Nationalist Formation in the Former European Colonies of Asia and Africa

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by

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This paper attempts to answer two potentially interrelated questions. First, how did the former European colonies of Asia and Africa which won their independence in the Post-World War II era come to think of themselves as nations and aspire to nationhood? What were the shared features of nationalist formation among this group? Second, why have so many of the former colonies experienced such difficulty
transitioning to independence? Is there a relation or connection between the manner in which they came to their national consciousnesses and their post-independence struggles? This paper is divided into three sections. Section I examines general theories regarding the historic origins of nations, nationalism and national consciousness. Section II compares two theories of nationalism which deal specifically with the formation of nationalism in the former colonies of Europe that won their independence in the Post-World War II era: that of the classical nationalist scholar, Benedict Anderson and that of the postcolonial/subaltern theorist, Partha Chatterjee. Section III moves from theory to practice, bringing Anderson’s and Chatterjee’s theories to bear on the case of East Timor, which I argue in many ways serves as the paradigmatic case of the wayward postcolonial nation-state, whose people joined together after the second World War, under highly idealistic nationalist banners and against great odds, to throw off the “yoke of colonial rule” and claim control of the nation-state, only to disintegrate post-independence into violence, the emancipatory aspects of their nationalist struggles seeming to have fallen by the wayside.
**INTRODUCTION**

On August 30, 1999, 78.5% of East Timorese voters chose independence from Indonesia in a UN-sponsored referendum, despite a massive campaign of intimidation by the Indonesian military and militias, who assured the Timorese\(^1\) that there would be huge reprisals if the independence option won\(^2\). The high number of Timorese who voted for independence in the face of real danger is even more significant if one takes into account Timor’s diversity – Timor consists of twelve different ethnic groups, which together use a total of nineteen different languages\(^3\). In addition, only twenty-four years earlier, when Indonesian troops first occupied the country, a year after the Portuguese colonizers left, these diverse groups of mostly illiterate farmers shared very little with each other. In fact, at the time of the Indonesian invasion of Timor in 1975 only a handful of East Timorese intellectuals had even begun to think of the Timorese as one people and to imagine a potential future East Timorese nation-state.

Timor’s story, of course, does not end with this clear expression of national unity in the ultimately victorious 1999 referendum. By 2006, which was only four years after Timor’s official independence, the country had fallen into a situation akin to civil war, with fighting between those from the east of the country and those from the west. Gangs of youth were responsible for much of the fighting. The end result was the internal

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\(^1\) Note that “Timorese” or “Timor” is meant to refer to “East Timorese” or “East Timor,” unless otherwise stated.

\(^2\) These threats were carried out. Immediately following the referendum Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militia initiated a “scorched-earth campaign,” killing approximately 1,400 Timorese, and forcing another 300,000 (out of a population of 890,000) into Indonesian West Timor, as refugees. Approximately 85% of the infrastructure of the country was destroyed (Bork 2004, 51).

\(^3\) Apart from “indigenous” Timorese, there are also Chinese-Timorese and “mestiço” Timorese of mixed African, Arab, Portuguese and local ancestries (Crockford 2002, 27).
displacement of about 100,000 Timorese, the destruction of approximately 1,000 homes, and the collapse of the first government.

An improbable and optimistic display of national unity and purpose, followed by a quick disintegration into chaos and inter-ethnic fighting: the story of East Timor’s post-independence path is sadly far from unique. In fact, Timor in many ways serves as the paradigmatic case of the wayward postcolonial nation-state, whose people joined together after the second World War, under highly idealistic nationalist banners and against great odds, to throw off the “yoke of colonial rule” and claim control of the nation-state, only to disintegrate post-independence into ethnic fighting, their post-independence states having morphed into “corrupt, fractious, and often brutal regimes” (Chatterjee 1993, 219), the emancipatory aspects of their struggles seeming to have fallen by the wayside somewhere along the journey.

Motivated by the case of Timor, I try to answer two potentially interrelated questions in this paper. First and most importantly, how did the former European colonies of Asia and Africa which won their independence in the Post-World War II period – a group of which Timor is part – come to think of themselves as nations and aspire to nationhood? What were the shared features or characteristics of nationalist formation among this group? Second, why has Timor’s post-independence narrative become so common as to have become almost a cliché? Why have so many of the former colonies of Africa and Asia had such a hard time transitioning to independence? Is there a relation or connection between the manner in which they came to their national consciousnesses and their post-independence struggles or crises?
In Section I of this paper I will examine general theories on “nationalist formation,” the process whereby a group develops a national consciousness and aspirations to nationhood. I will do this through a review of the debate in the literature on nationalism between the “modernists” and the “primordialists,” regarding the historic origins of nations, nationalism and national consciousness. In Section II, I will compare two modernist theories of nationalism which deal specifically with the formation of nationalism in the European colonies of Asia and Africa that won their independence in the Post-World War II era: the theory of the classical nationalist scholar, Benedict Anderson, as laid out in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1983) 2006); and that of the postcolonial/subaltern theorist Partha Chatterjee, as laid out in The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Studies (1993). Finally, in Section III, I will move from theory to practice, bringing Anderson’s and Chatterjee’s theories to bear on the case of East Timor. I will employ both theories to examine the process whereby the East Timorese began to think of themselves as one people under Indonesian rule, and I will attempt to answer whether and in what ways, the particular difficulties Timor has faced in the post-independence era can be connected to the manner in which Timor came to its national consciousness.
SECTION I: ORIGINS OF NATIONS, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

While this paper is primarily an attempt to understand the particular modes or processes of nationalist formation in the late 20th century European colonies of Asia and Africa, it is useful to first take a step back to examine how social scientists have theorized the historic origins of nations, nationalism and national consciousness. Scholars tend to follow one of two main paradigms when dealing with this issue: primordialism or modernism. A third paradigm, ethno-symbolism, attempts to bridge these two paradigms.

Primordialism

The oldest paradigm that has been employed to explain the origins of nations and nationalism is what is known today as primordialism (primordialism as a term did not come into usage until the 50s). Primordialism asserts that nations, or at least the roots of nations, are premodern, in that they are rooted in premodern collectivities which can be broadly conceived of as ethnicities. The origins of this mode of thought can be traced to Rousseau, with his call to flee urban corruption and return to ‘nature’ to recover a lost innocence. This type of “natural primordialism” entered into the very definition of nationhood with Abbe Sieyes, who asserted that “nations must be conceived as

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4 Perennialism, which, like primordialism and ethno-symbolism considers the roots of nations to be premodern, is sometimes linked with primordialism and sometimes considered a fourth, separate paradigm. This theory was mostly espoused by historians, as opposed to social scientists. Perennialists believe that nations have always existed in every period of history and that many nations existed from time immemorial. Perennialism comes in two main forms. Continuous perennialism asserts that particular nations have a long, continuous history, and can trace their origins back to the Middle Ages or, more rarely, antiquity. The emphasis is on continuity and the slow rhythms of collective cultural identity. Recurrent perennialism asserts that particular nations are “historical and change with time but ‘the nation-in-general,’ as a category of human association, is perennial and ubiquitous, because it reappears in every period of history and is found in every continent of the globe” (Smith 2001, 50-51).
individuals outside the social bond, in the ‘state of nature’; they exist only ‘in the natural
order’” (Smith 2001, 43).

A second kind of primordialism is a sociobiological version, which holds that
nations, ethnic groups and races can be traced to the underlying genetic reproductive
drives of individuals and their use of strategies of “nepotism” and “inclusive fitness” to
maximize their gene pools (Van den Berghe 1978, 403-404). In this case the cultural
group is treated as a wider kin network, and cultural symbols (language, religion, color,
etc.) are used as markers of biological affinity. The sociologist Pierre van den Berghe
writes that the nation is a “politically conscious ethny” (Van den Berghe 1981, 61),
ethnys being simply extended kinships. Van den Berghe argues that kinship ties remain
powerful even in modern society, because of a general behavioral principle of all animals
including human beings to “favor kin over nonkin” (1981, 18), in order to maximize the
chance of survival of one’s genes. Culture facilitates the myth of common descent by
which any ethny is bound together, “but the myth cannot be invented and had to be
rooted in historical reality to be accepted” (1981, 27).

A later, more influential version of primordialism is cultural primordialism. This
approach is traced to Edward Shils, who, relying on Weberian theory, used the term
primordialism for the first time in 1957 in his attempts to distinguish different types of
social bonds in modern society. Taking issue with the intellectual current of the 1950s
which posited that citizens gave their loyalty to the state purely out of rational, self-
interest, and that industrialization and modernization would erase “irrational” bonds such

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5 Van der Berghe was the first to use the term “ethny” in place of “ethnicity,” a term later adopted by
nationalist scholar and ethno-symbolist Anthony Smith.
as kinship and village, Shils argued that modern society is in fact “held together by an
affinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and
creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense” (1957, 131).

In the 1960s, Clifford Geertz drew upon Shils’s idea in one of his early studies of
non-Western societies. Geertz argued that in non-Western societies “primordial
attachments” bind people and can lead to tension and conflict with other groups. He
wrote that “new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on
primordial attachments” (Geertz 1973, 259), as ethnic loyalties and civic loyalties
compete for attention. Geertz defines the primordialism concept as:

One that stems from the 'givens' or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably
involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the
givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious
community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a
language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of
blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at
times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves (1973, 259).

For Geertz primordial attachments rest on perceptions and belief. It is not the
intrinsic nature of these attachments that makes them ‘given’ and powerful; rather it is
human beings who see these ties as givens, and attribute to them an overpowering
coerciveness. Individuals and members of collectivities feel and believe in the
primordiality of ethnies and nations – their naturalness, longevity and power. It is this
belief in the ties which matter – the reality that “peoples see their language…as essential
or as the very essence of their selfhood or ethnicity…without which the group would, in
their own estimation, cease to have meaning, or even cease to exist” (Schiffman 1998,
Introduction).
Geertz’s views have been built upon by the political scientist Walker Connor, who termed the type of nationalism based on belief in primordial ties “ethno-nationalism.” Connor argued that national sentiment could never be rationally explained, but only analyzed and invoked: “The nation is a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group that shares such a belief” (Connor 1994, 212). Steven Grosby turned away from this psychological emphasis, asserting that there was an empirical, rational explanation for why so many people share a sense of primordialism and feel such strong attachments. He argued that primordialism is based on certain beliefs about the life-enhancing/ life-sustaining properties of such collectivities (Grosby 1994).

Primordialist nationalism has been linked to the idea of the “organic nation,” a nation in which identity and cohesion are given to its members, independently of any free will. Nationalists who adopt a primordialist view (and most do, for obvious self-interested reasons) argue that the roots of national identity and sovereignty are based on primordial traits such as ancient ethnicity. The paradigmatic case of nationalism based on the idea of the “organic nation” is German nationalism. In Germany, nationalist history-writing looks far back in pursuit of a “naturalizing” account of German ethnicity. Germany must be rooted, it is asserted, in an “always already existing” ethnic identity (Smith 2001, 50-51); German nationalists from Herder and Fichte forward have emphasized “ethnic” rather than “political” or “civic” criteria for inclusion in the nation (Smith 2001, 38-39).

The main strength of the primordialist theory is that it helps to explain conflicts between states and within states – particularly within new states which consist of a mix of
ethnic and cultural groups – and answers the very important question of why people are willing to die for their nations (Bacová 1998).

The primordial concept has been heavily critiqued in the post-World War II era, however, and has been abandoned by most social scientists (although it is still espoused by nationalists). On the one hand, it is viewed as unscientific. Jack David Eller and Reed Coughlan, two of primordialism’s biggest critics, have argued that to use primordialism means admitting to a failure on the part of the social sciences to explain emotion (Eller and Coughland 1993, 192). Primordialism has also been viewed negatively because of what a belief in it had led to – not just Nazism, but more recently, the ethnic genocide that has accompanied the end of the Cold War. Post-Cold War conflicts have also led to the weakening of the primordialist paradigm in that they have revealed the constructed nature of ethnicities, providing evidence that ethnicity is fluid, and can even be created. Primordialism has been condemned as being linked to the essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight one another.

Modernism

On the opposite side of the debate from the primordialists are the modernists, whose views have become more-or-less orthodoxy in the nationalist literature since World War II, due, among other things to the plethora of criticism leveled at primordialists (a general move away from essentialism and towards a belief in social constructivism was also influential). Modernists believe that nations, as well as nationalism (the ideology, movement and symbolism), national states, national identities and the whole ‘inter-national’ community, are modern phenomena (Smith 2001, 46).
They are not merely relatively recent, but also qualitatively novel. Nationalism, in short, is a product of modernity: “Nationalism is an innovation, and not simply an updated version of something far older. Nothing like it existed before. But this is not a matter of the perennial movement of history, it is a phenomenon brought into being by a wholly new epoch and an entirely novel set of conditions” (Smith 2001, 46). Modernists believe that the French Revolution in 1789 inaugurated not just a new ideology, but “a new form of collective identity, a new type of polity, and in the end, a new kind of inter-state order. In this conjunction and interlinking of these novel phenomena, is mirrored the new world order of modernity. But equally, they reflect the new conditions characteristic of modernity” (Smith 2001, 47).

Modernist theorists agree that nations and nationalism are modern developments, and most also agree that their place of origin was Europe (a notable exception on this is Benedict Anderson, who believes that nationalism first emerged in the Americas). Yet they disagree greatly on how nations and nationalism first came into being – on what conditions of modernity were most influential in their development. Some emphasize the importance of structural-materialist factors; others emphasize the importance of ideational-subjective factors. Modernist theorists also debate whether the rise of nations was a result of agency, or an unavoidable byproduct of modernization. Those who believe it was a result of agency disagree as to whether the agency came from above (elite agency), or from below (popular agency). Finally, there is debate about whether nationalism developed on its own in places like China, or whether it merely spread to non-western countries from Europe. Below I will summarize several of the most well-known modernist theories.
The Scottish theorist of nationalism, Tom Nairn, asserts that nationalism was a European invention which arose from the unevenness of development, and in particular the uneven wave of capitalism: “European uneven development in the 19th century led to the development of nationalism, to this new and distinctive complex of political and philosophical notions – a complex both different from, and far more dynamic than, the older conceptions of nationality and the state” (Nairn 1977, 259). Nairn writes that the explosive outward surge of industrial-based capitalism carried nationalism rapidly across the globe. Implanted by imperialism, it nevertheless became (just as it had in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Latin America), the main vehicle of anti-imperialist struggle, the ideology of independent development.

