Title
Armed Force, Regimes, Contention, and Democratization in Europe since 1650

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As seen in the vivid light cast by French and British examples, Switzerland followed an astonishing path to partial democracy during the nineteenth century. Long a scattering of belligerent fiefs within successive German empires, most Swiss areas acquired de facto independence at the Peace of Basel (1499) and de jure recognition as a federation at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Until the very end of the eighteenth century the federation remained no more than a loose alliance of thirteen jealously sovereign cantons with strong ties to allied territories of Geneva, Grisons (Graubünden), and Valais, plus subject territories (e.g., Vaud, Lugano, Bellinzona, and Valtellina) of their component units. From the sixteenth to eighteenth century, Switzerland withdrew almost entirely from war on its own account, but provided crack mercenary troops to much of Europe. During that period, Switzerland's politics operated chiefly at the local and cantonal levels: outward-looking efforts to hold off other powers, inward-looking efforts to deal with—or defend—enormous disparities and particularities of privilege.

Conquered by Napoleon (with some assistance from Swiss revolutionaries) in 1798, then given new constitutions that year and in 1803, the Swiss adopted a much more centralized form of government with a national assembly, official multilingualism, and relative equality among cantons. Despite some territorial adjustments, the basic governmental form survived Napoleon's defeat. After 1830, Switzerland became a temporary home for many exiled revolutionaries (e.g., Mazzini and Weitling), who collaborated with Swiss radicals in calling for reform. Historians of the 1830s speak of a Regeneration Movement pursued by means of "publicity, clubs, and mass marches" (Nabholz et al. 1938, 406). With France's July 1830 revolution, anticlericalism became more salient in Swiss radicalism. Nevertheless, the new constitutions enacted in that mobilization stressed liberty and fraternity far more than equality. We might call the resulting regimes constitutional oligarchies.

From the early nineteenth century, Switzerland's already extensive rural textile industry and crafts began to urbanize and capitalize, which spurred disproportionate population growth in existing urban regions. With a Protestant majority concentrated in the richer, more urbanized cantons, an approximate political split Protestant-liberal-radical vs. Catholic-conservative became salient in Swiss politics. On the average, predominantly Catholic cantons lay in the country's central, higher-altitude, more rural areas. In regions dominated by conservative cities (e.g., Basel), the countryside (widely industrialized during the eighteenth century, but suffering contraction in cottage industry during the early nineteenth) often supported liberal or radical programs.

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The political problem became acute because national alignments of the mid-1840s pitted twelve richer and predominantly liberal-Protestant cantons against ten poorer, predominantly conservative-Catholic cantons in a diet where each canton had a single vote. Thus liberals deployed the rhetoric of national patriotism and majority rule while conservatives countered with cantonal rights and defense of religious traditions.

From 1830 to 1848, republicans and radicals repeatedly formed military bands (often called free corps, or *Freischaren*) and attempted to take over particular cantonal capitals by force of arms. Such bands failed in Lucerne (1841), but brought new administrations to power in Lausanne (1847), Geneva (1847), and Neuchâtel (1848). The largest military engagement took place in 1847. The federal diet ordered dissolution of the league (*Sonderbund*) formed for mutual defense by Catholic cantons Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais two years earlier. When the Catholic cantons refused, the diet sent an army to Fribourg (whose forces capitulated without serious fighting), then Lucerne (where a short battle occurred). The Sonderbund had about 79,000 men under arms, the federation some 99,000. After two more weeks of skirmishing and cleaning up, the Sonderbund War ended with 24 dead among the Catholic forces and 74 dead among the attackers. Its defeat consolidated the dominance of liberals in Switzerland as a whole, and led to the adoption of a cautiously liberal constitution (with many features modeled on the U.S. Constitution) in 1848.

A last ricochet of the 1847-1848 military struggles occurred in 1856: forces loyal to the King of Prussia (effectively, but not formally, displaced from shared sovereignty in Neuchâtel by the republican coup of 1848) seized military control of part of Neuchâtel's cantonal capital only to be displaced almost immediately by the cantonal militia. Prussia's threats to invade Switzerland only incited other European powers to hold Prussia in check. From that point on, the limited republican constitution applied to all of the Swiss Federation. Between 1849 and 1870, furthermore, the Swiss cantons terminated their profitable centuries-old export of mercenary units for military service elsewhere.

Whatever else we say about the Swiss itinerary toward democracy, it certainly passed through intense popular struggle, including extensive military action. The same process that produced a higher-capacity central government, furthermore, also created Switzerland's restricted but genuine democracy: as compared with what before, relatively broad and equal citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, and substantial protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents. As compared with late nineteenth-century French or British models of democracy, however, the Swiss federal system looks extraordinarily heterogeneous: a distinctive constitution and citizenship for each canton, multiple authorities and compacts, a surprising combination of exclusiveness with the capacity to create particular niches for newly accepted political actors. Through all subsequent constitutional changes, those residues of Swiss political history have persisted. They continue to exercise profound effects on social movements and other forms of contentious politics within Switzerland (Giugni and Passy 1997; Kriesi 1981; Kriesi et al. 1995).

**Regime Change and Contention**

Drawing on a lifetime of comparisons between French and British experiences, this essay clears ground for a more general explanation of variation in the impact of regimes on contention, and vice versa, over Europe as a whole since 1650. Differences among Swiss, British, French, Dutch, Iberian, and other European experiences with regime change and contention set challenging
empirical, conceptual, and theoretical problems. Considering the great variety of European trajectories, how can we possibly pinpoint important similarities and differences in the interplay among changes in social environments, alterations in governmental forms, histories of contentious politics, and approaches to (or retreats from) democracy? How can we single out the effects of varying patterns of military activity? What concepts will help discipline those comparisons and single out significant causal mechanisms? To what extent can we identify recurrent cause-effect relationships that operated throughout the range of European history since 1650? This paper's task is to lay out tools for pursuit of those questions.

The tools are chiefly conceptual--lots of definitions and schemata, no systematic presentation of evidence, no more than preliminary statement of causal propositions. They make it possible to talk cogently about causal interactions among three complex clusters of processes:

1. alterations and differences in politically-significant social environments of different European regions, defined chiefly in terms of coercion, capital, and connection
2. change and variation in the organizations and practices of political regimes, seen particularly in terms of differing governmental capacities and degrees of protected consultation for populations subject to those regimes--with special reference to the processes by which undemocratic regimes became more democratic
3. fluctuation, transformation, and variety in forms and intensities of contentious politics, conceived of especially in terms of their degree of localism, particularism, and directness of claim-making

In each of the three cases, let us seek first to identify the relevant field of variation, then to identify empirical and causal regularities within that field, finally to link change and variation in that regard to change and variation in each of the other clusters.

To head off likely misunderstandings of so grandiloquent a program, let me immediately post two warnings. First warning: social processes are coherent and explicable, but very complex--more like undersea life than planetary motion. They do not lend themselves to universal explanations involving two or three variables. Rather than general laws of political change, contention, or democracy, we should search for robust but partial causal mechanisms of relatively broad scope that recur in different sequences and different contexts with different outcomes on the large scale (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998). I have no hope or desire to promulgate a singular model of contention or democratization, much less to specify necessary or sufficient conditions for their appearance. I want instead to show something quite different: once we make due allowance for variation in sequences, environments, and initial conditions some of the same causal mechanisms that recurs significantly in European experience with variable outcomes depending on context, conjunction, and sequence also help explain patterns of contention and democratization outside of Europe. We should be astonished to find whole sequences or structures that we notice within Europe repeating themselves outside of Europe. If we have done an astute analysis of European political change, however, we should have some hope of identifying similar causal mechanisms operating elsewhere.

Second warning: The paper's argument repeatedly performs an intellectual dance step we might describe as Two Splits and a Lump. At first encounter with an analytical problem it introduces lists of elements, significant distinctions, and minute formulations concerning covariation of elements. Then it turns around abruptly and adopts a much simpler formulation as a tool for historical analysis. It performs that disconcerting reel in order to acknowledge the subject's complexity, to make connections with readers who are chiefly interested in applying its conclusions elsewhere than in European history, to prepare other readers for qualifications and
distinctions when explanation requires them, yet to render a narrative of 3.5 centuries manageable.

**Polities and Political Identities**

As no more than a point of departure, my argument assumes existence of an identifiable government and a polity organized around it. Figure 1 presents a crude, static model of government and polity. The government consists of an organization exercising control over concentrated means of coercion within recognized territorial limits. We call the organization a *state* if the organization is distinct from kinship groups, its means of coercion are enduring and extensive, the territories are relatively large, the organization enjoys priority over other organizations within those territories, and similar organizations nearby act to reinforce its authority. The polity attached to a particular government includes rulers, governmental agents, and other organized actors having some standing with respect to the government.

Organized actors vary in the extent to which they have routine access to agents, resources, and services under the government's control. At a first rough cut, we can distinguish a) rulers, b) agents of the government, c) members of the polity enjoying routine access to the government, d) challengers outside the polity, constituted actors lacking routine access, e) outside actors (such as other governments, international organizations, and external allies of dissidents) that sometimes intervene in the polity's operation. All of these actors rest to some degree on social construction in the sense that people put organizational effort into creating coherent performances, separating the identities involved (e.g., as peasants, as members of a given community, or as followers of a certain leader) from other identities, and display signs of common membership. Nevertheless, the public identities of organized actors vary between two different extremes: *embedded* identities figure widely in social life outside of public politics (as member of X family or inhabitant of hamlet Y are likely to in complex rural communities), while *disjoined* identities appear almost exclusively in public politics (as is generally the case with such labels as Whig or Dissenter).

