure as a blood count now is in physical diagnosis.” 58 And in defending his Stanford-Binet revision in the same volume, Lewis Terman likened his critics to the “excellent people who do not believe in vaccination against typhoid or smallpox, operations for appendicitis, etc.” 59 By deploying in particular medical and engineering vocabulary both in describing their results and in advertising their tests to educational and public health administrators, psychologists, Brown argues, made “the measurement of intelligence a technical matter akin to gauging temperature…thereby fostering their own opportunities as politically ‘neutral’ scientists.” 60 Add to this a statistical language that rendered test conclusions indecipherable to most non-

59 Ellwood P. Cubberley and Lewis Terman, in Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence, in Brown, The Definition of a Profession, 86.
60 Brown, The Definition of a Profession, 8.
professionals, and the racist, anti-democratic rationale underpinning intelligence testing was obscured by a cloud of scientific authority.

As current-day scholars such as Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva have argued, it is in no small part thanks to this obfuscation that intelligence testing remains a potent force in education, mental health services, and the business world. From their perspective, mental testing and other proto-scientific statistical instruments still rely on and construct imagined categories while making false claims to objectivity and authority.\(^61\) Zuberi, Silva, and the authors in their 2008 collection, *White Logic, White Methods: Racism and Methodology*, point appropriately to the eugenic origins of modern standardized testing and statistical techniques; after all, Aryan supremacist Carl Brigham invented the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT), and Galton modern statistics.

Keeping Zuberi and Silva’s critique, and these historical linkages, in mind, however, it is nevertheless dangerous to collapse early testing with its modern variant. While the eugenics movement of the 1920s cast a long racial shadow—modern immigration law, as well as IQ and standardized testing carry the embedded echoes of the eugenic era—intelligence testing is no longer used in the service of eugenic sterilization, and psychological studies that link race and intelligence are roundly criticized.\(^62\) This change is due largely to a cadre of early-twentieth-century scholars, 


led by Columbia University Anthropologist Franz Boas, who were determined to divorce racism and hereditarianism from scientific inquiry.

In 1902, at the same time Spearman was conducting his tests in service of a growing eugenics movement, Franz Boas was adumbrating the critique that would ultimately lead to its downfall. Boas was no stranger to Galton and the eugenic psychologists operating in his wake. He had met Galton before immigrating to the United States from Germany in 1887, and he taught Galton’s statistical techniques from 1889 to 1892 as an instructor of statistical anthropology in G. Stanley Hall’s Department of Psychology at Clark University.63 When he was hired at Columbia University in 1896, he worked alongside James McKeen Cattell in the University’s joint Psychology and Anthropology Department, and Clark Wissler was one of his first advisees.64 Boas, however, was uncomfortable with the Eurocentrism and racial essentialism undergirding his colleagues’ work. Boas’ parents, as he described them, were liberals who had “broken through the shackles of dogma,” and they had raised him to do the same.65 After earning a Ph.D. in Physics in 1881, he went to live with and observe Inuit Indians in the Arctic Circle, and his earliest notebook entries

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evidence a willingness to call into question the cultural assumptions of European society:

I often ask myself what advantages our ‘good society’ possesses over that of the 'savages' and find, the more I see of their customs, that we have no right to look down upon them. . . We have no right to blame them for their forms and superstitions which may seem ridiculous to us. We 'highly educated people' are much worse, relatively speaking.  

Before immigrating to the United States, Boas’ egalitarian worldview, informed in equal parts by his parents, his fieldwork with the Inuit, and his own experiences with anti-Semitism, framed his understanding of the discriminatory scientific practices “good society” employed to maintain its position.

From the turn of the century to his death in 1942, Boas worked to decouple social sciences from their racist underpinnings. He and his successors in anthropology and sociology maintained that biological determinism, which had for centuries ordered anthropological inquiry, reflected cultural biases and had no place in modern scientific thought. This mission directed Boas’ efforts against African-American discrimination and led to decades-long relationships with prominent African-American intellectuals. After reading Boas’ 1904 Ethical Record article, “What the Negro has Done in Africa,” in which Boas highlighted ancient African achievements in agriculture and ironworks, scholar and African-American leader W. E. B. Du Bois invited Boas to give the commencement speech at Atlanta University. The speech had

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a profound impact on Du Bois. In *Black Folk Then and Now* (1939), Du Bois recalled that:

Franz Boas came to Atlanta University where I was teaching History in 1906 and said to the graduating class: You need not be ashamed of your African past; and then he recounted the history of black kingdoms south of the Sahara for a thousand years. I was too astonished to speak. All of this I had never heard and I came then and afterwards to realize how the silence and neglect of science can let truth utterly disappear or even be unconsciously distorted.68

Boas followed up his Atlanta speech with a campaign for an “African and African-American Museum,” in 1906 and 1907, and solicited the support of Booker T. Washington and Andrew Carnegie for the cause. Owing to Boas’ ties with the more radical Du Bois, Washington and Carnegie rejected him, but Boas remained undeterred, and spent the next several years at once requesting funds for the museum and debunking claims of African-American inferiority.69

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69 Williams, *Rethinking Race*, 29; There is still debate over whether Boas was in fact an anti-racist. Since the 1960s, critics of Boas have argued, alternatively, that Boas was a racist who worked only to secure the place of of Jewish intellectuals in American academia; that non-white advisees such as Zora Neale Hurston and Ella Doloria suffered under oppressive, discriminatory tutelage; or, at the very least, that Boas’ path away from racism was fraught with contradictions. The first two of these critiques are explored in depth in Herbert S. Lewis, “The Passion of Franz Boas,” *American Anthropologist* v.103, n. 2 (2001): 447-467. The third critique is the position of Vernon J. Williams Jr., in *Rethinking Race* and *The Social Sciences and Theories of Race* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), and is largely a reaction to the laudatory treatment of Boas in Melville J. Herskovits, *Franz Boas: The Science of Man in the Making* (1953; repr., New York: A. M. Kelley, 1973); Marshall Hyatt, *Franz Boas, Social Activist: The Dynamics of Ethnicity* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); Carl N. Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Elazar Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Baker, *From Savage to Negro*. Williams, who over the
Between 1910 and 1911 Boas delivered a series of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston and the University of Mexico devoted to debunking claims of white superiority. The lectures, published as *The Mind of Primitive Man* in 1911, challenged the assumption that Europeans possessed a higher culture than other “races,” and the corollary: that Europeans had a greater aptitude for civilization.

“Historical events,” Boas charged, “appear to be much more potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it follows that achievements of races do not warrant us in assuming that one race is more highly gifted than the others.”

*The Mind of Primitive Man* also staked out Boas’ egalitarian position on intelligence—a position that Lewis Terman’s graduate students would later critique as fundamentally

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past two decades has offered a consistent and nuanced appraisal of Boas, first articulated this third critique in his review of Barkan’s 1992 book, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism*. Williams argued that Barkan’s contention that “Boas was no racist, but he did reflect the values of his society,” made “no sense,” and wrote that “further investigation would have revealed a tension in Boas writing between his lifelong belief in inherent racial differences and his commitment to cultural explanations of human behavior.” Vernon Williams Jr., reviewed work: *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States between the World Wars* by Elazar Barkan. *The American Historical Review*, v. 98, n. 1 (Feb., 1993): 137-138. The evidence supports Williams. Boas published on the different cranial capacities of Europeans and Africans early in his career, and he never did fully escape biological notions of race. Franz Boas, "Human Faculty as Determined by Race," *Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, v. 43 (1894): 301-327. However, as Williams acknowledges, Boas’ retention of biological determinism did not preclude him from becoming the most prominent anti-racism advocate in interwar academia, nor did it affect Boas’ graduate students, many of whom devoted their careers to repudiating racial essentialism in all its forms.

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unscientific. Rebuking the claims of Galton and the early eugenicist mental testers, Boas argued that “the organization of the mind is practically identical among all the races of man; that mental activity follows the same laws everywhere, but that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual experience that is subject to the action of these laws.”

Although the shift was by no means immediate, the racial egalitarianism of Boas and his graduate students, several of whom went on to found Anthropology and Sociology departments in other universities, transformed the social sciences: whereas eighteenth and nineteenth century anthropologists had looked to anthropometrics and hereditarian explanations for human behavior, twentieth century anthropologists and sociologists would focus their attention on culture, on language, and on demographic shifts. After Boas, it would be left to Psychology to hold aloft the mantle of biological determinism.

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These first two chapters have explored the historical factors which set Stanford University’s Progressive-era intelligence testing of Asian Americans into motion. Chapter One focused in on the Terman-JAA relationship, framing the 1920-1926 Terman-JAA testing project as a direct response to California’s anti-Asian immigrant movement. In this chapter, we have taken a step back, placing Stanford

*to Early Man in America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918); *The Old Americans* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1925); *Anthropology of the American Negro: Historical Note* (Philadelphia: Wistar Institute Press, 1927); Clark Wissler and Bella Weitzner, *The American Indian: An Introduction to the Anthropology of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922); Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology* (New York: Holt, 1929); Robert Bennett Bean, *The Races of Man: Differentiation and Dispersal of Man* (New York: The University Society, 1932). Boas’ graduate students established race as a sociological rather than a biological construct. They included Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie, who founded the Anthropology Department at the University of California (1901); Edward Sapir, Yale Anthropology Department Chair (1931-1939); Melville Herskovitz, founder of Northwestern’s African Studies Department (1938); Ruth Benedict, who became President of the American Anthropological Association (1947); Margaret Mead, AAA President (1960) and founder of Fordham’s Anthropology Department (1968); and Ashley Montagu, the Rutgers Anthropologist who authored two radically antiracist tracts, *Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (1942), and the UNESCO *Statement on Race* (1950). 50 years before the Human Genome Project would invalidate the biological race concept in much the same manner, his UNESCO statement asserted that the genes “responsible for the hereditary differences between men are always few when compared to the whole genetic constitution of man and to the vast number of genes common to all human beings regardless of the population to which they belong. This means that the likenesses among men are far greater than their differences.” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Statement by Experts on Race Problems,” Paris, July 20, 1950 located at the UNESCO Online Archive, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001269/126969eb.pdf accessed on October 10, 2012. On the Human Genome Project, see Jonathan Marks, *What it Means to be 98% Chimpanzee: Apes, People and their Genes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and Patricia McCann-Mortimer, Martha Augoustinos and Amanda LeCouteur, “‘Race’ and the Human Genome Project: Constructions of Scientific Legitimacy,” *Discourse and Society*, v. 15, n. 4 (2004): 409-432.
testing projects within a longer history of scientific approaches to race. Tracking this longer history, and paying particular attention to intersections between science and popular understandings of race, allows us to better understand why individuals and organizations with divergent political positions felt it appropriate, even necessary, to test the mental and moral characteristics of Asian Americans during the 1920s and 1930s.

Since the Enlightenment, Europeans and Americans have been turning to science to validate their views on human difference. We began our discussion of scientific approaches to race with Carolus Linnaeus and Johann Blumenbach, whose mid-18th and early-19th century taxonomies separated the human species into groups with discrete physical and mental characteristics. Blumenbach’s pioneering though misguided work on craniometry, or skull measurement, in particular, influenced the racial world views of Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Coleridge, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Immanuel Kant. In the mid-19th century, scientists such as Samuel Morton in the United States and Paul Broca in France revised and expanded on Blumenbach’s racial taxonomies, attaching to them new arguments linking skull size and intelligence. These arguments, in turn, provided rationale for slavery in the American South and systemic discrimination against Africans and African Americans in the North.

In the last decades of the 19th century, British scientist Francis Galton altered race science in two fundamental ways. First, he invented and popularized eugenics, the pseudo-science that suggested humans could be improved through “selective breeding;” and second, he transitioned race science away from physical measurement
anthropometry) towards mental measurement (psychometry).\(^{74}\) Both of these contributions had profound effects on the way American scientists approached race. American psychologists such as James McKeen Cattell, Edward Thorndike, and then Lewis Terman embraced Galton’s eugenic philosophy and quasi-scientific techniques, and they used the latter to bolster their race-based arguments against immigration and in favor of school tracking and sterilization.

In the 1920s, Galton’s psychometric tests, revised and updated by leading American psychologists, became ubiquitous in the U.S. With Terman leading the way, psychologists, along with their sponsoring universities and publishing houses, sold the idea of testing and then the tests themselves to administrators in the U.S. Armed Forces, in public education, and in juvenile homes, prisons and mental health institutions. To validate their claim to scientific objectivity and shield themselves against criticism, the testers borrowed language from the more established fields of medicine and engineering to describe their work, and provided explanations of their data in statistical jargon that was unintelligible to most outside of their field.

Just as racial intelligence testing reached its peak in United States, however, scholars in the fields of anthropology and sociology were beginning to mount a successful campaign against it. Led by anthropologist Franz Boas and his peers and students at Columbia University, the pushback against testing centered on debunking the testers’ two foundational claims: first, that intelligence was primarily hereditary; and second, that it was inextricably linked to race. In the following chapter we explore some of these critiques in greater depth, and compare the methods scholars

working in the traditions of both Galton and Boas employed to study Asian Americans.
Chapter Three:
The Test and the Survey

During the 1920s, two racial projects affiliated with Stanford University set out to interpret and represent the dynamics of relations between European Americans and Asian Americans on the West Coast: Lewis Terman’s intelligence testing of Asian-American children in California public schools (1921-1935), and the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast (1924-1926). Thus far, we have fit Terman’s testing of Asian Americans within a wider history of race science, and explored the ways that this testing intersected with California’s anti-Asian-immigrant movement. Setting the second study, the Survey of Race Relations, in this same context reveals that California’s nativist political climate, and the authoritative position of the field of psychology on questions of race in the 1920s shaped not only Terman’s testing, but the Survey of Race Relations as well.

Terman’s intelligence testing in California was the first large-scale effort by a U.S. university to focus on Asians and Asian Americans. As we have seen, the testing project brought together a politically-eclectic mix of research and funding institutions, and it involved dozens of researchers and thousands of children throughout the state.¹ From 1920 to 1935, Terman, his colleagues, and his graduate

¹ As illustrated in Chapters One, Four and Five, Terman’s intelligence testing of Asian Americans in California public schools in fact consisted of several small, individual testing projects conducted by Terman, his colleagues, and his graduate students in the departments of psychology and education over the course of several years. I have grouped them together here not only because Terman was a titular head or advisor to each project, but because, in contrast to those involved with the Survey of Race Relations, all of the testers worked outward from the same dual supposition that intelligence could be measured, and that intelligence was linked to race.
students at Stanford University employed a wide range of tests—tests of intelligence, of academic achievement, even of musical ability and “aesthetic appreciation”—in an attempt to reveal what the testers believed were the heritable racial traits of their subjects.²

The Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast (hereafter SRR) was similar to Terman’s project in scale, but it differed methodologically. Initially conceived by former Tokyo YMCA Secretary George Gleason in 1921, the SRR did not involve psychologists; rather, it represented a combined effort of Protestant missionaries, sociologists, graduate and undergraduate students at West Coast universities, and community volunteers. Since one project was led by psychologists and the other missionaries and sociologists, the two projects employed very different data-collecting techniques: rather than conduct intelligence tests of Asian Americans, or tests of academic achievement or character, as Terman’s colleagues and students did, SRR researchers engaged in dialogue with their subjects. Between January 1924 and March 1925, SRR researchers interviewed hundreds of first and second-

generation Asian immigrants and Asian Americans from Southern California to Canada. Led by University of Chicago Sociologist Robert E. Park, they compiled over 600 life histories and 6,000 pages of magazine and newspaper articles, books, pamphlets, and government reports relating to immigrant and second-generation issues.

Distinctions between the two projects’ approach to race and to the Asian-American community arose out of the Progressive-era split between Galtonian psychology on the one side and Boasian anthropology and sociology on the other. As we saw in the previous chapter, early-twentieth-century psychology built on both the racial essentialist arguments and laboratory procedures of eugenicist Francis Galton. In the 1920s and 1930s, Terman and his fellow psychologists began with a belief in innate racial inequality and worked outward from there. Boas-led anthropology and sociology, by contrast, called into question the notion of innate racial biological differences, and abandoned the laboratory in favor of techniques which brought scientists out into the field. By the mid-1920s, subjects of anthropological and sociological study were no longer treated only as objects to be collected, measured, catalogued and set aside, but as groups and individuals with their own perspectives. A fundamental asymmetry still remained between the scientist and his or her subject, between the observer and the observed, as anthropologists and sociologists still had the power to frame their subjects. Yet, in abandoning the idea first of biological-racial and then of cultural superiority, social scientists working in the wake of Boas necessarily also embraced methods which allowed for greater agency on the part of their subjects.
Although successive individuals and organizations working with Terman brought to the Stanford testing studies their own concerns, they shared both Terman’s methodology and hereditarian conceptions of race, and this common foundation ensured that even as they argued against one form of racial discrimination, they invariably upheld another. As we saw in Chapter One, when members of the Japanese Association of America (JAA) collaborated with Terman to test Japanese-American children between 1921 and 1926, their motive was not to debunk the notion of racial hierarchy, but simply to reposition Japanese people within it. The same can be said of Terman’s student Kwok Tsuen Yeung, who conducted Terman’s Stanford-Binet test on Chinese-American students in San Francisco in 1921. In order to better contrast the approaches of the Stanford testing studies and the Survey of Race Relations, we will first look briefly at Yeung’s study, and develop further the ways that Terman’s eugenic politics and scientific genealogy shaped his students’ research on Asian Americans.

Whereas Stanford-affiliated psychologists conceived of racial intelligence testing as a measurement stick for assimilation, the missionaries and sociologists responsible for conducting the SRR saw theirs as a broader project—an explanatory tool first, but one endowed with what they intended as anti-racist, redemptive, socially transformative possibilities. This perspective evolved out of the SRR sociologists’ skepticism toward racial intelligence testing, and the missionaries’ stance toward Chinese- and Japanese-immigrant communities.

3 A “hereditarian” is one who believes that traits such as intelligence and personality are primarily hereditary, or passed down from generation to generation.
In comparing the Survey of Race Relations to Terman’s testing project, and setting both against the racially discriminatory anti-immigration movements of the 1920s, the SRR takes on a new shape. At times it still appears, as Henry Yu has argued, a flawed academic experiment, one that builds on Orientalist misinterpretation to put forth a limited, caricatured vision of Asian Americans. It expresses this form in some of the surveyors’ misguided questions, and in Robert Park and his colleague Emory Bogardus’ summaries of the SRR’s findings, published in a special May 1926 issue of *Survey Graphic.*

If in certain moments the SRR appears reductionist and racially regressive, however, in others it emerges as something more: a medium for dialogue on the state of race in the U.S., even a step toward the anti-racism and radicalism of the 1960s. This is largely because, compared to the rigid framework of psychological testing in which the subjects’ voices were entirely absent, the Survey of Race Relation’s methodology allowed for a greater dialogue between the surveyors and the surveyed. As Sara Griffith has observed, what started as a part of a “Christian Americanization effort” quickly became alternately a sounding board for pro- and anti-immigrant groups, a device for gathering social statistics, and, most importantly, a medium to record the voices of first and second generation immigrants. Although subjects’

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7 Gleason to Davis, October 28, 1922, SRR, Box 7, Folder 6; Sara Griffith, “Conflicting Dialogues: The Survey of Race Relations in the Trans-Pacific and the Fight for Asian American Racial Equality” (PhD diss., University of California Santa Barbara, 2010).
responses were mediated by several factors—the dearth of native speakers working for the survey, the types of questions surveyors asked, and, in many cases, the answers surveyors chose to record—unlike racial testing, the Survey provided what was at the time a rare occasion to explore American discrimination with actual input from victims of that discrimination.

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This chapter builds on the work of David Yoo, Henry Yu, and Sara Griffith, who have written on Asian-American racial testing and the Survey of Race Relations. In “Testing Assumptions: IQ, Japanese Americans, and the Model Minority Myth in the 1920s and 1930s,” David Yoo situates early Asian-American intelligence testing in the context of the Progressive-era education movement and the debate over nature and nurture. 8 Like scholars who have written on the testing phenomenon at large, such as Joanne Brown, David Tyack, and Joel Spring, Yoo places the testing of Asian Americans within the tool bag of Progressive-era school administrators, and looks at the ways this class of reformers, labeled “administrative progressives” by Tyack, utilized testing to meet administrative challenges. 9 Pointing to the enduring “explanatory power of IQ,” Yoo argues that interpretations of Japanese-American test

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results during the 1920s and 1930s contributed to the development of the model minority myth in the 1960s.\(^\text{10}\)

Henry Yu’s 2002 *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact and Exoticism in Modern America*, and Sara Griffith’s 2010 dissertation, “Conflicting Dialogues: The Survey of Race Relations in the Trans-Pacific and the Fight for Asian American Racial Equality,” provide studies of the Survey of Race Relations.\(^\text{11}\) As the SRR was a joint venture between sociologists and Protestant missionaries, reading the Yu and the Griffith together is instructive. Yu focusses on the sociologists, in particular SRR Research Director University of Chicago Sociologist Robert E. Park, and argues that they helped to construct a limited, Orientalist identity for Asian Americans that had important ramifications before, during, and after World War Two. Yu draws from a wealth of material on the SRR and provides a thorough account of the measure to which the project drew upon and contributed to American Orientalism.\(^\text{12}\)

Sara Griffith focuses on the role Protestant missionaries played in the SRR, highlighting their early-20\(^\text{th}\)-century missionary work in China and Japan, and the anti-racist, internationalist agenda this work engendered. Using SRR archives as well

\(^{10}\) Yoo, “Testing Assumptions,” 69.


as letters between the missionaries overlooked by previous studies, Griffith places the
SRR in a trans-Pacific context, and suggests that liberal Protestant organizers
conceived and shaped the SRR to bring national attention to the domestic political
and foreign diplomatic peril of continued anti-Asian hostility on the West Coast.13
Although the liberal Protestant organizers are her primary subjects, Griffith also looks
at the ways the SRR was used by both the Asian Americans who participated in it and
the sociologists who conducted it. For Asians and Asian Americans, Griffith writes,
the SRR “became a forum…to challenge their marginalization in white American
society,” to describe their immigrant experiences, and to speak to discrimination. 14

Yu and Griffith’s analyses provide a thorough history of the Survey of Race
Relations, and an even more thoroughgoing chronicle of its failings. Both Yu and
Griffith fault SRR sociologists for making decisions that reduced the scope and the
possibilities of the project. Yu argues that the sociologists’ fascination with “exotic
knowledge” drove them to produce in the SRR a body of knowledge about Asian
Americans that both objectified them and cast them as alien.15 Griffith contends that
whereas the missionaries conceived of the SRR as a practical political tool, a way to
address white discrimination and empower Asian Americans, the sociologists were
concerned primarily with theory. 16

If we add Terman’s testing project to the equation, however, some of the
sociologists’ decisions appear in a new light. The sociologists’ final summaries of the
SRR, published in the May 1926 Survey Graphic, for instance, reduce the complex

15 Yu, Thinking Orientals, 9, 159-178.
experiences of the subjects they interviewed into ill-fitted, ready-made categories. Looking at the SRR in the context of testing, however, allows us to see that they did so in an attempt to employ the language and presentation of psychology, to borrow the veil of legitimacy then enjoyed by testers like Terman.

Setting the SRR in the context of testing also complicates our understanding of SRR missionaries’ motives. As Griffith has observed, the two most prominent SRR missionaries, J. Merle Davis and George Gleason, had strong ties to Asia and to Asian immigrant leaders in the U.S., and they were primarily interested in using the SRR to combat anti-Asian forces on the West Coast. If we look at the Terman archives and the SRR archives together, however, we see that Gleason and Davis shared the eugenic worldview of those in the anti-Asian movement, and that they favored Asian immigration only in a limited, class-specific manner.

**Terman, Yeung, and the Psychological Approach to Race in the 1920s**

As we saw in Chapters One and Two, like most professional psychologists of his day, Lewis Terman was in 1921 a strict hereditarian. The tests he devised to measure the intelligence of children in public schools and state juvenile systems followed the logic and expanded upon the methods of Francis Galton, James McKeen Cattell, and Charles Spearman. Like his predecessors and the majority of his cohort, he was a white supremacist and eugenicist, and he was clear about his motives. He would use his intelligence tests, the realization of Spearman’s “practical fruit of almost illimitable promise,” to do no less than protect the nation and its superior
“Nordic and Alpine strains” from “deterioration.” In 1917 Terman had worked with Robert Yerkes and Carl Brigham in the army testing project, and he agreed with Yerkes’ and Brigham’s post-testing assessments, which asserted, respectively, that “men of foreign birth were markedly inferior in mental alertness to the native born American” and “the decline of American intelligence will be more rapid than the decline of the intelligence of European national groups, owing to the presence here of the negro.” In 1924, Terman, who the year before had become President of the American Psychological Association, was proud to declare that owing to his work with Yerkes and Brigham, psychology had “become the beacon light of the eugenics movement” and was “appealed to by congressmen in the shaping of national policy on immigration.”

Terman’s students at Stanford University, who actually administered the bulk of his intelligence tests, offered at times nuanced rejoinders to Terman’s strict racial hierarchies, but their work generally mimicked their advisor’s hereditarianism and racial essentialism. Research conducted by Kwok Tsuen Yeung, a visiting student from China who Terman advised in 1920-1921, illustrates this trend. One of the first of Terman’ graduate students to utilize the Stanford-Binet revision in the service of racial testing, Yeung conducted his tests on 109 Chinese-American children attending

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the Oriental School (formerly Principal Rose Thayer’s Chinese School) in San Francisco in the spring of 1921. He began his study with a challenge to Eurocentrism and white superiority: “The intelligence of a people,” he observed, “is expressed in its civilization. China has one of the most ancient civilizations in the world. As a people she has united to form a great empire dating back over four thousand years and with a written history of the same duration.” A few lines later he added: “Through actual contact with the Chinese, and by the spread of a fuller understanding of Chinese literature and civilization the Occidentals, at least the educated classes, are gradually coming to look upon the Chinese not as inferior but as equals.” Yeung was clearly decided on the question of Chinese racial equality. If “the intelligence of a people [was] expressed in its civilization,” the Chinese were surely the equal of Americans.20

Like his mentor, Terman, and like the Japanese Association of America who funded Darsie and Terman’s 1921 study of Japanese Americans, however, Yeung was convinced that science, and specifically the hard science of psychological testing, should be brought to bear on questions of racial disparity and assimilative possibility. In a literature review chapter entitled “Racial Mental Differences,” he distanced himself from Boas and sociologist William Isaac Thomas who held that the worlds’ “races” were of equal mental capacity. Calling their explanations “sound and logical” but unproven experimentally, he instead aligned himself with psychologists whose test findings instead showed wide disparities. He argued that “the negroes living in America, having the same environment and social conditions, possessing the same language with similar social and economic conditions are shown by the use of mental

tests to be much lower in mental ability than are the white Americans.” Echoing the white-supremacist, eugenicist language of his mentor, he continued: “this shows that the mental differences have not been due mainly to geographical conditions or social environment but that something else must be taken into consideration, that is, the heritage of mental capacity.”

Yeung’s confidence in contemporary psychology’s notions of racial hierarchy is demonstrated by the chart he used to explain his test findings. In it, he compared the median I.Q. of his Chinese-American students to other “races.” Of the Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Chinese, Northern European, and “American,” he noted that the Chinese students fared better than the first and were in fact closer to Northern Europeans and “Americans” than to the others. His table positioned these “races” exactly as they were placed in the anthropology and Biology textbooks of the day (although those were undergoing a Boas-led change), with Northern Europeans at the top, African Americans at the bottom, and Southern and Eastern Europeans in between—with one major revision: the results of his test raised the Chinese to a more exalted position within the hierarchy. Yeung was not interested in upsetting the balance of race in the U.S.; rather than transcend the dominant racial discourse, he contributed to it, hoping only to affect some change at its edges.

Sociologists Challenge Psychology’s Approach to Race

In contrast to Terman, Yeung, and the majority of Stanford University psychologists conducting testing, the sociologists who administered the Survey of

Race Relations on the Pacific Coast in 1924 did so in typically Boasian fashion. Epitomizing the larger shift within sociology, this meant that they rejected the hereditarian arguments of the eugenics movement and the intelligence testers, and looked instead to culture to explain differences between racial groups. Owing in large part to Boas, mid-1920s sociology was moving in the direction of “cultural relativism,” and this combination of anti-hereditarianism and “cultural relativism” opened the door to critiques of psychological research and, at times, outright refutations of racial hierarchy.\(^23\)

In the 1910s and early 1920s, the professional ties that bound psychology to sociology generally precluded critiques of the former by the latter in the academic press, but in the mid-1920s the floodgates opened. In March of 1926, the *American Journal of Sociology* printed an article by anthropologist Margaret Mead criticizing in stark terms the widespread and uncritical use of the results of race-based intelligence tests by those in anthropology and sociology. Mead, who had studied at Columbia under Boas and his advisee Ruth Benedict, warned her peers to avoid making racial generalizations based on what she termed the “circular,” faulty logic of psychologists like George Ferguson, whose oft-cited 1916 and 1919 studies of African Americans

\(^{23}\) Philosopher Alain Locke coined the term “cultural relativism” in 1924 to characterize the theories of Anthropologist Robert Lowie, but the idea was first expressed in Boas’ 1887 article, “Museums of Ethnology and their Classification,” *Science*, v.9, n. 229, (1887): 587-589; in this first of many works that would challenge Western ethnocentrism and claims to universality, Boas wrote that “civilization is not something absolute, but that it is relative, and that our conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes.” Boas, “Museums of Ethnology and Classification,” 589. On Locke and Lowie, see Leonard Harris, ed., *The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
used skin color as an index and concluded that innate intelligence correlated directly with the amount of white blood in his subjects’ bodies.24

In November of 1926, the American Journal of Sociology followed up Mead’s article with a scathing review of Carl Brigham’s much-lauded Army testing project summary, A Study of American Intelligence, submitted by the Columbia University psychologist M.R. Neifeld. Neifeld accused Brigham of “obvious inconsistencies,” of “error in computing his racial norms,” and of bias both in his testing methods and his conclusions.25 The review indicted Brigham and his cohort for suggesting that the army tests should “be the basis of mandatory [immigration] legislation,” as their results, in his words, gave the “appearance of solidity to what is as yet but the shadow of such.”26

In December, the sociology journal Social Forces, edited by Howard W. Odum, who straddled the psychology-sociology divide with doctorates in both from Clark University and Columbia, joined the fray with a systematic critique of racial mental testing by the University of Missouri sociologist C. Terence Pihlblad. Pihlblad identified and discredited three key assumptions of the testers: 1) that the “cultural level of any race, nation or class is dependent on the innate qualities or capacities of that group;” 2) that intellectual differences are hereditary; and 3) that intelligence tests provided real measurements of this “hereditary capacity or innate

intelligence.” As Pihlblad notes, Harvard psychologist William McDougall articulated the first and second of these assumptions in his alarmist 1921 monograph, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* Sounding very much like Galton, McDougall wrote:

> Each people that has attained a high level of civilization has done so on the basis of the intellectual and moral qualities of the races which have entered into its composition. The combination of qualities peculiar to each race was *formed* and *fixed* [emphasis added] during the long ages of the pre-historic period, compared with which the historical period of some 2500 years is very brief.28

To counter this peculiarly ahistorical argument, Pihlblad offered the example of Japan, whose recent “development from a backward, semi-feudal, isolated little nation into a modern industrial world power,” he noted, with characteristic Western chauvinism, “surely could not be correlated with any change in the native mental capacity of the Japanese people.”29 If Japan had come so far so fast, Pihlblad reasoned, intelligence could neither be fixed nor hereditary. “As far as we are able to tell,” Pihlblad continued, “there have been no changes in the neural structures of man during the last 10,000 years which would in any way account for the development of his culture. The growth of civilization has not been a matter of uncovering new resources of native capacity,” as psychologists claimed their tests could do, “but it has been closely connected with great cultural and social changes which have widened the intellectual horizon for larger and larger numbers of people.”30 Undercutting the eugenic argument that psychological testing would discover elite classes of

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30 Ibid.
individuals perfectly suited to lead their nations into idyllic futures, Pihblad counseled that progress had always rested on the backs of the many, not the few.