Ernest Gellner, the philosopher, sociologist and social anthropologist, writes that industrialization is the primary cause of nationalism. In “the agro-literate” stage of history, when the inhabitants were economically static and internally culturally diverse, rulers had little incentive to impose cultural homogeneity on the ruled. But in modern society, as work becomes technical, the populace must learn skills. There is a need for impersonal, context-free communication and a high degree of cultural standardization. Furthermore, industrial society is underlined by the fact that there is perpetual growth – employment types vary and new skills must be learned. Thus, generic employment training precedes specialized job training. On a territorial level, there is competition for the overlapping catchment areas (e.g. Alsace-Lorraine). To maintain its grip on resources, and its survival and progress, the state and culture must for these reasons be congruent. Nationalism therefore is a necessity. Gellner writes:
It is this which explains nationalism: the principle – so strange and eccentric in the age of agrarian cultural diversity and the 'ethnic' division of labour – that homogeneity of culture is the political bond, that mastery of (and, one should add, acceptability in) a given high culture ... is the precondition of political, economic and social citizenship (Gellner 1997, 29).

The scholar John Breuilly points to the emergence of the modern state as being central to the rise of nationalism. He writes that the prime focus of nationalist mobilization is to get control of the state’s power and resources. Breuilly writes that “A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty” (1993, 3).

British historian Elie Kedourie claims that nationalism was a response to “the predicament of modern man” (Kedourie 1960, xv). Kedourie stresses the ideological nature of nationalism, its quasi-religious power and its role in breaking up empires and creating nations where none had existed. According to Kedourie, nationalism was a species of the European idea of progress coming out of the Enlightenment, which attempted to attain the impossible by seeking perfectibility in a world of doubt, giving political form to the optimistic rationalism of the Enlightenment which had undermined the stable forms of community which humans need. Kedourie maintains that nationalism is destructive when seized upon by disgruntled third world intellectuals and adapted to native ethnic and indigenous traditions (1960, 106). He rejects the sociological explanation provided by Gellner as “economism”.
British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawn divides the development of nationalism into three eras: 1830-1880, which he says is dominated by liberal nationalism; after 1880 until the end of WWI, where there is a turn towards the conservative right, and nationalism is more self-conscious about being geared towards the masses; and 1918-1950, which Hobsbawn labels the apogee of nationalism. Hobsbawn writes that the decolonization process was more a result of anti-imperialist attitudes than it was of nationalist sentiments, making the huge number of states born after 1945 unclassifiable as “nations.” Hobsbawn believes nations owe much to ‘invented traditions,’ which are the products of social engineering, and argues that nations are created to serve the interests of ruling elites by channeling the energies of the newly enfranchised masses. Hobsbawn defines ‘invented tradition’ as follows:

‘Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.... However, insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented' traditions is that the continuity with it is largely fictitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, 1-2).

Finally, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community” (Anderson [1983] 2006, 6). It is imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community”([1983] 2006, 6). Anderson is said to have broken new ground by “combining the structuralist-materialist
accounts of nation formation with a sustained focus on the ideational-subjective constitution of nationhood” (Roy 2007, 10).

At one level Anderson explains the emergence of the nation in terms of social and economic transformations such as the advent of “print capitalism” or as the formation and consolidation of a new form of human solidarity – a bounded community that perceives itself to exist in the simultaneity of “homogenous empty time” as a result of the widespread circulation of print-capitalist commodities such as the newspaper and the novel. At another level, Anderson talks about the work of “imagination” in bringing the national community into being, agreeing with Kedourie that the nation was enabled amongst other things by the universal human need to believe in a higher trans-individual purpose in a post-Enlightenment world where unquestioned faith in divine providence is no longer possible. Anderson writes, “With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear…What was then required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning…few things were better suited to this end than the idea of the nation” ([1983] 2006, 19).

Taking issue with what he labels the “Eurocentrism” of most scholars of nationalism, Anderson writes that the large cluster of political entities that sprang up in the West between 1778 and 1838, all of which self-consciously defined themselves as nations, were historically the first such states to emerge and therefore inevitably provided the first real model of what such states should ‘look like’ ([1983] 2006, 47). The European nation-state came into being as the response to nationalism in the European Diaspora beyond the ocean.

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6 Anderson himself labels his approach “historical-materialist or Marxist.”
Nationalists who adopt the modernist viewpoint speak of “constructed” or “voluntaristic nations” – nations which are a result of the free choices of their members. They claim that traditional identities such as ethnicity have been superseded by the founding of a true and modern nation. The paradigmatic case of nationalism based on the idea of the modern nation is French nationalism. The French narrative traces the nation to a modern act of founding by its members, people who were not constituted properly as French (rather than Provencal or Béarnaise, Protestant or Catholic) until that radically novel founding. French nationalists emphasize the nation-making political form of the republic and the idea of citizenship, and emphasize “political” or “civil” criteria for inclusion in the nation rather than “ethnic” criteria (Smith 2001, 37). One scholar closely linked with this view is the French theorist Ernest Renan, who wrote that “a nation’s existence is… a daily plebiscite” (Renan 1882).

The modernist paradigm is widely embraced among scholars of nationalism. Yet, it does have some detractors. Among other things, modernist theories have been criticized for being too focused on the objective to the detriment of the subjective, for being elite-oriented, for rupturing the historical record, and most importantly, for failing to address problems of collective passion and attachment. Critics ask the rhetorical question, “Why should so many have ‘fought and died’ for their nation, when nationalism was only a tool created by the elites for the sole purpose of economic gain and economic cohesion?” Finally, just as in other fields of study in the social sciences, grand narrative, all-encompassing explanatory paradigms of nationalism, including the modernist paradigm, have begun to be replaced with limited models and accounts of particular, usually contemporary aspects of the study of nations and nationalism.
Ethno-symbolism

Finally, while the literature on nationalism focuses primarily on the two-way debate between modernists and primordialists, nationalist scholar Anthony Smith has proposed a synthesis of primordialist and modernist views, called ethno-symbolism. A former student of Ernest Gellner, Smith created his theory to try to overcome perceived deficiencies in Gellner’s model and those of other modernists. In Nationalism: Key Concepts (2001), Smith writes that the process of nation-formation is “not so much one of construction, let alone deliberate ‘invention,’ as of reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural motifs and of reconstruction of earlier ethnic ties and sentiments” (Smith 2001, 83). Smith explains that ethnosymbolists have “pointed to the danger of a ‘blocking presentism,’ that is, an exclusive focus on the views and interests of the present generation in shaping the past. This makes it difficult…if not impossible, to grasp the many ways in which ethnic pasts help to shape present concerns by providing the cultural frameworks and parameters within and through which the needs and understanding of the present are formed and articulated” (2001, 83). Besides for being historically shallow, Smith writes that the presentist view simply does not stand up to historical scrutiny. Smith explains that ethno-symbolists place the rise of modern nations in the context of previous collective cultural identities in premodern epochs, of which the most important is the ethnie, “the named human population which is associated with a particular territory, and which shares myths of ancestry and historical memories, as well as elements of a

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7 Many scholars place Smith and the ethno-symbolist paradigm in general within the primordialist paradigm. See, for example (Joireman and Fullerton [2003] 2007, 29).
common culture” (2001, 85). Smith asserts that nations are “specialized developments of (one or more) looser ethnic groups and that the ethnic community has historically served as a model and basis of many nations” (Smith 2001, 85-86).

The strength of the ethno-symbolist approach is that it gives more weight to subjective elements of ethnicity and nationalism. It also moves away from elite-oriented analysis and stresses the two-way relationship between various elites and the lower strata or people. In addition, it takes a long-view of history, placing the analysis of nations and nationalism within a framework of earlier collective cultural identities, and especially of ethnic communities or ethnies, while stressing that the relationship of nations to ethnies is a complex one with no simple linear progression. By relating national identities to prior ethnic ties, ethno-symbolism, like primordialism, works to explain the continuing hold modern nations have over people and provides alternative explanations for conflicts, beyond the economic and political.

Critics of the ethno-symbolist approach have argued that the approach is merely descriptive, and as such does not explain the variability of national movements. Some have argued that ethnosymbolism is too similar to primordialism, or that it is largely an internal critique of modernist nationalism.

Both primordialists and ethno-symbolists believe that nations, or at least the roots of nations, are premodern, in that they are rooted in collectivities which can be broadly conceived of as ethnicities (or ethnys). These ethnicities or ethnys are based on primordial ties, which are a product of blood, kinship or culture. Thus, primordialists and ethno-symbolists believe that nations precede the ideology of nationalism and the rise of political nation-states. Modernists, on the other hand, believe that nations are a novel
form of belonging that only came into being in the modern age. Modernists thus assert that the ideology of nationalism either preceded or arrived alongside the birth of nations. Most modernists believe that ethnicity was constructed in the modern age as well. Post-World War II, the modernist paradigm has been embraced by most scholars of nationalism. However, almost all nationalists make claims based on some type of primordialism; nationals too, often hold primordialist views.
SECTION II: NATIONALIST FORMATION IN THE FORMER COLONIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

In Chapter I, I summarized the debate in the nationalist literature on the origins of nations, nationalism and national consciousness. In this chapter I will narrow my focus, and examine two modernist theories – by Benedict Anderson and by Partha Chatterjee – that look specifically at the spread of nationalism among the group of former European colonies of Asia and Africa which gained their independence in the post World-War II era.

In addition to my belief in the validity of the modernist paradigm and its widespread acceptance in the nationalist literature, the modernist paradigm, which proposes that all nation-states were in fact constructed in the modern era, is simply the best suited to explaining nationalist formation in the former colonies, as the borders and cultural and political identities of these polities were shaped and defined in the modern era by colonial states, which usually paid little heed to pre-existing ethnic, linguistic, cultural or political groups, in laying down their boundaries. While the primordialist paradigm has a lot to say about problems faced by these polities post-independence, due to their mix of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups, it is clearly less able to talk about the processes whereby these diverse groups came to see themselves as one people and aspire to nationhood.

I have chosen to focus on Benedict Anderson’s theory for many reasons, including the central place accorded to Anderson in the nationalist literature, the fact that Anderson’s notion of the nation as an imagined community, with its focus on social belonging, is so particularly well suited for anthropological use in, the fact that Anderson
writes at length about the construction of national identity in late 20th century colonies, and the fact that Anderson is an Indonesianist/Southeast Asianist who has written about East Timor. I have chosen to focus on Chatterjee’s theory because of the central place Chatterjee is accorded in the postcolonial and subaltern fields (fields necessarily intertwined with the field of nationalism), and because Chatterjee accepts and works with Anderson’s general definition of the nation as an imagined community, while at the same time voicing dissent with several key aspects of Anderson’s theory.

**Classical Perspective: Benedict Anderson**

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson refers to the phase of nationalism experienced by the former European colonies of Asia and Africa which gained their independence in the post World-War II era as “last wave nationalism”\(^8\). In order to understand Anderson’s ideas regarding “last wave nationalism” – which he believes is the fourth phase of nationalism – we must first review the three models of nationalism which he believes preceded this phase.

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\(^8\) The one nationalism which Anderson includes in this group of ‘last wave’ nationalisms, which is not Asian, African, or indeed anti-colonial, is Swiss nationalism. Anderson cites Christopher Hughes’s assertion that the 1891 jubilees marking the 600th anniversary of the Confederacy of Schwyz, Obwalden, and Nidwalden – when the Swiss state ‘decided on’ 1291 as the date of the ‘founding’ of Switzerland – marks the birth of this nationalism. He asserts that if Hughes is right in dating its birth to 1891, Swiss nationalism is not much more than a decade older than Burmese or Indonesian nationalism, and it too arose in that period of world history in which the nation was becoming an international norm, and in which it was possible to ‘model’ nationness in a much more complex way than hitherto. Anderson writes, “if the conservative political, and backward socio-economic, structure of Switzerland ‘delayed’ the rise of nationalism, the fact that its pre-modern political institutions were non-dynastic and non-monarchical helped to prevent the excesses of official nationalism… Finally, as in the case of the Southeast Asian examples, the appearance of Swiss nationalism on the eve of the communications revolution of the twentieth century made it possible and practical to ‘represent’ the imagined community in ways that did not require linguistic uniformity” (Anderson [1983] 2006, 139).
The first phase, colonial, or creole nationalisms, occurred between 1776-1836 in Brazil, the United States and the former colonies of Spain. These states were all “creole states” in that they were composed of “creoles,” defined as “persons of (at least theoretically) pure European descent but born in the Americas (and by later extension, anywhere outside Europe)” (Anderson [1983] 2006, 47). The republics that ultimately emerged from these former colonies were isomorphic with their previous colonial administrative units. Anderson writes that one of the ways these administrative units came to be conceived of as fatherlands was through the “journeys” or “pilgrimages” of creole functionaries, which allowed creoles to recognize their difference from metropolitan (1983] 2006, 53). Anderson explains that the pilgrimages of creole functionaries were vertically barred (it was nearly unheard of for a creole to rise to a position of official importance in Spain) as well as laterally circumscribed (the apex of the creole functionary’s looping climb, the highest administrative centre to which he could be assigned, was the capital of the imperial administrative unit in which he found himself). Yet “on this cramped pilgrimage he found traveling companions who realized they were alike in the shared fatality of their trans-Atlantic birth and the exclusion it merited” ([1983] 2006, 57).

Anderson writes that printmen also contributed to the creation of national consciousness with their provincial newspapers, which served as a tool for imagining the nation. Anderson emphasizes that language was never an issue in these early struggles for national liberation (all these states were formed and led by people who shared a common language and common descent with those against whom they fought). He also asserts that intelligentsias did not play a major role.
Next came the linguistic/popular nationalisms of Europe, which emerged between 1820 and 1920. In almost all of them, “national print languages” were of central ideological and political importance, and “all were able to work from visible models provided by their distant, and after the convulsions of the French Revolution, not so distant, predecessors” ([1983] 2006, 67). “Official nationalisms” developed after and in reaction to, the popular national movements in Europe. These nationalisms, of which Czarist Russification is the best-known example, can best be understood as a means for “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire” ([1983] 2006, 86).

Finally, there were the last wave nationalisms about which this paper is primarily concerned. This phase of nationalisms took place post-World War II in the former colonies of Europe, after the age of high dynasticism had ended and the nation-state had become the legitimate norm ([1983] 2006, 113). Just as the ‘pilgrimage’ played a major role in the rise of 18th century nationalisms in the Americas, so too did it play a major role in the rise of 20th century nationalisms. Pilgrimages undertaken by colonized subjects throughout the imperial unit caused them to recognize their commonality as colonized subjects and their differences with the colonizers:

For even in cases where a young brown or black Englishman came to receive some education or training in the metropole, in a way that few of his Creole progenitors had been able to do, that was typically the last time he made this bureaucratic pilgrimage. From then on, the apex of his looping flight was the highest administrative centre to which he could be assigned: Rangoon, Accra, Georgetown, or Colombo. Yet in each constricted journey he understood rather quickly that his point of origin – conceived ethnically, linguistically, or geographically – was of small significance. At most it started him on this pilgrimage rather than that: it did not fundamentally determine his destination or his companions. Out of this pattern came that subtle, half-concealed transformation, step by step,
of the colonial-state into the nation-state, a transformation made possible not only by a solid continuity of personnel, but by the established skein of journeys through which each state was experienced by its functionaries ([1983] 2006, 114-115).