Embedded and disjoined identities imply not only significantly different forms of contentious politics but also contrasting processes of social construction. To the extent that embedded identities prevail in contention, transitions from daily routines to collective claim-making (for example, as regular participants in a local market gang up on a price-gouging merchant) occur easily, but claims ordinarily remain local, particular, and short-lived while large-scale coordination of collective action faces serious obstacles. To the extent that disjoined identities prevail, specialized political entrepreneurs and organizations gain importance, transitions between explicitly political and non-political interactions become more dramatic, and sustained, standardized large-scale making of claims increases in feasibility.

A liberal-to-radical western tradition (e.g., Boggs 1997) has often identified a "public sphere" or "civil society" mediating between routine social life and public politics. Public opinion, organized preferences, trust, and collective commitment to change are supposed to form chiefly in that intermediate area, with social movements often regarded as the twentieth century's quintessential participants in relevant interactions and debates. The more vigorous, extensive, and autonomous that public sphere, runs a characteristic argument, the stronger the foundations of democracy. No agreement has emerged concerning the actual groups, social relations, or activities that constitute the public sphere or civil society (Ahrene 1996; Bratton 1989; Cohen and Arato 1992; Diamond 1997; Fatton 1992; Gellner 1994; Mamdani 1996; Mastnak 1990; Minkoff
1997; Seligman 1992; Somers 1993). Analysts also divide sharply as to whether civil society makes a difference to democracy through its production of shared attitudes, values, understandings, and practices that then permeate public politics or through its operation as an institutional constraint on professional politicians.

Within the polity model, a plausible site for the processes analysts have located in the public sphere or civil society would be in relations among constituted actors, both polity members and challengers. In addition to the coalitions already represented in Figure 1, an elaborated version of the diagram might then display opinion-forming interactions among all non-state actors that actually communicate with each other. Those interactions would then differ significantly among polities, depending on the distribution of constituted actors along the continuum from embedded to disjoined identities. We will, in fact, discover different interactions, and different political consequences of interactions, in polities whose principal actors bear strongly embedded identities, other polities whose principal actors deploy disjoined identities, and still other polities that lie between the two extremes. While avoiding reification of
public sphere or civil society, I will borrow the insight that routine relations among constituted political actors, broadly defined, significantly affect prospects for democracy.

As we proceed to real political change and its explanation, of course, we will have to modify any such model and set it into motion: convert sharp boundaries into gradients, recognize strong differences among the relations of polity members to their governments, represent the continuous, contingent jockeying for position that occurs in any polity, unpack governments into their many levels, units, and agents, allow for the many forms of control over governments. For the moment, nevertheless, let us lump instead of splitting; a static polity model calls attention to the political context within which contentious claims emerge.

**Coercion, Capital, and Connection**

Regimes are to polities as fish species are to all fish. Regimes designate variable organizations of polities: more or less inclusive, more or less centralized, more or less unequal, and so on. Three variable elements of regimes' social environments strongly affect their organization. Let us call those three elements coercion, capital, and connection.

**Coercion** includes all concerted means of action that commonly cause loss or damage to the persons or possessions of social actors. We stress means such as weapons, armed forces, prisons, damaging information, and organized routines for imposing sanctions. Accumulation of such means within a given polity varies in principle from nonexistent (0) to huge (1), with low accumulation signifying that over a specified population the total volume of such means is small, high accumulation signifying that the population contains extensive coercive means. Concentration of coercion means likewise varies from trivial (0) to total (1), with low concentration signifying that whatever means exist disperse across the population, high accumulation signifying that all coercive means--however extensive--come close to forming a single clump under one agent's control. These distinctions define a two-dimensional space, whose four corners we might label anarchy, petty tyranny, guerrilla, and Leviathan. Figure 2's first panel represents that two-dimensional space.

The organization of coercion helps define the nature of a regime. In the lower left-hand corner of our diagram (Anarchy) all regimes are insubstantial, while in the upper right hand corner (Leviathan) all regimes are formidable. But since no government ever gains control of all the coercive means within its territory, the organization of coercion constitutes not only a feature of regimes but also part of each regime's immediate environment. All other things equal, for example, regimes in circumstances of high coercive accumulation and low coercive concentration (Guerrilla) spend a good deal of their effort fighting off, repressing, evading, or making deals with violent entrepreneurs who are operating within the regime's territory but outside the government. Southern Italian regimes long operated in just such circumstances.

**Capital** refers to tangible, transferable resources that in combination with effort can produce increases in use value, plus enforceable claims on such resources. As with coercion, accumulation of capital varies in principle from nonexistent (0) to huge (1). Capital's concentration likewise varies from trivial (0) to total (1). The resulting two-dimensional space (panel B of Figure 2) contains corners we can call paupers, pashas, kulaks, and tycoons. In the case of pashas, for example, the total population in question has accumulated little capital, but a large share of what capital exists lies under the control of a few wealthy figures. In the idealized case of kulaks, relatively little concentration of capital obtains, but households all have substantial capital of their own.
Figure 2: Coercion, Capital, and Connection

A. COERCION

CONCENTRATION

petty tyranny
anarchy

Leviathan
guerrilla

ACCUMULATION

B. CAPITAL

CONCENTRATION

passes
paupers

tycoons
kulaks

ACCUMULATION

C. CONNECTION

CONCENTRATION

single node
fragments

centralized web
grid

ACCUMULATION
In Europe since 1650, the organization of capital in a region shaped the region's regimes in several different ways: by determining the prominence of capitalists and cities as presences with which agents of government had to contend; by affecting the extent and form of resources that were available for governmental activities such as war, infrastructural investment, or enrichment of rulers; by affecting relations of non-governmental activity (e.g., industrial production, trade, agriculture, migration) within the government's jurisdiction to activities outside that jurisdiction. Kulaks present very different problems and opportunities to aspiring rulers from the combination of pashas with impoverished shepherds or serfs.

By connection I mean relations among social sites (persons, groups, structures, or positions) that promote their taking account of each other. Connection's local organization varies as dramatically as do the structures of coercion and capital. Connections can take the form of shared religion or ethnicity, trading ties, work-generated solidarities, communities of taste, and much more. Accumulation in this regard varies in principle from a nonexistent 0 -- every person an isolate, and no collective structures at all -- to an overwhelming 1 -- vast collective organization, including ties of every person to every other one. But concentration likewise occurs: from an even dispersion of relations across all social sites (0) to binding of everyone and everything that is connected at all into a single centralized system (1). Panel C represents variations in connection as one more two-dimensional space. Names for the four corners of this space are fragments, single node, grid, and centralized web.

How does connection impinge on regimes? First, by confronting agents of government with varying cleavages and solidarities inside the government's subject population, for example the presence or absence of large religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, or cultural minorities. Second, by affecting the degree to which members of the subject population maintain strong relations with persons, groups, or organizations outside the government's own territory. Third, by influencing the ease with which (and the means by which) governmental agents incorporate members of the subject population into the governmental structure. A fragmented population faces high costs of communication and resistance on a large scale but also presents formidable coordination costs to its government. In contrast, a population that resembles an evenly and intensely connected grid combines lower communication and resistance costs with vulnerability to observation and infiltration by governmental agents.

Over time and space, coercion, capital, and connection covary to some degree; as great chunks of accumulated coercion form, so in general do clumps of accumulated capital and webs of accumulated connection. Yet in European experience as a whole, plenty of independent variation occurred in these regards: regions, periods, and structures combining high capital concentration with relatively little coercion, others combining extensive connection with little capital accumulation, and so on. A quarter century ago, the great Norwegian political analyst Stein Rokkan sketched "conceptual maps" of Europe to capture crucial geopolitical dimensions of variation in state formation. His maps excluded Russia and the Ottoman empire, but they captured important patterns in the rest of Europe. Figure 3 presents one of Rokkan's more compact conceptual maps.

Figure 3 suggests three crucial insights:

- Over the long sweep of history the continent's regimes varied significantly along an east-west axis differentiating a) the commercial-urban belt between central Italy and southern England from b) its more agrarian and landlord-dominated flanks.
- Another north-south axis defined increasingly strong influence of international churches--notably the Roman Catholic church--with proximity to the
Mediterranean; on the whole Reformation-based state churches, which prevailed toward the north, fostered national unification, while strong relations with Rome hindered it. Nevertheless, over recent centuries regimes in these different regions underwent common experiences and mutual influences that pushed them toward increasing similarity in organization and operation.

As a consequence, east-west and north-south differences have attenuated without by any means disappearing. Rokkan himself looked backward, concentrating on origins of twentieth-century variation: why Scandinavian regimes resemble each other while differing so greatly from Mediterranean regimes, and so on. He searched the past for "variables" that would explain differences in the present. But we can invert Rokkan's retrospective procedure, refining his conceptual maps to explain transformation of European governmental forms and their geographical distribution after 1650.

![Figure 3: Stein Rokkan's Conceptual Map of Europe](image)

When we do so, some quibbles with Rokkan's formulation immediately come to mind. Whether we label Britain as more "distal"—less well connected with the central city-state band of Europe—than France, for example, depends heavily on what date we choose for the comparison. Britain remained relatively peripheral vis-à-vis France at the time of the Norman conquest in 1066, but by 1650 the difference had vanished. Rokkan's omission of territories that became Russia and the Ottoman empire hides the great influence of Muscovites, Vikings, Mongols, and other invaders on politics in the continent's eastern half, not to mention the significance of Orthodoxy, Islam, and Byzantine Christianity as organizing principles in European state formation. To ignore the profound influence of Muslim empires around the Mediterranean is to distort the political history of Iberia. As I can testify from many conversations with him on these matters, Rokkan would have been the first to recognize these limitations of his scheme, then to propose modifications that would take them into account. The Rokkanian scheme cannot serve us as a precise map. It nevertheless distills an important insight: the clustering of different sorts of state-forming conditions in different regions of Europe.