Movements of people and new means of mass communication such as the crusades and the printing press—these, he argued, were the catalysts of great historical change.

Finally, presaging the movement against standardized testing of the 1960s and 1970s, Pihblad debunked the third assumption of psychologists, that their tests measured innate capacity, by observing that the test “measures are an index to native differences only on the assumption that the experience, social background and opportunity to become familiar with the test materials are common to all those tested.”31 As several fellow critics had also observed, these prerequisites had not been met in the Yerkes, Terman, and Brigham Army project, as recruits came to the tests with widely-varying levels of previous exposure to the indices measured. In a final renunciation of the entire mental testing movement, Pihblad opined that the “general intelligence” the tests were supposed to have measured, “turns out to be nothing else than those capacities which are measured by the tests.” “The tests,” he wrote tersely, “only test what they test. How important such capacities are socially is extremely hypothetical.”32 Echoing Mead and Neifeld, Pihblad concluded by stressing social formation over individual capacity. Human achievement, leadership skills, eminence—Galton’s own favorite measures of individual, national, and “racial” progress—were on all occasions better explained by larger social forces than by Galtonian tests of so-called innate capacity.

These 1926 critiques marked a tipping point in the psychology-sociology divide over the study of race, but as the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast illustrates, sociologists opposed to hereditarianism were developing new ways to explore race even earlier. The director of the SRR, University of Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park, was a great admirer of Boas and shared his interest in American race relations, and particularly African Americans. Between earning his doctorate in Germany and beginning his tenure at Chicago in 1913, Park worked for the Congo Reform Association, and he was for seven years Booker T. Washington’s personal secretary, ghost writer, and public relations officer.33 In his earliest writings, it is clear that Park also looked to Boas for his methodology, which stressed escaping the confines of the laboratory and turning a critical gaze to the wider world. Spelling out his approach to the practice of sociology in 1915, Park suggested that “the same patient methods which anthropologists like Boas and Lowie have expended on the life and manners of the North American Indian might be even more fruitfully employed in the investigation of the customs, beliefs, social practices, and general conceptions” of people living in American cities.34 In 1923, Park would have a chance to put these methods to use in the study of Asian Americans on the West Coast.

“Free from Partisanship and Bias”: The Effort to Build an Apolitical Survey

The Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast was the brainchild of liberal Protestant missionary and Tokyo YMCA Secretary George Gleason. Gleason was a tireless proponent of peaceful diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Japan, and he understood Japanese immigration and naturalization rights—what many referred to alternately as “the California question,” or “the Japanese question”—to be central to that issue. 

In 1921, with help from fellow YMCA Secretaries Galen

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35 George Gleason, *What Shall I Think of Japan?* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 204. In the years leading up to the SRR, Gleason became a central figure in the debate over Japanese Immigration in California. In his capacity as Director of Religious Activities for the Los Angeles Branch of the YMCA, between 1922 and 1923, he attended several conferences with a core group of nine men—anti- and pro-Japanese immigration leaders representing the Japanese Exclusion league, labor unions, and Christian organizations—concerned with the “California question” to hear their views, to persuade them of the benefits of controlled Japanese immigration, and to gauge their interest in a survey of attitudes on Japanese immigrants in California. In February of 1923, upon learning of the Johnson-Reed Bill’s (later the Immigration Act of 1924) movement in Congress, Gleason appealed to State Department Chief of Far Eastern Affairs John MacMurray on behalf of this group to take action against the legislation. As proposed, the law would eliminate all Japanese immigration to the US, and the group was concerned that this would present two problems: first, it would offend the Japanese state; second, it would make it impossible for the thousands of Japanese men laboring in the United States to find Japanese wives. The specifics of the group’s proposal to the state department evidence the nuances of the pro- and anti-Japanese immigrant positions:

It was suggested at our meeting that it might be possible to negotiate a treaty with Japan allowing not over 15,000 women to come into this country during the next five years, not over 3,000 coming in any one year; that the Japanese continue the agreement that no more laboring men shall come, and at the end of five years, that all immigration, except the usually specified classes, cease. That, in return, America agree to try to get all the States to give all civil rights to Japanese, except the right of marriage with Americans and naturalization. The West is not yet ready for this. Gleason to MacMurray, SRR, Box 7, Folder 6.
Fisher and John Merle Davis, as well as Protestant leader John R. Mott, Gleason appealed to the Rockefeller-funded Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISRR) in New York City to sponsor a study which would address the treatment of Japanese and Japanese Americans in California. The ISRR agreed to fund the project at $25,000, with the understanding that an additional $30,000 would be gained through the fundraising efforts of local SRR committees on the West Coast. In the hopes that the SRR would not only provide insight into “the Japanese question,” but also several other issues relating to Asian immigration on the West Coast, the ISRR expanded the scope of Gleason’s proposed survey to include immigrants from China, Korea, the Philippines and India in California, and also, at least initially, in Oregon, Washington, Hawaii and Canada.

Ironically, it was the politics of the hereditarian, anti-Asian movement that prompted Robert Park’s involvement in the SRR. Board members of the Institute for

Although the group of nine was divided over Japanese immigration, they appeared to see eye to eye on the prospect of miscegenation. “The West” they decided together, was “not yet ready.” Civil rights might be granted, but not the right to marry Americans, coded here as white. As we saw in Chapter Two, the sexual politics of race was always central to the question of Japanese immigration and naturalization.

Before writing MacMurray, the group of nine presented this proposal to Masanao Hanihara, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., and Charles Warren, U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Hanihara responded unfavorably: “All we want is to be accorded the same fair treatment you accord to other people. In other words, no unfair discrimination on account of race or nationality. We ask no more, no less.” This was the official position of the Japanese state. However, according to Gleason, Ambassador Warren “indicated that a treaty similar to the one we discussed might possibly be negotiated.” Gleason to MacMurray, SRR, Box 7, Folder 6.

“Survey of Race Relation: A Study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast,” SRR, Box 1, Folder 1.

Ultimately, the SRR was shaped by the more narrow interests of the surveyors, whose expertise and connections led them to focus on Chinese and Japanese populations to the exclusion of other immigrant groups. Limited cooperation from local affiliates and funding difficulties also contributed to tapering the investigations.
Social and Religious Research saw the participation, cooperation and funding of traditionally anti-Japanese labor organizations and community groups as crucial to the project; if tensions between whites and Asians and Asian Americans were to be understood, all sides would need to be involved in the SRR. However, since anti-Asian immigrant forces distrusted intervention from East-Coast figures in general, and Protestant agencies with missionary ties to Asia in particular, the ISRR had two counts against it from the start.38

In order to downplay its role in the project, and thus stave off the expected charge that the survey of race relations would amount to pro-Asian propaganda, the Institute for Social and Religious Research instructed missionaries Gleason and J. Merle Davis to take a step back from their research leadership roles and find a social scientist to head the survey. In a confidential letter to Gleason and Davis dated January 23, 1923, friend and ISRR board member Galen Fisher counseled that the SRR should “magnify the religious and human-contact aspects, but should also include the economic, educational, civic and legal factors.” A page later, he continued along the same lines: “It is indispensable that the whole study be kept on a genuinely scientific basis—that is, free from partisanship and bias.” “The staff,” he directed, “should consist of at least two persons, - yourself [Davis] and an expert in sociological and economic matters who is at the same time a man in close contact and

38 After meeting with Anti-Japanese movement leaders in San Francisco (including Paul Scharrenberg and V.S. McClatchy, see Chapter One), Gleason observed that “this West Coast seems to resent anything like interference or control from the East. It is quite able to take care of itself. It rather wishes to control the rest of the country then be controlled from the Atlantic seaboard.” George Gleason to Galen Fisher, October 12, 1922, SRR, Box 7, Folder 6.
sympathy with the Christian movement.” 39 By bringing in a sociologist such as Park to head the SRR, Fisher believed the ISRR would simply appear be a minority funder of a survey designed by an impartial scientist and carried out by local academics and community members. The decision was made. Although J. Merle Davis would stay on as Administrative Director, Gleason and Davis would surrender formal control over the direction of the research to Park.

In selecting Park to head the SRR for political reasons, the ISRR also introduced to it a new design and set of imperatives that ran contrary to Gleason’s original vision. Gleason and then Davis had envisioned a project that would improve the standing of Japanese immigrants in California and consequently stabilize U.S.-Japan diplomatic relations. They wanted the SRR to be wide-ranging, to address “political, economic, social, racial, educational, and religious matters,” and to aid the “Christian Americanization efforts” of pro-immigrant groups in California. 40

Unlike Gleason and Davis, however, Park was neither interested in undertaking a study of all aspects of “the Japanese problem,” nor in direct immigrant advocacy. Rather, he saw the SRR as an opportunity to further demonstrate his theories regarding race relations, in particular a model he termed the “race relations cycle.” The cycle, elements of which Park developed in several publications between 1917 and 1950, consisted of four stages: contact, competition and conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. 41 Migrations of different racial groups, spurred by

39 Galen Fisher to J. Merle Davis, January 23, 1923, SRR, Box 7, Folder 3.
40 Gleason to Davis, October 28, 1922, SRR, Box 7, Folder 6.
global economic imbalances, produced contact along what he called a “racial frontier,” and this contact led inevitably to competition and conflict over resources, the accommodation of the minority group, and finally their eventual assimilation into a majority culture. Park believed that the SRR would show that race relations between Asian Americans and whites on the Pacific Coast were not dissimilar to those between African Americans and whites in the American South. Although they manifested differently—African American accommodation meant enslavement, while Asian immigrant accommodation meant segregation and low-wage labor—Park thought that the race relations cycle could function as an explanatory model for both.

Park’s vision for the SRR as a project that would demonstrate the race relations cycle rather than one geared toward immigrant advocacy is apparent in the language of one of the earliest documents generated for the study: the “Survey of Race Relation: a Study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast.” The “Survey of Race Relation” [sic] was a proposal outlining the SRR that was sent to would-be contributors and participants in early 1924. The very first sub-section of the


44 The “Survey of Race Relation” has no author, but given its language it was most likely composed by J. Merle Davis after a meeting with Park on January 18, 1924 in which Davis expressed his willingness to combine his own organizational plan and research goals with Park’s. “Survey of Race Relation: A Study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast,” undated, SRR, Box 1, Folder 1; Davis to Fisher, January 25, 1924, SRR, Box 7, Folder 4.
document, entitled “The Pacific Coast: A Racial Frontier,” borrows the rhetoric of Park’s prior writings on race. It sets up both the geographical and theoretical parameters of the project with “The Pacific Coast is the racial frontier of the North American, as far as the Oriental is concerned,” as does the fourth sub-section, which lays out the aims of the study, stressing the conflict and competition component of Asian-American/white relations along this purported “racial frontier.” According to this outline, the study was to be one of racial relationships, concerned with finding not only “the fundamental facts which condition the life of the Oriental on the Pacific Slope” but with “his inter-relation with the Occidental.” Reflecting the ISRR and Park’s insistence on the impartiality of the project, the document also includes a section entitled “Facts not Propaganda,” which reads: “The purpose of the SRR is to secure and publish facts; facts representing the experiences with the Oriental of the local communities and of individual men and women. It seeks to impose no program, advocates no specific policy and champions no special interest.”

In order to keep the ISRR board happy, Davis was grudgingly content to accommodate Park’s organizational plan during the initial weeks of the project. The language of the early outline, “Survey of Race Relation,” which integrates Park’s “racial frontier” thesis, indicates this, as does correspondence between Davis and ISRR Board member Galen Fisher in the winter of 1924. On January 25, after spending nearly a year meeting with local organizations and constructing a plan prior to Park’s involvement, Davis bristled to Fisher that Park “did not favor the organizational plan that I had prepared.” He continued: “I had prepared pretty

45 “Survey of Race Relation,” SRR, Box 1, Folder 1.
complete schedules of geographical organization, budgets, and other plans to present to the central committee” which Park was “inclined to discount.” Additionally, according to Davis, Park

was quite disturbed over the budget plans that I had worked out. Dr. Park’s principal of organization was to lay down the list of subjects which we wished to find…[and] enlist those people and organizations who can give us the required information. My plan was rather more mechanical – dividing the community into the different groups that are interested in the Oriental.

Yet Davis made sure to add “I saw at once that the two plans can easily be combined and accepted his viewpoint without question.”\footnote{Davis to Fisher, January 25, 1924, SRR, Box 7, Folder 4.}

As time wore on, however, Davis became increasingly concerned that Park would narrow both the range and the goals of the survey. On April 9, 1924, he wrote to Galen Fisher at the ISRR: “I want to write to you very confidentially of an increasing problem in this survey.…I refer to Dr. Park’s oft expressed estimate of the nature of this Survey.” Davis then quoted Park from a meeting the two had had earlier in the week: “My idea of the report on this Survey is to get out a volume very similar to ‘Old World Traits Transplanted.’ I expect to handle the Pacific Coast as the racial frontier of the two races and show the factors that limit and condition the mingling of the two races as they are living here side by side.” For Davis, this was unacceptable. “Dr. Park’s method,” he wrote to Fisher, “is based very largely upon the personal case or history, anecdotes, episodes, stories, expression of personal feeling and inward states of mind,” and while Davis approved of this for a purely sociological study, he felt that the SRR promised something more: “Dr. Park does not understand
that the great majority of our committee men and women and the people of all the regions are expecting a much wider treatment of the subject.”

In her history of the Survey of Race Relations, Sara Griffith uses this letter to portray the liberal Protestants who initiated the survey as interested in a broad program of reform, and the sociologists, and particularly Park, as responsible for holding them back. If we add to this depiction Henry Yu’s characterization of the sociologists as Orientalists, we are left with a picture of opposites: on the one side we have the missionaries, agents of redemptive political change; on the other, the sociologists, self-concerned, Progressive-era examples of, as Yu has written, an “elite white fascination with the exotic” whose racial cosmopolitanism was in fact illusory.

In the following section, I build on both Griffith and Yu’s observations by setting the Survey of Race Relations within the context of an era in which psychologists’ hereditarian approach dominated racial research. When we compare the writings of SRR researchers to those in the testing movement, their motives look more ambiguous: the missionaries appear less progressive agents of change, and the sociologists less in lockstep with the racist tendencies of their time.

Revisiting the Motives and Contributions of SRR Missionaries and Sociologists

The liberal Protestant missionaries who conceived and implemented the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast between 1924 and 1926 generally supported public policies that favored Asian immigrants, but this support was

47 Davis to Fisher, April 9, 1924, SRR, Box 7, Folder 4.
48 Yu, Thinking Orientals, 89.
qualified by a eugenic worldview. Correspondence between SRR coordinators George Gleason, J. Merle Davis, and Galen Fisher suggests that they shared prejudices common to both leaders of the anti-Japanese movement such as V.S. McClatchy and self-styled “friends” of the Japanese such as Stanford University President and prominent eugenicist David Starr Jordan, who reconciled his white supremacy and pro-Japan stance by theorizing that the Japanese had “white blood.”

As we have seen, the joint testing project between Stanford University and the Japanese Association of America (1921-1926) was not only as a moment of collaboration between an immigrant advocacy organization and white supremacists in academia, it demonstrated that the two seemingly disparate groups shared a eugenic worldview that combined class with race. Eugenicists at Stanford and elite Japanese in San Francisco were both eager to restrict immigration to certain “types” of immigrants—those from a high economic class, descended, in Jordan’s terms, of better “stock”—and intelligence testing appeared the most viable tool to achieve this.

Despite his decades of work in Japan, and his apparent anti-racist position, George Gleason shared this eugenic position. In a document dated Christmas 1924, one year in to the SRR, Gleason hinted at the idea that only a certain class of immigrants should be allowed to enter the U.S. The document, entitled “Suggested International Objectives for American Followers of the Prince of Peace” at first appears by its title and initial content to represent a position advocating racial

50 Ibid.
egalitarianism. It calls for the “naturalization of all people who measure up to our educational, patriotic and moral standards, regardless of race,” and speaks to “the necessity of eliminating discriminatory laws from city, state or national statute books.” Under the subsection “Immigration,” however, it reads: “After careful study, we urge congress to adopt a policy of selective immigration by which certain types of individuals shall be selected from applicants in their home countries, the selection being based on moral, physical and educational fitness.” This criteria and language Gleason borrowed directly from the American eugenics movement.51

In the summer of 1924, Survey of Race Relations coordinator J. Merle Davis echoed and elaborated on Gleason’s eugenic argument, disclosing to V.S. McClatchy, *Sacramento Bee* editor and leader in the anti-Japanese movement, that he actually agreed with the measures congress enacted in the Johnson-Reed Bill to restrict immigration. On July 28, Davis wrote McClatchy that the Japanese should not be seen as “unassimilable…simply because they are Japanese.” Yet, he qualified,

I believe that the great majority of Japanese in Japan should be automatically excluded from citizenship by qualification test…There is no question in my mind that the coolie class of Japanese and the peasant class are incapable of becoming Americans, at least in the first generation….I believe that the exclusion of the Japanese follows as naturally and logically the Ineligibility Measure as the daylight follows the night. 52

Additionally, although he frequently disagreed with V.S. McClatchy’s approach to Japanese immigration, Davis characterized the *Sacramento Bee* editor as the “most friendly” of the “Anti-Oriental” leaders, and considered his arguments proffered in

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51 “Suggested International Objectives for American Followers of the Prince of Peace,” George Gleason, Christmas 1924, SRR, Box 1, Folder 1.
52 Davis to McClatchy, July 28, 1924, SRR, Box 9, Folder 3.
good faith, “sane,” “strong, dignified and clear presentation[s] of the facts of the case.”

The SRR missionaries’ stance on Asian immigration and assimilability stood in marked contrast to that of other progressives such as missionary Sidney Gulick and newspaper editor and Democratic Party leader John P. Irish, who offered unqualified support to the Asian-immigrant community. Whereas Davis accepted McClatchy’s arguments as “sane” and “dignified,” Sidney Gulick and John P. Irish fought against them at every turn. In November of 1924, Gulick wrote directly to McClatchy, calling his arguments—and the exclusionary legislation they helped prompt—“undemocratic,” “un-American,” “unethical,” and “not substantiated by history or by an impartial study of our laws.” Two years earlier, John P. Irish, working on behalf of the Executive Committee of Justice in Oakland, California, had responded to McClatchy’s exclusion arguments with similar disgust. In a letter to McClatchy from May 25, 1922, Irish made his position fairly clear:

Val McClatchy, Zoology knows of several kinds of ass. There is the plain ass, the burro, the donkey, the zebra and the mule. But you are a new and interesting kind of ass. You have the hee haw of your more decent and respectable relatives, but you lack common sense. You take a mixture of perjuries, lies, hatred and prejudice, and boil it in a solution of dishonor and moral treason….If I can gather a bunch of thistles, I will send it to you to eat.

Set against figures involved in the anti-Asian and eugenic testing movements, the racial politics of SRR missionaries appear ambiguous. Certainly Gleason and Davis were more progressive on matters of race than most who lobbied against Asian

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53 Davis to Sidney Gulick, October 11, 1923, SRR, Box 8, Folder 3; Davis to McClatchy, July 28, 1924, SRR, Box 9, Folder 3.
54 Gulick to McClatchy, November 17, 1924, SRR, Box 8, Folder 1.
55 John P. Irish to McClatchy, May 25, 1922, SRR, Box 9, Folder 3.
immigration. Indeed, anti-Japanese movement leaders like V.S. McClatchy, and labor
leader Paul Scharrenberg—who also labeled themselves “true friends of Japan”—
were white supremacists who fought to “keep California white,” and petitioned for
the exclusion of all Asian immigrants. On the other hand, however, like David Starr
Jordan and elite Japanese in San Francisco, Gleason and Davis’ favorable position on
Japanese immigration was class specific, and qualified by the same eugenic principles
as those they opposed.

Prior treatments of the SRR missionaries have argued that Gleason and Davis
courted anti-Asian leaders in order to gain much-needed support for the project, and
that Davis hedged his arguments somewhat to remain in McClatchy’s favor. However, this reading of their correspondence with figures in the testing and anti-
immigrant movements suggest that Gleason and Davis had more in common with
David Starr Jordan, Terman, and even McClatchy than previously imagined, and that
neither shared the vehemence of their more progressive peers in the anti-exclusion
movement.

To fill out the picture of the SRR even further, it is useful to consider how the
eugenic testing movement shaped the contributions of the survey sociologists. As we
saw in Chapter Two, in the mid-1920s the testing movement had explanatory
authority in debates over race and immigration. Thus, although the SRR sociologists
employed different methodology than the testers to acquire their data on racial

56 McClatchy to K. Abiko, July 23, 1924, SRR, Box 9, Folder 3; V. S. McClatchy,
“Guarding the Immigration Gates: What Has Been Done, What is Still to be Done,”
1925, Pamphlets on Japanese Exclusion, Pamphlet 29, Bancroft Library, University
of California, Berkeley.
groups, Park and Bogardus borrowed the statistical techniques and language of the latter to present their conclusions. This move ultimately weakened the SRR, as it pushed Park and Bogardus to reduce the complex survey returns, interviews, and rich life histories that SRR researchers had compiled into data points that did not convey the experiences of the Asian immigrant and Asian American communities.

The shortfalls attendant to borrowing from the testers’ approach are most apparent in the “social distance scale,” Park and Bogardus’ flawed attempt to present levels of racial prejudice on the West Coast in their May 1926 summary of the SRR. Park and Bogardus employed the concept “social distance” to measure the level of antipathy between racial groups. Beginning in the winter of 1924, they sent out several hundred questionnaires asking people on the West Coast to “rate Japanese, Chinese, Hindus, Mexicans, Armenians and thirty-five other racial groups according to the primary reactions that they experienced toward each race.” Descending by order of questions that they considered measured “intimacy,” they asked respondents whether they would, for instance, “willingly intermarry with the Japanese;” “have the Japanese as chums in their fraternal groups…have Japanese live as their neighbors on their street…in their occupation (as possible competitors); in this country as citizens; in this country simply as visitors; or would they exclude Japanese from the country altogether?” To each question they assigned a numerical value, and in their summary of the SRR, they published a chart indicating results calculated from a sample of 110 respondents living on the West Coast. Not surprisingly, since their sample was overwhelmingly white, the results indicated that the “social distance” between the respondents and “Chinese” and “Japanese” was greater than that between the
respondents and “English” and “Canadians.” Numerically, “Chinese” and “Japanese” were at 4.28 and 4.30 respectively, while “English” and “Canadians” were at .27 and .30. (“Chinese” and “Japanese” were bookended by “Negroes” at 4.10 and “Turks” at 4.80.)

Park and Bogardus’ attempt to quantify racial prejudice in this manner was problematic. “Why,” as Yu asks, “was sex and intermarriage to be the ground zero of social distance? Would a racist white man marrying an Oriental woman and treating her like a prostitute really show close social distance….Or how about a slave owner who had sex with an enslaved woman?” The social distance equation did not account for the possibility that someone could, in Yu’s words, both “abhor and desire a person of another race.” This error signals Park and Bogardus’ blindness toward the complexities of race and sexuality, but it was also an error that arose out of their attempt to fit round pegs into square holes. People’s racial understandings could not be quantified so easily.

Set against the context of the testing movement, which purported to provide hard evidence of racial disparities and worked to discount the effects of social prejudice in educational and economic outcomes, however, Park and Bogardus misguided foray into statistical presentation should also be seen as a somewhat progressive attempt to fight fire with fire. Despite its obvious flaws, the “social

59 Yu, Thinking Orientals, 51.
60 Bogardus made a literal connection between the scale and the intelligence testing movement, beginning the quantitative portion of his article with the question: “Can social distance, like intelligence, be measured?” Bogardus, “Social Distance,” 169.
distance scale” was designed to take advantage of the public fascination with measurement to convey how racial discrimination affected Asian Americans.

Bogardus was explicit about his intent to use the scale to thread together the stories of Asian Americans the SRR had interviewed, and to bring home the concrete effects of racial prejudice. In his introduction to the scale, Bogardus traced a lack of “social contacts between…Americans and Orientals” to “a correlative decrease of understanding and intimacy” and to anti-Asian legislation and daily systemic discrimination:

Today, no matter how worthy an oriental immigrant on the Pacific Coast may be, he is continually in danger of being embarrassed and of being made to feel that he is not wanted. The Oriental may walk into an American barber shop, and be met with “no service”….If he tries to better his housing status, he awakes the next morning to find a sign on the front lawn: “Japs not wanted”…. If his son, a citizen of his country in spirit as well as by law, is elected a student body president, the pupils may…demand a recall simply because their parents have reacted violently against the idea, as one boy put it, “of having a Jap for a president.” These illustrations, drawn from the data of the Pacific Coast Race Relations Survey, demonstrate the existence of social distance.

For the most part, Park and Bogardus excluded the life histories SRR researchers had collected from their final survey summaries, but this does not mean, as previous literature has suggested, that they disregarded the instances of racial discrimination those histories revealed.61 Instead, the sociologists read the SRR questionnaire returns, interview transcripts, and life histories, and presented them in a manner that

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they thought would most effectively alter the course of a national dialogue on race, a
dialogue dominated at the time by statistics-heavy psychology.

Although by the mid-1920s the tide was changing, the SRR operated in a
context in which proximity to hard science, not history or ethnography, still signaled
legitimacy on the question of race. The ISRR’s decision to hire Park had been based
on his perceived connection to science and the purported objectivity that came with it.
The decision by Park and Bogardus to distill all of the SRR data into devices like the
“social distance scale,” rather than either more expansive or more inclusive
presentations was made with these same political considerations in mind.

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Ultimately, neither the Institute for Social and Religious Research’s decision
to hire Park to head the survey, nor Park and Bogardus’ decision to borrow the tactics
of the testers to present survey results gained the support of California’s anti-
immigrant forces, or bolstered the status of the Survey of Race Relations. Despite
Park’s involvement in the SRR, anti-immigrant groups such as the Native Sons of the
Golden West, and labor leaders such as Paul Scharrenberg never trusted that the SRR
would render impartial data on race relations. In October of 1923, even before the
SRR began, Davis confided to Sidney Gulick that “as we fully expected, some of the
Anti-Oriental organizations are beginning to withdraw.”62 And in June of 1924, the
Grizzly Bear a publication of the Native Sons of the Golden West, warned that the

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62 Davis to Gulick, Oct 11, 1923, SRR, Box 8, Folder 8.
SRR was “pro-Jap,” that it was funded by “pro-Jap sources,” and that “its real purpose” was to “assist the Japs in their ‘peaceful invasion’ of California.”

The SRR missionaries’ and sociologists’ failure to garner the support of anti-Asian leaders on the West Coast stands in contrast to Terman’s ability to secure support from people and organizations on both sides of the Asian-immigration debate. As we saw in Chapters One and Two, as a fellow member of the Eugenics Committee of the U.S.A., Terman had the ear of Asian exclusionist Washington State Senator Albert Johnson even as he successfully raised testing funds from the Japanese Association of America. This is not to suggest that the anti-Asian movement always stood firmly by Terman’s side—organized labor on the West-Coast was consistently suspicious of Stanford University and those associated with it—but Terman’s close ties to the eugenics movement and his ability to sell racial testing as objective scientific measurement ultimately shielded him from criticism in ways unavailable to the SRR missionaries and sociologists.

In this chapter, we have reassessed the Survey of Race Relations in the context of the eugenic testing and associated anti-Asian-immigrant movements of the

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63 *Grizzly Bear*, June 1924, SRR, Box 1, Folder 1. The SRR was always much more successful reaching out to anti-hereditarians such as Walter Lippman, Terman’s most famous opponent in the nature versus nurture debate, who agreed to serve as a counselor to the project. Fisher to Walter Lippmann, January 14, 1924, SRR, Box 7, Folder 4.