Just as in 18th century America, these 20th century pilgrimages help explain the isomorphism between each of the 20th century nationalisms’ territorial stretch and that of the previous imperial unit. The only major difference between the pilgrimages of the 18th century and those of the 20th century was that the number and variety of pilgrims was increased in the 20th century, due to an increase in physical mobility made possible by the achievements of industrial capitalism, the need for armies of bilingual clerks due to the increase of the state everywhere after the turn of century, and the spread of modern-style education ([1983] 2006, 114).

The last of these factors – the spread of the colonial school system and the literate, bilingual intellectuals it produced – was a second central element in the spread of last wave nationalisms. Intelligentsias were central to the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories, due to the fact, among other things, that “colonialism ensured that native agrarian magnates, big merchants, industrial entrepreneurs, and even a large professional class were relative rarities” ([1983] 2006, 116). The intelligentsia’s “vanguard role” also derived from their literacy and bilingualism, and what this made possible:

Print literacy already made possible the imagined community floating in the homogeneous, empty time of which we have spoken earlier. Bilingualism meant access, through the European language-of-state, to modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of nationalism, nation-ness and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteen century” ([1983] 2006, 116).

Anderson refers to the rise of modern-style education as the “paradox of imperial official nationalism,” in that it “inevitably brought what were increasingly thought of and written
Emerging intelligentsias in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century colonies were different than the intelligentsias of 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe because of their youth and, more importantly, because of the political significance attached to their youth (a significance which Anderson claims remains to this day). While Anderson acknowledges that in Europe and in the colonies “young” and “youth” signified dynamism, progress, self-sacrificing idealism and revolutionary will, he notes that in Europe one could be ‘young’ and have little in the way of definable sociological contours. There was no necessary connection between age, language, class and status:

One could be middle-aged and still part of Young Ireland; one could be illiterate and still part of Young Italy. The reason was that the languages of these nationalisms was either a vernacular mother-tongue to which the members had spoken access from the cradle, or, as in the case of Ireland, a metropolitan language which had sunk such deep roots in sections of the population over centuries of conquest that it too could manifest itself, Creole-style, as a vernacular ([1983] 2006, 119).

In the 20\textsuperscript{th} century colonies things were different, as “youth meant, above all, the first generation in any significant numbers to receive European-style education, marking them off linguistically and culturally from their parents’ generations, as well from the vast bulk of their colonized agemates” ([1983] 2006, 119). Anderson writes, “this…reminds us again of the unique role played by the colonial school-systems in promoting colonial nationalisms” ([1983] 2006, 120-121).

Along with pilgrimages, and the rise of modern education and its production of young, politicized, bilingual intelligentsia, Anderson points to a third factor that was
responsible for the spread of nationalism in the 20th century colonies (one that is intricately related to the first two): the “gaze of the colonial state.” Colonized peoples were brought together under the gaze of the colonial state so that internal differences, such as ethnicity, language and gender were made to seem irrelevant. Moreover, they were brought together in a way that pointed to their inferiority. Writing about student pilgrims in the Dutch East Indies, Anderson asks, “what were they all together”([1983] 2006, 122)? He answers his own question:

The Dutch were quite clear on this point: whatever mother-tongue they spoke, they were irremediably inlanders, a word which, like the English ‘natives’ and the French ‘indigènes,’ always carried an unintentionally, paradoxical semantic load. In this colony, as in each separate, other colony, it meant that the persons referred to were both ‘inferior’ and ‘belonged there’ (just as the Dutch, being ‘natives’ of Holland, belonged there). The word also implied that in their common inferiority, the inlanders were equally contemptible, no matter what ethnolinguistic group or class they came from. Yet even this miserable equality of condition had a definite perimeter. For inlander always raised the question ‘native of what?’ If the Dutch sometimes spoke as if inlanders were a world-category, experience showed that this notion was hardly sustainable in practice. Inlanders stopped at the coloured colony’s drawn edge. Beyond that were, variously, ‘natives,’ indigènes and indios….From all this, by a sort of sedimentation, inlander – excluding whites, Dutchmen Chinese, Arabs, Japanese, ‘natives’, indigènes, and indios – grew ever more specific in content; until, like ripe larva, it was suddenly transmogrified into the spectacular butterfly called ‘Indonesian’ ([1983] 2006, 122-123).

A fourth factor responsible for the rise of 20th century nationalisms was the nineteenth-century colonial state and the policies that its mindset encouraged. 9 Anderson writes that the nineteenth century colonial state “dialectically engendered the grammar of the nationalisms that eventually arose to combat it…indeed one might go so far as to say

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9 This fourth factor was not included in Anderson’s original analysis of “last wave nationalism” in the 1983 edition of Imagined Communities, but was added as an appendix to his revised, 2006 edition. Anderson qualified this addition, noting that his data on this point was drawn wholly from Southeast Asia. He writes that it remains to be seen whether his analysis “even if plausible for this region, can be convincingly applied around the globe” (Anderson [1983] 2006, xv).
that the state imagined its local adversaries, as in an ominous prophetic dream, well before they came into historical existence” ([1983] 2006, xiv). Anderson points out three specific institutions which contributed to shaping the state’s imagination: the census, the map and the museum. He writes, “To the forming of this imagining, the census’s abstract quantification/serialization of persons, the map’s eventual logoization of political space, and the museum’s ‘ecumenical,’ profane genealogizing made interlinked contributions” ([1983] 2006, xiv).

Finally, Anderson emphasizes that 20th century nationalisms had a modular character, in that they “can, and do, draw on more than a century and a half of human experience and three earlier models of nationalism” ([1983] 2006, 135). Anderson writes that nationalist leaders in the 20th century are thus in a position to consciously deploy civil and military educational systems modeled on the systems of official nationalisms; elections, party organizations, and cultural celebrations modeled on the popular nationalisms of nineteenth-century Europe; and the citizen-republican idea brought into the world by the Americas ([1983] 2006, 135). Above all, in the 20th century, “the very idea of ‘nation’ is now nestled firmly in virtually all print-languages; and nation-ness is virtually inseparable from political consciousness” ([1983] 2006, 135). Anderson points out that in a world in which the national state is the overwhelming norm, “all of this means that nations can now be imagined without linguistic communality10, not in the

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10 Anderson points out that the fact that nations in the 20th century can be imagined without linguistic communality was also a result of a communications revolution: “In the 20th century one could represent the imagined community in ways that did not require linguistic uniformity; one could bypass print in appealing to illiterate masses, and appeal to literate masses reading different languages” (Anderson [1983] 1996, 135).
native spirit of *nosotros los Americanos*, but out of a general awareness of what modern history has demonstrated to be possible” ([1983] 2006, 135).

**Postcolonial/Subaltern Perspective: Partha Chatterjee**

In *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Chatterjee writes about “anticolonial nationalism” in India (a phrase he uses in place of Anderson’s “last wave nationalism”)\(^\text{11}\), but makes clear that his arguments are meant to apply to all anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa. While Chatterjee concurs with Anderson’s depiction of the nation as an imagined community, he takes issue with Anderson’s argument that the nationalisms outside of the Americas and Europe are modular:

If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined communities from certain “modular” forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anticolonial resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized (Chaterjee 1993, 5).

Rather than being modular, Chatterjee claims that “the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imaginations in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity with, but rather on a difference with, the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by the modern West” (1993, 5)\(^\text{12}\). Chatterjee asserts that anticolonial

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\(^{11}\) Note the significance of the choice of category name in talking about the group of nationalisms in Asia and Africa. In labeling this group’s nationalism “last wave” Anderson is stressing the modularity of nationalisms (in that there are clearly many waves) as well as their historicity. In choosing the descriptor “anti-colonial,” Chatterjee is stressing the centrality of the anti-colonial element of this group’s nationalisms. (Unlike Anderson, Chatterjee would never include Switzerland as part of this group.)

\(^{12}\) Compare this with Chatterjee’s previous book, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (1986), in which Chatterjee asks whether any form of autonomous thought is
nationalism in Asia and Africa creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual:

The material is the domain of the “outside,” of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an “inner” domain bearing the “essential” marks of cultural identity. The greater one’s success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual culture (1993, 6).

While the colonial state is kept out of the “inner” domain of national culture, the so-called spiritual domain is not left unchanged. In fact, here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a “modern” national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation is an imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being. In this, its true and essential domain, the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hands of the colonial power. Chatterjee claims that the dynamics of this historical project are completely missed in conventional histories in which the story of nationalism begins with the contest for political power. In those conventional histories, nationalism has no option but to choose its forms from the gallery of “models” offered by European and American nation-states: “difference” is not a viable criterion in the domain of the material.

possible in the colonial world and answers mostly in the negative, explaining that nationalist discourse is merely derivative. This thesis was attacked as depriving the colonized subject of all autonomy or agency. His newer book seems to represent an evolution of thought on the topic.
There are several areas within the so-called spiritual domain that nationalism transforms in its journey. The first is the sphere of language. Turning to the case of Bengal, Chatterjee writes that the crucial step in the development of the Bengali language came, not at the end of the 18th century when the East India Company and the European missionaries first produced printed books in Bengali and the first narrative prose compositions were commissioned, nor in the first half of the 19th century, when English displaced Persian as the language of the bureaucracy and the most powerful vehicle of intellectual influence on a new Bengali elite. Rather, the critical moment in the development of the Bengali language came in mid-century, when the bilingual elite “[made] it a cultural project to provide its mother tongue with the necessary linguistic equipment to enable it to become an adequate language for ‘modern culture’” (1993, 7):

An entire institutional network of printing presses, publishing houses, newspapers, magazine and literary societies was created around this time, outside the purview of the state and the European missionaries, through which the new language, modern and standardized, is given shape. The bilingual intelligentsia came to think of its own language as belonging to that inner domain of cultural identity from which the colonial intruder had to be kept out; language therefore became a zone over which the nation first had to declare its sovereignty and then had to transform in order to make it adequate for the modern world (1993, 7).

A second area in the inner domain of national culture was the family. Here the assertion of autonomy and difference was perhaps the most dramatic. Those things associated with the domain of the family, such as religion and the treatment of women, had been classified as barbaric “tradition” by the Europeans. The early phase of “social reform” through the agency of colonial power had concentrated on reform in this “traditional” arena. The nationalists, however, disputed this choice of agency, forbidding the colonial state to legislate the reform of “traditional” society; instead they took this
domain under their control and claimed it for the nation, creating, for example, a “new
to be modern, but who would also display the signs of national
tradition and therefore be essentially different from the “Western woman” (1993, 9).

Chatterjee, in line with Anderson and other mainstream nationalist scholars
argues that the intelligentsia, whom he calls the “the middle class,” were the principal
agent of nationalism in the former colonies. However, he places more emphasis on this
class’s social agency and mediating role, rather than its sociological characteristics. He
stresses that this class is composed of social agents who are preoccupied not only with
leading their followers, but who are also conscious of doing so as a “middle term” (1993,
35) in a social relationship – in a position of subordination in one relation and a position
of dominance in another. He speaks of the “subalternity” of the middle class, whose
project, both one of contestation and mediation, leads to a “middle-class mind...split in
two” (1993, 54).

Chatterjee illustrates the “fears and anxieties of [the middle] class aspiring to
hegemony” (1993, 36-37), as well as the process whereby a religion for the middle class
was constructed and brought into nationalism’s “inner” sphere, through an examination
of the text of the Kathāmrta. This text, written by Mahendranath, is a collection of
sayings by Ramakrishna (referred to in the text as “Master”), a famous mystic of
nineteenth century India who was influential in the Bengali and Hindu renaissances
during the 19th and 20th century.

Chatterjee notes that the use of English in this text to introduce questions of a
philosophical nature “serves to create the impression that Ramakrishna is dealing with the
same questions that are discussed in European philosophy” (1993, 53). The bilingual
dialogue runs through the text, translating the terms of an Indian philosophical discourse into those of nineteenth-century European logic and metaphysics, “as though the wisdom of an ancient speculative tradition of the East, sustained for centuries not only in philosophical texts composed by the learned but through debates and disquisitions among preachers and mystics, is being made available to minds shaped by the modes of European speculative philosophy” (1993, 53). The dialogues express the “desire to assert that the ‘common’ philosophy of the ‘rustic’ Indian preachers is no less sophisticated...than the learned speculations of modern European philosophers: in fact, the former is shown as providing different, and perhaps better, answers to the same philosophical problems posed in European philosophy” (1993, 53).

Chatterjee points out that while the internal arrangement of each volume in the Kathāmṛta is chronological, in keeping with the requirements of authentic documentation, as soon as Mahendranath passes to the reporting of the Master’s sayings, he “not only abandons the formal structure of a rational narrative prose, he surrenders himself completely in his journey with Ramakrishna through the fluid space of mythic time” (1993, 54). Chatterjee asserts that Mahendranath’s escape in the text into the world of mythic time is an escape from the oppression of the discourse of reason, which “served as a justification of colonial rule and as a condemnation of indigenous culture as the storehouse of unreason, or (in a stage-of-civilization argument) of reason yet unborn, which only colonial rule would bring forth” (1993, 55).

Chatterjee asserts that the subordination of the Bengali middle class to the colonial power was based on much more than a mental construct, as hegemonic power is always based on force as well as the persuasive self-evidence of ideology. It was the
Bengalis’ fear of the colonial power that accounts for the recurrent message which runs
through the Kathāmrta, a message that asserts that “worldly pursuits occupy a domain of
selfish and particular interest…a domain of conflict, of domination and submission, of
social norms, legal regulations, disciplinary rules enforced by the institutions of power”
(1993, 58-59), and then assures the worldly householder that he “can always escape into
his own world of consciousness, where worldly pursuits are forgotten, where they have
no essential existence…the inner world of bhakti (devotion), a personal relation…with
the Supreme Being” (1993, 59).

There are two themes in Chatterjee’s reading of the Kathāmrta which permeate
the remainder of the book, both having to do with the idea of nationalism as a project of
mediation. First is the appropriation of the popular. Mahendranath’s favorite description
of Ramakrishna is that of the child, with an innocence which contains a wisdom richer
than the cunning of worldly adults. Chatterjee explains that in anticolonial nationalism
the popular becomes the repository of natural truth, naturally self-sustaining and therefore
timeless. He writes that “it has to be approached not by the calculating and analytic of
rational reasoning but by ‘feelings of the heart,’ by lyrical compassion. The popular is the
timeless truth of the national culture, uncontaminated by colonial reason” (1993, 73).
The popular is always appropriated in sanitized form, “erased of all marks of vulgarity,
coarseness, localism, and sectarian identity.” The popular enters hegemonic discourse as
a gendered category:

In its immediate being, it is made to carry the negative marks of concrete
sexualized femininity. Immediately, therefore, what is popular is
unthinking, ignorant, superstitious, scheming, quarrelsome, and also
potentially dangerous and uncontrollable. But with the mediation of
enlightened leadership, its true essence is made to shine forth in its natural
strength and beauty: its capacity for resolute endurance and sacrifice and its ability to protect and nourish (1993, 73).