For our baseline of 1650, we can easily translate Stein Rokkan's insight into the language of coercion, capital, and connection. On his east-west axis, the main differences concern the relative predominance of coercion and capital: landlord-controlled coercive means relatively
powerful at the "distal" peripheries, merchant-organized capital relatively powerful in city-state Europe, more equal combinations of coercion and capital along the flanks of the city-state region. The chief qualifications we require come from recognition that by 1650 the icy fingers of capital had long since gripped not only the central city-state band from Amsterdam to Venice but also the coastal regions of the Baltic, the North Sea, the British Isles, France, Iberia, and the Ottoman empire.

With regard to connection and the north-south axis, we need a little more caution, since Rokkan stressed the relative predominance of Catholic and Protestant religions, but other distinctions also require attention: not only other religious entities and identities such as Islam and Orthodoxy but also connections mediated by kinship, trading systems, linguistic pools, crafts, and membership in overarching political structures such as the Holy Roman Empire. As of the twelfth century, after all, the Hohenstaufen empire ran from what are now the Netherlands and Denmark down through Sicily; such previous imperial connections left traces in the seventeenth century. Connection rose not only from north to south but also from periphery to center. With that qualification, Rokkan's formulation holds for 1650: on the whole, people toward the south and closer to the central city-state band connected more intensely with various long-distance networks that facilitated distant people's taking serious account of each other. This does not mean, of course, that they lived in sunny harmony.

How Social Environments Shaped Regimes

As of 1650, how did the geography of coercion, capital, and connection affect the character of regimes? No large European regime of that time greatly resembled a twentieth-century state. None exercised anything like routine twentieth-century state controls over resources, activities, and populations within its nominal territories, and none afforded anything like the extent of popular participation in national affairs that became commonplace after 1900. But prevailing combinations of coercion, capital, and connection in a region significantly affected the character of that region's regimes. In general, state capacity ran higher at intermediate levels of coercion, capital, and connection. Let us simplify again by reading "high" or "low" from the diagonals of our coercion, capital, and connection diagrams. That means multiplying accumulation by concentration and temporarily disregarding the difference between them. At very low levels of any (and especially all) of them, would-be rulers lacked the means to assemble organizations that could control resources and activities within their claimed territories; petty, fluctuating tyrannies characterized such marginal regions in the Europe of 1650. Much of the interior Balkans, buffer areas between the Russian and Ottoman empires, high mountain valleys, and pastoral islands such as Corsica and Sardinia conformed to this pattern.

Very high values on just one of the elements--coercion, capital, or connection--likewise blocked the creation of high-capacity governments. High accumulations and concentrations of coercion, as in Poland of the time, yielded war-making magnates who bowed reluctantly to central control and interfered incessantly in each other's regional rule. Disproportionate strength of capital yielded merchant-dominated political structures with great propensities to factionalism--although the case of the Dutch Republic shows that merchant oligarchies were also capable of fierce, if intermittent, coordination in warfare. In the absence of equivalent coercion and capital, extensive connection typically meant that local people had the means of escape from or resistance to the exactions of would-be state-builders, as when persecuted Protestants received aid from their co-religionists elsewhere.
Intermediate and relatively equal levels of coercion, capital, and connection facilitated the creation of governmental capacity through synergy. Creators of effective states used their coercive means to draw resources from their capitalists in exchange for protection of commerce. But they also employed moderately centralized webs of connection to integrate subject populations into their state enterprises through stable indirect rule. Although Scandinavian, Burgundian, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Northern Italian rulers had at various times over the two previous centuries made partially successful attempts to create stable state capacity, by 1650 the two leading exemplars were no doubt France and Britain.

Until the nineteenth century, Europe's large states worked their will on subject populations chiefly through indirect rule. They empowered established, relatively autonomous local and regional authorities to collect taxes, gather troops, administer justice, and maintain order on their behalf without dispatching central agents for local or regional administration more than intermittently. Rulers ruled directly in their capitals, indirectly elsewhere. Such an arrangement reduced the cost and personnel of government from the center's perspective, but it also set stringent limits on the resources central authorities could extract from their nominal jurisdictions, reduced the amount of standardized control those authorities could exert over activities within remote regions, promoted or tolerated the formation of variable rights and obligations connecting different clusters of subjects to agents of the central power, and augmented the influence of privileged intermediaries. European colonizers exported a very similar system to conquered territories outside of Europe. As Mahmood Mamdani sums up for Africa:

Debated as alternative modes of controlling natives in the early colonial period, direct and indirect rule actually evolved into complementary ways of native control. Direct rule was the form of urban civil power. It was about the exclusion of natives from civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Indirect rule, however, signified a rural tribal authority. It was about incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order. Reformulated, direct and indirect rule are better understood as variants of despotism: the former centralized, the latter decentralized. (Mamdani 1996: 18)

Although European "natives" sometimes belonged to the same broad linguistic and cultural groups as their rulers, the partition between direct and indirect rule operated quite similarly within the colonizer's own continent.

More so than in European-conquered regions of Africa, however, European indirect rule resulted from the interaction of top-down and bottom-up politics. From the top, expanding states selectively incorporated constituted leaders and their followers into state structures while granting retention of previously-existing rights and customs. From the bottom, constituted political actors bargained for particular rights as the price of peace when they could not fight off their would-be conquerors. Thus even centralizing Britain and France fashioned special systems of rule for such territories as Ireland, Scotland, Brittany, and Franche-Comté.

Since 1650, accumulations and concentrations of coercion, capital, and connection have all increased enormously in Europe as a whole. Although the formation of standing armies, police forces, and weapons of mass destruction certainly register great expansions of coercive means, the sensational growth has occurred on the side of capital. As measured by total wealth, current income, productive plant, or domination of production and distribution, capital's influence over European life has multiplied (Bairoch 1976; Bairoch and Lévy-Leboyer 1981; Dodgshon 1987; Hohenberg and Lees 1985; Kellenbenz 1976; de Vries 1984). Connection has altered in a more mixed fashion: on one side an undoubted multiplication of connections among
Europeans by means of political organization, commercial ties, and improved means of communication; on the other, undermining of transnational trade diasporas, linguistic networks, and crafts in favor of segmentation of social life within a limited number of well-bordered, increasingly monolingual states. Until the recent past, the net effect of changes in coercion, capital, and connection has been to make the particular state to which European citizens were attached more and more salient in all varieties of contentious politics. Even today, great debates surround the question of whether the European Community, international agencies such as the World Bank, and the globalization of capital are eroding the autonomous powers of established European states (see, e.g. Tilly et al. 1995; Wiener 1998).

Military Organization and Regime Change

Up to the nineteenth century, war and preparation for war played a large part in the formation of European states. War operated in contradictory fashion, creating similarities in state organization as it created dissimilarities in international power (Blockmans 1996; Blockmans and Genet 1993; Blockmans and Tilly 1994; Burke 1997; ‘t Hart 1993; Koch 1993; Mann 1986; Mann 1993; Porter 1994; Rasler and Thompson 1990; Spruyt 1994; Thomson 1994; Tilly 1992; Tilly 1993). Most weak-state trajectories that might eventually have led to democratization sputtered out either because their ruling dynasties failed to produce viable heirs or because more powerful states conquered and incorporated them. Even where the physical environment provided some protection against outside political predators, as in Switzerland, defensive or offensive preparations generally left large traces in political organization. Swiss military forces, indeed, figured importantly in European warfare on their own account well into the sixteenth century, then as formidable mercenaries until the end of the eighteenth. They left behind them, among other things, strong ties between (male) military service and (male) citizenship at the cantonal level.

Aside from its notorious death, destruction, and wasted resources, the trouble with war was that it gave advantages to those political officials and entrepreneurs who could commandeer and discipline the means of military action: men, arms, transportation, food, clothing, military expertise, and money to buy them. Despite such counter-examples as Switzerland, Hesse, and the Dutch Republic, on the whole states based on large territories and populations did better in military competition than their small neighbors. In fact, they often gobbled up or subordinated those neighbors. France absorbed Franche-Comté; The English conquered Wales; the expanding Russian empire incorporated dozens of previously autonomous but militarily weak political entities. For such smaller states, outside connections mattered greatly. Links established by trade, dynastic solidarity, and religion increased the likelihood that powerful outsiders would intervene to stop the dissolution of a militarily vulnerable state.

Characteristic procedures for creation of military forces varied by era and region. Averaging brutally over Europe as a whole, we can impose a chronology something like this:

- Before 1300 or so, rulers drew armed forces from retainers, vassals, and militias who owed them personal service, but only in specified numbers, forms, seasons, and circumstances. Beyond those contractual limits, rulers had only their personal retinues to defend them.
- Between roughly 1300 and 1700, these older forms of military levy lost ground as contractor-supplied mercenaries became increasingly central to European warfare, peaking in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Even militia levies, as in Switzerland, fell under increasingly professional discipline. In the same process, tax farmers and other
fiscal contractors who could raise money for warfare quickly acquired greater and greater power within European regimes. Military entrepreneurs and their forces similarly posed growing threats to the very regimes they served, because they enjoyed considerable autonomy from rulers and could either switch sides or refuse to fight when treated unsatisfactorily.