64 Labor leader and Asian exclusionist Paul Scharrenberg in particular held Stanford administration and faculty in low regard when it came to the immigration issue. In a 1954 interview, he remarked: “If it had not been for the early labor agitators, I think this Pacific coast would have been filled up with Chinese…the upper strata, the University people, they weren’t interested, they never raised a finger. It was the hell-raising of the agitators that maintained California for us and our kind of people.” Oral History Interview with Paul Scharrenberg, 1954. Bancroft Library, University of California Berkeley, 62.
1920s. In so doing, we have shed light on two key aspects of the survey: the Institute for Social and Religious Research’s hiring of University of Chicago sociologist Robert Park to head the project, and Park and Bogardus’ statistical presentation of the survey’s findings. As this chapter has demonstrated, the ISRR, which funded the survey, chose Park instead of Liberal Protestant missionary George Gleason because ISRR board members wanted traditionally anti-Asian organizations to support and participate in the survey. Board members assumed that labor leaders opposed to immigration and groups such as the Native Sons of the Golden West would be more amenable to a survey directed by a social scientist affiliated with a university than Gleason, who had strong ties to the Japanese immigrant community. In this way, the SRR was from the start shaped both by California’s nativist political climate, and by a perceived connection between science, objectivity, and authority.

California’s political climate and the perception that hard science enjoyed greater legitimacy than ethnography on questions of race also shaped the manner in which SRR sociologists ultimately presented their research. Although their researchers had compiled hundreds of interview transcripts, questionnaires, and full life histories of first and second-generation Japanese and Chinese, SRR project director Robert Park and his colleague Emory Bogardus chose to borrow the statistical language of psychology and the testing movement to communicate their findings. This decision, however, compromised the richness of their research. By borrowing the techniques of the testers to convey their findings, Park and Bogardus achieved results similar to those of the testers, reducing Asian Americans’ complex
lived experiences along what Park termed “the racial frontier” into manageable, but false statistical categories.
As we saw in Chapter Three, between 1910 and 1930 eugenicist psychologists in the United States promoted race-based intelligence testing at the nation’s borders as a bulwark against what they called “the decline of American intelligence.” They made use of purported scientific evidence gathered from testing data to convince Americans that “new” immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe threatened the nation’s genetic purity, or what Lewis Terman once termed the “American germ plasm.” They campaigned alongside white supremacists in the media and in

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1 I use “tide” here to invoke eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard’s 1920 bestseller, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy* (1920; repr. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1922), which cautioned readers that birth-rate differentials between whites and non-whites, migrations, and the death toll of World War One (which he described alternately as an “internecine” conflict and “the White Civil War”) portended the fall of white racial hegemony. Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, vi. Stoddard was particularly concerned with Asian migration, warning that it was “in fact Asians, and above all Mongolian Asians, who form the first wave of the rising tide of color. Unfortunately, the white world cannot permit this rising tide free scope. White men cannot, under peril of the very race-existence, allow wholesale Asiatic immigration into white race-areas” [sic]. Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 231. Stoddard’s imaginary “tide” stands in marked contrast to the very real tide of nativist sentiment and anti-Asian legislation that overtook the Western states of the U.S. between 1880 and World War II.


3 Lewis Terman, "Were We Born that Way?" *The World's Work*, v. 44 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922), 660. Like Galton, Terman’s immigration concerns were tied to anxiety about the “fecundity” of the supposedly superior races. In a meeting of the National Education Association in Oakland, California on July 2, 1923, he warned:

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government to exclude immigrants who did not fit their racial standard, and with the 
passage of the restrictive 1924 Immigration Act their pseudo-science-backed politics 
of exclusion carried the day.\footnote{4}

The racial stocks most prolific of gifted children are those from 
 northern and western Europe, and the Jewish. The least prolific are the 
 Mediterranean races, the Mexicans, and the Negroes. The fecundity of 
 the family stocks from which our gifted children come appears to be 
 definitely in the wane...It has been said that if the present differential 
 birth rate continues, 1,000 Harvard graduates will at the end of 200 
 years have but 50 descendants, while in the same period 1,000 South 
 Italians will have multiplied to 100,000. Lewis Terman, “The 
 Conservation of Talent,” \textit{School and Society} v. 19 (March 1924), 363. 
\footnote{4 For more on intelligence testers’ views on the immigrant, see H.H. Goddard, “The 
 105-107; “Mental tests and the Immigrant,” \textit{Journal of Delinquency}, v. 2 (1917): 243-
 277; Carl Brigham, \textit{A Study of American Intelligence} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
 University Press, 1922). In 1974, Princeton Psychologist Leon Kamin exposed the 
 connection between intelligence testers and the restrictive immigration law of 1924 in 
 \textit{The Science and Politics of I.Q.} (Potomac, M.D.: Lawrence Erlbaum and Assoc., 
 1974), but there has been some debate over the extent of their involvement. In the 
 early 1980s this debate played out—largely via sardonic rejoinders from 
 psychologists divided over the work of Kamin, Stephen J. Gould and Richard 
 Herrnstein—in the annals of the \textit{American Psychologist}. See Richard Herrnstein, 
 “Try again, Dr. Albee,” \textit{American Psychologist}, v. 36 (April 1981): 424-425; Donald 
 Dorfman, “Henry Goddard and the Feeble-mindedness of Jews, Hungarians, Italians, 
 and Russians,” \textit{American Psychologist}, v. 37.1 (January 1982): 96-97; David Gersh, 
 “Professor Herrnstein: Look Before You Leap,” \textit{American Psychologist}, v. 37.1 
 (January 1982): 97; Leon Kamin, “Mental Testing and Immigration,” \textit{American 
 Psychologist}, v. 37.1 (January 1982): 97-98. See also Ashley Montagu, ed., \textit{Race and 
 IQ} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); N.J. Block and G. Dworkin, \textit{The IQ 
 Controversy: Critical Readings} (New York: Pantheon, 1976); Allan Chase, \textit{The 
 Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism} (New York: 
 Knopf, 1977); Paul Ehrlich and S. Shirley Feldman, \textit{The Race Bomb: Skin Color, 
 Prejudice, and Intelligence} (New York: Quadrangle, 1977); Stephen J. Gould, \textit{The 
 Mismeasure of Man} (New York: Norton Press, 1981); Elaine Mensh and Harry 
 Mensh, \textit{The IQ Mythology: Class, Race, Gender and Inequality} (Cardondale, IL: 
 Southern Illinois University, 1991); William Tucker, \textit{The Science and Politics of 
 Racial Research} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Graham Richards, 
 \textit{Race, Racism and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History} (London: Routledge, 
 1997); Jefferson Fish, ed., \textit{Race and Intelligence: Separating Science from Myth} 
 (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002); Stephen Murdoch, \textit{IQ: A Smart 
 History of a Failed Idea} (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2007).}
In the 1970s, historians of education began to explore the impact that Progressive-era race-based intelligence testing had on U.S. schools as well. Looking at Progressive-era public schools in Los Angeles, Gilbert Gonzalez and James Cameron charged that white educators used testing to track Chicano students into vocational classes as part of a larger effort to maintain a racially-segmented hierarchal class structure in the city.\textsuperscript{5} R. Scott Baker and Ruben Donato found that in the two decades following \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} (1954), boards of education in the South and Southwest used testing to avoid classroom integration, adopting strict testing programs to track Mexican-American and African-American children into separate, lower-tiered classes.\textsuperscript{6}

In his 1973 critique of Progressive-era educational reforms, “Testing for Order and Control in the Corporate Liberal State,” Clarence Karier argued that intelligence tests developed during the Progressive Era promoted racial and ethnic bias in students and teachers into the 1960s, and paved the way for subsequent economic stratification along racial lines. To illustrate the blatant bias of the intelligence tests, Karier pointed to a two-part illustrated question from Terman’s...


1960 revision of the Stanford-Binet. The question required that a six-year-old child examine four drawings of faces, in sets of two, and select “Which is prettier?” Part A paired a supposedly “Nordic Anglo-Saxon type” male face against that of a “Mexican” or “southern European;” part B compared two women, one supposedly “white,” and the other “black.” In each case the child was expected to choose the “Nordic type” as the “prettier” of the two to get the answer correct. Linking intelligence testing to psychologists’ efforts to promote eugenic sterilization and restrictive immigration legislation, Karier wrote that:

Neither blacks nor southern Europeans were beautiful according to the authors of the Stanford Binet, but then, there was no beauty in these people when [leaders in the testing field] called for the sterilization of the “socially inadequate,” the discriminatory closing of immigration, the tracking organization of the American school or, for that matter, when they defined these peoples’ place in the meritocracy.7

For Karier and other historians of education such as Cameron, Gonzalez, Joel Spring, Paul Violas, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, testing was one important aspect of a socially-conservative agenda designed to police the working class, stigmatize minorities, and indoctrinate youth with the values of a corporate order.8

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8 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Joel Spring, The American School, 1642-1985: Varieties of Historical Interpretation of the Foundations and Development of American Education (New York: Longman, 1986). As we discussed in the previous chapter, during the first half of the twentieth century the testing movement was pervasive, extending into and reshaping public education, the military, immigration, mental health, prisons, and the juvenile system. Testing historians have written extensively on each of these topics. Evidence suggests, however, that the testing framework and questions devised by Terman and
As I will show in this chapter, however, during the 1920s and 1930s psychologists attempted to use racial testing for anti-racist, socially-progressive purposes as well. Between 1928 and 1932, Reginald Bell, a graduate student in Stanford University’s Education program, deployed Terman’s tests in the fight against school segregation. Seeking to prove the negative effects of segregation on Japanese-American children, Bell used tests of intelligence and school achievement to compare student performances in four segregated and four non-segregated school districts in Placer and Sacramento counties, California.\(^9\) Controlling for other factors, such as age, sex, school grade, and aptitude, Bell hypothesized that differences in the educational progress of students over an eighteen-month period were attributable to segregation.\(^{10}\)

Bell’s dissertation, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” submitted to the Stanford University psychologists such as Robert Yerkes, Henry Goddard, Arthur Otis, Walter Scott, and Walter Bingham also found their way into state literacy tests used to disenfranchise African-American voters. The 1964 Louisiana Literacy Test, for example, designed to “be given to anyone who cannot prove a fifth grade education,” began with instructions akin to, though more punitive than, those of a standardized intelligence test: “Do what you are told to do in each statement, nothing more, nothing less. Be careful, as one wrong answer denotes failure of the test. You have 10 minutes to complete the test.” And the test included linguistic and spatial reasoning questions nearly identical to those developed by Terman: “Draw a line around the number or letter of this sentence…. Circle the first, first letter of the alphabet in this line….In the space below draw three circles, one inside (engulfed by) the other….In the space below, write the word “noise” backwards and place a dot over what would be its second letter should it have been written forward.” “The State of Louisiana Literacy Test c. 1964,” Civil Rights Movement Veterans Association, http://www.crmvet.org/info/la-test.htm.

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School of Education in 1932, is remarkable because it attempted to turn scientific racism against itself, using its means to subvert its ends. Whereas Terman and fellow psychologists such as Henry Goddard and Edward Thorndike conceived of the tests—and invented much of the quasi-scientific jargon that accompanied them—to aid in the preservation of an assumed national-racial purity, Bell used them to challenge racist practices within the educational system.  

11 Like Terman, Goddard studied at Clark University with G. Stanley Hall. In 1908, Goddard published the first English-language translation of the Binet-Simon intelligence scale. From 1906 to 1918 he was the director of the Vineland Training School, the first research institute devoted to studying mental deficiency in the U.S. At Vineland, Goddard aided in the development in the US Army Intelligence Testing program and published several manuals on the use of the Binet-Simon (and later) Stanford-Binet intelligence scale, as well as books and pamphlets on what he called “feeble-mindedness,” the purported hereditary nature of criminality, and immigration. See H.H. Goddard, *The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale for Intelligence* (Vineland, N.J.: Training School, Department of Psychological Research, 1911); *The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-mindedness* (New York: MacMillian, 1912); “Mental Tests and the Immigrant,” *Journal of Delinquency*, v. 2 (1917): 243-277. Goddard was also a member of several eugenics societies; he spelled out his eugenic principals in *Feeble-mindedness: It’s Causes and Consequences* (1914; repr. New York: MacMillan, 1920):

> The feeble-minded person is not desirable, he is a social encumbrance, often a burden to himself. In short it were better both for him and for society had he never been born. Should we not then, in our attempt to improve the race, begin by preventing the birth of more feeble-minded….The eugenist proposes to work along two lines; first, to restrain the ignorant and unintelligent from such matings as will surely result in defective offspring; second, to appeal to the reason of intelligent persons not to marry into families where there is any hereditary taint whereby their offspring may be affected [sic]. (558)

Edward Thorndike, a Columbia University Professor of Psychology and one-time President of the American Psychological Association, worked alongside Terman and Goddard to develop and promote intelligence testing and eugenics. In addition to participating in the Army Intelligence Testing Project during World War One, Thorndike published a popular revision of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, *The Measurement of Intelligence* (New York: Columbia University, 1927), and sat on the boards of the Eugenics Society of the U.S.A, the American Eugenics Society, the
The study is also remarkable because of its focus: had Bell simply wanted to challenge segregation in the short term, he might very well have had more success examining its effects on white children. White students were the dominant group in the sample districts he selected, and their parents had the political influence to challenge the status quo. By directing attention to Japanese-American children, however, Bell was able both to avoid a white-centered narrative, and, paradoxically, to reframe what was frequently characterized as a “Japanese problem,” into an American one. In Bell’s formulation, the problem was not the immigrant; it was American “color prejudice” and the unfulfilled promise of democratic education.12

Despite—or perhaps because of—the remarkable nature of Bell’s study, it has received no coverage in the extensive literature on intelligence testing and race in the fields of Education, History, and Asian-American studies. It could be that, because Bell’s study challenges rather than reaffirms the prevailing mindset of intelligence testers during the 1920s, it does not fit easily into histories of the period. It is not practicable to list all of the books in which Bell’s study does not appear, but we can note that otherwise wide-ranging and inclusive accounts of pre-1945 American

Galton Society and the Eugenics Research Association. Unlike Terman, whose allegiance to eugenic principals began to wane later in life, Thorndike continued to promote eugenics into the twilight of his career, writing as late as 1940 that "the argument for sterilizing anybody near the low end of the scale in intellect and morals whenever it can be done legally is very strong." Edward Thorndike, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), 456. See chapter three, which builds on the work of JoAnne Brown, The Definition of a Profession: The Authority of Metaphor in the History of Intelligence Testing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), for a prolonged discussion of the scientific, medical, and business-management terminology Terman, Goddard, Thorndike and others borrowed to lend credibility to the testing movement.

Psychology such as Graham Richards’ *Race, Racism and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History*, William Tucker’s *The Science and Politics of Racial Research*, and Stephen Murdoch’s *IQ: A Smart History of a Failed Idea* do not include it, even when its inclusion might have supported the authors’ arguments, such as in sections in Richards’ study devoted to “Changing Paradigms” and “Criticisms of Race Psychology.” Bell’s later work, *Public School Education of Second-Generation Japanese in California* (1935), which we will discuss in Chapter Five, has been widely known in the field since Yuji Ichioka brought it to light in his standard text, *A Buried Past: An Annotated Bibliography of the Japanese American Research Project Collection* (1974), though it, too, has received scant coverage. Other than David Yoo’s brief characterization of it as an early, mild critique of the uncritical acceptance of racial mental testing, it appears only in bibliographies. In short, although Bell’s 1932 study was the first to challenge segregation using the methods of professional psychologists devoted more of their research to exploring mental disparities between African Americans and whites than any other groups. However, as we have shown, the psychology profession’s approach to racial intelligence classification was comprehensive; through the World War One testing project and studies conducted in hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools, even immigration centers such as Ellis Island, millions of people from other ethnically and racially-defined groups came under the testing umbrella.

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13 Tucker, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research*; Richards, *Race, Racism and Psychology*, 65-159; Murdoch, *IQ: A Smart History of a Failed Idea*. It is also possible that histories of 1920s racial testing have overlooked the Bell study as a consequence of the tendency to see—and to portray—American race relations as a black and white phenomenon. There is no doubt that early-twentieth-century psychologists devoted more of their research to exploring mental disparities between African Americans and whites than any other groups. However, as we have shown, the psychology profession’s approach to racial intelligence classification was comprehensive; through the World War One testing project and studies conducted in hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools, even immigration centers such as Ellis Island, millions of people from other ethnically and racially-defined groups came under the testing umbrella.


psychology, representing a major divergence from earlier work in the field, it has enjoyed no critical examination.

This chapter will take a close look at Bell’s dissertation, exploring both his methodology and the motives and influences that guided his research. Given the training he acquired under Stanford psychologist Maude Merrill, his prior writing on American racial prejudice, and his relationship with prominent Japanese historian and political activist Yamato Ichihashi, it was no accident that Bell used intelligence testing in the service of an anti-racist agenda, nor that he took up the segregation of Japanese-American children as his focus.

This chapter will also set Bell’s 1932 study in the context of studies of racial segregation produced prior to 1932. Bell was of course not the first to look at the performances of minority children in segregated educational environments. Even within Bell’s own program, visiting Chinese education scholar Kwok Tsuen Yeung had used Terman’s tests to examine Chinese-American students in a segregated school in 1921. Social scientists such as W. E. B. Du Bois (1899), E.C. Rowe (1914), W. H. Pyle (1915), J.A. Fitzgerald and W.W. Ludeman (1926) and E. George Payne (1928) had looked at segregated African-American and Native-American school children previously. However, Bell was the first to focus solely on the educational effects of segregation, and the first to use a Stanford-Binet-tested control group to do so.16

16 Kwok Tsuen Yeung, “The Intelligence of Chinese Children in San Francisco and Vicinity” (master’s thesis, Stanford University, 1921); W.E.B. Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1899); The Negro Common School: A Social Study Made Under the Direction of Atlanta University by the Sixth Atlanta Conference (Atlanta: Atlanta University Press, 1901); E. C. Rowe,
In the last section, we will place the subject of Bell’s dissertation in a specific historical and geographical frame. Although educational segregation is a national story, Bell’s study should be seen within the context of the history of segregated education in California as well. We will first draw back to look at this history, from State Superintendent Andrew Moulder’s nineteenth-century codification of universal but separate education, to the struggles of Chinese and Japanese parents to educate their children in the early twentieth century. Finally, piecing together government reports, newspaper coverage, and oral histories, we will focus in on the factors that led school board members to segregate or not segregate in the Sacramento-area school districts Bell sampled.

Reginald Bell and the Influences that Guided his Research on Japanese Americans

Reginald Bell was born in India, received a Bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College in 1916, and a Master’s and Ph.D. from Stanford in 1928 and 1933. From 1928 to 1935 he worked in Stanford’s School of Education as a teaching fellow, and

then in the Stanford University “Citizenship office,” first as an instructor, then as Assistant Director of Citizenship, and finally as Acting Director.17

Bell’s career after graduate school was devoted to teaching. From 1935 to 1948, he worked at Stanford as an instructor in Educational Psychology and child development. During World War Two, he traveled to Washington D.C. to work in the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics, but his new position took advantage of his educational training. Bell, who became a captain in the Training Films Section, wrote excitedly to a friend in 1943, “I surely have to call on all my knowledge of pedagogy and curriculum building” to put together films on everything from “airplane engines, ground tackle for ships, diesel engines, the geography of the South Sea Islands, aerial acrobatics, and hospital nursing” to “torpedo boat tactics, and navigation.”18 After World War Two, Bell returned to California, where from 1948 to 1962 he served as Dean of Instruction and Chairman of the Committee on General Education at San Francisco State University.19 In October of 1962, Bell traveled to India to work as a Specialist in Teacher Education for the Columbia University Teachers College. While there, he served as an advisor to India’s Ministry of Education.20

Bell’s biography reveals a figure deeply committed to child development and education, but it does not provide a picture of his racial politics. A closer look at Bell’s dissertation, as well as his Stanford affiliations and classroom work, helps us

17 “Summer Quarter, 1939” Stanford University Bulletin, Sixth Series, n. 77 (February 1939), 9.
18 Bell to Emma McLaughlin, January 16, 1943, Emma McLaughlin Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
understand why he chose to address the issue of racial segregation as a Stanford University researcher. On the first page of his dissertation, Bell articulated the problems that guided his research. Racial segregation in California’s public schools, he reasoned, raised two sets of questions: the first centered on the causes of segregation, the second, the results. First, Bell asked, “were there fundamental, valid causative factors based on known mental and educational differences” between Asian-American and white students that led school boards to separate them, or was the “propaganda-based fact of race prejudice the fundamental underlying cause?” Second, how did segregation affect the students? Did it alter their “educational progress,” or their “social and civic attitudes” in any measurable way? 21

Bell approached the first set of questions as a historian. In the first full chapter of his dissertation, “The History of the Problem,” Bell chronicled what he termed the “Oriental-American problem in California.”22 Bell’s coverage of the “problem” followed a course set by Mary Coolidge’s 1909 text Chinese Immigration, alternating between the arrival of Asian immigrant groups and the responses their presence elicited from white politicians and labor leaders.23 Building on Coolidge and the work of C. N. Reynolds, Bell characterized race relations during the initial period of Chinese immigration, between 1850 and 1869, as relatively benign.24 There was in 1856, by his estimation “a period of lawlessness in San Francisco which laid the basis

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for a hostile attitude toward the yellow race,” but as Chinese workers were necessary
for mining and railroad construction, anti-Asian agitation “was not needed in
politics.”25 The completion of the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869, however, at once
rendered 9,000 Chinese-immigrant laborers jobless, and, according to Bell, increased
the potential for racialized labor conflict, as thousands of European immigrant
laborers made their way to California from the eastern seaboard by rail. Again taking
his cue from Coolidge and Reynolds, Bell laid the blame for the anti-Chinese
agitation of the 1870s and 1880s at the feet of the California Democratic Party.
Although individual labor leaders and newspaper editors fanned the flames anti-
Chinese resentment, it was the Democratic Party that made “the Chinese question” a
central issue in California.26

Following an outline that would be filled in by later scholars of Asian-
American history such as Roger Daniels, Alexander Saxton, Yuji Ichioka, and Ronald
Takaki, Bell transitioned quickly from the anti-Chinese movement of the nineteenth
century to the anti-Japanese movement of the twentieth.27 Between 1890 and 1920, as
increasing numbers of Japanese immigrants began to fill the labor gap created by the
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, California’s anti-Asian exclusionists in Labor and

25 Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in
American Schools,” 7.
26 Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, 67; Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of
27 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in
California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1962); Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the
Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1971); Yuki Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese
Immigrants, 1885-1924 (New York: The Free Press, 1988); Ronald Takaki, Strangers
from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston: Little, Brown and
government turned their attention toward what they described as “the new Oriental menace.” Bell did not compare the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese movements in detail, but he did link them together in unambiguous terms: “To many who retained their anti-Chinese prejudice,” Bell observed, “these new arrivals were more of the same thing, so that the Japanese inherited on their arrival in California much of the hostility that had been built up in the long years of anti-Chinese agitation.”

Invoking a notion that he felt was at the crux of the history of antagonism against Asian immigrants, Bell noted that whites’ reception of turn-of-the-century Japanese immigrants was shaped by “the color prejudice which had become habitual in the United States.” This idea of color prejudice surfaced frequently in Bell’s dissertation. Somewhat of an anachronism, in that it was more common to the education literature of the 1960s and 1970s than the 1920s and 1930s, Bell’s usage of the phrase betrays his progressive racial politics, and provides a clue as to what motivated his graduate research.

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After characterizing the anti-Japanese movement as an extension of anti-Chinese agitation and “built-up hostility,” Bell wrote a survey of the Japanese immigrant experience that focused on segregation and anti-Japanese legislation between 1900 and 1920. In a survey treatment similar to Japanese-American histories written today, Bell concentrated first on the San Francisco Board of Education’s 1906 attempt to segregate Japanese students from city elementary schools, and then on the passage of the 1913 and 1920 California anti-alien land laws designed to uproot Japanese farmers.30

Three aspects of Bell’s research set it apart from other contemporary studies of educational segregation: first, the fact that Bell’s narrative of the Japanese experience in California was so ahead of its time; second, Bell’s choice to write his dissertation on Japanese Americans; and third, Bell’s decision to employ the science of intelligence testing to further his progressive agenda.

Bell’s research and affiliations at Stanford shed light on all three aspects of his study. To provide a frame for his narrative of the Japanese experience in California, Bell looked to general histories of the state such as R. G. Cleland’s A History of California–The American Period and H. H. Bancroft’s History of California, as well as government findings on education and immigration from the Congressional Records Office and the U.S. General Commissioner of Immigration.31 He also

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consulted studies focused on Asian immigration such as Eliot Mears’ *Resident Orientals on the Pacific Coast*, Jesse Steiner’s *The Japanese Invasion*, Kiyoshi Kawakami’s *The Real Japanese Question*, and Sidney Gulick’s *The American Japanese Problem*. Yet, for the balance of his description of the relationship between Japanese immigrants and white Californians, his statistical evidence, his argument concerning color prejudice, and his conclusion, Bell leaned heavily on three works by one of his mentors, Stanford Professor Yamato Ichihashi: *Japanese Immigration*, *Japanese Immigration: Its Status in California*, and *Japanese in the United States*.33

One reason Bell’s brief history of Japanese-Americans, completed in 1932, was indeed so ahead of its time was that it followed closely the work of Ichihashi. One of the first scholars to concentrate on Asian-Americans, Ichihashi’s contributions have remained pivotal to twentieth and twenty-first century historians of the Japanese-American experience.34 As an instructor and then Professor of Japanese

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History at Stanford University, between 1913 and his internment in 1942 he published dozens of books and articles on Japanese Americans, Japanese history, Japanese economics, and international diplomacy. He pioneered research of the Issei, or first-generation Japanese immigrants, conducting interviews in Japanese and English and translating their experiences to wider audiences within and outside of academia.

Evidence suggests that Bell came to study Japanese Americans partly because of his personal and mentor relationship with Yamato Ichihashi. Although not a signatory on Bell’s dissertation, nor his academic advisor, Ichihashi was the first person Bell thanked in his acknowledgements. As Bell stated plainly, he was “especially grateful to Dr. Yamato Ichihashi for interesting him in the problem, for aiding him in the field as the research was begun, and for advising and encouraging him throughout.”


From his earliest years at Stanford, Ichihashi sought to forge allies for the Japanese immigrant cause among Stanford University administrators, professors and students. In addition to publishing articles on behalf of Japanese immigrants in the U.S., Ichihashi also gave public talks and taught a popular course on “Immigration and the Race Problem.” In a letter to the Japanese Consul General in San Francisco regarding his classes in the Fall of 1915, Ichihashi wrote that he had “handled some eighty students in a way that they will at least remember me. And the personal contact and relationship thus made and formed will be of value to me and therefore to Japanese interests sometime or [other]. I am trying to build a circle of friends, and I feel that my students will form the nucleus of such a circle.”37 Later that year, Ichihashi communicated to a new acting Consular General in explicitly political terms the benefits attendant to his teaching. He was pleased with the high enrollment figures of his “Immigration and the Race Problem” class, because “I thought that each student who studies under me regardless of the nature of subjects is to become more or less pro-Japanese American citizen. Hence the larger number of students I have, the greater my influence over them. This might eventually become a social force in favor of Japan.”38

Judging from Bell’s dissertation, and from classwork completed for Ichihashi, he was clearly one of those students within the professor’s circle. Over the course of his career, Ichihashi saved several student papers. One of these, from a folder titled “Student Papers, 1921-1924” was authored by Bell. Since no correspondence exists between Bell and Ichihashi, we do not know why Ichihashi saved Bell’s paper. He may have done it to document the effectiveness of his teaching. Or he may have been impressed with Bell’s approach to the class. Either way, Bell’s essay, titled “A Quota for Japan,” demonstrated Bell’s complex understanding of race and California history.39

Bell’s “A Quota for Japan” linked the long history of racial tensions in California to contemporary anti-Japanese politics. He began, however, by making a connection between this history and the physical landscape of Stanford:

A few weeks ago the widening of the highway leading south past Stanford University necessitated the tearing down of an ancient wooden fence bounding a field. In black letters on the fence, still plainly decipherable after over fifty years of California suns and rains, was a political campaign slogan of the late 1870’s – “The Chinese must go. O’Donnell for Governor.”40

Bell went on to catalog offenses against Chinese immigrants, including the race riots of the late 1860s and 70s and the 1882 exclusion law. In terms less restrained than those he would use to describe this history in his dissertation, he lambasted “unscrupulous politicians,” and “hostile labor organizations” for their leading roles in both the Anti-Chinese and Anti-Japanese movements, and he criticized journalists such as Sacramento Bee publisher Valentine Stuart McClatchy for their gross misuse

39 Reginald Bell, “A Quota for Japan,” Yamato Ichihashi Papers, Special Collections, Stanford University, Box 3, Folder 5.
40 Ibid.
of immigration data, and their “unscientific conclusions” regarding “the Japanese problem.”

Bell followed this with a historical analysis of racial thinking in the United States as evocative of W.E.B. Du Bois as of Ichihashi. Labeling the problem of race “a psychological one, a complex of economic-historical fact carried over into attitude-determining propaganda,” he described the ways that first slaves and then immigrant groups became characterized by their occupation:

As a new people in the country, and an ignorant one, [African Americans] did only servile labor. The badge of their occupation – servile, unskilled, inferior – attached itself to them. They were inferior people by virtue of their occupation. The same thing up to this point occurred with the early Irish, Italian, and Slav immigrants that came to this country. They did our hard physical work. The badge of their occupation stuck to them, till an Irish ditch-digger, a Dago, a Polack, a Hunyak, was an inferior, whether inherently he was or not.

Focusing on the crucial role perceptions of skin color played in this history, he continued:

The white groups, however, have largely outgrown their classification. The second or third generation becomes indistinguishable from the rest of us by virtue of education and a new occupation. But the Negro, or the Japanese or Chinese does not lose his distinctiveness. His color remains – but not merely as a badge of color. We are confused by this time between his color and his caste. His color has become his badge of caste. He is, by virtue of his color, inferior.