The second theme concerns the structure of the hegemonic domain of nationalism, and touches on my second question in this paper, which asks why postcolonial polities have had such a hard time transitioning to independence, and whether there is a connection between the manner in which they came to their national consciousnesses and the difficulties they face post-independence. According to Chatterjee, nationalism inserted itself a new public sphere where it sought to overcome the subordination of the colonized middle class – to challenge the “rule of colonial difference.” Thus, the legal-institutional forms of political authority that nationalists subscribed to were in conformity with the principles of a modern regime of power and often modeled on examples supplied by Europe and America. But the hegemonic project involved a contrary movement as nationalists created a new sphere of the private in a domain marked by cultural difference from the West. The subjectivity constructed here was premised not on a conception of universal humanity but rather on particularly and difference: the identity of the “national community” as against other communities. According to Chatterjee “the contradictory implications of these two movements in the hegemonic domain of nationalism have been active right through its career and continue to affect the course of postcolonial politics” (1993, 74). In short, the search for a postcolonial modernity has so often been a failure because it has been tied from its very birth with its struggle against modernity (1993, 75).

How is Chatterjee’s perspective on nationalist formation in the former European colonies of Asia and Africa different from Anderson’s perspective and those of other mainstream nationalism theorists? What, if anything, does it add to their arguments?
First, Chatterjee takes issue with mainstream nationalist theorists who look to the political realm in trying to tell the story of nationalism, instead of to the inner, spiritual realm, where the true nationalist project takes place. Following this logic, Chatterjee disagrees with Anderson’s assertion that last-wave nationalism, or anticolonial nationalism, is modular in character. Chatterjee writes that anticolonial nationalism is only modular in the outside, material realm where there is no choice but to be modular; in the inner/spiritual realm, where the nationalist project actually takes place, anticolonial nationalism is anything but modular; in fact it is predicated on difference, not similarity with the West. Chatterjee stresses that even certain modular influences from the West, such as modern European languages and literatures, which were embraced by those in the colonies, did not necessarily produce similar consequences.

Second, while both Anderson and Chatterjee point out that the “gaze of the colonial state” has the effect of sending messages to the colonized not only of their commonality but also of their inferiority, Anderson is mainly concerned with the first message. Chatterjee, on the other hand, places more emphasis on the negative value judgment inherent in the colonial gaze. Chatterjee stresses that the colonial attitude of superiority, with its representation of the “other” as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly inferior, was central to the Western colonial state and its “rule of colonial difference.” He makes it clear that this attitude had the effect not merely of excluding colonized elites from the top echelons of powers and thus contributing to their politicization, but of colonizing the minds and the consciousnesses of the colonized in a penetrating and lasting way. This emphasis is what accounts for Chatterjee’s increased focus on the subjectivity of the middle class and its “mediating role,” in a position of
subordination in one relation and a position of dominance in another. Chatterjee’s emphasis on the deep and lasting effects of the colonial state’s attitude towards the colonized helps us to understand the contours of the middle class’s national project in India, based as it was on a desire to escape the “prisonhouse of reason” and overcome the feelings of humiliation and fear created by the rule of colonial difference. Chatterjee makes it clear that the “gaze” of the European colonial state in the 20th century was indeed very different in nature from that which emanated from the metropoles of Spain and England in the 18th century, something which Anderson does not do.

Third, Chatterjee brings gender into his analysis of nationalism, something almost no mainstream scholars of nationalism have done13. On the one hand he talks about the domain of gender relations being one of the colonial state’s main targets for reform, and therefore often a domain which nationalists choose to take control of in an inner sphere, where new kinds of patriarchies are reproduced. He also talks about the hypermasculinity of colonialism, which “feminizes” the colonized, resulting in the colonized either desiring to become sexless, or desiring to fulfill a hyper-masculine ideal themselves.

Finally, Chatterjee’s theory goes much further than Anderson’s, which tends to stress the utopian aspects of nationalism, in explaining the problems faced by so many former colonies post-independence. On the one hand, Chatterjee stresses, as discussed above, the inherently contradictory nature of the nationalist project. In the outer sphere, nationalism seeks to institute and ramify the characteristically modern forms of disciplinary power, and accept ideas of the West and universal humanity; yet in the inner

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13 One notable exception is the feminist and nationalist scholar Nira Yuval-Davis. Yural-Davis’s book Gender & Nation (1997) is perhaps the central book on gender and nationalism.
sphere, nationalism seeks to resist the modern institutions of disciplinary power, to reject the West and to stress particularity. This contradiction comes to a head when the colonized people achieve their ultimate goal of taking over the state.

Chatterjee also talks about the exclusionary nature of the nationalist project, showing how the formation of a hegemonic “national culture” was necessarily built upon the privileging of an “essential tradition,” which in turn was defined by a series of exclusions. Thus, upon independence in India, Chatterjee writes that the ideals of freedom, equality, and cultural refinement went hand in hand with a set of dichotomies that systematically excluded from the new life of the nation the vast masses of people whom the dominant elite would represent and lead, but who could never be culturally integrated with their leaders:

Because [nationalism] could confer freedom only by imposing at the same time a whole set of new controls, it could define a cultural identity for the nation only by excluding many from its fold; and it could grant the dignity of citizenship to some only because the others always needed to be represented and could not be allowed to speak for themselves…the relations between the people and the nation, the nation and the state, relations which nationalism claims to have resolved once and for all, are relations which continue to be contested and are therefore open to negotiation all over again (1993, 154).
SECTION III: THE CASE OF EAST TIMOR

Sections I and II examined the theoretical literature on nationalist formation. Section I looked at the debate in the literature between the modernists and the primordialists regarding the historic origins of nations, nationalism and national consciousness. Section II focused more narrowly on theories of nationalist construction in the former Asian and African colonies of Europe. It involved a comparison of the theories of two modernist thinkers: Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee. In this final section I will attempt to apply the theories of Anderson and Chatterjee to a particular case: that of East Timor. I will discuss how both theories work to explain the processes by which the East Timorese began to think of themselves as one people under Indonesian rule, and to answer whether and in what ways the particular difficulties Timor has faced in the post-independence era can be connected to the manner in which Timor came to its national consciousness. My data regarding Timor’s nationalist formation comes from Anderson’s own 1993 article on the topic, entitled “Imagining East Timor” and Fiona Crockford’s ethnography, *Contested Belonging: East Timorese Youth in the Diaspora* (2007).  

Before beginning my analysis, I will give a brief summary of the history of East Timor.

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14 Academic scholarship on East Timor is limited. The country was officially closed until 1989. Even when the country opened in 1989 it was very difficult for foreigners to do research in Timor. A few intrepid journalists (usually posing as tourists or otherwise coming incognito) entered for short periods of time. They mostly wrote political pieces concerning the human rights situation in Timor. Thus, no ethnographic work, much less anthropological ethnographic work, was done in Timor before 1999, which could have captured the process of Timor’s nationalist formation as it was occurring. Two anthropological ethnographies have been published on Timor post-independence, both based on research conducted during the Indonesian occupation, and both focused on national identity among diaspora communities in Sydney in the 90s. These include Crockford’s *Contested Belonging: East Timorese Youth in the Diaspora* (2007) and Amanda Wise’s *Exile and Return Among the Timorese* (2006). While Crockford’s work centers on identities of youth in exile in Sydney, it also contains more general analysis of nationalist formation in
Background

The narrow, mountainous island of Timor lies in the southeastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. “East Timor” did not exist as a separate entity prior to Portuguese colonization in the sixteenth century. Today’s East Timor encompasses half the island of Timor, the small enclave of Oecusse located within West Timor on the north coast near the border, and the small island of Atauro (Wise 2006, 19).

Portuguese colonial rule

Portuguese Dominican friars first made contact with what is now East Timor in 1556. Until that time Timor had remained relatively secluded from the dramatic economic, socio-cultural and religious shifts occurring in western Indonesia from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. As a result “while Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic beliefs circulated through Southeast Asia, Timorese remained “animists with an Iron Age culture…a hierarchical social structure…and a system of hereditary chiefdoms of a quasi-feudalistic type” (2007, 44). There were hundreds of kingdoms across East Timor, each ruled by a liurai (royal chief) who had absolute power over his people, both nobles and commoners.

By 1702, unnerved by the proximity and tenacity of the Dutch15, the Portuguese Crown intensified its defense of the protectorate and imposed civil control of the island in

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15 The Dutch worked their way into Timor from the West, finally defeating the western capital of Kupang and taking over West Timor in 1653. In 1859, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Portuguese and the Dutch divided the island between them. The definitive border was drawn by the Hague in 1916. In 1949 West Timor became part of the new Indonesian state.
lieu of the ecclesiastical administration. Yet East Timorese cultural life and social structures at a general level remained relatively untouched during Portuguese rule: “The comparably favorable conditions in East Timor should be seen as resulting mostly from distance, isolation from other colonies, and neglect as Portugal directed attention and resources elsewhere in its empire” (2006, 20).

During World War II, Australia moved into Timor to defend from Japanese encroachment from the north. When Australians were forced out in 1943 the Timorese carried on fighting the Japanese. Some 40,000 Timorese died as direct result of the war between 1941 and 1946. Between 1946 and 1974 there was a second period of Portuguese presence in Timor, during which “living conditions for the majority of Timorese in the post-war years remained relatively unchanged, characterized by poverty, underdevelopment, lack of resources and lack of mobility” (2007, 54). In 1959 there was a major uprising of Timorese, which was eventually quelled by the Portuguese (2006, 21).16

Decolonization

In 1974, the Portuguese army staged a coup in Lisbon, leading to the collapse of Europe’s last colonial empire. A policy of decolonization was implemented in Timor almost immediately. This took place amid massive illiteracy (93% of the population was illiterate in 1973). However, there was a small group of elites who had been educated in

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16 Under Portuguese rule, Timorese resistance to the Portuguese was based on claims to a “cultural common past” with the indigenous West Timorese. After the 1959 uprising one of the group’s leaders said: “We are not interested in the government of Indonesia but in the integration of East and West Timor. We have ancient links – we never had a border before Portugal colonized Timor” (Wise 2006, 21). For obvious reasons (including the fact that the East Timorese were not disputing the claims of Indonesia to West Timor), this type of claim, based on a pre-modern primordial ethnicity, was not the primary claim to independence under Indonesian rule. Under Indonesian rule, claims to independence were instead based on East Timor’s history of Portuguese rule, in opposition to Indonesia’s history of Dutch rule.
Catholic schools, and then had gone on to University in Portugal. When the governor of Lisbon declared the legality of political parties, these elites stepped into the fray. Three parties were created: UDT\textsuperscript{17}, which proposed “aggressive autonomy under the Portuguese Flag,” ASDT\textsuperscript{18}, soon to become FRETELIN\textsuperscript{19}, which proposed an immediate right to independence for Timor, and APODETI\textsuperscript{20}, which proposed autonomous integration into Indonesia\textsuperscript{21} (2006, 23-24).

Shortly thereafter, Indonesian developed an operation to destabilize Timor, manipulating UDT to split into two camps – those for independence and those against it. Under Indonesian influence UDT mounted a coup against Fretilin leading to a three weeks civil war. By mid-September 1975 Fretilin had gained control of Timor and created a de facto government which ruled Timor for three months, sending urban educated youth to rural areas to encourage the development of a nationalist spirit through consciousness-raising. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military began to make incursions into Timor (the civil war had the effect of giving substance to Indonesia’s territorial claim to East Timor in the eyes of the international community). This caused Fretilin to declare independence on November 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1975 (2006, 25-26).

\textit{Indonesian invasion and occupation}

\textsuperscript{17} Uniao Democratica de Timor (Timorese Democratic Union).
\textsuperscript{18} Associação Social-Democrata Timorense (The Timorese Social Democratic Association).
\textsuperscript{19} Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).
\textsuperscript{20} Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (Timor People’s Democratic Association).
\textsuperscript{21} It is now widely known that APODETI was clandestinely supported and funded by the Indonesian government (Wise 2006, 24).
Nine days later, on 8 December 1975, Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor by land, sea and air. The initial attack was vicious and made no attempts to avoid civilian casualties. Within the first two days, 2,000 East Timorese were murdered. Days of murder, rape and looting followed. Full-scale attacks lasted for four years. In 1976 East Timor was declared Indonesia’s 27th province. By 1979, almost one third of the pre-invasion population (approximately 680,000) had perished (they were either killed or died of hunger and/or disease). No East Timorese family was left unmarked (2006, 26).

A strategy of cultural and social genocide, or “Indonesianization” ensued. As many as 80 percent of villagers were resettled in towns, where they had no means of support, or put into concentration camps (euphemistically known as “model villages.”) Forced labor was rife: “these camps destroyed local social systems, were psychologically devastating, and caused an enormous increase in diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. Furthermore, those sent to them lost ownership of their traditional lands” (2006, 27).

During the next twenty-four years the Indonesian state invested heavily in infrastructure in Timor, including schools, hospitals, and government offices, “in an attempt to show the impressive benefits of integration with Indonesia compared to the underdeveloped state in which the Portuguese left East Timor” (2006, 27). Schools

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22 The Indonesian invasion occurred two days after the President of the United States, Gerald Ford, had completed a state visit to Jakarta with his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. It is now well known that they privately gave Suharto US approval for the invasion. The United States had wanted to avoid a prospect of “a second Cuba” in Southeast Asia that might impede the free passage of US nuclear submarines through the Ombai-Wetar Straits that lie parallel to East Timor. Australia’s Whitlam government knew precisely of Indonesia’s plans as well (Crockford 2007, 65).
became a prime site of “Indonesian indoctrination.” Teaching Portuguese was banned, and schooling in Indonesian became compulsory. Children had to learn the Indonesian “Pancasila,” the nationalist ideology of Indonesia, word for word and sing the Indonesian national anthem each morning. They also had to attend special classes to learn about Indonesian nationhood. There was a program of forced birth control, whereby Depo-Provera was injected into women in clinics, women who were unconscious after operations and young girls in high schools. From 1989 (when the country was opened to foreigners for the first time since the invasion), a program of resettlement commenced, bringing migrants from other parts of Indonesia to “Indonesianize” the population. By the late 1990s, Indonesians were estimated to be 20% of the population. Over the twenty-four period of Indonesian occupation the Timorese suffered a massive amount of human rights violations, including disappearances, tortures, rapes, forced prostitutions and murder (2006, 27-28).23

Resistance

For the first three years of the occupation, Fretilin and its guerilla forces, Falintil, fought in a “traditional mode” under a central command. In Fretilin-controlled areas during this time, Fretilin ran classes on food production, housing, education and health care. However, after massive bombing, Falintil forces were virtually at the point of extinction. In 1981, under the new command of Xanana Gusmão, Falintil broke up into mobile guerrilla units and moved into the mountains. They were backed by a very successful clandestine support network, which helped supply intelligence, food, and

medicine to the Falintil fighters and organize demonstrations (often to attract foreign media attention) in Dili and elsewhere. In 1994 Gusmão organized a coalition of the disparate parties to form a single resistance movement, bringing together UDT and Fretilin. It was called the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) (2006, 28-29).