• Quite variably and through extensive struggle, after 1700 war-making powers shifted toward the formation of standing armies drawn from their domestic populations, thus absorbing military organization much more directly and durably into central state structures (Lynn 1990; Lynn 1993; Thomson 1994). Although partly autonomous financiers continued to organize much of the fiscal preparation for war, increasingly regimes internalized the fiscal apparatus, building bulky administrative structures for customs, excise, direct taxes, and other sources of money to finance war. In the longer run, dependence on the state-controlled fiscal apparatus reduced political autonomy of the military. How this process worked and how far it went in a particular regime strongly affected the extent and character of democratization.

Over the long-run process, war-driven conquest and consolidation reduced the number of at least nominally autonomous political units in Europe from thousands at the First Millennium (Christian Era) to thirty-odd at the Second Millennium.

Creation of large-scale centralized control over means of war expanded state capacity in general, usually at the expense of protected consultation. But most weak states disappeared. As a result, far more long-term trajectories of European regimes resembled our strong-state cartoon than our weak-state cartoon. When we search for special characteristics of those few trajectories that led to early and general democratization, we are mainly picking our way among strong-state trajectories.

The relative weights of coercion, capital, and connection in a region and era, however, strongly affected how these state-forming processes operated, and with what organizational consequences. Regarding intersections of coercion and capital, we can distinguish among three stylized paths of change: coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized coercion. **Coercion-intensive** state formation, which occurred in regions where autonomous holders of coercion such as troop-raising large landlords predominated in the absence of powerful cities and capitalists, involved rule by means of those coercion-wielding intermediaries as in Russia, Poland, and Castile. Coercion-intensive states had military advantages so long as most wars were being fought by militias and feudal levies, but they lost out in naval warfare, in the rental of mercenaries, and in the purchase of heavy military equipment.

**Capital-intensive** state formation, the characteristic process of what Stein Rokkan called city-state Europe, depended heavily on cities and capitalists, as in the Dutch and Venetian republics. Militias, freebooters, mercenaries, and convertible fleets gave its states substantial advantages in defensive actions, maritime warfare, and acquisition of military means on international markets. But states following this trajectory remained vulnerable to fragmentation, to merchants' pursuit of their parochial interests, and to land warfare against large standing armies.

State formation through **capitalized coercion** resulted from the conjunction between substantial concentrations of coercion and capital, such that rulers (as in England and France) could play each against the other and acquire war-making resources from both sides. In the creation of effective military power, states that could draw on capitalized coercion eventually prevailed over those following coercion-intensive and capital-intensive trajectories. Through
conquest and emulation, their forms of organization then became the dominant European models of state structure. As a consequence, many a European area that entered the sixteenth century on a well-defined coercion-intensive or capital-intensive path entered the twentieth century under a regime centering on capitalized coercion.

Connection modified effects of capital and coercion without fundamentally altering them. Between 1450 and 1700 Europe underwent enormous struggles over proper relations between state attachments and religious identities: expulsions and forced conversions of Muslims and Jews in Iberia, reform movements, Protestant breakaways, and outright creations of state-based Protestant churches in the rest of Catholic Europe, intermittent armed conflict between Protestants and Catholics in France, Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. Although war between the expanding Ottomans and their Christian neighbors always had religious overtones, these conflicts had relatively little impact within Orthodox and Ottoman Europe. Ottoman obliteration of the Byzantine empire during the fifteenth century, however, freed Orthodox hierarchies to cluster around protective states. As Rokkan's conceptual maps indicated, those struggles generally fortified state capacity to the degree that they established the independence of national churches from Rome and Constantinople/Istanbul.

Between the treaties of Westphalia (1648) and the French Revolution of 1789-1799, state churches and statist churches continued to support the expansion of state capacity in much of Europe. Despite their nominal Catholicism, for example, France, Portugal, and Spain all expelled the Rome-oriented Jesuit order during the eighteenth century. Where subdivisions of a state adhered officially to different faiths (as in the Swiss confederation) religious cleavage inhibited that expansion.

A great shift in the salience of connection, however, occurred with the Revolution. Partly as a result of French conquests in the name of captive nations, common ethnic origin—nationality—acquired unprecedented importance as a basis for state formation. On one side, rulers who already controlled a state organized state-led nationalism, promoting the predominance of a single cultural complex including language, festivals, costumes, historical accounts of national origins, and sometimes religious traditions. On the other side, cultural minorities within empires and large states organized state-seeking nationalism, demanding political autonomy on the grounds that they constituted distinctive peoples. The nineteenth-century unifications of Germany and Italy combined state-led with state-seeking nationalisms. As they picked apart the multicultural Ottoman empire, European powers encouraged state-seeking nationalism on the part of Greeks, Albanians, and many others.

In almost every such process, rival claimants arose who demanded recognition as leaders either of the same putative nationalities or of other nationalities whose rights recognition of the first claimant would trample. That cycle of claim and counter-claim continues into our day. It added to coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion trajectories the regular creation and imposition of the routines, understandings, and obligations of nationality.

Any of these paths entailed extensive demands on subject populations for the means of war. (Partial exceptions occurred where international trade or tribute from colonies provided state revenues. But, as the experiences of Spain and Portugal illustrate, that form of financing for war made rulers vulnerable both to interruptions of revenue flows and to pressures from international bankers who supplied them with short-term credit.) Subject populations most often responded with evasion, rebellion, or intermittent compliance. Where rulers succeeded in overcoming those obstacles, they always engaged in bargaining with brokers, with groups yielding the crucial resources, or with both at once. Bargains established mutual rights and
obligations between subjects and state agents, for example by defining legitimate and illegitimate procedures for conscription or taxation.

Where state capacity increased significantly, that expansion made control over the state an increasing advantage for whoever had it, hence an increasing object of struggle. Sometimes contention over state apparatus, personnel, and action had the effect of establishing citizenship, broadening it, equalizing it, creating mechanisms of binding consultation, and expanding protection for citizens. In those rare cases, the spiral of militarization and struggle promoted democratization.

Region by region, ghosts of regimes that had prevailed in a given part of Europe haunted later regimes in the same regions (Downing 1992; Ertman 1997). Two different mechanisms produced that effect: borrowing of visible organizational models for political work, and shaping of political regimes by social relations that outlasted them. Iberia provides striking examples of the two mechanisms at work. Christian rulers from the Iberian north accomplished the centuries-long expulsion of Muslim rulers from the peninsula largely by licensing municipalities and freebooting horsemen to raise their own military forces in exchange for booty and extensive, autonomous but royally-sanctioned political rights. The creation of government as federations of chartered nobles and municipalities rightfully exercising licensed violence and fiscal privileges then became a standard Iberian model, and the fundamental structures of parliaments in the peninsula. But it also established relations between aristocrats and plebeians—the latter liable to regionally-based taxation, forced labor, and military service not as horsemen (caballeros) but as foot-soldiers (peones)—that survived the centuries. When newly-crowned emperor Charles V put down Castile's rebellion of the Holy League (or Comuneros) in 1520, he cemented the settlement by ceding fiscal, administrative, and representative advantages to the very municipalities whose militias had constituted the rebellion's most effective fighting forces.

In a superb synthesis of scattered research on popular participation in European contentious politics between 1500 and 1700, Wayne te Brake (1998) has mapped the great variety of regimes that existed north of the Balkans and west of Russia. Figure 4 sums up his mapping. The "late medieval composite state" itself designates a wide variety of structures from small to large and from urban leagues to dynastic tyrannies. Almost all, te Brake rightly insists, involved diverse organizational components, multiple layers of sovereignty, and contingent, contested relations among their elements. Te Brake argues strongly (and again rightly) against the teleological idea that as of either 1500 or 1700 all states were converging on a single type of presumably modern state. On the contrary, he shows that struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shaped new sorts of states, quite different from each other, that persisted well into the following century. These diverse trajectories laid down distinctive institutional and cultural materials in different parts of Europe.

Because they are necessarily particular, these influences of previous regimes do not lend themselves to the same simple schematization as coercion, capital, and connection. Nevertheless, one general feature of historical influence deserves our attention. The major empires that impinged on European territory all left indelible marks on the continent's political life. The Roman empire and its successors, right through the Habsburgs, provided a legacy of Roman law, Romance languages, municipal autonomy, and regional military organization that shaped subsequent state formation throughout the continent's western half. Nomadic invaders such as Mongols and Turks repeatedly swept in from the Eurasian steppe to create empires in Europe's southeastern third. Their tribute-taking institutions, subordination of sedentary cultivators, impaling of enemies, and reliance on episodic terror to keep urban populations in check marked
Figure 4: Wayne te Brake’s Map of Regime Trajectories in Europe, 1500-1700

Adapted from te Brake 1998: 184-186.
subsequent regimes within their zones of influence. The wide incorporation of southern European territory in Islamic empires (notably including the Ottomans, for all the ultimate origins of their founders in the steppe) established procedures for attaching chartered religious, ethnic, and commercial minorities to culturally distinct regimes. They also provided institutionalized connections to the long-dominant trading system that linked the Middle East, East Africa, India, China, and Southeast Asia (Abu-Lughod 1989; Chaudhuri 1990). Byzantine, Bulgarian, and other more fleeting empires likewise left institutions, languages, and ties among dispersed peoples in their wake. These were the connections and cultural materials with which later creators of political systems had to work.