In *The Souls of Black Folk*, Du Bois described a “veil of color” that cast a shadow over African Americans in the early-twentieth-century American South. The veil ensured that in a nation divided by “the color line,” African-American individuality,

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
ambition, humanity—and importantly, labor—would not be valued. Bell’s description of race in American history recognized an essential component of this veil: while Irish, Italian, Polish and Hungarian immigrants could in essence become white and enjoy the economic and social benefits accrued to whiteness, African Americans and Asian Americans could not. “Color prejudice,” another formulation Bell borrowed from Du Bois, blocked their path.\(^4^4\)

In a final impassioned plea, Bell once again brought the issue home to the Stanford landscape, likening the nearby “ancient wooden fence” to American racism: “The American people may have to learn to deal with racial situations in a new and just way or be continuously and increasingly handicapped in the world’s arena of trade and politics…Like modern highway construction, modern statesmanship demands the clearing away of barriers too narrowly conceived.”\(^4^5\) Bell’s invocation of the “modern” is significant. For Bell, who began his essay by calling attention to a political slogan from the 1870s, racism and xenophobia were not only “barriers too narrowly conceived,” they were relics from a pre-modern era. It is fitting that Bell’s later research would look to science, the embodiment of modernity, to address racism in the schools.

Bell’s essay is undated, but if Ichihashi’s filing system was accurate, Bell must have written it between 1921 and 1924, either a half or a full decade before his dissertation. If the perceptiveness and empathy apparent in the essay are any


\(^{4^5}\) Bell, “A Quota for Japan.”
indication, Bell was interested in race and immigration early in his academic career, and in Ichihashi he found the right mentor to nourish and guide this interest.

Whether it was fully formed before coming to Stanford, or guided along by Ichihashi, by the time of his dissertation Bell clearly had an anti-racist, progressive agenda. The question remains, however: why did Bell employ the science of intelligence testing to further this agenda? The evidence recommends that Bell leaned toward intelligence testing for two reasons: his relationship with Stanford psychologist Maude Merrill, and a recognition of the explanatory and political power the testing movement offered.

Although Bell’s official thesis advisor was Professor of Education Walter C. Eells, evidence suggests that Bell received a significant proportion of his training from Maude Merrill. In his dissertation acknowledgements, Bell credited Ichihashi first, Merrill second, and Eells third. Eells, who would later become known for his contributions to the Japanese higher education system, was in 1927 a newly-minted Professor of Education at Stanford, having completed a Ph.D. only the year before. Though he had early training at the University of Chicago in mathematics, Eells worked in curriculum assessment and development rather than intelligence testing.

Maude Merrill, by contrast, specialized in intelligence testing, and was a leader in educational psychology by the time Bell considered his Ph.D. topic in 1927. Merrill, an Oberlin College-trained psychologist, had in 1919 given up a research

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position at the Faribault Minnesota State Home for the Feeble Minded to work with Terman at Stanford. After earning both her M.A. and Ph.D under Terman, she was appointed to an assistant professorship in psychology, and for the next three decades she worked closely with Terman on developing and promoting intelligence tests. By the middle of the 1920s, Merrill had become, as psychologist Robert Sears put it in his 1979 memorial to Merrill, “the acknowledged authority on the proper use” of the Stanford-Binet Test. Sears wrote that Merrill’s “certification of a student's having ‘completed 30 perfect administrations’ was considered, throughout the English-speaking world of psychologists, as the highest possible accreditation for this professional task.”

In Merrill, Bell had a powerful example of the currency testing offered. In a few short years she had risen to prominence in her field, and her testing methods had become standard models.

The second factor that presumably directed Bell towards the use of testing methodology was a simple recognition of its impact. In 1927, when Bell approached his topic, the testing movement was at its zenith, and it enjoyed especially high praise in the very educational circles Bell sought to influence. Although it certainly had its critics, testing had been well received by leading figures in education since Terman published his original Binet revision (1916), and by the middle of the 1920s had become a widely accepted tool within the fields of Education and Psychology for

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48 Sears, “Obituary.”
explaining both race and intelligence in the U.S. As we discussed in Chapter Three, even social scientists on the opposite side of the nature-nurture divide, such as sociologists Robert Park and Emory Bogardus, borrowed the methodology and language of testing to augment their research.

With “A Study of Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” Bell sought to alter both the way the field of education perceived segregation and to end the practice in the public schools. For Bell, testing, welcomed by educational scholars, administrators, and teachers alike, promised the most expedient way to achieve these goals.

In September 1929, armed with his testing training and a deep commitment to his cause, Bell began his research. Over an eighteen-month period, he and his two research assistants, his wife Florence Bell, who had trained with Maude Merrill, and Hisakichi Misaki, who had just completed an M.A. under Terman and Merrill on

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49 Upon the 1919 publication of Terman’s Stanford-Binet revision, influential educator and Journal of Education editor A.E. Winship wrote the following to Terman’s publisher: “I must say that you have rendered the cause of education inestimable service….Terman has given us the most epoch making book in American education in my day. He has taken Binet and his own previous book and has revealed a clear course for the recreation of the Public Schools of America, the first time anyone has made this way clear.” A.E. Winship to Hoyt, August 2, 1919, LMT Papers, Box 1. In a personal note to Terman that same year, he heaped further praise upon Terman: “Not until [your work] have I been really ready to rejoice in the significance of Binet’s revelation….For almost fifty years I have been longing for something in American education worth of our boasting. From this day forward it will be a crime against childhood, against humanity to continue the “course of study for all children” in any schools.” A eugenicist himself, it is not surprising that Winship shared in Terman’s fundamental misunderstanding of Binet’s intentions. Rather than address the needs of a small, selected group of students, as Binet had intended, Winship and educators like him looked to intelligence testing to “recreate” public schooling. A.E. Winship to Terman, undated, 1919, LMT Papers, Box 1.

“The Effect of Language Handicap on Intelligence Tests of Japanese Children”
visited eight schools, testing a total of 637 Japanese-American students in Sacramento and Placer Counties, California. Four of the schools, in the towns of Courtland, Florin, Iselton, and Walnut Grove, were segregated; the other four, in Enterprise, Loomis, Penryn, and Sierra were not. 51

To better understand Bell’s project, it is useful to look first at Bell’s testing regimen and then his research design. During the last week of September and first week of October, 1929, Reginald Bell, Hisaki, or Florence Bell took each of 637 students out of class individually to test them on the Stanford Revision of the Binet Scale (Terman’s IQ test). The tests took on average one hour and twenty minutes to administer, although a few took, as Bell put it, “much, much longer.” 52 During those same weeks, Reginald and Florence Bell administered Terman’s Stanford Achievement Test in classrooms to groups of thirty to forty students. This test was designed to measure students’ grasp of grade-level reading, mathematics, literature, history and science, and was administered in three sittings of forty to forty-five minutes, “though occasionally,” as Bell wrote, “pressure of time or all-school programs made it necessary to vary somewhat. In no case, however, was evidence of fatigue noted. The Japanese children seemed to be indefatigable.” 53 Bell used Terman’s Stanford-Binet Revision to establish what Bell assumed would be a

baseline-level of intelligence for each student, so the test was only administered once to each student in September-October. He and his assistants used the Stanford Achievement Test to measure student progress over an eighteen-month period, so they gave variants of this test (forms A, B, and V) to students in October of 1929, May of 1930, and February of 1931. In all, each of the 637 “indefatigable” children underwent ten hours of testing.54

Bell’s research design attempted to separate out segregation as an experimental variable in order to find for differences between the segregated and non-segregated schools. To do this, Bell controlled for “general intelligence, school ability or aptitude for scholastic success,” (the students’ performance on Terman’s IQ test), age, grade, and sex by forming 209 pairs of students.55 The students in each pair would be equal in all of the above categories, and different only in their attendance of a segregated or non-segregated school. In order to account for what he called additional “conditions of initial inequality,” Bell also considered what he termed “educative factors:” which included “teachers and teaching; specialization or

55 In order to reproduce as nearly as possible the experimental method in a schooling environment, where the researcher could not control for all factors, Bell followed the guidelines of Walter S. Monroe and Max D. Engelhart’s “Experimental Research in Education,” University of Illinois Bulletin, v. 27, n. 32 (April 1930): 15-16, quoted in Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” 4, which described ”experimentation” as “the name given to the type of education research in which the investigator controls the educative factors to which a child or group of children is subjected….The investigator seeks to evaluate the influence of some one educative or ‘experimental’ factor on a single group of children. He must start the experiment with some measurement of the initial attainment of the children in the trait or ability to be influenced. He then subjects the children to the experimental factor…”(ital. added). In Bell’s case the experimental factor was segregation.
departmentalization of instruction; curriculum and time allotment for subject
instruction; length of school year; and class size.” 56

Given what we know of his politics, when Bell compared his equal pairs by
their Stanford Achievement Test performance progress from October 1929 to May
1930 he may have been surprised. In the October tests, Bell found that the non-
segregated pupils scored significantly higher in all subjects. In May, however,
although this disparity remained, the segregated students had closed the gap
somewhat, especially on the language-dependent subtests. Stated simply, the results
implied that segregated students had actually made faster progress over time than
non-segregated students. 57

To account for the accelerated performance of segregated students, Bell
offered a complicated hypothesis:

If there is a language handicap on the part of the segregated children
associated with segregation, it might produce spuriously low test
mental age scores for them, due to inferior performance on the
linguistic tests of the Binet scale. If continued schooling lessened this
handicap, relatively better performance on the achievement tests might
be expected at later dates by those inaccurately measured by the Binet,
earlier. 58

In other words, it was not that the students did better in the segregated educational
environment; it was that Bell’s initial pairs were unequal. He thought he had been
comparing students of equal baseline intelligence, but he had not. Instead of
questioning his own unstated initial hypothesis—that segregation deleteriously

56 Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in
American Schools,” 34, 31, 38.
57 Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in
American Schools,” 91.
58 Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in
American Schools,” 96.
affected Japanese students—Bell questioned the reliability of the Stanford Binet Scale.

Bell came to same conclusion when he analyzed the pairs’ performances on the February 1931 achievement tests. In those tests the segregated students had attained parity with the non-segregated students in all but one subject, “arithmetic computation.” For Bell, this further supported the hypothesis that “segregation may have produced spuriously low mental ages on the Binet tests, which in turn caused fallacious equivalence of individuals and groups paired on mental age scores.”

Bell now staked his ground on two hypotheses: first, that segregation caused Japanese-American students to learn English at a slower rate than their non-segregated peers; and second, that this English-language handicap produced, as he put it, “spuriously low” Binet IQ scores. To substantiate both claims, he turned to Marvin Darsie’s 1926 study of the “Mental Capacity of American Born Japanese Children,” which found, as Bell summarized it, that the IQs of Japanese-American students were low “not because of inferior mental ability but because of language difficulties, probably based on lack of opportunity.”

Bell continued to address segregation throughout the dissertation, but his evaluation of it began to take a back seat to his analysis of the problems inherent with using the Stanford-Binet test. Indeed, Bell’s strongest critique of segregation appeared not in his conclusion, but buried two-thirds of the way through his dissertation.

dissertation, when he stated that “the fact that the Stanford-Binet tests of the pupils in the segregated schools who were tested actually yielded lower average mental ages and intelligence quotients than did those of the non-segregated may in itself be an indication of the retarding effect of segregation.”61 As the chapters progressed, it was clear that although he believed segregation did hamper the educational achievement of students by impeding their capacity for language acquisition, the Stanford-Binet itself was a major part of the problem. The test had produced “spurious” results and “inaccurate” measurements, causing him to assign incorrect baseline IQ scores, an initial step that ultimately compromised his controlled pairs and invalidated his experiment.62 The transition was gradual, and Bell’s critique of the Stanford-Binet was more often implicit than explicit, but by the time Bell reached his conclusion the die was cast; what had started out as a study seeking only to critique segregation had become one that challenged the effectiveness of its own methodology.63

In the end, Bell had perhaps not mounted the challenge to segregation he had hoped. Had he found, for instance, that segregated students performed far worse over time, his study would have presented a clearer, stronger message. Additionally, he would not have been put into the awkward position of having to question his own procedures, and thus those of his advisors. On the other hand, by pointing out the

61 Yet even this Bell qualified, adding a few lines later that “those who believe that intelligence is primarily a matter of native endowment will be satisfied to assume that the Japanese who make up the population served by the segregated schools are inherently less equipped with intelligence than are those Japanese served by the non-segregated schools.” Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” 119.
63 Ibid.
inability of the Stanford-Binet to adequately account for language handicaps, Bell added his work to an important body of literature critical of the test and of those who used it.\textsuperscript{64} If the Stanford-Binet could not be used to establish an accurate IQ for segregated Japanese-American children with limited exposure to English, all IQ test findings in regards to immigrant groups could be questioned.

**Studies of School Segregation prior to Bell**

Bell’s dissertation was the first to employ the experimental method—using an experimental and control group to isolate for one variable, in this case segregation—to determine the effects of educational segregation on a set of students, but it was not the first to examine the performances of minority children in segregated educational environments.\textsuperscript{65} Before Bell, Stanford University student Kwok Tsuen Yeung (1921) had used the Stanford-Binet test to measure the intelligence of Chinese-American children at the segregated “Oriental School” in San Francisco. W.E.B. Du Bois (1899), W.H. Pyle (1915), E. George Payne (1928) had studied the performance of


African-American students in schools in the rural South and urban North. And E.C. Rowe (1914), J.A. Fitzgerald and W.W. Ludeman (1926) had looked at the mental development of Native-American children in segregated schools in Michigan, South Dakota, and Nebraska. To understand the theoretical foundations of Bell’s 1932 study, it is useful to set it in the context of this prior work.

As we saw in Chapter Three, during the Spring of 1921, Kwok Tsuen Yeung, a visiting scholar from China working with Terman, sought to discover “the intelligence of Chinese children” in order to compare it to that of “native children.” He administered the Stanford-Binet intelligence test to 109 Chinese and Chinese-American children ages five to fourteen attending the segregated Oriental School in San Francisco. With complete faith in the methodology of the Stanford-Binet, Yeung followed the test administration instructions spelled out by Terman in his 1916 *The Measurement of Intelligence*, omitting only the vocabulary subtest, “for the vocabulary test,” wrote Yeung, “is a measure of ones mastery of words in a native tongue; it is, therefore, not fair to apply such a test to foreigners.” With this omission, Yeung found that “the general intelligence of these Chinese children [was] nearly equal to that of the American children.” Yeung had a mission to elevate the

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68 Yeung, “The Intelligence of Chinese Children in San Francisco and Vicinity,” 58. For a full discussion of the Yeung study, see Chapter Three.
status of “the Chinese” in the minds of his teachers and peers—who like him subscribed to the notion of a racial intelligence hierarchy—but he did not write on the ways segregation might have affected the educational progress of his test subjects.

Bell’s call to examine the effects of educational segregation on a Japanese Americans echoes that W.E.B. Du Bois, who in 1899 surveyed the educational opportunities of African-Americans in *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study*. One of the earliest sociological works to make use of statistics, *The Philadelphia Negro* included two sections on African-American education. The first section chronicled the history of African-American schooling in Philadelphia from the opening of the city’s first African-American school, a Quaker-run 22-pupil schoolroom in 1770, to the relative non-impact of the 1881 desegregation law—*de facto* segregation immediately replaced *de jure*—to the educational status of African Americans in 1896. The second section detailed the results of an in-depth survey of school attendance and literacy rates of 8,464 African Americans in the city’s predominantly black Seventh Ward. Although the population he studied was segregated, Du Bois, like Yeung, did not consider segregation a primary causative agent of educational achievement. “The only difficulties in the matter of education,” he wrote, “are carelessness in school attendance, and poverty which keeps children out of school. The former is a matter for colored people to settle themselves, and is one to which their attention needs to be called.”⁶⁹ Perhaps for both Du Bois in 1899 and Yeung in

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⁶⁹ Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro*, 95. While Du Bois attributed educational deficiencies of Seventh Warders to “careless in attendance,” this conservative, by-the-bootstraps perspective by no means defined his later work. Indeed, just two years after *The Philadelphia Negro*, in May of 1901, Du Bois submitted to Atlanta University’s Sixth Conference for the Study of the Negro Problems a report entitled
1921, segregation was so entrenched that neither thought to question its role in
determining educational outcomes. As non-white scholars operating in the white-
supremacist environment of early-twentieth-century academia, Yeung and Du Bois
also had good reason to assume a challenge to segregation would likely fall upon deaf
ears and impede their own professional progress.

Following Du Bois, in 1914 and 1928, psychologist W.H. Pyle and sociologist
E. George Payne published studies of segregated African-American children that
addressed the issue of segregation, though they did so from markedly different
perspectives. In 1914, Pyle, whose work often provided fodder for eugenicists,

_The Negro Common School_, which among things was an indictment of white
sources included state school board reports, records of the Freedmen’s Bureau and the
U.S. Board of Education, and returns on three sets of questionnaires sent out to
district superintendents throughout the region. Marshaled from this evidence were
data regarding the conditions of black teachers, whom he found to be underpaid, and
statistical proof that, contrary to the prevailing arguments of the day, black schools
established after the Civil War were not a burden to the white tax base. In fact, he
found, because funds appropriated for Post-Bellum schools were so meager, blacks
disproportionately supported white schools. Du Bois also included in this report a
history of white antagonism towards African-American education, a critique of white-
elite-supported black industrial education, and a well-documented argument that
African Americans were in good part responsible for the development of public
schooling in the South. See W.E.B. Du Bois, _The Negro Common School_. Du Bois
expanded on these arguments three decades later in _Black Reconstruction in America:
An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to

One anecdote from Du Bois’ own life speaks to this outlook. When Du Bois
tendered _The Philadelphia Negro_ to the University of Pennsylvania he was already a
Professor of Economics and History at Atlanta University, but the University of
Pennsylvania offered him neither an instructor position at the college nor at the
attached Wharton School of Business, granting him instead the unheard-of position
“Some Time Assistant in Sociology.” As David Levering Lewis has pointed out, Du
Bois later admitted that “the force of segregation in 1897 was such that an
appointment simply ‘didn’t occur to me.’” Interview with Du Bois, Columbia
University Oral History Project, May 1960, quoted in David Levering Lewis, _W.E.B.
administered intelligence tests to 408 African-American children in three segregated schools in Missouri.\textsuperscript{71} The testing regimen included four tests of memory, two which tested “quickness of learning,” an ink-blot test, two word-building tests, and four tests of association.\textsuperscript{72} Pyle found that while African-American children lagged behind white children on most of the tests, African-American children of “better social position,” as he called them, tended to “approach the norm of white children.”\textsuperscript{73} This finding led him to question what differences would have been found between black and white students had the former “been subject to the same environmental influences” as the latter. Giving a nod to the nurture side of the nature-nurture debate then burgeoning in the social scientific community, Pyle acknowledged that “the conditions of life under which the negroes live might account for the lower mentality of the negro.” He then concluded, however, with what he felt was the more likely scenario: “it may be that the negroes living under the better social conditions are of better stock. They may have more white blood in them.”\textsuperscript{74} Pyle was not entirely blind to the impoverishment of African Americans in the segregated South, but he was also a hereditarian psychologist, and this position dictated that he relegate environmental

\textsuperscript{72} Pyle, “The Mind of the Negro Child,” 357.
\textsuperscript{73} Pyle, “The Mind of the Negro Child,” 359.
\textsuperscript{74} Pyle, “The Mind of the Negro Child,” 360.
influences like poverty and segregation-induced educational inequality to a secondary role, even when doing so contradicted his own findings.

If Pyle’s approach to the issue of African-American education and intelligence epitomized the nature side of the nature-nurture debate in education, E. George Payne’s exemplified the nurture. In 1928, Payne, head of the Department of Educational Sociology at New York University, published a brief report entitled “Negroes in the Public Elementary Schools of the North.” Payne indicted white school districts for segregating black students and creating “an attitude of mind in both the whites and the Negroes that enforces totally different educational effects…[making] understanding or common culture impossible.”75 Like Du Bois, Payne also recognized that northern schools continued to segregate long after state ordinances made the practice illegal. As an example of the ways educational administrators circumvented desegregation laws, Payne pointed to schools in New Jersey that divided their buildings “so that white and Negro children are completely separated, with white teachers for the white and Negro teachers for the Negro students, and a heavy wire screen dividing the playground.”76 In direct contrast to Pyle, Payne believed that this segregation “[bore] directly upon [the facts of] retardation and the intelligence quotient,” and he even cited Pyle’s findings regarding distinctions between African Americans of different social classes to support this position. Whereas Pyle abandoned his clear evidence of the environmental effect on intelligence, choosing instead to proffer the “more white blood” hypothesis, Payne embraced it, asserting that Pyle’s work, along with other more recent studies “warrant

75 Payne, “Negroes in the Public Elementary Schools of the North,” 228.
76 Payne, “Negroes in the Public Elementary Schools of the North,” 227.
the conclusion that much of the difference of so-called native intelligence” especially in regards to “the northern Negro and white children may be explained on the ground of difference in environment and education, and that segregation is an important, if not the main, factor of difference.”

In a conclusion reminiscent of Bell’s undergraduate paper for Ichihashi, Payne tied educational segregation to broader racial concerns. Addressing what he termed “the problem of incorporating the Negro into social and civic life,” he wrote that “the solution of this problem is the one that the educator must face, because the welfare of both races depends upon it…” Educators such as those he observed in New Jersey who created environments “in which the Negroes and whites are separated by rooms and a wire screen on the playground, always with the general recognition of distinctive white superiority” only served to exacerbate race problems in the U.S.

E.C. Rowe’s (1914) and Fitzgerald-Ludeman’s (1926) approaches to Native American children attending segregated schools in Michigan and South Dakota mirrored the contrast in perspectives that separated Pyle and Payne. When Rowe’s Binet-Simon testing of 268 Native-American children at the State Normal Training School in Mount Pleasant, Michigan produced results indicating lower average IQ’s than those of “white” children, he questioned neither the test nor the possibility of environmental factors. Rowe wrote that whereas “probably every child in the Indian school was born in a rural community where food is abundant…where the child leads an outdoor and more nearly natural life,” and the school’s educational and work-apprenticeship programs were of good quality, “the only satisfactory explanation of

77 Payne, “Negroes in the Public Elementary Schools of the North,” 228.
78 Payne, “Negroes in the Public Elementary Schools of the North,” 228, 233.
their inferiority in terms of the tests [was] to be found in an inferiority of native
ability.”79 Rowe’s was an early racial study, administrated according to Henry
Goddard’s 1911 Binet-Simon scale instructions rather than the subsequent field-
making Terman revision, so his report did include some criticism.80 By his own
estimation, “with the present method of scoring, the tests are not always to be relied
upon for accurate data.”81 The inaccuracy of the test, however, did not prompt Rowe
to reconsider his conclusions. Like Pyle, he was confident in the innate superiority of
the white race, and the Binet-Simon served as a useful tool to prove this confidence
well-founded.

Twelve years after the Rowe study, psychologists J.A. Fitzgerald and W.W.
Ludeman drew a different conclusion from Rowe when they administered the
National Intelligence Test, Terman Group Test, and Otis Test to 83 Native-American
students at the St. Mary’s Mission School, Springfield, South Dakota and the Santee
Normal Training School, in Santa, Nebraska. Rather than assume any innate racial
inferiority on the part of their subjects, they approached the testing itself with
skepticism. Unlike Rowe and Pyle before him, who had administered and then
accepted the results of the Binet-Simon Intelligence scale without thought to
linguistic or cultural biases, Fitzgerald and Ludeman were conscious of possible bias
throughout. This allowed them to note, mid-testing, first “that the test in which the
Indian child did not use language in solving exercises was the test in which he

79 Rowe, “Five Hundred Forty-seven White and Two Hundred Sixty-eight Indian
Children Tested by the Binet-Simon Tests,” 456.
80 Goddard, The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale for Intelligence.
81 Rowe, “Five Hundred Forty-seven White and Two Hundred Sixty-eight Indian
Children Tested by the Binet-Simon Tests,” 457.
accomplished the most;” and second, that “three of the five who made the highest scores in the proverb test had fathers who were either ministers or Y.M.C.A. workers.” To them this indicated clearly the effects of language handicap and “training or nurture” on test performance. Fitzgerald and Ludeman concluded that while “the median score of the intelligence quotients” of Native American students was 87.5, “slightly inferior” to “whites,” test bias had factored in to that disparity. 

In the introduction to his dissertation, Bell asserted that his was the first study designed to determine the effects of educational segregation on a set of students, and this may indeed have been the case. Of the several studies that explored the educational progress of segregated students prior to Bell, only the one by Payne addressed segregation explicitly. However, Du Bois, Pyle, Rowe, Yeung, Fitzgerald and Ludeman all helped to shape the discourse on race and education—albeit in decidedly different ways—before Bell. Though Bell did not acknowledge it, their work predicated the fundamental assumption undergirding his own study of Japanese-American children in Sacramento: that a child’s educational environment was a determinative factor in the possibility of her or his achievement.

School Segregation in California

Bell’s work was influenced by his mentors at Stanford, by the nature-nurture debate in the social sciences, and by broader conversations in the discipline of education about student achievement, but the immediate prompting for his study was the fact of racial segregation in nearby schools. To better understand the Bell study,

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82 Fitzgerald and Ludeman, “The Intelligence of Indian Children,” 327.
83 Ibid.
we turn to the history of school segregation in California, and then revisit a question Bell himself asked: given the population similarities of the eight districts he sampled, why had some decided to segregate while others had not?

Segregation has been a defining characteristic of education in United States since the first movements to promote universal schooling in the mid-nineteenth century. The type of segregation practiced, however, has varied regionally, and

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even, as we will see in the case of California, by school district. Most northern states abandoned the practice of segregation legislatively in the late nineteenth century. The Massachusetts legislature was the first to pass a law explicitly forbidding public school segregation (1855), and over the next three decades Illinois (1874), Pennsylvania (1881), and New Jersey (1881) followed. As Du Bois and Payne showed in their early studies of segregated schools, however, the practice of *de jure* segregation was immediately and lastingly replaced by that of *de facto* segregation, as school districts throughout the North found ways to get around desegregation laws. In the American South, legal segregation persisted until the Supreme Court’s decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954, but, as in the North, desegregation legislation did not in fact guarantee integrated schools.


85 “Keep California White!” the official slogan of James Phelan’s unsuccessful 1920 U.S. Senate campaign, distilled a half century of anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiment. Ever the politician, when Phelan spoke before audiences with larger concentrations of Hispanic and African-American voters he substituted the phrase
with prompting from African-American community leaders and parents, the San Francisco Board of Education opened the state’s first African-American school in a church basement on the corner of Jackson and Virginia streets. Five years later, the San Francisco Chinese community successfully petitioned the Board to educate their own children, and the city set up another church-basement school at the corner of Sacramento and Stockton.86 Both schools educated only non-white students and demanded little of the city’s coffers. Over the next decade, however, city administrators opened and closed the Chinese school in response alternately to petitions from anti-Chinese community leaders, and white politicians decrying the use of any public funds for Chinese education.87

As with the case of the Chinese in San Francisco, over the next few decades the educational opportunities of non-white students would be tied directly to the shifting racial politics of different local and state administrators and politicians. The earliest California state school laws did not mention race, but in 1855, one year after San Francisco established “colored” schools, the legislature took up the issue, recommending that municipal education funds be distributed only “in proportion to the number of white children” in a district.88 The school code of 1860, reflecting the racist influence of State Superintendent Andrew Jackson Moulder, a recent Southern transplant, stipulated that:

86 Beasley, The Negro Trailblazers, 173; Low, The Unimpressible Race, 14.
87 Low, The Unimpressible Race.
88 Wollenberg, All Deliberate Speed, 12.
Negroes, Mongolians and Indians shall not be admitted into the public schools; and whenever satisfactory evidence is furnished to the Superintendent of Public Instruction to show that said prohibited parties are attending such schools, he may withhold from the district…all share of the State School Funds.89

This 1860 law was the first in California to officially penalize schools for admitting non-white students and put the burden of securing education on their parents.

“Negroes, Mongolians and Indians,” it read, could attend school in a given location, but only a separate school, and only if the parents of ten or more children made application.90 In 1866, under the influence of the more liberal State Superintendent John Swett, the legislature revised the code again, allowing for non-white students to attend integrated schools provided they secure a majority of the white parents’ written consent.91 Then, in 1874, the Supreme Court of California decided in the case of Ward v. Flood that “the exclusion of colored children from schools where white children attend as pupils cannot be supported except where separate schools affording the same facilities for education are actually maintained for the education of colored children.”92 A precursor to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision, Ward v. Flood had prompted the state legislature to amend the school code

89 California School Code, 1860, Section 8 quoted in Beasley, The Negro Trailblazers, 180.
90 Ibid.
91 Elmer Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California (1939; repr. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 50. John Swett was one of the first advocates of universal education in California. In his First Biennial Report as State Superintendent of Public Instruction (1864-1865), Swett wrote that “if all classes pay taxes on their property for the support of the schools, there is no reason why the children of all classes, whether white, black, tawny, or copper-colored, should not be educated.” On the differences between Moulder and Swett, see Nicholas Polos, “Segregation and John Swett,” Southern California Quarterly v.46, n. 1 (March 1964): 69-82.
once again, although neither the court case nor the state law explicitly mentioned Asians or Asian Americans.

In 1885, at the behest of Andrew Moulder, now San Francisco Superintendent of Public Schools, Asian and Asian Americans were explicitly excluded from attending integrated schools. The previous year Joseph and Mary Tape, the former a first generation immigrant from China, the latter an American-born white woman, had attempted to enroll their daughter Mamie in a San Francisco public school, but the principal of the school, backed up by the city Board of Education and Superintendent Moulder, had denied her enrollment. The Tapes sued the school board, and the State Superior Court judge, invoking the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, found in their favor. Unsuccessful in their bid to maintain San Francisco public schools for whites only, Moulder and Board of Education President Ira Hoit successfully petitioned the state to revise the school code. Whereas the State School Code of 1880 had stipulated that “trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases,” Moulder’s 1885 amendment to the code added “and also to establish separate schools for children of Mongolian or Chinese decent. When such separate schools are established Chinese or Mongolian children must not be admitted into any other schools.”