Diplomatic efforts by Timorese exiles to raise awareness of Timor’s plight in the international arena also contributed to the resistance movement. Most notable among the exiles was Jose Ramos-Horta. The Catholic Church was also a central element in the resistance. As the Church ran the only higher education institution in Timor, it was “a breeding ground for the early East Timorese independence leaders” (2006, 34) (both Gusmão and Ramos-Horta were educated there). Later, because Indonesia required all its citizens to identify with one of the six “official” religions, the East Timorese flocked to Catholicism as a form of resistance against the predominantly Muslim invaders. While only 30% of the population was Catholic in 1975, by 1998 well over 90% of the population was Catholic. The Catholic Church resisted attempts to incorporate the East Timor church into the wider Indonesian church, instead administering East Timor as a separate entity, giving services in Timor’s lingua franca, Tetum. Many leaders of the Church spoke out against the Indonesian state, including, most famously, Bishop Belo. Belo and Ramos-Horta both won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 in recognition of their work advocating for Timor (2006, 31).

24 The choices were: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism or Confucianism.
Following the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, President Habibie offered Timor the chance to have a referendum, whereby they could choose autonomy within Indonesia or full independence. On 30 August 1999 78.5% of the Timorese voted in favor of independence. The next day the Indonesian-armed and trained militia went on a violent rampage, implementing their planned “scorched earth” policy. They killed approximately 1,400 Timorese, and forced another 300,000 (out of a population of 890,000) into Indonesian West Timor, as refugees. Approximately 85% of Timor’s infrastructure was destroyed (Bork 2004). After three weeks of violence, an Australian-led force came in to secure the area. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) took over the country until May 20, 2002, the date of Timor’s official independence. Timor’s first government was led by Fretilin Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri; Xanana Gusmão served as President.

**Nationalist Formation in Timor Pre-Independence: Analysis**

With that brief background out of the way, I can now return to my main question. As noted above, in 1974-75 East Timor nationalism was still quite thin on the ground; perhaps only a small percentage of the population could then really imagine the future nation-state of East Timor. Yet by 1999 this situation has changed dramatically, despite the diversity of the population, the virtual absence of print-capitalism, the still substantial illiteracy and the attempts of Indonesia to erase any marks of “Timoreseness.” What made it possible to “imagine East Timor” in such a short time period in these circumstances? I will apply the theoretical frameworks of Anderson and Chatterjee in an attempt to answer this question.
Benedict Anderson

The task of using Anderson’s theoretical framework to explain why nationalism spread so quickly in Timor post-1975, is facilitated by the fact that Anderson himself attempted to answer this question in a 1993 article he wrote, predating Timorese independence, entitled “Imagining East Timor.” In this article, Anderson posed and then answered the question of what made it possible to think East Timor.

Anderson begins with the name itself: “East Timor,” noting that it is an expression which comes from the Mercatorian map, on which a penciled administrative line divides Timor in half. Pondering the fact that “this 'aerial' demarcation [had] become so real a reality that it is possible for young people in Dili to think it is perfectly normal to call themselves 'East Timorese,'” as if these two words were one, no longer immediately pointing to ‘West Timor’” (Anderson 1993), Anderson asserts that the origins of the new consciousness of East Timor as one concrete entity “derive in part from a bureaucratic imagining which long pre-dates the invention of nationalism” (1993) and parallels the way that the Irianese or West Papuans were imagined or came into being, only perhaps in the last thirty years.

25 The power of “mapping” is so strong that when Indonesia invaded East Timor and incorporated it into the Indonesian state, Indonesia kept the colonial boundaries set by the Portuguese and Dutch in place, governing East Timor, with its enclave of Oecusse located in West Timor, as one separate province. Indonesia fell prey itself to the power of “mapped imagination” thus helping to facilitate Timorese nationalism. Anderson points out that the Papuans began to imagine themselves as one people through the power of the map, in which Papua was marked as singular province, as it had been ruled that way under Dutch rule. In 2003, Indonesia tried to make up for the “mistake” it had made in Timor in keeping the province whole, by dividing the province of West Papua. In 2003 Megawati ordering that the singular province be divided into three provinces: Central Irian Jaya (Irian Jaya Tengah), Papua (or East Irian Jaya, Irian Jaya Timur), and West Papua (Irian Jaya Barat). A local government for Jakarta was installed in Irian Jaya Barat (West) in February 2003; a government for Irian Jaya Tengah (central) was delayed from August 2003 due to violent local protests (no doubt due to recognition of the destructive effects of Jakarta’s plans for the development of Papuan identity). The creation of this separate central province was blocked by Indonesian courts, who declared it to be unconstitutional and in contravention of Papua’s 2002 special autonomy agreement. The previous division into two provinces was allowed to stand as an established fact.
Admitting that the consequences of “mapped imagination” is not the whole answer, Anderson turns to an analysis of the effects of the “gaze of colonial state” upon the Timorese, much greater under Indonesian rule than under Portuguese rule because of the greater size and penetration of the Indonesian state:

If you look at the official speeches about East Timor, you will never find Suharto or the generals talking about its people as anything but 'East Timorese,' even though there are at least thirty ethnic or tribal groups in the region. In the same way, the Jakarta regime never talks about Asmat or Dhani, but always about Irianese. This exactly parallels the late colonial Netherlands East Indies, where the colonized knew they were all ‘natives’ together in their rulers' eyes, no matter what island, ethnicity or religion they belonged to. A profound sense of commonality emerged from the gaze of the colonial state. Indonesian power is infinitely more penetrating, infinitely more widespread, than Portuguese colonial power ever was. It is there in the smallest villages, and is represented by hundreds of military posts and a huge intelligence apparatus. Thus the consciousness of being East Timorese has spread rapidly since 1975 precisely because of the state's expansion, new schools and development projects also being part of this (1993).

Continuing with the theme of the expansion of the Indonesian state, Anderson points out that in an attempt to create Indonesian citizens, the Indonesian state forced the Timorese to choose one of the official religions recognized by the Indonesian state. Anderson writes:

With regards to the Catholic Church in East Timor, Jakarta finds itself in a strange bind, for it has found itself both wanting and distrusting Catholicism’s spread, recognizing, on the one hand, that as official members of the Catholic Church the population will enjoy protection according to the logic of the religions provisions of the Pancasila state ideology and, on the other hand, fearing the emergence of a popular Catholicism, which, as in nineteenth-century Ireland or Communist-ruled Poland, has become a powerful expression of common suffering (1993).

Anderson writes that the Catholic commonality of the Timorese in some sense substituted for the kind of nationalism he talked about elsewhere, which came from print-
capitalism, in that it gave people a shared reality – in this sense an expression of common suffering. Moreover, he notes that the decision of the Catholic hierarchy in East Timor to use Tetum, not Indonesian, as the language of the Church, had profoundly nationalizing effects, raising Tetum from being a local language or lingua franca in parts of East Timor to becoming, for the first time, the language of “East Timorese” religion and identity (1993).

Anderson next points to the spread of the colonial school system and its production of bilingual intellectuals. He writes that in Timor the school system was responsible for creating a young generation of educated Timorese, who could speak the “modern” language of Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia):

There is a further colonial irony at work. For young Indonesian intellectuals at the turn of the century, the language of the colonizer, Dutch, was the language through which it became possible to communicate across the colony, and to understand the real condition of the country. It was also the language of access to modernity and the world beyond the colony. For one generation at least, Dutch performed the absolutely essential function of getting natives out of the prisons of local ethnic languages. In the same way, the spread of Indonesian in the Jakarta-sponsored school system has created a new generation of young Timorese who are quite fluent in Indonesian, and who, through Indonesian, have found access to the world beyond Indonesia. Indonesian is not the language of internal solidarity among the East Timorese young but it is one of the important languages of access to modern life. Indonesian/Tetum corresponds in 1990 to Dutch/Indonesian in 1920 (1993).

Finally, Anderson points to the Indonesian state’s inability to sufficiently imagine East Timor as part of Indonesia. Anderson points out that Indonesian nationalism sees itself as “incorporating or covering many different ethnic-linguistic groups and many different religious cultures, precisely those agglomerated over centuries into the Netherlands East Indies” (1993). He writes that the commonality of ‘Indonesia’ is
fundamentally one of historical experience and mythology. On the one hand there is the conception of centuries of struggle against Dutch colonialism. On the other, “there is the myth…of grand pre-colonial states, most notably that of Majapahit in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which can be read to include the whole of Timor, as well as regions today solidly part of Malaysia and Singapore” (1993).

Jakarta needed to “recompose the national people narrative so as to incorporate the East Timorese” (1993). State leaders had been cautious about using the myth of the Majapahit empire as a prime basis for the historical identity of modern Indonesia, because it is so closely identified with just one of Indonesia’s ethnic groups, the Javanese. Yet the link could not be made in terms of resistance to Dutch imperialism, because East Timorese had obviously not been colonized by the Dutch (“mapped imagination” therefore was not possible); nor could it be made in terms of solid historical connections and contacts with the rest of the archipelago, for “one of the peculiar characteristics of Portuguese colonialism was that it kept East Timor extremely isolated, except for links between Portugal, Macau, Mozambique, Angola and Goa” (1993). Jakarta could have used a biological argument, stressing that “After all, we have the same physical features, our languages are connected, our original cultures were identical” (1993). However, this line of argument was tricky, as it leads to claims, unacceptable today, to the Philippines and Malaysia. Anderson concludes that the result of the inability to fit the Timorese into their “national people narrative” was a deep inability to imagine East Timor as Indonesian: “Clearly the greatest difficulty has been to persuade themselves that the East Timorese ‘really’ are Indonesians. If they were, there would be only the simplest task of
scraping away a kind of superficial strangeness attributable to Portuguese colonization revealing a ‘natural Indonesianness’ underneath” (1993).

The greatest evidence of Indonesia’s incapacity to incorporate Timor was the extremist methods of rule that were used in East Timor after the invasion of 1975. However, there were more subtle ways in which this incapacity was expressed. Anderson tells a story that what really enraged the East Timorese students studying in Jakarta was that they were always being told how ungrateful they were. Day in day out they heard from deans, professors, fellow students, and so forth “Look at all we have done for you! Where is your gratitude?” (1993). Anderson comments,

It unlikely that in the heyday of Indonesian nationalism people ran around the country telling fellow Indonesians whom they were enlisting to the nationalist cause that they should be ‘grateful.’ Even in the 1950s when Indonesia was shaken by many regionalist revolts, the accusation of ingratitude never emerged. The accusation then on all sides was typically that of 'betrayal' of a common historical project. By contrast, 'ingratitude' was a typical accusation by Dutch colonial officials against 'native' nationalism: 'Look at all we have done for you, down there, in terms of security, education, economic development, civilization'…. The language is that of the superior and civilized towards the inferior and barbarous. It is not very far from racism, and reveals a profound incapacity to 'incorporate' the East Timorese, an unacknowledged feeling that they are really, basically, foreign (1993).

26 Anderson points out that the vast scale of the violence deployed, the use of aerial bombardments, the napalming of villages, the systematic herding of people into resettlement centers leading to the terrible famines of 1977-80, have no real counterparts in Indonesian government policy towards, as it were, “real Indonesians”: “They seem more like policies for enemies than for national siblings. It is true that there was massive violence in the anti-Communist campaign of 1965-66. Yet the bulk of that violence was local in character, fuelled by the panic of millions of people about what was going to happen to themselves, their families, and so forth, 'if Communism prevailed'. It had its cold, planned elements certainly, but nothing comparable to the coldness and the plannedness of the ravaging of East Timor, which reminds me very much of the horrific depredation of Leopold's 'spectral agents' in Conrad's Heart of Darkness. Conrad made the point that for these agents all civilized rules were abandoned in 'Africa.' There atrocities they would never get away with back home in Belgium were permissible” (Anderson 1993).
In Anderson’s analysis of nationalist formation in Timor, he touched on most of the factors he claimed were characteristic of “last wave nationalisms” more generally, including the colonial state’s role in bringing the new nation into being through mapping, the “gaze of the colonial state,” and the spread of the colonial school system with its production of bilingual, literate intellectuals. He also added an important point regarding Indonesia’s failure to imagine Timor as part of its nation (a point connected to his theory of “mapping”). The only factor which Anderson theorized was characteristic of ‘last wave nationalisms’ generally, which he did not apply directly to the case of Timor in his article, concerns their modular nature (although he did allude to this in his discussion of the Indonesian language giving youth access to modern ideas in school). However, it is clear that modularity was also a big component of Timorese nationalism: By the end of Portugal’s rule there was a small, educated elite in Timor, many of whom had studied abroad in Portugal or the Portuguese colonies in Africa, where they had obtained a strong dose of anticolonial nationalism. Significantly, due to the late decolonization of the Portuguese empire, the models of nationalism available to Timorese elites not only included the European, American and Russian models of which Anderson wrote, but specific models of anticolonial nationalisms from other Asian and African colonies. Crockford writes of the time immediately after the Carnation Revolution, when “despite the lack of support from Lisbon, young, educated East Timorese elites, inspired by the nationalist liberation movements of Portugal’s West and East African colonies in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome e Principe, began to envision a more progressive and independent future” 27(Crockford 2007, 59).

27 Other commentators have noted that in the 1970s the political elite in Timor were reading such people as
Anderson’s theory of “last wave” nationalist formation maps nicely on to the case of Timor. While this was helped, of course, by the fact that Anderson mapped his theory onto the case of Timor himself in his article, the cleanness of the fit is evidenced by the fact that Anderson’s analysis has been heavily cited by almost all scholars who have written about Timorese nationalism, including Fiona Crockford, whose ethnography I discuss below. Anderson’s theory can be said to apply particularly well to the case of Timor, due to Anderson’s familiarity with anti-colonial nationalism in Indonesia and the reality that Indonesia was replicating in Timor what the Dutch had done in Indonesia (with similar results). Yet, while Anderson’s theory has clearly proven to be a fruitful one with which to look at the case of Timor, it is certainly not the only one. I will now turn to Chatterjee’s theory to see whether it also proves useful in explaining nationalist formation in Timor, and whether it helps to illuminate any components of Timor’s nationalist formation that Anderson’s may have overlooked.

*Partha Chatterjee*

In *The Nation and its Fragments*, Chatterjee uses India as a case study, but claims that his theory of anticolonial nationalism is more widely applicable. An application of Chatterjee’s theory to East Timor is a good test of this claim, as India and Timor could hardly be more different. Not only were there major differences between both India’s and Timor’s precolonial polities, but also in these two states’ experiences of colonialism. To lay out just a few of the most obvious surface differences between the two states: India, which gained its independence in 1947, was one of the first of the former Asian and

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Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi, W.E.B. Du Bois, Aime Cesaire and Amilcar Cabral, and that these thinkers had a significant influence over Fretelin's political discourse (Wise 2006, 30).
African colonies to gain its independence in the post-World War II era; Timor was the last. At the time of its independence India had a population of 347 million people; Timor had only 680,000. India has a long history of literacy; Timor to this day is predominately illiterate. Despite these differences, and more, does the crux of Chatterjee’s theory – that nationalists divide society into two spheres, with an “inner” non-Western spiritual sphere and an “outer” Western material sphere – apply to the case of Timor?