Regional variation in the accumulation and concentration of coercion, capital, and connection, then, strongly affected the sorts of governmental institutions that formed in different parts of Europe through the centuries, but the prior impact of certain kinds of regime in a region constrained what kinds of regimes formed later. Adjacent governments consequently tended to form similar sorts of relations with their subject populations as well as with other governments, and to reinforce each other in doing so.

So far we have concentrated on change and variation in 1) politically-relevant social environments, 2) regimes, 3) interactions between them. In order to bring the analysis of contention more directly into the discussion, we will have to stop splitting for a while and undertake some more lumping. The remainder of this paper takes social environments for granted, introduces a simple model of politics, then incorporates contentious politics into that model.

The word "claims" resonates across my analysis of contention. It refers to interactions in which one party acts (however successfully or ineffectually) to elicit responses from another party. Typical claim-making verbs include request, propose, demand, command, beseech, beg, implore, petition, solicit, attack, bribe, entice, require, expel, chase, and confront. Contentious politics, then, refers to collective making of claims on others which, if realized, would affect those others' interests, when at least one of the parties (including third parties) is a government. The definition excludes quite a bit of political life, for example gathering to plan, to celebrate, to persuade, or to exercise routine political rights and obligations; such actions join contentious politics only when they include explicit claims on others and affect relations of people to governments. Contentious politics includes, however, wars, revolutions, social movements, rallies, terrorist actions, many strikes, collective attacks on officials or public properties, and a wide variety of other concerted actions, just so long as participants make fairly definite interest-affecting claims on others and at least one government is somehow involved as claimant, object of claims, arbiter, monitor, guarantor, or partisan in some other regard.

Routine, institutionalized politics often includes circumscribed forms of contention, thus defined: legal proceedings, parliamentary debates, contested elections, humble petitions, and more. Figure 5 schematizes the problem and frames some preliminary hypotheses concerning differences between relatively democratic and undemocratic regimes. In both kinds of regimes, authorities prescribe a certain number of political performances such as payment of taxes and military service; authorities offer both positive and negative incentives for meeting those political obligations. They also tolerate a range of performances outside the prescribed zone, for example by allowing leaders of established churches to take positions on current political issues or by declining to intervene in local struggles over control of turf. Within limits of their capacity, they typically forbid a considerably larger array of technically possible ways of making claims, for example assassination and mass religious ecstasy. Contentious claim-making can, in
principle, coincide with prescribed means, as when challengers disrupt public ceremonies. It can coincide with tolerated means, as when legal public meetings entertain seditious demands. Or it can enter the terrain of forbidden means, as when challengers of the established order take up armed attacks on public officials.
Politics in general centers on two kinds of interactions: between agents of government and other actors, and between other actors when governments figure as significant third parties. Most politics consists of performances in the sense that previously-established scripts exist for the relevant interactions, however much participants improvise in their enactment of those scripts. Here we concentrate on collective, public performances, both contentious and otherwise, treating the give and take of small-scale patron-client relations, politicians' individual efforts at mutual influence, private deal-making, and routine governmental administration as essential background, but not as our major object of analysis.

All these points are matters of definition. The scheme also incorporates four hypotheses for verification and modification in further research:

1. Technically possible claim-making interactions cover a wider range in undemocratic regimes, both because experience with democracy systematically unfits the subject population for many damaging and high-risk forms of claim-making and because, on the average, democratic regimes rest on states and economies that have installed greater uniformity in social structure within their territories.

2. For essentially the same reasons, contentious claim-making includes a wider range of performances in undemocratic regimes than in democratic regimes.

3. Democratic regimes impose a smaller ratio of prescribed to tolerated political performances, so that a considerable portion of democratic public politics takes place in forms and settings that state agents authorize and monitor but do not prescribe. Undemocratic regimes prescribe and forbid more performances, leaving only narrow ranges of toleration. (The hypothesis, as we will soon see, makes more sense for high-capacity than for low-capacity states.)

4. Under democratic regimes, contentious politics greatly overlaps prescribed and tolerated forms of political performance. Under undemocratic regimes, in contrast, contentious claim-making rarely enters the prescribed sphere (and there chiefly as subversion or covert protest) while extending farther into forbidden performances than under democracies.

Democratic regimes, runs the main argument, draw contention toward their prescribed and tolerated performances, while undemocratic regimes generally make sure that prescribed performances--the great bulk of routine public politics--stay away from contested claims.

Prescribed and tolerated forms of contention often figure in my analysis as contexts, counterparts, and even objects of more unruly actions. The analysis stresses, however, contentious action that is public, repeated, organized, but not prescribed by the governments in question—not routine voting or exchanges of favors in patron-client networks, but gathering visibly to demand, complain, attack, affirm, oppose, support, block, resist, and so on through the lexicon of claim-making verbs. Each of the relevant verbs entails a relation between claimants and objects of claims, rather than the single-minded attitude, mentality, or state of consciousness implied by such words as "protest" and "rebellion." I stress non-prescribed contentious relations out of a belief that they play crucial—and usually underestimated—parts in the formation of democracy.

Democracy? Here I adopt a relational definition. It lies halfway between two other competing conceptual traditions: substantive and constitutional. Substantive definitions of democracy stress outcomes such as equity, justice, community, and satisfaction of needs. Constitutional definitions stress legally-prescribed arrangements such as contested elections, representative parliaments, and independent judiciaries. A relational definition highlights interactions between citizens and their governments. It requires a substantial government that
enforces rights and obligations of citizenship. Although the content of citizenship often varies by age, gender, and other social characteristics, citizenship in general identifies a set of mutual, binding rights and obligations linking governmental agents directly to whole categories of people defined by their attachment to a given government.

In relational terms, a regime is democratic in so far as it installs
- broad citizenship
- equal citizenship
- binding consultation of citizens with respect to governmental personnel, resources, and policies
- protection of citizens, especially members of minorities, from arbitrary action by governmental agents

In this view, a regime may be democratic without providing well-being to all its citizens, much less all people subject to its influence. A regime may also be undemocratic despite having all the constitutional consultative apparatus of functioning democracies, simply because it does not protect its citizens from arbitrary action by state agents or because rich and powerful persons subvert ostensibly binding consultation of citizens. By these standards, no regime in the world has ever been fully democratic. All have operated somewhere on the plane between full democracy at one extreme, and narrow, unequal, or non-existent citizenship; no governmental consultation of the subject population; and no protection from arbitrary governmental agents, at the other.

The bulk of historical polities have not featured citizenship in any strong sense of the word. Constituted political actors have enjoyed (or suffered from) variable relations to governments and each other, but most regimes have not established general categories of the population defined exclusively by the rights and obligations that tie them to governmental agents. Instead, custom, compact, and conquest have typically created particular relations between existing groups and governments: patron-client chains, purchased immunities, customary tributes, recognitions of communal peculiarities, treaty-based rights of appeal, and so on. Relatively embedded identities have predominated over the course of political history.

Each element of democracy--breadth, equality, consultation, and protection--is a citizenship-tinged special case of a more general element that varies among polities:
- breadth of polity membership (what proportion of a government's subject population belong to constituted actors that are polity members?)
- equality of polity membership (how similar is the access to governmental agents, resources, and services available to constituted polity members?)
- consultation of polity members (to what extent do existing polity members exercise collective control over governmental agents, services, and resources?)
- protection of polity members (how extensive are constraints on arbitrary action by rulers and governmental agents?).

Only where breadth, equality, consultation, and protection couple with categorical establishment of rights and obligations--that is, with citizenship--can we reasonably characterize a regime as democratic.

Although we will often explore breadth, equality, consultation, and protection separately, for the sake of setting our problem, it helps to lump them, to combine them into a single index of protected consultation, high being relatively democratic, low being undemocratic. Imagine each of them as running from 0 (e.g., no protection whatsoever) to 1 (e.g., full protection of all citizens). Then imagine a multiple:
breadth x equality x consultation x protection = extent of protected consultation

The multiple's range runs in principle from 0 (no breadth, equality, consultation, or protection whatsoever) to 1 (full breadth, equality, consultation, and protection). Near the bottom of this range we would find seventeenth-century Russia, near its top the Netherlands after World War II.

Effective democratization depends not only on the presence of protected consultation at the small scale, but also on the capacity of governments to sustain breadth, equality, consultation, and protection. Governmental capacity is the actual impact of action by governmental agents on activities and resources within the government's jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency. (Eventually any full analysis of these processes must distinguish two aspects of governmental capacity, the top-down extractive and coercive ability that Michael Mann calls "despotic power" and the collective ability to change things that Mann calls "infrastructural power", but it will simplify the work at hand to blur Mann's distinction.) As with protected consultation, we can imagine governmental capacity as ranging in principle from 0 (no impact whatsoever) to 1 (when they occur, governmental actions completely control relevant activities and resources). Effective democratization only occurs above some combined threshold of governmental capacity and protected consultation.
Figure 6 schematizes the argument. At low levels of governmental capacity and protected consultation, no citizenship worthy of the name exists. Instead, fragmented tyranny prevails, with warlords, landlords, bandits, priests, merchants, and/or heads of kinship groups competing with each other and exercising hegemony on a small scale. The zone of citizenship lies at the other end, where some minimum degrees of governmental capacity and protected consultation coexist. Citizenship, according to the scheme, varies within limits set by three extremes: A) relatively low levels of protected consultation combined with very high state capacity, which more or less describes totalitarian citizenship; B) relatively low state capacity with very extensive protected consultation, which more or less describes limited citizenship; and C) extensive protected consultation in company with high state capacity, which more or less describes an idealized welfare-state citizenship.