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94 Low, The Unimpressible Race, 67. Apart from amendments in 1909 and 1921 to add Indian and then Japanese children to those groups excluded, this law remained unchanged until 1947. Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” 13. In San Francisco, administrators sometimes went beyond simply segregating the student population. In May of 1896,
The battle over school segregation in California garnered national and international attention in 1906, when the San Francisco Board of Education attempted to segregate Japanese students. In 1905 the board had passed a resolution calling for the segregation of Japanese and Korean students, but the only existing school for Asians, the “Chinese School,” did not have enough space for additional students, and the board did not have the money to build a separate school.

On April 18, 1906, an earthquake and fire leveled Chinatown, and the argument about establishing a separate school for children of Asian heritage was subsumed by a larger discussion regarding where Chinatown would be rebuilt. As Chinese residents took refuge in Portsmouth Square, the mayor announced that the Chinese would not be allowed to rebuild in Chinatown. White business leaders and government officials had long coveted the area, and plans were drawn up to move the Chinese to Hunter’s Point, in the southeastern section of the city near the slaughterhouses. Ironically, however, as Victor Low has written, “restrictive clauses in most property deeds barred the use or occupation of property by Chinese outside of

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the Board of Education passed the following resolution: “That it is the desire of the Board of Education that Chinese and Japanese not be employed in or about the school buildings belonging to this Department, for the purpose of cleaning windows, scrubbing &c. and that a copy of this resolution be sent to all of the Principals and janitors in this Department [sic].” Letter from the Office of the Superintendent of Common Schools to Principals, May 13, 1896, San Francisco Unified School District Records 1854-2005, San Francisco Public Library.


Wollenberg, *All Deliberate Speed*, 54.

Chinatown,” so Chinatown was rebuilt in its original location, though, at least initially, without a Chinese School.  

Six months after the earthquake, the city rebuilt the Chinese school; however, the Board of Education attempted to repurpose it with a new name: “the Oriental School.” In the Oriental School, the city would have a school for all children of what the board called “oriental decent,” and the board could legally compel Japanese students to attend. On October 11, the board announced that “principals are hereby directed to send all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children to the Oriental Public School situated on the south side of Clay Street, between Powell and Mason Streets, and after Monday, October 15, 1906.”

While the board’s maneuver met state legal requirements, it was a public-relations disaster for the city. It drew the ire of the Bay-Area Japanese community, Japanese leaders in Japan, and finally President Roosevelt, who was not eager to strain further the US’s diplomatic relationship with a country that had just defeated Russia and was expanding its colonial borders. The local Japanese community met the board’s decision with defiance. Nearly all Japanese parents kept their children at

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98 Low, The Unimpressible Race, 92.
99 San Francisco Board of Education Minutes, October 11, 1906, quoted in Low, The Unimpressible Race, 93.
100 The Chinese community in San Francisco had also protested numerous times for better educational opportunities, but they did not receive the attention the Japanese community received in 1906. Before the successful Tape v. Hurley case of 1885, in 1878, 1300 Chinese merchants from San Francisco and Sacramento had addressed a petition to the state legislature demanding additional expenditure and facilities. In 1903 Chinese parents backed by the Chinese Six Company once again took their case to the legislature, demanding that their children be able to attend schools other than the Chinese school, which at the time only educated to the sixth grade. Carton 49, Him Mark Lai Papers, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley. Without the international pressure the Japanese community was able to bring to bear, however, they were more easily rebuffed. Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice, 35.
home rather than acquiesce, and Japanese Association of America Secretary Goroku Ikeda threatened legal action if the board did not retract the order. Within ten days, news of the board’s decision crossed the Pacific. On October 20, a leading Tokyo Newspaper, the Mainichi Shimpo, ran an article calling for Japanese to “stand up. Our countrymen have been HUMILIATED on the other side of the Pacific. Our boys and girls have been expelled from the public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and merciless like demons” [sic].

On October 25, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Viscount Aoki met with Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Elihu Root to discuss the issue, and a week later the president sent his Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Victor Metcalf, to San Francisco to convince the Board that its actions were not in the national interest.

Despite this pressure, the Board was only willing to yield after an in-person meeting with the president and the promise of new Japanese immigration restriction. On February 15, 1907, a San Francisco delegation to Washington, led by Mayor Eugene Schmitz and Superintendent Albert Roncovieri, agreed to withdraw the segregation order in return for Roosevelt’s pledge to negotiate a “gentlemen’s agreement” with Japan ending the further immigration of Japanese laborers. When a Japanese delegation led by Viscount Aoki agreed to restrict said emigration provided that California no longer pass discriminatory schooling laws, a major international incident was at last avoided.

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101 Mainichi Shimpo, October 20, 1906, quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle, October 25, 1906, cited in Wollenberg, All Deliberate Speed, 55.
102 Wollenberg, All Deliberate Speed, 59.
103 Ibid.
After the San Francisco School Board controversy of 1906, nearly all California school districts decided not to segregate Japanese students. The national and international spectacle it created cast a pall over the idea. In addition, most districts did not have enough Japanese students to warrant their separation, and most educators saw no reason to do so.\(^{104}\) Excepting this rule were four small school districts in Sacramento County: Courtland, Isleton, Walnut Grove, and Florin. All four towns were within thirty miles of the state capital. The first three were agricultural, canning and packing towns bordering the Sacramento River. Each had either what was known as a “Japan Town,” a “China Town,” or both, generally with dance halls and gambling houses; and each employed large numbers of Mexican, Filipino, Japanese, and Portuguese migrant laborers. Florin, on the other hand, was marked by a greater percentage of white landholders. Although it too was primarily agricultural, it employed a smaller itinerant labor force. In all four districts the population of Chinese and Japanese exceeded that of whites.\(^{105}\)

By the time Bell started his study in 1929, the four towns had all built separate school facilities to enable segregation. Walnut Grove was the first to separate their students when it barred Japanese and Chinese from attending classes in a new school

\(^{104}\) Wollenberg, *All Deliberate Speed*; Low, *Unimpressible Race*.

building in 1908. Isleton, Courtland and Florin followed course when they built new school buildings in September and November of 1920, and October of 1923.

In her study, *We the People, A Story of Internment in America*, Florin resident Mary Tsukamoto recalled the change:

> A new brick building was built at the west end of town. Some people knew what it was for. One day, all the white children were paraded out of Florin School. They carried American flags and marched down the muddy road. School was held for them at the church hall until the classrooms were ready at the new West School. The Japanese children stayed at the East School.

Tsukamoto also remembered the teachers’ justifications: “The Japanese pupils are so far behind….Children from homes where Japanese is spoken need a different teaching program….The school cannot handle such insurmountable linguistic and cultural problems.” Mary Tsukamoto’s husband, Al, added to her account: “I was in the primary grades when we split up. One day the white children were there; the next day they were not. I missed some of my playmates. The thing I remember most after that is that the teacher gave us a lot of recess.”

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Remarkably, as Bell discovered, in all four districts that he surveyed, school administrators had chosen to go to the trouble of segregating a minority white population from a majority Asian and Asian American. The student population of the segregated towns Bell studied was as follows: in the so-called “Oriental schools” there were 500 students, 325 Japanese or Japanese American, and 175 Chinese or Chinese American. In the “white” schools, there were 275 pupils, or 35 percent of the total. 109

In the second chapter of his dissertation, Bell queried why Courtland, Florin, Isleton and Walnut Grove had made the decision to segregate while his four control-group districts—Enterprise and Sierra in Sacramento County, and Loomis and Penryn in adjacent Placer County—had not, given that all the districts were so similar and in such close proximity. All were primarily agricultural centers with relatively large Japanese populations and approximately the same percentage (sixty-five percent) of Japanese students. In the grades he studied in Enterprise, Sierra, Loomis and Penryn, there were 500 pupils; 300 were Japanese or Japanese-American and the rest were white. (The non-segregated towns did not have the same significant Chinese populations.)110

Bell speculated that the first four towns had chosen to segregate because of their proximity to Sacramento and its major newspaper, the Sacramento Bee. The

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Bee, co-owned by brothers Valentine Stuart and Charles Kenny McClatchy, leaders in the movement for Japanese exclusion, had long expressed anti-Japanese views, but when the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on Japanese immigration in California and Washington in the summer of 1920, the paper ratcheted up its vitriol. Bell wrote that “they would be judicially minded small town politicians indeed who would not be swept off their feet with such propaganda being fed to them daily.”

A review of the Bee’s output in July 1920 suggests Bell may have been on the right track. The McClatchy brothers floated their daily coverage of the hearings over a steady undercurrent of anti-Japanese editorials and articles. These anti-Japanese pieces were wide-ranging, and well-timed to coincide with the hearings, which began

111 Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” 22. The Sacramento Bee’s coverage of the 1920 Immigration and Naturalization Committee may have been the lynchpin of segregation in Bell’s four sample districts, but their majority Japanese populations made Florin and the surrounding area a focus of anti-Japanese agitation in the months leading up to the hearings as well. When the Farmer’s Educational and Cooperative Union of California met in Oakdale, California in December 1919 to discuss farm labor issues, they also brought in reverend and anti-Japanese speaker F.C. Farr, and President of the Asiatic Exclusion League, State Senator J.M. Inman, to address “the Japanese question.” According to R.E. Hodges, who recorded the meeting for the Pacific Rural Press, the reverend “epitomized the sentiment of the convention” in his opening address: the assembled “did not want to banish Japanese from the earth, but they do want to keep out from our country all nationalities which admittedly cannot be assimilated into real American citizens.” Senator Inman went further, announcing that “there was no need of abusing the Japanese—they stand convicted by their own utterances and by the own well-known and less-known practices and ambitions.” The senator backed up this vague claim with a more tangible, audience-targeted example: “Picture yourself, owning and living on a ranch, with Japanese owning or leasing the ranches on both sides of you, and figure out how soon you would ‘blow’ off that ranch with your family.” He then held up a photo of the then majority Japanese-American Florin School: “Picture [your] own children outnumbered in their schools by aliens incapable of becoming Americans.” R. E. Hodges, “Farmers Union Wants Japanese Excluded,” Pacific Rural Press, December 13, 1919.
on July 12 and ran until the end of the month. The McClatchys’ first editorial in the month of July, “Fearful Atrocities Practiced by Japanese upon Koreans: Horrible Crucifixions and Other Cruelties Perpetrated upon Victims in Order to Keep Subject Race Down,” set the tone for the month.112 Other pre-hearings July editorials included “Washington Should Stop Japanese Miscegenation,” “Wants a White Wife,” “Picture Bride Who Jumped in Ocean Was to Wed Local Japanese,” an editorial insisting that Americans should “treat with fairness and courtesy the Japanese who are legally here” but maintained that “this country shall be preserved for the white race,” and two frenzied pieces on the Japanese birthrate in California.113 From July 12 on, in addition to daily hearings coverage, the Bee continued its anti-Japanese coverage with several more pieces on picture brides, the specter of mixed marriage, Japanese atrocities in Asia, anti-Japanese letters to the editor, and one above-the-fold political cartoon mocking the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907.114

114 Several of these articles appeared in a special Saturday edition seemingly devoted solely to the anti-Japanese cause. See “Ten Blushing Picture Brides Arrive but Husbands do not Appear,” “Japanese Exclusion is Favored by Carson Club,” “Belief Expressed Picture Brides will Continue to Come Despite Agreement,” “Japanese is Hated in the Far East,” “A Poor Fence to Keep Out the Neighbor’s Chickens (cartoon),” Sacramento Bee, July 17, 1920. A sample letter to the editor, printed on July 15, 1920 read as follows:

I have taken a keen interest in the Japanese problem, also your article in tonight’s paper wherein Shima, the Potato King of Berkeley and one of the leading Japanese of California, made a statement that he was a Christian and that he believed in the marriage of his race and our
The articles covering the daily events of the hearings were marked by the same hostile reporting. As might be expected, anti-Japanese testimonials received full and glowing coverage, whereas pro-Japanese voices were met with skepticism. The Bee’s disparate treatment of McClatchy ally James Phelan and Japanese-immigrant supporter John P. Irish present the starkest example. On the morning of July 12, at the behest of Congressman Albert Johnson, the politician from Washington State who led the charge against Japanese immigration in the House, James Phelan opened the hearings. Phelan began the proceedings with two alarmist claims: first, “the Japanese” had nearly purchased 800,000 acres of land along the California-Mexico border; and second, Japanese were being smuggled in large numbers from Mexico into the United States. According to his testimony, Phelan had recently visited the

women. Since Shima has got his Christian beliefs, the price of spuds has risen….He evidently received his model from our other generous Christian friend, John D., who donates $1,000,000 to the drys and raises gas to heaven. Regarding the marriage of white women to Japanese, if any of our congressmen would only take a machine ride within a few miles of Sacramento and see how nice these fine gentlemen treat their wives, they would get all the information direct, and all the John P. Irish and others of his class would be looking for new jobs. Suppose a Japanese had a white wife hoeing potatoes, or picking strawberries from daylight to darkness, there would be a race riot here that never would compare with the lynchings of the South. Let’s have our country for Americans, and if Mr. Japanese does not like our gate, he need not swing on it.

The McClatchys no doubt chose the letter because it encapsulated their own positions so well. A regurgitation of Bee editorials on George Shima, John D. Rockefeller, and intermarriage, it echoed in particular V.S. McClatchy’s indignant, often sarcastic tone, and his nativist “America for Americans” message. Al Zeimer, “Shima and Spuds,” Sacramento Bee, July 15, 1920.

Congressman Johnson, for whom the 1924 Immigration Act is named, convened and chaired the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1920. He also sat with Lewis Terman on the Eugenics Committee of the U.S.A.
border towns of “Tia Juana,” Mexicali, Calexico, and Andrade, and had been notified of the “Japanese subterfuge” by local immigration officials.116 Phelan did not present any viable evidence to the committee to support his claims, but it did not matter. That evening, the Bee ran with the front-page headline: “Japanese Almost Bought Immense Tract in the South: Senator Phelan Tells Congressional Committee How Nipponese Had Deal Closed for Imperial County Land; Japanese Consul Conniving in Smuggling Across Border.” The article continued in the same tone, holding up Phelan and impugning the Japanese for their “conquest in California and other Pacific States through land holdings, immigration, and brazen violation of the Gentlemen’s Agreement and other subterfuges.” The McClatchys’ anti-Japanese position ensured that Phelan’s testimony would not be overly scrutinized, so what in the morning began as baseless claims by the evening were transformed into facts. 117

While the Bee treated Phelan’s testimony with kid gloves, repeating word-for-word his accusations and describing his trips to Angel Island and the Mexican border as, in the article’s words, “data”-gathering missions, John P. Irish was not so fortunate. In the same July 12 issue, an article covering Irish’s testimony introduced him as “one of the leading propagandists of the Japanese,” and was headlined by “Irish defends the Japanese,” and “Denies He is Paid.” The comparably brief article spent more time on Irish’s liberal views on miscegenation, and the possibility of his

being “in the employ” of the Japanese” than on the bulk of his testimony, which apparently only “endeavored to disprove statements made by Phelan (italics added).”\textsuperscript{118} In this not-so-subtle way, the *Bee* made it clear whose testimony was to be trusted.

\textsuperscript{118} “Col. Irish Defends Japanese at Hearing,” *Sacramento Bee*, July 12, 1920. In this the *Bee* piece was at least consistent with Immigration Committee’s own treatment of Irish. Although Irish had gone before the Committee to testify to the civility and hard-working nature of Japanese immigrants in California, committee members tried to derail him at every pass, such as in the following exchange between Irish and California Congressman John Raker:

Mr. Raker: Do you regard as desirable assimilation between the Caucasian and the Oriental?
Mr. Irish: I do not desire any assimilation that goes against the will of the parties to the contract…
Mr. Raker: …but assuming that it would be desired by the parties to the contract, do you think it would be desirable for the race?
Mr. Irish: It might improve both races.
Mr. Raker: Do you think it would? In your opinion do you think that mixture would improve the races?
Mr. Irish: Mr. Morris—
Mr. Raker: (interposing). I am asking you about the mixture of the races.
Mr. Irish: It is a question that does not concern me…
Mr. Raker: You believe it is German propaganda when the people of this country are opposed to intermarriage…. 
Mr. Irish: Well, who is going to force them to intermarry?....
Mr. Raker: That is kind of evading the question.

The exchange continued for several more pages, as Raker and other congressmen prodded Irish for examples of successful intermarriage and questions such as: “What is the preponderance of color of the children born of whites and Japanese?” The conversation, like so much of the anti-Japanese rhetoric we discussed in chapter one, was obsessed with race and sexual promiscuity, and littered with catchwords from the eugenics movement such as “blood,” “mixture,” and “breeding.” In the words of Congressmen Raker, it was incumbent upon the Committee to “provide an environment which is best for the young men and young women of this country. We should keep its citizens pure and clean.” To Congressmen Raker and several of his peers on the Committee, racial intermarriage was not in line with this goal. “Statement of Mr. John P. Irish,” *Japanese Immigration: Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization*, 48-51.
No direct evidence links the *Sacramento Bee*’s coverage of the immigration hearings of July 1920 to the segregation decisions of nearby districts, but the more one examines the similarities between the segregated and non-segregated towns, the more a distinguishing variable becomes apparent: the non-segregated towns did not rely on McClatchy’s newspaper for their coverage of Japanese and Japanese Americans. Although they were as close to Sacramento as Walnut Grove, the Placer County towns of Loomis and Penryn had their own newspapers, the *Auburn Journal* (alternately the *Auburn Journal and Placer County Republican*), and *Placer Herald*, and their treatment of Japanese issues was unlike that of the *Bee*’s. Whereas the *Bee* published a series of articles on the hearings and editorials concerning the threat “the Japanese” posed to the U.S., and Japanese imperial ambitions in the Pacific, the Placer County newspapers all but ignored issues involving the Japanese. In fact, during the entire fateful summer of 1920, the editors of the *Placer Herald* published only one article concerning the Japanese, a piece documenting V.S. McClatchy and James Phelan’s attempts to include an “Asiatic Exclusion” plank in the Democratic national convention, and, in striking contrast to the *Bee*, the article adopted a staid, impartial tone. 119

It is difficult to surmise why the Placer County Newspapers ignored the hearings, but a front-page editorial on July 15, 1920 in the *Auburn Journal* suggests that it may have had something to do with a distaste for the politics and personality of the brothers McClatchy, who co-owned and edited the *Bee*. 120 The editorial opened

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120 It was not that, as smaller newspapers, they concentrated only on town affairs. Their coverage of state, national and international issues rivaled that of the *Bee*. 216
with “In the Sacramento Bee Monday night, Chas. K. McClatchy rants on in his usual
dramatic fashion on what he fears is the downfall of woman in America—Woman
Suffrage,” and charged McClatchy with being “shallow,” and typically “egotistical”
sic. It then ended with a dramatic flurry: “There is less shrieking and a great deal
less possibility of buying the women of this country off than in the same McClatchy
who wrote the article that holds woman suffrage up in such a derogatory light.”121
Whether it was due to his personal feelings toward C.K. McClatchy, or his unstated
racial politics, (which given the former were probably more liberal than the
McClatchys’) Auburn Journal editor R.A. Cassidy decided not to take up the
“Japanese question” during the summer of 1920, and it is possible that this decision
had some effect on Placer County readers’ decision not to segregate.

Ultimately, as Bell speculated in 1932, newspaper coverage of the 1920
immigration hearings may have been a factor in the segregation decisions of Bell’s
sample districts. The Sacramento Bee increased its anti-Japanese rhetoric during the
hearings, and not long after that Isleton (1920), Courtland (1920) and Florin (1923)
segmented their students. When Bell wrote his study, however, his idea connecting
press coverage to anti-Japanese action was only a supposition, relegated to his
footnotes. The principle flaw in the theory, according to Bell, was that the segregated
towns were so close to the non-segregated. “The writer,” he confided, “is not able to
hazard a guess as to why segregation was affected in one situation and not the

121 R.A. Cassidy, “Unjustified Attack on Woman Suffrage,” Auburn Journal, July 15,
1920.

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other.”122 Having reexamined area press coverage, we now have more information to address Bell’s “guess.” Whether or not this was a deciding factor in towns’ decisions to segregate or remain integrated, the integrated towns had their own newspapers, and those papers did not adopt the anti-Japanese tone of the Sacramento Bee.

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From the outset, Reginald Bell understood his work to be an intervention in California's long history of anti-Asian discrimination. This is why, although he framed it as a scientific study, Bell began his dissertation not with a discussion of methodology, but with a chapter on the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese movements of the past half century. Bell had chosen to employ intelligence testing because of the extraordinary influence of the testing movement in education, and he had received training at Stanford from one of the nation’s leading testing experts, Maude Merrill, a colleague of Lewis Terman. However, another of Bell’s mentors at Stanford, Japanese Professor Yamato Ichihashi, a Japanese-immigrant advocate, influenced the direction Bell’s testing would take. Though his earliest Stanford writings suggest that Bell entered the University with an interest in racial discrimination, Ichihashi guided him towards the topic of Japanese-American school segregation in particular.

Between his work with Merrill and Ichihashi, Bell was of two worlds. Merrill had trained him to employ intelligence testing impartially, and undoubtedly Bell believed, at least initially, that intelligence testing was an objective science. It is clear from his work with Ichihashi, however, that Bell had a definite political—even

emotional—stance on Japanese educational segregation. We saw this internal contradiction playing out on the pages of his dissertation, as Bell walked the line between dispassionate researcher and partisan. Rather than betray himself at the outset with a hypothesis such as “segregation negatively affects children of Japanese parentage,” he introduced his research with a question: “how, if at all, does segregation affect the educational progress and achievement of children of Japanese parentage who are attending American schools?”

By the end of his second chapter, however, Bell’s flag of objectivity was tattered; with a history of anti-Asian discrimination in California that held racist propaganda culpable for the current state of segregation, Bell positioned himself squarely in the pro-Japanese-immigrant, racial-integration camp.

Leaving aside Bell’s inability to hide his point of view, his study is significant because it attempted to employ the means of scientific racism against its ends. Whereas the great majority of racial intelligence testers in the first half of the twentieth century used the “science” to provide evidence in support of their own eugenic and white supremacist worldviews, Bell attempted to use it to end racial school segregation. Yet the significance of Bell’s work also lies in the fact that although he began with one implicit hypothesis, that segregation was immodern, immoral and unproductive, he finished with a second: Terman’s Stanford-Binet tests could not be trusted to render accurate intelligence scores in cases involving non-

124 As we saw in Chapter One, Terman was far better at dissembling. When tasked with convincing the Japanese Association of America to fund his 1921 testing of Japanese-American children, he toned down his white-supremacist rhetoric.
native English speakers. In the end, because Bell’s own findings conflicted with this first hypothesis—the segregated students actually progressed more rapidly over the course of his eighteen-month testing regimen—Bell’s most important contribution to the literature was his challenge to the Stanford-Binet. The fact that Terman’s lauded test did not establish accurate baseline IQ’s for the students in the Bell experiment opened the door to a reinterpretation of all immigrant-related Stanford-Binet findings.

Bell’s study was the first to use a control group to study the effects of segregation upon a set of students, but, as this chapter has shown, Bell was not the first to focus on the educational progress of racialized minority students in segregated schools. In Bell’s own graduate program at Stanford, visiting Chinese education scholar Kwok Tsuen Yeung had employed intelligence tests to examine Chinese-American students in San Francisco’s segregated “Oriental School” in 1921. And educational researchers such as W. E. B. Du Bois (1899), E.C. Rowe (1914), W. H. Pyle (1915), J.A. Fitzgerald and W.W. Ludeman (1926) and E. George Payne (1928) had looked at segregated African-American and Native-American school children before Bell. Bell did not acknowledge their work in his dissertation, but a review of 1920s education literature suggests that their contributions, particularly to the nature versus nurture debate, shaped the discursive framework into which Bell intervened.

After Bell, increasing numbers of social scientists mounted challenges to the political ideologies of the original generation of testers. Although scholars in education and psychology still found intelligence testing useful, many turned away from eugenics, choosing instead to employ the technology of intelligence testing to promote progressive racial change. In the following chapter, we will look at several
such studies completed between 1930-1940, paying special attention to Stanford University’s role in this transition.
Chapter Five:


On May 28, 1926, American historian Charles Beard traveled from his home in New Milford, Connecticut to the Carnegie Corporation in New York City to meet with his long-time friend, the corporation’s president, Frederick Keppel. Beard’s agenda was to convince Keppel to provide a Carnegie grant for the education, vocational training, and job placement of second-generation Japanese in California.¹ Over the next three years, Beard corresponded with Keppel several more times, probing him for news of progress on the grant, and reminding him of the direction the funding ought to take.²

It was particularly important to Beard that the Carnegie Corporation be involved in what he called “practical” measures to improve the lives of second-generation Japanese Americans.³ While in the past large philanthropic organizations had only funded studies of Japanese Americans, Beard suggested that future funding should be directed toward agencies that promised something more concrete.⁴

² Box 338, Folder 5 of the CCNYR archive contains memos of three meetings, as well as dozens of letters between Beard, Keppel, and Keppel’s assistant related to “the Stanford Study” from 1926-1929.
³ Frederick Keppel to Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur, December 22, 1928, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
⁴ Beard was likely speaking about the Rockefeller-funded “Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast,” published earlier that same month in a special issue of the sociology journal Survey Graphic. “East by West,” Survey Graphic, v. 56, n. 4 (May 1926).
particular, Beard hoped that the Carnegie Corporation would aid the ongoing job placement efforts of Dr. Roy Akagi, Secretary of the Japanese Student Christian Association in North America (JSCA), an affiliate of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in Los Angeles. The work that Akagi was doing in Los Angeles, Beard argued, was a good deal more valuable than additional “boorky charts.” “Another ‘survey’ without a whip crack of action,” he wrote pointedly to Keppel in the Spring of 1929, “does not strike me as worthwhile.”  

Ultimately, the Carnegie Corporation did allocate funds toward second-generation Japanese Americans, but not in the way Beard had hoped. Five years after his initial meeting with Keppel, as hundreds of Chinese-American and Japanese-American students sat at their desks completing a 125-question Bernreuter Personality Inventory funded by Carnegie, it was clear that Beard’s original plan for the funding had gone off course. The Inventory, employed in this case to measure and compare specific personality traits—“self-sufficiency,” “introversion-extroversion,” and “dominance-submission,”—of Asian-American and white students at the University of Hawaii and Stanford University, is emblematic of the direction in which the Carnegie Corporation chose to move. Rather than fund the job placement of Japanese Americans through the YMCA, as Beard had suggested, Keppel directed Carnegie’s resources toward the Stanford Psychology Department and researcher Edward Kellogg Strong. Utilizing techniques such as the Bernreuter Personality Inventory, surveys, and the latest psychometric tests, Strong put together a project to assess the “educational and occupational opportunities afforded to American citizens

5 Charles Beard to Frederick Keppel, April 15, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
of oriental races.”6 The project, funded in full by an October 22, 1929 $40,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation, took the form of a four-part study: three detailed monographs of particular interest to specialists in psychology, education, and sociology, and one book summarizing the monographs, placing their findings within a historical context, and making suggestions for further research—in short, exactly what Beard had wanted to avoid.7

This chapter will explore the politics and institutional momentum that transformed Beard’s original vision into the Carnegie-Stanford study. In so doing, it contributes to our understanding of the ways in which personal and institutional politics, embedded within larger scientific and political trends, shaped American interwar approaches to race. Correspondence between Beard, Carnegie Corporation board members, and Stanford University administrators reveals that the direction the Carnegie-Stanford project took was contingent upon personal relationships between American and Japanese government bureaucrats, politicians and scholars. The origins of Beard’s interest in working-class Japanese Americans speak to this point. Had Beard not worked in Japan and established strong relationships with Japanese officials, he presumably would never have brought his proposal to Keppel. Yet, the

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6 Carnegie Corporation Executive Committee Resolution, September 13, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
project was also shaped by state-level relationships and institutional investments in particular ways of seeing and measuring the world.

Three factors transformed the joint Carnegie-Stanford project from its original 1926 variant, Charles Beard’s proposal for vocational training and job placement, into its end product, a 1934 study that Edward Strong titled *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem*. The first factor was Keppel's reluctance to cast the Carnegie Corporation into the maelstrom of the Japanese immigration and naturalization debate. Although the passage of the exclusionary 1924 Immigration Act had quelled this debate considerably, the potential for political blowback still worried the corporation’s president. His choice to route the project through the Stanford University Education Department, an ostensibly apolitical beacon of the white establishment, rather than Roy Akagi and the YMCA-affiliated Japanese Student Christian Association in North America (JSCA), grew out of this concern. The second factor was the relationship between two would-be directors of the project: Akagi at the JSCA, and Japanese historian Yamato Ichihashi at Stanford University. In the midst of large-scale state and institutional catalysts for the project’s transformation, letters between Beard, Akagi, Keppel, Ichihashi, and Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur suggest that a rift between these two Japanese scholars was partly responsible for shifting Beard’s proposal off its moorings. The third factor was the institutional momentums of Stanford University and the Carnegie Corporation. Both institutions played formative roles in establishing the field of psychometrics, and in 1926 both remained devoted to psychometric approaches to understanding race. More than any other single factor, this dedication altered the fate of the Beard proposal.
Despite the prominence of the institutions and individuals involved, the Carnegie-Stanford project has received little scholarly attention. Ellen Lagemann’s two histories of the Carnegie Corporation, *Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching* (1983) and *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy and Public Policy* (1989) provide the most comprehensive accounts of Carnegie funding during the interwar period, but neither book refers to the project.8 Nor is the project mentioned in standard histories of Stanford University.9 Aside from footnotes in several works, the same is true for scholarship in Asian American studies and histories of early-twenthi-century education and psychology.10

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Like Reginald Bell’s Ph.D. dissertation, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” the Carnegie-Stanford project stands out for its attempt to use psychometric tests for progressive purposes. At every stage of the project’s development, individuals in charge of planning and implementation invoked progressive, anti-xenophobic objectives. Thus the project should be recognized as a prime example of racial testing deployed against the nativist politics of its leading advocates. Yet, as with the Bell project, the essentializing tendencies of racial psychometric research handcuffed the progressive agenda of Edward Strong and the Stanford team. Whatever their objectives, the investment of Strong and his colleagues in the scientific racial paradigm, which posited discrete, quantifiable differences between races, limited the scope and the potentially transformative power of their research. In the last section of this chapter, we will explore Strong’s essentialist approach to race science, and highlight the tensions inherent in using racial testing for progressive purposes.