One roadbump in applying Chatterjee’s model to the case of Timor is that his model is based on the centrality of the “colonial experience” in the process of nationalist formation, with the understanding that the “colonial experience” involves a Western or European colonizer and a non-Western or non-European colonized\(^{28}\). While this classic colonial situation existed in India, it did not in Timor. Nationalist formation in Timor primarily took place under Indonesian rule, not under Portuguese rule. Indonesia is not only a non-Western/non-European state, but as discussed above, Indonesian did not see itself in the role of “colonizer.” Although its attitude towards the Timorese was indeed one of colonizer to colonized, this was neither inwardly not outwardly acknowledged by the Indonesian state\(^{29}\). Rather, until the very end of its rule in Timor, Indonesia continued

\(^{28}\) There is always a risk of reifying the constructs of West and non-West through their use, but as “Westerness” is such as essential part of Chatterjee’s argument and arguably, of the self-definition of European colonizers, I will employ the term here for the argument’s sake.

\(^{29}\) Granted, which states do and do not fit into the category of “colonizer” is far from clear. Even those states deemed classic colonizers, including Timor’s first colonizer, Portugal, did not always self-identify as such. “In common with a long Latin tradition, initiated by the Romans and followed by both the Spaniards in their Latin American empire and later the French in some of their colonies, including Algeria, the Portuguese constitution of 1820 and Constitutional Charter of 1826 had effectively used the term ‘provinces’ to describe the overseas possessions. In 1910, with the republican revolution the territories were renamed ‘colonies’ to emphasize the transient nature of colonialism. The terms ‘overseas provinces’ regained currency during the Salazar years of fascist government (1932-7) as Salazar sought to rebuild the Portuguese Empire and to convince the Portuguese people of the need for expansionism and increased ‘living space’ at a time when other European col wers were dissembling” (Crockford 2007, 55).
to insist that East Timor was the 27th province of Indonesia, spending money and effort “developing” Timor to prove how different (and how much better) it was than Timor’s former colonizer – the Portuguese. Indonesia failed, as Anderson pointed out, to see that “[it was] replaying, in reverse, the final trajectory of the colonial relationship between themselves and the Dutch” and “that [its] policy of ‘Education-Repression-Development’ in East Timor followed exactly the logic of earlier Dutch policies…[its] failure was ‘foretold’ by Indonesia's own modern birth” (Anderson 1993).  

In the case of East Timor not only do we not have a situation of classic Western/European colonial rule, we also do not have a classic Eastern colonized people. Under Indonesian rule, Timorese identity and claims for independence were based in large part on its experience of being colonized by the Portuguese: the Timorese deployed claims to Portuguese identity and used the resources of Roman Catholicism to defend against Indonesia’s policy of Indonesianization. While the Indonesian state ignored these claims to Portuguese identity, indeed treating the Timorese as “backward” “primitives” who needed to be “civilized” (the Javanese in particular consider themselves to be a superior people, and feel that all peoples to the east of Java are inferior), at least some Timorese held their own attitude of superiority towards the Indonesian state, based on Timor’s past ties with the West. In my past research, for example, I have heard Timorese speak disparagingly of the “barbaric” Indonesians who ate with their hands, while bragging that they, as Timorese, had been eating with silverware since Portuguese times.  

30 Here, in fact, we see one of the clearest examples of what Chatterjee calls the “hegemonic nature” of the nationalist project: under the flag of nationalism a formerly oppressed people liberates itself only to oppress its weaker neighbor, unaware of the fact that its own nationalist project has taken a very wrong turn.  

31 Note that “Portugueseness” was in fact, in a material sense, available only to a select few Timorese and even then it was a highly qualified identification defined by a plethora of overlapping assimilationist
Nevertheless, taking this possible problematization of the Western/non-Western component of Chatterjee’s model into consideration, an examination of Crockford’s ethnographic work, Contested Belonging: East Timorese Youth in the Diaspora, shows that Timorese nationalists did indeed develop a spiritual inner sphere where Timorese identity thrived, in opposition to an outer material sphere where the Indonesian state resided. An examination of Crockford’s data shows that there were several things within this so-called spiritual sphere that Timorese nationalists claimed sovereignty over. These included the Catholic Church, a “spirit of resistance,” and a new youth generation (Gerasaun Foun).

I noted above that the Timorese converted en masse to Catholicism (from 30% in 1975 to over 90% by 1998) after the Indonesian state forced the Timorese to choose one of its six official religions, and that the Church made the decision to employ only Tetum in its services. In “Imagining Timor,” Anderson wrote that the Catholic commonality of descriptors. The assimilation policy conferred honorary Portugueseness openly only to those Timorese deemed to have attained an appropriate standard of “civilization.” You had to be educated or Catholic, speak Portuguese and preferably have a Portuguese name. In return assimilados were granted Portuguese citizenship and voting rights, and officially became “not indigenous.” By 1964 only 2% of Timorese were considered “Portuguese.” But of course even this was only a “contingent Portugueseness, marked by what Edward Said describes as the ‘dreadful secondariness of colonial subjectivity’” (Crockford 2007, 57).

The failure of Chatterjee’s model to cover the particularities of the case of Timor raises interesting questions: In what ways are the “structures of domination” employed by non-Western/non-European colonizers different than those employed by “classic” Western/European colonizers? In what ways is the behavior of non-European/non-Western colonists shaped by their experience of former colonization by the West/Europe? (Is it typically more violent or vicious?) How does a state’s refusal to acknowledge its role as a colonizer affect the “structures of domination” it employs? (The US might serve as an example here.) Finally, what are the particular ways “second imperialists” rule? (Do they always try to be seen as “kinder” than the colonizer which preceded them?) What are the particularly ways in which “second imperialists” are perceived? (Are they always perceived more negatively than the first?) To answer many of these questions it might be useful to compare the case of Timor with that of Eritrea. Eritrea had been colonized by a Western/European power before being invaded and essentially colonized by a “second imperialist,” its non-Western/non-European neighbor, Ethiopia. Ethiopia also refused to accept its role as colonizer, and (debatably) had been colonized before by a Western/European power. (Anderson himself notes similarities between the two cases and mentions that Eritrea’s liberation from Ethiopia was a positive inspiration to the Timorese.)
the Timorese in some sense substituted for the kind of nationalism which came from print-capitalism, in that it provided a common expression of suffering, in a common language. Crockford goes into much greater depth on what the Catholic Church meant to the Timorese, making it clear that the Church was indeed claimed by nationalists as part of an inner/spiritual sphere where a decidedly non-Western Timorese identity could flourish. Crockford explains that it was “not simply Indonesian state coercion that drew Timorese to the Church” (Crockford 2007, 83):

Under threat of extinction and subject to acts of violence and oppression of medieval proportions, East Timorese turned to the Church for safety and spiritual solace. Sealed off from the world, Timorese suffered the humiliation of being imprisoned in their own land. The Church offered a means to subvert the crushing effects of Indonesian state violence and intimidation. It became the foundation of the East Timorese capacity to resist ‘Indonesianization,’ offering a vehicle through which the expression of a specific national identity might be articulated. Indeed, mass affiliation with the Catholic Church since 1975 enabled Timorese to frame their struggle in terms of a conflict between a Catholic ‘us’ and a largely Muslim (Indonesian) them. Politics, religion and the moral right to the restitution of the land thus became inseparable (2007, 83).

On the one hand, membership and participation in the Church provided the Timorese with a symbolic means to affirm an identity in opposition to their mostly Muslim rulers. It also offered the means for a more concrete subversion of Indonesian rule (and thus expression of Timoreseness). Crockford writes that the Church provided a “cultural space, a public place not occupied by Indonesian authorities, a sense of inner liberty” (2007, 81). In addition to enabling Timorese to speak their common language, Tetum, the Church allowed Timorese to gather in large numbers for public worship, feast days and mourning. Crockford writes that such public practice enabled Timorese to “contest the limits of state monopolization of space” (2007, 82). In the process,
Crockford writes, “the distinction between public and private space became blurred” (2007, 82). At *kore metan*, for example, held to celebrate the first anniversary of the death of a relative and bring closure to the period of mourning, “domestic spaces became more fluid, as large numbers of guests congregated to show their respects, spilling out of front rooms into front yards and ultimately into the streets, as a procession of vehicles, transporting possibly a hundred or more and led by a bereaved family, made its way deliberately towards the cemetery” (2007, 82). Crockford writes:

> Such events were not simply a manifestation of Timorese religious devoutness. They were public displays of non-adherence to Indonesian cultural and religious values and beliefs and they were attempts at circumventing the pervasively felt Indonesian control over their lives. Through the sacrilization of place and the practice of populist devotions, East Timorese were thus able to construct a very visible geography of resistance (2007, 82).

The Church also offered resources for the Timorese to deal with their suffering and grief and to spiritually resist Indonesian rule. Crockford writes

> The growth and radicalization of the Catholic Church in East Timor inspired a revolutionary spirit and mass defiance, especially among the younger generation. The will to resist and oppose an oppressive power and to confront absolute danger, unarmed, required a transcendence of self and the desire to transform one’s existence at any price” (2007, 84).

Crockford writes that the “Church thus became a major institution of resistance providing a site of solidarity…from which resistance could be organized and sustained both materially and spiritually” (2007, 84).

As noted above, the Church, through its leaders, ultimately made clear its allegiance with the Timorese people by becoming one of the most outspoken critics of the
Indonesian regime. To this day the Church is honored for its role in the resistance movement. Crockford writes: “In isolation from the Universal Church, Timorese clergy became increasingly desperate and correspondingly more strident in their criticisms of terror tactics of the Indonesian state” (2007, 83-84). Most famously, Bishop Belo won the Nobel Peace Prize Winner in 1996 (along with Jose Ramos-Horta) for speaking out about the violent repression of East Timorese cultural identity.33

The Catholic Church was brought into Timor in the 1500s by the Portuguese as a foreign, modern, Western institution – an instrument of colonial oppression. It failed to be embraced by the Timorese for over 450 years out of a recognition of this fact. It was only under Indonesian rule, when the Timorese were forced to choose a “modern” religion, that the Timorese strategically decided to embrace the Church and its links to a non-Indonesian past. However, they did not embrace the Church before turning it into an indigenous Church, which (literally) spoke the language of the people. While the decision to use only Tetum in Church services may have been made on high, the Timorese people themselves claimed the Church and made it their own in multiple ways: in addition to layering their own indigenous, animist beliefs on top of more mainstream Catholic ones, the Timorese turned Church membership into a symbolic statement of oppositional identity, used the Church as a means for a more concrete subversion of Indonesian rule (and thus expression of Timoreseness), and finally, used the Church to give them the

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33 In a now famous letter dated 1985 and smuggled out of Timor, Belo wrote: “In East Timor, we are witnessing an upheaval of gigantic and tragic proportions in the social and cultural fabric of the Timorese people and their identity is threatened with death...An attempt to Indonesianise the Timorese people through vigorous campaigns to promote Pancasila, through schools or the media, by alienating the people from their world view, means the gradual murder of Timorese culture. To kill the culture is to kill the people” (Crockford 2007, 84).
spirit to deal with their suffering and to continue resisting the Indonesian state. The Church was one zone over which the nation first declared its sovereignty. As Xanana Gusmão declared:

A church that lives with the people, a church that suffers with the people, a church that cries with the people, a church that receives the same humiliation as the people, is a church that can never abandon the people! The church serves the people and because it serves the people it can interpret the wishes and the sentiments of the people. A church like this has the complete trust of the people; a church like this is a church of and for the people! (2007, 81)

That the Church had become part of a Timorese inner sphere over which the Timorese people had control (and that this was recognized by the Indonesians as a potentially powerful force for resistance), was evidenced by Indonesia’s not-so-subtle attempt to take back control of the Church through a “gift” they bestowed upon the Timorese in 1996, of a 27 foot tall statue of Jesus. Crockford writes: “Holding His palms forth, in a gesture of supplication and (some say) initiation, He beckons from the eastern extremity of the Indonesian archipelago towards Jakarta, Indonesia’s cultural heartland and the seat of political power – the centre of a largely Muslim nation” (2007, 101). The political nature of this gift, replete with many other references to Indonesian nationhood, was not lost on the Timorese, who largely found it patronizing and offensive. There was some debate over whether it should be removed after Indonesia left, but like the Church itself, brought in by foreign rulers for their own self-seeking purposes.

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34 In addition to his westward gaze, at 27 meters tall, He is said to represent the 27 provinces of Indonesia, with East Timor as the Nation’s newest, 27th acquisition. There are 1945 steps to the top of Fatumaca Hill on which Jesus stands: the number of the year in which Indonesia became a republic. The steps are divided into 76 ‘levels’ recalling the anniversary of Integration with Indonesia on 17th July 1976 (Crockford 2007, 102).
and embraced by the people and made their own, the Jesus statue has also been brought into Timorese society and embraced as an integral part of the people’s history.

The second element in Timor’s inner sphere, which has already entered into my analysis, as it was so intricately connected with the Church, is a “spirit of resistance.” In *The Nation and its Fragments*, Chatterjee’s central argument is that nationalism does not take place in an outer material, political sphere but in an inner spiritual/cultural one. While the creative/cultural acts which occur in this inner sphere (in Bengal’s case, the modernizing of the language and the creation of a “new woman”) may ultimately be viewed as form of “resistance,” this is only in an abstract sense – these acts are different from the type of resistance which ultimately takes place in the outer sphere, after sovereignty is gained over the inner sphere. That type of “outer resistance,” which has as its ultimate goal the downfall of the colonial state and independence for the colonized, is more concrete, political, conscious, and oppositional/reflexive, in that it directly challenges the state. Chatterjee clearly views “outer resistance” as less empowering, because it ultimately takes place on the colonizer’s terms, in the colonizer’s own language; that’s why he stresses that the true nationalist project takes place in the inner sphere.

In the case of Timor, however, this sequence of gaining sovereignty over an inner/spiritual sphere before moving on to a more politicized form of concrete resistance in an outer sphere, was not a possibility. On the one hand, extreme political repression meant that political resistance in an outer sphere was never going to be permitted. On the other hand, extreme social/cultural repression made it very difficult for the Timorese to build up an identity in an inner sphere (which could have at least lessened a sense of
urgency for independence). While we have seen the Timorese were sometimes able to creatively get around these restrictions (rather than losing their sense of Timoreseness by joining the Church, they managed to make the Church the very essence of Timoreseness), this was very difficult to do. As a result, the more political/oppositional/outer type of resistance of which Chatterjee writes, was forced to move into Timor’s “inner” sphere.