Only those cases closer to extremes B and C qualify as democratic. The diagram's curved diagonal arrow accordingly represents the main line (although of course not the actual historical trajectory) of democratization. Its downward slope toward the upper right incorporates the hypothesis that very high levels of governmental capacity actually bar effective democratization because they increase incentives and abilities of governmental agents and their closest allies to intervene on behalf of their own interests instead of serving providing effective consultation or protection. Thus the argument built into the diagram implies that conflict between the many and the few increases with rising state capacity, that at the extreme citizenship based on vast state powers begins to contradict protected consultation among citizens.

Figure 7 sketches two idealized paths out of fragmented tyranny into democracy, taking only central states into account. The "strong state" path involves early increases of governmental capacity, often at the expense of whatever protected consultation existed in previous regimes. Later we see an expansion of protected consultation as struggle produces broadening and equalization of access to state agents, services, and resources while binding consultation and protection generalize. In such historical experiences, goes the hypothesis, even the resulting democratic state bears distinct marks of its authoritarian history in the form of centralized institutions and serious constraints on the range of tolerated political performances.

Russia and Prussia stand as exemplars of the strong-state path to citizenship and democracy. The weak-state trajectory entails elaboration of protected consultation—relatively broad and equal access to the state, binding consultation, and creation of protections from arbitrary state action—before any great expansion of state capacity. Here again we expect to see residues of previous history in the workings of democracy and citizenship, with greater restraints on the state's power of intervention in local affairs and greater accommodation of difference. In this case Switzerland will serve as a model.

Even where they eventuated in democracy, most European experiences lay between the two idealized trajectories, and followed more irregular paths. In Great Britain, for example, eighteenth-century wars and colonial expansion built up a strong central state apparatus amid local autonomies that had previously been vested in landlords, magistrates, municipalities, and (especially after 1689) elements of the Anglican church. In the Low Countries, municipal oligarchies predominated until French conquests under the Revolution and Napoleon established centralized regimes that endured into the nineteenth century. In Scandinavia, the Protestant Reformation promoted alliances between war-making rulers and state-serving pastors in the construction of relatively high-capacity states, but (especially in Norway and Sweden) peasants acquired corporate representation in return for provision of military service. Russia went from tribute-taking regimes leaving great autonomy to landlords and warlords to extensive
incorporation of landlords and bureaucrats into a repressive administrative hierarchy. Both the Balkans and much of Iberia featured sharp alternations between imperial expansion and petty tyrannies, with effects on democratic politics that endure today. In short, strong-state and weak-state paths to democracy present cartoons of limiting cases.

Along either of these idealized trajectories, democracy builds on citizenship, but does not exhaust it. Indeed, most western states created some forms of citizenship after 1800, but over most of that period the citizenship in question was too narrow, too unequal, too non-consultative and/or too unprotective to qualify their regimes as democratic. Take the regimes we loosely call "totalitarian": they typically combined high governmental capacity with relatively broad and equal citizenship, but afforded neither binding consultation nor extensive protection from arbitrary action by agents. Some monarchies maintained narrow, unequal citizenship while consulting the happy few who enjoyed citizenship and protecting them from arbitrary action by governmental agents; those regimes thereby qualified as oligarchies. In searching for democratic regimes, we can take relatively high governmental capacity for granted because it is a necessary condition for strong consultation and protection. We will recognize a high-capacity regime as democratic when it installs not only citizenship in general, but broad citizenship, relatively equal citizenship, strong consultation of citizens, and significant protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents.
Both consultation and protection require further stipulations. Although many rulers have claimed to embody their people's will, only states that have created concrete preference-communicating institutions have installed binding, effective consultation. In the West, representative assemblies, contested elections, referenda, petitions, courts, and public meetings of the empowered figure most prominently among such institutions. Whether opinion polls, discussions in mass media, or special-interest networks qualify in fact or in principle remains highly controversial. To the extent that governmental agents routinely alter their performances in response to these forms of consultation, however, we should no doubt include them among the instruments of democracy--with due regard to their frequently antidemocratic effects on breadth, equality, and protection.

On the side of protection, democracies typically guarantee zones of toleration for speech, belief, assembly, association, and public identity, despite generally imposing some cultural standards for participation in the polity; a regime that prescribes certain forms of speech, belief, assembly, association, and public identity while banning all other forms may maintain broad, equal citizenship and a degree of consultation, but it slides away from democracy toward populist authoritarianism. Some of democracy's most acute dilemmas concern the ways in which supporting one actor's preferred cultural patterns threatens another actor's well-being or survival. Is it consistent with democracy, for example, to impose a majority culture's norms with regard to familial, sexual, or conflict-settlement behavior on minorities that have nurtured contrary norms? High-capacity states run the risk not only of compromising democracy by diverting state resources to influential polity members, but also of imposing debilitating demands on culturally-distinct minorities.

The place of brokerage in contention illustrates a similar interplay of political culture, state capacity, and democracy. People live their lives within historically-accumulated and historically-modified cultural complexes containing cosmologies, discourses, categories, sets of meanings, and allowable social relations. Those cultural complexes constrain social life by channeling the social interactions of which people can readily conceive, collective understandings concerning the propriety and likely consequences of those interactions, routines and connections that facilitate such interactions, and collectively-available stories that people use to interpret past, present, and future interactions. Every social world beyond a very small scale contains multiple cultural complexes of this sort, some overlapping and some segregated from each other. Cultural brokers--either simultaneous members of two or more cultural complexes or knowledgeable mediators among them--play critical roles in organizing communication and mobility among cultural complexes. Thus bilingual travel agents often become significant figures in today's immigrant communities; they acquire influence outside by claiming successfully to speak for those communities. Historically, Europe's priests, landlords, merchants, and schoolteachers often played similar roles as cultural brokers.

The very general phenomenon of cultural brokerage has a political version. Each government selects and creates a limited cultural complex as the medium of its official business. To the extent that the government is powerful and attractive, its limited cultural complex informs claim-making throughout its polity. Nationalist governments aggressively pursue programs to impose a single cultural standard on public life, but all governments do some thinning and standardizing of cultural complexes within their own spheres (Scott 1998). Separatists, in contrast, defend threatened cultural complexes from obliteration by officially-imposed cultural forms. Hence a discrepancy (and sometimes intense conflict) between cultural complexes prevailing in zones strongly influenced by government and zones in which people live out other
parts of their lives. It has become a cliché of academic and cinematic writing, for example, to
dramatize contrasts between the stylized culture of Louis XIV's courtiers and grim living
conditions in the seventeenth-century French countryside.

We can distinguish five stylized responses of governments to incompatibilities between
their official cultural complexes and those that pervade all or some of their subject populations:
1) ignore, 2) repress, 3) segregate, 4) incorporate, 5) create an unacknowledged set of
accommodations. Response Number One happens chiefly in low-capacity states. Its operation in
high-capacity states requires a paradoxical deliberate organization of ignorance. Two is the
standard strategy of state-led nationalism. Three, four, and five constitute variants on the same
strategy, the establishment of a modus vivendi with populations that retain some sort of relation
to centers of power but also maintain their own distinct cultural complexes. In all three variants
of the accommodative strategy, cultural brokers play crucial parts as simultaneous interpreters.
As brokers do in a wide variety of settings, governmental or otherwise, they typically acquire
power and access to resources in the process, and therefore acquire an interest in maintaining
existing relations between the distinct populations they represent and central authorities.

All other things equal, increasing state capacity enhances the salience of brokerage, while
democratization diminishes it. Why? At least up to the point where state capacity begins to
destroy or assimilate all non-state cultural complexes, increasing state capacity sharpens the
discrepancy between the state sphere and other spheres of life while augmenting the significance
of state actions for the lives of all people within the state's jurisdiction. Hence brokers who
bridge the gap between public and private spheres gain prominence as mediators and
interlocutors. But democratization moves all persons and politically constituted actors closer
toward having their own established means of access to state services, resources, and personnel,
a process that diminishes the leverage brokers wield. Established rights and obligations of
citizenship substitute for brokerage.

To be sure, in a world of ever-incomplete democracy brokerage never disappears. As we
will see abundantly later on, every democratic social movement features intermediate figures
who claim to speak for aggrieved populations, but those populations also claim privileged access
to circles of power; indeed radical members of their followings often accuse such brokers of
selling out to the establishment. Immigrants in pursuit of citizenship frequently rely on longer-
term immigrants as their guides and intermediaries. Political parties themselves often employ
favor-dispensers who garner votes for their candidates. Yet such temporary brokers occupy much
less significant places in the contentious politics of their time than do the religious leaders, tribal
chiefs, party patrons, and regional princes who figure centrally in less democratic versions of
high-capacity politics.

Figure 8 summarizes the joint effect of democratization and increasing state capacity on
the salience of brokerage, arguing that brokerage reaches its peak in circumstances of little
democracy and high state capacity. If correct, this argument has deep significance for the
character, trajectories, and dynamics of contentious politics -- notably for the centrality of
brokers as initiators, interlocutors, and negotiators of contested claims. In a strong-state path to
democratization, for example, we should find brokers first increasing greatly in political activity
as state capacity increases, then fading away dramatically with the move of a high-capacity state
toward protected consultation.