The Impetus for the Study: Charles Beard and Japan

It seems an odd twist of history that a project concerned with the vocational aptitudes of Japanese Americans began at the insistence of Charles Beard. Most Americans remember Beard as a historian of the U.S. Constitution. Beard’s *An

Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of United States, which argued that the founding fathers drafted the Constitution to suit their financial interests, vaulted the Columbia University scholar into the national spotlight in 1913, and the text remained both popular and controversial throughout the 20th century. Among historians, Beard is not regarded as a specialist in Japanese or Japanese-American affairs. His biographers only mention Beard’s early interest in Japan and Japanese in passing, and none chronicle his involvement in the Carnegie-Stanford project.

A close look at Beard’s personal and professional relationships, however, suggests a rationale for his interest in Japanese Americans, and working-class Japanese Americans in particular. First, throughout his career as a historian, Beard was also an advocate for workers’ rights and worker education. After graduating from Depauw College in 1898, he worked with low-wage immigrant workers at Jane Adam’s Hull House in Chicago. In 1899, while studying at Oxford, Beard helped found Ruskin Hall, an Oxford-affiliated college dedicated to giving English factory workers access to higher education. In 1903, Beard was a founding member of the

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Rand School of Social Science in New York City, one of the first workers’ schools in the country. In 1919, Beard and progressive educators John Dewey, James

13 Peter Rutkoff and William Scott, New School: A History of The New School for Social Research (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 5; Ira Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) chronicles the tumultuous early years of the Rand School. The Rand School represented an early foray into the field of worker-focused education, but the Rand School and Charles Beard were part of a much larger movement. In the early 1900s, as education reformers centralized control over ward boards, segmented curricula, and hired superintendents trained in “scientific” Taylorism, working-class radicals became concerned, as Kenneth Teitelbaum and William Reese have put it, with what they saw as a “tendency among educators to attempt to make the interest of society identical with the interest of the property owning class.” Kenneth Teitelbaum and William J. Reese, “American Socialist Pedagogy and Experimentation in the Progressive Era: The Socialist Sunday School,” History of Education Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 429-454, 431. Socialists had for years worked within the public school system. They had served on ward boards, designed curricula, taught, and been at the forefront of progressive movements for playgrounds and school lunches. However, as increasing numbers of them became disempowered by Progressive-Era educational reforms, and disenchanted by what they perceived to be industry-friendly curricula, they looked to form their own institutions. These alternative sites of education were designed to instill in students socialist values and inoculate them against what they perceived to be the competitive, nationalistic and anti-democratic principles being taught in public schools.

Often these efforts manifested themselves through union initiatives. In 1915, the Jewish Waist and Dress Makers Union of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union requested that the New York Public Library open up a designated branch for Union women, and hired Barnard instructor Juliet Stuart Poyntz to teach classes. Two years later, ILGWU vice president Fannia M. Cohn chartered the Workers’ University at Washington Irving High School in Manhattan. After World War One, the movement for worker education progressed rapidly. These were on occasion independent efforts, such as Work People’s College, Brookwood Labor College, the Southern Summer School for Women Workers, and Commonwealth College, and sometimes the result of coordination between unions and universities, such as the Wisconsin School for Workers, the Boston Trades Union College, the University of California’s extension service for trade unions, and the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers. Leon Fink, Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 44. For more on the history of labor colleges and alternative worker-focused schooling, see Richard Altenbaugh, Education for Struggle: The American Labor Colleges of the 1920s and 1930s (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Richard Altenbaugh, “"The Children and the Instruments of a Militant Labor Progressivism:” Brookwood Labor College and the American Labor College
Robinson, and Thorstein Veblen established the New School for Social Research, which mirrored the Rand School’s commitment to democratic, working-class education.¹⁴ And, two years later, alongside members of the United Mine Workers and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Beard started the Workers’ Education Bureau of America, designed, according to its constitution, “to collect and to disseminate information relative to efforts at education on any part of organized labor” and “to coordinate and assist in every possible manner the educational work now carried on by the organized workers.”¹⁵ Beard coordinated the Bureau’s fundraising efforts, and chaired an editorial board that published inexpensive textbooks for use at labor colleges. When the American Federation of Labor took over the Workers’ Education Bureau in the mid-1920s, Beard left the agency, but this did not interrupt his career-long commitment to worker education; stepping out of the board room and into the lecture hall, Beard taught a course on the Movement of the 1920s and 1930s.”

¹⁴ Unlike the Rand School, the New School was not socialist, but its concentration on adult education did offer a departure from mainstream higher education, and it was founded with a radical mission; in the words of its first director, Alvin Johnson, the New School sought “to seek an unbiased understanding of the existing order, its genesis, growth, and present working as well as…its revision.” Alvin Johnson, Announcement, 1923-1924, quoted in Rutkoff and Scott, New School, 35.

“Economic Basis of Politics” at the Workers’ School in New York City from 1926 to 1929.\textsuperscript{16}

In a career characterized by a willingness to assist divergent groups of working-class Americans, why in 1926 did Beard single out one specific subgroup for Carnegie Corporation aid? The answer lies in Beard’s connection to Japan. By 1926, when he proposed the Japanese-American vocational project to Keppel, Beard had lived and worked in Japan twice, and had become a friend and admirer of many Japanese politicians and scholars. Beard’s project proposal was a direct result of this experience.\textsuperscript{17}

In February 1922, Tokyo Mayor Goto Shimpei called upon Beard, then a supervisor at the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, to assist him in formulating a municipal development plan for Tokyo. Goto gave him four specific tasks. According to Beard, the first and foremost of these tasks was to “arouse deeper interest in municipal government and public administration among college and university students and among the citizens of the leading Japanese cities.” Beard’s second responsibility was to help the mayoral staff understand “the American experience in dealing with a number of concrete municipal problems, such as taxation, assessments and transportation.” His third task was to organize a library for Tokyo’s own newly-established Institute for Municipal Research, and his fourth, as he put it, was “to imagine myself mayor of the city for the time being and to make a...

\textsuperscript{16} Barrow, \textit{More Than a Historian}, 12.
\textsuperscript{17} Beard never identified any single individual as being responsible for his interest in working-class Japanese Americans, but in a March 11, 1929 letter to Keppel he did suggest that his “Japanese friends” were looking to stay apprised of the proposal’s progress. Beard to Keppel, March 11, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
report to the citizens on the problems of the municipality, expressing my opinion ‘freely and without reserve.’”  

In addition to being a historian and a coordinator of worker education, Beard was also one of the Progressive Era’s foremost authorities on city government, and Goto was confident that Beard would lead his staff in the right direction.  

From September 16, 1922 to February 27, 1923, in an effort to acquaint Beard with municipal Japan, Goto and the mayoral staff shuffled their American visitor from one public facility to the next. The group made an extensive survey of Tokyo’s social agencies and infrastructure projects, visiting schools, libraries, lodging houses, almshouses, hospitals, and employment exchanges, as well as parks, sewage disposal plants, water stations, filter beds, pumping stations and waste disposal yards.

To address the first of Goto’s tasks, Beard also appeared at public gatherings across the country. He gave thirty-two lectures on municipal governance to large crowds at Japanese YMCAs, social work conferences, and leading Japanese universities. By Beard’s estimation, nearly 10,000 people attended his talks, and millions more read them in newspapers and journals.

During the six months he toured Japan, Beard developed a strong relationship with the mayor, as well a deep and abiding admiration. Partially, this is because Beard and Goto were so like-minded. Like Beard, Mayor Goto was a reformer. Born into a samurai family in 1857, Goto studied medicine and social insurance in

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Germany before returning to Aichi Prefecture in 1890 to practice as one of the nation’s earliest hospital doctors. Goto’s administrative skills, of which Beard wrote glowingly, soon took him beyond the hospital, however, and in 1892 he became Chief of the Bureau of Health and Sanitation. 22 Under Goto, the Bureau became a transformative force in Japanese public life, introducing to the Japanese government the social insurance policies of Bismarck’s Germany, and a focus on the living standards of workers. 23 In 1916 Goto and his cohort of what historian Sheldon Garon has termed “social bureaucrats” ushered in protective labor laws for women and children, and in 1917 Goto established a Relief Section to address unemployment and poverty. 24

Beard also accorded well with Goto’s staff members, who like the mayor were social bureaucrats and students of the West. Time and again in his official account of the 1922 Japan trip, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo (1923), Beard lauded each staff member’s hard work and accomplishments, which he equated with mastery of Western languages and methodologies. Second Assistant Mayor Hiroshi Ikeda was fluent in English, French, and German, publisher of three books on municipal government, and a former Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare before assuming his position with the mayor. According to Beard, Third Assistant Mayor Tamon Maeda

22 Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, 7. Beard, not one for hyperbole, wrote that Goto was “regarded by all Japanese as one of the ablest men in the Empire,” and that “his knowledge of the facts, theories, movements, and practices of the Western world is broad and deep….Giving him advice on administrative affairs is like carrying coal to Newcastle!” Ibid.
also spoke and read English fluently, had traveled extensively in Europe and the United States, and was conversant in the latest Western theories and practices of municipal governance. Rounding out the Mayor’s staff, in charge of Tokyo’s water works, was engineer Dr. Eiji Nakajima. Nakajima, too, had traveled and lived in Europe, “spoke English with ease,” in Beard’s estimation, and was an expert in Western engineering practice. Like Beard, all of the men were reformers, and all were municipal government policy wonks. From Beard’s account of the trip, one might well surmise that he had traveled halfway around the world to find his ideological brethren.25

In The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, Beard not only praised his Japanese counterparts, he positioned himself alongside them against would-be critics from the West. “So many American visitors here,” he fumed, “get entirely false notions about the local situation.” They compare what they observe of Japanese municipal infrastructure to American infrastructure and say, “I would like to tell the city officials how we do things in the United States.” Yet “nine out of ten” of these Americans, observed Beard, “know little or nothing about the history of sanitation and planning in the United States...[about] how recently Baltimore and New Orleans have completed their sewer systems, how many people in Pittsburgh had no sewer service in 1912, or how the death rate was in Washington that year.”26 Against this unflattering portrait of the ignorant American visitor, Beard set his hosts:

It would be difficult to find any live theme of municipal government in the West with which Japanese specialists are not familiar. One of the first questions asked me by Dr. Mizuno, Minister of Home Affairs,

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25 Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, 7-9.
26 Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, 6.
was: “How is the city manager plan working in America?” I think it safe to say that Viscount Goto is more deeply interested in important municipal events in New York City than any American mayor west of the Alleghenies.27

Clearly, Beard was enthusiastic about his Japanese colleagues, and optimistic about what their abilities meant for Tokyo. He approached his position as a touring lecturer with humility, writing that “there were many Japanese students of municipal affairs who could have spoken with more knowledge and more eloquence on every theme which I discussed,” and this approach gained him the trust, and in some cases the long-lasting friendship of staff members.28

In addition to the mayoral staff, Beard became fast friends with the Mayor’s son-in-law, Yusuke Tsurumi, Secretary of the Department of Railways. Tsurumi accompanied Beard on his travels, hosted the Beards at his house, and served as their entre into the social world of Japanese arts and letters.29 Only a limited record of Beard’s time in Japan remains, unfortunately. Beard famously destroyed much of his archival material before his death, exclaiming that he wanted to be remembered for his publications, not “what I ate for breakfast,” but the extant correspondence does

27 Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, 9.
28 Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, 2. It is a testament to their relationship that Goto invited Beard back to Japan for his assistance in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake. According to Beard’s publisher at MacMillan, Goto’s cable to Beard, on September 7, just six days after the earthquake, was “the first official news dispatched from Japan with regard to the disaster.” Beard, The Administration and Politics of Tokyo, v.
suggest that Tsurumi and his family, Mayor Goto, and Third Assistant Mayor Tamon Maeda and his family remained close with the Beards after their 1922 trip.30

Although Beard’s wife, the historian Mary Ritter Beard, does not appear in the Beard-Keppel correspondence, she too had strong connections to Japan, and to working-class Japanese in particular. During the Beards’ stays in Japan in 1922 and 1923, Mary Beard sought out individuals and organizations devoted to working-class and women’s rights. She established a lifelong friendship with pioneering Japanese birth control activist Shidzue Kato, (whose autobiography she would help to publish in 1935), attended labor meetings with women’s rights activist Caroline MacDonald, and gave talks on social work and women’s health at schools and the Young Women’s Christian Association.31 Mary Beard was received well by progressives in the Japanese publishing world was well. A letter dated September 23 1922 from Shige Takenaka of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun thanks her profusely for meeting with him, and in a December 8, 1922 letter to Charles Beard, the scholar W. Midzuno, who translated the Beards’ co-written 1914 book American Citizenship, expresses particular gratitude for permission to translate Mary Beard’s 1915 book, Women’s Work in Municipalities, noting that its translation will “much stimulate the activities

30 Barrow, More than a Historian, xx. What correspondence remains has been archived at Beard’s alma mater, DePauw University. See “Letters to the Beard’s Relating to their Japan Visit” for letters between the Beards and Tsurumi, Maeda, and Goto.
31 Nancy F. Cott, ed., A Woman Making History: Mary Ritter Beard Through Her Letters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 286, 114; Margaret Prang, A Heart at Leisure from Itself: Caroline MacDonald of Japan (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), 189; Michi Kawai to Mary Beard, January 8, 1923, Beard Archive; Ryuhei Kikuchi to Mary Beard, November 12, 1923, Beard Archive.
of women’s organizations and social workers.” In addition to giving talks and making connections with scholars and activists, Mary Beard also published on Japanese women’s organizing twice, first in a 1924 article on Japanese women’s responses to the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923, and then decades later in her 1953 book, *The Force of Women in Japanese History*. Given her interest in Japanese labor issues, and the Beards’ cooperative professional relationship, it may be that Mary Beard also played a role in prompting her husband’s 1926 meeting with Keppel.

Upon his return to the U.S., Charles Beard’s life-long commitment to working-class education and his interest in Japan coalesced in his 1926 proposal to the Carnegie Corporation. If Carnegie could back Roy Akagi’s current vocational education and job placement efforts at the Los Angeles YMCA, the program might be expanded, a job placement bureau might be established, and young Japanese-

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32 Shige Takenaka to Mary Beard, September 23, 1922, Beard Archive; W. Midzuno to Charles Beard, December 8, 1922, Beard Archive.
34 Charles Beard himself was not evidently active in working-class movements during his trip to Japan, but his politics did influence his work. His official account of the trip, which doubled as the report he submitted to the mayor, included observations about the necessity of working-class participation in municipal government. He lamented the fact that Japanese industrial workers “cannot vote, are not organized, and have no municipal interest or programme,” but he did so cautiously, writing not as a radical but as a municipal planner: “In the West, organized labor has been for many years a factor in forcing the improvement of the conditions of municipal life. Labor parties have developed complete municipal programmes, and even where they have been in the minority they have profoundly influenced municipal policy [sic].” Beard, *The Administration and Politics of Tokyo*, 147.
American men and women in California might get a chance, as Beard put it to Keppel, “to earn an honest living.”\(^35\) As Beard would soon discover, however, bringing his proposal to the Carnegie Corporation would set the project on quite a different trajectory.

**A Transpacific Vision for the Project**

While Beard’s initial proposal to Carnegie Corporation President Frederick Keppel appeared to address one specific, local problem—the vocational challenges faced by second-generation Japanese in California—it is clear that Beard, Keppel, and interested parties on both sides of the Pacific conceived of Beard’s proposal within a transnational framework. The memorandum of the first Beard-Keppel meeting framed Beard’s proposal as “as a gesture of international good will,” and time and again in correspondence between Keppel, Stanford administrators and Carnegie Board members, Keppel sold the project on its transnational merits.\(^36\) This is most apparent in a December 22, 1928 letter from Keppel to Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur:

> Beard and others tell me that nothing would give greater pleasure to the Japanese nation than a more intelligent and sympathetic treatment by the United States of the second generation Japanese who, by virtue of birth, are American citizens but who fall between two stools. They know no Japanese and have no contacts in the old country, but have not been accepted as Americans. In fact, they have great difficulty in finding decent jobs. Beard says that the most practical thing to do for these young people is to do a first-rate job in placing them in industry and other employment. A good start has been made in finding jobs as

\(^{35}\) Beard to Keppel, April 15, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.  
\(^{36}\) Memorandum of Interview, May 28, 1926, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
mechanicians in industrial laboratories etc., where the racial deftness can be taken advantage of.”

Keppel’s letter elicited a fast response from Wilbur, who, though no making no mention of the former’s aptitude at measuring “racial deftness,” did agree that it was indeed “a serious problem,” and brought it before his trustees and his resident Japanese immigration expert, Stanford University historian Yamato Ichihashi.

Beard, Keppel, Stanford administrators, and Carnegie Corporation board members saw the employment difficulties of second-generation Japanese Americans in California as “a serious problem” not simply because they affected the quality of Japanese immigrant lives, but because they presented an opportunity to alleviate the transpacific tensions brought on by the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act.

Wilbur himself was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization that promoted transpacific business, academic, and diplomatic cooperation, and he and other Stanford members of the Institute viewed the Immigration Act a threat to the U.S. and Japan relationship.

When the U.S. Congress passed the act on April 12, 1924, Japanese politicians, journalists, scholars and businesspeople had responded with immediate and universal condemnation. On April 19, the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun declared that a race war was “imminent,” and two days later, fifteen of Tokyo’s largest newspapers ran a joint statement that castigated the law as an “unfair and immoral”

37 Keppel to Wilbur, December 22, 1928, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
38 Wilbur to Keppel, December 27, 1928, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR; Wilbur to Keppel, January 7, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
39 R.M. Lester, Assistant to the President, Carnegie Corporation to Wilbur, October 22, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
gesture that “injure[d] deeply the traditional friendship between the nations.” On July 1, 1924, a day many termed “Humiliation Day,” tens of thousands of Japanese citizens joined protests in dozens of cities. The months that followed saw the boycott of American goods, protests at American churches, and even one case of self-immolation. On the third anniversary of “Humiliation Day,” just as Keppel was considering Beard’s proposal, the Osaka Mainichi editorialized that “Japan and her people will never forgive nor forget the insult and injustice to which they have been subjected….International democracy…will not permit her to be humiliated by disgraceful discrimination.”

Keppel, for his part, did not have the personal ties to Japan that Beard did, but he was certainly aware of Japanese antipathy toward the law, and he envisioned the Carnegie Corporation as an institution that could, at least indirectly, mediate affairs of state. If the U.S. government was unwilling to address the growing U.S.-Japan antagonism, the Carnegie Corporation would.

In general, this was the position that Keppel adopted toward all large-scale problems. After serving as Dean of Columbia College from 1910-1917, Keppel

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41 Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, April 19, 1924, cited in Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice, 21; Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 1924, cited in Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice, 22. Hirobe’s analysis is particularly useful for our discussion regarding elite Japanese acceptance of and investment in the race paradigm. As Hirobe writes: “While some newspapers regarded the law’s passage as an insult to Asians as a whole, others revealed a different kind of prejudice. The law, they argued, was an insult especially to Japan because Japanese were superior to other Asian nationals, whose immigration was already banned.” Hirobe writes that the Asahi Shimbun, for example, declared that it “could not accept the law because the Japanese were inferior but superior to other peoples.” Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice, 22.

worked for the War Department during World War One, and as historian Walter Jackson has written, the experience left him not with “a thirst for political power,” but rather an “abiding distrust of the federal government.” Private foundations, Keppel believed, provided the best hope for securing the public good.\footnote{Walter Jackson, \textit{Gunnar Myrdal and American’s Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938-1987} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 14.} Beard’s project provided Keppel the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of non-state solutions to state-level problems.

To rally support for Beard’s plan, Keppel turned to former Carnegie Corporation President Elihu Root. When Keppel reached out to him in the spring of 1929, Root was the senior statesman of the Carnegie Corporation board.\footnote{Jeffrey Brison, \textit{Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Canada: American Philanthropy and the Arts and Letters in Canada} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 27.} A former U.S. Secretary of War (1899-1904), Secretary of State (1905-1909), U.S. Senator (1909-1915) and Nobel Laureate (1912), Root was also intimately familiar with the anti-Japanese movement and the problems faced by Japanese Americans. In 1906, when the San Francisco city school board created an international controversy by segregating the city’s Japanese students, Root gave a speech denouncing the policy, and it was Root, alongside President Roosevelt and Japanese Ambassador Viscount Aoki, that met with San Francisco School Board members and compelled them to reconsider their decision.\footnote{Ultimately, these negotiations yielded the Gentlemen’s Agreement (1907), which prohibited Japanese laborers from immigrating to the U.S. See Chapter Four for a longer history of the San Francisco School Board’s 1906 segregation decision.} As he had with Stanford University President Ray Lyman Wilbur, Keppel focused on the transpacific aspects of the possible grant in his...
correspondence with Root. On June 20, 1929 he wrote to Root that second-generation Japanese Americans weren’t afforded the “normal opportunities of American citizens,” and that he “was told that nothing would please the Japanese in Japan more than a little intelligent consideration in the United States of the problems presented by this group of our citizens.” 46

Like Wilbur, Root was receptive to this message. Within the week he responded in favor of financing the project. Sounding very much the elder statesmen, Root accompanied his endorsement with a brief treatise on American morality. “We need in this country,” he wrote,

to think a little more about other people….We are too self-centered; we lack humility; we unconsciously feel as if we stood alone in the universe. We feel under no obligation to consider the rights or feelings of other peoples. This condition of things among a great and powerful people soon become a national arrogance, and that is something which the high Gods always punish soon or late.

For Root, fixing the problems of second-generation Japanese Americans would not only act as a salve on U.S.-Japan tensions, it might serve to awaken a dormant American collective conscience. He was committed. On June 27, 1929, he signed off confidently to Keppel: “you may use my name at your discretion as favoring the proposal.” 47

With Root on board, Keppel moved the project forward. On October 22, 1929, his assistant R.M. Lester forwarded to Wilbur, now U.S. Secretary of the Interior, a copy of the Carnegie Corporation Board of Trustees’ October 15 resolution appropriating $40,000, in two payments of $20,000, to Stanford University for “a

46 Keppel to Elihu Root, June 20, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
47 Root to Keppel, June 27, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
study of educational and occupational opportunities offered to American citizens of 
Oriental races.” As Keppel had from the start, the board’s resolution framed the 
project as a solution to transpacific problems. It now went even further, however, to 
designate U.S. immigration law as the catalyst of the tensions:

The President has been informed that government and public opinion in China and Japan as to whether our exclusion acts are based upon economic necessity, as we maintain, or upon race antipathy, as they suspect, will be more influenced by the attention accorded to the young people of our own citizenship but of their race, than by any other factor.48

The transpacific aspect of Beard’s original proposal thus took center stage. Whereas in his letters to Wilbur and Root, Keppel had mentioned a “difficulty in finding decent jobs,” and a lack of “opportunities,” now, however, there was no mention of the specific problem of employment:

the second generation Japanese and Chinese…have great difficulty in finding an appropriate place in our national life. The problem cannot be solved by returning them to the land of their forefathers, because they have, in almost every instance, lost both the language and the cultural traditions necessary for adjustment there.49

The vocational problem that Beard had brought to Keppel was now lost, replaced by a vague notion of acculturation, of finding a “place” in American society. Beard’s proposal—that the Carnegie Corporation finance vocational education and vocational opportunities—had been replaced by a study of education and vocational opportunities. Keppel had won the support of Stanford, and of his board, but he had transformed the project entirely.

48 R. M. Lester, Assistant to Keppel to Wilbur, October 22, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
49 Ibid.
Beard brought his proposal for vocational education to the Carnegie Corporation in May of 1926 because he knew that Carnegie President Frederick Keppel prioritized adult education. Keppel committed his office to broadening educational opportunities even more than his predecessor, Acting President Henry Pritchett, who had articulated to the Carnegie Board of Trustees in 1922 a mission to “further…understanding of that deeper stratum of knowledge and feeling which involves philosophy, art, and the comprehension of human relations.” Keppel’s first major act as president was to seek the advice of leaders in adult education. In June 1924 he began a series of conferences that brought together library leaders such as John Dana of the Newark Library in Newark, New Jersey, and Carl Milam of the American Library Association, figures in the field of adult education such as James Russell of Teachers College at Columbia University, Spencer Miller and Charles Beard of the Workers’ Education Bureau, and representatives from other organizations ranging from the YMCA and the Conference of Southern Mountain Workers to the Rockefeller Institute and the publisher Houghton Mifflin. The conferences resulted in increased funding for several of these interests, and, of even greater significance, the 1926 founding of a new national organization devoted to adult education, the American Association for Adult Education (AAAE).  

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51 Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, 106.
After working with Keppel to establish the AAAE, Beard assumed correctly that Keppel would be interested in funding another educational project. What Beard did not anticipate, however, were the complications that came along with proposing a project that involved Japanese Americans and the specter of race.

From 1926 to 1929, as Keppel searched for potential project directors and garnered the support of the Carnegie board, the project took on a new form. Three factors in particular were responsible for this change: Keppel’s reluctance to involve the Carnegie Corporation in the politics of Japanese immigration, the relationship between JSCA Secretary Roy Akagi and Stanford history professor Yamato Ichihashi, and the institutional momentum of Carnegie and Stanford toward psychometric approaches to understanding race. A close look at each of these factors sheds further light on the project.

Although Keppel did not state this outright, the first problem with Beard’s proposal was the suggestion that Carnegie fund a Japanese-American organization directly. As we saw in Chapter Three with the Rockefeller-funded Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISRR), which walked a tightrope to fund of its *Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast* (1924), liberal philanthropic organizations that attempted to address issues concerning Japanese and Japanese Americans, much less fund their organizations, were subject to criticism from anti-Japanese labor leaders and politicians. In 1924, Rockefeller’s ISRR had attempted to fend off a charge of pro-Japanese bias by casting the *Survey of Race Relations* as an impartial scientific investigation. The *Survey* had been proposed by YMCA Secretary George Gleason, but Gleason was a known supporter of Japanese immigrant rights, so the ISRR board
asked Gleason to step aside and allow University of Chicago sociologist Robert Park to take over. As board member Galen Fisher explained to one of Gleason’s colleagues, the study had to appear “free from partisanship and bias,” and electing a University of Chicago researcher to direct it would promote this image. This strategy, however, had fallen short. Anti-Japanese leaders in California, unimpressed with the ISRR’s hiring of Park, castigated the Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast, and the Rockefeller Foundation became the subject of unwanted controversy.

During the period between the planning of the ISRR Survey of Race Relations (1921-1923), and Keppel’s consideration of Beard’s proposal (1926-1928), the landscape of political debate over Japanese immigration changed considerably. The 1924 Immigration Act closed the door to immigration from Asia by excluding immigrants ineligible for citizenship. It was a victory for the anti-Japanese movement, but one that simultaneously took the wind out of its sails. After passage of the legislation, the Japanese Exclusion League, California’s leading anti-Japanese organization since 1920, disbanded, and its leaders—representing the American Legion, the State Federation of Labor, the State Grange, and the Native Sons of the Golden West—formed a new organization dedicated to maintaining exclusion: the California Joint Immigration Committee (CJIC). The committee was underfunded, however, and relied upon its executive secretary, newspaper editor V.S. McClatchy, for most of its funding. As Roger Daniels and Izumi Hirobe have observed, after 1924

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52 Galen Fisher to J. Merle Davis, January 23, 1923, Box 7, Folder 3, Survey of Race Relations Archive, Hoover Library, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California.  
the anti-Japanese movement became more one man’s crusade than a well-funded, organized campaign.\(^5^4\)

Despite the weakened position of the anti-Japanese movement, however, in 1926 Keppel was still concerned with the public relations risk that might accompany making a grant directly to a Japanese YMCA. The Carnegie Corporation president wanted to do something to address the employment situation of second-generation Japanese, but he wanted to do so in an apolitical fashion, and he was convinced that tying Beard’s project to an elite institution like Stanford would achieve this. In a December 22 1928 letter to Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur Keppel wrote that he was “inclined to think that the whole matter would interest our trustees, but we can’t make a grant to the YMCA without opening the floodgates. We might, however, make one to Stanford if you would be interested in some cooperative enterprise with Mr. Akagi and his associates.”\(^5^5\)

Judging from his communications with Keppel, Beard saw the *Survey of Race Relations* as a cautionary tale. In her analysis of the survey, Sarah Griffith has written that the Institute for Social and Religious Research’s 1923 decision to choose University of Chicago sociologist Robert Park over YMCA Secretary George


\(^{55}\) Keppel to Wilbur, December 22, 1928, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
Gleason altered the methodology and goals of the project. Whereas Gleason had envisioned the survey as a project that would balance concrete social advocacy programs and social scientific research, Park all but abandoned the advocacy component.\(^{56}\) The more Beard learned of Keppel’s progress with Stanford University scholars and administrators, the more he worried that his proposal might be derailed in a similar fashion. On April 15, 1929 Beard wrote Keppel that he understood the latter’s “very valid case for using Stanford rather than the Y,” but, he queried, “is Stanford in a position to organize a going placement bureau which is the real need[?]” Beard pressed further:

> I am no position to judge the prospects [of the project] in case several professors are let loose on the job. Dr. Akagi has traveled all over America, is an intelligent, [illegible] man of action, and is placing second-generation Japanese in positions where they can earn an honest living. He knows businessmen…with Japanese enterprises in hand and can interest them in helping boys and girls….I merely wish to see something done that will produce results—not more printed matter.\(^{57}\)

Beard feared that if Keppel funneled the project through Stanford University and not the YMCA, a vocational training and job placement program would never develop.