Once it moved into the inner sphere, this resistance changed form. It became a kind of “revolutionary spirit” and took on a spiritual element. Crockford quotes Paul Routledge and John Simon, who write that the revolutionary experience is not only political, but also the expression of a “desire to renew [one’s] entire existence by changing one’s way of being in the world” (2007, 89). It also became more than merely reflexive/oppositional. Because of the limited sites of autonomy from which the Timorese could build an identity, this spirit of revolution and resistance came to be embraced by the Timorese as a fundamental mark of their culture. The Timorese came to “own” the resistance, just as they had come to own the Church. While this “spirit of resistance” (which was concretely manifested in the guerillas in the mountains and the clandestine movement) was of course in opposition to the Indonesia state, it was also a purely Timorese phenomenon. This “spirit of resistance” was at the heart of Timor’s inner,

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35 In its attempts force an Indonesian identity onto Timorese by whatever means possible, the State did not just try to reform, but tried to destroy, those very arenas of “tradition,” such as the family and religion, which Chatterjee claims so often forms the basis of the nationalist project. We have seen, for example, the Indonesian government’s attempts at sterilization of women through the “family planning program.” Its policy of forcing the Timorese to choose an “official religion” was not only anticommunist, it also had the goal of moving Timorese away from their ancient “ancestral” or “animist” beliefs. This special policy of repressive “Indonesianization” in Timor was complemented by the general ideology of the New Order Regime, with its attempts to “develop and modernize” Indonesia by working to “reorient Indonesians away from local authorities and institutions of power, towards nonlocal institutions and sources of authority” (Brenner 1998, 229). For example, while family planning programs may have been harsher in Timor, similar ones were in fact implemented throughout the archipelago.
spiritual sphere, and inseparable from everything else that thrived in that sphere, including the Church and the new “youth generation,” which I will describe shortly.\(^{36}\)

The “spirit of resistance” which resided in Timor’s inner sphere was embodied in the symbol of “Maubere.” Crockford explains that Maubere means ‘friend’ or ‘brother’ in one of Timor’s local languages. The name was used pejoratively by the former Portuguese colonizers as a generic descriptor for ‘native,’ ‘poor,’ ‘barefooted’ East Timorese. In 1974 Fretilin co-opted the symbol of Maubere and transformed it into a central motif of national pride and identity and an emblem of what their movement represented. Maubere became a symbol of cultural survival and quintessential Timoreseness: “To be a Maubere was to be a son of Timor and a patriot. It came to symbolize the reassertion of Timorese culture and the struggle against poverty and colonial subordination” (2007, 62).

Crockford writes that as a symbol of authentic Timoreseness, Maubere embodied primordialist ideas of an “essentialized, precolonial Melanesian Timorese identity” (Crockford 2007, 70). It signified ‘the people,’ with its concomitant identification with poverty and oppression, and evoked a capacity to suffer and endure, linked to the notion that the nation was being purchased with blood of people (2007, 79). Drawing “significant affective power from notions of authenticity, inheritance, incorruptibility and the rhetoric of blood, martyrdom and sacrifice” (2007, 78), we see that Mauberism reflects Chatterjee’s notion of the “appropriation of the popular,” whereby the popular becomes “the repository of natural truth, naturally self-sustaining and therefore

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\(^{36}\) The centrality of resistance to Timorese identity and its inclusion in an “inner” sphere is illustrated by the title of the autobiography Xanana Gusmão published post-independence, *To Resist is to Win* (2000). The title can be interpreted to mean that as long as the Timorese resisted, a Timorese identity and culture still existed, and the Indonesians therefore had not won.
timeless...approached not by the calculating and analytic of rational reasoning but by ‘feelings of the heart,’ by lyrical compassion…the timeless truth of the national culture, uncontaminated by colonial reason, erased of all marks of localism” (Chaterjee 1993, 73).

Also in keeping with Chatterjee’s description of the appropriation of the “popular” (which he writes, “enters discourse as a gendered category”), it is clear that the symbol of Maubere, which stood for endurance, sacrifice and strength, was a heavily gendered, masculine image.

Chatterjee writes that in India, women had been a major target of reform by the colonial state. As a result, Indians nationalists took the domain of gender under their control, creating a “new woman,” who was modern but bore the marks of the nation. In the case of Timor we see a parallel situation, but with Timorese youth. As detailed above, Indonesians sought to raise a new generation of Timorese who would grow up to see themselves as Indonesians and be loyal to the Indonesian state. Education was a key instrument of governance through which the Indonesian state sought to acculturate young Timorese as Indonesian subjects and institutionalize ideals of modern citizenry, via political and moral discourses of modernity and progress. Anderson pointed out that this was a flawed project, as Timorese used the Indonesian they acquired in school for nationalist purposes. Crockford elaborates on this point, explaining how Indonesia’s attempts at “reform” ultimately led to the construction of a new generation of youth (Gerasaun Foun), which I argue is a third entity in Timor’s inner sphere. Crockford explains:

The exigencies of the struggle for independence from Indonesian oppression depended upon a very specific enactment of youth within East Timor through which youth acquired a potent and heroic role. The
nationalist project of imagining community thus involved the essentialized construction of a patriotic and self-sacrificing youth (2007, 74).

Youth was defined not as biologically driven, but as a “spirit” or state of mind and a “sacred” and patriotic calling. One youth explained:

To be young…is a state of spirit, a force of will, a quality of imagination, an emotional intensity, a victory of courage over cowardice, and a desire for adventure instead of a love of comfort. One who has lived a certain number of years is not old, but one who has deserted one’s ideals is…Timorese youth have inherited a unique capacity for patriotism and nationalism in the face of any foreign occupation. Hundreds and thousands of our young people from all political and social categories have embarked on the great crusade for independence (2007, 85).

Youth identity involved a conception of youth as heroic martyrs for the nation, “foot soldiers” or “frontline pawns,” whose chief responsibility was to “shield the ranks” of the older generation leadership in the struggle for Timor’s freedom. As one youth wrote:

Defending the rights of the Maubere people is a sacred duty for all the sons and daughters of Maubere. It is to be carried out boldly, selflessly and relentlessly. Students and young people are an integral part of the Maubere people. They have a role to play in this difficult stage of the history of East Timor. It is at the front line of the struggle: to achieve liberty and freedom, for the nation, land and state (2007, 86).

Timorese youth were viewed and viewed themselves, as adults-in-waiting, whose futures, dreams and aspirations must be placed on hold while they fulfilled their critical task. As such, Timorese in their mid to late thirties might refer to themselves and be referred to as ‘youth’ (2007, 87). Some of the more politically active members of the younger generation made conscious decisions to forestall marriage and children until independence, on the grounds that the distractions or attachments of familial responsibility might compromise or diminish an individual’s capacity to act decisively
under pressure. Such explanations were offered matter-of-factly, as a necessary renunciation of self and condition of resistance (2007, 87):

Inevitably, youthful needs and ambitions were subordinated to the struggle. This sacrifice has been framed within nationalist discourse, and by young Timorese themselves, as a sacred duty. As a result, the young have been popularly valorized as heroes and moral agents and those who lost their lives commemorated as martyrs. Through this representation, youth came to symbolize selfless courage, hope and regeneration (2007, 88).

Youth identity was represented as a heroic and, through the gendered ascription of the symbol of Maubere, nominally masculinized identity. Notably, it was also a modern identity. In Timor’s past, the transition to adulthood was marked by marriage and ‘wearing clothes’ – there was no liminal space of youth or adolescence. The invention of a transitional phase of youth was fostered by mass education under the Indonesian occupation (2007, 86). Youthful investment in the hardship of struggle was sustained by a promise of a utopic future. The youth generation referred to Timor as “Paradise” and to themselves as “Paradisians” (2007, 87). Crockford concludes:

Inevitably, youthful needs and ambitions were subordinated to the struggle. This sacrifice has been framed within nationalist discourse, and by young Timorese themselves, as a sacred duty. As a result, the young have been popularly valorized as heroes and moral agents and those who lost their lives commemorated as martyrs. Through this representation, youth came to symbolize selfless courage, hope and regeneration (2007, 88).

Nationalists fostered the construction of Timor’s nationalist identity through discourse, including political communiqués by elites. Taking themes already salient in nationalist discourse, the discourses represented youth as inheritors of the Maubere conscience and as Christian militants (thus including an articulation of Christian and pagan symbolism). The following letter by Xanana urged youth on:
Beloved Youth and Maubere Patriots, the youth is the promising force of our people; the youth is the hope of constructing our Homeland; the youth is the guarantee of the future of our nation. You are this force; you are this hope; you are the guarantee. Our people’s eyes rest on you; our elders, our fathers, are giving you the duty to continue this struggle. Many young people have already given their lives for this struggle. Very many of our compañheiros, young like you, have fallen beside our parents… Children of two, three, four and five years of age are already working for the resistance of our people – many of them have suffered imprisonment, torture, banishment and threats! Many of them bear these atrocities with heroism, and are not fooled by the sweets which the criminal occupiers offer them to buy information about their parents, their relatives and colleagues! They are living examples of a conscience that is transmitted from parent to children – from the massacred parents to orphans who survive, this conscience runs in the Maubere blood in our veins, impregnates our flesh and penetrates our bones and our innermost being! (2007, 79)

As representatives of true ‘Timoreseness’, youth were central to the imaginings of the Timorese nation. Yet, this generation did not only lend symbolic force to the nationalist movement – the distinct, heroic Timorese youth identity was not merely discursive but was taken up and enacted by the Timorese. “Through [their] intimate knowledge of Indonesian institutions and language…. the Gerasaun Foun developed a cultural dexterity and dialogic capacity that would enable them to negotiate the borders between centers and peripheries of power in the service of independence” (2007, 74). Schools became spaces where assertions of Timorese identity could be secretively nurtured and maintained. From the early 80s high school students began to form cells and tentatively made contact with Fretilin and the guerillas in the mountains. As domains of clandestine activity, schools, universities and youth organizations became sites of cultural resistance and political agency. Throughout the 1980s, the movement gradually developed its networks across the Indonesian border, particularly through Renetil, the national organization of Timorese students in Indonesia, whose networks included
Indonesian as well as international activists, including journalists, intellectuals and human rights advocates who were sympathetic to the Timorese cause. In the 1990s, youth moved on to the strategic staging of ‘events’, public protests, secretly planned under conditions of intense surveillance, to coincide with the visits of important dignitaries. These events involved the creation and assemblage of *tais* (weavings), banners, flags and posters in Portuguese and English that declared Timorese resistance to integration.

Crockford writes that the prevailing culture of oppression in East Timor merely drove youth resistance deeper underground:

Chatterjee’s theory of nationalist formation, which posits that nationalists in colonial society divide society into an inner and outer sphere, can be seen to apply to the case of Timor. Crockford’s work presents evidence of at least three different entities which existed in an inner sphere in Timor: the Church, a “spirit of resistance” (represented by the symbol of Maubere), and a new youth generation. The central component in this inner sphere, which permeated all of the other elements in the sphere, was the “spirit of resistance.” This resistance was not merely political, but spiritual; it was not merely oppositional/reflexive, but embraced by the Timorese as a fundamental part of their identity.

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37 The anthropologist Elizabeth Traube has noted an East Timorese tendency to realize symbolic dualism in social arrangements. Traube writes that the land of Timor is imagined as crocodile, which splits the ocean into two: a northern, calm, female sea and a southern, stormy, heroic and macho sea. Timor thus separates “calm and storm, chaos and order, war and peace” (Crockford 2007, 41). In addition, Timorese make a division between the ‘coast’ and ‘interior.’ The ocean is felt to be the domain of foreigners, who are ‘archetypal wanderers…who belong to the world of ‘beyond’ and have political powers over ‘speaking’ humanity (humankind). Timorese, on the other hand, are the ‘insiders,’ with seniority in the ritual real. They are the original inhabitants and ‘older brothers,’ the custodians of the place of origin, who preside over the ‘silent’ cosmos of the natural world” (Crockford 2007, 42). Thus, Timor is thus composed of many oppositional realms: inside/outside; land/sea; indigenous/foreign; speech/silence; stillness/mobility. It would be interesting to explore whether the “inner”/“outer” divide I have argued existed in Timor, had a basis in these types of “indigenous” beliefs.
In applying both Chatterjee’s and Anderson’s theories to the case of Timor, we see manifestations of some of the differences between the two theories, which I pointed out earlier in Section II. Both theories highlighted several of the same factors as being crucial to the spread of nationalism in Timor, including the Church and the politicized, bilingual, literate youth. Yet the theories’ analysis of how these factors led to nationalism differed. For example, Anderson’s theory, which likened the Church to print capitalism, in its ability to help the Timorese imagine their nation, stressed the generic/modular nature of the Church’s role: the Church merely enabled in Timor what newspapers had enabled in other, particularly 18th century American colonies. Chatterjee’s theory, on the other hand, emphasized the unique role the Church played in Timor’s nationalist movement, in that it came to be part of Timor’s spiritual, inner sphere and a central part of Timorese identity. Chatterjee’s theory brought agency into the equation, stressing the active role the Timorese played in bringing the Church into the inner sphere and making it their own. Finally, Chatterjee’s theory also shed light on several additional elements of nationalist formation in Timor, that Anderson’s theory failed to illuminate, including the “popularly appropriated” and gendered symbol of the “Maubere.”

Nationalism in Timor Post-Independence: Analysis

I will now apply the second theoretical question I pose in this paper to the case of Timor: Why has Timor suffered such difficulties in the post-independence era? Are these difficulties in any way connected to the manner or the ways in which it came to its national consciousness?
In the initial years after its independence the case of Timor was hailed as a UN success story. However, by 2006 Timor had fallen into a state of crisis. The crisis was sparked when 600 members of the military, all from the west of East Timor, were fired by the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri for complaining of discrimination from the military leadership, which is primarily of eastern descent (this is due to the fact that the leadership was largely recruited from former Falintil fighters, who were mostly Easterners)\(^\text{38}\). The firing of the soldiers led to mass fighting in Dili, where Westerners began burning Easterners homes (about 1,000 homes were burned). Gangs of unemployed youths, organized along East-West lines, took to the streets, fighting each other. Ultimately, around 100,000 Timorese from Dili became “internally displaced,” either returning to their home villages or moving into IDP camps scattered throughout the capital (Kingsbury & Leach 2007, 124).

The crisis brought attention to long-standing dissatisfaction with the Fretilin government and its Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri. In addition to being criticized for setting off the crisis, by firing the soldiers and then failing to quell the violence, the government was criticized for being corrupt, for being unresponsive and for failing to spend Timor’s oil revenues quickly enough\(^\text{39}\). Mass protests ensued (both Westerners and Easterners participated), calling for the resignation of Alkatiri. The President, Xanana,

\(^\text{38}\) Dili is located in the center of East Timor. The eastern half of Timor refers to the three districts east of Dili and is called “Lorosa’e” (land of the rising sun). The western half of Timor refers to the nine districts west of Dili and is called “Loromonu” (land of the setting sun). The tags probably originated from Timorese in Dili trying to identify outsiders in simplistic fashion, sometime during Portuguese times. Both sides consists of numerous “ethnic groups” and thus there is no natural “ethnic” divide between two groups.