Political culture matters in another way. In the corner of our two-dimensional space that
contains effective democratic regimes (Figure 7), previous historical experience has laid down a
set of models, understandings, and practices concerning such matters as how to conduct a
contested election. Once Britain, France, and other major countries had created procedures for routine electoral consultation, their examples shaped later innovations. This political culture of democracy limits options for newcomers both because it offers templates for the construction of new regimes and because it affects the likelihood that existing power-holders-democratic or not-will recognize a new regime as democratic.

Over the long run of human history, the vast majority of regimes have been undemocratic; democratic regimes are rare, contingent, recent creations. Partial democracies have, it is true, formed intermittently at a local scale, for example in villages ruled by councils incorporating most heads of household. At the scale of a city-state, a warlord's domain, or a regional federation, forms of government have run from dynastic hegemony to oligarchy, with narrow, unequal citizenship or none at all, little or no binding consultation, and uncertain protection from arbitrary governmental action.

Before the nineteenth century, as we have seen, large states and empires generally managed by means of indirect rule: systems in which the central power received tribute, cooperation, and guarantees of compliance on the part of subject populations from regional power-holders who enjoyed great autonomy within their own domains. Up to the French Revolution of 1789-99, ecclesiastical, noble, judicial, and even fiscal intermediaries--political and cultural brokers--who continued to evade or resist central control played significant parts in
the government of France. The great regional power exercised by British Justices of the Peace exemplifies the persistence of indirect rule into the politics of nineteenth-century Great Britain. Seen from the bottom, such systems often imposed tyranny on ordinary people. Seen from the top, however, they lacked capacity; intermediaries supplied resources, but they also set stringent limits to rulers' ability to govern or transform the world within their presumed jurisdictions.

Under systems of indirect rule, bicultural and bipolitical brokers maintain and profit from crucial links between ruling classes and the subject population. The subject population typically organizes its relations to rulers around distinctive, manifestly subordinate identities: as commoners in relation to nobles, as members of tolerated religious minorities in relation to followers of the state religion, as tribal clusters in relation to ostensibly national populations, and so on.

Only the nineteenth century brought Europe widespread adoption of direct rule, the creation of structures extending governmental communication and control continuously from central institutions to individual localities or even to households, and back again. Even then, direct rule ranged from the unitary hierarchies of centralized monarchy to the segmentation of federalism. On a large scale, direct rule made substantial citizenship, and therefore democracy, possible. Possible, but not likely, much less inevitable: instruments of direct rule have sustained many oligarchies, some autocracies, a number of party- and army-controlled states, and a few fascist tyrannies. Even in the era of direct rule most polities have remained far from democratic.

In France and Britain, nevertheless, installation of direct rule eventually promoted democratization. In both countries, eighteenth-century expansion of military activities greatly increased the state's demand for money, supplies, manpower, and popular compliance. Increased state demands, however, also generated resistance, often including resistance by segments of the ruling classes-major members, that is, of the polity-who found their privileges and identities threatened. Responding to, suppressing, bypassing, or bargaining with elite and popular resistance all involved state agents in creation of new forms of organization, new connections with subject populations, and new understandings concerning rights and obligations binding states and their subjects. In the process, intermediaries such as priests and landlords lost some of their own power and autonomy.

These organizational innovations moved both French and British states toward direct rule, toward creation of citizenship, and toward elements of democracy. What is more, political leaders and organizers in the two countries eyed each other uneasily across the Channel, sometimes borrowing institutions such as the lobby and the meeting (both terms carried intact from English into French), sometimes deliberately fashioning alternatives to their neighbors' practices, as when French revolutionaries of 1848 eliminated their equivalent of the House of Lords and adopted near-universal manhood suffrage.

Beyond these very general common properties, France and Britain followed rather different trajectories, even after 1650: outright revolution on the French side, a series of challenges, rebellions, standoffs, negotiations, and (especially if we include Ireland) near-revolutions on the British side. That contrast offers a splendid opportunity for explanation. An effective explanation of similarities and differences in French and British experiences with democratization will offer a valuable entrée into comparing the democratizing experiences of France and Britain with those of other European countries that democratized later, differently, or not at all.

My long-term aim is to trace causal connections between 1) national histories of contentious politics and 2) a polity's changing position in a terrain one edge of which touches
high governmental capacity, broad citizenship, equal citizenship, strong consultation, and significant protection, while the opposite edge features a weak state, nonexistent citizenship, unequal access to the state, no consultation of people subject to a state's jurisdiction, and no protection against arbitrary governmental action. We must trace those causal connections, however, within significant limits set by the path-dependent histories of different European regions. Democratic arrangements that emerged in one country or another bore strong marks of earlier political struggles in the same countries.

Some episodes of contention actually promoted democracy in two different ways: first, they induced power-holders to make direct concessions such as broadening the franchise. Second, struggles often generated innovations-special-interest associations, non-military policing, claim-making forms such as the demonstration, governmental surveillance or public opinion, and more-that in turn had the (often unintended) effect of broadening citizenship, equalizing it, expanding consultation, or increasing protection from arbitrary government action. Democracy, in short, often advanced as a by-product of struggles in which no party was explicitly demanding democracy as such. Any struggle that, on balance, fortified citizenship, broadened it, equalized it, strengthened consultation and/or increased protection of citizens had such an effect.

Like lepidopterists who net a trembling butterfly, let us seize that observation, dissect it, and examine its implications for the analysis of contentious politics. Different sorts of political regimes emerge from long-term struggles centering on means of production, coercion, and affiliation. Those struggles form governments and collective actors sustaining variable relations to the government and to each other—that is, polities. The same process creates standard forms of political communication and control that are prescribed, ratified, rewarded, or at least tolerated by governmental authorities-routine politics. Contentious politics—public, collective claim-making by politically constituted actors that bears on interests of other actors, including the government—comes into being as a penumbra of routine politics. Having emerged, however, it transforms the character of routine politics.

Sometimes contentious claims divert government-prescribed means such as regular elections toward conflict-filled ends. Sometimes they take place in the zone of tolerated means, as when assemblies of dissidents adopt the same organizational forms as their conformist counterparts. Often, however, contentious politics involves means that the government has forbidden, such as armed attacks on authorities and their symbols. The proximity of contentious politics to the forms, issues, and personnel of routine politics varies with circumstances and type of regime. Loosely-knit empires, for example, host a wide variety of local struggles in which representatives of central authority intervene only intermittently if at all, while high-capacity democracies draw contenders and conflicts of all sorts into their own orbits.

In all regimes, nevertheless, contentious politics reshapes routine non-contentious politics and relations among political actors; at a minimum, acts of repression and intervention by central authorities divert resources and alter the organization of power even when power-holders thereby hold off challenges to their advantages. Installation of effective political policing, for example, alters governmental organization and routine politics as it limits the maneuverability of dissidents. Contentious politics provides the primary site of political innovation, experimentation, and bottom-up signaling. It sometimes issues in tyranny, anarchy, or deadlock, but under rare circumstances it moves toward democracy. Our challenge is to survey a wide range of changing regimes, examine their characteristic contentious politics, then specify how,
when, and where struggle promotes net movement toward broad, equal citizenship with binding consultation and widespread protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents.

Being more numerous, more widely spread in time and space, and less well connected to each other than their democratic counterparts are, non-democratic regimes necessarily vary in political life far more than democratic regimes do. Europe's non-democratic regimes range from vast nomadic empires such as those the Mongols ran to tightly-controlled city-states such as the Vatican. Each form of rule generates its own qualities of politics, contentious or otherwise. On the average, nevertheless, by definition non-democratic regimes feature narrower polity membership, more unequal access among polity members, weaker consultation, and fewer protections from arbitrary governmental action than do democratic regimes.

We can clarify the implications of those on-the-average conditions by turning to the idea of contentious repertoires. A repertoire of contention is a set of established performances by means of which contenders in a given polity make claims on each other-emphatically including claims on or by governmental agents. Strictly speaking, repertoires link pairs of interacting parties, for example unionized workers and corporate managers. For convenience, nevertheless, we can sum up interactions over all pairs in a polity, calling all currently available performances part of a national repertoire. The British national repertoire of the 1990s includes, among other performances, demonstrations, creation of special-purpose associations, public meetings, petition drives, appeals to mass media, and lobbying. It does not include the collective seizures of high-priced grain, donkeying of non-conforming workers, tearing down of dishonored houses, forcible expulsions of tax collectors, invasions of fenced commons, or shaming ceremonies that conveyed collective claims repeatedly in Great Britain two hundred years earlier.

Two strands of history intertwine in the evolution of contentious repertoires. One of them accumulates the experiences and interactions of potential collective actors outside of open contention: day-to-day relations of masters with journeymen, of landlords with peasants, of merchants with their customers, of party leaders with constituents, of constables with people who live in their jurisdictions, of neighbors with each other. These relations establish understandings, solidarities, hostilities, interests, shared memories, collective identities, and specific social ties that are available as materials of contentious politics. But involvement in collective contention itself lays down a record and memory of interaction and innovation. People learn collectively that certain forms of claim-making are possible, feasible, costly, efficacious, ineffectual, destructive, dangerous, or gratifying. The course of struggle itself confirms some known ways of making claims, generates some new ones, and eliminates others. Through the interplay of everyday interaction and intermittent struggle, contentious repertoires evolve.