To keep Stanford University attached to Beard’s proposal without derailing the project, Keppel attempted to forge a joint partnership between the university and the Japanese YMCA. But Stanford history professor Yamato Ichihashi stood in the way. After a December 1928 exchange between Keppel and Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur—an exchange that had left Keppel hopeful about Stanford faculty participation—Wilbur consulted Ichihashi about the Beard proposal. It was at this


\(^{57}\) Beard to Keppel, April 15, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
juncture that Keppel’s plan stalled. According to correspondence between Wilbur and Ichihashi, the latter was already engaged in his own research on second-generation Japanese in the U.S., and he was not looking for partners, even if that meant less funding. In late December Wilbur conveyed to Keppel that Ichihashi did “not feel justified at the present time in asking for funds for any specific purpose.”

Unsatisfied with Wilbur’s response, on March 12, 1929, Keppel wrote to Ichihashi directly: would he be interested in working on the project? Ichihashi replied a week later:

You may be interested to know that for nearly twenty-five years I have interested myself on the whole subject of the Japanese question in this country, and with the rise of second generation problems about fifteen years ago, I have been trying my best in helping these young Japanese in every way possible….I have already gathered a considerable amount of data… and about a week ago I have started to prepare a manuscript.

Though Ichihashi “genuinely appreciated” Keppel’s “kind interest in the problem,” his language suggests that he was wary of interlopers. He wanted to convey his expertise in the field and to keep meddlers at arm’s distance. He did not, however, explicitly reject Keppel’s invitation to work with the YMCA on the project. So, on March 26, Keppel sought clarification. “If you will turn to the copy of my letter of December 22 to President Wilbur,” he directed, “you will see that I made definite suggestion in that letter with reference to cooperation between Stanford and the Japanese YMCA through Mr. Akagi. I had understood… that some arrangement along these lines would be practicable.” Again, Ichihashi responded within the week: “To

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58 Wilbur to Keppel, January 7, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
59 Ichihashi to Keppel, March 19, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
60 Ibid.
my knowledge…nothing definite has been arranged by the University or Dr. Wilbur with Mr. Akagi or anyone else connected with the Japanese YMCA in regard to your kind suggestion.”

Keppel, exasperated by Ichihashi’s evasive responses, considered shutting Stanford out of the project. On April 9, 1929, he forwarded Ichihashi’s letter to Wilbur, and added that it was “evident from the enclosed letter that Professor Ichihashi is not what one would call enthusiastic about the idea of bringing Stanford and the Japanese YMCA into a joint program.” Keppel then closed with what seem equal parts threat and resignation: “The Stanford Department of Education is obviously the best qualified on the Coast to give direction to the scheme, and I should be sorry to have to turn to some other institution.”

Whether or not Keppel’s letter was indeed a veiled threat, it produced immediate results. The very next day, on April 10, Wilbur answered Keppel with more clarity: “Professor Ichihashi and some of the others had a feeling that anything done by the Japanese YMCA might be purely amateurish and without a real beneficial effect upon the whole question.” Wilbur did not name who “some of the others” might have been, but by the end of the letter he singled out Ichihashi more definitively: “Professor Ichihashi wants to do a fundamental piece of work rather than to help out a few of those who need attention.”

Ichihashi was unwilling to work with the Japanese YMCA because he looked upon Japanese organizations and Japanese leaders in the U.S. in general with disdain.

61 Ichihashi to Keppel, April 2, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
62 Keppel to Wilbur, April 9, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
63 Wilbur to Keppel, April 10, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
Ichihashi’s first biographer, Yuji Ichioka, suggested this was because Ichihashi suffered from “an inflated sense of his own importance.” According to Ichioka, Ichihashi “placed no stock in the ability of Japanese immigrant leaders to contribute towards improving Japanese-American relations.” Ichihashi believed “not a single contribution” had “ever been made,” for instance, by the Japanese Association of America, the largest Japanese organization in the U.S. Ichihashi extended this critique to all Japanese Associations and their leaders. In a letter to Japanese Consul Numano Yasutaro in 1915, Ichihashi wrote that “they should be put under the absolute control of the Consulate….The Japanese here…are at least twenty years behind the intelligent Japanese at home, and lord knows how many years they are behind the intelligent Americans.”

This contempt for Japanese organizations and Japanese leaders meant that Ichihashi remained on the margins of the Japanese immigrant community. As Gordon Chang observed in his 1997 biography of Ichihashi, the Stanford professor “played no role in community politics, rarely published books for Japanese American audiences, and steadily reduced his personal contact with other Japanese Americans over the years until World War II.” Though Ichihashi never chastised Akagi or the Japanese YMCA directly in his correspondence with Keppel, Wilbur’s April 10 letter offered the Carnegie president a sense of Ichihashi’s disposition.

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65 Chang, Morning Glory, Evening Shadow, 78.
Having extracted the truth from Wilbur, and identified Ichihashi as the major impediment to a YMCA-Stanford partnership, Keppel consulted with Beard. On April 12 he forwarded Beard his most recent letter from Wilbur, and sought advice on how to best proceed: “As you will see, I have smoked out Wilbur. How do you think I should reply? There would be great tactical advantage in bringing Stanford into the picture, but, on the other hand, there appears to be no love lost between the two Japanese educators.”66

Beard, who Keppel had copied on all proposal-related correspondence, was not surprised by his friend’s finding. A month earlier, at the very first sign of reticence on the part of Ichihashi, he had asked Keppel: “Should we allow everything to hang on the [illegible] of a history professor? Is it possible to take another tack?”67 Additionally, from March 11 to March 28, at the same time Keppel was trying to “smoke out” Wilbur, Beard had been corresponding with Roy Akagi about Ichihashi, and Akagi had not minced words. On March 20, Akagi wrote Beard:

You asked me about Prof. Ichihashi. I am not in “bad” terms with him; nor am I in specially intimate terms with him. If everything depends upon his attitude, however, I am sorry to foresee that the result will not be very encouraging one as he is usually against everything which is not his own initiative. I do not think I shall make any special effort in reaching him at this time [sic]. 68

On March 28, Beard forwarded Akagi’s letter to Keppel, and once again asked if “it would be possible to make another line of attack—through some other competent organization in sympathetic understanding with work of the character in question?”69

66 Keppel to Beard, April 12, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
67 Beard to Keppel, March 11, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
68 Beard to Keppel, March 28, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
69 Ibid.
Akagi had made it apparent to Beard that Ichihashi was going to be an insurmountable obstacle.

Although they never spoke directly to the matter, in May of 1929 Keppel and Beard’s priorities diverged. From Beard’s perspective, Akagi was the key to the project, and if Akagi and Ichihashi could not work together, there was no point in continuing to woo Stanford.\(^\text{70}\) Keppel, however, believed that the political benefits of partnering with Stanford outweighed the prospective costs; besides, abandoning the YMCA did not necessarily mean abandoning a vocational training program. As the architect of the grant, Keppel believed he would be able to facilitate such a program through Stanford.\(^\text{71}\)

On May 9, 1929, Wilbur wrote to Keppel with what he believed was a workable solution: bypass both Akagi and Ichihashi and fund the study through the Stanford University Department of Education. Wilbur suggested that Stanford could put together a three-part project. The first part would be “a comparative study of the educational and civic progress of Japanese children in American schools under segregation and non-segregation” carried out by Reginald Bell, then a graduate student in the Department of Education; the second would be “a study of vocational aptitudes of second-generation Japanese” directed by Edward Kellogg Strong, a professor of psychology; and the third would be a “cooperative practical study

\(^{70}\) Beard to Keppel, May 22, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.

\(^{71}\) Keppel to Beard, May 27, 1929; and Keppel to Wilbur, July 23, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
between Professor Strong and those interested in the placement of second generation Japanese in actual employment.”

The truth of the matter is that Reginald Bell and Edward Strong were already interested in conducting studies of segregated Japanese students and Japanese vocational aptitudes, respectively, and they—and Wilbur—were looking to get Carnegie money to fund their research. Reginald Bell, in fact, had already begun research on his doctoral thesis and had met with his faculty advisors in late April about securing additional funding. If combining Bell and Strong’s individual research and adding a vocational placement aspect meant Carnegie funding, the Stanford team was happy to acquiesce.

Again, Keppel forwarded Wilbur’s letter to Beard, and again, Beard replied with apprehension. On May 22 he reminded Keppel that although he favored a study of “Japanese vocational aptitude…what appeals to me is the third plank in Mr. Wilbur’s program: the placement of second-generation Japanese.” Still unwilling to give up on his original plan, he ended his letter with a plea: “I hope that you will find it possible to suggest that Professor Strong inquire into the work done by Dr. Akagi and if it is good lend some assistance to it. Men who have labored and starved to do good things at least deserve consideration.”

On October 15, 1929 the Carnegie Board approved a grant to fund Wilbur’s three-part plan, but just as Beard had feared, Strong did not meet with Akagi, and within two years Strong had abandoned the third plank. In a July 15, 1931 progress

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72 Wilbur to Keppel, May 9, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
73 Ellwood Cubberley, Dean of the Stanford University School of Education to Wilbur, May 1, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
74 Beard to Keppel, May 9, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
report to Keppel’s assistant, R.M. Lester, Strong pointed to the economy to rationalize his decision:

Due to the business depression it has been impossible to discuss…vocational opportunities of second generation Japanese…with American businessmen, and I am frankly not very enthusiastic about what can be accomplished here even in a period of good times. There is too great a gap between what men think they would do in a hypothetical condition and what they actually will do….Frankly I am not greatly concerned about [Japanese Americans’] trouble because I believe the Japanese are superior enough to find a way of solving their problem even though right now no one has a very clear idea of how they are going to do it.75

Strong’s assessment reveals that he never bothered to consult Akagi, who actually did have a “clear idea” of how to address the issue. Three years before Strong began to write *The Second Generation Japanese Problem*, Akagi and his staff at the Japanese Students’ Christian Association had in fact published *The Second Generation Problem: Some Suggestions Toward Its Solution*, which made specific suggestions regarding vocational training, networking, and job placement.76

Strong’s letter to Keppel’s assistant also suggests three important aspects about his perceptions on race. First, like his principal collaborator on the project, Reginald Bell, he held that the “Japanese problem” was in fact a problem of white prejudice. Second, he was a racial essentialist: he believed that race was real, and that races were possessed of distinct and measurable qualities. This essentialism was

75 Strong to Lester, July 15, 1931, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
76 Roy Akagi, *The Second Generation Problem: Some Suggestions toward Its Solution* (New York: Japanese Students’ Christian Association in North America, 1926). Midway through Strong’s research, he did finally meet with Akagi, along with several other prominent Japanese and Japanese-American figures at a luncheon in San Francisco, but the luncheon was staged, in Strong’s words, less to ask for counsel than to “acquaint…the Japanese with the aims of the project.” Strong, *Japanese in California*, 28.
prerequisite to racial testing, but, as we will explore in more depth in the final section of this chapter, the two were mutually reinforcing, since testing methodology itself contributed to the separation of subjects into discrete categories. Third, Strong believed that the Japanese as a race were not inferior to “whites.” The employment problem was not a matter of great concern precisely because “the Japanese” were “superior enough” to overcome white intransigence.77

To better understand Strong’s approach to the Carnegie-Stanford project, it is useful to take a step back and look at his training, teaching, and publishing history. Strong was born in Syracuse New York in 1884, but moved west with his family in 1902 to attend the University of California. He graduated in 1906 with a degree in Biology, worked for a brief time with the United States Forestry Service, and then returned to Berkeley for a Master’s degree in Psychology, which he received in 1909. Strong then pursued his doctoral training at Columbia University under leading psychometricians James McKeen Cattell and Harry Levi Hollingworth. After receiving his PhD in psychology in 1911, Strong stayed on at Columbia, where he worked for three years on marketing and business research. From 1914 to 1917, Strong taught psychology at George Peabody College for Teachers, and in 1917 Strong joined the army, where he worked for three years on the Committee on Classification of Personnel, directed by psychologist Robert Yerkes. After the Army, Strong joined the faculty of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, where he taught

77 Strong to Lester, July 15, 1931, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
applied psychology and psychology in business until 1923, when he was recruited by Terman to join the Department of Psychology at Stanford.  

Influenced first by Cattell and Hollingworth at Columbia, and then by Yerkes and Terman during his time in the armed forces, Strong believed himself to be an objective scientist, with an attitude toward racial mental abilities that emanated not out of prejudice, but out of the most recent psychometric findings on the matter.  

Strong’s correspondence with Keppel demonstrates, however, that like his teachers, who used intelligence testing to bolster their white-supremacist claims, Strong brought his own racial preconceptions to his work. In May 1930, even before the testing began, he confided to Keppel that “my own belief is that our findings will show the Japanese and whites to be about equal, unless the Japanese are superior along artistic lines and inferior along musical lines.” Provided the tests come out as expected, he continued, “we can summarize the study as far as aptitudes are concerned by stating that there is no essential difference between the Japanese and whites and consequently that about the same percentage of Japanese can go into our different occupations as is true of whites.” Here, Strong revealed to Keppel that he had his conclusion in mind before beginning the study, but he did not see the possible conflict of interest that might create. Strong may have been more progressive than many in his psychology cohort when it came to the Japanese, but he shared with his

79 Hansen, “Edward Kellogg Strong, Jr.”  
80 Strong to Keppel, May 16, 1930, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
fellow testers this blind spot, this inability to see that his racial views defined the parameters of his work.

Strong’s racial essentialism—exhibited most curiously in his note to Keppel that “the Japanese” might be “superior along artistic lines and inferior along musical lines”—was a constant throughout his career, appearing in both his earliest and latest writings. In a 1922 publication, *The Psychology of Selling Life Insurance*, Strong leaned on race to illustrate the importance of managerial incentivizing:

> In the South a negro cook will prefer to work half a day and live in a squalid hut rather than work all day and enjoy decent habitation. So, also, most salesmen do far less work than they are capable of because further gain does not appeal to them….‘Desire to Excel,’ ‘Appeal to Imitation,’ ‘Appeal to Affection,’ ‘Love of Praise,’ and ‘Pleasure of Possession,’ are all fundamental.”

Decades later, he maintained a slightly more nuanced, but still fundamentally essentialist perspective on racial traits. In a 1952 article titled “Interests of Negroes and Whites” on vocational interest testing, the field for which Strong is most well-known, he entertained the assumption that “negroes actually have different interests from those of whites, in the sense that a man and a woman differ in their interests” in order to ascertain whether “negro…interests must be measured from a negro, not a white, point of reference.”

As illustrated by the quote above, Strong’s essentialism, this belief in fixed types, applied to sex and gender as well. In a 1936 article, “Interests of Men and Women,” in the *Journal of Social Psychology*, he asserted that while recent

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intelligence tests had proven the sexes equal in respect to mental capacity, their interests were “quite distinct.” Strong set the table for this argument in his introduction: “Four times as many men say they like to ‘repair electrical wiring;’ the reverse is true for ‘decorating a room with flowers.’ How shall such difference be explained?” Did those differences arise from differences in types of education, or natural abilities, or because men and women had “different objectives or goals toward which they more or less unwittingly strive?”83 To answer those questions Strong tested hundreds of subjects in three age groups, “high school,” “college,” and “adult,” ranking their answers to questions on a “masculinity-femininity scale” that included such charming data points as: “were quite sure of themselves,” “have mechanical ingenuity, “frequently make wagers,” and “look at a collection of rare laces.”84 Propensities thus measured, Strong concluded, one, that men and women have innately different interests; and two, as they age, the interests of both males and females “become more distinctly feminine.”85 Like in his work with race, Strong was unable to see how his own predispositions toward particular answers affected his methodology. He was not so beholden to hereditarianism that he dismissed environmental arguments out of hand—as evidenced by his willingness to ask about the effects of education—but he could not make that next logical step; he could not

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84 Strong, “Interests of Men and Women,” 60.
85 Strong, “Interests of Men and Women,” 65.
bring himself to question the degree to which his own observations were socially constructed.  

Strong’s racial essentialism and confidence in psychometrics made him the perfect person for Keppel and for the Carnegie Corporation. Keppel knew Strong well from their mutual time at Columbia University and from Strong’s publications in the fields of educational psychology and advertising. Indeed, in May of 1929, when Wilbur proposed to Keppel that Strong head the project, Keppel had assured a reluctant Beard that Strong was “exceptionally well qualified.” More important than their personal relationship, however, was that Strong’s racial outlook and research methodology aligned closely with epistemology and practices long supported by the Carnegie Corporation.

Like Stanford University, the Carnegie Corporation was intimately linked to the eugenics movement and the field of psychometrics. From 1911 to 1939, through its satellite agency the Carnegie Institute of Washington, the Carnegie Corporation funded Charles Davenport’s and Harry Laughlin’s Eugenics Records Office in Cold Spring Harbor, New York. The Eugenics Records Office acted as the base of

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87 By 1929, Edward Kellog Strong had already made a name for himself in psychology and advertising.
88 Keppel to Beard, May 27, 1929, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
89 Carnegie began to fund the ERO through the Carnegie Institute of Washington in 1904, but it was not until 1911 that the Carnegie Corporation proper assumed control. For Carnegie Corporation funding figures, see Frederick Keppel, *The Foundation: Its Place in American Life* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1930); Daniel Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
eugenic research in the U.S.; it was the largest publisher of eugenic materials, and its findings—along with direct testimony from Laughlin—provided Congress the “scientific” rational for the 1924 Immigration Act. Additionally, Carnegie Corporation trustees Elihu Root and John Merriam endorsed Madison Grant’s eugenic, white-supremecist tract *The Passing of a Great Race* (1918) and both joined Laughlin in his testimony supporting the 1924 Act. As historian Ellen Lagemann has established, from its creation until World War II, the Carnegie Corporation was intent on helping to “preserve the racial purity of American society.”

Although Carnegie fellows and trustees were primarily concerned with quantifying racial mental capacity and influencing immigration policies in the U.S., their eugenic mission did not stop at the border. Alexandra Stern has found that after the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, Laughlin became “increasingly preoccupied with definitions of whiteness predicated on family lineage and Mendelian fractions.” Concerned, like Terman, that America’s “melting pot” was becoming contaminated by too much bad “germ plasm,” Laughlin turned to the Carnegie Corporation to finance a trip to the Texas-Mexico border. His mission, as he put it: “to find out the relative amount of race-crossing between American men and Mexican women and between Mexican men and American women.”

In 1929, the Corporation sponsored Davenport and anthropologist Morris Steggerda’s joint study, *Race Crossing in Jamaica*, which relied upon physical

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measurements and psychometric test data to assert that miscegenation resulted in biological and cultural decay.\textsuperscript{93} At over five-hundred pages packed with anthropometric and psychological measurement data, \textit{Race Crossing in Jamaica} attempted to offer, as Jonathan Spiro has observed, “the definitive argument against miscegenation.”\textsuperscript{94} Unfortunately for its authors, the report was roundly criticized for claims that outpaced evidence. Ultimately, the only danger of race mixing the authors could settle on definitively was that a few “mixed” individuals had long legs (a supposed black trait) and short arms (a supposed white trait). In his 1929 report to Carnegie, Davenport admitted, “We do not know whether the disharmony of long legs and short arms is a disadvantageous one for the individuals under consideration.”\textsuperscript{95} “However,” he thought to add in a \textit{Scientific Monthly} piece, it was entirely possible that such a trait “would put them at a disadvantage in picking things up from the ground.”\textsuperscript{96}

In addition to Laughlin’s and Davenport’s projects along the Texas-Mexico border and in the Caribbean, the Corporation also funded lobbying efforts directed at changing immigration policies, and research on racial psychometrics in Latin America. Nancy Stepan provided the first glimpse of the former phenomenon in her 1991 study, \textit{The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America}, which in addition to exploring eugenic thinking among Latin American elites, tracked

\textsuperscript{94} Jonathan Spiro, \textit{Defending the Master Race}, 244.
the influence of Carnegie-funded figures such as Davenport and Laughlin on Latin American immigration policy. Stepan found that while Davenport and Laughlin were certainly committed to shaping Latin American immigration policies in the U.S. eugenic mold—they invited Latin American scientists and state delegates to their Second International Congress of Eugenics in New York in 1922, and traveled to Cuba for a Pan America Conference on eugenics in 1927—their hard line white supremacist ultimately undermined their efforts. Stepan noted that while many of the Latin American delegates “shared the United States’ view that the Anglo-Saxon race was ‘best,’ …it was painful to be told bluntly by others that Latin American nations were not eugenic,” i.e., that they were racially “impure.” What is more, delegates balked at the way U.S. immigration law sometimes selectively treated Latin Americans. As Stepan observes, for example, “the Mexican delegate to the conference, Rafael Santamarina, felt called upon to defend the Indians from the charge of inferiority and to protest against the immigration tests the United States applied to Mexican children.”

At the same time Davenport and Laughlin were attempting to influence Latin American immigration policy, the Carnegie Corporation was funding psychometric research in the Yucatán, Mexico. As part of the Carnegie “Program on Maya Research,” 1924-1948, which according to historian Alexandra Puerto sent dozens of annual scientific expeditions to Mayan territories for clues to the origins of man, the

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97 See Nancy Stepan, Chapter 6, in *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1991) for a history of Davenport’s and Laughlin’s generally unsuccessful efforts to bring American-style eugenics to Latin America.

Carnegie Corporation sponsored an eight-year psychometric study by Davenport’s *Race Crossing in Jamaica* co-author Morris Steggerda. As Puerto’s research reveals, from 1930 to 1938, Steggerda brought what he had learned with Davenport in the West Indies to the Yucatán, conducting anthropometric measurements and psychological and personality trait tests on 500 Maya adults and children. Steggerda sought out Maya in remote settlements in order to find “pure Maya,” or Maya that shared as nearly as possible the genetics of the ancient Maya. He felt that this would allow him to establish both racial differences between Maya and other groups, and to further his and Davenport’s thesis regarding the dangers of “race crossing.”99 Just as in Jamaica, however, though Steggerda managed to compile an enormous amount of anthropometric and psychometric data on his subjects, he was unable to find evidence to support the anti-miscegenation claim.100

Through its funding of the Eugenic Records Office and Carnegie Institute of Washington studies in the U.S. and beyond, the Carnegie Corporation displayed an absolute commitment to a specific kind of knowledge production regarding race, and this commitment provided the context for Strong’s work on second-generation Japanese Americans. When Strong was putting together the Carnegie-Stanford project, he was doing so against the backdrop of two institutions heavily invested in eugenics and psychometrics. Set against this institutional investment, and the contentious politics surrounding Japanese in California, Beard’s original proposal to

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Keppel—that Carnegie simply fund a vocational placement agency for Japanese Americans—stood little chance of remaining unchanged.

The Second-Generation Studies

With this framework in mind, we can now turn to the four publications that resulted from the 1929-1935 Carnegie-Stanford collaboration. They provide insight into both the power of eugenic thinking in the 1930s, and the problems attendant to employing racist methodologies for antiracist ends. The publications included Strong and Bell’s *Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States*, Strong’s *Japanese in California: Based on a Ten Percent Survey of Japanese in California and Documentary Evidence from Many Sources*, Bell’s *Public School Education of Second-Generation Japanese in California*, and Strong’s summary of the prior three, intended for general audiences, *The Second Generation Japanese Problem*. Of the four, *Japanese in California* and *Vocational Aptitudes* represented Strong’s most original contributions to the literature to date. They were the works to which Strong devoted the balance of his efforts, and, consequently, the ones that afford us the clearest view of his research goals, preferred methodologies, and conceptual limitations.101

Although Strong was most invested personally in *Vocational Aptitudes*, it was *Japanese in California* that touched the lives of the greatest number of Japanese

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101 I am omitting consideration of Strong’s *Second Generation Japanese Problem* because it is largely a summary of the other three studies, and Bell’s *Public School Education of Second-Generation Japanese in California* because it builds primarily on Bell’s Ph.D. thesis, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” an extensive analysis of which is available in Chapter Four.
Americans. Carnegie’s funding allowed Strong to put together a twelve-member research team, five members of which Strong labeled “of the Japanese race,” and seven “of the white race,” and send them out to conduct interviews with 9,416 people of Japanese ancestry in the spring of 1930. The researchers surveyed individuals and families in the northern California counties of San Francisco, Sacramento, Fresno, Santa Clara, and Monterey, the southern California districts of Los Angeles, Hawthorne, Gardena, and San Pedro, and students at the University of California, Berkeley. According to Strong, these 9,416 individuals in these locations represented a fair sampling of Japanese and Japanese Americans in California.

By Strong’s own admission, *Japanese in California* had a straightforward political objective: “to give whites a truer picture of the Japanese than has yet been available” in order to “clear up many misconceptions resulted from the propaganda of agitators.” Strong hoped his analysis would replace “a wealth of opinions” with “facts.” Following in the tradition of Robert Park’s 1924 *Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast*, Strong had his research team compile age, sex, occupation, birthplace, family size, education and religious affiliation data of interviewees and survey respondents. Unlike the 1924 Survey, however, *Japanese in California* was designed specifically to deal with propagandist claims regarding Japanese birth rates, population distribution, and vocational and educational goals, so Strong did not delve into deeper psychological issues regarding to immigration and acculturation, and he

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was careful to position his work as simply a fact-finding mission. “Most of the book,” Strong announced in the introduction, “is filled with facts. What bearing a certain few of them have on the problem is not altogether clear….But most of the facts, if not all, help us to understand what kind of people these Japanese are.”

Though he attempted to present *Japanese in California* as a purely objective intervention into the contentious politics of Japanese immigration, the book was brimming with Strong’s own racial and class prejudices. In describing the districts included in the survey, Strong frequently disparaged other groups in order to prop up local Japanese. According to Strong, the Japanese population in Sacramento, for instance, had accomplished “in two generations what it took the Chinese three to do, in gaining control of land and community development….Remarkably self-sufficient…they have learned to make money by catering to the pleasure-seeking instincts of Filipinos and of the white fruit-tramps.” In Fresno, the Japanese were “the most successful, intelligent, law-abiding, and desirable citizens, while most of the Chinese ‘stores’ are reputed to blinds to conceal gambling…. Strong wrote that the sidewalks in the western district of Fresno “swarm with Negroes, Filipinos, Hindus, Russians, Mexicans, and poorer-class whites,” but he did not include the Japanese in that picture, opting instead to depict them as “the best businessmen of the district.”

That Strong would belittle other racial groups in order to lift up the Japanese was not surprising; he and Keppel had done the same in conversations prior to his

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writing *Japanese in California*. On June 9, 1930, in response to a Strong claim about Japanese-white intelligence parity, Keppel suggested the Stanford psychologist speak with University of Hawaii President David Livingston Crawford, who had found that his “white,” “Japanese” and “Chinese” students were of equal mental ability, but that, as Keppel recalled for Strong, “there was a sharp drop before the native Hawaiians, Philippinos and Portuguese were reached [sic].”\(^{109}\) A month later, on July 15, 1931, Strong wrote that he wanted to secure some objective evidence of Japanese “cleanliness”—a trait with which Francis Galton’s eugenics movement and then American psychologists were obsessed—as compared to other “races.” “Mexicans,” he protested to Keppel’s assistant, “are allowed the use of bathing beaches and the YMCA; Japanese are largely debarred. The former are usually very filthy and the latter are probably the cleanest of all races as a daily bath is almost a religious requirement.”\(^{110}\)

Strong’s conversations with Keppel reveal a good deal about processes of racial formation during the interwar period. In 1930, for example, neither Keppel nor the president of the University of Hawaii considered Portuguese “white.” At the same time, in California, where racially segregated community facilities were the norm, Mexicans and Mexican Americans were *white enough* to enjoy racial privileges unavailable to African Americans or Asian Americans. These patterns are consistent with those described by historians of race in Hawaii and California who have pointed to the mutually constitutive relationship between race and class, the fluidity of

\(^{109}\) Keppel to Strong, June 9, 1930, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.
\(^{110}\) Strong to Lester, July 15, 1931, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.

The conversations between Strong and Keppel also reveal that while Strong was certainly more progressive than many of his peers in his recognition of white-Japanese equality, he never divorced himself from the eugenic preoccupations of his field. Nowhere in the Carnegie-Stanford project are these preoccupations more apparent than in Strong’s 1933 book, Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States.

Just as Strong was the right person for the Carnegie Corporation, possible Carnegie funding for a project involving Japanese-Americans and vocations was a perfect fit for Strong. Though he had focused early in his career on the psychology of advertising, by 1933 Strong was committed to vocational guidance. In 1927 he had
published the *Strong Vocational Interest Blank*, which presented individuals with a list of activities and compared their positive or negative reactions to those activities to those of men in a range of occupations, and when Keppel contacted him he was working on an interest blank specifically designed for women.\(^{112}\) *Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States* allowed Strong the opportunity, then, to tackle sex and race all at once.

Strong was confident that a thorough presentation of Japanese abilities—voiced in the language of psychometrics—would rid white employers of their irrational prejudices.\(^{113}\) Both a synthesis of previous literature and a compilation of new studies, Strong designed *Vocational Aptitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States* to address the following questions:

- first, do second-generation Japanese differ significantly from whites?
- And, second, if there are such differences, what bearing do they have upon choice of occupation? In other words, is there any indication that Japanese should enter certain occupations and not other occupations because of their peculiar physical, mental, and moral make-up?\(^{114}\)

As he confided to Keppel in May, 1930, Strong knew the answers to these questions long before the data was in. The Japanese did not in fact differ from whites significantly, and thus should enter all the same occupations.

Strong proposed that the psychological literature had established adequate baselines for Japanese and white intelligence, but not for vocational aptitudes. "When the present study was undertaken," he asserted, "it was known that Japanese and

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\(^{113}\) Strong to Keppel, May 16, 1930, Box 338, Folder 5, CCNYR.

\(^{114}\) Strong and Bell, *Vocational Interests*, 7.
whites average just about the same on general intelligence tests." The Terman-JAA study of American-born Japanese children (1926), carried out by Marvin Darsie, had established this, as had studies by Yoshihide Kubo (1922), a lecturer at the University of Tokyo (and, like Terman, a student of G. Stanley Hall), Tonan Fukuda (1923), and Hisakichi Misaki (1927). Vocational aptitudes, however, represented the product of a more complex formula, one that opened up Strong’s Japanese-American subjects to a whole new battery of testing.