\(^\text{39}\) Timor currently has 5.3 billion dollars in oil revenues from the underground oil in the Timor sea.
finally came in to fray, using his considerable symbolic power\footnote{The President in Timor does not have as much power as the Prime Minister. However, as the former head of Fretilin and then CNRT, Xanana has been held up as the nation’s greatest hero, akin to South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and thus has great symbolic power.} to force Alkatiri to step down (Xanana threatened to resign if Alkatiri did not). New elections were held in 2007. Xanana’s newly-formed party won the election, and Xanana was appointed Prime Minister; Ramos-Horta was elected President. While things have calmed down in Timor since the 2007 election, Timor is no longer seen as being immune to the problems faced by other postcolonial, post-conflict states.

Experts analyzed Timor’s multi-faceted crisis from every imaginable angle in the hopes of locating one central “cause” of the crisis. Some pointed to Timor’s “endemic poverty”\footnote{Timor is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and is heavily reliant on foreign aid. While creation of employment opportunities, business and industry was a priority of the first government, it struggled to manage the most basic social services. Malnutrition affects nearly half the population and infant and maternal mortality statistics are some of the worst in the world (Kingsbury & Leach 2007, 125).}; others focused on the unresolved traumas of the Indonesian era, heightened by the subsequent lack of international justice; others pointed to political factors, such as Timor’s weak institutions; others tried to figure out the roots of what appeared to be an “ethnic conflict” between Easterners and Westerners (Kingsbury & Leach 2007). Most of this analysis was valid. Yet besides for general comments that Timorese unity seemed to have fallen apart now that Timor’s common enemy, Indonesia, was gone, there was shockingly little discussion which attempted to link Timor’s rash of problems to the process whereby the Timorese had arrived at a shared national identity before independence, or to the problems and paradoxes inherent in the nationalist project more generally. In this section I refer back to Chatterjee’s theory, which posits that postcolonial polities often face problems upon gaining independence, due to two main
aspects of the nationalist project: its inherently exclusionary nature and its inherently
contradictory nature. I will use Chatterjee’s theory to try to shed light on the role of
Timor’s youth in the crisis, the East-West fighting, and the protests which ultimately led
to the downfall of Timor’s first government.

Writing about the inherently exclusionary nature of the nationalist project,
Chatterjee states that in post-independence India, the ideals of freedom, equality and
cultural refinement went hand in hand with “a set of dichotomies that systematically
excluded from the new life of the nation the vast masses of people whom the elite would
represent and lead, but who could never be culturally integrated with their leaders”
(Chatterjee 1993, 194). The violence of Timorese youth, one of the main elements of the
2006 crisis, can easily be seen as a reaction to feelings of, and actual exclusion from, the
new Timorese state. In 2001 the government made the decision to adopt Portuguese as
the official language of the country (Tetum was given the lesser status of national
language). Many of the older elites who returned to run the country post-independence
had been in exile during the Indonesian occupation in Portugal or other former
Portuguese colonies. These elites speak Portuguese (most had been educated in it), feel a
cultural affiliation to Portugal, and see Timorese national identity as being largely based
on its past ties with Portugal. They have no connection to Indonesia and do not speak the
language.

Yet only 10% of the Timorese population speaks Portuguese. A full 90% of those
under 35 speak Indonesian and would have much preferred Indonesian or Tetum to be
Timor’s official language. These youth have no real ties with Portugal, and do not believe
that Timor’s national identity is based primarily on its ties with Portugal. As a result of the government’s language policy, youth have had a very difficult time finding jobs. The result has been deep disillusionment among the young generation, expressed in feelings of being “tricked” (Crockford 2007, 80). As one youth put it: “The current leaders have decided that their own history is more valuable than ours, but we younger people, we fought for independence, too. How can we be turned into second-class citizens” (Beach 2007)?

The youth’s exclusion no doubt stung that much more, because of the central role youth had played in the clandestine movement, as the heroic and selfless inheritors of the Maubere legacy, fighting for their “paradise.” It was precisely their Indonesian language ability and familiarity with Indonesian – which was now being deemed worthless – which had placed them in this central role. In the sidelining of Timor’s youth from the new Timorese state, we see not only the exclusionary nature of nationalism, but also its contradictory nature: during the occupation, the youth were valued for their boldness, aggressiveness and hypermasculinity. Now, post-independence these very same qualities are seen as destabilizing and dangerous for the country: the militancy and boldness of Timor’s youth are traits which are no longer admired, but condemned. Youth have been heavily criticized for their violence in the 2006 crisis.

A reaction to fears of exclusion from the new Timorese state can also account for the core of the conflict: the East-West fighting, consisting primarily of Westerners attacking Easterners. During the occupation, most guerilla bases were in the East, due the

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42 Unemployment rates of youth at the time of the crisis have been estimated to fall anywhere from between 35% to over 90%.
East’s distance from Indonesian West Timor, and as well as its mountainous terrain. Most of the militias recruited to commit violence after the 1999 referendum, on the other hand, were from the West, due to the West’s proximity to Indonesia. After Timor’s independence, some Easterners began boasting that they had played a stronger role in the independence struggle than Westerners, putting Westerners down as cowards and militias: “Eastern Lorosa’e claimed to represent the resistance fighters [and] in contrast, the western-based Loromonu were stereotyped as the accomplices of the Indonesian occupation and as anti-independence militia members” (Trindade 2007, 12). As resistance to Indonesia is at the core of Timorese identity, with these boasts, Easterners were in effect claiming to be the only true Timorese: “the ‘true custodians’ of an independent East Timor” (Trindade 2007, 12). The Western soldiers’ protests against discrimination in the military by Easterners, and the widespread violence committed by Westerners after these soldiers were fired, can thus be seen to stem from Westerners’ legitimate fears of exclusion from the new state, based on their being deemed less “authentically Timorese” than Easterners.

Commentators writing about the East-West fighting speculated that there must have been a long-standing conflict between Easterners and Westerners (some argued that this was a “primordial ethnic conflict”; others argued that it was a result of colonial-divide-and rule tactics), which was subsumed during the Indonesian occupation when the Timorese stood united, but which naturally arose again once Timor’s common enemy was gone. I argue that this is not the case – that Timor’s unity during the occupation – built upon the logic of exclusion – was not what masked a long-standing division between the East and West, but instead, the very thing that produced/foretold it. As
Chatterjee explains, the formation of a hegemonic “national culture” was necessarily built upon the privileging of an “essential tradition,” which in turn was defined by a series of exclusions, which are reproduced post-independence. This thesis is borne out by a plethora of studies that have shown no evidence to suggest the two regions’ populations had ever had violent relations. The East-West division then, was not the revival of a long-standing ethnic or regional division, but rather a conflict over who was to be deemed a “true Timorese” in post-independence East Timor (and thus who would “reap the awards” of independence).

While the Timorese nationalist movement, like all nationalist movements, was based on a series of exclusions, as I have just discussed, I feel it is important to point out that due to the violence and repression of the Indonesian state, Timor’s nationalist movement was somewhat less exclusionary than other movements. Instead of being elite-driven, it was mostly violence and repression of the Indonesian regime that drove the mass of Timorese into the resistance movement. The violence and repression was so great – almost no family did not suffer the loss of at least one family member over the twenty-four years of Indonesian rule – as to create a leveling effect. No one was left out of the suffering that came to define Timoreseness. The resistance movement would not have succeeded without a majority of the population’s collusion; Timor would not have won independence without a majority of the population’s vote. Due to the unique inclusiveness of the Timorese nationalist movement pre-independence, the inevitable exclusions post-independence have been even more devastating (and devastating to a larger swath of the population), than in the typical post-colonial context. This reality no doubt also contributed to the 2006 crisis.
In addition to pointing out the exclusionary nature of nationalism, Chatterjee points out the inherently contradictory nature of the nationalist project, which in the outer sphere, seeks to institute and ramify the characteristically modern forms of disciplinary power, and accept ideas of the West and universal humanity; yet in the inner sphere, seeks to resist the modern institutions of disciplinary power, to reject the West and to stress particularity. The community which nationalism builds before independence in the “inner” realm, which opposes modern forms of disciplinary power, clashes with the modern, liberal democratic state which is adopted upon independence. The postcolonial clash between community and state which Chatterjee writes occurs in all postcolonial situations, was heightened in the case of Timor, due to the fact that resistance had come to be the central component of Timorese identity. To be Timorese was to resist the State. This logic helps explains the animosity of the Timorese towards their first government, and their (successful) attempt to bring the government down. Even though Fretilin had been the party of nationalist revolution, once it was in control of the state, it was by definition a target of the people’s opposition and an institution to be resisted by all means.

Commentators writing about the downfall of the Fretilin government tried to pinpoint the precise causes of the Timorese people’s anger towards the government. What exactly had the Fretilin government done that was so “wrong” as to merit such hostility from the population? In focusing on the specific Fretilin government, these commentators failed to examine how Timorese attitudes towards the general institution of the state had been shaped as a result of the nationalist formation process. They failed to note how Timorese resistance to the Timorese state was an inevitable result of the
nationalist-formation process that had brought the state into Timorese’s own hands in the first place. Only one report (based on interviews conducted throughout the country, and perhaps not coincidentally, written by Timorese as opposed to foreign commentators), seemed to fully grasp this point. In explaining the crisis, the authors of this report wrote:

The Western systems and values of democratic governance were adopted without a wider societal debate about the implications and consequences, which led to a sense of disconnection between the people and government. The [Timorese] mistrust the current government and perceive that the idea of the nation-state… is imposed on them just as the colonial system was. Respondents stated that the nation-state seems to benefit only the political elites (Trindade 2007, 14).

We have already seen one concrete clash between the community which was formed in Timor’s inner sphere, and the liberal, democratic state that was adopted upon independence, in the conflict between Timor’s youth and the state, after the state’s adoption of the Portuguese language policy. A second clash occurred between the Church and the state. Fretilin and the Church had worked together during the Indonesian occupation, despite Fretilin’s semi-Marxist ideology. Yet after Fretilin assumed its position at the head of the modern state, it no longer felt it had to compromise with the “community,” and tensions between the Church and Fretilin came to a head. In February 2005, the government made a decision to make religious education an unfunded after-school elective, rather than a compulsory part of the curriculum. In response, the Catholic Church organized a nineteen-day demonstration against the government’s stance, the largest public protests since independence. These protests (which ultimately led to the reversal of the decision and prompted the establishment of a consultative body comprised of government and religious organization members), were a major factor in the government’s eventual downfall.
Xanana became the new Prime Minister of East Timor in 2007. His government was forced to spend its first days in office resolving the fallout from the 2006 crisis. It focused on getting Timorese out of IDP camps and back to their homes (actions taken to facilitate this included providing amnesty for all criminals in the 2006 crisis and giving money to those whose houses were burned). More proactive attempts at creating national unity followed, included inviting traditional leaders to come to the capital, Dili, for talks; recognizing the importance of youth through the creation of a youth assembly; and spreading the message (on posters and murals) that “Timor ida deit” (“Timor is one”).

Yet, based on my research it appears that the government’s main strategy to promote national unity, has been to embrace its role as a “development state.” In 2008 the government increased its budget from the previous year by 126 percent (the new budget was so large it was actually ruled unconstitutional by the court of appeals and criticized by the World Bank). The goal seems to be to get Timor’s oil money out to the people, in the hopes that peace and unity will come when the Timorese finally receive some long-awaited material awards of independence. At the moment this strategy seems to be working: Dili in particular is full of new cars and shops and Timor’s first shopping mall is currently under construction. All of the IDPs have returned to their homes and things are peaceful. Yet Timor should be careful to heed Chatterjee's warnings regarding the pitfalls of the development state, which will not only continue to clash with the community which was created in Timor during the Indonesian occupation, but is a contradiction in and of itself, with its two irreconcilable goals of “promotion of economic growth” and “political representation.”
CONCLUSION

In this paper I asked two main theoretical questions. First, what were the shared features of nationalist formation among the former European colonies of Asia and Africa that won their independence in the Post-World War II era? Second, why have the former colonial states of Africa and Asia had such a hard time transitioning to independence? Is there a relation or connection between the manner in which they came to their national consciousnesses and their post-independence struggles or crises?

After reviewing the historic origins of nations, nationalisms and national consciousness in the first section, I turned, in the next section, to two theorists who have attempted to answer these questions, albeit from quite different angles: Benedict Anderson and Partha Chatterjee. Anderson defined the nation as an “imagined community” and pointed to five main factors that contributed to national consciousness in the former European colonies of Asia and Africa: the nineteenth century colonial state, which “dialectically engendered the grammar of the nationalisms that eventually arose to combat it” through the use of the census, the map and the museum; the ‘pilgrimages’ taken by functionaries and students; the colonial school system and the young, bilingual intelligentsias it produced; the “gaze of the colonial state”; and the availability of models of nationalisms from the Americas and Europe.

Chatterjee also defined the nation as an “imagined community,” but stressed that it was a community built in opposition to the Western colonial state, in an “inner,” “spiritual” sphere. Chatterjee argued that nationalism in the former colonies of Asia and Africa was not modeled on previous forms of Western nationalism as Anderson had asserted, but was predicated on difference with West. He placed emphasis on the split
consciousness of the middle class which controls the nationalist project, a project which is characterized by an appropriation of the popular and which is gendered. Moreover, Chatterjee, unlike Anderson, stressed the inherently contradictory and exclusionary nature of the nationalist project, helping to answer the second theoretical question I posed in this paper, regarding the problems faced by so many former colonies post-independence.

In the third section I applied both Anderson’s and Chatterjee’s theories to the case of East Timor, attempting to explain both the process of nationalist formation there, as well as the post-independent violence. The differences between the two theories resulted in different interpretations. In regards to nationalist formation, Anderson’s theory emphasized the effects of certain material factors, including access to previous models of nationalism, in the creation of a national Timorese identity; Chatterjee’s theory stressed the agency of Timorese nationalists and their production of an inner, cultural sphere, in opposition to an outer, material Indonesian sphere. Chatterjee’s theory served more clearly than Anderson’s to explain Timor’s post-independence violence.

Anderson and Chatterjee share a definition of the nation as an imagined community, but differ in their understanding of the process of imagining this community, at least as it occurs in the former European colonies. Most significantly, Anderson sees the nationalism of these former colonies as being based on an identity with the West, while Chatterjee sees it as being based on difference with the West. Anderson sees these nationalisms as but a step in the universal historical process of nationalism. He has a utopian view of what nationalism can accomplish. Chatterjee sees these nationalisms as a reaction to Western imperialism. He is more pessimistic about what anticolonial
nationalism will lead to. The difference between the views of Anderson and Chatterjee is significant not only because the two theories provide different understandings of the process of nationalist formation itself, but also because the two theories give different explanations as to why so many former colonies have had difficulties post-independence. If we accept Chatterjee’s theory that disorder in the former colonies is directly linked to the inherently contradictory nature of anti-colonial nationalism, we must give serious attention to discovering ways to ensure that the “new forms of the modern community” (Chatterjee 2006, 11) so courageously imagined into being in former colonies such as Timor, do not continue to be “overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial state” (2006, 11).
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