Let us begin with a classificatory approach, simply associating types of contention with types of regime. We can think of repertoires as varying along three dimensions: 1) particularism: how specifically the forms of claim-making in question attach to certain localities, groups, or issues; 2) scale: how many clusters of people who are readily distinguishable in routine social life participate in the making of claims; 3) mediation: the degree to which the communication of claims depends on privileged intermediaries, as opposed to direct confrontation with objects of claims. On the whole, contentious politics that builds on embedded identities features relatively particular and small-scale repertoires while bifurcating between direct confrontation (often violent) on a local scale and mediation by established authorities on the larger scale. Contentious politics building on disjoined identities more regularly involved modular, generalized forms of claim-making, large-scale coordination, and reliance on specialized representatives or political entrepreneurs.
What do these dimensions imply for differences between democratic and non-democratic contention? Here is a gross generalization for later refinement; on the whole, contentious repertoires of non-democratic polities feature:

- more particular, small-scale, and mediated forms of claim-making
- more violent competition between similar groups
- more direct action against renegades, moral reprobates, and agents of central authority
- more clandestine retaliatory damage
- more concerted resistance to outside threats
- more localized action
- closer ties to embedded identities
- more variation in cultural content

than apply in democratic polities. These features recur in non-democratic polities because, on the average, governments have lower capacity, governmental claims on subjects occur more episodically and brutally, governmental repression is more selective, erratic, and violent, fewer contenders have routine non-contentious means of making claims on governmental agents, and political power is more fragmented. Later we will have to qualify such gross generalizations by examining, for example, contention in non-democratic polities that center on high-capacity government.

Democratic polities, in contrast, create contentious repertoires that more often:

- include modular forms of claim-making that transfer easily among populations, localities, and issues
- operate on a large scale, involving multiple populations and localities simultaneously
- involve direct claims on regional or national power-holders instead of passing through honored brokers
- depend on extensive organization and preparation rather than springing from non-contentious daily routines such as marketing, working, drinking, or attending religious services
- activate collective identities broader than or separate from those that inform routine social relations, e.g., workers in general rather than machinist in this particular shop
- broadcast capacity, threat, and/or intentions to act—both individual and collective—rather than immediately engaging the actions in question
- involve displays of the worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment both of direct participants and of the populations they claim to represent
- target regional or national power-holders, including agents of national governments

Democratic repertoires rely on cumulation, coordination, and communication among multiple actors and events much more so than do non-democratic repertoires. Because they rely so heavily on cumulation, coordination, and communication, indeed, critics of existing democracies properly complain that normal democratic procedures offer great advantages to classes and clusters whose routine social life gives them access to centralized organizations, that the poor and marginal therefore regularly lose out in standard democratic struggles for power, that the apparatus of democratic politics imposes uniformity on culturally and organizationally
diverse populations, that particularity and difference therefore lose some of their public means for self-expression as democracy advances.

What implications do these static contrasts between non-democratic and democratic contention have for the dynamics of contentious politics? Three implications stand out. First, because a larger share of contention in non-democratic polities takes place at a distance from the state, rhythms and trajectories of non-democratic contention depend more heavily on fluctuations in local and regional circumstances, while in democratic polities national and international political-economic fluctuations predominate. As democratization proceeds, therefore, the rhythms of contention become more highly coordinated at a national scale and more closely dependent on governmental action.

Second, in non-democratic polities ordinary sequences of claim-making depend relatively little on realignments within the polity and greatly on realignments and responses of local and regional actors; only in cases where national economic crisis (e.g., famine or disaster) or massive governmental action (e.g., warfare, dynastic struggle, or rapid augmentation of taxes) intervenes simultaneously across the jurisdiction are parallel sequences of action across the polity likely to occur. Within democratic polities, in contrast, interplay among government, polity members, and challengers combines with coordination among challengers to favor generalization of political interaction's forms across all of a polity's many niches.

Third, in the repertoires of non-democratic polities standard sequences of action crystallize as a function of local or regional histories and cultures, with only attenuated effects of politics in national centers. Routines for sanctioning non-conforming workers, forcing stored grain into a local market, or sabotaging an effort at tax collection unfold locally, within channels set by local knowledge and localized social relations. Only rarely—typically in response to such major national cleavages as dynastic succession struggles or to major threats from rulers such as military mobilization or suppression of religious sects—do local people employ those performances in coordinated action against regional and national authorities. Contentious performances of democratic repertoires, in contrast, generally cluster adjacent to the routines of politics as usual: elections, parliamentary deliberations, governmental pronouncements, and so on. Their sequences interact with those of politics at usual, and at times merge with politics as usual. Thus social movements acquire the power to influence conventional politics by broadcasting the identities of challengers, publicizing defective governmental performance, and announcing programs that deserve attention. In the same process, they lose the power to make revolutions.

A finer analysis would, of course, qualify these generalizations, for example by noting that in non-democratic regimes protected sites and authorized assemblies (e.g., mosques, markets, public holidays) often provide occasions for claim-making and criticism, while in democratic regimes challengers generally enjoy more liberty in the timing and sites of their action. We will also start making distinctions, notably between low-capacity and high-capacity non-democratic regimes. To judge from the experience of state socialism, for example, in high-capacity non-democratic regimes the very operation of the state typically promotes the formation of clandestine networks of cooperation, influence, and mutual aid without which major governmental activities would collapse, and without which ordinary people would lack goods, services, information, or ability to nudge agents of the state. Those same networks become major channels of contentious politics when a split in leadership or an externally-generated crisis facilitates action against agents of the state. That sort of political process looks very different from contentious politics at the peripheries of empires or in wealthy city-states.
Contention in democratic polities reflects a political system shaped by repeated mobilization of excluded groups demanding places in the system of power. Such mobilizations permit outsiders or previously-unrecognized actors to make known their presence, their identities, their programs, and their capacity to act collectively in ways that could disrupt the existing power structure. They therefore give established polity members incentives and opportunities to recognize outsiders, fight them, repress them, ally with them, absorb them, bargain with them, or buy them off before they have carried out promised or threatened actions. Electoral campaigns and social-movement politics epitomize activation of democratic repertoires.

These characteristics of democratic repertoires create ambivalent relations between social-movement politics and prescribed democratic procedures such as voting, paying taxes, and honoring national symbols. On one side, established holders of power, who have less strenuous and visible ways of working their will, generally condemn and denigrate attention-getting actions of social-movement activists, except when those power-holders seek allies against other members of the establishment. On the other side, social-movement activists can best demonstrate their potential impact on politics as usual by innovating at the edge, or just beyond the edge, of established legal means. Instead of assassinating rulers or blowing up parliaments, they ostentatiously refuse conscription, boycott or disrupt elections, desecrate public ceremonies, block streets, burn national flags, shout outrageous slogans, withhold their taxes, or stage enormous marches. Since even those marginal tactics evoke disapproval from members of the establishment, social movement activists and organizations that move toward accommodation with the existing polity ordinarily moderate their tactics, only to face accusations from within their own ranks that they are selling out the cause.

As a consequence of this intimate interdependence between prescribed and forbidden means of political expression, democracies that lay down precise procedures for electoral participation and access to governmental services characteristically leave vague and contested the boundaries of acceptable speech, assembly, association, and assertion of collective identity. As another consequence, public performances of social-movement politics almost always involve prior negotiation among activists, allies, journalists, police, and public authorities, each estimating and negotiating how others will act. Such performances, indeed, regularly eschew violent direct action in favor of demonstrating the potential of disciplined social movement activists for forceful action if authorities or other power-holders fail to meet their demands. More generally, democratic contention differs from non-democratic contention, on the average, by calling up a politics of anticipation, oriented to how various weighty actors might act, could act, will act, or deliberately threaten to act.

This paper's arguments therefore propose partial answers to a series of questions concerning the interplay of military activity, regimes, contention, and democratization:

- What accounts for variation in the sorts of regimes that prevailed in different parts of Europe at various times since 1650? Distinctive histories of contention interacted with alterations of coercion, capital, and connection to shape Europe's political regimes.
- What caused the forms and intensities of popular contention to vary and change over the same period? In particular, how did characteristics of regimes and of contentious politics interact? Alterations in governmental capacity and protected consultation, on one side, occurred in tight interdependence with shifts in the actors and repertoires of collective contention, on the other.
• Under what conditions, how, and why did the interaction between existing regimes and their contentious politics promote democratization? Expansion of state activities, containment of military involvement in politics, reduction of political and cultural brokerage, and sustained mobilization of excluded but essential segments of the population interact to make democratic programs more attractive and feasible as provisional settlements—but in very different patterns according to the priority of state capacity and protected consultation,

• How did democratization affect the character of popular contention? On the whole, it moved contentious claim-making closer to routine politics, reduced the role of established intermediaries, increased the salience of specialized political entrepreneurs, and promoted modular, organizationally-connected forms of large-scale claim-making.

• What part did military organization and activity play in these dynamic processes? The ways that rulers brought military power under their control in different parts of Europe strongly influenced the forms of governmental organization that emerged in their territories. Top-down attempts to acquire military means repeatedly generated popular resistance, which in turn created governmental structure through repression and bargaining. In those regimes that moved toward democracy through revolution, conquest, or colonization, military control figured directly in democratization, while in those where expansion of oligarchic institutions constituted the main path toward democracy, military conflict among the principal parties, defeat of national military forces in international war, and extraction of military means from the subject population all frequently generated opportunities for democratization. To the extent that military forces retained autonomous political power, however, that power impeded democratization.

Such schematic questions and answers invite us to a dialectic of theory and evidence. If they make sense, they should allow us to identify common properties and systematic variation in the tangled histories of different European regions. The optimal results of such an inquiry will not be general laws of contention and democratization but strong causal analogies. Such causal analogies will allow us to explain how different initial conditions, different historical paths, and different environments produce varying concatenations and sequences of similar causal mechanisms, thus generating distinctive histories of democratization and contention.

References