The battery of tests that Strong, Bell and their team of researchers compiled included measurements of reaction and motor coordination, intelligence, art ability, and personality traits. In order to provide a fuller measure of aptitudes and personality, Strong also included surveys of vocational interest, subjects’ ability to speak Japanese and English, “juvenile and adult delinquency and crime," and “honesty and trustworthiness,” the last split into the subcategories: “credit rating” and “ratings of housewives for efficiency and trustworthiness of Japanese.”

Except for Strong’s “honesty and trustworthiness” category, all of these types of measurement had long histories within the eugenic psychometric movement. Physical and motor measurements were the first measures of intelligence, developed by the founder of Eugenics, Francis Galton, in the late nineteenth century. As we saw

115 Strong and Bell, *Vocational Interests*, 8.
117 Strong and Bell, *Vocational Interests*, 5.
in Chapter Two, Galton’s tests represented a transitional stage in race science
between a focus on anthropometry, or physical measurement, and psychometrics,
mental measurement. At the turn of the twentieth century, French psychologists
Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon, and then American psychologists Goddard,
Terman, Cattell and Thorndike nearly completed this transition by refining Galton’s
experiments and devising new problem-solving spatial and language-based testing
procedures. Strong and Bell’s inclusion of these tests of motor coordination alongside
those of intelligence in *Vocational Aptitudes* demonstrates applied psychologists’
unwillingness to abandon the anthropometric approach, especially when it came to
studying groups they themselves racialized as non-white.

Tests of art ability, aesthetic appreciation, and personality traits were all part
of Galton’s early formula for divining intelligence, though these too developed
through the subsequent efforts of Binet and early American psychologists such as G.
Stanley Hall and his Clark University Colleague, George Partridge. By the 1930s,
aesthetic appreciation and personality had become standard categories of
measurement, frequently operating in conjunction with the most popular test,
Terman’s revision of the Binet-Simon intelligence scale, to find for individual or
group intelligence.118

118 For a more detailed look at the history of psychometrics, see Chapter Two of this
dissertation. I have also consulted Francis Maxfield, “Trends in Intelligence Testing,”
“History of, and Present Trends in Testing,” *Yearbook of the National Council of
Measurements Used in Education*, n. 6 (1948-1949): 1-22; Benoit Godin, “From
Eugenics to Scientometrics: Galton, Cattell, and Men of Science,” *Social Studies of
Biography, Cognitive Deficits, and Laboratory Practice: James McKeen Cattell and
Strong’s survey of what he called “delinquency and crime” among Japanese Americans in California also had deep roots in applied psychology’s eugenic past, but its inclusion speaks as well to long-held concerns of Stanford University faculty and administrators, and to the specific anxieties associated with Japanese immigration. Since Galton’s earliest inquiries into human traits, eugenicists in Britain and the United States had been particularly concerned with criminality, especially when they could establish it as a hereditary marker of class.119 Strong’s colleagues in the Stanford Psychology department were among those most responsible for developing this concern into a professional field, popularizing psychometric testing in prisons and juvenile centers. In 1915 Lewis Terman sent his doctoral student, J. Harold Williams to the Whittier State School, a reform school for boys, to classify its students and to further Terman’s larger goal of determining the causes of delinquency.120 The next year, working for the California State Board of Charities and Corrections, and the State Joint Committee on Defectives, Terman himself, along with Stanford psychologist Herbert Knollin, conducted psychometric evaluations of prisoners at San Quentin.121 Terman and his fellow researchers nearly always

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121 Lewis Terman and H. E. Knollin conducted the survey in 1916, but it was published as “A Partial Psychological Survey of the Prison Population of San Quentin, California,” in California State Board of Charities and Corrections, ed.,
“discovered” that “feeblemindedness,” the trait Terman associated most closely with
delinquency, was not only hereditary, but was more common among working-class,
non-white subjects.

In 1923, eugenicist and former Stanford University President David Starr
Jordan made his own contribution to the idea of criminality as a fixed, hereditary trait.
“Criminals and prostitutes,” he wrote in the San Francisco Journal, were from a
“slum population” that “even if modified by training can never wholly be reclaimed.”
Merging notions of race and class explicitly, Jordan wrote that “the well-born and ill-
born in England, for instance, differ from each other as much as though they were of
a different race,” and that while descendants of the former might “be educated into
useful citizenship,” those of the latter, of “the permanent slum population, never.
Feeble-minded children follow feeble-minded parents and from their number spring,
in all lands, the majority of criminals and prostitutes.”

The topic of criminality and delinquency was also a powerful component of
debates over Japanese immigration and education. As we saw in the first chapter,
anti-Japanese movement leaders, beginning in the late nineteenth century with Dennis
Kearney, condemned the Japanese as vice-ridden. This prompted Japanese
immigrant advocacy organizations such as the Japanese Association of America to
attempt to institute moral reforms among Japanese in California; and it led Japanese
immigrant advocates such as Sidney Gulick and John P. Irish to write books and

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Surveys in Mental Deviation in Prisons, Public Schools, and Orphanages in
California (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1918).

123 Denis Kearney, Sacramento Daily Record-Union, July 7, 1892.
testify before congress on the virtues of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, in 1933, in order to prove to the wider public that Japanese Americans were in fact worthy of equal vocational opportunities, Strong felt he needed to address Japanese-American criminality and delinquency.

As with my analysis of the Terman-JAA project in Chapter One, I am less concerned with the findings of Strong’s studies than what the studies themselves suggest about race and science during the interwar period. Strong’s work, after all, was the sort that cited long passages from articles with titles such as “Japanese People, Artistic as a Race; Fond of Children.”\textsuperscript{125} In order to get an idea of the scope of Strong’s project, however, it would be useful to go over some of the numbers. In addition to the nearly 10,000 interviews Strong’s research team collected for *Japanese in America*, between 1930 and 1934 Strong’s researchers conducted psychometric tests—those of motor measurement, reaction time, intelligence, art ability and personality traits—on 1,810 Japanese and 3,804 whites in California and Hawaii. For his “Honesty and Trustworthiness” chapter, Strong secured by survey the retail-credit rating of 995 Japanese and 3,589 whites in California, and “efficiency and trustworthiness” ratings for 178 Japanese and 557 white servants. For his chapter


\textsuperscript{125} W.E. Priestley, “Japanese People, Artistic as a Race; Fond of Children,” *Japanese American Courier*, Seattle, May 10, 1930 cited in Strong, *Vocational Aptitudes*, 140 to demonstrate that in contract law, “the Japanese have learned that ‘honesty is the best policy.’”
on juvenile delinquency, written by Terman’s former student, Hisakichi Misaki, Strong’s team compiled juvenile delinquency records for, according to Strong, “all Japanese and whites reported during the last 10 years in Alameda, Fresno, Los Angeles, and San Francisco Counties, and during the last 15 years in Honolulu County, territory of Hawaii.” The study, then, was a massive undertaking, involving dozens of researchers and thousands of subjects.

Ultimately, like nearly all racial research conducted by applied psychologists, the tests and surveys published as part of the Carnegie-Stanford project confirmed the hypotheses—and the conceptual limitations—of those who administered them. After compiling all of the data, Strong concluded that Japanese-American and white artistic abilities were equal, that Japanese Americans “as a class” were “no more dishonest than Americans,” that they had “a fine record...as far as crime [was] concerned,” and that, although Japanese-Americans were more introverted and less dominant than whites according to the Bernreuter Inventory, there was nothing to suggest that this should alter their vocational choices or aptitudes.

On its face, and certainly in reaction to decades of anti-Japanese sentiment, the findings of Strong’s project seem progressive. Ultimately, Strong’s data supported the notion that Japanese Americans deserved the same occupational opportunities as whites. Like all racial testing, however, the tests had a powerful downside. First, as we saw in Japanese in America, most of the testing and surveying depended on the idea of racial hierarchies. For Strong and his generation of testers, racial position did not exist in a vacuum. In order to raise the Japanese in the estimation of Americans,

126 Strong and Bell, *Vocational Interests*, 8.
127 Strong and Bell, *Vocational Interests*, 80, 154, 173, 138, 113.
Strong invariably lowered another racially-defined group along that hierarchy. And, like other testers looking to augment the position of Asian Americans, such as Yeung (1921), Darsie (1926) and Misaki (1927), Strong generally relegated Mexican Americans and African Americans to this lower tier.\(^{128}\)

Just as significantly, Strong’s conclusions served to reify imaginary borders between “the Japanese,” as he called them, and “Americans.” Japanese and Americans were always presented as two separate, distinct categories of analysis, rather than what they actually were: overlapping populations. Additionally, since test results comparing Japanese and Americans were generally presented as averages, the results themselves obscured heterogeneity within each population, ignored overlap, and furthered the idea of discrete boundaries. In this way, racial psychometric research was a trap. Researchers attempting to use racial testing for ostensibly anti-racist agendas could not escape the confines of the testing itself. The basic assumption undergirding racial testing, the race paradigm, necessarily limited testing’s redemptive possibilities.\(^{129}\)


\(^{129}\) Tukufu Zuberi, “Deracializing Social Statistics: Problems in the Quantification of Race,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, v. 568 (March, 2000); *Thicker Than Blood: How Racial Statistic Lie* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001); and Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, eds. *White Logic, White Methods: Race and Methodology* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008) have written on the problems of employing social science methodology (e.g. psychological testing and statistics) toward the research of
In some ways, Strong’s inability to transcend the limitations of his field to produce truly progressive research embodies the entire history of the Carnegie-Stanford testing project. Just as Strong’s research team was held back by its own methodologies, so too was the project constrained by larger scientific and political trends. As we have seen, Charles Beard had envisioned the project as a concrete intervention into the lives of second-generation Japanese Americans. By the time he brought his proposal to Carnegie Corporation President Fred Keppel in the Spring of 1926, he had spent decades advancing the cause of workers’ education, and through these efforts had forged strong connections to members of the philanthropic community. In 1922 and 1923, his work as a municipal advisor had taken him to Japan, where he developed equally strong relationships with Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and scholars. Thus, when he learned about the employment difficulties of Japanese Americans in California, he thought himself an ideal conduit between the Carnegie Corporation and Japanese-American interests. His proposal—that Carnegie support the education, vocational training and placement efforts already underway under the direction of Roy Akagi at the Japanese YMCA of Los Angeles—appeared to him a workable solution to the local problem of Japanese unemployment.

race. Tracing current social science methodologies back to Francis Galton’s eugenic experiments, Zuberi, Bonilla-Silva, and the several authors writing for their 2008 volume contend that social science in general and statistical analysis in particular has not wrested itself from its racist ideological underpinnings. Their warning: uncritical use of methodologies born in the service of scientific racism and matured within the Western racial context produce false conclusions regarding race.
Moreover, Beard’s Japanese friends and colleagues had convinced him that funding Akagi would also alleviate transpacific tensions brought on by the recent passage of the 1924 Immigration Act.

What Beard did not foresee, however, was the degree to which domestic anti-Japanese politics would dictate the direction of Carnegie Corporation funding. Keppel agreed with Beard that funding the education and vocational placement of Japanese Americans would address both local and transpacific Japanese-American problems, but he was unwilling to fund a Japanese organization directly. If he were going to enter the Carnegie Corporation into the contentious politics surrounding Japanese immigrants and their children in California, he would need a buffer. In 1924, another New York-based philanthropic organization, the Rockefeller-funded Institute for Social and Religious Research, had ventured into the fray with their study, *A Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast*, and their involvement had earned them unwanted criticism from West Coast anti-Japanese organized Labor, politicians, and journalists. To avoid subjecting Carnegie to direct exposure to the anti-Japanese element, Keppel chose to funnel Beard’s proposal through Stanford University. Stanford seemed the perfect fit. It was a white-run, elite institution that positioned itself above the fray of contentious California politics; additionally, its administration had professional ties to Japan, and an interest in maintaining good transpacific relations.

Routing Beard’s proposal through Stanford, however, transformed it considerably. Beard had wanted Carnegie to fund an actual Japanese-American education and job placement program, but under the auspices of psychology professor
Edward Strong, Stanford researchers put together a study of Japanese-American educational and vocational aptitudes. This transition—from a concrete vocational education and placement program to a research platform—was fundamentally a product of the way Stanford University and the Carnegie Corporation approached race in the early twentieth century. From the early 1900s, both institutions had played a formative role in the development of eugenics and psychometrics in the US, and both maintained a leading role in those movements into the late 1930s.

By proposing a study regarding Japanese Americans to Carnegie, Beard unknowingly contributed toward its undoing. Had Beard proposed an education and jobs program for another group of Americans, Keppel might have funded it. As we noted above, when Beard was a member of the Workers’ Education Bureau in 1924, he and Keppel worked together on several such projects. For Keppel, and subsequently for Stanford researchers, however, introducing Japanese Americans into the equation not only implied an intervention into California’s racial politics, it meant an opportunity for additional racial measurement. Within the context of Stanford and Carnegie’s institutional investments in eugenics and racial psychometric research, and set against the politics of the anti-Japanese movement, Beard’s original proposal stood little chance of remaining unchanged.

Edward Strong and his researchers—many of whom were Japanese and Japanese American—attempted to build a progressive project. Their conclusions regarding Japanese racial abilities were intended as a response to three decades of anti-Japanese arguments and legislation. However, the tools they used to forge these conclusions sabotaged their progressive goals in two ways. First, racial psychometric
testing was always a zero-sum game. Thus, whenever Strong and his team compared Japanese favorably to whites, they did so by disparaging other racially-defined groups. Second, by relying on race as a category of measurement, and producing data which presented, for instance, Japanese, white, Chinese, Mexicans, Filipinos, and Koreans in California in discrete, measurable groups, the Stanford team only further strengthened hereditarian arguments which essentialized race.

When we set the Carnegie-Stanford project alongside the 1921-1926 collaboration between Terman and the Japanese Association of America (JAA), and studies conducted by Stanford graduate students Kwok Tsuen Yeung (1921), Hisakichi Misaki (1927), and Reginald Bell (1932), a strong pattern of political progressivism emerges. In all cases, either the researchers or the funders of the studies sought to use psychometric testing to improve the life chances of the group being tested. In the instance of the Stanford-JAA project, JAA board members believed that Terman’s testing would prove the racial worth and assimilative possibility of Japanese Americans, and thus provide fodder for their struggle against California’s anti-Japanese movement. Kwok Tsuen Yeung and Hisakichi Misaki looked to Terman’s Stanford-Binet test to demonstrate that Chinese-American and Japanese-American students were as intelligent as their white peers. And Reginald Bell employed testing in an attempt to show the negative effects of racial segregation in California’s public schools.

As with the Carnegie-Stanford project, however, the redemptive political possibilities of all of these projects were limited by the hereditarian and racial essentialist thinking upon which racial testing was predicated. Wherever the Stanford-
affiliated researchers looked to psychometric testing to measure purported racial norms, their projects suffered from “two deep fallacies,” to borrow Stephen Jay Gould’s phrase: reification, which Gould defines as “the tendency to convert abstract concepts into entities,” and ranking, “our propensity for ordering complex variation as a gradual ascending scale.”\footnote{Gould, \textit{The Mismeasure of Man}, 24.} The testers bound their subjects into separate racial groups with associated mental, physical, and emotional characteristics. They compared these groups to each other, highlighting further their differences, and labeling those differences innate, or natural. This continual reification of race meant that even in their most radical moments, as they attempted to prove white/non-white IQ parity, their work was adding planks to the scaffolding that made white supremacy possible.
Epilogue

Low as is the average intelligence of our population…it is nevertheless far higher than the average of the immigrants we have been receiving from southern and southeastern Europe….We have taken in since 1900 over 6,000,000 who were graded as "inferior" or "very inferior,” that is, far below the average intelligence of the white population, so that not only will the blood of the native American be mongrelized by these alien hordes, but the average intelligence of the country will be steadily reduced by the newcomers.

- Madison Grant, “The Racial Transformation of America,” 1924

The statistical construct known as IQ can reliably estimate general mental ability, or intelligence. The average IQ of immigrants in the United States is substantially lower than that of the white native population, and the difference is likely to persist over several generations. The consequences are a lack of socioeconomic assimilation among low-IQ immigrant groups, more underclass behavior, less social trust, and an increase in the proportion of unskilled workers in the American labor market.


On May 6, 2013, as the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate deliberated a bill on immigration reform, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, published a report aimed at derailing the legislation. The Heritage report, with the byline “Robert Rector and Jason Richwine, Ph.D.,” claimed that the proposed bill’s amnesty provisions, which legalized certain classes of undocumented immigrants, would cost the government $5.3 trillion in taxes, welfare, and public services. According to Rector and Richwine, while the immigrants themselves would

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A central contention of Rector and Richwine was that education levels and fiscal deficits are connected. “In 2010, in the U.S. population as a whole,” they wrote, “households headed by persons without a high school degree, on average, received $46,582 in government benefits while paying only $11,469 in taxes….The high deficits of poorly educated households [sic] are important in the amnesty debate because the typical unlawful immigrant has only a 10th-grade education.” Rector and Richwine then warned that this educational-cum-fiscal deficit would persist over the generations, stipulating that while “children of unlawful immigrants will have substantially better educational outcomes than their parents, these achievements will have limits. Only 13 percent are likely to graduate from college.” Thus, according to their report, the children of unlawful immigrants were “likely to remain a fiscal net burden on U.S. taxpayers.”\footnote{Ibid.}

\textit{Washington Post} journalist Dylan Mathews investigated Richwine’s Ph.D. and found that the Heritage paper was not the first time Richwine had linked race and intergenerational-educational deficits to public-policy recommendations. In a May 8, 2013 article for the \textit{Post}, Mathews revealed that Richwine had received his doctorate from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government in 2009 with a dissertation titled “I.Q. and Immigration Policy.” In the dissertation, Richwine had argued that when
dealing specifically with Mexican immigration, U.S. policy should take into account what he called “persistent” racial differences in I.Q.\(^5\) “No one knows,” he had written, “whether Hispanics will ever reach IQ parity with whites, but the prediction that new Hispanic immigrants will have low-IQ children and grandchildren is difficult to argue against.”\(^6\) Citing magnetic resonance imaging studies that had purportedly “shown that Asians have larger brains than whites, who have larger brains than blacks,” and relying upon the findings of hereditarian psychologists such as Richard Jensen, Phillip Rushton, and Charles Murray, Richwine’s dissertation had set up an intelligence hierarchy with “whites intermediate, and Asians and Blacks at the extremes.”\(^7\)

Mathews’ revelation that the co-author of the Heritage study believed in innate-racial I.Q. differences provoked a media firestorm, protests at colleges and universities, and Richwine’s rapid departure from the Heritage Foundation. Within hours of Mathews’ posting the Richwine article on the *Washington Post* website, the story was picked up by dozens of online news outlets, and within a week it had

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become a focus of the national print media.\(^8\) Twenty-four student groups at Harvard University published an open letter responding to Richwine’s claims and delivered a petition with 1,200 signatures to David Ellwood, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, calling for the school to condemn Richwine’s conclusions and to investigate the conferral of his degree.\(^9\) On May 10, 2013, just two days after his 2009 dissertation came to light, Richwine resigned from the foundation.\(^10\)

If we take a closer look at Richwine’s dissertation, we see that like the Heritage Foundation, which chose to include Richwine’s academic suffix in the byline of its report, Richwine relied upon the perceived moral authority of the academy, of supposedly objective scholarship, to grant his arguments power. His dissertation cited several psychological studies linking race to intelligence, and characterized critics of those studies as out of step with “mainstream” psychology.\(^11\)


In a first chapter titled “The Science of IQ,” Richwine wrote that his views on race and IQ were shared by those with “expert knowledge” in the field. If they were not well-received, it was because lay people did not understand the science behind them, and because “IQ can be an uncomfortable topic in a liberal democracy,” he observed, self-assuredly. “The reality of innate differences between individuals and groups is often difficult to accept for those with an aversion to inequality.”

In the days and weeks following his resignation, Richwine did not back down from these claims. On May 13, 2013, he stated to a *Washington Examiner* reporter, "I don't apologize for any of the things that I said. But I do regret that I couldn't give more detail. And I also regret that I didn't think more about how the average lay person would perceive these things, as opposed to an academic audience." 

Richwine’s 2009 dissertation triggered such an immediate and hostile response in 2013 partly because Richwine was in a position to affect public policy. Indeed, his dissertation only came to light because he was involved in lobbying efforts for the Heritage Foundation. Richwine, however, is only the most recent in a long line of scientists and social scientists who have attempted to use racial intelligence testing to legitimate racist claims and influence public policy. In this dissertation, we have explored the history of racial intelligence testing and brought

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13 York, “A Talk with Jason Richwine.”
14 To quote former American Psychological Association President Robert Sternberg, "the articles and books reporting on [race and I.Q.] research inevitably have the seemingly obligatory final public-policy section…attempting to show that one group is inferior to another and that not much, if anything, can be done about it.” Robert J. Sternberg, “There are No Public-Policy Implications: A Reply to Rushton and Jensen,” *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law* v. 11, n. 2 (June 2005): 295-301, 296.
attention to one aspect of it that has been overlooked: Stanford University’s testing of Asian Americans during the first decades of the twentieth century.

Just as Richwine sought to inject data he purported was objective on the I.Q. inferiority of Mexican immigrants into the immigration policy debates of 2013, Stanford University researchers hoped to use race-based testing data to influence policies related to Asian immigrants and Asian Americans in the 1920s and 1930s. Under the direction of psychologist Lewis Terman, between 1920 and 1935, Stanford psychologists and graduate researchers in psychology and education administered thousands of psychometric, or mental measurement, tests to children of Asian heritage in public schools throughout California. Like Richwine, who pointed not only to IQ data, but to MRI studies on brain size in an attempt to prove the existence of an innate racial intelligence hierarchy, Terman’s colleagues and students invented and deployed a diverse regimen of assessment techniques in service of their mission. All of the Stanford studies included the Stanford-Binet Revision, Terman’s 1916 reworking of French psychologist Alfred Binet’s 1905 intelligence test, and a number of other verbal and non-verbal tests, as well as surveys and questionnaires designed to measure not only intelligence and academic achievement, but such indices as “aesthetic appreciation,” “permanence of mood,” “musical ability,” and “honesty and trustworthiness.”15 As we have seen, however, not all of these Stanford testing projects were conducted for the same reasons.

Critics of racial intelligence testing have rightly pointed out that psychometric
tests have long been a primary arm of scientific racism, and a method for maintaining
white supremacy. Several of the psychologists who developed testing techniques in
the United States between 1910 and 1930 had ties to the American eugenics
movement. They used testing to place African-American and Latino children into
vocational tracks in the public schools, and they lobbied congress for exclusionary
immigration legislation that would, in the words of eugenicist and testing enthusiast
Harry Laughlin, “protect against inferior immigrants” and “select and welcome
superior strains.” Richwine and the current breed of hereditarian psychologists and
social scientists he cites in his dissertation—most notably Arthur Jensen and Charles


Murray—have continued this tradition, using testing to further a conservative political agenda hostile to government welfare programs and immigration reform.¹⁸

Focusing on the Stanford testing projects allows us to see, however, that we cannot draw a straight line back from Richwine and his cohort to some monolithic, nativist testing movement of the 1920s. While racial testing today serves only conservative, even reactionary agendas, the racial testing of the 1920s and 30s was not always so politically consistent. The researchers, as well as the academic and funding institutions involved in the Stanford studies approached racial testing from a wide array of political positions, and with a diverse set of expectations. Some, like Lewis Terman and Harry Laughlin, intended to use the tests to further a racialist and xenophobic agenda, but others, like board members of the Japanese Association of America, and Stanford researchers such as Kwok Tsuen Yeung, Hisakichi Misaki, Reginald Bell and Edward Strong, had more progressive motives.

When we look at the Progressive-era Stanford testing projects, we see examples of non-white organizations and individuals attempting to use racial testing to combat nativist movements. In 1921, the Japanese Association of America (JAA), a Japanese-government-affiliated immigrant advocacy organization, agreed to be the sole benefactor of a testing project aimed at Japanese and Japanese-American children in California schools. Despite the fact that the director of the project, Lewis Terman, was a white supremacist who published on the merit of race-based immigration policies, the JAA raised $10,000 dollars, (between one-third and one-

half of its annual budget) to fund the project because JAA board members believed its findings might be useful in the struggle against California’s anti-Japanese movement.

Tomás Almaguer has written that European Americans in turn-of-the-twentieth-century California conferred social status to other racial groups along the “fault lines” of a constantly-shifting racial hierarchy. A racial group’s tenuous place along this hierarchy in many ways determined the extent to which it could participate in society—earn fair wages, vote, own land, even attend public schools. In 1921 and 1927, two of Terman’s students at Stanford, Kwok Tsuen Yeung and Hisakichi Misaki, the first a visiting student from China, the second a Hawaiian of Japanese descent, attempted to use racial testing to reposition Chinese and Japanese along this hierarchy.

Steeped in the culture of testing and the racial worldview of American psychologists, neither Yeung nor Misaki was interested in upsetting the apple cart of racial hierarchy in California, but their work did question how the cart’s contents might be arranged. Like Terman, Yeung and Misaki were confident in psychology’s approach to race. Both cast aside as unscientific the critiques of Boas and other social scientists who questioned whether races indeed possessed different levels of intelligence, and both believed that psychological testing, and Terman’s Stanford-Binet Revision in particular, promised the true measurement of a racial group. Rather than use testing to promote anti-immigrant policies, however, Yeung and Misaki attempted to employ it prove that people of Chinese and Japanese heritage were as intelligent as white Americans, and thus worthy of assimilation. Set against the anti-

Asian politics and policies of the 1920s—and the nativist politics of the psychologists that trained them—this was a radical move.\(^{20}\)

White psychologists at Stanford attempted to use testing for progressive, anti-racist purposes as well. In 1932, Reginald Bell, a student trained by Terman’s close friend and research partner Maude Merrill, sought to draw attention to the negative effects of racial segregation in California’s public schools. With financial backing from the Carnegie Corporation and guidance from Stanford Japanese professor and immigrant activist Yamato Ichihashi, Bell and co-researchers Florence Bell and Hisakichi Misaki administered Terman’s Stanford Binet Revision and Stanford Achievement Test to 500 Japanese-American children in segregated and non-segregated school districts near Sacramento, California. Bell began his research with complete faith in Terman’s tests, but when he discovered that segregated students were outperforming non-segregated on the tests over a seven-month period, his confidence wavered. A firm believer in the ills of segregation, he ended his work by challenging his own methodology, questioning whether Terman’s Stanford-Binet Revision could really be used at all to establish I.Q. in cases where an English-language handicap existed.\(^{21}\)

In addition to his research on school segregation, between 1929 and 1935 Bell collaborated with psychologist Edward Strong on a study of Japanese Americans designed to change anti-Japanese sentiment in California. The six-year study, which


\(^{21}\) Bell, “A Study of the Educational Effects of Segregation upon Japanese Children in American Schools,” 118-123.
looked at the vocational and educational opportunities and abilities of second-generation Japanese Americans, was Stanford’s largest and longest-running racial testing project. Using a $40,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Strong and Bell hired a team of English- and Japanese-speaking researchers (including, once again, Hisakichi Misaki) to test, survey and interview nearly 10,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans living in California.22

Beyond the mere scope of the 1929-1935 Carnegie-Stanford project, its significance lies in what it can tell us about the factors that shaped American racial projects during the interwar period. Tracking the project from proposal to implementation reveals that the directions it took were contingent upon personal relationships between scholars and administrators, regional politics in the U.S., and international diplomatic concerns. In 1926, the historian Charles Beard, who during the early 1920s had forged personal and professional ties to Japan, asked his long-time friend, Frederick Keppel, President of the Carnegie Corporation, to fund a job placement program at the Japanese YMCA of Los Angeles. Beard successfully sold the project to Keppel as a means to ameliorate the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, a relationship recently soured by the exclusionary Immigration Act of 1924. However, Keppel’s reticence to draw the ire of anti-Japanese politicians and

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journalists in California by funding a Japanese institution directly, and his institution’s long connection to psychometric research, prompted him to funnel the project through Stanford University and psychologist Edward Strong rather than the Japanese YMCA. By 1929, under the leadership of Strong, what had begun as a proposal to fund an education and job placement program for Japanese Americans had become a study of Japanese American educational and vocational abilities.

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When we actively engage with the history of the Stanford testing projects, asking questions about the testers and their funders, we learn that the testing movement was more variegated and more inclusive than previously imagined. We see that while several prominent test developers such as Terman, Robert Yerkes, and Carl Brigham did use the tests to promote racist, anti-immigrant policies, the movement included more progressive voices as well. Asian-immigrant organizations such as the JAA, and pro-Asian-immigrant researchers such as Yeung, Misaki, Bell and Strong all sought to use the tests to combat anti-Asian prejudice in California.

It is important to recognize that despite their progressive intentions, organizations and individuals associated with the Stanford testing projects were limited both by their own racial worldviews, and by the testing methodology itself. As this study has underscored, members of the JAA, as well as Terman’s colleagues and students, embraced eugenic testing because they themselves were racial essentialists. They believed, like Terman, that humans were in fact separated into discrete racial groups with mental characteristics that were both innate and measurable, and the testing methodology they employed drew upon and helped to
reify these false categories. Psychometric testing, developed in the service of
eugenics by Francis Galton, and then by admirers of Galton in the United States such
as James McKeen Cattell at Columbia University and Terman at Stanford, reflected
the assumptions of its inventors, and although many of the Stanford testers had an
agenda on immigration that was progressive compared to that of Terman’s, they
never escaped the constraints of this paradigm.

By highlighting the diverse contributions that Stanford-affiliated individuals
and organizations made to eugenic testing during the 1920s and 1930s, this
dissertation complicates our understanding of the eugenics movement, and adds to the
expanding literature demonstrating the movement’s broad reach. As scholars such as
Ashley Montagu and William Tucker have shown, testing was an integral component
of a eugenics movement that pervaded most major U.S. institutions in the first half of
the twentieth century. Politicians, and administrators at all levels of public and
private education, the Armed Forces, hospitals, and prisons looked to the eugenic
technology of testing to make policy decisions, track students, and separate their
charges into manageable administrative categories. If we add to this troubling history
the progressive-minded organizations and individuals associated with the Stanford
University testing projects, we get a renewed sense of the eugenics movement’s
influence over American institutions, an influence that resonates even today.

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